sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Alternatively, if s1 cannot satisfy the request itself then s1 will attempt to act in C­ mode, with any other server agent of the e-collective, to service c s request.
Sentence 2: s1 will adhere to the Principle of Maximal Individ­ ualistic Satisfaction and satisfy whatever it can of c s request and then ask for assistance with the remainder.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Next, we apply a concise grammar [30] to label each token to a specifictype (title, list element, list start, normal).
Sentence 2: by identifying specific types of sentences, we can increase the classification performance.we found that section titles typically do not contain ACRs, and we design the mechanism of scoring sentence similarity to compare titles with only other titles within the document.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: During a normal hop-by-hop aggregation process in a tree topology, (implicitly) we need to place more trust on the high-level nodes (i.e., nodes closer to the root) than the low-level nodes, because the aggregated result calculated by a high-level node is due to a larger number of sensor nodes.
Sentence 2: if a compromised node is closer to the root, the bogus aggregated data from it will have a larger impact on the .nal result computed by the root.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The operator dov for policy is based on a single inter­pretation of Indeterminate and has the following behavior: dov(Indeterminate, Permit) = Deny In contrast, dov for rules takes into account the e.ect of the rule in which the error occurred in order to make a decision.
Sentence 2: it has the following behavior: dov(Indeterminate, Permit) = Permit if e(I) = Permit dov(Indeterminate, Permit) = Indeterminate if e(I) = Deny where e(I) indicates the e.ect of the rule which returns Indeterminate.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Moreover, un­like plain universal re-encryption [17], our scheme produces ciphertexts that contain implicit proofs of being safe to randomize.
Sentence 2: any randomizer will be able to con.rm that the ciphertext is intended for legitimate users; if that check fails the randomizer has the option to oblit­erate the contents with safe but meaningless ciphertexts, destroying the adversarial hidden channel and preventing tracing.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Hence, we approach the problem of detecting ma­licious software at a later point when it initiates contact with its maintainer; a process referred to as phoning home .
Sentence 2: we introduce Botzilla, a method for detection of malware communication, which proceeds by repetitively recording network tra.c of malware in a controlled envi­ronment and generating network signatures from invariant content patterns.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, we will put some restriction on the geometry of traitors so that the colluding traitors will not be able to de­duce the step of the walking of the tracing ciphertexts un­less the step a.ects directly one of the traitors.
Sentence 2: we will assume that all of the traitors are in the same user group Ul = {u2k·l+1,...,u2k·l+2k} for some l .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, statistical attacks on pronounceable passwords have not been examined in great detail, leaving many direc­tions open which would be prudent to explore.
Sentence 2: we intend to explore the value of applying a-work-factor [65] and a-guesswork [20] metrics to the distributions generated by pronounceable passwords schemes in order to quantify their security.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The same structured concatenation for Godd with Sodd is used, but not discussed further for brevity.
Sentence 2: the glyphs from sets G are then mapped to a crypto­graphic hash of the secret key, k. the least signi.­cant byte from the hash is used as an index into Geven, the next byte into Godd, and so on.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If such a vulnerability existed between two actual net­work hosts such as 128.x.y.2 and 128.x.y.9, then the corre­sponding exploit would have the form of sshv1 (128.x.y.2, 128.x.y.9).
Sentence 2: if a vulnerability is instantiated with actual network speci.c information, then the result is an exploit.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: ... .. 0 00 ... 1 bn-1 i a1 a2 a3 ··· an-1 ia ·b ...... and both of s1,s2 are orthogonal to Gp4 under the bilinear map e, so this signature veri.es correctly.
Sentence 2: 3.2 Security r rc xr when we begin with Si0 := gg2g3 , Ui0 := r d ry ihr f zr ug2 rg , and H0 = g r3 , then after applying a single up­ 32 g date with matrix A, we will have Ar Arc Arx i S1 = gg2 g3 , Ar AdrAry i U1 = ug2 g3 , Ar AfrArz i H1 = hgg.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: More speci.cally, ftrans takes the current state of the system (which also includes the current time) and a set of actions attempted by subjects, and returns for the next clock tick the state obtained by applying the permitted actions in some unspeci.ed, .xed order which has the property that at the point each action is taken the state satis.es a policy rule which allows that action.
Sentence 2: we adopt a de­terministic model of state transition; from the current state and the actions taken at present, we can uniquely determine the next state.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A tuple of ordered sets (S1 , ..., Sn) is a p­extension of another tuple of ordered sets (R1 , ..., Rn)i. for all 1 = i = n, Si is a p-extension of Ri.
