sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If this is a desirable feature, the SML must be integrated inside the at­testation tokens t, which would remove the need of a direct connection to the prover and the veri.er can collect attesta­tion tokens without noticing the server.
Sentence 2: to ensure freshness of the attestation token and to complete the au­thentication process, a direct communication between server and client is needed.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Several solutions against collusion have been proposed, such as [25] and [15].
Sentence 2: there is no fully-private protocol that is able to securely compute the summation, because no matter how secure the protocol is, the value of one party can be computed directly by subtracting the summation of all other values from the final result if all parties other than this one collude.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Models for language become more accurate as they take into account more context of a given work or character, e.g., the previous k words or characters.
Sentence 2: the computational overhead of using the model increases as one increases k. Determining the strength of the correlation between characters k apart in the string would help determine the optimum value of k. Empirical Distributions and Partial Inde­pendence: Consider two random variables X and Y on [n].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Moreover, they are paramount in threat prediction research, in that they allow us to safely explore the botnet design space in scenarios where the botnet operating parameters have been optimised, something that would be unthinkable with in-the-wild experimentation.
Sentence 2: in comparison with simulation studies, where arti.cial models are used in lieu of real botnet entities, in emulation exper­iments, botnet entities that are either identical or slightly adapted versions of their real-world counterparts, are executed in controlled environments.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: One way to do this would be to use a simple delega­tion pattern, where the trusted service directly exposes the 1https://play.google.com/about/developer-distribution­ agreement.html#prohibited  functionalities needed.
Sentence 2: this solution would imply having a public API on the trusted component able to satisfy all possible usages of private data in an Android application, which seems a requirement very di.cult to satisfy.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As a product of the traditional circuit-switched wireline and wireless telecommunications indus­try associations, the J-standard does not speci.cally address the re­quirements of other (competing) technologies such as Voice-over-IP (VoIP).
Sentence 2: j-standard serves as a guide to many other industry associations to develop their own speci.cations meeting their technical requirements.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: HyperSentry s end-to-end execution time, which is about 35.04 milliseconds, implies 0.4% and 0.2% direct perfor­mance overhead if invoked every 8 and 16 seconds, respec­tively.
Sentence 2: the benchmark output reports an average overhead of 2.4% if HyperSentry is invoked every 8 seconds, and 1.3% if HyperSentry is invoked every 16 seconds.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.2 Viewing and Updating the Record The patient can log in to see the latest version of the record and append or update information such as latest ob­served symptoms, drug e.ects, etc.
Sentence 2: the patient isnotallowedto modifycontentsauthoredby otherparties, such as the lab tests or doctors diagnoses, but is allowed to annotate such content by adding comments [8].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This result is in sharp contrast with the fact that the zero-error ran­domized communication complexity of the equality function over n-bit strings is O(n).
Sentence 2: the information complexity of DISJn turns out to be linear (Theorem 7.2): IC (DISJn,1/2-e)=O(n)for all 0 <e < 1/2.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This assumption allows traceability, 7 and apparentlyincreases usabilityby requiringless userin­put(cf.[28]).
Sentence 2: ourgeneralizedproposal can be extended to generate more restricted ID numbers (even transaction-speci.c numbers), e.g., by includ­ing timestamp, validity period, transaction amount, etc.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Figure 1: Syntax of SECTET-PL Constraints The positive rule perm[rolei]:pcondExpi describes the con­dition pcondExpi under which some role rolei is permitted to ac­cess the resource (the class in this case).
Sentence 2: the negative rule proh[rolej]:ncondExpj describes the condition ncondExpj under which some role rolej is prohibited to access the resource.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: = -1, .... .. = 0  3.2 Adaboost-IHMM with On-line Adjusting Capability Our research adopts Oza s on-line adaboost to adjust normal profile.
Sentence 2: in Oza s procedures of on-line adaboost, a new sample will be trained more than one times in each weak classifier to make this sample be correctly classified, so it may have the problem of model over-training.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 2.3 Claw-Free Permutations As brie.y touched upon in the Introduction, FDH was originally proven secure when an arbitrary trapdoor permu­tation is used [1].
Sentence 2: subsequent work on FDH [11] and PSS [3, 12] has focused on speci.c classes of trapdoor permutations such as the RSA and Rabin per­mutations.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since the signature generation requires comparable amount of computation as veri.cation, generation of a 64-bit signa­ture takes about 1.2 seconds and veri.cation takes about 1 second in our un-optimized implementation.
