sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 5.1 Approximating IP Address Delegation Whilepreviousstudieshaveaccuratelyreconstructedtheroutingtopologygraph[33],itisexceptionallydif.culttoapproximateadelegationgraphfortheInternet.Toshowwhythisisso,considerthefragmentationofAT&#38;T s12.0.0.0/8 addressspace.Are­centevaluationofBGPupdatesforasingledayshowed571dif­ferentASesannounced923distinctpre.xesinthe12.0.0.0/8 range.8Thedelegationofthesepre.xesoftenoccurredyearsago.Moreover,manyorganizationstowhichaddressspacewasdele­gatednolongerexist,havechangedhands,orcurrentlyhavenoformalrelationshipwithAT&#38;T.Hence,reconstructingandrecord­ingthesedelegationswouldbeanarduousprocess.DoingsoforeveryorganizationintheInternetmaytakeyears.Forthisreason,anysolutionmustbeincrementallydeployable:weasacommunitysimplycannotwaitforalldelegationtobediscoveredandrecorded.
Sentence 2: inarelatedwork,Kentet.al.estimatedthestatisticalpropertiesoftheIPv4addressdelegationininvestigatingdeploymentcostsofS-BGP[17].Theydeterminedthenumberofdelegatedaddress,or­ganizations,andASesusingMeritBGPstatisticsandotherpublicdataasofFebruary1999.Aswasappropriatefortheirpurposes,thisworkonlyestimatedthesizeoftheproblem,butdidnotcon­sideritsstructure.Itisthislatterfeaturewhichismostrelevanttothecurrentwork:wewishtounderstandthehowandbywhomdelegationoccurs.WealsofoundthestatisticalpropertiesofBGPhaveshiftedsigni.cantlysincetheoriginalstudy.Forexample,weidenti.edaBGPspeakerwhoreceived300timesthenumberofUPDATEscitedinthepreviousstudy(1,500in1999vs.600,000in2003).Thisdifferentialmaybepartiallyexplainedbytheoriginalstudy.lteringiBGP(wedidnot).Notethatweseeksolutionsthatcansustaintheworst-caseload,andhencewefocusonthelargestvisibleloadonanyBGPspeaker.TheratioofiBGPtoeBGPtraf­.cistopologydependentandhighlyvariable.wewishto 8This.gureincludespre.xesdelegatedoutofAT&#38;T saddressspace,aswellasafractionofthepre.xesmulti-homedbyAT&#38;T.  UPDATES Prefix ASN 12.0.0.0/8 7018 12.1.83.0/24 14787  Figure 2: Address Delegation graph for pre.x 12.1.0.0/16.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Computing and verifying these zero-knowledge proofs seems at .rst as a computationally expensive task.
Sentence 2: per­formance can be greatly improved, and be quite reasonable, based on two observations: Since all encryptions are based on the El Gamal scheme, all proofs can be translated to proofs that a certain tu­ple is a Di.e-Hellman tuple.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Països Catalans 26 E-43007 Tarragona, Catalonia ABSTRACT The usual approach to location privacy is to cloak and/or perturb the positions or trajectories of the mobile objects.
Sentence 2: if unlinkability of the various interactions between a mobile object and the service/control system can be af­forded and achieved, neither cloaking nor perturbation are necessary.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As in Figures 6(c) and 6(d), while there exist none or a small number of packet-dropping nodes on the way, our scheme works almost like the single-path forwarding with the help of a few additional relaying nodes.
Sentence 2: when confronting a large number of packet-dropping nodes, our scheme makes full use of the help from additional relaying nodes, in order to successfully deliver the packet to the base station at any cost to the best e.orts.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This means that signing (and verifying) is much more ef­.cient, as log T hashes (private key operations) are extremely fast to compute, compared with log T signatures, which are slow.
Sentence 2: key update is much slower here, since the signer must generate all the public keys in a bottom-up fashion, in order to compute their hash which is the public key; since the signer does not keep all keys (or else the key size would be very large), re­generation of keys is necessary during the life time of the scheme, resulting in (amortized) log T key generations per update.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Certi.cate chains of size 13 are probably going to be rare in real environments.
Sentence 2: the cost of security also depends on the depth of the tree of contacted services, k. When taking this value into account, we get a cost of k* l* 16ms for the no delegation case and a cost of l* 16ms + 180ms + (k-1) * 16ms for the del­egation case.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: John Linwood Grif.n Department of Computer Science The Johns Hopkins University Baltimore, Maryland, United States jlg@cs.jhu.edu a community.
