sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It be­came quickly apparent that the di.erence in input times be­tween PassShapes and EyePassShapes were due to a group of six participants that did not perform the EyePassShapes au­thentication in one stroke but in several consecutive strokes.
Sentence 2: in contrast to the technical evaluation, some partic­ipants of the usability study decided to use the accumulative input technique for EyePassShapes.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the .rst simulation, we use a speci.c schedule for the degradation of users.
Sentence 2: we choose speci.c values for the degradation parameters (L and {ei}i) in the scheme Although it is not necessary to encrypt all .ve terms of the bracketed expression in the .gure under KR¯,since do­ing so doesn t increase the cost of the scheme signi.cantly we choose to encrypt them all the simplify the proof and exposition.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We show how to construct very e.cient protocols in the gRO model, which in most cases improve on the highly e.cient known existing solutions in the CRS model.
Sentence 2: we .rst show a highly e.cient UC-commitment scheme, which compares very favorably to the most e.cient known UC-commitment scheme of Lindell in [16] (in the CRS model).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The Traust system was designed explicitly to meet the needs of large-scale open systems.
Sentence 2: the Traust system: uses current prototype trust negotiation systems (such as Trust-X [3] or TrustBuilder [27]) to allow clients to establish bilateral trust with previously-unknown resource providers on-the-.y and negotiate for access to new system resources at runtime;  integrates transparently with newer, trust-aware re­sources while still maintaining compatibility with and allowing increased access to legacy resources;  can broker access tokens in any format for any size se­curity domain, ranging from single hosts (e.g., in peer­to-peer systems) to entire organizations;  has policy maintenance overheads that scale indepen­dently of the number of users in the system and the rates at which users join and leave the system.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: FRAGMENT AUTHENTICATION AS A MULTICAST AUTHENTICATION PROBLEM The problem of fragment authentication can be stated as follows: how can a single sender securely and e.ciently dis­tribute a sequence of data pieces towards any number of receivers, each of which can e.ciently verify the authentic­ity of received data but is being precluded from producing new data seemingly originating from the source?
Sentence 2: how can source authentication be implemented in a multicast or broadcast transmission without the use of a digital signature per data piece?
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: These approaches are modeled after the characteristics of the botnet under study and vary along different axes, depending on whether they have access to direct traces of infected machines [6] or have to resort to indirect mea­surements[11,34,35,37], whethertheyhavea completeor partial view of the infected population, and, .nally, whether individual bots are identi.ed by using a network-level identi.er (typically, an IP address) or an application-de.ned identi.er (such as a bot ID).
Sentence 2: we brie.y compare our measurementtechnique to those described by Rajab et al.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this paper we present the realization of the TVD con­cept on smartphones.
Sentence 2: our contributions are: TVD Framework for Smartphones: We present the design (Section 3) and implementation (Section 5) of a TVD framework on top of the OKL4 microker­nel, and we support to run Android operating systems and their applications in isolated environments to sep­arate data and applications of corresponding security domains based on TVDs.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The intuitive reason behind this is a natural loss of synchronization between the bot and the solver, due to the dynamic nature of DCG captchas (moving objects).
Sentence 2: by the time the solver provides the locations of target object and the answer objects within a challenge image (let us call this the n th frame), the objects them­selves would have moved in the subsequent, kth, frame (k> n), making the prior responses from the solver of no use for the bot cor­responding to the kth frame.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In our example above of an ACL with an entry of the form (Alice, .le f, read, allow), a semantics would need to unambiguously specify what the consequence of the existence of such an entry as part of the ACL is to authorization.
Sentence 2: a semantics would provide a yes or no answer to a question such as can Alice read the .le f?
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We believe that a framework with the properties described in this paper can be adapted toward formalizing other types of broader security workloads and analyzing candidate implementations with respect to those workloads.
Sentence 2: given a more general security goal, we may be able to utilize a similar approach to that which we advocate for the analysis of an application s access control needs: .rst, identify the candidate solutions which are capable of servicing the security workload while preserving its requisite safety and security properties, then determine which solution works best relative to the application s speci.c cost valuations.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In [17] the authors propose and discuss several protocols and mechanisms that di.er in their trust models, e.ciency, and the functionali­ties o.ered by the trusted components.
Sentence 2: [17] discusses how the Trusted Software Stack (TSS) can provide a property-based attestation protocol based on the existing trusted computing hardware without a need to change the underlying trust model.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As stated more precisely below, functionality FsP RE cap­tures the same security notion as De.nition 2.5, except for the following issue: Consider a party P that s not e.ectively corrupted, but has setup a re-encryption proxy X with a corrupted party P ' .
