sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: First, we consider an adversary launching an o.-line password guessing attack on the user Ui,j .Since ti is encrypted using encryption key eki,j which is secret and the symmetric encryption scheme SKE is secure, hence, ti is unknown to an adversary.
Sentence 2: it is not possible for the adversary to verify the correct guess of password from vi,j .Furthermore, MACS is secure and ti is unknown to the adversary, therefore, it is not possible for the adversary to verify the correct guess of zi,j from µ¯i,j * through the password guessing in zi,j .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The power consumption model for the analysis was chosen based on an assumption about the internal DES hardware, i.e, the common design choice that the state of the cipher is saved in a bu.er in every round.
Sentence 2: we computed the correlation coe.cient between the processed measure­ments and the HD of two consecutive round outputs of the .rst DES decryption, which is a typical hypothetical power model when attacking hardware.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Given that concrete instantiations of the generic scheme are iteratively executed, the limited size of the primary memory (PM) (see below) and the fact that accessing the secondary memory requires signi.cantly more time than accessing PM, we consider this assumption to be reasonable for most practical instantiations.
Sentence 2: 5.2.2 System-Level Properties The size and utilization of the primary memory (PM) plays a fundamental role for assessing the optimality of a software attestation scheme with regard to the resources used by a prover P. a common assumption is P that PM is just big enough to honestly execute Attest, i.e., there is no free PM that could be used otherwise.3 Another crucial assumption of any software attestation scheme not explicitly made in most previous works is that the state S should not be compressible into PM.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The simulator .ips a fair binary coin ., and returns an encryption of m. .The ciphertext is output as: E =(.,E ' = m. Z,{Ei = Cri }i.. ) If µ =0 then Z = e(g,g)abc.If we let s = c,then we ri )c have Ys =(e(g,g)ab)c = e(g,g)abc,and Ei =(g = Cri .
Sentence 2: the ciphertext is a valid random encryption of message m. .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Also when an administrator or delegator attempts to revoke a permission granted to a user, the same user might still be exercising the permission to ac­cess a resource, which violates system safety.
Sentence 2: we extend [3] to include the Use Cases of: (1) role-based del­egation extending the delegation framework of [3], and (2) policy administration with or without delegation extending the Use Cases proposed in [19].
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: LetusrevisittheI-hierarchyofFigure1(c).Figure1(d) showstwopossibleintervalsassociatedwiththeenabling timesofthetworoles.InFigure1(d)-(i),weseethatthe enablingintervalofSoftwareEngineerroleisasubsetof thatoftheProgrammerrole.Inthiscase,theI-hierarchy hasthesemanticssimilartothenon-temporalRBAC,that is,wheneveruactivatestheSoftwareEngineerroles/he alsoacquiresthepermissionsoftheProgrammerrole,be­causeatthattimetheProgrammerroleisalsoenabled.
Sentence 2: inintervalT1,ucannotacquireanypermissionsof  Figure1:Anexamplehierarchy Table3:Hierarchiesandassociatedfeatureswithuassignedtox1 x1x2:::xn;1xn Rolecombinationthatcanbeactivatedinasessionbyu MaximalPermissionsetthatcanbeacquiredbyu MinimalPermissionsetthatcanbeacquiredbyu Numberofcombinations ofP1P2:::Pn acquiredbyu I-hierarchy fx1g Pmax (Byactivatingfx1g) Pmax (Byactivatingfx1g) 1 A-hierarchy X.fx1x2:::xng Pmax (Byactivatingfx1x2:::xng) Pmin (Byactivatingfxng) 2jXj;1 IA-hierarchy X.fx1x2:::xng Pmax (Byactivatingfx1g) Pmin (Byactivatingfxng) n theProgrammerroleevenifitisenabled,astheSoftware Engineerroleisdisabledatthattime.Itisalsopossiblethat thereisatemporalintervalinwhichSoftwareEngineer roleisenabledbuttheProgrammerroleisnot,asindicated byintervalT2inFigure1(d)-(ii).Insuchacase,wecansee thatthefollowingtwoapproachescanbeusedtocapture theinheritancesemantics: 1.Weaklyrestrictedapproach(Iw):Thepermissionsof theProgrammerroleareinheritedbytheSoftware EngineerroleinintervalT2, 2.Stronglyrestrictedapproach(Is):Thepermissionsof theProgrammerrolearenotinheritedbytheSoftware EngineerroleinintervalT2.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Although most attacks can be detected by looking at a fraction of these char­acteristics, the redundant characteristics bene.t in two ways:  An attack would likely change at least a subset of the large set of characteristics being monitored.
