Paper:
Safe and Nested Subgame Solving for Imperfect-Information Games
In imperfect-information games, the optimal strategy in a subgame may depend on the strategy in other, unreached subgames. Thus a subgame cannot be solved in isolation and must instead consider the strategy for the entire game as a whole, unlike perfect-information games. Nevertheless, it is possible to first approximate a solution for the whole game and then improve it in individual subgames. This is referred to as subgame solving. We introduce subgame-solving techniques that outperform prior methods both in theory and practice. We also show how to adapt them, and past subgame-solving techniques, to respond to opponent actions that are outside the original action abstraction; this significantly outperforms the prior state-of-the-art approach, action translation. Finally, we show that subgame solving can be repeated as the game progresses down the game tree, leading to far lower exploitability. These techniques were a key component of Libratus, the first AI to defeat top humans in heads-up no-limit Texas hold'em poker.

Review:
The authors present algorithms and experimental results for solving zero-sum imperfect information extensive-form games, with heads-up no-limit Texas Hold'em poker as the motivating application.  
They begin by reviewing the distinction between "unsafe" and "safe" subgame solving.  In unsafe subgame solving, the opponent's strategy outside the subgame, and hence the distribution of the player's state inside the initial information set, is held fixed.  In safe subgame solving, the opponent's strategy in the subgame's head is allowed to vary as well, and hence the distribution of true states is responsive to the player's strategy.
They then introduce "reach" subgame solving, in which a "gift" (the additional value that the opponent could have obtained by choosing a different subgame) is computed for each path that leads to the subgame.  These gifts are added to the margin for each information set.  
Finally, they introduce nested subgame solving as a method of dealing with large action spaces: the trunk strategy is computed for an abstracted version of the game, but any time the opponent plays an action that is not in the abstraction, a new subgame is generated and solved on-the-fly that contains the action.
Experimental results suggest that the two methods combined are extremely effective in practice.
Overall I found the exposition well organized and easy to follow, and the performance of the algorithm seems impressive.  I have only minor comments about the presentation.
1. Gifts are motivated as "allowing P2 to be less concerned with P1 reaching the subgame along that path" (L.173-174).  My guess is that the gift can be added to the margin because it's a measure of how unattractive a branch is to the opponent, and the goal of maxmargin solving is to make the subgame as unattractive as possible to the opponent; but a little more concreteness / hand-holding would be helpful here.
2. At L.297-303, the authors note that in spite of having better theoretical guarantees, the no-split variants seem to always outperform the split variants.  They note that this is not necessarily the case if the gifts are scaled up too aggressively; however, that does not seem directly relevant to the point (I don't believe the experimental results include scaling rather than just failure to divide).
   If the full gift is simply awarded to every subgame, with no division but also no scaling, is exploitability ever worse in practice?  If so, can the authors provide an example?  If not, do the authors have an intuition for why that might be?
   
   At L.210 the authors say that any split is sufficient for the theoretical guarantees, but it seems clear that some splits will leave more on the table than others (as an extreme example, imagine awarding the entire gift to the lowest-probability subgame; this might be close to not using Reach at all). 
3. At L.88: "Figure 4a" probably should be "Figure 1".