sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As the rule order is top down, resolving this con.ict requires deletion of order-minor rule P4 from the rule base.
Sentence 2: consider a pair of rules P5 and P6, P5 : permit TCP X1, Y1 eq telnet; P6 : permit TCP X2, Y2 eq telnet; such that, ((X1 .
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Finally, with the wide adoption of virtualization in data centers, we also envision that di.erent security VMs can be dispatchedto eachphysicalmachinetoinspect runningguest VMs and their internalprocesses (for .ne-grained execution monitoring).Thisislargely feasibleasthesemanticgap has been e.ectivelybridgedtosupport existingmonitoringtools.
Sentence 2: with our current focus on examining in­dividual suspect process for malicious behavior, we believe other interesting applications and opportunities (e.g., per­formance monitoring andintelligentparalleljob scheduling) remain, which we plan to explore in the future.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Table3showsvariousfeatures,indicatedinthefrstrow, ofthosetypesofhierarchy.Thesecondrowshowsthesefea­turesfortheI-hierarchyoverthesetofrolesx1x2:::xn forwhichtheinheritancerelationisx1::: tx2ttxn;1t xn(i.e.,x1isthesenior-mostandxnisthejunior-most).In thetable,ureferstoauserassignedonlytorolex1.Similar featuresoverthesetofrolescharacterizetheA-hierarchy andIA-hierarchy;theserelatessarereportedinthethird andthefourthrowsofTable3.Thesecondcolumnshows thecombinationsofrolesthatcanbeactivatedbyu.Inthe I-hierarchy,onlyonerolecanbeactivated.InAandIA­hierarchies,anysubsetoftherolescanbeactivatedbecause oftherole-activationsemantics;however,inIA-hierarchy theactivationisredundantintermsofpermissionacquisi­tion.Forexample,considerasubsetofrolesthatcontain rolex1;activationofanyotherrolesinthissetisunneces­saryasitdoesnotaddnewsetofpermissionsacquiredby u. ThethirdandforthcolumnshowthatanI-hierarchy allowstheacquisitionofonlythemaximalpermissionset Pmax.Here,byconsideringPiasthepermissionsetassoci­ [n atedwithrolexi,wegetPmax =ii1PiandPmin =Pn.
Sentence 2: thetwocolumnsalsoshowthatinAandIA-hierarchies, ucanacquireboththemaximumorminimumnumberof permissions.underanA-hierarchy,uwillneed toactivatealltherolestoacquirePmax,whereasunderan IA-hierarchy,uwillneedtoactivateonlythesenior-most role.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Other works onlayeredencryption canbe found for H.264 [30], DCT-based [19], Hierarchical MPEG [22], andscalable codecsingeneral[20].
Sentence 2: thefour latter works are not directly applicable to the videosurveil­lancescenario, asnoobjectsofinterestareconsidered(the whole image is encrypted).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: They may want to do so to improve their downloading performance, to reduce monetary costs of downloads over cellular links, or, in the long-term, to interact with their peers using Mobile 2.0 applications in which users are not only consumers of content but also producers [5] (so much so that they have been aptly called prosumers [30]).
Sentence 2: sharing content introduces the problem of how to .nd reputable sources of downloads.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This is because there are 22 nodes with the degree 5 in the original graph.
Sentence 2: for r(ß|dß = 20), we can see that randomization can signi.cantly decrease its disclosure risk: the disclosure risk is 100% when we release the anonymized graph without edge randomization while the disclo­sure risk decreases 0.39 (0.2) when we apply Rand Add/Del with k =2.5%m(5%m).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: having an anonymized version of T as a sub-trajectory, where a sub-trajectory is a selection of triples of a trajec­tory.
