sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 2.4 Opportunistic IPsec IPsec with opportunistic encryption (OE), [RFC4301, RFC6071], was also proposed for providing privacy of the DNS requests between the stub resolver and the recursive resolver, [9, 21].
Sentence 2: [21], de.ne a new resource record ipseca which can be used to enhance DNS transactions with IPsec, by pointing to the entries in the security policy database (SPD).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Starting at the right­most bit k, we proceed from right to left within the synopsis Susing a bit window of w bits.
Sentence 2: in each epoch, only the nodes that con­tribute a 1 to the bits in S corresponding to the current position of the window, send MACs to the sink that can be used to verify their contribution to S. in the .rst epoch, only nodes that contribute a 1 to bits k to k-w+ 1 respond to the query.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When we reported this issue to Friendcaster, the developers were confused be­cause they thought Facebook s access tokens were bound to relying parties and checked with every API call: From Facebook s perspective, the API calls wouldn t appear to be originating from Friendcaster, but the attacker s own app.
Sentence 2: the developers of Friendcaster thought Face­book uses the OAuth 1.0 interpretation of the access token, while in reality Facebook uses the OAuth 2.0 interpreta­tion.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The increasing computing and storage capabilities, new interfaces such as near .eld commu­nication technology (NFC) or integration of hardware-based secure execution environments as well as rich context sensing capabilities have turned these devices to enablers for many useful (and fancy) applications.
Sentence 2: we consider two emerging trends with high commercial interest: smart devices as access tokens (e.g., in conjunction with NFC), and smart devices as powerful sensors for context-aware access control to resources.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note that di.erent time points may correspond to di.erent policy versions and data updates, so an inconsistency found at time T may be short lived.
Sentence 2: the inconsistency may not exist at time T - E, where E is the minimum amount of time that it takes for a policy, preference, or data value to get updated at the particular FSP.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Thus, DSTM2 mechanisms track read/write sets, perform validation and contention management, and commit/abort transactions.
Sentence 2: dSTM2 contains two mature, substantial STM mechanisms for detecting and resolving con.icts (the obstruction-free and shadow @atomic shared object factories; thosefactories are described in detail in the DSTM2 pa­per[34]).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The similarity between probability distributions can be measured by the multiplicative distance dP de.ned as dP (µ1, µ2) = sup| ln µ1(z) | with | ln µ1(z) | = 0 if both z.Z µ2(z) µ2(z) µ1(z), µ2(z) are zero and 8 if only one of them is zero.
Sentence 2: dP (µ1, µ2) is small i. µ1, µ2 assign similar probabilities to each value z.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, in Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks, the attacker has to in­stall the DDOS daemon programs in vulnerable hosts be­fore he/she can instruct the daemons to launch an attack.
Sentence 2: an attacker has to (or usually does) reach a certain state before he/she can carry out certain attacks, and usually reaches the state by launching some other at­tacks.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Although many routes are still short-lived, en­tities send packets over long-lived routes (longer than 6 hours) for 96% of the times [9].
Sentence 2: considering the fact that the load balancing within an ISP causes most route variations (i.e., up to 82%), OPT running at AS-level uses more stable routes than router-level OPT.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: That is, it is di.cult for an adversary to distinguish abab abc a triple (g ,g ,g ) from (g ,g ,g ) for a, b, and c chosen randomly and for a generator g of QRN .
Sentence 2: we use a variant of the problem which says that DDH problem is hard even when the factorization of N is known.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, in practice users performing these well de.ned job functions are limited in scope to either a particular sub-process or a particular geography in accordance with the organization of the plant.
Sentence 2: the job functions identi.ed in ICS, such as Operator and Engineer , perform certain types of operations; what objects those operations can ap­ply to are dependent on the attributes of users and those objects.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Introduction Client-side scripting languages such as JavaScript are ubiq­uitous in modern, internet-connected computing, but pose a serious security risk to the client.
