sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As Fi(v) is the probability that Pi s risk appetite, 1 - Ei = v, F can be expressed as (see Appendix A for proof): Fi(v)= v (3) Our second IDS accuracy function, F ,is representative of real IDS functions.
Sentence 2: it is impossible to determine with complete certainty that a node is malicious (see Equation 4).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the context of ongoing international standard­ization e.orts like ISO TC 22/IEC TC 69, it is manifesting that in the future certain roles of actors in the backend sys­tem will be concerned with security and privacy-related pro­cesses.
Sentence 2: for the charging management of EVs, the draft standard ISO/IEC 15118-1 [7]de.nes actors and protocols to perform load management, billing and clearing, as well as certi.cation.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Given the lack of perfect ground truth, to measure false positives we check whether the malware can establish successful communication with the detected remote servers and whether a server s response successfully trig­gers the malware s malicious logic.
Sentence 2: for each detected server, we conduct another round of veri.cation by redirecting the malware s request to the detected servers and monitor the malware s execution afterwards.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: IDENTITY BOXING An identity box is a secure execution space in which all processes and resources are associated with an external iden­tity that need not have any relationship to the set of local accounts.
Sentence 2: within an identity box, a program runs with a high-level name such as /O=UnivNowhere/CN=Fred rather than with a simple integer UID or account name.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While a driver s license, Social Secu­rity number or credit card number may be stolen secretly and used to impersonate someone, a biometric can be linked only to a specific individual (with only small levels of false identifica­tions) so that fraud may be discounted.
Sentence 2: if a biometric can be traced to one person, 77 it must be from that person.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The contribution of this paper is overcoming the above limitation.
Sentence 2: by exploiting the unusual feature of the pdf standard [19] which tolerates the presence of the header within the .rst 1024 bytes, we are able to enhance the attack in such way that the two .letypes, namely pdf and tiff, embedded into the polymorphic .le are both ex­tremely safe allowing the attacker to produce a fake docu­ment that appears in a format widely accepted in the con­text of e-government activities both whenever it is signed and whenever it is fraudulently exploited.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: E.ectiveness against anti-forensics tools: Although forensics techniques can collect signi.cant amounts of in­formation, investigators must be careful to ensure the ve­racity and .delity of the evidence collected because anti­forensic techniques can hide or intentionally obfuscate in­formation gathered.
Sentence 2: rootkits can be used by hackers to hide the presence of malicious software such as bots running in the system.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A key-like decryption blackbox D in our setting is viewed as a probabilistic circuit that takes as input a ci­phertext CT and outputs a message M or ., and such a decryption blackbox does not need to be perfect, namely, we only require it to be able to decrypt with non-negligible success probability.
Sentence 2: the adversary (i.e.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Following the approach of Steiner [27], we analyze the security of our protocol in the framework for asynchronous reactive sys­tems proposed by P.tzmann and Waidner [23].
Sentence 2: we .rst specify the target behavior of a GKE protocol in terms of an idealized service, and then show that our protocol has the same input-output behavior as this idealized service.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: One property of UNF terms is that if a userset X satis.es a term f under con.guration (U, UP),then X also satis.es f un­der (U ' , UP ' ),where U .U ' and UP .UP ' .
Sentence 2: because a UNF term does not have the negation operator, then if X satis.es the term under a con.guration, enlarging the con.guration will not make X fail to satisfy the term.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In P 64, the outcome is stored in memory pointed to by the qhasm variable rp.
Sentence 2: the limb ri of R = r0 + 264 r1 + 2128 r2 + 2192 r3 corresponds to the qhasm expressions *(uint64 *)(rp + 8i) for every i .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our proto­type provides all the features required for deployment.
Sentence 2: we implemented the following parts: (a) the communication .ows and processing logic for the message exchanges presented in Section 4, (b) the ILS process with the fully implemented Integrity Tree, and the capability to publish the information required for its consistency checks, (c) the validator process, which monitors the ILSes and pub­lishes misbehaviors, (d) the CA process that includes the validator s role with the additional ability to produce on-line con.rmations, (e) the client process, i.e., a browser extended with support for full ARCert validation, (f ) the protocol for accountable synchronization, and (g) the domain tool, which can register, update, revoke, recover, and con.rm ARCerts.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 5.1 Bitcoin protocol enhancement proposal In [3, Section 3.2], the authors propose to modify the Bitcoin protocol so that in order to create a transaction txnew that re­deems an unspent output i of an earlier transaction txold, this out­put will be referenced in txnew via (SHA256d(txsimp), i) instead of old (SHA256d(txold), i).
