sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As shown in Figure 2, be­fore the two paths reach the arbiter, we intentionally place extra delays within one of the paths.
Sentence 2: assuming we are mea­suring an m-bit PUF, and assuming the expected delay of each stage is D (since delays are distributed normally in the presence of process variation), the expectation of the total delay for each path is m × D. we intentionally add 0.1× m × D delay to one of the paths using our addi­tional architecture.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: void copy( char* src , char* dst ) { int i = 0; char curr = src [0]; while ( curr ) { dst[i] = curr; i ++; curr = src[i]; }} At run-time, no information about the array size is avail­able.
Sentence 2: most C-compilers will generate code that will allow a program to copy data beyond the end of an array.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Although in such applications the overhead is rather prohibitive, and cancels out the bene.ts of using a static mechanism, in other cases, such as for the cher and nginx servers, the overhead is within an accept­able 20%.
Sentence 2: it could be the case that IntFlow might be used as a runtime defense for certain types of applications, i.e., I/O-bound.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Fortunately, we have a new observation: while multi-threads for the same process share the same CR3 (threads share the same virtual address), each process at kernel level has a unique kernel stack (this is dynamically allocated) which can be used to isolate the thread execution context at kernel level.
Sentence 2: we propose to use CR3, process name, and kernel esp register (with a lower 12bits cleared by mask) together, to uniquely differentiate and isolate the .ne­grained thread execution context.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: ANu×NF and TNu×NF are matrices in which each row corresponds to a separate user and each column corresponds to a speci.c frequency identi­.ed by FNu×NF , a matrix of complex sinusoids at frequen­cies of interest.
Sentence 2: sk(a,b) contains the SMSE informa­tion at the bth frequency for the a th user.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For the stages that the mix pair does not complete in t90 minutes, the probability that they do complete within t99 minutes is at least 0.992 > 0.98.
Sentence 2: the probability that any given mix pair completes 90 99 90 99 the seven stages in less than 5t+2t= Dr(t,t)minutes is at least 0.982 > 0.96.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This, however, leads to a hypergeometric distribution of the underlying plain­texts for each ciphertext, yielding a very dominant peak, i.e., a very probable m.l.p., along the diagonal of domain and range [3, 4].
Sentence 2: instead of choosing functions uniformly from OPFD,R, we use construction schemes that have di.erent probabilities of drawing the di.erent OPFs.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: These overheads can grow ex­ponentially as client VMs are placed at deeper levels of nesting becauseoftheneedto emulatetraps withineach nestedhypervisor (e.g.,see [25, Section 3]).
Sentence 2: astraightforward combination of CloudVisor and XenBlanket will likely be unpalatable to clients.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: From this result, (logq)/ |q| is larger than q)-1 e 0.694.
Sentence 2: (logis (0.694 |q|)-1 and assuming e Figure 2: (logq)/ |q| e that the two factors of N have the same length, this value is (0.347 |N|)-1 .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Answer set semantics conceptually grounds the input program over all the values that the variables can take, ef­fectively constructing a proof tree, in which the paths from root to leaf constitute the answer sets for the model under considera­tion.
Sentence 2: it is possible to explore all possible sequences of events entailed by some starting state, re.ecting the intuition expressed in section 4.2.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Furthermore, a user who wishes to alter the bits which will be revealed by his card can simply run the protocol at home (acting as both warden and veri.er) some random number of times between 1 and t. This randomizes the round in which the card fails when actually interacting with a real veri.er.
Sentence 2: the veri.er (or even a misbehaving adversary controlling multiple veri.ers) cannot distinguish one user whose card has stopped cooperating from another whose card has stopped cooperating, when only seeing transcripts of the failing multi-round protocol executions.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: From the length of a parcel we can infer whether an application is reading a single entry or dumping the entire contacts database.
Sentence 2: we propose the following two features for parcels:  Length of received parcel: length of the parcel re­ceived by an application in bytes; and  Length of sent parcel: length of the parcel sent by an application in bytes.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Additionally, Lowe identi.ed a multiplicity attack on the Wide Mouthed Frog protocol [15], where the attacker either masquerades as A or S replaying messages from a previous run of the protocol within an appropriate time frame.
Sentence 2: principal B is lead into thinking that A is trying to estab­lish multiple sessions, whereas A has established only one session.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: By induction, this accounts for at least a p2 -(i-1).2 fraction of all possible rC s. The probability that a uniformly selected rC conditioned on E2 .Fi-1 will fail to decrypt the ith ciphertext query is Pr[¬GOODi|E2 .Fi-1] = .2 .
Sentence 2: p2-(i-1).2 we calculate that Pr[E2 .Fi] is at least p2 - i.2.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: {C1 .... .Cr¯-1} (1) The probability of this event can be expressed as: 8Q k(¯r-1) t kr¯-i < · if kr¯= n ni=1 n-i PADV(n,k, ¯= r,t) : 1 otherwise The .rst term on the left accounts for the probability that si is compromised before round r¯while the other terms rep­r resent the probability that sensors in Si ¯are compromised up-to round r¯.