Sentence 2: (X is not corrupted and the re-encryption key between P and P ' is secret.)
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: BLAST proves assertions using predicate abstraction [19].
Sentence 2: it partitions the reachable states of the program using a set of predicates appearing in the as­sertion to prove, the conditional branches and assignments as well as internally generated predicates from failed proofs using Craig s interpolation theorem [23], in order to obtain a .nite representa­tion of the program.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The idea is that i rep­  Figure 1: Geo-indistinguishability: privacy varying with r. resents the user s level of privacy for that radius: the smaller i is, the higher is the privacy.
Sentence 2: in order to allow the LBS to provide a useful service, we require that the (inverse of the) level of privacy i depend on the radius r. we require that it is proportional to r, which brings us to our de.nition of geo-indistinguishability: A mechanism satis.es E-geo-indistinguishability iff for any radius r > 0, the user enjoys Er-privacy within r. This de.nition implies that the user is protected within any radius r, but with a level i = Er that increases with the distance.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: [6] as a mechanism for maintaining data privacy in the pres­ence of active adversaries who have the ability to coerce data senders or recipients into opening observed ciphertexts.
Sentence 2: af­ter observing a ciphertext, an adversary approaches the sender and asks her to reveal the random choices or keys used in generating the ciphertext, which expose the corresponding plaintext.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: There are three main concepts underlying X2S:  Formal Model of Policies : XACML policies are for­mally represented as many-sorted .rst order formulas whose variables denote policy attributes.
Sentence 2: xACML policies are transformed into policy formulas in a normal form, which de.ne the conditions under which a policy evaluate to a certain access decision.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: An alphanumeric instruction is an instruction where each of the four bytes of the instruction is either an upper case or lower case letter, or a digit.
Sentence 2: the bit patterns of these bytes must always conform to the following constraints: The most signi.cant bit, bit 7, must be set to 0  Bit 6or 5 must beset to 1  If bit 5 is setto 1, butbit 6 isset to 0,then bit4mustalsobe set to 1  These constraints do not eliminate all non-alphanumeric charac­ters, but they can be used as a rule of thumb to quickly dismiss most of the invalid bytes.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Passwords choices and configurations [26] Password category Password length Stroke count Bit-size strength Weak 7 3 ~25.1 Medium 10 5 ~39.1 Strong 13 7 ~53 The configuration of the password length and stroke count for each security level, together with the bit-size strength of each level, is chosen as in Table 1.
Sentence 2: our weak password has a search space of about 25 bits, the medium password about 39 bits.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Thirdly, the practice of rehearsal and planning has been challenging; the rehearsal environment cannot be completely identical to the production environment.
Sentence 2: con­cerning importing policies into the rehearsal environment, some information (e.g., IDs in a policy database) is not pre­served the team has to make do with the same kind of objects, rather than replications of them: Yeah, you know, when you re trying to import group policies and stu.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Then we say that the context-sanitizer map is correct if when ff(INP ) is reduced, the grammar never leaves context C. In other words, applying the correct sequence of sanitiz­ers locks a string in the current context.
Sentence 2: a string locked in the HTML context cannot cause the browser to transition to the JavaScript context, leading to a code in­jection.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Availability of a privacy policy: The availability of a privacy policy with a Facebook app correlates negatively, albeit weakly, with Pdanger (r= 0.12, p<.001) and Pdinfo (r= 0.14, p<.001).
Sentence 2: there is some weak evi­dence that Facebook apps accompanied by a privacy policy are more likely to request fewer permissions.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Instead, the action is triggered when the monitored survivability metric SU(r) drops below the threshold survivability (TS).
Sentence 2: by adopting the duo scheme of TS and ES, we ensure the ES by taking preventative actions (prescribed by ESS and triggered by the TS) in early stages, which buffers the potential consequences of UUUR events.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We also remark that the various design choices above are made to not only allow practically ef.cient constructions, but also to suit the security and usability requirements of the applications that mo­tivated this work.
Sentence 2: the non-interactive nature (encryp­tions instead of protocols) and the of.ine nature of data owners make a C-FE scheme much easier to deploy in these applications than a solution relying on, say, secure multi-party computation.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In all three ASes, we .nd that the Zipf-Mandelbrot distribu­tion .ts accurately for high value of skew a (i.e., 1.77 1.89) when J is deliberately .xed to 2.1 to yield a best .t and allow direct skew comparison.
Sentence 2: a few AS internal links are extremely heavily used whereas most other internal links are very lightly used.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Finally, theRBAM algorithmproposedinthispaperinher­its most of its characteristics from well-known data mining techniques.
