sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since we always select the neighbor closer to the base station, the number of hops a message goes throughinthegreedy algorithmisthe same asinthe short­est path routing algorithm.
Sentence 2: the delivery time for a message originated from node i in the greedy algorithm is Td = EY (Y)× i.h, where i.h denotes the minimum number of hops from node i to the base station.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In ourdevelopmentpro­cess, wefoundthat arti.ciallygeneratinga register withthe NaT-bit at the granularity of functions degrades the perfor­mancebyafactor of3X, compared togeneratingaNaT-bit and keeping it for all subsequent uses.
Sentence 2: we believe that adding simple instructions to set and clear the NaT-bit willlargelyimproveprogramperformance.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our goal was to generate a representative data set containing APs from various vendors and a variety of .ngerprinter ma­chines.
Sentence 2: we placed twelve di.erent physical APs 2 AVM FritzBox 7050 (AP1 2), 1 LANCOM L-54G (AP3), 1 D-Link DAP-1360 (AP4), 2 Edimax EW-7228APn (AP5 6), 4 Linksys WRT54GL (AP7 10) and 2 Netgear WG602v4 (AP11 12) in a dedicated room, all operating on the same channel (for simplicity of data collection).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: After generating noisy networks using the edge-rewiring method , we remove some percentage of the nodes randomly from both the original and the noisy networks so that if the noisy net­work has been generated by re-wiring 10% of edges, we addition­ally remove 5% of the nodes from each of the original and the noisy networks.
Sentence 2: the resulting networks would have different and overlapping user and edge sets.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Exploiting this principle in the proposed framework implies retrieving the authorizations/prohibitions by querying the SAKB ontology.
Sentence 2: for example, to verify whether a user u is authorized to specify access control policies for the read privilege on object o, it is necessary to verify if the in­stance AdminRead(u,o) is in the ontology, i.e., to perform an instance checking.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Basic,Di­gest, NTLM) information for the domain.
Sentence 2: this is done regardless of whatpagecaused thebrowser to initiate thisrequest.the webbrowsercanbecomeaconfuseddeputy[16],and thistypeof attackisknownasCross-SiteRequestForgery(CSRF).CSRFdoes not rely on XMLHttpRequest to work, and can be performed in a varietyof ways,e.g.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When we apply threshold operator, the above equation can be written as P = t [A1 AND (A2 OR A3)]     where 1 = t = N For AtDRM, the dummy attribute .. is acknowledged as a mandatory attribute in making the access decision.
Sentence 2: the access policy can be expressed as P = .. AND t [A1 AND (A2 OR A3)] We made an assumption that the user attributes are fetched from an Active Directory (or its equivalent) and the hierarchal access tree semantics are preserved during retrieval from the Active Directory.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Theproblemofview-basedqueryansweringisthefollow­dataenableexpressingRPQs[3,6,22].AnRPQasksfor allpairsofnodesinthedatabaseonnetedbyapathon­ing:Given formingtoaregularexpression,andthereforemayontaina restritedformofreursion.Notethatwhenthequeryon­tainsunrestritedreursion,bothview­basedqueryrewrit­ingandview­basedqueryansweringbeomeundeidable, evenwhentheviewsarenotreursive[20].
Sentence 2: inthissetionwestudytherelationshipbetweenview­basedqueryrewritingandview­basedqueryanswering.We defnearewritingofaquerywithrespettoasetofviewsas afuntionthat,giventheextensionsoftheviews,returnsa setofpairsofobjetsthatisontainedintheanswersetof thequerywithrespettotheviews.Wealltherewriting thatreturnsexatlysuhsettheperfetrewritingofthe querywrttheviews.view­basedqueryanswering,and evaluatingtheperfetrewritingovergivenviewextensions, areequivalentproblems.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The aim of dimensionality reduction is to preserve as much of the signi.cant structure of the high­dimensional data as possible in the low-dimensional map.
Sentence 2: mDS allows an analyst to visualize how far observations are from each other for di.erent kinds of similarity measures, which in turn can deliver insights into Figure 2: Visualization of geographical cliques of attack­ers.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.1 Packet Sequences and their Features In general, packet sequences have four major features: unique packet lengths, packet length frequency, packet ordering, and in­terpacket timing.
Sentence 2: a packet sequence P can be written as: P = (t1, 1), (t2, 2), ..., (tn, n) In the above, ti is the difference in time observed between packets i and i - 1 (interpacket timing), with t1 = 0; i is the byte length of packet i.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Furthermore, this paper showed by experiments conducted on face and fingerprint biometrics that if two-factor biometric system is configured to yield a zero EER, an imposter with a stolen transformation key needs no more than two attempts on average to be falsely accepted by the biometric system.
