sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We found that attacks target three general classes of vulnerabilities: plugin memory violations (e.g., over.ows in plugins or ActiveX components), unsafe APIs (e.g., APIs that, by design, allow to perform unsafe actions, such as downloading and executing a remote .le), and browser memory vi­olations (e.g., over.ows in some of the core browser components, such as its XML parser).
Sentence 2: an off-line analysis of the script will fail, since it changes the location to an incorrect value.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Notice however that if the number of iterations were a function of the secret size, for example by inserting in the second line of the program the assignment N =size(h),(where size(h)=k the size of the secret) then it becomes a 1 bounded channel with decreasing rate 1k and capacity 1.
Sentence 2: previous information-theoretic models of programs are imprecise, due to their overly conservative treatment of looping constructs.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In HotSec 09: Proceedings of the 4th USENIX Workshop on Hot Topics in Security, 2009.
Sentence 2: the Client De­vice pushes context and activity data to a Data Aggregator; the Authentication Engine queries the Data Aggregator for individual device reports; the Client Device requests a service from the Authen­tication Consumer; the Client Device authenticates itself through the Authentication Engine; and the Authentication Engine exchanges a secret with Au­thentication Consumer during authentication (in or­der to later verify authentication results).
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Because the relative frequencies are sorted in descending order, it can be expected that the values of ICD(x) are more signi.cant for the anomaly score when x is small.
Sentence 2: all probabilities in the interval [0.0, 0.1[ are added to the .rst bin, values in the interval [0.1, 0.2[ are added to the second bin, and so forth.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 5.2 FreeWave Proxies FreeWave prevents this type of .ngerprinting by using supern­odes in the Skype network as proxies, which then forward the con­nection to the actual FreeWave server and off to the end destination.
Sentence 2: using the packet lengths generated by the samples from Oregon Graduate Institute corpus [15] mentioned in Section 3, we compared the distribution of packet lengths to those generated by the modem.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Speci.cally, the Markovian order at which the decaying conditional entropy saturates is chosen as the value of k. The size of each bin is thencalculatedby taking thedi.erenceof the minimumand the maximumanomaly scoreanddividing thatdi.erenceby k. The sizes of the .rst and the last bin are kept .exible to accommodate anypreviously-unseenanomaly scoresthat may be observed during real-time operation.
Sentence 2: we, on the other hand, arguethattheinput characteristicsof areal-timeIDS change continuously with time and setting a rigid(time and behavior invariant) classi.cation threshold limits the accu­racy that theIDS canpotentially achieve.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Let, ß denote the number of times the obligations in Bi and b needs to be unrolled.
Sentence 2: 4.4.1 Finite Cascading Obligation In this special case of cascading obligation, we consider that the policy is written in a way that the maximum num­ber of new obligations incurred by a single obligation is bounded by a constant (see appendix A).
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We propose contextual analy­sis techniques that analyze bytes surrounding the bytes matching the proposed signature to determine whether these matched bytes indeed correspond to a buffer over.ow attack.
Sentence 2: the minimal number of times the attack pattern is repeated is assumed to be 1, 2, 3 or 10, and the stack size tested is 2Mbytes, 16Kbytes, or 8Kbytes.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Such vulnerabilities allow attackers to read memory locations dynamically at runtime, thus learn exactly how code has been randomized.
Sentence 2: 1 recv(socket, buf, input); 2 rv = (*funcptr)(); 3 send(socket, &#38;rv, length);  In the above example, the attacker can use a buffer over.ow to overwrite a function pointer.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A Key Pre-Distribution Scheme for Secure Sensor Networks Using Probability Density Function of Node Deployment Takashi Ito, Hidenori Ohta, Nori Matsuda, and Takeshi Yoneda Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, Information Technology R &#38; D Center 5-1-1 Ofuna, Kamakura, Kanagawa 247-8501, Japan {takashim,hidenori,norim,tyone}@iss.isl.melco.co.jp ABSTRACT Pairwise key establishment is a fundamental service pro­vided in secure sensor networks.
Sentence 2: technical report, NAI Labs, September 2000.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While such methods can ensure the integrity of the injected code, they cannot ensure the integrity of the data that is provided to them by a potentially compromised OS.
Sentence 2: time skew introduced by trapping the guest into the hypervisor has also been e.ectively countered in prior research by alter­ing the guest s access to hardware time sources [9], although external time sources could still be available to the malware if network access is allowed.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: INTRODUCTION The problem of ordering task executions, or task schedul­ing, has been extensively investigated under thermal con­straints or performance concerns [2,5] (Note that task schedul­ing and task ordering are sometimes considered two di.erent things.
