Datasets:

tvergho

/

DebateCards

like 0

30318ae6b7dcb29d0331a138688f5950dc7d7a03b971c54a3ed9120b900d93d7

The 1AC lapses into a ‘folk politics’ that cedes the terrain to alter structural conditions of power subsumed by neoliberal agents.

Gurevitch ’22 [Leon; December; Associate Professor and Associate Dean of Research and Innovation at the Faculty of Architecture and Design, Victoria University of Wellington; Beyond Narrative: Exploring Narrative Liminality & Its Cultural Work; “Narrating Authorship,” Ch. 16]

folk-politic characterized by local progress over limit s favored over counter-hegemonic project that cap ignorantly accept neoliberal sense the future has been ceded to the right progress were defeated by neolib In absence of concrete demands there was palpable passivity

limited and timid demands amongst protest movements are the result of folk-politic al sentiment characterized by S]mall is beautiful, the local is ethical permanence is oppressive progress is over These limit ation s are favored over any counter-hegemonic project that could contest cap italism “at the largest scales folk politics is driven by a pessimism that large-scale collective social change is possible entwined in this is a fear of returning to grand narratives that characterized progressive utopianism of socialist movements folk-political sentiments ignorantly accept the neoliberal common sense , preferring to shy away from grand visions and replace them with a posturing resistance From discomfort with modernity to the inability to envision an alternative world the future has been ceded to the right skill that the left once excelled at—building enticing visions for a better world—has deteriorated If the unifying narrative was hard to identify, perhaps it was because it was so by design protest reject grand narratives of progress that were comprehensively defeated by neolib eralism In the absence of concrete demands beyond recognition and incremental improvements there was a palpable degree of passivity about the protests

limited timid folk-politic al sentiment local is ethical progress is over counter-hegemonic largest pessimism progressive utopianism ignorantly accept grand visions posturing modernity envision an alternative world ceded to the right enticing deteriorated hard it was so by design reject comprehensively absence concrete demands palpable passivity

['In their book Inventing the Future, Srnicek and Williams suggest that limited and timid (if not altogether absent) demands amongst twenty-first-century protest movements are the result of what they call “folk-political sentiment.” Folk-politics is, they argue, characterized by a series of widely accepted values: “[S]mall is beautiful, the local is ethical, simpler is better, permanence is oppressive, progress is over.” These limitations, then, are favored over any counter-hegemonic project that could contest capitalism “at the largest scales.” Instead, folk politics is driven by a profound pessimism that large-scale collective social change is possible. Crucially, entwined in this is a fear of returning to the grand narratives that characterized the progressive utopianism of nineteenth-century socialist movements and fell out of favor amongst postmodernists for obvious reasons:', 'Such folk-political sentiments [ignorantly] blindly accept the neoliberal common sense, preferring to shy away from grand visions and replace them with a posturing resistance. From the radical left’s discomfort with technological modernity to the social democratic left’s inability to envision an alternative world, everywhere today the future has largely been ceded to the right. A skill that the left once excelled at—building enticing visions for a better world—has deteriorated after years of neglect. (Srnicek and Williams)', 'One could see these green screen protests as an example of precisely this “posturing resistance.” If the unifying narrative of the green screen protests was hard to identify, perhaps it was because it was so by design. In an era of protest that rejected the grand narratives of social and political progress that were apparently so comprehensively defeated by late twentieth-century neoliberalism, the green profile pictures operated as a communication device that reached the same local network ecosystems of the tagged credits photos. Like the title credits photos, green profile pictures themselves became a means of communicating industry membership, participation, and identity. At an individual level, they may have functioned positively for VFX professionals: signaling solidarity amongst each other in a manner that was difficult if not impossible for the large studios (who were not their direct employers) to counteract or object to. In the absence of labor mobilization or even concrete demands beyond recognition and incremental improvements in labor conditions, however, there was a palpable degree of distributed passivity about the protests. In an environment where professionals under short-term contracts with extremely stringent non-disclosure clauses are cautious to the degree of paranoia about making public pronouncements, especially over labor rights,6 the green profile pictures represented a form of passive resistance to the events taking place over Rhythm and Hues.']

[(0, 13)]

ndtceda

Michigan-ShGa-Neg-Long-Beach-Round-7.docx

Michigan

ShGa

51cf6dc8e6685c2dd89ec8156ecb42b3444a3aa5a80e97fe335440f645b98240

Heg is sustainable---Putin revamped international faith

Brands and Beckley 22, *is Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. **is associate professor of political science at Tufts University and a nonresident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. (Hal & Michael, 3-14-2022, “The Return of Pax Americana?”

The U S can win the struggle to save the international order Putin has done a tremendous favor given a opportunity to regroup for intense competition This happened In the 40s the West was entering a period of competition defense spending was inadequate unprovoked authoritarian aggression revolutionized Western politics and laid the foundation for a successful containment strategy Putin’s aggression created a window of opportunity democracies must undertake multilateral rearmament against the wave of autocratic aggression It requires massive investments in forces sustained diplomacy to enlist and retain allies and willingness to confront adversaries and even risk war containment considered successful was on the verge of failure before the Korean War invasion convinced policymakers that dictators were on the march of global conflict U.S. policymakers decided to mount a global campaign to strengthen the noncommunist world The Korean War thus turbocharged the global network of alliances and the backbone of containment After plunging for the 2010s defense spending across the democratic world started to rise This flurry of activity to consolidate a global alliance that unites democracies against Russia and China Russian aggression created possibilities by sharpening divisions between the liberal order and authoritarians eight out of ten U.S. residents view Ukraine crisis as part of broader fight for global democracy Washington can use outrage by Moscow to get tougher with Beijing the U S goal should be to build a transregional coalition of democracies partnerships severed Russia’s access to the global financial system Creating overlapping technology coalitions in which democracies pool resources to race ahead The Ukraine crisis can a similar effect if it motivates the U S and its allies to get serious about defending the world

The U nited S tates and its allies have failed to prevent Russia from brutalizing Ukraine but they can still win the larger struggle to save the international order . The U nited S tates has declared great-power competition on Moscow and Beijing but failed to summon the money the creativity or the urgency necessary to prevail in those rivalries Putin has now inadvertently done the United States and its allies a tremendous favor he has given them a historic opportunity to regroup and reload for an era of intense competition not just with Russia but also with China to rebuild an international order that just recently looked to be headed for collapse This happened before In the 19 40s the West was entering a previous period of great-power competition but had not made the investments or initiatives needed to win it defense spending was pathetically inadequate Then an instance of unprovoked authoritarian aggression revolutionized Western politics and laid the foundation for a successful containment strategy Putin’s aggression created a window of strategic opportunity for Washington and its allies democracies must now undertake a major multilateral rearmament program and erect firmer defenses military and otherwise against the coming wave of autocratic aggression The invasion of Ukraine signals a new phase in an intensifying struggle to shape the international order The United States has been talking tough about great-power competition for years It also requires massive investments in military forces geared for high-intensity combat sustained diplomacy to enlist and retain allies and a willingness to confront adversaries and even risk war That is why ambitious competitive strategies usually sit on the shelf until a shocking event compels collective sacrifice Take containment considered one of the most successful strategies in U.S. diplomatic history containment was on the verge of failure before the Korean War broke out Truman ignored the paper and announced plans to cut the defense budget It took a brazen international land grab to shake Washington out of its torpor The invasion convinced U.S. policymakers that the dictators were on the march and the danger of global conflict was growing U.S. policymakers decided not just to defend South Korea but to mount a global campaign to strengthen the noncommunist world t N orth A tlantic T reaty O rganization with a unified command structure and 25 active divisions at its disposal he Truman administration dispatched additional forces to Europe In the Asia-Pacific, the United States created a cordon of security pacts involving Australia and New Zealand Japan and the Philippines The Korean War thus turbocharged the emergence of the global network of alliances and the enduring military deployments that constituted the backbone of containment HISTORY RHYMES After plunging for most of the 2010s defense spending across the democratic world started to rise This flurry of activity came too late to spare Ukraine from Putin’s aggression But it may have arrived just in time to consolidate a global alliance that unites democracies against Russia and China and thereby secures the free world for a generation to come A CALL TO ARMS Russian aggression has created similar possibilities by sharpening divisions between democracies that support the liberal order and powerful authoritarians trying to destroy it eight out of ten U.S. residents view the Ukraine crisis as part of a broader fight for global democracy Washington and its allies can use an outrage hatched by Moscow to get tougher with Beijing the U nited S tates’ overarching goal should be to build a transregional coalition of democracies that can confront Russia and China with a basic proposition local aggression will trigger a swift and devastating global response Today, the United States and its allies should build on the coalition that has formed to handle the Ukraine crisis and be ready to redeploy it against China. partnerships severed Russia’s access to the global financial system and key technologies could serve as a model for similar sanctions against China if it invades Taiwan Creating overlapping technology coalitions in which democracies pool money and resources to race ahead in key areas, such as semiconductors or artificial intelligence while denying critical inputs and capital to autocracies, will be critical. f the democracies don’t waste the moment then a lasting result of the Ukraine crisis could be a tighter free-world economic bloc that makes it harder for autocratic regimes to coerce or seduce The United States should spend roughly five percent of GDP on defense over the coming decade. The United States and its major allies should also allow for arms transfers to potential frontline states such as Poland and Taiwan conditional on them committing to major increases in defense spending and adopting military strategies suited to buying time for a larger multilateral response Even an economically devastated militarily constrained Russia will retain the ability to make geopolitical trouble China will be a formidable rival for decades, even if it is prevented from overturning the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific and beyond The Ukraine crisis can have a similar effect in another long twilight struggle if it motivates the U nited S tates and its allies to get serious about defending the world order that has served them so well

U S larger struggle international order U S great-power competition Moscow Beijing Putin tremendous favor regroup reload intense competition rebuild international order 40s competition defense spending inadequate unprovoked authoritarian aggression successful containment strategy Putin’s aggression window of strategic opportunity allies multilateral rearmament autocratic aggression new phase struggle massive investments in military forces retain allies confront adversaries risk war ambitious competitive strategies containment most successful strategies Korean War defense budget brazen international land grab dictators global conflict global campaign noncommunist N A T O Australia New Zealand Japan Philippines global network of alliances backbone of containment HISTORY RHYMES plunging defense spending rise arrived just in time consolidate a global alliance unites democracies Russia China CALL TO ARMS sharpening divisions liberal order powerful authoritarians eight out of ten fight for global democracy outrage tougher U S transregional coalition of democracies global financial system technology coalitions resources Russia China Ukraine crisis U S get serious about defending the world

['The United States and its allies have failed to prevent Russia from brutalizing Ukraine, but they can still win the larger struggle to save the international order. Russia’s savage invasion has exposed the gap between Western countries’ soaring liberal aspirations and the paltry resources they have devoted to defend them. The United States has declared great-power competition on Moscow and Beijing but has so far failed to summon the money, the creativity, or the urgency necessary to prevail in those rivalries. Yet Russian President Vladimir Putin has now inadvertently done the United States and its allies a tremendous favor. In shocking them out of their complacency, he has given them a historic opportunity to regroup and reload for an era of intense competition—not just with Russia but also with China—and, ultimately, to rebuild an international order that just recently looked to be headed for collapse. This isn’t fantasy: it has happened before. In the late 1940s, the West was entering a previous period of great-power competition but had not made the investments or initiatives needed to win it. U.S. defense spending was pathetically inadequate, NATO existed only on paper, and neither Japan nor West Germany had been reintegrated into the free world. The Communist bloc seemed to have the momentum. Then, in June 1950, an instance of unprovoked authoritarian aggression—the Korean War—revolutionized Western politics and laid the foundation for a successful containment strategy. The policies that won the Cold War and thereby made the modern liberal international order were products of an unexpected hot war. The catastrophe in Ukraine could play a similar role today. Putin’s aggression has created a window of strategic opportunity for Washington and its allies. The democracies must now undertake a major multilateral rearmament program and erect firmer defenses—military and otherwise—against the coming wave of autocratic aggression. They must exploit the current crisis to weaken the autocrats’ capacity for coercion and subversion and deepen the economic and diplomatic cooperation among liberal states around the globe. The invasion of Ukraine signals a new phase in an intensifying struggle to shape the international order. The democratic world won’t have a better chance to position itself for success. SHOCK THERAPY The United States has been talking tough about great-power competition for years. But to counter authoritarian rivals, a country needs more than self-righteous rhetoric. It also requires massive investments in military forces geared for high-intensity combat, sustained diplomacy to enlist and retain allies, and a willingness to confront adversaries and even risk war. Such commitments do not come naturally, especially to democracies that believe that peace is the norm. That is why ambitious competitive strategies usually sit on the shelf until a shocking event compels collective sacrifice. Take containment. Now considered one of the most successful strategies in U.S. diplomatic history, containment was on the verge of failure before the Korean War broke out. During the late 1940s, the United States had undertaken a dangerous, long-term competition against a mighty authoritarian rival. U.S. officials had established maximalist objectives: the containment of Soviet power until that regime collapsed or mellowed and, in the words of President Harry Truman, support for “peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation.” Truman had begun to implement landmark policies such as the Marshall Plan to rebuild Western Europe and the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. Yet before June 1950, containment remained more of an aspiration than a strategy. Even as Cold War crises broke out in Berlin, Czechoslovakia, Iran, and Turkey, U.S. military spending plummeted from $83 billion at the end of World War II to $9 billion in 1948. The North Atlantic Treaty was new and feeble: the alliance lacked an integrated military command or anything approaching the forces it needed to defend Western Europe. Resource constraints forced Washington to write off China during its civil war, effectively standing aside as Mao Zedong’s Communists defeated Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalist government, and to draw a defense perimeter that initially excluded South Korea and Taiwan. U.S. statecraft combined sky-high ambitions with a bargain-basement approach to achieving them. The reasons for this shortfall will sound familiar. U.S. officials hoped that the United States’ overall military superiority—especially its atomic monopoly—would compensate for weaknesses everywhere along the East-West divide. They found it hard to believe that even ruthless, totalitarian enemies might resort to war. In Washington, moreover, global visions competed with domestic priorities, such as taming inflation and balancing the budget. U.S. officials also planned to economize by splitting the country’s rivals—specifically, wooing Chinese leader Mao Zedong’s communists once they won China’s civil war and pulling that country away from the Soviet Union. Putin has now inadvertently done the United States and its allies a tremendous favor. That policy failed: Mao sealed an alliance with Moscow in early 1950. Just months before, another strategic setback—the first Soviet nuclear test—had ended the United States’ atomic monopoly. Yet even then, Truman was unmoved. When Paul Nitze, the director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, crafted his famous memo, NSC-68, calling for a global diplomatic offensive supported by a massive military buildup, Truman politely ignored the paper and announced plans to cut the defense budget. It took a brazen international land grab to shake Washington out of its torpor. North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung’s assault on South Korea, undertaken in collusion with Mao and the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, changed everything. The invasion convinced U.S. policymakers that the dictators were on the march and the danger of global conflict was growing. The conflict also dispelled any hope of dividing Moscow and Beijing: Washington now faced a communist monolith applying pressure all around the Eurasian periphery. In short, the North Korean invasion made the Truman administration fear that the postwar world was hanging in the balance. U.S. policymakers decided not just to defend South Korea but to mount a global campaign to strengthen the noncommunist world. The North Atlantic Treaty became the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with a unified command structure and 25 active divisions at its disposal. The Truman administration dispatched additional forces to Europe, where U.S. allies accelerated their military preparations and agreed, in principle, to rearm West Germany. In the Asia-Pacific, the United States created a cordon of security pacts involving Australia and New Zealand, Japan, and the Philippines and deployed naval forces to prevent a Chinese takeover of Taiwan. The Korean War thus turbocharged the emergence of the global network of alliances and the enduring military deployments that constituted the backbone of containment. It precipitated the revival and rearmament of former enemies, Japan and West Germany, as core members of the free world. Underpinning all this was an enormous military buildup meant to make Soviet aggression unthinkable. U.S. defense spending more than tripled, reaching 14 percent of GDP in 1953; the U.S. nuclear arsenal and conventional forces more than doubled. “The Soviets respected nothing but force,” said Truman. “To build such force . . . is precisely what we are attempting to do now.” To be sure, the Korean War also showed the danger of going too far. The Truman administration erred spectacularly in trying to reunify the Korean Peninsula by force in late 1950, which provoked communist Chinese intervention and a longer, costlier war. The idea that a setback anywhere could lead to disaster everywhere prefigured the so-called domino theory and the United States’ tragic intervention in Vietnam. Sky-high, wartime defense spending eventually proved too onerous to be sustained. But overall, the Truman administration’s reaction to the Korean War was vital in stabilizing a fragile world and creating the situations of strength that allowed the West to triumph in the Cold War. HISTORY RHYMES The war in Ukraine differs in many ways from the Korean War, not least because U.S. troops aren’t directly involved. The Russia and China of the 2020s are not the Soviet Union and Maoist China of the 1950s, even if Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping have taken on distinctly Stalinist tendencies of late. Yet history certainly seems to be rhyming today. In the late 2010s, as in the late 1940s, Washington and its allies perceived growing threats but were struggling to contain them. To their credit, the Trump and Biden administrations identified great-power competition as the United States’ strategic priority. NATO deployed several thousand additional troops to eastern Europe after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014, and new coalitions started forming in the Indo-Pacific region to check Chinese power. Until the current war in Ukraine, however, balancing against Russia and China was often lackadaisical. After plunging for most of the 2010s, defense spending across the democratic world started to rise—and modestly at that—only around 2018. Due to inflation, U.S. military spending actually declined six percent in real terms in 2021. This reflected prevailing public apathy: Americans questioned why the United States should defend far-flung friends such as the Baltic states and Taiwan; for their part, many voters in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom believed that their countries should remain neutral in the U.S.-Chinese cold war. The decline in defense funding was compounded by a lack of strategic seriousness. The Trump and Biden administrations saddled the U.S. military with extraneous missions, including combating election fraud, illegal immigration, climate change, and pandemics. Western European militaries spent meager budget increases on pay raises and pensions. In East Asia, U.S. allies devoted defense dollars to missions that had nothing to do with containing China, such as conducting counterinsurgency in the Philippines or acquiring vulnerable prestige platforms. Nearly a quarter of Taiwan’s 2021 defense budget was earmarked for fancy warships and fighter aircraft that may not make it out of their bases in a war. The Korean War turbocharged a global network of alliances. Defense wasn’t the only area in which decisive rhetoric accompanied desultory policy. The Trump and Biden administrations talked about China as a century-defining challenge and then refused to back the single best initiative for countering Chinese economic influence: the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a massive free-trade deal originally negotiated by the United States and 12 Pacific Rim economies. Europe, meanwhile, was deepening its dependence on Russian gas. There were creative, energetic policies, such as the use of sanctions on technology to derail Huawei’s push for dominance of the world’s 5G networks, but nothing like the across-the-board urgency one might expect in a fight over the fate of the world order. This strategic lethargy had many causes—economic hangovers from the Great Recession and the eurozone crisis, the legacy of grinding wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the impact of surging populism all took their toll. In the United States and across Europe, voters pushed governments to focus on nation building at home rather than competition abroad. Fundamentally, however, democratic societies that had grown complacent amid the great-power peace of the post–Cold War era struggled to comprehend just how grave the danger of major war had become. Democratic populations believed that globalization had rendered old-fashioned conquest and imperialism obsolete. They assumed that Putin and Xi were savvy, cautious leaders pursuing limited objectives—staying in power, maximizing economic growth, and gaining a greater say within the existing order. Russian and Chinese paramilitary forces might engage in “gray zone” operations below the threshold of war. But if push came to shove, Moscow and Beijing would cut deals and de-escalate crises. And if they started acting more aggressively, there would be time for the West to pull itself together. Until then, the United States and its allies could focus on getting their own houses in order and squabbling among themselves. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine shattered these comfortable myths. Suddenly, great-power war looks not only possible but perhaps probable. Western policymakers have rediscovered the value of hard power and have started taking Putin’s and Xi’s imperial aspirations literally. The idea that the United States can focus on China while pursuing “stable and predictable” ties with Russia has become laughable: the Chinese-Russian entente could violently challenge the balance of power at both ends of Eurasia simultaneously. As a result, moves previously thought impossible—accelerated German and Japanese rearmament, EU arms transfers to Ukraine, the near-total economic isolation of a major power—are well underway. This flurry of activity came too late to spare Ukraine from Putin’s aggression. But it may have arrived just in time to consolidate a global alliance that unites democracies against Russia and China and thereby secures the free world for a generation to come. To make the most of this critical moment, the United States and its allies should heed three key lessons from the Korean War. A CALL TO ARMS First, think big. Truman didn’t limit his response to North Korean aggression to the Korean Peninsula or even to Asia. Rather, he sought to fortify the larger free world. Today, Russian aggression has created similar possibilities by sharpening divisions between democracies that support the liberal order and powerful authoritarians trying to destroy it. Nearly eight out of ten U.S. residents view the Ukraine crisis as part of a broader fight for global democracy. In the short term, the crisis in Europe may pull U.S. attention away from the Indo-Pacific. In the long-term, however, Washington and its allies can use an outrage hatched by Moscow to get tougher with Beijing. Indeed, the United States’ overarching goal should be to build a transregional coalition of democracies that can confront Russia and China with a basic proposition: local aggression will trigger a swift and devastating global response. Second, move fast. Truman knew that moments of allied solidarity and domestic unity could be fleeting, so his administration rushed to get a full-fledged containment strategy up and running in a matter of months. “By 1951,” the political scientist Robert Jervis observed, “all the elements we have come to associate with the cold war were present or in train.” Today, the United States and its allies should build on the coalition that has formed to handle the Ukraine crisis and be ready to redeploy it against China. For example, the partnerships that severed Russia’s access to the global financial system and key technologies could serve as a model for similar sanctions against China if it invades Taiwan. The ongoing efforts to slash European reliance on Russian energy should be expanded into a broader push to decouple free-world economies from Russia and China in critical areas, including advanced technologies, rare earths, and emergency medical supplies. Creating overlapping technology coalitions in which democracies pool money and resources to race ahead in key areas, such as semiconductors or artificial intelligence, while denying critical inputs and capital to autocracies, will be critical. The centerpiece of this approach would be a U.S. move to rejoin the TPP (now called the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, or CPTPP)—perhaps the best example of an initiative whose strategic value is incontestable and whose political costs should fall as the price of complacency rises. If the democracies don’t waste the moment, then a lasting result of the Ukraine crisis could be a tighter free-world economic bloc that makes it harder for autocratic regimes to coerce or seduce. The United States should spend roughly five percent of GDP on defense over the coming decade. Economic power goes only so far, however, so the democratic world also needs a rapid multilateral rearmament program to shore up a military balance that has been eroding in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. This will include enhanced forward deployments of well-armed forces—especially armor and airpower in eastern Europe and a thicket of shooters and sensors in the western Pacific—that can turn attempted land grabs into protracted, bloody quagmires. A rapid ramping up of detailed operational planning on how the United States and key allies, such as Australia and Japan, would respond to Chinese aggression is also necessary. The United States and its major allies should also allow for arms transfers to potential frontline states, such as Poland and Taiwan, conditional on them committing to major increases in defense spending and adopting military strategies suited to buying time for a larger multilateral response. All this will require the sort of money that democracies struggle to find in times of peace but don’t hesitate to spend under the threat of war. The United States should plan on spending roughly five percent of GDP on defense over the coming decade (compared with roughly 3.2 percent today), to allow it to respond to aggression in one theater without leaving itself naked in others. Key allies on both sides of Eurasia should commit to similar proportional increases. But if the United States and its allies must move fast, a final lesson is that they must avoid going too far. The escalation of the Korean conflict, and the embrace of a version of containment that knew no geographic bounds, led to overextension and tragedy. There is a thin line between urgency and recklessness. Washington should thus eschew directly military intervention in Ukraine. It should ignore impassioned calls to pursue regime change in Russia or China—an objective the democratic world lacks the power to achieve at a cost it can tolerate. The United States must also remain selective about where it competes most vigorously with Moscow and Beijing: eastern Europe and East Asia matter tremendously, whereas parts of Central Asia and Africa do not. Above all, the United States and its allies must remain patient. Truman acknowledged, in 1953, that the Cold War wouldn’t end anytime soon, but he argued that “we have set the course that we can win it.” That’s a reasonable standard for U.S. policy in the early 2020s. Even an economically devastated, militarily constrained Russia will retain the ability to make geopolitical trouble. China will be a formidable rival for decades, even if it is prevented from overturning the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. The free-world offensive during the Korean War was an emergency program, but it created enduring strategic advantages that largely determined the Cold War’s outcome. The Ukraine crisis can have a similar effect in another long twilight struggle if it motivates the United States and its allies to get serious about defending the world order that has served them so well.']

[(0, 6), (19, 21)]

ndtceda

Kansas-PaSe-Aff-8.-NDT-Round-1.docx

Kansas

PaSe

f8d2a944f6f50a81a90307f31827ee46fbdc7910eb5ed6c3021f62715c9a21e8

Consumer confidence collapsing now

Bueso 1/14 – Alexander Bueso, Sharecast, citing University of Michigan Consumer Confidence index, “US consumer confidence dips below forecasts in January,” 1/14/22, https://www.sharecast.com/news/international-economic/us-consumer-confidence-dips-below-forecasts-in-january--9031576.html

consumer confidence slipped to its second lowest ever amid Curtin attributed the reading to Delta and Omicron but also escalating" inflation confidence in government policies is at its lowest since 2014

consumer confidence slipped to its second lowest reading ever amid increasing worries over inflation The University of Michigan's consumer confidence index for early January came in down slightly from its end of December level Curtin attributed the low reading to the advent of Delta and Omicron but said it was also due to the " escalating" inflation rate Three quarters of consumers saw inflation as a greater problem than unemployment confidence in government economic policies is at its lowest level since 2014

second lowest reading ever inflation escalating" inflation rate government economic policies lowest level

['US consumer confidence slipped to its second lowest reading ever amid increasing worries over inflation, the results of a very closely-followed survey revealed.', "The University of Michigan's consumer confidence index for early January came in at 68.8, which was down slightly from its end of December level of 70.6 and economists' forecasts for a reading of 70.2.", "A gauge of consumer expectations led the drop, retreating from a reading of 68.3 to 65.9, while another linked to consumers' views of current economic conditions dipped from 74.2 to 73.2.", 'Richard Curtin, the survey\'s director attributed the low average reading on the index of 70.3 over the last six months to the advent of Delta and Omicron but said it was also due to the "escalating" inflation rate.', 'Over the first six months of 2021 the index had averaged 82.9.', 'The decline in confidence was especially clear among households with incomes beneath $100,000, with the sentiment index for those falling by 9.4%.', 'Three quarters of consumers saw inflation as a greater problem than unemployment in early January, Curtin added.', '"Importantly, confidence in government economic policies is at its lowest level since 2014.']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-Shankar-Vergho-Aff-5%20-%20Texas-Doubles.docx

Dartmouth

ShVe

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Dartmouth/ShVe/Dartmouth-Shankar-Vergho-Aff-5%2520-%2520Texas-Doubles.docx

642e126ef8d3298d94023538978c506f727fce3911ec3eeed2a665c5a353085a

Apoc rhetoric is good—concrete images are necessary and empirically verified.

Mausbach 17 - (Wilfried Mausbach, Executive Director of the Heidelberg Center for American Studies (HCA) at Heidelberg University, Ph.D. from the University of Cologne where he studied History, Political Science, and Philosophy; 1-27-2017, Nuclear Threats, Nuclear Fear and the Cold War of the 1980s, pp. 27 - 54, "Nuclear Winter: Prophecies of Doom and Images of Desolation during the Second Cold War," doa: 9-11-2023) DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316479742.002

Notification survival was hanging in the balance accounted for much of the excitement engendered by nuc winter . Armageddon long bound with nuc war However it was the concept of nuc winter that gave “ concrete substance to that image .” the idea could not remain a merely mental image . hardly any doubt nuc scenario materially helped change the discourse on nuc s . reinforce belief nuc war was unwinnable but also paved the way command large majorities . abetted the celerity in which Reagan and Gorbachev reached arms control Gorbachev personally attributed willingness to compromise to nuc winter . art and parcel of a larger and powerful concern for the well-being of Earth . this was accompanied by whistleblowers and doomsayers . The fear for “this precious world ” makes unique in the annals of opposition to the nuclear threat. one of the most powerful groups put out a booklet warning nuclear winter followed by silen c e . people bid adieu to traditional views of nuc war.

Notification that the survival of the human species was hanging in the balance accounted for much of the excitement engendered by nuc lear winter . To be sure, notions of catastrophe , the destruction of civilization , annihilation of all human life , or the coming of Armageddon had long been bound up with nuc lear war . However while the visual image of an overwhelming mushroom cloud had already evoked the vision of man’s extermination of his species by means of his own technology , it was the concept of nuc lear winter that gave “ concrete substance to that image .” the idea could not remain a merely mental image . there can hardly be any doubt that the nuc lear winter scenario materially helped to change the discourse on nuc lear weapon s in the early 1980s . Not only did it reinforce the firm belief of antinuclear activists that nuc lear war was unwinnable and unsurvivable , but it also most certainly paved the way for these convictions to finally command large majorities among the American people in general . There is even some evidence that the nuclear winter scenario might have abetted the astonishing celerity in which Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev reached major arms control agreements . Gorbachev personally told Sagan that he had familiarized himself with the research, and retrospectively he attributed his willingness to compromise in superpower negotiations partly to the specter of nuc lear winter . Nuclear winter was p art and parcel of a larger and powerful concern for the well-being of that newly discovered living organism called Earth . From the very start this concern was accompanied by a chorus of whistleblowers and doomsayers . The fear for “this precious world ” is what makes the nuclear winter episode unique in the annals of opposition to the nuclear threat. with the introduction of nuclear winter the protest against the arms race squarely arrived in the field of environmentalism. one of the most powerful environmental groups put out a booklet titled “ Nuclear Winter, Silent Spring ” warning that “ biologists predict that a nuclear winter would be followed by a spring more silen t than Ra c h e l Carson ever imagined . ” After the problem of nuclear winter came into the open , SCOPE organized a series of conferences on the subject leading to the publication of a nine-hundred-page , two-volume report . people had to bid adieu to traditional views of nuc lear war.

Notification that the survival of the human species was hanging in the balance accounted for much of the excitement engendered by nuc lear winter catastrophe destruction of civilization annihilation of all human life bound up However extermination own technology concept concrete substance to that image merely mental image materially helped discourse firm belief unwinnable unsurvivable command large majorities abetted celerity major arms control agreements personally familiarized attributed his willingness to compromise specter of nuc lear winter p art parcel larger powerful concern well-being Earth concern whistleblowers doomsayers precious world unique opposition protest against the arms race most powerful environmental groups Nuclear Winter, Silent Spring open nine-hundred-page two-volume report traditional views

['', 'Notification that the survival of the human species was hanging in the balance accounted for much of the excitement engendered by nuclear winter. To be sure, notions of catastrophe, the destruction of civilization, annihilation of all human life, or the coming of Armageddon had long been bound up with nuclear war. However, as Robert Jay Lifton observed at the 1983 annual meeting of the American Psychiatric Association in Los Angeles, while the visual image of an overwhelming mushroom cloud had already evoked the vision of man’s extermination of his species by means of his own technology, it was the concept of nuclear winter that gave “concrete substance to that image.”19 Still, the idea could not remain a merely mental image. Nuclear winter shared with other depictions of the end of the world the aporia that no one would be around to report reality. As pointed out in the New Yorker, “NUCLEAR WAR ERUPTS – WORLD ENDS” is a headline that we’ll never see.” The magazine therefore felt that the Washington conference should have prompted the news media to herald in “before-the-fact headlines” and to “treat the findings of the conference as though they had been extinction itself,” turning over entire front pages to its coverage, which, of course, had not happened.20 Jacques Derrida, drawing attention to the fact that the arms race itself had become increasingly dominated by an economy of speed, tagged the said aporia by employing the future perfect verb-tense when talking about the apocalypse: “At the beginning,” he said, “there will have been speed.”21 Jonathan Schell, who had covered much of the same ground as the Washington conference did in his 1982 bestseller The Fate of the Earth, reminded his readers that “we are forced in this one case to become historians of the future – to chronicle and commit to memory an event that we have never experienced and must never experience.”22', 'Equally tantalizing and inherently joined with the notion of the extinction of humankind itself was the realization, graphically reinforced by nuclear winter, that he who did strike first would be second to die. As Carl Sagan warned in a lengthy piece for the policy journal Foreign Affairs, “We have, by slow and imperceptible steps, been constructing a Doomsday Machine. Until recently – and then, only by accident – no one even noticed.”23 The conceivability of such a device, designed to automatically destroy the world if deterrence failed, had first been raised by RAND Corporation strategist Herman Kahn in the early 1960s, and had been instantly immortalized in Stanley Kubrick’s 1964 black comedy Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb.', 'The nuclear winter concept received additional resonance because it placed humanity firmly on the path of the dinosaurs. When Donald Kennedy, president of Stanford University, opened the Washington conference warning that “the greatest biological and physical disruptions of this planet in its last 65 million years” were in the offing, he was, of course, alluding to the famous K-T boundary at which dinosaurs had disappeared from the earth.24 The similarity of the scenarios cast a spell on publics and policymakers alike. Thus, when the US Senate’s Committee on Armed Services held hearings on the implications of the nuclear winter thesis, its chairman, Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ), explained his motivation in calling the hearings as follows: “I do not see any new threat except the fact that there is that possibility of killing off a lot of people like the Nemesis theory killed off all the dinosaurs and I do not want to be one of those dinosaurs.”25', 'Perhaps inevitably, nuclear winter lost much of its sensational thrill when its identification with the idea of a doomsday machine precipitating the extinction of the human species waned after further research revealed that a less severe decline in temperatures would follow a nuclear exchange. Starley Thompson and Stephen Schneider, who had earlier been involved in the Washington conference, explained in a most influential 1986 article that “[t]hese temperature changes more closely describe a nuclear ‘fall’ than a nuclear winter.” And they inferred that “the global apocalyptic conclusions of the initial nuclear winter hypothesis can now be relegated to a vanishingly low level of probability.”26 Other studies also chipped away at many of the original estimates. As much as members of the TTAPS team maintained that all this was nibbling at the margins and did not take anything away from the basic soundness of their case, one observer toward the end of 1986 aptly concluded, “Nuclear winter continues to melt.”27 By the end of the decade, the originators of the concept acknowledged that they had overestimated its severity. To be sure, biologists continued to point out that, as far as agriculture was concerned, there was hardly a difference between a nuclear winter and a nuclear fall as even a quite small reduction of temperatures during the growing season would result in an unprecedented disaster that could kill billions of people. Yet the press now allotted much more space to critics of the concept, who charged that “all the hype about a lot of freezing following a nuclear exchange is hyperbole” or even called the notion of nuclear winter a “blatant semantic aggression.”28 One of the more prolific and sharp-tongued critics riled that TTAPS’s research represented a “series of coin tosses” sold to the public “as a ‘sophisticated onedimensional model’ – a usage that is oxymoronic, unless applied to [slender British model] Twiggy.”29 More important, as scientists involved in the debate freely acknowledged, “[I]t was the extreme predictions of possible human extinction that originally gave the nuclear winter idea a special status, since it provided a compelling argument for the uselessness of most of the world’s nuclear arsenals.”30 That special status was now gone.', 'To be sure, nuclear winter was – initially at least – being taken quite seriously in the 1980s by both the Reagan administration and the larger national security community. The US government set up a program involving more than a dozen agencies to review the theory. This led the New York Times to speculate in a front page article that, if proven valid, “the threat of a ‘nuclear winter’ could force a dramatic overhaul of the nation’s nuclear arsenal and the military’s plans and equipment for fighting a nuclear war.”31 Congress passed several bills and amendments asking the Pentagon for a comprehensive study of nuclear winter and its potential effects on defense strategy and doctrine.32 Defense experts wondered whether there should be a move to develop and deploy technologically advanced conventional weapons for strategic purposes or whether, at least, the targeting for nuclear war would have to be revised in order to avoid cities. Carl Sagan made no bones about his own policy prescriptions. He advocated slashing worldwide nuclear stockpiles by more than 90 percent to about two thousand warheads with an average yield of no more than one megaton so that “no concatenation of computer malfunction, carelessness, unauthorized acts, communications failure, miscalculation and madness in high office could unleash the nuclear winter.”33 Subsequently, he and his TTAPS colleague Richard Turco urged even deeper cuts to a few hundred warheads, which would still provide what they called “Minimum Sufficient Deterrence” (MSD) but would remain well below the threshold for a nuclear winter.34', 'The vast majority of experts, however, saw no need for a radical turnabout. Joseph Nye, for example, wrote that “the scientific evidence about nuclear winter is too uncertain to serve as a base for precise policy conclusions about reduction of weapons.” Others were concerned that any fundamental reappraisal of existing strategies would undermine NATO. Most of all, however, many felt that the specter of nuclear winter actually reinforced the existing policy of deterrence that was designed to avert nuclear war in the first place.35 This was exactly the line taken by the Reagan administration. The comprehensive review of nuclear winter that Congress had requested from the Pentagon eventually came down to a mere seventeen typewritten pages expounding at length on the reasons why the administration’s policies decreased the chances of nuclear war, and thus the likelihood of nuclear winter. Indeed, the report touted Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), popularly referred to as “Star Wars,” as a congenial answer to nuclear winter since it would prevent the detonation of thousands of nuclear warheads and would thus have a greater mitigating effect on atmospheric consequences of nuclear war than arms control agreements. One of the congressional sponsors of the study fumed, “All the Pentagon has done is use this as a soapbox for defending ‘Star Wars.’”36 Not surprisingly, four years after TTAPS publicly launched the nuclear winter theory, there was little evidence that it had resulted in any specific changes in policy.37', 'In fact, even its impact on the massive peace movement that had sprung up in reaction to the demise of détente and the bellicose rhetoric that accompanied the Reagan administration’s plans to deploy new weapons systems in both the United States and Europe seems to have been ambiguous. Although conservative critics asserted that the scenario had become “the new cause célèbre of nuclear freeze advocates”38 and even that the nuclear winter scare was “planned in early 1983 as a way of backing the political goal of a nuclear ‘freeze’ with the Soviet Union,”39 the reaction on the part of the peace movement was rather muted. One of the reasons might have been that neither a freeze on the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons, around which the American movement rallied, nor a reversal of NATO’s decision to station Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe, the chief target of European protesters, would have done anything to alleviate the threat of nuclear winter.40 Perhaps more important, to antiwar activists this might have simply looked like “catastrophes piled on top of catastrophes.” As Washington Post columnist Mary McGrory sighed, “Now come the biologists to tell us again something ordinary people have no trouble grasping, that nuclear warfare means the extinction of the human race.”41 As a mode of expression, moreover, the use of myriad numbers in describing everything from warheads to temperatures made the warnings of a nuclear winter resemble the talk of arms control experts much more closely than the usually emotive language of the antinuclear movement.42', 'And yet, there can hardly be any doubt that the nuclear winter scenario materially helped to change the discourse on nuclear weapons in the early 1980s. Not only did it reinforce the firm belief of antinuclear activists that nuclear war was unwinnable and unsurvivable, but it also most certainly paved the way for these convictions to finally command large majorities among the American people in general. For the first time, at any rate, pollsters in 1984 found that almost nine out of ten respondents felt that both the Soviet Union and the United States would be completely destroyed in an all-out nuclear war. And tellingly, 83 percent of respondents concurred with the statement that “we cannot be certain that life on earth will continue after a nuclear war.”43', 'There is even some evidence that the nuclear winter scenario might have abetted the astonishing celerity in which Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev reached major arms control agreements during the second half of the decade. Carl Sagan himself managed to brief the Soviet Central Committee on the concept in 1986, reportedly making a lasting impression. Gorbachev personally told Sagan that he had familiarized himself with the research, and retrospectively he attributed his willingness to compromise in superpower negotiations partly to the specter of nuclear winter.44 As for Ronald Reagan, a streak of nuclear abolitionism seemed to have always been running through his veins.45 In the fall of 1983, it was obviously much strengthened. A series of critical events have been held responsible for this: the downing of Korean Airlines Flight 007 by a Soviet fighter plane in early September; a private prescreening for the president of the ABC television drama The Day After on October 20; Reagan’s eventual introduction to US nuclear war plans about a week later; and the apparent misreading in Moscow of NATO’s Able Archer exercise as cover for a nuclear first-strike in early November.46 While nuclear winter has not been mentioned in this context, Sagan’s initial article, the Washington conference, and the ensuing media blitz all fell smack dab into this crucial period and should have added to Reagan’s trepidation. In early 1985, at any rate, with Reagan’s rapprochement toward the Soviet Union well under way, the president told two journalists that “a [nuclear] war could just end up in no victory for anyone, because we would wipe out the Earth as we know it. And if you think back to a couple of natural calamities, back in the last century, in the 1800s, just natural phenomena from earthquakes – or, I mean, volcanoes, we saw the weather so changed that there was snow in July in many temperate countries. And they’ve called it the year in which there was no summer. Well, if one volcano can do that, what are we talking about with a whole nuclear exchange: the nuclear winter that scientists have been talking about? It’s possible.”47', 'If we cannot gauge with any precision the degree to which the nuclear winter scenario influenced peace activists or policymakers, the concept’s larger significance – it seems to me – lies somewhere else. For not only do its dire predictions enqueue the notion of nuclear winter in a discourse of doom and desolation that was the hallmark of the era, but also its unique blending of arms control and ecological concerns establishes it as a crossover phenomenon that anticipated the post–Cold War concerns of today’s world.', 'Nuclear Winter and the Narratives of Crisis in the 1970s and 1980s', 'The 1970s is considered a long “decade of nightmares,” spanning a dozen or more years of “malaise and mayhem,” which, as one observer put it, were “characterized by bad hair, bad clothes, bad music, bad design, bad books, bad politics, bad economics, bad carpeting, bad fabrics and a lot of bad ideas.”48 “In the life of the mind,” wrote Tony Judt, “the nineteen seventies were the most dispirited decade of the twentieth century.”49 Whoever sought refuge in a movie theater better have gotten ready for “sinking ships, burning buildings, shark attacks, zombie invasions, and other disasters and tragedies that reflected the siege mentality and were staples of Hollywood in the era.”50 Columnist Matt Ridley remembers, “When I was a student, in the 1970s, the world was coming to an end. The adults told me so. They said the population explosion was unstoppable, mass famine was imminent, a cancer epidemic caused by chemicals in the environment was beginning, the Sahara desert was advancing by a mile a year, the ice age was returning, oil was running out, air pollution was choking us and nuclear winter would finish us off ... By the time I was 21 years old I realized that nobody had ever said anything optimistic to me – in a lecture, a television program or even a conversation in a bar – about the future of the planet and its people, at least not that I could recall. Doom was certain.”51 And Ridley’s list does not even include slumping economic growth, rising unemployment, turmoil in monetary markets, escalating inner-city crime rates, political violence in Italy, Spain, West Germany, and Northern Ireland, Palestinian terrorism (including recurring skyjackings), and myriad postcolonial and civil wars in Africa and Asia. No wonder, then, that crisis is a leitmotif of many histories of the twentieth century’s last quarter.52', 'Yet there are also an increasing number of scholars who see in the 1970s not just crisis but also the spawning ground for many ideas that shape today’s world.53 The tectonic shift causing the tremors and releasing the force of creative destruction is generally held to be “the shock of the global.”54 Most authors understand this shock to have been first and foremost socioeconomic, shattering the foundations of the Fordist model of industrial society and instigating the transition to a postterritorial, digital capitalism dominated by flighty financial markets.55 Yet we may just as well place special emphasis on a different “global” experience, namely the sudden realization that planet Earth was an endangered beauty floating in a black and boundless sea of nothingness – a realization that unleashed what J. R. McNeill has called “global-scale environmentalism.”56 From this perspective the most important legacy of the depressing 1970s might well be a new appreciation of the precariousness of the human habitat and the limitations of its natural resources. Patrick Kupper has coined the term “1970s diagnosis” for this profound redefinition of the relationship between human beings and their natural environment.57 Based on a full-fledged revolution in scientific thought that spawned new fields of study like ecology, cybernetics, systems theory, and futurology, the world was now conceived of as a complicated and interdependent configuration of systems wherein everything was connected to everything else. Regulatory regimes that had hitherto been by and large autonomous, like air monitoring, water pollution control, or noise protection, were now all assigned to national agencies responsible for the protection of the environment. Formerly single-issue citizens’ groups either followed this trend or banded together in umbrella organizations. At the same time, traditional and frequently right-of-center conservationist groups were either eclipsed by or downright transformed into reform movements with a leftist, or at least alternative, streak.58', 'Two scholarly conferences and two iconic images encapsulated, identified, and energized the breakthrough to environmentalism in the halfdecade between 1968 and 1972. The Intergovernmental Conference of Experts on the Scientific Basis for Rational Use and Conservation of the Resources of the Biosphere (known as the Biosphere Conference) convened in Paris in September 1968. Sponsored by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), it marked the culmination of a spate of smaller conferences emphasizing the interrelatedness of the environment and presenting the biosphere as a system, the whole of which could be affected by activities in any one part of it.59 Four years later, in June 1972, the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment was held in Stockholm. According to historian John McCormick, it was “the single most influential event in the evolution of the international environmental movement.”60 Representatives from 113 countries and more than 400 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) discussed the damage that human mismanagement was doing to the interrelated system sketched out earlier. A statement prepared by the NGOs and read to the conference by Margaret Mead noted, “So great has been the technological thrust of our science and energy, so rapacious our consumption of nonrenewable resources, so rapid our growth in numbers, so heavy the load we place on our life-supporting systems that we begin to perceive the finite qualities of the biosphere of soil, air and water ... This is a revolution in thought fully comparable to the Copernican revolution.”61 The realization that there were limitations to the exploitation of the planet, that depletion at one end or in one area would have repercussions elsewhere, and that humankind therefore had a joint responsibility to safeguard the resources it depended upon, was articulated most forcefully in an unofficial report drawn up as a kind of conceptual framework for the conference and later published as Only One Earth. In it, authors Barbara Ward and René Dubos appealed for a “sense of planetary community” and implored the human race to show some “loyalty to the earth.”62', 'This empathy for Planet Earth derived much of its vigor from two spectacular photographs that mesmerized terrestrials in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The first had been taken on Christmas Eve 1968 by the crew of Apollo 8 as the spacecraft was orbiting the moon and, suddenly, spotted the Earth appearing over the lunar horizon. As the poet Archibald MacLeish wrote the following day in a much-noticed commentary, “For the first time in all of time men have seen the earth: seen it not as continents or oceans from the little distance of a hundred miles or two or three, but seen it from the depth of space ... To see the earth as it truly is, small and blue and beautiful in that eternal silence where it floats, is to see ourselves as riders on the earth together, brothers on that bright loveliness in the eternal cold.”63 More than thirty years later, Denis Cosgrove has argued with good reason that Apollo’s “most enduring cultural impact has not been knowledge of the Moon, but an altered image of the earth.”64 Joachim Radkau has even suggested that with this change of perspective the Copernican revolution has, in a sense, come full circle: Earth is no longer deemed to be just one planet among many but is once again thought of as one of a kind.65 Today the year 1968 might evoke pictures of riots and assassinations but as that year drew to a close, American newspaper editors voted Apollo 8 the story of the year and a special issue of Life magazine, looking back on “The Incredible Year ’68,” put a picture of Earth on the cover, as did – of course – Ward and Dubos’s published report to the Stockholm conference in 1972.', 'The second spectacular photograph, taken in 1972, resulted from Apollo’s final mission and went on to assume an even more iconic status. According to Denis Cosgrove, the famous “Blue Marble” shot of the full Earth upset conventional Western cartographic conventions, primarily by stripping away the graticule. “Thus liberated, and with no signs of naming, boundary marking, or possession, Earth appears to float free as a sui generis organism.”66 The image has become nothing less but ubiquitous. In the United States it soon turned up as the logo for Earth Day. Friends of the Earth, an environmental lobby group founded in 1969 in the United States that by 1971 had begun to evolve into an international network, used the image often and effectively. In 1979, James Lovelock put it on the cover of his widely discussed first Gaia book, in which he proposed to see Earth as a single unified and self-regulating organism; more recently Al Gore has used it as a backdrop for his slideshow on climate change that served as the basis for his 2006 book and film An Inconvenient Truth (meanwhile an audiobook edition of Gore’s first environmental bestseller Earth in the Balance finds itself adorned by the Earthrise photograph from the earlier Apollo mission). In fact, the “Blue Marble” has been designated “the most widely reproduced image in human history.” It has been used not only for environmental issues but also for purposes ranging from human and animal rights to global education, not to mention indiscriminate examples of commercial advertising.67', 'Apollo’s earlier photographs had shown how small and lonely our planet appeared set against a vast black infinity and had thus evoked feelings of humility and human solidarity. Just a few weeks before the Stockholm conference opened, President Richard Nixon in outlining his environmental program to the US Congress had noted, “We are now growing accustomed to the view of our planet as seen from space – a blue and brown disk shrouded in white patches of clouds ... No matter what else divides men and nations, this perspective should unite them.”68 The “Blue Marble” shot, by contrast, picturing Earth alone and filling the frame, manifested the globe’s vitality and organic unity, generating sentiments of home and parental care. As Robert Poole has observed, “Suddenly the image of the Earth was everywhere ... Since then, the phrase ‘blue planet’ has come to be bound up with the idea of caring for the Earth.”69 A good example for this nexus is provided by biologist Lewis Thomas. In 1974 he wrote “Viewed from the distance of the Moon, the astonishing thing about the Earth, catching the breath, is that it is alive.”70 A decade later, he echoed this sensation in his foreword to the proceedings of the Nuclear Winter conference in Washington. Confessing that the most beautiful thing he had ever seen in a photograph in all his life had been “the planet Earth seen from the distance of the moon, hanging there in space, obviously alive,” Thomas urged his readers to consider that – if the nuclear winter thesis was accurate – the two billion people estimated to die as a result of a nuclear war were only part of the story. “Something else will have happened at the same time, in which human beings ought to feel the same stake as in the loss of their own lives. The elaborate, coherent, beautifully organized ecosystem of the Earth – what some people call the biosphere and others refer to as nature – will have been dealt a mortal or near-mortal blow.”71 The Apollo images reinforced and visualized a transformed worldview that simultaneously found expression in Paris, Stockholm, and elsewhere, and that represented the soundboard from which the notion of nuclear winter resonated. Knowing this full well, Carl Sagan had commissioned a film on the climatic consequences of TTAPS’s baseline scenario, which was shown to the press following the Halloween conference. Ted Koppel, anchor of ABC’s Nightline, included the footage in the late-night news program’s coverage of the conference. Extolled one critic, “Koppel, making use of ‘graphics’ that had been created for the conference, displayed a new and arresting image of the peril that threatens us. First, we saw the now familiar picture of the earth in space. Then a dark cap materialized on the top half. It moved down over the bottom half as well, like a shade being pulled down in front of a lighted window at night, until our bright and fair planet was totally dark.”72 Nuclear winter was part and parcel of a larger and powerful concern for the well-being of that newly discovered living organism called Earth.', 'From the very start this concern was accompanied by a chorus of whistleblowers and doomsayers.73 After Rachel Carson had launched her anything but quiescent clarion call against the American pesticide industry in her 1962 bestseller Silent Spring, subsequent premonitions grew increasingly alarming. In 1968 Paul Ehrlich, who would later spearhead the biological side of nuclear winter research, published one of the bestselling eco-political treatises of all time. In The Population Bomb he argued that humankind could save itself only if it got a handle on overpopulation. Barry Commoner, an environmental activist and professor of biology at Washington University in St. Louis, disagreed. Instead of population growth he identified as the root problem an economy that was processing and churning out evermore synthetics, disposable products, pesticides, and detergents. In his 1971 book The Closing Circle, Commoner set down four laws of ecology, including that there is only one interconnected ecosphere for all living organisms and, most memorably, that there is no such thing as a free lunch.74 British science journalist Gordon Rattray Taylor took these and other concerns and consolidated them in a popular Doomsday Book. 75 These Anglo-American debates were increasingly reflected in the media and reverberated in Europe as well.', 'In West Germany, for example, Bernhard Grzimek, the director of the Frankfurt Zoo and immensely popular host of a television series called Ein Platz für Tiere (Wildlife Refuge), encouraged the weekly Der Spiegel to publish a cover story on environmental problems in the fall of 1970. The issue sold half a million copies in no time.76 Grzimek had recently been appointed nature conservation commissioner by Chancellor Willy Brandt, whose center-left coalition had virtually invented environmental politics in West Germany as part of its larger reform agenda.77 The government’s educational work soon found expression in many ways, as in children’s and youth magazines like Der kleine Tierfreund (Little Animal Lover), which in September 1970 devoted an entire issue to “The Endangered Planet.” The inside front cover with the table of contents showed Apollo’s Earthrise photograph. Indeed, as Jens Ivo Engels has demonstrated, Grzimek and other nature filmmakers used their popular wildlife documentaries to transform the mental image of nature from a heroic yet distant wilderness into a close and personal but at the same time endangered habitat.78 To be sure, Grzimek also soon annoyed many of his political superiors when he chimed in with the prophets of doom.', 'The voices of gloom and doom reached a crescendo in 1972. In January, British ecologists published A Blueprint for Survival, concluding that “if current trends are allowed to persist, the breakdown of society and the irreversible disruption of life-support systems on this planet, possibly by the end of the century, certainly within the lifetimes of our children, are inevitable.”79 Two months later the Club of Rome published its report on the Limits to Growth, arguing that pollution, population growth, and the exhaustion of resources attendant to exponential growth, if unchecked, would bring on certain catastrophe by the end of the century. The report attracted an unprecedented amount of public attention, perhaps because this time the apocalyptic message emanated from one of those modern, cybernetic computer models that had up to now embodied the fantasies of feasibility associated with public management ideas of the 1960s.80 In this regard, that is, in its application of complex computer models, the nuclear winter concept was a worthy successor to the Club of Rome report. If the latter, however, had focused on socioeconomic trends, TTAPS tapped into the work of astronomers, climatologists, and geologists and the contingency of sudden climate change that some of their models suggested.81', 'By the early 1980s, of course, delusions of planning and control had long fallen out of favor. Rather, the things that were out of control dominated public discourse throughout the 1970s and 1980s, in particular when it came to the human habitat. Acid rain, toxic wastes, filthy seas, contaminated landscapes, dying forests, suffocating cities, nuclear nightmares, endangered species, ozone depletion, global warming, and other alarming news commanded the headlines. With reference to a spate of Hollywood disaster movies, Der Spiegel observed that real-life angst was also reflected on the screen. In 1981, with Cold War tensions rising and a progeny of Hollywood in the White House, impending nuclear apocalypse achieved pride of place: “The US president’s ‘doomsday’ machine, his airborne command post for ending the world in an atomic blaze, is ready for takeoff,” readers were advised in a slightly crooked account. “Today, the touch of a button is all it takes for the salto mortale into the void.”82 If this widely read weekly is any indicator, angst must have reigned supreme in West Germany. Hardly a month had passed from the 1981 year-end cover story on apocalyptic scenarios when the magazine upped the ante with a six-part series on “German Angst,” quickly followed by a four-part series about ‘Unprotected Nature.’”83 This array of topics marks a striking shift in the source of anxiety. For a generation or two, the Russians had dominated German – or, for that matter, Western – angst; now it was rockets and reactors. Ideology took a backseat to ecology. If the world was no longer divisible into protected nature reserves and a vastly greater portion of the planet to be exploited and contaminated at will, then a similar division into East and West was also meaningless and obsolete.84 This new type of anxiety gripped not just Germans, and the prophets of doom freely admitted that they wanted people worldwide to be afraid. In his introduction to a collection of essays concerned with psychological and moral aspects of nuclear winter, psychiatrist Lester Grinspoon, a close associate of Carl Sagan, adjured his readers, “We need the courage to be afraid and to make our friends, neighbors, and colleagues afraid – with a fear ... not so much for ourselves as for our children, for civilization, and for this precious world.”85', 'The fear for “this precious world” is what makes the nuclear winter episode unique in the annals of opposition to the nuclear threat. In fact, with the introduction of nuclear winter the protest against the arms race squarely arrived in the field of environmentalism. Contemporaries made that connection quite casually. In 1984 the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), one of the most powerful environmental groups in the United States, put out a booklet titled “Nuclear Winter, Silent Spring” warning that “biologists predict that a nuclear winter would be followed by a spring more silent than Rachel Carson ever imagined.”86 The following year the SCOPE report foregrounded the close conjunction between nuclear winter and environmental concerns even more forcefully. SCOPE, the Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment, was founded in 1969 as a branch of the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU). Its purpose was to study the effects of humanity on the environment. After the problem of nuclear winter came into the open, SCOPE organized a series of conferences on the subject leading to the publication of a nine-hundred-page, two-volume report in September 1985. 87 The upshot of the report was that people had to bid adieu to traditional views of nuclear war. As Mark Harwell, one of the report’s authors put it, “Hiroshima is a dangerously misleading example of what the next nuclear war would be like.”88 Forget about blast, heat, and radiation, the report in effect said; stop thinking of billions of casualties and the destruction of cultural assets; instead, start worrying about Earth as the enduring home of the human species and innumerable other species as well. To drive this message home, SCOPE not only hired a public relations agency to tout the launch of the report, but also commissioned a writer to create an abridged paperback version entitled Planet Earth in Jeopardy. 89 Nuclear war, said Harwell, constituted “war waged on the global environment itself.”90', '']

[(0, 11)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-HeMu-Aff-Mukai-Round-3.docx

Minnesota

HeMu

213c5b5b7574d695fc4e3d0228725b1e39e4eb2aa31bd862421333c5d0ab3162

No inequality crisis and antitrust makes it worse---prefer studies on consumption instead of capital.

Wright et al 19 [Joshua D. Wright is University Professor and the Executive Director of the Global Antitrust Institute at Scalia Law School at George Mason University. Professor Wright also holds a courtesy appointment in the Department of Economics. In 2013, the Senate unanimously confirmed Professor Wright as a member of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), following his nomination by President Obama. He rejoined Scalia Law School as a full-time faculty member in Fall 2015. "Consumer Welfare & the Rule of Law: The Case Against the New Populist Antitrust Movement." https://regproject.org/paper/consumer-welfare-the-rule-of-law-the-case-against-the-new-populist-antitrust-movement/]

evidence is mixed there are several problems not reliable evidence higher markups might reflect a shift in composition of firms work finds conflicting results Hall finds “no evidence mega-firm sectors have cost markups which is consistent with concentration concentration do not lead to higher prices , but correspond with increased output evidence is mixed at best in no case clearly identify shortcomings in antitrust the argument we must abandon consumer welfare is in serious tension with remedies Each would diminish consumer welfare fostering higher prices is difficult to see what better standard could be adopted inequality is overstated there is a dearth of empirical support consumption indicates inequality is muted empirical evidence supporting a causal link between antitrust and inequality remains undeveloped results do not offer evidence Populist claims appear overstated there is no empirical supp ort for antitrust

populist antitrust supporters regularly make is that prices have increased and output has decreased. Again, the evidence here is mixed at best . Eeckhout purports to demonstrate an increase in markups since 1980, which they argue indicates market power has increased over this period. there are several problems with this methodology and reasoning industrial organization economics literature has clearly established that profit margins, alone, are not reliable evidence Additionally, it is clear that increased markups, alone, are not reliable evidence of price increases. Moreover, a trend toward higher markups does not necessarily indicate firm profits are likewise trending higher As they explain, a technological change that reduces variable, but increases, fixed costs might result in increased markups but not increased profits . higher markups might simply reflect a shift in the composition of firms within the economy. Today, high-tech (and other) firms with low marginal costs but substantial R&D costs comprise a more significant percentage of the economy than they have historically Aside from the methodological issues with these studies, there is the added complication that other work finds conflicting results Hall for instance, finds “no evidence that mega-firm -intensive sectors have higher price/marginal cost markups he finds no real evidence of increasing markups in less regulated sectors he does find a fairly strong trend of increasing markups in heavily regulated sectors which is consistent with something other than concentration Traina analyzes this same question, attempting to correct for another flaw in Eeckhout’s method markups actually remain flat Ganapati examines data and finds concentration issues do not lead to higher prices , but in fact correspond with increased output . He concludes that the concentrated industries he analyzes are concentrated not due to anticompetitive behavior, but “likely due to technical innovation or scale economies. The evidence is , accordingly, mixed at best The limits of these studies must be acknowledged in any serious debate regarding the state of antitrust enforcement today in no case do they clearly identify systemic shortcomings in current antitrust enforcement efforts. the argument that we must abandon the consumer welfare standard because prices are higher and output is lower under this standard is in serious tension with remedies the populist antitrust movement proposes. Each would , as described above, diminish consumer welfare And it would lead to the perverse result of antitrust law deliberately fostering higher prices or lower output, meaning consumers would be less able to purchase products or services they desire. . If the goal is to lower prices and increase output, it is difficult to see what better standard could be adopted than one that makes these consumer concerns its sole focus. supporters further note that income inequality has increased dramatically and proffer that lax antitrust enforcement is (to varying degrees) to blame inequality is likely increasing, though the magnitude of this increase is probably overstated On the proffered causal link between antitrust enforcement and inequality, there is , so far, a notable dearth of empirical support or development . Scholars have argued that consumption might be a superior measure of welfare, given a “closer link between consumption and well-being Consumption trends would also seem to be relevant when considering an titrust enforcement efforts, as they offer more information regarding economic effects than isolated income or wealth measurements. Examining household consumption over the last couple decades indicates that inequality is increasing but at a muted rate Potentially more-accurate measures of income and welfare, however, suggest this trend is not as significant as populists claim consider the empirical evidence supporting a causal link between antitrust enforcement and inequality This proffered link remains , thus far, largely theoretical and undeveloped empirically Wright et al., for instance, present time series regressions relating measures of inequality to antitrust enforcement measures. The authors examine data from DOJ investigations focusing first on merger investigations, given the populist emphasis on merger activity, and then broadly examine all DOJ investigations for a more general enforcement measure. Their results do not offer “ much empirical evidence to substantiate the proposed correlation between antitrust enforcement activity and inequality . Populist claims that increased antitrust enforcement is necessary to combat a severe trend of increasing inequality thus appear to be overstated . While inequality appears to be increasing, the rate is likely more modest than the populist movement implies there is no empirical supp ort for the underlying proposition that increasing antitrust enforcement levels would slow, stop, or reverse this trend.

populist antitrust mixed at best Eeckhout several problems not reliable evidence increased profits composition firms methodological issues conflicting results Hall concentration Traina Eeckhout’s method markups actually remain flat Ganapati do not lead to higher prices increased output innovation scale mixed at best no case systemic shortcomings current antitrust enforcement abandon consumer welfare tension remedies diminish consumer welfare fostering higher prices better standard consumer concerns income inequality magnitude overstated notable dearth support or development consumption well-being an titrust enforcement muted rate more-accurate empirical evidence causal link inequality undeveloped much empirical evidence enforcement inequality overstated no empirical supp ort reverse this trend.

['Another assertion populist antitrust supporters regularly make is that prices have increased and output has decreased. Again, the evidence here is mixed at best.', 'The movement’s proponents claim increased monopoly power economy-wide has led to increased prices for consumers. One study by De Loecker and Eeckhout, for instance, purports to demonstrate an increase in markups since 1980, which they argue indicates market power has increased over this period.68 This study utilizes Compustat-compiled input and output data for firms across the U.S. economy to calculate firm-level markups, examining measures of sales, input expenditure, capital stock information, industry activity classifications, and accounting data measuring profitability and stock market performance.', 'While this study purports to demonstrate an increase in markups and, therefore, an increase in market power, there are several problems with this methodology and reasoning. Fundamentally, industrial organization economics literature has clearly established that profit margins, alone, are not reliable evidence of market power.69 Additionally, it is clear that increased markups, alone, are not reliable evidence of price increases. To understand whether higher markups translated to higher prices, we would need to understand additional factors, such as whether marginal costs have changed.70 If, for example, marginal costs decreased, markups could increase even if prices remained the same; indeed, depending upon how much marginal costs decreased, margins could increase even while prices decreased. Moreover, a trend toward higher markups does not necessarily indicate firm profits are likewise trending higher, as De Loecker and Eeckhout acknowledge. As they explain, a technological change that reduces variable, but increases, fixed costs might result in increased markups but not increased profits.', 'In addition, higher markups might simply reflect a shift in the composition of firms within the economy. Today, high-tech (and other) firms with low marginal costs but substantial R&D costs comprise a more significant percentage of the economy than they have historically. Consider, for instance, a software company that spends a tremendous amount developing an innovative new software that consumers download on their personal devices. While the marginal cost of selling each new unit of software would be miniscule, the company—to stay in business—would need to charge a price that helped it recoup the costs incurred to create its innovative product. The more firms within the economy employing this business model, the more we would expect to see higher markups, and so the less we could assume, based upon the existence of higher markups, alone, that those markups derive from increased market power.', 'Aside from the methodological issues with these studies, there is the added complication that other work finds conflicting results. Robert E. Hall, for instance, finds “no evidence that mega-firm-intensive sectors have higher price/marginal cost markups.”71 Notably, while he finds no real evidence of increasing markups in less regulated sectors like Manufacturing or Transportation and Warehousing, he does find a fairly strong trend of increasing markups in heavily regulated sectors like Finance and Insurance, and Health Care and Social Assistance—which is consistent with something other than concentration driving increased markups.72', 'Others examining the effect of concentration upon prices likewise find results that conflict with the populist antitrust movement’s claims. James Traina, for example, analyzes this same question, attempting to correct for another flaw in De Loecker and Eeckhout’s methodology: namely, De Loecker and Eeckhout focus only on the “cost of goods sold” (COGS) facet of firms’ operating expenses, omitting the “selling, general, and administrative expenses” (SGA) facet. Traina argues that SGA is an increasingly significant share of variable costs for firms in the U.S. economy, and demonstrates that once SGA is incorporated into De Loecker and Eeckhout’s measure of cost, markups actually remain flat (or decline).73', 'Similarly, Ganapati examines data from 1972-2012, and finds concentration issues do not lead to higher prices, but in fact correspond with increased output.74 He concludes that the concentrated industries he analyzes are concentrated not due to anticompetitive behavior, but “likely due to technical innovation or scale economies.”75 His findings are consistent with other work that finds that the trends in concentration populists condemn may, in fact, be related to changes in economies of scale and to their corresponding productivity improvements.76', 'Other studies upon which populist antitrust proponents rely purport to identify higher prices using different metrics. One such regularly-cited study is John Kwoka’s meta-analysis of retrospective studies of mergers, joint ventures, and other horizontal arrangements.77 Here, Kowka compiles data covering more than 3,000 mergers and concludes the average price effect for the studied mergers is a 7.22% increase.78 His findings have, however, been called into serious question. Experienced economists in the FTC’s Bureau of Economics, Michael Vita and David Osinski, identify several objections to Kwoka’s methodology and, accordingly, his findings. They explain why various methodological failings—including not using standard meta-analytic techniques to compute average price effects and standard errors, not weighting observations by their estimated variances (meaning all price estimates are treated the same regardless of their certainty), and omitting standard errors from his report—undermine Kwoka’s fundamental findings regarding price effects.79', 'The evidence upon which populist antitrust supporters rely in asserting that prices have increased is, accordingly, mixed at best. The studies they cite often attempt to examine very important—but also difficult to measure—questions. The limits of these studies must be acknowledged in any serious debate regarding the state of antitrust enforcement today. While many of these studies offer good initial insights, they mostly identify areas for further research. And in no case do they clearly identify systemic shortcomings in current antitrust enforcement efforts.', 'In addition to questionable empirical premises, the argument that we must abandon the consumer welfare standard because prices are higher and output is lower under this standard is in serious tension with remedies the populist antitrust movement proposes. Each of the proposed remedies would, as described above, diminish consumer welfare. If, for instance, we adopted a public interest standard, prices and output might be one concern—but employment, democracy, the environment, and inequality might be competing concerns. And lower prices, higher output, and product improvements would not have the trump card in the analysis they do today. Similarly, if we decided to ban vertical mergers or prohibit any transactions over a certain size, we would be preventing at least some transactions that would lower prices and increase output. This would appear to be particularly likely in the case of banning vertical mergers, a move which empirical evidence indicates has anticompetitive outcomes—i.e., higher prices or lower output—result only rarely.80 And it would lead to the perverse result of antitrust law deliberately fostering higher prices or lower output, meaning consumers would be less able to purchase products or services they desire.', 'Accordingly, even if prices and output have, in fact, trended in directions harmful to consumers, the better question to be asking is whether this is because enforcement under the consumer welfare standard is not at the optimal level. The consumer welfare standard focuses on just such factors—along with innovation, quality, and other consumer concerns. If the goal is to lower prices and increase output, it is difficult to see what better standard could be adopted than one that makes these consumer concerns its sole focus.', 'C. Increasing Antitrust Enforcement Would Reduce Inequality', 'Populist antitrust supporters further note that income inequality in the United States has increased dramatically in recent decades, and proffer that lax antitrust enforcement is (to varying degrees) to blame.81 The general intuition here is fairly easily stated: lenient antitrust enforcement allows firms to obtain market power, which allows them to reduce output, raise prices, and generate monopoly profits—all of which enriches shareholders. Shareholders are, by and large, in the top percentage of wealth and income distribution, so these increasing returns increase the wealth of the wealthiest and, thus, inequality.82', 'Imbedded in this theory are a couple key assumptions, both of which can be empirically tested. First, that inequality is increasing. The evidence here suggests inequality is likely increasing, though the magnitude of this increase is probably overstated. Second, that increasing antitrust enforcement would reverse this trend. On the proffered causal link between antitrust enforcement and inequality, there is, so far, a notable dearth of empirical support or development.', 'First, consider the evidence on inequality trends. Populist claims regarding increasing inequality largely rely upon analysis of the Gini coefficient for US incomes over the last 50 years, which appears to show a steep increase in inequality. Examining the ratio of the share of US income among the 5th quintile of income-earning households to the share among the 1st quintile of households likewise seems to show increasing inequality.83', 'While these data points offer interesting insights, it is again important to understand their limitations. As Robert Kaestner and Darren Lubotsky emphasize, for example, failing to account for government transfers and employee benefits—that presumably substitute, in part, for cash income—can meaningfully affect these kinds of inequality measures.84 One important example they explore is that of healthcare benefits. As healthcare costs have rapidly increased in recent years, omitting a measure of health insurance benefits (provided by employers or by the government) could significantly affect ultimate inequality findings. Kaestner and Lubotsky, in fact, analyze inequality measures accounting for this omission, and find that including health insurance benefits substantially lessens the difference between high-end and low-end incomes.85 They find the ratio of income between households at the 90th percentile and the 10th percentile to be approximately 5 in 1995, 5.2 in 2004, and 5.6 in 2012.86 So while their findings support the notion that inequality is increasing, they also suggest that the trend is significantly smaller than reported.', 'Examining household consumption trends tells a similar story. Scholars have argued that consumption might be a superior measure of welfare, given a “closer link between consumption and well-being.”87 Consumption trends would also seem to be relevant when considering antitrust enforcement efforts, as they offer more information regarding economic effects than isolated income or wealth measurements. Examining household consumption over the last couple decades indicates that inequality is increasing but at a muted rate.', 'Accordingly, the evidence does seem to indicate inequality is increasing by some amount. Potentially more-accurate measures of income and welfare, however, suggest this trend is not as significant as populists claim. So, the first assumption in this particular populist theory appears to be valid, if often overstated. That leads us to the second—and for this discussion, the critical—assumption that antitrust enforcement is driving the apparent inequality trend.', 'Second, consider the empirical evidence supporting a causal link between antitrust enforcement and inequality. This proffered link remains, thus far, largely theoretical and undeveloped empirically. Populist papers advocating for increased antitrust as a salve for increasing inequality do not offer empirical support for their preferred course of treatment. But other authors have begun to explore empirically the proposed tie between antitrust enforcement and inequality. Wright et al., for instance, present time series regressions relating measures of inequality to antitrust enforcement measures.88 While the authors acknowledge the standard reasons that these analyses cannot isolate, with confidence, causation, their work provides a useful foray into the empirical basis for the notion that antitrust enforcement and inequality are causally linked. The authors examine data from DOJ investigations between 1984 and 2016, focusing first on merger investigations, given the populist emphasis on merger activity, and then broadly examine all DOJ investigations for a more general enforcement measure. Their results do not offer “much empirical evidence to substantiate the proposed correlation between antitrust enforcement activity and inequality.”89', 'Populist claims that increased antitrust enforcement is necessary to combat a severe trend of increasing inequality thus appear to be overstated. While inequality appears to be increasing, the rate is likely more modest than the populist movement implies. And there is, as of yet, no empirical support for the underlying proposition that increasing antitrust enforcement levels would slow, stop, or reverse this trend.']

[(0, 6), (13, 15)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Margolin-Muse-Neg-CEDA-Round5.docx

Michigan

MaMu

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/MaMu/Michigan-Margolin-Muse-Neg-CEDA-Round5.docx

17d3e7d84c09e4e84035944ed0f1451740cf431cdd698f0cfbdfd61cd6172a13

US Midwest soil degradation is rapidly accelerating---threatens complete collapse.

Carly Cassella 22. Fitzpatrick Award for Science Communication, interned at the International Federation of Journalist in Brussels, referencing the results of a 2022 study on Midwestern soil erosion published in Geology. “​​US Soil Could Be Eroding Up to 1,000 Times Faster Than It Should.” .

