sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The access control list data structures and algorithms were designed for services, such as the file system, with only a few types of objects (files and directories), and with only a small number of operations (such as read, write and execute) and data properties (such as owner and creation time).
Sentence 2: the Active Directory con­tains hundreds of types of objects and every object has many properties that must be protected separately.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: But this phenomenon could be explained partially by the exis­tence of di.erent security indicators, not directly related to SSL, as identi.ed by Whalen and Inkpen [18].
Sentence 2: the e.ect of introducing extended certi.cates, aiming to provide even more information about service providers to users, was studied in [10, 15].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In NetReview, routing messages are recorded in a tamper-evident log to analyze anomalous behaviors ofBGP routesbasedon de.nedfault patterns.Inthisway, NetRe­view can detect invalid routes caused by attacks or con.guration faults and policycon.icts.
Sentence 2: netReview does not address the response mechanism to detectedfaults.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Especially in high speed traf.c situation where vehicles moving in opposite directions contact for an instant, the three-way hand­ shake in the onion voucher model may incur a great deal of mes­ sage loss.
Sentence 2: we note that, unlike safety-related applications in VANETs, ad content itself is not critical information, nor of real­ time constraints, rather a soft state10.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.3 Limitations of the Approach By applying the techniques presented in this section, it is possi­ble to remove all unaligned free-branch instructions from a binary, and to protect the aligned ones from being misused by an attacker.
Sentence 2: since our protection mechanism does not remove the free branches, but prepends a short piece of code to protect them, the result of the compilation will still contain some gadgets.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Coveringradiusproblem.Twofundamentalonstants assoiatedtoany(infnite)setofpointsinEulideanspae arethepakingradiusandtheoveringradius:thepaking radiusisthelargestradiussuhthat(open)spheresentered atdistintpointsdonotinterset,andthepakingradius isthesmallestradiussuhthat(losed)spheresenteredat thepointsovertheentirespae.Fortheaseoflatties, thepakingradiusequalshalfthelengthoftheshortest lattievetor,andomputingthepakingradiusislearly equivalenttoSVP.Theoveringradiusproblemisalassi probleminthegeometryofnumbers,butithasreeived sofarverylittleattentionfromaomputationalomplexity pointofview.Weprovethatthereexistollisionresistant hashfuntions(and,therefore,alsoone­wayfuntions)that areatleastashardtobreakasapproximatingtheovering radiusofanylattieintheworstasewithinO(Tn 2logn), whereforsomeTE[1,n].EvenforT=n,thisimproves thesmallestinapproximabilityfatorforlattieproblems thatisknowntoimplytheexisteneofone­wayfuntions.
Sentence 2: previousresults[1,7]gaveone­wayfuntionsthatare atleastashardtoinvertasapproximatingtheshortestlin­earlyindependentvetorproblem(SIVP,seenextsetionfor adefnition)withinafatorO(n 3+c).Itfollowsfromgen­eralredutionsfromSVPtoSIVP[10,]thattheone­way funtionof[1,7]isatleastashardtoinvertasapproxi­matingSVPwithinO(n 4+c).Expressingthehardnessof invertingafuntionintermsoftheomplexityofapproxi­matingSVPisimportantbeauseSVPisbyfarthemost famousandwidelystudiedomputationalproblemonlat­ties.asbasingryptographifuntionsonthe worstasehardnessofSIVPallowstoreduetherequired inapproximabilityfatortoO(n 3+c),SIVPseemsabetter startingpointinthestudyoflattiebasedryptography thanSVP,andthismotivated[5]tostudytheomputa­tionalomplexityofSIVPandproveNP­hardnessresults forthisproblem.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Security experts believe that if a dynamic technique that meets the aforementioned requirements can be developed then it will be resilient to code obfuscation, self-encryption and polymorphic transfor­mations of a stealthy malware because a malware .nally has to do the desired malicious activity while it is executing.
Sentence 2: these transformations can easily defeat well-known static techniques.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A simple back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that for a one-bit SECTAG, an 8-way associative, 64K L2 cache, with 128 byte lines, requires (block size×width(SEC T AG)) or a 128-bit tag per cache line, if the tags are added to each line.
Sentence 2: with our scheme, the number of additional bits per cache line is 2+log2(#sets)+log2(associativity)+log2(8/width (SEC T AG)), or 14.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: All three Insert conditions resulted in improved passwords having signi.cantly more estimated bits of security than the Control and Replace-2 conditions (t(831.87) = 13.50, p < .001).
Sentence 2: the three Insert variations produced improved passwords of similar estimated security (F(2, 480) = 0.32, p = 0.727).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As long as they use their privileges for precisely the purpose for which they were granted1, they will not commit an insider attack.
