sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, instead of seeing semantic-level objects such as processes, .les, and kernel modules, we only see memory pages, registers, and disk blocks from outside the VM, making it dif.cult for out of the box malware detection.
Sentence 2: the out of the box approach gains tamper resistance at the cost of losing the native, semantic view of the host enjoyed by the in the box approach.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This rate, t , is thus the probability with which two peers, upon 15 s 30 s I-Worm/Bagle.Q 76% 81% I-Worm/Bagle.S 76% 73% I-Worm/Mydoom.D 97% 93% I-Worm/Mydoom.F 97% 93% I-Worm/Jobaka.A 97% 93% I-Worm/Sasser.B 97% 93% I-Worm/Sasser.D 97% 93% Worm/Lovesan.A 97% 93% Worm/Lovesan.H 97% 93% Table 1: Probability, t , with which two peers, upon exchang­ing snapshots of their internal behavior, can decide using in­tersection of snapshots that they are, more likely than not, both executing the same worm during some window of time, for windows of 15 and 30 seconds, per our prior work [21].
Sentence 2: percentages of all possible pairs of samples |S1nS2| from some worm for which = 0.5, where S1 max(|S1|,|S2|) and S2 are snapshots, unordered sets of system calls ex­ecuted during some window of time.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Again, this approach is not unique, but it o.ers an oppor­tunity to study its strengths and weaknesses in the context of our network security domain.
Sentence 2: we were curi­ous to see which general techniques (if any) we could begin with, and how signi.cantly these techniques needed to be modi.ed before they would be used by our analysts.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Because the proposed framework requires additional informa­tion to be transmitted by the Owner to both Publishers and users, we store all such information into a directory server (which can also be shared among different Owners belonging to the same do­main or to federated ones), to limit the overhead that these oper­ations require.
Sentence 2: as depicted in Figure 1, the directory server contains three kinds of entries: the Publishers entry, which is shared by all Publishers and contains all encrypted documents that they are entitled to manage, plus additional information they need for the correct functioning of the system; the Users entry, shared by all the subscribed users, storing common information; and a distinct User ID entry for each single user, containing needed information to verify the security properties.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: But since a di.erent salt is used to encrypt each .le, an adversary may not need to use all possible salt values when populating an HMAC-SHA1 key dictionary.
Sentence 2: mallory would only need to populate the dictionary using enough di.erent salt values to ensure, with high probability, that one of the salt values that a user uses when encrypting her .les will collide with one of the salt values that Mallory used when creating his dictionary.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Many machine learning algorithms can be written in dual form by expressing sought feature vectors as linear combination of f(wx1),...,f(wxn).
Sentence 2: if w = a1f(wx1)+ ···anf(wxn)for some aw.Zn,then nn X X fw (wxi)= aj ·(f(wxi),f(wxj))= .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Its score can be represented as a linear expression with the sym­bol D(l, xt-1) and the symbol related to xt, and simpli.ed using the fact that all nucleotides between the two columns are known.
Sentence 2: an expression that compares the scores of two differ­ent connection paths can often be reduced: for example, we know that a path with a score D(l, xt-1)+ C1 + s1(i, xt) is better than the one with D(l, xt-1)+ C2 + s1(i, xt) if the constant C1 is smaller than C2.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Although the adoption of RBAC introduces bene.ts from both a system and business perspective, many organizations are still reluctant to deploy role-based access control sys­tems, since there are still some important issues that need to be addressed.
Sentence 2: to maximize the advantages of­fered by roles, the model must be customized to capture the needs and functions of the company.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 1.1 Contribution and Comparison We study the power of transferable non-equivocation in the con­text of AMPC and demonstrate how to improve the resilience of AMPC from t < n/3 to t < n/2, without any synchrony assump­tion.
Sentence 2: we present a general MPC protocol in a com­pletely asynchronous communication model with n = 2t + 1.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It should also be noted that as current propos­als for coordinate systems assume that the nodes partaking in the system cooperate fully and honestly with each other that is that the information reported by probed nodes is correct this could also make them quite vulnerable to malicious attacks.
Sentence 2: insider attacks executed by (potentially colluding) nodes in.ltrat­ing the system could prove very effective.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.1 Threat Model We consider a threat model in which the adversary can ei­ther corrupt protocol participants (and make them behave maliciously) or transmit spoofed messages on behalf of ar­bitrary entities.
Sentence 2: our focus is on a scenario in which agents behave maliciously and attempt to disrupt the protocol by sending spoofed messages to honest customers.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In addi­tion, while leftover ssh keys only allow people with the corre­sponding private key (normally the AMI image creator), to obtain access to the instance, passwords provide a larger at­tack vector: Anybody can extract the password hashes from an AMI, and try to crack them using a password-cracking tool (e.g., John the Ripper [9]).
