sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Table 2: Performance Evaluation of DS No.
Sentence 2: of Policies Load Time Evaluation Time (w/o cache) Evaluation Time(with cache) 10 5ms 48ms 38ms 100 15ms 64ms 46ms 1000 29ms 88ms 64ms  the time taken by the DS for xDAuth policy loading and evaluation is heavily dependent on the number of policies.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Signing: Message m, compute r = m· gk mod p, ´r = r mod q, s = -k - r · x mod q, and output (r, s).
Sentence 2: verification Verify s < q, compute r_ = r mod q, and check that gs · yr · r = m .it is advised to apply some redundant function R to a message m and use R(m) instead of m[4].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This paper is sim­ilar to ours in that it deals with the interplay between high level properties and lowlevel policies and deals with both static and run­time analysis.
Sentence 2: it is limited to analyzing the assignment of users to roles, and so only deals with enforcement on an access control policyand statelevel,but not on an actionexecutionlevel.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Concerning inner edges, doubly incident to the outer face, their number is m-1, hence their contribution to the boundary size is at most 2(m-1).
Sentence 2: the contribution of dummy faces is maximum when a dummy face is produced by a true stem immediately preceded by a false stem: as there are m+ 2 stems, there may be at most p m+2 ldummy faces, each contributing for 2 4 edges.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: From this point onwards, the principle of booting is like in TPM where every component takes a measurement of the next component to be run.
Sentence 2: in MTM the measurement can be further validated against a certi.cate a Reference Integrity Metric (RIM) before the measurement is extended into the Plat­form Con.guration Registers (PCRs).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Figure 4(a) shows that the difference between RSVAMO and RSMV are relatively small, and .RS varies between -0.02 and 0.06.
Sentence 2: the three remaining validity indexes (Figure 4(b) through Figure 4(d)) clearly show that VAMO s reference cluster­ing agrees more closely with the underlying true clustering C, com­pared to the majority voting-based reference clustering.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We also acknowledge that our validations on some possible explanations proposed in this work may be not absolutely rigorous, due to the di.culties in thoroughly obtaining crim­inal accounts social actions or motivations.
Sentence 2: we be­lieve that our .rst-in-its-kind analysis of those phenomenon still provides great values and opens a new door to better understand the cyber criminal ecosystem on Twitter.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Access-key or Cipher-text tracing, Eavesdropping and Spoofing (Reading and recording the messages passed between tags and interrogators), and Man-in-the-Middle attack (Modifying the messages passed between tags and interrogators) -Tag output is indistinguishable from truly random values and un-linkable to EPC.
Sentence 2: the tag output is not constant and also it does not expose any meaningful information.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In order to guarantee transmission for all nodes during a time slot, the latin square dimension P (which decides the number of available channels) must at least be equal to the number of colors produced by the vertex-coloring step.
Sentence 2: a graph G with maximum degree D needs at least D+1 colors to be distance-2 colored, and is upper bound by o(L2) [14].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Still, item-level RFID tagging is often consid­ered to be 5 or more years in the future for retail RFID appli­cations, due to the cost of tags, reader infrastructure, and uncertainty about near term applications.
Sentence 2: li­brary RFID applications require item-level tagging, because RFIDs are used to manage each item in a library collection.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Given knowledge of the target selection algorithm, the sequence of scans could be re-enacted to provide a detailed view of the worm s evolution, and also provide insights into characteristics of the in­fected hosts.
Sentence 2: although the information required for this approach (i.e., the payload) can be recovered locally, the mecha­nism can not be easily generalized to other worms, since each in­stance will have to undergo the same, possibly arduous, task of reverse-engineering.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Other PCAs mentioned in this paper whose evaluation results do not depend on the order of sub-policies, such as permit­override, strong-consensus, and weak-majority, can also be spec­i.ed using linear constraints.
Sentence 2: the linear constraint ap­proach cannot specify .rst-applicable , as the evaluation of linear constraints does not take the order of policies into account.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Speci.cally,itworksby arti.ciallygenerating exceptions and using the exception handling mechanisms (i.e., signal han­dling) to hide normal control .ow.
Sentence 2: each exception used for obfuscationis standalone and.ow-insensitive,which makesthe level of obscuritydirectly rely on the number of exceptions.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Liakh, Grace, and Jiang [25] analyze the enforcement of the write exclusive-or execute regime for Linux kernel pages, and propose .xes for each violation.
Sentence 2: on the 3.2.48 x86-64 vanilla Linux kernel we used, we were able to verify (by performing a page table dump) that writable and executable kernel pages remain.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The following trigger closely resembles the pre-condition constraint (1): s:activateManager for John .
