sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This is certainly the case for the two examples of regularities mentioned above.
Sentence 2: the two-phase locking (TPL) protocol does not satisfy our conditions, because in contradiction to con­dition (1) above, a client may pro.t by holding a lock for a resource longer than allowed by this protocol; and in con­tradiction to condition (2) this may harm other clients, by causing deadlocks and/or compromising the integrity of re­sources due to unserializable interactions.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Although the regular mode s explicit information on the most likely ranges for every key and key-pair should guar­antee that its average performance is much better than the worst case model presented in Section 3, the regular mode runs into scalability issues when n is large.
Sentence 2: the model information from the training phase helps mini­ () ßj -aj mize the term +1, and also ensures that the do­ .j main [ßj aj] is traversed in intelligent order (by prioritizing the most likely combinations).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this paper, we propose a compiler-based approach to defeat return-oriented rootkits by directly attacking the root of the return-oriented programming model.
Sentence 2: based on the observation that the gadget is the essential basic unit in return-oriented programming and each gadget has to end with a ret instruction (so that one gadget can be chained together with other gadgets), we propose to re-target the compiler design to generate an OS kernel without ret.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note that current state-of-the-art pub­lic veri.cation schemes [31], although quite impressive relative to prior work, still require 288 bytes storage and 9ms to verify.
Sentence 2: each miner would be required to spend 9ms to execute the veri.ca­tion algorithm in order to validate the Fj CR transaction.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 7.2 Location Service We have built a subset of the location system shown in Fig­ure 1.
Sentence 2: we have implemented the People Locator ser­vice, the Device Locator service, the Wi-Fi service, and two Cal­endar services, which exploit calendar information from the Ical program [12] and from the centralized Oracle CorporateTime cal­endar system.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Notice that C can perfectly answer by itself all queries from A (speci.ed in accordance with the CK-framework).
Sentence 2: for any session ( B, B, X, Y ), which is not A, A, the test-session or its matching session, C can expose all the pre-computed and stored values (a, X, x, Bx) to the attacker, even if A will be the player holding the test-session.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Nevertheless, in order to provide for more .ne-grained revocation, we envisage that an identi.er revocation list (IRL) [17], analogous to a certi.cate revocation list (CRL) [28], or other existing key revocation mechanisms, such as Online Certi.cate Status Protocol (OCSP) [40], can be employed or adapted for use in ID-XKMS.
Sentence 2: the Revoke service would implement such functionality in a similar way to the corresponding service in XKMS, if re­quired.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this paper, as contributions to this line of research, we construct hybrid identity-based encryption schemes which produce compact ciphertexts while providing both e.ciency and strong security without resorting to the strong length­preserving symmetric cipher.
Sentence 2: all of the pro­posed schemes incur only one group element ciphertext ex­pansion (de.ned as the size of the ciphertext minus the size of the plaintext message) and do not depend on the strong PRP.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Another issue to consider is privacy, intended not just as the desire to keep the contents of communications secret (we refer to the provision of such secrecy as con.dentiality), but also the desire of keeping private the very fact that a com­munication between two given individuals ever took place.
Sentence 2: cryptographic means applied for securing the communications should not leave a proof veri.able by a third party (say a judge) that a particular conversation took place.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, A has no in- P .uence anymore once Attest is executed between P and V P in the execution phase.
Sentence 2: as P is a device with the same characteristics as an honest prover, PPhas to comply to the same restrictions as P. the adversary has un­bounded resources for preparing the attack but only a tight time-bound and limited resources for executing the attack.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In order to achieve this goal, we argue that the current HTH detection approaches [1], which rely on the monitoring of the end system in the post-silicon stage, have to be moved to sequential synthesis at the design time.
Sentence 2: the detection process must examine the re­dundant states generated by the untrusted CAD tools and exclude the possibility of HTH attacks early at the design time, which is an extremely di.cult task.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In order to eliminate both factors, we neglect the interim step, i.e., 1the de.nition of normal form can be looked up in Section 2.4 Figure 2: A conversion from (d, c)-bounded access tree T to its (d, c)-normal form Tn converting the access tree to norm form, and directly map the (d, c)-bounded access tree selected by the sender to the (d, c)-universal tree.
Sentence 2: the redundant steps which pull all the leaf nodes to the deepest level by adding non-leaf nodes are eliminated and thus the computation cost is reduced.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We reported all the .aws discovered in our research to Google, Amazon, and other service providers, which all acknowl­edged the importance of our .ndings.