Sentence 2: all co-optimal solu­tions whose (errk, covk, latk) fall in the same bin are consid­ered to be close to each other and are merged together.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Disabling the Start menu provides a great inconvenience to the user and the user still can run any application from its icon on the desktop.
Sentence 2: [25] Ernst, M., Klupsch, S., Hauck, O., and Huss, S. A., Rapid Prototyping for Hardware Accelerated Elliptic Curve Public-Key Cryptosystems, 12th IEEE Workshop on Rapid System Prototyping, Monterey, CA, June 2001.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 2 3.2 Policy base template instantion for the pro­tection of XML sources Inthissection,weshowhowtheXMLpolicybasetem­platecanbeinstantiatedfortheprotectionofXMLsources.
Sentence 2: vpt =Ve[Vaisasetofnodesrepresentingelements  ptptandattributetypes.Inparticular,vVpthasaunique directchild,belongingtoVewhichmodelsasecu­ pt,ritypolicyspecifcation.Suchnodehasfveattributes whosespecifcationisgiveninTable1.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: So, the approaches that will be implemented are: GP rule inference method, which will generate/create new rules in order to cover those situations non con­templated in the current set of rules.
Sentence 2: [40] G. Suarez-Tangil, E. Palomar, J. Fuentes, J. Blasco, and A. Ribagorda.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Furthermore, in order to evaluate the effectiveness of different component methods in our solution, we create special versions of our recommender by disabling one or more component meth­ods.
Sentence 2: in re­ality, the MAC policy makers in an organization may not know the administrational structure of another organization, making it infeasible to de.ne .ne-grained scopes regarding the latter.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In signa­ture veri.cation both discrete and continuous distributions are used.
Sentence 2: an estimate for a user-independent threshold can be obtained by assuming that the distribution of scores is False Alarm probability (in %) Figure 6: DET plot for signature veri.cation task with skilled forgeries using 16-, 32-, and 64­components GMM These results are of the same order as published HMM­based systems, demonstrating the e.ectiveness of Gaussian mixture models for signature veri.cation tasks.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: CONCLUSIONS Implementing cryptographic algorithms, either in hardware or software, is not an endeavor for unexperienced develop­ers without in-depth knowledge of side-channel and fault attacks, their combination, and e.ective countermeasures.
Sentence 2: as an example, time to execute Algorithm 1 may leak the number of nonzero bits in the private exponent d. More sophisticated algorithms, which can reveal the bits of d, require details of the implementation.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.2 Example of TMI-based policy enforcement As a concrete example of using a TMI reference monitor to en­force authorization policies on client requests, consider Figure5, which shows a snippet of code taken from GradeSheet, a Java­based multi-threaded serverto manage student grades.For ourex­perimentsin Section5,we modi.ed GradeSheettomake useofthe object-based STM system DSTM2.
Sentence 2: has been ported to use an unmodi.ed DSTM2, for concurrency control only.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: These results are shown and discussed below.
Sentence 2: pUF Reliability(Voltage Supply Variation): We com­puted the intra-distances for each challenge by comparing responses at one nominal voltage supply (Vdd = .9) and 100 sample re­sponses from the same RO-PUF with a randomly varying voltage supply (mean .1V, standard deviation .33mV) to emulate environ­mental variations.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Flow chart on Control Center Assuming the error between the estimated data and real state is small enough to ignore; and the error between measurements and real state is e. According to (1), the reserved­data on Smart Terminal can be expressed as: RSD i ( ) t = RSD i e ( ) t + e (8) The dynamic secret on Smart Terminal is e DS ( ) t = Hash Truncate RSD t × K +e× K (9) i ( ( i ( ) )) If the e>1/K, the dynamic secrets on Smart Terminal and Control Center are different, which could not decrypt the received cipher text correctly.
Sentence 2: it is difficult for the adversary to conduct the state estimation to compute the Reserved­data on the terminals.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: icate is the same as in classical Datalog, with the condition that the sequence of states in the derivation of the body of the rule must be continuous.
Sentence 2: (D, f)= true if and only if there exist a variable substitution s and a sequence of database states S such that view.P (U, s(T1),...,s(Tn)can be inferred using the sequence S. For negated formulas, .
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 2 7 =61.87, p<.001 basic12 27.4 <.001 cond.1 3class16 mean 1.4 cond.2 basic12 basic16 basic20 mean 1.3 1.3 1.3 p-value .029 .029 .004 cond.1 3class16 % 60.2 cond.2 2word12 2word16 basic20 basic16 basic12 % 51.4 51.3 50.0 49.9 45.4 p-value .002 .002 <.001 <.001 <.001 2word16 3class12 36.8 35.3 basic16 basic12 basic12 30.1 27.4 27.4 .03 <.001 .002 comp8 56.9 basic20 basic16 basic12 50.0 49.9 45.4 .029 .02 <.001 3class12 54.9 basic12 45.4 <.001 Table 3.