Sentence 2: the id of txold shall be de­simp rived from the simpli.ed form txold , i.e., the form that excludes the input scripts which are required for txold to become valid.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In particular, we assume here that the attacker can manipulate samples corresponding to the digit 3 in order to have them clustered together with the cluster corresponding to the digit 6 , while preserving the initial clusters.
Sentence 2: the desired clustering output for the attacker consists of three clusters: one corresponding to the 0 digit, one corresponding to the 1 digit, and the latter corresponding to the digits 6 and 3 .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Let the root vertex of the hash tree be r. Then, for each node i, assuming that node i itself has never divulged the value of MACKi(M||N) in the past, exhibiting the value r suf.ces as proof of the ability to independently compute MACKi(M||N) since r was computed via a sequence of collision-resistant hash functions evaluated with MACKi(M||N) as an input.
Sentence 2: it is computationally infeasible for an adversary that does not know Ki or MACKi(M||N) to produce a new pair M. ,r ,N. in such a way that MACKi(M||N) is a leaf vertex in some hash tree with root r .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The key idea here is to build DL predicates over enriched secu­rity metadata and a knowledgebase that semantically en­codes the state of the world as observed by the decision maker.
Sentence 2: we have used security metadata de­veloped in [23] and an extended version of KANI ontology (Knowledge Associates for Novel Intelligence [9]) for build­ing the knowledgebase.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 5.1 Towards ideal implementation: a sample setup In the ideal case, an escort box is comprised of .ve components materialized in an as compact as possible blackbox: (1) a low­cost processor for protocol enforcement; (2) a large-enough but bounded memory used by the processor; (3) a wireless interface to connect to the LAN; (4) a wireless/wired interface to connect to the guest; and (5) a tamper-resistant shell to protect any physical tam­pering of the above four components.
Sentence 2: we recommend to select read-only memory that can only be modi.ed/written after opening the tamper-resistant shell, so that mobile guests or other unauthorized parties cannot easily mishandle the escort box, for ex­ample, they should not be able to make the escort box run mobile agents or codes not conforming to pre-installed network protocols.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In animal world, information warfare may occur whenever one party has, or contend to have, access to information that their opponents are keen to know (Krebs and Dawkins 1984, Kilner and Hinde 2008).
Sentence 2: the asymmetry in physical prowess may motivate the physically weak but knowledgeable rivals to exploit information and get the upper hand (Kilner and Hinde 2008).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: One idea is to use the Levenshtein (string-edit) distance between pronunciations, which is de.ned as the minimum number of phoneme insertions, deletions, and sub­stitutions required to turn one pronunciation into another [52].
Sentence 2: the string-edit distance has been shown to in.uence perceived word similarity in psycholinguistic experiments [10, 41, 58] and in real-world confusions [50].
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Here we relax this obfuscation notion and only require that the proxy learn nothing about the en­crypted messages (but the proxy might learn other things not exposed by black-box access.)
Sentence 2: our notion of security allows for a deterministic re-encryption proce­dure, whereas the obfuscation notion of [21] mandates that the re-encryption process be randomized.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Approximations of the true information .ow are good enough so long as they capture the most important aspects of the information .ow.
Sentence 2: as long as the out­put tells the user of the DIFT system something meaningful about the true information .ow in the system, perfect accu­racyfrom an information-theoretic perspective, which is im­possible to achieve in practice, is not a requirement.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.4 Misf t Characters in Entity Representationbreaking CSS Strings Combining aforementioned exploit with enabling CSS-escape decoding behavior results in yet another interesting e.ect observable in several browsers.
Sentence 2: when both CSS es­cape and the canonical representation for the double-quote character inside a CSS string are used, the render engine converts them into a single quote, regardless of those two characters seeming unrelated.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It is important for the encryption scheme to be veri.able to pre­vent the SM from corrupting the decrypted aggregate result.
Sentence 2: given the publickey PK and a ciphertext E(a), when given a and some randomness r, the server can verify that E(a)was indeed an encryption of a using r, and there is no bsuch that E(a)could have been an encryption of bfor some randomness.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since virtual machines are oftenusedby researcherstostudymalwareina containedenviron­ment, we assume that these bots in reality correspond to researchers studying theTorpig malware.
Sentence 2: we were able to deter­mine the nid values generated on a standard con.guration of the VMware and QEMU virtual machines and we found 40 hosts using these values.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our protocols achieve weaker goals: Our protocols output a graph AG that is not strictly isomorphic to G, but rather is isomorphic to a per­turbed version of G. The perturbations consist of the addition and/or deletion of a small number of edges and/or nodes.