Sentence 2: one of them (UrbanAirship [16]) informed us its plan to formally cite us in its release notes and another organization (Section 3.2) has expressed gratitude for our willingness to keep them anonymous.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Code that in source code was part of an aspect can become part of another class and the security subsystem cannot distinguish between these two identities.
Sentence 2: in general, there are three di.erent (run-time) scenarios in which a security-sensitive access attempt trig­gered from an (source-level) aspect can occur: the original class is modi.ed by the aspect and accesses the sensitive logic  a class that represents the aspect accesses the sensitive logic  some other module that is a.ected by the same aspect accesses the sensitive logic  For the second case, the problem can be addressed in a quite straightforward manner: since the identity of the as­pect is identical to the identity of a class, the Java permis­sion system can be applied directly to control the access attempt.5 a permission check could be intro­duced by the compiler such as the following: AccessController.checkPermission(new AspectPer­mission(target, action)) ; Remark that for the target parameter it would make sense to support both module-level identities and more .ne-grained targets such as class methods and members.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since no individual probability is greater than 1, it must be the case that for polynomially many di.erent (P ' ,W ' )pairs, the conditional probability above is greater than one-half by a substantial amount.
Sentence 2: for polynomially many di.erent pairs, the probability is greater than 2 1 + kc1 1 .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While many of them were designed to support a rather general types of compu­tation (normally on integers) and some have attractive properties, due to ef.ciency and .exibility goals that we target to achieve we choose to build our own compiler instead of directly extending one of the existing tools.
Sentence 2: the features that we .nd crucial are: (i) support for multi-party computation, (ii) support for a vari­able number of participants (including separation between compu­tational, input, and output parties), (iii) the use of standard linear secret sharing techniques, (iv) applicability of techniques for ma­licious adversaries, (v) support for arithmetic of desired precision, and (vi) ef.ciency.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In addition, because the tracing process can easily abuse the privileges of the traced process, IFEDAC re­quires that s2 does not have any privileges that are not avail­able to s1.
Sentence 2: int(s1) = int(s2), and s2 does not have any exceptions if int(s1)= T. These conditions should be satis.ed during the whole tracing period.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While such tag-speci.c TIDs may prevent simple copying of one EPC into another, it does not prevent the emulation of an EPC tag in another radio de­vice.
Sentence 2: the TID may (or may not) help prevent physical copying of an EPC tag, but it certainly does not prevent logical copying.2 An ordinary RFID reader makes no distinction between a tag embodied in a .ake of silicon and one emulated by a larger, more powerfully instrumented platform.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: More in­formation on our proposal, theFANTASY-app, and its source code canbe found on the project website [2].Weinvolvedin ourexper­iments 10 test users (User 1, ... , User 10), each of them providing us with 50 movement patterns (for answering or placing a call).
Sentence 2: we asked the users to answer the phone in the way we depicted before, put the phone in front of them, press the start button to imitate the call, then bring the phone to the ear.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Instead of relying on the relevance of any particular proba­bilistic analysis which may break each time a known attack is re.ned Buddies relies on an indistinguishability principle that applies to all attacks of this class.
Sentence 2: if two users A and B have exhibited identical histories with respect to inclusion in each round s .ltered user set Pi, across all rounds i in which a Nym N was scheduled so far, then under any probabilistic analysis of the above form the adversary must assign identi­cal probabilities to A and B owning Nym N. if for every round i, it holds that (A .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: = Exp£ AEC,A for some £ polynomially bounded by .. As Sim is regu­lar, the distribution of IF (Sim(1. , 1)) is E-close to the uni­form distribution over {0, 1}L(.).
Sentence 2: we proved that mtm t Pr Expj = 1 - Pr Expj+1 = 1 = E is negligible for all j.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: {0, 1}is a hash function, which is de.ned as follows: The (n/12)-bit key is interpreted as an element u .GF (2n/2) (say, by padding it with zero bits), the n-bit input is interpreted as two el­ement x1,x2 .
Sentence 2: gF (2n/2), and the function is de.ned as 3for any distribution D with min entropy n/3or more, for all but a 2-3n/4 fractions of the seeds r,it holds that extr(D)is 2-n/12-close to the uniform distribution over {0, 1}n/12 (see Appendix A).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: DRKey, the details of which is explained in Section 4, is instrumental in achieving OPT s ef.ciency properties.
Sentence 2: the source prepares and inserts a special .eld in the packet header called S ESSIONID such that intermediate routers Ri on PATHs dy­namically compute the shared symmetric key with Sand D(Ri only needs to look up its local secret SVRi for computation).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In each of the preceding scenarios, the English-language pol­icy that is speci.ed makes no distinction between the digital credentials that must be presented and the horizontal trust assessment calculations that must be carried out to satisfy the policy.
