sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, resolvers are usually con.gured to share the in­formation retrieved from the DNS database only with stub resolvers or name servers acting as such ( DNS forward­ing ), for which a TSIG-based mechanism would su.ce.
Sentence 2: resolvers usually do not share DNS responses (for which they are not authoritative or can t provide delegation nodes) with other name servers nor name servers are con­.gured to query other servers that cannot refer to delegated subdomains.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The .rst requirement suggests to devise a negotiation mech­anism more .exible than that used by IPsec IKE (based on Di.e-Hellman) and, rather, similar to the TLS handshake protocol.
Sentence 2: we should prefer a key exchange protocol that provides the .exibility to permit the negoti­ation of the preferred or most appropriate public key algo­rithm for key transport or key agreement.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The results clearly indicate that the certifying algorithm approach out­performs the BFS approach and that the planar separator approach outperforms both BFS and the certifying algorithm dramatically which is expected since the planar separator proof-computation time grows sublinearly with the number of nodes.
Sentence 2: proof­computation time of the planar separator scheme has a speedup of more than 1.4X105× on a 1,000-node graph, and a speedup of more than 2.3X108× on a 100,000-node graph (compared to BFS).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In particular, to limit the physical memory accessible to a DMA engine of an I/O de­vice, we utilize the hardware-based IOMMU support (already im­plemented in Xen) in the recent CPU/chipsets to map the address space of DMA engine to a safe place.
Sentence 2: the way the IOMMU is set up preludes the possibility of overwriting HookSafe as well as HookSafe-protected memory regions in a guest.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Second, by directly asking users about their usage of screen locks, reactivity to the observation e.ect is reduced [28].
Sentence 2: by .rst hav­ing the participants self report their screen lock usage before they are exposed to a targeted intervention, any change dur­ing the intervention itself should less likely be due merely to a reaction to their suspicion that locking behavior is being monitored by the installed agent [29, 30].
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Speci.cally in the code sample at line 4-10, the tainted input of s1 at line 41 and s2 at line 45 will .ow into the constructor of Search at line 4 and then Request s data .eld at line 15, resp s result at line 8, as well as resp s body .eld at line 30 and line 34.
Sentence 2: unsanitized input .ows back to the client at line 11, creating the possibility of a an XSS attack.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If such fault-tolerance techniques are used to tolerate security attacks in a network with homogez.eous elements, the as-sumption of failure independence L~; ill founded.
Sentence 2: for security attacks it is not reasonable to assume that identical replicas will fail independently: rather, once a successful attack is performed against one replica, the same attack can be performed successfully on all identical replicas.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Each node uses the aggregated gossips and warnings received as inputs to its classi.er.
Sentence 2: the idea of this scheme is the following: With the warnings, victim-closest nodes will indicate to the bordergate nodes to stop the attack .ow, and with the gos­sips, the source-closest nodes will indicate to the interme­diate network nodes that the aggregated tra.c is still at­tempting to enter the network, instead of letting the attack .ow in.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We also found that many of these web­sites make use of a handful of third-party history-sni.ng libraries.
Sentence 2: of the 46 cases of con.rmed sni.ng, 22 sites use history-sni.ng code from interclick.com and 14 use history-sni.ng code from meaningtool.com.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Similarly, (2)can be upper bounded by 2-t/5 since At canbe usedasacircuit inverting G on input k. Summing gives the desired result.
Sentence 2: f -1 Consider an oracle t =( F, t we can G, ) .Tt.From construct an oracle t =(G, F, F -1) .Tn as:2 G(tk)= G(tka,tkb)=(G (tka),tkb).G ..t,n is a permutation acting only on the .rst t bits of its input.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our LPPMs can .nd the optimal privacy protection mech­anism in any given scenario, i.e., they achieve the best pro­tection among all possible mechanisms against a strategic adversary with knowledge of mobility pro.les and LPPM al­gorithm.
Sentence 2: lPPMs designed under our frame­work provide privacy level that constitutes an upper bound on the privacy that is achievable by any other defense.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.1 Inferring NAT usage Our approach is based on inferring the presence of NATted hosts from malware traces captured at a number of distributed active re­sponders.
Sentence 2: we deployed a modi.ed version of the Nepenthes malware collection tool [2] to a /24 pre.x in our in­stitution and 14 smaller monitors running on PlanetLab nodes [14] with access to darknet space (covering from 4 to 12 IP addresses).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.3 Homomorphic Evaluation of Circuits We will now describe how to homomorphically evaluate a Boolean circuit .
