on a military police unit out for its morning jog, in which 16 officers were killed, on a Uighur terrorist group, despite the fact that the officers apparently were run down by a truck and attacked by a taxi driver and a vegetable vendor, hardly the modus operandi of a sophisticated terrorist organization. Even last Julys massive race riot in Urumqi set off by rumors that a Uighur woman had been raped and several Uighur men killed by Han Chinese in far-away Guangdong was labeled as an organized, violent action against the public and an act of terrorism. So, while China does face periodic upsurges in politically motivated violence by Uighurs, one has to ask, why? The answer: Beijing has engaged in a systematic, multi-decade program of marginalizing Uighurs in their own homeland, fostering economic growth that favors the Han majority of eastern China and that encourages the exploitation of Xinjiangs wealth of natural resources for Han areas. Beijing has organized and encouraged an influx of Han into Xinjiang, changing the ethnic ratio since 1949 from about 5 percent Han to more than 40 percent today. Moreover, Uighur culture and the Muslim religion are contained under tight restrictions. Beijing proudly points out that Xinjiang in recent years has been among the fastest growing economies in the country, with per capita income higher than all regions except Chinas southeast coast. Most of that growth, however, has accrued to State-owned enterprises, Han entrepreneurs, or the government; not to Uighurs. And income inequalities there have actually expanded significantly in recent years. The region also suffers from some of the worst environmental degradation in China. It is hardly surprising that frustration occasionally boils over into civil unrest or that such conditions breed terrorist groups intent on taking action against the regime. That many of Chinas problems with terrorism and unrest are largely of its own making has reduced international trust and sympathy for the situation. Chinas concerns also have both shaped its approach to the broader region and reduced Chinas willingness to cooperate with the US in counter-terrorism, negatively affecting the overall US -China relationship. Xinjiang, more than any other area of China, is strategically vulnerable, partially as a result of its location in one of the most fractious neighborhoods outside the Middle East. Representing one-sixth of Chinas territory, Xinjiang is rich in oil, gas, and mineral deposits and contains numerous sensitive military installations, including some of the countrys premier nuclear research and testing facilities. It borders the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, all of which are less than politically stable.* Complicating Chinas relations with the Central Asian states is the fact that as many as 500,000 Uighurs and sizable populations of other Chinese minorities live across relatively porous borders and engage in extensive trade and contacts. Several of these countries contain anti-China Uighur separatist organizations, both peaceful and terrorist. And China is very afraid of the potential contagion of color revolutions from Central Asia like the 2005 Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan destabilizing Chinas control in Xinjiang. Uighur activities including violent attacks have