Sentence 2: the redundancy provides a safety cushion against making a poor choice of characteristics to monitor, or inadequa­cies in the learning algorithms.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A Dependency Constrained Assertion is one, wherein the Condition element is extended by de.ning an Asser­tionDependancy element, which is further de.ned to con­tain one or more AssertionPatternType elements.
Sentence 2: any Assertion containing the AssertionDependancy element can be used only along with those Assertions, which satisfy the requirements of the speci.ed AssertionPatternType el­ements.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In contrast to this, the av­erage correlation coe.cient value between the attack .ows and Sout for values of k from one to nine is computed to be 0.927, which is indeed an indication of strong correlations in those cases.
Sentence 2: the MSs (e.g., MSb in Fig.2) re­quire to consider tracing back those .ows at the con.uence point which lead to doubtful correlation coe.cient values in the vicinity of 0.50.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Shannon Distinguishabil- ity is the optimal mutual information between Eve's bits (£) and Alice's j~h bit (.4j) (when all other PA bits are given together with the ECC data and test data).
Sentence 2: i(.Aj; ~lir, jT, b,, bT, s) g c~ + ~ Z P(c, liT, jT, I~, bT, S) .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: On the other hand, in the IBE setting a revoked user, or the adversary holding its private key, should not be able to decrypt messages even if it colludes with any number of non-revoked users.
Sentence 2: to the best of our knowledge, the solution proposed by Boneh and Franklin in [7] remains the most practical user revocation solution in the IBE setting.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Hence, the probability for Stage 1 to compute the correct output is given by: 1 m - m 2K-m 1 - e 2K-m In general, for many real-world applications, m can be at most 100.
Sentence 2: for 1024-bit key size (i.e., K = 1024), the proba­bility for SBDp to produce correct output in the .rst run is approxi­ - 100 2924 mately e 1.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Because in the context of [19, 12] the length of m and the number of 1s in it are known a priori to both Alice and Bob, insertions and changes of 1 to 0 must be ac­companied by deletions and changes of 0 to 1.
Sentence 2: eve can create edit errors in the message, but at least a quarter of the errors introduced (namely, deletions and changes of 0 to 1) require her to .nd an extractor output on her own.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As described in [26], GP is computed by a PCFG as the product of the base structure (i.e., L6D2) probability and the probabilities of the strings which .ll each variable (i.e., L6 and D2), with the strings selected from an input dic­tionary.
Sentence 2: only strings that are present in the dictionary can be guessed.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: From its interaction with B, A s view of the simulation is either that of Experiment Hj or Hj+1.We showed above that A has advantage ./Qc in distinguishing between Ex­periment Hj and Experiment Hj+1.Note that B makes exactly Qt + Qc -1 test queries and 1 challenge query to C, and has approximately the same running time as A.
Sentence 2: b also has the same non-negligible advantage Adv[A.,1,CCF] =./Qc in breaking the scheme.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While we recognizethat malwarecouldusetheirowndecryption meth­ods, or bundle third-party crypto libraries, the convenience this package provides appears alluring to malware authors.
Sentence 2: in our current prototype, we opt to check for the use of its APIs.5 Moreover, in possible execution paths, we also look for related JNI calls as well as other methods (e.g., Runtime.­exec(...)) to invoke native code.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If we only listen for exploit traf.c passively (e.g., the network telescope approach [16]), the exploits would simply appear as TCP SYNs destined for port 135 in the trace.
