sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: D represents the event that we have a certain set of Leff or Vth measurements for N sampled chips.
Sentence 2: p (H|D) represents that the probability that a gate matches with other gates under the condition that we have that certain set of measurements; and P (D|H) is the probability of hav­ing the certain set of measurements under the condition that the gate matches with some other gates.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: CRYPTOGRAPHY 4.1 Requirements Tahoe is designed to run in software without requiring Trusted Computing (also called Treacherous Computing [2]) hardware.
Sentence 2: the only robust way to constrain users or administrators from certain behavior such as unau­thorizedly reading or altering .les is to make such behavior require secrets, and to withhold those secrets from people who are not authorized to perform those behaviors.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Also for each IDS pair we generate the vector of correlation C ij , where cij is the percentage of attack at i which are correlated with some attacks at j.If proximity in the IP space is a reason for attack corre­lation, then the more the distance between IDSs i and j is, the less likely they share correlated attacks i.e., D.ij and C.ij should be inversely correlated.
Sentence 2: we 1 compute the cross correlation between these two vec­ 0.5 tors.2 Note that a cross correlation around zero means 0 independence.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Using the same steps shown above, faulty state elements are represented I as [vr,(j-i) mod 4]3 r=0.
Sentence 2: from (8), we know that I [v 33 r,(j-i) mod 4]r=0 =[vr,((j-i)+3 mod 4) mod 4]r=0 the faulty column in C1 is (j - i) mod 4, but the faulty column in C2 corresponds to column ((j -i) mod 4)+3) mod 4 in C1; note that 0 = i, j = 3 and (j -i) mod 4 = (((j -i) mod 4)+ 3) mod 4.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: IDEAS '14, July 07 - 09 2014, Porto, Portugal Copyright &#38;#169;2014 ACM 978-1-4503-2627-8/14/-7 $15.00 http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1145/2628194.2628229.
Sentence 2: in order to understand this new age in terms of some of its origins, it is useful to briefly recall the history of data storage From here on, this paper will examine more closely some specific consequences of this new age which bear most directly on the theory and practice of the data engineer, namely, the proliferation of data and the novel possibilities it affords.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In our role graph model, if the privileges of the FinancialAid role are no longer a proper subset of the Admissions role, the edge from FinancialAid to Admissions has to be deleted.
Sentence 2: role graph designers need to be very careful in specifying constraints, if they are not to negate inheritance between roles which was intended in the original role graph design.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Periodic delete operations of certificates that are in the tree and reach their expiration date, require rebuilding the part of the tree involving the path from those nodes to the root.
Sentence 2: in order to maximize our proposal, such tree rebuilding is proposed to be linked to the moment when all the sibling nodes of some internal node are expired because this avoids unnecessary reductions of the system efficiency by having to rebuild the tree very often.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since the secrets used in OTR contain the .ngerprints of both Alice andBob, as wellasthe userinput, an attacker may not simply relay SMP information between Alice and Bob in an attempt to get it to match.
Sentence 2: after a successful run of the protocol, Alice knows that an attacker may neither learn her secret nor rely onathirdparty sknowledge of thesecret.Thatis,foranattack to succeed, the attacker must actuallyknow the secret.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Sec­ond, since P appears random from the attacker s point of ae ae ae c1 A e2 view, = e1 + is an LWE(n, n+i, q, Use , Use ) c2 P e3 instance, which again is hard by assumption.
Sentence 2: p e1 +e3 is indistinguishable from a uniformly random vector, and hence also is c2.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: AprotocolP has strict location privacy with respect to a raw-tuple domain, D, if, for any polynomial-time adversary Adv, winP(Adv,k)= 1/2+ negligible function of k. Intuitively, this de.nition says that, when the server examines the data it receives and anyside information, all possible con.gurations of client paths having the same aggregate result are equally likely.
Sentence 2: the server learns nothing newbeyond the aggregate result.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In addition, more computa­tionally expensive algorithms such as behavioral detection engines, which are becoming more important for detecting sophisticated threats, are simply infeasible to deploy on cur­rent mobile devices due to their heavyweight resource re­quirements.
