sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Research on methods of authenticating websites to users include security indica­tors [5, 19], secure bookmarks for known websites [9, 45, 47], and automated detection and blacklisting of known phishing sites [11].
Sentence 2: studies suggest that security indicators are ine.ective at preventing phishing attacks [10, 34]; and blacklisting of phishing sites has the issue of a high rate of false-positives and false-negatives [48].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The Chipcon CC2420 does have hardware support for the cryptographic primitives that allows for seamless op­eration with 802.15.4 devices that follow the speci.cation.
Sentence 2: as we detail in Section 3.2.3, they do not adhere to the interface outlined in the 802.15.4 speci.cation, so they do not support multiple keys well.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It can be ob­served that whenever the system was in a load management request state, the response state was observed next with the probability of 1.
Sentence 2: response also had multiple states depending on the size of the response which was used as a variable in de.ning the state s consisting of multiple s. Therefore, it can be concluded that the model exhibits a temporally deterministic behavior for the system under consideration.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For an ideal clock, the di.erence C(t2)-C(t1) between two time measurements at points t1 and t2 in true time would always be t2 - t1.
Sentence 2: due to physical properties (see Section 3.1), clocks based on crystal oscillators exhibit a certain o.set o.setC (t1, t2) = [C(t2) - C(t1)] - [t2 - t1] (1) when measuring such time intervals (positive if the clock is too fast and negative if the clock is too slow).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Under overload conditions, the original Snort imple­mentation misses a signi.cant number of packets, resulting to a considerably lower number of alerts, with many of the labeled attacks in our trace passing undetected.
Sentence 2: selective packet discarding signi.cantly improves the detec­tion accuracy of Snort under increased tra.c conditions, allowing it to detect most of the attacks that would have otherwise been missed.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The .rst approach is to give the users more management/control power, such as: allow­ing the users to assign and revoke permissions of apps af­ter the installation [8], enforcing usage control with user­de.ned policies [1], allowing the users to better control the access to their private data [15].
Sentence 2: this approach does not strive to help the users deal with permission-abuse before they decide to revoke some permissions.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our notion of robustness, however, is somewhat weaker than the standard notion: In our scheme it is possible for a corrupt server colluding with a corrupt user to modify the ciphertext element derived from the ci- phertext of the corrupt user during one stage of the mix process.
Sentence 2: it is not possible for the collud- ing parties to modify elements derived from honest users; nor is it possible to modify any element after learning any portion of the output of the mix network.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our decision to block individual scripts rather than block­ing the entire page when an XSS attack is detected means that, like the IE8 XSS .lter, our .lter can be used to dis­able poorly written frame busting scripts.
Sentence 2: because several techniques for disabling frame busting already exist, we recommend that sites replace their circumventable frame busting scripts with the X-Frame-Options HTTP response header [12], which was designed to help mitigate clickjack­ing.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: ·m = m, and, if ß ·n > m holds, then attacker A will never be able to obtain an authenticity rating that is higher than the rating of the correct peer.
Sentence 2: since we assume that n >> m, and, in particular ß · n > m, it is clear that the attacker will not succeed in getting his pairing accepted as genuine in our scheme.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We feel that there is reason to expect these policies and their enforcement, which have been extensively studied in database security, to be successfully combined into our approach, as the interactions between the DP and the DC does not have any substantial difference from those between clients and a database.
Sentence 2: it remains to be seen how effectively and ef.­ciently these techniques work under our framework, which is left as future research.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In these measurements, and somewhat counter-intuitively, we observe that the unweighted graph model results in best entropy (in all three categories: min, mean, and max) Further details are in the discussion section.
Sentence 2: we also observe that Figure 6: Average entropy for walk length of 10; all DBLP graphs (S. is single, G and R are geometrical reciprocal distri­butions of weights, W is weighted, and UW is unweighted, and numbers are to indicate which graph is used: 1-5 are original graphs whereas 11-15 are the dynamic graph model).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The embedded seal or watermark essentiallyadds noise on the original data, which has also been the topic of discus­sion in many works that consider privacy preserving data­mining[13, 10, 14, 3].
Sentence 2: these techniques typically donotworkdirectly onthe actualperturbeddata(like our technique),but attempttoreconstructthe originaldatadis­tribution using the known noise distribution that has been added onthedataset[1,17].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.2 GDOI Events In general, events map to actual messages and vice versa.
Sentence 2: since the central messages of the groupkey-pull exchange simply defer computation in order to resist forms of denial-of-service attacks [12] and the NPA does not cur­rently support reasoning about denial-of-service, we behave as if their information load were compounded with the outer messages of this exchange.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: proposed a functional encryption scheme based on stateless hardware tokens that are identical for all users [24].
