sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: valid signature on a message m, or a Deny protocol to show that s is not a valid signature on a message m. Without the con.rmer, however, no party can determine whether s is a valid signature for m or not.
Sentence 2: pRELIMINARIES 2.1 Bilinear Pairings We brie.y review the bilinear pairings using the same no­tation as in [3, 4]: Let G be a (mutiplicative) cyclic group of prime order q.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For low robustness, the difference between NCR and SDF Table 2: Network parameters and their exemplary values for WirelessSensorNetworks(WSNs)and cellular networks.
Sentence 2: the relay b then repeats this packet, allowing the destination c to make use of two(possibly corrupt) copies of a packet to reconstruct the correct packet, e.g., by tech­niqueslikeMaximumRatioCombining(MRC).
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Copyright 2014 ACM 978-1-4503-3024-4/14/06 ...$15.00.
Sentence 2: to symbolically execute protocol implementations would re­quire extending the symbolic execution system to know about cryptographic primitives: how to synthesize inputs that pass cryptographic checks like signatures or MACs, and how to transform inputs that pass through encryption or decryption.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: [9] A. L. Herzog, J. D. Guttman, D. R. Harris, J. D. Ramsdell, A. E. Segall, and B. T. Sni.en.
Sentence 2: such MAC enforcement is both stronger than traditional VM isolation, as even network communi­cation is controlled, and more .exible than traditional VM isolation, as local VM interactions may now be enabled (i.e., if permitted by the MAC policy).
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As such, it is not possible to automatically identify which locations an indirect call or jmp may lead to in general.
Sentence 2: and the steps undertaken by the post-link patch-up phase are: (1) use the .lockinfo to construct the call graph and identify all lock and unlock code locations; (2) make note of indirectly called symbols for use in the second pass; and (3) patch the binary with the k values computed for each function in all lock and unlock code.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The source node S determines a set Nof non-compromised nodes that can establish pairwise keys with S directly with a non-compromised polynomial.
Sentence 2: in summary, the attacker has to compromise one sensor involved in the path key establishment to compromise the pairwise key, and at least 2m- 3 sensors to prevent uand vfrom establishing a pairwise key.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The hardware setup was the same in both cases an IBM vertices V = 7 vertices V = 15 vertices V = 63 Faerie­play ORAM Faerie­play ORAM Faerie­play ORAM time (mins) 4.1 174 8.9 300 53 1554 instructions/gates 5.4K 10.5K 15.1K 18.7K 93K 90K mem/array reads 640 1.2K 1.7K 2.4K 11.3K 13K mem/array writes 510 1K 1.1K 1.8K 9.5K 8K RAM size (words) n/a 4.8K n/a 4.9K n/a 6K Table 2: Table of running times of Dijkstra on Faerieplay and ORAM 4758 as TTP, running the TTP portion of the Faerieplay CVM.
Sentence 2: a Faerieplay transcript T consists of entries of the form (Time, Operation, Data).
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 5.2 What Did Not Work LityaLeaks, the part of the infrastructure used to dis­tribute the .red transitions of the Petri nets, as well as various hints and clues about services and challenges, was an integral part of our design (and the name .t in nicely with the theme).
Sentence 2: the main drawback of these exercises is that they require substantial resources to be designed, implemented, and executed.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To address this problem, we adopt an approach that combines con.dence and support into a single parameter called predictive accuracy and that uses a Bayesian framework to determine the con­tributions of support and con.dence to the expected accuracy of a rule [17].
Sentence 2: unfortunately, with few exceptions (e.g., [8, 7]), these kinds of miscon.gurations have not been widely studied.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Due to the generally large number of heuristic steps performed by the RAND O M algorithm, all runs using this heuristic are assigned a step limit one order of magnitude greater than the corresponding run using DE P SE A R C H. Test Parameters.
