sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Without loss of generality, we can use n-gram (joint distri­bution of bytes) by computing frequency of consecutive n bytes in P to model the information from the payload of unknown protocol requests.
Sentence 2: the major problem with n-gram is that such feature-space contains redundant information and the selection of right value of n is not triv­ial (i.e., if n is small, the accuracy of the system decreases whereas large values of n signi.cantly increase the process­ing overheads) [23].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Regarding privacy, it is also desirable to implement di.erent privacy pro.les, such that each user has relative freedom to choose how, when and against whom his/her data must be pro­tected, and whetheror nottheobject-user wantstobe informed whenever some subject-user accesses his/her data.
Sentence 2: subject-users generate only reports ontheir activity ondatapreviously createdby object-users; thus, theprivacy of subject-usersis taken into accountbygrantingthemprivilegesin order notto report certain actions; for example, a representative of the law authorities may have visioning access to some recorded scenes, and this event should not originate reports to the involved object-users.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Supporting multi-user work.ows is seemingly at odds with the Tractability requirement, as the work.ow satis.ability problem has been shown to be NP-complete [26].
Sentence 2: the proof of Theorem 1 makes use of recent results [4] to show that ACCostEvalSim is .xed­parameter tractable in maximum task length (typically a small constant).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When the event E reaches a broker, if the set of attributes associated with the event satisfy the .lter Fj , then the broker knows that the event can be for­warded to Sj .
Sentence 2: if the KP-ABE scheme is used as proposed in [3], then the broker is still able to obtain infor­mation on the .lters and attributes associated with events, thus violating the con.dentiality of events and .lters.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This value, together with user s output (p-p ) a = s · gi ti computed for an arbitrary p , allows an off-line dictionary attack, where each candidate password p ' can be tested ' p-p by checking if s = a · (a) 1 looks like a valid plaintext.
Sentence 2: if the shifted ElGamal encryption encrypts hp in­s · h(p-p ) i ti stead of gp then a = is a one-time pad encryption of s because under the DDH assumption h i ti is a pseudorandom value, and hence so is hdpi ti for any dp (p - p ), even given w ai = g i ti , if i ti is random in Zq.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Furthermore, web servers must also support server-side scripting (e.g., PHP and ASP), which in turn requires further security hardening measures.
Sentence 2: in­fection techniques that require user interaction such as pull­based infection techniques (e.g., drive-by downloads) and push-based techniques (e.g., opening malicious email attach­ments) are often not applicable to servers.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Theseoverheads are still signi.cant,however our scheme is compatible with several techniquesproposed in [4] that can reduce this overhead, such as using a single MACto cover not oneblockbut several blocks.
Sentence 2: thekey point here is that AISE+BMT is more storage-ef.cient than global64+MT irre­spectiveof the MACsize used.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Data gathered from 21 people and 27 PIN com­binations display that the heat transferred to the keypad depends on the amount of pressure exerted to the keys as well as the warmth of the hand.
Sentence 2: the heat of the ATM was not taken into consideration as the keypad is used as an isolated test bed, without being wired to or placed on any electronic device.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.2 IDRM is NP-Complete In a monotype I-hierarchy, as the permissions of a junior role can_be_acquired by senior roles, the role hierarchy can facilitate a top-down scan to solve the IDRM problem.
Sentence 2: the presence of a hybrid hierarchy presents a more complicated and realistic model, in which a senior role may not have more permissions than a junior role (as illustrated in the Example 3).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It is also di.cult to quantify the security of a computer con­.guration [18] since the introduction of new security vulner­abilities and functionalities can make a once secure con.gu­ration insecure.
Sentence 2: evolution-based algorithms, which formulate bet­ter solutions from good solutions, are well suited for address­ing such ill-formed and dynamic problems.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The di.erences between WPA and WPA2 are not rele­vant for this discussion.
Sentence 2: wPA and WPA2 each operate in two primary modes: WPA-Enterprise (or WPA2-Enterprise), for use in a large-scale networks with an IEEE 802.1X-compliant authentication server, and WPA-Personal (or WPA2-Personal).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 7.5 Denial-of-service We brie.y discuss denial-of-service (DoS) attacks a po­tential problem for methods such as cha.ng-by-tweaking that generate honeywords by predictably modifying user­supplied passwords.
Sentence 2: (cha.ng-with-a-password­model as well as the hybrid scheme of Section 5.5 o.er strong DoS resistance.)
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: They conclude that for |R| = |D|3 and h = o(|D|n), where 0 <E< 1, a ROPF is able to achieve one-wayness.
Sentence 2: this only applies for classical one-wayness, i.e., aimed to recover the exact plain­text of a given ciphertext, not the ability of an adversary to correctly estimate a plaintext close to the actually underly­ing plaintext.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Similarly, the toast approach has a lower success rate 27.9%, which is bet­ter than vibration, but some participants said that without vibration they did not notice the toast message.
