sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: POSTER: Identity-Based Steganography and Its Applications to Censorship Resistance Tim Ruf.ngSaarland University Jonas Schneider Saarland University Aniket Kate MMCI, Saarland University Saarbrücken, Germany tim.ruf.ng@stud.uni­saarland.de Saarbrücken, Germany s9joscne@stud.uni­saarland.de Saarbrücken, Germany aniket@mmci.uni­saarland.de ABSTRACT The use of public-key steganography has been proposed for several censorship-resistance systems.
Sentence 2: distribu­tion of the employed public keys presents an availability, scalability, and security challenge in many of these.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The components include: (1) an identification number for each syllable; (2) a value for the duration of each syllable; (3) values for the frequency ranges of the syllables; (4) values for average duration of the phonemes; and, (5) a ranking of the frequency levels.
Sentence 2: the platform cannot locate the user s voice file using the phonetic alone.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Forthepurposeofthealgorithmitisnecessaryforthe attackedsystemadministratortopossessamap"ofthe Internetthatwouldshowthewhichroutersneighborother routers.Thismapiseasytoobtainforasmallnetworkif OSPF[10]isused.Forinformationfurtherfromthesource, BGPtables[11]maybeusedtoobtainthisinformation.
Sentence 2: currentlyitisnotalwayspossibletoobtainallthe necessarytableentriestobuildamapoftheInternet.Tofll inthegapsinknowledgeasystemadministratorcanbuild hisownmapoftheInternetusingtraceroute[9].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In our earlier work [31], we used an XFA de.nition that associated instructions with edges rather than states.
Sentence 2: edge­based XFAs are equivalent to state-based XFAs semanti­cally, although state-based XFAs require more states.1 combination, matching, and optimization algorithms are more e.cient for state-based XFAs.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As the issuance of Do­main nodes and Domain links are the same as the issuance of User nodes and User links, existing protocols can be used to facilitate local domain management.
Sentence 2: new node attributes are added to the Domain node in that it contains a Domain ID as its identi.er and a reference to the Domain Manager,where a Domain UPnP UUID is used to uniquely identify the Domain Manager in UPnP context.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: According to the C standard [25], this would result in unde.ned behavior if the out-of-bounds calculation was larger than 1 element out­of-bounds and as a result we could terminate the program.
Sentence 2: as noted by CRED [36], a signi.cant amount of programs that are not vulnerable to bu.er over.ows will perform out-of-bounds calculations that are larger than 1 element out-of-bounds.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In fact, the next operator after the shift provides no more uncertainty because to obtain the expected value it is su.cient to know the centers of the .nal obfuscation region.
Sentence 2: both Example 2 and 4 hold the known-position-indistinguishability property since they pro­vide di.erent obfuscation regions in time.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Thus claims 8 -11 imply that the advantage of any PPT adversary in dis­tinguishing Hybrids 1 and 5 is at most 2(v + 1) ·EP RG , where EP RG is the maximal distinguishing adversary of any adver­sary in distinguishing the output of the PRG.
Sentence 2: any adversary distinguishing Hybrids 1 and 5 distin­guishes the output of the puncturable PRF.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In modern computing systems, this task is so overwhelming that it is rarely done (i.e., certi.cation, veri.­cation, and monitoring of entire system stacks).
Sentence 2: consider remote execution of a browser in a virtual machine (to take one popular suggestion) over a display protocol like RDP or VNC; if the remote virtual machine is compromised, one need not immediately worry about local data, as the at­tacker must attack the only communications link between these two environments.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If we assume that the key is not known to attackers, but other con.guration parameters can be known, an attacker has to accurately guess the re­porting time from a range of values such that success ratio will be above the property threshold in order to evade detec­tion.
