sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We suspect that a number of factors a.ect the incorpora­tion of information into users mental models.
Sentence 2: these factors may be important for home computer users decision to in­corporate new information into their mental models: -Content: information about threats vs. behaviors [2, 24] -Source: friends, other people like me, experts, or un­ familiar strangers [5, 16] -Format: stories vs. policies vs. explicit advice [44] -Valence: positive vs. negative cases [5] -Intensity: emotional vs. not [37]  -Style: .gurative vs. literal language [21] we suspect that: a) Stories about threats have a larger in.uence on mental models than behavioral ad­vice; and b) Information from friends and colleagues have a stronger in.uence on mental models than information from strangers or experts.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The authorization of a requested action by the client agent becomes meaningful if and only if an intention to perform the action and an empowerment to so act exist for a server agent.
Sentence 2: a client agent c cannot be authorized by a server agent y to perform an action a unless there is an intention by y to perform the act a for c and y is empowered to perform the act a for c. Intentions and empowerments can be viewed as part of a richer interpretation of the notion of authorization; speci.cally, intentions and empowerments may be interpreted as preconditions for autho­rization.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Thus, in order to deter­mine whether to grant a data access for a certain access pur­pose, the system must consider both the intended purpose explicitly associated with the data object and the implicit intended purposes inherited to the data object.
Sentence 2: the system accepts a query if and only if the access purpose of the query is compliant to the e.ective intended purpose of the requested data object.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this section we show that the previous scheme can be modi.ed in order to achieve function privacy.
Sentence 2: if we see the polynomial Before the speci.cations of the scheme, we shall make a .­nal observation: due to the noise growth of the BGV scheme summarized in lemma 1 (for D = 1), in order to achieve cor­rectness of the result to be decoded by the client, we need q t 1.5 to be larger than 2 · p · x · s · n , where x is the evaluation point of the scheme.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Inparticular,if we expectthatthe results ofqueries willgrow approximatelylinearly with the number N of end-users in the database, then we could getuseful resultsevenif thenoisewasproportional tothenumber of end-users.
Sentence 2: even if we choose e tobe aslow as 1/N, Theorem 2.1 tells us that the noise s = ./e ~ N. will be acceptablein this model.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Overall, the tracing algorithm makes a total of O(f) calls to the pirate decoder PD.Using Tardos s t-collusion resis­tant code we have f = O(t2 log(n/E)) = O(t2.log n)and therefore the total number of queries to PD is `´ # PD queries = Ot 2.log(n) We note that this tracing algorithm is minimal access as de.ned at the end of appendix A.
Sentence 2: the tracing algo­rithm does not need access to the decrypted message from PD.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this section, we will examine the expressiveness of E by identifying what family of rela­tional policies are de.nable in E. We will .rst establish, in Section 4.1, an upper bound of the policies de.nable in  E: i.e., identifying a natural family of ReBAC policies to which every E-de.nable policy belongs.
Sentence 2: we will then estab­lish, in Section 4.2, a lower bound of the expressiveness of E. we will identify a natural subclass of relational policies that are de.nable in E. In other words, we estab­lish the representational completeness of E with respect to that subclass of relational policies.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Taking advantage of this SMS spam reporting mechanism, we collect one year of spam reports from a large cellular carrier in the US from June 2011 to May 2012 which contains approximately 543K spam messages  and, together with anonymized SMS net­work records collected from the same network associated with the reported spam numbers (over 78K), carry out an extensive analy­sis of SMS spam.
Sentence 2: by grouping spam messages us­ing text clustering tools, we identify many large and long-lasting spam campaigns.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: What makes XACML v3 an inter­esting access control mechanism to investigate is that it uses two decision sets.
Sentence 2: it uses the four-valued deci­sion set of XACML v2 [1] in which indeterminacy is repre­sented using a single decision value; in addition, it introduces an extended set for indeterminacy to represent the poten­tial decision to be returned if there would not have been an error causing the indeterminacy.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The parent node of Ak is the previous node of the .rst node in Ak-1 if Ak is not empty.
Sentence 2: ak =(a1,...,ak-2,ak-1; ik,c -1) is followed by Ak-1 = (a1,...,ak-2; ak-1 +1,jk-1).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Speci.cally, Figure 6(a) shows that the corresponding virtual disk of the honeypot VM is externally in­terpreted and transparently represented as a local Z: drive; while Figure 6(b) reports 21 infected .les in the VM.
Sentence 2: among those infected .les, there is a rootkit named SHv4 [47], which re­places a number of system-wide utility commands (e.g., ps, ls, if­con.g, netstat, and syslogd etc.)
