sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To see why, note that if b = 0, then (g0 , h0 , g, h) is a DDH tuple, if b = 1, then (g1 , h1 , g, h) is a DDH tuple.
Sentence 2: a malicious sender distinguishing bit 0 from 1 can be transformed in DDH distinguisher.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, suppose that G is the loop data .ow graph ({L1, L2, L3}, :), such that L1 : L2 and L2 : L3, then we test during the compar­ison phase not only the connected component {L1, L2, L3}, but also {L1, L2}, {L2, L3}, and .nally each loop instance alone.
Sentence 2: we will be able to identify cryptographic func­tions used in combination with others.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The SNPs with highest ratios repre­sent those where LD correlations cause the most signi.cant decrease in the genomic privacy of family member k, and/or provide high utility.
Sentence 2: these SNPs are the .rst ones that should be included in , in order to have the small- XD est di.erence in privacy loss, thus still meeting k s privacy constraint and providing maximal utility increase.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The solution exploits a simple observation: manywebsites only need to store and/or forward users data without interpreting or processing the data.Forexample,an onlinealbum serviceonly needsto store photosonthe serverside.
Sentence 2: ifthealbumsite storesaphoto simply as a byte array, it is possible for users to store encrypted photos on the album site without affecting usability of the service.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The documenta­tion also con.rmed that protectionLevel=2 indicates the signature protection level whilst protectionLevel=3 indi­cates the signatureOrSystem protection level.
Sentence 2: whilst the log .le did not contain detailed information about labels or groupings, it did provide protection level informa­tion for 47 of the 51 manifest permissions which hadn t been granted.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This is because the temperature of the cold tag began to rise as soon as it was removed from the freezer, while the heightened min-entropy of the hot tag could have been caused either by the increase of temperature from the blow dryer or the buffeting of the air being blown at the tag by the blow dryer.
Sentence 2: as a follow up, we performed 3 additional tem­perature tests.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In addition, according to the Linux process memory layout, the most signi.cant address byte of the .bss section (where we store our random key) is limited in practice to 0x08 for regular ELF executables and 0xb* for shared libraries 1.
Sentence 2: it encodes either a variation of a load imme­diate into register instruction (e.g., mov $IMM, %reg), or an or instruction between two 8-bit operands.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In security proofs one then typically uses these q solutions to answer the queries of the adversary and then turn the adversary s forgery into a new solution to the problem.
Sentence 2: q-type assumptions are of­ten very close to assuming that the scheme itself is secure to start with and also, the size of the assumption (i.e., the value of q)is polynomial in the security parameter.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, even if these .elds are modulated without spatial precoding, malicious clients cannot estimate CSI through those non-beamformed .elds because APs in 802.11n/ac use all antennas with cyclic shifts to send those .elds.
Sentence 2: the estimated CSI through those .elds at receiver rxi is .1hi2 + .2hi2 + .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Simi­larly, apart from the possibility of containing a malicious en­tity, the medical unit honestly follows the protocols.
Sentence 2: we assume that the medical unit does not make malicious requests from the SPU.1 We consider the following models for the attacker: A curious party at the SPU (or a hacker who breaks into the SPU), who tries to infer the genomic sequence of a pa­tient from his stored genomic data.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The problem is that there is a basic set of concepts on cryptography (symmetric key and public key) and its uses for confidentiality, authentication, message integrity and non-repudiation that needs to be covered when studying the single computer case as well as in the networked case.
Sentence 2: there has to be a dependency between the two information security courses, in addition to the dependency with the Operating Systems course and the Internet Protocols course.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Finally, we found that many sites exhibiting privacy-violating .ows have built their own infrastructure, and do not use pre-packaged solutions like ClickTale, tynt, Tealium, or Beencounter.
Sentence 2: our study shows that popular Web 2.0 applications like mashups, aggregators, and sophisticated ad targeting are rife with di.erent kinds of privacy-violating .ows, and, hence, there is a pressing need to devise .exible, precise and e.cient defenses against them.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Under these assumptions, we can transform any con.dentiality adversary O (§3.2.1) into a successful adver­ sary against the encryption scheme, the group key agreement that derives the encryption key gki, or the deniable signature key exchange scheme that distributes the ephemeral signa­ture keys that are used to authenticate messages sent during the group key agreement.
Sentence 2: under the assumption that the above protocols are secure, our full scheme is secure against any con.dentiality adversary O.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The algorithm receives as input an ac­cess request R modelled as a triple (u,Objs,p), where the Objs component is generated by function proc obj() (cfr.
