sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This structure will allow a tool to auto­matically identify relevant systems and attacker information as security evidence, and aggregate the related evidence in an organized way to construct a holistic work.ow-centric argument graph.
Sentence 2: our work is a new type of security assessment method centered around work.ow, instead of an amendment to existing security assessment methods to incorporate work.ow information.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The objective of this paper is to raise the awareness about the security issues related to the adoption of such technologies in power grids.
Sentence 2: we address two main vulnerabilities of the synchrophasor networks: (i) the protocols used to exchange data between the PMU and the PDC are usually not encrypted, and (ii) PDCs do not automatically sanitize the data received from the PMU.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Intuitively, the security de.ni­tion requires that the server learns nothing about the access pattern.
Sentence 2: no information should be leaked about: 1) which data is being accessed; 2) how old it is (when it was last accessed); 3) whether the same data is being accessed (linkability); 4) access pattern (sequential, random, etc); or 5) whether the access is a read or a write.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: That is, to recover s, A* i i and Ci are exchangeable regardless of the values taken on the remaining |A*|-1 positions.
Sentence 2: the value at the positions in Ci can be mapped to the value at A* in terms of recovery (albeit the recovery of i the value at position A* may also be in.uenced by the i values at some other positions in A*).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For space limitation, we report here only part of the results we obtained.
Sentence 2: we only report here (Figure 1) the values of the acceleration on x-axis (of the ac­celerometer sensor) obtained with two users (User1and User 2), each one performing the movement.ve times(Pattern1,Pattern2, Pattern3,Pattern4,andPatterns5).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Node  also corresponds to the event of S1 being available while S2 and S3 are not available (oc­currence probability: A(S1) * (1 - A(S2)) * (1 - A(S3)) = 0.014).0 Each directed edge from an event e1 to an event e2 in the graph expresses that if a bundle is compromised/available in case of occurrence of the event e1 it would also be com­promised/available if event e2 occurs.
Sentence 2: these semantics of the edges imply that, if an event is relevant, all events that can be reached from this event in the graph have to be relevant, too.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: IDENTIFYING A FEATURE SET We now establish a core feature set that we consider im­mutable.
Sentence 2: when we analyze the key exchange pro­tocols, we will analyze them with a view towards how they support (or do not) this core feature set in a transparent manner (i.e., the feature behavior should not be modi.ed to conform to the machination of the speci.c media keying protocol.)
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Therefore, it is straight­forward to pose as a normal USB mouse or keyboard device and send prede.ned command stealthily to simulate mali­cious interactive user activities.
Sentence 2: to verify this functionality, in our controlled experiments, we send keycode sequences to perform non-fatal operations and show how such a manipu­lated device can cause damages we simulated a Dell USB keyboard (vendorID=413C, productID=2105) sending CTRL+ESC key combination and U and Enter key sequence to reboot the machine.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the absence of disinformation the value operator is mono­tonic, that is, we assume that adding additional information never decreases value.
Sentence 2: if an object x is com­pletely contained in object y,then Gxx(t) = Gxy(t), for all t. Finally, the third constraint simply states that the value of tactical information decays with time.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The experiments presented in [9] seem to indicate that the un­derlying audio channel is resistant to eavesdropping.
Sentence 2: it was shown that transmission of the key was easy to feel with the hand in close contact with the human chest enclosing a cardiac im­plant (using meat to simulate human chest for a cardiac implant), but was dif.cult to comprehend from a farther distance.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, any condition in an attack graph may mean certain amount of risk and thus should be guarded against potential attacks.
Sentence 2: for example, having the user privilege sh(1) in Figure 2 may already allow an attacker to cause considerable damage to host 1 even though this risk is not as signi.cantasthatof root(2).the security of a network should be measured against all rele­vant resources with different weights.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.2 Delay Model The delay of a single logic gate can be expressed as d = gh + p (3) where g and h are logical e.ort and electrical e.ort, respec­tively; and p is parasitic delay [38].
Sentence 2: we use the delay model in [29] that connects the gate delay to its sizing and operating voltages: · L2 ktp · kfit Vdd Delay = · (1+s)Vdd-Vth 2 · n · µ · .2 t 2·n·.t (ln(e + 1))2 (4) .i · Wi + Wi+1 · Wi where subscripts i and i+1 represent the the driver and load gates, respectively; .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We impose cryptographic constraints on the IDs of a trigger in such a manner that we can provably prevent topologies that are non-trees at the same time not compromising the functionality of i3.
