sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The reason for this is that a reactive jammer or random jammer causes the channel state to alternate between busy and idle in much the same way as normal tra.c behaves.
Sentence 2: be­cause the reactive jammer does not change the underlying busy and idle periods for a normal tra.c scenario, it is par­ticularly di.cult to distinguish between signal readings for a reactive jammer and signal readings from the underlying tra.c.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 6.4 Scalability and Interoperability According to RFC2931 [27], PK-DNSSEC with SIG(0) provides stronger security protection than PK-DNSSECwith SIG RR which in general does not provide protection of the overall integrity of a response.
Sentence 2: pK-DNSSEC with SIG(0) provides protection for glue records, DNS re­quests (mutual authentication), and message headers on re­quests or responses.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Again, there is no fundamental problem in extending our static vertical composition result for arbitrary message trans­missions as long as, again, the message spaces Mi for Ai,Bi the di.erent used channel types are disjoint.
Sentence 2: observe that we require honest receivers in the channel pro­tocol to accept any payload that is embedded into the proper context; thus, the abstraction of the payload in the pure Pi works, independent of whether there is just one concrete payload message per session or many of them.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For each app we de.ned a speci.c sand­boxing pro.le that prevents the app from accessing private user information.
Sentence 2: pSiOS successfully prevents access to the address book (for Quickscan, Facebook, and Whatsapp), to personal photos (for ImageCrop and Insta-Gram), and to the iOS universal unique identi.er, short UUID (for Quickscan, BatterLife, Flashlight, MusicDown­loader, MyVideo, NewYork, and Audi).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We set up multiple virtual machines with 32 bit Win­dows XP SP2 and installed a di.erent PDF viewer applica­tion on each of them.
Sentence 2: we used Adobe Acrobat Reader 6.0.0, 7.0.0, 7.0.7, 8.1.1, 8.1.2, 8.1.6, 9.0.0, 9.2.0 and 9.3.0.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Let k be a security parameter, Q be a di.culty parameter, and GenRSA be a modulus generation algorithm.
Sentence 2: suppose there exists a prob­abilistic algorithm A running in time t which can solve the IDL * problem for GenRSA on an interval of size q.Then there exists a probabilistic algorithm B with running time t' = t + texp(k)+ c,where texp(k) isthetimetocompute an exponentiation modulo an output of GenRSA(1k) and c is a constant, that solves either the factorisation problem for GenRSA or the IDL problem on an interval of size q.(k) = AdvFact AdvIDL * A,GenRSA,qB,GenRSA(k)+AdvIDL (k)+negl(k) .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the example shown in .gure 6(a), there may exist an in­struction that directly jumps to the second je instruction, which un­fortunately has been overwritten by the detouring jmp instruction.
Sentence 2: that instruction would essentially jump to the mid­dle of the detouring jmp, which typically causes an invalid opcode exception.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: An illustrative example of administrative scope, based on a hierarchy .rst used by Sandhu [15], is shown in Fig­ure 2.
Sentence 2: a dotted edge (r, r ' ) indicates that r controls r ' .PSO1 controls PL1 and hence s(PSO1)= {ENG1, PE1, QE1, PL1}.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 2 Next, for any session j' E {j,j + 1,... ,ms} for which he has not already done so, he generates new personal key poly- nomials.
Sentence 2: for each such j', he randomly chooses masking polynomials rF(x'Y)' ~t'Ja~')l-(x' y) and s t, (x,y) of degree t in both variables.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: :( p, n, r) .. is the trust opinion generator, such that .=p /(p +n +r).
Sentence 2: p is the positive points of evidence on a proposition, n is the negative points of evidence on the proposition, r =1 is a parameter controlling the rate of loss of uncertainty, which can be used to tune the use of uncertainty for the requirements of different scenarios.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Even though it could be used with a signing scheme, such as XML Signature [18], the regular digital signature scheme would only allow data sharing in an all-or-nothing manner.
Sentence 2: redaction invali­dates the signature, and therefore a customer has to disclose the entire energy usage data in a Green Button data .le to the service provider, limiting the customer s ability to con­trol the amount of data disclosed and giving rise to privacy issues, as discussed earlier.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When an exact copy of a .le appears elsewhere with no modi.cations, we de.ne that as a .le read .
Sentence 2: if Tom has .le X at time t1, and Kathy has .le Y , which is an exact copy of X, at time t2 where t1 < t2, then Kathy has read X.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Such Dynamic Bayesian Network (DBN) encodes the joint probability distribution over those stochastic variables that capture the evolution of the dy­namic working conditions.
