sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Hence, observing additional sessionsprovides no newinformation regarding the val­ues of Ri.
Sentence 2: a can only model the PUF by computing the modular square roots.Returning tothePPT model, such anattack cansuc­ceed with only negligibleprobability, as computing modular square rootsis atleast asdif.cult asfactoring alargeproduct ofprimesfor composite values of N [25].
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Similarly, if an insurer o.ers a contract on the left side of A along the MRS, that contract could always be improved by o.ering a contract at point A (only the safe customers will prefer the contract A and thus it would attract all the safe types, with all the unsafe types remaining at the point at the left side of A).
Sentence 2: a Nash equilibrium cannot exist in a setting where the same type of insurance is o.ered to all types of users.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A message in­dicating that the post was originally a limited share pre­sented to the user, but the extent to which the original poster desires the post to remain within the circle is not clearly indicated by the context: no agreed upon norms exist to guide the appropriateness of the .ow of infor­mation.
Sentence 2: the re-sharer may inadvertently violate the expectations of the user.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Although proof-carrying code (PCC) [29] can, in principle, allow such veri.­cation to be applied to binaries, practical dif.culties have limited its application to primarily type and memory safety properties.
Sentence 2: for the vast majority of code distributed in binary form, and the vast majority of safety policies which concern resource accesses  Producer-side Figure 1: The Model-Carrying Code Framework made by untrusted programs, static analysis-based approaches do not provide a practical solution for safe execution.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The key observation is that by the end of step 2, every bucket will be processed by at least one honest server, since the total number of rounds of mixing in steps 1 and 2 is M ' + 1 > M ' .
Sentence 2: therefore, of Proposition 2.2, the elements found in the slots of any given bucket after the end of step 2 will be completely mixed in the view of the adversary.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To remain synchronized, the time interval between two consecutive MMIOreadsby the hostCPU should match the timerequired to computechecksum blocks on the NICCPU.
Sentence 2: given the initiation time of a read of cksum [i], the time when the host CPU should start to read the value of cksum [i + 1] can be predicted.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, as there is the need to determine which are the intervals of values for similarity degree, which determine each user category (normal, suspect and abnormal).
Sentence 2: we assumed the following de.nition: Normal user: a similarity degree above 90%;  Suspect user: a similarity degree between 70% and 90%;  Abnormal user: a similarity degree below 70%.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Even assuming that this hypothesis holds, g-SIS seems pragmatically better-suited to group-centric workloads than systems such as role-based access control built with dissemination-centric uses in mind (in both ease of imple­mentation and e.ciency).
Sentence 2: in this work we evaluate the expressiveness hypothesis and other questions regarding the capabilities of dissemination-centric access control sys­tems within the context of group-centric sharing workloads.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, [31] showed that sharing of resources between instances of di.erent cus­tomers, may allow attacks on one cloud application, by an­other application running on the same physical machine.
Sentence 2: cloud providers usually take steps to hide the exact identity of the physical server running the hosted cloud services as well as the structure of their internal network (and of particular servers within it).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Thus, a copyright instance for the work class Wsim is de- W noted by RICR =(rid , ({rCR}, Wsim W )).
Sentence 2: the set of all usage-rights is de.ned as UR := P(URT )× P(W).The set of all usage-right instances is de.ned as URI := RID ×UR.a usage-right instance for the r, Wsim work class Wsim is denoted by RIU =(rid , ( W ) where W r .P(URT ) encodes the types of use granted on works in work class Wsim W .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: {U1, ..., Un},where |B.C|= t and 1= j1 <j<j2 = m, {zi " ,j}Ui " .B,1=j=j1 contains {qj (i)}Ui.B,and the set {zi " ,j}U.C,m=j=j2 con­ i " tains {pj(i)}Ui.C .
Sentence 2: for session j, the coalition B .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Cost here is de.ned as the power consumption caused by sensing as well as network transfer.
Sentence 2: given a set of predicates, we de.ne a minimal cost set as the set of predicates that are su.cient for inferring user context such that the cumulative cost of evaluating them is = C. We restructure our model as follows Least cost rule .rst(LCRF) The RETE algorithm is a pattern matching based algorithm that builds a dependency tree based on the truth values of the predicates in the rule base.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The design challenges for an e.cient credentials system are as follows:  Resource Limitations: The veri.cation of access rights to a service by devices of providers should not consume too much time and storage space since there are maybe millions of packets sent by di.erent users si­multaneously.
