sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: According to the previous con.guration, there are 10, 000 sensor nodes in the network, and n = m = 100.
Sentence 2: for the random pairwise keys scheme, the probability of having a direct key be­tween two neighbor nodes is 0.01, while for the group-based RK scheme, the probability of having a direct key between two neigh­bor nodes is 0.15 as shown in Figure 5.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: According to [8], the two-hop distance is a good approximation of the carrier sensing range in ad hoc networks, and node activation scheduling usually requires all neighbors of a node within two hops to be silent when the node transmits.
Sentence 2: in our In construction, we assign an element Inij the value 1 only if the two nodes i and node j are within two-hop distance from each other.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A second lesson is that designing cryptographic hash func­tions is di.cult; we believe that this is the case because so far no clear design principles have crystallized; a second rea­son is that unkeyed primitives seem to be easier to attack than keyed primitives.
Sentence 2: the half-life of a cryptographic hash function is about 9 months; this is de.nitely shorter than the half-life of a block cipher or a stream cipher.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It can be intuitively argued that this false prediction rate will be the bound for the false positive for the attack detection accuracy, since this shows how well the model represents the data.
Sentence 2: it can be concluded that the fourth order  100 1 milliseconds ( 300ms) and the memory size of the model 90 0.9 for each collector was few kilobytes ( 20KB).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Figure 6 shows the results of this performance test by comparing the following three con.gurations: No DR BACA: This con.guration uses Android 4.0.4 system without the modi.cations by DR BACA;  DR BACA Policy A: In this con.guration, DR BACA is enabled and prevents all applications listed above from starting;  DR BACA Policy B: In this con.guration, DR BACA is enabled and allows the execution of all applications  Figure 5: READ SMS request time overhead listed above.
Sentence 2: this con.guration can be di­rectly compared to the con.guration without DR BACA, which by default allows the execution of all applica­ 110 READ SMS requests and removed the top and bottom 5 tions.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Poliies,asshowninFigure2,areinitiallyreadinfroma fle.Itispossibletoremoveoldpoliiesandaddnewones dynamially.Intheurrentimplementation,suhpoliy hangesonlyafetnewonnetions.InSetion5wewill disusshowthesehangesanpotentiallybemadetoafet existingonnetions,ifsuhfuntionalityisrequired.
Sentence 2: communiationbetweenthepoliydaemonandtheker­nelispossible,aswementionedearlier,usingthepoliy devie.Thedaemonreeiveseahrequest(seeFigure7) fromthekernelbyreadingthedevie.Therequestontains alltheinformationrelevanttothatonnetionasdesribed inSetion4.1.Proessingoftherequestisdonebythedae­monusingtheKeyNotelibrary,andadeisiontoaept ordenyitisreahed.Finallythedaemonwritesthereply baktothekernelandwaitsforthenextrequest.Whilethe informationreeivedinapartiularmessageisappliation­dependent(inourase,relevanttothedistributedfrewall), thedaemonitselfhasnoawarenessofthespeifapplia­tion.itanbeusedtoprovidepoliyresolutionser­viesformanydiferentappliations,literallywithoutany modifations.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In particular, note that the simulator knows how to equivocate even at the start of the decommitment phase (conditioned on the event that it previously extracted a valid trapdoor from the receiver), while the cheating sender can only equivocate after the re­ceiver reveals the trapdoor.
Sentence 2: we now require the com­mitter to commit to its openings of the commitments (from the commitment phase) before the receiver reveals the trap­door.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It does this without seeing the strings instead we have a test algorithm, which takes an encrypted query and a set of encrypted strings, and returns true if there is a match, without revealing any other in­formation.
