Datasets:

tvergho

/

DebateCards

like 0

d5e3d8c97709602ac2ac2132a1f3623f2cd26e5f0c51f5e05dd00256feeb8bcf

PC low---Biden’s Israel dilemma

Collinson 11-2-2023 (Stephen, “Israel aid drama is the latest failure of American governance,” CNN, America’s News)

the domestic political aftershocks of Israel’s war are an increasing problem for Biden progressives are critical of Israel’s tactics The debate over aid will drive Democratic tensions to the surface Biden has refused to publicly call on Israel to agree to a ceasefire The president is in a perilous political position among progressive s the president unveiled plans to counter Islamophobia The initiative could expose Biden to attacks from Republicans the conflict in the Middle East is leaving the president with a new set of tricky political hazards to navigate at home

the domestic political aftershocks of Israel’s war with Hamas are becoming an increasing problem for Biden prominent progressives are becoming more and more critical of Israel’s tactics The debate in the House chamber over the aid package for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government will drive Democratic tensions to the surface The president came face-to-face with such anger during a trip to Minnesota when a protester started chanting “ceasefire now Biden has refused to publicly call on Israel to agree to a ceasefire The president is in a perilous political position among progressive s who favor the Palestinians in swing states the president unveiled plans for a new strategy to counter Islamophobia The initiative could expose Biden to attacks from Republicans at a time when the country is being rocked by growing antisemitism the conflict in the Middle East is leaving the president with a new set of tricky political hazards to navigate at home

an increasing problem for Biden will drive Democratic tensions to the surface The president is in a perilous political position progressive s new set of tricky political hazards to navigate at home

['', '— While Republican schisms on foreign policy are getting most of the headlines, the domestic political aftershocks of Israel’s war with Hamas are becoming an increasing problem for Biden. Some prominent progressives are becoming more and more critical of Israel’s tactics in Gaza where hundreds of civilians have been killed in what Israel says are targeted raids against leaders of the Islamist militant group. The debate in the House chamber over the aid package for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government will drive Democratic tensions to the surface. The president came face-to-face with such anger during a trip to Minnesota on Wednesday when a protester who identified herself to reporters as Rabbi Jessica Rosenberg started chanting “ceasefire now.” Biden explained that he favored a humanitarian pause in Israeli operations to allow time for the release of hostages in Gaza and said he understood the “emotion.” But he has refused to publicly call on Israel to agree to a ceasefire with Hamas, reasoning that it has a right to defend itself after the October 7 terrorist attacks that killed 1,400 people in Israel, most of them civilians. The president is in a perilous political position a year ahead of the election, and can ill afford low turnout among progressive and Muslim voters who favor the Palestinians in swing states like Michigan. In an apparent sign the White House understands the potential political risks, the president unveiled plans for a new strategy to counter Islamophobia in the United States Wednesday. The initiative could expose Biden to attacks from Republicans at a time when the country is being rocked by growing antisemitism. But the conflict in the Middle East is leaving the president with a new set of tricky political hazards to navigate at home.']

[(0, 14)]

ndtceda

Kansas-MaPa-Aff-4---Wake-Round-6.docx

Kansas

MaPa

885cb08439a64ac1cc3f39e17ff7323e347c5e2c5e1ea66a110a5f90d4efaad9

That’s easily implementable using current doctrines---like modifying property law and public trust.

Laura Spitz and Eduardo M. Penalver 21, Spitz is Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law (on leave), and Professor of Law, Thompson Rivers University, Penalver is Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, “Article: Nature's Personhood And Property's Virtues,” 45 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 67, 2021, lexis.

nature as a person fails to apprehend valuable tools within property law for conservation Property owners owe responsibilities to others private land is limited by rights of neighbors and future gen s imposes obligations to use property in ways that do not harm neighbors' correlative rights to the use and enjoyment of their own property they may not be able to take actions that harm future owners such as removing natural resources property can become a vehicle for transmitting values that can foster sustainability Unlike rights of nature this views wise land use as aligned with human interests public trust provide another vehicle recognizes resources as common heritage of humankind in whose long-term interest the state has a special obligation to manage The interests doctrine can consider are numerous district court held open possibility for application in climate change

The work personhood may be asked to do is rhetorical . This work aims to decenter human interests, reorient human relationships with the nonhuman natural world, and maybe even participate in the arduous process of producing a cultural shift in interpretative approaches to existing statutory and common law doctrines scholars acknowledge the symbolic and "reframing" functions of personhood, On the other hand, it seems equally possible that speaking of nature as a person whose interests are different from those of human beings could lead to even worse decision-making by presenting the preservation of natural resources as adverse to human interests or as simply one interest among many to be considered and safely discounted Claims about the impact of rhetoric are very hard to evaluate human beings' relationships to natural resources would be more effectively reoriented by showing how the wise stewardship and preservation of natural resources aligns with human beings' true interests rejection of property fails to apprehend the many valuable tools within property law for fostering a culture of conservation and stewardship . Property owners owe far more responsibilities to others ," he explains, "than the conventional imagery of property rights suggests ." property is more accurately understood as a legal vocabulary for the contestation and resolution of human beings' conflicting interests in finite and scarce resources Understood in this way, environmental regulations are part of the extended law of property rather than external to it or reflective of wholly unrelated values Property can be public or private , individual , or shared . Even a parcel of private , individually owned land is limited by the correlative rights of others And it can be encumbered by servitudes reflecting the entitlements of neighbors and the interests of future gen eration s The constraints and obligations that operate within the law of private ownership are too numerous to list in an exhaustive way. The law of nuisance imposes reciprocal obligations on landowners to use their private property in ways that do not harm their neighbors' correlative rights to the use and enjoyment of their own property they may not be able to take actions that harm the interests of those future owners , such as removing natural resources from the property mistake leads commentators to reject the notion of property as inherently exploitative without considering the community-strengthening possibilities of, for example, public or shared ownership On the right, so-called "free market environmentalists" make the converse mistake when they argue that private landownership readily aligns the financial incentives of owners with the long-term stewardship of their land Scholars in the Progressive Property movement have adopted such a broad approach, pushing back against the tendency by both environmentalists and their adversaries, to equate property with unconstrained private prerogative and unregulated markets Viewed from a thicker conception of the rights and duties of "owners," one that is faithful to the roots of our own legal system, but also reflected in many other legal cultures , property can become a vehicle for transmitting values that can help to foster a culture of sustainability and respect for natural systems Unlike the rights of nature " approach however this is not an approach that pits human beings against nature in a zero sum contest . Rather, it views wise land use as aligned with human beings' interests in thriving and flourishing . Historically, doctrines like nuisance law and the law of servitudes helped to mitigate and coordinate the local impacts of owners' decisions . The common law of riparian ownership limited owners to limited uses of neighboring waterways that do not impair the waterway itself or otherwise infringe on the correlative property rights of other riparian owners and users Guided by private and public constraints on their ability to exploit the land in ways that harm others, owners who reflect the virtue of humility with respect to their impact on the land can become a powerful ally of both natural systems as well as future generations. Among the property tools with potential to bring the interests of human beings and nature into closer long-term alignment, the ancient doctrine of " trust " and--more specifically--the doctrine of " public trust provide another possible vehicle for managing intergenerational interests . recognizes certain resources such as water and its attendant ecosystems-- as the common heritage of humankind , in whose long-term interest the state has a special obligation to manage those resources. As one court has put it: The duties imposed upon the state [as steward of resources subject to the public trust doctrine are] the duties of a trustee and not simply the duties of a good business manager The beneficiaries of the public trust are not just present generations but those to come . T Although the application of the public trust doctrine has largely been limited to waters there is no conceptual reason why this must continue to be the case. The interests and values the doctrine can consider are numerous . More recently, a U.S. district court held open the possibility for application of the public trust doctrine to the federal government in the context of global climate change . In Juliana v. United States a group of minors brought a claim against the United States and various federal officers, arguing in part that the defendants violated their obligations under the public trust doctrine by knowingly ignoring the impacts of continued fossil fuel consumption the plaintiffs' public trust claims survived not only a motion to dismiss, but also a motion for judgment and a motion for summary judgment

rhetorical reorient human relationships cultural shift symbolic "reframing" equally possible person different human beings worse decision-making adverse one interest many considered safely discounted very hard to evaluate more effectively reoriented wise stewardship preservation human beings' true interests valuable tools property law culture of conservation stewardship far more responsibilities others conventional imagery suggests legal vocabulary conflicting interests finite scarce resources extended law property external unrelated values public private individual shared limited correlative rights of others encumbered neighbors future gen eration s constraints obligations too numerous to list nuisance reciprocal obligations harm neighbors' rights use enjoyment own property future owners removing natural resources reject property inherently exploitative community-strengthening possibilities public shared ownership property unconstrained private prerogative unregulated markets thicker conception rights duties faithful roots other legal cultures vehicle transmitting values culture of sustainability respect for natural systems rights of nature " approach not pits human beings against nature zero sum contest aligned human beings' interests thriving flourishing nuisance law law of servitudes mitigate coordinate local impacts owners' decisions limited uses of neighboring waterways correlative property rights trust public trust intergenerational interests certain resources common heritage of humankind long-term interest special obligation manage trustee those to come limited waters no conceptual reason continue interests values numerous held open public trust doctrine global climate change .

['C. Rhetorical Work', 'The third kind of work personhood may be asked to do is rhetorical. This work aims to decenter human interests, reorient human relationships with the nonhuman natural world, and maybe even participate in the arduous process of producing a cultural shift in interpretative approaches to existing statutory and common law doctrines. In the international examples referenced by the Colorado River plaintiff, scholars and jurists acknowledge the symbolic and "reframing" functions of personhood, at least in the sense of reframing relationships between people, government, and the land. In seeking to reframe their claims along these lines, advocates may be engaging in what scholars of social movements call "frame alignment" or "frame bridging"--that is, seeking to make connections with, and leverage the power of, other successful movements by employing similar discursive strategies. 117', 'Perhaps making arguments about nature\'s personhood will have the kinds of dramatic impacts on human decision-making that advocates claim. On the other hand, it seems equally possible that speaking of nature as a person--a person whose interests are different from those of human beings--could lead to even worse decision-making by presenting the preservation of natural resources as adverse to human interests or as simply one interest among many to be considered and safely discounted. 118Claims about the impact of rhetoric are very hard to evaluate in any context, and especially in the context of American environmental law. We believe that human beings\' relationships to natural resources would be more effectively reoriented by showing how the wise stewardship and preservation of natural resources aligns with human beings\' true interests. The Colorado River plaintiff says as much when they argue in favor of recognizing the personhood of nature by analogy to the legal recognition of corporate personhood. Calling the relationship between human beings and nature "symbiotic," the plaintiff argued that "ecosystems are living, and that human life is inextricably intertwined with, and dependent upon, ecosystems." 119', 'But the rhetoric of "property" is far less hostile to wise stewardship than the Colorado River plaintiff implied. The Colorado River plaintiff argued that "the dominance of a culture that defines nature as property enables its destruction." 120The Colorado River plaintiff argued that environmental laws that accept the status of nature as property necessarily and "merely regulate the rate at which the natural environment is exploited." 121In our view, however, this argument rests on an overly simplistic understanding of the nature and function of "property" within our common law legal system. As a consequence, this rejection of property fails to apprehend the many valuable tools within property law for fostering a culture of conservation and stewardship.', 'Far from representing the kind of Blackstonian "sole and despotic dominion" 122of owners that the Colorado River plaintiff associated with the institution of property, property concepts are more capacious. 123This is not to deny that the Blackstonian concept of ownership has exerted a powerful influence over the American imagination. As Greg Alexander and many others have observed, the notion of property as commodity has been the dominant strain of American property discourse since the country\'s founding. 124Despite its rhetorical power this understanding has always been contested by a more socially constrained account of ownership as entailing obligation and "propriety." 125As Alexander has put it, the Blackstonian account of property ownership is "highly misleading." 126"Property owners owe far more responsibilities to others," he explains, "than the conventional imagery of property rights suggests." 127', 'Rather than reflecting a worldview of relentless exploitation and domination, property is more accurately understood as a legal vocabulary for the contestation and resolution of human beings\' conflicting interests in finite and scarce resources. Understood in this way, environmental regulations are part of the extended law of property, rather than external to it or reflective of wholly unrelated values. 128A system of "private property" is one that provides a set of "rules governing access to and control of material resources" that are "organized around the idea that resources are on the whole separate objects each assigned and therefore belonging to some particular individual." 129But "private" property is just one property possibility among many others, and Blackstonian dominion is just one possible way of understanding private ownership, one that has never been reflected in the common law of property. 130', 'Property can be public or private, individual, or shared. Even a parcel of private, individually owned land is limited by the correlative rights of others. And it can be encumbered by servitudes reflecting the entitlements of neighbors and the interests of future generations. The constraints and obligations that operate within the law of private ownership are too numerous to list in an exhaustive way. The law of nuisance imposes reciprocal obligations on landowners to use their private property in ways that do not harm their neighbors\' correlative rights to the use and enjoyment of their own property. 131Tens of millions of homeowners own their homes subject to elaborate and extensive servitudes that limit their freedom to use or alter their property in ways that their neighbors might find distasteful or obnoxious. 132Owners of property subject to future interests owe obligations to the holders of those interests. For example, they may not be able to take actions that harm the interests of those future owners, such as removing natural resources from the property. 133So-called "conservation easements" deploy the private property device of the servitude to require landowners to permanently preserve lands with unique ecological, aesthetic, or historic value. 134', 'When it comes to protecting natural resources, the Colorado River plaintiff\'s rejection of "property" as a vehicle for accomplishing that goal makes the double mistake of employing a caricatured understanding of ownership as private ownership and private ownership as Blackstonian dominion. This mistake is common on both the left and the right ends of political and legal discourse. On the far left, this mistake leads commentators to reject the notion of property as inherently exploitative without considering the community-strengthening possibilities of, for example, public or shared ownership. 135On the right, so-called "free market environmentalists" make the converse mistake when they argue that private landownership readily aligns the financial incentives of owners with the long-term stewardship of their land. 136This view derives some support from examples of situations in which owners\' self-interest aligns with the goals of environmental conservation. 137But the problem of spatial and inter-temporal externalities, not to mention profit-minded owners\' tendency to focus narrowly on market-tradeable values, makes an unconstrained reliance on owners\' profit-motives a risky and incomplete strategy for environmental protection. 138', 'Dismissing private ownership altogether or, on the other hand, simply equating the decisions of private owners with wise land use reinforces some of the worst stereotypes of "property" rhetoric. But a broader perspective on the varieties of available "property" regimes, and a more accurate account of the qualified nature of property rights within our common law system, reveals the potential to reconcile the interests of "property" and nature. Scholars in the Progressive Property movement have adopted such a broad approach, pushing back against the tendency by both environmentalists and their adversaries, to equate "property" with unconstrained private prerogative and unregulated markets. Viewed from a thicker conception of the rights and duties of "owners," one that is faithful to the roots of our own legal system, but also reflected in many other legal cultures, property can become a vehicle for transmitting values that can help to foster a culture of sustainability and respect for natural systems. 139Unlike the "rights of nature" approach advocated by the Colorado River plaintiff, however, this is not an approach that pits human beings against nature in a zero sum contest. Rather, it views wise land use as aligned with human beings\' interests in thriving and flourishing.', "Like more market-oriented defenders of property rights (and unlike anti-property voices on the left), the Progressive Property approach has the conceptual tools to take seriously the value of private ownership as a vehicle for coordinating economically productive behavior and for yoking owners' self-interest to society's interest in that production. 140At the same time, its recognition of values beyond the market enables it to take seriously the externalities that can lead private owners to make decisions about land and natural resources that are rational in narrow market terms, but nevertheless harmful, all things considered.", 'Among these possible externalities, the most intractable for narrowly market-based approaches are those that involve the intergenerational consequences of today\'s landowners. The notion that land has a "memory," that today\'s land use decisions echo far into the future, creates a genuine problem of intergenerational conflicting interests within a system of property. 141But, contrary to the arguments of the Colorado River plaintiff, this is a conflict that is well known and capable of being addressed by the rhetorical and substantive legal tools of property law (understood to include both the private law of property and the owner-constraining public law matrix within which that private law is situated).', 'One of us has argued previously that, properly understood and encouraged by appropriate land use regulation, even private land ownership can help owners develop the virtue of humility (literally, a closeness to the Earth) regarding their impact on the land 142:', 'Expressing humility in our land-use decisions does not mean that we should never alter the landscape around us, but it does suggest that we would be wise to err on the side of caution and comprehensiveness in our decision making about land. Consequently, the virtue seems to lend itself to a precautionary approach to land-use decisions. Although it comes in a variety of shapes and sizes, in most guises the precautionary principle is understood to recommend special sensitivity even to relatively small or uncertain risks of irreversible harms. 143', "Historically, doctrines like nuisance law and the law of servitudes helped to mitigate and coordinate the local impacts of owners' decisions. The common law of riparian ownership limited owners to limited uses of neighboring waterways that do not impair the waterway itself or otherwise infringe on the correlative property rights of other riparian owners and users. 144More recently, the public regulation of private landowners at local, state, and federal levels--both to coordinate conflicting land uses and to protect sensitive lands--extends the harm-preventing and coordinating functions of these common law doctrines and refutes (at least as a descriptive matter) the caricature of ownership as absolute dominion. Guided by private and public constraints on their ability to exploit the land in ways that harm others, owners who reflect the virtue of humility with respect to their impact on the land can become a powerful ally of both natural systems as well as future generations.", 'Among the property tools with potential to bring the interests of human beings (considered over the long term) and nature into closer long-term alignment, the ancient doctrine of "trust" and--more specifically--the doctrine of "public trust" provide another possible vehicle for managing intergenerational interests. In his landmark 1970 article, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law, Joseph Sax revived interest in that ancient doctrine, which traces its roots into Roman law, as a vehicle for intergenerational stewardship of natural resources. 145The doctrine recognizes certain resources--such as water and its attendant ecosystems--as the common heritage of humankind, in whose long-term interest the state has a special obligation to manage those resources. 146As one court has put it:', '"The duties imposed upon the state [as steward of resources subject to the public trust doctrine are] the duties of a trustee and not simply the duties of a good business manager." Just as private trustees are judicially accountable to their beneficiaries for dispositions of the res, so the legislative and executive branches are judicially accountable for the dispositions of the public trust. The beneficiaries of the public trust are not just present generations but those to come. The check and balance of judicial review provides a level of protection against improvident dissipation of an irreplaceable res. 147', "Although the application of the public trust doctrine has largely been limited to waters, there is no conceptual reason why this must continue to be the case. 148The interests and values the doctrine can consider are numerous. Sax discusses an important 2000 Hawaii case in which the Hawaiian Supreme Court required the restoration of the natural flow of waters down a mountainside, taking into account both the ecological harm of diverting the water, as well as traditional Native Hawaiian understandings of the appropriate uses of those flows. 149In her survey of western states' public trust doctrines, Robin Kundis Craig observes that California courts have extended public trust concepts to aquatic wildlife and their habitats. 150", 'More recently, a U.S. district court held open the possibility for application of the public trust doctrine to the federal government in the context of global climate change. In Juliana v. United States, 151a group of minors brought a claim against the United States and various federal officers, arguing in part that the defendants violated their obligations under the public trust doctrine by knowingly ignoring the impacts of continued fossil fuel consumption. In the district court, the plaintiffs\' public trust claims survived not only a motion to dismiss, but also a motion for judgment on the pleadings and a motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the court held that (1) it did not need to determine whether the public trust doctrine applied to the atmosphere at the summary judgment stage in the litigation because the plaintiffs\' claim was also based on public trust violations in connection with the territorial sea; 152(2) the case law did not foreclose the public trust doctrine from applying to the federal government; 153(3) public trust claims were uniquely linked to the fundamental attributes of sovereignty and thus not displaced by statutory law; 154and (4) the plaintiffs could properly bring their public trust claim in federal court because it was a substantive due process claim regarding the plaintiffs\' fundamental rights. 155"This lawsuit may be groundbreaking, but that fact does not alter the legal standards governing the motions to dismiss." 156']

[(6, 15), (27, 38), (38, 39)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-DeWe-Neg-Georgetown-Round-4.docx

Northwestern

DeWe

bfe5c21285a12f48a53a8cbca5183ef41a55d84cc91301533b0638f3d06798e9

Social death is a constant everywhere war on Blackness enabled by the ethical positioning of Black life as vulnerable.

Castro, 21—assistant professor of political science at the University of Massachusetts Boston (Andrés Fabián Henao, “Ontological Captivity: Toward a Black Radical Deconstruction of Being,” differences (2021) 32 (3): 85–113, dml)

totalitarianism can be distinguished in logics of elimination and exclusion Black people are lost to extrajudicial killings and subjected to accelerated slow death that do not register as losses for the Symbolic order Death drops below the threshold of the human and comes to define which losses are human and which can be violated postmortem anti-Black violence comes to naturalize life in hell The ability to naturalize a form of death otherwise only experienced in war dispossesses the damné of an ontogenetic death When war comes to be the overwhelming reality of existence death becomes social onticide registers nonbeing as availableness Racial capitalism not only forces Black people to be available for use but plasticizes their flesh to remain available Captivity makes alterity impossible the captive body transforms any relation into instrumental domination

we face the coloniality of being Any ontology is made impossible in a colonized society the color line that fixes the body in the condition of being the problem turns it into the first cage by which the world is kept away totalitarianism can already be distinguished in the capacity of settler colonial capitalist logics of elimination and exclusion to dehumanize natives and aliens territorial alienation to which native African populations were subjected prepared the ground for their future superfluousness Black people were subjected to social death Black people are lost to extrajudicial killings by the police and subjected to accelerated rates of slow death via mass incarceration among other forms of new Jim Crow segregation that do not register as losses for the Symbolic order of the settler colony Death drops below the threshold of the human and comes to define which losses are recognizably human and thus collectively grievable and which can continue to be violated even postmortem anti-Black violence comes to naturalize render stable and longstanding an otherwise undeclared war Damnation life in hell constitute a reality characterized by the naturalization of war by means of the naturalization of slavery now justified in relation to race The ability of slavery to naturalize a form of death otherwise only experienced in war to guarantee the continuation of war by other means dispossesses the damné of an ontogenetic death When the extraordinary death of war comes to be lived as the overwhelming reality of ordinary existence under slavery’s aftermath death becomes social Warren’s notion of onticide registers the nonbeing that colonialism forces on Black people when the settler colonial logic of exclusion reduces them to a fungible commodity Warren conceptualizes the fungibility of the object recast in ontological terms as availableness a mode of existence dominated by internecine use and function Jackson argues Racial capitalism not only forces Black people to be available for other people’s use but plasticizes their flesh to pluralize those uses for which they must also remain available Captivity makes alterity impossible as the difference that racial capitalism forces on the captive body transforms any relation between a self and another into an instrumental relation of domination there is no expectation of a response nor any face to engage there is only availability and plasticity to endlessly instrumentalize

coloniality of being impossible first cage kept away totalitarianism settler colonial capitalist logics of elimination exclusion future superfluousness social death extrajudicial killings accelerated rates of slow death do not register as losses below the threshold define recognizably human continue to be violated naturalize stable longstanding war Damnation life in hell reality war slavery race otherwise only experienced in war guarantee dispossesses ontogenetic death overwhelming reality social onticide nonbeing fungible commodity availableness dominated available plasticizes pluralize makes alterity impossible transforms instrumental relation of domination no expectation endlessly instrumentalize

['From Du Bois’s body “turned asunder” to Frantz Fanon’s body “spread-eagled, disjointed, redone, and draped in mourning,” we face what Maldonado-Torres has called “the coloniality of being,” Warren has referred to as “onticide,” and Jackson conceptualizes as “ontologized plasticity.”11 “Any ontology,” Fanon argued, “is made impossible in a colonized and acculturated society” (Black 89). One’s socially marked body does not articulate a differential way of experiencing the world; rather, the color line that fixes the body in the condition of being the problem turns it into the first cage, one by which the world is kept away, apart from the self. Hannah Arendt analyzed such dehumanizing worldlessness through the concepts of uprootedness and superfluousness, but she misplaced these conditions of colonial history in the totalitarian power of Nazi Germany (475). The uprootedness, that is, not having a place in the world, and superfluousness, that is, not belonging to the world, by which Arendt distinguished totalitarianism from tyranny can already be distinguished in the capacity of settler colonial capitalist logics of elimination and exclusion to dehumanize natives and aliens. The territorial alienation to which native African populations were subjected, when they were literally uprooted from their communities of origin and put first into dungeons and then into slave ships, prepared the ground for their future superfluousness. Enslaved, Black people were subjected to social death, which Patterson defines as “the permanent, violent domination of natally alienated and generally dishonored persons” (13). Socially dead, Black people are lost to extrajudicial killings by the police and subjected to accelerated rates of slow death via mass incarceration, among other forms of new Jim Crow segregation, that do not register as losses for the Symbolic order of the settler colony. Death drops below the threshold of the human and comes to define which losses are recognizably human, and thus collectively grievable, and which can continue to be violated even postmortem.', 'Although he defined it as the problem of the twentieth century, Du Bois did not present the problem of the color line as an ontological question, unlike, for instance, Nahum Chandler in X—The Problem of the Negro as a Problem for Thought (2014). In The Souls of Black Folk, the color line remains a problem of recognition, more cogito than Dasein, more double consciousness than nonbeing. But Du Bois’s emphasis on the problem gives the key to the existential turn in Black studies (see Gordon, Existence). From Fanon’s zone of nonbeing to Lewis Gordon’s anti-Black violence, understanding the problem as the ability of the body to ask questions—the prayer with which Fanon ends Black Skins, White Masks (1952)—situates colonial violence at the level of ontology (Gordon, Bad Faith). Gordon thus recognizes his debt to Du Bois when he claims that Du Bois first understood the color line as a way to distinguish groups of people who “are studied as problems instead of as people with problems” (“Problematic” 124). Problematic people do not pursue, unfold, or project through the active thinking or becoming that an engagement with problems affords them. Rather, by being made into problems, they are pursued, fixed, and held captive. As Achille Mbembe summarizes it, Black people are “trapped in a lesser form of being” (17).', 'From an Ethical to a Political Critique of Being ', 'No one has given such analytic depth to the understanding of the coloniality of being as Maldonado-Torres. Undoubtedly influenced by Gordon, given their similar investments in phenomenology, Heidegger, and Fanon, Maldonado-Torres focuses on the Latin American tradition of decolonial theory. Turning especially to the work of Sylvia Wynter to rethink anti-Black violence in the context of the coloniality of power (Wynter), Maldonado-Torres distinguishes coloniality, a term first introduced by Aníbal Quijano, from colonialism in that coloniality “refers to long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, labor, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations” (243). Among those patterns of power, the naturalization of slavery holds a unique status, as slavery comes to naturalize, that is to say, render stable and longstanding, an otherwise undeclared war. As Maldonado-Torres puts it, in a definition that I would argue translates Patterson’s concept of social death into the philosophical vocabulary of ontology: “Damnation, life in hell, refers here to modern forms of colonialism which constitute a reality characterized by the naturalization of war by means of the naturalization of slavery, now justified in relation to the very physical and ontological constitution of people—by virtue of ‘race’—and not to their faith or belief” (247). The damné (an allusion to Fanon’s Les damnés de la terre, [the wretched of the earth]) are no ordinary Daseins. The ability of slavery to naturalize a form of death otherwise only experienced in war, to guarantee the continuation of war by other means (to play on Michel Foucault’s own play on Carl von Clausewitz), dispossesses the damné of an ontogenetic death. When war is all there is, death, as Maldonado-Torres argues, “is not so much an individualizing factor as a constitutive feature of reality”; death can be said to arrive “always too late, as it were, since death is already beside [the damné]” (251). Death, in other words, is what colonialism so radically modifies when it turns ordinary the otherwise “extraordinary event of confronting mortality” (255). When the extraordinary death of war comes to be lived as the overwhelming reality of ordinary existence under chattel slavery and slavery’s aftermath, death changes so radically that it becomes paradoxically “social.”', 'But is the damné, as Maldonado-Torres concludes when contrasting this figure with the European Dasein, simply “the being who is ‘not there’ ” (253)? Would it not be more adequate to say that the damné is the being who is held captive “there”? How to confront the fact that the da, the “there” that grants Being an ontogenetic space for difference to become otherwise, is the same da that holds the becoming of the damné in perpetual check? There is no “there,” after all, that has not already been enclosed by racial capitalism. We are all, in other words, affected by this history, even if we are all affected differently: not all of us are equally constructed as damné.', 'Fanon would have put it differently. In my view, he would have claimed not that the damné is “the being who is ‘not there,’ ” but that it is the being who is there in the form of nonbeing. The settler house-habitat-polis is materially built to house the human who can dwell by holding captive the Indigenous native and the Black alien whose “dark hands” must labor for the captor, for the captor’s enlarged Being, for the captor’s ability to ask questions from the comfortable remove of their protective privative fences. The coloniality of being, in my view, needs a more radical confrontation with the settler colonial dispossession of da that spatializes the temporality of Being’s unfolding. It is not that the damné is not there, but that the whole of “there” has been enclosed, fenced, not only expropriated and reappropriated but subjected to a private proprietorial relationship that slowly but steadily extinguishes any possibility for a commons. If Being can only take place within already confined spaces, we are not all subjected to the same forms of confinement, nor are all spaces confined in the same way—including the body as perhaps the space par excellence of Being’s motion and the first racial capitalist prison cell of ontological difference.', 'Warren’s notion of onticide registers the nonbeing that colonialism forces on Black people when the settler colonial logic of exclusion reduces them to a fungible commodity. Enclosed in the commodity form, that is to say, radically transformed into an object, the Negro is not the “being who is ‘not there,’ ” but “the quintessential tool Dasein uses” to experience and establish “the facticity of its thrownness in the world” (Warren, Ontological 8). In the tool-like character of Warren’s description, one can hear the echo of Spillers’s “being for the captor,” the resonance of Césaire’s equation of colonialism with “thingification” (Discourse 42), and Fanon’s account of his experience of a “suffocating reification” when he is turned into “an object among objects” (Black 89). Warren conceptualizes the fungibility of the object, recast in ontological terms, as “availableness,” that is to say, as “a mode of existence dominated by internecine use and function” (Ontological 45). Jackson, by contrast, prefers the vocabulary of plasticity, as ontological captivity does not merely confine what does not preexist capture but comes to plasticize the flesh that it holds captive to pluralize its uses. Plasticity, Jackson argues, “is a mode of transmogrification whereby the fleshy being of blackness is experimented with as if it were infinitely malleable lexical and biological matter, such that blackness is produced as sub/super/human at once, a form where form shall not hold: potentially ‘everything and nothing’ at the register of ontology” (3).12 Racial capitalism not only forces Black people to be available for other people’s use but plasticizes their flesh to pluralize those uses, uses for which they must also remain available. While Jackson and Warren are not saying the same thing, their ways of understanding what it means to be for the captor complement each other.', 'In confronting such “availableness” and the “plasticization” that it presupposes, Warren finds Levinas’s ethical framework insufficient (Ontological 197n29). Warren thus parts ways with Maldonado-Torres insofar as ethics presupposes an insufficiently interrogated political relation. Plasticity and availableness both describe an instrumental relation that makes it impossible for Black people to be for the other, as they are not for the “other,” but for the captor. Captivity, to put it differently, makes alterity impossible, as the difference that racial capitalism forces on the captive body (what Fanon refers to as the racial schema that comes to overdetermine the body schema) transforms any relation between a self and another into an instrumental relation of domination. The captive is not just another version of the “other,” as there is no expectation of a response nor any face to engage; there is only availability and plasticity to endlessly instrumentalize.']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Michigan-HaRa-Neg-2-Kentucky-Round-6.docx

Michigan

HaRa

73224a749bc21587ef37a3848cf8727e215aa819d4aea07e957db0901333ba02

Baltics invasion is existential.

Welton 22 - (George O. Welton: United States Air Force, Advised by *Boris Shif: Chief, ISR Engagements Division United States Air Force; January 2022, Air University Advanced Research, "Russia Invades the Baltic States: How and Why NATO Must Liberate the Region," doa: 3-20-2024) url: https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ISR/student-papers/AY22-23/RUSSIAINVADESTHEBALTICSTATESComplete_Welton.pdf

If Russia invade the Baltics NATO could collapse along with foundations of Western security for 70 years . effectiveness would erode cred would be lost nations could begin competing to become the guarantor of security . Baltics are vulnerable balance of power is towards Russia . invasion accomplished rapidly . NATO would be heavily reliant on flying or shipping in reinforcements . Kaliningrad hosts the most effective IADS in the world . c an deny access and thwart airpower . Belarus NATO’s choke point offered to host Russian nuc s . threat of a nuclear strike is real in “ e to d .” changes the calculus of NATO Europe become the site of nuclear war

If Russia is able to invade , occupy, and hold the Baltics NATO itself could collapse along with the foundations of Western security for the last 70 years . this is a goal of Putin. The principle of collective defense is the bedrock of NATO and is enshrined in Article V Alliance members are obligated to collectively defend Russian forces occupying the Baltic states is in direct contradiction to the North Atlantic Treaty If NATO were to collapse , the collective economic and military strength its members currently enjoy over Russia would be gone leaving a power vacuum in Europe for Russia to step into other Eastern European countries with little resistance. Even if NATO did not disintegrate following unsuccessful attempts to liberate the Baltics, its effectiveness at maintaining European security would be erode d . prosperity would decline due to new worries of NATO’s ability and willingness to defend members. cred ibility of NATO would be lost and Russia will achieve its goal of disrupting security arrangements. organizations or nations could begin competing with NATO, and hence the US, to become the guarantor of security . The mission to liberate the Baltic states from Russian invasion is no easy task . The Baltics are NATO’s most vulnerable territory and the balance of power in the region is heavily tilted towards Russia . A Russian invasion would be accomplished rapidly leaving the Alliance with limited response options . critical issues are Russia’s geographic advantage in the conflict (proximity to the Baltics, Kaliningrad, Belarus); NATO would be heavily reliant on flying or shipping in reinforcements . Another geographic advantage is Kaliningrad a great counterbalance for Russia to the military threat posed by NATO. Kaliningrad hosts what may be the most effective Integrated Air Defense System ( IADS ) in the world . capabilities located in Kaliningrad “ c an deny NATO access to the Baltic states and slow, if not thwart US and NATO airpower should either respond to a Russian attack against the Baltic states . a critical piece of Russia’s defense against any NATO operation and provides air superiority operations should at least be to bring down Kaliningrad’s IADS and enable freedom of movement for NATO forces from the rest of Europe to the east. Another piece of Russia’s geographic advantage is Belarus . Belarus and Russia are close allies based on shared history and formal creation of the “Union State” In a conflict in the Baltics, Belarus would play host to Russian forces . Belarus borders two NATO members and sits on the east side of the Suwalki Corridor and connects Poland with Lithuania becoming the only land link from central Europe to the Baltics. This is NATO’s “ most vulnerable choke point ” and provides an opportunity for Russia to “ incapacitate NATO as a security provider for Baltic members.” Belarus has offered to host Russian nuc lear weapon s . threat of a nuclear strike by Russia in a regional conflict, such as the Baltics , is real . Russia maintains the option to use nuclear weapons in a first-strike capacity to coerce an adversary to agree to its terms in a strategy of “ e scalate to d e-escalate .” NATO members maintain nuclear forces under the umbrella of NATO that include strategic assets as well as tactical nuclear weapons. Russia’s ability to stage and potentially launch nuclear weapons from Belarus changes the calculus of NATO and US planners use of nuclear weapons, especially if deployment of nuclear weapons to Belarus materializes and becomes public knowledge . Europe become the site of nuclear war

collapse foundations of Western security for 70 years bedrock Article V collectively defend collapse step into other Eastern European disintegrate erode decline cred lost nations could begin competing guarantor of security no easy task Baltics vulnerable territory heavily tilted towards Russia limited options geographic advantage heavily flying shipping Kaliningrad most effective Integrated Air Defense System ( IADS ) in the world deny access thwart airpower superiority bring down Kaliningrad’s IADS enable freedom of movement Belarus close allies host Russian forces most vulnerable choke point incapacitate NATO security provider nuc s Baltics real first-strike capacity coerce an adversary e to d umbrella changes the calculus public knowledge nuclear war

['', 'If Russia is able to invade, occupy, and hold the Baltics while fending off a NATO counter-attack, NATO itself could collapse along with the foundations of Western security for the last 70 years.3 While this effect may seem extreme, it is not completely unrealistic and is a goal of Vladimir Putin. 4 The principle of collective defense is the bedrock of NATO and is enshrined in the Alliance’s founding treaty as Article V: “…an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all…” which allows members to use “armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”5 This means that if attacked, the Alliance members are obligated to collectively defend the attacked member and restore its security. Russian forces occupying the Baltic states is in direct contradiction to the North Atlantic Treaty and their continued occupation would invalidate NATO’s purpose for existing. If NATO were to collapse, the collective economic and military strength its members currently enjoy over Russia would be gone leaving a power vacuum in Europe for Russia to step into other Eastern European countries with little resistance.', 'Even if NATO did not disintegrate following unsuccessful attempts to liberate the Baltics, its effectiveness at maintaining European security would be eroded. US and European prosperity would decline due to new worries of NATO’s ability and willingness to defend its members. The credibility of NATO would be lost and Russia will achieve its goal of disrupting both European and US security arrangements. In this light, NATO’s ability to garner support from member states to achieve a common security goal will suffer and decline. Different organizations or even nations could begin competing with NATO, and hence the US, to become the new Western guarantor of security. The strategic consequences for failing to uphold Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty are disastrous for the US and Europe and a great victory for Russia as well as opening windows of opportunity for other authoritarian regimes and strategic competitors in the world.', 'STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF SUCCESSFULLY LIBERATING THE BALTICS', 'Successfully liberating the Baltic states from Russian occupation would prove to the world the importance and credibility of NATO, and of the US, in demonstrating resolve to uphold and defend strategic interests. NATO and the US share the common interest of a stable and peaceful Europe. While the US provides the bulk of NATO security guarantees, the alliance is an important force multiplier for US strategic interests that is able to project unmatched power across the globe. Since the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO has struggled to define its role and relevance to a 21st Century security environment. Russian aggression over the last decade has been a reminder of NATO’s continued importance for guaranteeing security across Western democracies and free markets. As victors in this sort of conflict, NATO would have enhanced leverage and advantage over Russia with the ability to garner concessions to improve the security of NATO as well as the continued economic prosperity of its members. The successful liberation of the attacked Baltic states would lend credibility and legitimacy to the defensive alliance.', 'The ability to bring the economic and/or military power of 30 NATO member states to bear is unmatched in the world and “is a powerful message and powerful commitment.”6 No single country can match the capabilities NATO as a whole is able to muster. No matter the notoriously slow decision-making process that must be supported by the views of all member states7 , a victory over Russia in liberating NATO members from an invasion would confirm NATO’s importance in securing Western democracies’ interests. By demonstrating its ability to protect its members using Article V, NATO could potentially receive more applications for 4 membership from countries looking for the security guarantee that collective defense provides (e.g., Finland and Sweden).', 'HOW TO LIBERATE THE BALTICS FROM RUSSIA', 'The mission to liberate the Baltic states from a Russian invasion is no easy task. The Baltics are NATO’s most vulnerable territory and the balance of power in the region is heavily tilted towards Russia.8 A Russian invasion into the sovereign territories of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania would be accomplished rapidly leaving the Alliance with a limited response options.9 Two critical issues for NATO’s operation to liberate the Baltics are: 1) Russia’s geographic advantage in the conflict (proximity to the Baltics, Kaliningrad, Belarus); and 2) The kind of conflict NATO is willing to fight (length, cost in terms of lives and money, nuclear weapon threat) in order to defend the Baltics. These two issues will form the general framework of how NATO should design a campaign plan and conduct operations to defend against a Russian attack and liberate the Baltic region from Russian occupation.', 'Russia possesses a large geographic advantage over NATO forces in regards to conflict in the Baltic region. From the Russian border to Tallinn is about 200 kilometers (125 miles), to Riga 275 kilometers (170 miles), compared to the shortest land routes from Poland to Riga and Tallinn being 325 kilometers (200 miles) and 600 kilometers (370 miles) respectively.10 This proximity affords Russia a crucial advantage in a conflict, which combined with NATO’s notoriously slow and deliberative decision process could lead Russia to significant gains in the region before NATO can agree on an appropriate response.11 Russia is able to reinforce troops at a much faster rate with a less complicated process than NATO due to the proximity of forces. NATO would be heavily reliant on flying or shipping in reinforcements to the region.12', 'Another geographic advantage held by Russia in this conflict is its exclave, Kaliningrad (sandwiched between Lithuania and Poland on the Baltic Sea). Kaliningrad is a great counterbalance for Russia to the military threat posed by NATO.13 Kaliningrad hosts what may be the most effective Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) in the world.14 The capabilities located in Kaliningrad “can deny NATO access to the Baltic states and slow, if not thwart US and NATO airpower should either respond to a Russian attack against any of the Baltic states.”15 Kaliningrad is a critical piece of Russia’s defense against any NATO operation into the Baltic region and essentially provides Russia with initial air superiority over the Baltic states.', 'The question of what to do about Kaliningrad is important, because if Kaliningrad is left untouched NATO will be unable to provide any kind of meaningful air power over the Baltics. The IADS from Kaliningrad would be able to stop NATO troop reinforcements by air and even by sea with the anti-ship missile capabilities and Baltic Fleet located there. According to a wargaming study conducted by Rand in 2016, airpower is required from the beginning of a conflict with Russia to enable ground operations in the Baltics.16 Knowing this information, operations against Kaliningrad must be part of the effort to liberate the Baltics. The extent of those operations should at least be to bring down Kaliningrad’s IADS and enable freedom of movement for NATO forces from the rest of Europe to the east. Operations against Kaliningrad could even extend to annexing the Russian exclave to ensure it is not a threat again for future conflicts in the region. However, annexing Kaliningrad would likely be viewed as an offensive action rather than a defensive action that NATO claims is its purpose.', 'Another piece of Russia’s geographic advantage over NATO in a Baltic conflict is Belarus. Belarus and Russia are close allies based on their shared history and the formal creation of the “Union State” in 1999.17 Currently Russian troops are moving into Belarus to continue the encirclement of Ukraine. In a conflict in the Baltics, Belarus would certainly play host to Russian forces. Belarus borders two NATO members, Lithuania and Poland, and sits on the east side of the Suwalki Corridor with Kaliningrad on the west side. The Suwalki Corrider is 65 kilometers (40 miles) wide and connects Poland with Lithuania, effectively becoming the only land link from central Europe to the Baltics. This is NATO’s “most vulnerable choke point” in a conflict with Russia in the Baltics and provides an opportunity for Russia to “incapacitate NATO as a security provider for its three Baltic members.” 18 Protecting the Suwalki Corridor and denying its use by Russia to resupply Kaliningrad must be a key part of any strategy to liberate the Baltics to ensure there are multiple avenues of approach for NATO forces and stop Russia from being able to concentrate its efforts on just one of those avenues.', 'Aside from its proximity to the Baltics and the key land bridge connecting the Baltics to the rest of NATO, Belarus has offered to host Russian nuclear weapons.19 The threat of a nuclear strike by Russia in a regional conflict, such as the Baltics, is real. Russia maintains the option to use nuclear weapons in a first-strike capacity in order to coerce an adversary to agree to its terms in a strategy of “escalate to de-escalate.”20 NATO members maintain nuclear forces under the umbrella of NATO that include strategic assets as well as dual-capable aircraft and tactical nuclear weapons. Both NATO and the US hold the same policy of maintaining nuclear capabilities to impose costs so great on the adversary that the benefits of the adversary’s use of nuclear weapons would be far outweighed by NATO’s response.21 Russia’s ability to stage and potentially launch nuclear weapons from Belarus changes the calculus of NATO and US planners use of nuclear weapons, especially if the deployment of nuclear weapons to Belarus materializes and becomes public knowledge. If Russia were to threaten the use of nuclear weapons to deter a NATO counter-offensive to liberate the Baltics, it would drastically alter the decision calculus of NATO members who do not want Europe to become the site of nuclear war.', '']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PhJo-Aff-00---NDT-Round-7.docx

Minnesota

PhJo

c8c5aac8180ce704993e491e4919c1372d78eb2f126f8ad4d5c72506c3f34bc6

Conservatives will destroy the admin state to resuscitate Lochner, even if it takes a while and it’s not through one case.

Needham ’21 [Lisa; Adjunct Professor at Mitchell Hamline School of Law; December 7; Balls and Strikes, “The Supreme Court’s Slow-Motion Assault on Modern Government, Explained,” https://ballsandstrikes.org/legal-culture/west-virginia-v-epa-preview-qa/]

With a supermajority conservative s tee up slow destruction of admin state a pet project for the conservative movement agencies impede upon rights of employers to do what they want conservatives pine for capitalism non-del would empower judges to veto any decision Alito criticized EPA Thomas has taken Gorsuch thinks judges who defer are abdicating their job Kavanaugh complained it encouraged aggressiveness Why do conservatives hate the admin state so much ? reg s make it hard for rich who prop up the movement to remain rich weakening the admin state shifts power to the judiciary conservatives control the Court and six courts of appeals life-tenured ideologues throw out reg s what’s going to happen this term ? bad things ! decision gut the EPA Gorsuch, Alito, Thomas, and Kavanaugh made positions clear Roberts written A court should not defer Barrett refused to answer a question about climate

With a 6-3 supermajority on the Court conservative justice s have been methodically tee ing up the slow -motion destruction of the modern admin istrative state the Court will hear West Virginia v. EPA This has long been a pet project for the conservative legal movement ’s luminaries notably Gorsuch Why do conservative judges say they don’t like agencies? justification revolves around the idea Congress should oversee every aspect of lawmaking Because agencies impede upon rights of employers to do what ever they want vis-a-vis employees, conservatives view them dimly and have long pine d for a return to unfettered capitalism Alito has been the most obvious cheerleader , praising the early 20th-century era of “ liberty to contract ” conservative judges are fighting to throw them out using the non-del egation doctrine. According to them, all congressional delegations are inherently suspect that would empower judges to veto any agency decision they don’t like Alito criticized the EPA ’s attempts to regulate g h g s for “ erasing the numbers that Congress wrote” Thomas has taken swings Gorsuch thinks judges who defer to agencies are abdicating their job responsibilities ; as a judge on the D.C. Circuit Kavanaugh complained that it encouraged aggressiveness on the part of the executive branch. (God forbid any of the big brains of the Court defer to actual scientists and policy experts Why do conservatives hate the admin istrative state so much ? reg ulation s make it hard er for the unfathomably rich people who prop up the conservative movement to remain unfathomably rich weakening the admin istrative state shifts power to the federal judiciary . Given conservatives control the Court and six of the federal courts of appeals , this is exactly the result they want life-tenured ideologues get to decide what laws and regulations mean—or to throw out reg ulation s altogether what’s going to happen this Supreme Court term ? Probably bad things ! West Virginia v. EPA challenges EPA’s ability to regulate carbon emissions decision could gut the ability of the EPA to enforce the Clean Air Act when it comes to g h g s conservatives have lots of routes to get to that result: Four justices— Gorsuch, Alito, Thomas, and Kavanaugh —have already made their positions on the subject clear Roberts has written things like “ A court should not defer until the court decides, on its own the agency is entitled to deference.” During Barrett ’s confirmation hearings, she refused to answer a question about climate change because doing so would “ solicit an opinion” about public policy More will be left to a dysfunctional, gerrymandered Congress if progressive legislation does somehow sneak through there remains judicial veto . This is the future the conservative legal movement has long dreamed of . They are closer than ever to realizing it

6-3 supermajority methodically tee ing up slow -motion destruction modern admin istrative state pet project conservative legal movement ’s luminaries every aspect impede what ever they want view them dimly long pine d unfettered capitalism most obvious cheerleader liberty to contract all congressional delegations inherently suspect empower veto g h g erasing taken swings abdicating their job responsibilities complained any of the big brains actual scientists policy experts hate so much hard er unfathomably rich people unfathomably rich shifts power control six of the federal courts of appeals exactly the result they want throw out reg ulation s altogether this Supreme Court term bad things gut g h g lots of routes already made clear not defer decides, on its own refused solicit public policy dysfunctional, gerrymandered Congress judicial veto long dreamed of closer than ever

['With a 6-3 supermajority on the Supreme Court, the conservative justices have jumped feet-first into their favorite culture wars this term, taking on cases that could allow them to eviscerate the constitutional right to abortion care and empower millions of people to carry guns in public. Beyond those flashy cases, though, those same justices have been methodically teeing up another legal revolution that will entail profound consequences: the slow-motion destruction of the modern administrative state. ', 'Later this term, the Court will hear oral argument in West Virginia v. EPA, a challenge to the Environmental Protection Agency’s authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions that will take place even as unchecked greenhouse gas emissions threaten to plunge the planet into a heat-induced death spiral. This has long been a pet project for the conservative legal movement’s luminaries, most notably Neil Gorsuch, and it’s going to be really, really, terrible when they succeed. ', 'Below, we answer all your most pressing questions about how a significant amount of policymaking power currently vested in nonpartisan subject matter experts could soon be in the hands of six life-tenured reactionaries who are accountable to no one.', 'What is the “modern administrative state,” exactly?', 'The Constitution tasks Congress with the work of passing laws, but the executive branch is charged with enforcing those laws. Executive agencies like the EPA or the United States Department of Agriculture are empowered by Congress to create regulations to implement the laws Congress passes. The administrative state is sprawling, and includes both the 15 Cabinet-level agencies and hundreds of smaller agencies, too. ', 'Why do conservative judges say they don’t like agencies?', 'The fancy legal justification revolves around the idea that Congress, as the democratically-elected body, should be the entity that oversees every aspect of the lawmaking process. Justice Clarence Thomas covered this at length—way too much length, including a trip back to discussing English law at the time of King Henry VIII—in a concurring opinion in a 2015 case about Amtrak. The Framers, he explained, drew sharp distinctions between the legislative and executive branches, from which America has now “deliberately departed” by “bowing to the exigencies of modern government.”', 'On its face, this seems relatively uncontroversial, in a sort of high school civics way. But it’s absurd and unworkable in practice, precisely because of the “exigencies of modern government.”', 'Why? Why not just have Congress do everything?', 'As you may have noticed, Congress is completely unable to get anything substantive done. Most major federal environmental laws came in a flurry in the early 1970s, but few of them have been routinely updated in the decades since. The Clean Air Act, for example, hasn’t had a major revision since 1990. Leaving the details of policymaking in lawmakers’ hands would leave us with no policy details at all. ', 'Agencies are also nimbler than Congress. Legislation takes time, requires consensus-building, and is undertaken by non-experts. Agencies, by contrast, are largely staffed by non-political experts, avoiding the constant churn of faces on Capitol Hill that accompany each biannual rejiggering of power. The need for this sort of technical, specialized knowledge in the lawmaking process is one of those “exigencies of modern government” that the Framers could not have anticipated. An understanding of whether toxic substances are to be measured under a given statue using milligrams per liter or parts per million was not exactly on James Madison’s mind when he was writing the Federalist Papers.', 'west virginia v epa', 'Photo by George Frey/Getty Images', 'So when did this all start?', 'As with many things that make conservatives upset, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal. Lifting the country out of the Great Depression required a massive infusion of government money and government oversight—hence, the increased need for agencies to oversee those processes. The New Deal era brought with it health and safety regulations and minimum wages laws, undercutting several decades of allowing companies to do whatever they wanted when it came to worker safety and pay.', 'Because agencies impede upon the rights of employers to do whatever they want vis-a-vis employees, conservatives view them dimly and have long pined for a return to that brand of unfettered capitalism, Justice Samuel Alito has been the most obvious cheerleader, praising on a 2018 opinion the early 20th-century era of “liberty to contract”—a euphemism for barring the government from imposing regulations on employers. It was the law of the land until 1937 when the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of federal minimum wage laws in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish.', 'What’s stopping conservatives from weakening the administrative state now?', 'Great question. The answer is two judge-made legal doctrines that govern when the federal judiciary, in theory, must defer to agencies’ interpretations of statutes: Chevron deference and Auer deference. ', 'Chevron deference arose out of a 1984 Supreme Court case that is still important enough to have its own page on the Department of Justice’s web site. The case, Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, was about how federal courts should review an agency’s construction of a statute that Congress gave it the authority to administer. Under the standard announced in Chevron, courts have to defer to the agency’s read as long as it is reasonable and Congress did not otherwise address it. Auer applies the same concept to regulations, requiring courts to give deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations. ', 'Conservatives, as you might guess, don’t care for either of these doctrines. But instead of working to weaken them, many conservative judges and legal scholars are fighting to throw them out altogether, using a third concept known as the non-delegation doctrine. According to them, all congressional delegations of lawmaking authority are inherently suspect—an idea that, if it were to gain more traction, would empower judges to veto almost any agency decision they don’t like. This surfaced recently when a Trump-appointed federal judge issued a nationwide injunction against the healthcare worker vaccine mandate, arguing that Congress cannot delegate this sort of complete power to an executive agency. To let an agency create a vaccine mandate, he argued, would give them the authority “to do almost anything they believe necessary.” ', 'Which Supreme Court justices don’t like deference?', 'All the usual suspects. In a speech to the Federalist Society in 2016, Alito criticized the EPA’s attempts to regulate greenhouse gas emissions for, in his words, “erasing the numbers that Congress wrote” and writing in “numbers that were more to its liking.” Thomas has taken swings at Chevron and Auer in multiple cases, writing that agency deference “precludes judges from exercising that judgment, forcing them to abandon what they believe is the best reading of an ambiguous statute in favor of an agency’s construction.” Justice Gorsuch thinks judges who defer to agencies are abdicating their job responsibilities; as a judge on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, Kavanaugh complained that it encouraged aggressiveness on the part of the executive branch. (God forbid any of the big brains of the Supreme Court ever have to defer to actual scientists and policy experts.)', 'Okay, but why? Why do conservatives hate the administrative state so much?', 'Because regulations make it harder for the unfathomably rich people who prop up the Republican Party and the conservative movement to remain unfathomably rich. Whether they restrict where coal mining can occur or protect essential workers during the pandemic, regulations protect corporate giants from getting to do whatever they want without facing consequences. ', 'Second, and perhaps even more importantly, weakening the administrative state shifts power to the federal judiciary. Given that conservatives control the Supreme Court and six of the federal courts of appeals, this is exactly the result they want: If agencies are no longer owed any deference, the life-tenured ideologues on those courts get to decide what the laws and regulations mean—or, perhaps, to throw out the whole concept of binding regulations altogether.', 'So what’s going to happen this Supreme Court term?', 'Probably bad things! West Virginia v. EPA, which the Court will hear this term, is about challenges to the EPA’s ability to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from power plants—a lengthy regulatory fight spanning the Obama and Trump administrations. The Obama administration’s plan set forth detailed targets for each state but was put on hold by the Supreme Court in 2016. Trump replaced it with his own plan calling for less-comprehensive changes, but again, the courts stepped in: The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals blocked that plan earlier this year. ', 'A decision in favor of the various challengers in the four now-combined cases could gut the ability of the EPA to enforce the Clean Air Act when it comes to greenhouse gases. And the conservatives have lots of routes to get to that result: Four justices—Gorsuch, Alito, Thomas, and Kavanaugh—have already made their positions on the subject clear. Chief Justice John Roberts, who often casts himself as the conservative wing’s more moderate member, has written things like “A court should not defer to an agency until the court decides, on its own, that the agency is entitled to deference.” During Justice Amy Coney Barrett’s confirmation hearings, she refused to answer a question about climate change because, she explained, doing so would amount to “soliciting an opinion” about “a matter of public policy” rather than acknowledging that climate change is a scientific fact. None of this bodes well for people who think breathing clean air is an important goal for which government should strive.', 'What would this mean beyond West Virginia v. EPA?', 'If agencies are less able to issue binding regulations, as Thomas and company would prefer, a lot more, in theory, could be on the chopping block: workplace safety rules, food additives rules, building materials rules, and so on. More will be left to a dysfunctional, gerrymandered Congress—and, if some piece of progressive legislation that delegates power to agencies does somehow sneak through, there remains the ever-present possibility of a judicial veto. This is the future the conservative legal movement has long dreamed of. They are closer than ever to realizing it.', '']

[(0, 11)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Phil-Skoulikaris-Aff-Fullertown-Round2.docx

Michigan

PhSk

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/PhSk/Michigan-Phil-Skoulikaris-Aff-Fullertown-Round2.docx

aae38ed26b972c90327e6b31ac8d8fb99af4cab9cc8243b19c2deaef41dba8b2

Georgia and New Hampshire thump fetal personhood.

Vagianos ’10-20 [Alanna; 2022; senior national reporter; Huffington Post, “Georgia Says A Fetus Is A Person. The Implications Are Terrifying,” https://www.huffpost.com/entry/georgia-says-a-fetus-is-a-person-the-implications-are-terrifying_n_634f09afe4b03e8038d8fbae]

Georgia’s law may foreshadow a frightening chapter in the war on choice There’s a snowball effect when a state defines a fetus as a human Georgia is not the first New Hampshire ruled a fetus can have a cause of action against its mother a fetus is a person

The idea of legally defining a fetus as a person has gained steam in right-wing groups since the fall of Roe Georgia’s personhood law may foreshadow a frightening new chapter in the war on choice “It’s so important for people to understand just how significant this specific provision is This is a wholesale change to who a person is in this state.” There’s a snowball effect when a state defines a fetus as a human Georgia is not the first state to legally interpret a fetus as a person New Hampshire ruled a fetus can have a cause of action against its mother for prenatal injuries The infant’s attorney successfully argued a fetus is a person

legally defining steam frightening new chapter significant this specific provision wholesale change snowball effect not cause of action successfully argued

['The idea of legally defining a fetus as a person is not new, but it has gained steam in right-wing groups since the fall of Roe ― most recently in Boston, where a so-called men’s rights group hosted the “National Men’s March to Abolish Abortion and Rally for Personhood.” Georgia’s personhood law may foreshadow a frightening new chapter in the war on choice.', '“It’s so important for people to understand just how significant this specific provision is, even apart from the six-week abortion ban,” Jordan said. “This is a wholesale change to who a person is in this state.”', 'A Law That Set Off Shock Waves', 'There’s a snowball effect when a state defines a fetus as a human. And while Georgia is the first state to enact a personhood law in a post-Roe world, it’s not the first state to legally interpret a fetus as a person.', 'Sharon Bonte was seven months pregnant when she was hit by a car crossing the street in New Hampshire in 1988. She had an emergency cesarean section and her daughter was born with cerebral palsy due to the accident, leaving the child permanently disabled. A New Hampshire court ruled at the time that a fetus can have a cause of action against its mother for prenatal injuries, permitting the infant to sue her mother for negligence. The child’s father, Andy Bonte, brought the civil action against his wife, on behalf of his daughter. The infant’s attorney successfully argued that a fetus is a person, entitled to the same rights as born children, and won a $1 million judgment.', '']

[(0, 15)]

ndtceda

Michigan-McSk-Aff-Gonzaga-Jesuit-Debates-Round-2.docx

Michigan

McSk

4cddb8d978551a2f5599abf6d333e286b060ca8f99f30b2a8908ab895139dc7a

Limiting the role of U.S. nuclear weapons shatters NATO cohesion and trust which are the cornerstone of all cooperative efforts.

Sophia Becker and Elisabeth Suh 21. Becker holds a Master in Public Policy from Harvard University, as well as an MA and a BA in political sciences from Sciences Po Paris, and is a research fellow for the German Council on Foreign Relations. Suh is a research fellow in DGAP’s Center for Security and Defense, and an an associate PhD fellow at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH). She holds an  M.A. from Goethe University Frankfurt and  is a PhD student at the Graduate School of East Asian Studies at the Free University Berlin. “How Biden’s Plan to Limit the Role of Nuclear Weapons Challenges NATO.” December 17th, 2021. German Council on Foreign Affairs.

US nuc is built on strategic ambiguity policy to increase predictability for adversaries would confront NATO allies wi th major issues Nuc s play a vital role in deterrence posture alliance has never ruled out using n uc s first Five NATO members host US sub-s broader deterrence arrangements would be called int o question critics vindicated would increase their calls for withdrawal disagreements on fundamental issues or logic of deterrence threaten NATO cohesion result would not be increasing fragmentation among allies raise serious concerns Adversaries perceive dissent as an opportunity to further undermine and decouple Allies Mutual trust are the cornerstone of credible readiness

US nuc lear policy is built on the principle of strategic ambiguity policy has the opposite intention It aims to increase predictability for adversaries so as to minimize the danger of misperceptions and miscalculations on their part. For America’s allies, however, such a policy would raise complicated questions . it would confront NATO allies wi th at least three major issues : First, NATO would have to revise its own deterrence strategy towards non-nuclear threats (the so-called cross-domain deterrence); second, NATO would be pressed to reopen the debate about nuclear sharing , as the role of US nuc lear weapons on European soil would be reduced; and third, the alliance would have to find other ways to bolster its cohesion interests and assumptions pertaining to US nuclear strategy unr avel. The Issue of Cross-Domain Deterrence Nuc lear weapon s play a vital role in NATO’s deterrence posture . The Western alliance has never ruled out the option of using n uc lear weapon s first – a strategy going back to the Cold War, when the threat of a deliberate escalation with nuclear weapons was meant to deter or halt large-scale conventional attacks . US nuclear forces are the foundation of NATO’s cross-domain deterrent. Consequently, if the U nited States were to limit the purpose of its nuc lear weapons to deterring nuclear attacks, NATO’s ability to deter non-nuclear attacks would be curtailed Questions about NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements may also arise. Five NATO members currently host forward-deployed US sub-s trategic nuclear weapons and provide aircraft capable of delivering these gravity bombs – Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. Nuclear sharing serves a range of purposes, from deterring non-nuclear hostilities to reassuring allies. Yet it has come under criticism time and again. If the United States limited the use of nuclear weapons to responding to an adversary’s nuclear attack, the broader deterrence purpose of nuclear sharing arrangements would be called int o question . Allies would have to consider how this would affect the usefulness of forward-deployed sub-strategic nuclear weapons. Most certainly, critics of nuclear sharing would see themselves vindicated and would increase their calls for the withdrawal of these weapons. Most problematically, disagreements on such fundamental issues as the role of nuclear weapons or the logic of deterrence could threaten NATO cohesion . If Washington adopted a sole purpose policy, the result would not be concerted opposition but increasing fragmentation among allies . Eastern European countries would raise serious concerns , while others like Canada , Spain, or the Netherlands might actually welcome limiting the role of nuclear weapons. France and the United Kingdom, who contribute their independent nuclear forces to NATO’s general deterrence posture. Neither country is likely to adjust their own strategies in line with Washington and reduce the role of their nuclear weapons. Adversaries might perceive the dissent on nuclear issues as an opportunity to further undermine and decouple Allies . Mutual trust , political, and military commitment are the cornerstone of credible military posture, military readiness , and effective deterrence.

US nuc lear policy strategic ambiguity to increase predictability for adversaries For America’s allies, complicated questions confront NATO allies major issues NATO revise its own deterrence strategy reopen debate about nuclear sharing US nuc find other ways bolster its cohesion US nuclear strategy unr avel. Nuc vital role never using n uc lear weapon s first U were to limit nuc curtailed Five NATO members US sub-s trategic nuclear weapons come under criticism limited the use of nuclear weapons broader deterrence nuclear sharing arrangements called int o question vindicated increase their calls fundamental issues threaten NATO cohesion increasing fragmentation among allies serious concerns Canada likely to adjust reduce the role perceive the dissent opportunity to undermine and decouple Allies Mutual trust cornerstone

['Strategic Ambiguity vs Sole Purpose', 'Up to now, US nuclear policy is built on the principle of strategic ambiguity. The aim is to leave adversaries guessing about the conditions under which America would use nuclear weapons. This ambiguity applies in particular to the question whether the United States might use nuclear weapons in response to attacks involving non-nuclear means such as biological, chemical, or conventional weapons. The goal is to convince the adversary to refrain from any kind of severe attack for fear of suffering unacceptable consequences.', 'A sole purpose policy has the opposite intention: It aims to increase predictability for adversaries so as to minimize the danger of misperceptions and miscalculations on their part. The objective is to lessen the risk of an unintentional nuclear exchange.', 'For America’s allies, however, such a policy would raise complicated questions.', 'Should the US adopt a sole purpose policy, it would confront NATO allies with at least three major issues: First, NATO would have to revise its own deterrence strategy towards non-nuclear threats (the so-called cross-domain deterrence); second, NATO would be pressed to reopen the debate about nuclear sharing, as the role of US nuclear weapons on European soil would be reduced; and third, the alliance would have to find other ways to bolster its cohesion as interests and assumptions pertaining to US nuclear strategy unravel.', 'The Issue of Cross-Domain Deterrence', 'Nuclear weapons play a vital role in NATO’s deterrence posture. The Western alliance has never ruled out the option of using nuclear weapons first – a strategy going back to the Cold War, when the threat of a deliberate escalation with nuclear weapons was meant to deter or halt large-scale conventional attacks.', 'In recent years, the role of nuclear weapons has expanded as NATO has tried to deter the growing range of threats from non-nuclear sources including cyber-attacks. NATO reserves the right to use nuclear weapons across all operational domains, “should the fundamental security of any NATO ally be threatened.” Other nuclear-armed states, such as Russia, have similar deterrence postures and purposely remain ambiguous about any possible use of nuclear weapons to deter attacks across all domains.', 'US nuclear forces are the foundation of NATO’s cross-domain deterrent. Consequently, if the United States were to limit the purpose of its nuclear weapons to deterring nuclear attacks, NATO’s ability to deter non-nuclear attacks would be curtailed. Sole purpose proponents reject this idea and point out that threatening the use of nuclear weapons to retaliate against cyber operations already holds little credibility for adversaries. Critics, however, argue that substituting the nuclear element in cross-domain deterrence is effectively impossible since no other capability comes close to the destructive power and thus the deterrence effect of nuclear weapons.', 'Uncertainty Over Nuclear Sharing in Europe', 'Questions about NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements may also arise. Five NATO members currently host forward-deployed US sub-strategic nuclear weapons and provide aircraft capable of delivering these gravity bombs – Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. Nuclear sharing serves a range of purposes, from deterring non-nuclear hostilities to reassuring allies. Yet it has come under criticism time and again.', 'Most recently, members of the Social Democratic Party in Germany questioned the country’s participation in NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangement following the decision to replace the country’s aging Tornado aircraft fleet last year. The Green party has consistently called for a withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from Germany. Similar debates also exist in other host countries like Belgium and the Netherlands, where voters view the presence of US sub-strategic nuclear weapons skeptically.', 'If the United States limited the use of nuclear weapons to responding to an adversary’s nuclear attack, the broader deterrence purpose of nuclear sharing arrangements would be called into question. Allies would have to consider how this would affect the usefulness of forward-deployed sub-strategic nuclear weapons. Most certainly, critics of nuclear sharing would see themselves vindicated and would increase their calls for the withdrawal of these weapons.', 'Deepening Splits Within NATO', 'Most problematically, disagreements on such fundamental issues as the role of nuclear weapons or the logic of deterrence could threaten NATO cohesion. If Washington adopted a sole purpose policy, the result would not be concerted opposition but increasing fragmentation among allies. Eastern European countries would raise serious concerns, while others like Canada, Spain, or the Netherlands might actually welcome limiting the role of nuclear weapons.', 'Major resistance should be expected from the other two nuclear powers in NATO: France and the United Kingdom, who contribute their independent nuclear forces to NATO’s general deterrence posture. Neither country is likely to adjust their own strategies in line with Washington and reduce the role of their nuclear weapons. Indeed, Britain recently announced it will increase the cap on its nuclear warheads and no longer publish their operational or deployed numbers.', 'But while neither Paris nor London wishes to limit its own use of nuclear weapons, neither will be willing or able to replace US commitments to the Alliance, should Washington reduce the role of its nuclear weapons for European cross-domain deterrence.', 'Adversaries might perceive the dissent on nuclear issues as an opportunity to further undermine and decouple Allies. Mutual trust, political, and military commitment are the cornerstone of credible military posture, military readiness, and effective deterrence.', '']

[(7, 17), (28, 34)]

ndtceda

Emory-RuSh-Neg-3---Navy-Round-2.docx

Emory

RuSh

db79ebde69086c97a600584f1bb604bceb0b94c6dcac72cf7eabdd1e847947d9

Their ev agrees!

Harvard Law Review (HLR), 4-11-2022 ("Indigenous Interpretations: Invoking The Third Indian Canon To Combat Climate Change," Chapter 2 of “Developments in the Law: Climate Change,” 135 Harv. L. Rev. 1568, https://harvardlawreview.org/2022/04/indigenous-interpretations/, accessed on 6-24-2022) AB

U.S. courts have yet to establish “ r ights of nature” — when an ecosystem has legal personh ood and thus the right to defend itself in court against har m. U.S. courts rejected legal personhood under the standing doctrine . B ut tribes convince fed courts to acknowledge r o n by showing how tribes understood treaties to recognize personhood of resources . White Earth sued Minnesota in tribal court to enforce r o n . The Tribe asserted the pipeline’s permit violated the treaty rights of manoomin . . It is an open question whether a tribe can sue a state department official for violation of a treaty right in tribal court White Earth endeavor to bring claim i n federal cour t and bolster chances for success by invoking the third ca non. courts will consider manoomin’s relationship with the Tribe to show manoomin was not an object .

Tribes may bring suits that interpret treaty text using tribes’ understanding of their relationship to nonhuman relatives. Some tribes and tribal courts are already beginning to recognize the rivers’ rights against environmental degradation. U.S. courts have yet to establish the “ r ights of nature” — when an ecosystem has legal personh ood and thus the right to defend itself in court against har m. other countries’ court systems have recognized rights of nature U.S. courts have long rejected the legal personhood of ecosystems under the standing doctrine . B ut tribes may convince fed eral courts to acknowledge the r ights o f n ature by showing how tribes understood the provisions of their treaties to recognize the personhood of those resources at the time of signing . As resistance against the Enbridge Line 3 oil pipeline ramped up in Minnesota the White Earth Band of Ojibwe sued the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources Commissioners in tribal court to enforce the r ights o f n ature . The Tribe asserted the State’s permit to use five billion gallons of public groundwater for Enbridge’s Line 3 pipeline violated the Tribe’s rights recognized in its 1837, 1854, and 1855 treaties with the U S the pipeline’s permit ting violated the treaty rights of manoomin , . The Tribe offered evidence of its original understandings about usufructuary property rights to the lands and waters being ceded and held in common among Chippewa Indians across Mississippi and Lake Superior, exclusive from the state and federal government. According to the Tribe, the water diverted for Line 3 was not the State’s to give because it belonged to manoomin . It is an open question whether a tribe can sue a state department official for violation of a treaty right in tribal court The White Earth Band of Ojibwe may endeavor to bring this claim i n federal cour t and bolster its chances for success by invoking the third ca non. Since courts will consider Indigenous linguistic understandings of trea ties, the Tribe might use testimony from language keepers of Anishinabemowin to demonstrate that manoomin’s relationship with the Tribe has existed for centuries. to show manoomin was not an object .

“ r ights of nature” — when an ecosystem has legal personh ood and thus the right to defend itself in court against har m. B ut tribes may convince fed eral courts to acknowledge the r ights o f n ature by showing how tribes understood the provisions of their treaties to recognize the personhood of those resources at the time of signing . the pipeline’s permit ting violated the treaty rights of manoomin . the water diverted for Line 3 was not the State’s to give because it belonged to manoomin i n federal cour t and bolster its chances for success by invoking the third ca non.

['3. Pipelines. — Tribes may bring suits that interpret treaty text using tribes’ understanding of their relationship to nonhuman relatives. Some tribes and tribal courts are already beginning to recognize the rivers’ rights against environmental degradation. U.S. courts have yet to establish the “rights of nature” — when an ecosystem has legal personhood and thus the right to defend itself in court against harm. Although other countries’ court systems have recognized rights of nature, attempts in the United States have faltered. U.S. courts have long rejected the legal personhood of ecosystems under the standing doctrine. But tribes may convince federal courts to acknowledge the rights of nature by showing how tribes understood the provisions of their treaties to recognize the personhood of those resources at the time of signing.', 'As resistance against the Enbridge Line 3 oil pipeline ramped up in Minnesota in 2021, the White Earth Band of Ojibwe sued the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources Commissioners in tribal court in the “first case brought in a tribal court to enforce the rights of nature.” The Tribe asserted that the State’s issuance of a permit to use five billion gallons of public groundwater for Enbridge’s Line 3 pipeline project violated the Tribe’s rights recognized in its 1837, 1854, and 1855 treaties with the United States. The Tribe argued that the pipeline’s permitting violated the treaty rights of manoomin, wild rice that is the cultural center and subsistence staple of the Anishinaabe peoples. Climate change presents an existential threat to manoomin. The Tribe offered evidence of its original understandings about usufructuary property rights to the lands and waters being ceded and held in common among Chippewa Indians across Mississippi and Lake Superior, exclusive from the state and federal government. According to the Tribe, the water diverted for Line 3 was not the State’s to give because it belonged to manoomin. It is an open question whether a tribe can sue a state department official for violation of a treaty right in tribal court. But a federal court recently dismissed the State’s bid to end the case. This case’s outcome may bring hope to other tribes trying to recognize the rights of nonhuman relatives mentioned in treaties.', 'The White Earth Band of Ojibwe also may endeavor to bring this claim in federal court and bolster its chances for success by invoking the third canon. Since courts will consider Indigenous linguistic understandings of treaties, the Tribe might use testimony from language keepers of Anishinabemowin to demonstrate that manoomin’s relationship with the Tribe has existed for centuries. It can also use language to show manoomin was not simply an object but a relative to the Anishinaabe people with its own stories and history. Finally, it might point to manoomin’s primacy in the negotiations, in which tribal representatives endeavored to ensure that tribal members would always have enough water to thrive.', '', '']

[(20, 23), (24, 30)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PaPr-Neg-Navy-Round-5.docx

Minnesota

PaPr

89f3c2dd570dc76055b12c77ed6d81b75d76edd4223ebe05cf5099c7dd0c345d

Automation increases demand for middle and high skill jobs.

Robert ATKINSON President Information Technology and Innovation Foundation & Former Project director at the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment ’19 “The Case Against Taxing Robots” p. 12

if this pattern occurs , the occupational profile will shift to one with a higher share of middle- and upper-wage jobs a plus for millions whose wages remain low because productivity remains low As lower-wage jobs become automated, prices of the goods and services declines savings result in consumers spending more on other goods with employment generated in industries with low-, middle-, and high-wage jobs.

lower- income jobs are more at risk if this occupational impact pattern occurs , the occupational profile of advanced economies will by definition shift to one with a higher share of middle- and upper-wage jobs This would result in relatively fewer lower-paying jobs and more higher-wage jobs a plus for millions of workers now employed in occupations whose wages remain low and stagnant because the productivity of those jobs remains low and stagnant As more lower-wage jobs become automated, the prices of the goods and services also declines savings result in consumers across the income spectrum spending more on other goods and services with the employment generated by this added production in industries with low-, middle-, and high-wage jobs. Thus, added demand creates more middle- and higher-wage jobs.

occupational profile shift higher share of middle- and upper-wage jobs prices of the goods and services declines

['Many will argue that these future occupational automation patterns are problematic, as lower- income jobs are more at risk. While true, if this occupational impact pattern occurs, the occupational profile of advanced economies will by definition shift to one with a higher share of middle- and upper-wage jobs (as lower-wage jobs are automated at higher rates and therefore employ fewer people). This would result in relatively fewer lower-paying jobs and more higher-wage jobs—a plus for millions of workers now employed in occupations whose wages remain low and stagnant because the productivity of those jobs remains low and stagnant. The reason behind employment shifting to more middle- and higher-wage jobs is not necessarily intuitive. Here’s why: As more lower-wage jobs become automated, the prices of the goods and services still produced by the lower-wage workers (were there no associated cost savings, firms would have no incentive to employ technology to boost productivity) also declines in relative terms. These savings result in consumers across the income spectrum spending more on other goods and services—with the employment generated by this added production in industries with low-, middle-, and high-wage jobs. Thus, added demand creates more middle- and higher-wage jobs.']

[(7, 15), (154, 157)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-ShVe-Aff-7---Dartmouth-RR-Round-5.docx

Dartmouth

ShVe

ac044de12e4d0bda9b2923ee78421670ddb11b344c09d140b5806c7a8bf6ee5d

3---Scenario analysis is pedagogically valuable.

Naazneen Barma et al. 16. May 2016, [Advance Publication Online on 11/6/15], Barma, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Brent Durbin, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Professor of Government at Smith College, Eric Lorber, JD from UPenn and PhD in Political Science from Duke, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Rachel Whitlark, PhD in Political Science from GWU, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program within the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, “‘Imagine a World in Which’: Using Scenarios in Political Science,” International Studies Perspectives 17 (2), pp. 1-19,

“cult of irrelevance” in political science has been lamented one component is substantive research that are policy relevant strikingly little attention is paid to techniques to articulate plausible futures referred to as “alternative worlds.” Good scenarios rely on explicit causal propositions ability of decision makers to imagine, let alone prepare for, is constrained by existing models and well-known cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias individuals break out of conventional modes of thinking Imagining alternative future worlds scenarios are deliberately forward-looking identifying questions of great empirical importance even if these do not appear in existing research programs

Over the past decade, the “cult of irrelevance” in political science has been lamented by a growing chorus Prominent scholars have diagnosed the gap made the case for why research is valuable for policymaking and offered ideas several initiatives have been formed Many focus on providing scholars with the skills, platforms, and networks to better communicate findings and implications to the policymaking community Yet enhancing communication is only one component Another is the generation of substantive research programs that are actually policy relevant In a field that has an admirable devotion to pedagogical self-reflection strikingly little attention is paid to techniques for generating policy-relevant ideas for research topics This article outlines an experiential and problem-based approach to political science research using scenario analysis Scenario analysis can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks Scenario analysis is thus typically seen as serving the purposes of corporate planning or as a policy tool Yet scenario analysis is not inherently limited to these uses This section makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship We characterize scenario analysis as the art of juxtaposing current trends in unexpected combinations in order to articulate surprising and yet plausible futures referred to as “alternative worlds.” Scenarios are they are depictions of possible future states of the world together with a narrative of the driving causal forces that could lead to those futures Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions Several features make scenario analysis particularly useful for policymaking Long-term global trends across a number of different realms combine in often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges Yet the ability of decision makers to imagine, let alone prepare for, discontinuities is constrained by their existing mental models and maps This limitation is exacerbated by well-known cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias The power of scenarios lies in their ability to help individuals break out of conventional modes of thinking and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something altogether different from the known present Scenarios are essentially textured, plausible, and relevant stories that help us imagine how the future could be different from the past Very simply, scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation Scenarios thus offer an innovative tool for developing a political science research agenda achieving this objective requires careful tailoring of the approach The use of scenarios is similar to counterfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given situation in order to analyze the resulting effects Whereas counterfactuals are traditionally retrospective scenarios are deliberately forward-looking and designed to explore potential futures We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in international affairs, rather than as a replacement The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer some guidance to policy-oriented students who are otherwise left to the relatively unstructured norms by which political science ideas are typically developed The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world, even if these do not appear in existing research programs or as clear extrapolations from past events scenarios envision alternative worlds that could develop in the medium (five to seven year) term and are designed to tease out issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future so that they can begin thinking critically about them now This timeframe offers a period distant enough from the present as to avoid falling into current events analysis, but not so far into the future as to seem like science fiction participants learn strategies for avoiding failures of creativity and for overturning the assumptions that prevent scholars and analysts from anticipating and understanding the pivotal junctures that arise in international affairs

generation of substantive research programs that are actually policy relevant strikingly little attention is paid to techniques for generating policy-relevant ideas typically seen as serving the purposes of corporate planning or as a policy tool Yet scenario analysis is not inherently limited to these uses articulate surprising and yet plausible futures referred to as “alternative worlds.” they are depictions of possible future states of the world together with a narrative of the driving causal forces that could lead to those futures explicit causal propositions well-known cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias break out of conventional modes of thinking Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something altogether different from the known present scenarios are deliberately forward-looking explore potential futures do not appear in existing research programs tease out issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future begin thinking critically about them now learn strategies for avoiding failures of creativity overturning the assumptions that prevent scholars and analysts from anticipating and understanding

['Over the past decade, the “cult of irrelevance” in political science scholarship has been lamented by a growing chorus (Putnam 2003; Nye 2009; Walt 2009). Prominent scholars of international affairs have diagnosed the roots of the gap between academia and policymaking, made the case for why political science research is valuable for policymaking, and offered a number of ideas for enhancing the policy relevance of scholarship in international relations and comparative politics (Walt 2005,2011; Mead 2010; Van Evera 2010; Jentleson and Ratner 2011; Gallucci 2012; Avey and Desch 2014). Building on these insights, several initiatives have been formed in the attempt to “bridge the gap.”2 Many of the specific efforts put in place by these projects focus on providing scholars with the skills, platforms, and networks to better communicate the findings and implications of their research to the policymaking community, a necessary and worthwhile objective for a field in which theoretical debates, methodological training, and publishing norms tend more and more toward the abstract and esoteric. Yet enhancing communication between scholars and policymakers is only one component of bridging the gap between international affairs theory and practice. Another crucial component of this bridge is the generation of substantive research programs that are actually policy relevant—a challenge to which less concerted attention has been paid. The dual challenges of bridging the gap are especially acute for graduate students, a particular irony since many enter the discipline with the explicit hope of informing policy. In a field that has an admirable devotion to pedagogical self-reflection, strikingly little attention is paid to techniques for generating policy-relevant ideas for dissertation and other research topics. Although numerous articles and conference workshops are devoted to the importance of experiential and problem-based learning, especially through techniques of simulation that emulate policymaking processes (Loggins 2009; Butcher 2012; Glasgow 2012; Rothman 2012; DiCicco 2014), little has been written about the use of such techniques for generating and developing innovative research ideas. This article outlines an experiential and problem-based approach to developing a political science research program using scenario analysis. It focuses especially on illuminating the research generation and pedagogical benefits of this technique by describing the use of scenarios in the annual New Era Foreign Policy Conference (NEFPC), which brings together doctoral students of international and comparative affairs who share a demonstrated interest in policy-relevant scholarship.3 In the introductory section, the article outlines the practice of scenario analysis and considers the utility of the technique in political science. We argue that scenario analysis should be viewed as a tool to stimulate problem-based learning for doctoral students and discuss the broader scholarly benefits of using scenarios to help generate research ideas. The second section details the manner in which NEFPC deploys scenario analysis. The third section reflects upon some of the concrete scholarly benefits that have been realized from the scenario format. The fourth section offers insights on the pedagogical potential associated with using scenarios in the classroom across levels of study. A brief conclusion reflects on the importance of developing specific techniques to aid those who wish to generate political science scholarship of relevance to the policy world. What Are Scenarios and Why Use Them in Political Science? Scenario analysis is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends, preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company Shell, a pioneer of the technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering “what if” questions about possible future worlds. Scenario analysis is thus typically seen as serving the purposes of corporate planning or as a policy tool to be used in combination with simulations of decision making. Yet scenario analysis is not inherently limited to these uses. This section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC were created. The Art of Scenario Analysis We characterize scenario analysis as the art of juxtaposing current trends in unexpected combinations in order to articulate surprising and yet plausible futures, often referred to as “alternative worlds.” Scenarios are thus explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns, and they are not hypothesis-based expert predictions. Nor should they be equated with simulations, which are best characterized as functional representations of real institutions or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). Instead, they are depictions of possible future states of the world, offered together with a narrative of the driving causal forces and potential exogenous shocks that could lead to those futures. Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale gas revolution in the United States, China’s slowing economic growth, and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC’s decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way. While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning during the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. Shell-style scenario planning “helped break the habit, ingrained in most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the present” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector. Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policymaking tool. For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of “alternative worlds” approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects.4 As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the latter is the German Marshall Fund’s EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013). Several features make scenario analysis particularly useful for policymaking.5 Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges. Yet the ability of decision makers to imagine, let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm is constrained by their existing mental models and maps. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). The power of scenarios lies in their ability to help individuals break out of conventional modes of thinking and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future. Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something altogether different from the known present. Designing Scenarios for Political Science Inquiry The characteristics of scenario analysis that commend its use to policymakers also make it well suited to helping political scientists generate and develop policy-relevant research programs. Scenarios are essentially textured, plausible, and relevant stories that help us imagine how the future political-economic world could be different from the past in a manner that highlights policy challenges and opportunities. For example, terrorist organizations are a known threat that have captured the attention of the policy community, yet our responses to them tend to be linear and reactive. Scenarios that explore how seemingly unrelated vectors of change—the rise of a new peer competitor in the East that diverts strategic attention, volatile commodity prices that empower and disempower various state and nonstate actors in surprising ways, and the destabilizing effects of climate change or infectious disease pandemics—can be useful for illuminating the nature and limits of the terrorist threat in ways that may be missed by a narrower focus on recognized states and groups. By illuminating the potential strategic significance of specific and yet poorly understood opportunities and threats, scenario analysis helps to identify crucial gaps in our collective understanding of global politicaleconomic trends and dynamics. The notion of “exogeneity”—so prevalent in social science scholarship—applies to models of reality, not to reality itself. Very simply, scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation. Scenarios thus offer, in principle, an innovative tool for developing a political science research agenda. In practice, achieving this objective requires careful tailoring of the approach. The specific scenario analysis technique we outline below was designed and refined to provide a structured experiential process for generating problem-based research questions with contemporary international policy relevance.6 The first step in the process of creating the scenario set described here was to identify important causal forces in contemporary global affairs. Consensus was not the goal; on the contrary, some of these causal statements represented competing theories about global change (e.g., a resurgence of the nation-state vs. border-evading globalizing forces). A major principle underpinning the transformation of these causal drivers into possible future worlds was to “simplify, then exaggerate” them, before fleshing out the emerging story with more details.7 Thus, the contours of the future world were drawn first in the scenario, with details about the possible pathways to that point filled in second. It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that some of the causal claims that turned into parts of scenarios were exaggerated so much as to be implausible, and that an unavoidable degree of bias or our own form of groupthink went into construction of the scenarios. One of the great strengths of scenario analysis, however, is that the scenario discussions themselves, as described below, lay bare these especially implausible claims and systematic biases.8 An explicit methodological approach underlies the written scenarios themselves as well as the analytical process around them—that of case-centered, structured, focused comparison, intended especially to shed light on new causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The use of scenarios is similar to counterfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given situation in order to analyze the resulting effects (Fearon 1991). Whereas counterfactuals are traditionally retrospective in nature and explore events that did not actually occur in the context of known history, our scenarios are deliberately forward-looking and are designed to explore potential futures that could unfold. As such, counterfactual analysis is especially well suited to identifying how individual events might expand or shift the “funnel of choices” available to political actors and thus lead to different historical outcomes (Nye 2005, 68–69), while forward-looking scenario analysis can better illuminate surprising intersections and sociopolitical dynamics without the perceptual constraints imposed by fine-grained historical knowledge. We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in international affairs, rather than as a replacement for counterfactual analysis, historical case studies, or other methodological tools. In the scenario process developed for NEFPC, three distinct scenarios are employed, acting as cases for analytical comparison. Each scenario, as detailed below, includes a set of explicit “driving forces” which represent hypotheses about causal mechanisms worth investigating in evolving international affairs. The scenario analysis process itself employs templates (discussed further below) to serve as a graphical representation of a structured, focused investigation and thereby as the research tool for conducting case-centered comparative analysis (George and Bennett 2005). In essence, these templates articulate key observable implications within the alternative worlds of the scenarios and serve as a framework for capturing the data that emerge (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Finally, this structured, focused comparison serves as the basis for the cross-case session emerging from the scenario analysis that leads directly to the articulation of new research agendas. The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer some guidance to policy-oriented graduate students who are otherwise left to the relatively unstructured norms by which political science dissertation ideas are typically developed. The initial articulation of a dissertation project is generally an idiosyncratic and personal undertaking (Useem 1997; Rothman 2008), whereby students might choose topics based on their coursework, their own previous policy exposure, or the topics studied by their advisors. Research agendas are thus typically developed by looking for “puzzles” in existing research programs (Kuhn 1996). Doctoral students also, understandably, often choose topics that are particularly amenable to garnering research funding. Conventional grant programs typically base their funding priorities on extrapolations from what has been important in the recent past—leading to, for example, the prevalence of Japan and Soviet studies in the mid-1980s or terrorism studies in the 2000s—in the absence of any alternative method for identifying questions of likely future significance. The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world, even if these do not appear as puzzles in existing research programs or as clear extrapolations from past events. The scenarios analyzed at NEFPC envision alternative worlds that could develop in the medium (five to seven year) term and are designed to tease out issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future so that they can begin thinking critically about them now. This timeframe offers a period distant enough from the present as to avoid falling into current events analysis, but not so far into the future as to seem like science fiction. In imagining the worlds in which these scenarios might come to pass, participants learn strategies for avoiding failures of creativity and for overturning the assumptions that prevent scholars and analysts from anticipating and understanding the pivotal junctures that arise in international affairs.']