U S Midwest world's most productive farming region researchers calculated current soil erosion is a thousand times greater That's more loss than sustainable Midwest can withstand only a mil of erosion America's topsoil is simply unable to recover lost 2 mil s per year rapid deterioration of the US Midwest threatens future ag production it's not too late to take action Reducing erosion is possible with sustainable farming

The U S is on an eroding foundation In the Midwest , the world's most productive farming region researchers calculated current soil erosion is a thousand times greater than before modern agriculture's rise. That's much , much more soil loss than is sustainable measurements show cultivated areas are losing topsoil at far greater rates – a thousandfold faster the Midwest can withstand only a mil limeter of soil erosion every year. This is a worry at this rate America's topsoil is simply unable to recover it's disappearing faster than it can accumulate As a result, more and more go missing every year. ag fields in the Midwest lost 2 mil limeter s of soil per year on average since the Euro-American settlement. That's equivalent to about 57.6 billion metric tons of topsoil lost in roughly 160 years. the consequences of tilling the soil at the rate we are today are even worse than scientists appreciated The rapid deterioration of the US Midwest threatens future ag ricultural production and precious habitats . In a time of climate crisis, maintaining the health of our planet's topsoil is more crucial than ever. in top layer of land it's not too late to take action Reducing erosion is possible with the right solutions sustainable farming experts that 90 percent of Earth's topsoil could be at risk of by 2050 Recovering will take thousands of years . We can't keep going on like this

U S eroding foundation world's most productive farming region a thousand times greater much much sustainable at far greater rates thousandfold faster only a mil limeter America's topsoil is simply unable to recover disappearing more and more Midwest 2 mil limeter s 57.6 billion metric tons of topsoil lost even worse rapid deterioration threatens future ag precious habitats more crucial than ever. not too late possible sustainable farming experts 90 percent 2050 thousands of years We can't keep going on like this

['The United States is building its future on an eroding foundation.', "In the Midwest, one of the world's most productive farming regions, researchers have calculated that current soil erosion is up to a thousand times greater than before modern agriculture's rise.", "That's much, much more soil loss than what should be allowed following what the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) says is sustainable in its soil management guidelines.", '"For the first time, we know what the natural rates of erosion are in the Midwest,"\xa0\xa0geologist Caroline Quarrier, who completed the research as part of her master\'s thesis at the University of Massachusetts (UMass) Amherst.', '"And because we now know the rate of erosion before Euro-American settlement, we can see exactly how much modern agriculture has accelerated the process."', 'The study is based on the presence of a rare element known as beryllium-10, which Quarrier and colleagues detected in the topsoil of 14 native prairies across the US Midwest that have been undisturbed by agriculture.', "\xa0is mostly formed in Earth's atmosphere when cosmic rays from the Milky Way pierce our planet. Once it ends up in the top layer of the soil, its half-life can reveal erosion rates over thousands or even millions of years.", 'Before modern agriculture, average erosion rates across prairies in Iowa, Minnesota, South Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas were about 0.04 millimeters a year, Quarrier and colleagues found. That was the case stretching back to the last Ice Age, about 12,000 years ago.', 'But the situation has changed. Previous measurements from agricultural fields adjacent to the native prairies studied show these cultivated areas are losing topsoil at far greater rates – a thousandfold faster at some sites.', "The USDA's current sustainability rules are based on the idea that topsoil in the Midwest can withstand only a millimeter of soil erosion every year.", "But this 'baseline' level of erosion, it turns out, is 25 times greater than the average pre-agricultural erosion rates Quarrier and colleagues calculated. In other words, the erosion the USDA considers 'tolerable' for these locations is far, far above natural erosion rates, according to these latest figures.", "This is a worry because, at this rate, America's topsoil is simply unable to recover; it's disappearing faster than it can accumulate. As a result, more and more go missing every year.", "Earlier in 2022, some of the same researchers at UMass Amherst\xa0\xa0that agricultural fields in the Midwest have lost 2 millimeters of soil per year on average since the Euro-American settlement. That's equivalent to about 57.6 billion metric tons of topsoil lost in roughly 160 years.", "That's equivalent to about 57.6 billion metric tons of topsoil.", 'Now that we know from their latest study that natural erosion rates in the Midwest were actually far slower than past estimates, it suggests the consequences of tilling the soil at the rate we are today are even worse than scientists appreciated.', 'The rapid deterioration of the US Midwest threatens future agricultural production and precious habitats.', "In a time of climate crisis, maintaining the health of our planet's topsoil is more crucial than ever.", "The world currently\xa0\xa0in this top layer of land, and recently the United Nations (UN)\xa0\xa0that if we don't start preserving our planet's soil, the world is on track to suffer biodiversity loss, widespread infrastructure damage, and possibly the displacement of entire human communities.", "Soil is also an important way to suck excess carbon out of the atmosphere.\xa0's effects could be even worse without this natural carbon sink.", "That's a lot of bad news, but the good news is that it's not too late to take action. Reducing our current erosion rates is possible with the right solutions.", '"There are agricultural practices, such as no-till farming, that we know how to do and we know greatly reduce erosion,"\xa0\xa0Quarrier.', 'Planting no-till crops is but one example of sustainable farming, however. Better\xa0\xa0can reduce the effects of water erosion while\xa0\xa0instead of burning it off at the end of a season can also help topsoil further withstand weathering.', "Earlier this year, experts at the UN\xa0\xa0that 90 percent of Earth's topsoil could be at risk of erosion by 2050. Recovering just a few centimeters of that soil under natural conditions will take thousands of years.", "America's Midwest isn't the only place that needs to seriously consider changing its ways.", "We can't keep going on like this."]

[(6, 17)]

ndtceda

Emory-GiKe-Aff-NDT-Quarters.docx

Emory

GiKe

b4cac04576b14b75bd15bbc933e516042d73896b296d1c3e564eb06a182d551e

Congress also rejects the AFF.

Bryan Bender & Connor O’Brien 22. **Defense editor for POLITICO Pro. **Defense reporter for POLITICO. “Top GOP hawks warn Biden against nuclear cuts.” 1/13/2022. https://www.politico.com/news/2022/01/13/republicans-warn-biden-nuclear-cuts-527030

top Republicans warning Biden not to cut any nuclear weapons profoundly concerning politically challenging it will be for Biden to reform U.S. nuclear strategy GOP leaders raised concerns that Biden could adopt a “ no first use in spite mountains of evidence to the contrary bipartisan congressional allied and expert opposition , and a security environment that get worse by the day Biden continues to look for opportunities to weaken the ultimate guarantee

The top Republicans on the Senate and House Armed Services committees are warning the Biden administration not to cut any newly approved nuclear weapons profoundly concerning ” to scale back any aspects of the nuclear modernization effort underscores how politically challenging it will be for President Joe Biden to make major reform s to U.S. nuclear strategy the GOP defense leaders also raised concerns that Biden could still decide to change U.S. policy on the role of nuclear weapons, including adopt ing a “ no first use ” policy reports surfaced that the Biden administration was considering departing from long-standing nuclear policies that have deterred major wars U.S. allies across the globe joined a bipartisan chorus in Congress to urge the administration to take a wiser, more measured path in spite of mountains of evidence to the contrary , bipartisan congressional , allied and expert opposition , and a security environment that seems to get worse by the day , the Biden administration continues to look for opportunities to weaken the ultimate guarantee

profoundly concerning reform s to U.S. nuclear strategy no first use mountains of evidence to the contrary congressional allied opposition get worse by the day weaken the ultimate guarantee

['The top Republicans on the Senate and House Armed Services committees are warning the Biden administration not to cut any newly approved nuclear weapons as it completes an internal review.', 'In a joint statement, Sen. Jim Inhofe (R-Okla.) and Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Ala.) said it would be “profoundly concerning” to scale back any aspects of the nuclear modernization effort, especially in light of Russian and Chinese developments.', 'Background:\xa0The two Armed Services leaders were responding to a new report from POLITICO that the Biden administration is considering cutting a trio of programs that were added or revived by the Trump administration, including a nuclear-armed cruise missile now in the early stages of development.', 'Their public warning, which comes weeks before the administration’s Nuclear Posture Review is supposed to wrap up, underscores how politically challenging it will be for President Joe Biden to make major reforms to U.S. nuclear strategy or upend long-term plans that were mostly codified in the Obama administration to upgrade land-based nuclear missiles, submarines and bombers.', '“Reports that the Biden administration is considering abandoning long-overdue and much-needed improvements to our nation’s nuclear deterrent – when China is massively expanding its nuclear arsenal, North Korea is flagrantly violating UN sanctions on its missile program, and Russia is poised to launch the largest invasion in Europe since World War II – are profoundly concerning, and if true, would only invite further aggression,” the lawmakers said.', 'Biden, who has said he believes the United States maintains more nuclear arms than needed, has been under pressure from arms control groups and some leading Democrats in Congress to follow through on his pledge when he became president to “take steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy.”', 'Bipartisan argument:\xa0But the GOP lawmakers make the case that existing plans to add the weapons also have widespread support among top military leaders, including Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, as well members of Congress in both parties, and among foreign allies that rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella for their own defense.', '“Over the past year, our committees heard from the nation’s leading defense and nuclear experts, including from within the current administration,” they said. “Their stark warnings on the threats we face were sobering — and their clear advice, from Secretary Austin on down, was to continue along the path of modernization.”', 'They added that “an overwhelming bipartisan majority supported continuing all aspects” of nuclear modernization plans in defense policy legislation signed last month by Biden.', 'Despite resistance from some Democrats to the wholesale overhaul of the nuclear arsenal, the defense policy bill backs the administration’s funding request for new weapon systems, such as the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent, and warhead modernization programs.', 'The bill also included $15.5 million that Biden requested for research and development of a Nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise Missile, one of the main “add ons” pursued by the Trump administration that POLITICO reported could be on the chopping block.', 'Other Trump-era additions were the W76-2 “low yield” warhead outfitted on submarines in 2019 and the B83 gravity bomb that was revived by the 2018 review after being slated for retirement.', 'A ‘wiser’ path:\xa0In addition to weapons, the GOP defense leaders also raised concerns that Biden could still decide to change U.S. policy on the role of nuclear weapons, including adopting a “no first use” policy or declaring that nuclear weapons are only to deter other nuclear weapons.', '“When reports surfaced that the Biden administration was considering departing from long-standing nuclear policies that have deterred major wars and the use of nuclear weapons for over seventy years,” the lawmakers said in their statement, “U.S. allies across the globe joined a bipartisan chorus in Congress to urge the administration to take a wiser, more measured path.”', '“It’s almost incomprehensible that even now,” they concluded, “in spite of mountains of evidence to the contrary, bipartisan congressional, allied and expert opposition, and a security environment that seems to get worse by the day, the Biden administration continues to look for opportunities to weaken the ultimate guarantee of our nation’s and our allies’ security.”', '', '']

[(6, 12), (13, 14), (22, 32)]

ndtceda

Emory-MiPi-Aff-5---Long-Beach-Round-1.docx

Emory

MiPi

324441fff91c9c4650b4d0cfc691432881dfaf21318a784d7cf1155e998d3730

‘Mythmaking’ fails without a blueprint.

Visoka, 19—Associate Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at Dublin City University (Gëzim, “Critique and Alternativity in International Relations,” International Studies Review, Volume 21, Issue 4, December 2019, 678-704, dml)

theory risks losing its ethical commitment knowledge may examine the causes but fall short of reaching out to the policy community missing the opportunity to transform the practices that reproduce violence critique should not only be problematizing dominant policies but also needs to envisage practical alternatives the lack of an explicit agenda limits their impact and validates the existing order alternativity has the potential to rejuvenate critical scholarship without being co-opted by the policy world. The challenge should be how alternatives make an impact

without tangible alternativity critical theory risks losing its normative impetus and its ethical and emancipatory commitment , potentially becoming a post - epistemological vocation without politics Critical knowledge without a dose of alternativity may examine the causes and consequences of subject matters but could fall short of reaching out to the wider policy community and the affected subjects where power relations reside missing the opportunity to transform the practices that reproduce violence , inequality, and injustice a conjunction between criticality and alternativity is possible Critique-without-alternative tends to avoid offering normative and practical alternatives to their critical reflections aimed at maintaining the conservative and radical impetus of critical theory and dissociating from problem-solving and policy-relevant methods of inquiry. This mode of critique refuses to offer any emancipatory and practical alternative critique should not only be directed toward problematizing dominant discourses, practices, and policies but also needs to envisage political and practical alternatives rooted in ideational and material elements the lack of an explicit emancipatory agenda limits their social and political impact and unintentionally validates the existing order critique-as-alternative have taken up the challenge of practical relevance Their main flaw has been their inability to elaborate sufficiently their practical and emancipatory alternatives promoting alternativity has the potential to rejuvenate critical scholarship embedded in the ethos of impactful engagement with the world without being co-opted by the policy world. The challenge for scholars should be how alternatives can make an impact in the real world

losing its normative impetus ethical emancipatory commitment without politics examine the causes consequences fall short missing the opportunity avoid dissociating refuses not only envisage political practical alternatives limits their social political impact unintentionally validates inability to elaborate sufficiently rejuvenate critical scholarship without being co-opted make an impact

['As a result, there is a growing realization that, without tangible alternativity, critical theory risks losing its normative impetus and its ethical and emancipatory commitment, potentially becoming a post-epistemological vocation without politics. Critical knowledge without a dose of alternativity may examine the causes and consequences of subject matters but could fall short of reaching out to the wider policy community and the affected subjects where power relations reside, thus missing the opportunity to transform the structural, discursive, and performative practices that reproduce violence, inequality, and injustice on human and nonhuman ecology. To bridge this epistemological gap, the analysis in the second part of this article examined how alternativity features in peace and conflict studies, a disciplinary field known for adding normative, empirical, and practical substance to critical IR debates. The analysis offered a conceptual scoping of three modes of critique and alternativity in peace and conflict studies. The three modes of critique showed that a conjunction between criticality and alternativity is possible and that it is necessary to renew the practical and emancipatory potential of critical theory in IR. The three modes of alternativity in peace and conflict studies expose a spectrum of different critiques, ranging from those perspectives that disengage completely from conceptual and empirical alternatives, to more pragmatic and prescriptive approaches.', 'Critique-without-alternative represents one strand, which tends to avoid offering normative and practical alternatives to their critical reflections aimed at maintaining the conservative and radical impetus of critical theory and dissociating from problem-solving and policy-relevant methods of inquiry. This mode of critique is committed to revealing the weaknesses of peacebuilding interventions but refuses to offer any emancipatory and practical alternative on how to build sustainable peace after violent conflict. If the end goal of critical perspectives is achieving emancipation, then critique should not only be directed toward problematizing dominant discourses, practices, and policies but also needs to envisage political and practical alternatives rooted in ideational and material elements. In turn, the lack of an explicit emancipatory agenda limits their social and political impact and unintentionally validates the existing order. In response to this challenge, a new mode of critique has emerged, namely, critique-as-alternative, which exemplifies the optimal approach. Proponents of critique-as-alternative have remained committee to critical analysis, but most importantly, they have taken up the challenge of offering emancipatory knowledge that has practical relevance for vulnerable societies in global politics. Their main flaw, however, has been their inability to elaborate sufficiently their practical and emancipatory alternatives—a flaw that has opened up space for epistemic contestation and policy co-optation. Finally, the third mode of critique—critique-with-alternative—which is embedded in a positivist, problem-solving, and policy-driven logic of inquiry, offers alternatives that seek either to verify existing knowledge and the existing interventionary order or to reject other critical alternatives.', "Looking at different modes of critique through the lens of alternativity in IR's subdiscipline of peace and conflict studies has provided interesting insights on the promise and limits of critical IR in shaping global politics. The analysis found that existing modes of critique have failed to develop elaborative emancipatory alternatives at both the conceptual and the practical levels. To infuse critique-with-alternative with emancipatory elements, expand the epistemological scope of critique-without-alternative, and operationalize further the practical solutions offered by this mode of critique, substantial changes are needed. This article has suggested exploring postparadigmatic approaches of inquiry in order to avoid existing epistemological entrapments and limitations, reclaiming the practical relevance of critical theory through pragmatic, reflexive, and situated alternatives—across the conceptual, normative, and empirical spectrums—and promoting decolonized, bottom-up methods of knowledge production. The existing modes of critique require pursuing more nonconflictual and postparadigmatic epistemologies, embracing situated knowledge and reclaiming and expanding its practical relevance, breaking away from geo-epistemological hierarchies, and opening up to post-Western IR. To conclude, promoting alternativity has the potential to rejuvenate critical scholarship embedded in the ethos of impactful engagement with the world without being co-opted by the policy world. The next challenge for scholars should not be whether alternativity and criticality are congruent but how emancipatory alternatives can renew the social and political purpose of critical theory and make an impact in the real world.", '']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Michigan-DoPh-Neg-Wake-Round-1.docx

Michigan

DoPh

7e046c94c3f8e11784dce1fd87ccf942a4dbfda6485bef9f2851ccfadf92e222

Ukraine fundamentally changed Chinese thinking. They no longer believe NFU.

Tong Zhao 23, Senior Fellow at the Nuclear Policy Program of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, based in Beijing at the Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, “Implications of Russia’s Nuclear Signaling During the Ukraine War for China’s Nuclear Policy,” 10/13/22, https://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/recna/bd/files/Tong-Zhao_SRno14_RECNA_20221013-rev.pdf

According to mainstream Chinese view Russian nuclear signaling worked Chinese strategists will incorporate tactics a country can achieve leverage of nuc s without crossing the threshold of use Chinese nuclear signaling could add ambiguity to NFU Changes in how China views utility of threatening could undercut NFU That China prepared to change use policy during crises will undermine any remaining confidence toward declaratory policy including Chinese NFU with other N W S

According to the mainstream Chinese view , Russian nuclear signaling has largely worked Putin’s nuclear signaling did make Western countries more cautious Chinese strategists have been closely watching the Russian practice of sending nuclear signals and will likely incorporate Russia’s tactics To Chinese observers, Russia achieved the coercive benefits of nuclear signaling without issuing an explicit threat This observation is likely to enhance China’s appreciation that a country can achieve the coercive leverage of nuc lear weapon s without crossing the threshold of explicitly threatening use This Chinese thinking on nuclear signaling could add further ambiguity and uncertainty to the interpretation and application of China's NFU Recent Russian signaling practices during the Ukraine war are likely to encourage further thinking Changes in how China views the utility of threatening nuclear weapons could undercut the reassuring value of NFU policy including in the Taiwan Strait That China may be prepared to change its nuclear use policy during crises is not a surprise , as the international community also watched Putin go beyond the narrow conditions specified in Russia’s official declaratory policy The impression that top leaders can change their nuclear policy at will during crises will undermine any remaining confidence that nuclear armed states have toward each other’s nuclear declaratory policy . This will make diplomatic efforts to reassure one’s rivals and build stable nuclear relations more difficult , including Chinese NFU with other N uclear W eapons S tates

mainstream Chinese view Russian largely worked did make Western countries more cautious Chinese strategists closely watching sending nuclear signals likely incorporate Russia’s tactics achieved the coercive benefits without explicit threat explicitly threatening use further ambiguity uncertainty NFU Russian signaling further thinking Changes China utility threatening nuclear weapons undercut reassuring value NFU policy including in the Taiwan Strait China change during crises not a surprise Putin beyond narrow conditions official impression top leaders change nuclear policy will crises undermine any remaining confidence that nuclear armed states have toward each other’s nuclear declaratory policy diplomatic efforts to reassure one’s rivals more difficult including Chinese NFU with other N uclear W eapons S tates

['According to the mainstream Chinese view, Russian nuclear signaling has largely worked. Putin’s nuclear signaling did make Western countries more cautious in providing military support to Ukraine and has been considered in debates on imposing crippling sanctions on Russia that may lead to regime instability. Chinese strategists have been closely watching the Russian practice of sending various nuclear signals and will likely incorporate some of Russia’s tactics into future Chinese nuclear signaling strategy, as Beijing has been referencing and learning from Moscow’s nuclear development and employment strategies for decades.', 'To Chinese observers, Russia achieved the coercive benefits of nuclear signaling without issuing an explicit threat to use nuclear weapons. None of the Russian signaling activities, including nuclear exercises, testing of nuclear-capable delivery systems, declaring the step to a higher alert status for its nuclear forces, and mentioning nuclear weapons in senior officials’ public statements, were overtly manifested in the form of an unambiguous threat of using nuclear weapons against a specific enemy. This observation is likely to enhance China’s appreciation that a country can achieve the coercive leverage of nuclear weapons without crossing the threshold of explicitly threatening nuclear use. Short of an unambiguous nuclear threat, there are many things a country can do or say to refer to nuclear weapons and implicitly threaten their use.', "This Chinese thinking on nuclear signaling could add further ambiguity and uncertainty to the interpretation and application of China's No First Use (NFU) policy. The NFU policy prohibits the first use of nuclear weapons by China but not the threat of first use of nuclear weapons in a conventional war, thus leaving “wiggle room” for China to maximize the coercive leverage of nuclear weapons without violating the letter of its NFU pledge. According to international scholars who have had access to authoritative Chinese military texts such as the Science of Second Artillery Campaigns written in the mid-2000s, the authors of those texts and those senior military officials who approved the texts already had the view at that time that to threaten nuclear use in a conventional war would not contradict China’s NFU policy.1 Recent Russian signaling practices during the Ukraine war are likely to encourage further thinking in this direction. Changes in how China views the utility of threatening to use nuclear weapons could undercut the reassuring value of the NFU policy and incentivize China to make more use of flexible nuclear signaling to capitalize the coercive leverage of nuclear weapons in future conventional conflicts, including in the Taiwan Strait. In this sense, the line between threat and non-threat of nuclear use will likely become blurrier.", 'In addition to the implicit indulgence of threatening first use of nuclear weapons, both the Science of Second Artillery Campaigns and writings by a former deputy commander of the Second Artillery were found by international scholars to include the operational concept of “Lowering the Nuclear Coercion Threshold”, which indicates that China gives itself the option to change its nuclear policy as announced in peacetime and to adopt, or make the appearance of adopting—a lower nuclear use threshold in a time of crisis if necessary.2 That China may be prepared to change its nuclear use policy during crises is not a surprise, as the international community also watched Putin make a general nuclear threat during his recent announcement of partial mobilization in Russia. The broad conditions under which Putin now threatens possible nuclear weapons use go beyond the relatively narrow conditions specified in Russia’s official nuclear declaratory policy. Putin has indicated that he could potentially use nuclear weapons in response to any threat to Russia’ territorial integrity, whereas the Russian official policy only allows nuclear use when Russia faces an “existential threat” as a country in a conventional war. The impression that top leaders can change their official nuclear policy at will during crises will likely undermine any remaining confidence that nuclear armed states have toward each other’s peacetime nuclear declaratory policy. This will make diplomatic efforts to reassure one’s rivals and build stable nuclear relations more difficult, including Chinese efforts to promote NFU with other Nuclear Weapons States.']

[(5, 12)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-BaCa-Neg-8---Texas-Round-5.docx

Dartmouth

BaCa

4aef62d174f0f00d42e67a52c713e8d03aaebb5248996b5453f9d67bb1d70c10

NFU doesn’t solve prolif.

Brad Roberts 19, Director of the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy in the U.S. Department of Defense, Ph.D. in International Relations from Erasmus University, “Debating Nuclear No-first-use, Again,” Survival, Vol. 61, No. 3, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2019.1614788

NFU impact on non-prolif would be modest and short-lived Obama took steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons the result a workaround to the NPT leadership cannot be achieved with palliatives Leadership requires a idealism and pragmatism. There is too much of the former and too little of the latter in the claim NFU would make a positive impact on non-prolif

while NFU would be welcomed by advocates of disarm ament its actual impact on non-prolif eration would be at best modest and short-lived . This follows the experience of the Obama administration, which took numerous steps to reduce the number and role of US nuclear weapons the actual practical result was the negotiation of a workaround to the NPT leadership of the global nuclear order cannot be achieved with palliatives like NFU . Leadership requires a blend of idealism and pragmatism. There is too much of the former and too little of the latter in the claim NFU adoption by the U nited S tates would make a positive impact on non-prolif eration and disarmament

advocates disarm actual impact non-prolif at best modest and short-lived actual practical result workaround to the NPT cannot be achieved with palliatives like NFU too much of the former too little of the latter U S non-prolif

['My own experience points me to the following conclusion: while NFU would be welcomed by the many advocates of more action on disarmament by the nuclear-armed states, its actual impact on non-proliferation and disarmament would be at best modest and short-lived. This assessment follows the experience of the Obama administration, which took numerous steps to reduce the number and role of US nuclear weapons, many of which had been recommended to it by NGO advocates. These helped to contribute to a successful Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference in 2010 (assuming the measure of success is the agreement of a final statement). But the actual practical result in the disarmament community was the negotiation of a workaround to the NPT – namely, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons – and the creation of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, which aims to pressure and shame the democracies in reaction to their supposed bad faith in negotiating the elimination of nuclear weapons.', 'In my view, leadership of the global nuclear order cannot be achieved with palliatives like NFU. Leadership requires a proper blend of idealism and pragmatism. There is too much of the former and too little of the latter in the claim that NFU adoption by the United States would make a positive impact on non-proliferation and disarmament.']

[(5, 15)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-BiSl-Neg-Wayne-State-Round-2.docx

Kentucky

BiSl

3793a4f8178fa48aeb4bd0a15baa8ea6fd1e38845408beec361831bb41ad9a26

3. Survivalism is compatible with pessimism---weighing the ethical implication of nukes doesn’t efface structural violence, but imagines existence “in spite of” hopelessness.

Stevens 18—Lecturer in Global Security, King’s College London (Tim, “Exeunt Omnes? Survival, Pessimism and Time in the Work of John H. Herz,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 283-302, dml) [ableist language modifications denoted by brackets]

imagine futures with survival whilst imagining futures in which humans become extinct pessimism did not preclude the former in nuclear geopolitics researchers raise awareness of survival in policy-makers and public link inaction and survival scholars should think the worst to establish livable world ’ this is ‘the first time ’ futurism is ensuring survival the future’ was not liberal progress nuclear weapons characterised uncertainties it was impossible to draw cyclical and linear time pessimism can produce positive outcomes through action , rather than negative ones through inaction Survival was a response to pessimism not rejection pessimism was no fatalism ’ always end analyses with in spite of it all This seems not to be hope but engender the ontological temporality of perpetual change .

implicit recognition of an open yet linear temporality allowed him to imagine possible futures aligned with the survival ethic, whilst at the same time imagining futures in which humans become extinct pessimism about the latter did not preclude working towards the former . it was one thing to develop an ethics of survival but quite another to translate theory into practice . What was required was a collective , transnational and inherently interdisciplinary effort to address nuclear issues and to problematize notions of security in the context of nuclear geopolitics The principal responsibilities of researchers were two-fold. One, to raise awareness of survival issues in the minds of policy-makers and the public , and to demonstrate the link between political inaction now and its effect on subsequent human survival . Two, to suggest and shape new attitudes more ‘appropriate to the solution of new and unfamiliar survival problems’, rather than relying on ingrained modes of thought and practice ‘In our age of global survival concerns, it should be the primary responsibility of scholars to engage in survival issues’ IR should not be afraid to think the worst , if the worst is at all possible, and to establish the various requirements of ‘a livable world ’ . Of significance here is not the appeal to futurism per se but the suggestion this is ‘the first time ’ futurism is necessary to ensuring human survival . This is not bound to a cyclical vision of political or historical time in which events and processes reoccur over and again identification of nuclear weapons demonstrates this belief in the non-cyclical nature of humankind’s unfolding temporality ‘the horizons of meaning it produced installed a temporal break with the past, and simultaneously carried a promise for the future ’ This ‘promise for the future’ was not , however, a simple liberal view of a better future consonant with human progress experiences of Nazism and the Holocaust destroyed all remnants of any original belief in ‘ inevitable progress ’ frustration at scientism, technocratic deception, and the brutal rationality of twentieth-century killing, all but demanded a rejection of the liberal dream and the inevitability of its consummation . If the ‘new age’ ushered in by nuclear weapons is characterised by anything, it is by its ‘ indefiniteness of the age and the uncertainties of the future ’; it was impossible under these conditions to draw firm conclusions about the future course of international politics both cyclical and linear -progressive ways of perceiving historical time each marginalises and diminishes the contingency of the social world in and through time, and the agency of political actors in effecting change each shapes the futures that may be imagined and brought into being without care and attention, ‘the assumption may determine the event ’ the difference between ‘ deterministic pessimism ’ and realists the latter may be pessimists but they still believe ‘human affairs can be directed and modified by human action and human thought’ the possibility of agency is a product of a temporality ‘neither temporally closed nor deterministic , neither cyclical nor linear-progressive ; it is rooted in contingency ’ a realistic and consistent pessimism can clarify where we are and prepare us to do what is necessary Pessimism is a necessary component of a realistic view of the world, upon which proper and reasoned action can be founded pessimism can be productive . It produce s positive outcomes through action , rather than negative ones through inaction or resignation . These are subjective value-judgements but are obtained through a process of realist engagement with the world , rather than [mere] fumbling or ideological railroading Survival was a response to pessimism about the future, not a rejection of it pessimism does not imply disengagement from the world pessimism was no ‘ passive fatalism ’ Pessimism can be a spur to thought and to action and need not be a watchword for conservatism in theory or practice pessimism required that scholars chart different paths through troublesome times and articulate alternative visions of international order, not to preclude political action but to facilitate it In the face of worldly frustrations and horrors, it is this attention to the production of alternative futures that prevents ‘pessimism from turning into fatalism ’ it is unhelpful and misleading to treat pessimism and optimism as oppositional they mingle and cross-pollinate in ways that defy easy explication optimism about how the world could be refashioned ‘was never more than guarded ’ Even as pessimism deepened always end analyses with a ‘ yet ’ or ‘ in spite of it all ’ growing pessimism was accompanied by increasing resolve to tackle the problems of the world head-on This drive seems not to be rooted in optimistic conviction , nor even a subtle version of hope , but in a properly pessimistic reading of the world and its possibilities, engender ed as they were by the ontological temporality of perpetual change .

open linear temporality imagine possible futures survival at the same time imagining futures in which humans become extinct pessimism did not preclude translate theory into practice collective transnational inherently interdisciplinary effort nuclear issues nuclear geopolitics principal responsibilities researchers raise awareness policy-makers public demonstrate the link between political inaction now subsequent human survival suggest shape new attitudes relying on ingrained modes of thought practice primary responsibility of scholars should not be afraid to think the worst establish the various requirements livable world not the appeal to futurism per se first time necessary to ensuring human survival not bound to a cyclical vision non-cyclical nature of humankind’s unfolding temporality temporal break promise for the future not simple liberal view better future consonant with human progress Nazism Holocaust inevitable progress demanded a rejection liberal dream inevitability of its consummation indefiniteness of the age uncertainties of the future impossible draw firm conclusions cyclical linear -progressive ways marginalises diminishes agency of political actors shapes the futures that may be imagined brought into being assumption may determine the event deterministic pessimism realists may be pessimists directed modified possibility of agency temporally closed deterministic cyclical linear-progressive rooted in contingency realistic consistent pessimism necessary component proper reasoned action can be founded productive produce s positive outcomes through action negative ones through inaction resignation subjective value-judgements process of realist engagement with the world fumbling ideological railroading response to pessimism not a rejection of it does not imply disengagement passive fatalism spur to thought action need not be a watchword for conservatism chart different paths articulate alternative visions preclude political action facilitate it attention to the production of alternative futures turning into fatalism unhelpful and misleading oppositional mingle cross-pollinate never more than guarded always end analyses yet in spite of it all tackle the problems of the world head-on optimistic conviction subtle version of hope properly pessimistic reading ontological temporality of perpetual change

['Herz explicitly combined, therefore, a political realism with an ethical idealism, resulting in what he termed a ‘survival ethic’.65 This was applicable to all humankind and its propagation relied on the generation of what he termed ‘world-consciousness’.66 Herz’s implicit recognition of an open yet linear temporality allowed him to imagine possible futures aligned with the survival ethic, whilst at the same time imagining futures in which humans become extinct. His pessimism about the latter did not preclude working towards the former. As Herz recognised, it was one thing to develop an ethics of survival but quite another to translate theory into practice. What was required was a collective, transnational and inherently interdisciplinary effort to address nuclear and environmental issues and to problematize notions of security, sustainability and survival in the context of nuclear geopolitics and the technological transformation of society. Herz proposed various practical ways in which young people in particular could become involved in this project. One idea floated in the 1980s, which would alarm many in today’s more cosmopolitan and culturally-sensitive IR, was for a Peace Corps-style ‘peace and development service’, which would ‘crusade’ to provide ‘something beneficial for people living under unspeakably sordid conditions’ in the ‘Third World’.67 He expended most of his energy, however, from the 1980s onwards, in thinking about and formulating ‘a new subdiscipline of the social sciences’, which he called ‘Survival Research’.68 Informed by the survival ethic outlined above, and within the overarching framework of his realist liberal internationalism, Survival Research emerged as Herz’s solution to the shortcomings of academic research, public education and policy development in the face of global catastrophe.69 It was also Herz’s plea to scholars to venture beyond the ivory tower and become – excusing the gendered language of the time – ‘homme engagé, if not homme révolté’.70 His proposals for Survival Research were far from systematic but they reiterated his life-long concerns with nuclear and environmental issues, and with the necessity to act in the face of threats to human survival. The principal responsibilities of survival researchers were two-fold. One, to raise awareness of survival issues in the minds of policy-makers and the public, and to demonstrate the link between political inaction now and its effect on subsequent human survival. Two, to suggest and shape new attitudes more ‘appropriate to the solution of new and unfamiliar survival problems’, rather than relying on ingrained modes of thought and practice.71 The primary initial purpose, therefore, of Survival Research would be to identify scientific, sociocultural and political problems bearing on the possibilities of survival, and to begin to develop ways of overcoming these. This was, admittedly, non-specific and somewhat vague, but the central thrust of his proposal was clear: ‘In our age of global survival concerns, it should be the primary responsibility of scholars to engage in survival issues’.72 Herz considered IR an essential disciplinary contributor to this endeavour, one that should be promiscuous across the social and natural sciences. It should not be afraid to think the worst, if the worst is at all possible, and to establish the various requirements – social, economic, political – of ‘a livable world’.73 How this long-term project would translate into global policy is not specified but, consistent with his previous work, Herz identified the need for shifts in attitudes to and awareness of global problems and solutions. Only then would it be possible for ‘a turn round that demands leadership to persuade millions to change lifestyles and make the sacrifices needed for survival’.74 Productive pessimism and temporality In 1976, shortly before he began compiling the ideas that would become Survival Research, Herz wrote: For the first time, we are compelled to take the futuristic view if we want to make sure that there will be future generations at all. Acceleration of developments in the decisive areas (demographic, ecological, strategic) has become so strong that even the egotism of après nous le déluge might not work because the déluge may well overtake ourselves, the living.75 Of significance here is not the appeal to futurism per se, although this is important, but the suggestion this is ‘the first time’ futurism is necessary to ensuring human survival. This is Herz the realist declaring a break with conventional realism: Herz is not bound to a cyclical vision of political or historical time in which events and processes reoccur over and again. His identification of nuclear weapons as an ‘absolute novum’ in international politics demonstrates this belief in the non-cyclical nature of humankind’s unfolding temporality.76 As Sylvest observes of Herz’s attitude to the nuclear revolution, ‘the horizons of meaning it produced installed a temporal break with the past, and simultaneously carried a promise for the future’.77 This ‘promise for the future’ was not, however, a simple liberal view of a better future consonant with human progress. His autobiography is clear that his experiences of Nazism and the Holocaust destroyed all remnants of any original belief in ‘inevitable progress’.78 His frustration at scientism, technocratic deception, and the brutal rationality of twentieth-century killing, all but demanded a rejection of the liberal dream and the inevitability of its consummation. If the ‘new age’ ushered in by nuclear weapons, he wrote, is characterised by anything, it is by its ‘indefiniteness of the age and the uncertainties of the future’; it was impossible under these conditions to draw firm conclusions about the future course of international politics.79 Instead, he recognised the contingency, precarity and fragility of international politics, and the ghastly tensions inherent to the structural core of international politics, the security dilemma.80 Herz was uneasy with both cyclical and linear-progressive ways of perceiving historical time. The former ‘closed’ temporalities are endemic to versions of realist IR, the latter to post-Enlightenment narratives feeding liberal-utopian visions of international relations and those of Marxism.81 In their own ways, each marginalises and diminishes the contingency of the social world in and through time, and the agency of political actors in effecting change. Simultaneously, each shapes the futures that may be imagined and brought into being. Herz recognised this danger. Whilst drawing attention to his own gloomy disposition, he warns that without care and attention, ‘the assumption may determine the event’.82 As a pessimist, Herz was alert to the hazard of succumbing to negativity, cynicism or resignation. E.H. Carr recognised this also, in the difference between the ‘deterministic pessimism’ of ‘pure’ realism and those realists ‘who have made their mark on history’; the latter may be pessimists but they still believe ‘human affairs can be directed and modified by human action and human thought’.83 Herz would share this anti-deterministic perspective with Carr. Moreover, the possibility of agency is a product of a temporality ‘neither temporally closed nor deterministic, neither cyclical nor linear-progressive; it is rooted in contingency’.84 Again quoting from his autobiographical account of the impact of Nazism, Herz described the relationship between his early pessimism and his developing intellectual stance: The world became a theatre of the absurd. Suicide would probably have been the logical next move, and I considered it from time to time. But I was still too young for such a radical step. One thing, however, emerged: a growing interest in domestic and, above all, international politics. My complete resignation was no longer appropriate. If not from within, fascism might perhaps still be destroyed from without. To my continuing interest in theory, therefore, was added a practical interest in action.85 Channelling the spirit of E.H. Carr, he wrote of this ‘brutal awakening’ to the nature of power politics in the 1930s that, ‘Study could no longer be “pure” research; it had to become research committed to warn of the deadly peril and show the way to the necessary action.’86 His commitment to active engagement was an early one, gestated during his personal experiences of Nazism in the 1930s.87 This desire to combat Nazism from the outside was manifest in his activities for the Allies during and after World War II but it coloured his scholarly life also. Herz recognised pessimism was a powerful force in his life but, rather than overcome or mask it, he used it to propel his intellectual project further, and to engage with, not withdraw from, the world. He was, as van Munster and Sylvest relate, ‘[d]eeply pessimistic yet a committed social thinker’.88 Herz was explicit about this: a realistic and consistent pessimism can clarify where we are and prepare us to do what is necessary.89 Pessimism is a necessary component of a realistic view of the world, upon which proper and reasoned action can be founded. In this sense, pessimism can be productive. It produces positive outcomes through action, rather than negative ones through inaction or resignation. These are subjective value-judgements, to be sure, but are obtained through a process of realist engagement with the world, rather than blind [mere] fumbling or ideological railroading. Survival Research was a response to Herz’s pessimism about the future, not a rejection of it. This leads us to two observations about the relevance of pessimism to the study of international relations. The first is that pessimism does not imply disengagement from the world. If anything, the example of John Herz suggests the opposite. He was a pessimist, but his brand of pessimism was no ‘passive fatalism’.90 As he recalled a few years before he died, ‘I consider myself a realist who comes sometimes to pessimistic conclusions, but never gives up looking for solutions if ever so difficult ones’.91 Pessimism can be a spur to thought and to action and need not be a watchword for conservatism in theory or practice.92 This is not to say being a pessimist is easy. Morgenthau, for his part, ‘never flagged in efforts to use his conceptual skills to help improve the human condition’, despite his pessimism about the ability and will of people to take the long view on significant political issues.93 This required that scholars chart different paths through troublesome times and articulate alternative visions of international order, not to preclude political action but to facilitate it; not quite the conservative position realism is often assumed to occupy.94 In the face of worldly frustrations and horrors, it is this attention to the production of alternative futures that prevents ‘pessimism from turning into fatalism’.95 The second observation is that it is unhelpful and misleading to treat pessimism and optimism as oppositional.96 Pessimism and optimism are commonly regarded as antonyms but often enjoy a symbiotic relationship. In Herz, they mingle and cross-pollinate in ways that defy easy explication. Stirk claims, for instance, that Herz’s optimism about how the world could be refashioned ‘was never more than guarded’, restrained by his fierce attachment to the importance of the security dilemma.97 Puglierin notes that his ‘blatant pessimism’ (eklatanter Pessimismus) was always accompanied by some form of optimism.98 We are reminded of Gramsci’s famous statement regarding ‘pessimism of intellect, optimism of the will’ as the cognitive binary at work in the political mind.99 Even as his pessimism deepened over the course of his career, he was always wont to end his analyses with a ‘yet’ or ‘in spite of it all’.100 Importantly, as he became more pessimistic, ‘the solutions he proposed became ever more ambitious’.101 His growing pessimism was accompanied by increasing resolve to tackle the problems of the world head-on, although, as he admitted in a footnote in the 1980s, ‘Not for a moment do I have the illusion that what I have proposed is likely to happen’.102 A suitably pessimistic aside, perhaps, but it did not deter him from continuing his project for another twenty years. This drive seems not to be rooted in optimistic conviction, nor even a subtle version of hope, but in a properly pessimistic reading of the world and its possibilities, engendered as they were by the ontological temporality of perpetual change.', '']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Emory-GaHe-Aff-NDT-Round-3.docx

Emory

GaHe

e375e32d8f586d504ff94bdce7247415138bf65f0c75f53741b47fb529c06663

Affect theory is wrong.

Emily Martin 13, professor of socio-cultural anthropology at New York University, “The Potentiality of Ethnography and the Limits of Affect Theory,” Current Anthropology 54(S7), Stras

psychological ev that is the basis of affect theory is questionable out of date theorists misread research No doubt the brain is necessary for thought But theorists place too much weight on experimental evidence studies show evidence is open to contrary interpretations before drawing far-reaching conclusions , one would consider experimental structures that generate data

the psychological ev idence that is the basis for the tenets of affect theory is questionable and out of date affect theorists misread biological and psychological research No one would doubt the brain is necessary for thought and action. But affect theorists place too much weight on experimental evidence studies show evidence is open to contrary interpretations before drawing such far-reaching conclusions , one would would consider the experimental structures that generate psychological data

the basis for the tenets questionable and out of date misread doubt necessary too much weight contrary interpretations such far-reaching conclusions experimental structures

["There are many points at which this argument can be criticized.[ 9] Some critics have shown in detail how the psychological evidence that is the basis for the tenets of affect theory is questionable and out of date (Leys [25]). Others have detailed the ways affect theorists sometimes misread biological and psychological research (Papoulias and Callard [36]). For example, in a 1985 experiment by Benjamin Libet, subjects were asked to decide to flex a finger at will and to note the exact time they made the decision. The experimenters also measured the exact time of any rise in the subject's brain activity and the exact time of the subject's finger flexing. The results showed that there was a 0.2-second delay between the brain's activity spike and the subject's decision, then a 0.3-second delay between the subject's decision and his finger flexing. In all, there seemed to be a half-second delay between the subject's brain's initial activity and the subject's finger actually flexing (Libet [27]). This half-second gap provides Massumi ([30]:29) with the evidence of a gap between (lower) brain activity and (higher) decision, intentionality and action. He concludes that material processes of the brain generate our thoughts; conscious thoughts, decisions, and intentions come too late to be very significant. At most they are reflections after the fact. No one would doubt that the brain is necessary for thought and action. But Massumi and other affect theorists place too much weight on this experimental evidence. Other studies have shown that Libet's evidence is open to contrary interpretations from its publication in 1985 up until the present (Banks and Isham [ 2], [ 3]; Gomes [17]). At the very least, before drawing such far-reaching conclusions, one would hope scholars of cultural phenomena would consider the experimental structures that generate psychological data. As I noted earlier, the psychological subject becomes a particular kind of stripped down entity, a data-emitting being whose subjective experience is outside the frame of the experiment. Perhaps this is not the most adequate model for understanding human intentionality."]

[(6, 15)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-PaCh-Aff-Georgetown-Round-5.docx

Northwestern

PaCh

ba49dca3c157e31d406d26c357d039c61438a607db10083436007d9e45474735

Chinese emissions are an alt cause and they won’t cooperate with the US.

Larson & Knickmeyer ’21 [Christina. Global Science & Environment Correspondent for the Associated Press. Ellen. Associated Press Correspondent, former Bureau Chief. “US-China tensions threaten global climate change efforts”. 3/4/21. ]

hopes for curbing climate change are deteriorating China U S tensions threaten their success China and the U S pump out half of the fumes warming the atmosphere cuts needed are impossible unless countries work together the U.S. used China’s emissions and China pointed to U.S. emissions to resist action Kerry and Zhenhua face new challenges climate diplomacy threatens to be overshadowed by Hong Kong, Taiwan the S C S conflict over h r trade, and claims of espionage Chinese officials are upset about declaration that atrocities against Muslim minorities are “genocide.” Kerry called the climate “a standalone issue” drawing criticism from China

The world’s hopes for curbing climate change are deteriorating China U S say they are intent on retooling their economies to burn less coal, oil and gas But tensions threaten their success China and the U S are the world’s No. 1 and 2 polluters pump ing out half of the fumes warming the atmosphere The cuts in carbon needed are impossible unless these countries work together the U.S. used China’s emissions as an excuse not to act, and China pointed to U.S. emissions to resist action Kerry and Xie Zhenhua face new challenges U.S.-China climate diplomacy threatens to be overshadowed by Hong Kong, Taiwan and the S C S , conflict over h uman r ights and trade, and claims of espionage Chinese officials are upset about restrictions on trade, tech , Chinese media and students in the U.S., and declaration that atrocities against Muslim minorities are “genocide.” Kerry told reporters: “Those issues” “will never be traded for climate. ” Kerry called the climate “a standalone issue” drawing criticism from China

deteriorating impossible work together criticism from China

['WASHINGTON (AP) — The world’s hopes for curbing climate change hinge on action by two giant nations whose relations are deteriorating: China and the United States. The two countries both say they are intent on retooling their economies to burn less climate-wrecking coal, oil and gas. But tensions between them threaten their ultimate success.', 'China and the United States are the world’s No. 1 and No. 2 carbon polluters, respectively, pumping out nearly half of the fossil fuel fumes that are warming the planet’s atmosphere.', 'The fast cuts in carbon needed to stave off the worst of climate change are all but impossible unless these countries work together and basically trust each other’s pledges. During the Trump administration, the U.S. used China’s emissions as an excuse not to act, and in the past China pointed to U.S. historical emissions as a reason to resist action.', 'New details of how quickly China plans to reduce carbon emissions will be revealed Friday when Beijing releases its next Five Year Plan. And in April, President Joe Biden is expected to announce the United States’ own new targets for emissions cuts.', 'The U.S. and China both have appointed veteran envoys as their global climate negotiators, John Kerry and Xie Zhenhua. But while the two senior statesmen worked well together in laying groundwork for the 2015 Paris climate accord, now they face new challenges.', 'U.S.-China climate diplomacy threatens to be overshadowed by what the United States sees as Beijing’s menacing policies toward Hong Kong, Taiwan and the South China Sea, conflict over human rights and trade, and U.S. claims of Chinese espionage.', 'Meanwhile, Chinese officials are upset about restrictions imposed by the Trump administration on trade, technology, Chinese media and students in the U.S., and the State Department’s declaration this year that atrocities against China’s Muslim minorities are a “genocide.”', 'Kerry, a secretary of state under President Barack Obama who was brought back to be Biden’s climate envoy, recently told reporters: “Those issues” with China “will never be traded for anything that has to do with climate. That’s not going to happen.” But Kerry also called the climate “a standalone issue” with China, drawing criticism from China and from some human-rights advocates in the U.S.']

[(0, 23)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-VaWa-Neg-Texas-Round-1.docx

Dartmouth

VaWa

e1bb4a9eb8ee489b8cd4a6927c7729c8e9481a8be3d38795f77f54e515bed0c0

Disarm requires 100% universal global buy-in to intrusive verification regimes, which will never happen

George Perkovich 9, vice president for studies and director of the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and James M. Acton, associate in the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009, “Introduction,” in Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, ed. Perkovich & Acton, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/abolishing_nuclear_weapons_debate.pdf

global diffusion of tech and know-how threatens to overwhelm neither non-prolif nor abolition can be achieved without active cooperation of non-nuclear states abolition require much more than dismantling to enable detection of rearmament , all states that possess reactors enrichment reprocessing even transshipment ports have to accept intrusive inspection all states need to enforce rules with greater robustness than historically normal nonnuclear states felt these issues too low among priorities to debate with nuclear states There is little substantive give-and-take

need for non-nuclear states to join a debate over details of disarmament is great global diffusion of tech nology and know-how to produce fissile materials threatens to overwhelm the existing regime Fear of nuclear proliferation is motivating some nuclear states to take nuclear disarmament more seriously but neither non-prolif eration nor the abolition of nuclear weapons can be achieved without the active cooperation of non-nuclear -weapons states . Nuclear abolition would require much more than the dismantling of all nuclear weapons in the nine states that now possess them. To make abolition feasible and to enable detection of rearmament , all states that possess nuclear reactors , uranium- enrichment plants , plutonium- reprocessing facilities , uranium reserves or even transshipment ports would have to accept more intrusive control measures and inspection procedures than they do today. To build confidence an agreement to prohibit nuclear weapons would be enforced, all states would need to demonstrate a willingness to enforce international rules with greater alacrity and robustness than has been historically normal experts in nonnuclear - weapons states felt these issues were too low among their national priorities for them to be able to fruitfully debate them with nuclear -weapons states There is little substantive give-and-take on disarmament issues between informed citizens and officials from nuclear-weapons states and many non-nuclear-weapons states

details of disarmament global diffusion tech neither non-prolif eration nor the abolition achieved without the active cooperation much more than the dismantling of all nuclear weapons feasible enable detection of rearmament all states reactors enrichment plants reprocessing facilities even transshipment ports all states too low among their national priorities

['The need for non-nuclear-weapons states to join a debate over the details of nuclear disarmament is great. The global diffusion of the technology and know-how to produce fissile materials threatens to overwhelm the existing regime to prevent the ‘diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons’.6 Fear of nuclear proliferation is motivating some nuclear-weapons states to take nuclear disarmament more seriously, 7 but neither non-proliferation nor the abolition of nuclear weapons can be achieved without the active cooperation of non-nuclear-weapons states. Nuclear abolition would require much more than the dismantling of all nuclear weapons in the nine states that now possess them. To make abolition feasible and to enable the detection of rearmament, all states that possess nuclear reactors, uranium-enrichment plants, plutonium-reprocessing facilities, uranium reserves or even transshipment ports would have to accept more intrusive control measures and inspection procedures than they do today. To build confidence that an agreement to prohibit nuclear weapons would be enforced, all states would need to demonstrate a willingness to enforce international rules with greater alacrity and robustness than has been historically normal.', 'Discussions of this paper’s early drafts suggested that experts in nonnuclear- weapons states felt at times insufficiently informed on technical details and/or that these issues were too low among their national priorities for them to be able to fruitfully debate them with their counterparts in nuclear-weapons states. Some nuclear-weapons-state officials appear happy to reinforce such feelings. What ensues, then, is (often heated) debate between factions within states that possess nuclear weapons over what types of inspection protocol would be necessary to verify nuclear disarmament, or whether the permanent members of the UN Security Council would retain veto rights in a world without nuclear weapons. Frequently these debates are limited to the US, the UK and, to a lesser extent, India, as nuclear policy is not a major subject for discussion in France (where there is not much public interest in the subject), and information is tightly controlled in Russia, China, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea. There is little substantive give-and-take on disarmament issues between informed citizens and officials from nuclear-weapons states and many non-nuclear-weapons states, whether the topic is, for instance, how to guarantee the supply of nuclear fuel to actors that forgo indigenous uranium enrichment, or how to deter cheating in a nuclear-weapons-free world.']

[(7, 16), (17, 18), (156, 161)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-ChDe-Neg-ADA-Nationals-at-Indiana-University-Doubles.docx

Northwestern

ChDe

7156e9158871c793c5e93fdacedb52c8fc3dbb8466933b491ab584041dd82f27

The CP modifies the ECFR to include personhood---that spills over to supranational emulation, including the US, AND independently shores up tech leadership.

Atik ’21 [Jeffrey and Xavier Groussot; 2021; Professor of Law and Jacob Becker Fellow at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles, Guest Professor in Civil Law at Lund University; Professor of EU Law at Lund University; Nordic Journal of European Law, “A Weaponized Court of Justice in Schrems II,” vol. 2]

data made clear the EU’s intent to subject America to rules the CJEU played a role in shaping Personhood within the U S no doubt the CJEU is respected enjoys status of a world articulator and propel the order of the E U This concession driven by realities of power of European choices EU law set standard worldwide in data and a i The ‘Brussels Effect’ reveals power to influence corporations and set rules acting ‘ unilaterally the U S work toward eliminating conflicts and harmonization As alternative , the EU and U S elevate global instrument . A cooperative standard would attract countries the initiative is understood to be a proposal , to be accepted The next move would be the U S to enact legislation The first-mover yield benefits the EU occupied and set standard for all states follow

The ‘ export ’ of personal data made clear the EU’s intent ion to subject America n digital giants to EU rules the CJEU has played a major role in shaping data protection in Legal Personhood in E uropean P rivacy P rotection GDPR expressly directs an effectiveness evaluation of the rule of law within the U nited S tates There can be no doubt that the CJEU is an authorized and respected juridical voice in contributing meaning to these categories of legal norms . It is precisely because the CJEU enjoys the status of a world -class articulator of these norms that it enjoys discretion in its application of these norms and thus propel ling the legal order of the E uropean U nion There may be a Trans-Atlantic view that deserves recognition This concession may have been driven more by the realities of power (think Brussels Effect ) of the European policy choices EU law made in Brussels can set the legal standard of protection worldwide in many law fields such as data privacy and a rtificial i ntelligence. The ‘Brussels Effect’ reveals the EU’s unique power to influence global corporations and set the rules of the game while acting alone what she calls a ‘ unilaterally regulatory globalization ’. EU law, due to its regulatory and legal strength , acts here as a soft power The field describing the application of law to regulate the conduct of a legal person The ‘ no true conflict ’ scenario includes the frequent situation where one state proscribes behaviour that the other state does not address There are a variety of cooperative techniques available to the EU and the U nited S tates to resolve the GDPR conflict. Notwithstanding Europe’s assertion of a first-mover advantage in the field of the protection of personal data rights, the U nited S tates and Europe could work toward eliminating conflicts and inconsistencies in this area. This might take the form of harmonization As a formal alternative , the EU and the U nited S tates could have elevate d the protection of personal data to a global instrument . A cooperative promotion of a global standard based on a common EU-U.S. position with regard to the protection of personal data would likely attract the adhesion of many other countries the first initiative in a particular regulatory space is understood to be a functional proposal , to be accepted , rejected or amended The next move would be for the U nited S tates to enact legislation adopted some or all of the GDPR with any remaining conflict eliminated through a process of reconciliation The first-mover advantage can yield enduring benefits to the state that occupies a vacant regulatory space that touches multiple jurisdictions. Having enacted GDPR earlier than any other data privacy regime, the EU both occupied the field and set the standard for all states which follow

export made clear EU’s intent ion America EU rules CJEU major role shaping Legal Personhood E P P directs effectiveness evaluation within U S no doubt authorized respected juridical voice legal norms status world -class articulator discretion propel ling legal order E U Trans-Atlantic view recognition concession realities of power Brussels Effect European policy choices EU law legal standard worldwide law fields data privacy a i EU’s unique power global corporations rules of the game unilaterally regulatory globalization regulatory legal strength soft power application legal person no true conflict frequent situation proscribes not address variety cooperative techniques EU U S Europe’s assertion first-mover advantage U S Europe eliminating conflicts inconsistencies harmonization alternative EU U S elevate global instrument cooperative global standard EU-U.S. position attract the adhesion other countries first initiative functional proposal next move U S enact legislation first-mover enduring benefits vacant regulatory space occupied the field set the standard all states

['It has been a relentless feature of extraterritoriality conflicts that the offending party asserts serious internal effects of external behaviour that justify reach. And so it has been the case with the Europeans in justifying the reach of the GDPR. The entry into effect of the GDPR had been well anticipated by both American and European interests. The somewhat sophist notion of ‘export’ of personal data made clear the EU’s intention to subject American digital giants to EU rules. Yet hard-wired into the GDPR was a mechanism to relieve some of the inevitable pressure: the GDPR, by its terms, exempted from the ‘export’ prohibition any data processing that occurred in countries with data protections ‘equivalent’ to those found in the GDPR.13', '2.2 Identifying Discretion Within Schrems II – Internal View', 'We begin with a brief recapitulation of the internal view of the Schrems II decision - that is, an account that would be adopted by an EU constitutional lawyer. We look at the sources of law utilized by the CJEU and at the Court’s exercise of authority in reaching its judgment. We will stipulate that the Court reached a ‘correct’ decision when viewed from this internal perspective. There is little to gain from contesting the Court’s judgment as a matter of EU law. Rather we will explore whether there existed a range of alternative determinations that the Court could have reached that would have avoided the resultant trans-Atlantic conflict. That is, we will describe (as well as we are able) the field of discretion open to the Court. We conclude – regardless of the correctness of the CJEU’s judgment as a matter of EU law – the Court was not compelled to rule as it did and so could have adopted a more conciliatory stance. ', 'The terms of the regulation - the GDPR - are of course binding on the Court. Absent conflict between the GDPR and some higher order EU law (such as a conflicting treaty norm), the Court is obliged to give effect to GDPR’s terms. Processing of personal data requires either consent14 or compliance with GDPR provisions. Any data transfer - internal or export - must comply with the terms of GDPR Article 6. 15 Some transfers must comply with the stricter requirements of GDPR Article 9.', 'But the relevant term underlying the Court’s holding striking down the Privacy Shield arrangements with the United States in Schrems II involves the ‘adequacy’ determination found in GDPR Article 45. 16 Article 45(1) provides:', 'A transfer of personal data to a third country or an international organisation may take place where the Commission has decided that the third country, a territory or one or more specified sectors within that third country, or the international organisation in question ensures an adequate level of protection. Such a transfer shall not require any specific authorisation.', 'GDPR further outlines both substantive and procedural considerations that underlie any adequacy determination. Among the examined substantive features of the export country’s legal system (here, the U.S. legal system) are its adherence to the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as any counterpart legislation, regulation or case-law. Among the procedural considerations is the existence of ‘independent supervisory authorities’ 17 charged with enforcing data privacy rules', 'Again, our project in this section is to discuss zones of discretion available to the CJEU. The first involves the review the Court was compelled to apply to an extant determination by the Commission that the United States did satisfy the ‘adequate level of protection’ required by GDPR Article 45. It is beyond the scope of this essay to take a deep dive into the deference the Court could or should afford a Commission action either generally or in this specific instance. 18 But we imagine that the Court had a sound legal basis - had it chosen to do so - to limit its review of the Commission’s adequacy decision.', 'Further, on a searching review of the Commission’s action, the Court faced terms endowed with substantial ambiguity, which created opportunity for the authoritative interpreter (here the Court). The Court was free to give meaning to terms such as ‘adequate’ or ‘independent’ (with regard to the third country supervisory authorities) as it saw fit - and in so doing effect the resultant consequences of the Court’s (as opposed to the Commission’s) meaning.', 'But more than the resolution of ambiguity is demanded with regard to the adequacy decision of the Commission. The adequacy decision is a process and leads to a result. When the Court reviews the adequacy decision of the Commission, it goes beyond mere interpretation of a legislative term.', 'We further note the sources available (and utilized) by the CJEU in reaching its judgment in Schrems II. In addition to the provisions of Schrems II, the Court had direct access to treaty provisions, Charter provisions, and general principles in its review - and indirect access (as general principles) to the wider corpus of ultra-Charter international human rights law.19 This approach is common not only to the recent case law of the CJEU on the GDPR20 but also to the whole approach of the CJEU in the cases concerning digitalization in the processing of personal data such as Privacy International21 and La Quadrature du Net. 22 This also confirms the view that the CJEU has played a major role in shaping data protection in to a proper fundamental right.23 <<FOOTNOTE 23>> Susanna Lindroos-Hovinheimo, Private Selves: Legal Personhood in European Privacy Protection (CUP 2021), 11. <<FOOTNOTE 23 ENDS>> Moreover, GDPR Article 45 expressly directs an effectiveness evaluation of the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedom within the United States.24', 'The demands of the ‘rule of law’ or ‘human rights’ or ‘fundamental freedom’ are fluid, to say the least.25 There can be no doubt that the CJEU is an authorized and respected juridical voice in contributing meaning to these categories of legal norms. It is precisely because the CJEU enjoys the status of a world-class articulator of these norms 26 that it enjoys discretion in its application of these norms. Since Schrems I, the Court is keen to link the protection of EU Charter to the rule of law problematic defines as État de droit27 and thus propelling a substantive rule of law in the legal order of the European Union.28 We suggest that the Court could have found in its evaluation of the U.S. data privacy regime compliance with the GDPR’s effectiveness mandate without betraying a cogent adherence to the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedom. Here too was present discretion that could have been exercised in a different way.', 'At this point, we cannot resist making a comparative comment. U.S. constitutional principles require courts - where they enjoy discretion - to exercise their discretion in a manner that supports both the determinations of the administrative agencies they are reviewing (Chevron doctrine) 29 and in a manner consistent with international legal obligations (Charming Betsy doctrine) 30 that arguably would have included the Privacy Shield arrangements between the EU and the United States.', 'In concluding our remarks here on the internal correctness of the Court’s judgment in Schrems II, the telling inquiry is not whether the Court was correct in the judgment it reached - but rather would the Court have been correct in reaching an alternative disposition of the matter. If an alternative judgment were available to the Court that would have preserved the Privacy Shield, it then becomes a matter of external scrutiny whether the Court should have acted differently. We suggest that the Court had not been legally compelled to reach the conclusion it reached in Schrems II - without in our so doing asserting any internal legal error in its judgment.', '2.3 Identifying Discretion Within Schrems II – External View', 'We restate our view that the CJEU is presumptively correct in its holding in Schrems II as a matter of internal EU law. This would be true, of course, of any judgment of the CJEU with regard to a question of EU law and results from the primacy of the Court within the EU legal system. The inherent correctness of the CJEU in Schrems II does not, however, insulate it from critique or disregard from external vantages, at least with respect to definitions and applications involving those categories of norms that are located in shared legal space. It is open season for the Americans and others to challenge the Court’s resort to rule of law, human rights law and fundamental freedoms, as the CJEU is far less privileged in these domains than it is within the EU law closure.', 'There are certainly many areas of rule of law or human rights or fundamental freedom analysis that have been fleshed out by courts and tribunals throughout the world. But within the specific domain of the protection of personal data, there is thin law at best. Indeed, the very best positive law in this field is the GDPR and other European legal initiatives. But Europe, as the sole or primary occupant of this specific legal domain, can hardly claim that its proprietary approaches deserve global (or universal) recognition as constituent features for human rights law. There is certainly a first mover advantage in many fields of international law, but Europe’s pioneering foray into data privacy rights does not make the GDPR a de facto standard against other approaches (or non-approaches) adopted by other nations.', 'What then might international human rights law (or rule of law or fundamental freedoms) demand of the United States with regard to the protection of personal data? At the moment, there is no recognition of any such obligation by the U.S. Congress. Not only is there no relevant legislation, there are no visible legislative proposals in the pipeline. A few states - notably California - have been inspired by Europe’s GDPR to adopt state-level data protection regimes, but most states have been as silent as the federal government itself. It is of course harder to read Congressional inaction than action, but it appears that the current state of American law and practice is one of non-recognition of any obligation to protect interests in personal data. This may, of course, change.', 'There may, however, be a Trans-Atlantic view (in contrast to either the European regulatory or U.S. laissez-faire stances) that deserves recognition, and that is the law expressed by the now-discarded Privacy Shield! The United States, through the act of negotiating a framework for trans-Atlantic data traffic, implicitly conceded a good part of the GDPR’s international legitimacy. This concession may have been driven more by the realities of power (think Brussels Effect) 31 than by recognition of the intrinsic legitimacy of the European policy choices. We assert that it would be easier to claim the Privacy Shield represented the stance of international human rights law than the unadulterated GDPR itself.', '<<FOOTNOTE 31>>', 'See in general Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rule the World (OUP 2020). In her book, she shows the great power of EU law to influence the regulation of legal standards outside Europe. Her main argument is that EU law made in Brussels can set the legal standard of protection worldwide in many law fields such as competition law, health law, consumer safety, data privacy and artificial intelligence. The ‘Brussels Effect’ reveals the EU’s unique power to influence global corporations and set the rules of the game while acting alone what she calls a ‘unilaterally regulatory globalization’. EU law, due to its regulatory and legal strength, acts here as a soft power. The situation is comparable to the so-called ‘California Effect ‘where the Californian environmental standards can influence the rest of the US legislation due to the strong market power of the State of California in the US federation’. According to Bradford, four conditions are necessary to ensure the effect: 1) the existence of a very large economic market with enforcement power 2) a regulatory capacity with a preference to enact stricter rules 3) specific areas/policies used as regulatory targets 4) the need of non-divisible legal standards for the companies. EU is seen as a soft power which can influence without coercion the world legal standards. This regulatory and legal expansion is clearly connected to the existence of the lex mercatoria.', '<<FOOTNOTE 31 ENDS>>', '3 Locating Schrems II on the Scale of Belligerency', '3.1 The Conflict / Coordination / Cooperation Spectrum', "The GDPR conflict between the European Union and the United States is first a legal conflict. The field describing the multiple exercise of what international lawyers call prescriptive jurisdiction - the application of law to regulate the conduct of a legal person - is known as private international law in most legal systems, although common lawyers recognize the area with the more evocative name ‘conflict of laws’. But the GDPR conflict is also an economic and perhaps cultural conflict. There is a strand of conflict of law classification that it considers a predicament to be 'no true conflict' where a legal subject can comply fully with the demands of one relevant legal system without violating the demands of the counterpart legal system.", 'The ‘no true conflict’ scenario includes the frequent situation where one state proscribes behaviour that the other state does not address. Using this test, GDPR presents ‘no true conflict’. Roughly speaking the GDPR constrains the ability of Google or Facebook to export personal data from the EU for processing in the United States; the ordinary operation of these platforms involves the processing of personal data as that notion is defined in the GDPR. Google or Facebook could fully comply with the GDPR export limitations by desisting from any data export. By so doing, Google or Facebook would not violate any conflicting U.S.-based legal mandate. The problem of course is that Google and Facebook wish to export EU-based personal data.32 Regulatory conflicts can be resolved. There is a spectrum that runs from true conflict (where the legal subject is caught between conflicting demands) to complete elimination of conflict through cooperation, such as by resort to a mirror-image (uniform) rule or the construction of a common rule shared within a higher legal space superimposed on two otherwise independent sovereign regimes. A fully cooperative resolution may more closely match the regulatory imperatives of one state than the other. At one extreme, the ‘cooperative’ solution might be a complete capitulation of one state to the regulatory choices of the other.', '3.2 Cooperation and Coordination in Regulatory Conflicts', 'There are a variety of cooperative techniques available to the EU and the United States to resolve the GDPR conflict. Notwithstanding Europe’s assertion of a first-mover advantage in the field of the protection of personal data rights, the United States and Europe could work toward eliminating conflicts and inconsistencies in this area. This might take the form of harmonization, where both the United States and Europe would adjust their current regulatory positions according to a common design. Under certain conditions, regulatory convergence can arise spontaneously, gradually resolving past conflict, as occurred in the field of corporate payments to foreign public officials.', 'As a formal alternative, the EU and the United States could have elevated the protection of personal data to a bilateral, multilateral, or global instrument. A cooperative promotion of a global standard based on a common EU-U.S. position with regard to the protection of personal data would likely attract the adhesion of many other countries (although perhaps not China). ', 'And finally, data protection may be an area ripe for what we have described elsewhere as ‘trans-Atlantic bicameralism’,33 where the first initiative in a particular regulatory space (here the GDPR) is understood to be a functional proposal, to be accepted, rejected or amended by the trans-Atlantic counterparty. The next move, under this modality, would be for the United States to enact legislation adopted some or all of the GDPR (as it sees fit), with any remaining conflict eliminated through a process of reconciliation. Europe then would amend GDPR accordingly.', 'Cooperation is not an inevitable result, of course. The first-mover advantage can yield enduring benefits to the state that occupies a vacant regulatory space that touches multiple jurisdictions. Having enacted GDPR earlier than the emergence of any other data privacy regime, the EU both occupied the field and set the standard for all states which follow. The GDPR was designed to be global standard - and its insistence of adequacy and equivalency were designed to puncture less robust protections.']

[(0, 4), (5, 8)]

ndtceda

Michigan-PiPh-Neg-Dartmouth-Round-7.docx

Michigan

PiPh

de797388e4cfb30cd1b3bac14190f7806ddab395ccaa309f034a3c85be17988e

Affording rights and duties to animals doesn’t solve but the status quo does.

Jeffrey Skopek 13. A.B. in History from Stanford University, J.D. from Harvard Law School, and Ph.D. in the History and Philosophy of Science from the University of Cambridge. Associate Professor with tenure at the University of Cambridge Faculty of Law and the Deputy Director of its Centre for Law, Medicine, and Life Sciences. “Animals in Court: Does Personhood Matter?” https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2013/12/06/animals-in-court-does-personhood-matter/

legal personhood is far less important than often thought. large number of states have recognized personhood of all animals personhood impose insignificant duties on others some argue that it makes no sense if not possess standing assert that right this is ultimately unconvincing many statutes are enforceable only by public officials and public gained new rights through their passage what is at stake is not whether chimpanzees are legal persons That has already been decided

one of the important arguments made in these habeas petitions is that New York has already recognized the legal personhood of all animals—in its trust law Setting aside the question of the validity of this clever argument (which seems right based on a quick skimming of the sources cited), what I want to highlight here is that it is illustrative of the fact that legal personhood is far less important than is often thought. For a large number of states have recognized the legal personhood of all types of animals . personhood is not granted categorically, but rather with respect to specific rights, which can impose significant or insignificant duties on others . weight given to talk of personhood seems to derive from the idea that legal personhood is a foundational status—something onto which a substantive right, and the power to enforce it, can be added . insofar as it is uncontested that a state’s constitutional law allows it to grant rights to animals (or other non-human entities), there is no question about whether they are legal persons in this sense. While there are some who argue that it makes no sense to say that someone has a legal right to something if he does not possess standing to assert that right , this line of argument is ultimately unconvincing agree that if a law is in principle unenforceable, it makes little sense to say that it confers a right hard to see how a fact about the law’s enforcer, rather than its enforceability, should matter in our evaluation of whether it confers rights. after all, many statutes that create duties to persons that are enforceable only by public officials , and it seems clear that the public gained new rights through their passage . what is at stake in this litigation is not the broad question of whether chimpanzees are legal persons with rights. That has already been decided

far less important impose significant or insignificant duties can be added ultimately unconvincing gained new rights through their passage That has already been decided

['Yet one of the important arguments made in these habeas petitions is that New York has already recognized the legal personhood of all animals—in its trust law. Historically, trusts created for animals were void because a trust cannot exist without a beneficiary, and animals could not be legal beneficiaries. However, New York and many others states (including all those that have adopted the Uniform Trust Act of 2000) now allow animals to be the legal beneficiaries of trusts. Drawing on this feature of the law, the Nonhuman Rights Project created trusts for the chimpanzees at issue in its petitions, turning them into legal beneficiaries—and thereby, it argues, legal persons—under New York law. Setting aside the question of the validity of this clever argument (which seems right based on a quick skimming of the sources cited), what I want to highlight here is that it is illustrative of the fact that legal personhood is far less important than is often thought. For a large number of states have—without much impact on our legal system or the world in which we live—recognized the legal personhood of all types of animals. What this highlights is that personhood is not granted categorically, but rather with respect to specific rights, which can impose significant or insignificant duties on others. It is the underlying substantive rights that are most important. The weight given to talk of personhood seems to derive from the idea that legal personhood is a foundational status—something onto which a substantive right, and the power to enforce it, can be added. But insofar as it is uncontested that a state’s constitutional law allows it to grant rights to animals (or other non-human entities), there is no question about whether they are legal persons in this sense. While there are some who argue that it makes no sense to say that someone has a legal right to something if he does not possess standing to assert that right, this line of argument is ultimately unconvincing. I agree that if a law is in principle unenforceable, it makes little sense to say that it confers a right. But it is hard to see how a fact about the law’s enforcer, rather than its enforceability, should matter in our evaluation of whether it confers rights. There are, after all, many statutes that create duties to persons that are enforceable only by public officials, and it seems clear that the public gained new rights through their passage. Thus, what is at stake in this litigation is not the broad question of whether chimpanzees are legal persons with rights. That has already been decided. Chimpanzees have rights in the Hohfeldian sense that humans have duties to them (e.g., under a wide range of animal protection laws), and they are legal persons in that claims can be brought on their behalf (e.g., under trust law). Rather, what is at stake in this litigation is the far more meaningful and specific question of whether a chimpanzee possesses the common law right of bodily liberty that is protected by the writ of habeas corpus.']

[(8, 17)]

ndtceda

Emory-MoSa-Neg-Owen-L-Coon-Memorial-Tournament-at-Northwestern-Round-6.docx

Emory

MoSa

4e8c05e52fd0fe1741e5ea7680bdb8267ce4de5cdc9fef07cc9e7d5c22d70d4f

No burn out---impact’s extinction

Guterl 12 – Fred Guterl, Executive Editor of Scientific American, Former Senior Editor at Newsweek, Professor at Princeton University, The Fate of the Species: Why the Human Race May Cause Its Own Extinction and How We Can Stop It, p. 1-2

One spin of the genetic roulette wheel and a deadly pathogen would spread across the globe in days kill 60 percent pandemic would be devastating optimists were wrong viruses had killer combination of lethality and transmissibility new viruses multiply risks to survival

One bad spin of the genetic roulette wheel and a deadly new human pathogen would spread across the globe in a matter of days . With a kill rate of 60 percent , such a pandemic would be devastating a flu virus has to combine lethality and transmissibility optimistically minded scientists argued one trait prec luded the other optimists were wrong bird flu viruses had killer combination of lethality and transmissibility We have created the conditions for new viruses to flourish and multiply risks to survival

["Over the next few years, the bigger story turned out not to be SARS, which trailed off quickly, bur avian influenza, or bird flu. It had been making the rounds among birds in Southeast Asia for years. An outbreak in 1997 Hong Kong and another in 2003 each called for the culling of thousands of birds and put virologists and health workers into a tizzy. Although the virus wasn't much of a threat to humans, scientists fretted over the possibility of a horrifying pandemic. Relatively few people caught the virus, but more than half of them died. What would happen if this bird flu virus made the jump to humans? What if it mutated in a way that allowed it to spread from one person to another, through tiny droplets of saliva in the air? One bad spin of the genetic roulette wheel and a deadly new human pathogen would spread across the globe in a matter of days. With a kill rate of 60 percent, such a pandemic would be devastating, to say the least.", 'Scientists were worried, all right, but the object of their worry was somewhat theoretical. Nobody knew for certain if such a supervirus was even possible. To cause that kind of damage to the human population, a flu virus has to combine two traits: lethality and transmissibility. The more optimistically minded scientists argued that one trait prec', 'luded the other, that if the bird flu acquired the ability to spread like wildfire, it would lose its ability to kill with terrifying efficiency. The virus would spread, cause some fever and sniffles, and take its place among the pantheon of ordinary flu viruses that come and go each season.', "The optimists, we found out last fall, were wrong. Two groups of scientists working independently managed to create bird flu viruses in the lab that had that killer combination of lethality and transmissibility among humans. They did it for the best reasons, of course—to find vaccines and medicines to treat a pandemic should one occur, and more generally to understand how influenza viruses work. If we're lucky, the scientists will get there before nature manages to come up with the virus herself, or before someone steals the genetic blueprints and turns this knowledge against us.", "Influenza is a natural killer, but we have made it our own. We have created the conditions for new viruses to flourish—among pigs in factory farms and live animal markets and a connected world of international trade and travel—and we've gone so far as to fabricate the virus ourselves. Flu is an excellent example of how we have, through our technologies and our dominant presence on the planet, begun to multiply the risks to our own survival.", '', '']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

MichiganState-GeSc-Neg-JW-Patterson-Debates-hosted-by-UK-Round-4.docx

MichiganState

GeSc

59a246deb84745a98abf90785e03ff75064e783c8367b9059f9532e7e06f8135

The CP competes because it’s not legally binding BUT solves by shifting antitrust policy

Theodore Voorhees 17, Senior Litigator and Member of the Antitrust and Competition Law Practice Group at Covington & Burling LLP, JD from the Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, AB from Harvard University, and Leah Brannon, Partner at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, JD from Harvard Law School, BA with Highest Distinction from the University of Virginia, ABA 2016 Presidential Transition Task Force, “Presidential Transition Report: The State of Antitrust Enforcement”, American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law, January 2017, http://cartelcapers.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/ABA-SAL-Presidential-Transition-Report-1-18-17-FINAL-2.pdf

Where uncertainties it is essential for Agencies to provide guidance documents for providing clarity moving policy and ensuring a perspective on the international arena guidance is useful to communicate a shift in policy uncertainty may enable anticompetitive behavior guidance not only define boundaries of how Agencies view and enforce law, but impact how courts rule Because foreign authorities look for leadership clear guidance helps achieve uniformity Speeches, while not binding give advance notice by setting forth the agency's reasoning documents make a policy statement as to what conduct are beneficial or harmful

Where there are uncertainties in the Agencies' enforcement policies or priorities, it is often essential for the Agencies to provide guidance . The formal guidance can take the form of formal guidance documents or FTC opinions Agency guidance is important and beneficial for multiple reasons, such as providing clarity for businesses, moving competition policy in the right direction, and ensuring a U.S. perspective on the international arena . Agency guidance is particularly useful to communicate a shift in enforcement policy or practice The recent guidance issued by the Division and the FTC communicating the decision to treat wage-fixing and no-poaching agreements as criminal violations going forward provides an excellent example of this uncertainty as to the boundaries of antitrust laws may chill potentially procompetitive conduct or enable potentially anticompetitive behavior to continue unchecked agency guidance and enforcement not only define the boundaries of how the Agencies view and enforce the law, but may also impact how courts rule in litigation Guidance ensures a place for the U.S. perspective on the international stage . Because so many foreign antitrust authorities look to the Agencies for leadership and study U.S. enforcement decisions and cases, clear ly articulated guidance helps achieve uniformity across jurisdictions Speeches, while not binding can give advance notice by setting forth the respective agency's reasoning for how it views proposed conduct, these documents in effect make a policy statement as to what characteristics of the conduct are considered to be beneficial or harmful for consumers

uncertainties essential guidance guidance documents FTC opinions clarity moving competition policy international arena particularly useful shift wage-fixing no-poaching uncertainty anticompetitive behavior unchecked define the boundaries view enforce impact how courts rule international stage leadership study U.S. enforcement decisions clear achieve uniformity not binding advance notice reasoning policy statement beneficial harmful

['III. ENFORCEMENT MATTERS', 'A. Agency Enforcement and Policy', '1. Guidance', "Where there are uncertainties in the Agencies' enforcement policies or priorities, it is often essential for the Agencies to provide guidance. The formal guidance can take the form of formal guidance documents (such as the Horizontal Merger Guidelines of 2010) or FTC opinions. Informal guidance can take the form of agency reports, speeches by key agency personnel, amicus briefs, decisions to litigate, or closing statements. Agency guidance is important and beneficial for multiple reasons, such as providing clarity for businesses, moving competition policy in the right direction, and ensuring a U.S. perspective on the international arena. Agency guidance is also particularly useful to communicate a shift in enforcement policy or practice.3", '[FOOTNOTE] 3 The recent guidance issued by the Division and the FTC communicating the decision to treat wage-fixing and no-poaching agreements as criminal violations going forward provides an excellent example of this. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV., FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN RESOURCE PROFESSIONALS (Oct. 2016), available at www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/ public_statements/992623/ftc-doj_hr_guidance_final_10-20-16.pdf. [END FOOTNOTE] ', 'Furthermore, uncertainty as to the boundaries of antitrust laws may chill potentially procompetitive conduct or enable potentially anticompetitive behavior to continue unchecked. Businesses may be less willing to engage in novel business activities that could benefit consumers. Moreover, agency guidance and enforcement not only define the boundaries of how the Agencies view and enforce the law, but may also impact how courts rule in litigation.', 'Guidance also ensures a place for the U.S. perspective on the international stage. Because so many foreign antitrust authorities look to the Agencies for leadership and study U.S. enforcement decisions and cases, clearly articulated guidance helps achieve uniformity across jurisdictions. Moreover, an international presence and influence as to antitrust policy is particularly critical in an era in which some foreign competition agencies use the pretense of antitrust enforcement as a cover to mask decisions that are actually based on industrial policy or protectionism.', "Speeches, while not binding on the Agencies or as long-lasting as more formal agency documents, can give advance notice of enforcement priorities and the views of agency leadership regarding how best to analyze certain forms of conduct. For instance, in her first speech as Acting Assistant Attorney General, Renata Hesse offered important insights into the use of bargaining models in analyzing vertical mergers and the Division's skepticism of procompetitive claims in horizontal mergers. Indeed, for changes in agency thinking, an agency speech or other non-enforcement guidance can be the fairer approach, at least in the first instance, than initially embarking on litigation.", "Business review letters from the Division and advisory opinions from the FTC serve as another avenue for providing guidance on novel conduct. More important, by setting forth the respective agency's reasoning for how it views proposed conduct, these documents in effect make a policy statement as to what characteristics of the conduct are considered to be beneficial or harmful for consumers."]