Sentence 2: using vibration, toast and alert bar together is the most reliable way to alert users, which signi.cantly dropped the touchjacking attack s success rate to 6.97%.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Then, v broadcasts these one-time certi.­cates, and neighbors of v falsely believe that x is a direct neighbor of v. Unfortunately, we do not provide a proper countermea­sure to defend against this type of man-in-the-middle at­tacks.
Sentence 2: we point out that this type of attacks has watch node exists in the lower bound (c =0.4)criti­cal area.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The location identi.ers generated by an Adeona­enabled device only need to be meaningful to the individual device owner since only she is allowed to track her device.
Sentence 2: sMILE must allow independent, co-located users to deter­ministically compute the same encounter identi.er without reveal­ing any information about the encounter s place or time to entities that were not present.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This implies that the M7 mimimorphic engine generates 143 .ngerprints that can be used to identify the mimimorphic instances!
Sentence 2: the results are much better for M8 .les.Whereasthereare339 shared.ngerprintsinall M8 .les, 321 of them match legitimate .les, leaving only 18 additional .n- Table 7: Shared Fingerprints of All M7 and M8 Instances and Good/Bad FingerprintsinThem Sharedfprnts.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Ingeneral,thisinvolvescomputingtheauthorizationtypes ofasubjectT(s)andthepermissionsoftheseauthorization typesP(t).Fromthesefunctions,wecandeterminewhether oneoftheauthorizationtypesofasubjecthasthedesired permission.Therefore,forauthorization,twotypesoffunc­tionsmustbecomputedtoperformauthorization.There­fore,wecanthinkofthecomplexityofthenodechunksin authorizationasthenumberoffunctionsthatmustbecom­puted.Thishastheresultthatprimitiveentities,subjects andpermissions,haveacomplexityofzero.
Sentence 2: thecomplexityofauthorizationmaybereducedbythe useofotherrelationships,suchasaggregationandinher­itance.Theideaisthataggregationreducesthenumber ofindividualassignmentsofsubjectstoauthorizationtypes byassigningthesubjectstoanaggregatethatcanbeas­signedtomultipleauthorizationtypes.Permissionsmaybe aggregatedbeforeassigningthemtoauthorizationtypesas well.theaggregationrelationshipsaremorecom­plicatedthandirectassignments,sothebeneftofaggrega­tionshouldoutweighthecostofmanagingtheaggregation.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The TLD could authen­ticate laptops and only perform HKD for laptops not yet reported stolen.
Sentence 2: this means signi.cant administrative overhead with per-laptop secrets on the TLD, or the addition of laptops to the company PKI and the maintenance of a Certi.cate Revocation List (CRL) to identify stolen laptops.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To cal­culate the memory load address, (table + index*8), we use a tainted operand, index, which has never been derefer­enced before, and so i1 becomes tainted.
Sentence 2: we have just reached the landmark for i1, meaning that dereferences of i1 propagate taintedness, but addresses derived from i1 in a clean way do not.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.5 Timeout Method The most outstanding characteristic of the reconstruction operations is that if a mesh node does not have su.cient number of neighboring nodes, it simply can compute nei­ther the master key shares nor its private key.
Sentence 2: a situation as the following may also occur: a packet sent by a mesh node consisting of a service request drops due to colli­sions.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: of South Carolina Zhejiang University Columbia, SC 29208 Columbia, SC 29208 Hangzhou 310027, China xum@email.sc.edu Jesse Walker Intel Labs Hillsboro, OR 97124 jesse.walker@intel.com ABSTRACT Wireless sensor networks are increasingly being integrated into the modern automobile with the intention of improv­ing safety and reducing costs.
Sentence 2: it has been shown that the .rst widely-deployed and mandatory in-car sen­sor networks Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems (TPMSs) employ no cryptographic algorithms for protecting their wireless communication, incurring serious security and pri­vacy risks for consumers.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Consideryetagainthetimebetween(start,end) condition.Inprac­tice,theconditionismostlikelyimplementedbypollingaremotetimingsource.Thetimingsourcesimplyreturnsthecurrenttime.Thereceivingstubwilltranslatethecurrenttimeintoaresult,i.e.,determiningifthecurrenttimeisbetweenstart andend.Becausetimeisreturned,thesameservicecanbeusedtoimplementanynumberofconditions(e.g.,isWeekday()).