Sentence 2: our protocols allow the adversary to learn some infor­mation about the isomorphism that maps G to AG, but ensure that the adversary learns only minimal in­formation about the isomorphism restricted to honest  nodes in G. our protocols leak much less information about honest nodes than the simple approach based on pseudonyms described in the intro­duction.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Although SNR is a simple way to measure the noise introduced by the embedded mark and can give a general idea of impercep­tibility, it does not take into account the speci.c characteristics of the HAS and, thus, better measures should be used in the future re­search.
Sentence 2: the use of HAS models should be investigated [17] or auditive perceptual tests might be performed.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Running code at system management mode privilege opens a number of challenges that need to be properly addressed to achieve the goals mentioned at the beginning of this section.
Sentence 2: we must (i) trigger system management inter­rupts to switch to SMM, (ii)beabletoaccess all the physical [md5 (pkt) | pkt] (3)  C = md5(mem) (1) (4) sign(C)  (2) [0x00... -0xff...]  Figure 1: Overview of the system memory of the target system, even when more than 4GB of physical memory is installed on 32-bit hosts, (iii) guaran­tee the integrity of the collected data on the host as well as while in transit to a generic but trusted device.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 2C that describes how each basic block shared with the victim (i.e., in the shared executable) is stored in one or more chunks mapped into the adversary instance s virtual memory.
Sentence 2: here, C is the set of all chunks mapped into the adversary s vir­tual memory and occupied by the shared executable, and 2C denotes the power set of C. each basic block in B is mapped to one or more chunks, by BBToChunks.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, for safety, the goal is to be as complete as possible better safe than sorry so it is acceptable to have a false positive (i.e., an image occurrence that does not correspond to a real occurrence) but not a false negative (i.e., a real occurrence which is not signaled).
Sentence 2: we need to report an alert for every image occurrence of s in lo and these alerts should be interpreted as possibly corresponding to real attacks.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: First, we argue that the al­gorithm used by AutoBatch to produce a batch veri.cation equation unconditionally satis.es Security De.nition 2.2.
Sentence 2: the batch veri.cation equation will hold if and only if each of the individual signatures would have passed the individual veri.cation test (up to a negligible error probability).7 1.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: An important observation is that the entire client-side code base does not have to be included in the replica.
Sentence 2: display code does not need to be executed on the server because the replica is essentially headless there is no user to see the GUI.To further reduce the amountof code the replica must run, we can use a slicing analysis [51] to only include a portion of the client-side code that contribute to values included into RPCs.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We consider the problem of devising a fully distributed, non-interactive, robust, and adaptively secure construction which is as e.cient as the centralized schemes obtained from [55, 19] and does not rely on era­sures.
Sentence 2: we want to retain private-key shares of O(1) size, no matter how many players are involved in the protocol.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For exam­ple, if we .nd a Sadmind Ping followed by a bu.er over.ow attack against the corresponding Sadmind service, we can correlate them to be parts of the same series of attacks.
Sentence 2: we model the knowledge (or state) of attackers in terms of individual attacks, and correlate alerts if they indicate the progress of attacks.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Because wireless communication is not secure, we assume an adversary can eavesdrop on all tra.c, inject packets or replay older messages.We assume that if a node is com­promised, all the information it holds will also be compro­mised.However, we assume the base station will not be compromised.
Sentence 2: 2.2 Design Goals ThemaingoalofLEAPistodesigne.cient security mechanisms for supporting various communication models in sensor networks.The security requirements not only in­clude authentication and con.dentiality but also robustness and survivability.the sensor network should be robustagainst varioussecurityattacks, andifanattack succeeds, its impact should be minimized.For example, the compromise of a single node should not break the security of theentirenetwork.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: (y = Trapdoorx)},where k = |KQ|.
Sentence 2: we later show that Mallory can be success­ful with very high probability even when k<< l.It turns out that Mallory has high probability of being successful even when she does not know the identity of any of the queries in Q.  Mallory has an m × m matrix M.Each (i, j)th cell  in matrix M contains the expected probability of both ith and jth keywords appearing in any random docu­ment d .D.Mi,j = Pr [(Ki .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Unfortunately, the peak of the initial curve occurs at about the same time that the passive monitor data became un- available, so the duration of the 2,000 host/minute infec- tion rate is unknown.
Sentence 2: the large spike corre- sponds to 7,700 hosts; it is an anomaly caused by a small gap in the collected netflow data that resulted in detection of all hosts infected during the down time when collection resumed.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since there are 4 di.erent acls (i.e., {A, B}, {A, B, C}, {B, C, D}, {A, B, C, D}), and 4 users we de.ne 8 di.erent keys, one for each acl and one for each user.