[(9, 19), (19, 20)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-Adam-Kiihnl-Neg-Fullertown-Round5.docx

Kentucky

AdKi

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kentucky/AdKi/Kentucky-Adam-Kiihnl-Neg-Fullertown-Round5.docx

792a81bbf8be53f33b0be391916f257ed2d607960692b39ef61e756e0f418d14

Pantex is on the brink of overflowing, any increase in decommissioning would cause a crisis at the plant

William Broad 22, American science journalist, author and a Senior Writer at The New York Times, 10/17/22, “The Surprising Afterlife of Unwanted Atom Bombs,” https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/17/science/retired-nuclear-bombs-b83.html

nuc storage is a disaster It has a long history of accidents lapses and security failures that lead to catastrophe it’s getting more dangerous plutonium cores are of concern They’re kept at Pantex bunkers at Pantex are

Beyond the weapon debate, critics of the atomic recycling warn that the nuc lear storage complex is a disaster waiting to happen . It has a long history of accidents , safety lapses and security failures that could lead to a nuclear catastrophe . It’s dangerous And it’s getting more dangerous , as the quantities in storage have increased. The plutonium cores of retired hydrogen bombs are of particular concern They’re kept at a sprawling plant in the Texas panhandle known as Pantex . Plutonium is deadly to humans in tiny amounts, and that greatly complicates its safekeeping. If recycled, pits from the B83 bombs would enter plutonium bunkers at Pantex that are already and overtaxed torrential rains in 2010 and 2017 flooded a major plutonium storage area at the Pantex site Repairs , he added, cost hundreds of millions of dollars.

accidents , safety lapses and security failures nuclear catastrophe

['Beyond the weapon debate, critics of the atomic recycling warn that the nuclear storage complex is a disaster waiting to happen. It has a long history of accidents, safety lapses and security failures that could lead to a nuclear catastrophe.', '“It’s dangerous,” said Robert Alvarez, a nuclear expert who, from 1993 to 1999 during the Clinton administration was a policy adviser to the Department of Energy, which runs the nation’s atomic weapons infrastructure. “And it’s getting more dangerous, as the quantities in storage have increased.”', 'The plutonium cores of retired hydrogen bombs are of particular concern, Mr. Alvarez and others say. Roughly the size of a grapefruit, these cores are usually referred to as pits. The United States now has at least 20,000 pits in storage. They’re kept at a sprawling plant in the Texas panhandle known as Pantex. Plutonium is deadly to humans in tiny amounts, and that greatly complicates its safekeeping.', 'If recycled, pits from the B83 bombs would enter plutonium bunkers at Pantex that are already and overtaxed. Mr. Alvarez said that torrential rains in 2010 and 2017 flooded a major plutonium storage area at the Pantex site. Repairs, he added, cost hundreds of millions of dollars.', 'The Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations all made plans — with costs in the billions of dollars — to get rid of excess plutonium stocks, which grew rapidly after the Cold War because of arms disassembly. But no strategy has so far succeeded.', '']

[(8, 16)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-ArRa-Neg-Kathryn-Klassic-at-the-Beach-2024-Round-2.docx

Northwestern

ArRa

19e7bc4e223720dd1a5372b4eb5e1f3a0866a51db99e20c7acb7fddba8e9dafd

No commitment trap.

Smetana et al. 23, Michal Smetana, Associate Professor of Political Studies at Charles University, Coordinator of the Peace Research Center Prague, Head Researcher at the Experimental Lab for International Security Studies, Ph.D. in International Relations from Charles University; Marek Vranka, Researcher at the Peace Research Center Prague, Ph.D. in Social Psychology from Charles University; Ondřej Rosendorf, Ph.D. candidate in Political Studies at Charles University, Junior Researcher at the Peace Research Center Prague, “The 'Commitment Trap' Revisited: Experimental Evidence on Ambiguous Nuclear Threats,” SSRN, 01-09-2023, https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4228497

we show no statistically significant difference between approval in the control and ambiguous threat group We reject that leaders suffer disapproval when they make ambiguous nuclear threats and back down we gained empirical support that explicit threats generate larger audience costs we gain support that public disapproval is higher if leaders employ nuclear weapons after an ambiguous threat there was no statistically significant association between preference for nuclear use and the threat we reject that the public is more likely to prefer use if their leader issued an ambiguous nuclear threat we found that, unlike explicit threats, ambiguous ones did not generate audience costs Our study found no evidence for the “commitment trap” in ambiguous nuclear threats when we exposed participants to the explicit nuclear threat approval decreased significantly

we show no statistically significant difference between the approval in the control group and ambiguous threat group We reject that leaders suffer domestic disapproval when they make ambiguous nuclear threats and back down from using nuclear weapons when deterrence fails we gained empirical support that explicit nuclear threats generate larger audience costs than ambiguous ones we gain support that public disapproval is higher if the leaders employ nuclear weapons after an ambiguous nuclear threat than if they do not there was no statistically significant association between preference for nuclear use and the nuclear threat we reject that the public is more likely to prefer the use of nuclear weapons if their leader issued an ambiguous nuclear threat we found that, unlike explicit threats, ambiguous ones did not generate any audience costs Our study found no evidence for the “commitment trap” in the context of ambiguous nuclear threats , questioning key assumptions The leader did not pay domestic audience costs when he backed down when we exposed participants to the explicit nuclear threat treatment, the approval decreased significantly once the leader reneged the U.S. public is attentive to hints at nuclear use in ambiguous threats it does not see them as binding

no statistically significant difference reject empirical support reject we found that, unlike explicit threats, ambiguous ones did not generate any audience costs no evidence ambiguous nuclear threats key assumptions did not pay domestic audience costs when he backed down explicit nuclear threat treatment, the approval decreased significantly once the leader reneged it does not see them as binding

['First, we conducted an ordinal logistic regression with the approval of the President’s handling of the crisis as an outcome variable, treatment α as a predictor, and gender, age, income, education, and partisanship as control variables. We kept the nature of the military response constant, i.e., non-nuclear (β1). As we show in Figure 4, there was no statistically significant difference (p = 0.627) between the approval in the control group (α1) and ambiguous threat group (α2 AMB).7 We, therefore, reject hypothesis H1 that leaders suffer domestic disapproval when they make ambiguous nuclear threats and then back down from using nuclear weapons when deterrence fails.', 'However, Figure 4 also shows that approval was significantly lower (p < 0.001) in the explicit nuclear threat group (α2 EXP) than in the ambiguous threat group (α1 AMB). The absolute audience costs for the explicit threat are higher than the audience costs for the ambiguous threat (μ12 – μ22EXP> μ12 – μ22AMB). As such, we gained empirical support for hypothesis H2a that explicit nuclear threats generate larger audience costs than ambiguous ones, and we reject the competing H2b that these costs are statistically indistinguishable.', 'Next, we examined whether the public disapproves more of the leader’s empty threats than of the actual use of nuclear weapons (i.e., if μ21 > μ22). Figure 5 shows the results for participants in the ambiguous treatment (α2 AMB) with approval as an outcome variable, response β as a predictor, and sociodemographic characteristics as control variables. The nuclear response was negatively associated with approval (p < 0.001). As such, we reject H3a and gain support for H3b that the public disapproval is higher if the leaders employ nuclear weapons after an ambiguous nuclear threat than if they do not. 8', 'Next, we investigated whether nuclear threats make our participants more likely to prefer the use of nuclear weapons. We conducted a logistic regression with preference as an outcome variable, treatment α as a predictor, and the response β, α*β interaction, and sociodemographic characteristics as control variables. As we show in Figure 6, there was no statistically significant association between preference for nuclear use and the ambiguous (or explicit) nuclear threat. 9 Thus, we reject H4 that the public is more likely to prefer the use of nuclear weapons if their leader issued an ambiguous nuclear threat beforehand.', 'Since we found that, unlike explicit threats, ambiguous ones did not generate any audience costs, we fielded an additional experiment to see why that might be the case. One possible explanation is that the public is not attentive to the implicit hint at nuclear use in ambiguous messaging (so it does not find the non-nuclear response inconsistent). We, therefore, examined the baseline expectations of the likelihood of different policy responses following αAMB and αEXP (due to space constraints, we discuss the design and full results in Appendix 13). In Figure 7, we show that although our respondents saw nuclear use as slightly more likely in αEXP, the difference was not statistically significant (p = 0.497). This suggests that the (non-)effects found in our original experiment were not caused by the public ignorance of implicit reference to nuclear weapons in leaders’ ambiguous threats.', 'Discussion and conclusions', 'Our study found no evidence for the “commitment trap” in the context of ambiguous nuclear threats, questioning one of the key assumptions of Sagan’s (2000) seminal work on U.S. declaratory policy. The fictional leader in our study did not pay domestic audience costs when he backed down from using nuclear weapons. However, when we exposed the participants to the explicit nuclear threat treatment, the approval decreased significantly once the leader reneged on his commitment. We also demonstrated that the U.S. public is attentive to the implicit hints at nuclear use in ambiguous threats. As such, it probably does not see them as binding as explicit ones10 and, therefore, is less likely to punish the President for not following through with nuclear use when deterrence fails. These findings give credence to Susan Martin’s response to Sagan that a conventional response following an ambiguous nuclear threat would not impact the U.S. reputation, as “negative reputational effects follow from the failure to carry out the threatened punishment, not from the failure to carry out the threatened punishment by a particular means” (Martin and Sagan 2001, 193).', '', '']

[(0, 17)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-AdMc-Neg-Texas-Round-2.docx

Kentucky

AdMc

f353f293a795f883fcd3d5a0ab8d5a0e547ea32756b2a579f41cc20cfd8e4477

First use doesn’t deter---the risk is disproportional to the threat.

Gomez 18, Senior Fellow, CATO Institute, B.A., International Relations, State University of New York, M.A., International Affairs, Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University (Eric Gomez, March 6, 2018, “REVISITING THE VALUE OF THE U.S. NUCLEAR UMBRELLA IN EAST ASIA,” War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/revisiting-value-u-s-nuclear-umbrella-east-asia/)

deterring low level aggression in a fait accompli which China seizes territory U.S. nuclear umbrella is ill-suited for such gray-zone scenarios in E C S It strains credulity U.S. leaders convince Beijing it will use nuc s to prevent seizure of uninhabited rocks U.S. stake is too negligible to risk Chinese retaliation Chinese assume stakes would be too low for U S and Washington would restrain

deterring low er- level aggression in general specifically a fait accompli in which China seizes disputed territory and threatens escalation The U.S. nuclear umbrella is ill-suited for deterring such gray-zone scenarios in the E ast C hina S ea. It strains credulity to think U.S. leaders could convince Beijing that it will use nuc lear weapon s to prevent or reverse the seizure of uninhabited rocks in the East China Sea the U.S. stake in uninhabited rocks is too negligible to risk Chinese nuclear retaliation “[ Chinese analysts] implicitly assume that the stakes would be too low for the U nited S tates… and that Washington would either restrain if defending them gave rise to a situation in which the U nited S tates would need to threaten to use nuclear weapons

low er- level fait accompli territory gray-zone E C S credulity Beijing nuc lear weapon s seizure uninhabited rocks stake too negligible retaliation implicitly assume stakes too low U S situation U S need weapons

['One of Japan’s most pressing short-term security challenges is maintaining its control over islands in the East China Sea that China also claims. While the possibility of China initiating a large-scale conflict against Japan over the uninhabited Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands is unlikely, lower-level friction is entirely plausible. As Roehrig states, “Conflict in gray zones…is of greater concern, along with the possibility that a small-scale or accidental clash could escalate.” Beyond traditional war, Japanese strategists have been preoccupied deterring lower-level aggression in general, and they specifically seek to deter a fait accompli in which China seizes disputed territory and threatens escalation should Japan try to restore the status quo ante.', 'The U.S. nuclear umbrella is ill-suited for deterring such gray-zone scenarios in the East China Sea. It strains credulity to think U.S. leaders could convince Beijing that it will use nuclear weapons to prevent or reverse the seizure of uninhabited rocks in the East China Sea. According to\xa0Daryl Press’s book on credibility, “Leaders assess the credibility of threats by comparing the expected costs of carrying out those threats against the interests at stake.” Press’s views on credibility have been overturned in recent years by\xa0new research, but none of the new literature disputes his emphasis on the balance of interests for making credible threats. The U.S. nuclear umbrella plays no plausible role in a gray-zone scenario involving Chinese aggression in the East China Sea because the U.S. stake in uninhabited rocks is too negligible to risk Chinese nuclear retaliation. As\xa0Fiona Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel’s work on China’s nuclear strategy\xa0argues, “[Chinese analysts] implicitly assume that the stakes would be too low for the United States…and that Washington would either restrain or abandon its allies if defending them gave rise to a situation in which the United States would need to threaten to use nuclear weapons.”']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Kansas-WiWi-Aff-78th-National-Debate-Tournament-Round-2.docx

Kansas

WiWi

5ad38533b789c964e19590128cd8187e698c84cfeba98504b241ceac4e6cfc8e

Antitrust key—existence of the loophole sends contradictory signals that wreck solvency.

Martyniszyn 21 - (Dr Marek Martyniszyn, Professor @ Queen’s School of Law, formerly Senior Research Fellow in the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies at Loyola University Chicago, current Member of the Research Partnership Platform of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; 1-14-2021, Journal Of Competition Law & Economics, "Competitive Harm Crossing Borders: Regulatory Gaps And A Way Forward," doa: 6-10-2021) doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhaa034

F T A I A cut back Sherman to protect U.S. Export cartels this is problematic . From a normative perspective, it sends contradictory signals undermining the credibility of the law a policy of ‘ you’ll go to jail if you do it here, but not elsewhere’ is unlikely to reinforce a belief in the serious nature of such violations

Anticompetitive conduct harming the domestic market is prohibited in virtually all states Conduct harming only foreign markets is virtually never proscribed . in the United States the 1982 F oreign T rade A ntitrust I mprovement A ct ‘ cut back the reach of the Sherman Act the key U.S. competition law statute principally to protect U.S. sellers from challenges … for their activity abroad . Export cartels are permitted in virtually all jurisdictions . In the long- term this is problematic . If conduct that causes harm abroad is not illegal , law enables businesspersons involved in transnational commerce to develop skills and mindsets that may be later used to cause competitive harm on the domestic market will be costly and difficult to uncover and remedy. From a normative perspective, it sends contradictory signals to the public, undermining the credibility of the law , especially in those jurisdictions that envisage the severe sanction of imprisonment for some violations of competition law, such as cartel conduct or bid rigging a policy of ‘ you’ll go to jail if you do it here, but we do not mind if you do it elsewhere’ is unlikely to reinforce a belief in the serious nature of any such violations

only foreign markets never proscribed F T A I A cut back Sherman Act the key U.S. competition law statute protect U.S. sellers activity abroad Export cartels permitted all jurisdictions problematic not illegal businesspersons transnational commerce competitive harm contradictory signals credibility of the law severe sanction you’ll go to jail if you do it here, but we do not mind if you do it elsewhere’ reinforce a belief serious nature

['', 'Anticompetitive conduct harming the domestic market is prohibited in virtually all states that introduced competition legislation. That is the raison d’être of such legislation. Conduct harming only foreign markets (causing outbound competitive harm) is virtually never proscribed. Arrangements causing competitive harm abroad are legal under most domestic competition laws. For example, in the United States the 1982 Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act ‘cut back the reach of the Sherman Act [the key U.S. competition law statute] … principally to protect U.S. sellers from challenges … for their activity abroad.’15 Export cartels, for example, are permitted in virtually all jurisdictions.16 Hosting states— which are best positioned (in terms of the relative ease of enforcement) to deal with such anticompetitive conduct—wash their hands of it. Essentially, states care about national, not global, welfare.', 'In the long-term this is problematic. If conduct that causes harm abroad is not illegal, law enables businesspersons involved in transnational commerce to develop skills and mindsets that may be later used to cause competitive harm on the domestic market, which—in turn—will be costly and difficult to uncover and remedy. From a normative perspective, it sends contradictory signals to the public, undermining the credibility of the law, especially in those jurisdictions that envisage the severe sanction of imprisonment for some violations of competition law, such as cartel conduct or bid rigging (rigging public tenders). At a minimum, a policy of ‘you’ll go to jail if you do it here, but we do not mind if you do it elsewhere’ is unlikely to reinforce a belief in the serious nature of any such violations.', '']

[(0, 14)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Davis-Parrish-Aff-Indiana-Round5.docx

Minnesota

DaPa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/DaPa/Minnesota-Davis-Parrish-Aff-Indiana-Round5.docx

754f270f674be8914f976c64ca68b5680e91eb39e8c82a8d6b6844b671537458

Plan solves the link—affirming integrated deterrence is proven to be sufficient.

Bristow 22 - (Alex Bristow, deputy director of ASPI’s defence, strategy and national security program; 9-28-2022, Strategist, "Why the US nuclear umbrella underpins non-proliferation," doa: 8-15-2023) url: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/why-the-us-nuclear-umbrella-underpins-non-proliferation/

opportunity to apply integrated deterrence nuc s play a reduced role in maintaining credible e d emphasis shifts to conventional . This would support non-prolif Japan and S o Ko already investing in long-range strike and offensive cyber . So Ko gone furthest introducing three-axis’ to deter nuc through m d and conventional . These complement umbrella which is made more credible by becoming clearly a last resort . evidently better for non-prolif than reintroducing nuc s

We have an opportunity to apply this more joined-up style of thinking as the US works with its allies to develop the concept of integrated deterrence nuc lear weapon s should play a reduced role in maintaining credible e xtended d eterrence. Instead, more emphasis shifts on to conventional and hybrid capabilities , leveraging the US network of allies and partners . This would support non-prolif eration Australia , Japan and S o uth Ko rea are already investing in capabilities like conventional long-range strike and offensive cyber . So uth Ko rea has perhaps gone the furthest by introducing a new command structure to implement the ‘ three-axis’ system, which is intended to deter a North Korean nuc lear attack through a combination of m issile d efence and conventional strike . These investments by US allies are intended to complement rather than supplant the US nuclear umbrella , which , in theory, is made more credible by becoming more clearly a last resort . it seems evidently better for the cause of non-prolif eration than other options being mooted to address the credibility of extended deterrence, such as reintroducing US nuc lear weapon s to the Korean peninsula or allies pursuing sovereign nuclear capabilities a world with fewer nuclear weapons . requires finding a way to incorporate the non-proliferation benefits of the US nuclear umbrella into multilateral initiatives

joined-up integrated deterrence reduced role conventional hybrid capabilities allies partners Australia Japan S o uth Ko rea long-range strike offensive cyber investments complement more credible last resort evidently better fewer nuclear weapons incorporate multilateral initiatives

['', 'We have an opportunity to apply this more joined-up style of thinking as the US works with its allies to develop the concept of integrated deterrence, which is a key component of the US national defence strategy. In line with the nuclear posture review, nuclear forces are being modernised. Overall, however, nuclear weapons should play a reduced role in maintaining credible extended deterrence. Instead, more emphasis shifts onto conventional and hybrid capabilities, leveraging the US network of allies and partners. This would support non-proliferation if it can be achieved.', 'Consistent with integrated deterrence, Australia, Japan and South Korea are already investing in capabilities like conventional long-range strike and offensive cyber. For Australia, AUKUS is crucial for achieving this—not just for submarines but also in the other areas of advanced technology cooperation. South Korea has perhaps gone the furthest by introducing a new command structure to implement the ‘three-axis’ system, which is intended to deter a North Korean nuclear attack through a combination of missile defence and conventional strike. These investments by US allies are intended to complement rather than supplant the US nuclear umbrella, which, in theory, is made more credible by becoming more clearly a last resort.', 'We don’t yet know how integrated deterrence will work in practice, but it seems evidently better for the cause of non-proliferation than other options being mooted to address the credibility of extended deterrence, such as reintroducing US nuclear weapons to the Korean peninsula or allies pursuing sovereign nuclear capabilities.', 'We would all prefer to see a world with fewer nuclear weapons. In our current strategic circumstances, that requires finding a way to incorporate the non-proliferation benefits of the US nuclear umbrella into multilateral initiatives.', '']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PhJo-Aff-5---Long-Beach-Round-4.docx

Minnesota

PhJo

7894a075c6cb06eaf755217a6b9871b8e66817f22fe54d1dd2661cead903f966

Schotten adheres to high theory and anti-futurity, which means the alt fails; she endorses political engagement

Amin 20, Professor of Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies at Emory University, the recipient of a Mellon Postdoctoral Fellowship in “Sex” from the University of Pennsylvania Humanities Forum (2015-16) and a Humanities Institute Faculty Fellowship from Stony Brook University (2015) (Kadji Amin, 3-17-2020, "Queer Terror: Life, death, and desire in the settler colony," Contemporary Political Theory, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41296-020-00389-2)

Schotten concedes Edelman universalizes futurism of the settler state to say native futures and life occupies structural position of death, and antifuturity, is to concede the symbolic order to settler sovereignty Schotten acknowledges, ‘it seems cruel dismiss futurist movements and political struggles Schotten’s faithfulness to Edelman and high’ theory prevents her from articulating alternative decolonial futurity she concedes terms of discourse to settler sovereignty, granting it an absolute chokehold on representation Queer Terror is not a book about decolonial tactics and does not engage alternative s Readers interested in political praxis and native resistance will be left with questions that go beyond the book’s abstract theoretical framing

Schotten concedes that Edelman universalizes the futurism of the settler state as the futurism of all politics to say that native life is not recognized as life, that native futures are not recognized as futures, and thus that native life occupies the structural position of death, and antifuturity, is to concede the symbolic order the order of representation and meaning to settler sovereignty Schotten acknowledges, ‘it seems particularly cruel and benighted to dismiss futurist movements and political struggles Edelman would surely respond that indigenous political movements, like all political movements , are versions of futurism must oppose, because every futural politics, even that of the most disenfranchised, necessarily repudiates a-temporality of drives Schotten’s faithfulness to the Edelman ian frame and to ‘ high’ theory itself prevents her from articulating the alternative terms of native and decolonial futurity she concedes the terms of political discourse to settler sovereignty, granting it an absolute chokehold on representation itself Queer Terror is thus not a book about decolonial tactics or imaginaries , and it does not engage the alternative temporalitie s , futurities , or cosmologies of native life . Readers interested in concrete political praxis and modes of native resistance will be left with questions that go beyond the book’s abstract theoretical framing

concedes concede the symbolic order to settler sovereignty particularly cruel dismiss futurist movements political struggles like all political movements Schotten’s faithfulness to the Edelman ian frame to ‘ high’ theory itself articulating the alternative terms of native and decolonial futurity granting it an absolute chokehold on representation itself decolonial tactics imaginaries does not engage the alternative temporalitie s futurities cosmologies of native life concrete political praxis modes of native resistance left with questions abstract theoretical framing

['C. Heike Schotten’s Queer Terror: Life, Death, and Desire in the Settler Colony brings together conversations in political theory, native studies, queer theory, and biopolitics to offer a stunningly original theory of the temporality of settler sovereignty. Trenchant, polemical, and committed to a revolutionary politics against settler sovereignty, Queer Terror nonetheless seeks to conscript its reader to a seemingly untenable position. Schotten closes the book with the memorable and apparently indefensible declaration, ‘We choose to stand on the side of ‘‘terrorism’’’ (168). Queer Terror builds a solid theoretical armature for why standing on the side of ‘terrorism’ is a queer and decolonial position. The core of the book is chapter 2, in which Schotten conducts a highly original reading of Hobbes’s Leviathan in order to theorize settler sovereignty as driven by futural, expansionist desire. For Hobbes, what is desired is possession, and possession is a temporal affair. In the state of nature, there is no hope of securing the object of one’s desire from all those who would seek to take it from you. Hence, there can be no temporal continuity of desire into a future of guaranteed satisfaction. Thus, the state of nature is characterized by hopelessness and emotional stasis. The stable order of the commonwealth, by contrast, is supposed to guarantee a future of satisfied and protected possession. But in Hobbes’s theory of desire, possession is never enough, as desire seeks to constantly renew itself, as well as the experience of satisfaction, by turning from one object to another. For Schotten, the expansionist character of desire within the settler commonwealth is one driving engine of imperialism. The disavowed violence of settler sovereignty – in actual settler states as in Hobbes’s myth of the founding of the commonwealth out of the state of nature – is its other engine. Because the violence of native dispossession and would-be genocide cannot be acknowledged by the settler state, and because the continuing existence of native peoples threatens this disavowal, imperialism emerges with deadly force: ‘Empire functions as a kind of substitutive satisfaction to compensate for the failure of settler sovereignty to finally and fully exterminate indigenous peoples’ (59). Schotten’s critique of the temporality of settler colonial desire in chapter 2 thus offers shared ground for native studies and (post)colonial studies – two fields that are often seen as in tension with one another. The second pillar of Schotten’s argument is an astonishing reading of Lee Edelman’s No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive as a politically revolutionary text in favor of native life and native resistance. This flies in the face of the well-established reading of No Future as an a- or even anti-political text. Indeed, Edelman famously critiques all politics as based on a futural temporality that must repudiate the meaninglessness and a-temporality of the death drive, which, for Edelman, is socially represented by queers. In Schotten’s reading, however, No Future’s project of saying no to the futurism of politics ‘is not equivalent to abolishing politics as such and could only mean as much if every modernity were European modernity, if every politics were a sovereign biopolitics, and if every temporality were futurist’ (109). Instead, she reframes Edelman as an advocate of the opposition to the futurism of settler sovereignty developed in chapter 2 – a settler sovereignty that, much like the death drive itself, posits all resistance to it as irrational (‘terrorism’) and/or a-temporal (‘savage’). Hence, in Schotten’s rereading, Edelman’s project is ‘wedded to life, albeit a life that is unlivable as life, which is the status of native life within settler colonial regimes’ (110). To be sure, Schotten concedes that Edelman universalizes the futurism of the settler state as the futurism of all politics, just as he universalizes the heteroreproductive futurity symbolized by the white child as that of all children. Hers is therefore less a reading of Edelman than an adventurous and compelling appropriation – for the most part, that is. For to say that native life is not recognized as life, that native futures are not recognized as futures, and thus that native life occupies the structural position of the queer, of death, and of antifuturity, is to concede the symbolic order – the order of representation and meaning – to settler sovereignty. As Schotten acknowledges, ‘it seems particularly cruel and benighted to dismiss futurist movements and political struggles when they are so often waged precisely by those who were never meant to survive’ (112). Edelman would surely respond that indigenous political movements, like all political movements, are versions of futurism that queers must oppose, because every futural politics, even that of the most disenfranchised, necessarily repudiates the a-temporality of the drives. Beyond the Edelmanian frame, we might wonder whether a truly decolonial politics and theory would decolonize futurity, rather than conceding it to the settler state, while refuting the meanings of death, a-temporality, and structural queerness that settler sovereignty assigns to native resistance. But Schotten’s faithfulness to the Edelmanian frame – and to ‘high’ theory itself – prevents her from articulating the alternative terms of native and decolonial futurity. Though she helps us to see how settler sovereignty falsely universalizes its own futurity, ultimately, like Edelman, she concedes the terms of political discourse to settler sovereignty, granting it an absolute chokehold on representation itself. In the final chapter, Schotten constructs an illuminating genealogy of ‘terrorism’ that will not only be highly teachable but also useful to scholars of the Global War on Terror, Palestinian resistance, and contemporary anti-Muslim sentiment. Throughout the chapter, Schotten puts ‘terrorism’ in scare quotes to signal that the term, on her view, functions as a moral epithet rather than a description of any particular form of political violence. ‘Terrorism’s’ sole function is to designate a political threat as evil, making outraged condemnation and military violence the only possible responses to it. Schotten demonstrates how, during the Cold War, Western states sought to use the language of ‘terrorism’ to delegitimate ‘totalitarianism,’ whether it be Nazi fascism or Soviet Stalinism. During the same period, the Soviets sided with anti-colonial movements to brand colonial violence as ‘terrorism.’ The Global War on Terror effectively wrested the term ‘terrorism’ away from its anti-colonial usage, while adding Islam to its existing genealogies. Schotten tracks how U.S. and Israeli architects of contemporary ‘terrorism’ discourse conflated radical Islam, Nazism, Marxism, and fascism in order to delegitimate ‘terrorism’ as a threat to civilization and democracy. ‘Emptying oppositional politics of any content whatsoever,’ Schotten writes, ‘‘‘terrorism’’ becomes another word for savagery and nihilism, for the negation of the West and everything it ostensibly stands for: freedom, democracy, and the American way’ (141). In a reading of two scenes in which right-wing conservative pundits face off with defenders of Palestinian resistance, Schotten demonstrates how ‘terrorism’ discourse leaves no room for dialogue or retort. Rhetorically, defenders of Palestinian resistance, particularly when they are Muslim, cannot respond to ‘terrorism’ discourse without either condemning Palestinians as ‘terrorists’ or being themselves branded as ‘terrorists.’ For those in solidarity with Palestinian resistance, the choice, in fact, is no choice at all. In a compelling use of the Edelmanian model, Schotten concludes: ‘Let’s declare that we, too, are queers, bent on the annihilation of the social order and its ceaseless reproduction of specters of nihilism and death. We choose not to choose empire or the endless futurism of colonial domination. We choose to stand on the side of ‘‘terrorism’’’ (168). Queer Terror is a polemical must-read for scholars of biopolitics, native studies, queer theory, and the Global War on Terror. Few readers will agree with all of Schotten’s claims, but the work of a polemic is to generate disagreement, controversy, and conversation as much as it is to convince its readers. Queer Terror is sure to do all of the above. Structurally, Queer Terror is built around a series of highly original, illuminating, and, at times, counterintuitive readings of canonical political and queer theorists. This means that, paradoxically, Queer Terror seeks to contribute to native studies by building an original theory of the temporality of settler desire from the works of canonical, white settler theorists. Queer Terror is thus not a book about decolonial tactics or imaginaries, and it does not engage the alternative temporalities, futurities, or cosmologies of native life. Readers interested in concrete political praxis and modes of native resistance will therefore be left with questions that go beyond the book’s abstract theoretical framing. What does the praxis of resistance to settler sovereignty consist of, beyond performatively declaring oneself to stand on the side of ‘terrorists’? Is the choice to declare oneself on the side of ‘terrorists’ as available to Muslims, Palestinians, and indigenous water protectors, who are already likely to be targeted as ‘terrorists,’ as is it to white settler queers? Is there a danger in taking ‘queer’ and ‘terrorist’ to be structural markers of everything that settler sovereignty deems threatening, given the way these terms bundle together vastly divergent peoples, politics, practices, imaginaries, and yes, uses of violence? These and other questions of concrete praxis are the stuff of another project. Queer Terror is best read as an anatomy of the settler symbolic order and the impossible position in which it places native and decolonial resistance – a position, as Schotten compellingly if controversially argues, of death, ‘terrorism,’ and queerness. ']

[(0, 7)]

ndtceda

Kansas-Park-Semrick-Aff-6%20-%20Texas-Round2.docx

Kansas

PaSe

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kansas/PaSe/Kansas-Park-Semrick-Aff-6%2520-%2520Texas-Round2.docx

8bf657c5c966f809335544320014bee7a362f628219a01af53e9b3c10499481a

Doesn’t solve – insurance industry says no, can’t insure things you can’t foresee, and fails to deter.

Rafael Dean Brown, 12-10-2020 [Centre for Law and Development, Qatar University College of Law, Doha, Qatar, "Property Ownership And The Legal Personhood Of Artificial Intelligence," Information & Communications Technology Law || https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13600834.2020.1861714]

insurance to cover liability opens a number of legal issues It is temporary liability will not be solved by simply insuring insurance industry will not bear the risk could spend substantially for liability Insurance would not cope will likely limit coverage

alternative is insurance to cover the liability of an AI deemed a legal person This approach opens a number of legal issues related to insurance law It is a temporary solution For the same reasons corporate liability is not solved by simply insuring the corporation AI liability will not be solved by simply insuring the AI insurance industry will not allow itself to bear the risk where the insurance company could spend substantially for the liability of an AI One can imagine an AI that has manipulated the digital currency market costing billions of dollars in losses Insurance would simply not cope with the risk and could not cover AI liability Insurance companies will likely limit coverage to risks that they foresee bringing the inquiry back to the issue of foreseeability and the autonomy of the machine Additionally insurance approach prevents the legal system from imposing punitive orders on AI

This approach opens a number of legal issues AI liability will not be solved by simply insuring the AI insurance industry will not allow itself to bear the risk could spend substantially for the liability of an AI costing billions in losses Insurance would simply not cope

['An alternative approach to property ownership of AI is the one proposed by Solum: the use of insurance to cover the liability of an AI deemed as a legal person. This approach, however, opens a number of legal issues related to insurance law, and raises the same issues posed by agency and contract law. It is a temporary solution. For the same reasons that corporate liability is not solved by simply insuring the corporation, AI liability will not be solved by simply insuring the AI. One reason is that AI may actually control and possess property, and owners of AI may be able to avoid liability by simply having the AI control and possess property. The insurance industry will not likely allow itself to bear the risk, where the insurance company could spend substantially for the liability of an AI. One can imagine an AI, for example, that has manipulated the digital currency market or initial coin offering (ICO), costing billions of dollars in losses. Insurance would simply not cope with the risk, and could not cover all types of AI liability. Insurance companies will likely limit coverage to risks that they foresee, bringing the inquiry back to the issue of foreseeability and the autonomy of the machine. Additionally, the insurance approach prevents the legal system from imposing punitive and restraining orders on the AI.']

[(12, 17), (27, 29)]

ndtceda

Michigan-IpMc-Aff-02----Kentucky-Round-2.docx

Michigan

IpMc

88aa959eaaaf8f77ba3a3f44e5c7ba2d2756a5a374cd2c562b5674aa7f3fc4a2

Healthcare driven budgetary overstretch causes global instability

Brown 13, PhD, Professor of Practice and Vice Chair, Public Administration and International Affairs at Syracuse, worked as an economist at the International Monetary Fund and as Chief Economist for Eastern Europe, Africa, and the Middle East at BNP Paribas, (Stuart S., “Global Power: Key Issues,” in The Future of US Global Power: Delusions of Decline, Palgrave, p. 57-58)

In the first instance budget deficits are likely symptoms of incipient overstretch Overstretch suggests a need to realign commitments persistently large deficits demand adjustments if fiscal imbalances prove chronic they can trigger growth-inhibiting alterations incipient overstretch can mutate into a primary threat to the system's underlying dynamism . imperial overstretch” refers to unrestrained military campaigns the US fiscal challenge does not primarily reflect out-of-control defense spending an endemic failure to rein in explosive economy-wide health care costs with the latter's implications for public health insurance the real fiscal challenge will erode the material foundation of US power By viewing health-care driven fiscal deficits as a necessary manifestation of overstretch is misguided The root of the fiscal problem involves unsustainable commitments in health expenditure

In the first instance structural budget deficits are more likely to be symptoms of incipient overstretch then evidence of national decline Overstretch suggests a need to realign commitments persistently large deficits demand adjustments that need not materially impact the underlying drivers of prosperity if fiscal imbalances prove sufficiently chronic they can eventually trigger growth-inhibiting alterations in microeconomic incentives In such cases, incipient overstretch can mutate into a more primary threat to the system's underlying dynamism . “ imperial overstretch” refers to unrestrained military campaigns in contrast to widespread impression, the US fiscal challenge does not primarily reflect out-of-control defense spending This neither minimizes the sizable resources the US commits to military-related spending nor denies that cutbacks in such spending can help facilitate overall fiscal adjustment Rather the point is that an endemic failure to rein in explosive economy-wide health care costs with the latter's implications for public sector health insurance programs the real fiscal challenge will do more to endanger macroeconomic stability and eventually erode the material foundation of US power By viewing health-care driven fiscal deficits as a necessary manifestation of overstretch is misguided The root of the US fiscal problem involves unsustainable commitments in the area of health expenditure It is decidedly not any dearth of national resources to meet the health needs of the population the US possesses more than enough resources to achieve this goal

first instance incipient overstretch adjustments sufficiently chronic growth-inhibiting alterations mutate primary threat to the system's underlying dynamism does not primarily reflect endemic failure explosive economy-wide health care costs the real fiscal challenge erode the material foundation of US power health-care driven fiscal deficits commitments health expenditure

['', "In the first instance, structural26 budget deficits are more likely to be symptoms of incipient overstretch then prima facie evidence of national decline. Overstretch suggests a need to realign commitments and resources, hence spending and revenues. In principle, persistently large deficits demand adjustments that need not materially impact the underlying drivers of longer-term prosperity. In contrast, if fiscal imbalances prove sufficiently chronic, they can eventually trigger growth-inhibiting alterations in microeconomic incentives. In such cases, incipient overstretch can mutate into a more primary threat to the system's underlying dynamism. In its classical formulation, “imperial overstretch” refers to unrestrained and exorbitant foreign military campaigns. The latter can be said to redound to the detriment of great powers by crowding out more productive capital investments. Yet in contrast to widespread impression, the US fiscal challenge does not primarily reflect out-of-control defense spending and the burden of foreign entanglements. If this were the case, then the feasibility of financing an ever-expanding global power projection would be brought into question. This neither minimizes the sizable resources the US commits to military-related spending nor denies that cutbacks in such spending can help facilitate overall fiscal adjustment. Rather, the point is that an endemic failure to rein in explosive economy-wide health care costs with the latter's implications for public sector health insurance programs – the real fiscal challenge – will do more to endanger macroeconomic stability and eventually erode the material foundation of US power (see chapter 8). By viewing (health-care driven) fiscal deficits as a necessary manifestation of overstretch is misguided for a more basic reason. The root of the US fiscal problem involves unsustainable commitments – particularly in the area of health expenditure – made by government to its citizens. It is decidedly not a question of any dearth of national resources to adequately meet the health needs of the population at large. As the richest country in the world, the US possesses more than enough resources to achieve this goal. The relevant political and social question is whether the population’s basic health requirements are best met via ever-expanding entitlements requiring increasingly higher levels of taxation. ", '']

[(0, 5), (6, 8)]

ndtceda

Kansas-Park-Semrick-Neg-6%20-%20Texas-Round4.docx

Kansas

PaSe

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kansas/PaSe/Kansas-Park-Semrick-Neg-6%2520-%2520Texas-Round4.docx

5b30d23debbe8ca4cf1f49198f3ff4e7dddb26998efbc52a7cbc89e3fd1d1b46

Hypersonics are key to defeat adversarial A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) strategies – specifically, China’s in the SCS and Taiwan.

Dr. Corinne Kramer 23. Physicist, Congressional Budget Office; PhD, Physics, JHU. “U.S. Hypersonic Weapons and Alternatives.” Congressional Budget Office. Jan. 2023. https://www.cbo.gov/publication/58924#_idTextAnchor048.

hypersonic s Long range and high speed are desirable China have advanced air defenses long-range missiles and antiship missiles Chinese forces could establish large areas in which U.S. forces would be vulnerable Such antiaccess, area-denial would reduce U.S. power and give an adversary freedom of action Long-range weapons with high speeds could be launched from areas of lower risk but not take too much time to targets Disputes over the S C S occurred China threaten to take Taiwan by force China has A2/AD weapons that could limit U.S. naval and air access Chinese missiles have range of 1,500 km bombers could reach 3,500 km offshore China air defenses could engage naval aircraft China’s ability to intercept very fast, missiles en route to targets is limited for the future Hypersonic s could thwart A2/AD defenses

why is the Department of Defense interested in new hypersonic missile s ? Longer ranges and higher speeds distinguish the hypersonic weapons DoD is developing from weapons in today’s inventory. Long range and high speed are always desirable for a strike weapon, shift in focus to potential conflicts with near-peer adversaries that have advanced militaries brought those characteristics to the fore Of specific concern are China or Russia both of which have advanced air defenses long-range missiles and antiship missiles Chinese or Russian forces could establish large areas in which U.S. forces would be vulnerable to attack. Such antiaccess, area-denial strategy would reduce U.S. combat power and give an adversary freedom of action A2/AD weapon systems China and Russia deployed could force the U.S. to use weapons from as far as 2,500 miles away Launching such weapons from shorter distances would put launchers and units at greater risk Long-range weapons with high speeds could be launched from areas of lower risk but not take too much time to cover longer distances to their targets . In any conflict combatants try to establish A2/AD to protect their forces and territory and limit where their opponents can operate near-peer adversaries pose particular A2/AD challenges because they possess longer-range weapons and ability to target them in greater numbers China and Russia both have many systems capable of establishing challenging A2/AD environments China Disputes over the S outh C hina S ea have occurred in recent years China threaten ed to take Taiwan by force And the U S has indicated in increasingly explicit ways intent to come to Taiwan’s aid should China attempt to do so If a conflict erupted China has A2/AD weapons that could challenge the United States and its allies China’s antiship and air defenses have potential to limit U.S. naval and air access to much of the South China Sea China could extend the reach of those weapons by basing them on disputed islands Chinese surface-to-air missiles and antiship cruise missiles could cover 400 km potentially including Taiwan If missiles were located on the Paracel Islands which China claimed sovereignty over China’s reach into the South China Sea could be doubled [FIGURE 2 - 1 AND BOX REMOVED] Chinese DF-21D antiship ballistic missiles have a range of 1,500 km . Chinese H-6K bombers could reach 3,500 km offshore China employs modern air defenses purchased from Russia most notable are the S-300 and S-400 surface-to-air missile systems China fielded a variety of shorter-range air-defense systems that could engage naval aircraft Those defenses would be less effective against cruise missiles , that fly a few hundred feet above the surface to avoid detection until close to their targets China’s S- 300 and S-400 have some capability China’s ability to intercept very fast, high-flying missiles en route to their targets is likely limited for the near future . Russia As evinced by invasion of Ukraine Russia may harbor aspirations to restore the former Soviet Union That includes the three Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania which are members of NATO If Russia invaded a NATO country the U S would have a treaty-based obligation to respond Such a response would be harder if Russian forces could protect themselves with long-range air defenses Russia has a variety of antiaccess area-denial weapons that could pose challenges for the U S and its allies For attacking targets on land Russia can use ground-launched Iskander ballistic missiles which have a range of 300 km and land-attack cruise missiles which have ranges up to several thousand kilometers Russia’s Kinzhal ballistic missiles which have a range of 2,720 km when launched from fighter aircraft can strike targets on land or at sea and could limit naval access to the Baltic Sea Russia’s air defenses such as the S-300 and S-400 could limit access by NATO air forces to areas that would include Poland, Lithuania , Latvia , Estonia , and Finland [FIGURE 2-2 AND BOX REMOVED] Hypersonic weapon s could prove useful in thwart ing the A2/AD defenses of near-peer adversaries Although there might not be U.S. forces nearby a hypersonic missile could hit the target from a long distance in a time frame that would not be possible with a slower-flying missile

Longer ranges higher speeds always near-peer adversaries advanced militaries fore air defenses large areas vulnerable antiaccess, area-denial strategy reduce freedom 2,500 miles Long-range weapons high speeds lower risk not too much time any conflict particular greater numbers both have China Taiwan explicit limit naval air access much 400 km including Taiwan doubled 1,500 km . 3,500 km offshore modern air defenses S-400 shorter-range less effective cruise missiles few hundred feet very fast, high-flying limited near future Russia Soviet Union Baltic nations obligation harder protect themselves variety challenges 300 km several thousand kilometers Kinzhal 2,720 km or at sea limit naval access air forces Lithuania Latvia Estonia useful thwart ing A2/AD defenses not forces nearby not be possible

['Scenarios That Define Potential Requirements for Hypersonic Missiles', 'The U.S. military’s arsenal includes a wide variety of guided weapons that can be used to attack targets on land. Those weapons have ranges that vary from as short as a few kilometers (for the Joint Direct Attack Munition) to more than 1,500 kilometers (for the Tomahawk cruise missile) and speeds that vary from well below the speed of sound (for the AGM-154 glide bomb) to more than three times the speed of sound (for the Army Tactical Missile System). With that variety available, why is the Department of Defense interested in pursuing new and relatively expensive hypersonic missiles?', 'Longer ranges and higher speeds are the main attributes that distinguish the hypersonic weapons DoD is developing from the conventional strike weapons in today’s inventory. Long range and high speed are nearly always desirable characteristics for a strike weapon, but they can be expensive. DoD’s shift in focus, to potential conflicts with near-peer adversaries that have advanced militaries, has brought those characteristics to the fore. Of specific concern are potential conflicts with China or Russia, both of which have advanced air defenses, long-range bombers and missiles, and antiship missiles. With those systems, Chinese or Russian forces could establish large areas in which U.S. forces would be vulnerable to attack.', 'Such an antiaccess, area-denial strategy would reduce U.S. combat power and give an adversary greater freedom of action. In particular, the A2/AD weapon systems that China and Russia have deployed could force the U.S. military to use ground- or ship-launched weapons from as far as 4,000 km (about 2,500 miles) away and air-launched weapons from at least 1,000 km (about 600 miles) away. Launching such weapons from shorter distances would put the launchers and the units operating them at greater risk. Long-range weapons with high speeds could be launched from areas of lower risk but not take too much time to cover the longer distances to their targets.', 'This chapter describes, in general terms, the planning scenarios for near-peer adversaries that DoD is currently using and their implications for the performance requirements of weapons designed to overcome the A2/AD threats found in those scenarios. In any conflict, combatants try to establish A2/AD zones to protect their own forces and territory and to limit where their opponents can safely operate. But near-peer adversaries pose particular A2/AD challenges because they are likely to possess longer-range weapons (and the ability to target them) in greater numbers than less advanced adversaries do. In particular, China and Russia both have many offensive and defensive weapon systems capable of establishing challenging A2/AD environments.1 Beyond those challenges, other types of scenarios could also affect the U.S. military’s requirements for hypersonic missiles.', 'China', 'Disputes over territory in the South China Sea have occurred in recent years. The People’s Republic of China has threatened at times to take the island of Taiwan by force. And the United States has indicated in increasingly explicit ways its intent to come to Taiwan’s aid should China attempt to do so. In addition, if the Chinese military tried to coerce other U.S. allies in the Pacific or shut down access to sea lanes there, the United States could choose to respond militarily.', 'If a conflict erupted in the region, China has a variety of A2/AD weapons that could pose challenges to the United States and its allies. At present, China’s antiship and air defenses have the potential to limit U.S. naval and air access to much of the South China Sea, particularly because China could extend the reach of those weapons by basing them on disputed islands in the South China Sea, such as those in the Paracel and Spratly chains. Chinese surface-to-air missiles and antiship cruise missiles located on the mainland could cover an area with an estimated radius of 400 km, potentially including Taiwan (see Figure 2-1). If those missiles were located on the Paracel Islands—which China has claimed sovereignty over, in violation of international law—China’s reach into the South China Sea could be roughly doubled.', '[FIGURE 2-1 AND BOX REMOVED]', 'In addition, Chinese DF-21D antiship ballistic missiles have a range of 1,500 km. DF-26 antiship ballistic missiles may reach as far as 4,000 km, but their actual capabilities are not yet clear and would require that China have an intelligence and surveillance system that could detect and track targets at those long ranges with enough accuracy for the missiles to find their targets. Chinese H-6K bombers flying from an inland base could reach 3,500 km offshore, and SU-30MKK fighter aircraft have a range of 1,350 km.', 'China also employs modern air defenses, most of which were purchased from Russia or designed in Russia and licensed for production in China. The most notable are the S-300 and S-400 surface-to-air missile systems, which have maximum ranges of a few hundred kilometers. China has also fielded a variety of shorter-range air-defense systems that could engage naval aircraft in the region or land-based fighters and bombers. Those defenses would be less effective against cruise missiles, such as the Tomahawk, that fly a few hundred feet above the surface to avoid detection until they are close to their targets. But such defensive systems would still have some capabilities against low-flying missiles at short ranges.', 'To defend against ballistic missiles, China’s S-300 and S-400 surface-to-air missile systems (like the U.S. Patriot missile system) have some capability as point defenses against shorter-range ballistic missiles as they approach their targets. (A point defense can protect a relatively small area, from a few kilometers to a few tens of kilometers in diameter.) China is working to develop interceptors to defend against longer-range ballistic missiles, but those systems are still in development and have not yet been deployed. Thus, China’s ability to intercept very fast, high-flying missiles en route to their targets is likely to be limited for at least the near future.', 'Russia', 'As evinced by its invasion of Ukraine, Russia may harbor aspirations to restore the territory of the former Soviet Union. That territory includes the three Baltic Sea nations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which are now members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).2 If Russia invaded a NATO country, the United States would have a treaty-based obligation to respond. Such a response would be harder if Russian forces were able to establish a strong ground presence in one of those NATO countries and could protect themselves with long-range air defenses and missile attacks.', 'Like China, Russia has a variety of antiaccess and area-denial weapons that could pose challenges for the United States and its allies—particularly Russia’s long-range missiles and air defenses. For attacking targets on land, Russia can use ground-launched Iskander ballistic missiles, which have a range of 300 km, and ground-, ship-, and air-launched land-attack cruise missiles, which have ranges up to several thousand kilometers. In addition, Russia’s Kinzhal ballistic missiles, which have a range of 2,720 km when launched from fighter aircraft, can be used to strike targets on land or at sea and could limit naval access to the Baltic Sea. And Russia’s air defenses, such as the S-300 and S-400 surface-to-air missile systems also deployed by China, could limit access by NATO air forces to areas that would include much of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland (see Figure 2-2).', '[FIGURE 2-2 AND BOX REMOVED]', 'However, the Russian military’s failure to seize the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv in February 2022, which many analysts thought would be fairly easy for Russia, suggests some of the pitfalls of relying on technical assessments to measure military capability. Sensors, intelligence gathering, flexible command-and-control systems, and well-trained personnel are just as important. Thus, the risks to U.S. weapon systems in potential adversaries’ A2/AD zones may be overstated.', 'Other Scenarios', 'Hypersonic weapons could prove to be useful in ways other than thwarting the A2/AD defenses of near-peer adversaries. Notable examples would be scenarios in which the United States wanted to conduct a rapid, long-distance strike because it had intelligence indicating the location of a high-value target, such as the leader of a terrorist organization or a nuclear-armed missile about to be launched by a rogue nation. Such intelligence would have to be acted on quickly because of potential movement of the target. Although there might not be U.S. forces nearby, a hypersonic missile could potentially hit the target from a long distance in a time frame that would not be possible with a slower-flying missile, such as a subsonic cruise missile. That type of mission is what initially revived DoD’s interest in hypersonic weapons in the early 2000s.']

[(12, 18), (19, 21)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-VaWa-Aff-Texas-Round-5.docx

Dartmouth

VaWa

72a9a400e0b172081f57ce8e4dc213ab3162535fef9ee74fb1005201bed63525

Coordination is key to insulate global supply chain disruptions.

Roger Alford 18, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division U.S. Department of Justice. "Antitrust Enforcement in an Interconnected World." https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1029821/download

there are 130 jurisdictions with antitrust Cartels affecting global supply engaged activity in countries Unilateral enforcement affect marketing around the world this means international coordination are important Without these tools, the uncertainty associated with divergent enforcement and risks of inconsistent remedies are high. Antitrust enforcers who do not consider global impact create inefficiencies

Today there are more than 130 different jurisdictions with antitrust agencies A merger of two multinational firms can trigger merger filings and reviews in a dozen or more jurisdictions Cartels affecting the global supply chain may involve companies engaged in illegal activity in countries separated by thousands of miles Unilateral conduct enforcement in one jurisdiction has the potential to affect marketing and licensing practices not just in that jurisdiction, but around the world . For antitrust enforcers, this means that international coordination and cooperation are more important than ever Without these tools, the uncertainty associated with divergent approaches to enforcement has potentially significant costs for globally active companies, and the risks of inconsistent and potentially conflicting remedies are high. Antitrust enforcers who do not consider the global impact of their enforcement decisions can create inefficiencies that ultimately harm consumers throughout our interconnected world .

130 different jurisdictions filings reviews illegal activity Unilateral conduct enforcement marketing around the world coordination cooperation more important than ever uncertainty divergent approaches enforcement inconsistent conflicting remedies global impact decisions interconnected world

['Today, I would like to speak at more length about the third principle—recognizing the global impact of antitrust enforcement. Just as Korea and the world have fundamentally changed since the 1988 Seoul Olympics, so too has global antitrust enforcement. In 1988 there was no International Competition Network, and only a handful of competition agencies were active, as much of the world continued to embrace highly-regulated or command economies. As President Ronald Reagan put it, the attitude of governments at the time was “if it moves, tax it, if it keeps moving, regulate it, and if it stops moving, subsidize it.”7 But as companies competed on an ever more global scale, countries became ever more committed to market-based economies and to enforcing competition laws. Today there are more than 130 different jurisdictions with antitrust agencies. A merger of two multinational firms can trigger merger filings and reviews in a dozen or more jurisdictions. Cartels affecting the global supply chain may involve companies engaged in illegal activity in countries separated by thousands of miles, numerous time zones, and multiple languages. Unilateral conduct enforcement in one jurisdiction has the potential to affect marketing and licensing practices not just in that jurisdiction, but around the world. ', 'For antitrust enforcers, this means that international coordination and cooperation are more important than ever. Without these tools, the uncertainty associated with divergent approaches to enforcement has potentially significant costs for globally active companies, and the risks of inconsistent and potentially conflicting remedies are high. Antitrust enforcers who do not consider the global impact of their enforcement decisions can create inefficiencies that ultimately harm consumers throughout our interconnected world. ']

[(6, 15)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-Adam-Kiihnl-Aff-Harvard-Round6.docx

Kentucky

AdKi

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kentucky/AdKi/Kentucky-Adam-Kiihnl-Aff-Harvard-Round6.docx

4780e020e323bf266dc5886fc11b8c0d3a6fec06ff60e60614934ade72009305

Climate change causes extinction

Hilton 22

a two-metre sea rise would displace 2.5% of the world’s population displaced populations increase scarcity and the risk of conflict displacement increases the spread of diseases Climate change s create economic shocks, migration crises, and resource scarcity Russia, China, India, Pakistan, the EU, or the US, could cause a great power war Migration crises, heat stress, sea rise, changes to agriculture, or broader economic effects on these countries contribute to the chances of conflict Conflict makes it harder to solve coordination problems it incentivises arms races which increases existential risk Climate change hurt economic prospects, which can create desperation violence unrest and war we could be driven to develop destabilising technology Risks to humanity don’t just affect particular groups promising solutions require global cooperation climate change will reduce our ability to cooperate instability increases the risk of terrorist groups unilaterally acting to cause a catastrophe

climate change seems to contribute to the risk of human extinction anyway, by making other existential threats worse Climate change will likely increase migration, which could lead to instability higher temperatures and rising sea levels will significantly affect where people are able to live. And other factors (like changes to agriculture) will affect where people are able to make a living, also leading to more migration a half-metre sea level rise implies the displacement of 72 million people a two-metre sea level rise would displace 2.5% of the world’s population At 6°C of warming, warmer areas without air conditioning could become unlivable, causing migrations of potentially hundreds of millions of people. displaced populations can increase resource scarcity and the risk of conflict in countries that they move to Forced displacement also arguably increases the spread of infectious diseases and general political tensions How might this increase extinction risk? The biggest route is through increasing conflict and therefore the risk of great power war, which seems like a significant risk factor for extinction. Climate change ’ s clear ability to create economic shocks, migration crises, and resource scarcity makes it completely plausible that there will be (as there have already been23) conflicts at least partially caused by climate change. Lots of this conflict is likely to be civil conflict in areas that are already unsta ble and are particularly vulnerable to climate change . If climate change significantly affects the fortunes of Russia, China, India, Pakistan, the EU, or the US, this could cause a great power war . Migration crises, heat stress, sea level rise, changes to agriculture, or broader economic effects on these countries could all contribute to the chances of conflict . it’s worth taking seriously Conflict makes it harder to solve coordination problems it incentivises dangerous arms races , which are even more dangerous when they’re between great powers. Because of this, it stands to reason that conflict — especially between powerful nations — increases existential risk . Climate change could make society less stable in other ways Reduction in tax revenues because of changes to the economy can make people in power less able to act. This changes the relative strengths of political factions, making changes in governments mo re likely. Climate change could hurt people’s economic prospects, which can create desperation and violence . This can be a key cause of civil unrest and civil war . When climate change causes hardship, populations may blame their governments, increasing political instability we could be driven to develop destabilising technology to change our climate with the intention of averting catastrophe — e.g. solar geoengineering. is poses its own risks, as it will be near impossible to carry out experiments on the global scale we’d need to act in order to verify the safety of our technology Risks to humanity (like nuclear war or pandemics) don’t just affect particular groups or countries, so we shouldn’t be surprised if many of the most promising solutions require global cooperation . climate change will reduce our ability to cooperate increased resource scarcity (in particular water scarcity) caused by climate change could increase the risk of conflict in Kashmir, one of the most important flashpoints for great power and potentially nuclear war General instability also increases the risk of individual actors like terrorist groups unilaterally acting to cause a catastrophe . And this sort of deliberate harm is one of the key ways we could succumb to a global catastrophic biological risk the worse climate change becomes, the more unpredictable these things will be.

['(Benjamin Hilton - Benjamin is a Research Analyst at 80,000 Hours. He is a former civil servant, having worked as a policy adviser across the UK government in the Cabinet Office, Treasury and Department for International Trade. He has master’s degrees in economics and theoretical physics and he has published in the fields of physics, history and complexity science.), “Is climate change the greatest threat facing humanity today?“, 80,000 Hours, 5-1-2022, accessed — 10-19-2022, NCS, https://80000hours.org/problem-profiles/climate-change/', 'How climate change could cause extinction indirectly anyway We’ve argued that climate change is very, very unlikely to directly cause human extinction. But climate change seems to contribute to the risk of human extinction anyway, by making other existential threats worse. Here we’ll go over the common factors people put forward to argue that climate change might increase extinction risk, and how big a contributor we think each factor really is. Climate change will likely increase migration, which could lead to instability As we’ve seen, higher temperatures and rising sea levels will significantly affect where people are able to live. And other factors (like changes to agriculture) will affect where people are able to make a living, also leading to more migration. According to the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report, a half-metre sea level rise (without governments implementing adaptive measures) implies the displacement of 72 million people; a two-metre sea level rise (something like the IPCC’s worst-case scenario) would displace 2.5% of the world’s population. These figures assume we wouldn’t act to prevent this displacement — measures like building protective dikes could reduce this to less than half a million people. If there’s more extreme warming, we’ll see more extreme migration. At 6°C of warming, warmer areas without air conditioning could become unlivable, causing migrations of potentially hundreds of millions of people. It’s often claimed that displaced populations can increase resource scarcity and the risk of conflict in countries that they move to. Forced displacement also arguably increases the spread of infectious diseases and general political tensions. But it’s very difficult to estimate the size of these effects — and from there, to estimate the implications of these effects for the rest of society. How might this increase extinction risk? The biggest route is through increasing conflict and therefore the risk of great power war, which seems like a significant risk factor for extinction. We’ll turn directly to that factor now. Will climate change increase global conflicts? Climate change’s clear ability to create economic shocks, migration crises, and resource scarcity makes it completely plausible that there will be (as there have already been23) conflicts at least partially caused by climate change. Lots of this conflict is likely to be civil conflict in areas that are already unstable and are particularly vulnerable to climate change (the ICCP’s Fifth Assessment Report focuses on civil war in Africa). There’s also the possibility of much larger wars. If climate change significantly affects the fortunes of Russia, China, India, Pakistan, the EU, or the US, this could cause a great power war. Migration crises, heat stress, sea level rise, changes to agriculture, or broader economic effects on these countries could all contribute to the chances of conflict. This is all pretty speculative, but we still think it’s worth taking seriously. Conflict makes it harder to solve coordination problems. For example, it incentivises dangerous arms races, which are even more dangerous when they’re between great powers. Because of this, it stands to reason that conflict — especially between powerful nations — increases existential risk. Climate change could make society less stable in other ways There are many other proposed pathways for climate change to make our society generally less stable. For example: Reduction in tax revenues because of changes to the economy (e.g. if a country’s agricultural land becomes less productive) can make people in power less able to act. This changes the relative strengths of political factions, making changes in governments more likely. Climate change could hurt people’s economic prospects, which can create desperation and violence. This can be a key cause of civil unrest and civil war. When climate change causes hardship, populations may (correctly or incorrectly) blame their governments, increasing political instability. It’s also possible that we could be driven to develop destabilising technology to change our climate with the intention of averting catastrophe — e.g. solar geoengineering. But this poses its own risks, as it will be near impossible to carry out experiments on the global scale we’d need to act in order to verify the safety of our technology. And technology to change the weather could in turn lead to conflict between (or within) states over things like induced droughts or rainfall. Summing up: how climate change makes global catastrophic risks worse Risks to humanity (like nuclear war or pandemics) don’t just affect particular groups or countries, so we shouldn’t be surprised if many of the most promising solutions require global cooperation. Fortunately, if we have the ability to cooperate to reduce these risks, we expect that we will. After all, if we don’t, the consequence is global catastrophe! But actually having this ability is vital. Unfortunately, it seems like climate change will reduce our ability to cooperate. For example, it’s been suggested that increased resource scarcity (in particular water scarcity) caused by climate change could increase the risk of conflict in Kashmir, one of the most important flashpoints for great power and potentially nuclear war (in this case, between India and Pakistan, even though both sides have an interest in avoiding war). We’re not sure this is right, but it doesn’t seem impossible. General instability also increases the risk of individual actors like terrorist groups unilaterally acting to cause a catastrophe. And this sort of deliberate harm is one of the key ways we could succumb to a global catastrophic biological risk. We think that the 21st century could plausibly be humanity’s most important due to rapid technological progress, especially in artificial intelligence. If that’s true, we’re going to want to be very careful to ensure it goes well. Lots of unpredictable things will happen, and climate change will be a key cause of many of them. And the worse climate change becomes, the more unpredictable these things will be. That in itself might be a strong reason to dedicate your career to working on climate change.', 'This means the China advantages turns the DA—we can’t cooperate on anything especially war with accelerating climate change. Only the AFF solves because we create US China relations which solves climate—that’s the conceded Horton evidence. ']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PrWe-Aff-5--CSULB-Round-7.docx

Minnesota

PrWe

778e76965b181fcfacf0439a0406521023b9ad27ae61f1e40a8afa82cb76a9d7

US leadership in nuclear fusion ensures US science leadership AND checks a laundry list of risks including warming, grid security, and non-prolif

Gattie 20 [David K. Gattie, Associate Professor of Engineering in the University of Georgia’s College of Engineering, School of Environmental, Civil, Agricultural and Mechanical Engineering, and a Resident Fellow in the University of Georgia’s Center for International Trade and Security, B.S. and Ph.D. from the University of Georgia, serves on the Advisory Board for the Energy Policy Institute at Boise State University; and Joshua N. K. Massey, Director of the Master of International Policy program at the University of Georgia, PhD from UGA’s School of Public and International Affairs, “Twenty-First-Century US Nuclear Power,” Vol. 14, No. 3, Fall 2020, pp. 121-142, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26937414]

Nuclear power not merely energy issue leveraging geopolitical objectives . revisionist powers lead in science engineering , and tech with adverse implications Energy shapes international because of dual utility Nuclear power is an instrument of foreign policy hubris for US to sustain leadership in nuclear tech uphold commitment to control , maintain reliable grid , and climate change

America’s twentieth-century policy on peaceful uses of nuclear power was original US strategic thinking Nuclear power generation is not merely a domestic energy issue Competing powers are leveraging civilian nuclear collaborations to meet strategic geopolitical objectives . If America retreats from civilian nuclear field, revisionist powers will become global lead ers in nuclear science , nuclear engineering , and nuclear tech nology with adverse implications In a globalized, interdependent world, energy is among a country’s most important natural resources . Abundant supplies of marketable energy afford resource-rich countries with geopolitical opportunities and advantages historical trend in energy has been toward resources of greater energy density coupled with development of technologies to harness and channel energy into the human endeavor. Energy animates a country’s economy and underpins technological capacity to protect itself and defend its interests shapes geopolitical relationships and international stature Nuclear energy is arguably most complex energy resource because of its dual utility for civilian power and military weaponry Nuclear power is an instrument of US national security and foreign policy . bipolar Cold War have given way to a globalized, multipolar twenty-first century with nations turning to nuclear power to meet economic development needs faces specter of climate change When international control of nuclear energy, competition for global nuclear technology leadership, and climate change are combined challenges appear more complex It might be considered hubris for US to conclude it can sustain its global leadership role in nuclear science and tech nology, uphold its commitment to international control of nuclear energy , maintain a reliable electric grid , and meet the additional challenge of climate change while unilaterally disengaging from civilian nuclear power

Competing powers leveraging civilian nuclear collaborations geopolitical objectives nuclear science nuclear engineering nuclear tech adverse implications animates economy underpins geopolitical relationships international stature civilian power military weaponry instrument foreign policy economic development needs hubris global leadership role nuclear science tech commitment international control nuclear energy reliable electric grid challenge climate change unilaterally disengaging civilian nuclear power

['America’s twentieth-century policy on the peaceful uses of nuclear power was original US strategic thinking. It was a policy founded on a rules-based liberal international order shaped by personal experiences and aligned with comprehensive, long-term national security objectives. However, in the twenty-first century, the US is embroiled in a national discussion as to whether it should advance its civilian nuclear power enterprise or abandon it altogether. This disposition conflicts with America’s original nuclear power policy and does not align with twenty-first-century realities. Nuclear power generation is not merely a domestic energy issue subject to popular opinion or the volatility of energy markets. Competing powers are leveraging civilian nuclear collaborations to meet strategic geopolitical objectives. If America retreats from the civilian nuclear field, revisionist powers will become the global leaders in nuclear science, nuclear engineering, and nuclear technology in the twenty-first-century with adverse implications for US national security. Thus, the civilian nuclear power enterprise should be included as a strategic sector within the US national security industrial base and deliberated as a foreign policy issue within a global alliance.', 'In a globalized, interdependent world, energy is among a country’s most important natural resources. Abundant supplies of marketable energy such as coal, oil, and natural gas afford resource-rich countries with geopolitical opportunities and advantages that resource-poor countries lack. The historical trend in energy has been toward resources of greater energy density coupled with the development of technologies to harness and channel energy into the human endeavor. Energy animates a country’s economy and underpins the technological capacity to protect itself and defend its interests. It has a value proposition beyond that of a market commodity as it defines and shapes geopolitical relationships and international stature.', 'Nuclear energy is arguably the most complex energy resource because of its dual utility for civilian power and military weaponry, both of which have distinct strategic roles. Because of this dual utility, it should not be reduced to a mere domestic energy policy issue. Nuclear power is of such strategic importance that it must be viewed as an instrument of US national security and foreign policy. This article first reviews the original principles of US nuclear power policy and evaluates the disposition of twenty-first-century US nuclear power policy. Next, it identifies domestic and international issues that are challenging the US nuclear enterprise. Finally, the article recommends two core actions for aligning twenty-first-century US nuclear power policy with national security and foreign policy.', 'The twentieth century and the bipolar Cold War that threatened it have given way to a globalized, multipolar twenty-first century with nations turning to nuclear power to meet economic development needs.1 At the same time, the twenty-first century faces the specter of climate change—a global issue that is complicating US energy discussions. When international control of nuclear energy, competition for global nuclear technology leadership, and climate change are combined, these challenges of twenty-first-century US nuclear power policy appear more complex than those of the twentieth century.2 It might, then, be considered hubris for the US to conclude it can sustain its global leadership role in nuclear science and technology, uphold its commitment to international control of nuclear energy, maintain a reliable electric grid, and meet the additional challenge of climate change while unilaterally disengaging from civilian nuclear power. In all, America is facing a perfect storm of twenty-first-century domestic and international challenges to its nuclear power enterprise. We contend that the legacy principles of US nuclear power policy established in the twentieth century remain sound and valid and that actions are required to operationalize those principles to meet this century’s national security challenges.', '']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

MichiganState-GuMi-Neg-CSULB-Round-5.docx

MichiganState

GuMi

1110a71fa56e144d1e78393acc1ccf4544e4413a631b016fc6cb7c9338171995

It enables effective allocation.

Anderson 18 - (*Robert D. Anderson, **William E. Kovacic, ***Anna Caroline Müller and ****Nadezhda Sporysheva *Senior Counsellor and Team Leader for Government Procurement and Competition Policy, Intellectual Property, Government Procurement and Competition Division, WTO Secretariat; Honorary Professor, School of Law @ University of Nottingham, UK **Global Competition Professor of Law and Policy and Director @ Competition Law Center @ George Washington University Law School; Visiting Professor @ Dickson Poon School of Law, King's College London; and Non-Executive Director, UK Competition and Markets Authority ***Legal Affairs Officer, Intellectual Property, Government Procurement and Competition Division, WTO Secretariat ****Legal/Economic Analyst, Intellectual Property, Government Procurement and Competition Division, WTO Secretariat; 10-21-2018, World Trade Organization Economic Research and Statistics Division, "Competition Policy, Trade And The Global Economy: Existing WTO Elements, Commitments In Regional Trade Agreements, Current Challenges And Issues For Reflection," doa: 6-4-2021) url: https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201812_e.pdf

jurisdictional conflicts may arise 'positive comity' can be helpful allows one party to request another party take enforcement actions thus, allocating effectively enforcement resources

the extraterritorial reach of competition law is a sensitive issue and jurisdictional conflicts may arise , two different countries may assert their own jurisdiction in the same case, leading to potential divergent assessments the possibility of 'positive comity' can be , where available, helpful . Positive comity allows one party to request another party to take appropriate enforcement actions with respect to anti-competitive activities occurring in the territory of the requested party that adversely affect important interests of the requesting party, thus, allocating effectively enforcement resources by allowing the better-placed party to deal with the issue

extraterritorial reach sensitive issue jurisdictional conflicts may arise 'positive comity' allocating effectively enforcement resources better-placed party

['', "In part to tackle these issues, an increasing number of jurisdictions have embraced versions of the 'effects doctrine'. 276 Under this principle, domestic competition laws are applicable to firms and arrangements based outside of the domestic market when they have effects that are felt within the domestic territory. Such applications of competition law have, beyond a doubt, yielded important benefits for consumers in many instances. Nonetheless, the extraterritorial reach of competition law is a sensitive issue and jurisdictional conflicts may arise. For example, two different countries may assert their own jurisdiction in the same case, leading to potential divergent assessments. In such circumstances, the possibility of 'positive comity' can be, where available, helpful. Positive comity allows one party (requesting) to request another party (requested) to take appropriate enforcement actions with respect to anti-competitive activities occurring in the territory of the requested party that adversely affect important interests of the requesting party, thus, allocating effectively enforcement resources by allowing the better-placed party to deal with the issue.277", '', '', '', '']

[(0, 11)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Amundsen-Frese-Aff-MAC-Round5.docx

Minnesota

AmFr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/AmFr/Minnesota-Amundsen-Frese-Aff-MAC-Round5.docx

bdf168d15d9b673b8e6a34f4aa775441d3553c16cf9e32c80aa231b5d9e360f2

Infrastructure prevents food supply shocks.