Sentence 2: a p-extension adds low-ranked elements to the ordered set, while keeping the q highest-ranked elements the same.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: After learning sj(N, i'), the coali- tion can determine the personalized shares of user Ui, sent in Bj, e.g, pj-1 (i').
Sentence 2: consider the case where Ue is a member of the coalition who was a group member dur- ing session j -2, but actively revoked during session j -1.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Despite of the (practical and potential) worth of an IBSAS scheme, the construction of a secure IBSAS scheme is not simple.
Sentence 2: in principle, an identity-based signature scheme is designed in a 2-level hierarchical signature scheme: a trusted key generation center generates a signature to authenticate an identity of a signer and the signer uses the signature as his private signing key to generate his signature on a message.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Once this adversary course of action is identified, the security analyst can provide advice to senior leaders on how best to allocate limited resources to thwart the attack and break the chain.
Sentence 2: the high level of threat understanding enables security analysts to predict not only where an adversary will attack, but also the logical and physical infrastructure that is most important to defend in order to thwart the attack.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: On the Limits of Privacy in Reputation Systems Stefan Schiffner Andreas Pashalidis Elmar Tischhauser stefan.schiffner@esat.kuleuven.be andreas.pashalidis@esat.kuleuven.be elmar.tischhauser@esat.kuleuven.be K. U. Leuven, ESAT/SCD/COSIC and IBBT Kasteelpark Arenberg 10 B-3001 Leuven-Heverlee, Belgium ABSTRACT This paper describes a formal model for multiple privacy notions that apply to reputation systems and shows that, for certain classes of systems, very strong privacy notions are unachievable.
Sentence 2: it is shown that, systems where a user s reputation depends exclusively on the ratings he received, necessarily leak information about the relationship between ratings and reputations.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This holds for any S,so Pr[.j |L= L]= Pr[.j |L= L ' ].
Sentence 2: fj reveals no information about the ordering of N within L. Thisprovestheclaim.2 Now recall that £|F |+1,...,£k-|P | denotes the order of N within L,so that Xj = f(£k-|P |).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: P As mentioned earlier, we use P (I) to denote the standard Datalog semantics for the Datalog portion of the SEAL pro­gram P against a given set of base predicates I.
Sentence 2: the Datalog rules of P are applied iteratively (and cumulatively) on the predicates of I and derived predicates are populated until they reach a .x-point.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the "testing" process, the anomaly decision, i.e., either 1 for "yes" or 0 for "no" from the upper layer is inserted into the deviation score of the lower level, for example, (0.1, 0.1) now becomes (0.1, 0.1, 0).
Sentence 2: the deviation data also carries the extra information passed from the upper level.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Instead of anonymizing each node one by one independently, our approach treats each partitioned substructural component of the network as one single unit to be anonymized.
Sentence 2: by drawing on the concept of the non-trivial community structures existing in the social networks ([10], [2]), we de.ne the concept of local structure, based on the structural delineation naturally inherent in the social networks.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: More­over, we introduce a new entity called User-Revocation man­ager whose role is to revoke users.1 In the previous group signature schemes with user revocation [5], the function of dismissing users was built into the role of Group manager or the role of Issuing manager.
Sentence 2: one could not sep­arate the function of issuing a new key to new user and the function of revoking an old key.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Notice that a signal handler is a user-mode routine that the OS kernel will invoke when a running process receives a sig­nal.
Sentence 2: when the signal is received, the kernel .rst prepares a signal-handling context stack frame on the pro­cess user stack and executes call *SIGF HANDLER(%rsp) to invoke the signal trampoline code de.ned by the sig­tramp() routine in the kernel, which calls the user s signal handler.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: INTRODUCTION Role-based access control (RBAC) has established itself as a solid basis for today s security administration needs, as documented in the RBAC96 model [16] and the subsequent NIST standard [7].
Sentence 2: enterprise Roles spanning across di.erent IT systems are increasingly used in medium and large organisations as a basis for company-wide secu­rity management.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Logical Protection of the Recovery System Logical protection means that it should not be possible for a running application to prevent the execution of the recovery procedures.
Sentence 2: if the program code running on a node has crashed or been corrupted by an adversary (e.g., by ex­ploiting a security hole), this should not a.ect the integrity and availability of the recovery system.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Furthermore, for users that are not members of the F eel W ell federation, it requires the name and the phone number of the user together with a valid credit card number.
Sentence 2: acibademH ealth o.ers C S can ser­vice for its registered users if they let AcibademH ealth to pos­sess the resulting C Scan Report.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A puncturable PRF [3, 26] is a type of contrained PRF that enables evaluation at the complement of a single arbitrary polynomial-sized subset of the input space.