Sentence 2: enable Junior_Employee (assume John is the manager)  the only if semantics of the pre-condition constraint requires that there be no other events that will enable the Junior_Employee role, i.e., the Junior_Employee role is not enabled if John does not activate the Manager role.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Furthermore, we .nd particularly interesting to compare our method withthe onesof(externalor internal)ear recognition.Infact,sim­ilar to our method, also these methods could be used for authen­ticating the user answering a phone call, without requiring a spe­ci.c interaction for the authentication.
Sentence 2: these methods have the drawbacks discussed before: theysuffer from in.uence of externalfactors (e.g.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: By avoiding the use of the forking lemma, the GDL-and SJKEA-based security reduction of OAKE in Theorem 6.2 is as tight as the GDH-based security reduction of KEA, which is in turn much tighter than the GDH-based analysis of OAKE in The­orem 6.2.
Sentence 2: the GDH-based security re­duction of OAKE is still tighter than that of HMQV based on GDH and SKEA.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Approaches to information-.ow tracking can be split roughly into two cate­gories: programming language-based techniques [13], which are generally .ne-grained and static, and techniques used in operating systems (e.g., [10, 4]), which are coarse-grained and dynamic.
Sentence 2: both Breeze and the Safe hardware support dynamic enforcement of .ne-grained in­formation .ow, as done in [2]: indeed, a low-level dynamic approach allows our platform to run programs that were not statically checked or compiled with our compiler.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: About two years prior to the participatory observation, the IDS had been installed by the security specialists in one particular network domain.
Sentence 2: it soon crashed, pos­sibly due to memory space issues (the IDS GUI did not pro­vide practitioners with functionality to manage the IDS s use of the hard-disk partitions), and/or from additional tra.c from a newly-added wireless network.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: assumes that the malicious tag agrees to yield partial information about the secret key so as to aid the adversary, but not if the adversary can directly use the data for future authentication.
Sentence 2: the attack is in itself somewhat impractical, or .awed, since (a) when the tag helps, the ad­versary s success probability is not overwhelming (just sig­ni.cantly larger than guessing probability); (b) when the tag stops helping, the adversary has a lower probability to succeed than before, but not an insigni.cant one.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Notethatthereisnoexpliitmentionoftheationwithin authorizations,theationbeingalwaysthesubmissionofthe SOAPrequesttotheSOAPGateway.
Sentence 2: iftheobjetofanauthorizationisEnvelope,theautho­rizationreferstotherequestasawhole;andiftheauthoriza­tionisnegative,itsenforementimpliesaompleterejetion oftherequest.Asalreadydisussed,theobjetanalso beanyelementoftheSOAPrequesttree(e.g.,toidentify, withintheBody'stree,speifparametersthatrequestor annotspeify).3 Onemightobjetthatnegativeauthorizationsassignedto rolesareunreliable,asusersmaysimplynotpresenttheir roleertifate.thisisnotaprobleminourontext wherenegativeauthorizationsforarolewillbeprimarily usedtospeifyexeptionstopositiveauthorizationsgranted totheroleitself(whihtheuserisobviouslypresenting).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Their rewriting techniques typically target the assembly code yielded by a speci.c compiler with speci.c compiler options (e.g., [25, 39, 53, 58, 61]) or type-safe byte-code languages (e.g., [2, 6, 16]).
Sentence 2: most static binary rewriters make strong assumptions about target binaries in order to successfully preserve their behavior.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.2 Platform locking issues At .rst glance, mandating certain security con.gurations might seem like a practical solution to the whitelist manage­ment problems: the service provider would select a number of con.gurations that they consider trustworthy and force the users to use them to access their service.
Sentence 2: man­dating the use of proprietary security software can impose severe usability and compatibility penalties, and must be treated with caution.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Tracing Algorithm without Knowledge of the Sub­group containing traitors We will now present a tracing algorithm that doesn t necessarily need to locate the user group that contains all of the traitors.
Sentence 2: we are still under the same assumption on the geometry of traitor lo­cations: all of the traitors T are in the same user group Ul = {u2k·l+1,...,u2k·l+2k} for some l .
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.5 Pseudorandom Function That IC card has few random source causes problem when it uses probabilistic signature scheme since most of proba­bilistic signature schemes are known to be weak if the ran­dom tapes used for signing are revealed.
Sentence 2: most of deterministic signatures such as RSA-FDH [5] and BLS signature [11] are ine.cient.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Conventional X.509 digital certificates [2] provide all desirable characteristics except privacy since the individual s identity is explicitly included in plaintext on the certificate.