Sentence 2: we can guarantee that, even given this encrypted query, the server will not learn the string be­ing queried for, or any other information besides which ci­phertexts were matches.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While a sophis­ticated approach for such alarm aggregation is possible, that is not Attack Attacks Attacks Description Name Present Detected Apache2 2 2 Dos attack on Apache web server Back 3 3 Dos attack on Apache web server IP Sweep 6 6 Probe to identify potential victims Mailbomb 3 3 Large volume of mail to a server Mscan 1 1 Attack tool Neptune 3 3 SYN-.ood attack Ping-of-Death 4 4 Over-sized ping packets Smurf 3 3 ICMP echo-reply .ood Queso 3 3 Stealthy probe to identify victim OS Satan 2 2 Attack tool Portsweep 13 13 Probing to identify exploitable servers Total 43 43 Figure 4: Attacks detected in 1999 Lincoln Labs IDS Evaluation Data the focus of this paper.
Sentence 2: we use a simple strategy that is ade­quate for this data: combine alarm reports that are spaced less than a few minutes apart.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For each function ext2 api in the ext2 API, the static analyzer then aggregates code pat­terns of all statements potentially reachable via a call to ext2 api.
Sentence 2: at the end of this step each ext2 API func­tion ext2 api is associated with a set of code patterns Code­Pats(ext2 api).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Moreover, in AR-BAC97, each user s role memberships are controlled com­pletely independently of other users role memberships, so we can perform user-role reachability analysis by tracking only tuples in UA that contain the user u0 mentioned in the reachability query.
Sentence 2: the answer to a user-role reachabil­ity query can be expressed in terms of a graph whose vertices (states) correspond to sets of non-administrative roles that u0 is a member of.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Notice that the di.erence between the two spaces is that in D0,i only i keys are chosen and used to encrypt values in the tree D made of totally random strings, while in D0,i+1 there are i + 1 such keys.
Sentence 2: in D0,i+1 there exists a node x and a key kx used to encrypt some values f1, .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Each element (i.e., CI(Tx)) represents the context information value captured in the instant Tx, such that x = 1, 2, 3,..., n, where T1 and Tn represent the inferior and superior time limits, respectively, necessary to measure the QoCI.
Sentence 2: cI represents the minimum set of values necessary to measure QoCI using the Alg algorithm.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: At the same time, they rely on the ampli.cation of vulnerabil­ities that seem insigni.cant from the perspective of a single browser, but can cause signi.cant damage when abused by a popular Web site.
Sentence 2: it seems harder to eliminate such a threat in similar terms to common implementation .aws, especially if this would require sacri.cing functionality that is of great value to Web designers.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As showninFigure2,for each viewfrom contents.x.com, we embedit within aniframefrompseudodomain name isolate.x.com.
Sentence 2: evenif a worm obtains control of contents.x.com in one view,it cannotbreak isolate.x.com to access contentsinside another view that also belongs to contents.x.com due to the same-origin policy.HTML5 alsoprovides a sandbox feature forpreventing the origin access, which canbe used tofurther strengthen theisolation between different views.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: On receiving the proof information, the challenger .rst conducts l MUL and 2l EXP operations to generate .. Then, 2 more EXP and 5 P airing operations are needed for the .nal veri.cation.
Sentence 2: as shown in Table 1, the total computation cost for the challenger in one veri.cation is l MUL+(2l + 2)EXP+5P airing.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To bootstrap its µTESLA key chain, the controller pre­loads every node with the commitment (i.e., the .rst key) of the key chain prior to the deployment of the network.
Sentence 2: the base station then discloses the keys in the key chain periodically in the order reverse to the generation of these keys.The use of µTESLA allows the key server to broad­cast authenticated packets (including keying materials and data messages) e.ciently.Since µTESLA uses delayed key disclosure, a node needs to bu.er a received message until it receives the µTESLA key used for authenticating this mes-sage.there is a one µTESLA interval latency for node revocation.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Ratherthanrelyingonthetopologialnotionsof"inside" and"outside",asisdonebyatraditionalfrewall,adis­tributedfrewallassignsertainrightstowhihevermahines owntheprivatekeysorrespondingtoertainpublikeys.
