sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: collected 204,040 applications from various online stores and reported native code deployment rate of 4.52% in total [31].
Sentence 2: the ma jority of the applications may not be in­stalled and used by most smartphone users: according to statistics shown in Google Play in November 2013, the No.1 application in the chart has accumulated almost a billion installs, while the application ranking 300 shows less than 500,000 installs in total, which is approximately only 0.05% of the top application.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Now we set D = max{|d1|,|d2|, , |d8|}.
Sentence 2: for the 8-point integer DCT we employed in our scheme, we cannot estimate the watermarking error directly similar to the processing for the floating-point DCT because the 8-point integer DCT is not a linear transform and therefore the distortion caused by the addition of the maximum coefficient ACmax cannot be calculated using eq.(7).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since .rst proposed by Forrest [12], e.orts to secure sys­tems through automated diversity mechanisms have focused more on randomized implementations (of memory layout [2] and instruction sets [1, 16]) than on functional diversity systems that have di.erent purposes and speci.cations, not just implementations.
Sentence 2: diversity-introducing mech­anisms such as address space layout randomization (ASLR) [20] have proven to be useful mitigation mechanisms and are now part of Windows Vista and many Linux distributions.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: SUD relies on IOMMU, transaction .ltering in PCI express bridges, and IO permission bits in TSS to securely grant user space device drivers direct access to hardware.
Sentence 2: sUD cannot be applied to the hosted hypervisors such as KVM simply because that hardware virtualization extension (e.g., Intel VT) is not constrained by the IOMMU or other hardware mechanisms that SUD relies on.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The fact that parts of the grid might have di.erent access granularity (i.e., the level of individual cells versus the level of blocks of cells) will allow us to achieve signi.cant savings in the data structure and key derivation time in certain systems.
Sentence 2: we initially consider the case where the mn cells have distinct access rights (hence there needs to be a separate key for each cell).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: These studies provide a strong foundation for the obser­vation that protecting content from unwanted audiences is more than simply a matter of preventing strangers from ac­cessing pro.les.
Sentence 2: we are unaware of any large-scale studies that have attempted to quantify the extent to which users are sharing content inappropriately with members of their friend networks through the use of users previously posted content or questions about speci.c friends.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: and PROG P2 1k+1 O = A &#38;07k-1Intuitively, one might argue that PROG P1 leaks more information leakage than PROG P2 when k is large, because it reveals complete information about the secret input with probability 81 ; on the other hand, when k is large, PROG P2 reveals roughly 18 of the number of bits in A.
Sentence 2: applying the Shannon entropy measure and computing the mutual information I1 between A and O yields a counter intuitive result: 771 1 P 1: I1(A, O)= - log - log = k +0.169, 28k 8 88 27k-1 27k-1 P 2: I1(A, O)= -2k+1 · log = k +1, 28k 28k Indeed, from a security standpoint, PROG P1 leaves A highly vulnerable to being guessed (e.g., when it is a multiple of 8), while PROG P2 does not (at least for large k).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Each EP e in E(C) is denoted as: {itemset},score(e) Where, itemset is the item set which represents e, score(e) is the score contributed by e and its value derives from the following formula: Score(e)= (GrowthRate(e)/(GrowthRate(e)+1))supportc(e) (1) Where, supportc(e) is the support of e in class C, GrowthRate(e) is the growth rate of e. (2) Detecting Process The specific steps of detecting process are as follows: 1) Aggregating the scores of EP for the instance In the training process, we obtain the score of each single EP.
Sentence 2: the fraction of instances which contain an EP may be a very small fraction of all instances.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: DCsperformconcrete executiononpublicdataand symbolicexe­cution on sensitivedata, and mayperformqueries toDPs on sensi­tivenucleotides.
Sentence 2: onlyqueriesthatdonotletDCsrecon­struct sensitive regions are allowed by DPs and generic two-party computationtechniques areusedduringquery execution.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since the inheri­tance of permissions in the role hierarchy is always upwards, role-based access control models do not directly support a simulation of the *-property, which requires that certain per­missions be inherited downwards.
Sentence 2: role-based approaches have circumvented this problem by introducing two partial orderings, r and w,onthe setof roles, where r r r ' if and only if r ' w r.This gives rise to two hierarchies RHr and RHw to which read and write permissions are respectively assigned [13].6 this begs the question How should read/write permissions be handled?
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: reused, causing the compromise of one server to probably a.ect several independent applications as well.
