sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Instead, A will be inferred from other access control data structures.
Sentence 2: r2BAC the role-and-relation-based access control model of Wang and Li [21] introduces a set of roles R, a user-role relation UR .U ×R and a role-step relation SA .R ×S from which it is possible to derive the steps for which users are authorized.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To verify a signature, 3 exponentiations modulo n and 1 exponentiation modulo G.  4.10.4 Experimental Results A prototype of direct anonymous attestation has been implemented at IBM Research in Zurich in the JAVA pro­gramming language.
Sentence 2: all the parties, in particular also the TPM, were implemented in software.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Notably though, the notion that these two attacks (malware and a form of shoulder sur.ng) represent the full spectrum of threats that the system could face is for several reasons debatable.
Sentence 2: by assuming these two as the only threats, researchers in this area appear to disregard the following two attributes of a touch biometric­s system: 1) Users behavioral biometrics patterns exhibit a great deal of intra-user variability and overlap across a large population, implying that for certain types of users (see [30][23] for examples of biometric user categories), statistics extracted from a large population database could be used to create forgeries that signi.cantly increase error rates (e.g., see [8][26]).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: What is more, in favor of users convenience, current web applications maintain authentication state, usually in the form of HTTP cookies, for each established session, which can be destroyed only if the user is explicitly logged o. or decides to erase the browser cache.
Sentence 2: like the user is not prompted for his password for every HTTP re­ quest the browser makes when rendering a site, he won t be interrupted when a service he is already logged in is in­ volved as a vouching party in SAuth.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It is challenging for tenants, however, to .nd out what security mechanisms cloud providers have in place [91].
Sentence 2: platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) clouds, such as Google App Engine [36] or OpenShift [62], hide internal deployment de­tails [18], giving tenants no visibility into the PaaS platform on which to anchor their trust.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We show that such an energy attack can be implemented by embedding an ultra-small hardware Trojan trigger to the integrated circuit (IC) of the system, which hides in the circuit and results in huge energy increase on the device.
Sentence 2: we for the .rst time develop and demonstrate two types of hardware energy attacks by manip­ulating the input vectors and biasing the power supply, re­spectively.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For instance, RegExes are used for repre­senting programming language tokens in compilers or con­straint formulation for DNA multiple sequence alignment.
Sentence 2: nIDPSs Bro [1] and Snort [2] and Linux Ap­plication Level Packet Classi.er (L7 .lter) [20] use RegExes to represent attack signatures or packet classi.ers.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Basically, we mon­itor the inbound SMTP tra.c .rst, then apply the rule of packet symmetry for detecting the spam laundry path inside the customer network.
Sentence 2: dBSpam focuses on the clock-wise reply packet .ow as shown in Figure 1, in­stead of the counter-clock-wise command packet .ow, for connection correlation detection.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The strict path linking rules forbid the presence of null We now prove that if Linki is added to Pathi after sat­cross links.
Sentence 2: two domains can interoperate only isfying all the above rules then the new path Pathi+1 = Pathi||Linki does not violate the strict path property and principles of security and autonomy.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: With ubiquitous computing, intelligence will be embedded in environmental and daily life items so as to support a variety of applications based on person-to-person, person-to-machine, machine-to-person, and machine-to-machine interactions.
Sentence 2: ioT in e-health applications are the edge component of a fully connected clinical system, where patients individually carry their Body Area Networks (BANs).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Integrity pro­tection, such as a MAC, is required to allow use of short values of the done pre.x (de.ned below) with­out leaving ambiguity as to whether the secret has been properly recovered, and to ensure that A can­not attack the system by creating shares which appear to recover di.erent secrets depending on how B satis­.es the policy.
Sentence 2: the integrity protection must ensure that A cannot .nd two secrets s1 and s2 which both provide valid decryptions of a ciphertext.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note, in addition, that by the obliviousness de.nition in the OS model, it does not matter how many accesses Alice makes to the solution, B(N), provided that her number of accesses are not self-revealing of her data items themselves.2  5.
Sentence 2: mISS-TOLERANCE An important functionality that is lacking from the square­root solution is that it does not allow for accesses to items that are not in the set S. it is a miss-intolerant OS solution.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Application-level privilege di~ers from other kinds of priv- ilege in that (a) it is not part of the environment but is cre- ated specifically to defend an application (b) it uses cryp-tographic techniques (which will be described later) (c) it does not subsume any of the other kinds of privilege and it is not not subsumed by any of them.
