sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Hardware
Sentence 1: , rm = 0) = G(x ) = RM(x * , xr = [px[1,m-1] I 0]) = p on(x * ) m = pm(x * ) = 0 Similarly, for a minterm x * which makes pm(x * ) = 1, we can also derive the same result.
Sentence 2: after attaching all recti.cation functions pi s to signal ri s, there is no error minterm between F and G. Example 2.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Hardware
Sentence 1: Frequency variation [%] 15 10 5 0 -5 -10 -15 4 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 .Delay .Delay .Delay (1) .Vth n + .Ln + .Vpw =0, .Vth n .Ln .Vpw .Delay .Delay .Delay (2) .Vth p + .Lp + .Vnw =0.
Sentence 2: .Vth p .Lp .Vnw -3s -2s -s 0 s 2s 3s -3s -2s -s 0 s 2s 3s .Vth_n n .L at the second step, .Vpw and .Vnw are computed by ( )/ .Delay .Delay .Delay -.Vth n +.Ln.Vth n .Ln ,(3) .Vpw = .Vpw ( )/ .Delay .Delay .Delay -.Vth p +.Lp.Vth p .Lp .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Hardware
Sentence 1: The number of tester chan­nels with high data rates may be constrained in practice however due to ATE resource limitations, the power rat­ing of the SOC, and scan frequency limits for the embedded cores.
Sentence 2: we formulate the following optimization problem: given two available data rates for the tester chan­nels, an SOC-level test access mechanism (TAM) width , nnn ( ) channels that can transport test data at the higher data rate, determine an SOC TAM architecture that minimizes the testing time.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: PRELIMINARIES In order to improve efficiency of communication and computation in the management of revoked public-key certificates in VANETs, some authors have proposed the use of particular ADSs such as Merkle trees [6] and skip lists [4] [5].
Sentence 2: to the best of our knowledge no previous work has described in detail the use of k-ary trees in general as hash trees for revoked certificate management.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The placement of authorization hooks mainly addresses com­plete mediation, which requires that all security-sensitive opera­tions be mediated by an authorization hook to ensure that the se­curity policy permits all such operations.
Sentence 2: we .nd that the placement of authorization hooks also impacts tamperproo.ng, by authorizing requests that may affect the authorization process (e.g., change the policy), and veri.ability, by determining where authorization queries are deemed necessary.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A sim­ilar approach was described in [11], where random start-up values of .ip-.ops are exploited.
Sentence 2: the extraction of these start-up values has to be done by the con.gura­tion controller or by a speci.c circuit, which has to be reset externally after every start-up, which makes it impractical.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The .nal example is an instance of occlusion (occlusion is discussed in more detail in the next section): l := 0; (if l then l := declassify(h) else skip); l := h No program run passes through a declassi.cation statement be­cause it occurs in dead code.
Sentence 2: the insecure assign­ment l := h is always reachable.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: SDAP: A Secure Hop-by-Hop Data Aggregation Protocol for Sensor Networks* Yi Yang, Xinran Wang, Sencun Zhu , and Guohong Cao Department of Computer Science &#38; Engineering, The Pennsylvania State University University Park, PA, USA 16802 {yy5,xinrwang,szhu,gcao}@cse.psu.edu ABSTRACT Hop-by-hop data aggregation is a very important technique for re­ducing the communication overhead and energy expenditure of sen­sor nodes during the process of data collection in a sensor network.
Sentence 2: because individual sensor readings are lost in the per­hop aggregation process, compromised nodes in the network may forge false values as the aggregation results of other nodes, tricking the base station into accepting spurious aggregation results.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When the PIV card is issued by an agency that obtains PKI certificates through the Common Policy Framework, the PIV content signing certificate is clearly distinguishable through the presence of the id-CommonHW policy identifier and an extended key usage of id-PIV-content-signing.
