sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In addition to host-based features, we can also use lexical prop­erties of the URLs themselves as potentially strong features (again, we are not considering theWeb page content).
Sentence 2: if the URLs themselves look malicious, then a lexical feature set can help us automatically learn the tell-tale strings that characterize a malicious or benign URL.Forexample, malicious sites mayhavelegitimate­looking tokens appended to the sub-domain of the hostname, or have them embedded in the path of the URL for obfuscation pur­poses.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the rest of this work we assume that a recommendation is given for a speci.c condition (or a combination of condi­tions) and is computed from ratings submitted by patients.
Sentence 2: patient i who has seen physician j for condition k can submit a rating rijk on the scale 1 to n. We use P rjk = i rijk to denote the sum of all ratings for physician j on condition k and weight wjk to denote the number of pa­tients who contributed their ratings for physician j treating condition k. 2.3 Privacy Requirements In the vast majority of existing recommendation systems, data contributed by users is assumed to be public informa­tion.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The main reasons for such a popularity of smartphone usage are the overall improvement in performance, battery life, and decreasing price of the mobile Internet access over 3G ra­dio networks.
Sentence 2: the frequent Internet access is crucial for the success of application markets and a high Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro.t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the .rst page.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: CONCLUSIONS Many future Internet architectures are being designed to include new forms of name resolution, and the associated name resolution servers represent a powerful architectural component that can sup­port security.
Sentence 2: it is possible to deploy access control mechanisms at a name resolution service so as to regulate access to network address information, which could otherwise be used by an adversary to launch network attacks or could be queried to glean information useful for subverting privacy.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Each of our privacy notions is de.ned in two variants, re­.ecting that adversaries might of might not have a copy of the signing key.
Sentence 2: we also address security with full key exposure (FKE), which has been formalized for anony­mous schemes by Fischlin [17] (and is also considered in [2, 25], but did not .nd formal treatment in the de.nitions of con.dentiality in [16]).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.2 DerivingRoleEngineeringArtifactsfrom BPMNCollaboration Models Figure14 shows theintegrated meta-model for thederivation of role engineering artifacts from BPMN collaboration models.
Sentence 2: itindicates whatBPMNmodel elements are used tode­rive corresponding role engineering artifacts: We use participants and lanes to identify candidate roles.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: DEFINITIONAL APPROACH AND SOME INTRINSIC LIMITATIONS Roughly, to de.ne security with respect to key-dependent input attacks we modify the standard attack scenarios for the various primitives that we study, by allowing the at­tacker to query its oracles not only on explicit strings but also on functions of the secret key.
Sentence 2: where the orig­inal notion provided the attacker access to an oracle O(·), we addanoracle O'(·) that gets as input a description of a function g (e.g., in the form of a circuit that computes the function) and outputs O(g(s)) where s is the secret key of the construction in question.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Here, we use PlainText [41], a popular text-editing app, as an example to explain what can go wrong, though apps using Dropbox iOS SDK are all vulnerable.
Sentence 2: after the mobile user authorizes this account linking, the Dropbox app delivers to the PlainText app a scheme URL, which is in the following format: db­://1/connect?oauth_token&#38;oauth_token_secret&#38;uid.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To account for the fact that nodes that are online (at distance 1) may go of.ine permanently (e.g., due to an equipment failure), we expire the distances after one week.
Sentence 2: if a computer or .ash drive has not connected to any other node in the system in one week, the FlashPatch software resets its distance to 8.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Speci.cally, by randomizing the start address of the code segment, a single exploit packet would not be e.ective on all running instances of an application.
Sentence 2: two di.erent running instances would have a di.er­ent base address, so the addresses that an attacker needed to jump to in one instance would not be the same as the addresses in the other instance.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Suppose S = {s1,s2,s3,s4}, such that s1 < s2 <s4, s1 <s3 <s4 and s2 I s3,and C = {( =,s2,s3)}.
Sentence 2: then we may de.ne a plan p with the property that p(s2)= p(s3),in which case ((s1,s2,s3,s4),p) is not a solution to OWSP (since there is a restriction on the user that performs 7an execution schedule is a linear extension or topological sort of (S, ).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: RsM : IDU , T , E *]User creates an encrypted package, denoted E *, containing the requested role to activate (Role), the hash that provides proof- H * of-location, the user s password P wdU , and the two certi.cates signed previously by RoM.
Sentence 2: e * = EKU (Role, H * , P wdU , CertU , CertLD).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For so doing, we first scale the floating point data by locally tracking it and finding local minimum and maximum values of that ECG segment within a window ., that is centered on the data value.