Sentence 2: we divide a 256-bit ID into three .elds: a 64-bit pre.x, a 128-bit key, and a 64-bit suf.x.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Among cryptographers, it is a well­understood design principle to maximize the entropy of the distribution from which secret credentials are drawn, by not processing these little by little.
Sentence 2: if a server were to verify an entered password character by character as these are entered, and halt if an incorrect character is seen, then this will very clearly allow for an interactive divide-and­conquer approach to determining the password of a victim.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As an example that we will use throughout the paper, we consider three policies P1, P2 and P3,inthe context ofdata and resource management for a grid computing system in a university domain.
Sentence 2: p1 is a data owner pol­ PolicyId=P1      <Sub ject Designation belong to{Professor, PostDoc, Student, TechnicalSta.}
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A volume anomaly at time t typically results in a large change to ya(t), which can be detected by thresholding the squared prediction error Iya(t)I2 against Qß,the Q-statistic at the 1 - ß con.dence level [13].
Sentence 2: the PCA-based detector classi.es a link measurement vector as ( anomalous, Iya(t)I2 >Qß c (y (t)) = .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Using a month-long NetFlow data collected at our campus border router, our investigation reveals that i) many bad scanners successfully compromised inside end hosts, such tary set, A = I - G, is referred to the active space.
Sentence 2: for any a E A, there is tra.c originating from a at some time during [t0 - T, t0 + T + T]; thus a is likely assigned to an active host during the time period.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Although the solution appears quite simple in retrospect, there were a few interesting issues regarding the handling of the threat model and the security de.nitions, for payload plaintexts that may bene.t from having little or no intrinsic redundancy.
Sentence 2: hCR protocols have to handle the combined threat of outsider and insider attackers, which must both be repelled in the best possible way, regardless of the o.ine testability of the access keys that is being placed in remote storage.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Except with negligible or very low probability beyond 1/2, the adversary should be unable to distinguish between any two possible access sequences of equal length and maximum set size.
Sentence 2: consider two possible access sequences, s1 and s2, that consist of L operations, get, put, and remove, that could be made by Alice, on a set of size up to N, where L is polynomial in N. Then an oblivious storage (OS) solution has correlation hardness if it applies an obfuscating transformation so that, after seeing the sequence of I/Os performed by such a transformation, the probability that Bob can correctly guess whether Alice has performed (the transformed version of) s1 or s2 is more than 1/2 by at most 1/Na or a negligible amount, where a = 1 is a constant1 that represents a trade-o.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The veri.er (Ed) would then verify the PRU as in the spending protocol, with the additional step of also verifying the mi­gration step from Bob to Dave.
Sentence 2: in addition to verifying the signature of the incproof from Bob at time tB + n, Ed also distills Dave s counter value tD from the incproof (it is included as part of CommitD ), and then veri.es that the log on Dave s side starts from tD +1 and is complete up to the current time tD + k.  3.4 Complex Usage Conditions and General-Purpose Count-Limited Certi.cates.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The emails in our experiments are indistinguishable from the emails in the corresponding attacks (Figure 12).
Sentence 2: if in Experiment 3 we receive (through Alice) an answer from Bob, we know that Bob has entered his credentials to a site he had no reason to trust so we can consider the probability that we receive a response from Bob to be strongly indicative of the probability Bob would have compromised his credentials had he received a real phishing attack.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The root does not need to store any information about U as all it needs is stored into the symmetric certi.cate enclosed with the re­quest.
Sentence 2: the certi.cate contains the necessary secret keys used to create private and authenticated chan­nels between the root and the host U. DNS Request to Root with Symmetric Certificate: R0 .- U : PR0U,DNS Req,Nonce0; R0 -.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Such clas­si.cations are not successful against the new anonymization technique because even the cover locations lie close to the actual user locations and are realistic.
Sentence 2: cover Locations indirectly take into consideration the user query patterns (as recommended in the work of [30]), since it gen­erates locations close to the real locations, at times the user visited those locations.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, as the antenna is optimized for working with Nexus 7, nShield cannot harvest the maximum amount of power from PN532 breakboard.
Sentence 2: the maximum power is harvested at 12 V out­put and the battery voltage on nShield is only 4.8 V. This voltage mismatch limits the maximum harvested power to be only 57 mW.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: ACKNOWLEDGMENT We would like to thank the BlueZ group from the IBM Research Zurich Lab for their continuous support and ex­tremely helpful insight.
Sentence 2: we valued the dis­cussions with Michael Baentsch (eID scenarios), Thomas Eirich(fast addition),ThorstenKramp(fast computations onJCOP),MichaelKuyper(JCOP environment),Michael Osborne(eID scenarios, card support andpersonalization), Tamas Visegrady (fast computations and crypto accelera­tion onJCOP), andThomasWeigold(JCOP environment, fast addition).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A possible way is to implement RBAC per­missions using access control list (ACL) approach and the capability-based permissions are implemented by extension of the ACL approach.
