sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The similarity measurement SimSub(G4(c),G4(a))=0.90and Sim(G4(c),G4(a))=0.73in­dicate that these two strategies are very similar and it is very likely that Figure 4(c) is a sub-strategy of Figure 4(a).
Sentence 2: it is possi­ble that some probe attacks are missed by the IDS when the IDS detected the attacks corresponding to Figure 4(c).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We already haveitsprobability density function pY (y) in (3).
Sentence 2: the expected waiting time at every hop is Z b EY (Y)= y· pY (y)dy 0 Z a 2yj =(a +b-2y)j-1 dy 0 (a + b)j Z b -2yj +(y-b)2j-1 dy a2)j a (b2 -a)j+1 a + b (b- =+ 2(j+1) 2(b+ a)j(2j+1)(j+1) (1+x)j+1 (2j+1)+(1-x)j+1 Let a = xb, EY (Y)= × b.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Let (SoToEstoE tt)be a data exchange set­ting in which Estis a set of tgds and E tis the union of a set of tgds with a set of egds.
Sentence 2: if Iis a source instance and Jis a solution for I, then core(Jn)is a solution for I. if Jis a universal solution for I, then also core(Jn)is a universal solution for I.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: VMI is a simple and convenient way for cloud users to acquire trustworthy information from their running VM in­stances, but the in.exibility to integrate with existing security monitoring systems and the possibility of exposing con.den­tial information from VMs makes it di.cult to apply this technique in the public cloud.
Sentence 2: we propose CryptVMI, an encrypted Virtual Machine Introspection system, to provide users complete status of their virtual instances, while keeping con.dentiality from possible attackers, including administrators of cloud services.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Weobservethatthereisaontinuuminthetrade­ofbe­tweentheexpressivepowerofanaessontrolmodeland theeaseofsafetyenforement.Inarestritedmodel,suhas Bell­LaPadula,onstraintsareimpliitinthemodel'sdef­nition(e.g.,asubjetofonelabelannotwritetoanyobjet ofa'lower'seuritylabel).Therefore,safetyenforementis trivial,butpoliyexpressionislimited.Ontheotherhand, generalpoliyexpressionmodels,suhasRBAC,makeon­straintsexpliitoneptsandpermitthedefnitionofar­bitraryonstraints.Inthisase,theexpressionofsafety requirementshasproventobediÆult.However,wehave reentlyfoundthatavarietyofommonaessontrolpoli­iesanbeenforedbyafew,simpleonstrainttypes[30].
Sentence 2: welaimthatanaessontrolmodelwhihuses thesesimpleonstraintsanprovidesignifantexpressive powerwhilereduingtheomplexityofaessontrolpol­iyspeifationandsafetyevaluation.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.5.4 Reliability Not only were our participants concerned with hardware reliability, they also expressed their dislike of software that increased the risk of them overlooking critical information, which is a kind of error.
Sentence 2: we generalize Nielsen s Software Reliability (called Errors by Nielsen System should have low error rates with few user errors, few catastrophic er­rors, and easy recovery from common errors, as cited in [8]) and Elliot and Kling s Hardware Reliability, with just Relia­bility.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If multiple resources access each other, forming a chain of calls, then the user accessing the .rst resource in the chain needs roles authorizing each link in the chain; the role requirement manifests as a logical AND.
Sentence 2: in order to con.gure an RBAC policy correctly, a system adminis­trator must infer which role requirements could arise in any possible execution, and evaluate potentially complex logi­cal expressions of these role requirements.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since the number of users is typically quite high, to reduce the cost of the basic algorithm described above, we propose a modi.ed heuristic presented in Algorithm 1, where instead of checking all possible swaps, a small number of random swaps are chosen, and a swap carried out immediately if the new cost is lower than the current cost.
Sentence 2: an additional parameter to the algorithm is s, the number of tentative swaps executed.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In contrast, black hole routing [14, 8] can reduce the load at the ingress point of backbone networks, but legitimate services on the victim server become unavailable when this method is used, and it is also easily detectable.