Sentence 2: in this scheme, the public keys are generated in advance, so the sender must compute twice as many hashes because it must recompute the hashes when he wishes to actually compute a signature instead of simply gener­ating the public key.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: At present, WorSE focuses on sym­bolic execution of HRU-type access control models.
Sentence 2: since our goal is to provide method and tool support for analyz­ing more up-to-date security models like role-based or attribute­based access control models, a symbolic model execution engine class (SMEE class) based on a generic deterministic state machine is implemented here.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: BACKGROUND Torpigisamalwarethathasdrawnmuch attention recentlyfrom thesecurity community.Onthesurface,itisoneofthemanyTrojan horses infesting today s Internet that, once installed on the victim s machine, steals sensitiveinformation and relays it back to its con­trollers.
Sentence 2: the sophisticated techniques it uses to steal data from its victims, the complex network infrastructure it relies on, and thevast .nancial damage thatit causes setTorpig apart from other threats.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Traditional introspection solutions as­sume that even if the guest OS is compromised, their mechanisms and tools, residing at a lower-level (hypervisor) will continue to report accurate results.
Sentence 2: baram et al [4] argued that this security assumption does not hold because an adversary, after gain­ing control of an OS (e.g., through kernel-level rootkits), can tam­per with kernel data structures so as a bogus view of the system is provided for introspection tools.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, in the case of a =0.51, A1 and A2 start to compromise private keys after compromising about 15 nodes, whereas the other attacks start to compromise pri­vate keys after compromising about 20 nodes.
Sentence 2: in order for the attacker to compromise private keys, the attacker has to compromise at least 15 nodes or so in the case of a =0.51, to compromise at least 25 nodes or so in the case of a =0.7, and to compromise at least 35 nodes or so in the case of a =0.9.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In other words, ALLOW-TOPICVIEW would be added more often than the other two a s, and ALLOWTOPICRENAME would be deleted more often than the other two a s. Thus, an­notations on an added rule with ALLOWTOPICRE-NAME and a deleted rule with ALLOWTOPICVIEW should be used carefully in calculating the importance of authorization rules.
Sentence 2: because there can exist many reasons for adding or deleting a rule with ALLOWTOPICCHANGE, it should be nec­essary for users to attach a detailed annotation to the rule.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: And,whenBobdoesnothaveaccess ' '' to di,we have di + ai = di +(-di)=0.
Sentence 2: if Bob is not authorized to access d, then the cloud has no entry ' for Bob corresponding to Epka (d ) and thus upon a data request fromBob,thecloudwillnotrevealanyinformationabout dtoBob (under the assumption that there is no collusion between Bob and thecloud).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: An application, such as the one in Figure 3, typically will generate di.erent query structures depending on the input(theinput value of the variable n, in this case).
Sentence 2: these query structures are generated di.erentially using conditional clauses that check certain values in the input(typically check-boxesinWeb applicationinput), asin inFigure1.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If the component for encryption (say, an encryptor) finds any elements to be encrypted in the series, it encrypts them or their contents and then sends the results as XNI events to a lower-level component.
Sentence 2: if the component for decryption (say, a decryptor) finds any EncryptedData elements to be decrypted in the series, it decrypts them and then sends the results also as XNI events to a lower-level component.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In their system, we can express the authorization property by asserting that every caller on the called stack has the per­mission to execute the current sensitive operation, thus en­abling static veri.cation of permission checking for the given set of classes.
Sentence 2: using their approach one cannot as­sert that every sensitive operation is preceded by a security check, because the security check operation returns (and is no longer in the call stack) when the sensitive operation is performed.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, the attacks were presented in a different context, and the authors focus was more on the development of a small hypervisor to prevent these de­vice passthrough attacks from causing damage in a compromised OS.
Sentence 2: we aim at revealing design, con.guration, and implementation weaknesses in commodity VMMs that can be abused to escalate privileges, read restricted memory regions and perform DoS attacks.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: f. In­tuitively, a location remains private if, regardless of his side knowl­edge (captured by his prior distribution), an adversary draws the same conclusions (captured by his posterior distribution), regard­less of whether hiding has been applied or not.
Sentence 2: if f replaces locations in Paris with those in London, then clearly the adversary s conclusions will be greatly affected.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This .rst, partial solution works in the case of a semi­honest veri.er and it is described in Section 3.
Sentence 2: this protocol is not zero-knowledge against a malicious V , who can mount all the well-known active attacks against Yao s protocol (garbling a function di.erent than the one he is supposed to, selective failure attack during the input phase [KS06] etc.).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The intra-scan variance imposes limitations on our system.
