sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.1 Ethical Considerations Our experiments randomly forge an address book and col­lect corresponding user pro.les from messenger application­s, which may bring about ethical and legal issues, similar with the cases in [9, 3].
Sentence 2: this is the most e.cient and e.ective way to conduct our experiments since 1) other methods like survey always su.er from in.ating user con­cerns about privacy [6], by directly asking questions about privacy; 2) Comparatively, empirical experiments are more reliable.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since they only support string operations, they are not able to handle non-string constraints, and particularly length constraints that are related to both string and non-string domain and cannot be captured in each individual one.
Sentence 2: the solvers Kaluza [28], [6] and Z3-str [39] are in the same category as ours, and can reason about strings and non-strings simultaneously.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: At present, there is no limit to the num­ber of times a host can make a TPM use an encrypted key or data blob once it has a copy of that blob.
Sentence 2: if we can enable a TPM to keep track of a large number of virtual monotonic coun­ters, then we can link a blob with a particular virtual monotonic counter so that the TPM can use this counter to track and limit the usage of these blobs.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In our multi-cloud ORAM, we can still achieve about 2X­3X client-cloud bandwidth cost even with a single partition.
Sentence 2: with a single partition, reads would have to block waiting for reshu.ing operations of up to N blocks to .nish (e.g., gigabytes or terabytes of data transfered between the two clouds), resulting in prolonged response times.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: XOM processors provide the move from NULL and move to NULL instructions to move register data between com­partments.These instructions simply change the value of the tag on each register value.
Sentence 2: 4.2 Handling Program State When a XOM program is interrupted, the operating sys­tem needs a way to save the context of the interrupted pro­gram, and restore it at a later time.at interrupt time, the contents of the registers are still tagged with the identity of the interrupted program.As a result, the oper­ating system is unable to read those values to save them.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, such a scheme is likely to encounter severe usability challenges since it requires the ability to perform modular addition mentally, a skill that is arguably difficult to teach to users with limited education backgrounds.
Sentence 2: substitution coding is a skill that is known to have been used by humans in practical systems for a long time, although its usage in the above form, and with a developing-world population, remains untested prior to the current work.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Aslightgeneralization[16]enableslimitationofatrusted prinipal'sabilitytoassignobjetstotypes.Ingeneral, thesetofseuritytypesandtheassignmentsofsubjetsto typesinthesemodelsisfxed,soifthetrustedprinipalsare trulytrustedthentheonfgurationsaresafebydefault.On theotherhand,dynamimodels,suhasrole­basedaess ontrol(RBAC)aretypiallyusedtoexpressleastprivilege poliies,suhasChineseWall[9]andSeparationofDuty (SOD)[27].Thesepoliiesoftenrequirethataprinipal's orrole'srightshangedynamiallybasedonsomebehavior topreventanunauthorizedation(e.g.,signingahek).
Sentence 2: weobservethatthereisaontinuuminthetrade­ofbe­tweentheexpressivepowerofanaessontrolmodeland theeaseofsafetyenforement.Inarestritedmodel,suhas Bell­LaPadula,onstraintsareimpliitinthemodel'sdef­nition(e.g.,asubjetofonelabelannotwritetoanyobjet ofa'lower'seuritylabel).Therefore,safetyenforementis trivial,butpoliyexpressionislimited.Ontheotherhand, generalpoliyexpressionmodels,suhasRBAC,makeon­straintsexpliitoneptsandpermitthedefnitionofar­bitraryonstraints.Inthisase,theexpressionofsafety requirementshasproventobediÆult.wehave reentlyfoundthatavarietyofommonaessontrolpoli­iesanbeenforedbyafew,simpleonstrainttypes[30].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Second, to prove the security of dPEKS under the known hardness assumptions, we prove that if the security of PEKS (dPEKS) is not guaranteed, it is possible to solve the hard­ness problems.
Sentence 2: it is hard that an attacker A of hardness problems provides trapdoors, test results, and a challenges to an attacker B of Baek et al.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The features of a view could be the number, types or layout of the visible components (e.g., buttons, menus), or a set of Android platform speci.c APIs invoked in this view s activity.
Sentence 2: the former one (e.g., lay­out) is much easier for an attacker to manipulate because it does not represent the fundamental semantics of an app.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note that the resulting scheme is both randomized and tailored for each g,and hence inferior to the construction in Section 4.2.
Sentence 2: scheme (4) preserves invertibility, namely, if f is a family of invertible pseudorandom permutations (over (g,r) n + 1 bits) then F is a KDI-secure invertible pseudo­random family mapping n bits into n+ 1 bits.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The analysis of existing .le-system implementations indicates that fast algorithms would contribute thousands of lines of code to the TCB (e.g., 2,300 lines of code in the case of the Ext3 .le system).
