thegoodfellas/blogset-br huggingface dataset:
sendo desconstruida desde os anos 70 nas humanidades e nafilosofia contemporanea (DERRIDA, 1980; HALL, 1997). O senso comum hoje aceita cada vez menos orotulo primitivo para qualquer cultura. No entanto, o romantismo e o evolucionismo social continuam a falar peloOutro (FICHMAN, 2002). ReferenciasASAD,Talal. Introducao. In: ASAD, Talal (Org.). Anthropologyand the Colonial Encounter. NewYork: Humanity Books, 1973.BHABHA,Homi K. O Local da Cultura. BeloHorizonte: Editora UFMG, 1998.CHAGNON,Napoleon. Yanomamo. In: National Geographic Society. PrimitiveWorlds: People Lost in Time. Washington,D.C.: Library of Congress, 1973.CUNHA,Manuela Carneiro da. Politica Indigenistano seculo XIX. In: CUNHA, ManuelaCarneiro da (Org.). Historia dos Indios no Brasil. Sao Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1992.DERRIDA,Violence and Metaphysics. In: DERRIDA,Jacques. Writing and Difference. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.DIAMOND,Stanley. The Uses of the Primitive. In:DIAMOND, Stanley (Ed.). Primitive Views of the World. New York: Columbia University Press, 1960.FABIAN,Johannes. Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.FICHMAN,Martin. Evolutionary Theory and Victorian Culture. New York: Humanity Books, 2002.FOUCAULT, Michel. O Homem e Seus Duplos. In:FOUCAULT, Michel. AsPalavras e as Coisas. Sao Paulo:Martins Fontes, 1999.GEERTZ,Clifford. The Impact of the Concept ofCulture on the Concept of Man. In:Platt, J. (Org.). New View of the Nature of Man. Chicago: University of ChicagoPress, 1966._______________ AInterpretacao das Culturas. Rio deJaneiro: Editora S.A., 1989.HALL,Stuart (Ed.). Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices. London: Sage Publications, 1997.HARRIS,Marvin. Canibais e reis. Lisboa:Edicoes 70, 1977.JANSON,H.W. Historia Geral da Arte. SaoPaulo: Martins Fontes, 2001.LEVI-STRAUSS,Claude. The Raw and the Cooked: Mythologiques volume 1. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1983.NATIONALGEOGRAPHIC SOCIETY. Primitive Worlds: People Lost in Time. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1973.ORTNER,Sherry. Theory in Anthropology Since theSixties. Comparative Studies in Society and History. vol.26, p.126-166,1984.RAPPAPORT,Roy. Ecology, Meaning, and Religion. Berkeley: North Atlantic Books, 1979.ROGNON,Frederic. Os Primitivos, Nossos Contemporaneos. Campinas: Papirus, 1991.SAID,Edward. Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books, 1978.SANTOS,Yolanda Lhullier dos. Imagem do Indio: O Selvagem Americano naVisao do Homem Branco. Sao Paulo:IBRASA, 2000.SERVICE,Elman. The Ghosts of Our Ancestors. In:National Geographic Society. Primitive Worlds: People Lost in Time. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress,1973.TORGOVNICK,Marianna. Gone Primitive: Savage Intellects, Modern Lives. Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 1991.[1] Professor Assistente deAntropologia e Sociologia do curso de Turismo com enfase em Meio Ambiente daUniversidade Estadual Paulista UNESP/Campus de Rosana. rodrigo@rosana.unesp.br
only be effective if it questions the metaphysics and moral underpinningsthat form worlds as dual. This will notcome through a fuller integration or something of the sort, but through, asNietzsche thinks, an affirmation from a different place. And this place cannot be reduced to aconcept, such as equality - or liberation, emancipation. When talking about political practices, thereis always something undemonstrable. An affirmation from a different place heremeans one that would not understand itself to be constrained by the fictivecertainty of a polar world, and the annihilations that accompany it. [1] Although not strictly related to thetopic, an important reference: Shanley, M.L.; Narayan, U. Reconstructing PoliticalTheory: Feminist perspectives. Pennsylvannia: The Pennsylvannia StateUniversity Press. 1997. 210p.[2] Bobbio,Norberto. Direita e esquerda: Razoese significados de uma distincao politica. 2a ed. Sao Paulo:Editora Unesp. 1995. 187p.[3] Note that the definition of"dualism" is always contextual, in this case referring to theleft/right dualism. To phrase it in afinal definition would be a claim to total knowledge, and the reproduction ofdualisms themselves. [4]Bobbio, op. cit. p.11. [Authors Translation][5]Bobbio, op. cit. p.83. [A.T.][6] And this is not to say that this is the only way Christianity has been practiced, or that it is the'origin' of dualisms. [7] Foucault, Michel. Em Defesa da Sociedade. Sao Paulo: Martins Fontes. 2002. p.22 [A.T.][8] Foucault, Michel. Power/Knowledge. New York: Pantheon Books. 1980. p.90[9] Bobbio,op. cit. p.34. [A.T.][10] Giddens, Anthony. BeyondLeft and Right: The future of radical politics. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1994. 253p.
