sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Without any constraints the num­ber of answer sets increases by 24 (for this problem, because the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 Figure 4: Behavioural rules maximum number of variables in any right hand side of a rule is happens to be 4) with each increment in the trace length, so a trace of length n has 24(n-1) answer sets.
Sentence 2: as noted earlier, not all sequences of events make sense and so we de.ne several constraints to discard the corresponding answer sets (or rather, to ensure they are not constructed in the .rst place).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Combined with the policy speci.ed in table 5, we can see that both prj1leader and prj1leader can only assign {Alice, Charlie, Dan} to their projects.
Sentence 2: according to the policy in table 4, both roles are authorized User involved training clearance skills -prj -passed Alice Ø true TS {C++, Java} Bob {prj3} false TS {C++, C, Java} Charlie {prj3} true TS { C } Dan Ø true TS {C++, Java} Eve {prj1} true UC {C++, Java} Fred {prj2} true UC {C, Java} to assign all users to their projects.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: On average, 81% of the OSN images with illumination and 79% of the OSN images with low lighting cannot be used to log in the face authentication systems in low security level while 96% of the OSN images with illumination and 94% of the OSN images with low lighting cannot be used to log in the systems in high security level.
Sentence 2: a face authentication system in low security level has higher tolerance for varied login environments, which is necessary for the system to be usable in the complex environments.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The results also indicate that some .nder pattern algorithms require a white space around the marker, and some do not.
Sentence 2: figure 8: Data Matrix (bottom right, rotated) in QR In a second test, the embedded Data Matrix code was positioned in the center of the QR code: .rst without a white border (Figure 9), and then with a white border (Figure 10).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Assuming that some distinguisher D can successfully dis­tinguish D0 from Dm with probability non-negligibly better than guessing, it must be the case that D can distinguish at least one pair of neighboring hybrids Di and Di+1 with non­negligible probability.
Sentence 2: since the di.erence between two neighboring hybrids is simply one transcript of the one­round protocol, this amounts to D being able to distinguish between either two one-round protocol transcripts of accept­ing executions, or two one-round protocol transcripts of re­jecting executions.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Although the number of each account s actions is bounded by wL, without SynchroTrap the total malicious actions remain unlimited if attackers can control an extremely large number of malicious accounts.
Sentence 2: synchroTrap limits the total number of abusive ac­tions on a constraint object (e.g., an IP address), irrespective of the number of malicious accounts an attacker controls.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If a suf.­ciently subtle attacker with suf.ciently many compromised hosts at his disposal can mimic legitimate traf.c well enough that the victim cannot tell good from bad, there is little that can be done beyond load-shedding, adding server resources, and minimizing collateral damage.
Sentence 2: our ultimate goal is that this is the only way to persistently DoS-attack a server, and that routers and client systems are invulnerable to DoS attacks.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Thus, the establishment of an in-group indirect key involves an in­termediate node, a direct key for the link between the source node and the intermediate node, and a direct key for the link between 0 0 50 100 150 200 Number of compromised nodes for the random pairwise keys scheme to establish an indirect key (not to mention the indirect key that involves only one intermediate node) between two neighbor nodes.
Sentence 2: according to the analysis in Section 3.2.3, we know that the probability of having an indirect key between two neighbor nodes is almost 1 for the group-based RK scheme even if there are severe memory con­straints on sensor nodes.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: ATTACKS AND LIMITATIONS As stated earlier, the approach we take relies on the se­curity properties of the hypervisor to properly isolate our monitoring code from tampering by malicious entities resid­ing in the guest OS s. This assumption is not unique to our solution,and todate,therehasbeennoconcretedemonstra­tion that suggests otherwise.
Sentence 2: if the security of the hypervisor is undermined, so too is the integrityand correct­ness of the transactions we record.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this case, the number of trials required is decreased from the av­erage of 215 that wouldbe needed using the methods of[5, mask probability  2-2 0000 0001 0000 0001 2-3 0000 0011 0000 0001 2-3 0000 0001 0000 0011 2-4 0000 0111 0000 0001 2-4 0000 0011 0000 0011 2-4 0000 0001 0000 0111 2-5 0000 0001 0000 1111 .. .. .. 2-16 1111 1111 1111 1111 Table 1: Table of masks and probabilities for d = 0xFF00 18] to an average of only 6.75.
Sentence 2: assum­ing nothing about the TTL .eld except that it is uniformly distributed, then a simple calculation using a variant of this approach shows that the expected number of trials needed to set the TTL .eld to 0x00 and correct the checksum is only 382.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The rightmost (CT) peaks give the round-trip for the constant­time implementation of OpenSSL 1.0.1e, which substantially re­duces the vulnerability the curves are almost identical.