Sentence 2: all the so­phisticated algorithms and caching mechanisms are already available within the untrusted commodity OS s .le-system stack.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Consuming Sockets with PCTCP: PCTCP may potentially of­fer performance gains by dedicating a separate TCP connection for every circuit.
Sentence 2: pCTCP widens the attack surface and reduces the cost of the anonymous socket exhaustion attack dis­  (a) (b) (c) Figure 2: Showing (a) anonymous socket exhaustion attack using client sybils (b) throughput of relay when launching a socket exhaustion attack via circuit creation with shaded region representing when the attack was being launched (c) memory consumption as a process opens sockets using libevent.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Generally the attestation techniques based on additional hardware such as Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) have been considered infeasible in WSNs because of their size, .nancial cost and energy overhead.
Sentence 2: recent work has shown that a TPM chip (Atmel AT 97SC3203S)costs US$4.5 when ordered in large-quantity, which is less than 5% of the cost of a typical sensor node ($100).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: More speci.cally, the overall time cost is O(n 2)for the KGC, O(n 2) for the cloud server CS1, O(n 2)for thecloud server CS2 and O(n) for each group member.
Sentence 2: ac­cording to the original scheme, KGC takes time O(n 3)to adopt the Lagrange s interpolation formula and takes time O(n 2) to adopt the Newton s Interpolation Formula; for each group member, it will takes time O(n 2) no matter using the Lagrange s interpolation formula or the Newton s interpola­tion formula.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Eager allocation generally improves performance because the taint-tracking system is free to place the taint storage at a predetermined location relative to the memory value it is tracking taint for, thus simplifying access to the taint information.
Sentence 2: eager allocation wastes memory in exchange for better performance because the amount and granularity of taint storage cannot be dynamically adjusted in response to the tainting behavior of the application.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Theirschemeperformsthe same writes to the FW table for Add and Delete, since each Add or Delete operation reveals an identi.er for the .le and reveals the word identi.ers by the locations that it modi.es in their index.
Sentence 2: their scheme never writes adja­cency information to the Adj table: it hides all adjacency information at the cost of requiring per-word storage and communication complexity that is linear in the maximum number of .les that can be stored in their index.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Moreover, with the increase popularity of dis­tributed computing frameworks, such as MapReduce [12], the computation of data that belongs to million of users could be split and processed independently in parallel by di.erent workers without the need to recombine the results as in the traditional MapReduce Implementation.
Sentence 2: the distributed computation aspect was not the main focus of our paper therefore we don t elaborate it here.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Technically, this lower bound follows the classical theoretical trend in security: proving lower bounds of se­curity (or anonymity as it is the case in hand) would enable us to guarantee, in the worst time, that our system would perform better than this bound for every user.
Sentence 2: considering the average case for achieved entropy might be very deceiving since many senders are not likely to achieve this average bound.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For a user s personal registered or generated pro.le and content data, with the user s consent, the IdPs and Web SSO solution should allow RPs to access the user s personal data as easily as possible.
Sentence 2: for a user s social attributes (e.g., birth certi.cate, degrees, credit records, driving records) that are asserted by an IdP, the IdPs should act as gate keepers that protect the con.dentiality and integrity of their customers data and provide only meta-identity infor­mation to the RPs.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Alternatively, the use of static analysis (in the kernel and the applications) in the analysis phase can help to deduce all code sections required by the applications.
Sentence 2: it can be argued that many applications include a large amount of functionality that is disabled at runtime (e.g., by reading a con.guration .le), and the e.ectiveness of such a static approach would be lower.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Recent studies[20,39]have shown a close-to-linear speedupinthe number of cores.
Sentence 2: theCPUis stillsaturatedbythelarge number of diverse and computationallyheavy operationsit needstoperform: network .ow tracking, TCP stream reassembly, protocol parsing, string searching, regular expression matching, and so on.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In principle, even if an SSL-protected page provides a login win­dow, there is no guarantee that the logic for the login window s Submit button is properly implemented to send the information se­curely.
Sentence 2: from a customer s perspective, there is an implied understanding with a .nancial institution that an SSL-protected page provided by that institution has trustworthy contents, includ­ing handling of contents submitted to that page.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To visualize the unigram packet frequencies exhibited by a given network protocol, we use heatmaps similar to those in Section 2, with time on the x-axis and packet size on the y-axis.
Sentence 2: instead of the time elapsed since the start of the connection, we set each packet s x-coordinate as the log of its interarrival time, that is, the time elapsed since the arrival of the previous packet in the connection.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The above authentication scheme provides source authen­tication (like an authentication scheme based on pairwise shared keys) while not precluding passive participation (un­like an authentication scheme based on pairwise shared keys).