Sentence 2: with two-input NAND gates that takes f inputs, and has depth d. our scheme will be able to evaluate circuits of depth c · log n (for any constant c) under a polynomial LWE assumption, namely DLWEn,q,.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The key is to note that the permissions are applied to virtual pages, but a physical page may be simultaneously mapped to several virtual pages with differ­ent permissions.
Sentence 2: if Patagonix does not check for simultaneous inconsistent mappings, an attacker could simultane­ously gain executable and write access to a page by constructing one set of page tables that maps a physical page as executable but non-writable, and constructing another set of page tables that maps the same physical page as writable but non-executable.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Based on Lemma 1 and conditioned on the event that no collision happens with high probability (Lemma 2), the elements of A ' that cor­respond to honest parties can be any permutation of the elements of honest parties in A.
Sentence 2: the prob­ability that the adversary can successfully map A ' to A is less than 1 which guarantees (n - t)-anonymity (i.e., (n-t)!
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Helios has been shown to ensure ballot privacy for successively stronger notions of privacy and more accurate implementations [15, 7, 9].
Sentence 2: yet none of the existing ballot privacy proofs [15, 7, 9, 11] for Helios considers a fully distributed setup phase with an arbitrary threshold t in the total number of trustees e. a setup phase where trustees generate the election pub­lic and secret keys without a trusted dealer while a.ording an arbitrary t-out-of-e threshold parameters selection.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Thus, the foreign producers can not actively investigate the domestic environment for finding and fighting against local cheating while the domestic distributor companies who can play a more active role in this fighting cannot directly create solutions by modifying the game client software.
Sentence 2: the domestic distributors are more familiar with cheating forms as well as hacking tools developed by domestic hackers but cannot do much to change the game client software which is developed by the foreign producers.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Unlike the standard knapsack DPS where secret keys are build with strong modular multiplication, here the author offers a more generalized way, which is the generalization of well-known Merkle-Hellman scheme.
Sentence 2: different modifications of DPS with knapsacks A and B, built on the base of parametrical solutions of the set multistage system (1).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our solution is for pi to provisionally act as though the re­quired ciphertext cj from pj was the encryption of a random value if a request for cj was previously sent in the current session but no reply has yet been received.
Sentence 2: pi homo­morphically combines the ciphertext ci that it will return to the requesting principal pr with the encryption of a newly generated random value.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We stress, moreover,that much about our attackgeneral­izesbeyondElGamaldecryption(or, moregenerally,discov­ering private exponents used in modular exponentiations) in libgcrypt.
Sentence 2: our techniques for preempt­ing the victim frequently for observation and sidestepping several sources of cache noise are independent of the use to which the side-channel is put.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In a traditional ROP attack, the desired control .ow is achieved by placing the addresses of the gadgets on the stack and then ex­ploiting ret instructions to fetch and copy them to the instruction pointer.
Sentence 2: if we consider each gadget as a mono­lithic instruction, the stack pointer plays the role of the instruction pointer in a normal program, transferring the control .ow from one gadget to the next.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: ON THE DIFFICULTY OF REMOVING ANGEL The construction of tools such as AngeL always raises con- troversial issues regarding the possibility to easily bypass them and their update.
Sentence 2: software modules intended to protect a system can be removed or bypassed in various ways by intruders who have gained control of the system, e.g., by mean of a root compromise, thus making such a protection in- effective; AngeL, being a software module, is not im- mune to this drawback; updating the signature database used by all types of filter modules to detect attacks is particularly difficult and critical, especially if the database is bundled in the code, and periodical update is necessary to maintain the effectiveness of the filter; AngeL's atta£k signature database is bundled in the code.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We also showed through simulations on random sets of n-grams, the use of single hash function minimized the difference between the Jaccard in Equation 1 and the bitvector Jaccard in Equation 2.
Sentence 2: we created two sets that contain 1000 n-grams each, with varying number of overlapping n-grams, and measured how much the bitvector Jaccard differs from the Jaccard.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Even though Google pro.les existed before the Buzz experience started, and are publicly searchable, the tiny frontier that exist between Buzz, public Google pro.les and Gmail accounts may create a serious security risk for Google services.
Sentence 2: in this paper we show how it is now easy, quick and ef­fective to crawl millions of Google email accounts, exploiting Buzz and related Google pro.les without being noticed and from a single machine.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY 3.1 Law of Pragnanz There is a law of Pragnanz which is core concept of Gestalt psychology founded by Max Wertheimer According to this; we tend to order our experience in a manner that is regular, orderly, simple.
Sentence 2: capability of our visual perception makes us recognize the form which can easily be seen from us.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: MOTIVATION The family of HTML5 technologies is set to dramatically change the way in which applications are designed for mobile devices.
