sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Secondly, platform-level IA mechanisms would need to be managed by the platform developers or some central authority.
Sentence 2: iA is a rel­atively new area that still experiences radical revisions due to the research .ndings in such areas as the use of novel sensors or wearable devices for IA [28, 35], and the research .ndings on the usability and acceptance of IA schemes.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: By concatenating two formal contexts (G1,M1,I1) and (G2,M2,I2), we mean mainly to unite the contained sets.
Sentence 2: we use disjoint object sets G.i = {i}×Gi and have, therefore, also to adapt the incidence relations Ii before the union: (G1,M1,I1) · (G2,M2,I2)=( G.1 .
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The above discussion shows that the security of Hyper-Sentry relies on various hardware components (e.g., IPMI, SMI, TPM, IOMMU, APIC).
Sentence 2: this should not be a concern to the security of the whole framework because most of these components need to be trusted to preserve the correctness of most, if not all, security systems.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Hence, our approach is suit­able for environments where the .ltering rule sets do not change too frequently, as changes to the source rule set require a recompu­tation of the modi.ed rule set in order to prevent a degeneration of the embedded decision trees.
Sentence 2: during our evaluation we encountered the problem that the transformation process for some very large rule sets (10K or more rules) or rule sets with many large rules (in a geometrical sense) took very long for a given binth pa­rameter and cut heuristic.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The knowledge of how many characters can be expected in a challenge was used for locating connected characters and estimating the number of such characters in the challenge, which is a crucial step in our highly successful segmentation attack on the MSN scheme [16].
Sentence 2: in this attack, our segmentation success rate was higher than 92%, which could lead to an overall (both segmentation and recognition) success rate of higher than 60%.on the other hand, such a design choice contributes to improving the scheme s usability.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.6.1 Password  Participants liked the familiarity of password entry, com­menting that there was no need to learn new tricks , it was comfortable, easy and familiar , seemed to be the fastest method and easiest to remember the measurements and familiar = easy = like!
Sentence 2: they did not like that the input requires many steps (including switching back and forth between alphabet and number input) .
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, if the health organisation were a medical practitioner registration board, then it could be that its certificates confer the authority to sign e-prescriptions and other transactions under certain legislation (and the Certificate Policy would call out that legislation explicitly and incorporate, probably by reference, all associated rights, responsibilities, terms and conditions).
Sentence 2: if the health organisation were a hospital, then its certificates might have a more restricted scope of meaning, such as the authority to admit patients for procedures according to a contract between the hospital and a doctor.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: [9] have presented a context-dependent access control forcontext information,which canbecharacterizedbythree basic properties: owner-centric, context-dependent, and in­dividual role model for each user.
Sentence 2: this solution has been proposed to control access exclusively on context information, which limits its use in PCE (resources can be data, services, etc).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Many databases such as Oracle have implemented roles in addi­tion to ACLs to group together common sets of privileges and simplify administration.
Sentence 2: in a scenario where each user requires an individually-de.ned view of a table (such as the policy of each employee can view their own data in the table ), it becomes just as tedious to use roles as to use ACLs.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If the host was a legitimate host (Figure 3b), that is, not using decoy routing, then because there is an existing TCP stream, the destination will treat this packet as a duplicate, and, per the TCP RFC [23], send a duplicate acknowledgement.
Sentence 2: if the host was actually using decoy routing (Figure 3c) and the destination was simply the overt destination, no TCP connection will exist, and the destination will respond with a TCP reset packet.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This validates the results of TA HO E s anal­ysis because the hook placement in LSM-SELinux has been tested thoroughly, and the errors found by veri.cation tools [10, 23] have been .xed.
Sentence 2: in the case of vfs rmdir, LSM-SELinux optimizes hook placement: A closer look at the source code of vfs rmdir reveals that all code paths to line (V5) pass through line (M4) and line (P3) (formally, line (M4) and line (P3) dominate line (V5) [17]).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Non-SecurityGoals: As atenant sVMstill uses servicesprovided bytheVMMandits managementVM andtools,CloudVisorcannot guarantee availability and execution correctness of a tenant s VM.
Sentence 2: we believe this is not an issue for multi-tenant cloud, as the primary goal of cloud providers is featuring utility-style com­putingresourcesto users with certain service-level agreement.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: After successful validation, interrupts are remapped by the hard­ware module to the corresponding physical interrupt vectors with the proper attributes (e.g., delivery mode).
Sentence 2: if Extended Interrupt Mode (x2APIC mode) [27] is disabled, old, compatibil­ity-format MSI interrupts can still be generated if VMM software enables them during runtime.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We presented results for a server-like and desktop-like load, and showed that training on one does not allow us to detect under the other, and that training on both results in decreased detec­tor performance from the case where we train on only one of the loads.