Sentence 2: this means that there will be k anonymized trajec­tories containing the single location of T. not all of these anonymized trajectories start at the single location of T. Since an individual s home at 8am is likely to be the .rst location of any individual s original trajectory, those anonymized trajectories that do not start at the single loca­tion of T (justpassthroughit)canbe .ltered outby anad­versary and only the remaining trajectories are considered.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Additionally, it requires pro­grammers to provide a summary for each library function to allow the information .ow through library calls, which can be an error-prone and tedious task as many library calls are fairly complex, causing many side-effects in addition to simple return values.
Sentence 2: implementing infor­mation .ow tracking via binary instrumentation, such as in TaintCheck [34], can track information accurately even in libraries, but suffers from a major overhead problem: it can slow down the program execution by around 37 times too large to be used during production runs against security at­tacks.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As can be seen, the bound provided by Algo­rithm 1 is an order of magnitude larger than the aver­age state-estimation error for each system.
Sentence 2: for each system S we are more interested in the ratio be­tween the worst-case observed state estimation error for all 1000 simulations i.e., maxi=1:1000 l.xSl2, and the error bound M AX l.xSl2 provided by Algorithm 1 for the system.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this paper we propose scalable solutions for the privacy-preservingquery result veri.cationproblem andde­velop a number of solutionsthatprovide atradeo.between the overhead for the owner, the e.ciency of the veri.cation, and the degree of exposure of the owner s database in or­der to prove the correctness of a query.
Sentence 2: it should be pointed out that our solution is directly applicable to the authentic third party data publication and the tamper proo.ng of audit trail problems too (with no modi.cation whatsoever) with the added advantage that we do not need to trust the owners of these databases.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: On the other hand, J. M. Orset, B. Alcalde, and A. Cavalli [13] proposed an EFSM-based IDS that uses specifications of routing protocol OLSR to detect anomalies in Ad Hoc networks.
Sentence 2: their solution was not complemented by a signature-based component, which made it difficult to detect attacks such as DoS attacks.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The calculus could in princi­ple be adapted to take branching decisions (explicit indirect .ows) into account simply by (1) annotating terms with a context describing which computations the current compu­tations depends upon and (2) update this context based on t1 and t2 in the T-CondT and T-CondF rules.
Sentence 2: from a theoretical point of view, the policies we currently have in mind are strongly related to data processing (i.e.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Fur­thermore, some systems have formal proofs that if an appli­cation running on the system correctly manipulates labels to implement a policy, then the system will enforce the policy [13].
Sentence 2: for a user to have end-to-end assurance that their application implements a high-level information-.ow policy, they must have assurance that the application in­deed correctly manipulates labels.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Ciphersinthebounded-storagemodelmakeuseofavery largeamountofauxiliaryinformation,denotedRandalled publirandomnessorsimplytherandomizer.Therandom­izerRouldforinstanebearandombitsequenebroadast byasatelliteortransmittedbetweenthelegitimateparties, orthesignalofadeep-spaeradiosoure.IfRisat-bitran­domstring,thentsisrequiredtoguaranteethatEvean­notstoreRompletely.3Therestritiontsimmediately showstheinherent(butonly)limitationofthebounded­storagemodel:Inordertoberealisti,sandhenealsothe sizeofRmustbeverylarge.Nevertheless,shemesbased onthismodelforwhihtisnotmuhlargerthansmaybe onthevergeofbeingpratial,evenforverypowerfulad­versaries.Themainhallenge,whihwesolveinthispaper, istodeviseaprovablyseureshemewithslosetot.
Sentence 2: letusommentbriefyonthepratialityofthebounded­storagemodel,butinthispaperwedonotgiveadetailed feasibilityanalysisforurrenttehnology.Areentartile intheNewYorkTimes(Feb.20,2001)andothermedia reportssuggestedthatsuhshemesmaybeusedinpra­tie.beauseoftheinherentonditionst,the feasibilitydependsonpossibleadvanesinstorageandin ommuniationtehnology(see[10]or[9],Setion1.3.1for ananalysisoftheurrenttehnology).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: s DCS scheme seemingly sat­is.es invisibility, as it appears that without the con.rmer s private key xc, there is no feasible way to either extract standard signature s from a given DCS s ' by computing -1 s = s 'x c , or check the validity of s ' by using equation mr e(s ' ,s ' )= e(uv g,a)xc .
