sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Notethatadelegationofauthorityoveranattribute isrepresentedbyatype­2redential;type­2redentials playanimportantroleinthetrustmanagementap­proah,wheretheyarequiteommon.Addingdelega­tionswithinredentialsintroduesthefollowingprob­lems.
Sentence 2: distributeddisoveryofredentials:possessionof anattributeA.maybeproventhroughahain ofredentials.Inadeentralizedenvironment, redentialsareissuedandstoredinadistributed manner.negotiatorsmustontend withtheproblemofdisoveringandolletingre­dentialsforthepurposeofprovinghavinganat­tribute.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The PCR registers are reliably populated by boot-up measurements by the CRTM, and these PCR values cannot be re-populated to any known values after boot.
Sentence 2: a TPM2_PolicyPCR command that maps the values of these PCRs into the policy session will identify whether the device was booted into a software state recognizable as part of the policy, or into some other state.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Also, let r1 be the value such that e12 := g r1 and let m := za za e11y -r1 .
Sentence 2: e2 = e12g = g r1z+a and e1 = e11(m/m1)z y za -r1z+a = m y -r1z(m/m1)z y.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Proof : Since gcd(a, b) = 1, then by the extended Euclidean algorithm, there exists some integers u, v such that av+bu = 1.
Sentence 2: one has the following: av+bu av av u y = y =(y )(x )u =(y x )a mod N. Hence, the value y := y v x u is a a-th root of y.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Any re-allocation of resources between the security-sensitive application and the commodity OS would have to be handled by the hypervisor.
Sentence 2: for the cost of the encryp­tion and decryption overhead, Overshadow permits the commodity OS kernel to handle resource sharing between the security-sensitive application and the rest of the commodity OS instead of relying on the hypervisor.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Moreover, by construction, f sends more than .h(t2 - t1)+ ßh in the new sequence X 'IXtt1 2, whose time span is t2 - t1 + ..
Sentence 2: l can detect f in the new sequence because .h(t2 - t1) + ßh = .h' (t2 - t1 + .)
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: After a weak learner is added, the data is re-weighted: examples that are misclassi.ed gain weight and examples that are classi.ed correctly lose weight (some boosting algorithms actually decrease the weight of repeatedly misclassi.ed examples, e.g., boost by ma­jority).
Sentence 2: future weak learners focus more on the examples that previous weak learners misclassi.ed.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: (Data veri.cation) CoD can be decisive factors in the stock value assessment.
Sentence 2: if the con.dence level of a CoD item is less than a speci.c level, c, the item must be veri.ed by a prede.ned veri.cation procedure, verifyCoD(this), before it is referenced by SA.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Evaluating Security Controls Based on Key Performance Indicators and Stakeholder Mission F. T. Sheldon, R. K. Abercrombie Oak Ridge National Laboratory 1 Bethel Valley Road, PO Box 2008 Oak Ridge, TN 37831-6418, USA +1 865-576-1339, +1 865-241-6537 sheldtonft@ornl.gov, abercrombier@ornl.gov Abstract Good security metrics are required to make good decisions about how to design security counter­measures, to choose between alternative security architectures, and to improve security during operations.
Sentence 2: in essence, measurement can be viewed as a decision aid.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Therefore, the total number of free slots in all the nodes excluding i increases by e. After iteration t - 1, it holds that degG (i)= e. Since i was selected for removal by iteration t, it is the case that e< 0.1degGT (i), i.e, degGT (i) > 10e.
Sentence 2: after iter­ation t - 1, the number of free slots in node i is degGT (i) - degG (i) > 9e.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Usu­ally, even for experienced users it is not self-evident which actions are justi.able and which are not.
Sentence 2: the system should give him or her the information required to decide what exactly he or she is not permitted to do, why he or she is not permitted to do so, and what the possible consequences (risks) of overriding the access control are.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The semantic security of [ · ] prevents Bob from 2 2 determining that x¯A + ¯yA, -2 ¯xA and -2 ¯yA are not dis­tributed properly.
Sentence 2: no PPT algorithm can distin­ 2 2 guish [x¯A + ¯yA], [-2 ¯xA] and [-2 ¯yA] from the encryption of properly distributed values.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since in our previous analysis for the PRNG, the amount of information provided to the side-channel adver­sary is hidden in the leakage function abstraction, the PRNG with initialization process just has to consider more (but still limited) information leakages.
Sentence 2: if su.cient noise is present in the measurements, a su.cient security level can be reached, as in the previous sections.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To be well prepared for future attacks, increasing number of researchers have begun to study advanced botnet designs that could be developed by botmasters in the near future; however, they need a relatively closed and controllable environment designed by researchers to quantitatively evaluate the capabilities of these next-generation botnets.