Sentence 2: pRF F (K, ·) is equipped with ad­ditional PPT algorithms (EvalF , PunctureF ) such that the following properties hold Functionality preserved under puncturing For every PPT algorithm A which on input 1. outputs a set S .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Therefore, before designing a protocol or developing a formal system to check the proper working of the design, it is extremely important to give clear semantics to the notion of security properties, model of the threat, and the underlying assumptions taken in order to achieve a secure system.
Sentence 2: for authentication protocols, important design issues are data freshness, message bindings, secure functions, and the underlying cryptosystem.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.3 Scenario Collection and Replay Based on the de.nition above, the collection of WMS is actually the collection of (µ, V, E, T ) so that all the informa­tion related to (µ, V, E, T ) are stored and can be accessed later (for .ne-grained analysis).
Sentence 2: all interactions and contents during all infection trails should be stored if possi­ble.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This is shown by 97.5% average round success rate and 0.13 average edit distance in the worst case.
Sentence 2: for the distribution of average edit distance of NumPad-Shift, 27 participants among 40 samples (after removing the experimental data when NumPad-Shift appears as the .rst test group) has an average edit distance of zero (i.e.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Given a key pair (sk, pk) and a message m in ZN*, c=Epk(m) denotes an encryption of the plaintext m, and d=Dsk(c) denotes the decryption of the cryptograph c. Most of public key encryptions are based on the modular arithmetic with a modulus N, a large integer.
Sentence 2: we call such an encryption system a homomorphic encryption, if there are two operations + and * satisfying the condition for any m1 and m2: Epk(m1+m2) = Epk(m1)*Epk(m2).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: has the same exact security bounds as those of the Feistel S-Pads of Theorem 2 for both TDPs and claw-free permutations, but with an improvement in the running time of the reduction such that t ' = t - O((qG + qS + qH ) · (Tf + Textract )) Recall that S-Pad and X-Pad are constructed identically, the only difference being the selection of length parameters (and the manner in which the TDPs are applied to the output).
Sentence 2: since s is concatenated alongside the output of the TDPs, length param­eters should be chosen to minimize the length of s. The practical costs of this small increase in the minimum ciphertext length for X-Pads are generally not signi.cant, but the resulting increase in exact security is substantial enough to warrant the use of the X-Pad paradigm instead of the S-Pad paradigm in most situations.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The rule states that explicit substitution may invert usual substitution to create instances as required.
Sentence 2: variables that appear in packed code can be associated with the label of the process that packs that code,even though thosevariablesmaybe bound later by(Reduct evaluate) when that code is eventually unpacked at some other label.Forexample,the instanceof empty in binVirus may be correctly associated with Low (the label at which it is packed) instead of High (the label at which it is unpacked).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: That is, the hierarchy adopted for determining the structure of a histogram is also used as a basis for representing it, thus introducing surprising e.ciency in terms of both space con­sumption and accuracy of estimations.
Sentence 2: our histogram (namely GHBH -Grid Hierar­chical Binary Histogram) is based on a constrained partition scheme, where blocks of data cannot be split anywhere along one of their dimensions, but the split must be laid onto a grid partitioning the block into a number of equally sized sub-blocks.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Moreover, changing the arguments to these functions might result in (1) a sequence of system calls that was not experienced during learning or (2) a data.ow between system calls that might not be covered by the model.
Sentence 2: by inserting more random invalid system calls in the program code, we can make it more and more di.cult for an attacker to come up with a permissible sequence of system calls.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Thus, the .rst player already knows the value of E. We reveal the value of E to the second player (the .rst player already knows this value).
Sentence 2: we condition the game G(Y ,X|V1,B,W )TV1 on the value of E, and consider the game G(Y,X |V1,B,W )TV1 |E = G(Y ,X |V1,B,W,E)TV1 , with pa­ rameters (k, d - 1, P(Y |V1,B,W,E)TV1 , P(X|V1,B,W,E)TV1 ).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.1 Chinese Wall Policy We examine how we specify our risk .ow policy as a Chi­nese Wall policy and evaluate the legality of our resulting risk .ows using the Chinese Wall semantics.
Sentence 2: the resulting combination of covert and overt information .ows must adhere to simple and *-security property semantics of the Chinese Wall policy.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To investigate how EARDet performs in reality, we conduct experiments and compare EARDet with FMF and AMF in the face of common attacks.
