sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The probability Pq of having mismatching blocks in spite of reconciliation can be expressed as: () ..b/2.
Sentence 2: b b-2i 2i Pq = (1 - q)q 2i i=1 the probability P, of agreeing on an error-free key of length K is P = (1 - Pq)K/b For example, if there is as little as a 2% chance of a bit mismatching between endpoints, for a block size b = 8 there is approximately a 15% chance of uncorrected errors in a key of length K = 128, in which case the key will have to be regenerated.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: vv The overlapareais6×(pR2/6- 3R2/4) = pR2-33R2/2.
Sentence 2: the maximum jamming area with 3 jammers is vv mer (Black nodes are victim nodes, Grey nodes are trig­ger nodes, Forks are jammers) Lemma 6.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: (See[34,35,36]foran­otherlineofattakonthelassifationquestionforCSP(B) problems.)
Sentence 2: 4ConstraintSatisfation,Games,andDatalog ADatalogprogramisafnitesetofrulesoftheform to:­t1VVtmV whereeahtiisanatomiformulaR(XVVX).There­ 1n lationalprediatesthatourintheheadsoftherulesare theintensionaldatabaseprediates(IDBs),whileallothers aretheextensionaldatabaseprediates(EDBs).Oneofthe IDBsisdesignatedasthegoaloftheprogram.Notethat IDBsmayourinthebodiesofrulesand,thus,aDat­alogprogramisareursivespeifationoftheIDBswith semantisobtainedvialeastfxed­pointsofmonotoneopera­tors(see[52]).EahDatalogprogramdefnesaquerywhih, givenasetofEDBprediates,returnsthevalueofthegoal prediate.Moreover,thisqueryisomputableinpolynomial time,sinethebottom­upevaluationoftheleastfxed­point oftheprogramterminateswithinapolynomialnumberof steps(inthesizeofthegivenEDBs).expressibilityin DatalogisasuÆientonditionfortratabilityofaquery.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: According to the way covering policies are constructed, before C* is disclosed, the covering policies of those credentials appearing in the independent disjunct Ci are satis.ed by {C1,...,Ck-2}.
Sentence 2: we can replace C* in G with the credentials in Ci if they are not in the sequence yet, which will give us a safe disclosure sequence under the covering policies.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For each such qidi 2, F (qid1, qid2) = F (qid1, qidi 2) since |g1|-min(|g1|, |g2|) =|g1|- min(|g1|, |g2i |), where (g1,g2) is in CG(qid1, qid2) and (g1,g 2i ) is in CG(qid1, qidi 2).
Sentence 2: f (qid1) is non­decreasing wrt the specialization.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The obtained results in Fig­ure 7 and 8 show that the optimal number of iterations to attain a good performance (LPF , SAC, BIC and DPF ) as described in Section 4.1 is log2(Q) = 3.
Sentence 2: in our implementation each byte is substituted by applying the RC6 nonlinear function for three iterations.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: (12)), we .nd that for N= 1000 and E=10-6, the maximum probability of a bit .ipping (p) that can be tolerated by hashes of length 64, 256, and 1024 bits is 0.1, 0.3, and 0.4, respectively.
Sentence 2: we expect the hash with length 1024 bits to have a higher value of Pd, as it can resist stronger attacks.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our make rules take byte sequences that uniquely identify in­struction sequences, disassemble a live target Solaris libc, match symbols to instruction sequences, and look up libc runtime ad­dresses for each instruction sequence symbol.
Sentence 2: even if in­struction sequence addresses vary in a target libc from our orig­inal version, our dynamic address lookup rules can .nd suitable replacements (with a single make command), provided the actual instruction bytes are available anywhere in a given target library at runtime.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The Cadabia can not only running in server but also personal computer, even the tablet and smart phone, and the AZS and ACS can also move to these personal devices.