Sentence 2: the wide­spread inclusion of third-party scripts into major websites in­ * This research was conducted at USU supported by NSF grant IIS­0850825: REU Site Program in Computer Vision and Multi-Agent Systems.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For a cryptographically strong #, the adversary is expected to correctly guess half (plus a negligible quantity) of the bits by coin-.ips, and the other half is incorrectly guessed.
Sentence 2: by the XOR protection scheme an injected rogue frame is expected to have approximately n corrupted bits, 2 and CRC-32 can be used to detect the corruption .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Even though the search space can be signi.cantly reduced by applying our correla­tion scheme, the number of correlated con.icting rules may still be large, leading to the permutation algorithm unapplicable.
Sentence 2: the permutation algorithm can help us identify an optimal solution for a con.ict resolution, but it is inef.cient for the .rewall policies with a larger number of con.icting rules within some con.ict corre­lation groups.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Suppose there is no wormhole between A and B.
Sentence 2: then: RSSIA,i = PB,i - LBA,i (8) RSS IB,i = PA,i - LAB,i (9) Channel reciprocity implies LBA,i LAB,i and hence: RSS IA,i - RSSIB,i PB,i - PA,i (10) the more reciprocal the channel between A and B is, the higher is r(PA - PB, RSS IB - RSSIA).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 6.3.1 Impersonation Resistance Consider an adversary A thathas asitsgoal to runa suc­cessful handshake thus convincing another user that he has actually owned a tag without disposing of the legiti­mate information.
Sentence 2: a does not have the tuple (X1v* ,X2v* ,X3v* )for a given user v* and a given tag, both object of the challenge.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The SAA scheme constructed in Section 5 is (.., .... ,.... ,.. ,.. ,..)-secure under the EF-CMA model.
Sentence 2: for all .. and .. satisfying .. = .. ' ...... .. = .. ' - (........ +2........ +3.... +4....), where the exponentiation and bilinear map on .. take time .... and ...., respectively.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If F = {} is a singleton set with hierarchy relation , then we call H a monotype hierarchy and write (R, ).
Sentence 2: we use notation Pau(r) to refer to the set of authorized permissions of role r, which is a set of permissions that can be acquired by activating r. Pau(r) = can_be_acquired(r, p), and Pau(R) = UPau (r) .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: CONCLUSION We describe how the HT functionality encapsulated in the CPS algorithm for secure data aggregation is useful for developing a va­riety of useful and ef.cient security applications.
Sentence 2: we show fast and ef.cient primitives for broadcast authentication, pub­lic key management, and node-to-node signatures, each of which has important properties superior in some way to the current best known protocols in the literature.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 5d, roles in all three systems are particularly permission-sparse, averaging 1.2, 0.4, and 0.2 permissions per role in RBAC1, RBAC0, and ugo, respectively.
Sentence 2: rBAC0 and ugo utilize many additional roles to store simulated hierarchy information, and many of these roles are never assigned permissions.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our .ndings indicate that the attacks are possible using a low-cost oscilloscope with a sample rate as little as 100 MS/s.
Sentence 2: we have successfully exempli.ed our at­tack at hand of the bitstream decryption of a Virtex-II Pro XC2CP7 FPGA manufactured by the market leader Xilinx.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: That is, it must be infeasible for an adversary to directly or indirectly cause the counter to behave incorrectly without at least being detected.
Sentence 2: an adversary must not be able to set the value of the counter ar­bitrarily, cause it to revert to a past value, cause it to generate false execution certi.cates (as de.ned below), or cause it to fail in any other way without being detected even if the adversary owns and has physical access to the hardware and software used to implement and use the counter.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 6.2 Experimental Results speed dating small blue facebook B 0.522 0.374 0.683 X 0.795 0.758 0.853 X * 0.823 0.885 0.892 X+ 0.884 0.785 N/A X *+ 0.887 0.902 N/A Capture of Privacy Preference This set of experiments are designed to evaluate the ef.cacy of XACCESS (denoted by X)in capturing social users implicit pref­erence of information sharing with relevant users.