Sentence 2: this accuracy (evasion) is highly dependent on the parameter randomization range.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Poster: A Hybrid Botnet Ecological Environment Dai Yumei Liang Yu Li Ke Beijing University of Posts and Beijing University of Posts and Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications Telecommunications Telecommunications daiyumeibupt@gmail.com liangyu@software.cit.ac.cn like@software.ict.ac.cn ABSTRACT Research into defense against botnets, especially countermeasures against the command and control (C&#38;C) protocol, has become increasingly significant as several large-scale botnets have resulted in serious threats on the Internet.
Sentence 2: most existing research efforts lack safe and efficient analysis platforms for C&#38;C protocol fuzzing.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The SIM card (Subscriber Identity Module), present in most mobile devices, constitutes a dedi­cated TEE where security-sensitive services, that withstand mobile OS compromise, could be implemented.
Sentence 2: ser­vices implemented on SIM cards are limited to isolated com­putations, and, furthermore, deployment of global services on SIM cards is challenging due to a large number of mobile network operators involved in the process.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Zero-knowledge watermark de­tection is a promising means to overcome this problem and to improve the security of digital watermarking schemes in the context of various applications: it allows to cryptograph­ically conceal the information required for the detection of a watermark and to prove the presence of the hidden water­mark by e.cient zero-knowledge proof systems.
Sentence 2: concealing the watermark prevents the verifying party from performing additional checks on the watermark, e.g., on its probability distribution, which may be required for certain applications.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: That is, Pf (Af (x) = a) = 2-a Note that for univariate and multivariate Gaussians, this de.nition agrees with the typical de.nitions of anomalous­ness, which are either based on the z-score or Mahalanobis distance.
Sentence 2: this de.nition is much more general, since it applies to multivariate Gaussians, discrete distribu­tions, and (with some additional work) stochastic processes.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: There are also over 50 references in the file system to VMware and vmx, and over 300 references in the registry to VMware.
Sentence 2: while the areas to choose from for the attacker to detect a commodity VMM are plentiful, there are few malware making use of such fingerprints to detect VMM because these fingerprints can be hidden by employing various techniques borrowed from stealth malware technologies.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The mail client policyis sim­ilar when using the POP or IMAP protocol.
Sentence 2: when mail is delivered locally, the mail INBOX folder must be write shared to enable sharing with the mail transfer agent (e.g., postfix)IFS and all mail folders must be write shared when using a mail deliv­ery agent (e.g, procmail).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To re-instantiate a key after compromise, there is an unavailabil­ity period (COP_UNLINKED as speci.ed in the certi.cate) in case the domain lost access to its private key.
Sentence 2: if the domain owner still has access to the private key, it can obtain trusted CA signatures for its new key, sign it with its old key, and immediately obtain an ILS con.rmation that will enable use of the new key.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Moreover, the experiments indicate that the SAT­based procedure scales better than the DPLL-based proce­dures when optimal solutions are sought, whereas the DPLL­based procedures scale better than the SAT-based procedure when an exact solution is wanted.
Sentence 2: the experiments indicate that the time needed to solve the UAQ problem is in the order of seconds even for relatively simple problems.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As we known, the page tables (PTs) in the OS are utilized by the hardware MMU to translate the linear addresses (LA) used by programs to the machine address (MA) used by CPU.
Sentence 2: when the hardware-virtualization feature such as AMD-SVM is turned on, the PTs in the OS can only translate the LAs to the guest physical addresses (GPAs).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Onthesemantilevel,themergeneedstoidentifyin­stanesommontobothsystemgraphs.Instanesanbe ommononlyiftheyhaveaommontype.Theseman­tialintegrationgluesthetwosystemgraphsalongthese ommoninstanes.Figure11showsasystemgraphforthe DACandtheLBACpoliy.Theusernumbered1isauserof bothompaniessinehe/sheoursinbothsystemgraphs; similarlyfortheobjetsnumbered2and3,flesalreadyin ommonbeforethemerge.Theintegratedsystemgraphis shownatthebottomofFig.11.Itontainsfeaturesofboth poliies,suhastheRloopoftheDACandtheseurity levelsoftheLBACframework.
