sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: D. sort(src : D int[]) : D int[] { i : public int; a, b, c : D int; alength : public int = length(src); sn : public int[] = makeSortingNetwork(alength); for (i=0; i < length(sn)-1; i = i + 2) {  a = src[sn[i+0]]; b = src[sn[i+1]]; c = isLessThan(a, b); // from PDK implementation src[sn[i+0]] = c*a + (1 -c)*b; src[sn[i+1]] = c*b + (1 -c)*a; } return src; } Listing 1: Generic sort However, we can do better if we have more information about the given PDK.
Sentence 2: if a PDK K provides a fast method to shu.e vectors, an e.cient method for sort­ing can be implemented.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, the additional layer introduced by virtualization can increase the overall system security since a virtual ma­chine (also VM, guest VM or simply guest) can be protected by additional boundaries [3].
Sentence 2: an hypervisor (also Virtual Machine Monitor,VMM or host in the follow­ing) can provide a trusted computing base where the mon­itoring system can be located, out of reach of malware.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: But if we can provide low level users with an appropriate cover story which appears to be consistent then they should be unable to distinguish whether or not high level events are occurring.
Sentence 2: 3.1 The Problem we wish to focus on what happens when a low level user attempts to schedule an action whose pre­conditions will not be met because a higher secrecy action interferes with them.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The minimal l<k*=m cost is reached by launching MTD to induce con.gurations Cl* ,Cm * respectively with portions of time [pl* ,pm * ]: pl* 1 (µm * -d)+p1(µ1 -µm * ) = , pm *µm * -µl*-(µl* -d)+p1(µl* -µ1) (15) where 0<d «1is some constant.
Sentence 2: mTD is (µ1,µ2,··· ,µN ,p1,F)-powerful.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Hence, many cloud computing platforms use virtualization to encapsulate services inside virtual machines (VMs), in­cluding Amazon EC2 [1] and Microsoft Azure [2].This approach allows CIP to better utilize resources, while still providing adequate isolation.The adoption of virtualiza­tion also enables other bene.ts including the ease of service deployment and the .exibility of VM migration to provide fault tolerance and improved consolidation.
Sentence 2: isolation properties of a virtualized platform, however, are weaker compared to physical isolation.re­sources that may be implicitly shared among VMs, such as the last level cache (LLC) on multicore processors and mem­ory bandwidth, present opportunities for security or perfor­mance interference.For example, it has been shown that an otherwise isolated process can compromise the con.den­tiality of another process [14]; with similar attacks possi­ble in the virtualized environment.Similarly, use of shared cache(s) makes it di.cult to properly isolate performance [7], possibly allowing a malicious VM to launch the denial of ser­vice attack on another VM, and certainly threatens a service provider s ability to guarantee an SLA to its clients.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: There are several other secure methods that provide au­thentication and privacy [4, 9], which can be employed in our system.
Sentence 2: encrypting .rst the message and then computing the MACfunction over the ciphertext is usually preferable since the encryption function does not have to be computed in CBC mode [9] and invalid cipher­texts can be discarded without the overhead of decryption.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As a re­sult, we found that the OpenSSL PRNG is initialized by the Zygote process upon the system boot, and that each appli­cation initializes its own OpenSSL PRNG state by copying the last state of Zygote.
Sentence 2: every SSL appli­cation generates random data from the same initial state.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.3 Mutability and Continuity 4.3.1 Updates of Attributes As described in Section 4.1, in a usage session, pre-updates are results of the approval of the access request performed by the PDP, according to a particular usage policy.
Sentence 2: pre-updates are trig­gered by an access request based on a policy.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The Context Handler attached to PEPPr, is responsible for forwarding this request to the LPDPPr which queries LPAPPr.If the LPDPPr does not find any policy that applies to that resource, then it is not possible evaluated the access requests locally.
Sentence 2: to get access to a resource, a principal should be inserted in the policy rules of the LPAPPr.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The results of our experiments also lead to the follow­ing research question which we plan to validate by a future user study: If minimum length requirement for the text part of the T&#38;C passwords is exactly same as in the policy ap­plied to the text passwords, which scheme performs better in terms of recall rates?
Sentence 2: how do users per­form if implicit feedback property of T&#38;C comes together with the additional burden of recalling the click location?
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As the real SNPs are stored at the SPU, a curious party at the SPU can infer the nucleotides corresponding to the real SNPs from their positions and from the correlation between the patient s potential SNPs and the real ones (as discussed in Section 4).
Sentence 2: by knowing the positions of the patient s real SNPs, the curious party at the SPU will at least know that the patient has one or two minor alleles at these SNP positions (i.e., it will know that the cor­responding SNP position includes either a real homozygous or heterozygous SNP), and it can make its inference stronger using the correlation between the SNPs.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For each value of the parameter 0 <a < 1 we have .
