sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: By theorem 4.2, any reasonable adversary who can recover a secret share for which he does not pos­sess the required credential can also compromise BasicIdent, contradicting the BDH assumption [6].
Sentence 2: a cannot recover a satisfying set of secret shares and learns nothing, in an information theoretic sense, about s. Without s, re­covering M from W requires compromising E. 4.3 Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Security This section shows how Encrypt can be changed so that a complete ciphertext remains secure even in the presence of a decryption oracle.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our post-experimental brief survey regarding handset us­age con.rmed that a ma jority of the participants (47 out of 72) primarily use mobile handsets with touchscreen keypads.
Sentence 2: our sample population for Experiment 1 was predom­inantly familiar with touchscreen keypads, resulting in the same potential bias for physical vs. touchscreen group.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In fact, in a shared hosting con.g­uration, the user has few privileges on the machine and she is not allowed to to run or install any monitoring or IDS application, nor to customize the machine s web server, its .rewall, or security set­tings.
Sentence 2: in order to protect his or her website, a user has to fully rely on the security measures employed by the hosting provider.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Letting the Puss in Boots Sweat: Detecting Fake Access Points using Dependency of Clock Skews on Temperature  Fabian Lanze University of Luxembourg fabian.lanze@uni.lu Benjamin BraatzUniversity of Luxembourg benjamin.braatz@uni.lu Andriy PanchenkoUniversity of Luxembourg andriy.panchenko@uni.lu  Thomas EngelUniversity of Luxembourg thomas.engel@uni.lu ABSTRACT The only available IEEE 802.11 network identi.ers (i. e., the network name and the MAC address) can be easily spoofed.
Sentence 2: an attacker is able to fake a real hotspot and attract its tra.c.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In some cases, such as the FreeCS example dis­cussedabove,the .ngerprintmay consistofa sequence of resource accesses (rather than a set).
Sentence 2: the TMI reference monitor must be extended to support an introspection log, and .ngerprints must be matched against this log to determine when a corresponding security-relevant operation is performed.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We found empiri­cally that there is a high bias in the pattern selection process, e. g., the upper left corner and three-point long straight lines are very typical selection strategies.
Sentence 2: the en­tropy of patterns is rather low, and our results indicate that the security o.ered by the scheme is less than the security of only three digit randomly-assigned PINs for guessing 20% of all passwords (i. e., we estimate a partial guessing entropy G0.2 of 9.10 bit).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Likewise, a Mann-Whitney U test of the surprise assessments between those who found any hits and those who did not was also statistically signi.cant (U = 98, 735.5, p < 0.001).
Sentence 2: over a third of our participants found sensitive data in their email accounts, which was surprising to them, and those lock­ing their smartphones were more likely to .nd sensitive data.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: can obtain more information from the constraints: Notice that the existence of a constraint .x = .y implies that information about the value of x may .ow to the value of y.
Sentence 2: the above con­straints tell us that information about the value stored in hmay .ow to variable l through variables x0,x1,...,xn-1,xn in this order.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Pf,I : |I ' | = i}| denotes the car­ 0 if 0 = su <c dinalities of equivalence classes as induced by the link­ 1 if c = su < 2c ing relation.
Sentence 2: cf,I is the multi set of equivalence ··· , class sizes with respect to the linking relation Pf,I .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since the Skitter map does not include bandwidth measurements, our simulations employ a simple bandwidth model in which the senders uplinks have one tenth the capacity of the victim s network connection, while the rest of the network links have 10 times that of the victim s network connection.
Sentence 2: each host has a small link connecting it to a well provisioned core that narrows down to reach the victim.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Similarly, assume that only O3 has changed at time t3 such Ti 3L < t3 < Ti and none of the other items of G1 changed in the interval [Ti - 6L, Ti - 3L].
