sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As shown, there are eight nodes in the network (i is external) with limited accessibility as shown by the edges.
Sentence 2: for attackers to compromise a Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro.t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the .rst page.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Conversely, if transferring the encrypted genome is part of the online phase, transfer dominates complexity of SPH-PSM.
Sentence 2: the preferredinstantiation is EC-ElGamal, since group elements are much smaller (160-bit), as opposed to 1024-bit in AH-ElGamal and 2048-bit in Paillier, using the same security parameters.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For =Xi N (a, d2), it is well-known that rms(f ) 1.253 · d/ n. We have cal­culated that, for k 8 n, rms * (f , k) = a · rms(f ) where = a 1 + 0.101k2 .
Sentence 2: f is (k, a)-resilient for this value of a.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We now examine protocol ECKE-1 in relation to the secu­rity attributes de.ned in section 2; informal arguments are provided to support our claims: KK-S: Every session key sk is uniquely derived from the random ephemeral keys rA, rB and the static private keys wA, wB (through construction of eA, eB , dAdB).
Sentence 2: an adversary with known session keys but no information on rA, rB, wA, wB , has a negligible probability of mounting a successful attack against any run of the protocol since extracting this data requires (at least) tractability of the Elliptic Curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: INTRODUCTION The consequences of unauthorized access to digital doc­ument content can be severe when a .nancial statement is modi.ed, a con.dential business document is disclosed to the public, or a design speci.cation (e.g., in automotive in­dustry) is leaked to a competitor.
Sentence 2: .nancial insti­tutions, governmental agencies and manufacturing compa­nies all face the problem of controlling sensitive documents information when processed and exchanged among several parties within and beyond their boundaries.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Table 1: Simulation Parameters Parameter Description Value/Range Computation a Proportional gain 0.1 ß Integral gain 0.9 Setting .1 Positive derivative gain 0.05 .2 Negative derivative gain 0.2 Environment g Fraction of compromised guards [0, 1/3, 2/3, 1] Setting d Drop rate by compromised relay 0 = d = 1 f Transient network failure 0.21  21%.
Sentence 2: we set the circuit failure rate, f to 0.21 in all our simulations.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The notion of d-consistency is useful, since it p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 u1 0 1 0 0 1 u2 1 1 1 0 1 u3 1 1 0 1 1 u4 1 1 1 0 0 Table 1: User-privilege assignment helps to bound the degree of approximation.
Sentence 2: we now de.ne the approximate Role Mining Problem using d­consistency.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Therefore, group N - N - N leader-L1leader-L2 C join = × Cgroup (2) N where C is given by: group group group Cgroup =Cupdate + Crekey (3) with group member C = H × M + H × N × M update leader leader member member update (4) and group region-memberCrekey =H region × Nmember × M update (5) The cost for group leave event includes three cases: non-leader member leaves, L1-leader leaves, and L2-leader leaves.
Sentence 2: the cost for group leave event is: non-leader leader-L1 leader-L2Cleave = Cleave + Cleave + Cleave (6) with N - N - N non-leader leader-L1leader-L2 Cleave = ×Cgroup (7)N leader-L1 change Cleave =Pleader-L1 × (Cgroup + C ) (8) leader-L1 leader-L2 change Cleave =Pleader-L2 ×Cleader-L2 (9) L1 L2 Pleader-L1 =N L1 / N L1 + N member + N member (10) L1 L1 L2Pleader-L2 =N member / N L1 + N member + N member (11) where C is given earlier in Eq.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For instance, we may wish to allow an access purpose to be used by a set of users only in a speci.c time interval (e.g., business hours) or only when the users are logged into speci.c machines (e.g., machine identi.cation number).
Sentence 2: the system informa­tion that a.ects the access purpose authorizations must be clearly de.ned and available to the access control system.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The entropy of this class of triangulation with a boundary is however a =2.17 bits per face (plus a ßk lg m term to take into account the number of sides into which the boundary is divided).