sujeitos que precisam ser detidos ouexterminados. Como explicacao maior daviolencia e ela propria reprodutora da violencia, pois todo discurso e umapratica social viva e atrelada a acoes respectivas. Os discursos sobre os maus sujeitos comoexplicacao para a violencia sao uma das multiplas causas da violencia. O filme nao existe num vacuo deinterpretacao, de historia e cultura. Aspessoas que estao assistindo sao as mesmas, com excecoes, que votaram SIM asarmas no ultimo plebiscito, e grande parte acredita na violencia como um mal acombater principalmente pela violencia (sobre isto Jose Arbex Jr. ja nosalertava na Caros Amigos). Jose Padilha esta certo quando teme por umacultura que acredita que a violencia urbana e resolvida pela violencia. Ele apostou na inteligencia das pessoasfazendo um filme inteligente, porque nao aponta causas ou solucoes;deixa-nos pensar, o que poucos cineastas tem conseguido fazer (assim como eletambem conseguiu em Onibus 174,documentario que tambem mostra como as pessoas acham que a violencia contrabandidos resolve e e justificada, quando o Sandro e atacado pelos transeuntesenfurecidos). O filme mostra que asregras atuais e as condicoes sociais de nossa sociedade nos condenam a repetircontinuamente um processo de corrupcao e violencia policial inaceitavel. -disse Padilha numa entrevista. Se osespectadores preferem torcer pelo mocinho ou pelo bandido, ou aguardar queo filme mostre um caminho (mesmo quando nao sabemos nem como chegamos ateaqui), que isto nos faca agir entao para transformar estas interpretacoesreducionistas do mundo em uma gama de acoes necessarias para melhorar a vida detodos em relacao a violencia. Mudar aconsciencia social dominante sobre a violencia, o senso comum que divide apopulacao entre bons e maus, ao mesmo tempo em que se questiona explicacoesfinais, sao acoes que podem modificar nossa relacao com a violencia, incluindoum fator muito importante: a sua naturalizacao. Nao e fechando os olhos que vamos resolver alguma coisa, mas tambem naoe achando que ja sabemos o que tem que ser feito. Ha muito que fazer, por isto eu agradeco Tropa de Elite por nos irritar mais umavez com esta realidade. Temos muito porresolver sim. Esperar demais de um filme, no entanto, e o tamanho da alienacaoe e a distancia que separa os comentaristas de filmes das favelas.Rodrigo GomesGuimaraes e antropologo, professor da Universidade Estadual Paulista. Nao e mocinho nem bandido.
Human Rights, Nationalism, and the Discourse on Terror in the U.S.A.Author: Rodrigo Gomes GuimaraesProfessor: Magid ShihadeCourse: Human Rights and LawCalifornia Institute of Integral Studies2008 Human Rights, Nationalism, and the Discourse on Terror in the U.S.A. This paper discusses the forms that a final paper would take on the links between three dominant discourses present in the United States of America. The first of those, the discourse on human rights, would have to be studied in its shifts and application (or lack of) to the cases of those labeled terrorists or suspects over the war on terror. The second discourse to be analyzed would be nationalism. This would be done by dissecting its presence in the discourses on terrorism: how is American nationalism either reproduced or shifted through the encounter with discourses on terrorism operating in the U.S., and what role does nationalism play in the formation of these discourses? Lastly, I would need to focus both on an analysis of human rights and nationalist discourses from particular cases of discourses on terrorism, since otherwise such analysis would have no grounding, due to the pervasiveness of discourses on rights, nationalism and terrorism in the U.S. The focus I choose to do this study with is strategic, since the discourse on terrorism is something that is produced in military settings, government, media, the academy, and throughout the culture. Therefore, my choice of the RAND Corporation as the focus of this study is because it has represented the scientific and military views on terrorism that actually reach practical application many times, besides having direct participation in government and appearing in the media. It became with time the non-governmental organization that most produces research for governmental ends in the world, and probably the one that has more access and is heard in the American government. For thirty years, according to its website, it has been producing studies on terrorism, and institutionally it became one of the most important references, if not the greatest of them, on the subject. Therefore, my choice of the RAND Corporation, a government- and private-funded think tank, with direct links to the military, government, media and the academy, is an important node in the power/knowledge of terrorism as an applied science in the U.S. I work from the perspective that it can be shown that discourses on terrorism in the U.S. form discursive practices which Michel Foucault (1977) has explained thus: Discursive practices are characterized by the delimitation of a field of objects, the definition of a legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of norms for the elaboration of concepts and theories. Thus, each discursive practice implies a play of prescriptions that designate its exclusions and choices. Therefore, the study of a discourse on terrorism as discursive practice needs to show how it is that terrorists and terrorism are made into objects, what is expected of a subject in order to speak of those objects, and what that does to the possibilities of this discussion, what can be said and what cannot be said of them, what are
