sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Although we have not encountered this worst case behavior in our previous work in intrusion preven­tion [33, 4], the mere possibility shows that policy enforcement is not necessarily simpler than model enforcement.. Another possible reason for favoring policy enforcement over model enforcement is that the soundness of the approach will no longer depend on the correctness of the veri.er.
Sentence 2: since the veri.er is already very simple, we believe that the reduction in the size of the trusted computing base achieved as a result of such a choice is not compelling.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The results show that Spectral Clustering grouping algorithm (SC) outperforms poles but is not as space-efficient as GABG and SA.
Sentence 2: since both of GABA and SA are heuristic algorithms which need lots of iterations to converge to an optimum solution, it is not quite time-efficient to obtain such a result in a long run time.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To embrace the new hardware privileges, we would like to propose the fol­lowing classi.cation of TCB components: 4.2.1 Core hypervisor TCB The core hypervisor TCB (hTCB) is located on ring 0 in VMX root mode H0 and in essence remains the same as dis­cussed in Section 3.1.
Sentence 2: the core hypervisor TCB consists of all security critical functionality, which if failing, would undermine the system s security.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A wide range of functions may be de.ned simply by introducing di.erent speci.cations of the SF I M i and the J I M i expressions.
Sentence 2: taking into account that the color opacity takes values in the range [0,255], the highlight function should satisfy the following constraint: 0 : H F i : 255 * 0 : wSF × S F I M i + wJ × J I M i : 255 (2) Functions SF I M i and J I M i should be incremental, by showing higher levels of thread by higher values.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: An appropriate receiver side security policy would be: a) the element specified by /soap:Evelope/soap:Body must be referenced from a signature A using WSS with XML Signature, and b) if present, any element matching /soap:Envelope/soap:Header/wsa:ReplyTo must be referenced via an absolute path XPath expression from a signature A using WSS with XML Signature, and c) if present, any element matching /soap:Envelope/soap:Header/wsse:Security/wsu:Timest amp must be referenced via an absolute path XPath expression from a signature A using WSS with XML Signature, and d) the signature A verification key must be provided by an X.509v3 certificate issued by one of a set of trusted Certificate Authorities (CAs).
Sentence 2: this might not provide the desired level of protection.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If the key is created eagerly, with a key for every possible address in the program, past or future, then the attacker would still need to know where the at­tack code is going to be written in process space to be able to use that information.
Sentence 2: in our implementation, where keys are created lazily for code loaded from disk, the key for the addresses targeted by the attack might not exist, and therefore might not be discoverable.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The honest server cannot have been labeled as an uncooperative server: it is honest, reachable, and has an efficient implementation for all API calls.
Sentence 2: instead, the other server must have constructed a DetermineNext proof of a next computation history different from the honest server s. the honest server s claim is, by definition, the result of an invocation of DetermineNext.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) protocol [4] was designed to provide exactly these properties.
Sentence 2: avail­able TPMs do not yet implement this protocol, so until DAA becomes available on TPMs (or whatever secure hardware forms the basis for Assayer), Assayer must imperfectly ap­proximate it using structured AIK certi.cates.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The exceptions can be caused by (1) packet fragmentation, (2) packet compres­sion, (3) packet retransmission occurring along the laundry path.
Sentence 2: due to the fact that SMTP reply messages are very short (usually less than 300 bytes including packet header) and Path MTUs for most customer networks are above 500 bytes, the occurrence of (1) and (2) is very rare.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the case of attacks against integrity, a single attacker selects n/2nodes, i1,i2, ..., in/2, and generates the samples ti1 , ..., tin/2 , of the times-to-compromise whose distribution is described by f1,2,...,n.  In the case of attacks against availability, a single attacker must sample all n nodes and in doing so generates the sam­ples t1, ..., tn, of the times-to-compromise whose distribution is described by f1,2,...,n. 3.2 A Single, Sequential Attacker against aClassical Monoculture These results assume that attacks are serial in that one component is attacked at a time.
Sentence 2: because of the classical monoculture assumption, a successful attack against one node can immediately be used against other nodes in the monoculture with minimal e.ort, for example in an au­tomated and distributed attack.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If the user enters the name Bobby, then the resulting SQL query will select all database entries where the name is Bobby presumably what the programmer intended.
Sentence 2: if a malicious user claims their name is Bobby ; DROP TABLE students; -­ then the resulting query becomes SELECT * FROM students WHERE name = Bobby ; DROP TABLE students; -- This SQL statement deletes part of the database, which is presumably not what the programmer intended.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It may seem reasonable, then, to use security assurance cases to convince stakeholders that The smart meter remote disconnect command cannot be abused to cause a blackout.
