sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In practice, the available user attribute data will often have a lower attribute .t than 0.6, e.g., because some rel­evant user attributes are unavailable.
Sentence 2: we also produce a version of the user attribute data with fewer at­tributes; speci.cally, we discard attributes one at a time, un­til the attribute .t drops below 0.6 (except we use a higher threshold of 0.8 for healthcare, otherwise Na is very low).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the private- key setting we allow the adversary to know u by always setting u = 1 ~ (for instance).
Sentence 2: we have the following algorithm for/C' (the encryption and decryption algorithms remain unchanged): Algorithm K:'(1 k) sk e-- /C(1 k) u = lk,v *-- {0,lff sk' = sklv return sk' The previously given analysis still holds, and lZI' is NM-P2- CO secure (NM-P2-C0 degenerates to NM-C0 in the public- key setting).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: How­ever, if stolen data is sold on, it needs to be gathered at a central place; the customer of a data harvester will barely want the data distributed over a number of hacked ma­chines, to which connecting to always poses some risk of being caught.
Sentence 2: space (and to some extent, computation time) can be used as a bottleneck; this has for example been pro­posed for e-cash [4].
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Once the balloon driver has allocated them, the hypervisor can safely remove the guest-physical­to-host-physical mappings of these pages in both CPU MMU page tables and IOMMU translation tables (if the page was previously mapped for DMA) and give the host frames to some other virtual machine.
Sentence 2: one possible approach for the dynamic quota policy for cooperative guests is to de.ne the quota as what­ever amount of memory is allocated to the guest at the mo­ment anyhow.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: After checksum com-T cpu putation, communication consumes time recv to send the checksum back to the host CPU.
Sentence 2: the time of one challenge-response pair is: normal T cpu + T per + T cpu T = (1) comp send comp recv In a proxy attack, the peripheral forwards the challenge sent by the host CPU to a proxy helper, which consumes time T per The remote helper consumes T helper to compute send .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: S0), we compute a minimal Cmin s (or Ctmin), Thus, S min min fmin = k * S + ks * Cs (or k * S + kt * Ct )  Then, {fS Sm.S.S0 fmin = min min} will be the desired solution for case C (or @).
Sentence 2: we observe that: For case C, the objective is to minimize Cs, i.e., the number of programs after MLD with a given S. Bya reduction from the Bin Packing problem, we prove that it is NP-hard to .nd an optimal solution for case C. we present a heuristic algorithm in Section 3; For case @, the objective is to minimize Ct, i.e., the transferred data size.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The rea­son is that the encryption primitive they used at each node requires to divide each search token of a multi-dimensional query into the independent ones in single dimensions just like the limitation introduced in [25].
Sentence 2: according to our observation, in order to design a faster-than-linear and single-dimensionally private tree-based MDRSE scheme, we need to be careful about not only what type of tree struc­tures will be leveraged, but also what kind of encryption primitive at each node will be used.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Overuse of administrator authority, in turn, makes it diffi­cult to enforce any notion of least privilege when managing appli­cation state and resources across multiple applications.
Sentence 2: singularity compound principals offer the possibility of self-management, where installation and manipulation of pro­tected application state is performed by the application itself or through utility software written by the software publisher explicit­ly for that purpose.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: TRCTC uses a sample of legitimate tra.c Sin as input and replays Sin to transmit information.
Sentence 2: sin is par­titioned into two equal bins S0 and S1 by a value tcuto.. TRCTC transmits a 1-bit by randomly replaying an inter­packet delay from bin S1 and transmits a 0-bit by randomly replaying an inter-packet delay from bin S0.as Sin is made up of legitimate tra.c, the distribution of TRCTC tra.c is approximately equal to the distribution of legiti­mate tra.c.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When we view y as a function of x,we have f ' [y(x)] = f ' (x) and therefore '' ''' f [y(x)] ·y (x)= f (x) .
Sentence 2: ' f '' (x) (1 -x)T -2[2 -(T +1)y] y (x)= = <0 .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, the PAMP and in.ammatory signals are host based features which are undesirable because network­based malware detectors are generally more reliable, robust, and, most importantly, generic and scalable than host-/OS­based detectors.
Sentence 2: we use the variance of desti­nation IP addresses as a PAMP and the inverse of average inter-arrival session time as an in.ammatory signal (see [12] and references therein for this decision).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: disclosure of a resource which should have been deleted in the .rst place due to an older event and its corresponding obligation).
Sentence 2: we pro­pose to combine the two approaches such that only the fol­lowing obligations are enforced synchronously; (1) the obli­gations with access authorization 6 as the triggering event, and (2) the obligations that a.ect the status of the system (e.g.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The first statement is explicitly shown by the content of the voucher, and the second statement is implic- itly assumed to be true--Charlie will not create the voucher without verifying the relations of the keys.
