sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Indistinguishable regions in Geographic Privacy Jorge CuellarMartín Ochoa Ruben Rios Siemens AG Siemens AG, Computer Science jorge.cuellar@siemens.com TU Dortmund Department, martin.ochoa@cs.tu-University of Malaga dortmund.de ruben@lcc.uma.es ABSTRACT The ubiquity of positioning devices poses a natural security challenge: users want to take advantage of location-related services as well as social sharing of their position but at the same time have security concerns about how much informa­tion should be shared about their exact position.
Sentence 2: moreover, we will in­vestigate what are the implications of using dishonest obfus­cation functions in the provision of practical location-based services as well as their impact on the privacy protection level.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: [bit.ly]  Incentive -No Previous Screen Lock (1) IMPORTANT: As a way to encourage security, we are giving away a free $10 Amazon Gift Card.
Sentence 2: [bit.ly]  Deterrence -Pattern Screen Lock (1) IMPORTANT: Gesture based passwords have are easy to guess and thus anyone with your phone could have access to all your personal messages and info.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Similarly, there is no guarantee that attackers cannot remotely break into the computer [26, 30, 33], but should we allow attackers to easily decrypt the passwords saved by a BPM?
Sentence 2: users do not need to remember a large number of strong passwords; meanwhile, BPMs will only .ll the passwords on the login forms of the corresponding websites and thus can potentially protect against phishing attacks.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To show the ef.cacy of our proposed approach, we adopt the state-of-the-art k-anonymity and t­closeness to anonymize the set of KI P F S found by our algorithm, and then compared with the original k-anonymity and t-closeness applied on the pre-de.ned set of semi-id features.
Sentence 2: this set of correlated features can not be directly acquired.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The XO-1 was targeted to ship with the AMD Geode GX-500 proces­sor running at 366 MHz, which could only encrypt about 4MB/s with the AES-128 algorithm in CBC mode, a tenth of the throughput of the NAND .ash chip.
Sentence 2: users cannot be ex­pected to choose passwords when they .rst receive computers.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Moreover, a closer investigation with this instruction yields the following 6 bytes unique instruction sequence: 0f 20 d8: mov EAX, CR3; 0f 22 d8: mov CR3, EAX; In fact, these two consecutive instructions are used by the modern OS to force a TLB .ush, avoiding problems related to implicit caching [18].
Sentence 2: we have to neutralize the randomization.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Even if persistence is achieved, the cloud comput­ing environment will be minimized with only the data and programs necessary to carry out the required computation, and so will likely be of low value to the attacker.2 In order to escape to the high-value client environment, the attacker must compromise the channel between the client and the cloud.
Sentence 2: pDFs are essential and ubiquitous in many places where layouts must be preserved across platforms and envi­ronments.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In access trees, each non-leaf node is a (t, n) threshold gate described by its n child nodes and the threshold value t of a (t-1)-degree poly­nomial.
Sentence 2: table 2: On-line cryptographic cost Signing Verify Exponent Paring Owner 1 1 5n Consumer 2 2(|I L|) + 1 Authorizer 2 11 Authority 1 2|I - 5| Server 1 2|L| +2 Table 2 shows that the number of users and attribute uni­verse size do not a.ect computation cost per token.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: [22] .rst formalized the notion of veri.able com­putation to solve the problem of veri.ably outsourcing the computation of an arbitrary functions, which based on Yao s garbled circuits [23] and Gentry s breakthrough on fully ho­momorphic encryption (FHE) scheme [24].
Sentence 2: 2: KGC computes ai = xi +a, ßi = b×(yi .h1(xi,yi,ri))+ c,for i =0, ...,n - 1, where x .
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Minimal Performance: In general, the tss api re­quires an extensive amount of repetitive code for even the routine tasks, like creating a key, managing passwords or data encryption and decryption.
