sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The Li are hierarchy or relation literals that establish a connection between p and q for mission m. Data redirection rules must encode useful relationships be­tween principals.
Sentence 2: data should only be redi­rected to principals that: a) are authorized to read the data themselves; and b) are mission-related to the original re­questors so that they can propagate some (or all) of the bene.t of the data to the mission without breaching con.­dentiality.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: One may tempt to use existing general solutions to the two­party Secure Function Evaluation (2-SFE) [55, 30, 28] (e.g., Yao s scramble circuit protocol [55]) for policy-hiding access control.
Sentence 2: alice inputs her certi.cates and Bob inputs his policy; and they run a 2-SFE protocol to evaluate Bob s policy on Alice s at­tributes in her certi.cates.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, the Gen-2 standard only requires that the TID identify the manufacturer and give enough additional infor­mation to determine the tag s capabilities.
Sentence 2: two classes of TIDs are de.ned: the E0h class, where the TID consists of a manufacturer ID and a 48-bit serial number, and the E2h class, which merely de.nes the manufacturer and model.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: a · x + a · x · m · y = c We use Mathematica to prove that no such c '' exists as­suming the veri.cation condition is correct via the Mathe­matica Script API.
Sentence 2: we utilize the F indI nstance function to mathematically .nd proof over non-zero real numbers then subsequently try .nding a solution over in­tegers.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This can also go the other way when botnet-infected machines are used in denial-of-service attacks and SPAM campaigns, making port 445 attacks the con­spicuous species in this case.
Sentence 2: the resource that both port 135 and port 445 species consume that leads to competition between these two species is the patience of the people that control machines on the subnetwork.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To get a more concrete insight into the possible clus­tering of users pro.les, we studied the variability seen by users for each of these two variables.
Sentence 2: we computed the standard deviation of the mean area and mean pressure exhibited by each of the user­s represented in Figure 2(a), and then plotted these values on a CDF (Figure 2(b)).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For the i + 1 update, Ai+1 is chosen so that the kernel of Ai+1AiAi-1A now includes a new uniformly random vec­tor.
Sentence 2: a random vector it is chosen, and Ai+1 is chosen randomly in the form prescribed by the update al­gorithm up to the additional constraint that Ai+1AiAi-1Ait is the all zeros vector.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If we chose gc,t = g ac,t , for example, then it would be possible to cycle through candidate seed values by computing g rc,t and repeatedly multiplying by g. 2.2.1 Identity-based public keys Here we brie.y and informally sketch a technique for dis­tributing the public keys {yI } of defending servers in an identity-based manner.
Sentence 2: we show how yI can be derived from a string representing the identity I (e.g., a domain name) and a master private key.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: With active security, we look to go one step further and upon detection of a compromised system, effectively turn that system into one that closely monitors the activity giv­ing the attacker the perception that they re interacting with a real system when, in reality, it s a system that records their actions, decisions, and reactions, giving insight into their methodology.
Sentence 2: we can migrate the malicious code and its open network connections to a dedicated virtual machine.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the example in Figure 1, RegEx signature R1 contains equal length sub-signatures r1, r2, and r3.
Sentence 2: signature R1 can be matched if and only if these three sub-signatures are found in an incoming packet2.detection of any two sub-signatures in a packet is not enough to guarantee that the packet matches to R1.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.9.1 Con.dentiality The time to compromise any component i by multiple, parallel attackers is the smallest of n samples of a random variable distributed according to f(t).
Sentence 2: this is the 1st order statistic, t(1), and, as is shown in the technical section of this paper, E(T(1)) .a as n .8 where a is the leftmost value in the support of f.a is the largest value (supremum) for which f(t) = 0 for all t<a.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We can show that the privacy of an NFA, F = (V, E, e, <), is only dependent on E, the labeled edges: no matter how the state indices, V , are set, the texts accepted by the NFA is unchanged.
Sentence 2: the language L(F ) is indepen­dent of V , and its disclosure does not leak any information on the NFA except its size, |V |.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Figure14: Derivation ofrole engineering artifactsfromBPMN collaboration models: Integrated meta-model   Figure13: Examplefor thederivation of role engineering artifactsfrominteraction models Credit application process     Figure15: Examplefor thederivation of role engineering artifactsfrom collaboration modelsindescriptive conformance class Figure 15 shows an example of how we identify role engineer­ing artifacts from the XMI representation of BPMN collaboration models in the descriptive conformance class.