Sentence 2: we require active responders to capture the RPC Bind and Request por­tions of the exploit handshake to differentiate the exploits, and we use network traces of live honeypots and stateless responders [20] to obtain these exploits.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: k-1 k n e1 = p i(1 - p)n-i (3) i i=0 For the second event error 2 and maximum distance value q = 2l, no suitable PUF output is found for a single code se­quence bit with probability (1 -p)q.
Sentence 2: no code sequence bit will fail with (1 - (1 - p)q)k .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: · = , 2n 2n - 1 2n - t 2n - t - 1 2n | {z } Pr[.rst t-1 probes fail] where n is the number of bits of randomness in the address space.
Sentence 2: the expected number of probes required for scenario 1 is 2n 2n X X t · 1 = 1 · t =(2n +1)/2  2n-1 .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The properties of veri.able resource accounting, however, do not directly map to the applications targeted by nested virtualiza­tion (e.g., defending against hypervisor-level rootkits or addressing compatibility issues with public clouds).
Sentence 2: we need to iden­tify and extend the appropriate resource allocation chokepoints to provide the necessary hooks, while guaranteeing that customer jobs run untampered.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Thus, no code sequence bit will fail with (1 - (1 - p)q)k .
Sentence 2: as complementary event, the probability of at least one over.ow in a code sequence is e2 = 1 - (1 - (1 - p)q)k (4) the yield y is computed by the proba­bility that neither error 1 nor error 2 occur.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In a nutshell, the observation is that the previous simula­tors invest exponential time in decoding the transcript of the simulation so far, and this decoding is indepen­dent of the speci.c protocol.
Sentence 2: given that our simulation is of logarithmic length, we can create a ta­ble (or better, a decision tree) with the decodings of all possibilities, which will enable linear-time simulation.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: These subsession IDs are sent to the browser as cookies, each marked with a di.erent ring label: SubSID_K is marked with ring K. The following example shows a portion of the HTTP header generated by the server when a session is created (Escudo introduces a new header called Set-Ring to set the rings for cookies): Set-Cookie: SID=pjdfbpnd228b2n; path=/ Set-Cookie: SubSID_0=gg5u1pc3inutmb Set-Cookie: SubSID_1=h1d3vg4ep351qv Set-Cookie: SubSID_2=n91n6kgiv05fe2 Set-Ring: SID=2 Set-Ring: SubSID_0=0 Set-Ring: SubSID_1=1 Set-Ring: SubSID_2=2 With Escudo s access control rules, contents in ring t can access the subsession cookies in rings t and above (numeri­cally).
Sentence 2: when an HTTP request is made in ring t from an Escudo-protected webpage, all the subsession cook­ies from rings t and above will be attached to the request; the server can use these cookies to decide that the request belongs to subsession t. Figure 5 depicts the subsession­identi.cation process.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In practice, operating with a large window size corresponds to heavily smooth the images, cap­turing solely their main characteristics, while at the smaller scale, all the details of an image contribute to determine a precise location in the grid.
Sentence 2: having a set of multi-resolution CGs corresponds to analyze the images at a di.erent level of detail, from a coarse to a .ne grain.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Contrary to the shutter sound or a LED that indicate an active camera [4], there is not even an audio-visual feed­ back that signals the user that data is being collected with the sensor.
Sentence 2: we conclude that the information provided by the ambient-light sensor can be exploited in side-channel attacks, which means that an attacker is able to determine the corresponding input based on this information.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In our experimental results with some modern PCs (including the environment shown in Table 3), the CPU usage of BitVisor with full speed back­ground encryption is around 10-30% (the rest 70-90% are available for the guest OSs).
Sentence 2: heavy CPU load applications in guest OSs without any low-level events will not be signi.cantly a.ected by CPU time consumption of background encryption process.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For every edge that is marked as should be kept, Heat-ray creates a constraint that this edge s cost is greater than the bene.t assigned by the linear program to cutting this edge.
Sentence 2: the set of labeled edges translate into a set of linear constraints on the cost: b(e) - c(e) =-1 if e is to be kept, (11) b(e) - c(e) = 1 if e is to be cut.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In such case, the rule similarity is computed considering which one of the two policies contains the extra rule.