Sentence 2: our results are promising in show­ing that even under a fundamentally di.erent type of load, the detector still provides adequate discrimination between  Figure 7: ROC curve for system under both desk­top and web server loads, showing degraded perfor­mance clean and infected systems.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: First, AKI s setup suggests that validators can be non-pro.t organizations whose only incentive is to check the correctness of ILS operations.
Sentence 2: aKI s design implies that if validators are not continuously online or have rooti h13 h14 h9 h10 h11 h12 h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6 h7 h8 rooti-1 A.com D.com F.com K.com P.com S.com Z.com  Figure 2: Integrity Tree in i-th ILS_UP period.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Other reasons such as the relative frequencies of dif­ferent key-pairs in natural language are also often cited for the di.erences in typing speeds of the respective key-pairs.
Sentence 2: for the design of Master-key, we needed precise distribution information for KHTs and KITs from typing sessions which were designed to closely match password en­try in a typical KD authentication environment and thus could not rely on general trends that have been reported from experiments conducted mostly in the .eld of psychol­ogy under a wide range of conditions (in terms of sample sizes, keyboard types, type of text typed, key logger clock resolutions, features studied, pre-processing of experimental data (e.g., outlier removal), method of text entry (e.g., we required users to re-enter text if an error was made in the password),etc.,).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: LetRbethesetofnodestowhihpermissionis grantedatnodeR,AthesetgrantedbyA,et.
Sentence 2: therequestisauthorizedif: Req<(RUAUBUCUDUEUFUGUHUIUJUKULU ) Determiningtheallowabilityofarequestimpliesalarge searhspaeinthepermissionstree.exploiting thehierarhialnatureoftheXSetstandardallowssearh spaetobelimitedbyeliminatingpartsofthetreethat annotontainmembersoftherequestedset.Nodesanbe eliminatedeitherbytheloationofbranhpointsintheset, asintheaseofFandG,andbythemaximumdepthofa desirednodespeifedbytheXSet,asintheaseofD,E, K,L,andM(seeFigure5).Applyingtheserulesredues theauthorizationfuntionforReqto: Req<(RUAUBUCUHUIUJ)  3.2 Set-Access Control Lists YGuardisbasedonahierarhyofset­aessontrollists.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The advantage of IG is its simplicity, however its disad­vantage is that combining individually-good features into a subset does not necessarily mean that the features sub­set are good team-playing members.
Sentence 2: one of the questions this evaluation attempts to answer is how likely is it to have such scenarios in real-life datasets where highly predictive individual features are not good team-playing fea­tures.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The two techniques are complementary: one could use backtracking to identify the source of the intrusion, then use the Repairable File Service s forward tracking to identify the .les that potentially have been contami­nated by the intrusion.
Sentence 2: we believe that an intruder can hide her actions much more easily from the forward tracking phase, e.g., by simply touching all .les in the system.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: On one hand, this property is helpful in tracing: a judge (given the decryption box and the decryption key of the user) can probe the box exactly on those ciphertexts which the user key should not be able to decrypt.
Sentence 2: this does not seem to create a problem for decryption queries since the chance that a malicious PKG will hit such a ciphertext (with a polynomial number of queries) is negligible.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: ComprehensibilityandintuitiveappealItislear thattheadmin-authorityrelationisfarsimplerthan an-modify.Inpartiular,theonlyonstraintsontu­ples(a,r)Eadmin-authorityarethataIrand (r,a)Eadmin-authority,whileeveryauthorityrangein an-modifymustbeanenapsulatedrangeandanypair ofauthorityrangesmustnotoverlap.Furthermore,in theRHA4modelweanvisualizetheadministrationof therolehierarhyusingtheextendedhierarhy.Inshort, thereisanintuitiveandimmediateinterpretationofthe admin-authorityrelationthatislakinginthean-modify relation.
Sentence 2: aformalanalysisoftheomplexityofimplementing RHA4isbeyondthesopeofthispaper.wenote E (d)DeleteEdge(ENG1,PE1) theextendedhierarhy thatthean-modifyrelationisdefnedintermsofenapsu­ 21R1 latedrangeswhiharesubsetsofR.Therearesubsets ofR.Henethenumberoftuplesinan-modifyisbounded 21R1 bylARl,whereARisthesetofadministrativeroles.5 Thenumberoftuplesinadmin-authorityisboundedby lRl.Itanbeseenfrom(5) (7)thattheomplexityofan algorithmtodeterminewhetherarangeisenapsulatedis ertainlynobetterthanthatofanalgorithmtodetermine whetheraroleisintheadministrativesopeofanotherrole.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Wang and Lakshmanan [31] use OPE in querying en­crypted XML database and address the prior-knowledge enhanced attacks on OPE with duplicated fake index entries that point to the same data item in the encrypted data block.