Sentence 2: they rely on computationally intensive operations (fully homomorphic encryption schemes) as well as a powerful tamper proof token carrying out signi.cant computation (signature, non­interactive zero knowledge proofs (NIZK) and succinct non-interactive arguments (SNARGs) veri.cation).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As neither the auditor nor the service provider know tU , this still holds even if both collude.
Sentence 2: we note an important difference: while in [35] the chal­lenge (I , {(i, .i)}i.I ) is randomly sampled, challenges in Fortress are generated pseudo-randomly using the pseudo-random bit gen­erator g with a seed extracted with GetRandomness.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Recall that the traditional ideal Zero Knowledge func­tionality, FZK , allows a prover to convince a veri.er (whose identity is determined by the prover) of the correctness of a statement without revealing any additional information, and without allowing the veri.er to transfer the proof to another party.
Sentence 2: as discussed in the Introduction, any proof in the global ROM is inherently transferable: To transfer a proof to party C, the veri.er V simply lets C act as the veri.er, and in particular have C make all the ora­cle queries herself.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: {SR,LR} Furthermore, note that as per the de.nition of Strict Join (sec­tion 3.3 and table 2), the user may access some or all objects that are added after Join time.
Sentence 2: in the p-system, we will use the following speci.c interpretation of Strict and Liberal operations which effectively replaces some or all with all .
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This 1-3/k yielded memory lower bounds of O(n ) for estimating Fk, for k> 3, improving the previous memory bound of O(n 1-5/k)[AMS99].
Sentence 2: by using R´enyi di­ 1-2/k) vergences,they managed toprove a near-optimalO(n memoryboundfor one-pass Fk estimationfor all k> 2.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Hence, if we consider existing reports and a sample to be malicious if at least 30% of the employed AV scanners reported that the sample is malware, then about 50% of all cracks and keygens we collected would be infected with malware.
Sentence 2: fresh reports are based on more recent AV signatures and, as a result, also include more malware infections.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, the rDNS record for an IP address 64.12.116.6 corresponds to a domain name cache-mtc-aa02.proxy.aol.com, which suggests that the IP address is used as a cache proxy in the AOL net­work.
Sentence 2: only a fraction of PIP addresses have rDNS records (62.6% in our experiment), and only 1.49% of them contain useful keywords for PIP identi.cation (Table 1).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Architecture-Driven Smart Grid Security Management Markus Kammerstetter Institute of Computer Aided Automation Automation Systems Group International Secure Systems Lab Vienna University of Technology mk @ iseclab.org  Lucie Langer Safety and Security Department Austrian Institute of Technology lucie.langer @ ait.ac.at Wolfgang Kastner Institute of Computer Aided Automation Automation Systems Group Vienna University of Technology k @ auto.tuwien.ac.at Florian Skopik Safety and Security Department Austrian Institute of Technology .orian.skopik @ ait.ac.at ABSTRACT The introduction of smart grids goes along with an extensive use of ICT technologies in order to support the integration of renewable energy sources.
Sentence 2: the use of ICT tech­nologies bears risks in terms of cyber security attacks which could negatively a.ect the electrical power grid.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Apache with CGI pro­cesses does provide some isolation, but at a signi.cant cost when compared to Mod-Apache, since each request is handled in a forked process.
Sentence 2: at least in its default con.guration, Apache does not run CGI processes in a chroot jail, so if the CGI is exploitable, any vulnerabilities exploitable by a UNIX user on the system are accessible.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: There are a number of techniques that could be considered by smartphone operat­ing system designers: User control on private data access: As in Windows Phone 7, involving user action on each data access helps to mitigate the impact of colluding applications (and more generally, malicious applications).
Sentence 2: this also limits applica­tions capabilities; for example, in such an environment, it is impossible for third-party developers to create applications that perform automated backups of private data.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: How­ever, the chief drawback of this scheme is that it leads to ciphertext whose size expands linearly with the number of re-encryptions.
Sentence 2: we would like to stress that this is the state-of-the-art method as far as unidirectional schemes are concerned, and creating a multi-use scheme without lin­ear expansion of ciphertext for unidirectional schemes is an open problem.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However,here,theuserassignedtoSeniorSecurityAdmin cannotassumetheroleofthejuniorrolesSecurityAdmin1 andSecurityAdmin2.Toremovethislimitation,wecanuse IAw-hierarchyinstead.
