sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The monitoring at MSb continues till [(t-.)+(N*.)].
Sentence 2: vb is constructed at MSb as follows: ( Vb = ., Fb1 , Fb2 , Fb3 , ... , Fbl , ..., FbN ) (3) The correlation coe.cient, denoted by ra,b(Va,Vb)or simply r(Va,Vb), between the target vectors, Va and Vb, is obtained by the following equation [10]: 1 PN r(Va,Vb)= [Va(l) -V.a][Vb(l) -V.b](4) Nsasb l=1 .of the monitored features of the vector Va, respectively.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If the number of bits repre­senting a group element of G is approximately log(N)=6., then our secret key has length 3n log(N) = 162. bits, and the variables in our update matrices can be represented with 2(n - 1) log(N) = 96. bits.
Sentence 2: the amount of leakage al­  1 lowed per update/signature is roughly a 162 fraction of the 1 secret key length, a 96 fraction of the update randomness, and a 1 fraction of the total length of the secret key and 258 update randomness.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We analyzed the resources o.ered by mobile devices to identify contexts and properties relevant to the users and their behaviors in pervasive environments.
Sentence 2: the following authentication-relevant contexts were identi­.ed [21]: Operational context: describes the goals, tasks and activities of the user;  Interpersonal context: describes the social aspects of the user, such as the relationships and communication channels between the user and his community;  Spatial context: considers attributes regarding the use s location;  Environmental context: captures the situations sur­rounding the user, such as services, people and infor­mation accessed by the user.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, in Section 5 we are able to solve FullObserve for small IEEE bus topolo­gies due to their small size.
Sentence 2: by establishing that our PMU placement problems are NPC, we claim that there ex­ist bus topologies for which these problems are di.cult to solve (i.e., no known polynomial-time algorithm exists to solve those cases).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Indeed, with network connections measured in gigabits per second but with latencies measured in millisec­onds, the number of rounds of communication is likely to be the bottleneck, not bandwidth.
Sentence 2: because of this orders­of-magnitude di.erence between bandwidth and latency, we assume 1/c M = N, for some .xed constant c = 2, but that Alice s memory is smaller than N. Equivalently, we assume that c = logM N is a constant.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It is important that not only are faculty and staff trained in the proper behaviors necessary to secure information, but that Information Technology students are taught these as well so that they will be able to participate in the development of information security programs upon graduation.
Sentence 2: it is necessary to determine if university faculty and staff are engaging in proper information security practices, and if not, how we can make recommendations to correct any flaws in our practices, best train our users, and include these best practices in the pedagogy of our information technology courses as well as in employee training.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: An internal stream can be de.ned in terms of (the portion of) the graph by which it results.
Sentence 2: given an internal stream S and the corresponding graph G, the protection object like repre­sentation of S can be de.ned in terms of the boxes contained into G. More precisely, given a graph G, not containing an Union box, de.ned over a set S in of input streams we can de.ne the stream S resulting from graph G, as the Cartesian product of streams in S in, where all attributes speci.ed in the Map boxes of the graph G are projected, and all predicates speci.ed in the Filter, Join and Resample boxes are applied.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Real-world virtualized infrastructures consist of tens of thousands low-level components and similarly many edges, an initial complexity that could easily overwhelm the solver back-ends.
Sentence 2: we support the solver back-ends in traversing these graphs e.ciently by either abstracting from low-level nodes not impacting the analysis or introducing fast lanes into the graph: Definition 6 (Optimization: Graph Refinement).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The results show that we obtain less than 0.50% switching probabilities of the HT gate in all the benchmark circuits, which is considered very low and di.cult to observe by the switching power-based detection.
Sentence 2: our results indicate that the attacker can leverage the rare but non-zero switching activities to ac­tivate the HT during the operation of the wireless system, since the one-gate HT is di.cult to detect before the actual activation of the malicious circuitry.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Every piece of information here is actually meant to be dis­closed by Android and most of such data has been extensively used by legitimate Android apps: for example, hundreds of data usage monitors are already out there [5], relying on the usage statistics to keep track of a user s mobile data consumption.
Sentence 2: .xing these information leaks must be done carefully to avoid undermining the basic functions of these existing apps and to strike a balance between system utility and data protection.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It is ine.cient for a group with many users when the keys are re-distributed frequently, e.g., multiple users need to be revoked asynchronously in one time slot, or multiple users need to be revoked in di.erent time slots, or the revocation needs to persist for multiple time slots.
Sentence 2: it may not be suitable for a large group with frequent revocation, highly dynamic group, or long term revocation (key exposure).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Given M as de.ned in (7), deg(cj) gradually decreases as stated by Equation (8).