Sentence 2: we propose the Hybrid Botnet Ecological Environment (HBEE), which aims to make bots expose as many of their execution paths as possible, in order to mine the C&#38;C protocol vulnerabilities of bots as well as to evaluate the capability of advanced botnets.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The lazy synchronization scheme is highly effective because it exploits the fact that there are limited occurrences of active sharing in application programs: if a page is not accessed during the activation of the particular SP3 domain, it will not generate any page-fault.
Sentence 2: the images of a page frame are synchronized only when necessary, thereby reducing the runtime overhead of re­encryption for synchronization.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While unscheduled approvability may require more users per role, it avoids delaying a task because the selected user is unavailable at the time the action is to be performed.
Sentence 2: as long as some user is available which does not violate past constraints, unscheduled approvability does not delay the task, and hence the urgency with which the task can be completed is not a.ected.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For such VOs, Mesh can be con.gured to require two-factor authentication to obtain a Mesh key and to limit key lifetime to the extent desired.
Sentence 2: while it is still not possi­ble for the user to be present during unattended operations, it can be guaranteed that all Mesh keys used for such operations are di­rectly bound to a successful two-factor authentication within some con.gurable time into the past.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, we observe that the NISC protocol of [1]requires (O(tn+t2)exponentiations, where t is the statistical parameter for the cut-and-choose protocol and n is the size of the input of one of the parties.
Sentence 2: when plugged into NISC, our one-sided simulat­able OT construction does not add a signi.cant overhead.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The computation cost of the user (E4) and the service provider server (E5) is the time spent by the user and the service provider server during the process of authentication.
Sentence 2: the computation cost of the user (E4) is 3TE + 3TH and that of the service provider server (E5) is 2TE + 3TH.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 2.2 Group-based Key Establishment While some node deployment scenarios allow for manual or automated placement of nodes, or for key nodes to have known .xed positions [24], we believe that certain critical applications, such as battle.eld deployments, do not provide such means.
Sentence 2: it is desirable to have a solution which provides secure key establishment without requiring speci.c location knowledge for each node.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This function is used during session negotiation as well as during normal data transfer.
Sentence 2: nIDSs that monitor the SSL protocol in order to de­tect SSL-related attacks can be evaded if they correctly ad­here to the speci.cation instead of mimicking the behavior client-hello C -> S: challenge,cipher_specs server-hello S -> C: connection-id,server_certificate, cipher_specs client-null C -> S: client-null C -> S: client-null C -> S: client-master-key C -> S: {master_key}server_public_key client-null C -> S: client-null C -> S: client-finish C -> S: {connection-id}client_write_key server-verify S -> C: {challenge}server_write_key server-finish S -> C: {new_session_id}server_write_key Figure 2: SSLv2 session negotiation NULL record evasion.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: a (c)willbetter MS re.ect the behavior of an optimal attacker in this case.
Sentence 2: 4.1.2 Expected Estimation Error For most applications of order-preserving functions (e.g., geographic locations or account balances), information is disclosed not only by the exact decryption of a given cipher­text c, but also if it is possible to estimate a plaintext lying in a narrow interval around the actual plaintext producing c. we are interested in the expected estimation error of a maximum-likelihood attacker, estimating the plaintext mapped to a given ciphertext c by choosing uniformly at random one element from the set mlpS(c): mlpS (c)=arg max Pr(f(p)= c) p.D For the ideal object , it is known, that this estimator has y maximum error of O(|D|) with probability arbitrarily close to one [4].
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The public part of this key is used Candidates Approach Instances 1 10 50 SSH 130,580 2,149 8,869 11,762 Services 203,563 7,017 30,345 63,512 Web 125,554 5,548 31,651 54,918 Table 5: Discovered Instances to verify the authenticity of the server.
Sentence 2: this key is disclosed to the clients.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: [1,k], i=1 U Ui satis.es fi and thus satis.es ( n fi).
Sentence 2: u satis.es U i=1 (( n fi)).Since U also satis.es (m {ui}), U satis.es k U i=1 i=1 ((( n fi))n(m {ui})).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Although the rewriting is performed inside the browser, implementing our approach requires understanding only the browser s AST data struc­ture, and none of the complexity of the JavaScript run­time.
Sentence 2: in addition to supporting an extremely .exi­ble .ow policy speci.cation language, our approach is sim­ple to implement and can readily be incorporated inside other browsers.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Ryuya Uda Tokyo Univ ersity of Technology, School of Computer Science 1404-1 Katakuramachi, Hachioji City, Tokyo 192-0982, Japan +81-42-637-2111 uda@cs.teu.ac.jp Most of SPAM e-mails are needless to read.
Sentence 2: filtering by a function on e-mail software is popularly used.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, the temperature (T ) impacts leakage power exponentially, which means that the leakage power would have a large variation when the temperature varies due to IC activities or environmental fac­tors.
