sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: [1] in­troduced the model of leakage-resilient chosen-plaintext (lr-CPA) security and showed that the lattice-based public-key encryption scheme of Regev [29] and the identity-based en­cryption of Gentry, Peikert, and Vaikuntanathan [13] were lrCPA secure.
Sentence 2: regev s encryption scheme is re­silient to any weak key-leakage of L(1-o(1)), where L is the length of the secret key.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In particular, since the two considered algorithm DTW-D and DTW-S work in different ways, we also considered for the two of them different set of threshold values.
Sentence 2: we considered the following values for the threshold ßD: 0, 1000, 3000, 5000, 7500, 10000, 12500, 15000, 17500, and 20000.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.2 Security requirements The objective of our protocol is to securely evaluate T on V.The protocol should reveal nothing to the Server.
Sentence 2: the User should learn T(V), which is a classi.cation label contained in one of the leaves of the branching program T. The User is also permitted to learn the total number of nodes of T (see the discussion in Section 4.6) and the length of the path from the root node of T to the leaf containing the result of evaluation, i.e., the label assigned by T to V. The User should not learn anything else about T. the User should not learn which attributes from V have been con­sidered by T, with what threshold values they have been compared, the outcome of any comparison, and so on.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Among these writes, there is no single write to the set of 5, 881 kernel hooks for protection, while the number of writes to the 41 memory pages that contain protected hooks is 6,479,417.
Sentence 2: about 1% of kernel memory writes would cause unneces­sary page faults and thus introduce expensive switches between a VM and a hypervisor.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In fact, as we prove in Lemma 19 (in Section 5.5 after results needed for the proof have been developed), for every k and n such that 2 < k < n, there exists no set of SMER constraints that pre­cisely enforces a k-n RSSoD requirement.
Sentence 2: the two special cases in Lemmas 10 and 11 are the only cases where precise en­forcement can be achieved.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: CONCLUSION We have developed three one-gate hardware Trojan attack models that can bypass the widely used side channel-based HT detection schemes and pose threats on the security of wireless systems.
Sentence 2: the HT models leverage a single HT trigger that exhibits rare switching activities, con­sumes ultra-low leakage power, and hides from delay charac­terizations due to reconvergent paths.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If the mode is READ, then a host holding a clob can use it an unlimited number of times, as long as it has not been migrated from that host more than its count limit.
Sentence 2: (if the host migrates the clob more than n times where n is the count limit in the host s copy of the clob, then the counter exceeds the count limit and the host s TPM starts disallowing use of that clob.)
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The expected time to defeat integrity by a parallel attack is simply m. 3.9.3 Availability The time to compromise all n components by multiple attackers is the largest of n samples of the independent ran­dom variables distributed according to f(t).
Sentence 2: this is the nth order statistic, t(n), and, as is shown in the technical section of this paper, E(T(n)) .ß as n .8 where ß is the rightmost value in the support of f.ß is the smallest value (in.mum) for which f(t) = 0 for all t>ß.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We have used our JavaScript information .ow framework to detect and study the prevalence of such attacks on a large set of web­sites, and show that history hijacking is used, even by quite popular websites.
Sentence 2: policies We formalize history hijacking in our framework using the following information .ow policies: at $1.getCompStyle($2,...) if $2.isLink() inject secret at document.send($1, $2) block secret on $2 whenever the computed style of a link is read using getCompStyle, the return value is marked as secret.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: (Ei,Fi) () Return (pkDB, ER1,..., ERN ), skDB Figure 3: Database Setup algorithm To set up the database, the database provider runs the algorithm shown in Figure 3.
Sentence 2: it uses the issuer s public key and a pairing group generator to create goups of thesameorder p and generate keys for encrypting records.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Such rewriting is enabled by relaxing the requirement of exhaustive matching to that of non­overlapping matching.
Sentence 2: we propose two rewrite rules, one for rewriting specific patterns belonging to the case of quad­ratic-sized DFAs (Case 4 in Section 3.2), and the other for rewrit­ing specific patterns that generate exponential-sized DFAs (Case 5 of Section 3.2).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: OUR APPROACH In this work, we explore a novel 3D object based CAPTCHA system, which essentially combines the benefits of 3D text CAPTCHA and Sketcha to make the CAPTCHA system more secure, robust, and less vulnerable.
Sentence 2: our approach first asks a user to solve the 3D object rotation problem, similar to Sketcha.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: > > > > current time(T ), > > > > month(T, M )  > > > sales(V, M, widgets) < ., : V = 5000.
Sentence 2: a0 speci.es that users with a status level between 1and5can access anyobject in r2 if the user has this per­mission assignment speci.ed via the IBLP p.1 and the sys­tem load factor is less than or equal to 2, as recorded in the IBLP ..