Sentence 2: the additive part of the entropy leads to a representation which is compact, but succinct only for class of triangulations with a boundary (recall that the class of triangulations of the sphere has only entropy 1.62 bits per triangle).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, .ngerprints correspond­ing to worm packets should appear with a frequency determined by the number of worm packets observed in the observation epoch.
Sentence 2: given a suf.ciently large observation epoch over which one observes multiple worm packets, and a .ngerprint universe that is signi.cantly larger, one can create inverse distributions where the .ngerprints that appear only in the background traf.c are essen­tially squashed against the y-axis.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Detecting a communica­  Figure 1: Basic ideas tion carried out to transfer the program itself in order for the program to infect another terminal when the malicious program any were present in the LAN.
Sentence 2: remove malicious programs easier by .nding the infected from the history of communication even if the infection and preven­tion of infection has been successful it is possible.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Therefore, to determine whether X satis.es a 5CF term, one can .rst determine whether X satis.es each of the 4CF sub-terms, and then combine these results using logical conjunction and disjunction.
Sentence 2: for a 1CF term f, if it is a unit term, then it is straightforward to determine whether X satis.es f, because a unit term can be satis.ed only by a singleton set, and because of the de.nitions of n and U.If f is of the form t+,where t is a unit term, then one just needs to determine whether each user in X satis.es t. one can ef.ciently check whether X satis.es an 1CF term.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Later on, if the knot initiates a JREP it will synchronize the pseudonym of the new estab­lished route to its united pseudonym (Kseed1 ) in the same way.
Sentence 2: if a received data packet is forwarded by a knot only once using its united route pseudonym, all of the knots connected to it will receive it.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: After one last next-ror with |R3| = 20, S1 remains the same, S2 = HK(S4||S2||S1) = HK(4||R2||R2), R3 = S2.
Sentence 2: a obtains a 20-byte string in the last next-ror­oracle that is predictable (R3 = HK(4||R2||R2)), whereas this event should occur with probability 2-80 .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Table 1: Common data .ow instructions Mnemonic Op1 Op2 Movement Instructions mov r/m r/m/imm xchg r/m r/m push r/m/imm NA pop r/m NA lea r r/m Arithmetic Instructions add r/m r/m/imm sub r/m r/m/imm inc r/m NA dec r/m NA mul r/m NA Logic Instructions and r/m r/m/imm not r/m NA or r/m r/m/imm xor r/m r/m/imm Key r: Operand can be a register m: Operand can be a memory address imm: Operand can be an immediate value NA: Operand not used Edge Confusion Factor is de.ned as ECF = (OE -UE) / OE, where OE is the count of control .ow edges in the original program and UE is the number of original control .ow edges which remain in the obfuscated program.
Sentence 2: eCF is the percentage of original edges in the control .ow graph which have been hidden through embedding.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: SineKeyNoteallowsdelegation,deentralizedadminis­trationbeomesfeasible(establishingahierarhyorwebof administration,forthediferentdepartmentsorevenindi­vidualsystems).Usersarealsoabletodelegateauthority toaessmahinesorserviestheythemselveshaveaess to.Althoughthismayinitiallyseemounter­intuitive(after all,frewallsembodytheoneptofentralizedontrol),in ourexperieneusersanalmostalways4bypassafrewall's flteringmehanisms,usuallybythemostinseureandde­strutivewaypossible(e.g.,givingawaytheirpassword, settingupaproxyorloginserveronsomeotherport,et.).
Sentence 2: itisbettertoallowforsomefexibilityinthesystem, aslongastheusersfollowtheoverallpoliy.Alsonotethat itispossibleto"turnof"delegation.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Hence, the attacker tries to .nd p, q, or d. Since the size of the key is very large, e.g., 1024 bits, the exponentiation is (even on todays very powerful PC platforms) still very expensive in terms of the execution time.
Sentence 2: actual implemen­tations of RSA usually employ very e.cient and optimized algorithms to accelerate the result of this operation.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To show this, we prove that an adversary that computes a lin­ear combination of the checking equation for a set of inputs X , can also resolve 3-SAT on this same set X : given any 3-CNF F, it can .nd a satisfying assignment for F in X (if one exists).
