sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: [6], [44] Further, the physical, managerial, and sta.ng contexts within which the election technologies are deployed will not be static.
Sentence 2: internet voting: the potential to increase voter turnout rates ... o.ers many advantages over the conventional pa­per-based electoral systems, including mobility and convenience for voters, greater speed and ac­curacy in the counting process, prevention of in­voluntary voting errors, better accessibility, lower costs, support of multiple languages, greater .ex­ibility, etc.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this paper, we propose a privacy preserving protocol that assesses signal quality and combines this with a linear classi.er used to decide whether the measured signal is of high enough quality or not.
Sentence 2: evaluating the quality of a non-referenced signal is a di.cult problem for which only a few solutions are known even in the plain do­main (see [15, 3] for example).
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: dinality or over the threshold cardinality, multiset element reduction, and others.
Sentence 2: we measure performance of a protocol in the current setting in terms of two parameters: (i) the number of interactive oper­ations (multiplications, distributing shares of a private value or opening a secret-shared value) necessary to perform the computation and (ii) the number of sequential interactions, i.e., rounds.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For X in G1, X denotes for the element in G2 that log X = log X where logarithms are with respect to default bases SPS.Vrf (vk, s, msg ): Parse s as (opk , so, sr), so as (Z, R).
Sentence 2: since UC-ACOT functionality prevents users from pooling their credentials (every user has a unique secret key embedded into each of her credentials), we have to consider multiple users here, some of which are corrupted, and some of which are honest.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Efforts to overcome it are considered low, since solutions mostly rely on conducting an extensive survey to gain the needed understanding (SEVERITY: Low).
Sentence 2: 1) Be1 Cost reductions, is classified as: NATURE Organizational, IMPACT - Primary, and BENEFICIARY  Internal, and TARGET Process; and 2) Be15 Improved communications between government agencies, is classified as: NATURE Inter-Organizational, IMPACT - Secondary, and BENEFICIARY Internal.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If It entities have been infected at time t, the KM model shows that It satis.es the logistic equation, where N0 is the number of all entities, a = rN , and T = 1 ln(N - 1).
Sentence 2: thepa­pershowsthat memoryfaultattacksinsensorsarenotjust the same as in regular computers due to sensor s hardware and software architecture.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: One big reason that these systems are small is the fact that they are research prototypes and do not contain complete support for all possible applications one might want to use them for.
Sentence 2: this is be­cause compromising the OS kernel neither allows the attacker to change the processor hardware nor the binary format speci.cation used by the system, since both of these are independent of the ker­nel implementation.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Each of these blocks is a fully synchronous dual-port (True Dual Port) 4096-bit RAM with independent control signals for each port.
Sentence 2: mEXICO balderas@inaoep.mx  ABSTRACT This paper presents two novel and high performance hard­ware architectures, implemented in FPGA technology, for the KASUMI block cipher; this algorithm lies at the core of the con.dentiality and integrity algorithms de.ned for the Universal Mobile Telecommunication System (UMTS) stan­dard.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: prm(Kds, R, do), pca(Kds,Kdu, C, P ), arca(Kds, read, R, C, P ), not arcd(Kds, read, R, C, P ).
Sentence 2: we regard privacy as essentially a con.dentiality­preserving problem that demands that extensions to existing access control models be developed.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, both analysis (Section 3) and simulations (Section 4) show that even without special provisioning a substantial number of keys are left unused on key rings.
Sentence 2: this solution requires pre-distribution and storage of n - 1 keys ineachsensor node, and n(n - 1)/2 per DSN, which renders it impracti­cal for DSNs using, say, more than 10,000 nodes, for both intrinsic and technological reasons.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, to .nd a tap point that can be used to notify the hypervisor whenever a URL is entered in a browser, one can visit a known sequence of URLs, and then monitor all tap points, searching for speci.c byte sequences that make up those URLs.
Sentence 2: locating a tap point at which system-wide .le accesses can be observed is of considerable importance.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: De.ne the Markov chain on the graph G following the transition matrix P which is de.ned according to P = [pij ]n×n where: 1 , vi ~ vj deg(vi ) pij =(3) 0 otherwise A unique stationary distribution is de.ned for the Markov chain over the transition probabilities de.ned above if the Markov chain is ergodic requiring it to be both irreducible and aperiodic [13].
Sentence 2: other as­sumptions in social network-based systems, like binary trust [10], edge directionality [12], and expansion properties [11] are previ­ously consider and challenged in separate studies.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, any ob­servations about computer attacks or malware propagation characteristics revealed from some large months-long tra.c dump from East-Asian Tier-2 ISP may turn out to be un­observable at the same Tier-2 level but in Northern Europe because of regional di.erences in distribution of popular applications, social networks and so on.
