sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, these pre-computed and stored values are much vulnerable to leakage, in view of the various side-channel attacks (see, e.g., [41, 12]) discovered in recent years.
Sentence 2: the powerful cold-boot attack [41] allows an attacker to reveal information about memory contents, particulary the values that are pre-computed and stored in memory, in the absence of computation and even after the device is powered down [57]!
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This is the point of view with which we developed ULISSE (Unsupervised Learning IDS with 2Stage Engine) [27], a network-based anomaly detection IDS with a novel two-tier architecture which analyzes network packets overcoming the dimensionality problems which arise in the application of unsupervised learning techniques to network-based anomaly detection.
Sentence 2: we use the two-tier architecture to avoid discarding the network packet contents: the .rst tier is an unsupervised clustering algorithm which reduces the net­work packets payload to a tractable size.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Consider any session-key reveal query made by A against a session run by the uncorrupted player B with  z a peer player Z .
Sentence 2: b, B, = ,Y Denoted by ( Z, Z g = gy ,X = g x) the corresponding session tag, where the DH-exponent y is generated by (and thus known to) C on behalf of B, but the player Z may be a corrupted one and thus the secret key z or the DH-exponent x is in general unknown to C. the values (Y, y, Zcy ) are (o.ine) generated by C on behalf of B , and can be exposed to A upon its state-reveal query against this session.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Many of the traditional security parameters may be applied to registry security.
Sentence 2: the registry contents must be authentic verifiably placed in the registry by a known source (typically the registry owner or maintainer),  authoritative verifiably submitted to the registry by an authorized originator of the data (typically the organization providing the Web service),  unmodified verifiably identical at the time of retrieval to what was originally placed in the registry,  current warranted (typically by the registry owner or maintainer) to be the most up-to-date information supplied by the service providers.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.2 Relation to Previous De.nitions We say a group key exchange protocol is UC-secure if it securely realizes the (multi-session extension of ) ideal func­tionality FG KE .
Sentence 2: for any adversary A there exists an ideal adversary S such that no ppt environment Z can determine whether it is interacting with A and players running the protocol in the real world, or whether it is in­teracting with S and dummy players communicating with (the multi-session extension of ) ideal functionality FG KE in the ideal world.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Brent Waters SRI International Menlo Park, CA bwaters@csl.sri.com get together and build a pirate decoder D. Then there is a tracing algorithm Trace that takes the public key PK as input and interacts with Das a black-box oracle.
Sentence 2: the algo­rithm outputs the identity of at least one of the users who created D.Ø TraceD (PK) .T.Note, however, = that there is no way to revoke the traitor broadcasts can always be decrypted by all users.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, as the basic (H)MQV is role-independent, for two sessions between the same pair of players A and B but with the opposite order of DH-component exchange (which may be made by a cross-message attack [25]),4 player A (resp., B) thinks it is interacting with a responder B (resp., A), while the session-key outputs in these two ses­sions are the same.
Sentence 2: two sessions (between the same pair of players) output the same session-key but with role confusion between each other.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Finally a set of constraints {c1,...,ct}is vio­lated if at least one ci is violated.
Sentence 2: we can determine whether there exists a plan that violates a set of constraints by determining if there exists a plan a that satis.es a constraint expression in disjunctive normal form, where each clause is a conjunction of Type 1 constraints.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The RHA4 model can be used to control changes to the UA relation and the role hierarchy.
Sentence 2: the user-role assignment (u, r) can be added to UA (by administrative role a) provided r .s(a);  the user-role assignment (u, r) can be deleted from UA provided r .s(a);  an edge (r, r ' ) can be added to the role hierarchy pro­vided r, r ' .s(a);  an edge (r, r ' ) can be deleted from the role hierarchy provided r, r ' .s(a);  a role r can be added to R with parents P .R and children C provided C, P .s(a);  a role r can be deleted from R provided r .s(a).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This paper is concerned with illegal information .ows through the .xed-priority scheduling subsystem.
Sentence 2: we investigate how malicious code (e.g., a virus or a Tro­jan Horse executing inside a virtual machine) can exploit the scheduling subsystem to illegally transfer information and how this information leakage can be prevented by mod­ifying a budget-enforcing .xed-priority scheduler to treat potentially-leaking blocked threads as if they were ready.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This knowledge can be possibly used to perform more effective attacks.
Sentence 2: 3The .nal form of the security-enhanced transformed query is rep­resented with the matrices Tis that are described in Section 5.2. when the original data have independent columns and no more than one column having Gaussian distribution, an attack called Indepen­dent Component Analysis (ICA) [23] can be applied to effectively recover the original data from the perturbed data.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: By default, all streams created by a client within a 10 minute period are carried over the same circuit.6 Tor uses a di.erent schedul­ing mechanism to share bandwidth between streams than it does between circuits, providing an opportunity for new attacks that correlate streams.
