sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In most cases, the switching power model could help reduce the number of variables, due to the fact that the number of switching gates is much less than the number of gates in the entire circuit.
Sentence 2: from the perspective of HTH detection, we should consider using leakage power, because it covers all the gates in the circuit and thus makes the HTH impossible to hide from our measurement.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the upload user selection phase, each user calculates the value of w for which the NE can be achieved, and then decides whether to upload or not based on w. Recall that the desired NE is achieved if and only if we choose an ap­propriate value of w. If the players are aware of the upload costs of their opponents, i.e., c1 = c2 = · · · = cn, it is easy to get w = ck .
Sentence 2: since each player loga(1+;(k+1))/(1+;k)  does not know the privacy levels and privacy costs of others, we need to estimate the value of ck.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: APK information should be unique to individual APKs; thus, organizations can share the same values, and it is ine.cient if individual organizations col­lect the APK information in isolation.
Sentence 2: the results from risk evaluations should di.er depending on how APK information is evaluated; individual organiza­tions could work on producing their own evaluation results by using their own know-how and expertise, or individual organizations could choose evaluation results produced by third-party organizations they trust.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In any case, the fear of detection by FRAppE will increase the onus on hackers while creating and maintaining malicious applications.
Sentence 2: we argue that several features used by FRAppE, such as the reputation of redirect URIs, the number of required permissions, and the use of different client IDs in app in­stallation URLs, are robust to the evolution of hackers.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, when Apple migrated from PPC to x86, they may have wanted to produce a single pro­gram bpip that behaved the same as separately compiled programs bx86 and bppc.
Sentence 2: one may also want the PIP s behavior to be di.erent for each platform, e.g., a mal­ 19090289016 decodes to nop; nop; .byte 0x28 ; nop on x86, which is not a valid instruction sequence.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Compared with the results above, the multithreaded version pl pl = pl = leaks less than the sequential version because the non-determinism Lp = H(h) - µ(T001)H(h|T001) - u(T= pl in the scheduler introduced in some random noise.
Sentence 2: if = 010) 111 )+ 1 4 × H( 111 4 × 0) the attacker can track the program (by observing the scheduler se­ 1 010)H(h|T=2 - ( 4 × 0+ × H( )+ , , 42222 =1.5 bit; quence), the leakage becomes larger.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If the device appears to be in use (i.e., the accelerometer sensor is acti­vated), and its recent location traces are inconsistent with the PoS location, then the transaction may be rejected or require further corroboration, depending on policy.
Sentence 2: if everything is consistent with the legitimate user making the purchase, the clearing house may signal to the PoS that no signature is needed resulting in a fast­track checkout.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When the population of V. .scheri is low, the autoinducer has no e.ect.
Sentence 2: as the population of V. .scheri grows, the concentration of 3-oxo-C6-HSL increases as well, eventually triggering transcription of the bacterial luminescence gene, thereby producing enzymes that cause the squid s light or­gan to glow.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 7.7 Integer comparison protocol We now compare the protocol in Section 3 to zero-knowledge range proofs (ZK:RP) [18, 21, 22, 28], which, like the protocol in Sec­ tion 3, provide privacy-preserving integer comparisons.
Sentence 2: a ZK:RP provides stronger properties than V E X (it can answer queries about ranges versus inequalities), but here our focus is on costs: the size of commitment, the length of proofs, and the number of rounds of interaction.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We hy­pothesize that users/advocates of Tor would most likely not use their default ISP name servers and instead would choose to use public DNS providers such as Google Public DNS or OpenDNS (AS36692, which has a share of 2.06%).
Sentence 2: more surprising is to see that many .onion queries originated from AS15169 given that Google Public DNS has an intensive caching policy in use to avoid multiple queries to the root that would potentially result in 2All of the autonomous systems listed in Table 4 have large number of IP addresses allocated to them, thus publishing them does not put the privacy of individual users at risk.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: That is, they do not say in which state role r is at time t. For example, if can_activate(u, r, t) and enabled(r, t) hold, then a user u s request to activate r at time t is granted provided there are no other activation or SoD constraints prohibiting it.
Sentence 2: if can_activate(u, r, t) holds but not enabled(r, t), then u s request to activate r at time t is denied.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Cognitive passwords, also referred to as personal knowledge questions , are now often used as password-reset mechanisms.
Sentence 2: cognitive passwords su.er from some of the same weaknesses as traditional passwords: in partic­ular, they are often easily circumvented by targeted attacks using information gathered through acquaintances, phish­ing, social media and other publically available data sources [25, 67, 70].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For instance, recall that RBAC1 was able to implement many interesting g-SIS workloads while maintaining strong security guarantees.
