a rational attempt to understand complex phenomena and deal with feelings of powerlessness. In this sense, such beliefs reveal not psychopathological minds but the lived experience and consciousness of groups of individuals (Sanders & West, 2003).Psychological accountsEarly psychological studies often sought to highlight characteristics of conspiracy theories themselves, rather than characteristics of the audience. So, for example, conspiracy theories were described as being characterised by poor or unproven evidence, circular reasoning, repetition of unproved premises, and the creation of false predicaments (e.g. Young et al., 1990; Zarefsky, 1984). On the other hand, once the notion that conspiracy theories serve some psychological need became established, a small number of studies began to explicitly examine the socio-cognitive basis of those beliefs.For example, one early study examined the effects of exposure to Oliver Stones 1991 film JFK, in which it is alleged that the assassination of John F. Kennedy was a conspiracy at the highest levels of government. The authors found that the film changed beliefs toward accepting the broad conspiracy theory and significantly aroused anger, which was explained as a function of helplessness (Butler et al., 1995, p.237). Moreover, viewing the film was found to be associated with a decrease in viewers (self-reported) intention to vote or make political contributions, suggesting that the message of the film carried over to general political judgements.Other research activities have focused on the psychological factors and processes associated with belief in conspiracy theories. For example, some early work suggested that conspiracy theories emerged because of an irrational need to explain big and important events with proportionately big and important causes McCauley & Jacques, 1979, p.637; see also Leman, 2007). Clarke (2002), on the other hand, has discussed conspiracy theories in the context of the fundamental attribution bias: because of the general tendency to overestimate the importance of dispositional factors and underestimate situational factors, conspiracy theorists are more likely to blame Hofstadters (1966) preternaturally effective international conspiratorial network even when adequate situational explanations are available. This may be especially true when people are outraged or distressed and seek to justify their emotional state by claiming intentionality of actions even in the absence of evidence (cf. Festinger, 1957).Sunstein and Vermeule (2009) have suggested that the emotional content of many conspiracy theories plays an important role in their dissemination and acceptance. They cite studies showing that urban legends that are devised to trigger strong emotions are more likely to be spread among populations (e.g. Heath et al., 2001). Applying this to conspiracy theories, they postulate that conspiracy theories create intense emotions that help spread similar beliefs, while also providing a justification for affective states produced by some traumatic event.Other relevant work has examined the psychological impact of exposure to conspiracy theories, particularly in relation to mass media sources (e.g. Butler et al., 1995), but also in relation to the third-person effect (the tendency for people to believe that persuasive media has a larger influence on others than themselves). In one study, Douglas and Sutton (2008) had participants read material containing conspiracy theories about Princess Dianas death before rating their own and