Sentence 2: if at all possible, attackers should be kept obliv­ious to an attack mitigation e.ort, because they will change attack methods or sources if the attacker nodes determine that their attack is being thwarted.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The quadratic complexity comes from the fact that the letter B overlaps with the class of character [^n] and, hence, there is inherent ambiguity in the pattern: A second B letter can be matched either as part of B+, or as part of [^n]{3}.
Sentence 2: if an input contains multiple Bs, the DFA needs to remember the number of Bs it has seen and their loca­tions in order to make a correct decision with the next input char­acter.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Moreover, the proposal pro­vides .exibility as it allows di.erent manners of authentica­tion according to the di.erent security levels required by the applications.
Sentence 2: it s notable that the proposed approach is able to successfully circumvent the absence of al­ternatives to address issues of context-awareness, .exibility, autonomicity, and dynamicity simultaneously in pervasive and mobile environments.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As we can see from the .gure, the proposed IFO estimation metric I does not give large values at the outside of SDC and TDC regions, and also has large difference between SDC and TDC compared with (7).
Sentence 2: the pro­posed IFO estimation metric I gives a better IFO detection proba­bility than that of the REA method, which is proved by simulations in Section 4.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this case, {u1,··· ,uk} ((0 )) satis.es ri .k-1 Allfor every ifrom 1 to n.Since k< m, {u1,··· ,uk}is a strict subset of U.
Sentence 2: u can be divided into two nonempty subset {u1,··· ,uk} and U -{u1,··· ,uk} ((0 )) such that {u1,··· ,uk}satis.es (.n i=1 ri .All) and 0 k-1 U -{u1,··· ,uk}satis.es ( All).In other words, U satis­ m-k .es f. C.2 Proof that UTS is in NP Lemma 15.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Table 2: Evaluation of the State-Space Reduction Technique M1 has timed-automata for users (6 timed-automata) and roles (10 timed-automata), in total is 17 automata including the observer automata.
Sentence 2: the number of automata in M1 is reduced to 41% from the number of automata in M. M2 includes on 18 timed-automata: 10 automata for roles, 7 automata for permissions, and the observer automata.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 0 5 10 15 0 5 10 15 c=2 c=5 c=8  This system of equations cannot be handled analytically because we are unable to determinate the joint distributions of (X1 ,...,Xn).
Sentence 2: we resort to the mean-.eld approximation by replac­ing random variables Jv and Tv with their respective expectations n E[Jv] and E[Tv].Since E[Jv]=u=1 auvpu,c,we have [ 8 (1) N.(t) (1) n auv pu,c E[Tv,c ]= E(F.n (c1 )) u=1 · auv pu,c u=1 0 t t [ E (F (2) (2) N (t) ¯ (c2 )) .v dt, (12) ¯ .v Figure 4: q v,c (t) (dashed curves) vs qv,c (t) (solid curves): c = where .¯v c1 = c2 , a =2, .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The privacy requirement means that the environment and nature of the data require that each record be sliced into four pieces and stored separately in order to prevent reconstruction of the data from any single part of the data.
Sentence 2: since each record must be replicated four times and sliced into four parts, and given that each replica and slice must be main­tained independently, 16 machines are required to maintain the availability, integrity, and con.dentiality of the system.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Location Pro.le Building Module is de­signed to collect users historical trajectory and then build users location pro.les.
Sentence 2: we model the trajectory of a spe­ci.c user U as a function mapping a time point in T to the user s location in R at that time, i.e., au : T -R. if the user traverses k POIs for k di.erent time slots, the real mobility traces of the user u can be denoted as M =, .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: CGIF expression of conceptual graph 01 : [Country : England] 05 : (Dest ?x1 England) 02 : [AirPlane: *x2] 06 : (Inst ?x1 ?x2) 03 : [Person: Tommy] 07 : (Agnt ?x1 Tommy) 04 : [Going: *x1] 08 : In this paper, the method of malicious code pattern matching is represented as a conceptual graph by converting CGIF.
