sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As a result, the value of t should be as large as possible.
Sentence 2: according to the way of modifying M1 shown in section 2.4, the message freedom from mt to m15 should be larger than n. In our attack on MD4(P || C), message m14 and m15 are padded messages, where the freedom is 0. message m137 can be randomly 62RPC is utilized in our attack.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The existing exploit vertices will then carry the .nal metric score TS (instead of the BS in the static case), which has a similar role as the calculated scores in the case of static domain (as described in Section 3.2).
Sentence 2: in the static do­main, the .nal score is calculated based on the base score and the causal relationship between this exploit and others, whereas in the dynamic domain, the .nal score of each exploit will depend on four factors: The base score, the temporal score, the causal relationship between exploits and others, and the previous time slice (this will become clearer later when we discuss the two concrete cases).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, an in-vehicle radar system might not alert the vehicle to danger around a mountain curve.
Sentence 2: as we have already noted, to be useful all control systems have to be designed to minimize damage or loss of property or life even when denied external sensor data; the data from RSUs can never do more than enhancing the basic capability of the vehicle s behavior without the RSU input.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If we compare impact of the most intensive SMS stealer with the impact of the most intensive photo stealer (red curves), we easily notice that stealing text messages is more noticeable process on the micro-architectural level.
Sentence 2: stealing 50 photos results in transmission of 225 Mb, and stealing 1700 sms messages leads to uploading 85 Kb data.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: [30], when blocks need to be shu.ed, the client downloads the blocks, shu.es them locally, and up­loads them back to the cloud in order to avoid increasing the the client s storage.
Sentence 2: in our multi-cloud construc­tion, one of the clouds just shu.es the blocks and sends them to the other cloud and the other cloud simply stores them and does not need to send the blocks back to the .rst cloud.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The hash engine in our prototype hardware has lower throughput and higher latency due to the limitation of Ethernet I/O, and it runs at a much lower clock frequency (125 MHz, which is also limited by the Ethernet speed) compared to that of the software hash function (3.33 GHz).
Sentence 2: in a real storage system, these limitations can be easily removed by using an ASIC as the P chip.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, the rule: Professors can update StudentRecords expresses that the class or the cat­egory of subjects Professor can perform all actions of class update on the resource class StudentRecords .
Sentence 2: the low-level policy (LLP) expresses a set of assignments between individual entities of access control and their corre­sponding classes, such as Bob is a Professor , the .le SR1 belongs to the group StudentRecords .
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: They all contain a mechanism to unmask the input data, perform the basic S(x) (where x is an 8-bit unmasked data) and re-mask it with another constant.
Sentence 2: these new S-Boxes would clearly be a source of .rst-order information leakage if implemented in logic gates, as the unmasked variable would be associated to an actual net.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Level l is an upper bound on the information that the oracle is permitted to use to reason about the termination behavior of command c. In Section 2, this level is implicitly assumed to be L. Level l ' is an upper bound on what information is allowed to be leaked by (non)termination of program c. This level is only relevant for budgeted semantics, as explained below, and in Section 5 it is implicitly assumed to be H. We do not place any restrictions on the relationship between lev­els l and l ' .
Sentence 2: if l ' g l then the termination behavior of the loop is permitted to reveal no more information than the oracle uses to reason about termination behavior, and so the budgeted se­mantics give no additional bene.t over the standard semantics.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.2 Web Site Scanning Technology Web Site scanning technology is not new and there are a number of vendors that provide tools to scan an organiza- tion's web site.
Sentence 2: two of these vendors, WatchFire with their WebCPO software [24] and IDcide with their Pri- vacy Wall software [12], have specialized in scanning web sites for privacy problems.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Even in a perfectly functioning encryp­tion system (consisting of file, database or media-based en­cryption),, data could be compromised in one of many lay­ers above the encrypting layer.
Sentence 2: encrypting at the application layer allows implementers to encrypt data at the highest possible layer in the stack, leaving little wiggle-room for the attacker to compromise the data.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Establishing Pairwise Keys in Distributed Sensor Networks Donggang Liu Cyber Defense Laboratory Department of Computer Science North Carolina State University Raleigh, NC 27695-8207 dliu@unity.ncsu.edu ABSTRACT Pairwise key establishment is a fundamental security service in sen­sor networks; it enables sensor nodes to communicate securely with each other using cryptographic techniques.
Sentence 2: due to the re­source constraints on sensors, it is infeasible to use traditional key management techniques such as public key cryptography and key distribution center (KDC).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: RELATED WORK Several approaches [1][7][18][5][3][19] are proposed in the litera­ ture to study the problem of mining association rules in distributed and parallel manners, where the data is partitioned across several nodes.
