sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For the .rst two issues (security and redundancy), they clari.ed to us that these exist by design.
Sentence 2: the default privilege mode when one invokes a proce­dure p2 from within a procedure p1 is for p2 to run with de.ner s rights, immaterial of whether p1 is de.ned to run with invoker s or de.ner s rights.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 5.1 AR-evaluation function The AR-evaluation() function receives as input the subject access request r and returns the authorized nodes of the corresponding AC-XML document answering the request, or a zero value, if the access request cannot be granted.
Sentence 2: for each node n belonging to r.nodes, the AR-evaluation() function calls the evaluate_node() function that verifies whether the subject is authorized to access n by checking the corresponding Accesses element.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: EVALUATION In this section, we evaluate the performance of the Clouseau compliance checker and then discuss the implica­tions of our .ndings.
Sentence 2: we examine the amount of time required to .nd all satisfying sets of evidence for a given policy in three sets of experiments; each set of exper­iments was conducted on a 2.5GHz Pentium 4 with 512MB RAM running Linux.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.3 Signature score computation and normal­isation A signature score is obtained as a ratio of the likelihood that observation O is seen given the model for user u to the likelihood that any other user produced test signature O.
Sentence 2: the score S(O, e u , e -) shows how di.erent the test signature is from any other signature in the system world.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: recall of our algorithm with respect to the 20 true as­sociations that we identi.ed manually.
Sentence 2: for a con.dence threshold of c, precision is the fraction of the associations with con.dence at least c that are true associations, and the recall is the fraction of the true associations that have con.dence at least c. For exam­ple, if c = 0, and the support threshold is 10, then our algorithm produces 44 pairs including 18 of the true as­sociations, and so precision is 0.409 and recall is 0.9.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It is well known [11] that such activity can result in deadlocks, but that it would be serializable and deadlock free if the fol­lowing kind of two-phase locking (TPL) protocol is strictly observed by all clients: The process of resource use by each client must be di­vided into two phases: a growing phase of locking, and a shrinking phase of updating resources and releasing locks.
Sentence 2: new locks cannot be acquired after the .rst release of a lock, or after a resource has been updated.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Therefore, for each of the k -1 larger edges we enforce the order constraint with an additional set of inequalities.
Sentence 2: inequality 3 needs to be satis.ed only for i,j = k. For the other edges we only need to ensure that Dp(E(k))= Dp(E(j)) .k<j =|E| The relative ordering amongst the remaining |E|-k edges need not be maintained.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: r} and C to represent permission to Figure 3: Graph representation of roles to users in a hierarchy and role to permission assignments role assignments {r .
Sentence 2: p}.B =[bij ]where bij =1 implies user i has role j and bij = 0 implies user i does not have has role j.Matrix C =[cij ]where cij = 1 implies role i been given permission j and cij = 0 implies role i has not been granted permission j.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Another bene.t of the Rete approach is that the network maintains state between invocations, which greatly mini­mizes the number of times that the working memory is iter­ated over as multiple policies are matched.
Sentence 2: each ob­ject in the Rete engine s working memory is matched against each pattern node at most one time and the results of this matching operation are saved.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In a computing environment such as Matlab, Boolean mul­tiplication can be implemented by using the normal (integer) matrix multiplication operator, which is then divided by the sum of the elements of cc and truncated so that a value of 1 P is produced only if the sum of terms is exactly |c| = t cct.
Sentence 2: $ % c * W c · W = .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: RELATED WORK The administration of RBAC policies is an issue that at­tracts considerable attention from the research community.
Sentence 2: there is a large body of literature on how to choose administrative policies (informally, about which roles should get what authority to change the RBAC policy) [2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 14, 16, 18, 19].
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The set S can be thus recovered e.ciently by observing the non-zero entries of g.. DD 4.2 ANecessary Condition For a given ExEG scheme, we observe that based on the fact that R is a linear transformation it holds that the following linearity property is satis.ed: for any instance I with decryption-keys (.1, g.1),..., (.N , g.N ) it holds that if PN PN .ig.i = 0 then also .iR(.i, g.i) = 0. i=1 i=1 Next, we show a necessary condition that the class of lin­ear ExEG schemes need to satisfy in order to be transformed to e-TTS schemes.
Sentence 2: if the linear code associ­ated to a linear ExEG scheme satis.es the condition in the statement of the theorem below, we show that a certain g ..., duv })) = TT (aux, gdu0 )= {gdu1 , .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.3 Vulnerability Analysis Our vulnerability analysis led to several interesting results, espe­cially once combined with our efforts to determine the provenance of each app.
