Os olhos, dificilmente se enganam... pessoas sim.Iludidas por um coracao tapado, talvez... mas nao acredito muito que tal sentimento venha de outro lugar, que nao de si mesmo.A ilusao e para quem se permite o engano.A fuga da realidade...o caminho mais facil? nem tantoA luta com um eu interior... sim e nao... a vida... afffbesta... A perseguicao do cheiro...esta no ar? dificilonde esta? sera que realmente nao sei?em mim? talvezevaporou... poesias para mim sao como pessoas...as que de fato leio, me encantam!odeio o romantismo...as pessoas ou as poesias, ou mesmo as duas entrelacadas, me fazem ser piegas......nao permitindo a fuga de tal!mais uma vez, odeio o romantismo!fuga de que? do romantismo, eu acho, ou sera das pessoas? deve ser das poesias! e a vida da gargalhadas dos momentos pseudo sofridos...o que foi realidade? A Paraconsistent Version of Pavelka's Fuzzy LogicIn 1979 Jan Pavelka introduced a very general framework to deal with many valued logics. Pavelka's idea was to process Zadeh's Fuzzy Sets such that theories, rules of inference, proofs as well as tautologies may be only partial, i.e. fuzzy. Pavelka defined all his concepts in complete residuated lattices. The main issue was to study the circumstances under which the fuzzy semantic consequence operation and fuzzy syntactic operation coincide; such a property is called Pavelka style completeness. Pavelka solved the problem in the special case that the set of truth values is the Lukasiewicz sturucure, i.e. the real unit interval equipped with standard MV-structure. The present author has recently proved that Pavelka style completeness holds if, and only if the set of truth values is a complete MV-algebra. Thus, if in particular ,the set M of truth values is a certain collection of 2x2-matrices equipped with suitable operations, then M is a complete MV-algebra. In fact, the set M extends Belnap's four valued para consistent logic. Such an approach results a complete many-valued logic that behaves consistently when looking from outside: the structure in related to Lukasiewicz logic which is a consistent logic. However, looking the logic from inside, i.e. a single 2x2-matrix, para consistency steps in. Truth and falsehood are not opposites of each other, and also contradictions and lack of knowledge is involved.*Tampere University of Technology (Tampere, Finland) "Leibniz Logic" on Wednesday April 15th, 16:30, Godel Room at CLE- UNICAMP"A Survey on Epistemic Logic" on Thursday 16th, 14:00, Godel Room at CLE- UNICAMPBiography and eulogy: Prof. Wolfgang Lenzen (in German)http://www.lumer.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/C005_LumerMeyer_VorwortFSLenzen.pdfDepartment of Philosophy, Universitat Osnabruck, Germany Adding connectives to non-classical logicsAlready in 1919 Skolem studied, from an algebraic point of view, certain operations that appear afterwards from a logical point of view, for example in 1942 in a work by Moisil. This is done in the context of a logic that, more recently, has been called bi-intuitionistic. Some decades afterwards, there also appear many papers by the polish logician Rauszer on the same logic. More recently, in 2009, Priest gave a paraconsistent version of some kind of bi-intuitionistic logic. We have proved that, in fact, using a notion by Urbas, it is strictly paraconsistent. Approximately in the same tradition appears the connective