Sentence 2: the minimum number of iterations iis given by 2m-n-1 -i(m-k) :0 2m-n-1 =i>,* (17) m-k '' For polynomials over GF(2) a,b' with deg(a) <n and deg(b') <n, c0 = a' *b' can be partially reduced to c=c0 mod M,deg(c) <nas follows: c0 can be split up into c0,h and c0,l with deg(c0,h) <n-1 and deg(c0,l) m. the minimum number of reduction steps iis n-1 n-1 -i(m-k) :0 =i>, * (18) m-k 7.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It generates a signature s * = ots.Sig(sk * , (E1 * ,  {C.i }i.L,vk*=0, {C.l+i }i.L,vk*=1,CJ).
Sentence 2: ii It outputs the challenge ciphertext as E * = (E1 * , {C.i }i.L,vk * =0, {C.l+i }i.L,vk * =1, C, s * , vk * J ii If (g, A, B, C, Z) .Dbdh and we let s = c, then we have s).i Y s = e(g, g)abc , E ' = C.i =(g = T 's and E ' = C.l+i = (g s).l+i = T 's the ciphertext is a valid random i ii l+i.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Furthermore, these paths in Gb contain at most one occurrence of each cycle in Gb, because transitions that go around a cycle in Gb a second time would not add more irrevocable roles or constraints to the corresponding forward states, hence the corresponding fragment of the path in Gf would be a cycle, contradicting the assumption that the path in Gf is simple.
Sentence 2: the number of states in Gf is bounded by the number of paths in Gb that go around each cycle at most once.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since Update algorithms of both in [5] and proposed scheme consist of computing a abß mod n, the computational cost of both Update algo­rithms are in proportion to the size of a and ß.
Sentence 2: update algorithm of the proposed scheme becomes |e|/|e' |times faster than that of [5] since a and ß will also be in ' proportion to the size of e and e, respectively.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For the obtained Radon image, we compute Eigen values.
Sentence 2: given a matrix A, a scalar A is called an eigen value of A if there exists a nonzero vector x such that, Ax = Ax for a square matrix A of size nxn, the eigen value equation can be expressed as- Ax - AIx =0 Here, I is the identity matrix of size nxn.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: At the same time, we can pre-compute a ' = e(u, a), b ' = e(g, a) and c ' = e(v, a), and publish them as part of the desig­nated con.rmer s public key.
Sentence 2: in the con.rm and deny protocol, C and V only compute some exponentia­tions.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If the only event is a send to j then Sj will not be in.uenced since the only sub-state received as a result of a message will con­tain the initial time stamp equal to the time stamp of the local sub-state s0 and therefore will be removed by the al­gorithm (lines 23-24).
Sentence 2: the empty sequence .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: That is, the compliance checker must return zero or more sets of local evidence that minimally satisfy p so that the local entity knows which local evidence can be sent to the remote entity to gain access to the resource protected by p. We say that some set E of evidence minimally satis.es a policy p if no proper subset of E also satis.es p. A compli­ance checker capable of recognizing all possible subsets of the local evidence that minimally satisfy a given policy is required to ensure that a trust negotiation protocol will es­tablish trust whenever possible and can also a.ord its user a number of strategic advantages.
Sentence 2: our focus in this paper is to e.ciently solve the following speci.c instance of the more general policy compliance checking problem: The Type-3 Compliance Checker Problem.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To see that it is bounded by some function of |NR n PR|, note that the set of non­positive roles in the state is the same in every state in Gred except the initial state, because the reduced transition relation never adds non-positive roles to the state, and revocation has no preconditions, and hence invisible transitions that revoke non-positive roles occur only in composite transitions leaving the initial state.
Sentence 2: the set of non-positive roles is the same in every state in GNR except the initial state, so the number of nodes in GNR is bounded by some function of the number of positive roles in NR.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.4 Exploit Firmware As the utilization of the co-processors includes the def­inition of entry-points, interrupt service routines and fur­ther con.gurations, we tend to choose a standardized format for our exploit.
Sentence 2: the adversary-.rmware is orga­nized in the executable and linkable format (ELF -format [5]), which is the common standard for executables in UNIX­like OS and also the binary-format for co-processor utiliza­tion frameworks like remoteproc [11].
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While adhering to the principles and the methods ofprovable security, veri.ed security takes the view that cryptographic proofs should be treated in a manner similar to high-integrity software, so that con.dence in the designof acryptographicsystemis nolowerthancon.dence in the software systems that use it.
Sentence 2: veri.ed security mandates that security proofs are built and validated using state-of-the-art technology in programming languages and veri.cation.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Some of the initially suggested OPF schemes rely on tra­ditional encryption techniques to generate intermediate ci­phertexts, assign them to buckets based on the order of their underlying plaintexts, and prepend bucket identi.ers to ob­tain resulting ciphertexts [4, 5, 6].