the unstated rules of discourse, what are the statements that represent it, and what are its unstated limits. Human Rights and Terror(ists) To make the case of the links between discourses on human rights and terrorism, I would have to look first at the formation of human rights discourse in the U.S. Interestingly, the discourse on human rights is intimately tied to the discourse of American nationalism (Hunt, 2007). The Declaration of Independence of 1776 reads:We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. The Declaration, the result of a nationalist movement that was successful, is a sign that points to the links between American discourses on human rights and nationalism. We will discuss this point in more detail below. For what interests me here is to understand what shifts, if any, occurred to human rights discourse in relation to discourses on terrorism. To this event we should look to current forms of Orientalism with Edward Said's understanding as a frame only to find how nationalist-culturalist discourses is influencing terrorism to be understood as a form of cultural-religious war. Human rights discourse in the U.S.A. came to hegemony, in the Gramscian sense, from the Declaration as something that was later turned into a monument, to which political culture pays homage here and there and uses for very different purposes, such as two opposing parties in a conflict. This is because it is what regulates, in a very direct way, what can be constitutive of the rights of individual citizens, as individuals. Group's rights are always at a lower status of relationship, in this discourse. It is as if, in order to make compatible the idea of rights in modern states, rights needed to be understood as relative to individuals, or else the state would not be seen as working for all and equals. No matter how much the discourse on rights limits possibilities of difference, be it social, cultural, economic, political, historical, of gender, race, nationality, religion, sexuality, language, or other, it is generally those who come to power at a certain moment with relation to a certain issue that bring rights. Rights thus are not inalienable, they are very contingent spaces. The culture around rights then, is very contested. As a greater participant of the American imagination, for example, human rights discourse is nationalist. Mahmood Mandani (2000) shows how the discourse on rights is always political and reflects the dominant political culture. Therefore, it is not a surprise that dominant discourses on terrorism in the U.S.A. reflect human rights as limited by nationalism, in a country so prone to war, and thus productive of human rights violations elsewhere more than any other in history (See for example the works of Noam Chomsky). There is another side to this, that also needs to be studied. It is how human rights discourse, as a producer and diffuser of forms of power and knowledge that are linked to
with relation to suicide bombing, the motives are searched for as truths to be uncovered, as opposed to the manifest intention to kill. Asad also shows how although liberal discourses on violence have separated it from politics, mortal violence is part of the formation of liberalism as political. The discourses on violence within liberalism, however, have been produced through its institutions as combinations of cruelty and compassion. Asad says that this is his more speculative analysis of the book. He suggests that liberal institutions diminish the feelings and anxieties of violence being put to work by war for example, by its discourses on compassion and necessary cruelty as forms of compassion (for others or for ones own). Moral justifications for killing other human beings including innocent civilians - exist within liberalism; however, those who are labeled terrorists are not granted this privilege because they are considered by liberals as morally inferior or evil. In liberalism, evil is conceived not as a principle that is essential to the world, but as a dynamic principle that opposes divine will and is therefore eliminable (p.4). In the first chapter of the book, Asad shows how the September 11 attacks were very rapidly discoursed by the US government as evil terrorist acts which are against the American way of life, but the next day they were called acts of war by president Bush. Terrorism was thus argued as an irrational act, and an international threat. This kind of violence was therefore illegitimate from the beginning. It did not have something which it stood for in history in the Western imaginary, or coming from its conceptions of proper history, such as Marxist or socialist and anarchist terrorism had. Asad discusses Bernard Lewis an orientalist - views on a clash of civilization, a category which has expounded the assertion of jihad as Muslim organized violence against non-Muslims. This view supports the assumption that Islam is today a tradition of resentment against modernity, and terrorism is just an aspect of this resentment. Asad shows