sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Writing the send entry is the tricky step, because the sender needs to know the identi.er of the remote receive queue.
Sentence 2: the sender and receiver may not have any shared information which can be used to agree on an identi.er, so the cleanest solution is for the sender to choose an identi.er for the remote receive queue and transmit it along with the .rst data packet.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Attribute based access control approaches [7] provide enhanced .ex­ibility compared to the previous mentioned access control models, by utilizing a number of security related character­istics of subjects and objects, which are expressed in the form of attributes, in order to provide .ne-grained access control.
Sentence 2: modern computing environments require the utilization of a number of factors for the creation of the access control decision.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, 28 of 29 users (97%) granted the foursquare app (in which users check in to various loca­tions nearby) access to their location, a similar approval rate to that of Maps.
Sentence 2: 40 of 68 users (59%) who had installed the IMDb app (which can use location to display nearby movie showtimes) granted it access to their location, and Shazam (which allows users to tag where they heard a song) was granted access by only 53% of users.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The predominant .rst-line of defense against scripting vul­nerabilities is sanitization the process of applying encoding or .ltering primitives, called sanitization primitives or san­itizers, to render dangerous constructs in untrusted inputs inert [1, 38, 49, 50].
Sentence 2: the practice of manually apply­ing sanitizers is notoriously prone to errors [1, 27, 33, 41 43].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, after Alice discloses A1 .B1, from Bob s point of view, he will .nd a circular dependency between A1and B1, which may make him believe that there is no hope to establish trust, and terminate the negotiation prematurely.
Sentence 2: the policy migration in the second example does preserve the potential success of the trust ne­gotiation.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Even in these simple cases, it may not be straightforward to .nd a solution that minimizes the recon.guration cost and at the same time pre­vents the attacker from reaching the goal.
Sentence 2: by exploring the dependency relationships among vulnerabilities, the minimum-cost network hardening approach in [15, 31] can com­pute optimal solutions based on the given attack graphs.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: BitVisor: A Thin Hypervisor for Enforcing I/O Device Security Takahiro Shinagawa Hideki Eiraku Kazumasa Omote University of Tsukuba Kouichi Tanimoto Japan Advanced Institute of shina@cs.tsukuba.ac.jp University of Tsukuba Science and Technology {hdk,tanimoto} @osss.cs.tsukuba.ac.jp omote@jaist.ac.jp Shoichi Hasegawa Manabu Hirano Kenichi Kourai Takashi Horie Toyota National College of Technology Kyushu Institute of Technology University of Tsukuba manabu@dsl.gr.jp kourai@ci.kyutech.ac.jp {s-hase,horietk} @osss.cs.tsukuba.ac.jp Yoshihiro Oyama Eiji Kawai Kenji Kono University of Electro-Communications Nara Institute of Science and Technology Keio University oyama@cs.uec.ac.jp eiji-ka@is.naist.jp kono@ics.keio.ac.jp Shigeru Chiba Yasushi Shinjo Kazuhiko Kato Tokyo Institute of Technology University of Tsukuba University of Tsukuba chiba@is.titech.ac.jp yas@is.tsukuba.ac.jp kato@cs.tsukuba.ac.jp Abstract Virtual machine monitors (VMMs), including hypervisors, are a popular platform for implementing various security functionalities.
Sentence 2: traditional VMMs require numerous components for pro­viding virtual hardware devices and for sharing and protecting sys­tem resources among virtual machines (VMs), enlarging the code size of and reducing the reliability of the VMMs.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A ret instruction can be encoded with any of the 0xc2, 0xc3, 0xca or 0xcb bytes, and, as such, can be part of any of the instruction .elds (excluding the pre.xes).
Sentence 2: jmp*/call* instructions are encoded by two-byte opcodes: an 0xff followed by an ModR/M byte carrying certain three-bit sequences.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Finally, their proposed model integrates time-bound access control of EHR data with role­based access control using personalized and customizable time windows.
Sentence 2: in these approaches, the data owner does not keep a copy of the data and when access control policies change, the data owner has to download and decrypt the data, re-encrypt it with the new keys, and upload the en­crypted data.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: With a total turnaround time of about 5 seconds between GPRS Attach commands (3 second response time + 2 second command interval), GPRS Attach has a output rate of roughly 0.2 commands per second.
Sentence 2: as only one in .ve attach commands reach the HLR, the throughput is further reduced by one-.fth, to 0.04 commands per second.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The only requirement is that by the time the branch is executed, it must evaluate to the ad­dress of the dispatcher, or to another gadget that leads to the dispatcher.