Sentence 2: they still differ measurably, as row 5 of Table 3 shows the two can still be distinguished with Vmax = 62% probability, while to be completely secure, we should only be able to guess with 50% probability.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A variation on this idea is to take an unconditional jump to an address .and convert it to an indirect jump through a jump table where the address .appears as the kth table entry.
Sentence 2: the table is indexed by the value of an opaque expression that always evalu­ates to k. the bounds check for the table uses a table size m .k, leading the disassembler to believe that the jump table contains m entries.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Hence,Figure11showsboththe averageexecution timeoverheadand fractionofL2 cache spaceoc­cupied by data across MACsizes, ranging from 32 bits to 256 bits.
Sentence 2: the.gureshowsthatastheMACsize increases,theexecutiontime overheadforMT increases almostexponentiallyfrom3.9%(32-bit) to 53.2% (256-bit).forBMT,theoverhead remainslow, ranging from 1.4% (32-bit)to 2.4% (256-bit).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Of course, some personal identification methods with properties of touch panels are implemented and used on smart phones such as a single stroke method.
Sentence 2: many users lock their smart phones with a simple ordinary four-digit password which can be easily broken Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Anti-Virus (AV) companies commonly rely on signatures, such as strings and regular expressions, to determine malware fam­ilies, but it is well known that signature-based methods are error­prone and can be easily evaded by intelligent malware programs.
Sentence 2: manually reverse-engineering every malware variant to .gure out its lineage requires advanced skills and is often a time-consuming, sometimes even tedious, process.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: =SupposeforallzE(x,y)andforallwE(x,y)we havezwif,andonlyif,z'y.Wenowprovethat tivesopetomodelthisbehaviour.
Sentence 2: dEFINITION3.1.Theadministrativesopeofaroleris defnedasfollows: A(r)={sER:sr,tstr.tr}(7) Forexample,inFigure1a,ENG1EA(PL1)beause tENG1={ENG1,PE1,QE1,PL1,DIR}andtPL1={PL1,DIR}; henetENG1tPL1={ENG1,PE1,QE1}tPL1.Itaneas­ilybeseenthatA(PL1)={PL1,PE1,QE1,ENG1}.ENG1EA(PE1),forexample,beauseQE1EtENG1and QE1EtPE1.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In these cases, as the behavior of the illegitimate users becomes more similar to the legitimate user behavior, the detection rate in the .rst time window starts to decrease to 87% and 45% respectively compared to the random at­tacker case.
Sentence 2: it increases signi.cantly as more time windows are processed to identify the legitimate user with detection rates over 90% starting with time window 2 in the informed attacker case and time window 6 in the compro­mised device case.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Pr (x|si = vj,p) (3) Using Bayesian inversion, the attacker can then transform these probabilities into a vector of aposteriori probabilities Pr (si = vj |x, p).
Sentence 2: in contrast to standard template attacks, it is not simply possible to choose the most value for each state byte and combine them, since not all full state vectors correspond to valid encryptions.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Doubling the adversary s bandwidth roughly halves the time to .rst compromise, with the result that at 200MiB/s the adversary fully compromises a user within 30 days with probability 50%.
Sentence 2: an adversary that is limited to 10MiB/s ( still more than a typical consumer-grade connection) has a less than 10% chance to compromise a user at all.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If u is assigned to l by some slainit rule s2 (in s1 = s2)in.then u remains assigned to l when the body of s1 becomes false (unless this assignment has been terminated).
Sentence 2: an slaterm rule de.nes the explicit termination of the assignment of an agent u to a status level l and if the body of any one slaterm rule, that de.nes the termination of u from l,is true in .
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our goal offaithfully repli­cating the client execution on the server can be accomplished by running an instance of the actual full-.edged browser loaded with the application code on the server, one per user, as proposed by Deep.sh [35].
Sentence 2: for a popular and complex application, this approach is dif.cult to scale because the browser is a highly memory-and CPU-intensive piece of software.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: assume that x 2 = 1 and that |x1||x2| ... |xN |.
Sentence 2: applying De.nition 4, we know that w t x[t+1..N]2 e. i=1 |xi|2 1, 11 therefore |xt| v and thus x[t+1..N] 8v .
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The above procedure can be repeated until we reach a point x r (r = n - d, i.e., in at most n - d steps) in which n constraints are activated and where f(x r) = f(x 0).
Sentence 2: since in x r exactly n constraints used to specify Q are active we have that x r is a vertex of the polyhedron [4], and therefore there exist an optimal point of the maximization problem that is a vertex of the polyhedron Q.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: WARM-UP: HONEST VERIFIER ZERO-KNOWLEDGE It is trivial to construct zero-knowledge proofs when the prover is semi-honest.