Sentence 2: when the PIV card issuer is using a legacy branch of the Federal PKI (e.g., one that is directly cross-certified with the FBCA) there is no obvious way to differentiate a PIV content signing certificate from a regular signature certificate issued under a policy equivalent to the FBCA Medium-HW policy.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If the server fails to verify that copies is a positive number, both the hostile and benign responses will present a con.rmation screen, the only dif­ference being the number of copies and total price.
Sentence 2: if the server checks for a negative number of copies, the hostile response will be an error page, which likely differs signi.­cantly from the con.rmation screen.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The attacker uses this tim­ing channel (of response latency) as indication of a correct guess.
Sentence 2: in our work, we do not attempt to guess the port at the receiver, and our goal is to discover the in­ternal IP address of the victim host; thus, we can send our packets burst to any port of the receiver, which adds a delay to all connections that the victim host maintains.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To evaluate the performance and the possible functional impact of the rotation mechanisms on normal Grid opera­tion, we .rst tested the system using an engineering applica­tion for metal casting processes from the D-Grid.
Sentence 2:  (a) Spambot Attack No Rotation (b) Spambot Attack With Rotation Figure 8: Spambot Attacks (a) Botnet Installation 1 (b) Botnet Installation 2 Figure 9: Botnet Installation Rotations 20  123456 100 15 80 Percentage Percentage 10 Percentage 60 40 5 5 20 0 0 0Seconds Seconds Seconds (a) CPU load with unmodi.ed Counter-(b) CPU load with modi.ed CounterSer-(c) CPU load with modi.ed CounterSer-Servicevicevice and rotations Figure 10: CPU performance no noticeable di.erence could be detected, since the applica­tion (like most Grid applications) running on our new Grid setup only requires minimal e.ort from the Grid headnode: one job submission connection and certi.cate check to start the computation and one noti.cation connection when the job is completed.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The CPU requirements of cryptographic and av-recording operations were too small to be noticed by humans.
Sentence 2: the sending of email on a 2.8GHz P4 PC running Windows XP with 1Gb of RAM took around 10 seconds when two 15-second av-recordings (taking about 2.8Mb each) were sent as email attachments.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Accuracy FPR FNR PE consistency 90.0%/89.7% 2.6%/23.4% 2.8%/24.8% 8-Gram 98.6%/88.2% 0.9%/2.1% 11.1%/12.7% Static IS 89.5%/86.3% 17.0%/20.6% 3.6%/6.6% Dynamic IS 93.7%/91.0% 9.4%/12.6% 4.1%/6.5%  Table 1 C4.5 decision Tree results Accuracy FPR FNR PE consistency 90.6%/85.3% 2.2%/22.5% 1.7%/23.3% 8-Gram 94.5%/89.3% 2.0%/10.2% 6.0%/17.2% Static IS 94.3%/84.9% 4.1%/12.7% 8.3%/18.7% Dynamic IS 95.4%/91.9% 7.4%/9.6% 2.5%/6.8% Table 2 Support Vector Machine results The main criteria to evaluate a model are accuracy over testing dataset.
Sentence 2: we also calculate false positive rate and false negative rate.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, most current works implic­itly/explicitly assume that the adversary and user both use the same Tor Browser Bundle (TBB), visit the same local­ized version of a limited set of pages/sites almost at the same time (or a few days apart) by using only one tab browsing.
Sentence 2: violating at least one of these assumptions can re­duce the e.cacy of the attack signi.cantly to a point that might not make WF a threat in the real world.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Speci.cally, for a .xed a, a regular graph with node degree 10 sometimes exhibits a better attack­resilience than a regular graph with node degree 4 (e.g., a = 1), and sometimes exhibits a worse attack-resilience (e.g., a =0.8).
