sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To summarize, our policy language is complete in the sense of being able to express any policy (relative to a suf­.ciently expressive language of access predicates), and also complete in the sense that it can express all policy operators that are the pointwise extensions of functions on the Belnap space.
Sentence 2: there are some useful policy composition oper­ations that are not pointwise extensions of functions on the Belnap space.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this example, the driver can simply decide whether or not to send a tuple to the DSMS server based on the speed value.
Sentence 2: if the privacy policy is changed such that the driver only restricts Role 2 (e.g., users of taxi booking service) users from seeing his/her anchored record and allows Role 1 users (e.g., the traff c authority) to see all his/her data, there will be a problem.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Unlike the EZ-Online service, no TLS/SSL connection is established between the PC and the EZ-Link server, and data is transmitted through TCP (rather than HTTP) on ports 55155 and 9999, respec­tively.
Sentence 2: tLSv1 is used to secure the communication between the PC and the EasyPay Server.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Addition­ally, an operational separation of duties constraint was speci.ed that an examinee had to leave the BulletinBoard-User role during his/her ExamSession activity.
Sentence 2: the veri.cation of the con.dentiality property failed as ex­aminee A was able to wait for completion of examinee B s exam-session and was able to share the ExamPaper through the BulletinBoard.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In theory, these approximations could fail to detect an attack that is able to persistently reuse some or all of the kernel s existing functionality (reminiscent of jump-to-libc ­style attacks [32]).
Sentence 2: we believe that the above ap­proximations will defend against many such attacks because of the di.culty of reusing complete functions for the wrong purpose.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: On the one hand, [23, 24, 25] took the approach of devising top-down assumptions about the security policies of other services in the same security domain, i.e., covered by the same cer­ti.cate for a secure channel.
Sentence 2: we have the ap­proach of modeling scenarios according to concrete security poli­cies [11].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Rumpole: A Flexible Break-glass Access Control Model Srdjan Marinovic Department of Computing Imperial College London, UK Robert Craven Department of Computing Imperial College London, UK Jiefei Ma Department of Computing Imperial College London, UK srdjan@imperial.ac.uk r.craven@imperial.ac.uk j.ma@imperial.ac.uk Naranker Dulay Department of Computing Imperial College London, UK n.dulay@imperial.ac.uk ABSTRACT Access control operates underthe assumptionthatitispos­sible to correctly encode and predict all subjects needs and rights.
Sentence 2: in human-centric pervasive domains, such ashealth care, itishardif notimpossible to encode all emer­gencies and exceptions, but also to imagine a priori all the permissible requests.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: They argue that asymmetric trust relationships are hard to establish, since the parties are exposed to di.erent risks in the case of failure.
Sentence 2: with regard to complex SOA that might be based on the dynamic selection of services and service pro­viders  de.ning and enforcing a common trust level is dis­advantageous: A symmetric trust relationship between the providers in a federation would require a trust level, which is su.cient for the service with the strongest authentication re­quirements.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Even though there is some excellent literature available that covers many stealth techniques of computer malware [15, 6], it does not answer the question how their presence looks like from a system state point of view.
Sentence 2: we know from the properties of VMI (see Section 2) that a VMI-based IDS can be provided with a complete and untainted view of the system state, thus be­ing able to observe any system activity, whether benign or malicious.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Just like a species that draws on a small gene pool can succumb to a single environmental threat, so a ho- mogeneous network is vulnerable to a malicious attack that exploits a single weakness com--,m to all of its components.
Sentence 2: in a network in which each critical functionality is provided by a diverse set of protocols and implementa- tions, attacks that focus on a weakness of one such protocol or implementation will not be able to bring down the entire network, even though all elements are not be bulletproof and even if some of components are compromised.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: These modelsassociatethein­tended purpose information with a given data element, and access is granted when the access purpose is consistent with thedata element sintendedpurpose.
Sentence 2: ashealthcare is such a complexdomaininvolving variousparties withdif­ferent duties and objectives, the purpose-based access con­trol alone cannot meet all the patient s privacy protection requirements.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: At the moment, our tool replaces addition operations, multiplexers and integer com­parisons with hand-optimized versions.
Sentence 2: the tool o.ers full .exibility; once our modi.ed version of CBMC is able to identify other basic blocks that turn out to be perfor­mance bottlenecks, they can easily be replaced by optimized circuits.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We infer the presence of bridged structures by examining the server status  7There is of course caveat in using IP address (albeit real or cloaked [13]) for this purpose.