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The obstacle comes from the setting that in CP-ABE the decryption privilege of a user is determined by his attributes rather than by his index as in broadcast en­cryption.
Sentence 2: in AugBE [6, 9], the indices of users are simultaneously used to determine users decryption priv­ilege (for broadcast encryption part) and to identify users (for Tracing), and the construction and the proof of index­hiding of AugBE [6, 9] are based on this fact.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To overcome security issues in WBSNs, we propose a digital watermarking scheme based on Wong s algorithm [1] which involves simple mathematical operations that make it suitable for implementation on low-powered sensors with limited computational resources.
Sentence 2: we focus our studies on electrocardiogram (ECG) signals for this paper, but the proposed algorithm can be applied on any sampled streaming data.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Then, the chal­lenger runs the Setup(.)
Sentence 2: algorithm and provides the adver­sary with all decryption keys corresponding to the set of attributes GR = G(ß1 n ß2 ...n ßn)with |GR| = R.the adversary is provided with the private key dku = r(ß+su) su su su su (g ,g ,...,g ,gn+2,...,g ,di1 ,di2 ,...,diR )where 11 n 2n dij .G(ß1 n ß2 ...n ßn)and su .R Z/pZ.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Partition S into a m × n array of tiles Si,j , 1 = v v i = m and 1 = j = n, where each tile is itself a v v m × n grid.
Sentence 2: si,j consists of the cells of v S whose row number is in the interval [(i - 1) m + v 1, i m] and whose column number is in the interval v v [(j-1) n + 1, j n].
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, most of the re­search focus on modeling, veri.cation, analysis, and testing of XACML policies (e.g.,[4,6 8,11]).
Sentence 2: the focus ofprior work onXACMLis the correctness ofXACML policies while the focus of this paper is on the performance of XACML policies.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the CHS scheme, the answer to a given POSH must not be known at login-time, because if it is, it can be accessed by the attacker.
Sentence 2: the POSH generator cannot simply take pi and display a CAPTCHA of pi, because the attacker also knows pi given a password guess (and thus knows the CAPTCHA s solution).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: _: RT x T4[L] --+ Ti[RT x n] ]s<tA (s, ~) ~ (t, y) } It follows from this definition that if my confidence is r that P is upheld then the same policy can be upheld if I decrease my confidence level to s < r. EXAMPLE 6 Figure 3 gives the possible flows in the rated policies mls ~ PALM and palm o ~ PALM based on the rating ordering R1 fl'om Figure 2.
Sentence 2: a Note that a policy rated at '0' (from Figure 2) does not represent complete uncertainty, rather it repre- sents uncertainty at all levels except the lowest level LEMMA I Given ratings r,s, and policies P, Q : T~[L] then it follows from the definitions of ~ and _ that r<sAPEQ~r]PEs$Q the rated policy r : P can be replaced (re- fined) by the higher rated policy s : Q without any loss of confidence.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: From our analysis of the existing location privacy metrics presented in Section 3 and the description of our distortion­based metric in Section 4.1, it is clear that the proposed for­mal framework, speci.cally the linkability graph model (Sec­tion 2.5), clearly captures the required criteria to measure lo­cation privacy.
Sentence 2: the adversary model assumed in existing metrics and the proposed distortion-based met­ric can also be captured within the linkability graph-based model.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As de.ned above, a router that announces its new best AS path for a given address block to all of its neighbors must send a slightly different attestation to each of its eBGP neighbors.
Sentence 2: to an­nounce the route r it must send r, RAT (r.a)to an eBGP peer in AS a,and r, RAT (r.a ' )to an eBGP peer in AS a ' etc.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Second, FPGate is tested with two real world browsers, Firefox 3.6.16 (FF3) and Internet Explorer 6 (IE6)1.
Sentence 2: the core mod­ules xul.dll in FF3 and mshtml.dll in IE6 are hardened by FPGate, and other modules are left intact.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In view of the aforementioned discussion, the aim of the present article is to characterize the e.ect of adversarial ac­tions on the sensor and control data on the performance of the canal system.
Sentence 2: we aim to a) Investigate the stealthy deception attacks on sensor and control data that can disrupt the intended purpose of commonly used P and PI controllers by increasing wa­ter loss and decreasing operational e.ciency.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Figure 12 shows the breakdown of the client-cloud band­width cost.
Sentence 2: about 2X (out of a total of ~ 2.6X) of the bandwidth cost is due to hiding whether the block is being read or written (i.e., fetching one block of data with 1X cost and writing one block of data with 1X cost).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: MALWARE ANALYSIS AND CONTAIN-MENT Several di.erent strategies have been proposed in the state of the art to address the problem of network containmnent and the quality of the dynamic analysis.
