thepsychological point of view, it is arbitrary. The political separation between"public" and "private" establishes the human rights and thecivic duties as well as its political subordinations, considering thehistorical process responsible for the privatization of State and of the publicsphere such as Hannah Arendt argues. But the separation between the psycho orsubject (psychological subject) andthe social, on the contrary, can reduce the power of the epistemologicalanalyses on the formative processes of integral human development. The exercise of the author seeks to think howthe constitutive dimensions of the human subject have been established, movingon toward a deconstruction and analytical separation of these categories as thesignal of a criticism that starts to act on its own process once that, inaccording to the author, to think purely from indistinction between the"subject" and the "social" would require to talk abouttheir intrinsic relations which couldn t be questioned about how they reallywere built. On thequestion of the role of reflexivity in psychosocial studies, providing acritical attitude to the production of their own knowledge, we recall Hegel sattention on the mediation process of the self, remembering the danger ofestablishing truths by opposition, such as the author also states, "'inhere" and "out there"; "subject" and"object"; "psychic" and "social". From theHegelian heritage and dialectically Socratic, we assume the understanding ofthe critical thinking as an activity of border, in the foucaultian sense. On the perspective of social psychology, inaccording to Tassara and Ardans (2007)[9],it establishes the defense of human diversity as an ethical prerequisite ofscientific understanding on the human, what makes the object of social psychologyand its method ontologically interdisciplinary. As Roland Barthes speaks (1988), the interdisciplinarityinvolves the creating of a new object that does not belong to anyone. Thereby theinterdisciplinary nature of social psychology would not occur due to atheoretical location and internal, but mainly because to produce knowledge insocial psychology should be assumed unknown dimensions on the object so that makespossible to consider it as an new object seen from a border thinking andvanguard. [1] How the human subject is bothformed as an entity through the social order and yet has agency within it? (...) Thisparadox, that one can be both subject to the workings of society and yet alsobe a subject in the sense of being an agent with power to act on the world,is a core issue for psychosocialtheorists, as it is for many in the broader field of social theory. [2] LAPSI IP USP - Social and EnvironmentalPsychology Laboratory and Intervention.[3] Theindividualising tendency of psychology can thus be seen as a particular kind ofintervention in social science, paralleling the separation of private frompublic and personal from political. [4] Florestan Fernandes, Comunidade e Sociedade noBrasil. Leituras Basicas de introducao ao estudo macro-sociologico do Brasil,p. XI.[5] (...) investigations of cognitionsin social settings (attitudes, prejudice, social judgements, etc) and ofpeoples behaviour in groups and other social situations.[6] Robert M. Farr. The roots of modern social psychology. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996.[7] Theconceptualisation of the individual/social divide is itself the problem here.[8] (...) In fact these( person and social ) are not distinct entities, but simply ways of carvingup the research field to