Sentence 2: section 4.1) by taking in input the graph representation G of the stream(s) on which the user requires to apply box p. in case R is a request for a Map, Filter, Bsort or Aggregate box, Objs consists of a single triple, whereas if the request is for Join, Resample or Union, Objs consists of two tuples denoting the protection object like representation of the operand streams.7 Then, the algorithm exploits the secure operators introduced in Section 3 to generate a set of Aurora expressions, if any, whose evaluation over G generates the authorized views resulting from the requested operations, that is, the stream resulting from the appli­cation of the requested box and from which unauthorized tuples and/or attributes have been pruned.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As a matter of fact, the data anomalies shown in all the examples that we have included in this paper cannot be eliminated automatically by traditional vertical decomposition methods.
Sentence 2: the solutions in the Template Dependency discussed in [9], Subset Dependency in [10], and the Sixth Normal Form (6NF) in [5] bear little relevance since these solutions all rely on decomposition methods.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Based on the process of abstract design, this includes: identifying the key factors to form the observation vector and determine the vector space; designing an appropriate answer set for de.n­ing the decision function; and identifying the actions which the security mechanism may take to produce the execution space for de.ning the enforcement function.
Sentence 2: the main steps of an implementation process for a DACA may include: 1. writing speci.cation (details of the targets, services, potential users, policies/requirements etc).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Furthermore, strategies could be designed where a media object were partitioned into multipleESs, each of themDRM-protected and stored in adi.erentserver;doing so, not evenhacking a server would be enough for accessing the protected data, as the set of all the servers containing data of a multime­dia object should be cracked.
Sentence 2: the privacy and security levels provided by this approach would be signi.cantly higher than for the privacy-enhancing videosurveillance systems proposed so far.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When tuning detectors settings, we also modify the combination strategy results to increase the number of reported anomalies.
Sentence 2: the num­ber anomalies contributed by each detectors increases after Before tuning After tuning (a) Contribution to the MAWILab output (b) Contribution to the MAWILab output (c) Breakdown regarding number of detectors (d) Breakdown regarding number of detectors    0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 False positive rate False positive rate (e) ROC curve (f) ROC curve Figure 6: Analysis of detectors contributions (6(a) and 6(b)), breakdown regarding the number of detectors that detected the anomalies reported by MAWILab (6(c) and 6(d)), and ROC curves (6(e) and 6(f)) before tuning (left column) and after tuning (right column) (unit is equal to 1000 alarms, e.g.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This is simply because a properly designed MAC policy limits the modi.cation of OS objects that a particular subject s depends on only to sub­jects that are trusted by s, and any other object is untrusted and needs to be .ltered on input.
Sentence 2: if we identify the set of subjects trusted by s, we can then derive the trusted and untrusted objects for s from the MAC policy.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Assuming that each value has the same chance to be taken by the variable7,we have p(.1)=0.5 and p(.2)= p(.3)=0.25.
Sentence 2: h(T |.1)= H({a, c}|.1)=1 bit, H(T |.2)= H({b}|.2)=0 bit, H(T |.3)= H({d}|.3)=0 bit, the conditional entropyof T becomes 0.5 bits.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: These numbers are essentially the same as Abe s blind signature; Brands blind signature at the heart of UP­rove requires essentially the same number of exponentiations for signature issue, and 4 exponentiations fewer for veri­.cation.
Sentence 2: we get comparable e.ciency to the most e.cient examples of protocols that either lack essential fea­tures (such as previously provable secure blind signatures) or provable security (such as UProve).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For devices which functions as client devices, reference [16] recommends to change their IP addresses periodically to prevent eavesdroppers and other information collectors from correlating the clients seemingly unrelated activities over an extended period of time.
Sentence 2: it is very difficult in practice for CAs to keep track of correct associations between IP addresses and all devices interfaces in a consistent and timely manner, not to mention issuing and revoking public key certificates for them.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As a re­sult, an adversary can only send one claim per user per type of malicious or sel.sh behavior.
Sentence 2: moreover, the existence of the latter guarantees that the number of adversaries in the peer-to-peer system is less than t. even if all the adversaries collude with each other, they cannot gener­ate t or more claims against an innocent user for the same reason.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: ih If the desired false alarm probability (D) is given then, the optimal value of threshold is defined by, T­ii T i ½ hopt sup®¦CT p1(1 p1) dD¾.