Sentence 2: if we consider the distribution of vul­nerable apps across each phone image (Table 4), the percentage of vulnerable apps of these devices varies from 1.79% to 14.97%.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Due to the di.erent characteristics of smart pricing signals and remote user control commands, we evaluate di.erent input channels with di.erent models.
Sentence 2: real-time pricing signals mostly show a periodical pattern that repeats daily; while the user control commands are more likely to be scattered over a certain period of a day and usually conform to diver­siform distributions.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: With respect to previous work, the design of traitor trac­ing schemes with type-0 traceability (i.e., black-box reset­table access) has been undertaken successfully in the past.
Sentence 2: the original traitor tracing scheme of [2] o.ers such traceability and a sequence of subsequent papers im­proved on this, including [12, 11, 4].
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: D Though the criteria (Criterion 1 or Criterion 2) indicate that one system is more secure than the other one it is a rare case when the set of possible attacks for one system is completely included into the set of possible attacks for another system.
Sentence 2: this criterion gives us only a partial order, and, thus, we need a more .ne-grained way for de.ning the more secure relation.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We describe new attacks that can be launched by a routing adversary, and allow the censoring authority to defeat each of the security goals of decoy routing schemes.
Sentence 2: we show that a censoring authority, or warden, that has this capability can detect the network locations of decoy routers; we demonstrate that a warden in control of how a user s packets are routed can prevent those packets from being seen by the decoy routing system; we show how an adversary that can predict the properties of paths to innocent destinations can de­tect the use of decoy routing through timing analysis; and we show how that same warden can launch con.rmation attacks that, by ex­ploiting the differences between a normal user and a decoy routing user, test if a host is utilizing a decoy routing system.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Forging for the same time interval: .
Sentence 2: .. * after observ­ing tags for (..1,..,..2,.., ··· ,....,.. ) from all participants in the ..-th time interval, the adversary generates a forgery .. * (..1,..,..2,.., ··· ,....,.. ) ..,... ..,.. of the same time interval for some partici­pant .. .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This allows us to detect any attack, including zero-day at­tacks, as long as it a.ects the network s QoS parameters.
Sentence 2: we do not attempt to monitor the by-products e.ects of speci.c types of attacks, such as the increased number of failed TCP connections, increased tra.c volume, shifts in port or IP distribution or changes to routing ta­bles and DNS caches.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Notice that, supposing x and y are pre-computed and allowed to be exposed as in the traditional CK-framework, the leakage of both x and y will expose the session-key of NAXOS, and consequently NAXOS is actually insecure in the eCK-model in this case.
Sentence 2: the eCK­security of NAXOS depends upon what are speci.ed in session-states.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It is easy for a prover P who has found out the correct result y of the computation task to .nd out the cor­rect assignment z = (z1, z2, · · · , zn) including the correct re­sult y and all the intermediate results of the circuit.
Sentence 2: z satis.es all the constraints fu, u = 1, · · · , n. If P responds with correct values as in the protocol, all corresponding test equations (unencrypted version) will hold.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: By modifying or replaying the control commands observed in SCADA networks, the attacker stealthily moves the system into insecure states by means of legitimate commands, which seldom introduce any network anomaly.
Sentence 2: we refer this type of attack as control-related attacks in which a sophisticated attacker can exploit system vulnerabilities and possibly use a single maliciously crafted control command to cause a wide range of system disturbances or changes.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Given the described setting, in the following we show and dis­cuss the results of our experiments.
Sentence 2: section 5.1 dis­cusses the experimental results for the basic methods, Section 5.2 the ones for the boolean combinations, while Section 5.3 present the ones for the combinations considering the normalized version of both DTW-D and DTW-S algorithms.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The last factor corresponds to the probability of success of an on-line dictionary attack in a threshold setting: An adversary who learns the shares of t' = t servers can test any pass­word p in D by executing User( p, st0) and interacting with any subset of t - t' +1 uncorrupted servers.
Sentence 2: to the best of our knowl­edge all previous works on T-PAKE s bound attackers success by qS , which is higher than the above bound, except if the adversary |D| ' corrupts the maximum threshold of servers, t= t. if each server locally bounds the number of sessions it performs with the same user to k, such de.nition bounds the number of passwords which a network attacker can test to n * k passwords, instead of the optimal number of L n*k J passwords.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Because laptops are one of our major use cases, we con­sider it important to interact with the operating system s power management features.
Sentence 2: tethers needs to know when the system has been instructed to go to sleep, because it must assume that the computer will wake up in a minimally secure environment, and thus must take proac­tive steps to protect whatever sensitive data is present.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this work, we focus on the e.ciency of UFH-based communication and make the following contributions: First, we describe a frequency channel selection strategy for UFH communication and prove its optimality.