Sentence 2: gaining domain administrator ('~root") privilege does not guaran-tee application-level privilege; this will be explained shortly.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A major consideration is the performance of our system; while our implementation serves as a proof of concept, none of our code was written with performance in mind, so there is much room for speedup.
Sentence 2: we assume a signi.cant re­duction in overhead could be achieved by a sparse labeling semantics similar to Austin and Flanagan [3], whose prelim­ inary experiments suggest a 50% overhead reduction.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Although this new de.nition is not as strong as the eCK security de.nition [12], we main­tain that a reductionist security proof that a protocol sat­is.es De.nition 2 can provide meaningful practical assur­ances.
Sentence 2: de.nition 2 captures all elements of the Canetti-Krawczyk de.nition [7], which has been accepted as a strong de.nition (see [8]).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Moreover, in a world of self-interested mix administrators, it is not clear that lengthening the mix chain, the typical defense against outright compromises, will be e.ective.
Sentence 2: without some means of discouraging mix administrators from selling input-to-output message correspondences, it is conceivable that entire mix chains could be bought out or otherwise coerced.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Whereas WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy protocol) and WPA 1.0 (Wi-Fi Protected Access) [1] use a single shared secret key, DRKH utilizes the full key space (four keys) allowed by the 802.11b standard [3].
Sentence 2: each two communicating nodes share a secret list of four static keys.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Only requestors who possess the correct asymmetric decryption keys (which correspond to role identi.ers assigned by their home organisations) would be able to recover the symmet­ric keys and access the resources.
Sentence 2: our access control approach can be deployed without binding to any particular PEP and PDP, and it does not rely on SAML­style access control techniques.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Below we show that an attacker who posts a malicious link on Yelp can bypass an important mechanism Facebook uses to authenticate 3rd-party iOS apps.
Sentence 2: when app A invokes the Facebook app through schemes such as fbauth:// , the Facebook app sends the app ID specified by app A and its bundle ID retrieved from the OS to the Facebook server for authentication.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: MDSA is a system and method for managing and analyzing security and information assurance requirements in reusable models.
Sentence 2: mDSA (mostly) automates the verification of the traceable correspondence between the functional models, the security models, and the requirements models, whereby the correspondence indicates that compliance / security / accreditation requirements defined in the requirement model match with security objectives implemented by controls defined by the security implementation model (i.e.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our design is still preliminary but, even with a modest set of primitive operations, it is already possible to capture many com­mon basic programming idioms.
Sentence 2: our core language supports: Queries that use linear arithmetic; SQL-like operations such asjoins of tables and selecting rows satisfying an arbitrary predicate; functional programming idioms like map and fold; and aggregation such as sums, max, and min of collections.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note that this problem is actually a more generalized form of the problem in the stored-balance of.ine payment system described earlier, except that the directions are reversed.
Sentence 2: here, the user is storing his data on a third-party machine, instead of the other way around (i.e., a third-party such as the credit issuer or merchant storing data on the user s device).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This can be easily .xed by having the client send a (shared) MAC together with his shares.
Sentence 2: now the client picks a key k, computes a MAC t = Tagk(x) and secret shares the MAC between the server and the worker, who now securely compute the function: g ( (x1, t1, k1, r1), (x2, t2, k2, r2, y) ) , := f(x, y) + r, if Verk(t, x) = 1 abort, else Unfortunately this requires that the MAC is veri.ed by the secure computation protocol, and this will increase the cir­cuit size signi.cantly.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This is likely because KHTs are bounded by system settings such as the keyboard typematic delay, a parameter that de.nes the amount of time that elapses before key strokes begin to repeat [21].
Sentence 2: if a user holds a key X for an interval equal to the typematic delay, the next X which appears on the screen is associated with a distinct key press event.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our principle .nding is that ARBAC97, with proper generalization, is suitable in large measure to address user attribute assignment adminis­tration.
Sentence 2: we generalize the user role assignment model (URA) which is part of ARBAC97 since role is just one type of user attribute, this generalization is straight for­ward yet e.cient.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In contrast, in M, mutual exclusivity constraints may be de.ned with respect to any number of categories.
