particularly relevant.4 Niel Gross in his study of Rorty notes that Rorty had been a hard-nosed analyst who engaged in the rarefied debates in the philosophy of mind (Gross 2008:4). Later on Rorty encouraged a '"relaxed attitude" toward the question of logical rigor, to stop drawing arbitrary boundaries between philosophy and other humanities fields' (Gross 2008:4). Richard Rorty, to mention a most concrete example, left his post in the philosophy department at Princeton University to become a professor of humanities at Virginia (Robbins 2011:xv). This epistemological shift does not only relate to Rorty's personal development but has wider philosophical relevance. Vattimo (2011) explains: Twentieth-century philosophy had once cherished a dream of becoming a rigorous science, a dream that ... had characterized positivism and phenomenology, respectively. But as Husserl put it, the dream was 'dreamed out' (ausgetraumt), it faded away, and with it the idea that philosophy ought to be a robust representation either of reality or, at any rate, of the modes in which we represent reality. (p. 2)Focus on the collectiveMottier (2005:para. 9) notes that in qualitative research, different perspectives associated with the interpretive turn regard the social world not as 'a collection of external "facts", but as a subjectively experienced construct.' If by subjectively is meant individually, then there is still more that needs to be said. The epistemological, interpretive shift did not only leave us with an emphasis on the individual. Our view is that similar to what one might find with pertinent development in science from early modernisation to a scientific consciousness of later modernity, so also one might find a shift in consciousness from childhood - early postmodern consciousness (reality as individual construct) - to early adulthood (reality as social construct). De Roest was correct in his estimation of the agenda of practical theology at that time with an emphasis on the individual. He himself had then extended the focus to the collective (cf. De Roest 1998), which along with the notion of what it means to be an inscribed facilitator, is to us a central concern in facilitation. It seems then that something else - being mindful of the collective - started to happen that is of importance to a facilitative approach in, and to, practical theology. Deriving from the re-emergence of the practical philosophies, Browning (1991:3) points to a renewed interest in matters of practical reason, practical wisdom, phronesis, practice, praxis, justice, consensus, dialogue, conversation and communication. All of these, but perhaps most clearly the latter notions, relate to the collective.The focus on the collective found particular expression in the 1990s: De Roest (1998:27) - drawing on Habermas' perspectives on discourse - extends the focus to the collective and communicative identity. Herein his work is aimed at communities, organisations, movements, groups or all those who, by having some kind of relationship to the person of Christ, are 'surprised at being together' as in the French expression he uses, bien etonnes de se trouver ensemble. Browning refers to philosophers who underscore the notion of tradition in the way that practical rationality works (1991:2). Herein our focus