sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This is performed through a TPM unseal operation that depends on the SRK and the PCR values.
Sentence 2: the Nexus state can only be restored by the kernel that initially took ownership; attemptstobootamodi.edkernelto acquire accesstotheSRKand, consequently, decrypt the VDIR and VKEY contents, are prevents becausea modi.edkernel that permits such unsafe operations will lead to different PCR values.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: That is, an advertiser who desires to build a browsing pro.le of users, can use the leaked short URL, resolve it to its real long URL, and include that ex­panded URL in a database of that speci.c user.
Sentence 2: over­time, advertisers can build lengthy browsing pro.les of the users of ad-based URL shortening services, even if the desti­nation sites do not directly provide them with visitor data.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Cookie Stealing: Code included from a particular site, say for displaying an advertisement, has access to all the information on the hosting web page, including the cookie, the location bar, and any other sensitive information stored on the page.
Sentence 2: if the ad code is malicious it can cause the cookie and other sensitive pieces of information to be leaked to the third-party ad agencies, and can lead to a variety of routinely observed attacks like request forgery.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Theintegrated MTBDD can be obtained by using the Apply and Projection operations asfollows : Projection(Apply(Apply(T P1 .root, T P2 .root, -), Apply(T P2 .root, T P1 .root, -), +), dc).
Sentence 2: 6.3 XACMLPolicyGeneration Intheprevious section, wehavepresentedhowto constructthe integrated MTBDD given any policy expression f. Though such integratedMTBDDcanbe usedto evaluate requests withrespectto the integrated policy, they cannot be directly deployed in applica­tions usingthe access controlsystembasedonXACML.wedevelopan approachthatcan automaticallytransformMTBDDs to actualXACMLpolicies.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, if the user wants to visit www.google.com and if there is a map record in the /etc/hosts .le, the system will not request IP lookup from a DNS server but instead, it directly uses the IP address which is recorded in the hosts .le.
Sentence 2: it would be very dangerous if the hackers modify this .le and add malicious redirection information.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Atthesametime,switching toamuch .nergranular­ity will increase the time needed to generate the proof and verify the results(asdescribedinSection7).
Sentence 2: a judicious choice of the granularity for hashing needs to be made in order to balance the cost of generating a proof and the degree of exposure of private data during veri.cation.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Consider the following program: x:= h-h; ···; l := x From type inference, we obtain a suspicious information .ow path h · x · l. Since the possible .ow from h to x is inferred from the assignment x := h - h, if there is indeed such a .ow, the values of x and x ' in the self-composition should differ after the assignment.
Sentence 2: we can insert additional assume statement into the self-composition: assume(x = x ' and l = l ' and ···); ''' ' x := h -h; x := h -h ; assume(x = x ); .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 5.1 Accuracy In all experiments for evaluating accuracy, we con.gured IntFlow to operate in whitelisting mode, since this mode produces the greatest number of false positives, as it pre­serves most of the IOC checks among the three modes.
Sentence 2: whitelisting provides us with an estimationoftheworst-case performance of IntFlow, since the other two modes perform more .ne-tuned instrumentation.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note that directory removal is a specialized write: removal of bar from foo requires removal of the entry of bar from foo, as opposed to other directory manipulations, such as directory creation, which adds a new entry.
Sentence 2: d IR R M D IR denotes a special kind of di­rectory write, as opposed to D I R W R ITE, which denotes the generic write operation.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Now, if s violates f and f saturates ~atomA , then s ' violates f as well.
Sentence 2: to show that s ' is fair in Lm according to F we note that in the branching simulation preorder the set of actions enabled at s ' is the same as that of s. as s is a fair schedule in Ln, we conclude that s ' is a fair schedule in Lm.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since the owner presumably would not be present for some requests and keys cannot be shared at a distance, we counted these as false rejects unless one of the relevant users had unauthorized knowledge of a hidden key.
Sentence 2: under the moderate as­sumption, 2 of these false rejects became false accepts (be­cause the user was allowed access without ful.lling the de­sired condition), and under the pessimistic assumption, all 4 of these false rejects became false accepts.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Two di.erent sets of pa­rameters for FingerCodes were suggested: [3, 5] use K = 16-dimensional vectors of £ = 7-bit elements and perform the comparison on 19-bit results while [28] uses K = 640­dimensional vectors of £ = 8-bit elements and performs the comparison on 16-bit results.
Sentence 2: for the param­eters of [3, 5] we have to perform n = K £ = 112 OTs on 19N-bit strings, and for the parameters of [28] we have to perform n = 5 120 OTs on 16N-bit strings.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Lastly,constraintsmayrequirethecomputationoffunctions thatarenotnecessaryforauthorization,sotheseadditional computationsincreaseconfgurationcomplexitybytheneed tounderstandnewconcepts.