Sentence 2: a  3.3 Watermark Extraction time-based sliding window over the data stream is employed for The extraction procedure involves almost exactly the same finding the local minimum and maximum values of that window.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: {0,1}and computes T1 := Ahmod N, T2 := g whe(g " )r mod N, K := Bf mod p. 2.
Sentence 2: the prover produces a signature of knowledge that T1 and T2 are commitments to the prover s private key and K was computed using the prover s secret f. the prover computes the signature of knowledge SPK{(f,v,e,w,r,ew,ee,er): f -ew Z =T1 eRSv h(mod N) .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Instead, we chose to place the burden of entropy estimations on D itself, which allows us to concentrate on the provable security of the refresh and next procedures.
Sentence 2: in our security de.nition we will not attempt to verify if D s claims are accurate (as we said, this ap­pears hopeless without some kind of heuristics), but will only require security when D is legitimate, as de.ned in (3).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In our case, the goal of veri.cation is to show that there is no way for the partitions to a.ect each other, directly or in­directly, except through the intended channel.
Sentence 2: there should be no way for a partition to access the mem­ory or register contents, by reading or writing, of the other partition, other than when the communication is realized by explicit usage of the intended channel, by both partitions in collaboration.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Figure 7 illustrates the results: with a increasing from 16 to 1024, the corresponding number of conditions that can be uniquely identi.ed drops from 201 to 1.
Sentence 2: except a peculiar condition DEMENTIA IN HEAD INJURY whose total reply Figure 7: Effectiveness of round up and round down payload has 13513 bytes with its condition overview of 11106 bytes (a huge deviation from the average case), all other conditions can no longer be determined from the usage statistics when the counter value is rounded to a multiple of 1024 bytes.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We leave it to the community to determine what function is most meaningful for use in medical recommendation sys­tems, but for the purposes of our realization, we propose to compute the scores as a combination of the average rating rjk/wjk and the number of patients treated wjk.
Sentence 2: set sjk = rjk/wjk + bjk,where rjk/wjk .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: That is, using a zero-knowledge proof, U convinces OV of (1) possessing a signature generated by OI on a statement containing attr and N, and (2) knowing the master secret key SU related to N. We stress that U does not reveal any other informa­tion to OV .
Sentence 2: u does not send OV the actual credential.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Moreover, the Trusted Com­puting Group (TCG)1 has published several speci.cations on various concepts of trusted infrastructures (see, e.g., [35, 34]).
Sentence 2: it de.nes attestation protocols that allow a platform to provide evidence of its integrity, and therefore its trustworthiness with respect to well de.ned policies, to remote parties [24].
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: WhiletheSDKprovidesdocumentationandsample codefortraditional smart cards(e.g., only reading or only writing NDEF-formatted tags), this approach is undesirable for our design.
Sentence 2: this basic approach would require connecting the phone to the reader twice; the .rst touch would send data from the phone to reader, and the second touch would be the response.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Finally, we can use the external-memory deterministic oblivious-sorting algorithm of Goodrich and Mitzenmacher [9], for instance, so as to use messages of size O(M1/2), which will result in an algorithm that sorts in O((N/M) logv M (N/M )) = O((N/M)c 2) I/Os.
Sentence 2: such a sorting algorithm uses a constant amortized number of I/Os per item.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Having selected p, a respective ciphertext c is chosen uniformly at random from [rmin + mS ,rmax - mL], where mS = p-dmin and mL = dmax -p are the numbers of plaintexts smaller and larger than p. The resulting pair (p, c) is added to f (line 11), dividing both the domain and the range into subspaces.
Sentence 2: the lower subspace has domain [dmin,p - 1] and range [rmin,c - 1], whereas the up­per subspace has domain [p+1,dmax] and range [c+1,rmax].
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Furthermore, we gradually .ll the set of observed SNPs (XK) with the set of 80k SNPs of other family mem­bers.
Sentence 2: we sequentially reveal 80k SNPs (whose IDs are in S) of all family members (excluding the target in­  (a) (b) (c) Figure 5: Evolution of the genomic privacy of the (a) grandparent (GP1), (b) parent (P5), and (c) child (C7).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: On the Invisibility of Designated Con.rmer Signatures Rui Xue State Key Laboratory of Information Security Institute of Software Chinese Academy of Science Beijing 100080 P.R.China rxue@is.iscas.ac.cn Fubiao Xia School of Computer Science University of Birmingham Birmingham, B15 2TT United Kingdom F.Xia@cs.bham.ac.uk  Guilin Wang School of Computer Science and Software Engineering University of Wollongong Wollongong NSW 2522 Australia guilin@uow.edu.au ABSTRACT As an important cryptographic primitive, designated con­.rmer signatures are introduced to control the public veri.a­bility of signatures.
