sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A Practical Property-based Bootstrap Architecture René Korthaus1 Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi1 Christian Stüble2 rene.korthaus@rub.de ahmad.sadeghi@trust.rub.de stueble@sirrix.com * 1,3  Jing Zhan jingzhan_whu@yahoo.com.cn 1Horst Görtz Institute for IT-Security 2Sirrix AG security technologies 3Computer School Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany Germany Wuhan University, China ABSTRACT Binary attestation, as proposed by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG), is a pragmatic approach for software integrity protection and veri.cation.
Sentence 2: it has also various shortcomings that cause problems for practical deployment such as scalability, manageability and privacy: On the one hand, data bound to binary values remain inaccessible after a software update and the veri.er of an attestation result has to manage a huge number of binary versions.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While it is understood that W.X is not foolproof [26, 10, 11], it was thought to be a suf.ciently strong mitigation that both Intel and AMD modi.ed their processor ar­chitectures to accommodate it and operating systems as varied as Windows Vista [13], Linux [25, 21], Mac OS X, and OpenBSD [17, 18] now support it.
Sentence 2: in 2007 Shacham demonstrated that W.X protection could be entirely evaded through an approach called return-oriented programming [23].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.1 Boot-time Entropy Hole of LPRNG LPRNG is designed to be supplied with external entropy when system events such as a disk I/O operation, user input, and IRQ occur by calling the following functions: add_disk_ randomness(), add_input_randomness(), and add_interrupt_ randomness().
Sentence 2: we found that add_interrupt_ randomness() is not used in an Android device, which was already reported for other Linux platforms [11, 24].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 5.4.1 Theoretical Fastest Time for a Proxy Attack In an Ethernet-based proxy attack, to explore the best case for the attacker,we assume thatboth theperipheral and the proxy helper need no time to prepare the network pack­ets.
Sentence 2: the packets used in a proxy attack must go through the hardware Ethernet MAC (physical serial com­munications port) of the NIC.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, at the cutoff, ba­sic20 and basic16 are the third and fourth strongest condi­tions, respectively.
Sentence 2: in the face of an attacker able  Condition % Storage % of No Storage % of Storage 5 tries 1st try 5 tries 1st try comp8 56.9 75 56 84 76 basic12 45.4 75 61 86 76 basic16 49.9 79 64 85 75 basic20 50.0 77 64 86 73 3class12 54.9 74 54 86 74 3class16 60.2 73 51 84 72 2word12 51.4 74 59 85 76 2word16 51.3 71 55 83 73  Table 2.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The basic technology which underlies this infrastructure seems solid enough: the system uses a proper PKI with smartcards for authentication of (registered) health profes­sionals, it uses decentralized storage of patient records at the source rather than a potentially more risky centralized approach, and it uses a central infrastructure to control ac­cess to those patient records, including access by patients8 .
Sentence 2: in its details the current system s architecture falls short.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note that on both datasets, AUTO PRO BE can generate .nger­prints for all the malware, even those with no response, for which CYBERPROB E cannot.
Sentence 2: this demonstrates a clear advantage of AUTO PROB E. For the samples with a response in Dataset II, CYBERPROB E is able to generate a .ngerprint similar to AUTO -PROB E. for 57% of those, AUTO PROBE produces probes construction functions with variable .elds rather than concrete probes in CYBERPROB E. Thus, AUTO PROB E probe construction functions are potentially more accurate.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: By de.nition, a fast spreading worm will start to infect others as soon as it successfully infects one host and thus will always be contained by WormTerminator.
Sentence 2: a few normal network applications may exhibit a similar tra.c pattern as that of a fast worm, and special care is needed to di.erentiate such tra.c from the worm tra.c.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: [20] develops a sophisticated static analysis to automate the identi.cation of function pointers that could be hijacked for this purpose, and the same techniques could be applied here.
Sentence 2: in practice, we have found that persistent interposition attacks require very few functions to be interposed, and those can be easily identi.ed by dynamically tracing the sequence of function calls made by the victim application.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For each cost multiplier c, we plot the fraction of static sen­sors contained in the approximate solution, as well as the demand-weighted error incurredby this solution.For c =1, only static sensors are selected.
Sentence 2: even for c =2, only a small fraction of static sensors are selected, which indicates that the mobile sensors very quickly become more cost-effective.For c = 4, no static sensors are selected.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Many other proposals for host-based anomaly detection may be found in the literature [3, 2, 8, 26, 21, 5, 14, 15, 4, 26, 12, 13, 17, 27].