Sentence 2: we intend to examine the contributions by different features (i.e., static social network structure, dynamic historical activities) in capturing such implicit reference.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: On the defense side, our current design and implementation of Secomp is still preliminary.
Sentence 2: we built our SDKs as a wrapper of the GCM SDKs, making it convenient for the devel­opers to retro.t them into their apps: all they need to do is just a small adjustment of the APIs the apps call to activate the new pro­tection.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Additionally, an attacker can further obscure the attack signature by sending acknowledgments to more victims less often, with the total amount of traf.c generated staying constant.
Sentence 2: by generating less traf.c per host and staying under the detection threshold, but increasing the total number of hosts it is not locally obvious to the victims that they are participating in an DDoS at­tack.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It rather implies a functionally similar to that of IPsec IKE, whose goal is limited to the set up of a security association across a pair of nodes, whereas the task of deliv­ering authenticated or protected data packets is demanded to one or more di.erent dedicated protocols (e.g., the IPsec Encapsulated Security Payload or the IPsec Authentication Header).
Sentence 2: our proposed key exchange proto­col should provide negotiation for cryptographic algorithms, as well as keying material, to existing data security protocol speci.c for sensor nodes, such as TinySec [8] or MiniSec [9].
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Furthermore, since interval or range predicates are intro­duced into our location-based access control mechanism, it 2The anonymity set is de.ned as the group of people who hold the same access privileges.
Sentence 2: allows a user to use a coarse-grained spatio-temporal infor­mation in location to achieve obfuscation.a loca­tion in our system can be a region as opposed to a point and it serves as a cloak to the user s actual position.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: OBJ S is a function that maps each class in C to a countable set of object names of that class.
Sentence 2: oBJ S (c) gives all possible names for objects of the class c. We use U to denote OBJ S (user) and R to denote OBJ S (role), we also require that R contain a reserved role name sso, for the system security of.cer role.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The choice of the decision set depends on the algorithm used to combine poli­cies.
Sentence 2: permit-overrides and deny-overrides are de.ned using the Indeterminate extended set and therefore over D6; in contrast, the other combining algorithms .rst­applicable, permit-unless-deny, deny-unless-deny and only-one­applicable are de.ned over D4.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A large false negative rate may lessen the integrity and overall trust in an edited docu­ment, but provides a better starting point for future editors.
Sentence 2: while 28.5% of untrustworthy edits may be­come part of the document, the remaining 71.5% that would have become part of the document without the classi.cation system are automatically removed, reducing strain on edi­tors who may remove the changes on subsequent edits.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While it may seem unusual to de.ne the semantics of declarative languages like ODRL and XrML using a procedural mecha­nism, we argue that our semantics capture several signi.cant aspects of rights expression languages and real interpreters that are not captured by existing semantics.
Sentence 2: our semantics do not require rendering actions to be instan­taneous and infallible, and support constraints that modify the e.ect of an action rather than prohibit it outright.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We show in Section 6 that these new alternatives provably meet our strongest notions of security.
Sentence 2: assuming that these .xes are not used to encrypt more than 232 packets between rekeying, these new constructions will resist chosen­plaintext and chosen-ciphertext privacy attacks as well as forgery, replay, and out-of-order delivery attacks.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Then, by the standard hybrid argument there exists a j .
Sentence 2: {1,...,N}such that MH AdvA[j] -MH AdvA[j +1] >E/N this Ais somehow able to distinguish EncryptABE(S,PK,j,M)from EncryptABE(S,PK,j+1,M) for some M and S.But then Acan be directly used to win the ABE index hiding game.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: ETA has the smallest signature size (i.e., 240 bits) among all of its counterparts.
Sentence 2: the signature size of ETA is 6, 8, 1.3 and orders of magnitudes times smaller than that of HORS/HORSE, online/of.ine signatures, ECDSA/token-ECDSA and HORS++, re­spectively.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In addition, because the protocol processing associated with all outgoing TCP packets are performed on the CTCP router, it is now possible to collectively manage the congestion-related states of these TCP connections based on their destination sub­nets [1], and utilize the available bandwidth on the Internet more effectively.