Sentence 2: e. ICD(f,e) IC f, = a 1-a there is a protocol p such that: 1. for each (x,y).X×Y, P[p(x,y).f(x,y)] = ae , i.e.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For comparative purposes, we indicate the correspondence between our examples and those in the paper by Jaeger and Tidswell [12], which provides probably the most comprehensive set of examples in the literature.4 We do not enumerate all the possibilities available within our scheme.
Sentence 2: we do not generally discuss the three constraints that are possible by considering the dif­ferent temporal contexts.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: PAID [22] is a hy­brid approach that incorporates a limited degree of integrity checking into a system call monitor.
Sentence 2: it uses source-code transformation to insert notify system calls be­fore each indirect function call to report the target of the 7SELinux policies aren t stated in terms of system calls, but are close enough for our purposes, so we discuss them together with system-call based techniques.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The performance analysis discussed here considers the ef­.ciency of the implementations realized with two di.erent programming languages running on two di.erent machine architectures.
Sentence 2: as shown in Table 1, we have im­plemented and testedRSEPfor running both onARMpro­cessors and Intel processors, using two di.erent program­ming languages.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We consider a pair of critical permissions to be rare with respect to a threshold y if the individual permission s frequency is above threshold y but the frequency of occurrence of the two permissions as a pair is below y, and we de.ne this as #RPCP(y).
Sentence 2: we consider a pair of critical permissions to be rare if the permissions involved in the pair are themselves not rare (above threshold x)but their occurrence together in an app is rare (below threshold y).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since our interaction with the users is limited to logging the three aforementioned pieces of data, we believe there are no ethi­cal implications in this experiment.
Sentence 2: we regis­tered blogtools.us, a domain included on goldprice.org, which is a web application that monitors the price of gold and that ranks 4,779th in the US (according to Alexa).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To accomplish this we .rst observe that while the .rst malware needs to be compared against all other malware (i.e., s - 1 .nger­print comparisons), each of the remaining malware require fewer than s - 1 comparisons each.
Sentence 2: malware i requires only s - i comparisons, and malware s - i requires s - (s - i) comparisons.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Which tuples in the domain of re­lation D are critical to this query?
Sentence 2: clearly, any tuple t having the diagnosis attribute valued Cancer, for example t = D(123, Cancer, RX2), is critical to QS.for t = D(123, Cancer, RX2), the instance I in Figure 2 is such that QS(I .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The four possible access rights for a domain are No Access, Client, Reserved, and Manager as shown in Table 1.
Sentence 2: those .elds allow us to (1) prohibit any access to the mapped memory No Access, (2) ignore permission bits in the page table and allow unlimited access to the related memory Manager, (3) or let the page table to deter­mine the access right Client.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Now, suppose the forging attacker A can output, with b+e0 y0 non-negligible probability p, s0 = Ay0 X0 for the test­a session of tag ( A, A = g , B, B, X0 ,Y0), where the secret key a is generated by and thus known to C while none of the dis­crete logarithms of B, X0 or Y0 are known to C in general.
Sentence 2: the value Y0 maybe chosen bythe attacker A itself for the case when no matching session exists.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For simplicity, we assume for our envisaged use cases that the properties considered by the IT department represent Common Criteria Evaluation Assurance Levels (EAL) of the underlying operating system.
Sentence 2: an operating system that has been evaluated according to EAL4 is represented by the property 0x04.3 After successfully installing and con­.guring the Property-CA and the PBBL, a software update is handled as follows: Property Certi.cate Issuing: If the IT department decides to provide a software update, a new property certi.cate is generated.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The properties of the various functions of a scalable scheme should satisfy the following requirements: Efficient addition of unlimited number of users through- out the scheme's operation.
Sentence 2: the Add-user operation should be a protocol executed between a new user and the server, that should have (i) communica- tion independent of the size of the user-population, and (ii) it should not involve the existing users of the system in any way.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It is easy to see that for some r = O(log log N), we have st2 .2ß0/3 tr d. 2ß0/3N and tr 2 d N. Then for X = .N .N r ; .
Sentence 2: (log log N)2 log log N for su.ciently large N. By the above r-1 we have codim(X) ; i=0 Xi codim(X) .N argument based on Theo­ rem 4.1 and the choice of the ti s, it is easily seen that Xi is a (ti,ti+1, (./(log log N))O(1))­spread subspace.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It is our thesis, that for an access-control mechanism to support a wide range of policies, it is best to dispense with any built-in semantics for roles in the mechanism itself be it the semantics of RBAC, or any other leaving such se­mantics to be de.ned by particular policies.