Sentence 2: unless one is in very controlled settings, the manifestational properties are not appropriate for the pur­pose of IC identi.cation and, therefore, we consider using physical level properties as the IDs for the chips.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The challenging complexity and variety of public agencies, their intensive use of information and information technology (IT), and their need to effectively protect information assets, motivated us to study the activity of ISS management in the realm of Public Administration, focusing our attention on Local Government, given its proximity to citizens.
Sentence 2: the aim of this study is to identify and prioritize the key issues that Local Government chief information officers (CIOs) face, or believe they will face in 5 to 10 years, in the domain of ISS management.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Because caller side inlining needs to .nd the target of a method call statically, it is harder to ensure complete me­diation.
Sentence 2: we impose some restrictions on the pro­grams that are monitored: in the current prototype we dis­allow for instance the use of delegates when these delegates cross the boundary of the untrusted application, and the use of re.ection.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 5.1 Analysis Since each sensor node has two polynomial shares and each bi­variate polynomial is shared by about m different sensor nodes, each sensor node can establish a pairwise key with 2(m- 1) other sensor nodes directly.
Sentence 2: among all the other sensors, the per­centage of nodes that a node can establish a pairwise key directly is 2(m-1) 2(m-1) 2 = .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As users trust the sys­tem services more than applications, RiskMon should dif­ferentiate Binder transactions initiated by applications and system services.
Sentence 2: internal properties are represented with the following features:  Type of Binder transaction: 1,003 boolean fea­tures as a bit array, where one bit is set to 1 for the corresponding transaction type and others are 0; and  Direction of control .ow: another boolean fea­ture: 0 for transactions initiated from applications (API calls), 1 for transactions initiated from system services (API callbacks).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: There are how­ever signi.cant di.erences between the approaches in that FlowCheck is a security testing tool based on the Valgrind dynamic instrumentation framework whereas our approach is based on veri.cation and static analysis techniques.
Sentence 2: our work comes with stronger theoretical guarantees (for ex­ample veri.cation of the o.cial patches) and does not re­quire to run the code.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: {pk(s)/y}| a((M, sign(M, sk(s))))| a(x).if check(fst(x), snd(x),y)= ok then b(fst(x)) Here the value M is signed using the secret key sk(s).
Sentence 2: al­though M and its signature travel on the public channel a, no other process can produce N and its signature for some other N. again, we may reason that only the in­tended term M will be forwarded on channel b.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: {1..n} : coveremts(k)= i}| = i · n i=1 n X |{j .
Sentence 2: u : covermssc(j)= i}| = i · n i=1 X 1 = covermssc(j) n j.U orderemts minimizes E(min{i : rti(sr )= pr }| pr .T (sr )) P if and only if ordermssc minimizes j.U covermssc(j).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In other words, the di.erence between the acceptance probabilities p0 on en­cryptions of 0 and the acceptance probability p1 on encryp­tions of 1 is non-negligible.
Sentence 2: if pu is the acceptance probability on random words w, itmustbethe case that ei­ther |pu -p0|or |pu -p1|is non-negligible.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 1.BothY1andY2areavailable Inthisase,theseretkanbeorretlyreonstruted andthethreeembeddedwatermarksanbegener­atedperfetly.Allthethreeorrelationvaluesshould behigh,whileÆ0ishigherthanÆ1andÆ2,sinein Eq.(20)thewholewatermarksontributetotheor­relationvalue,whileinEq.(21)andEq.
Sentence 2: (22)only onehalfofthewatermarkontributetotheorrela­tionvalue.Æ=Æ0.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, we have found that if the attacker has some prior knowledge, such as the attribute domains (maximum and min­imum values), the attribute distributions, and even a few pairs of plaintext and ciphertext, these encryption methods will be vulner­able to attacks.
Sentence 2: although they can allow the service provider to build indices on encrypted data and perform ef.cient query processing, they can only be applied to very restricted ap­plications.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: "1" in one BFindex depends on hash function and the position may sometimes the same though the word is different because of collision by the hash function.
Sentence 2: in this system, "1" is calculated times of the number of 3/4 of whole bits in order to let "1" appear times of the number of 1/2 of whole bits with considering the collision by hash function.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Up to the point of this hash query, how­ever, the environments of F provided by A in the .rst and the second run are identical, because A uses thesamein­puts, random tape and values h1,...,hJ-1 to generate F s inputs, random tape and oracle responses.
