sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note that due to the post­processing of data in memory as discussed in Section 4.5, the output of deRop is also independent of any speci.c run­ning instance.
Sentence 2: although the output of the dynamic analysis of deRop (value of esp) di.ers in each running in­stance, the output of deRop can be always the same, and is semantically equivalent to the original ROP and executes on the vulnerable application in all running instances.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This paper is therefore not primarily about experimentation with security solutions (such as cryptographic protocols), yet with technologies in a wider sense in which security controls ap­pear as important building blocks.
Sentence 2: we focus on the deployment of such technolo­gies as experiments (Table 1), which has also been termed societal experiment , and might as well be called socio­technical experiment .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: UC-SimList is generated by first considering the semantically similar characters for each character in UCS, finding all visually similar characters of each semantically similar character, and finally ranking all these characters with their visual similarities for each character.
Sentence 2: uC-SimList(c)=UC-SimListv(UC-SimLists(c)), where c is a given character, UC-SimLists(c) denotes the semantically similar character set of c, UC-SimListv(·) denotes the visually similar character set of character set · , and UC-SimList(c) denotes the similar character set of character c. We denote UC-SimListT as the Unicode Character Similarity List that only contains the characters with similarities larger than T (the similarity threshold), e.g., UC-SimList0.8 is a subset of UC-SimList that only contains the characters with similarities larger than 0.8.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The Precise Query Protocols (PQPs) (e.g., [4 7, 23, 29]) use sophisticated en­cryption techniques that enables the server to execute range queries without incurring any false positives.
Sentence 2: for any given encrypted range query, the server returns the exact set of etuples that satis.es the given query.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To decorate the proxy certificate, Science Gateways install the GridShib SAML Tools software, which generates and inserts a SAML assertion containing user attributes into a proxy certificate associated with the user s session.
Sentence 2: the SAML assertion contains a user identifier that allows the Resource Provider to uniquely associate jobs submitted using that certificate with a particular Science Gateway user.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.3 A Note on the Chain Rule of Guesswork In De.nition 5, i.e., the de.nition of guesswork, the small­est probability value in the sum is weighted by the permu­tation with n. This is, however, not completely correct, since the last guess in the guessing process discriminate the last two values of the random variable [10].
Sentence 2: if the answer of the last question is yes then the correct value is X = xn-1, and the search terminates.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: MINE-TAG: MINING TAGS FOR MINED ROLES After we obtain the roles using the above role mining al­gorithms, administrators have no way of knowing how to use those roles, because the mined roles are only a symbol con­necting applications (subjects ) and permissions.
Sentence 2: if an application requires roles, the administrators might not know which roles should be assigned to the application.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: They are thus more separated from the vulnerable application and its wide variety of potential environment con.gurations and therefore less likely to have unforeseen side e.ects.
Sentence 2: their compatibility with normal operation is in principle relatively easy to test: Since they operate only on network tra.c, and are intended only to drop attack tra.c, they can be tested simply by exposing them to a suitably rich collection of net­work tra.c such as a long trace of past network activ­ity, or a synthetic test suite of representative tra.c to verify that they would allow it all through una.ected.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We also took the following steps to ensure that the inter­pretation of our results was clear: We compare the information .ow from source to sink(i.e., network to CPU control path) during attacks to the informa­tion .ow for the same exact network request against a non­vulnerable version of the system.
Sentence 2: we repeat the attack against a patched version of the system.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Assuming the host has given the guest enough memory for its regular operation, the guest can also use as much of that memory as it wishes for DMA.
Sentence 2: the quota will be indirectly applied since the pages that are used by the balloon will never be added to the map cache, and pages which were previously in the map cache and the balloon allocated will be removed from the map cache.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While facilitating the enforcement of a consistent policy throughout the system, this architecture relies on the PEP being able to contact the PDP to query decisions, and therefore su.ers from a single point of failure.
Sentence 2: key factors that a.ect the performance of the PEP are latency of the communication with the PDP, re­liability and survivability of this connection (and the PDP itself), as well as the aggregated impact of communication costs (which can include contacting a human to perform the authorization).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: should not be assigned to multiple attack characters.
Sentence 2: 4.2.3 Translation to ILP X constrij =1, .j .N (5) i.M For a sFSA IDS, we propose translating the problem of .nding a where M and N are the set of attack and normal characters, re­good path in a DAG into an Integer Linear Programming problem.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Shamir [33] and Blakley [6] were the .rst to propose a con­struction for secret-sharing schemes where the access struc­ture is a threshold gate.