Sentence 2: the attack does not rely on speci.c operands for each of these branches: functional gadgets may change the CPU state in order to make available a di.eren­t set of gadgets for the next operation.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Thus, if we want to de.ne that certain subjects or members of a certain role are allowed to perform two SME tasks in ex­ceptional (emergency) situations, we must explicitly de.ne a corresponding break-glass override via the bbr or bbs map­pings (see De.nition 2).
Sentence 2: dME constraints de.ne that two dynamically mutual exclusive tasks must never be performed by the same subject in the same process instance.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: [2] At this level of speci.city, such an argument is unquestionably sound.
Sentence 2: the process of reducing such intuition to a rea­sonable password expiration policy would ideally be grounded in measurements of what additional steps the policy hoists on an attacker, so as to be certain that these additional steps are an im­pediment to his continued access.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: There­sultingprotocol can compute severalfunctions(including CODIS) on sample T and pattern p, using the number of circuits linear in the number of occurrences of p. Complexityincurredby the under­lying keyword searchprotocolislinearin |T|.
Sentence 2: common knowledge of some threshold on the number of occurrences needs tobe assumed.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: XACML v2 employs two versions of dov, one for combining rules and one for combining policies [1, C.1].
Sentence 2: the operator dov for policy is based on a single inter­pretation of Indeterminate and has the following behavior: dov(Indeterminate, Permit) = Deny dov for rules takes into account the e.ect of the rule in which the error occurred in order to make a decision.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The security bene.ts of starting from scratch on a closed box special-purpose platform can be signi.cant.
Sentence 2: for most ap­plications these bene.ts do not outweigh the advantages of general­purpose open platforms that run many applications including a huge body of existing code and that take advantage of commodity hard­ware (CPU, storage, peripherals, etc.)
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: RESULTS We focus the presentation of our results on the public ISCX dataset due to its reproducibility, as well as space limitations.
Sentence 2: the .gures and discussion below also apply to the Columbia dataset, with the primary di.erence being tighter error bounds due to a larger number of sam­ples and a smaller di.erence between aggregate and local supervised content models.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As a result, the Trojan horse executed by a user will carry the user s identity and has all privileges associated with the user.
Sentence 2: the reality is that when one user s process executes a program con­trolled by another user (possibly a trojan planted by an attacker), both the invoker and the controllers of the program content may affect the requests made by the process.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In MU-MIMO with physical security, the data .eld is precoded by ZF-BF and transmitted with arti.cial noise as discussed in Section 2, so it does not leak CSI to eavesdroppers.
Sentence 2: preambles such as L-STF, L-LTF, L-SIG, and HT-SIG are transmitted without precoding for backward compatibility, thus enabling all receivers to sense these control .elds.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Fi­nally, we also extended near-optimal evasion to general lp costs; i.e., costs based on lp distances.
Sentence 2: we showed that the algorithms for l1 costs can also be extended to near-optimal evasion on lp costs,butaregenerallynot e.cient.in the cases when these algorithms are not e.cient, we show that there is no e.cient query-based algorithm.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As PCR[t+3] and above will still hold the same values af­ter a software update, representing the software s proper­ties, these functions won t be a.ected.
Sentence 2: to prevent attackers from bypassing security policies by changing the PBBL or by deleting the NV-Space to rollback software ver­sions, software should also be sealed to all other PCRs except PCR[t+2] which includes the current CL serial number.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our notion is also closely related to the notion of proto­cols for conditional disclosure of secrets [5, 1], where (for the two-party setting), a receiver is able to obtain the sender s secret if a .xed condition C is satis.ed by the receiver s input.
Sentence 2: such protocols have been typically considered for speci.c (usually algebraic) conditions C. in our setting, this condition itself is both chosen by the sender and must remain secret from the receiver.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the latter case, we identify a series of apps (possibly with the same authorship) which are claimed to be able to spoof the caller s identity or changing the caller s voice (referred to as spoof call malware).
Sentence 2: when a user placesacall(e.g.,toadomesticnumber),thecall will .rst pass throughanIRSF number(i.e., as aproxy)before reach­  Table 2: Categorization of fraud activities  Revenue Channel Description Pct.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note that the accuracy of our approach when setting both con.dence and similarity thresholds to 0.2 is 0.634, which is the best accuracy in Figure 1(c).
Sentence 2: this accuracy is still worse than that when setting con.dence threshold to 0.7 and similarity threshold to 0.6, which is 0.616 (see the accuracy of EPGP+ in the uniform scenario in Table I).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As mentioned above, the attacker could try to provide the SID value to the victim through a crafted URL, in case the application accepts session identi.ers in GET parame­ters.