Sentence 2: 4.2.2 Integration of rules Inafrststep,theintegrationofrulesouldbeseenas theunionofthetworulesetsRules.andRules..rulepairsmaybeinonfit,ifbothrulesareappliableto thesamepartoftheintegratedsystemgraphbutspeify adiferentationspeiftothepoliy.Forinstane,the LBACruleobjetandtheDACrulereateobjet newarebothappliabletouser1intheintegratedsystemgraph inFig.11.Therulereateobjetwouldreateanobjet withaseuritylevel,therulenewobjetanobjetwith­outone.Whihruleshallbeapplied?Anotherexample onernsthereadingofobjets.Whereasuser1anread objet3intheLBACframeworkbyruleread,thisisnot possibleintheDACframeworkbeauseofamissingRloop ontheobjetanduser1isnottheowneroftheobjet.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our current approach provides explanations over shareability; it also suggests information transforms that modify/delete information attributes (e.g., participants in a meeting) in order to downgrade information.
Sentence 2: it does not support automated downgrade using more so­phisticated functional transforms such as (e.g., decreasing image resolution, statistical aggregators, etc), disinforma­tion (e.g., false information intended to misguide the recip­ient), etc.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This causes a dilemma, since accommodating for even a single 2048-bit se­cret key in the state adds in the order of 1kB to the memory consumption.
Sentence 2: if we do not allow for the generation of 2048-bit TPM storage keys, the only allowed seals are such that are done with the (symmetric) SRK itself.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: ).Thesystempropagatestheentral poliytoallendpoints.Poliydistributionmaytakevarious forms.Forexample,itmaybepusheddiretlytotheend systemsthathavetoenforeit,oritmaybeprovidedtothe usersintheformofredentialsthattheyusewhentrying toommuniatewiththehosts,oritmaybeaombination ofboth.Theextentofmutualtrustbetweenendpointsis speifedbythepoliy.
Sentence 2: toimplementadistributedfrewall,threeomponentsare neessary: .Alanguageforexpressingpoliiesandresolvingre­quests.Intheirsimplestform,poliiesinadistributed frewallarefuntionallyequivalenttopaketfltering rules.itisdesirabletouseanextensiblesys­tem(soothertypesofappliationsandseurityheks Thisisbynomeansauniversaltrait,andeventodaythere areprotoolsdesignedwithnoseurityreview.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Observing that spammers and non-spammers usually form di.erent communities in the user graph, SD2 applies community detection based sybil de­fense algorithm to the user graph and achieves better spam detection performance than existing schemes.
Sentence 2: be­cause the e.ectiveness of sybil defense is sub ject to the spam attack intensity, SD2 does not perform well when the level of attacks increases.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For instance, few people are going to wish to prevent people from knowing that they have graduated from high school, but many would consider their lack of a high school graduation attribute to be sensitive.
Sentence 2: we argue that no system can adequately handle such a case because those who do have the attribute would likely be unwilling to accept any system which would result in them having to not disclose the attribute when it was useful for them to do so.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: One may think that because many web services are transitioning to HTTPS, most recorded web tra.c is going to be en­crypted, and both the ReSurf-based RCI approach and ClickMiner will become less useful in the near future.
Sentence 2: it is important to notice that many modern enterprise networks already deploy web proxies that allow for SSL man-in-the-middle [7] (SSL-MITM) to enable the inspection of all HTTPS tra.c (e.g., to enforce tra.c .ltering policies).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: XACML is a very rich and .exible language; users and security administrators can directly represent in XACML a large variety of AC policies.
Sentence 2: xACML has not been built to manage security in large distributed systems in which virtual enterprises are dynamically built with the collaboration of multiple independent sub jects sharing their resources (or services) to provide new (or better) services to customers.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The .rst part of the protocol is similar to the previous one: The procedure is started by the user requiring installation of a new compartment, then user request is transferred to the TVD Proxy, and TVD Proxy tunnels the request to TVD Master via the trusted channel.