Sentence 2: we show that, in UFH, the probability that a packet is success­fully received is maximized if the sender and receiver choose the frequency channels on which they send and receive uni­formly at random from a set of common frequency channels.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For Scalper we could drop all HTTP tra.c with the token x0dnTransfer-Encoding:x20chunkedx0dnx0dn which will not allow any chunked encodings, and is in fact the rule that Snort [53] uses.
Sentence 2: it may be acceptable to block a valid portion of a protocol (or even an entire protocol by blocking its ports) if that portion is not often used by legitimate tra.c.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The goal of Mallory is to successfully ascertain the sequence of keywords KB = (Ka1 , ···Kal ),where KB .K and .i .
Sentence 2: [1,l], T rapdoorKai = Qi.Mallory wishes to uniquely identify the under­lying keywords of each of the queries Qi.In this paper, we show that Mallory has a very high probability of succeeding if she has access to the following background knowledge on the document set.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To gain further insights into this process, we study some generated signatures in more detail.
Sentence 2: we examine the tokens and support values of three signa­tures generated for the malware classes Hupigon, Banload and Storm listed in Table 1. tokens : "GET a2965583/ip.txt HTTP/1.0nr User-Agent: MYURL[...]" : 1.000 threshold : 1.00 Figure 5: Signature for the malware Hupigon.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 2.1 Proximity and grid systems In principle, the neighborhood of a position can be de.ned by a circle of a given range, and the proximity testing prob­lem is to test whether a contact is inside or outside of the circle.
Sentence 2: checking whether a user is in proxim­ity simply means obtaining the location of the user (e.g., via GPS); calculating the distance to this location and testing if the distance is less than the given range.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: TMI allows security enforcement to bene.t from STM guarantees, yet remains compatible with existing security mechanisms, such as those based on history-or state-based enforcement[2,17,30].TMI helps ensure that enforcement remains correct,evenin corner cases.
Sentence 2: tMI-based enforcement needs neither consider con­current interleavings of execution nor worry about remedial steps on policyviolation.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Despite allowing the use of an external entity to con­trol authorization for Web resources, OAuth V2.0 fails to provide certain features required in the open Web environ­ment.
Sentence 2: it does not support dynamic introduc­tions by users, requires relationships between parties to be pre-established, and does not de.ne how a Resource Server comes to trust an Authorization Server.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Figure 7: Example transformation 6.1 SOAP to TCP In practice, a transformation from SOAP to TCP typ­ically works as follows: First each SOAP request and re­sponse message is encapsulated by a HTTP request and re­sponse header, respectively, then a new so-called TCP ses­sion is created for each HTTP request-response pair.
Sentence 2: for each HTTP request-response pair, (1) a connection is established between the two sides of communication, (2) both the request and response are segmented, encapsulated by TCP frames and transmitted, (3) .nally the connection is explicitly terminated.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When a measurement is extended into a PCR, the new digest value is calculated as follows: P C Rnew = H(P C Rold||digest) where P C Rnew is the new digest value being stored in the PCR P C Rold is the previous digest value stored in the PCR H() is the hash function associated with the PCR digest is the measurement value extended into the PCR  As a result of the old digest value being hashed into the new one, any deviation in a reported sequence of events causes an irrevocable change in the eventual PCR digest value.
Sentence 2: the PCR digest value is unique for the speci.c order and combination of digest values that have been extended into a particular PCR.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To de.ne anonymity formally, we consider the probability PA(k, s0, s1) that the ciphertext occupying slot s1 at the end of round k is the image (through successive permutations) of the input ciphertext that occupied slot s0 before mixing began, in the view of the adversary.
Sentence 2: the probability PA(k, s0, s1) is the probability that the path of the element that started in slot s0 goes through slot s1 after k rounds of mixing, in the view of the adversary.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: {0,1}h FOR i .1 TO nDO IF Y [i]= .
Sentence 2: tHEN IF (x= K[i] C[i]) THEN Hash[x] .H[i] ELSE IF (c,i)=(g1,g2) THEN Ki Ci .x; Yx .Y ; Yx[i] .Ki ; L.RecoverPSS (Yx) RETURN Hash [x] when (c,i) is equal to (g1,g2),adversary B2 records the candidate key as L.When A has terminated, adversary B2 re­turns Land halts.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Working within the UC framework also yields other ad­vantages, as highlighted by Canetti and Krawczyk in the context of two-party key exchange [14].
