sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The natural adaption of revocation and broadcast encryption schemes to our setting leads to high overhead.
Sentence 2: if we re­place a user in the revocation scheme with a conjunction of attributes, and users store the keys assigned by the revoca­tion scheme to each of their conjunctions, this may lead to high communication overhead (O(2m), where m is the total number of attributes).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: That is, even if the same design is used for two devices, it is physicallyimpossibleto maketheirPUFsbehaveidentically.
Sentence 2: ourinsightforthedesignofsuch PUFROKs istoin­corporate the PUF in a feedback loop for a system-on-chip (SoC)design.1 our design is for the PUF to reside on the same chip as the processor core that performs the encryption.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This approach has the advantage of leveraging an existing ontology that already models, in a fairly exten­sive manner, important intelligence and military concepts as well as taking into account the temporal dimension of the modeled data.
Sentence 2: it provides, through the use of OWL Time Ontology3 , a vocabulary for expressing re­lations between instants, intervals, duration and date-time information.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: ce, if all strings sanitized with f are guaranteed to parse validly starting in context cs yielding an end context ce according to our canonical grammar, and if the sentential forms generated during such a parse are valid syntactic forms as per the application s intended security policy [47].
Sentence 2: sanitized strings can span di.erent contexts, but all the intermediate contexts induceded during parsing untrusted strings should be syntactically con.ned to non­terminals allowed by the application s policy.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, if a process of type httpd t created a socket to connect to the Internet, the socket would also be of type httpd t. When checking permissions on a socket, one needs to check the permission on the socket labeled with the process type, and one needs to check the permission on the socket with the port type.
Sentence 2: we need to check that the process can access the port for which data is being received and the socket object itself.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: MCBPROBINGEXTRACTION  3.1 ICE:Ef.cientPathExploration As stated earlier, the problem of .nding candidate MCB paths is di.erent from the problem of traditional multipath exploration.
Sentence 2: as discussed in previous work [21],pathexploration without any high-level semanticguid­ance is ine.cient.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This is where those reserved bits in an ID help1.
Sentence 2: if an indirect branch uses an address that is not four-byte aligned, then the four-byte target ID loaded from the Tary table will not be valid (i.e., it will not have the special bit values 0, 0, 0, and 1 in the least-signi.cant bits).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As an intermediate, we also de.ne a hybrid Game (i + 1 2 ), which lies between Game i and Game (i + 1).
Sentence 2: in Game (i + 2 1 ), if the (i + 1)st next query is preserving than the challenger acts as in Game(i + 1) and chooses a ran­ dom S, R, and otherwise it acts as in Game i and follows the original oracle speci.cation.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since the bound that we have on ts applies to every proto­col .
Sentence 2: and every start vertex v, we get by Azuma s inequal­ity, that the depth of the end vertex reached by A is with high probability close to its expectation, and in particular is at least n. except with negligible probability in n, the protocol A retrieves the transcript of .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: [9] present techniques for visualizing sin­gle TCP connections and for clusters of many connections.
Sentence 2: they use scatter plots of packet size versus interarrival time for individual connections; our unigram Inter-Packet Delays as (size,time,size)-triples next packet size (bytes) 1500 1000 500 0-500-1000 -1500 0 0.2 0 0.4 -500 IA time (sec) 0.6 0.8 1-1500 -1000 gnutella SMTP HTTP SSH 1500 1000 500 current packet size (bytes) Figure 8: 3D Plot for Gnutella with HTTP, SMTP,and SSH heatmaps in Section 3.1 can be seen as a logical extension of this work to enable the visualization of the overall trends in massive datasets.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To achieve fast and efficient grouping result, we take advantage of the core idea of Spectral Clustering, which is a clustering algorithm based on graph theory and makes use of the similarity relation among sample points to cluster.
Sentence 2: for a grouping problem of distributing N regular expressions into k groups, the Spectral Clustering based regular expression grouping algorithm has following four steps.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The major difference from the design illustrated in section 3 is two­fold We factored out a separate object store OStore which is added to each machine state, mapping object locations to objects, and objects are now maps from keys to values.
Sentence 2: the structure of the object store is Curried: OStore = OLoc -String -D. In addition to factoring OStore out from the original abstract machine [6, 7], we not only add a taint store Taint for tracking taint property of ordinary addresses: Taint = Addr -T , but also an object taint store OTaint to achieve .eld-sensitivity for the taint property.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since UAS only consider the role hierarchy, we check each element in UAS against DSoD and cardinality constraints in line 3.
Sentence 2: if any two roles in the role set are restricted by a DSoD constraint, the role set is removed from UAS; and if any one of the role in the role set cannot be further activated according to the cardinality constraint, the role set is removed from UAS.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the two-party di­vision protocols and the one following them, all of which use homomorphic encryption, we assume that all players prior to protocol initiation agree on a range of possible values.