Sentence 2: these approaches are mostly interested in increas­ing the ef.ciency of the mining process; ignoring thus the privacy concerns that may arise from building such global mining model.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Likewise, major changes to JavaScript itself are currently out-of­scope as we assume an off-the-shelf JavaScript environment.
Sentence 2: the mathematical functions needed to roll your own cryptographic primitives such as modular arithmetic and native BigNum integer support in JavaScript is not feasible at this point, as these changes would impact the entire the entire JavaScript environment and thus are more properly standardized as part of JavaScript itself in ECMA TC 39.7 we provide a simple BigNum type de.nition in the Web Cryptography API, although we do not provide the under­lying operations as native code.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Secondly, the limited bandwidth for Internet access over cellular networks and the cost of GPRS/EDGE/3G access are barriers to the use smartphone users in an outdoor environment.
Sentence 2: a smartphone user can still be lured into downloading .les such as Skulls and Doomboot, disguised as games, and end up getting in­fected by a smartphone virus.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Removing B2 from the key fragments distri­bution would result in a lower overall key-vulnerability, as the event of S1 and S3 being compromised would not imply a compromised key (the attacker would only know subsets of B1 and B3).
Sentence 2: removing B2 would also reduce key-availability since a legitimate user would not be able to retrieve the key anymore if S2 was not available.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: These two requirements may appear to be in contradic­tion with each other, since the .rst suggests that the server cannot learn any information until the protocol completes, whereas the second states that mistakes to recognize invalid feedbacks are aggregated.
Sentence 2: this apparent contra­diction can be resolved by the use of oblivious transfer tech­niques; these allow the client to index (using the credential pre.x) a database of feedback items that is unique to the user in question.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Fourth, the ad exchange invites the bidders, so it can manipu­late auctions, by choice of bidders.
Sentence 2: such manipulation is mostly limited (§5) to endowing a colluding bidder with a right of .rst refusal.2 Last, a malevolent publisher can deliver the auctioned ad to the wrong user; this issue concerns the authenticity of what is being auctioned and is a different problem from auction integrity, but we can limit abuse by publishers (§5).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: On pages 5 and17 of his opinion, which is not pub­lished but which appears on the Public Citizen web site at http://www.citizen.org/documents/ dendrite.pdf, Judge MacKenzie appeared to apply a motion to dismiss standard in favor of these two defendants, inasmuch as he discussed the facts that Dendrite s complaint stated a cause of action for breach of the employment agreement, and that the message posts by Does 1 and 2 appeared to acknowledge their status as employees of Dendrite.
Sentence 2: judge MacKenzie stated that he did not need to decide whether there was sufficient evidence that these two employees had actu­ally signed the employment agreement that Dendrite was suing to enforce, id.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Similarly, when a VMM tries to copy data to a guest VM, the data is .rst written to the bouncebuffer and then readby theguestVM.
Sentence 2: inprinciple,the.rst trap and emulate based approach canhandle bothport-basedI/Oanddirect memory access(DMA).it willintroduce alarge amount oftraps(i.e.,VM exits)toCloudVisor if thedatais copiedin small chunks(e.g.,4 or8bytes).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: SessionLock does not prevent against active at­tacks, but prevents session hijacking and thus incapacitates tools such as Firesheep.
Sentence 2: an active attacker can easily alter the client s behavior by modifying a response to contain different JavaScript, which can then be used to either leak the session key or make use of the compromised client to construct signed messages.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Then one may ask whether it is possible to in­centivize a veri.able computation that preserves input/output pri­vacy of D. Indeed in the full version of our paper, we show some­what surprisingly it is possible to incentivize veri.able computation schemes with designated veri.er (i.e., in contrast to public veri.­cation).
Sentence 2: this comes at a price.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To all presented recovery measures applies that they are only applicable if at least the therefore needed systems of the corrupt node still work correctly.
Sentence 2: although it is generally agreed that entirely tamper-proof sensor nodes are too expensive, current trends in the hardware development of embedded devices indicate that at least some logical and physical protection (e.g., CPUs which support isolated mem­ory areas or automatic memory erason if a node is tempered with) will be available in the near future.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Compared to these three method [17, 22, 23] the method proposed in the Image Spam Hunter utilizes probabilistic boosted tree, which is much faster that SVM used in earlier methods [17, 18].