Sentence 2: h ¯ih " the probability of change-point detection is given as, hopt 1 ii T i 1 ¦CT p (1 p2) 2 i 0 If the lag parameter T grows then, the probability of change-point detection grows as well.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: From the second step we know that Cs and Cu encoded some value u and s on which the prover Uknows a CL signature by the issuer.
Sentence 2: s rs u ru h h c(0,t,0)  Cs = g and Cu = g for some rs and ru.Next, recall that by de.nition of c(·,·,·)the term g corresponds to t2lcnt c(0,t,0)CJ )ah.1 g .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example as indicated in the Figure 4, the item abcd has discriminator (d3, d1), while item efgh has discriminator (d0, d3) chunk d3 overlaps between them.
Sentence 2: if we program the discriminator value of abcd (both chunks d3, and d1) freely and thus use any bucket among the four choices it has, we will remain with only two bucket choices for the other item efgh as its discriminator chunk d3 will no longer be available to freely program (as it is already programmed by abcd).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, the basic execution may not work properly at allifthetarget address of anindirectjump orthenumber of loop iterations is incorrect(inconsistent) due to the pre­vious forced execution.
Sentence 2: we have to perform special handlingforloops andindirectjumpsinICE.Forindirect jumps, we need to determine whether the probing packets contributetothegeneration of thejump target.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We believe that the mitigation techniques and planning approaches depend on the intent and abilities of the attackers, and therefore a greater emphasis on the analysis from that angle is important.
Sentence 2: in this short paper, we are taking a more careful look at the typology of threat agents that can provide considerable insights into the likelihood and specific nature of an attack and can inform the planners about the best and pragmatic mitigation techniques.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: {1, 2, ..., m}, are counts of the number of pools of size i in the data sample.
Sentence 2: then we have xi ~ Binom(ni, Ci), and hence fi is a bi­nomial distribution that can be expressed in the following form: fi(xi | ni,Ci) (1) xi follows a family of binomial distributions indexed by parameters ni and Ci.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the same way that the RBAC model does, all these models do not work well in PCE because we cannot consider the existence of prede.ned roles and user-role association.
Sentence 2: pure context-aware access control -CAAC (i.e., do not use the role concept in the access control model, only context information) emerges as an alternative to access control based on role and user ID.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The primary policy source will be a server at the application vendor, and there will be mechanisms for some policy to be devolved to system owners.
Sentence 2: for example, a TC system used to enforce government- style protective markings for classified information may have a central policy that information may only move upwards, so that part of a 'confidential' file could be cut and pasted into a 'secret' file but not vice versa; there might be a fur- ther local policy component that would enable the author of a particular classified document to restrict it to a number of named individuals, or to prevent it from being forwarded, or to prevent it from being printed.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As cache lines are transmitted across the chip boundary, the seeds are increased by the corresponding line s sequence number.
Sentence 2: on the ith(i1)write to memory for a line L,the following steps are taken in sequence: seqnum;=seqnum;.l+systemtimer;(4) seed;=irtuaUUineaddress(L)+seqnum;;(5) Ciphertext=PUaintextE S (seed;)(6) where seqnuml=O.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Role Nurse { Object MyPrinter RDD (//PrinterRDD.xml) { Reaction { ... } } // end of MyPrinter object de.nition Operation Print { Action MyPrinter SessionMethod print } // end of operation } // end of Nurse Role Figure 3: Personalized role permissions The MyPrinter object refers to separate printer service instances for each role member.
Sentence 2: the binding of this object is maintained separately and independently for each Nurse role member.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A malicious TPM owner may delete the state B from NV-Space, making the PBBL believe that it has currently been installed and must go through initialization, storing the CL.serno from the CL on disk in NV-Space again and thus leaving the system vul­nerable to an improved version rollback attack.
Sentence 2: we store the CL serial number CL.serno together with a random number rnd created during PBBL initialization us­ing an NV-Space that is only writable by the PBBL itself.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: By visualizing small scale voicegraphs and characterizinglarge scale voicegraphs with classicgraph statistics, we .nd thatfraud numbersand victims often exhibit very strong correlation, which results in community structures in the voice call graph.
Sentence 2: the task of isolating fraud calls can be formulated as the problem of extracting dominant community structures from voice graphs.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: S of a non-empty set S that is one-to-one and onto, an unordered probability distribution pi can be arranged in a non-increasing probability order.