Sentence 2: if any t or more parties come together, they can reconstruct the secret by using their shares; however, any lesser number of parties do not get any information about the secret.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The third row shows the overhead of our implementation ver­sus a VM that is running our taint-friendly kernel and network driver, but without any emulator; there is no taint tracking, and no switching into emulation.
Sentence 2: we add about 10 percent total overhead to LMbench for running it on a virtual machine that is doing full system taint tracking.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The placements of a .eld and of a statement that accesses the .eld must be consistent.
Sentence 2: if a statement writes to a .eld, then the statement and the .eld must have the same place­ment; if a statement reads a .eld, then the statement must be repli­cated on a subset of the hosts that the .eld is replicated on.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: More fundamentally, even for a browser not using the wide-character representation, the attack still lacks an important prerequisite there is no way for the attacker frame to detect a syntax error in the victim frame, because the two frames are in different domains.
Sentence 2: for the probing attack to succeed, the attacker frame already needs the capability to communicate with the victim frame (e.g., through the onerror method of the victim frame), but such a prerequisite is exactly the domain-isolation violation that the attacker tries to achieve.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the new attack, certain return-like instruction se­quences take the place of the return instruction.
Sentence 2: these instruction sequences are rare but a single one used as a trampoline suf.ces to chain together other instruction sequences that each end in an indi­rect jump, which makes it possible to construct a Turing-complete 13http://code.google.com/p/androidterm/ 14Tan and Croft [44] identi.ed various vulnerabilities in native code of the JDK (Java Development Kit).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, Krawczyk [26] proposes a method where the total storage of the signer is still lin­ear in T , but the public key and the secret key themselves are both short (proportional to the security parameter).
Sentence 2: the bulk of the keying material stored is needed by the signer, but even if com­promised by an adversary, forgery is still not possible.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Example 2 In this example, the enterprise-security require­ment described in Example 1 is further restricted toprevent federation with untrusted XMPP servers.
Sentence 2: server­to-Server federation is not permitted except between trusted XMPP servers with an IP address of 143.239.75.235 and 193.1.193.140 .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: degli Studi di Milano Milan, Italy andrea.lanzi@unimi.it  Aurélien Francillon Eurecom Sophia Antipolis, France francill@eurecom.fr Abhinav Srivastava AT&#38;T Labs Research New Jersey, USA abhinav@research.att.com Christoph NeumannTechnicolor, Rennes, Francechristoph.neumann  @technicolor.com ABSTRACT The security of virtual machine monitors (VMMs) is a challeng­ing and active .eld of research.
Sentence 2: due to the increas­ing signi.cance of hardware virtualization in cloud solutions, it is important to clearly understand existing and arising VMM-related threats.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the general setting, data obtained from normal behavior of the system is used to create a model and then any outlier is considered an anomaly and a potential failure or attack; however, this line of research is very similar to the fault­detection, and safety mechanisms that have been deployed in control systems for decades.
Sentence 2: the protec­tion of control systems has traditionally been enforced by several safety mechanisms, which include bad data detec­tion, protective relays, safety shutdowns, interlock systems, robust control, and fault-tolerant control; however, so far there has not been a systematic study that tries to identify how much these protection mechanisms can help against at­tacks (as opposed to failures or accidents), and how can they be broken by an attacker and potentially .xed by a system designer that incorporates attack models in the design of their system.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, kwwei@ie.cuhk.edu.hk ABSTRACT We present the .rst O(1)-size designated con.rmer signa­tures (DCS) with security in the state-of-the-art model of Camenisch and Michels, Eurocrypt 2000, without random oracles.
Sentence 2: we achieve the security notion called the invisibility of signature therein.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: mov ecx, 2000 cpuid rdtsc xchg ebx, eax lb: nop loop lb cpuid rdtsc sub eax, ebx cmp eax, 2000 jbe det As RDTSC is a non-serializing instruction, it may be exe­cuted after the subsequent or before the previous instruc­tions if their execution takes a while.
Sentence 2: a serializing instruction, e.g., CPUID, is put before reading the counter.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The long code is not an LTC according to the de.nition of LTCs used in this paper, as it violates the soundness re­quirement (and indeed, the long code is not of constant size).
Sentence 2: there exist strings that are far (in Hamming dis­tance) from the code, but are accepted by the test above with high probability.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Query volume = 0.4% Storage space= 1600 words state-of-the-art techniques for compressing multi-dimensional 1000 150  100 50 data.
Sentence 2: we analyzed the histogram-based tech­ 500 niques MHIST [9] and MinSkew [1], and with the wavelet­ based techniques proposed respectively in [10] and [11].
