sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Ei QE2 roleinVr.Inourexample,onlyDS0wouldbeableto makePE1lessthanQE1.
Sentence 2: e2 Thesesolutionshaveasimilarapproahandouldbeim­ plementedbyimposingupperlimitsontheauthorityof eahadministrativerole.wedefneadministra­ .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Only that device can decrypt the rights object and thereore the media object, creating an implicit constraint equivalent to a pair of audioOutputPrincipal and videoOutputPrincipal constraints in MPEG-21.
Sentence 2: mPEG-21 audioOutputPrincipal and videoOut­putPrincipal constraints (if they are speci.ed as keyHolders) can be implemented by encrypting the exported rights ob­ject using the public key speci.ed in the constraints.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When messages pass from a corporate network (cluster) to another, they must be translated (de­crypted and re-encrypted) since di.erent TEKs are used in each cluster.
Sentence 2: upon receiving messages from par­ent cluster (encrypted using the parent s TEK), the DKD, which is the entry point of the cluster, will decrypt them and re-encrypt them using the TEK within its cluster be­fore forwarding them downward to its area members.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The number of subnets will be more when Node-B is the point of multicast termination while it will be the least when GGSN is the point of multicast termination given the same number of members.
Sentence 2: even if the current set of 3G devices are not modified for multicast capability, it is definitely desirable to have the multicast termination point in 3G networks to be at Node-B.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Therefore, given an internal stream S and the corresponding graph G, the protection object like repre­sentation of S can be de.ned in terms of the boxes contained into G. More precisely, given a graph G, not containing an Union box, de.ned over a set S in of input streams we can de.ne the stream S resulting from graph G, as the Cartesian product of streams in S in, where all attributes speci.ed in the Map boxes of the graph G are projected, and all predicates speci.ed in the Filter, Join and Resample boxes are applied.
Sentence 2: a possible approach to convert a graph G into a protection object like representation Objs is to traverse the whole graph by collecting into the Objs.ATTs component all attributes speci.ed in the encountered Map boxes, in the Objs.EXPs component the predicates speci.ed in the encoun­tered Filter, Join and Resample boxes, and by inserting into the Objs.STRs component all the input streams.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Browser integration enables BPMs to easily save users login information includ­ing usernames and passwords into a database, and later au­tomatically .ll the login forms on behalf of users.
Sentence 2: users do not need to remember a large number of strong passwords; meanwhile, BPMs will only .ll the passwords on the login forms of the corresponding websites and thus can potentially protect against phishing attacks.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Figure 4: Invoke Native Library Directly 4.1 Exploit JNI Naming Convention The way how native library functions are bound to native Java methods, either through the JNI naming convention or through registration, ensures that a native library function is only bound to a particular Java API, i.e., that API is the only path leading to the native library function.
Sentence 2: if the bytecode rewriting puts a secure wrapper on that Java API, all the invocation of the corresponding native library function has to go through the wrapper, hence going through the intended access control.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: WeneedsomesimplepropertiesaboutVoronoiells,as listedbelow.Allpropertiesareeasilyverifedandtheir proofsarelefttothereader.
Sentence 2: 1Thisproblemisnotusedasasoureofomputationalhard­ness,butasanalgorithmitooltoonstrutthehashfun­tionandarryouttheproof.wedefnethisprob­leminitsexatsearhversion.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Consequently, it will not only impact Dglobal , but kernel as Dheap also impact Dheap is often dereferenced from Dglobal kernel kernel kernel .
Sentence 2: if there is any address space randomization (e.g., [4, 49]) or data structure layout randomization [33] for Dglobal , our current kernel EX T ER IOR cannot support this.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Figures 2 and 3 show the optimal attack intensity and ex­pected pro.t as we vary the ratio m .As the ratio m increases, nn the bad nodes can a.ord to increase their attack intensity and yet tweak the opinion matrix in a way that makes it harder for the judgment system to distinguish the bad nodes from the good nodes.
Sentence 2: the overall expected pro.t as shown in Figure 3 increases dramatically with the ratio m ; n not only the absolute number of bad nodes increases with the ratio, but also each bad node uses a higher attack intensity in order to maximize its expected pro.t.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Assume the attack path is X to V, where X is the attack source and V is the victim.
Sentence 2: we assume that the attack path contains k intermediate routers, R1 to Rk, where the index stands for the distance to V. Figure 5: An Ad Hoc Network with Uniform Distri­bution (d = 6) First, we observe that there are i×d nodes that are i hops away from V. the probability that a node which is at least i hops away from V chooses Ri in its route to V is 1 .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the PUE attack, .rst coined in [3], an attacker pretends to be a primary user or incumbent by transmitting a signal with similar characteristics to a primary signal or replying a real one, thus preventing secondary users from using a vacant band.
