sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If subscription to any document costs the customer the same amount of money as any other document (ci = cj for 1 = i = j = n), then we solve the minimization problem by dividing all documents into m (the number of bits available for policy numbers) groups in such a way that each group contains the same number of documents.
Sentence 2: we have m groups of size n/m and assign the same policy bit to all documents within the same group.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It is urgent for current IdPs and RPs to adopt those protection mechanisms in order to prevent large-scale security breaches that could compromise millions of web users accounts on their websites.
Sentence 2: the design of server-.ow makes it more secure than client-.ow, and should be adopted as a preferable option, and IdPs should o.er ex­plicit .ow registration and enforce single-use of authoriza­tion code.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The technique described in [24] consists in .nding a sequence sc1,sc2,··· ,scn of system calls that are accepted by an intrusion detection model such as a Dyck model.
Sentence 2: the attacker hijacks the application and executes the following sequence: mc1,sc1,r1,mc2,sc2,r2 ··· ,mcn,scn,rn it executes a malicious code mci before a system call sci in which arguments to the system call have been overwritten with values de.ned by the attacker, executes the system call sci with the attacker s arguments, and then .nds a set of memory locations and corresponding values so that if these memory locations are over­written in a sequence ri of instructions, the program s .ow of exe­cution will return to a legitimate program control point to conform to the control .ow integrity enforced by the model.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our main idea is to encode so­ cial network-related information by means of an ontology.
Sentence 2: we suggest to model the following .ve important aspects of OSNs using semantic web ontologies: (1) user s 1http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics pro.les, (2) relationships among users (e.g., Bob is Alice s close friend), (3) resources (e.g., online photo albums), (4) relationships between users and resources (e.g., Bob is the owner of the photo album), (5) actions (e.g., post a message on someone s wall).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this worst-case scenario, we can imagine that the ordered vector of criteria (obtained from the evaluation of the fuzzy rules) could be something sim­ilar to Z = (0.3, 0.1, 0, 1, 0).
Sentence 2: we have a high cor­relation for the targeted port sequences (z4 = 1), and we have then some weak correlation (due to chance) for the geographical origins (z1 =0.3) and also for the subnets of origins (z2 =0.1).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Markov chain if it satis.es the Markov property, which is de.ned as: Pr{Xn = j |Xn-1 = i, Xn-2 = in-2 ,..., X0 = i0 } =Pr{Xn = j |Xn-1 = i }= pj|i.
Sentence 2: the probability of choosing a next state is only dependent on the current state of the Markov chain.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: W such that |T | = |W|/2, a secret key dUi,s corre­sponding to a boolean formula s for user Ui and a ci­phertext C, and outputs a message or a special symbol .. such that if T satis.es s and Ui .
Sentence 2: r, then we have Decrypt(T,dUi,s, Encrypt(mk, M, T, R)) = M. user Ui can decrypt all documents whose attributes satisfy the access rights of Ui, provided Ui s right to decrypt these documents were not revoked.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this paper, we make two major contributions: (1) We present a black-box approach for deriving the ap­plication speci.cation and detecting malicious SQL queries, which exploit application logic .aws.
Sentence 2: we char­acterize the application as an EFSM and systematically uti­lize the persistent objects in the database for deriving a more complete and accurate speci.cation for web applica­tions, which is missing from existing works.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, a policy might say that parent consent is necessary if the data owner is less than 13 years old.
Sentence 2: only if AGE<13 holds, the condition PC=Yes needs to be fulfilled in Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Non-binding information is information that is true in an uncom­promised OS, but can be arbitrarily changed by an attacker who has compromised the OS kernel.
Sentence 2: white-box sys­tems depend on assumptions implied by the non-binding informa­tion, but the attacker is not bound to uphold these assumptions and can break them to evade detection by the monitor.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To realize private .oating point arithmetic, we use representation (and corresponding operations) from [7].
Sentence 2: each .oat­ing point number is represented as a 4-tuple (v, p, s, z), where v is an £-bit signi.cand, p is a k-bit exponent, and s and z are sign and zero bits, respectively.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 5.2 Security Services We have implemented security services partly as native applications that run directly on the top of OKL4 and partly as Linux applications.
Sentence 2: a Mobile Trusted Mod­ule (MTM), the TVD Proxy, and an Attestation Service are implemented as Linux applications that run in a small Linux OS instance, while Compartment Manager and Secure GUI are native C applications which run each in their own OKL4 cell.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 97 To some extent, these questions arise now because of the emergence of the wired world .