Sentence 2: tRUST 14 June 09-11 2014, Edinburgh, United Kingdom Copyright is held by the owner/author(s).
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Thus, a new mobile identi.cation recognition system is expecting to be developed to solve those security issues in mobile commerce applications.
Sentence 2: s3311235@student.rmit.edu.au fengling.han@rmit.edu.au ABSTRACT Touch-based .ngerprint sensor has been used in the mobile device, which can easily be hacked by an individual fake .ngerprint .
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This choice enables us to model policies such as separation of duty.
Sentence 2: (p2 : f) maps the the authorization state ((Cathy, jRecord, {readRequest, writeRequest}), (Vinti, jRecord, {readRequest}), (Bill, jRecord, {readRequest})) to the au­thorization state ((Cathy, jRecord, {read, write}), (Vinti, jRecord, {read}), (Bill, jRecord, {readRequest})) the policy expressed in parts 1 and 2 can be ex­pressed as p1;(p2 : f).
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (May 2006), pp.
Sentence 2: when each node n of the CDG is processed, the set of propagated hooks that reach n represent the hooks that control dominate n. if a hook placed at node n is in the set of propagated hooks then that hook can be safely removed without violating the complete­ness guarantee.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We can now model the e.ect of deception attack on sensor measurements as boundary control actions that switch among a set of modes Q= {1,..., N} according to a piece s(t) s(t) .+(0,t)=GL .-(0,t),.-(X,t)=GR .+(X,t), (22) We conclude that the switching hyperbolic system (21), (17),(22)models the adversary s action onwaterwithdrawal from o.takes and deception attack on sensor measurements.
Sentence 2: and t = 315 min, this time under the in.uence of adver­sary s action.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In implementations of DL-based proofs, the CPU time required to compute powers (exponentiation) and products of powers (multi­exponentiation) dominates the running time.
Sentence 2: a simulator for the composed protocol simply (i) chooses a fake exponent y .R Zq * arbitrarily, (ii) outputs H0 = h0 y , (iii) per­fectly simulates a proof of correctness for H0 = h0 y with respect to  n ai n ai C(x), and then (iv) follows the above-optimized inequality of DLs 3.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We describe how to reconstruct P given ~ using the algebraic decoding algorithm of the linear code C: ff immediately reveals the indices {il,...,im} = {i I (i < n) A v~ # 0}.
Sentence 2: this constitutes a major novelty of our adversarial model, since in all previous work both the number of revoked users and the number of compromised user-keys (tied together by the definition of corruption query) were required to be bounded by v. Clearly, for the challenge to the adversary not to be trivial, all the user-keys that .,4 obtains through Join queries must have been rendered useless by corresponding subsequent Re- voke queries.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We address these dynamic issues by proposing MsAMS, a framework for modelling and simulation of network attacks, the design of which draws heavily on Cardelli s work on Mo­bile Ambients [5, 6] and formal biology [4], and on Milner s work on bigraphs [21].
Sentence 2: the intention of enter­ing an ambient is expressed in terms of the primitive Enter, used for example for simulating the actions of an attacker.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Although the regular mode s explicit information on the most likely ranges for every key and key-pair should guar­antee that its average performance is much better than the worst case model presented in Section 3, the regular mode runs into scalability issues when n is large.
Sentence 2: the reverse event, (ER < 100 | AN<100) had a slightly reduced probability but still indicated that a user who typed the digraph AN in under 100ms was more likely to type the pair ER in less than 100ms than in more than 100ms.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The key o d e information associated with pin the temporal interval [ln2, denoted as enoln2e, consists of a pair of values, de.ned through the following formula: g- - 2 g oo_ enene_ y- -C2 gygneee ln2=phhmodollC _ _ In the following we show how by the key information enoln2e it is possible to derive the class information corresponding to each o o d to all the time granules belonging to [ll2.
Sentence 2: aCM TODS, 23(3):231 285, 1998. n [2] E. Bertino, S. Castano, and E. Ferrari.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: [28] Emin Topalovic, Brennan Saeta, Lin-Shung Huang, Collin Jackson, and Dan Boneh.
Sentence 2: we implemented the following parts: (a) the communication .ows and processing logic for the message exchanges presented in Section 4, (b) the ILS process with the fully implemented Integrity Tree, and the capability to publish the information required for its consistency checks, (c) the validator process, which monitors the ILSes and pub­lishes misbehaviors, (d) the CA process that includes the validator s role with the additional ability to produce on-line con.rmations, (e) the client process, i.e., a browser extended with support for full ARCert validation, (f ) the protocol for accountable synchronization, and (g) the domain tool, which can register, update, revoke, recover, and con.rm ARCerts.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While the rotation transformation increases the processing e.ort of the attacker, it cannot hinder an attacker as a stand­alone transformation, as the attacker can perform rotations upon the crafted photo to increase detection rates.