Sentence 2: ssh keys were probably left on the images by mistake, and without a malicious intent.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It has been argued that it would be of practical value to be able to de.ne constraints in terms of organizational struc­tures, rather than just the identity of particular users [17].
Sentence 2: the .rst contribution of this paper is to introduce a model the Graph k-Colorability problem can be reduced to a special case of WSP in which the work.ow spec­i.cation only includes separation-of-duty constraints [17].
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The adver- sary wins the game if b = b'.
Sentence 2: an OSBE scheme is oblivious if for every probabilistic interactive Tufing Machine .,4, IPr[.A wins the above game] -½[ _< f(t), where f is a negligible function in t. (The adversary cannot do substantially better than random guessing.)
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, they are not suf.cient in our framework, since each group member also has access to some secret information (i.e., Si for Ui), which is used to compute the group keys.
Sentence 2: forward secrecy doesn t imply that the adversary cannot discover the subsequent group keys if he/she further has the secret information only known to some past group members, and backward secrecy doesn t guar­antee that the adversary cannot discover the preceding group keys if he/she is further provided the secret information only known to some new group members.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: IMPROVEMENTS TO ADDRESS-SPACE RANDOMIZATION ARCHITECTURE Our attack on address-space randomization relied on sev­eral characteristics of the implementation of PaX ASLR.
Sentence 2: our attack exploited the low entropy (16 bits) of PaX ASLR on 32-bit x86 processors, and the feature that address-space layouts are randomized only at program load­ing and do not change during the process lifetime.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The authors would like to thank the management team, development team, the researchers, and the architects for their support and guidance.
Sentence 2: we would like to thank Mike Day, Peter Hofstee, Dan Brokenshire, Jeremy Kerr, Mark Nutter, Arnd Bergmann, Mike Kistler, Sally Tekulsky, Mike Perks, and Vladimir Zbarsky.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Third, while J¨urjens distinguishes between potential and explicit nondeterminism in order to de.ne a re.nement preserving property of con.dentiality and integrity, he does not rely on this distinction in the de.nition of his information .ow property.
Sentence 2: a secure information .ow property for UML machines is formalized such that each behavior re.ne­ment to a deterministic UML machine satis.es this property, i.e.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For ex-3.3 Results Overview ample, VMMs (e.g., Xen) execute the privileged VM (Dom0) with the role of a host OS, and strictly divide the physical address space and privileges between Dom0 and the VMM.
Sentence 2: the VMM is speci.cally designed to be protected against a malicious privileged VM.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, such attestation mech­anisms provide only integrity veri.cation at load-time but not at run-time: An attacker can change the .ow of execu­tion of a program, e.g., via bu.er over.ow attacks [2] that are despite numerous countermeasures still a great security concern in software systems today.
Sentence 2: new runtime attacks were found based on so called return-oriented programming [5, 31].
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Unauthorized replacement or update of gateway executables on the RP resources  A compromise of the science gateway server is a serious risk and is out of the scope of control of the RPs, however, the first gateway security requirement mandates that the gateway owner/developers notify the TeraGrid when a gateway compromise is detected.
Sentence 2: a gateway compromise can easily lead to the compromise of the gateway's proxy credential and its unauthorized use to access TeraGrid resources.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 2.1 Graph Data Models Graphs are a very natural representation of data in many application domains, for example, precedence networks, path hierarchy, family tree and concept hierarchy.
Sentence 2: we emphasize on applying graph theory to redaction by us­ing two existing data models, namely a RDF data model [16] and the OPM provenance model [20].
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Wefurther analyzed the difference between IP count and the actual bot count by examining their temporal characteristics.
Sentence 2: figure5displays the number of unique IP addresses observed during the ten days that we were in control of theTor­pig C&#38;C. After the initial spike when the bots started to contact our server, there was a consistent diurnal pattern of unique IP ad­dresses with an average of 4,690 new IPs per hour.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this case, the channel matrix per­ h11 h12 ceived at transmitters will be F =instead of H. Using f21 f22 ZF-BF, the received symbol will become: -1 v y1 h11 h12 h11 h12 p1m1 n1 =v + y2h21 h22f21 f22p2m2n2 v (6) 1 0 p1m1 n1 =v + h21f22-h22f21 h11h22 -h12h21 p2m2n2 h11f22-f21h12 h11f22 -f21h12 The .rst insight in this equation is that no matter how rx2 forges and reports the CSI, rx1 always receives the signal y1 = v p1m1 + n1.
Sentence 2: it is impossible for rx2 to inject any payload into y1 by forging CSI, i.e., misleading the decoded signals at rx1.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our .rst observation is that the asymmetric (namely, non­commutative) nature of matrix multiplication gives rise to an interesting phenomenon in the GSW scheme: when mul­tiplying two ciphertexts with noise levels e1 and e2, the noise in the output turns out to be e1 + poly(n) · e2.