Sentence 2: the education cloud can be contributed including these device so that we can avoid the drawback of using the non-personal cloud may lose the control and rights over their data due to complicated and potentially changing end-user agreements.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We emphasize a complication that applies more to human-computer interaction than to other scienti.c disciplines (e.g., physics): experimental results are often very strongly in.uenced by minute details of user inter­faces, instructions to users, experimental design, and proto­type implementations.
Sentence 2: it is often very di.cult or impossible to generalize results, diminishing the scienti.c weight of many individual results.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: States are a fully ordered set such that si < s if i < j and f (i)= ÀÃÕ k; i ß max - k max - i; i > max - k Analysis of Simple Sample Manifestation j s = s only if i = j .
Sentence 2: we can have one-to-one mapping i j between the set of integers used as indexes and the states.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Sharing among users does occur, of course, but we claim that sharing can be modeled by a small number of mechanisms: email, web, and version control repositories.
Sentence 2: we believe that future access control models should leverage such natural isolation of users to simplify policy, provide a reliable control of user s data based on applications, and enable limited sharing without compli­cating policy signi.cantly.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For comparison purposes, we also measured data usage for different apps on Android and iOS devices, and we found that: (1) playing a YouTube video requires over 10 MBytes per minute, (2) a voice­only Skype call requires around 0.9 MBytes per minute, and (3) reading an article (including text and images) on the Yahoo news website consumes about 350 KBytes per minute on average.
Sentence 2: safeSlinger has modest bandwidth requirements for an exchange.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The problem is that even legi­timate input that has been regularly seen during the training phase may receive a very small probability value because the probability values of all possible input words sum up to 1.
Sentence 2: we chose to have the model return a probability value of 1 if the word is a valid output from the Markov model and a value of 0 when the value cannot be derived from the given grammar.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Hooking the veri.cation functions alone is insu.cient to force proper veri.cation in vulnera­ble applications due to the fact that they often go unused by developers [19].
Sentence 2: certShim also targets the main connection functions of SSL libraries, which represent a choke point at which we can force certi.cate veri.cation.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: At the same time, any of the supporting set of Asser­tions may be encoded, with Dependency constraints (limit­ing their linkage with other Assertion), which too must be satis.ed prior to successful linking and usage.
Sentence 2: for using a Dependent Assertion, the Attesting Party would require to support it with suitable Assertions (Inde­pendent or Dependent) to satisfy the requirement encoded within the Dependent Assertion.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: DMZ Inside DMZ Inside # correctly correlated alerts 54 41 5 12 LLDOS 1.0 LLDOS 2.0.2 # related alerts 57 44 8 18 # correlated alerts 57 44 5 13 completeness measure Rc 94.74% 93.18% 62.5% 66.7% soundness measure Rs 94.74% 93.18% 100% 92.3% Table 2: Ability to di.erentiate true and false alerts     Dataset # observable Tool # alerts # detected Detection # true False alert attacks attacks rate alerts rate DMZ 89 RealSecure 891 51 57.30% 57 93.60%  LLDOS Our method 57 50 56.18% 54 5.26%  1.0 Inside 60 95.23% Our method 44 36 60% 41 6.82% DMZ 7 RealSecure  425 4 57.14% 6 98.59%  LLDOS Our method 5 3 42.86% 3 40% 2.0.2 Inside 15 96.73% Our method 13 10 66.67% 10 23.08%  false alert rates greatly without sacri.cing the detection rate too much.
Sentence 2: it is reasonable to treat correlated alerts more seriously than uncorrelated ones.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 5.2 Zero-order Languages For zero-order languages, L0, the symbols in the alpha­bet S are independent and identically uniformly distributed.
Sentence 2: n-1 Hn 0 (b)= H0(Xi|E(M)) i=0 n-1 = biH(Xi) i=0 n-1 = biH(X0) i=0 = ne log2 |S| (24) where the .rst step uses that the symbols are independent, the second step which H(Xi|E(M)) are encrypted or not, the third step that the random variables are identically dis­tributed, and, .nally, the last step that the symbols are uniformly distributed.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 7.2 Blocking due to Nonpreemptibility To determine the maximum blocking time due to nonpre­emptibility we need to know how many times Kh a thread th suspends itself after it starts and the duration of the largest nonpreemptible critical section max delay low(th) (De.ni­tion 4).