Sentence 2: in our vision, this mechanism can be adopted by web services as a user-speci.c CAPTCHA service, or even by high value services (e.g., banking websites) as a security measure addi­tional to two-factor authentication.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: ACCESS CONTROL REQUIREMENTS FOR INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL WORKFLOW There are many security requirements for inter-organizational workflows such as establishing secure communication among servers, and providing different views of the workflow based on users needs-to-know and their affiliated organization.
Sentence 2: if a workflow accesses the organization s role server directly, we cannot achieve this decoupling between the workflow security infrastructure and organization security infrastructure.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To be consistent with our goal of giving the students more choices at least one of the five courses should be an arbitrary computer science elective so that the student has some flexibility.
Sentence 2: these exploits closely relate to the process address space since they involve issues such as the protection mode code is executing in (user mode or kernel mode), whether a memory segment is read-only (for example, the code segment) or read-write, and the layout of the stack and the heap segments.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: INTRODUCTION With rising popularity of tablets and M2M applications, Cisco [6] foresees that in 2015, the average smartphone will generate a tra.c of 1.3 109 bytes.month-1, which represents a 16-fold increase over the 2010 average of 79 106 bytes.month-1 .
Sentence 2: delay Tolerant Ap­plications are other examples where mobility is not neces­sary.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The periodic reports can be used to detect such passive tro­ Category Value Identity 555-123-4567 Authentication digital signatures [Optional Privacy] Submission Tickets Log Date Dec 4, 2006 Mobility Pro.le CellID 1234 CellID 756 CellID 3215 Message Sent 555-111-1111 555-222-2222 555-333-3333 .... Bluetooth Sent 11:11:11:50:11:11 22:22:22:22:22:22 33:33:33:33:33:33 .... Table 3: Dynamic activity information reported by a smartphone during the operational phase.
Sentence 2: 4.3.2 Abnormality Monitoring Statistical monitoring is e.ective in observing sudden and wild change in behavior from the user population, and thereby possesses the ability to detect fast spreading worms.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To give a concrete example, consider that Malheur can be con.gured to extract binary feature vectors that are subsequently normalized to have unitary e2-norm.
Sentence 2: they use single-linkage clustering over three stages, mainly to reduce computational complexity: .rst, a coarse-grained clustering is performed; each of the corresponding clusters is then subdivided into a more .ne-grained set of clusters; and, eventually, similar clusters are merged together to avoid redundant signature generation.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Fenton s Data Mark Machine [22, 23] requires a special instruc­tion set to de.ne when the program counter can be untainted, and also requires that all registers in the system be statically assigned as tainted or untainted.
Sentence 2: also, address dependencies are only enabled when the CPU is not in supervisory mode, i.e., these de­pendencies are only applied in user space.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For instance, Systrace and SELinux policies7 have the primary objective of limiting damage to system resources and other applications that can result when a protected application is compromised.
Sentence 2: such sequences are often dozens of system-calls long[11] and are deeply dependent on the application s control .ow and the IDS model of the application, necessitating automatic tools for .nding mimicry attacks[15].
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A formal model for verifying stealthy attacks on state estimation in power grids.
Sentence 2: the constraint on the expected impact by launching a UFDI attack is formal­ized as follows: ¬ (.P G P G P G OPF ) (25) , ,··· , 1 2 b The above constraint states that there is no possible generation distribution that can cost less than TOPF .
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Because of this we use a modi.ed de.nition of edge betweenness: CB (e)= P spathst(e) where pathst(e) is the number of BGP paths =t.V between IP blocks in s and t that use link e. Since each of these routes must be individually withdrawn, recomputed, and re-advertised this will provide an approximation of the number of BGP messages generated if the link were to fail.
Sentence 2: by carefully choosing BGP sessions to terminate, CXPST generates a surge of BGP updates that are seen by nearly all core routers on the Internet.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For the sake of presentation, we call such a group of sensor nodes as a deployment group.
Sentence 2: if we apply our framework to the random pairwise keys scheme, the resulting scheme still has the perfect security guarantee against node capture attacks (pgcd(c) = 0), which means that the compromise of sen­sor nodes does not affect direct keys between non-compromised nodes.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Bin() must remain well-typed when unpacked at anylabel lower than P.  Invariant(1) follows from our interpretationofeffects.To preserve this invariant in(Typvariable), forexample, theeffectof xat P is obtained by lowering x s effect in the typing environment with P. In(Typ store), typechecking is independent of the process label, that is, a store is well-typed if and only if it is so at any process label; recall thatby(Struct store)stores can .oat across contexts, and typing must be preserved by structural equivalence.