Sentence 2: as current Web applications only very sel­dom still allow SIDs in URLs [18], a realistic attack scenario would very likely require the adversary to illegitimately set a cookie.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Any studies on pronounceable passwords and particularly lexical blends would have to overcome similar bias, though perhaps less so than, e.g., graphical passwords.
Sentence 2: while the bias toward the familiar may be small due to the similarity between pronouceable and traditional passwords, the same similarity also com­plicates the analysis by introducing ambiguity as to the actual extent of any bias.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This is an issue as a receiver may not easily identify valid fragments as described in the pa­per.
Sentence 2: modifying perfect hash functions with a small range such that they map forged fragments to some invalid hash value does not help either, as in this case a single hash function can no longer be perfect for mul­tiple inputs a simple combinatorial argument then yields that the hash function has a minimum representation size  l of log22 n= nl - n log2 n bits if the order of the frag­ments is ignored (where l denotes the output bit length of a cryptographic hash function and n is the number of frag­ments in the bundle), or exactly nl bits otherwise, which is precisely the amount of space required for the hash list ap­proach.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Vanity, Cracks and Malware Insights into the Anti-Copy Protection Ecosystem Markus Kammerstetter, Christian Platzer and Gilbert Wondracek Vienna University of Technology Vienna, Austria {mk,cplatzer,gilbert}@iseclab.org  ABSTRACT Today, a large amount of software products include mecha­nisms to counter software piracy.
Sentence 2: most protection mechanisms can be easily circumvented by applying soft­ware patches (cracks) or license key generators (keygens) with seemingly no .nancial incentives.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-based Encryption (CP-ABE) [1, 7] is regarded as one of the most suitable technologies for data access control in cloud storage systems, because it gives the data owner more direct control on access policies and the policy check­ing occurs inside the cryptography".
Sentence 2: due to the attribute revocation problem, it is very costly to apply the CP-ABE approach to control the data access in cloud storage systems.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This technique is orthogonal to the one presented to far: it can be applied on top of it or on the original DFA before the default transition computation is performed.
Sentence 2: the basic idea is the following: in a DFA recognizing regular expressions over an alphabet S each state has potentially |S| outgoing transitions, one for each symbol in S. S can be partitioned into classes of symbols C1,...,Ck which are indistinguishable for the purposes of the DFA operation.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Moreover, as VMs can be migrated among di.erent nodes, and these migrations are ought to be transparent to users, di.culties are intensi.ed for separated attestation scheme to accurately determine the trust states of the ex­act dependency for a user s cloud application.
Sentence 2: as appropriate repeatedly attestation timing can only be decided according to the communication patterns of par­ticular VMs, it is hence di.cult for the combined attesta­tion scheme to determine the strategies to satisfy attestation needs of every application in the cloud.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: On the one hand, the service provider (a company or an hospital) may not be willing to provide the end user directly with its proprietary protocols because of fear of dis­closing valuable intellectual property to third parties or com­promising the basis for its service.
Sentence 2: pa­tients or users of the service might not be willing to disclose their personal signal information to a third party (not nec­essarily a hospital or doctor) for fears of losing control of their data (e.g., a user might be concerned that due to cer­tain medical condition his insurance premium will increase or that he will be discriminated during a job application).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: More generally, given an RCP instance that asks whether UP satis.es rp(P, s, d, t), if s + d > tb(UP, P ), then the answer is no .
Sentence 2: when d = 2 and s + d = tb(UP, P ), we do not immediately know whether UP satis.es rp(P, s, d, t) or not.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We also analyze the outputs of our digital PUF using the security principles of confusion and di.usion, as presented by Shan­non [2], through demonstration of the avalanche criterion.
Sentence 2: despite the theoretically sound and mathemati­cally proven security properties of many digital cryptographic systems, there exist many potential side-channels which can e.ectively bypass these mathematical constructs altogether by reading internal memory or inferring internal procedures through power analysis and memory attacks.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To acquire Md, we can run our SVM and take its memory snapshot before (Mbef ore ) and after (Maf ter ) executing a con.guration utility, and then we can get Md = Maf ter -Mbef ore .
Sentence 2: such an approach only works if and only if Md is located inDglobal If Md includes any Dheap data, it will fail kernel .
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: With such a large percentage of .onion requests originating in the United States, it is not surprising to observe the major Internet Ser­vice Providers (ISP) in Table 4 (AS7922 is Comcast and AS7018 is AT&#38;T)2 .
