Paper:
Antimalware products are a key component in detecting malware attacks, and their engines typically execute unknown programs in a sandbox prior to running them on the native operating system. Files cannot be scanned indefinitely so the engine employs heuristics to determine when to halt execution. Previous research has investigated analyzing the sequence of system calls generated during this emulation process to predict if an unknown file is malicious, but these models require the emulation to be stopped after executing a fixed number of events from the beginning of the file. Also, these classifiers are not accurate enough to halt emulation in the middle of the file on their own. In this paper, we propose a novel algorithm which overcomes this limitation and learns the best time to halt the file's execution based on deep reinforcement learning (DRL). Because the new DRL-based system continues to emulate the unknown file until it can make a confident decision to stop, it prevents attackers from avoiding detection by initiating malicious activity after a fixed number of system calls. Results show that the proposed malware execution control model automatically halts emulation for 91.3% of the files earlier than heuristics employed by the engine. Furthermore, classifying the files at that time improves the true positive rate by 61.5%, at a false positive rate of 1%, compared to a baseline classifier.

Review:
This paper attempts to train a predictor of whether software is malware. Previous studies have emulated potential malware for a fixed number of executed instructions, which risks both false negatives (haven’t yet reached the dangerous payload) and false positives (malware signal may be lost amidst too many other operations). This paper proposes using deep reinforcement learning over a limited action space: continue executing a program or halt, combined with an “event classifier” which predicts whether individual parts of the program consist of malware. The inputs at each time step are one of 114 high level “events” which correspond to related API invocations (e.g. multiple functions for creating a file). One limitation seems to be that their dataset is limited only to events considered by a "production malware engine", so their evaluation is limited only to the benefit of early stopping (rather than continuing longer than the baseline malware engine). They evaluate a variety of recurrent neural networks for classifying malware and show that all significantly underperform the “production antimalware engine”. Integrating the event classifier within an adaptive execution control, trained by DQN, improves significantly over the RNN methods. 
It might be my lack of familiarity with the domain but I found this paper very confusing. The labeling procedure (the "production malware engine”) was left entirely unspecified, making it hard to understand whether it’s an appropriate ground-truth and also whether the DRL model’s performance is usable for real-world malware detection. 
Also, the baseline models used an already fairly complicated architecture (Figure 3) and it would have been useful to see the performance of simple heuristics and simpler models.