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In a second step, we account for nonces shared between the sessions.
Sentence 2: note that if two sessions involving the reader share both nonces (and thus use the same T 0, T 1), the adversary may learn up to a half of the bits of sk * (accounting for about 2 1 Nc time­critical phases where the challenges will di.er in the two sessions, and for the responses which the adversary either allows an honest prover to forward, or gets from the prover with e.g.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: By de.nition, a plan p sat­is.es the constraint (., S1,S11)if there exist s 1 .S1 and 11 .S11 111 s such that (p(s ),p(s )) ...
Sentence 2: we could decide the satis.ability of W by considering the satis­.ability of multiple instances of WSP1: speci.cally, for each 1 11 ×S11 pair (s ,s ) .S1 , we consider the satis.ability of the work.ow ((S, E),U, A, {(., s1 ,s 11)}); if any one of these in­stancesissatis.able, then so is W .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, au­thentication is an issue when bundles get fragmented as a DTN node receiving only partial block data will not be able to verify the integrity or authenticity of the fragment.
Sentence 2: a receiver is faced with the question whether to cache the fragment and wait for the remaining bundle data to arrive, which may take a completely di.erent path to the destination because of a continually changing network topol­ogy, or to forward a potentially forged fragment bundle.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Fur­thermore, throughout the proofs, we adopt some notational abuses for the sake of simplicity.
Sentence 2: we informally use encrypted tuples as arguments of comparison operators (e.g., =, , =,=)and arithmetic operators (e.g., +,-)to mean that the actual operation is to be performed on the at­tribute value of A of the argument etuples.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Step 3 R calculates a = e(TQ,Qs)ar .GT .The sim­  ulator calculates.Therefore, the simulator and R have a shared common key K = K Step 4 The receiver could send messages to the sim­ulator.
Sentence 2: she sends a message m and the cor­responding authentication message MAC = HK,m) ( to the simulator.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this paper, we study the effect of de­centralizing user-role assignment and revocation, and assume that changes to the permission-role assignment relation and the role hi­erarchy are centralized, i.e, made only by trusted users.
Sentence 2: whoever is allowed to make changes to permission-role as­signment and the role hierarchy will run the security analysis and only make changes that do not violate the security properties.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, if the pixel direction of xU(4, i) is d1, d2, or d3, then |xU(4, i)-ym(1, i+1)|, |xU(4, i)-ym(1, i)|, or |xU(4, i)-ym(1, i-1)| will be computed for DBME, respectively.
Sentence 2: if either  the boundary pixel direction of xU(4, 1) is d3 or the boundary pixel direction of xU(4, 4) is d1, then they are ignored in DBME computation.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In further key exchanges, we use MACs to au­thenticate a new key using an old, known-authentic shared secret.
Sentence 2: a protocol message looks like: g xi+1 , E(Mr, kij ), MAC({g xi+1 , E(Mk, kij )}, H (kij )) So, if the initial authentication key is known to be secure, then further ones will be secure as well.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: {t;1,t;2} are t;-safe (for KESig) if PrSuccKESig(F) < 1/2k e whenever te =te;and {t1,t2}={t1;,t2;}.
Sentence 2: let S be the set of all triplets (te;,{t1;,t2;})such that if for any F as above FS .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For row i= i * , S encrypts using the secret key zj.
Sentence 2: for column j<j * ,let ** rr * 1)zj £i,j )=(g zj £i,j )= Ehj ci,j =(c1,(c ·g * ,g * ·g (fi,j ; r ), and similarly for j>j * (encrypting mi,j ).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Ac­cording to the NIST de.nition [35], key characteristics of cloud computing include on-demand service, broad network access, resource pooling, rapid elasticity, and metered ser­vice similar to a utility.
Sentence 2: what di.erentiates cloud-hostingproviders from traditionalhostingproviders is their ability to o.er elastic resources [36] which can respond to dynamicdata volumes.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The first motivation is to emphasize that the core of the three-layer survivability analysis possesses unique and powerful functionalities in dealing with three fundamental difficulties in studying IW, i.e., rationality (an assumption of tradition game theory), uncertainty (vulnerability), and deception.
Sentence 2: these three properties are dependent upon each other, and each of them can be time and space dependent.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This en­cryption scheme is CPA-secure (up to the birthday bound on |r|)if fs(·) is a secure PRF, and, intuitively, it appears that it should also be KDI-secure.
Sentence 2: it was shown in [4, Thm 5.1] that when fs is implemented as fs(x)= H(s|x)and H is a random oracle, then the scheme in Eq.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It has been used in several asynchronous distributed systems [21 23, 33, 34] to improve their resiliency.
