sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The key-caching policy object on the client is either corrupted, or the integrity of the object cannot be veri­fied; In all cases, the client machine sends the following KCP re­quest (shown without the WSS header): <ekmi:KCPRequest xmlns:ekmi="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ekmi/2008/01"/> As one can notice, the KCP request is empty.
Sentence 2: the WSS header that carries the digital signature of the requesting client is all that the SKS server needs, to determine the authenticity of the request as well as the identity of the requester.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: been developed to enhance the robustness of this paradigm to servers actively deviating from the prescribed protocol, e.g., [18, 24, 1, 17, 2, 23, 22, 11, 14, 7, 18].
Sentence 2: the threat with which we are primarily con­cerned in this paper is a purely passive attack, in which a mix administrator is convinced to reveal the mapping be­tween an input message and an output message, e.g., to an investigator or buyer.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: At time t, the user U possesses the Bloom .lters BFk, where 0 = k = t. At time t + dt, tampered Bloom .lters BF i T and BF j T are presented to the auditor A in correspondence with Proof(Li) and Proof(Lj ), where i < j .
Sentence 2: the auditor uses both the proofs and the Bloom .lters with the membership check function FuncBChk() to verify BFi .
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In simple applications, where the watermark is embedded and detected by the same party (e.g., web-spider applica­tions that use watermarks to .nd protected content on the Internet) this requirement is trivially ful.lled.
Sentence 2: in applications, where the party detecting the watermark can­not trust the party that has generated and embedded it, the detecting party has to verify the correct probability dis­tribution of the watermark.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Although the approach that we have described is related to the work in [20] and [5], on the .exible speci.cation of access policies using logic languages, it should be clear that these works relate to access control in a centralized envi­ronment and, respectively, assume that discretionary and RBAC policies are to be enforced.
Sentence 2: we use a di.erent type of logic language to introduce a di.erent type of access control model: ASAC.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Before stating the full security properties of this scheme, note that a terrorist attack is intuitively successful if an ad­versary authenticates aided by a malicious tag, but it can­not authenticate later without this aid.
Sentence 2: this in­formal de.nition is deceptive: many protocols claiming to be terrorist-fraud resistant are actually resistant to a weak attack, if the prover does not forward any sensitive infor­mation to the adversary; in other words, A learns nothing about the secret key [3].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: On the one hand, the extensive use of PIC code in the platform comes at a minimal cost to performance due to the extensive prelinking performed.
Sentence 2: pIC code allows for easier patching of software: only the mod­ules a.ected by a bug .x need to be recompiled, and all the rest can simply be prelinked again, lowering the risk of introducing new bugs in an incremental update.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: RecentworkbyMcSherry[25]proposedtheidea of a rich, com­positional language for differentiallyprivatequeries and identi.ed the notion of sequential andparallel composition ofqueries topre­serveprivacyproperties.
Sentence 2: webelievethat alanguage can bemuch more .exiblebybuilding uponthenotionof a differential privacy type system.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Algorithm kABS .rst calls a clustering algorithm, i.e., K-means, to cluster users with similar pro.les, and then uses existing k-anonymity generalisation algo­rithms to calculate regions.
Sentence 2: uniformDP itera­tively splits a region into two sub-regions until it is not possible to have a partition such that both of the sub-regions satisfy the issuer s privacy requirement.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: INTRODUCTION Private classi.cation like ordinary classi.cation comprises of two subtasks: learning a classi.er from data with class labels often called a training data and predicting the class labels for unlabeled data using the learned classi.er.
Sentence 2: the main emphasis is on privacy, i.e., how to dis­close only the minimal amount of data.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The savings for these objects are nominal in both TaintDroid and LazyTainter as the taint storage overhead is only one taint tag, so there isn t much opportunity to de­crease the taint tracking cost of arrays.
Sentence 2: users who want fewer false positives and more precision may decide to turn on per-element taint tracking for arrays, at which time lazy tainting will be able to provide even greater memory savings.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Step 3: RPF Checking of Server Addresses Using path-based client addresses severely restricts source-address spoo.ng by a client, but it does not restrict spoo.ng by servers.
Sentence 2: the domain-level symmetry that emerges from using client­based addresses means that packets traveling from server.client follow the reverse client.server inter-domain path.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The reduction in taint tag size may lead to a reduction in memory overhead because there is less taint infor­mation to store.
Sentence 2: a taint tracking system with 1-bit taint tags can only indicate whether a variable is tainted or not without the ability to distinguish be­  tween di.erent taint sources, such as location, IMEI, etc.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, there is anecdotal evidence that a strong sense of community and ownership in a SecondLife sims can result in effective oversight of shared resources such as server load.