Sentence 2: the authors themselves point out that some of the weaknesses of their method includes inaccurate detection if image contains scanned documents or real life photos.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The trusted and the un­trusted parts of VPFS as well as trusted and untrusted ap­plications need to be executed in di.erent protection do­mains (i.e., isolated tasks on a microkernel and legacy VMs).
Sentence 2: the isolation must be breached such that the two parts of VPFS are still able to communicate with each other.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: From t = 190 min until t = 360 min, we (the adversaryin this case) continue the deception attack resulting in open-loop response of actual water level, The recovery period lasts from t = 360 min to t = 510 min using the same recovery action as in the case of simulation experiment described above.
Sentence 2: a residual error still remains after the end of recovery period (which is also the end of attack) and the PI controller reacts to this error.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: [6] designed a mobile botnet called Andbot 10 Di.erent international exit codes are used to di.erentiate calls tothese numbers, e.g.,011forMontserrat,001forThai­land, and 00 for New Zealand.
Sentence 2: such exit codes are often attached automatically by the device without inform­ing the user.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Swim reports to the user that it may not be possible to instrument the program to satisfy the policy, and as a programming aid, provides the subprogram and policy assertions that contributed to the unsatis.able core.
Sentence 2: if the SMT solver .nds a solution to the bit-vector constraints, then Swim translates this to a solution for the system of set constraints.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It is possible to extend SPM to only disclose the presence of a contiguous substring in a string at a speci.c location, e.g., by modifying parties inputs from a sequence of letters to a sequence of hash(letter||position).
Sentence 2: there is no straightforward way to adapt SPM to match non-contiguous substrings, ex­cept for surrounding the pattern with single-character wild cards, which (as noted earlier) considerably increases proto­col complexity.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The BA problem has been studied extensively over the past three decades and tight bounds have been established on resilience, round complexity and communication complexity for several variants of the prob­leminsynchronoussettings(see[13]).
Sentence 2: verylittle attentionhasbeenpaidindesigningfast, communicationef­.cient, optimally resilient ABA protocol.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We tried this attack against the standard version of [4] (in which a single watermark pattern is tiled over the whole image) and found it to be fairly ineffective at removing the watermark.
Sentence 2: the possibility of this attack can be eliminated en- tirely by associating each key with a sequence of watermark patterns so that each segment belonging to one key contains a different watermark pattern.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Using the employee s working set to regulate .le accesses 1For this paper, we will assume that devices administered by the corporation are trusted, and that employee s personal devices are untrusted.
Sentence 2: wSBAC is independent of this assumption and will work with any technique that can be used to di.erenti­ate between trusted and untrusted devices, e.g., devices equipped with TPM hardware and integrity measurement tools [26] could be considered trusted.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.2 Real Identities versus Pseudonyms The two European networks, La Ruche and Qype, do not oblige their users to register with their real identities.
Sentence 2: foursquare asked in its terms of use that users should provide Foursquare with accurate, truthful, and com­plete registration information (including, but not limited to your name ( User Name ), e-mail address and a password you will use to access the Service) and to keep your regis­tration information accurate and up-to-date .
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: By our assumption this implies s = r z .
Sentence 2: for this ciphertext to be valid, it is necessary that: l z l z Cj,0 = E.EncPKj,0 ([fz]j,0,r j,0; H([fz]j,0,r j,0,s)) z since rj,0 has not been queried as a component in H, the argument for H has not yet been queried and therefore the above will hold with only negligible probability by the guarantee of unpredictable ciphertexts for E. Notice that if there is no overlapping valid ciphertext we can simply use the queries to the hash function to decrypt.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Aside from 3.8% of mouse movements with e.ciency less than 0.02 (most of which are zero e.ciency moves, due to the cursor being placed back to the origin), a bot rarely moves the mouse with other e.ciencies.
Sentence 2: for human players, the ob­served probability of mouse movement e.ciency follows an exponential distribution.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: ANONYMITY AGAINST MALICIOUS DESTINATION The Comp-N-anonymity de.nition of the previous sec­tion covers the following attackers: eavesdroppers, malicious peers, and any combination of them that controls the appli­cation adaptively.
Sentence 2: due to the restrictions of the RH N relation, the de.nition cannot be used for testing anonymity properties when the attacker controls destinations of mes­sages from honest peers.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It is shown that if an RFID system has strong (or weak) unp­privacy then the computational power of an RFID tag can be used to construct a pseudorandom function family provided that the RFID system is complete and sound.