Sentence 2: the complexity required for these implementations to maintain this set of properties resulted in loss of atomicity when executing certain actions, increased state size and state management overheads, and (ultimately) a loss of the elegance of the original workload.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In our evaluation, we were able to show that all pro­posed schemes outperform the ideal ob ject when consider­ing ciphertext-only attacks.Moreover, in case of known or chosen plaintexts, while the random o.set addition cannot provide any security features anymore, the proposed random subrange selection and random uniform sampling schemes mostly improve on the ideal object .
Sentence 2: the obtained results clearly suggest that further improvement is possible in di.erent directions.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We attach a thin aluminum antenna to the back of each tag to measure the .eld strength, using an Agilent DSOX2024A 1 The exact amount of harvested power is not given in [21].
Sentence 2: it is expected to be much lower than 30 mW, due to the load-source mismatch and the loss on rectifying and regulating components.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: (0), but node u will detect this attack by over­ i hearing node vi s transmission.Node vi is required to erase ski after it has done the forwarding for node u,which is important to prevent ski from being disclosed if node vi is compromised later.After the cluster head c receives all shares, it re-constructs S.The cluster head can send back a DONE message authenticated with S, which allows node u to detect if the established pairwise key is correct.Clearly, this scheme is secure when up to m - 1 proxies are compro­mised.
Sentence 2: the scheme described above can be extended for estab­lishing a pairwise key on the .y for two nodes that are more than two hops away.Its performance overhead will depend on the desired security level m.An alternative approach for establishing multi-hop pairwise keys is to use the base sta­tion as a helper [22].it is unclear if this approach will outperform our multiple path scheme.Designing a more e.cient scheme for this purpose without the involvement of the base station is an interesting research problem.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It is also possible to use pushdown automata (PDA) for expressing models, which have the bene.t of capturing call-return relationships, and hence are more accurate.
Sentence 2: this added accuracy may not be fully useful, since enforcement of PDA models would require secure intercep­tion of all function calls made by a program, which is not possible for arbitrary binaries.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As its core security technology, iOS provides applica­tion sandboxing but assigns a generic sandboxing pro.le to every third-party application.
Sentence 2: recent attacks and incidents with benign applications demonstrate that this de­sign decision is vulnerable to crucial privacy and security breaches, allowing applications (either benign or malicious) to access contacts, photos, and device IDs.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Others are not intended but present due to the density of x86 instructions and the feasibility of unaligned execution.
Sentence 2: unlike ROP, where a ret gadget can naturally return back the control based on the content of the stack, a jmp gadget is performing an uni-directional control­.ow transfer to its target, making it di.cult to regain con­trol back to chain the execution of the next jump-oriented gadget.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The Transformed Value Transformed Extrema Values 0.02 0 -0.02 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 Sample Number x 10 IncomingRtpReader is responsible for RTP depacketization, media decompression, and media playback; and CaptureRtpRea der is responsible for microphone capture, media encoding, and Figure 9: Original Extrema Samples (top) and its Transformed RTP packetization.
Sentence 2: for media processing, the whole me-Values (bottom) Amplitude 0 Amplitude -1 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 Sample Number x 10 5 Figure 10: Cover Carrying Covert Media dia packets at the SBC located at the edge of the VoIP service provider s network.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If a newly-hired employee gets added to the database,thenthe responsetothisquery will automatically includethe new employee without any changestothequery or to the policy, and is therefore dependent on the current database state.
Sentence 2: this re.ective capabilityislimited: it cannot express a policy such as the manager of each de­partment may update the salary data for each employee in that department without de.ning a separate view.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: s.s1 = .i=i ' F2,i(K2,i, t(i)).F2,i ' (K2,i ' {p}, (i ' ) (i ' ) s1 .. t).
Sentence 2: if t= p, then s = i=1 (i) (i) F2,i(K2,i, t) .
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Even though the maximum CPU share initially assigned to each domain is 50%, the TcN1 line shows that Domain0 takes over 60% of the CPU share to process the I/O requests from Domain1.
Sentence 2: cPU usage dropped to less than 30% by enforcing I/O ACM with the CPU usage limit of 20% (TcN2).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, if proportional fairness is adopted for power allocation, i.e., allo­cating power proportional to the clients reported quality of links, the same technique to forge CSI with a higher magnitude can also be used by the attacker.
Sentence 2: if proportional fair­ness is adopted in the same way as in LTE for user scheduling [32], monotonically increased CSI can also gain slots unfairly allocated to that attacker.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It might seem that there is nothing to argue for sessions on which p = p, but this is not the case: In a standard password-authenticated protocol (PAKE), the attackers indeed win if they guess the pass­word on any session.