Sentence 2: it is an unrealistic assumption, that we will reach a situation, in which password-based authentication looses its signi.cance, even in the presence of well designed password-less techniques, such as client-side SSL authenti­cation, and promising new developments, such as Mozilla Persona [30].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In [2], the authors have used 4 signals for the SYN scan detection prob­lem: (1) the number of error messages generated per second by a failed network connection (PAMP); (2) the number of transmitted network packets per second (danger signal); (3) the inverse rate of change of number of network packets per second (safe signal); (4) high system activity (in.ammatory signal).
Sentence 2: the PAMP and in.ammatory signals are host based features which are undesirable because network­based malware detectors are generally more reliable, robust, and, most importantly, generic and scalable than host-/OS­based detectors.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The main idea in IBE is to eliminate the public key distribution prob­lem by making a public key to be publicly derivable from a human­memorizable information on its owner, such as email address, phone number combined to a user name.
Sentence 2: practical and secure IBE schemes were not found until two independent works of Boneh-Franklin [8] and Cocks [15] in 2001.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since many samples collectively contribute to been employed to improve the detection accuracy, and the the detection of a watermark pattern, such verification wa- likelihood ratio test (LRT) has been utilized to construct termarking usually has high robustness, even though its ca-detectors accordingly [ll] [lo] [2].
Sentence 2: in these mod­pability of recovering more than one information bit is not els attacks are not properly incorporated and the detections as high as the transmission watermarking.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The simplest key derivation protocol would have the laptop derive a decryption key from a .xed m. Without access to the constrained channel, an OT will be unable to derive the key.
Sentence 2: an attacker in possession of the laptop could quickly brute force the key, given the limited entropy of m. Instead, the TLD can possess a strong secret to help derive the laptop s de­cryption key and use m to ensure the requesting laptop is in the room and protect communication over the wireless network.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The proof size of the PI N O CC H IO BFS scheme is always a constant (288 bytes) see [30].
Sentence 2: in our approaches (certifying algorithm and planar separator), the proof contains a 256-bit (32 bytes) HMAC for each edge contained in the shortest path, therefore being proportional to the size |p| of the shortest path p. Speci.cally, for the case of the certifying algorithm scheme the proof size is |p| × 32 + 288 bytes while for the planar separator scheme the proof size is |p| × 32 + 288 × num bytes, where num is the number of PI N O CC H IO circuits involved in the proof computation of the planar separator scheme (num is bounded above by the levels of the planar separator tree).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: From Figure 2, it is easily seen that the total number of attack countries is 228 and about 60% of the all attack sessions was caused by only four countries, i.e., Japan, China, United States and South Korea.
Sentence 2: in our further investigation, we ob­served that most source IP addresses in Japan are located in black hole sensors and honeypots, and some of them were caused by Unicast Flooding of L2 Switches[8] which gen­erates incomplete data of sessions and makes IDS raises false alarms.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To save theperformanceloss, we use the explicitway of trigger­ing control transfer according toNaT tokens.
Sentence 2: to make it dif.cult for an attacker to guess the real control transfer by iden­tifying the checkinginstruction(e.g., tnat and chk.s), we convert all explicit control transfer instructions to the form that uses the NaTtokens as oraclestodirectthe control.ow, as wellasinserting faked control transfer usingNaT tokensinbogus code.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: More speci.cally, according to UCON, information characteriz­ing an object-right combination, like the price of a service, must be contained into object s attributes [9].
Sentence 2: the price of a service is actually derived from the subject-right­object combination, resulting so in a di.erentiated pricing for the same pair of right-object requested by various sub­jects.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the case of hard-coded strings created through re.ection (by invoking a string constructor by name), our instrumenter for MetaStrings would not recognize the constructors and would not change these instantia­tions to instantiations of the corresponding meta classes.
Sentence 2: the MetaStrings library can handle most other uses of re.ection, such as invocation of string methods by name.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If a cryptanalyst has ciphertext which is encrypted by one key stream frame and corresp onding plaintext, he can de­crypt the plaintext which length is equal to the length of key stream frame f from another encrypted .le with same key stream pool.
Sentence 2: to extract useful information from ci­phertext, the adversary must decrypt ciphetext which length is longer than the length of minimal units of meaning(M).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: ATTACKS AND IMPROVEMENTS ON YANG-SHIEH AUTHENTICATION SCHEMES  Yang and Shieh claimed that the securities of their authentication schemes are based on the difficulties of both factoring large numbers and discrete logarithm problem.
Sentence 2: since the remote server does not check the integrity of the request message before processing verification, malicious users can forge a request message and make it satisfy equation (1).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Indeed, the u,t * STATu,t * adversary STATu,t * is given the value au,t * and for each h =1,...,m, the public value p(vh,.h),(u,t *) computed by Gen1 corresponds to the encryption of au,t * .