Sentence 2: the second part of the protocol is di.erent: The TVD Master does not transfer new compartment data to  Figure 5: System Installation: OKL4 Image built by TVD Proxy Figure 6: System Installation: OKL4 Image built by TVD Master the TVD Proxy, but builds the new OKL4 image itself.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A Closer Look at Recognition-based Graphical Passwords on Mobile Devices Paul DunphyNewcastle University Andreas P. Heiner Nokia Research Center N. Asokan Nokia Research Center Newcastle upon-Tyne, UK p.m.dunphy@ncl.ac.uk Helsinki, Finlandandreas.heiner@nokia.com Helsinki, Finlandn.asokan@nokia.com ABSTRACT Graphical password systems based on the recognition of photographs are candidates to alleviate current over-reliance on alphanumeric passwords and PINs.
Sentence 2: despite being based on a simple concept and user evaluations consistently reporting impressive memory retention only one commercial example exists and over­all take-up is low.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.2 Using General-Purpose Systems To reduce the asymptotic complexity of the strawman approach above, one can use a general-purpose system for VC/SNARKs [30] to veri.ably execute BFS which we did in Section 5 (assume unit­weight graphs for the purpose of this section).
Sentence 2: most ex­isting systems implementing VC require the computation (in our case, the BFS algorithm) to be expressed as a circuit.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The length of the string is too short for robust automated language detection.
Sentence 2: we can, based on the presence of operator-speci.c (e.g., com.vzw.hss.myverizon, My Ver­izon Mobile ) and currency-speci.c (e.g., com.fdj.euro, Euro Millions ) package names, estimate the number of in­fected devices in certain regions like the US, Europe, and Japan.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Activation Access checks Intra-session Number Number of roles Nature  Number of permissions  Nature of roles  Nature of permissions  Inter-session Number of sessions  Arrival rate  Table2: Sessionpro.lecategoriesinourbenchmark.
Sentence 2: this is not the only encoding as a permission that is meaningful; see,forexample,thework ofCrampton[26].)
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Such systems have the ability to make access control decisions based upon the state of the world.
Sentence 2: for instance, one could use constraint datalog to grant access based on user clearance levels and document classi.cation levels as follows: grant(U, D) :-user(U), document(D), clearance(U, L1), level(D, L2), L1 = L2 such systems use rigid and opaque classi.cation of documents to drive access control decision (e.g., clear­ance and level in the example above).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Drawing from this knowledge, we strive to improve the security of the scheme: by systematically changing the pattern layout in such a way that these typical strategies are thwarted, we encourage users to chose patterns in a more diverse way.
Sentence 2: we concentrate on small modi.cations that allow us to keep the overall design of the patterns to foster the roll-out of a potentially better graphical password scheme.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Au is required to perform distG(u,v) + 1 decryptions, where distG(u,v) denotes the length of the shortest path between u and v in G.The EBC supports insertions, but not deletions, of classes and edges in the hierarchy without re-distributing private information to the classes a.ected by such changes.
Sentence 2: in [11] a simple modi.cation of the scheme which avoids such a re­distribution has been proposed.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As example, the nova-compute service ac­cepts .le paths from nova-api service specifying locations to up­load data to an instance.
Sentence 2: if the .le path is not validated by the nova-compute service, it can cause a directory traversal at­tack [20, 21, 22] and permit the nova-api service to overwrite arbitrary .les on the compute node.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If we use standard µTESLA with one key per day, it would take one day to authenticate the message, since the receivers would need to wait for the disclosed key one day later.