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Q] < 1/poly(k) where * =0and Q is the set of pairs (m, s) such that A queried Osign (0,m) and obtained s. Bidirectional: Since both parties are delegators, this prop­erty does not apply.
Sentence 2: 3.Delegator Security: If the delegator is honest, then she is safe from a colluding delegatee and proxy.there are distinguishable signatures for a user based on whether she used her strong secret key or her weak secret key.The colluding delegatee and proxy cannot produce strong (a.k.a., .rst-level) signatures on her behalf.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Visualizing Your Key for Secure Phone Calls and Language Independence Michael Oehler Dhananjay Phatak John Krautheim Department of Computer Science and Electrical Engineering University of Maryland Baltimore County, Baltimore, Maryland, USA {michael.oehler, phatak, john.krautheim}@umbc.edu ABSTRACT We present a method to visualize and authenticate a cryp­tographically negotiated key for a secure phone call.
Sentence 2: each caller is presented with a graphical representation of the key and through verbal interaction (i.e., side-channel au­thentication) they describe what they see.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Sensitivity: If x is a randomly chosen object and z is a random white noise with variance more than ss 2 , then Detect(x + z, Enc(x)) gives no with probability more than 1 - Es.
Sentence 2: if an object is corrupted by some noise with level less than sr, then with high probability, the detec­tor should declare that the object is authentic if it is robust.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: ANY STRONGLY SUBLIMINAL-FREE PROTOCOL ACHIEVES GOALS In this section, we observe that any protocol which meets the de.nition of a strongly subliminal-free multi-round zero­knowledge proof of know ledge does in fact achieve our stated system goals.
Sentence 2: any protocol meeting this de.nition can be used as part of a biometric-based non-transferable anonymous credential system.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: graph G =(V, E) is a model of the IFC system and we call it the IFC graph.
Sentence 2: from this graph we derive the binary relation T , read as transmits , where Tt(v1,v2) is true iff edge (v1,v2)t is in E. Tt(v1,v2) is true iff vertex v1 sends data tagged t to vertex v2.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: These include forward-secure group signature schemes [35], key insulated signatures [15, 16], and intrusion resilient signature schemes [22], combining the bene.ts of forward-secure and key­insulated signatures.
Sentence 2: intrusion resilient schemes have the advantage that if the key is exposed for some number of time periods, signatures in all other time periods (not just the past ones) are still valid.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Hence each linear extension allows us to discard either (.i,s,s 1)or (.j ,s 1 ,s) (since exactly one of them will be irrelevant to the schedule de.ned by the linear extension), thus de.ning an instance of WSP that contains fewer constraints than the original problem.
Sentence 2: we may consider our instance of OWSP1 to be the disjunction of k!
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: (4) |S| s The entire procedure repeats the loop r times, and the probability of obtaining 1 every time is r 2 1 Ps |fa) , |S| s in which case the .nal state (on the .rst two registers) is (r 5 r 1 |fa) Ps |S| s (r. 5 r 1 |fa) Ps |S| s To get some intuition about what states might pass even the .rst iteration of this test with reasonable prob­ 5 ability (4), note that the state 1 P s|fa) can only |S| s have norm close to 1 if most of its terms add coherently.
Sentence 2: most of the P s|fa) must be nearly the same (they are all exactly the same for good quantum money).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Microhypervisor-based approaches: We discussed two notable microhypervisors, NOVA [27] and Trustvisor [19], as well as seL4 [15] in the introduction.
Sentence 2: seL4 is a promising approach that uses formal veri.cation to in­troduce a vulnerability-free microkernel, though it cannot be extended to commodity hypervisors due to its restric­tions (e.g., it should run with interrupts mostly disabled).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: With these (valid but arti.cial) choices of Extract and G, we can keep the same distribution sampler D and the at­tacker A as in the simpli.ed BH example.
Sentence 2: now, however, we observe that the state S always remains equal to 0n, ir­respective of whether is it updated with I = or I = , 0p 1p ' = G ' since the new state S (S .Extract(I)) = G ' (0n .0n) = 0n = S. we have not gained even a single bit of entropy into S, which clearly breaks backward security in this case as well!
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To that end, we formulate the problem of emulating emulation­resistant malware in terms of its environment observations, and propose an approach of comparison-based state modi.cation that modi.es the execution state of a malware sample to simulate a dif­ferent environment and so thwart the sample s anti-emulation tech­niques.