Sentence 2: thehierarchyinFigure2(b),ontheotherhand,isoftype Is.TheseniorroleisthePartTimeDoctorrole,whichhas twointervalsinwhichitcanbeenabled,(3pm,6pm)and (7am,10am).IfauseractivatesthePartTimeDoctorrole inthefrstinterval,accordingtotheIsrelation,heessen­tiallygetsalltheprivilegesofonlytheDayDoctorrole,as theNightDoctorroleisdisabledatthattime.Now,con­siderthesecondinterval.Weseethatitoverlapswiththe (a) (b) (d) (c)  Figure2:Hierarchyexamples enablingtimesofthetwojuniorroles.Hence,iftheuser activatesthePartTimeDoctorroleinthesecondinterval,he acquirestheprivilegesofonlytheNightDoctorroleinthe sub-interval(7am-9am)andthatofonlytheDayDoctorrole intheinterval(9am,10am).Thus,weseethatthetwodif­ferentsemanticsofaninheritancehierarchycanbeusedto achievediferentneeds.Again,aparttimedoctorcannot workasaDayDoctororaNightDoctor,althoughhecan acquiredthepermissions.ifauserisalsotobe allowedtousethejuniorroles,wecanuseIAw-hierarchy instead.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: From a safe sequence, one can de.ne x as y and s as any encoding which satis.es s(Fi(y)) = zi, for all unmarked Fi.This cor­respondence preserves probabilities.
Sentence 2: it does not completely cover the sample space {s, x} since executions such that Fi(x)= Fj (x), for some indices i, j, such that Fi and Fj are not identical are omitted.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It may be practical to adapt this approach to detect rootkits on smart phones, because an increasing number vendors are beginning to deployTPMs on their products (this chip is called the mobile trust module, or MTM) [24].
Sentence 2: now that the MTM is beginning to be de­ ployed on commercial smart phones, using the TPM detection ap­proachisapossibility.threekeychallenges mustbeover­comein orderto implementintegrityveri.cationforsmart phones; the .rst two challenges discussed below also apply to integrity ver­i.cation on desktop computers.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Based on the results of the preceding sections, we challenge the claim that h is a keyed hash function and, as part of this argument, the claim that h is a one-way function: A basic characteristic of any hash function is that it compresses a message of arbitrary length into a .xed length digest.
Sentence 2: the Dusart-Traor´e primitive is speci.ed as a mapping of .xed length inputs onto .xed length outputs, namely Z816 Z816 Ñ Z816 22 2 It furthermore requires that one of the Z82 16 inputs has high entropy as it is used as secret key.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It means that when the user is not highly visible , his/her information is most likely buried in the massive amount of online information and becomes in­visible.
Sentence 2: consider the fact that only a small portion of the general population have disclosed their information  2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0 1234 5678 9 1011121314151617181920 # of positive results (a) Number of positive results in each successful attack.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Both sys­tems aim to protect user (patient vs. voter) privacy while providing aggregated result of the private data (statistical function vs. count).
Sentence 2: the solutions for voting sys­tems cannot be easily applied to the telemetry systems be­cause of two major di.erences of the problems: (1) The  Table 1: Estimated overhead added by HICCUPS for performing a simple aggregation with 100 caregivers with 1000 records each.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Techniques to reduce linking across sessions, such as dis­abling cookies, client-side scripting, refresh tags, and caching; using privoxy or TorVM; and others can be applied, and are recommended as standard practice when using an anonymity service such as Tor, to limit the cases in which this is possi­ble.
Sentence 2: for some services such as pseudonymous use of online forums, this factor may be unavoidable.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Often, a particular statistic is designed that speci.­cally targets IPsweep, e.g., the number of different IP addresses for which packets were received in the last tseconds for some suitably small value of t. Once this is done, there is no surprise that the attacks can be detected fairly accurately, based on anomalies in this statistic.
Sentence 2: we do not encode any knowledge about IP­sweeps in our approach.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Typically, trusted computing cannot guarantee that soft­ware executed on a computer system is free of programming errors (vulnerabilities) that could be exploited [22].
Sentence 2: when the input of a process can be trusted (e.g., signed by a trusted party), 2The remote attestation is either challenged by SB1 or SB2, or both depending on application and trust requirements.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: FAF/ASL could, of course, be extended to some extent to accommodate the richer notion of categories that we advocate using.
Sentence 2: a richer form of ASL/FAF would be required to accommodate the generality of M e.g., to allow for hierarchies that are not restricted to partial orders, for assertions made by remote authorities, for an extended form of done that, for instance, admits proactive events and more expressive forms of event descriptions, for a generalized interpretation of can , etc.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Both of our address discovery mech­anisms are limited: they do not apply to cloud providers that block connections from internal addresses, e.g., Microsoft Azure.