Sentence 2: the GIRi report in SCI will not contain any information about G1 and the mobile node will not be able to point to the (O3, t3) sent in the OIRi report thus failing to invalidate it if it is cached and compromising the consistency of the data.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: So,(20)equals(a " ,u " ).Again,theomponentsof a " andu " aretotallyindependent,withtdistributed U "uniformlyatrandomoverGandat"equaltothesum ofindependentrandomvariables,eahsatisfyingthe hypothesisofProposition.Thistimeai" isthesum ofk-2suhvariables.So,thestatistialdistane(20) isatmost m-11m3 =.
Sentence 2: 2k+12k-12k+1 Thelastasei=jisalsoanalogous.Thistime(18) """ isatmost(a,u)wherea=a-ai,zei-aj,kejand u " =u-ai,zei-aj,kej.Asusual,Ut"aredistributed independentlyanduniformlyatrandomoverG,while at"isequaltothesumofk-1(iftE{i,j})ork(iftE {i,j})independentindependentrandomvariableseah satisfyingthehypothesisofProposition.thestatistialdistaneisatmost m-22m2 =.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The addition of the safeguards did not negatively affect accuracy in the baseline case, and the number of test cases for which all devices are mapped regardless of plant features is in­creased to 4 out of 5.
Sentence 2: if an adversary has reason to suspect that an emergency stop system may be in place, the use of safe­guards can be an effective workaround.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This principle can be seen as an extension to the social network context of many national legislations on medical data that con­sider that a patient record belongs to the patient, and not to the doctor that creates or updates it, nor to the hospital that stores it.
Sentence 2: it is of paramount importance for the privacy of a user that the geosocial network provides him with the tools to control how his geolocated data is collected, used and disseminated.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Xueqi Cheng Shuyuan Jin Institute of Computing Institute of Computing Technology Technology No.6 Kexueyuan South No.6 Kexueyuan South Road, Beijing,China Road, Beijing,China cxq@ict.ac.cn jinshuyuan@ict.ac.cn hand privacy leaks software need to be given enough info to let user understand the threat level.
Sentence 2: it is necessary to find quantitative method for calculating the indicators of PLS.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since |k · (N - f (N ))| < N/2, there is a good chance that no over.ow or modular reduction occurs when computing |( - a| mod f (N ), and in this case .
Sentence 2: = |( - a| is an integer multiple of k. after gathering several faulty signatures, we obtain a list of values .1 , .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Moreover, even given f bits of leakage about skid, decrypting a valid ciphertext C produces a value R which is indistinguishable from a value R. having (|R|- f) bits of entropy.
Sentence 2: one can get the desired LR-IBE by combining an IB-HPS with a well studied primitive called a randomness extractor (see [31, 13]), which will extract from R a one-time pad of length (almost) (|R|- f) to mask the actual message.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: POSTER: Secure Authentication from Facial Attributes with no Privacy Loss Orr Dunkelman Margarita Osadchy Mahmood Sharif orrd@cs.haifa.ac.il rita@cs.haifa.ac.il mahmood.sharif01@gmail.com University of Haifa, Mount Carmel, Haifa, Israel 31905 ABSTRACT Biometric authentication is more secure than using regular passwords, as biometrics cannot be forgotten and contain high entropy.
Sentence 2: many constructions rely on biometric features for authentication, and use them as a source for good cryptographic keys.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Thus, a given set of input .les (sequence of votes and election con.guration) produce the same set of output .les that are communicated to the server.
Sentence 2: the CA team replayed an election en­gineered using the NM system o.ine, waited until the USB was unmounted by the client, and then overwrote its con­tents with the .les arti.cially generated which would pass the integrity test at the server.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Now when any member leaves the group then in this case many more unicast messages could be generated as compared to the TI scheme.
Sentence 2: when m1 departs from the group, we will have two multicast messages sent to groups G1 and G01 containing the new session key in an encrypted form and one unicast message sent to m0 which is the same as in case of the TI scheme.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Such security policies usually result in extra inconvenience to the user (in this example, user has to go to the bank to pick her ATM card) and incur extra security management cost (in the example, bank has to provide extra customer service to users with locked accounts).