Sentence 2: with the bucket identi.ers, ciphertexts can be compared, allowing e.cient range queries.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Moreover, if two packets arenotsen­t back-to-back, say the intervalbetween these two packets being largerthan .CAP ,then the IPD will be equal to the original inter­val if there is no cross traf.c[21].
Sentence 2: althoughRAINBOW andSWIRLintroduce asmall delay to the packets, they disturb the distribution of IPDs less than .RTT .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, note that .R1 as well as R are random values with unknown discrete logarithms, which can not be computed using any values from signa­tures or public keys.
Sentence 2: the values tT (a)P + R and dP are uniformly random and, consequently, e(tT (a)P + R, dP ) as well as C = H ' (e(tT (a)P +R, dP )) are also uniformly ran­dom.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The system of­ten uses a handle as an ID of an object, not as an address, so it would be problematic if handles are regarded as an ad­dress for our conversion, because then the system would not be able to recognize them.
Sentence 2: when parsing through therelocationtabletolookforpre-generatedaddresses,ifan address points to the base address, we leave it unconverted as it is most likely used as a handle.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This list is intended to contain what look like plausible passwords users might generate; it is not intended to be a list of high­strength passwords.
Sentence 2: this honeyword generation scheme is qualitatively di.erent than the process of tweaking a password to generate anew password: it is OK for a honeyword tobe much weaker than the true password in an attempt to trick the adversary.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: From this log, the TTP can check the usage status of each of the user s certi.cates, and produce validation certi.cates that attest to the usage status of the user s certi.cates at that time.
Sentence 2: in a future transaction with an­other user (not requiring contact with the TTP), the user need only present a PRU containing the validation certi.cate plus any new in­cproofs, and does not anymore need to present any old incproofs that have been seen and validated by the TTP.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: PrivayoflosingbidAllbiddingpriesexepttheon­tratprieisnotrevealedtoanyoneinludingtheau­tioneer.
Sentence 2: ifthebidderBiwithhisbidw,isthewinner,hedoes notdislosesi,-Ibutprf(si,-I).the autioneerannotgetanyinformationofdk,-Iand deryptthesubsequentommitmentstobids.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We evaluated the computation costs of this secure comparison by .xing m = 5 and varying values of n. Following from Figure 1(b), the running time of secure circuit comparison varies from 37.45 to 185.013 minutes when n is changed from 1000 to 5000 respectively.
Sentence 2: we observed that the running time of secure circuit comparison grows almost linearly with n. Based on above results, as shown in Figure 1(c), the com­putation costs of O-PPBA protocol scales approximately lin­early with n and m. For example, when m = 5, the com­putation time of O-PPBA increases from 39.032 to 194.934 minutes when n is varied from 1000 to 5000.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, it is dif.cult to achieve high-performance computation while keeping cost low by combin­ing all the building blocks on a single chip, because the silicon fab­rication technology for the NVRAM and that for high-performance computational logic are different.
Sentence 2: today s trusted hard­ware is generally slow, which affects the throughput and latency of the whole system.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The EROS kernel does, in fact, use the same variable in both calls, and we know from the implementation that any attempt to decache the process must ultimately call either proc NeedRevalidate() or proc Unload().As long as nei­ther of these functions is called, a cached process will remain cached.
Sentence 2: so long as the value of param1 has not changed before the call to proc GetRegs32, we know that the process remains cached.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: m1 I(Ei ) m2 , i = 1, 2 In other words, variables that appear in expressions that may be de­classi.ed in c2 (namely, expressions from Ei ''' ), are never updated in c1.
Sentence 2: memories that agree on these expressions before starting c1 just as well agree on them before c2, and visa versa. ''
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 2N+2 = 8 log q · (nB)+ ..+(j - 1) · 8 log q(nB) .
Sentence 2: 2N+2 = .. + j · (8 log q(nB)) the .nal error after a multiplication and relineariza­tion is at most ... +8N log q ·(nB)2N+2 = ... +(B ·n)O(N) , as claimed, for the setting of q =2n .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The rules about Sealed Envelopes (SE) use information from the care records and the workgroup memberships.
Sentence 2: their type is: types SEPolicy = (Operation ×Spine ×S) m.unit A user is allowed to read an entry directly (i. e. without breaking a seal), if the entry is either not sealed or, else, he is a member of the respective workgroup.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note that it is important that the attackers not be able to calculate the actual assignments for any other players but their own; if they could, that might help them incriminate an innocent player.
Sentence 2: a feasible extension of our approach is that the code assignments are randomly per­muted at each code position, that is, at each variation point in the movie, and in each movie itself.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Now, Bob runs an FTP client (gftp standard implementa­tion) and logs in to Alice s FTP server.