Sentence 2: if we use many keys, for example, one key per second, it would require 86,400 keys per day (not using the opti­mization we presented in the previous section), and a sensor node would require an expected time of 43 seconds to verify the authen­ticity of the key.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The Adage project [19], the successor of MAP project [18], may be the largest effort to date to employ usability design techniques in developing an authorization service for distributed application.
Sentence 2: mAP and Adage were intended for use by professional system administrators who already possess a high level of expertise, and as such they did not address the problems posed in making security effectively usable for a more general population of end-users.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Most of the policy-level queries implemented by the advisor correspond to attacks uncovered during formal analyses of sample policies.
Sentence 2: the table that summarizes the integrity and con.dentiality guarantees of a policy corresponds to authenticity and secrecy theorems proved by the veri.cation tool: if any header is both present and signed according to the table then, in the model, it is authenticated between client and server.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.6 Policy of Data Retention and Account Dele­tion Foursquare speci.es that when a user deletes an informa­tion submitted, this information is withdrawn from the ser­vice.
Sentence 2: foursquare also states that this data might still appear on backup logs for a reasonable amount of time (whose duration is not de.ned) or in possession of users who have already browsed through and downloaded the submissions of the users.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Instead, using a powerful dedicated central node to compute clusters/super-traces and distribute them to Glove proxies (e.g., via Tor bridges  since the security of Glove is independent of the secrecy of the computed super-traces) is more e.cient.
Sentence 2: such a node may not be easily avail­able in the real world.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It is a protection domain in that each process has its own address space and privileges are associated with process IDs.
Sentence 2: a process is also an execution unit in that each process runs as a separate entity.bundling protection domains withexecu­tion units is unnecessary in situations where an application desires only a new protection domain for isolating sensitive code; creating an extra process would force the application to create an execu­tion unit as a by-product.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Relief can be found in the fact that a jammer using EM would considerably deteriorate its own lifetime advantage because EM is a computationally expensive, and hence energy-consuming algorithm that in­volves multiple exponentiations.
Sentence 2: a duty cycle of 50% may not be energy-e.cient enough for most WSNs that are characterized by low data rate [29].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Secure Streaming Forensic Data Transmission for Trusted Anyi Liu Department of Computer Science Indiana University Purdue University Fort Wayne 2101 E. Coliseum Blvd., Fort Wayne, Indianan 46805 liua@ipfw.edu  Cloud Jigang Liu Department of Information and Computer Sciences Metropolitan State University 700E 7th St., St. Paul, MN 55106 jigang.liu@metrostate.edu ABSTRACT The proliferation of cloud computing requires excessive forensic data to be acquired, transmitted, and analyzed in a timely man­ner.
Sentence 2: current digital forensic technology is ill-suited to cloud as it exposes the problems of trusted data acquisition and secure data transmission.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: of Computer Science, UCLA, 4732 Boelter Hall, Los Angeles, CA 90025 1 IBM T.J. Watson Research, 19 Skyline Drive, Hawthorne, NY 10532 2 {chengje,hywong1,slu}@cs.ucla.edu1, haoyang@us.ibm.com2 ABSTRACT Smartphones have recently become increasingly popular be­cause they provide all-in-one convenience by integrating traditional mobile phones with handheld computing devices.
Sentence 2: the .exibility of running third-party softwares also leaves the smartphones open to malicious viruses.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 7.2 Countermeasures Although various traf.c watermarks have been designed, onlya few approaches have been proposedto detectthem.PNR [11],a pioneeringwork from Peng etal., employs in.ated one-way packet delays to detectthe traf.c watermarks proposedin[1] and estimates its parameters.
Sentence 2: pNR adds a timestamptoeach packet and has tohandle the synchronization issues.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 7 are nearly equal to the ideal value of 50%.
Sentence 2: the average inter-chip HDs for the bitstrings of length 5,662,020, i.e., those with the weak bits included (not shown), is 48.4% and 48.5% for TGVD and TCD, resp., so removing the weak bits improves the inter-chip HDs.
Relationship: contrasting