sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Speci.cally, we require (1) a CCA-secure encryption scheme, and (2) a CPA-secure en­cryption scheme with an associated smooth projective hash function [12].
Sentence 2: the KOY/GL framework requires1 a CCA-secure encryption scheme with an associated smooth projective hash function, something not known to follow from the previous assumptions.2 In particular, our results imply a more e.cient as well as simpler construction of PAKE from lattice assump­tions as compared to the recent work of Katz and Vaikun­tanathan [22].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Encode(pkw,G(b,c),s) The security properties of the TOR scheme then give us the following guarantee: Given the translation table and encodings of s corresponding to b * ,c * , we clearly compute the encoding of s corresponding to G(b * ,c * ).
Sentence 2: the encoding corresponding to 1 - G(b * ,c * ) remains pseudoran­dom.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: They consist in identifying signatures of known attacks to compare them to each request and deter­minewhetheritisanattack ornot.
Sentence 2: these methods are settodefault whentheattackis unknownitis frequentthatan attackhas alreadybeendetectedby another organization andit wouldbe useful tobe able tobene.tfrom this knowledge to enrich the database of signatures.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note that here we are using an implicit quanti.cation on set variables X and Y. SEAL does not allow quanti.cation over set variables, and the IFEDAC model cannot be ex­pressed in our framework.
Sentence 2: as in the case of As­bestos presented previously, it is possible to encode a par­ticular instance of an IFEDAC system where these sets are .xed, and SEAL can be used in a limited way to verify safety when other relations can change dynamically.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The ability to locate services relies on the fact that server programs typically run on known reserved port numbers, allowing those services to be easily found by any visitor; imagine the chaos of attempting to connect to web sites if every web server used a di.erent port for this service.
Sentence 2: relocating services to di.erent port numbers is a common defensive strategy for services that should not be open to the public, which is most often done with ssh.The attacker can still locate the relo­cated service based on the connection negotiation with the host on the relocated port but the e.ort to locate the service becomes more challenging.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: RELATED WORK Some solutions have been proposed to increase privacy on di.erent online sharing platforms like exclusively on social networks or webmail platforms.
Sentence 2: these solutions ei­ther: (1) do not hide that communication is con.dential [11, 8], (2) protect only certain kind of data (e.g., pro.le infor­mation or private messages) [43], (3) require the existence of dedicated infrastructure or a trusted third-party, or (4) are restricted to a speci.c platform.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We call {C |.E : t per­mits (C, E)} the set of acceptable causes and {E |.C : t permits (C, E)} the set of desired e.ects of S. Note that a causality (C, E) is not necessarily permitted by t if C is acceptable and E is desired.
Sentence 2: if C is not acceptable or E is not desired we can conclude that (C, E) is not permitted without further analysis.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Credit is used to identify aggres­sive attackers; during congestion, the credit of an ac­  Figure 1: Components of the proposed defense tive client is decreased proportionally to the amount of tra.c it contributes to the congestion.
Sentence 2: credit assignment alone cannot deal with distributed attacks where each malicious client sends tra.c at a very low rate.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Processing time with CRT (secs.)
Sentence 2: 1 0.208438 0.057042 2 0.223449 0.057879 3 0.206945 0.057248 4 0.215324 0.056165  5 0.229685 0.056701 6 0.226190 0.056904 7 0.233663 0.058223 8 0.224079 0.05743 9 0.212913 0.056463  10 0.205311 0.057443 Average 0.2186 0.05715  in this application, the participant that requires speed up is the vehicle which utilizes a simple 16-bit processor.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In case of(1), the test resultispositive only if: fp(D ) .G, i.e., fp(D )nG = fp(D ): if this happens, thereis actuallynodifferencebetweenthe output ofPSIandthat of PSI-CA.