Sentence 2: this is not the fact as explained below.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.4 Remote Wipe-Out When the SIM card is removed from a smartphone, any service that uses the IMSI as the subscriber identi.cation cannot be requested by this phone, such as the basic call service and SMS.
Sentence 2: a smartphone without the SIM card still could camp on an available network to make an emergency call, using IMEI as equipment identi.cation.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It is relatively easy to design and implement accurate at-tack detection for a DDoS defense system positioned at the victim network because it can closely observe the victim and notice anomalous behavior.
Sentence 2: 2 the range of re- sponse is limited: large-volume attacks can overwhelm the defense, and attacks deploying seemingly legitimate packets will force the defense system to inflict collateral damage dur- ing the response.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Aurasium is designed for reference-monitor capa­bilities, and we can achieve similar results by intercepting calls to sensitive methods, such as those that require the INTERNET permission.
Sentence 2: retroSkeleton can be used for many other ways, such as app UI augmentation or behavior modi.cation like our auto-localization functionality, which would be far more dif.­cult to achieve from within a replaced libc.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Suppose W1(m1)= c.K.i W1(m2)= c.K.i W2(m1)= c.K.i W2(m2)= c ' .K.i ' and c c ', and label(K) = L. Then W1(m1) L = W2(m1) and W1(m2) L W2(m2).
Sentence 2: w1 and W2 are distinguishable to low users, because the values of m1 and m2 are created by the same encryption operation according to W1, and by different encryption operations according to W2.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: CAB [14] and PiPA [33] aim at of.oading the analysis code alone to another execution thread, and they are the closest to Shad­owReplica.
Sentence 2: neither of the two has been able to deliver the expected performance gains, due to (a) naively collecting infor­mation from the application, and (b) the high overhead of commu­nicating it to the analysis thread(s).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Auditing Cloud Administrators Using Information Flow Tracking Afshar Ganjali David Lie a.ganjali@utoronto.ca lie@eecg.utoronto.ca Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering University of Toronto ABSTRACT In the last few years, cloud computing has evolved from being a promising business concept to one of the fastest growing segments of the IT industry.
Sentence 2: one im­pediment to widespread adoption by enterprise customers is the threat of attack by a malicious cloud administrator.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.3.2 AttackingScenarios The necessarystepsto attack obfuscatedbinary codeinvolvedis­assembling the binary code, gaining the control .ow graphs and thenperformingprogram analysis and transformations to undo the effects of obfuscation.
Sentence 2: toobtainthereal control .owanddata .owgraphs,a determined static analyzer(i.e.,being aware of the approach taken by BOSH) must .rst derive the whole tag .ow.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: C at time t, we produce an output ot which is either equal to the true observation ct , or to the synthetic obser­vation close tothetruevalue c ' t or completely suppressed, denoted by .. We denote by o1:t the vector of all outputs o1 ,o2 ,...,ot up to time t. In this work, we do not consider synthesis as a possible mechanism for generating value for ot .
Sentence 2: theuse of agenerative model such astheDBN allows usto synthesize contextsby sampling theirjointdis­tribution.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: One potential remedy for having to trust today s unauditable pro­prietary all-electronic voting systems is to add an independent voter­veri.ed paper trail that is the vote of record [11], as some vendors are now attempting to do.
Sentence 2: this introduces further com­plexities, and appears to be only a palliative addition to an already overly expensive PC-based solution when compared with less ex­pensive paper-based alternatives that are much less dependent on untrustworthiness of computer systems, such as optical scan tech­nologies (but which of course have their own potential risks).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, the malicious applica­tion FarmVile attempts to take advantage of the popular Far­mVille app name, whereas the Fortune Cookie malicious ap­plication exactly copies the popular Fortune Cookie app name.