Sentence 2: figure 15highlights an excerpt ofFigure8 and shows what role engineer­ing artifacts canbederivedfrom the corresponding XMI represen­tation.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The difference between Strong Password-based EAP methods and Password-based EAP methods is that Strong Password-based EAP methods provide a way to use passwords for identification without transmitting any data that can subsequently be used to determine the password which is the only thing that is required for authentication.
Sentence 2: both sides can determine that they know a secret with having ever revealed what the secret is.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This is automat­ically enforced in most operating systems by simply chang­ing the corresponding .lename extension, thus resulting in a very subtle vulnerability of the widely accepted trust mecha­nism used to generate and verify digitally signed documents.
Sentence 2: enveloping signatures basedonPKCS#7 [21], are commonly implemented with no authentication of the content type of the document being signed, allowing the above attack to be done by simply changing the .rst ex­tension of the cryptographic message .lename (for instance, from delegation.bmp.p7m to delegation.htm.p7m).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: dao The proof3 of the theorem relies on the fact that the igno­rance property is de.ned in terms of behavior alternatives as opposed to individual traces which is how secure infor­mation .ow properties are usually de.ned in the literature [25].
Sentence 2: instead of demanding that there exists a trace that ful.lls a certain criterion, we demand that there exists a behavior alternative such that all its traces ful.lls a cer­tain criterion.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our Enumerative Approach for Studying Residue Objects In this section, we describe our approach of examining the logic correctness of the guarding mechanisms, which is to generate different residue objects, and observe the browser s memory states.
Sentence 2: it consists of two steps: (1) at the HTML/Javascript level, we use a tactic to enumerate different scenarios for object-creation, cross­referencing and navigation; (2) at the C++ level, we augment the browser to log critical function calls.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We obtain di.erent decisions depending on the point at which we apply the reduction.
Sentence 2: if we apply the reduc­tion at the top level (i.e., .rst decisions are combined using dov of XACML v3 and then the decision is reduced), we obtain Permit; on the other hand, if we apply it at the sub­policy level (i.e., .rst decisions are reduced and then they are combined using dov of XACML v2), we obtain Deny (when dov for policy is used).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.2.2 Spatial indistinguishability Given two parties A and B communicating together, an eavesdropper should not be able, using spatial analysis (or signal strength analysis), to distinguish the packets emitted by A from those emitted by B with a probability larger than 1/2.
Sentence 2: the eavesdropper should not be able to detect the packets source from their re­ception power.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: More speci.cally, let dnow be a parameter indicat­ing to the search algorithm that it should ignore any database item whose distance to the query q is larger than dnow.Given dnow,the search only needs to explore those partitions whose distance range overlaps with the range of interest, [d(p, q)-dnow,d(p, q)+dnow], as shown in Figure 2.
Sentence 2: partition Pi is pruned if and only if high[i] d(p, q)+ dnow.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The main di.erence between the two algorithms is that MinSkew uses a di.erent criterion to select the block to be split and where to split it.
Sentence 2: it tries all possible splits along every di­mension of every block, and evaluates how much the SSE of the The marginal distribution of a block b along the i-th dimension, denoted as margi(b), is given by the projection of the internal data distribution of b on the i-th dimension.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Then the SK is distributed through the data paths as shown in Fig.2.
Sentence 2: when a node h on Lk-1 receives the encrypted SK from a node p (obviously h and p are in the same cluster), h decrypts the SK with the CK shared with p. If h is also a leader on Lk, then h re-encrypts the SK with the CK shared by the cluster on Lk and forwards the encrypted SK to the members in the cluster on Lk.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We call this new type of attack a doppelganger window attack as it evades security require­ments by looking the same as (potentially) secure interfaces but without o.ering the behind-the-scenes functionality of these.
Sentence 2: the attacker strives to become a dop­pelganger or identical twin of the various interfaces he wants his victim to see.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Attacker modi.cations may make policies less re­strictive (e.g., to trick employees of a company into acci­dentally taking and distributing photos of con.dential in­formation in conference rooms) or more restrictive (e.g., to prevent the cameras of surrounding users from recording the attacker breaking a law).
Sentence 2: attackers attempting to change policies may employ the following methods: 1.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: After this, the method compares a newly observed pattern with the reference ones.
Sentence 2: depending on the similarity measure and the threshold set, the method outputsa binary result:0(rejected user),1(accepted user).We also proposeawayof combining these basic methodsto improvetheir performances.weleveragethefactthat, combining methods, the similarity measures can give us more in­formation than the binary onegives as output.Weimplemented our proposals for the Android system, and tested it with the HTC Dev 1smartphone considering ten different users.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note that heap objects allocated by HeapAlloc can still start at random ad­dresses in a heap block, but we have an interesting observation: when a heap object is bigger than a certain threshold, 512K in our experiment, Windows always allocates a separate heap block for this object.