Sentence 2: it is in some cases inter­esting to consider a relaxation of zero-knowledge in which the veri.er is semi-honest i.e., where the veri.er follows the protocol correctly but then tries to extract additional infor­mation about the prover s witness from the transcript of the protocol.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This example illustrates that labels are a powerful mech­anism for enabling application programmers to enforce information-.ow policies.
Sentence 2: the example also illus­trates that there is a signi.cant gap between the high-level policies of programmers, e.g., that no Worker should be able to send information to another Worker, and the manipu­lations of labels required to implement such a policy.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In[11,12], the di.erence of movement paths between human players and bots in a .rst-person shooter (FPS) game is revealed and then used for the development of trajectory-based de­tection methods.
Sentence 2: it is unlikely that this type of detection method can achieve similar speed and accuracy in MMOGs, because maps used in MMOGs are much larger than thoseinFPSgames and avatar trajectories inMMOGs are far more complicated.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Because it seems risky to allow the delegate to perform operations without constraint, even if the delegate is named in the resulting principal, we follow the Taos delegation model [33] and require that all delegations be explicitly enabled by the delegator.
Sentence 2: the presence of the delegate name in the resulting principal reduces the risk to the point that we antic­ipate clients routinely and safely enabling delegation in a large class of scenarios where the service is both trusted to handle dele­gated access checks correctly, and a potential candidate for trans­parent mediation.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The .rst approach is to simulate the ICA attack in suf.cient rounds to .nd a statistically resilient A matrix as the previous work does [9].
Sentence 2: a more attack-resilient approach is using the composition encryption scheme (CES) that consists of two steps: transforming the original data with an order preserving encryption scheme Eo .rst; then followed by the basic RASP encryption, which can be represented as follows.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The standard explicitly allows processes without appropriate priv­ileges to set the e.ective user ID to any one of the current real, e.ective, or saved user IDs.
Sentence 2: the EPERM condi­tion speci.es that an attempt by processes without appropri­ate privileges to set the e.ective user ID to any value other than the real or saved user ID is an error.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Over the last years, denial-of-service attacks on wireless local area, ad-hoc and sensor networks have widely been analyzed [2,13,14,20], and various countermeasures for their detection and prevention have been proposed [8, 9, 20, 27, 29].
Sentence 2: all these countermeasures rely on secrets that were pre-established between sender and receiver(s), or are very speci.c regarding the attacker s capabilities and the considered scenarios.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This is because misbehaving UEs do not start gen­erating attack tra.c until a suitable state transition occurs, which happens only after the UE sends or receives normal tra.c.
Sentence 2: the e.ect of the end of the storm is imme­diate, and queueing times very quickly drop to normal levels as the RNC serves the queued signalling messages.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The attestation to­ken therefore consists of all information that is necessary to validate the freshness of the attestation response: t = {Na0, time0}-1 , Cert(AIK) (7) K TTP {hv s (Na0), v, PCR,g mod p} -1 K AIK The attestation token introduced here has similarities to the one introduced in [14].
Sentence 2: the main di.erence is that a veri.er can validate the platform con.guration without requiring the prover to perform expensive TPM operations.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Binary analysis showed that tElock uses an undocumented opcode, F1, which causes interrupt vector 1 to be issued by the processor on normal hardware.
Sentence 2: inQEMU, thisinstructionhad the ef­fect of freezing the entire guest OS, rendering the guest un­usable even when tElock is executed from guest userspace.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The empirical probabilities of the bot pressing a key every 1 or 5.5 seconds are signi.cantly higher than their neighbor intervals, which provides us some in­sightsinto theinternals of thebot: it usesperiodic timers to poll the status of the avatar(i.e., current coordinate), and issue keyboard commands accordingly (e.g., bypass possi­ble obstaclesby turningleft/right andjumping).
Sentence 2: for human players, their keystroke intervals follow a Pareto distribution, which matches the conclusions of previous re­search [53].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: On the other hand, 8 is the fourth most frequent number in Company A s password constitutions, because the pronunciation Table 2 Character frequency distributions of English plain texts, western passwords, Pinyin texts, and Chinese Passwords Latter A BCDE FGHI J KLMN OPQRSTUVW XYZ Western_PWD 9.34 3.11 3.79 3.69 9.52 1.71 2.75 3.05 6.23 1.16 2.38 5.07 3.66 6.04 6.84 2.75 0.37 6.90 6.41 5.25 2.99 1.22 1.65 0.89 2.38 0.85 China_PWD 9.73 2.38 3.21 2.81 5.24 2.13 4.76 4.95 8.05 2.94 1.61 4.73 2.59 8.00 4.65 1.48 2.47 1.94 3.93 2.43 3.98 0.98 3.87 3.24 4.63 3.25 is similar to making fortune.