Sentence 2: pSI-CA is preferred over PSI since, if the test is negative, less information about Server genome is revealed to Client.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Figure 7: Maximum jamming probability against seed (n = lm 4, 9, 25, 49, 81, 121, 169; ls =64; |Ce| = |C2 p| )  Figure 8: Advantage of receivers over jammers (n = lm 4, 9, 25, 49, 81, 121, 169; ls =64; |Ce| = |C2 p| ) Figure 7 shows that the real-time jammer has the highest jam­ming probability among all jammers.
Sentence 2: we would like to point out that the real-time jammer is a strong assumption; such a jammer may have to use special hardware (e.g., parallel computing devices) to obtain the despreading results.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: APR-Quad proofs range from 79 KB for 1k insertions to just less than 3.5 MB for 90k insertions (Figure 10).
Sentence 2: individual proofs scale linearly with the number of insertions, requiring 194 MB for Time (sec) Poof Size (MB) Figure 7: Inter-block search times during insertion of 10k objects in varying sized dictionaries.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The access control rules and conditions language intro­duced in Section 4.6.1 was designed to illustrate the ca­pabilities and usage of idemix for con.guring anonymous attribute-based access control in a prototype application environment.
Sentence 2: as idemix certi.cates can be used to formulate any assertion (also identity assertions, if re­quired), idemix attribute-based authentication can support any of the trust management models mentioned; also, in a distributed system where credential veri.ers do not know credential issuers (and their keys) on beforehand, credential veri.cation conditions and rules can be modi.ed to express more general authority delegation and trust management policies (e.g., I accept a credential issued by an issuer sat­isfying trust or delegation condition Y instead of I accept a credential from issuer X.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Vetting Undesirable Behaviors in Android Apps with Permission Use Analysis Yuan Zhang1 Min Yang1 Bingquan Xu1 Zhemin Yang1 Guofei Gu2 Peng Ning3 X. Sean Wang1 Binyu Zang1 1School of Computer Science, Fudan University, China {yuanxzhang, m_yang, xubingquan, yangzhemin, xywangCS, byzang}@fudan.edu.cn 2SUCCESS Lab, Texas A&#38;M University, USA, guofei@cse.tamu.edu 3Department of Computer Science, North Carolina State University, USA, pning@ncsu.edu Abstract Android platform adopts permissions to protect sensitive resources from untrusted apps.
Sentence 2: after permissions are granted by users at install time, apps could use these permissions (sensitive resources) with no further restrictions.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, someone selling packs that contain a home DSL router and three wireless LAN base stations might install a different, randomly­chosen NMK in each pack, to guarantee plug-and-play performance with no user intervention.
Sentence 2: here there remains an option for the user to enroll the devices in a larger network by either the Secure Mode or Simple Connect Mode mechanisms.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.2.2 Activation-only hierarchy (A-hierarchy) WeseethatwhenwehaveanA-hierarchy,itisnatural tojustusethesecondapproachgivenabove,thatis,there isnoactivation-inheritanceallowedinintervalT2.Thisis becauseofanexplicitneedforactivatingajuniorroleby auserassignedtoitsseniorroleinordertoacquirethe juniorrole'spermissions,andinT2,thejuniorrolecannot beactivated.Ifwetrytoalsoenforcethefrstpossibility mentionedabovethenitwillconfictwiththesemanticsof anenabledrole,asonlyenabledrolescanbeactivated.
Sentence 2: asactivationhierarchyneedsauserassignedto theseniorroletoactivateajuniorroleinordertoacquirethe juniorrole'spermissions,theissueofpropagationoftem­poraluser-roleassignmentdowntheA-hierarchyneedsto beconsidered.Forexample,considertherolesSoftware EngineerandProgrammerformingtheA-hierarchyinFig­ure1(b).Consideragainthesameenabledtimesofthetwo rolesasinFigure1(d).Weneedtodeterminewhetherthe useristobeallowedtoactivatethejuniorroleatthetime whentheseniorroleheisassignedtoisnotenabled,asindi­catedbytheintervalT1inFigure1(d)-(i).Forsuchacase, wecanagaindelineatethefollowingtwoapproaches: 1.Weaklyrestrictedapproach(Aw):Theuseruisallowed toactivateProgrammerroleintheA-hierarchyatany timetheProgrammerroleisenabled.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The propagation of the virus is slowed down signi.cantly when applying ACT.