Sentence 2: hTML5 provides direct support for features including 1By native, we mean built for a speci.c platform (e.g., Android,iOS, etc), not necessarily that they contain compiled native exe­cutable libraries or code.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: XOR (this weak­ness has been widely documented in the literature and al­ready exploited in some application contexts, like Wep.
Sentence 2: it holds that CRC(a XOR b) =CRC(a)XOR CRC(b), that is the checksum of the XOR of two numbers is equal to the XOR of the checksums of the two numbers.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: INTRODUCTION The development of information and communication technology, represented by the Internet and mobile phone, has changed people's lifestyles and has created a demand for information and service to be received in all kinds of environments, such as at home, in school, and in the office[2].
Sentence 2: information and communication technology is constantly being upgraded for the provision of new services that meet the above-mentioned demand.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Instead, we can re-use the XACML infrastructure and resolve the ordering during the model-to-code transformation.
Sentence 2: for each class of the design model, we gen­erate a policy set (XACML element PolicySet) con­taining the permissions (Rule) assigned to emergency policies (Policy) for this class ordered with respect to the topological sorting of the emergency policies.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Furthermore, we propose to extend the scope of CERTs/ISACs to support e.ective collaborations involving multiple organizations by additionally becoming ICIMs.
Sentence 2: these novel enhancements result in a Process Model (see Figure 2) that allows incident responders and investigators across multiple sites a.ected by an attack to e.ectively collaborate in their common goals of investigating and responding to the attacks.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A set of countermeasures is complete if, after removing the proper arcs from the cor­responding attack graphs, ag cannot reach a .nal node.
Sentence 2: if a set is complete, the arcs associated with the attacks stopped by its countermeasures determine a cut of theattackgraph that splitstheinitial nodes and the .nal nodes into two disjoint subsets so that no .nal node can be reached.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: TimeCapsule: Secure Recording of Accesses to a Protected Datastore Srinivas Krishnan Fabian Monrose Department of Computer Science Department of Computer Science University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Chapel Hill, NC Chapel Hill, NC krishnan@cs.unc.edu fabian@cs.unc.edu ABSTRACT We present an approach for transparently recording accesses to protected storage.
Sentence 2: we provide a framework for data monitoring in a virtualized environment using only the abstractions exposed by the hypervisor.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The idea is the following: relax the condi­tion on a puzzle solution so that the probability of solving a puzzle can be increased.
Sentence 2: instead of .xing the nu­merical value of the Q-bit target string as d = 0, we can relax that the numerical value d of the Q-bit target string could be anything in [0,D], so that 0 : d : D< 2Q .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We can state our main result as a reduction from any attribute­based encryption and any fully homomorphic encryption scheme.
Sentence 2: we show how to construct a (single-key and succinct) functional encryption scheme for any class of functions F by using a homomorphic encryption scheme which can do homomorphic evaluations for any function in F and an attribute-based encryption scheme for a slightly larger class of functions F ' ; F ' is the class of functions such that for any function f .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, the compo­nent breakdown is designed to compartmentalize any faults or attacks and to simplify the design and implementation of the security-critical components.
Sentence 2: the application server is the most vulnerable component of our architecture: it performs sophisticated in­teractions with the client, presenting a large attack surface, and it contains complex and evolving application logic that can be a source of vulnerabilities.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: (ix ~, ,co)~ Pi ) <'-- uT¢(~) [ i-lJ (d) Permutatiom Server Si randomly permutes {/=(J) =O) ~,O)~ln ,t~i ,/~i ,Ui /J-j=z.
Sentence 2: si selects a permutation rl on N elements uniformly at ran- dom, sets (c~ j), p~J), y~J)) = (~'(J)),/2~ =' (J))~'(~))), and posts to the bulletin board the ordered set {(c~D, " U) ° (J)~IN I'~i , Sl );j=l" (e) Batch proof of correctness of output keys.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Meanwhile, we view sentient adversaries as having both measurement and actuation capabilities, and as pursuing 1) estimation of network dynamics/structure and also 2) deliberate actuation/modification of the dynamics to their own benefit and to the detriment of the network performance.
Sentence 2: we assume that the sentient adversary (like the natural adversary) is able to modify the original network dynamics to .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The plan p satis.es constraint (.=,s,s1), for example, if the same user is assigned to both steps by p, and satis.es constraint (.,s,s1 =) if di.erent users are assigned to s and s1.
Sentence 2: these represent, respectively, binding-of­duty and separation-of-duty constraints.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, a data redirection rule making use of the chain-of-command relation will necessarily result in a set of potential recipients that includes the entirety of the chain of command above the original requestor.