Sentence 2: pH is fairly typical, in the sense that many host-based IDS s rely on recognizing attacks based on the traces they produce, be it traces of sys­tem calls, BSM audit events, or Unix commands.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.1 Finding Convergence Usage Data An ideal investigation of any alternate CA proposal would include an empirical study of its usage in the wild, but this is presently impossible for Convergence due to a lack of users and infrastructure.
Sentence 2: through consultation with a major university s network services, we overcame this ob­stacle we obtained anonymized net.ow data of HTTPS tra.c from the university s network gateway, which we then used to synthesize a realistic Convergence workload at uni­versity scale.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: There are many performance and complexity­related challenges to building such hardware, including multiple levels of address translation, privileged instruc­tions and virtual devices.
Sentence 2: if it were available, we suspect that a Haven-like shield module would be a suit­able architecture to protect unmodi.ed guest VMs from a malicious hypervisor, since the same trust issues ad­dressed by Haven in the OS also arise in VM interfaces.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Two basic safety properties that all software fault isolation systems enforce is memory safety, which guarantees that a module can only access memory that it owns or has legitimate access to, and control .ow integrity, which guarantees that a module can only execute its own isolated code and external functions that it has legitimate access to.
Sentence 2: memory safety and control .ow integrity are insuf.cient to provide API in­tegrity, and the rest of this section describes other safety properties enforced by LXFI.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: sj, i (1) Likewise, at the decryption side, the it h byte of cipher block is XORed with the it h byte of key-stream sw j, i to recover the it h byte of the plain block mw j, i : w ww mj, i = cj, i .
Sentence 2: sj, i (2)  3GPP adopted till now three pairs of standards for DC and DI; (EEA1, EIA1), (EEA2, EIA2) and (EEA3, EIA3).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Using a linear decay function, tightness of the optimal + operator as de.ned in Equation 7 is given by: From Figure 12 we observe that a value function that con­sists of 100 piecewise linear functions can be approximated with only 4% overestimation (tightness = 0.04) using a cu­bic spline over 10 control points.
Sentence 2: it is harder to approximate exponential decay functions; a cubic spline over 10 control points approximates the exponential decay function (see Figure 13) with about 21% overestima­tion (tightness = 0.21).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, once an attacker manages to get access to these systems, the negative impact will eventually be high; for instance, shutting down a primary substation node could a.ect whole city districts.
Sentence 2: security breaches targeted on decentralized components, which are deployed typically in the Functional Buildings and Customer Premises domain, are much more likely as attackers can easily get hold of these components.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: North bridge con.guration registers can be accessed by any core on any node.
Sentence 2: each processor core has its own general-purpose registers, MSRs, APIC, and two  Memory Control Hub Memory Control Hub (North Bridge) 0 (North Bridge) 1 -Configuration -Configuration registers registers -I/O space register -I/O space register -L3 cache -L3 cache Figure 3: General multi-core processors architecture levels of cache.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Furthermore, it is computationally quite inef.cient too.
Sentence 2: liu and Terzi [5] de.ne a graph to be k-degree anonymous if for every node v, there exist at least k-1 other nodes in the graph with the same degree as v. The .nal anonymized graph is constructed by using a k-anonymous degree sequence computed from the original degree sequence.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, existing ICT-related risk management processes are not directly applicable to the smart grid domain as the technology and the security requirements are signi.cantly di.erent.
Sentence 2: readily available smart grid security guidelines such as the Protection Pro.les [3, 4] developed by the German Federal O.ce for Information Security (BSI) merely focus on smart metering and thus do not map to the entire smart grid ar­chitectures deployed.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Anticipatingallpossibleconditionsisnotfeasibleingeneralpur­posepolicy.Inresponsetothis,theGenericAuthorizationandAccess-controlAPI[22](GAA-API)supportsexternallyde.nedcontextfunctions.InGAA-API,conditionsarearbitraryfunctionsde.nedbytheirtype,name,andgoverningauthority.Conversely,theIsmenesystem[16]assumesverylittle.Ismenepoliciesdonotidentifywhichauthority,ifany,shouldgoverntheevaluationpro­cess.Bothofthesystemsleavethevastmajorityofconditioneval­uationtothesupportingimplementation.Eachsystemprovidesanupcall interface,butneithermandateshowsecurityrequirementsareidenti.edoraddressed.
Sentence 2: theOASISsystemimplementsRBACauthorizationandaccesscontrolpolicy[1,11].OASISroleactivationandserviceusearegovernedbypolicyexpressions.Theseexpressionsde.necontextthatmustbetrueatactivationoraccesstime.Thesecontextscanfurthermandatethatthecontextbesustained:theconditionbeingmeasuredmustremaintruewhiletheroleisactivatedortheactionisbeingperformed.Ifatanytimetheconditionbecomesfalse,theactivatororserviceisnoti.edviaaneventchannel.Frame­workslikeOASISarelikelytobene.tfromtheAntigoneconditionframework.sustainedcontextwillrequireinfrastructurenotavailableinthecurrentimplementation.Forexample,oneim­plementationmaypollandmonitorthecontextimplementationforstatechanges.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The security of the management software in Xen[12]is also improvedby moving thedomain(i.e., VM)build­ing utilitiesintoaseparatedomain[44].