Sentence 2: while we hope that the existing social norms in the community can influence the direction of security oversight to a higher chance of success (or stronger result), it could also impede potential benefits if community-norms are misguided or view good security practices negatively.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This is because Bro per­forms network monitoring and intrusion detection for the network layer and above of the network stack, and also monitors cross-application, cross-session interactions based on various attack patterns.
Sentence 2: shield is only con­cerned with application-speci.c tra.c passing over trans­port layer, or of even higher-level protocols such as HTTP and RPC.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Intel s AES-NI set [25] contains special­purpose instructions, which not only accelerate AES encryp­tion, but also protect it against cache attacks.
Sentence 2: due to the fact that not all microprocessors have similar archi­tectural support and that using lookup tables is an integral part of acceleration techniques in many other cryptographic algorithms, cache attacks are still relevant.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: According to Eqn (8) and (9), the mean of each distribu­tion p(Sk|Hi k) is: F T k i- = F A T k+ -1 + F Bµi (13) Therefore the di.erence between the mean of p(Sk|Hk i ) and p(Sk|Hj ) is F Bµi - F Bµj , which only depends on the k power pro.le of each task (µi) and is independent of time.
Sentence 2: the value of covariance matrix of each distribution p(Sk|Hi k) is: i- T TTTT F C F + R = F AC + AF + F BSiBF + R (14) k k-1 It depends on the power pro.le of each task (Si) as well as the error covariance in the Kalman Filter C+ We de.ne: k-1.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Centre-ville Montréal, QC, Canada tremblay.guy@uqam.ca Usually, intrusion detection systems assume that all events that occur are recorded and, reciprocally, that any event that is recorded is an actual event.
Sentence 2: depending on the logging mechanism available on the system and their con.guration, an event that did occur may not have been recorded, or an event that was recorded may not correspond to a real event.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For instance, when using a block cipher with 128-bit keys as encryption algo­rithm and HMAC-MD5 with 128-bit keys as MAC function, a signature in SK-DNSSECis only 384 bits long (author­itative answer).
Sentence 2: each referral includes two signatures (one for the symmetric certi.cate and one for the actual signature), thus the total space required to authenticate the message is actually 768 bits.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If the number of endpoints is greater when the DNS or TCP rewriting is enabled, but remains similar between the two runs with di.erent durations, we expect the mal­ware contains a .nite set of additional endpoints as a backup mechanism.
Sentence 2: if we see many more endpoints in the 2t duration run than in the t run, this suggests the malware is capable of constantly generating additional candidate do­mains or IPs to connect to, which indicates DGA or P2P behavior, respectively.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In-vehicle applications, providing services to the vehicle occupant(s) on behalf of the telematics service providers, may need access to data from particular vehicle sensors (e.g., GPS coordinates), and/or actuators (e.g., navigation display unit).
Sentence 2: direct access by applications to sensors and actuators is undesirable, for safety and liability reasons as well as for security and privacy reasons Therefore, the challenge for the data protection framework will be to provide authenticated access to sensors and actuators in a manner that can be agreed to in advance such that each access can easily be verified and logged.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 5.3 ClientTechnical Knowhow SSC provides clients with unprecedented .exibility to deploy cus­tomized cloud-based services and holds clients responsible for ad­ministering their own VMs.
Sentence 2: this does not necessarily mean that clients need to have increased technical knowhow or manpower to leverage the bene.ts of SSC, e.g., to implement their own services as SDs.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Dawn Song UC Berkeley  dawnsong@cs.berkeley.edu is particularly important for tasks such as unpacking [6, 19, 23] (obtaining de-obfuscated malware code), behavioral signature gen­eration [3] (classifying a malware sample based on the malicious actions it performs), and information .ow tracing [14, 37] (for in­stance, to understand spyware behavior).
Sentence 2: malware authors are motivated to make analysis dif.­cult: to slow the development of defenses that make their malware obsolete, and also to protect proprietary information from reverse­engineering by competing malware authors.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When a process executes a secure store, the internal XOM ID register and the mappings between register and compart­ment keys areused todetermine theprocess cacheowner­ship tag, which is then used to tag the data in the cache.If this cache line is .ushed to memory, the value is encrypted with the compartment key that corresponds to the tag.On a secure load, a similar translation is done to obtain the cor­rect cache ownership tag value, which is checked against the tag in the cache.
Sentence 2: 5.7 User De.ned Signal Handlers A user de.ned signal handler may access the state of the interrupted process.It may also modify that state and then restart the process with the altered state.when a process executing in its XOM compartment is delivered a signal, the state of the interrupted thread will be encrypted.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, network attackers can modify the header since it is not authenticated, or they could completely drop the header without the client knowing.
Sentence 2: hTTPi pro­vides authentication by signing content hashes, and since it speci­.es the requirements for a page using HSTS in advance, the client can detect whether content requiring integrity is dropped by net­work attackers.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: External certi.cate management Developers may wish to use certi.cates (perhaps previously acquired) issued by a certi.cate authority to assert a validated identity on their apps.