Sentence 2: categories and Sub ject Descriptors D.4.6 [OPERATING SYSTEMS]: Security and Protec­tion Cryptographic controls ;D.4.7 [OPERATING SYS-TEMS]: Organization and Design Real-time systems and embedded systems Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro.t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the .rst page.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: O is the set of output symbols, which include web re­sponses sent to users (e.g., header( Location:user.php )) and SQL queries issued to the database (e.g., Query0 ).
Sentence 2: we leverage a well­known technique (i.e., daikon engine [12]) to derive value­based invariants, including the invariants over variables that are used for indicating the application state and the data constraints.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Credentials are signed assertions describing properties of a sub ject that are used to establish trust be­tween two unknown communicating parties before allowing access to information or services.
Sentence 2: pDL formulas are composed from atomic propo­sitions by applying arbitrary propositional connectives, and modal operators ( r) f and [r]f.Formula ( r) f means that there exists an execution of r (i.e., a sequence of actions con­forming to the regular expression r)reaching a state where f holds; and formula [r]f is intended to mean that all ter­minating executions of r reach a state where f holds.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: [23] F.Stajano and R.Anderson.The resurrecting duckling: Security issues for ad-hoc wireless networks.
Sentence 2: after a node detects an impersonation attack, it knows one of its neighbors is compromised, although it does not know which one.In this case, it increases its challenge probability pc.It can also send a notice encrypted with its pairwise keys to each neighbor, so that every node will be aware of the compromise.Finally, it sends a notice to the controller, encrypted with its individual key.The controller can then take any necessary actions to detect and recover from the compromise.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, the set of numbers that the user calls on a regular basis, the duration of the calls with those numbers, the set of numbers that the user sends SMS to, base station identi.cation numbers that serve the device, a list of URLs visited in the data transactions, a set of IP address that the device contacted, etc.
Sentence 2: we assume there is no malicious activity in the training data.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The set certain(n)of I n certain answers of a query over the target schema, with respect to a source instance I, consists of all tuples that are in the intersec­tion of all n(n) s, as Jvaries over all solutions for I(here, n(J Jn)n denotes the result of evaluating on J).
Sentence 2: the notion of the certain answers originated in the context of incomplete databases (see [21] for a survey).
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Bank IT SP Users 46 000 150 000 Target systems 25 10 Attributes in rules 15 6 Rules 1000 2000 Rule changes per week 10 1 Table 2: Quantity Structure for Case Studies Our conclusion is that ERBAC with rule-based provision­ing has proven to be an e.cient concept in practice for the administration of users and their access rights.
Sentence 2: permissions can easily be taken away or added to a role if necessary.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Waters, Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption: An Expressive, E.cient, and Provably Secure Realization, In Public Key Cryptography PKC, vol 6571 of LNCS, pp.
Sentence 2: the computation cost in this procedure results from a symmetric-key encryption for data .les, a signature, and a CP-ABE encryption for the header.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our example process shows .ve exclusive Gateways(diamonds), aStartEvent(circle) toindicatewhereto begintheprocess and aEndEvent(circle with thickline) toindi­cate where thepath of theprocess will end.
Sentence 2: in addition, we are currently investigating the options to combine the derivations from scenario and process models based on different languages to automatically propose a candidate RBAC model.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The non­determinism created by the abstraction process determines exactly where mimicry attacks are possible.
Sentence 2: there exists some ifor which executing the sequence mci,sci that overrides system call arguments with attacker s values instead of the sequence lci,sci consisting of the legitimate block of instruction lci preceding the system call sci will not follow the program execution paths from which gi has been generated and propagated and will violate gi that summarizes the data .ow in lci.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Fortunately, most major web servers are ready to accept percent encoded versions of these characters as equivalent, so it is su.cient to utilize the common percent-escaping for these characters in URLs instead.
Sentence 2: it can be stated that amongst the 10.000 most popular web pages, roughly one third uses the innerHTML property, and about 65% use Java-Script libraries like jQuery [7], who abet mXSS attacks by using the innerHTML property instead of the corresponding DOM methods.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We empha­size, however, that even with just addressing the L1 cache, D¨ uppel already interferes with all known cryptographic side­channel attacks that have been demonstrated in a virtualized SMP environment.