Sentence 2: 8 is the much less frequently used number in Burnett and Kleiman s data for western users passwords [2].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Addition­ally P2 sends the keys for the input wires corresponding to its own input y and a NIZK proof to prove that the garbled circuit is correct and the keys sent in the OT are consistent with the circuit and P2 s input.
Sentence 2: this solution is very ine.cient as it requires non-black-box use of the un­derlying primitives.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Implementing tamperproof interfaces into the drive appear contrary to the marketplace desires for inexpensive, high­performance storage.
Sentence 2: building additional security into the drive enclosure in a similar manner to the IBM 4758 secure co-processor [12] is a design point that is only feasible to achieve if the cost-bene.t ratio for a speci.c application dictates it to be appropriate.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Traditionally, malicious code targets system utilities, pop­ular network services or components of the operating system.
Sentence 2: in a continuous e.ort to become more persistent and avoid detection, the target of the infection has shifted from software components towards more low-level elements, such as bootloaders, virtual-machine hypervisors, computer BIOS, and recently even the hardware itself.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 6.3 Effects of Sibling Information Our results indicate that using sibling categories statistically significantly improves the F1-measure by up to 14.61% on the 20NG dataset and by 10.33% on the ODP46 dataset for the short queries.
Sentence 2: our results indicate that using sibling categories does not improve F1-measure for the long queries.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It is clear from the current use of Orbot, that the Tor network can be successfully accessed from mobile devices.
Sentence 2: the results from our study provide an early indi­cation of the e.ectiveness of operating Tor within a truly mobile context, and of the signi.cance of the performance impact, introduced by roaming, on a mobile Tor user and/or the wider Tor network.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, suppose that a peer A receives t claims against another peer B.When employing the direct identity validation method proposed in [17] against Sybil attacks, A should .rst challenge all the t witnesses who generated the claims to perform some task that can only be completed by t real-world users before as­serting that B is malicious or sel.sh.
Sentence 2: in SDT, the identities of the witnesses are unknown due to the require­ment of witness anonymity.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, prior research shows that the users do not pay too much attention to the permission list when installing apps, and the developers tend to declare more permissions than needed [25].
Sentence 2: the traf.c usage data generated by some applications (e.g banking applications) is exceptionally sensi­tive, at a degree that the app developer might not want to divulge them even to the legitimate data monitoring apps.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The ISO/IEC 15118 standard is ascribed that incorporates X.509 PKI solution for V2G network.
Sentence 2: as traditional X.509 based PKI for V2G network has several shortcomings, we have proposed an effectual PKI for a V2G network that is built on based on elliptic curve cryptography and self-certified public key technique having implicit certificate to reduce certificate size and certificate verification time.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A larger overlap will result faster execution but coarser boundaries .. WM capacity Execution time (s) Encoding Decoding 1 0.296 0.259 2 0.292 0.255 3 0.285 0.271 4 0.306 0.283 5 0.307 0.288  ..
Sentence 2: the selected window size here is less than 1/20th .
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.4 AspectJ Correctness As mentioned in the introduction, the process of inlining the gen­erated AspectJ code into the program is outside the boundaries of JavaMOP, and thus JavaMOP makes no guarantees that the actual weaving of the AspectJ .le is done correctly.
Sentence 2: it is worth highlighting that there are some security concerns that arise in the AspectJ-weaved code (for example, in AspectJ5 for a privileged aspects to access private class members it introduces into the target class a public method to get and set the private member) [13].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Therefore, care should be taken in constructing cardinality constraints based on them.
Sentence 2: for example, the function .2eval(¬active( u , r, t )) refers to a set of roles that are not active in any of user u s sessions at time t. Hence, |.2eval(¬active( u , r, t ))| = n states that the number of roles not active in any of user u s sessions at time t cannot be more than n. it is not clear whether it is n out of those that u can activate or that are in R. Depending upon application, distinction may need to be made a priori.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Three examples of recent browser security features are HttpOnly cookies [2] that enable web developers to specify cook­ies that should be inaccessible from JavaScript, X-Frame-Options [21] to enable web developers to prevent their pages from being framed, and JSON.parse() [1] to enable web de­velopers to deserialize JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) text safely without executing JavaScript code.
Sentence 2: web developers have been slow to use these new browser security features [30, 26].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The provider of the original software holds the best position to serve as the role of trusted veri.er for certifying the property of the cus­tomized software.
Sentence 2: when the original provider is not trusted or not available, a trusted third party can be employed and it should maintain a repository to store the property information of all known-good source code, which may come from di.erent software providers, another trusted third party or trusted agent for software certi.cation.
Relationship: contrasting