Sentence 2: when computing the similarity between policies pi and pj ,if pi has a policy the attribute of which is not in pj ,the rule similarity is Restrict ; on the other hand, if pj contains a rule the attribute of which is not in pi, the rule similarity is Extend .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: )Inordertoguaranteethatthedisputeanbere­solved,weusethetehniqueofverifableenryption(i.e.,a waytoenryptthemessageunderadesignatedpublikey andsubsequentlyprovethattheresultingiphertextindeed ontainssuhmessages).Reently,Ateniese[l4]showseÆ­ientprotoolforverifableenryptionofvarioustypesof ryptographifuntions.
Sentence 2: ourprotoolresultsinapratialsealed­bidautionprotoolthatallowsanautioneertodetermine thewinningbidinauniversallyverifablewayandsimulta­neouslypreventsevenanautioneerfromgettinganyuseful informationofbidsoflosers.Previousshemes[3][4]require thebidder'shelpduringopeningproedures.Ontheother hand,ourprotoolisquiteeÆientsineabiddertakesa partonlyatthebeginning.Moreimportantly,oursheme isrobustagainstheatingbidders;i.e.,anydeviationofbid­dersannotpreventtheautioneerfromdeterminingthe aution.Tothebestofourknowledge,thisisthefrston­strutionofauniversallyverifablesealed­bidautionpro­toolinanoptimistiapproah.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, an ECDH key exchange using our ECC software would require only one third (36% to be precise) of the energy of the ECDH implementation contained in TinyECC.
Sentence 2: our work makes ECDH key exchange much more attractive for WSNs since high energy consumption is generally considered to be the most signi.cant drawback of ECDH and other ECC-based key establishment techniques.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The basic idea here is that a sub-role has more responsibil­ities or tasks than its super-roles, and additional permissions are necessary to perform them [21]; with this de.nition of a role hierarchy, a role inherits all the permissions of all its super-roles.
Sentence 2: the cluster corresponding to the sub­role has to include those permissions and will consequently be formed later than the cluster representing the super-role.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The well-formed ciphertexts are de.ned to be all ciphertexts that include a valid signature (or MAC) on the rest of the ciphertext, which the simulator uses to check that query ciphertexts are well formed.
Sentence 2: the simulator has to arrange for the identity in the challenge set to match the identity that corresponds to the challenge it wishes to craft.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note that, as shown in [31, 3], for any card corresponding to index i .Wj, the card does not learn t+ 1 distinct points on polynomial sj+1(x, x).
Sentence 2: the value of the polynomial sj+1 at any point other than the ones made public in the broadcast is still equally likely to be any value in Fq.This means that the key value kj is also equally likely to be any value in Fq .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: There are 560 unknowns in this system representing the initial states of the 31 bits in each of the 16-stages of the shift register and the two memory words R1 and R2.
Sentence 2: the number of monomials T in this system is given by: T = 560 2102 i i=0 we would need to generate at least T equations for all initial states to be recovered.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note that E1 = E, as G was obtained in Step 2(a)i by the removal of the edges in E from GT .
Sentence 2: in addition, |E|= degGT (I), as only edges touching vertices in I were added to E. |E1| = |E|= degGT (I) < 0.2degGT .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It is because of a fundamental dilemma between the object-referencing ability of scripts, the garbage collection and the navigation mechanisms of modern browsers: i) using scripts, an object X in a page can be referenced by a data structure Y that is not within the page (of course, after the navigation of the page, Y is still a valid object because it does not belong to the navigated page); ii) on the other hand, because Y references to X, the garbage-collector cannot destroy X from the memory, otherwise Y would have a dangling reference and the memory safety is broken.
Sentence 2: object X has to reside in the memory and become a residue object.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The Web Services environment permits such adversaries, since the passive requestors usually trust a large set of Root Cer­ti.cation Authorities (CAs) and hence may fall prey to weak cer­ti.cation policies of some of the CAs in the trust trees.
Sentence 2: an adversary may obtain a key and certi.cate for an address of its own.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As with the forg­ing DP attack, to guarantee that the value of r3 and r4 have a constant o.set from the correct value, the malicious code has to jump out of the malicious checksum block (one jump instruction) to modify the PC value, and then jump back (another jump instruction)before the jump instruction at end of each checksum block.