Sentence 2: their ap­proach requires the data owner to build indices for the server, which is expensive and not convenient when the database is large and fre­quently updated.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: V EX does not ensure that the auctioned im­pression is actually delivered to the claimed user: the seller can send the ad to a different user, or even a bot.
Sentence 2: based on the HTTP request that fetches the ad, the winning bidder can check that the fetching user matches the original user information (§2.2), in terms of browser, IP pre.x, cookies, etc.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.2.5.2 Secure Key Distribution.
Sentence 2: secure key distribution does not require the use of a spe­ci.c routing protocol.for concreteness, in this paper we assume the use of a routing protocol similar to the TinyOS beaconing protocol [12, 17].In this protocol, the nodes in the network are organized into a breadth .rst spanning tree on the basis of routing updates that are peri­odically broadcast by the base station and recursively prop­agated to the rest of the network.Each node keeps track of not only its parent and its children in the spanning tree, and also other immediate neighbors.Note that in the TinyOS beaconing protocol a node does not maintain any informa­tion regarding any non-parent nodes in the spanning tree; however, this information is necessary for secure key distri­bution below and for defending against various attacks in Section 5.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This approach appears conceptually simple, but hides com­plexity in the construction of the argument system: existing schemes all make use of complex Probabilistically Checkable Proofs (PCPs), and this appears to be an inherent property of e.cient argument systems [RV10].
Sentence 2: the con­stants hidden in the asymptotic notation of our construc­tions are very small (see Theorem 3.7 for the parameters).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The results of security checks must be established before trans­actions attempt to commit.
Sentence 2: tMI-based enforcement should abort a transactionif,andonlyif,a security checkfailsandvalidationof the completeexecution .ndsno con.icts.security checks need not be fully evaluated when the TMI reference monitor is in­voked; thebulkof thework can oftenbe performed lazily, oreven overlappedwiththeexecutionofthe transaction.Wehaveusedboth lazy and overlapped enforcement of authorization policies for our experiments in Section5, and found that they can signi.cantly re­duce overheads.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This query will be allowed, since tainted characters occur only inside a string literal.
Sentence 2: when the malicious user enters their name, the SQL query will be: SELECT * FROM students WHERE name = Bobby ; DROP TABLE students; -- In this case, the infrastructure can recognize that the web application is under attack, since taint is not limited to liter­als: several SQL keywords (e.g., DROP) and operators (e.g., ;) are partially or wholly tainted.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For instance, un­til the late 20th century, Polish (a close relative of Rus­sian, with 39 million native speakers) had only a hand­ful of lexical blends, which were not recognized as such by most speakers.
Sentence 2: since the 1960s, and especially the 1990s, blending has become a ma jor source of new Pol­ish words under the in.uence of English and other interna­tional languages [51].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, as in Figure 2, we may want to allow some third-party extensions in Escudo ring 1 to invoke the DeleteFriends function, as long as the user speci.cally grants the permission (i.e., the function will provides ex­tra application-speci.c control to safe-guard the friend list).
Sentence 2: because of protection needs, the Friend table is stored in Scuta ring 0, forcing the DeleteFriends func­tion to be put in ring 0 as well, and denying invocation by the third-party JavaScript code (in Escudo ring 1).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In particular, we introduced a systematic con.ict detection and resolution approach [21] to cope with privacy con.icts occur­ring in collaborative management of data sharing in OSNs, balanc­ing the need for privacy protection and the users desire for infor­mation sharing by quantitative analysis of privacy risk and sharing loss.
Sentence 2: the proposed privacy con.ict resolution mechanism assumes that all controllers are well-behaved to provide their pri­vacy settings for collaborative sharing.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: File access: Unlike OAuth, our protocol has no extended message.
Sentence 2: for a challenge message, the crypto­graphic cost at a server is CP-ABE encryption (2|L| +2 exponentiations); and for a response message, the computa­ n tion cost at a consumer is CP-ABE decryption (2|IL| +1 pairing operations).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To simplify the de­velopment of context-aware applications typically a dedicated mid­dleware is implemented which reduces the complexity of context­modeling for developers.
Sentence 2: since these frameworks are of­ten di.cult to use or lack certain features like runtime updates or are generally hard to extend, Ambient Dynamix, a plug-and-play context framework has been introduced by Carlson et al.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In particular, several content .ltering tech­niques have been proposed to used Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) for taking advantage of the hardware par­allelism and the con.gurable nature of the device [4][5][6].