Sentence 2: many other forms of constraint (beyond SoD/SoC) may be de­.ned in terms of M. For example, the constraint, .. pca(P, c),not pca(P, c.), can be used to express that a principal P cannot be assigned to a category c unless P is assigned to the category c ..a prerequisite constraint can be naturally de.ned in M. Cardinality constraints may also be de.ned.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: with a camera) the user while she inputs the secret (password or drawing).Forexample,a recentwork[7]hasshownthe feasibility of the smudge attack to the Android password pattern.
Sentence 2: usingacamerathattakes picturesofthe screenofthe smartphone,it is possibleto reconstructthe patterndrawnbythe useronthe touch screen,to unlockthephone.Thisisdonebyleveragingthelightre­.ex of the smudge left on the smartphone.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As can be seen from Table 2, the running time of unoptimized programs for arithmetic operations, matrix multiplication, and Ham­ming distance grows linearly with the number of multiplications that they use.
Sentence 2: performing multiplication of 5 × 5 matri­ces, computing 125-element Hamming distance, and performing 1250 arithmetic operations takes very similar amount of time for both LAN and WAN experiments.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Besides integrity measurement, trusted storage and reporting mechanisms, the TCG-MPRA requires the resources of different stakeholders to be strongly isolated and the communi­cations between different agents and services representing corre­sponding stakeholders to be controlled according to pre-agreed security policies.
Sentence 2: the TCG-MPRA generalizes the concept of a platform to mean a set of conventional TCG-enabled platforms, and calls them engines to differentiate them from the ensemble platform" [14].
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The next set of experiments focuses on evaluating the perfor­mance penalty introduced by FireDroid when applications interact with each other and access the device s resources through the An­droid API.
Sentence 2: we have created a test application that per­forms the following operations: HttpGet to simulate web brows­ing, BroadcastIntent to send an implicit intent, QueryContact to access the phone contact list, and GetLastLocation to ac­cess the location information provided by the device s GPS.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Second, we measure three important properties -average path length, clustering coef.cient, and the distribution of node degrees and do a comparison in terms of how they have changed after the perturbation.
Sentence 2: for the distribution of node degrees, we treat the degree distribution of the original graph and that of the anonymized graph as two discrete proba­bility distributions, and compute the Kullback-Leibler(KL) divergence between them.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: An interesting artifact of this feature is that the reply to a message need not come from its original recipient; the recipient may forward it to a third party, who may then click the link in the message, log in, and answer.
Sentence 2: a message sent through rOnl to an email account contains what is essentially a reply-to address encoded in its Reply Now button and rOnl does not check that the answer to a question comes from its orig­inal recipient.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: DRID,user = DID -DRID,user -The PKG then delivers the private key share corre­sponding to the pseudonym ID,namely DID,sem to the SEM.
Sentence 2: the User receives a unique private key share ,and this keyis usedbythe PKG to generate or DRID,user derive SEM private key shares every time a new pseudonym is required.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Given a long sequence of tweets (usually we check 60 or more if needed), the user is labeled as a human if we can obtain some evidence of original, intelligent, speci.c and human-like contents.
Sentence 2: a human user usually records what he is doing or how he feels about something on Twitter, as he uses Twitter as a micro-blogging tool to display himself and inter­ 44,431,923 tweets in the training set, and 3,918,172 tweets in thetest set.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We systematically explore the principles behind such architec­ture, and devise a number of enabling techniques.
Sentence 2: unlike all of the existing VMI techniques, which only extract and distinguish coarse-grained process information, we are the .rst to present a new and binary code analysis technique to extract and isolate even the .ne-grained thread information at VMM layer.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: MD5(data)) 13: end for 14: return S } Our detailed signature generation algorithm is presented in Al­gorithm 2.
Sentence 2: for all the pages whose virtual addresses have been resolved in CCK , we .rst search all the possible starting addresses for disassembly (because within one page there could be multiple function prologues) in each page by verifying the direct function call instruction and its prologue (line 5 -line 8).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This is not a trivial task, given the fact that the phone could be reset, re-.ashed with different operating system im­age, or the IMEI code can even be modi.ed via software.
Sentence 2: since every piece of current device information is stored in Flash memory, and the Flash memory is under the control of adver­saries, nothing can prevent them from modifying such information and defeat the kill switch mechanism.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We as­sume a sophisticated adversary with physical access to all ex­ternal interfaces of the SoC.
Sentence 2: the adversary can compromise all software running in the normal world such as applications and the mobile OS, and he can physically attach malicious peripherals such as DDR memory devices and even DMA-capable devices to the SoC as he has access to external interfaces of the SoC.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Notice that apart from being true and false, both com­petences and empowerments can also be unknown.