Sentence 2: the blocking time due to nonpreemptibility is [15]: Equation 4.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Because the keys s1,s2 of SKE are used as a one-time pad, it is easy to see that: Pr [B(pk, C)=1] = Pr [A(v)=1] t.Tt,n v.SKE(M0) (pk,C).PKEt (M0)  I and, similarly, Pr [B(pk, C)=1] = Pr [A(v)=1].
Sentence 2: t.Tt,n v.SKE(M1) (pk,C).PKEt (M1) I the advantage of B is equal to the advantage of A (which is greater than d), contradicting (3).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While TaintDroid supports Android up to version 2.3.4, thereby covering at least 75 % of the device market as of Oct. 2012, DroidBox only supports Android up to version 2.1 which can be considered severely outdated.
Sentence 2: we updated the DroidBox patchset to work with TaintDroid 2.3.4, including some additional enhancements such as sup­port for UDP tra.c logging.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While the bystander packets are competing for less than the link s full request capacity, the senders of the high-level puzzles actually use less bandwidth than they otherwise would, since the compu­tational time required to solve high-level puzzles forces them to send at a much lower rate than they could at lower puzzle levels.
Sentence 2: portcullis only cause limited, local increases in puzzle lev­els which will not cascade across the network.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Encryption is too heavyweight and has di.erent security properties than the properties re­quired for hash functions.
Sentence 2: in case of graph data, there is a need to de.ne the formal notions of hashing and perfectly secure hashing schemes, and develop constructions for such de.nitions that are e.cient and practical to be used by real-world graph database systems.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Therefore, if we remove all tokens scheduled by S(Fi) during [t,t ' ] and replace them with tokens in S(F) on the period [t-.,t ' ], the number of tokens used by S(Fi)attime t ' -.willbe reduced while we still can .nd a matching for all packets in .ow fj arrived before and at t ' -..
Sentence 2: this is a contradiction to the proof of Theorem 1, where we show that S(Fi) should be optimal at time t ' -.. By lemma 1, we see that S.(F) is a matched schedule for all the incoming .ows in S = {S(F1),...,S(Fm)}.the performance of DLP can be bounded by the following theorem.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Besides, any mobile transmitting node, who has ever transmit­ted a packet dt ago and within the distance vavg ·dt of the motion-MIX, could also be in the venue now.
Sentence 2: given an inter­cepted transmission at current moment, the adversary cannot de­cide who is the sender of the transmission amongst all nodes in the enlarged venue . '
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Virtualization can provide strong isolation between trusted and untrusted domains, but noticeably use up the battery life of the device, because major parts of the software stack are duplicated and executed in parallel in currently available virtualization solutions.
Sentence 2: an isolation solution is required, which pre­serves the battery life by minimizing the computational over­head and still provides isolation of corporate assets from untrusted applications.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: An infective computation is one where any error introduced by a fault propagates throughout the computation, ultimately ensur­ing that the .nal result is randomized in such a way that no useful information can be obtained from any erroneous output of the computation.
Sentence 2: with an infective algorithm, there is no need to check the output for errors; any error will not be useful to the attacker.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: UT could communicate with U, but still not with V, since VS(vT )= 2; and if U received a message from V, its send label would rise to vT 2, preventing further communication with UT.
Sentence 2: when user taint uses level 3, the system defaults to deny­ing user-tainted messages, and the compartment manager must ex­plicitly raise the receive level of each process allowed to receive user data.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note that in what follows, for simplicity and notational convenience, we use graphs and not multigraphs, i.e., given any two nodes a and ß,there is at most one arc connecting a to ß.For instance, this means that it is not possible that a and ß are connected by a friend of and colleague of direct relationship at the same time.