Sentence 2: several safety-decidable fragments of the HRU calculus emerged [HR78, LS78, San92] that bought safety decidability by limiting the expressive power of the calculus.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.1 The Solution Let Ci denote the set of encrypted counters at V , following the i-th user run of CheckI n. Ci = {Ci[1], .., Ci[b]},where Ci[j] denotes the encrypted counter corresponding to Rj , j the j-th sub-range of R.We write Ci[j]= E(uj ,uj ,cj ,j)= j j [E(uj ,cj ),E(uj ,j)], where uj and uj are random obfuscat- 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 Benaloh moduli bit size Figure 2: Setup dependence on Benaloh mod size.
Sentence 2: we have used Android Samsung Admire smartphones (800MHz CPU) and a Dell laptop (2.4GHz In­tel Core i3, 4GB of RAM) for the server.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Unfortunately, these scanning services are based on proprietary anti-malware engines, and as such, the exact details of the engines underpinning these services are very closely held trade secrets.
Sentence 2: we note that when calculating the time re­quired to scan a package, we add both the time to scan the package with an anti-virus module as well as the time for scanning with ComDroid.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 1 /*** property.c ***/ 2 int dixLookupProperty(PropertyPtr *p, 3 Window * win, Atom pName,Client * c) 4 { 5 PropertyPtr prop; 6 for (prop=win->opt->userProps; 7 prop; prop = prop->next) 8 { 9 if (prop->name == pName) 10 break; 11 } 12 *p = prop; 13 } that are uniquely tied to the functionality of the application.
Sentence 2: we can reason about the correctness of the output of our approach assuming the correctness of certain ora­cles upon which it depends.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: that treats c and u as g. In other words, if p makes no statement, or con.icting statements, about an access a, then p(a)= g. We have de.ned these policy operators directly for clarity.
Sentence 2: a : p1(a) =k p2(a) For example, if p1 is de.ned on every access, then so is p2.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We denote a property certi.cate as: C =(PKPCA,H(S), P, C.serno, (1) SigSKPCA (H(S),P,C.serno)) where (PKPCA, SKPCA)isthekeypairof PCA, H(S)isthe hash value of the software binary, P represents the property, SigSKPCA (x) is a signature on x using the signing key SKPCA of PCA,and C.serno is a unique serial number of the cer­ti.cate generated by PCA to identify each issued certi.cate.
Sentence 2: a property-based secure bootstrap process would be an ap­propriate solution providing end-users both, security and availability of their data.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Dis­appointingly, we show in this paper that their proposal is not secure.
Sentence 2: def Line 5 computes f (c2 ) = (m - f (S)et2 + 1) mod t2 , but because f (S) = S mod t2 , we see that f (c2 ) = c2 = 1, so c2 def is una.ected.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Taking advantage of this SMS spam reporting mechanism, we collect one year of spam reports from a large cellular carrier in the US from June 2011 to May 2012 which contains approximately 543K spam messages  and, together with anonymized SMS net­work records collected from the same network associated with the reported spam numbers (over 78K), carry out an extensive analy­sis of SMS spam.
Sentence 2: cHARACTERIZING SPAM CAMPAIGNS (a) Time similarity (b) Location similarity Figure 2: Correlation of spam numbers.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For this reason, social engineers take care not to burn their sources.
Sentence 2: social Engineering: The Dark Art Tim Thornburgh Kennesaw State University Department of Computer Science and Information Systems 1000 Chastain Road, MS 1101 Kennesaw, GA 30144 +1 770-423-6005 tat6214@students.kennesaw.edu  ABSTRACT The key to maintaining the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of an organizations information and information systems is controlling who accesses what information.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The challenge is to ensure integrity, which in this context means the following: (1) always the correct .le is opened, (2) no .le gets overwritten by creating a new .le or renam­ing an existing one, (3) failure to look up an existing .le is correctly recognized as a deletion attack, (4) deleted .les are no longer accessible (i.e., no replay attacks), and (5) any directory listing is correct, complete, and up to date.