Sentence 2: only the signer or a semi-trusted party, called designated con.rmer, can interactively assist a veri.er to check the validity of a designated con.rmer sig­nature.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The relation £ is a conservative, syntactic notion of equiva­lence.
Sentence 2: if two functions are observable to an attacker who can only make observations at security level J or lower, then the two functions must be syntactically identical for the attacker to regard them as equivalent; the attacker can distinguish two func­tions that are contextually equivalent, but syntactically different.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The RTKDSM system uses the XenAccess API [13] to set up necessary memory map­pings required to access the monitored VM s memory pag­es (Step 2 of Figure 2).
Sentence 2: it leverages the PyXaFS file system in the XenAccess tool suite to make the physical memory pages of a monitored VM available to Dom0.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: [22] generalized the results [21, 23, 34] and proved that non-equivocation with signatures (or transferable non-equivocation) allows treating Byzantine faults as crash faults for many distributed computing tasks.
Sentence 2: they present a generic transformation that enables any crash-fault tolerant dis­tributed protocol to tolerate the same number of Byzantine faults using transferable non-equivocation.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The Accuracy of User Authentication Through Keystroke Features Using The Most Frequent Words Alaa Darabseh Akbar Siami Namin Department of Computer Science Department of Computer Science Texas Tech University Texas Tech University Lubbock, TX, USALubbock, TX, USA alaa.darabseh@ttu.edu akbar.namin@ttu.edu ABSTRACT We study the performance and in.uence of various keystroke features on keystroke dynamics authentication systems.
Sentence 2: we investigate the performance of keystroke fea­tures on a subset of most frequently used English words.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We believe there is little to be gained by adopting a rigorous approach here, and for the sake of simplicity, we do not make the distinction between abstract and concrete sets whenever it is clear from the context.
Sentence 2: we assume that the decision set of XACML v2, D4, is included into that of XACML v3, D6, such that Indeterminate and Indeterminate{PD} are just di.erent in­terpretations of the same abstract decision.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In fact, a set of small changes to the JavaScript interpreter would help us secure event capture and de­livery and would also address the sources of non-determinism dis­cussed above.
Sentence 2: instrumenting Math.Random and Date routines as well as event handlers as described in Section 3.2 in the interpreter is the easiest and most systematic way to treat these is­sues that ensures that malicious JavaScript code co-existing within the same page is unable togain access to this data.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note that although we believe InvokeMemberFunc and InvokeNavigation are able to comprehensively perform accenting in all script-sending scenarios, the security does not rely on the comprehensiveness hypothetically, if there was an unexpected scenario to send a script without being accented, it would fail the compilation in the receiver frame.
Sentence 2: the incomprehensiveness would not cause a security compromise, but a compatibility problem only cause a fail-stop, but not a security bug.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note that edf(g, h) gives the cost of a particular edit path from g to h.The minimality of edit distance across all edit paths ensures that the dis­tance from the Hungarian method is an upper bound on the edit dis­tance.
Sentence 2: for any two graphs g and h, ed(g, h) = edf(g, h).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: They base their argument on the following doctrine: the more diverse a network environment (e.g., network s hosts are con.gured with di.erent operat­ing system and services types), the smaller the likelihood of all hosts being compromised by the same attack.
Sentence 2: attacks in heterogeneous network environments are limited to speci.c, smaller set of hosts.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In other respects, the error model of mpqc is stronger: in our setting errors may be ma­liciously coordinated.
Sentence 2: they will not be independently placed, and they may in fact depend on the data of the computation the adversaries will use any partial information known about the other players data, as well as information about their own data, to at­tempt to corrupt the computation.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Thus, we can compute all ei s with |ei| < Xi when Xt)j/t < N(1+o(1))(j/k)(t+1)/t (X1 · · · , which achieves the < N(1+o(1)) maximum N(1+o(1)) at j= k-1.
Sentence 2: if Xi k , we can compute those ei for which |ei| < Xi in polynomial time.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Speci.cally, for 15% of noise and 16 seeds, A(G) is 0.2 and 0.84 (or the anonymity is 3.29 and 13.82 bits) when using community-aware and community-blind algorithms, respec­tively.
Sentence 2: the community-aware algorithm reduces the anonymity by 10 additional bits compared to the community-blind algorithm.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This way, SPPEAR achieves its goals under weakened assumptions on the trustworthiness of the PS sys­tem.