Sentence 2: encryption-based schemes are not practical due to the cost of cryptographic operations.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Committing results of the tested samples Samples Total FNs FPs Worm 20 0 - Trojan 19 0 - Backdoor malware 17 0 - Script Virus programs 2 0 - Rootkit 2 0 - Sum 60 0 - Security utilities 10 - 1 System utilities 9 - 1 Benign Games 5 - 0 Multi-media programs 5 - 0 Web Pages (ActiveX, Script) 21 - 0 Sum 50 - 2 malicious.
Sentence 2: we can completely remove the malware programs that intentionally distribute ASEP hooks and the auto-start executables into different clusters.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Notice that while in game G1 the values u mad u ~ are obtained using the same value r, in game G2 they are totally independent, subject to r 5~ r ~.
Sentence 2: using a standard reduction argument, any non-negligible difference in behavior between G1 and G2 can be used to construct a PPT algorithm A1 that distinguishes Diffie-Hellman tuples from totally random tuples with non negligible advantage.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Proving that an entity is granted access or that a service is trusted includes verifying the signatures of any certi.cates needed for the proof.
Sentence 2: the cost for proving is similar to the cost for ver­ cached proofs cached proofs and cached session key (2x) Figure 4: Query processing time if the People Locator service and the Calendar service cache proofs and if they cache both proofs and session keys.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Nevertheless, data might leak via System Services from the trusted to the un­trusted domain and thus isolation should be enforced here as well.
Sentence 2: as for the System Content Providers, TrustDroid tags the read-/writable data values of the System Service Providers with the color of the last app updating them, e.g., when setting the volume level (Step (1) in Figure 5).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We have also observed that in many of the past evaluations, en­vironmental variables that could potentially in.uence mouse dynamics were not properly controlled from one test sub­ject to the next.
Sentence 2: it is unclear whether the results of those evaluations actually re.ect detectable di.erences in mouse behavior among test subjects, or dif­ferences among their computing environments.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We will start with an expression for Bi standard for the literature modeling security interdependencies, as in [8, 6, 10, 7, 9, 3], and many others.
Sentence 2: to be concrete, let us borrow the speci.cation from [10], see p. 21, where breach proba­bility Bi = Bi(s1,...sn) for node i is de.ned as: Players are risk-averse: (·) > 0, (·) < 0, and W n Bi(s1,...sn) = 1 - si + si {q(1 - sj )} , (2) jj=i player i face two types of attack threats, direct and indirect.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.2 Node-based Formulation We say that a node n is Si-possible if it is on a path from a source node s to a sink node t that requires sanitizer Si, that is, P(t(s), t (t)) = Si.
Sentence 2: if n is Si-possible, then at least some of the data passing through node n requires application of Si.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Clearly, the algo­rithmic approaches aren t going to fully resolve the analysis process, due to the inability to formalize what an anomaly is; or more appropriately, which anomalies are of interest due to their likelihood of being malicious.
Sentence 2: identifying cliques and representing the cliques visually for user analysis provides a compromise between excessive analyst time and excessive computational preprocessing.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In Test C2, the average time to read the public key is ~1 ms.4 The size of the meter s public key is 64 bytes and the LoPA-encrypted value is 4 bytes.
Sentence 2: reading 16 LoPA-encrypted values would also take ~1 ms. As shown in Test C3, in creating the group keys for 50 meters, each meter receives 49 keys and the total average time required is 9100 ms.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: INTRODUCTION Recent Internet worms are very speedy and destructive, posing a major problem to the security community [2 6].
Sentence 2: permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro.t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the .rst page.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The important thing to note from the previous example is that any categories can be referred to in the generic, meta-model that we are proposing; our proposal is not restricted to particular types of cat­egories.
Sentence 2: principals may be assigned to categories according to whether they have a shared attribute, a shared measure of trust, a common security clearance, as a consequence of an assignment to the same department, division, organization, as a consequence of actions or events, ... or any combination of these forms of cate­gory types.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: They are often substantially more compact than traditional normal forms, such as conjunctive normal form (CNF) and disjunctive nor­mal form (DNF), and they can be manipulated e.ciently.
Sentence 2: they are widely used for a variety of applications in computer-aided design, including symbolic model check­ing, veri.cation of combinational logic, and veri.cation of .nite-state concurrent systems [7].
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In case there are f such bits, the attack takes 2£ time.
Sentence 2: assuming that Z is random, the expected overhead of the attack is 40 4040 223 £=0 2£ Pr(|1ZR |= f)=£=0 2£ £ 2-40 =(3/2)40 .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A public bridge is published through the bridge authority and the connection from the bridge relay into the Tor net­work (to the middle router) is shared with other Tor users.
