sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: By the completeness property of the real protocol and the no-cloning theorem, the residual state left over af­ter the ideal interpolation circuit (i.e., the state of the cheaters) has almost no correlation to the data shared using the circuit, so swapping in S and running the circuit backwards gives us a state  with high .delity to the state that would have re­ sulted from sharing S directly with the same A1.
Sentence 2: the simulation is faithful in this case as well.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Both primitives can be easily constructed with uncon­ditional security in the random oracle model (when time­complexity is measured by the number of oracle queries rather than computational e.ort) for every index distribu­tion with super-logarithmic min-entropy.
Sentence 2: in this model we get unconditionally secure time-lock puzzles and time stamping schemes for any puzzle and/or document distribution with super-logarithmic min-entropy.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In additionthatthelengths ofinstructions are not.xed,there is no prior knowledge of subsequent instruction generations when the mimimorphic engine produces a branch/call instruction.
Sentence 2: abyte offsetcouldpointtothe middle ofafollowinginstruction,in­validatingthecontrol.ow.Weresolvethisproblembyperforming control .owcorrectionontheintermediatedataaftertheencoding phase.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Akamai, the biggest content provider handling around 20% of the total Inter­net tra.c using 61,000 Servers deployed world wide, reports only less than 300 attacks in 24 hours in average [1] and so most of the tra.c is legitimate.
Sentence 2: in fact, if we can avoid the legitimate tra.c to be processed by the RegEx detec­tion system, a RegEx detection system with a throughput much less than the line rate can keep up with the tra.c.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The malware detection problem demands in addition to the classi.cation accuracy a number of additional requirements: (1) process­ing overheads to ensure the feasibility of realtime deploy­ment, and (2) comprehensibility of the developed solution that helps malware forensic experts.
Sentence 2: malware detection problem is relatively more challenging because we need to simultaneously optimize accuracy and e.ciency of classi.cation.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For instance, one VM may consider the presence of a maintenance person in the vicinity as a threat, whereas an­other VM may not consider it as a threat according to which security level was selected for the VM.
Sentence 2: two VMs operating on the same server, under the same threat con­text, may perceive the same threat with di.erent urgency and hence have di.erent response times.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Most current security models and mechanisms that address these problems and allow a system to detect and recover from errors/attacks are hard to change, reuse, and analyse and thus making infrastructures inflexible, lost investment, damages realized through mechanisms not matching the threats, etc.
Sentence 2: there is a need for the development of risk-based adaptive security methods and mechanisms for IoTs that increase security to an appropriate level.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When actually running this protocol, we suggest to run n OTs for both fnum , where the .rst £ OTs only and f den concern fnum while the last £ OTs concatenate contributions to both fnum and fden .
Sentence 2: complexity (before compar­ + £ × OT2[log2(£)l ison) is £ × OT[log2(£)l in the 1-vs-1 case or £ × OTN[log2(£)l + £ × OT2N[log2(£)l in the 1-vs-N case.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Over-pro.ling by kernel tracing systems When we calculate the percentage of successfully traced system calls as the comprehensive coverage provided by kernel tracing systems, we exclude other system calls except the system call we intend to trace, and also select the system calls exercised by the actual fuzzer process.
Sentence 2: in theory, the successfully traced count by each system call should not exceed 100.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We .rst recall that, by de.nition, X satis.es f1 n f2 if and only if X satis.es both f1 and f2,and X satis.es f1 U f2 if and only if X satis.es either f1 or f2.
Sentence 2: to determine whether X satis.es a 5CF term, one can .rst determine whether X satis.es each of the 4CF sub-terms, and then combine these results using logical conjunction and disjunction.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In RFLP analysis, a DNA sample is broken into pieces (digested)byrestriction enzymes and the resulting restrictionfrag­ments are separated according to theirlengthsbygel electrophore­sis.
Sentence 2: rFLP provides information about the length (but not the composition) of DNA subsequences occurring between known subsequences recognized by particular enzymes.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: At this point, we observe that both components c1 = f(x)and c2 = g(vk * ,x) of the challenge ciphertext lose information about x.
Sentence 2: h(x) is statistically close to uniform (given the rest of the view of the adversary), so even an unbounded adversary has only negligible advantage in guessing the encrypted message.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A SEM will only participate in a decryption or signature process if the security capabilities of the corresponding User have not been revoked.
Sentence 2: if a SEM is instructed to stop assisting cryptographic processes, Instant (or immediate) Revocation is provided in the sense that a User wishing to decrypt a message with a compromised private key share will not be issued with the decrypted token generated by the SEM.Also, a User trying to impersonate another entity will not be able to generate a full signature on a message since the SEM will refuse to cooperate with its corresponding private key share.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The similar incident was also transpired recently in 2011 [23] where an attacker whose IP address originated from Iran forcefully requested several fraudulent certificates to be issued by Comodo certification services for the well-known websites, such as Google, Yahoo, Skype, Mozilla, and several others.