Sentence 2: we have n servers, and an adver­sary who corrupts t ' = t of them needs to use the correct pass­word on t - t ' +1 sessions with distinct uncorrupted servers in order to break the scheme.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Although these seem to have been designed with digital-rights management (DRM) appli­cations in mind, it may be possible to use the same mechanisms to enhance security in a different application domain.
Sentence 2: us­ing a full-featured block cipher such as DES or AES in our system is likely to prove too expensive, even if it is implemented inside the processor [36].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Another early method is Talking to Strangers [2], that uses infrared (IR) communication as the OOB channel and re­quires almost no user involvement, except for initial setup.
Sentence 2: this method is deceptively simple since IR de­mands line-of-sight alignment and its set-up requires the user to .nd IR ports on both devices not a trivial task for many users and align them.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Classification Accuracies of the Experiment BLN-Host/Network Based BLN-Network Based Hybrid-Host/Network Based Hybrid Network Based Total Cases 65,505 62,047 65,505 62,047 Correctly Classified 65,019 59,734 65,238 61,631 % Accuracy 99.26% 96.27% 99.59% 99.33%   The results shown in Table 1 reveal that both approaches to classifying the types of traffic flows contained within the data set produce very accurate responses.
Sentence 2: there was a noticeable gain in classification accuracy for the network only based analysis between using a pure BLN versus the Hybrid system.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Without loss of generality, suppose U ' = {u1,··· ,ut},where t=k.As (ui,rj ) .UR if and only if ej .Si, the union of {S1,··· ,St}is S. The answer to the set cov­ering problem is yes .
Sentence 2: if k subsets in F cover S, without loss of generality, assume that k i=1 Si = S.From the construction of UR,users u1,··· ,uk together have member­ship of all roles in {r1,··· ,rn}.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When it comes to message delivery, what happens within mp-Cloud is that the device makes a socket connection to the cloud server, providing it the device s identity information to get mes­sages, as other messaging services do.
Sentence 2: different from GCM, in which the server will check both the registration ID of an app and the Android ID/device-token of a device before push­ing messages to the app, mpCloud solely relies on the client ID to identify a device and the app running on it.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: SMash addresses earlier problems of using frag­ment identi.ers caused by browsers allowing complete navigation of other frames, even of different origins.
Sentence 2: it extends the fragment messagingprotocol withashared secrettoensure linkintegrityand prevents frame-phishing with a combination of eventhandlers and messagesduringframeunloads.themessagingprotocol inversion1.1 ofOpenAjaxwasvulnerable toanattackdiscovered byBarthetal.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Only permitted IP packets may pass through the fire-wall or the NAT much like only people who have the key may pass through the door of the house.
Sentence 2: when a host in the LAN is compromized by a malicous bot, it is hard to identify the compromized host from the outside of the LAN, much like it is hard to find a robber who is hidden in the house or the building.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Layer-3 IDSs are likely popular because there is far more data available at Layer-3, making it straightforward to respond to attacks, and because de­tectionand responseatLayer-3 is independent of theLayer-2 con­nection medium.
Sentence 2: wireless Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are much more dif.cult to deal with at Layer-3 as these attacks occur at Layer-2 and, even if detected, response is limited given that attackers will likely utilize .ctitious or spoofed MACaddressesand may nothaveanIP address toretaliateagainst.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.1 Effectiveness 4.1.1 Wilander s Benchmark Test-Suite There exists different buffer over.ow attacks in the publicly avail­able Wilander s Benchmark Test-Suite, and we select buffer over­.ow bugs aim at stack and bss objects.
Sentence 2: wilander s bench­mark writes the shellcode in the program, in order to emulate the network application, we modify it to let the user input the shell­code from the network.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Given the fact that NodeSentry has a programmatic policy, and that policy code can e.ectively modify how the enforcement mechanism functions, it could be possible to introduce new vulnerabilities into the system via a badly written policy.
Sentence 2: we consider the production of safe and secure policy code an interesting but orthogonal and thus out-of-scope issue, for which care must be taken by the policy writer to prevent mistakes/misuse.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Some of the objects and functions de.ned by the function author­ities such as MATH and BYTES (other than TIME) could be rebuilt within the logic system: for example, numbers can be constructed using Heyting arithmetic [55].
Sentence 2: this formally minimalis­tic approach would add substantial practical complexity and inef.­ciency compared with bootstrapping from Python s arithmetic.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Cloud customers can verify that the cloud veri.er satis.es their integrity property requirements and that the properties the cloud veri.er vouches for being enforced on its hosts satis­.es the customer s properties for those components as well.