[(9, 24)]

ndtceda

Emory-HaWi-Neg-Northwestern-Season-Opener-Round-5.docx

Emory

HaWi

bcae933130857a839e5fad8c636483fd57a4740bb9f66f96c313b021e8f1d647

Nuclear first use gets replaced with hypersonic first use---that ensures arms racing and miscalc that turn the case

Russell 21, Foreign Affairs Specialist with the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration, (Ruby, 02/01/2021, “No First Nukes: Replacing the U.S. Nuclear First Strike Mission with Non-Nuclear Hypersonic Weapons,” On the Horizon: A Collection of Papers from the Next Generation, Feb. 1, 2021, pp. 135-150, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep29483.14?seq=1)

Parallel to debates on NFU is the pursuit of HSWs unique in their unpredictable flight paths at speeds greater than Mach 5 With no existing anti-missile system capable weapons provide the U S the ability to execute a devastating conventional attack within minutes “[a]s the role of nuc s is reduced non-nuclear elements will take on a greater burden one goal for nuclear first-strike option include deterrence against non-nuclear attacks The idea is not new with promotion of PGS the substitution of conventional for nuclear warheads would require significant improvements in accuracy two decades later HSWs could finally carry out the mission a U.S. nuclear deterrent “tipped” by a conventional first-use system bypas modern missile defenses three attributes are relevant to a first-strike scenario: Accurate Delivery Penetrating Diverse and Graduated Options HSWs satisfy all three accuracy combined with speed with minimal collateral damage designed to penetrate buried defenses despite not the same energy as a nuclear HSWs still take out a significant numbe r of strategic sites a damaging non-nuclear option more optimal possible to forego the nuclear first-strike option for an NFU policy tipped by HSWs HSWs concern stability , crisis management , and unintended escalation HSWs will induce a “ new arms race threatening to upend deterrence and renew Cold War-era tensions an adversary has no way of tracking or intercepting adversary launch all strategic assets at once for fear of losing them

should the United States declare a no-first-use (NFU) nuclear policy? Parallel to renewed debates on NFU is the pursuit by the United States of nonnuclear hypersonic weapons HSWs These highly maneuverable systems are unique in their ability to traverse unpredictable flight paths at speeds far greater than Mach 5 five times the speed of sound With no existing anti-missile system capable of intercepting projectiles maneuvering at such speeds weapons have the potential to provide the U nited S tates with the ability to hold hostage strategic targets thousands of miles away and to execute a devastating conventional attack within minutes In order to assess the merits of an NFU policy, it is critical to understand the strategic purpose behind maintaining a first-use nuclear option in the first place From Delpech’s perspective, “the relationship between nuclear and conventional weapons is evolving rapidly , and new forms of deterrence are appearing, including those involving the offense-defense balance.”15 Similar thinking is prevalent throughout the 2010 NPR , which states, “[a]s the role of nuc lear weapon s is reduced in U.S. national security strategy . . . non-nuclear elements will take on a greater share of the deterrence burden .” 16 hypersonic systems have existed in the U.S. arsenal for decades, including in the form of ICBMs advancements in technology have allowed for the onset of highly-maneuverable HSWs, which “combine the maneuverability and accuracy of cruise missiles with the long range and speed of ICBMs While an ICBM traditionally travels along a predictable parabolic arch, modern HSWs are designed to “fly at unusual altitudes this lower altitude flight path makes it 20 times harder to detect an incoming ballistic missile the HSW’s potential landing zone might appear to be “about as big as Rhode Island the U nited States has notably chosen to focus development efforts on non-nuclear HSWs Current systems under U.S. development include hypersonic boost-glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles , conventional HSWs “function like nearly invisible power drills that smash holes in their targets, to catastrophic effect HSWs “have great kinetic energy to get through hardened target in light of their “sheer speed and force,” HSWs can be engineered to rely on kinetic energy alone, absent of conventional payloads all together . one goal envisioned for retaining a nuclear first-strike option include bolstering U.S. deterrence against both nuclear and non-nuclear attacks what if that intent to use was no longer based in a nuclear deterrent but rather in a non-nuclear, precision-guided HSW capable of undermining defense systems and smashing through hardened strategic targets ? The idea of integrating conventional systems into the broader U.S. deterrent strategy is not a new one and has been considered seriously by multiple U.S. administrations over the last two decades considerations present themselves most clearly with in promotion of Conventional Prompt Global Strike ( PGS if missiles could deliver their payloads more precisely to their target then they may not need the explosive yield of a nuclear weapon to destroy the target the substitution of conventional warheads for nuclear warheads in the U.S. war plan would require significant improvements in the accuracy two decades later it seems possible that the advent of highly maneuverable, precision-guided HSWs could finally carry out the mission Consider here a U.S. nuclear deterrent “tipped” by a conventional first-use system capable of travelling at hypersonic velocities while also maneuvering in flight, allowing for the “[ bypas sing of] modern layered missile defenses ” and ability to strike targets with greater precision non-nuclear HSWs could fill this role three attributes are listed which appear particularly relevant to a first-strike scenario: 1. Accurate Delivery 2. Penetrating The capacity to counter active and passive defenses, including hardened and buried facilities 3. Diverse and Graduated Options The ability to provide “the spectrum of yield options, weapon types, and delivery options non-nuclear HSWs sufficiently satisfy all three of these criteria the accuracy of hypersonic systems combined with their speed arguably places them with in the “Accurate Delivery” category, especially considering the minimal collateral damage , in addition to being designed to penetrate buried defenses a key defining factor of HSWs is their potential to evade existing missile defense systems “Penetrating.” conventional HSWs would help diversify the option set for “effective tailoring of strategies,” providing war planners and the president with a zero-yield choice. despite not being able to deliver the same amount of energy as a nuclear system, non-nuclear HSWs still may be able to take out a significant numbe r of strategic sites in a first-strike scenario it seems clear that the United States would be able to pack a punch with non-nuclear hypersonic systems in a first-strike scenario, all without resorting to nuclear war U.S. war planners have contemplated such a strategy in the past with arguably less advanced conventional systems a damaging non-nuclear option might present a more optimal strategic scenario not only equipping the United States with the ability to take out enemy strategic sites while keeping a conflict below the nuclear threshold but also preserving valuable nuclear assets if the conflict should escalate it may be possible to forego the nuclear first-strike option for an NFU policy tipped by non-nuclear HSWs . THE DOWNSIDE: HYPERSONIC “FALLOUT” conventional HSWs come with a type of fallout of their own: major concern s over stability , crisis management , and unintended conflict escalation the development of such technologies “threatens to outpace any real discussion about the potential perils of such weapons, including how they may disrupt efforts to avoid accidental conflict experts fear that highly maneuverable HSWs will induce a “ new arms race ,” threatening to “ upend existing norms of deterrence and renew Cold War-era tensions If an adversary detects the launch of a foreign missile headed in its direction, but has no way of tracking or intercepting it due to its hypersonic speed and unpredictable flight pattern , what is to stop that adversary from launch ing all its strategic assets at once , for fear of losing them in a potential nuclear strike?

should the United States declare a no-first-use (NFU) nuclear policy? HSWs unique unpredictable flight paths Mach 5 five times the speed of sound no existing anti-missile system U S devastating conventional attack within minutes relationship nuclear conventional evolving rapidly NPR role of nuc lear weapon s reduced non-nuclear elements take on a greater share ICBMs nuclear first-strike option deterrence against both nuclear and non-nuclear attacks integrating conventional systems into the broader U.S. deterrent strategy not a new one considered seriously by multiple U.S. administrations Conventional Prompt Global Strike substitution of conventional warheads for nuclear warheads require significant improvements conventional first-use system bypas sing of] modern layered missile defenses ” first-strike scenario: 1. Accurate Delivery 2. Penetrating 3. Diverse and Graduated Options HSWs sufficiently satisfy all three of these criteria “Accurate Delivery” minimal collateral damage penetrate buried defenses key defining factor evade existing missile defense systems “Penetrating.” non-nuclear HSWs significant numbe strategic sites in a first-strike scenario pack a punch with non-nuclear hypersonic systems war planners contemplated such a strategy with less advanced conventional systems non-nuclear option might present a more optimal strategic scenario forego the nuclear first-strike option for an NFU policy tipped by non-nuclear HSWs . THE DOWNSIDE: HYPERSONIC “FALLOUT” stability crisis management unintended conflict escalation new arms race upend existing norms of deterrence renew Cold War-era tensions no way of tracking or intercepting hypersonic speed unpredictable flight pattern launch all strategic assets fear of losing them in a potential nuclear strike?

['The 2020 U.S. presidential primary debates generated renewed public interest in a long deliberated question within the nuclear weapons landscape: should the United States declare a no-first-use (NFU) nuclear policy? The question over whether the United States should explicitly commit never to use nuclear weapons first in any conflict—including in response to a chemical, biological, cyber, or conventional attack—has been debated by more than one U.S. administration and was considered most seriously under President Barack Obama. While ultimately electing to stay with the traditional posture of “ambiguity” rather than adopt an NFU policy, through the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) President Obama committed the United States to “work to establish conditions under which such a policy could safely be adopted.”2 But what are those conditions exactly and how might they be established? ', 'Parallel to renewed debates on NFU is the advancement and pursuit by the United States of nonnuclear hypersonic weapons (HSWs). These highly maneuverable systems are unique in their ability to traverse unpredictable flight paths at speeds far greater than Mach 5, or five times the speed of sound. With no existing anti-missile system capable of intercepting projectiles maneuvering at such speeds, these weapons have the potential to provide the United States with the ability to hold hostage strategic targets thousands of miles away and to execute a devastating conventional attack within minutes.3 Could the advent of highly maneuverable HSWs help bring about the very conditions outlined in the 2010 NPR, wherein non-nuclear strategic systems play a meaningful role in strategic deterrence? Can the unique qualities of modern non-nuclear HSWs adequately replicate the strategic goals envisioned for U.S. nuclear weapons in a first-strike scenario, allowing the United States to finally declare a nuclear policy of NFU? ', 'This study examines the role of nuclear first-strike options in the U.S. deterrence strategy and explores whether non-nuclear HSWs, supplemented with additional measures to bolster extended deterrence, are sufficient to carry out the United States’ current first-use mission. Additionally, this study assesses the potential normative benefits of adopting an NFU policy, including raising U.S. moral credibility within the nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament arena and increasing U.S. bargaining power to negotiate verifiable arms control treaties with Russia and China. ', 'FIRST-USE AND DETERRENCE ', 'In order to assess the merits of an NFU policy, it is critical to understand the strategic purpose behind maintaining a first-use nuclear option in the first place. What role does retaining the right to use nuclear weapons first play in the U.S. deterrence strategy and how does it manifest itself? Can first-use be characterized as a physical capability or is it merely an intent? An examination of these questions will help establish a basis upon which to explore whether the nuclear first-use option can be replicated with a non-nuclear alternative. However, before proceeding, it is important to note that while twenty-first century concepts of deterrence have expanded to include considerations of non-military force such as cyber weapons, this work will focus on nuclear deterrence—defined as “the belief that nuclear weapons are so devastating that nuclear strikes must be avoided at almost any cost.”4 With this definition in mind, how does first-use fit into nuclear deterrence? ', 'Notably, the phrase “first-use” is rarely used to characterize current U.S. nuclear policy. Instead, the United States often refers to maintaining a policy of “ambiguity” in regard to the circumstances under which it would actually employ nuclear weapons, including in a first-strike scenario.5 Given that U.S. declaratory policy on the matter is literally defined by ambiguity, nailing down the underlying strategic purpose and the actual manifestation of first-use proves challenging. That said, an examination of official U.S. policy documents including NPRs as well as the works of government experts leads to at least three primary purposes of a “first-use” nuclear option. ', '1. A FACET OF BROADER NUCLEAR DETERRENCE ', 'In an elusive effort to outline the circumstances under which nuclear weapons might be employed, the 2018 NPR states that the United States “would only consider the employment of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States, its allies, and partners. Extreme circumstances could include significant non-nuclear strategic attacks.”6 In an only slightly more specific statement, the 2010 NPR states “there remains a narrow range of contingencies in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or CBW attack against the United States or its allies and partners.”7 In either case, there is no explicit reference to firstuse but rather a description of the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear threats. Such language could be characterized as retention of a first-use option—if an adversary attacks the United States with conventional weapons or non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), it should expect a possible nuclear response (i.e., first-use). ', 'The approach laid out in the 2010 and 2018 NPRs appear to focus on the need to retain the intent or option to use nuclear weapons in response to certain non-nuclear threats in order to bolster deterrence. Under this logic, “[s]trategic planners for nuclear weapons powers see the credible threat of the first-use of nuclear weapons as a powerful deterrent against a range of significant nonnuclear threats.”8 This line of thinking parallels opponents of NFU, who argue that in the absence of retaining a first-use option, “would-be aggressors . . . do not have to fear U.S. nuclear retaliation as long as they attack us or our allies with advanced conventional, chemical, and/or biological weapons.”9 Again, the underlying assumption is that U.S. nuclear weapons are critical to deterring nuclear and non-nuclear aggression. 10 ', 'But is the intent to use nuclear weapons first really irrevocably intertwined with successful deterrence? Can U.S. nuclear deterrence still function if the intent is not to use nuclear weapons first but rather a non-nuclear alternative such as an HSW capable of destroying an adversary’s strategic assets?11 Could the threat to employ non-nuclear HSWs in response to a non-nuclear attack prove more credible than the nuclear alternative? In her work, Therese Delpech points to the widespread assumption that “nuclear deterrence is not credible unless the actual use of nuclear weapons is contemplated.”12 This assumption, she argues, generates “little perceived difference between a doctrine of deterrence and a doctrine of actual use. This leads to the belief that nuclear deterrence is inseparable from a doctrine of use, when in fact the purpose of deterrence is to prevent use.”13 ', 'If the role of nuclear weapons was circumscribed to deterring adversary nuclear use, where any contemplation of use is limited to response to nuclear attack (or what the 2010 NPR refers to as “sole purpose”), how would U.S. deterrence be impacted and how might it adapt?14 Is there room for a non-nuclear supplement? From Delpech’s perspective, “the relationship between nuclear and conventional weapons is evolving rapidly, and new forms of deterrence are appearing, including those involving the offense-defense balance.”15 Similar thinking is prevalent throughout the 2010 NPR, which states, “[a]s the role of nuclear weapons is reduced in U.S. national security strategy . . . non-nuclear elements will take on a greater share of the deterrence burden.”16 ', 'Although superseded by the 2018 NPR, the 2010 NPR is not an outlier in suggesting that conventional weapons could play a meaningful role in strategic deterrence. In 2005, then commander of the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) General James Cartwright testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that “by replacing some nuclear weapons with conventional weapons in the U.S. strategic war plan the United States might be able to further reduce its reliance on, and, therefore, its number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons.”17 A 2009 congressional commission report led by William Perry and James R. Schlesinger acknowledges that nuclear posture is “not the only element of the U.S. strategic military posture, which also includes . . . non-nuclear means of strategic strike.”18 This thinking applies to extended deterrence as well. In 2016, then secretary of defense Ash Carter stated the United States was “refreshing NATO’s nuclear playbook to better integrate conventional and nuclear deterrence.”19 ', 'The above statements make clear that turning to non-nuclear means as a facet of U.S. strategic deterrence is not out of the realm of possibility and continues to be seriously contemplated at the highest levels of government. Thus, even in the absence of the intent to use nuclear weapons first, successful deterrence may be possible through the deployment of and threat to use alternative nonnuclear capabilities. However, the question of whether the right conventional weapons exist to fill the role intended for nuclear weapons in a first strike, in this case deterring an adversary’s non-nuclear attack, has always underlined the debate. This essay will consider whether non-nuclear HSWs are in fact the “right” weapon. ', '2. DISARMING FIRST STRIKE ', 'A second strategic goal historically envisioned for a nuclear first strike was preemptive disarming or debilitation of an enemy’s strategic forces. While this is not a stated goal of U.S. nuclear policy today, an examination of a 1962 declassified briefing by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to President John F. Kennedy on the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) suggests that during the Cold War, a disarming first strike against the Soviet Union was among the top priorities of U.S. strategic war planners. ', 'During this briefing, the JCS chairman explained that the SIOP “provid[ed] for the optimum employment of the US atomic delivery forces in the initial attack of strategic targets in the Sino-Soviet Bloc.”20 The 1962 SIOP was “designed for execution as a whole” and could be executed either “in retaliation to a Soviet nuclear strike of the US” or, notably, “as a preemptive measure.”21 Furthermore, the 1962 SIOP aimed to meet two objectives under either scenario: “a. To destroy or neutralize Sino-Soviet Bloc strategic nuclear delivery capability primary military and government controls of major importance;” and “b. To attack the major urban-industrial centers of the Sino-Soviet Bloc.”22 These objectives provide a small insight into the goals imagined for U.S. nuclear first strike during the Cold War. ', 'In another work examining the impact of HSWs on deterrence, Lieutenant Colonel Nathan Terry discusses the first-strike option in the context of “deterrence by denial,” or “removing ‘strategic options’ from the adversary.”23 Under this strategy, according to Terry, a first strike “successfully destroys or disables the adversary’s entire ICBM force.”24 Considering the potential objectives outlined above for a first strike, the question remains: could non-nuclear HSWs perform the role of a nuclear first strike, “destroy[ing] or neutraliz[ing]” an adversary’s strategic delivery capabilities to the same extent nuclear weapons could? The answer is likely not. However, if a critical number of sites could be held hostage, would that be enough? Could a first strike carried out by non-nuclear HSWs cause enough damage to an adversary’s strategic sites to deter or prevent retaliation, especially if backed by the threat of a second-strike nuclear deterrent? This question will be further explored in the section on HSWs. ', '3. EXTENDED DETERRENCE ', 'Perhaps the most important issue to consider in examining the role of the nuclear first-strike option in U.S. deterrence strategy is extended deterrence. According to the 2009 Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, “U.S. nuclear posture must be designed to address a very broad set of U.S. objectives, including not just deterrence of enemies in time of crisis and war but also assurance of our allies and dissuasion of potential adversaries.”25 By providing a reliable extended deterrent, the United States not only aims to dissuade adversaries from attacking allies or U.S. forces in allied territory but also to dissuade allies from developing their own domestic nuclear weapons programs, thereby stemming further nuclear proliferation. ', 'Both the 2010 and 2018 NPRs are explicit in their assessment of the important role U.S. nuclear weapons have played in extended deterrence. According to the 2010 NPR, “U.S. nuclear weapons have played an essential role in extending deterrence to U.S. allies and partners against nuclear attacks or nuclear-backed coercion by states in their region that possess or are seeking nuclear weapons.”26 Taking it a step further, the 2018 NPR argues “conventional forces alone do not adequately assure many allies and partners. Rather, these states place enormous value on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence.”27 ', 'While neither document disputes the right of the United States to respond in kind to a nuclear attack on an ally, the 2010 NPR flirts with the question of whether responding to a non-nuclear attack on an ally truly requires a nuclear response. As the 2010 NPR hints at, under the right conditions in the post-Cold War era, there may be room for restructuring the concept of extended deterrence. Under this restructuring, nuclear weapons would play the “sole purpose” of deterring a nuclear weapons attack and be bolstered by conventional forces which may be employed in response to a nonnuclear attack on allies. An extended deterrent structured in this manner could in theory create the conditions under which the United States might declare an NFU policy. ', 'To better understand the current U.S. position on the link between NFU and extended deterrence and whether there is room for this position to evolve, it is helpful to look at the genesis of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence during the Cold War. As both advocates and opponents of NFU will attest, the early years of the Cold War were defined by stark disparities between the West’s recovering postWWII forces and the Soviet Union’s superior conventional capabilities. Following the 1948 Berlin Crisis specifically, it became “clear that the Soviet Union was aggressive and the United States would be unable to stop it through conventional means alone.”28 The United States therefore “adopted a policy of using nuclear weapons to deter or respond to a Soviet invasion of Europe,” which included a promise “to respond to any Soviet attack with immediate and massive nuclear retaliation.”29 In advancing this policy, the United States aimed to assure allies in Europe while also discouraging them from pursuing nuclear weapons themselves.30 ', 'Such thinking led to the establishment of first-use as “a cornerstone of the defensive posture of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).”31 This posture persists today, manifest in NATO’s “flexible response” policy, which “allows the alliance to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into a conflict, including in reply to an attack with conventional weapons.”32 In addition to its European allies, the United States also extends deterrence to allies in East Asia and the Middle East, including South Korea and Japan, to “deter major nonnuclear threats against them.”33 ', 'While the threat of U.S. nuclear first-use as a component of the extended deterrence commitment to NATO allies during the Cold War may have been prudent, it is less clear whether such thinking remains applicable in the twenty-first century. As the 2010 NPR consents, in a post-Cold War world, the “advent of U.S. conventional military preeminence” has fostered in a new strategic environment in which the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in “deterring non-nuclear attacks . . . has declined significantly.”34 Experts advising Congress have reached similar conclusions, acknowledging that “the challenge of deterring Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional attack obviously disappeared.”35 ', 'Such statements are of course a decade old and fail to account for an evolved strategic environment in which China has continued to qualitatively and quantitatively improve its conventional and nuclear forces and Russia has carried out serious conventional offensives, including the invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. Even so, continued U.S. military dominance in the post-Cold War environment cannot be discounted. Furthermore, while not NATO members themselves, the invasions of Georgia and Ukraine occurred despite continued deployment of NATO nuclear forces in neighboring countries, potentially calling into question the effectiveness of these nuclear forces in deterring conventional attack in the region. ', 'Beyond European allies, many view the threat of first-use via extended deterrence as essential to assuring allies such as Japan and South Korea, as well as for minimizing incentives to pursue nuclear programs of their own.36 But the credibility of this first-use threat in response to a non-nuclear attack on an ally remains questionable. As Bernard Brodie, the father of deterrence, asked, “[w]e may be quite sure we will hit back if hit directly ourselves, but will we do so if any of our chief allies is attacked or threatened to attack?”37 ', 'Diving deeper into this question of credibility, Steve Fetter and Jon Wolfsthal examine scenarios in which allies such as Japan might expect the United States to use nuclear weapons in their defense, including in response to conventional attacks by North Korea. The authors conclude that there is no plausible scenario in which nuclear weapons would be expected or needed to be used to meaningfully retaliate against a non-nuclear attack by North Korea. They go on to argue, “if the United States and Japan do not believe that it would make sense to use nuclear weapons first, the threat to do so cannot be a credible deterrent to nonnuclear aggression by North Korea.”38 Furthermore, “making incredible threats weakens the credibility of other commitments. Abandoning incredible threats should make the remaining nuclear use scenarios, and therefore deterrence, more credible.”39 ', 'In bolstering their argument for the success of extended deterrence, opponents of NFU often point to nuclear threats the United States reportedly made during the Gulf War in response to concerns Saddam Hussein might employ chemical weapons. At the time, “Iraq seemed to understand that the threats of retaliation included nuclear weapons. This had an effect on its behavior during Operation Desert Storm, even if the U.S. message was more a bluff than the expression of precisely planned war operations.”40 In the early 1990s, it is possible that threats of nuclear first-use may have been the United States’ best option. Looking ahead two decades to the 2010 NPR, however, in this post-Cold War world the United States “continues[s] to strengthen conventional capabilities and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks.”41 As confidence in non-nuclear deterrent alternatives builds and reliable non-nuclear first-strike options diversify, it will be increasingly difficult to justify nuclear fist use in the extended deterrent context. ', 'It should be made clear here that eliminating the nuclear first-strike option from NATO doctrine and U.S. extended deterrence more broadly does not eliminate the nuclear second-strike option nor alter NATO’s identity as a nuclear alliance but rather reserves nuclear retaliation for response to a nuclear attack alone. Even still, if the United States forgoes the option of employing nuclear weapons in response to non-nuclear attack, deterrence must be bolstered in some other way. Here, the question must be asked: is there a credible non-nuclear supplement to nuclear deterrence? Specifically, are non-nuclear HSWs capable of replicating the contemporary strategic goals envisioned for U.S. nuclear weapons in a first strike, and therefore of becoming a viable replacement? ', 'HYPERSONIC WEAPONS (HSWS): A SOLUTION TO THE NFU PROBLEM? ', 'Often defined as vehicles or weapons systems capable of travelling faster than Mach 5, hypersonic systems have existed in the U.S. arsenal for decades, including in the form of intercontinental ballistic missile systems (ICBMs).42 However, advancements in technology have allowed for the onset of highly-maneuverable HSWs, which “combine the maneuverability and accuracy of cruise missiles with the long range and speed of ICBMs.”43 While many are still in the developmental stages, modern hypersonic systems are being designed to travel up to 25,000 kilometers per hour, or between one and five miles per second.44 Critically, these advanced systems can also be “maneuvered in ways that confound existing methods of defense and detection.”45 ', 'While an ICBM traditionally travels along a predictable parabolic arch, modern HSWs are designed to “fly at unusual altitudes – between a few tens of kilometers and 100 kilometers.”46 According to a study by R. Jeffrey Smith, this lower altitude flight path makes it “roughly 10 to 20 times harder to detect an incoming ballistic missile,” such that from the adversary’s perspective, the HSW’s potential landing zone might appear to be “about as big as Rhode Island.”47 Notably, according to Smith, these weapons fly below altitudes easily detectable by U.S. ballistic missile interceptors, including the Aegis and THAAD systems.48 ', 'In addition to their unique combination of speed and maneuverability, HSWs may be developed to deliver either nuclear or conventional payloads. While Russia has already introduced the nuclear Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle into its arsenal and China is also reportedly pursuing nuclearcapable hypersonic systems, the United States has notably chosen to focus development efforts on non-nuclear HSWs.49 Current systems under U.S. development include hypersonic boost-glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles. While the former relies on a conventional missile to “boost” the weapon into a low-altitude hypersonic trajectory, the latter is powered by air-breathing “scram jet” engines which use “shock waves created by [their] speed to compress incoming air in a short funnel and ignite it while passing by.”50 ', 'The logic for pursuing the non-nuclear path becomes clearer upon considering the sheer kinetic impact delivered by a system travelling at hypersonic speeds. According to Smith, conventional HSWs “function like nearly invisible power drills that smash holes in their targets, to catastrophic effect.”51 In his work on hypersonic boost-glide weapons, James Acton compares the top U.S. penetrator weapon, the GBU-57, or Massive Ordinance Penetrator, to a hypothetical boost-glide penetrator weapon. Based on the metrics of the U.S. Hypersonic Technology Vehicle-2, first tested in 2010, Acton estimates a hypersonic boost-glide penetrator could “penetrate more deeply than the Massive Ordnance Penetrator by a factor of 1.5 ± 0.4.”52 Finally, Air Force Chief Scientist Geoffrey Zacharias states that HSWs “have great kinetic energy to get through hardened targets.”53 In fact, in light of their “sheer speed and force,” HSWs can be engineered to rely on kinetic energy alone, absent of conventional payloads all together.54 ', 'Given their capacity to undermine defense systems and kinetic potential, could HSWs play a meaningful role in the U.S. strategic deterrent? As Smith asks, could conventional HSWs “undertake a task long imagined for nuclear arms: a first strike against another nation’s government or arsenals, interrupting key chains of communication and disabling some of its retaliatory forces, all without the radioactive fallout and special condemnation that might accompany the detonation of nuclear warheads”?55\xa0The following sections will examine this question through the lenses of the three possible roles envisioned for a nuclear first strike. ', '1. A FACET OF BROADER NUCLEAR DETERRENCE ', 'As noted earlier, one goal envisioned for retaining a nuclear first-strike option might include bolstering U.S. deterrence against both nuclear and non-nuclear attacks. If would-be aggressors believe the United States does not maintain the intent to use nuclear weapons in response to nonnuclear attacks, they may not be deterred from carrying out a non-nuclear strike. But what if that intent to use was no longer based in a nuclear deterrent but rather in a non-nuclear, precision-guided HSW capable of undermining defense systems and smashing through hardened strategic targets? ', 'The idea of integrating conventional systems into the broader U.S. deterrent strategy is not a new one and has been considered seriously by multiple U.S. administrations over the last two decades. These considerations present themselves most clearly within promotion of Conventional Prompt Global Strike (PGS), a system designed “to maintain and enhance its long-range strike capability so that it can strike anywhere in the world with forces that are based in or near the United States.”56 Within the context of this program, General James Cartwright testified to Congress in 2005 about the potential for the United States to develop a “New Triad Concept,” which “joined long-range nuclear-armed missiles with precision-strike conventional weapons in a category called offensive strike weapons.”57 During the testimony, General Cartwright and others suggested that “if missiles could deliver their payloads more precisely to their targets, then, for some categories of targets, they may not need the explosive yield of a nuclear weapon to destroy the target.”58 However, Cartwright emphasized at the time that “the substitution of conventional warheads for nuclear warheads in the U.S. war plan would require significant improvements in the accuracy of U.S. long-range ballistic missiles.”59 ', 'Nearly two decades later, it seems possible that the advent of highly maneuverable, precision-guided HSWs could finally carry out the mission envisioned by General Cartwright, wherein non-nuclear systems play a meaningful role within the broader U.S. strategic deterrent. Consider here a U.S. nuclear deterrent “tipped” by a conventional first-use system capable of travelling at hypersonic velocities while also maneuvering in flight, allowing for the “[bypassing of] modern layered missile defenses” and ability to strike targets with greater precision. Does this capability sufficiently fulfill the role designed for nuclear-armed ICBMs in a first strike? Would intent or threat to use such a capability effectively deter an adversary from launching a WMD or conventional strike on the United States? ', 'In terms of delivering the ability to wreak havoc on first-strike point targets (e.g., a silo, command center, or bunker), especially in a scenario in which the United States is responding to a non-nuclear attack, it seems possible that non-nuclear HSWs could fill this role. However, the question remains as to whether conventional HSWs could deliver the same “psychological effects associated with nuclear weapons,” a key facet of nuclear deterrence.60 While there would be no threat of nuclear fallout, a key psychological effect of nuclear weapons, it could be argued that the intent to use a conventional system in response to a non-nuclear attack, paired with the second-strike nuclear option (fallout and all), would be viewed by adversaries as more credible than the first-use of a nuclear weapon. Keeping in mind this non-nuclear first strike would be backed by the threat of a nuclear second strike, the enemy might be sufficiently deterred from launching a non-nuclear attack on the United States. If the enemy were to consider nuclear escalation, all the psychological effects of nuclear weapons would be back in play as part of a nuclear second strike. In this case, it seems possible the United States could retain a robust strategic deterrent while also declaring a nuclear NFU policy. ', '2. DISARMING FIRST STRIKE', ' While it seems possible conventional HSWs could be capable of fulfilling the role the nuclear first-strike option plays in bolstering the broader U.S. deterrent, it is less clear whether these systems could truly carry out a disarming first strike on a strategic adversary such as Russia. This is largely due to the fact that nuclear weapons can undoubtedly deliver more explosive power than any conventional system. It is therefore important to briefly consider the true kinetic impact of HSWs relative to nuclear weapons. ', 'There are varying estimates on the potential kinetic impact a HSW can deliver alone, absent of explosives. According to Smith, for example, the “missiles’ kinetic energy at the time of impact, at speeds of at least 1,150 miles per hour [between Mach 1-2], makes them powerful enough to penetrate any building material or armored plating with the force of three to four tons of TNT.”61 A RAND study estimates that a 500 kg mass travelling at Mach 8 can deliver the equivalent of around 3.5 metric tons of TNT.62 Notably, of the two hypersonic systems currently under U.S. development, one is being designed to “fly at speeds between Mach 15 and Mach 20, or more than 11,400 miles per hour,” presumably allowing for a higher kinetic impact, all without a conventional explosive payload.63 Even still, four tons of TNT (or even 400 tons) is nothing close to the equivalent of what even the earliest nuclear weapons could deliver. Little Boy for example, the novel gun-type device dropped on Hiroshima in 1945, carried the equivalent of 15,000 tons of TNT.64 But is that really the type of punch the United States would seek to deliver in a nuclear first strike in the post-Cold War era? ', 'In discussing the need for survivable and flexible nuclear forces, the 2018 NPR states that the U.S. nuclear triad is designed to provide “multiple options to deter effectively and respond as necessary to different threats and circumstances.”65 In this context, three attributes are listed which appear particularly relevant to a first-strike scenario: ', '1. Accurate Delivery: “The precision needed to hold adversary assets at risk while minimizing unintended effects”; ', '2. Penetrating: “The capacity to counter active and passive defenses, including hardened and buried facilities, to pose credible deterrent threats and achieve military objectives with high confidence”; and ', '3. Diverse and Graduated Options: The ability to provide “the spectrum of yield options, weapon types, and delivery options necessary to support the most effective tailoring of strategies across a range of adversaries and contingencies.”66 ', 'It seems possible that non-nuclear HSWs could sufficiently satisfy all three of these criteria. For example, the accuracy of hypersonic systems combined with their speed arguably places them within the “Accurate Delivery” category, especially considering the minimal collateral damage (“unintended effects”) delivered by a hypersonic system relative to a nuclear one. Furthermore, in addition to being designed to penetrate buried defenses, a key defining factor of HSWs is their potential to evade existing missile defense systems, both elements of “Penetrating.” Finally, conventional HSWs would help diversify the option set for “effective tailoring of strategies,” providing war planners and the president with a zero-yield choice. ', 'On the impact front, despite not being able to deliver the same amount of energy as a nuclear system, non-nuclear HSWs still may be able to take out a significant number of strategic sites in a first-strike scenario. For example, a study by industry analysts estimated that “between 10% and 30% of existing targets” in the U.S. war plan could be attacked with conventional weapons.”67 This estimate was made in 2005 in reference to PGS, prior to the advent of highly maneuverable HSWs, which, given their advanced features, might be capable of destroying an even higher percentage of targets. Even still, back in 2005 the PGS program aimed to provide the United States a “leading edge capability that degraded an opponent’s defenses,” including “ballistic missiles or caches of [WMD],” thereby allowing the United States to “destroy these weapons before an adversary could use them.”68 According to Acton, the “United States has stated explicitly that [conventional] PGS weapons could be acquired to target nuclear-armed ballistic missiles in North Korea and, perhaps in the future, Iran.”69 Such conventional missions appear comparable to those envisioned for a nuclear first strike. ', 'While not fully disarming, it seems clear that the United States would be able to pack a punch with non-nuclear hypersonic systems in a first-strike scenario, all without resorting to nuclear war.70 And notably, U.S. war planners have contemplated such a strategy in the past with arguably less advanced conventional systems. In the end, a damaging non-nuclear option might present a more optimal strategic scenario, not only equipping the United States with the ability to take out enemy strategic sites while keeping a conflict below the nuclear threshold but also preserving valuable nuclear assets if the conflict should escalate. Again, in this context it may be possible to forego the nuclear first-strike option for an NFU policy tipped by non-nuclear HSWs. ', '3. EXTENDED DETERRENCE ', 'As discussed earlier, advocates for a U.S. NFU policy often face the greatest opposition in two areas: (1) the policy’s potential to undermine extended deterrence assurances; and, as a result, (2) the ensuing domino effect of nuclear weapons development among allies. In addition, allies’ historical discomfort with U.S. deliberations over adopting an NFU policy cannot be ignored. In fact, allies such as South Korea, Japan, the United Kingdom, and France reportedly conveyed their concerns to President Obama when his administration was considering adopting an NFU policy in 2016.71 ', 'However, the question of credibility remains: would the United States actually employ nuclear weapons in response to a non-nuclear attack on allies? As many point out, while such a threat might be credible for deterring attack on the homeland, in the overseas context “it runs the risk of appearing as a hollow bluff to allies and adversaries alike.”72 The integration of non-nuclear strategic forces into the U.S. extended deterrent could help close this credibility gap. Specifically, it seems possible that the use of non-nuclear HSWs, capable of evading defense systems and penetrating strategic targets all at hypersonic speeds, could serve as a more credible, and therefore meaningful, extended deterrent. ', 'In order to understand how conventional HSWs might function as a valuable extended deterrent for U.S. allies, it is important to consider how such weapons might be deployed. In fact, many point to HSWs as providing an excellent “standoff capability,” where the sheer speed of these weapons provides “the ability to hold distant, time-critical, highly defended, fleeting targets at risk.”73 In discussing the Alternate Re-Entry System, an HSW under the Army’s development capable of being launched from bombers, Navy vessels, and the Army’s land launchers, Sydney Freedberg compares the versatile weapons system to a “sort of new non-nuclear triad.” In fact, according to Pentagon R&D officials, the United States has “land-, sea- and air-based prototyping that will be done” for HSWs.74 ', 'What does this mean for allies? These incredibly fast, accurate, and destructive systems could be deployed nearly anywhere in the world, from land, sea, or air. The United States could assure allies that this versatile non-nuclear system flying as fast as five miles per second would be capable of destroying enemy strategic targets within minutes, or even seconds, depending on how closely they were deployed to targets. Additionally, according to Brad Roberts, former deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense, allowing allies such as Japan to maintain conventional strike systems capable of defeating adversary anti-access/area denial strategies could play a meaningful role “in reducing the confidence of enemy leaders that they could strike Japan or U.S. forces in Japan without the risk of a strong Japanese response,” thereby bolstering deterrence.75 On paper, the destructive and precision-based potential of non-nuclear HSWs, combined with a possibly more credible threat of use as compared to nuclear first-use, might provide a satisfactory alternative for allies. But is it enough? ', 'Both the 2010 and 2018 NPRs support negative security assurances as part of U.S. nuclear declaratory policy, wherein the United States commits “not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.”76 But what about an additional explicit positive security assurance, under which the United States commits bilaterally with allies such as Japan or South Korea to respond to a nuclear attack on their soil with nuclear weapons? Such a commitment in writing might serve to reinforce and therefore reassure allies of the unambiguous and continued U.S. commitment to extend its nuclear deterrent to prevent nuclear warfare while also extending a new, non-nuclear hypersonic deterrent against non-nuclear attacks. Under these conditions, it may be possible for the United States to declare a policy of NFU while also assuring allies and discouraging them from pursuing their own nuclear programs. ', 'NORMATIVE CURRENCY: THE BENEFITS OF DECLARING A POLICY OF NFU', ' While thus far this work has focused on the possibility of replicating a nuclear first-use mission with non-nuclear HSWs, it has yet to consider the possible benefits associated with adopting a nuclear NFU policy. Is it possible that by adopting an NFU policy the United States could enhance its national security by raising its moral credibility among international peers, providing it with the normative currency to increase its bargaining power in the nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament arena? ', 'The 2010 NPR states that “[b]y reducing the role and numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons we can put ourselves in a much stronger position to persuade our NPT partners to join with us in adopting the measures needed to reinvigorate the non-proliferation regime and secure nuclear materials worldwide.”77 Since the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the United States has continued to struggle to convince Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) of the meaningful steps it has taken toward meeting its Article VI disarmament obligations. If the United States were to adopt an NFU policy, replacing its nuclear first-use mission with non-nuclear HSWs, it could demonstrate progress toward nuclear disarmament by reducing the role of nuclear weapons in its national security strategy all while creating new strategic options for defending the homeland. This in turn could provide it with additional moral credibility or what this study calls “normative currency” to bargain for the adoption of stronger nonproliferation measures to meaningfully curb the spread of nuclear technology to bad actors. ', 'In addition to bolstering U.S. moral credibility among NPT member states, adopting an NFU policy could also help improve allies’ standing within the NPT fora and their own civil societies well known for opposition to nuclear weapons. In Japan, for example, the government’s nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament policy is grounded in its 1968 “Three Non-Nuclear Principles,” under which it “pledges not to manufacture, possess, or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons onto Japanese soil.”78 However, the principles come with a major caveat: reliance on the extended U.S. nuclear deterrent. By offering an alternative form of extended deterrence to allies, the United States could bolster arguments for the non-nuclear option by pointing to the moral credibility allies could gain within their domestic constituencies and at the United Nations. With Japan in particular, the United States could be offering the opportunity for Tokyo to finally be the true champion of global nuclear disarmament. ', 'Finally, adoption of an NFU policy could serve as a bargaining chip to bring nuclear powers such as China and Russia to the table to negotiate new verifiable arms control agreements. While a top criticism of NFU is the inability to verify its implementation, a U.S. willingness to adopt NFU after so many years of opposition could help bolster the global norm that nuclear weapons are reserved solely for deterring nuclear attack. Such a move could generate value in the eyes of certain nuclear powers, mollifying growing resistance to negotiating verifiable nuclear arms reductions. ', 'As the original advocate of NFU, China has continued to maintain the policy since its first nuclear test in 1964.79 According to China’s 2019 Defense White Paper, “China is always committed to a nuclear policy of no first-use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon free zones unconditionally.”80 Furthermore, in a testament to the value China places on NFU, it has long advocated other nuclear states declare NFU policies as well, going so far as to call on NWS to negotiate a “Treaty on Mutual No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons.”81 While the Russian record on NFU is not nearly as robust as China’s, the Soviet Union did maintain an NFU pledge between 1982 and 1991, and the Russian Federation between 1992 and 1993.82 Notably, however, many argue that the NFU pledge was never viewed as credible and instead served as “a propaganda move aimed at the antinuclear movements in the West, and not as a credible policy.”83 Even still, the decision to take the pledge suggests the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation saw some normative value in maintaining an NFU policy, even if just to buy credibility among Western antinuclear groups. ', 'Given the value China in particular has placed on NFU, it seems possible that a U.S. move to declare an NFU policy could entice China to the arms control negotiating table. If the United States were to back China’s mutual NFU treaty, would China consider discussions to limit or control its nuclear cache, something it is historically reticent to pursue while the United States and Russia maintain much larger strategic stockpiles? And if China expressed an interest in coming to the table to discuss limits on strategic weapons, would Russia be more willing to back U.S. efforts to secure a trilateral U.S.-Russia-China arms control treaty? While declarations of NFU are not necessarily verifiable, such a pledge by the United States could serve as a catalyst for the negotiation of truly verifiable treaties. ', 'THE DOWNSIDE: HYPERSONIC “FALLOUT”', ' While highly maneuverable conventional HSWs do not deliver the lethal radioactive fallout associated with nuclear weapons, they do come with a type of fallout of their own: major concerns over stability, crisis management, and unintended conflict escalation. As Smith points out, the development of such technologies “threatens to outpace any real discussion about the potential perils of such weapons, including how they may disrupt efforts to avoid accidental conflict, especially during crises.”84 ', 'Examining the potential instability affiliated with the introduction of modern HSW systems, conventional or nuclear, into the U.S. or any other country’s arsenal is not the focus of this work. In part, this is because there is already a host of literature on this topic.85 Furthermore, this work focuses on the potential to replicate and replace a mission already associated with instability and crisis escalation—the first-use of nuclear weapons. However, it is important to briefly consider the impact negative perceptions of HSWs might have on any potential normative currency to be gained with elevating them to the first-use mission. ', 'As noted above, many point to the potential for HSWs to introduce a dangerous degree of volatility into strategic stability. As Smith highlights, experts fear that highly maneuverable HSWs will induce a “new arms race,” threatening to “upend existing norms of deterrence and renew Cold War-era tensions.”86 The point is a fair one. If an adversary detects the launch of a foreign missile headed in its direction, but has no way of tracking or intercepting it due to its hypersonic speed and unpredictable flight pattern, what is to stop that adversary from launching all its strategic assets at once, for fear of losing them in a potential nuclear strike? Is it possible for the United States to dispel such perceived notions of instability? ']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Kansas-LoPh-Neg-06---CEDA-Round-5.docx

Kansas

LoPh

cd137dad5f92388e00914f4bac7ac5c00989825330e5b62212df945c3d0b63c8

The text of the resolution calls for debate on hypothetical government action.

Ericson 3 (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

each topic contains key elements An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” should urges action should adopt a policy The debate is about whether something ought to occur .

each topic contains certain key elements 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should that urges action For example, should adopt means to put a policy into action though governmental means The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur .

['The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose. ', '']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Kansas-PaMa-Neg-JW-Patterson-Debates-hosted-by-UK-Round-1.docx

Kansas

PaMa

33711c1f53d62c949fb96134201f4e0037cd9d5492b05e09f94d94a8672cdc84

Extended deterrence defies basic logic.

Stephen M. Walt 21. Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. “It’s Time to Fold America’s Nuclear Umbrella.” https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/23/its-time-to-fold-americas-nuclear-umbrella/.

convincing allies you mean it is challenging would a U.S. president risk Washington to save Paris answer was “no.” Extended deterrence isn’t credible first-strike not usable wouldn’t risk New York if first strike turned out to be less effective you’d be a fool This casts doubt on extended deterrence number of nuclear states crept upward increasing size of arsenals serious rifts continue to grow

deterring a conventional or a nuclear attack on an ally by threatening to go nuclear—and convincing your allies that you really mean it — is more challenging would a U.S. president really risk Washington or Chicago to save Paris or Berlin answer was almost certainly “no.” Extended deterrence isn’t as credible true first-strike capability not as a usable option you wouldn’t want to risk losing New York , Los Angeles, Chicago, Boston, or any other major U.S. city, which is what might happen if that first strike you authorized turned out to be just a tiny bit less effective than your advisors predicted , you’d have to believe the proposed attack would work perfectly the very first time it was executed almost all of the missiles and bombs that have been sitting in silos or storage facilities for years would work as designed, and the other side wouldn’t have dispersed its own forces or hidden some extra weapons in places you had failed to detect you’d be a fool to roll the dice in this way As first-strike capabilities improve adversaries respond by keeping forces on higher alert adopting “launch-on-warning” procedures increase the risk of accidental or inadvertent war it’s hard to see how any president would be willing to use nukes first even if the probability of “success” was extremely high This casts further doubt on the whole idea of extended deterrence the nuclear weapons environment has changed: The number of nuclear -armed states has crept upward , and several countries increasing the size of their own arsenals the United States is not as tightly coupled to some of its traditional allies serious rifts may continue to grow

is more challenging answer was almost certainly “no.” isn’t as credible not as a usable option you’d be a fool to roll the dice in this way adopting “launch-on-warning” procedures accidental inadvertent casts further doubt serious rifts may continue to grow

['By contrast, deterring a conventional or a nuclear attack on an ally by threatening to go nuclear—and convincing your allies that you really mean it—is more challenging. It is one thing to threaten to use nuclear weapons to keep one’s own country from being subjugated but quite another to do so to save an ally from defeat or domination. Or, as people used to wonder back in the Cold War, would a U.S. president really risk Washington or Chicago to save Paris or Berlin? Long after they had left office, a few former U.S. officials suggested the answer was almost certainly “no.” Extended deterrence could still work because potential attackers can’t be sure about any of this, but it still isn’t as credible as deterring attacks on one’s own territory. The solution to this conundrum—if one can call it that—is to achieve overwhelming “nuclear superiority.” If you could wipe out an adversary’s entire nuclear force in a first strike, you wouldn’t have to fear its retaliation, and using nuclear weapons to defend an ally would be much more credible. Even if a splendid first strike were not possible, perhaps you could convince a potential attacker that it will end up even worse off than you are at the end of a nuclear war to convince it not to put so much as a toe on the first rung of the escalation ladder. Thus, the perceived need to extend deterrence is one of the reasons why the United States has long sought nuclear superiority. It’s not the only reason: A genuine first strike capability could limit damage in the event of an actual war. A few commentators have also tried to argue—not very convincingly—that superiority would enable the stronger side to coerce weaker states in crises. Chasing the holy grail of a first-strike advantage was also popular with defense contractors and parts of the armed services because it requires spending billions of dollars annually on more and more accurate weapons, more efficient and destructive warheads, improved surveillance and anti-submarine warfare capabilities, and lots of other shiny objects. Interestingly, a number of sophisticated scholars have recently claimed that technological advances have put the United States on the brink of a true first-strike capability. Perhaps in theory, but certainly not as a usable option. To see why, ask yourself what you would do if you were president and facing a serious crisis with a nuclear-armed adversary. You’ve put the armed services on alert, and there is some danger that force might be used and fighting could escalate. Suppose your military advisors and intelligence experts tell you if you order a first strike now, you can almost certainly destroy the enemy’s entire nuclear arsenal, leaving the United States unscathed and in an ideal position to resolve the dispute on favorable terms. Being a sensible person, you’d undoubtedly ask them: “Can you guarantee that? Are you absolutely, 100 percent sure the enemy will have zero usable weapons left, and therefore, we won’t even get our hair mussed?” “We are highly confident of success,” you are told. “But there is a slim chance that a few enemy weapons would survive and reach U.S. soil. No more than one to three.” Even if you weren’t troubled by the moral issues involved in ordering an attack that would kill untold numbers of people (and you ought to be), would you do it? Of course you wouldn’t, because you wouldn’t want to risk losing New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Boston, or any other major U.S. city, which is what might happen if that first strike you authorized turned out to be just a tiny bit less effective than your advisors predicted. To issue a launch order, you’d have to believe the proposed attack would work perfectly the very first time it was executed (simulations and exercises aren’t the same), almost all of the missiles and bombs that have been sitting in silos or storage facilities for years would work as designed, and the other side wouldn’t have dispersed its own forces or hidden some extra weapons in places you had failed to detect. Based on everything the United States’ knows about complex military operations and the limits of intelligence, you’d be a fool to roll the dice in this way. One more thing: As first-strike capabilities improve, adversaries may respond by keeping forces on higher alert or adopting “launch-on-warning” procedures that increase the risk of accidental or inadvertent war. No matter what U.S. forces are capable of in theory, in short, it’s hard to see how any president would be willing to use nukes first even if the probability of “success” was extremely high. This reality casts further doubt on the whole idea of extended deterrence, insofar as it is based on the threat to deliberately escalate to the nuclear level if a key ally is in danger of being conquered. Extending a protective umbrella over allies in Europe and Asia may have made good sense during the Cold War, both to protect them and to discourage proliferation. But the nuclear weapons environment has changed: The number of nuclear-armed states has crept upward, and several countries (India, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom) are increasing the size of their own arsenals (though they remain far lower than U.S. or Russian levels). Moreover, the United States is not as tightly coupled to some of its traditional allies as it was during the Cold War, and serious rifts may continue to grow despite the Biden administration’s efforts to restore alliance solidarity and reassert U.S. leadership.']

[(11, 18)]

ndtceda

Emory-MoSa-Aff-Kentucky-Round-1.docx

Emory

MoSa

0293e6297e74141e794a4a48047d34b3e49c771b9d3f86e361cb83ab01be71aa

Their evidence is aspirational. Countries decide nuclear policy based on self-interest, NOT the US.

Keith Payne 15, PhD, Professor and Head of the Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, “US Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence”, Air & Space Power Journal, July-August 2015, pg. 65-67 [italics in original]

how cooperative norm will be a reality unhappy history of unmet claims Russian military actions are sufficient ev to demonstrate states will continue to demand nuc s for protection decades of US reductions have no effect Neither led to any strengthening of nonprolif want U S to lead by example but no one is following leaders make decisions based on strategic needs not in deference to America’ leaders do not emulate US behavior

how and when a cooperative international norm will be come a reality point to the unhappy history of the unmet claims and dashed hopes of Kellogg-Briand Pact the League of Nations and the U N realists want to see some clear evidence of the emerging transformation of the global order Russian military actions against Georgia and Ukraine are sufficient empirical ev idence to demonstrate Thucydides ’ stark description is alive and well China’s expansionist claims and military pressure against its neighbors teach the same lesson states with the capability and felt need will continue to demand nuc lear capabiliti e s for their own protection This reality stands in stark contrast to utopian claims that norms and international institutions will reorder the international system and allow individual states to dispense with nuclear weapons The U S decided to be highly revealing of its nuclear capabilities to encourage others to do so with no apparent effect decades of deep US reductions appear to have had no moderating effect on Russian Chinese or North Korean programs Neither have U.S. reductions led to any effective strengthening of international nonprolif efforts Utopians want the U S to lead the world toward nuclear disarmament by good example but no one is following foreign leaders make decisions about nuclear weaponry based on their countries strategic needs not in deference to America’ s penchant for nuclear disarmament leaders do not seek to emulate US nuclear behavior they formulate policy based primarily on their assessment of the security threats

reality Kellogg-Briand Pact League of Nations U N clear evidence sufficient empirical ev idence Thucydides alive and well expansionist claims continue stark contrast reorder dispense highly revealing encourage others no apparent effect no moderating effect any effective strengthening good example no one is following their countries strategic needs not deference emulate security threats

['Realists in this regard are from Missouri, the “show me” state, and ask utopians to explain how, why, and when a powerful new cooperative international norm with corresponding international institutions will become a reality. Realists point to the unhappy history of the unmet claims and dashed hopes of the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact (intended to prevent offensive war by global legal agreement), the League of Nations, and the United Nations. To be sure, the future does not have to be bound by the past, but before moving further toward nuclear disarmament, realists want to see some clear evidence of the emerging transformation of the global order—not just the claim that it can occur if all key leaders are so willing, faithful, and visionary and can “embrace a politics of impossibility.”12 As the old English proverb says, “If wishes were horses, then beggars would ride.” ', 'But has not everything changed in the twenty-first century? Has not the end of the Cold War ushered in a new global commitment to cooperation, the rule of law globally, and benign conflict resolution? The unarguable answer is no. Russian military actions against Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine since 2014 (the latter in direct violation of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum signed by Russia, Great Britain, and the United States) are sufficient empirical evidence to demonstrate that Thucydides’ stark description of reality is alive and well. China’s expansionist claims and military pressure against its neighbors in the East and South China Seas teach the same lesson. ', 'Why is this reality significant in the consideration of nuclear weapons? Because in the absence of reliably overturning the powerful norm of raison d’État and Thucydides’ explanation of international relations, states with the capability and felt need will continue to demand nuclear capabilities for their own protection and, in some cases, to provide cover for their expansionist plans. To wit, if Ukraine had retained nuclear weapons, would it now fear for its survival at the hands of Russian aggression? Former Ukrainian defense minister Valeriy Heletey and members of the Ukrainian parliament have made this point explicitly, lamenting Ukraine’s transfer of its nuclear forces to Russia in return for now-broken security promises of the Budapest Memorandum.13 ', 'This lesson cannot have been lost on other leaders considering the value of nuclear weapons. Nor is it a coincidence that US allies in Central Europe and Asia are becoming ever more explicit about their need for US nuclear assurances under the US extended nuclear deterrent (i.e., the nuclear umbrella). They see no new emerging, powerful global collective security regime or cooperative norms that will preserve their security; thus, they understandably seek the assurance of power, including nuclear power. The Polish Foreign Ministry observed in a recent press release that “the current situation reaffirms the importance of NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy.”14 This reality stands in stark contrast to utopian claims that powerful new global norms and international institutions will reorder the international system, overturn Thucydides, and allow individual states to dispense with nuclear weapons or the nuclear protection of a powerful ally. As the Socialist French president Francois Hollande has said, “The international context does not allow for any weakness. . . . The era of nuclear deterrence is therefore not over. . . . In a dangerous world—and it is dangerous—France does not want to let down its guard. . . . The possibility of future state conflicts concerning us directly or indirectly cannot be excluded.”15 There could be no clearer expression of Thucydides’ description of international relations and its contemporary implications for nuclear weapons. ', 'Opponents of the administration’s plan to modernize the US triad now double down on the utopian narrative by insisting that the United States instead lead the way in establishing the new global norm by showing that Washington no longer relies on nuclear weapons and does not seek new ones. Washington cannot expect others to forgo nuclear weapons if it retains them, they say, and thus it must lead in creation of the new norm against nuclear weapons by providing an example to the world. For instance, “by unilaterally reducing its arsenal to a total of 1,000 warheads, the United States would encourage Russia to similarly reduce its nuclear forces without waiting for arms control negotiations.”16 A good US example supposedly can help “induce parallel” behavior in others.17 If, however, the United States attributes continuing value to nuclear weapons by maintaining its arsenal, “other countries will be more inclined to seek” them.18 ', 'Nuclear realists respond, however, that the United States already has reduced its nuclear forces deeply over the last 25 years. America cut its tactical nuclear weapons from a few thousand in 1991 to a “few hundred” today.19 Moreover, US-deployed strategic nuclear weapons have been cut from an estimated 9,000 in 1992 to roughly 1,600 accountable warheads today, with still more reductions planned under the New START Treaty.20 The United States has even decided to be highly revealing of its nuclear capabilities to encourage others to do so, with no apparent effect on Russia, China, or North Korea.21 America has adhered fully to the reductions and restrictions of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty—the “centerpiece of arms control”—but the Russians now are in open violation. As former undersec-retary of state Robert Joseph stated recently, decades of deep US reductions “appear to have had no moderating effect on Russian, Chinese or North Korean nuclear programs. Neither have U.S. reductions led to any effective strengthening of international nonproliferation efforts.”22 Utopians want the United States to lead the world toward nuclear disarmament by its good example, but no one is following. ', 'The basic reason, realists point out, is that foreign leaders make decisions about nuclear weaponry based largely on their countries’ strategic needs, raison d’État, not in deference to America’s penchant for nuclear disarmament or some sense of global fairness. A close review of India by S. Paul Kapur, for example, concluded that “Indian leaders do not seek to emulate US nuclear behavior; they formulate policy based primarily on their assessment of the security threats facing India.”23 The same self-interested calculation is true for other nuclear and aspiring nuclear states. ']

[(6, 14)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-AdMc-Neg-Indiana-Round-5.docx

Kentucky

AdMc

dea1b01db41f6f28a7cd3e54a79ccd0d3e182b7c74efe7fba342a092c3968ef5

International governance stops extinction.

Brooks ’14 [Rosa; November 14; Professor of Law at Georgetown University, Senior Fellow with the New America and Arizona State University Future of War Project, former Senior Advisor at the U.S. State Department; Foreign Policy, “Embrace the Chaos,” https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/14/embrace-the-chaos/]

risk of catastrophe increased life has gotten better war killed millions , but conflict declined The modern order beats world wars advances brought prosperity alliances rights and movements interconnectedness enables disease and conflict to spread we worry about bio threats and cyberattacks states destroy the human race though nuclear conflict We have no comparison for understanding risks the U S remains powerful Empires should prefer rules and institutions that will maximize America U.S. strategy should creat an equitable order with effective governance built upon human rights , and rule of law for resolving problems international governance would become our highest priority

The last century’s technological revolutions made our world more globally interconnected than ever day-to-day life is far less dangerous than in previous eras; for the species as a whole the risk of future global catastrophe has increased The world has grown more complex We’ve got 7 billion people living in 192 U.N. member states life has gotten substantially better in this interconnected era. Seventy years ago , global war killed scores of millions , but interstate conflict declined sharply since the end of World War II, and the creation of the U N ushered in democratic international governance militarily powerful states are far less free than in the pre-U.N. era to use overt force and the world now has numerous transna tional courts and dispute-resolution bodies that collectively offer a viable alternative to the use of force. The modern international order is no global utopia , but it sure beats colonial domination and world wars advances brought unprecedented health and prosperity communications enabled cross-border alliances empowering global human rights and environmental movements this has had a dark side As access to knowledge has been democratized, so has access to the tools of violence and destruction, and greater interconnectedness enables disease , pollution , and conflict to spread quickly and easily beyond borders we have to worry about massive bio engineered threats and globally devastating cyberattacks from a species-survival perspective, the world has grown vastly more dangerous a small number of states possess the unprecedented ability to destroy the human race all in a matter of hours though the near-term threat of interstate nuclear conflict diminished since the Cold War, nuclear material and know-how are less controlled We have no points of comparison for understanding the scale and scope of the risks faced by humanity today the events of the century have taken place in the blink of an eye . This should give when we’re tempted to conclude trends are likely to continue a century of rising life expectancy could be a mere blip on the charts That’s why one can’t dismiss the risk of catastrophic events as “high consequence, low probability.” pressure may be building up over time, undetected the good news is the U S remains an extraordinarily powerful nation The U S has “the most powerful military in history,” The U.S. military can get to more places, faster, with more effective weapons, than any military on Earth U.S. power and global influence have been declining because various weak states have been growing stronger, and no state can be autonomous globalization reduced every state’s autonomy, creating collective challenges — from climate change to capital — that no state can fully address global influence declined in absolute terms This domestic decline makes American systems less appealing to others The U S still has unprecedented power to destroy But the country’s capacity for destruction is not equaled by its capacity to shape the behavior of other states and the U S has less and less ability to insulate itself from the world’s woes Continued U.S. decline is not inevitable uncertainty should be a lodestone , pointing realists toward a sensible, forward-looking global strategy This has obvious implications for global strategy Empires that refuse to accept reality tend to rapidly decline . A clear-eyed acceptance of uncertainty is the surest route to a more secure future uncertainty should motivate strategic planning the U S should prefer international rules and institutions that will maximize America ’s odds of thriving in a worst-case future scenario This has urgent implications for strategic planning because U.S. global power may continue to decline, the U S should use power to foster the international order likely to benefit the country if it loses that power The ultimate objective of U.S. grand strategy should be creat ion of an equitable and peaceful international order with an effective system of global governance — one built upon respect for human dignity , human rights , and the rule of law , with robust mechanisms for resolving collective problems If we take seriously the many potential dangers lurking in the future fostering a stronger , fairer , and more effective system of international governance would become our highest strategic priority An effective global governance system would need to be built upon the recognition that states remain the primary mode of organization in the international sphere An effective international system will develop innovative ways to bring actors within the ambit of international law as responsible institutions

technological revolutions globally interconnected far less dangerous species as a whole future global catastrophe substantially better Seventy years ago scores of millions interstate conflict international governance far less free overt force tional courts no global utopia colonial domination world wars unprecedented health prosperity cross-border alliances human rights dark side tools of violence disease pollution conflict easily beyond borders bio engineered threats devastating cyberattacks species-survival vastly more dangerous destroy the human race interstate nuclear conflict no points of comparison scale scope of the risks blink of an eye mere blip on the charts can’t dismiss the risk good news extraordinarily powerful declining no state collective challenges absolute terms domestic decline not equaled shape the behavior less and less ability not inevitable lodestone global strategy obvious implications refuse to accept reality rapidly decline surest route international rules maximize America ’s odds urgent implications international order equitable peaceful effective system global governance built upon respect human dignity human rights rule of law collective problems potential dangers stronger fairer more effective international governance highest strategic priority global governance system within the ambit

['I. The Character of the Mess', 'Defining the character of the current mess is the easy part. Briefly:', 'The last century’s technological revolutions have made our world more globally interconnected than ever.', 'Power (along with access to power) has become more democratized and diffuse in some ways, but more concentrated in other ways.', 'For most individuals around the globe, day-to-day life is far less dangerous and brutal than in previous eras; for the species as a whole, however, the risk of future global catastrophe has increased.', 'The continuously accelerating rate of technological and social change makes it increasingly difficult to predict the geopolitical future.', 'Nothing is particularly original about these observations; they’re repeated in some fashion in every major national strategic document produced over the last decade. They probably teach this stuff to kindergarteners now. Indeed, we’ve heard it all so often that it’s tempting to dismiss such claims as meaningless platitudes:\xa0Been there; theorized that. Can we get please get back to foreign-policy business as usual?', 'No, we can’t. Not if we want our children and grandchildren to live decent lives. If we care about the future at all, we need to do more than prattle on at cocktail parties about globalization, interconnectedness, complexity, danger, and uncertainty. We need to feel these seismic changes in our bones.', 'So bear with me. Let’s try to breathe some life into the clichés.', 'I’ve written about these issues before (here\xa0and\xa0here), and at risk of being both a narcissist and a broken record, I’ll\xa0quote myself:', 'The world has grown more complex.\xa0Believe it. The world now contains more people living in more states than ever before, and we’re all more interconnected. A hundred years ago, the world population was about 1.8 billion, there were roughly 60\xa0sovereign states\xa0in the world, the automobile was still a rarity, and there were no commercial passenger flights and no transcontinental telephone service. Fifty years ago, global population had climbed to more than 3 billion and there were 115\xa0U.N. member states, but air travel was still for the wealthy and the personal computer still lay two decades in the future.', 'Today? We’ve got 7 billion people living in 192 U.N. member states and a handful of other territories. These 7 billion people take 93,000 commercial flights\xa0a day from 9,000 airports, drive 1 billion\xa0cars, and carry 7 billion\xa0mobile phones\xa0around with them.', 'In numerous ways, life has gotten substantially better in this more crowded and interconnected era. Seventy years ago, global war killed scores of millions, but interstate conflict has\xa0declined\xa0sharply since the end of World War II, and the creation of the United Nations ushered in a far more egalitarian and democratic form of international governance than existed in any previous era. Today, militarily powerful states are far less free than in the pre-U.N. era to use overt force to accomplish their aims, and the world now has numerous transnational courts and dispute-resolution bodies that collectively offer states a viable alternative to the use of force. The modern international order is no global utopia, but it sure beats colonial domination and world wars.', 'In the 50 years that followed World War II, medical and agricultural advances brought unprecedented health and prosperity to most parts of the globe. More recently, the communications revolution has enabled exciting new forms of nongovernmental cross-border alliances to emerge, empowering, for instance, global human rights and environmental movements. In just the last two decades, the near-universal penetration of mobile phones has had a powerful leveling effect: All over the globe, people at every age and income level can use these tiny but powerful computers to learn foreign languages, solve complex mathematical problems, create and share videos, watch the news, move money around, or communicate with far-flung friends.', 'All this has had a dark side, of course. As access to knowledge has been democratized, so too has access to the tools of violence and destruction, and greater global interconnectedness enables disease, pollution, and conflict to spread quickly and easily beyond borders. A hundred years ago, no single individual or nonstate actor could do more than cause localized mayhem; today, we have to worry about massive bioengineered threats created by tiny terrorist cells and globally devastating cyberattacks devised by malevolent teen hackers.', 'Even as many forms of power have grown more democratized and diffuse, other forms of power have grown\xa0more\xa0concentrated. A very small number of states control and consume a disproportionate share of the world’s resources, and a very small number of individuals control most of the world’s wealth. (According to a 2014 Oxfam\xa0report, the 85 richest individuals on Earth are worth more than the globe’s 3.5 billion poorest people).', 'Indeed, from a species-survival perspective, the world has grown vastly more dangerous over the last century. Individual humans live longer than ever before, but a small number of states now possess the unprecedented ability to destroy large chunks of the human race and possibly the Earth itself — all in a matter of days or even hours. What’s more, though the near-term threat of interstate nuclear conflict has greatly diminished since the end of the Cold War, nuclear material and know-how are now both less controlled and less controllable.', 'Amid all these changes, our world has also grown far more\xa0uncertain. We possess more information than ever before and vastly greater processing power, but the\xa0accelerating pace\xa0of global change has far exceeded our collective ability to understand it, much less manage it. This makes it increasingly difficult to make predictions or calculate risks. As I’ve\xa0written previously:', 'We literally have no points of comparison for understanding the scale and scope of the risks faced by humanity today. Compared to the long, slow sweep of human history, the events of the last century have taken place in the blink of an eye. This should … give us pause when we’re tempted to conclude that today’s trends are likely to continue. Rising life expectancy? That’s great, but if climate change has consequences as nasty as some predict, a century of rising life expectancy could turn out to be a mere blip on the charts. A steep decline in interstate conflicts? Fantastic, but less than 70 years of human history isn’t much to go on….', 'That’s why one can’t dismiss the risk of catastrophic events [such as disastrous climate change or nuclear conflict] as “high consequence, low probability.” How do we compute the probability of catastrophic events of a type that has never happened? Does 70 years without nuclear annihilation tell us that there’s a low probability of nuclear catastrophe — or just tell us that we haven’t had a nuclear catastrophe yet?…', 'Lack of catastrophic change might signify a system in stable equilibrium, but sometimes — as with earthquakes — pressure may be building up over time, undetected….', 'Most analysts assumed the Soviet Union was stable — until it collapsed. Analysts predicted that Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak would retain his firm grip on power — until he was ousted. How much of what we currently file under “Stable” should be recategorized under “Hasn’t Collapsed Yet”?', 'This, then, is the character of world messiness in this first quarter of the 21st century. So on to the next question: Where, in all this messiness, does the United States find itself?', 'II. The United States in the Mess: Goodbye, Lake Wobegon?', 'For Americans, the good news is that the United States remains an extraordinarily powerful nation. The United States has “the most powerful military in history,” Obama declared in a recent\xa0speech. Measured by sheer destructive capacity, he is surely right. The United States spends more on its military than China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, and India\xa0combined. The U.S. military can get to more places, faster, with more lethal and effective weapons, than any military on Earth.', 'The United States also manages to gobble up a\xa0disproportionate\xa0share of the world’s wealth and resources. By the year 2000,\xa0wrote\xa0Betsy Taylor and Dave Tilford, the United States, with “less than 5 percent of the world’s population,”\xa0was using\xa0“one-third of the world’s paper, a quarter of the world’s oil, 23 percent of the coal, 27 percent of the aluminum, and 19 percent of the copper.” In 2010, Americans possessed\xa039 percent\xa0of the planet’s wealth.', 'The bad news for Americans? U.S. power and global influence have been declining. In part, this is because various once-weak states have been growing stronger, and in part, it’s because no state can be as autonomous today as it might have been in the past. The United States’ geographical position long helped protect it from external interference, while its strong military and economy enabled it to dominate or control numerous less powerful states. But globalization has reduced\xa0every\xa0state’s autonomy, creating collective challenges — from climate change to the regulation of capital — that no state can fully address on its own.', 'U.S. power and global influence have also declined in absolute terms, as America’s own political and economic health has been called into question. The United States\xa0now has greater income inequality\xa0than almost every other state in the developed world — and most states in the developing world. American life expectancy ranks well below that of other industrialized democracies, and the same is true for infant mortality and elementary school enrollment. Meanwhile, the United States has the world’s highest per capita\xa0incarceration\xa0rate, and on international\xa0health\xa0and quality-of-life metrics, the United States has been losing ground for several decades. This domestic decline jeopardizes the country’s continued ability to innovate and prosper; it also makes American values and the American political and economic systems less appealing to others.', 'Worse, the political system that Americans rely on for reform and repair seems itself to be broken; the federal government shutdown in 2013 offered the world a striking illustration of U.S. political dysfunction. Add to this the divisive national security policies of George W. Bush’s administration — many of which were\xa0continued\xa0or\xa0expanded\xa0by the Obama administration — and it’s no surprise that the United States has recently become\xa0less admired\xa0and\xa0less emulated\xa0around the globe, reducing American “soft power.”', 'No matter how you slice it, it comes to the same thing: Compared with 30 years ago, the United States today has a greatly reduced ability to control its own destiny or the destiny of other states. The United States still has unprecedented power to destroy (Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden both discovered this, to their detriment). But the country’s capacity for destruction is not equaled by its capacity to shape the behavior of other states or their populations, and the United States has less and less ability to insulate itself from the world’s woes.', 'Unfortunately, American political leaders share a bipartisan inclination to deny these realities. Mostly, they succumb to the\xa0Lake Wobegon effect: “Declinism” and “declinist” have entered the American political vocabulary, but only as purely pejorative terms.', 'This is both stupid and dangerous. How can we adapt our global strategy to compensate for the ways in which U.S. power has been declining if we refuse to admit that decline?', 'Continued U.S. decline is certainly not inevitable, and\xa0some argue\xa0that the United States is in fact poised for an economic and political resurgence. There is no way to know for sure — but it’s worth recalling that, historically, every significant empire has eventually declined. Are we prepared to bet that the United States will prove an exception?', 'There is also no way to know for sure what form continued or eventual U.S. decline will take. We don’t know whether it will be fast or slow; we don’t know whether the American Empire is in for a hard landing or a soft one. Will the United States crash, like the former Soviet Union? Or will a slow decline in power leave the country an intact and influential nation, like the United Kingdom? Will America’s future be more like Canada’s present, or more like Brazil’s?', 'III. Behind the Veil of Ignorance: Uncertainty as Lodestone', 'We don’t know what America’s future will look like, and we can make fewer and fewer geopolitical predictions with confidence. The world has changed too much and too fast for us to accurately assess the probabilities of many types of future events. Perhaps this is why it’s so tempting for Americans to stay in Lake Wobegon, with eyes closed and fingers crossed. Uncertainty is frightening.', 'But paradoxically, this very uncertainty should be a lodestone, pointing realists and idealists alike toward a sensible, forward-looking global strategy. In fact, radical uncertainty can be a powerful tool for strategic planning.', 'That may seem oxymoronic, but consider one of the 20th century’s most influential thought experiments: In his 1971 book,\xa0A Theory of Justice, philosopher\xa0John Rawls\xa0famously sought to use a hypothetical situation involving extreme uncertainty to derive optimal principles of justice.', 'Imagine, said Rawls, rational, free, and equal humans seeking to devise a set of principles to undergird the structure of human society. Imagine further that they must reason from behind what Rawls dubbed a “veil of ignorance,” which hides from them their own future status or attributes. Behind the veil of ignorance, wrote Rawls, people still possess general knowledge of economics, science, and so forth, and they can draw on this knowledge to assist them in designing a future society. Their ignorance is\xa0limited to\xa0their own future role in the society they are designing: “no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does any one know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like.”', 'If we were collectively designing social structures and rules, but could not know our own individual future positions in that social structure, what structures and rules would we come up with? Applying a version of\xa0decision theory, Rawls concluded that in the face of such radical uncertainty, rational, free, and equal beings behind the veil of ignorance would be drawn toward a “maximin” (or “minimax“) rule of decision, in which they would seek to minimize their losses in a worst-case scenario. Since those behind the veil of ignorance don’t know whether they’ll be among the haves or among the have-nots in the society they are designing, they should seek to build a society in which they each will be\xa0least\xa0badly off — even the luck of the draw leads them to start with the fewest advantages.', 'Rawls posited that such a rule of decision should lead those behind the veil of ignorance to support two core principles: the first relating to liberty (“each person [should] have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others”), and the second relating to social and economic goods. (Social goods should be distributed equally, unless an unequal distribution would serve the common good\xa0and be\xa0“to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged,” while “offices and positions [should remain] open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.”)', 'This is in some ways intuitive: On a national level, it is the reason Americans across the political spectrum continue to express substantial\xa0support\xa0for the maintenance of unemployment benefits, Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, and so on. Any one of us might someday face a job loss or illness; nearly all of us will eventually face old age. We know we might someday\xa0need\xa0those benefits ourselves. In the face of uncertainty about the future, we all recognize the value of insurance, savings, and at least some minimal social safety net.', 'In the international arena, the same is true.', 'This has obvious implications for global strategy. Empires, like individuals, can sink into poverty, illness, or simple old age — and in an era of uncertainty, empires, like individuals, would do well to hedge against the possibility of future misfortune.', 'Indeed, two decades after the publication of\xa0A Theory of Justice, Rawls sought to apply a form of this thought experiment to derive the core principles that he believed would characterize a just global order. His arguments are complex, and I can’t do justice to them here — but fortunately, unlike Rawls, I am not interested in coming up with abstract principles of global justice. My less lofty agenda is limited to arguing that a crude version of Rawls’s thought experiment can help us delineate the contours of a sensible U.S. global strategy — a “maximin” strategy that is well-suited to protecting the interests of the United States and its people, both in today’s messy world and in a wide range of future messes.', 'Here’s my thought experiment.', 'Imagine a crude version of Rawls’s veil of ignorance, with only the United States behind it. This veil of ignorance doesn’t require us to disavow what we know of history (America’s or the world’s), nor does it require us to disavow what we know of recent trends, present global realities, U.S. values, or our current conception of the good. It only hides our future from us: Behind this veil of ignorance, we don’t know whether energy, food, water, and other vital resources will be scarcer or more plentiful in the decades to come; we don’t know whether global power will be more or less centralized; we don’t know whether new technologies and new forms of social organization will make existing technologies and institutions obsolete.', 'Most of all, we don’t know whether, in the decades to come, the United States will be rich or poor, weak or strong, respected or hated. For that matter, we don’t know whether the United States — or even the form of political organization we call the nation-state — will exist at all a century or two from now. In the face of such radical uncertainty, what kind of grand strategy should a rational United States adopt?', 'Of course, this shouldn’t really be called a “thought experiment” at all: The United States\xa0already\xa0operates behind a veil of ignorance, if we could only bring ourselves to admit it. We know the past; we have a reasonable understanding of recent trends; we know that the world is messy and dangerous; we know that the potential for rapid and potentially catastrophic change is real; and we know that our ability to predict future changes and quantify various risks is profoundly limited.', 'This knowledge is profoundly unsettling. Thus, we try our best to know and not know, at the same time: We speak glibly of complexity, accelerating change, danger, and uncertainty, but then fall back into the comfortable assumption that continued U.S. global dominance is a given and that catastrophic change is unlikely to occur. As long as we remain willfully ignorant of the veil of ignorance that hangs over us, we can avoid asking hard questions and making harder choices.', 'But this is shortsighted and dangerous. Empires that refuse to accept reality tend to rapidly decline. A clear-eyed acceptance of uncertainty and risk is the surest route to a more secure future. Instead of blinding us or paralyzing us, the uncertainty of our future should motivate us to engage in more responsible strategic planning.', 'If the United States can manage to be as rational as Rawls’s hypothetical decision-makers, it should adopt a similar maximin rule of decision: It should prefer international rules and institutions that will maximize America’s odds of thriving, even in a worst-case future scenario. In fact, we should wish for international rules and institutions that will be kindest to the individuals living in what is now the United States and their descendants, even if the United States should someday cease to exist entirely.', 'Could happen, folks.\xa0Look around you. Do you see the Roman Empire, or the Aztec Empire, or the Ottoman Empire?', 'IV. From Messiness to Strategy: A Preliminary Sketch', 'This has urgent implications for U.S. strategic planning. Precisely because U.S. global power may very well continue to decline, the United States should use the very considerable military, political, cultural, and economic power it\xa0still has\xa0to foster the international order most likely to benefit the country if it someday\xa0loses\xa0that power.', 'The ultimate objective of U.S. grand strategy should be the creation of an equitable and peaceful international order with an effective system of global governance — one that is built upon respect for human dignity, human rights, and the rule of law, with robust mechanisms for resolving thorny collective problems.', 'We should seek this\xa0not\xa0because it’s the “morally right” thing for the United States to do, but because a maximin decision rule should lead us to conclude that this will offer the United States and its population the best chance of continuing to thrive, even in the event of a radical future decline in U.S. wealth and power.', 'But, one might argue, the United States\xa0already\xa0tries to promote such a global order — right?', 'Sure it does — but only inconsistently, and generally as something of an afterthought. We pour money into our military and intelligence communities, but starve our diplomats and development agencies. We fixate on the threat du jour, often exaggerating it and allowing it to distort our foreign policy in self-destructive ways (cf.\xa0Iraq War), while viewing matters such as United Nations reform or reform of global economic institutions or environmental protection rules as tedious and of low priority. If we take seriously the many potential dangers lurking in the unknowable future, however, fostering a stronger, fairer, and more effective system of international governance would become a matter of urgent national self-interest and our highest strategic priority — something that should be reflected both in our policies and in our budgetary decisions.', 'An effective global governance system would need to be built upon the recognition that states remain the primary mode of political and social organization in the international sphere, but also upon the recognition that new forms of social organization continue to evolve and may ultimately displace at least some states. An effective and dynamic international system will need to develop innovative ways to bring such new actors and organizations within the ambit of international law and institutions, both as responsible creators of law and institutions and as responsible subjects.']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Pierry-Rabbini-Aff-Kentucky-Quarters.docx

Michigan

PiRa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/PiRa/Michigan-Pierry-Rabbini-Aff-Kentucky-Quarters.docx

bc6473ca6388e0a5b6d922e31b3ad03ebc14d67cdd9940e9aca5e22d8ea7de27

Overturning AmEx wrecks biz con---firms are terrified of false positives from evaluating only one side of a platform

Knowledge@Wharton 18 – publication of the Wharton School of Business at the University of Pennsylvania, 3/8/18, “Why Tech Companies Are Worried about the Ohio v. Amex Case,” https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/impacts-ohio-vs-amex/

companies might be worried about the Court fear is if you only look at one side you will see what looks like anti-competitive harm Tech companies charge prices on one side to advertisers, and use revenue to subsidize the product which they give away to consumers tech companies have a “ valid concern if only side is considered courts might see supra-competitive or predatory pricing if they looked holistically this is an efficient pricing scheme overall in isolation, they might find some problem Amazon’s Prime could be questionable if you looked only interaction between Amazon and merchants, it looks like extracting payment because they foreclose this massive market unless merchants pay the choice is made by the consumer

companies like Amazon, Google and Uber might be worried about the outcome of the Supreme Court decision. “The fear is if you only look at one side of these two-sided markets you look at [one] part of the transaction, there’s a risk that you will see what looks like prima facie anti-competitive harm in the form of high prices without increasing output or some kind of a restraint that looks problematic Tech nology companies charge prices on one side of their markets to advertisers, and use revenue to subsidize the creation and maintenance of the product itself, which they then give away to consumers , tech nology companies have a “ valid concern if only side of the transaction is considered , “the courts might be inclined to see supra-competitive pricing in one instance or potentially predatory pricing in the other instance if they looked at the issue holistically this is actually an efficient pricing scheme overall , even though again if you look at it in isolation, they might be able to find some problem Amazon’s Prime membership could be seen as questionable if you looked only at the interaction between Amazon and these merchants, it looks like Amazon is extracting payment from merchants that are supra-competitive, because they foreclose access to this massive part of the market unless the merchants pay an entry fee the choice is fundamentally made by the by the consumer whether or not to enter into the Amazon Prime program in the first place the Supreme Court will determine whether it is sufficient for the government to show Amex’s anti-steering requirements stifle price competition in order to prove its anti-competitive effects

if you only look at one side of these two-sided markets what looks like Tech tech valid concern holistically overall looks like fundamentally made by the by the consumer

['Manne, who is also a distinguished fellow at Northwestern Law School, explained why companies like Amazon, Google and Uber might be worried about the outcome of the Supreme Court decision. “The fear is if you only look at one side of these two-sided markets, or put another way, you look at [one] part of the transaction, there’s a risk that you will see what looks like prima facie anti-competitive harm — whether that’s in the form of high prices without increasing output or some kind of a restraint that looks problematic,” he said.', 'Technology companies such as Google or Facebook charge prices on one side of their markets, say to advertisers, and use that revenue to subsidize the creation and maintenance of the product itself, which they then give away to consumers, he explained.', 'According to Manne, the technology companies have a “valid concern” that if only side of the transaction is considered, “the courts might be inclined to see supra-competitive pricing [or pricing that is higher than in a competitive market] in one instance or potentially predatory pricing in the other instance.” On the other hand, “if they looked at the issue holistically, they would realize that this is actually an efficient pricing scheme overall, even though again if you look at it in isolation, they might be able to find some problem,” he added.', 'Against the backdrop of that debate, Manne offered the example of Amazon’s Prime membership as one that could be seen as questionable. Amazon Prime members get access to a host of benefits including free shipping. But the free shipping applies only to merchants that have opted into a program through which Amazon handles their shipping for them. “Here, the concern would be that if you looked only at the interaction between Amazon and these merchants, it looks like Amazon is perhaps effectively extracting payment from merchants that are supra-competitive, because they foreclose access to this massive part of the market unless the merchants pay an entry fee,” he said. “But the choice here is fundamentally made by the by the consumer. He’s the one who decides whether or not he’s going to enter into the Amazon Prime program in the first place.”', 'Now, as the Supreme Court is hearing the case, it will decide on the applicability of the “rule of reason,” according to the court blog. It will determine whether it is sufficient for the government to show that Amex’s anti-steering requirements stifle price competition in order to prove its anti-competitive effects. In that case, it would be the responsibility of Amex to show any pro-competitive benefits from its anti-steering provisions.']

[(0, 20)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-Deo-Fridman-Neg-ADA-Round4.docx

Northwestern

DeFr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Northwestern/DeFr/Northwestern-Deo-Fridman-Neg-ADA-Round4.docx

4233b3f6d933a36d6294831f479e516ba012b8a2310370a9b66bccdc10114796

b---fails.

James Pethokoukis 20. A columnist and blogger at the American Enterprise Institute. “A Federal Jobs Guarantee Will Not Solve America's Economic Woes” The National Interest. 09-13-20. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/federal-jobs-guarantee-will-not-solve-americas-economic-woes-168754

federal jobs guarantee is underwhelming To think it is good means thinking Washington could successfully direct workforce multiples larger than teachers to do work they are not trained not be made complicated by the inability to fire would not “ crowd out” existing jobs could figure if these were replacing existing jobs employers would not see an employee drain jobs would not become mandatory cost not be tremendous

A federal jobs guarantee is an underwhelming idea . To think it is a good idea means thinking that (a) Washington could anytime soon successfully direct a workforce that would be multiples (maybe many multiples) larger than the number of K-12 teachers (but less educated) to do meaningful, socially productive work that they are not currently trained to do ; (b) even if that managerial Manhattan Project took decades to accom plish, it could be sustained (c) running such a program might not be made even more maddeningly complicated by the possible inability to actually fire anyone ; (d) these permanent government gigs would not “ crowd out” existing jobs e) we could ever figure out if these new government-supplied jobs were replacing existing jobs or jobs that would have been created anyway ; (f) private employers in high poverty areas would not see an employee drain to these probably better-paying jobs ; (g) these voluntary jobs would not become mandatory ; and (h) the cost would not be crazy tremendous .

['A federal jobs guarantee is an underwhelming idea. And perhaps if Dave were remade as an HBO mini-series or something, the many, many downsides would become evident. To think it is a good idea means thinking that (a) Washington could anytime soon successfully direct a workforce that would be multiples (maybe many multiples) larger than the number of K-12 teachers (but less educated) to do meaningful, socially productive work that they are not currently trained to do; (b) even if that managerial Manhattan Project took decades to accomplish, it could be sustained amid “stories about how these are disorganized make-work programs” and the “stigma” that follows; (c) running such a program might not be made even more maddeningly complicated by the possible inability to actually fire anyone; (d) these permanent government gigs would not “crowd out” existing jobs that actually matched the skills of the workers; (e) we could ever figure out if these new government-supplied jobs were replacing existing jobs or jobs that would have been created anyway; (f) private employers in high poverty areas would not see an employee drain to these probably better-paying jobs; (g) these voluntary jobs would not become mandatory; and (h) the cost would not be crazy tremendous. ', '', '']

[(6, 20)]

ndtceda

Emory-MiPi-Aff-Brick-City-Round-Robin-Round-2.docx

Emory

MiPi

05e882e52f00ea38cba7130806c1e0b7ccb1a274aafada2e5d5c4965b1496aa2

It gets weaponized by elites, absolves the state, and doesn’t solve colonial atrocities

Coombes 21 (Brad Coombes, Senior Lecturer in the Environment @ the University of Auckland, exact date unknown but year is 2021, "Nature’s rights as Indigenous rights? Mis/recognition through personhood for Te Urewera," Space, Populations, Societies, https://journals.openedition.org/eps/9857, accessed 10-10-2022)

personhood for nature hegemonize and silence Indigenous autonomy Rights-making involves need for Indigenous peoples to demonstrate ecocentrism imposition of repressive authenticity some are skeptical recognition of nature’s rights address their own R o n are conditioned by expectation of reconciliation In uneven circumstances benefits are offset by false inclusion where Indigenous participation is coopted framing themselves as worthy Rights derived from ecological credentials confine Indigenous communities to non-development r o n act as identity politics that mis/recognize Indigenous circumstances and fails to address colonial atrocities It is tautological for the state to become arbitrator of resolution right is insufficient to sponsor resurgence recognition revises Indigenous within another’s system multiculturalism that obfuscates colonial practice fails to address racism forsakes power Rights serve elites right- and left-wing actors contest demands

personhood for nature has perverse influences on Indigenous identities hegemonize and silence activism that sought Indigenous autonomy and repatriation of resources Rights-making involves construction of group identities as worthy beneficiaries and need for Indigenous peoples to demonstrate ecocentrism an archetypal imposition of repressive authenticity Biased expectations that Indigenous communities support conservation triumphed over Indigenous right-to-development some are skeptical that recognition of nature’s rights can address their own problems will magnify if trying to achieve both R o n are conditioned by expectation of reconciliation burden of supporting reconciliation is borne differentially by Indigenous peoples whereas the Crown are affiliated to powerful institutions In uneven circumstances benefits are offset by false inclusion where Indigenous participation is coopted at the expense of land repatriation Indigenous claimants framing themselves as worthy victims of colonial repression Yet that backfire within repressive authenticity of rights-making Rights derived from ecological credentials confine Indigenous communities to non-development protections for indigenous rights become contingent upon adherence to conservation outcomes backlash diminish rights Personifying nature deepen expectations of Indigenous ecological nobility an aggravated impact on Indigenous development rights can be expected r o n only act as recognition an identity politics that mis/recognize causes of Indigenous circumstances and fails to address colonial atrocities It is tautological for the state to become arbitrator of resolution ecognition of a right is insufficient to sponsor Indigenous resurgence recognition revises the appreciation of Indigenous beings within another’s system a weak form of multiculturalism that obfuscates colonial practice fails to address racism and forsakes power Rights -based approaches serve conservation elites more than Indigenous claimants right- and left-wing actors contest demands stating that renewed Indigenous interest is false consciousness

perverse autonomy construction ecocentrism repressive skeptical own magnify R o n powerful false inclusion coopted worthy ecological deepen r o n identity politics atrocities tautological resurgence another’s obfuscates elites false consciousness

['', 'I associate personhood for nature with state recognition, concluding that it has perverse influences on Indigenous identities and agendas. Recognition and rights-based models for claims settlement discursively control, hegemonize and silence decades of activism that sought Indigenous autonomy and repatriation of resources. Recognition of an Indigenous homeland as a legal person may be problematic for those who desire to reclaim ownership. Although often predicated on slavery, settler societies long ago criminalized ownership of persons, signifying one of many discursive restraints of personhood that discipline Indigenous claims to ownership. Rights-making involves the social construction of group identities as worthy beneficiaries, and the need for Indigenous peoples to demonstrate ecocentrism to secure rights is an archetypal imposition of Wolfe’s [2006] repressive authenticity. Biased expectations that Indigenous communities will support conservation have triumphed over an Indigenous right-to-development in the past, so some are skeptical that recognition of nature’s rights can also address their own rights. It has been difficult to satisfy Indigenous or environmental agendas in an era of rabid developmentalism, so problems will surely magnify if trying to achieve both within claims settlements.', 'Rights-for-nature, Indigenous rights and the inadequacy of rights', 'Claims settlements are conditioned by an expectation of reconciliation so are intended to safeguard such impossible conceptions as a singular nation-state and a unified settler society. Consequently, “the burden of supporting reconciliation is borne differentially by Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples” [Palmer and Pocock, 2019: 1]. As one-time protagonist and newfound partner for Indigenous claimants, the Crown has become a slippery concept in claims settlement [Borrows, 2017]. Indigenous organizations struggle to find voice beyond the local, whereas the Crown and its allies are poly-vocal and affiliated to powerful, multi-scale institutions. In those uneven circumstances, the benefits of claims settlement are offset by false inclusion, where greater Indigenous participation in policy communities is easily coopted and at the expense of such other agendas as land repatriation [Coulthard, 2014]. Settlements are predicated on the need to identify historic moments of colonial repression, Treaty-making or -breaking and expressions of original conditions, including records of pre-contact resource use [Borrows, 2017]. Lack, or lack of recording, for any of those requirements may invalidate claims before commencement.', 'Indigenous claimants often foreground their credibility and readiness for settlement by framing themselves as worthy victims of colonial repression or forest denizens at one with nature. Yet, that may backfire within the repressive authenticity of rights-making procedures over which Indigenous peoples have limited control [Wolfe, 2006]. Rights derived from ecological credentials may confine Indigenous communities to future scenarios of non-development. The “danger here is that protections for indigenous rights become contingent upon – and are thus eroded or taken away without – adherence to conservation outcomes” [Witter and Satterfield, 2019: 1103]. Where claims are based on either essentialized notions of ecological nobility or non-Indigenous destruction of nature, the holding of claimants to their eco-positionalities or societal backlash may diminish any rights that have been awarded [Martínez Novo, 2018]. Personifying nature is likely to deepen expectations of Indigenous ecological nobility, so the same or an aggravated impact on Indigenous development rights can be expected.', 'Addressing Indigenous claims through rights-for-nature is problematic because the latter can only act as a form of recognition – an identity politics that fails to reauthorize Indigenous polities and may mis/recognize the causes of Indigenous circumstances [Tola, 2018]. Indigenous scholars attack recognition, arguing that it provides only for a cultural right-to-be and fails to address colonial atrocities [Coulthard, 2014]. It is tautological for the state, as perpetrator of historical violence, to become arbitrator of resolution mechanisms in the present. After long periods of state elimination then assimilation of Indigenous lifeways, recognition of a right-to-be is insufficient to sponsor Indigenous resurgence. Decolonization demands “redirection of energies away from attempts to further modify the conditions of colonialism…from within” the state apparatus [Elliott, 2018: 62]. It anticipates living as Indigenous within alternative social structures, but recognition merely revises the appreciation of Indigenous beings within another’s system. It is a weak form of multiculturalism that obfuscates colonial practice, fails to address structural racism, and forsakes redistribution of power [Hale, 2018]. The core assumption is a “perceived relationship” between “affirmed recognition” and “autonomy of marginalized individuals” but there are no linear connections between the two [Coulthard, 2014: 3]. Burgeoning Maori research on claims settlement confirms that these limitations are replicated in New Zealand. Conflicts based on the re-writing of history to suit current generations, the burdens of state-imposed mandates and organizational preconditions or how to disburse, independently utilize and maintain the benefits of Treaty settlement are now commonplace [McCormack, 2016; McDowell, 2018; Mutu, 2018].', 'Rights-based approaches to resolving Indigenous claims against protected areas have also become conventional but, notably, they have served conservation elites more than Indigenous claimants [Witter and Satterfield, 2019]. To so embed Indigenous politics in assertions of kinship with nature that claimants accept nature’s rights as their own results in outcomes analogous to the earlier framing of claimant authenticity according to ecological credentials. It too risks a future of non-development, and it has emerged at a time when demands for land repatriation have become academically and politically unfashionable [Bhandar, 2016]. Both right- and left-wing actors contest those demands, stating that renewed Indigenous interest in land ownership is false consciousness: an adoption of the mean-spirited possessiveness of their former oppressors [Coulthard, 2016]. By contrast, perceived planetary crises yield public validation of protected areas as never before. Most sites where rights-of-nature have been gazetted in Aotearoa, Australia, USA and South America are protected areas, perhaps alerting to important contradictions. Preservation of forests through national parks has been a colonizing act of aggression, with wide-ranging cultural and socio-economic impacts [Brockington and Wilkie, 2015]. Those impacts are often dismissed as historic, but Lunstrum and Ybarra [2018] prove that displacement of Indigenous peoples for conservation purposes is increasing in an era of alleged biosecurity risks and ecological crises. A national park is not an obvious site for joint resolution of Indigenous and environmental interests.', '']

[(0, 9), (9, 10)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-HaHe-Neg-ADA-Fall-Championship-Round-5.docx

Minnesota

HaHe

9520ab289d1dfe879a27e5a410575b5a3eaf6448734e079c5f28466e95287b36

Tech innovation and economic growth enable adaptation to solve for adverse climate impacts—despite warming, deaths from weather, disease, and famine are declining

Lewis et al., 5-17-22, <Competitive Enterprise Institute Senior Fellow, Marlo>, In the matter of the proposed rule “The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors, p. https://cei.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/CEI-Lewis-Comments-SEC-Climate-Risk-Disclosure-June-17-2022-1.pdf

technological innovation update adaptive capabilities the number of people dying from storms, floods, droughts, wildfires, and extreme temperatures decreased dramatically This is even true of 2021 annual climate-related deaths have declined by more than 96 Weather-related mortality rates have declined by more than 99 percent over the past 100 years A “climate crisis” cannot be discerned in that data Yields of all major food crops keep increasing, and production is increasing exponentially find that climate-related hazards show a “clear decreasing trend in vulnerability

wealth creation and technological innovation update s mankind’s adaptive capabilities that has made Earth’s naturally dangerous climate much more livable. As global CO2 emissions have increased, so have global average life expectancy, population growth, and per capita income The notion that the long-term increases in prosperity, health, and safety of our civilization mask a rapidly approaching climate catastrophe cannot be squared with the evidence Since the 1920s global temperatures increased by about 1°C the number of people dying from storms, floods, droughts, wildfires, and extreme temperatures decreased dramatically . This is even true of 2021 almost 99 percent fewer people died that year than a hundred years ago Over the past hundred years, annual climate-related deaths have declined by more than 96 percent Weather-related mortality rates have declined by more than 99 percent over the past 100 years . A “climate crisis” cannot be discerned in that data Nor is a crisis discernible in other trends of fundamental relevance to human survival and flourishing Yields of all major food crops keep increasing, and production is increasing exponentially deaths from malaria declined by 52 percent During the past three decades mortality and economic loss data point to an increasingly sustainable civilization Formetta and Feyen find that climate-related hazards show a “clear decreasing trend in both human and economic vulnerability , with global average mortality and economic loss rates that have dropped by 6.5 and nearly 5 times, respectively, from 1980–1989 to 2007–2016

wealth creation and technological innovation update s mankind’s adaptive capabilities that has made Earth’s naturally dangerous climate much more livable. As global CO2 emissions have increased, so have global average life expectancy, population growth, and per capita income The notion that the long-term increases in prosperity, health, and safety of our civilization mask a rapidly approaching climate catastrophe cannot be squared with the evidence Since the 1920s global temperatures increased by about 1°C the number of people dying from storms, floods, droughts, wildfires, and extreme temperatures decreased dramatically . This is even true of 2021 almost 99 percent fewer people died that year than a hundred years ago Over the past hundred years, annual climate-related deaths have declined by more than 96 percent Weather-related mortality rates have declined by more than 99 percent over the past 100 years . A “climate crisis” cannot be discerned in that data Nor is a crisis discernible in other trends of fundamental relevance to human survival and flourishing Yields of all major food crops keep increasing, and production is increasing exponentially deaths from malaria declined by 52 percent During the past three decades mortality and economic loss data point to an increasingly sustainable civilization Formetta and Feyen find that climate-related hazards show a “clear decreasing trend in both human and economic vulnerability , with global average mortality and economic loss rates that have dropped by 6.5 and nearly 5 times, respectively, from 1980–1989 to 2007–2016

['Industrial civilization’s virtuous circle of wealth creation and technological innovation endlessly updates mankind’s adaptive capabilities—a process that has made Earth’s naturally dangerous climate much more livable. As global CO2 emissions have increased, so have global average life expectancy, population growth, and per capita income—three critical metrics of human well-being. The notion that the long-term increases in prosperity, health, and safety of our mostly fossil-fueled civilization mask a rapidly approaching climate catastrophe cannot be squared with the evidence. Since the 1920s, global CO2 concentrations increased from about 305 parts per million to more than 415 ppm, and average global temperatures increased by about 1°C. Yet, globally, the number of people dying from storms, floods, droughts, wildfires, and extreme temperatures decreased dramatically. Danish economist Bjorn Lomborg recently detailed the good news: Fewer and fewer people die from climate-related natural disasters. This is even true of 2021—despite breathless climate reporting, almost 99 percent fewer people died that year than a hundred years ago. Why is this consistently not reported? Over the past hundred years, annual climate-related deaths have declined by more than 96 percent. In the 1920s, the death count from climate-related disasters was 485,000 on average every year. In the last full decade, 2010-2019, the average was 18,362 dead per year, or 96.2 percent lower. In the first year of the new decade, 2020, the number of dead was even lower at 14,885—97 percent lower than the 1920s average. For 2021, which is now complete, we see an even lower total of 6,134 dead or a reduction since the 1920s of 98.7 percent. The almost 99 percent drop in aggregate weather-related mortality is all the more impressive given the quadrupling of global population since the 1920s. Weather-related mortality rates have declined by more than 99 percent over the past 100 years. A “climate crisis” cannot be discerned in that data. Nor is a crisis discernible in other trends of fundamental relevance to human survival and flourishing. The past 70 years have been marked by unprecedented improvements in global life expectancy, per capita income, food security, and various health-related metrics. Yields of all major food crops keep increasing, and production is increasing exponentially. Nearly 3 billion people gained access to improved water sources since 1990, and deaths from malaria (the most consequential climate-sensitive disease) declined by 52 percent during 2000-2015. During the past three decades, mortality and economic loss data point to an increasingly sustainable civilization. Formetta and Feyen (2019) compare fatalities over exposed population and losses over exposed GDP, to climate-related hazards between 1980 and 2016. They find that climate-related hazards show a “clear decreasing trend in both human and economic vulnerability, with global average mortality and economic loss rates that have dropped by 6.5 and nearly 5 times, respectively, from 1980–1989 to 2007–2016.” Recent insurance industry data indicate that climate-related damages as a share of global GDP declined during 1990-2020, with the trend line now below 0.2 percent. An important policy implication of those trends is often overlooked. Policies that help make the United States and other countries wealthier also make humanity better able to handle whatever climate-related hazards occur in the future.']