Sentence 2: experiment Expm+1 is the same as ExpIND-0 .In­ u,t * STATu,t * deed, the adversary STATu,t * is given the value au,t * and, for each h =1,...,m, the public value p(vh,.h),(u,t *) com­ puted by Genm+1 corresponds to the encryption of the value ßm+1.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 1 There are a total of 831 1The VCL data was provided by the VCL management team, while the EC2 data was retrieved from the public Ama­zon Machine Images (AMIs) listed at Amazon s AMI page (http://developer.amazonwebservices.com/connect/  VM images in VCL and 575 public VM images posted at EC2 s AMI page.
Sentence 2: more than 91% of the VCL images and more than 96% of the EC2 images have not been updated for at least 1.5 months.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If the Identity Data Service triggering the dependency is at lower privacy level, then having shared the list of user data elements during the Link Creation phase, it is expected to share the values of these elements in this resolution phase.
Sentence 2: if the triggering Identity Data Service is at a higher pri­vacy level, then it would not send any data elements, indicating the other Identity Data Service to honor its end of the privacy level and return with the appro­priate user data elements, which have been federated from its end.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In contrast, Sec View(Position,acp2) is given by: Map(Pos, SID)(Filter(Position.Platoon =X.Pos=Target( a)-d.Pos=Target(a)+d.ts=TAction start(a).ts= TAction end(a))(Position)).
Sentence 2: we assume that if an action is not currently taking place the evaluation of Target(), TAction start(), and TAction end() for that action re­turns null.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: SUNDR [8] protects the integrity of data stored on an un­ trusted server and uses versioning to ensure that the order of updates to blocks of data stored on the server is preserved.
Sentence 2: sUNDR only provides a guarantee of fork consis­tency to the clients, which means that a malicious server can lie to clients about the contents of .les so long as it lies consistently to each client.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Similarly, consider the execution of the program on the normal programinputGET /index.html HTTP/1.1.Forthis simple function, a singleinput already exercises alargeproportion of the code(forinstance,it executes all of thelines of non-error codein the .gure).
Sentence 2: examining this single path is not enough to elucidate the relationship between the variable ptr and the input, because that relationshipinvolves controldependencies.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Wagner and Soto pose the problem of generating such an attack sequence as a .nite-state automata intersection prob­lem, and generated a mimicry attack consisting of over 100 system calls that achieves the e.ect desired by an initial ex­ploit consisting of 8 system calls.
Sentence 2: they did not implement a working mimicry attack.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Research on methods of authenticating websites to users include security indicators [6, 20], secure bookmarks for known websites [8, 51, 53], and automated detection and blacklist­ing of known phishing sites [10].
Sentence 2: studies suggest that security indicators are ine.ective at preventing phish­ing attacks [9, 40]; and blacklisting known phishing sites still cause the problem of a high rate of false-positives and false-negatives [54].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: present a logic model that can be used to analyze, develop, and prove systems that use what they call con­sumable credentials i.e., credentials that provide authorization only a limited number of times, such as coins, tickets, and simi­lar tokens in both the real and digital worlds.
Sentence 2: as far as we understand, although they discuss how consumable credentials (which are essentially count-limited objects as well) can be used, they do not answer the question of how these can be implemented.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It is obvious that the layered analysis for Merkle-Damg°ard designs is much more intricate than those for the sponge functions.
Sentence 2: the permutation of Keccak is simple and clear arguments for its security can be provided, but the detailed analysis of the bit-oriented permutation is more complex; there is a need for new techniques to provide better security bounds, in particular for variants of the permutation with a reduced number of rounds.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: AssumethattheProgrammerrolehasapermissionset, sayP,associatedwithalicensedsoftwarepackage.Suppose thatthereare5userlicensesforthepackageindicatingthat only5userscanconcurrentlyexecuteanyprogramofthe package.Suchaconstraintcouldbedirectlyexpressedas acardinalityconstraintontheProgrammerrole.Software Engineer,beingseniortoProgrammer,caninheritP.How­ever,atanytimethenumberofconcurrentexecutionsof anyparticularprogrambyusersassignedtotheSoftware EngineerroleandProgrammerroleneedstoberestricted to5.IfweadoptanIorIA-hierarchy,weobservethat correctlyenforcingsuchaconstraintisnotstraightforward: .AsthecardinalityconstraintisappliedontheProgrammer role,itcannotcapturetheuseofthepermissionsetP bytheSoftwareEngineerrole.Hence,theremaybe fveconcurrentactivationsoftheProgrammerroleand someactivationsoftheSoftwareEngineerroleatany time,allowingmorethanfveuserstohaveaccessto theprograms.Insuchasituationextrameasuresneed tobetakentoenforcethecardinalityconstraint.