Sentence 2: as the use of computer technology grows, and in particular, the use of computer technology in a global network that includes all individuals, de facto standards and policies are made by virtue of what is possible and customary in this network ([3] and [4] discuss this at length).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The set of output masks rx is also stored in the mask table M so that S ' (x .n).M(x .n)= S(x).m (2) holds for every input x.
Sentence 2: m can be viewed as the output mask of S that is split into two shares rx and M(x.n),thesplittingbeingindividualfor eachtableentry.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: [6] use a Prolog-based language to de­scribe the activation conditions for environment roles, but do not specify the fundamental predicates from which en­vironment roles can be built in their system.
Sentence 2: they de.ne the syntax of the language but do not de.ne a speci.c vocabulary of criteria that can be used to de.ne environment roles.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: i Proposition 2: There exists a sub set of features F FSmax containing the maximum number of features and is close to a privacy feature fp, if removing any member feature f, i then the new sub set FS' is no longer close to fp.
Sentence 2: i if distance(FFSmax,fp) <t i f .F FSmax F FS' = FSmax -{f}, then distance(FS',fp) =t.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While in current AUTO PROB E we do no decode these encrypted traf.c (a common research challenge in this area, and out of the scope of this paper), AUTOPRO BE can observe malware s logic of handling correctly-encoded response and incorrectly-encoded response.
Sentence 2: we can generate some random response packet and record the malware execution path, which represents malware s logic of handling invalid packet.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: the sensor) in the network that we are taking into account.
Sentence 2: di.erent sensors can detect di.erent attacks, and the same (IPsrc,ethsrc) pair can be classi.ed as malicious by a sensor on a node N1, but as admissible by another sensor on a di.erent node N2 (see also [13] for a more detailed discussion of the IP spoo.ng case).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% False Negative 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% False Positive Figure4: Static thresholdvs.per-processfalse alarmpro.les a> 0 (we onlydraw a =6.51 and a =9 for illustration), mean­ing that we make use of the suspicion-levelinformation and assign each process a customized threshold, the curves are always below the staticthreshold approach(i.e., a =0).
Sentence 2: given a false-positive rate, the a> 0 curves can always achieve lower false-negative rates than a =0 curve does, indicating that us­ingper-process suspicion-levelinformationresultsinanimproved false alarm curve.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Over several  General Terms months, we instantiated and analyzed over .ve thousands Security, Design, Experimentation Linux and Windows images provided by the Amazon cata­log, checking for a wide-range of security problems such as Keywords the prevalence of malware, the quantity of sensitive data left on such images, and the privacy risks of sharing an image Cloud Computing, Elastic Compute Cloud Service, Security, on the cloud.
Sentence 2: we identi.ed three main threats related, re­spectively, to: 1) secure the image against external attacks, 2) secure the image against a malicious image provider, and Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are 3) sanitize the image to prevent users from extracting and not made or distributed for pro.t or commercial advantage and that copies abusing private information left on the disk by the image bear this notice and the full citation on the .rst page.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our objective in developing the anti-phishing game was to teach users three things: (1) how to identify phishing URLs, (2) where to look for cues in web browsers, and (3) how to use search engines to find legitimate sites.
Sentence 2: the game teaches users about identifying three types of phishing URL s: IP based URLs, sub domain, and deceptive.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In reactive initialization, a mesh router is initialized  Figure 1: WMN multicast session (GS: group server, GM: group member, SL: subgroup leader); one-to­many multicast: (a)-(d); many-to-many multicast: (1)-(8) when there is a demand.
Sentence 2: a mesh router is not ini­tialized until its .rst subgroup member joins the group.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The true positive rate gives us an idea of how effective a classifier is at detecting malicious executables, however, we need to take into account the false positive rate to ensure that our classifier does not flag too many benign executables as malware.
Sentence 2: in a real computing environment there will be many more benign executables than malware, therefore a detection solution which generates too many false alarms can severely disrupt a computer user s experience, potentially making the solution more unattractive than the problem.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: public class CameraLauncher{ public void failPicture(String paramString){ String str = "javascript:navigator.camera.fail( "; str += paramString + " );"; this.mAppView.loadUrl(str); } } Unfortunately, since failPicture() is a public method in CameraLauncher, which is already binded to WebView, the method is accessible to the JavaScript code within We­bView, from both child and main frames.