Sentence 2: thesesystems aim at protecting the virtualization layer from external attacks to the VM stack, but without considering possible attacks that lever­age legal maintenance operations from the cloud operators, which is a new requirement in multi-tenant cloud.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If X ' = X then, by non-malleability, the value R ' is unrelated to the random key R and hence the value s ' = MACR' (µA) will not help the adversary produce a valid tag s under the key R not even to authenticate Alice s actual message µA!
Sentence 2: if X ' = X then R ' = R and hence we can rely directly on the security of the MAC to ensure that µB = µA.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: End Figure 2: Pseudo cede for the generation of a transaction token 6.3 Resynchronization of Card Holder and Card Issuer The authentication scheme described on section 6.2 is based upon the synchronization of grammar and history set between the card issuer and the cardholder.
Sentence 2: there is a possibility that a cardholder generates a disposable credit card number and later decides not to use it or the number is garbled by noise on the communication line.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Copyright 2009 ACM 978-1-60558-784-4/09/11 ...$10.00.
Sentence 2: ripal Nathuji Microsoft Corporation 1 Microsoft Way Redmond, WA ripaln@microsoft.com  Paul England Microsoft Corporation 1 Microsoft Way Redmond, WA pengland@microsoft.com forms, decoupling the service provider (SP) from the plat­form owner or the cloud infrastructure provider (CIP).Such a model has potential for huge cost savings for service providers as they avoid the signi.cant .nancial overheads associated with deploying, maintaining, and managing datacenter en­vironments, and instead pay just for the usage of these re-sources.this bene.t comes at a price -the sep­aration of service and infrastructure providers implies that the service provider has less control over the service deploy­ment, and must trust the CIP to uphold the guarantees pro­vided in the service level agreement (SLA).An SLA works as a contract between CIP and service provider, and provides guarantees either in terms of low level resource provisioning, e.g., X number of CPUs with some computational capacity and Y Mbps network throughput, or in terms of higher-level goodput value(s) for the service, such as Z ops/second.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this paper, we focus on how a BitTorrent-like .le­sharing system might use endorsed e-cash, because the dy­namics of BitTorrent are better understood than less popu­lar peer-to-peer systems.
Sentence 2: we believe that e-cash is more widely applicable, and outline how to apply endorsed e-cash to applications such as distributed lookup, computa­tion, storage, and onion routing.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our Troubles with Linux and Why You Should Care Ashif S. Harji Peter A. Buhr Tim Brecht Cheriton School of Computer Science University of Waterloo Waterloo, Canada asharji,pabuhr,brecht@uwaterloo.ca Abstract Linuxprovides researchers with afull-.edged operating sys­temthatiswidely used and opensource.
Sentence 2: duetoits complexity and rapid development, care should be exercised when using Linux for performance experiments, especially in systems research.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note that the newer Ajax technol­ogy allows connections to be opened using XMLHttpRe­quest objects, but with the constraint that the domain of the URL request destination must be the same as the one that serves up the page containing the script [3].
Sentence 2: the attacker can easily leak out the information by modify­ing the URL of a (hidden) image embedded in the page so that the web browser requests this image from a web server under the attacker s control.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: At .rst glance, enabling interrupt delivery while KVM runs may only require setting up the IDT (Interrupt Descrip­tor Table).
Sentence 2: one quirk of the x86 architecture makes this more complicated than it should be: when an interrupt happens, the CPU will save the current state (such as EIP, ESP, and EFLAGS) to the stack so that it can resume the execution of the interrupted task.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We found that skewness in access requests does not affect mean access time for the access matrix and CPOL SDPs.
Sentence 2: the num­ber of access requests made in a session has a strong in.uence on SDP performance especially of CPOL with larger access times observed for shorter sessions, which we attribute to not reaching the best steady-state phase fast enough.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We assume that it is not possible to prevent attacks on defense mechanisms that offer these capabilities, just as much as it is not possible to prevent the attacks on the application that these mechanisms aim to protect.
Sentence 2: we have showed that the attacker's acqui- sition of privilege can be prevented or slowed down earlier, which makes such attacks on the capabilities more difllcult and time consuming.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the context of IA-DHKE, one natural interpretation for two sessions ( B, X, Y )and ( A, Y, X ) tobematchingis A, B, that: the players A and B should have matching roles in the two sessions, i.e., if A is the initiator (resp., responder) then B is the responder (resp., initiator) in both of the two ses­sions.