Sentence 2: we adopt the fol­lowing state transition model Pt and observation model Po:  zt ~ Pt( zt|zt-1) hist pt ~ Po( pt|pt ,zt) where zt and pt are the predicted states, p histt denotes the historic pricing vector at time t, pt .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note that it is assumed that there are no intrusions during route discovery.
Sentence 2: the intrusion detection process is performed in Physical layer using the Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) value, in MAC layer using scheduling based protocols (such as TDMA and S-MAC), in Routing layer applying the IASN protocol was initially proposed in [10], and in Application layer using both Round trip time and Mutual Guarding approaches.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This work and ours complement each other, since we focus on the enforcement of security policies in the platform of a peer, while their work aims to control a peer s join­ing or using resources in the system.
Sentence 2: when a genuine peer joins the network and use the resources, the usage of an object in that platform may need further protection, such as realtime pro­tection during playing media data, and re-distribution control for sensitive documents.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While the above de.nition assumes an adaptive adversary, in our case this adversary is no more powerful than a static adversary that is given the maximum amount of informa­tion.
Sentence 2: if an adversary B ' is given a challenge node vc, keys for every child of vc, and keys for every sibling of each node on the way from the root to vc (i.e., obtains B ' keys for siblings of nodes vj s.t.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As an initial approach, we suggest mitigating this threat by monitoring passports.
Sentence 2: a policy owner can monitor a passport directly by installing a device to ac­tively monitor the policy, e.g., to ensure that the expected QR code or ultrasound signal is still present or can in­clude in the policy itself a request that devices occasionally report back policy observations.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In our vision of a true Web SSO system, a user should log into her IdP once and gain access to all websites that she has an account with, without being prompted to login again on each website.
Sentence 2: when accessing N RPs using one IdP, the user should provide her credential exactly once to the IdP, con­sent at most N times (one for each RP if the consent was not recorded before), and should perform a logout process only once from the IdP.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: SYSTEM DESIGN AND PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION As part of our on-going research e.orts, we have designed and implemented a prototype system, ShareEnabler,to demon­strate how the proposed access management framework and policy speci.cation can be deployed as detailed authoriza­tion services and mechanisms within the context of collabo­rative sharing applications.
Sentence 2: shareEnabler adopts a speci.c communica­tion infrastructure from a P2P based information sharing toolkit SciShare [4] developed by Lawrence Berkeley Na­tional Laboratory (LBNL).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 2.4 Decision Dif.e-Hellman Assumption Our proof of security also makes use of the decisional Di.e-Hellman (DDH) assumption in the quadratic residue group QRN when N is the multiplication of two strong primes.
Sentence 2: it is di.cult for an adversary to distinguish abab abc a triple (g ,g ,g ) from (g ,g ,g ) for a, b, and c chosen randomly and for a generator g of QRN .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Conclusion We present the design, implementation, and evaluation of PoKeR, a kernel rootkit pro.ler that produces multi-aspect rootkit pro.les which include hooking behavior, targeted kernel objects, user-level impacts, and executed rootkit code.
Sentence 2: via the combat tracking technique, PoKeR maintains a map of dynamic kernel objects, which allows it to accurately determine which kernel objects are modi.ed by a rootkit.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To discourage false posi­tives, whereby we classify non-worms as worms, we propose Table 3: Probability with which two peers, upon ex­changing snapshots of their internal behavior, can decide using intersection alone that they are, more likely than not, both executing the same worm dur­ing some window of time, for window sizes of 5, 15, and 30 seconds.
Sentence 2: percentages of all possible pairs of samples from some worm for which |S1nS2| = 0.5, where S1 and S2 are snapshots, max(|S1|,|S2|) treated as unordered sets.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The purpose of this research paper is to illustrate the industrial and federal need for ISSE in order to build IA into a system rather than the current costly practice of fixing systems after production.
Sentence 2: this paper will describe what ISSE is, how it is used today within academia, industry as well as the federal government and why it must be recognized and treated as a critical component of the systems engineering lifecycle.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this paper we present DR-DNS, a design and early prototype DNS service that leverages diverse replication to mask Byzantine errors.
Sentence 2: we design and im­plement a DNS hypervisor, which allows multiple diverse replicas of DNS software to simultaneously execute, with the idea being that if one replica crashes or generates a faulty output, the other replicas will remain available to drive execution.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: (5) r 1- pr « T (R)1 kca/W lim =(1- p l +p 2l)+ .
Sentence 2: (6) n.8 T (S) 1+c 1+c for suf.ciently large n, topology R has the expected number of infected nodes exponentially close to optimality, yet re­duces the expected infection time by a linear factor of 1+c(ka/W ) .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The objective of the comparison algorithm is to check if the relationship between values in INGk and OUTGk is also maintained by PF .