Sentence 2: the voucher implicitly conveys the following important seman-tics: Charlie can convert any signature on some arbitrary message M, which is verified using (el, N), to a signature on M that is verified with (e, N).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: {0,1}m where, for every distribution X over {0,1}n with min-entropy = k, the output of F(X,s) is statistically E-close to the uniform distri­bution over {0,1}m when s is chosen uniformly at random, s .R {0,1}d .
Sentence 2: a (k,E)-extractor is nothing more than a function that ac­cepts n bits of input with min-entropy kand a dbit seed and outputs m bit long values that are nearly uniform.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As discussed above, if the termina­tion criterion is satis.ed in epoch e, the aggregation completes after epoch e+ 1.
Sentence 2: by property 2 and property 4 in Section 2, if m synopses are computed in parallel, the expected number of nodes which send a MAC varies in the range of (2.58 ×m) to (5.16 ×m).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, the system timer interrupt is not received by thekernelfor thedurationofthereboot,andhence theLinux jif.es software timer is suspended.
Sentence 2: system time lags behind wallclocktime.Inordertopreservethesemanticsof softwarethat relies on the correct time, we restore the system s time by read­ing the wall clock time from the hardware clock, which is always running(poweredby abattery) evenwhenthecomputeris turned off.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, since PHi+2,t is poly-time computable, if Di is distinguishable from Di+1,then Histi; Histi+1 is distin­guishable from Histi; SimHist(i+1,1,Histi), contradicting the strong minimality property for the 1-round setting, with respect to prover Pi' +1(Histi).
Sentence 2: each pair of neigh­boring hybrids must be statistically indistinguishable, and, since there are only polynomially many such pairs, we know that D0 Dt.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As, we represent each SNP with 3 bits, for a 0.5 million SNP pro.le, we require 1.5 million bits.
Sentence 2: we conducted experiments with 1.5 million bits and our results shows that it requires less than 8 minutes and 135MB network commu­nication to .nd similarity between two SNP pro.les of 0.5 million SNPs each (using our encoding scheme).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For e.ciency and simplicity reasons, slices are usually computed with the help of dependence graphs [33].
Sentence 2: the set of statements/expressions on which statement y the slice criterion depends is called the backward slice of y [35]: BS(y)= {x|x -y} given a program P and a set S of secret vari­ables, we can say: ..o .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Regarding .nal outputs, T - R = , , n (ti - .i + fi(0, Y )) + fX (X) + fY (Y ) = n (.i + i=1 i=1 fi(xi, Y ) - fi(0, Y ) - .i + fi(0, Y )) + fX (X) + fY (Y ) = , n fi(xi, Y )+fX (X)+fY (Y ) = f (X, Y ).
Sentence 2: r .R Zm i=1 and T = R + f(X, Y ) and the protocol is correct.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4) of an R-tree in the plaintext domain, the search algorithm in Maple exactly follows the same search rules in an R-tree not only at every non-leaf node but also at every leaf node, which enables Maple to achieve the same search complexity as an R-tree with regard to the number of data records.
Sentence 2: our scheme is able to achieve a better e.ciency (faster-than-linear complexity regarding to the number of data records)compared to the basic solution.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We observe that rootkit writers are mo­tivated to make persistent modi.cations to the CFG, e.g., to add illicit functionality that performs keystroke logging or packet analysis, or to hide such functionality when it is implemented in user-level objects.
Sentence 2: rather than validating every branch as it happens, we periodically ex­amine the kernel s state and validate it as a whole.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, our network backend driver handles Tx requests from guest domains with a tasklet and the MTD backed driver handles I/O requests in a kernel thread per guest domain.
Sentence 2: to delay a request for a virtual device whose back­end driver is implemented with tasklet, softirq, or workqueue, the virtual I/O scheduler cancels to preceed the current request and inserts the request again into a tasklet list, a softirq list, or work­queue after certain period of time using timer event, mod_timer().
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: By contrast, in the Gamboa approach the raw event stream is segmented into strokes and features are computed directly over each stroke; classi.cation is then done at the stroke level, and the classi.cation of a sequence of consec­utive strokes is determined according to the average classi­.cation of the constituent strokes.
Sentence 2: in a sense, both approaches can be viewed as making a single authentica­tion decision based on a sequence of individual actions.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To see this, suppose T is an independent set.