Sentence 2: since that formalism does not provide a precise step-by-step framework to build the arguments and/or to evaluate them afterward, several utilities in the same region could reach di.erent conclusions about the security of their systems, even if they use identical business processes (work.ow of the disconnect command) and the same type of smart meters.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 2.3 Type of Input Data Our research shows that detection of random password poses a signi.cant challenge, since only the (raw) audio signal is available as input to the attack.
Sentence 2: attacks on English-text or weak passwords may achieve better results due to the underlying language model and the dictionary tools, as demonstrated by prior research [9, 10, 2].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4, we can see that the BER performance of the MC-CDMA scheme is the same as that of the MC-DS-CDMA scheme under a .at fading channel.
Sentence 2: the MC-DS-CDMA scheme is unable to perform well under a multipath fading channel while the MC-CDMA still main­tain an e.cient BER performance.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Among them, most related to our work is the work on the information leaks from procfs, which includes using the ESP/EIP data to infer keystrokes [38] and leveraging memory usages to .ngerprint visited websites [31].
Sentence 2: it is less clear whether those attacks pose a credible threat to Android, due to the high non-determinism of its memory allocation [31] and the challenges in keystroke analy­ sis [38].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: ACM Classification Keywords K.6.5 Management of computing and information systems: Security and protection: Authentication Keywords Authentication, chunking, computer security, memory, passwords, Persuasive Technology, usable security Introduction User-chosen text passwords are the authentication method of choice for most online systems that require privacy and security.
Sentence 2: many users select weak passwords [4] that are vulnerable to automated attacks that systematically guess passwords, resulting in users account resources, privileges, and data being compromised.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In such systems, it is often necessary to support the possibility of remotely revoking and updating the long-term keys on the device.
Sentence 2: while extensive research addresses the problem of establishing a new session key or determining what security properties can be guaranteed in the event of long-term key corruption, relatively little work has appeared addressing the problem of revocation and update of long-term keys.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In sharp contrast, counter­feit navigation signals from di.erent GPS satellites have the same AOA, since all the GPS signals are transmitted by one GPS spoofer.
Sentence 2: the AOA based techniques typ­ically require an antenna array with dedicated GPS receiver electronics to estimate the AOA of the GPS signals, which signi.cantly increases the size and cost of device.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: SPF answers the question: According to DNS-based SPF records, is the sending host (in the current SMTP session) authorized to send mail on behalf of the domain implied by the asserted MAIL FROM and/or SMTP HELO identity?
Sentence 2: our proposal answers the question: Does the asserted originating mail server (Case 1), or asserted orig- inating mail client (Case ~), confirm having originated this specific mail message?
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note that when the access control policy is modeled in the form of a tree, each branch of the tree is simply a set of credentials.
Sentence 2: as seen above, by allowing policy speci.cation in the form of a tree, we enable speci.cation of more complex policies that can have constraints on the number of credentials from a certain set that can be used to satisfy the required points.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The next standard 128-EEA3 has been recently designed and it is now published for public evaluation, its core is based on ZUC stream cipher [4].
Sentence 2: designing a less complex DC algorithm that has adequate security strength and consistency with the standards is preferred, since it would require lower computation power and consequently lower energy consumption at both eNB and UE sides during ciphering/deciphering procedure.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Another approach is relocating .le systems from guest OSs to another virtual machine (VM), and communicating via NFS or other .le-level protocol [24, 10, 17].
Sentence 2: these approaches need large and complex components for handling .le systems inside VMs or hypervisors, with the e.ect of in­creasing the size of the trusted computing base (TCB) and reducing the reliability of the systems [13, 19].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 6.1.9 16-bit Memory Writes in MixColumns (MIX16) When compiled with the O3 option, using an 8-bit shift and or operation to generate a 16-bit value to write to RAM instead of writing two 8-bit values hurt performance by 2.22%.
Sentence 2: without the use of compiler optimizations, the per­formance showed a slight improvement.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Much of the time, While many health and wellness scenario have important privacy implications, the user has no incentive to forge data as they are themselves the primary data consumer.
Sentence 2: when data is shared with third parties (such as insurance companies for the purpose of getting a lower in­surance rate due to a healthy lifestyle bonus) or other in­dividuals (as in the case of fellow dieters in an online Weight 3http://www.digifit.com  Watchers support group), the integrity of the data can some­times be suspect.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, considering two policy components P1 and P2 of the policy set PS1 in Figure 1, P1 is con.icting with P2,be­cause P1 permits the access requests that a developer changes reports in the time interval [8:00, 17:00], but which are de­nied by P2.