Sentence 2: .Analternativesolutionmaybetodevelopaconstraint expressiononthecombinationofroles,suchasthe onethatsaysthenumberofconcurrentactivationsof SoftwareEngineerandProgrammerrolesshouldbe atmost5.thisintroducesotherproblems becauseofthefactthatPcouldbeonlyasubset ofthepermissionsetassociatedwiththeSoftware Engineerrole.Insuchacase,theconstraintwillen­forcethesamecardinalityconstraintonallthepermis­sionsassignedtotheSoftwareEngineerroleandnot onlytoP.Forexample,sixconcurrentactivationsof theSoftwareEngineerrolewillnotbepermittedand hencepermissionsotherthanPassignedtoitcannot beused,whichmaynotbewhatwewant.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: These techniques are powerful in terms of their robustness, semantic-preservation, obscurity, resilience, stealth, and other properties [7, 11, 15].
Sentence 2: most existing techniques Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro.t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full cita­tion on the .rst page.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Apart from the fact that we cannot ignore I frames when encrypting low temporal frames we can clearly seethat encryptinglowtemporalframes also su.ciently de­stroys the visual quality.
Sentence 2: since we have to encrypt all I frames in addition to the low temporal frequencies it is usually su.cient to either encrypt I frames or low spa­tial frequencies (with or without full I frame encryption).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.2 Discovery It is a requirement of the bridge design that every bridge client should be able to discover some small number of bridges; otherwise the fact that bridges are hard to block does not improve the ability of censored users to circumvent blocking.
Sentence 2: it should not be too easy to .nd the list of bridges, or they become as convenient to block as the public relays.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: INTRODUCTION Recent experiments [26] and real-life attacks [6] have of­fered concrete evidence that link-.ooding attacks can severely degrade, and even cut o., connectivity of large sets of ad­versary selected hosts in the Internet for uncomfortably long periods of time; e.g., hours.
Sentence 2: neither the root cause nor pervasiveness of this vulnerability has been analyzed to date.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: [33] mediate web applications at a much coarser granularity of web pages while also using a speci­.cation of roles, and infer the difference between sitemaps of priv­ileged and unprivileged roles as the de.nition of security-sensitive operations.
Sentence 2: our approach proposes concepts that are applicable uniformly in all domains.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Ru may promote actions like those seen for deletions: i) the update of tuples referencing tuples involved in Ru via tit's with Cascades modality; or ii) the update of foreign key values in tuples referencing tuples involved in Ru via tit's with Nullified modality.
Sentence 2: if one tuple t references one tuple involved in Ru via one tit with a Restricted modality, t blocks the execution of Ru.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: CD2FA synthesized immediately after reduction phase are generally compact as i) there is reduced number of la­beled transitions in the D2FA and ii) all default paths are bounded to a single default transition leading to compact content labels.
Sentence 2: even more compact CD2FA can be created by allowing longer default paths for certain states, specifically the states where not many labeled transi­tions enter.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: That is, ConstructCascadeBF always has enough space to allocate to the counting Bloom .lter of the .rst level of the cascade, and can afford to have just one more level, which is the explicit list.
Sentence 2: the sparse memory available for counters in the second strategy requires ConstructCascadeBF to allocate more levels in the cascade Bloom .lter.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The servers return a non-repudiable audit proof to the domain such that the domain can provide its certi.cate along with the audit proof to clients for a TLS connection setup.
Sentence 2: as CT s goal is only to make used certi.cates visible, it is still vulnerable to attacks when an adversary compromises a CA to create and register the fraudulent certi.cates, and CT does not prevent clients from accepting these certi.cates.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: That is, the DKs are unique session secret keys between two communication devices, which protect xDLMS APDU transmitted between a COSEM client, Central DCS or Concentrator, and a COSEM server.
Sentence 2: dKs are transmitted after being encrypted using a Global Unicast Encryption Key that is shared among the Central DCS, Concentrator and COSEM servers.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In other words, if the subject does not posses the necessary creden­tials it may be more appropriate to say that it is unknown whether it is competent rather than adopting the Closed WorldAssumption(CWA)and automatically assuming that it is not.
Sentence 2: not belonging to a particular category may be deemed as su.cient to establish that the subject is not competent.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since there is a huge di.erence between the sim­ulation time (e.g., in the magnitude of nanoseconds) and the prediction time (e.g., in the magnitude of seconds) for obtaining the output signals, PUFs can be used as a secu­rity key for identity authentications in many applications [10][31][33][48].
Sentence 2: a direct use of PUF with randomly generated challenge bits cannot resolve the replay attack, since we must ensure that the collected power pro.le in the monitoring process are those generated from the speci.c sensor at the speci.c time frame.
Relationship: contrasting