Sentence 2: giventhisintuition,wecanseewhytheuseofconstraints toenforcesafetycreatesaproblemforaccesscontrolmodel designers.Thedesiretoprovideameansforensuringsafety inanaccesscontrolmodelcannotbeprovidedbyatool thatisevenmoreerror-prone.Unfortunately,constraints, bytheirverynature,createasignifcantamountofcom­plexityinthemodel.theuseofconstraintsmust bemanagedtokeeptheircomplexityfromoutweighingthe administrators'abilitytomaintaintheconfguration.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: That is, our aim is not to .nd attacks on the network s end hosts that do not a.ect the network itself, such as the silent spread of a worm in the network, a slow port scan or a bu.er-over.ow that a.ects only the victim end host.
Sentence 2: it is important to note that we do not aim to propose an alternative to ex­isting detection approaches, but rather to complement them where they are less e.ective.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since our anal­ysis does not rely on the type information of data variables, it identi.es all variables used as function pointers regardless of their type de.nition.
Sentence 2: our analysis avoid the limi­tation of the approach by Petroni and Hicks [18], which can be misled by ambiguous type de.nitions (e.g., void*).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Measuring the precise latency of a .ngerprinting defense scheme poses a challenge: we can easily measure the time it takes to load a page using the defense, but we cannot infer the exact time it would have taken to load the page without the defense.
Sentence 2: every time we loaded a page using a defense, we immediately loaded it again using SSH to get an estimate of the time it would have taken to load the page without the defense in place.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Each of them has to .nd k + 1 predecessors with a shared key to the destination node.
Sentence 2: as described above, this can be done gradually: If an initial node x .nds a predecessor y claim­ing to possess a key, x will not only send one share to y but also different shares to all k predecessors of y. k nodes working together can only assemble k key shares.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For any perturbed record y, y T Tay recovers (xi - ai)xk+2,where xi and xk+2 are the dimensional values of the corresponding original vector x.Since xk+2 is a ran­domly generated positive value, knowing Xi s domain and distri­bution does not help recover xi.
Sentence 2: dimensional selection attack does not work either.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In ad­dition to ret, there are indirect variants of call and jmp instructions: they may take a register or memory reference as an operand, allowing a similarly unrestricted change of control .ow.
Sentence 2: to guard against code-reuse attacks in the gen­eral case, it is necessary to not only protect ret, but also the indirect formsof call and jmp.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A manual hook placed at the en­try node would require that the client have permissions for all the structure member accesses (name, format, data, and size) to the same object pProp, whereas only a subset are necessary in some branches (e.g., data and size for Op2.2).
Sentence 2: a hook at entry operation-dominates a hook at Op2.2.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Ingeneral,DSLsproviderelevantdomainabstractionsas .rstclass language elements and can be designed and used on different ab­stractionlayers, rangingfromDSLsfortechnical tasks toDSLsfor tasks on the business-level.
Sentence 2: dSLs can also be de.ned for non-technical stakeholders, such asbusiness analysts orbiologists, forexample.Ingeneral,aDSLmakesdomain-knowledge explicit.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Step 1: Clearly, user U1 has the right to delegate P if she has direct rights for P or P +, or if she has received P + through delegation.
Sentence 2: in order to verify if U1 has the appro­priate rights to assert the delegation delegate(U1,U2,P ), we have to: (a) verify if there is a stronger right P + that user U1 can hold.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In order to analyze P, PA or at least some of its components need to reside in the underlying environment E. Themalwareprogram P, on the other hand, will try to detect thepresence of PA and change or hide its actvities to thwart analysis.
Sentence 2: we want PA to be transparent or undetectable by P. Since PA and P share at least some resource in the run­time environment(e.g., theCPU), a covert channel can ex­ist that leaks information about the presence of PA to the malware P. To prevent such leakage, the principle of non­interference [21]dictates that the execution of PA shall not interfere with the execution of P. Intuitively, if noninter­ference is achieved, P hasthe same execution(forthe same given input) regardless of PA. We model an attemptby P todetect thepresence of PA in E as a boolean function dP(E).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We use symmetry of user optimum s¯ = s  = s, and s = qs: h " (s) .c0 = , (14) [1 - q(1 - s)] Di.erentiating (14) wrt s, with an assumption of h """ > 0 we obtain that the right hand side derivative is positive: h "" (s) [1 - q(1 - s)] - h " q """ > 0, if h > 0.
Sentence 2: (15) [1 - q(1 - s)]2 there exists a unique user symmetric optimum for a given contract.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While we have built a full-coverage protomatcher for more than 50% of the 1022 HTTP signatures in Snort s database, we no­ticed that a full-coverage protomatcher cannot .t in 2GB of memory if it contains signatures that require complicated regular expressions.