Sentence 2: there is a need for providing e.ective methods in order to distinguish between legitimate primary transmissions and fake ones (PUE attacks).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The traditional ways of defence are becoming less and less e.ective, since the attackers methods and tools are chang­ing.
Sentence 2: new technologies to detect attacks against Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro.t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the .rst page.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: i(m)= LW (m)J Since an XSweb term effectively encodes two Sweb terms, the evaluation of a XSweb term can be projected into two Sweb evaluations.Anevaluation stepofabracket statement(s1 |s2) is an evaluation step of either s1 or s2, and s1 or s2 can only access the corresponding projection of the web state.
Sentence 2: the con.guration of XSweb has an index i .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Due to the cut-and-choose, P2 is forced to query the RO to compute most of the PRF seeds used in the protocol, oth­ * erwise it will be caught whp by P1 .
Sentence 2: if P2 passes case bi = 0 and thus gci is a circuit that will be checked, all the checks, whp the simulator will extract the relevant information.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Moreover, event T2 depends on (V, Xo, [t*]2) according to the same functional dependence of event Ta upon (V, Xo, [t*]3).
Sentence 2: to prove the Lemma, it suffices to show that (V, Xo, [t*]2) and (V, Xo, [t*]3) have the same distribution.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 7.1 Leaf Networks and Router Stamping Itmaybeadvantageousforroutersofleafnetworksto stampoutgoingpacketswithaprobabilityof1ratherthanp.
Sentence 2: thisincreasesthechancethatapacketcontainsthestamp ofthatrouter,butdoesnotafectlaterstamps.we permitfasterandmorepreciseidentifcationofthesource ofanattackbyreducingthenumberofpacketsneededto identifytheleafnetwork.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 6.2 Access request evaluation In general, an access request can be modeled as a triple (u, p, URI), which means that a user u requests to execute the privilege p on the resource located at URI.To evalu­ate this request the framework has to verify whether there exists an access control authorization granting p on URI to requester r. However, since the proposed system also sup­ports .ltering policies, the presence of such an authorization does not necessarily imply that r is authorized to access URI because there could be a prohibition denying access to the resource to the user.
Sentence 2: to evaluate whether an access request has to be granted or denied, it is necessary to per­form two queries to the SAKB.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Thus,evenwith100 instances of M8 mimimorphic malware, there are still comparable amount of bad signatures mixed with the good signatures of the malware.
Sentence 2: even given a large number of identi.ed in­stances, M8 mimimorphic malware can still maintain enough bad .ngerprints to render the control .ow .ngerprints unusable.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: e. However, suppose e ' =..,where .is logical contradiction.
Sentence 2: then e ' contains no information and yet it implies e. Similarly, if p.e ' =..,then e ' contains no information with respect to p. we de.ne p as follows: ' ' '' Let (s, r, a, e) p (s, r, a, e ) i. ''
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: More over, since source (ek) has multiple edges coming from it, by assumption that the data.ow graph has no nodes with both multiple successors and multiple predecessors, node source (ek) has a single predecessor, edge ek-1, and so ek-1 is also on the path from s ' to ek.
Sentence 2: edge ek-1 must be source dependent: since ei can reach t ' , and ei is sink inde­ ' '' pendent, it means that either P(t(s), t (t )) = P(t(s ), t (t )) or P(t (s), t (t)) = P(t(s ' ), t (t)).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: On the other hand, the error of non­compromised nodes, even when it is large, comes from a large number of independent factors, and thus must roughly have a Gaussian distribution.
Sentence 2: instead of looking just at the Root Mean Square (RMS) magnitude of errors of each sensor, we look at the statistical distribution of such er­rors, assessing the likelihood whether they came from a nor­mally distributed random variable.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: IS THEORY FOUNDATIONS Due to the fact that ISM processes are heavily influenced by random factors, the theoretical classical systems methods are in fact unsuitable for solving the problems of creation, implementation and operation of IPSs.
Sentence 2: there is an urgent task of expanding the classical theory techniques through the use of methods allowing adequate modelling of the processes depending essentially on the impact of the factors difficult to predict.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The VMM uses this metadata to verify its integrity, as the cloaked shim will have access to the address space of the cloaked application.
Sentence 2: to bootstrap a secure protection domain for the application, the shim must be trusted; i.e., not malicious to the application.Thecallto createanew contextalsotakesa pointer to a portion of thread-local storage in which the VMM can setup a new CTC.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: bits, £ sij 0 if y = y2i j=1 1j which is the bound of leakage information of BHHO.