Sentence 2: 4.3 Feature Noise Each person s ngerprint consists of a xed set of minutiae locations mi = (xi, yi) E M. due to systematic errors in image capture, processing, and alignment, noise is added to each point, such that our nal points are mi ' = (xi + nxi, yi + nyi ) Additionally, the processing noise may discard features or add additional features that are not present on the actual ngerprint.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: What we found is that the content of device needs to match the Android ID within the Authorization .eld to let the request go through.
Sentence 2: x-GOOG.USER_AID does not need to be consistent with the other two .elds, which turns out to be a security-critical logic .aw that can be exploited by an unau­thorized party to collect sensitive user messages.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This means that, for example, in the context of rapid malware that is obfuscated to make disas­sembly and manual analysis dif.cult, even if the attacker makes no speci.c effort to hide the malware s timetable, by the time a new worm is unpacked and all of its date and time calculations are reverse-engineered, the critical time may have passed.
Sentence 2: all checks of the date and the time and conversions to different formats can be traced back to the SystemTime timer, and ultimately to the PIT; and a suitably control-.ow­sensitive, full-system, machine-level symbolic execution imple­mentation should be able to discover and trace any predicates on any form of the date and time from this source, or from other known sources such as NTP.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Second, keyboard is much more complex than mouse in structure, and thus keystroke dynamics are more easily a.ected by di.erent kinds of keyboards in terms of shape, size, and layout.
Sentence 2: to date the existing mouse-based user veri.ca­tion approaches have either resulted in unacceptably low accuracy or have required an unacceptably long amount of time to reach a decision, making them unsuitable for online re-authentication.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Hence, even if the OS is compromised and allows a malicious application to map its address space to a good application, the malicious application still cannot read the data of the good application due to the compartment ID mismatch.
Sentence 2: compart­ments are incompatible with how a modern OS manages protection and sharing between processes, through virtual memory management features such as inter-process commu­nication, copy on write, and dynamic linked library.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note that the lack of leakage does not mean that the user s location cannot be inferred (it could be inferred by the prior alone), but instead that the adversary s knowledge does not increase due to the observation.
Sentence 2: in the context of LBSs, no privacy de.nition can en­sure a small leakage under any prior, and at the same time allow reasonable utility.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Based on the JNI naming convention, the native library function Java_edu_com_MyClass_my_1Func is supposed to be mapped only to the my_Func function de.ned in the .rst example in our previous attempt.
Sentence 2: we can successful call this same native library function through a di.erent Java method, i.e., the 1Func method.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: An important design consideration for security protocols based on symmetric keys is the degree of key sharing be­tween the nodes in the system.At one extreme, we can have network-wide keys that are used for encrypting data and for authentication.This key sharing approach has the lowest storage costs and is very energy-e.cient since no communi­cation is required between nodes for establishing additional keys.However, it has the obvious security disadvantage that the compromise of a single node will reveal the global key(s).
Sentence 2: at the other extreme, we can have a key sharing approach in which all secure communication is based on keys that are shared pairwise between two nodes.From the security point of view, this approach is ideal since the compromise of a node does not reveal any keys that are used by the other nodes in the network.under this approach, each node will need a unique key for every other node that it communicates with.Moreover, in many sensor networks, the immediate neighbors of a sensor node cannot be predicted in advance; consequently, these pairwise shared keys will need to be established after the network is deployed.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Ad­vances inbiotechnology facilitatedDNApaternity tests and stimu­lated the creation of hundreds of online companies offering test­ing via self-administered cheek swabs for as little as $79 (e.g., http://www.gtldna.net).
Sentence 2: this practice raises several security andprivacy concerns: the testing company mustbetrusted withprivacy and accuracy of test results, as well as with swabs that mightyieldfullgenome sequencing.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note that the above reduction from -PIR to -PIR (us­ k1 G) n ing batch codes) cannot be directly applied for reducing -OT k G) n to 1-OT, since it allows the user to get mbits of information (rather than k), and even these are not necessarily physical bits of G) n x.
Sentence 2: it is possible to obtain similar amortization for -OT G)k n by using ef.cient reductions from this primitive to -PIR (e.g., k using [15, 24, 25, 19, 11]).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Practical attacks such as [21] require millions of traces, both for the o.ine pro.ling phase and for the online attack phase1 .