Sentence 2: adapting traditional approaches to malware detection may not be appropriate for the mobile environment as they consume a signi.cant amount of on­device resources and power.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: ClickMiner is not able to infer all these UI events from the network traces, and therefore it is dif­.cult to have the browser replay the same asynchronous requests.
Sentence 2: the replayed DOM will be di.erent from the one on which the user originally clicked (see related discussion in Sec­tion 5.4), and we will not be able to .nd the DOM element needed to mine a con.rmed interaction.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Now, assume that a ciphertext c, that was generated for P as an encryp­tion of a message m, is being re-encrypted to a ciphertext c ' ciphertext c is a dummy ciphertext that s statistically un­related to m. In contrast, c ' must be a value that decrypts to m under a key that s known to the adversary and the environment.
Sentence 2: furthermore, c ' must look like a plausible re­encryption of c. a scheme that realizes FsP RE must allow a simulator to convincingly transform a ciphertext c that s unrelated to m into a ciphertext c ' linked to m. This is a property that seems to be an artifact of the simulation paradigm; it is not implied by De.nition 2.5.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Thus, when comparing  Table 1: Challenge for Authentication Level Level User s Nature Challenge High Suspect Please, enter your SSN Abnormal Please, enter your login and pass­word Medium Suspect Please, enter your birthday Abnormal Please, enter your driver license number Low Suspect Please, enter/choose your zipcode Abnormal Please, enter/choose your favorite color  Figure 3: Results of SaTScan analytical models the p-value of the two executions of the spatio-temporal per­mutation model (with co-variables and without co-variables), the system .nds the minimum value between them to ana­lyze the worst case (the case that represents a higher risk to the authentication process).
Sentence 2: the system uses the p-value of 0.826, determined by the spatio-temporal analysis without co-variables, which is represented in Figure 3.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 2PERMS identi.es the permissions assigned to a given user users: PERMS .
Sentence 2: 2USERS identi.es users assigned to a permission Figure 1: The Proposed Methodology at a glance of k can be ignored, and n - k n. the com­ (2) putational cost is really On , i.e., quadratic with respect to the number of users.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This is because, as of this writing, guidelines on SIP certi.cate issuance are in the process of being standardized[10] and until a certi.cate canbeissued speci.callyfor aSIP service, any other certi.cate(e.g., one issued for the use of web services) may su.ce.
Sentence 2: an ad­versary may be able to obtain a legitimate certi.cate from a certi.cate authority and then insert itself in the inter­mediary chain by techniques such as DNS cache poisoning.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The evaluation we have carried out using blacklists of known malicious IP addresses is really a proxy, because: (i) it doesn t capture the fact that all IP addresses in a cluster may share the same vulnerability but only a few of them are blacklisted.
Sentence 2: we may be accurately inferring cluster boundaries despite low detection rates, (ii) it doesn t capture the fact that known malicious IP addresses may truly lie in di.erent inner clusters, and when this happens, we do not have a way of making a prediction.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: }.Thatis,foreachxIjV(C),C sdelegationpolicyforxIjis{(C,xIj,Fc(xIj))}.
Sentence 2: simple Delegation Attestation: Thesimplesttypeofdelegationattestationforapre.xxIjisasignaturebyCof(C,xIj,Fc(xIj)),i.e.,[(C,xIj,Fc(xIj))]cwherethenotation[m]cdenotesm,a whereaisthesignatureofmsignedbyC skey.ifCusesonlysimpledelegationattestationsthenwecanwriteallofitsdel­egationattestationsas [(C,xlIjl,Fc(xlIjl))]c, [(C,x2Ij2,Fc(x2Ij2))]c, , [(C,xsIjs,Fc(xsIjs))]c whereallofthepre.xesofV(C)arerepresented.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We can obtain an adaptation e.ect by updating L.If an in­put vector x is classi.ed as a legitimate user s, x replaces the oldest element in L. 3.4 Classi.cation A legitimate user s vector which does not participate in making a hypothesis space may appear out of the hypothesis space slightly, because the hypothesis space is constructed tightly according to the vectors in the enrollment process.