Sentence 2: zi = £ sij 1 if y = y2i S can obtain the value f(td) returned from its 1jj=1 I Aleakage oracle and then correctly deal with s leakage I Finally, output the message Rz = z1z2 · · · zn.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This is similar to the grouping of one s friends in social networks, except that the groups in collaboration systems are more dynamic: collaboration groups may evolve quickly over time along with the changes of collaborative projects and the various roles each collaborator plays.
Sentence 2: rather than deriving static groups from one s contacts, as existing work does in social networks [5], we design a time­sensitive probabilistic approach to model the dynamic grouping of contacts in collaboration systems.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The user must either (a) directly be assigned Right (by Repo Admin), or, (b) there must exist a valid mnemonic (as spec­i.ed by the VCS Admin) to which User is assigned (by the Repo Owner), and that mnemonic must have in its effective set of rights, Right.
Sentence 2: the .rst set of processes that the compiler runs comprises assembling the following from the con.guration rules.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The actual trace of a system is the union of all users ac­ tual traces and is denoted by R, i.e., R = u Ru.Notice Preserving Mechanism Observed  Reconstruction that .u, v .U we have Ru nRv = Ø.
Sentence 2: the equiv­alence relation ~ partitions the trace R into subsets, each representing the actual trace of one user.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In general, a frequent connection to the PKI to renew pseu­donyms cannot be guaranteed because large-scale coverage by road-side units (RSU) or cellular communication in every vehicle is considered unrealistic during early years of V2X deployment.
Sentence 2: the OBU has to store a potentially large set of pseudonyms to allow frequent change of pseudonyms in absence of backend connectivity.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since Bro is not multithreaded, if it determines that a packet should be dropped to block an attack, the drop directive will oc­cur prior to Bro beginning to process the next packet.
Sentence 2: at the point where Bro s internal engine requests a new packet, if the analysis of the current packet did not explicitly indicate it should be dropped, we know we can safely go ahead and forward it.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: is applied m times with q a divisor of m. A column of R q is used once in tdb, whereas in ttdb, it is used q times.
Sentence 2: there are only m distinct columns in R.A q column(r1,i,r2,i,··· ,rn,i)T of R is obtainedusingthe(n,k) 1 0 threshold scheme. '
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The fundamental di.erence between their modeling and ours is that they formulate an access control policy as a set of ground terms over an alphabet for (subject, object, action) terms, whereas we model policies as non-deterministic transformers (relations) over a collection of subjects, objects, action terms.
Sentence 2: [5] takes a set-based approach in.uenced by logic programming whereas we take a state transformation based approach.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: But no gadget can set EAX into the mem­ory.
Sentence 2: to store the return value (EAX) of system call to memory, we use the gadgets xchg eax, edi; cmp ah, dh; jmp [esi-77h] to exchange the return value to edi and the store gadget mov [ebx-2],edi;jmp [esi-77h] to save edi to memory.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: , (1 - ß)j xk, Wj ) is at most 2(1 - ß)2j .2 log Wj .
Sentence 2: the total variance s2 of F p(j, c) is  8 2 2 1 1 2j s = .log (j + 1)(1 - ß) c 1 - ß j=0 3 11 11 = .2 log = Olog cß2(2 - ß)2 1 - ß cß2 1 - ß Using Lemma 2 as in Theorem 3 we can show that for any j, with probability at least 1 - ., | ' Fp(j, c) - F (j)| = 1 1 )1.5 11 O(( log log0.5 1 ) if log = log 1 cß2 1-ß .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A iii knows the values xi'(1in where the partial private bb) Qi ) of bb) unknown to him.
Sentence 2: keys D s(1bb nA(1in are ii iAI cannot compute the valid individual signatures (,) rQ,( r hD tP) () xfor (1bb) without RV in ii ii i ii 0 knowing the partial private keys D sQ(1bb in) and the final ii nn multisignature (, ) RV .and SR as well, where .R, V ii i 1i 1 Thus, the generation of the forged multisignature SeVQÖ(, ).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Therefore, it is not possible to use the ide­alized discrete-time model from (8), but rather the full input compensation has to be done as in (6) and (7), before the state-estimator is executed.
Sentence 2: a bound on GPS error is determined from manufacturer speci.cations, worst-case sampling jitter and synchronization error, and is experimentally validated to be dk,1 = 0.4 m/s.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As long as one of them works, the source node can estab­lish an indirect key with the destination node through this bridge.
Sentence 2: the probability that none of these bridges works can be estimated as (1 -pdk)m. the probability that at least one bridge works, which is equivalent to the probability of having an indirect key be­tween two neighbor nodes in different deployment groups, can be estimated as 1 -(1 -pdk)m .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Compared with the basic DSD-DSSS scheme, in which the jam­mer can introduce 2ls seed candidates (e.g., 264 seed candidates using the same parameters in Figure 10), the content-based code subset selection scheme has signi.cantly reduced the impact of the DoS attacks against seed disclosure.