Sentence 2: theprobability thatthetarget data remains unforged is: PCoMAC (n,k, ¯=1-PADV(n,k, ¯(2) r,t)r,t) Figure 2 plots this probability in a UWSN 100 sensors, where ADV can compromise k = 10 sensors per round.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To prevent ufrom establishing a common key with v, the attacker must com­promise at least one node in each pair; otherwise, it is still possible to establish a pairwise key between node uand v through multiple rounds of path discovery process.
Sentence 2: in this case, the attacker 1If t+1shares of one bivariate polynomial are compromised, there is no need to remember more compromised sensor IDs, because the polynomial is already compromised.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This term encloses cases where an insider is unaware of the sensitivity of the data which he deals with, or is unaware that some classified material got mixed with the unclassified message or media which he prepares.
Sentence 2: and despite common security measures, sensitive data may escape the organization's boundaries through an insider's unintentional or at least without deliberate malicious intention.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: According to Lemma 4.8, if p(n) |a1 then the distribution is exponentially close to TM*,t(M).On the other hand, if p(n) fa1, Lemma 4.6 says that the dis­tribution is exponentially close to the uniform distribution UM* .
Sentence 2: we can decide with non-negligible proba­bility if p(n) |a1 by calling an algorithm that distinguishes between TM*,t(M) and UM* .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Nev- ertheless, we show that under the assumption that one-way functions exist, there exist (natural) functionalities for which the following holds: Every secure protocol for computing these functionalities that remains secure when self-composed m times and is proven using black-box simulation, must have more than m rounds of communication [3].
Sentence 2: protocols that remain (black-box) secure for any concurrent number of executions do not exist for these functionalities.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, it can be dif.cult tofairly compare symbolic execution tools on an end-to-end basis, because of differences in input assumptions and search heuristics.
Sentence 2: we con.ne our evaluation to the last stage of vulner­ability search by starting both our tool and an SPSE tool with a program input that reaches the line of code where a vulnerability occurs, but does not exploit it.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Considering the two node (worst) case, Let Pc =1 - P j/h be the probability nc that one node fails to detect energy in one minislot when the other node is ON , where P j=1 - b/h.And we nc have Pa = P m .
Sentence 2: suppose P j=0.5and h =4, then c nc Pc =0.875, m = 2 (two FH minislots) should su.ce.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Interestingly, the e.ectiveness of this worm monitoring system [14] strongly depends on ob­taining the information of the underlying vulnerable­host group distribution in /8 subnets and /16 subnets.
Sentence 2: the weapon race between the attackers and the defenders relies on how each side can collect and pro­cess the information of vulnerable-host distribution.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 21a+b,15a+7b,13a+9b,4a+18b,2a+20b =4 a+ 21b, 7a+ 5b, 9a+ 13b, 18a + 4b, 20a+ 2b.
Sentence 2: for m= 5, n= 6 we will have: 1. a+2b,4a+2b,6a+9b,12a+9b,14a+16b,17a+16b =5 2a+b,2a+4b,9a+6b,9a+12b,16a+14b,16a+17b.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In contrast, Hazay and Lindell [9] need to introduce additional modi.cations in order to deal with such repeats in the text.
Sentence 2: our resulting protocol for pattern matching makes only a single call to the underlying sub-protocol for OPRF, whereas the Hazay-Lindell protocol for pattern matching requires n-m+1 calls to an underlying OPRF protocol.4 More generally, we can use keyword search for secure com­putation of any text-processing task of the following form: P1 holds a text T , and P2 holds a pattern p; the goal is for P2 to learn {f(T,i) | Ti = p} for an arbitrary function f .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As mentioned in section I, there are several de.nitions of personal information which have been taken into consideration in the technological de.nition in this work.
Sentence 2: not only attributes of an individual such as height, weight, social security number, .ngerprint, health record, credit card history, criminal record and so on are considered personal information, but also the sole occur­rence of actions of an agent could be considered as personal information.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: INTRODUCTION Many sensor systems are deployed in unattended and of­ten adversarial environments.Hence, security mechanisms that provide con.dentiality and authentication are critical for the operation of many sensor applications.Providing se­curity is particularly challenging in sensor networks due to the resource limitations of sensor nodes.As a speci.c exam­ple, it is not practical to use asymmetric cryptosystems in a sensor network where each node consists of a slow (4 MHz) under-powered processor with only 8 KB of memory [22].
Sentence 2: key management protocols for sensor networks are based upon symmetric key algorithms.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Non-ROP shellcode does not usually mix code and data to­gether in such a special way (it may do so with immediates as operands of instructions, which will be discussed in Sec­tion 4.5).