Sentence 2: the concept of quality refers to both the need to allow connec­tivity to external hosts (to expose the malware interesting behavior) and to the need to make the analysis process re­peatable.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We infer the response type for each SQL signature by examining all the responses, returned by SQL queries with the same signature and associate a .ag r with each signature to indicate its response type.
Sentence 2: we transform the singular SQL response into a set of key­value pairs similar to the representation of session variables (e.g., $row[ id ], $row[ role ] in index.php).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Given a tree of qupits which is 2-good in both bases, the outputs of RI and D are the same.
Sentence 2: this means that no changes made by cheaters to their shares can a.ect the outcome of D. Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 show that there is essentially a unique state which will be recovered in the reconstruc­tion phase when the receiver R is honest.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: ¯ When k 2, the number of columns of H in the modi­.ed approach is smaller than that in Algorithm CT, while the constraint set for each entry of x1 is still Xk, which is larger than X1, the constraint set for each entry of the un­known vector x¯in Algorithm CT.
Sentence 2: compared with Algorithm CT, when k 2, our modi.ed approach de­creases the dimension of the overdetermined ILS problem, while increases the ranges of part of the constraint sets.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note that we were able to transform the original attack se­quence into a modi.ed variant that would not trigger even a single mismatch but that would have a similarly harmful e.ect.
Sentence 2: there was no need to take advan­tage of the fact that pH allows a few occasional mismatches without setting o. alarms: our attack would be successful no matter what setting is chosen for the pH locality frame count threshold.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: set is a subset of the ARM instruction set and is in particular suit­ Table 1: ARM Registers Register Purpose r0 r3 Function arguments; function results r4 r11 Register variables (callee saved) r12 Scratch register r13 (sp) Stack Pointer r14 (lr) Link Register (subroutine return address) r15 (pc) Program Counter cpsr Control Program Status Register able for embedded systems which often suffer from greater mem­ory restrictions as PCs.
Sentence 2: the libraries libc and libweb­core which we use as the code base for our attack on ARM contain mainly THUMB instructions.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In order to compare IG in a fair manner, we decided to select the top-n ranked features according to IG criterion which achieved lowest WErr rates, which happened to be the top-45.
Sentence 2: we evaluated RF classi.cation models with top-n IG ranked features, for n = 1 ...46 (top­47 excluded as it is the full features set), and the top-45 achieved the lowest WErr rates.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To maximize a Nym N s possinymity and minimize anonymity loss rate, while also limiting delays caused by unreliable users, we may wish to consider some members of N s current possinymity set to be more valuable than others: e.g., users who have remained online and participating reliably for a long period with at most a few brief o.ine periods.
Sentence 2: a policy might apply an o.ine-time threshold as discussed above to limit loss rate, but apply di.erent thresholds to di.erent members of N s current possinymity set, giving longer, more generous thresholds to more valued users.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A source program P + is safe for G and A when P + is typable, polynomial, and all its declassi.cation labels are robust against A. Typability implies that, in a source program, no untrusted host is allowed to modify trusted variables, neither by modifying them directly, nor by calling a trusted host that modi.es high integrity variables.
Sentence 2: for every locality a : S+ within P +, we must have rv(S+) .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Malicious Code Suppose that the string returned by the call to adserver.com was: initSettings("evil.com"); When this string is passed to eval() and executed, it over­writes the page s settings.
Sentence 2: it sets the variable searchUrl which is used as the pre.x of the query string, to refer to an attacker site evil.com.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If a set C of t-m SMER constraints does not enforce a set E of k-n SSoD policies under PA and RH , then there ex­ists a counter-example, i.e., a user-role assignment UA such that satis.esC((UA,PA, RH ))is true but safeE((UA, PA, RH ))is false.
Sentence 2: there exists a k-n SSoD policy in E that is violated by k -1 users.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, if a line has two boxes, an unmarked one on the left and one marked Gi for some i on the right, then game Gj follows the box on the left for j<i and the box on the right for j = i.
Sentence 2: the boxes on the right mark the differences from G0 introduced in some game, which are then adhered to in each subsequent game.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When doing so, the resulting point P3 = 2P1 comprises .ve coordinates instead of four, which means P3 is actually represented in the form of a quintuple (X3 : Y3 : E3 : H3 : Z3).
Sentence 2: the auxiliary coordinate T is split up into factors E and H so that EH = T = X Y /Z , thereby saving a multiplication in the point doubling.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While these approaches produce OPFs from speci.c sub­classes of OPFD,R, Agrawal et al.
Sentence 2: [1] were the .rst to uni­formly draw OPFs from the complete set of OPFD,R.M = |D| numbers are drawn uniformly at ran­dom from R = {1,...,N}.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 8.1 is that the minimal performance degradation induced by the attacks in this paper o.ers little hope for detecting these at­tacks.