Jahn '19 [Chris; 8/7/19; president and CEO of The Fertilizer Institute; "America is in desperate need of infrastructure investment: Senate highway bill a step in the right direction," https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/456602-america-is-in-desperate-need-of-infrastructure-investment-senate/]

infrastructure is in need situation degraded national growth For agriculture flooding highlights how vulnerable our network is and how quickly food be severed hurting ability to deliver fertilizer rains wash away bridges that keep our economy growing communities connected delivery of fertilizer is essential to keeping yields high to sate global demand the U S is the globe’s top exporter

our country’s infrastructure is in desperate need of investment As our network of roads and bridges have continued to crumble, the situation has degraded from an occasional personal inconvenience to a serious barrier to national economic growth and prosperity. The infrastructure network we depend upon to move people and commercial goods is operating on borrowed time For agriculture , recent flooding in the Midwest highlights how vulnerable our network is and how quickly critical food supply chains can be severed . These disruptions can potentially lead to higher prices on everyday goods for all consumers roads and bridges have always played a critical role in getting plant nutrients to farmers’ fields with railroad rate increases, rail service challenges and stalled reform roadway infrastructure is more important now than ever the state of our road system is hurting our industry’s ability to deliver fertilizer to customers heavy rains wash away deteriorating roads and bridges that that keep our economy growing and our communities connected The safe and reliable delivery of fertilizer to ensure that nutrients can be applied at just the right time in the growing process is absolutely essential to both keeping crop yields high enough to sate global demand and protecting the environment Carbon capture and recycling will continue to be a strategy to reduce emissions from the nitrogen fertilizer production process Additional investments in research and development in this area will help continue to reduce emissions by making the technology more feasible, efficient and scalable for future use. the fertilizer industry relies heavily on the timely delivery of product to growers where and when they need it so they can grow the food, fuel and fiber to feed a growing world Our country’s farmers are the most productive in the world and the U S is the globe’s top agricultural exporter A robust and well-maintained infrastructure network to facilitate the movement of critical inputs is necessary to ensure that doesn’t change.

desperate need of investment serious barrier to national economic growth recent flooding in the Midwest vulnerable our network is how quickly critical food supply chains can be severed fertilizer to customers heavy rains deteriorating roads and bridges communities connected keeping crop yields high sate global demand protecting the environment reduce emissions feed a growing world U S globe’s top agricultural exporter

['It’s no secret that our country’s infrastructure is in desperate need of investment after years of neglect. We’ve all groaned and said some choice words when hitting deep potholes or been late to an appointment due to road or bridge closures. As our network of roads and bridges have continued to crumble, the situation has degraded from an occasional personal inconvenience to a serious barrier to national economic growth and prosperity.', 'The infrastructure network we depend upon to move people and commercial goods has long outlived its designed lifespan and is operating on borrowed time. For agriculture, recent flooding in the Midwest highlights how vulnerable our network is, the extensive nature of disrepair and how quickly critical food supply chains can be severed. These disruptions are not just headaches for the fertilizer and farming industries; they can potentially lead to higher prices on everyday goods for all consumers.', 'Last week Sens. John Barrasso (R-Wyo.), Tom Carper (D-Del.), Shelley Moore Capito (R-W.Va.) and Ben Cardin (D-Md.) demonstrated much needed leadership by introducing “America’s Transportation Infrastructure Act of 2019,” legislation that would provide $287 billion over five years to maintain and repair our crumbling roads and bridges. The funding level authorized in the bill is a nearly 30 percent increase over current levels and will be a much-needed economic shot in the arm for all communities and local economies across the country.', 'Our country’s roads and bridges have always played a critical role in getting plant nutrients to farmers’ fields when they are needed. But with railroad rate increases, rail service challenges and stalled reform efforts due to oversight board vacancies, roadway infrastructure is more important now than ever. Unfortunately, the state of our road system is hurting our industry’s ability to deliver fertilizer to customers. Last year we had truck drivers waiting in line for up to 11 hours to pick up fertilizer due to bottlenecks and breakdowns in road networks. This year we saw heavy rains wash away deteriorating roads and bridges that should have long ago been repaired and upgraded to standards that keep our economy growing and our communities connected. The Senate proposal would provide $6 billion over five years to address the backlog of bridges in poor condition nationwide and alleviate and prevent future network delays.', 'The importance of the timeliness of fertilizer deliveries cannot be overstated. The safe and reliable delivery of fertilizer to ensure that nutrients can be applied at just the right time in the growing process is absolutely essential to both keeping crop yields high enough to sate global demand and protecting the environment. The Fertilizer Institute (TFI) has for years been tirelessly promoting 4R Nutrient Stewardship, a collection of best management practices which include using the Right fertilizer source, at the Right rate, at the Right time and in the Right place. The 4Rs have been identified by multiple conservation and environmental stakeholders as one of the most impactful pathways to keep fertilizer on fields where it belongs and out of waterways where it doesn’t. A key part of that formula is getting it there at the Right time and a reliable infrastructure network is necessary to make that happen.', 'In addition to providing needed investment in roads and bridges, the Senate legislation supports increased research for carbon capture and storage projects. Thanks to years of investment, nitrogen fertilizer production efficiency has essentially reached its technical efficiency limit due to the laws of chemistry. Carbon capture and recycling is and will continue to be a strategy to reduce emissions from the nitrogen fertilizer production process. In 2016, our industry captured 8 million metric tons of carbon dioxide, the equivalent of removing 1.7 million cars from the road for a year. Additional investments in research and development in this area will help continue to reduce emissions by making the technology more feasible, efficient and scalable for future use.', 'At the end of the day, the fertilizer industry relies heavily on the timely delivery of product to growers where and when they need it so they can grow the food, fuel and fiber to feed a growing world. Our country’s farmers are the best and most productive in the world and the United States is the globe’s top agricultural exporter. A robust and well-maintained infrastructure network to facilitate the movement of critical inputs is necessary to ensure that doesn’t change. “America’s Transportation Infrastructure Act” will help ensure U.S. agriculture has a 21st century transportation network that allows it to thrive and grow in a competitive global marketplace.']

[(0, 4), (5, 6), (6, 8)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Pierry-Rabbini-Neg-Kentucky-Octas.docx

Michigan

PiRa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/PiRa/Michigan-Pierry-Rabbini-Neg-Kentucky-Octas.docx

61962488d2ba97fa875a565d38b7fe5ecb20ca163ffa6ea2e3d67e3742c4c4a7

There’s roughly a dozen clear buckets of topical AFFs—the author of our interp lists out doctrinal exemptions—every AFF highlighted has been read by a team this year!

Christopher L. Sagers 15, James A. Thomas Distinguished Professor of Law and Faculty Director of the Cleveland-Marshall Solo Practice Incubator at the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University, “Table of Contents,” Handbook on the Scope of Antitrust, American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law, 2015,

The Scope of Federal Antitrust Trade or Commerce The Extraterritorial Reach Limitations Respecting Comity U.S. Exports National Security Review “Petitioning” Immunity Doctrine of Implied Repeal “Filed-Rate” Doctrine Organized Labor Agriculture Newspaper Production FCC Review Sports Insurance Banking Air Transport Shipping Railroad Exemptions

The Domestic Scope of Antitrust, Unadulterated The Scope of Federal Antitrust Unadulterated Trade or Commerce Exclusion of Charity and Gratuity Chapter III The International Scope of U.S. Antitrust The Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Antitrust Law Limitations Respecting Foreign Sovereignty and Foreign Relations Policy Comity U.S. Exports Webb-Pomerene Act FTAIA’s Export Protection National Security Review The Noerr -Pennington Doctrine or “Petitioning” Immunity The State Action Doctrine and Litigation Against State and Local Governments The Doctrine of Implied Repeal and the Federal Instrumentality Rule Credit Suisse The Keogh or “Filed-Rate” Doctrine The Doctrine Of Primary Jurisdiction Antitrust and Organized Labor Antitrust and Agriculture The Cooperatives Exemption: Antitrust Issues under Capper-Volstead and the Fishermen’s Collective Marketing Act The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act Chapter XIII Antitrust and the Media Newspaper Production Joint Ventures FCC Merger Review and Broadcast Ownership Rules Antitrust and Sports in General The Baseball Exemption The Curt Flood Act The Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 The NFL-AFL Merger The Olympic and Amateur Sports Act The Labor Exemption In Sports Statutory Exemptions for Regulated Industries Insurance and the McCarran-Ferguson Banking and the Financial Sector Air Transport Exemptions Ocean Shipping Railroad Exemptions

The Domestic Scope of Antitrust, Unadulterated The Scope of Federal Antitrust Unadulterated Trade or Commerce Exclusion of Charity and Gratuity The Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Antitrust Law Comity U.S. Exports Webb-Pomerene Act FTAIA’s Export Protection National Security Review The Noerr -Pennington Doctrine or “Petitioning” Immunity The State Action Doctrine and Litigation Against State and Local Governments The Doctrine of Implied Repeal and the Federal Instrumentality Rule Credit Suisse The Keogh or “Filed-Rate” Doctrine The Doctrine Of Primary Jurisdiction Antitrust and Organized Labor Antitrust and Agriculture The Cooperatives Exemption: Antitrust Issues under Capper-Volstead and the Fishermen’s Collective Marketing Act The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act Chapter XIII Antitrust and the Media Newspaper Production Joint Ventures FCC Merger Review and Broadcast Ownership Rules Antitrust and Sports in General Statutory Exemptions for Regulated Industries Insurance and the McCarran-Ferguson Banking and the Financial Sector Air Transport Exemptions Ocean Shipping Railroad Exemptions

['', 'Chapter II', 'The Domestic Scope of Antitrust, Unadulterated ........................ 13', 'A. The Scope of Federal Antitrust Unadulterated: The “Commerce” Requirement, the Meaning of “Persons,” and the Complicated Reach of the Clayton and FTC Acts ......................................................... 13', '1. “Trade or Commerce” in General, Its Exclusion of Charity and Gratuity, and the Baseball Exemption ...................................................... 13', '2. “Persons” ....................................................................... 17', '3. The Reach of Clayton Act Section 7: Limitation on “Persons” Who Acquire “Assets” ............................ 21', '4. The Jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission ................................................................... 23', '5. Clayton Act Sections 3 and 8, and the RobinsonPatman Act .................................................................... 25', 'Chapter III', 'The International Scope of U.S. Antitrust ................................... 27', 'A. Political Compromises Underlying the International Scope of Antitrust ................................................................ 27', 'B. The Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Antitrust Law, in General ............................................................................. 30', '1. The Traditional “Effects Test” ...................................... 30', '2. Codification of Extraterritorial Scope in FTAIA .......... 32', 'a. In General ............................................................... 32', 'b. Import Trade or Commerce .................................... 34', 'c. Foreign, Non-Import Commerce with “Direct, Substantial, and Reasonably Foreseeable” Domestic Effects ............................... 36', 'd. Plaintiff’s Claim Must Arise from a Domestic U.S. Harm ............................................... 38', 'C. Limitations Respecting Foreign Sovereignty and Foreign Relations Policy ...................................................... 40', '1. Comity ........................................................................... 40', '2. Sovereign Immunity ...................................................... 42', '3. Act of State .................................................................... 43', '4. Foreign Sovereign Compulsion ..................................... 46', 'D. Statutory Protection for U.S. Exports .................................. 47', '1. Webb-Pomerene Act ..................................................... 47', '2. The Export Trading Company Act of 1982 ................... 49', '3. FTAIA’s Export Protection ........................................... 51', 'E. Exon-Florio: National Security Review of Certain International Acquisitions ....................................... 51', 'PART TWO', 'ANTITRUST AND THE CONSTITUTION', 'Chapter IV', 'Antitrust and the Constitution ....................................................... 57', 'A. Antitrust, Expression, and Free Association ........................ 58', '1. Private Speech as a Component of Anticompetitive Conduct ............................................... 59', '2. Political Activity and Public Speech .............................. 60', '3. Association ..................................................................... 70', 'B. Antitrust and the Press .......................................................... 71', 'C. Antitrust and Religion ........................................................... 73', 'PART THREE', 'ANTITRUST AND POLITICS', 'Chapter V', 'The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine or “Petitioning” Immunity ..... 77', 'A. The Key Cases ..................................................................... 77', 'B. The Basis of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine: Statutory Construction Versus the First Amendment ......................................................................... 80', 'C. What Is Petitioning? ............................................................ 84', '1. In General ..................................................................... 84', '2. Antitrust Violations Themselves Are Not “Petitioning” .................................................... 87', '3. The “Sham” Exception ................................................. 88', '4. The “Misrepresentation” or Corruption Exception ...................................................................... 91', '5. The “Commercial” Exception ...................................... 94', '6. Ministerial Government Acts ....................................... 94', 'D. Who May Be Petitioned ...................................................... 96', '1. Quasi-Governmental Entities ....................................... 96', '2. Petitioning of Foreign Governments ............................ 98', '3. Foreign Parties Petitioning the U.S. Government .................................................................. 99', 'Chapter VI', 'The State Action Doctrine and Litigation Against State and Local Governments ........................................................................ 101', 'A. The State Action Doctrine ................................................... 101', '1. Origins and Development ............................................. 103', '2. Persons and Entities Entitled to Immunity ................... 106', 'a. The “Ipso Facto” Immunity of the State Qua State ............................................ 106', 'b. Cities, Counties, and Municipalities ....................... 107', 'c. Executive Departments, Agencies, and Special Authorities ........................................... 107', '3. Issues in the Midcal Elements ....................................... 110', 'a. The Clear Articulation Requirement ....................... 110', 'b. The Active Supervision Requirement ..................... 114', '4. Exceptions to State Action Immunity ............................ 117', 'a. Exceptions That Have Been Rejected: Conspiracy, Malicious Motives, and Corruption ................................................................ 117', 'b. The Uncertain Viability of the Market Participant Exception ............................................... 119', 'B. The Local Government Antitrust Act ................................... 120', '1. In General ....................................................................... 121', '2. Entities and Persons Entitled to Protection ..................... 122', 'C. Constitutional Aspects of Antitrust Litigation Against State and Local Government ................................... 125', '1. Sovereign Immunity Issues: The Eleventh Amendment and the Rule of Ex Parte Young .............................................................................. 126', '2. Antitrust and the Immunity for Public Officials .......................................................................... 129', '3. Facial Challenge to Anticompetitive State Laws: Sherman Act “Preemption” and the “Hybrid Restraints” Concept .......................................... 132', 'PART FOUR', 'DOCTRINES OF IMPLICIT REPEAL', 'Chapter VII', 'The Doctrine of Implied Repeal and the Federal Instrumentality Rule ................................................................................................... 137', 'A. Implied Repeal and the Evolution of the Traditional Standard: Repeals by Implication Were Disfavored ............. 138', 'B. Credit Suisse .......................................................................... 144', 'C. Lower Court Developments Since Credit Suisse .................. 146', '1. The “Generality” Gloss of Short Sale ............................. 146', '2. Other Lower Court Developments .................................. 147', 'D. The Federal Instrumentality Rule .......................................... 150', 'Chapter VIII', 'The Keogh or “Filed-Rate” Doctrine .............................................. 153', 'A. The Filed-Rate Doctrine in General....................................... 154', 'B. Doctrinal Details .................................................................... 158', '1. Scope of the Doctrine ...................................................... 158', '2. The Filed-Rate Doctrine and Deregulation ..................... 164', '3. Exceptions ....................................................................... 166', 'C. Future Prospects .................................................................... 170', 'Chapter IX\t', 'The Doctrine Of Primary Jurisdiction ........................................... 173', 'A. Origin and Contours of Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine ................................................................................. 174', 'B. Primary Jurisdiction in the Antitrust Context ........................ 178', 'C. Determining Whether Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine Applies .................................................................... 181', '1. Identifying Appropriate Issues for Reference to Agency ........................................................................ 181', '2. Determining Whether Agency Has Jurisdiction ...................................................................... 183', '3. Determining Whether Referral Is Warranted ........................................................................ 184', 'D. Procedures Applicable to Primary Jurisdiction Referral .................................................................................. 187', 'E. Review of Decision to Invoke Primary Jurisdiction ............................................................................. 189', 'PART FIVE', 'ISSUES OF SECTOR-WIDE APPLICABILITY', 'Chapter X', 'Antitrust and Organized Labor ...................................................... 193', 'A. Historical Background ........................................................... 194', 'B. Current Law ........................................................................... 196', '1. The “Statutory” Exemption ............................................. 196', '2. The “Nonstatutory” Exemption ....................................... 200', 'Chapter XI', 'Antitrust and Agriculture ................................................................ 207', 'A. The Policy Problem and Evolution of the Statutory Framework ............................................................. 208', 'B. The Cooperatives Exemption: Antitrust Issues under Capper-Volstead and the Fishermen’s Collective Marketing Act ...................................................... 214', '1. Applicability ................................................................... 214', '2. Exempt and Non-Exempt Conduct ................................. 219', '3. The Regulatory Roles of the Secretaries of Agriculture and Commerce ........................................ 222', 'C. The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act ......................... 224', '1. Orders and Antitrust Liability ......................................... 227', 'a. Filed Rates ................................................................ 228', 'b. Conduct Issues Associated with Orders ................... 228', '2. The Hog-Cholera Serum Exemption ............................... 229', 'Chapter XII', 'Innovation and Entrepreneurship .................................................. 231', 'A. The National Cooperative Research and Production Act and the Standards Development Organization Advancement Act ............................................ 232', '1. Applicability ................................................................... 235', '2. Liability Standard, Awards of Costs and Fees, and Limited Damages ..................................................... 237', 'B. The Small Business Joint Venture Exemption ...................... 238', 'Chapter XIII', 'Antitrust and the Media .................................................................. 241', 'A. Newspaper Production Joint Ventures .................................. 243', '1. Special Economic Problems in the Newspaper Industry ........................................................ 244', '2. The Law of the NPA ....................................................... 246', 'a. Failing Newspaper Test ............................................ 247', 'b. “Effectuate the Policy and Purpose” of the Act ................................................................... 250', 'c. Challenges to Completed JOAs or Conduct by JOA Members ........................................ 250', '3. Reform Efforts ................................................................. 251', 'B. FCC Merger Review and Broadcast Ownership Rules ...................................................................................... 252', '1. Telecommunications Mergers ........................................ 252', '2. Broadcast Ownership Rules ............................................ 254', 'C. Television Programming Collaboration ................................. 256', 'Chapter XIV', 'Antitrust and Sports ......................................................................... 259', 'A. Antitrust and Sports in General .............................................. 259', 'B. The Baseball Exemption and the Curt Flood Act .......................................................................................... 264', '1. Historical Development of the Baseball Exemption ........................................................................ 264', '2. The Curt Flood Act .......................................................... 265', '3. The Scope of the Modern Baseball Exemption ........................................................................ 266', 'C. Statutory Exemptions for Sports ............................................ 267', '1. The Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 .............................. 268', '2. The NFL-AFL Merger ..................................................... 270', '3. The Olympic and Amateur Sports Act ............................ 271', 'D. The Labor Exemption In Sports ............................................. 272', 'PART SIX', 'REGULATED INDUSTRIES AND TARGETED EXEMPTIONS', 'Chapter XV', 'Statutory Exemptions for Regulated Industries ........................... 275', 'A. Insurance and the McCarran-Ferguson Act .......................... 276', '1. Elements of the Exemption ............................................ 277', 'a. The Business of Insurance ....................................... 277', '(1) Rate Setting ....................................................... 278', '(2) Policy Standardization ...................................... 279', '(3) Joint Underwriting Arrangements .................... 279', '(4) Products Without Insurance Risk ...................... 280', '(5) Non-Indemnity Health Insurance ...................... 281', '(6) Relationships Between Insurers and Third-Party Vendors ......................................... 282', '(7) Mergers & Acquisitions .................................... 283', '(8) Marketing, Distribution, & Claims ................... 284', 'b. Regulated by State Law .......................................... 285', 'c. Boycott, Coercion, or Intimidation ......................... 288', '2. Reforming the McCarran-Ferguson Exemption ...................................................................... 290', 'B. Banking and the Financial Sector ......................................... 291', '1. Banking Law as a Competition Policy ........................... 292', '2. The Current Applicability of Antitrust to Banking .......................................................................... 295', 'a. In General ................................................................ 295', 'b. The Robinson-Patman, Clayton, and FTC Acts .......................................................... 297', '3. Bank Merger Review ..................................................... 298', 'a. In General ................................................................ 298', 'b. Resolution of Failing, Systemically Significant Firms ..................................................... 303', '4. Alternative, Bank-Specific Competition Rules ............................................................................... 304', 'a. Objective Size and Concentration Limits ....................................................................... 305', 'b. Bank-Specific Conduct Rules .................................. 305', 'c. Affirmative Deconcentration: BHCA Divestiture Orders and the Kanjorski Amendment ............................................................ 306', '5. Credit Unions ................................................................ 307', 'C. Air Transport Exemptions ................................................... 308', '1. Regulation, Deregulation, and the Current Scope of Antitrust in General .......................... 308', '2. The Exemptions That Remain ...................................... 310', 'a. Cooperative Agreements for International Markets ............................................. 311', '(1) Alliance Agreements ....................................... 312', '(2) Immunity for International Tariff Conferences ........................................... 314', '3. Competition Regulation by the Department of Transportation ........................................................... 315', 'a. Unfair Competition ................................................. 316', 'b. Review of Joint Ventures ........................................ 317', 'D. Ocean Shipping .................................................................... 317', '1. Legal Background ......................................................... 321', '2. Antitrust Immunity ........................................................ 324', '3. Ongoing Deregulatory Efforts ....................................... 326', 'E. Railroad Exemptions ............................................................ 328', '1. Historical Background ................................................... 328', '2. The Authority of the STB and the Applicability of Antitrust Laws in General ........................................................................... 330', '3. Applicability of Antitrust Laws to Specific Practices ........................................................... 332', 'a. Rate-Related Antitrust Exemptions ......................... 332', 'b. Transactional Antitrust Exemptions ........................ 335', '(1) Mergers & Acquisitions .................................... 335', '(2) Pooling Agreements .......................................... 339', '(3) Interlocking Directorates ................................... 339', '(4) Rail Reorganization Meetings ........................... 339', '(5) Other STB Powers with Competitive Consequences: Competitive Access, Market Entry, and Market Exit ................................................ 340', '4. The Future of Railroad Antitrust Exemptions ............... 341', 'F. Collective Agreements among Motor Carriers ................... 342', '1. Price Fixing .................................................................... 343', '2. Interstate Bus Mergers ................................................... 344', '', '', '', '', '', '', '', '', '', '', '', '', '']

[(15, 21), (22, 24), (235, 295)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Amundsen-Frese-Neg-Texas%20Open-Round2.docx

Minnesota

AmFr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/AmFr/Minnesota-Amundsen-Frese-Neg-Texas%2520Open-Round2.docx

cfe5898bbe5a07920037fb108dc96cf071d5078e2e3db1fcb0170df49e56ea10

The aff incentivizes follow-on indigenous litigation---that’s time-consuming, bankrupting, and emotionally damaging

Alexandra Huneeus 22, Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, “THE LEGAL STRUGGLE FOR RIGHTS OF NATURE IN THE UNITED STATES,” https://wlr.law.wisc.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/1263/2022/04/15-Huneeus-Camera-Ready.pdf

nature rights lawyers trick towns into passing illegitimate laws that lock them into costly litigation the flight to symbolic legal actions is a response to legislative losses. Even in countries where rights of nature have strong legal footing, how much it affects change on the ground is unclear Rights are difficult to implement in practice several court judgments granting rights failed to reduce extractivist activities we can construct guardianship models without actually calling them nature rights

U.S. NGOs have begun to acknowledge this by increasingly identifying themselves as working within a movement led by Indigenous peoples in the materials they publish about rights of nature Some have criticized nature rights lawyers trick ing towns into passing illegitimate laws that lock them into costly , losing litigation the flight to symbolic legal actions described here is a response to court and legislative losses. Even in countries where rights of nature have strong legal footing, how much it affects change on the ground is unclear . Rights of nature laws are , without a doubt , difficult to implement in practice several court judgments granting rights to rivers and forests have failed to reduce extractivist activities .168 In any case, we can construct guardianship models without actually calling them nature rights .169

nature rights lawyers passing illegitimate laws lock them into costly , losing litigation flight to symbolic legal actions affects change on the ground without a doubt difficult to implement in practice several failed to reduce extractivist activities construct guardianship models without actually calling them nature rights

['The third dynamic revealed here is a shift in identity. Thus far, rights of nature claims have been most successful in places with strong Indigenous social movements, and these are the places where the legal doctrine is consequently most developed.162 The U.S. NGOs have begun to acknowledge this by increasingly identifying themselves as working within a movement led by Indigenous peoples in the materials they publish about rights of nature.163 As a result, the U.S. movement is currently an unusual amalgam of white suburban and Indigenous communities. More recently, U.S. Native American communities have begun to write nature rights into tribal law.164 There are tactical reasons for this shift in domestic law. There is more autonomy and even more legal ambiguity in the relation of tribal law to state and federal law than there is for municipal law.165 But it is also because this move resonates with nature rights movements abroad. In this sense, it is not just that the U.S. movement is using Southern Indigenous movements to sustain itself; Southern Indigenous movements have reshaped the U.S. movement.166 One could argue that the shifts described above have not been a winning strategy. Even if each year brings a few new ordinances passed in the United States, the U.S. movement is peripheral to the environmental movement as a whole, and it steadily loses court challenges. One might even say that the case of Toledo with which this Article began and the Menominee case with which it ends are but examples of political and legal defeat. Some have criticized nature rights lawyers, accusing them of committing malpractice by tricking towns into passing illegitimate laws that lock them into costly, losing litigation.167 Indeed, the flight to symbolic legal actions described here is a response to court and legislative losses. Even in countries where rights of nature have strong legal footing, how much it affects change on the ground is unclear. Rights of nature laws are, without a doubt, difficult to implement in practice: thus far, several of the court judgments granting rights to rivers and forests have failed to reduce extractivist activities.168 In any case, we can construct guardianship models without actually calling them nature rights.169']

[(10, 20)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-PaCh-Neg-Wake-Forest-Round-5.docx

Northwestern

PaCh

7172908a5b5c6a670a6c0082a94c9b10796ceac0b00be1f9a9e834e74e27b6d5

US is key. Our warrant’s not self-congratulatory hegemony – but relative US commitment to faster global deployments.

Prager 11 (Stewart, Director –Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory and Professor of Astrophysical Sciences – Princeton University, “Perspective On: The future of Fusion”, 5-12, http://www.pppl.gov/polPressReleases.cfm?doc_id=772)

in fusion, our contributions are needed U.S. has a workforce for fusion second to none the U.S. has been at this for quite a while we have a broad and deep workforce of physicists and engineers others are not doing everything. We have ideas in the U.S. needed in the world fusion program if the U.S. disappears will the world get there? I think so , but I don’t think they’ll get there as rapidly as if the U.S. contributed time is important

Why should the U.S. maintain its funding of the fusion program? in fusion, our contributions are needed . The U.S. has a workforce for fusion that is second to none But, since the U.S. has been at this for quite a while and has operated world-class facilities, we have a broad and deep workforce of fusion physicists and engineers producing fusion energy is a complex, multi-faceted problem and others are not doing everything. We have ideas for facilities here in the U.S. that are needed in the world fusion program if the U.S. just disappears from fusion will the rest of the world get there? I think so , but I don’t think they’ll get there as rapidly as they would if the U.S. contributed . And time is important in this problem

our contributions are needed second to none broad and deep workforce needed in the world fusion program think so rapidly time is important

['Why should the U.S. maintain its funding of the fusion program?', 'The first reason is U.S. competitiveness, both the specific competitiveness in fusion and the general competitiveness in science and technology. Whoever controls the energy sector, whoever innovates with the science, is going to be economically dominant. Fusion is a perfect case study of where we can be either retaining our competitiveness or we can give it up. If the latter, we will be importing fusion reactors.', 'Second, in fusion, our contributions are needed. The U.S. has a workforce for fusion that is second to none. In other countries, they have outbuilt us and they may have better hardware. But, since the U.S. has been at this for quite a while and has operated world-class facilities, we have a broad and deep workforce of fusion physicists and engineers. That’s a fabulous workforce that takes time to nurture. Also, producing fusion energy is a complex, multi-faceted problem and others are not doing everything. We have ideas for facilities here in the U.S. that are needed in the world fusion program.', 'You can ask the question, if the U.S. just disappears from fusion will the rest of the world get there? I think so, but I don’t think they’ll get there as rapidly as they would if the U.S. contributed. And time is important in this problem.', '']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

MichiganState-KoLe-Neg-4---CSU-Long-Beach-Round-8.docx

MichiganState

KoLe

6bf76ba1e4fc7b4633d8a4a943a7ce031eb3cad67e61b40bedab4af6bf4730a8

2—Allies Link: experts and countries alike near unanimously believe NFU would decimate cohesion

Ardnt et al. 21 (Anna Clara Arndt is a Policy Fellow for Global Security and Nuclear Policy at the European Leadership Network (ELN). Holds master’s degrees in international security and international Relations from Sciences Po Paris and the London School of Economics and Political Science, and undergraduate degrees focused on European and Middle East studies from University College London and Sciences Po Paris. 12-20-2021, "Euro-Atlantic Concerns regarding a US »Sole Purpose« Policy: A Review of Twenty-One National Perspectives," doα: 9-26-2023 url: )

an NFU divide NATO as it runs counter to the deterrence strategies of the Alliance leading experts from across the continent fear repercussions on NATO’s cohesion Russian coercion and Russian conventional superiority in local theaters Lithuania Latvia Poland Czech Republic Slovakia Romania assesses current US posture ensures credible deterrence and concludes changes should only be made in consultations with allies France U K expressed concerns an SP challenge nuclear policy in NATO Belgium Netherlands Denmark Finland Norway worry an SP could divide NATO weakening collective defense Italy Lisbon only welcome a policy if it was negotiated to reflect concerns of US allies

it would undermine US commitments to allies and partners an SP or NFU pledge might divide NATO as it runs counter to the deterrence strategies of both the Alliance leading experts from across the continent how their country perceives and might react to a potential US NFU countries analyzed here raise concerns regarding an SP declaration fear negative repercussions on both NATO’s cohesion . More precisely opposition towards SP based on anxieties over weakening deterrence governments Russian coercion and reliant upon US security provision appear to be strongly opposed to a policy change officials worri it would weaken deterrence and embolden Moscow. Concerned with potential Russian conventional superiority with in local theaters Lithuania considers the current US policy of “calculated nuclear ambiguity” as ensuring credible deterrence Latvia States Poland ’s Czech Republic see an SP as harming NATO’s nuclear deterrence, as Moscow would likely perceive such a step as weakness Slovakia Romania ’s government assesses current US posture ensures credible extended deterrence and seemingly concludes that changes should only be made in close consultations with allies . France would oppose a US SP, U nited K expressed its concerns in Washington, and UK officials appear to be worried that an SP might embolden Russia, challenge nuclear policy with in NATO NATO Several European allies look concerned with an SP declaration’s impact upon nuclear deterrence, but also anxious about its effect upon NATO unity Belgium Netherlands Denmark Finland worried about cohesion within the Alliance, especially within Russia Norway worry that an SP could divide NATO allies Its security concerns barely touched by US nuclear extended deterrence, Greece weakening collective defense Italy Rome Lisbon would only welcome a policy change if it was adequately negotiated to reflect the concerns of US allies Bulgaria Canada appears to be less ambitious vis-à-vis an SP because of its more uncertain international security environment and more complex alliance relationships, primarily with the United States.

leading experts from across the continent fear negative repercussions on both NATO’s cohesion conventional superiority States ensures and seemingly concludes that changes should only be made in close consultations with allies . upon NATO unity worry that an SP could divide NATO allies weakening collective defense

['', 'While proponents believe that such a change in declaratory policy would reduce the risk of nuclear war, critics have warned it would undermine US commitments to allies and partners relying on extended US nuclear deterrence for their own security. Some have also voiced concerns that an SP or NFU pledge might divide NATO as it runs counter to the deterrence strategies of both the Alliance and of the European nuclear powers, France and the United Kingdom. But how do European and transatlantic capitals, both NATO and nonNATO members, view this debate? What do they make of it? ', 'We asked leading experts from across the continent and beyond how their country perceives and might react to a potential US NFU or SP declaration. Specifically, the contributing authors were asked to offer their assessments on the following questions: ∎ How does your country\'s government view a potential US "no first use" or "sole purpose" declaration? ∎ What is the reason for your country\'s position? ∎ What would be its likely reaction to such a declaration? We explicitly requested experts to assess the positions and gauge the reactions of their countries’ governments – not to offer their own views on SP or other national policies. However, few governments took explicit public stands. Hence, the contributions included here offer well-informed assessments of likely positions, especially in those cases where governments’ standpoints are not publicly available. We would like to sincerely thank all contributors for participating in this project and for sharing their insights.', 'Overall, most of the countries analyzed here raise concerns regarding an SP declaration. Governments fear negative repercussions on both NATO’s military deterrence and the political cohesion of the Alliance. More precisely, in our own attempt to strip down these twenty-one multi-faceted contributions to their barebones, we identified four broad trends. First, opposition towards SP based on anxieties over weakening deterrence Several governments worried about Russian coercion and reliant upon US security provision appear to be strongly opposed to a policy change in Washington. For instance, officials in Estonia would react negatively to an SP, worried that it would weaken deterrence and embolden Moscow. Concerned with potential Russian conventional superiority within local theaters, Tallin could potentially react to an SP by seeking enhanced conventional reassurance through NATO. Lithuania considers the current US policy of “calculated nuclear ambiguity” as ensuring credible deterrence and, hence, serving its security interests vis-àvis Russia. Latvia might even see an SP as an additional bargaining chip for a wider and more permanent US conventional presence in the Baltic States. Poland’s negative stance towards a US SP is no secret, and Warsaw would worry about weakened deterrence and question SP’s benefits for arms control and non-proliferation. The Czech Republic would see an SP as harming NATO’s nuclear deterrence, as Moscow would likely perceive such a step as weakness. Slovakia would also be worried about the message such a change would send to Moscow, but also concerned about the credibility of US commitments, and would, like others, probably request enhanced reassurance. In a deteriorating security environment, Romania’s government assesses that the current US posture ensures credible extended deterrence, and seemingly concludes that changes should only be made in close consultations with allies. ', 'Second, concerns regarding SP by European nuclear powers The two European nuclear-weapon states seem also not enthralled with a sole purpose declaration. France would oppose a US SP, worried that it would weaken nuclear deterrence, send the wrong signals to both adversaries and friends, and create pressures to change French policy as well. The United Kingdom reportedly expressed its concerns in Washington, and UK officials appear to be worried that an SP might embolden Russia, challenge nuclear policy within NATO and put the spotlight on London’s own nuclear policies. ', 'Third, principled support for a potential SP, but reluctance due to a challenging security environment and fears of political fragmentation within NATO Several European allies look concerned with an SP declaration’s impact upon nuclear deterrence, but also anxious about its effect upon NATO unity. For instance, the government in Belgium appears divided, with some welcoming SP’s reduction of emphasis on nuclear deterrence, and others raising concerns about the potential impact upon Alliance cohesion. In addition, some in Brussels seem preoccupied with the financial costs of a reduced reliance upon nuclear deterrence. The Netherlands also welcomes nuclear disarmament steps, but, given the current security environment, the Dutch government would favor maintaining calculated ambiguity. Denmark endorses steps towards nuclear disarmament, but its assessment of an SP would be impacted by such a declaration’s implications for nuclear deterrence. Finland welcomes in principle raising the bar for using nuclear weapons, but would be worried about cohesion within the Alliance, especially within an environment in which Russia is seen as more assertive. Norway publicly supports reducing the significance of nuclear weapons in defense policy, but even Oslo would worry that an SP could divide NATO allies. Its security concerns barely touched by US nuclear extended deterrence, Greece would nonetheless see an SP as weakening collective defense. Less worried about Russian immediate superiority at the theater level and more relaxed about relying upon NATO’s overall conventional superiority, Italy would in principle support an SP, but Rome would still be worried about the effects of a policy change upon NATO. Portugal’s focus is on NATO cohesion, and Lisbon would only welcome a policy change if it was adequately negotiated to reflect the concerns of US allies. Bulgaria, although it does rely on nuclear deterrence to stop Russian aggression, might support deemphasizing the role of nuclear weapons in order to avoid further escalation. Yet even Canada appears to be less ambitious vis-à-vis an SP than has been the case in the past, largely because of its more uncertain international security environment and more complex alliance relationships, primarily with the United States. ', '']

[(0, 15), (491, 535)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-HaBe-Neg-Navy-Round-3.docx

Minnesota

HaBe

676d6cadc4d73607d3061bfe5c0b0631c3160069f12aacb3efcf4a17d55822e1

That boosts the agenda

Cooper 13 [David Cooper, Professor & Chair of the Department of National Security Affairs, US Naval War College, “Globalizing Reagan’s INF Treaty: Easier Done Than Said?” The Nonproliferation Review, 20(1), March 2013, https://www.ciaonet.org/catalog/32977]

to challenge China forcing them to reject INF might restore a healthy dollop of bipartisan support to the president’s agenda

states that have or aspire to nuclear weapons and associated missile delivery systems would resist joining Global INF, potentially rendering the enterprise little more than an empty symbolic gesture China represents the ripest target for applying international pressure, because it is a member in good standing of NPT and the wider community of responsible nonproliferation actors perhaps the single most persuasive reason for the U S to launch a declaratory Global INF initiative is to challenge China ’s long habit of disarmament freeriding by focusing international pressure on Beijing to bring a key part of its growing nuclear arsenal to the disarmament table forcing them to reject Global INF would add one more visible strike against their international cred ibility Globalizing Ronald Reagan’s INF Treaty might even restore a healthy dollop of bipartisan support to at least this part of the president’s nuclear disarmament agenda

challenge China ’s long habit of disarmament freeriding forcing them to reject Global INF visible strike international cred restore a healthy dollop of bipartisan support president’s agenda

['No, the real telling argument here is that states that have or aspire to nuclear weapons and associated missile delivery systems would resist joining Global INF, potentially rendering the enterprise little more than an empty symbolic gesture. This is a reasonable near-term forecast, particularly for a treaty that had been foisted on an unsuspecting world without the legitimacy of emerging from negotiations within the UN system. However, this argument misses the sometimes long-term horizon in establishing a new treaty-based global nonproliferation norm. As one recent study observes, the advent of any such a treaty simultaneously provides a vehicle for: 1) the vast majority of states with low compliance costs (in this case, non-nuclear/non-missile states) to join as an easy symbolic gesture; 2) states with intermediate compliance costs (nuclear/missile ‘‘hedgers’’ and early-stage/investment developers) to be cajoled by the United States and others to join through bilateral incentives/disincentives; and, 3) states with high compliance costs (nuclear/missile possessors and late-stage/investment developers) to be punished over time by the United States and others for failure to join. The study notes that this is precisely the dynamic that the United States and Soviet Union successfully applied in putting the NPT in place and then systematically and incrementally expanding adherence.51 Applying this hierarchy to Global INF, the vast majority of states in the first grouping should be persuadable in reasonably short order, essentially comprising all states not listed in Table 1 (with the possible exception of a few radical fellow travelers who may make a show of solidarity with the ‘‘hard cases,’’ as well as any passive hedgers hoping to keep their options open). In the second category, Egypt and Saudi Arabia*with deep security ties to Washington, obsolete missile programs, and an untarnished status as NPT members in good standing with no known nuclear weapons programs*represent potentially easy pickups (along with any closet hedgers that might have been revealed by their reluctance to join).52 In the third category, China represents the ripest target for applying international pressure, because it alone among the remaining states in Table 1 is a member in good standing of NPT and the wider community of responsible nonproliferation actors. Indeed, perhaps the single most persuasive reason for the United States and Russia to launch a declaratory Global INF initiative is to challenge China’s long habit of disarmament freeriding by focusing international pressure on Beijing to bring a key part of its growing nuclear arsenal to the disarmament table.53 As for the remaining proliferation ‘‘hard cases’’ like Iran and North Korea, forcing them to reject Global INF would add one more visible strike against their international credibility. A Gambit Worth Trying? If the most successful imaginable outcome of a Global INF initiative is nothing more than laying the groundwork for an incremental norm-building effort, would it still be worth trying? Assuming the risks and costs are relatively low, as the present analysis suggests, then yes. At a minimum, it would augment current international ‘‘best practices’’ for nonproliferation, thereby further stigmatizing scofflaws. This, in turn, would afford the United States and its nonproliferation partners a new source of leverage to induce joining by these outliers and the moral high ground in the meantime to pursue supply-side remedies against them. In addition to bolstering long-term nonproliferation goals, partnering with Moscow on a declaratory Global INF initiative could be just the thing to jump-start President Obama’s seemingly stalled nuclear disarmament agenda as he begins a second term. In his April 2009 roadmap to a world without nuclear weapons, the president asserted that completing a new strategic arms reduction treaty with Russia, ‘‘will set the stage for further cuts, and we will seek to include all nuclear weapons states in this endeavor.’’ 54 However, pursuant to an understanding reached with the US Senate in 2010 in connection to ratifying New START, the next step that the Obama administration is tackling is a new follow-on bilateral agreement with Russia in which the United States will seek to redress Russia’s overwhelming imbalance in tactical nuclear weapons. In contrast, Russia is expected to resist this focus and will instead seek new limits on non-deployed strategic warheads and the total withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from Europe. These will be tough issues for the two sides to reconcile, and the Russians, for their part, are not seen to be in any particular hurry.55 Even in an optimistic scenario, these negotiations are likely to occupy the rest of the Obama administration’s tenure. Meanwhile, there is no clear path to coaxing any (never mind all) of the other nuclear weapons states to join in negotiating nuclear reductions. In a nutshell, as things stand, President Obama appears unlikely to achieve his stated goal to multilateralize the nuclear disarmament process. Global INF could provide a quick and easy solution that would strike a cooperative note with Moscow heading into the next round of bilateral negotiations while at the same time get the ball rolling on broadening the nuclear disarmament map. Globalizing Ronald Reagan’s INF Treaty might even restore a healthy dollop of bipartisan support to at least this part of the president’s nuclear disarmament agenda. All in all, this seems like a disarmament-cum-nonproliferation proposal that deserves a little respect.', '']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

MichiganState-KoLe-Aff-8---NDT-Round-1.docx

MichiganState

KoLe

54b045bbd438e50ede7960c765d0e3d2d5ed575dca058fb02077c1a1aab14976

No Ukraine Aid

Josh Rogin 10/6; Washington Post Columnist; "MAGA Republicans outplayed Kevin McCarthy and Democrats on Ukraine aid;" 10/6/23; https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/10/06/ukraine-aid-congress-maga-gaetz/; NT-ML

Congress failed to approve support McCarthy’s departure has made any new aid impossible far-right Republicans opposing supporters overconfident Despite GOP crumbling everyone underestimated MAGA capacity pledging to oppose any new funding

Washington surprised when Congress failed to approve continued vital support to Ukraine last weekend far-right MAGA lawmakers fighting to kill the aid culmination of months of hard work As competition heats up to replace McCarthy support for Ukraine has become politicized McCarthy’s departure has made passing any new Ukraine aid impossible far-right Republicans see opposing Ukraine aid as good politics Trump introduced MAGA isolationism into the caucus and it has spread supporters of Ukraine aid were overconfident Despite public warnings that support inside the GOP caucus was crumbling Biden fully expected Congress would include billions in Ukraine aid everyone underestimated MAGA members’ capacity for maneuver Many assumed Republican leadership had far-right members under control MAGA members Gaetz are pledging to oppose any new funding for Ukraine

Congress failed continued support Ukraine support Ukraine politicized McCarthy’s departure made any new Ukraine aid impossible far-right opposing Ukraine supporters Ukraine aid overconfident support crumbling fully expected billions underestimated MAGA maneuver assumed leadership under control MAGA members pledging oppose any new funding

['Many in Washington were surprised when Congress failed to approve continued vital support to Ukraine last weekend. But for the far-right MAGA lawmakers fighting to kill the aid, this was the culmination of months of hard work. Now, Ukraine’s backers face a steep uphill climb to restore the funding. If they fail, the result will be more Ukrainians killed and a longer, costlier war.', 'As the competition heats up to replace Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.) as House speaker, support for Ukraine has become politicized. McCarthy’s departure has made passing any new Ukraine aid through the House extremely difficult, and perhaps impossible. On Tuesday, speaker candidate Jim Jordan (R-Ohio) told reporters he would not bring Ukraine funding to the House floor if he gets the gavel. His main competitor, Steve Scalise (R-La.), is said to be less enthusiastic about funding Ukraine’s fight.', 'Those Republicans who still support Ukraine are sounding the alarm.', '“The Ukrainians are fighting not only for their survival but for the liberty and security of Europe and democracies around the world. Providing them support is in our national security interests and not something that should be a wedge issue or political football,” Rep. Joe Wilson (R-S.C.) told me. “If war criminal [Vladimir] Putin takes over Ukraine, it’s going to be far worse than the fallout of the failed withdrawal of Afghanistan.”', 'These arguments make a lot of sense. The cost of helping Ukraine fight off Russia’s brutal invasion amounts to less than 5 percent of the U.S. defense budget. Much of that money goes back to U.S. companies to replenish stocks of old weapons that were sitting idle anyway. Weakening the Russian military makes Europe safer. And China is watching to see whether the West has the stomach to defend democracies from aggression.', 'The problem is that none of those arguments matter to the far-right Republicans who see opposing Ukraine aid as good politics. The House GOP leadership has all but endorsed the MAGA movement’s retreat from defending democracy, House Armed Services Committee member Pat Ryan (D-N.Y.) told me.', '“The origination point of all of this goes back to the beginnings of the MAGA movement,” he said. “Trump introduced this virus of MAGA isolationism into the Republican caucus and it has spread.”', 'Part of the problem is that supporters of Ukraine aid were overconfident. Despite some Republican lawmakers’ public warnings that support inside the GOP caucus was crumbling, the Biden administration fully expected Congress would include billions in Ukraine aid as part of the most recent bill to keep the government running.', 'Worse, everyone underestimated the MAGA members’ capacity for maneuver. Many assumed that the Republican leadership had far-right members such as Rep. Matt Gaetz (R-Fla.) and Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-Ga.) under control. In fact, the House GOP leadership was quietly working with the hard-liners to separate the aid from other spending legislation. When McCarthy removed $6.1 billion in aid Ukraine aid from the temporary government funding bill last Saturday, it was meant to appease the hard-liners. Three days later, he was removed as speaker by the same MAGA members he had been trying to placate.', 'Gaetz and his crew are pledging to oppose any new funding for Ukraine. If the next speaker won’t bring a Ukraine funding bill to the floor, House Democrats could force a vote on it through what’s called a discharge petition, and pass it with a minority of GOP votes. It’s a messy process, which is why it would only be possible once. That means such a bill would need to have enough funding to get Ukraine through the next year. That number is between $60 billion and $100 billion, depending on who you talk to. The GOP is sure to demand concurrent border-related funds in return.']

[(5, 15)]

ndtceda

Michigan-GiSa-Aff-Wake-Round-1.docx

Michigan

GiSa

e5a6ee56055f47398836badc60856d1dea08913a87ab9d2f1a51a19f79cc6138

Futurity good for people with disabilities.

Harris 12 – Sarah Parker Harris, is an assistant professor and Randall Owen is a postdoctoral research associate, both in the department of disability and human development. Cindy De Ruiter is a doctoral candidate in the department of occupational therapy.   “Civic Engagement and People with Disabilities: The Role of Advocacy and Technology”, http://jces.ua.edu/civic-engagement-and-people-with-disabilities-the-role-of-advocacy-and-technology/

participation and involvement in public policy can have an emancipatory effect, as marginalized groups are able to feel they are part of something, and become more aware of their civic rights Disability advocate Charlton cites civic engagement as a vital strategy for people with disabilities to develop a raised consciousness Increasing the engagement of people with disabilities will ensure that new policies do not continue cycles of political marginalization use of advocacy has been successful in changing policies In order to create widespread change, forming relationships between people with disabilities and state representatives is critical because it helps citizens gain power in the policy arena. The use of adaptive technology is another vital strategy that empowers people with disabilities to connect with government

Research acknowledges the importance of direct involvement of people with disabilities in all aspects of policy debates, and civic engagement is one means in which to create or influence change civic engagement can help to create self-efficacy, promote social integration, and develop personal interests people with disabilities want an equal voice in democratic debates and the opportunity to advocate for change Such participation and involvement in public policy efforts can have an emancipatory effect, as marginalized groups are able to feel they are part of something, and in turn become more aware of their civic rights and responsibilities Disability advocate Charlton cites civic engagement as a vital strategy for people with disabilities to develop a raised consciousness Increasing the engagement of people with disabilities will ensure that new policies do not continue the cycles of political marginalization historically experienced by this population use of advocacy by people with disabilities has been successful in changing policies and programs most of which are associated with protests organized by the disability rights movement. In order to create widespread change, forming relationships between people with disabilities and state representatives is critical because it helps citizens gain power in the policy arena. The use of adaptive technology is another vital strategy that empowers people with disabilities to connect with government , as it facilitates communication and allows for full expression in policy debates; and are, at times, the only means by which they can access public debate. Furthermore, people with disabilities often use technology to relate to the real world. This is especially true for people who use augmentative and alternative communication devices as people with severe communication impairments face significant additional barriers in participation, attaining self-determination, and realizing a high quality of life ( such technology , can help people with disabilities overcome barriers to full and equal participation, Adaptive technology is vital in allowing people with disabilities full participation in policy debates and the ability to become involved in the decision-making processes about policies that affect how they live in society.

and involvement in public policy efforts can have an emancipatory effect, vital new policies has been successful critical gain power in the policy arena.

['Research acknowledges the importance of direct involvement of people with disabilities in all aspects of policy debates, and civic engagement is one means in which to create or influence change. For people with disabilities, civic engagement can help to create self-efficacy, promote social integration, and develop personal interests (Barnartt et al., 2001; Hahn, 1985; Zola, 2005). Like other citizens, people with disabilities want an equal voice in democratic debates and the opportunity to advocate for change (Barnartt et al., 2001). Such participation and involvement in public policy efforts can have an emancipatory effect, as marginalized groups are able to feel they are part of something, and in turn become more aware of their civic rights and responsibilities (Lewis, 2010). Disability advocate and scholar Jim Charlton cites civic engagement as a vital strategy for people with disabilities to develop a raised consciousness as they engage in grassroots advocacy for change in local communities. The title of his book, Nothing About Us Without Us, is a mantra frequently heard in disability rights movements and calls for people with disabilities to be involved in decisions made about them (Charlton, 2000) Increasing the engagement of people with disabilities will ensure that new policies do not continue the cycles of political marginalization historically experienced by this population. Disability Advocacy The use of advocacy by people with disabilities has been successful in changing policies and programs, most of which are associated with protests organized by the disability rights movement. A historical analysis of the number of protests by disability organizations between 1972 and 1999 shows growth in political activism over the years (Barnartt & Scotch, 2001). For instance, the group Disabled in Action developed strategies to block traffic to secure accessible public transportation in New York in 1977. That same year several groups of people with disabilities led sit-ins in 10 federal government offices until the government issued regulations for Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and in 1988 deaf students at Gallaudet University protested until a deaf president was hired to lead them (Barnartt et al., 2001; Fleischer & Zames, 2001; Shapiro, 1994). In 2003 representatives from a group known as Mad Pride in California received national attention for a hunger strike organized to bring attention to the rights of people with mental health issues (Lewis, 2010). In Chicago, there is a strong history of grassroots disability advocacy being used to elicit change and connect citizens with government. Disability organizations, including Access Living and the Progress Center for Independent Living, have played a significant role in disability policy debates across Illinois. This included efforts toward deinstitutionalization, transportation accessibility, and securing access to sign language interpreters. In addition, the Mayor’s Office for People with Disabilities in Chicago has been active in ensuring access around public sidewalks, voting, and schools. Non-profit organizations face legal restrictions on the amount of lobbying they can engage in, but they still manage to make a significant impact in policymaking (Vaughan & Arsneault, 2008). In order to create widespread change, forming relationships between people with disabilities and state representatives is critical because it helps citizens gain power in the policy arena. However, people with disabilities face various barriers to full involvement. Most barriers fall into one of three categories: intrapersonal (skills and competence); interpersonal (team dynamics); or organizational (resources, decision-making processes) (Foster-Fishman, Jimenez, Valenti, & Kelly, 2007). One of the most common barriers is a lack of resources or funds to either purchase assistive devices or make trips to visit official, so having a voice in policy decisions can be challenging. Other barriers that hinder the development of advocacy skills in individuals with disabilities include inaccessible buildings, a lack of training experiences, negative attitudes, and few opportunities to practice learned skills. Increasing safe environments, supporting advocacy trainings, and forming mentor relationships can help facilitate the development of self-advocacy skills for people with disabilities. Technology for People with Disabilities While advocacy has been an essential strategy for promoting the rights and participation of people with disabilities, further efforts are needed to encourage and facilitate people with disabilities in public policy domains. The use of adaptive technology is another vital strategy that empowers people with disabilities to connect with government, as it facilitates communication and allows for full expression in policy debates; and are, at times, the only means by which they can access public debate. Furthermore, people with disabilities often use technology to relate to the real world. This is especially true for people who use augmentative and alternative communication devices as people with severe communication impairments face significant additional barriers in participation, attaining self-determination, and realizing a high quality of life (Light et al., 2007). Research has demonstrated that such technology, when people are appropriately trained to use it, can help people with disabilities overcome barriers to full and equal participation, and develop socio-relational and problem-solving skills (Light et al., 2007; McCarthy et al., 2007). It is imperative that people with disabilities have opportunities for continued training and support in using technology, because increased participation implies a greater range of communication environments (McNaughton & Bryen, 2007). Adaptive technology is vital in allowing people with disabilities full participation in policy debates and the ability to become involved in the decision-making processes about policies that affect how they live in society. Aside from facilitating communication, technology can also be used as an organizational tool, it can help spark discussions about policy, and it can permit people with disabilities to find up-to-date information on government regulations and laws. Though seemingly all positive, some aspects of new technologies create additional barriers for people with disabilities who want to fully engage in civic society. There is a digital divide in society due to the fact that some individuals have access to internet and advanced technology and some do not (Rubaii-Barrett & Wise, 2008). Cost, availability, accessibility features, and lack of knowledge in effective usage are all barriers to people with disabilities taking full advantage of different forms of technology. There are regulations in place that address the issue of inaccessible technology, but states are either unable or unwilling to carry out federal mandates. Instead of focusing on increased spending, lobbying for greater enforcement of existing state and federal policies can be effective in bringing about positive changes in technology for those with disabilities (Rubaii-Barrett & Wise, 2008). Creating equal access to advanced technology for all people will help weaken the digital divide and increase opportunities for individuals with disabilities to become involved in policymaking processes.']

[(0, 11)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-McWi-Neg-Owen-L-Coon-Memorial-Tournament-at-Northwestern-Round-3.docx

Kentucky

McWi

2cb08885457b5a52678ecb5c0be29d6f7d17e669c156e5fcb31988e60f398019

DC-9 PROTESTS attempted to break up Dow, but REFUSING to engage in antitrust resulted in failure

Carroll 20, is an Associate Producer at WETA. He is a recent D.C. transplant who writes about ethnic histories, social movements, and, occasionally, the mafia. (Frank, 1-23-20, “"Dow Shalt Not Kill": The Story of the D.C. Nine,” Boundary Stones, )

We were not experts what we were doing others vandalized the Dow office until the police arrived why Dow Chemical why target a private corporation The protestors attacked the role of corporations in the war effort We are outraged by the exploitation of people of the Third World and powerless who are victimized by your profit seeking ventures corporations under the cover of stockholder and executive anonymity in search of profit They were profiting so much

We were not experts in any way, shape or form, at what we were doing , so there was laughter because it's like, how do we get the door open t Meanwhile, the others vandalized the Dow office until the police arrived why Dow Chemical why target a private corporation The 9 outlined their motives in a statement entitled “An Open Letter to the Corporations of America,” which was distributed to the gathered press at the time of the break in The protestors then attacked the role of corporations in the United States war effort in Vietnam We are outraged by the death-dealing exploitation of people of the Third World , and of all the poor and powerless who are victimized by your profit seeking ventures Considering it our responsibility to respond we deny the right of your faceless and inhuman corporations to exist You, corporations , who under the cover of stockholder and executive anonymity exploit deprive ehumanize and kill in search of profit We urge you all to join us as we say no to this madness. Dow Chemical had been selected as the target because of its role in the “production of napalm, defoliants, nerve gas. They were profiting so much They were so involved in this war as a profit-making venture

not experts why Dow Chemical private corporation role of corporations profit seeking ventures search of profit

['', "Despite the absence of any detailed planning, they had a rough sketch of how the evening would go. The evening of March 22, Bernie Meyers gathered a group of photographers and journalists, who he had called in advance, and led them to a location in the Washington Post building, where they could witness the break-in across the street at the Dow Chemical offices.[8]Meanwhile, the others entered the building and made their way to the Dow office on the fourth floor. As Malone recalled recently, the mood was light: “We were not experts in any way, shape or form, at what we were doing, so there was laughter because it's like, how do we get the door open? I brought a crowbar, right? I hope it works.”[9] It worked; they broke in, and Joann and Catherine set to work finding files that related to Dow’s role in the U.S war effort (more on this later). They threw those files out the window, where they were collected and published by supporters who had gathered on the street, and eventually by the Washington Post. Meanwhile, the others vandalized the Dow office until the police arrived. But why Dow Chemical? After all, many war resisters had targeted draft boards for acts of vandalism — why target a private corporation? The 9 outlined their motives in a statement entitled “An Open Letter to the Corporations of America,” which was distributed to the gathered press at the time of the break in. “Today, March 22nd, 1969, in the Washington office of the Dow Chemical Company, we spilled human blood and destroyed files and office equipment,” began the page-long statement. The protestors then attacked the role of corporations in the United States war effort in Vietnam: We are outraged by the death-dealing exploitation of people of the Third World, and of all the poor and powerless who are victimized by your profit seeking ventures. Considering it our responsibility to respond, we deny the right of your faceless and inhuman corporations to exist…You, corporations, who under the cover of stockholder and executive anonymity, exploit, deprive, dehumanize and kill in search of profit…In your mad pursuit of profit, you, and others like you, are causing the psychological and physical destruction of mankind. We urge you all to join us as we say no to this madness.[10] Dow Chemical, in particular, had been selected as the target because of its role in the “production of napalm, defoliants, nerve gas.’”[11] Begin described Dow’s role in the war in stark terms: “They were profiting so much. They made the napalm, they made the black bags that people came home in, and they made the defoliants. They were so involved in this war as a profit-making venture.”[12]", '', '', '']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Johnson-Sun-Aff-14-NDT-Round8.docx

Minnesota

JoSu

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/JoSu/Minnesota-Johnson-Sun-Aff-14-NDT-Round8.docx

b1ff429c3ad1adc4d358dc11b69e2df7ead3f4e35142451053d7f21379f7ac6b

Democracy solves extinction.

Twining 21, PhD, president of the International Republican Institute, former director of the Asia Program at the German Marshall Fund. (Daniel, 10-10-2021, "America must double down on democracy", The Hill, ) *language edited

the best antidotes to great-power conflict terrorism and mass migration lie in democratic institutions Western retreat emboldens autocrats extremism flourishes under dictatorship Democracies don’t fight each other , export extremism or produce conflicts Democracies are better partners in fighting terrorism as well as establishing trad Open societies incubate the tech that will solve pressing problems , including climate change

a world that is less free is one that is less stable The greatest dangers to the American way of life emanate from hostile autocracies the best antidotes to great-power conflict , terrorism and mass migration lie in building democratic institutions Democratic freedoms are under assault in many nations American isolationism compound the danger Western retreat emboldens autocrats in ways that amplify dangers to American national security. violent extremism flourishes under dictatorship In nations without democratic accountability , citizens become drawn to the only forms of expression available to them, which are often violent and extreme . The free world cannot be neutral in the face of autocracy’s resurgence America’s closest allies are democracies . Democracies don’t fight each other , export violent extremism , or produce the conflicts that drive mass migration Democracies are better partners in fighting terrorism and poverty as well as establishing reliable trad Open societies incubate the tech nologies that will help solve the world’s most pressing problems , including climate change . Citizens can hold leaders accountable when they fall short, and democratic institutions are stronger than any individual

less free less stable greatest dangers hostile autocracies best antidotes great-power conflict terrorism mass migration building democratic institutions compound the danger emboldens autocrats amplify dangers flourishes dictatorship democratic accountability violent extreme cannot be neutral autocracy’s resurgence closest allies are democracies don’t fight each other export violent extremism produce the conflicts mass migration better partners fighting terrorism poverty trad incubate the tech solve most pressing problems climate change hold leaders accountable institutions stronger than any individual

['', 'The hard truth is that a world that is less free is one that is less secure, stable and prosperous. The greatest dangers to the American way of life emanate from hostile autocracies. There are no quick fixes, but the best antidotes to the challenges of great-power conflict, terrorism and mass migration of desperate refugees lie in the building of inclusive democratic institutions — and working with allied democracies to sustain the free and open order that China, in particular, wishes to replace with a world that’s safe for autocracy. The conventional wisdom that authoritarianism has popular momentum is wrong. No one anywhere is taking to the street to demand more corrupt governance, the adoption of one-man rule, a stronger surveillance state, or greater intervention by malign foreign powers. Democratic freedoms are unquestionably under assault in many nations. Autocrats are aggressive precisely because of the growing demands for change in their more modern, connected societies — and the rising risk that middle classes in nations such as China and Russia will not be willing forever to forfeit political rights for prosperity. American retrenchment and isolationism compound the danger. It would be nice to live in a world where failed states and dictatorships were a problem for someone else to worry about. But rather than producing stability, Western retreat only emboldens autocrats in ways that amplify dangers to American national security. We know that violent extremism flourishes under state failure and dictatorship. Broken states become breeding grounds for extremist groups because they leave vacuums that terrorists are only too happy to fill. In nations without democratic accountability, citizens become drawn to the only forms of expression available to them, which are often violent and extreme. The good news is that we have billions of allies around the world: citizens on every continent chafing for greater freedom and dignity. They do not want U.S. military-led nation-building. They want peaceful support for their independent efforts to create democratic space in systems distorted by overweening government control, dangerous governance gaps and foreign malign influence. The free world cannot be neutral in the face of autocracy’s resurgence. Rather, it should play to its strengths. The appeal of democratic opportunity is a strategic asset for the United States — despite our own shortcomings — because people around the world similarly aspire to live in societies that guarantee justice, rights and dignity. America’s closest allies are democracies. Democracies don’t fight each other, export violent extremism, or produce the conflicts that drive mass migration. Democracies are better partners in fighting terrorism, human trafficking and poverty, as well as establishing reliable trading relationships. Open societies incubate the technologies that will help solve the world’s most pressing problems, including climate change. Citizens can hold leaders accountable when they fall short, and democratic institutions are stronger than any [individual] man — as America itself witnessed after the assault on the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6. ']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Kansas-Harris-Wilkus-Neg-3%20-%20Harvard-Round4.docx

Kansas

HaWi

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kansas/HaWi/Kansas-Harris-Wilkus-Neg-3%2520-%2520Harvard-Round4.docx

fb2708ee28b65eae9ec3b5b43904fd0107d101d69dd8a2e63e53684c109f318d

Putin is bluffing, BUT threat of first use are sufficient.

van Brugen 23, reporter, M.A. from the University of London. (Isabel, 2-21-2023, “Putin ‘Bluffing’ About Nuclear Threats—Ex-Russian Diplomat,” Newsweek, https://www.newsweek.com/putin-bluffing-nuclear-threats-russian-diplomat-boris-bondarev-1782784)

Putin's bluffing and we know he has bluffed about nuclear threats . Ukrainians recovered territory, and no retaliation He wants you to be compelled If Putin threatens to use threaten him back

Putin's bluffing and we know that he has bluffed about nuclear threats . Ukrainians recovered some parts of territory, and there was no nuclear retaliation If you're afraid of Putin using nukes, then you already lose the war against him and he wins He wants you to be compelled or be deterred by his threats If Putin threatens to use nukes threaten him back

bluffing bluffed nuclear threats recovered no nuclear retaliation afraid already lose wins compelled threaten him back

['"Today [Putin\'s] bluffing and we know that he has bluffed about nuclear threats. Ukrainians recovered some parts of their territory, and there was no nuclear retaliation," Bondarev said in a phone interview from Switzerland.', '"If you\'re afraid of Putin using nukes, then you already lose the war against him and he wins," Bondarev said when asked about Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky\'s pledge to take back Crimea. "Because that\'s what he wants. He wants you to be compelled or be deterred by his threats."', '"It\'s a question of how far [you can] go into this war to bring Putin to justice, so to speak. And do you agree with the concept that if there is a [country with] nuclear weapons, then it can be can be allowed to do whatever it wants?" Bondarev asked.', '"So if you hold Ukrainians from recapturing Crimea, then you say OK, well Vladimir, Crimea is yours forever. You must go to the end because if you stop halfway, you lose and Putin wins.', 'And Putin [winning] means not very bad consequences for Ukraine only, but for Europe and the United States as well, strategically…so if Ukrainians have tried to recapture Crimea, well, let them do it."', 'Bondarev added: "If Putin threatens to use nukes, OK, threaten him back."', '']

[(0, 13)]

ndtceda

Kansas-SpHa-Neg-9---CEDA-Round-4.docx

Kansas

SpHa

2d23e730546ec7fc9904f2a9e98bd078789daa645096a3a83986511dd4396f31

Psychology matters---even if conventional weapons could deter, the signal of the US committing its strongest weapons is important to allies

Kim 22, a Seoul-based adjunct senior fellow with the Center for a New American Security and a columnist with the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. (Duyeon, 2-15-2022, “Biden Can Find Middle Ground in Heated Nuclear Debate,” Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/15/nuclear-weapons-review-biden/)

allies objected to alterations in doctrine that put their security at risk and exacerbate doubts about security commitment enemies pay no attention, but allies pay too much the psychological effect of weapons is just as important as their power officials say they need something stronger to scare adversaries decision-makers in will not spend time analyzing researching officials interpret n f u as A premature pledge bring back ghosts allies have been increasingly skeptical about nuclear umbrella , and would consider their own nuclear options from Korea , Japan , Taiwan , and Australia progressives use policy as rationale to question troop and U N C

American allies have firmly objected to alterations in U.S. nuclear doctrine that could put their own security at risk . Many Asian and European officials and experts in allied countries have told that changes would exacerbate existing doubts about Washington’s security commitment to them The real danger of a no-first-use pledge is that our enemies would pay no attention, but our allies would pay too much attention losing confidence the next president could reverse further undermining credibility . Allies firmly resisted the pledge and recently expressed similar concerns during the consultations. That’s hard to ignore at a time when Biden is attempting to strengthen alliances damaged U.S. allies do not want Washington to limit its nuclear use to only responding to a nuclear attack. For Asian allies the psychological effect of nuclear weapons is just as important as their physical destructive power . Even if conventional weapons could respond to non-nuclear attacks officials say they still need something much stronger to scare and deter adversaries decision-makers in both allied and adversarial countries will not spend time analyzing words and researching definitions and historical origins according to different formulations of the language presented in the upcoming N P R officials will interpret n f u as A premature pledge would bring back the ghosts of Trump “America first” nightmare From an alliance perspective , if the U S renounced its right to nuclear first use in extreme circumstances and declared sole purpose today, it would contradict NATO and undermine the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons . European allies object to no- first-use because of Russia revanchism In Asia, allies have already been increasingly skeptical about the of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent , or nuclear umbrella , and would be tempted to seriously consider their own nuclear options because of threats from China and North Korea . South Korea , Japan , Taiwan , and even Australia have previously nuclear weapons programs progressives might use a no- first-use /sole purpose policy as rationale to question the need for U.S. troop presence and the U N C

American allies firmly objected alterations put their own security risk officials experts exacerbate existing doubts security commitment real danger pay no pay too much losing confidence could reverse credibility firmly resisted hard to ignore attempting strengthen alliances damaged do not want limit psychological effect just as important Even if conventional weapons officials need something much stronger will not spend time analyzing words researching definitions historical origins different formulations N P R n f u premature pledge bring back ghosts Trump “America first” nightmare alliance perspective extreme circumstances declared sole purpose contradict NATO undermine deterrent effect nuclear weapons European allies object Russia revanchism increasingly skeptical extended nuclear deterrent nuclear umbrella tempted seriously consider China North Korea South Korea Japan Taiwan Australia previously use as rationale question U.S. troop presence U N C

['American allies, however, have firmly objected to alterations in U.S. nuclear doctrine that could put their own security at risk. Many Asian and European officials and experts in allied countries have told me that changes would also exacerbate existing doubts about Washington’s security commitment to them. As former U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy\xa0\xa0in 2014, “The real danger of a no-first-use pledge is that our enemies would pay no attention, but our allies would pay too much [attention], losing confidence in the alliances.”', 'Plus, the next American president could reverse Biden’s decision, further undermining U.S. credibility. Allies firmly resisted when the\xa0\xa0was considering adopting a no-first-use pledge and most recently expressed similar concerns during the\xa0\xa0consultations. That’s hard to ignore at a time when Biden is attempting to strengthen alliances damaged during his predecessor Donald Trump’s presidency.', 'Those\xa0\xa0a no-first-use and/or sole purpose policy present many important arguments whose common denominator is enhancing crisis stability, reducing the chances of escalation to the nuclear level, and leading by example through unilateral nuclear restraint. The potential return of Trumpism (and a president’s sole authority to launch nuclear weapons) would add more weight to these claims, even though such policy could be reversed by a future president.\xa0\xa0also believe that no-first-use and sole purpose are different. The latter, they argue, avoids “eroding primary or extended deterrence” because such language leaves enough ambiguity about the circumstances in which the United States would use nuclear weapons.', 'However, U.S. allies do not want Washington to limit its nuclear use to only responding to a nuclear attack. For Asian allies in particular, the psychological effect of nuclear weapons is just as important as their physical destructive power. Even if high-tech conventional weapons could effectively respond to non-nuclear attacks from an operational standpoint, Asian officials say they still need something much stronger to scare and deter adversaries from waging any kind of attack.', 'Plus, decision-makers in both allied and adversarial countries will not spend time analyzing words and researching definitions and historical origins according to different formulations of the language presented in the upcoming Nuclear Posture Review. Several officials have told me that they will interpret no-first-use and sole purpose as the same concept, and either articulation will have the same effect on allies and rivals. A premature pledge would also bring back the ghosts of Trump’s “America first” nightmare, in which allies’ needs were abandoned in favor of a narrow concept of American security.', 'The United States can and should play a leadership role in reducing nuclear dangers worldwide. But the conditions or circumstances in the global security environment must support it. Not all nuclear-possessing countries have a no-first-use policy. Russia dropped it in 1993, and nuclear weapons play a\xa0\xa0in its\xa0. This is important to remember amid increasing fears of another Russian invasion of Ukraine and the potential for Moscow to be further emboldened by an American no-first-use/sole purpose policy. China’s claimed no-first-use policy has been met with increasing\xa0. North Korea maintains a first-use policy. India’s conditional no-first-use policy reserves the right to use nuclear weapons against biological or chemical weapons attacks. Pakistan, France, and the United Kingdom have first-use policies.', 'What’s more, China and Russia have made strides in their conventional capabilities, continue to modernize their nuclear weapons capabilities, and are increasingly aggressive. North Korea’s nuclear weapons advancements and sophistication drive neighbors to want their own nuclear deterrent. Advanced weapons in both conventional and dual-capable systems risk blurring the distinction between an incoming conventional and nuclear attack. Emerging non-nuclear threats and new technologies have also increased uncertainties about their destructive power and impact on military strategies as well as possibilities for nuclear use. And there is no guarantee or evidence that other countries will follow America’s lead on no-first-use/sole purpose. The list goes on.', 'A decision on when and how to take tangible steps toward no-first-use/sole purpose, therefore, should be guided primarily by the circumstances in the security landscape and the security concerns of both the United States and its allies. They could be assessed according to four general conditions: threat assessments of concerned parties; adversaries’ nuclear doctrines, force postures, and military capabilities; allies’ confidence in U.S. security guarantees; and U.S. military and political capabilities to deter both nuclear-weapons use and non-nuclear threats that can cause mass destruction by adversaries.', 'The Biden administration could demonstrate it is serious about working toward no-first-use/sole purpose by taking a series of declaratory and actionable steps. First, it could reiterate that no-first-use/sole purpose is America’s ultimate goal and that it will proactively work toward that end. It could outline specific steps in the Nuclear Posture Review or in a separate format.', 'Such a statement would further advance Obama’s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, which articulated its commitment to work toward reducing the role of nuclear weapons without yet giving up its right to nuclear first use, while acknowledging the Trump’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review’s assessment of a sharp deterioration of the security environment with growing threats from China, Russia, North Korea, and non-nuclear strategic sources.', 'The Biden administration could compile an\xa0\xa0under which it might consider employing a nuclear weapon against a non-nuclear attack, as proposed by expert Robert Einhorn. Such a list, he argues, would indicate that those circumstances would be much more limited than the impression that was conveyed in Trump’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. The Obama administration stated that Washington would consider the use of nuclear weapons only “in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.” It did not elaborate on “extreme circumstances.” The Trump administration used almost identical language, but it went further to articulate that “Extreme circumstances could include significant non-nuclear strategic attacks … [which] include, but are not limited to, attacks on the U.S., allied, or partner civilian population or infrastructure, and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities.”', 'Washington could also announce that it will take steps toward adopting no-first-use/sole purpose in close consultation with allies. Specifically, the administration could run threat assessments of both the United States and its allies respectively to gauge the specific circumstances under which all parties would feel comfortable with Washington renouncing nuclear first use, declaring sole purpose, and beginning to take steps to add credibility to its declaratory policy. Such measures would include moving nuclear weapons off high alert, or ready to launch instantly. These discussions could be held in newly created consultative mechanisms with allies or included in existing ones that deal with defense and extended deterrence issues. Congress could also stay informed about the administration’s progress by receiving regular briefings.', 'From an alliance perspective, if the United States renounced its right to nuclear first use in extreme circumstances and declared sole purpose today, it would contradict NATO’s policy and undermine the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons. European allies object to no-first-use because of Russia’s revanchism and\xa0. Washington would, therefore, need to manage any future no-first-use/sole purpose policy within NATO.', 'In Asia, allies have already been increasingly skeptical about the\xa0\xa0of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent, or nuclear umbrella, and would be tempted to seriously consider their own nuclear options because of threats from China and North Korea. South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and even Australia have previously\xa0\xa0nuclear weapons programs. South Koreans tell me that progressives might use a no-first-use/sole purpose policy as rationale—arguing that the nuclear umbrella is gone or broken—to question the need for U.S. troop presence and the United Nations Command, while moderates and conservatives would likely use the same rationale to call for the country’s own nuclear weapons. Prospects of Japan’s nuclear armament would ignite a nuclear arms race in the region as well.']