Sentence 2: an ef.cient algorithm for typechecking is outlined in [15].
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this paper, a virtual com­posite EHR sharing system is designed and implemented for integrated and federated healthcare networks, where a patient consent mechanism is incorporated to demonstrate our approach to controlling and providing only authorized views of patient medical information to requesters.
Sentence 2: if the requester is not authorized to access all the data he requested, the requester is noti.ed with a warning, so that the requester may further ask for new patient consents to access the data for the need of his practice.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Instead, we decide to analyze the intention of the application experiencing outbound data flow, in terms of its hiding efforts in preventing the user from being aware of its internal activity.
Sentence 2: http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2656434.2656448 Since users are willing to send private or sensitive data to a remote server in exchange for useful service(s), it is often difficult to define a specific situation when information leakage really occurs.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: System call-based detection methods can more accurately detect malicious behavior than other methods since it is impossible to modify original functionality of system calls; mal­ware creators hardly disguise malicious behavior as normal behav­ior.
Sentence 2: andro-pro.ler performs well in detecting and clas­sifying malware families with 99% classi.cation accuracy on aver­age, regardless of updating method, while Crowdroid has 35% clas­si.cation accuracy on average.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Together with its institutional collaborators, ESG-CET will extend its present capabilities in order to supply additional types of climate model data and metadata, to provide more powerful server-side access and analysis services, to enhance interoperability among commonly used climate analysis tools, and to enable end­to-end simulation and analysis workflow.
Sentence 2: furthermore the profile mandated that all OpenID-specified backchannel communication between the IdP-SP used for establishing a shared-key, must be protected by a mutually authenticated TLS-channel [29][30].
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We then give insights into security and performance trade-offs that we faced with the different monitor implementations, as well as the security of the monitoring system against subversion by an attacker.
Sentence 2: previous work has shown that it is possible to .ngerprint hard­ware by measuring the time required to perform certain computa­tions [23], as well as observing .elds in TCP headers that are gov­erned by time [15].
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: [14] T.MensandP.V.Gorp.ATaxonomy ofModel Transformation.
Sentence 2: one main differenceis relatedtotheboundaries ofthe validityof userpermis­sions: RBAC-WS-BPEL considerspairs of adjacent activities(a1 and a2 , where a1 has a control .ow link to a2 )and de.nes rules among them,including separation ofduty(a1 and a2 must execute underdifferent roles) andbinding ofduty(a1 and a2 require the same role or user); our approach, on the other hand, is to annotate scopes in BPEL processes, which allows to apply separation and binding ofdutiesin a sequential,but alsoin ahierarchical manner.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: TheprotocolsRSA-S1andRSA-S2,proposedbyMatsumoto, KatoandImaih[12],aswellastheirvariantsin[11]and[3] usearandomlineardecompositionofthesecretkey.In contrast,theprotocolin[6]isbasedonadditionchains.All theseprotocolshaveincommonthattheirsecurityhastobe analysedcarefullyastheymayleakadditionalinformation aboutthesecretkey.
Sentence 2: 1.Theclientsendsn,d1,:::,dmandMtotheserver.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Now, if we add an additional implemen­tation of a requirement from a check list to the system B, which though does not remove any possible attack, we have that ASMw(A) < ASMw(B).
Sentence 2: the two systems which imple­mented the same set of requirements have the same values of the metrics, even if they have di.erent sets of attacks, e.g., GA .
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: REFERENCES [1] L. Apvrille, R. El Khayari, O. Henniger, Y. Roudier, H. Schweppe, H. Seudi´e, B. Weyl, and M. Wolf.
Sentence 2: the research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union s Seventh Framework Programme pro ject PRESERVE under grant agreement n.269994.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this con­text, Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) that generatea unique hardware-speci.c output (response) to each input (chal lenge), are a promising technology to bind software­based attestation schemes to a particular physical hardwareplatform and enable lightweight remote attestation particu­larly suitable for embedded devices [30].
Sentence 2: tHE ALU PUF The ALU PUF exploits delay di.erences in identically de­signed and redundantly available logic components, such asthe ALUs in a processor.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Of particular practical importance are the class of elec­tronic PUFs, containing arbiter PUFs, ring oscillator PUFs and memory-based PUFs, since these can be completely im­plemented in silicon.
Sentence 2: pUFs are devices that function as random identi.ers, meaning that the output of a PUF is di.erent for each physical instan­tiation of a particular PUF design and it is impossible for manufacturers to clone PUFs by controlling their production process.
Relationship: neutral