Sentence 2: it is interesting to observe that nearly 8% of all .onion traf.c originates from AS15169 (Google).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If he submits this new document to the time-stamping service, later veri.cation by the acquirer will fail because the time-stamp of the docu­ment is past the certi.cate end date.
Sentence 2: if one assumes that the attacker has the capabil­ity to brute-force the supplier certi.cate private key, one can equally well assume that the attacker can also brute force the private key of equal strength of the time-stamping authority, investing the same order of magnitude of e.ort.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The common mode can be less e.cient than the attach mode, as individual mixes must route their messages to the head of the cascade for transmission.
Sentence 2: in the com­mon mode, an adversary must convince a mix that a mes­sage the adversary is asking the mix s help to trace is not the mix s own message, because the mix cannot recognize its own messages in a re-encryption mix-net [1].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For instance, in the case of a sandboxed process, if the process is bound by the kernel to execute in split-hardened context, the attacker needs to .rst compromise another process that executes in split-base mode.
Sentence 2: in doing so, the attacker needs to escape the sandbox .rst, which is typically their initial motivation for using a kernel exploit [15].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Thesethreeaspetsofomposabilityareurrentlyalso understudyinourresearhprojet.
Sentence 2: sofar,wehavenoimplementationompleted.suhworkisontheway.Rightnowweareworkingonprin­iplesforahievinga"omplete"setofonfitresolution mehanisms,foragivenappliationdomain.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Keynote Talk Challenges and Opportunities for Virtualized Security in the Clouds Frank Siebenlist Argonne National Laboratory University of Chicago Argonne, IL, USA franks@mcs.anl.gov Abstract The virtualization technologies that underlie the cloud computing infrastructures pose challenges on enforcing security policy when we have a sense of ambiguity concerning the actual physical properties of the resources.
Sentence 2: the virtual machine managers provide us with better sandboxing, detailed monitoring capabilities and fine-grained access control on the resource usage.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The incentive to plant Easter eggs (developers coding bugs intentionally in order to later bene.t from their discovery), might be decreased if the payment of a bounty decreases the developers bonus pool for the vulnerable product, or if bug bounties paid were deducted from developers pay.
Sentence 2: the resourcefulness of devious developers to .nd ways to personally bene.t from any system should not be underestimated.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In a previous work, we presented a very rudimentary sketch of incorporating PUFsintoanauthentication system(referenceomit­  Figure 1: A sample 1-bit PUF based on ring oscillators ted for purposes of anonymity).
Sentence 2: the focus of that pa­per was onjointinstallation ofPUF challengesto combatinsider threats.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This is a consequence of the large value (say, hundreds of thousands of Euros) of the respective outsourcing contracts if the service provider does not adhere to the policies, he looses a customer and a large sum of money.
Sentence 2: the owners of web services that implement, for instance, the negotiation of health insurances, may have a strong interest in keeping sensitive data, even though this may con.ict with respective policies.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The security proof in [1] ensures that this scheme is unconditionally secure and t-collusion resistant; i.e., a coalition of no more than t compromised nodes can­not know anything about thekey sharedby anytwo non­compromised nodes.
Sentence 2: an attacker who compromises t+1 nodes can use interpolation to recover the masterpoly­nomial f(x,y).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The repeated invocation of consensus construction consumes more computation resources.
Sentence 2: the additional computation over­head is overshadowed by its bene.ts: given the long-tail distri­bution of different proxies latencies, it effectively improves the time-to-.rst-byte latency by eliminating the effects of slow, cor­rupt, and/or failed proxies.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To keep the sensitive user data con.dential against untrusted CSPs, a natural way is to apply cryptographic approaches, by dis­closing decryption keys only to authorized users.
Sentence 2: when enterprise users outsource con.dential data for shar­ing on cloud servers, the adopted encryption system should not only support .ne-grained access control, but also pro­vide high performance, full delegation, and scalability, so as to best serve the needs of accessing data anytime and any­where, delegating within enterprises, and achieving a dy­namic set of users.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example consider the problem of going to a nice Shake­spearian Tour in Italy: you might decide to go to the city of Shylock, from there rent a car and travel to Romeo and Juliet s last resort, to jump then on a train and visit the Senate s seat where Pompeous spoke after Caesar s death.
Sentence 2: you might as well decide to travel instead to Ger­many .rst and then the train to Verona from there.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Upon reaching defense node 8, it is aggregated with another incoming ap- proved traffic flow (bearing stamp 002), and both flows leave this node 8 bearing stamp 101 and continue toward the vic- tim.
Sentence 2: attack traffic from the 126 subnet is rate limited by defense node 6, and becomes a monitored flow leaving this node with stamp 768.
Relationship: contrasting