Sentence 2: let euv be a protected entity with the associated context C(euv)= {u,v}, where (u,v)is some edge in G. Since, T is an independent set it cannot contain both u and v. C(euv)nT is one of {u}or {v}or Ø.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It works as follows: for each sequence of k consecutive characters in a document, we compute its hash value and store it in an array.
Sentence 2: the .rst item in the array is a hash of c1c2 ...ck, the second item is a hash of c2c3 ...ck+1, etc., where ci are the characters in the docu­ment, for i =1,...,n. We then slide a window of size w through the array of hashes and select the minimum hash within each window.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: One study reports that SQL injection, cross-site scripting, and HTTP response splitting account for 52% of observed vulnerabilities in a large collec­tion of web sites [11]; another found that these vulnerabil­ity classes accounted for 80% of observed vulnerabilities [4].
Sentence 2: a successful defense against these attacks could make a signi.cant di.erence to web applications.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: (.a) {a}, authorized perms(r) .actvt perms * (a), authorized perms(r) .actvt perms * (a ' )}.
Sentence 2: (6) Equation 6 requires that all the permissions needed to ex­ecute the activities of Ar must be assigned to the role r. Ar contains only those activities that are allowed by assigning a user just to the role r. Further, given a .Ar none of the parents of a are contained in Ar,that is Ar contains only activities that are farther from the root.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We observe that the di.erence between m(V) and B(V) is subtle: m(V)focuses on the occurrence of a claim while the Bel(V) focuses on the occurrences of the supporting evi­dence for the claim V. In general, a longer path requires more evidence to support the claim.
Sentence 2: it is not nec­essary that the small value of m(V) will deduce the small value of Bel(V).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since we are dealing with hierarchies, we may suppose that the nodes in the entire hierarchy are ordered, and we can in­dex them in such a way that, given two values i and j,with i<j,then there may be a direct or indirect relationship from nodei to node nodej,but no relationship from nodej to node nodei.Therefore, we can extract the sub-ordering of the nodes in BorderUnAuth(ar)from the general ordering of the nodes in the hierarchy and use a speci.c indexing from 1to bua = |BorderUnAuth(ar)| when dealing only with the nodes in BorderUnAuth(ar).
Sentence 2: we can rewrite Formula  26 as follows: as follows: v UAR(ar) = 1 - P .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Forinstance,inFigure13 the sendEvent of the message with name "getCustomerPro­.le(id)" iscoveredby the "BankClerk" lifeline,whilethe receiveEvent of this message is covered by the "Cus­tomerMgmt" lifeline.
Sentence 2: we derive a candidate rolefromthe "BankClerk" lifeline.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Speci.cally, we found that 37% raised concerns over sharing speci.c posts with subsets of their friend networks or with allowing speci.c friends to view their pro.le infor­mation.
Sentence 2: while global privacy settings have helped users cope with the threat of strangers viewing content, our results indicate that they do not adequately address the in­sider threat.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Similarly, if Out = 1, she chooses the j maximizing yj, and the success probability is µ(1,[k]) -maxj µ(1, j).
Sentence 2: the success probability of p0 is max µ(0,[k]) -max µ(0, j), µ(1,[k]) -max µ(1, j) .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It is stated as follows: Given a set of features O and a classi.cation quality mea­sure P , determine the feature subset F * such that: P (F * )=max P (F ) F .O In general the search space for this type of problems is 2d ,where d is the total number of possible features.
Sentence 2: exhaustive search strategies can not be applied in this case.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Each character processed causes exactly one labeled transition and zero or more default transitions to be taken.
Sentence 2: let us suppose that, at a given point, a chain of k default transitions must be taken from a state s. Since default transitions are only directed towards states with smaller depth, state s must have depth = k. to get to state s, at least k labeled transitions (in excess to default transitions) must have been taken before.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Even though some companies, such as Eurekify, offer con­sulting and technical services on role management, such services are costly, and some companies consider their internal structure con.dential and are reluctant to reveal this information to a third party.
Sentence 2: we believe that effective role mining tools will pro­vide valuable help to role engineering and is complementary to the top-down approach of role engineering.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note T-51 s 3-try login rate (93%) and CCP s 1-try login rate (96%) are comparable, as are the con.rm success rates of T-51 3-try (82%) and CCP 1-try (83%).
Sentence 2: cGP users can successfully re-enter passwords, but may require more than one attempt.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While it is possible to write regular ex­pressions for this 67-character symbol set, the resulting al­gorithms are not very e.cient.
Sentence 2: we give up a little bit of expressivity and group the character set into four categories (lowercase, uppercase, numerals, and special characters, which we will denote, respectively, as a, A, n and s), and consider the input alphabet of our automata to consist of just these four symbols.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: e(1 + qrk)2l0+l1 q Meanwhile, if event AskH * 2 happens, algorithm B will be by * )1/y * able to solve the 3-QBDH instance by picking (e(g, g) a from the list H2list .