Sentence 2: let s be a permutation that maps the index of largest value to one, the index of the second largest value to two, and so on, until the index of the smallest value is mapped to n. ps-1(1) = ps-1(2) = ... = ps-1(n) (11) Using permutations guesswork is de.ned as follows.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: x ' ) = sup |g(.x10 (t)) - g(.x ' (t))| t.[0,T ] = sup Sg|.x0 (t) - . '
Sentence 2: (t)| x t.[0,T ] c = Sg = c. Sg the traces are at least c apart, and A2 is not a c­abstraction of A1.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If we examine the rate of Android OS releases, tab­ulated on Table 2, we see that there has been an Android release every 3 months on average with 4 permissions changing on aver­age (either added, removed or deprecated) with each release.
Sentence 2: one might conclude the tendency towards overdeclaration is be­cause permissions are constantly changing underneath the develop­ers.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.2 Obfuscation Methods For most genetic tests (e.g., genetic disease susceptibil­ity tests), it is su.cient (for the MC) to obtain the range that the end-result falls in.
Sentence 2: as a simple obfuscation method, we propose to provide the end-result of Test 2 to the MC as a range.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: From Table 1, even though the amount of code in Android has increased by over 40% from 2.2 to 4.0, there has re­mained roughly one permission check for every 2KLOC in all versions.
Sentence 2: the amount of checking that Android performs to ensure that applications have permissions to access sensitive resources has increase proportionally with the functionality in the OS.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our experience is that highly complex systems (including many which on paper are "provably secure") do not make their way into the real world often, and when they do, they are too frequently easily side-stepped by attackers for a num- ber of reasons (none of which may directly contradict the security claims of the system designers).
Sentence 2: for practical deployment, we favour the alternative of simple, lightweight approaches - because they are far more likely to be deployed, and even if not offering national-security level strength, they are of tremendous incremental wdue over the status quo.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Collecting personal information comprising status up­dates, photos and videos from users, storing this information for later use, and collating it for display to other users, does not re­quire the ability to examine that data it just requires copying and displaying it.
Sentence 2: fauxbook treats user information as indistin­guishable from opaque blobs, and theFauxbook code is restricted to store, manipulate, and merge such blobs without seeing their content.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Moreover, we can choose the length of p and N' randomly.
Sentence 2: we can choose the same length of p and q by choosing p whose length is half the length of N'.In this case, we may obtain q whose length is 1 bit longer than that of p with a probability of almost 50 %, but otherwise, we can typically obtain the same length of p and q.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As this technology continues to be adopted by more and more companies every year, malware and hacker attacks are potentially going to affect virtualized systems as they have been affecting physical systems in the past.
Sentence 2: the increasing growth of virtualization has created the need for a new generation of computer system defenses as well as computer forensic techniques to effectively defend these systems before or after they have been attacked.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Each in­volved entity (i.e., prover and veri.er), is modelled as a .nite state machine and each transition from one state to another requires the receipt of a message and the sending of a reply message.
Sentence 2: the veri.er is modelled as a state machine with three states and the prover is modelled as a state ma­chine with two states.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We highlighted in this paper that depending on the control­.ow semantics of the constrained tasks, situations may oc­cur at work.ow runtime that could lead to a disruption of the work.ow execution based on the current de.nitions of task-based entailment constraints.
Sentence 2: we evaluated the execution semantics of basic control-.ow patterns that were supported by all major BPM standards, such as BPEL, BPMN, EPC, XPDL or UML [33].
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: ENHANCEMENTS OF THE SCHEME 5.1 Time Stamp server The voting system closes at a precise time T. Hence, the votes of users who have not voted before T will not be taken into account for the computation of the tally.
Sentence 2: the users who have correctly voted before T and whose votes have been refused because of time reasons, must prove that their vote is valid.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, this attack does not work for MT-SRoT because anytampered datum within the target memory region will be ver­i.ed by one of the computing units at any time (unpredictable to adversary) before the end of veri.cation process.
Sentence 2: mT-SRoT provides the same integrity guarantee as provided by the in­stances ofT-SRoT in MT-SRoT.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Moreover, the two inequalities (lines 4 and 5) hold only when k = s or k = d, indicating that it is bene.cial to use the updated edge esd and its correspond­ing hosts hs and hd in leveraging some path s access level.
Sentence 2: we reduce the procedure for computing indirect ac­cess edges to two cases: (1) k = s and (2) k = d, as shown in Figure 3.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Otherwise, he either has to do this all the time, sending every message to the target device, or gets caught when he stops doing that.
Sentence 2: our strategy is to generate a challenge at a random moment: each time when a message to be pushed to an app, its server .ips a random coin, with a certain probability (which can be tuned by the developer) to set the challenge .eld, asking the app to come up with a response.
Relationship: reasoning