Sentence 2: javaScript code in a child frame can use this interface to display an error message in the main frame, opening a chan­nel between the child frame and the main frame.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If a person is asked whether someone is allowed to use a resource owned by him, s/he will say yes or no according to some rules s/he knows, which can be represented with a set of sentences such as only I can use the notes in my wallet or the members of our research group are allowed to modify the project code .
Sentence 2: they already know the access control policy, or a set of rules, that are needed to make correct access control decisions.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.3 Calling Patched Methods Once a Dalvik method has been intercepted and redirected to a native method provided by the attacker, there exists no direct path to call the original method.
Sentence 2: every time the method is looked up through standard Android functions such as dvmFindVirtual-MethodHierByDescriptor, the method structure that is returned Figure 6: The DDI instrumentation library in operation.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Proposition 1: There exists a sub set of features F FSmax containing the maximum number of features and is close to a privacy feature fp, if any new feature f is added into this i sub set, then the new sub set FS' is no longer close to fi p .
Sentence 2: if distance(F,fp) <t FSmax i f/.F FSmax F FS' = FSmax .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 6.3 Discussion Although we utilize a well-understood set of network .le system traces in our evaluation, they unfortunately do not allow us to fully evaluate the e.ectiveness of WSBAC.
Sentence 2: since the traces do not identify the types and capabilities of client devices, (e.g, trusted/untrusted, hand­held/desktop/mobile), there are a number of dimensions that we cannot assess quantitatively in our evaluation.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A deadlock occurs in the following situation: There is no device in the graph that does not share a key with the target device and that has at least s neighbors that already share a key with the target device.
Sentence 2: rKEP will never deadlock if the following statement is true for the key graph: If the algorithm has not yet terminated, there is always a set of s devices that share a key with the target device and for this set, a device exists that shares a key with all devices in the set, but not the target device.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Fortunately, we make a key observation: the above scheme is not only existentially­unforgeable with respect to adaptive chosen message attacks, but also with respect to adaptive chosen state-message pair attacks, pro­vided that each state is used only once.
Sentence 2: it is hard to produce a signature on any new (s, M) pair, not just on a new message M. Final Solution.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: supp(W ), the game w.supp(W ) GX Y |W =w is obtained with probability Pr[W = w].
Sentence 2: in both cases, we denote by GX Y |W the random game chosen according to the distribution G, such that the game GX Y |W =w is chosen when W = w. for every w .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: S-BGP attestations include a valid­ity interval I =[ts,te) and are denoted A(a1; r : a2|I) As noted before, the S-BGP attestations are implemented as a public key sig­nature.
Sentence 2: a(a1; r : a2|I)= I, s where s is the signature of the string r : a2|I using the private key of a AS a1.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Consider a sta­tistical database that produces the transcript U on the set of queries Q = {Q1,...,Qq}, and let E> 0 be an arbitrarily-small real con­stant.
Sentence 2: transcript U satis.es E-indistinguishability if for every pair of views T1,T2 such that |T1| = |T2| and T1,T2 differ in only one record, it holds that Pr[TRT1 = U] Q ln = E (1) Pr[TRT2 = U] Q an attacker is not able to learn whether the transcript was obtained by answering the query set Q on view T1, or on view T2.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Particular keying mechanisms may preclude or reduce the e.ectiveness of in-network processing.To support passive participation, it is essential that intermediate nodes be able to decrypt or authenticate a secure message exchanged be­tween two other sensor nodes.Thus, passive participation of secure messages is only possible if multiple nodes share the keys used for encryption and authentication.On the other hand, if a pairwise shared key is used for encrypting or authenticating a message, it e.ectively precludes passive participation in the sensor network.
Sentence 2: in this paper, we describe LEAP (Localized Encryption and Authentication Protocol), a key management protocol for sensor networks that is designed to support in-network processing, while at the same time providing security prop­erties similar to those provided by pairwise key sharing sche­mes.the keying mechanisms provided by LEAP enable in-network processing, while restricting the security impact of a node compromise to the immediate net­work neighborhood of the compromised node.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The times given in Table 2 show that the new schemes are competitive with U-Prove, especially when most of the attributes are committed, and that they are much faster than Idemix.
Sentence 2: in the .rst benchmark (when (n, c, r) = (10, 2, 2)), MACGGM is 6.28 times faster than Ide­mix, and MACDDH is 4.7 times faster than Idemix.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Therefore, in an artist collaborative environment, the multimedia services can be classified into different categories according to the business models, e.g., Free services, Once-pay Compressed services, Once-pay Uncompressed services and Two-pay services.