Sentence 2: in order to address the previously mentioned concerns, we propose an idea to integrate the community trust services, such as Web of Trust (WoT) into DRPM workflow, particularly in the client registration process.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The total memory installed was2GB.Xen3.4withHVM support and our modi.cations servedasthehypervisor,andtheguest virtual machinewas either Windows XP (SP2) or Debian Linux (kernel 2.6.26).
Sentence 2: the virtual machine was allocated 512 MB of memory and had twodisks mounted,a20GBsystemdisk and80GBdata disk.The80GBdatadiskhosted theuser shomedirectories, and was mountedasa monitored virtualdisk.all blocks in this virtual disk were automatically added to the watchlist of the storage module.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The 15GB-RAM experiment machine was running out of memory when compiling the certifying algorithm code on graphs with more than 10, 000 vertices.
Sentence 2: whereas the veri.cation time offered by the ALITHEIA graph VC only grows sub-linearly and can be considerably faster than the compiled Schnorr proofs we use in this approach, this comes at a high storage cost for the server.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: CYBER SECURITY AS SOCIAL EXPERIMENT Currently, there seems to be a lack of systematic real­world security evaluation of new information technologies.
Sentence 2: whereas functional capabilities of technologies are tested via controlled deployments (e.g., pilot projects of smart grids), security evaluations are often not part of the analysis scope in the running pilots.2 we think the paradigm of new technologies as social experiments has added value for cyber security.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We believe that these current software solutions including solutions that use run-time binary modifications are of limited use in practice, as they rely on a significant amount of trusted infrastructures in the system, as discussed in Section 3.4.
Sentence 2: in our solution, we make a conscious attempt to minimize the size (and variety) in the trusted code base (TCB) needed to support our technique.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Although the DMV example above motivates the need for considering the tree structured owner s policy, it may not motivate the need for a privacy preserving solution as the DMV is a governmental entity and the user s documents in most cases are required to be shared.
Sentence 2: in the fol­lowing, we take a concrete example to motivate the need for a privacy preserving credential veri.cation scheme by con­sidering credit scoring policy of a bank for deciding loan / mortgage applications.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In particular, we encode the signature on the value in a vector dimension as the distance from that value to the maximum value for that dimension, and then embed that distance as a root in the RSA group.
Sentence 2: by exponentiating the signature by an exponent corresponding to this dimension, the distance in that dimension can be de­creased (and so the value in that dimension is increased).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Without loss of generality, we further assume m = n.Thus, rank(H)= n.Since P = H(HTH)-1HT , P is a projection matrix of H.Thus, rank(P)=rank(H)= n, and n eigenvalues of P are 1 s and the remaining m - n eigenvalues of P are 0 s [20].
Sentence 2: obviously, for B = P- I, m - n eigenvalues of B are 1 s and n eigenvalues of B are 0 s. rank(B)= m - n.The matrix B' is a m × k matrix.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The set of + 4,h+ 8,h secure variables of the program is S = variable h: if l1 > 0 and h = 0 the program will output {h = invalid .ows is F D {h} and the set of + 12}.
Sentence 2: output(l1) because of the absence = only one value but if l1 > 0 and h 1= 0, the execution will t(3 output(l1),F ) result in two outputted values.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In a trust network, if there is only one trust path from a to c, then any untrust in the path will make the trust path broken which is equivalent to the case that there is no trust path from a to c. As a result, a will untrust c. This property reveals that trust evaluation will not change by adding or cutting o. a trust relationship with td = dtd = 0.
Sentence 2: cutting o. all trust relationships with td and dtd near 0 will e.ectively reduce the complexity of a trust network and the associated computation complexity.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this case, the embedded information and the high-order bits of the public key N are almost the same (the last bit is di.erent, but in binary number, it is the same number), i.e.
Sentence 2: 9718C6CE785FB08C9DFCD9A8C71A3DB2BA4AC5F3 21CE2615384A5B286644256448E7D960216AB6F32C3 5E1B7312FB54FA81E0524B563019C82F80D9F6A0B1 5EB3462B1C2EEFC9EDCAAABE3F9A1C280E5BD8BB AFB0B686C9DC445AA41AC8D53D688011DE999D0820 165163BFBA936473FD41CB673D0B87E09B3697B2916 081(4) the Lenstra algorithm is successfully and e.­ciently executed in the real world.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If, in a real deployment each time window is shifted one hour these results show that the illegitimate user that ex­hibits a completely random network communication behav­ior can be identi.ed with 98% accuracy in the .rst hour.