Sentence 2: often internal communication has to be al­lowed, e.g., to reduce costs or to improve quality of service, and there is an increasing amount of tenant-to-tenant com­munication, [2, 28]; indeed, some popular cloud providers allow communication between internal hosts, e.g., Amazon AWS, Rackspace Cloud Servers.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: (In fact, such a method is often called a HIP for Human Interactive Proof rather than captcha, because the latter technically requires that all algorithms and data are publicly known.)
Sentence 2: golle [10] showed that the Asirra captcha is vulnerable to machine learning attacks; simply put, it is possible to design an algorithm that can identify cats and dogs with enough reliability that the captcha can be solved with probability 0.1, which is su.ciently often to render it ine.ective as a security mechanism.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: [10, 23], or even information about speci.c keystrokes on a keyboard [3, 28].
Sentence 2: this knowledge Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro.t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the .rst page.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Passwords that are more random (through composition policies or system generation) or contain more characters are harder for password crackers to guess [14].
Sentence 2: users have trouble remembering random or complex pass­words [7, 16] and resort to insecure workarounds, such as writing down the password or following predictable patterns to meet password requirements [13, 15, 24, 27, 3, 23].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A na¨ive approach is to provide isolation for window place­ment by de.ning a static mapping in which the IC applica­tions only access the IC display and the HU applications ac­cess the HU display and, additionally, the IC display within a reserved area.
Sentence 2: this approach lacks .exibility since only a prede.ned number of applications can be sup­ported, and sharing is restricted to pre-de.ned display areas.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In particular, when a message is received via the PKS network, the Respon­der Engine unwraps the PKI message embedded in the rawBytes .eld.
Sentence 2: when a response is ready to be sent over the PKS Network, the PKS responder builds up the PKSMessage by including the generated PKI response (e.g., the OCSP or SCVP re­sponse) in the message and routes it to the requesting PKS node.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our improved implementation evaluates about 500,000 non-linear gates per second (2µs per gate) on the same host (setting as described above) and about 350,000 non-linear gates per second (3µs per gate) over WLAN (setting as de­scribed in §4.1).
Sentence 2: [HEKM11] reported 96,000 non-linear gates per second (10µs per gate) over a LAN.3  In the following we show that the online time of our frame­work when evaluated on the same host as described above (i.e., assuming an ideal network) is up to 10 times faster than that of previous frameworks; we give a comparison for small circuits with FastGC [HEKM11] in §4.2.1 and §4.2.2 (using optimized circuit constructions), for medium size circuits with FastGC [HEKM11] and TASTY [HKS+10] in §4.2.3, and for large circuits with FastGC [HEKM11] and VMCrypt in §4.2.4.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: An ERBAC model can be used to specify not only sophisticated access requirements centrally for resources resident in several target systems, but also administrative data required to map those defined access requirements to the access control structures native to the target platforms.
Sentence 2: the ERBAC model (i.e., the RBAC implementation) supported in many commercial ESMS products has not taken full advantage of policy specification capabilities of RBAC.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Speci.cally, a malicious node in the CPS algorithm can sabotage the hash tree dis­semination process causing the veri.cation of legitimate nodes to fail.
Sentence 2: such an attack is much less severe than the certi.cate­revocation attack because (a) it is easily detectable (via the veri.­cation con.rmation functionality in the algorithm) and, once de­tected, countermeasures can then be taken to locate and revoke the malicious node; (b) the attacker can only disrupt one round of the algorithm per attack, with no lasting impact on the network, instead of being able to completely drain the physical battery reserves of a given node; (c) the attacker can only perform the attack from in­side the network using a compromised node instead of being able to freely perform the attack from an external device outside of the network.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We have not yet pursued parallelizing the presented applications inside HILTI, as that would involve a number of further aspects in terms of analysis structure and evaluation, exceeding the scope of this paper.
Sentence 2: we have veri.ed HILTI s thread-safety guarantees, as well as correct operation of the scheduler, by load­balancing DNS traf.c across varying numbers of hardware threads, each processing their input with the corresponding HILTI-based parser.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note that in an alternative approach this aggregation could be done by encrypting each of the values {EncRp (xi,j )} dis­tributed among caregivers C1, C2,..., Ck, where xi,j is a value known to Ci and j ranges from 1,...,ni the sample size in Ci.
Sentence 2: in the case of computing aggregates for medical data nationwide this could potentially involve transmitting millions of values to the aggregator A, instead of sending only one sub-aggregate ai per caregiver.
Relationship: contrasting