Sentence 2: the method of detecting malicious codes proposed in this paper is based on evaluating conceptual graph expression for script source codes and concept pattern matching.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As long as the total number of errors (our injected errors plus the errors naturally incurred) in each codeword are still less than t, the error correction code mod­ule at the receiver side will be able to recover all the symbols correctly in the codeword.
Sentence 2: non-CR receivers can receive the signals as usual, i.e., the tags are transparent to this type of receivers.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Similarly, when strengthening, the use of a larger dictionary should produce passwords which are more resistant to guess­ing as the scenario just described would not have occurred if the strengthening dictionary contained pearlharbor .
Sentence 2: while the partial versus full processing of passwords has the bene.t of not providing an attacker any advantage in the event of a leak, there is also a cost: the strengthened pass­words must, due to the smaller dictionary being used, be more susceptible to a PCFG-based attack.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Then, the receiver, Ni+1, can have HMACs from both Ni and Ni-1, and node Ni+1 can validate M from Ni-1's HMAC.
Sentence 2: dRETA can trace the forwarded routing evidence using the HMAC of the Previous Forwarder (PF) and ensure the integrity of the forwarded messages.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Nowbothpartiesknow that: « a3 b3 Qa Rab = Qb a-bx-y )a3 b3 =(gg 12 a-b (x-y)a3 b3 = gg 32 « (x-y) Pa a3 b3 = Pb g2 So to check whether x = y, they need only check whether Rab = Pa a3 b3 Pb .
Sentence 2: notethat nopartyknowsthe value of g2 , andthatthat valueis a randomgenerator of G. if x .y, Rab Pa = · Pb will be a random element of G, and if x = y, it will be 1.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This behavior may be due to limits in the static analysis of PjS­ can, since malware exploiting advanced obfuscation tech­ niques and speci.c vulnerabilities (e.g., CVE-2010-0188 14) were completely unobservable by the system.
Sentence 2: con­ sidering all submitted samples, the average detection rate of PjScan would be actually 78.84%, with 0.31% of false positives.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Notation 2 Network Parameters Theorem 5 (Complexity of OCCP) N Number of mobile nodes M Average Adjacent of each node Di Hop Number of transmitting reply packet d Distance between Source CA certificate and Destination CA certificate  Inf worstf case,f eachf OCCPf activityf willf generatef O((M+d)*fN)ffprotocolfpacketfoverhead.f Proof:f With Lemma 4, all reachable mobile nodes will receive at least one request and one identical request packet can be propagated only once by each receiving mobile node to its neighboring nodes as described in protocol design intent in section 4.1.
Sentence 2: the worst overhead caused with request packet is O(N*M) (4.4-1) Assume the certificate distance of the requested two certificates associated with the two codewords is d. If one mobile node is in the middle of the reserved reverse route, it can forward up to d replies to the source because any IN will discard the reply packet with the certificate information having been sent back to the source by this IN.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While the WS-Security speci.cation describes security measures for SOAP messages, a WS-SecurityPolicy document describes which security mea­sures are to be applied to which parts of the messages.
Sentence 2: along with its Web Service description (WSDL), a Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro.t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the .rst page.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Command sequences that have the property of establishing necessary conditions for a right leakage are more promising in comparison to arbitrary sequences without this prop­erty.
Sentence 2: the DE P SEAR CH heuristic chooses command sequences that are paths in the CDG, beginning at a node with­out incoming edges (meaning that all conditions of this command are already met) and ending at a node that has an edge to ct arget .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In DL ontologies, given a relation R(A,B), the set of individuals belonging to A that are associated with a speci.c instance of B, say b, is represented by the class .R : b where : is the role .ller construct.
Sentence 2: in order to model the (Subject,(Ri,Rj ),s) constraints, the following axioms are added to the ontology:  subRoleOf Subject hasPermission hasResource hasActionPermission Resource Action Figure 3: OWL schema for RBAC.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Miguel Soriano Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC) &#38; Centre Tecnològic de Telecomunicacions de Catalunya (CTTC) Barcelona, Spain soriano@entel.upc.edu spectrum by allowing Cognitive Radios (CRs) to act as sec­ondary users of the spectrum left unused by licensed ser­vices.