Sentence 2: we will show that packet scheduling of streams that use the same circuit creates special characteristics that can easily be recognized bya completelypassive attacker; this canbe used tolink the streams as belonging to the same user and thus compromise some of the unlinkability protections provided by Tor.7 4.1 StreamThroughputatDifferentTimeScales ConsiderthescenarioinFigure9: Aliceiscommunicating simultaneously with Eve1 and Eve2.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To ef.ciently resolve the protection granularity gap, in HookSafe we relocate kernel hooks from their original (widely-scattered) locations to a page-aligned centralized location and then use a thin hook indirec­tion layer to regulate accesses to them with hardware-based page­level protection.
Sentence 2: we create a shadow copy of the kernel hooks in a centralized location.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.3 Whole-System Malware Analysis When the malware executes, SEMU monitors and logs key events in both user-and kernel-mode.
Sentence 2: unlike the user-only tracing common in current tools such as TEMU, Anubis, CWsandbox, and Ether, SEMU monitors and logs control .ow in the kernel whenever the processor switches to the kernel to serve a malware s request.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Clearly, this also reduces the possibility of .nding a suitable path in the dominance graph, thereby increasing the number of false negatives.
Sentence 2: one obvious choice of l can be derived from the secu­rity lattice L. note that L is .nite, hence the Hasse diagram7 of L contains a path of maximal length lmax .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: At the same time, isolation is achieved by putting the monitor code along with its private data in a separate  Figure 1: (a) In-VM and (b) Out-of-VM monitoring hypervisor protected guest address space that can only be entered and exited through specially constructed protected gates.
Sentence 2: our system is designed in such a way that normal operation of the monitor can continue without hypervisor intervention, but any attempts to breach the security of SIM is trapped and prevented by the hypervisor.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When we dampen the processing power using cpulimit to 10%, we observe that the speed falls commensurately, i.e., to about 10%.
Sentence 2: this still means that we are able to make one access decision is less than 1 ms. even if we were to support up to 100 sessions on a low-capability device such as a WiFi network access point, we would be able to processes thousands of access requests per second.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Incoming tra.c is both logged in a trace database, and fed to the unmodi.ed ap­plication/OS running on our emulator 1In the emulator we employ dynamic taint analysis to detect when a vulner­ability is exploited to alter an application s control .ow 2 This is achieved by identifying illegal uses of possibly unsafe data such as the data received from the network [31].
Sentence 2: there are three steps to accomplish this: tag data originating from an unsafe source as tainted;  track tainted data during execution  identify and prevent unsafe usage of tainted data;  data originating from the network is marked as tainted, whenever it is copied to memory or registers, the new location is tainted also, and whenever it is used, say, as a jump target, we raise an alarm.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We show that we can keep only one LFSR (e.g., L(1)), discard the , L(f+1) rest (e.g., L(2) , · · · ) and represent the outputs of the discarded LFSRs using the internal states of the remaining one (e.g., L(1)).
Sentence 2: the actual implementation of an s-gate will be more or less like Fig 4.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: That is, we do not im­plement the usage restrictions at the level of Java API or operating systems calls but rather assume that this is done by the trusted ap­plications (this assumptions can clearly be justi.ed in the running example of this paper).
Sentence 2: the enforcement compo­nent restricts usages by providing a key to trusted applications, in addition to implementing required actions [13] (e.g., deleting a data object).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As long as the positions are not perturbed 444  (a) Phase Shifting (b) Shifting Directions (c) An Example (d) Tag Detection Regions Figure 4: The QPSK Tagging Scheme too much, the data carried by the signals can still be cor­rectly retrieved.
Sentence 2: qPSK can tolerate noise to certain degree.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.2 Source indistinguishability: de.nition and requirements The described key exchange protocol requires the source indistinguishability property.
Sentence 2: if two par­ties, A and B, run the previously described key exchange protocol, an eavesdropper should not be able to distin­guish the packets sent by A from the packets sent by B.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Informally speaking, computing F(v) requires a hint ; the amount of hint that is available is inversely correlated with the amount of work that s expended when generating F(v).
Sentence 2: users in R are unable to recover a hint from the header, and so it is infeasible for such users to recover SK, while users in D recover partial hints from the header and thus are able to recover SK with some work, and users in P recover a complete hint (i.e.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We posit the following individuals: Joe is a user, and WSM is an intermediary web service providingservice to users, part of a system that includes access toa centralized medical database web service WSM DB {to be continued...}  4.2 Roles As in many other systems, roles are an important com­ponent of our authorization scheme.