Sentence 2: we argued that setting a two-factor biometric authentication system to achieve zero EER introduces a serious lapse in security in the case of stolen keys where the False Acceptance Rate (FAR) reaches unacceptable levels.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: By de.ni­tion, the degradation ratio for B (i.e., b(S,D)(B)) is the sum of normalized occurrences of the links in B.
Sentence 2: degra­dation ratio can be accurately modeled by the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the Zipf-Mandelbrot distri­bution since the normalized link occurrence follows this dis­tribution.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Using the .ow of tags as opaque predicates for obfuscation en­joys severaladvantages.
Sentence 2: first, the .ow of tags is inherently a part ofthedata-.owof aprogram.thevaluesofthetagsare .ow­sensitiveinstead ofbeing constant valuesthroughtheprogram exe­cution asinprevious approaches[6,23,20].
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.1 Open Linguistic Considerations Prounceable password generators must be able to gener­ate nonsense words that humans would nonetheless .nd ap­pealing; however, the properties that make such word-like strings appealing also represent opportunities for an adver­sary to narrow down and possibly rank-order the space of possible passwords.
Sentence 2: we are concerned with the linguistic factors that a.ect the security of pronounceable passwords.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Correctness: As according to the policy pro.le B1 is the only fragment bundle, the availability of the key e can be calculated as aj .
Sentence 2: due to the minimum key- Sj.B1 availability boundary condition policy it holds that: aj = A Sj.B1  -wj 2-W .2= ij.K .wj = W ij .K the weight of all items in the knapsack does not exceed the knapsacks capacity.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this case, we may specify that the grantor must request the delegatee consent in order to activate the dy­namic context.
Sentence 2: context obligatee approval * will activate a pre-obligation for grantor S to request the consent of the delegatee S ' to delegate obligation D as follows: Obligation(S ' , S, req consent, D, immediate, Cv).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this rule, all table lookups in Bob s policy are replaced with view predicates with the username bob as the .rst pa­rameter.
Sentence 2: when another principal, say Alice, accesses the picnic table, view.picnic will be invoked, but the .rst clause in the body of the rule will fail if bob does nothave read-access toAlice s employee tableinforma­tion.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Nevertheless, the societal as­pect is comprised of privacy techniques based on laws and regulations that help the owner to protect her privacy and con.ne the holder to certain rules that de.ne how to use or disseminate the personal information of the owner.
Sentence 2: the .rst level of classi.cation of technological privacy techniques for LTE-based PSN branches out into two classes, .rst responders and holder.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, the operating system may update a .eld representing a performance counter quite frequently, but its value is not signi.­cant to the correct operation of the OS.
Sentence 2: to be con.dent that a signature based on a particular .eld will be robust against evasion attacks, we must ensure that the .eld cannot be arbitrarily modi.ed.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The query is then forwarded to the processor that executes in the same level as the query.
Sentence 2: the query processor at level l can view only those input tuples whose levels are dominated by l and produce output streams at level l. during query processing overt information .ow can only occur from levels dominated by level l to level l. In the proposed ar­chitecture, level l receives tuples from dominated levels and stores them at its own level.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since physical properties depend on environmental conditions and measurements always contain noise, PUF responses of the same device are highly correlated, but not fully identical.
Sentence 2: syndrome coding schemes such as Code-Offset Syndrome Coding [1], Index-Based Syndrome Coding (IBS) [2] or Differential Sequence Coding (DSC) [3] enable error correction for PUFs to increase the reliability of the output key.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As a design alternative (listed as Baton alternative in Ta-Each delegation token, including a signed hash of the dele­ ble 1), it is possible to avoid embedding a certi.cate chain at gation token prior to itself in the chain, allows cryptographic all by retaining all previous versions of AndroidManifest.xml veri.cation of the entire certi.cate chain.
Sentence 2: this prevents an and the META-INF directory in future versions of the APK.11 adversary from removing, adding, or rearranging delegation signing a new APK will bind the current Android­token elements in the chain.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: First, in those nations that main­tain a two-stage election tally process, where preliminary or uno.cial vote tallies are followed by more a more careful thorough canvass (often known as the o.cial or certi.ed re­sults), the claim will be that any intrusion into networked tallies and transmissions of voted ballots can be corrected at the o.cial count.
Sentence 2: use of networked communications should not be o. limits for transmitting preliminary tallies and voted ballots.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Martina Zitterbart University of Karlsruhe 76128 Karlsruhe, Germany +49 721 608-6400 zit@tm.uka.de or simple feasibility reasons, tiny sensor hardware is not tamper­proof and therefore an attacker willing to eavesdrop or even modify essential data might compromise a loyal node for his purposes or add a malicious node to the network.
Sentence 2: data transportation starting from a sensor node towards a data sink has to be protected against such threats.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Axiom (3) states that if a user u can activate a role r, then all the permissions that can be acquired through r can be acquired by u.