Sentence 2: complex condition -conditionsoftenrequireimplementationsthatarehybridsoflocal,remote,andfunctionalconditions.Suchim­plementationscanrepresentmoreextensiveprogramswhichmayinvolveinteractiveprotocolsbetweenmanyend-points.DepictedinFigure4,theconditionscanbepresentedtothepolicyinfras­tructureasasinglestubfunction.beneaththissimpleveneerliescomplexlogicwhichcoordinatesthedataandprotocolsneededtoevaluatethecondition.Notethatitmaybepossibleforanimplementationtobe(atleastpartially)constructedfrommorebasicconditions.Thisissimilarinphilosophytothecomponentsystems[3],andisillustratedinthefollowingexample.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, in Figure 5 the user needs to be in a a policy that requires both a previous state and the current state.
Sentence 2: speci.c ST state S0 to obtain the key promptly before entering S3.Along with all the previous tokens a user has, since history infor-this method will fail if the malicious user has a colluding partner that obtains the key at the speci.c location during the spe­ ci.c time and then immediately sends the key to the attacker, who mation is carried in the token, the complete state transition path can be determined so that it is possible to express a policy involving two or more previous states as in the second example.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When used to educate about organization-specific security policies and targeted attacks, PG and SRAs are likely to require similar supervisory effort (i.e., supervisors who know users' context well, set security policies, and help the system select and label instances of JRs and URs).
Sentence 2: to the extent that PG seeks to educate only about generic threats, it has the advantage that it can benefit individuals without supervi-sion.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We worried that the critical usability requirements of requiring the application to be a Web application without binary code and requiring it to perform well enough so that users' workflows are not at all slowed down would be irreconcilable, in which case we were prepared to resort to using Java applets or something like them in the vein of Hushmail [9] (see Section 5).
Sentence 2: in the end we were able to build the entire application out of scripts while satisfying all our usability concerns.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Multi-factor schemes that use an additional token or biometrics also may not need protection against guessing attacks, assuming the additional factors provide enough entropy.
Sentence 2: single­factor multi-stage schemes (e.g., SiteKey or personal ques­tions with passwords) may bene.t from Uvauth; e.g., the fake session can start right at the end of .rst-stage of au­thentication.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Like other network-based approaches, Nemean does not have the bene.t of a correlation step to pinpoint attack-containing bytes, but its knowledge of service semantics provides capabilities similar to our input context identi.cation.
Sentence 2: our approach requires only simpli.ed message format speci.cations, whereas their approach seems to require more detailed knowledge of ser­vice semantics that needs to be incorporated into their implemen­tation.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note that these equations are not exactly true because the padding is not exactly the same in Hmac and in Nmac: in Hmac one block key is concatenated to the message and this changes the length of the hash function input and then changes the associated padding.
Sentence 2: to simplify the notations, we can omit this particularity since it does not alterate the results.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Viewing the problem from a high level, there are many tracks we can take to make a network architecture that is more resilient to DoS than the current Internet: Signi.cant improvements in end-system software security will reduce the ease with which systems are compromised, and hence make the construction of zombie-armies more dif.­cult.
Sentence 2: we do not expect this to be suf.cient by itself.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In practice, we could directly include a concrete sequence of requests in the state, and remove requests from this sequence as the system con­trols them.
Sentence 2: such a concrete structure does not bring much in the decision process and tends to obfuscate the exposition of the framework, so we leave the concrete de.nition of the function Tr to be done at the implementa­tion level.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Hence, the maximum security level that can be achieved is t = 80 bits.
Sentence 2: in the most recent implementation of FastGC [HEKM11] (version 0.1.1 released August 9, 2011), the last bit of the 80 bit wire labels is used as permuta­tion bit for the point-and-permute technique of [NPS99] (cf.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 8.1 Heat-ray Effectiveness Heat-ray is designed to be run periodically on an organi­zations s security con.guration (e.g., to review con.guration changes made in the past week).
Sentence 2: our evaluation focuses on the initial use of Heat-ray to reduce the threat of identity snowball attacks in an organization that has not previously been running Heat-ray.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Therefore, honest recommenders have to assume the defensive strategy of holding grudges against liars by keeping others RRep in order to guard their own interests.
Sentence 2: dishonest recommenders, i.e., liars, treat all types of recommendation requesters alike since their utmost goal is to spread lies as widely as pos­sible to take advantages such as promoting their colluders reputation.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The remaining bi­nary operators 8and nhave .avor of set intersection, which does not have counterparts in regular expressions.
Sentence 2: observe that determining whether a string satis.es a regular ex­pression is in NL-complete, where NL stands for Nondeterminis­tic Logarithmic-Space, and is contained in P. determining whether a userset satis.es a term is NP-complete, even if the term uses only U and .
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If it is known that a user cannot violate a security property using their current privileges, then we do not need to actively monitor for se­curity property violations,but insteadwe can simplykeepalogof actions.