Sentence 2: p1 denies the requests allow­ing a designer to change reports or codes in the time interval [12:00, 13:00], which are permitted by P2.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the case of encryp­tion stackable .le systems, .le data is encrypted on write oper­ations before passing it to the lower .le system, and is decrypted on readoperations after it is received from the lower .le system.
Sentence 2: this scheme does not provide authentication and integrity, and provides privacy only for .le data (not for NFS commands and arguments).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This is (or reduces to) the standard TPM enrolment problem, and thus we do not explicitly address it.
Sentence 2: it is possible to partially mitigate incorrect trust decisions of this kind (or hardware attacks against TPMs): if the capability issuer uses a di.erent issuer key for each TPM to which it issues capabilities, upon discovering that a TPM has been compromised, the issuer key associated with it can be invalidated, invalidating all of the capabilities bound to it.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The value does not need to be secret: an attacker can learn the veri.cation value, and attempt to insert data (either in user-space or in kernel data sections) with an attacker-chosen pointer value followed by the veri.cation value.
Sentence 2: we also check that the veri.cation value is located in the kernel text section, or within a module.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This rootkit was motivated by and is similar in its intent to a previ­ously proposed attack that stealthily drains a smart phone s battery byexploitingbugsin the MMS interface [22].
Sentence 2: thekey 1This mechanism is also useful in Attack 1 instead of hard­coding the number that the rootkit must dial, an attacker can trans­mitthe numberthatthe infectedphonemustdialviaatext message.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.3 HT Triggers: Rare Activation of Attacks In the previous two subsections, we have shown that HT­based energy attack could cause huge energy increase, either linearly in the sleep mode or exponentially in the operation mode.
Sentence 2: the attacks would not take e.ective un­less the triggers are well hidden from the common detection approaches.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: defnedwithinourframeworkinthispaper,dealsprimarily withtheproblemoflimitingthetransferofinformationin onediretion.Theseondfamilyofpoliies,ofwhihA­essControlListsisalassialexample,isalsoformallyde­sribedwithourformalisminthispaperandisbasedonthe ideathattheownerofdatadeterminesitsaessrights.The thirdfamilyofpoliies,Role­BasedAessControl,hasbeen proposedmorereentlyasaompromisebetweenthepre­vioustwo(onsideredin[6]withinthisformalframework).
Sentence 2: thethreemajorACpoliiesaregeneral,inthesensethata modelofonepoliyanbeexpressedbyamodelofanother poliy.Forexample,theRole­BasedACpoliyhasbeen usedtoexpressotherACpoliies(e.g.lattie­basedaess models)[10].theproblemofevolution,transition andintegrationofACpoliieswasstillopen.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since the bxpl lr10 (located at the end of the execve function) redirects execution back to the value stored in the link register, we have to ensure that lr points at that time to a valid instruction sequence.
Sentence 2: when the blx instruc­ tion is invoked, lr will be automatically loaded with the address of [pc,#2] (for Thumb compiled code).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This model is .exible enough to allow users to de.ne access privileges for their own tables, without requiring superuser privileges.
Sentence 2: aCMs are limited to expressing the extent of the policy, such as Alice can view data about Alice, Bob can view data about Bob, etc., rather than the intent of the policy, such as each em­ployee can view their own data.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A crucial assumption underlying the access control system is that the encoded security policy is complete and can anticipate andprecisely formulate which subjects ought to be permitted to access a resource.
Sentence 2: indomains whereitis notpossible to completely encode or anticipate who should be granted access under which conditions, this assumption can result in obstructing people in their tasks, thus creating more risk than it tried toprevent.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Sim­ilar to the above, the server rebuilds C on behalf of the client, and the client only simulates the rebuilding of C op­erating on the sX(B) s instead of the full blocks.
Sentence 2: slightly di.erently from the rebuilding of H, the bu.er C is rebuilt by computing an erasure code of the fresh data in U.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, if the application runs for one second be­fore returning to the OS, only 53% of the Flicker session is spent on application work; the remaining 47% is consumed by Flicker s setup time.
Sentence 2: if we allow the application to run to two or four seconds at a time, then Flicker s over­head drops to only 30% or 18%, respectively.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Informally, an authorization provenance denotes a set of agents whose statements are referenced in the deduction of an au­thorization decision.
Sentence 2: in traditional centralized authorizations, a central trusted party has the complete knowledge of requesting users and requested resources; thus this party can make decisions allbyitself.nosuchentityexistsin distributedenviron­ments, and systems have to employmechanisms like delegations to facilitate distributed authorizations.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: She could use Face­book s Friend Finder.