Sentence 2: if a mobile user is also the operator of a pub­lic bridge, the bridge operator should, in theory, appear no di.erent to the other Tor clients using the bridge, when viewed from the rest of the Tor network, speci.cally at the middle router.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Now, to determine the lowest cost solution, if one exists, for each matching branch, U can simply multiply the cor­responding encryptions of the cost -since the cryptosystem is product homomorphic, multiplying the encryptions will give the encryption of the multiplication.
Sentence 2: to sim­ulate the sum homomorphic encryption, we use 2cost instead of cost in our approach.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Again, note that once this branch is identi.ed, U can ask O to list the credentials required for this branch and then give them to O.Note that though we assume semi-honest adversaries, it is interesting that in this step, our protocol is actually resilient to certain forms of cheating, since the results can be veri.ed by either party against the information it already has.
Sentence 2: o can­not cheat since U can always check that the sum of the cost of the credentials matches the lowest cost it has already de­termined.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, in other cases we .nd the dissemination-centric system unable to fully match the g-SIS system, e.g.
Sentence 2: rBAC0 and tgSI S. although we cannot count out the possibility that there is some traditional system with the same capabilities as a given g-SIS system, this is not a claim we can con.rm based on our investigation of several commonly-used traditional systems and several natural g-SIS parameterizations.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It is easy to see that the correct watermark willhave maximum correlation (pW)× W, while any other watermark W'= W will have a smaller correlation(pW')× W. The cost we have to pay for such an e.ective detection process is to store, together with the watermark W (length l), the vector µ(D) (also length l).
Sentence 2: the full 2l values can be considered as the new key used in the wa­termarking.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Finally, we applied a .lter to the edge groups based on our experience with IT administrators: IT administrators never want to remove every login from a particular machine without looking at the identity of the accounts logging in.
Sentence 2: we do not propose cutting edge groups where the speci.ed node is a machine, though we do allow these same edges to be cut as part of other edge groups or as individual edges.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To allow for multiple independentsessions to exist at once, we also augment the stored authentication information with a unique identi.er cor­responding to the tab that received the information, as well as the locationofthe source window in the windowhierarchy(to allowfor nested s).
Sentence 2: a user is able to log into the same site morethanonceinadifferent tab orwindowandtheauthentication information willbekept separately.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: First, from the e.ciency point of view, which is a frequent concern, we are aware that the current proposals do not deal with either the computational cost, or the communication load, in an e.cient way.
Sentence 2: for example, can the number of .elds in a twin DSA be reduced from four ({c,d} and {c d,dd})to three or less?
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: BitVisor monitors and modi.es data in the DMA transfers by .lling the shadow DMA descriptor with the addresses of bu.ers in BitVisor (shadow bu.ers) instead of the addresses of bu.ers provided by the guest OS.
Sentence 2: bitVisor mon­itors the transferred data while it o.oads most operations to the guest OS and the DMA controller.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Intuitively, if an en­tire block is entitled, then we encode it e.ciently using the reverse Merkle tree described above; if it is partially enti­tled, then we fall back on our original construction.
Sentence 2: let Nij be the minimal set of nodes in the tree which are su.cient for reconstructing all entitled blocks (i.e., every entitled block has among its parents an element of Nij), and only these blocks.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For Nmax = *, the process will always terminate at either -D or D. However, the average number of steps should be smaller when qi = 0, because of the fact highlighted in equation (10).
Sentence 2: if D and Nmax are chosen properly, a termination at D or -D is a strong indicator for qi = 0, whereas reaching Nmax without termination points that qi = 1.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Now, let s be very conservative and assume k 280 qh that qh = , thus the factor 2 we lose is of 160-bits.
Sentence 2: if we want to achieve 128-bit security we would need an elliptic curve group where the bit size of an element is 2(128 + 2 · 80) = 576-bits.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The fundamen­tal di.erence between the P2P downloading and worm tra.c is that P2P downloading tra.c normally follows a request-response model while worm tra.c is almost always un-solicited.
Sentence 2: we can di.erentiate the P2P downloading tra.c from worm propagation tra.c by checking if the current host is communicating with a host that has recently contacted the current host.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Depending on the intrusion detection algorithms, these useful data streams can include system and user activities within the mobile node, communication activities by this node, as well as communi- cation activities within the radio range and observable by this node.
Sentence 2: multiple data collection modules can coexist in one IDS agents to provide multiple audit streams for a multi-layer integrated intrusion detection method (Sec- tion 6).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: X Pl =LPl(i) ibl X i X-i x 1 n -1 =L() ()()(1 -(1 -p)i) [2] inn ibl  3.2.2 Choose-two Scheme In choose-two scheme, each password is asked randomly and a particular password can be asked more than once during x previous login sessions.