Sentence 2: we append some margin to the hypothesis space as follows: x -c r,p =1+ .·sP , (7) where sP denotes the standard deviation of the value of x -c r,p for x .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 1Another known address allocation service is bootp[18], but it allocates addresses semi-permanently, without any mech­anism for renewing the allocation and is thus not usable for our purposes.
Sentence 2: in a system implementing NASR, consider that at time tb, where ta < tb < tx, all hosts are assigned a new address from R. at the time of the attack tx the probability that a hitlist entry xk still corresponds to a live host is p = m/n and thus the attacker will be able to infect (m/n)|X|hosts.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This expands the set of roles to include a role named for every path through the logical hierarchy in the downward direction.
Sentence 2: if in RBAC1 we would store a hierarchy that says A = B, B = C, and A = D, we represent this in RBAC0 with roles {A, B, C, D, AB, ABC, AD, BC }.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Though promising, our accuracy is unable to reach the European Standard for Access Control Systems, which re­quires a false acceptance rate (FAR) of under 0.001% and a false rejection rate (FRR) of under 1%.
Sentence 2: we be­lieve that our scheme is more suitable to work together with other authentication methods for user veri.cation, instead of working as a stand-alone authentication system.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Policy Violations Default-Deny-Existing Policy Only 11050 INSTALLED-FILES 11048 CREATED-FILES 49 INSTALLED-FILES+CREATED-FILES 47 SAVED-FILES+OPENED-FILES 11034 INSTALLED-FILES+CREATED-FILES+ SAVED-FILES+OPENED-FILES 31 a second Mozilla program was installed during our test installation.
Sentence 2: the second program did not have access under the installation rule to the external program s files.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The number of added FLOSS source code lines and similar measures double at the same rate, as they are derivations of the number of lines and derivations of exponential functions are exponential func­tions with the same basis again.
Sentence 2: no matter what speci.c measure accounts most for the cost of CI mainte­nance, the described measure may be used to estimate the growth of computing performance required to provide CI services to all FLOSS projects.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 1,if t =0 Ht i = At-1 j ,if t > 0 (1) (i,j).E 1,if t =0 At i = Ht-1 j ,if t > 0 (2)  (j,i).E According to this algorithm, a higher hub score of an ac­ count implies that it follows many accounts with high fol­ lower numbers.
Sentence 2: we extract 90 criminal hubs with 0.2 counts (to obtain their followers).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 2 The (Shannon) entropy [34]H(X) = -x.B pX(x)log2 pX(x)of X is alowerbound for the average number ofbits requiredfor rep­resenting the results of independent repetitions of the experiment associated with X.
Sentence 2: in terms of guessing, the entropy H(X) is a lower bound for the average number of questions with binary outcome that need to be asked to determine X s value[6].
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This function works by adding an accessor space sa derived from policies of an con­troller a to an accessor space set S. A pair of accessor spaces must satisfy one of the following relations: subset (line 14), superset (line 19), partial match (line 22), or disjoint (line 27).
Sentence 2: one can utilize set operations to separate the overlapped spaces into disjoint spaces.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, such encodingis usuallydoneintheexponentofa group wherethe prover knows the order, say q, and therefore all relations that can be proven about values contained in the credential hold modulo q only.
Sentence 2: the prover needs to provide an integer commitment to the attribute values contained in the credential (i.e., the product oftheprime encoded attributevalues),sothatwecandoourproofs for the prime encodings over the integers.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This is because a smaller set of in­stances will share a larger set of features in common.
Sentence 2: the root node shows the set of features common to all in­stances in I, while the leaf node shows the set of instances that share all features in F.  (a) The relation CodePats CodePats pat1 pat2 pat3 pat4 api1 .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: More specifically, for any O value (e.g., O ) that is greater than the b local minimum coefficient ratio (corresponding to coefficient 8) but less than some of the subsequent ones (coefficients 11 to 16), the rate estimation algorithm accumulates the codeword lengths of these coefficients to base-layer as if its operational R-D curve were a convex.