Sentence 2: virus propaga­ situations Number of Infected Nodes 3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0 Time Figure 5: Non-reinfection Virus Propagation With DQ: Random Topology 4000 3500  Number of Infected Nodes 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 3000  Number of Infected Nodes Number of Nodes 2500 2000 1500 1000 1000 500 500 0 0 Time Time Figure 7: Reinfection Virus Propagation With DQ: Figure 9: Details of Virus Propagation in the Ran­random topology dom Network 5000 non-reinfection virus can be calculated as 4500 d i 4000 R0 i = Ph i k , k = 1, 2, · · · , di (2) Number of Infected Nodes 3500 k=1 3000 where hi k, k 1, 2, · · · , di are the neighbors of host i.= 2500 is decreased when a warning signal is received.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For exam­ple, a set of numeric objects may be statistically downgraded using their mean; an image may be downgraded by lowering its resolution, smoothness factor, etc.
Sentence 2: let us consider an aggregation operation that reconstructs a secret x (output) from a collection of its secret shares {yi}(input) using a standard k-out-of-n secret sharing scheme.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While we do not know the exact RAM usage while the response is computed, it seems very likely that implementing a masking scheme on that controller would exceed the RAM availability.
Sentence 2: in contrast to the more than 15 year old PIC16LC58B, state-of-the art micro­controllers or, better smart card controllers are equipped with enough resources for implementing a masking scheme.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Existing research on authenticating websites to users include security indicators [12, 30], secure bookmarks for known websites [14, 75, 78], and automated detection and blacklisting of known phishing sites [16].
Sentence 2: studies suggest that security indicators are ine.ective at preventing phishing attacks [15, 60], and blacklisting known phishing sites still su.ers from a high rate of false-positives and false­negatives [79].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In fact, a lower threshold may be more appropriate: as we describe in Section 5.3 below, a signi.cant fraction of accepted mail is still spam, and, in many cases, SpamTracker captures this spam before the Organization or Spamhaus does.
Sentence 2: without ground truth data, it is dif.cult to determine a precise false positive rate, because accepted mail may simply be misclassi.ed spam.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Unlike competing security solutions, this design is unique in that even if the 1Also referred to as the Synergistic Processor Unit (SPU) isolation mode  supervisory software such as the operating system or thehy­pervisor is compromised, the process isolation is guaranteed.
Sentence 2: most security architectures rely on the perpet­ual integrity and security of their supervisory software to protect and separate the processes.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Particularly, these schemes may take the threshold-based approach, in which the group key is ei­ther agreed among group members or generated based on shares from group members [14, 6, 7].
Sentence 2: none of the existing solutions .ts well in WMNs, since they cannot take advantage of or mitigate the disad­vantage of the architectural heterogeneity of WMNs.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Previous work did not present a comprehen­sive malware clustering validity analysis system, and the cohesion and separation validity indexes used in [15] were mainly internal validity indexes that required a signi.cant amount of interpretation through manual analysis.
Sentence 2: vAMO introduces a comprehensive, fully automated malware clustering validity analy­sis process that can more readily be used to select the parameters of a malware clustering system, or to compare results obtained using different clustering algorithms.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 2.3 Advantages and Shortcomings The major difference from the traditional two-factor authentica­tion mechanisms (e.g., con.rmation codes sent via text message or OTP tokens) is that Facebook s SA is less cumbersome, especially because users have grown accustomed to tagging friends in photos.
Sentence 2: as presented recently by Kim et al.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In settings, where d2d chan­nel(s) do not exist (i.e., when at least one device does not have a receiver), pairing methods can be based upon device-to-human (d2h) and human-to-device (h2d) channel(s) instead (e.g., based on transfer of numbers [25]).