Sentence 2: before cleansing the L1 cache (and any other time-shared caches), D¨ uppel .rst determines if the VCPU it is running on has been preempted since it last ran on the VCPU.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The TPM picks random integers rv .R {0, 1}£v+£Ø+£H and rf0 , rf1 .R {0, 1}£f +£Ø+£H and computes Srv rf0 rf1 £f r f T1t :=R0 R1 mod n r f :=rf0 + rf1 2mod .
Sentence 2: this approach would never work in practice: as soon as one hardware module (TPM) gets compromised and the secret key extracted and published, veri.ers can no longer distinguish between real TPMs and fake ones.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As of today, a simple analysis of the default TA stores in Operating Systems (OSes) and browsers reveals 132 TA in Firefox, 152 TA in OSX, 286 in XP, and (obviously heading in the right direction) just 30 TA in Vista.
Sentence 2: being able to securely identify a user is not su.cient.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Finally, we will consider to add sanitized packet headers of honeypot data to Kyoto 2006+ dataset.
Sentence 2: in our further investigation, we ob­served that most source IP addresses in Japan are located in black hole sensors and honeypots, and some of them were caused by Unicast Flooding of L2 Switches[8] which gen­erates incomplete data of sessions and makes IDS raises false alarms.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note that the leader node needs to set the .ag .eld to 1 , so that data from this group will not be aggregated any more.
Sentence 2: unlike the trimming-based resilient aggre­gation [9] that simply ignore some fraction of highest and lowest values without any reasoning, our attestation scheme provides ef­fective means to validate and then probably accept the abnormal values, as oftentimes we are more interested in those abnormal val­ues than normal ones.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: [35] V. Varadarajan, T. Ristenpart, and M. Swift.
Sentence 2: to recover the pid upon initialization of the PRNG the adversary needed to perform a (trivial) o.ine brute-force guessing attack in 216 a search space of size 220 = × 24 (space 216 for the pid and 24 for four invocations of gettimeofday()).
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: inthisdirectedgraphadherestothefollowing:a)theoriginofthepathisIANAb)thepathisacyclic,and)thelastnodeinthepathisanAS.Intheoriginauthenticationsystemsconsideredinthispa­per,entitiesdelegateaddressspacebygeneratinganddistributingproofsre.ectingedgesinthegraph.Tosimplify,anOAproofisasignedstatementassertingthat:a)anorganizationhasbeendel­egatedauthority(byIANAorsomeorganization)overaspeci.edaddressrange,b)thatanAShasbeengrantedtherighttobetheoriginofthataddressrange,orc)thattheaddressrangecannotbeused(reserved).Veri.erscollectandvalidateproofscorrespond­ingtothedelegationchains.Weapplyarangeofcryptographicconstructionstotheproblemofproofconstructionandconsiderthecomplexitiesoftheirapplicationinrealenvironments.
Sentence 2: aPNIC(12%),4-RIPENCC(8%),5-RIPE(4%),6-LACNIC(3%),7-AT&#38;T(2%),8-UUNET(1%),9-ARINCable(1%),andSprint(1%).
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When an SP is activated, the MH loads the security policies of theSPin thePEM and enables the applications associated to the SP.Deactivating anSPistheoppositeof activation: .rsttheappli­cations are disable and then the policies in the PEM are unloaded.
Sentence 2: 3.2 SecurityPro.leSwitching One ofthe main contributions ofMOSEScompared to other sim­ilar approaches is the use of context for controlling the activation and deactivation of SPes.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Using our technique we are able to construct an even more e.cient (albeit non­generic) fully non-interactive threshold KEM with CCA2 security in the standard model, by specializing the method of [5].
Sentence 2: following Boneh and Boyen, we consider the BDH problem stated for .xed G, G , GT , e, as follows: a c Given (g, g , g , h, ha , hb) .
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Nevertheless, as shown in Proposition 3.1, we can use our Hoare logic to prove IND-CPA security at the price of completeness.