Sentence 2: due tothe inherently volatile and popular nature of the web, webservices cannot in general be expected to know the names ofevery possible invoker a priori ; thus, authorization for priv­ileges will be granted to known roles, and individuals mustprove that they may assume claimed roles.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Now suppose we are given another identi.cation problem in a second register, quantum state ßY for a random bit Y , and suppose b = De(ß0,ß1) is the largest value for which we can obtain a (b, e)-predictor for Y .We now want to de­termine the optimal probability with which we can identify (again with error at most e or something related) both states simultaneously.
Sentence 2: what is the maximal probability p = De(a0 .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It maxi­ from the authorized k-trust level mizes the likelihood the client reaches a .nal state ones Table 3: Access control strategies As part of our future work we would like to integrate our approach with an exception-based mechanism tailored to support access control enforcement.
Sentence 2: in a step-by-step approach, whenever a client cannot complete a conversation because of the lack of authorization, some alter­native actions and operations are taken by the Web service.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: More speci.cally, we chose Adobe Acrobat Reader 9.00 and those 4,869 samples forwhichILCexecutionwasdetectedinthatviewerinthe 1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0 Code Ratio Figure 2: Code Ratio Distribution Number of Partitions Number of Partitions .rst experiment.
Sentence 2: we performed the following steps to measure the quality of the extracted ILC: we analyzed 4,869 PDF samples in Acrobat Reader 9.00 with enabled MVD,  all consecutive memory pages were concatenated to code regions, resulting in either one or two versions each:  one initial region, if only one dump version of each contained memory page exists, and additionally one .nal region, if more than one dump version exists for at least one contained page the code ratio of each region was determined by using IDA Pro,and  all valid strings from each region were extracted and counted.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 7http://www.kindi.com/swf-encryption.php  The focus of the experiment then shifts towards motivating human-6.3.1 Study Design, Goals and Process solvers to perform at their best by employing meaningful interfaces and by framing the underlying task in a way that is amenable to these solvers.
Sentence 2: since attacker s goal is to minimize the delay incurred by the human solver in responding to the challenges, we model human-solver attack as a reaction time [20] task described be­low.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Let G(h)= H and G(low)= L. Consider program cast[while h> 0 do h := h - low]; outputL(1) This program is accepted by the type system, because the termina­tion level of the cast is L, and so the pc level of the output command is also L, and thus the output command type checks.
Sentence 2: the termina­tion of the while loop here depends on the values of low and h. when low > 0, the while loop will terminate regardless of the value of h; when low = 0, termination depends on h. At runtime, according to S-CAST, the termination oracle needs to ex­amine variable low, and execution continues only when low > 0.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: the number of pixels in a game scene, M is the number of sample frames, and M « N ) since the foreground object masks are read­ily available as part of the output from the previous phase.
Sentence 2: the most time consuming part, which is the extraction of fore­ground objects (O(MN2)) from sample frames, has been covered in the previous phase.6 1 2 3 4 MBRfinal 5 6 7 8 Figure 4: Eight sub-areas generated according to moving area of foreground objects The Edge-based method employs a different design principle than MBR-based method.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: uk/explanation/, last access: 21 October 2009 SecureWindowControlCompliantSection = Section AND not(section connectedBy SectionConnector some StandardWindow) Read: any OWL individual that is asserted to concept Section and is not connected to any OWL individual that is asserted to concept StandardWindow by relation sec­tion connectedBy SectionConnector will be classi.ed as se­cure section regarding the secure window control.
Sentence 2: the reasoner checks if only safety windows are used in the server room (section) where the customer data is lo­cated: (1) our solution checks how much potential control implementations exist (e.g.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The Generalized-TRBAC (GTRBAC) model [12] incorporates a set of language constructs for the specification of various temporal constraints on roles, including constraints on their activations as well as on their enabling times, user-role assignment and role-permission assignment.
Sentence 2: gTRBAC makes a clear distinction between role enabling and role activation.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 8.1 Retroactive Privacy Adv has non-negligible advantage over 1/2 in the retroac­tive privacy game (see Section 3) only if it can infer infor­mation about a from interaction with Snd, Rcv and Rt after the message Ma has expired.
Sentence 2: adv can only inter­act with protocol participants after content packets used to encode Ma have been removed from Rt s PIT and from all caches.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.1 Role-Based Access Control We shall now review some concepts of the ANSI/INCITS RBAC standard [1] required for the present analysis.