Sentence 2: the result of each such calculation is treated as a piece of evidence that is calculated in a trusted manner and attests to some attribute of a particular prin­cipal.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We argue that this phenomenon can be leveraged for powerful energy attacks, since an exponential energy increase could cause huge impact to the wireless system and thus becomes the best interest of an attacker.
Sentence 2: we argue that an attacker could possibly apply a forward adaptive body bias (FBB, or forward ABB) voltage that, instead of compensat­ing for the process variation as in the normal use of body biasing techniques [6][10][36], would increase the energy ex­ponentially in the circuit under attack.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Gupta [1996] proved that verifying whether or not a pro­ grammer has provided a correct transition function for ac­complishing a source code upgrade is, in the general case, undecidable.
Sentence 2: a hot update system cannot, in the general case, prove that a patch, along with a state tran­sition function, results in a valid state for the new program.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In addition, we discovered 142 (56.8%) Android .rmwares have the default signature vulnerability, .ve (2.0%) Android .rmwares contain malicious hosts .le, at most 40 (16.0%) Android .rmwares have native level priv­ilege escalation vulnerability and at least 249 (99.6%) An­droid .rmwares have Java level privilege escalation vulnera­bility.
Sentence 2: we carry out detailed investigation on a real world pre-installed zero-day Android malware known as CEPlugnew, which involves 348,018 infected Android smart­phones and reveal its geographical spread.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: One may argue that, this scheme is not really byte-granular be­cause a leaked address will reveal the checksum for all other ad­dresses with the same input bits.
Sentence 2: using a leaked address0xKKYAAAAA,whereYandAAAAAarechecksumbits and input bits respectively, the attacker can designate all addreses 0xXXYAAAAA for arbitrary XX.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: of 2%, RCP has a warning rate of 6.36%, and a 52.90% detection rate, easily outperforming Kirin.
Sentence 2: 6.26% apps in the market dataset request a critical permission (in P24) that is requested by less than 2% apps, and 52.90% of apps in the malware dataset does so.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our cheating prevention mechanism is based on commu­tative encryption [24].
Sentence 2: for any message M and two keys K1 and K2, a commutative cipher E always satis.es: EK1 (EK2 (M)) = EK2 (EK1 (M)) (1) with a commutative cipher, the order of encryption operations does not a.ect the result.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Signature Generation We report seven categories (from the 6th to 12th column) of data for this component.
Sentence 2: in the 6th column, we report the total number of clusters |T | identi.ed by connecting the pages with direct forward function call constraint; the 7th column (#pages ) reports the total number of pages in the largest cluster of |T |.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, the issue has been left seemingly unstudied in the stronger decisional case.
Sentence 2: we posit that having access to such an oracle Oy for a small constant number of queries, say t, is helpful only in computing t Di.e-Hellman values, and is not of any other help in distinguishing even a t + 1st Di.e-Hellman value from random, even if the values x1 xt g , ..., g of interest to the adversary were known in adv ance.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While many of the ideas have been seen before in other systems or in slightly different forms, their combination provides the right balance of feasibility, performance, and manageability needed for Windows 2000.
Sentence 2: extending access control en­tries to specify both to which portion of an object they refer and onto which objects they may be inherited allows the existing model, designed for file systems, to be applied to many other applications.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Using a previously seen variant of NotCompatible, a family-speci.c plugin was able to produce a custom rule for this (unseen before) variant of NotCompatible in lines 3 5.
Sentence 2: our plugin is able to automatically generate IDS signatures for new variants of Not-Compatible as long as the overall networking protocol used in the malware family does not change.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While it is not explicitly speci.ed, we expect that each tag will have a globally unique seed in practice.
Sentence 2: we note that 32 bits of the 64 bit manufacturer ID are de.ned to be a globally unique speci.c identi.er ; it would be natural to use this speci.c identi.er to seed a PRNG.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: are ±(g )and the X = {x0,x1,...,xt} and any point x, it holds that (and hence the polynomials g and h) using lattice-basis reduction, ' 2 · (4r/p)n< 1, m l as described next.
Sentence 2: observe that to ensure p x - xj ' it is su.cient to set t Y X 2log p > , which is indepen­ log p-log 4r P (x)= P (xi) · i=0 j= i n. xi - xj dent of the degree t. For the parameters suggested in [7] | {z } L(X,x,i) this formula applies to each of the polynomials using n ' = 11 is always enough.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The central security property of a designated con.rmer signature scheme is called invisibility [2], which requires that any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary cannot feasibly determine the (in)validity of an alleged signature in adaptive attacking scenario.