Sentence 2: we can answer the question of whether or not a user can violate a security property given their past actions and their current tasks by again using an intersection of .nite state machines as we did in section4.1.theNFAmodelingthe possible actionsthata usercantakeshouldbeginwithastringof transitionsthat represent the actionsthattheuserhasalreadytakensofar.Thatis,ratherthan have a set of states representing different time segments where the transitions model what actions the user is allowed to take, for time segments prior to the current time, only the transitions representing the actions which the user actually took should remain.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 2.3 Data cleansing and partitioning Roles are introduced to compress the user-permission as­signment relation so that if n users share m permissions instead of dealing with n × m user-permission assignments a role is introduced requiring a total of n + m assignments.
Sentence 2: it is not clear that introducing a role will help in the administration when n or m are small.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The binding of the key pair to the con.guration of the TCB guarantees that no other platform and even no modi.ed system booted on the same platform can decrypt the key and, hence, the wallet data.
Sentence 2: for each device the user wants to use TruWallet, the user has to (i) establish a trusted channel, and (ii) if the TCB or the wallet have to be updated, the trusted channel has to be re-established.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Similarly, .e, p.0..j denotes .e0,p0., .e1,p1.,..., .ej,pj.. Weuse [ and ] asan alternate form of parenthesis to aid the eye in recognizing the formula s syntactic structure 4A notion of weak accountabilityhas alsobeenproposed [8].
Sentence 2: deciding weak accountability in general is co-NP­complete, so we do not discuss it here, as the current paper focuses on practical issues.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In fact, all the community users have two opposed interests: on one hand they compete against the customer devices which they serve for the available network bandwidth provided by the mesh routers, since they have to share the capacity of their outgoing wireless link established with other mesh routers of the WMCN.
Sentence 2: mesh routers have an incentive to serve a large number of users in a fair way, since we assume they are rewarded by the mesh community network considering both the number of served customers and their satisfaction.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Toxicity(a, s, t1,t2)= i t2 A(a, s, t) * (C(s, t) - D(s, t)) dt (1) t1 OptimalAttacker(s, t)= { 1 if C(s, t) - D(s, t) > 0 (2)0 otherwise MaxToxicity(s, t1,t2)= it2 OptimalAttacker(s, t) * (C(s, t) - D(s, t)) dt (3) t1 E.ectiveness(a, s, t1 , t2 )= Toxicity(a, s, t1,t2) (4) MaxToxicity(s, t1,t2) The de.nitions of toxicity and e.ectiveness are general and apply to any arbitrary functions C(s, t), A(a, s, t), and D(s, t).
Sentence 2: we constructed the iCTF competition so that we could measure and observe these functions and en­sure they are valid metrics.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, enterprise networking devices like Cisco routers and switches run on proprietary operat­ing systems like IOS, which do not resemble traditional unix architecture.
Sentence 2: recent advancements in exploitation and root-kitting techniques for proprietary operating sys­tems like Cisco IOS [17, 14] could allow attackers to com­promise high-end enterprise devices like backbone routers and .rewalls.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: propose more e.cient protocols based on cryptographic techniques like homomorphic encryption and secure multi-party com­putation for recommender systems based on collaborative .ltering [9, 11, 10].
Sentence 2: in their proposals, the users are actively involved in the computations, which makes the overall construction more vulnerable to timeouts and laten­ciesintheusers connections.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The main challenge when implementing the disaggregated do­main builder was that the existing code relies on .le system ac­cess, in order to load kernel images and, optionally, initial ramdisks for a new guest.
Sentence 2: it is dif.cult to load a .le into our do­main builder, because, as we have already remarked, MiniOS in­cludes no physical device drivers, .le systems or networking stack.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Table2: RuntimeAnalysisforMimicFunction Digesting =O(n) Table building Reading a symbol 1 Pre.x lookup 1 Recording frequency 1 Input length n Tree conversion Sort Construct tree Number of tables C C C Encoding/Decoding =O(n) For each symbol Locate Huffman tree 1 Huffman de(en)coding 1 Input length n proximately the same frequency of the mimicry target.
Sentence 2: withoutproper enhancements,themimicfunctionfallsshort against semantic analysisdetection.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, program execution [11] is an attestation technique that helps in measuring the system calls generated by the applications and it also computes the hash of these system calls, which could be used by a remote party for the purpose of veri.cation.
Sentence 2: there are a few limitations with this approach, which are as follows: Firstly, it does not have such an automatic mechanism which can help in analyzing the source code of the target application so it will be analyzed statically by a challenger.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Even in the case of 9 streams, which 0.1 hasanaverage PDRof74.1% and corresponds to a very 0 poor quality of service, over 99% of all observed transmission delays occur within 60 msecs.
Sentence 2: for the constant jammer, the time taken to acquire the channel will be large relative to normal MAC-sensing times, or even the times observed for poor QoS conditions.
Relationship: contrasting