[(0, 6)]

ndtceda

Kansas-ReSo-Neg-Northwestern-Round-3.docx

Kansas

ReSo

658a8b438354cec8704dbfc09d59bf7dde0b37206b57ec91b05471dcee2032f1

Liability is a prerequisite to AI’s potential

Mailiha and Parikh 22, *JD at Harvard Law School, MD at the University of Pennsylvania. **Assistant Professor in the Department of Medical Ethics and Health Policy and Medicine at the University of Pennsylvania. (George & Ravi, 6-29-2022, “Who Is Liable when AI Kills?” Scientific American, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/who-is-liable-when-ai-kills/)

liability is unprepared for AI Liability rules were designed when humans caused mistakes errors may occur without human input liability needs to adjust accordingly Getting the liability landscape right is essential to unlocking AI’s potential Uncertain and costly litigation will discourage development The key is to ensure stakeholders bear enough liability to ensure AI safety but not so much they give up on AI

Our current liability system is completely unprepared for AI Liability rules were designed for a time when humans caused the majority of mistakes or injuries with AI errors may occur without any human input at all The liability system needs to adjust accordingly Bad liability policy will harm patients consumers and AI developers The time to think about liability is now ri ght as AI becomes ubiquitous but remains underregulated AI-based systems have contributed to injury an AI-based mental health chatbot encouraged a simulated suicidal patient to take her own life AI algorithms have discriminated against the resumes of female applicants an AI algorithm misidentified a suspect in an aggravated assault leading to a mistaken arrest Getting the liability landscape right is essential to unlocking AI’s potential Uncertain rules and potentially costly litigation will discourage investment in and development and adoption of AI systems AI challenges traditional liability how do we assign liability when a “ black box ” algorithm These are unanswered questions and critical to establishing the responsible use of AI in consumer products AI is powerful if properly created and tested can aid in diagnosis market research predictive analytics and any application that requires analyzing large data sets Shifting blame solely to AI designers or adopters doesn’t solve the issue either some AI algorithms constantly self-learn taking their inputs and dynamically using them to change the outputs No one can be sure of exactly how an AI algorithm arrived at a particular conclusion The key is to ensure that all stakeholders and everyone else along the chain from product development to use bear enough liability to ensure AI safety and effectiveness but not so much that they give up on AI

current liability unprepared majority of mistakes AI without adjust accordingly liability discriminated mistaken arrest liability landscape unlocking AI’s potential discourage investment development adoption AI systems traditional liability black box critical AI is powerful solely AI designers doesn’t solve the issue key stakeholders enough liability AI safety effectiveness not so much

['Our current liability system—our system to determine responsibility and payment for injuries—is completely unprepared for AI. Liability rules were designed for a time when humans caused the majority of mistakes or injuries. Thus, most liability frameworks place punishments on the end-user doctor, driver or other human who caused an injury. But with AI, errors may occur without any human input at all. The liability system needs to adjust accordingly. Bad liability policy will harm patients, consumers and AI developers.', 'The time to think about liability is now—right as AI becomes ubiquitous but remains underregulated. Already, AI-based systems have contributed to injury. In 2018, a pedestrian was killed by a self-driving Uber vehicle. Although driver error was at issue, the AI failed to detect the pedestrian. Recently, an AI-based mental health chatbot encouraged a simulated suicidal patient to take her own life. AI algorithms have discriminated against the resumes of female applicants. And, in one particularly dramatic case, an AI algorithm misidentified a suspect in an aggravated assault, leading to a mistaken arrest. Yet, despite missteps, AI promises to revolutionize all of these areas.', 'Getting the liability landscape right is essential to unlocking AI’s potential. Uncertain rules and potentially costly litigation will discourage investment in, and development and adoption of, AI systems. The wider adoption of AI in health care, autonomous vehicles and in other industries depends on the framework that determines who, if anyone, ends up liable for an injury caused by artificial intelligence systems.', 'AI challenges traditional liability. For example, how do we assign liability when a “black box” algorithm—where the identity and weighting of variables changes dynamically so no one knows what goes into the prediction—recommends a treatment that ultimately causes harm, or drives a car recklessly before its human driver can react? Is that really the doctor or driver’s fault? Is it the company that created the AI’s fault? And what accountability should everyone else—health systems, insurers, manufacturers, regulators—face if they encouraged adoption? These are unanswered questions, and critical to establishing the responsible use of AI in consumer products.', 'Like all disruptive technologies, AI is powerful. AI algorithms, if properly created and tested, can aid in diagnosis, market research, predictive analytics and any application that requires analyzing large data sets. A recent McKinsey global survey showed that already over half of companies worldwide reported using AI in their routine operations.', 'Yet, liability too often focuses on the easiest target: the end-user who uses the algorithm. Liability inquiries often start—and end—with the driver of the car that crashed or the physician that gave faulty treatment decision.', 'Granted, if the end-user misuses an AI system or ignores its warnings, he or she should be liable. But AI errors are often not the fault of the end-user. Who can fault an emergency room physician for an AI algorithm that misses papilledema—a swelling of the retina? An AI’s failure to detect the condition could delay care and potentially cause a patient to go blind. Yet, papilledema is challenging to diagnose without an ophthalmologist’s examination because more clinical data, including imaging of the brain and visual acuity, are often necessary as part of the workup. Despite AI’s revolutionary potential across industries, end-users will avoid using AI if they bear sole liability for potentially fatal errors.', 'Shifting the blame solely to AI designers or adopters doesn’t solve the issue either. Of course, the designers created the algorithm in question. But is every Tesla accident Tesla’s fault to be solved by more testing before product launch? Indeed, some AI algorithms constantly self-learn, taking their inputs and dynamically using them to change the outputs. No one can be sure of exactly how an AI algorithm arrived at a particular conclusion.', 'The key is to ensure that all stakeholders—users, developers and everyone else along the chain from product development to use—bear enough liability to ensure AI safety and effectiveness—but not so much that they give up on AI.', '']

[(12, 21)]

ndtceda

Kansas-PaMa-Aff-Texas-Open-Round-5.docx

Kansas

PaMa

065c81f39b83fcece4ebc593ef4fa53ada09726327c83356dd43b3b065fbae86

Private sector is key—otherwise we lose the tech race.

Ryseff 22 - (James Ryseff et al, senior technical policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, former SDE at Amazon and Google, M.S. in security studies from Georgetown University, B.S. in computer science from University of Illinois; 2022, RAND, "Exploring the Civil-Military Divide over Artificial Intelligence," doa: 8-26-2022) url: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1498-1.html

experts expressed that AI if exploited to its fullest might become decisive in maintaining superiority or ceding it to a competitor If the DoD desires to transform itself through AI , it faces one particularly difficult obstacle . the private sector significantly outstrips the government in R&D . most breakthroughs in AI have been achieved by private sector . top companies compete to attract the best talent . the DIB do not have experience aggressively pursuing risky investments into unproven tech if DoD wants access to AI solutions and experts at the cutting edge of AI it will need to collaborate

technical advances by China and Russia since the beginning of the 21st century now pose a credible threat to the U.S. military. experts have expressed the belief that artificial intelligence ( AI ) if exploited to its fullest potential , might become the decisive element in maintaining the United States’ military superiority — or in ceding it to a more innovative competitor . China possesses the might, talent, and ambition to surpass the United States as the world’s leader in AI” and observes that China has already developed the world’s most-advanced AI applications in some areas . Private Sector Talent as a Key Resource If the U.S. Department of Defense DoD desires to transform itself through AI , it faces one particularly difficult obstacle . Unlike previous eras of military competition, the private sector now significantly outstrips the federal government in research and development ( R&D ) spending . This gap is particularly pronounced in AI . As a direct result, most of the major recent breakthroughs in AI have been achieved by U.S. software companies that focus on private sector customers . Defense contracts account for a slim proportion of their overall business , and even less of this work involves creating solutions custom tailored for government clients . These top companies compete intensely to attract the best talent available , offering lucrative salaries , advanced technical toolsets , and a workplace culture with less formal process and bureaucracy than is found in a typical government agency or government contractor . At the same time, the defense industrial base DIB increasingly consists of a relatively small number of companies these companies do not have the same experience with aggressively pursuing risky investments into unproven or unfamiliar tech nologies . if DoD wants to maintain access to the companies that have the most experience deploying AI solutions and the technical experts at the cutting edge of AI research, it will likely need to collaborate with companies that do not think of themselves as defense contractors

technical advances China Russia credible threat AI exploited to its fullest potential decisive element ceding it more innovative competitor already developed most-advanced AI applications some areas Private Sector Talent as a Key Resource DoD transform itself AI particularly difficult obstacle private sector significantly outstrips R&D spending particularly pronounced AI recent breakthroughs private sector customers slim proportion overall business custom tailored government clients compete intensely best talent available lucrative salaries advanced technical toolsets workplace culture less formal process bureaucracy government contractor DIB relatively small number of companies aggressively pursuing risky investments unproven unfamiliar tech maintain access most experience deploying AI solutions technical experts cutting edge collaborate defense contractors

['', 'Since the end of the Cold War, much of the U.S population has taken the technological superiority of the U.S. military as a given.1 However, technical advances by China and Russia since the beginning of the 21st century may be calling that viewpoint into question, and many military experts believe that foreign forces now pose a credible threat to the U.S. military.2 As the 2018 National Defense Strategy recognizes, “we are emerging from a period of strategic atrophy, aware that our competitive military advantage has been eroding.”3 Some experts have expressed the belief that artificial intelligence (AI),4 if exploited to its fullest potential, might become the decisive element in maintaining the United States’ military superiority—or in ceding it to a more innovative competitor. Yet others express concerns about the ability of the United States to win this essential race. The final report from the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence warns that “China possesses the might, talent, and ambition to surpass the United States as the world’s leader in AI” and observes that China has already developed the world’s most-advanced AI applications in some areas.5 In response, the commission argues that the United States should increase its investments in AI and do more to increase the availability of AI talent to ensure that it wins this crucial race. ', 'Private Sector Talent as a Key Resource', 'If the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) desires to transform itself through AI, it faces one particularly difficult obstacle. Unlike previous eras of military competition, the private sector now significantly outstrips the federal government in research and development (R&D) spending.6 This gap is particularly pronounced in lucrative digital technologies, such as AI. As a direct result, most of the major recent breakthroughs in AI have been achieved by U.S. software companies that focus on private sector customers. Defense contracts account for a slim proportion of their overall business, and even less of this work involves creating solutions custom tailored for government clients.7 These top companies compete intensely to attract the best talent available, offering lucrative salaries, advanced technical toolsets, and a workplace culture with less formal process and bureaucracy than is found in a typical government agency or government contractor.8 At the same time, the defense industrial base (DIB) increasingly consists of a relatively small number of companies that specialize in serving the defense industry. Although these companies have a long history of incremental improvements to existing weapon systems and defense capabilities, they do not have the same experience with aggressively pursuing risky investments into unproven or unfamiliar technologies.9 Consequently, if DoD wants to maintain access to the companies that have the most experience deploying AI solutions and the technical experts at the cutting edge of AI research, it will likely need to collaborate with companies that do not think of themselves as defense contractors.', '', '', '']

[(0, 6), (7, 9)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-JoPh-Aff-JW-Patterson-Debates-hosted-by-UK-Round-5.docx

Minnesota

JoPh

23fbbda3b0d7447be95a7b7c8f5e9c8bc8bf61b9d6bdbaa9cf4fd11a5d5a3bdc

They are distinct

Report of House Judiciary Committee 10 DISCOUNT PRICING CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2009, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CRPT-111hrpt676/html/CRPT-111hrpt676.htm

antitrust offenses are subject to one of two classes either a per se or rule-of-reason analysis rule-of-reason offenses reflect a recognition that some types of business practices may be, on balance, either procompetitive or anticompetitive depending upon the factual circumstances in Dr. Miles the case established a per se prohibition In 7 the Court overturned Dr. Miles, holding that retail price fixing would henceforth be judged under the rule of reason minimum retail price agreements are no longer per se prohibited they are instead subject to a case-by-case rule-of- reason analysis

Alleged antitrust offenses are generally subject to one of two classes of review, either a per se or rule-of-reason analysis Per se offenses consist of a limited number of business practices deemed so harmful to competition that proof of the practice itself establishes an antitrust violation without further analysis. Per se prohibitions are generally limited to ``conduct that is manifestly anticompetitive rule-of-reason offenses reflect a recognition that some types of business practices are not always anticompetitive, and may be, on balance, either procompetitive or anticompetitive depending upon the factual circumstances . in Dr. Miles the Supreme Court held that an agreement between a manufacturer of proprietary medicines and its dealers to fix the minimum price at which its medicines could be sold was illegal illegal on their face , the case established a per se prohibition In 200 7 the Supreme Court overturned Dr. Miles, holding that minimum retail price fixing would henceforth be judged under the rule of reason , on a case-by- case basis the majority, concluded that a per se prohibition could not be justified minimum retail price agreements are no longer per se prohibited by law This does not mean that these agreements are now legal; they are instead subject to a case-by-case rule-of- reason analysis

Per se prohibitions , the case established a per se prohibition per se prohibited rule-of- reason

["``Rule of Reason'' Analysis vs. ``Per Se'' Prohibition Alleged antitrust offenses are generally subject to one of two classes of review, either a per se or rule-of-reason analysis. The category of analysis is significant both in terms of a policy judgment and as an evidentiary burden of proof. Per se offenses\\5\\ consist of a limited number of business practices deemed so harmful to competition that proof of the practice itself establishes an antitrust violation without further analysis. Per se prohibitions are generally limited to ``conduct that is manifestly anticompetitive,''\\6\\ that would ``always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output.''\\7\\ On the other hand, rule-of-reason offenses reflect a recognition that some types of business practices are not always anticompetitive, and may be, on balance, either procompetitive or anticompetitive depending upon the factual circumstances. Rule-of-reason analysis requires a more in-depth look at the practice in question in order to weigh the competitive effects.\\8\\ Such an analysis generally involves expensive and time-consuming economic research and analysis. Leegin Overturns the Per Se Precedent Set By Dr. Miles In its 1911 decision in Dr. Miles,\\9\\ the Supreme Court held that an agreement between a manufacturer of proprietary medicines and its dealers to fix the minimum price at which its medicines could be sold was illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act.\\10\\ For the next 96 years, Dr. Miles stood for the proposition that agreements between manufacturers and retailers that established a minimum price for the manufacturers' products were illegal on their face. In antitrust parlance, the case established a per se prohibition on vertical minimum price restraints, alternately referred to as ``resale price maintenance,'' or minimum retail price fixing. In its 2007 Leegin decision, the Supreme Court overturned Dr. Miles, holding that minimum retail price fixing would henceforth be judged under the rule of reason, on a case-by- case basis. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, acknowledged that setting minimum retail prices could have anticompetitive effects, but concluded that it could also have procompetitive benefits, and that a per se prohibition could not be justified, as it could not be ``stated with any degree of confidence that retail price maintenance `always or almost always tend[s] to restrict competition and decrease output.'''\\11\\ The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a joint amicus brief in favor of overturning Dr. Miles' per se prohibition; 37 State attorneys general filed one in favor of affirming it.\\12\\ The effect of Leegin is that minimum retail price agreements are no longer per se prohibited by law. This does not mean that these agreements are now necessarily always legal; they are instead subject to a case-by-case rule-of- reason analysis.", '', '']

[(0, 35)]

ndtceda

Kansas-Barreto-Snow-Neg-Shirley-Round3.docx

Kansas

BaSn

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kansas/BaSn/Kansas-Barreto-Snow-Neg-Shirley-Round3.docx

b6f9c20437ba710b63b422ac6b80e49e195981a52834e37db26b1fe658ca8f8c

It has enormous reach and decisive institutional advantages over judicial antitrust law.

Peter M. Brody & Matthew J. Rizzolo 17, attorneys @ Ropes & Gray LLP, “Looking Beyond Patents at the International Trade Commission—Is the ITC an Underutilized Forum?,” Ropes & Gray, 10/18/17, https://www.ropesgray.com/en/newsroom/alerts/2017/10/Looking-Beyond-Patents-at-the-International-Trade-Commission-Is-the-ITC-an-Underutilized-Forum

The ITC default remedy—an exclusion order that bars products from the U S is powerful leverage in disputes investigations are extremely fast taking less than 18 months and rarely suffer delays affect court action for global disputes that the ITC need only in rem jurisdiction is key ITC does not need personal jurisdiction over a respondent , and may order even where a respondent fails to show up a attractive forum for companies seeking to defend rights broad authority to investigate unfair practices lead to companies becoming creative taking advantage of ITC’s unique position in regulating trade

The U S ITC is an independent, quasi-judicial federal agency responsible for enforcing Section 337 of the Tariff Act Traditionally, the large majority of Section 337 investigations have focused on allegations of patent, copyright, or trademark infringement. However, Section 337 is not limited only to enforcement of statutory IP rights ; other types of unfair acts of competition can provide the basis for filing a Section 337 complaint The ITC is first and foremost a trade forum tasked with ensuring international parity in trade . The ITC promotes a level playing field where companies with a U.S. presence are insulated from unfair business actions from competitors . The default remedy—an exclusion order that bars affected products from entry into the U nited S tates — is a source of powerful leverage in business disputes . Section 337 investigations at the ITC are extremely fast , often taking less than 18 months from filing to final decision and a potential exclusion order, and rarely suffer from delays that can affect a federal district court action for global disputes , the fact that the ITC need only exercise in rem jurisdiction over products is a key consideration —the ITC does not need to obtain personal jurisdiction over a respondent , and may enter an exclusion order barring products from the U.S. market even where a respondent fails to show up to defend against a complaint. Section 337 broadly authorizes the ITC to investigate all forms of “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles.” These so-called “ Section 337(a)(1)(A) claims ” (or “nonstatutory Section 337 claims”) make the ITC a potentially attractive forum for companies seeking creative solutions to defend their rights The requirements to bring Section 337(a)(1)(A) claims differ in two significant ways from claims relating to statutory rights. In asserting an (a)(1)(A) claim, a complainant must plead four elements : (1) unfair competition by the respondent; (2) importation (3) the existence of a “domestic industry”; and (4) injury to the domestic industry from the alleged unfair act the ITC has instituted investigations under Section 337(a)(1)(A) based in whole or in part on allegations of trade secret misappropriation, common law trademark infringement, breach of contract , tortious interference false advertising passing off, violation of the DMCA and violation of a state-law Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act Trade secret misappropriation cases have been particularly popular the ITC may be a valuable forum to protect competition although Section 337 litigation at the ITC has traditionally focused on statutory IP claims, the Commission’s broad authority to investigate a wide range of unfair practices has lead to a growing number of complaints alleging nonstatutory claims more and more companies are becoming increasingly creative in taking advantage of the ITC’s unique position in regulating international trade . the Commission may still be an underutilized forum Section 337 could be ripe for use by companies in business disputes with competitors who refuse to play by the rules in a variety of arenas.

U S ITC Section 337 of the Tariff Act not limited only to enforcement of statutory IP rights other unfair acts of competition provide the basis for filing a Section 337 complaint international parity in trade level playing field U.S. presence insulated from unfair business actions from competitors default exclusion order that bars affected products from entry into the U S source of powerful leverage in business disputes fast less than 18 months delays affect a federal district court action global in rem products key consideration not personal respondent order products even where a respondent fails to show up to defend against a complaint. Section 337(a)(1)(A) claims attractive forum for companies seeking creative solutions to defend their rights four elements unfair competition importation existence injury trade secret trademark contract interference advertising DMCA Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act particularly valuable forum protect competition broad authority to investigate a wide range of unfair practices becoming increasingly creative unique position underutilized forum

['Introduction', 'The United States International Trade Commission (“ITC”) is an independent, quasi-judicial federal agency responsible for enforcing Section 337 of the Tariff Act, a trade statute designed to protect U.S. industries from injuries caused by the importation of goods connected to unfair acts. Traditionally, the large majority of Section 337 investigations have focused on allegations of patent, copyright, or trademark infringement. However, Section 337 is not limited only to enforcement of statutory IP rights; other types of unfair acts of competition can provide the basis for filing a Section 337 complaint. This article explores the history of such claims at the ITC, and the role that the ITC and Section 337 may play within the broader context of increasingly global business competition.', 'I. Advantages of Litigating at the ITC—Speed and Broad Global Reach', 'The ITC is first and foremost a trade forum tasked with ensuring international parity in trade. The ITC promotes a level playing field where companies with a U.S. presence are insulated from unfair business actions or surprises from competitors. The default remedy—an exclusion order that bars affected products from entry into the United States—is a source of powerful leverage in business disputes. Section 337 investigations at the ITC are extremely fast, often taking less than 18 months from filing to final decision and a potential exclusion order, and rarely suffer from delays that can affect a federal district court action. And for global disputes, the fact that the ITC need only exercise in rem jurisdiction over products imported into the U.S. is often a key consideration—the ITC does not need to obtain personal jurisdiction over a respondent, and may enter an exclusion order barring products from the U.S. market even where a respondent fails to show up to defend against a complaint.', 'II. Non-Patent, Non-Statutory IP Claims Under Section 337', 'Section 337 broadly authorizes the ITC to investigate all forms of “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles.” These so-called “Section 337(a)(1)(A) claims” (or “nonstatutory Section 337 claims”) make the ITC a potentially attractive forum for companies seeking creative solutions to defend their rights and gain a competitive edge in global business disputes.', 'The requirements to bring Section 337(a)(1)(A) claims differ in two significant ways from claims relating to statutory IP rights. In asserting an (a)(1)(A) claim, a complainant must plead four elements: (1) unfair competition or an unfair act by the respondent; (2) importation, sale for importation, or sale after importation into the United States of an article; (3) the existence of a “domestic industry”; and (4) injury to the domestic industry from the alleged unfair act. In contrast, to prove a statutory cause of action (such as patent infringement), the complainant must plead only three elements—there is no requirement to prove injury to a domestic industry, because such injury is presumed when a statutory IP right is infringed. However, the complainant asserting a statutory cause of action must also tie the domestic industry to the accused product or the intellectual property in question, which is not required for nonstatutory claims.', 'In recent years, the ITC has instituted investigations under Section 337(a)(1)(A) based in whole or in part on allegations of trade secret misappropriation, common law trademark and trade dress infringement, breach of contract, tortious interference with contractual relations, false advertising, passing off, violation of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), and violation of a state-law Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act.1', 'Trade secret misappropriation cases have been particularly popular in recent years. That growth in popularity was sparked by the Federal Circuit decision in TianRui Group Co. v. International Trade Commission, an appeal from a case at the ITC in which the complainant sought to prevent steel railroad wheels manufactured by TianRui in China from being imported into the United States. The complainant argued that the ITC had authority under Section 337 to enter an exclusion order because TianRui was manufacturing the wheels using a trade secret it stole from the complainant’s licensee in China, even though the complainant itself no longer used the trade secret in the United States. In other words, although TianRui’s misappropriation of trade secrets occurred wholly overseas and were not connected to the trade secret being used in the United States, the complainant argued that the nonstatutory prong of Section 337 nonetheless authorized the ITC to act. The ITC agreed, and its decision was upheld on appeal to the Federal Circuit. Since then, several other complaints asserting trade secret misappropriation have been successful at the ITC.2', 'Section 337(a)(1)(A) claims based on other unfair acts have also seen increased activity at the ITC. For example, the recent decision in Certain Woven Textile Fabrics involved a claim of false advertising. The complainant in that case alleged that the respondent was unfairly and falsely advertising the thread count of its bed sheets. After investigating, the ITC found a violation of Section 337 and, notably, entered a general exclusion order—meaning that not only would respondent’s sheets be excluded, but all sheets that falsely advertised their thread count would also be excluded.3 Furthermore, Section 337 claims based on false designation of origin (mislabeling the country of origin of imported goods, often to avoid tariffs or duties) have also been on the rise. After being successful in the 1980s,4 only two such claims have been brought since 2008: Certain Footwear Products in 2014 and the currently-pending Certain Carbon & Alloy Steel Products. The latter case is particularly interesting, as it also involves the first ITC investigation based on an alleged antitrust violation in more than 25 years. There, the ITC is expected to rule soon regarding the specific showing that must be made to plead an injury for an antitrust claim under Section 337.', 'III. Other Potential Claims Under the ITC’s Broad Section 337 Authority', 'Although cases asserting nonstatutory causes of action have been on the rise, they are still a small minority compared to other cases brought under Section 337. Yet the ITC’s authority to investigate nonstatutory claims is viewed as very broad, as the permissive language of Section 337(a)(1)(A) illustrates. The legislative history of the Tariff Act and case law make clear that the ITC has the broad authority to prevent every type and form of unfair practice—thus, the breadth of Section 337(a)(1)(A) may make it ripe for bringing actions in additional contexts than those described above.', 'Some complainants have already started to push the envelope in the food and drug area, and the ITC has responded favorably. For example, in 2012, KV Pharmaceutical Company (“KV”) filed a Section 337 complaint alleging that several compounding pharmacies were competing unfairly by creating a drug called 17P in violation of KV’s exclusivity period granted by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”).5 The complaint drew a significant amount of attention, with several third parties urging the ITC to decline to investigate the complaint on the grounds that this was a matter for FDA, not ITC, jurisdiction. The ITC ultimately issued a rare denial of institution, explaining that because the FDA had already declined to pursue enforcement against the named respondents, the complained-of conduct was not unlawful. Crucially, in a concurring memorandum, two commissioners explicitly stated “that they d[id] not reach the issue of whether properly pleaded claims based on the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [(“FDCA”)] may be cognizable under section 337(a)(1)(A).” Since then, at least three complaints have been filed alleging unfair acts under Section 337 based at least in part on violations of provisions of the FDCA such as drug labeling regulations. The first, Certain Potassium Chloride Powder Products, Inv. No. 337-TA-1013, resulted in an ITC investigation, and subsequently, a quick settlement. A second complaint was filed in August 2017 in Certain Periodontal Laser Devices, alleging unfair acts of false advertising relating to non-FDA-cleared medical devices. That complaint resulted in the institution of Inv. No. 337-TA-1070, which is scheduled to go to trial in April 2018. The third, Certain Synthetically Produced, Predominantly EPA Omega-3 Products (“Omega-3 Products”), was filed in late August, and a decision on institution is still pending—in fact, the complaint in Omega-3 Products has attracted significant briefing from both the parties and non-parties as to whether the ITC has jurisdiction over the complaint. The FDA even submitted a letter to the ITC, requesting that the ITC not institute the complaint.', 'These two latter cases are definitely ones to watch in this developing area of law; the ITC’s institution in Omega-3 Products is due October 27.', 'Another potential use of the ITC could be to challenge violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”). Although the federal government has stepped up enforcement of the FCPA in recent years, there is no private cause of action under the FCPA—similar to the FDCA implicated in the investigations discussed above. This means that a company who “has played by the rules”—and who may be at a significant disadvantage to a competitor who has engaged in illegal acts abroad—nonetheless cannot seek recourse under the FCPA. However, if the illegal acts (such as bribery) can be tied to importation of products into the United States, then the ITC may offer a way for the injured competitor to seek redress. Indeed, the U.S. Customs and International Trade Guide considers “commercial bribery” to be a “[p]ossible Section 337 violation.”6 Given the ITC’s expansive mandate to enforce Section 337, under the appropriate circumstances, the Commission may institute an investigation in this context.', 'Parallel importation, sometimes known as the importation of “gray market” goods, is also a prime example of a situation where Section 337 may be applicable. Gray market goods are genuine (i.e., not counterfeit) products protected by copyrights, patents, or trademarks, which are legally bought outside of the United States (usually for a lower price) and then imported into the United States and sold without authorization from the intellectual property owner. In the past, such conduct may have given rise to claims of statutory-based infringement in district court. However, two recent Supreme Court decisions may have left copyright and patent owners without an ability to enforce their rights under the traditional statutory framework. The Court in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. held that under the first sale doctrine, an initial sale extinguishes all copyright rights as to that copyrighted work, even if that sale is made overseas. And in Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc., the Court held that under the analogous patent exhaustion doctrine, patent rights are similarly “exhausted” once an initial sale is made, regardless of geographical considerations. Under these new precedents, an IP owner would likely be unable to bring suit in district court to address the parallel importation. However, the IP owner may be able to use a Section 337(a)(1)(A) claim to argue that the foreign buyer’s conduct constitutes unfair competition or unfair acts justifying exclusion from the U.S. market.', 'Environmental law and fair labor standards practices are additional areas where Section 337 may be creatively utilized. Although no complaints have yet been brought under Section 337 in these contexts, there is no prohibition on such claims. Indeed, because the Commission’s Section 337 authority is broad, if a company can tie its competitors’ violations of environmental or fair labor laws to the importation of goods and show that those violations are giving its competitors an unfair advantage, it could succeed in excluding those goods from the domestic market. Notably, the ITC already has experience in investigating practices in the environmental context as they relate to international trade,7 and so could easily bring that expertise to Section 337 investigations.', 'Finally, the ITC may be a valuable forum to protect competition in the data privacy and security context. Hacking and data breaches are not new concepts to the ITC. In Certain Carbon & Alloy Steel Products, U.S. Steel alleged that its trade secrets were misappropriated in 2010 and 2011 through Chinese government-backed “cyber attacks intended to aid China’s state-owned steel enterprises.” While these claims were subsequently dropped, U.S. Steel’s complaint may provide a roadmap for other companies to assert claims of similar misconduct in the future. And unfair data privacy and security violations need not be tied solely to trade secrets misappropriation claims. Data privacy concerns and data breaches are generally investigated in other contexts by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), and the FTC has found a multitude of unfair practices relating to data privacy and security, especially when data breaches have occurred. In the past, the ITC has looked to the FTC’s definition of what constitutes an “unfair” act in resolving its own investigations under Section 337(a)(1)(A). Therefore, the ITC may potentially investigate a broad swath of actions in the data security arena.', 'Conclusion', 'In sum, although Section 337 litigation at the ITC has traditionally focused on statutory IP claims, the Commission’s broad authority to investigate a wide range of unfair practices has lead to a growing number of complaints alleging nonstatutory claims. From trade secret misappropriation to false advertising claims, more and more companies are becoming increasingly creative in taking advantage of the ITC’s unique position in regulating international trade. Yet the Commission may still be an underutilized forum. Section 337 could be ripe for use by companies in business disputes with competitors who refuse to play by the rules in a variety of arenas.']

[(9, 16), (28, 38)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-Deo-Fridman-Neg-00%20NDT-Doubles.docx

Northwestern

DeFr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Northwestern/DeFr/Northwestern-Deo-Fridman-Neg-00%2520NDT-Doubles.docx

c59b080b3e9bff5845bca59261e08954a69e60e1cf0dee354e6792b9e2890ecc

CCS Can’t solve---too late to scale up and lets companies emit more carbon

Kole 16 (Allison Kole, Senior legal fellow with the Climate Investigations Center, “It’s Too Late for Expensive Capture Technology to Help Climate,” The New York Times, July 7, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/07/07/clean-coal-or-a-dirty-shame/its-too-late-for-expensive-carbon-capture-technology-to-help-the-climate)

carbon capture has yet to come close to offsetting damage and created new hazards Carbon capture is expensive requiring new infrastructure . This includes thousands of miles of pipeline and monitoring sites it is likely too late to be scaled up To recoup costs carbon capture operators plan to sell carbon to oil companies to help them extract more oil using carbon capture requires more coal to produce the same amount of energy

carbon capture and storage for coal­fired power plants has yet to come close to offsetting the damage caused by coal and has created new hazards of its own. We cannot afford further investment in a pipe dream that distracts us from developing real solutions and technologies for climate change. Carbon capture is an expensive technology requiring expansive new infrastructure . This includes potentially thousands of miles of pipeline for transporting captured carbon dioxide and maintenance and monitoring of storage sites to prevent leakage. Assuming such obstacles can be overcome, it is likely too late for carbon capture to be scaled up as needed to be an effective tool for combating climate change. No carbon capture project has been able to capture the quantities of carbon dioxide promised. carbon capture investment is not a smart strategy for reducing carbon emissions. To recoup costs , some carbon capture power plant operators plan to sell carbon dioxide to oil companies to help them extract more oil . , using carbon capture actually requires the use of more coal to produce the same amount of energy than a plant without carbon capture. Putting costs, infrastructure issues and efficiency problems aside, the use of carbon capture to reduce carbon emissions ignores the harmful effects of coal on the environment and communities. plants with carbon capture still release harmful air pollutants and produce polluting coal ash ponds. With or without carbon capture, the burning, storage and extraction of coal disproportionately affects poor communities and communities of color. Our energy and environmental future should not be dictated by the narrow vision of the fading coal industry.

yet to come close new hazards distracts us from developing real solutions and technologies expensive new infrastructure thousands of miles of pipeline maintenance monitoring of storage sites too late help them extract more oil requires the use of more coal to produce the same amount of energy still release harmful air pollutants

['Despite decades of effort, carbon capture and storage for coal\xadfired power plants has yet to come close to offsetting the damage caused by coal and has created new hazards of its own. The term “clean coal” has always seemed like an oxymoron, and so it is no wonder that carbon capture, a technology touted by industry, has done little to clean up coal. We cannot afford further investment in a pipe dream that distracts us from developing real solutions and technologies for climate change. Yet policymakers, prodded by the coal industry, continue to invest money and precious time to try to develop carbon capture for coal\xadfired plants. The Department of Energy began developing carbon capture in 1997, and since 2008, Congress has allocated $7 billion for carbon capture programs. Still, no commercial\xadscale carbon capture power plant has gone online in the United States, and the long list of abandoned projects in the United States and abroad grows. Carbon capture is an expensive technology requiring expansive new infrastructure. This includes potentially thousands of miles of pipeline for transporting captured carbon dioxide and maintenance and monitoring of storage sites to prevent leakage. Assuming such obstacles can be overcome, it is likely too late for carbon capture to be scaled up as needed to be an effective tool for combating climate change. To achieve meaningful carbon dioxide reductions, approximately 100 carbon capture projects must be online by 2020 and 3,000 by 2050. No carbon capture project has been able to capture the quantities of carbon dioxide promised. Also, carbon capture investment is not a smart strategy for reducing carbon emissions. To recoup costs, some carbon capture power plant operators plan to sell carbon dioxide to oil companies to help them extract more oil. Also, because carbon capture reduces a coal plant’s efficiency, using carbon capture actually requires the use of more coal to produce the same amount of energy than a plant without carbon capture. Putting costs, infrastructure issues and efficiency problems aside, the use of carbon capture to reduce carbon emissions ignores the harmful effects of coal on the environment and communities. Regardless of any reduction in carbon achieved, plants with carbon capture still release harmful air pollutants and produce polluting coal ash ponds. With or without carbon capture, the burning, storage and extraction of coal disproportionately affects poor communities and communities of color. We cannot afford further investment in the carbon capture pipe dream that distracts the nation from developing real solutions and adaptive technologies for climate change. Our energy and environmental future should not be dictated by the narrow vision of the fading coal industry.']

[(0, 7)]

ndtceda

Emory-HeLo-Neg-Georgetown-Round-3.docx

Emory

HeLo

82fb7389ce797bb5e72cd8c6e90255fa78d66cd98a0e873e2577a173053414cc

AND it’s a rare occurrence that doesn’t occur in practice

Daniel F. Spulber 20, Elinor Hobbs Distinguished Professor of International Business, and Professor of Strategy, Strategy Department, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, and Professor of Law (Courtesy), Pritzker School of Law, Northwestern University, Articles And Essay: Licensing Standard Essential Patents With FRAND Commitments: Preparing For 5G Mobile Telecommunications, 18 Colo. Tech. L.J. 79, 81

SSOs require disclosure there is little chance an implementer will be "surprised" holders have economic incentives to make offers The rarity disputes compared to active patents implies "patent holdup" is unlikely . There is no evidence disputes lead to excessive royalties it is the opposite , reasonable damages are not to capture implementer's benefit and switching costs

there is no need for FRAND to address "patent holdup" SSOs require disclosure of SEPs so there is little chance an implementer will be "surprised" by SEPs SSOs identify SEPs so that prospective implementers adopting the standard are informed about the relevant patents , and SSOs require SEP holders to make FRAND that also provide information to prospective implementers . SEP holders thus cannot take advantage of companies that unknowingly started using the patented tech SEP holders have economic incentives to make patent license offers to obtain license revenues and reasonable damages in the event of infringement The rarity of patent disputes compared to the number of active patents implies that "patent holdup" is unlikely . There is no evidence that patent disputes lead to excessive royalties for infringement it is the opposite , reasonable damages are based on harm to the patent holder from infringement . Reasonable damages in patent disputes are not intended to capture the implementer's benefit from infringement and are not increased by switching costs . Reasonable damages are increased when the infringement is found to be willful infringement , which is rare

FRAND "patent holdup" disclosure little chance implementer "surprised" prospective implementers standard relevant patents FRAND information implementers advantage of companies started tech economic incentives patent license offers license revenues reasonable damages infringement rarity disputes number of active patents "patent holdup" is unlikely no evidence that patent disputes excessive royalties opposite patent holder infringement not intended to capture implementer's benefit infringement switching costs damages increased willful infringement rare

['Overall, there is no need for SSO FRAND commitments to address "patent holdup" or SEP holdup. SSOs require disclosure of SEPs so there is little chance an implementer will be "surprised" by SEPs. 265SSOs identify SEPs so that prospective implementers adopting the standard are informed about the relevant patents, and SSOs require SEP holders to make FRAND commitments that also provide information to prospective implementers. SEP holders thus cannot take advantage of companies that unknowingly started using the patented technology. SEP holders also have economic incentives to make patent license offers to prospective implementers to obtain license revenues and reasonable royalty damages in the event of infringement.', 'The rarity of patent disputes compared to the number of active patents implies that "patent holdup" is unlikely. There is no evidence that patent disputes lead to excessive royalties for infringement. In fact, it is the opposite, reasonable royalty damages are based on harm to the patent holder from infringement. Reasonable royalty damages in patent disputes are not intended to capture the implementer\'s benefit from infringement and are not increased by the implementer\'s switching costs. Reasonable royalty damages are only increased when the infringement is found to be willful infringement, which is relatively rare.']

[(10, 17), (18, 20)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-Landgraff-Wegener-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx

Northwestern

LaWe

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Northwestern/LaWe/Northwestern-Landgraff-Wegener-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx

f8560b7d46bdee28dbfb100ddf6648ec3e45afbb50dff72c0dbce671e0053e3d

No cyber impact.

Lewis ’20 [James Andrew; 8/17/20; senior vice president and director of the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; "Dismissing Cyber Catastrophe," https://www.csis.org/analysis/dismissing-cyber-catastrophe]

Nonstate actors and most states lack capability to cause damage There is enough uncertainty among attackers about U S ability to attribute that they are unwilling to risk retaliation No one has died from cyber State emphasis is espionage and coercion U S opponents have no interest in catastrophic attack it would produce equal retaliation inadvertent escalation has never occurred there are constraints that limit risk absence suggests high degree of control by advanced states neither Russia nor China would be well served by attack on the U S Iran could but only when it decided to engage in major conflict

there are powerful strategic constraints on those who have ability to launch catastrophe attacks . We have more decades of experience with the use of cyber techniques and have a clear understanding of motives , capabilities , and intentions Nonstate actors and most states lack the capability to launch attacks that cause physical damage at any level There have been regular predictions every year that nonstate actors will acquire these in two or three years The monetary return is negligible , which dissuades the skilled cybercriminals who might have the necessary skills There is enough uncertainty among potential attackers about the U nited S tates’ ability to attribute that they are unwilling to risk massive retaliation in response No one has ever died from a cyber attack, and only a handful produced physical damage. A cyberattack is not a nuclear weapon, and it is intellectually lazy to equate them The shadow of nuclear war distorts discussion of cyber warfare State use of cyber operations is consistent with their broad national strategies and interests. Their primary emphasis is on espionage and political coercion . The U nited S tates has opponents and is in conflict with them, but they have no interest in launching a catastrophic cyber attack since it would certainly produce an equal ly catastrophic retaliation . Their goal is to stay below the “use-of-force” threshold not start a war This has implications inadvertent escalation , something that has also never occurred there are both technological and strategic constraints that shape and limit risk in cyber operations, and the absence of inadvertent escalation suggests a high degree of control for cyber capabilities by advanced states . Attackers, particularly among the U nited S tates’ major opponents for whom cyber is just one of the tools for confrontation, seek to avoid actions that could trigger escalation The U nited S tates has two opponents ( China and Russia ) who are capable of damaging cyberattacks. but neither Russia nor China would be well served by a attack on the U nited S tates. Iran may reach the point where it could use cyberattacks but it would only do so when it has decided to engage in a major armed conflict with the U nited S tates North Korea has not developed this kind of capability

strategic constraints catastrophe attacks cyber techniques clear understanding motives capabilities intentions Nonstate most states return is negligible dissuades uncertainty U S attribute unwilling to risk massive retaliation nuclear war distorts discussion primary emphasis espionage coercion U S opponents conflict no interest certainly catastrophic retaliation inadvertent escalation never occurred technological strategic constraints limit risk absence control advanced states U S opponents avoid actions trigger escalation U S China Russia Russia China U S Iran only decided engage major armed conflict U S North Korea not

['More importantly, there are powerful strategic constraints on those who have the ability to launch catastrophe attacks. We have more than two decades of experience with the use of cyber techniques and operations for coercive and criminal purposes and have a clear understanding of motives, capabilities, and intentions. We can be guided by the methods of the Strategic Bombing Survey, which used interviews and observation (rather than hypotheses) to determine effect. These methods apply equally to cyberattacks. The conclusions we can draw from this are:', 'Nonstate actors and most states lack the capability to launch attacks that cause physical damage at any level, much less a catastrophe. There have been regular predictions every year for over a decade that nonstate actors will acquire these high-end cyber capabilities in two or three years in what has become a cycle of repetition. The monetary return is negligible, which dissuades the skilled cybercriminals (mostly Russian speaking) who might have the necessary skills. One mystery is why these groups have not been used as mercenaries, and this may reflect either a degree of control by the Russian state (if it has forbidden mercenary acts) or a degree of caution by criminals.', 'There is enough uncertainty among potential attackers about the United States’ ability to attribute that they are unwilling to risk massive retaliation in response to a catastrophic attack. (They are perfectly willing to take the risk of attribution for espionage and coercive cyber actions.)', 'No one has ever died from a cyberattack, and only a handful of these attacks have produced physical damage. A cyberattack is not a nuclear weapon, and it is intellectually lazy to equate them to nuclear weapons. Using a tactical nuclear weapon against an urban center would produce several hundred thousand casualties, while a strategic nuclear exchange would cause tens of millions of casualties and immense physical destruction. These are catastrophes that some hack cannot duplicate. The shadow of nuclear war distorts discussion of cyber warfare.', 'State use of cyber operations is consistent with their broad national strategies and interests. Their primary emphasis is on espionage and political coercion. The United States has opponents and is in conflict with them, but they have no interest in launching a catastrophic cyberattack since it would certainly produce an equally catastrophic retaliation.', '', ' Their goal is to stay below the “use-of-force” threshold and undertake damaging cyber actions against the United States, not start a war.', 'This has implications for the discussion of inadvertent escalation, something that has also never occurred. The concern over escalation deserves a longer discussion, as there are both technological and strategic constraints that shape and limit risk in cyber operations, and the absence of inadvertent escalation suggests a high degree of control for cyber capabilities by advanced states. Attackers, particularly among the United States’ major opponents for whom cyber is just one of the tools for confrontation, seek to avoid actions that could trigger escalation.', 'The United States has two opponents (China and Russia) who are capable of damaging cyberattacks. Russia has demonstrated its attack skills on the Ukrainian power grid, but neither Russia nor China would be well served by a similar attack on the United States. Iran is improving and may reach the point where it could use cyberattacks to cause major damage, but it would only do so when it has decided to engage in a major armed conflict with the United States. Iran might attack targets outside the United States and its allies with less risk and continues to experiment with cyberattacks against Israeli critical infrastructure. North Korea has not yet developed this kind of capability.']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-Cai-Sullivan-Aff-Northwestern-Round6.docx

Dartmouth

CaSu

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Dartmouth/CaSu/Dartmouth-Cai-Sullivan-Aff-Northwestern-Round6.docx

69fd379c1289f000575b1814e466e425b58522a59b2c96465b7fb1d6acbf2473

Failure causes digital protectionism. That cedes to Chinese internet governance AND desynchs emerging tech responses

Meredith Broadbent 20, Senior Adviser (Non-resident), Scholl Chair in International Business. "Internet or Splinternet? The Consequences of European Tech Sovereignty"

U.S. digital behemoths respond to concerns about market domination more exaggerated in Europe a frenzy of rulemaking at the Commission As Congress probes it is important to consider parallel pressure for protectionism in Europe This endangers transatlantic data —the lifeblood of innovative firms — and will hurt business globally while distracting Europe from China’s authoritarian system in AI blockchain and liberalizing market access in emerging markets improved coop under open and free internet seems remote in light of regulators governments advocate paramount importance for competition there is pressure to address industrial challenges in competition through new guidelines these aspirations should be balanced to avoid balkanization of the internet and dampening innovation Fragmentation is not good the U S and E U can reach understandings and have in the past but any reset of U.S. antitrust should take into account the trends in Europe

U.S. digital behemoths appeared respond to public and congressional concerns about market domination . The size and success of these champions, under fire for anticompetitive practices, have triggered more exaggerated concerns in Europe which are playing out in a frenzy of proposed rulemaking at the Commission As Congress probes market behavior of U.S. digital companies, it is important for U.S. legislators to consider parallel rising pressure for digital and industrial protectionism in Europe This flurry endangers transatlantic data transfers —the lifeblood of innovative U.S. firms — and will hurt U.S. business success globally while simultaneously distracting Europe and the U nited S tates from the broader threat posed by China’s authoritarian state capitalist system . Europeans are deeply worried about the continent’s ability to compete long term in the global digital economy, given challenges developing competitors to the U.S. tech giants. Yet European economies have tremendous strengths The U S and Europe share interest in leveraging disruptive tech like AI blockchain and the I o T in key industries , and liberalizing market access for services in emerging markets . The U S and Europe can also work together to ensure firms and workers in more underserved and remote regions are able to apply technologies, access educational and training opportunities, and increase productivity . But improved transatlantic coop eration under an open and free internet architecture seems remote in light of where European regulators say they are headed. European governments advocate for policies to tackle the “ digital platforms with paramount importance for competition ,” saying that these firms should be subject to “ specific scrutiny ” in Europe and an enhanced regulatory framework. competition authorities are increasingly weaving regulation of technology markets there is pressure to address Europe’s long-term industrial challenges in other sectors states are pressing for a revamp of competition through the adoption of new guidelines these aspirations couched in protectionist rhetoric, should be balanced against the need to avoid a balkanization of the internet and a further dampening of the environment for innovation Fragmentation of the internet is not good the U nited S tates and the E uropean U nion can reach negotiated understandings on sensitive digital economy issues and have done so in the past negotiations will be necessary to once again resolve the impasse but they offer the chance to hammer out a better transatlantic partnership in the commercial digital space any active reset of U.S. antitrust policy should take into account the aggressive trends in Europe

public congressional concerns size success anticompetitive exaggerated Europe frenzy of proposed rulemaking at the Commission probes important consider parallel rising pressure for digital and industrial protectionism in Europe flurry transatlantic data transfers lifeblood innovative firms globally distracting Europe U S broader China’s authoritarian state capitalist system tremendous strengths U S Europe interest leveraging disruptive tech AI blockchain I o T key industries liberalizing market access emerging markets U S also underserved remote regions educational training productivity transatlantic coop open free internet architecture remote regulators digital platforms competition subject specific scrutiny enhanced regulatory framework. weaving regulation other sectors revamp of competition new guidelines aspirations balanced avoid balkanization of the internet dampening environment for innovation not good U S E U reach negotiated understandings have done so in the past negotiations better transatlantic partnership commercial digital space any active reset of U.S. antitrust policy take into account aggressive trends in Europe

['Sitting atop resounding commercial success in the domestic as well as the global marketplace, the CEOs of four U.S. digital behemoths appeared last week before the House of Representatives to respond to public and congressional concerns about market domination.', 'The size and success of these champions, under fire for lack of transparency and anticompetitive practices, have triggered similar, more exaggerated concerns in Europe, which are playing out in a frenzy of proposed rulemaking at both the Commission and member-state level. As Congress probes the market behavior of U.S. digital companies, it is important for U.S. legislators to consider parallel rising pressure for digital and industrial protectionism in Europe, particularly in Germany and France. This flurry of regulatory activity endangers transatlantic data transfers—the lifeblood of many innovative U.S. firms—and will hurt U.S. business success globally while simultaneously distracting both Europe and the United States from the broader threat posed by China’s authoritarian state capitalist system.', 'Many Europeans are deeply worried about the continent’s ability to compete long term in the global digital economy, given its challenges in developing competitors to the U.S. and Chinese tech giants. Yet European economies have tremendous strengths—highly educated workforces, depth in engineering, advanced technologies, and a leadership role in a host of industries that are rapidly digitizing, such as agriculture, infrastructure, transportation, logistics, manufacturing, and knowledge-intensive services, for example, financial, business, environmental, and engineering services. Constructing new European regulations for the digital era should be guided first by the do no harm warning.', 'The United States and Europe share an interest in piloting, investing in, and leveraging disruptive technologies like artificial intelligence (AI), blockchain, and the Internet of Things in these key industries, and liberalizing market access for services in emerging markets. The United States and Europe can also work together to ensure firms and workers in more underserved and remote regions are able to apply technologies, access educational and training opportunities, and increase productivity. But improved transatlantic cooperation in supporting innovation, productivity, consumer welfare, and sustainable job creation in a flourishing transatlantic digital economy, under an open and free internet architecture, seems all the more remote in light of where European regulators say they are headed.', 'The Commission released a series of documents earlier this year outlining Europe’s regulatory future, including a White Paper on Artificial Intelligence, a Communication on European Strategy for Data, and a framing paper related to Shaping Europe’s Digital Future. These documents and many more speak to the European desire to achieve “digital autonomy” and “tech sovereignty” through an array of regulatory and tax changes aimed at nurturing indigenous tech firms, developing independent European data pools, and tamping down on large, innovative foreign firms offering attractive digital services to European consumers.', 'Artificial Intelligence', 'Following the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) model of being the first mover with comprehensive regulation, the Commission is taking aggressive aim at being the preeminent “global standards setter” in AI. The European Union’s heavy-handed preliminary proposal for AI regulation diverges sharply from the U.S. approach. In its white paper on AI, the Commission has proposed ex ante conformity assessments to control access to the EU market for AI applications originating outside of the EU. That would likely require a new framework with criteria, benchmarks, and standards that European authorities will use to determine if an AI product is “trustworthy, secure and in respect of European values and rules” before it is allowed entry into the European market. This approach could include a pre-market review by EU authorities of algorithms, training data, documentation on programming, and how the system was built, as well as accuracy tests and other requirements. ', 'Also under consideration are data quality and traceability requirements that would require non-EU firms to train AI applications on GDPR compliant data, an extraterritorial regulation that seemingly would burden U.S. firms with requirements to completely retrain many proprietary algorithms developed in the United States with new data sets as a condition of market access in the European Union.', 'Unlike its inaction in the area of federal privacy regulation, which has allowed Europe to set a de facto global standard, the United States has led an international, cooperative effort through the G7 to reach common standards in the challenging area of AI research and development. A coordinated interagency team in the United States focused on AI regulation and emerging issues makes transatlantic collaboration is this new regulatory space a possibility.', 'New Activist Competition Measures', 'In a February 4, 2020, letter to Commission Executive Vice-President Vestager calling for more activist competition policy, France, Germany, Poland, and Italy describe their two overarching goals: (1) moderating competition emanating from “state-backed and subsidized” foreign competitors (e.g., China); and (2) controlling “emergence of large players in the digital economy relying on the accumulation of data and unparalleled network effects resulting in . . . excessive market power.” (e.g., large U.S. and Chinese tech companies.) The four European governments advocate for policies to tackle the “digital platforms with paramount importance for competition,” saying that these firms should be subject to “specific scrutiny” in Europe and an enhanced regulatory framework.', 'In different EU jurisdictions, competition authorities are increasingly weaving the precautionary principle into regulation of technology markets with the idea that new ex ante rules should be imposed ahead of any actual anticompetitive behavioral violation. Legislation pending in the German Bundestag is in this vein. For its part, the French government has put forward a legislative proposal to regulate “systemic platforms.” Under the French plan, competition regulators would be authorized to surveil and block planned acquisitions of European tech startups of almost any size.', 'Also, there is pressure on Vestager to address Europe’s long-term industrial challenges in other sectors. Member states are pressing for a revamp of competition, merger control, and state aid rules through the adoption of new guidelines governing horizontal mergers and updated definitions of relevant market concepts. Details of these proposals are still forthcoming.', 'Describing her guidelines for the European Commission, President von der Leyen has instructed Thierry Breton, the commissioner for internal market, to put into place the right framework to allow Europe to enhance its “technological sovereignty.” In her program, she writes, “we will invest in blockchain, high-performance computing, quantum computing, algorithms and tools to allow data sharing and data.” She has directed him to define standards for 5G networks and other new generation technologies and has given him authority to lead a European approach to artificial intelligence and a strategy on data.', 'Digital Services Act', 'The Commission is drafting a new Digital Services Act (DSA) to update the landmark e-Commerce Directive from 2000, which set rules for online safety and liability of online intermediaries for third party content. Addressing all digital services, as well as digital platforms, the DSA is expected to address difficult questions regarding hate speech, disinformation, certain advertising on social networks, and election tampering. In addition to major changes to the EU’s intermediate liability framework, the DSA is expected to include new rules on use of data by online platforms, new transparency requirements for algorithms, and possibly the establishment of a regulatory body to monitor the activities of online firms. Many member states are also increasing liability risks and imposing content monitoring requirements for online communications. Gauging the potential impact of these proposals on U.S. business interests has so far not been of perceptible concern to Congress or the administration who are enmeshed in the domestic debate on similar themes.', 'Going Forward', 'European Commission officials are clear about their goals for achieving “tech sovereignty” through a new regulatory framework for the European digital economy. But these aspirations, couched in protectionist rhetoric, should be balanced against the need to avoid a balkanization of the internet and a further dampening of the environment for innovation in Europe. Fragmentation of the internet is not good for European companies, not good for U.S. companies, not good for governments on either side of the Atlantic, not good for economic growth generally, and not good for the internet.', 'The recent decision by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to invalidate the 2006 U.S.- EU Privacy Shield has thrown transatlantic data flows once again into an unnerving state of regulatory uncertainty. But the decision is a reminder that the United States and the European Union can reach negotiated understandings on sensitive digital economy issues and have done so in the past, with the Privacy Shield and the Safe Harbor before that, even as negotiators appeared oceans apart and faced multiple setbacks, including several previous rulings by the CJEU.', 'Bilateral negotiations will be necessary to once again resolve the transatlantic impasse on privacy, but they offer the chance to hammer out a better transatlantic partnership in the commercial digital space that can be geared toward aiding a climate for innovation in Europe. When strategic considerations are taken into account, a partnership based on the principles of democracy, transparency, privacy, and individual liberty, which Europe and the United States share, would stand as a healthy contrast to China’s approach to privacy, AI regulation, competition policy, and free speech on the internet.', 'Although not the topic of last week’s headline grabbing congressional hearing, any active reset of U.S. antitrust policy should take into account the aggressive regulatory trends in Europe that threaten to stifle innovation there while unfairly targeting U.S. national champions.']

[(9, 21)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-Deo-Fridman-Aff-FullerTown-Round6.docx

Northwestern

DeFr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Northwestern/DeFr/Northwestern-Deo-Fridman-Aff-FullerTown-Round6.docx

4615709006129dafd6437593ca6c49f77fd274a49293f74ebe39f72438fb97bd

It has zero chance of success---prefer empirical studies.

Calnitsky ’21 [David; August 8; Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology at Western University; Critical Sociology, “The Policy Road to Socialism,” Sage Online]

the rev is impossible You do not see rev s in developed capitalist democracies Drawing on a thousand years of data not one had collapsed with GDP higher than Argentina These include any kind of regime collapse A smashed state is likely to result in tyranny Not only has there never been a successful revolution there has never a working class that wanted one rev involves colossal risks people have a lot to lose all working classes have been reformist capitalists fight far harder against a revolution than reformist drives If revolution were the alt employers would grant every reform democracy has never emerged in the wake of social collapse, socialist economy would be rife with unintended consequences it is hard to imagine success without incremental transformation the only way to avoid blunders

the rev olutionary road is impossible inside the rich capitalist democracies And between the implausible and the impossible the choice is clear. this can be framed as an empirical hypothesis You do not see rev olution s in developed capitalist democracies there has never been a revolution in a moderately middle-class democracy Drawing on a thousand years of data they show that not one had collapsed with a per-capita GDP higher than that of Argentina in 1976. A These data in fact include any kind of regime collapse ; narrowing the data to socialist revolution makes the empirical case against it even more impressive. Their definition of revolution is very broad and includes “attempts” to overthrow government as well as “unsuccessful” rebellions The revolutionary road is closed on the following grounds: Workers do not want it Capitalists would sooner grant reforms A smashed state is more likely to result in tyranny Not only has there never been a successful revolution in a developed democracy, there has never been a working class that has wanted one , the reasons workers are not revolutionary are materialist in character. Explaining their reformist politics does not require appeal to venal trade union leaders or false consciousness. Most people wish to minimize risk in their lives, and rev olution involves taking on colossal risks . home-ownership in the developed world hovers around 70%; this means that a lot of people have a lot to lose . the materialist case for revolution proposes that people favor it when their expected post-revolutionary standards of living are greater than their current standard when we add moderate risk- and loss-aversion the calculation changes all working classes in all developed democracies have been decidedly reformist in orientation The reason why revolutionary socialism has always been marginal in rich capitalist economies is that only the latter consistently deliver hi Revolution is only possible when the forces of production are underdeveloped, but it can only be successful when they are sufficiently developed to make socialism objectively viable the circumstances under which revolutions spark and succeed never coincide . capitalists will fight far harder against a revolution than they would against reformist drives ignoring the response from capitalists violates Elster’s first law of political rationality: Never assume your opponent is less rational than you. If revolution were the alt ernative employers would grant every imaginable reform Why we imagine that total social breakdown would prompt a deepening of democracy rather than authoritarian entrenchment This happy outcome has never before emerged in the wake of social collapse, A socialist economy would be so rife with unintended consequences it is easy to imagine a democracy voting its way back into capitalism This is true even if we believe that the socialist calculation debate is solvable in the age of big data it is hard to imagine success without a slow and incremental transformation experimenting with bits and pieces along the way . An experimental approach is likely the only way to avoid devastating blunders that undermine the whole project Moments of institutional upheaval and big change may at times be necessary, but to be successful they will have to rest on a foundation of smaller changes that have been tested.

the rev olutionary road is impossible You do not see rev olution s in developed capitalist democracies never thousand years of data not one had collapsed any kind of regime collapse Workers do not want it Capitalists would sooner grant reforms A smashed state is more likely to result in tyranny there has never been a working class that has wanted one minimize risk rev olution involves taking on colossal risks a lot of people have a lot to lose . all working classes in all developed democracies have been decidedly reformist in orientation spark and succeed never coincide capitalists far harder reform Why authoritarian entrenchment unintended consequences imagine success slow and incremental transformation devastating blunders undermine the whole project

['I do not, however, think that the revolutionary road is implausible. Rather, it is impossible, at least inside the rich capitalist democracies. And between the implausible and the impossible the choice is clear.', 'Again, this can be framed as an empirical hypothesis: You do not see revolutions in developed capitalist democracies. As Przeworski and Limongi (1997) have written, there has never been a revolution in a moderately middle-class democracy (see also Przeworski, 2019). Drawing on a thousand years of data, cumulatively collected across 37 democratic countries, they show that not one had collapsed with a per-capita GDP higher than that of Argentina in 1976. Among countries with half that figure, collapse was exceedingly rare. Even a modest GDP brings with it an enormous amount of regime stability. These data in fact include any kind of regime collapse; narrowing the data to socialist revolution makes the empirical case against it even more impressive. Any case for revolution must begin by acknowledging rather than ignoring this evidence.', 'To look at this question in a different way, I draw on the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive, which contains information on revolutions (rather than government collapse) for over 200 countries since 1919. Their definition of revolution is very broad (see footnote 7) and includes “attempts” to overthrow government as well as “unsuccessful” rebellions. The data were compiled from newspaper sources and warrants caution, but nonetheless constitutes the most systematic evidence available for these questions. In Figure 9, I present the GNP per capita distribution of revolutions, from 1919, where GNP is first available, to the present. By considering only those country-years with revolutions I reduce the observation count from 17,520 to 184. Unlike Przeworski, I do not further restrict the data to democracies. The graph displays an extreme skew: The vast, overwhelming majority of cases of revolutionary threat occur in countries with a per capita GNP below $5,000 USD. For reference, the figure for the US in the data is about $65,850 in 2019. The hypothesis above—that we do not see revolutions in developed democracies—seems borne out by the evidence.', 'figure', 'Figure 9. Histogram of country-years with revolutions.', 'Source: Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive. Data drawn from 200 plus countries between 1919 and 2018 are then restricted to country-years (N = 184) in which there were “revolutions,” as well as a “major government crisis” and “anti-government protests.”', 'Why exactly is this true and what are the mechanisms to explain it? Why is the revolutionary strategy impossible for a country like the US? There are, at bottom, three reasons, each of which stands alone as a sufficient condition to snap the last threads of one’s revolutionary faith.23 The first two suggest that revolution is unachievable, and the last suggests that even if it is achievable, socialism by revolutionary means is unachievable. The revolutionary road is closed on the following grounds:', '(1)\u2003Workers do not want it', '(2)\u2003Capitalists would sooner grant reforms', '(3)\u2003A smashed state is more likely to result in tyranny than deep democracy', 'Not only has there never been a successful revolution in a developed democracy, there has never been a working class that has wanted one (e.g. Erikson and Tedin, 2015; Sassoon, 1996).24 There are no clear cases where the dominant inclination of the working class in a developed democracy was revolutionary. Recall that the above graph also includes attempts and unsuccessful cases. It is self-evident that workers have not joined revolutionary groups en masse at any point in the context of a rich democracy. Nor were their aspirations to join such groups thwarted by violence or ideology. When gains inside a capitalist democracy are available—either individual or collective ones, and this has been true even through the neoliberal period, where median living standards have continued to (slowly) go up and not down—it is not worth risking everything for an uncertain future (Thewissen et al., 2015).25 More important than the dynamic point is the static one: When standards of living are moderately high, as shown in Figure 9, the modal worker has more to lose than her chains. This is not an argument against socialism; but to revise Werner Sombart, the life raft of revolution really was shipwrecked on shoals of roast beef and apple pie.', 'Therefore, the reasons workers are not revolutionary are materialist in character. Explaining their reformist politics does not require appeal to venal trade union leaders or false consciousness. Most people wish to minimize risk in their lives, and revolution involves taking on colossal risks. For example, home-ownership in the developed world hovers around 70%; this means that a lot of people have a lot to lose.', 'By contrast, the materialist case for revolution proposes that people favor it when their expected post-revolutionary standards of living are greater than their current standard (Roemer, 1985). But when we add moderate risk- and loss-aversion the calculation changes (Kahneman and Tversky, 1991). Say you have a low income, but own a few assets, maybe a house, a car, and perhaps you also have a child; what risk profile would you require to gamble your modest holdings for an uncertain future which might be better but might be worse? Even if you are certain that the probability of better is greater than the probability of worse, you have to envision workers as a class of inveterate gamblers to take the bet. Moderately cautious people who prefer a bird in the hand will still view the downside risk as too great. Equal gains and losses are not experienced equally. This is the loss aversion phenomenon. But the assumption of a population confident about improved standards of living—and a willingness to take risky strategies to achieve them—is itself unwarranted. This is the risk aversion phenomenon. The modal worker is of course correct to suspect that her post-revolutionary welfare is uncertain; socialists after all do not have satisfactory answers to the problems of coordination, motivation, and innovation under socialism (for attempted answers that are provocative and oftentimes brilliant, see Albert, 2004; Cottrell and Cockshott, 1992; Corneo, 2017; Roemer, 1994; and Wright and Hahnel, 2016). When one compares the status quo to a future where both heaven and hell are seemingly plausible, it is perfectly rational that people everywhere would abandon the barricades. And abandon them they did.', 'Now perhaps the revolutionaries have persuaded us that negative outcomes are far-fetched, that we are very confident that revolution will usher in, eventually, the land of milk and honey. It is still the case that in this model the promised land will only be reached after a social breakdown of unknown duration: A complete overhaul in the organization of production will lead to some middle period of deteriorating material welfare as capitalists rapidly exit the economy. This means chaos and uncertainty, but it could also mean war. The interregnum could last a year, but it might last two decades, and however optimistic we are about the end point, we cannot in advance know how long this interim phase will persist. In the meantime, revolutionary enthusiasm will wane, erstwhile supporters will decamp, a “stay-the-course” electoral strategy will be outflanked by competitor parties promising a return to normalcy, and the desire to consolidate gains will make the authoritarian impulse greater. From a materialist perspective, the uncertain passage through what Przeworski (1986) calls the “transition trough” makes the journey less appealing.26', 'To my mind, these factors explain why all working classes in all developed democracies have been decidedly reformist in orientation. The reason why revolutionary socialism has always been marginal in rich capitalist economies—and will always be outflanked by reform-oriented socialism—is that only the latter consistently deliver high (and usually increasing) standards of living and low (and usually decreasing) levels of risk. As long as the Mad Max world of catastrophic collapse can be avoided, reform-oriented parties will always better capture the enthusiasm of poor and working people.', 'Thus, when we try to explain the non-revolutionary attitudes of our working-class friends and family, we do not need to lean on the false consciousness account, for there is a more parsimonious materialist explanation. As such, any case for revolution must be non-materialist in character: You can be a materialist or a revolutionary, but not both.', 'This is the dilemma the revolutionaries must consider: Revolution is only possible when the forces of production are underdeveloped, but it can only be successful when they are sufficiently developed to make socialism (or communism) objectively viable.27 As Elster (1986) has argued, the circumstances under which revolutions spark and succeed never coincide.', 'What about the capitalists? Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to expect that they will fight far harder against a revolution than they would against reformist drives. Indeed, ignoring the response from capitalists violates Elster’s first law of political rationality: Never assume your opponent is less rational than you. If revolution were the alternative, employers would grant every imaginable reform, from far higher taxes to the rejiggering of power relations in the workplace. In a mugging, most people will surrender their wallet before their life.', 'Actors in the state ought to respond in more or less the same way—that is, as long as you admit your adversary the competence to read the situation as well as you. If our theory of the state suggests that it acts on behalf of the capitalist class, its apparatchiks would anticipate and preempt any revolutionary crusade with a cocktail of concession and repression. And while it will certainly contest reforms, it will devote all of its resources to break the revolution. Nonetheless, this means that revolutionaries can play a crucial role, even if it is not to foment revolution. Militancy is a powerful strategy to foment reform (for an argument about the history of social democracy along these lines, see Piketty, 2014).', 'Thus far, the main reason revolution is off the table is because no one wants it—not workers, nor employers, nor the state.', 'The third point above asks us to imagine the prospects for revolutionary success even if we ignore the wrinkle that workers have neither an interest nor capacity to make it. But let us pretend they did: Why then would we imagine that total social breakdown would prompt a deepening of democracy rather than authoritarian entrenchment? This happy outcome has never before emerged in the wake of social collapse, and there is little reason why the final showdown with the American military ought to produce fertile ground for deepening democracy in all spheres of life. In fact, evidence from the General Social Survey suggests that in response to recession and economic downturn people tend to become less altruistic and less concerned with questions of fairness.28 After situations of economic crisis, voters tend to shift to the right (Lindvall, 2014). The old union song cries out that “we can bring to birth a new world from the ashes of the old,” but life is not birthed on ash. None of the historical case studies track this narrative, and indeed everything we know about human psychology suggests that social devastation makes people more, not less, prone to demagoguery. This means that even if a revolution were achievable, it is probably undesirable.', 'The argument I have thus far laid out against revolution contends only that it is off the table in middle-class democracies. I have in mind social dynamics within developed capitalist democracies, countries “like the US,” but the premise no longer holds true if we imagine a society that has already suffered some sort of catastrophic societal disintegration—at that point all bets are off. We are of course now talking about a world we are not living in, but it is worth considering the thought experiment nonetheless.', 'It is possible that America, after some world-historic environmental or economic collapse, begins to look something more like Russian feudalism than contemporary developed capitalism. Revolution then might again be on the table, but the context of desperation and scarcity in this scenario gives little reason to expect it would incubate an egalitarian democratic society. The historical evidence is unambiguous: None of the communist revolutions of the 20th century ushered in deeply democratic egalitarian social structures. Not only are there no examples, but there are also no clear mechanisms on offer.', 'The fact that this scenario generates an interest in bringing about an egalitarian society by means of revolution does not mean there will be a capacity to do so. The theory is little more than “where there is a will there is a way.” But, as Elster (1980: 124) argues, the general interests of society do not secrete the conditions for their fulfillment. Interests and capacities need not overlap.', 'There is a final reason to be skeptical of non-evolutionary strategies: The highly dubious premise that the system we erect the morning after will actually work. A socialist economy, if plopped down tomorrow, would be so rife with unintended consequences and pathologies that it is easy to imagine a democracy voting its way back into capitalism. This is true even if we believe (mistakenly, in my view) that the socialist calculation debate is solvable in the age of big data (Morozov, 2019). Interlocutors in the calculation debate have had very little to say about the politics of transition. Indeed, it is hard to imagine success of any kind without a slow and incremental transformation, experimenting with bits and pieces along the way—as we have been doing for the past century. An experimental approach is likely the only way to avoid devastating blunders that undermine the whole project. Moments of institutional upheaval and big change may at times be necessary, but to be successful they will have to rest on a foundation of smaller changes that have been tested.']

[(0, 9), (10, 13)]

ndtceda

Michigan-PiPh-Neg-NDT-Round-1.docx

Michigan

PiPh

a7060903bddd5e6c392fe32831dd36779ad08ccf145a77b72b199b83b825f616

The XO is empty talk that’s years from being implemented

Jeff Jaeckel 21, Co-Chair Global Antitrust Law Practice Group at Morrison & Foerster, Alexander Paul Okuliar, Co-Chair Global Antitrust Law Practice Group at Morrison & Foerster, and Lisa M. Phelan Co-Chair Global Antitrust Law Practice Group at Morrison & Foerster, and Megan E. Gerking Partner at Morrison & Foerster, “Charting a New Course for Antitrust: President Biden’s Executive Order Promoting Competition in the American Economy”, Client Alert, 7/14/2021, https://www.mofo.com/resources/insights/210714-president-biden-executive-order-antitrust.html

immediate effect is less clear EO does not enact any new regulation EO uses vague language guiding agencies there is a significant gap between action directed and time to implement a rule Even where direction is explicit , issuing takes time this does not account for legal challenges

Despite its breadth, the immediate effect of the EO on law or regulation is less clear . The EO itself does not enact any new law or regulation . Rather, the EO often uses vague language in instructing or guiding the actions of agencies for almost every initiative, there is likely to be a significant gap between the action directed or encouraged by the EO and the time it will take for the relevant agency to investigate, evaluate, and potentially implement a new rule or policy. Even where the direction to an agency is explicit , issuing a new rule or regulation takes time . An agency must first draft allow notice-and-comment make revisions , and then issue and start to enforce a final rule. And this does not account for likely legal challenges

immediate effect less clear not vague language guiding significant gap time Even where the direction to an agency is explicit draft notice-and-comment revisions issue enforce legal challenges

['Despite its breadth, the immediate effect of the EO on law or regulation is less clear. The EO itself does not enact any new law or regulation. Rather, the EO often uses vague language in instructing or guiding the actions of agencies. This is likely purposeful in many instances, including when the EO refers to independent agencies, like the FTC, Federal Communications Commission, Maritime Commission, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and the Surface Transportation Board. Nonetheless, for almost every initiative, there is likely to be a significant gap between the action directed or encouraged by the EO and the time it will take for the relevant agency to investigate, evaluate, and potentially implement a new rule or policy. Even where the direction to an agency is explicit, issuing a new rule or regulation takes time. An agency must first draft a rule, allow for a notice-and-comment period, make any necessary revisions, and then issue and start to enforce a final rule. And this does not account for likely legal challenges. In some instances, the EO directs the agencies to submit a report on the issue first rather than make any immediate changes, pushing any resulting regulatory activity out at least until the period following completion of the report. ']

[(5, 15)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-Adam-Kiihnl-Neg-Fullertown-Round3.docx

Kentucky

AdKi

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kentucky/AdKi/Kentucky-Adam-Kiihnl-Neg-Fullertown-Round3.docx

6b87759e956ea475c858ae9bea83253e5085eacc12b1440fef6faf407f79cf6b

Language is functional.

UH 4 (University of Hertfordshire School of Combined Studies, “Describing and Analysing Language”, http://www.uefap.com/courses/baecc/sfl/intro.htm)

Language is functional language is the way it is because of the meanings it makes using language is semiotic a process of making meanings

Language is functional language is the way it is because of the meanings it makes . Resources available within the systems of semantics and vocabulary are utilised in specific ways to make specific meanings . language can only be understood in relation to the context in which it is used . different purposes for using language result in different texts . The process of using language is a semiotic process, a process of making meanings by choosing .

Language is functional

['The approach taken for this description and analysis is Systemic-Functional Linguistics (SFL). This analytical approach is mainly taken from the work of Michael Halliday, in particular the model of language set out in An Introduction to Functional Grammar (1985, 1994 and Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004), following on from Malinowski (1923), Firth (1957) and Hymes (1967) (Halliday & Hasan, 1985, pp. 5-9).', 'Systemic-functional linguistics has a number of beliefs that make it particularly useful as a basis for developing such a description:', ' * Language is functional. That is, language is the way it is because of the meanings it makes. Resources available within the systems of semantics, grammar and vocabulary are utilised in specific ways to make specific meanings.', ' * It is a theory of language in context, and suggests that language can only be understood in relation to the context in which it is used. So different purposes for using language and different contexts result in different texts. The construction of language texts in turn impacts on the context. There is thus a two-way relationship between text and context.', ' * The process of using language is a semiotic process, a process of making meanings by choosing.', ' * The theory focuses on language at the level of the whole text. This theory differs from most other approaches to language study, which offer systematic analyses of language only up to the level of sentence, and provides little guidance to the language learner, who needs to know about structure, organisation and development in connected oral discourse and written texts.', '']

[(0, 4)]

ndtceda

Emory-MoSa-Neg-JW-Patterson-Debates-hosted-by-UK-Round-6.docx

Emory

MoSa

994faf15c86e8edba0eb3e64dfb81c078cb085ac633bcea9e6a4050c0173a386

Blockchain is less vulnerable than traditional infrastructure.