Sentence 2: under the Bounded Speedup Hypothesis, the set X must be of polynomial size, and the adversary can be simulated.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Fur­thermore, keyed one-way hash functions include a key as an additional argument.
Sentence 2: we may have: f(x, y + z)= h(f(x, y),z) where f is the keyed one-way hash function, h is the com­pression function, x is a key, and y + z represents the con­catenation of block z to y. Concatenation (+) associates to the left.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We .lter outliers in both directions because when large fraction of the guards are compromised, com­promised exits tend to obtain a higher reputation score (as majority of the circuits have a compromised guard in such scenario) compared to the other honest relays.
Sentence 2: under our assumption a high reputation score does not al­ways imply a trustworthy relay, rather a reputation score in the vicinity of the expected reputation score implies (proba­bilistically) a trustworthy relay.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A role view defined by a set of roles {r1, ,rn}is a sub-graph of the of the overall role graph with the following properties: 1. the view contains r1, ,rn as nodes; 2. if the view contains a role r, then it contains any user or role q such that q.r; 3. the view contains no other nodes except those included by rules 1, 2; 4. the view contains an arc q.r iff q and r are included in the view and q.r is an arc in the original graph.
Sentence 2: to define a view it suffices to indicate the most general roles contained in that view, which are called principal nodes of the view.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Register name Needs locking Locking condition Unlocking condition Authorized modi.cations SP CF SP CF SP Start SSCR No Partial Yes Yes N/A After First Write After First Write After First Write N/A Reboot Reboot Reboot Any Internal to CF instructions None None (b)New registers locking logic Figure 4: Stack con.gurations and control .ow stack pointer description and additional locking logic are 16 bit values and are modi.ed with two instructions.
Sentence 2: the update of the stack pointer is non atomic anditsvaluecanbetemporallyinvalid.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In addition, the conventional setups for EM display stealing were non-portable and assumed to be placed in doors or cars, which imposed a limit on proximity of approach to the target display.
Sentence 2: the previous studies [6][8][11] have discussed mainly zone-based countermeasures [16] that decrease the intensity of EM emanations to the background noise floor before those emanations reach eavesdroppers.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: User-Centric Identity as a Service-Architecture for eIDswith Selective Attribute Disclosure Daniel SlamanigKlaus Stranacher Bernd Zwattendorfer Graz University of TechnologyE-Government Innovation E-Government Innovation (IAIK)Center (EGIZ)Center (EGIZ)daniel.slamanig@tugraz.at klaus.stranacher@egiz.gv.at bernd.zwattendorfer@egiz.gv.at ABSTRACT Unique identi.cation and secure authentication of users are essential processes in numerous security-critical areas such as e-Government, e-Banking, or e-Business.
Sentence 2: many countries (particularly in Europe) have implemented na­tional eID solutions within the past years.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Fortunately, this con.u­enceof thedata-.owand code-.owgraphsof anapp isonly problematic if the arguments originate outside the current method body (recall that data-.ow within a method is well­de.ned).
Sentence 2: it is possible to ignore a large number of re.ection calls, as many such calls use constant arguments in practice.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Pr(PtIPt-1)= Pr([Pt]I[Pt-1])(l-p[p.])  {[Pt] =[Pt-1],Pt=[Pt]ent,Pt-1=[Pt-1]exit l-p[p.][Pt]=[Pt-1]and Ptis the next state of Pt-1  p[p.] Pt=Pt-1  0otherwise 4.3 Incorporation of additional observable variables As shown in Figure 4, the state 7tat time instance tis decided based on the state 7t-1at the previous time instance as well as the current period Ytand the scheduled plan zt.
Sentence 2: the state tran­sition probability distribution should be given by the conditional probability Pr(7tI7t-1,Yt,zt)for each quadruple (7t,7t-1,Yt,zt).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In most cases,thebinomial theorempredictsthat combin­ing three decisions for the 4-action neural network should be more accurate than combining two decisions for the 6­or 8-action neural networks.
