wentstraight to Nkrumah and explained that perhaps his shareholders would not go along with theproject if we asked for a higher power rate than Kaiser was asking for. A message came back after lunch from Nkrumah that wewere to go ahead and accept the [Kaiser] rate. He wanted the project, at all costs.[James Moxon] Kwame Nkrumah and Edgar Kaiser, on 22 January 1962,signed the Master Agreement, which enfolded every provision that was necessary betweenEdgar Kaiser's company and the Ghana[ian] government. When they had signed it, they stood upand clasped each other in a very, very genuine embrace. I was there, together with a large number ofother distinguished guests; and I don't think any of us will ever forget it. The following day, weall went to Akosombo [the dam's site] and Nkrumah let off a vast charge and the scheme started.Professor Akilagpa Sawyerr, Vice-Chancellor, GhanaUniversity 198592 Yes, I suppose you can say Kaiser used Nkrumah, but,if that makes Nkrumah passive, that'd be inaccurate, because Nkrumah [] used Kaiser. The questionis: Whose end of the bargain came out better? Nkrumah was seen to have been going into an area withso many unknowns. One can say that while he was pursuing power, power slipped throughhis fingers.But even as Nkrumah andEdgar Kaiser celebrated, other forces were becoming involved in the scheme. Thedam was now a hostage in thevicious confrontations of the Cold War.The year before, the Congohad been torn apart by a brutal civil war. America and the Soviet Union backedopposite sides. The policy of the new Kennedy administration was to fight thespread of communism in Africa. In 1960, Brezhnev, the President of the SovietUnion, had visited Ghana. It frightened America's leaders. They were determinedthat Nkrumah, despite his brand of African socialism, would be their man.Bill Mahoney, US Ambassador to Ghana 19621965 Nkrumah was everything. He was everything politically, economically... psychologically, culturally and so on. He just absolutely dominated the scene.Nkrumah, though, wanted tokeep Ghana and Africa out of the Cold War.[From footage of Kwame Nkrumah speaking at the] UNITED NATIONS [in] 1960 "... It is quite clear that a desperate attemptis being made to create confusion in the Congo; extend theCold War to Africa; and involve Africa in the suicidal quarrels of foreignpowers. The UnitedNations must not allow this to happen ..."But there was the dam. TheAmerican government realised that it was a powerful weapon with which to ensnareNkrumah. Like the World Bank, the Kennedy administration had agreed to lendmillions of dollars to the scheme. In an internal memorandum, the Secretary ofState, Dean Rusk, made it quite clear what this money was for. "Bymaintaining this leverage on Nkrumah", he wrote, "the US will be in abetter position to influence his policies." In public, though, it was called"foreign aid".George Ball, Under-Secretary of State, Kennedyadministration The problem was that we foresaw the progress that theSoviets were making in extending their communist ideology, particularly in Africa and, tosome extent, in South America; [and] certainly in the Middle East. [] Therefore, we had tocounter that [in] some way; and we countered it with foreign aid as a defence against