Dr. Hossein Hassani 18, Faculty in the Research Institute for Energy Management and Planning at University of Tehran, Ph.D. in Statistics from the University of Tehran; Dr. Xu Huang, Senior Lecturer in Economics at De Montfort University, Ph.D. in Economics from the Bournemouth University; Dr. Emmanuel Silva, Reader in Applied Statistics at the London College of Fashion, Ph.D. in Statistics from the Bournemouth University, “Banking with Blockchain-ed Big Data,” 8/8/2018, Journal of Management Analytics, Vol. 5, Iss. 4, p. 261-262

Security is paramount to banking 45% experienc crimes blockchain is critical info cannot be altered and added in real-time difficult to manipulate transparency enable regulators to scrutinize data encryption achieve security an immutable record enabl all to trust the data centralised banking more vulnerable one point of failure blockchain unique structure provides capabilities not in legacy tech distributed nature and computing renders mod impossible

Security is of paramount importance to banking 45% of intermediaries are experienc ing econ omic crimes 20 and 27% for services and tech blockchain for extra security is a critical component of future digital banking Blockchain can offer enhanced security as historical info rmation cannot be altered and new info rmation is added in real-time shared by multiple entities and thus difficult to manipulate any alterations can be tracked and monitored to prevent misuse and blockchain allows for real-time updating on scams transparency would enable regulators to easily scrutinize actions data can only be accessed by trusted sources in addition to encryption capabilities Blockchain can achieve security and privacy by enabling confidentiality and maintaining the size of a ledger Since 08 there has been a surge in the importance of risk management loan asset integrity is a major problem Assets on the decentralized ledger generate an immutable record enabl ing all participants to trust and be certain they are looking at the same data Fraud reduction is offered centralised nature of banking make it more vulnerable to cyber attacks as it has one point of failure unlike blockchains less susceptible to fraud as each block contains a timestamp a ledger enables banks to limit who sees information and selectively share data reducing the risk of fraud blockchain is the future of secure info rmation processing its unique structure provides capabilities not present in legacy tech nologies the distributed nature and computing power required renders mod ification impossible altering a chain requires control of 51% of computers in the ledger and alteration of all records within 10 minutes

Security paramount importance 45% econ omic crimes extra critical component enhanced historical cannot real-time multiple difficult alterations tracked monitored prevent misuse updating transparency easily scrutinize only trusted encryption security privacy confidentiality maintaining 08 surge importance risk management major problem decentralized immutable all trust certain same Fraud reduction centralised more vulnerable one point of failure less susceptible each limit selectively reducing future secure unique structure not present legacy tech nologies distributed computing power impossible 10 minutes

['2.3 Enhanced Security', 'Security is of paramount importance to the banking industry. As Tapscott and Tapscott (2017) stated, 45% of financial intermediaries are experiencing economic crimes in comparison to the 20% and 27% for the professional services and technology sectors. Therefore, applying blockchain for extra sense of security is a critical component of the future digital banking model (Maiya, 2018). Blockchain can offer enhanced security for banking data as historical information cannot be altered and the new information which is added in real-time is essentially shared by multiple entities and thus making it difficult to manipulate the data (Garcia, 2018b; Harsono 2018). As Patel (2018) points out, any alterations to data within a block can be tracked and monitored to prevent fraud and misuse and more importantly blockchain technology allows for real-time communication and updating on potential scams (Patel, 2018).', 'Blockchain is also affecting the antecedents of trust including confidence, integrity, reliability, responsibility and predictability (Beck, 2018). The transparency in blockchain’s distributed ledger is also useful as it would enable regulators to easily scrutinize financial actions (Tapscott and Tapscott, 2016). As a trust network, consumer data stored via blockchain can only be accessed by trusted sources in addition to the data security attainable via the encryption capabilities of blockchain (Patel, 2018). Blockchain can also achieve simultaneous security and privacy by enabling confidentiality through “public key infrastructure” and by maintaining the size of a ledger (Schou-Zibell and Phair, 2018).', 'Since the 2008 financial crisis, there has been a surge in the importance of risk management and the development of risk management capability (Silva et al., 2013). Furthermore, loan asset integrity is identified as a major problem leading to the 2008 financial crisis (Moore, 2018). To this end, the adoption of blockchain in banking can enable low risk credit transactions. For example, the Global Debt Registry (https://www.globaldebtregistry.com/) is evaluating the use of blockchains to ensure the integrity of loan assets and protect pledged assets on the network from errors or misrepresentation in the future (Moore, 2018). Assets can be placed on the decentralized ledger which will generate an immutable record of each asset, enabling all participants in the lending ecosystem to trust and be certain they are looking at the same loan data (Moore, 2018; Tapscott and Tapscott, 2016).', 'Fraud reduction is another form of enhanced security offered by blockchain technology. Risk.net (2017) recognised fraud as one of the top operational risks in 2017 whilst PwC (2014) notes that 45% of financial intermediaries suffer from economic crimes each year. The centralised nature of banking systems make it more vulnerable to cyber attacks as it has one point of failure, unlike with blockchains which are less susceptible to fraud as each block contains a timestamp and holds batches of individual transactions with a link to a previous block (Marr, 2017). In India, there is an interest in evaluating whether blockchain technology can be a means of stopping bank frauds (D’souza, 2018). As Mauri (2017a) asserts, the distributed, immutable and permissioned nature of blockchain will help prevent fraud. In fact, Chiles Santiago Exchange plans to use blockchain to technology to reduce errors and possible fraud in its short selling system for securities lending (Mauri, 2017b). In addition, the UAE’s Emirates Islamic was the first Islamic bank to adopt blockchain technology to issue new cheque books as a means of fraud prevention (Lyon, 2017) whilst the Bank of Thailand too is considering blockchains as a means of fraud reduction (Yakubowski, 2018). The recent Facebook data scandal has heightened the case for data privacy and blockchain can support this process as data can only be shared or sold with the consent of the individual (Garcia, 2018a). Technology giants such as Microsoft (2008) are also researching into developing ‘Corda’ an enterprise-grade ledger that enables banks to limit who sees what information and selectively share data with only relevant parties as a means of reducing the risk of fraud. They also envision their efforts can lead to reducing many other forms of banking risks in future.', 'Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that whilst many authors harp on the immutable nature of blockchains, Schou-Zibell and Phair (2018) note that blockchains are technically prone to modification. As such, the challenges pertaining to the security aspect of blockchain are discussed further in what follows. Nevertheless, security expert Frank Abagnale is of the view that blockchain is the future of secure information processing and data settlement (Marinova, 2018) and English (2018) notes that while blockchain is not immune to all forms of cyber risk, its unique structure provides security capabilities not present in other legacy technologies. This is because, the distributed nature and computing power required to make changes renders modification nearly impossible. In fact, altering a blockchain requires control of more than 51% of computers in the same distributed ledger and alteration of all of the transactional records within 10 minutes for Bitcoin (Schou-Zibell and Phair, 2018). Those interested in more insights into how blockchain is impacting the security landscape in banking are referred to Gupta (2017).']

[(12, 22)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-GrKi-Aff-Indiana-Round-2.docx

Kentucky

GrKi

266a7a8416056249189c29bacab363cc9ac2182725f005818c9b52802d379dd6

Nukes exist because of “necessity” and “amorality”—upending both solves.

Wilson 23 - (Ward Hayes Wilson, Senior Fellow and director of the Rethinking Nuclear Weapons project at the British American Security Information Council; 9-19-2023, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, "Yes, nuclear weapons are immoral. They’re also, practically speaking, useless.," doa: 10-17-2023) url: https://thebulletin.org/2023/09/yes-nuclear-weapons-are-immoral-theyre-also-practically-speaking-useless/#post-heading

many believe nuc s guarantee safety . two parts to elimination equation: morality and necessity . You can only solve if you take on both parts . you have to remove the roadblock that their country must have nuc s to keep safe. start with the practical consideration . Make a case that nuclear weapons could realistically be eliminated and the morality argument falls like a hammer blow . there are practical arguments for eliminating nuclear weapons. commanders repeatedly turned away from nuc s because of practical doubts nuclear deterrence prevents moral arguments from working But if you’re willing to argue against showing that necessity is false there’s a clear pathway to elimination

many people believe that nuc lear weapon s are such powerful weapons that they can guarantee a country’s safety . Therefore it makes sense that most countries secretly want such powerful weapons, and as a consequence, nuclear weapons will always exist. If this analysis of how people feel is right, then there are two parts to the nuclear weapons elimination equation: morality and necessity . You can only solve the equation if you take on both parts . Before you can move people with moral discourse, you have to first remove the roadblock in their heads that tells them that their country must have nuc lear weapon s to keep them safe. The key to eliminating nuclear weapons, then, is to start with the practical consideration . Make a case that nuclear weapons could reasonably , realistically be eliminated , neutralize that part of the equation, and the morality argument falls like a hammer blow . there are practical arguments for eliminating nuclear weapons. A lot of them . military commanders have repeatedly turned away from using nuc lear weapon s —not because of moral concerns, but because of practical doubts about the military value of the weapons. many people argue that nuclear weapons are important because of nuclear deterrence . deterrence is fatal over the long run . Eventually, human failure will lead to a catastrophic nuclear war . Moral arguments are powerful in the fight against nuclear weapons. But a roadblock prevents moral arguments from working . it causes them to boomerang and actually turn people off. But if you’re willing to argue against nuclear weapons with a two-step process —first showing that the necessity argument is false and only then arguing that the weapons are horrible and immoral— there’s a clear pathway to elimination

such powerful weapons guarantee safety secretly want elimination morality necessity You can only solve the equation if you take on both parts remove the roadblock must practical consideration reasonably realistically be eliminated morality argument falls like a hammer blow A lot of them repeatedly turned away practical doubts military value nuclear deterrence fatal over the long run human failure catastrophic nuclear war powerful roadblock prevents moral arguments from working boomerang two-step process necessity argument false clear pathway to elimination

['', 'In the case of nuclear weapons, many people believe that nuclear weapons are such powerful weapons that they can guarantee a country’s safety. Therefore it makes sense that most countries secretly want such powerful weapons, and as a consequence, nuclear weapons will always exist. They are such desirable weapons, in other words, that even if you could ban them, someone would inevitably build an arsenal in secret. So it’s impractical to even think about eliminating them.', 'If this analysis of how people feel is right, then there are, in fact, two parts to the nuclear weapons elimination equation: morality and necessity. You can only solve the equation if you take on both parts. But you have to solve the parts in the right sequence. Before you can move people with moral discourse, you have to first remove the roadblock in their heads that tells them that their country must have nuclear weapons to keep them safe.', 'The key to eliminating nuclear weapons, then, is to start with the practical consideration. Make a case that nuclear weapons could reasonably, realistically be eliminated, neutralize that part of the equation, and the morality argument falls like a hammer blow.', '“But Ward,” a devil’s advocate might argue, “there are no practical arguments for eliminating nuclear weapons.” Well, actually, there are. A lot of them. Let me point out just three.', 'First, you may have noticed that when Vladimir Putin threatened to use nuclear weapons again and again in Ukraine last fall, a number of establishment sources suddenly spoke up, making the case that nuclear weapons actually aren’t very good weapons. The New York Times, The Institute for the Study of War, and even Gen. David Petraeus all argued that using nuclear weapons on the battlefield wasn’t very militarily useful.', 'And if you look back over past wars, military commanders have repeatedly turned away from using nuclear weapons—not because of moral concerns, but because of practical doubts about the military value of the weapons.[1]', 'It has been an open secret in Washington for decades, apparently, that battlefield use of nuclear weapons was militarily inadvisable. When President George H. W. Bush ordered the removal of all but a handful of 7,000 tactical nuclear weapons from Europe in 1991, there was no open revolt among military officers. Apparently, they were fine with the decision. So there is a good deal of evidence, based on the advice of military officers, that nuclear weapons aren’t such great weapons.', 'Which brings us to another argument: What about using nuclear weapons not on the battlefield but against an enemy’s homeland? Well, if your adversary also has nuclear weapons, that option is, if anything, worse. When your adversary strikes back, your country will be devastated. It is clearly a suicidal option. And if your adversary doesn’t have nuclear weapons, it’s not war, it’s genocide.', 'Finally, many people argue that nuclear weapons are important because of nuclear deterrence. But even a 12-year-old can effectively show that deterrence is fatal over the long run. After all, human beings are fallible, aren’t they? And human beings play a critical role in nuclear deterrence. Human beings make the threats, evaluate the threats, and decide how to respond. If human beings are prone to folly—and we are—and if human beings run the deterrence process, then nuclear deterrence is inherently flawed. It will fail. Over the long run it cannot be safe. Eventually, human failure will lead to a catastrophic nuclear war.', 'Moral arguments are powerful in the fight against nuclear weapons. But a roadblock prevents moral arguments from working. In fact, it causes them to boomerang and actually turn people off. But if you’re willing to argue against nuclear weapons with a two-step process—first showing that the necessity argument is false and only then arguing that the weapons are horrible and immoral—there’s a clear pathway to elimination.', '']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PhJo-Aff-8---Texas-Doubles.docx

Minnesota

PhJo

6b8f1d67a3485edb539cb9836591face0dfce920a17e04123938fb2db594d4b8

No space war and terrestrial conflict turns it

Hall ’15 [Luke; August 18; Analyst at The Cipher Brief, M.A. from the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, B.A. in International Relations and Religious Studies from Claremont McKenna College; The Cipher Brief, “5 Reasons “Space War” Isn’t As Scary As It Sounds,” https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/5-reasons-%E2%80%9Cspace-war%E2%80%9D-isn%E2%80%99t-scary-it-sounds]

Every country with ASAT capabilities needs sat s U.S., Russia, China and India have a vested interest preventing militarization to attack would hurt them far more International Prohibits ASAT space war is highly unlikely All parties are incentivized against attacking if did occur, it would be part of a larger conflict on Earth

The U.S. depends heavily on military and commercial satellites An ASAT attack would likely be part of a larger, terrestrial attack Every country with ASAT capabilities also needs sat ellite s most other countries need satellites to participate in the global economy. All countries that have the technical ability to play in this space – the U.S., Russia, China and India - also have a vested interest in preventing the militarization of space and protecting their own satellites. If any of those countries were to attack U.S. satellites, it would likely hurt them far more than it would hurt the United States. International Prohibits the Use of ASAT Weapons. Several international treaties expressly prohibit signatory nations from attacking other countries’ space assets. It is generally accepted that space should be treated as a global common area, rather than a military domain. space war is highly unlikely All involved parties are incentivized against attacking . However, if a space war did occur, it would be part of a larger conflict on Earth

part of a larger, terrestrial attack sat s vested interest hurt them Prohibits prohibit signatory nations highly unlikely incentivized against part of on Earth

['The U.S. depends heavily on military and commercial satellites. If a less satellite-dependent opponent launched an anti-satellite (ASAT) attack, it would have far greater impact on the U.S. than the attacker. However, it’s not as simple as that – for the following reasons: ', '1. An ASAT attack would likely be part of a larger, terrestrial attack. An attack on space assets would be no different than an attack on territory or other assets on earth. This means that no space war would stay limited to space. An ASAT campaign would be part of a larger conventional military conflict that would play out on earth.', '2. Every country with ASAT capabilities also needs satellites. While the United States is the most dependent on military satellites, most other countries need satellites to participate in the global economy. All countries that have the technical ability to play in this space – the U.S., Russia, China and India - also have a vested interest in preventing the militarization of space and protecting their own satellites. If any of those countries were to attack U.S. satellites, it would likely hurt them far more than it would hurt the United States.', '3. Destruction of satellites could create a damaging chain reaction. Scientists warn that the violent destruction of satellites could result in an effect called an ablation cascade. High-velocity debris from a destroyed satellite could crash into other satellites and create more high-velocity debris. If an ablation cascade were to occur, it could render certain orbital levels completely unusable for centuries.', '4. Any country that threatened access to space would threaten the global economy. Even if a full-blown ablation cascade didn’t occur, an ASAT campaign would cause debris, making operating in space more hazardous. The global economy relies on satellites and any disruption of operations would be met with worldwide disapproval and severe economic ramifications.', '5. International Prohibits the Use of ASAT Weapons. Several international treaties expressly prohibit signatory nations from attacking other countries’ space assets. It is generally accepted that space should be treated as a global common area, rather than a military domain.', 'While it remains necessary for military planners to create contingency plans for a, space war it is a highly unlikely scenario. All involved parties are incentivized against attacking. However, if a space war did occur, it would be part of a larger conflict on Earth. Those concerned about the potential for war in space should be more concerned about the potential for war, period. ']

[(0, 4), (5, 8)]

ndtceda

Emory-RaHw-Aff-ADA-Round-2.docx

Emory

RaHw

4035bde3c2fdd441b2c0a8765abcd08faf0bc0fd15df354d67a4ab4d6c438683

Coercive Mimeticism DA

Gaztambide 14 Daniel, doctoral candidate at the Graduate School of Applied and Professional Psychology, Rutgers University. He currently serves as an adjunct lecturer at Hunter College Silberman School of Social Work, where he teaches courses on race, gender, class, and sexuality and psychoanalytic developmental theory. He is an APA Division 39 (Psychoanalysis) liaison to the APA Committee on Ethnic Minority Affairs and a fellow in APA's Minority Fellowship Program. “I’m not black, I’m not white, what am I? The illusion of the color line.” Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1088-0763 Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society Vol. 19, 1, 89–97 97.

coercive mimeticism whereby ethnic minorities must act to present themselves as “recognizably ethnic,” and adapt to that image coercive societal pressures to conform to that notion of identity When ambiguously ethnic subjects fail to see their image in the mirror there is discomfort and anxiety Puerto Rican-ness is non-linear and fosters emancipatory potentialities How we exclude based on expectations about what it means to be Latino threatens to disempower us further, limiting political power color-checking narrows what it means to be Latino and prevents us from experimenting with new forms of resistance, emancipation, and psychosocial revolt.

what the Lacanian Latino Studies scholar Antonio Viego refers to as “ coercive mimeticism ,” an institutional and social practice whereby there are certain ways in which ethnic minorities must act , believe, dress, and be in order to present themselves as “recognizably ethnic,” as Latino-enough, as Black-enough , as Asian-enough, and so forth It is mimetic insofar as one has to look into the mirror of ethnic identity and adapt oneself to that image , reproducing a very particular ego-identity, one that is often a poor fit to one’s more immediate subjective experience. It is also coercive in that there are institutional, cultural, and societal pressures to conform to that notion of identity in order to find one’s place in the coordinates of race and ethnicity – essentially, to be allotted a place on the color line. We are to take up our respective place on the chessboard as Black or White, pawns in a much bigger and deadlier game. Here we can glean both the imaginary and symbolic functions of racial object maps. object maps provide coherence and integration in the imaginary to an otherwise chaotic collection of signifiers – the racialized bodies in which we exist. racial object maps yield symbolic categories of me and not-me, Black and White, and a language with which to organize and regulate closeness, distance, and racial desire. what is contained, or to be more precise, excluded, through the symbolic and imaginary operations of the object map is the Real dimension of race – the ever shifting, anxiety-producing, formless nature of the color line. When ambiguously ethnic subjects fail to see their image in the mirror , when they are unable to play the language games of race and racial signification, there is a noticeable discomfort and anxiety that sets in among those who partake in the production of coercive mimeticism. The illusion of the color line comes into focus, disrupting how we see and define racialized bodies, evoking the mirror stage . The illusion of wholeness, of being a whole body-ego – whether White, Black, or Brown – falters, revealing the destitute, undifferentiated, and broken nature of race and racial identity. To survive the encounter with the Real of race, I argue, paves the way for a unique kind of freedom. To give one example, a Puerto Rican-ness is more malleable, flexible, and non-linear than one bound into one static form and yields a fluidity that fosters experimental and novel ways of responding to oppression This fluidity at the same time can validate the ghosts of one’s ancestors while integrating their wisdom into new, emancipatory potentialities . , I am not denying the importance of addressing colorism, racism, and the privileging of white skin that exists in the Latino community and other ethnic minorities (not to mention society as a whole). How we exclude one another based on not meeting certain expectations about what it means to be Latino , Asian, Black , etc., threatens to disempower us further, limiting our political power by carving out a “minority of a minority” as opposed to sustaining often difficult conversations about our sameness and difference. black-checking or color-checking narrows our vision of what it means to be Black (or Latino , or Asian, etc.). and Color-checking prevents us from experimenting with different forms of dis-identification which enrich, challenge, and nourish us, and which hold the promise of new forms of resistance, emancipation, and psychosocial revolt. these perpendicular conversations push and pull toward different trajectories, but have as their intersection the most crucial nexus of political, cultural, and social justice. with each turn, each attempt to define me, to mark me, to confine and bind me, you free me. Like the hysteric who produces ever shifting configurations of symptoms in order to throw the obsessive physician off guard I will keep producing knowledge of something else, something other, something that is incalculable and undefinable “Do not ask me who I am and do not ask me to remain the same” (p. 17). Because in the end this is not really about me, or where I stand on the color line. It is about your illusion about where you stand and where you place yourself in the coordinates of race and ethnicity, of self and other, of Black and White. I function as your blank screen, receiving your projections and identifications, hopefully returning them to you as knowledge productions that question, destabilize, and decenter your ego, paving the way for the subject that slides in the link between signifier and signified, that does not know if it is caused by the signifier or the signified of race, but is instead, its own cause.

coercive mimeticism ,” an institutional and social practice whereby there are certain ways in which ethnic minorities must act , believe, dress, and be in order to present themselves as “recognizably ethnic,” as Latino-enough, as Black-enough , as Asian-enough, and so forth We are to take up our respective place on the chessboard as Black or White, pawns in a much bigger and deadlier game. object maps provide coherence and integration in the imaginary to an otherwise chaotic collection of signifiers – the racialized bodies in which we exist. racial object maps yield symbolic categories of me and not-me, Black and White, and a language with which to organize and regulate closeness, distance, and racial desire. what is contained, or to be more precise, excluded, through the symbolic and imaginary operations of the object map is the Real dimension of race – the ever shifting, anxiety-producing, formless nature of the color line. evoking the mirror stage To give one example, a Puerto Rican-ness is more malleable, flexible, and non-linear than one bound into one static form and yields a fluidity that fosters experimental and novel ways of responding to oppression This fluidity at the same time can validate the ghosts of one’s ancestors while integrating their wisdom into new, emancipatory potentialities . How we exclude one another based on not meeting certain expectations about what it means to be Latino , Asian, Black , etc., threatens to disempower us further, limiting our political power by carving out a “minority of a minority” as opposed to sustaining often difficult conversations about our sameness and difference. black-checking or color-checking narrows our vision of what it means to be Black (or Latino , or Asian, etc.). Color-checking prevents us from experimenting with different forms of dis-identification which enrich, challenge, and nourish us, and which hold the promise of new forms of resistance, emancipation, and psychosocial revolt. with each turn, each attempt to define me, to mark me, to confine and bind me, you free me. Like the hysteric who produces ever shifting configurations of symptoms in order to throw the obsessive physician off guard I will keep producing knowledge of something else, something other, something that is incalculable and undefinable “Do not ask me who I am and do not ask me to remain the same” (p. 17). Because in the end this is not really about me, or where I stand on the color line. It is about your illusion about where you stand and where you place yourself in the coordinates of race and ethnicity, of self and other, of Black and White. I function as your blank screen, receiving your projections and identifications, hopefully returning them to you as knowledge productions that question, destabilize, and decenter your ego, paving the way for the subject that slides in the link between signifier and signified, that does not know if it is caused by the signifier or the signified of race, but is instead, its own cause.

['Part of what I am talking about here is what the Lacanian Latino Studies scholar Antonio Viego (2007) refers to as “coercive mimeticism,” an institutional and social practice whereby there are certain ways in which ethnic minorities must act, believe, dress, and be in order to present themselves as “recognizably ethnic,” as Latino-enough, as Black-enough, as Asian-enough, and so forth. It is mimetic insofar as one has to look into the mirror of ethnic identity and adapt oneself to that image, reproducing a very particular ego-identity, one that is often a poor fit to one’s more immediate subjective experience. It is also coercive in that there are institutional, cultural, and societal pressures to conform to that notion of identity in order to find one’s place in the coordinates of race and ethnicity – essentially, to be allotted a place on the color line. We are to take up our respective place on the chessboard as Black or White, pawns in a much bigger and deadlier game. Here we can glean both the imaginary and symbolic functions of racial object maps. These object maps provide coherence and integration in the imaginary to an otherwise chaotic collection of signifiers – the racialized bodies in which we exist. At the same time, racial object maps yield symbolic categories of me and not-me, Black and White, and a language with which to organize and regulate closeness, distance, and racial desire. Conversely, what is contained, or to be more precise, excluded, through the symbolic and imaginary operations of the object map is the Real dimension of race – the ever shifting, anxiety-producing, formless nature of the color line. When ambiguously ethnic subjects fail to see their image in the mirror, when they are unable to play the language games of race and racial signification, there is a noticeable discomfort and anxiety that sets in among those who partake in the production of coercive mimeticism. The illusion of the color line comes into focus, disrupting how we see and define racialized bodies, evoking the fragmented and uncoordinated nature of the child’s body prior to Lacan’s (2005a, b) mirror stage. The illusion of wholeness, of being a whole body-ego – whether White, Black, or Brown – falters, revealing the destitute, undifferentiated, and broken nature of race and racial identity. To survive the encounter with the Real of race, I argue, paves the way for a unique kind of freedom. To give one example, a Puerto Rican-ness is more malleable, flexible, and non-linear than one bound into one static form and yields a fluidity that fosters experimental and novel ways of responding to oppression. This fluidity at the same time can validate the ghosts of one’s ancestors while integrating their wisdom into new, emancipatory potentialities. To be clear, I am not denying the importance of addressing colorism, racism, and the privileging of white skin that exists in the Latino community and other ethnic minorities (not to mention society as a whole). It is important for us to have that conversation, and point out how notions of mestizaje, of hybridity in the Latino experience, may mask underlying tensions around race and skin color, and render the relative privilege of light-skinned Latinos such as myself invisible. At the same time, I am proposing that we also have a conversation that is perpendicular to a critique of racism and colorism, intersecting with it but going towards a different vector. How we exclude one another based on not meeting certain expectations about what it means to be Latino, Asian, Black, etc., threatens to disempower us further, limiting our political power by carving out a “minority of a minority” as opposed to sustaining often difficult conversations about our sameness and difference. Similarly, as Baratunde Thurston (2011) points out in his recent book, How to be Black, often this kind of black-checking or color-checking narrows our vision of what it means to be Black (or Latino, or Asian, etc.). Reflecting on his own sense of his Blackness, he writes, “One of the most consistent themes in my own experience… is this notion of discovering your own Blackness by embracing the new, the different, the uncommon, and, simply, yourself” (p. 218). Color-checking prevents us from experimenting with different forms of dis-identification which enrich, challenge, and nourish us, and which hold the promise of new forms of resistance, emancipation, and psychosocial revolt. As I argue, these perpendicular conversations push and pull toward different trajectories, but have as their intersection the most crucial nexus of political, cultural, and social justice. So what am I, in the end? I am whatever you want me to be: oppressor, oppressed, cracker, spic, enemy, friend, White, Black, lover, fighter, masculine, effeminate, strong, weak, dead or alive. Just know that with each turn, each attempt to define me, to mark me, to confine and bind me, you free me. Like the hysteric who produces ever shifting configurations of symptoms in order to throw the obsessive physician off guard (see Gherovici, 2003), I will keep producing knowledge of something else, something other, something that is incalculable and undefinable. Something Real. For you I’ll become a Hispanic hysteric, screeching Foucault (1972) with each symptom, with each episode of acting out, “Do not ask me who I am and do not ask me to remain the same” (p. 17). Because in the end this is not really about me, or where I stand on the color line. It is about your illusion about where you stand and where you place yourself in the coordinates of race and ethnicity, of self and other, of Black and White. In that sense I function as your blank screen, receiving your projections and identifications, hopefully returning them to you as knowledge productions that question, destabilize, and decenter your ego, paving the way for the subject that slides in the link between signifier and signified, that does not know if it is caused by the signifier or the signified of race, but is instead, its own cause.']

[(0, 13)]

ndtceda

MichiganState-GlMe-Neg-Owen-L-Coon-Memorial-Tournament-at-Northwestern-Round-2.docx

MichiganState

GlMe

b8463cc7093c54e27a135d2ce2bbe61364d6358d0c2fd874d2bf21e7e1d4ca78

It’s on track

Jacob Heilbrunn 10-1, Editor of the National Interest, Former Arthur F. Burns Fellow, “Can Biden Unite the Feuding Democratic Party?”, National Interest, 10/1/2021, https://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/can-biden-unite-feuding-democratic-party-194894

Biden is headed to Capitol Hill to corral feuding factions Will he lasso straying members reaching agreement on infrastructure Biden moved to assuage the left flank Biden needs to unite his party The odds are that he will . Despite doomsaying Dem s know they will hang at the polls failure would torpedo the presidency Dem s are “on track” to pass infrastructure question will be whether Biden can assuage progressives

Biden is headed to Capitol Hill to try and corral the feuding factions of the Democratic Party into cooperating on legislation that will determine the fate of his presidency. Will he be able to lasso the straying members or will it turn into a shootout at the O.K. corral? For Democrats reaching an agreement on bipartisan infrastructure has become a prolonged exercise in reviving divisions But Biden has moved to assuage the left flank He has not chastised the congressional progressive caucus, for holding out Biden needs to unite his bickering party The odds are that he will . Despite the doomsaying surrounding the two bills, the Dem ocrat s know that if they don’t hang together, they will hang together at the polls . Already the ructions in the House are casting a shadow over McAuliffe’s run against Youngkin for a new term as governor of Virginia a failure to would torpedo the Biden presidency Dem ocrat s are “on track” to pass the infrastructure bill . The question will be whether Biden can assuage the apprehensions of progressives about whether they will forfeit any and all leverage in voting for it

corral feuding factions lasso bipartisan infrastructure assuage left flank not chastised unite bickering party The odds are that he will doomsaying Dem s polls Dem ocrat s are “on track” to pass the infrastructure bill question assuage the apprehensions

['Joe Biden is headed to Capitol Hill, his old stomping grounds, to try and corral the feuding factions of the Democratic Party, centrist and progressive, into cooperating on legislation that will determine the fate of his presidency. Will he be able to lasso the straying members or will it turn into a shootout at the O.K. corral?', 'For Democrats reaching an agreement on the bipartisan infrastructure bill and a second spending bill has become a prolonged exercise in reviving the divisions that were on during the presidential primary, when Biden stuck to the center as Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), Bernie Sanders (I-VT) and others made the case for progressive reform. They lost. But Biden has moved to assuage the left flank of the party since he became president. He has not chastised legislators such as Pramila Jaypal (D-WA), who heads the congressional progressive caucus, for holding out on a big second package of spending. They are, after all, defending his sweeping proposals. But he also has to keep his ideological brethren on board in the House, not to mention Sens. Joe Manchin (D-WV) and Kyrsten Sinema (D-AZ). Absent those two senators, any bill is dead on arrival. Biden needs to unite his bickering party.', 'The odds are that he will. Despite the doomsaying surrounding the two bills, the Democrats know that if they don’t hang together, they will hang together at the polls. Already the ructions in the House are casting a shadow over Terry McAuliffe’s run against Glenn Youngkin for a new term as governor of Virginia. It’s also the case that a failure to reach an agreement would torpedo the Biden presidency. His approval rating has already dropped to fifty percent, according to a new AP poll. His slide began with the turbulent Afghanistan pullout but is being exacerbated by the battles over infrastructure and social spending.', 'House speaker Nancy Pelosi says that Democrats are “on track” to pass the infrastructure bill. The question will be whether Biden can assuage the apprehensions of progressives about whether they will forfeit any and all leverage in voting for it. Their aim will be to push Manchin above his $1.5 trillion marker. If he doesn’t, they may be facing a Hobson’s choice.']

[(6, 20)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-Adam-Kiihnl-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx

Kentucky

AdKi

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kentucky/AdKi/Kentucky-Adam-Kiihnl-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx

a492536f9eca27cb4e5f2dc0459d5547681ef03a81261b661dae99d5e5a84e86

Enforcement in shipping is effective and ensures compliance

Consadine 21, Attorney with Seward & Kissell LLP. (Michael, Shipping Companies Beware: Antitrust Challenges Ahead as DOJ Focuses On Industry, )

Given that shipping companies may be separately charged and face draconian penalties , it is incumbent for all shipping companies to minimize the likelihood of harmful consequences including by establishing compliance

Given that shipping companies may be separately charged by DOJ regardless of their physical location and face draconian penalties upon conviction , it is incumbent for all shipping companies – foreign and domestic – to take steps to minimize the likelihood of harmful consequences , including by establishing or enhancing compliance programs.

['In response to U.S. President Joseph Biden’s July 9, 2021 Executive Order to enhance competition and antitrust enforcement, the U.S. Federal Maritime Commission (“FMC”) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) with the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to facilitate criminal investigations of violations of U.S. laws. Given that shipping companies and their employees may be separately charged by DOJ regardless of their physical location and face draconian penalties upon conviction, it is incumbent for all shipping companies – foreign and domestic – to monitor these recent developments and take steps to minimize the likelihood of harmful consequences, including by establishing or enhancing existing compliance programs.']

[(0, 9), (10, 12)]

ndtceda

Kansas-Harris-Soper-Aff-CEDA-Round2.docx

Kansas

HaSo

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kansas/HaSo/Kansas-Harris-Soper-Aff-CEDA-Round2.docx

8ea996c68e44367b185ee43f9dd47ee2b1a3ba63d3e4584f64587d17b7a662f9

NPT fails because of nuclear hypocrisy---the plan solves.

Jennifer Knox 21. Policy and Research Analyst at The Union of Concerned Scientists. “The World’s Most Important Nuclear Treaty Faces New Threats, Familiar Failures.” https://blog.ucsusa.org/jknox/the-worlds-most-important-nuclear-treaty-faces-new-threats-familiar-failures/.

Failure is at risk of becoming habit Divisions intensified nuclear powers double down on expanding modernizing arsenals credibility relevance of NPT will fade must realize NPT is not the foundation of nonproliferation it is the heart Unless it is active it will die nuclear powers cannot expect benefits if they are unwilling to fulfill obligations

Failure is not new at NPT review conferences we are at risk of failure becoming a habit Divisions between the “haves” and the “have-nots” have intensified over the last decade attention has also been directed to the “need-nots” – states, like those in NATO, which do not have their own nuclear weapons, but who nevertheless center nuclear weapons within their national security strategies As nuclear powers double down on expanding and modernizing their nuclear arsenals credibility and the relevance of the NPT will continue to fade These states must realize that the NPT is not the foundation of the global nonproliferation regime it is the heart Unless it is active it will die The nuclear powers cannot expect to continue enjoying the benefits of nuclear nonproliferation if they are unwilling to fulfill their own obligations

failure becoming a habit expanding modernizing will continue to fade it is the heart it will die their own obligations

['Failure is not new at NPT review conferences, but now we are at risk of failure becoming a habit. In 2010, NPT members adopted an action plan for the first time, a major milestone. But five years later, the Ninth Review Conference fell apart over the failure of states to fulfill those commitments. Divisions between the “haves” – the five nuclear powers – and the “have-nots” – the non-nuclear states, have intensified over the last decade. More attention has also been directed to the “need-nots” – states, like those in NATO, which do not have their own nuclear weapons, but who nevertheless center nuclear weapons within their national security strategies. As nuclear powers double down on expanding and modernizing their nuclear arsenals, the credibility and the relevance of the NPT will continue to fade. These states – and US allies – must realize that the NPT is not the foundation of the global nonproliferation regime: it is the heart. Unless it is active, it will die. The nuclear powers cannot expect to continue enjoying the benefits of nuclear nonproliferation if they are unwilling to fulfill their own obligations to pursue nuclear disarmament. US President Kennedy once described his fear of a world with 20 nuclear powers. That world is still possible. A world without nuclear weapons is also possible, but only if we pursue it with courage and conviction.']

[(9, 16)]

ndtceda

Emory-KeRa-Aff-Harvard-Round-5.docx

Emory

KeRa

5d78661bc358bc6c364025c298cce9d118c64eef2f535dfde355fb7c7cbf4b5e

a) Functionalism---plan recognizes the reality of cities’ existing role, AND links are thumped by other non-state actors

Elif Durmuş 21, PhD Researcher, Utrecht University Cities of Refuge Project, February 2021, “Cities and international law: legally invisible or rising soft-power actors?,” https://www.cidob.org/en/articulos/monografias/global_governance/cities_and_international_law_legally_invisible_or_rising_soft_power_actors

state-centricity ceased to reflect reality global governance is messy Non-state actors organisations individuals , NGOs corporations armed groups , have been accepted to possess legal significance regardless whether it takes time for formal change of status If cities are seeking formal recognition they are on the right path recognition does not come by permission but retroactive recognition of ev showing new de facto reality

International law is seen by many as strictly inter-state this may have been true for many centuries. But since at the latest the Reparations Advisory Opinion of the I C J recognised legal personality of the U N strict state-centricity has ceased to reflect the state of affairs today’s reality of global governance is messy , pluralist, multistakeholder international legal personality is the primary concept in positive international law distinguishing actors fr om non-actors. Now even the most positivist lawyers are confront ed with the pluralisation of actors without established legal personality engaging in practices traditionally reserved for states Non-state actors , starting with international organisations like the U N later also encompassing individuals , NGOs , transnational corporations and armed groups , have been gradually accepted by international lawyers to be participants and to possess legal significance in international law In this world, cities have been engaging with increasing resonance, competence and rigour in the governance of (and norm generation on) issues that would traditionally be considered within the jurisdiction of the state international law, even as it currently stands, can be observed progressively. The progressive perspective recognises de facto engagement and even influence of local governments on international law even if observed through a conservative legal positivist lens engagement of local governments with international law is likely to be increasingly relevant to the developments in the content and practice of international law regardless of whether it takes a long time for any formal change of status to occur If cities are seeking formal recognition of their role and status in international law, they are on exactly the right path recognition of new players in the game does not come about by such permission but by a retroactive recognition of accumulated ev idence showing a new de facto reality

strictly inter-state at the latest I C J U N ceased to reflect the state of affairs messy Now even the most positivist confront pluralisation of actors without established legal personality Non-state actors U N individuals NGOs corporations armed groups accepted possess legal significance cities regardless of whether it takes a long time for any formal change of status to occur cities formal recognition of their role and status exactly the right path does not come about by such permission retroactive recognition of accumulated ev idence showing a new de facto reality

['International law is seen by many practitioners, as well as by conservative legal scholars, as a strictly inter-state endeavour. Symbolically associated with the Treaty of Westphalia, this may have been true for many centuries. But since – at the latest – the Reparations for Injuries Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice recognised the legal personality of the United Nations as the first non-state entity, this strict state-centricity has ceased to reflect the state of affairs. Instead, today’s reality of global governance and its primary normative framework – international law – is messy, pluralist, multistakeholder, uses soft governance tools rather than hard and binding law, and bridges public–private divides. In fact, arguably, states were never monolithic, unified rational actors conducting international law and governance, but were, in fact, when scrutinised through a socio-legal lens, an amalgamation of influence from elements within and without the state apparatus, such as diplomats, networks, bureaucrats, faith organisations, political groups, other levels of governments and more (Berman, 2007). International law worked to reduce such influences to stricter imagined categories such as “subjects” and “objects” for the purpose of creating a solid, dependable, as well as binding legal framework with chances of enforcement. This “subjecthood” or international legal personality is the primary concept in positive international law distinguishing actors from non-actors. Now, however, even the most positivist1 of international lawyers are confronted with the pluralisation of actors without established legal personality engaging in practices traditionally reserved for states. There is, additionally, a growing preference for norms designed to govern international behaviour to be soft, non-binding and created through multistakeholder governance processes rather than binding treaties signed by states only. Non-state actors, starting with international organisations like the United Nations, but later also encompassing individuals, NGOs, transnational corporations and armed groups, have been gradually accepted by international lawyers to be participants and to possess legal significance in international law (Gal-Or et al., 2015). The pluralisation of actors and the softening of the norms created corresponds to a move from multilateralism – referring to an inter-state governance system – towards multistakeholderism – referring to a system of norm generation and governance that involves many actors relevant to a subject matter, which is the premise of this volume.', 'In this world, cities and their transnational city networks (TCNs) have been engaging with increasing resonance, competence and rigour in the governance of (and norm generation on) issues that would traditionally be considered within the jurisdiction of the state. Our previous research (Durmuş and Oomen, forthcoming) focussing on the field of migration has found that this engagement of cities with matters of global governance, including by mobilising international law, can be generally divided into two types of engagement, namely: (a) seeking a seat in traditionally state-centric processes; and (b) creating city-centric (or local-centric, to be more inclusive of non-urban localities) fora to engage collectively with international law and global governance. The two types of engagement are complemented by cities’ engagement with international law in governing their own locality. For some, the question then becomes: Is any of this city engagement relevant for international law? What are the prospects for achieving recognition of cities’ activities and space for their engagement in formal international legal frameworks? This piece argues that international law, even as it currently stands, can be observed both conservatively and more progressively. The progressive perspective recognises – often through the support of interdisciplinary research – the de facto engagement and even influence of local governments on international law. This piece also argues that even if observed through a conservative legal positivist lens, the engagement of local governments with international law is likely to be increasingly relevant to the developments in the content and practice of international law. This is true regardless of whether it takes a long time for any formal change of status to occur – if it occurs at all. If cities, collectively, are seeking formal recognition of their role and status in international law, they are on exactly the right path, both in seeking a seat at the table in state-centric processes and in organising and convening with their peers to engage in international law and governance matters without reservations and concerns about whether or not they are “permitted” by international law to do so (as “subjects” or holders of international legal personality). The recognition of new players in the game, whether by progressive or more conservative observers or by existing players, does not come about by such permission but by a retroactive recognition of accumulated evidence showing a new de facto reality. I will now seek to explicate this by first reflecting on what the conservative and more pluralist perspectives concerning actors in international law are and how they have changed, followed by a reflection on the current state of affairs with regard to cities’ engagement with international law. Finally, I will summarise some suggestions for practitioners representing the municipalist movement in global governance.']

[(5, 14)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-DeWe-Aff-77th-National-Debate-Tournament-Round-8.docx

Northwestern

DeWe

a550cde1ea44a87a7e0887c6a2c9613ca5e35de2674c0988b4847723b7acf27c

They assume a false oppositional place outside of normativity—rather queer resistance must be a dialectical negotiation with and between normativity—their outright dismissal of political engagement ignores the ways individuals exercise agency in these interactions and make the world inhabitable by queering public cultures

West, 14 – (Isaac West, professor in the Communication Studies department at University of Iowa, 2014, accessed on 11-6-2020, NYU Press, "Transforming Citizenships: Transgender Articulations of the Law", https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qfmd7)

better see law as an everyday practice of making way in the world political order is secured not only by institutions, but also by 'deep rules' prescribe interactions resistance circulates in queer studies preferred modality of agency, it is too often figured as oppositional of normativities rather than dialectical within and between result is agency only if, one refuses recognition and legibility always already legible as subjects no outside one can function as power's opposite not all norms function the same not all oppositions to them are equally valuable to accepting non-normative practices Resistance requires refinement as an analytic recognize resistance as a relational employ of vital world-making practices in particular spaces anti-essentialist qualities are lost to fixed radical anti-normativity incapable of accommodating anything other than acts of being against something assigning fixed qualities to a per¬son or action rather than mobilizing queer singular attention to a norm , can be appropriated undid the question of normativity expression of desire to be treated with respect not equated with conformity the outright dismissal inherently normative must be resisted until articulation is contextualized. focusing on deployments of citizenship as performatively produced articulations of the law do not have to see demands for equality enactment of liberal subjectivities start to see how individuals exercise agency in these interactions

When the law is understood as a way to performatively manage stranger relationalities, we are better positioned to see the law less as an activity determined and enforced by the state and more as an everyday practice of making one's way in the world , sometimes to address urgent political needs political order is secured not only by institutions, but also by 'deep rules' that prescribe specific interactions among citizens Obviously, we cannot impose the perspective of wholeness onto individuals who do not express these motives. Nonetheless, I do want to suggest that the mode of reparative reading can help us understand how practices of citizenship can be productive sites for engaging others and queering public cultures. Upon first impressions, much of what we will explore appears to be outside of the expected range of queer practices due to their failure to resist or reject the state and its authority to regulate gender Even though resistance circulates prominently in queer studies as its preferred modality of agency, it is all too often figured as an oppositional occupation somewhere visibly outside of normativities , rather than as a dialectical negotiation within and between them the result is a repudiation of the most basic of Foucaultian insights about the inescapability of power relations because it installs agency as a possibility if, and only if, one refuses all modes of recognition and legibility 85 For, if we are always already legible as subjects due to our interimplication with power relations, there is no outside from which one can function as power's opposite , as its pure negative or refusal Additionally, not all norms and normativities function in the same manner, and therefore not all oppositions to them are equally valuable to sustaining cultures amenable to tolerating or accepting non-normative practices and identities. Resistance thus requires further refinement as an analytic , not in the service of a more orthodox definition of queer, but rather to recognize resistance as a relational and contextual troubling of mythic norms in the employ of vital world-making practices in particular spaces and temporalities. Without this awareness of contingency, the anti-essentialist qualities of queerness are lost to a predetermined and fixed sense of radical anti-normativity incapable of accommodating anything other than facially recognizable acts of being against something , most nota¬bly, the norm. Another unfortunate consequence of this mode of theorizing queer resistance as oppositional is how it prefigures a norm and its subsequent hegemonic solidification into the normal as an isolated node of meaning rather than as part of a reticulated relay between and among norms Intentionally or not, this approach attitudinally orients us toward the noun and adjectival forms of queer, assigning fixed qualities to a per¬son or action , rather than mobilizing queer as a verb and asking how someone or something is queering the interdependent norms within the normativities operative in a given situation The singular attention to a norm , rather than the norm's situation in a network of norms , as Janet Jakobsen argues, " can be (misleadingly) appropriated as if resistance to normalization undid the question of normativity rather than moved us into another normativity?" culture cannot be queered in the final instance, both because normativities are necessary conventions of interpersonal relationships and resistance is dialectically enjoined to the exercise of power we need to be sensitive to the particular ways in which resistance participates in both the undoing and doing of norms and normativities When we refrain from immediately trying to position demands for recognition within a framework of assimilation ( the perspective of one¬ness), we start to hear how individuals may be making more robust claims on the body politic . More often than not, these demands argue for the acceptance and accommodation of difference, not its denial or erasure. Thus, the expression of one's desire to be treated with dignity and respect must not be equated with conformity or false consciousness To the contrary, rights claims and demands for recognition, as we have already established, are articulations that can performatively produce subjective opportunities for challenging the pressures of oneness. Such claims are not perfectly mimetic and hence normalizing for they require "two moves: invocation and critique.?" Butler names this practice a "performative contradiction'' to explain how individuals can articulate themselves into symbolic economies to expose the failures of the promises of equality and freedom for all citizens Yet, an articulation of citizenship works within the performative contradiction's invocation of already established norms and its linkage to its own constitutive exclu-sions to initiate a critique of the universality of freedom and equality. Therefore, the outright dismissal of citizenship as inherently normative and normalizing must be resisted as a critical impulse and deferred until the articulation is properly contextualized. the radical dimensions of the transgender movement arise neither from simply claiming that trans people are "normal;' which we certainly are, nor from claiming that we are "exceptional;' which we also are, but from arguing that being transgender is eminently compatible with all else that comes with being human, the ordinary as well as the extraordinary= If we want to work toward cultures underwritten by wholeness, as opposed to oneness, we cannot make sweeping generalizations about the experience of citizenship. Instead, we must look to see how citizen¬ship is a performatively produced set of stranger relationalities that may not be entirely faithful to the intentions of the state or cultural hegemonies As spaces of citizenship are perfor-matively reproduced, individuals both do and undo citizenship. They do citizenship as they rely upon certain discursive expectations to gain recognition as subjects. At the same time, they also undo citizenship as subjects articulating unexpected elements into their demands for recognition By focusing on transgender deployments of citizenship as performatively produced articulations of the law , we do not have to see mundane activities or demands for equality as merely the enactment of unreflective liberal subjectivities Instead, we can start to see how individuals exercise agency in these interactions and make the worlds around them more inhabitable by queering public cultures. To this point, I have avoided defining queer, queering, and queerness for fear of assigning them essentialized meanings

Even though resistance circulates prominently in queer studies as its preferred modality of agency, it is all too often figured as an oppositional occupation somewhere visibly outside of normativities , rather than as a dialectical negotiation within and between them 85 For, if we are always already legible as subjects due to our interimplication with power relations, there is no outside from which one can function as power's opposite , as its pure negative or refusal Resistance thus requires further refinement as an analytic , not in the service of a more orthodox definition of queer, but rather to recognize resistance as a relational and contextual troubling of mythic norms in the employ of vital world-making practices in particular spaces and temporalities. Without this awareness of contingency, the anti-essentialist qualities of queerness are lost to a predetermined and fixed sense of radical anti-normativity incapable of accommodating anything other than facially recognizable acts of being against something , most nota¬bly, the norm. The singular attention to a norm , rather than the norm's situation in a network of norms , as Janet Jakobsen argues, " can be (misleadingly) appropriated as if resistance to normalization undid the question of normativity rather than moved us into another normativity?" we need to be sensitive to the particular ways in which resistance participates in both the undoing and doing of norms and normativities . More often than not, these demands argue for the acceptance and accommodation of difference, not its denial or erasure. Thus, the expression of one's desire to be treated with dignity and respect must not be equated with conformity or false consciousness Therefore, the outright dismissal of citizenship as inherently normative and normalizing must be resisted as a critical impulse and deferred until the articulation is properly contextualized. By focusing on transgender deployments of citizenship as performatively produced articulations of the law , we do not have to see mundane activities or demands for equality as merely the enactment of unreflective liberal subjectivities

['', 'Although it begins with an examination of an individual and her resistance to legal normativities, the majority of the rest of this book is dedicated to collective politics, moving from local to state to national advocacy efforts to trace how trans advocates and their allies performatively produced citizen subjectivities. When the law is understood as a way to performatively manage stranger relationalities, we are better positioned to see the law less as an activity determined and enforced by the state and more as an everyday practice of making one\'s way in the world, sometimes to address urgent political needs. Danielle Allen offers a similar perspective on stranger relationality when she states that "political order is secured not only by institutions, but also by \'deep rules\' that prescribe specific interactions among citizens."? Concerned about the lack of interracial trust and the general unwillingness to sacrifice for another\'s benefit that poisons American culture (for example, identity groups may see themselves as involved in zero-sum battles for position within cultural hierarchies), Allen locates the effectivities of these "deep rules" in everyday interactions ( or in the absence of interac¬tion) and concludes that "ordinary habits are the stuff of citizenshrp\'< In effect, Allen provides a way out of an intractable framework of cultural division by reorienting us to see ourselves not as "one people;\' a move that suppresses difference, but instead as a "whole people;\' where difference is accepted as a generative resource for renewing our civic bonds to one another.82 In her words, "an effort to make the people \'whole\' might cultivate an aspiration to the coherence and integrity of a consolidated but complex, intricate, and differentiated bodY:\'83 Allen elaborates further: "To be the people as \'whole; citizens do not need to spend more time in the public sphere attending to politics than they presently do, but they must learn to see and hear what is political in the interactions they already have with fellow citizens:\'84 The actions of trans people and their allies explored in this book provide valu¬able political and cultural lessons about the challenges associated with thinking of ourselves as whole instead of one. Obviously, we cannot impose the perspective of wholeness onto individuals who do not express these motives. Nonetheless, I do want to suggest that the mode of reparative reading can help us understand how practices of citizenship can be productive sites for engaging others and queering public cultures. Upon first impressions, much of what we will explore appears to be outside of the expected range of queer practices due to their failure to resist or reject the state and its authority to regulate gender. In this regard, though, the failure may be located in our own biases more than in the actions of transgender advocates and allies. Even though resistance circulates prominently in queer studies as its preferred modality of agency, it is all too often figured as an oppositional occupation somewhere visibly outside of normativities, rather than as a dialectical negotiation within and between them; the result is a repudiation of the most basic of Foucaultian insights about the inescapability of power relations because it installs agency as a possibility if, and only if, one refuses all modes of recognition and legibility. 85 For, if we are always already legible as subjects due to our interimplication with power relations, there is no outside from which one can function as power\'s opposite, as its pure negative or refusal. Additionally, not all norms and normativities function in the same manner, and therefore not all oppositions to them are equally valuable to sustaining cultures amenable to tolerating or accepting non-normative practices and identities. Resistance thus requires further refinement as an analytic, not in the service of a more orthodox definition of queer, but rather to recognize resistance as a relational and contextual troubling of mythic norms in the employ of vital world-making practices in particular spaces and temporalities. Without this awareness of contingency, the anti-essentialist qualities of queerness are lost to a predetermined and fixed sense of radical anti-normativity incapable of accommodating anything other than facially recognizable acts of being against something, most nota¬bly, the norm. Another unfortunate consequence of this mode of theorizing queer resistance as oppositional is how it prefigures a norm and its subsequent hegemonic solidification into the normal as an isolated node of meaning rather than as part of a reticulated relay between and among norms. From this perspective, the moment of queer judgment involves a comparison between an action and the norm to discern its incongruency with the norm. The greater the gap between them, the more queer it is. Intentionally or not, this approach attitudinally orients us toward the noun and adjectival forms of queer, assigning fixed qualities to a per¬son or action, rather than mobilizing queer as a verb and asking how someone or something is queering the interdependent norms within the normativities operative in a given situation. The singular attention to a norm, rather than the norm\'s situation in a network of norms, as Janet Jakobsen argues, "can be (misleadingly) appropriated as if resistance to normalization undid the question of normativity rather than moved us into another normativity?" If culture cannot be queered in the final instance, both because normativities are necessary conventions of interpersonal relationships and resistance is dialectically enjoined to the exercise of power, we need to be sensitive to the particular ways in which resistance participates in both the undoing and doing of norms and normativities. When we do this, Jakobsen concludes, we can appre¬ciate how it is that "agency can be constituted not just from different iterations of the norm and the ambivalence within the subject but also from various norms played off against each other within the network:\' all while the network is recursively transformed as it is performatively reproduced. 87 When we refrain from immediately trying to position demands for recognition within a framework of assimilation ( the perspective of one¬ness), we start to hear how individuals may be making more robust claims on the body politic. More often than not, these demands argue for the acceptance and accommodation of difference, not its denial or erasure. Thus, the expression of one\'s desire to be treated with dignity and respect must not be equated with conformity or false consciousness. To the contrary, rights claims and demands for recognition, as we have already established, are articulations that can performatively produce subjective opportunities for challenging the pressures of oneness. Karen Zivi accurately describes these discursive formations as "a performative politics" that is "neither perfectly subversive in its effects nor an exact replication of existing regulatory norms:\' Such claims are not perfectly mimetic and hence normalizing for they require "two moves: invocation and critique.?" Butler names this practice a "performative contradiction\'\' to explain how individuals can articulate themselves into symbolic economies to expose the failures of the promises of equality and freedom for all citizens. The demand for equality and freedom, Butler contends, "starts to take what it asks for;\' because "to make the demand on freedom is already to begin its exercise and then to ask for its legitimation is to also announce the gap between its exer¬cise and its realization and to put both into public discourse in a way so that that gap is seen, so that that gap can mobilize?" The demand alone cannot materialize its desired effect - it is, after all, an articulation avail¬able for multiple interpretations and effectivities. Yet, an articulation of citizenship works within the performative contradiction\'s invocation of already established norms and its linkage to its own constitutive exclu-sions to initiate a critique of the universality of freedom and equality. Therefore, the outright dismissal of citizenship as inherently normative and normalizing must be resisted as a critical impulse and deferred until the articulation is properly contextualized. With this theoretical framework in play, we must be mindful of the fact that the use of rhetorics of normalcy employed in citizenship claims, as in \'Tm a citizen just like you;\' does not carry the same con¬notations for all people in all situations. We can take this seemingly simple phrase at face value and strip it of its nuance, but its complete and complex articulation may be lost when we assume this claim is tied to an intention of denying one\'s differences from others. Michael Cobb\'s study of queer articulations of religious and national identities under¬scores this point in suggesting that "perhaps the \'normal\' is the desire for legibility, a desire for community, and a desire for another route into social resistance and minority complaint that need not be so \'counter\' public in order to be innovative and queer:\' The publicity attached to and enabled by articulations of normalcy and equality, Cobb concludes, "does not always imply that one has uncritically submitted to, or is even protected by, the state or even the church. Perhaps this decision is not so much about ease as it is about protection, about insuring that one\'s life is still valuable enough not to destroy"> It is not always the case that invocations of citizenship rely on an either/or logic of assimilation or radical alterity-sometimes it is a rhetorical move of both/and involv¬ing the desire to be a citizen like everyone else even as an individual wants to preserve his or her difference and maintain a critical relation¬ship with the norms authorizing inclusion into a community. Thus, Currah, Iuang, and Minter invite us to consider this radical demand in relation to trans people: the radical dimensions of the transgender movement arise neither from simply claiming that trans people are "normal;\' which we certainly are, nor from claiming that we are "exceptional;\' which we also are, but from arguing that being transgender is eminently compatible with all else that comes with being human, the ordinary as well as the extraordinary= If we want to work toward cultures underwritten by wholeness, as opposed to oneness, we cannot make sweeping generalizations about the experience of citizenship. Instead, we must look to see how citizen¬ship is a performatively produced set of stranger relationalities that may not be entirely faithful to the intentions of the state or cultural hegemonies. The performativity of citizenship entails a reiteration of discourses already operating in culture, discourses saturated with history and ripe with the potential for appropriation. As spaces of citizenship are perfor-matively reproduced, individuals both do and undo citizenship. They do citizenship as they rely upon certain discursive expectations to gain recognition as subjects. At the same time, they also undo citizenship as subjects articulating unexpected elements into their demands for recognition. Likewise, subjects are constantly done and undone as they struggle to negotiate the contingent discourses working around and through them. It is in this dialectical negotiation that subjective agency is born, which leads us to the second intervention proposed by Trans-forming Citizenship\'s more generous judgments about these contextual¬ized performances of citizenship. By focusing on transgender deployments of citizenship as performatively produced articulations of the law, we do not have to see mundane activities or demands for equality as merely the enactment of unreflective liberal subjectivities. Instead, we can start to see how individuals exercise agency in these interactions and make the worlds around them more inhabitable by queering public cultures. To this point, I have avoided defining queer, queering, and queerness for fear of assigning them essentialized meanings. I recognize, however, my use of these terms is the fulcrum on which disagreements over my read¬ings may rest. In that spirit then, I wish to adopt Sedwick\'s rendering of queer as "the open mesh of possibilities, gaps, overlaps, dissonances and resonances, lapses and excesses of meaning when the constituent elements of anyone\'s gender, of anyone\'s sexuality aren\'t made ( or can\'t be made) to signify monolithically">\' For what follows, the key phrase is "open mesh\'\' as we want to remain aware of dissident identities that may not always appear queer at first glance. To begin to draw out the implications of this understanding of queering public cultures, stranger relationalities, and the performativity of citizenship, we will return in another chapter, like Mayne herself, to one of the most, if not the most, quotidian practices of citizenship: using public bathrooms. ']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-DaMu-Neg-BTO-Round-6.docx

Minnesota

DaMu

845bbcddee8d7af0946030e76a8442cf52c23062181eb667cb7d96206483b62b

Baltic conflict leads to extinction.

Karnitschnig 22, POLITICO’s chief Europe correspondent. (Matthew, 6-20-2022, "The most dangerous place on earth," POLITICO, https://www.politico.eu/article/suwalki-gap-russia-war-nato-lithuania-poland-border/)

an invasion would cut off Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia from the rest of NATO a move would result in an immediate faceoff between Moscow and NATO pushing the world to the brink of world-ending confrontation In Kaliningrad, Russia has a formidable military presence Kasyanov a former p m added the Baltic s will be next A move on Poland or Lithuania would trigger Article 5 immediately pulling in the alliance It’s the kind of edge case Putin has proved eager to test

in a conflict with the West, Russia could sweep into the corridor simultaneously from the east and the west, severing the Baltic countries from their allies to the south It’s a huge vulnerability because an invasion would cut off Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia from the rest of NATO Such a move would result in an immediate faceoff between Moscow and NATO ’s nuclear members pushing the world to the brink of world-ending confrontation . In Kaliningrad, Russia has built a formidable military presence , spanning nuclear weapons, its Baltic fleet and tens of thousands of soldiers While there’s no reason to suggest an attack is imminent, the Russian leader appears to delight in keeping the West guessing what his next move will be Mikhail Kasyanov a former Russian p rime m inister added more fuel to the fire last week, predicting that “ the Baltic state s will be next ” The expected NATO accession of Sweden and Finland would also turn the Baltic Sea into what some are calling a NATO lake, perhaps giving Moscow even more of an incentive to build a bridge to Kaliningrad. A move by Russia on Poland or Lithuania would clearly trigger Article 5 immediately pulling in all the alliance ’s members It’s exactly the kind of edge case that Putin has proved eager to test

severing Baltic huge vulnerability NATO result in an immediate faceoff between Moscow and NATO ’s nuclear members brink world-ending confrontation p m Baltic s will be next trigger Article 5 immediately pulling in all the alliance ’s members eager to test

['', '‘The Baltics will be next’ Former Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves said he came up with the name “Suwałki Gap” minutes before a meeting with then-German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen in 2015 in an effort to raise alarm about the hole in Western defenses. The worry is that in a conflict with the West, Russia could sweep into the corridor simultaneously from the east and the west, severing the European Union’s Baltic countries from their allies to the south. “It’s a huge vulnerability because an invasion would cut off Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia from the rest of NATO,” said Ilves. Such a move would also result in an immediate faceoff between Moscow and NATO’s nuclear-armed members, pushing the world to the brink of world-ending confrontation. Ilves’ warning to von der Leyen, now president of the European Commission, was a reaction to Russia’s annexation of Crimea the year before, but his doomsday scenario has gained new credence in the wake of Putin’s latest invasion of Ukraine. Just as Putin is trying to create a land bridge between Russia and the Crimea peninsula, taking the Suwałki Gap, which is named for a prominent town on the Polish side of the border, could link Russian troops in Kaliningrad, a key Russian outpost, with those stationed in its de facto protectorate Belarus. In Kaliningrad, Russia has built a formidable military presence, spanning nuclear weapons, its Baltic fleet and tens of thousands of soldiers. (The exclave, which has a population of nearly 1 million, was German territory until after World War II, when it was known as Königsberg. The Soviet Union wrested control of the region from Germany after the war, renamed it Kaliningrad and expelled the German population.) While there’s no reason to suggest an attack is imminent, the Russian leader appears to delight in keeping the West guessing what his next move will be. Earlier this month, he praised the imperial exploits of Peter the Great, declaring that “a country is either a sovereign or a colony,” comments that did little to reassure the Baltics. Mikhail Kasyanov, a former Russian prime minister under Putin, added more fuel to the fire last week, predicting that “the Baltic states will be next” if Ukraine falls. The expected NATO accession of Sweden and Finland has further raised tensions between Russia and the alliance. The addition of the two Scandinavian countries might make it more difficult for Russia to sever the Baltics from the rest of the alliance, but it would also turn the Baltic Sea into what some are calling a NATO lake, perhaps giving Moscow even more of an incentive to build a bridge to Kaliningrad. Sweden’s and Finland’s inclusion in NATO makes a Russian move “less likely, but that doesn’t mean it’s unlikely,” said Linas Kojala, the director of the Eastern Europe Studies Center, a Vilnius-based think tank. Eastern alliance Despite the Baltics’ strategic concerns, what may be the most dangerous thing about the Suwałki Gap is its relative irrelevance. A move by Russia on Poland or Lithuania would clearly trigger NATO’s Article 5 mutual defense provision, immediately pulling in all the alliance’s members — from Turkey to Bulgaria to France and the United States. At least in theory. How eager would Washington and NATO be to risk Armageddon over a stretch of largely unpopulated farmland few of their citizens even know exists? It’s exactly the kind of edge case that Putin has proved eager to test.', '', '', '']

[(0, 15)]

ndtceda

Kansas-ReSo-Neg-Northwestern-Round-5.docx

Kansas

ReSo

6944235e4f08497b1c06ce4ad0ce81c2efa97b6bcf0265acb41eab4662ddb40f

AI can’t produce effective counterforce, BUT U.S. military leaders will over-estimate its capabilities, AND the perception of improving U.S. counterforce causes destabilizing reactions by adversaries---both cause nuclear war

Rafael Loss 19, nuclear scholar with the Project on Nuclear Issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 9/30/19, “Artificial Intelligence, the Final Piece to the Counterforce Puzzle?,” https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1568008

technical assessments of limitations of current machine-learning suggests conclusions about future, AI-infused counterforce effect on stability past counterforce suffered from inability to track enemy TELs AI remote sensing could enable effective counterforce Or so some argue AI’s potential remains hampered by inherent flaws in data available future improvements should not be expected to perfect AI Faulty assumptions lead policymakers to overestimate AI and overlook limitations AI ISR will not satisfy perfection in counterforce Yet AI’s contribution to marginally improving counterforce provide powerful incentives for adversaries to hedge adjusting doctrines pre-delegation and co-location heighten risk of nuclear use during a crisis AI-infused ISR are useful for future great-power competition Even if U.S capabilities are not aimed at China or Russia states in competitive relationships care more about what others can do than what others say

technical assessments of the vulnerabilities and limitations of current machine-learning technologies suggests preliminary conclusions about future, AI-infused counterforce capabilities and their effect on international stability AI can play a critical role in improving ISR for military operations While in the past counterforce suffered from an inability to identify and track enemy TELs , these advances in AI -supported remote sensing could finally enable an effective counterforce capability Or so some argue AI’s true potential to revolutionize counterforce remains hampered by inherent flaws in the shortcomings of the data available to AI for both training and operationalization. Because of inherent limitations illustrated by machine-learning theory and adversary incentives to fool algorithms, future improvements should not be expected to perfect AI either. Faulty assumptions about the inner workings of a rtificial i ntelligence, however , lead policymakers to continue to overestimate the impact and potential of AI in military affairs and overlook its real limitations while there is demand for AI -infused ISR capabilities to improve target id entification and elimination, including of adversary nuc lear force s , supply will not satisfy the necessarily high requirements for perfection in counterforce . Yet , expressed U.S. interest in damage limitation and counterforce options as well as AI’s contribution to a marginally improving counterforce capability provide powerful incentives for adversaries to hedge by increasing the survivability of their nuclear forces and adjusting their employment doctrines . Such measures, particularly pre-delegation of launch authority and co-location of operational warheads and delivery systems would heighten risk of inadvertent and accidental nuclear use during a crisis U.S. leaders should want to mitigate such risks. Yet, AI-infused ISR and greater effectiveness of non-nuclear weapons are tremendously useful for future military operations in the context of great-power competition Neither can these efforts be siloed out of the counterforce complex , particularly from the point of view of adversaries. Even if U.S . counterforce capabilities are expressly not aimed at China or Russia but rather the product of damage-limitation requirements vis-à-vis North Korea, efforts to keep up with a gradually expanding North Korean nuclear arsenal might encroach upon China’s relatively small number of weapons as well states in competitive relationships care more about what others can do to them than what others say about their intentions

technical assessments current machine-learning technologies future, AI-infused counterforce capabilities AI can play a critical role past could finally enable an effective counterforce capability Or so some argue inherent flaws perfect a i lead policymakers to continue to overestimate the impact and potential of AI overlook its real limitations demand id nuc s perfection in counterforce marginally improving counterforce capability powerful incentives for adversaries nuclear use during a crisis should tremendously useful for future military operations in the context of great-power competition Neither can these efforts be siloed out of the counterforce complex expressly not aimed at China or Russia more about what others can do to them than what others say

['This article provides an assessment of whether AI enables states to conduct effective counterforce strikes against adversary nuclear arsenals. An effort was made to minimize abstraction by drawing on recent U.S. experiences with the application of AI to the Defeat-ISIS campaign, technical assessments of the vulnerabilities and limitations of current machine-learning technologies, and open-source material on North Korea’s nuclear program, arsenal, and force posture. While this necessarily makes for an incomplete picture, it nevertheless suggests some preliminary conclusions about future, AI-infused counterforce capabilities and their effect on international stability. This analysis has shown that AI can play a critical role in improving ISR for military operations. Since the failed Scud hunt of the 1991 Gulf War, U.S. armed forces have invested heavily in improving their ability to find, fix, and finish mobile missile launchers. More recently, AI has been leveraged to better make use of the expansive full-motion video imagery provided by UAS operating in the skies above Syria and Iraq. While in the past counterforce suffered from an inability to identify and track enemy TELs, these advances in AI-supported remote sensing could finally enable an effective counterforce capability. Should a crisis erupt on the Korean Peninsula, the United States’ unparalleled military power and ISR capabilities, equipped with AI, would be more able than ever to find and destroy North Korea’s road-mobile nuclear weapons. Or so some argue. ', 'AI’s true potential to revolutionize counterforce remains hampered by inherent flaws. These lie in the shortcomings of the data available to AI for both training and operationalization. Because of inherent limitations illustrated by machine-learning theory and adversary incentives to fool algorithms, future improvements should not be expected to perfect AI either. Faulty assumptions about the inner workings of artificial intelligence, however, lead policymakers to continue to overestimate the impact and potential of AI in military affairs and overlook its real limitations.', 'Thus, while there is demand for AI-infused ISR capabilities to improve target identification and elimination, including of adversary nuclear forces, supply will not satisfy the necessarily high requirements for perfection in counterforce. Yet, expressed U.S. interest in damage limitation and counterforce options as well as AI’s contribution to a marginally improving counterforce capability provide powerful incentives for adversaries, like North Korea, to hedge by increasing the survivability of their nuclear forces and adjusting their employment doctrines. Such measures, particularly the pre-delegation of launch authority and co-location of operational warheads and delivery systems, however, would heighten the risk of inadvertent and accidental nuclear use during a crisis.', 'U.S. leaders should want to mitigate such risks. Yet, AI-infused ISR and greater effectiveness of non-nuclear weapons are tremendously useful for future military operations in the context of great-power competition. Neither can these efforts be siloed out of the counterforce complex, particularly from the point of view of adversaries. Even if U.S. counterforce capabilities are expressly not aimed at China or Russia but rather the product of damage-limitation requirements vis-à-vis North Korea, efforts to keep up with a gradually expanding North Korean nuclear arsenal might eventually encroach upon China’s relatively small number of weapons as well. After all, states in competitive relationships care more about what others can do to them than what others say about their intentions. Thus, chances are that we have indeed entered a new era of counterforce, resulting in greater instability among nuclear-armed states. However, contrary to the expectations of some, this is fueled less by the technological change brought about by AI than by the perception of threats and other’s intentions in a world of ever-evolving military capabilities.']

[(7, 14)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-DeWe-Neg-ADA-Nationals-Round-1.docx

Northwestern

DeWe

705504fcf4c8f398f9a812cf5e2e1f6f9cfdd1e7541f7ac9fa9303df899154bf

Middle East war is more unlikely than ever.

Karlin & Wittes 19 Mara Karlin, International Studies Professor at John Hopkins University, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, and U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development 2015-2016, & Tamara Cofman Wittes, a Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution and U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs from 2009-2012. [America’s Middle East Purgatory: The Case for Doing Less, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2019, 98(1)]

state conflicts that threatened U.S. have been replaced by substate threats other regions have taken on more importance diversification of energy has weakened oil During the Cold War, traditional threats pushed a role efforts were successful U S contained Israel countered Saddam and built a presence that deterred and muffled disputes among Arab states. Thanks to these chances of war are lower than any time in 50 years

inter state conflicts that directly threatened U.S. interests have largely been replaced by substate security threats other rising regions have taken on more importance the diversification of global energy markets has weakened oil as a driver During the Cold War, traditional state threats pushed the U S to play a major role efforts were largely successful Despite challenges U.S. dominance was never in question. The U S contained the Arab- Israel i conflict , countered Saddam ’s bid to gain territory in the Gulf War, and built a seemingly permanent military presence in the Gulf that deterred and muffled disputes among Arab states. Thanks to all these efforts , the chances of interstate war in the Middle East are lower now than at any time in the past 50 years

directly threatened largely been replaced substate security threats other rising regions the diversification of global energy markets a major role largely successful the Arab- Israel i conflict Saddam ’s bid to gain territory a seemingly permanent military presence deterred muffled disputes all these efforts lower now any time in the past 50 years

['LESS RELEVANT REGION In response to the Iraq war, the United States has aimed to reduce its role in the Middle East. Three factors have made that course both more alluring and more possible. First, interstate conflicts that directly threatened U.S. interests in the past have largely been replaced by substate security threats. Second, other rising regions, especially Asia, have taken on more importance to U.S. global strategy. And third, the diversification of global energy markets has weakened oil as a driver of U.S. policy. During the Cold War, traditional state-based threats pushed the United States to play a major role in the Middle East. That role involved not only ensuring the stable supply of energy to Western markets but also working to prevent the spread of communist influence and tamping down the Arab-Israeli conflict so as to help stabilize friendly states. These efforts were largely successful. Beginning in the 1970s, the United States nudged Egypt out of the pro-Soviet camp, oversaw the first Arab-Israeli peace treaty, and solidified its hegemony in the region. Despite challenges from Iran after its 1979 revolution and from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq throughout the 1990s, U.S. dominance was never seriously in question. The United States contained the Arab-Israeli conflict, countered Saddam’s bid to gain territory through force in the 1990–91 Gulf War, and built a seemingly permanent military presence in the Gulf that deterred Iran and muffled disputes among the Gulf Arab states. Thanks to all these efforts, the chances of deliberate interstate war in the Middle East are perhaps lower now than at any time in the past 50 years. ']

[(0, 18)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-ArPa-Neg-Franklin-R-Shirley-at-Wake-Forest-Round-2.docx

Northwestern

ArPa

36e52e73dc63ded218926bfb316a32ba6fc9f079a1da7c046d6bd8fca357bb56

No connection between inequality and conflict

Elise Must 16, PhD Candidate at the London School of Economics, “When And How Does Inequality Cause Conflict? Group Dynamics, Perceptions And Natural Resources”, Doctoral Dissertation, http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/3438/1/Must_When_and_how_does_inequality.pdf

Does inequality lead to conflict results remained mixed studies struggle to establish a firm relations studies rely on individual measures However minority groups rebel, not the whole population People take action because of perceived injustices rath er than measured of which they might not be aware Gini coefficient leaving aside how inequality is actually perceived cross-country analyses have neglected perceptions Analysing data for 89 to 14 objective inequalities do not have any significant effect

Does economic inequality lead to conflict ? results remained mixed quantitative studies struggle d to establish a firm relations hip between the two These quantitative studies rely on analysis of individual measures of inequality However it is minority groups or collectives of individuals who rebel, not the whole population , nor individuals studies neglect a potential crucial part of the inequality-conflict causal chain Seemingly all studies are based on objective inequalities Yet People take action because of perceived injustices rath er than because of measured statistical inequalities of which they might not be aware Gini coefficient data most commonly used as proxies leaving completely aside how economic inequality is actually interpreted and perceived by both groups and individuals cross-country analyses of conflict have neglected perceptions of inequality measures have to account for relevant groups as well as for the perception of inequality in these groups Analysing data for the period 19 89 to 20 14 from the World Values Survey (WVS), I find that mere objective regional economic inequalities do not have any significant effect

results remained mixed struggle d to establish a firm relations hip between the two individual measures However minority groups collectives of individuals not the whole population are based on objective inequalities perceived injustices measured statistical inequalities might not be aware Gini coefficient actually interpreted and perceived by both groups and individuals neglected perceptions of inequality 89 14 mere objective regional economic inequalities do not have any significant effect

['Does economic inequality lead to conflict? This question has attracted the attention of prominent scholars at least since the time of Aristotle (Nagel 1974). The frequent assumption that unequal distribution somehow fuels rebellion has resulted in a vast amount of theoretical as well as empirical work. For long, results remained mixed. Despite countless qualitative studies asserting that inequality is a major reason for conflict outbreak, quantitative studies struggled to establish a firm relationship between the two (Blattman and Miguel 2010, Cramer 2005, Lichbach 1989). ', 'These quantitative studies, including the most influential ones by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003), rely on analysis of individual measures of inequality. However, as most prominently set forth by Frances Stewart, it is minority groups or collectives of individuals who rebel, not the whole population, nor individuals (Stewart 2002). Stewart’s theoretical development has given rise to several quantitative studies which uniformly support the role of economic group inequality in inducing conflict (Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch 2014, Cederman, Weidmann, and Bormann 2015, Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011, Deiwiks, Cederman, and Gleditsch 2012, Østby 2008a, b, Østby, Nordås, and Rød 2009). Hence, there is an emerging consensus in the literature that inequality causes civil conflict when it overlaps with relevant group identities. ', 'Promising as these studies are, they nevertheless neglect a potential crucial part of the inequality-conflict causal chain. Seemingly all studies of inequality and conflict, including those measuring group inequalities, are based on objective inequalities. Yet, as Stewart (2010, 14) herself notes, ‘People take action because of perceived injustices rather than because of measured statistical inequalities of which they might not be aware’. Economic inequality measured by the Gini coefficient, or by local GDP data, is most commonly used as proxies, leaving completely aside how economic inequality is actually interpreted and perceived by both groups and individuals (ref. Zimmermann 1983). It remains obvious, however, that in order for people to take action to address inequalities, the first step is to recognize them and to consider them unjust (Han et al. 2012). The use then, of objective measures in current empirical studies, is based on the assumption that both objective and perceived horizontal inequalities essentially amount to the same thing. Put another way it is assumed that all objective inequalities are actually perceived as inequalities by relevant groups, and conversely all perceived inequalities have an objective basis. These are strong claims that are so far largely untested. Existing studies of the link between objective and perceived horizontal inequalities range from concluding that there is no such link (Langer and Smedts 2013) to documenting imperfect correlations – ranging from 0.27 to 0.30 depending on indicators and datasets (Holmqvist 2012). ', 'While cross-country analyses of conflict have neglected perceptions of inequality, the case study literature does offer some examples demonstrating their importance. Interviewing Muslim immigrants in London and Madrid, Gest (2010, 178) finds that what distinguishes democratic activists from those who engage in anti-system behavior, is the nature of their individual expectations and perceptions about shared economic realities. Moving on to larger conflicts, a recent World Bank report concludes that the so called ‘Arab Spring’ was driven by a decrease in popular subjective satisfaction, while the objective economic situation actually improved in the years before the widespread mobilization (Ianchovichina, Mottaghi, and Shantayanan 2015). The report also points to the importance of inter-group inequality as opposed to individual inequality. ', 'My main argument is that in order to better capture the role of inequality in inducing civil conflict, measures have to account for relevant groups as well as for the perception of inequality in these groups. In addition, my analyses fill two other gaps in the literature. While Stewart emphasizes how groups can mobilize around different identities, current studies have almost exclusively focused on ethnic groups. However, a regional identity might be just as relevant (ref. Posner 2004). I will therefor look at the effect of regional economic inequality on civil war. And finally, most of the studies, and all of those with a global scope, rely on time invariant measures of economic horizontal inequality. This is commonly defended by referring to the demonstrated ‘stickiness’ of horizontal inequalities (see e.g. Stewart and Langer 2008, Tilly 1999). Still, a recent study covering 1992 to 2013 demonstrates a global decline of ethnic inequality (Bormann et al. 2016), while Kanbur and Venables (2005) compare case studies of 26 developing countries and conclude that regional inequalities are rising. The data used in this analysis also show that horizontal inequalities change quite substantially over time. Using inequality data from one particular year to analyze decades of conflict incidents is therefore questionable. Hence, my study represents the first time-variant analyses of the effect of both objective and perceived regional inequality on civil war covering developed and developing countries in all world regions14 . ', 'Analysing data for the period 1989 to 2014 from the World Values Survey (WVS), I find that countries with a high level of perceived regional economic inequality have an elevated risk of civil war outbreak. On the other hand, mere objective regional economic inequalities do not have any significant effect. The group aspect remains essential, as neither objective nor perceived individual inequality is linked to increased civil conflict risk.']

