Paper:
While progress has been made in crafting visually imperceptible adversarial examples, constructing semantically meaningful ones remains a challenge. In this paper, we propose a framework to generate semantics preserving adversarial examples. First, we present a manifold learning method to capture the semantics of the inputs. The motivating principle is to learn the low-dimensional geometric summaries of the inputs via statistical inference. Then, we perturb the elements of the learned manifold using the Gram-Schmidt process to induce the perturbed elements to remain in the manifold. To produce adversarial examples, we propose an efficient algorithm whereby we leverage the semantics of the inputs as a source of knowledge upon which we impose adversarial constraints. We apply our approach on toy data, images and text, and show its effectiveness in producing semantics preserving adversarial examples which evade existing defenses against adversarial attacks.

Review:
Major caveat: I have published in the area of adversarial attacks on NLP models, but the specifics of the methods presented in this paper are quite outside of my expertise, and I do not have time to become familiar with them for this review.  I hope there are other reviewers that are more qualified than I am to check the specifics of the methods.
This paper presents a new technique for generating adversarial examples, by first learning the data manifold in an embedding space, then finding an adversarial example that lies on the manifold.  I like this idea, it intuitively seems like a promising method for obtaining semantically meaningful adversarial examples.
As I said above, I do not feel qualified to review whether the method should _theoretically_ accomplish its goals, so my judgment of this paper is on the intuition behind the idea (which I like), and the results that I can see (which are less promising).  In order to have a "semantics preserving" attack, the method needs to (1) remain on the data manifold, and (2) not change the label a human would give to the input.
For (1), this appears to have been accomplished on most datasets, though it seems pretty hard to argue that the artifacts seen in the MNIST examples shown are on the data manifold - there are no such artifacts in any of the inputs, or in the clean reconstruction.  How do the authors claim that this actually did a reasonable job of staying in the data manifold?
For (2), most of the images do indeed look like they should retain their human labels, which is good (but also not hard for adversarial images).  Almost all of the textual examples, however, have correct predictions from the model after the adversarial change to the input.  You can't really argue that these are "semantics preserving", or even "successful attacks", as they change the expected input label.  This is why semantics-preserving attacks are so hard in NLP, and I don't think that this method has accomplished its goal here at all, at least for text.  The authors should consult with experts in NLP before making claims about successfully constructing semantics preserving attacks on NLP models.
I'm pretty on the fence about this paper, as I like the intuition, and the method appears to work reasonably well for vision.  It does not work as claimed for text, however, and that should be fixed before this paper is published (either with softened claims or with better results).  Hopefully people from other perspectives can pipe in and give a more clear picture on this paper.
EDIT: See discussion below for my justification for reducing my score from a 3 to a 1.
EDIT 11/14: The authors' revisions have satisfied my concerns about how the NLP attacks are described.  I'm a little bit nervous about how the examples were changed - it seems that nothing changed about the method itself, so the authors probably cherry-picked better examples - but that's not sufficiently worrying to me to justify rejection.  The pilot study is also quite weak, as the number of inputs that were evaluated was only 20, and the questions presented don't appear to ask about changes in the label.  I don't know how you could get 100% on that given the examples that I saw in the previous version of the paper.  This is all to say that I don't think the NLP attacks are actively problematic anymore, as they were previously, now they are just weak.  The main contribution here is the technical contribution, anyway, so weaker results on one of the datasets tested is not a deal-breaker to me.  Assuming the technical contributions pass muster (which, as I said, I don't really feel qualified to judge), I'm satisfied with this paper as it is now.