Sentence 2: deRop relocates such data to another location in memory, e.g., see the last 20 bytes of the initial results presented in Table 1.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The save instruc­tion prologue of the subroutine slides the register window, mapping %o0-7 to the %i0-7 input registers.
Sentence 2: for our gadget, we have two options: (1) set up %o0-5 and jump into the full function (with the save), or (2) set up %i0-5 and jump to the function after the save.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Right: Average SignatureVeri.cation Time (2048 bit) increases when D increases depending on the bit length of the modulus.
Sentence 2: the cost for malicious nodes to gen­erate signature that pass the initial divisibility test can be set by choosing suitable values for D. The three graphs for veri.cation show the average processing time for a single signature.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, bigger size of S(k) causes an increase of both storage space to keep pre-computed primes and processing time for the sieve procedure.
Sentence 2: one of the goals when optimizing a prime finding algorithm is to find the optimal point of using a siev¢ algorithm that uses the largest S(k) possible keeping a small overhead One or the most used sieve methods is the trial division method [3].
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Due to the 64K (0x10000) Windows memory allocation granularity, a 512K-byte heap object covering the address 0x0c0c0c0c can only start from 0x0c050000, 0x0c060000, ..., 0x0c0c0000.
Sentence 2: the offset of the address 0x0c0c0c0c0 inside the object have eight possible values: 0x70c0c, 0x60c0c, ..., 0x00c0c.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: On loading a block into an already full set, some other entry must be evicted.
Sentence 2: if sender and receiver have access to (disjoint) blocks of memory that map to the same cache set, the sender can 2http://ssrg.nicta.com.au/software/TS/channel_tools/  evict the receiver s blocks from the cache by touching its own (load­ing them into the cache).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This is at the root of the kernel rootkits: once some malicious codes are loaded into the kernel, they can read, write and execute whatever they want in the kernel with the highest privilege.
Sentence 2: in this research, we design a native hy­pervisor, Barrier, based on the hardware-supported memory virtualization to isolate the address spaces of di.erent kernel modules so as to enhance the kernel integrity.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.3 Memory Consumption Measuring the memory consumption of a Java program is fuzzy, since released ob jects remain on the heap until the garbage collector deletes them and the garbage collector it­self is managed by the Java virtual machine.
Sentence 2: the heap contains not only the currently used objects but also already released ones and therefore the size of the heap will be greater or equal to the size of the currently used objects.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Wereognizethatausermayplaydiferentrolesindifer­entgroups,e.g.a"developer"ofthegroup"network"may temporarilyalsobea"programmer"ofthegroup"rypto".
Sentence 2: iftheaessrightswouldonlyrefertoarole,thisuserwould begrantedaesstoobjetsofthegroup"rypto"whihare restritedtotherole"developer"ofthisgroup.Thismaybe undesirable.Thustheaessrights,orlimitations,forapar­tiularpersonwillbespeifedw.r.t.hisorhermembership inagroup,projetteamet.everyaess rightwillbespeifedtoapplytoapair((r0 ),(gr0up)).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Com­mercial security products, such as TippingPoint X505 [20] and security appliances from Cisco Systems [21] also use regular expressions.
Sentence 2: several specialized hardware-based regular expressions matching architectures have been proposed [15,16,17] and specialized commercial engines like RegEx from Tarari [22] report packet scan rates up to 4 Gbps.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To estimate the speci.c symbol di(n) of the desired user, i =1, 2, ..., .
Sentence 2: , take the same procedure as in MC-CDMA systems di(n)= Ci(n)HZi(n)/GMD ei(n)= di(n) -Ci(n)HZi(n)/GMD the code update equation can be formulated as a * Ci(n +1) = Ci(n)+ Zi(n) ei (n) GMD where a is the step-size and GMD is the spreading code length.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When round subkey is calculated, the following principle is used: from round 1 to round 24 the order is straight, (K1, K2, K3, K4, K5, K6, K7, K8, K1, K2, etc); from round 25 to round 32 reversed order is used (K8, K7, K6, K5, K4, K3, K2, K1).
Sentence 2: it appears that the same subkey K1 is used at both the first and the last rounds.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: During the channel establishment, A sets g gsern scocm f mpg m s ) ) ocdcdcdco gsernp ocm f mpg m ) ) N : s s ; g ) and sends N to the server.
Sentence 2: a -SS::Np;rSC-A : sei g s N ; adversary A could obtain the signature value corresponding to a WS-security token A forged.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If we assume that attackers can gain physical access to computer systems for which we want to provide secure com­puting environment, we must assume that all o.-chip hard­ware components and all software components are vulnera­ble to both passive (eavesdropping) attacks as well as active attacks.