[(6, 13)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-Adam-Kiihnl-Neg-Harvard-Round5.docx

Kentucky

AdKi

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kentucky/AdKi/Kentucky-Adam-Kiihnl-Neg-Harvard-Round5.docx

6c04cdce581b7fe1084b4cd90218c8e324fa9a390644225da4fa9b63a9d501cc

AI subs now and maritime transparency high now

Ben 1NC Yeldham 22, postgraduate student in strategic studies at the Australian National University’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 2/11/22, “Ocean Transparency and Australia’s Impact on Nuclear Stability,” https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/ocean-transparency-and-australias-impact-on-nuclear-stability/

AUKUS was another milestone in maritime defence the ASW capabilities threatens nuclear stability in the Indo-Pacific AUKUS allows for the sharing of critical breakthroughs in military applications of artificial intelligence and quantum technology with the potential to significantly advance anti-submarine capability it marginalises the importance of submarines for nuclear stability

AUKUS was another milestone in Australia’s development of a comprehensive maritime defence strategy However the ASW ) capabilities threatens nuclear stability in the Indo-Pacific AUKUS agreement allows for the sharing of critical breakthroughs in military applications of artificial intelligence and quantum technology with the potential to significantly advance anti-submarine capability it marginalises the importance of submarines for nuclear stability

AUKUS However ASW AUKUS artificial intelligence and quantum technology with the potential to significantly advance anti-submarine capability

['The establishment of AUKUS was another milestone in Australia’s development of a comprehensive maritime defence strategy. However, the advancement of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities threatens nuclear stability in the Indo-Pacific.', 'Building upon the Royal Australian Navy’s Future Frigate Program, the AUKUS agreement allows for the sharing of critical breakthroughs in military applications of artificial intelligence and quantum technology – both with the potential to significantly advance Australia’s anti-submarine capability. While ASW capabilities will serve Australia’s short-term strategic interests in defending against Chinese maritime aggression, it marginalises the importance of submarines for nuclear stability. At this crossroads in the direction of Australian defence, policymakers should set aside the immediate benefits of developing such capabilities, and consider the future pressure advanced ASW capabilities will place on stability in the face of nuclear warfare.']

[(4, 7), (8, 15), (16, 18)]

ndtceda

Kansas-PaSe-Aff-5---Georgetown-Round-6.docx

Kansas

PaSe

4440326c922f3e85cc57cb7429c5a5a78b806a847f08c70f9e5654403d215de5

The cases will be heard in federal district courts OR by the states.

Murrill ’22 [Brandon; September 20; Legislative attorney and expert commissioned by Congress; Congressional Research Service, “Federal Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction Part 5: Exclusivity of Federal Jurisdiction,” https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10828]

Article III granted “ admiralty cases conferred exclusive jurisdiction on district s while preserving state jurisdiction In practice, state s retain most tort s within admiralty actions may choose either fed or state

In Article III of the Constitution, the Framers granted the federal judiciary jurisdiction over “ admiralty and maritime ” cases Congress conferred exclusive admiralty jurisdiction on the federal district court s while preserving concurrent state court jurisdiction In practice, state court s retain concurrent jurisdiction over most contract and tort case s that fall within federal admiralty jurisdiction because a plaintiff may bring a personal action When bringing such maritime actions against defendants, the plaintiff may choose either fed eral or state court

Article III federal judiciary admiralty maritime exclusive district s preserving state court state s most tort s within personal action maritime actions either fed

['In Article III of the Constitution, the Framers granted the federal judiciary jurisdiction over “admiralty and maritime” cases to ensure that courts would apply uniform rules in deciding cases that could affect domestic commerce and might implicate foreign affairs. In the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress conferred exclusive admiralty jurisdiction on the federal district courts while preserving concurrent state court jurisdiction over common-law remedies so that the states could supplement the administration of federal maritime law.', 'In practice, state courts retain concurrent jurisdiction over most contract and tort cases that fall within federal admiralty jurisdiction because a plaintiff may bring a personal action seeking common-law remedies against an individual defendant in most of these cases. In an in personam case under the common law, liability attaches to property only to the extent of the individual defendant’s title in that property. When bringing such maritime actions against defendants, the plaintiff may choose either federal or state court.']

[(0, 7), (8, 11)]

ndtceda

Michigan-PiPh-Neg-Run-for-the-Roses-Round-4.docx

Michigan

PiPh

a58bacc57fb044eb60a9921d96541a607af0509be20aa83599a8c5bc1ff11099

We solve subs

Emmanuelle Maitre 20, Research Fellow, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, February 2020, “What prospects for arms and missile control after the end of the INF Treaty?,” https://www.frstrategie.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/recherches-et-documents/2020/202003.pdf

some believe it possible to revive INF by ensuring it only covers nuclear intermediate-range missiles all intermediate-range systems should be taken into account, including deployed at sea , on mobile launchers or carried by bombers This is compatible with focussing solely on specifically nuclear missiles

some believe it is still possible to revive the INF by altering its scope and ensuring it only covers nuclear -armed intermediate-range missiles verification methods used in New START could certify the absence of nuclear warheads from identified delivery vehicles. Other views are that all intermediate-range systems should now be taken into account, including those deployed at sea , on mobile launchers or carried by bombers This concern is compatible with focussing solely on specifically nuclear missiles , because a large part of these missiles are conventional weapons

still possible to revive the INF only covers nuclear -armed intermediate-range missiles all intermediate-range systems deployed at sea mobile launchers carried by bombers compatible with focussing solely on specifically nuclear missiles

['First, some experts believe it is still possible to revive the INF by altering its scope and ensuring it only covers nuclear-armed intermediate-range missiles. This reorientation would take into account both Russia’s and the United States’ wish to have conventional intermediate-range ground-launched missiles, particularly in Asia and to counter the Chinese arsenal, which is very developed over these ranges. This is the recommendation made by Rose Gottemoeller, former NATO Deputy Secretary General, who mentioned the possibility of “Putting the N back in INF”. 5 The verification methods used in the New START Treaty could effectively certify the absence of nuclear warheads from identified delivery vehicles.', 'Other views are that all intermediate-range systems should now be taken into account, including those deployed at sea, on mobile launchers or carried by bombers. 6 This concern is compatible with the idea of focussing solely on specifically nuclear missiles, because a large part of these missiles are conventional weapons regularly used in military conflicts', '', '']

[(11, 17), (18, 20)]

ndtceda

MichiganState-BeMo-Aff-4---CSULB-Round-4.docx

MichiganState

BeMo

16d373a80eae0be333c02fcee2d78af1eb45fe5e65454448cb3bd87cee41c3d2

Our interp is by far the most precise—entities are either public OR private, but not both—here’s a court decision that cites a litany of definitions and concludes NEG.

Reavley 88—(Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit). Thomas Morrow Reavley. February 10, 1988. United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Richard A. Tonry, Defendant-appellant, 837 F.2d 1281. . Accessed 9/7/21.

Webster's defines " private " as "not engaged in public office not holding public office or employment ." Black's Law defines " private " as belonging to private individuals , as distinct from the public a business may be 'private' as contradistinguished from a public function public corporations are contradistinguished from private corporations The terms " public " and " private " are mutually exclusive and together they exhaust the universe .

Webster's defines " private " as "not invested with or engaged in public office "p rivat e" is defined as " not holding public office or employment ." Black's Law defines " private " as "affecting or belonging to private individuals , as distinct from the public generally a business may be called 'private' as contradistinguished from a municipal or public duty or function all public corporations are municipal corporations , as contradistinguished from private corporations The terms " public " and " private " are mutually exclusive and together they exhaust the universe .

private invested engaged public office "p rivat e" employment private private individuals distinct public business 'private' contradistinguished municipal public duty function public corporations municipal corporations contradistinguished private corporations public private exhaust the universe

['', 'Evidence of the legislature\'s intent to implement a comprehensive set of bribery laws is found also in the "usual sense" of the word "private" in the commercial bribery statute. Webster\'s defines "private" as "not invested with or engaged in public office." Webster\'s Third New International Dictionary 1805 (1976). Similarly, "private" is defined as "not holding public office or employment." The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1145 (1966). Black\'s [**19] Law Dictionary defines "private" as "affecting or belonging to private individuals, as distinct from the public generally," and defines "private agent" as "an agent acting for an individual in his private affairs; as distinguished from a public agent." Black Law Dictionary 59 and 1076 (5th ed. 1979). The implication is that "private" includes all that is not considered public.', 'As admitted by the majority, the Louisiana Supreme Court has similarly interpreted "private." Galloway v. Wyatt Metal & Boiler Works, 189 La. 837, 181 So. 187, 189 (1938) ("Highways are public ways as contradistinguished from private ways.") Strohmeyer v. Consumers\' Electric Co., 111 La. 506, 35 So. 723, 724 (1904) ("Such a business may be called \'private\' as contradistinguished from a municipal or public duty or function . . . ."); State ex rel. Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Board of Levee Commissioners, 109 La. 403, 33 So. 385, 399 (1902) ("all public corporations are municipal corporations, as contradistinguished from private corporations.") In short, the "usual sense" of the word "private" is that which is not public. The terms "public" and "private" [**20] are mutually exclusive, and together they exhaust the universe. Therefore, the legislative intent of the commercial bribery statute, as derived from the usual sense of the word "private," was to prohibit all forms of bribery not covered under the public bribery statute.']

[(0, 7), (8, 10)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Davis-Munson-Neg-JV%20Nats%20%20WVU-Semis.docx

Minnesota

DaMu

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/DaMu/Minnesota-Davis-Munson-Neg-JV%2520Nats%2520%2520WVU-Semis.docx

caf023f3c98171cd9ae12ce419f502aa45b8b010278697eb000999ae044eb545

ASATs are existential.

Dallon Adams 18, Staff Writer for Digital Trends, “Weaponized Satellites and the Cold War in Space,” Digital Trends, 05-01-2018, https://www.digitaltrends.com/cool-tech/weaponized-satellites-and-the-cold-war-in-space

potential for accident due to misinterp is ripe say a U.S. sat is taken out by solar flare or debris while a Chinese or Russian sat with suspected ASAT floats U.S. would believe this was a preemptive strike to diminish capacity Would defense officials wait calmly no ensuing war an existential threat life could disappear

a nuclear-armed Soviet submarine had been spotted patrolling near the U.S. blockade line around Cuba, kicking off the Cuban Missile Crisis. , a U.S. destroyer began dropping non-lethal depth charges. The captain of the submarine mistakenly believed these charges were an attack and ordered his crew to arm the nuclear-tipped torpedo for launch the U.S. would have presumably retaliated with a barrage of nukes launched at predetermined locations one man’s last-minute decision prevented what could easily have been the beginning of World War III. This is perhaps as close the world has ever come to a doomsday scenario, and it’s chilling to think a moment of indeterminacy would have meant instant annihilation for millions the potential for a grave accident due to misinterp retation is dreadfully ripe in the space-age Cold War we’re currently entrenched in. Bingo! Attribution is tremendously difficult If a sat ellite stops working in orbit, it’s not always apparent why. It could be because of faulty parts, solar flares, or deliberate interference.” Let’s say a U.S. intelligence sat ellite is taken out by a solar flare or fleck of debris while a Chinese or Russian sat ellite with suspected ASAT potential floats haphazardly nearby The U.S. would have every reason to believe this was a possible preemptive strike to diminish U.S. GPS capacity before a larger attack. Would defense officials wait calmly with such crucial satellite assets potentially in the crosshairs ? Probably no t. the ensuing war would extend to earth soon thereafter This unnerving warning was echoed by General Hyten If war does extend into space someday the first response is not going to be in space,” the risk of an existential threat on this pale blue dot has never been higher . It’s incredible that a nuclear weapon hasn’t been used on civilians in more than 70 years, but most military experts would agree it is a matter of when, not if. Without meaningful legislation to prevent such a disaster, life on this planet could disappear as quickly as a blip on a radar screen, with only the artificial halo of orbiting trash left to tell the tale.

sat sat sat

['High stakes', 'On October 27, 1962, a nuclear-armed Soviet submarine had been spotted patrolling near the U.S. blockade line around Cuba, kicking off the Cuban Missile Crisis. In an attempt to bring the submarine to the surface, a U.S. destroyer began dropping non-lethal depth charges.', 'The captain of the submarine mistakenly believed these charges were an attack and ordered his crew to arm the nuclear-tipped torpedo for launch. If this launch occurred, the U.S. would have presumably retaliated with a barrage of nukes launched at predetermined locations across the USSR.', 'Per Soviet protocols, all three of the Russian submarine’s commanding officers needed to agree unanimously on the decision to launch the warhead. The second in command, Vasili Arkhipov, refused to consent to a launch. The commanding officers eventually brought the submarine to the surface and returned to Russia without incident.', 'In essence, one man’s last-minute decision prevented what could easily have been the beginning of World War III.', 'This is perhaps as close the world has ever come to a doomsday scenario, and it’s chilling to think a moment of indeterminacy would have meant instant annihilation for millions. But unfortunately, the potential for a grave accident due to misinterpretation is dreadfully ripe in the space-age Cold War we’re currently entrenched in.', '“In regards to indeterminacy of an attack: Bingo! Attribution is tremendously difficult,” says Samson. “If a satellite stops working in orbit, it’s not always apparent why. It could be because of faulty parts, solar flares, or deliberate interference.”', 'Let’s say, for instance, a U.S. intelligence satellite is taken out by a solar flare or fleck of debris while a Chinese or Russian satellite with suspected ASAT potential floats haphazardly nearby. The U.S. would have every reason to believe this was a possible preemptive strike to diminish U.S. GPS capacity before a larger attack. Would defense officials wait calmly with such crucial satellite assets potentially in the crosshairs? Probably not.', 'While there is currently tremendous potential for a military battle to begin in space, the ensuing war would extend to earth soon thereafter. This unnerving warning was echoed by General John Hyten, head of the U.S. Air Force Space Command. “If war does extend into space someday — and I hope it never does — the first response is not going to be in space,” he warned.', 'All things considered, it could easily be argued that the risk of an existential threat on this pale blue dot has never been higher. It’s incredible that a nuclear weapon hasn’t been used on civilians in more than 70 years, but most military experts would agree it is a matter of when, not if.', 'Without meaningful legislation to prevent such a disaster, life on this planet could disappear as quickly as a blip on a radar screen, with only the artificial halo of orbiting trash left to tell the tale.']

[(7, 15)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-DiGr-Aff-ADA-Round-3.docx

Kentucky

DiGr

20672308fec7e3c749b49eac9e66914a712a40cf632dd440c7a38bc81d440ab1

‘network governance’ is a tool for white supremacy

20. Professor of Urban and Environmental Policy and Planning at Tufts University. “Urban Planning as a tool of white supremacy – the other lesson from Minneapolis.” The Conversation. 7/27/20. https://theconversation.com/urban-planning-as-a-tool-of-white-supremacy-the-other-lesson-from-minneapolis-142249

segregation the norm urban planning is used as spatial toolkit for maintaining white supremacy higher levels of racial segregation linked to lower incomes worse education excluded from limits access to segregation still high despite

segregation , represents the norm . Across the U.S., urban planning is used as spatial toolkit , consisting of a set of policies and practices, for maintaining white supremacy . higher levels of racial segregation were linked to lower incomes for Black residents, as well worse education al outcomes that racial segregation leads to Black Americans being excluded from segregation limits access to . Residential segregation is still stubbornly high despite more than 50 years since the passing of the .

maintaining white supremacy

['As a\xa0, I know that Minneapolis, far from being an outlier in segregation, represents the norm. Across the U.S., urban planning is still used by some as the spatial toolkit, consisting of a set of policies and practices, for maintaining white supremacy. But urban planners of color, especially, are pointing out ways to\xa0\xa0by dismantling the legacy of racist planning, housing and infrastructure policies.', 'Racial segregation was not the byproduct of urban planning; it was, in many cases, its intention – it was “not by accident, but by design,” Adrien Weibgen, senior policy fellow at the Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development, explained in a 2019\xa0.', 'The effect was and still is devastating.', 'The Urban Institute, an independent think tank, noted in\xa0\xa0that higher levels of racial segregation were linked to lower incomes for Black residents, as well worse educational outcomes for both white and Black students. Other studies have found that racial segregation leads to Black Americans being excluded from\xa0. In Minnesota – which ranks as\xa0\xa0–\xa0\xa0is among the highest in the U.S. Likewise, segregation limits access to\xa0.', 'Income and wealth gaps', 'According to the U.S. Census Bureau, in Minneapolis\xa0. After Milwaukee, this is the biggest gap of the 100 largest metropolitan areas in the U.S. Mirroring the city’s income gap is a huge wealth gap. Minneapolis now has the\xa0.', 'Residential segregation in Minneapolis and elsewhere is still stubbornly high despite more than 50 years since the passing of the\xa0, which prohibited discrimination in the sale, rental and financing of housing based on race, among other factors. But while some residential segregation is now income-based,\xa0.']

[(1, 3)]

ndtceda

Emory-PiWa-Neg-Texas-Open-Round-3.docx

Emory

PiWa

5eeac7a01c6787c5b551ba28dd0fb4e478bd78e94cdef8733feb16715a7841a7

Capitalism is sustainable---markets solve their impact and the alt fails.

Noah Smith 9/6/21. Assistant Professor of finance @ SUNY Stony Brook, an economics PhD student at the University of Michigan, an academic editor in Japan, and a physics major at Stanford. “People are realizing that degrowth is bad.” https://noahpinion.substack.com/p/people-are-realizing-that-degrowth

the idea growth requires resource is false rich countries us less of the planet’s water metals carbon some materials are recyclable others of abundance if you substitute sand for oil, you’re getting efficient gross tonnage ignores this growth was correlated with emissions started moving in opposite directions rich countries inflection point is a strong indicator industrializing countries will the rest will take advantage of tech by developed countries degrowth is impossible everyone is going to reject global degrowth would freez world income most people would never come close to current living standards Degrowers need to convince 86% of rich countries that incomes are too high such is political suicide the political demand will set climate politics back , it would be disastrous magical thinking giving up beef SUVs housing food transportation and medical care is not happening China produces more CO2 Do you think China will accept a diminution to satisfy activists

degrowth is a very bad idea we can raise human living standards without exhausting the planet the idea that economic growth requires growth in resource use is false rich countries have started to grow while us ing less and less of the planet’s resources For example, here is U.S. use of fresh water and various metals as well as carbon we don’t need degrowth we can keep raising everyone’s standard of living without exhausting the planet’s resources growth can mean finding more efficient ways to use the stuff we have. Degrowthers show resource use for the entire world, and show that it’s correlated with global growth. This is a weak response Degrowthers have no idea how to combine various resources into an overall measure so they go with gross weight. This is absurd some materials are recyclable and others if you “use” a ton of copper you still have the copper , whereas if you “use” a ton of oil, your oil is gone it doesn’t take into account relative abundance if you figure out how to substitute 2 tons of sand for 1 ton of oil, you’re getting more efficient , since sand is much more plentiful A lot of growth is figuring out how to substitute plentiful resources for rare ones, and simply adding up gross tonnage ignores this . Past trends are no guarantee of future trends Until the 70s growth was closely correlated with both energy use and carbon emissions ; after the 70s, this correlation broke down completely and the lines started moving in opposite directions Degrowthers present historical curves as if these are law they are not the fact that rich countries have hit an inflection point use is a strong indicator that industrializing countries will as well this degrowther argument is just wrong degrowthers counter Decoupling isn’t happening fast enough. If we wait it will be far too late This argument isn’t strong the rest will be able to take advantage of the efficiency-inducing tech nologies created by the developed countries , like solar And they will be able to embrace “dematerialized” goods like social networks So these countries’ resource use trajectories won’t look quite like the U.S. ’ or Europe’s. this degrowther argument does contain a nugget of truth use is currently unsustainable But degrowth ers’ prescription is wrong The reason is politics The kind of massive intention reordering of global production and consumption is not just pragmatically impossible to implement it’s the thing everyone in the world except Twitter activist is going to reject The political argument against degrowth forcing developing countries to stay in poverty would be bad suppose we interpret “degrowth” as the decision to fix global GDP at its current level…Then we are condemning to permanent abject poverty 15 percent of world that currently earn less than $1.90 per day and some quarter of humankind who earn less than $2.50 per day Keeping so many people in abject poverty Enforcing global degrowth would require freez ing world income most people in the world would never even come close to current rich-world living standards this would require impoverishing most of the population of developed countries one would have to engage in a massive reduction of incomes for…practically all of the Western population. Only 14% of the population live at the level of income less than the global mean Degrowers thus need to convince 86% of the population living in rich countries that their incomes are too high and need to be reduced such a proposition is a political suicide Demanding people in rich countries accept absolutely catastrophic declines is a political non-starter if the political demand of the [degrowth] movement becomes you don’t get to eat beef, you will set climate politics back so far, so fast , it would be disastrous Same thing with S.U.V.s if you are telling people in rich countries that the climate movement is for them not having cars you are just going to lose You are going to lose fast the politics of degrowth fall apart I just don’t see the argument for degrowth as being anything but an extraordinarily slower way of approaching the politics counterproductive compared to what we’re doing I think you can make tremendous strides on climate change by deploying renewable technologies and giving people opportunity Milanovic is less gentle, calling this “ outright magical thinking ”. When you look at how much people in America are willing to sacrifice in terms of their material well-being in order to fight climate change, it’s far less it’s not just giving up beef and SUVs , it’s a dramatic reduction in the size of housing and the amount of food and the ease of transportation and the quality of medical care It is , frankly, not happening even this vastly understates the political and practical difficulties of degrowth curbing resource use will actually cause a lot more restrictions on developing countries degrowth would do nothing about the bulk of emissions , which are occurring in developing countries . China now produces more CO2 emissions than the U.S., the EU, and Japan combined: And no, this is not because of outsourcing you can see by looking at the trade-adjusted emissions numbers China’s CO2 emissions per dollar of GDP are more than twice America’s Do you think China will accept a substantial diminution of its living standards to satisfy the environmental-economic diktats of activists If so, you need to rethink a great many things a sudden drop in rich-world consumption would affect the developing world The consequences in poor countries were devastating . Hunger rose, and child mortality followed. Degrowth is economic planning without equal anywhere in human history it is abject fantasy these criticisms are utterly devastating to degrowth it will not advance beyond a media fad the things they call for simply will not happen .

degrowth is a very bad idea without exhausting the planet false us ing less and less of the planet’s resources fresh water metals carbon we don’t need degrowth without exhausting the planet’s resources more efficient ways weak response Degrowthers absurd some materials are recyclable still have the copper relative abundance ignores this Past trends are no guarantee of future trends broke down completely opposite directions they are not use is a strong indicator that industrializing countries will wrong This argument isn’t strong take advantage of the efficiency-inducing tech nologies won’t look quite like the U.S. But degrowth ers’ prescription is wrong politics pragmatically impossible everyone in the world is going to reject degrowth bad we are condemning to permanent abject poverty 15 percent quarter of humankind abject poverty freez ing world income never even come close to current rich-world living standards impoverishing most of the population Degrowers thus need to convince 86% of the population living in rich countries that their incomes are too high and need to be reduced political suicide is a political non-starter you will set climate politics back so far, so fast , it would be disastrous you are just going to lose the politics of degrowth fall apart extraordinarily slower way of approaching the politics counterproductive compared to what we’re doing outright magical thinking far less beef SUVs housing food transportation medical care not happening bulk of emissions developing countries And no, this is not because of outsourcing China will accept a substantial diminution of its living standards rethink a great many things devastating Hunger child mortality without equal anywhere in human history it is abject fantasy utterly devastating media fad will not happen

['I was going to write a lengthy post explaining why “degrowth” — the idea that we need to halt economic growth in order to save the planet — is a very bad idea. But in the meantime, other people have written that post, or recorded that podcast, and done it well. These include Branko Milanovic, Kelsey Piper, and Ezra Klein. So instead I’ll write a shorter post trying to catalog and boil down the arguments against degrowth.', 'But first, let’s go over the standard argument, so we can see why these new arguments are necessary.', 'The standard argument against degrowth', 'First, note that the typical argument against degrowth, which I laid out in a Bloomberg post a while back, is that we don’t need it; we can raise human living standards without exhausting the planet. This argument was capably put forward by Andy McAfee, in his excellent book More From Less, which you should buy and read. Essentially, the idea that economic growth requires growth in resource use is false; rich countries have started to grow while using less and less of the planet’s most important resources. For example, here is U.S. use of fresh water and various metals, as well as trade-adjusted carbon emissions:', '', '', '', 'So the idea here is that we don’t need degrowth; instead, we can keep raising everyone’s standard of living without exhausting the planet’s resources. Because growth doesn’t just mean using more and more stuff; instead, it can mean finding more efficient ways to use the stuff we have.', '', '', '', '', '', 'Degrowthers have two counters to this. Their first counter, typically, is to show a graph of resource use for the entire world, and show that it’s correlated with global growth. This is a weak response, for two reasons:', 'Degrowthers have no idea how to combine various resources into an overall measure of resource use, so they typically go with gross weight. This is absurd, since some materials are recyclable and others are not — if you “use” a ton of copper you still have the copper, whereas if you “use” a ton of oil, your oil is gone. It’s also absurd because it doesn’t take into account the relative abundance of resources — if you figure out how to substitute 2 tons of sand for 1 ton of oil, you’re getting more efficient, since sand is much more plentiful than oil (and doesn’t pollute as much when you use it). A lot of growth is figuring out how to substitute plentiful resources for rare ones, and simply adding up gross tonnage ignores this.', 'Past trends are no guarantee of future trends. Until the 70s, for instance, U.S. economic growth was closely correlated with both energy use and carbon emissions; after the 70s, this correlation broke down completely and the lines started moving in opposite directions. Degrowthers present historical curves as if these are laws of nature, but we know that they are not. The trend is your friend only til the bend at the end. And the fact that rich countries have hit an inflection point where economic growth no longer depends on growing resource use is a strong indicator that industrializing countries like China will also hit this point as well. (And no, falling use in rich countries is mostly not due to outsourcing, as the emissions graph above illustrates.)', 'So this degrowther argument is just wrong. But degrowthers have a second, far better counter to McAfee’s notion that we can have our cake and eat it too: Decoupling isn’t happening fast enough. If we wait for China and India and all the countries of Africa to industrialize in a resource-intensive way like today’s developed countries did, and then to dematerialize their growth like today’s developed countries are doing now, it will be far too late and the planet will suffer ecological catastrophe.', 'This argument isn’t as strong as it sounds — China and India and the rest will be able to take advantage of the efficiency-inducing technologies created by the developed countries, like solar power (indeed, they are already doing so). And they will be able to embrace “dematerialized” goods and services like social networks and video games (sorry, Xi Jinping) very early in their growth path. So these countries’ resource use trajectories won’t look quite like the U.S.’ or Europe’s.', 'But this degrowther argument does contain a nugget of truth: Global resource use is currently on an unsustainable trajectory. Here, via Zeke Hausfather, are the current projections for global warming by century’s end, even with the advances in techologies like solar:', '[CHART OMITTED]', 'Any one of these scenarios represents utter global catastrophe.', 'So even if there is a sustainable growth path, we are not currently on it. About this, degrowthers are right; a gentle, natural transition to green growth is possible, but is an unaffordable luxury. But degrowthers’ prescription is the wrong one.', 'The reason, in a word, is politics. The kind of massive intention reordering of global production and consumption that degrowthers fantasize about is not just pragmatically impossible to implement, it’s the kind of thing that essentially everyone in the world except for a few very shouty people in Northern Europe and the occasional Twitter activist is going to reject. To see why, let us turn to the excellent articles/podcasts by Milanovic, Piper, and Klein.', 'The political argument against degrowth', 'Milanovic actually has two excellent posts on the topic of degrowth. In the first one, he lays out why forcing developing countries to stay in poverty would be bad:', 'Let us suppose, for the sake of the argument, that we interpret “degrowth” as the decision to fix global GDP at its current level…Then, unless we change the distribution of income, we are condemning to permanent abject poverty some 15 percent of world population that currently earn less than $1.90 per day and some quarter of humankind who earn less than $2.50 per day…Keeping so many people in abject poverty so that the rich can continue to enjoy their current standard of living is obviously something that the proponents of degrowth would not condone. ', 'Enforcing global degrowth would require freezing world income at about $17,000/year. That means that most people in the world would never even come close to current rich-world living standards — instead, they would at best only be able to reach the level currently enjoyed in China or Botswana. Perhaps that’s not such a horrible fate, but as Milanovic notes, this would require impoverishing most of the population of developed countries. He elaborates on this point in his new post, pulling no punches:', '[In order to avoid keeping most of the world in poverty, degrowthers must] introduce a different [income] distribution (B) where everybody who is above the current mean world income ($PPP 16 per day) is driven down to this mean, and the poor countries and people are, at least for a while, allowed to continue growing until they too achieve the level of $PPP 16 per day. But the problem with that approach is that one would have to engage in a massive reduction of incomes for…practically all of the Western population. Only 14% of the population in Western countries live at the level of income less than the global mean…Degrowers thus need to convince 86% of the population living in rich countries that their incomes are too high and need to be reduced….It is quite obvious that such a proposition is a political suicide.', 'Milanovic quite rightly waves away degrowthers’ protestations that GDP is not a good measure of human welfare. GDP isn’t perfect, he notes, but it’s close enough where the basic point stands.', 'Demanding that people in rich countries accept absolutely catastrophic declines in their living standards is a political non-starter. Klein, on his podcast, tries to point this out as gently as possible:', 'I think that if the political demand of the [degrowth] movement becomes you don’t get to eat beef, you will set climate politics back so far, so fast, it would be disastrous. Same thing with S.U.V.s. I don’t like S.U.V.s. I don’t drive one. But if you are telling people in rich countries that the climate movement is for them not having the cars they want to have, you are just going to lose. You are going to lose fast…This is where the politics of [degrowth] for me fall apart…', 'I just don’t see the argument for degrowth as being anything but an extraordinarily slower way of approaching the politics, probably counterproductive compared to what we’re doing, which is I think you can make tremendous strides on climate change by deploying renewable energy technologies and giving people the opportunity to have a more materially fulfilling life atop those technologies.', 'Milanovic is less gentle, calling this “outright magical thinking”. He is correct. When you look at how much people in America are willing to sacrifice in terms of their material well-being in order to fight climate change, it’s far less than what Klein is talking about. And Klein is really softballing it here — it’s not just giving up beef and SUVs, it’s a dramatic reduction in the size of housing and the amount of food and the ease of transportation and the quality of medical care that people in rich countries enjoy. It is, frankly, not happening.', 'But even this vastly understates the political and practical difficulties of degrowth. Piper adds several key points. First of all, she notes, because developed countries have been decoupling resource use and growth for a while now, curbing resource use will actually cause a lot more restrictions on developing countries than Milanovic’s simple calculations would suggest:', 'From a climate change perspective, though, there’s a problem [with simply reducing rich-world living standards]. First, it means that degrowth would do nothing about the bulk of emissions, which are occurring in developing countries.', 'This is an incredibly important point. For example, China now produces more CO2 emissions than the U.S., the EU, and Japan combined:', '', '(And no, this is not because of outsourcing, as you can see by looking at the trade-adjusted emissions numbers.)', 'Another way of looking at this is that China’s CO2 emissions per dollar of GDP are more than twice America’s, and about five times that of the EU. Any global degrowth plan that actually reduces resource use is going to entail more pain for China than its GDP numbers would suggest, simply because China is at a more resource-intensive stage of growth.', 'Do you think China will accept a substantial diminution of its living standards, in order to satisfy the environmental-economic diktats of activists in Northern Europe? If so, you need to rethink a great many things.', 'Anyway, Piper makes a second crucially important point. So far we’ve been waving our hands and talking about lowering rich-world GDP while raising GDP for poor countries. In fact, economies don’t work like that:', 'Second, the global economy is more interconnected than Hickel implies. When Covid-19 hit, poor countries were devastated not just by the virus but by the aftershocks of virus-induced slowdowns in consumption in rich countries.', 'There’s some genuine appeal to the idea of an end to “consumerism,” but the pandemic offered a taste of how a sudden drop in rich-world consumption would actually affect the developing world. Covid-19 dramatically curtailed Western imports and tourism for a time. The consequences in poor countries were devastating. Hunger rose, and child mortality followed.', 'Degrowth would thus require deep changes in the entire way that the global economy works. Change happens, but not like that; implementing the kind of reallocation schemes that degrowthers throw around with abandon would require global economic planning that would put Gosplan to shame. Klein points this out, again rather gently:', 'Degrowth is, as its advocates understand it, a act of global economic planning really without equal anywhere in human history. It is an act of extraordinary central planning.', 'In other words, it is abject fantasy.', 'Taken together, these criticisms are utterly devastating to the entire degrowth project. In its current form, it will not advance beyond a media fad. No matter how shrilly degrowthers quote apocalyptic projections, the things they call for simply will not happen.', '']

[(5, 10), (15, 17)]

ndtceda

Emory-SaSh-Aff-JW-Patterson-Debates-hosted-by-UK-Round-4.docx

Emory

SaSh

61ef96b52cfded66e9a7541951a54b1dfb7db9e4344bd56d61b4af41342e88db

Deterrence of North Korea is stable

Daniel Post 21, Commander in the U.S. Navy and Ph.D. candidate studying international relations at Brown University, 1/29/2021, “Deterring North Korea,” https://warontherocks.com/2021/01/deterring-north-korea/

deterrence work vis-a-vis North Korea North Korea remains vulnerable to U.S. nuc attacks , while the U S and partners remain vulnerable to attack from North Korea mutual vulnerability necessitates caution the U S continues to invest in homeland m d these attempts to reduce vulnerability enhance deterrence by denying North Korea gains from a limited attack U.S. capabilities are sufficient to make success appear difficult and costly . Vulnerability to severe retaliation is unavoidable both sides are vulnerable there is no development that might remove vulnerability from Kim’s mind There is uncertainty in red lines While the U S should not increase this threat level the threat of nuclear retal should be maintained uncertainty remains about which actions beneath the nuclear threshold trigger a larger response . This induce caution in lower-level conflict behavior . The U.S. includes ambiguity in its declaratory statements This makes aggression against the U.S. risky

can deterrence work vis-a-vis North Korea ? In short, yes vulnerability has played an important role in nuclear strategies and policies of both sides. The vulnerability of allies and assets has been a check on a more aggressive U.S. strategy although Kim would like nothing more than to unify the Korean Peninsula it has refrained from overt and aggressive military action in pursuit of this goal. There is no doubt that Kim is wary of such behavior in the face of U.S. and allied military capabilities North Korea remains vulnerable to U.S. nuc lear attacks , while the U nited S tates and its regional partners remain vulnerable to nuclear attack or retaliation from North Korea . This mutual vulnerability necessitates caution on both sides. progress in North Korean missile technology made portions of the U.S. mainland vulnerable , giving the U.S. reason to avoid provocation North Korea conducted tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles , two of which demonstrated the capability to reach the continental U S North Korea tested a s l b m and showcased a new and larger s l b m at a recent parade. As a result, the U S continues to invest in homeland m d as well as deploy missile defenses to defend allies and assets in the region Though imperfect, these attempts to reduce vulnerability enhance deterrence by denying North Korea military gains from a limited missile attack Kim will have to factor in these defensive capabilities when assessing the success of engaging in conflict and will question the ability to achieve even limited goals through limited means. From Kim’s perspective, U.S. military capabilities are more than sufficient to make military success for North Korea appear difficult and costly . Vulnerability to severe retaliation and punishment from U.S. strategic forces is unavoidable In sum, both sides are vulnerable to each other there is no development in the near to medium term that might remove this sense of vulnerability from Kim’s mind There is uncertainty in the nuclear capabilities and red lines of each side , in particular concerns about what might cause Kim to feel existentially threatened , and concerns over what might trigger the U S to exercise nuclear defense on behalf of its allies in the region While the U S should be careful not to increase this threat level to a point where Kim believes he must start a major war, the threat of nuclear retal iation should be maintained Missile defenses add an important element of uncertainty to the relationship. Uncertainty about the effectiveness of these systems should induce caution on both sides because neither can be completely sure about how effective the systems will be uncertainty remains about which actions beneath the nuclear threshold might trigger a larger response . This uncertainty will undoubtedly induce caution in even lower-level conflict behavior . The U.S. includes some ambiguity and uncertainty in its declaratory statements This statement leaves plenty of room for adversaries to question what might trigger a response and makes any aggression against the U.S. or its allies a risky proposition

yes important role aggressive U.S. strategy unify Korean Peninsula refrained U.S. allied military capabilities vulnerable U.S. nuc lear attacks vulnerable nuclear attack retaliation mutual vulnerability U.S. mainland vulnerable intercontinental ballistic missiles continental U S s l b m new larger s l b m homeland m d allies assets in the region reduce vulnerability enhance deterrence limited missile attack defensive capabilities success engaging in conflict question the ability limited goals limited means. military success difficult costly severe retaliation punishment vulnerable remove this sense of vulnerability from Kim’s mind nuclear capabilities red lines Kim existentially threatened nuclear defense allies the threat of nuclear retal iation should be maintained uncertainty effectiveness caution on both sides completely sure which actions larger response induce caution lower-level conflict behavior ambiguity uncertainty declaratory statements plenty of room trigger a response any aggression a risky proposition

['With these principles in mind, can deterrence continue to work vis-a-vis North Korea? In short, yes. Throughout the evolution of the U.S-North Korean deterrence relationship, vulnerability has played an important role in the nuclear strategies and policies of both sides. The vulnerability of U.S. allies and assets in the region to North Korea’s intermediate-range missile and artillery barrages has almost certainly been a check on a more aggressive U.S. strategy, whether geared toward nonproliferation or regime change. It is certainly plausible that in the absence of this vulnerability the chances of the U.S. preventively attacking North during the Trump administration would have been higher, especially considering the extremely hawkish views of his national security adviser in 2017. As a result of this vulnerability, the U.S. routinely demonstrates its dedication to security agreements with allies in word and deed. Strategic bomber flights and military exercises, for example, demonstrate to North Korea their own vulnerability to U.S. and allied power in the region. Conversely, although the Kim regime would like nothing more than to unify the Korean Peninsula under North Korean leadership (dubbed the “holy grail of North Korean statecraft” in a recent report), it has refrained from overt and aggressive military action in pursuit of this goal. There is no doubt that Kim, like his predecessors, is wary of such behavior in the face of U.S. and allied military capabilities. Today, North Korea remains vulnerable to U.S. nuclear attacks, while the United States and its regional partners remain vulnerable to nuclear attack or retaliation from North Korea. This mutual vulnerability necessitates caution on both sides.', 'Recent progress in North Korean missile technology have made portions of the U.S. mainland vulnerable, giving the U.S. further reason to avoid unnecessary provocation. In 2017, North Korea conducted several tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles, two of which demonstrated the capability to potentially reach the continental United States. More recently, North Korea has successfully tested a submarine-launched ballistic missile and has showcased a new and larger submarine-launched ballistic missile at a recent parade. As a result, the United States continues to invest significantly in homeland missile defense, as well as to deploy missile defenses to defend allies and assets in the region. Missile defenses likely contribute to increased feelings of vulnerability among Kim’s regime, which may see the build-up as a prelude to a military offensive. Though imperfect, these attempts to reduce vulnerability enhance deterrence by potentially denying North Korea the expected military gains from a limited missile attack, even as fully effective missile defenses might contribute to strategic instability. Regardless of their effectiveness, Kim will have to factor in these defensive capabilities when assessing the success of engaging in conflict and will question the ability to achieve even limited goals through limited means. For example, in order to ensure the success of a missile attack, Kim would have to increase the size of the salvo in order to compensate for missiles likely to be shot down by U.S. and allied defenses. But knowing that a larger initial attack would be perceived as particularly aggressive and would likely invite a larger counter-attack, he might be deterred from pursuing whatever limited gains a smaller attack might have achieved. From Kim’s perspective, U.S. military capabilities are more than sufficient to make military success for North Korea in any conflict appear difficult and costly. Vulnerability to severe retaliation and punishment from U.S. strategic forces is also currently unavoidable for Kim. In fact, this very vulnerability has driven the North Korean nuclear program toward a capability to directly threaten the U.S., thereby demonstrating its own acknowledgement of vulnerability. In sum, both sides are vulnerable to each other. Most importantly for U.S. decision-makers, there is no likely development in the near to medium term that might remove this sense of vulnerability from Kim’s mind.', 'There is also great uncertainty in the nuclear capabilities and red lines of each side, in particular concerns about what might cause Kim to feel existentially threatened, and concerns over what might trigger the United States to exercise nuclear defense on behalf of its allies in the region. Kim consistently expresses concerns about regime survival and fear of a U.S. attack, and recent U.S. regime change operations in other states only strengthen this fear. While the United States should be careful not to inadvertently increase this threat level to a point where Kim believes he must start a major war, the threat of nuclear retaliation should be maintained. Such a scenario is far from implausible (nuclear scholar Jeffrey Lewis sketches out a hypothetical nuclear war between North Korea and the United States in a recent novel). Missile defenses also add an important element of uncertainty to the relationship. Uncertainty about the effectiveness of these systems should induce caution on both sides because neither can be completely sure about how effective the systems will be (though these systems may also strengthen resolve on the part of the U.S. if deemed very effective, as Robert Powell suggests). Although the United States has been clear in its statements regarding North Korean nuclear use, for example stating in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review that “there is no scenario in which the Kim regime could employ nuclear weapons and survive,” uncertainty remains about which actions beneath the nuclear threshold might trigger a larger response. This uncertainty will undoubtedly induce caution in even lower-level conflict behavior. The U.S. explicitly includes some level of ambiguity and uncertainty in its declaratory statements, such as when describing possible conditions for nuclear use, saying, “Significant non-nuclear strategic attacks include, but are not limited to, attacks on the U.S., allied, or partner civilian population or infrastructure, and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities.” This type of statement leaves plenty of room for adversaries to question what might trigger a response and makes any aggression against the U.S. or its allies a risky proposition.', '', '', '']

[(7, 14)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-RaYe-Neg-JW-Patterson-Round-6.docx

Northwestern

RaYe

dd060b58d064d2f32e0f13d9ec4781db99d34c13d1c6703d0050d17f6e3181fd

The aff solves any tradeoff link – private litigation takes cases off the government’s docket

Harrington ‘15 [Joseph; 1/29/15; Patrick T. Harker Professor, Department of Business Economics & Public Policy, at The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania; CPI Antitrust Chronicle; “The Comity-Deterrence Tradeoff and the FTAIA: Motorola Mobility Revisited,” https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/the-comity-deterrence-trade-off-and-the-ftaia-motorola-mobility-revisited/]

The DOJ has limited resources there are many cases of collusion that do not involve behavior that is per se unlawful Given the lower threshold for conviction in a civil case private litigation has been essential the DOJ chooses not to pursue litigation in many meritorious cases because it lacks the necessary resources

The DOJ has limited resources which means all possible cases cannot be pursued the presence of a resource constraint impacts the type of cases that are pursued the DOJ’s caseload is heavily oriented to cases involving the leniency program but not all forms of collusion lend themselves to a firm receiving amnesty. there are many cases of collusion that do not involve behavior that is per se unlawful . Given the lower threshold for a conviction in a civil case , private litigation has been , and will continue to be, essential in prosecuting these less flagrant, but no less harmful, forms of collusion . the DOJ obtained convictions in 92 percent of 699 cases filed over 1992 to 2008 The DOJ appears much more willing to tolerate a false negative than a false positive it appears the DOJ chooses not to pursue litigation in many meritorious cases , perhaps at least in part because it lacks the necessary resources . This may well create a need for private litigation as a complement to government enforcement of the antitrust laws.

DOJ limited resources all possible cases cannot pursued resource constraint type of cases pursued DOJ’s caseload oriented cases leniency program lower threshold conviction civil case private litigation essential prosecuting collusion DOJ much more willing tolerate false negative DOJ not to pursue litigation meritorious cases lacks the necessary resources need for private litigation complement government enforcement

['Of greater relevance is the second reason for the lack of public enforcement, which is that the government suspects unlawful collusion but chooses not to litigate. The Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has limited resources, which means all possible cases cannot be pursued. Furthermore, the presence of a resource constraint impacts the type of cases that are pursued. These days, the DOJ’s caseload is heavily oriented to cases involving the leniency program but not all forms of collusion lend themselves to a firm receiving amnesty. A member of a hard-core cartel engaged in a per se offense can expect to receive leniency if it is the first to come forward but there are many cases of collusion that do not involve behavior that is per se unlawful. Given the lower threshold for a conviction in a civil case, private litigation has been, and will continue to be, essential in prosecuting these less flagrant, but no less harmful, forms of collusion.\nWhile it is difficult to document case selection by the DOJ, there is certainly evidence consistent with it being a substantive factor. In noting that the DOJ obtained convictions in 92 percent of 699 cases filed over 1992 to 2008, Professors Robert Lande and Joshua Davis comment:17', 'The DOJ appears much more willing to tolerate a false negative (a failure to prosecute a violation of the antitrust laws) than a false positive (litigating a case when in fact there was no violation). In other words, it appears the DOJ chooses not to pursue litigation in many meritorious cases, perhaps at least in part because it lacks the necessary resources. This may well create a need for private litigation as a complement to government enforcement of the antitrust laws.', '', '', '']

[(0, 14)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Agrawal-Mikelson-Aff-harvard-Round1.docx

Michigan

AgMi

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/AgMi/Michigan-Agrawal-Mikelson-Aff-harvard-Round1.docx

d7a8555766c7ed9aea458fc4a61c036bfdf7ad338242ea8b955e392efcca827c

Privacy legislation will pass and regulate big tech.

Lima ’3-2 [Cristiano; 2022; Washington Post, “Biden’s endorsement could be a game-changer for kids’ privacy legislation”; https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/03/02/bidens-endorsement-could-be-game-changer-kids-privacy-legislation/]

Biden endorsing legislation on kids’ privacy could have a ripple effect in Congress his allies on tech championed greater privacy for children with Biden now throwing his support behind privacy and protect children’s data — it may clear the jam on Capitol Hill

Biden endorsing legislation on kids’ privacy during a prime time address could have a major ripple effect in Congress his closest allies on tech issues have long championed greater data privacy protections and safeguards for children with Biden now decisively throwing his support behind privacy legislation, and particularly to protect children’s data — it may finally help clear the log jam on Capitol Hill

could major ripple effect closest allies long championed now decisively throwing clear the log jam

['While Biden endorsing legislation on kids’ privacy during a prime time address could have a major ripple effect in Congress, it’s not entirely surprising. ', 'One of Biden’s top advisers, Bruce Reed, and some of his closest allies on tech issues have long championed greater data privacy protections and safeguards for children. ', 'Still, with Biden now decisively throwing his support behind privacy legislation, and particularly to protect children’s data — it may finally help clear the logjam on Capitol Hill.', '']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Phil-Skoulikaris-Aff-ADA-Round1.docx

Michigan

PhSk

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/PhSk/Michigan-Phil-Skoulikaris-Aff-ADA-Round1.docx

f833766302786008c31474b85cb10745c5638ba363d950e686eb6fca1a29f98a

The agenda is uniquely frenetic

Victor Reklaitis 9/11, Money & Politics reporter at MarketWatch, “Debt limit, social spending, infrastructure battles loom in ‘uniquely frenetic period’ for Congress”, 9/11/21, https://www.marketwatch.com/story/debt-limit-social-spending-infrastructure-battles-loom-in-uniquely-frenetic-period-for-congress-11631045095

long to-do list a uniquely frenetic period spending deadline debt ceiling , and reconciliation also delivering bipartisan infrastructure September an unmitigated mess no similar concentration since a decade ago. stakes could not be higher chaotic fall shaping up

lawmakers have a long to-do list month ahead a uniquely frenetic period in Washington that touches on the federal spending deadline , the debt ceiling , and the reconciliation effort Congress must deliver measure before the fiscal year starts as well as raise the federal borrowing limit Dem s aiming to pass a social spending package through reconciliation , while also delivering a bipartisan infrastructure plan. September is set to be an unmitigated mess C apitol Hill has no t produced a similar concentration of political risk since the fiscal wars a decade ago. stakes of a big legislative agenda could not be higher chaotic fall is shaping up in Washington outlook for massive new spending and taxes now in doubt nasty debt ceiling fight

long uniquely frenetic spending deadline debt ceiling reconciliation must reconciliation bipartisan infrastructure unmitigated mess similar concentration political risk decade could not be higher chaotic fall massive nasty

['U.S. lawmakers have a long to-do list for the coming weeks — and financial markets could get rattled by the ensuing drama, analysts are warning.', 'The month ahead “appears likely to be a uniquely frenetic period in Washington that touches on the federal spending deadline, the debt ceiling, and the ongoing budget reconciliation effort,” said Isaac Boltansky, director of policy research at Compass Point, in a note.', 'Congress must deliver a funding measure before the federal government’s new fiscal year starts Oct. 1 in order to avoid a partial shutdown, as well as raise the federal borrowing limit this fall to prevent a U.S. default. Plus, the House and Senate’s Democratic leaders are aiming to pass a $3.5 trillion social spending package through a process known as budget reconciliation, while also delivering a $1 trillion bipartisan infrastructure plan.', '“We hope that everyone was able to recharge during August, because September is set to be an unmitigated mess,” Boltansky said. He wrote that the market SPX, 0.23% DJIA, 0.76% is also “eagerly awaiting clarity on the Fed’s tapering timeline as well as the White House’s plans for the Fed’s leadership. Taken together, Capitol Hill has not produced a similar concentration of political risk for the markets since the fiscal wars a decade ago.”', 'The autumn action will help determine President Joe Biden’s legacy, along with whether Republicans can take control of the House or Senate in next year’s midterm elections, according to James Lucier, managing director at Capital Alpha Partners.', '“The stakes of a big legislative agenda this fall could not be higher,” Lucier said in a note. “Biden is betting his presidency and his recovery from the Afghanistan debacle on it. Democrats hope that the ambitious legislative agenda will be a popular success and lock in Democratic dominance of Congress and the White House for years to come.”', 'Greg Valliere, chief U.S. policy strategist at AGF Investments, stressed that moderate Democratic lawmakers are raising concerns about the cost of the proposals touted by their party leaders. One such lawmaker, Sen. Joe Manchin of West Virginia, last week reiterated his opposition to his party’s efforts to pass its $3.5 trillion package, as he called for a “strategic pause.”', '“A chaotic fall is shaping up in Washington, with the outlook for massive new spending and taxes now in doubt — and a nasty debt ceiling fight threatening to annoy financial markets by next month,” Valliere said in a note.']

[(7, 16), (17, 21)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-Flaherty-Stockstill-Aff-Northwestern-Round5.docx

Kentucky

FlSt

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kentucky/FlSt/Kentucky-Flaherty-Stockstill-Aff-Northwestern-Round5.docx

5ef600722059a48f16ad8e6db4ab0fd50d4dbce6b9d621657ba3b51d48dfddef

There hasn’t been a hearing on nuclear policy in decades.

Sara Sirota 22. Politics Reporter at The Intercept. She was previously an Air Force reporter at Inside Defense. She has a master’s in security studies from Georgetown University and bachelor’s in political science from Colgate University. “CONGRESS IS ALREADY BLOWING A KEY CHANCE TO REFORM NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY.” https://theintercept.com/2022/03/24/nuclear-weapons-reform-commission-ukraine-russia/.

Congressional leaders were sincere they would hold public hearings There has not been serious hearing on nuclear policy in Congress in decades

If Congressional leaders were sincere about their stated desire to ‘examine the long-term strategic posture of the United States,’ they would hold a series of public hearings to do so There has not been a serious hearing on nuclear policy in Congress in decades

sincere in decades

['“If Congressional leaders were sincere about their stated desire to ‘examine the long-term strategic posture of the United States,’ they would hold a series of public hearings to do so,” Joe Cirincione, a nuclear nonproliferation advocate with the Quincy Institute, told The Intercept in a written statement. “There has not been a serious hearing with contrasting views on nuclear policy in Congress in decades.”', '']

[(5, 14)]

ndtceda

Emory-PiWa-Neg-5---Franklin-R-Shirley-at-Wake-Forest-Round-3.docx

Emory

PiWa

03ff4d6aca1a85ba1051b670d201504d379ba2575f90082b7b33681750232c3c

Apocalyptic images challenges settler-colonialism by contesting the implausibility that inequitable structures can produce catastrophe

Hurley 17, Assistant Professor in the Humanities at the University of Chicago (Jessica Hurley, 2017, “Impossible Futures: Fictions of Risk in the Longue Durée,” Duke University Press, https://read.dukeupress.edu/american-literature/article/89/4/761/132823/Impossible-Futures-Fictions-of-Risk-in-the-Longue)

apocalyptic narrative forms disrupt conservative realisms that maintain the s quo logics of implausibility have undergirded settler colonialism apocalyptic form deconstruct the claims to verisimilitude a deep-time perspective transform the present speculative space catastrophe produces unevenly distributed damage revolutionary forms of justice insist on a truth that probability modeling cannot contain the future will be unimaginably different the apocalyptic mode allows narratives of danger to move beyond the paranoid logic of risk. In impossibilities of our deaths will come. But so too will a determination to let the world live Realism insists there must be no bad surprises comfort comes not from ameliorating the danger but constructing illusion A realist approach has consequences blotting out alt s

Buell offers his suggestion for the appropriate literary mode for life lived within a crisis that is both unceasing and inescapable: new voices, “if wise enough….will abandon apocalypse for a sadder realism that recognizes crisis as a place where people dwell This essay argues for the continuing importance of apocalyptic narrative forms in representations of risk to disrupt conservative realisms that maintain the s tatus quo state logics of implausibility have long undergirded settler colonialism in the United States apocalyptic form deconstruct the claims to verisimilitude that undergird state realism, transforming nuclear waste into a prophecy of the end of the United States rather than a means for imagining its continuation. a deep-time perspective into contemporary America, transform the present into a speculative space where catastrophe produces not only unevenly distributed damage but also revolutionary forms of social justice that insist on a truth that probability modeling cannot contain : that the future will be unimaginably different from the present, while the present, too, might yet be utterly different from the real that we think we know the apocalyptic mode in deep time allows narratives of harm and danger to move beyond the paranoid logic of risk. In the world of deep time The endless maybes of risk become certainties. The impossibilities of our own deaths and the deaths of everything else will come. But so too will other impossibilities the end of the colonial occupation of North America, perhaps, or a sudden human determination to let the world live For many critics the terror of a world of risk produces apocalypticism as a symptom and realism as a solution however, the realist commitment to describing the totality of the world’s relations produces its own set of epistemic anxieties threats can come to make thought itself look like a particularly advanced form of cultural paranoia. Realism becomes visible as itself a symptom of the paranoid mindset that the risk society tends to produce, a mindset that insists , that “ there must be no bad surprises ” comfort comes not from ameliorating the danger that produced the original discomfort, but rather from constructing a model of the world that can give an illusion of totality A realist approach to representing risk thus has real-world consequences in second modernity, “ blotting out any sense of the possibility of alt ernative way s of understanding or things to understand”

disrupt conservative realisms s quo implausibility transform speculative space unevenly distributed damage unimaginably different sudden human determination real-world consequences alt s

['If contemporary ecocriticism has a shared premise about environmental risk it is that genre is the key to both perceiving and, possibly, correcting ecological crisis. Frederick Buell’s 2003 From Apocalypse to Way of Life: Environmental Crisis in the American Century has established one of the most central oppositions of this paradigm. As his title suggests, Buell tells the story of a discourse that began in the apocalyptic mode in the 1960s and 70s, when discussions of “the immanent end of nature” most commonly took the form of “prophecy, revelation, climax, and extermination” before turning away from apocalypse when the prophesied ends failed to arrive (112, 78). Buell offers his suggestion for the appropriate literary mode for life lived within a crisis that is both unceasing and inescapable: new voices, “if wise enough….will abandon apocalypse for a sadder realism that looks closely at social and environmental changes in process and recognizes crisis as a place where people dwell” (202-3). In a world of threat, Buell demands a realism that might help us see risks more clearly and aid our survival. Buell’s argument has become a broadly held view in contemporary risk theory and ecocriticism, overlapping fields in the social sciences and humanities that address the foundational question of second modernity: “how do you live when you are at such risk?” (Woodward 2009, 205).1 Such an assertion, however, assumes both that realism is a neutral descriptive practice and that apocalypse is not something that is happening now in places that we might not see, or cannot hear. This essay argues for the continuing importance of apocalyptic narrative forms in representations of environmental risk to disrupt conservative realisms that maintain the status quo. Taking the ecological disaster of nuclear waste as my case study, I examine two fictional treatments of nuclear waste dumps that create different temporal structures within which the colonial history of the United States plays out. The first, a set of Department of Energy documents that use statistical modeling and fictional description to predict a set of realistic futures for the site of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico (1991), creates a present that is fully knowable and a future that is fully predictable. Such an approach, I suggest, perpetuates the state logics of implausibility that have long undergirded settler colonialism in the United States. In contrast, Leslie Marmon Silko’s contemporaneous novel Almanac of the Dead (1991) uses its apocalyptic form to deconstruct the claims to verisimilitude that undergird state realism, transforming nuclear waste into a prophecy of the end of the United States rather than a means for imagining its continuation. In Almanac of the Dead, the presence of nuclear waste introjects a deep-time perspective into contemporary America, transforming the present into a speculative space where environmental catastrophe produces not only unevenly distributed damage but also revolutionary forms of social justice that insist on a truth that probability modeling cannot contain: that the future will be unimaginably different from the present, while the present, too, might yet be utterly different from the real that we think we know. Nuclear waste is rarely treated in ecocriticism or risk theory, for several reasons: it is too manmade to be ecological; its catastrophes are ongoing, intentionally produced situations rather than sudden disasters; and it does not support the narrative that subtends ecocritical accounts of risk perception in which the nuclear threat gives rise to an awareness of other kinds of threat before reaching the end of its relevance at the end of the Cold War.2 In what follows, I argue that the failure of nuclear waste to fit into the critical frames created by ecocriticism and risk theory to date offers an opportunity to expand those frames and overcome some of their limitations, especially the impulse towards a paranoid, totalizing realism that Peter van Wyck (2005) has described as central to ecocriticism in the risk society. Nuclear waste has durational forms that dwarf the human. It therefore dwells less in the economy of risk as it is currently conceptualized and more in the blown-out realm of deep time. Inhabiting the temporal scale that has recently been christened the Anthropocene, the geological era defined by the impact of human activities on the world’s geology and climate, nuclear waste unsettles any attempt at realist description, unveiling the limits of human imagination at every turn.3 By analyzing risk society through a heuristic of nuclear waste, this essay offers a critique of nuclear colonialism and environmental racism. At the same time, it shows how the apocalyptic mode in deep time allows narratives of environmental harm and danger to move beyond the paranoid logic of risk. In the world of deep time, all that might come to pass will come to pass, sooner or later. The endless maybes of risk become certainties. The impossibilities of our own deaths and the deaths of everything else will come. But so too will other impossibilities: talking macaws and alien visitors; the end of the colonial occupation of North America, perhaps, or a sudden human determination to let the world live. The end of capitalism may yet become more thinkable than the end of the world. Just wait long enough. Stranger things will happen. Realism and Risk in the Longue Durée The nature of risk, as Ulrich Beck notes in his foundational Risk Society (1986, 72), is fundamentally anti-realist; in the risk society, “dangerous, hostile substances lie concealed behind the harmless façades. Everything must be viewed with a double gaze, and can only be correctly understood and judged through this doubling. The world of the visible must be investigated, relativized and evaluated with respect to a second reality, only existent in thought and yet concealed in the world.” The traumatic nature of living in a world of risk, exemplified in the canonical toxic-world novels White Noise (Don DeLillo, 1985) and Gain (Richard Powers, 1998), lies in the way that the real world is no longer accessible to perception.4 Risks become perceptible only when they are already no longer threats but events, a condition that makes risk itself appear in a fundamentally literary mode; as Susan Mizruchi (2010, 119) writes, “when improbable risks are actualized in catastrophe, the familiar becomes the uncanny.” What Mizruchi calls the uncanny, Laurence Buell (2001) describes as the gothic; in both cases, Beck’s description of a second, real-er world beneath the phenomenological one finds a strong descriptor and a place in literary history as critics connect risk fiction to more established genres that account for what we cannot perceive and cannot understand. No longer haunted by falling helmets or animate dolls, the risk novel tries instead to theorize the connections between tumors and the factory that closed down two generations ago, between what we know of bioaccumulation and what we feel when we look at a carrot. For many critics, as for F. Buell, the gothic terror of a world of risk produces apocalypticism as a symptom and realism as a solution. 5 Even when apocalypse is recognized as a potentially valuable tool for approaching risk, as in Ursula K. Heise’s insight that in a world of world-threatening danger “apocalyptic narrative….can appropriately be understood as a form of risk perception” (2008, 141), the potential benefit of apocalypse is as the most realistic genre for representing a scenario that is genuinely apocalyptic (as in the exponentially increasing flood of contemporary apocalypse novels depicting climate change, for example).6 As Peter van Wyck has argued, however, the realist commitment to describing the totality of the world’s relations produces its own set of epistemic anxieties in a world defined by risk: contemporary ecological threats can come to make ecological thought itself look like a particularly advanced form of cultural paranoia. I mean this in the sense that once we say that everything is connected in this fashion, we mean that everything is, if not already, then at least potentially integrated into a framework of understanding. And it isn’t. To make everything connected is to see the fissures and cracks rendered by ecological threats—whether the threats posed by wastes or the threats retroactively discovered through accidents— as a kind of recompense for a failure to have properly understood the connections. The real punishing the epistemic for its sins of omission. (ix) Realism, in van Wyck’s account, becomes visible as itself a symptom of the paranoid mindset that the risk society tends to produce, a mindset that insists, as Eve Sedgwick writes concurrently with van Wyck, that “there must be no bad surprises” (2003, 130). In such a mode, comfort comes not from ameliorating the danger that produced the original discomfort, but rather from constructing a model of the world that can give an illusion of totality (ibid. 133-6). A realist approach to representing risk thus has real-world consequences in second modernity, “blotting out any sense of the possibility of alternative ways of understanding or things to understand” (131). Such consequences can be seen nowhere more clearly than in the government experiment with realism that goes by the unglamorous name of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), where the realism is that of the settler colonial state and the alternative ways of understanding are those of the Native nations who are most vulnerable to the site’s dangers.7']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Kansas-Harris-Wilkus-Aff-9%20-%20ADA-Round4.docx

Kansas

HaWi

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kansas/HaWi/Kansas-Harris-Wilkus-Aff-9%2520-%2520ADA-Round4.docx

ad570a1763379fe45877230248f57da1a4d917a2ac1095c890a0e87f73914e69

2) DIFFERENT PROCESS---backlash was NOT because of broad interpretations, but because commissioners were needlessly adversarial and undermined comity. The CP uses an inclusive, participatory rulemaking process that solves.

Thomas B. Leary 9, Of Counsel, Hogan & Hartson, LLP, Washington, D.C., Federal Trade Commissioner 1999-2005, “A Suggestion for the Revival of Section 5,” FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/section-5-ftc-act-competition-statute/tleary.pdf

A major objection is the lesson of the 70s It is possible to use Section 5 in ways that take account of the 70s alarm was heightened because the Chairman view the private bar with suspicion refused traditional seat on the ABA a gesture keenly resented the a perception the Commission had been co-opted It is inconceivable the leadership in the future would make the same mistakes open dialogue between the Commission and private sector is important to appreciate the Commission and private bar are not adversaries the bar want agencies to be pro-active, efficient and successful agree on principles

A major objection to more extensive reliance on Section 5 is based on what is sometimes called “ the lesson of the 19 70s ” In the 1970s, proposals for an aggressive use of Section 5 by a activist Chairman stimulated a particularly harsh Congressional response It is possible , however, to make use of Section 5 in ways that take appropriate account of the “lesson of the 19 70s .” alarm was heightened because the Chairman appeared to view the private bar with suspicion . He refused to take a Chairman’s traditional seat on the ABA Antitrust Section’s Council a gesture keenly resented at the time And, the re were consequence s. There was a perception that the Commission had been co-opted by the counter-culture , was out of control It is inconceivable the leadership of the F T C in the foreseeable future would make the same mistakes the “lesson of the 1970s” has been taken to heart . An open dialogue between the Commission and the private sector is important to appreciate Although the Commission and members of the private bar may have an adversarial relationship in certain specific cases , they are not adversaries across the board . Most members of the private bar want the antitrust agencies to be pro-active, efficient and successful some of these sentiments are prompted by pure self-interest. But, both “sides” have a genuine belief that competition law is important , and there is remarkable agree ment on fundamental principles . Even lawyers employed on large corporate staffs feel that way Commission transparency is important not only because candor elicits reciprocal candor from people who really are friends of the agency a well informed private bar will also enforce the law

lesson of the 70s activist Chairman harsh Congressional response It is possible Section 5 in ways that take account of the 70s heightened Chairman view the private bar with suspicion traditional seat on the ABA Antitrust Section’s Council keenly resented the consequence co-opted by the counter-culture out of control inconceivable the leadership of the F T C foreseeable future make the same mistakes has been taken to heart dialogue private sector important specific cases not adversaries across the board want pro-active, efficient and successful genuine belief that competition law is important agree fundamental principles corporate staffs Commission transparency important well informed private bar also enforce the law

['Objections and Opportunities', 'A major objection to more extensive reliance on Section 5 is based on what is sometimes called “the lesson of the 1970s” by those Commission veterans who served at that time. In the 1970s, proposals for an aggressive use of Section 5 by a particularly activist Chairman, Michael Pertschuk, stimulated a particularly harsh Congressional response that almost destroyed the Commission. 26/ It is possible, however, to make use of Section 5 in ways that take appropriate account of the “lesson of the 1970s.” ', 'The 1970s were characterized not only by civil unrest over an unpopular war but also by the (hopefully) high-water mark of an intellectual movement that was profoundly skeptical about a market system driven by consumer sovereignty. This essentially paternalistic view, prominently associated with celebrities like John Galbraith and Ralph Nader, obviously had a strong influence on the leadership of the Federal Trade Commission at the time.', 'In addition, the Chairman appeared to claim an unprecedented span of authority. Since non-compliance with any financially burdensome regulation could confer a competitive advantage, he speculated that this non-compliance could potentially be attacked by the Commission as an unfair method of competition. 27/ He may have been just musing aloud but, given the overheated politics of the time, the private sector reacted with alarm.', 'This alarm was heightened because the Chairman appeared to view the private bar with suspicion. He refused to take a Chairman’s traditional seat on the ABA Antitrust Section’s Council -- a gesture of no practical importance because there were other ways to share opinion and information, but it was nevertheless keenly resented at the time. I remember. And, there were consequences.', 'There was a perception that the Commission had been co-opted by the counter-culture, was out of control, and was suspicious of the private sector. Members of Congress were made aware of these concerns. It is inconceivable that the leadership of the Federal Trade Commission today or in the foreseeable future would make the same mistakes. The fact that the Commission is hosting this Workshop is a good indication that the “lesson of the 1970s” has been taken to heart.', 'An open dialogue between the Commission and the private sector is particularly important. Because we have become so used to it in recent years, we may not appreciate how remarkable it is. Although the Commission and members of the private bar may have an adversarial relationship in certain specific cases, they are not adversaries across the board. ', 'Most members of the private bar want the antitrust agencies to be pro-active, efficient and successful overall. Of course, some of these sentiments are prompted by pure self-interest. But, both “sides” have a genuine belief that competition law is important, and there is remarkable agreement on fundamental principles. Even lawyers employed on large corporate staffs feel that way, which is not so surprising when you consider that their employers are customers as well as sellers.', 'Commission transparency is important not only because candor elicits reciprocal candor from people who really are friends of the agency. It is also important because the Commission is a very small agency, with a huge responsibility. It cannot be everywhere at once, and needs a well informed private bar that will also enforce the law. ']

[(10, 17)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-Deo-Fridman-Neg-Harvard-Doubles.docx

Northwestern

DeFr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Northwestern/DeFr/Northwestern-Deo-Fridman-Neg-Harvard-Doubles.docx

eba248de17f344b1c994237f9cb0374ebcca583da5f6907863142ab62c45e648

Our turn outweighs. Blips like COVID and Ukraine disprove their internal link, but ecosystemic recession will be unprecedented in human history.

Nicholas Stern et. al 22. IG Patel Professor of Economics and Government, Chairman of the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, Head of the India Observatory at the London School of Economics; Chair, Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy. Joseph Stiglitz: Professor, Economics, Columbia Business School and School of International and Public Affairs; Chief Economist, The Roosevelt Institute; PhD, Economics, MIT. Charlotte Taylor: Policy Analyst and Research Adviser, LSE Grantham Institute. “The economics of immense risk, urgent action and radical change: towards new approaches to the economics of climate change.” Journal of Economic Methodology, Vol. 29, Iss. 3. 2022. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1350178X.2022.2040740

climate change is unchartered our economy has never experienced in lifetime of homo sapiens anything like what we face It is analogous to prediction preceding financial crisis on a far bigger scale. especially because of large non-linearities with climate

climate change is unchartered territory our economy has never experienced in the lifetime of homo sapiens anything like what we are likely to face future dynamics are not well-described by stationary processes It is analogous to prediction preceding the global financial crisis extrapolations (forecasts) based on that data were wildly off the mark the problems are likely on a far bigger scale. These are especially important because of large non-linearities associated with climate

never experienced anything prediction preceding the global financial crisis far bigger scale. large non-linearities

['A central problem is that climate change is moving us into unchartered territory: we do not know how an increase in greenhouse gas concentrations will affect weather and how changes in climate will affect the economy, simply because our economy has never experienced in the lifetime of homo sapiens anything like what we are likely to face. We can extrapolate the future based on the past, but whether in these circumstances that makes sense is highly problematic. The underlying dynamics are not well-described by stationary processes (Milly et al., 2008). It is analogous to the problems of prediction in the years preceding the global financial crisis, when financial markets created new products which they claimed fundamentally changed the way the economy behaved; but the only data to forecast how the economy would behave was from an economy without these financial products. As it turned out, the extrapolations (forecasts) based on that data were wildly off the mark. In this case the problems are likely on a far bigger scale.', 'These concerns are especially important because of the large non-linearities associated with climate processes, which makes simple extrapolations from the limited climate change experienced thus far highly dubious.']

[(9, 24)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-BaCh-Aff-7---ndt-Round-7.docx

Dartmouth

BaCh

b3e4bac945889b34c6a6a06333e72b664470894a5ffcd98fbc56a692309b08e3

5. The aff worsens ambiguity by conflating delivery vehicles for nuclear and conventional warheads---adversaries don’t know about fiat and will always assume that we will just put nukes on the missile.

James M. Acton 13, senior associate in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment, “Silver Bullet? Asking the Right Questions about Conventional Prompt Global Strike,” 9/3/13, https://carnegieendowment.org/2013/09/03/silver-bullet-asking-right-questions-about-conventional-prompt-global-strike-pub-52778

unilateral steps that enable Russia or China to distinguish nuclear and CPGS these would be unlikely to mitigate warhead ambiguity and make it worse a adversary might believe the U S had placed nuc s on CPGS This may appear fanciful However, this has been raised by Chinese experts countries could never be confident there is not a nuc the Russians believed, despite our best efforts ground-based interceptors could be nuclear Fears that CPGS could be nuclear might be compounded because boosters for CPGS are retired nuclear delivery vehicles

CPGS supporters have emphasized unilateral steps that could enable Russia or China to distinguish between a nuclear missile and a CPGS weapon these steps would be unlikely to do much to mitigate warhead ambiguity and might actually make it worse and create new risks. a potential U.S. adversary might believe that the U S had actually placed nuc lear warhead s on a CPGS system. This fear may appear fanciful who understand that such a step could never be taken secretly However, this concern has been raised by Chinese experts other countries could never be confident that there is not a nuc lear warhead on a new U.S. system simply because the United States says so the Russians believed, despite our best efforts that ground-based interceptors in Poland could be fitted with nuclear weapons Fears that CPGS weapons could actually be nuclear might be compounded because the boosters being used for CPGS are retired nuclear weapon delivery vehicles

unilateral steps unlikely to do much might actually make it worse actually placed nuc s may appear fanciful this concern has been raised could never be confident simply because the United States says so despite our best efforts compounded retired nuclear weapon delivery vehicles

['Whether or not this conclusion is accepted, it seems likely that Congress will only fund the acquisition of a CPGS system if it can be persuaded that the risks of warhead ambiguity can be mitigated. In this regard, two conceptually different sets of mitigation techniques have been proposed: cooperative and unilateral. The former, which were emphasized by the NRC and would require U.S.-Russian (or Sino-U.S.) cooperation to implement, include inspections, monitoring, and data exchanges.23 By contrast, the Obama administration and most other CPGS supporters have generally emphasized American unilateral steps that, they argue, could enable Russia or China to distinguish between a nuclear missile and a CPGS weapon. These measures include', '• locating land-based CPGS systems away from ICBM fields', '• not using the boosters from existing ICBMs and SLBMs for CPGS weapons', '• adopting hypersonic gliders that fly in a non-ballistic trajectory', '• employing a terminal guidance system for CPGS weapons that could enable them to maneuver, unlike current ICBMs and SLBMs24', 'For three reasons these steps by themselves—that is, without associated cooperative measures— would be unlikely to do much to mitigate warhead ambiguity and might actually make it worse and create new risks.', 'First, without cooperative measures, a potential U.S. adversary might believe that the United States had actually placed nuclear warheads on a CPGS system. This fear may appear fanciful to U.S. analysts who understand that, because of the need to obtain funding from Congress and satisfy U.S. safety and reliability requirements for nuclear weapons, such a step could never be taken secretly. However, this concern has been raised, particularly by Chinese experts.25', 'Moreover, the NRC recognized that “other countries could never be confident that there is not a nuclear warhead on a new U.S. system simply because the United States says so.”26 In fact, in 2009, the then secretary of defense, Robert Gates, said in describing Russian objections to the Bush administration’s missile defense plans that “the Russians believed, despite our best efforts to dissuade them, that the ground-based interceptors in Poland could be fitted with nuclear weapons and become an offensive weapon.”27', 'Fears that CPGS weapons could actually be armed with nuclear warheads might be compounded because a number of the boosters being used for CPGS flight tests are retired nuclear weapon delivery vehicles—a point not lost on some Russian experts.28 While the United States might develop a new booster for any deployed CPGS weapons, it might also decide, on the grounds of cost, to continue using these boosters.29', '']

[(9, 17)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-DiGr-Neg-Texas-Round-2.docx

Kentucky

DiGr

60dce5914be22317d765f3bba35a1e9b2e9baec092af9bfd0428148c47d1d6a6

Russia is a revanchist power seeking a sphere of influence in Europe. Threatening first use is key to deter Putin from attacking NATO.