Sentence 2: prior studies suggest that cross-tenant side­channel attacks in cloud settings can induce signi.cant per­formance degradation in victim workloads, as was the case in, e.g., the attacks demonstrated by Zhang et al.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To support this, we mod­ify Credo to support mapping certain I/O devices directly into an emancipated guest VM.
Sentence 2: for our implementation we enable one form of I/O support: our current implementation uses a GPS sensor that attaches through a serial port, as a result we need to enable serial port I/O from an emancipated guest VM.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this paper, we discuss the general problems of e-health systems and provide a technical solution for the protection of privacy-sensitive data, which has not been appropriately addressed yet for end-user systems.
Sentence 2: our con­tributions are as follows: We describe an abstract model of e-health clouds (Sec­tion 2), which comprehends the common entities of healthcare telematics infrastructures.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For all of those except publish app activity to Facebook, Null Hypothesis 2, that respondents ability to identify which write permissions they are authorizing is no di.erent than if they were randomly guessing, can be rejected with p < .01.
Sentence 2: for these six permissions, people would have been signi.cantly more likely to correctly identify whether they were granting the permission by randomly guessing.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A measure µ of the utility of a privacy mechanism must respect the generality partial order .G.
Sentence 2: µ(M) = µ(A. M) for any ran­domized algorithm whose input space is the output space of M. 3.2 Measures of Generality In this section, using Axiom 3.1.4, we examine some candi­ date measures of utility.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Usually, the business activity tree can be provided by business sta..  Once activity-spread and organization-unit-spread indices are de.ned, we propose to adopt our cost-driven approach (see Section 3.2) to take them into account during the role mining process.
Sentence 2: leveraging the cost function concept makes it possible to combine such indices with other cost elements in a single metric (function) to be used for the evaluation of elicited roles during the role mining pro­cess.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Thus, ROKs incorporate some unpredictable element that does not exist in traditional Tur­ing machines: the history of prior machine executions.
Sentence 2: for any given machine T , only the .rst execution (assum­ing either the encrypt or decrypt primitive is executed) will use the transitions de.ned by d. The second (and subse­quent) executions will use d ' , as the state after the primitive is invoked will di.er.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To mitigate the problem, we make special pro­visions for array handling.
Sentence 2: if an element of an array is modi.ed within the body of a conditional statement with private condition and that assignment is not surrounded by a loop, the ele­ment of the array is treated as an ordinary variable, i.e., only a copy of the element is made, not a copy of the array.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The Regularity Principle of Self-Management Naftaly Minsky Department of Computer Science, Rutgers University Piscataway, NJ 08854 USA minsky@cs.rutgers.edu ABSTRACT The principle of regularity proposed here for self manage­ment of systems, states that foralargesystem tobeman­ageable it must possess suitable regularities.
Sentence 2: this principle identi.es the ability to establish regularities in asystem, as a necessary condition for its self-manageability.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Mobile storage devices are regularly employed to store copies of documents that the user (e.g., a doctor) may take home or to another o.ce, or data to be processed on other systems.
Sentence 2: uSB disks are frequently used o.ine, i.e., plugged to any platform while it is not con­nected to the domain network (e.g., a laptop in the train or on an airplane).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Table 1: A brief comparison among (T)OAKE, HMQV and KEA KA = KB involves only a single hashing, where the out­put length of h, i.e., l, is set approximately to be |q|.For applications where g ab-traceability takes priority over HP­ Ab+yXb+ey Ba+xY a+ex deniability, we set KB = = = KA , which is referred to as traceable OAKE (T-OAKE, in short).
Sentence 2: the value g ab can simply get involved (for applica­tions where traceability takes priority over HP-deniability) at the minimal cost of only one modular addition, which eases more .exible and modular deployments in practice.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: P and T if and only if there does not exist p .
Sentence 2: p, t 1 * ,t * 2 and t 1 * ..(p), 2 .T * such that t * =t * 1 t2 * ..(p) a generalization is non-overlapping when a real tuple can match at most one generalized tuple.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: [1, 8)}: It follows from the computation of C(All),C(r),C(f1 Uf2),C(f1 nf2)that the character­istic set of any unit term f free of usersets and negations is {1}.
Sentence 2: given a con.guration (U, UR) and a singleton {u1}such that {u1} satis.es f, we can make n -1copies of u1 for any n = 2so that the n users together satis.es f+.f+ maybesatis.edby n users for any n =1.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Hence, any user assigned to a role at least as senior as r can exercise permission p. This is analogous to the abil­ity of a subject to read any object whose security label is dominated by that of the subject.5 In its simplest form, the *-property requires that the se­curity label of a subject is no greater than that of any ob­ject to which the subject tries to write.
Sentence 2: if a subject can write to an object, any subject with a lower security label can also write to that object.
Relationship: entailment