Sentence 2: a generic encryption scheme GE satis­.es the PA-syntactic criterion, if the sanity check has the form V(t,h)= v,where D is such that h is assigned H1(t), t is assigned ine||r,ine is the plaintext and E(ine; r) is the ciphertext (i.e., r is the random seed of E).
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Given that e.ective computer security is virtually never strictly a property of technical equipment but rather a func­tion of the interaction of people (including security train­ing and practices), equipment features (such as avoidance of software coding errors known to introduce vectors for attack) and physical circumstances (including physical security, such as locks and video surveillance), regulatory systems dedi­cated to achieving high information and information sys­tem security cannot evaluate only the equipment s techni­cal features.
Sentence 2: use of networked communications should not be o. limits for transmitting preliminary tallies and voted ballots.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: AlthoughOAuthitselfhasasoundsecuritymodel, andtheau­thorizationcodegrantflowwascryptographicallyprovedsecure[6] undertheassumptionthatTLS isused, manyreal-world attacks were found.
Sentence 2: provider2alsouses thisaccesstokenforashould-beApp-originatedoperation,namely tosendappnotificationtoalltheuserswhohaveinstalledtheApp.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Security analysis and experiments for Voice over IP RTP media streams.
Sentence 2: it is a hot po­tential target for imposters who can launch di.erent types of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to disrupt communica­tion; resulting in not only substantive revenue loss to VoIP operators but also undermining the reliability of VoIP infras­tructure.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We say that L satis.es W if and only if W answers 1 on L. Usually, notation L |= W is used to represent the fact that L satis.es W ,and the case of L does not satisfy W is denoted by L |= W .
Sentence 2: com­plexity of the construction is extremely high and can just serve as a theoretical feasibility.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: No-RFA 512     Machine # Machine # Machine # E5507-1 4 E5507-4 3 E5507-7 2 E5507-2 2 E5507-5 2 E5507-8 3 E5507-3 2 E5507-6 2 E5507-9 3 Figure 9: Summary of EC2 machines and number of co­ resident m1.smallinstances running under our accounts.
Sentence 2: a VM that has run out of credits cannot receive boost.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, we can compute and store a best-.t attribute ex­pression er for each role r, i.e., an attribute expression that minimizes the attribute mismatch for r. When a new user u is added to the access control system, the system suggests that u be made a member of the roles for which u satis.es the best-.t attribute expression, and it presents these suggested roles for u in descending order of the attribute mismatch.
Sentence 2: the ef­fort required for a large organization to migrate from ACLs to RBAC can be a signi.cant obstacle to adoption of RBAC.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 2.2 Timing Attacks Execution times of cryptographic computations show varia­tions, which can be exploited to infer secret keys used during computation.
Sentence 2: there has been a vast amount of research e.ort to .nd potential vulnerabilities in the implementation of cryptographic algo­rithms, and e.cient and e.ective countermeasures if such vulnerabilities exist.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: , en-1 are not tag edges, then edges e1, .
Sentence 2: at tag edges we tag values and start taint tracking, and continue taint tracking the tagged value until it reaches an untag edge: if the untag edge is a sanitization edge, we apply the appropriate sanitizer; otherwise, the untag 2We de.ne domination in data.ow graphs as follows.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Unity uses the same idea of replication to protect against failure and mali­cious attack, but is able to be simpler and more e.cient by using the user s own devices as replicas, which allows Unity to place greater trust in systems replicating data.
Sentence 2: while clients may eagerly repli­cate some blocks to reduce read latency, the above protocol only requires them to do this based on a locally determined policy, which cannot guarantee that all blocks will achieve the n replication factor that we desire from Unity.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: of the Workshop on Architectural Support for Security and Anti-virus (WASSA), pages 11 21, 2004.