Sentence 2: blind certificates [3, 4] (including limited show certificates) provide guaranteed privacy, but do not provide accountability, or an audit trail, and cannot be used in a regulatory reporting context since it is impossible to link a blind certificate to its owner after it has been signed.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Certainly, this is necessary for a complete understanding of the underlying mechanisms in modern encryption algorithms.
Sentence 2: the vast majority of people developing or evaluating a cryptosystem will never create or crypto-analyze the underlying Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This allows for Turing-complete behavior in the target program without the need for injecting attack code, thus signi.cantly negat­ing current code injection defense e.orts (e.g., W.X).
Sentence 2: its inherent characteristics, such as the re­liance on the stack and the consecutive execution of return­oriented gadgets, have prompted a variety of defenses to detect or prevent it from happening.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As we explain in Section 5, applications do not use many undocumented APIs, so the omissions of these APIs from Stowaway s mapping does not result in false detection of overdeclaration by Stowaway on real applications.
Sentence 2: the inclusion of these undocu­mented APIs in PScout s mapping allows us to perform a more complete analysis of Android s permission map.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 5.3 Comparing Sandboxing and Language Overheads Past, published measurements of SFI-based sandboxing slowdown have considered only fully-optimized, ahead-of-time compiled versions of C and C++ benchmarks like SPEC [20, 44, 46, 56].
Sentence 2: the SciMark Benchmark Suite includes C as well as C# implementations of its benchmarks.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Resistance is a measure of the degree to which the group does or does not do the work of executing the information exchange.
Sentence 2: novelty is a measure of the degree to which the group has done prior work developing a persistent operational infrastructure to support the execution of the information exchange, including but not limited to: the production of documentation, the allocation of budget and staff, and the degree to which the information exchange is codified in contracts, laws and regulations As is the case with resistance, we consider groups to be more unified in their work practices if the information exchange is well established in both groups environment and more diverse if it is more novel.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: With the di.erent wavelet bases and decomposition levels, the TSH transform [3] can extract dif­ferent kinds of information from the media, and is therefore very likely to be used to watermarking and encryption [1].
Sentence 2: the traditional .ngerprinting methods do not con­sider the relationship between users and the tremendous s­cale of social network, they then cannot be applied to secure media sharing in social network environment.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Here, we assume that the cloud actsas asemi-honest party (honestbut-curious); whichfollows the rules of the protocol but is free to later use the intermediate re­sults it sees to compromise the security.
Sentence 2: since the data is in encrypted form and the encryption scheme is probabilisitic, the intermediate results computed by the cloud are random values uniformly distributed in ZN .
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In many cases, we expect the e.ective user ID to be the same as the real user ID, because access control is based customarily on the invoker, i.e., the user whose process is attempting access.
Sentence 2: the e.ective and the real user IDs may di.er in cases wherein, for example, we want the authorization to be granted based on the owner of the program rather than the invoker of the program.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In fact, if ISSE is properly utilized from the beginning of a systems engineering process, ISSE may provide additional benefits such as identifying and mitigating system risk in regards to cost, schedule and performance earlier on and thus further enhance a system s ability to remain on target [9].
Sentence 2: due to the extreme difficulty of properly measuring IA effectiveness and because IA is not always a black box that can be engineered, procured and just simply placed on a system and expected to solve all IA worries, it is extremely difficult to warrant the need of ISSE without stating just because or relying on corporate or governmental regulations.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The manufacturer was able to .x the Mobile Java prob­lem in the latest models which have not been delivered to thecustomersatthat time.
Sentence 2: patchingallor most of thealready deployed mobilephonesishardbecause mostof the end-users will never notice that theirphones are vulner­ableanddonot takecareofpatchingtheirphones.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 0.8 0.7 anomalies that have a big impact on the total energy con­ 0.6 sumption.
Sentence 2: short bursts of energy consumption will 0.6 Test data (days)  0.9 Figure 12: Classi.cation accuracy with di.erent res- Average accuracy not be recognizable at low resolutions.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When the dealer is faulty, some honest parties may terminate a weak AVSS protocol and others may not, but those who terminate hold consistent shares and axe guaranteed that there are enough honest parties holding shares in order to reconstruct the se- cret.
Sentence 2: aVSS guarantees that either all honest parties terminate the protocol successfully or none, which ensures agreement on the success of the sharing.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This richer authentication of e-mail can be enabled by eliminating the server in favor of a peer-to-peer e-mail paradigm because a sysadmin for a central mail service cannot possibly take the time to assess the rich authentication inputs for every sin­gle email routed through the system, even in relatively low­volume environments.