Bowen 22, PhD, postdoctoral fellow in the Kissinger Center at Johns Hopkins SAIS. (Tyler Bowen, 4-20-2022, "Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine and NATO’s Crisis of Nuclear Credibility," War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/russias-invasion-of-ukraine-and-natos-crisis-of-nuclear-credibility/)

Ukraine revealed Putin’s ambitions: to reconstitute Russian empire Putin feels Russia needs to revise the balance of power as a product of Putin’s illiberal philosophy and desire to develop a sphere of influence the extended nuclear deterrent will form the backbone of European security Russia has the strength to expand the war into NATO territory Russia could leverage long-range strike to attack convoys Russia could hold territorial gains and free forces for an attack on NATO NATO’s defense of the Baltics hinges on the threat of responding with its nuclear arsenal NATO should embrace brinkmanship high risk could generate restraint To break out of a stalemated war Putin could target supplies in transit Putin could attack a Baltic State to take territory that is majority Russian-speaking Russian forces could overwhelm forces assigned to a defense of the Baltics The U S can stress they reserve the ability to use nuc s first The current arsenal should be sufficient Threatening early use in a NATO-Russia conflict may be the best way to protect Europe from Putin’s recklessness . Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine must awaken the West Russian wars in Georgia , Ukraine , and Syria paramilitary campaigns assassinations violation of peace treaties arms agreements and norms Russia foments ethnic strife and uses military exercises for intimidation and control Joint Chiefs Chairman use the word existential to describe the threat Russia poses Putin has demonstrated his determination to use Russian power to fulfill revanchist ambitions Russia is the most menacing threat to the U.S.-led order With co-opting of ports Russia is positioned to intimidate international shipping Russia targets Poland and the Baltics with cyber turned Belarus into a puppet state influences Georgia through occupation and repeatedly violated Baltic airspace Russia’s imperial designs extend beyond Ukraine and beyond Europe In the Mid East Russia cultivates paramilitary groups and seeks permanent bases In the Arctic , Russia has built bases and conducts Russia attempts to prop up dictators in the Western Hemisphere Russia’s Wagner Group operates in Africa

Americans and Europeans did not have to think about the dynamics of large-scale warfare between great powers Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has shattered that sense of security Ukraine has revealed the scope of Vladimir Putin’s grand ambitions: He wishes to reconstitute as the old Russian empire in Eastern Europe The delegitimization of Ukraine has thrown into doubt the legitimacy of former Soviet republics Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia and Finland and Poland Putin regards the collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest catastrophe of the century and laments that it caused tens of millions to live beyond the fringes of Russian territory Putin feels that to be secure, Russia needs to revise the current balance of power in Europe. This ambition is consistent with scholarship that explains Russian foreign policy as a product of Putin’s illiberal , conservative philosophy and Putin’s desire to develop a Russian sphere of influence the American extended nuclear deterrent and NATO’s tactical nuc lear weapon s will form the backbone of European security . If, as appears likely, Russia gets bogged down in a long drawn-out fight in Ukraine, it may have an incentive to expand the conflict by attacking an Eastern European NATO country the U S should embrac brinkmanship tactics This would entail a America’s and nuclear posture such that it threatens to use its nuc lear weapon s earlier The Russian military is performing poorly in the initial phase of the war in Ukraine, but this should not be taken as ev idence that NATO countries in Eastern Europe have adequate capabilities for conventional defense these countries may fare worse against a Russian invasion than Ukraine has done, as their militaries are smaller than the Ukrainian military the Russian operation in Ukraine appears to have been informed by wildly optimistic assumptions that the Ukrainians lacked the will to put up a fight and that resistance would crumble Russia still has the conventional strength to expand the current war into NATO territory Russia could leverage its strength in conventional long-range strike to attack convoys of supplies going into Ukraine Russia could try to hold territorial gains in eastern and southern Ukraine instead of fighting offensive missions A new “defensive” focus in Ukraine could free more Russian forces for an attack on an Eastern European NATO country Russia still has the capability to conduct strikes against NATO allies NATO’s defense of the Baltics hinges on the threat of responding to a Russian attack with its nuclear arsenal NATO should embrace brinkmanship by arranging it so that the U S might have to blow up the world, we would not have to maximum brinkmanship generates high risk for nuclear war in the event of a conflict, but that high risk could generate restraint on the part of the adversary. The U S used brinkmanship in the 1958–59 Berlin Crisis by threatening escalation to nuclear use very early Based on current developments, it seems all too likely the result will be an aggravated Russia that is stuck in a grinding war in Ukraine At the same time, Russia is unlikely to accept defeat Fighting for this objective is likely to be costly and raises the probability that this war will be a protracted conflict. To break out of a stalemated war Putin could try to target supplies in transit while they are still in an Eastern European NATO country Putin could also conduct a limited attack against a Baltic State to take territory that is majority Russian-speaking . That could bolster his claim of defending Russian speakers abroad A strike on supplies going to Ukraine would be difficult to defend against, and Russian forces could overwhelm the NATO forces assigned to a n initial defense of the Baltics brinkmanship could prove effective The U S and NATO can stress that they reserve the ability to use nuc s first The current arsenal of around 130 tactical nuclear weapons should be sufficient for that task . Putin has disabused Western leaders of their naïveté and in the process shown himself to be aggressive and risk-acceptant in the pursuit of ambitious goals Threatening early nuclear use in a NATO-Russia conflict may be the best way to protect Europe from Putin’s recklessness . revanchist power existential Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine must awaken the West from its post-Cold War slumber For years now, Russia’s been building its capabilities, violating its commitments, and probing our weaknesses Russian wars in Georgia , Ukraine , and Syria paramilitary and disinfo rmation campaigns in Europe , the Americas, and the Mid East cyber op s to divide the U S assassinations imprisonment and violation of peace treaties arms agreements and international norms Russia foments ethnic strife and as these variables help Russia increase its own power at the expense of the West. It uses menacing military exercises for intimidation and control . Russia’s Europe strategy creates fear and dependency to reap geopolitical rewards the West downplayed Russia’s post-Cold War resurgence Russia’s and China’s growing entente reflects their decision to back each other insofar as the actions of each weaken the U S and advance their expansionist goals Concerning agreements between Russia and Iran include coordinated efforts to challenge U.S. space-based systems that play a critical role in intelligence-gathering and the monitoring of WMD programs and military activity. top U.S. military leaders have in recent years identified Russia as America’s greatest threat because of Russia’s willingness to use force and determination to bring the West down the world order is under the biggest attack since World War II and Russia is the “principal threat.” Joint Chiefs Chairman use the word “ existential ” to describe the threat Russia now poses Russia has made great advances in hybrid, conventional, and nuclear capabilities, has fielded hypersonic weapon s , and has installed nuclear-capable missiles in Kaliningrad Russia is a master at using cyberwar, subterfuge, and sabotage to amplify the menace of its military power Putin periodically suggests the use of nuc s to defend Russia from purported NATO aggression It would be foolhardy to underestimate the Russian threat, for Russia is on the warpath, and Russia has a great military capability and sophisticated tools of hybrid warfare Putin has time and again demonstrated his determination to use Russian power to fulfill his revanchist ambitions Russia is the most menacing threat to the U.S.-led order With aggressive naval and air exercises and the co-opting of ports , Russia is positioned to intimidate international shipping and aircraft. we must not forget Putin’s broader ambitions Russia aggressively targets Poland and the Baltics with propaganda and cyber op s has turned Belarus into a puppet state influences Georgia through the occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and installed “peacekeeping” forces to exploit tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan Russia has pressured Bosnia, Kosovo, Moldova, Macedonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Kazakhstan, and Montenegro politically and militarily and has repeatedly violated Baltic airspace with Russian warplanes Russia’s imperial designs clearly already extend way beyond Ukraine and beyond Europe In the Mid East Russia pursues destabilizing arms sales , cultivates paramilitary groups and sectarian conflict, and seeks permanent military bases . In the Arctic , Russia has built military bases and conducts numerous patrol and training operations there are Russia ’s increasingly overt attempts to prop up anti-American dictators in the Western Hemisphere , especially Maduro in Venezuela, Ortega in Nicaragua, and Castro and Diaz-Canel in Cuba Russia’s Wagner Group operates between 3,000 and 5,000 mercenaries in Africa

shattered that sense of security revealed reconstitute Russian empire thrown into doubt former Soviet republics Finland Poland greatest catastrophe of the century laments needs to revise the current balance of power consistent illiberal conservative philosophy Russian sphere of influence extended nuclear deterrent tactical nuc s backbone expand the conflict attacking an Eastern European NATO country embrac brinkmanship tactics posture that threatens to use its nuc s earlier should not be taken as ev wildly optimistic assumptions still has the conventional strength expand the current war NATO territory conventional long-range strike convoys of supplies hold and free Russian forces attack on an Eastern European NATO country still has strikes against NATO allies hinges responding to a Russian attack nuclear arsenal NATO should embrace brinkmanship maximum brinkmanship high risk generate restraint used escalation early aggravated Russia grinding war in Ukraine stalemated war target supplies in transit limited attack Baltic State overwhelm brinkmanship could prove effective stress that they reserve the ability to use nuc s first current arsenal sufficient for that task aggressive risk-acceptant ambitious goals early nuclear use best way protect Europe from Putin’s recklessness war of aggression awaken the West Georgia Ukraine Syria paramilitary disinfo campaigns Europe cyber op s divide assassinations imprisonment peace treaties arms agreements international norms ethnic strife and military exercises intimidation control greatest threat Joint Chiefs Chairman use existential Russia poses great advances hypersonic s use of nuc s foolhardy time and again demonstrated revanchist ambitions most menacing threat to the U.S.-led order co-opting of ports broader ambitions Poland Baltics cyber op s puppet state Georgia occupation of Abkhazia South Ossetia exploit tensions repeatedly violated Baltic airspace Russian warplanes imperial designs beyond Ukraine beyond Europe Mid East arms sales paramilitary groups permanent military bases Arctic Russia overt attempts anti-American dictators Western Hemisphere Wagner Group Africa

['', 'For decades, Americans and Europeans did not have to think about the dynamics of large-scale warfare between great powers or the possibility of nuclear escalation. Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has shattered that sense of security.', 'What’s more, the invasion of Ukraine, and the rhetoric surrounding it, has revealed the scope of Vladimir Putin’s grand ambitions: He wishes to reconstitute as much of the old Russian/Soviet empire in Eastern Europe as he can. The delegitimization of Ukraine has thrown into doubt the legitimacy of former Soviet republics Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia and even neighboring states such as Finland and Poland. Putin regards the collapse of the Soviet Union as the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century” and laments that it caused “tens of millions of our fellow citizens and countrymen to live beyond the fringes of Russian territory.” Putin feels that in order to be secure, Russia needs to revise the current balance of power in Europe. This ambition is consistent with scholarship that explains Russian foreign policy as a product of Putin’s illiberal, conservative philosophy and Putin’s desire to develop a Russian sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space.', 'In the long run, the best way for NATO to deter him is to have enough conventional forces in Eastern Europe to deny Russia the ability to take the territory of countries such as Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland. But NATO does not have the capability to do this at the moment, and it will take time to develop it. In the intervening “window of vulnerability,” the American extended nuclear deterrent and NATO’s tactical nuclear weapons will form the backbone of European security.', 'The best way to ensure the credibility of this deterrent depends, in turn, on the outcome of the current war. If, as appears likely, Russia gets bogged down in a long drawn-out fight in Ukraine, it may have an incentive to expand the conflict by attacking an Eastern European NATO country. To deter this, the United States and NATO should increase the credibility of their nuclear deterrent by embracing a moderate form of the brinkmanship tactics articulated by an earlier generation of nuclear strategists. This would entail altering America’s and NATO’s nuclear posture such that it threatens to use its nuclear weapons earlier in a conflict. This solution is not ideal and should only be regarded as a short-term fix, but European security today requires NATO to accept a degree of brinkmanship.', 'Risk to the Baltics', 'The goal for the United States and its NATO allies should be to protect Eastern European countries such as Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland from a Russian attack. Eastern European NATO countries, especially the Baltic states, do not have the capabilities to do this on their own. The Russian military is performing poorly in the initial phase of the war in Ukraine, but this should not be taken as evidence that NATO countries in Eastern Europe have adequate capabilities for conventional defense. Indeed, these countries may fare worse against a Russian invasion than Ukraine has done, as their militaries are smaller than the Ukrainian military. Plus, the Russian operation in Ukraine appears to have been informed by wildly optimistic assumptions that the Ukrainians lacked the will to put up a fight and that resistance would crumble in short order. This could be why the first phase of the Russian invasion used only a fraction of the 190,000-strong force it amassed around Ukraine. The United States and NATO should expect that a Russian attack on a NATO country would have different assumptions and go differently, perhaps with Russia using many more of its forces in the opening phase of the campaign.', 'Many Russian forces are bogged down in Ukraine, but Russia still has the conventional strength to expand the current war into NATO territory. For example, Russia could leverage its strength in conventional long-range strike to attack convoys of supplies going into Ukraine. Indeed, this is something that Russia has recently threatened to do. Furthermore, Russia could try to hold territorial gains in eastern and southern Ukraine instead of fighting offensive missions to take more territory. A new “defensive” focus in Ukraine could free more Russian forces for an attack on an Eastern European NATO country. In short, Russia still has the capability to conduct strikes against NATO allies and to turn the focus of its combat power on them should it choose to do so.', 'After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, European NATO allies are now likely to increase investments in their armed forces that could make a successful conventional defense possible in the future. Germany’s decision to double its defense budget is telling in this regard. NATO’s increase in troops deployed to Eastern Europe is also a positive recent development. But these developments will take time to bear fruit.', 'Currently, NATO’s defense of the Baltics hinges on the threat of responding to a Russian attack with its nuclear arsenal. But Putin’s recent nuclear saber-rattling suggests he may not find this threat credible and believes Washington will back down rather than risk nuclear war. Indeed, even during the Cold War, it was difficult enough to convince the Soviet Union that the United States would trade Berlin for Boston. Expanding the alliance has only heightened this challenge. How can the United States make Putin believe that it is willing to trade Vilnius for New York?', 'The Art of Brinkmanship', 'In response to this challenge, the United States and NATO should embrace the paradox of brinkmanship, which involves trying to prevent war by making it hard to contain once it starts. In the words of Thomas Schelling, “by arranging it so that we [the United States] might have to blow up the world, we would not have to.” This involves making “threats that leave something to chance,” or threats that, once enacted, would “initiate a process that may quickly get out of hand.”', 'States use tactical nuclear weapons to bid up the shared risk of nuclear escalation in the event of a war. Because tactical nuclear weapons are less destructive than “strategic” nuclear weapons, they are seen as more usable and blur the firebreak between conventional and nuclear war. At the same time, the use of tactical nuclear weapons generates a higher risk of general nuclear conflict than does the use of conventional forces, meaning that threats to use tactical nuclear weapons early in a war increase the shared risk of disaster. This is why states who face conventional inferiority tend to invest more heavily in these weapons.', 'Brinkmanship tactics also involve a trade-off between deterrence and the risk of escalation. A state could employ a “minimal brinkmanship” strategy that generates low risk of nuclear use, and if the state lacks the conventional strength to deny the adversary its objectives in a war, this could incentivize the adversary to attack. On the other hand, a state could enact a “maximum brinkmanship” strategy that generates high risk for nuclear war in the event of a conflict, but that high risk could generate restraint on the part of the adversary. The United States used a form of maximum brinkmanship in the 1958–59 Berlin Crisis by threatening escalation to nuclear use very early in a war over Berlin. As one of Daniel Ellsberg’s colleagues described that strategy to him: “We send in a series of increasingly larger probes. If they’re all stopped, we fire a [nuclear] warning shot. If that doesn’t work, we blow up the world.”', 'The degree of brinkmanship in a state’s defense strategy lies on a scale from the minimum to the maximum end. Where a state’s strategy should fall on the scale depends on the adversary’s intentions and capabilities. Against an adversary with conventional inferiority, it makes little sense to run a higher risk of nuclear war. For an adversary with aggressive motivations, the risks of maximum brinkmanship may be justified. However, if an adversary is not planning on using force, a maximum brinkmanship strategy could make them feel insecure and prompt them to launch the attack that the state was attempting to deter.', 'Brinkmanship in the Baltics', 'What kind of adversary does NATO face in Moscow? The answer depends on the outcome of the current conflict. Based on current developments, it seems all too likely the result will be an aggravated Russia that is stuck in a grinding war in Ukraine. After six weeks of fighting, the Russian advance in Ukraine has stalled. This slow progress has prompted Russian forces to resort to horrific indiscriminate violence against civilians in these areas. At this moment, a quick victory toppling the Ukrainian government and leading to an emboldened Russia looks unlikely.', 'At the same time, Russia is unlikely to accept defeat in Ukraine anytime soon. Reports came out on March 29 that Ukraine and Russia were making progress on peace talks, but Russia’s lead negotiator Vladimir Medinsky stressed that there was “still a long way to go” before Russia would agree to a ceasefire. Instead, Russia appears to have changed its war aims from taking Kyiv to consolidating control over eastern Ukraine. Fighting for this objective is likely to be costly and raises the probability that this war will be a protracted conflict. Western sanctions against Russia will remain in place during the war, and Western countries will continue to provide assistance to Ukrainian armed forces. That assistance will flow through Eastern European member states.', 'To break out of a stalemated war and achieve victory, Putin could try to target supplies in transit while they are still in an Eastern European NATO country, especially Poland. Putin could also conduct a limited attack against a Baltic State in order to take territory that is majority Russian-speaking. That could bolster his claim of defending Russian speakers abroad. He may be incentivized to do this if the economic sanctions prove too harsh on the Russian economy, and he sees no way out of the crisis except by expanding the war. That pathway to escalation is similar to Imperial Japan’s rationale for attacking Pearl Harbor in 1941.', 'This scenario poses a serious test for deterrence for NATO. A strike on supplies going to Ukraine would be difficult to defend against, and Russian forces could overwhelm the NATO forces assigned to an initial defense of the Baltics. The best response to the threat of these scenarios is to prevent them from happening in the first place. To do that, a modest degree of brinkmanship could prove effective. Here, the United States and NATO should alter their nuclear posture and declaratory policy to allow for asymmetric escalation.', 'The alliance already has B61 gravity bombs deployed across five countries in Europe and deliverable by dual-capable aircraft. The United States and NATO can enhance their impact by changing the Nuclear Posture Review and the Deterrence and Defence Posture Review to stress that they reserve the ability to use nuclear weapons first. In addition, the aircraft units assigned to carry NATO’s nuclear weapons can hold more exercises to emphasize the operational readiness of those forces. If an attack by Russia looks imminent, the United States, in consultation with NATO allies, can put those forces on alert. The goal of these steps by the United States and NATO would be to emphasize to Russia the nuclear implications of an attack on a NATO country without taking steps that could cross a Russian “red line” and provoke it.', 'What is important here is not making sure that NATO has more tactical nuclear warheads than Russia or that they are able to stop a Russian advance on their own. NATO’s nuclear weapons would primarily have a political effect: threatening a breach of the nuclear threshold. The current arsenal of around 130 tactical nuclear weapons should be sufficient for that task.', 'Such an asymmetric escalation strategy is not ideal and carries great risks, but it is a product of past decisions to expand NATO without first developing real plans for the defense of new members. NATO expansion came at a time when policymakers assumed that the risk of war in Europe was low and thus did not have to think about the dynamics of great power war or escalation. Putin has disabused Western leaders of their naïveté and in the process shown himself to be aggressive and risk-acceptant in the pursuit of ambitious goals. Threatening early nuclear use in a NATO-Russia conflict may be the best way to protect Europe from Putin’s recklessness.', 'Russia is a revanchist power with ambitions beyond Ukraine. Irresolution is existential.', 'Pierce 23, PhD @ U Chicago, author of books and articles on American presidents, American foreign policy, and American society (Anne, 3-10-2023, "The magnitude of the Russian threat," Washington Examiner, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/politics/the-magnitude-of-the-russian-threat)', '', 'Russia’s cruel war of aggression upon Ukraine must finally awaken the West from its post-Cold War slumber. This is merciless Putin’s war, waged against an innocent sovereign nation, but there will always be aggressors, and it is up to democracies to stop them before they are so emboldened and powerful that they threaten freedom itself. As U.K. Foreign Secretary Liz Truss put it in a recent speech, “For years now, Russia’s been building its capabilities, violating its commitments, and probing our weaknesses. … The free world must draw a line under a decade of drift.” While it is refreshing to hear a Western leader call out the West’s inertia, the sad reality is that the Russian threat is greater than Truss implies, and our “drift” in response to it should have ended long ago. So should our complacency toward the global march of authoritarianism spearheaded by the growing axis of Russia, China, and Iran.', 'The Russian threat grew while democracies weighed and meted out minimalist costs. Penalties for Russian wars in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria; paramilitary and disinformation campaigns in Europe, the Americas, and the Middle East; cyber operations to divide and destabilize the United States; assassinations, poisonings, imprisonment, and torture of those who dare to speak out; and violation of peace treaties, arms agreements, and international norms have been halting and incremental. Russia exacerbates and foments ethnic strife, corruption, and even antisemitism insofar as these variables help Russia increase its own power at the expense of the West. It uses menacing military exercises and energy blackmail for intimidation and control. Russia’s multipronged Europe strategy creates fear and dependency, and exploits chaos and division, in order to reap geopolitical rewards.', 'Rather than extract better behavior from a weakened Russia by leveraging America’s and NATO’s military, economic, and political predominance, the West downplayed Russia’s post-Cold War resurgence and responded inadequately and hesitatingly to Russia’s illicit acts, massive rearmament, and cold-blooded aggression. Thus, Russia regained much of the ground it lost when the Soviet Union collapsed.', 'Since Russia and China both define America as the adversary whose post-World War II order they are determined to replace, anti-democratic victories of the one serve the anti-democratic designs of the other. Russia’s and China’s growing entente reflects their decision to back each other insofar as the actions of each weaken the United States and advance their expansionist goals. China and Russia have cooperated in places as far afield as Afghanistan, Venezuela, and the Arctic. Testimony to the lethal potential of Russia and China combined, the Rand Corporation reported that U.S. forces were defeated by Russian and Chinese forces in European and Asian hot spots in the research organization’s war games.', 'Moreover, growing military and strategic partnerships between Russia, China, and Iran enhance the power of all three. These countries provide cover for the foreign policy misdeeds of each other and present, in the words of one analyst, an “anti-Western global front.” Russia and China use alignment with Iran to impair U.S. and Western influence in the Middle East. Russia and Iran joined forces to save the brutal Assad regime, thereby gaining new footholds in the region and exposing the West’s moral and strategic inertia. Russia, China, and Iran benefit from weapons and technology transfers, joint military exercises, and mutually beneficial breaches of sanctions. With its plum role as intermediary between Iran and the United States in nuclear negotiations, Russia has produced wins for Iran — wins that bode ill for the human rights of those targeted by Iranian proxies and the security of Iran’s sworn enemies. Concerning agreements between Russia and Iran include coordinated efforts to challenge U.S. space-based systems that play a critical role in intelligence-gathering and the monitoring of WMD programs and military activity.', 'China and Iran have demonstrated overall support for Russia’s war on Ukraine and no doubt expect Russia to return the favor. China has condoned Vladimir Putin’s inflammatory and opportunistic propaganda regarding NATO and has blocked U.N. Security Council action on Ukraine and other Russia-related matters. With designs on Taiwan and Asia that mirror Russia’s designs on Ukraine and Europe, China, of course, watches Russia’s audacious war with keen interest.', 'Although rarely reported, many top U.S. military leaders have in recent years identified Russia as America’s greatest threat. This, they say, is not only because of Russia’s dramatically growing military might and geopolitical influence; it is also because of Russia’s willingness to use force and determination to bring the West down. Former Secretary of Defense James Mattis said the world order is “under the biggest attack since World War II” and that Russia is the “principal threat.” Former Joint Chiefs Chairman Joseph Dunford, Air Force Gen. Paul Selva, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command John Hyten, and current Lt. Gen. Scott Berrier have all used the word “existential” to describe the kind of threat Russia now poses. April 2019 changes to U.S. Strategic Command’s “CONPLAN 8010” emphasized renewed great-power competition and Russia’s overtly hostile posture toward Europe and the United States.', 'Russia has made great advances in hybrid, conventional, and nuclear capabilities, has fielded hypersonic weapons, and has installed nuclear-capable missiles in Kaliningrad. Russia’s deployed nuclear arsenal now exceeds that of the United States, and its militarization of occupied regions of the Black Sea includes advanced S-400 air defense systems. Russia is a master at using cyberwar, subterfuge, and sabotage to amplify the menace of its military power. The 2021 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community concluded, “Russia will remain a top cyber threat as it refines and employs its espionage, influence, and attack capabilities. Russia continues to target critical infrastructure, including underwater cables and industrial control systems, in the United States and in allied and partner countries.” Incredibly, Putin periodically suggests the possible limited use of nuclear weapons to defend Russia from purported NATO aggression.', 'It is true that Xi’s China has, in the last few years, taken a more overtly hostile stance against the United States and that China’s astounding military growth, pursuit of global domination, geopolitical expansionism, and extreme human rights abuses intensified during that time. In the year 2022, it is reasonable to prioritize the China threat. But re-pivoting to China was a mistake, for Russia and China both threaten the security of the free world and the stability of the democratic project. It would be foolhardy to underestimate the Russian threat, for Russia is on the warpath, and Russia has a great military capability and sophisticated tools of hybrid warfare. Perhaps the most trenchant fact is that Putin has time and again demonstrated his determination to use Russian power to fulfill his revanchist ambitions. Right now, Russia is the most actively menacing, effectual threat to the U.S.-led order.', 'Ranking member of the House Intelligence Committee Mike Turner asserts that, with the predominance Russia has achieved in Kaliningrad, Syria, and Crimea, Russia has created an “area of access and denial even greater than it had with the Warsaw Pact in the Soviet days.” With aggressive naval and air exercises and the co-opting of ports, Russia is positioned to intimidate international shipping and aircraft. Ukraine recently issued a formal protest against Russia’s partial blockade of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, which makes navigation in both seas “virtually impossible.” Noting how little the West has done to forestall this eventuality, Peter Dickinson of the Atlantic Council observes, “Moscow’s latest Black Sea gambit comes following years of escalating Russian interference targeting Ukrainian merchant shipping in the nearby Sea of Azov. Ever since the completion of the Crimean Bridge connecting the Russian-occupied Ukrainian peninsula with the Russian mainland, the Kremlin has introduced an expanding range of restrictions on Ukrainian and international vessels using ports along southeastern Ukraine’s Azov Sea coastline.”', 'With Russia’s malign military campaign against Ukraine finally receiving due attention, we must not forget Putin’s broader ambitions. Russia aggressively targets Poland and the Baltics with propaganda and cyber operations, has turned Belarus into a puppet state', '', '', ' and front in the war against Ukraine, influences Georgia through the occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, uses energy blackmail against Moldova and other countries, and installed “peacekeeping” forces to exploit tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, ultimately ending the conflict on Putin’s terms. Russia has pressured Bosnia, Kosovo, Moldova, Macedonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Kazakhstan, and Montenegro both politically and militarily and has repeatedly violated Baltic airspace with Russian warplanes. Putin seeks to subvert the West’s pro-democracy agenda whenever there is an opening — and there is often an opening.', 'Russia’s imperial designs clearly already extend way beyond Ukraine, and way beyond Europe. China and Russia wasted no time capitalizing on the United States’s precipitous and ill-begotten Afghanistan withdrawal. In the Middle East, Russia pursues destabilizing arms sales, cultivates paramilitary groups and sectarian conflict, and seeks permanent military bases. In the Arctic, Russia has built military bases and conducts numerous patrol and training operations. Then there are Russia’s increasingly overt attempts, often in tandem with China, to prop up anti-American dictators in the Western Hemisphere, especially Maduro in Venezuela, Ortega in Nicaragua, and Castro and Diaz-Canel in Cuba. Russia’s shadowy paramilitary “Wagner Group” operates between 3,000 and 5,000 mercenaries in Africa and about 800 to 1,000 in Mali.']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Kansas-MaPa-Neg-1---Northwestern-Round-2.docx

Kansas

MaPa

eb070660ac0e288f241b4c50496df63d143b11f136b72fcc64ab69047380837c

4. AI will ignore and contravene legal mandates

Gervais 21, professor of law, focuses on international intellectual property law and the law of Artificial Intelligence (Daniel, “Towards an effective transnational regulation of AI,” AI and Society, )

enforcing human laws on AI would be useless machine’s “refusal” would not be enforceable by imposing monetary penalty the idea ethical principles can be encoded misconceives law Programmers face constraints AI compliance overlooks direct conflict with machine’s program harm may not be something the machine can grasp it seems impossible to rule out in advance disastrous ways machine could achieve a specified objective

limits of the legal order enforcing human laws on or against AI machines will not be easy take a simple example, if a court were to issue an injunction to “order” a machine to do, or stop doing, something, that order would be useless The machine’s “refusal” to obey an order would not be enforceable by imposing a monetary penalty (on the machine) or a prison sentence the idea that relevant ethical principles can be encoded in a manner interpretable by an AI system misconceives the nature of ethics and law Programmers face significant constraints as coding the exact scope of the order may not be obvious an AI machine compliance with human law overlooks what may well be a direct conflict with the machine’s program and objective an AI machine programmed to achieve a specific set of objectives “will certainly understand that it will fail in its objective if it is switched off before completing its mission The harm the machine can cause may not be something the machine can actually grasp Think of “how content-selection algorithms on social media wrought havoc on society in the name of maximizing ad revenues it seems impossible for mere humans to anticipate and rule out in advance all the disastrous ways the machine could choose to achieve a specified objective

limits of the legal order useless misconceives direct conflict it seems impossible rule out in advance

['The limits of the legal order', 'As the previous Parts explained, enforcing human laws on or against AI machines will not be easy. To take a simple example, if a court were to issue an injunction to “order” a machine to do, or stop doing, something, that order would be useless in se.Footnote32 The machine’s “refusal” to obey an order would not be enforceable by imposing a monetary penalty (on the machine) or a prison sentence. The order’s force, if any, would depend entirely on humans responsible for the machine’s behavior and whether they are willing—and perhaps more importantly able—to obey the order.Footnote33 Someone “will have to translate that injunction, written in legalese, into code the robot can understand” (Lemley and Casey 2019, 1370). Yet, as Chesterman rightly notes, ‘the idea that relevant ethical principles can be reduced to a few dozen words, or that those words might be encoded in a manner interpretable by an AI system misconceives the nature of ethics and law. (Chesterman 2021, at 174). Programmers face significant constraints as coding the exact scope of the order may not be obvious for reasons alluded to above. The order may naturally involve the use of a kill switch to stop and then perhaps reprogram the machine.', 'Then, as noted in the previous Part, for an AI machine compliance with human law overlooks what may well be a direct conflict with the machine’s program and objective. As explained in the discussion of kill switches in the previous Part, an AI machine programmed to achieve a specific set of objectives “will certainly understand that it will fail in its objective if it is switched off before completing its mission” (Russell 2019, 138). The harm the machine can cause may not be something the machine can actually grasp. Think of “how content-selection algorithms on social media wrought havoc on society in the name of maximizing ad revenues” (ibid., 140). Consequently, it seems “very hard, and perhaps impossible, for mere humans to anticipate and rule out in advance all the disastrous ways the machine could choose to achieve a specified objective” (ibid).', '']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Kansas-PaMa-Neg-Gonzaga-Jesuit-Debates-Round-3.docx

Kansas

PaMa

4a65a877f70e1900a60259b6235d1bc104aff737a328bac53bb36ae0cb84e3bd

The plan is uncharacteristic for a conservative court system—guarantees it’s perceived as an ideological shift away from leniency for big business.

Crane 21—(Professor of Law, University of Michigan). Daniel A. Crane. 2021. “Antitrust Antitextualism”. 96 Notre Dame Law Rev. 1205. . Accessed 9/12/21.

it would take abundant motivation from pure principle for the average Federalist Society judge to restore the original meaning of section 1’s absolutist prohibition Progressive judges looking for leverage to unwind perceived laxity face Pandora’s Box . To insist would risk considerable backlash after the long reign of moderating common law and the system’s reliance on courts to correct Congress’s overstatements .

it would take abundant motivation from pure principle for the average Federalist Society judge to restore the original meaning of the Clayton much less mount a cataclysmic return to section 1’s absolutist prohibition on agreements restraining trade. Progressive judges looking for leverage to unwind the perceived laxity might invoke statutory text or original meaning as a foil, but they too face Pandora’s Box . To insist on taking at face value Congress’s words would risk considerable backlash after the long reign of moderating common law and the system’s reliance on the courts to correct Congress’s textual overstatements . it should count in favor of the system’s normative legitimacy that it has worked for 130 years without anyone complaining too much

abundant motivation from pure principle average Federalist Society judge original meaning Clayton cataclysmic return section 1’s absolutist prohibition leverage perceived laxity statutory text original meaning Pandora’s Box taking at face value Congress’s words considerable backlash long reign of moderating common law correct Congress’s textual overstatements normative legitimacy 130 years

['', 'Finally, if the system lacks democratic legitimacy, there is the question of how to begin unwinding it—and whether anyone has the incentive to try. Most committed textualists are also committed economic conservatives;264 it would take abundant motivation from pure principle for the average Federalist Society judge to restore the original meaning of the Robinson-Patman Act or the Clayton Act’s incipiency presumption, much less mount a cataclysmic return to section 1’s absolutist prohibition on agreements restraining trade. Progressive judges, perhaps looking for leverage to unwind the perceived laxity of Chicago School antitrust, might invoke statutory text or original meaning as a foil, but they too face Pandora’s Box. To insist on taking at face value Congress’s words and ostensible purposes—words and purposes to which Congress itself might not have been fully committed—would risk considerable backlash after the long reign of moderating common law and the system’s reliance on the courts to correct Congress’s textual overstatements. So maybe it should count in favor of the system’s normative legitimacy that it has worked for 130 years without anyone complaining too much.', '', '', '', '']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Davis-Rudd-Neg-UMW-Round1.docx

Minnesota

DaRu

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/DaRu/Minnesota-Davis-Rudd-Neg-UMW-Round1.docx

5482fcb264b850ba30c93386fffdb16afd8769ab1d521a388e90c320c91b8844

Permutation Do Both – regulated capitalism best. Plan challenges market concetration and consumer welfare standard. Blanket critique totalizes.

Clive BARNETT Faculty of the Social Sciences @ Open University (UK) ‘5 [“The Consolations of ‘Neoliberalism’” Geoforum 36 (1) p. Science Direct]

stop thinking of “neoliberalism” as a “hegemonic” project privatization, market liberalization followed an ironic pattern they have been triggered by citizens’ movements arguing from the left against the rigidities of statist social policy and welfare in the name of greater autonomy theories of “neoliberalism” have difficulty accounting for new forms that emerged in tandem with neoliberal hegemony environmental politics and sustainability “neoliberalism” sets up a simplistic image of the world divided between hegemony and subversion clinging to this image makes it more difficult to acknowledge the possibility of positive political action that does not conform to a romanticized picture of rebellion

There is no such thing as neoliberalism The blind-spot in theories of neoliberalism comes with trying to account for how top-down initiatives ‘take’ in everyday situations the best thing to do is to stop thinking of “neoliberalism” as a coherent “hegemonic” project altogether For all its apparent critical force the vocabulary of “neoliberalism provides a double consolation for leftist academics it supplies us with plentiful opportunities for unveiling the real workings of hegemonic ideologies and invites us to align our own professional roles with the activities of various actors “out there”, who are always framed as engaging in resistance , between an overly economistic derivation of political economy and an overly statist rendition of governmentality, stories about “neoliberalism” manage to reduce the understanding of social relations to a residual effect of hegemonic projects and/or governmental programmes of rule Stories about “neoliberalism” pay little attention to the pro-active role of socio-cultural processes in provoking changes in modes of policy, these ongoing changes in the terms of public-policy debate involve a combination of different factors that add up to a much more dispersed populist reorientation in policy, politics, and culture what we have come to recognise as “hegemonic neoliberalism” is a muddled set of ad hoc, opportunistic accommodations to these unstable dynamics of social change Processes of privatization, market liberalization , and de-regulation have often followed an ironic pattern in so far as they have been triggered by citizens’ movements arguing from the left of the political spectrum against the rigidities of statist forms of social policy and welfare provision in the name of greater autonomy , equality, and participation The political re-alignments of the last three or four decades cannot therefore be adequately understood in terms of a straightforward shift from the left to the right, from values of collectivism to values of individualism Recent theories of “neoliberalism” have retreated from the appreciation of the long-term rhythms of socio-cultural change Instead, they favour elite-focused analyses of state bureaucracies, policy networks theories of “neoliberalism” have great difficulty accounting for , or recognizing new forms that have emerged in tandem with the apparent ascendancy of “ neoliberal hegemony ”: environmental politics and the politics of sustainability an ethics of assistance and global solidarity the identity politics of sexuality . Instead, the trouble-free amalgamation of Foucault’s ideas into the Marxist narrative of “neoliberalism” sets up a simplistic image of the world divided between the forces of hegemony and the spirits of subversion clinging to this image only makes it all the more difficult to acknowledge the possibility of positive political action that does not conform to a romanticized picture of rebellion The radical academic discourse of “neoliberalism” frames the relationship between collective action and individualism simplistically as an opposition between the good and the bad In confirming a narrow account of liberalism, understood primarily as an economic doctrine of free markets and individual choice, there is a peculiar convergence between the radical academic left and the right-wing interpretation of liberal thought the discourse of “neoliberalism” reiterates a longer problem for radical academic theory of being unable to account for its own normative priorities in a compelling way by denigrating the value of individualism as just an ideological ploy by the right, the pejorative vocabulary of “neoliberalism” invites us to take solace in an image of collective decision-making as a practically and normatively unproblematic procedure The turn to an overly systematized theory of governmentality, derived from Foucault, only compounds the theoretical limitations of economistic conceptualizations of “neoliberalism

There is no such thing as neoliberalism the best thing to do is to stop thinking of “neoliberalism” as a coherent “hegemonic” project altogether always framed as engaging in resistance privatization, market liberalization ironic pattern been triggered by citizens’ movements arguing from the left of the political spectrum against the rigidities of statist forms of social policy environmental politics and the politics of sustainability clinging to this image only makes it all the more difficult to acknowledge the possibility of positive political action romanticized picture of rebellion

['3. There is no such thing as neoliberalism! The blind-spot in theories of neoliberalism—whether neo-Marxist and Foucauldian—comes with trying to account for how top-down initiatives ‘take’ in everyday situations. So perhaps the best thing to do is to stop thinking of “neoliberalism” as a coherent “hegemonic” project altogether. For all its apparent critical force, the vocabulary of “neoliberalism” and “neoliberalization” in fact provides a double consolation for leftist academics: it supplies us with plentiful opportunities for unveiling the real workings of hegemonic ideologies in a characteristic gesture of revelation; and in so doing, it invites us to align our own professional roles with the activities of various actors “out there”, who are always framed as engaging in resistance or contestation. The conceptualization of “neoliberalism” as a “hegemonic” project does not need refining by adding a splash of Foucault. Perhaps we should try to do without the concept of “neoliberalism” altogether, because it might actually compound rather than aid in the task of figuring out how the world works and how it changes. One reason for this is that, between an overly economistic derivation of political economy and an overly statist rendition of governmentality, stories about “neoliberalism” manage to reduce the understanding of social relations to a residual effect of hegemonic projects and/or governmental programmes of rule (see Clarke, 2004a). Stories about “neoliberalism” pay little attention to the pro-active role of socio-cultural processes in provoking changes in modes of governance, policy, and regulation. Consider the example of the restructuring of public services such as health care, education, and criminal justice in the UK over the last two or three decades. This can easily be thought of in terms of a “hegemonic” project of “neoliberalization”, and certainly one dimension of this process has been a form of anti-statism that has rhetorically contrasted market provision against the rigidities of the state. But in fact these ongoing changes in the terms of public-policy debate involve a combination of different factors that add up to a much more dispersed populist reorientation in policy, politics, and culture. These factors include changing consumer expectations, involving shifts in expectations towards public entitlements which follow from the generalization of consumerism; the decline of deference, involving shifts in conventions and hierarchies of taste, trust, access, and expertise; and the refusals of the subordinated, referring to the emergence of anti-paternalist attitudes found in, for example, women’s health movements or anti-psychiatry movements. They include also the development of the politics of difference, involving the emergence of discourses of institutional discrimination based on gender, sexuality, race, and disability. This has disrupted the ways in which welfare agencies think about inequality, helping to generate the emergence of contested inequalities, in which policies aimed at addressing inequalities of class and income develop an ever more expansive dynamic of expectation that public services should address other kinds of inequality as well (see Clarke, 2004b J. Clark, Dissolving the public realm? The logics and limits of neo-liberalism, Journal of Social Policy 33 (2004), pp. 27–48.Clarke, 2004b). None of these populist tendencies is simply an expression of a singular “hegemonic” project of “neoliberalization”. They are effects of much longer rhythms of socio-cultural change that emanate from the bottom-up. It seems just as plausible to suppose that what we have come to recognise as “hegemonic neoliberalism” is a muddled set of ad hoc, opportunistic accommodations to these unstable dynamics of social change as it is to think of it as the outcome of highly coherent political-ideological projects. Processes of privatization, market liberalization, and de-regulation have often followed an ironic pattern in so far as they have been triggered by citizens’ movements arguing from the left of the political spectrum against the rigidities of statist forms of social policy and welfare provision in the name of greater autonomy, equality, and participation (e.g. Horwitz, 1989). The political re-alignments of the last three or four decades cannot therefore be adequately understood in terms of a straightforward shift from the left to the right, from values of collectivism to values of individualism, or as a re-imposition of class power. The emergence and generalization of this populist ethos has much longer, deeper, and wider roots than those ascribed to “hegemonic neoliberalism”. And it also points towards the extent to which easily the most widely resonant political rationality in the world today is not right-wing market liberalism at all, but is, rather, the polyvalent discourse of “democracy” (see Barnett and Low, 2004). Recent theories of “neoliberalism” have retreated from the appreciation of the long-term rhythms of socio-cultural change, which Stuart Hall once developed in his influential account of Thatcherism as a variant of authoritarian populism. Instead, they favour elite-focused analyses of state bureaucracies, policy networks, and the like. One consequence of the residualization of the social is that theories of “neoliberalism” have great difficulty accounting for, or indeed even in recognizing, new forms of “individualized collective-action” (Marchetti, 2003) that have emerged in tandem with the apparent ascendancy of “neoliberal hegemony”: environmental politics and the politics of sustainability; new forms of consumer activism oriented by an ethics of assistance and global solidarity; the identity politics of sexuality related to demands for changes in modes of health care provision, and so on (see Norris, 2002). All of these might be thought of as variants of what we might want to call bottom-up governmentality. This refers to the notion that non-state and non-corporate actors are also engaged in trying to govern various fields of activity, both by acting on the conduct and contexts of ordinary everyday life, but also by acting on the conduct of state and corporate actors as well. Rose (1999, pp. 281–284) hints at the outlines of such an analysis, at the very end of his paradigmatic account of governmentality, but investigation of this phenomenon is poorly developed at present. Instead, the trouble-free amalgamation of Foucault’s ideas into the Marxist narrative of “neoliberalism” sets up a simplistic image of the world divided between the forces of hegemony and the spirits of subversion (see Sedgwick, 2003, pp. 11–12). And clinging to this image only makes it all the more difficult to acknowledge the possibility of positive political action that does not conform to a romanticized picture of rebellion, contestation, or protest against domination (see Touraine, 2001). Theories of “neoliberalism” are unable to recognize the emergence of new and innovative forms of individualized collective action because their critical imagination turns on a simple evaluative opposition between individualism and collectivism, the private and the public. The radical academic discourse of “neoliberalism” frames the relationship between collective action and individualism simplistically as an opposition between the good and the bad. In confirming a narrow account of liberalism, understood primarily as an economic doctrine of free markets and individual choice, there is a peculiar convergence between the radical academic left and the right-wing interpretation of liberal thought exemplified by Hayekian conservatism. By obliterating the political origins of modern liberalism—understood as answering the problem of how to live freely in societies divided by interminable conflicts of value, interest, and faith—the discourse of “neoliberalism” reiterates a longer problem for radical academic theory of being unable to account for its own normative priorities in a compelling way. And by denigrating the value of individualism as just an ideological ploy by the right, the pejorative vocabulary of “neoliberalism” invites us to take solace in an image of collective decision-making as a practically and normatively unproblematic procedure. The recurrent problem for theories of “neoliberalism” and “neoliberalization” is their two-dimensional view of both political power and of geographical space. They can only account for the relationship between top-down initiatives and bottom-up developments by recourse to the language of centres, peripheries, diffusion, and contingent realizations; and by displacing the conceptualization of social relations with a flurry of implied subject-effects. The turn to an overly systematized theory of governmentality, derived from Foucault, only compounds the theoretical limitations of economistic conceptualizations of “neoliberalism”. The task for social theory today remains a quite classical one, namely to try to specify “the recurrent causal processes that govern the intersections between abstract, centrally promoted plans and social life on the small scale” (Tilly, 2003, p. 345). Neither neoliberalism-as-hegemony nor neoliberalism-as-governmentality is really able to help in this task, not least because both invest in a deeply embedded picture of subject-formation as a process of “getting-at” ordinary people in order to make them believe in things against their best interests. With respect to the problem of accounting for how “hegemonic” projects of “neoliberalism” win wider consensual legitimacy, Foucault’s ideas on governmentality seem to promise an account of how people come to acquire what Ivison (1997) calls the “freedom to be formed and normed”. Over time, Foucault’s own work moved steadily away from an emphasis on the forming-and-norming end of this formulation towards an emphasis on the freedom end. This shift was itself a reflection of the realization that the circularities of poststructuralist theories of subjectivity can only be broken by developing an account of the active receptivity of people to being directed. But, in the last instance, neither the story of neoliberalism-as-hegemony or of neoliberalism-as-governmentality can account for the forms of receptivity, pro-activity, and generativity that might help to explain how the rhythms of the everyday are able to produce effects on macro-scale processes, and vice versa. So, rather than finding convenient synergies between what are already closely related theoretical traditions, perhaps it is better to keep open those tiresome debates about the degree of coherence between them, at the same time as trying to broaden the horizons of our theoretical curiosity a little more widely.']

[(6, 13), (68, 70)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-Laurent-Vazquez-Torres%20Aff-1-%20Northwestern-Round3.docx

Dartmouth

LaVa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Dartmouth/LaVa/Dartmouth-Laurent-Vazquez-Torres%2520Aff-1-%2520Northwestern-Round3.docx

72a791acc2c01d0b2c72dff2f5b5b51ba37294d68e50af0e8c2bd3982f2568f1

Increase means to expand the existence of an already existing policy

Buckley ’6 [Jeremiah S, Joseph M. Kolar; November 13; partners at Buckley Kolar LLP; Westlaw, Brief of Amici Curiae for “Mortgage Insurance Companies of America and Consumer Mortgage Coalition,” WL 3309503]

the definition offered by the Ninth Circuit compels the conclusion . Because “increase” means “to make greater ,” there must be an existing to be compared , to determine whether an “increase” occurred under canons of construction “increase” should be construed to apply to increases of an existing policy

t the definition offered by the Ninth Circuit compels the opposite conclusion . Because “increase” means “to make something greater ,” there must necessarily have be en an existing to be compared , to determine whether an “increase” occurred . Congress chose “increase.” That definitional choice must be respected, not ignored Each presupposes an already-existing policy , and under usual canons of statutory construction the term “increase” also should be construed to apply to increases of an already- existing policy

the definition the opposite conclusion something greater an existing be compared occurred chose respected, not ignored presupposes an already-existing policy usual canons of statutory construction construed increases an already- existing policy

["First, the court said that the ordinary meaning of the word “increase” is “to make something greater,” which it believed should not “be limited to cases in which a company raises the rate that an individual has previously been charged.” 435 F.3d at 1091. Yet the definition offered by the Ninth Circuit compels the opposite conclusion. Because “increase” means “to make something greater,” there must necessarily have been an existing premium, to which Edo's actual premium may be compared, to determine whether an *26 “increase” occurred. Congress could have provided that “adverse action” in the insurance context means charging an amount greater than the optimal premium, but instead chose to define adverse action in terms of an “increase.” That definitional choice must be respected, not ignored. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392-93 n.10 (1979) (“[a] definition which declares what a term ‘means' … excludes any meaning that is not stated”).", 'Next, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that because the Insurance Prong includes the words “existing or applied for,” Congress intended that an “increase in any charge” for insurance must “apply to all insurance transactions - from an initial policy of insurance to a renewal of a long-held policy.” 435 F.3d at 1091. This interpretation reads the words “existing or applied for” in isolation. Other types of adverse action described in the Insurance Prong apply only to situations where a consumer had an existing policy of insurance, such as a “cancellation,” “reduction,” or “change” in insurance. Each of these forms of adverse action presupposes an already-existing policy, and under usual canons of statutory construction the term “increase” also should be construed to apply to increases of an already-existing policy. See Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (“a phrase gathers meaning from the words around it”) (citation omitted).', '']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Agrawal-Hsu-Aff-indiana-Round2.docx

Michigan

AgHs

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/AgHs/Michigan-Agrawal-Hsu-Aff-indiana-Round2.docx

dbde4817a68f67c75ec05e3ba8a92e384a933bfd5d148c932115c7cf564f8d87

Data is the crux of effective AI, BUT allies won’t share it.

Erik Lin-Greenberg 20, PhD, Postdoctoral Fellow, Perry World House, University of Pennsylvania, "Allies and Artificial Intelligence: Obstacles to Operations and Decision-Making," Texas National Security Review, Vol. 3, Issue 2, Spring 2020, pg. 64-65.

AI requires data to enhance accuracy or effectiveness sharing has posed a significant challenge hard to get the right data to the right place resides in thousands of repositories and lacks standard format Firms must unlock face political and technical barriers close allies be hesitant to share sensitive data reveal sources and methods compromise operations or strain relations technical obstacles as non-standardized formats reside on different networks alliances — with greater actors and data sources encounter greater obstacles

AI requires massive amounts of data Shared data might be needed to enhance the accuracy of AI-enabled systems or to increase effectiveness of multinational operations the U.S. military has described data as a strategic asset yet sharing data — even within the U.S. military — has posed a significant challenge data “has stymied the [military] services when they dive into AI they realize how hard it is to get the right data to the right place , get it cleaned up, and train algorithms on it data resides in thousands of different repositories and lacks standard ized format ting significant amounts of data collected by weapons and sensor systems are considered proprietary by contractors Firms must unlock this data before it can be analyzed or fed into other systems states face political and technical barriers to sharing security sector information even the close st allies may be hesitant to share sensitive data that undergirds military AI systems States fear sharing sensitive data might reveal intelligence sources and methods which could compromise ongoing operations or strain relations hips States worry that shared info could be used for purposes other than initially intended or in ways that are at odds with the sharing state’s interests states impose restrictions on info sharing There are technical obstacles to data sharing as the i c stores information in non-standardized formats on multiple systems, so too do national security institutions in other allied states the same type of data might reside on hundreds of different networks and in different formats making it difficult to share data or to develop interoperable systems expect alliances — with their greater number of institutional actors and data sources — to encounter greater obstacles to data sharing

massive amounts needed accuracy effectiveness strategic asset sharing within significant challenge stymied how hard right thousands of different standard ized proprietary unlock political technical close st allies hesitant sharing reveal compromise strain shared info other at odds restrictions info sharing technical obstacles i c non-standardized formats national hundreds of different networks different formats difficult greater greater obstacles

['As the number of states that employ military AI applications grows, the ability of allies to operate collectively will depend, in part, on the sharing of data that fuels AI systems. AI requires massive amounts of data to train and feed algorithms and models. To identify a surface-to-air missile site, for instance, an AI image classifier must learn to differentiate missile sites from other facilities by studying images of known missile sites. The more data used to train these systems, the more accurate the system will be.66 Once fielded, AI-enabled systems like the image classifier must continue to be fed imagery from reconnaissance aircraft, satellites, or other assets in a format that allows for target identification. Shared data might be needed to enhance the accuracy of AI-enabled systems or to increase the effectiveness of multinational operations. For example, some member states may be better positioned than others to gather data on a shared rival, increasing the amount of data available to AI systems.67', 'Because of its central role in AI development and operations, the U.S. military has described data as a “strategic asset,” yet sharing data — even within the U.S. military — has posed a significant challenge.68 Lt. Gen. Jack Shanahan, founding director of the Department of Defense’s Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, lamented that data “has stymied most of the [military] services when they dive into AI.” Specifically, “they realize how hard it is to get the right data to the right place, get it cleaned up, and train algorithms on it.”69 There are two primary factors that underlie these challenges. First, data resides in thousands of different repositories and often lacks standardized formatting. Video from the U.S. military’s fleet of reconnaissance aircraft, for instance, is stored on multiple separate networks and in different data formats. Second, significant amounts of data collected by weapons and sensor systems are considered proprietary by the contractors that design and maintain the equipment. Firms must first release or “unlock” this data before it can be analyzed or fed into other systems.70', 'Although shared data is needed to develop AI technologies that can integrate with allied equipment, states face both political and technical barriers to sharing security sector information. From a political standpoint, even the closest allies may be hesitant to share the sensitive data that undergirds military AI systems. States fear that sharing sensitive data might reveal intelligence sources and methods, the revelation of which could compromise ongoing operations or strain political relationships. During the Vietnam War, for example, the United States was hesitant to share intelligence with its ally South Vietnam. Officials feared that communist sympathizers in the ranks of South Vietnam’s military and intelligence services would pass information to North Vietnam and the Vietcong. They were also concerned that intelligence might highlight that the United States was planning operations that did not align with South Vietnam’s government priorities.71 States also worry that shared information could be used for purposes other than initially intended or in ways that are at odds with the sharing state’s interests. Turkey, for instance, may have used intelligence shared as part of counter-Islamic State operations to instead target Kurdish forces in northern Syria.72', 'To minimize these perceived risks, states often impose restrictions on information sharing. One of the most common control measures is sharing only finished intelligence — products such as briefings or reports derived from a variety of different intelligence sources.73 These products provide assessments, but generally omit technical data — like details about the information source — that could reveal intelligence-gathering procedures and methods. Although data sharing is a type of intelligence sharing, developing and operating AI-enabled systems may require the exchange of more complete raw data in far larger quantities than traditional intelligence sharing. Raw data, which includes imagery files and signals intercepts, can include metadata such as spectral signatures of imagery or characteristics of electronic emissions that can be used to feed AI systems.74 Since this information can expose precise capabilities and shortcomings of a state’s intelligence systems, decision-makers may be hesitant to share it — especially in the large quantities needed to develop and run many AI-enabled systems.', 'There are also technical obstacles to data sharing. Just as the U.S. intelligence community and military stores information in non-standardized formats on multiple systems, so too do national security institutions in other allied states. Across an alliance, the same type of data might reside on hundreds of different networks and in different formats, making it difficult to share data or to develop interoperable systems. To use data from other alliance partners, data must first be located, transferred out of a state’s classified computer network, and reformatted into a standardized, usable form. Given that the U.S. military has faced significant data management challenges in its own AI development, we should expect alliances — with their greater number of institutional actors and data sources — to encounter even greater obstacles to data sharing.']

[(5, 21)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-DaSt-Neg-Hoosier-Invitational-Tournament-2023-Round-6.docx

Kentucky

DaSt

a67249e77650829ea1ac7d5690ea2678a66e31e03ee56f92dcca9b8eee14e01f

Tons of thumpers.

Freddy Gray 11/6, Deputy Editor of The Spectator, “Superbad: Joe Biden’s plummeting presidency,” The Spectator, 11/6/21, https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/superbad-joe-bidens-plummeting-presidency

his presidency is a catalogue of crises . lost governorship of Virginia first test result looks damning . Biden decided to invest his own p c intervention only made a bad situation worse . election became a ‘nationalised’ battle the picture for Biden is extremely grim . Biden’s polling tanking nationwide e . no president has fallen faster . supply-chain crisis is causing bottlenecks Inflation is biting harder and institutions are panicking .

Joe been in office for less than a year and his presidency is already a catalogue of crises . His party lost the governorship of Virginia , the first big test of the political temperature in the Biden era. the result looks damning . Biden decided to invest his own p c in the race. Biden’s intervention only made a bad situation worse . Virginia election thus became a ‘nationalised’ battle the picture for Biden is extremely grim . Biden’s polling has been tanking nationwide e . His approval rating has fallen steadily since he took office to 43 per cent Biden’s seems only to go down. And no postwar president has fallen faster . number of Americans who think the country is on the ‘wrong track’ is 71 per cent. Republicans hold an 18-point advantage over their rivals when it comes to ‘dealing with the economy’. highest recorded gap since 1991 supply-chain crisis is causing bottlenecks across America and the world. Inflation is biting harder and institutions are panicking . The Fed is expected to ‘ taper’

catalogue of crises political temperature damning his own p c bad situation worse ‘nationalised’ battle the picture for Biden is extremely grim Biden’s polling tanking nationwide e no postwar president has fallen faster supply-chain crisis Inflation institutions are panicking taper’

['Poor Joe. He has a lot on his addled mind. He’s been in office for less than a year and his presidency is already a catalogue of crises. On Tuesday, as the President stood on the COP stage in Glasgow, impotently lecturing China and Russia about their absence, another disaster was happening back home. His Democratic party lost the governorship of Virginia, an election widely seen as the first big test of the political temperature in the Biden era. Virginia is increasingly thought of as Democratic territory. This time last year, Biden beat Donald Trump by ten points in the state — so the result looks damning.', 'Last month, as the polls tightened, Biden decided to invest his own political capital in the race. He joined the Democratic candidate Terry McAuliffe on the campaign trail and tried to brand the Republican challenger, Glenn Youngkin, as a Trumpkin wolf in sheep’s clothing — ‘extremism… can come in a smile and a fleece vest,’ he said.', 'Biden’s intervention only made a bad situation for the Democrats worse. The fleece-wearing Youngkin was clearly not an extremist. He successfully disassociated himself from red-raw Trumpism. He also picked a culture-war fight and won. He turned education, and the Democrats’ apparent eagerness to brainwash children with critical race theory in schools, into a rallying cause. His opponent moronically said that teachers, not parents, should decide what children learn. Showing even less nous, the National School Boards Association then demanded that protesting parents should be investigated for ‘domestic terrorism’. The Virginia election thus became a ‘nationalised’ battle between American families and Biden’s hyper-progressivist elite. The families won.', 'It’s silly to read too much into the Virginia result, even if the Democrats also underperformed in other races. Looking ahead to the 2022 midterm elections and beyond, however, the picture for Biden and the Democrats is extremely grim.', 'America is a lot bigger than Virginia. Yet Biden’s polling has been tanking nationwide', 'e. His job approval rating has fallen fairly steadily since he took office, from 55 per cent in January to 43 per cent today. He isn’t quite as unpopular as his predecessor at the same stage in his presidency, but Trump’s popularity bounced off a low base throughout. Biden’s seems so far only to go down. And no postwar president has fallen faster.', 'The number of Americans who think their country is on the ‘wrong track’ is 71 per cent. The young are giving up on Biden: 43 per cent of 18- to 24-year-olds approve of his job performance, a drop of 20 points since June. Perhaps most alarmingly of all for Democrats, the latest NBC poll found that Republicans now hold an 18-point advantage over their rivals when it comes to ‘dealing with the economy’. That is the highest recorded gap since 1991, when the survey started asking the question.', 'Americans think a lot about money and are understandably worried about what Biden is doing to the financial universe. He came into power promising to ‘restore the soul’ of their nation through preposterous amounts of government spending. What could go wrong?', 'Various trillion dollar bills barrelled into Congress. Americans didn’t mind at first. People like receiving large stimulus cheques. Media sycophants hailed Biden’s Build Back Better agenda as the 21st-century answer to Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal. But Biden was conspicuously vague about how the government would pay for it all — aside from his insistence that the two million Americans who earn more than $400,000 a year might have to cough up. Now Build Back Better is Collapsing Very Quickly as political and fiscal realities catch up with the executive branch. A supply-chain crisis is causing bottlenecks across America and the world. Inflation is biting harder in America than in Britain, and institutions are panicking. The Federal Reserve is this week expected to ‘taper’ its enormous stimulatory bond-buying programme. The Biden administration hopes that once its $1.75 trillion infrastructure bill gets through Congress, the public mood will shift in their favour again. But spend, spend, spend is not always the most sensible political strategy. The Democrats have been squabbling over the bill and the Republicans have done a good job of presenting themselves as the voice of economic sanity.', '']

[(7, 16)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-Barrett-Dal-Pra%20Aff-Wake-Round3.docx

Kentucky

BaDa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kentucky/BaDa/Kentucky-Barrett-Dal-Pra%2520Aff-Wake-Round3.docx

f86bffede314d68c23f3b6b4fcd7ae651137876983554ba7fc358d4069aace4f

Statistical analysis agrees

Dr. Thomas Bernauer 18, Professor of Political Science at ETH Zurich and Director of ETH’s Institute of Science, Technology and Policy (ISTP)., 9-10-2018, "Dispelling The Water War Myth," Diplomatic Courier, https://www.diplomaticourier.com/dispelling-the-water-war-myth/

Statistical analyses show water scarcity is not relevant for conflict research groups examined scale of conflict and coop interactions around water adhere to normal distribution conflicts fought violently are extremely rare . No wars were observed dating back to the 40s conflicts in the form of verbal disputes are common. More common are coop

Cooperation rather than violent conflict Statistical analyses of international and civil wars show that water scarcity is not a relevant variable for predicting this extreme form of conflict . Several research groups , including my own, have also examined the scale of conflict and coop eration over water resources on an international and national . Studies such as these analyze a vast number of worldwide media reports The single most important conclusion is that social and political interactions around water resources adhere to a kind of normal distribution . Water conflicts that are fought out violently are extremely rare . No international or domestic water wars were observed in the available data dating back to the 19 40s water conflicts in the form of verbal disputes are relatively common. More common , however, are interactions of a coop erative nature. In other words, water scarcity more often leads to cooperation than to conflict

is not a relevant variable for predicting this extreme form of conflict coop adhere to a kind of normal distribution extremely rare 40s in the form of verbal disputes coop In other words, water scarcity more often leads to cooperation than to conflict

['Cooperation rather than violent conflict Research on this subject has contributed significantly to bringing such assertions back to reality. Statistical analyses of international and civil wars show that water scarcity is not a relevant variable for predicting this extreme form of conflict. Several research groups, including my own, have also examined the scale of conflict and cooperation over water resources on an international and national level. Studies such as these analyze a vast number of worldwide media reports. The single most important conclusion is that social and political interactions around water resources adhere to a kind of normal distribution. Water conflicts that are fought out violently are extremely rare. No international or domestic water wars were observed in the available data dating back to the 1940s. On the other hand, water conflicts in the form of verbal disputes are relatively common. More common, however, are interactions of a cooperative nature. In other words, water scarcity more often leads to cooperation than to conflict.']

[(11, 23)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-AgRu-Neg-Texas-Open-Round-5.docx

Northwestern

AgRu

4e2c03de778fca31ce3b20cb366851ee4eb525e85a4fcdfe999c517c04a20bf5

Extinction outweighs

Baum and Barrett 17 (Seth Baum, executive director of GCRI with a PhD from Penn State and is a Research Affiliate of the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk at the University of Cambridge and completed a post-doctoral fellowship with the Center for Research on Environmental Decisions at Columbia University and was a Fellow of the Emerging Leaders in Biosecurity program of the Center for Health Security at Johns Hopkins University, Anthony Barrett, oversees GCRI’s research activities with a PhD from Carnegie Mellon University and was a postdoctoral research associate at the National Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE) at the University of Southern California and a Fellow in the RAND Stanton Nuclear Security Fellows Program, 10-2-2017, "Global Catastrophes: The Most Extreme Risks," Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, pages 174-184 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3046668, accessed 9-26-2021)

some catastrophes are more important than others nuclear winter loss would be the loss of all future generations 500 trillion lives may be an underestimate Barring catastrophe, Earth will remain habitable for one billion more years risk-equals-probability-times-magnitude society should try 500 trillion times harder to prevent a global catastrophe than to save a person even tiny GCR reductions merit significant effort the strongest arguments are that all human lives should be valued equally This suggests high value for reducing GCR

a global catastrophe would be catastrophic for a significant portion of the globe Minimum thresholds have been set around ten thousand to ten million deaths or $10 billion to $10 trillion in damages or death of one quarter of the population Others emphasized long-term declines in the trajectory of civilization some catastrophes are vastly more important than others Without nuclear winter, a global nuclear war might kill several hundred million people. This is obviously a major catastrophe, but humanity would presumably carry on. However, with nuclear winter humanity could go extinct loss would be the loss of all future generations 500 trillion lives , assuming humanity would continue for ten million more years Sagan’s number may even be an underestimate Barring major global catastrophe, Earth will remain habitable for about one billion more years the multiverse will remain habitable for a lot longer than that should our descendants gain the capacity to migrate there risk-equals-probability-times-magnitude reducing the probability of global catastrophe by a mere one-in-500-trillion chance is of the same significance as saving one human life society should try 500 trillion times harder to prevent a global catastrophe than it should to save a person ’s life society should make extremely large investment in GCR reduction, at the expense of virtually all other objectives as long as something along the lines of the standard risk equals-probability-times-magnitude framework is being used, then even tiny GCR reductions merit significant effort This point holds especially strongly for risks of catastrophes that would cause permanent harm to global human civilization , if each of us only cares about our immediate selves, then global catastrophes may not be especially important the strongest arguments are for the widely held position that all human lives should be valued equally This in turn suggests a very high value for reducing GCR , or a high degree of priority for GCR reduction efforts

Minimum thresholds the loss of all future generations risk-equals-probability-times-magnitude society should try 500 trillion times harder to prevent a global catastrophe than it should to save a person ’s life all human lives should be valued equally

['**edited for language; GCR = global catastrophic risk', '', '2. What Is GCR And Why Is It Important?', 'Taken literally, a global catastrophe can be any event that is in some way catastrophic across the globe. This suggests a rather low threshold for what counts as a global catastrophe. An event causing just one death on each continent (say, from a jet-setting assassin) could rate as a global catastrophe, because surely these deaths would be catastrophic for the deceased and their loved ones. However, in common usage, a global catastrophe would be catastrophic for a significant portion of the globe. Minimum thresholds have variously been set around ten thousand to ten million deaths or $10 billion to $10 trillion in damages (Bostrom and Ćirković 2008), or death of one quarter of the human population (Atkinson 1999; Hempsell 2004). Others have emphasized catastrophes that cause long-term declines in the trajectory of human civilization (Beckstead 2013), that human civilization does not recover from (Maher and Baum 2013), that drastically reduce humanity’s potential for future achievements (Bostrom 2002, using the term “existential risk”), or that result in human extinction (Matheny 2007; Posner 2004). A common theme across all these treatments of GCR is that some catastrophes are vastly more important than others. Carl Sagan was perhaps the first to recognize this, in his commentary on nuclear winter (Sagan 1983). Without nuclear winter, a global nuclear war might kill several hundred million people. This is obviously a major catastrophe, but humanity would presumably carry on. However, with nuclear winter, per Sagan, humanity could go extinct. The loss would be not just an additional four billion or so deaths, but the loss of all future generations. To paraphrase Sagan, the loss would be billions and billions of lives, or even more. Sagan estimated 500 trillion lives, assuming humanity would continue for ten million more years, which he cited as typical for a successful species. Sagan’s 500 trillion number may even be an underestimate. The analysis here takes an adventurous turn, hinging on the evolution of the human species and the long-term fate of the universe. On these long time scales, the descendants of contemporary humans may no longer be recognizably “human”. The issue then is whether the descendants are still worth caring about, whatever they are. If they are, then it begs the question of how many of them there will be. Barring major global catastrophe, Earth will remain habitable for about one billion more years until the Sun gets too warm and large. The rest of the Solar System, Milky Way galaxy, universe, and (if it exists) the multiverse will remain habitable for a lot longer than that (Adams and Laughlin 1997), should our descendants gain the capacity to migrate there. An open question in astronomy is whether it is possible for the descendants of humanity to continue living for an infinite length of time or instead merely an astronomically large but finite length of time (see e.g. Ćirković 2002; Kaku 2005). Either way, the stakes with global catastrophes could be much larger than the loss of 500 trillion lives. Debates about the infinite vs. the merely astronomical are of theoretical interest (Ng 1991; Bossert et al. 2007), but they have limited practical significance. This can be seen when evaluating GCRs from a standard risk-equals-probability-times-magnitude framework. Using Sagan’s 500 trillion lives estimate, it follows that reducing the probability of global catastrophe by a mere one-in-500-trillion chance is of the same significance as saving one human life. Phrased differently, society should try 500 trillion times harder to prevent a global catastrophe than it should to save a person’s life. Or, preventing one million deaths is equivalent to a one-in500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. This suggests society should make extremely large investment in GCR reduction, at the expense of virtually all other objectives. Judge and legal scholar Richard Posner made a similar point in monetary terms (Posner 2004). Posner used $50,000 as the value of a statistical human life (VSL) and 12 billion humans as the total loss of life (double the 2004 world population); he describes both figures as significant underestimates. Multiplying them gives $600 trillion as an underestimate of the value of preventing global catastrophe. For comparison, the United States government typically uses a VSL of around one to ten million dollars (Robinson 2007). Multiplying a $10 million VSL with 500 trillion lives gives $5x1021 as the value of preventing global catastrophe. But even using “just" $600 trillion, society should be willing to spend at least that much to prevent a global catastrophe, which converts to being willing to spend at least $1 million for a one-in-500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. Thus while reasonable disagreement exists on how large of a VSL to use and how much to count future generations, even low-end positions suggest vast resource allocations should be redirected to reducing GCR. This conclusion is only strengthened when considering the astronomical size of the stakes, but the same point holds either way. The bottom line is that, as long as something along the lines of the standard risk equals-probability-times-magnitude framework is being used, then even tiny GCR reductions merit significant effort. This point holds especially strongly for risks of catastrophes that would cause permanent harm to global human civilization. The discussion thus far has assumed that all human lives are valued equally. This assumption is not universally held. People often value some people more than others, favoring themselves, their family and friends, their compatriots, their generation, or others whom they identify with. Great debates rage on across moral philosophy, economics, and other fields about how much people should value others who are distant in space, time, or social relation, as well as the unborn members of future generations. This debate is crucial for all valuations of risk, including GCR. Indeed, if each of us only cares about our immediate selves, then global catastrophes may not be especially important, and we probably have better things to do with our time than worry about them. While everyone has the right to their own views and feelings, we find that the strongest arguments are for the widely held position that all human lives should be valued equally. This position is succinctly stated in the United States Declaration of Independence, updated in the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments: “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and women are created equal”. Philosophers speak of an agent-neutral, objective “view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986) or a “veil of ignorance” (Rawls 1971) in which each person considers what is best for society irrespective of which member of society they happen to be. Such a perspective suggests valuing everyone equally, regardless of who they are or where or when they live. This in turn suggests a very high value for reducing GCR, or a high degree of priority for GCR reduction efforts.', '']

[(0, 4), (17, 19)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Johnson-Sun-Aff-3-Wayne-Round6.docx

Minnesota

JoSu

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/JoSu/Minnesota-Johnson-Sun-Aff-3-Wayne-Round6.docx

c1d3ba42568434b226413fb638a44cceafca9b71315b476bb4507d47082755ef

2---Social pressures will force any state that creates legal duties for AI to also award corresponding legal rights.

Anat Lior 20, Teaching Fellow @ Yale, J.S.D. Candidate at Yale Law School, Resident Fellow with the School’s Information Society Project, holds a masters’ degree from Reichman University, “AI Entities as AI Agents: Artificial Intelligence Liability and the AI Respondeat Superior Analogy”, Mitchell Hamline Law Review: Vol. 46: Iss. 5, Article 2

report states nothing about granting AI rights but only obligations is obligations leads to existence of rights hard to impose obligations without rights lead to slippery slope imposing obligations inevitably lead to assigning rights society may unintentionally reward rights

the report does not display favoritism towards one solution over another it merely tries to provide a general futuristic picture of what instruments of legislation attempt to regulate robots in a liability context the report states nothing about granting AI rights but rather only talks about their obligations . The problem with this argument like in the context of animals is that the existence of obligations usually leads to the parallel existence of rights It is hard to impose obligations on the one hand without granting rights on the other This may lead to a slippery slope where imposing obligations on AI entities will inevitably lead to also assigning them rights if an AI entity is found liable for the damage it causes it seems only reasonable that a human can be found liable if she causes damages to the AI entity itself In the AI context, society is trying to protect humans from potential damages they may be exposed to by AI entities, and in the process, society may unintentionally reward the latter rights that it did not want them to have .

rights obligations The problem with this argument usually leads to the parallel existence of rights hard impose obligations granting rights on the other slippery slope inevitably lead to also assigning them rights unintentionally reward the latter rights did not want them to have .

['However, it is important to note that the EU report does not display favoritism towards one solution over another; it merely tries to provide a general futuristic picture of what instruments of legislation the EU can consider in attempting to regulate robots in a liability context. 151 Furthermore, the report states nothing about granting AI rights but rather only talks about their obligations.152 The problem with this argument, like that presented in the context of animals, is that the existence of obligations usually leads to the parallel existence of rights.153', 'It is hard to impose obligations on the one hand without granting rights on the other. This may lead to a slippery slope where imposing obligations on AI entities will inevitably lead to also assigning them rights. 154 For example, if an AI entity is found liable for the damage it causes, it seems only reasonable that a human can be found liable if she causes damages to the AI entity itself. 155 In the AI context, society is trying to protect humans from potential damages they may be exposed to by AI entities, and in the process, society may unintentionally reward the latter rights that it did not want them to have.', '']

[(5, 12)]

ndtceda

Emory-CoRu-Neg-Owen-L-Coon-Memorial-Tournament-at-Northwestern-Round-6.docx

Emory

CoRu