sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For anomaly detection model, we are studying the effectiveness and scalability of our approach for building anomaly detection models for ad-hoc routing protocols and for other layers of wireless networking.
Sentence 2: we will first focus on two questions about ad-hoc routing: what information a routing protocol should include to make intrusion detection effective, and what is the best anomaly detection model for a given routing protocol.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: APPLICATIONS Blaze, Bleumer, and Strauss [5] suggested several interest­ing applications of proxy re-signatures relating to key man­agement.We begin by taking a closer look at how proxy re-signatures can help relieve some of the common key man­agement headaches.Next, we explore a broader set of ap­plications and show that proxy re-signatures can be used to form weak (but easy to manage) group signatures, a space­e.cient proof that a certain path was taken in a graph (e.g., a packet followed a prescribed path through the network), and more.
Sentence 2: 4.1 Exploring BBS Key Management BBS [5] pointed out that proxy re-signatures can be used to change or add new public key pairs to a sys­tem without obtaining new certi.cates, notably simplifying key management.Let us explore this idea in more detail.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Following the advice of Kempton [27], we do not evaluate models on the basis of correctness in terms of the reality of security threats home computer users face, but rather on the potential bene.ts that could be attained from behav­iors that stem from the models regardless of correctness.
Sentence 2: we believe that to make progress in this area, we should not constrain ourselves to teaching correct models and ideas about security; rather, we should focus on communicating models that are simple, coherent, easy to understand, and lead to desirable behaviors.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: S ' 0 - S0 = y· H1(Y||A||0) + a mod p, S ' 1 - S1 = y· H1(Y||A||1) + a mod p.  4.2 DiscussionontheProposal Schemecan be considered as a variant of the Schnorr S signature.
Sentence 2: (R ' ,S ' ,m) is a signature of the Schnorr signature on behalf of the signer, and (A,S b' -Sb,b), (b .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Now, the TPM and host together produce a signature of knowledge that T1 and T2 commit to a certi.cate and NV was computed using the secret key going with that certi.cate.
Sentence 2: they compute the signature of knowledge SPK{(f0, f1, v, e, w, r, ew, ee, er) : f0 f1 -ew w "r Z = ±T1 eR0 R1 Svh(mod n) .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Before agreeing to compute a function f(s1,s2), P1 determines whether computing the residual function f(·,s2) would reveal too much information as determined accord­ing to a threshold 0 <t1 = 1set by P1.
Sentence 2: p1 will not compute the function if P2 s belief about the likeli­hood of a possible secret value (including the actual secret s1) increases above t1.1 If P1 does reveal f(s1,s2)then it determines what P2 will learn from the output and revises its estimate d2 of P2 s knowledge accordingly.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, p(TaS)(x) and p(Tbs)(X) used during broadcast Bs will be dif-ferent (respectively) from p(7~9)(x) and p(r~)(x) used during broadcast B9 (except with negligible probability), hut the sum of any two corresponding shares of the same session key will be equal.
Sentence 2: because the polynomials pt(x) and qt(x) are constant over all update messages, we must be careful that legit-imate knowledge of a point on one of these polynomials does not help a user learn anything to which he is not entitled, should he later be revoked.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: First, given the original sFSA representing the IDS, adjust the probabilities of the transi­tions in sFSA for the attack vector, the decryptor, the key table, and the encrypted attack code.
Sentence 2: similar to the step of determin­ing the encryption key discussed above, the sFSA is adjusted ac­cording to what have already been matched by these existing attack packet sections.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, we stress that a more careful implemen­tation of bit operations as well as pre-computing required inputs would further decrease the runtime of GSHADE.
Sentence 2: all the values fi(0, Y j ) and fi(1, Y j ) can be com­puted once, when a data Y j is added to the database, and stored with the database, instead of computing them online.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The main benefit of the propagation option is that it reduces the number of policies that need to be specified.
Sentence 2: three different propagation options are supported: no propagation (NP), that is, the policy only applies to the protection objects which appear in the specification; first level (F), according to which the policy propagates to all the direct subelements of the elements in the specification, and cascade (C), according to which the policy propagates to all the direct and indirect subelements of the ones specified in the policy.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The ideal strength and the design objective for a one-way function whose output length is equal to t-bits is to not to have a shortcut attack easier than brute-force and have a strength of 2t against pre-image attacks.
Sentence 2: considering an ideal one-way function f(x) = y, for a given y having t bits, the number of computations required to find x is 2t .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The command ke,kd := Ge(); xLH := E(yHH,ke); xLH ' := E(0,ke) is computationally non-interferent (CNI).