[(0, 5), (14, 21)]

ndtceda

Kansas-HiOr-Aff-JW-Patterson-Debates-hosted-by-UK-Round-6.docx

Kansas

HiOr

7738b3cd0e1017e77448d402449e9a3ead63a4353b0d8016aa87caabf47a240b

The core of extended deterrence commitments is nuclear submarines. Absent that, they’ll withdraw from the NPT.

Ahn 23, research associate for Korea studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. (Jennifer, May 2, 2023, Evaluating Extended Deterrence at the U.S.-South Korea Summit, )

Biden and Yoon announced the Washington Declaration outlines strengthened pledges for signaling deterrence Yoon hailed the agreement strengthening of extended deterrence The declaration includes efforts to enhance its defense commitment most notably through the visit of a U.S. ballistic missile submarine South Korea acknowledged its reliance on U.S. nuclear deterrence reaffirmed commitment to the NPT The declaration counters calls to withdraw from the NPT and develop nuclear weapons coordination relieve South Korean concerns The Declaration symbolizes a clear commitment amid South Korean debates over nuclear weapons affirms Yoon will not pursu nuclear weapons Japan and So Ko might seek nuc s put deterrence at risk and create temptation toward preemption nuclear competition in the Pacific could call for drastic military options preemptive war an unrestricted arms race in Asia would increase accidental nuclear war states have histories of protracted conflict unreliable c c technical malfunction resulting in unintended or unauthorized launch faulty warning cause one side to misinterpret defensive moves triggering mistaken preemption

April 26 Biden welcomed South Korean President Yoon to the White House for a summit meeting Biden and Yoon announced the Washington Declaration , which outlines strengthened U.S. pledges for signaling its extended deterrence commitment to South Korea Yoon hailed the agreement as an unprecedented broadening and strengthening of extended deterrence The declaration also includes U.S. efforts to enhance the visibility of its defense commitment , most notably through the visit of a U.S. ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) to South Korea As part of the Washington Declaration, South Korea acknowledged its continued reliance on U.S. nuclear deterrence and reaffirmed its commitment to the NPT The declaration counters domestic calls in South Korea to withdraw from the NPT and develop nuclear weapons . Yoon pledged that strengthened coordination and consultations under the NCG should relieve South Korean concerns over its vulnerability to North Korea’s nuclear weapons The Washington Declaration symbolizes a clear display of U.S. defense commitment amid South Korean public debates over the independent acquisition of nuclear weapons the Washington Declaration affirms that the Yoon administration will not unilaterally pursu nuclear weapons . nuclear Japan and So uth Ko rea might seek nuc s A configuration of nuclear powers in the Pacific basin Russia , China , Japan including the U S with its own Pacific interests could put deterrence at risk and create enormous temptation toward preemption A nuclear competition in the Pacific would be linked , in geopolitical deterrence and proliferation space, to the existing nuclear deterrents of India and Pakistan , and to the emerging nuclear weapons status of Iran . An arc of nuclear instability to Tokyo could place US proliferation strategies into the ash heap of history and call for drastic military options , not excluding preemptive war , defenses, and counter-deterrent special operations an unrestricted nuclear arms race in Asia would most likely increase the chance of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war . It would do so because some states in the region already have histories of protracted conflict states may have politically unreliable or immature c c systems, especially during a crisis involving a decision for nuclear first strike or retaliation unreliable or immature systems might permit a technical malfunction resulting in an unintended or unauthorized launch , by rogue commanders faulty intelligence and warning systems might cause one side to misinterpret the other’s defensive moves to forestall attack as offensive preparations for attack triggering a mistaken preemption

Washington Declaration strengthened deterrence strengthening most notably reliance on U.S. nuclear deterrence reaffirmed counters develop relieve affirms

['On April 26, U.S. President Joe Biden welcomed South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol to the White House for a summit meeting to celebrate the seventieth anniversary of the U.S.-South Korea alliance and open a new chapter for the next seventy years of expanded cooperation. Amid a substantial list of topics discussed by the two leaders, extended deterrence emerged as the top deliverable. In the joint press conference that followed the meeting, Biden and Yoon announced the Washington Declaration, which outlines strengthened U.S. pledges for signaling its extended deterrence commitment to South Korea. The two governments established the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), which involves a stepped-up role for South Korea by engaging in joint nuclear planning and decision-making with the United States. Yoon hailed the agreement as an unprecedented broadening and strengthening of extended deterrence to new levels. The declaration also includes U.S. efforts to enhance the visibility of its defense commitment, most notably through the upcoming visit of a U.S. ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) to South Korea. Unlike the nuclear arrangements within NATO, the Washington Declaration does not forward deploy U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea. Nor does the agreement grant the South Korean president shared authority on nuclear-use decisions in the event of a contingency on the Korean Peninsula. As part of the Washington Declaration, South Korea acknowledged its continued reliance on U.S. nuclear deterrence and reaffirmed its commitment to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as well as the U.S.-South Korea Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. The declaration counters domestic calls in South Korea to reduce its reliance on the United States for the country’s defense and survival by withdrawing from the NPT and developing nuclear weapons. However, Yoon pledged that strengthened coordination and consultations under the NCG should relieve South Korean concerns over its vulnerability to North Korea’s nuclear weapons. The Washington Declaration symbolizes a clear display of U.S. defense commitment amid South Korean public debates over the independent acquisition of nuclear weapons. A growing number of South Koreans have argued that South Korea should possess nuclear weapons to more effectively deter North Korean provocations and to achieve the country’s invulnerability to future security threats. However, the Washington Declaration affirms that the Yoon administration will not incur damage to the U.S.-South Korea alliance by unilaterally pursuing nuclear weapons. With South Korea’s nonproliferation commitment reiterated in the agreement, South Korean efforts to strengthen its defense and security posture in response to growing North Korean capabilities will continue to work alongside alliance mechanisms and the global nonproliferation regime.', 'Asian prolif goes nuclear.', 'Cimbala 14, PhD, Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Penn State Brandywine, an American Studies faculty member. (Stephen J., March 2014, “Nuclear Weapons in Asia: Perils and Prospects,” Military and Strategic Affairs, Volume 6, Number 1, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/nuclear-weapons-in-asia-perils-and-prospects/)', 'Failure to contain proliferation in Pyongyang could spread nuclear fever throughout Asia. Japan and South Korea might seek nuclear weapons and missile defenses. A pentagonal configuration of nuclear powers in the Pacific basin (Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea – not including the United States, with its own Pacific interests) could put deterrence at risk and create enormous temptation toward nuclear preemption. Apart from actual use or threat of use, North Korea could exploit the mere existence of an assumed nuclear capability in order to support its coercive diplomacy.19 In Paul Bracken’s terms, North Korea can use its nuclear weapons to support either a “strategy of extreme provocation” or one intended to “keep the nuclear pot boiling” without having crossed the threshold of nuclear first use.20 In October 2013 there were reports of the DPRK renewing nuclear activities, and perhaps preparing for new nuclear tests.', 'A five-sided nuclear competition in the Pacific would be linked, in geopolitical deterrence and proliferation space, to the existing nuclear deterrents of India and Pakistan, and to the emerging nuclear weapons status of Iran. An arc of nuclear instability from Tehran to Tokyo could place US proliferation strategies into the ash heap of history and call for more drastic military options, not excluding preemptive war, defenses, and counter-deterrent special operations. In addition, an unrestricted nuclear arms race in Asia would most likely increase the chance of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war. It would do so because: (a) some states in the region already have histories of protracted conflict; (b) states may have politically unreliable or immature command and control systems, especially during a crisis involving a decision for nuclear first strike or retaliation; (c) unreliable or immature systems might permit a technical malfunction resulting in an unintended launch, or a deliberate but unauthorized launch, by rogue commanders; (d) faulty intelligence and warning systems might cause one side to misinterpret the other’s defensive moves to forestall attack as offensive preparations for attack, thus triggering a mistaken preemption.', '']

[(0, 6)]

ndtceda

Kansas-MaPa-Neg-4---Wake-Round-4.docx

Kansas

MaPa

df147b3f82a0b8dbb38e3c3173e106fe0fbc7feccd3783a62891a1d813e10269

3---Economic predictions about anti-trust are worse than a guess---empirics prove capitalist ideology produces inaccurate assessments and serial policy failure.

Rozga 20, J.D. @ BU and former FTC merger review and litigation expert (Kai, August 31st, “How tech forces a reckoning with prediction-based antitrust enforcement,” Tech Law Decoded, , Accessed 09-12-2021)

The Economism guessing game analyzing competitive effects responsible for turning antitrust into a guessing game belief that economic theories and models provided scientific rigor predicting complex markets remains unproven inherently “unreliable for decision-making economics is like a fable sets them up for larger blow-ups with systemic consequences dependably ineffective way to predict the future Antitrust is poorly suited for predictive decision-making technocrats are on a fool’s errand that will result in inaccurate evaluations of market conditions and poor predictions Bad competition policy will result armies of economists reach opposing positions Alarm bells should be going off academics more likely to be heard describing the rigor and rationality that they believe neoliberal economic thinking has brought to antitrust like a captain that insists on navigating a ship with the stars even when it is obvious that clouds cover the night sky

The Economism guessing game The Economism of antitrust has sought to make the analysis in competition cases more rational It was an ideological one, too, guided by the belief that it was more often than not better to wait for free markets to correct themselves rather than have the government meddle in them the burden of analyzing actual competitive effects is responsible for turning antitrust into a guessing game this is largely a forward-looking exercise: And it is through the competitive effects guessing game that Economism was thrust into the forefront of antitrust predictive approach to enforcement would not have been possible without the belief that economic theories and models provided scientific rigor Economism became the beating heart of antitrust The unproven and perhaps unprovable premise of Economism the bedrock assumption in modern antitrust that lawyers supported by economic experts are capable of understanding and predicting complex markets remains unproven there is good reason for reserving doubt Man-made complex systems tend to develop cascades and runaway chains of reactions that decrease, even eliminate, predictability Taleb is skeptical of what he calls “superfragile” predictions guided by economic theory and models which are inherently “unreliable for decision-making economics is like a fable a fable writer is there to stimulate ideas but certainly not to direct or determine practice policymaking that uses economic models to manage complex systems in a top-down fashion is bound to fragilize things economic policy which, in an attempt to minimize short-term gyrations in the economy and financial markets, instead sets them up for larger blow-ups with systemic consequences due to limits and biases innate to human cognition, expert judgments amidst uncertainty and unpredictability—what he calls “low-validity” environments—are a dependably ineffective way to predict the future Antitrust operates in precisely the sort of environment that is poorly suited for subjective, predictive decision-making The works of Taleb and Kahnemann suggest that antitrust technocrats are on a fool’s errand that will result in inaccurate evaluations of market conditions and poor predictions about competitive effects Bad competition policy will result Pulling back the curtain on Economism The pitfalls of Economism in antitrust can be seen in everyday practice parties looking to dodge enforcement actions in close-call cases hire economists to predict how a merger will lower costs, increase output, and improve innovation In private antitrust litigation, plaintiffs and defendants alike rely on armies of economists Too often, the result is a series of warring expert reports submitted by uber-qualified economists with stellar reputations who reach diametrically opposing positions Alarm bells should be going off An academic field’s reputation would seem to be put in doubt, and with it the foundation of an influential body of law that shapes our economy and society Instead, academics and policymakers are more likely to be heard describing the rigor and rationality that they believe neoliberal economic thinking has brought to antitrust antitrust are trivial when considering how none tackle the fundamental flaws of the status quo And so, paradoxically, as antitrust turns its focus on increasingly difficult-to-predict markets, it does so increasingly with Economism-driven prediction as its lodestar— like a captain that insists on navigating a ship with the stars even when it is obvious that clouds cover the night sky

The Economism guessing game turning antitrust into a guessing game belief that economic theories and models provided scientific rigor unproven doubt inherently “unreliable for decision-making economics is like a fable fragilize things larger blow-ups with systemic consequences ineffective way to predict the future Antitrust poorly suited on a fool’s errand inaccurate evaluations poor predictions Bad competition policy will result hire economists armies of economists diametrically opposing positions Alarm bells should be going off academics and policymakers are more likely to be heard describing the rigor and rationality that they believe neoliberal economic thinking has brought to antitrust trivial none tackle the fundamental flaws of the status quo captain that insists on navigating a ship with the stars even when it is obvious that clouds cover the night sky

['The Economism guessing game', 'The Economism—as some call it—of antitrust has sought to make the analysis in competition cases more rational by requiring that, before intervening in markets, enforcers must make a strong showing of the expected actual effects on competition of a given merger or a monopolist’s conduct. (To be sure, it was not just an intellectual disagreement with the status quo that inspired this movement. It was an ideological one, too, guided by the belief that it was more often than not better to wait for free markets to correct themselves rather than have the government meddle in them.)', 'On its face, it may seem sensible that the enforcement of laws which serve to protect competition should turn on an assessment of actual competitive effects. But this shift has meant that governments (and also private plaintiffs) bringing an antitrust case are required to present more evidence to explain the competitive dynamics of a market and how the conduct of its actors impacts competition in it. This exacts a heavy toll on everyone involved. Any antitrust litigator can attest to how antitrust cases stand out from others in terms of length, complexity, and scale. They are fact-heavy and data-intensive. And in the end, it is a burden borne by everyone involved in the case—prosecutor, defendant, and judge alike.', 'But the burden of analyzing actual competitive effects is more than just a hassle. It is responsible for turning antitrust into a guessing game. In merger cases, this is largely a forward-looking exercise: predicting how a combination of two companies will impact competition by comparing the market’s expected competitive state if the merger goes through to its expected competitive state if it does not. In monopolization cases, a similar analysis of the impact on competition of a monopolist’s abusive conduct can either be forward-looking (for preventing future harms) or backward-looking (for righting past wrongs).', 'And it is through the competitive effects guessing game that Economism was thrust into the forefront of antitrust. That is because a predictive approach to enforcement would not have been possible without the belief that economic theories and models provided the scientific (hard “s”) rigor for understanding how a market operates and how the conduct of its actors impacts competition in it. Depending on how you look at it, making predictions with economic models in antitrust was either the root cause or a necessary by-product of shifting the focus to actual competitive effects. Either way, Economism became the beating heart of antitrust at the same time that the law’s enforcement became premised on making predictions about actual competitive effects.', 'The unproven and perhaps unprovable premise of Economism', 'Despite forming its foundational underpinning, the bedrock assumption in modern antitrust that lawyers supported by economic experts are capable of understanding and predicting complex markets remains unproven—if it is even provable. To the contrary, there is good reason for reserving doubt.', 'In Antifragile, uncertainty expert Nassim Taleb writes: “Man-made complex systems tend to develop cascades and runaway chains of reactions that decrease, even eliminate, predictability … the modern world may be increasing in technological knowledge, but, paradoxically, it is making things a lot more unpredictable.” Taleb is skeptical of what he calls “superfragile” predictions guided by economic theory and models which are inherently “unreliable for decision-making.” To him, “economics is like a fable—a fable writer is there to stimulate ideas, indirectly inspire practice perhaps, but certainly not to direct or determine practice.”', 'According to Taleb, policymaking that uses economic models to manage complex systems in a top-down fashion is bound to fragilize things—no matter how well-intentioned the intervention might be. His most poignant examples of the dangers of expert-guided prediction-making come from looking at economic policy which, in an attempt to minimize short-term gyrations in the economy and financial markets, instead sets them up for larger blow-ups with systemic consequences. He concludes that “even when an economic theory makes sense, its application cannot be imposed from a model, in a top-down manner.”', 'In Thinking, Fast and Slow, behavioral economist and decision-making researcher Daniel Kahnemann endorses a similar skepticism about relying on expert judgments to evaluate and make predictions about complex environments. Kahnemann summarizes research in various domains (medical, economic, etc.) finding that, due to limits and biases innate to human cognition, expert judgments amidst uncertainty and unpredictability—what he calls “low-validity” environments—are a dependably ineffective way to predict the future.', 'Antitrust operates in precisely the sort of environment that the works of Taleb and Kahnemann would suggest is poorly suited for subjective, predictive decision-making. The lawfulness of a merger is determined by predicting whether it will cause prices to go up, a monopolist’s abusive conduct by conjecturing whether prices were inflated over a surmised competitive level—everything heavily reliant on economic theories and models. And the fact-specific inquiry of every antitrust case—especially when any case involving dynamic tech markets—means that its practitioners never get exposed to the sort of “regularity” and “prolonged practice” that Kahnemann concludes is necessary for subjective expert judgments to acquire predictive validity. If anything, low validity is supercharged in digital markets operating in vast ecosystems of constantly-evolving and interrelated markets with complicated relationships among its players.', 'The works of Taleb and Kahnemann suggest that antitrust technocrats are on a fool’s errand that will result in inaccurate evaluations of market conditions and poor predictions about competitive effects. Bad competition policy will result, if for no other reason than the limits of human cognition and the complexities of the market environments being observed.', 'Pulling back the curtain on Economism in practice', 'Practitioners can also draw on their own experiences to find ample support for the skepticism that flows from the works of Taleb and Kahnemann about expert-based, predictive decision-making.', 'The pitfalls of Economism in antitrust can be seen in everyday practice. In merger cases, economic models are presented to predict future price increases by the merged companies. And parties looking to dodge enforcement actions in close-call cases hire economists to predict how a merger will lower costs, increase output, and improve innovation.', 'In private antitrust litigation, plaintiffs and defendants alike rely on armies of economists to make out the elements of a case or defend against it. Too often, the result is a series of warring expert reports submitted by uber-qualified economists with stellar reputations who—based on the exact same factual record—reach diametrically opposing positions about a market’s dynamics or likely competitive effects. Equally troubling is how the uncertainty of the expert opinions can be seen fading away by the time the court chooses a winner, as the prevailing view achieves a supreme prescience when cited by the judge in support of its decision.', 'Alarm bells should be going off. An academic field’s reputation would seem to be put in doubt, and with it the foundation of an influential body of law that shapes our economy and society. Instead, academics and policymakers are more likely to be heard describing the rigor and rationality that they believe neoliberal economic thinking has brought to antitrust enforcement. And while some reforms proposed by the mainstream antitrust community might seem dramatic within the existing paradigm, they are trivial when considering how none tackle the fundamental flaws of the status quo.', 'And so, paradoxically, as antitrust turns its focus on increasingly difficult-to-predict markets, it does so increasingly with Economism-driven prediction as its lodestar—like a captain that insists on navigating a ship with the stars even when it is obvious that clouds cover the night sky.']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Kansas-Spiers-Zin-Neg-Wayne%20State-Round3.docx

Kansas

SpZi

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kansas/SpZi/Kansas-Spiers-Zin-Neg-Wayne%2520State-Round3.docx

fe97e34943b6037e842b1aa88d8161ce68b468da2f2f2dde65a32d37339c1cba

Cartels are common, undeterred, and on the rise due to COVID.

WBG ’21 [World Bank Group; 2021; International Financial Institution; Open Knowledge Repository, “Fixing Markets, Not Prices: Policy Options to Tackle Economic Cartels in Latin America and the Caribbean,” p. 6]

cartels are common across markets undetected and on the rise in COVID Cartels affect hundreds Only a fraction is detected the sector is consolidating with lower dynamism concentrated markets create ground for cartels detection has come to halt

cartels are common across many markets , mostly undetected and on the rise in the context of COVID -19 Cartels affect hundreds of markets Only a fraction of secretive agreements is detected each year. In the aftermath of COVID the corporate sector is consolidating , and market power is associated with lower business dynamism More concentrated and less dynamic markets create fertile ground for even more cartels cartel detection has come to a virtual halt since COVID-19

common many markets undetected on the rise COVID -19 hundreds fraction consolidating lower More concentrated less dynamic fertile ground virtual halt

['Executive Summary', 'Collusive agreements among competitors create unmitigated harm. When competitors agree to limit competition, i.e. to form economic cartels, the poor pay up to 50 percent more for essential goods, growth is stymied as competitiveness and productivity declines, and public policies become less effective. Such collusion undermines citizens’ trust in market economies and in the role of the private sector as an engine of growth.', 'And yet, cartels are common across many markets, mostly undetected and likely on the rise in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Cartels affect hundreds of markets from milk and poultry to oxygen and cement. Only a fraction of such secretive agreements is detected each year. In the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis, the corporate sector is consolidating, and governments are intervening more in markets. Increasing corporate market power is associated with lower business dynamism. 1 More concentrated and less dynamic markets create fertile ground for even more cartels. All the while, cartel detection has come to a virtual halt since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic.']

[(0, 7)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Pierry-Rabbini-Aff-Shirley-Round4.docx

Michigan

PiRa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/PiRa/Michigan-Pierry-Rabbini-Aff-Shirley-Round4.docx

aa20b17687b5235cc848c9211afbaae61c921d9c31faa1f86247d5a781024ae5

Entanglement is stabilizing.

Kroenig 21, *PhD, Professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. **MA, associate director in the Forward Defense practice of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. (*Matthew and **Mark J. Massa, “Are Dual-Capable Weapon Systems Destabilizing? Questioning Nuclear-Conventional Entanglement and Inadvertent Escalation,” pg. 11, Atlantic Council Issue Brief, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Nuclear-Entanglement-IB-v7.pdf)

Dual-use capabilities increase nuclear targets, making it more difficult to conduct a disarming strike China’s missiles present a challenging target set States facing a eroding position due to strikes that are degrading their forces might sue for peace Leaders might conclude attacking dual-use is too risky They refrain from attacking targets in a way that contributes to stability

dual-use capabilities might strengthen stability the presence of dual-use capabilities reduces first-strike incentives Dual-use capabilities increase nuclear -related targets, making it more difficult to conduct a successful disarming strike China’s large numbers of dual-capable missiles present an adversary with a challenging target set entanglement might stabilize international politics by causing countries in an inferior position to choose capitulation rather than escalation States that are facing a weak and eroding military position due to adversary strikes that are degrading their nuclear-related forces might , be more likely to deescalate sue for peace than choose deliberate nuclear escalation countries may pursue deterrence through entanglement theories of entanglement if correct, could suggest a reason dual-use capabilities might render nuclear escalation less likely. Leaders might conclude that attacking dual-use capabilities is too risky They might voluntarily refrain from attacking certain targets adversaries could become more cautious around dual-use systems in crises in a way that contributes to stability

strengthen stability reduces first-strike incentives increase nuclear -related more difficult successful disarming strike China’s missiles challenging stabilize capitulation escalation weak eroding position more likely to deescalate sue for peace deliberate nuclear escalation deterrence less too risky voluntarily refrain attacking certain targets more cautious contributes to stability

['Nuclear Entanglement Can Be Stabilizing', 'Nuclear entanglement theory suggests that entanglement is inherently destabilizing. If one takes the logic of nuclear entanglement seriously, however, then there are reasons to believe that dual-use capabilities might actually strengthen strategic stability.', 'First, the presence of dual-use capabilities reduces first-strike incentives. If a nuclear-armed state believed with high confidence that it could eliminate its opponent’s nuclear arsenal, then it might be tempted to do so. Dual-use capabilities increase the number of nuclear-related targets, making it more difficult to conduct a successful disarming strike. China’s large numbers of dual-capable DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and DF-21 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) present an adversary with a challenging target set.37 Without these dual-use systems, China’s adversaries might be able to target a smaller number of nuclear-capable systems with a higher level of confidence that they could eliminate all of them.', 'Second, entanglement might stabilize international politics by causing countries in an inferior position to choose capitulation, rather than escalation. Basic international relations theories maintain that the balance of power shapes coercive bargaining and that weaker countries are more likely to choose submission.38 States that are facing a weak and eroding military position due to adversary strikes that are degrading their nuclear-related forces and NC3 might, therefore, be more likely to deescalate the crisis or sue for peace than to choose deliberate, and potentially devastating, nuclear escalation.', 'Third, countries may intentionally pursue deterrence through entanglement. Ironically, theories of entanglement and inadvertent escalation, if correct, could actually suggest a reason why dual-use capabilities might render nuclear escalation less likely. Leaders might conclude that attacking dual-use capabilities is too risky. They might voluntarily refrain from attacking certain targets in order to avoid the escalatory risks. Indeed, states with vulnerable dual-use systems are already attempting to exploit this possibility to their advantage. China may purposely co-locate its nuclear and conventional missiles in order to achieve this deterrent effect.39 The United States, in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), implied that any attack (even a cyberattack) on its NC3 systems might conceivably result in US nuclear retaliation.40 Many criticized this US threat for not being credible.41 But, to the degree that leaders believe entanglement theory, countries should have incentives to deter through entanglement, and their adversaries could become more cautious around dual-use systems in crises in a way that contributes to stability.42', '']

[(0, 7), (8, 10)]

ndtceda

Kansas-SpHa-Neg-7---Indiana-Round-2.docx

Kansas

SpHa

e4bd35eff4dd275bf4cd28ce0bff611b05b8a4cedfa48a6ecbaa7f0c1624ea7b

Lobbying link specifically applies to patents.

Haber 21—(professor of political science at Stanford). Stephen H. Haber & Naomi R. Lamoreaux. 2021. “The Battle Over Patents: History And The Politics Of Innovation”. National Bureau Of Economic Research. . Accessed 10/23/21.

complaints about the patent system nothing new issues have enormous consequences firms want producer surplus firms that develop the innovations lobby for stronger patent laws other firms in the production chain lobby for weaker patent laws to improve their negotiating position

complaints about the patent system and about how it could be abused to the detriment of legitimate businesses—are nothing new . patent holdup were raised as matters of concern in the nineteenth century. issues that underpin them have enormous consequences for the distribution of the producer surplus from innovation. Regardless of whether or not they are innovators, firms at the end of the production chain —that is, those that sell the final good or service to consumers— want to retain as much of the producer surplus as they can. firms that develop the innovations that create surplus tend to lobby for stronger patent laws , because stronger property rights improve their negotiating position vis à vis businesses in the rest of the production chain. other firms in the production chain lobby for weaker patent laws to improve their negotiating position

nothing new patent holdup enormous consequences end of the production chain producer surplus develop the innovations stronger patent laws weaker patent laws

['', 'As Raymond’s testimony suggests, complaints about the patent system—and about how it could be abused to the detriment of legitimate businesses—are nothing new. Indeed, virtually all the sources of market friction that critics seize upon today as pretexts for patent reform (“patent thickets,” “patent trolls,” “patent holdup,” “excessive patenting,” and so on) were raised as matters of concern in the nineteenth century. These complaints have resurfaced again and again for the simple reason that the issues that underpin them have enormous consequences for the distribution of the producer surplus from innovation. Basically stated, producer surplus is the sum total of all the profits earned by the firms that make up the production chain for a good or service.2 Innovators create surplus by developing new products that consumers want to buy or by devising new ways to make existing products more cheaply, but ultimately the total amount of surplus available to producers is determined by consumers’ demand for the final good or service. Regardless of whether or not they are innovators, firms at the end of the production chain—that is, those that sell the final good or service to consumers—want to retain as much of the producer surplus as they can. Firms further up the chain, from the producers of raw materials to those that make intermediate inputs, also want as much of the surplus as they can get, regardless of whether they are innovators. Every firm in the production chain battles over the surplus, and they fight with all the arrows in their quivers, including lobbying to change the laws governing patents. As a general rule, firms that develop the innovations that create surplus tend to lobby for stronger patent laws, because stronger property rights improve their negotiating position vis à vis businesses in the rest of the production chain. The other firms in the production chain, by contrast, tend to lobby for weaker patent laws in order to improve their negotiating position. ', '']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Davis-Rudd-Neg-Harvard-Round4.docx

Minnesota

DaRu

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/DaRu/Minnesota-Davis-Rudd-Neg-Harvard-Round4.docx

bde4616769283f73c8ec3301565c84a17bd50732cad97c162b24e1b5e37f1412

A—Ukraine mega-aid coming in lameduck to circumvent GOP—Russia war otherwise

Collinson 10—26 [Stephen Collinson, journalist, “Putin Has Been Watching and Waiting for this Moment in Washington,” CNN, 10—26—22, , accessed 10-26-22]

political jousting in Washington could decide the war there is growing talk Dem s pass a mammoth bill during the lame-duck to carry Ukraine through next year’s fighting conflict is a fight for democracy itself . If Ukraine falls This would have grave consequences in other conflicts Taiwan Russian victory directly threaten allies and bring US closer to a direct conflict with Russia

Putin has waited and watched, hoping for a fracturing of the remarkable Washington consensus built by Biden the need to do everything it takes to defend democracy in Ukraine cracks may be appearing. stirrings of political opposition are growing on both sides Even the hint of a softening of American resolve could comfort Putin as the prepares to inflict a painful winter on Ukrainian civilians and Europeans reliant on Russian gas Ukraine aid is taking place in a critical context, with anxiety still acute over a possible escalation of the war that could spill over into direct US-Russia hostilities signs of fraying political resolve in the U S are significant They could convince Putin that a war of attrition over the winter could cause fatigue and therefore weaken Ukraine’s ability to fight. there is no diplomatic track in the conflict debates play into the hands of Putin, who has already demonstrated his capacity to exploit and widen US political divides political jousting in Washington could decide the war and could be the motivation for Putin’s frequent escalation of nuclear rhetoric The episode could give McCarthy cover in a future Congress to argue that opposition to Biden’s arms packages is not just a Republican preoccupation. while the letter was withdrawn its sentiments could boil up again terms that Russia has set for any peace deal involve locking in its battlefield gains diplomacy could offer Putin a prize for the human carnage he perpetrated in Ukraine drama over the Dem letter on Ukraine show anxiety about the war is there is growing talk Dem s pass a mammoth bill during the lame-duck which they will still control after the midterms to carry Ukraine through next year’s fighting The conflict is a fight for democracy itself . If Ukraine falls , Russia will establish the principle that a large authoritarian nation can simply wipe a smaller neighbor off the map This would have grave consequences in other conflicts Taiwan amid rising concerns China could try to take back the island by force Russian victory could directly threaten allies and bring the US closer to a direct conflict with Russia

softening resolve comfort Putin U S jousting decide drama Dem letter Ukraine show anxiety war there is growing talk Dem s mammoth bill lame-duck Ukraine fighting conflict fight democracy itself falls establish principle authoritarian wipe neighbor off the map grave consequences other conflicts Taiwan take back by force victory directly threaten allies bring closer direct conflict

['', 'For months, Russian President Vladimir Putin has waited and watched, hoping for a fracturing of the remarkable Washington consensus built by President Joe Biden on the need to do everything it takes to defend democracy in Ukraine.', 'Now, at last, the first cracks may be appearing.', 'There is no sign that the $18 billion US pipeline of military aid that has helped Ukraine drive back Russia’s onslaught is immediately in danger. But the stirrings of political opposition to an endless US role in the war are growing on both sides of the aisle just two weeks before the November midterms.', 'Even the slightest hint of a softening of American resolve could comfort Putin as the Kremlin strongman prepares to inflict a painful winter on Ukrainian civilians and Europeans reliant on Russian gas.', 'In what can only be described as a political debacle on Tuesday, progressive Democrats published, then withdrew, a letter initially signed in June that called on the White House to match its effort to arm Ukraine with a strong diplomatic effort to engage Russia and seek a ceasefire. This came days after House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy, the possible next speaker, warned that Kyiv could not expect a “blank check” on aid if the GOP is in charge next year.', 'Ex-President Donald Trump, a possible future Republican candidate, has, meanwhile, been complaining about the cost of supporting a government locked in a struggle with his hero, Putin, and that he dragged into his first impeachment by using military aid in a coercion scheme.', 'It’s clear that a bipartisan consensus for aiding Ukraine still exists in Washington. But the rumblings that Biden’s hardline on Russia may not always enjoy near unanimous support came at an especially sensitive time as the West seeks to discredit Russia’s latest round of nuclear rhetoric – a warning that Kyiv could use a dirty bomb. The claims have led to high-level talks between US and Russian military chiefs and are widely being interpreted as either more scare tactics or perhaps an attempt by Moscow to create a false flag operation that could be used as a pretext for its own use of weapons of mass destruction.', 'Seeking to highlight US and Western commitment to Ukraine amid the political chatter, Biden delivered a fresh warning on Tuesday against the use of smaller-yield nuclear weapons on the battlefield in Ukraine.', '“Let me just say: Russia would be making an incredibly serious mistake for it to use a tactical nuclear weapon,” Biden told reporters after he was asked whether Russia was preparing to use a dirty bomb. “I’m not guaranteeing you that it’s a false flag operation yet, don’t know, but it would be a serious, serious mistake.”', 'The President’s comments were a reminder that the maneuvering in Washington over Ukraine aid is taking place in a critical context, with anxiety still acute over a possible escalation of the war that could spill over into direct US-Russia hostilities and put the world on a disastrous path toward a full-on nuclear escalation.', 'This is why signs of fraying political resolve in the United States, and in some allied nations, are so significant. They could convince Putin that a war of attrition over the winter could sooner or later cause fatigue in the West and therefore weaken Ukraine’s ability to fight.', 'Questions that need to be asked', 'And yet some of the questions raised by those who are cautious about the US stance are relevant and important. A foreign policy operation that lines up the United States against its former Cold War foe and nuclear rival must be constantly evaluated and justified by the President, given the cost and risks.', 'The fact that there is no diplomatic track in the conflict – Biden has several times mused privately that he doesn’t know what Putin’s “off-ramps” might be – is worthy of discussion and, potentially, testing in contacts with Moscow. And at a time of raging inflation and economic hardship in the United States, it is incumbent on the administration and its supporters to demonstrate to American taxpayers why a war on the edge of Europe is sucking up billions in public money, even if it’s not as if Ukraine currently has the “blank check” McCarthy mentioned.', 'The risk, though, is that such debates still play into the hands of Putin, who has already demonstrated his capacity to exploit and widen US political divides with his election-meddling scheme in 2016 and the hold he had over Trump, even getting him to denounce US intelligence agencies in a joint news conference.', 'Sooner or later, the political jousting in Washington over how long the US should stay involved in arming Ukraine – and how much it would cost – will stumble on the critical questions that could decide the war and could be the motivation for Putin’s frequent escalation of nuclear rhetoric that raises the stakes.', 'Is the West as dedicated as Putin, whose political survival may depend on victory or at least not losing, to prevailing in Ukraine? And is it really willing to enter into a dangerous cycle of escalation that could risk wider nuclear war to do so?', 'Political drama on both sides of the aisle', 'It is with these questions lingering that the drama over a letter signed by 30 progressives played out on Tuesday. Most of the members did not endorse releasing the letter this week, and some said they wouldn’t have signed it now given the grave turn the war has taken in recent days. The anger over the letter caused Rep. Pramila Jayapal, the head of the Congressional Progressive Caucus, to withdraw the letter, saying it was drafted months ago and released by staff without vetting.', 'The episode did not just threaten to expose vulnerable lawmakers just two weeks before an election in which Democrats increasingly fear they will lose the House. It could give McCarthy cover in a future Congress to argue that opposition to Biden’s multi-billion dollar arms packages is not just a Republican preoccupation.', 'And while the letter was withdrawn, some of its sentiments could boil up again.', 'The letter said that lawmakers were under no illusions about the difficulty in engaging Russia, given its “outrageous and illegal invasion of Ukraine.” But it added: “If there is a way to end the war while preserving a free and independent Ukraine, it is America’s responsibility to pursue every diplomatic avenue to support such a solution that is acceptable to the people of Ukraine.”', 'The problem, however, is that the terms that Russia has set for any peace deal involve locking in its battlefield gains. Now that it has illegally annexed several Ukrainian regions, any preconditions that Putin would set would be impossible for Kyiv to agree to. And rolling back such positions would deal the Russian leader the defeat he is desperate to avoid. So while the idea of talking might seem appealing, it’s not clear how the US could shift the calculus of either side. And Biden has repeatedly insisted he will not negotiate over Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s head, as Putin would like.', 'One progressive Democrat, Rep. Ro Khanna of California, told CNN’s Bianna Golodryga that he did not support the decision to pull back the letter.', '“I think the letter was common sense,” Khanna said. “I support making sure we arm Ukraine and provide arms to Ukraine and continue to fund it, but I also believe that the President, as he said, we are at a risk of nuclear war.”', '“Don’t you think our counterpart should be talking to Russia? Of course they should to be sure that it doesn’t escalate.”', 'There is also a risk that diplomacy at this stage could offer Putin a prize for the human carnage he perpetrated in Ukraine.', '“There is moral and strategic peril in sitting down with Putin too early. It risks legitimizing his crimes and handing over parts of Ukraine to Russia in an agreement that Putin won’t even honor,” Democratic Sen. Chris Murphy of Connecticut wrote in a tweet on Tuesday.', '“Sometimes, a bully must be shown the limits of his power before diplomacy can work.”', 'One thing that the drama over the Democratic letter on Ukraine did achieve was to show that while support for Ukraine is bipartisan, anxiety about the war is too, even if the skeptics are a smaller group so far.', 'What a Republican House could mean for Ukraine', 'The prospect of a House more squarely in Trump’s ideological image after the midterm elections and of more GOP senators who share his “America First” worldview will worry the administration.', '“I think people are gonna be sitting in a recession and they’re not going to write a blank check to Ukraine,” McCarthy said in an interview with Punchbowl News last week, which was seized upon by Democrats.', 'But it did not necessarily mean the California lawmaker was determined to cut off aid. He may simply have been creating some political room for himself in the knowledge of the sensitivity of the issue in his pro-Trump party. In theory, a speaker McCarthy would be able to pass a Ukraine funding bill by using both Republican and Democratic votes.', 'But whether his own position in a fractious GOP conference would allow him to do so is another matter. That’s one reason why there is growing talk in Washington that Democrats might try to pass a mammoth bill during the lame-duck Congress, which they will still control after the midterms even if the GOP wins, to carry Ukraine through next year’s fighting.', 'McCarthy is not the only Republican sounding skeptical notes. Ohio Republican Senate nominee J.D. Vance said he didn’t really care about what happened to Ukraine before the invasion and that the US should worry about the influx across its own southern border. (His comment has been used by Democratic opponent, Rep. Tim Ryan, who is seeking to make inroads among the state’s significant Ukrainian exile community). Vance is one of a new breed of potential GOP senators that could prove more skeptical to aiding Ukraine than the old guard of senior leaders like Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell and hawkish South Carolina Sen. Lindsey Graham.', 'Similar sentiments to Vance’s are often heard on conservative media. But those opinions usually discount the broader implications of the war in Ukraine. The conflict is so important because it represents more than a territorial spat on the far edges of Europe. It is a fight for democracy itself. If Ukraine falls, Russia will establish the principle that a large authoritarian nation can simply wipe a smaller neighbor off the map.', 'This would have grave consequences in other conflicts – for example, over Taiwan amid rising concerns China could try to take back the democratic island by force. And a Russian victory in Ukraine could directly threaten America’s NATO allies and bring the US closer to a direct conflict with Russia.', '']

[(0, 15)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-DaMu-Neg-BTO-Round-1.docx

Minnesota

DaMu

259a8742373544681fa5b08fef2e463bfeec87cb37170eda94b591663b832425

Doctrinal and public support for first-use shapes Chinese perceptions of conventional weapons—failure to signal restraint ensures modernization and escalation.

Hiim 23 - (*Henrik Stålhane Hiim, **M. Taylor Fravel, ***Magnus Langset Trøan *Associate Professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies at the Norwegian Defence University College **The Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science and Director of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology ***Researcher at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs; 1-4-2023, International Security (2023) 47 (4): 147–187, "The Dynamics of an Entangled Security Dilemma: China's Changing Nuclear Posture," doa: 6-22-2023) doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00457

between the U S and China nuc s poised to play a greater role than ever before in security ties Although China may view its modernization as defensive , it has elicited a sharp U.S. response , with the U S preparing for conflict . Both states now view the other as hostile conventional competition affect nuclear perceptions and may be mutually reinforcing . shifts in conventional produce “ nuclear compensation ,” If a state fears unable to protect allies it may seek limited nuc s . conventional modernization may degrade nuc s and exacerbate security by creating strong pressure to modernize or expand nuc s . I one state's conventional defen se may threaten another state. it may lead to setting off an action-reaction dynamic . The NPR's focus on China as a competitor convinced Chinese experts the U S views lower-yield weapons as a way to maintain dominance . observers noted Defense official Colby claims that rather than “excluding first use , Washington should be emphasizing it. believe such reflect a shift in U.S. thinking and generated concerns in China about U.S. nuclear first use . risk of an incident is rising , given tensions in the S C S and Taiwan . D o D recognized Chinese worries Like the intel community . the U.S. may “promote nuclear war .

between the U nited S tates and China , nuc lear weapon s are poised to play a greater role than ever before in security ties between the two countries. The security dilemma is an important driver of the intensifying rivalry and military competition between the United States and China. Although China may view its military modernization as largely defensive , it has elicited a sharp U.S. response , with the U nited S tates bolstering its military presence in East Asia and preparing its forces for potential military conflict with China . Both states now view the other as harboring hostile intentions Traditionally , most scholars do not view the conventional military balance as influencing nuclear threat perceptions . conventional military competition may affect nuclear threat perceptions and exacerbate the security dilemma . We identify three pathways through which such dynamics may occur. These three pathways are not mutually exclusive and may be mutually reinforcing . shifts in the conventional balance of forces can produce incentives for “ nuclear compensation ,” If a state fears that its conventional inferiority will leave it vulnerable to aggression or unable to protect its allies at an acceptable cost, it may seek to develop limited nuc lear option s in order to make threats of limited nuclear employment more credible . Nuclear compensation can exacerbate the security dilemma by increasing the perceived threat to the conventionally superior state. In a second pathway, which we call “ conventionally created vulnerability ,” conventional military modernization may affect nuclear threat perceptions if an adversary uses conventional forces to degrade or even destroy a state's nuc lear capabilitie s . Such vulnerabilities are a key implication of growing entanglement , with nuclear weapons and nuclear command, control, communication, and intelligence C3I networks facing increasing threats from conventional capabilities. Recent technological advances the advent of advanced long-range precision-strike weapons that increase the vulnerability of nuclear assets to conventional attacks have made such threats more salient . advanced cyber weapons or counterspace weapons principally intended for conventional operations now constitute potentially serious threats to C3I networks of even advanced nuclear weapons states. A likely consequence of conventionally created vulnerability is to exacerbate the security dilemma by creating strong pressure for states to modernize or expand their nuc lear force s . a state's conventional modernization can nevertheless influence another state's perceptions about the robustness of its deterrent . concerns about conventional counterforce could lead the target state to bolster its nuclear arsenal in response , creating incentives for the other state to strengthen its own nuclear forces . I n a third pathway, which we call “ conventional bolstering ,” one state's efforts to use conventional weapons to defen d its nuclear ar se nal may threaten another state. Advanced conventional capabilities can cause states to strengthen their nuclear deterrent in new ways , including by threatening their adversary's counterforce capabilities Concerns about missile defenses may prompt states to develop both kinetic and non-kinetic conventional capabilities to target early-warning satellites and other assets that enable missile defense. States may use such capabilities to counter counterforce, but they may also direct them against assets that are critical to the operation of conventional forces or potentially even nuclear forces. it may lead the target state to bolster its conventional forces or to rely more strongly on nuclear compensation in response, setting off an other action-reaction dynamic . The NPR's focus on China as a s trategic competitor has convinced Chinese experts that the U nited S tates now views lower-yield weapons as a way to maintain its military dominance in East Asia . Chinese observers have also noted arguments such as that of former Defense Department official Elbridge Colby , who claims that because of China's increasing conventional power, rather than “excluding the possibility of American nuclear first use , Washington should be emphasizing it. ” Chinese observers believe that such comments reflect a shift in U.S. thinking about nuclear weapons. and These developments have generated concerns in China about U.S. nuclear first use in a conflict . the shifts in U.S. nuclear policy mean that “China cannot refrain from being concerned about the possibility of U.S. nuclear first use in a regional crisis.” the risk of an incident escalating to conventional or even nuclear use is rising , given the tensions in the S outh C hina S ea and the Taiwan Strait . the U.S. D epartment o f D efense has recognized these Chinese worries , noting that “by late 2018, PRC [People's Republic of China] concerns began to emerge that the United States would use low-yield weapons against a Taiwan invasion fleet.” Like wise, the U.S. intel ligence community 's 2023 annual threat assessment states that: “Beijing worries that bilateral tension , U.S. nuclear modernization , and the PLA's advancing conventional capabilities have increased the likelihood of a U.S. first strike . ” the U.S. lowering of the nuclear threshold may “promote the escalation of low-intensity conflicts to nuclear war . ” Chinese experts have also highlighted that a limited nuclear strike could be misinterpreted as a high-yield countervalue attack, and thus lead to major retaliation . Therefore, [the opponent] may use strategic nuclear weapons in response, turning a nuclear conflict into a full-scale nuclear war .”

U S nuc lear weapon s greater role than ever before intensifying rivalry military competition defensive elicited a sharp U.S. response U S preparing its forces potential military conflict harboring hostile intentions Traditionally conventional military balance influencing nuclear threat perceptions exacerbate the security dilemma not mutually exclusive mutually reinforcing incentives nuclear compensation conventional inferiority vulnerable to aggression limited nuc lear option s limited nuclear employment credible increasing the perceived threat conventionally created vulnerability conventional forces degrade destroy nuc lear capabilitie s growing entanglement C3I increasing threats long-range precision-strike weapons vulnerability of nuclear assets salient advanced cyber weapons counterspace weapons serious threats to C3I networks exacerbate the security dilemma strong pressure modernize expand their nuc lear force s conventional modernization robustness of its deterrent bolster its nuclear arsenal in response other state strengthen its own nuclear forces conventional bolstering defen d its nuclear ar se nal new ways threatening counterforce capabilities missile defenses kinetic non-kinetic conventional capabilities target early-warning satellites an other action-reaction dynamic NPR's focus on China trategic competitor convinced Chinese experts U S views lower-yield weapons maintain its military dominance Defense Department official nuclear first use emphasizing reflect a shift concerns in China U.S. nuclear first use concerned escalating conventional nuclear use rising tensions S C S Taiwan D o D recognized these Chinese worries intel ligence community 's bilateral tension U.S. nuclear modernization advancing conventional capabilities U.S. first strike nuclear war limited nuclear strike misinterpreted major retaliation full-scale nuclear war

['', "Answers to these questions are important for several reasons. Amid growing competition between the United States and China, nuclear weapons are poised to play a greater role than ever before in security ties between the two countries. Understanding the nuclear dynamics between the two, and China's perceptions of the United States, has never been more pressing. Moreover, China's significant expansion of its silo-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force raises the question of whether China is on the cusp of a fundamental change in its nuclear strategy and the start of a new arms race. Finally, understanding the drivers and future direction of China's nuclear strategy is critical to any effort at enhancing arms control or improving strategic stability.", "For the past few decades, China's approach to nuclear weapons was mostly influenced by assessments of U.S. nuclear posture and its impact on China's ability to develop and maintain a secure second strike. Today, however, security competition between the United States and China is increasing, as China continues to undergo an unprecedented peacetime modernization of its conventional forces that is shifting the balance of power in Asia. At the same time, the United States is pursuing a trillion-dollar modernization of its nuclear arsenal and reorienting its conventional posture in East Asia to address China as the “pacing threat.” As a result, nuclear and conventional capabilities and threats are increasingly intertwined and interacting with each other.", "To explore these dynamics of entanglement and how they may be influencing China's approach to nuclear weapons, we use the concept of the security dilemma. Specifically, we identify three pathways for how conventional and nuclear entanglement shapes threat perceptions.8 First, adverse shifts in the conventional balance can create strong incentives for “nuclear compensation,” or a state's increasing its reliance on nuclear weapons to compensate for a weakening conventional position. The opposing state, however, will likely view such an increased reliance on nuclear weapons as a threat to its own nuclear forces that requires increasing the role of nuclear weapons in its own strategy. The second pathway highlights how conventional weapons may weaken a state's nuclear deterrent, creating perceptions of vulnerability. If a state perceives that its nuclear forces can be degraded by an adversary's conventional capabilities, the state may respond by bolstering its nuclear deterrent. Third, a state may also develop conventional capabilities to enhance the survivability of its nuclear forces. For example, it may develop platforms that can target an adversary's missile defenses to ensure its ability to retaliate after a strike. Its adversary, however, may regard these platforms as a threat to its conventional forces—or even its nuclear forces.", "Our analysis of China's approach to nuclear weapons amid the shifting balance of conventional capabilities yields several conclusions. First, Chinese experts believe that the United States seeks to lower the threshold for nuclear use, especially by emphasizing lower-yield weapons. They regard this development as part of an effort to counter China's growing conventional strength in East Asia and fear that the United States could rely on such weapons in a conflict over Taiwan and threaten limited first use.", "Second, Chinese experts view U.S. conventional capabilities, in addition to U.S. nuclear counterforce capabilities, as posing a growing threat to China's nuclear deterrent. China's long-held concerns about U.S. missile defense and more recent concerns about U.S. conventional precision-strike capabilities have intensified in recent years. This apprehension is spurred by developments such as the 2016 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and an associated X-band radar deployment in South Korea, the demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the successful testing of an SM-3 interceptor against an ICBM, and the continued investments in the conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) program, as well as new capabilities to target nuclear forces such as “left of launch.”9", "Third, in response to concerns about conventional threats to its deterrent, China is not only expanding and modernizing its nuclear forces but also pursuing advanced conventional capabilities. China's construction of new missile silos suggests a desire to bolster its second-strike capability because the silos will be largely invulnerable to conventional counterforce attacks. To defeat U.S. missile defenses and ensure the penetrability of China's nuclear weapons, Chinese experts also argue that China should rely on conventional capabilities, such as anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons and conventionally armed missiles that can strike enabling capabilities such as satellites and ground-based radars.", "Fourth, while the entangled security dilemma is contributing to significant shifts in China's strategic posture, most available sources indicate that China is not (yet) abandoning its strategy of assured retaliation. Nevertheless, China's assessment of the force levels required for deterrence appears to have changed. Moreover, although the evidence remains inconclusive, an increased role for silo-based ICBMs and the development of a space-based early warning system indicate that China could place parts of its forces on a LOW posture, a policy that some Chinese experts favor. Finally, even if China's nuclear strategy has not yet changed, the expansion of its arsenal and development of capabilities such as the dual-capable, highly precise DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile can enable future changes in strategy. Fears of U.S. nuclear compensation and limited nuclear use arguably increase the likelihood that China will adopt a strategy that incorporates limited nuclear use for retaliation.", "Our findings are based on a diverse set of Chinese-language sources on military affairs and nuclear weapons published before China started to construct the silo fields in 2020. These sources include teaching texts, yearbooks, scholarly books, academic articles, and newspaper reporting published by organizations or institutes that are part of the PLA or China's defense industries. Authors include military officers from the PLA Rocket Forces (PLARF), military scholars affiliated with PLA research institutes, civilian nuclear experts, and scientists and engineers. Taken together, we refer to these experts as members of China's strategic community. Although these sources are incomplete because they do not include classified materials on strategy and operational doctrine, they allow us to identify areas of consensus and contestation within China's strategic community, which informs leadership decision-making regarding nuclear weapons. Access to new, additional sources might warrant reassessments of our conclusions.", "The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. In the first section, we describe how conventional and nuclear modernization together create an entangled security dilemma between the United States and China, which shapes U.S.-China nuclear dynamics. Second, we analyze Chinese assessments of the United States’ nuclear posture, including threats to China's deterrent springing from U.S. lower-yield nuclear weapons as well as U.S. missile defense and conventional counterforce capabilities. Third, we analyze debates about how China may respond in terms of its nuclear strategy. Fourth, we examine how China's nuclear posture is changing, and how conventional capabilities play an increasingly important role in Chinese nuclear strategy. The conclusion points to some of the lessons that the Chinese case may have for debates about arms control between the United States and China, the prospects for strategic stability, and broader debates about the security dilemma as well as the implications of increasing entanglement between conventional and nuclear weapons.", 'Nuclear-Conventional Entanglement in a Security Dilemma', "The security dilemma is an important driver of the intensifying rivalry and military competition between the United States and China.10 The security dilemma refers to actions that one state takes to enhance its security that another state perceives as offensive and threatening, thus increasing its own military capabilities in response. Even though both states may view themselves as pursuing defensive goals, the security dilemma is associated with increased instability and spirals of tensions.11 In the current U.S.-China relationship, China's rapid military modernization, and its economic growth more generally, create apprehension and uncertainty in the United States about China's intentions.12 Although China may view its military modernization as largely defensive, it has elicited a sharp U.S. response, with the United States bolstering its military presence in East Asia and preparing its forces for potential military conflict with China. Both states now view the other as harboring hostile intentions: The United States describes China as having “the intent to reshape the international order,” whereas Chinese leaders point to “external attempts to blackmail, contain, blockade and exert maximum pressure on China.”13", "As we describe in more detail below, spiral dynamics sparked by China's conventional modernization and U.S. responses can shape perceptions of nuclear security and the robustness of deterrence for both states. In other words, the effect of conventional military competition on nuclear threat perceptions exacerbates the security dilemma between the United States and China. Although recent literature on entanglement—or “how militaries’ nuclear and nonnuclear capabilities are becoming dangerously intertwined”—highlights how it affects crisis stability, the question of how entanglement may undermine arms race stability and affect the security dilemma has received less attention.14", 'Traditionally, most scholars do not view the conventional military balance as influencing nuclear threat perceptions. Scholars associated with the influential theory of the nuclear revolution argue that nuclear weapons dampen or may even eliminate the security dilemma when two states have a mutual second-strike capability.15 When deterrence exists between two states, nuclear weapons generate a significant defensive advantage. One implication of this logic is that the conventional military balance should be unlikely to affect threat perceptions between nuclear-armed states, even when the gap in conventional capabilities is significant. According to Robert Jervis, “if nuclear weapons have had the influence that the nuclear-revolution theory indicates they should have … political outcomes will not be closely related to either the nuclear or the conventional balance.”16', "Furthermore, to assess the nuclear balance and its effect on the security dilemma, nuclear revolution theorists emphasize that nuclear weapons or capabilities are intimately tied to nuclear operations, such as missile defenses and strategic anti-submarine warfare. When considering platforms that could create perceptions of insecurity and incentives for nuclear arms racing, they emphasize counterforce capabilities, such as ground-launched ICBMs carrying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) that could target the opponent's nuclear forces and ballistic missile defenses (BMD).17 Even counterforce capabilities, however, are often viewed as wasteful rather than harmful because of the defense dominance generated by nuclear weapons.18 Most conventional weapons and conventional military operations are not seen as having much effect on the nuclear balance, and thus are not seen as part of the security dilemma between nuclear-armed states.19 This is unsurprising, given that the theory of the nuclear revolution was developed during the Cold War, when platforms such as conventional precision-strike were far less mature and had limited counterforce utility, particularly in the U.S.-Soviet nuclear relationship.", 'Although nuclear weapons may dampen the security dilemma, broadly speaking, conventional military competition may affect nuclear threat perceptions and exacerbate the security dilemma. We identify three pathways through which such dynamics may occur. These three pathways are not mutually exclusive and may be mutually reinforcing.', "First, in a pathway that was identified during the Cold War, shifts in the conventional balance of forces can produce incentives for “nuclear compensation,” or threatening nuclear use or even employing nuclear weapons to offset conventional weakness.20 If a state fears that its conventional inferiority will leave it vulnerable to aggression or unable to protect its allies at an acceptable cost, it may seek to develop limited nuclear options in order to make threats of limited nuclear employment more credible. It may rely on such options to bolster deterrence, control escalation, or possess a warfighting option to secure a favorable military outcome if a conflict occurs.21 Several conventionally inferior nuclear-armed states have pursued compensation strategies. Prominent examples include the United States’ Cold War “flexible response” strategy in Europe and Pakistan's nuclear strategy.22", "Nuclear compensation can exacerbate the security dilemma by increasing the perceived threat to the conventionally superior state. If the state believes that its adversary is developing or deploying nuclear weapons tailored for limited use, it may conclude that the adversary is lowering the threshold for nuclear first use, and that it could use them for coercion. Moreover, the state may worry that it lacks credible options to counter threats of limited nuclear strikes. For example, India has faced a dilemma regarding how to respond to Pakistan's development of tactical nuclear weapons during the last decade. Should it shift from massive retaliation to more proportional retaliation, or should it develop counterforce capabilities? Both a tit-for-tat retaliatory approach and a counterforce approach would constitute a significant shift in India's nuclear strategy and would potentially require it to develop new nuclear weapons capabilities.23", "In a second pathway, which we call “conventionally created vulnerability,” conventional military modernization may affect nuclear threat perceptions if an adversary uses conventional forces to degrade or even destroy a state's nuclear capabilities. Such vulnerabilities are a key implication of growing entanglement, with nuclear weapons and nuclear command, control, communication, and intelligence (C3I) networks facing increasing threats from conventional capabilities. Recent technological advances (e.g., the advent of advanced long-range precision-strike weapons that increase the vulnerability of nuclear assets to conventional attacks) have made such threats more salient. Similarly, advanced cyber weapons or counterspace weapons principally intended for conventional operations now constitute potentially serious threats to C3I networks of even advanced nuclear weapons states.24", "A likely consequence of conventionally created vulnerability is to exacerbate the security dilemma by creating strong pressure for states to modernize or expand their nuclear forces. Because of entanglement, a state's conventional modernization (not intended to alter the nuclear balance) can nevertheless influence another state's perceptions about the robustness of its deterrent. For example, if one state deploys conventional high-precision strike platforms to counter a perceived conventional threat from another state, the target state may view such capabilities as a potential counterforce threat to its nuclear arsenal. Such concerns about conventional counterforce could lead the target state to bolster its nuclear arsenal in response, creating incentives for the other state to strengthen its own nuclear forces.", "In a third pathway, which we call “conventional bolstering,” one state's efforts to use conventional weapons to defend its nuclear arsenal may threaten another state. Advanced conventional capabilities can cause states to strengthen their nuclear deterrent in new ways, including by threatening their adversary's counterforce capabilities, although this is less frequently discussed than their potential to threaten nuclear platforms. Concerns about missile defenses may prompt states to develop both kinetic and non-kinetic conventional capabilities to target early-warning satellites and other assets that enable missile defense. States may use such capabilities to counter counterforce, but they may also direct them against assets that are critical to the operation of conventional forces or potentially even nuclear forces. Thus, it may lead the target state to bolster its conventional forces or to rely more strongly on nuclear compensation in response, setting off another action-reaction dynamic.", "In sum, if conventional military competition is influencing nuclear threat perceptions, creating an entangled security dilemma between two nuclear powers, then at least one of the following indicators should exist: (1) greater concern about nuclear compensation, or that an adversary will rely on threats of limited nuclear use to compensate for conventional relative weakness; (2) debates about how to respond to this nuclear compensation, including discussions about or actual development of tit-for-tat capabilities (i.e., limited nuclear options); (3) concerns over how conventional weapons threaten a state's nuclear second-strike capability; and (4) debates about and deployment of conventional capabilities that are intended to bolster a state's second-strike forces.", 'How China Views U.S. Nuclear Strategy and Capabilities', "Since the end of the Cold War, China's perceptions of its own nuclear security have been dominated by concerns about the United States. In the past few years, China's strategic community has viewed two shifts in U.S. military posture with growing alarm. The first, which reflects concern about nuclear compensation, is a shift in U.S. nuclear doctrine toward greater emphasis on the limited use of nuclear weapons, which many in Beijing believe is driven by fear of China's growing conventional military capabilities. The second shift, which reflects conventionally created vulnerability, is the development of a suite of primarily conventional counterforce capabilities—including missile defenses and conventional precision-strike platforms—that together would degrade or even eliminate China's secure second strike. In sum, Chinese observers are increasingly pessimistic about both the risk of nuclear escalation and the robustness of China's deterrent.", 'shifts in u.s. strategy and threats of limited nuclear use', "China's strategic community viewed the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) as reflecting an alarming shift in U.S. nuclear policy. The NPR reiterates key points of the 2017 National Security Strategy, describing China and Russia as seeking to “substantially revise the post–Cold War international order and norms of behavior.”25 In response, China's 2019 defense White Paper states that the United States had “provoked and intensified competition among major countries” and undermined strategic stability by pushing “for additional capacity in nuclear, outer space, cyber and missile defense.”26 According to Chinese experts, the NPR demonstrates that the United States is again wielding nuclear weapons as a “hegemonistic tool” to maintain its dominant position rather than as weapons of last resort, and that nuclear weapons are an essential component of great power competition with China.27", "Concerns about U.S. nuclear compensation appear frequently in Chinese sources. The 2018 NPR and the development of new lower-yield nuclear weapons signal to China that the U.S. military strategy is increasingly emphasizing nuclear weapons and nuclear war-fighting. For example, two scholars from the National University of Defense Technology believe that the NPR indicates that the United States has “lowered the threshold for nuclear first use.”28 Likewise, other experts view the NPR as reviving the “theory of limited nuclear war” and thus “laying the groundwork for the development of low-yield nuclear weapons.”29 The 2018 NPR suggests that the primary justification for developing and deploying new lower-yield capabilities is to counter Russia's “escalate to de-escalate” strategy—a claim that Chinese experts reject.30 Instead, Chinese experts see U.S. efforts as at least partly a response to China's growing conventional capabilities. The NPR's focus on China as a strategic competitor has convinced Chinese experts that the United States now views lower-yield weapons as a way to maintain its military dominance in East Asia. With the conventional balance of forces in the region gradually but steadily tilting in China's favor, especially regarding Taiwan and other areas close to China, Chinese experts believe that the United States will rely on such capabilities to compensate for its conventional inferiority.31 In the words of Chinese arms control expert Li Bin, the NPR indicates “that the United States would use its nuclear weapons to respond to nonnuclear Chinese aggressions.”32 Chinese observers have also noted arguments such as that of former Defense Department official Elbridge Colby, who claims that because of China's increasing conventional power, rather than “excluding the possibility of American nuclear first use, Washington should be emphasizing it.”33 Chinese observers believe that such comments reflect a shift in U.S. thinking about nuclear weapons.34 Moreover, Chinese officials argue that the Joe Biden administration has largely maintained the Donald Trump–era nuclear policies by continuing to place “even more importance on the role of nuclear weapons in its national security policy” and lowering “the threshold for using nuclear weapons.”35", "These developments have generated concerns in China about U.S. nuclear first use in a conflict. According to arms control expert Luo Xi from the PLA's Academy of Military Sciences (AMS), the shifts in U.S. nuclear policy mean that “China cannot refrain from being concerned about the possibility of U.S. nuclear first use in a regional crisis.”36 She further notes that the risk of an incident escalating to conventional or even nuclear use is rising, given the tensions in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.37 Similarly, retired PLA Major General Pan Zhenqiang claims that changes in U.S. policy have contributed to a strategic shift with “enormous” consequences for China, and that “China must contemplate a war scenario in which the US may launch a nuclear attack, perhaps in a conflict over the Taiwan Straits.”38 Indeed, the U.S. Department of Defense has recognized these Chinese worries, noting that “by late 2018, PRC [People's Republic of China] concerns began to emerge that the United States would use low-yield weapons against a Taiwan invasion fleet.”39 Likewise, the U.S. intelligence community's 2023 annual threat assessment states that: “Beijing worries that bilateral tension, U.S. nuclear modernization, and the PLA's advancing conventional capabilities have increased the likelihood of a U.S. first strike.”40", 'Consequently, Chinese thinking about the risk of nuclear escalation and U.S. limited first use is shifting. Fiona Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel highlight that Chinese leaders and strategists have traditionally believed that nuclear escalation could not be controlled, and that leaders therefore would be highly cautious about employing nuclear weapons.41 But with the U.S. fielding new lower-yield weapons, this confidence is weakening. A scholar from the AMS, for example, argues that the U.S. lowering of the nuclear threshold may “promote the escalation of low-intensity conflicts to nuclear war.”42 Chinese experts have also highlighted that a limited nuclear strike could be misinterpreted as a high-yield countervalue attack, and thus lead to major retaliation. According to analysts from a research institute under the China National Nuclear Corporation, if the United States launches missiles carrying W76-2 warheads, “it is almost impossible for opponents to distinguish whether the warheads they carry are strategic or low-yield nuclear warheads. Therefore, [the opponent] may use strategic nuclear weapons in response, turning a nuclear conflict into a full-scale nuclear war.”43', '']

[(0, 7)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PhJo-Aff-6---USNA-Round-1.docx

Minnesota

PhJo

dae8c451781811b80596ff1b91d7396ef6767e8fb2e3e09b5871b3d4247b0cfe

Hotlines can’t solve---China views them with deep suspicion and presumes malicious intent by the U.S.

Lyle J. Morris & Kyle Marcrum 22. **Senior Policy Analyst at the RAND Corporation. **Student at the United States Army War College. “Another 'Hotline' with China Isn't the Answer.” 7/27/22. https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/07/another-hotline-with-china-isnt-the-answer.html

hotline give false hope PRC views as tools to manipulate rather than solve crises inadequacy constitutes clear and present danger of miscommunication PLA harbors deep suspicion about crisis communications and perceives U.S. proposals for new channels as excuse to engage in provocative military activities Beijing regards communications subservient to political goals of exploiting crises and manipulating risk calculations Hotlines not meant to resolve crisis but to assign blame, and stall until Beijing stakes out maximum pressure over the U S hotlines ring endlessly

another hotline isn't the answer It would give false hope that the United States and PRC will resolve disputes more rapidly during a crisis. The PRC does not hold the same value and goals for hotlines as the United States: it views them as tools to manipulate rather than to solve crises . The United States is better off changing its expectations, understanding how the PRC views crisis communications Their inadequacy constitutes a clear and present danger of potential miscommunication that could fuel a dangerous U.S.-China military confrontation at a time of heightening bilateral tensions in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea the United States and PRC hold different assumptions and goals about hotlines. United States views them as a tool to deconflict and de-escalate and communicate between forces during a crisis PLA harbors deep suspicion about crisis communications with the United States, and perceives U.S. proposals for new channels as an excuse to engage in provocative military activities near PRC-claimed waters and territory. Beijing regards crisis communications as subservient to broader political goals of “crisis management,” which encompass exploiting crises to its advantage and manipulating risk calculations Hotlines are not meant to resolve the crisis but to empower higher-level organs within the PRC to signal resolve, assign blame, and stall until Beijing stakes out a position of maximum pressure and leverage over the U nited S tates during negotiations. hopes could be misplaced. Not only could hotlines fail to solve crises but they might also not perform as intended hotlines tend to “ ring endlessly in empty rooms

another hotline isn't the answer false hope manipulate inadequacy deep suspicion perceives proposals for new channels excuse to engage in provocative military activities exploiting crises manipulating risk not meant to resolve the crisis assign blame, and stall ring endlessly

["As the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) enter a period of “strategic competition,” U.S. officials apparently see these lines of communications as “guardrails” to “keep both sides from veering off the road toward escalation.”", "While well-intentioned, another hotline isn't the answer. It would give false hope that the United States and PRC will resolve disputes more rapidly during a crisis. The PRC does not hold the same value and goals for hotlines as the United States: it views them as tools to manipulate rather than to solve crises.", 'The United States is better off changing its expectations, understanding how the PRC views crisis communications, and shifting the focus to the internal, inter-agency process by which U.S. policymakers would coordinate in a crisis with Beijing.', 'Incompatible Goals', 'Secretary Austin is one of several senior leaders within the Biden administration calling for more U.S.-PRC hotlines. Current and former U.S. officials believe that U.S.-PRC crisis communication mechanisms are underdeveloped.', 'As one article put it: “Their inadequacy constitutes a clear and present danger of potential miscommunication that could fuel a dangerous U.S.-China military confrontation at a time of heightening bilateral tensions in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.”', 'However, the United States and PRC hold different assumptions and goals about hotlines.', 'The United States views them as a tool to deconflict and de-escalate and communicate between forces during a crisis. The PLA harbors deep suspicion about crisis communications with the United States, and perceives U.S. proposals for new channels as an excuse to engage in provocative military activities near PRC-claimed waters and territory.', 'Beijing regards crisis communications as subservient to broader political goals (PDF) of “crisis management,” which encompass exploiting crises to its advantage and manipulating risk calculations. Hotlines are not meant to resolve the crisis but to empower higher-level organs within the PRC to signal resolve, assign blame, and stall until Beijing stakes out a position of maximum pressure and leverage over the United States during negotiations.', 'This incompatibility has not stopped senior U.S. defense officials from holding out hope that hotlines and personal relationships with PLA leaders might ease tensions. In his recent book, for instance, former U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper says he could rapidly contact his “counterpart,” Minister of National Defense General Wei Fenghe, to clear up misunderstandings.', "Such hopes could be misplaced. Not only could hotlines fail to solve crises, but they might also not perform as intended. As Kurt Campbell, the Biden administration's National Security council Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific, has said: hotlines tend to “ring endlessly in empty rooms.”"]

[(8, 16), (22, 32)]

ndtceda

Emory-CoYa-Aff-harvard-Round-4.docx

Emory

CoYa

ec065abbb652af0859b7566549fbd1bfe5d3d0ad01b26a7d49a79b238084e5ca

Their NFU is symbolic. It’s omitted in defense papers, has territorial carveouts, AND asymmetric information means determining ‘first-use’ is impossible.

Prakash Nanda 23 – Former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship; Distinguished Fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies; Visiting Professor at Yonsei University (Seoul) and FMSH (Paris); Chairman of the Governing Body of leading colleges of the Delhi University. https://eurasiantimes.com/china-prepared-to-use-nuclear-missiles-against-india-afte/#google_vignette

NFU needs debate China is now silent latest defense white paper omitted for the first time promise never to use nuclear weapons first NFU would not apply against countries possessing Chinese territory India Kashmir Pakistan does not believe in NF. imagine conventional war between India Pakistan China They do not know which establishments are nuclear or non-nuclear hit an enemy target that turns out to be nuclear results are strategically horrible

Secondly, the “no first use” ( NFU ) policy concept needs a thorough debate . China , another country that professed NFU policy, is now silent . Its latest biannual defense white paper (2013) omitted for the first time a promise never to use its nuclear weapons first . Even otherwise, China had asserted before that its NFU would not apply against countries possessing Chinese territory . That means China’s NFU does not apply to India as it claims over our lands in Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh. That leaves Pakistan , our other major adversary. But Pakistan, too, does not believe in NF. The concept of NFU has other problems as well. For one, imagine a conventional war between India and Pakistan (or, for that matter, China ), and Indian forces target military establishments within the enemy territory. They do not know which of these establishments are nuclear or non-nuclear . In the process of their operations, they hit an enemy target that turns out to be a nuclear one , and the consequent results are strategically horrible . Will it mean that India did not observe its NFU pledge? For another, also imagine a situation when the Indian forces engaged in conventional wars simultaneously against China and Pakistan find it difficult to carry on

latest biannual defense white paper omitted for the first time not apply against countries possessing Chinese territory does not apply to India Kashmir Pakistan conventional war India and Pakistan nuclear or non-nuclear enemy target turns out to be a nuclear one strategically horrible

['Secondly, the “no first use” (NFU) policy concept needs a thorough debate. The United States or, for that matter, other Western nuclear powers such as Britain and France do not have the NFU policy. Russia, which initially had the NFU pledge, withdrew it long ago.', 'China, another country that professed NFU policy, is now silent. Its latest biannual defense white paper (2013) omitted for the first time a promise never to use its nuclear weapons first.', 'Even otherwise, China had asserted before that its NFU would not apply against countries possessing Chinese territory. That means China’s NFU does not apply to India as it claims over our lands in Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh. That leaves Pakistan, our other major adversary. But Pakistan, too, does not believe in NF.', 'The concept of NFU has other problems as well. For one, imagine a conventional war between India and Pakistan (or, for that matter, China), and Indian forces target military establishments within the enemy territory.', 'They do not know which of these establishments are nuclear or non-nuclear. In the process of their operations, they hit an enemy target that turns out to be a nuclear one, and the consequent results are strategically horrible. Will it mean that India did not observe its NFU pledge?', 'For another, also imagine a situation when the Indian forces engaged in conventional wars simultaneously against China and Pakistan find it difficult to carry on. And here, as the situation challenges the very integrity of the country, should one not exercise the nuclear option? After all, we have already modified our nuclear posture in the event of chemical and biological attacks. Why should we tie our hands with the NFU when faced with multi-fronted attacks on our territories or forces?']

[(8, 16)]

ndtceda

Emory-LoKi-Neg-2---Kentucky-Round-2.docx

Emory

LoKi

5a2da495bd2d5e4364c143c66a3c9e6df8ee43873bc0f6f362382ade94a9f2ba

China nullifies U.S. restrictions

Baruzzi, 21 is an Editorial Research Assistant with Dezan Shira & Associates, an AmCham China Corporate Partner Program member. (Sofia Baruzzi “China Promulgates New Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Measures” accessed online 9/17/2021 https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-promulgates-new-extraterritorial-jurisdiction-measures/)

Ministry of Commerc released Measures for Blocking Improper Extraterritorial Application of Foreign Laws “PRC persons”) must report to China, any inappropriate application of foreign laws The competent authority has the power to issue an injunction China is sending a message to the entire world, warning foreign countries to stop unjustly prohibiting Chinese business the Measures will serve as countermeasures to US restrictions

the Ministry of Commerc e (“ released the Measures for Blocking Improper Extraterritorial Application of Foreign Laws and Measures Chinese citizens, legal entities, and organizations (hereafter collectively referred to as “PRC persons”) must report to the competent authority in China, any inappropriate application of foreign measures or laws The competent authority has the power to issue an injunction allowing the reporter not to recognize, implement, or comply with the said foreign norms the Measures provide a retaliation clause remarking that China is ready to take the necessary countermeasures against any improper extraterritorial application of foreign laws and measures China is sending a message to the entire world, warning foreign countries to stop unjustly prohibiting or restricting Chinese people or companies from doing business the Chinese government is ready to intervene. while the Measures do not mention any specific foreign country, they will likely serve as countermeasures to the US restrictions and bans China’s move might be interpreted as an attempt to change the direction of US-China relations, in the hope that such Measures will deter President Joe Biden’s administration from maintainin the regulations implemented during Trump’s administration

allowing the reporter not to recognize, implement, or comply with the said foreign norms China is ready to take the necessary countermeasures against any improper extraterritorial application of foreign laws and measures China is sending a message to the entire world, warning foreign countries to stop unjustly prohibiting or restricting Chinese people or companies from doing business the Chinese government is ready to intervene. while the Measures do not mention any specific foreign country, they will likely serve as countermeasures to the US restrictions and bans

['On January 9, 2021, the Ministry of Commerce (“MOFCOM”) released the Measures for Blocking Improper Extraterritorial Application of Foreign Laws and Measures (“Measures”), with immediate effect. The Measures state that Chinese citizens, legal entities, and organizations (hereafter collectively referred to as “PRC persons”) must report to the competent authority in China, any inappropriate application of foreign measures or laws that are designed to bar economic, trade, and related activities between China and other countries. The competent authority has the power to issue an injunction allowing the reporter not to recognize, implement, or comply with the said foreign norms, as well as to file a lawsuit in China claiming for losses’ compensation. What is the reason behind the adoption of the Measures? As further explained below, the Measures provide a retaliation clause remarking that China is ready to take the necessary countermeasures against any improper extraterritorial application of foreign laws and measures. In this way, China is sending a message to the entire world, warning foreign countries to stop unjustly prohibiting or restricting Chinese people or companies from doing business. With the decision to promulgate such type of measures, China reasserts that, if Chinese businesses are not treated equally and allowed to carry out their business in a lawful and regular manner, then the Chinese government is ready to intervene. It is worth noting that while the Measures do not mention any specific foreign country, they will likely serve as countermeasures to the US restrictions and bans – for instance, the ban against Tik Tok and WeChat, the measures adopted against Huawei’s chips, or the exclusion of China Unicom, China Telecom, and China Mobile from the stock exchange – that heavily impact doing business with Chinese companies and individuals. Considering the recent change in US administration, China’s move might be interpreted as an attempt to change the direction of US-China relations, in the hope that such Measures will deter President Joe Biden’s administration from maintaining (or exacerbating) the regulations implemented during Trump’s administration. Hence, how China will relate itself with the US – and consequently how global companies will be impacted by the Measures – really depends on the Biden administration’s approach. (In a recent interview, Biden said that his administration would be ready for “extreme competition” with China but based within the scope of international rules.) The same type of logic shall apply to any other foreign country, in other words, if it wants to maintain a good and smooth relationship with China – it will have to evaluate whether to modify (or remove) the policies and regulations that prevent or restrict PRC persons from performing economic, trade, and related activities.', '']

[(0, 11)]

ndtceda

Kansas-Spiers-Snow-Neg-NU-Round3.docx

Kansas

SpSn

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kansas/SpSn/Kansas-Spiers-Snow-Neg-NU-Round3.docx

cf9894d35a15acd5343959e9ca726a6afa440f4aa7888c44f47df8b729a417f7

Prolif’s not inevitable---slow, cautious engagement now will successfully limit Iran’s program

Leon Hadar 23, Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Insitute's Middle East Program, 8/25/23, “Biden’s Middle East Balancing Act: Iran’s Nuclear Program and Saudi-Israeli Ties,” https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/08/containing-irans-nuclear-program-while-normalizing-ties-between-israel-and-saudi-arabia/

Washington assumed a deal to curb the nuclear program would reach dead end after two years the U S may be finally having success to reduce tensions with Iran containing the nuclear crisis growing anxiety led Washington France, Germany U K to resume discussions with Tehran aimed at cooling tensions and reach understanding on interim deal the U S would ease sanctions for restrictions on nuclear activities

Washington assumed diplomatic efforts to reach a deal between the U S and Iran to curb the nuclear program would reach a dead end after two years of uncertain negotiations, there are signs the U S may be finally having some success to reduce tensions with Iran and start containing the nuclear crisis growing anxiety over Iran’s nuclear program led Washington and the E3 governments France, Germany , and the U K to resume discussions with Tehran resulted in the opening of talks between American and Iranian officials aimed at cooling tensions and to reach an understanding on several issues, including an interim deal under which the U S would ease some sanctions on Iran in exchange for Iran committing to place restrictions on its nuclear activities

assumed U S would reach a dead end U S finally having some success containing the nuclear crisis E3 governments U K resume discussions cooling tensions an interim deal U S restrictions on its nuclear activities

['For some months now, officials in Washington and other world capitals assumed that diplomatic efforts to reach a deal between the United States and Iran to curb the Islamic Republic’s growing nuclear program would reach a dead end. ', 'But after two years of uncertain negotiations, there are signs that the United States may be finally having some success in its effort to reduce tensions with Iran, reach an agreement to secure the freedom of Americans imprisoned there, and perhaps start to move in the direction of containing the nuclear crisis with the Islamic Republic.', 'These efforts are taking place against the backdrop of evolving dynamics of Middle Eastern politics, including activist diplomacy being pursued by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and continuing political instability in Israel, which impact the Biden administration’s foreign policy. ', 'In turn, the White House, according to reports, has been pursuing the possibility of a process of normalization between Riyadh and Jerusalem as part of a deal with Washington that could upgrade US defense ties with the Saudis. ', 'Moreover, Donald Trump could return to the Oval Office after the 2024 presidential elections. Leading Saudi and Israeli policymakers consider the former president as more sensitive to their security needs than President Joe Biden. ', 'It was under Trump that the United States unilaterally pulled out of the accord Tehran signed with world powers in 2018; the nuclear deal imposed stringent limits on Iran’s nuclear programs and included Tehran’s agreement for strict international inspection of its nuclear sites in exchange for the removal of economic sanctions.', 'Trump revoked the deal with Iran and instead imposed punishing sanctions (i.e., “maximum pressure”) that were intended to force Tehran to renegotiate the deal on terms favored by the Trump administration as well as by the Saudis and the Israelis. But the Trump administration’s expectations were not fulfilled and Iran instead renewed and even accelerated its previously prohibited nuclear activities. ', 'Biden took office pledging to revive the pact, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). But there have been no formal negotiations since last November, when Iran walked away from a proposed agreement and US officials expressed pessimism about the chances of reaching a new agreement. ', 'Moreover, since a government crackdown on protests in Tehran as well as reports that Iran was supporting Russia in its war with Ukraine, contacts between the United States and Iran have declined. ', 'But all of that seemed to have changed following a discovery by the International Atomic Energy Agency in January that the uranium in the dust taken from Iran’s nuclear plant in Fordow had been enriched to a purity of 83.7 percent. That suggested that the Iranians were closer than ever to having the capability to develop nuclear weapons.', 'Indeed, as General Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told a congressional hearing in March, Iran “could produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon in approximately 10–15 days and it would only take several months to produce an actual nuclear weapon.” ', 'The main concern in Washington has been that if Iran reached the threshold of becoming a nuclear state, Israel would then strike Iran’s nuclear sites. That in turn could ignite a regional war the United States would eventually be drawn into. If that happened, it would be a nightmare scenario considering America’s role in the war in Ukraine and the growing military tensions with China over Taiwan. A new war in the Middle East is the last thing the Biden administration needs. ', 'The growing anxiety over Iran’s nuclear program has led officials in Washington and from the so-called E3 governments—France, Germany, and the United Kingdom—to resume discussions on trying to restart negotiations with Tehran. That resulted in the opening of talks between American and Iranian officials in New York and later in Oman in May aimed at cooling the tensions between the two countries and to reach an understanding on several issues, including on a prisoner exchange and possibly an interim deal under which the United State would agree to ease some sanctions on Iran in exchange for Iran committing to place some restrictions on its nuclear activities; the emphasis in both cases being on “some.” ']

[(5, 13)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-ChDe-Neg-Harvard-College-Tournament-Round-8.docx

Northwestern

ChDe

c835782e62feeb04147a4d41aae6ef3d0e2ba33b05477eb7150ac88892f8cd7e

3. China is inherently skeptical – credibility requires relinquishing all first-strike capabilities. Their demands are in bad faith.

Santoro and Gromoll, '20 – President of the Pacific Forum. Specializes in strategic deterrence, arms control, and nonproliferation (David Santoro and Robert Gromoll ; On the Value of Nuclear Dialogue with China""; Pacific Forum, Issues & Insights, Vol. 20, No. 1; https://pacforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/issuesinsights_Vol20No1.pdf; 11-2020; NC)

fixation on NFU seems muddled Given Chinese suspicions US intentions can change as with A B M why would Beijing rely on pledge pledge lack cred unless U S relinquished capability to strike first it would need to be done in with Russia also impossible NFU would require considerably more baggage better explanation for fixation on NFU may be interest in weakening alliances

China’s fixation on an NFU pledge had much to do with importance Beijing attaches to second-strike capability Their reasoning seems muddled if the U S strictly adhered to an NFU pledge then China should have no need for a retaliatory capability Given Chinese suspicions that US intentions can change as they did with the A nti- B allistic M issile Treaty why would Beijing rely on a mere US pledge ? pledge would lack cred ibility unless the U S also relinquished its capability to strike first it would need to be done in conjunction with Russia also extremely difficult if not impossible the NFU pledge, would require considerably more baggage A much better explanation for Chinese fixation on NFU may be China’s interest in weakening US alliances in Asia

reasoning seems muddled no need for a retaliatory capability suspicions that US intentions can change would lack cred ibility also relinquished its capability impossible considerably more baggage weakening US alliances

['China’s fixation on an NFU pledge had much to do with the importance Beijing attaches to safeguarding its second-strike retaliatory capability and ensuring US vulnerability to Chinese retaliation, which they also highly prized. Most importantly, though, it probably was to get a US commitment not to use nuclear weapons against Chinese conventional operations in the region, e.g., on the Korean Peninsula, against Japan, or in a Taiwan contingency.', 'Their reasoning still seems muddled, however: if the United States strictly adhered to an NFU pledge, then China should have no need for a retaliatory capability. Given Chinese suspicions that US intentions can change (as they did with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty), why would Beijing rely so heavily on a mere US pledge not to use nuclear weapons first? The pledge would lack credibility unless the United States also relinquished its capability to strike first. If this were possible, it would need to be done in conjunction with Russia and most likely in a P-5 or P-5+3 context—also extremely difficult under the best circumstances, if not impossible. So, the NFU pledge, as simple as it may seem on paper, would require considerably more baggage if it were to be something more than a “feel good” exercise. A much better explanation for the Chinese’s fixation on NFU may be China’s strong interest in weakening US alliances in Asia.', '']

[(0, 24)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-BaCa-Neg-6---Kathryn-Round-8.docx

Dartmouth

BaCa

ab3a80fa415b234101f458937f3141fdc3c9796f4ab4e4b5f1af1d700fe52b25

4. It is mathematically near zero.

Dr. Mihai A. Diaconeasa et al. 18, B.S from Utrecht, M.S in Nuclear Science and Engineering from MIT, PhD in Mechanical Engineering from UCLA, Postdoctoral Research Scholar at the B. John Garrick Institute for the Risk Sciences; Theresa Stewart is a PhD Candidate at UCLA for Materials Engineering; Dr. Ali Mosleh is a Distinguished Professor of Materials science and Engineering and Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering at UCLA, PhD in Nuclear Science and Engineering at UCLA, Dr. B. John Garrick was a Distinguished Adjunct Professor of Materials Science and Engineering at UCLA, PhD in Engineering and Applied Sciences from UCLA, “Quantifying Global Catastrophic Risks”, The B. John Garrick Institute for the Risk Sciences, July 2018, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/54628adae4b0f587f5d3e03f/t/5c6df30fe2c483fb4fedc47e/1550709531155/2018+Proceedings+-+Global+Catastrophic+Risks+Workshop+Envelope+C5.pdf

Two methods were used for quantifying historical data on false alarms , and individual parts taken from NORAD these events will be used to determine frequency of inadvertent nuclear war although several events occurred each day , only five per year were enough to make it past routine checks probability of inadvertently initiating nuclear war multiplying this with false alarms probability was 7.65E-4

Two methods were used for quantifying the system fault trees top-down quantification using historical data on the frequency of false alarms , and bottom-up quantification using failures for individual parts taken from a published table from NORAD The frequency of these events will later be used to determine the frequency of inadvertent initiation of nuclear war Thus, although several events occurred each day , only about five per year were serious enough to make it past routine checks data used in the computation was based on cognitive psych ology, experimental results , operation of US nuclear power plants and expert opinion. the probability of inadvertently initiating a nuclear war by multiplying this probability with the frequency of false alarms per year given in the model quantification discussion, the probability of frequency distribution was obtained with a median value of 7.65E-4 per year

['III.3.5 MODEL QUANTIFICATION', 'Two primary methods were used for quantifying the system fault trees linked to the initiating event: top-down quantification using historical data on the frequency of false alarms, and bottom-up quantification using failures in time (FIT) rates for individual parts obtained from the Texas Instruments Reliability Database. Overall, the probability of failure of the systems in a year were taken directly from historical data, but the bottom-up quantification was still shown as an example of how a thorough analysis of new satellite or radar systems could be carried out with complete information on the design of these systems.', 'Data on the frequency of false alarms was taken from a published table from NORAD (Table III). Since there is consistently more than one event per year, we assumed a probability of 1.0 for an initial false alarm, which is used as the top gate for the satellite false alarm detection fault tree. The frequency of these events will later be used to determine the frequency of inadvertent initiation of nuclear war, given that the probability obtained from the event sequence diagram is on a per false alarm basis. It should be noted that even if in Table III the number of false alarms is on the order of thousands per year, consideration should be given to the severity of the alarms. Thus, although the several events occurred each day, only about five per year were serious enough to make it past routine checks.', '', 'The joint conditional probabilities of the crew failure modes obtained by quantifying the BNs (Ekanem, 2013) while setting each performance influencing factor’s influence at 0%, 50%, and 100% being true (Table IV).', '<<TABLE IV OMITTED>>', 'The set of data used in the computation of human failure events was based on available theories of cognitive sciences and psychology, experimental results, operation of US and German nuclear power plants experience, and expert opinion.', 'Next, an example Bayesian estimation calculation performed with the Bayesian Estimation Web Application12 is given for how to process expert opinion information with a log-normal prior model and lognormal likelihood model. We used the lognormal distribution to specify the source to source variability of human failure events probability estimates since it can be generally used to express orders of magnitude variations in the estimates of the quantity of interest. In Table V, the prior model parameters, the prior mean and error factor (EF), are given. It should be noted that these parameters are also uncertain, thus their uncertainty needs to be specified as well as the EF of the mean and EF of the EF. The EF is obtained by the ratio between the 95th and 50th percentiles. In general, the EF is used to quantify the uncertainty around the estimate. Lower values are assigned to more certain estimates. For expert opinions values between 3-5 are considered appropriate.', '<<TABLE V OMITTED>>', 'The likelihood model parameters that were estimated by four experts, including the uncertainty (i.e., EFs), are shown below in Table VI. A Monte Carlo simulation was performed to obtain the posterior distribution. The obtained posterior distribution parameters are given in Table VI.', '<<TABLE VI OMITTED>>', 'With this method, we have generated a variability distribution for each of the model parameter estimates in order to obtain the posterior distribution as shown in Figure 14.', '<<FIGURE 14 OMITTED>>', 'III.3.6 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION', 'Given the initiating event of a false alarm with a probability of 1.0, the probability of inadvertently initiating a nuclear war given the described scenarios in the model was calculated using the HCLA Command-Line Tool. The uncertainties were propagated using Monte Carlo sampling techniques. Moreover, by multiplying this probability with the frequency of false alarms per year given in the model quantification discussion, the probability of frequency distribution from Figure 15 was obtained with a median value of 7.65E-4 per year. To put it in perspective, the core damage frequency of the U.S. nuclear power plants was estimated at 2.0E-5 per reactor-year (Gaertner, 2008).']