Sentence 2: if so, it would imply that the code from which Gk was constructed implements F. the actual output values of PF must match the output values  Table 1: Loop instance code in the execution trace of P. Each set of adjacent bytes manipulated by an instruction is noted as a concrete variable.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Among these principles, it has been argued that the Fair Information Practices Principles (FIPPs), which originated from a study commissioned by the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare in 1973 [25], have become the de-facto global standard for ethical use of personally identifiable information by large organizations [24].
Sentence 2: four of the total of five FIPPs (excluding enforcement/redress) are directly applicable to our problem domain and can potentially empower user control over both frond-end and back-end information flow [32]: notice/awareness that their personal information is being collected, consent/choice with regard to the authorized use of their information, access/participation to personal information the firm has collected, and security/integrity to prevent these data records from unauthorized access.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: At present, ICT devices at risk for EM information leakage include many commercial products, such as CRT and LCD monitors [2] [12], printers [13], and keyboards [14][15].
Sentence 2: the threat of display capture via EM emanation, called EM display stealing, has been studied for the relatively larger displays of desktop and notebook PCs.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Speaking generally, the A3 host blocked binary file uploads and path traversal attempts in the storage crumple-zone, and via the network crumple zone, A3 enforced a strict QoS policy on request rate thus mitigating DoS attempts, filtered  tags from submission thus blocking script injection attempts and enforced WS parameter and HTTP header constraints thus disallowing the execution of arbitrary, out-of-bounds fuzzed inputs.
Sentence 2: the attack clients attempted 1,519 attacks and benevolent clients executed 933 requests, which, in effect, doubled the number of clients.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The basic idea of the approach consists in aggregating the common message structure and data values of multiple mes­sages and their distinctive parts in a single message in order to apply once the rules of the security policy instead of re­peating the same procedure on duplicated parts in many messages.
Sentence 2: the signed message at step 5 in Figure 3 is not a single message but an aggregate of simi­lar SOAP messages.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We also pro­vide a theoretical analysis of decidability properties of our proposed system.
Sentence 2: we describe the problem of formal security analysis(which asks whether untrusted users can ever gain access to some protected data) and show that while this problem is in general undecidable, there are rea­sonable restrictions onpoliciesthat allowdecidable security analysis algorithms.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: By creating such a graph, removing a user is as easy as removing this node, and thus does not require rekeying.
Sentence 2: 5.2 Other Access Models Traditionally, the standard notion of permission inheri­tance in access control is that permissions are transfered up the access graph G. any vertex in Anc(vi, G) has a superset of the permissions held by vi.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Given that manydi.erentlanguagesappearontheTwitterstream with a signi.cant minority containing a mixture of multiple languages, we tested whether or not the remaining tweets contained su.ciently many English words.
Sentence 2: we discarded tweets with less than 25% of their good words appearing onAtkinson sshortestword list.Thegood words of the remaining tweets, without their surrounding punc­ tuation, were added to the Twitter list which, in the end, contained 102990 words (many of which are duplicates).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Further, for any function with a secret input param­eter (typically a long-term private key), the two-party protocol output from our compiler requires that shares of this secret pa­rameter be predistributed to the two parties that are to run the protocol.
Sentence 2: our compiler generates two party protocols that assume a trusted third party for sharing long-term secrets; removing this assumption is an area of ongoing work.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: One can, however, apply linear extension [8] over the set of permissions, which generates a topological ordering of the permissions, compatible with the original partial ordering.
Sentence 2: we are interested in a classed representation of the or­dering information, where the permissions in each class are equal or incomparable to each other, and can be considered as having equivalent con.dentialitylevel.Forexample,inFigure5,thesetof permissions can be grouped into four classes {f1}, {f2 ,f3,f4 }, {f5,f6}, {f7 }.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Impromptu is implemented over an event-based architecture, 3.1.2 Method which allows the GUI component to monitor and register access events from both local and remote repositories, as well as to present a unified (WYSIWIS) view of the application session.
Sentence 2: in Impromptu, events are used to both visualize dynamic activity and to ensure view consistency.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: EVALUATION: CASE STUDY 4.1 Information Ontology and Metadata In the proposed approach, two key ingredients in sup­porting .exible and dynamic information sharing policies are domain speci.c information ontology and enriched secu­rity metadata.