Sentence 2: we have xLH = xLH ' with negligible probability, even if yHH =0, so any IND-CCA2 encryption function must be probabilistic.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Once the signer issues a DCS, the veri.er can interactively validate it with the help from either the signer or the con.rmer.
Sentence 2: for any alleged DCS, the con.rmer will .rst check its validity, and execute the corre­sponding protocol, i.e., using con.rm protocol (for a valid signature) or disavow protocol (for an invalid signature).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Preventing malicious users from writing such a policy could be accom­plished by only allowing the policy to be executed under their privileges, so that the e.ects of a policy are limited to anything that user is already allowed to do manually.
Sentence 2: they should only be allowed to access view predicates under their own privileges, or built-in predicates which require no special privileges.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Flexible and Secure Enterprise Rights Management based on Trusted Virtual Domains Yacine Gasmi, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Patrick Stewin, Martin Unger, Marcel Winandy Chair for System Security Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany {yacine.gasmi, ahmad.sadeghi, patrick.stewin, martin.unger, marcel.winandy}@trust.rub.de Rani Husseiki, Christian Stüble Sirrix AG security technologies, Germany {r.husseiki, c.stueble}@sirrix.com  ABSTRACT The requirements for secure document work.ows in enter­prises become increasingly sophisticated, with employees per­forming di.erent tasks under di.erent roles using the same proprietary platform.
Sentence 2: .ne-grained access con­trol to document information is necessary in certain scenar­ios where the integrity and con.dentiality of parts of docu­ments is of high priority.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This theorem indicates that to ensure unp-privacy, the computational power of tags cannot be weaker than that of computing a PRF.
Sentence 2: the minimal requirement on tags to achieve unp-privacy for RFID systems is the abil­ity to compute a PRF or its equivalents such as one way function and cryptographically strong pseudorandom gener­ator [11].
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We explore China, Syria, Iran, and Egypt as routing capable ad­versaries, and evaluate several attacks that defeat the security goals of existing decoy routing proposals.
Sentence 2: we show that a routing capable adversary can enumerate the participating routers implementing these protocols; can successfully avoid sending traf­.c along routes containing these routers with little or no adverse effects; can identify users of these schemes through active and pas­sive attacks; and in some cases can probabilistically identify con­nections to targeted destinations.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In Shamir s scheme, the higher the degree of the polynomial, the higher the number of shares required to recover the original secret value.
Sentence 2: if the degree of the polynomial is k-1, at least k shares are needed to reconstruct the original value where k <= n. The higher the value of k, intuitively it is more difficult to break the security but then one must pay for more computation overheads due to a higher k. There are four types of computation overheads in Shamir s scheme.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The basic obfuscation LPPM, with an obfuscation level k =1, 2, 3,..., is constructed in the following way: For each location r, we .nd its k -1 closest locations (using the Eu­clidean distance between the centers of the regions).
Sentence 2: the 1The tracesareobtainedfromtheLausanneDataCollection Campaign dataset, http://research.nokia.com/page/11367  probability distribution function f(.|r) will be the uniform probability distribution on the set of the k -1 selected lo­cations together with the location r. location r is replaced by each of the k locations, as a pseudolocation, with the same probability k1 , and all the rest of locations have probability 0.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When there are multiple adjacent malicious routers on the in­tended path (Rj1 to Rjn), a wormhole is present: an honest router down the path can only conclude that the packet has entered into the hole via Rj1 and exited the hole from Rjn, but has no knowledge as to where the packet has been to in between these two points.
Sentence 2: when the source colludes with Ri, Ri+1 can be tricked into accepting and forwarding any packet.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: EHR SHARING SYSTEM As part of our ongoing research e.orts, we have designed and implemented a proof-of-concept system, called InfoS­hare, which is a simpli.ed clinical information sharing sys­temthat utilizesourproposed modelforapatienttocontrol access of his medical information.
Sentence 2: infoShare collects apatient s access controlpolicies aspatient consents, and uses these consents to selectively share the patient s medical information as contained in the virtual composite EHR with di.erent requesting parties through a point of service(POS) web application.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 1.1 Our Results MPC for the Masses Our main goal in this project was to implement a system that enables casual non-interactive multi-party computation (Canon-MPC, for CAsual NON-interactive MPC).
Sentence 2: the system should enable its users to run secure computation without complicated setup phases, and without download­ing, compiling and setting-up any software.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: {(s, o)}) T.((reg, cf,m), (s, o), deny)=(reg, cf,m)  2.3 Utility and Reward Function An important aspect of a decision process is the ability to give a utility value to a decision or a state.