Sentence 2: therighttoonnettothehttpportonaompany's internalWebservermightbegrantedtothosemahineshav­ingaertifatenameoftheform*.goodfolks.org,rather thanthosemahinesthathappentobeonnetedtoanin­ternalwire.AlaptopdiretlyonnetedtotheInternethas thesamelevelofprotetionasdoesadesktopintheor­ganization'sfaility.Conversely,alaptoponnetedtothe orporatenetbyavisitorwouldnothavetheproperre­dentials,andhenewouldbedeniedaess,eventhoughit istopologially"inside."
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For arithmetic operations on polynomials a,b =GF(2m), deg(a) <m,deg(b) <m and congruent polynomials over '' GF(2) a,b', i.e.
Sentence 2: a=a mod M and b' =b mod M,the following properties can be used: ' ' a+ b=a+ b mod M (10) '' a*b=a*b mod M (11) all computations for a point multiplication in GF(2m) can be executed on congruent polynomials, whose degree may be greater or equal to m. Reduction of the results to polynomials in canonical form only needs to be done in a last step of the point multiplication.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: [1, 17], the compression method and original .le length .elds in an encrypted .le s main .le and central directory records are not authenticated, which means that an adversary can change these .elds without voiding the HMAC-SHA1 au­thentication tag attached to the .le.
Sentence 2: assum­ing that the new uncompressed .le length .eld is correct or that the extraction tool does not check that .eld, when Bob attempts to decrypt and decompress the modi.ed .le F-prime.zip, the MAC veri.cation will succeed and the user will not see any error.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Ba = 0, where B = P- I = H(HTH)-1HT - I. H should be an m × n full rank matrix to allow the estimation of x from z [31].
Sentence 2: without loss of generality, we further assume m = n.rank(H)= n.Since P = H(HTH)-1HT , P is a projection matrix of H.rank(P)=rank(H)= n, and n eigenvalues of P are 1 s and the remaining m - n eigenvalues of P are 0 s [20].
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since the latent semantic analysis process is not a temporal inference, the maximum probability for each time stage t can be obtained as follows: { }{} max p(Xt|It, z, w) · p(It|z, w)= maxYt · p(It|z, w) { } = maxYt · p(d1 t |z, w),..., Yt · p(dtn|z, w).
Sentence 2: tracking at each time stage t is achieved by maximiz­ing the following quantity for each i = [1,n], .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: can .nd an exclusive match to the tokens in S(F) during [t-.,t ' ].
Sentence 2: if we remove all tokens scheduled by S(Fi) during [t,t ' ] and replace them with tokens in S(F) on the period [t-.,t ' ], the number of tokens used by S(Fi)attime t ' -.willbe reduced while we still can .nd a matching for all packets in .ow fj arrived before and at t ' -..
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, we can, based on the presence of operator-speci.c (e.g., com.vzw.hss.myverizon, My Ver­izon Mobile ) and currency-speci.c (e.g., com.fdj.euro, Euro Millions ) package names, estimate the number of in­fected devices in certain regions like the US, Europe, and Japan.
Sentence 2: we can conjecture that the infection rate in USA is likely to be more than 0.02% based on the fact that 13 infected devices (as per McAfee malware dataset) have USA-speci.c packages.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Assume, towards a contradiction, that Fr is lo­cally testable.
Sentence 2: fr is k-testable, for some k> 0. kk ' k ' k Let P1 = a1 · a2 · a1 · a2 · a1 · a2 · a1 · a3 · 0, and P2 = 0 with a1,a2,a3 .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For a given mapping µ, the adversary supplied payload or spec­i.cation under µ, denoted µ/payload or µ/f, is identical to the original, except with any names from Vf replaced by names from VM.
Sentence 2: to check whether a given mapping µ maps Vf to the devices is correct, SABOT checks: M|= µ/f Read, The temporal logic formula f with literal names mapped by µ holds over the labeled transition system M. If these checks are satis.ed under a given µ, then SABOT instantiates the payload over Vf into a payload over VM.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.5 User-dependent model orders Signatures from di.erent users exhibit di.erent degrees of intra-variability: some users sign very consistently, while others alter their signature with each realisation.