Sentence 2: a person s reputation may be quite di.erent between communities; people prized for their programming prowess may be vili.ed as griefers in computer gaming circles, or people known in one town for their kindness and generosity may in fact be escaped convicts known to the law enforcement of another.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: F0 f(r ): Ask(H,mIr) To prove the .rst premise, observe that any adversary that asks r '' to G, can be used to invert f on its k1 most signi.cant bits.
Sentence 2: before applying rule OW, we must .rst apply [Merge] to replace r '' I r ' by a fresh random variable r,so that the judgment has the appropriate form.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: {any, max}.When obj = min, there is a degra­dation in performance since, while the time taken for the generation of the clauses remains the same, the time taken for the solution of the generated PMAX-SAT problem in­creases signi.cantly, as expected.
Sentence 2: we observe that the timings in this case are still below 1 second.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A virtual machine (VM) achieves strong isolation and con.nes processes running inside the VM such that, even if they are compromised by malware, it will be hard, if not impossible, to compromise systems outside of the VM.
Sentence 2: a dilemma exists in switching from the in the box approach to the out of the box approach: It is well-known that there exists a semantic gap [29] between the view of the VM from the outside and the view from the inside the latter being seen by the traditional, in the box anti-malware systems.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since either the user or key genera­tion authority is assumed honest in all security games for standard Worry-Free Encryption, the CRS will always be correctly generated and we will be able to set the CRS in each security experiment.
Sentence 2: this will be incompat­ible with the ideas in the following section in constructing a minimally-vulnerable scheme and we leave the problem of constructing a CCA2 secure Worry-Free encryption scheme that is minimally-vulnerable open.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: is {0,1}n, and that for every .xed key s.{0,1}n the function .s(·) is injective.
Sentence 2: consider now a set of func­tions {gi,g':1 =i =n}with the property that for every i i 1the exact security language may be somewhat more natural when talking about block ciphers and tweakable block ciphers. '
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If the implementation of other components is tight­ened up to eliminate features unneeded for MCC, then the size of security-critical components of MCC can be brought down to be­low 10 KLOC.
Sentence 2: it should be noted that safety depends on many non-MCC components, including the underly­ing OS, the gcc compiler and related tools, and the XSB system.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For instance, in a social network with millions of users with hundreds of contacts each, utilizing private shar­ing could need extensive resources because of the server load.
Sentence 2: by eliminating the encryption load on the server, VPET gives an e.cient solution for private equality sharing.VPET increases the size of the location data slightly (see Table 2) as the vector components have to be transmitted by Bob (in each of three steps, FPET trans­mits (4 + 4 + 4) = 12 bytes in total, where VPET transmits (4+4+8) = 16 bytes in total).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this case, we can observe that the most interesting for the system to allow this access, even though interesting policy is for the AC-DP to make an autonomous decision, that is to start mitigation techniques, before allow­the access itself has a negative reward.
Sentence 2: with the state s2 =(reg, cf, {(s1,o1)}, (s2,o1)), that is, the state ing a bad access.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Nevertheless, it is applicable to map between both classi.cations as following: values high to low to the value medium (potential security risks-requires security guarantees from the cloud provider)  values negligible to the value low (does not have security re­quirements), due to the absence of security risks associated with this type of data.
Sentence 2: further requirements can be de.ned like costs or availability.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We hypothesized that passphrases would be eas­ier to remember if they were sentence-like, and that passphrases composed of nouns would be easier to visualize than passphrases composed of random words.
Sentence 2: we found that pp-sentence and pp-nouns resulted in slightly longer passphrases than pp-small (which contained short words such as: the, be, and, a, to), but oth­erwise performed similarly.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Privilege is also required to modify the properties of a DD, such as the types of events that are being monitored and the parties that will be noti.ed when such events are triggered (the owner of the DD, the sender of the message that triggered the event, the recipi­ent of the message, or any combination of the three).
Sentence 2: pro­cesses that receive messages sent to listening ports need not have privilege for the DDs to which those ports are connected.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For the other rounds, the adversary can guess the response; thus the overall winning probability is roughly 3 per time-critical round.
Sentence 2: once the prover with­ 4 draws its support, the adversary (more formally a simulator having access to the adversary s view) is unable to use the information learned during the prover-aided phase of the at­tack.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The reason for this is that in the second strategy, the in­vocation to ConstructCascadeBF receives a smaller upper bound value for the space dedicated to counters than the .rst strategy.
Sentence 2: the approach of severely limiting the space allocated for counters leads to more frequent re-allocations (invocations to ConstructCascadeBF) of the cascade Bloom .lter.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: properties of all the program executions that follow the same con­trol .ow path, and has been successfully applied to a wide range ofdifferentapplicationsinsoftware engineering and security[7, 10,14,26,41,46].