Sentence 2: without a better mea­sure of uniqueness at hand, we assume for now that IP addresses are a reasonable measure for uniqueness among members of a sin­gle botnet.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: = MACRauth (X ' key) KeyConfirmed ' RB := Extkey(W ; X ) key Figure 3: Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol the sender (Alice) would like to be assured that her key is private (and will remain private), but she does not need the key to be shared at the time that she prepares/sends her authenticated-ciphertext.
Sentence 2: the re­cipient (Bob) would like to know that the key he uses for decryption/validation is the same shared private key which was used by Alice.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Consequently, the tally cannot be very large and an exhaustive search allows to give the result.
Sentence 2: in multi-candidate election schemes the tally can become larger because the encoding of many candidates can- not be reduced and if we want to continue to compute the different results, we have to use an encoding size in O(px [~t), where p is the number of candidates and [£[ is the size of the number of users.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If the attacker can now determine the address of one of those pages at runtime, she can read that page and search for gadgets.
Sentence 2: as the last visited pages depend on the past control-.ow, she is either limited to the same n pages each time (in case of invariant control-.ow) or runs the risk of picking a path, which was not executed this time and hence crashes the program.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: between building an ac­curate model of the power consumption, which requires more key bits to be considered in a single time, and the computa­tional complexity involved in computing a power hypothesis for every possible value which may be taken by the key por­tion.
Sentence 2: since attacking one key portion is performed independently from attacking the others, the attacker is free to divide the whole key in portions that are small enough to be processed.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Though they differ in the proposed concepts, the general structure remains the same for the SLA: information on the par­ties involved, the SLA parameters, the resource metrics used to compute the SLA parameters, the algorithm to compute the SLA parameters, the service level objectives (SLO), and the appropri­ate actions to be taken in case of a violation of the agreement (aka breach management).
Sentence 2: classic QoS parameters that are used to describe the relationships among common web services are not suf.cient in a generic cloud environment.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: , 0) is in the span of rows of M indexed by I.
Sentence 2: this means that there exist constants {.i} i.I in Zp such that for any valid shares {.i = (Mv )i}of a ( i.I secret s according to ., it is true that: i.I .i.i = s. Additionally, it has been proved in [5] that the constants {.i}can be found in time polynomial in the size of the i.I share-generating matrix M. for unauthorized sets S' no such con­stants {.i} exist.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If a program stays in the sandbox fora long timewithoutperforminga context switch (for example, in computationally intensive programs), then the runtime overhead should be small; the overhead would be similar to the overhead of NaCl, which has been reported to incur 5% of overhead on SPEC2000.
Sentence 2: if a program makes frequent context switches between Java and native code, then there should be a signi.cant runtime overhead.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The loadscales proportionally withmore members.
Sentence 2: with Pre.Sec, a particular node, say RouteViews 2, would make 209 pre.x queries (due to pre.xes with a new origin: origin not seen ) and 1,949 subpre.x queries (due to new pre.xes seen: pre.x not seen )to the overlay.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Marc Joye Thomson R&#38;D, Security Competence Center Cesson-Sévigné, France marc.joye@thomson.net should be conceivable that buyers can make their choices and shop on Internet without risking to be pro.led.
Sentence 2: it is understandable that, in some situations, there may be a need to be able to revoke the anonymity; for example in the case of a legal dispute while keeping the content private.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: {1,...,f}there is a polynomial time semantic security adversary B for E such that Pr[wj ,E] = qj ] =SS Adv[B(3) To see why, notice that when all bits at position j in C are 1then Adoes not have sk[j,0].
Sentence 2: if Pr[wj qj]is = `´ non-negligible then Ais able to distinguish Eenc pk[j,0], 0 `´ from Eenc pk[j,0],m , which breaks semantic security of E. A similar argument applies when all bits at position j are 0.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To pro.t from their data while honoring the privacy of their customers, social networking services share anonymized social network datasets, where, for example, identities of users are removed from the social network graph.
Sentence 2: by using external information such as a refer­ence social graph (from the same network or another network with similar users), researchers have shown how such datasets can be de-anonymized.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The reason we designed and imple­mented MOBIKEv2 is that MOBIKEv2 is an extension of MOBIKE and leaves IKEv2 and the kernel implementations of IPsec unchanged.
Sentence 2: the BEET mode requires the BEET mode to be implemented in the kernel, and IKEv2 to consider this new mode.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Moreover, even when the controlling site has been taken down, existing puppets will continue to perform an attack the attack will only sub­side once all puppet browsers have been pointed elsewhere, which is likely to be in the order of 10-60 minutes, based on the viewing time estimates of Section 2.1.1.