Sentence 2: in both random and powerlaw graph topology cases, a graph with average node degree approximately 10 almost always exhibits a better attack­resilience than its respective counterpart with average  (a) Regular graph topology (b) Random graph topology (c) Powerlaw graph topology Figure 9: Attack-resilience vs. availability: the exponential node uptime and downtime distribution case (a) Regular graph topology (b) Random graph topology (c) Powerlaw graph topology Figure 10: Attack-resilience vs. availability: the Pareto node uptime and downtime distribution case (a) Regular graph topology (b) Random graph topology (c) Powerlaw graph topology Figure 11: Attack-resilience vs. availability: the normal node uptime and downtime distribution case node degree approximately 4.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, having not the same input information as the honest parties, the ideal world adversary has to behave di.erently in the following points: S uses only one certi.ed public key whereas, in the real world, each issuer Di uses his own certi.ed public key.
Sentence 2: if the real world adversary could distinguish between S and Di, then we could use the adversary to break the key privacy of our insubvertible encryption construction.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: One concern with this scheme is that is may reject a user s choice of password many times, and frustrate the user.
Sentence 2: over these trials, users are asked on average for 1.28 passwords Frequency 10000 First Choice Metropolis-Hastings Scheme Hard limit 1/1000000 1000 100 10 1 1 10 100 1000 10000 100000 1e+06 Rank 10: Plot of rank vs. frequency for users generated from rockyou dataset, with free choices, the Metropolis-Hastings scheme and a hard relative frequency limit (similar to [15]).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Themaingoalof CloneCloud[9]isthe acceleration ofCPUintensive andlow interaction applications, nonetheless its authors recognize the potential use of the approach in o.oading heavyweight security mechanisms from phones.
Sentence 2: in ParanoidAndroid[22]the authorspropose aframeworkfor collecting the state of a smartphone, which is periodically sent to the cloud, where various security checks are applied.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In summary, while our authority-mode SP architecture leverages the minimalist design philosophy and some fea­tures of user-mode SP, it provides signi.cant new security features and defends against some potential attacks on user­mode SP.
Sentence 2: it requires the device user to trust an authority to set up his device in a trusted depot, and does not support portability of the user s key chain across multi­ple devices or privacy of the user s keys from the authority.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Then the in­formation gain of X with respect to Y is given by I(Y ; X), where 1The terms accuracy and classi.cation accuracy are inter­changeably used in this paper.
Sentence 2: figure 2: Normal probability plot for gain ratio of attributes Figure 3: Box plot for distribution of symmetric uncertainty of attributes I(Y ; X)= H(Y ) - H(Y |X) a well-known problem with the information gain is its bias towards attributes split in multiple classes [29].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: ADAPTIVE ATTACKS We apply [3] s signature transformation attacks on [7, 8] s DCS s. The attack consequence is to cryptanalyze the in­visibility of the signatures.
Sentence 2: [7, 8] did not claim this security notion, our attacks in this Section are beyond their model attacks, meant to establish their DCS s indeed do not have the invisibility in our model.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Owing to incremental hash compu­tation, APR-Quad updates the AdHASH with two invocations of h at each level of the data structure.
Sentence 2: embedded tree imple­mentations [11, 24, 23] with fanout f require a hash for each level of both the outer and inner trees, resulting in logf b times more hashes.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: One could argue that with half of the message (randomly) chosen to be a part of the message signature, an attack could theoretically still be performed on the other half of the data and/or the key.
Sentence 2: since the uncer­tainty associated with the choice of the speci.c half of the message (and key) and that the message signature also in­cludes as its components the session parameters, it can be said that such attacks will still prove to be ine.ective.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, the size of the .le may be used to determine the average chunk size, potentially yield­ing greater deduplication in data such as media .les, which tend to be large and exhibit an all or nothing level of similarity with other .les.
Sentence 2: since some large .les, such as mail archives or tar .les, may be aggregations of smaller .les, another possibility would be to adjust chunking parameters based on .le types.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: So one TVD Master cannot trust another TVD Master to build a new image correctly.