Sentence 2: they de.ne MAXIN T to be a large number, such that all possible (aggregate) values of x and y will be less than MAXINT , but some randomly generated numbers may exceed MAXINT (in which case this is explicitly stated when they are de.ned).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The set Ei includes at least all the edges whose origin is Si (it may also include additional edges, since an individual may be aware of a relationship between two other individuals).
Sentence 2: we also assume that |Ei| << |E| for all i.no sub ject knows more than a small fraction of the edges in E. This is a reasonable assumption in our setting: there is no way to reconstruct privately a graph that is already known.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As a sideeffect ofin.atingthe IPDs, the burst size will also be changed.
Sentence 2: if the delay induced bya watermark is largeenough,say not less than the round-trip time (RTT), wecan discern twobursts ofpackets: one has three packets andthe other has one.Similarly, if a traf.c watermarkingscheme delays the .rst response packet(e.g., the seconddelay in Figure 3(b)), wecould observe an increased RRT (i.e., denoted by RRT ).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In order to recover s with this di.erent jamming speci.cation, since |A*|is minimum, it must be that some nonempty subset of positions in B*, which we call Ci, are not jammed and become part of A* in lieu of A*.
Sentence 2: to recover s, A* i i and Ci are exchangeable regardless of the values taken on the remaining |A*|-1 positions.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Fur­thermore, it administrates access policies for DBUs.
Sentence 2: database Admin (DBA) Database User (DBU) Figure 1: The proposed architecture for encrypted databases, consisting of the CS in the outsourced envi­ronment and both the DBA and the DBU (clients) and the KMA in the trusted environment it decides who is authorised to access tables in the database.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: [27] examined the same problem and improved upon the work of [3].
Sentence 2: they showed that using Mel Fre­quency Cepstrum Coef.cients (MFCC) features [12] yield better classi.cation accuracies compared to the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) features used in [3].
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: On the Role of Roles: from Role-Based to Role-Sensitive Access Control* Xuhui Ao Naftaly H. Minsky Department of Computer Science Department of Computer Science Rutgers University Rutgers University Piscataway, NJ 08854, USA Piscataway, NJ 08854, USA  ao@cs.rutgers.edu minsky@cs.rutgers.edu ABSTRACT This paper maintains that for an access-control (AC) mech­anism to support a wide range of policies, it is best to dis­pense with any built-in semantics for roles in the mechanism itself be it the semantics of RBAC, or any other leaving such semantics to be de.ned by particular policies.
Sentence 2: an AC mechanism should be sensitive to roles,al­lowing speci.c policies to take roles into account for their authorization decisions.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: And, given a pair of laws N and M in t(L0), we write N.M if N is subordi­nate to M. Semantically, the most important aspect of this hierarchy is that if N.M then N conforms to M,in the sense that law N satis.es all the stipulations of its superior law M. This concept of conformance hierarchy is related to, but much more general than, the concept of meta policy intro­duced by some policy mechanisms (see [2, 4], for example.).
Sentence 2: the conformance relation under LGI is en­forced by its very construction.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In order to implement a blacklist for this constraint, we would assign negative permissions to the role r. Any at­tempt to invoke a permission p using role r would be denied if the corresponding negative permission (which we denote ¬p) were assigned to r (irrespective of whether p was as­signed to r).
Sentence 2: negative permissions always take precedence over normal permissions.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, an email server canbe tested for password-strength, spam, virus-attachment, executable­code contents, and for malicious contents.
Sentence 2: an asset may consistof manyitems(atreeoftestobjects) thatare subject to test, e.g., a sample database server and its tested items, as shown in Figure 2, are Malware, Availability &#38;  Figure 2: An EA Screenshot of evaluation results of a database server conducted by a remote EA.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the path key identi.cation phase, if the neighboring nodes i and j in the range rt do not share a key, node i generates a new key and seds this key to j via the already established secure links.
Sentence 2: 1) node i tries to share a common key with all neighbors in the large disk with radius rf in the key set-up phase, and 2) if it could not connect to node j in the small disk with radius rt, it uses the secure channels in the large disk to set up a common key with the node j.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this paper, we give it an ef.cient and practical system design and implementation that can be easily deployed in today s web.
Sentence 2: we tackle several previously-unidenti.ed chal­lenges, such as supporting progressive page loading on the client s browser, designing browsers policies for handling of mixed end­to-end secure and insecure content, and de.ning access control policies among HTTP, HTTPi, and HTTPS content from the same domain.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: the generated heat per switch) for each gate.
Sentence 2: the switching power is formulated as follows:  (a) TYPE2 Correlations (b) Number of Switches (c) Characterization Errors Figure 1: Examples of TYPE2 Correlations ((a) in the leakage power model; (b)(c) in the switching power model): (a) shows a subpart of C880 circuit, in which the two outputs of x69 and x70 drive .ve gates: x90, x91, x92, x111, x126.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Next, we show that the protocol is a proof of knowledge.