Sentence 2: vPFS un­trusted proxy depends only on a POSIX-like API in order to allow for .exibility in the choice of the legacy .le sys­tem being reused (even if the source code is not available).
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: [8] JanCamenischandAnnaLysyanskaya.Ef.cient non-transferable anonymous multi-show credential system with optional anonymity revocation.InBirgitP.tzmann, editor, EUROCRYPT 01, volume2045 of LNCS,pages 93 118.Springer,2001.
Sentence 2: using commitments and representationsinthegeneralizedform asweexplaininSection6.2, wecanexpress NotEqualTo statements.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: One intelligent terminal will contain several sensor nodes or sensor gateway, and it is necessary to make them privacy.
Sentence 2: although Internet of Things (IoT) services is conducive to business users and consumers reduce IT costs, but the U.S. Federal Trade Commission that, given the user information will be stored remotely, the security of user information and whether it will be compromised, should cause regulators attention.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To demonstrate this weakness, we created a scenario with the following steps: Create file 1 with two encrypted 4-KB blocks, C1 and C2  Create a backup B1  Update C2 with C2  An attacker can take a disk image dump B2 and analyze B1 and B2  We gained access to the original source of AON-ext3cow.
Sentence 2: next, we searched the swap partition for the predetermined 512 byte string, which appeared 20 times.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: IMPLEMENTATION To determine the feasibility of our approach, we built a proto­type of the proposed architecture using the bochs emulator [1] for the x86 processor family.
Sentence 2: generally, the loss of performance associated with an emulator is unacceptable for most (but not all [61]) applications: we present a small but concrete ex­ample of this in Section 3.1.3.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: These results sug­gest that a small number (1-3) of thin (1-2px) straight lines in any orientation can be added to captchas without noticeably impairing human performance.
Sentence 2: captcha designers can for the most part freely adjust the length of the captchas to achieve the desired level of security without harming the accuracy of their users, though there will be an additional time requirement.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Novel contributions of this paper include a taxonomy of dif­ferent types of attacks on machine learning techniques and systems, a variety of defenses against those attacks, a dis­cussion of ideas that are important to security for machine learning, an analytical model giving a lower bound on at­tacker s work function, and a list of open problems.
Sentence 2: an adversary with su.cient information regarding training data, classi.cations of data points, or the internal state of a learner would be able to deduce the learner s decision bound­ary.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: [9] D. F. Sterne, G. W. Tally, C. D. McDonell, D. L. Sherman, D. L. Sames, and P. X. Pasturel, Scalable Access Control 8th for Distributed Object Systems, In Proceedings of USENIX Security Symposium, Washington, DC, August 1999.
Sentence 2: we need some communication mechanisms that exchange relevant information among monitor servers.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Theirprotoolensuresthat,barringollusionbetweenthe autioneerandtheautionissuer,neitherpartygainsany informationaboutthebids,evenaftertheautionisover.
Sentence 2: giveny=g " modp,prf(x)anbegener­atedasfollows.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The report size is reduced by making it dynamic and adaptive to the client needs.
Sentence 2: in SAS, whose report has a dynamic update history, the report size remains the same as long as the client disconnection period is less than the minimum history of changes covered in the report (in this case it is 200 seconds), then starts to increase but remains always less than the SCI report size.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Furthermore, the de­tection of these worms is challenging because the majority of techniques against zero-day infections rely on recogniz­ing anomalous patterns in inbound tra.c (e.g., [3] among others), or outbound DNS, ARP, or failed connection re­quests from local hosts [13,16].
Sentence 2: on Using Mobility to Propagate Malware.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 2.2 DJB Hash value The filter-hash value computed using the above method does not represent the whole signature since it is computed from a part of the signature.
Sentence 2: in order to scan a file using the above method, for any signature Sx , we compute the filter-hash value H(Sx,j) starting from a byte j for a pre-determined length L'.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In our case, the service provider s TCB must include at a minimum any code which has the opportunity to modify sensor data on the mobile device at any point from when it is extracted from hardware until it is signed by trusted local code before being submitted to a remote veri.er.