Sentence 2: the addresses of large heap objects are also aligned according to the allocation granularity, thus more pre­dictable.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The underlying idea is simply to select the attack sample (among the k - 1 bridges suggested by our bridge-based heuristic search) that lies in between the largest clusters.
Sentence 2: we assume that the attack point will e.ectively merge the two adjacent clusters, and thus modify Y ' accordingly (without re-estimating its real value by re-running the clustering algorithm).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Assume that the function family G is not pseudorandom.
Sentence 2: there exists an algorithm T which passes the PTPT for G with an advantage at least E and within a time at most t. We construct an algorithm B which runs T as a subroutine and (E, t, j +1,j +1, 0, 0)-breaks the weak unp­privacy of RS,where j is the number of queries that T asks in the PTPT experiment.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 2 2 D L P i PQ i F P - - ( - 1)] - [ )] = m 2 i i=1 (5) where C(Qi) is the cumulative histogram (the running sum of counts from 0 to Qi), LPi is the amplitude of Pi, and F(Pi) is defined as the number of Qi which are smaller than Pi in scale value.
Sentence 2: we define C(QN+1-1) in (4) equal to the sum of all data in histogram, i.e., C(Smax).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In set covering problem, there is a set, S,and a set of n subsets of S, {S1,.. .,Sn}.
Sentence 2: there is also a parameter, k, and the question is whether or not there is a set of k of the subsets such that the union of those sets is equal to S.is every member of S covered by one of the k subsets.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, it also has weak­nesses: it is di.cult and costly to build a good RBAC in­stance, and a pure RBAC system lacks .exibility to e.­ciently adapt to changing users, objects, and security poli­cies.
Sentence 2: it is impractical to manually make (and maintain) user to role assignment and role to permission assignment for dynamic applications and/or large scale ap­plications with a large number of users or objects.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To grant a parameter­ized permission [c, .1, a1] to a role, besides the empower permis­sion over the role, one should have the admin permission over the set of objects de.ned by .1.
Sentence 2: one should have the permission [c, .2, admin] such that .1 logically implies .2, which means that every object that satis.es .1 also satis.es .2 and thus .2 describes a larger set.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Next, we argue that if the adversary opens parallel reader­adversary and adversary-tag sessions such that they do not share the exact time-critical transcripts (challenges and re­sponses), they cannot learn bits of the secret key sk * (ex­cept with negligible probability).
Sentence 2: if at least one challenge or response is changed, the veri.cation string V computed by the tag will not be correct, thus authenti­cation always fails (regardless of whether the time-critical responses are correct or not).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: By looking at a 10-year period at Kenyon College, and by thinking strategically, we can take a more informed approach to whatever the next problem is.
Sentence 2: we can look at the changes in students and their relationship to their computers and the network, LBIS perception of the relationship of student computing to the mission of the college, and the changes in the nature of the threat.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the analysis we rely on the fact that the polynomial ed-1 evaluation hash function de.ned by hX (I¯) := j=0 Ij · Xj is (d/2n)-universal meaning that the probability of any two distinct inputs colliding is at most d/2n over the random choice of X.
Sentence 2: we can think of our refresh pro­cedure as computing this hash function in an on-line man­ner, processing the inputs Ij one-by-one without knowing the total number of future samples d, and keeping only a short local state.6 the updated state after the d refreshes is S ' = S · Xd + hX (I¯).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK This work has used the concept of access controls spaces to compose policies across operating systems and tra.c de­vices within a network.
Sentence 2: the new framework formalizes an analysis of a collection of SE-Linux operating systems within a network and provides a means for com­posing multiple security policies into a global view of the network, and a potential means to verify high-level policies.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As in Lemma 5.4, B is given g and X3 and he can simulate a full version of CDRWLW .
Sentence 2: he sets u = g x,h = gy which makes a normal ciphertext (c1,c2,c3) xid+y for id satis.es the relation c2 = c1 .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: They developed a security design for IM based on the premise that not only IM requires end-to-end security but the speci.cs of the medium and its applications require special security considerations.
Sentence 2: they observe that well estab­lished end-to-end tools such as PGP (designed to protect email tra.c) fall short of providing the security function­ality required in the IM setting.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Joux s idea is very simple and original he proposed creating sequentially collisions for the consecutive compression function calls.