Sentence 2: this approachgeneralizes an execution onlyto a set of executionsthatfollow exactlythe same control-.ow path.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As noted above, in deterministic sys­tems, this is equivalent to the statement that the history viewL(r) of everything that is observable to L in the run should depend only on purgeL(Act(r)).
Sentence 2: as the following example shows, a similar equivalence between de.nitions stated in terms of observa­tions in the .nal state of a run and de.nitions stated in terms of the view on the run does not hold in nondeterministic systems.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In particular, by using plagiarism detection algorithms to measure the similarity between malware samples, they show that a factor con­tributing to the strong results reported in [2] might be that the 2,658 validation instances selected via majority voting on multiple AVs are simply easy to classify.
Sentence 2: no complete solution is of­fered on how to perform a better malware clustering validity anal­ysis.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the orig­inal NY transform for PKE, the ciphertext of a resulting scheme consists of two ciphertexts that are decrypted to a common plaintext by respective decryption keys.
Sentence 2: this method cannot be applied for KEM straightforwardly since it is not generally possible to choose a common DEM key for two independent ciphertexts.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In normal operation at R0, a packet that arrives at R0 destined for R1 will be routed through the appropriate channel to reach its destination.
Sentence 2: the routing table in R0 can be modi.ed such that for packets destined for R1, instead of being routed through the West output port, the packet is re-routed towards the East output port (as shown with the dotted line in Fig­ure 7).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Guessing the symmetric key with a brute-force attack is com­putationally very dif.cult; while a host knows that the encrypted addresses provided to it are obtained from base addresses that have a common set of bits, exploring the entire key space to identify the secret symmetric key is computationally challenging (e.g., our prototype uses TDES for encryption, where the key space has 2168 keys).
Sentence 2: best practices for key management require ISPs to periodically change the encryption keys.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The underlying assumption is that real users will implicitly understand the outcome of their authentication attempt by the presented data; i.e., an unfamiliar account will indicate that the entered password is incorrect, and they need to try again.
Sentence 2: a random attacker may have little or no idea what to expect as user data after being logged in, even if she launches a human­assisted attack.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: ISSUES AND LIMITATIONS Later in the paper, we propose four types of anti-worm propagation methods: a passively spreading anti-worm which responds to worm probes with a counterattack; an active­scanning anti-worm which actively .nds targets and propa­gate to them; a hybrid scheme that combines the features of the passive and active anti-worms; and an IDS based anti­worm where an IDS or similar device intercept attack mes­sages and counter-attacks [21].
Sentence 2: the proposed anti­worms in their current forms have several unresolved issues and limitations that are almost certain to cause serious de­ployment problems.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Accelerators that perform entire large-scale oper­ations (such as an entire key generation or signature) on-chip using an internal random number generator would cause similar prob­lems, and likely be unusable for these FSS constructions.
Sentence 2: accelerators that only provide hardware assistance for cryptographic building blocks such as modular exponentiation or large number arithmetic, would cause no problems.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A common practice of malicious PDF authors is to scatter this code across many objects with the aim to hinder detection and analysis.
Sentence 2: no matter into how many objects the code has been split, in order for the original codetobe executablewhenthedocumentisopened, the respective objects (or their associatedparent objects) should all have been marked as containing JavaScript code using the /JS key.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Probability Distribution Of Silence Sample Values Probability Distribution Of Silence Sample Values 0.5 form, we may doubt if there is really any DC offset component 0.7 0.6 present in the caller s audio stream.
Sentence 2: if we look more 0.4 0.5 closely, especially in the caller s silence, Figure 2 (bottom) shows how the sample values are shifted below zero toward negative val­ ues.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The security notions for our labelled algorithms are similar to those of stan­dard signcryption, with the added requirement that t is considered part of the ciphertext (for the purposes of CCA decryption oracle queries), and must be authenticated.
Sentence 2: there is no hiding requirement for the label t. As expected, the security for signcryption consists of IND-CCA and sUF-CMA components when attacking some user U.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, the protocols proposed to satisfy this requirement are not zero-knowledge with respect to the underlying watermark but only with respect to their form:  these protocols show in zero-knowledge that the watermark has a certain form, e.g., WM = g x mod p without revealing x := logg(WM).
Sentence 2: they reveal the real watermark hidden in a list of fake watermarks, hoping that the veri.er does not discover the real one since all watermarks in the list are detectable in the corresponding work.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In biometric systems, the transformation function needs to transform the query template into another template which is expected to be the same as the registered template by taking care of the acquisition variability.
Sentence 2: unlike other areas such as communication systems or data storage where there is only one class of data, biometric systems need to deal with two classes of data, that is intra­class data and inter­class data.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, an administrator in UseCON is able to .nd all the (requested, activated, denied, completed or stopped) us­ages that are related to a particular object.