Sentence 2: the two executions of F are identical up to this point, and in particular the arguments of both hash queries must be the same, implying that R = R1 , L = L1 , n = n 1 , Xi = Xi 1 and mi = m 1 i for 1 = i = n. Moreover, the entries for X1,...,Xn in T2 are assigned at the latest when parsing the arguments of this hash query, causing the values of T2[Xi]to be the same in both runs as well.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If a VM A ran concurrently with VM B at time t, VM A was terminated at time t + 1, and VM C is started at time t+ 2, then there is a possible transitive leak of A s data to C via B.
Sentence 2: it is important to consider the overlap relation between VMs, where VMs A and B are said to overlap if they run concurrently at any time.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The root hash is guaranteed to be always fresh, and leaf hashes are veri.ed Figure 3: A Merkle tree example for a disk with 8 blocks by the S-P chip pair to be consistent with the root hash and sent to the clients in the response messages, which are authenticated using HMACs.
Sentence 2: a client can detect any data corruption or forking attack by verifying the received data against the received leaf hash.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: safeE ((UA, PA, RH )) ] In Figure 1, the constraint set C4 enforces E under PA and RH ; however, C4 is incompatible with RH , as it means no user can be authorized for r4.
Sentence 2: c4 does not implement E. De.nition 9 (Implementable SSoD con.gurations).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We de.ne r(a, b) to be the rank of b in the sorted list of Sim(a, ·); thus, r(a, b) = 1 if and only if b is the most likely author (other than a) to have produced the text of a.
Sentence 2: r(a, ·) is a permutation of {c =.a|c .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To prevent unauthorized processes from discern­ing the number of EFOs or their relative sizes, the lookup table and the EFOs are enveloped within a .le (i.e., the con­tainer) that resides on the standard .lesystem.
Sentence 2: to ensure integrity and authenticity, each EFO contains an HMAC 1our current LAC implementation can­not protect statically compiled executables.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Recall that now we are talking about G1 and G2 being subgroups of points on elliptic curves de.ned over the .nite .eld Fq and an extension .eld Fqk , respectively.
Sentence 2: the addition in G1 and G2 corresponds to the multiplication (M) of elements in G1 and G2 within the group-signature schemes outlined in Section 3.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Further- eNj_j =UjCj" more, since z = p + me, the inequality z < 2 k holds with probability at least 1 - 2tA/2 ~.
Sentence 2: a honest prover P successfully completes t iterations of the protocol with prob- ability (1 - 2t-kA) t ~ 1 - 2t-kAt.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 2) Otherwise (i) the instruction 0x104 disables the .ag Z, (ii) the instruction 0x108 has no e.ect, (iii) thus the memory referenced by the pointer is updated three times, always with the value zero.
Sentence 2: an attacker capable of observing the rele­vant memory state will in one case see the referenced mem­ory location .icker, and in another case not.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, security is still necessary be­cause almost all parties are not willing to leak any informa­tion to untrusted cloud servers.
Sentence 2: we are moti­vated to design a protocol to enable both KGC and group members to securely, veri.ably, and e.ciently outsource the relevant computation of group key transfer scheme to cloud servers.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Different from certificate path in one domain, the certificate path will contain the bridge node and the path will cross the different domains.
Sentence 2: actually, the crossing certificate path can be viewed as two pieces of the certificate path which are located in different domains; codeword­encoding approach can be applied into the certificate path discovery in the same domain and the discovery activity of the two paths can be done in parallel.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In a static network, the probability that a probe is hit is the probability that a local scan is hit plus the proba­bility that a non-local scan is hit.
Sentence 2: the probability anf (1 - a)nf ps =1 - ß · - (1 - ß) · m/s m - m/s In the MTD network, since eIP addresses are randomly chosen from address space the probability that a probe is missed is pm =1 - n/m.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: More formally, let pi represent the time-series of a physiological signal i.
Sentence 2: let Gi be the generative model of the signal i. Gi takes as input the time-domain features, fi, (e.g, heart rate variability for ECG or PPG) and morphological features mi, (e.g., parameters of equations in Section 4.2) and a time t as input to generate the phys­iological signal value at time t. the function Gi( fi,mi,t) rep­resents the synthesized signal at time t. The generative model is pre-loaded at the cloud and is parameterized with the user s phys­iological time-domain and morphological features.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Digging deep into the call chain of the findClass method, which is used to perform class loading, we found that eventually defineClass native method in DexFile is invoked, and its corresponding native library function does the actual class loading task.
Sentence 2: if API-level access control using bytecode rewriting is applied to prevent load­ing of Android classes, restriction on BaseDexClassLoader.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Unfortu­nately, this is insu.cient for DSoD since even if a user is highly trusted, she may not be able to perform a given ac­tion because she has performed some other con.icting action earlier: In this sense, DSoD actions consume users since, as a consequence of performing an action a user is unable to perform future actions to which she would otherwise be per­mitted.
Sentence 2: an organization s approval sequence for DSoD depends on both organizational size and structure.
Relationship: reasoning