[(13, 33)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-GaSl-Neg-Hoosier-Invitational-HIT-Round-2.docx

Kentucky

GaSl

2c6f0fe12c6b2d37d58c1e2c66ea6b3759ea8d965d87ce929dfdd630603e3bbd

No modeling. The US is not the driver of the arms race and action reaction theory is wrong.

David Trachtenberg et al 21. Vice President @ National Institute for Public Policy, American national security advisor, Vice president and head of the strategic analysis division of CACI International. “The Action-Reaction” Arms Race Narrative vs. Historical Realities.” 2021. https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/OP-6-final.pdf

the U S has not been the driver of an arms race decisions are based on multitude of factors U.S . action followed by behavior that was the opposite of what action reaction theory predicted U.S. inaction encouraged adversary actions ABM Treaty creat opportunity for Soviet expansion of ICBM s in no case examined does it appear the U S has been the cause of an arms race arguments about U S driving arms race by modernization appear politically inspired contrary to ev belief the U S sets direction and restraint will guide others reflects cultural arrogance While Russia, China, and North Korea have been pursuing programs for two decades the U.S. stockpile stands at its lowest level

the U nited S tates has not been the first cause driver of an arms race nor has U.S. restraint in nuclear developments been reciprocated The popular narrative lacks integrity yet it continues to be voiced without restraint as if it is a “law” of international relations The narrative of a “mindless” action-reaction arms race is not a new phenomenon in the early 1900s, Great Britain, the world’s preeminent naval power, was challenged for naval dominance by Germany, France, and Russia. By 1902, British experts had concluded that “we have lost our superiority The British government debated whether to build a faster vessel , many in Britain sought to avoid an arms race There remained a sizable sentiment for reducing armaments When Britain decreased her program in 1906 many increased. In 1907 the British “did not start the naval race: the Germans did in 1898 Britain’s desire to avoid an arms race with Germany by scaling back its own naval building plans went unreciprocated another example of the fallacy of the inaction-inaction argument arms races are not mechanistic processes where the actions of one party result predictably in similar actions by another party. Armament decisions are based on a multitude of factors that drive the decisions of states including unique historical , cultural , economic , and leadership characteristics During the years examined here , U.S . action or inaction frequently was followed by adversary behavior that was precisely the opposite of what proponents of the action reaction theory of arms racing predicted For example, Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative convinced Russia that the United States enjoyed a level of technological superiority that Moscow was unable to match In other cases, U.S. inaction encouraged adversary actions , such as when the United States ceased deployment of strategic missile defenses under the ABM Treaty , thereby creat ing an opportunity for the Soviet Union to channel resources into the expansion of Soviet ICBM capabilitie s in no case examined here does it appear that the U nited S tates has been the lead cause of an action-reaction arms race And in the cases of the 1983 SDI and 2002 missile defense initiative, U.S. actions were not followed by the reactions predicted by critics While the United States believed that strategic nuclear “parity” would lead to a satisfied Soviet Union and its quiescence the Soviets sought to attain a position of relative superiority These fundamental differences between U.S. and Soviet strategic thought are reflected in the asymmetric force postures of the two sides the Soviets regard nuclear war as a continuing possibility and have rejected mutual vulnerability as a desirable or permanent basis in light of historical developments arguments about the U nited S tates initiating or driving an arms race by virtue of its own nuclear modernization programs reflect an ideological predisposition to posit U.S. culpability for arms racing. Assertions have remained constant over decades that U.S . nuclear weapons programs are the cause of arms racing and that U.S. restraint will be followed by opponent restraint These assertions appear largely to be politically inspired speculation contrary to available empirical ev idence The belief that the U nited S t ates sets the scope pace and direction others’ armament activities and that the power of U.S. strategic restraint will guide others reflects a form of cultural arrogance that is unsupported by the historical record. While Russia, China, and North Korea have been pursuing nuclear building programs for two decades the number of nuclear weapons in the U.S. stockpile today stands at its lowest level since the mid-1950s The United States has not built a new nuclear weapon in decades and has not tested a nuclear weapon explosively in more than a quarter century. the United States continues to focus on the development of advanced conventional weapons technologies in support of the goal of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy

first cause nor has U.S. restraint lacks integrity is not a new phenomenon many increased. In 1907 unreciprocated fallacy of the inaction-inaction result predictably in similar actions a multitude of factors historical cultural economic leadership precisely the opposite action reaction theory technological superiority encouraged adversary actions ABM Treaty channel resources expansion lead cause were not followed a satisfied Soviet Union attain a position of relative superiority initiating driving virtue of its own modernization ideological predisposition constant over decades cause of arms racing followed by opponent restraint politically inspired contrary to available empirical ev idence scope pace direction will guide others cultural arrogance unsupported pursuing nuclear building programs stands at its lowest level reducing the role of nuclear weapons

['In contrast to the many assertions of the action-reaction narrative, during the period examined, the United States has not been the first cause driver of an arms race, nor has U.S. restraint in nuclear developments been reciprocated by others. The popular narrative of an action-reaction arms race dynamic led by the United States lacks integrity, yet it continues to be voiced without restraint as if it is a “law” of international relations. As journalist Walter Pincus wrote in 1999, “Whatever the United States does, wherever its presence is felt, its actions don’t occur in a vacuum. In the world of missiles, missile defenses, nuclear physics and nuclear politics, action-reaction is still the norm.”118 The narrative of a “mindless” action-reaction arms race is not a new phenomenon. Nor did it originate with the emergence of the nuclear era and the start of the Cold War. Predictions of a mechanistic action-reaction dynamic predate recent history and are reflected in arguments over armaments building that date back centuries. For example, in the early 1900s, Great Britain, the world’s preeminent naval power, was challenged for naval dominance by Germany, France, and Russia. Germany, in particular, was on a course to supplant Britain as a dominant naval power, launching a program to build dozens of battleships. By 1902, British experts had concluded that “we have lost our [naval] superiority and are distinctly dropping to the rear.”119 The British government debated whether to build a faster vessel—the Dreadnought—and how many. Yet, many in Britain sought to avoid an arms race with Germany and argued against building more Dreadnoughts. As one authoritative account explained: There remained a sizable sentiment [in Britain] for reducing armaments…. In 1905 Britain had built four ships to Germany’s two. When Britain decreased her program in 1906, Germany increased. In 1907 Britain further decreased her program while Germany increased once again. It took some British a little longer, but eventually most began to get the message.120 Those who saw danger in Germany’s buildup were accused of “naval scare-mongering,” with one British Cabinet member calling it the “diseased imagination of inferior minds.”121 However, as one historian recounted, the British “did not start the naval race: the Germans did in 1898.” As another historian noted, “The British soon realized that it was useless to try to turn Germany aside from its purpose by abstaining from countermeasures. Reluctance to do so would obviously be taken only as weakness.”122 Clearly, Britain’s desire to avoid an arms race with Germany by scaling back its own naval building plans went unreciprocated—another example of the fallacy of the inaction-inaction argument. A few short years later, World War I began. This British-German example demonstrates that arms races are not mechanistic processes where the actions of one party result predictably in similar actions by another party. Armament decisions are based on a multitude of factors that drive the decisions of states, including unique historical, cultural, economic, and leadership characteristics. Britain’s experience in the early 1900s is reminiscent of Harold Brown’s statement when asked about Soviet activities: “When we build, they build; when we cut, they build.” During the years examined here, U.S. action or inaction frequently was followed by adversary behavior that was precisely the opposite of what proponents of the action reaction theory of arms racing predicted, including U.S. action that led to Soviet inaction, and U.S. inaction that led to Soviet action. For example, Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)—even though it was never fully realized—convinced Russia that the United States enjoyed a level of technological superiority that Moscow was unable to match and, as a number of oral history participants noted, helped bring about the end of the Cold War by forcing the USSR to adopt various economic and political changes that ultimately led to the Soviet Union’s collapse. And, despite criticism based on the action-reaction metaphor, George W. Bush’s withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and move to deploy limited missile defenses against rogue state missile threats coincided with an arms control treaty sought by Russia, the Moscow Treaty. It mandated the deepest reductions in strategic offensive nuclear arsenals of any such agreement. In other cases, U.S. inaction encouraged adversary actions, such as when the United States ceased deployment of strategic missile defenses under the ABM Treaty, thereby creating an opportunity (as stated explicitly by Soviet senior military leadership) for the Soviet Union to channel resources into the expansion of Soviet ICBM capabilities. The critics’ action-reaction based prediction was that U.S. agreement to the ABM Treaty would instead render a continuing Soviet buildup in offensive nuclear capabilities unnecessary. Clearly, there have been interactions in U.S and Soviet (and subsequently, Russian) armament programs. Yet, in no case examined here does it appear that the United States has been the lead cause of an action-reaction arms race. The United States has focused on preserving its capacity for deterrence and extended deterrence in the face of rapidly expanding Soviet and more recently Russian strategic nuclear capabilities, theater nuclear, and conventional capabilities, and an aggressive, expansionist, anti-American foreign policy. And in the cases of the 1983 SDI and 2002 missile defense initiative, U.S. actions were not followed by the reactions predicted by critics based on the actionreaction metaphor. While the United States believed that strategic nuclear “parity” with the Soviet Union would lead to a satisfied Soviet Union and its quiescence, the Soviets sought to attain a position of relative superiority over the United States in the area of nuclear capability, particularly in hard target counterforce capability. And, in contrast to much U.S. behavior, the Soviets also actively sought strategic force advantages that would allow them to fight and prevail in a nuclear war should deterrence fail. Nuclear developments on both sides can be attributed to interactions based more on these different perceptions and motivations than to the presumed mechanistic action-reaction dynamic. Unlike the United States, which placed a premium on “stable” deterrence of nuclear attack through mutual possession of a credible, second-strike retaliatory capability, the Soviet approach to strategic doctrine placed a premium on developing and deploying counterforce nuclear capabilities comprehensively to target U.S. retaliatory forces and various defensive capabilities to limit damage from potential U.S. retaliatory strikes. The Soviet and U.S. approaches to their respective nuclear force postures reflected their divergence of views on the primary utility of nuclear weapons: their armament programs were driven by the requirements that corresponded to their divergent goals, not by an action-reaction dynamic associated with mutual adherence to a “stable” balance of terror. A presumption of the latter was the basic fallacy of the simplistic action-reaction arms racing paradigm. As a Joint Net Assessment concluded: These fundamental differences between U.S. and Soviet strategic thought are reflected in the asymmetric force postures of the two sides. Because the Soviets regard nuclear war as a continuing possibility and have rejected mutual vulnerability as a desirable or permanent basis for the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship, they seek superior capabilities to fight and win a nuclear war with the United States and have been working to improve their chances of prevailing in such a conflict.123 The Soviets developed and deployed a range of counterforce systems, including the large, heavily-MIRVed SS-18 ICBM, which correspondingly created a growing asymmetry in prompt counterforce capabilities. As the Department of Defense concluded: “The Soviets recognize the catastrophic consequences of global nuclear war. Nonetheless, they seek to survive and prevail in such a conflict.”124 And: If a war escalates to the nuclear level, Soviet doctrine calls for the massive use of nuclear weapons to preempt an imminent, large-scale enemy attack…. Following nuclear exchanges, the Soviets anticipate that combat at all levels would continue, possibly for a protracted period.125 If the expectation of an action-reaction arms race now leads to limits on U.S. strategic missile defenses--as occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, e.g., the 1972 ABM Treaty—there will likely be a significant trade-off that the United States did not face in the 1960s and 1970s. The dilemma the United States will face is whether to expand its strategic missile defense capabilities to keep pace with rogue threats, or, in the expectation of an action-reaction dynamic, to reimpose limits on its strategic missile defense. As rogue strategic missile capabilities expand and mature, limiting U.S. strategic missile defense now for fear of an action-reaction dynamic with Russia will likely leave the U.S. vulnerable to rogue missile strikes. The question the United States will likely face is whether a possible action-reaction dynamic with great powers or acquiescing to vulnerability to rogue missile attack is the priority security concern. This Occasional Paper builds on the outstanding arms race analyses of Colin Gray and Albert Wohlstetter from the 1970s. It concludes that in light of historical developments, arguments about the United States initiating or driving an arms race by virtue of its own nuclear modernization programs are not only wrong but reflect an ideological predisposition to posit U.S. culpability for arms racing. Assertions have remained constant over decades that U.S. nuclear weapons programs are the cause of arms racing and that U.S. restraint will be followed by opponent restraint. These assertions appear largely to be politically inspired speculation contrary to available empirical evidence. Moreover, implicit in the U.S.-led action-reaction arms race theory is an assumption that other governments simply react to U.S. developments in predictable ways. The belief that the United States sets the scope, pace, and direction of others’ armament activities, and that the power of U.S. strategic restraint will guide others similarly, reflects a form of cultural arrogance that is unsupported by the historical record. At least for the United States, the metrics for judging whether the United States is “racing” all suggest the opposite. While Russia, China, and North Korea have been pursuing nuclear building programs for two decades, the number of nuclear weapons in the U.S. stockpile today stands at its lowest level since the mid-1950s. The United States has not built a new nuclear weapon in decades and has not tested a nuclear weapon explosively in more than a quarter century. The level of investment in U.S. nuclear forces is at historical lows and will remain a single digit percentage of the overall U.S. defense budget even when the current modernization program reaches its peak. And the United States continues to focus on the development of advanced conventional weapons technologies in support of the goal of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy. None of these developments are consistent with the publicly espoused notion of U.S.-led “arms racing.”']

[(6, 28), (83, 83)]

ndtceda

Emory-MiPi-Neg-7---Texas-Round-2.docx

Emory

MiPi

29466086e44ec309678b21e5fade02dc5850c3430b0a5684a7e89b6c8413037d

“China making AI now” is not responsive because US and Chinese firms are deeply interconnected and tech is not zero sum – there is no “winning” the tech race. Any innovation the U.S. produces will go straight to China. Zeroes the advantage.

Sherman ’19 [Justin; Cybersecurity Policy Fellow @ New America; “Stop calling artificial intelligence research an ‘arms race’”; https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/03/06/stop-calling-artificial-intelligence-research-an-arms-race/?utm_term=.a8fe09dcfad5]

The premise that AI research is zero-sum is easy to debunk American firms invest billions in Chinese companies American firms depend heavily on Chinese manufacturing interconnections are also knowledge-related The arms race metaphor incorrectly treats artificial intelligence as a single technology commentators talk of China beating the U S without understanding what winning means What happens if China’s drones fly faster The end result is unclear

We see the phrase everywhere the United States and China are in an artificial intelligence arms race It manifests in and All this to capture the fear that another country might develop AI more powerful than our own. But calling the AI competition an arms race is both It suggests AI development is winner-take-all leading to policies that cut off valuable interconnection The premise that AI research is a zero-sum endeavor is especially easy to debunk American firms invest billions of dollars in Chinese AI companies and Chinese firms have tens of billions of dollars in the other direction American firms depend heavily on Chinese manufacturing which will have an even greater impact on AI development as artificial intelligence is increasingly deployed in hardware such as that of drones and robots. The interconnections between U.S. and China AI development are also knowledge-related China’s Tsinghua University an Institute for Artificial Intelligence where Jeff Dean is an adviser China’s largest retailer has a with Stanford University’s Artificial Intelligence Lab to fund research areas such as computer vision machine learning and forecasting To speak of AI as an arms race is also to ignore the many areas of AI development such as the potential for improved public health outcomes The arms race metaphor is also misguided because it incorrectly treats artificial intelligence as a single technology But with this arms race framing policymakers and commentators talk of China beating the U nited S tates without understanding what winning means What happens if Chinese tech giant Alibaba develops better facial recognition systems than Google? what if China’s military drones autonomously fly faster than those developed by a San Francisco start-up? The end result for these and other scenarios is unclear If we’re going to manage those dangers we need to think about them carefully and discretely, which becomes more difficult when we’re just rushing to produce them first the United States and China are both coursing along the same track toward the same finish line An American strategy that approaches AI development as one arms race is going to fall short because it tells a story that is far too simple about technologies that are getting more complex every day.

easy to debunk invest billions of dollars depend heavily on Chinese manufacturing even greater impact on AI development interconnections knowledge-related many areas of AI development improved public health outcomes misguided single technology winning better facial recognition systems autonomously fly faster unclear coursing along the same track

['We see the phrase everywhere — the United States and China are in an artificial intelligence “arms race.” It manifests in op-eds, news articles and television segments. It’s in books, think tank pieces and government documents. All this to capture the fear that another country might develop AI more powerful than our own. But calling the AI competition an “arms race” is both wrong and dangerous. It suggests AI development is winner-take-all, in that two isolated national AI sectors struggle for total domination, leading to policies that cut off valuable interconnection. Simultaneously, it misrepresents AI research more generally by implying that this varied field is a single technology, almost inevitably focusing too heavily on AI’s military applications. The premise that AI research is a zero-sum endeavor is especially easy to debunk. In reality, American firms invest billions of dollars in Chinese AI companies, and Chinese firms have invested tens of billions of dollars in the other direction. American firms also depend heavily on Chinese manufacturing, which will have an even greater impact on AI development, as artificial intelligence is increasingly deployed in hardware such as that of drones and robots. The interconnections between U.S. and China AI development are also knowledge-related: To name just a few examples, China’s Tsinghua University opened in June an Institute for Artificial Intelligence, where Google’s AI Chief, Jeff Dean, is an adviser; Baidu, the Chinese search company, belongs to the U.S.-based Partnership for AI, which aims to develop best practices for AI technology; and China’s largest retailer has a research partnership with Stanford University’s Artificial Intelligence Lab to fund research areas such as computer vision, machine learning and forecasting. The open-source nature of some elements of AI research further contributes to a near-constant flow of information across borders. [Five myths about artificial intelligence] To speak of AI as an arms race is also to ignore the many areas of AI development, such as the potential for improved public health outcomes, that may benefit both countries. Algorithms that better detect cancer, for instance, could notably reduce costs of care and increase the accuracy of early-stage cancer prediction. This could benefit the United States and China at once, not to mention other countries around the world. With a winner-takes-all “arms race” framing, though, U.S. policymakers may enact policies that hurt American AI development and foreclose opportunities by cutting off vital pipelines of funding, knowledge and other resources. Trump’s sweeping export controls on AI, for example, aim to limit the diffusion of certain knowledge and resources around AI to China. In the process, they might cut off beneficial relationships and exchanges and “substantially reduce” commercial opportunities for American companies. The “arms race” metaphor is also misguided because it incorrectly treats “artificial intelligence” as a single technology. From recognizing a face to detecting skin cancer to assessing a convict’s likelihood of recidivism, different applications of AI have different properties and different sets of training data. These technologies also develop at different speeds, as they may require different data or computing power and may rely on different computer science techniques. Some (such as lethal autonomous weapons) may have wide-ranging effects on state power, while others (such as sophisticated chess programs) may function more as corporate showpieces. Equating these and other fields could easily lead us to prioritize the wrong things for the wrong reasons. But with this “arms race” framing, policymakers and commentators talk of China “beating” the United States without understanding what “winning” means for either side. What happens if Chinese tech giant Alibaba develops better facial recognition systems than Google? Or what if China’s military drones autonomously fly faster than those developed by a San Francisco start-up? The end result for these and other scenarios is unclear, which means policymakers may not adequately invest in areas of AI development with the greatest strategic effect. Additionally, an “arms race” framing may very well lead policymakers to mishandle the varied risks that some AI technologies present. The social, political, economic, legal and ethical challenges of a facial recognition algorithm deployed by a city’s police department are quite different from those of a racially biased skin cancer predictor or a “black box” missile-firing system. If we’re going to manage those dangers, we need to think about them carefully and discretely, which becomes more difficult when we’re just rushing to produce them first. At a time when the United States should be setting strong democratic norms around the design and use of AI — in opposition to the Chinese government’s digital authoritarianism — treating these technologies as if they were the same may yield disastrous risk management. [AI is more powerful than ever. How do we hold it accountable?] This doesn’t mean that the United States and China aren’t competing over AI — or that the competition is irrelevant. On the contrary, artificial intelligence will bolster national economies and enhance military capabilities, both of which are bound to have an effect on state power. As many countries around the world decide on the role of AI in society, their choices will inevitably affect the world order — influencing whether AI is used to bolster democratic or authoritarian forms of governance. That adds another worrisome complication to the “arms race” metaphor, which suggests that the United States and China are both coursing along the same track toward the same finish line. This premise could make it harder for the United States to pursue research according to more democratic norms, as it suggests that we’re just trying to snatch away whatever it is that China is grasping at before it can get to it. The United States needs to design a cohesive national AI strategy — the recent executive order does not count, as it’s too vague and doesn’t adequately discuss a long-term American vision for AI — that addresses the many technologies at hand. China, on the other hand, does address AI’s many forms in its many documents that outline the government’s plans and ambitions for AI development in numerous domains. It’s a demonstration of commitment to AI development “at the highest levels,” from education to industrial transformation to driverless vehicles. An American strategy that approaches AI development as one “arms race” is going to fall short because it tells a story that is far too simple about technologies that are getting more complex every day.']

[(0, 11)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-BaCh-Neg-Owen-L-Coon-Memorial-Tournament-at-Northwestern-Doubles.docx

Dartmouth

BaCh

357e9335d76b36e7e61d3a2a659ca1620e764368acd532d4a639403e802b410f

It’s all these countries---inserting below---it includes Turkey which was the country listed in their card.

NFU Global ’21 [No First Use Global; 2021; Organization devoted to achieving nuclear no-first-use, publishing an open letter by thirty-four parliamentarians of NATO member countries; No First Use Global, “NATO parliamentarians support No-First-Use policies,” ]

UK Slovenia Luxembourg UK Germany Canada Czech Republic UK Netherlands Czech Republic Germany Scotland Turkey Greenland Denmark France Hungary Belgium Norway

Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle ( UK ) Dr Milan Brglez MEP ( Slovenia ) Mr Sven Clement MP ( Luxembourg ) Mr Tony Colman ( UK ) Mrs Özlem Demirel MEP ( Germany ) Dr. Ute Finckh-Krämer ( Germany ) Dr Hedy Fry MP ( Canada ) Ms Alena Gajdůšková ( Czech Republic ) Mr Andrej Hun ko MP ( Germany ) Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb ( UK ) Senator Farah Karimi ( Netherlands ) Mr Jan Kavan ( Czech Republic ) Dr. Franziska Kersten MdB ( Germany ) Mr Bill Kidd MSP ( Scotland / UK ) Ms Franziska Kersten ( Germany ) Prof. Dr. Dietmar Köster MEP ( Germany ) Dr. M. Sevki Kulkuloglu ( Turkey ) Ms Aaja Chemnitz Larsen ( Greenland / Denmark ) Baroness (Ruth) Lister of Burtersett CBE ( UK ) Ms Heather McPherson MP ( Canada ) Baroness Sue Miller ( UK ) Mr Holger K Nielsen ( Denmark ) Ms Eva Quistorp ( Germany ) Rt Hon Sir Malcolm Rifkind KCMG QC ( UK ) Senator Pierrette Ringuette ( Canada ) Dr (med) Tina Rudolf MdB ( Germany ) Mr Mounir Satouri MEP ( France ) Mr Christoph Schmid MdB ( Germany ) Lord Thomas of Gresford OBE, QC. ( UK ) Dr Andrea Varga-Damm MP ( Hungary ) Senator Orry Van de Wauwer ( Belgium ) Mr Thore Vestby ( Norway ) Mr Karsten Voigt ( Germany ) Ms Uta Zapf ( Germany )

UK Slovenia Luxembourg UK Germany Germany Canada Czech Republic Germany UK Netherlands Czech Republic Germany Scotland UK Germany Germany Turkey Greenland Denmark UK Canada UK Denmark Germany UK Canada Germany France Germany UK Hungary Belgium Norway Germany Germany

['Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle\xa0(UK)\nMember, All Party Parliamentary Group on Future Generations.\nMember All Party Parliamentary Group on the UN Global Goals for Sustainable Development.\nVice-President of the National Association of Local Councils.', 'Dr Milan Brglez MEP\xa0(Slovenia)\nMember of the European Parliament Delegation to the EU-Russia Parliamentary Cooperation Committee.\nFormer Speaker of the Slovenian National Assembly.', 'Mr Sven Clement MP\xa0(Luxembourg)\nMember of parliamentary committees on Finance & Budget and on Health & Sports.\nAlternate Member of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.', 'Mr Tony Colman\xa0(UK)\nFormer Member of the House of Commons.\nMember, World Future Council.', 'Mrs Özlem Demirel MEP\xa0(Germany)\nVice-Chair,\xa0European Parliament Sub-committee on Security and Defence.', 'Dr. Ute Finckh-Krämer\xa0(Germany)\nFormer Deputy-Chair of the Bundestag Sub-committee on Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-proliferation.', 'Dr Hedy Fry MP\xa0(Canada)\nOSCE Parliamentary Assembly Special Representative on Gender Issues.', 'Ms Alena Gajdůšková\xa0(Czech Republic).\nCouncil Member, Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (PNND).\nFormer Member of the Czech Senate.', 'Mr Andrej Hunko MP\xa0(Germany)\nMember of the Bundestag and the Council of Europe.', 'Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb\xa0(UK)\nLeader of the Green Party in the House of Lords', 'Senator Farah Karimi\xa0(Netherlands)\nHead of Netherlands Delegation to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.\nOSCEPA Special Representative on Youth Engagement.', 'Mr Jan Kavan\xa0(Czech Republic).\nMember, European Leadership Network.\nFormer Minister of Foreign Affairs.\nFormer President of the UN General Assembly.', 'Dr. Franziska Kersten MdB\xa0(Germany)\nMember of the Deutscher Bundestag.\nFormer Head of Unit at the German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and\xa0Nuclear Safety.', 'Mr Bill Kidd MSP\xa0(Scotland/UK)\nCo-President, Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (PNND).\nConvenor, Cross-party Group in the Scottish Parliament on Nuclear Disarmament.', 'Ms Franziska Kersten\xa0(Germany)\nMember of Deutsche Bundestag', 'Prof. Dr. Dietmar Köster MEP\xa0(Germany)\nMember, European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs.\nMember, European Parliament Delegation for Relations with the United States.', 'Dr. M. Sevki Kulkuloglu\xa0(Turkey)\nFormer Member of Grand National Assembly of Turkey.\nFormer Vice Chair of Committee on Democracy, Human Rights and Humanitarian Questions.', 'Ms Aaja Chemnitz Larsen\xa0(Greenland/Denmark)\nChair, Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region', 'Baroness (Ruth) Lister of Burtersett CBE\xa0(UK)\nFormer Member, Joint Committee on Human Rights.\nFellow of the British Academy.\nFormer Director, Child Poverty Action Group.', 'Ms Heather McPherson MP\xa0(Canada)\nDeputy whip of the New Democratic Party.\nMember of the Canada Delegation to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.', 'Baroness Sue Miller\xa0(UK)\nMember, UK House of Lords.\nCo-President, Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament.\nVice-Chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Global Security and Non-proliferation.', 'Mr Holger K Nielsen\xa0(Denmark)\nFormer member of parliament.\nFormer Foreign Minister.', 'Ms Eva Quistorp\xa0(Germany).\nFormer Member of the European Parliament.\nCo-founder, Women for Peace, Germany', 'Rt Hon Sir Malcolm Rifkind KCMG QC\xa0(UK)\nBoard Member, European Leadership Network.\nFormer Foreign Secretary. Former Defence Secretary.', 'Senator Pierrette Ringuette\xa0(Canada)\nOfficer of the Ordre de la Pléiade.\nMember, Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans.', 'Dr (med) Tina Rudolf MdB\xa0(Germany)\nMember of the Bundestag.\nFormer Member, Jena City Council Climate Advisory Board.', 'Mr Mounir Satouri MEP\xa0(France)\nMember of the European Parliament’s Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.\nMember of the European Parliament’s Security and Defence Sub-Committee.', 'Mr Christoph Schmid MdB\xa0(Germany)\nMember of the Bundestag.\nFormer Mayor of Alerheim.', 'Lord Thomas of Gresford OBE, QC.\xa0(UK).\nMember, UK House of Lords.\nLiberal Democrat Shadow Attorney General.', 'Dr Andrea Varga-Damm MP\xa0(Hungary)\nMember of the Hungarian Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.', 'Senator Orry Van de Wauwer\xa0(Belgium).\nAlternate Member of Belgium Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.\nAlternate Member of Belgium Delegation to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.', 'Mr Thore Vestby\xa0(Norway)\nFormer MP\nFormer Vice-President of Mayors for Peace', 'Mr Karsten Voigt\xa0(Germany)\nMember of the European Leadership Network.\nFormer President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.\nFormer German-American coordinator in the Federal Foreign Office.', 'Ms Uta Zapf\xa0(Germany)\nMember, European Leadership Network.\nFormer Chair of the Bundestag Sub-committee on Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-proliferation.\nFounding Co-President of Parliamentarians for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament (PNND).']

[(0, 14)]

ndtceda

Michigan-DoPh-Neg-Northwestern-Octas.docx

Michigan

DoPh

7d52ada6f249497cad8fff4ea7592451591daf7c59a181194c7ee5d856f15ea8

Our affirmative expands the extragrammatical intepretations of the law in response to the oppressive history of legal rights and duties creating limited humanity for Blackness. The 1AC is an act of jurisgenerativity -- iterative repetition of dialogue over rights and duties merely repeats the forced ‘extraction of sharing’ of Black women’s captive flesh into the liberal market grammars of property and personhood. Instead of attempting to reinfold the excluded into the liberal paradigm of rights and duties, the affirmative embraces the incomplete, the impossible, the contradiction to test the potential of emancipation.

David Lloyd, Spring 2020, "David Lloyd · The social life of black things: Fred Moten’s consent not to be a single being (2020)," Radical Philosophy, , jg

Fugitivity does not escape the law jurisgenesis the capacity to create legal meaning exceeds the law as written a the multiplicity of meaning – always many worlds are created by the too fertile forces of jurisgenesis ’ he rationale for legal interpretation , is the ‘need to suppress law , to impose upon laws a hierarchy ‘[ i ] nterpretation always takes place in the shadow of coercion’ curtail the flights of fantasy that generate ‘the awesome proliferation of meaning’ blackness as the anarchic principle of a jurisgenerativity that demands a reconfiguration of the very idea of law’ characterise blackness’s undoing of the law’s sentence the extragrammatical run-on, that informal incompletion where the sentence lives against its own execution

Fugitivity does not escape the law conditioned as it is by the long reach of the law that it calls forth no more does it embrace the sovereignty of freedom jurisgenesis the capacity to create legal meaning exceeds the law as written a nd determined by any given legal system the problem of the multiplicity of meaning – the fact that never only one but always many worlds are created by the too fertile forces of jurisgenesis ’ he rationale for legal interpretation and for those interpretive institutions , is the ‘need to suppress law to choose between two or more laws , to impose upon laws a hierarchy ‘[ i ] nterpretation always takes place in the shadow of coercion’ to curtail the flights of fantasy that generate ‘the awesome proliferation of meaning’ that is at once fertile and ephemeral, ante- and anti-institutional prompt Moten to imagine anoriginary criminality with which blackness is inextricably linked think blackness as the anarchic principle of a jurisgenerativity that demands a reconfiguration of the very idea of law’ , of the aesthetic Moten goes on to characterise blackness’s undoing of the law’s sentence in precisely such terms the extragrammatical run-on, that informal incompletion where the sentence lives against its own execution as a kind of anoriginal (declaration of) independence affirms a procedure

['[MICHIGAN = BLUE]', 'Fugitivity, then, does not escape the law, conditioned as it is by the long reach of the law that it calls forth, but no more does it embrace the sovereignty of freedom, the autonomy of the subject in its disciplined and abstracted individuated representation of the universal. Nevertheless, this ‘unruly music that moves in disruptive, improvisational excess … of the very idea of the (art) work’, and that is also ‘the site of a certain lawless, fugitive theatricality’ [SL 111], remains in its own peculiar relation to law, but one that exceeds any Kantian regulation of the imagination. Drawing on legal theorist Robert Cover’s classic essay ‘Nomos and Narrative’, Moten notes that ‘the fearsomeness of ungoverned generativity is held, for Kant, in the fact that what is being generated is law; that, above all, it is what Cover calls “the fecundity of the jurisgenerative principle”, which is manifest as endless mutation and differentiation, that freaks him out’ [UM 115]. 13 Cover’s point, on which Moten so generatively elaborates, is that jurisgenesis, the capacity to create legal meaning, exceeds the law as written and determined by any given legal system. It is, therefore, ‘the problem of the multiplicity of meaning – the fact that never only one but always many worlds are created by the too fertile forces of jurisgenesis’ 14 that the institutions of the law are concerned to contain by imposing a single nomos, or legal order. The law seeks ‘to maintain some coherence in the awesome proliferation of meaning lost as it is created – by unleashing upon the fertile but weakly organised jurisgenerative cells an organising principle itself incapable of producing the normative meaning that is life and growth’. 15 The rationale for legal interpretation and for those interpretive institutions, the courts, is, accordingly, not the need for law, but the ‘need to suppress law, to choose between two or more laws, to impose upon laws a hierarchy. It is the multiplicity of laws, the fecundity of the jurisgenerative principle, that creates the problem to which the court and the state are the solution.’ Accordingly, ‘[i]nterpretation always takes place in the shadow of coercion’. 16 Cover’s ‘jurispathic’ courts, in all their implicit violence against difference and multiplicity, correspond to Kant’s judgment of taste that seeks to ‘clip the wings of the lawless imagination’, to curtail the flights of fantasy that generate ‘the awesome proliferation of meaning’ that is at once fertile and ephemeral, ante- and anti-institutional.', 'Cover’s formulations prompt Moten ‘to imagine something on the order of an anoriginary criminality with which blackness is inextricably linked – or to think blackness, perhaps more precisely as the paradoxically anarchic principle and expression of a jurisgenerativity that demands a reconfiguration of the very idea of law’ [SL 19] – and, we might say by extension, of the aesthetic. 17 It’s not hard to see how the fugitive nature of an unconstrained jurisgenerativity corresponds to the protocols of improvisation and the ‘weakly organised cell’ of the ensemble, not least as Moten goes on to characterise blackness’s undoing of the law’s sentence in precisely such terms: ‘the improvisational para-statement – the extragrammatical run-on, that informal incompletion where the sentence lives against its own execution – continually and ubiquitously establishes itself otherwise, elsewhere and at another time, neither here nor there nor here and now, as a kind of anoriginal (declaration of) independence’ [SL 20]. That allusion to the declaration of independence affirms less the autonomy of a black life-form than a procedure, the sheer generative performativity of improvisation itself as it brings into being some new state of play out of the fugitive encounter of constraint and invention in and through the interdependence of the ensemble. Everywhere Moten insists on this performativity of a blackness that is not an ontological essence nor an originary identity but a constant process, a performativity that is necessarily non-performance insofar as it is never subjected or given over to institution, to the dismay of interpretation. ', '']

[(6, 11), (22, 24)]

ndtceda

Michigan-IpSh-Neg-Indiana-Round-4.docx

Michigan

IpSh

77a477fa436593aad91f8698550212f6f2f7725fc5c4ea6c013fea28f35e465f

1. INNOVATION

Merrell & Graham 16, *Henry A. Kessinger Postdoctoral Yellow at Yale University, Herb York Dissertation Fellow, Ph.D. in Political Science from UC San Diego, B.A. in Political Science and Economics from Southern Illinois University, research has appeared in World Development and Cornell University Press, has publications related to argumentation theory and debate pedagogy **Director of the Saluki Debate Team at Southern Illinois University Carbondale, B.A. from Missouri Southern State College in Communication, M.A. from Kansas State in Communication, Ph.D. from Arizona State University in Communication, expertise in competitive debate, political debates, persuasion, interpersonal communication, public speaker, argumentation (Brandon Merrell, Todd Graham, 2016, “Contrasting Structures, Conditional Strategies: Designing Format-Specific Theories for Competitive Debate,” Parliamentary Debate, Vol. 13, Issue 1 (Spring 2016), pp. 11-12)

Cond o encourages stale arg s there is no penalty to kicking generic discourages on-point research seeing interactions between positions cond o results in generic argumentation impedes strategic skills reducing education

cond o is said to increase argumentative creativity and to prevent neg s from relying on generic s. This analysis is functionally backward strategic teams should present whichever arguments they believe are most likely result in a win generic counterplans and kritiks are useful because aff teams answer them poorly Cond o encourages the continued use of stale , generic arg ument s because there is no penalty attached to trying and kicking a generic counterplan that the affirmative saddles with offense giving the negative “carte blanche to introduce as many [advocacies] as time permits creates a number of drawbacks. It fosters curriculum which discourages on-point research It discourages the development of in-round strategic thinking skills which require seeing interactions and synthesis between multiple different positions cond o results in a trend in favor of generic argumentation and impedes the development of strategic skills , thereby reducing the value of debate as an education al tool

cond o functionally backward Cond o encourages the continued use of stale generic arg s no penalty discourages on-point research discourages the development of in-round strategic thinking skills interactions synthesis cond o results in a trend in favor of generic argumentation impedes the development of strategic skills reducing the value of debate as an education al tool

['Finally, conditionality is said to increase argumentative creativity and to prevent negative teams from relying on generic advocacies. This analysis is functionally backward: in any give round, the strategic teams should present whichever arguments they believe are most likely result in a winning ballot. At present, generic counterplans and kritiks are useful in parliamentary debate because affirmative teams continue to answer them poorly. As such, very little penalty is attached to generic negative strategies that are read unconditionally. However, as affirmatives become more adept at answering generic counterplans and kritiks, teams will be less apt to read such arguments unconditionally for fear that their opponents respond successfully. Conditionality, on the other hand, encourages the continued use of stale, generic arguments because there is no penalty attached to trying and kicking a generic counterplan that the affirmative saddles with offense. Even in his assessment of conditionality in policy debate, Aaron Hardy (2010) argued that giving the negative “carte blanche to introduce as many [advocacies] as time permits in each debate creates a number of drawbacks. It fosters a debate curriculum which discourages on-point research in favor of generically applicable argumentation... It also discourages the development of in-round strategic thinking skills which require seeing interactions and synthesis between multiple different positions.” We agree with Hardy that, on balance, conditionality results in a trend in favor of generic argumentation and impedes the development of strategic skills, thereby reducing the value of debate as an educational tool.']

[(0, 6), (6, 7), (17, 19)]

ndtceda

Kansas-MaPa-Aff-3---Harvard-Round-7.docx

Kansas

MaPa

b4e3411c0663a325b479c6acda03cfd327a0b27514e97d0a2dc6fd59ff2b21b1

Studies prove our argument – overregulation dramatically hurts crypto prices.

Samantha St. Amand 18, Former Senior Research Associate, Global Economy, “Looming Regulation Likely to Impact Cryptocurrency Prices,” Centre for International Governance Innovation, 3-15-2018, https://www.cigionline.org/articles/looming-regulation-likely-impact-cryptocurrency-prices/

regulatory treatment affects the price There were 57 regulatory events The impact suggest events decrease returns and increase price volatility supporting the view cryptocurrencies derive value from anonymity and lack of regulation

regulatory treatment of crypto affects the price One study has found that exchanges that don’t require identification to create an account, and therefore are not following anti-money laundering or know-your-client regulations, post higher cryptocurrency prices than exchanges that do This analysis uses a quasi-event methodology There were a total of 57 regulatory events during the sample period that fit the definition above The impact of regulatory events are also separately identified based on the different types of events ( and the source country of the regulatory event the results suggest that regulatory events decrease cryptocurrency returns and increase price volatility supporting the view that cryptocurrencies derive some value from anonymity and lack of regulation

regulatory treatment affects the price 57 regulatory events impact decrease returns increase price volatility derive anonymity lack of regulation

['The regulatory treatment of cryptocurrency exchanges affects the price, too. One study has found that exchanges that don’t require identification to create an account, and therefore are not following anti-money laundering or know-your-client regulations, post higher cryptocurrency prices than exchanges that do. These results provide some evidence that cryptocurrencies derive value from serving as a more anonymous, borderless means of transactions, which has benefits for criminal activity and for individuals who place a very high value on their privacy. A simple analysis of the impact that regulatory policy announcements had on the price of 13 cryptocurrencies reveals more about the relationship between cryptocurrency regulation and the market. This analysis uses a quasi-event study methodology, as well as data from both Cryptocurrency Market Capitalizations and Coindesk to isolate the reaction of cryptocurrency returns and price volatility on the dates of regulatory events by key countries. Key countries were defined as the 20 countries with the largest number of nodes in the Bitcoin network: the United States, Germany, China, France, Netherlands, Canada, the United Kingdom, Russia, Singapore, Japan, Hong Kong, Australia, Switzerland, Sweden, Republic of Korea, Ukraine, Lithuania, Italy, Spain and Ireland. The analysis covers four types of regulatory events: an announcement by key policy makers or the legislature to explore regulation or introduce legislation to regulate cryptocurrency-related activity (includes virtual currency exchanges, initial coin offerings (ICOs), custodian wallets and derivative products); the imminent passage or passage of legislation to regulate cryptocurrency-related activity; a discussion, proposal or plan to enforce regulation by financial regulators; and action taken by financial regulators or governments to control cryptocurrency-related activities. Not included are positive regulatory actions, such as the recognition of cryptocurrency as a legal means of exchange, or announcements to allow the creation of virtual currency derivative products. Also excluded are warnings to investors about the potential dangers of investing in cryptocurrency markets (which do not constitute regulatory action or proposed interventions) or actions to shut down fraudulent activities related to digital tokens. There were a total of 57 regulatory events during the sample period that fit the definition above. Table 1 shows the results of the regression analysis. The impact of regulatory events are also separately identified based on the different types of events (as laid out in the bullet points above), and the source country of the regulatory event. In general, the results suggest that regulatory events decrease cryptocurrency returns and increase price volatility — supporting the view that cryptocurrencies derive some value from anonymity and lack of regulation.']

[(13, 21)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Phil-Skoulikaris-Neg-Rutgers%20RR-Round5.docx

Michigan

PhSk

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/PhSk/Michigan-Phil-Skoulikaris-Neg-Rutgers%2520RR-Round5.docx

395bfe769512eccb7ddcc32a303e158c0ef7d64d75e6dda3f423b194abf8d9c5

International order has no fixed ontic content---instead of prioritizing the AFF’s ontology of global order, prefer the ALT’s political ontology that enables orders to be contested.

Fränze Wilhelm 19, Research Group on International Political Sociology at the Institute of Social Sciences, Christian Albrechts University, Kiel, Germany, 4/16/19, "An Ontology of Global Order? Heidegger, Laclau, and Political Difference", New Political Science, Volume 41, Issue 2, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/07393148.2019.1596688?journalCode=cnps20

there can be no universal order which has ontological primacy over all other s Global order denotes a group of things which humans structure through specific political actions The ordering of order can never be closed the impossibility of closure , in spite of human desire for ontological certainty, is the positive impetus for generating a theoretical and applied practice of global order . Postfoundationalism stresses the ontological inferring the conclusion for a phenomenon only ever as one of many possible explanations explicitly linked to the radical contingency of Being , or the ‘lack’ or ‘void’ in any symbolic order An ontology of global order needs to be a political ontology able to come to terms with challenges of politics decisions , responsibility contestation which go beyond ontological fixity take order not as a given, but take active part in politicizing and contesting orders within and towards political social possible ordering. This includes global order

with regard to the question of global order, there can be no such thing as a universal , all-encompassing order which has ontological primacy over all other order s Global order denotes an order of a group of particular things which humans structure through their specific political actions . The ordering of order denotes a gap that can never be rationally closed , for if both sides of the difference were to overlap exactly, the very need for investment would dissolve. The understanding of particular ontic orders as representations of a contingent ontological investment into a necessary universal ordering function is simply nothing else than to presuppose an always already failing structuration. And yet, this do es not need to mean failure in its negative connotation. Rather, the impossibility of political and social closure , in spite of a human desire for ontological certainty, is the positive impetus for generating both a theoretical and applied practice of global order . Regarding epistemological and methodological aspects of interpretation and analysis Postfoundationalism stresses the ontological aspect of explanation based on the ontological difference. The logic of investigation changes from deduction to retroduction to inferring the conclusion for a phenomenon indeed in a definite logical form – but only ever problematically as one of many possible explanations . The critical-explanatory concepts developed and applied by its members “are explicitly linked to the radical contingency at the heart of Being , or more particularly the ‘lack’ or ‘void’ in any given symbolic order .” a postfoundational political ontology is not a positive ontology in the sense of basic concepts in any normative or empirical investigation. Rather, the ontological premise of the dislocation and contingency of all and any ontological foundation stems from the nature of being itself – from the ontological difference which discloses being as both no-thing and possibility. An ontology of global order needs to be a political ontology in this postfoundational sense. As such, it will be able to come to terms with challenges of politicization , possible politics and decisions , responsibility and the need for political contestation which go beyond the confines of ontological fixity in traditional explanations of social order. the essence of being as nothing is not simply a pure negativity which necessarily leaves postfoundational understanding with empty politics and orders. Rather , the postfoundational condition of global order calls upon people to take order not as a given, but to take active part in politicizing and contesting orders with regard to the nature of being, which is within and towards the political , the social , as well as possible ordering. This includes global order .

no universal order ontological primacy all other s Global order humans specific political actions . never closed universal presuppose an always already failing structuration. impossibility closure desire ontological certainty, positive impetus theoretical applied practice global order Postfoundationalism stresses the ontological deduction retroduction inferring the conclusion many possible explanations explicitly linked radical contingency Being ‘lack’ ‘void’ any symbolic order An ontology of global order needs to be a political ontology politicization politics decisions responsibility political contestation beyond the confines ontological fixity being not pure negativity take active part in politicizing and contesting orders This includes global order .

['Secondly, with regard to the question of global order, there can be no such thing as a universal, all-encompassing order which has ontological primacy over all other orders. However, the implications of the originary nothing do not end with postulating a particularistic pluralism of contingent orders next to or opposed to each other. Global order denotes an order of a group of particular things which humans structure through their specific political actions. Hence, to ground being on the foundational nothing helps to arrive at the ontological principle of ordering. The ordering of order – or the ordering function of order – denotes a gap that can never be rationally closed, for if both sides of the difference were to overlap exactly, the very need for what Laclau has called investment – and what we might also call the incentive for action and even thinking in the first place – would dissolve.', 'This last aspect also brings about the scope of implications which a postfoundational approach presents for both further research in the field of international political theory as well as global politics. The understanding of particular ontic orders as representations of a contingent ontological investment into a necessary universal ordering function is simply nothing else than to presuppose an always already failing structuration. And yet, this does not need to mean failure in its negative connotation. Rather, the impossibility of political and social closure, in spite of a human desire for ontological certainty, is the positive impetus for generating both a theoretical and applied practice of global order. Regarding epistemological and methodological aspects of interpretation and analysis, postfoundational thinking in the Heideggerian-Laclauian orientation presents a critique of positivist logics of explanation. The social sciences in general and therefore classic theories of social and political order presuppose a particular ontology which structures their explanations by way of deduction and causation. Postfoundationalism, instead, stresses the ontological aspect of explanation based on the ontological difference. The logic of investigation changes from deduction to retroduction, that is, to inferring the conclusion for a phenomenon indeed in a definite logical form – but only ever problematically as one of many possible explanations. This is exemplified in research and discourse analyses of the so-called Essex School. The critical-explanatory concepts developed and applied by its members “are explicitly linked to the radical contingency at the heart of Being, or more particularly the ‘lack’ or ‘void’ in any given symbolic order.” 84 It becomes clear in this context, that a postfoundational political ontology is not a positive ontology in the sense of basic concepts in any normative or empirical investigation. Rather, the ontological premise of the dislocation and contingency of all and any ontological foundation stems from the nature of being itself – from the ontological difference which discloses being as both no-thing and possibility. An ontology of global order needs to be a political ontology in this postfoundational sense. As such, it will be able to come to terms with challenges of politicization, possible politics and decisions, responsibility and the need for political contestation which go beyond the confines of ontological fixity in traditional explanations of social order. Ultimately, the postfoundational condition both explains and increases our experiences of paradox and wonderment, dislocation and conflict in the global order(s).', 'There is no ontological certainty but the certainty of the nothing. The synopsis of contemporary writings on postfoundational thought and particularly the political theory of Ernesto Laclau points to the continuing influence of the Heideggerian ontological difference for rethinking the question of order with regard to the global. As shown, the essence of being as nothing is not simply a pure negativity which necessarily leaves postfoundational understanding with empty politics and orders. Rather, the postfoundational condition of global order calls upon people to take order not as a given, but to take active part in politicizing and contesting orders with regard to the nature of being, which is within and towards the political, the social, as well as possible ordering. This includes global order.', '']

[(7, 17)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-DeWe-Aff-Gonzaga-Jesuit-Debates-Doubles.docx

Northwestern

DeWe

455c46c465aa6739c9044e3d8dc67110aa33cfe9c329f5bc69c35c322bf2c1ba

Window of opportunity for strategic stability with Russia is closing---NFU now is key to broader arms control.

Bidgood ’23 [Sarah; 6-13-2023; James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, CA. BA in Russian from Wellesley College, MA in Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies from the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill and MA with distinction in Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies from the Monterey Institute of International Studies. PhD candidate (ABD) in Defense Studies at King’s College London; "What We Talk About When We Talk About US-Russia Strategic Stability," Taylor & Francis; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2023.2221486?src=recsys]

US-Russia strategic stability is necessary because deficiencies of existing stability necessary in the interest of arms control. strategic stability is timely. lengthy break allow domestic political opposition to calcify even further views become more entrenched Russia’s decision to “suspend New START makes task urgent. Russian Minister considers “quite a possible scenario” treaty will expire in 26 without replacement little time to conclude treaty before 2 4

bilateral US-Russia strategic stability is necessary because of the deficiencies of existing definitions of strategic stability , which are underspecified , highly divergent , and of little use in determining whether various technologies and behaviors are stabilizing or destabilizing. necessary to address these deficiencies in the interest of advancing US-Russia arms control. exploring operationalization of strategic stability is timely. risks to leaving dialogue on this issue and , consequently, the follow-on negotiations that should flow from it , paused for too long. A lengthy break will allow domestic political opposition to US-Russia engagement to calcify even further introducing barriers to resuming dialogue even when the international environment is more conducive. views likely to become more entrenched , not less , as time wears on. more pressing concern with leaving the strategic stability dialogue on to arms control more broadly. Russia’s February 2023 decision to “suspend participation” in New START makes task urgent. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov indicated he considers it “quite a possible scenario” that the treaty will expire in 20 26 without a replacement need to act quickly to resume their strategic stability dialogue suspension of the last round of strategic stability talks means little time to conclude a treaty before 20 2 4 could help reestablish some fundamental principles both sides continue to describe as a priority.

necessary deficiencies existing definitions strategic stability underspecified highly divergent of little use behaviors are stabilizing or destabilizing. US-Russia arms control. is timely. risks dialogue follow-on negotiations , paused for too long. lengthy break domestic political opposition calcify even further is more conducive. more entrenched , not less more pressing concern strategic stability dialogue more broadly. “suspend participation” urgent. “quite a possible scenario” 20 26 without a replacement suspension little time 20 2 4 as a priority.

['This article has described a two-phased approach to disambiguating the concept of bilateral US-Russia strategic stability that is informed by a philosophy of Pragmatism and operationalized through interrelated processes including war gaming, backcasting, and threatcasting. It has argued that this approach is necessary because of the deficiencies of existing definitions of strategic stability, which are underspecified, highly divergent, and of little use in determining whether various technologies and behaviors are stabilizing or destabilizing. It has explained why it is necessary to address these deficiencies in the interest of advancing US-Russia arms control. It has underscored the imperative to explore such alternative approaches today in light of the onset of a new nuclear era and the multi-domain, multi-player challenges that will characterize it.', 'Although there remain many unknowns relating to the trajectory of Russia’s war against Ukraine, its duration, and the state of US-Russia relations in its aftermath, exploring alternate approaches to the operationalization of strategic stability like this one is timely. Indeed, there are risks to leaving dialogue on this issue and, consequently, the follow-on negotiations that should flow from it, paused for too long. A lengthy break will allow domestic political opposition to US-Russia engagement to calcify even further in both the United States and Russia, introducing barriers to resuming dialogue even when the international environment is more conducive. These views are likely to become more entrenched, not less, as time wears on.', 'Another, more pressing concern associated with leaving the strategic stability dialogue on hold pertains to the future of US-Russia nuclear arms control more broadly. Indeed, although Presidents Biden and Putin agreed in 2021 to extend New START for five years, many observers have called for negotiations on a follow-on treaty to begin early, recognizing the challenges the two sides will face in reaching and legitimating it. Russia’s February 2023 decision to “suspend participation” in New START makes this task even more urgent. Indeed, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov has already indicated that he considers it “quite a possible scenario” that the treaty will expire in 2026 without a replacement (Faulconbridge 2023).', 'If the two sides are to forestall this outcome, they will need to act quickly to resume their strategic stability dialogue once the opportunity arises. As Pifer (2022) has observed, the suspension of the last round of strategic stability talks means that “the sides would have little time to conclude a treaty, let alone for the Senate to discuss ratification, before the U.S. political season cranks up in 2024”. To this end, proposals such as the one described here are worth developing now in the interest of being prepared with a menu of options that could be implemented if and when the moment arrives. While it is impossible to predict when this might occur, or what the state of US-Russia relations will be at that time, this modest approach, if applied, could help reestablish some fundamental principles in an area that both sides – at least rhetorically – continue to describe as a priority.']

[(0, 10), (10, 11)]

ndtceda

Michigan-BlSi-Aff-Kentucky-Round-1.docx

Michigan

BlSi

dc7ba8f5cbeb389c6244d851f50a7f8f3f542a2522e6a16a233db2be8ab5c8b5

Social antagonisms and governance failures.

San Juan '21 [Epifanio San Juan Jr.; 8/3/21; Ph.D. from Harvard University, former director of the Philippines Cultural Studies Center in Storrs, Connecticut, recipient of the Centennial Award for Achievement in Literature from the Cultural Center of the Philippines; "Judgment day over the killing fields in the Philippines," https://mronline.org/2021/08/03/judgment-day-over-the-killing-fields-in-the-philippines/]

Crisis is essential to capitalism Dispossession destruction waste litter the landscape. Antagonism between managers and majority are bound to sharpen we are facing catastrophe capitalist globalization cannot stop We see a system of accumulation everywhere breaking down Market solutions leave Dickensian social conditions and perpetuate global shame The capitalism of today has become a fetter on development necessary for our survival The implication was spelled out by the U.S. N I C disruption of trade would ensue also erosion of world-order skepticism toward institutions calling for “ alternative providers divisions would multiply Global politics would be more contentious

Covid-19 betokens a profound crisis of the neoliberal capitalist global order Crisis is essential to capitalism as a forcible adjustment of all the contradictions of capitalism Dispossession as capital accumulation, creative destruction , profitable waste —such as the paradoxes, antinomies, aporias that litter the postmodern landscape. Antagonism between the few plutocratic managers of the security/surveillance state and the redundant majority are bound to sharpen as we face worldwide discontent Aside from the pandemic , drought , fires , floods and all sorts of natural disasters are wreaking havoc on economies and lives in many continents, on top of internecine and multilateral conflicts for control of markets, resources, territories etc What we are facing now is unprecedented It is not rebellion from the exploited masses but an ecological catastrophe that capitalist globalization cannot stop , much less prevent from worsening since it has exacerbated the process of disintegration . Commodity-fetishism reigns supreme. We see a world system of accumulation everywhere breaking down traditional boundaries between animal diseases and humans, increasing the power of drug monopolies , proliferating carcinogenic waste , subsidizing oligarchy and undermining progressive governments Market solutions leave in place Dickensian social conditions and perpetuate the global shame of income-limited access to clean water Davis sums up the convergent crises of our civilization as defined by capitalism’s inability to generate incomes for the majority of humanity, provide jobs and meaningful social roles , end fossil fuel emissions, and translate revolutionary biological advances into public health …. The super- capitalism of today has become a n absolute fetter on the development of the productive forces necessary for our species survival The implication s of this planetary upheaval was recently spelled out by the U.S. N ational I ntelligence C ouncil in its report, “ Global Trends 2040 .” Not only disruption of international trade would ensue but also an erosion of the world-order , fragmentation , polarization . Distrust and skepticism toward hegemonic institutions would intensify, calling for “ alternative providers of governance Racial, ethnic and national divisions would multiply and deepen. Global politics would be more volatile and contentious

profound crisis global order Crisis essential forcible adjustment contradictions of capitalism Dispossession destruction waste Antagonism to sharpen as worldwide discontent pandemic drought fires floods natural disasters economies lives multilateral conflicts control ecological catastrophe worsening exacerbated disintegration accumulation breaking down diseases drug monopolies carcinogenic waste oligarchy Dickensian social conditions global shame inability generate incomes provide jobs social roles public health necessary for our species survival planetary upheaval N I C Global Trends 2040 disruption international trade erosion of the world-order fragmentation polarization skepticism hegemonic institutions alternative providers divisions would multiply volatile contentious

['Less augury than symptom, the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic betokens a profound crisis of the neoliberal capitalist global order. Over four million people worldwide have died, 609 thousand in the U.S., 539 in Brazil, and 413 in India (as of July 15, 2021). Variants are multiplying, with no end in sight. People of color, the poor and marginalized everywhere, suffer more than the propertied, as usual. We transitioned from 9/11 “disaster” and “global war on terrorism” to the 2008 meltdown of casino/finance capital without much retribution—except the misery of the impoverished millions. Perhaps the survivors are now regrouping and strategizing their next moves to overturn the predatory iniquitous system.', 'Crisis is essential to capitalism as a way of what Marx called “the forcible adjustment of all the contradictions of capitalism” (Harvey 2014, xiii). Dispossession as capital accumulation, creative destruction, profitable waste—such as the paradoxes, antinomies, aporias that litter the postmodern landscape. Antagonism between the few plutocratic managers of the security/surveillance state and the redundant majority are bound to sharpen as we face worldwide discontent—witness the mass mobilization after George Floyd’s killing. Aside from the pandemic, drought, fires, floods and all sorts of natural disasters are wreaking havoc on economies and lives in many continents, on top of internecine and multilateral conflicts for control of markets, resources, territories, hopes, dreams, etc.', 'What we are facing now is however quite unprecedented It is not rebellion from the exploited masses but an ecological catastrophe that capitalist globalization cannot stop, much less prevent from worsening since it has exacerbated the process of disintegration. Commodity-fetishism reigns supreme. Mike Davis has incisively diagnosed our current predicament:', 'We see a world system of accumulation everywhere breaking down traditional boundaries between animal diseases and humans, increasing the power of drug monopolies, proliferating carcinogenic waste, subsidizing oligarchy and undermining progressive governments committed to public health, destroying traditional communities (both industrial and preindustrial) and turning the oceans into sewers. Market solutions leave in place Dickensian social conditions and perpetuate the global shame of income-limited access to clean water and sanitation.', 'Davis sums up the convergent crises of our civilization as', 'defined by capitalism’s inability to generate incomes for the majority of humanity, to provide jobs and meaningful social roles, end fossil fuel emissions, and translate revolutionary biological advances into public health…. The super-capitalism of today has become an absolute fetter on the development of the productive forces necessary for our species survival (“Mike Davis on pandemics, super-capitalism and the struggles of tomorrow,” Mada, 2020).', 'The implications of this planetary upheaval was recently spelled out by the U.S. National Intelligence Council in its report, “Global Trends 2040.” Not only disruption of international trade would ensue but also an erosion of the world-order, fragmentation, polarization. Distrust and skepticism toward hegemonic institutions would intensify, calling for “alternative providers of governance” (Barnes 2021). Racial, ethnic and national divisions would multiply and deepen. Global politics would be more volatile and contentious, as evidenced by the smoldering confrontation between China and the United States. But, unfortunately, the conclusion of this report appeals to the corporate elite, the State executives, to be “anticipatory rather than reactionary,” and solve the crises (“Why Spy Agencies Say the Future Is Bleak,” Editorial, New York Times, 2021). What about the rebellion of the Green parties and the coalition of indigenous communities defying corporate rapacity?', '']

[(0, 12)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Sposito-Hormozdiari-Neg-Harvard-Round6.docx

Michigan

SpHo

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/SpHo/Michigan-Sposito-Hormozdiari-Neg-Harvard-Round6.docx

cbfd5393be8938f6b916464e791b81eed0c67a7227ffb7e8b4f5cca185bd8678

NoKo War Turn - Their descriptions of North Korean collapse are both wrong and racist – creates policy failure and interventionism

Shim, 14 – Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations and International Organization, University of Groningen and Associate Research Fellow at the German Institute of

representations of scarcity, poverty and isolation is the belief that North Korea appears to be in a constant state of humanitarian crisis collapse of the entire system seems to be a matter of fact predictions about collapse have been prevalent these demise’ scenarios can be inferred that there is actually no need for evidence that it will happen ordinary’ people in North Korea are imagined to be awaiting liberation from their degenerate homeland constructions resemble other popular imaginations The cur- rent war in Afghanistan proves the powerfulness of such salvation narratives for international relations the rhetoric of saving is) one of the central arguments, in the justification for intervention the continent of North Korea, is made meaningful in terms of failure, absence and deficiency representations – North Koreans as brain- washed provide a discursive site against which an opposite pole can be positioned

One of the consequences of representations of scarcity, poverty and isolation is the widespread belief that North Korea appears to be in a constant state of political, economic and/or humanitarian crisis . As a result, the collapse of the entire system and society seems to be a matter of fact rather than a matter of speculation predictions (and hopes) about North Korea’s collapse have been prevalent par- ticularly since the end of the Cold War especially in moments of North Korean power transitions the country has persistently proved its doubters wrong these ‘imminent demise’ scenarios , which work true to the motto ‘one day North Korea will break down’, it can be inferred that there is actually no need for evidence that it will happen ; it is simply sufficient to suggest the vague possibility that such an event could occur these collapse predictions become perpetual and, consequently, perennial. Another consequence of these generic representations is that ‘ ordinary’ people in North Korea are imagined and expected to be awaiting liberation from their degenerate homeland and corrupt ideological system and to be likely to gladly embrace (our) capitalist liberal democracy. It appears almost natural to think that they cannot wait to relinquish their country as soon as they have the opportunity to do so people from North Korea can only be understood in terms of what they do not have – choices – causing them to seek refuge in the ‘promised land’, which can only belong to ‘our’ domain One consequence of assuming that North Koreans would flee their country at any available opportunity is the prediction of an imminent mass exodus (for example, ‘streams of refugees’) as a result of the grim reality in the country. Such constructions resemble other popular imaginations as well. For instance, numer- ous people in many different countries are convinced that Muslim women need to be rescued from Muslim male oppression and religious fanaticism in order to restore justice and to bring them education, modernity and equality, so that they become ‘full’ citizens, individuals and subjects The cur- rent war in Afghanistan proves the powerfulness and far-reaching consequences of such salvation narratives for international relations , as the rhetoric of saving has been (and still is) one of the central arguments, particularly by the United States, invoked in the justification for military intervention ( More often than not imagined as being one coherent entity the continent , similar to the example of North Korea, is historically made meaningful in terms of failure, absence and deficiency Construed as a site of spatial and temporal difference is a synonym for – catastrophes, corruption, diseases, hunger and poverty. This widespread conviction leads to the popular assumption that ‘Africans’ are incapable of helping themselves, which, in turn, legitimizes the intervention of outside forces – be it American, European or, more recently, Asian powers generic representations – North Koreans as brain- washed , Muslims women as victims, Africans as helpless – it is important to note, however, that they provide a discursive site against which an opposite pole – non- North Koreans as free, non-Muslim women as strong, non-Africans as apt – can be positioned . Regardless of whether or not there are historical connections and intellectual contours between certain generic representations, the overall func- tion of them is clear: the assurance of the self, or, more precisely, of ‘our’ self. In light of the above-mentioned assumption that North Koreans would escape their homeland at any opportunity as well as by recalling the discussion of the Foreign Policy photo essay, North Korea thus emerges as a place that cannot but be abandoned, because it is imaged and imagined as incarcerating all of its inhabit- ants. For that reason, it is highly legitimate to enforce initiatives that prepare for an imminent collapse like military contingency strategies and unification policies that make use of what Katherine Gordy and Jee-sun Lee (2009) call the ‘metaphor of death’ which, in light of the develop- ments that followed Kim’s demise, seem to be at best premature and at worst misguided

The cur- rent war in Afghanistan proves the powerfulness and far-reaching consequences of such salvation narratives for international relations , as the rhetoric of saving has been (and still is) one of the central arguments, particularly by the United States, invoked in the justification for military intervention ( North Korea, is historically made meaningful in terms of failure, absence and deficiency

['Global and Area Studies (GIGA). (David, “Visual Politics and North Korea: Seeing is Believing,” Routledge, 122-132)', 'One of the consequences of the above-mentioned representations of scarcity, poverty and isolation is the widespread belief that North Korea appears to be in a constant state of political, economic and/or humanitarian crisis. As a result, the collapse of the entire system and society seems to be a matter of fact – and by implication, time – rather than a matter of speculation. While, as was mentioned, predictions (and hopes) about North Korea’s collapse have been prevalent par- ticularly since the end of the Cold War, and especially in moments of North Korean power transitions, as Kim Jong-il’s takeover in the mid-1990s and Kim Jong-un’s ascent in the early 2010s have shown, the country has persistently proved its doubters wrong – and for over two decades now. From these ‘imminent demise’ scenarios, which work true to the motto ‘one day North Korea will break down’, it can be inferred that there is actually no need for evidence that it will happen; it is simply sufficient to suggest the vague possibility that such an event could occur. As a result, these collapse predictions become perpetual and, consequently, perennial. Another consequence of these generic representations is that ‘ordinary’ people in North Korea are imagined and expected to be awaiting liberation from their degenerate homeland and corrupt ideological system (and by us, of course) and to be likely to gladly embrace (our) capitalist liberal democracy. It appears almost natural to think that they cannot wait to relinquish their country as soon as they have – or are given – the opportunity to do so, and welcome all efforts that are assumed for them as being for the best. A good example of this way of thinking is the above-mentioned practice of applying certain (both official and unofficial) labels to North Koreans. Typically, North Koreans who leave their country permanently are simply referred to as ‘defectors’ in media accounts, government statements or academic reports, which serves to suggest that their motives for departure can only be ideological. Their defection, hence, constitutes a political act. The Korean-language equivalent talbukja (‘people who fled or escaped the North’) is another articulation of this dominant belief. Commonly translated as ‘defector’, talbukja was part of the polit- ical lexicon in South Korea until 2005, both North Koreans in South Korea and the North Korean authorities expressed concern regarding its use, citing its connotation of abandonment, betrayal and desertion. While talbukja has since then been replaced by what is considered a more neutral designation, saeteomin, meaning ‘people of a new land’ or ‘new settlers’, South Korea’s Ministry of Unification has recently returned to the more forceful term, bukhanitaljumin (‘residents who renounced or defected from North Korea’), which has been in use for legal purposes since the late 1990s. Bukhanitaljumin again emphasizes an antagonistic notion of how North Koreans should be spoken and thought of. Also, what needs to be added is that the terms talbukja and ‘defector’ continue to be used in national and international policy, academic and media debates. These examples show that people from North Korea – their lives, their motives, their concerns – can only be understood in terms of what they do not have – choices – causing them to seek refuge in the ‘promised land’, which can only belong to ‘our’ domain. At the same time, and in reference to above-mentioned diversity and the differing situations of the groups of people who have left North Korea, such an understanding does not ask one of the most crucial ques- tions that need to be asked: to whom should these different labels apply? For instance, a recent survey by a government-run institute in South Korea found that one-third of younger North Koreans now living in the South had been born and partly raised in either China or another country (Kim HJ 2012a). In other words, these children have different backgrounds and different experiences than their North Korean-born peers do, which, in turn, challenges the currently- established practices of describing and imagining North Koreans. In this regard, it is worthwhile to cite a longer quote from the report: So far, young North Korean defectors have been described as refugees who suffered a miserable and terrifying journey across the border and incognito from North Korean authorities while they sojourned in China. So we thought many of them needed therapy when they came into the South. However, those who were born in China or another country and then defected to the South had different experiences. They attended primary schools in China and had good memories of playing with their friends, just like ordinary chil- dren. Rather, they said they felt hurt after they came to South Korea because many local children did not respect them as a minority. They said that they miss their lives in their actual hometowns. For them, North Korea is nothing but the land of their parents. (cited in Kim HJ 2012a, italics added by this author) Again, what needs to be asked is whether one of the above-cited terms still applies to these children. How, then, to account for succeeding generations? Are they North Koreans at all? What about people who were born in North Korea but, for whatever reason, now live in China or elsewhere? Are they defectors/talbukja, refugees, people who renounced North Korea (bukhanitaljumin) or just ‘normal’ citizens? Further, if North Koreans leave their homes in the hope of a better life, how do they differ from other people pursuing the same goal – for instance South Koreans emigrating to the United States? One consequence of assuming that North Koreans would flee their country at any available opportunity is the prediction of an imminent mass exodus (for example, ‘streams of refugees’) as a result of the grim reality in the country. Such constructions resemble other popular imaginations as well. For instance, numer- ous people in many different countries are convinced that Muslim women need to be rescued from Muslim male oppression and religious fanaticism in order to restore justice and to bring them education, modernity and equality, so that they become ‘full’ citizens, individuals and subjects (cf. Kozol/Decola 2006). The cur- rent war in Afghanistan proves the powerfulness and far-reaching consequences of such salvation narratives for international relations, as the rhetoric of saving has been (and still is) one of the central arguments, particularly by the United States, invoked in the justification for military intervention (Abu-Lughod 2002). Another example concerns popular representations of ‘Africa’. More often than not imagined as being one coherent entity (‘one country’, ‘one history’, ‘one culture’, ‘one people’), the continent, similar to the example of North Korea, is historically made meaningful in terms of failure, absence and deficiency (Ryan 1997). Construed as a site of spatial and temporal difference, for many Africa (still) harbours – or is a synonym for – catastrophes, corruption, diseases, hunger and poverty. This widespread conviction leads to the popular assumption that ‘Africans’ are incapable of helping themselves, which, in turn, legitimizes the intervention of outside forces – be it American, European or, more recently, Asian powers. Similar to the case of Muslim women who have to be rescued, these out- side forces ensure that ‘Africans’ can become complete and capable subjects. While it is difficult to fully elucidate the historical or ideological trajectory of each of the above-mentioned generic representations – North Koreans as brain- washed, Muslims women as victims, Africans as helpless – it is important to note, however, that they provide a discursive site against which an opposite pole – non- North Koreans as free, non-Muslim women as strong, non-Africans as apt – can be positioned. Regardless of whether or not there are historical connections and intellectual contours between certain generic representations, the overall func- tion of them is clear: the assurance of the self, or, more precisely, of ‘our’ self. In light of the above-mentioned assumption that North Koreans would escape their homeland at any opportunity as well as by recalling the discussion of the Foreign Policy photo essay, North Korea thus emerges as a place that cannot but be abandoned, because it is imaged and imagined as incarcerating all of its inhabit- ants. For that reason, it is highly legitimate to enforce initiatives that prepare for an imminent collapse like military contingency strategies and unification policies that make use of what Katherine Gordy and Jee-sun Lee (2009) call the ‘metaphor of death’ – meaning hopes that the death of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il would bring change and terminate this socialist system – which, in light of the develop- ments that followed Kim’s demise, seem to be at best premature and at worst misguided. However, a deeper look at the experiences of former North Koreans reveals that such liberation and rescue narratives are just not that simple. ']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Emory-LiOk-Neg-navy-Round-5.docx

Emory

LiOk

9294e8ebba2568412d116e60ef299a9898d2b800a3e289bfd961193bcc8060b2

The accompanying operational changes structurally reduce the likelihood of miscalc and eliminate the primary drivers for Chinese and Russian nuclear buildup.

Nina Tannenwald 19. Director of the International Relations Program at Brown University’s Watson Institute for International Studies and a senior lecturer in political science. Franklin Fellow in the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation in the U.S. State Department. She holds a Master’s degree from the Columbia School of International and Public Affairs and a Ph.D. in international relations from Cornell University. “It’s Time for a U.S. No-First-Use Nuclear Policy.” https://tnsr.org/roundtable/its-time-for-a-u-s-no-first-use-nuclear-policy/.

clear n f u reduce risk of Russian or Chinese miscalc dur ing crisis alleviating concerns about U.S nuclear strike require doctrinal operational changes eliminate first-strike postures preemptive capabilities and other destabilizing warfighting strategies restraint in targeting l o w alert levels procurement modernization significantly reduce risk of accidental, unauthorized, mistaken preemptive use strengthen strategic and crisis stability contribute to US non-prolif objectives remove one source of crisis instability ought to unilaterally adopt an NFU create political space for Russia to follow suit given conventional capabilities, there are no circumstances which the U S start a nuclear war Relying on the pretense unacceptably increases the chances of nuclear escalation

a clear U.S. n o- f irst- u se policy would reduce the risk of Russian or Chinese nuclear miscalc ulation dur ing a crisis by alleviating concerns about a devastating U.S . nuclear first- strike the United States would rely on nuclear weapons only to deter nuclear attacks it would require meaningful doctrinal and operational changes it would allow the United States to adopt a less threatening nuclear posture. It would eliminate first-strike postures , preemptive capabilities , and other types of destabilizing warfighting strategies emphasize restraint in targeting , l aunch- o n- w arning, alert levels of deployed systems, procurement , and modernization plans it would help shape the physical qualities of nuclear forces in a way that renders them unsuitable for missions other than deterrence of nuclear attacks. Implementing these steps would significantly reduce the risk of accidental, unauthorized, mistaken , or preemptive use removal of threats would also strengthen strategic and crisis stability . adopting an NFU policy would help address humanitarian concerns reduce the salience of nuclear weapons it would “be more consistent with the long-term goal of global nuclear disarmament and would better contribute to US nuclear non-prolif eration objectives . ” NFU nevertheless remove at least one source of crisis instability The United States ought to unilaterally adopt an NFU policy constitute the formal adoption of what is already essentially de facto U.S. policy create political space for Russia to follow suit Doctrinal and operational changes would need to follow such a declaration China’s restrained nuclear arsenal provides the best example of an NFU pledge implemented in practice. The most important goal of the United States today is to prevent the use of nuclear weapons. The policy of relying on the threat to use nuclear weapons first is an outdated legacy of the Cold War given U.S. conventional capabilities, there are no circumstances in which the U nited S tates ought to start a nuclear war . Relying on the pretense that it might do so in order to deter a conventional threat unacceptably increases the chances of nuclear escalation Moving toward declared NFU policies is the best way to reduce the risks of nuclear war

Russian or Chinese it would require meaningful doctrinal and operational changes first-strike postures preemptive capabilities destabilizing warfighting strategies strategic crisis stability non-prolif eration objectives . crisis instability de facto Russia to follow suit nuclear escalation reduce the risks of nuclear war

['As Kingston Reif and Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association have argued, “a clear U.S. no-first-use policy would reduce the risk of Russian or Chinese nuclear miscalculation during a crisis by alleviating concerns about a devastating U.S. nuclear first-strike.”24 This would mean that the United States would rely on nuclear weapons only to deter nuclear attacks. Adopting this approach would involve more than “cheap talk,” for it would require meaningful doctrinal and operational changes.25 Specifically, it would allow the United States to adopt a less threatening nuclear posture. It would eliminate first-strike postures, preemptive capabilities, and other types of destabilizing warfighting strategies. It would emphasize restraint in targeting, launch-on-warning, alert levels of deployed systems, procurement, and modernization plans. In other words, it would help shape the physical qualities of nuclear forces in a way that renders them unsuitable for missions other than deterrence of nuclear attacks.26 Implementing these steps would significantly reduce the risk of accidental, unauthorized, mistaken, or preemptive use. The removal of threats of a nuclear first strike would also strengthen strategic and crisis stability.27 Of perhaps equal importance, adopting an NFU policy would help address humanitarian concerns and reduce the salience of nuclear weapons.28 Likewise, it would “be more consistent with the long-term goal of global nuclear disarmament and would better contribute to US nuclear non-proliferation objectives.”29 A multilateral NFU pledge would have even more benefits. It would move Russia and Pakistan away from their high-risk doctrines and reduce a source of Russia-NATO tensions. A common NFU policy would help anchor the existing NFU policies of China and India and implicitly acknowledge their leadership in this area, a virtue when middle-power states are feeling disenfranchised from the global nuclear order. Some analysts have questioned whether, in an asymmetric conflict, an American NFU policy would actually help reduce the risk of nuclear escalation by an adversary. The United States is so conventionally dominant, they argue that, in a crisis, a country like North Korea might employ nuclear weapons preemptively because the United States could take out North Korean targets even with just conventional weapons.30 It is true that an NFU policy might make no difference in such a situation. Still, it might nevertheless remove at least one source of crisis instability. Most importantly, however, in an era of “multi-front” deterrence, North Korea is not the only adversary and a U.S. NFU policy would remain valuable in less asymmetric conflicts. A second concern is that a real NFU strategy would require a greater commitment to a counter-value targeting strategy — targeting civilians rather than nuclear silos — and thus run up against moral and legal rules prohibiting the direct targeting of civilians.31 This is a legitimate point. However, current U.S. counterforce targeting policy will likely result in massive civilian casualties as “collateral damage,” making the risk to civilians of an NFU strategy little different.32 Implementation The United States ought to unilaterally adopt an NFU policy, and ask other nuclear-armed states to do the same. This would constitute the formal adoption of what is already essentially de facto U.S. policy.33 A U.S. NFU policy would create political space for Russia to follow suit: For Russia to consider NFU, its concerns about U.S. ballistic missile defenses, imbalances in conventional forces, and issues of NATO enlargement would need to be addressed. The United States would also need to tackle the issue of extended deterrence with its allies and move toward conventional extended deterrence.34 India and Pakistan would need a modus vivendi on Kashmir, while the United States and North Korea would need to sign a non-aggression pact. In fact, the United States could actually negotiate a mutual NFU agreement with North Korea. The United States is extremely unlikely to use nuclear weapons first on North Korea, therefore an agreement that provided a basis for imposing some restraint on the North Korean arsenal would be in America’s interest.35 Doctrinal and operational changes would need to follow such a declaration. China’s restrained nuclear arsenal provides the best example of an NFU pledge implemented in practice. Unlike the United States and Russia, China keeps its warheads and missiles separated. It has not developed precision-strike nuclear war-fighting capabilities, such as tactical nuclear weapons, and it does not keep its forces on “launch-on-warning” alert. China has also invested heavily in conventional military modernization so that it would not have to consider nuclear escalation in a conventional war.36 India, too, keeps its warheads and missiles separate in support of its NFU pledge, though some analysts argue that India’s NFU policy does not run especially deep and that it “is neither a stable nor a reliable predictor of how the Indian military and political leadership might actually use nuclear weapons.”37 Nevertheless, both countries’ operational postures reflect (to some degree) their NFU policies.38 The United States and the other nuclear powers should move in this direction. Conclusion What are the prospects for an NFU policy? On Jan. 30, 2019, Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) and Rep. Adam Smith (D-WA) introduced legislation that declared, “It is the policy of the United States to not use nuclear weapons first.”39 But Congress is divided on this.40 Skeptics have objected that the geopolitical preconditions are not ripe for an NFU policy at this time. In 2016, the Obama administration seriously considered declaring an NFU policy but then hesitated at the last minute largely because of pushback from European and Asian allies who are under the U.S. nuclear umbrella.41 Donald Trump, for his part, has been busy dismantling arms control agreements, not creating them.42 Adoption of an NFU policy will require close consultation with allies, but the U.S. administration should begin this task. As an initial step on the way to NFU, U.S. leaders should consider the recent proposal by Jeffrey Lewis and Scott Sagan that the United States should declare it will not use nuclear weapons “against any target that could be reliably destroyed by conventional means.”43 This policy would not solve the problem posed by highly asymmetric crises, as noted above. Nevertheless, it would represent an initial important declaratory statement of nuclear restraint. The most important goal of the United States today is to prevent the use of nuclear weapons. The policy of relying on the threat to use nuclear weapons first is an outdated legacy of the Cold War. As even card-carrying realists such as the “four horsemen” recognized, given U.S. conventional capabilities, there are no circumstances in which the United States ought to start a nuclear war.44 Relying on the pretense that it might do so in order to deter a conventional threat unacceptably increases the chances of nuclear escalation. Moving toward declared NFU policies is the best way to reduce the risks of nuclear war.']

[(5, 18)]

ndtceda

Emory-RuSh-Aff-1---JW-Patterson-Invitational-Round-1.docx

Emory

RuSh

6077b34d6e1dd7d93120f71d255e4d776b1dfe6b4b9a027c954e0a35bbaa5bec

Flattening disad---the Aff over-simplifies social existence to try to fit it within their theory, which is both wrong and makes the Aff a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Robert Jervis 17. Professor of political science at Columbia. “One World or Many?” Critical Review 29:2, 170-188.

scientists sought to construct theories that are as broad as possible quantum theories that govern atoms are very different from classical physics Unification is sought through disciplinary imperialism it is hard for some to believe that discipline’s insights do not have universal applicability But is life so unified? we behave differently in different realms moving concepts to high levels of abstraction may not permit unification behavior too varied to be captured by any one theory the attempt to do so flatten our world and suck the life out of it to be self-defeating theories are self-fulfilling prophecies

scientists have sought to construct theories that are as broad and unified as possible so many scientists see as unfortunate the fact that quantum theories that govern the behavior of the micro world of quarks , photons, and atoms are very different from the theories of classical physics that describe the behavior of larger bodies Unification is sought through disciplinary imperialism as it is hard for some scholars to believe that her discipline’s insights and tools do not have universal applicability In the 19 30s , many believed that Freudian psychology offered the key to all human behavior; in the 19 60s , forms of structural-functional sociology seemed to many to be a potential master theory; and for the past generation, economic thinking in the form of utility maximization has been seen as a way—sometimes the way—to understand how humans and organizations structure their lives and behave across a wide domain of times, places, and circumstances But is human life so unified? Perhaps we behave differently in different realms and how we act toward our family and friends cannot be subsumed under theories developed for explaining the workings of the modern economy Even moving our concepts to very high levels of abstraction may not permit such unification Human behavior may simply be too varied to be captured by any one theory the attempt to do so may flatten our world and suck much of the life out of it any attempt to build a grand theory is likely to be self-defeating because as people become aware of the theory their behavior will change Were relevant audiences to read these books and be made aware of the likelihood that they will make these errors unless they undertake special corrective measures to do so, they might either perceive more accurately or at least make different kinds of mistakes theories would remain as monuments, representing a past when they were not believed, and the knowledge of them would continue into the future and shape behavior that would now have to be explained differently, perhaps even using different concepts Here, theories are self-fulfilling prophecies The classic case is a bank run caused by the widespread belief that the bank is in a precarious position, which will indeed be true if many depositors believe it and try to withdraw their money bandwagon effects lead actors to support the side they think is winning or the trend that they believe will sweep into the future On a smaller scale, if we now see many states employing the bargaining tactics described by such theorists as Schelling the reason might be that his eloquent discussion convinced them that measures like commitment

quantum theories very different classical physics disciplinary imperialism 30s all 60s economic thinking in the form of utility maximization behave differently in different realms not permit such unification too varied flatten our world and suck much of the life out of it self-defeating self-fulfilling prophecies

['For years, if not forever, scientists have sought to construct theories that are as broad and unified as possible. Great acclaim follows accounts and discoveries that bring previously disparate phenomena under the same roof, so many scientists see as unfortunate, if not a scandal, the fact that quantum theories that govern the behavior of the micro world of quarks, photons, and atoms are very different from the theories of classical physics that describe the behavior of larger bodies. On the social-science side of things there is a different pressure for unification: the very limited extent to which different social sciences speak to one another. The analyses of the world provided by economists are very different from those developed by sociologists, and these in turn have little overlap with the prevailing work in anthropology. This may be warranted by their looking at different aspects of human behavior, but an outsider could not be blamed for wondering whether they are even looking at the same human beings.', 'Unification is often sought—but usually through disciplinary imperialism, as it is hard for some scholars to believe that her discipline’s insights and tools do not have universal applicability. In the 1930s, many believed that Freudian psychology offered the key to all human behavior; in the 1960s, forms of structural-functional sociology seemed to many to be a potential master theory; and for the past generation, economic thinking in the form of utility maximization has been seen as a way—sometimes the way—to understand how humans and organizations structure their lives and behave across a wide domain of times, places, and circumstances.', 'The attractions of a unified theory of human behavior are obvious. It would seem to meet our thirst for explaining as much as possible about our world, and presumably it would do so with a minimum number of constructs and concepts.', 'There are two quite different kinds of reason to seek parsimony. One is pragmatic: parsimonious theories are easy to apply (and remember). The other is aesthetic or even religious—the belief that a parsimonious world is beautiful or “sweet,” as many scientists put it, or that a parsimonious world is the one that God would have designed or evolution would have produced. Of course, it may be beyond our intellectual abilities to discern and decipher the relevant patterns, so our theories may have to remain segmented and incomplete, but it is suggested that the world itself is unitary and that our understanding should start from this basis. If the majority of modern scientists and social scientists are agnostics, if not atheists, such that looking to God provides little guidance for them, proponents of evolutionary sociology and psychology see their approaches as setting us on the right road because our brains and social institutions have been shaped by evolution (see, e.g., Wilson 1998).', 'But is human life so unified? Perhaps we behave differently in different realms, and how we act toward our family and friends cannot be subsumed under theories developed for explaining the workings of the modern economy (cf. Becker 1981). Even moving our concepts to very high levels of abstraction may not permit such unification. Human behavior may simply be too varied to be captured by any one theory, and the attempt to do so may flatten our world and suck much of the life out of it (Hirschman 1970; Hirschman 1998, 45-110).', 'A second objection, one compatible with the basic ideas of quantum mechanics, is that any attempt to build a grand theory, or even a complete theory of human behavior in a specified area, is likely to be self-defeating because as people become aware of the theory their behavior will change. Thus, Erik Gartzke argues that if states want to avoid wars, the prevailing theories of causes of wars will disconfirm themselves (Gartzke 1999). For example, if leaders believe the “power transition theory” of war (Organski and Kugler 1980), then when two countries are rapidly changing in their power relations, they will make special efforts to keep the conflict under control and the theory will apparently be disconfirmed. (I say “apparently” because one could re-specify it as applying only when statesmen are unaware of it.) Indeed, I think that American if not Chinese leaders now view their relations at least partly though this theoretical lens, and that this induces a degree of caution that would otherwise be lacking. My own work provides a much smaller-scale and probably still hypothetical example. I have explored the psychological biases people bring to evaluating information and applied this to how decision-makers and intelligence analysts view the world (Jervis 2010, [1976] 2017, and 2017). Were relevant audiences to read these books and be made aware of the likelihood that they will make these errors unless they undertake special corrective measures to do so, they might either perceive more accurately or at least make different kinds of mistakes. (This line of argument can be extended to encompass interaction: if others think that I will hold a certain misperception or utilize specified cognitive processes, they may alter their behavior in a way that is designed to change or build on what they think I think.) Our theories would remain as monuments, representing a past when they were not believed, and the knowledge of them would continue into the future and shape behavior that would now have to be explained differently, perhaps even using different concepts.', 'Conversely, theories can call up behavior that is consistent with them. When and if this happens, the theories will explain subsequent behavior, but not how people behaved in the past. Here, theories are self-fulfilling prophecies, and we are familiar with examples in many areas. The classic case is a bank run caused by the widespread belief that the bank is in a precarious position, which will indeed be true if many depositors believe it and try to withdraw their money. Similarly, bandwagon effects lead actors to support the side they think is winning or the trend that they believe will sweep into the future. More broadly, the ideas held by national leaders about international politics can shape their behavior, which means that any patterns we might discern would change with the actors’ beliefs about them (Wendt 1992). On a smaller scale, if we now see many states employing the bargaining tactics described by such theorists as Thomas Schelling (1960 and 1966), the reason might be that his eloquent discussion convinced them that measures like commitment, the threat that leaves something to chance, and showing irrationality are appropriate ways to prevail in a conflict. Perhaps pre-Schelling behavior was different.']