Sentence 2: many reputable CAs will not issue certi.­ 1We use the package name to di.erentiate between apps and to avoid counting app updates as key reuse.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In comparison, RockJIT can eliminate JIT spraying attacks and en­forces CFI on both the JIT compiler and JITted code.
Sentence 2: since software-diversi.cation techniques are orthogonal to CFI, it is perhaps bene.cial to deploy both defenses in a JIT com­piler, following the principle of defense in depth.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When only taking those samples into account that have been marked as malicious, our approach yields better results than those of the application speci.c analyz­ers.
Sentence 2: also when considering the suspicious samples as well, our results are comparable, i.e., 89.0% (Wepawet) and 98.9% (pdf examiner) vs. 93.2% (CWXDetector).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Password-based authentication for GKA protocols provide better solutions than digital signature au­thentication as password-based solutions do not require Pub­lic Key Infrastructure and are less computationally inten­sive.
Sentence 2: gKA protocols, including password-based GKA protocols, are susceptible to Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks that can disrupt GKA services, and most current GKA protocols, including password-based GKA protocols, do not provide protection against DoS attacks.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Indeed, this problem is inherently dif.cult since some aspects of severity are either context dependent (e.g., a mission critical server being shut down may be more severe than a print server) or may be inher­ently dif.cult to quantify.
Sentence 2: the issue of exploitation is far more clear cut  a vulnerability is either exploited or not and the date upon which a working exploit becomes known is frequently documented.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Capturing Malicious Bots Using a Beneficial Bot and Wiki  Takashi Yamanoue C:workshopsecurity201220120315CIMG0077.JPG   Kagoshima University Korimoto, Kagoshima 890-0065, Japan +81-99-285-7187   yamanoue@cc.kagoshima-u.ac.jp Kentaro Oda Kagoshima University Korimoto, Kagoshima 890-0065, Japan +81-99-285-7474 odaken@cc.kagoshima-u.ac.jp Koichi Shimozono Kagoshima University Korimoto, Kagoshima 890-0065, Japan +81-99-285-7474 simozono@cc.kagoshima-u.ac.jp  ABSTRACT Locating malicious bots in a large network is problematic because its internal firewalls and NAT routers unintentionally contribute to hiding bots host address and malicious packets.
Sentence 2: eliminating firewalls and NAT routers for merely locating bots is generally not acceptable.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We consider a new game Game 3 that is the same as Game 1 ex­cept that ciph.,S := TEnc(ckey, volatile, (.S, S, vkeyS, skeyS))e=1,...,m is replaced with a ciphertext of random string when F transfers it to terminals.
Sentence 2: when it is transferred, this ciphertext of random string is replaced back to the original ciphertext.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Oth­erwise, it will be fairly easy to cross-referenced sev­eral databases in which the user appears to infer new personal information.
Sentence 2: pseudonymity is often not su.cient to protect the privacy of users because a combination of locations can also play the role of a quasi-identi.er if they characterize almost uniquely an individual in the same way as the combination of his .rstname and last name.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: On the one hand, Core P-RBAC should have su.cient expressive power for representing public privacy policies, privacy state­ments and privacy notices in Web sites, and policies based on privacy related acts, such as HIPPA [25], COPPA[10], and GLBA[26], in the US.
Sentence 2: con.icts detection in Core P-RBAC should remain tractable.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: McCamant and Ernstpropose adynamic taint analysisforquan­tifyinginformation .ow[27].Theirmethoddoesnot assumeapar­ticular input distribution and provides over-approximations of the leaked information along a particular path.
Sentence 2: it does not yield guarantees for all program paths, which is important for se­curity analysis.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: At least O(r) of u s .ngers are honest, and these honest .ngers collectively know all of 4SybilLimit s solution is a subtle sampling-based protocol which each honest node uses to estimate r. 5The sampled nodes may themselves be added to the routing table as .ngers, reducing the overhead of the sampling protocol.
Sentence 2: 6Naively, this addition seems to increase the routing table s size by a logarithmic factor k. note that an average edge is known by O(log m) honest .ngers: therefore, the sets returned by the hon­est .ngers should be redundant by a logarithmic factor.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 5.1 TCP SYN Flooding Attack TheSYNFloodingAttackconsumesscarceresourceson theserveranddeniesservicetolegitimateusersbyexploiting  Spaces P(E1) Expectednumberof packetsneededto obtainatleastone occurrenceofE1 Numberofpackets neededtoobtain atleastoneoccur-renceofE1with99% probability 1 0.0121 83 380 2 0.0241 41 189 3 0.0362 28 125 4 0.0482 21 93 5 0.0603 17 74 6 0.0723 14 61 7 0.0844 12 52 8 0.0964 10 45 9 0.1085 9 40 Table1:Tradeofbetweenspaceallocatedforrouters'tableiscomputedforarouteoflength30,sop:033. aweaknessintheTCPprotocol.Anattackerbombards theserverwithSYNpackets.TheserverfollowstheTCP protocolandrespondstoeachwithaSYN-ACKpacket, allocatesresourcesforaconnection,andwaitsforanACK fromtheclient.Theconnectiontimesoutandtheresources arefreedonlyafter3minutes,soalargenumberofmalicious packetsquicklyconsumeallresourcesavailableontheserver.