Sentence 2: the goal of a secure computing environ­ment on untrusted computing node is to provide privacy (a guarantee that plaintext of code or data will not be leaked to the adversary) and integrity (a guarantee that program behavior or data cannot be modi.ed by the adversary).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: C and generate 30 different entities by appending 50 more random terms.
Sentence 2: the total number of entities is |E|= 3000; each entity e has 100 terms in its context (|C(e)|=100), of which a subset of 50 terms overlap with 29 other entities and the remaining set of 50 terms may have random partial overlaps.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We state that a subject label s depends upon a helper subject, if: (1) the two subject labels are part of the same application (e.g., package) and (2) the helper subject s executable writers are in the application or trusted by s. Identifying that two sub­ject labels are part of the same application is often easy be­cause MAC policies are now written per application.
Sentence 2: we compute an integrity wall for each subject that partitions the set of MAC policy labels P based on whether the subject depends on the label or not, based on the above criteria.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: First, after an adversary creates a faked identity by forging attributes similar to that of the victim, some victim s friends may add the faked one as their friend without noticing any suspicion, while some of them may notice such attacks and add the genuine one.
Sentence 2: some of the victim s friends are in the FL of the faked identity, whereas some of his friends are in FL of the authentic identity of the victim.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When query dependency is considered as part of the adversary s knowledge, the adversary s uncertainty of the issuer of (r, t, q) can be measured by the following entropy: L Hn n ' (U |(r, t, q))= - p (u |(r, t, q), Ot)· u .u£(r,t) log p n(u ' |(r, t, q), Ot).
Sentence 2: we can de.ne query-dependent ß-EBA as follows: DE FINIT ION 2.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Although Identity-base Public Key Cryptography (ID-PKC)[4] was introduced to eliminate the dependency from explicit certi.cates, it has a key escrow problem because the Key Generation Center (KGC) stores the private keys of all users.
Sentence 2: we apply the concept of Certi.cateless Public Key Cryptography (CL-PKC)[2] to resolve those drawbacks for the AMI.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: si si r s2 s2 rr |gni|2  Then, the achievable SNR in (7) can be rewritten as NNN ainpi ainbin SNRi(pi)= = ain - , (8)bin + pi bin + pi n=1 n=1 n=1 which can be easily veri.ed to be a concave, nondecreasing function in the positive region of pi.
Sentence 2: log2(1+SNRi)is also a concave function in pi [8].
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since {pi' (v)}i=1,...,m are picked randomly, we have H({pi(v)}i=1,...,m|{Si " }U.B, B1, ..., Bm) i " =H({pi(v)}i=1,...,m).
Sentence 2: h(Sv|{Si " }U.B, B1, ..., Bm)=H({pi(v)}i=1,...,m) i " = m logq.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The distribution D could capture the uncertainty of the adversary about the document D conditioned on the auxiliary information of the adversary about the document.
Sentence 2: if we want to guarantee the security of our scheme un­der any auxiliary information (e.g., knowing only half of the document), as long as there is d(log n) bits of uncertainty about the .nal version of the document, we can construct secure timestamping schemes under the assumption that the used hash functions are also secure under any index distri­bution with super-logarithmic min-entropy.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Secondly, we face an interactive and interconnected system where context information like time, location, access his­tory, for instance, frequently determines the access control decision [11].
Sentence 2: in order to enforce the context­aware and .ne-grained access control policies, permissions and permission assignment should support context informa­tion like the attribute from user, from ob ject to be accessed, or from the relationship between user and ob ject.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The fact that si remained after the states were combined indicates that j did not become aware of any event that happened-after last event of w, because otherwise the sub-state would have been removed from the combined state (Algorithm 1 lines 25-26).
Sentence 2: w remained an LPHB sequence even after the receiving of the message and thus for the sub-states originated from Sj the claim holds.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: DESCRIPTION OF ZUC STREAM CIPHER The internal state of ZUC [9] consists of a 16-stage LFSR (s0,s1,...,s15) and two internal memory states R1 and R2, with each register stage containing 31 bits and each memory state containing 32 bits.
Sentence 2: the total internal state size is 560 bits.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If the initiating process want to read a .le on the receiving processes machine, it will be assumed that the initiating process will write the request to the socket, the receiving process will read the .le, and write the contents back to the socket, which the initiating process can read.
Sentence 2: if the request was to create a new socket, a new socket would be created, and communication can oc­cur through multiple machines.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This method is associated with a new element Assertion-ConfirmationType, which constrains a SubjectConfirma­tionData element to contain one or more AssertionPat­ternType elements.
Sentence 2: when an Assertion is marked with the Holder-of-Assertion Subject Con.rmation method, it indicates that the Attesting Party needs to prove that it is the Subject of the Assertion by presenting a set of Asser­tions, which satisfy the pattern which is captured in the As­sertionPatternType element, within the SubjectConfir­mationData.
Relationship: reasoning