[(7, 16)]

ndtceda

Emory-LoKi-Neg-4---Long-Beach-Round-8.docx

Emory

LoKi

67159af0b6d00fa6181a0e573476caa1b0b5c77768efc229489f140157177f94

No impact to inequality

Auguste 22, is a member of the Washington Center for Equitable Growth’s Steering Committee, former senior partner at McKinsey and Co. (Byron, 1-18-2022, “Understanding how U.S. workers can benefit from workplace automation and artificial intelligence,” Washington Center for Equitable Growth, )

threat of automation could not be more pessimistic automation opportunities have always augmented work of humans rather than replaced breakthroughs amplify efficiency the idea that workers are unskilled is false skills will be augmented employers already automated most workers get paid for effective interactions such as communicating problem-solving These tasks will not replaced

The news cycle is awash with the threat of automation and a rtificial i ntelligence to the future of work for hundreds of millions of U.S. workers These stories could not be more pessimistic about the future of work in our nation Technology is not like gravity Workplace automation do what the humans who design and deploy them are rewarded to have them do Yet the biggest technology opportunities have always augmented the work of humans rather than replaced it altogether technological breakthroughs could amplify this trend combining machine efficiency with human empathy to make people’s interactions more efficient and effective A rtificial i ntelligence will enable teams of people to learn much faster than before A key contributor to common fears regarding technology is that the jobs of working people without bachelor’s degrees unskilled occupations are considered most likely to be eclipsed by computers automation and a rtificial i ntelligence the idea that workers in our economy are unskilled is false And employers can play a lead role in dismantling these practices by being held accountable for how they use tech for their own benefit and for the greater prosperity of U.S. workers and the broader U.S. economy individuals’ skills will be augmented by technology enabling them to succeed in more valuable reconfigured jobs that meet real needs workers will need to be trained to perform opportunity occupations or those that require modest upskilling and pay more than their previous jobs Businesses will be rewarded for the rapid reskilling of their workforces enabling more inclusive innovation creativity at every level greater openness to change better earnings and more fulfilling experiences for workers and their managers alike employers have already automated many routine tasks in the workplace most of what workers get paid for is effective interactions such as communicating problem-solving in teams learning what users value and finding the “ sweet spots ” These kinds of tasks will be enhanced not replaced by technology The impact of technology on our lives and on the future of meaningful work is the result of research , investment , regulatory action , and business-model choices that are made by people we can make the future of work one of hope and prosperity not disillusionment and despair

threat of automation a i future of work could not be more pessimistic automation augmented rather than replaced amplify more efficient effective A i unskilled computers automation a i unskilled is false tech individuals’ skills more valuable reconfigured jobs opportunity occupations inclusive innovation creativity at every level already automated communicating problem-solving in teams learning what users value sweet spots not replaced research investment regulatory action not disillusionment despair

['The daily economic news cycle is awash with stories these days about the threat of automation and artificial intelligence to the future of work for hundreds of millions of U.S. workers. Amid near-hysteria over ostensibly widening “skills gaps” and deepening labor shortages in key U.S. production and services industries—stories that are especially scary as the coronavirus pandemic enters its third year—workers across the country are hearing that these technologies are inexorably destroying their sources of livelihoods now and well into the future.', 'These stories could not be more pessimistic about the future of work in our nation. And they could not be more wrong. The reason? Technology is not like gravity. Workplace automation and artificial intelligence technologies do what the humans who design and deploy them are rewarded to have them do. Those rewards can be changed.', 'To be sure, workers’ fears of technological change aren’t without basis. Yet the biggest technology opportunities have always augmented the work of humans, rather than replaced it altogether. New technological breakthroughs could amplify this trend, combining machine efficiency with human empathy to make people’s interactions more efficient and effective. Artificial intelligence and machine learning will enable teams of people to learn much faster than before. ', 'Before I detail the kinds of steps that need to be taken and detail the kinds of evidence-based research that could be conducted to make this happen, it makes sense to first briefly walk through why so many falsely believe that technology and automation are taking over our jobs. ', 'A key contributor to common fears regarding technology is that the jobs of working people without bachelor’s degrees—which some pejoratively and wrongly view as “unskilled” occupations—are considered most likely to be eclipsed by computers, automation, and artificial intelligence and are first in line to be automated. Some say that these kinds of workers need to be “upskilled” to find work in the current and post-pandemic U.S. economy, or they will be “replaced by the robots.”', 'Another common denominator in this fear about the future of work is the experience many of us face when applying for jobs. Despite a record number of open jobs, getting hired hasn’t gotten any easier for the millions searching for work. It also is readily apparent that outdated hiring practices screen out qualified applicants such that “the endless quest to make hiring efficient has rendered it inefficient,” explain Rani Molla and Emily Stewart at Vox. ', 'First and foremost, the idea that workers in our economy are unskilled is false. In fact, employers play a lead role in building these kinds of destructive automation processes—ones that, by and large, do not benefit them or their employees and prospective new hires. And employers can play a lead role in dismantling these practices by being held accountable for how they use these technologies for their own benefit and for the greater prosperity of U.S. workers and their families and the broader U.S. economy.', 'With the rise of automated hiring processes, many companies use “bachelor’s degree” as a keyword search in their applicant tracking system, which omits candidates before any human gets to consider them. This one choice automatically screens out approximately 60 percent of all U.S. workers. But it’s not the applicant tracking system that is choosing how or who to screen; it is the humans behind it. The equitable answer to this hiring inefficiency is to look for talented individuals who are “Skilled Through Alternative Routes,” or STARs, by removing out-of-date barriers and letting workers shine because of their skills. ', 'National awareness and validation for the STARs talent category is growing—just last week, The New York Times profiled new insights on STARs from our latest report, “Rise with the STARs,” which quantifies the damage done by two decades of rising career barriers to more than 70 million U.S. workers skilled through alternative routes. These STARs don’t have bachelor’s degrees, but they have gained skills through community colleges, military service, training programs, skills bootcamps, and on-the-job learning.', 'Two papers in the National Bureau of Economic Research build on the body of work about STARs, including: ', '“Searching for STARs,” which segments and presents the more than 30 million STARs with trajectories to higher wages based on their skills', '“Skills, Degrees and Labor Market Inequality,” which presents rigorous quantitative analysis to show workers with bachelor’s degrees have dramatically better access to higher-wage occupations than STARs, exacerbating inequality between these groups', 'In this way, individuals’ skills will be augmented by technology, enabling them to succeed in more valuable, reconfigured jobs that meet real needs. As a result, workers will need to be trained to perform what Federal Reserve economists have called “opportunity occupations,” or those that require modest upskilling and pay more than their previous jobs. Businesses that create the conditions for these kinds of augmented technologies to flourish will deliver more overall productivity. They will be rewarded for the rapid reskilling of their workforces, enabling more inclusive innovation, creativity at every level, greater openness to change, better earnings, and more fulfilling experiences for workers and their managers alike.', 'Indeed, employers have already automated many routine tasks in the workplace. Today, most of what workers get paid for is effective interactions, such as communicating, problem-solving in teams, learning what users value, and finding the “sweet spots” that make companies and their customers better off. These kinds of tasks will be enhanced, not replaced, by technology.', 'Policymakers also need to come to grips with the institutional blockers to progress. Policies need to be put in place so that the use of technology improves the experiences, earnings, opportunities, and outcomes of working Americans and their families. In short, policymakers and economists alike need to stop blaming the tools and start fixing the rules. We need to make technology an empowering tool in the hands of workers—not because of luck, but through deliberate choices, including long-term investments, by our government, industry, and citizenry.', 'There is a key role for scholars to help us understand how best to handle the transformation of workplaces due to automation and artificial intelligence. The Washington Center for Equitable Growth, through its grant giving and its network of scholars, is a place where researchers come together and analyze the causes and consequences of the multiple dimensions of inequality, including in U.S. workplaces and across the U.S. workforce. The impact of technology on our lives—and on the future of meaningful work—is the result of research, investment, regulatory action, and business-model choices that are made by people. Together, we can make the future of work one of hope and prosperity, not disillusionment and despair.']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Kansas-PaSe-Aff-8---NDT-Round-8.docx

Kansas

PaSe

dd5c7c69127115297642bd845709056a4a65f18f1823c154191e36d372bcd937

Deterrence – agency remedies lack harsh enough pentalties to force investor compliance – that’s Posner and

Weinstein ’19 [Samuel; Assistant Professor of Law @ Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Former Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General @ U.S. Department of Justice's Antitrust Division; “Financial Regulation in the (Receding) Shadow of Antitrust,” Temple Law Review, 91(3), p. 447-512]

weakness of remedies compounds problems agencies do not have access to remedies as stringent as permanently enjoin anticompetitive conduct maximum authority was insufficient to deter violations

The relative weakness of remedies typically available to regulatory agencies compounds these problems Most agencies do not have access to remedies as stringent as an antitrust court's power to assign or to permanently enjoin anticompetitive conduct the FCC maximum authority was in many instances " insufficient to punish and deter violations " that

remedies typically available to regulatory agencies compounds these problems stringent as an antitrust court's power permanently enjoin anticompetitive conduct insufficient to punish and deter violations " that

['The relative weakness of remedies typically available to regulatory agencies compounds these problems. Most agencies do not have access to remedies as stringent as an antitrust court\'s power to assign treble damages under the Sherman Act or to permanently enjoin anticompetitive conduct. 302 The administrative record in Trinko showed that Verizon admitted it had violated its open-access commitments and voluntarily paid $ 3 million to the FCC and $ 10 [*488] million to competitive local exchange carriers. 303 While the Trinko opinion relied on these sanctions in part for its conclusion that the FCC\'s regulatory regime had fulfilled the antitrust function, the FCC Chairman subsequently told Congress that the Commission\'s maximum fine authority was in many instances "insufficient to punish and deter violations" that incumbent local exchange carriers like Verizon had committed with the aim of "slow[ing] the development of local competition." 304 Among other measures, Chairman Powell recommended increasing the FCC\'s forfeiture authority against common carriers for single continuing violations of the Telecommunications Act from $ 1.2 million to "at least $ 10 million." 305']

[(0, 13)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-Shankar-Vergho-Aff-6%20-%20NDT-Round8.docx

Dartmouth

ShVe

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Dartmouth/ShVe/Dartmouth-Shankar-Vergho-Aff-6%2520-%2520NDT-Round8.docx

bb5ca38cda56c056d8832060cae0d25a7cf90cc818f9368a9fbb85174e54c2fa

That causes nuclear escalation.

Ian Bowers & Henrik Stålhane Hiim 21. Ian Bowers is Associate Professor at the Institute for Military Operations at the Royal Danish Defence College, Copenhagen. Henrik Stålhane Hiim is Senior Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo. “Conventional Counterforce Dilemmas: South Korea’s Deterrence Strategy and Stability on the Korean Peninsula.” International Security, vol. 45, no. 3, 01/2021, pp. 7–39.

credible counterforce is challenging solutions No Ko tests strongly counter missile defense and disrupt counterforce Even if investing in ISR long lead times and costs make it challenging to obtain action reaction capability increase likelihood nuc s are employed in crisis No Ko leaders may fear preventive strike . present a use or lose dilemma rapid execution , leaving a small window to decide raises errors difficult to signal a strike would be limited No Ko may predelegate launch authority risk accidental use and escalation by rogue commanders survivability could hasten destabilizing systems sub s are vulnerable a s w could lead to escalation No Ko would perceive an attack on nuclear forces even talk about targeting leaders makes it challenging to signal

credible counterforce is challenging So Ko ’s strategy gives No Ko strong incentives to race for new weapons to ensure survivability and penetrability of the nuclear arsenal South Korea’s key problem is that offensive nuc lear capabilitie s are easier and less expensive to develop than conventional capabilities designed to stop them because effective deterrence requires clear communication of capabilities, the aggressor has substantial opportunities to find solutions to the capabilities it faces No Ko missile and weapon tests strongly indicate the country seeks to counter missile defense s and disrupt counterforce It demonstrated the ability to launch multiple missiles simultaneously , a variety of missile types capable of flying different ballistic trajectories , and a fully mobile launch capability No Ko is building its arsenal and developing new missiles . That many of these systems have short ranges implies they are directed against So Ko and its counterforce strategy Even if So Ko is investing in advanced ISR , strike, and missile defense the long lead times and tech development costs make it challenging to obtain an advantage in the action reaction dynamic the costs and technological hurdles of independently developing and operating such a capability may prove impossible for South Korea to meet . So Ko strategy may increase the likelihood that nuc lear weapon s are employed in a crisis although So Ko has signaled that it intends to employ its counterforce option only preemptively No Ko leaders nevertheless may fear that So Ko misunderstands their intentions in a crisis , launching a strike even if no attack is imminent . In a situation of increasing tension , they may fear a preventive strike . This could present No Ko with a use or lose dilemma , believing it must strike first to avoid being disarmed Of course, one may argue that No Ko has few incentives to strike first because that would invite retaliation from the U S However, if No Ko leaders were convinced that a disarming regime-ending strike was imminent , in an act of desperation they still strike first to neutralize the threat while holding back longer-range missiles, hoping to deter U.S. retaliation So Ko ’s strategy may stress both countries’ leadership in a crisis . The plan is premised on rapid execution , leaving leaders with a small window to decide Given short flight times leaders on both sides will need to make gut-wrenching decisions in a brief time frame after they receive warning This raises the risk of errors and misunderstandings the strategy may increase risks that a conflict would turn into an all-out war . It would be difficult to credibly signal that a strike would be limited as a counterforce attack would involve strikes on hundreds of military targets , severely degrading the North’s military capabilities in the process. For a regime that for decades relied on a “military first” policy, this likely would be seen as a mortal threat steps that No Ko may take to enhance survivability and address vulnerabilities to counterforce could be destabilizing . Threats against its arsenal may provide Pyongyang an incentive to bolster positive controls over its nuclear forces—that is, adopting a doctrine and C2 arrangements to ensure weapons work when directed . For example, No Ko may predelegate launch authority if communications are disrupted Even though No Ko judging from the scarce information available appears to favor assertive control in peacetime , we do not know what its doctrine and C2 arrangement would look like in crisis If No Ko were to bolster positive control , then it cou ld raise the risk of accidental nuclear use and inadvertent escalation or enable launch by rogue commanders To enhance survivability , No Ko also could hasten efforts to develop potentially destabilizing weapons systems For example it may accelerate efforts to develop an SSB Although submarines generally are highly survivable No Ko sub marine s are likely to be vulnerable . In a crisis So Ko a s w could lead to escalation if So Ko inadvertently targets an SSB counterforce increases the risk that No Ko would perceive this as an attack on its nuclear forces In addition, establishing C2 and communication procedures for its submarines might severely challenge the North, which could increase pressure to predelegate leadership-targeting threats further exacerbate many of these risks. Threats against leaders severely impede possibilities to signal limited intentions even talk about targeting leaders makes it extremely challenging to signal threats against leaders may complicate greatly intrawar deterrence and efforts to negotiate an end In a crisis, such threats could leave leaders highly cautious about establishing lines of communication because they would have legitimate reasons to fear that any communication could reveal their location . Being skeptical about their prospects for survival also would dampen incentives to negotiate threats against leaders provide further incentives to bolster positive controls and develop procedures to ensure retaliation if the leadership were killed or left incommunicado. Such threats may stress decisionmaking further if leaders expect to be among the first targeted in a conflict.

challenging So Ko ’s strategy No Ko strong incentives race for new weapons survivability penetrability offensive nuc s easier less expensive to develop conventional capabilities stop them communication find solutions faces No Ko missile weapon tests strongly indicate counter missile defense disrupt counterforce multiple missiles simultaneously variety types different ballistic trajectories mobile No Ko building its arsenal new missiles short ranges So Ko counterforce strategy So Ko investing long lead times tech development costs challenging advantage action reaction dynamic impossible for South Korea to meet So Ko strategy increase the likelihood nuc s are employed in crisis So Ko only preemptively No Ko leaders So Ko misunderstands intentions in a crisis even if no attack is imminent increasing tension fear preventive strike present No Ko use or lose dilemma may No Ko retaliation U S No Ko leaders convinced disarming regime-ending strike imminent desperation strike first neutralize the threat holding back longer-range deter U.S. retaliation So Ko ’s strategy stress both countries’ leadership in a crisis rapid execution small window decide short flight times both sides gut-wrenching decisions brief time frame errors misunderstandings conflict all-out war difficult credibly signal limited hundreds of military targets mortal threat No Ko enhance survivability address vulnerabilities counterforce destabilizing positive controls ensure work directed No Ko predelegate launch authority No Ko favor peacetime do not know crisis No Ko positive control accidental inadvertent escalation launch rogue commanders enhance survivability No Ko could destabilizing weapons systems SSB generally No Ko sub s vulnerable crisis So Ko a s w escalation So Ko inadvertently SSB No Ko perceive this nuclear forces predelegate leadership-targeting threats further severely impede possibilities limited intentions talk leaders extremely challenging to signal intrawar deterrence end highly cautious communication reveal their location survival dampen incentives negotiate

['As the preceding analysis showed, for South Korea to establish a credible counterforce capability is technically and operationally challenging. The arms race instability it almost certainly will create on the Korean Peninsula compounds these challenges. Arms race instability refers to a situation in which states race for new arms because they fear the other side is developing capabilities that might enable a preemptive or preventive attack.96 South Korea’s strategy gives North Korea strong incentives to race for new weapons to ensure the survivability and penetrability of the North Korean nuclear arsenal. For South Korea, the problem with arms race instability is not the costs or political fallout and mistrust that arms races may generate: if South Korea could be certain that its new capabilities would deny North Korea the ability to threaten a nuclear attack, then both costs might be worth the price.97 Instead, South Korea’s key problem is that offensive nuclear capabilities are easier and less expensive to develop than the conventional capabilities designed to stop them.98 Moreover, because effective deterrence requires clear communication of capabilities, the aggressor has substantial opportunities to find solutions to the capabilities it faces.99 North Korean missile and weapon tests since 2016 strongly indicate that the country seeks to counter missile defenses and disrupt counterforce capabilities. It has demonstrated the ability to launch multiple missiles simultaneously, a variety of missile types capable of flying different ballistic trajectories, and a fully mobile launch capability.100 Moreover, North Korea is building up its arsenal and developing new advanced ballistic missiles. That many of these systems have short ranges implies they are directed against South Korea and its counterforce strategy. In January 2020, the U.S. vice chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, Gen. John Hayten, stated that North Korea is “building new missiles, new capabilities, new weapons as fast as anybody on the planet.”101 Indeed, if North Korea is capable of efficiently producing these capabilities on a large scale, then it will have developed a potent ability to counter extant defensive and counterforce capabilities. Even if South Korea is investing in a series of advanced ISR, strike, and missile defense capabilities, the long lead times and the technology development costs make it challenging for Seoul to obtain an advantage in the action reaction dynamic. An example of this dilemma is South Korea’s proposed development of a nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN). The main SSN program rationale is to counter future North Korean ballistic missile submarines (SSBs). Although South Korea already operates a potent fleet of advanced, conventionally powered submarines, a nuclear-powered class would allow its navy to loiter submerged outside North Korean submarine bases for sustained periods.102 However, the costs and technological hurdles of independently developing and operating such a capability may prove impossible for South Korea to meet. THE STABILITY CHALLENGE A further broad challenge springing from South Korea’s strategy is its potential negative impact on crisis stability. Crisis stability refers to situations in which one or both parties have limited reason to fear a preemptive or a premediated attack, and thus limited incentives to strike first in a conflict.103 Certainly, there is a potential trade-off between deterrence and crisis stability.104 For South Korea, this leads to a difficult dilemma. While its strategy may reduce the likelihood of North Korea engaging in nuclear brinkmanship and threats, it may increase the likelihood that nuclear weapons are employed in a crisis. South Korea’s strategy may negatively affect crisis stability in several ways. First, although South Korea has signaled that it intends to employ its counterforce option only preemptively, North Korean leaders nevertheless may fear that South Korea misunderstands their intentions in a crisis, launching a strike even if no attack is imminent. In a situation of increasing tension, they may even fear a preventive strike. This could present North Korea with a “use them or lose them” dilemma, believing it must strike first to avoid being disarmed.105 Of course, one may argue that North Korea has few incentives to strike first because that would invite devastating retaliation from the United States, particularly given the substantial U.S. civilian and military presence in South Korea.106 However, if North Korean leaders were convinced that a disarming and regime-ending strike was imminent, in an act of desperation they still could strike first to neutralize the South Korean threat while holding back its longer-range missiles, hoping to deter U.S. retaliation. Second, South Korea’s strategy may stress both countries’ civilian and military leadership in a crisis. The South Korean plan is premised on rapid execution, leaving leaders with a small window to decide a course of action. Given the short flight times of missiles on the peninsula, leaders on both sides potentially will need to make gut-wrenching decisions in a brief time frame after they receive warning of a possible strike. This raises the risk of errors and misunderstandings.107 Third, the South Korean strategy may increase risks that a conflict would turn into an all-out war. It would be difficult for South Korean leaders to credibly signal to North Korea that a strike would be limited to its nuclear arsenal, as a counterforce attack would involve strikes on hundreds of military targets, severely degrading the North’s military capabilities in the process. For a regime that for decades relied on a “military first” policy, this likely would be seen as a mortal threat.108 Fourth, several steps that North Korea may take to enhance survivability and address its vulnerabilities to counterforce could be destabilizing. Threats against its arsenal may provide Pyongyang an incentive to bolster positive controls over its nuclear forces—that is, adopting a doctrine and C2 arrangements to ensure that weapons work when directed. For example, North Korea may predelegate launch authority to military commanders under certain circumstances, such as if communications are disrupted.109 Even though North Korea—judging from the scarce information available about its doctrine— appears to favor assertive control in peacetime, we do not know what its doctrine and C2 arrangement would look like in a time of crisis.110 If North Korea were to bolster positive control, then it could raise the risk of accidental nuclear use and inadvertent escalation or enable launch by rogue commanders.111 To enhance survivability, North Korea also could hasten efforts to develop potentially destabilizing weapons systems. For example, it may accelerate efforts to develop an SSB. Although submarines generally are regarded as highly survivable platforms, North Korean submarines are likely to be vulnerable. In a crisis, South Korean anti-submarine warfare operations could lead to escalation if, for example, South Korea inadvertently targets an SSB. South Korea’s counterforce strategy increases the risk that North Korea would perceive this as an attack on its nuclear forces.112 In addition, establishing C2 and communication procedures for its submarines might severely challenge the North, which could increase pressure to predelegate some degree of launch authority.113 South Korea’s leadership-targeting threats further exacerbate many of these risks. Threats against leaders severely impede possibilities to signal limited intentions. As James Wirtz highlighted, even talk about targeting leaders makes it extremely challenging to signal that counterforce attacks are limited and directed against an adversary’s nuclear weapons (and not regime).114 Moreover, threats against leaders may complicate greatly intrawar deterrence and efforts to negotiate an end to a war.115 In a crisis, such threats could leave North Korean leaders highly cautious about establishing lines of communication because they would have legitimate reasons to fear that any communication could reveal their location. Being skeptical about their prospects for survival also would dampen incentives to negotiate or surrender. In addition, threats against leaders provide further incentives to bolster positive controls and develop procedures to ensure retaliation if the leadership were killed or left incommunicado. Such threats may stress decisionmaking further if leaders expect to be among the first targeted in a conflict.', '', '']

[(4, 12), (29, 33), (34, 36)]

ndtceda

Emory-KeRa-Aff-Texas-Semis.docx

Emory

KeRa

2087fe1d5123b2371df7f170e141683a5abb0979f889e1c9de1d5e2449a859fd

Post-Fordism has inaugurated a new era of capitalism, designating the general intellect as the primary mode of production – the educational potentiality of the masses, actualized through communication and knowledge, is now directly funneled toward capital accumulation

Ford 21 – Assistant Professor of Education Studies at DePauw University and Ph.D. in Cultural Foundations of Education from Syracuse University (Derek R., “3. The General Intellect and the Struggle over the Knowledge Economy”, Chapter in “Marxism, Pedagogy, and the General Intellect: Beyond the Knowledge Economy”, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 37-54, 2021)

post-Fordism is the empirical verification of the general intellect the faculty of thinking; potential as such The general intellect attaches itself to living labor through the paradigmatic role of language and communication The communication industry provides the means of production for the totality of capitalism it produces the linguistic forms and practices of the general intellect The general intellect flows from the workers to capital which authorizes and deploys it to change the former Workers, consumers, and capita l tethered between production and consumption eliminating distinctions between innovation and execution Communication is so central we could name it “the communicative mode of production.” processes of knowledge production become determinate profitability happen through small quantities of products

post-Fordism is the empirical verification of Marx’s theoretical formulation about the general intellect by placing particular emphasis on the general of the general intellect the faculty of thinking; potential as such , not its countless particular realizations links the general intellect with living labor, rather than with fixed capital The general intellect is public and based on the cooperation of workers, even though capitalists privately appropriate it the extension of the general intellect to potentiality via the linguistic faculty The general intellect most clearly attaches itself to living labor under post-Fordist production through the paradigmatic role of language and communication Under Fordism, silence was the rule Under post-Fordism, the opposite is the case If the slogan in the Fordist factory was “‘Silence, men at work!’ … Today, in certain workshops, one could well put up signs mirroring those of the past, but declaring: ‘Men at work here. Talk!’ The communication industry is hegemonic in the sense that it provides the means of production for the totality of capitalism except that rather than producing machines it produces the linguistic forms and practices of the general intellect Psychologists, engineers, and others studied factories and workers—in increasingly invasive detail—to maximize productivity and reengineer workplaces and the workers themselves “scientific management” wasn’t only about the division of labor but encompassed the entirety of life and the social The general intellect flows from the workers to capital , the latter of which authorizes and deploys it in a planned manner to change the former Under post-Fordism, the movement and mobilization of the general intellect is more dynamic and more centrally located within production itself while production spreads throughout all of society companies initiated more frequent contact with consumers while the working-class movements were broken up, resulting in “a working class strongly imp lied in the entrepreneurial spirit, faithful to the firm’s objectives, capable of adapting to its imperatives and ready to identify with its destiny.” Workers, consumers, and capita l were tethered to a tightening link between production and consumption , as production could shift rapidly in response to flexible demand, effectively eliminating the distinctions between innovation and execution and inverting the relationship between production and consumption such that production can be organized in response to rather than in anticipation of demand Communication is so central to post-Fordism that we could name it “the communicative mode of production.” the processes of knowledge production /extraction and circulation that become determinate profitability doesn’t happen through economies of scale but small quantities of ever diverse and specialized products , instituting tighter and tighter networks between producers and consumers, “reducing to zero defective output and immediately responding to the market’s oscillations.”

empirical verification general intellect paradigmatic role of language and communication communication industry linguistic forms and practices “the communicative mode of production.” processes of knowledge production

['', 'Virno boldly claims that post-Fordism is the empirical verification of Marx’s theoretical formulation about the general intellect in the Fragment. At the same time, he reconceptualizes the general intellect by placing particular emphasis on the general of the general intellect, as distinct from any particular intellect. The concept, he writes, “should not necessarily mean the aggregate of the knowledge acquired by the species, but the faculty of thinking; potential as such, not its countless particular realizations.”22 Virno links the general intellect with living labor, rather than with fixed capital, as Marx (apparently) did in the Grundrisse. The general intellect is public and based on the cooperation of workers, even though capitalists privately appropriate it. While this distinction between fixed capital and living labor has significant implications for any theory of surplus value (as it upsets the definition of value as socially necessary labor time), more pertinent to my purposes here is the extension of the general intellect to potentiality via the linguistic faculty. The general intellect most clearly attaches itself to living labor under post-Fordist production through the paradigmatic role of language and communication. Under Fordism, silence was the rule. Communication was a distraction, or worse, something that signaled the potential for forging solidarity and radical consciousness. To take just one example, in The Soundscape, R. Murray Schafer affirms this by quoting industrial factory inspectors. The workers his team interviewed “spoke of the ‘silence’ of the mills, by which they meant the ‘rule of silence.’” “Yes, they will not allow them to speak; if they chance to see two speaking, they are beaten with the strap.”23 Under post-Fordism, the opposite is the case. If the slogan in the Fordist factory was “‘Silence, men at work!’ … Today, in certain workshops, one could well put up signs mirroring those of the past, but declaring: ‘Men at work here. Talk!’”24 The communication industry is hegemonic in the sense that it provides the means of production for the totality of capitalism; except that rather than producing machines it produces the linguistic forms and practices of the general intellect. While under Fordist production the general intellect is dynamic as it flows between living labor and fixed capital, there is nonetheless a more hierarchical relationship in terms of its circulation. Not only was the definition of intellect more restricted, but its implementation was planned in a top-down manner. Psychologists, engineers, and others studied factories and workers—in increasingly invasive detail—to maximize productivity and reengineer workplaces and the workers themselves. This latter aspect is particularly important in that it highlights how “scientific management” wasn’t only about the division of labor but encompassed the entirety of life and the social.25 We could also think about the growing importance of public surveys and questionnaires in marketing. The general intellect flows from the workers to capital, the latter of which authorizes and deploys it in a planned manner to change the former. Under post-Fordism, the movement and mobilization of the general intellect is more dynamic and more centrally located within production itself while production spreads throughout all of society. The origins of post-Fordism are often located in Japan in the middle of the twentieth century with the rise of “Toyotism.” Marazzi gives a few justifications for this. For one, the internal market was limited, which meant the mass production-consumption model of Fordism wouldn’t be efficient. For two, the 1949 financial crisis, the resulting strikes in 1950, and the Korean War further reduced demand. The strikes, organized on the basis of the professional trade union model, failed. In response, companies initiated more frequent contact with consumers while the working-class movements were broken up, resulting in “a working class strongly implied in the entrepreneurial spirit, faithful to the firm’s objectives, capable of adapting to its imperatives and ready to identify with its destiny.”26 Workers, consumers, and capital were tethered to a tightening link between production and consumption, as production could shift rapidly in response to flexible demand, effectively eliminating the distinctions between innovation and execution and inverting the relationship between production and consumption such that production can be organized in response to rather than in anticipation of demand. Communication is, as such, so central to post-Fordism that we could name it “the communicative mode of production.”27 It’s not knowledge goods but the processes of knowledge production/extraction and circulation that become determinate. In the move from mass to lean production, profitability doesn’t happen through economies of scale but small quantities of ever diverse and specialized products, instituting tighter and tighter networks between producers and consumers, “reducing to zero defective output and immediately responding to the market’s oscillations.”28', '']

[(0, 7)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-DaHa-Neg-Gtown-Round-5.docx

Minnesota

DaHa

b996147befaf05bc2b4db6e0457c0e7d3c8b4f723029c21999cae0f603aaab2d

Particularly, bees are on the brink---extinction

Dr. Bruce E. Tonn 21, Professor of Political Science at the University of Tennessee, PhD in Urban and Regional Planning from Northwestern University, BS in Civil Engineering from Stanford University, Senior Researcher in the Environmental Sciences Division of Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Anticipation, Sustainability, Futures and Human Extinction: Ensuring Humanity’s Journey into The Distant Future, p. 33

they could be initiating events to human extinction Ag systems failure the world relies on only 14 crops 75% of food is dependent on bees the population is under extreme stress a collapse lead to famine and collapse in population

they could be initiating events to human extinction Ag ricultural systems failure – There are catastrophic risks facing the world’s agricultural systems the world currently relies up on only about 14 different crops Unanticipated and unchecked microbial infections could wipe out major portions of the food supply 75% of the world’s food is dependent in some way on bees for pollination. Currently, the world’s bee population is under extreme stress a catastrophic collapse of the world’s bee population could lead to widespread famine and collapse in human population

initiating events human extinction Ag on microbial infections wipe out extreme stress widespread famine collapse in human population

['This second class of existential risks is primarily found in coupled human–natural systems. These could be seen as extinction-level events in and of themselves, but I think they could be initiating or contributory events to human extinction (again see the scenario at the end of Chapter 4). Technically, we also know how to prevent these events or at least how to adapt to them. Here are four to consider:', '(1) Significant loss of biodiversity – It is well documented that human behavior is causing a sixth mass species extinction on the earth.44 This is due to many factors including destruction of habitat, spreading of disease (e.g., Chytrid fungus in amphibians), pollution, and climate change. The risk to humanity is that if too many of the species become extinct, global ecosystems could crash, disrupting essential balances of species needed to support ecosystem services and maybe even threatening global balances of oxygen and nitrogen.45', '(2) Agricultural systems failure – There are numerous additional potentially catastrophic risks facing the world’s agricultural systems. For example, the world currently relies upon only about 14 different crops.46 Unanticipated and unchecked microbial infections could wipe out major portions of the food supply. Soil erosion, extended droughts, fires, and various other natural disasters could also seriously impact the food supply and cause widespread famine.47 At least 75% of the world’s food is dependent in some way on bees for pollination. Currently, the world’s bee population is under extreme stress.48 Many worry that a catastrophic collapse of the world’s bee population could lead to widespread famine and collapse in human population.', '', '']

[(13, 17), (18, 20)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-Landgraff-Wegener-Aff-Northwestern-Round2.docx

Northwestern

LaWe

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Northwestern/LaWe/Northwestern-Landgraff-Wegener-Aff-Northwestern-Round2.docx

9ef6aa8ac58b82421c2b8c2bc47dc056600025b212bdeb266597b8d1e51e9b7f

1. No solvency---Russia perceives the plan as encirclement and will backlash.

Nemenov 16 [Alexander. Journalist at Sputnik. "Nuclear Poker: Why the US Can't Trick Russia Into Changing Its Nuclear Doctrine." 9/29. https://sputniknews.com/politics/201609291045845530-russia-nuclear-doctrine-us-diplomatic-maneuvers/]

superiority in nuclear forced Washington to reckon with Russia the US accuse Russia of destabilizing to maintain and upgrade America's arsenal the weapon's will target Russian territory there is no way of knowing whether it carries a nuclear or conventional warhead unilateral rejection of first strike could be tying Russia's hands they retain attack by all weapons The result is doctrine containing Russia the US is increasing capabilities Meanwhile allowing them to blam Moscow for an arms race the initiative is aimed at superiority over Russia Moscow should not give

US military analysts actively developed the concept of preventative defense, and these designs have never gone away Only Moscow's superiority in nuclear forces forced Washington to reckon with Russia as a serious potential opponent." the US finds it beneficial to accuse Russia of destabilizing the international situation, in order to maintain and upgrade America's own nuclear arsenal ." the weapon's glide capability will allow it to target Russian territory without its carrier entering the zone of Russian air and missile defense there is no way of knowing whether the rocket carrying it carries a nuclear or conventional warhead thus increasing the risk of unintended escalation ." Pentagon analysts remain confident about a qualitative and quantitative superiority in Europe Key US experts believe that Russia's latest weapons would make little difference – they are too few in number." unilateral US rejection of the doctrine of first strike could be aimed only at tying Russia's hands Washington is talking only about giving up preemptive strike using nuclear weapons they retain the possibility of a pre-emptive attack by all other types of weapons The result is that in accordance with the doctrine of containing Russia the US is increasing its nuclear capabilities Meanwhile , in formally abandoning the doctrine of preemptive nuclear strike, they get an opportunity to 'play in the field', where it is more difficult for Russia's armed forces to achieve superiority Finally allowing them to talk about the 'monstrous aggression of the Russian regime' and blam ing Moscow for unleashing an arms race ." the US is repeating the technique of Brezhnev's Soviet Union which unilaterally renounced the first use of nuclear weapons because at the time, the USSR had a significant superiority in conventional forces over NATO Thus, the Democrats' initiative is aimed at achieving strategic superiority over Russia and China Moscow should not give in to this kind of demagogy. Russia must continue to retain the right to use tactical nuclear weapons first

superiority nuclear forces maintain upgrade own nuclear arsenal nuclear conventional warhead unintended escalation qualitative quantitative superiority first strike tying Russia's hands all other types of weapons containing Russia increasing capabilities 'monstrous aggression of the Russian regime' Brezhnev's Soviet Union Russia China

['"In the early 1990s," the expert recalled, "US military analysts actively developed the concept of preventative defense, and these designs have never gone away. It is on the basis of these concepts that the US continues to build its long-term military strategy. The US always proceeded from the assumption that they have an advantage over China and Russia in conventional weapons, and overwhelming superiority in prospective weaponry. Only Moscow\'s superiority in nuclear forces forced Washington to reckon with Russia as a serious potential opponent."', 'In recent years the US appraisal of Russian capabilities has since shifted. "Washington has learned that Russia has a strong foundation in Soviet military research, which has allowed the Russian Armed Forces not only to stay afloat, but to ensure their future development. In this situation, the US finds it beneficial to accuse Russia of destabilizing the international situation, in order to maintain and upgrade America\'s own nuclear arsenal."', 'For example, Ermakov noted that the US plans to spend $8.1 billion to modernize its B61 nuclear bomb – via the so-called B61-12, which would replace four existing modifications, by 2024. This weapon will feature improved range and accuracy compared to its predecessors, and can be fired from both strategic and tactical aviation. ', 'This is concerning to Moscow, the analyst explained, since the weapon\'s glide capability will allow it to target Russian territory without its carrier entering the zone of Russian air and missile defense. Moreover, "this type of weapon is dangerous because there is no way of knowing whether the rocket carrying it carries a nuclear or conventional warhead, thus increasing the risk of unintended escalation." ', 'At the same time, Pentagon analysts remain confident about a qualitative and quantitative superiority in Europe over Russia in conventional armaments. "This assessment is not changing, in spite of the recent noise in Western mainstream media about the US\'s alleged weakened military might," Ermakov emphasized. Key US experts believe that Russia\'s latest weapons would make little difference – they are too few in number."', 'Accordingly, the analyst emphasized, a unilateral US rejection of the doctrine of first strike could be aimed only at tying Russia\'s hands. "Washington is talking only about giving up preemptive strike using nuclear weapons. But they retain the possibility of a pre-emptive attack by all other types of weapons, and will stand firmly on that principle."', '"The result is that in accordance with the doctrine of containing Russia, the US is increasing its nuclear capabilities. Meanwhile, in formally abandoning the doctrine of preemptive nuclear strike, they get an opportunity to \'play in the field\', where it is more difficult for Russia\'s armed forces to achieve superiority over the US. Finally, an initiative rejecting preemptive nuclear strike gives the US a trump card in the information war –allowing them to talk about the \'monstrous aggression of the Russian regime\', and blaming Moscow for unleashing an arms race."', "Mikhail Alexandrov, a senior expert at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations Center for Military-Political Studies, agreed with Ermakov's assessment, recalling that NATO has a significant quantitative superiority over Russia in conventional weapons.", '"With this numerical superiority, the West expects to win in a war with Russia. But it cannot do so if nuclear weapons become part of the equation. These weapons would destroy Western Europe and the US much faster than Western countries are able to mobilize." ', "Accordingly, Alexandrov suggested that US lawmakers' proposal is based on the understanding that a nuclear war is unwinnable, and to try to trick Russia into abandoning its established doctrine.", '"In essence, the US is repeating the technique of Leonid Brezhnev\'s Soviet Union, which unilaterally renounced the first use of nuclear weapons. This was done because at the time, the USSR had a significant superiority in conventional forces over NATO. As a result, the use of nuclear weapons was judged to be disadvantageous, since all of Western Europe could be captured without their use. In that situation, it\'s worth noting, NATO banked on the use of tactical nuclear weapons, which became a deterrent against possible Soviet attack."', 'Today, Alexandrov noted, the situation has been flipped on its head. Russia can no longer resist the combined might of NATO in a long war using only conventional weaponry. "Therefore, since the 1990s, our doctrine provides for the possibility of using nuclear weapons first in case of a serious threat to Russia\'s national security."', '"Thus, the Democrats\' initiative is aimed at achieving strategic superiority over Russia, and possibly China," the analyst suggested. "Of course, Moscow should not give in to this kind of demagogy. Russia must continue to retain the right to use tactical nuclear weapons first," he emphasized.']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-DiGr-Neg-Texas-Round-2.docx

Kentucky

DiGr

3371568b0cd97fb216244799e1dd14a4386b2af208be9fe99f3e360c3dec1add

Liberal idealism DA is wrong---Craig is a critique of using Article VI of the NPT to achieve abolition because it doesn’t require action by the West---it’s not a broad critique of all disarmament movements---that was 1AC CX AND inserting for reference

Craig 20 (Campbell Craig, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK, “Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies: Non-Nuclear Peace Beyond the Nuclear Ban Treaty” , 2020, Palgrave Macmillan, Pg. 173-176, ) // Ayy

their achievement does not outweigh two important costs that an attempt to achieve nuclear peace solely by means of disarmament would incur central strategy initiative and larger abolitionist projects is to focus on the NPT problem with relying upon Article VI to advance disarmament lies in nature of contemporary politics major supporters of the regime mainstream non-proliferation institutions associated with and funded by them—have used the ideal of nuclear abolition as a carrot to obtain the support of anti-nuclear activists and states for their real objective, which is to use the institution to deny smaller states the bomb nonproliferation complex’ as a means of defecting criticism of the nuclear states Article VI dangling a carrot of disarmament in front of anti-nuclear forces privileging an idealist solution that demands little sacrifce from supporters (in the liberal West in favour of a more hard-headed solution that would demand radical and convulsive political change The disarmament project, as it currently stands , is a classic example of liberal idealism

Advocates of nuclear abolition might concede that total and irreversible disarmament is unlikely or impossible for the reasons developed above formally designating states who possess nuclear weaponry as immoral outlaws the campaign could succeed in shifting discourse away from the tacit acceptance of nuclear deterrence and force those states who persist in keeping their weapons to pay real political and economic costs. However, their achievement does not outweigh two important costs that an attempt to achieve nuclear peace solely by means of disarmament would incur . A central strategy of the ban initiative and larger abolitionist projects is to focus on the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty ( NPT ) As disarmament advocates stress, the major nuclear powers have used this institution to deny smaller states the bomb whilst persistently ignoring Article VI of the treaty, which calls upon existing nuclear states to disarm . This move would put serious political pressure on the existing nuclear powers, who have an interest in keeping weaker states disarmed for purposes of coercion though disarmament advocates are reluctant to acknowledge this particular objective The problem with relying upon the non-proliferation regime and the deployment of Article VI to advance the cause of disarmament lies in the very nature of the contemporary politics of non-proliferation. What has happened over the past few decades, and in particular since the end of the Cold War, is that the major supporters of the regime —the nuclear states of the West, and mainstream non-proliferation institutions associated with and funded by them—have used the ideal of nuclear abolition as a carrot to obtain the support of anti-nuclear activists and states for their real objective, which is to use the institution to deny smaller states the bomb . Because a world free of nuclear weapons is a noble goal that is easy for idealists to support but obviously diffcult to achieve, the ‘ nonproliferation complex’ has been able to use it as a means of defecting criticism of the nuclear states and especially their 50-year defance of Article VI This allows the nuclear states to continue on with business as usual, dangling a carrot of disarmament in front of anti-nuclear forces which can never quite be grasped An anti-nuclear discourse that focuses exclusively upon disarmament, in other words, benefts the nuclear haves, because it costs them nothing to voice support for the goal in abstract terms A second, related problem with focusing exclusively upon disarmament is that it runs the risk of privileging an idealist solution that demands little sacrifce from its supporters (in the liberal West in favour of a more hard-headed solution that would demand radical and convulsive political change . idealistic policies that attract the attention and support of liberal polities to a solution that will not work can often do more harm than doing nothing The disarmament project, as it currently stands , is a classic example of liberal idealism Its identifcation of the bomb as the problem that must be gotten rid of, rather than the political condition in which bombs can be used, makes it relatively easy for liberal idealists to support the project I have already noted that this ideal plays into the hands of the ‘nonproliferation complex’, which uses the dream of global zero to help perpetuate a regime that actually locks in a permanent nuclear order it communicates to the liberal Western elite that the spectre of nuclear war can be ended without any danger to its own position or risk of political convulsion. there is a real risk that disarmament may nevertheless remain as the dominant solution to the nuclear problem precisely because it does not pose any serious threats to the liberal nuclear states that purportedly support it. There are a number of liberal international projects—on nonproliferation, climate change, economic development and aid in the third world, to name a few—which have become institutionalized over the past several decades: rather than taking the serious political steps necessary to solve the problems in a straightforward manner, a series of well-funded international institutions emerge which purport to deal with them as long as they do not threaten the interests of the liberal states that support and fund these projects. Because the idea of abolition does not threaten the powerful states as long as it never actually happens, disarmament could become institutionalized just like these other projects —it would become the only mainstream solution to the nuclear problem, gamed indefnitely by the world’s most powerful states and the institutions that work for them. ? If the answer to this question is ‘no’, then an exclusive focus upon disarmament harms the anti-nuclear cause, by rallying support for a project that cannot work and/or sidelining more radical proposals that powerful states would actively oppose but could really solve the nuclear problem.

['Why the Quest for Disarmament Actually Damages the Cause of a Durable Non-Nuclear Peace Advocates of nuclear abolition might concede that total and irreversible disarmament is unlikely or impossible for the reasons developed above, but that the multilateral campaign on its behalf can produce real benefts. By formally designating states who possess nuclear weaponry as immoral outlaws, and raising global awareness of the ongoing dangers of nuclear war and the fact that only a handful of nations are responsible for these dangers, the campaign could succeed in shifting discourse away from the tacit acceptance of nuclear deterrence and force those states who persist in keeping their weapons to pay real political and economic costs. These are important objectives and I support them. However, their achievement does not outweigh two important costs that an attempt to achieve nuclear peace solely by means of disarmament would incur. 2.1 The Non-proliferation Game A central strategy of the ban initiative and larger abolitionist projects is to focus on the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the massive institutional regime it has spawned over the past fve decades (Meyer and Sauer 2018). As disarmament advocates stress, the major nuclear powers have used this institution, which Jan Ruzicka and I have called the ‘nonproliferation complex’, to deny smaller states the bomb whilst persistently ignoring Article VI of the treaty, which calls upon existing nuclear states to disarm. They argue that a major component of the attempt to stigmatize the nuclear powers must be to zero in on this hypocrisy, and indeed to make future support for the NPT conditional upon tangible disarmament measures undertaken by the nuclear ‘haves’. This move would put serious political pressure on the existing nuclear powers, who have an interest in keeping weaker states disarmed for purposes of coercion (as the example of North Korea reveals), though disarmament advocates are reluctant to acknowledge this particular objective, as it is based upon the implicit assumption that deterrence works (Ruzicka 2018). The problem with relying upon the non-proliferation regime and the deployment of Article VI to advance the cause of disarmament lies in the very nature of the contemporary politics of non-proliferation. What has happened over the past few decades, and in particular since the end of the Cold War, is that the major supporters of the regime—the nuclear states of the West, and mainstream non-proliferation institutions associated with and funded by them—have used the ideal of nuclear abolition as a carrot to obtain the support of anti-nuclear activists and states for their real objective, which is to use the institution to deny smaller states the bomb. Perhaps the most vivid example of this process at work was President Obama’s famous 2009 speech in Prague calling for a world free of nuclear weapons, for which he almost immediately received the Nobel Peace Prize. This move tied the cause of nuclear abolition to a state which possesses the world’s most advanced nuclear arsenal; what is more, not long after this speech Obama approved of a multi-billion dollar upgrade of the US nuclear arsenal. It was very interesting to see that this latter decision attracted the attention or criticism of very few non-proliferation institutions or experts (Craig and Ruzicka 2013). Because a world free of nuclear weapons is a noble goal that is easy for idealists to support but obviously diffcult to achieve, the ‘nonproliferation complex’ has been able to use it as a means of defecting criticism of the nuclear states and especially their 50-year defance of Article VI (Ritchie 2019). Abolition is employed as the dream that everyone supports and seeks one day to achieve, whilst recognizing that it is too diffcult to happen right away. This allows the nuclear states to continue on with business as usual, dangling a carrot of disarmament in front of anti-nuclear forces which can never quite be grasped (Kmentt 2013). An anti-nuclear discourse that focuses exclusively upon disarmament, in other words, benefts the nuclear haves, because it costs them nothing to voice support for the goal in abstract terms, as did President Obama, in order to retain support for a regime that locks in the existing nuclear order. 2.2 The Marginalization of a More Effective Solution A second, related problem with focusing exclusively upon disarmament is that it runs the risk of privileging an idealist solution that demands little sacrifce from its supporters (in the liberal West) in favour of a more hard-headed solution that would demand radical and convulsive political change. As authors like E. H. Carr have argued, idealistic policies that attract the attention and support of liberal polities to a solution that will not work can often do more harm than doing nothing, as they crowd out more diffcult and controversial proposals that promise a more enduring solution to the problem (Carr 1946). The disarmament project, as it currently stands, is a classic example of liberal idealism. By this I mean that it focuses upon the power of ideals to solve the problem of nuclear war rather than advocating radical change, and that it therefore does not call for measures that could threaten the extant liberal international order. Its identifcation of the bomb as the problem that must be gotten rid of, rather than the political condition in which bombs can be used, makes it relatively easy for liberal idealists to support the project: for who, apart from a few extreme academics and military offcials, can really be for the bomb? Being against the existence of nuclear weapons is essentially a moral, not a political position, like being against torture or climate change—it does not necessarily demand the adoption of a radical political stand, if by that we mean, in the international sphere, a fundamental challenge to existing modes of power. It is possible, and indeed often specifcally argued, to imagine a world without nuclear weapons which otherwise resembles our existing world: everything is the same except that a class of genocidal weaponry is gone.10 I have already noted that this ideal plays into the hands of the ‘nonproliferation complex’, which uses the dream of global zero to help perpetuate a regime that actually locks in a permanent nuclear order. The other problem, however, is that it communicates to the liberal Western elite that the spectre of nuclear war can be ended without any danger to its own position or risk of political convulsion. The humanitarian and ban initiatives threaten no one apart from the states that possess nuclear weapons, and this threat comprises only the demand that they divest themselves of their arsenals, not that they must undergo political or economic change. If abolition can work—if complete and irreversible disarmament can occur, and in the reasonably near future, not 200 years from now—then it is a perfect solution to the problem of nuclear war, because we rid ourselves of the nuclear spectre without having to face the prospect of radical and dangerous political transformation. If it cannot work, however, then there is a real risk that disarmament may nevertheless remain as the dominant solution to the nuclear problem precisely because it does not pose any serious threats to the liberal nuclear states that purportedly support it. There are a number of liberal international projects—on nonproliferation, climate change, economic development and aid in the third world, to name a few—which have become institutionalized over the past several decades: rather than taking the serious political steps necessary to solve the problems in a straightforward manner, a series of well-funded international institutions emerge which purport to deal with them as long as they do not threaten the interests of the liberal states that support and fund these projects. Vast institutional regimes are the result, whose many thousands of well-paid offcials in the West have an interest in not antagonizing the states that provide the money, and indeed in not really solving the problem they are working on, which would mean working themselves out of a job.11 In my view, the new disarmament initiatives run this risk. Because the idea of abolition does not threaten the powerful states as long as it never actually happens, disarmament could become institutionalized just like these other projects—it would become the only mainstream solution to the nuclear problem, gamed indefnitely by the world’s most powerful states and the institutions that work for them. That would be a mortal blow to the cause of nuclear peace. Thus the abolitionist cause hinges on the question of whether it can work. Can the total and irretrievable disarmament of all present (and putative) nuclear states and all other potential actors happen in the foreseeable future, and without transformative political change that would threaten the interests of the world’s most powerful nations? If the answer to this question is ‘no’, then an exclusive focus upon disarmament harms the anti-nuclear cause, by rallying support for a project that cannot work and/or sidelining more radical proposals that powerful states would actively oppose but could really solve the nuclear problem. For the institutional reasons just outlined, the response that disarmament might not work at the moment but could change discourse sometime in the future is not good enough. Its advocates have to demonstrate now that it can achieve the goals it demands, which means persuasively refuting the arguments I (and many others) have put forward above.', '', '']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

MichiganState-GuMi-Neg-Wake-Round-2.docx

MichiganState

GuMi

9debcf5b23bb00d06db49f2dd2b04b7290e6030ff3019c0def722d3c78d927bf

2. It doesn’t solve warhead ambiguity---the credibility threshold is too high.

Carrie A. Lee 22, associate professor at the U.S. Army War College, where she serves as the chair of the Department of National Security and Strategy and co-director of the USAWC Center on Civil-Military Relations, “Technology Acquisition and Arms Control: Thinking Through the Hypersonic Weapons Debate,” The Scholar, Texas National Security Review, Fall 2022, pp 29–48

despite declared intention to use hypersonic s exclusively for conventional U.S. leaders still may not have a credible way of signaling a non-nuclear mission in the absence of verification Any missile warning in the Pacific places America’s interests at extreme risk and forces a aggressive posture in response

despite America’s declared intention to use hypersonic s exclusively for conventional strikes, U.S. leaders still may not have a credible way of signaling a non-nuclear mission in the absence of independent verification Any missile warning for areas around U.S. entities or allies in the Pacific places America’s interests at extreme risk — and forces a more aggressive posture in response

America’s declared intention hypersonic s exclusively conventional still not have a credible way of signaling a non-nuclear mission in the absence of independent verification Any missile warning extreme risk forces aggressive posture in response

['The United States is also potentially at risk of misinterpreting the intent of a potential adversary due to information asymmetries. Unlike the United States, both Russia and China have declared their intention to use hypersonic weapons to modernize their nuclear arsenal. Given that most hypersonic missiles are able to carry both conventional and nuclear warheads, it may be much more difficult for Russia or China to signal its intent to keep the war limited in the event of a conflict. Indeed, despite America’s declared intention to use hypersonic weapons exclusively for conventional strikes, U.S. leaders still may not have a credible way of signaling a non-nuclear mission in the absence of independent verification through an arms control regime.69 Any missile warning for areas around U.S. entities or allies in the Pacific places America’s interests at extreme risk — and potentially forces U.S. forces to adopt a more aggressive posture in response.']

[(10, 16)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-VaWa-Neg-Harvard-Round-4.docx

Dartmouth

VaWa

3172ed597f2ceba9f960bfbc529572932551d961a101999dd9d90fbde9109b84

2- Repetition Compulsion -- the addendum of “extinction outweighs” to “black lives are affected too” is the Slave State’s advertisement that pornotropes black flesh a fungible tool for its existential project -- that ritual reputation is inseparable from the episteme of slavery and ensures complacency -- turns case.

Warren ’18 [Calvin; 2018; Associate African American Studies at Emory University; Ontological Terror; Blackness, Nihilism, and Emancipation, “THE INVENTION OF THE NEGRO AND THE NECESSITY OF BLACK BEING,” p. 45-48]

Black being is invented to serve as equipment for human being’s existential project We must understand the purpose of antiblack dealings is to obliterate flesh black being is a “ living laboratory a collection of instruments for experimentation explained by fungibility made possible by replaceability Instruments are interchangeable black being is pure utility used for the human’s fantasies the flesh is ‘ murdered’ over and over again This onticide continues impervious to legal and political change the ritual repetitive murder of the flesh is necessary as long as the world exists

body is a metaphor for instrumentality or abject use value Black being is invented , however, precisely to secure the human’s mode of existence the black body invented to serve as the premier tool or equipment for human being’s existential project (and I would argue that this equipment is not equivalent in form to the human other words, the mode of existence for black being is what Heidegger would call “availableness.” Availableness is “the way of being of those entities which are defined by their use in the whole.” We must , then, understand antiblackness as a global One systemic dealing with black bodies, as available equipment. Heidegger considers dealin gs the way the Being of entities, or equipment, is revealed phenomenologically through the use of this equipment Antiblack dealings with black bodies do not expose the essential unfolding, or essence, of the equipment; rather, the purpose of antiblack dealings is to systemically obliterate the flesh , and to impose nothing onto that obliterated space Why does black equipment cut across all assignments, and why is it the tool Dasein relies on to commence its existential journey? the essence of black equipment is nothing If Heidegger assumes that equipment will reveal its being through its usage, then he did not anticipate the invention of the Negro— equipment in human form, embodied nothingness. Using black equipment reveals existence but not being Spillers describes black being is a “ living laboratory A living laboratory is a collection of instruments for experimentation The relation between pleasure and the possession of slave property, in both the figurative and literal senses, can be explained in part by the fungibility of the slave— that is, the joy made possible by virtue of the replaceability and interchangeability endemic to the commodity Put differently, the fungability of the commodity makes the captive body an abstract and empty vessel vulnerable to the projection of others’ feelings, ideas, desires, and values Instruments , tools , and equipment are interchangeable /replaceable; this is starkly different from human being, whose existential journey in the world renders it incalculable and unique When I suggest that black being is pure function or utility , I mean precisely the way this being is used as a site of projection for the human’s desires, fantasies it is through the human’s engagement with instruments (tools and equipment) that the human comes to understand the self Even though the captive flesh/body has been ‘ liberated ,’ and no one need pretend that even the quotation marks do not matter . . . it is as if neither time nor history, nor historiography and its topics, show movement, as [ the flesh ] is ‘ murdered’ over and over again by the passions of a bloodless and anonymous archaism, showing itself in endless disguise This onticide continues impervious to legal , historical, and political change . the ritual istic and repetitive murder of the flesh , the primordial relation, is absolutely necessary and indispensable in an antiblack world. And as long as the world exists , this murder must continue .

human’s existence equipment for human being’s existential antiblackness global purpose dealings obliterate flesh equipment existence living laboratory instruments fungibility replaceability interchangeability interchangeable utility human’s fantasies liberated the flesh murdered’ over and over onticide legal political change the ritual istic and repetitive murder of the flesh necessary world exists murder must continue

['In this schematic, the body is a metaphor for instrumentality or abject use value. Spillers suggests that this body “is reduced to a thing, to being for the captor.” With the death of African existence (the flesh) an oppres- sive mode of existence is imposed on the Negro. This existence is unlike human being. The human being’s mode of existence is to be for itself, and this being for itself is the structure of care between Dasein and Being. Black being is invented, however, precisely to secure the human’s mode of existence. Reading Spillers’s metaphysical schema through Heidegger’s, we could suggest that the black body or this “thing, being for the captor,” is invented to serve as the premier tool or equipment for human being’s existential project (and I would argue that this equipment is not equivalent in form to the human, even if the structure of tool-being, as Graham Harman would call it, provides a general explanatory frame).37 In other words, the mode of existence for black being is what Heidegger would call “availableness.” Availableness is “the way of being of those entities which are defined by their use in the whole.”38 To exist as “a thing, being for the captor” is to inhabit a mode of existence dominated by internecine use and function. Black being, then, is invented not just to serve the needs of economic interest and cupidity, but also to fulfill the ontological needs of the human. This thing is something like Heidegger’s equipment—an object that when used with such regularity becomes almost invisible, or trans- parent, to the user (blackness is often unthought because the world uses it with such regularity; antiblackness is the systemization of both the use of blackness and the forgetting/concealment of black being). Utility eclipses the thing itself. We must, then, understand antiblackness as a global, 46 Chapter One systemic dealing with black bodies, as available equipment. Heidegger considers dealings the way the Being of entities, or equipment, is revealed phenomenologically through the use of this equipment. Antiblack dealings with black bodies do not expose the essential unfolding, or essence, of the equipment; rather, the purpose of antiblack dealings is to systemically obliterate the flesh, and to impose nothing onto that obliterated space—care and value are obsolete in this encounter.39 Therefore, equipment structure is predicated on the premier use of blacks within the network of equipment. In other words, black use cuts across every equip- mental assignment, making it the ultimate equipment. Why does black equipment cut across all assignments, and why is it the tool Dasein relies on to commence its existential journey? We might say the answer to these difficult questions is that the essence of black equipment is nothing— being is not there. If Heidegger assumes that equipment will reveal its being through its usage, then he did not anticipate the invention of the Negro— equipment in human form, embodied nothingness. Using black equipment reveals existence but not being (existence as non-being for Greek philosophers, according to Heidegger in Introduction to Metaphysics). This puzzle is what black philosophy must investigate, must think through, to understand the continuity of antiblackness.', ' Spillers describes black being is a “living laboratory,” and we can conceptualize this laboratory as the source of availableness for modernity. A living laboratory is a collection of instruments for carrying out ontological experimentation, or the construction of the human self. Black beings constitute this irresistible source of availableness for the world. Saidiya Hartman meditates on the ontological utility of black being for the human when she states:', ' The relation between pleasure and the possession of slave property, in both the figurative and literal senses, can be explained in part by the fungibility of the slave—that is, the joy made possible by virtue of the replaceability and interchangeability endemic to the commodity—and by the extensive capacities of property—that is, the augmentation of the master subject through his embodiment in external objects and persons. Put differently, the fungability of the commodity makes the captive body an abstract and empty vessel vulnerable to the projection of others’ feelings, ideas, desires, and values; and, as property, the dispossessed body of the enslaved is the surrogate for the master’s body since it guarantees his disembodied universality and acts as the sign of his power and dominion.', '40 Instruments, tools, and equipment are interchangeable/replaceable; this is starkly different from human being, whose existential journey in the world renders it incalculable and unique. When I suggest that black being is pure function or utility, I mean precisely the way this being is used as a site of projection for the human’s desires, fantasies, and onto- logical narcissism. The body that Spillers presents is a necessary invention because it is through the human’s engagement with instruments (tools and equipment) that the human comes to understand the self. To be for the human is to serve as the empty vessel for the human’s reflection on the world and self. In short, what I am suggesting is that black being is invented as an instrument to serve the needs of the human’s ontological project. This use, or function, exceeds involuntary labor and economic interest. It is this particular antiblack use that philosophical discourse has neglected. The Negro, as invention, is the dirty secret of ontometaphysics.', ' If we follow Heidegger’s understanding of the human being as Dasein (being there) and thrown into the world, then black being emerges as a different entity: the Negro is precisely the permanence of not being there [Nicht Da Sein], an absence from ontology, an existence that is not just gone away (as if it has the potential to return to being there) but an exis- tence that is barred from ever arriving as an ontological entity, since it is stripped of the flesh.41 To assert that black being is not of the world is to suggest, then, that black being lives not just outside of itself, but outside of any structure of meaning that makes such existence valuable. Black being is situated in a spatiotemporality for which we lack a grammar to capture fully. Spillers’s body, then, is the symbolic and material signifi- cation of absence from Being. To be black and nothing is not to serve as an aperture of Being for the Negro; rather, it is to constitute something inassimilable and radically other, straddling nothing and infinity. The Negro is the execration of Being for the human; it is with the Negro that the terror of ontology, its emptiness, is projected and materialized. This is the Negro’s function.', ' Inventing the Negro is essential to an ontometaphysical order that wants to eradicate and obliterate such ontological terror (the terror of 48 Chapter One the nothing); and since ontometaphysics is obsessed with schematization and control, it needs the Negro to bear this unbearable burden, the execration of Being. To return to our proper metaphysical question “How is it going with black being?,” we can say that neither progressive legislation nor political movements have been able to transform black being into human being, from fleshless bodies to recognized ontologies. Spillers also seems to preempt the question when she states, “Even though the captive flesh/body has been ‘liberated,’ and no one need pretend that even the quotation marks do not matter . . . it is as if neither time nor history, nor historiography and its topics, show movement, as [the flesh] is ‘murdered’ over and over again by the passions of a bloodless and anonymous archaism, showing itself in endless disguise.”42 This onticide, the death of the flesh/African existence, continues impervious to legal, historical, and political change. This is to say that the problem of black being, as both a form of ontological terror for the human and a site of vicious strategies of obliteration, remains. To ask the (un)asked question “How is it going with black being?” is to inquire about the resolution of the problem of black and nothing, ontometaphysically, as it imposes itself onto the Negro. The answer to the Negro Question, then, is that the ritualistic and repetitive murder of the flesh, the primordial relation, is absolutely necessary and indispensable in an antiblack world. And as long as the world exists, this murder must continue.']

[(0, 6), (7, 9), (9, 10)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Harrington-McGraw-Neg-3-%20Harvard-Doubles.docx

Michigan

HaMc

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/HaMc/Michigan-Harrington-McGraw-Neg-3-%2520Harvard-Doubles.docx

acb7ecf3452b19f3c6576a31099638973894ee19c67d88d57ff5a3f361b294b0

Wrecks foreign policy.

Sloss ’13 [David; 2013; Professor of Law and Director, Center for Global Law and Policy, Santa Clara University School of Law; Maryland Journal of International Law; “Kiobel and Extraterritoriality: A Rule Without a Rationale,” vol. 28, p. 241-255]

In Empagran Breyer asserted courts should construe statutes take account of sovereign interests of other nations He cited Charming Betsy but the traditional canon does not support Justices have invoked an i r rationale to justify p ex Roberts referred to unwarranted judicial interference in foreign policy despite paying lip service the Court subverted principles the Court chose to employ a rationale antithetical to key U.S. foreign policy interests articulated by the political branches

In Empagran Breyer asserted that U.S. courts should construe statutes so as to take account of the legitimate sovereign interests of other nations He cited Charming Betsy to support this proposition, but the traditional Charming Betsy canon does not support his claim The Charming Betsy canon focuses on international law: courts should interpret statutes to avoid violations of international law. Breyer‘s analysis focuses on international relations: courts should consider the legitimate sovereign interests of other countries. Empagran is one of several recent cases in which Supreme Court Justices have invoked an i nternational r elations rationale to justify application of the p resumption against ex traterritoriality in Kiobel Roberts invoked an international relations rationale to justify the presumption against extraterritoriality also emphasized the separation-ofpowers principles that are a key feature of the international relations rationale. Roberts referred to the danger of unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of foreign policy and warned courts to be wary of impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in managing foreign affairs despite paying lip service to these important separation-of-powers principles, the Court subverted the very principles it claimed to endorse by adopting an opinion that is starkly at odds with the clearly expressed foreign policy preferences of the political branches. the Court chose to employ a rationale that is antithetical to key U.S. foreign policy interests articulated by the political branches .

Empagran traditional Charming Betsy canon i nternational r elations rationale p resumption against ex traterritoriality international relations rationale unwarranted judicial interference paying lip service separation-of-powers subverted starkly at odds antithetical foreign policy interests articulated political branches .

['In F. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Empagran S.A., 25 Justice Breyer asserted that U.S. courts should construe statutes so as to ―take account of the legitimate sovereign interests of other nations.‖26 He cited Charming Betsy to support this proposition, but the traditional Charming Betsy canon does not support his claim. The Charming Betsy canon focuses on international law: courts should interpret statutes to avoid violations of international law.27 Justice Breyer‘s analysis focuses on international relations: courts should consider the legitimate sovereign interests of other countries.28 Empagran is one of several recent cases in which Supreme Court Justices have invoked an international relations rationale to justify application of the presumption against extraterritoriality.29 Although the international relations rationale supports application of the presumption against extraterritoriality in some cases, it does not justify the Supreme Court‘s application of the presumption in Kiobel.', 'In his opinion for the Court in Kiobel, Chief Justice Roberts invoked an international relations rationale to justify the presumption against extraterritoriality.30 He also emphasized the separation-ofpowers principles that are a key feature of the international relations rationale. In particular, Chief Justice Roberts referred to ―the danger of unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of foreign policy,‖31 and warned courts to be ―wary of impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in managing foreign affairs.‖32 Unfortunately, despite paying lip service to these important separation-of-powers principles, the Court subverted the very principles it claimed to endorse by adopting an opinion that is starkly at odds with the clearly expressed foreign policy preferences of the political branches.', 'To be clear, my objection to the Court‘s opinion in Kiobel is not about the result. The Court could have justified dismissal of plaintiffs‘ claims by employing any one of several rationales that are consistent with U.S. foreign policy interests.33 Instead, the Court chose to employ a rationale that is antithetical to key U.S. foreign policy interests—as those interests have been articulated by the political branches.', '']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Phil-Skoulikaris-Aff-NDT-Round3.docx

Michigan

PhSk

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/PhSk/Michigan-Phil-Skoulikaris-Aff-NDT-Round3.docx

6f944198b2925d6cf941d13e465d76313cbe139e197c96bd5f6a2c1bae3b5ce5

Mass exits of senior staff coming.

Bruce Love 7/13/21, Bruce Love lives in Washington, DC, and writes about the Beltway legal community and the business of law, “'A Real Disquiet': FTC Staff Attorneys Are Job Hunting,” National Law Journal, https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2021/07/13/a-real-disquiet-ftc-staff-attorneys-are-job-hunting/

several leaders of law firm s are predicting many more government attorneys heading for private practice as a new-look forms under leadership of Khan senior career lawyers might not align with Khan’s vision exits will increase as Khan’s leadership continues. Eyebrows are up over recent moves which career attorneys see as heavy-handed They’re worried about their jobs it’s a tense environment FTC lawyers are not politically motivated to move Instead, they felt circumspect about how the agency can pivot to encapsulate such legal concepts in the face of a large body of antitrust law.

Seeing a pile of resumes several leaders of law firm antitrust practice s are predicting many more government attorneys heading for private practice in the coming months as a new-look Federal Trade Commission forms under the leadership of chairperson Lina Khan . I’m getting a lot more resumes across my desk from the FTC, There’s a lot more people coming out, and they’re going to get snapped up fast.” While some staff turnover in the wake of an administration change is routine, law firm leaders said the number of agency lawyers seeking out career options outside the FTC appears to be high senior career lawyers at the FTC, including people who did not vote for President Donald Trump, might not align with Khan’s vision of antitrust enforcement or they are uncomfortable with the work they may be asked to do. these senior career lawyers are currently looking to go into the private sector exits will increase as Khan’s leadership continues. I think there’s a real disquiet there now Eyebrows are up over some of the most recent moves , which to some career attorneys at the agency might see as a little heavy-handed . I won’t be surprised if more folks decide maybe now’s the time to test the [private practice] market.” The new chair is telling staff attorneys that she’s going to change antitrust enforcement and the way the agency does things to be more vigorous and vigilant for many, it feels like they’re being told that the mission they’ve pursued and the policies they’ve implemented—they’ve been doing it all wrong They’re worried about their jobs They’re worried about being replaced , and it’s creating quite a tense environment FTC lawyers they’ve spoken to are not politically motivated to move . Instead, they felt FTC lawyers may be circumspect about how the agency can pivot to encapsulate such legal concepts in the face of a large body of antitrust law. I’m seeing Big Tech firms—particularly Amazon and Facebook—pulling folks out of the DOJ and FTC that we’re not even getting a look at . “I can only assume that they’re paying well and offering interesting careers.” Demand will continue to be strong for FTC lawyers

pile of resumes leaders law firm antitrust practice s predicting many more government attorneys heading for private practice in the coming months I’m getting a lot more resumes across my desk from the FTC, they’re going to get snapped up fast.” high senior career lawyers not align uncomfortable exits will increase as Khan’s leadership continues. Eyebrows are up heavy-handed . I won’t be surprised if more folks decide maybe now’s the time to test the [private practice] market.” They’re worried about their jobs They’re worried about being replaced tense environment not politically motivated circumspect pivot encapsulate such legal concepts in the face of a large body of antitrust law. Demand will continue to be strong for FTC lawyers

['Seeing a pile of resumes already, several leaders of law firm antitrust practices are predicting many more government attorneys heading for private practice in the coming months as a new-look Federal Trade Commission forms under the leadership of chairperson Lina Khan.', '“I’m getting a lot more resumes across my desk from the FTC,” said the co-chair of one antitrust practice in an Am Law 100 firm who declined to be named so that he could discuss an agency that he frequently interacts with. “There’s a lot more people coming out, and they’re going to get snapped up fast.”', 'While some staff turnover in the wake of an administration change is routine, law firm leaders said the number of agency lawyers seeking out career options outside the FTC appears to be high now and they are anticipating more later in the year. They attribute that, at least in part, to agency lawyers who have different views compared with Khan’s ideas of what constitutes antitrust behavior and how to bring cases.', 'In particular, private practice antitrust lawyers told the National Law Journal that some senior career lawyers at the FTC, including people who did not vote for President Donald Trump, might not align with Khan’s vision of antitrust enforcement or they are uncomfortable with the work they may be asked to do.', 'The sources said they believed, based on their conversations with FTC lawyers, that these senior career lawyers are currently looking to go into the private sector. The sources said they anticipate the number of exits will increase as Khan’s leadership continues.', 'An FTA agency spokesperson declined to comment.', 'Khan shot to the top of the FTC last month only hours after being approved by the U.S. Senate as a commissioner. She has been a harsh critic of Big Tech pricing behaviors and is famous for her views that the current method for evaluating anti-competitive harm misses wide swathes of antitrust behavior in the modern economy.', '“I think there’s a real disquiet there now—even in what I would say is a pretty liberal agency,” the antitrust co-chair said. “Eyebrows are up over some of the most recent moves, which to some career attorneys at the agency might see as a little heavy-handed. I won’t be surprised if more folks decide maybe now’s the time to test the [private practice] market.”', 'Another practice head at a different Am Law 100 firm with a strong antitrust bench was more direct.', '“The new chair is telling staff attorneys that she’s going to change antitrust enforcement and the way the agency does things to be more vigorous and vigilant,” said the practice leader, who has knowledge of internal dynamics based on his connections with current FTC staff. “And for many, it feels like they’re being told that the mission they’ve pursued and the policies they’ve implemented—they’ve been doing it all wrong. They’re worried about their jobs. They’re worried about being replaced, and it’s creating quite a tense environment. An avalanche [of resumes] is inevitable, and it’s not just a byproduct of a changing administration.”', 'Antitrust activity is traditionally measured as the impact on consumers using a measure based on prices. But Khan has argued that this misses crucial elements of antitrust behavior such as a company using predatory pricing aimed at lowering consumer prices in the short term to quickly capture market share.', 'Antitrust practice heads approached for this article were quick to point out that the FTC lawyers they’ve spoken to are not politically motivated to move. Instead, they felt FTC lawyers may be circumspect about how the agency can pivot to encapsulate such legal concepts in the face of a large body of antitrust law.', 'As a result, many antitrust practice heads think there will likely be a significant number of attorneys seeking to move to the mid-level or senior associate level at law firms.', 'Recruiters are also seeing moves from the FTC ranks. And it’s possible some agency exits are also influenced by the strong law firm demand for antitrust lawyers and the rising compensation scale for Am Law 100 associates.', 'Lauren Drake, a Washington, D.C.-based legal recruiter with Macrae, said her firm was seeing “huge demand for antitrust talent coming from government.” Macrae has recently placed a number of senior people out of the FTC, she added.', 'Law firms find themselves competing for this talent with an unusual source: their clients—especially for top talent.', '“I’m seeing Big Tech firms—particularly Amazon and Facebook—pulling folks out of the DOJ and FTC that we’re not even getting a look at,” said one of the antitrust co-chairs. “I can only assume that they’re paying well and offering interesting careers.”', 'Demand will continue to be strong for FTC lawyers, the practice leader said, noting his firm was interviewing for antitrust positions now. “The work level is up and like everybody else, we expect a lot more activity out of the FTC. But the market [for talent] is hot. We expect more folks to be coming out, but we haven’t been hit with an avalanche yet.”']

[(6, 15)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-De-Leon-Park%20Aff-Harvard-Round3.docx

Northwestern

DePa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Northwestern/DePa/Northwestern-De-Leon-Park%2520Aff-Harvard-Round3.docx

40b9fbb2392b39ee094293371254ef44558f2bab2bf827203642b757466b9e94

Inducements solve.

Koch 15 – Svea Koch, Social Science Researcher at the German Development Institute. [A Typology of Political Conditionality Beyond Aid: Conceptual Horizons Based on Lessons from the European Union, World Development, Volume 75, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X15000078#b0185]

incentives change actors by raising costs or offering benefits to change calculations reward makes benefits contingent upon conditions institutions make admission depend on conditions aid or trade measures induce outcomes before benefits are granted costs of non-compliance are increased by punishment This can relate to measures in development, foreign, or trade policy It can include pressure in diplomatic realms enforcement obtain changes leverage consists of temporary withdrawal to achieve compliance suspension of relation s

external incentives change the utility calculations of actors by raising the costs of non-compliance or by offering additional benefits to change cost–benefit calculations “ reinforcement by reward ” the actor makes certain benefits contingent upon the fulfillment of conditions “ membership conditionality ” whereby institutions make admission depend ent on conditions aid or trade selectivity for beneficial aid or tra de concessions negative measures induce preferred outcomes or political reforms before benefits are granted this mechanism reflects “ reinforcement by punishment ” meaning the costs of non-compliance are increased by imposing punishment on the conditionality recipient . This punishment can relate to negative measures taken in development, foreign, or trade policy to influence outcomes in specific policy domains . It can include strong pressure in diplomatic realms the size of the benefit depends on the level of performance and reform speed of conditionality recipients the benefit is not fixed but dynamic with the actual performance is assessed continuously enforcement and pressure obtain desired political changes The leverage mechanism consists of the ( temporary ) withdrawal of benefits to achieve compliance of the conditionality recipient the government of a given country. Examples include suspension of diplomatic or economic relation ship s , or condemnation

external incentives the utility calculations of actors the costs of non-compliance offering additional benefits cost–benefit calculations reinforcement by reward certain benefits membership conditionality institutions admission conditions aid trade selectivity beneficial aid tra de concessions negative measures preferred outcomes political reforms granted reinforcement by punishment non-compliance imposing punishment the conditionality recipient negative measures specific policy domains strong pressure diplomatic realms the size of the benefit the level of performance reform speed not fixed but dynamic the actual performance assessed continuously enforcement and pressure desired political changes the ( temporary ) withdrawal of benefits suspension diplomatic or economic relation ship s condemnation

['What is clear, however, is that conditionality differs from a broader set of means of international influence generally subsumed under socialization.3 The main difference between socialization and conditionality is the use of material (positive and negative) incentives in the latter case and the reliance on “the logic of appropriateness” (March & Olsen, 1998) in the former: “The defining feature is that external actors do not link any concrete incentives to behavior but rely solely on the use of norms to either persuade, shame, or praise actors into changing their policies” (Kelley, 2004, p. 428). In the case of conditionality, external incentives are expected to be able to change the utility calculations of actors by raising the costs of non-compliance or by offering additional benefits in order to change cost–benefit calculations (Risse and Börzel, 2012, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). Changing the behavior of states, rather than their beliefs or preferences as in the case of socialization, is considered the ultimate goal of conditionality (see e.g., Kelley, 2004, Risse et al., 1999, Tallberg, 2002a).', 'In the broadest terms, conditionality thus describes an incentive instrument in the relationship between two actors, in which one actor aims at changing the behavior of the other by setting up conditions for the relationship and by manipulating its cost–benefit calculation by using (positive and negative) material incentives. In the case of political conditionality, the behavior that is sought to be changed relates to democratic development and the protection and promotion of all three generations of human rights. In order to capture this definition conceptually – and to provide a structured overview of the varied types of political conditionality and their different leverage mechanisms – I develop a simple ideal–typical typology of political conditionality along two dimensions.', 'The aim of the typology is to capture and distinguish the different mechanisms potentially at play in different external policies. Empirically, it is possible that different mechanisms are combined by the conditionality actor and that conditionality recipients are faced with varying obligations and different types of political conditionality at the same time. It is also possible that political conditionality is applied in one policy field but not in another (e.g., trade sanctions are imposed on a country but aid continues to flow or vice versa). The typology thus aims to provide researchers with an idea of the different kinds of mechanisms that exist in different external policies and that need to be considered to study the existence and interplay of various sources of influence potentially at play.', 'The first dimension of the typology relates to an ex-ante mechanism of conditionality: If conditions need to be fulfilled before entering into a relationship, a specific form of cooperation or before reaping the benefits of a beneficial agreement, it is commonly referred to as ex-ante conditionality (see e.g., Checkel, 2000, Fierro, 2003). The interest of the conditionality recipient in receiving the benefit is used by the conditionality actor as a lever for desired behavior change. Ex-post conditionality, on the other hand, refers to conditions that are set during the course of an ongoing (contractual) relationship. The leverage mechanisms in ex-post conditionality relates to the interest of the conditionality recipient in upscaling, continuing, or resuming beneficial cooperation. In ex-post political conditionality, democratic governance and respect for human rights are objectives, whereas in ex-ante conditionality they represent a precondition.4', 'The second dimension of the typology relates to the quality of the leverage mechanism, which can be both punitive and restrictive (negative) or rewarding and incentivizing (positive). Positive conditionality consists of the receipt of benefits subject to the fulfillment of conditions, whereas negative conditionality involves the reduction, suspension, or termination of benefits should the recipient no longer meet the conditions (Fierro, 2003, Smith, 1998).', 'These two dimensions of political conditionality provide the basis for an ideal–typical characterization of different types of political conditionality in different external policies (Figure 1).', 'Figure 1. Typology of political conditionality, omitted.', 'Zooming in on the four different fields reveals the differences in the intervention logic and leverage mechanisms of each type of political conditionality.', 'Ex-ante/positive conditionality is considered by some as the “authentic conditionality” (Fierro, 2003, p. 131), since conditions, by definition, have to be imposed before entering into an agreement or partnership (Selbervik, 1999). Ex-ante/positive conditionality represents a strategy of “reinforcement by reward” (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004, p. 670), a cooperative approach following “an external incentives model” (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004, p. 671) in which the conditionality actor makes certain benefits contingent upon the fulfillment of pre-determined conditions. In theory, this type of political conditionality is meant to be “hands-off” in the sense that no additional coercive influence is taken to ensure compliance with the set conditions (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004). Examples of ex-ante/positive conditionality include so-called “membership conditionality” (Kelley, 2004, p. 426), whereby institutions or organizations make admission dependent on certain political (and often economic) conditions (e.g., the EU, Mercosur, G8, the Council of Europe, or NATO). Another example of ex-ante, positive conditionality is aid or trade selectivity, where sufficient levels of democratic governance and respect for human rights are considered pre-conditions for more beneficial aid or trade concessions (Orbie and Tortell, 2009, Svensson, 1999, World Bank, 1998). An example of aid selectivity is the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)5 of the United States.', 'The mechanism of ex-ante/negative conditionality relates to negative measures that are used to induce preferred outcomes or political reforms before benefits are granted or before actors enter into a (contractual) relationship. Following Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004), this mechanism reflects “reinforcement by punishment” (p. 4), meaning that the costs of non-compliance are increased by imposing punishment on the conditionality recipient. This punishment can relate to negative measures taken in development, foreign, or trade policy to influence outcomes in specific policy domains. It can also include strong pressure in diplomatic realms or in political dialogs.', 'The logic of ex-post/positive conditionality is that an incentive mechanism is created where the size of the benefit depends on the level of performance and reform speed of conditionality recipients. The difference to ex-ante/positive conditionality is that the benefit is not fixed but dynamic and varies with the actual performance which is assessed continuously, throughout the course of a relationship or the use of a particular conditionality instrument. In other words, democratic governance is not a precondition in this type of political conditionality. Rather, it is the objective, and recipients can start from very different levels of performance. Ex-post/positive conditionality occurs mostly in relation to financial benefits, whereby the amount of financial assistance is (on a continuous basis) a function of the reform performance stipulated. Examples include the EU’s Governance Facility in its Neighborhood Policy 2007–2013.', 'Ex-post/negative conditionality refers to the use of enforcement and pressure – in the form of a reduction or suspension of benefits – to obtain desired political changes or reforms in an ongoing relationship or during the course of an agreement. The leverage mechanism consists of the (temporary) withdrawal of benefits in order to achieve compliance of the conditionality recipient, that is, in most instances, the government of a given country. Examples include the imposition of sanctions,6 the temporary suspension of development cooperation and of diplomatic or economic relationships, or condemnation in international institutions and forums (Fierro, 2003).7']

[(0, 7)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Phil-Skoulikaris-Neg-Wake-Doubles.docx

Michigan

PhSk

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/PhSk/Michigan-Phil-Skoulikaris-Neg-Wake-Doubles.docx

28362c46962332bf2cd317538b8d9c12572be37115c94ec4ac942691161a9fb2

Allied proliferation causes extinction.

Narang ’23 [Vipin; January 15; Professor of Political Science @ MIT; Scott Sagan; Professor of Political Science @ Stanford; Cornell University Press, “Conclusion” in The Fragile Balance of Terror, Ch. 9; AS]

Each new state risks accidents efforts to thwart programs create war new aspirants grow increasing spread Saudi and Turkey contemplate concerns over reliability of extended deterrence generate nuc s among Japan Korea , or Germany accidents and preemptive war intensified by growing states evidence erode confidence on rational actors dictatorships driven by pathology states facing multiple adversaries misinformation small arsenals may not be survivable or retain command factors in combination , generate risks

Each new nuclear state adds complexity of nuclear balances rivalries risks of accidents , and pressures for existing nuclear states to act efforts to thwart nuclear programs create turbulence , and a generation-defining war new nuclear aspirants remain on the horizon the risk of nuclear contagion grow s, increasing the likelihood of the spread of nuclear weapons Saudi Arabia and Turkey contemplate acquiring their own nuc s concerns over the reliability of extended deterrence partners, may generate independent nuc lear weapon s among Japan , South Korea , or Germany novel risks as information environment, leadership and technologies change nuclear accidents and preemptive war incentives intensified by the growing number of nuclear states military conflicts these challenges reduce confidence deterrence will spare the world use of nuclear weapons evidence erode confidence classical deterrence theory premised on rational actors will apply prevalence of personalist dictatorships driven by pathology and incomplete or incorrect information states facing multiple nuclear adversaries and operating in a novel information environment where misinformation can be planted each state possessing small nuclear arsenals which they fear may not be survivable or retain command and control these factors in combination , generate risks

new nuclear state complexity nuclear balances accidents existing act thwart turbulence war horizon nuclear contagion likelihood spread Saudi Arabia Turkey nuc s reliability extended deterrence nuc lear weapon s Japan South Korea Germany novel risks technologies nuclear accidents preemptive growing military conflicts confidence use of nuclear weapons classical deterrence theory rational actors personalist dictatorships pathology multiple misinformation small nuclear arsenals survivable command and control combination risks

['It is often said that every child is born into a different family. Similarly, every nuclear weapons state is born into a different nuclear world. Each new nuclear state adds to the complexity of nuclear balances, the range of real and potential rivalries, the risks of normal accidents, and the pressures for existing nuclear states to act against emerging threats. Since the end of the Cold War, the nuclear weapons club has grown by “only” three members: India, Pakistan, and North Korea. However, this obscures that other states—Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Iran—tried to acquire nuclear weapons, and efforts to thwart their nuclear programs created significant turbulence, and a generation-defining war, in the international system. And new nuclear aspirants remain on the horizon as the risk of nuclear contagion grows, increasing the likelihood of the spread of nuclear weapons. Iran’s nuclear journey seems far from over, and its mere retention of a potential nuclear weapons program appears to be incentivizing neighbors such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey to at least contemplate acquiring their own nuclear weapons options. Meanwhile, concerns over the reliability of the US’ extended deterrence commitments, after the Trump administration’s testy relations with alliance partners, may generate motivations for independent nuclear weapons programs among US allies such as Japan, South Korea, or even Germany. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the subsequent war further increased the risk of nuclear proliferation, both among NATO states threatened by Russia and among potential proliferators elsewhere, who have witnessed three states give up nuclear weapons programs or weapons—Iraq, Libya, and at least nominally Ukraine—only to later suffer a devastating attack.', 'What are the risks in this emerging nuclear era? Some are novel risks as the system structure, information environment, leadership characteristics, and technologies change; some are enduring risks—such as nuclear accidents and preemptive war incentives—intensified by the growing number of nuclear states, ongoing military conflicts with rivals, and asymmetries between them. Put together, these challenges significantly reduce confidence that deterrence and luck will continue to spare the world its first deliberate or accidental use of nuclear weapons since August 1945. This volume has assembled a distinguished set of scholars to analyze the dynamics of this emerging nuclear era. The conclusions are worrying.', 'Declining Confidence in Deterrence', 'The arguments and evidence presented by different authors in this volume, especially when assessed together, substantially erode our confidence that classical deterrence theory—premised on rational actors behaving on the basis of cost-benefit calculations—will apply and lead to stability in the emerging nuclear era. Consider the following factors: the growing prevalence of personalist dictatorships driven by pathology and incomplete or incorrect information; many states facing multiple nuclear adversaries and operating in a novel information environment where misinformation can be maliciously planted or otherwise spread rampantly; and each state possessing small nuclear arsenals which they fear may not be reliable or survivable or over which they may not retain firm command and control. Each of these factors alone, and especially in combination, generate risks that our standard strategies of nuclear deterrence are simply unequipped to manage or address.', '', '']

[(0, 9), (9, 10)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-VaWa-Neg-Long-Beach-Round-8.docx

Dartmouth

VaWa

2ac4f7ee09f2ecd82d1b182327a8a64f5e23a71274528719e0625f399b5bc073

Asteroid impact outweighs nuclear winter on magnitude---even launching every nuke wouldn’t cause total extinction

Toon et al. 97 , NASA Ames Research Center. Department of Atmospheric Sciences and Institute of Geophysics and Planetary Physics University of California, Los Angele Environmental Programs Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Livermore, California (Owen B., Richard P. Turco, David Morrison, Kevin Zahnle, and Curt Covey, February 1997, “ENVIRONMENTAL PERTURBATIONS CAUSED BY THE IMPACTS OF ASTEROIDS AND COMETS,” Review of Geophysics, Date Accessed: 7/18/2023)

impact winter versus nuclear winter evidence overwhelmingly favors an asteroid impact there is probably not just one extinction mechanism many devastating environmental changes would occur following impact plankton died owing to loss of light land dwellers died from global wildfires or the cold As some became extinct others vanished in a complex chain fatalities due to a war employing the world's nuclear arsenal to be in the hundred million people Some suggested fatalities high as one billion but these assume every population center is targeted following the K-T event light levels may have been so low that photosynthesis ceased and vision may have been impossible neither is expected to occur after a nuclear war the K-T impact appears to lie above a threshold that nuclear wars cannot surpass

Since environmental changes that may occur after an impact have been compared with those that may occur after a nuclear war it is useful to contrast these situations impact winter versus nuclear winter we find that the evidence overwhelmingly favors an asteroid impact there is probably not just one extinction mechanism many devastating environmental changes would occur following a large impact plankton in the ocean may have died owing to loss of light and sulfuric acid rain many land dwellers may have died from global wildfires or the cold and dark As some creatures became extinct others that depended upon them would have vanished in a complex chain the direct fatalities due to blast and local fallout in a war employing the world's nuclear arsenal to be in the hundred million people Some studies suggested fatalities as high as one billion but these studies assume every population center is targeted If the world is forced to return to primitive agricultural techniques population levels are expected to fall to 1-10% the population losses would vary following the K-T event light levels may have been so low that photosynthesis ceased and vision may have been impossible these two alone might have been capable of causing global extinctions neither is expected to occur after a nuclear war the K-T impact appears to lie above a threshold that nuclear wars cannot surpass

neither is expected to occur after a nuclear war the K-T impact appears to lie above a threshold that nuclear wars cannot surpass

['', "2. MEANS OF DESTRUCTION: IMPACTS AND NUCLEAR WARS During the past decade there has been a creative burst in finding ways that impacts and explosions might damage the global environment. Since the environmental changes that may occur after an impact have been compared with those that may occur after a nuclear war, it is useful to contrast these two situations: impact winter versus nuclear winter [Crutzen and Birks, 1982; Turco et al., 1983]. Table 1 outlines mechanisms that might have led to the extinctions at the K-T boundary. There has been debate about whether this sudden extinction was due to a massive volcanic eruption or an asteroid impact. Indeed, quite a few researchers continue to believe that neither of these factors was involved, and that extinctions occurred gradually as a consequence of natural factors such as changing sea levels. Although we find that the evidence overwhelmingly favors an asteroid impact at the K-T boundary, there is probably not just one extinction mechanism. We shall show in this paper that many devastating environmental changes would occur following a large impact. The actual extinction event must have been very complex, with the causative mechanism varying from species to species and from place to place, as well as depending upon long-lasting interactions within the biota. For example, plankton in the ocean may have died owing to loss of light and sulfuric acid rain, while many land dwellers may have died from the global wildfires or the ensuing cold and dark. As some creatures became extinct, others that depended upon them would also have vanished in a complex chain. Table 2 outlines factors that have been suggested to lead to destruction following a major nuclear war. The ecological ramifications of the physical environmental changes that might occur after a nuclear war have been studied extensively [Harwell and Hutchinson, 1989]. Nuclear conflicts have unique killing mechanisms, such as radioactivity, that we shall not discuss further, since they do not occur when comets or asteroids hit the Earth. Although there are parallels between the suggested K-T impact extinction mechanisms and those following a nuclear war, there are also important differences. Most studies estimate the direct fatalities due to blast and local fallout in a war employing the bulk of the world's nuclear arsenal to be in the range of a few hundred million people, which is a large fraction of the population of the targeted countries. Some studies have suggested fatalities due to these direct effects as high as one billion people, but these studies assume that every significant population center in the world is targeted irrespective of whether or not it lies within a combatant count• [Ha.rwe!! and Hutchinson• !989]• During the past decade a variety of investigations have shown that the indirect effects of a nuclear conflict are likely to produce higher casualties than the direct effects. The impacts of ozone reductions, pyrotoxins, and radioactive fallout have been difficult to quantify, and though these factors may be significant locally, they have generally been considered as secondary in relation to climate changes caused by smoke and to disruptions in the fabric of society. Plant communities are very sensitive to temperature and also to light level. Sudden temperature declines, even of short duration, occurring in spring or summer could have a major impact on the standing crops at midlatitudes, while such temperature changes occurring in fall or winter would be much less important. Temperature declines in the tropics would be significant at any time of year. Human sensitivity to short-term climate changes and to disruptions in the infrastructure of society originate from fundamental weaknesses of civilization itself. Most countries have only enough food on hand to feed their populations for a short period of time. Obviously, the least amount of food in storage occurs just before the next harvest period. If it is assumed (1) that food is well distributed within a given country but food imports cease owing to disruption of society, (2) that humans shift from eating animals to directly consuming the more abundant grain supplies, (3) that they.maintain a minimum caloric input, and (4) that the local harvest is lost because of climate changes during the period of median food storage, then only about half the population of the affected region is estimated to survive until the next year's harvest [Harwell and Hutchinson, 1989]. Fatalities are much higher if the harvest is lost at the time of minimum food storage. During the next agricultural growth period, climate conditions may be only slightly worse than normal, but a massive disruption of fuel supplies, spare parts, transportation systems, fertilizer, and so forth remains probable because these items are concentrated in areas that are likely to have been directly attacked during the war. If the world, or part of it, is forced to return to primitive agricultural techniques to grow its food, then population levels are expected to fall to 1-10% ofthose currently e•'sting. Naturally, the population losses would vary widely from one country to the next, and these estimates depend upon a variety of assumptions about how people might behave in such circumstances. Nevertheless, they demonstrate the great dependence of our society on high-technology agriculture, and upon food transport, to overcome regional crop failures. In making a comparison between nuclear wars, the impact at the K-T boundary, and the impact of an object smaller than the one that made the K-T boundary, it should be clear that there are important distinctions to be drawn. For example, following the K-T event, light levels may have been so low that photosynthesis ceased over much of the Earth and vision may have been impossible. Although other mechanisms (Table 1) may also have acted, these two alone might have been capable of causing global-scale extinctions; neither mechanism, on the other hand, is expected to occur after a nuclear war. From that perspective the K-T impact appears to lie above a threshold that smaller impacts and nuclear wars cannot surpass.", '', '']

[(0, 11), (12, 14)]

ndtceda

Kansas-WiYa-Neg-1---Missouri-State-Round-1.docx

Kansas

WiYa

c16c22860676466225857afdaa29d2c81aa69b3f8df28f16291f2bdd01e673a4

China won’t shed their NFU.