Sentence 2: an AC mechanism should be sensitive to roles, allowing spe­ci.c policies to take roles into account for their authorization decisions.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The operators Uand ndistribute over each other.
Sentence 2:  (f1 U(f2 nf3)) =((f1 Uf2) n(f1 Uf3)) and (f1 n(f2 U f3)) =((f1 nf2) U(f1 nf3)).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 1 r/0.479 A/-0.157 M/0.432 2 A/-0.027 M/-0.358 M/1.025 3 T/0.01 W/-0.43 4 L/0.255 W/0.216 5 A/0.482 V/-0.2 V/-0.242 6 V/0.238 p/1.087 A/-0.384 7 y/-0.151 w/-0.462 V/-0.127 8 V/0.358 V/1.11 H/-0.088 w/0.238 9 r/-0.035 6/-0.519 M/-0.255 10 c/0.554 d/1.075 11 Table 3: The n × n table generated by CNN for the CmPay sample in Figure 11 123456 789 1 K/0.935 K/0.781 H/-0.229 2 K/0.647 4/0.493 4/-0.445 3 6/0.593 U/0.692 4 6/0.06 U/0.688 5 J/0.093 U/-0.332 6 7 Q/1.102 8 R/0.229 R/1.057 9 S/1 the associated weight gives both the recognition result of this combination and the con.dence level calculated by the neural network for this result.
Sentence 2: the number of arcs in a graph equals to the number of non-empty cells in its corresponding table.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.6 Model Analysis Besides high classi.cation accuracy, LR has the advantages of performing automatic feature selection as well as providing an in­terpretable linear model of the training data.
Sentence 2: because the output of a linear model depends on the weighted sum of the features, the sign and magnitude of the individual parameter vector coef.cients can tell us how individual features contribute to a ma­licious prediction or a benign prediction.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Within this context, we examined the cost of processing queries across a range of database sizes and CTM rule com­plexities.
Sentence 2: we considered small (100 users/ company, 10 feedback reports/user), medium (500 users/ company, 20 feedback reports/user), and large (1000 users/ company, 30 feedback reports/user) databases, as well as low (100% intersection containment), medium (90% inter­section containment, 5% linking containment, 5% aggregate containment), and high (70% intersection containment, 15% linking containment, 15% aggregate containment) complex­ity rule sets.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Any attempt to embed the key into SMMDumper may be threatened by sophisticated at­tacks aimed at reading its code or data.
Sentence 2: to overcome such threats, we have decided to o.oad all the cryptographic op­erations (key management and signing) to an external hot­pluggable smart card device D. as soon as SMMDumper starts executing (that is, as soon as the sys­tem enters into SMM), it waits for D to be plugged into the system to carry out the tasks outlined above.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.1 Theoretical Choice: Oblivious Sorting One way to do this is to assign each item a random key from a very large universe, which is separate and distinct from the key that is a part of this key-value pair, and obliv­iously sort [9] the items by these keys.
Sentence 2: we can wrap each key-value pair, (k, v), as (k ' , (k, v)), where k ' is the new random key, and then wrap these wrapped pairs in a way that allows us to implement an oblivious sorting algorithm in the OS model based on comparisons involv­ing the k ' keys.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The line of work initiated by Kushilevitz [Kus89, Kus92] and Beaver [Bea91] helps us with this problem.
Sentence 2: the result of Maji, Prabhakaran and Rosulek [MPR09], shows that private protocols in the error-free model must advance in very speci.c ways.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Under the traditional Feige-Fiat-Shamir scheme, the prover sends y and the veri.er must compare both y 2 (mod N ) and -y 2 (mod N ) with the product of x and the committed values.
Sentence 2: it would seem that C and S would have to attempt the encryption and/or decryption twice.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the context of human genomics, WGS is ex­pected to foster signi.cant progress in the quality of health­care [14].
Sentence 2: genetic features and mutations are being increasingly and more e.ectively studied in relation to treatment of  as well as predisposition to diseases and Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro.t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the .rst page.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Generalizing this idea of spa­tially scoped relationships, consider the GSNS policy below: Policy B: Grant access if, in the social network of those users who are co-located with the owner, the requester is a friend-of-friend of the owner.
Sentence 2: access is only granted if (a) the requester is a friend­of-friend of the owner, and (b) both the requester and one of the common friends between the owner and the requester are co-located with the owner.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While web services are concerned with well-de.ned, reusable software components that perform speci.c tasks across organisa­tional boundaries via standardised web-based and message­oriented mechanisms, semantic web services are related to formal descriptions of properties, capabilities, interfaces and e.ects of web services in an unambiguous, machine­understandable form.