how these are Western interpretations of Islam, highly biased in favor of the West and therefore supportive of Islamophobia and anti-Islamic. He writes that in Western histories of Islam, jihad has been a central theme, although in Islamic thought jihad is not a central notion (p.10). He explains how jihad has been termed in the West as an integral part of Islamic civilization that would itself be deeply rooted in religion. He shows in what contexts the notion of jihad has been used within Islam, such as when it was invoked in struggles against colonial regimes or at the level of an individual religious duty (p.12). However, he says, such usages have not had the support of most Muslim jurists, for the legal preconditions of jihad it has been argued by Muslim scholars must include both the presence of a genuine threat to Islam and the likelihood of success in opposing it (p.12). Asad affirms that there can be no clash of civilizations because there are no self-contained societies to which fixed civilizational values correspond
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religioesdominantes, que certamente tem um papel na legitimizacao de dominacoes,continua uma forma de dominacao ele proprio. Firmando a dominacao sobre o chao solido da classe social, e excluindooutros tipos de dominacao (raciais, de genero, etnia, cultura, nacionalidade,etc.), Bourdieu reduz o poder efetivo de seu argumento. A razao para isto e, pelo menos em parte, ade que ele tinha em mente um dualismo fundamental como guia: o deprimitivoXmoderno. Ao tentar encontrar ofator originario da diferenca entre o primitivo e o moderno, e ao localiza-lona classe social, como o local soberano do poder, assim como fez Marx, Bourdieucria uma narrativa da historia que lhe possibilita falar de religiao como umacoisa monolitica. Osefeitos que Bourdieu liga a religiao como tal estao, a meu ver, muito coerentesquando ele fala sobre o Cristianismo, particularmente quando cita o efeito decompreensao dupla que estaria associado as religioes. Este efeito, se e que podemos encontra-lo emtodo lugar onde haja uma religiao, certamente estaria forte quando associadoaos dualismos (bem e mal, p.ex.) cristaos. Para Concluir Nestetexto, apresentei as ideias de Mauss & Durkheim e de Bourdieu com relacaoao que consideram como primitivo e moderno, e as possibilidades religiosasque dai derivam. Ao afirmar que asconcepcoes dualistas como primitivoXmoderno sao o referencial teorico paraeles, nao julgo estar provando o fundamento teorico que embasa todas asafirmacoes que os autores fazem nos textos referidos. Todas as formas derepresentacao sao parciais, e nao acredito que ha solucao para isto. E importante sim que estejamos sempre atentosaos efeitos da representacao, e e sobre estes que focalizei este artigo. Quanto aos efeitos deste, espero queencontrem entre eles formas de repensar o que entendemos por indio (ouOriental, tribal, tradicional) e Homem, conceitos que tem sido construidos umem relacao ao outro, mas que tem o ultimo por meio e fim. O Queou Quem e a Religiao?Autor: Rodrigo Gomes Guimaraes[1] In: A Economia das Trocas Simbolicas.[2] Ver Freud, S. Totem and Tabooe Jung, C.J. Tipos Psicologicos.[3] Em Power/Knowledge.
I do not intend to statethat there is no over-arching nationalism in any single moment in history. I am only saying that it should not be takenfor granted that nationalism as an always already complex and multiple socialpractice, contradicts itself. As adiscourse constructed and critiqued in postcolonial studies, nationalism canpartially be understood through the concept of hybridity, as always partiallyresponsible for producing its own forms of resistance to its owndomination. In a sense, then,nationalism as a colonial form of discourse produces anti-nationalism. This paper in no way summarizes allthere is to say on the books cited. Thiswould run contrary to all my approach here. I would rather see the three worksdiscussed here, Achebe, Cesaire, and Thiong'o - just to counter once more theWestern imagination - like Manifestos, as always speaking about the present, thansolely about the past of Africa. Becausethere is no bigger corporeality, materiality for the voice of the present, thana language in the present tense, relating itself to social relations of powerthat include us while we read them. Alllanguage is falsifying, revealing and hiding, and we can really be in troubleto understand language if we do not give enough importance to the falsifying,changing nature of it. Thus, let us, asa form of subversion of the dominance of science over art, and all theviolences that cultural modes of signification have superimposed on difference,end with a short Manifesto-style aphorism. - Manifestos always speak about thepresent. Because there is no largercorporeality. All the rest is filledwith falsehood. One certain thing we dois to fool ourselves when we believe in non-falsehood, like the West has donefor so long...And even if so, not all is false. Mobility gives a strange sensation of the conciliation of the true andthe false. And even then, this can bethe true error. Maybe the true and thefalse are really sensations, relations with their own corporeality. The question remains: is the presentpossible?[1] We must note, also, however, thatpostcolonial literature is a very contested space.