Sentence 2: we show there exists an extractor that can extract ' ' ' a SDH pair from (T, R, c, sx,sd,sß) and (T, R, c ' ,sx,sd,sß), where c = c ' and both transcripts satisfy the verifcation 11111) sx-s(sx-s)(sß -s)-(sd-s)(c-c x xßd equation.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To make the model easy to work with, we simplify away many important facets of the real SAFE system.
Sentence 2: (i) we focus only on IFC and noninterference, although the tag­ging facilities of the SAFE machine are generic and can be applied to other policies (we return to this point in §13); (ii) we ignore the Breeze and Tempest programming languages and concentrate on the hardware and runtime services; (iii) we use a stack instead of registers, and we distill the instruction set to just a handful of opcodes; (iv) we drop SAFE s .ne-grained privilege separation in favor of a more conventional user-mode / kernel-mode dichotomy; (v) we shrink the rule cache to a single entry (avoiding issues of replacement and eviction) and maintain it in kernel memory, ac­cessed by ordinary loads and stores, rather than in specialized cache hardware; (vi) we omit a large number of IFC-related concepts (dynamic principals, downgrading, public labels, integrity, clear­ance, etc.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: s·Vdd-Vth Pleakage =2 · n · µ · Cox · W · ( kT )2 · D · Vdd · e n·(kT/q) (1) Lq We observe from Equation (1) that the leakage power of a logic gate depends on the threshold voltage (Vth) in a non­linear manner.
Sentence 2: if one can increase the Vth, either in the pre-silicon or post-silicon stage, the leakage power would decrease exponentially.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.3 Emulation To deal with exploits that heavily rely on dynamic JavaScript fea­tures and sophisticated browser functionality, we visit web pages with a customized browser, which loads the page, executes its dy­namic content, and records the events used by the anomaly detec­tion system.
Sentence 2: in our system, a full browser environ­ment is emulated by HtmlUnit, a Java-based framework for test­ing web-based applications [9].
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Certificate-less User Authentication with Consent Shingo Orihara NTT Information Sharing Platform Laboratories 3-9-11 Midori-cho, Musashino-shi, Tokyo 180-8585 Japan orihara.shingo@lab.ntt.co.jp Yukio Tsuruoka NTT Information Sharing Platform Laboratories 3-9-11 Midori-cho, Musashino-shi, Tokyo 180-8585 Japan tsuruoka.yukio@lab.ntt.co.jp Kenji Takahashi NTT Information Sharing Platform Laboratories 3-9-11 Midori-cho, Musashino-shi, Tokyo 180-8585 Japan takahashi.kenji@lab.ntt.co.jp  ABSTRACT We introduce a new authentication scheme that is intended to be used on electronic commerce (EC) sites, which do not require strict user authentication but need user identification.
Sentence 2: the EC sites judge whether a user is the same person who visited the site before.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: STRONG1-OUT-OF-2SIGNATURE 5.1 De.nitionforStrong1-out-of-2Signature  In some cases, it is desired to protect rights of the signer and the proxy even in an extremely aggressive environment, i.e., the adversary has the unlimited computational power while the signer or the proxy only has the polynomially bounded power.
Sentence 2: 1) the signer and the proxy can show the existence of the forgery, and 2) the proxy can prove his/her innocence if he hasn t transformed any two partial signatures that are output from PreSign together.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Bidirectional: Since both parties mutually delegate, the set Q includes all messages associated with any Osign query.
Sentence 2: 2.Delegatee Security: If the delegatee is honest, then he is safe from a colluding delegator and proxy.they cannot produce any signatures on his behalf.We associate the index 0 to the delegatee.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The recent definition of the Web Service Resource Framework (WSRF) specification and other elements of the Open Grid Services Architecture (OGSA) within OASIS and the Global Grid Forum (GGF) introduce new challenges and opportunities for Grid security [21, 24].
Sentence 2: integration with Web services and hosting environment technologies introduces opportunities to leverage emerging security technologies such as described in the WS-Security, WS-Trust and WS-Secure-Conversation specifications [18, 22, 23].
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: l Then a .ow sending .h(t2 - t1)+ ßh + 1 over [t1, t2) will violate the high bandwidth threshold over [t1, t2) but comply with .l' t2 +ßl ' over [0, t2).
Sentence 2: no algorithm can satisfy (A2, L2, L3) and (A1, L1) at the same time.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In particular we want to argue that, in the honest-but-curious setting, no party should be able to get any information about the other party s input.