Sentence 2: spectrum sensing is a crucial task in order to detect vacant bands or white spaces and avoid interfering primary transmissions.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, since messaging protocols are typically asynchronous, it is possible that there is still a message in transit from Bob that was encrypted using the previous g xn-1 key; if Alice had thrown away the key, she would no longer be able to read the message.
Sentence 2: alice must remember the old g xn-1 key until she receives a message from Bob that uses the new g xn key.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: the effect of C1 can be computed as follows: Effect(C1) = (1*21) + (-1*37) + + (-1*26) + (1*3) = -86 Note that the sign of the effect is not important; only the magnitude is.
Sentence 2: c3, C1 and C2 are the most important controls, in decreasing order, based on the cost of their failure to the enterprise.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Intuitively, a relational policy is one in which the authoriza­tion decision is based solely on how owner and requester are connected to one another(e.g., friend, friend-of-friend, etc).
Sentence 2: arelationalpolicy doesnotbaseitsauthorization decision ontherequester sidentity(e.g.,John can access), attributes (e.g., managers can access), or social positions (e.g., all those who have at least 100 friends can access).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We have Pr(ei|ax)= Pr(ei = ax + ri mod w)= Pr(ri = ei - ax mod w)= Pr(ri = C mod w)=1/w = Pr(ei|ay) for any i, x, and y, where C is a constant integer randomly drawn from a uniform dis­tribution.
Sentence 2: a sequence of pressed keys observed by an adversary is equivalent to a random sequence, which is similar to a ciphertext generated by a one-time pad.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However,whileitisunlikelythataparticular rare word would appear in a new message, it is still quite likely that several rare words will appear in the message theZipfdistributionislong-tailed meaningthatthetailofit hassigni.cant mass.
Sentence 2: bypoisoning many(orall)rare words, theattack againstSpamBayeswasspectacularlysuc­cessful.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: An optimal solution for privacy con.ict resolution should cause a little more privacy risk when allowing the accessors in some con­.icting segments to access the data item, and gets lesser loss in data sharing when denying the accessors to access the shared data item.
Sentence 2: for each con.ict resolution solution s, a resolving score RS(s)can be calculated using the following equation: 1 RS(s)= (4) aPR(i1)+ßSL(i2) i1.CSps i2.CSds where, CSps and CSds denote permitted con.icting segments and denied con.icting segments respectively in the con.ict resolution solution s. And a and ß are preference weights for the privacy risk and the sharing loss, 0= a, ß = 1and a +ß =1.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The prob­ability of the occurrence of a long common pseudorandom number subsequence will be very low when using two different seeds for a non-.awed pseudorandom number generator.
Sentence 2: the prob­ability of the occurrence of a reusable common sub-task, which re­quires a long common pseudorandom number subsequence to off­set the extra communication cost, is also very low.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As a result, the genomic privacy of the patient changes over time (as he has more genetic tests).
Sentence 2: our goals are to (i) compute the decrease in the genomic privacy of patient P as a result of the genetic tests he undergoes, and (ii) show how simple policies and obfuscation methods help to keep the genomic privacy of the patient at high levels.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This knowledge-baseis searchable whereknowledge aboutXMPP operational requirements(forexampletheXMPPport),the enterprise-level security requirements(for example, deny ac­cess to untrustedIP addresses) andthe threats(for example, SPIM) are used to search for suitable .rewall countermea­sures.
Sentence 2: theapproachprovidesabasisfortheautomatic generation ofaccess control con.gurations applicable to spe­ci.c security mechanisms.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: n1 For high n, we ignore the last term in curly brackets: nk t B1 = 1 - s1 (1 - q) - s1 qks¯k, k=1 where ¯sk = 1 nk sj , and nk j=1 nk t qk := q(nk)nk, q := qk, k=1 and s := nk sk, and we will call s network security for k=1 qk ¯heterogeneous network.