Sentence 2: using UCON he is restricted into retrieving the value of the object attribute that contains only the number of its previous (com­pleted or terminated) usages (as proposed in [9]).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As these protocols avoid the use of digital signatures, they introduce asymmetry in one of three following ways: using information asymmetry, using time asymmetry, or by combining both approaches.
Sentence 2: multicast authentication protocols supporting non-repudiation attempt to amortize the overhead of a dig­ital signature over a group of data pieces (that is, packets1) or to reduce the online computational e.ort with the use of hash-based one-time signature schemes.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Cryptographic parameters have been successfully retrieved: 402000:8 and 402008:8 as inputs, and 402000:8 as output.
Sentence 2: we also collected parameters with values linked to this particular implementation: (i) eax:4, ebx:4, esp:4 containing memory addresses, (ii) ecx:4, containing a counter value, (iii) 12FFC0:4, corresponding to a local vari­able initialized before the loop (SIZETODECRYPT), and (iv) edx:4, an intermediate storage.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: WSBAC also requires that encrypted .le accesses originating from untrusted de­vices be decrypted at Polen (rather than at the network .le server).
Sentence 2: because both Polen and the network .le server are administered by Alice s employer, decrypting .le accesses at Polen compromises her privacy no more than decrypting them at the .le server.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When users use these metrics to express their privacy re­quirements, at least three elements should be provided a metric, the parameter values of the chosen metric, and the history win­dow s size.
Sentence 2: in practice it is dif.cult and cumbersome for a user to give exact values to these elements, as this requires them to understand the meaning of each parameter and the corresponding implication on privacy protection.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To achieve thisgoal, a common approachistopatchtheknown sys­tem/software vulnerabilities within the machines.
Sentence 2: there is typically a long time window between the identi.cation of vul­nerabilities and the release of the corresponding patches, not men­tionthatthere areprobably many zero-day(unknown) vulnerabil­ities inside our software.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In particular, encrypting .rst the message and then computing the MACfunction over the ciphertext is usually preferable since the encryption function does not have to be computed in CBC mode [9] and invalid cipher­texts can be discarded without the overhead of decryption.
Sentence 2: direct authentication of the plaintext is a desir­able property, and also notice that we employ the MAC to authenticate messages that are not necessarily private and that can be predictable or induced.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Current pro­posals for capability-based systems treat prioritized traf.c (i.e., pack­ets with a valid capability) preferentially over non-prioritized traf­.c.
Sentence 2: capability-based systems still suffer from a criti­cal weakness: they cannot protect the initial capability request, because that request is sent unprotected as non-prioritized traf.c.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Balfanz, et al., have proposed using location­limited channels for location-based access control [3], and many others have also proposed use of limited-range radio broadcasts as a way to verify proximity [13, 6, 5].
Sentence 2: there are no strong security guarantees that the communi­cation range will always be limited as desired: an adversary with more powerful equipment may be able to participate in the protocols even if they are substantially further away than non-malicious parties.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: of Florida State University Ottawa, Ontario K1V 1A7, London PO Box 4530 Canada Egham, Surrey, TW20 OEX, UK Tallahassee, FL 32306, USA carlisle.adams@entrust.com mikeb@dcs.rhbnc.ac.uk desmedt@cs.fsu.edu  Mike Reiter Philip Zimmermann Bell Laboratories, Lucent Technologies PGP 600 Mountain Ave. Menlo Park, California, USA Room 2A-342 prz@pgp.com Murray Hill, NJ 07974, USA reiter@research.bell-labs.com ABSTRACT Several organizations are setting up Public Key Infrastructures, examples are: the Corporation for Research and Educational Networking (CREN),  the Federal Government plans to fund 7 Public Key Infrastructure Models pilot programs at different federal agencies.
Sentence 2: experts have quite different viewpoints on how to set up such Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: MashupOS proposes HTML extensions such as  and , which occupy a middle ground: they allow the caller and callee to commu­nicate but only along well-understood channels (as opposed to across the whole DOM under the status quo).
Sentence 2: mashupOS has the same limitations that DAC-based operat­ing systems have: the user (or the integrator in MashupOS s terminology) must still decide apriori whether to trust a third party or not with sensitive data because sandboxed scripts in MashupOS can leak data to external servers.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Conceptual knowledge is knowledge about concepts or relationships that can be expressed as propositions (e.g., URLs have a protocol part and a domain name part).
Sentence 2: procedural knowledge (also referred as declarative knowledge) is the step-by-step knowledge that one uses to solve a given problem (e.g., check the URL in the address bar, and if it contains an IP addresses, you are likely visiting a phishing site) [2].
Relationship: contrasting