sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We .nd that both in the case of random access networks, as well as in the case of scheduled networks (where node transmissions are scheduled to be completely con.ict-free), a simpli.ed interference model such as the capture threshold model, can produce signi.cantly different results compared to an additive interference based model.
Sentence 2: a lot of cau­tion should be exercised before accepting or interpreting results based on simpli.ed interference models.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The access security policy of each of these groups can be de.ned through REL.
Sentence 2: both standards can complement each other within animplementation of our framework: whileMPEG-21RELprovidesthestandardlan­guage for de.ning user rights and access privileges, ONVIF would provide standardized protocols for the protection of these rights and privileges.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The data structure contains a filed called f_op that contains pointers to functions specific to MS-DOS files, including a function that reads a file sys_read() finds the pointer to this function and invokes it.
Sentence 2: the application's read() is turned into the rather indirect call: file->f_op->read(...); The common file model consists of the following object types (data structures) [Fig 2]: 1. super block objects: stores information concerning a mounted file system.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: But knowing Ta, Tb, ai, bi does not help .nd the unknown vectors - in fact there are an in.nite number of solu­ (Ta-Tb)rk+2 tions because rk+1 = .
Sentence 2: knowing pairs of (bi-ai)||rk+2|| input/ouput queries does not help probing A-1 .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, it is worth noting here that conservativeness of the presented results is (at least partially) caused by the fact that for each system we only considered random initial points, and random uncorrelated attack vectors and noise pro.les/modeling errors.
Sentence 2: the errors ob­tained through simulation do not represent the worst­case errors; for each system, to obtain scenarios that result in the worst-case estimation errors it is necessary to derive the corresponding attack vector (and the ini­tial state), which is beyond the scope of this paper.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If some participant pi of p, sends tra.c according to the number of messages in its application queue, a global eavesdropper attacker can detect that, by choosing two di.erent scenarios where pi has di.erent amount of messages in its application queue.
Sentence 2: for every two scenarios restricted by RRH SA, p s participants send regardless the messages in their applica­tion queue.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Assume there are n shares in total, Shamir s secret sharing scheme has two important properties: 1) knowledge of any k or more shares makes the secret easily computable; 2) knowledge of any k-1 or fewer shares leaves the secret completely undeterminable, (in other words, it is impossible to guess original value by simply looking at the k-1 or fewer shares).
Sentence 2: the security value of the scheme relates to the fact that as long as the attacker is not able to gain simultaneous access to k number of shares, he has zero information of the secret.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: E.g., Blumenthal, supra, 992 F. Supp at 52; Ben Ezra, supra, 206 F.3d at 985­ 86.
Sentence 2: the editing of statements to remove profanity, and the removal of some messages but not others, is not a proper basis for the imposition of liability in this case.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Zq then h · gis uniformly distributed at random in G as long as (xG +xB)b = -r. The latter can be discarded, as this only happens with negligible probability 1/q.
Sentence 2: using the standard reduction argument, we can con­clude that any IND-CPA adversary against the above fully distributed threshold cryptosystem implies a DDH solver.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: M7 and M8 .les are approximately 2.4MB and 3.3MB,whereasthelegitimate .lesrangefrom1KB to0.5MB.As smaller .lesarestatistically morelikely tovaryfromtheexpected value, the variance of the mimicry .les, whose sizes are larger on average,isvery small.Althoughthetest scoresofthemimicry.les are higher on average, the majority of these test scores fall within one standard deviation of the legitimate mean, 0.074 ± 0.045 (or 0.019to0.119).
Sentence 2: theKolmogorov-Smirnov testis unable toreliablydifferentiatemimicry.lesfromlegitimate .les.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: ASR defeats pointer corruption attacks by randomizing the loca­tion of various data and code objects in the process address space.
Sentence 2: the attacker can no longer guess the address of the input buffer containing attacker-provided code, the address of any spe­ci.c function in the process memory (such as execve), or any vulnerable data items (e.g., .le names).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If a function f is i th input nondeducible despite J, then even though the reader of the output knows the inputs in J, he still cannot infer the value of the i th input.
Sentence 2: in the general case, an SCS must ensure that f is i th input nondeducible for J, for every input i that it contributes, with J being the set of inputs contributed by the SCS who reads the output.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the .rst two protocols, which are based on time se­ries, it is undesirable to learn the absolute result: Ft (the forecasted value) might be considered to be revealing too much information because a player can learn his share of the value and possibly some additional information about other players data.