Sentence 2: so, the pair  uniquely denotes an arc connecting two nodes, where for simplicity we omit the relationship type.2 we can safely write p(a,ß )to denote the probability associated with it.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, a large num­ber of device owners do not con.gure pass-locks on their devices and furthermore, if the attacker has gained access to the device, he has already compromised the primary au­thentication mechanism.
Sentence 2: to support our o.-the­shelf design goal, Itus provides app developers with a de­fault PasswordConfigure activity, which is displayed when the app is launched for the .rst time to con.gure a pass­word that should be used for explicit authentication in case the IA scheme detects misuse.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the same way, there is also a high degree of confidence that the security implementation traceably matches with the security implementation models (because MDS is used) and the requirements (because MDSA s MDC is used).
Sentence 2: the input models have a very high probability to match with the actual implementation and operation of the running IT systems, especially when application are not just developed, but also deployed in a controlled fashion as part of MDE (e.g.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Using this data, the honest node can always de­tect a possible forgery and verify property I) Correct Data .
Sentence 2: iI) Correct Nodes As k is well-known and every node x knows its aggregation path IPx, x expects data from its descendants on the (k + 1) levels below x in G. every node receiving data can trivially verify property II) using its pairwise symmetric keys and authenticated encryption techniques.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To maximize the output SNR at the desired receiver, the transmit weighting vector t is chosen as the eigenvector v corresponding to the largest eigenvalue .max of HH H (as MRT), and the receive weighting vector r is assigned to r = Hv/IHvI (as MRC) [3].
Sentence 2: the combined signal at the desired receiver is v z = .maxs + r H Hw + r H n. (5) Note that the properties of the eigenvalue .max and eigen­vector v of the matrix HH H: HH Hv = .maxv and IvI2 = 1 [2] are used.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Additionally, in a cloud, the Polling Rate : 1/hr (more) to 1/sec (less vulerable to TOMTOR) management and tenant networks may have to be separated, logically or physically, in order to reduce the risks of malicious Classical Polling-based Attestation guests attacking the management system as well as unauthorized 1E+10 100 VMs, Polling every 1s 1,000 VMs, polling every 1s 10,000 VMs, polling every 1s 100,000 VMs,polling every 1s       operators connecting to guests.
Sentence 2: a direct connection 9E+09 8E+09 7E+09 6E+09 5E+09 4E+09 3E+09 2E+09 1E+09 between (M) and every guest may be impractical.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Then cyphertext is made by changing every letter of alphabet to the corresponding set The result of encryption is shown below: s = {2, 4}{1, 3}{5, 6}{3, 6}{6}{2}{1, 5} 3.CONCLUSION.
Sentence 2: the problem of building of the ordered set with specified condition is formulated and solved, on its base the task of choice of the letter on the specified set of strings is formulated and solved.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If you want to save space and use a 160-bit hash of a key instead of the key as the names of the 242 keys, the probability that any two of them would have the same hash is roughly 2-77 or one part in 151 thousand million million million.
Sentence 2: for all practical purposes, even the relatively short hash is globally unique while the full key certainly is.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Z * q and calculates Qs = uP .G and then sends to R.  Step 2 Recipient R chooses a random number v .Z * q and calculates Qr = vP .G, and then send to the simulator.
Sentence 2: step 3 R calculates a = e(TQ,Qs)ar .GT .The sim­  ulator calculates.the simulator and R have a shared common key K = K Step 4 The receiver could send messages to the sim­ulator.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In order to add the requested set of actions to the sched­ule, it must be the case, that by the time the a * action is scheduled to occur, the system state does not have two boolean variables which are both true which correspond to vertices in the graph which share an edge.
Sentence 2: the con­dition of a * is that all boolean variables which are still true share no edges between them and, as such, correspond di­rectly to an independent set.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: EV SSL certi.cates have .ve required .elds: organization name, domain name, jurisdiction of in­corporation, registration number, and address of place of business.
Sentence 2: a user may be able to view, for example, the address of a speci.c company using an EV certi.cate (as registered with the CA), whereas this information would be unknown under a domain-validated certi.cate.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, history-based constraints may be de.ned in terms of events, which, in access control terms, are happenings at an instance of time that typically involve a principal p .P (an actor) performing an action in relation to a resource.
