sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We then selected, among the redirection chains in S whose domain was .agged explicitly as benign by the AV vendor, those redirection chains relative to domains that we consider reputable and legitimate.
Sentence 2: we picked both pop­ular websites, such as Google and Facebook, as well as less popular sites that appeared legitimate after careful man­ual inspection (e.g., local news sites).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, if TS = SU(s) and ES=SU(t), then s<t is a necessary condition for the implementation of ESS.
Sentence 2: the implementation of strategies that ensures TS at time s will guarantee the future ES level at time t. To make the implementation more reliable and convenient, multiple dynamic TSs can be computed at time s1, s2, ..., sk, with si< t for all i.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Under the de.nition of Qin Theorem 4, the maximum portion of time the system can afford to stay in con.guration C1 is b-1 * 2b[-µ1 +d] p1 = , (22) b-1 c-a + 2b[-µ1 +d] 2a[µN1 -d] which is reached by launching MTD to induce con.guration (GN1 ,ß,.).
Sentence 2: mTD is (µ1,··· ,µN1 ,p1 * )-powerful.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: One of the most interesting parts for EUDAT is the support for most of the required authentication protocols, bridging the protocols supported by upstream (or external) identity providers, translate and harmonise the user informa­tion.
Sentence 2: from EUDAT perspective, Unity: bridges OpenID and SAML based identity providers: SAML is used by the linguists, OpenID by the climate 2Note that we did not use the ECP pro.le of SAML to manage command line access as our external IdPs are not exclusively SAML-based and most of the ones that are do not support ECP.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: On the implementation side, we provided an in­depth overview of the way that ALDSP implements access control e.ciently.
Sentence 2: we discussed the implemen­tation techniques (mostly based on query rewrite rules) used to keep access control checking from interacting in unfortu­nate ways with view rewriting, query optimization, query plan caching, and data service result caching.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To provide security for these summaries, the Sign function pro­duces composite signatures sa,t [j], sb,t [j], each consisting of two elements/signatures.
Sentence 2: their .rst elements (sa,t [j][1] and sb,t [j][1]) integrate machine-, time-, and column-/row-depen­dent values r to mask the summaries as in DVS.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While such methods might intuitively seem to prove knowledge of the secret key, they do not suf­.ce to realize the abstract model of [11, 29] in which the attacker actually hands the challenger the secret keys.
Sentence 2: not only does this type of proof of possession not su.ce to prove secure the MS-Bo and MS-LOSSW schemes, but there are actually attacks against these schemes if such proofs of possession are used [9].
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 2.2 DLMS/COSEM Security Analysis The DLMS/COSEM standard does not specify detailed steps regarding the way to distribute MKs and the GKs in the data transport security specification.
Sentence 2: dLMS/COSEM does not guide the design of a comprehensive security features or procedures about how the MKs are to be created in the Central DCS, how the keys are to be shared with a COSEM server.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We believe that a clear understanding of the se­cure programming primitive s failure modes is es­sential for both e.cient debugging and for reducing the potential attack surface in the mechanisms built on it.
Sentence 2: di.erences in the logic that propagates er­ror conditions to higher layers of the API and the result­ing di.erence in error reporting can be very confusing to programmers and reduce their overall productivity, making development more expensive and less secure.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Additional (expensive) approaches, e.g., which incorporate billing information and manual investiga­tion, can then be applied to analyze the detection results to further con.rm the fraud activities.
Sentence 2: our method servesasa .rst-line defenseinalerting usersand cellular providers of emerging fraud activities and isolating likely fraud activities proactively and quickly from a large number of call records.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: One of the landmarks in the area remains the work of Rushby [21], which clari.ed earlier work of Haigh and Young [10].
Sentence 2: rushby provides an proof method using unwinding relations that may be used to show security of a system, and moreover proves that secure systems can be concretely constructed by using an ac­cess control discipline satisfying a simple syntactic condition.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This system uses the behaviour of the user to determine the trust the system has in the genuineness of that user.
Sentence 2: it will focus on input of the user via mouse and key­board to avoid the situation where an attacker avoids detection by restricting to one input device because the system only checks the other input device [1, 4, 11, 21].
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We assume that the APs have syn­chronized clocks (i.e., within a few hundreds of milliseconds, which can be achieved with e.g., the NTP [25]) and that they are able to compute public-key cryptographic operations.
Sentence 2: we assume that the APs from a same network oper­ator share a public/private group key pair (GK pub, GK priv), where GK pub is known by the users and the service provider, whereas GK priv is only known to the APs.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, as virtual machines and, more generally, vir­ tualization, is increasingly employed on laptops and desktop com­ puters, running in a virtual machine is not a give-away that the plat­ form is attempting to analyze a piece of malware.