Sentence 2: an informed attacker can be identi.ed with 95% accuracy in the .rst 2 hours, and a compromised de­vice with 90% accuracy within the .rst 6 hours.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: By contrast, the reduction is rather smaller for applications manipulating relatively little tainted data : only2%and5%for mcfwhenitis trackedatbyte-leveland word-level.
Sentence 2: 5LIFT uses the notion of incurred overhead , which equals ( slow­down -1).the incurred overhead of3.6X shouldbe4.6X slow­down.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: f((u ' , whereis(u ' ,t),t,q))= (r, t, q)}| = k. Different from k-anonymity, the set of users that are k-approximate beyond suspicious is computed based on the spatial distribution of users with similar probabilities rather than the original distribution involving all users.
Sentence 2: the users in an anonymity set have similar probabilities and the size of the anonymity set is larger than k. k-approximate beyond suspicion can be seen as a gen­eralised version of k-anonymity.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: {(Emma,r3)}.The administrative activity of assigning Emma to r3 costs 3 and example, we re.ne OWA by decomposing user-task assign­ments into RBAC policies and assume the cost function to the overall risk and maintenance cost rises by 12 + 5.
Sentence 2: costR(UR, UR ) - costR(UR, UR) = 3 + 12 + 5 = 20.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The disadvantage, however, is that it does not actually prevent malicious activity from happening in of.ine transactions but only detects and punishes it later.
Sentence 2: it is not effective if it is possible for the adversary to hide and escape from being punished, or if there is a need to actually prevent the malicious activity from happening at the time of the of.ine transaction itself.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Mis­use detection can detect only known attacks based on avail­able signatures.
Sentence 2: dynamic signature updation is im­portant and new attack de.nitions are frequently released by Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro.t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the .rst page.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.THE VULNERABILITY LIFE-CYCLE In this section,we introduce the basic concept andterminology usedthroughout this paper.
Sentence 2: we .rst describe the vulner­ability lifecycle illustratedin Figure2.Speci.cally, we revisit the de.nitions ofdiscovery, exploit, andpatch time,andpropose adef­inition forthe disclosure time.We alsoexplain the differentphases ofthe vulnerability lifecycle andtheir players .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In particular, for each class of the design model, we gen­erate a policy set (XACML element PolicySet) con­taining the permissions (Rule) assigned to emergency policies (Policy) for this class ordered with respect to the topological sorting of the emergency policies.
Sentence 2: all permissions belonging to the regular policy will be mapped on the top policy of the policy set, followed by the rules belonging to the .rst emergency level.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As the key size increases (assuming the PUF size is increased accordingly so that only one polling is needed), the PUF execution time becomes 0.13% overhead for 2048-bit RSA decryption.
Sentence 2: the performance impact of polling the PUF during key generation is minimal.6 6Obviously, there is additional work required to convert the PUF output into a usable key.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Clearly(beauseof(15))wehavethat +---+ = A0:T ThereforeitsuÆestoshowthat () (1-0)m PB1+...+Bm:em:2m7(17) From(16)wehavethatforeveryiandforallbi+1,...,bm () PBi=0Bi+1=bi+1,...,Bm =bm:7.
Sentence 2: forallb1,...,bmE{0,1}, 1{i:b=0}1 , P(B1=b1,...,Bm =bm):77m-(b+---+b=) =.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, if we assume that the attacker cannot produce a valid TLS certi.cate for any domain he wants to extract data from, this attacker can only steal login data from sites that do not use HTTPS to serve their login form.
Sentence 2: this attack scenario can be thwarted if all pages use strict HTTPS for both the login form and the URL the data is then sent to.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The likelihood function L(6 | n, x) is a function of parameter 6, therefore a speci.c value of parameter 6 fed to the likelihood function in question results in a speci.c likelihood or unnormalized probability of that speci.c value of 6 itself.
Sentence 2: di.erent values of parameter 6 have di.erent likelihoods.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.4 Surveillance Ontology As shownintheprevious sections,theframework wepro­pose can cope with both sides of a videosurveillance system: the world behind the cameras, and the world in front of them.
Sentence 2: the ontologies typically associated to DRM systems are not enough to describe all the agents and rela­tionships that are present in our framework, such as the in­teraction rights.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: TEF denotes the expected frequency of occurrence of a particular threat (seen as a threat agent acting against an asset; a storm at the location of a power line), and V speci.es the likelihood of the threat in.icting damage upon the asset.