Sentence 2: as shownin[33], we have beenable to circum­vent the default behavior of browsers that set referrer in­formation, making puppetnet attacks more di.cult to .lter and trace.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Unauthorized Origin Crossing on Mobile Platforms: Threats and Mitigation Rui Wang Luyi Xing Microsoft Research Indiana University ruiwan@microsoft.com luyixing@indiana.edu ABSTRACT With the progress in mobile computing, web services are increasingly delivered to their users through mobile apps, instead of web browsers.
Sentence 2: unlike the browser, which enforces origin-based security policies to mediate the interactions between the web content from different sources, today s mobile OSes do not have a comparable security mechanism to control the cross­origin communications between apps, as well as those between an app and the web.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The 802.11 standards allow the realization of economic Wireless LANs that support data rates anywhere from 1Mbps to 54 Mbps based on the distance to the access point.
Sentence 2: 802.11 access points can cover areas of only a few thousand square meters, making them suitable for en­terprise networks and public hot-spots such as hotels, coffee saps, and airports.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Chuan Yue University of Colorado Colorado Springs Department of Computer Science Colorado Springs, CO 80918, USA cyue@uccs.edu Password security heavily depends on creating strong pass­words and protecting them from being stolen.
Sentence 2: re­searchers have demonstrated that strong passwords that are su.ciently long, random, and hard to crack by attackers are often di.cult to remember by users [5, 12, 22, 24, 36].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This will allow us to prevent malicious schemes from entering the ecosystem, such as an IA developer creating a keystroke Measurement that also functions as a keylogger.
Sentence 2: as running the Oracle or accepting its recommendations are not necessary steps in or­der to use Itus, this approach allows for researchers to freely experiment with IA, and for IA developers to distribute stan­dalone extensions to Itus.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Simi­lar to [32], we notice that our construction can be extended to the chosen-ciphertext model by applying the technique of using simulation-sound NIZK proofs to achieve chosen­ciphertext security [31].
Sentence 2: in Section 9 we describe how our delegation mechanism can be used with the tech­niques of Cannetti, Halevi, and Katz [16] to achieve a much more e.cient CCA-2 system.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For e.g the AP can share information related to User Authentication or pro.le information based on some revenue-sharing mechanism with the other members of the Circle of Trust (CoT).
Sentence 2: there may be other information types which are su.ciently generic and applicable across di.erent usages, yet semantically di.erent from or not easily covered by the above three standardized types.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, for .xed strings, there are algorithms for matching sets of strings simulta­neously.
Sentence 2: consequently, while Snort s default engine still works it­eratively, there has been recent work to replace it with a set-wise matcher [8, 12].1 regular expressions give us set­wise matching for free: by using the union operator on the individ­ual patterns, we get a new regular expression which effectively com­bines all of them.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In fact, in order for the jammer to be more e.ective, it needs to operate at a rela­tively higher power level.
Sentence 2: a jammer using higher power will further decrease the PDR value and increase the SS measurement, thus pushing the resulting (PDR, S S) pair further towards the upper left corner, making it more distinct the benign-region.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 8.CONCLUSION Traf.c watermarkingis importanttomany network security and privacyapplications, because it cancorrelatenetwork .ows ob­servedat different locations quicklyandaccurately.
Sentence 2: the state-of­the-art timing-basedtraf.c watermarks cannot only survive adver­sarialnetwork conditions but alsoevadeexistingdetection method­ s. we showin this paperforthe .rst time that all ofthem will disturb the intrinsic timingfeaturesinTCP .ows andpropose a novel system, BACKLIT,to detectthem.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If at some point in the execution of F two val­ues Ri = Ri 1 are found such that ti = H0(Ri)= H0(Ri 1), then clearly at least one collision must have occurred in H0.
Sentence 2: all response values of H0 are chosen uni­formly at random from {0,1}l0 , and since there are at most qH +NqS queries to H0, the probability that at least one col­lision occurs is at most ((qH + NqS)(qH + NqS +1)/2)/2l0 = (qH + NqS +1)2/2l0 .
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Authenticated Delegation List: Toreducethecostofsignaturecreationandveri.cationrequiredbysimpledelegationattestations,anorganizationcancreateasinglelistofallofitsdelegationsandsignthatlist.Wecallsuchalistanauthenticated delegation list.Moreexplicitlyanauthenticateddelegationlistisoftheform [(C,xlIjl,Fc(xlIjl)), (C,x2Ij2,Fc(x2Ij2)), , (C,xsIjs,Fc(xsIjs))] c whereV(C)={xlIjl,,xsIjs}.