Sentence 2: the i-th domain (for each i) has a server that manages RBAC permissions by ACL­based access control mechanism with two matrices speci­fying URAi and RP Ai.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This link indicates that the DM entity has propagated a DO s data to the DC entity fol­lowing agreement on a policy.
Sentence 2: when a link exists between a DM and a DC, the DM is responsible for tracing the DC s usage of the DO s data whereas the DC is responsible for reporting to the DM on how the data has been used or is maintained if it is so requested.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the context of specialising an RBAC P program ., H2A we note that the de.nitions of ura, pra, senior to and ds are part of the object level information that is used to pro­tect the ob ject level database in our approach.
Sentence 2: moreover, the sets of clauses de.ning the extensions of the ura, pra, ds and senior to relations are static relative to the set of active atoms that are implicit in .. the set of active facts will change dynamically as users activate and deactivate roles.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When we form W1 ; W2 or W1 IW2, we include all constraints in C1 and C2.In addition, we may create new constraints, governing the ex­ecution of some steps in S1 and some steps in S2.However, we prohibit the addition of constraints in which all the steps are contained in either S1 or S2 (the assumption being that they would have been created earlier, if required).
Sentence 2: any constraint that is added when we form W1 ; W2 (or W1 IW2) has the form (., S1,S11), where S1 .S11 .S1 and S1 .S11 .S2.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: U 2R : U .. 2R and R2P : R .. 2P are relations that are functional in their .rst coordinate, modeling user-to-role and role-to-permission assignments.
Sentence 2: u2R(u, M) and R2P (r, N) are true i. user u is allowed to play the set of roles M and role r can execute the set of permissions N respectively.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Finally, we use Zip.an Distribution to choose queries in our query load.
Sentence 2: if a particular query has a rank jin the ordering, we choose this query in our query set with prob­ 1 j Lt 1 ability Pj = , where N = is the Normalization N i=1 i n(n+1) Factor and t = 2 is the total number of all possible queries.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Compatibility with Existing Software Systems: Un­like isolation techniques that monopolize the highest privi­leged execution level of the target platform (e.g., Trustvisor), SICE does not exclude running legacy workloads (e.g., a hy­pervisor with multiple VMs) on the same physical platform.
Sentence 2: a platform using SICE can o.er isolated environments, and at the same time accommodate legacy virtualization software.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If the responder were to create a new state and send a new Message (4), and a new sa ' for a replayed Message (3), then an at­tacker who compromised the initiator could replay a recent session with the responder.
Sentence 2: by replaying Message (3) from a re­cent exchange between the initiator and the responder, the attacker could establish a session with the responder where the session-key would be identical to the key of the previous session (which took place when the initiator was not yet compromised).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In our protocol, we use the homomorphic properties of the Paillier cryptosystem to compute in a privacy-preserving fashion the availability of all users involved in the schedul­ing process.
Sentence 2: one can verify that the Paillier scheme satis.es the following: D[EKP ,r1 (m1) · EKP ,r1 (m2)mod n 2]= m1 + m2 mod n D[EKP ,r(m1)m2 mod n 2]= m1 · m2 mod n where ri,r .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: BACKGROUND 3.1 Trusted Computing Base The many platform components, technologies and con­cepts which are responsible for the correct functionality and security of a computing platform, constitute the Trusted Computing Base (TCB).
Sentence 2: a platform solely relies on the TCB components for functionality and security enforcement and therefore to evaluate a platform s trustwor­thiness it is necessary to assess its TCB.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We evaluated the performance of CBMC-GC on a num­ber of tests that are typically applied to assess the e.­ciency of STC; furthermore, we show the applicability of CBMC-GC to the problem of secure two-party computa­tions with private functions (i.e., the case where the func­tionality to be computed is only available to one party).
Sentence 2: we consider the size of the circuits produced by CBMC-GC and evaluate their runtime when used in com­bination with the above mentioned highly e.cient STC im­plementation [20].
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Then the attribute declara­tion for her DoB looks like DoB = 03/07/1986 :: BMV.driverLicense(DoB), Gov.passport(BirthDate) :: sensitive Because the disclosure of attribute values in a credential can be separated from the disclosure of the credential, one purpose of the attribute declarations is to uniformly manage the dis­closure of an attribute value that appears in different creden­tials.