Tellis 22, Senior Fellow & Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Ashley J. Tellis, 2022, “Striking Asymmetries: Nuclear Transitions in Southern Asia,” Carnegie Press, Chapter 1: China)

observers of China’s forces are skeptical Beijing would shift to l o w posture CCP always insisted on tight control over capabilities Given risks of escalation and civilian distrust of military , CCP unlikely to delegate launch authority to CMC or even to sole authority of CCP Because of risks it is likely Beijing will eschew this even if it appears to prepar for it China’s oriented toward deterrence than fighting it makes sense to eventually adopt willingness to launch to deter adversaries strikes although they would not execute such operations in any case even extremis In addition to soft political constraints China would face hard technical barriers to developing a nuclear warfighting capability China’s record of nuclear testing does not give it a basis for smaller, modern designs China might face production constraints from limited tritium and fissile material it would take time and resources to design new warheads China lacks the supporting infrastructure needed nuclear warfighting would require delegating authority to military commanders, China has prioritized strict control over its nucl s Beijing last produced weapons-grade plutonium in 1991 China faces a limited uranium stockpile it appears unlikely that it could undertake a nuclear breakout or accomplish one in the long term Analysts may assum China’s modernization is more expansive than it is

close observers of China’s nuclear forces are skeptical that Beijing would ever shift to ward a l aunch- o n- w arning posture CCP has always insisted on tight political control over strategic military capabilities Given the heightened risks of escalation or accidental nuclear conflict and some degree of civilian distrust of the military , CCP leaders are unlikely to pre- delegate launch authority to the CMC or even to the sole authority of the CCP G eneral S ecretary Because of the risks involved in any l aunch- o n- w arning or launch-under-attack strategy it is likely that Beijing will eschew this option even if it appears to be prepar ing for it China’s nuclear transformation is still oriented fundamentally toward shoring up deterrence rather than war fighting . Consequently, it makes sense for Chinese decisionmakers to eventually adopt a posture that conveys a willingness to launch their nuclear weapons to deter their adversaries from contemplating any first strikes to begin with, although they would probably not execute such operations in any case even in extremis . In addition to soft political constraints on a Chinese nuclear breakout China would face hard technical barriers to developing a nuclear warfighting capability the country’s current warhead designs, designed for the more limited strategy of assured retaliation, are too heavy and too powerful China’s record of nuclear weapons testing does not give it a basis for developing reliable, smaller, modern designs . Most of China’s tests involved heavy, high-yield devices China might face production constraints stemming from limited tritium and fissile material stockpiles China might choose to resume nuclear testing to develop newer warhead designs, but it would take time and resources to design and certify new warheads , and the international community would detect any new testing. China generally lacks the supporting infrastructure needed to employ a nuclear warfighting capability Such a capability would require developing new technical capabilities, organizational arrangements , and operational practices , which China has generally avoided , a nuclear warfighting capability would likely require more flexible command and control arrangements , including delegating more authority to military commanders, as Pakistan has done China has prioritized strict political control over its nucl ear weapon s , keeping its nuclear forces somewhat insulated from its conventional ones. China would face similar constraints in attempting a strategic sprint to parity The most significant challenge is its limited fissile material stockpile analysts believe Beijing last produced weapons-grade plutonium in 1991 Given these high fuel requirements and its limited stockpile , in a best-case scenario China could produce no more than 250 to 450 plutonium-based warheads. China could resort to using uranium-based designs, though it faces a limited uranium stockpile as well China would likely have to resort again to testing new designs. China’s historically conservative approach to its nuclear weapons program, it appears unlikely that it could undertake a military significant nuclear breakout in the near term or accomplish one in the long term without being detected. Analysts who have warned of an impending nuclear breakout may be assum ing that China’s ongoing modernization program is more expansive than it is conflating a push for greater survivability with a desire for “ usability ,” Policy decisions should rest on realistic threat assessments of China’s nuclear program Washington should recognize constraints on Beijing’s nuclear policy

observers forces skeptical would ever shift l o w CCP always tight control military capabilities risks escalation conflict degree distrust military unlikely launch or even sole authority CCP G S risks l o w strategy likely eschew this appears prepar ing transformation oriented deterrence war fighting makes sense eventually posture willingness weapons deter adversaries first strikes not execute in any case extremis soft political constraints hard technical barriers nuclear warfighting capability too heavy too powerful nuclear weapons testing not give it reliable, smaller, modern designs . heavy, high-yield devices production constraints limited tritium fissile material stockpiles resume nuclear testing time resources design certify detect any new testing. supporting infrastructure technical capabilities, organizational arrangements operational practices avoided flexible command control arrangements delegating more authority Pakistan strict political control insulated similar constraints strategic sprint to parity limited fissile material stockpile 1991 high fuel requirements limited stockpile best-case scenario 250 450 limited uranium stockpile again testing new designs. unlikely military significant nuclear breakout accomplish one long term assum ing more expansive than it is greater survivability usability realistic threat assessments recognize constraints nuclear policy

['Some close observers of China’s nuclear forces, however, are skeptical that Beijing would ever shift toward a launch-on-warning or a launch-under-attack posture. As Philip Saunders has noted:', 'The CCP has always insisted on tight political control over strategic military capabilities and on making military decisions with important political consequences itself. Given the heightened risks of escalation or accidental nuclear conflict and some degree of civilian distrust of the military, CCP leaders are unlikely to pre-delegate launch authority to the CMC or even to the sole authority of the CCP General Secretary.267', 'There is much that is persuasive in this critique given China’s still significant conservatism when it comes to managing nuclear weapons. Because of the risks involved in any launch-on-warning or launch-under-attack strategy—dangers that would only increase in an environment where adversary or third-party computer network operations could put even otherwise reliable warning systems at risk—it is likely that Beijing will eschew this option even if it appears to be preparing for it. When all is said and done, China’s nuclear transformation is still oriented fundamentally toward shoring up deterrence rather than warfighting. Consequently, it makes sense for Chinese decisionmakers to eventually adopt a posture that conveys a willingness to launch their nuclear weapons as soon as they receive information about a possible attack to deter their adversaries from contemplating any first strikes to begin with, although they would probably not execute such operations in any case even in extremis.', '', 'Logan 17, PhD student in Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and a Graduate Fellow and Deputy Director of the Strategic Education Initiative at Princeton’s Center for International Security Studies. (David C., 11-8-2017, “Hard Constraints on China’s Nuclear Forces”, War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/china-nuclear-weapons-breakout/)', '', 'Hard Constraints', 'In addition to these “softer” political constraints on a Chinese nuclear breakout, China would face several “harder” technical barriers to both developing a nuclear warfighting capability and undertaking a sprint to parity.', 'A nuclear warfighting capability would require China to deploy a more diversified nuclear force, with smaller-yield warheads affixed to more accurate missiles. However, the country’s current warhead designs, designed for the more limited strategy of assured retaliation, are too heavy and too powerful. During the Cold War, the average yield of U.S. tactical weapons was reported to be 4 kilotons, and NATO war planners set an upper limit of 10 kilotons for bombs that could be used on their own territory. More recently, the nuclear warhead for the U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile had a variable yield of 5 to 150 kilotons and weighed 130 kilograms. By comparison, China’s smallest nuclear warhead is estimated to have a yield of 200 to 300 kilotons and to weigh 500 kilograms.', 'China’s record of nuclear weapons testing does not give it an ideal basis for developing reliable, smaller, modern designs. Most of China’s tests involved heavy, high-yield devices. Beijing did successfully test an enhanced radiation device in the late 1980s that could serve as the technical foundation for tactical nuclear weapons, though it’s not clear this design would be suitable for developing a robust warfighting arsenal. Even if China were to rely on this design, it might face production constraints stemming from limited tritium and fissile material stockpiles. China might choose to resume nuclear testing to develop newer warhead designs, but it would take time and resources to design and certify new warheads, and the international community would detect any new testing.', 'Finally, China generally lacks the supporting infrastructure needed to employ a nuclear warfighting capability. Such a capability would require developing new technical capabilities, organizational arrangements, and operational practices, which China has generally avoided. For instance, a nuclear warfighting capability would likely require more flexible command and control arrangements, including delegating more authority to military commanders, as Pakistan has done to support its “asymmetric escalation” strategy. By contrast, China has prioritized strict political control over its nuclear weapons, keeping its nuclear forces somewhat insulated from its conventional ones.', 'China would face similar constraints in attempting a strategic sprint to parity. The most significant challenge is its limited fissile material stockpile. China’s modern warhead designs use plutonium fuel, but analysts believe Beijing last produced weapons-grade plutonium in 1991 and that it currently maintains a stockpile of only 1.8 metric tons. In addition, China has relied on conservative warhead designs that use more fuel than other countries’ warheads. Given these high fuel requirements and its limited stockpile, in a best-case scenario China could produce no more than 250 to 450 plutonium-based warheads.', 'China could resort to using uranium-based designs, though it faces a limited uranium stockpile as well. More significantly, the uranium designs it has tested in the past were relatively unsophisticated and ill-suited for a modern arsenal. To develop modern and reliable uranium-based warheads, China would likely have to resort again to testing new designs.', 'Certainly, China possesses the underlying economic, industrial, and technological bases on which to either develop a nuclear warfighting capability or attempt a sprint to parity. However, attempting either form of nuclear breakout would entail significant changes to China’s nuclear program, possibly including developing new warheads, resuming weapons testing, renewing weapons-grade fissile material production, and significantly changing operational practices. Given China’s historically conservative approach to its nuclear weapons program, it appears unlikely that it could undertake a military significant nuclear breakout in the near term or accomplish one in the long term without being detected.', 'Analysts who have warned of an impending nuclear breakout may be assuming that China’s ongoing modernization program is more expansive than it is, conflating a push for greater survivability with a desire for “usability,” or viewing the modest quantitative growth in China’s arsenal as a prelude to something much more expansive. Certainly, China has made tremendous progress in developing and deploying advanced ballistic missile systems, which would be a crucial component of any nuclear warfighting capability. Indeed, some observers worry that the hardware and operational practices associated with the conventional force could bleed over and end up benefitting the nuclear force. But a broader review of the other technical requirements of either developing a nuclear warfighting capability or pursuing strategic parity suggests China would nonetheless face harder obstacles.', 'Policy Implications', 'The constraints on China’s nuclear forces have important implications for U.S. policy. Policy decisions should rest on realistic threat assessments of China’s nuclear program and avoid provoking self-fulfilling prophecies. Washington should recognize the constraints on Beijing’s nuclear policy and work to reinforce those constraints and maintain strategic stability.', '']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Kansas-MaPa-Neg-5---Long-Beach-Round-5.docx

Kansas

MaPa

a9a0ca508ede8b6853d7a3dd60a3075630b7f9ab87548c5ec15fb0e57dbf2949

Russia cannot overmatch in AI.

Dr. Huon Curtis 22, PhD, Analyst & Project Manager, International Cyber Policy Centre, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, "What’s Happened to Russia’s Much-Vaunted Battlefield AI?" Strategist, 12/27/2022, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/editors-picks-for-2022-whats-happened-to-russias-much-vaunted-battlefield-ai/.

Russia’s military a i tech seem to be unsuccessful limitations and vulnerabilities exposed weaknesses in Russia’s development be wary of Russian claims tend to be overblown and deliberately fabricate info main barrier is microchips Russia lacks ability to produce microchips enterprises have shortages in human capital and exodus of tech talent has been accelerated sanctions hit hard underinvestment has hampered ability

Russia’s much-vaunted military reforms of the past decade—particularly the integration of a i tech nologies that were supposed to enhance Russia’s capability— seem to have be en unsuccessful a demonstration of the limitations and vulnerabilities of AI-enabled systems It has exposed strategic weaknesses in Russia’s development of AI for military and economic purposes It’s wise to be wary of Russian claims of full autonomy because the capacities of AI-enabled systems tend to be overblown and deliberately fabricate d info rmation is a component of Russia’s approach to new-generation warfare the interconnected nature of global trade means there are key technology choke points that affect Russia’s AI development The main barrier to Moscow’s vision of AI supremacy is microchips Russia lacks the ability to produce microchips production is outsourced to Taiwan which has suspended its production and export to Russia Russian defence enterprises have shortages in human capital particularly in process engineering, and the exodus of tech talent from Russia has been accelerated by the war A range of Western sanctions in key technologies and commodities will hit the economy hard even if it tries to substitute imports from China analysts claimed that Russian underinvestment in technology modernisation has hampered the army’s ability

much-vaunted a i tech nologies enhance unsuccessful limitations vulnerabilities exposed development of AI wary Russian claims overblown deliberately fabricate d info rmation interconnected nature key main barrier microchips produce outsourced Taiwan suspended shortages human capital exodus of tech talent accelerated Western sanctions hard substitute China underinvestment hampered

['The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the poorer than expected performance of the Russian army have prompted fierce debate among military commentators on why Russia’s much-vaunted military reforms of the past decade—particularly the integration of artificial intelligence technologies that were supposed to enhance Russia’s joint operations capability—seem to have been unsuccessful.', 'So far, Russia’s deployment in Ukraine has been a demonstration of some of the limitations and vulnerabilities of AI-enabled systems. It has also exposed some longer-term strategic weaknesses in Russia’s development of AI for military and economic purposes.', 'Russia’s use of AI-enabled technologies in the invasion reportedly includes disinformation operations, deep fakes and open-source intelligence gathering. But information operations are not the sum total of Russia’s AI capabilities. AI is embedded across the military spectrum, from information management, training, logistics, maintenance and manufacturing, to early warning and air-defence systems.', 'Since at least 2014, Russia has deployed multiple aerial, ground and maritime uncrewed systems and robotic platforms, electronic warfare systems, and new and experimental weapons in both Syria and Ukraine.', 'The AI elements in these systems include image recognition and image stitching in Orion combat drones, radio signal recognition in Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft systems, AI-enabled situational understanding and jamming capability in the Bylina electronic warfare system, and navigation support in the Kamaz truck. So-called kamikaze drones (developed by the Kalashnikov Group, the maker of the famous assault weapon) appear to use a mix of manual and automated target acquisition.', 'One of the earliest images that circulated online in the current conflict was of a Russian Pantsir-S1 stuck in the mud in a field in southern Ukraine. The Pantsir is a component of the early warning and air-defence system that features both short-range surface-to-air missiles and 30-millimetre automatic cannon.', 'If we look under the hood at the purported AI technologies of the Pantsir, Russian state media Izvestia reported two years ago that it', 'is capable of detecting, classifying and firing at air targets without the participation of an operator. The developed algorithms instantly determine the importance of objects and arrange the order of their destruction depending on the danger they represent …', 'Its software takes into account the tactical situation, the location of targets, their degree of danger, and other parameters and selects the optimal tactics for repelling a raid.', 'It’s wise to be wary of Russian claims of full autonomy, both because the capacities of AI-enabled systems tend to be overblown and because deliberately fabricated information is a component of Russia’s approach to new-generation warfare.', 'There are reasons to be concerned about the individual systems and their AI components, but it’s important to consider Russia’s grander AI vision.', 'The Pantsir-S1 is just one node of an interconnected system that includes airborne radar systems, satellites and reconnaissance drones, and panoptic information-management systems.', 'Just as the West has been pursuing a vision of an interconnected battlefield in the form of a ‘joint all-domain command and control centre’ (JADC2) concept, Russia has its ‘national defence management centre’ (NDMC), which aims for the same. The goal is to build systems in which ‘data can move seamlessly between air, land, maritime, space, and cyber forces in real time’.', 'According to researchers at CNA, a US think tank, ‘NDMC was designed to receive information from the lowest military unit levels, and, following analysis and evaluation, feed the data directly to those at the strategic level.’ This defines the battlefield in multiple dimensions and makes shared situational understanding contingent on information from the edge of the battlespace.', 'There has been some speculation that poor-quality tyres or failure to account for local conditions indicate vulnerabilities in Russian forward planning. While these physical aspects are important, in a battlespace that’s dependent on information it’s also important to consider the extent of interoperability of systems, any bandwidth constraints, and the tendency in computer-assisted decision-making to equate a map with territory. Expanding a military’s capacity to use so-called real-time information requires analyst teams to interpret and leadership to prioritise the information.', 'The critical human element was hindered because Russia’s planning seems to have been tightly held within President Vladimir Putin’s inner circle (which does not include the army) until just before the invasion.', 'Putin said in 2017, ‘Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere [artificial intelligence] will become the ruler of the world.’ Since then, he has pushed the use of defence sector spending and defence acquisition to generate national economic growth and drive national technological innovation.', 'With few reasons to adhere to international norms on ethical AI development, including regulation of data harvesting, as well as a ready supply of programming talent, Russia could be perhaps seen as having some advantages in AI developments, and the ability to quickly deploy innovations into its asymmetric warfare programs.', 'However, the two directions in which the Kremlin is steering the Russian defence sector—increasing civilian and dual-use goods and import substitution—carry some distinct vulnerabilities for Russia. Despite pushes by Putin in recent years towards economic self-sufficiency, the interconnected nature of global trade means that there are key technology choke points that affect Russia’s AI development.', 'The main barrier to Moscow’s vision of AI supremacy is microchips. Russian media has claimed that NDMC’s information management runs on ‘Russian-made’ Elbrus microprocessors. However, Russia lacks the ability to produce these microchips. The production of Elbrus chips is outsourced to Taiwan, to the company TSMC, which has now suspended its production and export to Russia.', 'At a broader level, at least 1,300 Russian defence enterprises have shortages in human capital, particularly in process engineering, and the exodus of tech talent from Russia has been accelerated by the war. A range of Western sanctions in key technologies and commodities will hit the Russian economy hard, even if it tries to substitute with imports from China.', 'Some analysts have claimed that Russian underinvestment in technology modernisation has hampered the army’s ability to ‘see’ the battlefield, forcing it to rely on the brute force of tanks and artillery. For those Ukrainians now under siege in cities around the country, the apparent modernisation of Russia’s war apparatus will be perhaps a moot point as artillery rains down. But AI is a critical technology that will be increasingly important for both economic development and national defence. It’s important to understand both the way it is embedded in technologies and the international supply-chain interdependencies that are crucial for its development.', '']

[(9, 18)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-DiGa-Neg-Indiana-Round-5.docx

Kentucky

DiGa

139c7bacb29a0df28587a193d1201b235fbc7095f6e1f6a645dfec2ab6102e64

3. An NFU policy requires operational changes.

Nina Tannenwald 19. Director of the International Relations Program at Brown University’s Watson Institute for International Studies and a senior lecturer in political science, 7-2-2019. "Policy Roundtable: Nuclear First-Use and Presidential Authority," https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-nuclear-first-use-and-presidential-authority.

NFU pledge must be built into structure of operational capabilities NFU policy require forces be consistent posture

an NFU pledge must be built into the structure of operational military capabilities NFU policy would require that nuclear forces be consistent with an “assured retaliation” posture that eschews counterforce objectives This perspective emphasizes the value of an NFU pledge in structuring operational forces to make them smaller and less threatening

NFU policy require structuring operational forces

['A second theoretical perspective, “liberal institutionalism,” emphasizes the role of rules and institutions, both domestic and international, in stabilizing expectations and behavior. According to this theory, even if no-first-use pledges are unenforceable, they are not necessarily meaningless. To be meaningful, an NFU pledge must be built into domestic institutions, that is, the structure of operational military capabilities.19 A genuine NFU policy would require that nuclear forces be consistent with an “assured retaliation” posture that eschews counterforce objectives — the ability to destroy an adversary’s nuclear arsenal before it is launched.', 'This perspective thus emphasizes the value of an NFU pledge in structuring operational forces to make them smaller and less threatening. When Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, soon after entering office in 1961, sent a directive to the Joint Chiefs of Staff about strategic force requirements, he stated that the first assumption shaping requirements was that “we will not strike first with such weapons.”20 McNamara’s directive was undoubtedly partly an effort to stem Air Force demands for a first-strike capability and the vast procurement of weaponry it would require. This directive, in effect, repudiated the extended deterrent doctrine that the United States would respond to a Soviet conventional attack in Europe with nuclear weapons.', '']

[(5, 18)]

ndtceda

Emory-RuSh-Aff-4---Texas-Round-6.docx

Emory

RuSh

8afbae41a090b1eeeee734b2ae7b29353a8c11d3fb85709ad270e75ffb445c41

So does nature

Guim and Livermore 21, assistant professor of law at the Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico (ITAM), **professor of law at the University of Virginia (Mauricio and Michael, “WHERE NATURE'S RIGHTS GO WRONG,” 107 Va. L. Rev. 1347, Lexis)

In the U S Pittsburgh and Santa Monica have recognized rights for nature states have approved laws recognizing rights

Local jurisdictions have started to pass laws and regulations granting rights for nature In the U nited S tates, Pittsburgh and Santa Monica have recognized rights for nature to exist and flourish states California Minnesota Maryland New Mexico New York Ohio Pennsylvania Virginia New Jersey and New Hampshire have approved laws recognizing inherent rights of nature

['Local jurisdictions inside countries have also started to pass laws and regulations granting rights for nature. In Mexico, the constitutions of the State of Guerrero and Mexico City recognize rights of nature, defining it as "formed by all its ecosystems and species, as a collective entity with collective rights." 40 In Argentina, the City of Santa Fe also elevated nature to the category of a rights holder. 41 In Brazil, the municipalities of [*1359] Florianapolis, 42 Paudalho, 43 and Bonito 44 also recognized nature\'s rights. In the United States, Pittsburgh and Santa Monica have recognized rights for nature to exist and flourish, along with people\'s rights to a healthy environment and a sustainable climate. 45 Other cities in the states of California, 46 Minnesota, 47 Maryland, 48 New Mexico, 49 New York, 50 [*1360] Ohio, 51 Pennsylvania, 52 Virginia, 53 New Jersey, 54 and New Hampshire 55 have also approved or are in the process of approving laws recognizing inherent rights of nature.', '']

[(9, 21)]

ndtceda

Kansas-HaSo-Aff-CEDA-Round-3.docx

Kansas

HaSo

627e087d40c5d4c928e847bb89ad0687396365d28a92bf5e9bf37dc20221aba8

3. COUNTER-FORCE. Subs are key.

Keir A. Lieber and Press 17, Associate Professor in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and the Department of Government at Georgetown University, Daryl G. Press is Associate Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, “The New Era of Counterforce,” https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/isec_a_00273_LieberPress.pdf

improved accuracy transformed the role of submarines, turning these instruments into potent counterforce weapons ICBMs take a polar route As a result, critical sites could be shielded by locating them on steep mountains. SLBMs strike from a wide range of locations, thwarting efforts to shield them SLBM launches are more dif f icult to detect reducing adversary response time before impact.

improved accuracy transformed the role of ballistic missile submarines, turning these instruments into potent counterforce weapons Increased SLBM accuracy has added hundreds of SLBM warheads to the counterforce arsenal ICBMs take a polar route As a result, critical sites could be shielded from ICBMs by locating them on the south side of steep mountains. SLBMs can strike targets from a wide range of launch locations, thwarting efforts to shield them . SLBM launches are more dif f icult to detect than ICBM attacks, further reducing adversary response time before impact.

potent counterforce weapons critical sites steep mountains. wide range SLBM launches are more dif f icult to detect

['First, improved accuracy has transformed the role of ballistic missile submarines, turning these instruments of retaliation against population centers into potent counterforce weapons. Recall (from figure 1 above) that a 1985 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) had only a 9 percent chance of destroying a hardened target. This meant that although ballistic missile submarines could destroy “soft” targets (e.g., cities), they could not destroy the hardened sites that would be a key focus of a disarming attack. Increased SLBM accuracy has added hundreds of SLBM warheads to the counterforce arsenal; it has also unlocked other advantages that submarines possess over land-based missiles. For example, submarines have ºexibility in ªring location, allowing them to strike targets that are out of range of ICBMs or that are deployed in locations that ICBMs cannot hit.38 [BEGIN FOOTNOTE 38] 38. U.S. ICBMs launched at Russia or China—or vice versa—would take a polar route to their targets. As a result, critical sites could be shielded from ICBMs by locating them on the south side of steep mountains. SLBMs can strike targets from a wide range of launch locations, thwarting efforts to shield them. [End FOOTNOTE 38] Submarines also permit strikes from close range, reducing an adversary’s response time. And because submarines can ªre from unpredictable locations, SLBM launches are more difficult to detect than ICBM attacks, further reducing adversary response time before impact.']

[(8, 27)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-DiGr-Neg-Long-Beach-Round-3.docx

Kentucky

DiGr

384809563b8d8a7fb6279e71e9a44e7f8b469ce55c6175daf685a0ab1e7b72a8

Strategic trickery is vital to effective solutions to anti-blackness

Sullivan 17 (Shannon Sullivan, Chair of Philosophy and Professor of Philosophy and Health Psychology at the University of North Carolina, Charlotte, 2017, “Setting Aside Hope: A Pragmatist Approach to Racial Justice,” in Pragmatism and Justice, p. 231-245)

successfully fighting white racism involves appeal to predictable self-interest of whites " it relies on the self-delusion to be like Brer Rabbit who tricks Brer Fox into setting him free Brer Fox acts in what he thinks is his own best interest and in so doing, he does the very thing that enables Brer Rabbit to escape A masterful tactician at manipulating ignorance Brer Rabbit is ruthlessly realistic and for that reason he is able to devise an effective strategy for getting out racial realism is neither passive nor apathetic. It is not hopeful racial realism doesn't involve believing the right thing will win out

In many ways then, successfully fighting white racism is a very crude, nonsophisticated business . It isn't about devising fancy moral arguments it involves " making a shameless appeal to the predictable self-interest of whites " it relies on the self-delusion of while people Bell argues that black people both individuals and communities—need to be like Brer Rabbit who tricks Brer Fox into setting him free by convincing Brer Fox that throwing Brer Rabbit into the briar patch is the worst thing that Brer Fox could ever do Brer Fox acts in what he thinks is his own best interest an interest in harming Brer Rabbit by keeping him captive and in so doing, he does the very thing that enables Brer Rabbit to escape A masterful tactician at manipulating the ignorance Brer Rabbit doesn't rely on the law He instead is ruthlessly realistic about the malicious self-interest that motivates Brer Fox, and for that reason he is able to devise an effective strategy for getting out of his clutches Because struggle is central to racial realism, racial realism is neither passive nor apathetic. It is not nihilist But neither is it hopeful . Even though they might bear a superficial similarity, the struggle involved in racial realism isn't the same struggle encouraged by politics of hope. The struggle of political hope is for the fantastical object of a future without antiblack racism . It insists legitimate action takes place in the political" and a refusal to 'do polities' is equivalent to 'doing nothing' The struggle of racial realism , in contrast, doesn't involve believing that the right thing will win out . Bell's racial realism invokes a different kind of existentialism appealing to Camus As Camus's The Plague understands, one resists and must resist the plague—whether in the form of mass death, the Nazi Holocaust, or in this case white class privilege white supremacy even though, or perhaps precisely because , one cannot conquer it There is no ultimate progress or victory to anticipate Fighting it is absurd if the goal of the fight is to eliminate it one fights the plague for different reasons that have to do with affirming the dignity and value of humanity black people's "struggle for freedom, is a manifestation of our humanity that survives and grows stronger through resistance to oppression even if that oppression is never overcome this is a kind of humanism absurd rather than progressive

successfully fighting very crude, nonsophisticated business making a shameless appeal to the predictable self-interest of whites self-delusion black people Brer Rabbit who tricks Brer Fox worst thing that Brer Fox could ever do Brer Fox acts in what he thinks is his own best interest he does the very thing that enables Brer Rabbit to escape masterful tactician manipulating ignorance the law He instead ruthlessly realistic devise an effective strategy racial realism not nihilist neither is it hopeful fantastical object of a future without antiblack racism racial realism doesn't involve believing that the right thing will win out white supremacy perhaps precisely because one fights the plague for different reasons affirming the dignity and value of humanity a manifestation of our humanity this is a kind of humanism absurd rather than progressive

['In many ways, then, successfully fighting white racism is a very crude, nonsophisticated business. It isn\'t about devising fancy moral arguments or ideal forms of jurisprudence; it instead involves "making a shameless appeal to the predictable self-interest of whites" and their wallets (1992a. 107). One could add that it also relies on the predictable self-delusion, self-grandeur, and racial ignorance of while people. Bell (1992a, 62) argues that black people—both individuals and communities—need to be like Brer Rabbit of the Uncle Remus stories, who tricks Brer Fox into setting him free by convincing Brer Fox that throwing Brer Rabbit into the briar patch is the worst thing that Brer Fox could ever do to him. Brer Fox acts in what he thinks is his own best interest—an interest in harming Brer Rabbit by keeping him captive—and in so doing, he does the very thing that enables Brer Rabbit to escape. A masterful tactician at manipulating the canine ignorance and solipsistic focus of Brer Fox. Brer Rabbit doesn\'t rely on rational argumentation, nor does he depend on the law or any universal rights of animal kind to obtain his freedom. He instead is ruthlessly realistic about the malicious self-interest that motivates Brer Fox, and for that reason he is able to devise an effective strategy for getting out of his clutches. Brer Rabbit doesn\'t succeed in making any sort of large-scale or structural change in the relationship between foxes and rabbits, nor does he particularly hope to. He instead focuses practically on how to save his life in the midst of a particular struggle with Brer Fox. and through his struggle, he is able to flourish even if the overarching tyranny of foxes has not been eliminated. Because struggle is central to racial realism, racial realism is neither passive nor apathetic. It is not nihilist in the sense that West uses the term. But neither is it hopeful. Even though they might bear a superficial similarity, the struggle involved in racial realism isn\'t the same struggle encouraged by West\'s politics of hope. The struggle of political hope is for the fantastical object of a future without antiblack racism. It insists that "legitimate action takes place in the political" and that "a refusal to \'do polities\' is equivalent to \'doing nothing\'" (Warren 2015, 223). The struggle of racial realism, in contrast, doesn\'t involve believing that the right thing will win out. Bell\'s racial realism invokes a different kind of existentialism than that of West, appealing to Camus (Bell 1992a, x). As Camus\'s main character from The Plague (1991) understands, one resists and must resist the plague—whether in the form of mass death, the Nazi Holocaust, or in this case white class privilege and white supremacy—even though, or perhaps precisely because, one cannot conquer it. There is no ultimate progress or victory to anticipate, no matter whether human struggle is assisted by the divine. The plague might be beaten back for a while, but it always will return. Fighting it is absurd if the goal of the fight is to eliminate it. On Camus\'s view, one fights the plague for different reasons, ones that have to do with affirming the dignity and value of humanity. Likewise, on Bell\'s view, black people\'s "struggle for freedom, is bottom, a manifestation of our humanity that survives and grows stronger through resistance to oppression, even if that oppression is never overcome" (1992b. 378). If this is a kind of humanism, it is absurd rather than progressive.']

[(0, 11)]

ndtceda

Michigan-ShGa-Neg-Long-Beach-Round-2.docx

Michigan

ShGa

5e57d1689f9a160ffb9e56ed5de4c0f1e8bc070a9c94df7b68e8e455ec4b6271

5---Sacrifice DA – The affirmative actualizes the dangers of a fabulously war by perfecting God terms invented by the Rand cooperation to justify extraction of inner-city and indigenous land

Matheson 15 [Calum Matheson, PhD is Associate Professor of Public Deliberation and Civic Life and the incoming Chair of the Department of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh.; “Desired Ground Zeroes: Nuclear Imagination and the Death Drive”; 2015;]

instill skepticism of current strategies meant to confront nuclear violence by challenging it discursively sanitizing effects of nuclear language. naming practices constrain public knowledge perfecting “God terms nuclear terminology conceals the reality of nuclear warfare and thus makes it palatable nuclear thinking developed by RAND theorists produced an arcane vocabulary for academia countervalue first strike. These terms mystify and enchant the public legions of undergraduate debaters nuclear metaphors and euphemism new vocabulary for public debate attempt to get closer to the Real Bomb as it “really is nuclear war remains “ fabulously textual” atrocities related to nuclear weapons and their production — indigenous peoples subjected to uranium mining and nuclear testing, inner city populations confined in the name of the Bomb To imagine a possible nuclear war does not reveal the truth the death drive it is a desire for unmediated experience spurred on by the Real this desire is frustrated as soon as it is expressed loss is the necessary condition for subjectivity in the first place

This project should instill skepticism about the efficacy of current strategies meant to confront nuclear violence by challenging it discursively . A great deal of work focused on the sanitizing effects of nuclear language. terms like “Strategic Defense Initiative” and CORRTEX bureaucratiz and domesticat nuclear issues. Through these verbal strategies, nuclear realities are “ insulated from public inspection by acronyms or sanitized jargon naming practices constrain public knowledge and influence attitudes about nuclear weapons, either through perfecting “God terms ” or through reference appealing historical myths such as the American frontier a chief goal of nuclear criticism is a “publicly accessible” language nuclear terminology conceals the reality of nuclear warfare and thus makes it palatable The nuclear thinking developed by RAND game theorists and others produced an arcane vocabulary for all aspects of nuclear conflict, much as academia has for its own concerns: “counterforce targeting,” “throw-weight,” “circular error probable,” “post-attack state,” and, of course, “ countervalue ” and “ first strike. ” These terms mystify and enchant the public just as they did public intellectuals during the Cold War, the fictional narrator of End Zone, and legions of high school and college undergraduate debaters to this very day nuclear metaphors and euphemism sustain the complex of nuclear destruction by concealing the horror of nuclear war. The implication of this idea is that providing a new vocabulary for public debate , such as the “devil terms would enable democratic deliberation and therefore constrain the nuclear state. negative nukespeak would consist of linguistic strategies to portray nuclear weapons and war as dangerous and immoral Such a strategy might “salvage” debate over nuclear weapons in the public sphere Nuclear critique remains the chief contribution of communication studies to the politics of nuclear warfare. The economy of nuclear discourse since the day of Trinity has been driven by the attempt to get closer to the Real , to have the Bomb as it “really is .” nuclear war remains “ fabulously textual” There have been atrocities related to nuclear weapons and their production — indigenous peoples subjected to uranium mining and nuclear testing, inner city populations confined and targeted in the name of the Bomb , “downwinders” exposed to radioactivity, U.S. soldiers made to witness tests with inadequate protection, and non-human animals subjected to cruelty in the name of understanding just what a nuclear war might be like there has never been a nuclear war in the sense that strategists, novelists, and survivalists imagined it. To imagine a possible nuclear war does not reveal the truth but instead relies on the same dynamic that makes the Bomb so fascinating in the first place: a sense of access to the Real. the death drive as a problematic for communication studies it is a desire for unmediated experience spurred on by the Real , this desire is frustrated as soon as it is expressed . Unable to enjoy the Real because its loss is the necessary condition for subjectivity in the first place , we invest in subjectivity instead, enjoying the perceived control over presence and absence demonstrated in the fort-da dynamic. silence, omission, and lack do not just frustrate our effort to communicate determine the ways in which we do so unspeakable failures are not negative—they are an excess beyond language efforts to understand what we do communicate require attention to the larger economy of desire and that which we cannot mediate rethinking the relationship between public discourse and political change since, as the example of nuclear weapons shows, horror woven together such that exposing the potential for catastrophe does not translate into an effective response

efficacy “Strategic Defense Initiative” and CORRTEX bureaucratiz domesticat insulated from public inspection acronyms or sanitized jargon nuclear terminology conceals the reality of nuclear warfare and thus makes it palatable nuclear thinking RAND game theorists arcane vocabulary “counterforce targeting,” “throw-weight,” “circular error probable,” “post-attack state,” “ countervalue ” and “ first strike. ” These terms mystify and enchant the public legions of high school and college undergraduate debaters to this very day fabulously textual” atrocities related to nuclear weapons and their production a sense of access to the Real.

["This project should instill skepticism about the efficacy of current strategies meant to confront nuclear violence by challenging it discursively. A great deal of work about the Bomb, following Carol Cohn’s excellent article and the germinal work of Stephen Hilgartner, Richard C. Bell and Rory O'Connor in Nukespeak, has focused on the sanitizing effects of nuclear language. Barry Brummett, Daniel Zins, and Edward Schiappa have all published work in this vein. Schiappa criticizes terms like “Strategic Defense Initiative” and CORRTEX for “bureaucratizing” and “domesticating” nuclear issues. Through these verbal strategies, nuclear realities are “insulated from public inspection by acronyms or sanitized jargon” (253). Both Barry Brummett and Charles Kauffman use the work of Kenneth Burke to argue that naming practices constrain public knowledge and influence attitudes about nuclear weapons, either through perfecting “God terms” for Brummett or through reference appealing historical myths such as the American frontier for Kauffman (Brummett, 1989; Kauffman, 1990). Even David Cratis Williams, who combines a Derridean perspective to the more familiar Burke, emphasizes that a chief goal of nuclear criticism is a “publicly accessible” language (Williams 202). These are all advocates for what we might call the concealment thesis. The basic assumption for proponents of this idea is that nuclear terminology conceals the reality of nuclear warfare and thus makes it palatable. The nuclear thinking developed by RAND game theorists and others produced an arcane vocabulary for all aspects of nuclear conflict, much as academia has for its own concerns: “counterforce targeting,” “throw-weight,” “circular error probable,” “post-attack state,” and, of course, “countervalue” and “first strike.” These terms mystify and enchant the public, just as they did public intellectuals during the Cold War, the fictional narrator of End Zone, and legions of high school and college undergraduate debaters to this very day (myself included). The theories of language used in the concealment thesis draw from different sources (Burke, Derrida, and Aristotle, Orwell, just to name a few), but their least common denominator is a belief that nuclear metaphors and euphemism sustain the complex of nuclear destruction by concealing the horror of nuclear war. The implication of this idea is that providing a new vocabulary for public debate, such as the “devil terms” Brummett suggests, would enable democratic deliberation and therefore constrain the nuclear state. As Schiappa puts it, a “negative nukespeak would consist of linguistic strategies to portray nuclear weapons and war as dangerous and immoral” (268). Such a strategy might “salvage” debate over nuclear weapons in the public sphere (Schiappa 254). Even outside communication studies, there is a broad consensus amongst critics of nuclear weapons that democratic debate is the key method for resistance to nuclear weapons and that concealing language stands as a barrier to it. Nuclear critique of all kinds has dropped off considerably since the end of the Cold War such that the concealment thesis, although advanced most comprehensively in the 1980s, remains the chief contribution of communication studies to the politics of nuclear warfare. The central argument of this book suggests that this legacy needs revision. The economy of nuclear discourse since the day of Trinity has been driven by the attempt to get closer to the Real, to have the Bomb as it “really is.” Chapter 2 will suggest that nuclear simulations were presented as more real and more rational than the Doomsday imaginations of Curtis LeMay and the early Strategic Air Command. Jonathan Schell’s Fate of the Earth was another effort to bring Americans face-to-face with the reality of nuclear war, as were the more explicitly fictional novels churned out especially in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1980s. Underlying these efforts is the fact that nuclear war remains “fabulously textual” in Derrida’s terms (24-27). There have been atrocities related to nuclear weapons and their production—indigenous peoples subjected to uranium mining and nuclear testing, inner city populations confined and targeted in the name of the Bomb, “downwinders” exposed to radioactivity, U.S. soldiers made to witness tests with inadequate protection, and non-human animals subjected to cruelty in the name of understanding just what a nuclear war might be like. But there has never been a nuclear war in the sense that strategists, novelists, and survivalists imagined it. To imagine the graphic details of a possible nuclear war does not reveal the truth but instead relies on the same dynamic that makes the Bomb so fascinating in the first place: a sense of access to the Real. My overall aim is to establish the death drive as a problematic for communication studies. I argue that it is a desire for unmediated experience spurred on by the Real, but because communication is always mediated, this desire is frustrated as soon as it is 29 expressed. The quest for the Real ends up mired in the Symbolic. Unable to enjoy the Real because its loss is the necessary condition for subjectivity in the first place, we invest in subjectivity instead, enjoying the perceived control over presence and absence demonstrated in the fort-da dynamic. In developing this argument, I hope to make a contribution to communication studies by showing that silence, omission, and lack do not just frustrate our effort to communicate, but partly determine the ways in which we do so. These unspeakable failures are not therefore purely negative—they are an excess beyond language, not a vacuum. Specific media artefacts, whether war games or literary texts, exist instead of others because they are animated by desire and the uncanny sense of the Real. Therefore, efforts to understand what we do communicate require attention to the larger economy of desire and that which we cannot mediate. For rhetoric, this means a new understanding of the sublime as an uncanny attribute of signifiers and media itself in relation to the Real, rather than simply a grand style of speech. For media and technology studies, it means acknowledging how the enjoyment of our power over presence and absence leads us to form attachments that sustain some particular technologies instead of others, making an account of desire necessary even for a truly materialist understanding of mediation. This also means rethinking the relationship between public discourse and political change since, as the example of nuclear weapons shows, horror and fascination are woven together such that exposing the potential for catastrophe does not translate into an effective response.", '']

[(0, 11), (12, 258)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-RiSt-Neg-ADA-Round-6.docx

Kentucky

RiSt

0ecee7ccd58651893bb9a821268bddc7067772f4e17d43dfeeff53cb25fbca84

Pandemics---they’re existential---risks civilization collapse and long-term neurological harm.

Baum 22 (Seth D. Baum, PhD in Geography from Pennsylvania State University, Fellow of the Society for Risk Analysis, MS in Electrical Engineering from Northeastern University, “Assessing natural global catastrophic risks,” Natural Hazards Journal, 10-12-22, Springer Link, , Go Green!)

activity can cause onset of pandemics risk from zoonosis may be larger global travel and density create more opportunities to spread. Earlier in history catastrophic pathogen only killed off a smaller portion same pathogen could cause global catastrophe historical ev is consistent with high ongoing probability of extinction from natural pandemics Pandemics could threaten civilization causing neurological harm result in insufficient cognitive fitness to maintain civilization

distinction between natural and anthropogenic pandemics is particularly blurry human activity can cause onset of “natural” pandemics , such as when interactions with wildlife cause pathogens zoonosis risk from wildlife zoonosis may be larger population has more points of contact with wildlife zoonosis can also occur in factory farms , a setting that exists in the gray area between natural and anthropogenic Once the pathogen has infected humans, it is spread primarily via human activity global travel and urban density create more opportunities for pathogens to spread. Earlier in human history , a catastrophic natural pathogen may have only killed off a smaller , isolated portion of the population, leaving no clear archaeological record , whereas the same pathogen could cause global catastrophe deep historical ev idence is consistent with even a high ongoing probability of human extinction from natural pandemics , implying natural pandemic risk can be of large long-term importance even if w(cc) is small Pandemics could further threaten civilization collapse . Pandemics could disrupt the labor pool , causing acute supply chain disruptions with severe effects such as to food security pandemic causing neurological harm could result in the human population having insufficient cognitive fitness to maintain civilization sorts of effects could have occurred earlier in history without leaving a trace. Supply chain disruptions would have been of minimal consequence for most of human history

interactions with wildlife wildlife zoonosis larger zoonosis factory farms global travel urban density more opportunities Earlier human history natural pathogen smaller portion no clear archaeological record cause global catastrophe deep historical ev idence consistent high probability extinction natural pandemics large long-term threaten civilization collapse disrupt labor pool acute supply chain disruptions food security neurological harm insufficient cognitive fitness maintain civilization

['Natural pandemics', 'The distinction between natural and anthropogenic pandemics is particularly blurry. One distinction is between pathogens that arises in nature and pathogens created via biological science and technology, such as gain-of-function experiments and DNA synthesis (Millett and Snyder-Beattie 2017). However, human activity can cause the onset of “natural” pandemics, such as when interactions with wildlife cause pathogens to jump from a nonhuman species to humans (i.e., zoonosis; Morse et al. 2012). The risk from wildlife zoonosis may be larger now than during early human history because the larger human population has more points of contact with wildlife. Additionally, zoonosis can also occur in factory farms, a setting that exists in the gray area between natural and anthropogenic (Manheim 2018).', 'Once the pathogen has infected humans, it is spread primarily via human activity.Footnote17 The risk is heavily affected by modern global civilization. On the one hand, modern medicine and public health creates more powerful techniques for reducing the severity of pandemics. On the other hand, global travel and urban density create more opportunities for pathogens to spread. Earlier in human history, a catastrophic natural pathogen may have only killed off a smaller, isolated portion of the population, leaving no clear archaeological record, whereas the same pathogen could cause global catastrophe (Manheim 2018). Therefore, the deep historical evidence is consistent with even a high ongoing probability of human extinction from natural pandemics, implying that natural pandemic risk can be of large long-term moral importance even if w(cc) is small.', 'Pandemics could further threaten civilization collapse. Pandemics could disrupt the labor pool, causing acute supply chain disruptions with severe effects such as to food security (Huff et al. 2015). A pandemic causing neurological harm, such as in long COVID (Misra 2021), could result in the human population having insufficient cognitive fitness to maintain civilization. Furthermore, these sorts of effects could have occurred during pandemics earlier in human history without leaving a noticeable trace. Supply chain disruptions would have been of minimal consequence for most of human history. Medical effects such as neurological harm could go away, for example, if it is not passed to subsequent generations. If w(cc) is large, the potential effects of pandemics on civilization collapse merit careful scrutiny.']

[(0, 7)]

ndtceda

MichiganState-BeMo-Neg-2---Kentucky-Round-3.docx

MichiganState

BeMo

072b2d61648cd4555745578429e74380d30b5a40b87c5bb4de287b0eb7a6a1b8

No inadvertent nuclear escalation---safeguards.

Lowther 23, *PhD, Vice President of Research at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. **B-52 Weapons System Officer and graduate of Sandia National Laboratories’ Weapons Intern program (*Adam Lowther and **Lt. Col. Derek Williams 7-10-2023, "Why America Has a Launch on Attack Option," War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2023/07/why-america-has-a-launch-on-attack-option/)

The military expects the humans and c c to make mistakes done through safety measures built into the weapons, training personnel reliability operational procedures and a c c system specifically designed to prevent accidental war In 32 accidents the U S never experienced miscalc leading to war the system is much better today than the last accident four decades ago the crew management model builds redundancies every error make the system safer

The Fallacy of Accidental Launch in every example, all of which are decades old redundant safety measures ensured that any one failure in the system did not lead to an actual failure The U.S. military expects the humans and its c c system to make mistakes everything from the weapons themselves to the crews that maintain them are designed to mitigate error . This is done through the safety measures built into the weapons, training of crews, the personnel reliability assurance program, operational procedures , and a c c system comprised of layers specifically designed to prevent accidental war In every instance of mistake or error that detractors can provide the redundancy built into the system worked In 32 accidents involving nuc s the U S never experienced an accidental detonation or miscalc leading to war the system is much better today than when the last accident occurred four decades ago was specifically designed to account for inevitable mistakes Where one layer failed, another layer succeeded. the crew resource management model builds redundancies into the system to prevent human error Similar approaches are in effect across the nuclear enterprise to prevent accidents every human or technical error that occurred in the past was carefully analyzed and used to make the system safer It is for good reason that the U S has been accident-free for four decades

Fallacy decades old actual failure expects humans c c system make mistakes weapons themselves crews designed mitigate error safety measures c c system specifically designed to prevent accidental war redundancy built into the system worked 32 accidents nuc s U S never miscalc leading to war four decades ago specifically designed account for inevitable mistakes another redundancies prevent human error used to make the system safer good reason U S accident-free four decades

['The Fallacy of Accidental Launch', 'In addition to suggesting that a significant portion of the intercontinental ballistic missile force would survive a Russian nuclear strike, Montoya and Kemp argue that “there are many historical examples of early-warning systems generating false alarms or computer-generated messages pretending to be actual warnings. When combined with a launch on warning posture, these glitches create real risks of accidental war.” ', 'What they fail to mention is that in every example, all of which are decades old, redundant safety measures ensured that any one failure in the system did not lead to an actual failure with nuclear weapons. The U.S. military expects the humans operating the nuclear arsenal and its command and control system to make mistakes. While the military strives for perfection, everything from the weapons themselves to the crews that maintain and operate them are designed to mitigate error.', 'This is done through the safety measures built into the weapons, training of crews, the personnel reliability assurance program, operational procedures, and a command and control system comprised of layers specifically designed to prevent the very accidental war Montoya and Kemp fret about. In every instance of a mistake or error that detractors can provide, the simple fact is that the redundancy built into the system worked.', 'In 32 accidents involving nuclear weapons, the United States never experienced an accidental detonation or miscalculation leading to war. Arguments suggesting that because part of the system failed, the entire system failed willfully ignore that the system, which is much better today than when the last accident occurred four decades ago, was specifically designed to account for the inevitable mistakes that would happen. ', 'The same is true of errors in the systems that comprise American integrated tactical warning and attack assessment. Where one layer failed, another layer succeeded. This layering of systems is sometimes referred to as Reason’s Accident Causation Model, or the Swiss cheese model. There may be holes in one slice of cheese (system), but no hole runs all the way through the entire block of cheese (system of systems). If slices of Swiss cheese are like the layers of redundancy, each slice may have holes in different places, but none of the holes line up perfectly on every slice. Thus, a hole (mistake/error) in one slice is covered in another slice. ', 'In the aviation world, the crew resource management model builds redundancies into the system to prevent human error when it comes to the combat crews flying nuclear-armed bombers. Similar approaches are in effect across the nuclear enterprise to prevent the kind of accidents Montoya and Kemp fear. Nowhere in the system does safety rely on a single point of failure. Multiple failures must occur, both mechanical or technical and human, before an accidental detonation or nuclear war can happen. It is certainly worth pointing out that no system is perfect. There is always some level of risk, even if it is very small. ', 'In reality, every human or technical error that occurred in the past was carefully analyzed and used to make the system safer. It is for good reason that the United States has been accident-free for four decades. To continue this safety record, America must invest in people, weapons systems, and nuclear warhead production infrastructure. Regularly building new nuclear warheads that continue to enhance safety and use control is the most reliable way to ensure the least possible risk. ', '']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Kansas-HaBa-Neg-ADA-Round-3.docx

Kansas

HaBa

cf000e0fc0e5579a1d84d9eac2eb55d729aa428509e4db5f5582b13921a2f3ea

Resources are limited

Ejudicate 21, online court filing help center service. (Edjudicate, 9-21-2021, “Will the Civil Courts backlog ever be cleared?”, https://www.ejudicate.com/civil-courts-backlog/)

average backlog increased one-third during pandemic Even in best of times courts consistently battle backlogs you add health crisis easy to see situation become more difficult system can’t do much with limited resources

this is where the US finds itself the average backlog increased by one-third during the pandemic the average backlog in US courts before the COVID-19 pandemic was 958 cases That backlog increased to 1,274 Even in the best of times , the nation’s courts consistently battle case backlogs When you add a public health crisis it is easy to see why the backlog situation may become much more difficult justice system is trying but it can’t do much with its limited resources

backlog one-third pandemic backlog pandemic 958 increased 1,274 best of times battle backlogs public health backlog difficult system can’t limited resources

['Bring yourself back to reality, and this is exactly where the US Justice system finds itself. published in August 2021 found that the average backlog for state and local courts in the US increased by one-third during the pandemic.', '', 'In the Impacts of the COVID-19 Pandemic on State & Local Courts Study 2021, a survey of more than 238 judges and other court professionals found that the average backlog in US courts before the COVID-19 pandemic was 958 cases. That backlog increased to 1,274 in the last year.\xa0', 'One-third of\xa0 US courts saw their case backlogs increase by more than 5% in the last year, and another 23% saw their backlogs increase by 1% to 5%.', 'Tellingly, the report states: “Even in the best of times, the nation’s courts consistently battle case backlogs for a variety of reasons. When you add a public health crisis into that equation, it is easy to see why the backlog situation may become much more difficult to manage.”', 'New Jersey now has a civil court backlog that is twice what it is before the Pandemic, with the prominent Epstein Law Firm, projecting that this figure could double again.', 'Georgia estimates that it will take three years and a staggering $60 million dollars to dig through the current court backlog.', 'The justice system is trying but it can’t do much with its limited resources. Massachusetts for example has taken over a grand ballroom kitted out with pianos and wooden dancefloors to try and farm out satellite jury locations. If it wasn’t so serious, it would be funny. But it isn’t a laughing matter at all.\xa0']

[(0, 9), (10, 12)]

ndtceda

Kansas-PaMa-Aff-Hoosier-Invitational-Tournament-2023-Round-4.docx

Kansas

PaMa

239a6bb231a7befb7918a58f673d3bc1dc7d397836baa1e0b13cea07e98c4553

Crypto is embedded in capitalist speculation and financialization---it creates instability AND reappropriation fails.

Daniel Denvir et al. 3/10/22. Host of The Dig on Jacobin Radio. AND Edward Ongweso Jr is a labor and technology reporter at Motherboard and host of the This Machine Kills podcast. AND Jacob Silverman is a staff writer at the New Republic. "Crypto Is Making Everything Worse". Jacobin. 3-10-2022. https://www.jacobinmag.com/2022/03/cryptocurrency-bitcoin-speculative-asset-digitization-metaverse

crypto is just speculative that means pain for the many the use is creating complex and economically dangerous financial instruments not different from credit default swaps productive value there is none pump and dump schemes are a feature if you look under the hood That is fraud and manipulation. These are features Do you think blockchain could be used on the Left I am dubious private money becomes a real problem We had Confederate bonds and rich people printing money

crypto is just another speculative asset that means profits for a few and pain for the many . cryptocurrency holds so much appeal despite its crassly profiteering nature It’s mostly a tool of speculation the main use case for cryptocurrency is for market speculation creating complex and economically dangerous financial instruments not that different from credit default swaps . In terms of productive value there is none The value of cryptocurrency is speculation it is for speculators whether that is increasingly just to pump up self-dealing assets or exchanges, or whether that’s to pump and dump various coins and tokens , it is speculative with really extravagant and complex ways to be so pump and dump schemes are a constant feature of the crypto landscape They hype up the group and then don’t announce the coin until right when the pump and dump is initiated. They say, “We’re going to get good returns Then, they announce the coin and it is usually some altcoin if you look at all under the hood at the trading data, you can see that someone started trading a lot of the coin a few minutes before the official announcement. This means that the people running the pump and dump bought in early and the price went down afterward That is fraud and manipulation. These are features of the landscape pump and dump schemes are standard features Do you think blockchain could be used in any sort of socially beneficial way? on the Left I am dubious we have had a fair amount of time to see blockchain be applied in more socially useful ways, and we have not seen those ways develop. currency needs to be tied to political governance private money becomes a real problem We certainly had a lot of it in the nineteenth century, with Confederate bonds and rich people printing their own private forms of money some of the initial conditions of this technology and how it is deployed are almost a nonstarter

crypto is just another speculative asset pain for the many It’s mostly a tool of speculation market speculation creating complex and economically dangerous financial instruments productive value there is none extravagant complex pump and dump schemes constant feature of the crypto landscape That is fraud and manipulation. These are features of the landscape pump and dump schemes are standard features I am dubious private money becomes a real problem nonstarter

['Are you sick of hearing about cryptocurrency yet? Don’t worry, we are too. But it’s important to set the record straight about what exactly crypto does and does not do, given the endless stream of overblown claims about its liberating power — and the immense amounts of money involved. Strip away the hype, and it’s clear that crypto is just another speculative asset that means big profits for a few and pain for the many.', 'In a recent interview on The Dig, a Jacobin Radio podcast, host Daniel Denvir spoke with Edward Ongweso Jr, a tech reporter at Vice Motherboard and a cohost of the podcast This Machine Kills, and Jacob Silverman, a staff writer at the New Republic. Together, they answer the question of why cryptocurrency holds so much appeal despite its crassly profiteering nature. The transcript has been edited for length and clarity. Listen to the full interview here.', 'DD', 'Before we get started, let’s cover some basic things. What is cryptocurrency, and is it actually currency?', 'EO', 'A simple way to look at cryptocurrency is as a digital token that is in some cases just a storehouse of value and in some other cases used in some really complicated schemes surrounding digital assets or projects. But, essentially is it just a digital token that in one way or another is supposed to have value somehow.', 'JS', 'Is it actually a currency? I would say no, because most cryptocurrencies cannot be readily exchanged for goods and services, and their values do fluctuate so much that it is hard to ascribe to them the relative stability of most currencies. Now, if we follow that line of argument, you will have crypto people saying, “Well, what about Lebanon or some other country with hyperinflation? Their currency isn’t always stable.” But ideally, of course, you want currency to be readily spendable, tradable, and to have a steady value. Crypto is not that.', 'DD', 'So if it is not a currency, what is it, and why does it have value? Sometimes quite a bit of value.', 'JS', 'It’s mostly a tool of speculation. Here is where we get ideas of irrational exuberance and what defines value and even collective hallucinations. But I think the main use case for cryptocurrency is for market speculation, and creating complex and potentially economically dangerous financial instruments that are not that different from credit default swaps.', 'In terms of productive value, I would say there is none. The main value of cryptocurrency is as a tool for speculation. People are trying to get rich.', 'EO', 'I agree. There are interesting projects that come as a result of the things that people believe they have to do when they are organizing off of a cryptocurrency or cryptocurrency-backed platforms. But cryptocurrency in itself, I can’t see it as a currency. Even in a generous framing, it is for speculators, and it is used largely to speculate or to facilitate the movement of funds from one pocket to another — whether that is increasingly just to pump up self-dealing assets or exchanges, or whether that’s to pump and dump various coins and tokens.', 'I have been surprised, from the beginning of getting involved in reporting on crypto and joining crypto groups and chats, about how regular the invites to pump and dump groups are, and how many different types of pump and dump groups exist. There are ones that seem like functional schemes where it’s like, “We are transparent about when we are going to pump and when we are going to dump and how much money everyone gets out of it. Here’s a nice little spreadsheet for us to figure it all out.” There are others that are chaotic.', 'But generally speaking, it is speculative with really extravagant and complex ways to be so.', 'JS', 'I think people who are more pro-Web3 or pro-crypto would say that all the cryptocurrencies and the pump and dump schemes are a kind of distraction. The things that are really interesting are the new types of governance created using tokens — such as using how many you have as a way to vote on certain things — and new types of organizations. I tend to think that those are the sideshows. For people who are interested in that stuff, they see new ways to store and secure data and new ways to govern organizations. Some of those folks have good intentions but are overlooking where most of the money and the fraud is.', 'Also, a “rug pull” is when the leader of a project just disappears and runs off with all the money, which happens pretty frequently, especially with non-fungible tokens (NFTs) or anything styled as a community that needs an initial investment from people.', 'The pump and dump schemes are an interesting and constant feature of the crypto landscape. One of my pet issues is the market manipulation on the exchanges. Here is an example. I am in a Telegram group with more than three million people. Almost every Sunday, they do a pump and dump on the cryptocurrency exchange Binance. And they call it a pump and dump. They hype up the group and then don’t announce the coin until right when the pump and dump is initiated. They say, “We’re going to get good returns. We have all these people participating. We have whales [people who are holding particularly large amounts of the coin in question] who are going to help drive the market.”', 'Then, they announce the coin and it is usually some altcoin, or “shitcoin,” as they’re also called. Sometimes some people make it out okay. But if you look at all under the hood at the trading data, you can see that someone started trading a lot of the coin a few minutes before the official announcement. This means that the people running the pump and dump bought in early and the price went down afterward. At the end of it, they spin it and say, “We got 400 percent returns and all these people got in. See you next week.”', 'That is fraud and manipulation. These are features of the landscape. There are people who think that you can clean up the industry and make it more reputable, which is possible. But right now, pump and dump schemes are standard features. They happen on Binance, the exchange that I subscribe to and the biggest exchange in the world. Binance must know this is happening every week, but it is just part of the system.', 'DD', 'Before we get any further, what is a blockchain and how does it work?', 'JS', 'A blockchain is basically a distributed database or ledger. Their history as a technology goes back about thirty years. One thing that critics will say is that blockchain as a technology has been around for quite a while and has not necessarily found an adequate use case. For example, bitcoin is a distributed ledger. It is a blockchain. It is immutable, so pieces get added onto the blockchain but things do not get deleted.', 'To oversee governance, people are running the bitcoin software on computers all over the world. When a transaction happens, it is appended to the blockchain. For all these distributed computers running the block, the bitcoin software helps ensure the security of the blockchain and that it is all recorded.', 'EO', 'Blockchain also gets a lot of focus because even if you are a skeptic on every other element of crypto or every other element of things connected to crypto, like decentralized financing schemes, blockchain technology is an interesting development that we can now apply to all sorts of things unrelated to crypto to facilitate more transparency or privacy.', 'DD', 'Transparency because every transaction is recorded privately, because the entities or individuals making those transactions are anonymous?', 'EO', 'Yes. There’s one example which would be pretty interesting if it got developed, but I don’t think it would because it is against a lot of people’s interests. I saw a proposal by Decode EU to try to develop a system using a blockchain that would allow for anonymous whistleblowing anywhere in the world by any government bureaucrat and, by extension, corporate workers. One way or another, you would be able to verify that it came from the place where it came from, but you would not have to worry about that person having their identity exposed, revealed, and cracked down on.', 'There are still some issues, though. For example, if it is a document that only a few people have a handle on, you would still be able to crack down a little bit and get a sense of who might have been responsible. It is an interesting proposal that could be developed, but something like that is also not going to be developed because some of these use cases are against the interest of a corporation.', 'DD', 'Do you think blockchain could potentially be used in any sort of socially beneficial way? I know there’s some debate about this on the Left.', 'JS', 'I am dubious. This is not to say that I think that technology is inherently evil, bad, or malicious, but I think we have had a fair amount of time to see blockchain be applied in more socially useful ways, and we have not seen those ways develop. Right now, we do have systems that exist like SecureDrop, which lets people blow the whistle. It may not be as effective, public, or permanent and censorship-resistant as something like a blockchain whistleblowing system, but I think some people are looking for a revolutionary possibility with blockchain, especially people in the industry who stand to make a lot of money. That is not necessarily apparent to a lot of folks who do not have a financial interest in the stuff. I am sympathetic and open to arguments from the Left. But, I don’t really see it yet.', 'Also, there are these first-order issues that we do not always talk about when we are critiquing cryptocurrency. Frankly, I think that currency needs to be tied to the state or to some kind of political governance. As much as I have a problem with the state and state control over things, I think private money becomes a real problem. We certainly had a lot of it in the nineteenth century, with Confederate bonds and rich people printing their own private forms of money. So there are ways in which some of the initial conditions of this technology and how it is deployed are almost a nonstarter.']

[(7, 20), (20, 20), (21, 28)]

ndtceda

Emory-PiWa-Neg-Georgetown-College-Tournament-Round-4.docx

Emory

PiWa

2310c625e7971eac8641ae6349117f8f9c494c5fa71f319557314399d30d3d5e

Mutual NFU is credible---both China and the US believe in the principle sufficiently for crisis stability.

Ai 21, Research Associate at the Research Institute for Indian Ocean Economies, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Ph.D. Candidate, Diplomacy & Disarmament, Jawaharlal Nehru University, M.A., Education, University of Essex, B.A., Business, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics (Zhong Ai, 2021, “VARYING PERCEPTIONS OF NUCLEAR NO-FIRST-USE: CHINESE– UNITED STATES CONVERGENCES AND DISCORDANCE,” International Journal on World Peace, Vol. XXXVIII No. 2, University of Kansas Libraries, ProQuest)

it is less likely U.S. would ever deliberately conduct a nuclear strike on China . Despite variance their discourses with NFU show strong convergence U.S. decisions about use have been influenced by the taboo given destructive impacts the records indicate U.S. leaders have deep apprehension about first use China believes “ existential ” deterrence though some thinktank analysts assum loss of tens of millions is acceptable in a real world of political leaders a decision that would bring even one bomb on one’s own country would be catastrophic NFU being privileged in China and in U.S. virtual practices reflect a proximity of policy. Both need to clarify varying interpretations of each other’s doctrines both China and U.S. need to appreciate risks of inadvertent war due to miscalc most immediate question is whether NFU as declaration without enforcement in force planning can be trusted is simple commitment sufficient to strategic stability ? Starting from commitment both U.S. and China have sufficient shared faith in sanctity of NFU to begin exploring NFU at least at the level of making a commitment . Specifics of future posture can follow from there

Today it is less likely that the U.S. would ever deliberately conduct a preemptive nuclear strike on any nations including China . Despite variance their discourses as well as policy perceptions with regards to NFU doctrine show strong convergence the U.S. decisions about whether to use nuclear weapons have been influenced by the thinking of nuclear taboo given its destructive impacts much of the historical records appear to indicate that U.S. leaders have a deep sense of apprehension about being the first to use nuclear weapons China believes the efficacy of “ existential ” deterrence , and the U.S. was deterred by first strike “ uncertainty .” even though some thinktank analysts who present delicate calculations assum ing the loss of tens of millions of lives is acceptable , “ in a real world of real political leaders … a decision that would bring even one hydrogen bomb on one city of one’s own country would be recognized in advance as a catastrophic blunder .” NFU being privileged in China ’s pronouncements and in U.S. virtual practices reflect a certain proximity of policy. Both countries need to clarify on their varying interpretations of each other’s doctrines For the part of the U.S. , rather than assuming China’s NFU pledge as a hypocritical statement, China’s distinct nuclear thinking deserves more serious engagement. In the meantime, both China and the U.S. need to consider examining various overlapping and shared elements in their nuclear policies as also appreciate various risks of inadvertent nuclear war due to the miscalc ulation and miscommunication. The most immediate question is whether a NFU pledge, as a declaration without enforcement in terms of requisite changes in force planning and deployments can be trusted by others is simple political commitment sufficient to ensure regional strategic stability ? Starting from their shared commitment on ensuring strategic stability and strengthening the norm of nuclear taboo , both the U.S. and China have sufficient ly shared faith in the sanctity of NFU doctrine to begin exploring their shared understanding on the NFU at least at the level of making a political commitment . Specifics of future direction of the nuclear force posture and deployment and policies can follow from there .

less likely deliberately conduct strike China discourses policy NFU strong convergence use influenced taboo destructive records leaders deep first weapons existential U.S. uncertainty thinktank assum millions acceptable real world leaders even one bomb country recognized catastrophic blunder privileged in China and in U.S. virtual practices proximity clarify doctrines U.S. assuming NFU hypocritical nuclear serious China U.S. overlapping policies risks war miscalc immediate NFU without enforcement trusted sufficient stability commitment stability norm taboo U.S. China sufficient ly shared faith in the sanctity of NFU exploring at least at commitment direction deployment can follow from there

['CONVERGENCE IN U.S.-CHINA DISCOURSES', 'Unlike its expressed drift towards “ambiguity” with regards to its First-Use policy, the praxis of the U.S. nuclear strategy of last several decades underlines how the U.S. could hardly decide whether to use nuclear weapons even when it has had a nuclear superiority. Today it is less likely that the U.S. would ever deliberately conduct a preemptive nuclear strike on any nations including China. Despite variance in China and India’s nuclear policy pronouncements, their discourses as well as policy perceptions with regards to NFU doctrine show strong convergence.', 'As regards China, it is Mao Zedong’s nuclear thinking that has shaped its nuclear policy and its NFU doctrine. Mao believed nuclear weapons, as political weapons, could only be used for countering nuclear blackmail and deterring nuclear attack, rather than for achieving other military goals through first-use. Similarly, the U.S. decisions about whether to use nuclear weapons have been influenced by the thinking of nuclear taboo given its destructive impacts on humankind. During 1950s, several American senior officials predicted the use of nuclear weapons would be gradually accepted globally and they will ultimately gain conventional nature and be inevitably used just like other weapons.66 However, much of the historical records appear to indicate that U.S. leaders have a deep sense of apprehension about being the first to use nuclear weapons. Though this practices of U.S. non-use is based on multiple considerations, the nuclear taboo which is influenced by a number of factors such as moral norms and reputation should be taken as a necessary element when analyzing the non-use of U.S. nuclear weapons.', 'Another convergence is that China believes the efficacy of “existential” deterrence, and the U.S. was deterred by first strike “uncertainty.” The then national security adviser McGeorge Bundy said even though some thinktank analysts who present delicate calculations assuming the loss of tens of millions of lives is acceptable, “in a real world of real political leaders…a decision that would bring even one hydrogen bomb on one city of one’s own country would be recognized in advance as a catastrophic blunder.”67', 'DISCORDANCE IN THEIR DISCOURSES', 'In terms of their policies, while China whose nuclear weapons are meant only for deterring nuclear attack or nuclear blackmail, the U.S. nuclear weapons are expected to serve more purposes including deterring conventional military attacks on itself and its allies. One of the most debated issues about the U.S. adoption of NFU is that the NFU doctrine might exclude the preemptive nuclear strike option which is necessary for the uncertainty of the future military threat especially in some circumstances where the U.S. conventional military forces may not be able to maintain the upper hand. Therefore, in the face of diverse threats and uncertainties, reserving the option of the first-use of nuclear weapon is perceived by the U.S. as. an appropriate political choice for the U.S. to guarantee the effectiveness of nuclear coercion and a better way to maintain peace and stability than a clear and unequivocal NFU pledge.', 'Besides, the preemptive strike option is perceived by the U.S. as necessary for guaranteeing the “damage limitation” capacity, which is deemed as an important purpose that the U.S. nuclear weapons are expected to serve. In the 1960s, Robert S. McNamara had introduced damage limitation concept to the strategic policy discourse. McNamara declared the U.S. strategic forces should first “deter deliberate nuclear attack upon the United States and its allies…” and second “in the event such a war nevertheless occurred, to limit damage to our population and industrial capacity.”68 The most recent 2018 NPR asserts “the United States would only consider the employment of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances…Nevertheless, if deterrence fails, the United States will strive to end any conflict at the lowest level of damage possible…”69', 'In the case of U.S.-China nuclear relationship, the U.S. damage limitation capability is supposed to reduce the damage that China could inflict upon the U.S. in a nuclear retaliation by attacking China’s nuclear forces and its command and control assets. In addition, the ballistic missile defenses would also be employed for intercepting China’s warheads which survived the first strike.70 To achieve the goal of damage limitation, the U.S. could even conduct a preemptive strike by employing nuclear missiles against China’s ICBMs, as well as launching conventional counterforce strike (e.g. Conventional Prompt Global Strike), without crossing the nuclear threshold, against China’s theater nuclear forces and its command and control system.', 'The call for the adoption of the damage limitation strategy over China could be found from most American hardliners, following the frame of U.S.-Soviet dyad, who do not accept that there is strategic stability between China and the U.S. because they don’t think China has credible second-strike capability in the face of the U.S. damage limitation capability.71 The conventional wisdom is that during a period of growing tension in which the nuclear war seems imminent, both NWSs would perceive the advantage and incentive to strike preemptively. As such, if China’s nuclear retaliation capability is not credible enough for the U.S. to accept the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) of the Soviet vintage, it is reasonable to assume that the probability of the preemptive strike by the U.S. might be higher', 'The U.S. damage limitation capability and its reluctance to acknowledge the mutual vulnerability to China’s nuclear retaliatory capability has become one of the significant challenge of China’s NFU. In China, therefore some discussion has also been germinating about raising the alert level of China’s nuclear forces so as to ensure the credibility of its nuclear retaliation. For instance, the book The Science of Military Strategy (the third edition) by PLA AMS suggested,', 'When conditions are met and when necessary, China can, after confirming the adversary has launched nuclear missiles against us, launch nuclear missiles quickly for counterattack, before adversaries’ incoming nuclear warheads have reached their targets and effectively exploded, and before these warheads cause actual damage. This is not only consistent with China’ NFU policy but also effectively avoid greater loss of our nuclear forces.72', 'Though there is no evidence showing China has been moving toward a high alert level of its nuclear missiles, the discussion about raising the alert level undoubtedly reveals China’s concern about its nuclear retaliatory capability. If China decides to raise the alert level of its nuclear forces, along with the danger of nuclear entanglement, the risk of nuclear escalation would be harder to manage.', 'Another fact, which is far too often overlooked by experts, is that in the U.S., the political orthodoxy of avoiding the use of term “NFU” restrains American scholars, strategists and politicians from proposing to their own government to adopt NFU policy – as the credit would go to China because of Beijing adoption of the NFU in the first place. The perception of NFU by the U.S. also remains plagued with the historical baggage of Soviet and Chinese NFU declarations during the Cold War. The U.S. believes the NFU declared by China in 1964 and by Soviet Union in 1982 were both politically motivated, seeking to cast a wedge between America and its NATO allies because citizens in these allies resisted the deployment of nuclear weapons on their soil even though they depended on American First-Use for their nuclear protection.73', 'CONCLUSION', 'Considering that the nuclear doctrines of China and the U.S. have evolved in different historical contexts, driven by different motivations, capabilities and security assessments, both Beijing and Washington nevertheless have continued to show a certain faith in the sanctity of non-first use of their nuclear discourses. Continuing variance in the finer details of their policies with regard to the NFU doctrine, however, makes it critical that both sides remain engaged in enhancing the mutual understanding on utilities and aims of respective nuclear arsenals. There clearly exists a tacit understanding that neither side should take nuclear weapons lightly. Especially, reserving the right to use nuclear weapons “first’ in an extreme circumstance must not be misunderstood as a policy of preemption.', 'NFU being privileged in China’s pronouncements and in U.S. virtual practices reflect a certain proximity of policy. Both countries need to clarify on their varying and often contentious interpretations of each other’s doctrines. Instead of presuming U.S. refusal to adopt NFU doctrine as a provocative policy, Chinese nuclear experts might take an in-depth insight into U.S. praxis. This can help understand why the U.S. has been insisting on retaining a first-use option. For the part of the U.S., rather than assuming China’s NFU pledge as a hypocritical statement, China’s distinct nuclear thinking deserves more serious engagement. In the meantime, both China and the U.S. need to consider examining various overlapping and shared elements in their nuclear policies as also appreciate various risks of inadvertent nuclear war due to the miscalculation and miscommunication.', 'The most immediate question is whether a NFU pledge, as a declaration without enforcement in terms of requisite changes in force planning and deployments can be trusted by others and could stand the test in extreme circumstances. Or is simple political commitment sufficient to ensure regional strategic stability? It has been frequently criticized that it makes no sense to declare NFU unless the problem of political trust is resolved to ensure adversaries trust each other. This paper argues that the trust deficit between two countries political elites remains most critical first step for adopting NFU as an instrument for ensuring regional strategic stability. Starting from their shared commitment on ensuring strategic stability and strengthening the norm of nuclear taboo, both the U.S. and China have sufficiently shared faith in the sanctity of NFU doctrine to begin exploring their shared understanding on the NFU at least at the level of making a political commitment. Specifics of future direction of the nuclear force posture and deployment and policies can follow from there.', '']

[(0, 5)]

ndtceda

Kansas-MaPa-Aff-2---Kentucky-Doubles.docx

Kansas

MaPa

7efdce9bada1dff7fea00e1322e7576dd098fc14312c2cd4219d270a61d90189

Prioritize existential risk prevention---it encompasses AND outweighs other threats.

Dennis Pamlin & Stuart Armstrong 15, Dennis Pamlin, Executive Project Manager Global Risks, Global Challenges Foundation, and Stuart Armstrong, James Martin Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford, February 2015, “Global Challenges: 12 Risks that threaten human civilization: The case for a new risk category,” Global Challenges Foundation, p.30-93, https://api.globalchallenges.org/static/wp-content/uploads/12-Risks-with-infinite-impact.pdf

Risk = Probability × Impact Impacts where civilisation collapses do not recover are infinite as the result is irreversible peer-reviewed reports indicate those can happen their probability is increasing due to unsustainable trends cultural references to infinite impacts have been dominated by groups seeking to scare society this is different as it focuses on evidence from peer-reviewed sources No positive gain can outweigh even a small probability potential impact reached a level where we now have the technological capacity to end human civilisation. An approach must take preventative action and bear the costs risks lie outside our experience collective fear-response will be ill-calibrated thresholds become invisible if they occur far in the future, even if current actions unbalance the system consequences are not clear-cut depend on value judgements that would be contentious and unshared as enduring poverty Nevertheless conflicts not sufficient to threaten humanity without a “ System Collapse”

given enough time, very low probability events not only can happen, but they absolutely will happen Risk = Probability × Impact Impacts where civilisation collapses to a state of great suffering and do not recover , or a situation where all human life end, are defined as infinite as the result is irreversible and lasts forever a limited number of global risks – that can be identified through a scientific and transparent process – with impacts of a magnitude that pose a threat to human civilisation, or even possibly to all human life The idea that we face a number of global challenges threatening the very basis of our civilisation at the beginning of the 21st century is well accepted in the scientific community This created the first science-based list of global risks with a potentially infinite impact uncertainty exists regarding the outcome and that we must find a way to take the best possible decision based on our understanding of this uncertainty The impacts (A), (B) and (C) all belong to the same category, [common] impacts : the impacts may be more or less serious, but they can be dealt with within the current system The impacts in this report are however of a special kind. These are impacts where everything will be lost and the situation will not be reversible, i.e challenges with potentially infinite impact in the worst case this is when we risk the extinction of our own species On a probability curve the impacts in this report are usually at the very far right with a relatively low probability compared with other impacts For each risk in this report the probability of an infinite impact is very low compared to the most likely outcome But a significant number of peer-reviewed reports indicate that those impacts not only can happen , but that their probability is increasing due to unsustainable trends Not only could a better understanding of the unique magnitude of these risks help address the risks we face, it could also help to create a path towards more sustainable development the way that extreme impacts are often masked by most of the theories and models used by governme nts and business today The tendency to exclude impacts below a probability of five percent is one reason for the relative “invisibility” of infinite impacts . The almost standard use of a 95% confidence interval is one reason why low-probability high-impact events are often ignored A failure to provide any estimate for these risks often results in strategies and priorities defined as though the probability of a totally unacceptable outcome is zero uncertainty is not a weakness in science; it always exists in scientific work. It is a systematic way of understanding the limitations of the methodology, data, etc Uncertainty is not a reason to wait to take action if the impacts are serious A contrasting challenge is that our cultural references to the threat of infinite impacts have been dominated throughout history by religious groups seeking to scare society without any scientific backing, often as a way to discipline people and implement unpopular measures . It should not have to be said, but this report is obviously fundamentally different as it focuses on scientific evidence from peer-reviewed sources These are impacts that threaten the very survival of humanity and life on Earth – and therefore can be seen as being infinitely negative from an ethical perspective . No positive gain can outweigh even a small probability for an infinite negative impact. Such risks require society to ensure that we eliminate these risks by reducing the impact below an infinite impact as a top priority , or at least do everything we can to reduce the probability of these risks The impacts are irreversible in the most fundamental way, so tools like cost-benefit assessment seldom make sense An additional challenge in acknowledging the risks outlined in this report is that many of the traditional risks including wars and violence have decreased , even though it might not always looks that way in media So a significant number of experts today spend a substantial amount of time trying to explain that much of what is discussed as dangerous trends might not be as dangerous as we think it is therefore easy to get the impression that global risks are becoming less of a problem The chain of events that could result in infinite impacts in this report also differ from most of the traditional risks, as most of them are not triggered by wilful acts , but accidents /mistakes risks involving accidents tend to get less attention Scientists who today talk about low-probability impacts, that are serious but still far from infinite, are often accused of pessimism and scaremongering, even if they do nothing but highlight scientific findings results in a situation where low-probability high-impact outcomes are often totally ignored. An honest and scientific approach is to, whenever possible, present the whole probability distribution and pay special attention to unacceptable outcomes The fact that we have challenges that with some probability might be infinite and therefore fundamentally irreversible is difficult to comprehend, and physiologically they are something our brains are poorly equipped to respond to, according to evolutionary psychologists This psychological denial may be one reason why there is a tendency among some stakeholders to confuse “being optimistic” with denying what science is telling us, and ignoring parts of the probability curve A scientific approach requires us to base our decisions on the whole probability distribution The report has found ample evidence that there are risks with an impact that can end human civilisation and even all human life global risks with potentially infinite impacts increase in both number and probability according to multiple studies The basic ethical aspect of infinite impact is this: a very small group alive today can take decisions that will fundamentally affect all future generations Only in the last few decades has our potential impact reached a level where all future generations can be affected, for the simple reason that we now have the technological capacity to end human civilisation. our 12,000-year history represents 0.024%, of our potential histo our generation has the option of risking everything Comparing 0.024% with the days of a person living to 100 years from the day of conception, this would equal less than nine days and is the first stage of human embryogenesis, the germinal stage An approach to infinite impacts cannot be one of trial-and-error , because there is no opportunity to learn from errors. The reactive approach – see what happens, limit damage, and learn from experience – is unworkable. Instead society must be proactive . This requires foresight to foresee new types of threat and willingness to take decisive preventative action and to bear the costs ( moral and economic) of such actions Institutions and individuals may find it hard to take these risks seriously simply because they lie outside our experience . Our collective fear-response will probably be ill-calibrated to the magnitude of threat Two things make infinite impacts special from a discounting perspective. First, there is no way that future generations can compensate for the impact, as they will not exist. Second, the impact is something that is beyond an individual preference, as society will no longer exist thresholds become invisible in calculations if they occur far in to the future, even if it is current actions that unbalance the system and eventually push it over the threshold Moral collapse of humanity. Humanity may develop along a path that we would currently find morally repellent . The consequences of this are not clear-cut , and depend on value judgements that would be contentious and unshared such as enduring poverty Resource depletion Biodiversity loss has often been argued that declining resources will cause increased conflict Nevertheless such conflicts would not be sufficient in themselves to threaten humanity on a large scale, without a “ System Collapse”

low probability events not only can happen, but they absolutely will happen Risk = Probability × Impact great suffering do not recover infinite irreversible lasts forever peer-reviewed not only can happen probability is increasing unsustainable trends relative “invisibility” infinite impacts discipline people fundamentally different scientific evidence peer-reviewed sources survival of humanity and life on Earth ethical perspective No positive gain can outweigh even a small probability top priority chain of events infinite impacts differ not wilful acts accidents physiologically psychological An approach to infinite impacts cannot be one of trial-and-error moral current actions morally repellent not clear-cut depend on value judgements that would be contentious and unshared enduring poverty not sufficient in themselves to threaten humanity on a large scale, without a “ System Collapse”