Sentence 2: cV can only verify the trustworthiness of the nodes hosting the user VMs, while RepCloud identi.es and dynam­ically manages the e.ective cloud TCB for the VMs and en­ables attestations with a higher level of con.dence for trust.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Given that the code segment starts at a relatively low address in the virtual address space of the program, it will most likely contain a NULL character (at least on the ARM R ® architecture), causing the snprinf function to terminate.
Sentence 2: leakage of the canary and either the stack or frame pointer is suf.cient to bypass both the canary-based pro­tection and ASLR.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: By (3), the link key kI,I' is a function of d- 1 common keys kI,I' ,l. Hence, the adversary has to compromise all these d-1 keys generated by the polynomi­ ' als fl (I(l), xd-1)and fl (I (l), xd-1)as in (2).
Sentence 2: il il these polynomials are stored only in the memories of I and I ' that are unavailable to the adversary.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Although this attack is valid for the Sandia scheme, which employs a .rst step in which one of 25 templates is chosen uniformly at random but the distribution of the number of possible passwords across templates is non-uniform [33], the proposed bucketing for the APG scheme does not produce the same e.ect using the base unit distribution given by Gasser [34].
Sentence 2: statistical attacks on pronounceable passwords have not been examined in great detail, leaving many direc­tions open which would be prudent to explore.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: So it has zero false negative, More­over, the fact that its signatures are derived from the .rst princi­ples of buffer over.ow attacks, rather than any speci.c byte pat­terns from particular buffer over.ow attacks, means that Nebula can even detect zero-day buffer over.ow attacks.
Sentence 2: there is no guarantee that Nebula will never generate false positives, especially when the number of repetition patterns Nis small and when the stack size is large.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The users that make less than 10 de­cisions (18,757) are those who may have installed PMP and subsequently uninstall it after use, or users who turned con­tribute o. so that we do not get their decisions.
Sentence 2: as can be observed from the table, an average user of PMP makes over 66 decisions, while a large number of our user population makes 10 to 100 (44,260 users) and 100 to 363 (16,729 users) decisions.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Patrick Tague Carnegie Mellon Univsersity Moffett Field, CA USA tague@cmu.edu from illegal access, Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 (WPA2) enterprise mode [2] can be considered as a solution.
Sentence 2: the device might not have a proper user interface to enter the passcode or computing resources processing the available Extensible Authen­tication Protocols (EAPs) with storing valid certi.cates.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In anony­mous CP-ABE, a user obtains his attribute secret key and if the attribute set associated with the secret key does not satisfy the access policy in the ciphertext, the user cannot decrypt and guess what access policy was speci.ed by the data owner.
Sentence 2: in existing anonymous ABE work, the user has to de­crypt and decide whether his attributes satisfy the hidden policy in the ciphertext or not.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For spill operation, the overhead only accounts memory access latency since the hash operation can be performed with the memory writing operation simultaneously.
Sentence 2: the fill operation overhead accounts both memory latency and hash latency since the hash operation can begin only mcf parser # of instruction 7136667402 7908917776 Max call-depth 37 208 #of RAS used 1201289 130794089  IPCMax Spilled chunks#of RAS spills (thousand) 2000 1500 1000 500 0 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0 1.25 1 1.75 1.5 0.75 0.5 0.25 0 (a) mcf parser (b) mcf parser 16~4 16~8 32~4 32~8 64~4 64~8 SIZE (RAS - Chunk) (c) mcf parser 16~4 16~8 32~4 32~8 64~4 64~8 SIZE (RAS - Chunk) (d) functions that are known to be vulnerable and substitute them with a safe version of corresponding functions.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The interleaved hop-by-hop scheme .lters injected false data in sensor networks, and assumes that falsi­.cation occurs in one direction: sensors to base station (equivalent to falsi.cation of route replies from destination to source in ad hoc networks).
Sentence 2: p-hop cross check handles falsi.­cation of route requests, which are broadcasted, as well as route replies.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: At .rst glance, it seems that these approaches can also defeat the malicious measurements in­jected by attackers, since such malicious measurements can be considered as interacting bad measurements.
Sentence 2: in this paper, we discover that all existing tech­niques for bad measurement detection and identi.cation can be bypassed if the attacker knows the con.guration of the power system.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Of course a number of users could always deviate from the general trends.
Sentence 2: if a trend is seen in a large number of users templates, then a tool that builds  DATE GENDER FIRST LANGUAGE TYPING LANGUAGE HANDEDNESS MALE FEMALE ENGLISH OTHER ENGLISH OTHER LEFT RIGHT AMBIDEXTROUS OCT2009 589412 ------- APRIL 2010 690 488 967 205 1131 43 100 1051 22 OCT 2010 692 507 974 216 1166 31 112 1052 21 Table 1: Summary of Dataset Details on this trend would likely have a very good performance on average.
Relationship: contrasting