Sentence 2: we .nd that a large majority of malicious apps in our D-Sample dataset show very little similarity with the 100 most popu­lar benign apps in our dataset.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In an­other direction, host-based detection techniques such as tra­ditional signature-based approaches (e.g., anti-virus tools) and more recentbehavior-based approaches(e.g.,[35,36]) have also been proposed.
Sentence 2: due to the widely used advanced obfuscation/polymorphism [46] and the require­ment of client-side installation, the solutions are not attrac­tive for large scale P2P malware detection.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: One of the core issues that emerged on our network was that many of the machines affected by the virus outbreak (see part I [Nachi, Sasser, Blaster]) had antivirus software.
Sentence 2: despite having the anti-virus software, it became clear in the wake of the outbreak that the antivirus data files and subscriptions of many students were out-dated.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This result leads to the Network1 which initiated the attack to the victim server-1.
Sentence 2: mS6, after detecting an attack against victim server-2, compares Sout,M S6 with TR5,R6 .The resul­tant correlation coe.cient (0.0145) is too small to consider MS5 as the next MS for carrying on with the traceback op­eration.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Patient-centric Authorization Framework for SharingElectronic Health Records Jing JinGail-Joon Ahn Hongxin HuUNC Charlotte Arizona State UniversityArizona State UniversityCharlotte, NC, USATempe, AZ, USATempe, AZ, USAjjin@uncc.edu gahn@asu.edu hxhu@asu.edu Michael J. Covington Intel Corporation Hillsboro, Oregon, USA  michael.j.covington@intel.com ABSTRACT In modern healthcare environments, a fundamental require­ment for achieving continuity of care is the seamless access to distributed patient health records in an integrated and uni.ed manner,directly atthepoint of care.
Sentence 2: elec­tronicHealthRecords(EHRs) contain a signi.cant amount of sensitive information, and allowing data to be accessible at many di.erent sources increases concerns related to pa­tient privacy and data theft.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It is sometimes said that search engines and on-line systems are the most daring and successful buccaneers in that they contain content which is either under copyright or intellectual property protection.
Sentence 2: in legal actions issuing from these new grey areas, many judges have held that the owner of the content, by not opting out, implicitly grants such systems the license to copy the pages.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Speci.cally, if we consider the stack used in a ROP-based program as its dispatch table and esp as its pc, the ret instruction at the end of each return­oriented gadget acts as a dispatcher that advances the pc by 4 each time a gadget is completed, i.e., f(pc)= pc + 4.
Sentence 2: all ROP-based attacks still rely on the stack, which is no longer necessary in a JOP-based attack.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Microsoft has re­cently released an updated version of CardSpace, known as Windows CardSpace 2.0 Beta 27 .
Sentence 2: in this pa­per we refer throughout to the CardSpace version that is shipped by default as part of Windows Vista and Windows 7, which has also been approved as an OASIS standard un­der the name Identity Metasystem Interoperability Version 1.0 (IMI 1.0) [28].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test revealed a statistically sig­ni.cant di.erence between OpenID and IDeB in the per­ceived ease-of-use and privacy control for all sub-tasks (z = -3.331 to -4.774, p<.001, with a medium to large ef­fect size, r =0.40 to 0.57).
Sentence 2: the test did not .nd a signi.cant di.erence in the perceived security protection provided by OpenID and IDeB.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Furthermore, since we can calculate from the timestamps on the sequence the driving time between the known location and the destination, the possible areas of the target can be roughly determined.
Sentence 2: even under these constraints, collecting speech-length sequences in a large scale is still dif.cult: our driving simulator takes 2 to 5 minutes to complete a 10-mile route in Bloomington (necessary for getting all the speech elements on the route), which is much faster than a real drive, but still too slow to handle thousands (or more) of possible routes we need to inspect.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This shows that per user, the number of other Google users that choose to reveal their pro.les is slightly higher than the number of users that hide their pro.les.