Sentence 2: due to the minimum key- Sj.B1 availability boundary condition policy it holds that: aj = A Sj.B1  -wj 2-W .2= ij.K .wj = W ij .K the weight of all items in the knapsack does not exceed the knapsacks capacity.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: (re­sourceC issimilarlydeclared)   ... var bWindow = document.getElementById("b").contentWindow; var bInterface = resourceWindow.getPublicInterface(); var cWindow = document.getElementById("c").contentWindow; ... function hookUpBWithC() { bInterface.registerC(cWindow); } (b) http://a.com/integrator.html, the integrator that connects re­sourcesB andC Figure 5: Sibling resources example: Integrator connects b.com with c.com function of other pages.
Sentence 2: it turns out that it is possible to make Firefox restrict access to the frames attribute from anotherdomainby setting "capability.policy.default.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: CONCLUSION We have presented the design, implementation and eval­uation of process out-grafting, an architectural approach to address isolation and compatibility challenges in out-of-VM approaches for .ne-grainedprocess-level execution monitor­ing.
Sentence 2: speci.­cally,only theuser-mode instructionsof thesuspectprocess, which is our main focus for .ne-grained monitoring, will be allowed to execute in the security VM; all kernel-mode exe­cution that requires the use of OS kernel system services is forwarded back to the production VM.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In order to di.erentiate the malicious scenarios from the benign ones, we exploit the following system state information: SMS state, which indi­cates whether or not there is a new SMS message received at a given time span (1 minute in our case).
Sentence 2: iMMS will be noti.ed when­ever IME sends/receives a rpc request to/from the client app.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.3 The Third Level Decomposition Since 0 = f m = +8 (f m has been relaxed in ij ij = cij the previous subsection), the constraint conditions (C1) and (C2) in (P3) can be eliminated.
Sentence 2: the Lagrange multiplier pij can be interpreted as the congestion measure at link (i, j) shared by the sessions in M. The dual problem of the primal problem (P1) is minimize D(p) subject to p =0 , (D1) where p =(pij , (i, j) .E) and the dual function D(p)= max L(x, f, p) (2) (C1),(C2),(C4),(C5) is the maximum of the Lagrangian obtained by relaxing the capacity constraint (C3), that is  fm L(x, f, p)=Um(xm) -pijij -cij m.M (i,j).E m.M .. =.Um) -ij .
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Due to lack of space, we omit a detailed security analysis from the body of this extended abstract, and refer to the extended version on the authors' webpages [14, 20] for proofs and proof sketches.
Sentence 2: the IThe assessment of these costs in [7, 24] are in terms of the num-ber of modular arithmetic operations of any kind, including modular additions, and thus somewhat misleading.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: That is, on one hand we require that during reg­ular operation, the outcome of the decryption of a ciphertext should not leak information about the which decryption key the user selected.
Sentence 2: fix a random tape rA of the adversary such that E1 occurs, then PrrC [¬E3|E2] = 2q.2 .
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.7 Entity-Mutation in non-HTML context ofHTML documents In-line SVG support provided in older browsers could lead to XSS attacks originating in HTML entities that were em­bedded inside style and similar elements, which are by de­fault evaluated in their canonic form upon the occurrence of innerHTML-access.
Sentence 2: the topic of security issues arising from MIME-sni.ng has been covered by by Barth et al., Gebre et al.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Using postings from 100 users, we created 25 clusters each of size 1, 2, 3, and 4 with half of each clusters postings from the Laci Peterson board, and half from the War in Iraq board.
Sentence 2: careful data cleaning is extremely important to guarantee that the algorithm does not cheat by using, for example, the signature at the end of each post as a highly discriminant feature.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Return error 1 (Not enough PUF outputs within 0] = 1 -pmax .Pr[rj+o = 1] = 1 -pmax ui := j-1 if Pr[rj+o = ci] = Pr[rj+o = ci .1] then vi := 0 (No inversion)  else vi := 1 (Inversion) end if o := o + j Break else if j= 2l then Return error 2 (Counter over.ow)  end if end for end for [17] led to the best results.
Sentence 2: our compressed DSC implementation is the most ef.cient FPGA implementation for this scenario known to date.
Relationship: neutral