Sentence 2: it is desirable to have systems that allow lax security policies but are still as secure as the ones with stricter security policies.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The states in an HMM oper­ator chain(e.g., S1 ... S4 S5+, where S5+ denotes one or more occurrences of S5) collectively indicate only a single operation (e.g., one instance of Square).
Sentence 2: our post­processingstep replaces every chain oftheform S1 ... S4 S5+ with a single S and every chain of the form M1 ... M4 M5+ with a single M. Unknown states carry noinformation about key bit values and so are discarded.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note that |K8| = p - s, and since s = 2qmax + 1 > 2qmax, it follows that |K8| < p - 2qmax.
Sentence 2: now consider any set K1 for which |K1 8| = p - 2qmax, meaning that |K1| = 2qmax < s. OKc does not have non-trivial kernel (since K is 1 the smallest such matrix), meaning that columns of OKc 1 c .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: THE YGUARD MODEL YGuardproeedsontheideathatobjetsaswellassub­jetsarelogiallygrouped.IntheYGuardModel,asubjet orgroupofsubjetsisauthorizedtoaesssetsofobjets.
Sentence 2: referringtothepreviousexample,YGuardallowsthe EPA'ssystemadministratortodefneasinglepermission atthepondleveltoauthorizeaspeifaessprivilegeto aspeifompanyfor"allfrogsinthepond,"(seeFigure 3)removingthediÆultyofmaintainingtheorretaess rightstoeahobjet.Set­basedpermissionsallowintuitive mappingofaessrightstoobjetsetswithinanaturalrep­resentationofthedata.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, the high dependence on realistic input val­ues (attacker pro.le, control implementation e.ectiveness, and a priori threat probabilities) requires further research on sound methods and techniques to gather, store, and pro­vide these crucial threat probability calculation components.
Sentence 2: we aim at establishing a public knowledge shar­ing portal based on the security ontology structure in order to collaboratively extend the security ontology knowledge base with a priori probabilities and knowledge necessary for a sound node weight determination.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To answer this question we have to recall that the probability of the fact that the difference remains unchanged after addition modulo 232 is directly dependent on the number of nonzero positions in it.
Sentence 2: we have assumed that the weak ones are the boxes for which the input difference .. contains only one high bit (i.e., only 4 variants of such difference exist, namely .. = 1, .. = 2, .. = 4, and .. = 8) will be replaced by the output difference .., which also contain only one high bit (i.e., .. = 1, .. = 2, .. = 4, or .. = 8).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This is feasible because a is usually very short, involving only a few hundreds of nucleotides, and as a result, typically no more than 5 of them are SNP [43].
Sentence 2: the DP can check all 45 possible combinations of these nucleotides to ensure that none of them will cause the answer for q to violate privacy policies, for example, exposing more nucleotides than permitted by a threshold.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Any point in S is a feasible assignment to X that satis.es the constraints Q .
Sentence 2: our problem is to randomly select a point in S. Our algorithm exploits the fact that D is an already known solution in S; it initiates a random walk from D and arrives at another internal point within S. We ensure that the random walk always stays within the bounds of S; thus, the arrival point corresponds to an acceptable value assignment to all the variables in X.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Intuitively, if the result of C is well­typed, then the results of evaluating C1 and C2 should also have equivalentlow-con.dentiality parts.
Sentence 2: the preservationof type soundness in an XSweb evaluation implies the preservation of low-equivalence betweentwoSwebevaluations.Thus,toprovethe noninterference theorem of Sweb, we only need to prove the sub­ject reduction theorem of XSweb.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: seconds, and then requests the token associated with post i * in order to make her nextpostwith id j * , there will be a tra.c analysis attack in which the SP can infer that post i * and j * are likely linked because of the proximity between the request for token i * and the appearance of post j * .