Sentence 2: it is easy to see that GTIP 2010 Dec. 7, 2010, Austin, Texas USA Copyright 2010 ACM 978-1-4503-0446-7/10/12 ...$10.00 1 Assuming that the security policies are valid.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The latter point is important in practice, this frequency inter­pretation of trust /distrust degree can be used as a practi­cal method to calculate trust /distrust degrees, by using the data accumulated in the interaction between a trustor and a trustee.
Sentence 2: when the data of interactions are not available or not used, a trust /distrust degree may be given as a subjective probability but with the assurance that the calculus itself is nevertheless correct.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our main approach is to use lazy evaluation to identify the essential measurements required from the underlying pri­vacy mechanism to evaluate an expression.
Sentence 2: the languages we considered exhibited a tension between lazy semantics and transparency of evaluation: lazy languages were less inclined to violate referential transparency, con­cealing whether a measurement was truly needed for an eval­uation, while strict languages such as F# [1] make it cumber­some to write lazy programs.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Unfortunately, for this multi-ciphersuite simulation to work, it is essen­tial that public keys not be shared across ciphersuites: this technique could show that switching between an RSA-based ci­phersuite and an ECDSA-based ciphersuite is safe.
Sentence 2: to analyze using the same RSA public key in two di.erent ciphersuites, one would have to take an alternative approach, as it may not be possible to generically prove that re-using the same public key in two ACCE protocols is safe.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We call this function decide, and de.ne it as follows, for nodes xA,yB and transaction a with risk r. decide(A, B, ar)= if r = t(A, B) then perform else abandon  3.3 Dynamic Response to Policy Changes If we were to leave the security policy as de.ned up to this point, it would be a static policy, never changing once deployed to a network.
Sentence 2: wSNs are often subject to dynamic forces beyond the control of the designer, and a comprehensive security policy that can adapt to those changes quickly and e.ciently would be a tremendous ad­vantage.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Thus, the state tran­sition probability distribution should be given by the conditional probability Pr(7tI7t-1,Yt,zt)for each quadruple (7t,7t-1,Yt,zt).
Sentence 2: since the size of the domain of the quadruple is very large for practical applications, it is not appropriate to de.ne the condi­tional probability by hand.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Poisoning Behavioral Malware Clustering Battista BiggioKonrad Rieck Università di Cagliari University of Göttingen Piazza d Armi Goldschmidtstraße 7 09123, Cagliari, Italy 37077, Göttingen, Germany battista.biggio@diee.unica.it konrad.rieck@uni­goettingen.de Davide Ariu Christian WressneggerIgino Corona Università di Cagliari University of Göttingen Università di Cagliari Piazza d Armi Goldschmidtstraße 7 Piazza d Armi 09123, Cagliari, Italy 37077, Göttingen, Germany 09123, Cagliari, Italy davide.ariu@diee.unica.it christian.wressnegger@ igino.corona@diee.unica.it cs.uni-goettingen.de Giorgio Giacinto Università di Cagliari Piazza d Armi 09123, Cagliari, Italy giacinto@diee.unica.it ABSTRACT Clustering algorithms have become a popular tool in com­puter security to analyze the behavior of malware variants, identify novel malware families, and generate signatures for antivirus systems.
Sentence 2: the suitability of clustering algorithms for security-sensitive settings has been recently questioned by showing that they can be signi.cantly com­promised if an attacker can exercise some control over the in­put data.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It is mainly because of two reasons: (1) voice is time sensitive media and (2) its presentation requires at least several thousands bits of information per second.
Sentence 2: if we could show that it is possible to hide a telephonic conversation by cre­ating a covert communication channel within another (i.e., cover) conversation, without using LSBs or any other previously known audio steganography methods, it will have profound effects on call monitoring and media interception.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Intuitively, this approach might seem to reduce the accuracy of inference.
Sentence 2: in examining Equation 1 derived in Section 3.1, we see that the dummy nodes in a given user s public list only add an additional constant term to the ex­pected value of ...., which will not a.ect edge coverage at­tacks which only consider the ranking of nodes by .. (..).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Therefore, if there is a safe disclosure sequence G according to Alice s original policies, then after the above policy migration, G is also a safe disclosure sequence ac­cording to the covering policies.
Sentence 2: suppose that according to the dis­closed covering policies, there exists a safe disclosure se­quence G. Since Alice never discloses the policy of C*, G does not involve C*.Let Ci be a disjunct of R s policy that was satis.ed before Ris disclosed in G. If the original policy of every credential C in Ci is satis.ed before C is disclosed, then G is also a safe disclosure sequence according to the original policies of Alice.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: These plg(t +1)l bits are in e.ect programmed into the card when the authority issues it.