Sentence 2: sealed storage can be used to protect private keys which should only be accessed by speci.c trusted software.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We appreciate helpful feedback from Steve Greenwald, Joe Wegehaupt, Hongda Xiao, and the NSPW 2011 participants.
Sentence 2: a potential policy violator may have a utility function under which he bene.ts (in expecta­tion) from violating the policy and another utility func­tion under which he does not bene.t in expectation.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Proven in use: The artifact has been in wide-spread use for considerable time and no harmful e.ects have been observed so far.
Sentence 2: 2.3 Tamper-proof delivery as prerequisite for trust-based distribution A trust-based approach to managing the risk of software artifacts relies, at least implicitly, on the pre-condition that the actual supplier of the artifact to the acquirer is the same entity that the acquirer assumes as basis for his trust model and that the artifact has not been modi.ed in transit.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While in the previous situation the attacker must be able to upload something to a white-listed subdo­main of domainA, which may not always be possible, in this case she is not restricted in any way.
Sentence 2: the adversary is able to launch a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attack as CSRF defense mechanisms [7] are ren­dered ineffective.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: INTRODUCTION With the rapid creation and dissemination of personal data, such as social media data and transaction data, high dimensional and correlated data is ready for knowledge discovery task.
Sentence 2: for the proof of necessity, assume that Proposition 1 but not the Proposition 2 holds, then based on Proposition 1, we have distance(F,fp (13) FSmax ) <t.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Recently, Cho and Hwang [5] presented arti.cial rhythms and timing cues for the purpose of reducing the instability of typing patterns.
Sentence 2: we append some margin to the hypothesis space as follows: x -c r,p =1+ .·sP , (7) where sP denotes the standard deviation of the value of x -c r,p for x .
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, for security reasons a process can only access memory inside its address space.
Sentence 2: for example, the .le /home/bob/symlink can be a symbolic link that points to a .le the attacker is allowed to access during the access() check (e.g., the .le /home/bob/bobsfile.txt that bob can read and write), but at a critical moment is changed to point to a different .le that needs elevated privileges for access(e.g., /etc/shadow).
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We argue that this is a realistic assumption given that TRA and TRV need to be typically broad­ casted back to back given a small delay (in the order of few sec­ onds); it is therefore unlikely that one of them is con.rmed within the .rst few seconds in a new block.
Sentence 2: 1 if a block is created within{tk-1,tk}, Xk = 0 otherwise.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Previously, a great deal of work has investigated anonymi­zation techniques [27, 16, 8, 13, 28, 5] to ensure network data privacy.
Sentence 2: to draw a neighbor T ' of Ti-1 uniformly at random, we .rst randomly choose an internal node r in Ti-1 (other than the root) and then permute the three subtrees associated with r to generate two alternative con.gurations of r s sub­trees, as illustrated in Figure 2.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In principle, such an ap­ 1In fact the security kernel has to provide comprehensive user ac­cess control as in typical operating systems, including system login and screen lock functionality, in order to prevent unauthorized ac­cess to the wallet.
Sentence 2: truWallet works with standard SSL-based authen­tication solutions for the web except that minor modi.cations and extensions on the server-side are necessary.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: SRNET: A Real-time, Cross-based Anomaly Detection and Visualization System for Wireless Sensor Networks  Eirini Karapistoli Department of Information Systems University of Macedonia Egnatias 156, 54006, Thessaloniki, Greece ikarapis@uom.gr  Panagiotis Sarigiannidis Dept.
Sentence 2: the J I M i function corresponds to the results obtained by a jamming attack to a single or to multiple sensor nodes.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In strong secrecy, the intruder learns a key KG only if KG is lost, a dishonest member received KG, either when it joined the group or while it was a member of the group, or if a pairwise key was stolen and used to distribute KG.