Sentence 2: the policy author gives disclosure policies for at­tribute DoB, instead of assigning separate disclosure policies for BMV.driverLicense(DoB) and Gov.passport(BirthDate).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This is a general application of the traditional 2-man rule (i.e., separation of duty) that can be applied to two different tasks, Prepare and Approve, with two different required roles.
Sentence 2: if the employee, who initiates the reimbursement process, happens to be a manager, then the manager should not approve the expense reimbursement request that he initiated even though he has both Employee and Manager roles.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The e.ciency gains that can be realized by materialized views do not come without cost, however.
Sentence 2: materialized views (i) require much more space within the database (1000s of rows) when compared to dynamic views (stored as a single query), and (ii) must be regenerated on­the-.y to remain consistent with changes made to the tables and views over which they are de.ned (e.g., when logical policies are edited).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The key idea to improve performance is to execute the comparison operations in an order such that the most ex­pensive operations are executed last.
Sentence 2: during the similarity index computation(either s t, for the text sec­tion, or s i, for the images), we keep the n (withn = 10 for thetextpart and n =5fortheimagepart) similarity values forthe mostsimilarpairsof tuplesfound sofar.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Firstly, C-FE avoids various im­possibility results that affect FE.
Sentence 2: simulation-based security de.nitions are typically impossible to achieve for func­tional encryption (e.g., [53, 19, 8]), unless severe limitations are placed on the number of keys that can be issued (e.g., [32, 30]).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: x0.X0  Figure 3: Discrete-time dynamical system b) Figure 4: a) Nominal system with signal decomposi­tion, and b) the same system under a stealth attack 3.1 Signal partitioning and attacked system To formalize the notion of stealth attack, we .rst divide the measurement and the control vector into their non­secure and secure parts.
Sentence 2: we assume that ns s ns .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, consider the conjunctive query with one inequality: n((X o)W:JZy:JZw2(T((XoZy )T( oZw2 )(Z(yW=Zw2))d no y Then returns ((aa)})when evaluated on J, and returns the empty set when evaluated on J2.
Sentence 2: this also shows o that ((aa)is not a certain answer; hence, query evaluation on a y universal solution (Jin this case) may be a strict superset of the set of certain answers (which is the empty set for this example).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In that architecture, the LPA forms the locus of a domain s policy management functions, as displayed in Figure 3.
Sentence 2: dynamic policy changes in Domain 1 are handled by the local LPA in Domain 1, which transparently hooks into the local domain and provides functions to 1) analyze local cross-domain policies and make analysis re­sults accessible to other domains but only through appropriate CDSs, and 2) deploy policy changes into edge gateways and security guards.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While concept analysis is asymptotically ine.cient its complexity is exponential in maxi(|CodePats(ext2 apii)|) our experiments showed that it is e.cient in practice.
Sentence 2: our analysis com­pleted in about 2 seconds for ext2, and in just over 310 sec­onds even for the largest of our case studies.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Especially, if we examine traditional anti-malware tools, they are typically deployed within vulnerable systems and could be the .rst targets once malware infect a computer system.
Sentence 2: though these traditional in-host tools are valuable in monitoring system behavior or detect­ing malicious activities (with their native access inside the systems), they are fundamentally limited in their isolation capability to prevent themselves from being infected in the .rst place.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Once the client has received the challenge it generates a new nonce, NC , sets M = Z||NS||NC ||IDS ||IDC and .nds a partial hash preimage of a Q-bit target string whose integer value is in the range [0,D].
Sentence 2: the client has to .nd X such that H(M, X) mod 2Q : D. Now the client replies with its nonce, NC , and the puzzle solution X, and the other values it received.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We imple­ment the TLR library for Mono and modify the Linux ker­nel in two ways: (i) implement the TLR system call, and (ii) change the kernel to eliminate all dependencies on re­sources only available in the secure world.
Sentence 2: we (i) modify the interrupt masks appropriately, (ii) disable cer­tain cache control initialization code, and (iii) remove some    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Time (s) Figure 11.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Con­veniently, we can merely reuse our existing Feistel S-Pad construc­tion as an X-Pad, for which we have a signcryption of the form fR(fS -1 (w)).s, where s is short.
Sentence 2: de.ne a Feistel X-Pad to be a Feistel S-Pad with length parameters chosen appro­priately for X-Pads.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Buckets are greedily .lled with blocks in the stash in the order of leaf to root, ensuring that blocks get pushed as deep  ' down into the tree as possible.
Sentence 2: a block acan be placed ' in the bucket at level e only if the path P(position[a]) ' to the leaf of block aintersects the path accessed P(x) at level e. if P(x, e) = P(position[a'], e).
Relationship: entailment