uponobservation reduces our physics from configuration space to shape space, and soon. So from this it is already clear how different definitions and philosophiesof movement may have a big impact in physics, since the mathematical structureof the relational and absolute pictures are very different.Now comes an interesting point. Bythe above construction it seems clear that the relational approach is anintellectual apparatus built upon questioning the meaning of statements aboutthe physical world. Upon the requirement of meaning upon observation, therelational approach becomes compelling. And the physical objects are theobserved entities, the primitive notion from which physics is built upon. Butwould happen if we ask ourselves what is the meaning of observing a physicalobject in such and such state? Or what is a physical object? Is thisquestioning too far? This is not something usually asked in the Machian pictureof the world, maybe because it would seem very hard to do physics beginningfrom nothing. There may be lots ofways to answer the question what is the meaning of observing a physicalobject in such and such state, I certainly did not explore this question asmuch as it deserves, but what is interesting for me is that it seems that wecan use the concepts of time and space again (denied as redundant for therelational picture) for a definite resolution for that question, and then uponthat conception of a physical object, apply the relational approach one more time.Stated verbally it looks obviously vague. But if possible, the mathematicalstructure of physics resulting from this procedure would be, at least,interesting, for the point of view of quantum gravity. Let me try to beclearer:Following a relational picture,statements such as does time run in an empty universe are completelymeaningless since time is defined only upon the behaviour of physical objects. Timeis a derived concept upon that of physical object. But the notion of a physicalobject does not exist by itself: just as we perceive time by motion we alsoperceive physical objects by motion. One objection could be stated: our mindseems to take us to the snapshot intuition. Suppose you take a snapshot ofa mechanical system, then you can start to make physics from the physicalobjects that are observable upon that. But howdo you identify what is a physical, material object using that snapshot? Looking at where are the black dots inthe white paper looks like cheating. There may be different ways to answer thisquestion (I havent found any, though). But is there a way to define what is a physicalobject inside dynamics itself, just like we defined time inside dynamicsitself?The notion of a physical objectwithout a time in which to evolve may seem an extrapolation just as timewithout objects is an extrapolation. All these concepts are tied together. Ourmind can easily make pictures of still images, but finding out whatsthe information contained in these still image seems a hard task. Sincethere is a constraint in the meaning of space and time upon that of observationof physical objects could there be a constraint on the meaning of aphysical object upon that of space and time too? Also, taking a look again at the