Sentence 2: we ensure user privacy even in the case of honest-but-curious  infrastructure and prevent a single PS entity from answering the user-information sensitive question: Which user (Who) submitted What sample, for which task (Where) and When .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: After forward chaining .nishes, the system reverts to backward chaining mode to solve goal S. The primary difference between linear logic programming and more standard logic programming is that the former does not allow weakening or contraction in proof contexts, as is the case for the unrestricted proof contexts of Prolog and Datalog.
Sentence 2: in the spirit of linear logic [9], facts are like resources, that are consumed when used in the proof of a judgement the same linear fact can­not be used more than once in the proof.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: (as we will see later, duplicates are suppressed when the erasure-coded copy C is rebuilt.)
Sentence 2: every time a block is written, the new value of the block along with its block identi.er is added to the hierarchical log structure H.  4.2 Operations After describing the three types of bu.ers that we use to organize the original blocks, we are ready to give the high level intuition of the operations of our construction.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Mark encoding convention: Given Si, c, vfalse and vtrue as above, we de.ne mark(Si) E{true, false, invalid} to be true if vc(Si) > (vtrue ×|Si|), false if vc(Si) <vfalse × |Si| and invalid if vc(Si) E (vfalse ×|Si|,vtrue ×|Si|).
Sentence 2: the watermark is modeled by the per­centage of positive con.dence violators present in Si for a given con.dence factor c and con.dence violators hysteresis (vfalse,vtrue).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Without much e.ort, we can obtain some basic results by translating Polymorphic DCC into System F (speci.cally, into a version of System F with unit, product, sum, and function types, as well as universal quanti.cation), even with an encoding less sophisticated than the one introduced by Tse and Zdancewic (see Section 5.4).
Sentence 2: our encoding may simply delete all occurrences of says.Writing (·)F for this encoding, we have that (A says s)F =(s)F The encoding is trivial for true, ., ., ., .,and type variables.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A q-ary code C is m-wise uniform if for any sequence of m distinct indices [i1,i2,...,im]and any sequence of values [x1,x2,...,xm]pickedfromthe q code symbols: |C| |{c |c .C, ci1 = x1,ci2 = x2, ..., cim = xm}|= .
Sentence 2: qm the code is m-wise uniform if every pattern of m symbols occurs with equal frequency in the code.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Then we use an exponen­tial weighted moving average (EWMA) model for reputation prediction.
Sentence 2: the reputation is predicted from the weighted average of all the past data points in the time 1Although the time series features become less useful with the decrease of k (due to the incomplete view in the time domain), PIPMiner can still achieve fairly high accuracy by combining the population features with the block-level time series features.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, a potential paradox of any graphical system is that the attacker may benefit from the very thing that makes it more usable the relative ease of processing and recalling visual information.
Sentence 2: graphical systems can be vulnerable to observation attacks [9], and while some specific systems have been developed to limit such attacks [10], little is known about the way such vulnerabilities affect security.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We can see that, also for this dataset, the privacy level of OptQL is, in general, as good as the one of OptPriv, and always bet­ter than the one of PL.
Sentence 2: the median value for OptQL is always higher than the corresponding one for the other mechanisms (again, with the exception of the all day prior, for which we know that these values coincide).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Collision resistance is the strongest notion and subsumes second pre­image resistance, which in turn subsumes pre-image resis­tance [8].
Sentence 2: any hash function that satis.es (2) satis.es also (3) but the reverse is not true; and any hash function that satis.es (1) satis.es also (2) (and transitively (3)) but the reverse is not true.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Requests in the same session can come from di.erent client-side processes or dif­ferent computers, through di.erent TCP connections, served by di.erent server-side processes, as long as they carry the same session ID (see 4(b)).
Sentence 2: the only session identi.er provided by the underlying web infrastructure is session ID.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: First, we strove to demonstrate that RO-based PUFs are both non-deterministic and consistent.
Sentence 2: different physical instantiations of the same PUFdesignproducedifferentbehavior,butrepeating thePUF exe­cution on the same input and hardware produce results that can be reliably quanti.ed as the same binary string.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The possibility of performing computation using data stored internally, .associated with the tamper-resistant characteristic [4] of the integrated circuit, make smart cards well suitable for a variety of applications [4, lg, 23, 25] that require high degree of security.
Sentence 2: the tamper resistance and Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for persona] or cl~sroom use is gt'amed without fee lxovided that copie~ are not made or distributed for lXOfit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page.
Relationship: entailment