Sentence 2: bk = 1 - sk (1 - q) - sk (26) s. we have shown that breach probability for the network with heterogeneous users could be expressed very similar to breach probability in the network of identical (homogeneous) users.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: in the de.nition of pointcuts) involves a certain risk as well, since it is hard to predict in which places the aspect will interfere.3 Given the invasive power of privileged aspects, this risk is further magni.ed in this context.
Sentence 2: one should at all times try to avoid the use of wildcards in privileged aspects for the sake of security.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It also con.rms that the VID speci.ed in the ticket matches that in the credentials of the requesting process1 and is present in the list of authorised VIDs for this key in GPRIV.
Sentence 2: the primary ticket holder of an object can use their possession of this to revoke access for a speci.ed set of VIDs which results in the kernel removing these from this list.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Similarity: As mentioned in the introduction,author­ship and rights/licenses refer not only to a single work in general,but also to a set of closely related similar works.
Sentence 2: any marginal modi.cation of an author s original work W (e.g.,change of the resolution or compressing the work) is still considered to be under the copyright of the au­thor.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When combining a dual receiver public-key encryption scheme Enc with a public-key signature scheme Sig we must verify that sharing keys between the two does not degrade the security of either scheme.
Sentence 2: an adversary for Enc with access to a signature-generation oracle should not have a greater probability of success in attacking Enc than it would if it did not have access to the oracle.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: On the contrary, if the risk level is quite low, the expected action should allow packets to pass through the .rewall so that the availability and usage of network services cannot be affected.
Sentence 2: con.ict resolution strategies (RS) can be generated automatically for partial con.ict segments by com­paring the risk levels with two thresholds, upper threshold (UT ) and lower threshold (LT ), which can be set by system administra­tors in advance.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, as we have seen in Sec­tion 3, currently cloud services implement method calls through a combination of unprivileged and privileged processes launched by the services, which has caused the line between the OS and ser­vices to be blurred in current systems.
Sentence 2: the SCOS strawman proposes that a clear privilege separation [46] be made between the privileged service processing that operates on OS and virtualiza­tion resources and unprivileged processing that operates on cloud resources.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Given the focus on the user action for this situation, we can de.ne the system to include hardware (computational and/or physical), pro­cedures (including error handling to compensate when errors are made following the procedures), and a set of people who are trusted to adhere to those procedures.
Sentence 2: formal veri.cation of these procedures using process or work.ow modeling is an integral part of validation.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: PROPOSITION3.2.If(x,y)isanauthorityrangefthen (x,y).A(y).
Sentence 2: pROOF.SupposezE(x,y).Thenx<z<yandhene txtzty.tztyt(x,y)ty =(x,y)by(5) ty Thatis,zEA(y).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Time (Secs) 4.3 Correctness and Anonymity The only di.erence between this protocol and the protocol in the semi-honest model is that her, messages are signed and signatures are veri.ed.
Sentence 2: when all parties follow the protocol, the miner .nally obtains a permutation 1 0.5 0 100 of (d1, .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: (23) * * pg(i) pg(i)pg(i) pg(i) From the derivation in Section 3.1, we see that the optimal strategy for the defenders is to deploy a new application uniformly in the Internet for any group­ing criteria, such as /8 subnets, /16 subnets, and DNS Top-Level Domains [6].
Sentence 2: the self-learning pro­cess cannot help the worm in speeding up the propa­gation.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This translates into the following result: each user will need to store a constant number of secret keys, key derivation can be performed in constant time, and the server must maintain O(m log log mlog * m) public space.
Sentence 2: note that none of the above characteristics depend on n, even though the grid is m × n. The case of vertical (rather than horizontal) spanning is treated similarly to the above, except that the roles of rows and columns are interchanged, as are the roles of m and n. the space complexity for vertical spanning is O(n log log n log * n).
Relationship: reasoning