["2. Risks with infinite impact: A new category of risks “Most risk management is really just advanced contingency planning and disciplining yourself to realise that, given enough time, very low probability events not only can happen, but they absolutely will happen.” Lloyd Blankfein, Goldman Sachs CEO, July 2013 1 Risk = Probability × Impact Impacts where civilisation collapses to a state of great suffering and do not recover, or a situation where all human life end, are defined as infinite as the result is irreversible and lasts forever. A new group of global risks This is a report about a limited number of global risks – that can be identified through a scientific and transparent process – with impacts of a magnitude that pose a threat to human civilisation, or even possibly to all human life. With such a focus it may surprise some readers to find that the report’s essential aim is to inspire action and dialogue as well as an increased use of the methodologies used for risk assessment. The real focus is not on the almost unimaginable impacts of the risks the report outlines. Its fundamental purpose is to encourage global collaboration and to use this new category of risk as a driver for innovation. The idea that we face a number of global challenges threatening the very basis of our civilisation at the beginning of the 21st century is well accepted in the scientific community, and is studied at a number of leading universities.2 But there is still no coordinated approach to address this group of challenges and turn them into opportunities for a new generation of global cooperation and the creation of a global governance system capable of addressing the greatest challenges of our time. This report has, to the best of our knowledge, created the first science-based list of global risks with a potentially infinite impact and has made the first attempt to provide an initial overview of the uncertainties related to these risks as well as rough quantifications for the probabilities of these impacts. What is risk? Risk is the potential of losing something of value, weighed against the potential to gain something of value. Every day we make different kinds of risk assessments, in more or less rational ways, when we weigh different options against each other. The basic idea of risk is that an uncertainty exists regarding the outcome and that we must find a way to take the best possible decision based on our understanding of this uncertainty.3 To calculate risk the probability of an outcome is often multiplied by the impact. The impact is in most cases measured in economic terms, but it can also be measured in anything we want to avoid, such as suffering. At the heart of a risk assessment is a probability distribution, often described by a probability density function4; see figure X for a graphic illustration. The slightly tilted bell curve is a common probability distribution, but the shape differs and in reality is seldom as smooth as the example. The total area under the curve always represents 100 percent, i.e. all the possible outcomes fit under the curve. In this case (A) represents the most probable impact. With a much lower probability it will be a close to zero impact, illustrated by (B). In the same way as in case B there is also a low probability that the situation will be very significant, illustrated by (C). Figure 1: Probability density function [FIGURE 1 OMITTED] The impacts (A), (B) and (C) all belong to the same category, normal [common] impacts: the impacts may be more or less serious, but they can be dealt with within the current system. The impacts in this report are however of a special kind. These are impacts where everything will be lost and the situation will not be reversible, i.e challenges with potentially infinite impact. In insurance and finance this kind of risk is called “risk of ruin”, an impact where all capital is lost.5 This impact is however only infinite for the company that is losing the money. From society’s perspective, that is not a special category of risk. In this report the focus is on the “risk of ruin” on a global scale and on a human level, in the worst case this is when we risk the extinction of our own species. On a probability curve the impacts in this report are usually at the very far right with a relatively low probability compared with other impacts, illustrated by (D) in Figure 2. Often they are so far out on the tail of the curve that they are not even included in studies. For each risk in this report the probability of an infinite impact is very low compared to the most likely outcome. Some studies even indicate that not all risks in this report can result in an infinite impact. But a significant number of peer-reviewed reports indicate that those impacts not only can happen, but that their probability is increasing due to unsustainable trends. The assumption for this report is that by creating a better understanding of our scientific knowledge regarding risks with a potentially infinite impact, we can inspire initiatives that can turn these risks into drivers for innovation. Not only could a better understanding of the unique magnitude of these risks help address the risks we face, it could also help to create a path towards more sustainable development. The group of global risks discussed in this report are so different from most of the challenges we face that they are hard to comprehend. But that is also why they can help us to build the collaboration we need and drive the development of further solutions that benefit both people and the planet. As noted above, none of the risks in this report is likely to result directly in an infinite impact, and some are probably even physically incapable of doing so. But all are so significant that they could reach a threshold impact able to create social and ecological instability that could trigger a process which could lead to an infinite impact. For several reasons the potentially infinite impacts of the risks in this report are not as well known as they should be. One reason is the way that extreme impacts are often masked by most of the theories and models used by governments and business today. For example, the probability of extreme impacts is often below what is included in studies and strategies. The tendency to exclude impacts below a probability of five percent is one reason for the relative “invisibility” of infinite impacts. The almost standard use of a 95% confidence interval is one reason why low-probability high-impact events are often ignored.6 Figure 2: Probability density function with tail highlighted [FIGURE 2 OMITTED] Climate change is a good example, where almost all of the focus is on the most likely scenarios and there are few studies that include the low-probability high-impact scenarios. In most reports about climate impacts, the impacts caused by warming beyond five or six degrees Celsius are even omitted from tables and graphs even though the IPCC’s own research indicates that the probability of these impacts are often between one and five percent, and sometimes even higher.7 Other aspects that contribute to this relative invisibility include the fact that extreme impacts are difficult to translate into monetary terms, they have a global scope, and they often require a time-horizon of a century or more. They cannot be understood simply by linear extrapolation of current trends, and they lack historical precedents. There is also the fact that the measures required to significantly reduce the probability of infinite impacts will be radical compared to a business-as-usual scenario with a focus on incremental changes. The exact probability of a specific impact is difficult or impossible to estimate.8 However, the important thing is to establish the current magnitude of the probabilities and compare them with the probabilities for such impacts we cannot accept. A failure to provide any estimate for these risks often results in strategies and priorities defined as though the probability of a totally unacceptable outcome is zero. An approximate number for a best estimate also makes it easier to understand that a great uncertainty means the actual probability can be both much higher and much lower than the best estimate. It should also be stressed that uncertainty is not a weakness in science; it always exists in scientific work. It is a systematic way of understanding the limitations of the methodology, data, etc.9 Uncertainty is not a reason to wait to take action if the impacts are serious. Increased uncertainty is something that risk experts, e.g. insurance experts and security policy experts, interpret as a signal for action. A contrasting challenge is that our cultural references to the threat of infinite impacts have been dominated throughout history by religious groups seeking to scare society without any scientific backing, often as a way to discipline people and implement unpopular measures. It should not have to be said, but this report is obviously fundamentally different as it focuses on scientific evidence from peer-reviewed sources. Infinite impact The concept infinite impact refers to two aspects in particular; the terminology is not meant to imply a literally infinite impact (with all the mathematical subtleties that would imply) but to serve as a reminder that these risks are of a different nature. Ethical These are impacts that threaten the very survival of humanity and life on Earth – and therefore can be seen as being infinitely negative from an ethical perspective. No positive gain can outweigh even a small probability for an infinite negative impact. Such risks require society to ensure that we eliminate these risks by reducing the impact below an infinite impact as a top priority, or at least do everything we can to reduce the probability of these risks. As some of these risks are impossible to eliminate today it is also important to discuss what probability can right now be accepted for risks with a possible infinite impact. Economic Infinite impacts are beyond what most traditional economic models today are able to cope with. The impacts are irreversible in the most fundamental way, so tools like cost-benefit assessment seldom make sense. To use discounting that makes infinite impacts (which could take place 100 years or more from now and affect all future generations) close to invisible in economic assessments, is another example of a challenge with current tools. So while tools like cost-benefit models and discounting can help us in some areas, they are seldom applicable in the context of infinite impacts. New tools are needed to guide the global economy in an age of potential infinite impacts. See chapter 2.2.2 for a more detailed iscussion. Roulette and Russian roulette When probability and normal risks are discussed the example of a casino and roulette is often used. You bet something, then spin the wheel and with a certain probability you win or lose. You can use different odds to discuss different kinds of risk taking. These kinds of thought experiment can be very useful, but when it comes to infinite risks these gaming analogies become problematic. For infinite impact a more appropriate analogy is probably Russian roulette. But instead of “normal” Russian roulette where you only bet your own life you are now also betting everyone you know and everyone you don’t know. Everyone alive will die if you lose. There will be no second chance for anyone as there will be no future generations; humanity will end with your loss. What probability would you accept for different sums of money if you played this version of Russian roulette? Most people would say that it is stupid and – no matter how low the probability is and no matter how big the potential win is – this kind of game should not be played, as it is unethical. Many would also say that no person should be allowed to make such a judgment, as those who are affected do not have a say. You could add that most of those who will lose from it cannot say anything as they are not born and will never exist if you lose. The difference between ordinary roulette and “allhumanity Russian roulette” is one way of illustrating the difference in nature between a “normal” risk that is reversible, and a risk with an infinite impact. An additional challenge in acknowledging the risks outlined in this report is that many of the traditional risks including wars and violence have decreased, even though it might not always looks that way in media.10 So a significant number of experts today spend a substantial amount of time trying to explain that much of what is discussed as dangerous trends might not be as dangerous as we think. For policy makers listening only to experts in traditional risk areas it is therefore easy to get the impression that global risks are becoming less of a problem. The chain of events that could result in infinite impacts in this report also differ from most of the traditional risks, as most of them are not triggered by wilful acts, but accidents/mistakes. Even the probabilities related to nuclear war in this report are to a large degree related to inadvertent escalation. As many of the tools to analyse and address risks have been developed to protect nations and states from attacks, risks involving accidents tend to get less attention. This report emphasises the need for an open and democratic process in addressing global challenges with potentially infinite impact. Hence, this is a scientifically based invitation to discuss how we as a global community can address what could be considered the greatest challenges of our time. The difficulty for individual scientists to communicate a scientific risk approach should however not be underestimated. Scientists who today talk about low-probability impacts, that are serious but still far from infinite, are often accused of pessimism and scaremongering, even if they do nothing but highlight scientific findings.11 To highlight infinite impacts with even lower probability can therefore be something that a scientist who cares about his/her reputation would want to avoid. In the media it is still common to contrast the most probable climate impact with the probability that nothing, or almost nothing, will happen. The fact that almost nothing could happen is not wrong in most cases, but it is unscientific and dangerous if different levels of probability are presented as equal. The tendency to compare the most probable climate impact with the possibility of a low or no impact also results in a situation where low-probability high-impact outcomes are often totally ignored. An honest and scientific approach is to, whenever possible, present the whole probability distribution and pay special attention to unacceptable outcomes. The fact that we have challenges that with some probability might be infinite and therefore fundamentally irreversible is difficult to comprehend, and physiologically they are something our brains are poorly equipped to respond to, according to evolutionary psychologists.12 It is hard for us as individuals to grasp that humanity for the first time in its history now has the capacity to create such catastrophic outcomes. Professor Marianne Frankenhaeuser, former head of the psychology division, Karolinska Institute, Stockholm, put it this way: “Part of the answer is to be found in psychological defence mechanisms. The nuclear threat is collectively denied, because to face it would force us to face some aspects of the world’s situation which we do not want to recognise.” 13 This psychological denial may be one reason why there is a tendency among some stakeholders to confuse “being optimistic” with denying what science is telling us, and ignoring parts of the probability curve.14 Ignoring the fact that there is strong scientific evidence for serious impacts in different areas, and focusing only on selected sources which suggest that the problem may not be so serious, is not optimistic. It is both unscientific and dangerous.15 A scientific approach requires us to base our decisions on the whole probability distribution. Whether it is possible to address the challenge or not is the area where optimism and pessimism can make people look at the same set of data and come to different conclusions. Two things are important to keep in mind: first, that there is always a probability distribution when it comes to risk; second, that there are two different kinds of impacts that are of interest for this report. The probability distribution can have different shapes but in simplified cases the shape tends to look like a slightly modified clock (remember figure 1). In the media it can sound as though experts argue whether an impact, for example a climate impact or a pandemic, will be dangerous or not. But what serious experts discuss is the probability of different oucomes. They can disagree on the shape of the curve or what curves should be studied, but not that a probability curve exists. With climate change this includes discussions about how sensitive the climate is, how much greenhouse gas will be emitted, and what impacts that different warmings will result in. Just as it is important not to ignore challenges with potentially infinite impacts, it is also important not to use them to scare people. Dramatic images and strong language are best avoided whenever possible, as this group of risks require sophisticated strategies that benefit from rational arguments. Throughout history we have seen too many examples when threats of danger have been damagingly used to undermine important values. The history of infinite impacts: The LA-602 document The understanding of infinite impacts is very recent compared with most of our institutions and laws. It is only 70 years ago that Edward Teller, one of the greatest physicists of his time, with his back-of-the-envelope calculations, produced results that differed drastically from all that had gone before. His calculations indicated that the explosion of a nuclear bomb – a creation of some of the brightest minds on the planet, including Teller himself – could result in a chain reaction so powerful that it would ignite the world’s atmosphere, thereby ending human life on Earth.16 Robert Oppenheimer, who led the Manhattan Project to develop the nuclear bomb, halted the project to see whether Teller’s calculations were correct.17 The resulting document, LA- 602: Ignition of the Atmosphere with Nuclear Bombs, concluded that Teller was wrong, But the sheer complexity drove them to end their assessment by writing that “further work on the subject [is] highly desirable”.18 The LA-602 document can be seen as the first scientific global risk report addressing a category of risks where the worst possible impact in all practical senses is infinite.19 Since the atomic bomb more challenges have emerged with potentially infinite impact. Allmost all of these new challenges are linked to the increased knowledge, economic and technical development that has brought so many benefits. For example, climate change is the result of the industrial revolution and development that was, and still is, based heavily on fossil fuel. The increased potential for global pandemics is the result of an integrated global economy where goods and services move quickly around the world, combined with rapid urbanisation and high population density. In parallel with the increased number of risks with possible infinite impact, our capacity to analyse and solve them has greatly increased too. Science and technology today provides us with knowledge and tools that can radically reduce the risks that historically have been behind major extinctions, such as pandemics and asteroids. Recent challenges like climate change, and emerging challenges like synthetic biology and nanotechnology, can to a large degree be addressed by smart use of new technologies, new lifestyles and institutional structures. It will be hard as it will require collaboration of a kind that we have not seen before. It will also require us to create systems that can deal with the problems before they occur. The fact that the same knowledge and tools can be both a problem and a solution is important to understand in order to avoid polarisation. Within a few decades, or even sooner, many of the tools that can help us solve the global challenges of today will come from fields likely to provide us with the most powerful instruments we have ever had – resulting in their own sets of challenges. Synthetic biology, nanotechnology and artificial intelligence (AI) are all rapidly evolving fields with great potential. They may help solve many of today’s main challenges or, if not guided in a benign direction, may result in catastrophic outcomes. The point of departure of this report is the fact that we now have the knowledge, economic resources and technological ability to reduce most of the greatest risks of our time. Conversely, the infinite impacts we face are almost all unintended results of human ingenuity. The reason we are in this situation is that we have made progress in many areas without addressing unintended low-probability high-impact consequences. Creating innovative and resilient systems rather than simply managing risk would let us focus more on opportunities. But the resilience needed require moving away from legacy systems is likely to be disruptive, so an open and transparent discussion is needed regarding the transformative solutions required. Figure 3: Probability density function with tail and threshold highlighted [FIGURE 3 OMITTED] 2.1 Report structure The first part of the report is an introduction where the global risks with potential infinite impact are introduced and defined. This part also includes the methodology for selecting these risks, and presents the twelve risks that meet this definition. Four goals of the report are also presented, under the headings “acknowledge”, “inspire”, “connect” and “deliver”. The second part is an overview of the twelve global risks and key events that illustrate some of the work around the world to address them. For each challenge five important factors that influence the probability or impact are also listed. The risks are divided into four different categories depending on their characteristics. “Current challenges” is the first category and includes the risks that currently threaten humanity due to our economic and technological development - extreme climate change, for example, which depends on how much greenhouse gas we emit. “Exogenic challenges” includes risks where the basic probability of an event is beyond human control, but where the probability and magnitude of the impact can be influenced - asteroid impacts, for example, where the asteroids’ paths are beyond human control but an impact can be moderated by either changing the direction of the asteroid or preparing for an impact. “Emerging challenges” includes areas where technological development and scientific assessment indicate that they could both be a very important contribution to human welfare and help reduce the risks associated with current challenges, but could also result in new infinite impacts.20 AI, nanotechnology and synthetic biology are examples. “Global policy challenge” is a different kind of risk. It is a probable threat arising from future global governance as it resorts to destructive policies, possibly in response to the other challenges listed above. The third part of the report discusses the relationship between the different risks. Action to reduce one risk can increase another, unless their possible links are understood. Many solutions are also able to address multiple risks, so there are significant benefits from understanding how one relates to others. Investigating these correlations could be a start, but correlation is a linear measure and non-linear techniques may be more helpful for assessing the aggregate risk. The fourth part is an overview, the first ever to our knowledge, of the uncertainties and probabilities of global risks with potentially infinite impacts. The numbers are only rough estimates and are meant to be a first step in a dialogue where methodologies are developed and estimates refined. The fifth part presents some of the most important underlying trends that influence the global challenges, which often build up slowly until they reach a threshold and very rapid changes ensue. The sixth and final part presents an overview of possible ways forward. 2.2 Goals Goal 1: Acknowledge That key stakeholders, influencing global challenges, acknowledge the existence of the category of risks that could result in infinite impact. They should also recognice that the list of risks that belong to this category should be revised as new technologies are developed and our knowledge increases. Regardless of the risks included, the category should be given special attention in all processes and decisions of relevance. The report also seeks to demonstrate to all key stakeholders that we have the capacity to reduce, or even eliminate, most of the risks in this category. Establish a category of risks with potentially infinite impact. Before anything significant can happen regarding global risks with potentially infinite impacts, their existence must be acknowledged. Rapid technological development and economic growth have delivered unprecedented material welfare to billions of people in a veritable tide of utopias.21 But we now face the possibility that even tools created with the best of intentions can have a darker side too, a side that may threaten human civilisation, and conceivably the continuation of human life. This is what all decision-makers need to recognise. Rather than succumbing to terror, we need to acknowledge that we can let the prospect inspire and drive us forward. Goal 2: Inspire That policy makers inspire action by explaining how the probabilities and impacts can be reduced and turned into opportunities. Concrete examples of initiatives should be communicated in different networks in order to create ripple effects, with the long-term goal that all key stakeholders should be inspired to turn these risks into opportunities for positive action. Show concrete action that is taking place today. This report seeks to show that it is not only possible to contribute to reducing these risks, but that it is perhaps the most important thing anyone can spend their time on. It does so by combining information about the risks with information about individuals and groups who has made a significant contribution by turning challenges into opportunities. By highlighting concrete examples the report hopes to inspire a new generation of leaders. Goal 3: Connect That leaders in different sectors connect with each other to encourage collaboration. A specific focus on financial and security policy where significant risks combine to demand action beyond the incremental is required. Support new meetings between interested stakeholders. The nature of these risks spans countries and continents; they require action by governments and politicians, but also by companies, academics, NGOs, and many other groups. The magnitude of the possible impacts requires not only leaders to act but above all new models for global cooperation and decision-making to ensure delivery. The need for political leadership is therefore crucial. Even with those risks where many groups are involved, such as climate change and pandemics, very few today address the possibility of infinite impact aspects. Even fewer groups address the links between the different risks. There is also a need to connect different levels of work, so that local, regional, national and international efforts can support each other when it comes to risks with potentially infinite impacts. Goal 4: Deliver That concrete strategies are developed that allow key stakeholders to identify, quantify and address global challenges as well as gather support for concrete steps towards a wellfunctioning global governance system. This would include tools and initiatives that can help identify, quantify and reduce risks with potentially infinite impacts. Identify and implement strategies and initiatives. Reports can acknowledge, inspire and connect, but only people can deliver actual results. The main focus of the report is to show that actual initiatives need to be taken that deliver actual results. Only when the probability of an infinite impact becomes acceptably low, very close to zero, and/or when the maximum impact is significantly reduced, should we talk about real progress. In order to deliver results it is important to remember that global governance to tackle these risks is the way we organise society in order to address our greatest challenges. It is not a question of establishing a “world government”, it is about the way we organise ourselves on all levels, from the local to the global. The report is a first step and should be seen as an invitation to all responsible parties that can affect the probability and impact of risks with potentially infinite impacts. But its success will ultimately be measured only on how it contributes to concrete results. 2.3 Global challenges and infinite impact This chapter first introduces the concept of infinite impact. It then describes the methodology used to identify challenges with an infinite impact. It then presents risks with potentially infinite impact that the methodology results in. 2.3.1 Definition of infinite impact The specific criterion for including a risk in this report is that well-sourced science shows the challenge can have the following consequences: 22 1. Infinite impact: When civilisation collapses to a state of great suffering and does not recover, or a situation where all human life ends. The existence of such threats is well attested by science.23 2. Infinite impact threshold – an impact that can trigger a chain of events that could result first in a civilisation collapse, and then later result in an infinite impact. Such thresholds are especially important to recognise in a complex and interconnected society where resilience is decreasing.24 A collapse of civilisation is defined as a drastic decrease in human population size and political/economic/social complexity, globally for an extended time.25 The above definition means the list of challenges is not static. When new challenges emerge, or current ones fade away, the list will change. An additional criterion for including risks in this report is “human influence”. Only risks where humans can influence either the probability, the impact, or both, are included. For most risks both impact and probability can be affected, for example with nuclear war, where the number/size of weapons influences the impact and tensions between countries affects the probability. Other risks, such as a supervolcano, are included as it is possible to affect the impact through various mitigation methods, even if we currently cannot affect the probability. Risks that are susceptible to human influence are indirectly linked, because efforts to address one of them may increase or decrease the likelihood of another. 2.3.2 Why use “infinite impact” as a concept? The concept of infinity was chosen as it reflects many of the challenges, especially in economic theory, to addressing these risks as well as the need to question much of our current way of thinking. The concept of a category of risks based on their extreme impact is meant to provide a tool to distinguish one particular kind of risk from others. The benefit of this new concept should be assessed based on two things. First, does the category exist, and second, is the concept helpful in addressing these risks? The report has found ample evidence that there are risks with an impact that can end human civilisation and even all human life. The report further concludes that a new category of risk is not only meaningful but also timely. We live in a society where global risks with potentially infinite impacts increase in both number and probability according to multiple studies. Looking ahead, many emerging technologies which will certainly provide beneficial results, might also result in an increased probability of infinite impacts.26 Over the last few years a greater understanding of low probability or unknown probability events has helped more people to understand the importance of looking beyond the most probable scenarios. Concepts like “black swans” and “perfect storms” are now part of mainstream policy and business language.27 Greater understanding of the technology and science of complex systems has also resulted in a new understanding of potentially disruptive events. Humans now have such an impact on the planet that the term “the anthropocene” is being used, even by mainstream media like The Economist.28 The term was introduced in the 90s by the Nobel Prize winner Paul Crutzen to describe how humans are now the dominant force changing the Earth’s ecosystems.29 The idea to establish a well defined category of risks that focus on risks with a potentially infinite impact that can be used as a practical tool by policy makers is partly inspired by Nick Bostrom’s philosophical work and his introduction of a risk taxonomy that includes an academic category called “existential risks”.30 Introducing a category with risks that have a potentially infinite impact is not meant to be a mathematical definition; infinity is a thorny mathematical concept and nothing in reality can be infinite.31 It is meant to illustrate a singularity, when humanity is threatened, when many of the tools used to approach most challenges today become problematic, meaningless, or even counterproductive. The concept of an infinite impact highlights a unique situation where humanity itself is threatened and the very idea of value and price collapses from a human perspective, as the price of the last humans also can be seen to be infinite. This is not to say that those traditional tools cannot still be useful, but with infinite impacts we need to add an additional set of analytical tools. Life Value The following estimates have been applied to the value of life in the US. The estimates are either for one year of additional life or for the statistical value of a single life. – $50,000 per year of quality life (international standard most private and government-run health insurance plans worldwide use to determine whether to cover a new medical procedure) – $129,000 per year of quality life (based on analysis of kidney dialysis procedures by Stefanos Zenios and colleagues at Stanford Graduate School of Business) – $7.4 million (Environmental Protection Agency) – $7.9 million (Food and Drug Administration) – $6 million (Transportation Department) – $28 million (Richard Posner based on the willingness to pay for avoiding a plane crash) Source: Wikipedia: Value of life http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Value_of_life US EPA: Frequently Asked Questions on Mortality Risk Valuation http://yosemite.epa.gov/EE%5Cepa%5Ceed.nsf/webpages/MortalityRiskValuation.html Posner, Richard A. Catastrophe: risk and response. Oxford University Press, 2004 Some of the risks, including nuclear war, climate change and pandemics, are often included in current risk overviews, but in many cases their possible infinite impacts are excluded. The impacts which are included are in most cases still very serious, but only the more probable parts of the probability distributions are included, and the last part of the long tail – where the infinite impact is found – is excluded.32 Most risk reports do not differentiate between challenges with a limited impact and those with a potential for infinite impact. This is dangerous, as it can mean resources are spent in ways that increase the probability of an infinite impact. Ethical aspects of infinite impact The basic ethical aspect of infinite impact is this: a very small group alive today can take decisions that will fundamentally affect all future generations. “All future generations” is not a concept that is often discussed, and for good reason. All through human history we have had no tools with a measurable global impact for more than a few generations. Only in the last few decades has our potential impact reached a level where all future generations can be affected, for the simple reason that we now have the technological capacity to end human civilisation. If we count human history from the time when we began to practice settled agriculture, that gives us about 12,000 years.33 If we make a moderate assumption that humanity will live for at least 50 million more years34 our 12,000-year history so far represents 1/4200, or 0.024%, of our potential history. So our generation has the option of risking everything and annulling 99.976% of our potential history. Comparing 0.024% with the days of a person living to 100 years from the day of conception, this would equal less than nine days and is the first stage of human embryogenesis, the germinal stage.35 Two additional arguments to treat potentially infinite impacts as a separate category are: 36 1. An approach to infinite impacts cannot be one of trial-and-error, because there is no opportunity to learn from errors. The reactive approach – see what happens, limit damage, and learn from experience – is unworkable. Instead society must be proactive. This requires foresight to foresee new types of threat and willingness to take decisive preventative action and to bear the costs (moral and economic) of such actions. 2. We cannot necessarily rely on the institutions, morality, social attitudes or national security policies that developed from our experience of other sorts of risk. Infinite impacts are in a different category. Institutions and individuals may find it hard to take these risks seriously simply because they lie outside our experience. Our collective fear-response will probably be ill-calibrated to the magnitude of threat. Economic aspects of infinite impact and discounting In today’s society a monetary value is sometimes ascribed to human life. Some experts use this method to estimate risk by assigning a monetary value to human extinction.37 We have to remember that the monetary values placed on a human life in most cases are not meant to suggest that we have actually assigned a specific value to a life. Assigning a value to a human life is a tool used in a society with a limited supply of resources or infrastructure (ambulances, perhaps) or skills. In such a society it is impossible to save every life, so some trade-off must be made.38 The US Environmental Protection Agency explains its use like this: “The EPA does not place a dollar value on individual lives. Rather, when conducting a benefit-cost analysis of new environmental policies, the Agency uses estimates of how much people are willing to pay for small reductions in their risks of dying from adverse health conditions that may be caused by environmental pollution.” 39 The fact that monetary values for human lives can help to define priorities when it comes to smaller risks does not mean that they are suitable for quite different uses. Applying a monetary value to the whole human race makes little sense to most people, and from an economic perspective it makes no sense. Money helps us to prioritise, but with no humans there would be no economy and no need for priorities. Ignoring, or discounting, future generations is actually the only way to avoid astronomical numbers for impacts that may seriously affect every generation to come. In Catastrophe: Risk and Response, Richard Posner provides a cost estimate, based on the assumption that a human life is worth $50,000, resulting in a $300 tn cost for the whole of humanity, assuming a population of six billion. He then doubles the population number to include the value of all future generations, ending up with $600 tn, while acknowledging that “without discounting, the present value of the benefits of risk-avoidance measures would often approach infinity for the type of catastrophic risk with which this book is concerned.” 40 Discounting for risks that include the possibility of an infinite impact differs from risk discounting for less serious impacts. For example the Stern Review41 prompted a discussion between its chief author, Nicholas Stern, and William Nordhaus,42 each of whom argued for different discount levels using different arguments. But neither discussed a possible infinite climate impact. An overview of the discussion by David Evans of Oxford Brookes University highlighted some of the differing assumptions.43 Two things make infinite impacts special from a discounting perspective. First, there is no way that future generations can compensate for the impact, as they will not exist. Second, the impact is something that is beyond an individual preference, as society will no longer exist. Discounting is undertaken to allocate resources in the most productive way. In cases that do not include infinite impacts, discounting “reflects the fact that there are many high-yield investments that would improve the quality of life for future generations. The discount rate should be set so that our investable funds are devoted to the most productive uses.” 44 When there is a potentially infinite impact, the focus is no longer on what investments have the best rate of return, it is about avoiding the ultimate end. While many economists shy away from infinite impacts, those exploring the potentially extreme impacts of global challenges often assume infinite numbers to make their point. Nordhaus for example writes that “the sum of undiscounted anxieties would be infinite (i.e. equal to 1 + 1 +1 + … = ∞). In this situation, most of us would dissolve in a sea of anxiety about all the things that could go wrong for distant generations from asteroids, wars, out-of-control robots, fat tails, smart dust and other disasters.” 45 It is interesting that Nordhaus himself provides very good graphs that show why the most important factor when determining actions is a possible threshold (see below Figure 4 and 5). Nordhaus was discussing climate change, but the role of thresholds is similar for most infinite impacts. The first figure is based on traditional economic approaches which assume that Nature has no thresholds; the second graph illustrates what happens with the curve when a threshold exists. As Nordhaus also notes, it is hard to establish thresholds, but if they are significant all other assumptions become secondary. The challenge that Nordhaus does not address, and which is important especially with climate change, is that thresholds become invisible in economic calculations if they occur far into the future, even if it is current actions that unbalance the system and eventually push it over the threshold.46 Note that these dramatic illustrations rest on assumptions that the thresholds are still relatively benign, not moving us beyond tipping points which result in an accelerated release of methane that could result in a temperature increase of more than 8 °C, possibly producing infinite impacts.47 Calculating illustrative numbers By including the welfare of future generations, something that is important when their very existence is threatened, economic discounting becomes difficult. In this chapter, some illustrative numbers are provided to indicate the order of magnitude of the values that calculations provide when traditional calculations also include future generations. These illustrative calculations are only illustrative as the timespans that must be used make all traditional assumptions questionable to say the least. Still, as an indicator for why infinite impact might be a good approximation they might help. As a species that can manipulate our environment it could be argued that the time the human race will be around, if we do not kill ourselves, can be estimated to be between 1-10 million years – the typical time period for the biological evolution of a successful species48 – and one billion years, the inhabitable time of Earth.49 [FIGURE 4 OMITTED] [FIGURE 5 OMITTED] If we assume – 50 million years for the future of humanity as our reference, – an average life expectancy of 100 years50, and – a global population of 6 billion people51 – all conservative estimate – , we have half a million generations ahead of us with a total of 3 quadrillion individuals. Assuming a value of $50,000 per life, the cost of losing them would then be $1.5 ×1020, or $150 quintillion. This is a very low estimate, and Posner suggests that maybe the cost of a life should be “written up $28 million” for catastrophic risks52. Posner’s calculations where only one future generation is included result in a cost of $336 quadrillion. If we include all future generations with the same value, $28 million, the result is a total cost of $86 sextillion, or $86 × 1021. This $86 sextillion is obviously a very rough number (using one billion years instead of 50 million would for example require us to multiply the results by 20), but again it is the magnitude that is interesting. As a reference there are about 1011 to 1012 stars in our galaxy, and perhaps something like the same number of galaxies. With this simple calculation you get 1022 to 1024, or 10 to 1,000 sextillion, stars in the universe to put the cost of infinite impacts when including future generations in perspective.53 These numbers can be multiplied many times if a more philosophical and technology-optimistic scenario is assumed for how many lives we should include in future generations. The following quote is from an article by Nick Bostrom in Global Policy Journal: “However, the relevant figure is not how many people could live on Earth but how many descendants we could have in total. One lower bound of the number of biological human life-years in the future accessible universe (based on current cosmological estimates) is 1034 years. Another estimate, which assumes that future minds will be mainly implemented in computational hardware instead of biological neuronal wetware, produces a lower bound of 1054 human-brain-emulation subjective life-years.” 54 Likewise the value of a life, $28 million, a value that is based on an assessment of how individuals chose when it comes to flying, can be seen as much too small. This value is based on how much we value our own lives on the margin, and it is reasonable to assume that the value would be higher than only a multiplication of our own value if we also considered the risk of losing our family, everyone we know, as well as everyone else on the planet. In the same way as the cost increases when a certain product is in short supply, the cost of the last humans could be assumed to be very high, if not infinite. Obviously, the very idea to put a price on the survival of humanity can be questioned for good reasons, but if we still want to use a number, $28 million per life should at least be considered as a significant underestimation. For those that are reluctant or unable to use infinity in calculations and are in need of a number for their formulas, $86 sextillion could be a good initial start for the cost of infinite impacts. But it is important to note that this number might be orders of magnitude smaller than an estimate which actually took into account a more correct estimation of the number of people that should be included in future generations as well as the price that should be assigned to the loss of the last humans. 2.3.3 Infinite impact threshold (IIT) As we address very complex systems, such as human civilisation and global ecosystems, a concept as important as infinite impact in this report is that of infinity impact threshold. This is the impact level that can trigger a chain of events that results in the end of human civilisation. The infinite impact threshold (IIT) concept represents the idea that long before an actual infinite impact is reached there is a tipping point where it (with some probability) is no longer possible to reverse events. So instead of focusing only on the ultimate impact it is important to estimate what level of impact the infinity threshold entails. The IIT is defined as an impact that can trigger a chain of events that could result first in a civilisation collapse, and then later result in an infinite impact. Such thresholds are especially important to recognise in a complex and interconnected society where resilience is decreasing. Social and ecological systems are complex, and in most complex systems there are thresholds where positive feedback loops become self-reinforcing. In a system where resilience is too low, feedback loops can result in a total system collapse. These thresholds are very difficult to estimate and in most cases it is possible only to estimate their order of magnitude. As David Orrell and Patrick McSharry wrote in A Systems Approach to Forecasting: “Complex systems have emergent properties, qualities that cannot be predicted in advance from knowledge of systems components alone”. According to complexity scientist Stephen Wolfram’s principle of computational irreducibility, the only way to predict the evolution of such a system is to run the system itself: “There is no simple set of equations that can look into its future.” 55 Orrell and McSharry also noted that “in orthodox economics, the reductionist approach means that the economy is seen as consisting of individual, independent agents who act to maximise their own utility. It assumes that prices are driven to a state of near-equilibrium by the ‘invisible hand’ of the economy. Deviations from this state are assumed to be random and independent, so the price fluctuations are often modelled using the normal distribution or other distributions with thin tails and finite variance.” The drawbacks of an approach using the normal distribution, or other distributions with thin tails and finite variance, become obvious when the unexpected happens as in the recent credit crunch, when existing models totally failed to capture the true risks of the economy. As an employee of Lehman Brothers put it on August 11, 2007: “Events that models predicted would happen only once in 10,000 years happened every day for three days.” 56 [FIGURE 6 OMITTED] The exact level for an infinite impact threshold should not be the focus, but rather the fact that such thresholds exists and that an order of magnitude should be estimated.57 During the process of writing the report, experts suggested that a relatively quick death of two billion people could be used as a tentative number until more research is available.58 With current trends undermining ecological and social resilience it should be noted that the threshold level is likely to become lower as time progress. 2.3.4 Global F-N curves and ALARP In the context of global risks with potentially infinite impact, the possibility of establishing global F-N curves is worth exploring. One of the most common and flexible frameworks used for risk criteria divides risks into three bands: 59 1. Upper: an unacceptable/ intolerable region, where risks are intolerable except in extraordinary circumstances and risk reduction measures are essential. 2. Middle: an ALARP (“as low as reasonably practicable”) region, where risk reduction measures are desirable but may not be implemented if their cost is disproportionate to the benefit achieved. 3. Lower: a broadly acceptable/ negligible region, where no further risk reduction measures are needed. The bands are expressed by F-N curves. When the frequency of events which cause at least N fatalities is plotted against the number N on log–log scales, the result is called an F-N curve.60 If the frequency scale is replaced by annual probability, then the resultant curve is called an f-N curve. The concept for the middle band when using F-N curves is ALARP. It is a term often used in the area of safety-critical and safety-involved systems.62 The ALARP principle is that the residual risk should be as low as reasonably practicable. The upper band, the unacceptable/ intolerable region, is usually the area above the ALARP area (see figure 8) By using F-N curves it is also possible to establish absolute impact levels that are never acceptable, regardless of probability (Figure 7. Based on an actual F-n Curve showing an absolute impact level that is defined as unacceptable). This has been done in some cases for local projects. The infinite threshold could be used to create an impact limit on global F-N curves used for global challenges in the future. Such an approach would help governments, companies and researchers when they develop new technical solutions and when investing in resilience. Instead of reducing risk, such an approach encourages the building of systems which cannot have negative impacts above a certain level. Pros – Clearly shows relationship between frequency and size of accident – Allows judgement on relative importance of different sizes of accident – Slope steeper than -1 provides explicit consideration of multiple fatality aversion and favours concepts with lower potential for large fatality events – Allows company to manage overall risk exposure from portfolio of all existing and future facilities Cons – Cumulative expression makes it difficult to interpret, especially by non-risk specialists – Can be awkard to derive – May be difficult to use if criterion is exceeded in one area but otherwise is well below – Much debate about criterion lines Figure 7: Example of F-n curve showing different levels of risk 61 Figure 9: Pros and cons of F-N curves 63 46 Global Challenges – Twelve risks that threaten human civilisation – The case for a new category of risks 2.3 Global challenges and infinite impact practical guidance that can provide defined group of risks 2.3.5 A name for a clearly 10 100 1000 10000 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10-2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 Number of Fatalities (N) Frequency (F) of Accidents with N or More Fatalities (Per Year) ALARP region Unacceptable Acceptable Today no established methodology exists that provides a constantly updated list of risks that threaten human civilisation, or even all human life. Given that such a category can help society to better understand and act to avoid such risks, and better understand the relation between these risks, it can be argued that a name for this category would be helpful.65 To name something that refers to the end of humanity is in itself a challenge, as the very idea is so far from our usual references and to many the intuitive feeling will be to dismiss any such thing. The concept used in this report is “infinity”. The reson for this is that many of the challenges relate to discussed. In one way the name is not very important so long as people understand the impacts and risks associated with it. Still, a name is symbolic and can either help or make it more difficult to get support to establish the new category. The work to establish a list of risks with infinite impact evolved from “existential risk”, the philosophical concept that inspired much of the work to establish a clearly defined group of risks. The reason for not using the concept “existential risk and impact” for this category, beside the fact that existential impact is also used in academic contexts to refer to a personal impact, is that the infinite category is a smaller subset of “existential risk” and this new category is meant to be used as a tool, not a scientific concept. Not only should the impacts in the category potentially result in the end of all human life, it should be possible to affect the probability and/or impact of that risk. There must also exist an agreed methodology, such as the one suggested in this report, that decides what risks belong and not belong on the list. Another concept that the category relates to is “global catastrophic risk” as it is one of the most used concepts among academics interested in infinite impacts. However it is vague enough to be used to refer to impacts from a few thousand deaths to the end of human civilisation. Already in use but not clearly defined, it includes both the academic concept existential risks and the category of risks with infinite impacts. macroeconomics and its challenges in relation to the kind of impacts that the risks in this report focus on. Further, the name clearly highlights the unique nature without any normative judgements. Still, infinity is an abstract concept and it might not be best communicate the unique group of risks that it covers to all stakeholders. In the same way as it can be hard to use singularity to describe a black hole, it can be difficult to use infinity to describe a certain risk. If people can accept that it is only from a specific perspective that the infinity concept is relevant it could be used beyond the areas of macroeconomics. Two other concepts that also have been considered during the process of writing this report are “xrisks” and “human risk of ruin”. Xrisk has the advantage, and disadvantage, of not really saying anything at all about the risk. The positive aspect is that the name can be associated with the general concept of extinction and the philosophical concept of existential risk as both have the letter x in them. The disadvantage is the x often represents the unknown and can therefore relate to any risk. There is nothing in the name that directly relates to the kind of impacts that the category covers, so it is easy to interpret the term as just unknown risks. Human risk of ruin has the advantage of having a direct link to a concept, risk of ruin, that relates to a very specific state where all is lost. Risk of ruin is a concept in use in gambling, insurance, and finance that can all give very important contributions to the work with this new category of risk. The resemblance to an existing concept that is well established could be both a strength and a liability. Below is an overview of the process when different names were Figure 8: Example of F-n curve showing an absolute impact level that is defined as unacceptable/ infinite. i.e no level of probability is acceptable above a certain level of impact, in this case 1000 dead 64 Global Challenges – Twelve risks that threaten human civilisation – The case for a new category of risks 47 2.3 Global challenges and infinite impact 3. 2. 1. 9. Unacceptable risks in different combinations, e.g. unacceptable global risks – This is probably not appropriate for two main reasons. First, it is a normative statement and the category aims to be scientific; whether these risks are unacceptable or not is up to the citizens of the world to decide. Second, the idea of risk is that it is a combination of probability times impact. If a risk is unacceptable is therefore also usually related to how easy it is to avoid. Even if a risk is small, due to relatively low probability and relatively low impact, but is very easy to address, it can be seen as unacceptable, in the same way a large risk can be seen as acceptable if it would require significant resources to reduce. There will not be a perfect concept and the question is what concept can find the best balance between being easy to understand, acceptable where policy decisions needs to be made and also acceptable for all key groups that are relevant for work in these area. During the process to find a name for this category inspiration has been found in the process when new concepts have been introduced; from irrational numbers and genocide to sustainable development and the Human Development Index. So far “infinite risk” can be seen as the least bad concept in some areas and “xrisks” and “human risk of ruin” the least bad in others. The purpose of this report is to establish a methodology to identify a very specific group of risks as well as continue to a process where these risks will be addressed in a systematic and appropriate way. The issue of naming this group of risks will be left to others. The important is that the category gets the attention it deserves. The three concepts are very different. Global catastrophic risk is possibly the most used concept in contexts where infinite impacts are included, but it is without any clear definition. Existential risk is an academic concept used by a much smaller group and with particular focus on future technologies. The category in this report is a tool to help decision makers develop strategies that help reduce the probability that humanity will end when it can be avoided. The relation between the three concepts can be illustrated with three circles. The large circle (1) represents global catastrophic risks, the middle one (2) existential risks and the small circle (3) the list of twelve risks in this report, i.e. risks where there are peer reviewed academic studies that estimate the probability of an infinite impact and where there are known ways to reduce the risk. A list that could be called infinite risks, xrisks, or human risk of ruin. Other concepts that are related to infinite impacts that could potentially be used to describe the same category if the above suggestions are not seen as acceptable concepts are presented below, together with the main reason why these concepts were not chosen for this report. 1. Risk of ruin – is a concept in gambling, insurance and finance relating to the likelihood of losing all one’s capital or affecting one’s bankroll beyond the point of recovery. It is used to describe individual companies rather than systems.66 2. Extinction risk – is used in biology for any species that is threatened. The concept is also used in memory/cognition research. It is a very dramatic term, to be used with care. These factors make it probably unsuitable for use by stakeholders accustomed to traditional risk assessment. 3. Astronomical risk – is seldom used scientifically, but when it is used it is often used for asteroids and is probably best reserved for them.67 4. Apocalyptic risk – could have been suitable, as the original meaning is apocálypsis, from the Greek ἀπό and καλύπτω meaning ‘un-covering’. It is sometime used, but in a more general sense, to mean significant risks.68 But through history and today it is mainly used for a religious end of time scenario. Its strong links to unscientific doom-mongers make it probably unsuitable for a scientific concept. 5. End-of-the-world risk - belongs to the irrational doomsday narratives and so is probably unsuitable for scientific risk assessments. 6. Extreme risk – is vague enough to describe anything beyond the normal, so it is probably unsuitable for risk assessments of this magnitude. 7. Unique risk – is even vaguer, as every risk is unique in some way. Probably best avoided in risk assessments. 8. Collapse risk – is based on Jared Diamond’s thinking.69 There are many different kinds of collapse and only a few result in infinite impact. 48 Global Challenges – Twelve risks that threaten human civilisation – The case for a new category of risks 2.3 Global challenges and infinite impact Estimations of impact Only literature where there is some estimation of impact that indicates the possibility of an infinite impact is included. Leading organisations’ priorities In order to increase the probability of covering all relevant risks an overview of leading organisations' work was conducted. This list was then compared with the initial list and subjected to the same filter regarding the possibility to affect the probability or impact. Possibility of addressing the risk Possibility of addressing the risk: From the risks gathered from literature and organisations, only those where the probability or impact can be affected by human actions are included. Expert review Qualitative assessment: Expert review in order to increase the probability of covering all relevant global risks. List of risks Result: List of risks with potentially infinite impacts. Relevant literature Identification of credible sources: search relevant literature in academic literature included in World of Knowledge and Google Scholar. 1 2 3 4 5 6 This chapter presents the methodology used to identify global risks with potentially infinite impact. Methodology overview In order to establish a list of global risks with potentially infinite impact a methodological triangulation was used, consisting of: – A quantitative assessment of relevant literature. – A strategic selection of relevant organisations and their priorities. – A qualitative assessment with the help of expert workshops. 2.4 Methodology 70 Global Challenges – Twelve risks that threaten human civilisation – The case for a new category of risks 49 2.4 Methodology The scientific review of literature was led by Seth Baum, Executive Director of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute72 and research scientist at the Center for Research on Environmental Decisions, Columbia University.73 The methodology for including global risks with a potentially infinite impact is based on a scientific review of key literature, with focus on peer-reviewed academic journals, using keyword search of both World of Knowledge74 and Google Scholar75 combined with existing literature overviews in the area of global challenges. This also included a snowball methodology where references in the leading studies and books were used to identify other scientific studies and books. In order to select words for a literature search to identify infinite impacts, a process was established to identify words in the scientific literature connected to global challenges with potentially infinite impacts. Some words generate a lot of misses, i.e. publications that use the term but are not the focus of this report. For example “existential risk” is used in business; “human extinction” is used in memory/cognition. Some search terms produced relatively few hits. For example “global catastrophic risk” is not used much. Other words are only used by people within a specific research community: few use “existential risk” in our sense unless they are using Nick Bostrom’s work. The term “global catastrophe” was identified as a phrase that referred almost exclusively to extremely negative impacts on humans, by a diversity of researchers, not just people in one research community. A list of 178 relevant books and reports was established based on what other studies have referred to, and/or which are seen as landmark studies by groups interviewed during the process. They were selected for a closer examination regarding the challenges they include.76 The full bibliography, even with its focus on publications of general interest, is still rather long. So it is helpful to have a shorter list focused on the highlights; the most important publications based on how often they are quoted, how wellspread the content (methodology, lists, etc.) is and how often key organisations use them. The publications included must meet at least one of the following criteria: – Historical significance. This includes being the first publication to introduce certain key concepts, or other early discussions of global challenges. Publications of historical significance are important for showing the intellectual history of global challenges. Understanding how the state of the art research got to where it is today can also help us understand where it might go in the future. – Influential in developing the field. This includes publications that are highly cited77 and those that have motivated significant additional research. They are not necessarily the first publications to introduce the concepts they discuss, but for whatever reason they will have proved important in advancing research. – State of the art. This includes publications developing new concepts at the forefront of global challenges research as well as those providing the best discussions of important established concepts. Reading these publications would bring a researcher up to speed with current research on global challenges. So they are important for the quality of their ideas. – Covers multiple global challenges (at least two). Publications that discuss a variety of global challenges are of particular importance because they aid in identifying and comparing the various challenges. This process is essential for research on global risks to identify boundaries and research priorities. In order to identify which global challenges are most commonly discussed, key surveys were identified and coded. First, a list of publications that survey at least three global challenges was compiled, and they were then scanned to find which challenges they discussed. The publications that survey many global challenges were identified from the full bibliography. Publications from both the academic and popular literature were considered. Emphasis was placed on publications of repute or other significance.78 To qualify as a survey of global challenges, the publication had to provide an explicit list of challenges or to be of sufficient length and breadth for it to discuss a variety of challenges. Many of the publications are books or book-length collections of articles published in book form or as special issues of scholarly journals. Some individual articles were also included because they discussed a significant breadth of challenges. A total of 40 global challenge survey publications were identified. For authors with multiple entries (Bostrom with three and WEF with ten) each challenge was counted only once to avoid bias. review of key literature 71 2.4.1 A scientific 50 Global Challenges – Twelve risks that threaten human civilisation – The case for a new category of risks 2.4 Methodology 0 5 10 15 20 25 Climate Change Nuclear War Pandemic Biodiversity loss Asteroid / Comet / Meteor Volcano Genetic Engineering High Energy Physics Nanotech Resource Depletion Artificial Intelligence Chemical Pollution Ecological Catastrophe Biogeochem Government Failure Poverty System Failure Astronomic Explosion LULCC Biological Weapons Chemical Weapons Extraterrestrial Reject Procreation Computer Failure EM Pulse New Technology Ozone Depletion Dysgenics Ocean Acidification Interstellar Cloud Atmosphere Aerosols Phase Transition Simulation Unknown 21 18 17 15 14 14 13 13 13 13 11 11 11 8 8 8 8 7 7 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 3 3 2 1 1 1 1 In terms of authorship and audience, there are 17 academic publications, 9 popular publications, 1 government report, 3 publications written by academics for popular audiences. In terms of format, there are 15 books, 5 edited collections, 7 articles, 3 of miscellaneous format. Of the 40 publications identified, 22 were available at the time of coding. In addition, 10 Global Risks Reports from the World Economic Forum were coded and then gathered under one heading: “WEF Global Risk Report 2005-2014”. A list of 34 global challenges was developed based on the challenges mentioned in the publications. A spreadsheet containing the challenges and the publications was created to record mentions of specific challenges in each publication to be coded. Then each publication was scanned in its entirety for mentions of global challenges. Scanning by this method was necessary because many of the publications did not contain explicit lists of global challenges, and the ones that did often mentioned additional challenges separately from their lists. So it was not required that a global challenge be mentioned in a list for it to be counted – it only had to be mentioned somewhere in the publication as a challenge. Assessing whether a particular portion of text counts as a global challenge and which category it fits in sometimes requires some interpretation. This is inevitable for most types of textual analysis, or, more generally, for the coding of qualitative data. The need for interpretation in this coding was heightened by the fact that the publications often were not written with the purpose of surveying the breadth of global challenges, and even the publications that were intended as surveys did not use consistent definitions of global challenges. The coding presented here erred on the side of greater inclusivity: if a portion of text was in the vicinity of a global challenge, then it was coded as one. For example, some publications discussed risks associated with nuclear weapons in a general sense without specifically mentioning the possibility of large-scale nuclear war. These discussions were coded as mentions of nuclear war, even though they could also refer to single usages of nuclear weapons that would not rate as a global challenge. This more inclusive approach is warranted because many of the publications were not focused exclusively on global challenges. If they were focused on them, it is likely that they would have included these risks in their global challenge form (e.g., nuclear war), given that they were already discussing something related (e.g., nuclear weapons). Below are the results from the overview of the surveys. Figure 9: Number of times global challenges are included in surveys of global challenges Global Challenges – Twelve risks that threaten human civilisation – The case for a new category of risks 51 2.4 Methodology Climate Change Nuclear War Pandemic Biodiversity loss Asteroid / Comet / Meteor Volcano Genetic Engineering High Energy Physics Nanotech Resource Depletion Artificial Intelligence Chemical Pollution Ecological Catastrophe 21 18 17 15 14 14 13 13 13 13 11 11 11 0 25 20 15 10 5 dung beetle star trek zinc oxalate human extinction 0 200 400 600 800 1000 It should be noted that the literature that includes multiple global challenges with potentially infinite impact is very small, given the fact that it is about the survival of the human race. Experts in the field of global challenges, like Nick Bostrom, have urged policymakers and donors to focus more on the global challenges with infinite impacts and have used dramatic rhetoric to illustrate how little research is being done on them compared with other areas. However, it is important to note that many more studies exist that focus on individual global risks, but often without including low-probability high-impact outcomes.80 How much work actually exists on human extinction infinite impact is therefore difficult to assess. The list of risks found in the scientific literature was checked against a review of what challenges key organisations working on global challenges include in their material and on their webpages. This was done to ensure that no important risk was excluded from the list. The coding of key organisations paralleled the coding of key survey publications. Organisations were identified via the global catastrophic risk organisation directory published by the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute.82 They were selected from the directory if they worked on a variety of global challenges – at least three, and ideally more. The reason for focusing on those that work on multiple challenges is to understand which challenges they consider important and why. In contrast, organisations that focus on only one or two challenges may not Figure 10: The global challenges included ten times or more in surveys of global challenges on global challenges 81 organisations working 2.4.2 A review of Figure 11: Number of academic papers on various topics (listed in Scopus, August 2012) From the paper “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority” 79 52 Global Challenges – Twelve risks that threaten human civilisation – The case for a new category of risks 2.4 Methodology Climate Change Nuclear War Pandemic Resource Depletion Biological Weapons Computer Failure Government Failure Nanotech Chemical Weapons Artificial Intelligence Genetic Engineering System Failure Biodiversity loss Ecological Failure Poverty Volcano Asteroid / Comet / Meteor Astronomic Explosion Biogeochem Chemical Pollution Extraterrestrial High Energy Physics New Technology Ozone Depletion Atmospheric Aerosols Dysgenics EM Pulse Interstellar Cloud LULCC Ocean Acidification Phase Transition Reject Procreation Simulation Unknown 13 13 12 9 8 7 7 7 6 5 4 4 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 8 12 2 6 10 14 be able to adjust their focus according to which challenges they consider the most important. The organisation coding used the same coding scheme developed for coding survey publications. References to specific global challenges were obtained from organisations’ websites. Many have web pages which list the topics they work on. Where possible, references to global challenges were pulled from these pages. Additional references to these challenges were identified by browsing other web pages, including recent publications. While it is possible that some of these organisations have worked on global challenges not mentioned on the web pages that were examined, overall the main challenges that they have worked on have probably been identified and coded. So the results should give a reasonably accurate picture of what global challenges these organisations are working on. Organisations working with global challenges were initially selected on the basis of the literature overview. A snowball sampling was conducted based on the list of organisations identified, according to whether they claimed to work on global challenges and/or their web page contained information about “existential risk”, “global catastrophic risk”,“human extinction” or “greatest global challenges”. Cross-references between organisations and input during the workshops were also used to identify organisations. An initial list of 180 organisations which work with global challenges was established. Based on the production of relevant literature, which other organisations referred to the organisation, and/or are seen as influential by groups interviewed during the process, a short-list of organisations were selected for a closer examination regarding the challenges they work with. Then those working with multiple challenges were selected, resulting in a list of 19 organisations.83 Below is the overview of the results from the overview of key organisations working with multiple global challenges. The organisations working on global challenges vary widely in: 1. What they count as a global challenge 2. How systematically they identify global challenges; and 3. Their emphasis on the most important global challenges For most organisations working with global challenges there are no explanations for the methodology used to select the challenges. Only a few thought leaders, like Tower Watson and their Extreme Risk Report 2013, have a framework for the challenges and estimates of possible impacts. Figure 12: Global challenges that key organisations work with Global Challenges – Twelve risks that threaten human civilisation – The case for a new category of risks 53 2.4 Methodology Climate Change Nuclear War Pandemic Resource Depletion Biological Weapons Computer Failure Government Failure Nanotech Chemical Weapons Artificial Intelligence Genetic Engeneering System Failure Atmospheric Aerosols 13 13 12 9 8 7 7 7 6 5 4 4 0 4 8 12 2 6 10 14 In most cases there is neither a definition of the impact, nor a definition of the probability. The report that focuses on global risk which is probably best known is the WEF Global Risk Report. The WEF’s risk work, with many other groups’, is probably best described as belonging to the category of risk perception rather than risk assessment, where experts are asked to estimate risks, but without any clear definition of probability or impact. The more serious organisations, like the WEF, also clearly define what they do as discussing perception of risk, not a scientific assessment of the actual risk. The WEF describes its perception methodology as follows: “This approach can highlight areas that are of most concern to different stakeholders, and potentially galvanise shared efforts to address them.” 85 The question which people are asked to answer is: “What occurrence causes significant negative impact for several countries and industries?” 86 The respondents are then asked to provide a number on two scales from 1-4, one for impact and another for likelihood (within 10 years).87 It is then up to the respondent to define what 1-4 means, so the major value of the report is to track the changes in perception over the years. Such perception approaches are obviously very interesting and, as the WEF states, can influence actual probability as the readers’ decisions will be influenced by how different challenges are perceived. Still, it is important to remember that the report does not provide an assessment of the actual probability (0-100%) or an assessment of the impact (and not the impact on human suffering, as many respondents likely define risk in monetary terms for their own company or country). An overview of WEF reports from the last ten years indicates that the challenges that likely could happen when applying a five year horizon, like the first signs of climate change, governmental failure and traditional pandemic, are identified. On the other hand, challenges which have very big impacts but lower probability, like extreme climate change, nanotechnology, major volcanoes, AI, and asteroids, tend to get less, or no, attention. An important question to explore is whether a focus on the smaller but still serious impacts of global challenges can result in an increased probability of infinite impacts. For example, there are reasons to believe that a focus on incremental adaptation instead of significant mitigation could be a problem for climate change as it could result in high-carbon lock-in.88 Other research indicates that focus on commercially relevant smaller pandemics could result in actions that make a major pandemic more likely. It is argued that this could happen, for example, by encouraging increased trade of goods while investing in equipment that scans for the type of pandemics that are known. Such a system can reduce the probability for known pandemics while at the same time resulting in an increased probability for new and more serious pandemics.89 Figure 13: The top 12 global challenges that key organisations work with 2.4.3 Workshops global risks 2.5 The list of Two workshops were arranged where the selection of challenges was discussed, one with risk experts in Oxford at the Future of Humanity Institute and the other in London with experts from the financial sector. See Appendix 2 for agenda and participants. In both workshops the list of global challenges was discussed to see if any additional challenges should be included, or if there were reasons to exclude some from the list. No challenge was excluded at the workshops, but one was added. Although little research exists yet that is able to verify the potential impacts, the participants agreed to include Global System Collapse as a risk with possible infinite impact. There was agreement that further research is needed to clarify exactly what parts of the economic and political system could collapse and result in a potentially infinite outcome. The conclusion was that enough research exists to include such a collapse on the list. Based on the risks identified in the literature review and in the review of organisations and applying the criteria for potentially infinite impact, these risks were identified: 1. Extreme Climate Change 2. Nuclear War 3. Global Pandemic 4. Ecological Catastrophe 5. Global System Collapse 6. Major Asteroid Impact 7. Supervolcano 8. Synthetic Biology 9. Nanotechnology 10. Artificial Intelligence (AI) 11. Unknown Consequences 12. Future Bad Global Governance This is an initial list. Additional risks will be added as new scientific studies become available, and some will be removed if steps are taken to reduce their probability90 and/or impact so that they no longer meet the criteria. Four categories of global challenges The challenges included in this report belong to four categories. The first, current challenges, includes those where decisions today can result directly in infinite impacts. They are included even if the time between action and impact might be decades, as with climate change. The second category is exogenous challenges, those where decisions do not – currently – influence probability, but can influence impact. The third category is emerging challenges, those where technology and science are not advanced enough to pose a severe threat today, but where the challenges will probably soon be able to have an infinite impact. The technologies included in emerging challenges, including synthetic biology, nanotechnology and artificial intelligence (AI), will be critical to finding solutions to infinite impacts. Including these technologies should not be seen as an attempt to arrest them. If anything, the development of sustainable solutions should be accelerated. But it is equally important to create guidelines and frameworks to avoid their misuse, whether intentional or accidental. The fourth category, future global policy challenges, is of a different kind. It includes challenges related to the consequences of an inferior or destructive global governance system. This is especially important as well-intended actions to reduce global challenges could lead to future global governance systems with destructive impact. The first category, current challenges, includes: 1. Extreme Climate Change 2. Nuclear War 3. Global Pandemic 4. Ecological Catastrophe 5. Global System Collapse The second category, exogenous challenges, covers: 6. Major Asteroid Impact 7. Supervolcano Those in the third category, emerging challenges, are: 8. Synthetic Biology 9. Nanotechnology 10. Artificial Intelligence (AI) 11. Unknown Consequences The fourth category, global policy challenges, is: 12. Future Bad Global Governance not included 2.5.1 Risks Many risks could severely damage humanity but have not been included in this report. They were excluded for one or more of three reasons: 1. Limited impact. Many challenges can have significant local negative effects, without approaching the “2 billion negatively affected” criterion - tsunamis, for example, and chemical pollution. 2. No effective countermeasures. The report focuses on promoting effective interventions and so ignores challenges where nothing useful can be done to prevent or mitigate the impact, as with nearby gamma-ray bursts. 3. Included in other challenges. Many challenges are already covered by others, or have a damage profile so similar that there seemed no need to have a separate category. Population growth, for one, is an underlying driver significant for climate change and eco-system catastrophe, but without direct large-scale impacts. The challenges mentioned in the reviewed literature and organisations which are not included in this report often refer to economic damage such as “fiscal crises” or “unemployment”. While such impacts could have far-reaching consequences they are obviously of another magnitude than those included here. Some of the risks that were suggested and/or which exist in books and reports about global risks were rejected according to the criteria above. They include: 91 1. Astronomical explosion/nearby gamma-ray burst or supernova.92 These seem to be events of extremely low probability and which are unlikely to be survivable. Milder versions of them (where the source is sufficiently far away) may be considered in a subsequent report. ͢ Not included due to: No effective countermeasures 2. False vacuum collapse. If our universe is in a false vacuum and it collapses at any point, the collapse would expand at the speed of light destroying all organised structures in the universe.93 This would not be survivable. ͢ Not included due to: No effective countermeasures 3. Chemical pollution. Increasingly, there is particular concern about three types of chemicals: those that persist in the environment and accumulate in the bodies of wildlife and people, endocrine disruptors that can interfere with hormones, and chemicals that cause cancer or damage DNA. ͢ Not included due to: Limited impact 4. Dangerous physics experiments creating black holes/strangelets including high energy physics. These risks are of low probability94 and have been subsumed under “Uncertain Risks”. ͢ Not included due to: Included in other challenges 5. Destructive solar flares. Though solar flares or coronal mass ejections could cause great economic damage to our technological civilisation,95 they would not lead directly to mass casualties unless the system lacks basic resilience. They have been subsumed in the Global System Collapse category. ͢ Not included due to: Limited impact/included in other challenges 6. Moral collapse of humanity. Humanity may develop along a path that we would currently find morally repellent. The consequences of this are not clear-cut, and depend on value judgements that would be contentious and unshared.96 Some of these risks (such as global totalitarianism or enduring poverty) were included in the Governance Disasters category. ͢ Not included due to: included in other challenges 7. Resource depletion/LULCC/ Biodiversity loss. It has often been argued that declining resources will cause increased conflict.97 Nevertheless such conflicts would not be sufficient in themselves to threaten humanity on a large scale, without a “ System Collapse” or “Governance Disasters”. ͢ Not included due to: included in other challenge", '', '']

[(7, 15), (22, 22), (23, 32), (33, 35)]

ndtceda

Kansas-Barreto-Snow-Aff-Binghamton-Semis.docx

Kansas

BaSn

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kansas/BaSn/Kansas-Barreto-Snow-Aff-Binghamton-Semis.docx

83e2e17b8c7a24ebd5dde987789c8ae2e9eadef82703964b69a2924799562d7d

2---it’s more likely than an accident.

Pry 20, Executive Director of Task Force on National and Homeland Security, a Congressional Advisory Board (Dr. Peter Vincent Pry, “Surprise Attack: ICBMs and the Real Nuclear Threat,” pg. 23, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/trecms/pdf/AD1114212.pdf)

U.S. technical safeguards minimizes accidental war but increases vulnerability The U.S. requires dual phenomenology to confirm enemy attack is incoming NORAD must threat conference The President must select a option ICBMs and SLBMs must be re-aimed Hypersonic s EMP and cyber-attacks could defeat this chain until enemy detonations occur

The U.S. array of technical and operational safeguards to verify an incoming nuclear attack minimizes the possibility of accidental nuclear war , but increases vulnerability to surprise attack The U.S. before launching ICBMs requires dual phenomenology to confirm enemy nuclear attack is incoming or underway NORAD and SPACECOMMAND must “ threat conference ” before warning the President that an enemy nuclear attack will be arriving The President must select a nuclear strike option and authorize its execution ICBMs and SLBMs must be re-aimed at targets Hypersonic s EMP and cyber-attacks could defeat this time-compressed chain of early warning until enemy nuclear detonations occur , when it will be too late

array of technical operational safeguards minimizes increases vulnerability surprise attack dual phenomenology threat conference select strike option and authorize its execution re-aimed Hypersonic s EMP cyber-attacks until enemy detonations occur too late

['U.S. Warning And Execution Vulnerabilities', 'The U.S. array of technical and operational safeguards to verify and react appropriately to an incoming nuclear attack minimizes the possibility of accidental nuclear war, but potentially increases vulnerability to surprise attack: --The U.S. before launching ICBMs, or any nuclear forces, requires “dual phenomenology” to confirm enemy nuclear attack is incoming or underway, such as satellite and radar confirmation or actual nuclear detonations. --NORAD and SPACECOMMAND must “threat conference” before warning the President that an enemy nuclear attack will be arriving in a few minutes. --The President must select a nuclear strike option and authorize its execution through an Emergency Action Message. --EAMs must be communicated to the forces. --Before launching, ICBMs and SLBMs, which are normally “detargeted” to strike broad ocean areas as a safeguard against accidental execution, must be re-aimed at targets.74 Hypersonic warheads, EMP and cyber-attacks could defeat this highly time-compressed chain of early warning and execution until enemy nuclear detonations occur, when it will be too late. He who strikes first in a nuclear war will most likely win—Russia, China, and North Korea know this.']

[(0, 6)]

ndtceda

Kansas-MaPa-Neg-3---Havard-Round-3.docx

Kansas

MaPa

903bfaac3edc8d8e183323e97b5a428f85700d46e27db2d3c36d6cbff5cf9e8d

International order is resilient, the U.S. isn’t key---it adapts and self-corrects

Deudney and Ikenberry, 18 - *Daniel Deudney, Associate Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University **G. John Ikenberry is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University; “Liberal World: The Resilient Order,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-06-14/liberal-world

it is too soon to write the obituary of liberalism liberal democracy only rebound and gain ground Even though U S power is waning the international system is remarkably durable states interact in the spirit of self-interested pragmatic accommodation liberalism remains universally appealing

illiberalism, autocracy, nationalism, protectionism, spheres of influence, territorial revisionism reasserted themselves China and Russia have dashed all hopes they would support the liberal world order they strengthened their authoritarian systems and flouted norms a new nationalist mindset has emerged hat views international institutions and globalization as threats to national sovereignty it is too soon to write the obituary of liberalism The liberal vision of nation-states cooperating to achieve security and prosperity remains as vital today liberal democracy has hit been hard times before only to rebound and gain ground thanks to the appeal of its basic values and its unique capacities to effectively grapple with the problems of modernity and globalization. The order will endure Even though the U nited S tates’ relative power is waning the international system is remarkably durable these efforts will build on and strengthen the institutions of the liberal order. despite some notable exceptions, states still mostly interact through well-worn institutions and in the spirit of self-interested , pragmatic accommodation Liberals are often portrayed as having overly optimistic assumptions about the path of human history they recognize it is often human nature to seek power which is why they advocate constitutional and legal restraints whereas environmental problems used to be contained largely within countries or regions, the cumulative effect of human activities on the planet’s biospheric life-support system has now been so great as to require a new geologic name for the current time period—the Anthropocene liberalism has a pragmatic adaptability and a penchant for institutional innovations that are vital for responding to such emerging challenges as artificial intelligence , cyberwarfare , and genetic engineering . liberalism remains perennially and universally appealing because it rests on a commitment to the dignity and freedom of individuals liberalism has always been at the forefront of efforts

reasserted themselves dashed all hopes strengthened their authoritarian systems flouted norms emerged too soon only to rebound and gain ground Even though is remarkably durable self-interested pragmatic accommodation constitutional legal restraints pragmatic adaptability vital for responding to artificial intelligence cyberwarfare genetic engineering perennially universally appealing

['Decades after they were supposedly banished from the West, the dark forces of world politics—illiberalism, autocracy, nationalism, protectionism, spheres of influence, territorial revisionism—have reasserted themselves. China and Russia have dashed all hopes that they would quickly transition to democracy and support the liberal world order. To the contrary, they have strengthened their authoritarian systems at home and flouted norms abroad. Even more stunning, with the United Kingdom having voted for Brexit and the United States having elected Donald Trump as president, the leading patrons of the liberal world order have chosen to undermine their own system. Across the world, a new nationalist mindset has emerged, one that views international institutions and globalization as threats to national sovereignty and identity rather than opportunities.', 'The recent rise of illiberal forces and leaders is certainly worrisome. Yet it is too soon to write the obituary of liberalism as a theory of international relations, liberal democracy as a system of government, or the liberal order as the overarching framework for global politics. The liberal vision of nation-states cooperating to achieve security and prosperity remains as vital today as at any time in the modern age. In the long course of history, liberal democracy has hit been hard times before, only to rebound and gain ground. It has done so thanks to the appeal of its basic values and its unique capacities to effectively grapple with the problems of modernity and globalization.', 'For the first time in history, global institutions are now necessary to realize basic human interests; intense forms of interdependence that were once present only on a smaller scale are now present on a global scale.', 'The order will endure, too. Even though the United States’ relative power is waning, the international system that the country has sustained for seven decades is remarkably durable. As long as interdependence—economic, security-related, and environmental—continues to grow, peoples and governments everywhere will be compelled to work together to solve problems or suffer grievous harm. By necessity, these efforts will build on and strengthen the institutions of the liberal order.', 'THE LIBERAL VISION ', 'Modern liberalism holds that world politics requires new levels of political integration in response to relentlessly rising interdependence. But political orders do not arise spontaneously, and liberals argue that a world with more liberal democratic capitalist states will be more peaceful, prosperous, and respectful of human rights. It is not inevitable that history will end with the triumph of liberalism, but it is inevitable that a decent world order will be liberal.', 'The recent rise of illiberal forces and the apparent recession of the liberal international order may seem to call this school of thought into question. But despite some notable exceptions, states still mostly interact through well-worn institutions and in the spirit of self-interested, pragmatic accommodation.', 'Moreover, part of the reason liberalism may look unsuited to the times is that many of its critics assail a strawman version of the theory. Liberals are often portrayed as having overly optimistic—even utopian—assumptions about the path of human history. In reality, they have a much more conditional and tempered optimism that recognizes tragic tradeoffs, and they are keenly attentive to the possibilities for large-scale catastrophes. Like realists, they recognize that it is often human nature to seek power, which is why they advocate constitutional and legal restraints. But unlike realists, who see history as cyclical, liberals are heirs to the Enlightenment project of technological innovation, which opens new possibilities both for human progress and for disaster.', 'Liberalism is essentially pragmatic. Modern liberals embrace democratic governments, market-based economic systems, and international institutions not out of idealism but because they believe these arrangements are better suited to realizing human interests in the modern world than any alternatives. Indeed, in thinking about world order, the variable that matters most for liberal thinkers is interdependence. For the first time in history, global institutions are now necessary to realize basic human interests; intense forms of interdependence that were once present only on a smaller scale are now present on a global scale. For example, whereas environmental problems used to be contained largely within countries or regions, the cumulative effect of human activities on the planet’s biospheric life-support system has now been so great as to require a new geologic name for the current time period—the Anthropocene. Unlike its backward-looking nationalist and realist rivals, liberalism has a pragmatic adaptability and a penchant for institutional innovations that are vital for responding to such emerging challenges as artificial intelligence, cyberwarfare, and genetic engineering.', 'Overall, liberalism remains perennially and universally appealing because it rests on a commitment to the dignity and freedom of individuals. It enshrines the idea of tolerance, which will be needed in spades as the world becomes increasingly interactive and diverse. Although the ideology emerged in the West, its values have become universal, and its champions have extended to encompass Mahatma Gandhi, Mikhail Gorbachev, and Nelson Mandela. And even though imperialism, slavery, and racism have marred Western history, liberalism has always been at the forefront of efforts—both peaceful and militant—to reform and end these practices. To the extent that the long arc of history does bend toward justice, it does so thanks to the activism and moral commitment of liberals and their allies. ', '', '']

[(0, 25)]

ndtceda

Kansas-HaSo-Neg-Indiana-Doubles.docx

Kansas

HaSo

610f9ccfeab36906052aee5973e624409b6fd02c5fe1040d157f9a80e7284166

Allies are worried about INF missiles specifically -- plan assures them

Gomez ’20 [Eric Gomez; Established professional analyst with expertise in regional security issues and U.S. military strategy in East Asia. Primary areas of interest are the nuclear forces and strategies of China and North Korea, the impact of conventional capabilities on nuclear deterrence and escalation, and U.S. conventional and nuclear deterrence in East Asia. “Are America’s East Asia Allies Willing and Able to Host U.S. Intermediate-Range Missiles?,” Aug. 19 2020, , Go Green!]

allies not greeted death of INF with enthusiasm not been pressing Washington to get missiles fielded different from Washington’s enthusiasm stands in sharp contrast to fears about China rise allies have not shied away from demanding reassurances push to deploy i r m s in the 70s modern day different set of circumstances much harder to disentangle economies from China greater risk of economic retaliation China’s threat is conventional

allies have not greeted the death of the INF with much enthusiasm Australia and So Ko were quick to note that there were no plans to discuss U.S. deployments in the wake of the withdrawal announcement. have not been pressing Washington to get missiles fielded either. Allies’ [silent] response to the INF Treaty’s demise is markedly different from Washington’s enthusiasm for a more robust military posture in East Asia. stands in sharp contrast to U.S. fears about China ’s military rise allies have not shied away from demanding reassurances when faced with significant threats NATO’s push to get the United States to deploy i ntermediate- r ange nuclear m issile s in the late 19 70s and early 1980s were acutely worried about the ability of Soviet intermediate-range missiles to reduce the credibility of U.S. security commitments prompted NATO allies to push hard on the Carter administration to move forward on deploying similar capabilities as a political signal of U.S. security guarantees. America’s allies in modern day East Asia face a very different set of circumstances . acrimony between Washington and Beijing has not yet changed many allies’ strategies of trying to have good relations with both countries much harder for U.S. allies to disentangle their economies from China exposes them to greater risk of economic retaliation from Beijing China’s military threat in the region is primarily conventional and in the gray zone, which compared to Soviet theater nuclear forces in the Cold War is easier for allies to hedge against even with their limited defense resources. gap between U.S. calls for a stronger military response to great power competition and allies’ perspectives on what is required to deter Chinese aggression.

INF enthusiasm markedly different i r m s 70s different disentangle

['[*language modified]', 'America’s allies in East Asia have not greeted the death of the INF Treaty with much enthusiasm. Both Australia and South Korea were quick to note that there were no plans to discuss U.S. deployments in the wake of the withdrawal announcement. No U.S. treaty allies have categorically refused to consider future deployments, but they have not been pressing Washington to get missiles fielded either.', 'Allies’ [silent] muted response to the INF Treaty’s demise is markedly different from Washington’s enthusiasm for a more robust military posture in East Asia. The lack of strong support from friendly governments stands in sharp contrast to U.S. fears about China’s military rise, the need for greater defense investments in the region, and deepening great power competition. Why is there an imbalance between the U.S. enthusiasm for a more robust military posture in East Asia and allies’ lukewarm response to supporting ground-based missile deployments?', 'U.S. allies have not shied away from demanding reassurances when faced with significant threats. A great example of this is NATO’s push to get the United States to deploy intermediate-range nuclear missiles in the late 1970s and early 1980s. European NATO countries were acutely worried about the ability of Soviet intermediate-range missiles to reduce the credibility of U.S. security commitments. This prompted NATO allies to push hard on the Carter administration to move forward on deploying similar capabilities as a political signal of U.S. security guarantees. ', 'America’s allies in modern day East Asia face a very different set of circumstances. Growing acrimony between Washington and Beijing has not yet changed many allies’ strategies of trying to have good relations with both countries. It is also much harder for U.S. allies to disentangle their economies from China, which exposes them to greater risk of economic retaliation from Beijing should they wholeheartedly welcome U.S. missile deployments. Moreover, China’s military threat in the region is primarily conventional and in the gray zone, which compared to Soviet theater nuclear forces in the Cold War is easier for allies to hedge against even with their limited defense resources.', 'None of these circumstances are set in stone, and U.S. allies could change their tunes and vociferously demand U.S. missile deployments in the future. However, the initial reaction to the end of the INF Treaty suggests a gap between U.S. calls for a stronger military response to great power competition and allies’ perspectives on what is required to deter Chinese aggression.']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

MichiganState-ScSh-Aff-Franklin-R-Shirley-at-Wake-Forest-Round-3.docx

MichiganState

ScSh

5f6447da7753882ffd5dc420903e9f96d7fe714f477d9bff764dd2ac3ec3f323

By centering the question on patents, the CP is a return to the Pre-Actavis “scope-of-the-patent” test—empirics prove that allows more anticompetitive practices because we overestimate patent strength—that’s Feldman and …

Carrier 13 (Michael A. Carrier is a leading authority in antitrust and intellectual property law with expertise in the pharmaceutical, high-technology, and music industries. He is a highly sought-after media expert and has frequently been cited by courts. He is a co-author of the leading IP/antitrust treatise and the author of more than 120 articles and book chapters, Oct 2013, accessed on 7-21-2021, American Bar Association, " Five Arguments Laid to Rest After Actavis", )

scope-of-the-patent No framework has wrought as much havoc courts abandoned any nuance assumed the patent was valid as long as it did not extend beyond the expiration date the court explained reverse payment is immune from antitrust strength of the patent’ refers to the exclusionary scope

“ scope-of-the-patent ” test is the most notable casualty of Actavis. No framework has wrought as much havoc in the area in the past decade courts abandoned any such nuance applying a version that assumed the patent was valid and infringed and upholding the agreement as long as it did not extend beyond the patent’s expiration date in the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Actavis, the court explained that “absent sham litigation or fraud in obtaining the patent, a reverse payment settlement is immune from antitrust attack so long as its anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential phrase ‘ strength of the patent’ refers to the potential exclusionary scope of the patent

courts abandoned any such nuance is immune from antitrust

['', 'The “scope-of-the-patent” test is the most notable casualty of Actavis. No framework has wrought as much havoc in the area in the past decade. To be sure, any test focused on a patent’s scope does not need to be deferential to the point of near-per-se legality. For example, the version employed by the Eleventh Circuit in Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 4 was more nuanced, with the court’s antitrust assessment comparing the parties’ settlement to “the likelihood” that the brand firm would “obtain[] [the] protections” of “the preliminary injunction and stay mechanisms.”5', 'But later courts abandoned any such nuance, applying a version that assumed the patent was valid and infringed and upholding the agreement as long as it did not extend beyond the patent’s expiration date. In In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, the Second Circuit found that the brand was “entitled to protect its . . . patent monopoly through settlement,” that the “question for th[e] [c]ourt” was “whether the settlement extended the patent’s scope,” and that the settlement did not “unlawfully extend the reach” of the patent.', '6 In In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, the Federal Circuit found that “[t]he essence of the inquiry is whether the agreements restrict competition beyond the exclusionary zone of the patent.”7 The court held that excluding generics “from profiting from the patented invention” was “well within [the brand’s] rights as the patentee.”8', 'And in the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Actavis, the court explained that “absent sham litigation or fraud in obtaining the patent, a reverse payment settlement is immune from antitrust attack so long as its anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent.”9 Addressing ambiguity from earlier decisions like Valley Drug, the court explained that “the phrase ‘strength of the patent’ refers to the potential exclusionary scope of the patent—that is, the exclusionary rights appearing on the patent’s face and not the underlying merits of the infringement claim.”10', '', '', '', '']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Johnson-Sun-Aff-5-Wake-Round5.docx

Minnesota

JoSu

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/JoSu/Minnesota-Johnson-Sun-Aff-5-Wake-Round5.docx

e5edfc66ae6af632f0cd9c69356ef48cd2669ce03e09bdd714f0a1b0801c2090

New standards get bogged down in courts.

Wright et al. 19, Joshua D. Wright, former Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission, Ph.D. in Economics from the University of California, Los Angeles; Elyse Dorsey, Adjunct Professor at the Antonin Scalia Law School at George Mason University, Deputy Chair of the Antitrust & Consumer Protection Working Group at the Regulatory Transparency Project, J.D. from the Antonin Scalia Law School at George Mason University; Jonathan Klick, Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, J.D. from the Antonin Scalia Law School at George Mason University; Jan M. Rybnicek, Adjunct Professor and Senior Fellow at the Global Antitrust Institute at the Antonin Scalia Law School at George Mason University, J.D. from the Antonin Scalia Law School at George Mason University, “REQUIEM FOR A PARADOX: The Dubious Rise and Inevitable Fall of Hipster Antitrust,” Arizona State Law Journal, Vol. 51, Spring 2019, accessed via Lexis

Replacing consumer welfare require other values throwing open uncertainty and exploitative behavior debate and case law refine consumer welfare and bring consensus economic theory and empirical ev offers a tractable method If replaced result would be other factors a transaction that increases prices, reduces output, or stifles innovation to not run afoul if such harm can be tolerated subjective, multiprong standard offers nothing sacrifices accuracy for administrative simplicity

Replacing consumer welfare would require courts to trade off some amount of consumer welfare for other values throwing open the door to uncertainty and to exploitative behavior decades of debate and case law worked to refine consumer welfare and bring consensus By using current economic theory and empirical ev idence as the starting point consumer welfare offers a tractable method for weighing procompetitive and anticompetitive effects If consumer welfare were to be replaced the result would be for courts and enforcers to elevate other factors above consumer welfare a new standard may result in a transaction that increases prices, reduces output, or stifles innovation to not necessarily run afoul of the antitrust laws if a court concludes such consumer harm can be tolerated to satisfy other aspects such as income equality a subjective, multiprong antitrust standard untethered from economics offers nothing beyond speculative benefits new structuralist approach is no better a replacement for consumer welfare because it sacrifices accuracy for administrative simplicity

uncertainty exploitative behavior ev elevate other factors above consumer welfare nothing beyond speculative benefits it sacrifices accuracy for administrative simplicity

['Replacing the well-established consumer welfare standard would necessarily require courts to trade off some amount of consumer welfare for some other set of values, thereby throwing open the door to uncertainty and to exploitative behavior. As has been discussed above, decades of debate and case law has worked to refine the precise contours of the consumer welfare standard and to bring consensus about the types of evidence that are indicative of harm to competition and consumers. 273 The consumer welfare standard employs a variety of economic tools to evaluate the effect transactions and business practices may have on consumers in the form of increased prices, reduced output, reduced innovation. By using current economic theory and empirical evidence as the starting point for creating liability rules and subsequently conducting an evidence-based inquiry into the welfare effects of a particular practice, the consumer welfare model offers a tractable method for weighing procompetitive and anticompetitive effects.', 'If consumer welfare were to be replaced by some other set of values, the result explicitly would be for courts and enforcers to elevate other factors above consumer welfare and to reach different conclusions about liability. Under a "public interest" or "citizen interest" approach, a transaction that would reduce prices to consumer, increase output, or spur innovation may be prohibited under the antitrust laws for failing to satisfy any number of other vague factors, including failing to leave some arbitrary number of competing firms in the market despite the clear presence of competition or create a more efficient albeit consolidated supply chain. Even more dramatically, a new standard also may result in a transaction that increases prices, reduces output, or stifles innovation to not necessarily run afoul of the antitrust laws if a court concludes that such consumer harm can be tolerated to satisfy other aspects of the multidimensional standard, such as income equality. In light of these very real concerns, a subjective, multiprong antitrust standard untethered from economics offers nothing beyond speculative benefits. Accordingly, it would be imprudent to abandon the consumer welfare standard.', "[*365] The same is true of proposals by some Hipster Antitrust advocates who seek not to implement a new public or citizen interest standard, but rather wish to see the Antitrust Agencies and courts return to the DOJ's 1968 Horizontal Merger Guidelines and a focus on market structure and concentration. These critics of the consumer welfare standard argue that modern antitrust has become far too complicated and, as a result, defendants all too frequently are capable of avoiding liability. To increase the probability of success under the antitrust law, they argue for a return to the days where an eight percent combined market share was sufficient grounds on which to block a transaction. Although this new structuralist approach has the benefit of clarity that the multi-dimensional public and citizen welfare tests lack, it is no better a replacement for the consumer welfare standard because it sacrifices accuracy for administrative simplicity. Although the economic foundation of the structuralist approach of the premodern era were robust, it has since been debunked and today no longer is treated credibly by industrial organization economics. Therefore, although replacing the consumer welfare standard with the 1968 structuralist approach may yield faster answers that are more frequently favorable to plaintiffs, the probability that those antitrust outcomes are in line with the actual competitive realities of whatever market is being examined is low."]

[(0, 16)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-Di-Griffith-Neg-Rutgers%20RR-Round1.docx

Kentucky

DiGr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kentucky/DiGr/Kentucky-Di-Griffith-Neg-Rutgers%2520RR-Round1.docx

361e55aca8a1197d7669be824092813976bd56f4c58be7a43bf8181af8ae7048

Growth key to innovation.

Christina P. Skinner 21. Assistant Professor, The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. “Cancelling Capitalism?” Norte Dame Law Review. Volume 97 Issue 1 Article 9. https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4992&context=ndlr

distance between companies and profit stymie innovations profit is the engine for progress profit incentivizes break-through tech medicines , or services enhancing welfare companies research in breakthrough profit is always part of the equation we need successful companies moves to hamstring profit is likely to translate to the R&D line

using law or regulation to create distance between companies and profit is likely to stymie welfare-enhancing innovations . A central theme is that profit is the engine for human progress profit incentivizes experimentation , which leads to break-through tech nologies, medicines , or services , ultimately enhancing human welfare that capitalism and the corporation are at the heart of progress seems difficult to deny name a great civilization that was created by a stakeholder-oriented society that did not look favorably on free markets , industry, and trade companies might be willing to subsidize research in the hopes of the rare breakthrough but profit is always part of the equation Edmans may underestimate the extent to which profit is the motivational spark that we need successful companies that are focused on innovation should put the brakes on moves to hamstring corporate profit forcing companies to forgo profits is likely to translate directly and in the first instance to the R&D line item in the corporate budget .

distance between companies and profit innovations is the engine for human progress experimentation tech nologies, medicines services heart of progress name a great civilization not markets profit is always part of the equation underestimate successful companies that are focused on innovation hamstring corporate profit R&D line item in the corporate budget

['For one, using law or regulation to create distance between companies and profit-seeking is likely to stymie welfare-enhancing innovations. A central theme throughout Edmans’s book is that profit is not profligate; rather, it is the engine oil for the human wheel of progress. Edmans refers to the social benefits of corporate innovation no less than eighty-four times throughout the book, with numerous examples illustrating a virtuous chain: profit incentivizes experimentation, which leads to break-through technologies, medicines, or consumer services, ultimately enhancing human welfare.48 Indeed, that capitalism and the corporation are at the heart of human progress seems difficult to deny—simply ask yourself to name a great civilization that was created by a stakeholder-oriented society (or, put differently, that did not look favorably on free markets, industry, and trade). In some ways, I would go further than Edmans here. At times, he may be overly sanguine in presuming that companies are inspired to innovate for innovation’s sake irrespective of profit potential.49 It seems more like the exception than the rule: companies might be willing to subsidize research in the hopes of the rare breakthrough— but profit is always part of the equation. So, Edmans is correct that corporate innovation is socially beneficial, but may well underestimate (at least in certain parts) the extent to which profit is the motivational spark, in one way or another. But overall, Edmans’s general point is quite well taken: the realization that we need successful companies that are focused on innovation should put the brakes on stakeholder capitalists’ moves to hamstring corporate profit. After all, forcing companies to forgo profits is likely to translate directly and in the first instance to the R&D line item in the corporate budget. ', '', '']

[(13, 23)]

ndtceda

Emory-DoPi-Aff-Owen-L-Coon-Memorial-Tournament-at-Northwestern-Doubles.docx

Emory

DoPi

596147baf748f38e8402b0b581f516ceec8c9fa18cf355fd502f3714c9c1445e

And – posture alignment link – NATO’s agreed defense posture is deliberately ambiguous the plan divides NATO by making the US an outlier

Robertson 21 [George Robertson - a former UK defence secretary and was the 10th secretary-general of Nato, “US nuclear arms shift could raise risk of inadvertent conflict”, Financial Times, 14 November 2021. https://www.ft.com/content/1e0f2194-dbc2-4c37-84a2-75308daa1710] Biden has already hinted that he is considering a “sole purpose” policy, a pledge that the US would use nuclear weapons only in a narrowly prescribed set of circumstances. “I believe that the sole purpose of the US nuclear arsenal should be deterring — and, if necessary, retaliating against — a nuclear attack,” he wrote in March 2020. “As president, I will work to put that belief into practice.” A number of other influential voices are now encouraging a move in this direction, or even a shift to a policy of “no first use” of nuclear weapons. For the sake of Nato unity, these ideas must be resisted.

this would divide Nato Nato as a nuclear alliance is deliberately ambiguous about circumstances it might authorise nuc s Russia’s invasions and massive boost to capabilities raised the profile of nuc s in Nato’s defence posture ambiguity is necessary Eye-catching US declarations would undermine the Nato alliance

this and “sole purpose” would undermine deterrence, divide Nato and increase the risk of conflict. Nato as a nuclear alliance is deliberately ambiguous about the circumstances in which it might authorise the deployment of nuc lear weapon s to deter attacks on the territory or interests of its members Russia’s invasions of Georgia and Ukraine and the massive boost to Moscow’s conventional and nuclear capabilities in the past few years, have necessarily raised the profile of nuc lear weapon s in Nato’s defence posture . nuclear ambiguity is necessary to reduce the temptation for adversaries to “game” our deterrence strategy at a time of heightened tension due to Russia and China’s growing military power and threatening behaviour , a US declaration of “sole purpose” or “no first use” would unsettle allies Eye-catching gestures from the US such as declarations of “sole purpose” or ‘no first use’ would undermine the Nato alliance and lead only to greater instability and insecurity

divide Nato as a nuclear alliance deliberately ambiguous Georgia Ukraine defence posture necessary heightened tension unsettle allies undermine the Nato alliance greater instability insecurity

['“No first use” sounds appealing, and its advocates argue that the US can set an example to other nuclear powers that would, in time, reduce the threat of nuclear conflict. They are wrong. There are three reasons why both this and “sole purpose” would undermine deterrence, divide Nato and increase the risk of conflict. ', 'First, a US declaration would be treated with scepticism by potential adversaries — because authoritarian regimes are likely to judge others by their own standards — and could even encourage them towards military aggression if the threat of nuclear reprisals is lifted. Paradoxically, changing the present definition of nuclear deterrence would increase the risk of a major conventional conflict that could return us to the era of mass civilian casualties last seen in the 20th century.\nSecond, Nato as a nuclear alliance is deliberately ambiguous about the circumstances in which it might authorise the deployment of nuclear weapons to deter attacks on the territory or interests of its members. In the aftermath of the cold war, when there was no credible conventional threat to Nato’s European allies, the alliance reduced its emphasis on nuclear deterrence. But Russia’s invasions of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, and the massive boost to Moscow’s conventional and nuclear capabilities in the past few years, have necessarily raised the profile of nuclear weapons in Nato’s defence posture. ', 'While nuclear ambiguity may be uncomfortable, it is necessary in order to reduce the temptation for adversaries to “game” our deterrence strategy by taking actions that will fall just short of provoking a military response. ', 'Third, at a time of heightened tension due to Russia and China’s growing military power and threatening behaviour, a US declaration of “sole purpose” or “no first use” would unsettle Washington’s allies in Europe and the Asia-Pacific. By casting doubt on its security guarantees, the US would run the risk of making its allies and friends more susceptible to coercion, or of driving them to develop nuclear weapons of their own as a form of insurance. And that would potentially kickstart further nuclear proliferation and add to the risk of pre-emptive actions by Russia and China. ', 'Advocates of change are right to say that progress on nuclear disarmament is painfully slow. But it will be achieved only by skilful diplomatic management of the conflicting ambitions and interests of the major powers. Painstaking efforts are needed to revive bilateral and, in time, multilateral steps towards verifiable nuclear disarmament and the prevention of proliferation. Eye-catching gestures from the US such as declarations of “sole purpose” or ‘no first use’ would undermine the Nato alliance and lead only to greater instability and insecurity.']

[(0, 12), (324, 325), (329, 330), (787, 788), (790, 791), (796, 797), (837, 841), (842, 847)]

ndtceda

MichiganState-KoLe-Neg-8---NDT-Round-6.docx

MichiganState

KoLe

fd7af5c010132fe34aee78d4d4f5920900b3e1a91a353a427db3a1ddff2510a4

B] No spillover---established docket control works

Meredith M. Render 20, Professor of Law at the University of Alabama School of Law, JD from the Georgetown University Law Center, BA from Boston College, “Fiduciary Injury and Citizen Enforcement of the Emoluments Clause”, Notre Dame Law Review, 95 Notre Dame L. Rev. 953, January 2020, Lexis

opening-the-floodgates is overblown lacking in empirical support Court predicted a deluge However, ev has yet to emerge Rules of Procedure stem the tide doctrines conserve resources , such as claim preclusion , issue preclusion , abstention , joinder , and case consolidation

there is reason to be skeptical about the efficacy of the rule in terms of reducing the overall number of cases in the federal courts the opening-the-floodgates worry itself is overblown Not only is the floodgates argument lacking in empirical support but it may also be lacking in a clear, germane, and substantive content The floodgate alarm has been used in diverse and internally inconsistent contexts without the mooring benefit of evidentiary support , such that it has taken on more the character of epithet than of a serious constitutional obstacle "The 'floodgates' argument the Court today embraces has been rehearsed and rejected before." The floodgate rationale is, at heart, a prediction about how future litigants will behave if the Court adopts a new rule. Yet the ordinary norms of prediction with their attendant empirical safeguards seem not to obtain Those invoking the floodgate alarm have not felt obliged to supply evidence of past instances in which the federal courts were in fact "flooded" as the result of similar rule changes, and that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were inadequate to address the "flood." Given that members of the Court have so frequently predicted a litigatory deluge as a consequence of a rule change, it would seem a simple matter to confirm that a deluge has, in fact, occurred However, ev idence of past flooding has yet to emerge within the floodgate discourse the floodgate worry has not been documented may be because it has yet to come to pass . There is ample reason to believe that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are generally commensurate to the task of qualitatively stem ming the tide of litigation The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are designed to weed out duplicative, harassing, frivolous, and meritless cases nonmeritorious cases are generally resolved on a motion to dismiss doctrines and mechanisms designed to conserve both judicial and defendant resources , such as claim preclusion , issue preclusion , abstention , joinder , and case consolidation , all operate to prevent horizonal lawsuits alleging the same nexus of operative facts from going forward simultaneously in multiple district courts

opening-the-floodgates overblown empirical support internally inconsistent mooring evidentiary support epithet serious constitutional obstacle rehearsed rejected norms of prediction not so frequently predicted simple matter confirm ev idence yet to emerge yet to come to pass ample reason Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally commensurate stem weed out doctrines mechanisms conserve both judicial and defendant resources claim preclusion issue preclusion abstention joinder case consolidation horizonal lawsuits simultaneously

['First, as previously discussed, there is reason to be skeptical about the efficacy of the CAP rule in terms of reducing the overall number of cases in the federal courts. 315 Moreover, in addition to the fact that the CAP rule likely does little to reduce the overall number of opportunities for federal courts to judge the behavior of coordinate branches, there is reason to [*1007] believe that the opening-the-floodgates worry itself is overblown. 316 Not only is the floodgates argument in support of the CAP rule lacking in empirical support, 317 but it may also be lacking in a clear, germane, and substantive content when used by various members of the Court. 318F or example, Professor Marin Levy has observed that "recent cases show the justices vacillating between providing assurances that their decision will not result in a deluge of new claims, and accusing each other of being driven by an improper desire to stave off such a deluge." 319 The floodgate alarm has been used in diverse and internally inconsistent contexts without the mooring benefit of evidentiary support, such that it has taken on more the character of epithet than of a serious constitutional obstacle. 320Justice Ginsburg, writing in dissent, has succinctly summarized this development, stating: "The \'floodgates\' argument the Court today embraces has been rehearsed and rejected before." 321 The fact that the floodgate rationale is frequently used to support both sides of a contested determination by the Court suggests that it may lack a stable normative content. 322 The floodgate rationale is, at heart, a prediction about how future litigants will behave if the Court adopts a new rule. Yet the ordinary norms of prediction with their attendant empirical safeguards seem not to obtain. 323 Those invoking the floodgate alarm have not felt [*1008] obliged to supply evidence of past instances in which the federal courts were in fact "flooded" as the result of similar rule changes, and that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were inadequate to address the "flood." 324 Given that members of the Court have so frequently predicted a litigatory deluge as a consequence of a rule change, it would seem a simple matter to confirm that a deluge has, in fact, occurred. 325 However, evidence of past flooding has yet to emerge within the floodgate discourse. 326', 'It is possible that the reason that the floodgate worry has not been documented may be because it has yet to come to pass. There is ample reason to believe that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are generally commensurate to the task of qualitatively stemming the tide of litigation. 327 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are designed to weed out duplicative, harassing, frivolous, and meritless cases. 328While no standing rule - including the CAP rule - prevents nonmeritorious cases from being filed in federal court, such cases are generally resolved on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. 329The Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is also the first opportunity during which a defendant can challenge standing. 330There is no strategic advantage to [*1009] defendants - in terms of the expenditure of resources - to having a case dismissed for want of standing as compared to any other grounds for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1). 331Likewise, doctrines and mechanisms designed to conserve both judicial and defendant resources, such as claim preclusion, issue preclusion, abstention, joinder, and case consolidation, all operate to prevent horizonal lawsuits alleging the same nexus of operative facts from going forward simultaneously in multiple district courts - a point that is especially important in the emoluments context where presumably any citizen suit would allege the same operative facts. 332', '']

[(12, 21)]

ndtceda

Emory-DoSa-Aff-Shirley-Round-5.docx

Emory

DoSa

ea580ab40567e05f3bd828a03c5e59969f7b1fb88a079a2f8ac8ba8d8a3e98a1

The counterplan’s reclarification of the conception standard is more accurate. “Conception” happens when someone uses an algorithm they made to solve a problem.