Sentence 2: the (in)validity of an alleged signature is invisible to a veri.er so that the only way to check this is to have interaction with either the signer or the designated con.rmer.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It is easy to see that, under the DLP assumption, NAXOS cannot be HP-deniable according to our HP-deniability de.nition.
Sentence 2: given the exposed session­state x ' ,weeven do not know how to e.ciently and  h(a,x 1) bh(a,x 1) Bx statistical ly simulate X = g or = g without knowing the secret key a.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: S ¯ri requiresknowledge ofboth(K ,d ¯rj ¯rj To summarize, ADV must know all the following keys: ¯ri¯rj¯rj ¯ri , {K ¯rj ,d ¯rj } sj .S ¯ri ¯rj¯rj sj .T ¯ri .
Sentence 2: aDV must have compromised si at any round r< r¯and sensors in S ¯ri .R ¯ri .T ¯ri at any round r = r¯.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In our proposal, we add to each node the ability of learning independently, therefore reacting di.erently according to its situation in the network and local tra.c conditions.
Sentence 2: this frees the administra­tor from having to guess and manually set the parameters distinguishing attacks from non-attacks: now such thresh­olds are learned and set from experience or past data.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 1.1 Applicability The NIDS architecture proposed in this work aims to iden­tify and locate attacks that have an adverse e.ect on the network and service provided to its users.
Sentence 2: our aim is not to .nd attacks on the network s end hosts that do not a.ect the network itself, such as the silent spread of a worm in the network, a slow port scan or a bu.er-over.ow that a.ects only the victim end host.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Within a model satisfying AC function correctness, it is always true that, if one who accesses a target to get a ser­vice, then the minimum requirement (e.g., C1 .... .Ck) for the person to access the target for receiving the service must be satis.ed.
Sentence 2: any (local) policy is never violated in such a model.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: CONSTRUCTION OF A SUITABLE EL-LIPTIC CURVE FOR ELLIGATOR 1 This section introduces a new high-security high-speed el­liptic curve, called Curve1174, that supports the injective map presented in Section 3.
Sentence 2: this section spec­i.es Curve1174; presents the criteria that we used to con­struct Curve1174; and analyzes the extent to which various previous curves meet the same criteria.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our evalua­tion shows that compared with an already optimized in-lined DFT framework [18], it is extremely effective in accelerating both the application and DFT, but also using less CPU cycles.
Sentence 2: we do not sacri.ce the spare cores to accelerate DFT, but ex­ploit parallelization to improve the ef.ciency of DFT in all fronts.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.3 A concrete example Based on the presented approach, the result of the weav­ing phase for SensitiveData and SniffingAspect,presented in Section 2, is shown in Figure 2.
Sentence 2: the after advice of the aspect is translated into the curious method in­cluded in the Sni.ngAspect.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 6.2 Validating the Jamming Model According to the SINR (Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio) model (aka the physical model [8]), whether or not a transmission is successful depends on the re­ceived signal strength, the interference caused by simul­taneous transmissions from other nodes, and the ambi­ent noise level.
Sentence 2: a transmission is successful i.     Pe = ß where Pe is the power of a signal sent by j Pn+Ie when received at e, Pn is the noise power level, Ie is the interference power generated by other concurrent trans­missions, and ß is the minimum signal-to-interference­ratio that is required for a message to be delivered at a receiver.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Because security checks need not be fully evaluated until a transaction attempts to commit, costly security-policy evaluation can be performed lazily, or in parallel with execution.
Sentence 2: theTMI architectureis practical.Wehave designedand imple­mented TMI reference monitors for enforcing authorization poli­cieson server software.wehavecreatedaTMI imple­mentation based on Sun s Dynamic SoftwareTransactional Mem­ory (DSTM2) toolkit for Java[34].
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Therefore our design philosophy is to present aggregated, attack­specific information in a simplified manner and leave the detailed information in the next stage of visualization.
Sentence 2: our overview design is significantly different from most published work in that (1) the overview highlights only the potential attackers without including information of potential victims; (2) overview focuses on visualizing the characteristics of the attacks rather than network traffic; and (3) overview reveals the likelihood of an external host attacking the network over a specified period without the need to be presented in timeline charts.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In our improved scheme, the HRebuild algorithm is executed by the server.
Sentence 2: in order to enforce honest server behavior, the client performs the HRebuild algorithm, not directly over the blocks, but over sX(B) s. imagine the client were to execute the HRebuild algorithm on its own:  Whenever the client needed to read a block B from the server, it now reads sX(B) instead, and decrypts s(B) .
Relationship: entailment