Sentence 2: in use cases where all TVDs are deployed on the device are controlled by a single administrator, e.g., in case when all TVDs belong to a sin­gle company (but, e.g., handle information of di.erent trust levels), the task of building of a new image can be delegated to a company server which represents a kind of multi-TVD Master and handles TVD Policies of di.erent domains.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This evi­dence takes different forms depending on how the commit­ment protocol ended (or failed): 1st Commitment does not take place (i.e., A does not send its rating): Nothing is done since we leave recommenders free to choose whether to rate or not.
Sentence 2: if A does not rate B, it should not be able to claim otherwise later.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While such an approach is e.ective, recon­structing high-level .le-system accesses (like path and per­missions) from the low-level disk-emulation perspective is in itself a form of the semantic gap problem and requires exten­sive knowledge of .le-system internals.
Sentence 2: the inter­nal kernel structures that DRAKVUF tracks reveal highly valuable information about the execution state of the sys­tem, such as the complete set of running processes, kernel modules, threads, and even objects allocated for .lesystem accesses by the OS.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, a layer needs mechanisms to provide verifiable guarantees of removing encrypted data and not moving or copying encrypted data.
Sentence 2: given the backward compatibility and legacy constraints of storage mechanisms such as read-copy-update [14], versioning [31], journaling [44], RAIDs [30], and so on, achieving secure storage will remain a difficult research area, ripe with challenges and opportunities.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: (t2 MyList)£1u£2 let rec for = fun xs -> fun f -> match xs with | Nil -> Nil | Cons xs -> union (f (fst xs )) (for (snd xs ) f) Note that the types of these functions correspond roughly to the typing rules given for the built-in constructs.
Sentence 2: in the case of union and for , the type is slightly more restrictive than the typing rule, due to the way recursion is type-checked.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In [11], Mika proposes a basic general social network, called Flink, based on a semantic datastore using a similar framework to that we have proposed, but using several di.er­ent speci.c semantic technologies.
Sentence 2: he does specify that their implementation, using backwards-and forward­chaining is e.ciently scalable to millions of tuples, which provides an evidence of the viability of our proposed scheme.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The last two hypotheses are based on the re.ection that Google s open app market makes Android users more conscious of possible malware infections, and that the explicitly presented app permissions draw user attention to the possibilities of data misuse.
Sentence 2: it is also possible that security and privacy aware users choose Android because it is open source, and because they can see in the permissions which data is accessed and manipulated by the apps.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In particular, under typical parametrizations, and with O(1) amount of client storage, known ORAM construc­tions require 400+ blocks be transferred between a client and a server for a single data access.
Sentence 2: our con­struction requires transferring only about 1.05 to 1.35 blocks per data access, which makes it both practi­cal and orders of magnitudes more e.cient than the scheme of Cash et al.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Of the 14420 admissible operations, 2340 of them are falsely judged as malicious so that authentication fails, thus the false negative rate is 0.1623.
Sentence 2: of the 3090 malicious modifications, only 10 of them are falsely determined as admissible so that authentication succeeds, therefore the false positive rate is 0.00324.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Under normal usage this lifetime is not a consideration, as the laptop s JFFS2 [22] .lesystem moves stored .les around as necessary to assure even leveling of the entire device.
Sentence 2: an unchecked malicious program that continually wrote random, uncompressable data could use up the .ash device s lifetime within a few days, whereas normally we expect the .ash to last the laptop s lifetime.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In Section 4, we show how this computation is possible in closed form in manyimportant applications.
Sentence 2: even if we can ef.ciently compute R(A), in order to evaluate F(B), we need to compute the expectation EA|B[R(A)]= N P(A|B)R(A), A which is a sum over an intractable number of terms.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: These identities can be independent of the IP addresses of the IKE daemons that are negotiating (e.g., temporary addresses acquired via DHCP, public workstations with smartcard dongles, etc.).
Sentence 2: since the ini­ tiator reveals her identity .rst (in message 5 of Main Mode), an attacker can pose as the responder until that point in the protocol.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The responder replies with a response message encrypted by the (anony­mous) querier's ephemeral public key.