Sentence 2: the FPGA has to be reprogrammed to modify the signature database, which could lead the network infrastruc­ture at stake in the presence of the zero-day attack [7].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For the mobile honeypot, we build our subsequent anal­ysis of monitoring attacks on a Linux-based system that is connected to a mobile operator network for two reasons: First, a major part of currently deployed smartphones runs Android, which makes this platform appropriate for obser­vations.
Sentence 2: current OS .ngerprinting tools such as Nmap or Xprobe do not reveal speci.cs of the Android OS, but only report about a Linux system.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: One way to decrease the SRK size requirement is to use a more size-e.cient asymmetric primitive like Elliptic Curve Cryptography.
Sentence 2: in the absence of such alterna­tives it is possible to implement the SRK of an MRTM as a symmetric key with a su.cient key strength, e.g.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We propose the Secure Deep Throat (SDT) protocol to provide anonymity for witnesses of malicious or sel.sh behavior to enable such peers to report on this behavior without fear of retaliation.
Sentence 2: in SDT the misuse of anonymity is re­strained in such a way that any malicious peer that attempts to send multiple claims against the same innocent peer for the same reason (i.e., the same misbehavior type) can be identi.ed.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To be fair, the CVSS speci.cation does not state how to interpret the Exploitability score; its in­tended purpose may not have been to represent the likelihood that a vulnerability is exploited.
Sentence 2: given its name and the factors that determine the score e.g., dif.culty and complexity of pro­grammatically accessing the vulnerability in an exploit attempt it seems reasonable to expect that the score correlates with exploit likelihood.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: At the end of the key generation phase, each player only needs to store a private key share SK i = {(Ak(i), Bk(i))}2 k=1 of constant-size whereas solutions like [4] incur the storage of O(n) elements at each player and can erase all interme­diate values, including the polynomials Aik[X] and Bik[X].
Sentence 2: we insist that the security analysis does not require reliable erasures.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Thus, these intervals take care of the signatures separated by distances >d and =d(1+ß) s( t2,M2 must use the same public key SI .PK .
Sentence 2: sI .SK was not created and thus was not known at the time of the latest exposure te.Thus F cannot generate the SI -signature for SI .PK (i.e., we could reduce forging S sig­natures to F success).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Forexample,theattackercansendapacketwithallofthe slotsflledwithfakerouterentries.Sinceagivenrouterdoes notknowhowmanyroutersprocessedthepacketbeforeit, itmustrelyontheentriesinthepacket.Sincealltheslots areflledwithfakeentries,therouterwillassumethatthe packethasalreadytraveledthroughmanyroutersandwill notrecorditsentry.Thustheattackeravoidsdetection.
Sentence 2: theaboveproblemcouldbeavoidedbyusingavariable lengthfeld,wherebyeachrouterappendsitsentrytothe end.thiswouldmaketheIPheaderexpandout ofcontrol.OnecouldeasilyimagineIPpacketsthatcontain moreheaderinformationthandata.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As presented in Figure 5, TP and FP rates did vary when URL class ratios varied in the dataset, which is expected due to the nature of this statistical classi.er.
Sentence 2: it is inter­esting that TP and FP rates did not vary noticeably consid­ering the noticeable variation in the datasets (i.e variations in TP and FP rates are around 1% and 3% respectively).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The proposed policy model associates program entrypoints, the instructions that invoke the system call library with whether the expected resource retrieved should be adversary-accessible or not.
Sentence 2: the entry­point may be invoked in multiple contexts, some of which may access di.erent resources, or use name values derived from multiple data .ows, only some of which may be under adversary control.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In a smart grid, the number of packets transmitted to IEDs per second is typically in hundreds, and so in the data injection attack, it is conceivable that the AMS may converge to an optimal strategy in matter of minutes.
Sentence 2: other types of at­tacks that are less frequent (e.g., where an attacker s action involves physical hampering), a dynamic technique such as the AMS might not be suitable.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Each level is unaware of how the next level structures itself, only that it provides an interface to read and write, and that it can do so securely.
Sentence 2: we cannot treat the map as a simple associative array now because the recursive ORAM will need to store more than one address per block in or­der to guarantee that we have only O(log n) levels of recursion.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this case, if our scheme precomputes (uj , rj ) , the timing of signing will be much shorter for two scalar multiplication operations reduced.
Sentence 2: our scheme uses the Tate pairing instead of Weil pairing because the Weil pairing takes longer than twice the running time of the Tate pairing for the cryptographic applications [10].
Relationship: contrasting