Sentence 2: it is possible to express the interest for the system of making a given decision in a given state, and we introduce an utility domain U.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.2.2.3 Thrashing Detection and Workarounds During the testing process of the VMX handler, it was discovered that the S-TLB would not permit two entries for the same address loaded for the same instruction.
Sentence 2: when instructions were within the same (4KB) page as the data being accessed, the VM EXIT handler would replace the TLB entry for data with the instruction address and vice versa, causing an infinite loop (thrashing back and forth).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, two MITRE technical reports [13, 26] highlight the fact that the lattice-based access control scheme relied upon by the U.S. Armed Forces is beginning to show signs of age.
Sentence 2: [13] cites several examples of improper and unauthorized out­of-band data sharing that have occurred because it is easier to ask for forgiveness than for permission, given the high delays and human costs associated with utilizing the proper channels.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: [14, 3]) to be of sig­ni.cant help towards a solution for this problem that may be provably-secure under standard cryptographic assumptions; the main idea being that previously stored data in encrypted form can appear as logically deleted data to whoever does not have any information about the decryption key.
Sentence 2: encryption reduces the problem of securely deleting large amounts of data to the problem of securely deleting a single encryption key.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Thirdly, according to the legislation of some countries, such astheDigitalMillenniumCopyrightAct[1], Germany s penal code (§202a), and the United Kingdom s Computer Misuse Act, automatically recovering the text from FHEO­generated imagesthat arefoundinthewild,potentiallycar­riesacertainlegal risk.Inlight ofthis,the exact levelofpro­tection that FHEO o.ers against recovery attacks may be, to some extent, irrelevant in the a.ected territories.
Sentence 2: even the easy distortion pro.le may su.ce to prevent some of the automatic processing of messages protected by FHEO that would otherwise be automatically processed in these territories.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This paper de­scribes the design, implementation and evaluation of the RTKDSM system, whose goal is to facilitate the develop­ment of VMI applications by alleviating them of the task of closing the semantic gap.
Sentence 2: a VMI application just needs to specify kernel data structures of interest, and the RTKDSM system is responsible for tracking down the memory locations of these data structures in the monitored guest OS, and notifying the application immediately when these data structures change at run time.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A Example of a Program with a Call to a Function with no System Calls 3.3 Invariant Generation and Assertion Checking Figure 6 describes the result of running Daikon on the program with respect to the function main.
Sentence 2: all of the likely in­variants that Daikon discovers about the function main and all functions and system calls within the body of the function main, and by running the program and providing respectively the inputs /csl/bin/library , 3, and 3, as the respective values for the vari­ables input, i,and j. Daikon captures the fact that arguments of functions and sys­tem calls are constants.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In general, AL I B I limits the options of in-.ight modi.cations of guest state available to the platform.
Sentence 2: it only al­lows changes to RSP and RIP that are consistent with handling of guest-mode exceptions (e.g., emulated I/O requests) that, typically, amount to advancing the RIP register to the next instruction follow­ing the one that caused an exception.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If this may happen, such a state is not considered safe with respect to that right.
Sentence 2: a model state q is called HRU-safe with respect to a right r if there is no sequence of inputs that writes r into an ACM cell that in q did not contain r. A general answer to this family of questions provides fundamental insights on right proliferation in access control systems.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Experience with this policy guided our choice of complexity parameters and restrictions for the analysis algorithms in Sections 3 4 and suggested realistic values for some of the parameters used in random policy generation in Section 8.
Sentence 2: we note the following characteristics of the policy: Every can_assign rule has at most one positive precondi­tion, so the analysis algorithm in Section 3 applies.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Based on the security policies of the Jif code, the compiler chooses annotations that ensure code and data are placed on the client only if the security of the program will not be violated by a malicious client.
Sentence 2: thetranslation ensuresthatdatamaybeplacedona client only if the security policies indicate that the data may be read by the principal client;data may originate from the client only if the security policies indicate that the data is permitted to be written by the principal client.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our goal is to avoid too restrictive and too general use of parallelism found in prior work and instead incorporate enough .exibility that will pro­vide fast runtime of compiled programs.
Sentence 2: in frameworks similar to ours, Sharemind [10] provides parallelism only at the level of arrays, where multiple instances of an operation applied to each cell of the array are performed in a batch.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: And the SP can choose to block a misbehaving user for the rest of the month, or until the end of the week, or for the day, according to the severity of the damage the user caused.