Sentence 2: the value for LEF can then be calculated as TEF · V. if a threat event is expected to occur 4 times in 10 years (TEF = 0.4 y-1), and one in two threat events is expected to cause loss (V = 0.5), then 2 loss events are expected to occur in 10 years (LEF = TEF · V = 0.4 y-1 · 0.5 = 0.2 y-1).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.2.2 Internal Channels In addition to interacting with the outside world, mobile apps often interact with other apps on the same device.
Sentence 2: if a malicious app is installed on the victim s device but its privilege is limited, this app can inject malicious JavaScript code into vulner­able HTML5-based apps that have more privileges, hence achiev­ing privilege escalation.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: [n - 1]} and SB = {(1,j), (2,n)}.Note that H(X)=1 and H(X|Y )=(1 - qj - qn)H(1/2, 1/2) + sj qj H(2/3, 1/3) n - 1 - 2sj +3sj H(2/3, 1/3) = .
Sentence 2: n +1 12 if sj =0 I(X; Y )= n +14 - 3H(2/3, 1/3) if sj =1 and hence, approximating I(X; Y ) by a factor at .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This was done because legitimate pro.les with a fairly high number of followers (e.g., 300), but following thousands of other pro.les, have a high value of R.This is a typical situation for legitimate accounts following news pro.les, and would have led to false positives in our system.
Sentence 2: we de.ned a new feature R' ,which is the R value divided by the number of followers a pro.le has.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Even if the user s card stops cooperating on her last visit, this visit cannot be connected to any prior visit.
Sentence 2: a user s privacy is protected over multiple visits, and the small number of bits that may be leaked on one visit (when the card stops cooperating) can be randomized by the user ahead of time, and become known to the user as soon as they are released by the card.3  5.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: On the other hand, we found the CFG metric based on ba­sic blocks to be too general because summarizing basic blocks by simply the presence of certain opcodes ignores subtle differences between shellcodes.
Sentence 2: this metric clustered function­ally distinct exploits as identical, as shown with families LSASS-2, 3 and 4 grouped together in Figure 4c.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When in this mode, the LS of the SPE, which contains the application s code and data, is locked for use only by the SPE and cannot be read or written to by any other software, even including code in the ring0 mode of the ring protection.
Sentence 2: even if the operating system kernel or the hypervisor is hacked and controlled by an ad­versary, he will still not be able to steal or manipulate the data or code in the isolated SPE LS.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Moreover, in several recent cases the only reported cases of which we are aware addressing this issue courts have expressly extended the protection of section 230 to individuals who are not themselves ISP s, when they were sued for messages that other persons created.
Sentence 2: in Marczeski v. Law, supra, the defendant was the organizer of a chat room for the discussion of a dispute about the plaintiff, and an anonymous poster accused the plaintiff of threatening her children; once the Court was satisfied that the defendant had not posted those comments, it dismissed the claim against her.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A malicious operator with access to the provider s management soft­ware, or malware targeting hypervisor vulnerabilities [26, 7], can take control of the hypervisor to inspect or manipulate hosted guest computations.
Sentence 2: current cloud architectures require users to place high and perhaps unwarranted levels of trust in the operators and hypervisor software responsible for hosting their services.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Furthermore, when the document streaming rate is high, the User may wish to monitor only the top-k documents within a sliding window (of the most recent documents, or of documents that ar­rived within the last several seconds).
Sentence 2: the correlation score vk of the k-th highest ranking document provides another threshold to limit the search for v. the User only needs to search for the score v of the new document within a bounded range: kd+kq v .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: JCA, upon which our JavaScript library is based, uses several Java features, such as re.ection, that are not supported by GWT.
Sentence 2: we .rst modi.ed JCA to a set of core components that were suf.cient to implement cryptographic operations needed forWeb2ID.We then used this stripped-downversionof JCA with GWT to produce our JavaScript library.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Although some previous work [5] attempts to prove expressiveness by describing only the mapping from states to states, other work shows that commands [7] and queries [25] can also a.ect the ability of a scheme to successfully simulate another.
Sentence 2: an implementation must include the following: The state mapping, which translates an abstract workload state to an equivalent state in the implementing scheme  The command mapping, which translates a workload com­mand to a list of commands that perform the same action in the implementing scheme  The query mapping, which maps a workload query to an equivalent query in the implementing scheme  Example 4.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: lock puzzle protocol, solving a puzzle should take approxi­mately N time (even for a massively parallel solver), while generating the puzzle and verifying the solution should take considerably less.
Sentence 2: one can think of a time-lock puzzle as an interactive proof of sequential work and view a solu­tion to the puzzle as a proof that at least roughly N time units have elapsed since the prover received the puzzle.
Relationship: reasoning