Sentence 2: we choose to use a neural network with 4 actions as input, which gives true positive and negative rates of 0.971-0.977 and 0.959-0.973, respectively.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Once the malicious Flash object is loaded in the victim s browser, any requests towards the target sub­domain will carry the victim s credentials, contained in an HTTP cookie or a session variable, and will originate from the victim s IP address.
Sentence 2: the adversary is able to launch a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attack as CSRF defense mechanisms [7] are ren­dered ineffective.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: pnk = n k dk(1 - d)n-k Moreover, the probability of his guessing all of the n - k unknown images is g n-k where g is the chance of guessing one ( 14 in our interface), and in that case he learns n - k images.
Sentence 2: for each attempted captcha he can expect on average to learn: n X f1 = g n-k(n - k)pnk k=0 Recall that the attacker is attempting captchas at rate aC, and that this must allow him to learn at least as fast as dfh, so: fa = aCf1 = dfh (2) Equation (1) and inequality (2) place a lower bound on the fraction a of the tra.c to the captcha necessary for the attacker to sustain in order to continue knowing a fraction d of the database.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: All bits in a bit vector being 0 means no path from this point is normal thus there is an anomaly.
Sentence 2: our hardware implementation of n-jump path checking detects the anomaly as soon as possible rather than waits for another n-1 jump instructions following the current jump and builds the n-jump path then checks whether the n-jump path is seen during training.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Disadvantage: However, for the same location, enryptk(address)remains the same every time the value is written into memory.
Sentence 2: a series of data value 0, 1, 2,... generated at address addrwill have a series of ciphertexts enryptk(addr), 1Eenryptk(addr), 2E enryptk(addr)which amounts to CC1ECC2EC where Cis a constant.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A Dependent Federation is related and distinct from a Federation in the following ways It is dependent on a Federation, in the sense it can­not be created or sustained without a prior existing federation  They are related for the same User, but created be­tween di.erent RP and the same AP  The User Identity Information federated within a De­pendent Federation with the secondary RP, would be sub-set of the information federated with the primary RP  A Dependent Federation is bound by the same con­straints (time-based validity etc) as the primary fed­eration and ceases to exist if the primary federation is disabled.
Sentence 2: it is now possible for the primary RP to enable the creation of a Dependent Federation between the secondary RP and the AP.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Typically, the OPF process is executed after the state estimation process to determine necessary changes in the generation dispatch.
Sentence 2: in this model, we consider that a change in the power consumption mea­surement (as it is estimated by the state estimation pro­cess) speci.es the change in the load, that is: .1=j=b .P G = 0 (13) j  3.4 Formalization of False Data Injection toMeasurements In order to launch an attack, the attacker must alter a set of measurements, which depend on the changes that are required to be made on di.erent power .ows or consumptions.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In group signature schemes, group members can be veri- fied to have valid membership and have the ability to sign messages anonymously, in addition, group signature schemes have many special properties such as anonymity, unlinkability, traceabi-lity, coalition-resistance, non-framing etc.
Sentence 2: many articles regard group signature schemes as a kind of effective tools in the design of auction schemes.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Similarly, modi.cations to the MTM SLBs result in a termi­nation, because the PCR17 value of a modi.ed MTM SLB is di.erent from the value used during the setup.
Sentence 2: the DigestAtRelease (DaR) of the sealed common key prevents the TPM from unsealing the common key.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While the app would still require the corresponding permissions such as android.permission.INTERNET for being allowed to open network sockets, a purely Java-based call tracer would not be able to detect any communication conducted using native calls.
Sentence 2: the dynamic analyzer should have the abil­ity to trace code included in native shared objects, those included with the app through the NDK as well as those shipped with Android.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In order detect new attacks classes, an IDS should not rely on the description of known attacks (e.g., DNS poisoning or OSPF attacks), their speci.c features (e.g., increased number of failed TCP connections) or even on monitoring known attacks surfaces (e.g., DNS cache or routing table), since a new attack class might ex­ploit the vulnerabilities of previously unexplored attack sur­faces, which might have signi.cantly di.erent features from those of previous attacks.