Sentence 2: for the case where user u and permission p are assigned to r, the axioms imply that u can acquire p. Similarly, axiom (4) states that if there is a user session in which a user u has activated a role r then u acquires all the permissions that can be acquired through role r. We note that axioms (1) and (2) indicate that permission acquisition and role activation semantics is governed by explicit user-role and role permission assignments.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In essence, it is inappropriate to manually assign the set of semi-id features due to the following reasons: (1) if a smaller set is empirically designated, then users privacy might be inferred as long as the correlations among features could be found; and (2) if a larger set is pre-de.ned, then the data privacy might be over protected, and consequently deteriorates the performance of the subsequent data analysis.
Sentence 2: the algorithm capable to identify an appropriate set of semi-id features, especially in the context of big data, is urgently needed which could then be integrated with most of existing privacy preserving algorithms such as k­anonymity [19], [17], l-diversity [10] and t-closeness [6].
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Secondly, we note that a considerable number of accounts followed by the Twitter users is actually represented by news feeds, i.e., BBC, CNN, etc., celebrities, notable academics and 4 http://www.swansea.gov.uk/index.cfm?articleid=44946 other popular figures.
Sentence 2: in a sense the Twitter social network reflects the interests of a user, rather than his or her friendships.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Taking the Rate procedure into account, the asymptotic execution time of the MaxAvail algorithm amounts to O(m* n ), where n constitutes the number of stores and m the 2 *2m maximum number of bundles de.ned in the policy pro.le.
Sentence 2: it does not depend exponentially on the num­ 2For the sake of simplicity, we only address vulnerability in the explanation.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The longest trace we found had a length of 4 (Table 8), while any successful attack that attempts to brute-force the current ASLR implementation will in­evitably create a trace of size close to 1024 (the number of di.erent randomization o.sets used in our implementation) over a relatively small number of attacked devices.
Sentence 2: crash address trace size is an excellent indicator that can be used to detect ASLR derandomization attempts.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the preamble .elds, HT-LTF1 to HT-LTFN represents the known sequence sent via each individ­ual antenna for receivers to estimate their CSI.
Sentence 2: these .elds do not leak CSI either, because CSIsec sends an unknown sequence U in those .elds instead of the original known sequence K. the only remaining .elds that might leak CSI to eavesdroppers are Figure 17 Packet structure in 802.11n/ac.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If the maximum similarity score continues to converge towards the value 1 after each consecutive step in the set of performed interactions, then the visualization produced by the active user is becoming similar to a visualization used to identify or detect a sus­pected attack by an expert user.
Sentence 2: as illustrated in Fig­ure 1, NAVSEC is guiding an active user to a visualization completed by an expert user.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We can conclude that |D| = 1,000 is su.cient to discover the power-law distribution in the top­100 rank because it displays the same power-law distribution in the range as that observed with smaller size for D; i.e., |D| <1,000.
Sentence 2: with a relatively small number of mea­surements one can learn the power-law distribution of the few but frequently observed high-rank links.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The absolute addresses of these entrypoint functionsarestoredintheinternaldatabaseoftheloader,and they point to the image loaded at the original base address, causing false-positives when they are dispatched.
Sentence 2: when image loading is hooked, we parse through the loader databasewhichisaccessiblefromPEB(ProcessEnvironment Block), and convert these entrypoint addresses as soon as theyareregistered.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Second, a non-LUT implementation of the Extended Euclidean algorithm occupies a non-trivial number of FPGA resources.
Sentence 2: in a resource-limited FPGA such as ours, rather than unnecessarily use flip-flops, LUTs, gates and various routing resources, a better choice is to put the table in the FPGA block RAMs, in a parallel approach.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Furthermore, if RoM is equipped with software to analyze recent logged requests, it could identify apotentially misbehaving User by identifying any IDU identi.ers that are associated with an abnor­mal number of requests.
Sentence 2: while both of these types of denial-of-service are possible, it is our obser­vation that these attacks are not contingent on the design of our architecture, and a number of mitigation techniques are possible.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The proof of the theorem relies on the observation that to maintain the truth value of each predicate for each tuple of entities, we need O(n a) bits, because § each predicate has arity at most a.
Sentence 2: each authorization state can be encoded with O(pn a) bits, which is polynomial in the size of the input, given the assumption that a is a constant.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We make no computational assumptions and therefore model Eve as being computationally unbounded.
Sentence 2: this re­quirement implies that all the entropy in R comes from w. one of the most important requirements of such a protocol is that the output length of R must be as long as possible given the entropy of w. The di.erence between the entropy of w and the length of R is called the entropy loss.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The standard way to de.ne a t-conorm is to use a t-norm: S(x,y)=1-T((1-x),(1-y)) [16, 11], and the S is referred to as the T s dual t-conorm.