Sentence 2: something more akin to peer-to-peer or a hybrid between peer-to-peer and central­ized mail could make this tractable.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: gating these policies together, newer police(s) should  Figure 4: Composite Strategy for Policy Con.ict Resolution takeprecedencetorespondanaccess requestthat matches policiesfromdi.erentpolicy sets.
Sentence 2: this strat­egy may not alwaysresolvethepolicy con.ictssinceno authorization wins when two con.icting policies have the same timestamps 1 .
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note that both Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 are speci.cally optimized for twisted Edwards curves with parameter a = -1 and do not work for curves with arbitrary a.
Sentence 2: both algorithms are independent of the second curve parameter d. There exist a variety of algorithms for computing a sca­lar multiplication using point additions and doublings; see e.g.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: From the de.nition of x 0, f(x 0) = f(x 0 + Ed) and f(x 0) = f(x 0 - Ed), meaning that 1 f(x 0) = (f(x 0 + Ed) + f(x 0 - Ed)).
Sentence 2: 2 since f is a convex function, we have that for all E > 0 f(x 0) = f(x 0 + Ed) = f(x 0 - Ed).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Unfortunately, the advantages of KEA/OPACITY usu­ally correspond to the disadvantages of (H)MQV, and vice versa.
Sentence 2: as the session-key structure of KEA/OPACITY and that of (H)MQV are di.erent in na­ture, it is uneasy or .exible to implement both of them and then switch between them according to di.erent application scenarios, particularly for applications based on low-power devices.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: They can remove the public information of this adversary from the LIST.
Sentence 2: as a result, this adversary will not be identi.ed even if submits multiple claims against the same peer for the same reason because the output of the public tracing procedure will al­ways be always NO-ONE.weargue that,given that there are s copies of the public information for each member, and they are uniformly distributed within the net­work, the probability (denoted as pad)thatthe entry for an adversary in the LIST is stored only by the adversary group is vert small.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We de.ne the traf.c density t£ of a geographic location £ as the number of trips that start, end, or traverse through £ in a .xed interval of time 1Consequently, our experiments also focus on trips in this geographic region.
Sentence 2: sybilQuery can automaticallygenerate Sybil queries for any geographic region if provided with asimilar traf.c database for that region.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, even on adesk­top with a wired Internet connection, downloading approximately 60GB of data is time-consuming for the tester and unscalable for thecloudprovider.5 Asfarasoption(3),recentadvancesin,and optimization of, single-serverPIR techniques haveyieldedpromis­ing results that might be ef.cient enough for the tester s desktop or laptop, especially if queried database is maintained in a cloud cluster[8].
Sentence 2: sinceouremphasisinthispaperisonthe smartphoneplatform, weleave thisitemforfuture work.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: passwords p.us (user) and p.ad (admin), or via vulnerability v. In this case, v is a remote­to-user vulnerability since it is accessible from any host on the internet and results in user privilege gained over the host Operating System.
Sentence 2: the host also contains an exposure exp which is forever repeating the action of releas­ing credential p.ad.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: KDI-SECURE PRFS IN THE STANDARD MODEL We have shown that an ideal cipher is also a KDI-secure PRF with respect to any function g that does not depend on the cipher itself.
Sentence 2: we saw, in the examples following De.nition 1, that in the standard model a secure cipher (or PRF) does not have to be KDI-secure, not even with respect to simple functions such as the identity func­tion.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: PAK allows Alice and randomness available to Alice and Bob comes from a weak Bob to agree on arbitrarily many random session keys using secret W whose entropy is k = 2 n .
Sentence 2: in our setting, the secret W , and achieves strong security guarantees even we assume that the parties also have access to a local (non­when the entropy k is very low.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The concept of authentication has been previously applied and used by (i) Quire [8] for provid­ing provenance proof on inter-component communications in Android, (ii) A2 [2, 1] for authenticating native Linux appli­cations, and (iii) the authenticated system calls [21] for pre­venting misuse of system calls.
Sentence 2: developing an au­thentication model for Android applications imposes unique technical challenges since the Android framework primar­ily runs Java applications running in virtual machines and makes use of features such as application services that run in background.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The difference between the GPU-assisted 4.2.2 emulator on the Mac and a real Galaxy Nexus, like all of the timing results, is statisti­cally signi.cant (Wilcoxon test, W = 8.1 × 106 , p < .001).
Sentence 2: gPU assistance on Windows emulators does not considerably improve upon collected values.
Relationship: contrasting