Sentence 2: we note that there is a possible impersonation at­tack on this scheme.For example, an adversary can shield node v or jam node v by letting another node w transmitting to v at the same time when node u is transmitting.Later the adversary sends a modi.ed packet to node v imperson­ating node u.Because node v has not received a packet with the same AUTH key, it will accept the modi.ed packet.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, one can insert addition noise to interference the power [4], insert the ran­dom delays [6], static complementary CMOS logic [3], or the masked logic.
Sentence 2: these methods cannot prevent DPA attacks completely because of the power leakage of CMOS Copyright 2010ACM 978-1-4503-0012-4/10/06 ...$10.00.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Recall that our threat model does allow attackers to write arbi­trary memory pages in the sandbox that are writable, so it is pos­sible that after the code is emitted in the sandbox and before it is copied outside of the sandbox for veri.cation, the attackers might corrupt it.
Sentence 2: the corrupted code still needs to pass the ver­i.cation.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In particular, the string-edit distance has been shown to in.uence perceived word similarity in psycholinguistic experiments [10, 41, 58] and in real-world confusions [50].
Sentence 2: this glosses over the fact that edit distance does better if the di.erent elementary operations are weighted di.erently, so that substituting similar-sounding phonemes contributes less distance than if the phonemes were distinct.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Such a raise of overheads culminated in the experiment involving the Needleman-Wunsch algorithm from the NeoBio library, which brought in a slow down factor of 64 and used 28 times more memory.
Sentence 2: the DC s cost seems to be compensated by the huge performance gain on the DP side: the query programs generated by the DC were so ef.cient that they were at least 10000 times faster than the baseline and typically con­sumed much less memory.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Obtaining a reliable estimate of the distribution of the single quantized MDCT coe.cients from the correspond­ing quantized or double quantized coe.cients appears to be a di.cult task.
Sentence 2: it has already been observed in the image forensic literature [6] that the DCT coe.cients obtained by applying a slight shift to the grid used for com­puting the block DCT usually do not exhibit quantization artifacts.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Thegoalof our experimentsisto determine the contention between workloads using different hard­ware resources and determine whether enough contention exists to mount anRFA.Withperfectisolation,performance should remain unchanged no matter what competingbenchmarks run.
Sentence 2: if the isolation is notperfect, then we may seeperformance degrada­tion, and thus maybe able to successfully mount anRFA.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Therefore, we can state at a minimum that the APRNGs of applications based org.webkit are vulnerable.
Sentence 2: table 2: Entropy of APRNG (bit) entropy general a .xed our sources devices device phone utsname 43 0 0 ktime 31 25 28 26 CBN 8 0 0 UID 0 0 0 Zygote PID 12 0 0 Zygote Time 20 20 t Application PID 15 5 7 6 Application Time 0 0 0 Buffer 0 0 0 Total 129 50 55 32 + t the problem does not end here.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Next, we analyze whether the derivation keys { ....L ' } ob­served by the adversary (or proxy) increase the adversary s by (.... ' .... , ¯.... ' .... ) accordingto(.... .... , ¯.... .... ), where .... <.... ' <.... ' < .....
Sentence 2: the con.dentiality of .. and .. ' can guarantee the security of scheme against this attack in terms of the advantage against our scheme.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This al­lows OS to operate solely on a ciphertext basis, for example it can create a perfect copy of data by copying the ciphertext of a page from one location to another.
Sentence 2: as pointed out in prior studies [26, 33, 35], address-dependent counter mode encryption has been shown to be superior to address­independent direct encryption in terms of security protection and performance.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Due to their key role in de.ning, implementing, and enforcing strategic security concepts, security polices are extremely critical, and quality assets such as correctness or consistency are essential objectives in policy engineering.
Sentence 2: given the large amount of their responsibilities, experiences with policy-controlled systems point out that security policies usually are large and com­plex, rendering analyses and quality guarantees dif.cult.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Data .ow integrity projects compute a data .ow graph for a vulnerable program using compile-time techniques, and insert extra guards to ensure that the .ow of data at runtime is allowed by the data .ow graph.
Sentence 2: static data .ow analysis usually analyzes one single program and only predicts approximations of a program s runtime behaviors, which su.ers from two major drawbacks: limit of tracking scope and accuracy.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: SOA and related modern IT architectural approaches are also sometimes criticized because of the added cost and the added software complexity they introduce.
Sentence 2: that up-front investment needs to be compared to the cost of not adopting modern IT architectural approaches, such as (1) maintenance cost / effort explosion, (2) integration hurdles / costs, (3) costs because re-use is not possible, (4) lost business opportunities because the lack of IT agility prevents the offering improved services to the business side etc., and (5) investments are siloed and stove-piped, and thus hard to future-proof .