Sentence 2: establishing such channels on constrained devices may also not be feasible.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A server can satisfy this condition via a high-bandwidth access link or co­location at a data center.
Sentence 2: we expect the more com­mon deployment to be ISPs which of course have signi.­cant bandwidth offering speak-up as a service (just as they do with other DDoS defenses today), perhaps amortizing the expense over many defended sites, as suggested in [2].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: According to the protocol model, a packet transmission on link m is successful, provided that for each interfering link l .L,l =m,wehave threshold model is quite close to the additive inter­ference model when the transmitter is close enough to the receiver, provided there is a single interferer.
Sentence 2: as the transmitter-receiver separation in­ 150 |Xl -Ym|> (1+.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.4 Impersonation Attacks Now let s discuss some possible impersonation attacks as below: (a) An adversary attempts to impersonate a signer P .
Sentence 2: i j she/he cannot create a valid individual signature (uj , rj ) to (ik) satisfy Equation (4) because of the lack of the secret key S .
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A possible solution is to use the LDRH instruction to load a half word if the processor was in thumb mode before activating the hypervisor handler.
Sentence 2: the TLS speci.cation requires that all hypercalls in­voked in thumb mode are handled as no operations; in this case there is no reason to access the guest memory to decode the SWI instruction and the hypervisor has been .xed by enforcing this policy.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For ex­ample, an administrator may consider the jamming attack much more important than the selective forwarding attack since the environment could be outdoor and more hostile to potential jamming attackers.
Sentence 2: in order to comply with the relation (2), the summation of the two weight factors is one: wSF + wJ = 1 (5) Initially, we treat both threads equally, so it holds: wSF = 0.5, wJ = 0.5 (6) a fair treatment of the above weights could be insu.cient.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the last decades, we have been very lucky that for most hash functions .nd­ing second preimages is much harder than .nding collisions (since .nding collisions turned out to be much easier than anticipated); hence it may be nice to keep this security mar­gin in designs that need long term security.
Sentence 2: there is the concern that if SHA-3 is not as fast as SHA-2 in software, it will not be widely adopted.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Protecting Function Pointers in Binary * Chao Zhang Tao Wei Zhaofeng Chen LiST, Peking University LiST, Peking University LiST, Peking University Beijing, China UC Berkeley Beijing, China chao.zhang@pku.edu.cn wei_tao@pku.edu.cn chenzhaofeng@pku.edu.cn Lei Duan Stephen McCamant Laszlo Szekeres LiST, Peking University University of Minnesota Stony Brook University Beijing, China lei_duan@pku.edu.cn USA mccamant@cs.umn.edu USA lszekeres@cs.stonybrook.edu ABSTRACT Function pointers have recently become an important attack vector for control-.ow hijacking attacks.
Sentence 2: no pro­tection mechanisms for function pointers have yet seen wide adoption.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If i1,i2reside in different parts of the database, then it clearly suf.ces to read one bit from each of the .rst two devices.
Sentence 2: if i1,i2 both reside in the same part, say L, then one of them can be re­trieved directly from the .rst device, and the other by reading one bit from each of the other devices and taking the exclusive-or of the two bits.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Systems initialized using personal images [26,37,38] are particularly promising due to the ubiquity of large image collections, in addition due to observed usability benefits where users have had involvement to capture or create the images [28].
Sentence 2: it appears likely that the usability benefits of this genre of graphical password are contingent upon subtle attributes of the image sets that are presented to users.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Further, rare words are vulnerable but will not be likely to appear in fu­ture messages.
Sentence 2: whileitisunlikelythataparticular rare word would appear in a new message, it is still quite likely that several rare words will appear in the message theZipfdistributionislong-tailed meaningthatthetailofit hassigni.cant mass.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: GENERALIZATION AND LOWER BOUNDS O.ine chaining and the hash-tree scheme have been dis­cussed as conceptually di.erent solutions in the literature, with the former being described as a graph-based signa­ture propagation scheme and the latter as a signature dis­persal protocol.