Sentence 2: market Basket Analysis (MBA, also known as association-rule mining) is a method of dis­covering customerpurchasingpatternsby extracting associ­ations or co-occurrences from transactional store databases.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Unlike the well-studied IP dark space analysis tech­niques (see, e.g., [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]) which are inher­ently ex situ and can potentially be evaded [10], IP gray space analysis is in situ and provides us with a direct means to monitor, identify and track suspicious and potentially harmful activities launched by outside hosts.
Sentence 2: we can observe the tra.c generated by outside hosts to­wards both the IP gray space and active space of a network, and correlate them to infer the nature of activities engaged by the outside hosts and isolate potentially harmful ones.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: prm(Kds, R, do), pca(Kds,Kdu, C, P ), arca(Kds, read, R, C, P ), not arcd(Kds, read, R, C, P ).
Sentence 2: o George uses a denial to de.ne an exception to Goods4U s preferred policy on releases of transaction data in relation to his purchase of bolts; he also requires that a denials override meta­policy be enforced rather than Goods4U s closed policy.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The effective mapping isthe mapping implicitly createdbythe actionsofkernel code.For a memory address, the effective mapping uses the type that ker­nel code implicitly assumes at that address, based on a sequence of pointer dereferences.
Sentence 2: if the kernel traverses a struct page pointer to arrive at memory address 0x100, then memory at address 0x100 is of type struct page.We assume that the effec­tive mappingis consistent with thekernel s type graph thekernel does not typecast pointers to an unrelated type as it traverses them.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: UNIFICATION OF POLICIES We will consider two NSSs as equivalent with respect to a set of policy rules, if this set of rules can be identically implemented in both NSSs.
Sentence 2: if two NSSs use equal commands (and/or other manipulations with user interface) in order to implement a set of policy rules, it means that these NSSs are equivalent with respect to this set of rules.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The explicit expanding graphs we used in Construction B.3 to connect the two copies of Gi are all of in-degree 0N for large enough O(log N) < log2 N. Since the depth of the recursion is .log N., the total in-degree of the .nal graph is at most O0(log2 N) < log3 N for large enough N. The explicitness of our constructed graph follows from the explicitness of the expanding graphs used.
Sentence 2: given any node v E [N] = [2t] let v - 1=(bt,...,b1) where bi is the i-th bit of the binary representation of v - 1.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: That is, there must exist some j such that the contents of Reg would be the sequence x0,R1,R2,R3,...,Rj = x0 Recall that we assumed (m = 1) |Cj| = |Rj | = |Rj ' | = |x0| = m = .- log2 .. Then the probability that any Rj = x0 would be 1/2m , which gives us 11 11 P (Rj = x0)= == == .
Sentence 2: 2m 2.- log2 .. 2log2 .-1 .-1 the probability that any polling of the PUF will produce an output that matches the seed x0 is less than the security parameter ..
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.3 The Third Level Decomposition Since 0 = f m = +8 (f m has been relaxed in ij ij = cij the previous subsection), the constraint conditions (C1) and (C2) in (P3) can be eliminated.
Sentence 2: when ca­pacity constraints are removed for session m,any rate xm can be achieved.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Bestpractice[37] requiresdefensein-depth andtherefore the .rewall countermeasures outlined in Table 1a are fur­ther restricted to .lter access to the S2S service port to the trusted XMPP servers only.
Sentence 2: a deny by default pol­icy (iptrDefaultDenyS2SAccess ) is implemented by the gateway .rewall (gwFw) where permitted inbound and outbound IP address exceptions are alsoimplemented(Table1b).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this paper, we address the automatic composition when component services have access control &#38; authorization con­straints, and impose further reputation constraints on other component services.
Sentence 2: access &#38; authorization control is based on credentials, component services may (or not) trust of credentials issued by other component services and the service behavior is modeled by the possible conver­sations the service can have with its clients.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: auth(a, c)) An intuition behind forward availability above is provided by the example of a user u being authorized to a resource r via member­ship in a group g. We require that u must be a member of g before g is authorized to r for u to be authorized to r. With backward availability, we change the order of the two direct authorizations from that example.
Sentence 2: for u to be authorized to r, we require that g be authorized to r before u is authorized to g. DE FI N IT I O N 11 (BACKWA R D AVAI LA B ILI TY ).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: KDI-Insecurity against unrestricted queries.