Sentence 2: our approach diagnoses the source of anti­emulation behavior by comparing an execution of a sample on an emulation-based analysis tool to its execution on a more transpar­ent reference system that would be impractical to use directly for analysis.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our access activity model is a single policy derived and abstracted from the observation of how a broad set of diverse applications interact with the operating system in general.
Sentence 2: while SELinux-style policies at­tempt to minimize the damage that a compromised applica­tion can cause, our policies attempt to distinguish between malicious and benign applications based on the way they interact with the OS.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In our study, for the purpose of privacy guarantees, zones coresidence is a many to one mapping between an IP address, and the zones that it hosts.
Sentence 2: zones hosted on a single machine, which is assigned N network interface cards (NICs), each mapped to a distinct domain name (or a set of domains), e.g., via virtual IP address allocation or by means of multiple NICs, are not considered coresident.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The work [51] was (implic­itly) clear of this situation, and such a problem is ruled out, by de.nition, by simply de.ning two sessions ( B, X, Y ) A, and ( A, Y , X ) to be matching, no matter whether the two B, players have matching roles or not.
Sentence 2: two sessions with adversary interference under a cross-message attack [25] are de.ned to be matching.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Given any family of collision-resistant hash functions CH and any fam­ily of sequential hash functions SH we construct a time-lock puzzle scheme that is secure for a puzzle distribution D as­suming that CH and SH are both secure when their index s is sampled from the same distribution D. The veri.cation time for our time-lock puzzle (and the cor­responding timestamping scheme) can be poly-logarithmic in the time it takes to solve the puzzle, and the soundness time-gap (the ratio between the running time of the honest solver and that of a successful adversarial solver) is bounded by a constant.
Sentence 2: our honest solver evaluates the hash function N times, and any adversary whose solution is ac­cepted by an honest veri.er must have used time propor­tional to c · N sequential evaluations of the hash function for a constant c. Our construction is fully black box (in the terminology of [RTV04]).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When a sequence representing an attack is discovered, the problem of re.ning the model is reduced to the problem of re.nement of a predicate abstraction, and can be addressed by several techniques developed in the literature.
Sentence 2: the techniques developed in [28]and [29] that de.ne the problem of re.nement of a predicate abstraction as the problem of eliminating nondeterminism in an abstract state graph.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While the number of possible channels is open-ended, we have opted to focus on L2 cache covert channels as described in prior work [31] for a variety of reasons: (i) it arguably has the highest potential bit rate as the time needed to make a contention measurement with modern L2 cache is on the scale of milliseconds, but the reported rate in prior work was very small, (ii) prior work only discussed such chan­nels in brief and did not provide an in-depth analysis of the mechanisms involved and their e.ects, both qualitative and quantitative, in various settings, (iii) reproducing these results bolsters con.dence in previous experimental results and allows for an exploration of changes to EC2 allocation and placement strategies since the initial work.
Sentence 2: the L2 cache-based information encoding scheme proposed by Ristenpart et al.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Filling the functional insufficiency by profiling and signal processing techniques, the portable setup can perform a real-time EM display stealing comparable to conventional non-portable setups.
Sentence 2: we apply a prior course profiling to a target and derive an accurate image by signal processing, which makes the system robust to individual difference, eliminates the time for estimating leakage parameters, and enables to steal information immediately by loading the leakage parameter.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Generally, image-based authentication can be divided into three categories based on their input methods: namely click­based graphical passwords, choice-based graphical passwords and draw-based graphical passwords.
Sentence 2: the click­based schemes require users to click on the provided image(s) (i.e., choosing an object or element of the image), the choice­based schemes require users to select a series of images (i.e., selecting images in an order), and the draw-based schemes require users to draw some secrets to be authenticated (i.e., drawing a user signature).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To accomplish this, we leverage the tendency of theXen credit scheduler togive the highest run priority to a VCPU that receives an interrupt.
Sentence 2: upon receiving an interrupt, the attacker VCPU will preempt another guest VCPU running on the PCPU, provided that it is not also running with that highest pri­ority(as a compute-bound victimwould notbe).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The tags simply reply with a few random bits signifying the tag has chosen that slot.
Sentence 2: instead of the reader receiving { | id1 | 0 |...| collision | 0 | }, where 0 indicates no tag has picked that slot to reply, and collision denotes multiple tags trying to reply in the same slot, the reader will receive { | random bits | 0 | | random bits | 0 | } resources.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 6.2 Categorization of Fraud Activities After removing duplicated instances, we match the fraud number candidates from our .ve months of detection results against the online userfeedback to categorize di.erent types of fraud.