Sentence 2: it can be observed that the hash tree also implements a graph structure on the ba­sis of a one-way hash function.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For mobile access to multiple local wireless LANs, the mo­bile guest can trivially reserve an escort in each of the LAN and seek help from an apposite escort inside each LAN.
Sentence 2: if the mobile guest wants to enjoy free local roaming at real time, then an ef.cient escort registration phase must be embedded in ES-CORT design to assign the guest a nearest/best escort box at real time.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Observe that accounting for the fact that Tor clients use 3guard relaysby default(as comparedto onein our exper­iments) would reduce the frequency of them being detected as a bottleneck relay by a factor of 3.
Sentence 2: note that our results are conservative since we selected relays from a limited pool of only 25 Tor relays.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As shown in Figure 3a, beginning at approximately Day 4.7 and ter­minating on Day 5.5, a DDoS attack is an abrupt increase in the amount of requests per second experienced by a site -similar in the peak request rate to that of a .ash crowd.
Sentence 2: as depicted in Figure 3b, the dramatic increase in the request per second rate during a DDoS attack is at­tributed to the increase in the per client request rate, which is signi.cantly di.erent from that of a .ash crowd or nor­mal usage.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Please note that there exists a solution to the given PBAFSA problem if and only if the  sub encrypted stra is accepted by FSAa for all 1 = a = r. If the above PBAFSA sub problem has a solution mapping eatti , 0 = i = m-1, then one can .nd assignments for variables xi, 0 = i = 127 using Equation 1.
Sentence 2: since Skey ac is accepted by FSASAT for mapping eatti , 0 = i = m - 1, the encrypted stra is accepted by FSAa for all 1 = a = r. the encrypted stra is accepted by FSAa only if clausea is true.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This resembles the PC operating environment where mutually distrusting users share host resources.
Sentence 2: unlike PCs that utilize multi-user operating systems for resource sharing, protection, and management, today s browsers do not employ any operating system abstractions, but provide just a limited all-or-nothing trust model and protection abstractions suit­able only for a single-principal system: There is either no trust across principals through complete isolation or full trust through incorporating third party code as libraries.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Proposed models such as Context-Role Based Access Control (CRBAC) [14], Generalized Role Based Access Control (GRBAC) [13], and Temporal Role-Based Access Control (TRBAC) [2] extend the RBAC model in order to take into account context information (e.g., environmental factors).
Sentence 2: the RBAC model and the aforementioned extended RBAC models are not suitable to open dynamic environments and peer-to-peer interactions where we cannot consider the existence of prede.ned roles and user-role association.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The performance of asymmetric MIMO con.gurations 2x3 and 3x2 are analyzed and it is found that their energy consumption is midway between the values of 2 × 3 and 3 × 2 MIMO con.gurations.
Sentence 2: the 2 × 3 provides better performance in terms of tradeo.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When the regular user tries to edit other user s informa­tion (i.e., sending I2 = K1 .V2 ), delete a user (i.e., sending I3 = K2 .V ) or add a new user (i.e., sending I4 = K3 .V ), the application should reject such input symbols with an ACCESS DENIED page (output symbol O2 ).
Sentence 2: the implemented application has two logic vul­nerabilities, which are re.ected as the discrepancies between Fideal and Fimpl , shown using the dashed lines with arrows in Figure 2.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This way, we will be able to achieve a much improved success rate in password guessing than that can be achieved without exploiting click-point information leaked by IDD.
Sentence 2: if the prediction of click-points is not very accurate, then the IDD scheme may not be as attractive as other discretization schemes, since a wrong prediction may result in a click-point far away from the center of a Voronoi polygon tile, leading to a significant reduction of the tolerance range of click­variations, and thus may cause unacceptable false accepts and false rejects.
Relationship: contrasting