Sentence 2: we are interested in the following ones:  PERMS, the set of all possible access permissions;  USERS, the set of all system users;  ROLES, the set of all roles;  UA .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since only packed objects can leak to the heap, the restriction that packed objects must be in a policy-adherent state is a potential limitation of the type system.
Sentence 2: it might often be desirable to leak an object that is not yet in a policy-adherent state to the heap, but later retrieve it and restore it to a policy-adherent state before the program terminates.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This work was partly funded by the Co-operative Research Cen­tre for Smart Internet Technology, Australia.
Sentence 2: the au­thor would like to thank Hartono Kurnio, Qiong Liu, Adam Muhlbauer, Rei Safavi-Naini, Farzad Salim and Sid Stamm for their contribu­tion to projects surrounding the SITDRM software.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Firstly, most people are sensitive to sound from some hundreds Hz to some thousands Hz, and people can only feel little when the sound is lower than 200 or higher than 15 kHz, con­sidering the limited volume of the phone.
Sentence 2: you can hear almost nothing if your cell-phone is playing a clip of music with null spectrum between 200 and 15k Hz.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Hypervisor-based Prevention of Persistent Rootkits YOSUKE CHUBACHI TAKAHIRO SHINAGAWA KAZUHIKO KATO University of Tsukuba University of Tsukuba University of Tsukuba 1-1-1 Tenno-dai,Tsukuba 1-1-1 Tenno-dai,Tsukuba 1-1-1 Tenno-dai,Tsukuba ,Ibaraki ,Japan ,Ibaraki ,Japan ,Ibaraki ,Japan bachi@osss.cs.tsukuba.ac.jp shina@osss.cs.tsukuba.ac.jp kato@osss.cs.tsukuba.ac.jp ABSTRACT Rootkits are prevalent in today s Internet.
Sentence 2: persistent rootkits pose a serious security threat because they reside in storage and survive system reboots.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Therefore, we can directly compare the values of these static function pointers guided by the system.map in the physical memory of SVM which is trusted, with the memory from GVM, to identify which kernel function pointer has been contaminated, and then recover it from the trusted value which is present in our SVM.
Sentence 2: if the value of a function pointer does not match in PM and G-PM, and if this function pointer is not pointed to kernel modules (usually in kernel heap) in our trusted kernel, then our MAK E UP tool will recover this contaminated function pointer.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 2.2 Situation-aware Trust The new concept of trust in VNETs introduces entity and data attributes, social and proactive factors to handle various situations and their changes.
Sentence 2: our so­lutions focus on three main aspects: (i) policy control, (ii) proactive trust establishment, and (iii) social network im­pacts on establishing trust.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Theorem 1: The modi.ed GSP satis.es the following properties: 1) It s not pro.table for a bidder to move up more than one position.
Sentence 2: when she submits a true value, if her position is the k-th highest rank, then moving k- 2 (or higher) by overbidding is not pro.table.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: From the attacker s point of view, this attack is particularly appealing since it can be carried out in a stealthy manner; by injecting a stream of packets with small deviations from normal volt­age, the attacks may remain undetected by the system until it results in a catastrophic result (i.e., a blackout), similar to the way Stuxnet [6] was carried out.
Sentence 2: given the actual voltage v, the attacker con­structs a series of packet that indicates a voltage value of kv + b,where k and b are constant multiplicative and ad­ditive factors determined by the attacker.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Although both had a URL containing the attacking machine s IP and port number, the padding after the URL differed.
Sentence 2: lSASS-0 identi.ers had taken the following form http://:/x.exexdfxdf ... xdfMozilla/4.0 and the 0xdf characters padded the identi­.er s length to a .xed value over all exploits (37 bytes).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The questions this security evaluation attempts to an­swer are 1) what could cause an observation attack (on the evaluated system)tobe successful,and2)whatistheextent of the damage to which a successful observation attack can lead.
Sentence 2: we want to .nd out if we can recover some of our participants authentication tokens (image port­folios or PINs).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This, in turn, limits the depth of the circuits we can handle.
Sentence 2: the noise grows by a multiplicative poly(n) factor on each recoding, which means that after O(d) O(d) depth d, it becomes n .Since n <q/4 < 2n ' ,wecan handle circuits of depth O (n E) (here, the .rst inequality is for correctness and the second for security).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Notably, the accuracy for users in the low­est con.dence class, even though low in absolute terms, was more than double the accuracy of the Facebook baseline (0.25 to 0.52).
Sentence 2: although greatest absolute accuracy is achieved for users with a high con.dence factor, on average even users with a low con.dence factor bene.t from our predictions.
Relationship: entailment