Sentence 2: new forms of malware may paradoxically employ virtualization de­ tection less frequently.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, we next ob­serve that the operator spends more than usual time on the database (Td = 10+), we get P (I = true|Fd =10-,H = 8 -17,Td = 10+) = 37.80%.
Sentence 2: the unusual event (Td = 10+) signi.cantly increases the intrusion probabil­ity.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The set of outcomes O is the set of distributions over the belief states of the agents about the input and output values; that is, O = (~B × ~Bn) n. We wish to implement the social choice function W which always selects an outcome in which, for all agents i, Pr(b{(vi, gi(O)) = f(v)) = 1.
Sentence 2: in our desired outcome, each agent always computes the correct value of the function.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If such a certi.­cate exists, use its issuer from the local repository as the next step in the path building process instead of searching for the issuer in the pushed certi.cate chain from the server.
Sentence 2: if path checking fails, a second attempt should be made by letting the locally stored certi.cates to take precedence over those pushed by the peer.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Whileexplicit substitutionhasbeenpreviouslyusedin language implementations, we seem to be the .rst to adapt this device to track data .ow in a concurrent language.
Sentence 2: we use explicit substitution both to specify DFI (in De.nitions 3.3 and 3.4) andtoverifyit statically(inproofsof Theorems5.4and5.7).We defera more detailed discussiononthis techniqueto Section6.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When such a policyor policyset is evaluated, an obligation SHALL be passed up to the next level of evaluation (the enclosing or referencing policy, policy set or authorization decision) only if the effect of the policy orpolicyset beingevaluated matches thevalue of the Ful.llOn attribute of the obligation.
Sentence 2: an obligation will be returned by the PDP if it is associated with a policywhose decision contributes to the .nal decision made by the PDP, and the obligation s Ful.llOn attribute equals the .nal decision.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To do so, we evaluated with our metric the websites in the following four datasets of domains in the Alexa Top 10, 000: XSSed domains: This dataset contains 1,702 do­mains that have been exploited through cross-site script­ing in the past.
Sentence 2: an attacker injected malicious JavaScript on at least one page of each domain.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the presence of EPT however, we aim to avoid large memory transfers by en­abling the memory transfer as follows: The helper module allocates the guest-physical page frames for those virtual addresses that were present in Srd and sends this informa­tion to the hypervisor; The hypervisor then simply maps each such page to the host-physical page frame for the cor­responding virtual address in the production VM.
Sentence 2: this mechanism ensures that a user-level virtual ad­dress A of the out-grafted process in the security VM and theuser-level virtual addressA oftheprocessintheproduc­tion VM are ultimately mapped to the same host-physical page(as illustratedinFigure2).Afterthat,thehelperalso ensures that any system call from the out-grafted process will not be serviced in the security VM.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A somewhat better approach than committing to all the attribute values would be to employ range proofs, in particular the ones by Boudot [5], to show that the revealed attribute value is contained in the binary vector.
Sentence 2: if the vector looked as (alblc), where b is the representation of the attribute that shall be revealed and a and c are the representationsofthe remaining attributes, onewouldprovidea commitment to a and c and then prove (1) that these have the right binary length and (2) that (alblc) indeed is signed by the issuer (without revealing a or c of course).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While rza focuses on dis­rupting botnets that use DNS-based C&#38;C infrastructure, it can also assist in cases where botnets are more advanced and use domain name generation algorithms (DGA) or communi­cate using a peer-to-peer structure (P2P).
Sentence 2: rza provides the .rst few steps for remediating advanced C&#38;C infrastructure: (i) identifying DNS-based primary C&#38;C in­frastructure, if it exists; (ii) automatically identifying if the botnet has DGA or P2P capabilities; and (iii) automatically identifying the malware samples that exhibit these behav­iors to triage binaries for reverse engineering.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the TW case, the cor­responding EER of 38.2% means that only 182 out of the 295 arecorrectlyidenti.edas interesting ,while3707 ofthe remaining9705 messagesarealso.aggedas interesting ,al­beit incorrectly.
Sentence 2: while Aw fails to .ag 38.2% of all interesting messages as such, only one in twenty-one images that are identi.ed as interesting , actually are.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We .rst de.ne the relation has(U,R).
Sentence 2: definition 3. has(U,R) is true if: there is a role X and can-play(U,X) and hold(X,R'), and R' 2 R or  there is a delegation of the form delegate(x,U,R') = A and R' 2 R  has(U,R) is true if, by direct right or by delegation, user U has the right R, or a stronger right.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: First, we add to the community s understanding of the factors in.uencing IDS usability.