Sentence 2: instead of providing its absolute Ft-dt value, we output only the slope dt , i.e., the percentage by which the value is expected to increase or decrease in the next time interval.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Example: One of the speci.c Missions recently under­taken by Project Impact is the repair of the Pajaro River levee in northern California.
Sentence 2: accomplishedBy(Pajaro River Flood Mitigation) = Project Impact MissionPartner: Missions × PartnerOrganiza­tions, holds for (m, p) when p is involved in the ex­ecution of m. The consistency of ParticipatesIn, AccomplishedBy and MissionPartner is assured by the following constraint, which states that any part­ner in a mission participates in the coalition which is to accomplish that mission: .m .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.3.1 Property-based Attestation with Revocation In order to solve the version-rollback problem for remote property-based attestation, we note that the attestation pro­cess is a dynamic process where the veri.er checks the PCR values attested to against what the veri.er considers trust­worthy for each protocol run anew.
Sentence 2: the veri.er can check whether the revocation list is recent enough.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: rotating images, adding dots, changing background colours etc) and could be easily tricked by spammers.
Sentence 2: new studies in this domain focused on extracting other features and using different techniques to combat spam like content obscuring detection [25], combining OCR with low-level image content (in order to detect existence of content obscuring objects) [26], maximal figure-of-merit (MFoM) learning approach [27], image spam detection based on file properties and header using C4.5 decision tree and SVM [22, 28].
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: That is, if an at­tacker can steal a key K from S, we assume he can steal the sensitive data directly without having to bypass our security mechanism.
Sentence 2: note, though, that the attacker can be an administrator with valid access to S. we do consider two spe­ci.c threats in relation to S.First,the administratorcould attempt to steal a copy of the list of the workstation au­thentication tokens.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The length of a ciphertext of Ours is 2|c| + |K| + |p1| whereas that of NY is 2|c| + 2|K| + |p2|.
Sentence 2: if we assume that the sizes of NIZK proofs are the same, Ours is more e.cient than NY by |K| in regard to the length of a ciphertext.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This implies the feedback from rx2 should be h 2 = U2 wU2 (wh1 - h2) = h 1 - U2 h2, which can only be estimated when K U1 K U2 and U1 are known to the attackers.
Sentence 2: cSIsec protocol prevents malicious clients from reporting forged CSI based on the genuine CSI of concurrent receivers.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In reality, we relax the de.nition in that this property may not hold in the TRGs constructed from pairwise classi.cation results, e.g., a node may have multiple paths leading to the same root, or multiple paths leading to di.erent roots.
Sentence 2: our TRG construction algorithm needs to .nd all the root trig­gers of a network event, which makes the problem equivalent to compute the transitive reduction of a direct graph.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since we assume that the en­cryption scheme is semantically secure, this implication is a contradiction, and there is no such distinguisher D that dis­tinguishes between H0(i1,...,in)and HB(i1,...,in); that is, the distribution of the simulated garbled OBDD is indis­tinguishable from that of a real garbled OBDD.
Sentence 2: bob s simulated view is indistinguishable, except with neg­ligible probability, to the real view, concluding the proof.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 5.2 Defending against Various Attacks on Se­cure Routing Karlof and Wagner [17] have studied various possible at­tacks on security of routing protocols for wireless sensor net­work.We now show how our schemes can defend against the attacks they described.Recall that in our scheme routing control information is authenticated by the inter-node au­thentication scheme, which prevents most outsider attacks (with the exception of the wormhole attack which we intro­duce in Section 5.2.1).
Sentence 2: in the discussion below we mainly consider attacks launched by an insider adver­sary that has compromised one or more sensor nodes.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It turns out that making a form s patchID tamperproof only requires expanding our notion of a patch to include one additional piece of information about each form: the URL to which that form submits its data.
Sentence 2: the patch generation phase must extract the target URL for each form and tie it to the form s patchID, and the patch enforcement phase becomes the following sequence of checks.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Fenton s Data Mark Machine [22, 23] requires a special instruc­tion set to de.ne when the program counter can be untainted, and also requires that all registers in the system be statically assigned as tainted or untainted.
Sentence 2: a practical compiler for Fenton s sys­tem would need to know the taint value of every piece of data at every possible program point, which implies that the compiler has already identi.ed all control dependencies through static analysis.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In contrast, the same applications use 292 API calls that require per­missions, out of which 22(7.5%) are undocumented.