Sentence 2: we obtain e ' = 1 Pr[AskH2* ] qH2 1 eqH1 +(qH1 + qH2 )qd qre +2qd () =- - .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Interactions of the system with the authentication module are represented in the X­axis, the .rst interaction is a traditional authentication, i.e., through password without graphical representation.
Sentence 2: the system is able to widen its knowledge base, and, thus, aggregate the user actions, which re.ect Figure 4: System evolution according to the number of interactions its knowledge and abilities, re.ning the authentication pro­cess according to the number of interactions with the user.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The intuitive notion is that since the assignments are the only way to relate the sets of objects (e.g., subject types and permis­sions), they are required for each constraint con.ict.
Sentence 2: all the constraint con.icts can be identi.ed by the minimal cover assign­ments which we aim to use to reduce the complexity of reason­ing about constraint con.icts.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In fact, to the contrary, on any site where the users registered--to access a news site, say, or to gain access to personalized features of a shopping site--Tripleclack collected all the personal information entered and linked it to the suppos­edly anonymous cookies.
Sentence 2: tripleclack might have in its database a user s name, credit card numbers, and home address, a comprehensive list of the user s search terms, and records of purchases made and sites visited online.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The instan­tiations of the generic model di.er in the extent to which the adversary can obtain the leakage of long-term keys in a bounded amount or obtain continuous leakage such that a protocol execution may reveal a small amount of leakage each time, and still expect security.
Sentence 2: we begin by presenting the after-the-fact leakage eCK model ((·)AFL-eCK model), where leakage is modelled using the output of a tuple leakage function f such that f = (f1, f2, .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, since the TPM does not check the nonce given to the TPMIncrementCounter opera­tion, there is nothing actually stopping a client device, in collusion with the host, from incrementing a virtual counter which has not been created or which has already been destroyed (thus generat­ing a new increment certi.cate).
Sentence 2: the usefulness of the create and destroy functions are limited when using the log-based scheme (unless we can assume that the client devices are trusted and never misbehave).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Furthermore, a kernel-mode solution, implemented as a filter driver, can in principle be placed 'below' the kernel-mode component of an AV program.
Sentence 2: coordination with the AV is made almost trivial, since the DMS tagging / untagging operations are done transparently below the level of the AV, and we do not depend on the AV program's exclusion mechanism to exclude our specific DMS.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Botmasters may indeed send com­mands at a given time to all zombies to instruct them to start scanning (or attacking) one or several IP subnets, which of course will create coordinated attack events on speci.c sen­sors.
Sentence 2: it seems important to look at relationships that may exist between attack events and the sensors they have been observed on.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The results illustrate the profound im­pact that throttling the worm can have on the system for a .xed number of patch servers throttling is of limited value, but in a P2P system throttling gains are magni.ed enor­mously.
Sentence 2: if we use the patch provider s P servers as seed servers for distributed patch delivery in a P2P system, we can truly achieve outstanding performance we wipe out the infection exponentially fast!
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The empty set is not added as a candidate.
Sentence 2: the candidate attribute user sets for the Com­ponent 1 Software Developer role (C1SD) can be expressed as: cau C1SD = {{(performsJob:software),(assignedTo: Blue), (hasExpertiseIn:java)}; {(performsJob: software), (hasExpertiseIn:financial functions), (assignedTo:Blue)}}.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: There is no particularly good way to collect this information programmatically, due to the privacy implications of an untrusted third-party application being able to read (e.ectively) system privacy settings.
Sentence 2: we took a di.erent approach: since all the past decisions on location access can be reviewed through the settings screen, and every iPhone ships with the ability to take screenshots,   Figure 2: Participant 113 uploaded this series of overlapping screenshots, which taken together show the participant s location privacy decisions.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Semantics: In addition to the variables in Var,wecon­sider variables .H1 ,..., .Hn .Variable .Hi records the queries to the hash function Hi and can not be accessed by the adversary.
Sentence 2: we consider states that assign bit­strings to the variables in Var and lists of pairs of bit-strings to .Hi .A state associates a value in {0, 1} * to each vari­able in Var and a list of pairs of values to .H .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It should be noted though that it is not possible to change the contents of 6http://xmpp.org, last accessed: 1st Oct. 2014 such an authentication message as it gets delivered directly from the service provider s infrastructure without possibili­ties for interception or modi.cation.
Sentence 2: such a sys­tem is pretty much unsuitable for commercial spammers and only useful as a disruption or annoyance.
Relationship: reasoning