objections to a natural theology, namely that it seeks to entrench particular national interests, is unfounded, leading to the unjust contamination of an inclination towards the acceptance of a natural theology.The direction in which I wish to seek the solution to such a problem is that which Darwin intimated when saying that 'psychology will be based on a new foundation'. The difference between revelation (faith) and nature (reason) lies not in which precedes, or overshadows, the other, but rather whether they are, in fact, two distinct aspects. Whether such a distinction underlies this particular form of epistemology, making it a disguised form of Platonic dualism, is debatable. I think that an evolutionary epistemology succeeds in overcoming such a diastasis, placing it meaningfully within a transversal space of interdisciplinary dialogue (Van Huyssteen 2006).My argument is constructed as follows. Initially, I consider the epistemological dispute between Brunner and Barth, which centred on 'the [other] task of theology'. Protestant theology splits at this point into a revelatory theology and one that is natural. Next, I deal with some of the insights provided by the Enlightenment, in terms of how they influenced processes of understanding. The writings of William Paley,2 an important architect of natural theology, are then juxtaposed against those of Darwin, preparing for the discussion of an evolutionary epistemology.3 The hybrid epistemology of apartheid theology is then closely examined, exposing its special ideological points of departure. Inspired by such theologians as Thomas Torrance, who could reinterpret Barth and who could also become involved in the physics of his day, as well as by such philosophers of religion as William Alston, who developed an epistemology of religious experience, I attempt, in my conclusion, to arrive at certain contours of a 'revival of' (Polkinghorne 1998:70) or a 'Christian' (Torrance 2001:107) natural theology. Ultimately, my proposal is that of a theology of nature. I conclude my argument with the conviction that Christians must consciously form their preconception in terms of the evidence of Creation, as articulated in the Scriptures. Such an epistemology, rather than preceding science a priori, forms a subdivision of it, allowing itself to be decisively determined thereby, and remaining in continuous interchange therewith. In short, heredity and selection remain the keys to the unlocking of an evolutionary epistemology (Altner 2003:11). THE [OTHER] TASK OF THEOLOGYThe BarthBrunner debate took place in 1934, which was the year in which Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany. Although one should assess such a background cautiously, as James Barr (1994:10, 111117) indicated, the debate has to be seen in terms of such a context. Barth (2002:71) refers to a time 'roughly after 1929' when Brunner, as far as he was concerned, began voicing unacceptable utterances, such as in speaking of 'the other task of theology' and 'the point of contact'. John Hart points out that Brunner, for his part, had, as long before as 1918, already begun expressing concern about Barth's 'one-sided' conception of revelation (McGrath 2008:161).Brunner's accommodating and modest style is particularly sharply contrasted to Barth's anger, bitterness, and even arrogance. Whether Barth (2002:7879) intentionally reflects Brunner's