Sentence 2: we run queries for all fraud num­ber candidates through popular online search engines and extract user comments regarding these numbers based on the search results.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.2 Features We train a support vector machine with a collection of robust features that discern between good and bad PIPs.
Sentence 2: feature Descriptions Population size The number of accounts Request size The number of requests Request per account The number of requests per account New account rate The percentage of accounts appear only in the last x days Account request dis­tribution The distribution of the number of requests per account Account stickiness dis­tribution The distribution of the number of PIPs associated with an account Table 2: Population features we propose three sets of quantitative features that can be automatically derived from online service logs.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: SYSTEM DESIGN Our general approach is to build RecDroid with four functional processes, of which two are on mobile clients and the remaining two are on remote servers.
Sentence 2: recDroid (1) collects users permission-request responses, (2) analyses the responses to eliminate untruthful and bias responses, (3) suggests other users with low-risk responses to permission requests, and (4) ranks apps based on their security and privacy risk level inferred from users responses.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 1.1 The Problem A major obstacle to implementing all these applications, how­ever, is the problem of replay attacks.
Sentence 2: in an of.ine context and without some form of trusted component, it is impossible to prevent the holder of a count-limited certi.cate from reverting his machine s state and reusing the certi.cate beyond its limits with different disconnected parties.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As a result, the client is able to to send pack­ets at a faster rate than it does under a Linux router, Second, the CTCP architecture allows the processing of a packet and the transmission of the next packet to proceed simultaneously.
Sentence 2: when the client checks the validity of an ACK packet of a previously sent packet, say P., and prepares for the next outgoing packet, say P., the CTCP router could process P. simultaneously.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Hence, we claim that the problem of specifying an ac­cess control policy can be seen as .rst associating utility values with accesses and/or states (instead of simple bad or good values) and then optimizing the decision making process for a sequence of requests while taking into account uncertainty over the next request in the sequence, the ef­fect of each decision and the current state of the system.
Sentence 2: the access control decision problem can be re­duced to a decision problem, and analysed in a quantitative way.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This approach simpli.es the administration work, while reducing the threat of a rogue administrator transferringkeys to an untrusteddevice.
Sentence 2: one possible criticism to our de.nition is that it does not con­siderwhathappenstothecontentsof the .leafterdecryption.if the device d is malicious(orisinfected with malicious soft­ware),it could simplybroadcastthecontents afterdecryption.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 2.1 App Developers Next, we re.ne our model of the spectrum of involvement by the app developers adding support for IA.
Sentence 2: we consider two levels of developer interest in IA frame­works: Cursory interest: app developers who only want to add support for IA to their apps without tuning its accuracy or providing any application-speci.c behaviour.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Different from the existing framework that centralizes privacy policy management and enforcement at the DSMS server, our framework leverages the resource at the data provider site for privacy control.
Sentence 2: the DSMS server remains the func­tionality of continuous and analytical query optimization and pro­cessing and applies a part of access control to meet system-level requirement, while data providers will f lter their data tuples based on their own privacy requirement and sends only the useful and qualif ed tuples to the server.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Any attempt of the adversary to subvert the valid execution path can be represented as a deviation from the CFG, which re­sults in a so-called control-.ow or runtime attack.
Sentence 2: figure 1 illustrates two typical control-.ow attacks at BBL3: (1) a code injection attack, and (2) a code reuse attack.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this paper, we focus on the application state preserving against the application-target attacks launched from com­promised drivers.
Sentence 2: the attackers .rst craft ex­ploit code to speci.c driver vulnerability, and then lever­age the privilege of the driver to unscrupulously and unde­tectably manipulate the service application for commercial bene.ts.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Each possible execution set in a non-deterministic work.ow speci.cation gives rise to a di.erent, deterministic work.ow speci.cation.
Sentence 2: given a work.ow speci.cation W =(S, E) with execution sets {S1,...,Sm}, we de.ne Wi =(Si,Ei), where  def Ei =(Si ×Si) nE.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The .rst is that formal methods detailed, machine-checked proofs of critical properties have now matured to the point where they can play a key role in the design of serious systems.
Sentence 2: we know how to write formal speci.cations of the semantics of full-blown instruction sets and of the higher-level abstractions provided by high-level programming languages and software services, and we can build machine-checkable proofs that each layer is correctly implemented by the software running on the layers beneath it.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 1.1 Our Results Our main result is the .rst upper bound on the value of C(E): a t C(E) = 1 - O H(E) .
Sentence 2: for small enough E, this gives the .rst separa­tion between interactive and non-interactive channel capac­ity, answering an open problem by Schulman [6].
Relationship: entailment