Sentence 2: the idea of this argument is that an attacker can try to apply many di.erent functions to the key s, and use colli­ ' sions of the form g(s)= g(s) todoabinary search for the key s. the attacker uses two di.erent functional ' queries g,g, and checks if it gets the same answer on both.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: between resources expended to degrade to or maintain an equiva­lent quality of service (QoS).
Sentence 2: these resource tradeo.s must also be understood in the context of Degrada­tion of Service attacks [6, 1], where the objective is not nec­essarily to make a target completely unavailable but rather substantially decrease its QoS.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: on Information and System Security (TISSEC) 4, 3 (Aug. 2001), 224-274. endfor [5] Ni, Q., Bertino, E., Lobo, J., Brodie, C., Karat, C., Karat, J., Figure 1: Algorithm to detect inconsistencies For each maximal overlapping set S, we need to check whether the formula specified in the conditions (1)-(3) as discussed in the previous section is true under every value of the underlying domain.
Sentence 2: the negation of the condition [6] Trombetta, A.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: W kT s·Vdd-Vth 2 n·(kT/q) Pleakage =2 · n · µ · Cox ·· ()· D · Vdd · e (1) Lq We note that the leakage power has a nonlinear (expo­nential) relation with the temperature T , which provides us with a method to vary the leakage power.
Sentence 2: if we apply a set of input vectors to the circuit that switch a subset of gates, the gates can be heated up and the heat will be transferred to other gates on the circuit, which causes the temperatures of the gates to vary over time.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: where .t > 0, RQ(t) is the set of run-time request received at time t. 5.1 Usage of conditional event expressions Conditional event expressions (De.nition 15) allow the enabling/disabling of roles in response of environmental con­ditions.
Sentence 2: by using ST EC ond conditions, it is possible to refer to space, time and/or particular events that might happen in the system.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We show this pictorially by augmenting the event-graph with faults to pro- duce a fault-graph in Figure 2.
Sentence 2: the dashed edges in Figure 2 correspond Entity Issues Action ,] I Allowed by Implementation ] IDenied by Implementation Figure 2: Fault graph for Access Control Decisions to the transitions that compromise the policy.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Work on unlinkability and untraceability was started by Chaum [14] and has been explored more extensively in recent years.
Sentence 2: work on unlinkability includes anony­mous group authentication ([3, 10, 13, 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 29] and others) and unlinkable serial transactions [30] for subscription-based services.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: of Software and Information Systems College of Information Technology University of North Carolina at Charlotte Charlotte, NC 28223, USA {doshin, gahn}@uncc.edu ABSTRACT In this paper we present an approach to modeling system­centric information in order to facilitate role engineering (RE).
Sentence 2: we .rst discuss the general character­istics of the information required in RE.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our research considered the threats both active and passive attacks that could be launched from the Pi.
Sentence 2: the major passive at­tacks would all fall under network reconnaissance, whereas active attacks cover a much broader spectrum including de­nial of service (DoS) attacks, man in the middle (MITM) attacks, WPS brute forcing attacks, and reverse connection utilization.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: From this .gure, we see that both the NN and LOF algorithms perform well in iden­tifying attacks after they begin.
Sentence 2: on the vali­dation set the LOF algorithm is able to detect over 80% of the malware within 30 windows (approximately one minute) after the start of the attack and over 90% of them within 40 windows.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The architecture of OASIS is illustrated in Figure 1.
Sentence 2: the service is composed of three main Android services: Sandbox service (number 1 in Figure 1), which realizes the isolated environment for the SODA execution;  DataGateway service (number 2), used to access pri­vate data from the Sandbox;  OasisService (number 3), the service which encapsu­lates the other two and is called by the application.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our approach, in contrast, provides a non-probabilistic guarantee of integrity at a potentially higher cost.
Sentence 2: if the client-side computation is highly CPU-intensive, as ray-tracing ingames tends to be, despite reply­ing on an emulator and runninginafaster .NET environment, with suf.ciently manyconnected clients, theRIPLEYserver mighteven­tually become overwhelmed.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: ForeCast: We select samples for analysis using FORECAST.We test FORECAST with values of L (the level of parallelism) ranging between 50 and 1600.
Sentence 2: optimum: Here we perform sample selection based on FORE-CAST s cluster scoring technique, but assuming that cluster predic­tion is 100% accurate; that we know to which behavioral cluster each sample belongs, before executing it.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, while obtaininga provably secure construction, they sacri.ced computational e.ciency to a certain extend.
Sentence 2: every ntor in­stance requires two online discrete logarithmic (DLog) ex­ponentiations on the client side and 1.33 exponentiations on theserver sidein ntor, where only one online exponentiation each was required on the both sides in the original fourth protocolin[15].
Relationship: entailment