Sentence 2: as the basic (H)MQV is role-independent, for two sessions between the same pair of players A and B but with the opposite order of DH-component exchange (which may be made by a cross-message attack [25]),4 player A (resp., B) thinks it is interacting with a responder B (resp., A), while the session-key outputs in these two ses­sions are the same.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since the TCG makes statements about the initial state of the platform only, it is crucial that this state cannot be (maliciously) manipulated after startup, otherwise a veri.er cannot rely on the informa­tion provided by the attestor.
Sentence 2: currently available operating systems (e.g., Windows, Linux) can easily be ma­nipulated by exploiting security bugs or by changing mem­ory which has been swapped to a harddisk.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We show that, although any attacker with ac­cess to d stored on S P can tell that Alice and Bob are com­municating, he cannot tell that there is a hidden message behind d. An attacker cannot link d published on S P to the ciphertext c stored in SS because he cannot compute hd.
Sentence 2: s P , HD, and SS might keep logs, record users IP addresses and requests, which could be used by an at­tacker to match requests made by the same user.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, it is required to do Fast Fourier Transform on recorded response in order to generate audio stimulus, so with some code analysis, it is possible to detect the existence of such suspicious operations though it can be hidden into the equalizer processing as if it is enhancing the audio quality.
Sentence 2: if an application s original function include FFT operation, then the de­tection problem is still dif.cult to handle.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In all these cases, all associated users may be desired to specify privacy policies to control over who can see this photo.
Sentence 2: current online social networks, such as Facebook and Google+, only allow the data owner to fully con­trol the shared data, but lack a mechanism to specify and enforce the privacy concerns from other associated users, leading to privacy con.icts being largely unresolved and sensitive information being potentially disclosed to the public.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For a lossy function, the encrypted matrix M is the all­zeros matrix M = 0.Then for every input x,the value f(x) is an entry-wise encryption of the all-zeros vector, so f intu­itively loses x.
Sentence 2: this alone is not enough to ensure lossiness, because the output ciphertexts still carry some in­ternal randomness that might leak information about the input.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Privacy-enhanced revoca­tion also allows for subjective judging [26], where SPs can re­ voke users at their discretion since the privacy of users is not at risk.
Sentence 2: tTP-free schemes such as e-cash [4] and k-Times Anonymous Authentication (k-TAA) [25] support accountability in only narrowly de.ned applications where misbehaviors can be mapped to too many authentications (such as double spending a digital coin).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Most research on passive steganalysis has focused on de­tecting steganography in still images [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 16, 17].
Sentence 2: given the high levels of redundancy present in video, we believe that there is tremendous potential for cre­ative data hiding and inspired steganalysis that extend to multimedia sensor networks.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The AWSS schemes of [6, 5] are based on the idea of sharing the secret using a bi-variate polyno­mial F (x, y)of degree at most t in x and y and requires T(n 2) invocations of the underlying AICP to generate IC signatures on n 2 distinct points on F (x, y).
Sentence 2: we design AWC based on the Shamir secret sharing, where a univariate polynomial f(x)ofdegree at most t is used to share the secret and only n instances of AICP are invoked to generate IC signatures on n distinct points on f(x).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: = 0.8, then SYS is 0.8-survivable given any compromise rate below 0.13 (i.e., r2 = 0.13) as long as the recovery rate is maintained at least at 0.19 (i.e., r1 = 0.19).
Sentence 2: if the recovery rate can only be 0.16 or less, then 0.8­survivability cannot be maintained.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A general approach to build a tc api for Android platform from an existing one (e.g., c-based tss or Java-based jtss [17]) would be to derive the complete set of functionality provided by these apis.
Sentence 2: our proposed api is not aimed to replace any of these apisinall of their functionality because some of the methods speci.ed in the tss are not relevant with our api.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The constraint checker can easily detect this violation, but it is unlikely to know how to op­timally transfer the responsibility for managing the customer email list, since workload information, employee preferences, and other external considerations are rarely encoded into the systems hosting an access control policy.
Sentence 2: a human policy administrator is likely to have access to such information and can easily select be­tween the employees who could be assigned to that task.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We believe this application of our proposal has the potential to simplify some important aspects of public-key infrastruc- tures (PKI's) for digital signatures, specifically for PKrs intended to adequately address the difficult related issues of key revocation and potentially undetected signature pri- vate key compromise.
Sentence 2: 5 an important issue, with respect to signatures intended to provide the property of non-repudiation, is that a user (or organization) must be prevented from repudiating a signature by simply deleting the corresponding posted corroborating information from a site they control.
Relationship: contrasting