Sentence 2: some scheme is needed that obscures which tokens have been requested.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The ability to activate one s own role membership is equivalent to role membership, hence: ismem R A <= for_role A A R. In RTD, delegation credentials are assumed to be submitted along with a request for a resource, and so do not need to be re­trieved.
Sentence 2: the crux of authorization is to prove the under­lying role membership for the desired activation, which can be es­tablished via previously discussed techniques.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Though protocol de­signers [4, 11, 15] suggest to cache evaluated pairings due to performance reasons, the presented results indicate that the evaluation of pairings yields faster timings, at least in case of asymmetric pairings.
Sentence 2: we conclude that the process of signature generation might be enhanced by per­forming an exponentiation in G1, followed by the evaluation of the pairing.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this case, for any query H(PK,A,B,m)made by Fthere is at most one possible value of c for which there exists an s s -cs -c satisfying A = gy1 and B = hy2 (this is easy to see by looking at the two linear equations over Zq in the exponent).
Sentence 2: f outputs a forgery (and hence Doutputs 1) with -1 -1 probability at most q + qhq .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If a web site that generates a small amount of tra.c maintains its own database of images, an attacker may be able to sustain a high rate of tra.c relative to legitimate users.
Sentence 2: covert .ltering is e.ective in contexts where the captcha is implemented centrally and serving many users  in this way sites with low tra.c can .nd safety in numbers by sharing a common database.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In compar­ison with the mainKey which is basically a random-looking value, the structure of ELIR records and concatenatedELIRs can be easily identi.ed from memory.
Sentence 2: assuming an attacker cannot identify the mainKey but can identify ELIR records from memory, it is still computationally in­feasible for the attacker to crack each individual recordKey and decrypt the corresponding sitePassword.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Gaussian with variance s2 N. On the other hand, in the proposal of Wang and Moulin [14]the watermarked signal is given by Y = ß(X+W), lattice ..
Sentence 2: the embedding power is 22 22 De =(1-ß)sX + ßsW , so s2 can be written as a function of De and s2 WX, s2 De(4s2 -De) 2 XX sW = , (14) (De -2s2 )2 X coinciding with the value obtained in (5) for the perfectly steganographic system based on Costa s construction; as in that case, the proposed analysis only makes sense when DWR =-6 dB.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 0.01, if circuit failed R[i] =(3) 1, otherwise When a circuit successfully transmits user traf.c each relay in the circuit obtains a high feedback score of 1, whereas if the circuit fails to transmit any user traf.c each relay obtains a low feedback score of 0.01.
Sentence 2: for a bad/malicious per­formance relays obtain a score which is 100 folds worse than a productive performance.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: ThoughMaat pays a cost for the convenience and security of public key cryptography, this cost for a small number of cryptographic operations is amortized across thousands of I/O requests by caching the results of both capability generation at the MDS and veri.cation at the OSDs.
Sentence 2: maat can a.ord to use public key cryptography even though it is orders of magnitude slower than shared key cryptography, because it dramatically reduces the number of capability generations and veri.cations.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Each Bitcoin node will only add to its memory pool the transaction it receives .rst among TRV and TRA.
Sentence 2: since only the transactions that appear in the memory pool of peers are eligible to be con.rmed in subsequent blocks, the probability that TRV is included in a block within time interval ]tk,tk+1]is: Prk = .k p. Similarly, VV · for TRA, the corresponding probability is Prk A = A · p. the .k probability pV(k)that a block containing TRV is generated within the time interval ]tk,tk+1 ]is given by: k-1 k-1 .k pV(k)=PrV k · (1 -PrVi )Vp· (1 -.i = Vp).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: At a very high level, the main insights for achieving source authentication and path validation without requir­ing routers to maintain per-source or per-path-length state are as follows: (1) In the packet header, source S includes H(P), which is the hash of the packet payload to help receiving entities identify the packet while avoiding expensive hash computation at each router; (2) On demand, each router Ri generates key Ki using a symmet­ric cryptographic operation, and requires only router s local secret SVRi and a special value called SESSIONID in the packet header as inputs.