Sentence 2: we generate attack .ows using two simple strategies .ooding attacks and Shrew DoS attacks [22,25] and then mix real traces with arti.cially generated attack .ows to simulate an attack environment.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Consider that a well-formed ciphertext (A, B, C, D, E, S) decrypts uniquely regardless of the corresponding public key.
Sentence 2: c = e(g, H(A))r · m and D = F (A)r uniquely .xes m. If we recall the de.nition of a derivative from De.nition 2.4, then we see by inspection that if A = svk * then for the ciphertext not to be a deriva­tive of the challenge (C, D, E) must not be identical to the challenge ciphertext.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Un­like the signature-based method [10] and message authenti­cation code (MAC)-based method [8], the BMW transfor­mation does not need to attach a one-time signature or a MAC to a ciphertext.
Sentence 2: the BMW transforma­tion is more suitable for key encapsulation than other meth­ods [10, 8].
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Additionally, once a malicious web site is identi.ed, the .-system can verify that a malicious modi.cation was removed and that the web site is now benign.
Sentence 2: if an infection campaign is dormant or the exploit page is o.ine, dynamic analysis systems detect that the web site is benign because it does not detect any malicious behavior.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since the functionality FG KE is aware of when a player outputs the session key (since that player outputs the session key immediately after receiving (sid, pid, ') from FG KE , and this message is received by Ui immediately after FG KE sends it), FG KE can give the appropriate information to the adversary when a corruption occurs.
Sentence 2: if the adversary corrupts a player after the session key has been sent to that player (corresponding to a corruption in the real world after the player has output a session key), the adversary is given nothing.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: PIV-Interoperable cards conform to the technical specifications for PIV and additionally have been issued in a manner that supports trust by Federal relying parties.
Sentence 2: these cards must include an authentication certificate issued by a provider cross-certified with the Federal Bridge certification authority (FBCA) at Medium-HW policy and require subscriber registration through an identity proofing process that satisfies NIST SP 800-63 Level 4 requirements.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: De.nition 5 (Term Equivalence).
Sentence 2: we say that two terms f1 and f2 are equivalent (denoted by f1 =f2) when for every userset X and every con.guration (U, UR), X satis.es f1 under (U, UR)if and only if X satis.es f2 under (U, UR).f1 =f2 [ ] if and only if .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: authorisation server, regardless of how the user authenticated to Unity.
Sentence 2: users authenticate with whichever external credential they have, and an intermediate SAML assertion is used to present a harmonised credential to the AS; in turn, the AS issues an access token to the portal to enable the portal to obtain an X.509 credential on behalf of the user: the EUDAT Online Certi.cation Authority is implemented as an OAuth resource (described in the following section.)
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: By making central use of role-based structures and going beyond the simple table lookup of the access control matrix, and the fixed structure of a lattice of security labels, access control models have evolved in their support of an increasing range of access control policies.
Sentence 2: rBAC has been shown to be natural in its support of least privilege as well as static and dynamic separation of duty policies [9, 13, 16] known to be important to the business applications of numerous organizations [11, 23].
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For instance, we can e.ciently and uniquely deter­mine roots of a polynomial over the message space when it is a .eld.
Sentence 2: .nding a root of a polynomial de.ned over ZN is equivalent to factoring N [44] and so there is no polynomial-time root-.nding algorithm for polynomials over the message space of Paillier encryption without the factor­ization of N. Hence, many polynomial representation based private set operation protocols require additional expensive costs to extract roots of polynomials [33, 23, 43].
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this pa­per we focus on the challenging task of triggering a certain behavior through automated UI interactions.
Sentence 2: we propose a hybrid static and dynamic analysis method to reveal UI-based trigger conditions in Android application­ s. Our method .rst uses static analysis to extract expected activity switch paths by analyzing both Activity and Func­tion Call Graphs, and then uses dynamic analysis to tra­verse each UI elements and explore the UI interaction paths towards the sensitive APIs.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We now present the new state of the art in low-power soft­ware implementations of ECC on the ARM Cortex-M0+.
Sentence 2: we propose an optimization of the L´opez-Dahab (LD) [16] .eld multiplication, which aims to reduce the num­ber of memory accesses, as this is a slow operation on the target platform.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: First, a user can declare her current location through a mechanism commonly known as check­in.
Sentence 2: second, the protection system has a prior notion of how locations are related geometrically, and it uses the relation­ship between the declared locations of the resource owner and the requester as a basis of authorization.1 if the declared location of the resource owner and that of the resource requester are related in a way mandated by the ac­cess control policy (e.g., co-location, close proximity, spatial containment, etc), then access is granted.
Relationship: entailment