On paraconsistent fuzzy logicsParaconsistent logics are specially tailored to deal with inconsistency, while fuzzy logics primarily deal with graded truth and vagueness. Aiming at studying logics that can handle inconsistency and graded truth at once, this talk will report about recent investigations on how a notion of paraconsistent fuzzy logic can be cast within the framework of the so-called logics of formal inconsistency (LFIs).As in classical logic, it is clear that the notion of truth-preserving deduction commonly used in systems of mathematical fuzzy logic is incompatible with any form of paraconsistency. However, in the first part of the seminar we will show that, instead, some degree-preserving fuzzy logics exhibit interesting paraconsistency features. We will also consider expansions of these logics with additional negation connectives and study their paraconsistency properties as LFIs.In the second part of the seminar, we will address a kind of converse problem, namely how to extend a given fuzzy logic with a new consistency operator in the style of the LFIs. We will introduce a set of postulates for this type of operators over the corresponding algebras, leading to the definition and axiomatization of a family of logics, expansions of MTL, whose degree-preserving counterpart are paraconsistent and moreover LFIs. In the third and final part of the seminar, we will talk about some remarks on ongoing work on the study on intermediate paraconsistent fuzzy logics between the truth-preserving and degree-preserving logics. *IIIA - CSIC, Barcelona, Spain On the foundations of a theory of deliberative reason: A logical survey of the general principles of the theory of rational choices and coherent preferencesLast century witnessed a great development of the mathematical foundations of social sciences, due to the rapid growth of research in decision theory, game theory and social choice theory and to the astounding results obtained in those fields. Such studies seem to me to point towards a more general theory of rationality in practical contexts, and, in particular, to a mathematical theory of deliberative reason. Such a possibility, however, presupposes a (to the best of my knowledge) not yet systematically undertaken philosophical inquiry of the principles underlying those theories, --- one that would explore their pertinence to settings broader than those proper to the social sciences.My exposition shall be divided in three parts.In the first part I shall present the main concepts common to all those theories --- to wit, the notions of choice, preference, welfare, norm and strategy --- and discuss in very broad strokes how they relate, with special attention to the relation between the more fundamental concepts of choice and preference. (I say they are more fundamental because they seem to me to be the ones that characterize, minimally, a deliberative setting.)In the second part I shall briefly discuss what contributions (beyond the already well-known use of games in model theory) I believe such an enlargement of the field of application of those concepts would have to offer to logic in general, and to logic in practical contexts in particular.In the third part I shall present a few questions about how already well-established logic, and modal