Sentence 2: this congestion state sharing mecha­nism allows short-lived TCP connections to start with a larger initial congestion window size and thus reduces their end-to-end connection time.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Table 2 shows the classification and the relationships; while Figure 2 illustrates the classification for two example benefits.
Sentence 2: 1) Be1 Cost reductions, is classified as: NATURE Organizational, IMPACT - Primary, and BENEFICIARY  Internal, and TARGET Process; and 2) Be15 Improved communications between government agencies, is classified as: NATURE Inter-Organizational, IMPACT - Secondary, and BENEFICIARY Internal.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As implemented in RCC, general role hierarchies provide support for an arbitrary partial order to serve as the role hierarchy, to include the concept of multiple inheritances of permissions and user membership among roles.
Sentence 2: general role hierarchies allow a role to have more than one immediate ascendant (potentially inheriting user membership from multiple sources) and at the same time one or more immediate descendents (potentially inheriting permissions from multiple sources).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We also show how to generate anonymous signatures that, much like group signatures, can be used to hide a group s membership while providing accountability.Indeed, a proxy could translate signatures from group members into signa­tures from the group manager.The advantage here is that the proxy does not store any signing key and the key of the group manager cannot get exposed even if the proxy is compromised.
Sentence 2: 1.1 Related Work Proxy re-signatures [5] should not be confused with the similar sounding proxy signatures [18, 12] as previously dis­cussed.de.nitions in Dodis et al.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We note that while the second and third phases of our attack are similar to previously known attacks, their application to this context has several interesting aspects.
Sentence 2: the winnowing phase is similar to the long-term intersection attack, which is normally discussed in the context of a global eavesdropper, but because of the bridge setting our attack can be inexpensively mounted by a remote adversary that in many cases does not require the coopera­tion of either endpoint.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: qv,c (t) By treating the attack events as a stationary point process with at­=P(Tv,c = t) tack inter-arrival times that exhibit the NBU property, we see that =1- E[E[I(Tv,c >t)|Jv,Tv]] for any z1 ,z2 = 0, [[( ) ]] T(1) ,T(2) =1- EEIc1 (Jv)>tc2 (Tv)>t|Jv,TvP.
Sentence 2: m) ( )() (1) (1) (1) Y(r)>z1 +z2|Y(r)>z1 = PY(r)>z2 i+1 i+1 i the extra-waiting time for the (i+1)th attack under the tf =1- EF ( N (1) (1) (c1 )P(t)=m · condition that the attack has not arrived after some time is smaller i,Jv Jv m=0 i=1 than the waiting time for the ith attack in the stochastic sense.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Thus, when 802.11n overtakes 802.11g (As predicted in [47]), the tracking capacity will increase at a small cost of accuracy.
Sentence 2: we .nd malnet tracking is likely infeasible with current systems, but when 802.11n overtakes 802.11g, geolocating malnets become fea­sible in dense metropolitan areas.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Like other SFI systems, Native Client also makes use of operating-system and hardware support where appropriate, e.g., to ensure that data is not executable, and that code is not writable and is loaded at the correct address.
Sentence 2: on the 32-bit x86 platform, Native Client relies on hardware segments, not software guards, to constrain reads and writes to data memory, as well as code execution.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: (v)) where P = policy (u) and G = (L, {Ri}i.I).
Sentence 2: the GSCS will (i) look up the current locations of u and v using the location assignment ., (ii) look up the access control policy P = policy (u) of the resource owner, (iii) instantiate P by the spatial knowledge base G = (L, {Ri}i.I) to obtain a binary relation P (G), and (iv) check if the locations .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Because most of the functionality of these networks relies on the availablity and proper functioning of HLRs, our attack seeks to vi­olate such conditions.
Sentence 2: an adversary with control over a set of compromised mobile phones will attempt to overwhelm 1Given the popularity of application download services provided on platforms such as the iPhone and Android, such numbers are expected to grow signi.cantly.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Z is a hash function (k is the length of m in base 2) is a subset w which is generated by selecting p elements from the set sk using a mapping function.