Sentence 2: addi­tional advantages include: (1) protocols proven secure within the UC framework remain secure even when run concur­rently with any other set of protocols; (2) the session keys generated by any UC-secure protocol may be securely used by any application calling the protocol as a sub-routine; also (3) we obtain a de.nition which guarantees security even in the so-called strong corruption model where honest players may be compromised at any point during execution of the protocol.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The memory phrase was an equivalent of the madeleine for Marcel, the main protagonist of Proust s famous novel Recherche du Temps Perdu [20]: just as the madeleine transports Marcel back into a world that is long gone but still vivid in his waking memory, so was the memory phrase intended to bring the memory of participants back to the events on which they provided feedback.
Sentence 2: the memory phrase, as we intended it, is not simply a tag onto a memory in a memory archive, because it may have no semantic relation to the event to which it is associated.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: s3 once the identity of the user that performs s2 has been .xed), whereas ((s1,s3,s2,s4),p) is a solution (since there is no restriction on the user that performs s2 if s3 is performed .rst).
Sentence 2: there exist work.ows for which a plan p is not a solution to WSP, but for which (s, p)isasolution to OWSP for certain choices of s. Crampton introduced the notion of a well-formed work.ow, which has the follow­ing property: for all si I sj ,(., si,sj ) .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Unlike the hot update systems described above, Gin­seng cannot be used to update legacy binaries because it re­quires signi.cant changes to programs at the source code layer before they are originally compiled.
Sentence 2: gin­seng rewrites a program s C source code to support upgrades via function indirection and type wrapping, and Ginseng ex­pects a programmer to annotate the to-be-updated software to indicate one or more safe update points.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: INTRODUCTION As defense techniques such as intrusion detection systems (IDSs) become widely deployed, attackers now have to consider how to de­feat these mechanisms when launching their attacks.
Sentence 2: permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro.t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the .rst page.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since both signatures P x can be veri.ed, we have { { R1 · K1 c = P1 s , R1 · K1 c= P1 s, {{ R2 · K2 c = P2 s , R2 · K2 c= P2 s. Let .c = c - c ' and .s = s - s ' ,wehave K1 .c = P1 .s and K2 .c = P2 .s, where at least one of P1 and P2 is not the identity element.
Sentence 2: the algorithm B can compute x := .s/.c where x =logP1 K1 =logP2 K2.B can compute the secret key x of the static DH and break the static DH problem.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: (3) Apply security patches: patching V s vulnerability results in both Supplier and Customer net­works satisfying the invariance property.
Sentence 2: to avoid violating security policies for both networks, host V should not exhibit any vulnerability that might be used in gaining access from host Cm to host Cf (since both Sm and Cm uti­lize this vulnerability in leverages their accesses on Sf and Cf , respectively).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The MQV and HMQV protocols stand for the current state-of-the-art of (public key cryptography based) e.cient authenticated DHKE, and marked the great milestones of IA-DHKE developments.
Sentence 2: the .rst formal anal­ysis of IA-DHKE within the Canetti-Krawczyk framework (CK-framework) was conducted w.r.t.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Furthermore, c ' must look like a plausible re­encryption of c. Thus, a scheme that realizes FsP RE must allow a simulator to convincingly transform a ciphertext c that s unrelated to m into a ciphertext c ' linked to m. This is a property that seems to be an artifact of the simulation paradigm; it is not implied by De.nition 2.5.
Sentence 2: our scheme does not have this property.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Informally, the state of the worm collective can be represented as the superset of each of the worm sets of the individual worm agents.
Sentence 2: the target set of the collective TS = TS1 U TS2 U U TSn, where TSi is the ith worm agent in the collective, and so forth for the other sets.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: [4] based on sum-product estimates in .nite .elds; see [35, §2.8] for background on such estimates.
Sentence 2: for our purposes, it is also convenient (but not strictly necessary) to have bipartite graphs that are 1a regular graph with a large gap between the largest and second largest eigenvalue of its adjacency matrix.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: CACQ-SoD1 prevents the acquisition of permissions through the conflicting roles that will not be caught by PAS-SoD3, similar to the way CACT-SoD1 prevents the activation of conflicting roles not prevented by ACT-SoD1.
Sentence 2: constraint CACQ-SoD1 employs the can acquire semantics and hence captures both explicit and implicit role-permission assignments.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The beauty of Lemma 4.2 is that if we know the depth d of the circuit we want to evaluate (in our case, d = ddec, the depth of the augmented decryption circuit), then we can construct a ladder of decreasing moduli q0,...,qd and perform modulus reduction after each operation so that at level i all ciphertexts reside in Rqi and the magnitude of the noise at each level is small.
Sentence 2: this is true at level d so that once the evaluation is complete, it is possible to decrypt the resulting ciphertext without decryption errors.
Relationship: entailment