Sentence 2: the forging PC attack needs .ve additional instructions (two jump instruc­tions, three arithmetic or logical instructions) and causes two additional cache misses for each checksum computation block to compute the expected checksum result.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A node is only viable if it is not an attacker, and has no attackers in its neighborhood.
Sentence 2: the probability that the entire circuit is viable is ((1 - f)r+1)6 =(1 - f)6(r+1), and it is easy to see why a small attacker fraction is capable of disrupting a large fraction of circuit constructions.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Here, we utilize the fact that the attacks on computers are often independent of the geographic distribution the way in which attackers gain access to the platform requires certain con.gurations or user behavior, and it is di.cult for an attacker to coordi­nate the locations of the attacks.
Sentence 2: there are platforms that share one physical connection (e.g., a wireless node), but have a reasonable probability that not all of them are corrupted by the same organization.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As an alternative, use the frame s id attribute in thesamemanneras inSection3: var innerWindow = document.getElementById("frameID").contentWindow; var innerInterface = innerWindow.getPublicInterface();  6.2 SiblingFrames AsdescribedbyJacksonandWang inSubspace[19],Firefox (alongwithSafari,InternetExplorer7, and some con.gurations of InternetExplorer6)allowstheframestructureof apage tobenav­igated regardlessofthedomains involved(Operarestrictsaccess to frames).
Sentence 2: a sibling frame with the name attribute set to bar can reference its sibling frame with name foo as discussed in the previous section via parent.frames["foo"] or parent.foo or parent[x].
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Furthermore, stan­dard methods like Color Filling Segmentation (CFS, intro­duced in [23]) will pick up not just character strokes or com­ponents, but also those that do not belong to any character and which we call noise components.
Sentence 2: it is essen­tial to di.erentiate between legitimate character strokes and noise components automatically.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Figure3:Theauthentiationrelationshipwithone oneptnodebetweensubjets(objets)andtheau­thorisationrelation.
Sentence 2: theauthorisationrelationalwaysreduestotherights subjetshavetoobjets,soagraphwithoutsubjetsand/or withoutobjetsisinomplete.weextendourfun­tionalnotationinanaturalmanner,andmaynowdenotethe subjets(objets)ofapartiularoneptCbyS(C)(O(C)), andmayevendenotetheobjetsofapartiularsubjet byS(O),andtheinversebyS(O).Ofoursetheymustbe supersriptedappropriately.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Infact,given thedistancegraphG (seeDe.nition5), our approach can only be used within one of the connected components of G. During the construction of the distance graph for the synthetic data we found 11 connected compo­nents, 10 of them of size 1.
Sentence 2: we removed these 10 trajectories in order to obtain a new distance graph with just one connected component.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: At­tacking the BTB, although being itself acting like a simple cache, is actually targeting the instruction .ow, which is magnitudes more complicated than the data .ow within the memory hierarchy, i.e., between the L1 data cache and the main memory.
Sentence 2: as already mentioned in the above section 2.1, numerous architectural enhancements take care feeding the µop Queue that a deeply pipelined superscalar CPU like Pentium 4 can­not get too easily stalled by a BTB miss.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, CAS-DB can only send di­ rectly signed atoms and rules in messages, and CAS signs auth(shaketable, Alice) is not true at CAS-DB.
Sentence 2: if CAS-DB wants to be help­ful, it must give Alice a set of atoms and rules from which it fol­lows that CAS lsigns auth(shaketable, Alice).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In par­ticular, the group manager doesn t need to use any revoking poly­nomial, but just need to keep the shares of the masking polynomials for {pi(x)}i=1,...,j away from the group members added after ses­sion j.
Sentence 2: the broadcast polynomial in Scheme 2, {gj (x)qi(x)+ hj,i+1(x)}i=j,...,m, can be replaced with {qi(x)+ fi(x)}i=j,...,m, where {fi(x)}i=j,...,m} is a set of random t-degree polynomials.
Relationship: reasoning