Sentence 2: semantic web services are web services augmented with automated service discov­ery, composition and invocation, and dynamic binding.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We use Hi+1 to denote the hash value of packet Pi+1.In gen­eral, Hash(M) is the hash value of message M,and Ek(M) is the encrypted value of message M with key k. Thus, each packet has format of Pi = datai||Hi+1, i =1..N. Each cryptographic hash Hi is calculated over the full packet i, not just the data portion, thereby establishing a chain of hashes, Hi = Hash(Pi)= Hash(datai||Hi+1), i - 1..N. Furthermore, the entire chain of hashes is veri.ed by signing the .rst hash H1 with the private key of the base station.
Sentence 2: packet P0 contains the signature S of H1, P0 = signature(H1)||H1 = EKs (H1)||H1, and the signature S = EKs (H1) is computed using the pri­vate key Ks of the base station.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The = attack can also be used to break the privacy of SSH-NPC when SSH-NPC uses random padding.
Sentence 2: if the .rst 232 messages that a user tags result in encoded packets that use the minimum 4 bytes of random padding, then an attacker capable of forcing a user to tag an additional 232 chosen-plaintexts will be able to learn information about the user s initial 232 messages.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If K, w, v |= f and w = w ' then K, w ' , v |= f. cipal accessibility relations determine what kind of knowl­edge is modeled [15].
Sentence 2: if, for example, these relations must whenever f holds at a world w, if the constructive be re.exive, then the logic models veridical knowledge: if reasoner is able to reach an extended state of knowledge at p says f, then f indeed holds.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This concept of stability has been studied in the .eld of Robust Statistics in which robust is the formal term used to qualify this notion of stability.
Sentence 2: there have been several approaches to developing robust PCA al­gorithms that construct a low dimensional subspace that captures most of the data s dispersion4 and are stable un­der data contamination [6, 7, 9, 19, 23].
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: MPEG s work in this area is still in its infancy and it remains to be seen how well this approach promotes inter-operability.
Sentence 2: it is not clear that all terminals will necessarily be capable of accessing all tools (which might only be avail­able for one particular computing platform, for example) or that all devices, particularly smaller ones, would necessar­ily have the resources to store and execute all of the tools required to access all of the multimedia owned by one user.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Given the modi.cations we made, an adversarial third party needs to mount a brute-force attack for each redacted leaf node individually to recover the original data.
Sentence 2: if 8 meter readings in a row are redacted, to reveal the series of data it would be necessary to perform brute-force attacks on all possible combinations of the 8 data values.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Security in the malicious model is achieved if the adversary (interacting in the real proto­col, without the TTP) can learn no more information than it could in the ideal scenario.
Sentence 2: a secure protocol emulates (inits realexecution) theideal execution thatincludes aTTP.This notionisformulatedby requiringthe existence of adversariesinthe ideal execution model that can simulate adversarialbehaviorin the real execution model.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In other work (e.g., [33, 37, 29]) the e.ciency requirement for a client is to run in time poly(n, log T), when delegating a function f that runs in time T and takes inputs of size n. Furthermore, as observed by Gennaro and Wichs [27], even if it is possible to reinterpret some of the results on veri.able computation in the setting of homomorphic mes­sage authenticators, the resulting solutions are still not ap­propriate.
Sentence 2: they might require a client to send the data all at once and would not allow for composition of several authenticated computations.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: INTRODUCTION 1.1 Background Role-based access control (RBAC) has established itself as a solid base for today s security administration needs, as documented in the RBAC96 model [14] and the subsequent NIST standard proposal [2].
Sentence 2: enterprise Roles spanning across di.erent IT systems are increasingly used in medium and large organisations as a basis for company­wide security management.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: ERR (error) = exp(random))/exp(empirical) showing the probability that an IP pair, picked at random, willproducesomelift value11 .Tab.3 alsopresentsthe more intuitive notion of expected row distribution.
Sentence 2: if one weretopick a row at randomfrom lift(H ' )or lift(H ' rand ), whatlift values should one expectto see, andin whatquan­tity?
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The unavailability of a vouching site V means the target service S will have to rely solely on its own authentication proce­dure which, as mentioned earlier, is the .rst step in an SAuth session and takes precedence over any vouching responses.
Sentence 2: should a vouching site be unavailable, the target service will still be able to function and operate, as it would do without the use of SAuth.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In addition to protecting PINs from agents and network operators, the scheme enjoys other security properties like resistance to skimming attacks and shoulder-surfing attacks, which makes it of potential interest in domains outside of mobile banking.
Sentence 2: our scheme offers a more secure alternative to the authentication solutions used by current-day ATM machines, which are known to be susceptible to such attacks.
Relationship: entailment