happen if China suffered a hard landing. Its answer to this apocalyptic question was quite benign. As it pointed out, Japan at the start of the 1990s accounted for a bigger share of GDP than China does today. Its growth slowed from about 5% to 1% in the first half of the 1990s without any discernible effect on global trends. It is hard to exaggerate China's weight in the world economy. But not impossible.from the print edition | Finance and economics Free exchangeChains of goldModern supply chains are making it easier for economies to industrialiseAug 4th 2012 | from the print edition GETTING rich used to be tough. For most of the past two centuries, few countries managed it. Lant Pritchett, an economist now at Harvards Kennedy School of Government, wrote in 1997 that divergence, big time between the rich and the rest was the dominant feature of modern economic history. But those stubborn gaps have begun to close. Industrialisation is suddenly everywhere. Since the mid-1980s, emerging markets have grown faster than advanced economies (see chart).Liberal reforms and sound macroeconomic management surely helped. Yet recent research by Richard Baldwin of the Graduate Institute in Geneva suggests it is not so much the developing world that has changed as development itself. Todays emerging markets face a different sort of globalisation than their predecessors 50 or 100 years ago.In this sectionJapanese lessonsMoney for nothingPromises, promisesCorn on the cuspBlood in the waterToo big to veilChains of goldReprintsRelated topicsJapanBusinessEconomicsGlobalisationRichard BaldwinMost advanced economies industrialised as part of what Mr Baldwin calls globalisations first great unbundling: the geographical separation of producers and consumers. Early in the industrial era, high transport costs restricted trade. Expensive shipping limited most manufacturers to sales within the same city or country. But as the industrial revolution progressed, steamships and railways slashed transport costs, exposing firms to foreign competition for the first time. The most productive firms were those best able to take advantage of economies of scale. A single large plant could produce goods at a lower unit cost than lots of smaller factories, and a cluster of large suppliers at lower cost still. Production clustered in massive cities in a few economies.Catching the leaders meant building an entire supply chain from the ground upand in the teeth of competition. Development was slow, laborious and rare. Japan and South Korea grew industries from modest beginnings. They entered global markets with inferior but cheap products, often supported by state aid, then slowly improved their technical competence. Painstaking accumulation of technological skill eventually enabled innovative multinational firms to emerge. Japanese and South Korean incomes converged with those in western Europe. Other emerging economies tried gamely to duplicate this success, to little avail. Aggressive industrial policies often strained government resources without delivering a critical mass in industry or the human capital needed for development.A new model began to emerge in the 1980s. Lower transport costs were a catalyst. Yet more important, reckons Mr Baldwin, was a budding revolution in information and communication technology (ICT). Cheaper communications allowed firms to manage supply chains over ever greater distances.