Sentence 2: it can be expected that using a system-wide .xed order for the models will lead to sub-optimal veri.cation performance: the optimal number of Gaussian components will not be the same for all users.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This requires the veri.cation of not only the delegation credentials, but also the role credentials of inter­mediate delegators on the delegation chain for ensuring that the delegators have the required roles to make delegations.
Sentence 2: even if an entity is neither the requester nor the veri.er, it has to participate in the veri.cation process and prove its role membership.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Due to space limitations, mappings are not discussed in this paper.
Sentence 2: figure 4: A Detailed XACML Behavior Policy for Fig 2b Using the XACML behavior policy, an SP can specify, at a .ne-grained level, which s are expected from which s. the XACML behavior policy can be used as a benchmark for measuring the trustworthiness of an SR platform.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: assumption (n-dimensional decisional LWE modulo q, with discrete Gaussian noise with parameter a), where a = 1/O(n E · n log(q) · q).
Sentence 2: the scheme is secure based on either the quantum worst-case hardness of GapSVPO (n1.5+'), or the classical worst­case hardness of GapSVP2+').
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since there are about 8 · 103 possible entry nodes out of 105 total peers (servers and clients together), the collisions in EP ' are unlikely if every tuple has at least 3 entry nodes: 105 · 105 1.
Sentence 2: (8 · 103)3 3 entry nodes uniquely identify a user, though two nodes also do this for a large percent of users.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In gen­eral we call Rj a root node if during tra.c replay ClickMiner was not able to .nd any page and DOM element that would lead to the node s HTTP request qrj, and if qrj did not carry a Referer .eld.
Sentence 2: a node can be considered as a root if it was mined as an uncon.rmed interaction, and if no referrer is carried in the related HTTP request.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.2.2 n-Level Advertisement Such level-free dissemination, however, involves a heavy outlay for advertisement due to its too much redundancy.
Sentence 2: in some cases, company S probably wants to set a limit on the number of propagation levels, as a compromise between one-level and level- Ru=(Cv, { ADI | u} K - v ), (Cw, { ADI | u} K - w ), ... where Ru is the receipts of ADI collected by u. VC .rst checks free case.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We observe thatfor very smallpacket sizes,theGPU­assisted design exhibits a slightly worse performance compared to themulti-coreapproach alone.Themainreasonforthisisthatthe buffering overheadsfor very smallpackets aregreater thanthe cor­responding pattern matching costs, as shown in more detail in the following experiment.
Sentence 2: it is better in terms of perfor­manceto match very smallpackets ontheCPU,ratherthantrans­ferring them to theGPU.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: data datai, i =1..N.A packet Pi is composed of both datai and a cryptographic hash Hi+1 to verify the next packet.
Sentence 2: we use Hi+1 to denote the hash value of packet Pi+1.In gen­eral, Hash(M) is the hash value of message M,and Ek(M) is the encrypted value of message M with key k. each packet has format of Pi = datai||Hi+1, i =1..N. Each cryptographic hash Hi is calculated over the full packet i, not just the data portion, thereby establishing a chain of hashes, Hi = Hash(Pi)= Hash(datai||Hi+1), i - 1..N. Furthermore, the entire chain of hashes is veri.ed by signing the .rst hash H1 with the private key of the base station.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Only those shown to be statistically signi.cant should be used for classi.cation, and non-signi.cant ones should be ignored.
Sentence 2: some features col­lected by the account properties component in Section 4.3, includ­ing followers to friends ratio, link safety, account veri.cation and registration date, are excluded from the classi.er.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We will show that, however, the de-synchronization attack is still possible as an active adversary can block the .rst message (r1,M1,M2) from reaching the tag, and then forge a second message D i, to which ti message (r1,M1,M2) has not been blocked.
Sentence 2: the server has no knowledge on the updated tag secret after this de-synchronization attack and thus the server will not able to identify or authenticate the tag in the future sessions.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Thus, if Alice delegates R + d(R,3) to Beth, and Beth delegates R + d(R,1) to Carla, and Alice revokes her original R + d(R,3) delegation, then, at .rst glance, the delegation from Beth to Carla should also be revoked; and thus, not only Beth, but also Carla, loses the right to R. However, what really happens with that delegation also depends on whether Beth had rights to R + d(R,1) by other means than the delegation from Alice, say, because she had direct rights to it, or through delegation from somebody else as well.