Sentence 2: first one finds a colliding message pair (M11, M12) for the first compression function, then (M21, M22) for the second (the input chaining value coincides with the output of the previous), and keeps repeating this procedure for all t compression function calls.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.2.2 Low Leakage HT Creation We employ IC aging technique to create a HT gate that consumes ultra low leakage power.
Sentence 2: during or after the IC manufacturing process, we intentionally stress the HT gate so that its threshold voltage can be increased and, by following Equation (1), the leakage power would decrease exponentially.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The case of 2-party protocols, especially those executed in a public-key setting (such as public-key en­cryption and digital signatures), has been more di.cult to analyze.
Sentence 2: gennaro and Trevisan [8] state as an open question whether their techniques can be extended to show e.ciency bounds for public-key encryption schemes based on trapdoor one-way permutations.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We then construct a secure ABE system for which the resulting concrete trace-and-revoke system has ciphertexts and pri­ v vate keys of size N where N is the total number of users in the system.
Sentence 2: this is the .rst example of a fully collusion resistant broadcast system with sub-linear size ci­phertexts and private keys that is secure against adaptive adversaries.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Vehicular Ad-hoc NETworks (VANETs) are self-organizing networks built up from moving vehicles that communicate with each other mainly to prevent adverse circumstances on the roads, but also to achieve a more efficient traffic management.
Sentence 2: these networks are considered an emerging research area of mobile communications because they offer a wide variety of possible applications, ranging from road safety and transport efficiency, to commercial services, passenger comfort, and infotainment delivery.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If the gap-DH and CDH problems are hard, AE = (enc, dec) is an int-0 secure AE scheme, and the signature scheme (sig, ver) used to produce card certi.cates is EUF-CMA, then the EMV protocol P = {., G } is secure in the sense of OS-EA.
Sentence 2: if there exists an adversary A against P = {., G} in the sense of os-entauth then there are adversaries B, C, D and E such that Advos-entauth eufcma .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: to generate C-mode responses: permissive(c0, buy, part(p, c, q)).
Sentence 2: c0 s request is to know whether it is permitted to buy q units worth of the p part colored c. On receiving c0 s request, the coordinator for an e-collective will request the server agents of the  8 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>: i_empowered(C, buy, part(X, Y, Z)) .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: After con.rming that x ' and y ' are of the correct length, the device searches for o.sets dx and dy such that the sums p = x + x ' + dx and q = y + y ' + dy are suitable RSA primes.
Sentence 2: p and q must be distinct primes such that gcd(p - 1, e) = 1 and gcd(q - 1, e) = 1, where e is the RSA encryption exponent.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The authors also de.ned an extension of the witness notion by including the use of views.
Sentence 2: the user can accesses only to a part of a table represented by a view; Hence, the user has clearance to view the values of T that contribute to the view (information permission) and (s)he is allowed to execute a query that physically accesses T , but only for the purpose of computing the view (physical permission).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Thus, the use of the duplex construction in our proposed hash tree allows the insertion of a new revoked certificate as new leaf of the tree by running a new iteration of the duplex construction only on the new revoked certificate.
Sentence 2: the RSU can take advantage of all the digests corresponding to the sibling nodes of the new node, which were computed in previous iterations, by simply discarding the same minimum number of the last bits of each one of those digests so that the total size of the resulting digest of all the children remains the same, n. Figure 2: Proposed Duplex Construction While the maximum number of children of an internal node has not been reached, the RSU has to store not only all the digests of the tree structure but also the state resulting from the application of Keccak hash function f in the last iteration corresponding to such internal node, in order to use it as input in a next iteration.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 2.2.1 When to Out-graft To determine the appropriate moment for process execu­tion transfer, we need to ensure it is safe to do so, i.e., the transfer will not corrupt the execution of the out-grafted process and the OS kernel.
Sentence 2: once a process is selected forout-grafting, thehypervisor .rstpauses thepro­ductionVM,whichisakin toaVMExitevent and causes the VM s virtualCPU(VCPU) statetobestoredinhypervisor­accessible memory.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: PROTOTYPE DESCRIPTION ProtectMe is implemented as an Android service, that can be invoked by third-party applications through a standard Android inter-application communication interface (AIDL [1]).
Sentence 2: protectMe: a) manages the association between a resource and its SP, that expresses the allowed access control directives and usage purposes, as well as con­ditions and obligations associated to the resource exploita­tion; b)prevents arbitrary usages of SP-protected resources, through the usage of encryption techniques as described in Sec.
Relationship: entailment