Sentence 2: if a low ranking soldier were to request some informational document in such a system, the data might be returned to every single individual from his or her immediate superior all the way up to the command­ing general.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Then, we extract a set of invariants for each SQL signature from both ses­sion variables and SQL responses, which characterize the application state and the associated data constraints when a SQL query is issued.
Sentence 2: we leverage a well­known technique (i.e., daikon engine [12]) to derive value­based invariants, including the invariants over variables that are used for indicating the application state and the data constraints.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Then, if it detects noti.cation suppression patterns corresponding to identi.ed suspicious billing behaviors, the application is considered to be a money-stealing application.
Sentence 2: we rely on  (a) Registering Receiver &#38; Permission (b) Sending SMS (c) Noti.cation Suppression Figure 1: The procedure of a case study of money-stealing application.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We reveal the value of F1 to the .rst player (the sec­ond player already knows this value), and the value of F2 to the second player (the .rst player already knows this value).
Sentence 2: we condition the game G(Y ,X |V1,B,W,E,B1)TV1 on the values of F1, F2, and consider the game G(Y,X|V1,B,W,E,B1)TV1 |F1,F2 = G(Y,X |V1,B,W,E,B1,F1,F2)TV1 , with parameters (k, d-1, P(Y |V1,B,W,E,B1,F1,F2)TV1 , P(X|V1,B,W,E,B1,F1,F2)TV1 ).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Because our language semantics are pa­rameterized on an oracle for termination analysis, improvements in automated termination analysis will increase the precision of our enforcement mechanism.
Sentence 2: results on proving ter­mination for recursive programs [21] and programs with polyno­ mial [23], bit-vector [22], and heap-based [8] termination argu­ ments offer possibilities for further improving precision of the ter­mination oracle.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The security, measured as the logarithm of the running time of the distinguishing attack, jumps from lg(T )=64 to lg(T ) = 218 when n goes from 2048 to 4096.
Sentence 2: suppose we require 128 bits of security for the system, we are constrained to one of two choices set n = 2048 (and risk the possibility of better attacks), or set n = 4096 (and settle for worse e.ciency).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The constructs e and (e are both atomic propositions.
Sentence 2: (e is not the application of the usual modal operator ( (with the temporal semantics) to formula e. Informally, the formula e is true in a session if the event e has been observed in that session, whereas (e, pronounced e is possible , is true if event e may still occur as a future observation in that session.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This is a variant of the latter approach that estimates Y ' using soft clustering assignments instead of hard ones.
Sentence 2: the (i, k)th element of Y ' is estimated as the posterior probability that the ith sample belongs to the kth cluster, using a Gaussian Kernel Density Estimator (KDE) with bandwidth parameter h. When h is too small, the posterior estimates tend to the value of 1/k, i.e., each point is assigned to any cluster with the same probability.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In order to compute g the decryption keys gd1,..., dN , the decryption-key gen­ eration operation F is applied to each element of G and the secret-key a0,...,av to obtain the sequence .1,...,.N and subsequently each gdi is computed us­g ing the representation reconstructor function R(.i,di) for i =1,...,N. The encryption and decryption functions ET and DT are identical to the encryption and decryption func­tions of the ExEG scheme E, D.  The spaces PK, SK, K, P, C are de.ned as collections of distributions parameterized by the security param­eter k. Each distribution is de.ned through a bijective dependency on the underlying group G and the pa­rameter v (i.e., this means that conditioning on G and v a speci.c element of these spaces is determined un­ambiguously).
Sentence 2: pK contains objects of  × ZN×v the form Gv+1 q , SK contains objects of the form Zvq +1 , and Ksk contains subsets of Zvq s.t.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Using the MaxEnt classi.er we predict policies with an average accuracy of 81%, compared to the 67% average ac­curacy obtained by following the default Facebook strategy of sug­gesting the policy that was used for the last post.
Sentence 2: our application of machine learning to policy prediction reduces the number of posts for which policy is miscon.gured by over 45% on average.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As part of the exploitation process, the attacker may attempt to execute arbitrary malicious code in the compromised hypervisor or the user-level program [8].
Sentence 2: by assuming the presence of exploitable software vulnerabilities in hosted hypervisors, we aim to deal with the threats from an untrusted guest so that the hosted hypervisor, even compromised, cannot take over the host and other guests.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The sec­ond group form the open identity management models.
Sentence 2: this group consists of federated identity manage­ment, which can be implemented by using SAML 2.0 [18] or WS-Federation [19], and user centric identity management that can be developed by using technologies such as OpenID (http://openid.net/) or InformatioCard.
Relationship: entailment