Bhaskar 2002). This newest of developments, as the exact opposite of fundamentalism, yet in the face of the usually typecast "liberal" post-modernism, has been pointing out the ambiguity of the traditional ambiguity of post-modernism. The uncertainty of epistemology, according to neo-essentialist/critical realist thought, is not to be confused with an uncertain ontology (cf. Bhaskar 2002 and Schreiber 2013 for full expositions of this distinction; briefer, Kroeze 2012:1-8.). To summarise such thinking perhaps a little too poetically: postmodernism has always had something to be uncertain about. Postmodernism's uncertainties are not about nothing. Formulated differently, from an insider's perspective (having experienced within post-modernism my own intellectual birth ground; something for which I am most grateful): the fact that post-modernism's tenet that there are no firm truths constitutes its own firm truth, had always been the inherent self-contradiction which could lead to its philosophical implosion or renewal.Thus, even as post-modernism's stance as normal science (in Kuhnian terms; cf. Kuhn 1962) is still de rigueur, the translation of critical realism from its highly philosophical analyses into a broader understanding may ring change. The seeds of sensed discomfort have been apparent for quite some time. As hinted at above about both Du Toit and me, the feeling had never completely disappeared within post-modernism that there is, after all, still something "out there", or perhaps "in here", namely the experience, the sense of an Other. This deep-lying awareness has been present in post-modernists fully versed in a range of academic disciplines, and has for precisely that reason given rise to the coming into being of the academic discipline of spirituality (cf. Kourie 2009:148-173), which takes seriously the awareness and the sense of the holy, in all its diversity, as its specialism. This experience, with the groundwork classically set by William James (1902) and Rudolph Otto (1917/1923) and of given expression by the recurring phrase of a "turn to spirituality" (influentially used by Ashley 1995:13-18), cannot do without the idea of (the reality of) the Divine. Faith is a relation to something that can hardly be understood existentially as a notion without reference (the concept of nirvana in Indian religions, for instance, stands in relation to this existence, jenseits: the idealised state of nirvana stands over against the life here). Even if in mystic terms this Other or Divine had already in the pre-modern era, at times, been identified as a Nothingness (cf. Kourie 2008:59-75), it was not because the Something was thought to be non-existent. Precisely the opposite, the object of adoration was of such fullness (oorvloedigheid/ eksessiwiteit), to appropriate from another context the language of Goosen 2007:418-428), that no extant words, ideas, metaphors and so forth could come close to approximating Wezer (a term for the divine from Waaijman 2004, translateable as, perhaps, "the [great] Be-ing").Hence, as a vague echo of this mystic sense of the Absolutely Absolute, the children of post-modernity in our time had to add the brackets to their, or more truthfully, our religious sensibilities: "(the reality of)" ... the Divine/God/the Other. The unbelievability of belief could in the last half millennium neither shatter