Sentence 2: free services include free viewing and editing services for audience and artists, Once-pay Compressed services include viewing services for audience with a fee, Once-pay Uncompressed services include editing services with a fee, and Two-pay services allow viewing and editing after paying a fee.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Foreach valueoftheparameter 0 <a < 1 we have ICext ext .
Sentence 2: e. D (f,e) ICf, = a 1-a there is a protocol p such that: 1. for each (x,y).X×Y, P[p(x,y).f(x,y)] = ae , i.e.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We attribute the high detection rates for RAINBOW andSWIRLto the factthat they aggressivelyaf­fect contiguous packets, although the introduceddelay is small in comparison withIBW and ICBW.
Sentence 2: rAINBOW affects almost every packet, while SWIRLin.uencespackets inconsecu­tive short intervals.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note that in the domain isolation mechanism shown in Figure 1, http://map.live.com and http://live.com are two different domains once the domain changing operation is done, so each one has its own accent key.
Sentence 2: when a frame is from http://live.com or from http://map.live.com with its document.domain set to http://live.com, its accent key is the one correspondent to http://live.com; if a frame is from http://map.live.com without its document.domain being set, its accent key is the one correspondent to http://map.live.com.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: First, theintractability assumptionbehind ourapproach(asdescribedin the next section) states that .nding the modular square root is at leastashard asfactoringtheproduct ofprimes, assuming the prod­uct and the modular square are the same size.
Sentence 2: computing Ri from a128-bitRi 2 is onlyasdif.cult asbreaking a 128-bit RSA key, which is quite a weak claim.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We illustrate and explain the di.erences and similari­ties between accountability based on utility functions and the economic notion of incentive compatibility.
Sentence 2: a potential policy violator may have a utility function under which he bene.ts (in expecta­tion) from violating the policy and another utility func­tion under which he does not bene.t in expectation.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The process for computing policy similarity between XACML policies is not trivial.
Sentence 2: three elements need to be considered: the rule targets and conditions,repre­senting the predicates that have to be evaluated; the rule E.ects, specifying the intended consequence (either Per­mit or Deny ) of the rules; and the rule combination al­gorithms, specifying how to combine the E.ects of the rules in a policy.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, given an observation that an operator accesses database 8 times, we get P (I = true|Fd =10-)= 23.81%.
Sentence 2: the operator has a very low probability of intruding on private information based on the observa­tion only, we do not exclude the possibility of intrusion on the observation since intrusion still could happen even when the database usage frequency is less than 10.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The QoI-trust values received from different TAs can also be composed by the consumer similar to a TA composing QoI-trust based on interactions with other TAs.
Sentence 2: periodically, the consumer will correlate information provided by a given source with its own experiences or from sources that have information with similar attributes, weighted by their QoI-trust levels.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Ourhy­pothesis was that this value was unique for each machine and re­mained constant over time, and that, therefore, it would provide an accurate method to uniquely identify each bot.
Sentence 2: byreverse engineeringtheTorpigbinary,we wereableto recon­structthealgorithmusedtocomputethis8-bytevalue.the algorithm .rst queries the primary SCSI hard disk for its model and serial numbers.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If it is preferred, Naor and Reingold s [8] technique could be used to replace the functions f3,K3 and f0,K0 in HESSK (·) with two pair-wise independent permutations, which may improve the performance in some applications.
Sentence 2: let h1(·) and h2(·) be two pair-wise independent permutations on the set of 2n-bit binary strings.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: F -1 Consider an oracle t =( F, t we can G, ) .Tt.From construct an oracle t =(G, F, F -1) .Tn as:2 G(tk)= G(tka,tkb)=(G (tka),tkb).That is, G ..t,n is a permutation acting only on the .rst t bits of its input.
Sentence 2: f (k, x)= F ((ka,kb), (xa,xb)) =( F (ka,xa),xb).F (k, ·) ..t,n is a permutation acting only on the .rst t bits of its input.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 2.3 The Signi.cance of Normative Con.icts inSecurity Policy Design The con.ict of norms in this way has underpinned a num­ber of signi.cant security breaches in the last .ve years.
Sentence 2: the data loss incident at the UK s HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) was the subject of much analysis [32].
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Some of these challenges stretch our current understanding of how information .ows in real systemsbut all of the challenges are tractable and can be addressed in future research.
Sentence 2: we propose a relaxed static stability approach to DIFT where data is tagged with a .xed point number indicating a degree of taint, speci.cally the mutual information between the tagged data item and some tainted source.
Relationship: entailment