Sentence 2: bob is able to list and read the contents of Alice s home folder; he transfers the usage-controlled .le AlicesFriends.txt to 1http://zvi.ipd.kit.edu/english/26_422.php   Figure 2: Mousepad fails to open the protected .le.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Each .ag con­tained (cryptographically) the service that it belonged to, the state of the service (active or not), and a timestamp sig­nifying when the .ag was created.
Sentence 2: when a .ag was submitted by a team, the .ag submission service had all the necessary information to determine the .ag s validity (.ags were valid for 5 minutes).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To this purpose, the algorithm makes use of the Sec Join operator (Sec Resample operator) over the re­quested stream.
Sentence 2: in this case the authorized views are given by the Aurora expressions obtained by applying the Sec Join op­erator (Sec Resample operator) over Objs1 and Objs2,plus the views generated by applying the Join (or Resample op­erator) over each possible combination of Aurora expressions in Sec Objs1 and Sec Objs2.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Examplesofstatiseuritypoliiesinludemultilevelseu­rity(MLS)poliies,suhasBell­LaPadula[4],andDomain andTypeEnforement(DTE)[8].Thesepoliiesaresafeby defnition,inthatanyhangeinanassignmentofasubjet orobjettoatype(orlabel)anonlybedonebyafully trustedprinipal.Mistakesinahangeofassignmentwill notbeaughtbeauseofthisfulltrustassumption.
Sentence 2: thesepoliies,althoughtheyhavebeenmoderatelysu­essful,arequiterestritive.Forexample,theabilityfor anobjetinoneMLSategorytobetransferredtoanother ategoryisimpossibleunlessitisdonebyafullytrusted prinipal.variousalternativestostatiseuritypoli­ieshavebeenproposed.Asmall,butsignifant,exten­sionofastatiseuritypoliyismadeintheSeaViewpol­iy[16]wherethetrustindowngradertasks(i.e.,thoseable tohangethetypeofanobjet)islimitedtoasubsetof thesystemtypes.Ontheonehand,thislimitsthepossibil­ ityoferrorbeausedowngradersanbespeializedtotheir task.Ontheotherhand,moredowngradersmayviolate thesafetyrequirementsofthesystem,sosafetyverifation beomesneessary.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Denning and Denning characterize explicit .ows [19] roughly as follows: a .ow of x is explicit if and only if the .ow depends abstractly on x (that is, it depends on the existence of x,but not on the value x).
Sentence 2: for example, the violation of DFI in Example 3.2 does not depend on the value empty any other value causes the same violation.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The models thathavebeenpreviouslyshown mainlypresent the following limits: On one hand, it is so easy to assign semantic labels (eg Very Trustworthy, Trustworthy, Untrustworthy) ([1], [18]) as it is more complex to give a numerical evaluation.
Sentence 2: most solutions that address the trust evaluation make one of the following assumptions: (i)The trust initialization is not a problem of the model, it is the responsibility of the actor of the system.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Hence, a change may be represented as: (si,oj ,ak) .c (si,oj ,ak' ) It can be readily inferred that .c is a three-place-relation over S × O × A.Furthermore, let M denote the class of all possible ACM versions.
Sentence 2: .c can be thought of as a binary relation over M and '' M .c Mi.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Decisions on how to handle ongoing trust negotiations during a policy change are business decisions that depend on factors such as the reasons for replacing the old policy, nature of the changes, importance that all ongoing instances comply with the new policy, and existence of tempo­rary transition policies.
Sentence 2: instead of provid­ing a .xed change management process, we provide policy management operators that policy developers can use to de.ne their own change process suitable for  their needs.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Fix some constants d and .. We will show that for all large enough m, any algorithm Q that takes as input X and a stream St ' and outputs a·a ' ±o( v m) with probability at least 1-O(m -2) can be used to compute a vector a such that ai = ai for all but an .
Sentence 2: fraction of i .U with probability 1 - d. the existence of such an algorithm Q implies that X cannot be E-di.erentially private for any .xed E. Indeed, assume for the sake of contradiction that an algorithm with the given properties exists and X is E-di.erentially private.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, even when people are deeply ambivalent about the effects of technology, they often still talk about these effects as if they were inevitable.
Sentence 2: a recent issue of Forbes magazine suggests that there is lively debate as to whether surveillance technology will bring on Orwell s 1984, or constitute a giant step toward human freedom ; yet, in the very next sentence, the author states [e]ither way, the damned thing is practically here.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Furthermore, the CSI measurements of the wireless packets collected from another device resided at a di.erent location (Position 2) should form a di.erent cluster in the CSI space.
Sentence 2: when the environment is benign, the CSI measure­ments from a particular device identity should be clustered together and form one cluster in the CSI space, while un­der the spoo.ng attack, the spoofer utilizes the same device identity as the legitimate user to transmit packets, and the CSI readings of the device identity are the mixture readings from both legitimate user and the spoofer, resulting in more than one CSI cluster.
Relationship: reasoning