Sentence 2: this provides only a rough approximation of the number of non public pro.les, as our crawler only collects unique public pro.les, and is unable to reveal uniqueness of non public pro.les.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The process terminates when this di.erence equals m1 = -D or m2 = +D > 0, or until a particular maximum neighborhood size Nmax is reached.
Sentence 2: for Nmax = *, the process will always terminate at either -D or D. the average number of steps should be smaller when qi = 0, because of the fact highlighted in equation (10).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: At time t, user U possesses the RSA chain accumulators Ck, where 0 = k = t. The tampered accumulators CT i and CT j are pre­sented to the auditor A by the user U, which correspond to the loca­tions Li and Lj , and i < j .
Sentence 2: the auditor only accepts the claim of location provenance if and only if the sequential derivation of the accumulator from CT i to CT j is successful.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the .rst-try protocol, the session key is com­ (eA+SA+zA)(eB+SB+zB) puted as ssk = g, so it seems that if an adversary does not learn all the partial secrets of either party, then the adversary cannot compute the session key.
Sentence 2: the protocol is insecure, consider an adversary who performs a similar attack as that against the HX protocol we described in Sec.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If restricted contexts have direct access to a user s password, private keys for TLS [9], or Kerberos ticket cache [11], then the untrusted code can authenticate itself as the user to another machine without the restrictions by implementing the authentication protocol itself.
Sentence 2: by exposing only abstract authentication operations, such as the GSS-API [14], the operating system can ensure that the authentication protocol carries restrictions to remote servers.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In biometric sys­tems where image processing techniques are mainly used, it is impossible to achieve exact biometric matching due to es­timation problem, that is exactly estimating the registered image given the query image.
Sentence 2: we approach the es­timation problem from a post­processing persp ective where derivative information of the registered template is used to transform the query template into another template that can be used to perform an exact match with the registered tem­plate.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: [n], [] 1/100 |vj |1 11 Pr |y.vj |== = .
Sentence 2: 100p1+ x2 100 -1/100 the probability that there exists an i such that |yi|= T is at most 2n -T 12n ==1/100 p-8 1+ x2 Tp for T = 100n.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: [47]introducedabehavior-basedbotdetection method, which relies on discrepancies in action frequencies betweenhumanplayers andbots.
Sentence 2: compared to our work, the metric used for their detection, action frequency, is coarse-grained and has low discriminability, resulting in low detection ratio (0.36 recall ratio on average) and long detectiontime(atleast15 minutes).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: XOMOS [18] provides an example where an attempt to add protection against OS attacks to XOM resulted in requiring signi.cant OS redesign.
Sentence 2: secureME is designed from bottom-up to make the interaction between the secure processor substrate and hypervisor synergistic, in order to provide the desired pro­tection while meeting the other goals of low performance overheads, compatibility and ease of programming.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: ICVGIP 14 December 14 -18 2014, Bangalore, India Copyright 2014 ACM 978-1-4503-3061-9/14/12...$15.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2683483.2683515.
Sentence 2: biometrics based systems provide a reliable solution for recognizing individuals.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To detect incoming C&#38;C messages, the detector needs to know the encoding scheme probably through binary analysis so that it can intercept and delete malicious messages before any application s access.
Sentence 2: the botmaster can apply advanced packing and obfuscation techniques to make the binary analysis harder, and periodically update the spam templates as well as the mapping between them and corresponding commands.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Robusta alreadyprevents code-injection attacksin native librariesbecause all codeis statically veri­.edbefore execution and no memory regionisbothwritable and executable (these invariants are also maintained during dynamic loading).
Sentence 2: it does not prevent exploits of vulnerabilities using code snippets already in the code region (e.g., return-to-libc attacks or return-oriented programming [27]).
Relationship: contrasting