Daria Kim 20, Senior Research Fellow in the department Intellectual Property and Competition Law at the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, May 2020, “‘AI-Generated Inventions’: Time to Get the Record Straight?,” GRUR International, 69(5), pp. 443-456

crucial is understanding extent to which intelligent systems’ can be designed by humans design of the overall computational method can be conception of a invention conception occurs before an algorithm is encoded and executed overall process is conceptualised by a human characterisation of a problem is the ‘hardest part there is no single ‘general-purpose’ algorithm as long as instructions determine operations it would be unjustified to attribute ‘cognitive autonomy’ to an algorithm

Of crucial importance from an inventorship perspective is understanding the extent to which the functioning of ‘ intelligent systems’ can be attributed to the way they are designed and applied by humans . If we accept problem solving ‘occurs when a problem solver determines how to solve a problem the ‘how’ refers to the conception of the overall computational procedure, which, can encompass multiple ingredients design of the overall computational method can be viewed as the conception of a problem-solving mechanism and, hence, an invention conception of a computational procedure occurs before an algorithm is encoded in a programming language and executed by a computer The overall process of how the input-output relation can be derived through computation is conceptualised by a human and constitutes a causal mechanism embodied in an algorithm and a computer program the characterisation of a problem is the ‘hardest part of problem solving’ if a computer learns new rules based on the given rules, one cannot view such new rules as being generated by a computer autonomously adjustment of an existing algorithm to a problem at hand should not be downplayed Even where such adjustment concerns an algorithm it may not happen instantaneously, or effortlessly design of the NASA antenna is an apt example ‒ it took the scientists one month to adjust the system to the changed technical specifications of a mission’s parameters and to prototype the final antenna even though AI is often characterised as a general purpose technology there is no single ‘general-purpose’ algorithm computational problem solving is about designing ‘intelligent’ computational systems and algorithms the future of AI is associated with the development of new algorithms as long as an algorithm contains instructions that determine computational operations , and as long as computers are bound by such instructions, it would be unjustified to attribute ‘cognitive autonomy’ to an algorithm , or a software system, and to view ‘intelligent systems’ as ‘standalone’ problem-solvers and inventors the delineation between the human and non-human (algorithmic) contributions to an invention appears, in itself, artificial

crucial importance attributed to the way they are designed and applied by humans design of the overall computational method conception of a problem-solving mechanism occurs before an algorithm is encoded in a programming language and executed overall process characterisation of a problem often characterised as a general purpose technology no single ‘general-purpose’ algorithm unjustified to attribute ‘cognitive autonomy’ to an algorithm appears, in itself, artificial

['', '1. The design of a computational method as the decisive factor of computational problem solving', 'Of crucial importance from an inventorship perspective is an understanding of the extent to which the functioning of ‘intelligent systems’ can be attributed to the way they are designed and applied by humans. If we accept that problem solving ‘occurs when a problem solver determines how to solve a problem, that is, how to accomplish the goal’,148 in the case of computational problem solving, the ‘how’ refers to the conception of the overall computational procedure, which, besides an algorithm, can encompass multiple ingredients. In the case of ANNs, of particular importance is the selection of datasets. Collectively, such elements determine how the input-output relation is computed. In other words, the design of the overall computational method can be viewed as the conception of a problem-solving mechanism and, hence, an invention.', 'The reviewed literature suggests that the conception of a computational procedure occurs before an algorithm is encoded in a programming language and executed by a computer.149 The overall process of how the input-output relation can be derived through computation is conceptualised by a human150 and constitutes a causal mechanism embodied in an algorithm and a computer program.151 Notably, the characterisation of a problem is considered to be the ‘hardest part of problem solving’,152 which invokes the famous postulate that a well-stated problem is half-solved. Further, defining ‘the right abstraction is critical’153 for computational problem solving.154', 'It is worth noting that algorithms vary in complexity and uniqueness: While routine tasks are performed by established algorithms, new algorithms can be designed for complex problems.155 Even though AI applications are, at times, portrayed in the legal scholarship as being able to ‘discover complex rules and patterns […] given only an abstract problem definition and simple rules for generating and evaluating possible solutions to the problem’,156 the simplicity of the given rules and the complexity of the derived rules ought not to be generalised. For instance, in the case of EAs, the definition of the fitness function is considered to be the most difficult part,157 which requires human judgement. More importantly, if a computer learns new rules based on the given rules, one cannot view such new rules as being generated by a computer autonomously, driven by ‘own will’.', 'Furthermore, the adjustment of an existing algorithm to a problem at hand should not be downplayed.158 Even where such adjustment concerns an algorithm, or a system designed to address a highly specific problem, it may not happen instantaneously, or effortlessly. The design of the NASA antenna is an apt example ‒ it took the scientists about one month to adjust the system to the changed technical specifications of a mission’s parameters and to prototype the final antenna.159 (It is worth mentioning that NASA scientists had reportedly spent two years developing the evolutionary system for designing the antenna.160)', 'Moreover, it is important to emphasise that, even though AI is often characterised as a general purpose technology,161 and even claimed to be ‘a general-purpose method of invention’,162 there is no single ‘general-purpose’ algorithm, or a ‘general-purpose’ model capable of solving any problem.163 Quite to the contrary, scalability and generalizability are well-known problems of AI.164 Thus, computational problem solving is about designing ‘intelligent’ computational systems and algorithms, whereas ‘computers […] are incapable of formulating algorithms and even so-called “intelligent” systems rely on a human being to formulate the algorithm’.165', 'Notably, the future of AI is associated with the development of new algorithms.166 Thus, as long as an algorithm contains instructions that determine computational operations, and as long as computers are bound by such instructions, it would be unjustified to attribute ‘cognitive autonomy’ to an algorithm, or a software system, and to view ‘intelligent systems’ as ‘standalone’ problem-solvers and inventors. In light of the foregoing, the delineation between the human and non-human (algorithmic) contributions to an invention appears, in itself, artificial.167', '']

[(6, 12)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-JoPh-Neg-JW-Patterson-Debates-hosted-by-UK-Round-4.docx

Minnesota

JoPh

c8f39273254ff2e65c47f00e378cf7f541cd1ce3ae151085554d99470df7ffae

Ableism is constructed via capitalist norms of productivity – the 1AC papers over cap’s role in perpetuating ableism.

Costello 17 [Chris, writer, 10/29/17, The Mighty, “How Capitalism Contributes to Ableism,” , DOA: 7/13/20, Lowell-TT]

category of disability arose with development of capitalism capitalism give rise to disability oppression perpetuates it capitalists have economic interest to exclude workers If a worker cannot meet requirements, the capitalist loses capitalism disables workers capitalism used disability to determine deserving and undeserving economics of capitalist production are responsible for disability oppression capitalist economy rejected disabled people as unproductive economic factors promote ableism

the category of disability arose with the development of capitalism Not only does capitalism give rise to disability oppression it also perpetuates it capitalists have both an economic and ideological interest to exclude workers based on perceived disability The capitalist needs the average worker to produce commodities in the average amount of socially-necessary labor time If a worker cannot meet these requirements, the capitalist loses value If a worker is too slow, they earn less profits there are economic reasons for a capitalist system to reject disabled people as workers capitalism also disables workers Production at tremendous speeds with little regard for safety leads to unsafe production processes capital takes no account of the health… of the worker unless society forces it to do so capitalism is inherently bad for disabled people that answer is , systemic laws of capitalist production confront the capitalists as a coercive force external to them it is about the logic of the system Under capitalism the state has also stepped in to manage the exclusion of people with disabilities used disability to determine the “ deserving poor” and the “ undeserving poor when doling out benefits that would discourage revolution This ensured the impaired lived uncomfortable lives Being categorized as disabled conferred poverty status on working class families Disability care has always been expensive This would force disabled workers and their families to seek employment in low-wage or unsafe industries driving down wages and conditions for the non-disabled sections of the working class the economics of capitalist production are responsible for disability oppression capitalists also perpetua ting disability oppression It discouraged workers from not working also engendered the idea that they had no right to a basic standard of living The widespread belief served to disenchant revolution. As the disabled population grew disability began to be seen as a problem to be banished This was done using institutionalization, sterilization, and euthanasia To be working class is to sell one’s labor in order to survive. Disabled workers were unable to do this They became either a public charge or a burden the state under capitalism does not provide disabled workers with adequate care To do so would be to “waste” resources on someone who could not perform productive labor in return the stigma around disability meant that even middle and ruling class disabled people were kept in custodial care or in remedial schooling oppression of disabled people trickled down” to affect the entire society While the capitalist economy rejected disabled people as unproductive state institutions created and reinforced negative social attitudes Capitalist society relegated disabled people to the most negative status of poverty and isolation. These were used to justify disadvantageous social positions, which strengthened attitudes Institutions and attitudes interact dialectically The discrimination and oppression of impaired people rested on that being “able-bodied” or “able-minded” was the social norm “ableism is part of capitalist society because production for profit at all costs means excluding workers who require individual accommodations The state and other institutions promote ableist ideas by rationalizing exclusion from the workplace stigma encompasses all realms of social existence ableism policies relegate over 70 percent of disabled people to unemployment in the U S someone with a disability earn far less than any abled person Inadequate housing, living conditions disproportionately affect disabled people Unemployed disabled people are forced to rely on disability stipends the state demands the right to interfere in the most intimate details of a person’s life to judge them worthy of receiving a small monthly check We must consider the economic and societal factors that promote ableism and oppression. Disability and ableism were created through collective institutions

the category of disability arose with the development of capitalism there are economic reasons for a capitalist system to reject disabled people as workers capitalism also disables workers logic of the system disability to determine the “ deserving poor” and the “ undeserving poor Disability care has always been expensive the economics of capitalist production are responsible for disability oppression capitalists perpetua the idea that they had no right to a basic standard of living disability banished using institutionalization, sterilization, and euthanasia Disabled workers became either a public charge or a burden oppression of disabled people trickled down” to affect the entire society Capitalist society relegated disabled people to the most negative status of poverty and isolation. “ableism is part of capitalist society because production for profit at all costs means excluding workers who require individual accommodations stigma encompasses all realms of social existence the state demands the right to interfere in the most intimate details of a person’s life to judge them worthy of receiving a small monthly check We must consider the economic and societal factors that promote ableism and oppression.

['I have argued that the category of disability arose with the development of capitalism. This is, however, only half the story. Not only does capitalism give rise to disability oppression, I believe it also perpetuates it. The capitalists have both an economic and ideological interest to exclude workers based on perceived disability. The social model of disability put forward by UPIAS in 1975 is vital for understanding this question.', 'The capitalist needs the average worker to produce commodities — that is, goods and services to be sold on a market. The capitalist also needs the worker to produce these commodities to be produced in the average amount of socially-necessary labor time. If a worker is too slow and cannot meet these requirements, the capitalist loses time that could be adding more value for himself. If a worker is too slow, they earn less profits for the given capitalist. Thus, there are purely economic reasons for a capitalist system to reject disabled people as workers. These workers cost more and cut into profit.', 'But there is a contradiction here: although capitalism rejects disabled workers, the system also disables workers. Production takes place at tremendous speeds with little regard for the safety of the workers (unless the class struggle results in temporary gains for the working class). The dynamic of profit-over-people leads to unsafe production processes. Marx’s longtime collaborator. Marx reiterated this in “Capital Volume One,” writing, “capital takes no account of the health… of the worker unless society forces it to do so.” This is an absolutely key point: although capitalism is inherently bad for disabled people, we have the power to remake society. We can force capital to work for our needs, to take our health and safety into account.', 'The answer to the outcry about physical and mental degradation, the premature death and torture of overwork, exists. Before we can determine what that answer is, however, we must figure out what the answer is not. The oppression of the disabled does not depend on the individual will, good or bad, of any particular capitalists. The objective, systemic laws of capitalist production confront the capitalists as a coercive force external to them. Even the bosses are not in full control of the system: market forces are. It is not about a capitalist being good or bad, it is about the logic of the system.', 'For instance, capitalism relies on a “reserve army of the unemployed” to maintain competition among workers and prevent them from seeing their common enemy. Unemployment also allows the bosses to drive down the quality of working conditions across the board. Unemployment forces workers to take low wages, unsafe conditions, and so on. If one worker refuses to do so, the poverty conferred by unemployment means that someone else will. Many people who are considered disabled under capitalism are forced to fill the role of a reserve army of labor, but this is not universal.', 'Under capitalism, the state has also stepped in to manage the exclusion of people with disabilities. The state has used the invented category of disability to determine the “deserving poor” and the “undeserving poor” when doling out benefits that would discourage workers from making revolution. This ensured the impaired lived uncomfortable lives in workhouses or prisons. Being categorized as disabled conferred poverty status on a member of the working class, and usually on their families as well. Disability care has always been expensive. Then and now, having a disabled child could mean destitution. This would force disabled workers and their families to seek employment in low-wage or unsafe industries, in addition to driving down wages and conditions for the non-disabled sections of the working class. First and foremost, the economics of capitalist production have been and are responsible for disability oppression.', 'In addition to this, the capitalists also had an ideological reason for perpetuating disability oppression. It discouraged workers from not working, yes, but also engendered in the workers the idea that they had no right to a basic standard of living. Charities that served the poor and disabled were roundly criticized because they did not convey enough of this moral stigma. The widespread belief that poor and disabled people were unworthy of decent lifestyles served to disenchant these populations from making revolution. A revolution was a way for the oppressed to improve their conditions, but the oppressed would never attempt to do this if they did not believe improvement was possible.', 'As the disabled population grew increasingly under the purview of laws and state institutions, the category of disability itself began to be seen as a problem to be banished from public view. This was done using whatever methods were effective, up to and including institutionalization, sterilization, and euthanasia.', 'The state’s ideological motivations were not entirely separate from their economic ones. If a person is perceived as being unable to work, then they are unable make a living. To be working class is to be compelled to sell one’s labor in order to survive. Disabled workers were unable to do this. They became either a public charge or a burden on their impoverished families. But the state under capitalism did not and does not often provide disabled workers with adequate care. To do so would be to “waste” resources on someone who could not perform productive labor in return. This is most clearly the case for working class and disabled people, but the stigma around disability has meant that even middle and ruling class disabled people were kept in custodial care or in remedial schooling. The oppression of disabled people has its roots in capitalist relations of production; it eventually “trickled down” to affect the entire society.', 'While the capitalist economy as such rejected disabled people as unproductive, the state institutions created and reinforced negative social attitudes towards disability. Capitalist society had relegated disabled people to the most negative status of poverty and isolation. These negative attitudes were used to justify disadvantageous social positions, which strengthened the attitudes themselves. Institutions and attitudes were and are in a constant interplay with one another, feeding back into and altering each other. In Marxist terms, they interact dialectically.', 'The discrimination and oppression of impaired people based on a manufactured category of disability rested on the underlying assumption that being “able-bodied” or “able-minded” was the social norm, the desirable default. Today, this attitude goes by the name “ableism.” It is part and parcel of capitalist society because production for profit at all costs means excluding workers who require individual accommodations. The state and other institutions, such as education and the media, promote ableist ideas by rationalizing our exclusion from the workplace. The stigma, while it originates in the workplace, goes beyond this sphere as well. It encompasses all realms of social existence.', 'But ableism is not just bad ideas or bad language. It is policies and actions of the state and the capitalist that relegate over 70 percent of disabled people to unemployment in the United States alone. When someone with a disability is employed, they tend to earn far less than any abled person. Inadequate housing, living conditions, and the like also disproportionately affect disabled people. Some disabilities can be noted almost as soon as a child is born, and they are immediately tested for other disabilities as well. Early detection is not the issue in and of itself, however. The problem is that mainstream systems of care generally treat such children as problems to be cured or as expenses to the state. Many of these programs are justified not because we have a moral obligation to help one another, but because they are “cheaper than the alternative” of letting disabled people struggle on their own.', 'Parents are generally advised to take measures, whether medical or therapeutic, to make their child as “normal” as possible. They face tremendous pressure to pathologize their children instead of working to make their lives as meaningful as possible. Ableist ideas have existed in public and private education for as long as either has existed. In the United States, disabled children were historically, and often still are segregated from their abled counterparts. As a result, abled children may not see their peers with disabilities as part of the same society, and may fail to make even the simplest of accommodations.', 'Likewise, disabled children themselves are often made to see themselves as apart from the mainstream. This engenders ideas of weakness in them. They grow to believe they are not capable of doing the kinds of things their peers can do. This is a harmful atmosphere for all of us. These ideas about disabled people continue into adulthood, most importantly surfacing in employment. Employers are encouraged to see people with disabilities as problems or expenses, just like parents and educators.', 'Unemployed disabled people are thus forced to rely on disability stipends and other government programs. Just like other such programs in the United States, the state demands the right to interfere in the most intimate details of a person’s life just to judge them worthy of receiving a small monthly check.', 'Ableism in the United States promotes the idea that disability is a personal tragedy. As we have seen, nothing could be further from the truth. The personal tragedy narrative is about the idea of “overcoming” disability through rehab or surgery, or else acknowledging their impairment and bravely going on in spite of it. In both cases, we are encouraged to look at disability as simply a set of obstacles that inexplicably arise to thwart us, rather than examining the barriers capitalist society puts in front of us. The individual is not the problem. We must consider the economic and societal factors that promote ableism and oppression. Disability and ableism were created through collective institutions, and can only be overcome through collective struggle.']

[(0, 11)]

ndtceda

Michigan-McSk-Neg-Indiana-Octas.docx

Michigan

McSk

a99aa5f43e3d7d4036be0882caecbaeab850e8cff229c9732c193c6ae47fbb9a

Even minor food shocks cause nuke war AND extinction by destroying resilience to other existential threats

Huon Porteous 20, Honors Student in Philosophy at the Australian National University, President of the Local Effective Altruism Society, 2020, "Food Insecurity", Commission for the Human Future, https://www.humanfuture.net/food-insecurity/

food crises initiate instability increasing conflict minor shocks have severe consequences causing instability across the 800 million in extreme poverty instability is dangerous in countries with w m d weapons could end up in a group that intends to use them maliciously Food insecurity is a catastrophic risk increasing likelihood of nuclear war ) or decreasing resilience Even if no catastrophe hundreds of millions die

Widespread access to food makes it possible to live in a stable society Without this incidence of political instability and war tends to increase There is emerging ev that food crises initiate political instability increasing the risk of conflict through decay in the ability of a state to govern In one example the drought that struck Syria forced 1.5 million from rural areas into cities, exacerbating stresses the drought contributed to a regional refugee crisis that spilt over into Europe and had profound effects on politics Even minor shocks to food supply can have severe consequences maize-exporting countries imposed export bans, which precipitated a price spike of 83%, causing instability across the developing world Such volatility affects 800 million people living in extreme poverty Political instability is most dangerous when it occurs in countries with access to w m d Should a food crisis arise in one of these countries these weapons could end up in the hands of a group that intends to use them maliciously The fact Pakistan and Iran are ranked the 25th and 44th most fragile states is cause for concern that food insecurity in those regions could have severe consequences Food insecurity is a global catastrophic risk increasing the likelihood of nuclear war ) or decreasing our resilience Even if no catastrophe results significant food failures would caus hundreds of millions to die

political instability war increase initiate political instability increasing the risk of conflict decay ability of a state to govern minor shocks severe consequences instability across the developing world 800 million most dangerous w m d group use them maliciously Pakistan Iran cause for concern food insecurity in those regions could have severe consequences global catastrophic risk increasing likelihood nuclear war decreasing our resilience no catastrophe hundreds of millions

['Widespread and consistent access to food makes it possible to live in a stable society. Without this guarantee, the incidence of political instability and war tends to increase. There is an emerging body of evidence that food crises can initiate political instability5,6,7, increasing the risk of conflict through various means, such as a decay in the ability of a state to govern its people.8', 'In one recent example, the severe drought that struck Syria between 2007 and 2010 contributed to massive crop failures that undermined livelihoods and forced 1.5 million people from rural areas into cities, exacerbating existing social stresses.9 Though the drought was clearly not the primary cause of the Syrian Civil War, it contributed to a regional refugee crisis that spilt over into Europe, and had profound effects on the politics of countries across the region, which are still playing out today.', 'Even minor shocks to the food supply can have severe consequences. From 2006 to 2008, large maize-exporting countries like Brazil, Argentina and Ukraine imposed export bans, which together with droughts and rising oil prices precipitated a price spike of 83%, causing economic instability and social unrest across much of the developing world.10 Such price volatility in food disproportionately affects the approximately 800 million people living in extreme poverty.11', 'Political instability is most dangerous when it occurs in countries with access to weapons of mass destruction. Should a food crisis arise in one of these countries occur that results in civil war and governmental collapse, these weapons could end up in the hands of a group that intends to use them maliciously as an act of terror. The fact that Pakistan (which has access to nuclear bombs) and Iran (considered capable of producing bioweapons) are ranked the 25th and 44th most fragile states in the world is cause for concern that food insecurity in those regions could have severe consequences.12', 'Risks of total food production loss', 'When Indonesia’s Mount Tambora erupted in 1815, dark volcanic dust and reflective sulphate aerosols thrust into the skies are thought to have lowered global temperatures by 1°C. The United States experienced snowfall in summertime and China, North America and Europe suffered crop failures and ensuing famines.13 We could easily see such effects again in future after a sufficiently large volcanic eruption or even a small-scale nuclear exchange.', 'There is some evidence from climate science that indicates it would take the detonation of only 50-100 nuclear weapons in populated cities to lift millions of tonnes of combustible material into the atmosphere and trigger what is known as nuclear winter, sharply lowering global temperatures over a decade.14,15 Summer temperatures would drop by more than 20°C over much of North America and Asia, and would stay continually below freezing for several years in the mid-latitudes, where most of our food is produced. Such drastic changes to the climate have the potential to bring food production to a near-complete halt, leaving billions at risk of starvation.', 'While we’d lose almost all of our regular food production, it’s likely there would be some food production via cold-tolerant crops and alternative foods such as seaweed and algae. Some human populations would likely survive, though in a vastly different world. The ability of surviving populations to recover an equivalent level of civilization is unclear.16,17 (See also our page on risks from nuclear war.)', 'Catastrophes such as this that result in (near or) total food production loss pose the most severe risks to global food production. The likelihood of such a total food production loss scenario is dominated by the anthropogenic risk of nuclear winter, with the natural risks like supervolcanoes or asteroid impacts having similar effects but being far less likely. Estimates of a total food production loss scenario vary between 1-10% this century, with a risk of human extinction of approximately 0.1%.', 'Risks of significant food production loss', 'Risks of significant food production loss are those that could result in a 3-30% reduction in our food production capacity. While this might sound much less extreme by comparison, keep in mind that all disasters in living memory have been less than a 3% loss. Based on current research18, there is an approximately 80% chance of significant food production loss this century. Sources of such risks include:', 'Global warming resulting in multiple bread-basket failure19;', 'Catastrophic crop disease to staple crops – the grass family poaceae (which includes wheat, rye, and barley) alone contributes 50% of the world’s calories20,21;', 'A severe pandemic – pandemics can impact global trade systems, limit movement of agricultural workers, and decrease affordability of food. The ebola virus resulted in a significant reduction in regional food security22, while COVID 19 had impacts on global trade and buying power of global poor.23 ', 'Loss of pollinators – in Europe, pollination services represents some 12% of food production, mainly by increasing the yield of fruits, vegetables and nuts.24 Global agricultural losses are estimated at between 3-8% in the event insect pollination were to fail.25', 'There are also risks of significant food production loss that would occur via failures of the physical infrastructure needed to produce food. We rely on a complex network of interlinked infrastructure – e.g. electricity, fossil fuels, water, telecommunication, etc – to run the industrial systems which provide the goods and services we consume daily. Food production, which has become increasingly industrialized since the 20th century, is highly dependent on the proper functioning of these systems. This is exemplified by modern agriculture’s reliance on synthetic fertilizers. An estimated 40-50% of the world’s population survives on food produced from fertilizers made through the Haber-Bosch process26, which requires gas (fossil fuel) and electrical infrastructure as well as transportation networks to distribute.', 'Infrastructure is vulnerable to various low probability high impact events such as High Altitude Magnetic Pulse (HEMP)27, space weather (solar storms or coronal mass ejections)28,29,30, pandemics31, and coordinated cyber-attacks.32 Such events could result in major impacts on food systems.33', 'Conclusion', 'Food insecurity is a global catastrophic risk factor increasing the likelihood of other catastrophes occurring (e.g., nuclear war) or decreasing our resilience to catastrophes. Even if no catastrophe results from prolonged food insecurity, such significant food system failures would be robustly bad, potentially causing hundreds of millions to die. The complex nature of food security and the highly interdisciplinary nature of the problem, makes it a difficult problem to address.', '', '', '']

[(5, 16)]

ndtceda

Kansas-SpHa-Aff-3---Harvard-Round-8.docx

Kansas

SpHa

4f6dee844166f752624ba04cc20dbf69885681d9d712177261ee1c769e6ea749

Extinction outweighs---it’s the upmost moral evil and disavowal of the risk makes it more likely.

Burns 17 – (Elizabeth Finneron-Burns is a Teaching Fellow at the University of Warwick and an Affiliated Researcher at the Institute for Futures Studies in Stockholm, What’s wrong with human extinction?, , Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2017)

it is good for people to exist and extinction would deprive people of this billions of people would die painful deaths there would be no future generations the value of all those generations together greatly exceeds the value of the current generation It would mean the loss of the only known form of intelligent life civilization and intellectual progress would be lost humans’ capacity for rationality is valuable in itself Existing people would endure physical pain and painful premature deaths there could be various psychological effects that would be endured by existing people sense of hopelessness there will be no more humans and that your projects will end with you.

four reasons that could be given against the moral permissibility of human extinction. reasons that impact the people who exist at the time that the extinction or the knowledge of the upcoming extinction occurs, can explain its wrongness. One reason of human extinction might be considered to be wrong lies in the value of human life itself. The thought here might be that it is a good thing for people to exist and enjoy happy lives and extinction would deprive more people of enjoying this good. if humans were to go extinct, the utility foregone by the billions (or more) of people who could have lived but will now never get that opportunity, renders allowing human extinction to take place an incidence of wrongdoing. One very bad thing about human extinction would be that billions of people would likely die painful deaths . this is by far not the worst thing about human extinction. worst thing about human extinction is that there would be no future generations the value of all those generations together greatly exceeds the value of the current generation The first is that there is value in human life and also something valuable about creating future people which gives us a reason to do so , it is possible the knowledge of this loss might create a personal reason for some existing people It would mean the loss of the only known form of intelligent life and all civilization and intellectual progress would be lost . A related argument is made by those who feel that there is something special about humans’ capacity for rationality which is valuable in itself . Existing people would endure physical pain and /or painful and/or premature deaths So, the final important reason people might think that human extinction would be wrong is that there could be various deleterious psychological effects that would be endured by existing people having the knowledge that there would be no future generations. higher level sense of hopelessness or despair that there will be no more humans and that your projects will end with you.

['Many, though certainly not all, people might believe that it would be wrong to bring about the end of the human species, and the reasons given for this belief are various. I begin by considering four reasons that could be given against the moral permissibility of human extinction. I will argue that only those reasons that impact the people who exist at the time that the extinction or the knowledge of the upcoming extinction occurs, can explain its wrongness. I use this conclusion to then consider in which cases human extinction would be morally permissible or impermissible, arguing that there is only a small class of cases in which it would not be wrong to cause the extinction of the human race or allow it to happen. 2.1. It would prevent the existence of very many happy people One reason of human extinction might be considered to be wrong lies in the value of human life itself. The thought here might be that it is a good thing for people to exist and enjoy happy lives and extinction would deprive more people of enjoying this good. The ‘good’ in this case could be understood in at least two ways. According to the first, one might believe that you benefit a person by bringing them into existence, or at least, that it is good for that person that they come to exist. The second view might hold that if humans were to go extinct, the utility foregone by the billions (or more) of people who could have lived but will now never get that opportunity, renders allowing human extinction to take place an incidence of wrongdoing. An example of this view can be found in two quotes from an Effective Altruism blog post by Peter Singer, Nick Beckstead and Matt Wage: One very bad thing about human extinction would be that billions of people would likely die painful deaths. But in our view, this is by far not the worst thing about human extinction. The worst thing about human extinction is that there would be no future generations. Since there could be so many generations in our future, the value of all those generations together greatly exceeds the value of the current generation. (Beckstead, Singer, and Wage 2013) The authors are making two claims. The first is that there is value in human life and also something valuable about creating future people which gives us a reason to do so; furthermore, it would be a very bad thing if we did not do so. The second is that, not only would it be a bad thing for there to be no future people, but it would actually be the worst thing about extinction. Since happy human lives have value, and the number of potential people who could ever exist is far greater than the number of people who exist at any one time, even if the extinction were brought about through the painful deaths of currently existing people, the former’s loss would be greater than the latter’s. Both claims are assuming that there is an intrinsic value in the existence of potential human life. The second claim makes the further assumption that the forgone value of the potential lives that could be lived is greater than the disvalue that would be accrued by people existing at the time of the extinction through suffering from painful and/or premature deaths. The best-known author of the post, Peter Singer is a prominent utilitarian, so it is not surprising that he would lament the potential lack of future human lives per se. However, it is not just utilitarians who share this view, even if implicitly. Indeed, other philosophers also seem to imply that they share the intuition that there is just something wrong with causing or failing to prevent the extinction of the human species such that we prevent more ‘people’ from having the ‘opportunity to exist’. Stephen Gardiner (2009) and Martin O’Neill (personal correspondence), both sympathetic to contract theory, for example, also find it intuitive that we should want more generations to have the opportunity to exist, assuming that they have worth-living lives, and I find it plausible to think that many other people (philosophers and non-philosophers alike) probably share this intuition. When we talk about future lives being ‘prevented’, we are saying that a possible person or a set of possible people who could potentially have existed will now never actually come to exist. To say that it is wrong to prevent people from existing could either mean that a possible person could reasonably reject a principle that permitted us not to create them, or that the foregone value of their lives provides a reason for rejecting any principle that permits extinction. To make the first claim we would have to argue that a possible person could reasonably reject any principle that prevented their existence on the grounds that it prevented them in particular from existing. However, this is implausible for two reasons. First, we can only wrong someone who did, does or will actually exist because wronging involves failing to take a person’s interests into account. When considering the permissibility of a principle allowing us not to create Person X, we cannot take X’s interest in being created into account because X will not exist if we follow the principle. By considering the standpoint of a person in our deliberations we consider the burdens they will have to bear as a result of the principle. In this case, there is no one who will bear any burdens since if the principle is followed (that is, if we do not create X), X will not exist to bear any burdens. So, only people who do/will actually exist can bear the brunt of a principle, and therefore occupy a standpoint that is owed justification. Second, existence is not an interest at all and a possible person is not disadvantaged by not being caused to exist. Rather than being an interest, it is a necessary requirement in order to have interests. Rivka Weinberg describes it as ‘neutral’ because causing a person to exist is to create a subject who can have interests; existence is not an interest itself.3 In order to be disadvantaged, there must be some detrimental effect on your interests. However, without existence, a person does not have any interests so they cannot be disadvantaged by being kept out of existence. But, as Weinberg points out, ‘never having interests itself could not be contrary to people’s interests since without interest bearers, there can be no ‘they’ for it to be bad for’ (Weinberg 2008, 13). So, a principle that results in some possible people never becoming actual does not impose any costs on those ‘people’ because nobody is disadvantaged by not coming into existence.4 It therefore seems that it cannot be wrong to fail to bring particular people into existence. This would mean that no one acts wrongly when they fail to create another person. Writ large, it would also not be wrong if everybody decided to exercise their prerogative not to create new people and potentially, by consequence, allow human extinction. One might respond here by saying that although it may be permissible for one person to fail to create a new person, it is not permissible if everyone chooses to do so because human lives have value and allowing human extinction would be to forgo a huge amount of value in the world. This takes us to the second way of understanding the potential wrongness of preventing people from existing — the foregone value of a life provides a reason for rejecting any principle that prevents it. One possible reply to this claim turns on the fact that many philosophers acknowledge that the only, or at least the best, way to think about the value of (individual or groups of) possible people’s lives is in impersonal terms (Parfit 1984; Reiman 2007; McMahan 2009). Jeff McMahan, for example, writes ‘at the time of one’s choice there is no one who exists or will exist independently of that choice for whose sake one could be acting in causing him or her to exist … it seems therefore that any reason to cause or not to cause an individual to exist … is best considered an impersonal rather than individual-affecting reason’ (McMahan 2009, 52). Another reply along similar lines would be to appeal to the value that is lost or at least foregone when we fail to bring into existence a next (or several next) generations of people with worth-living lives. Since ex hypothesi worth-living lives have positive value, it is better to create more such lives and worse to create fewer. Human extinction by definition is the creation of no future lives and would ‘deprive’ billions of ‘people’ of the opportunity to live worth-living lives. This might reduce the amount of value in the world at the time of the extinction (by killing already existing people), but it would also prevent a much vaster amount of value in the future (by failing to create more people). Both replies depend on the impersonal value of human life. However, recall that in contractualism impersonal values are not on their own grounds for reasonably rejecting principles. Scanlon himself says that although we have a strong reason not to destroy existing human lives, this reason ‘does not flow from the thought that it is a good thing for there to be more human life rather than less’ (104). In contractualism, something cannot be wrong unless there is an impact on a person. Thus, neither the impersonal value of creating a particular person nor the impersonal value of human life writ large could on its own provide a reason for rejecting a principle permitting human extinction. It seems therefore that the fact that extinction would deprive future people of the opportunity to live worth-living lives (either by failing to create either particular future people or future people in general) cannot provide us with a reason to consider human extinction to be wrong. Although the lost value of these ‘lives’ itself cannot be the reason explaining the wrongness of extinction, it is possible the knowledge of this loss might create a personal reason for some existing people. I will consider this possibility later on in section (d). But first I move to the second reason human extinction might be wrong per se. 2.2. It would mean the loss of the only known form of intelligent life and all civilization and intellectual progress would be lost A second reason we might think it would be wrong to cause human extinction is the loss that would occur of the only (known) form of rational life and the knowledge and civilization that that form of life has created. One thought here could be that just as some might consider it wrong to destroy an individual human heritage monument like the Sphinx, it would also be wrong if the advances made by humans over the past few millennia were lost or prevented from progressing. A related argument is made by those who feel that there is something special about humans’ capacity for rationality which is valuable in itself. Since humans are the only intelligent life that we know of, it would be a loss, in itself, to the world for that to end. I admit that I struggle to fully appreciate this thought. It seems to me that Henry Sidgwick was correct in thinking that these things are only important insofar as they are important to humans (Sidgwick 1874, I.IX.4).5 If there is no form of intelligent life in the future, who would there be to lament its loss since intelligent life is the only form of life capable of appreciating intelligence? Similarly, if there is no one with the rational capacity to appreciate historic monuments and civil progress, who would there be to be negatively affected or even notice the loss?6 However, even if there is nothing special about human rationality, just as some people try to prevent the extinction of nonhuman animal species, we might think that we ought also to prevent human extinction for the sake of biodiversity. The thought in this, as well as the earlier examples, must be that it would somehow be bad for the world if there were no more humans even though there would be no one for whom it is bad. This may be so but the only way to understand this reason is impersonally. Since we are concerned with wrongness rather than badness, we must ask whether something that impacts no one’s well-being, status or claims can be wrong. As we saw earlier, in the contractualist framework reasons must be personal rather than impersonal in order to provide grounds for reasonable rejection (Scanlon 1998, 218–223). Since the loss of civilization, intelligent life or biodiversity are per se impersonal reasons, there is no standpoint from which these reasons could be used to reasonably reject a principle that permitted extinction. Therefore, causing human extinction on the grounds of the loss of civilization, rational life or biodiversity would not be wrong. 2.3. Existing people would endure physical pain and/or painful and/or premature deaths Thinking about the ways in which human extinction might come about brings to the fore two more reasons it might be wrong. It could, for example, occur if all humans (or at least the critical number needed to be unable to replenish the population, leading to eventual extinction) underwent a sterilization procedure. Or perhaps it could come about due to anthropogenic climate change or a massive asteroid hitting the Earth and wiping out the species in the same way it did the dinosaurs millions of years ago. Each of these scenarios would involve significant physical and/or non-physical harms to existing people and their interests. Physically, people might suffer premature and possibly also painful deaths, for example. It is not hard to imagine examples in which the process of extinction could cause premature death. A nuclear winter that killed everyone or even just every woman under the age of 50 is a clear example of such a case. Obviously, some types of premature death themselves cannot be reasons to reject a principle. Every person dies eventually, sometimes earlier than the standard expected lifespan due to accidents or causes like spontaneously occurring incurable cancers. A cause such as disease is not a moral agent and therefore it cannot be wrong if it unavoidably kills a person prematurely. Scanlon says that the fact that a principle would reduce a person’s well-being gives that person a reason to reject the principle: ‘components of well-being figure prominently as grounds for reasonable rejection’ (Scanlon 1998, 214). However, it is not settled yet whether premature death is a setback to well-being. Some philosophers hold that death is a harm to the person who dies, whilst others argue that it is not.7 I will argue, however, that regardless of who is correct in that debate, being caused to die prematurely can be reason to reject a principle when it fails to show respect to the person as a rational agent. Scanlon says that recognizing others as rational beings with interests involves seeing reason to preserve life and prevent death: ‘appreciating the value of human life is primarily a matter of seeing human lives as something to be respected, where this involves seeing reasons not to destroy them, reasons to protect them, and reasons to want them to go well’ (Scanlon 1998, 104). The ‘respect for life’ in this case is a respect for the person living, not respect for human life in the abstract. This means that we can sometimes fail to protect human life without acting wrongfully if we still respect the person living. Scanlon gives the example of a person who faces a life of unending and extreme pain such that she wishes to end it by committing suicide. Scanlon does not think that the suicidal person shows a lack of respect for her own life by seeking to end it because the person whose life it is has no reason to want it to go on. This is important to note because it emphasizes the fact that the respect for human life is person-affecting. It is not wrong to murder because of the impersonal disvalue of death in general, but because taking someone’s life without their permission shows disrespect to that person. This supports its inclusion as a reason in the contractualist formula, regardless of what side ends up winning the ‘is death a harm?’ debate because even if death turns out not to harm the person who died, ending their life without their consent shows disrespect to that person. A person who could reject a principle permitting another to cause his or her premature death presumably does not wish to die at that time, or in that manner. Thus, if they are killed without their consent, their interests have not been taken into account, and they have a reason to reject the principle that allowed their premature death.8 This is as true in the case of death due to extinction as it is for death due to murder. However, physical pain may also be caused to existing people without killing them, but still resulting in human extinction. Imagine, for example, surgically removing everyone’s reproductive organs in order to prevent the creation of any future people. Another example could be a nuclear bomb that did not kill anyone, but did painfully render them infertile through illness or injury. These would be cases in which physical pain (through surgery or bombs) was inflicted on existing people and the extinction came about as a result of the painful incident rather than through death. Furthermore, one could imagine a situation in which a bomb (for example) killed enough people to cause extinction, but some people remained alive, but in terrible pain from injuries. It seems uncontroversial that the infliction of physical pain could be a reason to reject a principle. Although Scanlon says that an impact on well-being is not the only reason to reject principles, it plays a significant role, and indeed, most principles are likely to be rejected due to a negative impact on a person’s well-being, physical or otherwise. It may be queried here whether it is actually the involuntariness of the pain that is grounds for reasonable rejection rather than the physical pain itself because not all pain that a person suffers is involuntary. One can imagine acts that can cause physical pain that are not rejectable — base jumping or life-saving or improving surgery, for example. On the other hand, pushing someone off a cliff or cutting him with a scalpel against his will are clearly rejectable acts. The difference between the two cases is that in the former, the person having the pain inflicted has consented to that pain or risk of pain. My view is that they cannot be separated in these cases and it is involuntary physical pain that is the grounds for reasonable rejection. Thus, the fact that a principle would allow unwanted physical harm gives a person who would be subjected to that harm a reason to reject the principle. Of course the mere fact that a principle causes involuntary physical harm or premature death is not sufficient to declare that the principle is rejectable — there might be countervailing reasons. In the case of extinction, what countervailing reasons might be offered in favour of the involuntary physical pain/ death-inducing harm? One such reason that might be offered is that humans are a harm to the natural environment and that the world might be a better place if there were no humans in it. It could be that humans might rightfully be considered an all-things-considered hindrance to the world rather than a benefit to it given the fact that we have been largely responsible for the extinction of many species, pollution and, most recently, climate change which have all negatively affected the natural environment in ways we are only just beginning to understand. Thus, the fact that human extinction would improve the natural environment (or at least prevent it from degrading further), is a countervailing reason in favour of extinction to be weighed against the reasons held by humans who would experience physical pain or premature death. However, the good of the environment as described above is by definition not a personal reason. Just like the loss of rational life and civilization, therefore, it cannot be a reason on its own when determining what is wrong and countervail the strong personal reasons to avoid pain/death that is held by the people who would suffer from it.9 Every person existing at the time of the extinction would have a reason to reject that principle on the grounds of the physical pain they are being forced to endure against their will that could not be countervailed by impersonal considerations such as the negative impact humans may have on the earth. Therefore, a principle that permitted extinction to be accomplished in a way that caused involuntary physical pain or premature death could quite clearly be rejectable by existing people with no relevant countervailing reasons. This means that human extinction that came about in this way would be wrong. There are of course also additional reasons they could reject a similar principle which I now turn to address in the next section. 2.4. Existing people could endure non-physical harms I said earlier than the fact in itself that there would not be any future people is an impersonal reason and can therefore not be a reason to reject a principle permitting extinction. However, this impersonal reason could give rise to a personal reason that is admissible. So, the final important reason people might think that human extinction would be wrong is that there could be various deleterious psychological effects that would be endured by existing people having the knowledge that there would be no future generations. There are two main sources of this trauma, both arising from the knowledge that there will be no more people. The first relates to individual people and the undesired negative effect on well-being that would be experienced by those who would have wanted to have children. Whilst this is by no means universal, it is fair to say that a good proportion of people feel a strong pull towards reproduction and having their lineage continue in some way. Samuel Scheffler describes the pull towards reproduction as a ‘desire for a personalized relationship with the future’ (Scheffler 2012, 31). Reproducing is a widely held desire and the joys of parenthood are ones that many people wish to experience. For these people knowing that they would not have descendants (or that their descendants will endure painful and/or premature deaths) could create a sense of despair and pointlessness of life. Furthermore, the inability to reproduce and have your own children because of a principle/policy that prevents you (either through bans or physical interventions) would be a significant infringement of what we consider to be a basic right to control what happens to your body. For these reasons, knowing that you will have no descendants could cause significant psychological traumas or harms even if there were no associated physical harm. The second is a more general, higher level sense of hopelessness or despair that there will be no more humans and that your projects will end with you. Even those who did not feel a strong desire to procreate themselves might feel a sense of hopelessness that any projects or goals they have for the future would not be fulfilled. Many of the projects and goals we work towards during our lifetime are also at least partly future-oriented. Why bother continuing the search for a cure for cancer if either it will not be found within humans’ lifetime, and/or there will be no future people to benefit from it once it is found? Similar projects and goals that might lose their meaning when confronted with extinction include politics, artistic pursuits and even the type of philosophical work with which this paper is concerned. Even more extreme, through the words of the character Theo Faron, P.D. James says in his novel The Children of Men that ‘without the hope of posterity for our race if not for ourselves, without the assurance that we being dead yet live, all pleasures of the mind and senses sometimes seem to me no more than pathetic and crumbling defences shored up against our ruins’ (James 2006, 9). Even if James’ claim is a bit hyperbolic and all pleasures would not actually be lost, I agree with Scheffler in finding it not implausible that the knowledge that extinction was coming and that there would be no more people would have at least a general depressive effect on people’s motivation and confidence in the value of and joy in their activities (Scheffler 2012, 43). Both sources of psychological harm are personal reasons to reject a principle that permitted human extinction. Existing people could therefore reasonably reject the principle for either of these reasons. Psychological pain and the inability to pursue your personal projects, goals, and aims, are all acceptable reasons for rejecting principles in the contractualist framework. So too are infringements of rights and entitlements that we accept as important for people’s lives. These psychological reasons, then, are also valid reasons to reject principles that permitted or required human extinction. ', '']

[(0, 8), (9, 10)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-Barrett-Dal-Pra%20Aff-Northwestern-Round6.docx

Kentucky

BaDa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kentucky/BaDa/Kentucky-Barrett-Dal-Pra%2520Aff-Northwestern-Round6.docx

3098e48431e12ba598ec943390caf3873116e4b8b11b322524ea02a39d2850ce

The plan fortifies a liability shield, freeing humans AND AI from legal consequence.

Bryson ’17 [Joanna, Mihailis Diamantis, and Tom Grant; September 8; Professor of Ethics and Technology at the Hertie School in Berlin; Law Professor at the University of Iowa; Fellow at the Lauterpacht Centre for International Law at the University of Cambridge; Artificial Intelligence & Law, “Of, for, and by the people: the legal lacuna of synthetic persons,” vol. 25]

conferring personality is troublesome claimants would experience problems that have arisen with novel legal persons claimants confront the empty but un accountable arrangements An electronic person might be a black hole that absorbs a human s responsibilities and from which no glint of accountability is seen there is no question a readily-manufacturable lacuna would be exploited for displacing liabilities introducing synthetic persons could lead to abuse at the expense of persons Maintaining law’s capacity entails ensuring synthetic entities never become persons

conferring legal personality on robots is legally troublesome Trying to hold an electronic person to account, claimants would experience all the problems that have arisen in the past with novel legal persons Future claimants likely would confront the accountable but empty the fully-financed but un accountable and sui generis arrangements An electronic person might be a legal black hole , an entity that absorbs a human actor’ s legal responsibilities and from which no glint of accountability is seen there is no question that such a readily-manufacturable legal lacuna would be exploited for displacing legal liabilities and obligations introducing synthetic persons could easily lead to abuse at the expense of the legal rights of extant legal persons Maintaining the law’s coherence and capacity entails ensuring synthetic entities never become persons in law or fact

legally troublesome all the problems arisen in the past likely would accountable but empty fully-financed but un accountable sui generis arrangements legal black hole legal responsibilities no glint question readily-manufacturable legal lacuna displacing easily lead expense coherence and capacity never or

['Conclusion', 'We have shown that it is completely possible to declare a machine a legal person. The impulse to do so exists both at the individual level with academic proponents, and at the level of international governance with the European Parliament recommending consideration. We have also argued here that conferring legal personality on robots is morally unnecessary and legally troublesome. While it may, either now or in the future, have emotional and economic appeal, so do many superficially desirable hazards against which the law protects us. The basic concern is for protecting human and corporate legal rights against abuse by—or more accurately, by exploiting—robots. Trying to hold an electronic person to account, claimants would experience all the problems that have arisen in the past with novel legal persons. There almost inevitably would arise asymmetries in particular legal systems, situations like that of the investor under investment treaties who can hold a respondent party to account but under the same treaties is not itself accountable. Future claimants, if they were to sue an electronic person, likely would confront the accountable but empty, like the International Tin Council; the fully-financed but unaccountable, like the United Nations; and sui generis arrangements like the Bank for International Settlements that novel legal persons tend to instigate.', 'Perhaps a robot could be likened to a force of nature—a storm or avalanche. But this would not be satisfactory either: Natural forces are not legal persons. They affect our legal relations, but we do not speak of them as having legal relations. The electronic person by contrast, would engage in some or all of the legal relations available under the legal system, and yet, for those with whom it transacts or third parties whom it encounters, it would be difficult to hold to account. We have insurance schemes to address floods and fires. You can sue its owner if a dog bites you. The constituent states of the Tin Council, if the court had been willing to pierce the veil, would have stood exposed to the debts it had accrued. An electronic person by contrast might prove to be a legal black hole, an entity that absorbs a human actor’s legal responsibilities and from which no glint of accountability is seen. Unfortunately, there is no question that such a readily-manufacturable legal lacuna would be exploited as a mechanism for avoiding and displacing legal liabilities and obligations.', 'It could be in theory that the benefits justify the costs of introducing purely synthetic persons to a legal system. Both need to be considered with proper care before moving further toward such an innovation. But in summary of our own investigation, we find the idea could easily lead to abuse at the expense of the legal rights of extant legal persons. We currently have a legal system that is, first and foremost, of, for, and by the (human) people. Maintaining the law’s coherence and capacity to defend natural persons entails ensuring that purely synthetic intelligent entities never become persons, either in law or fact.']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Michigan-McSk-Neg-NDT-Doubles.docx

Michigan

McSk

d57e40fe36f99b80db2a38eb1acd8136626cd42a7d06db9a8bcffce72515a238

More generic challengers make anticompetitive tactics impossible.

Rees 20 (Victoria Rees is a journalist at European Pharmaceutical Review, 6-16-2020, accessed on 6-8-2021, European Pharmaceutical Review, "An alternative to pharmaceutical pay-for-delay deals", https://www.europeanpharmaceuticalreview.com/article/121255/an-alternative-to-pharmaceutical-pay-for-delay-deals/)

researchers supported switch to a system that rewards the first successful challenger, which will result in fewer deals. paying off one challenger will not block others with a weak patent, the challenger will not be able to pay them all

the researchers have supported the switch to a system that instead rewards the first successful challenger, which they say will result in fewer pay-for-delay deals. paying off one challenger will not block off entry attempt by others as the potential reward is still available. If there are enough potential generic entrants, then with a weak patent, the challenger will not be able to pay them all off and hence will not pay the first either

the researchers have supported the switch to a system that instead rewards the first successful challenger, which they say will result in fewer pay-for-delay deals. paying off one challenger will not block off entry attempt by others

['', 'Compared to the current first-filer system in the US, where generic exclusivity is awarded to the first generic applicant, the researchers have supported the switch to a system that instead rewards the first successful challenger, which they say will result in fewer pay-for-delay deals.', '“If you switch to a system that rewards exclusivity to the first successful challenger (as opposed the first filers as is in the US), then paying off one challenger will not block off entry attempt by others, as the potential reward is still available. If there are enough potential generic entrants, then with a weak patent, the challenger will not be able to pay them all off and hence will not pay the first either.', '']

[(0, 7)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Amundsen-Frese-Aff-Minnesota-Round1.docx

Minnesota

AmFr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/AmFr/Minnesota-Amundsen-Frese-Aff-Minnesota-Round1.docx

3eea67d623ced8d7503cdab0cace68a79a763a4d9bba7e751c5c427eb70528f0

Our representations explicitly challenge Anti-Asian sentiment in great power politics.

Knight 21, serves on the Organizing Committee of NYC DSA’s Bronx/Upper Manhattan branch. (Dee, 4-19-2021, “Denouncing Sinophobia, the New Cold War, and Anti-Asian Hate,” DSA-USA, https://www.dsausa.org/democratic-left/denouncing-sinophobia-the-new-cold-war-and-anti-asian-hate/)

Anti-Asian sentiment has been stirred by current nuclear strategy calls for preparation for war meaning nuclear war with China a hot war with China would not only obliterate hopes for a G N D and Medicare It would obliterate us all

Anti-Asian sentiment has been stirred in the U.S. by the rhetoric and foreign policy of both Trump and Biden current nuclear strategy calls for preparation for war meaning terminal nuclear war with China Blinken called to view China as a security threat The “ pivot to Asia ” has surrounded China with warships, missiles, and bombers a hot war with China would not only obliterate hopes for a G N D and Medicare for All . It would likely obliterate us all

stirred rhetoric foreign policy Trump Biden current nuclear strategy preparation for war terminal nuclear war China Blinken security threat pivot to Asia surrounded obliterate hopes G N D Medicare for All obliterate us all

['Anti-Asian sentiment has been stirred in the U.S. by the rhetoric and foreign policy of both the Donald Trump and Joe Biden administrations. In a\xa0March 29 interview, Noam Chomsky said that “Biden adopted Trump’s Iran program, with virtually no change,” adding that “current nuclear strategy calls for preparation for war—meaning terminal nuclear war—with China and Russia.” Retired Army Colonel Ann Wright of Veterans For Peace notes with alarm that the new U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, fresh from a head-to-head confrontation with his Chinese counterpart,\xa0called on NATO members\xa0to join the U.S. in viewing China as an economic and security threat. NATO’s charter is focused on Europe; in recent decades, the U.S. has pushed it to the border with Russia, pulled it into Afghanistan, and now wants it to help beef up its “pivot to Asia.”', 'In recent years, both the U.S. government and mainstream media have found nothing good and much bad to say about China. Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo admitted in 2019 that “We lied, we cheated, we stole… It’s part of the glory of the American experiment.” He and Trump proceeded to blame China for the COVID-19 pandemic, intensifying the new cold war. Nothing has changed so far with Biden and Blinken. The “pivot to Asia” has surrounded China with warships, missiles, and bombers. With many Americans unable to separate their animosity towards the Chinese government from their opinions of individual Asian Americans, Asians in the United States are among the early victims of this not-so-cold war. There will be many more victims at home and abroad if the war buildup continues. And a hot war with China would not only obliterate hopes for a Green New Deal and Medicare for All. It would very likely obliterate us all.', '']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Kansas-MaPa-Aff-3---Harvard-Round-5.docx

Kansas

MaPa

97e67a7b23424de706737769dc661a769f3eb6aece0d87a02c316ee8797a3e56

Workplace democracy provides a transition away from capitalism resolving economic inequalities as well as strict equality across different ethnic, racial, and gender groups

Richard Wolff, 2-13-2018, is an American Marxist economist, known for his work on economic methodology and class analysis. He is Professor Emeritus of Economics at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, and currently a Visiting Professor in the Graduate Program in International Affairs of the New School in New York, Democratizing the Workplace through “Worker Self-Directed Enterprises”, Democracy at Work (d@w), https://www.democracyatwork.info/democratizing_the_workplace; accessed 11-30-2020

those who control the enterprises undermined the standards of living deepening income inequality punctuated by cyclical downturns all laws imposed in the New Deal have been weakened We propose reorganizing enterprises that workers become bosses placing the workers in the position of their board of directors WSDEs represent transition from capitalist to a better system the emphasis is on working people Laws would need to be enacted or changed the profit motive is reduced competition’s costs would not borne individuals a shortening of the workweek growth is not the major goal Worker decisions will determine salaries we expect less inequality a job and income will be considered rights WSDEs seek to achieve less inequality across different ethnic racial and gender groups

capitalism no longer “delivers the goods those who control the dominant capitalist enterprises have made decisions that undermined the delivery of rising standards of living to the mass of people Post 1945, key decision-makers also made sure to disconnect government from what meager accountability to the mass of the citizenry That was their response to the Great Depression, when pressure from below forced the New Deal’s combination of high taxes on wealth and business to fund mass relief from capitalist depression That disconnect enabled the comput­erization f the U.S. workplace, alongside the massive export of jobs to low-wage regions of the world Who made the key decisions The ‘who’ is straightforward: large corporations’ major shareholders and the boards of directors Profit rate and growth plus market-share were ‘why’ they made the key decisions The result was fast deepening income and wealth inequality punctuated by debt bubbles , bursts , and resulting cyclical downturns Virtually all the laws , rules, and regulations imposed in the New Deal have been weakened , neutered, or eliminated Capitalism’s second worst depression has seen nothing remotely like the New Deal To achieve a fuller and more durable outcome requires us to do what the New Deal coalition did not change the ‘who’ and ‘why’ of key economic decision-making the people need to be in charge We therefore propose reorganizing enterprises such that workers become their own bosses That means placing the workers in the position of their own collective board of directors This is not primarily a matter of workers as own­ers of these enterprises We call such enterprises worker self-directed enterprises They embody economic democ­racy by locating it first and foremost inside the enterprises producing the goods and services upon which society depends WSDEs represent the goal; and their growth and proliferation to transition from the present capitalist system to a far better next system The strategic focus is not upon the government, as in traditional socialist thinking Rather, the emphasis is on working people , who either convert existing enterprises into WSDEs or start new enterprises as WSDEs Our core goal is the development of a major sec­tor of the economy that is comprised of enterprises in which the employees democratically perform the activities divide all the labors to be performed determine what is to be produced, how it is to be produced, and where it is to be produced, and decide on the use and distribution of the resulting output or revenues Laws would need to be enacted or changed to facilitate the conversion of capitalistically organized enterprises into WSDEs WSDEs already exist in many places, but whole WSDE sectors much more rarely Long-term capitalist development is the major force behind the change towards a significant WSDE sector The development has four key features its tendency towards deepening gaps between the rich and the poor its instability environmental unsustainability and the stark contradiction between capitalism and workplace democracy The workers in a WSDE could collectively own the means of production In WSDEs, the profit motive is reduced to one among other motives governing decisions, and is ranked below job security and social cohesion competition’s costs would not borne by individuals While this may somewhat reduce incentives to compete, it also reduces incentives for people to oppose or thwart competition We anticipate a shortening of the workweek production conditions will likely change in response to these questions do the changes make possible a diminution of work effort if so do we respond by sustaining the same effort as before the changes or by reducing effort? GDP growth is not the major goal or measure of economic success in the post-capitalist economic system we envision As described above, we envision a gradual reduction in GDP output in favor of more leisure time WSDEs make the decisions of how to distribute the net earnings Major owners and top executives will not be in the position to decide on a distribution that favors them Worker decisions will also determine the range of wages and salaries for different enterprise tasks we expect less inequality there as well Finally, a job and decent income will be considered rights for all citizens , while equality will be a social goal WSDEs seek to achieve much less inequality in income and wealth distributions among members of society, as well as strict equality across different ethnic , racial , and gender groups The goal is for democratically self-governed communities to share social decision-making Our work is not specifically directed to environmental concerns. Indirectly, it is For example, workers democratically decide whether to install a new technol­ogy that enhances profitability at the cost of pollution

to the mass of people massive export of jobs to low-wage regions the people need to be in charge to a far better next system GDP growth is not the major goal post-capitalist economic system we envision considered rights for all citizens different ethnic , racial , and gender groups Indirectly, it is

['', 'Contemporary capitalism no longer “delivers the goods” (which is understood as a rising standard of real wages) to the majority of people. That classic defense of its instability (e.g. recurrent bouts of unemployment), its deepening economic, political, and cultural inequalities, and its attendant injustices is no lon\xadger plausible. In the U.S. since the 1970s, and especially since 2007, those who control the dominant capitalist enterprises have made decisions that undermined the delivery of rising standards of living to the mass of people. Post 1945, key decision-makers also made sure to disconnect government from what meager accountability to the mass of the citizenry it then had. That was their response to the Great Depression, when pressure from below forced the New Deal’s combination of high taxes on wealth and business to fund mass relief from capitalist depression (via Social Security, unemployment compensa\xadtion, and a massive federal jobs program). That disconnect enabled the comput\xaderization [automation] of the U.S. workplace, alongside the massive export of jobs to low-wage regions of the world – both of which took place without opposition, or even compensation for the resulting dislocation (e.g. Detroit). Who made the key decisions and why? The ‘who’ is straightforward: large corporations’ major shareholders (shareholding is highly concentrated in the U.S.) and the boards of directors they elect made the decisions. Profit rate and growth plus market-share were ‘why’ they made the key decisions. When, after the 1970s, computerization and job exports altered the long-term supply and demand balance of labor power, long-term real wage stagnation set in; it lasts through the present. Meanwhile, those same factors contributed to steadily rising productivity. The result was (and remains) fast deepening income and wealth inequality punctuated by debt bubbles, bursts, and resulting cyclical downturns. Virtually all the laws, rules, and regulations imposed in the New Deal have been weakened, neutered, or eliminated. Capitalism’s second worst depression has seen nothing remotely like the New Deal. That turn to the government made from below by the New Deal coalition of the labor movements, socialists, and communists has now proved partial and temporary. To achieve a fuller and more durable outcome requires us to do what the New Deal coalition did not. That is: to change the ‘who’ and ‘why’ of key economic decision-making at the basic enterprise level. For the economic system to serve the people, the people need to be in charge. Historical efforts to do that at the macro level through government either failed when confronted by determined private capitalist opposition (in the U.S.) or by giving too much power to too few in the government itself (in the U.S.S.R.). We therefore propose reorganizing enterprises such that workers become their own bosses. That means placing the workers in the position of their own collective board of directors, rather than having directors be non-workers selected by major shareholders. This is not primarily a matter of workers as own\xaders of these enterprises, nor primarily as managers. It is the tasks of direction—the decision-making now assigned usually and primarily to corporate boards of directors and only second\xadarily to the major shareholders who choose them—that must be transferred to the workers collectively. We call such enterprises worker self-directed enterprises (WSDEs). They embody economic democ\xadracy by locating it first and foremost inside the enterprises producing the goods and services upon which society depends. WSDEs represent the goal; and their growth and proliferation represent the mechanism to transition from the present capitalist system to a far better next system. The strategic focus, then, is not upon the government, as in traditional liberal and socialist thinking. Rather, the emphasis is on working people, who either convert existing enterprises into WSDEs or start new enterprises as WSDEs. Our core goal is the development of a major (and, if possible, prevailing) sec\xadtor of the economy that is comprised of enterprises (offices, factories, farms, and stores) in which the employees democratically perform the following key enter\xadprise activities: (a) divide all the labors to be performed, (b) determine what is to be produced, how it is to be produced, and where it is to be produced, and (c) decide on the use and distribution of the resulting output or revenues (if output is mone\xadtized). A large portion of existing capitalistically organized enterprises would have to transition out of structures in which owners, top managers, or boards of directors perform the key enterprise activities mentioned above. Laws would need to be enacted or changed to facilitate the conversion of capitalistically organized enterprises into WSDEs, the formation of new WSDEs, and the functioning of WSDEs. School curriculums would need to explain, explore, and study WSDEs systematically as alternative-enterprise organizations alongside their traditional capitalist counterparts (corporations, partnerships, and family enterprises). Political parties and platforms need to emerge to represent the interests of WSDEs (the WSDE sector) in terms of state policies, much as now the Democrats and Republicans both represent the inter\xadests of the capitalist sector. WSDEs already exist in many places, but whole WSDE sectors much more rarely. Transitions to economies in which WSDE sectors exist can begin as soon as social conditions make it possible. Long-term capitalist development is the major force behind the change towards a significant (or prevalent) WSDE sector. The development has four key features: (a) its tendency towards deepening gaps between the rich and the poor, (b) its instability (business cycles), (c) its environmental unsustainability, and (d) the stark contradiction between capitalism and workplace democracy. The biggest obstacle to transition to economies with significant or prevailing WSDE sectors is political and ideological opposition; fears about undertaking transition to WSDE sectors are often expressed as disbelief in their feasibility. Ownership could be diversified among both workers and non-workers in each WSDE. Central, regional, and local governmental bodies could be owners. Communities and neighborhoods could be collective owners. The workers in a WSDE could collectively own the means of production. They could likewise be owned by individuals and social institutions, such as schools and churches, functioning as active or passive investors and creditors. WSDEs’ investment decisions occur via deliberation of both WSDEs and the democratic organizations of the residential communities interdependent and interactive with the WSDEs. Such conjoint decisions would cover both the raising of funds for the WSDE and the investment of those funds. Economic planning and deci\xadsion-making, now left to individual corporate boards of directors interacting in markets, would be democratically coordinated. The surplus in WSDEs is strictly controlled by the worker-members. In WSDEs, the profit motive is reduced to one among other motives governing decisions, and is ranked below job security and social cohesion. WSDEs would buy and sell in a market international economy. They could establish foreign subsidiaries (although Mondragon’s* experience with them is mostly unattractive). The primary loci of economic life (where social goods and services are produced or distributed) are enterprise, household, and residential communities at local, regional, and national levels. Cooperation is the dominant theme of WSDEs. The rewards of competition would be more social than individual, and, likewise, competition’s costs would not borne by individuals. While this may somewhat reduce incentives to compete, it also reduces incentives for people to oppose or thwart competition. WSDEs are compatible with both private and public property in endlessly variable com\xadbinations. We anticipate a shortening of the workweek. The WSDE form supports and encourages democratic decision-making, and production conditions will likely change in response to these questions: (1) do the changes make possible a diminution of work effort, and if so, (2) do we respond by sustaining the same effort as before the changes, thereby producing more out\xadput, or by reducing effort? In response to a technical improvement in efficiency, do we respond socially with more produce or more leisure? Where the size of WSDEs permit, all the workers will directly function as their own board of directors. No separate organization of workers into unions will be needed. Where the size of WSDEs yields a governing executive, however tem\xadporary or rotated among members of the enterprise, a union of all members not on that executive would be appropriate and necessary. GDP growth is not the major goal or measure of economic success in the post-capitalist economic system we envision. As described above, we envision a gradual reduction in GDP output in favor of more leisure time. Growth of technical effi\xadciency, as well as ecological considerations, will enable sustained output with grow\xading leisure. WSDEs make the decisions of how to distribute the net earnings of enterprises democratically. Major owners and top executives will not be in the position to decide on a distribution that favors them, an attribute at the root of growing inequality within capitalism. Worker decisions will also determine the range of wages and salaries for different enterprise tasks; so, we expect less inequality there as well. Finally, a job and decent income will be considered rights for all citizens, while equality will be a social goal. The organization Democracy@Work envisages meaningful work and income flows for all citizens, alongside leisure time. The balance between the two would be itself democratically determined. WSDEs seek to achieve much less inequality in income and wealth distributions among members of society, as well as strict equality across different ethnic, racial, and gender groups. The goal is for democratically self-governed communities to share social decision-making with democratically self-governed enterprises. Health, wealth, and solidarity are then all considerations that will govern such conjoint decision making, alongside but not subordinate to enterprise profitability. Our work is not specifically directed to environmental concerns. Indirectly, it is. For example, workers democratically decide whether to install a new technol\xadogy that enhances profitability at the cost of pollution. They will take seriously the social costs of the pollution for themselves, their family, and their neighbors in ways that capitalists—driven by profits and capable of evading pollution’s effects—would not. The two different organizational structures weigh the costs and benefits of production differently and so reach different decisions on what and how to produce. We challenge ‘profit qua bottom line’ and substitute a long list of goals, criteria, and standards, which include environmental concerns and sustainability. There are many past and present examples of worker and producer cooperatives that are close to what we mean by WSDEs. They are found in many countries and range from small to large (i.e. Mondragon). Our project is not about some potential, future, utopian possibility, but rather the extension of a model that has attracted workers in many different circumstances, and that has proved successful. The project of transition to worker cooperatives can align with other sorts of cooperatives (consumer cooperatives, sales cooperatives, and property-owning cooperatives) in a kind of generalized cooperative economy. This model can align with candidates or parties that advance the conditions needed for successful worker cooperatives to form and grow.', '', '', '']

[(8, 13), (22, 24)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PhoenixFlood-Spencer-Neg-1-Wyoming-Round4.docx

Minnesota

PhSp

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/PhSp/Minnesota-PhoenixFlood-Spencer-Neg-1-Wyoming-Round4.docx

01284ad5d950c3132b1891904428d0d63daabf170d9f1ce86b7d15049cf3d767

No diversionary war—rhetoric is more palatable, specifically in harsh economic conditions.

Carter 18 [Erin Baggott Carter, Assistant Professor, School of International Relations, University of Southern California. Diversionary Cheap Talk: Unemployment and US Foreign Policy Rhetoric, 1945-2010. August 29, 2018. ]

rhetoric may be appealing to improve ratings without incurring militarized disputes rhetoric is less outlandish theory of diversionary talk draws upon research that elite statements influence beliefs leaders use diversionary talk in poor economic conditions I test hypotheses with over 50,000 US diplomatic events between 1945 and 2010 the most historically extensive event dataset find robust evidence of diversionary talk presidents face incentives to divert verbally militarized initiation does not affect ratings critical rhetoric increased ratings as unemployment varied rhetoric doubled estimates are conservative leaders benefit from an ingroup rally without inviting crisis

This study extends the logic of diversionary conflict to foreign policy rhetoric if foreign policy rhetoric can activate ingroup identity it may be appealing for leaders who wish to improve their ratings without incurring the substantial risks of militarized interstate disputes it might be “outlandish” for presidents to engage in the impeachable exercise of diversionary war hostile foreign policy rhetoric is far less outlandish a risk To develop a theory of diversionary cheap talk this paper draws upon research in political psychology and communication literatures find persuasive evidence that elite statements influence citizen beliefs diversionary cheap talk highlights intergroup differences and leads citizens to evaluate their leader favorably When a leader criticizes foreigners cues ingroup identity which increases citizens’ social attachment to the nation and to its leader This is a solidarity mechanism through which [c]ollective group goals and common group identity are highlighted norms of group-based altruism are strengthened punishment and rejection of defectors are increased and perceptions of the in-group and out-group are manipulated theory generates observable implications about when leaders use diversionary cheap talk and who they target I follow the consensus in focusing on poor economic conditions as the most important source of public disapproval Low approval ratings limit leaders’ ability to advance their domestic agenda when the economy deteriorates leaders will criticize foreign nations to improve their approval ratings and restore political capital necessary depth of intergroup differences is important for group attachment I test these hypotheses with the American Diplomatic Dataset an original record of over 50,000 US diplomatic events between 1945 and 2010 I used tools from computational social science to classify bilateral interstate interactions into hundreds of specific types and four aggregate categories verbal cooperation verbal conflict material cooperation and material conflict This is the most historically extensive event dataset it allows an exploration of US foreign policy behavior across a variety of administrations and economic crises I find robust evidence of diversionary cheap talk in US foreign policy presidents face incentives to divert verbally rather than materially while militarized interstate dispute initiation does not affect presidential approval ratings critical rhetoric about other nations is associated with increased ratings presidents between 1945 and 2010 typically diverted in the form of words not deeds as unemployment varied from minimum to maximum hostile foreign policy rhetoric nearly doubled estimates are conservative US foreign policy rhetoric responds significantly to domestic economic conditions in many cases where diversionary theory predicts conflict initiation leaders instead choose rhetorical hostility leaders may have their cake and eat it too They benefit from an ingroup rally without inviting an international crisis mixed empirical findings may be due to existing scholarship considers only the most serious forms of diversion like militarized interstate disputes a wide range of diversionary behavior takes place at less extreme levels

appealing militarized disputes outlandish diversionary talk poor economic conditions 50,000 US diplomatic events 1945 2010 historically extensive robust evidence verbally militarized initiation not affect critical rhetoric increased doubled conservative ingroup rally crisis

['', 'This study extends the logic of diversionary conflict to foreign policy rhetoric. There is surprisingly little research on rhetoric in international relations. The international relations literature deems talk “cheap” (Fearon, 1995; Kydd, 2005). The audience cost literature considers rhetoric meaningful, but only if it invokes audience costs through explicit, public threats (Fearon, 1994; Schultz, 2001; Smith, 1998; Tomz, 2007). However, if foreign policy rhetoric can activate ingroup identity, then it may be appealing for leaders who wish to improve their ratings without incurring the substantial risks of militarized interstate disputes. While it might be “outlandish” for presidents to engage in the impeachable exercise of diversionary war (Meernik and Waterman, 1996), hostile foreign policy rhetoric is far less outlandish a risk.', 'To develop a theory of diversionary cheap talk, this paper draws upon research in political psychology and political communication. These literatures find persuasive evidence that elite statements influence citizen beliefs (Behr and Iyengar, 19s."); Bennett. Lawrence and Livingston, 2006; Brody, 1991; Cohen, 1995; Jentleson, 1992; Zaller and Chiu, 2000). I draw on social identity theory to argue that diversionary cheap talk highlights intergroup differences between nations and leads citizens to evaluate their leader favorably. When a leader criticizes foreigners, she cues ingroup identity, which increases citizens’ social attachment to the nation and to herself as its leader. This is a “solidarity mechanism,” through which “[c]ollective group goals and common group identity are highlighted, norms of group-based altruism are strengthened, punishment and rejection of defectors are increased, and perceptions of the in-group and out-group are manipulated” (Halevy, Bernstein and Sagiv, 2008, 405).', 'The theory generates observable implications about when leaders use diversionary cheap talk and who they target. I follow the consensus in the diversionary conflict literature in focusing on poor economic conditions as the most important source of public disapproval for leaders. Low approval ratings limit leaders’ ability to advance their domestic agenda. Therefore, when the economy deteriorates, leaders will criticize foreign nations to improve their approval ratings and restore the political capital necessary for them to govern. Second, a key observation from social identity theory is that the depth of intergroup differences is important for group attachment. Therefore, consonant with recent empirical findings in the diversionary conflict literature (McLaughlin and Prins, 2004), I expect diversionary rhetoric to be most effective when it targets threatening outgroups. In the context of foreign policy, these are best represented by historical adversaries. And finally, because diversionary cheap talk shifts the focus of political competition from the partisan to the international level, it has differential partisan effects. Because national identity cues widen the tent of the political ingroup, diversionary cheap talk is most effective at boosting support among the leader’s nonpartisans: liberal citizens for conservative leaders, and conservative citizens for liberal leaders.', 'I test these hypotheses with the American Diplomatic Dataset, an original record of over 50,000 US diplomatic events between 1945 and 2010 drawn from New York Times articles on foreign affairs. I used tools from computational social science to classify bilateral interstate interactions into hundreds of specific types and four aggregate categories: verbal cooperation, verbal conflict, material cooperation, and material conflict. This is by far the most historically extensive event dataset. As such, it allows an exploration of US foreign policy behavior across a variety of administrations and economic crises.', 'I find robust evidence of diversionary cheap talk in US foreign policy. First, I establish that US presidents face incentives to divert verbally rather than materially: while militarized interstate dispute initiation does not affect presidential approval ratings, critical rhetoric about other nations is associated with increased ratings, especially among nonpartisans. Responding to this incentive, presidents between 1945 and 2010 typically diverted in the form of words, not deeds. Simulations indicate that as unemployment varied from its minimum to its maximum observed value, hostile foreign policy rhetoric nearly doubled, depending on the administration. Throughout this study, estimates are conservative: I operationalize conflict as events the United States initiated, although findings are robust to a redefinition of conflict as events the United States participated in. The verbal statements in the dataset are high profile and likely to be noticed by the American public: all appeared in the headlines of the New York Times.', 'This study contributes to existing scholarship in several ways. First, it demonstrates that US foreign policy rhetoric responds significantly to domestic economic conditions. International relations scholars should therefore continue to focus more seriously on the communicative aspects of foreign policy, and in particular its relationship to domestic politics (Johnston, 2001, 2008; Kurizaki, 2007; Ramsay, 2011; Sartori, 2002, 2005; Trager, 2010, 2011, 201(i). The American Diplomacy Dataset will enable researchers to further explore the communicative aspects of foreign policy, and their relationships to material and economic factors, in more detail than existing datasets permit.', 'Second, this study contributes to the diversionary conflict literature by showing that in many cases where diversionary theory predicts conflict initiation, leaders instead choose rhetorical hostility. In this sense, leaders may have their cake and eat it too: They benefit from an ingroup rally without inviting an international crisis. The mixed empirical findings in the diversionary conflict literature may be partly due to the fact that existing scholarship considers only the most serious forms of diversion like militarized interstate disputes. It is possible that a wide range of diversionary behavior takes place at less extreme levels, such as the rhetorical hostility documented in this paper.1', '', '', '']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Amundsen-Frese-Neg-Wyoming-Quarters.docx

Minnesota

AmFr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/AmFr/Minnesota-Amundsen-Frese-Neg-Wyoming-Quarters.docx

d571e70e5e2b31cc8e4f4ff744b007e60589f648ea65aa26ad75df1387445389

The plan will function as a liability shield to encourage riskier behavior

Floridi 18, Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford, UK (Luciano Floridi, 2018, “Correspondence,” Nature, 557)

a i experts reject robots as persons Its rationale seems to be that robots can be electronic juridical persons in the same way as companies are. But companies are constituted and run by real people Attributing personhood to robots risks misplacing moral responsibility, causal accountability and legal liability regarding their mistakes and misuses people would dismiss the need for care in the engineering , marketing and use of robots

156 a rtificial i ntelligence experts from 14 European countries reject ed robots legal status as persons Its rationale seems to be that robots can be electronic juridical persons in the same way as companies are. But companies are constituted and run by real people . That is why they can be meaningfully attributed with intentions, plans, goals, legal rights and duties, and why they can be taught, praised or punished. Hence, they are responsible, accountable or liable Attributing electronic personhood to robots risks misplacing moral responsibility, causal accountability and legal liability regarding their mistakes and misuses irresponsible people would dismiss the need for care in the engineering , marketing and use of robots

a i reject ed robots legal status as persons dismiss the need for care in the engineering marketing use of robots

['In an open letter, 156 artificialintelligence experts from 14 European countries (go.nature.com/2t5mgov) have rejected the European Parliament’s recommendation that robots should have legal status as electronic persons. This would make robots responsible for repairing any damage they might cause (go.nature. com/2wxlwg6). We are not signatories to the open letter, but endorse it nonetheless. In our view, the parliament’s recommendation is flawed. Its rationale seems to be that robots can be electronic juridical persons in the same way as companies are. But companies are constituted and run by real people. That is why they can be meaningfully attributed with intentions, plans, goals, legal rights and duties, and why they can be taught, praised or punished. Hence, they are considered to be responsible, accountable or liable for their actions. Attributing electronic personhood to robots risks misplacing moral responsibility, causal accountability and legal liability regarding their mistakes and misuses. Robots could be blamed and punished instead of humans. And irresponsible people would dismiss the need for care in the engineering, marketing and use of robots. Even the Romans knew better: the owner of an enslaved person was fully responsible for any damage caused by that person (known as vicarious liability).', '']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Kansas-PaPa-Neg-ADA-Round-2.docx

Kansas

PaPa

a637bfa7245b2a6ba712317963021b1af5258a0387cfc0908e6f0a072303999f

2---Anti-nuclear norms in Japan are determined by the strength of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

Satoshi Machida 18. Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Nebraska-Kearney. B.A., Waseda University, Tokyo Japan. M.A. and Ph.D., University of Kentucky. “Anti-Nuclear Norms in Japan and Declining Faith in the U.S. “Nuclear Umbrella”: A Survey” Asian Politics & Policy—Volume 10, Number 3—Pages 442–459. DOI: 10.1111/aspp.12405

U S play essential roles culture in Japan confidence in the umbrella among the public shapes attitudes toward nuclear armament loss of confidence can undermine their commitment to anti-nuc norms result of statistical analyses relying on original survey data in Japan have verified the hypothesis , showing citizens skeptical of cred of nuc umbrella indicate stronger support for Japan’s nuclear armament study demonstrate malleability of the security culture in Japan statistical analyses clearly show citizens’ perceptions of U.S. nuc umbrella have significant impact on anti-nuc norms in Japan one cannot overlook the umbrella While political elites are deeply concerned the public also reacts in a similar manner

Previous studies have widely documented that Japan possesses “peaceful cultural norms” that critically limit Japan’s foreign policy In explaining Japan’s passive stance constructivist scholars have relied on the presence of cultural norms that are embedded in Japanese society the U nited S tates has play ed essential roles in establishing the peaceful culture in Japan confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella among the Japanese public shapes its attitudes toward Japan’s nuclear armament the loss of confidence in the U.S. nuc lear umbrella among Japanese citizens can undermine their commitment to the anti-nuc lear norms result of the statistical analyses relying on the original survey data in Japan have verified the hypothesis above , showing that citizens who are skeptical of the cred ibility of the U.S. nuc lear umbrella tend to indicate stronger support for Japan’s nuclear armament the statistical anal- yses in this study have demonstrated that the cultural content in Japan is indeed susceptible to the external factors surrounding the issues of national security main contribution of this study has been to demonstrate the malleability of the security culture in Japan statistical analyses have clearly show n that citizens’ perceptions of the U.S. nuc lear umbrella have a significant impact on the anti-nuc lear norms in Japan one cannot overlook the presence of the U.S. nuclear umbrella that pro- vides an immense sense of security among the Japanese the fundamental dynamics sur- rounding nuclear deterrence has remained the same . the Japanese government decided not to support the negotiation that could lead to the ban of nuclear weapons due to the consideration that Japan is covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella While political elites in Japan are deeply concerned about the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, the public also reacts to the emerging threats in a similar manner study has demonstrated that citizens indeed consider security concerns in forming their attitudes toward nuclear weapons

U S play ed essential roles confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella shapes its attitudes loss of confidence nuc undermine their commitment anti-nuc relying on the original survey data in Japan verified the hypothesis skeptical of the cred nuc stronger support for Japan’s nuclear armament indeed susceptible to the external factors malleability of the security culture citizens’ perceptions of the U.S. nuc lear umbrella significant impact anti-nuc lear norms in Japan cannot overlook remained the same due to the consideration covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella political elites the public also reacts similar manner citizens indeed consider security concerns

['Previous studies have widely documented that Japan possesses “peaceful cultural norms” that critically limit Japan’s foreign policy (Katzenstein, 1996). In explaining Japan’s passive stance in the security issues, constructivist scholars have relied on the presence of cultural norms that are embedded in Japanese society (Berger, 1993, 1998; Katzenstein, 1996). Recognizing the uniqueness of Japanese culture in this field, scholars have attempted to explore the origin of the peaceful norms in Japan. Emphasizing the importance of the structural and material factors, Miyashita (2007) contends thmat the United States has played essential roles in establishing the peaceful culture in Japan. Building upon these insights, the main goal of this study has been to further explore the nature of the peaceful norms among the Japanese public. The present research has examined how confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella among the Japanese public shapes its attitudes toward Japan’s nuclear armament. Taking advantage of the setting in which Donald Trump explicitly presented the idea of withdrawing the US troops from Japan, I have analyzed how the loss of confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella among Japanese citizens can undermine their commitment to the anti-nuclear norms. The result of the statistical analyses relying on the original survey data in Japan have verified the hypothesis above, showing that those citizens who are skeptical of the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella tend to indicate stronger support for Japan’s nuclear armament. Consistent with the proposition emphasizing the structural and material factors, the statistical anal- yses in this study have demonstrated that the cultural content in Japan is indeed susceptible to the external factors surrounding the issues of national security. ', 'The main contribution of this study has been to demonstrate the malleability of the security culture in Japan. The statistical analyses have clearly shown that citizens’ perceptions of the U.S. nuclear umbrella have a significant impact on the anti-nuclear norms in Japan. In understanding the anti-nuclear norms in Japan, one cannot overlook the presence of the U.S. nuclear umbrella that pro- vides an immense sense of security among the Japanese. Even after more than seven decades since the end of World War II, the fundamental dynamics sur- rounding nuclear deterrence has remained the same. In 2016, the Japanese government decided not to support the negotiation process in the United Nations that could potentially lead to the ban of nuclear weapons due to the consideration that Japan is covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella (Kakuheiki kinshi joyaku, 2016). While political elites in Japan are deeply concerned about the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, the public also reacts to the emerging threats in a similar manner. This study has demonstrated that citizens indeed consider security concerns in forming their attitudes toward nuclear weapons. Consequently, it is possible to verify the critical importance of the realist concerns among citizens in shaping the content of the security culture in Japan (Miyashita, 2007).', '']

[(8, 18)]

ndtceda

Emory-PiWa-Neg-Kathryn-Klassic-at-the-Beach-2024-Round-3.docx

Emory

PiWa

b49d54638b1302b3185e7ad82ba65810b09299f8662aab7d3d9c211d0c24a00c

“Non-human animal species” is the entire collective, not individual animals.

AIS Blog 15. The American Iris Society. "Species Irises: Back to Nature". https://theamericanirissociety.blogspot.com/2015/05/species-irises-back-to-nature.html

species is not an individual species is an entire population of related individuals like the whole of Homo sapiens all humans

a species is not an individual species is an entire population of related individuals it is like the whole of Homo sapiens all humans

a species is not an individual entire population of related individuals whole of Homo sapiens all humans

['If you take an interest in species irises, you soon learn an important difference between species and hybrid cultivars. The hybrid cultivars are all propagated by division. Each plant is an identical replica of the original. Each one is really an individual organism, as distinct from all other irises as you or I are from all other people. But a species is not an individual. A species is an entire population of related individuals; it is like the whole of Homo sapiens from all the places humans live, with all their different characteristics and genetic heritage. So whereas I can “have” a particular cultivar, say ‘Dividing Line’, in my garden, I cannot “have” a species, such as Iris pumila. I can only have at most a few individual plants that belong to that species. They will all be different individuals, and all different from the great numbers of other Iris pumila plants growing wild in Eastern Europe.']

[(0, 3), (4, 8), (9, 11)]

ndtceda

KansasState-SuRo-Neg-UCO-Joe-C-Jackson-Round-2.docx

KansasState

SuRo

68bb273d7ef1904986b1efdcd733fb80d6fbb10553e1d1ffea59ef611a96671e

Antitrust is key for finance, but NOT banks.

White ’14 [Lawrence; March 27; Former Director of the Economic Policy Office of the U.S. Department of Justice's Antitrust Division (1982–1983), Robert Kavesh Professorship in Economics at NYU; Conference on the Fiftieth Anniversary of United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, “Antitrust and the Financial Sector – with Special Attention to Too Big to Fail,” https://w4.stern.nyu.edu/economics/docs/workingpapers/2014/White_AntitrustFinancialSector_Mar2014.pdf]

the stance of antitrust to more competitive structures is as valid for the financial sector as other sectors of the economy “too big to fail” is a problem of subsidy It is not a problem antitrust can address antitrust enforcers should not be distracted from more productive uses of their time there are worthwhile new antitrust enforcement in the financial sector . One is communication among and collective action by securities holders

the general stance of antitrust to ward more competitive market structures is as valid for the financial sector as it is for other sectors of the U.S. economy the insurance industry remains a holdout “too big to fail” is a problem of subsidy and of negative externalities . It is not a problem antitrust can usefully address antitrust enforcers should not be distracted from more productive uses of their time there are worthwhile new areas for antitrust enforcement in the financial sector . One area is the communication among and the collective action by securities holders in various circumstances

the general stance more competitive market structures as valid other sectors a holdout subsidy negative externalities not usefully address not worthwhile new areas antitrust enforcement financial sector communication among collective action by various circumstances

['Despite the special nature of finance and of financial regulation, the general stance of antitrust toward more competitive market structures is as valid for the financial sector as it is for other sectors of the U.S. economy. If one takes a long-run perspective, the political and regulatory processes of the U.S. have generally been acceding to this view. A snapshot of the financial sector fifty years ago, circa the early 1960s (e.g., at the time of Philadelphia National Bank41), would have yielded a landscape that was much more pockmarked with anticompetitive features – such as restrictions on entry and on branching in banking, regulated ceilings on bank deposit rates of interest, and a cartel that was legally fixing stock brokerage commissions – than is found today. Unfortunately, the insurance industry remains as a holdout from this enlightened trend.', 'The financial crisis of 2008-2009 and the prominent role of large financial institutions in that crisis has made the phrase “too big to fail” a common one in the business and financial media. The “big” in TBTF has caused some antitrust practitioners to believe that somehow antitrust must have an involvement as well. However, although TBTF is a genuine problem for the U.S. economy, it is a problem of subsidy and of negative externalities. It is not a problem that antitrust can usefully address, and antitrust practitioners, enforcers, and policy makers should not be distracted from more productive uses of their time.', 'Finally, it is worth considering whether (unlike TBTF) there are potentially worthwhile new areas for antitrust enforcement – or, at least, for clarity as to the limits of enforcement – in the financial sector. One such area that may be worth exploring is the communication among and the collective action by securities holders in various circumstances. For example, when an enterprise is in financial difficulties but has not yet declared bankruptcy, its creditors will often communicate among themselves and sometimes agree on a common set of actions. Should this communication and collective action be considered to be an antitrust violation? Or is it a legitimate means of overcoming coordination difficulties and thereby achieving more efficient long-run financial outcomes?']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Pierry-Rabbini-Aff-Dartmouth%20Round%20Robin-Round4.docx

Michigan

PiRa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/PiRa/Michigan-Pierry-Rabbini-Aff-Dartmouth%2520Round%2520Robin-Round4.docx

210a112d5256b46310269156e43fb366cbf65e476c37a36347933a5f5294ca50

3. Policy requires publication.

O. Edward Schlatter 98, US Magistrate Judge, United States District Court for the District of Colorado, “Tracy v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc,” 185 F.R.D. 303, Lexis

policy refer to a rule , regulation or directive announced or published practice to refer to actions , whether pursuant to policy or not plaintiffs frequently use the term "policy," when they mean "practice," argue a "de facto policy" the phrase either blurs the distinction between policy and practice, or attempts to blend the two Policy refers to that which is directed through publication , while de facto is actually done

I noted a confusion over the use of the terms "policy" and "practice." the term " policy " refer to a rule , regulation or directive which has been announced or published the term " practice " to refer to that which employees do , that is, their actions , whether pursuant to policy or not . Thus, plaintiffs allege both a "policy and practice" I understand the policy published or announced In light of the definitions which I understand plaintiffs frequently use the term "policy," when they mean "practice," the policy must be understood to be saying published and announced a "practice" does not always or necessarily translate into "policy." In other places plaintiffs concede that policy is lawful , but argue a "de facto policy" is unlawful In the circumstances of this case, the phrase "de facto policy" either blurs the distinction between policy and practice, or attempts to blend the two because there may be facts to support one but not the other evidence of practices but no evidence of policy . Policy refers to that which is directed through publication , while de facto refers to that which is actually done . If fifty people are walking in the same direction, that is the event, or de facto ; if the fifty people have been told by a single source to walk in a particular direction, their common direction reflects that they are walking pursuant to the directive , or policy fifty people walking in the same direction may or may not be doing so pursuant to policy

confusion "policy" "practice." " policy " rule regulation directive announced published " practice " do actions pursuant to policy not both "policy and policy published announced "policy," mean "practice," policy published announced "practice" always necessarily "policy." policy lawful "de facto policy" unlawful "de facto policy" blurs the distinction blend the two one not the other practices no evidence of policy directed through publication de facto actually done de facto told by a single source common direction pursuant to the directive policy may or may not be doing so pursuant to policy

['Plaintiffs allege and argue that the national policy or practice of Dean Witter is to deny overtime compensation to employees who have earned it. In reading the briefs, and in listening to the arguments of counsel, I noted a certain confusion over the use of the terms "policy" and "practice." In the context of this case, I understand the term "policy" to refer to a rule, regulation or directive which has been announced or published [**9] by Dean Witter, either verbally or in writing, to its local supervisors and/or employees. I understand the term "practice" to refer to that which supervisors or employees do, that is, their actions, whether pursuant to policy or not. Thus, when plaintiffs allege that Dean Witter has both a "policy and practice" which unlawfully deprives employees of overtime compensation (Pl. Mtn, p. 20), I understand plaintiffs to mean by the phrase "unlawful policy" that Dean Witter has published or announced to supervisors and employees through a handbook, letter, memo or other means, that employees will not be paid for any overtime hours that they work.', 'Throughout their motions and memorandums, plaintiffs are frequently unclear in their use of the terms "policy" and "practice." In light of the definitions which I understand for the terms "policy" and "practice," plaintiffs frequently appear to use the term "policy," when they mean "practice," or "practice" when they mean "policy." If plaintiffs use the term "policy," they should be held to the meaning which makes sense in the circumstances of this lawsuit. Thus, where plaintiffs argue that the national policy of Dean Witter is unlawful, they [**10] must be understood to be saying that Dean Witter has published and announced a policy which is in violation of the law, and that by implementing this policy the Dean Witter branch [*306] managers are engaged in unlawful practices. In such circumstances, plaintiffs have an obligation to produce such an "unlawful policy," meaning, a directive or memorandum which states a policy that is, on its face, unlawful. Plaintiffs are obligated to produce such an unlawful policy because a party\'s "practice" does not always or necessarily translate into "policy." As I note below, plaintiffs have never produced any such "unlawful policy."', 'In some places in their memorandums, plaintiffs appear to concede that the national policy of Dean Witter is lawful, but that the national practice with regard to such a policy is not. If this is the position of the plaintiffs, intellectual honesty requires that plaintiffs admit that the national policy is lawful, and focus instead on the actions, or practices, of the Dean Witter administrators and supervisors which are allegedly unlawful. Actions or practices are discrete events, or facts, and plaintiffs are free to argue any inferences which logically [**11] flow from such facts.', 'In other places in their memorandums, plaintiffs appear to concede that Dean Witter publishes a national policy which is lawful, but argue that Dean Witter implements a "de facto policy" which is unlawful. See e.g., Pl. Mtn, pp. 16, 20, 22 & 27; Pl. Reply, p. 14. In the circumstances of this case, the phrase "de facto policy" either blurs the distinction between policy and practice, or attempts to blend the two, possibly because there may be facts to support one of the words, but not the other--evidence of practices, for example, but no evidence of policy. Policy refers to that which is directed through publication, while de facto refers to that which is actually done. If fifty people are walking in the same direction, that is the event, or de facto; if the fifty people have been told by a single source to walk in a particular direction, their common direction reflects that they are walking pursuant to the directive, or policy. The distinction needs to be kept in mind throughout the dispute which arises from plaintiffs\' motion to extend discovery, because fifty people walking in the same direction may or may not be doing so pursuant to [**12] policy or directive, depending upon the evidence which is available.']

[(10, 22)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-VaWa-Neg-NDT-Round-5.docx

Dartmouth