Sentence 2: if the subject does not posses the necessary creden­tials it may be more appropriate to say that it is unknown whether it is competent rather than adopting the Closed WorldAssumption(CWA)and automatically assuming that it is not.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When s is even and n = 2 s , the probability is always larger than 0.5.
Sentence 2: for a given s, a node is more likely than not to observe at least two consecutive occupied slots, if n, the number of occupied slots, at least satis.es Equation 2: n-1  ´` « s-n 3.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We are interested in a discrete time, t=0,1,2,..., susceptible­infected-removed (SIR) model, in which a node (or inter­changeably, vertex or individual) v .
Sentence 2: v is always in one of the three states: susceptible, infected,or removed.a removed node will not be infected any fur­ther, meaning that removed is an absorbing state; this is typical to epidemic spreading in computer systems.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: U, also arbitrarily, and starts an SA-experiment with the challenger where it issues |U||H| rate(·, ·) queries.
Sentence 2: in world b = 0, it rates all  users with H and, in world b = 1, it rates all users in U -{u}H ' H '' with and the user u with history .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The gRO model is di.erent, in that it only reduces the security guarantees to the level of the stand-alone security guarantees provided by the random oracle methodology to begin with.
Sentence 2: the level of reassurance provided by analysis in the gRO model with respect to universally com­posable security is no lower than the level of assurance pro­vided by analysis in the ROM for traditional, stand-alone security.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It remains true that for any userset X that satis.es a term f, |X|.
Sentence 2: c(f).C(f)gives an upperbound on the actual set of characteris­tic numbers of f. 3.3 The Term-Con.guration Satis.ability (TCSAT) Problem We have discussed the TSAT problem, which asks whether a term is satis.able at all.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: S can control the instance, but only in limited ways allowed by a well-de.ned operator API in P .
Sentence 2: a key element of the trusted platform cloud model is that the cloud provider C seals the instance to isolate it from tampering by S. S cannot log in as root and modify the software stack or con.guration, as would be allowed on a standard IaaS cloud system (e.g., using EC2 APIs).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Concepts, definitions and facts of multistage Diophantine equation system theory, which we use in building mathematic models of effective DPSs are considered in the first part of this work.
Sentence 2: the theorems about equal power knapsacks, components of which are the parametrical solution of Tarry-Ascot multistage Diophantine equation system or the numerical solution of such a system are formulated.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 5.3 Security Advisor After the domain expert knowledge has been captured in security patterns and re.ned by a local security administra­tor afterwards this knowledge can be utilized to generate the enforceable policy.
Sentence 2: we enable a web service developer to con.gure the underlying security module start­ing by choosing security goals and without having a deep knowledge about the underlying system.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While isolation (either strong or weak) is clearly a desirableproperty from a cloud, in practice, one may be satis.edwith something weaker.
Sentence 2: in some settings aguarantee that the adversary cannot co-locate with morethan a certain fraction of one s deployment may be enough.We formalize this property in Section 4.2 as the notion of co-location-resistance (CLR).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In distributed computing research, a similar problem with asyn­chronous protocols has recently been addressed by introducing a small trusted hardware assumption [21 23, 32 34].
Sentence 2: it was shown that, the resilience of asynchronous distributed comput­ing tasks such as reliable broadcast, Byzantine agreement, and state machine replication (SMR) can be improved using a small trusted hardware module at each party.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, if we de.ne = on the new reward function, we can calculate that q1 s4 =(reg, cf, Ø, 1, (s2,o1)), we have T (s3, mitigate)= s450 - 10 = 40, while q1 deny = 0.
Sentence 2: it is more and q allow 4 = 45.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our de.nition is more general and potentially more widely applicable than the accountability notions that have previously appeared in the security literature.
Sentence 2: we treat in a uni.ed manner scenarios in which accountabil­ity is enforced automatically and those in which enforcement must be mediated by an authority; similarly, our formalism includes scenarios in which the parties who are held account­able can remain anonymous and those in which they must be identi.ed by the authorities to whom they are accountable.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Later on, more general functions were considered and the security of these schemes was called Key Dependent Message (KDM) secu­rity [11].
Sentence 2: we say that a public-key encryption (PKE) scheme is KDM[F] secure (where F is a class of func­tions), if it is secure even against an adversary who is given Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro.t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the .rst page.
Relationship: entailment