Sentence 2: group protocols usually do not have such a notion of individual sessions strongly tied to principals and keys.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: At .rst glance, this problem is well-studied: there is a huge body of literature on Gaussian mixture modeling with unknown numbers of components, including integrated model selection and estimation approaches (e.g., [6]).
Sentence 2: addi­tional domain knowledge (e.g., the relative sizes of the bumps, their spread, and inter-bump spacings) can be easily incorporated within the Bayesian formulation.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The local uni.cation used to generate the set of candidate matches that is then reduced using def-use chains and value preservation is limited by several restrictions.
Sentence 2: the control .ow of the software now follows the calculation of a logical XOR, and at each of the four possible end points of the control .ow graph, code can be implemented that stores the result of the calculation to some output register.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: [9] D. Gao, M. K. Reiter, D. Song, On Gray-Box Program Tracking for Anomaly Detection , 13th USENIX Security Symposium, August 2004 [10] Debin Gao, Michael K. Reiter and Dawn Song, Gray-Box Extraction of Execution Graphs for Anomaly Detection , the 11th ACM CCS conf., 2004.
Sentence 2: data layout 1 scheme only allows performing protections on v5, v8 and v9 together at P4 since only they are adjacent and the protection operations on them can be clustered at the same clustering point (i.e.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As noted in Section 2.2, it is theoretically possi­ble for a single attacker on a modem to generate more than enough traf.c to exceed this threshold using large wscale values.
Sentence 2: whereas previous work has focused on opt-ack as a means to greedily improve end-to-end performance, we study opt­ack exclusively as a denial of service attack.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: REFERENCES [1] G. Carl, G. Kesidis, and S. Rai, Denial of service attack detection techniques, IEEE Internet Computing, 10(1): 82-89, Jan. 2006.
Sentence 2: in the experiments, we utilized the attackers to access the victim web server and launch well-known DDoS attacks using a series of DDoS tools such as Stacheldraht and TFN2K.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In par­ticular, for each i, where i =1,..., 2m, and each point (x * ,t * ), the ODE d j jj ** z(t)= .i(z(t)),z(t )= x (26) i ii dt has a unique solution, de.ned for all t. We say that t .. j * * zi (t;x ,t * )passing through(x ,t * )is the i-th characteris­tic curve for the j-th subsystem.
Sentence 2: following switching PDE models the o.takewithdrawal under discrete open/close actions of the adversary .
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Thus, we can compute all ei s with |ei| < Xi when Xt)j/t < N(1+o(1))(j/k)(t+1)/t (X1 · · · , which achieves the < N(1+o(1)) maximum N(1+o(1)) at j= k-1.
Sentence 2: [15] extended this attack to solve the GACD problem on multiple instances.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Theassumptionbehindthis modusoperandiisthatthetyp­ical maliciousprogramtriestoperformits maliciousactions as soon as possible.
Sentence 2: a behavioral pro.le aims to capture a program s behavior at anhigherlevel of abstractionthanaraw system call trace while correctly retaining a program s behavioral semantics.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Now consider Obviously, for N N D(R, Rref )= X 2 (ri - rref,i) D(R, R )= X (ri - ri)2 i=1 i=1 Note that the reference value Rref is obtained from the reg-D(R, R ) ~ .2(N) istration process where the average value of multiple images 2sr 2 is used.
Sentence 2: bASIS OF THE METHOD Authenticity and originality are two major requirements for printed document which need to be authenticated.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We instantiate our proto­col using the Burmester-Desmedt (BD) GKA [3] and bench­mark a proof-of-concept implementation of the protocol core as a plugin for Pidgin.1  2.
Sentence 2: for all following rounds, S uses the symmet­ric keys shared by the adversarial parties with the honest user to simulate the honest user s inputs following t ' and runs the adversary code to produce the adversarial portion of the transcript T ' .
Relationship: neutral