Sentence 2: we developed the superset protomatcher that requires a smaller memory footprint.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Using rectangles from Figure 2, there will be an edge from R(v2)to R(v3), but no edges between any other ordered pair of the four rectangles depicted in the .gure.
Sentence 2: now we have a 4-dimensional partial order G in which it is desired that v can derive the key of w if and only if v precedes w in G. we can use the solution in [5] to solve the problem with performance of: 1 key, constant key derivation time, and O(N2(log N)3 log * N)space.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Otherwise, the default transition (which leads to state s1) is followed, and state s1 is inspected for character c. Notice that s1 may or may not contain a labeled transition for character c. In the latter case, a default transition is followed again until a state containing a labeled transition for the current input character c is found.
Sentence 2: the number of state traversals involved in processing a character depends on the length of the default transition chains present in the D2FA.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Thus, it could implicitly sets qx(0) = .x, and chooses c - 1 other points at random to completely .x qx, including above three procedures.
Sentence 2: finally, it outputs , {D * J D = (., {Dj,x}j..,x.STu j,x}j.U* ,x.STu S can answer each secret key query with an at­tribute set ., where T * (.)
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Through running the trusted binary code in the monitored SVM, EXT E R I O R transparently redirects the memory read and write operations of kernel memory from SVM to GVM, thus modifying the state of the GVM.
Sentence 2: the outer-shell for the GVM is actually located in our SVM, and now we can execute trusted, native, widely tested administration utilities in SVM to timely supervise the state of GVM, including introspection and (re)con.guration of guest-OS kernel state as well as recovery and response to intrusions (EXTER I O R is named based on these underscored characters).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, if the acknowledgement toggle switch is off the circuit permanently signals that a successful ac­knowledgement has occurred, irrespective of the packets received from the low-security input.
Sentence 2: part of the overall device s functionality is implemented in hardware and part in software, so only a combined analysis of both can tell us about information .ow from the high-security domain to the low-security one.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It requires the statistics to be formally indistinguishable when computed with and without any particular record in the dataset, as if it makes little di.erence whether an individual is being opted in or out of the database.
Sentence 2: in the worst case, an adversary who knows all but one data record will only be able to infer information about this record with limited and pre-de.ned probability.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This is because when the malicious application acquires permission to access a sensor, there is no con.dential data at the sensor yet (we assume that the operating system does not cache sensory data).
Sentence 2: when a user cannot make an informed ac­cess control decision, the system can allow the access but notify the user continuously, e.g., via a .ashing icon or mes­sage box on the screen or intermittent beeps.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: On the contrary, the average strength of memorable passwords in the BDAS group was larger than 61.8 bits1.
Sentence 2: although the BDAS scheme did not significantly increase the average stroke count, it significantly increased the security of memorable passwords by increasing the password length, and the effective password space for memorable BDAS passwords was increased by a factor of more than 1024.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: theyanbefethedasneededbythehosts.Thisre­quiresonstantavailabilityoftherepository,andmay imposesomedelaysintheresolutionofrequest(suh asaTCPonnetionestablishment).
Sentence 2: whilethefrstaseisprobablythemostattrativefrom anengineeringpointofview,notallIKEimplementations supportdistributionofKeyNoteredentials.Furthermore, someIPseimplementationsdonotsupportonnetion­­grainedseurity.Finally,sineIPseisnot(yet)inwide use,itisdesirabletoallowforapoliy­basedflteringthat doesnotdependonIPse.itisneessarytoprovide apoliyresolutionmehanismthattakesintoonsideration theonnetionparameters,theloalpoliies,andanyavail­ableredentials(retrievedthroughIPseorothermeans), anddetermineswhethertheonnetionshouldbeallowed.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: (6) {x1,x2,...,xs} Note that for random variables A and B, and a deterministic function f, max Pr(A = a|B = b) = max Pr(A = a|f(B) = f(b)).
Sentence 2: a a maxa Pr(X = a|PX = R) is greater or equal to (6).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since Adv succeeds in convincing the veri.er to accept with non-negligible probability, at most a constant fraction of the extracted labels can be bad (i.e., don t cor­respond to a hash of their in-neighbors labels).
Sentence 2: by the depth-robustness property of the graph G, there must be a long path of good vertices in G. This path is exactly the hash-chain we are looking for.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For the random pairwise keys scheme [6], the compromise of sensor nodes does not affect any of the direct keys established be­tween non-compromised sensor nodes (pcd(j) = 0), since every key is generated randomly and independently.
Sentence 2: if we apply our framework to the random pairwise keys scheme, the resulting scheme still has the perfect security guarantee against node capture attacks (pgcd(c) = 0), which means that the compromise of sen­sor nodes does not affect direct keys between non-compromised nodes.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.1 One-level Advertisement Approval for Advertisement As mentioned in Section 2.2, before publicity, every commercial vehicular ad has to be approved by a Vehicular Authority (VA) in charge of the vehicular ad system, and each vehicle is preloaded with the VA s public key as well as the CA s public key.