Sentence 2: with the extension of multi-blacklists, SPs have freedom to block a die-hard vandal for as long as they want, and to cool down an edit war by temporarily blocking the editors involved for a short time period.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: An evaluation involving all signi.cant x86-32 Linux security patches from May 2005 to May 2008 .nds that most security patches 56 of 64 require no new code to be performed as a Ksplice update.
Sentence 2: ksplice can correct 88% of the Linux kernel vulnerabilities from this interval without the need for rebooting and without writing any new code.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For convenience, we denote the complete version of our so­lution as P.Complete.
Sentence 2: we disable both the interactive recom­mendation and the abnormality examination functionalities to cre­ate a plain pro.le-based recommender called Profile.Profile recommends recipients only once per .le shar­ing instance and does not examine user input for abnormality.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We say that the adversary Awins the game if the following two conditions hold: The decoder PD is perfect.
Sentence 2: for a randomly chosen m in the .nite message space, we have that Pr[PD(Encrypt(bk,m)) = m] = 1 (13) The set S is either empty, or is not a subset of T. We denote by TR Adv[A,TT (n,t)](.)
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.4.3 Latency hiding BottleCap, like any Flicker application, su.ers from prob­lems of latency.
Sentence 2: the combination of DRTM in­vocation, TPM unseal operations, and the inability to over­lap either of these with multiprocessing techniques results in a high performance penalty for the use of BottleCap.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: W is the set of weights w of different opinions, such that wi is the importance rate of .i on the evidence evi , or wi is the weight of opinion .i on an entity, where .i .. the set of opinions on an entity.
Sentence 2: []and .=1;  wi .0,1wi 4. x.y.z is the value of parameter z of y in x; e.g.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, for the attacker, the size of potential pro.le set (that may contain the target) under this de.nition is successfully decreased from n to k. To assess the identi.ability of D, we further count nk-, which is the number of pro.les that cannot be identi.ed from at most k other pro.les given seed information {attr1, ..., attrr}.
Sentence 2: for every possible value set {v1, ..., vr} in the seed attribute tuple space Rr , {v1,...,vr}{v1,...,vr} nk- = sum(IT ), for IT <k.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 6.3 RelationbetweenU-ProveandIdemix The signature schemes that underlie U-Prove and idemix are similar.
Sentence 2: they are both schemes that allow an issuer to (blindly)sign messages where the messages are algebraically en­coded as exponents of a representation of an element of an alge­braic group.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To achieve differential privacy for this query, we add a bit of noise to the output of the deterministic query.
Sentence 2: when thedeterministicquery returns a vector of real numbers, we can ap­ply the well-known Laplace mechanism [12]to analyze the under­lying function and apply the appropriate amount of random noise to achieve o-differentialprivacy.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We assume a unit-disc model for Wi-Fi communications, in which a user and an AP can communicate only if the dis­tance between them is lower than a given radius R, which is constant across all users and all APs.
Sentence 2: we as­sume that users cannot violate this model by, for example, in­creasing the transmission power of their devices.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since both sender and re­ceive follow the same protocol, our second set of experiment simply measures the performance overhead of remote attes­tation for the sender.
Sentence 2: for the CoCA, we mea­sure 1) the latency it generates a random nonce n, encrypts n with its AIK key and the sender s public key as a challenge c, and sends out c; 2)the latency it veri.es n, which return­s from sender.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The version P left Q discards the response from Q and returns the value from P.A typical use of this combinator in our algebra is to use Qas a continuation for the future with responses to policy queries, if any, coming from P. We have binary operators on policies corresponding to the boolean operations e.g., a binary combinator P or Q imposes the constraints of both P and Q but also yields a response to an access query that is the disjunction of the responses of the individual policies P and Q.
Sentence 2: an interesting combinator in this .avor is an over­riding combinator P def Q that overrides the results given by Q by those provided by P. the results of Q are used if P does not provide a response to the access request.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The history of the nuclear power activism suggests that now might be the time to broaden the scope of privacy issues, to use increased media coverage to link privacy issues to a variety of global concerns, to find common ground with existing activist organizations, and to take advantage of the modest, though significant, successes of welling popular social movements, such as resistance to the World Trade Organization and the biotech industry.
Sentence 2: we will attempt to answer the following questions: How philosophically and politi­cally expansive can privacy issues be?
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: First (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) = f(P1) - f(P2) - f(P3) + f(P4) = f(P1) - f(P2) - f(P5) + f(P6) - f(P7).
Sentence 2: next let C be an unauthorized set of the participant set P. C is a subset of P which is not equal(or does not contain) B1 or B2.
Relationship: entailment