Sentence 2: foreachoriginannouncementreceivedbyaBGPspeaker,thatspeakermustacquiretheauthenticateddelegationlistofeveryor­ganizationonthedelegationpathinordertopositivelyverifythepairingofthepre.xtotheASnumber.Clearly,someorganiza­tions authenticateddelegationlistsmaybequitelarge.Hence,ver­i.ersmustcommitsigni.cantbandwidthandstorage.thecomputationalcostsofverifyingalargenumberofsimpledelega­tionattestationsarelargelyavoided.Theef.cacyofauthenticateddelegationlistsdependontheinteractionbetweenthedelegationgraphandAStopology.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Antivirus products, probably the most widely deployed security technology, attempt to do this.
Sentence 2: they primarily rely on a blacklisting approach: only programs matching Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro.t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the .rst page.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In summary, the experiments show that two identical PUF circuits on two di.erent FPGAs produce a di.erent output bit with a probability of 46.15% on average.
Sentence 2: multiple measurements on the same chip are di.erent only with 0.48% probability (i.e., 0.6 bits out of 128) even in the worst-case environmental change.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Even when requiring a PIN to unlock the device, an at­tacker that has root permissions (root attacker ) can assign private keys to other applications on the same device by re­naming the (possibly encrypted) .les as shown in Section 8.3 and discussed above.
Sentence 2: the root attacker has to de­crypt the private key entries to be able to use them outside of the device.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A third challenge is that the execution of a SODA must be isolated from normal app code, and the SODA must run in a monitored environment where it can not cause side e.ects.
Sentence 2: since we want to access private data in the SODA (under the trusted component s supervision), we must devise a way to let the SODA easily access sensitive information while preventing it from leaking the information to untrusted components.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If A and B are highly correlated, most of the information about B is communicated through A and H(B|A) is small.
Sentence 2: if pA and pB (which respectively represent the probability mass functions of A ad B) are quite di.erent then H(B|A)assumes a high value.1 To identify the order of correlation presence in the IDS scoring random process, we de.ne a Markov chain based stochastic model as follows: Let the score at discrete time instance n represent the realization of a random variable derived from a stochastic process Xn.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It is important to note that we are not concerned with estab­lishing an apriori necessarily complete set of categories for ac­cess control, and we also only give a descriptive, language-based account of categories.
Sentence 2: the categories that may be used in our meta-model can be arbitrarily complex (e.g., by combining subcategories) and multiple subcategories can be derived from any number of (super-)categories.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The protocol, however, can be easily extended to make use of already established claim types such as these proposed in [24, 18, 11], and [10].
Sentence 2: some of these types appear to be too complex and therefore not well-suited for Web 2.0-style implementations, and all these types lack the ability to specify required parameter values in claims; thus they may be unable to satisfy complex use cases such as these discussed in [8].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As shown in Figure7, TMI-based authorization has acceptable overhead when applied to servers written to use STM techniques; TMI-based enforcementcanevenimprovethe performanceofsuch software.
Sentence 2: the No-STM and STM-only columns show that simply using DSTM2 for concurrency control results in a very substantial performance overhead.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the example, we show two RegEx signatures and based on these two RegEx signatures, we ex­tract four ranges [a-zA-Z], [a-z], [a-f] and [g-z].In Figure 6, we previously stored all the nine possible length combina­tions.
Sentence 2: not all the nine combinations are needed to represent the RegEx signatures set in this example, so num­ber of length combinations to be queried and stored can be reduced.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Fig­ure 4 shows the STREAM benchmark results where about 3 to 4% of performance overhead were observed when ATRA is in e.ect.
Sentence 2: aTRA without TLB .ushing feature (al­though the attack becomes ine.ective) showed nearly iden­tical performance as the case without ATRA.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Alternatively, we can enforce control­.ow integrity (CFI) [3, 39] on KVM inside the isolation runtime to provide a stronger security guarantee, especially in eliminating recent return-oriented programming (ROP)­based code-reuse attacks [8].
Sentence 2: one challenge behind CFI enforcement is the lack of an accurate and complete points-to analysis tool that could be readily applied to KVM.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3An automatic binding-time analysis is in the .nal stages of implementation (as can be guessed from the screenshot in Appendix D) and it will hopefully be able to annotate our interpreter automatically.
Sentence 2: it is acceptable to perform the BTA by hand, as the annotation only has to be generated once and it is independent of the database as well as the access control policy.
Relationship: contrasting