Sentence 2: while prior work has focused on the challenges associated with the monitoring and analysis phases of IDS work, suggesting that these phases are the most cognitively demanding, our results show that the de­ployment phase also involves challenges, and that these may be signi.cant enough to hinder the very adoption of an IDS within an organization.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: By keeping this issue in mind, it is, therefore, possi­ble to speci.cally craft the return address and indirect jump/call protection blocks to make sure they do not contain any convenient gadgets.
Sentence 2: we discuss the techniques we used in our prototype implementation and the number and type of gadgets that are left in the applications compiled by our tool in Section 5.5.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Iflength .lteringisnot enough ornotpossible,thenonecan .lter on the basis of causation : assuming no network con­gestion, a response is expected to be seen almost instantly afterthepacketthatcauseditwas receivedby thegateway.
Sentence 2: with su.ciently high probability, the attacker can expect to observe the response within a short time interval of the packet having a correct ESP trailer being sent.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A user will not reveal his/her private share to the PKG or RA since this share also serves as his/her private key in the identification protocol illustrated in Figure 4.
Sentence 2: a user should not collude with the PKG since doing so will enable the PKG to calculate the master secret s. Another advantage of the proposed infrastructure is that it provides convenience in key distribution.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Originator related roles address special characteristics and functionalities of an originator.
Sentence 2: the originator role (OR) abstracts a set of speci.c roles such as the resource owner (OW )who owns the resource; the resource administrator (AR)who is responsible to de.ne the access management policies for the resource; and the resource initial disseminator (ID)who triggers the initial resource dissemination process.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this paper, we propose a speci.cation-based intrusion detection framework to provide high visibility of the semantics of the data carried by the proprietary network protocols.
Sentence 2: we adapted Bro [7][8], a real-time network traffic analyzer, to integrate parsers of proprietary network protocols, such as DNP3, used in electrical power grids [3].
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Ubiquity of human and other genomes creates enor­mous opportunities and challenges.
Sentence 2: it promises to address one of the greatest societal challenges of our time: the unsustainable rise of health care costs, by ushering a new era of genome-enabled predictive, preventive, participatory, and person­alized medicine( P4 medicine).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If the certi.cate were to fail this test the message would be printed to indicate where the problem lies.
Sentence 2: the test framework also supports regular expression compar­ isons, for example: unlike($x509->sig_alg_name, /md5/i , Message digest MUST NOT be MD5 in new CA certs (2.2) ); the signature algorithm name must not match md5.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Initially, for instance, a clear distinction of security-relevant data was missing and, while TMI actions naturally supported STM functionality, we had to explore several options to .nd the support for .exible STM and TMI combinations that is present in the .nal semantics.
Sentence 2: the .nal semantics provides a a clear sep­aration between TMI and STM actions, which allows STM actions to be lifted to the TMI level and ensures correct be­havior when nesting TMI and STM actions, or several TMI actions, one within another.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As these cryptographic techniques mature, they may open up new possibilities for cloud computing security While in many cases more research is needed to make these cryptographic tools sufficiently practical for the cloud, we believe they present the best opportunity for a clear differentiator for cloud computing since these protocols can enable cloud users to benefit from one another s data in a controlled manner.
Sentence 2: even encrypted data can enable anomaly detection that is valuable from a business intelligence standpoint.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Infact,allthead­versary candecideiswhetherornot toincludethat tokenin his attack messages; this bounded form of in.uence ensures that the adversary cannot simply manipulate a single fea­ture to have a large impact on the detector s performance.
Sentence 2: it was not possible for a small number of emails controlled by the adversary to only use a small number of featuresinorder todamagethe.lter.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 5.2 IdemixEvidence Togenerate evidencefor a claim withtheidemix technology, we assumeit only contains expressions that are supportedintheimple­mentation extended with our proposals as described in Section 6.
Sentence 2: for idemix this means that a claim must not contain disjunctive expressions, while all other constructs are supported.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, the service dependency is indicated by the solid arrow between engines shown in Figure 1.
Sentence 2: the device engine provides basic plat­form resources, which include a user interface, debug connector, a radio transmitter and receiver, random number generator, the In­ternational Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI), and a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) interface.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.3 Protection of Non-Possession Sensitive Cre­dentials Recall that if C* is a non-possession sensitive credential for Alice, then we have the following scenario: Alice has C* .