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Their empirical evaluations on the datasets presented in Table 1 showed that features with better IG ranks re­sulted in better predictive accuracy than features ranked as medium and worst by the IG criterion, which generally showed that feature selection is needed and IG is a reason­able criterion for ranking features.
Sentence 2: the study did not compare ranked IG features against other feature subset selection methods.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Inthedigestingphase,themimicrytargetbinariesare .rstdisas­sembledinto CommonInst structuresbeforedigesting.
Sentence 2: in most legitimate executable binaries, there are a small but non­negligible amount ofembedded data, which mainlyconsist of con­stants andjump addresstables.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To see why this is required, we first show, in Figure 2, a 4-message handshake that has all the properties the IPsec WG wants for IKE, including mutual authentication and identity hiding (hiding the names of the communicating parties from eavesdroppers), as well as a stateless cookie for DoS protection.
Sentence 2: message 3 in this handshake is likely to be sufficiently large that it requires fragmentation, since it contains certificates and must repeat information from the first two messages.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We utilize page coloring as a software mechanism for cache isolation by isolating the color sets that are used to back individual VMs running on CPU cores that share the LLC (i.e., belonging to the same group).
Sentence 2: page coloring has the advantage over the cache hierarchy aware core allocation technique in that it does not result in processor under utilization.it is still possible to under utilize the memory available on the platform.For ex­ample, if memory required by a VM is not an integral sum of the amount of memory available of colors that are currently unassigned to any other VMs, remaining pages of these col­ors may not be assigned to any other VM.Also, since cache is exclusively partitioned using colors, the performance of a VM may su.er if VM s working set does not .t in the cache partition.Such performance degradation may be ac­ceptable, as long as the QoS SLA constraints of the VM are satis.ed.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: There are also parallel approaches to OAuth such as Facebook s extensions to the OAuth protocol in the form of OAuth 2.0 [9], Google s FriendConnect [3] and MySpace s alternative called MySpaceID [23].
Sentence 2: to the best of our knowledge, there is Algorithm 1 Sample Java code for unbinding data using JSR321 1: try { 2: TPMContext context = TPMContext.getInstance() ; 3: context.connect(null); 4: KeyManager keyManager = context.getKeyManager() ; 5: StorageRootKey srk = keyManager.loadStorageRootKey(Secret.WELL KNOWN SECRET) ; 6: Binder binder = context.getBinder() ; 7: Secret keyUsageSecret = context.getSecret(Passphrase for using the key.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A naive approach to realize blank digital signatures is that the originator produces n signatures for all n possible instan­tiations together with the public key of the proxy using a standard digital signature scheme, whereas the proxy simply signs the originator s signature for the chosen instantiations.
Sentence 2: the number of signatures issued by the originator would then be O(n), which gets impractical very soon with increasing number of choices in exchangeable parts.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Access Granted Abdulaziz Almehmadi University of Ontario Institute of Technology C:UsersPassDesktopUntitled-4 copy.jpg 2000 Simcoe Street North Oshawa, Canada L1H 7K4 abdulaziz.almehmadi@uoit.ca Khalil El-Khatib University of Ontario Institute of Technology 2000 Simcoe Street North Oshawa, Canada L1H 7K4 khalil.el-khatib@uoit.ca ABSTRACT Existing access control systems are mostly identity-based.
Sentence 2: such access control systems impose risks because recognized identity is not essentially an interpretation of good intentions of access.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: a mov ebx,fs:[eax]instruction is executed, it is more likely that eax will have been zeroed out, e.g., due to a previous two­byte long xor eax,eaxinstruction, instead of being set to 0x30.
Sentence 2: the percentage of inputs that matched both the .rst and the second condition is very low (0.0003% and 0.0004%, respec­tively), and no inputs matched all three conditions.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We focus on the schemes of [7, 18] which both have a similar, high-level structure: the public key contains ele­ments g,h in some group G, and the secret key contains the value x =logg h. Signing a message m involves computing s =(H(m))x,where H is a random oracle mapping strings uniformly onto G. Boneh, Lynn, and Shacham [7] use an FDH-like ap­proach to analyze their scheme (but with the optimization of Coron [11]); consequently they lose a factor of qs in the security reduction.
Sentence 2: goh and Jarecki [18] use a PFDH-like approach and include the random salt r with the resulting signature; this enables them to obtain a tight security reduction at the expense of increasing the signature length.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: During the execution of lines 2 and 3, while p points to i, WS(i) changes to include the instructions in WS(ref(p)).
Sentence 2: line ref(p) WS(i) 1 N/A {1} 2 i {1,3} 3 i {1,3} 4 NULL {1} once p s referent object changes to NULL on line 4, WS(i) goes back to its original value.
Relationship: contrasting