Sentence 2: we use an extended version of the KANI ontology (Knowledge Associates for Novel Intel­ligence [9]) for building a knowledgebase that captures the current state of the world.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: From the attacker Linux machine, we ran the probing program with Probing Packet Train size of 1, 4, and 10, respectively, such that PPT probing packets target different rules placed at different positions in the firewall s ruleset.
Sentence 2: we targeted rules at positions 1, 500, and 10000, for each of the three firewall types.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: From another perspective, other orthogonal defense schemes (e.g., randomization) have been proposed to defend against code injection attacks.
Sentence 2: address-space layout randomization (ASLR) [2, 7, 8] randomizes the memory lay­out of a running program, making it di.cult to determine the addresses in libc and other legitimate code on which return-into-libc or ROP/JOP-based attacks rely.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Figure 1(c) illustrates the target objects being selected ac­cording to the select()functioninDe.nition6as twodashed zones.
Sentence 2: ao1 results in the Asthma node under Illness being selected, and ao2 results in the nodes of HIV and Prescription2 being selected under Illness and Med­ications, respectively.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As such, an ideal PUF creates a mathematical function u­nique to each physical instance of a hardware design; even if the same design is used for two devices, it is physically impossible to make their PUFs behave identically.
Sentence 2: our insight for the design of such PUF ROKs is to in­corporate the PUF in a feedback loop for a system-on-chip (SoC) design.1 our design is for the PUF to reside on the same chip as the processor core that performs the encryption.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We now present our formal protection guarantee for well-typed code.Webeginby strengtheningthede.nitionofDFIin Section3.
Sentence 2: we assume that part of the adversary is known and part ofitisunknown.This assumptionallowstheanalysistoexploitany sound typing information that may be obtained from the known part of the adversary.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We will prove .rst that I(X,Y )~µ(¯p(X,Y);X|Y)= Ep~.A I(X,Y )~µ(p(X,Y);X|Y).
Sentence 2: (8) the amount of information revealed by p¯is bounded by the average amount of information revealed by p that is drawn according to .A once again, the concavity works in the right direction.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We observe that only one copy of L is needed to achieve the no-FNl property if L s tra.c synopsis is similar to the initial state throughout the execution of the algorithm, as checking such a synopsis is roughly equiv­alent to checking all of L1, L2 ,· · · , Li .
Sentence 2: we can keep only one synopsis which somehow approximates the synopsis in each sub-problem.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Whileentropybounds areanattractiveway of specifyinginteresting subsets ofinputdistributions,precise reason­ing about the leakage of programs in terms of such bounds turns out to be challenging.
Sentence 2: deriving tight bounds for the leakage ofprograms withloopsinterms ofentropyboundsfortheir input variablesis still an openproblem.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since the cvd .le format already incorporates versioning and a signature, the FlashPatch daemon passes around the daily.cvd .le directly.
Sentence 2: when a user inserts a .ash drive into a machine running FlashPatch, the FlashPatch daemon .rst checks whether a .le called daily.cvd exists on the .ash drive (in a particular subdirectory allocated for FlashPatch).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.4 Discussion One potential alternative for protecting possession-sensitive credentials is to require each party to always disclose the mirror equivalent of R s policy.
Sentence 2: after Bob discloses R s policy P, Alice only discloses P s mirror equivalent Pj, without telling Bob the policy of each individual creden­tial appearing in P. Similarly, Bob will disclose the mirror equivalent of Pj in his next message.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In particular, during or after the IC manufacturing process, we intentionally stress the HT gate so that its threshold voltage can be increased and, by following Equation (1), the leakage power would decrease exponentially.
Sentence 2: the method we use for aging a set of gates in the circuit is by setting the gates in the stress mode (i.e., signal 1).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Furthermore, with electronic voting systems, failures are not apparent because the results are hidden from the voter.
Sentence 2: even if the system were not behaving maliciously, the DRE can make mistakes due to con.guration problems, such as an inaccurate touch-screen calibration (i.e., the voter touches near the desired icon, but the vote is given to the candidate or party associated with a neighboring icon).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Tag Location Privacy: The responses of the tag Ti are anonymous, since the tag only ever sends pairs (M1, M2 ), which cannot be linked to any particular tag.
Sentence 2: the eavesdropper can neither link tag responses toprevious responsesfrom the same tag, nor distinguish one tag s responses from another s. It is thus di.cult to track the location of a tag.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: bj from the product Sa[j]· Sb[j]: for each entry of this outer product, there is a corresponding term in Sa[j]· Sb[j], scaled by a secret value (i.e., the product of the two corresponding keys).
Sentence 2: we obtain a summary of the outer product result matrix with similar properties to the DVS summary for a sin­gle vector.
Relationship: entailment