Sentence 2: the noise grows in an asymmetric manner.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 7.1 Security Proof We are going to show that there exist no (real world) adversary A who can trace tags in a system of issuers and randomizers that apply our insubvertible encryption scheme.
Sentence 2: we are going to show that no matter how the ad­versary A behaves, he cannot trace a tag unless he brakes one of the properties of our insubvertible encryption scheme listed above.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For low­frequency, synchronous communication channels (e.g., those that access XenStore), this method isolates individual transactions and resets the service to a fresh state at the end of every processed re­quest.
Sentence 2: every single request is processed by a fresh version of the serviceVM.2 The overhead of imposing a restart on every request would be too high for higher-throughput, concurrent channels, such as NetBack andBlkBack.FortheseserviceVMs,thehypervisorprovides ape­riodic restart timer that triggers restarts at a con.gurable frequency.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: (Vacuous privacy policy) We say that an ideal functionality ID is vacuous if there exists an ef­.cient extractor Ext such that for any PPT algorithm A there exists a simulator S so that for any database D: |P(AID (1k)= 1) -P(S(ExtID (1k))) = 1)|= .
Sentence 2: (k) we .rst extract all useful information from ID without any speci.c knowledge of the database, throw away ID, and use the extracted information to simulate ID against an arbitrary adversary.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We assume that service providers have a PKI infrastruc­ture that allows them to issue users signed transaction re­ceipts.
Sentence 2: we assume that each service provider is associated with apairofkeys(KPriv, KPub)where KPriv is the private key used to sign the transaction receipts and KPub is thepublickeyusedby other serviceproviders to ver­ify authenticity andintegrity of receipts.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Consider the term f =((Manager 8 Accountant 8 Treasurer) n(Clerk n¬{Alice , Bob})+) and the con.guration (U = {Alice , Bob, Carl, Doris, Elaine, Frank }, UR),inwhich UR is such that: UManager = {Alice , Doris, Elaine} UAccountant = {Doris, Frank } UTreasurer = {Bob, Carl, Doris} UClerk = {Alice , Bob, Carl, Doris, Frank }.
Sentence 2: the sub-term (Clerk n¬{Alice , Bob})+ means that only subsets of {Carl,Doris,Frank }may satisfy f.We have S(U,UR)(f)= {{Doris}, {Carl, Doris}, {Doris, Frank }, {Carl, Doris, Frank }} there are four usersets that satisfy the term f. 2.3 Algebraic Properties We now introduce the notion of equivalence among terms, which enables us to study the algebraic properties of the operators in the algebra.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Although security analysis of application-level software, to un­cover program design .aws, has been well-explored in the aca­demic literature [19, 17], little attention has been paid to embedded software.
Sentence 2: embedded programs interact directly with hardware components in their surrounding circuitry, thus creating potential information-.ow pathways that traditional software anal­ysis techniques [21] do not consider.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Firstly, security properties of a network and hosts allow us to conjecture the probability that a host hj is chosen or compromised as the next target, when the attacker resides in hi.
Sentence 2: network access control policies as well as the running services and vulnerabilities of hj allow us to predict how attractive a target such as hj would be to an attacker in hi.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We gathered quantitative data on the prevalence and nature of computer virus infections at our study site, which support our hypothesis that even of.ine computers need periodic software updates to be protected against .ash-drive-borne viruses.
Sentence 2: we found that the virus population at our .eld site was surprisingly young out of 674 infected .les observed, 63 .les contained a virus that had been discovered by anti-virus vendors fewer than six months before our scanner detected it.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To do this, we can think of the e.ect of insertions/deletions as implicitly re­de.ning the notion of centroid to be more .exible than that of no subtree of size more than n/2 when the centroid is removed .
Sentence 2: hypothetically suppose that in our construction we replaced the notion of centroid by that of c-approximate-centroid: A node whose removal leaves sub­trees with respective sizes of no more than cn for a con­stant c = 0.5 (e.g., c = 3/4).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To summarize, the paper makes the following contribu­tions:  We discuss how protocol learning techniques can be used to model the tra.c generated during the execu­tion of malware samples.
Sentence 2: we describe the limitations of protocol-agnostic approaches and show that, if properly setup and con.gured, they can be used to successfully replay real malware conversations.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The premise of data geolo­cation is that a provider may have some (economic) incen­tive for re-locating data in breach of contract, but assuring that all copies exist within some geographic region is out­side the scope of our work.