Sentence 2: applications make very little use of undocumented APIs, but for the undocumented APIs they do use, a signi.cantly larger fraction of those require permissions than for the doc­umented APIs they use.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Therefore, if we program the discriminator value of abcd (both chunks d3, and d1) freely and thus use any bucket among the four choices it has, we will remain with only two bucket choices for the other item efgh as its discriminator chunk d3 will no longer be available to freely program (as it is already programmed by abcd).
Sentence 2: even though both items have two discriminator bits, only one of them can use four choices of buckets.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our key idea is based on the obser­vation that the sensitive data is processed by only a small portion of routines in system software stack and should fol­low certain accessing patterns.
Sentence 2: if we can extract sensi­tive data accessing patterns and sensitive data propagation paths at runtime, it is possible to highlight the abnormal data leakage path through a visualized data .ow graph.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As a result, it is very di.cult, or nearly impos­sible to collect the complete original scenario (µ, V, E, T ).
Sentence 2: the goal of our scenario collection is to obtain (µ, V I,EI,T I), so that V n V I, E n EI and T n T I are max­imized and the replay service can reconstruct web infection trails as complete as possible using the recorded data.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This results in s =(a1, {a1})n-1 · (a1, {a2}) · (a2, {a2' }) · '''' ' (a2, {a1}) · (a1, {a1})m-1 · (a1, {a3}) · (a3, Ø) · (t, Ø)., which has to belong to F i. m = n. The expression above can n-1 m-1 be rewritten as s = x · y · z · w · t ., for appropriate x, y, z, w, and with overloading t .
Sentence 2: the set F nm must include U · t., with U = {x · y · z · w | m = n}.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As we assume complete isolation of the secure side, overall system scheduling (interrupt handling) may be adversely a.ected by the ObC.
Sentence 2: to support real­time requirements there may be a need to return con­trol to the open side after an allotted time, to serve any interrupts or other critical services, and then come back to continue the operation on the secure side where the execution was left o.. 3.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For this study, this was a sensible approach, as other Cloud Provider Types, such as Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) or Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS), differ substan­ tially in terms of attack surface and handling.
Sentence 2: these other types would require a mostly different approach in terms of attack types, attacker models, etc.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It is our opinion that the world is unlikely to ever settle on a single authentication technology, due to varied techni­cal requirements, as well as signi.cant social and economic issues.
Sentence 2: we believe that the bridging approach de­scribed in this article is not simply a short-term hack, but rather an approach that will continue to be required and further re.ned over time.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This property guarantees that, given some ciphertexts, the at­tacker can neither recover the plaintexts nor .nd the equality relationship of the plaintexts.
Sentence 2: it provides much stronger security guarantee than the standard one-wayness property used in [9] and the enhanced one-wayness property by Bellare, Boldyreva and O Neill [2].
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: According to the rules of difference transformation caused by addition modulo 2n, if .in = 2n - 1, then .out = 2n -1 with probability p = 1.
Sentence 2: if the right part of an output difference of the characteristics will be equal to 80000000x, such characteristic cannot be used for finding the secret key, because the probability that the characteristic passes the last round of encryption is also p = 1.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: That is, unlike the optimization problem of perturbated precoding matrix which can modify any components in the precoding matrix, our optimization problem can only control the second row of pre­coding matrix, i.e., f21 and f22.
Sentence 2: based on this observation, instead of solving the optimization problem in real time, we pro­pose an ef.cient heuristic to select proper CSI to gain a favorable power allocation to message m2 for both EP and MT allocations.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 1 shows, the motion of the bump denoting the worm packets is accompanied by the appear­ance at the corresponding region of frequency values, of a group of .ngerprints that have incurred large frequency changes with refer­ence to an earlier time instant.
Sentence 2: computing for each frequency value, the number of .ngerprints that have arrived there because of a large increment in their frequency, can help identify portions of the frequency range where a bump is located.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We have veri.ed our ability, how­ever, to kill a cloned EDL with an identical Gen-2 tag model, an Impinj Monza, over the air.
Sentence 2: unless the Washing­ton State EDL Gen-2 tag is specially manufactured which seems unlikely, given the presence of a generic TID it is subject to over-the-air killing by any reader.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Unfortunately, predicting the complexity of con.guring the IDS in a particular network is very di.­cult.
Sentence 2: the security specialists did not know if it was worth tuning the IDS for a simple domain of the net­work (i.e., low tra.c, not many di.erent types of devices) versus directly tuning the system for the more important, complex domains.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, given the increasing .exibility for the User in composing di.erent Services from di.erent vendors, it might happen that not all of them are in the same CoT.