Sentence 2: false and a policy PC* to control to whom she is willing to disclose the denial policy for C*.Alice will admit the fact that she does not possess C* only if Bob has satis.ed PC* .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Furthermore, since the maximum counter value is ßBF + a, counters will all be empty if the size of the virtual .ow = (ßBF + a)· n. (A tighter condition is if the virtual tra.c size = (maxj cj)* n - j cj, but this requires keeping track of the sum of all counters.)
Sentence 2: eARDet can simply reset all counters to zeros and avoid any update if the virtual tra.c size exceeds a certain threshold.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.7.1 Con.dentiality The time-to-compromise any component i in a classical monoculture by multiple, parallel attackers is the smallest of n samples of a random variable distributed according to f(t).
Sentence 2: this is the 1st order statistic, t(1), and, as is shown in the Appendix, E(T(1)) .a as n .8 where a is the leftmost value in the support of f.a is the largest value (supremum) for which f(t) = 0 for all t<a.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The following code (similar to the GNU C library (glibc-2.7) to_lower() function) is used to obtain the lower case value: [1] attributes = transl_table[kbd_data]; [2] lower_case = attributes->lower; In line 1, to get the address of attributes, a non-tainted pointer (transl_table) is combined with a tainted index, kbd_data and the pointer is dereferenced.
Sentence 2: atttributes is tainted.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: DecRs (n) - 1 These ideas can be extended to compute a linear regres­sion y = ß0 + ß1x and a sample correlation rxy.
Sentence 2: since the problem of estimating ß0, and ß1 can be obtained PPPP P from the sums: x, x 2 ,y, y 2, and xy as follows: PP P y · x - n · xy ß1 = PP ( x)2 - n · ( x2) and PP PP x · xy - yx 2 ß0 = P ( x)2 - n · x2 and P PP n · xy - xy rxy = pP PpP P n · x2 - ( x)2n · y2 - ( y)2 It may also be useful to compute maxima or minima.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Intuitively, P (p|r, i) measures how relevant (when i =1)or ir­relevant (when i =0)the purposep is with regards to the requestor r s tasks.
Sentence 2: whether r is supposed to claim the pur­pose p.For example, it may be rare for a research institute to claim the purpose emergent care .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: = p 3We do not wish to elaborate further on the nature of per­ The most important innovation in our model is that each permission is oriented (with respect to inheritance) and can be either up , down or neutral .
Sentence 2: p is the disjoint union of the sets P + , P - and P 0,where P + is the set of up permissions, P - is the set of down permissions and P 0 is the set of neutral permissions.4 Each permission p .P is available to some subset of roles in the hierarchy called the e.ective roles of p and denoted RE (p).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We generalize formal­izations in section 3.1.
Sentence 2: the model in (10) can be rewritten (for weighted undirected graph) as A = [ajk]n×n here, n = |V| where L (i) (i) (i) (i) (i) = w(v, v), v~ v. G.i.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It then com­putes the skewed value of the simple average of all sensor readings and commands the remaining compromised sensor node to report such skewed average as its readings.
Sentence 2: all but one compromised nodes distort the simple average of readings, while the remaining compromised node reports a value very close to such distorted average thus making such reading appear to the IF algorithm as a highly reliable reading.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We say that a policy (task,f) is monotonic if the term f is monotonic, i.e., if a userset X satis.es f, then any superset of X also satis.es f. A monotonic policy can be enforced either statically or dynamically, whereas a policy that is not monotonic cannot be enforced statically.
Sentence 2: to statically enforce a policy (task,f), one identi.es the set of all permissions that are needed to perform the task, and re­quires that any userset such that users in the set together possess all these permissions satis.es the term f. one de.nes sta­tic safety policies, each of which takes the form sp(P,f),where P = {p1,··· ,pn} is a set of permissions.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As a solution to this problem, we propose TrustDraw, which is a security service for the cloud that securely stores identi.ed critical data in a co-resident trusted VM and only temporarily inserts the critical data as long as it is required and not longer.
Sentence 2: the critical data is only in­serted into the VM s memory if certain previously de.ned in­tegrity conditions of the cloud user s VM could be met.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The mo­tivation is to provide inherently better coverage than blacklisting­based approaches (e.g., correctly predicting the status of new sites) while avoiding the client-side overhead and risk of approaches that analyzeWeb content on demand.
Sentence 2: we explore the use of statistical methods from ma­chine learning for classifying site reputation based on the relation­ship between URLs and the lexical and host-based features that characterize them.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While we discuss just three speci.c features for account match­ing, there are others that an attacker can exploit in a similar way.
Sentence 2: content may indirectly reveal further personal infor­mation that can help guide the matching process, such as Happy Birthday greetings from friends that reveal a person s birthday, even if she does note make the date itself publicly available.
Relationship: entailment