Sentence 2: histogram compensation is needed for non-convex regions by counting the data bits from such coefficients in a non-monotonic region to the bin of the local minimum value of the ratio in the histogram.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We assume that all points in R2 are equally prob­able to be visited by U. Fixed-position follows immediately, since xn is equally likely to be any point of Gn = f(x, d, n).
Sentence 2: an adversary A observing the coordinates Gn re­turned by the user U gains information about the location of the user with no further precision than d. The same holds for destination-indistinguishability, since once the user en­ters the region corresponding to destination ¯x he is likely to be in any point of this region.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This assumption is reasonable in reality for a public cloud, as they are in a group with only limited permissions interacting with the cloud service application programming interfaces (API) and VMs, otherwise the administrator can install their own VMI tools, even bypassing the logs in a cloud system.
Sentence 2: con.guration .les and keys stored with root permission for CryptVMI also stay safe.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: for v to become the secure state from the compromised state for the ith time (i.e., the length of time interval it takes for the ith recovery), Jv,i be the random number of compromised neighbors of node v after the (i -1)th recovery, where i =1,2,.... Un­der the condition that each compromise-and-recovery cycle has the same distribution after each recovery (i.e., reset to the secure state), Jv,i for i =1,2,... are independently and identically distributed.
Sentence 2: the stochastic process can be seen as an alternating re­newal process with a sequence of vectors (Tv,c,i,Rv,i) for i =1, which have the same distributions as (Tv,c,Rv).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.3 I/O Requests Accounting We assume that each I/O operation is atomic and thus does not affect subsequent I/O operations.
Sentence 2: the total CPU usage on Domain0 due to a virtual I/O device access by a guest domain becomes sum of the CPU usage of individual requests while the CPU time of an individual request is calculated from an inde­pendent variable request size.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: )Sinethenumberofequivalenelassesofx " i,jE£(B " ) modulo£(M)isdet(M)/det(B " ),thentheprobabilitythat ai,j=asatisfes I£(B " )QIdet(B " )I£(B " )QIdet(B " ) :Pr{ai,j=a}: .
Sentence 2: det(M) det(M) NotiethatbothQandQontainanopensphereofradius r=A1(A)/2.byProposition3andusingthe boundp(B " ):A1(A)/(8n)fromLemma2,thenumberof lattiepointsinQsatisfes () " det(A)2p(B " )n I£(B)QI?1­ det(B")A1(A) () det(A)1 ?1­ det(B") andtheprobabilitythatai,j=ais 3det(A)det(B " )3 Pr{ai,j=a}?
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: An argument can be made that forming a consistent physical pattern is of high cost to an attacker and may be less likely, but just be­cause a social network is used, it does not imply that there is trust between the nodes, just that the trust mechanism will augment its approach with information from the social net­work.
Sentence 2: an actively malicious node would still have to undergo the same calculations from the trust mechanism as it would without the social network, just at a higher cost to itself.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The generalization proposed by Boneh and Boyen di.ers from other proposals in that it does not require the homomor­phism f to be e.ciently computable, which gives a weaker assumption.
Sentence 2: following Boneh and Boyen, we consider the BDH problem stated for .xed G, G , GT , e, as follows: a c Given (g, g , g , h, ha , hb) .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Table 1: A running example ROP shellcode Resulting non-ROP shellcode Gadget # Payload Instructions Initial results Post-process 0x41 ×220 junk 1 0x7c9fb028 0x42424242 pop ecx retn mov ecx,[0x12f1ab] mov ecx,0x42424242 2 0x7c9eaddd 0xffffffff pop ebx retn mov ebx,[0x12f1af] mov ebx,0xffffffff 3 0x77c127e1 inc ebx retn inc ebx inc ebx 4 0x7c9ea67b 0x7c8922a4 pop ebp retn mov ebp, [0x12f1b3] mov ebp, 0x7c8922a4 5 0x7c9eeb47 0x7c9c1508 pop edi retn mov edi, [0x12f1b7] mov edi, 0x7c9c1508 6 0x7c9c204c 0x7c9c2051 pop esi retn mov esi, [0x12f1bb] mov esi, 0x7c9c2051 7 0x7ca11073 pushad retn mov esp, 0x12f1bf pushad pop edi jmp edi mov esp, 0x12f1ab pushad pop edi jmp edi 0x90 ×10 240 bytes nop shellcode 0x42424242 0xffffffff 0x7c8922a4 0x7c9c1508 0x7c9c2051 nil  Figure 4: Debugger payload format value of esp.