Sentence 2: this means that the client C should not be able to get anything about the database held by S (beyond what revealed by the functionality implemented by the protocol) whereas S should not get anything about the .ngercode and outcome of the authentication process.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Q64mult |) The precondition Q64xy eqns memorizes the limbs of the inputs X and Y in logical variables xi s and yi s. The formula Q64s eqns records the limbs si s after the qhasm fragment P 64M in logical variables si s. Q64mult ensures that the limbs si s are computed according to (1).
Sentence 2: the Hoare triple speci.es the multiply phase of Fp multiplication in the radix-264 representation.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The length of RL can be modeled as the M/G/1 queueing system.
Sentence 2: if the DRL is sent periodically, we use M/D/1 to model the length of RL.= The stationary length of RL is: = (.2 DRLds2 + 1)(.DRLa/.DRLd)2 LRL = , (10) 2(1 - .DRLa/.DRLd) where s is the standard deviation of arrival time of DRL packet for revival.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since the cloud has both Td and Epka (d ),and Bob (an authorized user of d)has prb, a collusion between the two can revealtheactual attribute values of d. Therefore, to prevent the information leakage due to the above collusion, we distribute the outsourced data.
Sentence 2: instead of ' storingthedata(Td,Epka (d ))ofeachdatarecord dononecloud, we distribute the data between two clouds (resulting in a federated cloud).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Di.erent levels usually also imply di.erent throughput and stealth.
Sentence 2: we notice that throughput is usu­ Overt Channel Throughput (kbps) Nexus One Samsung Galaxy S UNIX Socket Communication 340.45 (± 154.02) 34.78 (± 11.39) Internal Storage 292.03 (± 50.06) 32.60 (± 8.47) Shared Preferences 75.81 (± 6.83) 31.00 (± 2.75) Broadcast Intents 40.58 (± 8.41) 26.74 (± 4.88) External Storage 11.55 (± 1.10) 6.12 (± 3.95) System Log 2.94 (± 0.03) 2.14 (± 0.11) Requires extra WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE permission.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A large draw­back of using them to realize anonymous subscriptions is that there is no convenient way to terminate group membership.
Sentence 2: in group signature schemes that support revocation (e.g., [1, 4, 9, 13, 11, 37]), a member is revoked by (i) using a list of revoked users (every time a signature is veri.ed, it is checked against the list of revoked users); or (ii) updating the secret key every time a user is revoked.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While a variety of methods have been proposed, this is the .rst method to make explicit all aspects of resource retrieval: adversaries, using adversary roles; ad­versary control of the names used in resource retrieval, using name controls; the adversary control of the bindings used in name resolution; and adversary access to the resource retrieved.
Sentence 2: we focus on the challenges of ad­versary roles and name control via program .ows, de.ning simple models for expressing each that leverages a variety of prior work.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This is because the new Pout satis.es Cout (Duser , Dkernel ) = Cin (Duser , D ' kernel ) by reusing the legacy binary code Cin of Pout .
Sentence 2: pout can use all the syscall, APIs invoked by itself in SVM, and it transparently updates the state of D ' of GVM and achieves the same effect of running the kernel corresponding Pin in GVM, but with higher trustworthiness.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: At a high level, a system using PCE allows the patient to use her decryption key to generate subkeys which will allow her delegates to search and access only certain parts of her record.
Sentence 2: the goals of PCE are: Guarantee Strong Security PCE will (1) guarantee the patient s privacy: the patient should have con.dence that the administrators of the health data server will not learn anything about the patient s record7 , (2) guarantee security in the case of server compromise: even if the server is compromised or stolen, the patient should be certain that his data has not been 7with the exception of trivial information like the existence and size of the record.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, we believe many of the techniques we employ to accomplish this e.ectively and with high .delity in a virtualized SMP environment are novel.
Sentence 2: we provide an account of how to overcome three classes of signi.cant challenges in this envi­ronment: (i) inducing regular and frequent attacker-VM ex­ecution despite the coarse scheduling quanta used by VMM schedulers; (ii) overcoming sources of noise in the informa­tion available via the cache timing channel, both due to hardwarefeatures(e.g.,CPUpower saving) andduetosoft­ware ones(e.g.,VMM execution); and(iii) dealing with core migrations, which give rise to cache readings with no in­formation of interest to the attacker (i.e., the victim was migrated to a core not shared by the attacker).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If we have created a signature for detecting confused deputy attack , we can check internally the name of the applications trying to obtain IMEI information from other applications.
Sentence 2: if an application sends an RPC code to get IMEI information and the application is not one of the legal applications that can request IMEI information to other legal applications, we can identify the application as a malicious one.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: How­ever, telling whether C was generated as a re-encryption of C * may be problematic, especially when the re-encryption algorithm is randomized.
Sentence 2: requiring that C is not the result of running the re-encryption algorithm on the challenge ciphertext C * , for any randomness, would result in an overly weak de.nition, since a re-encryption algorithm could arti.cially output any string in {0, 1} * with negligi­ble but positive probability.
Relationship: entailment