Sentence 2: generating deterministic keys is stateless and faster than storing or retrieving secrets.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Because the whole path list is contained in each RREP, the following .elds are not necessary in the RREP sent or forwarded by node ni: BHLl , ni ni, FHLl ,and fhni .
Sentence 2: the calculation of Ml is changed as follows: ni ni,nj Mnl i,nj = MACni,nj (rrep,n0,nl,n0#,nl#,(n1,.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 5.2.3 Adaptive Wormholes Plugging the strategy in Equation (1) into Equation (5) yields: RS SIA,i - RSSIB,i -PA,i + PB,i (13) Hence, r(PA - PB, RSS IB - RSSIA) will be close to 1 when running SCREWED through an adaptive wormhole.
Sentence 2: sCREWED does not detect adaptive wormholes.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As the functional behavior and the security of a system are, usually, not independent from each other, this separation of concerns makes it di.cult to ensure that a given system ful.lls its requirements.
Sentence 2: we propose a tool supported, model-driven development process that inte­grates seamlessly the security and compliance requirements across all phases of the system life-cycle, i. e., from the sys­tem design to system execution to system audit.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: (c) corresponds to the set of actions removed from the attack model by deploy­ing c. Note that the administrator may need to take mul­tiple actions, i.e., deploy a set of countermeasures, in order to e.ect the removal of one transition in the attack graph.
Sentence 2: there is a many-to-many mapping between the set of countermeasures and the set of edges in the attack graph.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: to the average, then he can set minimum, maximum, average, or sum aggregates (or their x = 1 x1 + .n, and the average will be successfully altered corresponding temporal aggregation variants) are used.
Sentence 2: the count (or sliding window count) is the only primitive that is from y to y = y + .. the average is not a meaningful aggregate in the presence of even a single com­resilient to malicious data.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The secondisthepresence of prime-probe results and,inturn,SVM outputsthat simply encodenoin­formation of interest to the attacker for other reasons, e.g., because the victimVCPUhad migrated to adi.erentPCPU fromthe attackerorbecauseit wasperforming an operation not of interest to the attacker.
Sentence 2: we develop a sequence of mechanisms to re.ne SVM outputs to reduce these sources of noise.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Theintuitiveideaisthat a randomvari­able uniformly distributed over a hypersphere, as for exam­ple the watermark obtained using the mentioned lattices, tends assymptotically to a Gaussian distribution when the dimensionality goes to in.nity.
Sentence 2: it is expected that the more similar the Voronoi region of the lattice is to a hypersphere, the lower the KLD between the host and the watermarked signals will be.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Now, the ii iadversary AII knows the partial private key D sQ(1bb in) ii of A(1bbn) , however he cannot replace the public i ikeys P xP(1 i ) A bb n to the values of his choice.
Sentence 2: iI ii cannot compute the signatures (, ) (rQ r ,( hD ) txP RV ) ii ii i ii 0 for (1bb)and the final SR) too, without inmultisignature (, knowing the secret values x bbn) of A bbn) .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It is shown in [23] that, in the special case of deterministic systems, the lazy abstraction approach corresponds to the application of the purge function of NI to nondeterministic systems, and the mixed abstrac­tion approach corresponds to a notion of security van der Meyden calls ITO-security: this differs from TA security in that it uses func­tions that are like tau, but which track information about observa­tions as well as information about actions.
Sentence 2: both de.nitions differ from the TA-based de.nitions we have presented.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Whereas any subset of {u0, u1, · · · , ue-1} has at most k users that dominate ue.
Sentence 2: no subset of {u0, u1, · · · , ue-1} dominates A. Lemma 8 shows that if A satis.es the closure property, then none of the sets that have been considered so far dominates A, so A needs to be considered.
Relationship: reasoning