Sentence 2: when as a part of a Service Composition, a User enters a new CoT (or more precisely, invokes a par­ticular service provided by a member of another CoT) from an existing CoT (which contains most of the SPs required for other services), then it may not be able to successfully use various Federation bene.ts for completing the composed Service, due to the disjoint between the CoT members.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Let us now brie.y address robustness.
Sentence 2: the soundness of the proof system EqDl(g, R, vkj , cj ) implies that logg vkj = logR cj with overwhelming probability if VerifyEq(g, R, vkj , cj , pj ) = 1 for any 1 = j = l. for any (R, S ) .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Otherwise, in the case that these two messages would be inconsistent or would receive this ni-1 message from only one of these two nodes, it could report this inconsistency to a trusted server and asks from this server to send to it the latest status of this link.
Sentence 2: a malicious ni cannot falsely claim about this link failure unless it colludes with a malicious nj .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For such scenarios, Dependent Assertions can o.er an al­ternative, wherein the AP can issue a long-lived or wide­band Dependent Assertion, which is Dependent on one or more Independent Assertions, which can be of a lesser va­lidity period or usage scope.
Sentence 2: users can continue to get the bene.ts of the single Dependent Assertion (for e.g.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, providing no location .x avail­able to the Google Maps application, regardless of the ac­tual state of the GPS device, prevents the application from providing search results based on accurate location data, or showing the current location of the user on the map; other features of the application, such as directions, continue to function as normal.
Sentence 2: providing fake data allows the user to explore the trade-o.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The distinctive feature of Core P-RBAC lies in the complex structure of privacy permissions, which re.ects the highly structured ways of expressing privacy rules to represent the essence of OECD principles and privacy acts.
Sentence 2: aside from the data and the action to be per­formed on it, a privacy permission explicitly states the in­tended purpose, along with the conditions under which the Users UA  Roles  Figure 2: Core P-RBAC model permission can be given, and the obligations that are to be .nally performed.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: There are 26 upper [A-Z] and lower [a-z] case letters, 10 numbers [0-9], and 33 special characters (including punctuation, the dollar sign, asterisk, tilda, space, and so on).
Sentence 2: if a password contains lower case letters and numbers, Num Characters = 26 + 10 = 36.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: intuition behind this mechanism is as follows: Though there can be a larger number of attack vectors, many attack vectors are very close to each other, i.e., the dif­ference between them is very insigni.cant with respect to the potential impact on OPF.
Sentence 2: it is enough to consider one of these similar attack vectors to see the impact for each of them.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We believe that this is because users tend not to install apps that require larger set of permissions; Facebook suggests that application developers do not ask for more permissions than necessary since there is a strong correlation between the number of permissions required by an app and the number of users who install it [8].
Sentence 2: to maximize the number of victims, malicious apps seem to follow this hypothesis and require a small set of permissions.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, for data of 10,000 users, we calculated the average entropy of CDR data to be roughly .n 3.49n.
Sentence 2: an adversary that is given the Bloom Filter rep­resentation of the user behavior for the training period, has a probability of roughly 1/23.49 8% of correctly guessing a speci.c element of the hash set.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Nonetheless, the re.ned interface for MACs used for typecheck­ing their protocols is almost identical to the ideal interface IMAC of §3, thanks to its support for dynamic key generation and key compromise.
Sentence 2: we directly bene.t from their symbolic veri.­cation effort: for each protocol implementation that they generate and typecheck against their cryptographic library interfaces, The­orem 2 applies and, assuming that their MAC algorithm is CMA­secure, the generated protocol is also asymptotically safe, and their notion of session integrity holds with overwhelming probability.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since memory operations can take hundreds of CPU cy­cles, the communication between the host CPU and NIC is the most e.cient when the host CPU can predict the pre­cise timetoread theupdatedvalue, and obtain theupdated value from address B in a single read operation.
Sentence 2: we design an experiment to predict the time delay between a mailbox write and mailbox read on the host CPU, so that the host CPU can communicate e.ciently and reliably.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since in our approach we are evaluating the access request on the AC-XML data structure, which is built starting from a DTD/XML Schema, with the term node we do not intend the element/attribute of the target document, by contrast we mean the corresponding element into the AC-XML document.
Sentence 2: if the access evaluation grants the access to a node n, it grants the access to all the nodes of the target document, for which n is the corresponding node in the AC-XML document.
Relationship: reasoning