Sentence 2: these sys­tems employ transferable non-equivocation which (like digital sig­natures) allows a party to veri.ably transfer a non-equivocation tag  The Neq mechanism  3.3 Employed Primitives Neq is parameterized by a polynomial p(·), and an implicit secu­rity parameter ..
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, if local credentials are used in an attempt to satisfy a remote policy p, then R= 22E .
Sentence 2: the compliance checker must return zero or more sets of local evidence that minimally satisfy p so that the local entity knows which local evidence can be sent to the remote entity to gain access to the resource protected by p. We say that some set E of evidence minimally satis.es a policy p if no proper subset of E also satis.es p. A compli­ance checker capable of recognizing all possible subsets of the local evidence that minimally satisfy a given policy is required to ensure that a trust negotiation protocol will es­tablish trust whenever possible and can also a.ord its user a number of strategic advantages.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Whilethere are severalCKA2-secureSSE schemes[8,23, 6, 21], they all have limitations from a practical point of view.
Sentence 2: the constructions of [8] and [21] re­quire O(#f) time to search, where #f denotes the number of .les in the collection.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Now a plat­form/application claiming to provide a certain property can download the appropriate certi.cate(s), and prove to any (correct) veri.er that it has a valid certi.cate, since its con­.guration matches the one .xed in the property certi.cate without disclosing any information about the content of the certi.cate (except the property which is a common input which is public by de.nition).
Sentence 2: we are inter­ested in TCG compliant solutions allowing to use TSS and the existing TC hardware without a need to change the un­derlying trust model of TCG.3 Our contribution.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It starts from the binary histogram whose partition tree has a unique node (corre­sponding to the whole D) and, at each step, selects the leaf of the binary-tree which is the most in need of partitioning and applies the most e.ective split to it.
Sentence 2: the splitting position must be selected among all the positions laid onto the grid overlying the block.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Although large-scale phenomena on the Internet are com­plex and dynamic, our intuition is that two consecutive at­tack events should be linked to the same root phenomenon if and only if they share at least two di.erent attack char­acteristics.
Sentence 2: we want to build a decision-making process that will attribute two attack events to the same phenomenon when the events features are close enough for any combination of at least two attack dimensions out of the complete set of criteria: {origins, targets, activity, commonIP }.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We assume that the computer system enforces some kind of access control policy, by which di.erent users have di.erent degrees of access to the protected resources of the system.
Sentence 2: we are interested in distributed computer systems in which distinct, trusted software components are used to 1. intercept application requests;  2. decide whether each request should be granted by eval­uating the request with reference to the system s access control policy.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Let A be a streaming algorithm that on in­put a stream St and any constant a outputs (1 ± a)D(t) ± o(log 1/d ) with probability at least 1 - d. Then A is not log m E-pan private for any constant E. Moreover, the same con­clusion holds for A that for any constant a outputs (1 ± a)T1(t ) ± to(log 1/d ) with probability at least 1 - d. log m For small enough d (for example, d<mlog m), the theo­rem establishes that when an arbitrarily small multiplicative approximation factor is allowed, an additive polylogarithmic error is unavoidable for the problem of estimating distinct count.
Sentence 2: our lower bound matches the logarith­mic dependence of the additive error on the probability of failure of our fully streaming (i.e.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: On top of that, we re faced with an observation by one veteran of the security business: the potential user community for a security product is cut in half with each key stroke or button push required to use the product .
Sentence 2: security is seen as a nuisance rather than a benefit and users almost always want to just swat it away, or turn it off com­pletely.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A rule r in a .rewall F is redundant if removing r from F ful.lls that the network packet space derived from the new .rewall F ' is equal to the network packet space de.ned by F .
Sentence 2: f and F ' satisfy following equations: SFA = SFA , and SFD = SFD , , where SA and SD denote allowed and denied network packet spaces, respectively.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: First, IVP ensures the integrity of data only at the initial stage.
Sentence 2: once a certi.ed IVP con.rms that a particular data item is in a valid state (supposedly when the data is .rst introduced to the system), the integrity of the data is ensured by allowing accesses only to certi­.ed Transformation Procedures (TPs).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We present a signature scheme and public key encryption scheme in the continual memory leakage model which toler­ate a constant fraction of the secret key to be leaked between updates as well as a constant fraction of the secret key and update randomness to be leaked during updates.
Sentence 2: when the secret key and update randomness together have bit length K, we can allow cK bits of leakage per up­date where c> 0 is a positive constant, independent of the security parameter.
Relationship: entailment