Sentence 2: a password can be seen i times, where i =0,1,.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Short-term Forecasting of Behav­ior Vectors Since behavior vectors of clients change frequently in most mes­saging networks, logs collected at different time intervals may indi­cate different behavioral patterns.
Sentence 2: the service-behavior graph, generated at .xed time intervals, may differ from the actual behavioral patterns of the network when the list of vulnerable ma­chines need to be generated.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: TherearetwoprimaryreasonsthatCmaydeclareyIktobeUNAUTHENTICATED.The.rstisthatChasyettocompleteanyinternalaccountingandconstructionofproofsofwhichpre.xeshavebeenassignedtowhichofitsownASnumbers.ThesecondisthatChasyettocompleteitsaccountingandconstructionofproofsofwhichpre.xesithasdelegatedtowhichcustomerorganizations.Inbothcases,onceanorganizationChasobtainedthedelegationforasetofpre.xes,itwilltakesometimetocompletetheaccount­ingandconstructionofproofs.WewillconsiderageneralizationoftheoptionsabovethatallowCtorestrictthesetofpossiblenexthopsbeyondthecrudeUNAUTHENTICATEDoptionaboveinor­dertoencodeintermediatestatesofknowledgeinitsauditingandcontrolprocess.
Sentence 2: itiseasytoseethathavingmorethanonenodeinavalidpar­tialdelegationpathforyIkthathas(C,yIk,U)initsdelegationpolicydoesnotincreasethetotalnumberofvalidoriginannounce­mentsforyIk(argumentomittedduetolackofspace).forsimplicity,andwithoutlossofgenerality,werequireavalidpathtohaveatmostoneUNAUTHENTICATEDdeclaration.Moreover,thatdeclarationshouldbebythelastorsecondtolastorganizationinthepath.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Pass 1: It is easy to check that with probability 1-o(1) (using union bounds and the binomial distribution to bound the number of keys from group 1 that land in every other group) there are up to c log N groups for which X1,1,j = 2 and 0 groups for which X1,1,j = 3.
Sentence 2: there are N1/3 - O(log N) groups for which N-1/3 P1,j = and O(log N) groups for which P1,j = 2N-1/3 .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It can be seen that M satis.es obs-COR: the only H transition that can affect L observations is that from s0, but if this is added or deleted from a run, there exists an­other run with the same subsequent sequence of actions ending in the same .nal observation for L. However, the possible views may differ, depending on whether h occurred: note that purgeL(hee)= ee = purgeL(ee), but poss(viewL | Act = ee)= {0e1e2, 0e2e1}whereas poss(viewL | Act = hee)= {0e1e1, 0e2e2}.
Sentence 2: this machine does not satisfy COR.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Observe then that for binary instances and binary neighbors with the same weight the following hold: two neighboring sequences on universe [k] give rise to two neighboring sequences on universe U; therefore, an algorithm that is E-pan-private with respect to the transformed input is also E-pan-private with respect to the original input;  the number of k-heavy hitters in St ' is equal to the dis­tinct counts for St, as each item with nonzero state in St maps to an item with state WF1/k in St' , and F1 ' = WF1;  since each item in St ' is either a k-heavy hitter or has state 0, HH(k)= HH(k ' ) for any k ' = F1' .
Sentence 2: an algorithm that is e-pan private and vv outputs HH(k) .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For ex­ample, research in linguistics shows that power laws de.n­ing the frequency of word occurrences in random English text arise from the minimization of human-communication cost [33, 55].
Sentence 2: one would naturally expect that power­laws in link-occurrence distributions are caused by the cost minimization criteria for route selection and network de­sign in the Internet; i.e., both intra-and inter-domain in­terconnections and routing.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Hence, using HOC threshold, such as BMAC, after the threshold has adapted to the ambient energy of the jammer, the carrier sensing time will be small even when a jammer is blasting on the 200 channel.
Sentence 2: in the rest of this section, we only focus on MAC protocols that employ a .xed threshold, such 150 as the MAC in TinyOS 1.1.1.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We now need to compute P (path1|path2)to complete the formula.
Sentence 2: p (path1|path2)is the probability that rsc propagates along path1,once it is already known that rsc propagates along path2.it is the probability that rsc propagates along 3Here and in the following .gures, for simplicity we omitt the relationship type informationa associated with an arc.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Moreover, the adversary may intentionally disrupt the wireless communica­tion using various methods.
Sentence 2: techniques without fault tolerant features, or those that use error correction codes in traditional ways (e.g., Keystone [34]) cannot fully address this problem, especially in large, dynamic wireless networks (e.g., military networks con­sisting of mobile devices carried by soldiers, automatic weapons, sensing devices, etc.).
Relationship: reasoning