Sentence 2: restaurant I in scenario (2) gets its ad ADI certi.ed by a VA as follows: the advertiser s goal is not that every user in the area forwards the I -.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: More­over, most participants indeed appreciated the e.ect of the user guidelines on helping create their passwords during the password creation.
Sentence 2: from the .ndings, we conclude that the user guidelines can positively impact the password creation by helping users generate more secure graphical passwords, es­pecially for those users who do not know how to better cre­ate their graphical passwords.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Formally, based on the null hypoth­esis that the to-be-tested sequence (of the victim) is not within the case group, we have E(Tr)=0; however, if the sequence is indeed in the case, the expected contribution of this instance to a speci.c C .Tij signed allele correlation rij , i.e., , is non-negative for any .Chihj pair of SNPs i and j and any pair of alleles 11, 10, 01 or 00 (see Appendix 1 for a proof).
Sentence 2: the sum statistic of Tr is valid.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: nfa2e~.e'Ni2 rood g~2 gi2 vi 2 = 1{!
Sentence 2: '12 ui2 --i2 Taking the partial logarithms it follows z = loggquq + eml modN,~ z = logg~ ui~ + era2 rood Ni2 SinceO<z<2 ~,O<_em~<Ax2 e (<<2 ~)weget-2 s < -A x 2/-< z -em~ < 2 ~, there exists e~ and e2 in {0,1} such that the following equalities hold in the integers: z = logs, ~ + em~ -~N~ z = log~au~a + era2 -e2N2 if ml ~ m2, e ~-(logu~ -- logu~ --glNil -~-e2N~)/(m2 --ml), which occurs with probability at most 4/.4.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since a flow is declared anomalous as soon as its anomaly index exceeds e, we set e as the upper bound of the anomaly index.
Sentence 2: when all k-bits are set, it represents an anomaly index of e. Consequently, the per flow sampling window, n comprises of 2k/e packets; for every packet which matches a prefix, the k-bit counter is incremented by 1/e and for other packets it is decremented by 1 (note that a flow is a threat only if more than e fraction of its packets are diverted to the slow path, or the mean distance between packets which are diverted is smaller than 1/e packets).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: By combining the above three cases, the probability that ucannot establish a pairwise key with v in a single round of path discovery 2 d+2 can be estimated by Pf = Pf1 ×Pf2 ×Pf3 =(1 - m+1 )pc = d+2 (m-1)pd+2 (m-1)pc m+1 .
Sentence 2: the probability that two remaining sensor nodes d+2  c can establish a pairwise key is Ps =1 - m+1 1 -p .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A very small portion, approx­imately 2% of the whole space, is formed with the possible strings among P (2a +5n), P (1a +6n), and P (7n), so any password inside one of these spaces is evaluated with low entropy.
Sentence 2: yan suggests a rule for proactive checkers to reject any password if it is within the set of those low entropy ranges.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Furthermore, for equal |S| the graphs H0 n(b) and W0 n(b) seems to have the same slope.
Sentence 2: in fact, lim log2 W0 n(b)= H0 n(b) - 1 (27) ne.8 the slope of log2 W0 n(b) .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: CONCLUSION The question of generalization KSIS based on predefined knapsack is studied, in case of application p-nary Warshamov s code and necessary and sufficient conditions at which there is a decision for an input (.P, v) are established.
Sentence 2: unlike classical knapsacks systems in which at definition v, those or other components knapsack s vector either are present, or are not present -also the case when they can replicate predefined number of times here is considered.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: During this stage, we also collect one more piece of informa­tion: the code size of pre-loaded apps measured by their lines of code (LOC).
Sentence 2: although it is impossible for us to get all the source code of the pre-loaded apps, we can still roughly estimate their size based on their decompiled .smali code.1 we can draw a rough estimate of vendor customization from provenance analysis because the number and code size of apps are important indicators.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This cannot be deduced from real-world botnet observation, unless one has gained access to the actual C&#38;C server, a very unlikely proposition.
Sentence 2: we hope to have made a strong case for the use of at-scale botnet emulation as a fundamental tool in botnet research, comple­mentary at least, and superior in many respects to other botnet and counter-measure study techniques.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: More precisely, the new XPath expres­sion must be applied to the Id subelements of the Query-Info element contained into the Node-Info element corresponding to p.node in the SE-ENC document.
Sentence 2: the predicate that replaces p in the new location step is the following: [/Sec-Info//Node­Info[@Name=Enc(ls.p.node, Key(P C(ls.p.node))]/Query-Info /id[@Value .P I(ls.p.value)]], where P I() is the func­tion returning the partition id corresponding to the input value (step 4.h).
Relationship: reasoning