Sentence 2: it provides effective de­fense against such DoS attacks.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The zero .ag would become dirty after the fourth instruction and its data .ow graph would become msg[0] + 0x10=0x31.
Sentence 2: the .lter condition would be updated to msg[0] + 0x10=0x31 Figure 6: Data.ow graph for the zero .ag when the instruction jne out is executed by the program in Figure 4. after the .fth instruction because the jump is not taken.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: From the zero-knowledge learned by W condition, we know that an adversary acting as a warden W ' in an interaction with a legitimate prover P will gain no knowledge other than that P knows the secret k. (This will hold whether or not the adversary also acts as V ' during that interaction, as long as P is honest.)
Sentence 2: engag­ing in the protocol with legitimate provers will not allow an adversary to learn any information about the secret.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note that since our adversaries in this work always ask $ poly(n) < 2o(n) queries to O, at the time P. D is sampled, (except with negl(n) probability) no query with pre.x P is asked to O and therefore we can safely assume that both ora­cles sh(·) and ch(·) are completely random even conditioned on the poly(n) preprocessing queries asked by the adversary.
Sentence 2: to prove Lemma A.2 we just need to prove that random oracles can be directly used to get sequential and collision-resistant hash functions.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: By comparing C(hSadmindP ing ) and P (hSadmindBOF ), it is clear that VulnerableSadmind (152.1.19.5) (among others) in P (hSadmindBOF ) is also in C(hSadmindP ing ).
Sentence 2: hSadmindP ing prepares for, and is correlated with hSadmindBOF .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, the forces Fl and Fr, which can be considered as inputs to the model, are derived from the vehicle s electromo­tors and are a.ected by the motors, gearbox and wheels.
Sentence 2: we have also derived a 6-state linear model of this low-level electromechanical system based on the model from [12], which is then used to derive a local state (i.e., velocity) feedback controller that provides the desired Fl, Fr levels.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Because there is not a .rst class protocol that has better performance than the ones in the second class, there is not a protocol without false negative and with performance better than the others.
Sentence 2: assuming that the network administrator can not tolerate false negative detection, she has to adopt a protocol of the .rst class; otherwise, she can use a protocol of the second class, depending on the number of false negative the network can bear (discussed later).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We can see that the second term in CompB (Eq.
Sentence 2: (5)) is increasing in h, due to the non-sublinear behavior of the BITREP complexity, while the fourth term is decreasing in h. when N is high, the fourth term (the homomorphicallyperformed encrypted op­erations) is the dominating one, what justi.es that the value of h that produces the minimum complexity is the maxi­mum number of hyperplanes that can be packed without increasing s; on the other hand, communication complex­ity and the computation complexity for the client are still dominated by the BITREP complexity, so their increase after packing is almost negligible.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: (2) A signed piece of data that can be veri.ed by a third party using the user s private key to proof legitimate possession of the publickey.
Sentence 2: we have 2048 bits (user s public key) + 2048 bits (signature of CA) + 5000 bits (ad­ditional parameters) + 2048 bits (proof signature) = 11144 bit in total.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: First, we propose a classi.ed system call monitoring scheme that can separate system calls based on their origins (e.g., the library that initiates the system call).
Sentence 2: we can dynam­ically identify system calls originated from high-risk com­ponents such as third-party native libraries (i.e., native li­braries that are not included in the Android system libraries but are downloaded with applications from the app market).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note that computation of the extrinsic LLRs is the same as the general routine for BI­STCM­ID with a non­orthogonal space­time block code [4].
Sentence 2: 1k12k2 16­QAM symbols X2t, , X2t+1,k, X2t, , and X2t+1,k have to be demapped jointly.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this case it is due to the fact that when a data packet is received it is always stored in unencrypted form (line 2 in Figure 6), even if the encryption tog­gle switch is on.
Sentence 2: although the packet is forwarded to the low-security domain in encrypted form on the .rst occasion (line 4), this particular path shows that the packet may be retrans­mitted without encryption (line 5), if a negative acknowledgement is received and the encryption switch has subsequently been turned to the off position.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This reduc­tion, in order to store hierarchical accesses in a .at roleset, expands the set of roles to include a role named for every path through the hierarchy in the downward direction.
Sentence 2: if RBAC1 s hierarchy says A = B, B = C, and A = D, then this is represented in RBAC0 with roles {A, B, C, D, AB, ABC, AD, BC }.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Accordingto our knowl­edge, none of the existing work considers the owner s, re­questor s, and resource s context together for making context­based access control decisions in PCE.
Sentence 2: the proposed model extends the support for de.ningaccesspoliciescompletelybasedoncontext informa­tion, o.ering 7 (seven) types of context-based access control policies.
Relationship: reasoning