Sentence 2: if each tag is able to compute a pseudorandom func­tion, then the tags can be used to construct an RFID system with strong (or weak) unp-privacy.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: (d) If the required claims include attributes other than the PPID claim, then the plug-in terminates, giv­ing CardSpace the opportunity to operate nor­mally.
Sentence 2: if only the PPID claim is re­quested, then the plug-in adds the city and web page claims to the requiredClaims tag, marking them as mandatory (see section 3.2.3).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When the sender domain has a larger weight, the sender has too large an e.ect on exe­cution times of processes running in the receiver s domain; speci.cally, the receiver process is likely to miss a commu­nication request.
Sentence 2: in the current protocol, the receiver rec­ognizes a communication request when the period of high CPU load lasts for about 1.5 s. a receiver running in a domain with an extremely small weight may consider that the high CPU load lasts for more than 1.5 seconds, and consequently, it may miss the communication request.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: These failures have made clear the fragility of the trust model and revocation mechanisms in the web space, and have inspired the community to examine methods both for reinforcing the system s mechanisms to prevent fraudulent certi.cate issuances and improving the robustness of the revocation infrastructure.
Sentence 2: there is considerable debate in the community regarding what the appropriate metrics for judg­ing replacement systems should be, and how the di.erent proposals compare under realistic conditions.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: SecVisor [27] protectskernel code from mod­i.cation thus defeating certain attacks.
Sentence 2: merely protect­ing code segments is insuf.cient to guarantee correctkernel opera­tion, as shown by return-to-libc [30] and return-oriented program­ming [17, 28] attacks that make use of unmodi.ed, non-malicious code to accomplish malicious goals.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Intuitively, c can purchase the .ltering service from all the f -providers to max­imize its bene.t.
Sentence 2: as shown in Figure 1, since a spoo.ng .ow can be .ltered by multiple f -providers, purchasing the service from all the f -providers implies that c pays for .ltering a same .ow for more than once, and c wants to keep this redundant payment rate under a threshold µ.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: UPPER BOUNDS 4.1 Window Sum A key observation for computing window sums with er­ror polylogarithmically bounded in W is that, unlike with running sum, only the lowest log W + 1 layers of the dyadic tree are necessary to compute window sum.
Sentence 2: if we keep a dyadic tree for every window of size W , each up­date will contribute to more than W variables, resulting in data structures with large sensitivity, which, for di.erential privacy, translates into more noise.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This example provides strong evidence that analyzing implemen­tations rather than algorithmic descriptions can lead to the discovery of interesting attacks.
Sentence 2: it also highlights a number of di.culties with this approach: 1. the number of faulted implementations grows at least exponentially in the length of the original program, in par­ticular if multiple faults are considered; 2. some fault attacks require to tamper with some (but not all) loop iterations, or to add or remove some loop itera­tions; hence, the number of faulted implementations cannot be bounded solely based on the length of the program; 3. analyzing the e.ects of faults becomes very involved and error-prone, in particular for programs with loops; 4. there exist multiple implementations of basic arith­metic operations, requiring to repeat the analysis for each; 5. there might exist numerous countermeasures against a fault attack, requiring to repeat the analysis for each of the protected implementations.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The setjmp()/longjmp()-mechanism prohibits instrumentation in the app itself.
Sentence 2: under the term Zero-Cost Excep­tion (Itanium-ABI and 64-Bit Mac OS X) [6] and SafeSEH (Windows) [34] another mechanism is used, which stores the catch locations in a constant table.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Nonetheless we .nd that the number of iterations is reasonable in practice (see Section 5).
Sentence 2: the parallel cuckoo hash would not be a good choice for buildinga large hash table ona GPU, since each iterationwould re­quire shuf.ing items in global memory with global synchronization at each iteration.Butitisvery useful for tables which canbe com- Algorithm 1 Basic hash table implementation Phase1: Distribute intobucketsof size = 512 1: compute numberofbuckets required 2: allocate output space andworkingbuffers 3: for each k .
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.3 Security Requirements In our framework, we are concerned with the security risks from data users or service providers as follows: Data users: In our framework, the malicious users cannot observe the encrypted data stored in outsourced storages, thus they cannot directly attack to the ciphertext header H.. .
Sentence 2: the malicious users could try to make use of the Delegate algorithm to access .les.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Considering the statisticaldataout­sourcing primitive we have discussed, in order to prevent disclosureofdatadynamics,oneapproachisto estimatethe datachangeratethrough theperturbedstatisticaldata that are deployed at the data resource.
Sentence 2: updating the deployed data too often increases the amount of noise that need to be added to the synopsis.
Relationship: contrasting