and the field for which unfortunatelyhas been reduced[5]does not define as a whole its explanatory power on the social processes, butit is a result of historical conditions thathave privileged strategic knowledge applied to the world, the nature and thethings, making confused the greatrole of social psychology and human sciences in this techno-scientific world. Robert Far (1996)[6]has interpreted the development of American psychology from an individualperspective while the European psychology would have developed from a socialperspective. Thus this qualifying premise of the psychology development is notnew, but it is questionable to think that the Psychology s development can be fullyunderstood from an individualistic conception, being more reasonable to think aboutthe external forces responsible for the individualization of some theoreticallines of psychology is spite of the author recognizes that the great problem isexactly the definition of the individual-social separation[7]. The main epistemological issue looks to be howthe psychologist s activity came back itself strictly to the applied techno-scientificknowledge. It was not by chance that John Watson lost the investments to workwith animals and from there he started on to research human behavior in atotally strategic psychological perspective. From this perspective, the Psychology would nothave focused exclusively on the individual subject as an ideological andpolitical investment[8]face some kind of separation supposedly perceived as already given. Authorssuch as Solomon Asch, for example, understood and demonstrated the role of the humangroups on the psychological interactionand in the subjectivity constitution. Thereby the viability of scientificresearch in psychology does not depend on the epistemological separation from sociology.From a different position, the process of individual-social separation could becomeideological itself justly in the transposition of processes that separate, cut and edit the realityand determine the interpretation models of the world from some conveniences,interests and ideologies. In this sense, the critical psychology is not aninternalist formulation of Psychology field on the own individualization of itsobjects so that the goal is not holding together seemingly opposite entities, asthe text clearly makes mention, but to develop analytics models on imperialistforces, such as epistemological, ideological, political and economic, seekingfrom this to search on the clarification of consciousness, the development ofparticipatory means and collective action. Thereby the author makes a timidallusion to this perspective which is qualified as an internal relevance ofpsychosocial theory, weaving a role for the psychosocial theory as aconsideration to the scholars of how the knowledge-imperialism has become a socialexperience and existential truths. According to the author, the preservation ofthe hyphen would distinguish "psycho" and "social"categories and would indicate the clarity analytical on the differentcomponents of a whole immanent once that the critical would require the use ofdistinctions. However on the perspective of socio andenvironment psychology, the critical thinking is worried to understand how thenature was expelled out from the human survival sphere, being commonlyunderstood as a thing that is outthere - usually in the forest. Thereby its epistemological commitment is tounderstand how the environment began to be studied also as something outside ofman. On the "public" and"private" spheres, they are not directly comparable with the "subject"and "social" categories, as the author alludes. From the politicalperspective, the distinction is analytically necessary, but by