Sentence 2: data geolocation may be able to detect (in the context of privacy law) non­compliance, i.e.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: let db =  type ResultType = {name : string^H ; diff : int^L} let differences : Expr  = <@ for c in (% db).Couples do for p1 in (% db).People do for p2 in (% db).People do if (c.Person1 = p1.Id) &#38;&#38; (c.Person2 = p2.Id) &#38;&#38; (abs (p1.Age -p2.Age) > 10) then yield ({ name = p1.Name ; diff = p1.Age -p2.Age }) @> let main = run differences As can be seen in the above program the information-.ow pol­icy for this program is speci.ed by giving a type annotation to the quoted expression that generates the query, i.e., a type annotation for differences.
Sentence 2: the name components of the result are typed con.dential, while the age differences are public.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: are applied to bb3,bb4 and bb3* ,bb4 * as changes of basis matrix, respectively.
Sentence 2: b1 implicitly sets D = BA, D* B* = A. db1 := bb1, db2 := bb2, (db3, db4):= (bb3, bb4)A db1 * := bb * 1, db2 * := bb * 2, (db* 3, db* 4):= (bb * 3,bb4* )(A-1) .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Although all of these threats are hazardous to the mobile devices, we focus only on the Threat 4 in this paper since existing security approaches have mitigated Threat 1-3.
Sentence 2: threat 1 can be solved by using access control mechanisms like [2,6,15] (both in the VMM and in the kernel) and end-to-end encryption mechanisms.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 2.4.2 Semantics The semantics of the policy language is de.ned with re­spect to a schema F = (Id, {Si }i.Id , U, R, Q, I ), a con.g­uration C = (U, R, org , own, pol ), and a S = (sta, cur).
Sentence 2: the semantics is de.ned via a preprocessing func­tion and a satisfaction relation.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The security of a geo-spatial key assignment scheme is de.ned in a standard way.
Sentence 2: we require the properties of completeness and soundness to hold, as de.ned below: Completeness A user with access privileges to a rectan­ gular area R is able to compute the access key for each cell within R. Soundness Any coalition of users with access to rectangle areas R1, .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: More­over, the set of constraints {G1,... , Gc},where each Gi is a disjunction of primitive constraint expressions, is equivalent to the constraint expression G1 .···.Gc.
Sentence 2: we can reduce the problem of determin­ing the satis.ability of ((S, E),U,A,C ) to the problem of determining the satis.ability of a work.ow of the form ((S, E),U, A, G1 .···.Gc), where c = |C|;each clause Gi =(., Si 1,Si 11) has the form .i,1 .···..i,m(i),with m(i)= |Si 1|·|Si 11|;and each literal 11 .S11 .i,j has the form (., s1 ,s 11)for some s 1 .Si 1 and s i .we can represent any instance of WSP3(=, =) as a work.ow containing a constraint expression in con­junctive normal form in which each of the literals is a primitive constraint (which corresponds to a single Type 1 constraint).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: An impact of a dispersed burst is lower than that of a condensed burst.
Sentence 2: if the inter-packet delay, in arriving tra.c, is large enough, to allow the receiving host to process each packet before the arrival of a new one, then, even a large burst may not intro­duce signi.cant delays into the tra.c .ow.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Similar to the SSS construction [31], our 2-cloud ORAM scheme requires the client to store less than 1.5GB of data for an ORAM of 1TB in capacity (i.e., less than 0.15% of the ORAM capacity).
Sentence 2: in addition to caching v about O( N) data blocks where N is the total number of blocks, the client also stores about 4 bytes of metadata per block.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Zubulake claimed that Chapin treated her differently than her coworkers, who all happened to be male.
Sentence 2: zubulake claimed that Chapin treated her unfairly by "... ridiculing and belittling her in front of co-workers; [...] excluding her from work-related outings with male co-workers and clients; [...] making sexist remarks in her presence; and [...] isolating her from the other senior salespersons on the Desk by seating her apart from them" [14].
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.1.4 Cost Analysis In addition to evaluating the comprehensive coverage pro­vided by kernel tracing systems, we also calculate the per­formance and storage overheads caused by collecting kernel traces as follows: Performance overhead Since this amount of user and sys process time includes the execution time caused by the system call fuzzer, we remove it for retrieving the performance overhead produced by kernel tracing systems.
Sentence 2: we calculate the performance overhead by subtracting the total amount of user and sys process time obtained in step 1 from the time obtained in step 2.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.3 DesignDecisions Implementing the full-.edged CL anonymous credential system would not be feasible on current cards.
Sentence 2: features such as an age-proof(i.e.,proving thatthedate of birth contained in the credential issued has a distance of at most n years from the current date) or encoding all the more than 20 typical .elds of a standard identity card and allowing selective disclosure for each of them would result in a computation time on the order of 70 100 seconds.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A number of three-move identi.cation schemes in the literature turn out to have such a homomorphism though.
Sentence 2: one can obtain e.cient multi-signature schemes based on dis­crete logarithms from [36], based on RSA from [19], based on factoring from [16, 15, 33, 37], and based on pairings from [23].
Relationship: entailment