Sentence 2: we know that esp is at an o.set of 224 + 4 = 228 bytes, which will also be the location of the second gadget.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Coming back to our running example (E = ln(4)/0.2 and rad I = 0.3), taking a con.dence factor c of, say, 0.95, leads to a (0.69, 0.95)­useful mechanism (because CE -1(c) = 0.69).
Sentence 2: (PLE, 0.99) is both ln(4)/0.2-geo-indistinguishable and (0.95, 0.3)-accurate.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In still more practical terms, it is a highly structured system of concepts covering the processes, objects, and attributes of a domain in all of their pertinent complex relations, to the grain size determined by such considerations as the need of an application or computational complexity.
Sentence 2: an ontology may divide the root concept ALL i:nto EVENTs, OBJECTs, and PROPERTYs (Fig.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the adversarial-error model, on the other hand, we show that depending on the error rate, there are functions that can be privately computed in the error-free setting but not in the adversarial-error model.
Sentence 2: there is no hope to achieve constant-rate schemes for any function f, or even for any f which can be computed privately in the error-free setting.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The perfor­mance of the PBBL itself is actually not very critical, since the most time-consuming part of the enhanced architecture is intermediate kernel boot process.
Sentence 2: the perfor­mance overhead can be expected to be reduced to the SHA-1 measurements and certi.cates veri.cations when integrating the PBBL functionality into a common boot loader.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Consequently, when another principal, say Alice, accesses the picnic table, view.picnic will be invoked, but the .rst clause in the body of the rule will fail if bob does nothave read-access toAlice s employee tableinforma­tion.
Sentence 2: the rule will not .re, and hence protect Alice s data from being written onto Bob s leaked_info ta­ble.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this case, data copy operations can be detected because the OS-level clipboard is used, but data paste operations among applications in the same group cannot be detected, since only the application-level clipboard is used and the OS-level clipboard is not used.
Sentence 2: if a label-attachable TC in an application group joins a domain, then all of the label­attachable TCs in the same group must also be forced to join the same domain.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Moreover, it is infeasible to use computa­tionally intensive cryptographic algorithms for privacy and security, because memory and processing power in a low­costtag arelimited[3].
Sentence 2: authenticationprotocols for RFID systems should not only be designed to address theseprivacy and security threats,but should alsotakeinto account the limited capabilities of RFID tags.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This would be tied to penalties for violation ( we will pay you z ); if the expectation is no release to anyone and the mechanism purchased is baseline protection mechanisms, then the penalty for information leaking probably should be less than if the mechanism purchased were information on isolated systems only, trusted user access.
Sentence 2: expectations could be tied to both assurances and, with more specificity, to mechanisms for implementing assurances.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Unfortunately, to know the memory live-ins and live­outs at the beginning of a code segment is much harder be­cause some addresses may not be known at the beginning of the code segment.
Sentence 2: as demonstrated on Figure 3, to handle memory data tags, LIFT postpones the informa­tion check of a memory location until its address is known, usually right before this memory instruction.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: What we want is to be comfortable with a range of activities, around a norm, and to be able to identify situations or sets of cir­cumstances where we ought be uncomfortable, and thus be able to take steps to prevent real problems escalating, or at­tacks on systems succeeding.
Sentence 2: imprecision and leeway per se become not only acceptable, rather they become a requirement.
Relationship: reasoning