Sentence 2: a respon­der cannot check whether a public key is a valid key or a random value since this scheme gives no certifcation of the public key, and moreover the responder cannot detect even if the pubic key is replaced by an attacker.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It remains possible to extend our analysis to account for such .ows, following the ideas of [50, 55, 39, 37].
Sentence 2: we believe that it is more practical to enforce a weaker property like DFI at the level of an operating system, and enforce stronger, control-sensitive properties like noninterference at the level of the application, with speci.c assumptions.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: of Electrical Engineering &#38; Computer Science, Syracuse University Syracuse, New York, USA ABSTRACT Android uses a permission-based security model to restrict applications from accessing private data and privileged re­sources.
Sentence 2: the permissions are assigned at the appli­cation level, so even untrusted third-party libraries, such as advertisement, once incorporated, can share the same priv­ileges as the entire application, leading to over-privileged problems.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Although the impossibility result provides evidence that some form of trust is needed for SLP, we do not claim that hiding the number of tuples would remain impossible if one weakened the privacyguarantees or altered the model.
Sentence 2: we think our trust assumption is reasonable, as we explain in §8: a malicious SM has limited effect on privacy(it does not see the timing, origin, and identi.er of client tuples) and virtually no effect on aggregate results (it cannot decrypt an incorrect value or affect accountability).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Forexample,whenathreadofaellislaunhed,theprop­ertiesstateonlythattheresouresrequiredbythethread arevisible(alloated)tothethreadpriortolaunh.When thesepropertieswerereplaedbyafuntionaldefnition, afuntionwasspeifedtoexpliitlyonstrutthelistsof resoures.Theuseoffuntionaldefnitionshadtwomain advantages: .ExeutableMeASpeifation:Thefuntionaldefni­tionoftheMCAlevelprimitivesraisesthepossibility ofhavingafuntionalmodelofMASKwithoutthe MASKimplementationlevelspeifation.Thisan beusefulindeterminingifthekernelisrobustenough tosupporttheprojetobjetives.
Sentence 2: .TotalFuntions:Allofthefuntionaldefnitionswere madetotal.Thisisnotstritlyrequired.Ifitan beshownthatafuntionisneveralledwithertain arguments,thenthefuntionneednotbespeifedon thosearguments.ourexperienewasthat havingpartialfuntionsmakesthespeifationharder toreview,sinethequestionofwhatwillhappenifthe funtionisalledwiththoseargumentsalwaysarises.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Figure 3 shows that the reactive jam­ming attacks have much more impact than non-reactive jamming attacks due to the jammer s ability to synchronize with the sender.
Sentence 2: in all non-reactive jamming attacks, the jamming probabilities are no more than 0.01.even when |Cp| = |Ce| =7, 000, the reactive jammer s jamming probability is still 0.14.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The threshold-based approach is a common and intuitive technique to examine events of interest X across a Y-sized time window to detect port-scan attacks above certain thresholds [5].
Sentence 2: it s not easy to set a proper detection threshold: if the threshold is set too low, it would then mislabel normal traffic flow; whereas a relatively high threshold would fail to identify some malicious scans, especially those deliberately launched slow scans [12].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When V has more than 100 connections, the probability that it does not receive TRA is negligible; in this case, using a listening period might be effective to detect double-spending.
Sentence 2: since the connectivity of Bitcoin peers largely varies with the network churn13 (Figure 4), V needs to constantly mon­ itor its connection count to ensure that it does not drop below a threshold so that it can detect double-spending by adopting a listen­ ing period.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Particularly, we built our SDKs as a wrapper of the GCM SDKs, making it convenient for the devel­opers to retro.t them into their apps: all they need to do is just a small adjustment of the APIs the apps call to activate the new pro­tection.
Sentence 2: this treatment makes our tool kit less general, requiring a new implementation for a different service.
Relationship: contrasting