Sentence 2: to represent that a resource .1 can­not be read more than once on the same day by the same principal (a constraint that is often useful for satisfying the Principle of Least Privilege) the following constraint may be de.ned in M: .. happens(E, T ),actor(E, P ),action(E, read), resource(E, .1), happens(E.,T .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The size and the complexity of fcomplex is directly dependent on the number of inputs to fcompact .
Sentence 2: the number of inputs should be  0.35 0.35 0.3 0.3 0.25 0.25   0.2 0.15 Frequency 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.1 0.05 0.05  0 0 P(Oi=1|Ij=1) P(Oi=1|Oj=1) Output Hamming Distance (a) (b) (c)   Figure 5: (a) Distribution of output hamming distances testing the avalanche e.ect.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: According to the brightness formula: I = 0.3R + 0.59G + 0.11B And the theory of the human visual cells sensitivity of color, human eyes are most sensitive to the green, the next is to the red, and the least is to the blue [6].
Sentence 2: the different least bits of brightness components of the red, green, and blue of each pixel can be replaced by the hiding data.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Test the s numbers n0, n0 + 2, ..., n0 +2(s -1) for primality  Under reasonable number-theoretic assumptions, if s = c ·ln 2k, the probability of failure of this technique is smaller than 2e -2c, for large k. Using our notations, in such a way that there exists at least a prime in any set [m ×2t , (m +1) ×2t [, but with probability smaller than 2-80, we obtain from above formu­ ~ lae that c = 40, and 2t =40 ln 2k+t+1 .
Sentence 2: a suitable candidate is t ~= 5log2 k, and less than 20k primality tests have to be performed.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: On the other hand, if we consider typical private computers outside the corporate's boundaries we should notice that many third party applications can read both Microsoft Office documents and Adobe PDF files.
Sentence 2: when considering the effects of our method on a computer outside the organization's boundaries, we should not solely rely on the behavior of Microsoft Word, for example, when opening a Word document or of Adobe Acrobat reader when opening a PDF file.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However,sinceone of our mainobjectivesinthispaperistounderstand thedi­versity of voicefraud activitiesincellular networks, we want toincludeas manyfraud activitiesaspossible.
Sentence 2: in the rest of thispaper we choose5 cliques and10 originating numbers as the thresholds, i.e., only subgraphs with at least 5 cliques and 10 originating numbers will be considered as containing potential fraud activities.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: One could ar­gue that in the nuclear context, the health hazards make it hard to account for dual use in the social experiments (the concept of ethical hacker would be more di.cult to imple­ment), which could be a reason why existing work does not address this topic.
Sentence 2: the adversarial aspects of new technologies as social experiments still need to be developed from this perspective.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Fortunately, RS SIW A,i - RSSIW B,i 0 for all i is very un­likely since: RSS IW A,i -RSS IW B,i PA,i -PB,i -LAW,i +LBW,i (12) where PA,i - PB,i is uniformly distributed, and LAW,i and LBW,i are independent random variables.
Sentence 2: sCREWED is virtu­ally resistant to low variation.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When the aver­age number of required observations is very large, the incre­ments .j in the logarithm of likelihood ratio are also small.
Sentence 2: when the test terminates with selection of hy­pothesis H1, SN will be slightly larger than a, while when it terminates with selection of H0, SN will be very close to b.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In particular, the two-phase locking (TPL) protocol does not satisfy our conditions, because in contradiction to con­dition (1) above, a client may pro.t by holding a lock for a resource longer than allowed by this protocol; and in con­tradiction to condition (2) this may harm other clients, by causing deadlocks and/or compromising the integrity of re­sources due to unserializable interactions.
Sentence 2: if the group of potential clients is heterogeneous, one cannot rely on their voluntary compliance with this protocol because any one of them might violate it inadvertently, causing harm to others.
Relationship: reasoning