Sentence 2: the knowledge­based IDS approach is not suitable for the task at hand.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this case, the policy that keys cannot be used by others is inscribed in the key itself.
Sentence 2: the policy can be changed as well: it will no longer be prohibited to give keys away (they will be useless without the owner anyway), or even the applicability of the social norm changes (as the key will now be useless, it doesn t make sense to give it to someone; one would not want to give somebody a useless object).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: )Iftwopre.xesarerelatedbyxIjcyIk thenwewillsaythatxIjisasubpre.xofyIkandthatyIkisasuperpre.xofxIj.Wewillusethetermspropersubpre.xandpropersuperpre.xtodenotethecasethatthetwopre.xesarenotequal.Notethatthesubpre.xesofxIjaretheelementsofthesubtreeofthepre.xtreerootedatxIjandthesuperpre.xesofxIj arethenodesonthepathfromtheroottoxIjinclusive.
Sentence 2: delegation: Suppose,asanexample,anorganizationDexplicitlydelegatestheaddresspre.xxIjtoanorganizationC.CmaywanttousesomepartsoftheaddressesinxIjforitsownhostsaswellasdelegatesomesubpre.xesofxIjtootherorganizations.C maydelegatex.OlI(j+2)toClandx.lOlI(j+)toC2,etc.AtthispointwearenotrestrictingCtobehavingef.cientlyorpropertly.Cmayalsodelegatex.OlOI(j+)toCl althoughthisisredundantorx.lOI(j+2)toC3althoughthiscon.ictswithC sdelegationtoC2.Ifanorganizationchoosestouseasubpre.xofaddressesunderitsownershipforitsownhosts,ratherthandelegatingtheownershipofthesubpre.xtoanotherorganization,itwillassignthatsubpre.xofaddressestooneofitsASes.TheBGPspeakersofthatASwillthenannouncethepairingofthatASnumberwiththatsubpre.x.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: (15) 0 Let Probir,1 = i = k, denote the probability that Pi has not arrived from the network but can be recovered by the FEC decoder before its due epoch tid .
Sentence 2: the e.ective loss probability of packet Pi, denoted as PLi,can be expressed as PLi =1 -Probai -Probri , 1 =i =k.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In our implementation we use a modi.ed scheme [5] to increase randomness without any additional computational costs: F (c2,...,ck+1)=(p(F (c1,...,ck)+ ck+1 - c1p k)) mod M. (3) The advantage of picking block boundaries using Rabin functions is that when we get an excerpt of a payload and divide it into blocks using the same Rabin function that we used for splitting during the processing of the payload, we will get exactly the same blocks.
Sentence 2: we don t have to try all possible alignments of the .rst block as in previous methods.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We note that we also considered the p-system, a g-SIS system de.ned over the g-SIS0 model with support for all action varieties [11], but were unable to construct a reduction from p-system to (or implementation of (pgS I S, T ) in) any dissemination-centric system that was AC-preserving.
Sentence 2: although there was some success among dissemination-centric systems in implementing speci.c parameterizations of group­centric workloads, these systems do not admit as readily implementations of the fully expressive form of g-SIS without the sacri.ce of basic security guarantees.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Clearly, the most comprehensive security level will be achieved by running a set of those security sensors in parallel; however, this would re­sult in computationally intensive security analyses and hence over­consumption of the system s limited resources.
Sentence 2: the sys- Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro.t or commercial advantage, and that copies bear this notice and the full ci­tation on the .rst page.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Jx the (i, b) component of the challenge ciphertext is instead generated as (removing dependence on the challenge function): Ci,b = E.EncPKi,b (0m).
Sentence 2: after the output of f0,f1 by A3, the challenge ci­phertext is publicly computable from: ([fzl ]: i .
Relationship: reasoning