Sentence 2: w consists of si (p distinct elements selected from set K) with 1 = i = p. For secure operation, the parameters k, n, and p should be set to satisfy the following inequality.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Furthermore,wedesignnewtechniques to craft a speci.c/special MCB probing packet that canletMCB-enabled malware exposeitself(from net­work observationperspective), much more e.cient and e.ective than existing network software fuzzing tech­niques [7].
Sentence 2: we develop ICE (Informed forCed Executing), a newtechniquetoquicklyidentify possible MCB execution paths that can be used later in stitched dynamic symbolic execution to derive sat­is.able packet contents to trigger MCB logic.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3) Sparse Scenario: In this experiment, we create a sparse scenario where many users are new to the system and they have not signed many certi.cates yet.
Sentence 2: the system involves only 10% of experienced users and 10% of medium  TABLE I PERFORMANCE OF APPROACHES FOR UNIFORM,IDEAL,SPARSE AND SUFFICIENT INFORMATION SCENARIOS Uniform Scenario Ideal Scenario Sparse Scenario Suf.cient Information Approaches Coverage MAE Coverage MAE Coverage MAE Coverage MAE OPGP 0.499±0.004 0.744±0.015 0.546±0.004 0.357±0.006 0.143±0.003 0.902±0.045 0.773±0.002 0.622±0.012 MPGP 0.626±0.004 0.788±0.016 0.676±0.003 0.300±0.008 0.223±0.005 0.825±0.017 0.856±0.002 0.782±0.009 EPGP 0.636±0.002 0.794±0.027 0.717±0.007 0.228±0.004 0.385±0.021 0.784±0.022 0.855±0.003 0.773±0.003 EPGP+ 0.839±0.008 0.616±0.018 0.962±0.012 0.195±0.008 0.646±0.033 0.709±0.021 0.953±0.007 0.559±0.025  TABLE II PERFORMANCE OF APPROACHES FOR MANY MISTAKES AND HIGHLY MALICIOUS SCENARIOS Many Mistakes Highly Malicious (a) Highly Malicious (b) Highly Malicious (c) Approaches Coverage MAE Coverage MAE Coverage MAE Coverage MAE OPGP 0.503±0.009 0.867±0.022 0.307±0.014 0.906±0.036 0.291±0.011 0.932±0.013 0.292±0.009 0.912±0.002 MPGP 0.633±0.003 0.913±0.023 0.512±0.012 1.320±0.027 0.501±0.012 1.359±0.029 0.504±0.005 1.343±0.039 EPGP 0.644±0.005 0.914±0.003 0.521±0.007 1.351±0.021 0.533±0.005 1.329±0.034 0.504±0.006 1.342±0.038 EPGP+ 0.827±0.017 0.814±0.053 0.701±0.013 1.502±0.024 0.534±0.008 1.414±0.018 0.676±0.009 1.498±0.037 experienced users.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Though the rate of illegitimate attestations is bounded by that of human activity, smart attackers can determinis­tically bypass any spam .lter based on human attestation.
Sentence 2: bots could generate sophisticated spam messages for targeted users or act like humans when they access In­ternet banking or E-commerce sites if they adopt existing methods as human identi.cation.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: How­ever, in order to handle negative authorizations (which is an extension of RBAC) each role has two correspoding classes, eachpermissionorprohibitiononaresourcehas correspond­ing classes for roles and users.
Sentence 2: for each per­mission, we have a class of roles that have that permission, and thena classof userswhohave thatpermission.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When it is composite, the polynomial ring over the message space is not a unique factorization domain, and hence they can­not e.ciently obtain the exact corresponding set from the polynomial.
Sentence 2: the message space of Paillier en­cryption is ZN for a hard-to-factor integer N. In this case, .nding roots of the polynomial in ZN is equivalent to fac­toring N [44].
Relationship: entailment