Sentence 2: the three dual t-conorms are: Sg (x, y) = max(x, y) (Gödel t-conorm)  Sp(x, y)= x + y - x · y (Product t-conorm)  Sl(x, y) = min(1,x + y) (Lukasiewicz t-conorm)  The criteria for choosing an appropriate t-conorm are exactly the same as for t-norms.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Developmentofauthorizationmodelsforadvanedap­pliations,suhasappliationsintheontextofthe WorldWideWeb(WWW),DigitalLibraries(DL), WorkfowManagementSystems(WFMSs),andData WarehousingSystems.
Sentence 2: theseresearhefortshaveresultedinthedefnitionofa varietyofaessontrolmodels,thatgreatlydiferwrta­essontrolpoliiestheysupport.animportantissue ishowtoevaluateandomparetheexpressivepowerofall thosemodels.ItissometimesdiÆulttounderstandifnew requirementsandappliationsreallyrequirethedefnition ofanotheraessontrolmodelorthemodelssofardefned ouldbeenough.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As a correctness test for Ktmp the VMKR contains the encryption of a bit-string with prefix 0xDEADBEEF under the correct media key Km.
Sentence 2: whenever decryption of the ciphertext using the temporary key Ktmp results in a cleartext with prefix 0xDEADBEEF, Ktmp is equal to the correct media key Km with high probability.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: BUILDING CIRCUITS THAT HAVE UNI-FORM TOPOLOGICAL STRUCTURE When a circuit is scrambled, the operation in each gate is hidden; however, the topological structure of the circuit is not.
Sentence 2: the client could infer some information about the server s function by looking at the scrambled circuit if the server constructs the cir­cuit in a naive way.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Otherwise, the robustness condition ensures that, if the adversary can in.uence a declassi.cation, then it can also directly access the declassi.ed information [Zdancewic and Myers, 2001].
Sentence 2: depending on the lattice, a program with some declassi.cation (hence not necessarily CNI) may still be com­piled, with an implementation that provides the same security guar­antees as for the source program against the restricted class of ad­versaries that make it safe [see also Chong and Myers, 2006].
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: More­over, negative policies are also useful to preclude undesired re­source accesses or information disclosures due to wrongly speci­.ed positive authorization policies, if the Deny takes precedence over Permit approach is used to solve con.icts among authoriza­tion policies.
Sentence 2: the decision type of xfACL, decisionT, in­cludes both Deny and Permit.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 'Ifthere arenoauthorizationorsafetyrelationshipsbetweenasetof nodes,thenthereisnoneedtoconsideronesub-confguration whilemakingachangetoanother.Theaccesscontrolmodel shouldmakesuchrelationshipsexplicit,sowecandetect whentheirareindependentsub-confgurations.Clearly,di­vidingconfgurationsintoindependentsub-confgurationsis ausefulwaytolimitcomplexity.
Sentence 2: ourgoalistoidentifymetricstomeasurethe complexityofunderstandingtheconceptsinvolvedinaccess controloperations.First,wedefneanaccesscontrolmodel thatmakesexplicittheinformationthatmustbeusedto performaccesscontroloperations.Second,weidentifysome examplestodrivetheidentifcationofnecessaryconcepts andtheircomplexity.Wethendevelopcomplexitymetrics forunderstandingeachconceptinthemodelandapplythese metricstotheexamples.Thedegreetowhichthecombina­tionofdiferentcomplexitiesaccumulateisnotobvious,so weexperimentwithafewcombinationapproaches.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Instead of direct function calls or accesses to DOM objects, de­velopers would be forced to layer such interaction on top of asyn­chronous postMessage-based protocols, which carries extra mar­shalling costs and may be hard to design correctly, as illustrated by recent .aws found in Facebook Connect and Google Friend Con­nect [19].
Sentence 2: a developer may be discouraged from con­verting some content on an HTTPS site into HTTPi to bene.t from its cacheability properties.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For Sweb, the inputs of a program are just the initial web state, and any web state resulted from program execution is part of the outputs.
Sentence 2: a program s satis.es the noninterference property if evaluating s under two web states with equivalent low­con.dentiality parts results in web states that also have equivalent low-con.dentiality parts.In otherwords,low users cannot distin­guish the two executions.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, the resulting privacy guarantees can be sim­pli.ed as a P3P promise that is o.ered for the users of the services.
Sentence 2: p3P is used to publish an enterprise privacy policy in order to collect PII from the customers while E-P3P is used for internally enforcing the enterprise policy to control accesses to the collected PII.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Another important standard access control language is XACML, an XML encoded and attribute-based policy language, which supports a .exible speci.cation of access con­trol policies through the use of permit and deny rules within the same access control policy, and the combination of (possibly dif­ferent) decisions from different rules by policy combining algo­rithms.
Sentence 2: xACML has also been selected by several on­going industrial and academic projects, e.g.
Relationship: reasoning