Sentence 2: keys ka,..., kd are associated with users A, .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Quite similar to what happened in the .eld of program veri.ca­tion, where speci.c properties (e.g., partial correctness and mutual exclusion) were investigated before the introduction of the unifying safety-liveness framework [12], the same kind of development was made in the .eld of cryptographic protocols.
Sentence 2: speci.c cryp­tographic security properties were investigated before the introduc­tion of the unifying notion called universal composability [2], or its equivalent (but perhaps more intuitive) version called concur­rent general composition (arbitrarily many instances run possibly together with arbitrary other protocols) [13].
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The maximal potion of time the system can afford to stay in con.g­uration C1 is * µN -d p1 = , (5) µN -µ1 while the system will stay in con.gurations C2,...,CN respectively with portions of time given by ** * d-µ1 p2 = ··· = pN-1 =0,pN = .
Sentence 2: µN -µ1 MTD is (µ1,··· ,µN ,p1 * )-powerful.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We used the expert classi.cation for little datasets, but it was impossible to ap­ply to huge volumes of payloads; so we resorted to both manual inspection and proof of concept tasks to evaluate the correctness of the classi.cation.
Sentence 2: in Figure 2 we present the results of the training of a 10 × 10 Self Organizing Map that creates a di­vision of the data in 100 clusters.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In addition, the degree of trust in a credential for verifying certain attributes of its possessor also depends on the trustworthiness of the party issuing the credential.
Sentence 2: in a distributed environment with no central certification authorities, all credential issuers may not be trusted to the same extent [3, 5, 4, 6] and consequently, the assertions made in the issued credentials may fail to certify the claimed attributes of the user with the desired degree of trust.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For brevity, in this work we consider the SA, who can potentially realize a consistent number of threats with respect to the others insiders.
Sentence 2: thanks to its privileges, he could install malicious software/code, create backdoors, disable system logs and anti-virus, create new users or change users privileges, install remote network tools, plant logic bombs [16], perform operation on data base in order to have Secure!
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Unfortunately, we show that doing so is not su.cient.
Sentence 2: since the SSH spec­i.cation does not require the padding to be random, the re­sulting SSH implementation may be vulnerable to a rather serious reaction-attack (a privacy attack that works by mod­ifying a sender s ciphertexts and observing the receiver s re­sponse).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It gives the reputation system an opportunity to observe user activities for an extensive period of time, thus has a better chance of recognizing previously unclassi.ed accounts, either good or bad.
Sentence 2: we use the reputation score of July 2011, which provides us with an updated user reputation   Figure 7: The cumulative fractions of the percentage of ac­counts that registered in the top 1 month.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This means that, e.g., a 60-bit .ngerprint extracted during this time frame would have only 5.8 bits of total surprisal on the average.
Sentence 2: the attacker would have a 2-5.8 1.8% chance of guessing the exactly correct context .ngerprint by utilizing pro.ling information.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Given this model, our main security goal is to implement a vir­tual monotonic counter mechanism that is at least tamper-evident from the owner s point-of-view.
Sentence 2: at worst, all the client devices of the owner of a virtual monotonic counter must always be able to detect any failure or erroneous behavior of the counter caused by an attack by the host or another owner.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We portedWeirdX to enforce authorization policies using TMI.
Sentence 2: we used TMI in conjunction with the XACML framework to for­mulate and enforce several policies that have been discussed in priorwork[40], including preventinga rogueXclient from killing arbitraryXclients, and mediating copy/paste operations.Forexam­ple, we enforced the Bell-LaPadula policyon howdata copied from anXclient can be pasted to otherXclients.1 Overall, our port of WeirdX required about 4,800 changes in 25 classes, and introduced 108 transactions to the code that dispatchesXprotocol requests to handlers; as with FreeCS, most of these changes were related to re­placing reads/writes of transactional objects with DSTM2 accessor functions.Wealsohadtomakeafew changestoWeirdXcodethat handled outputtothe screen.we modi.edWeirdXto bu.er writes that happen within transactions, and .ush thebu.ers only upon a transaction commit.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For any frontiers F and G, de.ne Pr[F = G | x, y, Ch] = Pr[u | x, y, Ch] {u.F |u is a pre.x of some u1.G} the weighted probability of all the transcripts in F that are pre.xes of transcripts in G. In the same manner de.ne Pr[F < G | x, y, Ch] for transcripts which are strict pre.xes.
Sentence 2: 3no string in F is a proper pre.x of another string in F .
Relationship: entailment