Sentence 2: it requires her to enter her Hotmail user name and password: there is no way for her to just give Friend Finder access to her address book; her cre­dentials give Friend Finder the authority to not only access her address book but also to read her email and impersonate her by sending email from her account.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: ACFsupportsthecreationandevaluationofpolicyconditions.Depictedin.gure5,thelife-cycleofaconditioninACFisde.nedbythreecentralprocesses:conditionspeci.cation,instantiation,andevaluation.Initially,infrastructuredevelopersde.nethesetsofconditionsthataremadeavailabletothepolicyissuers.Thisincludesthecreationofanimplementationaswellasspecifying ade.ningAntigoneConditionDocument(ACD).Thisdocumentisusedtodetectincorrectusagewhenthepolicyisissued(instanti­ation).Theconditionisevaluated whenitisusedtomakepolicydecisions.
Sentence 2: theACFispolicyagnostic:thatis,anypolicylanguageisfreetouseconditionsbuiltwithinthisframework.thepolicyin­frastructuresoftenmustmodifytheevaluationprocesstoembracerun-timeconditionevaluation.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It is dif.cult to applying these ideas to languages like PHP or ASP where strings are not objects and there are no obvious mechanisms to instrument string operations without modi.cations in the underlying runtime system [20, 29, 33].
Sentence 2: the programming language Ruby provides some mechanisms to instrument operations 2 that could be possibly used to provided taint analysis via a library.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The isolated driver domain (IDD) model, a widely adopted architecture, enables strong system fault isolation by limiting the impact of driver faults to the driver domain itself.
Sentence 2: excessive I/O requests from a malicious domain to an IDD can cause CPU overuse of the IDD and performance degradation of applications in the IDD and other domains that share the same I/O device with the malicious domain.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The remote server which hosts the data should be steadily reachable in order to provide the computing / storage service, which po­tentially allows attackers to launch di.erent kinds of attacks against the server to .nd information about the stored da­ta.
Sentence 2: traditional (public key) encryption is one-to-one, which may not be desirable for e.ectively con­trolling the information sharing.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When in SMM, however, we cannot modify the CR3 register value stored in the State SavedMap.
Sentence 2: evenifPAE isenabled, this registeris not extended to 36 bits so we can access the memory pointed by the register, thus modifying the paging structure at our likings, even if we are restricted to 32-bit addressing.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since the attack completely destroys the three initial clusters after very few attack samples have been added, at later iterations (e.g., iteration 10), the bridge-based methods tend to enforce some connection within the cluster belonging to the 0 digit, probably trying to merge some of the .nal clusters together.
Sentence 2: since the maximum number of allowed clusters has been already reached, no further improvement is observed in the objective function.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Thissituationallsforapoliyompositionframeworkby whihdiferentomponentpoliiesanbeintegratedwhile retainingtheirindependene.Inthispaper,weproposean algebraforombiningseuritypoliiestogetherwithitsfor­malsemantis.Complexpoliiesareformulatedasexpres­sionsofthealgebra.Ourframeworkresultsfexibleand keepsompoundspeifationssimplebyorganizingthem intodiferentlevelsofabstration.Theformalframework anbeusedtoreasonaboutpropertiesof(possiblyinom­plete)speifations.Wefnallyillustrateatranslationof algebraexpressionsintoequivalentlogiprograms,whih providethebasisfortheimplementationofthelanguage.
Sentence 2: toourknowledgeoursisthefrstproposaladdressing ompositionofauthorizationspeifations.Previouswork onomposition(e.g.,[1,6])foussedontheseurebehavior ofprogrammodules.Closestworkliesinproposalstargeted tothedevelopmentofauniformframeworktoexpresspos­siblyheterogeneouspoliies[3,7,8,10,18].as alreadydisussednoneoftheseproposalsaddressedompo­sition.Ourworkisomplementarytotheseproposals,whih anbeusedtospeifytheindividualomponentpoliiesin ourframework.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For better understanding, consider the example Objective-C message used in Section 4.2, where valueForKey: forms the selector of the message: [ N S U s e r D e f a u l t s v a l u e F o r K e y :@ SBFormattedPho neNumber ] The selector is unique to the runtime system and is used to derive a unique identi.er of type SEL (a compiled se­lector) that is registered by the runtime system.
Sentence 2: since each object can implement its own version of a method, the same selector might refer to di.erent implementations.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The control .ow locking technique presented in this work shares many of the same goals as CFI and G-Free, in that it seeks to protect control .ow from diversion by attackers.
Sentence 2: it does so in a very di.erent way from these tech­niques, allowing greatly reduced overhead compared to CFI as well as G-Free in somecases.
Relationship: contrasting