Sentence 2: note that the authority cannot alter these pre-programmed bits once the card is is­sued, since the strong minimality property from [10] (which is encompassed in our condition 5 above) prevents the prover from learning any information from the veri.er during the protocol.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The architectural modi.cations we devise are designed to sit between cache and CPU in a single unit that can be added to a processor core without modifying either the instruction set or the rest of the architecture.
Sentence 2: some optimizations are possi­ble if one is willing to modify the instruction set (for setting dynamic memory permissions) and CPU (to optimize the in­struction pipeline for performance).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This is because MyPage-Keeper has a limited view of Facebook data the view provided by its subscribed users and therefore it cannot see all the malicious apps present on Facebook.
Sentence 2: during the nine month period considered in our study, MyPageKeeper observed posts from 111K apps, which constitutes a sizable fraction (over 20%) of the ap­proximately 500K apps present on Facebook [25].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The ARM architecture is a 32-bit architecture, hence it is im­perative that the operands of instructions must be able to span the entire 32-bit addressing range.
Sentence 2: since ARM instructions are 32 bits and a number of these bits are used to encode the in­struction OP code, operands and parameters, operands that repre­sent immediate values will never be able to store a full 32-bit value.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In particular, the model information from the training phase helps mini­ () ßj -aj mize the term +1, and also ensures that the do­ .j main [ßj aj] is traversed in intelligent order (by prioritizing the most likely combinations).
Sentence 2: the baggage of the exponential term (2n - 1) is still massive as n grows.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Some systems implement many-to-one mappings to sup­port shared memory; e.g., transparent page sharing maps multiple GPPNs copy-on-write to a single MPN [4, 30].
Sentence 2: existing virtualization systems do not provide .exible support for mapping a single GPPN to multiple MPNs.1 Multi-shadowing is a novel mechanism that supports context­dependent, one-to-many GPPN-to-MPN mappings.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In summary, one way to overcome these three obstacles is to add the VMBus driver support to the BIOS, rewrite the BIOS to remove its dependencies on devices which are not needed for the cloud, and paravirtualize all the guest OSes to no longer attempt to initialize devices at boot time other than the synthetic NIC and disk.
Sentence 2: such a plan requires a drastic amount of effort, comparable to implementing and testing a new release of a commodity operating system.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Obligations to Enforce Prohibitions: On the Adequacy of Security Policies Wolter Pieters Julian PadgetFrancien Dechesne Delft University of Technology University of Bath Delft University of Technology &#38; University of Twente United Kingdom The Netherlands The Netherlands jap@cs.bath.ac.uk f.dechesne@tudelft.nl w.pieters@tudelft.nl Virginia Dignum Delft University of Technology The Netherlands m.v.dignum@tudelft.nl ABSTRACT Security policies in organisations typically take the form of obliga­tions for the employees.
Sentence 2: it is often unclear what the pur­pose of such obligations is, and how these can be integrated in the operational processes of the organisation.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This optimized case in­troduces an interesting challenge: a traditional 0x80 would force a VMExit (thereby allowing one to trap the call), but fast syscalls on modern hardware virtualized platforms do not induce a VMExit.
Sentence 2: syscalls must still retrieve the target entry point (in the VM s kernel) by examining a well-known machine speci.c register (MSR)1 .
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since users can view fingerprints as a sort of "crypto address", they should be quite comfortable exchanging them, importing them into address books, notifying people when they change, and so on.
Sentence 2: schemes which try to simplify things through automation end up forcing users to grapple with the concepts of keys, signatures, certificates, certificate chains, revocation lists, trust roots, and validity/trust calculations.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: {P1,...,Pn}, Ris a set of uris, and Pi,1 =i=n, is an IBLP.
Sentence 2: to simplify the notation that is used, in the remainder of the paper Ai < .i is interpreted as a shorthand form of Ai < d(.i), and as shorthand for referring to the evaluation of Ai with respect to the IBLP Pi that is identi.ed by .i.Henceforth, .i will be used to denote the IBLP Pi.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the studied case of social login one could argue that the retrieved personal data might only be kept until access to the application (and consequently the company network) is granted, since the purpose of the processing of the social network data is limited to the social reputation update, and maximum maximorum to the access of the company network, which is the ultimate goal of the social login.
Sentence 2: this does not necessarily exclude the possibility to keep the data for a longer period of time, even in a non-anonymized form.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: SecurIT 12, August 17-19, 2012, Kollam, Kerala, India  Copyright 2012 ACM 978-1-4503-1822-8/12/08... $15.00 learning [2], sequential change-point detection [3,4] and so on.
Sentence 2: due to those techniques overlook the dependencies and correlations between features, they commonly suffer from an issue of high false positive rate.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our another scheme .2 can alleviate this prob­ cibe lem: Its CCA-security is based on the GBDH (Gap Bilinear Di.e-Hellman) assumption, which seems to be milder as­sumption than bilinear inversion assumptions as discussed in [7].