Sentence 2: whatmakesitparticularlydiffculttodefendagainstthis attackisthateachmaliciousSYNpacketarrivesbearing adiferentforgedIPaddress.Hence,theservercannottell whetheranygivenpacketisavalidrequestforaconnection, andtrustinglyallocatesresourcesforeachone.it isreasonabletoassumethatifmanyhalf-openconnections havebeenwaitingforanACKfromtheclientforalongtime, thenthesystemisunderaTCPSYNFloodingAttack.In alllikelihoodthemajorityofthehalf-openconnectionshave beencausedbytheattack.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In instance 2, the user can call EPKG[-r1]×EPKG[r1-sA+ sRA +r2]×EPKG[sRA]if it obtains EPKG[sRA], which will never be available to her.
Sentence 2: the registration phase must be inspected more closely to reveal the attack possi­bilities, which we do in the following.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Aho-Corasick is an efficient multi-pattern matching algorithm so we expect that it may help to reduce the number of the external memory accesses.
Sentence 2: aho-Corasick algorithm is based on simulating a state machine and a random access pattern on the states of the machine could incur a larger overhead because we might have to read into the internal memory a large number of bytes to access just a few bytes in the external memory.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Moreover, the problem of unicast security has been exten­sively addressed in traditional networks throughout several years of evolution, yielding extremely mature security as­sociation management protocols such as the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol [3] employed in the IPsec frame­work, or the handshake phase of the Transport Layer Secu­rity (TLS) protocol [4], proven adaptable to contexts (e.g., layer 2 authentication with EAP-TLS/TTLS) other than web security for which it was originally conceived.
Sentence 2: extending these approaches to resource-constrained wireless nodes requires careful investigation and is the subject of this work.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.2 Authorization Spheres Onenewaspetofourmodularauthorizationlanguageis adeentralizeddefnitionoftheaesspoliiesthroughloal authorizationteams.Theaesspoliyofaloalauthoriza­tionteam,expressedthroughasetofrules,shouldbevalid forawell defnedsetofsubordinategroupsortheirorgani­zationalfuntions.Weallthistheauthorizationsphere ofanauthorizationteam.Anauthorizationteamonsists ofalluserswhojointlymaymodifythesetofrulesofthis authorizationsphere.Anauthorizationsphereisaspeial group,e.g.
Sentence 2: "marketing"infgure2.whileevery groupiswithinanauthorizationspherewemayonsider, infgure2,thegroup"web"nottohaveanindependent authorizationteam.Authorizationspheresdonotoverlap.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A viable approach is to explore current applica­tions and systems to .nd de facto roles embedded in existing user permissions, leading to what is usually referred to as role mining.
Sentence 2: a key problem that has not yet been adequately addressed by existing role mining approaches is how to propose roles that have business meaning.In order to do this, we provide a new formal framework that also enjoys practical relevance.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Such a rule models the pol­icy that does not allow a surgeon to enable the Surgeon role in the OperatingRoom1 outside her working hours.
Sentence 2: let us assume that, under the same space and time conditions, the event S urgeryI nP rogress becomes '' ' visible, i.e., s '' = (s, t , e ) and SurgeryI nP rogress .
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The fac­ t that the auxiliary data may come from either the same or a di.erent domain/context with the anonymized data makes 1Also, di.erential privacy [9] was developed to protect the privacy of interactive data release.
Sentence 2: it cannot defend against structural data DA attacks which breach the privacy of non-interactive data release [2][3][8][9].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To maintain low embedding distortion, transform-domain watermarking schemes [17, 18, 22] always watermark some selected coefficients in the mid-frequency of the host image in order to minimize the embedding distortion.
Sentence 2: we observed that many of the schemes [17, 22] watermarked only some selected coefficients while leaving most coefficients unprotected in order to minimize the embedding distortion.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Given the fact that all instructions on a 32-bit RISC architecture are 4 bytes large, this turns out to be a non-trivial task: only 0.34% of the 32 bit words consist of 4 alphanumeric characters.
Sentence 2: we show that even with these severe constraints, it is possible to build an interpreter for a Turing complete language, showing that this alphanumeric shellcode is Turing complete.
Relationship: contrasting