Sentence 2: it is thus interesting to search for 1If the attacker knows in advance that the leakage model is the Hamming weight model, fewer traces can be used in the preprocessing step; this modi.ed attack does not return the complete secret key but only its vector of Hamming weights.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: They leverage lockboxes similar to PLUTUS, and CloudProof further uses Broadcast Encryption[10] to encrypt the distri­bution of the lockbox keys which avoids the need for out of band communication.
Sentence 2: it has been designed at a lower system abstraction and do not address our require­ments concerning .le management such as ability to perform secure search over the stored data.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This is clearly an over-simpli.cation, and it can be argued that the two di.erent four-valued sets presented in Section 2.3 associate a di.erent meaning with the fourth value, one be­ing for con.ict, the other for indeterminacy.
Sentence 2: we focus here on operators, which are de.ned similarly on both sets.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This latter query returns a subset of all the tuples of patients, and therefore only tuples that Alice, ac­cording to p1, is authorized to see.
Sentence 2: permission p1 is not su.cient for granting such a query since the query result conveys the additional information that the returned tuples refer to patients who are also employees of the given company (information which permission p1 does not autho­rize).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In addition, colour schemes might also be expected to work as an additional defence against OCR software attacks in some schemes, since typically OCR software performs poorly in recognising texts in colour images in particular, they do not do well in segmenting colour images.
Sentence 2: we have seen many CAPTCHAs, in which the use of colour is unhelpful for usability, has caused negative impact on security, or is problematic in terms of both usability and security.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, a tool such as an IDS installed in a large organization would likely re­quire ongoing distributed cooperation between SPs [46] and therefore bene.t from the guidelines on distributed ITSM.
Sentence 2: if an access control system were to be implemented in the same large organization, it would require a great deal of initial cooperative consultation to establish job roles and their corresponding privileges.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Mining Frequent Graph Patterns with Differential Privacy Entong Shen Ting Yu North Carolina State University North Carolina State University eshen@ncsu.edu tyu@ncsu.edu ABSTRACT Discovering frequent graph patterns in a graph database offers valu­able information in a variety of applications.
Sentence 2: if the graph dataset contains sensitive data of individuals such as mobile phone­call graphs and web-click graphs, releasing discovered frequent patterns may present a threat to the privacy of individuals.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our revocation API would allow us to remove k4, and if we are smart we will also remove k3 since it must be assumed to be lost as well.
Sentence 2: this will not suf­.ce: the attacker could replay the key distribution message {..., k3, ...}k5 , and therefore re-inject the corrupted k3 into the device.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: ; keys(k2,k3) Figure 1: Sevecom Revocation Protocol (simpli.ed)  At .rst it may seem that this protocol is achieves its se­curity goal: unless the intruder manages to obtain access to both inv(k1 ) and inv(k2 ), he cannot replace a key with one of his own.
Sentence 2: analysis by M¨ odersheim and Modesti showed that there is another attack scenario [12]: suppose an attacker had corrupted only inv(k2 ), and then waited until the server sent a revocation message for k1 .
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Allocating .xed hardware resources for a RS de­coder would be wasteful for standards not using this de­coder.
Sentence 2: in such case it would be more ef.cient to map thedecoder function on a more generic, programmable DSP.with a few dozen of operations per output sam­ple, and sample rates of 10-100 MHz, RS decoding is rathercomputational intensive.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Loop-Extended Symbolic Execution on Binary Programs Prateek Saxena Pongsin Poosankam Stephen McCamant Dawn Song University of California, Berkeley and Carnegie Mellon University Berkeley, California, USA {prateeks,ppoosank,smcc,dawnsong}@cs.berkeley.edu ABSTRACT Mixed concrete and symbolic execution is an important technique for .nding and understanding software bugs, including security­relevant ones.
Sentence 2: existing symbolic execution techniques are limited to examining one execution path at a time, in which symbolic variables re.ect only direct data dependencies.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Conse­quently, S P cannot query HD to .nd out the value elc reg­istered under the index hd.
Sentence 2: hence, S P cannot .nd out m or .nd out whether there is a hidden message m behind d. S P can erase or alter d, which would result in a denial of service for the communication between Alice and Bob.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We further assume that nodes can be either logically (i.e., by exploiting a software bug) or physically captured.
Sentence 2: the time to compromise a node physi­cally is considered non-negligible (i.e., it takes some time to move from node to node and to perform the physical manip­ulations) and to not signi.cantly decrease with the number of already captured nodes.
Relationship: contrasting