Sentence 2: .2 needs pairing and hashing into G op­ cibe erations to be performed.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Access control to XML documents is the foundation based on which access control for the Semantic Web should be built since the Semantic Web is built upon XML.
Sentence 2: when applied to the Semantic Web, the existing access control models to XML have to be extended to take into consideration the higher layers of the Semantic Web architecture [3] above XML (see Figure 2), such as RDF and ontologies.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: (2) From the viewpoint of cloud service users If the cloud service user can determine the variable security level that the cloud security visualization system provides, as shown in Figure 8, the user can quickly start investigating a switch to a different cloud service when the level seems to drop.
Sentence 2: this will increase the load of the cloud computing environment even more, and the service may stop when, for example, the cloud service user begins to back up data all at once at the time of the level drop.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Example guest con.guration (Linux): iwcon.g essid $ESSID mode ad-hoc key $WEP10 ip route replace default via 7.7.7.8 dev wi.0 Example escort con.guration (Linux): echo 1 >/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip forward iwcon.g wi.0 essid $ESSID mode ad-hoc key $WEP10 route add -host 7.7.7.7 dev wi.0 iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o wi.1 -j SNAT --to 8.8.8.8 It is obvious either wireless segment, namely guest-escort seg­ment or escort-infrastructure segment, can be replaced by a wired connection.
Sentence 2: this obviously impedes the guest s mobility in the wireless LAN.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since the message exchange required by the protocol can consume considerable network resources, we integrate our detection scheme in the AODV routing protocol by adding new routing messages and procedures to gather trust ratings by other network nodes and compute the global trust of the other mesh routers.
Sentence 2: we observe that the proposed framework can be implemented in any routing protocol and used to choose the most trustworthy path, when more alter­natives are available.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Its simple-security property pre­vents subjects from reading objects of a higher security (secrecy) level (no read-up ) and its *-security property prevents subjects from writing object of a lower security (secrecy) level (no write­down ).
Sentence 2: biba integrity model protects data in­tegrity by enforcing a simple-security property that prevents sub­jects from reading objects of a lower security (integrity) level (no read-down ) and a *-security property that prevents subjects from writing objects of a higher security (integrity) level (no write-up ).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The involved roles in this trust model are: Identity-CA: Similar to the TCG proposal, the Identity-CA (ICA) identi.ed by the key pair (PKICA,SKICA)is responsible for providing identities or pseudonyms of plat­forms involved into the property-based attestation protocols.
Sentence 2: in a centralized enterprise environment where the IT department owns all client platforms, anonymity is not an issue.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Similar to prior work on Android, PMP enables users to decide .ne grained privacy protection settings on a per app basis by allowing suitably anonymized data to be sent instead of privacy sensitive information [3, 14, 31].
Sentence 2: a crucial di.erentiator of PMP as com­pared to prior work is that we have developed a crowd­sourced system to collect and analyze users protection deci­sions to help make privacy recommendations to users.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: DAEl ··· DAE1 f is applied to PaPB|=MP4 ., where .
Sentence 2: = DAEn ··· DAEl DAEl ··· DAE1 f. From the induction hypothesis, index[AEt] =|AEt| for 1 = t = n. for, 1 = t = n, either index[AEt,q] = index[AEt,.]
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, this philosophy is adopted by our policy of gradual release [AS07], which rejects the program above.
Sentence 2: the rationale of localized delimited release, for a given piece of data, is to disallow data release before it is declassi.ed but, on the other hand, allow release to take place any time after declassi.cation.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Their approachis relatedtotheACPextraction of our ap­proach, since both use patterns to extract information.
Sentence 2: their patterns are based on the low-level POS tags (such as NP andNPList), while our semanticpatterns arebased ongrammatical functions ofphases(such as subject, main verbgroup, and object).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In particular, with the advent of Web 2.0 era, people not only extract knowledge from various informa­tion sources, but also contribute and share their own generated con­tents.
Sentence 2: web contents are typically published without being seriously fact-checked, thus greatly in.uencing people s daily life if non-credible web contents are relied on to make decisions.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Web tripwires [27] verify the integrity of a page by matching it against a known good representation (either a checksum or an en­coded copy of the page s HTML), using client-side JavaScript to detect in-.ight modi.cations.
Sentence 2: web tripwires have a high network overhead (approximately 17% of the page size), which could hinder the end-to-end response time, especially for slower networks.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our PoC can achieve FRR of 10% at FAR of 0%.
Sentence 2: to obtain longer keys, we decided to choose the threshold corresponding to FRR of 19% at FAR 8To avoid reporting outlier results on random hyperplanes, we report the average of 5 tests, using a di.erent set of 512 orthonormal hyperplanes each time.
Relationship: contrasting