Sentence 2: a chained delegation should only be revoked if it is solely dependent on the revoked delegation.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The individual signature (,i)(1i is verified using the equations VRi bbn) Ö(,) Ö( hQ , )(1 bb ) whereas the eVP eR tPP in i iii 0 multisignature (,SR) is verified using hQ tP , SeR Ö( TD ).
Sentence 2: b the proposed CL-SDVMS scheme has the constant verification time.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This assumption is made for the sake of realism, since even with c = 3, we can model Bob storing exabytes for Alice, while she and he exchange individual messages measured in megabytes.
Sentence 2: we analyze our solutions in terms of the constant c = logM N. We give practical solutions to the oblivious storage prob­lem that achieve an e.cient amortized number of I/Os ex­changed between Alice and Bob in order to perform put and get operations.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: How­ever, this also complicates OS handling of IPC and copy-on-write, and at the same time complicates the hardware since it must now support two modes of encryption.
Sentence 2: it is arguablybetter to identify and deal with the root cause of the problem: address is used as a fundamental component of memory management, and us­ing the address also asa basis for security intermingles security and memory management in undesirable ways.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The larger D is, the more time a sending unit has to spend to generate a valid signature.
Sentence 2: the generation time increases by a factor of D/2 on the average, since an adver­sary has to generate D/2 packets on the average, such that, for example, the last integer of the pretended signature is a multiple of D. the generation process canbe easily slowed down, whereas the veri.cation process increases only marginally for the new task to check the divisibility prior to the veri.cation of the signature.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Either way, Xen can always intercept the PTE update: a hypercall causes trap to Xen by de.nition; a modi.cation to a PTE incurs a page-fault since the pages used as guest page tables are always mapped with W bit cleared, meaning any attempt to write to the guest page tables causes a access-violation page-fault, trapping into Xen.
Sentence 2: by modifying the Xen s handler for PTE updates, the safe and transparent illusion of the extended KID .eld can be achieved.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Thus, if a x less than N is chosen randomly, the probability ofx being a prime number is approximately (N/log N)/N or 1/log N. If x is an n- bit number, then 1o~ = n*log2 = 0.69n.
Sentence 2: the ratio of primes arnong n-bit numbers is 1/0.69n, i.e.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the example, the component of m3 does not set the principal-delegation policy back to Student, which is the role requirement to invoke m7.
Sentence 2: bob,who was granted the Student role at the beginning, is now denied access to m7 for not having the role of Student.In this case, the principal delegation has, as a side effect, made the RBAC policy insuf.cient.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Conditional Attacking Probabilities of the example operating-system-based configurations )|(yxp .d .u .r .d 1 0.2 0.19 .u 0.08 1 0.02 .r 0.44 0.10 1  Based on the modeling of the conditional attacking probabilities, given a strategy profile , the utility of the attacker is , which represents the fraction of faulty replicas, and the utility of the defender is .
Sentence 2: vRDG is a two-player zero-sum game, in which the defender s objective to maximize the intrusion resilience through diversification so that the fraction of faulty replicas is minimized, while the attacker s objective is to maximize this faulty fraction.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: On an unpatched Windows XP machine with no servicepacks,thisisnotin itselfan attackbutis actuallya feature that Windows allows.
Sentence 2: the attacker does have a large amount of control over the control path of the CPU even before over.ow­ing the buffer, so it is not surprising that the vulnerable and in­vulnerable tests are indistinguishable in terms of magnitude.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Otherwise, if Ci = C* is in G, since we assume C* only appears in R s policy, we can move C* to the position right before R and the sequence is still safe.
Sentence 2: we as­sume Ck-1 = C*.Since G is a minimal sequence, before R is disclosed, a minimal solution for R s policy that contains C* must have been disclosed.
Relationship: reasoning