Sentence 2: its curve begins to ascend rapidly after a million guesses.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Moreover, the average time needed to solve an instance of APuz is exponential in Q, the di.culty lev­el.
Sentence 2: (Q,D),DIFF (Q,D),DIFF Succ(k) = Pr[Exec(k) = 1] A,GPuz A,GPuz = Pr[Awins|B] Pr(B) + Pr[Awins|B¯] Pr( B¯) (D+1)q (D+1) q : 1 × + × (1 - ) 2Q 2Q 2Q (D+1)(q+1) : = .k,(Q,D)(q).
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The Context Handler attached to PEPPr, is responsible for forwarding this request to the LPDPPr which queries LPAPPr.If the LPDPPr does not find any policy that applies to that resource, then it is not possible evaluated the access requests locally.
Sentence 2: based on the reduced (single) certificate, a specific authorization credential is created and sent to the mechanism implementing the PEPPr.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: x k+1 = Ax k + BUrk - L(Vrk - Cx k - DUrk ) Hobs :  Vrk = Cx k + DUrk (50) where L is the observer gain.
Sentence 2: -5 System Energy (Nominal) System Energy (Max Energy Attack on V) x 10 rk 8 0.035 6 0.03 4 0.025 2 0.02  Energy Energy 0.015 0 -2 0.01 -4 0.005 -6 0 -8 0.35 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.05 -0.005 Time (s) Time (s) (b) Energy Balance Plot.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We expand the scope of the pioneering work for this threat [31] by progressively re.ning models of cross-VM covert channels from the derived maximums, to implementable channels in the lab, and .nally in Amazon EC2 itself.
Sentence 2: a practical bit rate that is possible to be real­ized in a laboratory environment that satis.es requirements R1 and R2 would be: 1bit/(1.47ms +3ms) 223.71bps The di.erence between 223.71bps and the theoretic max­imum 262.47bps can be considered as the synchronization overhead in practice.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Adopting this, NLV can check whether the claimed neighbors are really lo­cated within geographically two hops away.
Sentence 2: then, x in return provides u with one-time certi.cates for each neighbor of v; these one-time certi.cates falsely attest that v has new neighbor x.Node u sends this information to v over the covert channel.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: An important technical point is that since dx,y ' contains both pieces multiplied together, an attacker will be unable to sep­arate these pieces out and decrypt the tracing and broad­cast portions of the system separately.
Sentence 2: suppose MH AdvA[1] >E for some ad­versary Aand non-negligible E.Since E is a secure ABE we know that MH AdvA (de.ned in Game 1) is negligible.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security, SOUPS 11, pages 15:1 15:14, New York, NY, USA, 2011.
Sentence 2: in this section, we propose several feasible alternatives for develop­ers to avoid this issue by tackling the key factor -the es­tablishment of connection between real phone numbers and virtual user accounts in .awed messenger applications: 1) Make phone numbers be queried with a one-at-a-time con­straint, which meets users needs and meanwhile removes the chance for attackers to launch large scale attacks.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Certainly, effective location proof could pre­vent our attack, but the typical location proof techniques include using the deployed trusted infrastructures (e.g., cell tower or Wi-Fi access points) [25] or using environmental signals as the location tags [24, 34, 9].
Sentence 2: to evaluate the proposed solution, we compare the uniform grid reference sys­tem with non-uniform grid reference system based on the data set collected from our real-world experiments.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Au is required to perform distG(u,v) + 1 decryptions, where distG(u,v) denotes the length of the shortest path between u and v in G.The EBC supports insertions, but not deletions, of classes and edges in the hierarchy without re-distributing private information to the classes a.ected by such changes.
Sentence 2: for example, some internet providers o.er prepaid plans which require the credit to be used in a limited period of time.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Then for every possible A and for every possible scheduler, there exists a compu­tationally secure AMPC protocol to securely compute f with com­munication complexity of O(((cM + cR)· n 3 + n 3 ).)bits.
Sentence 2: the protocol always terminates for an honest D and Pking and has communication complexity O(n 2 .).
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Also, let E1 and E2 be the set of corresponding etuples for these queries.
Sentence 2: if Mallory observes a sequence of m queries and their respective set of etuples (E1, E2,· · · Em), she can erate = m 1 m(m-1) di.erent non-trivial constraints from 2 2 m di.erent range queries.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Perhaps the most popular of these is Microsoft Outlook/Exchange, using them for e-mail.6 Outlook, however, is de­signed to be friendly to the user to present a pleasing and functional user interface and as a result what is displayed to the user is only the Common Name portion of the DN the user-friendly portion.
Sentence 2: public Key as Name For those using public key cryptography the solution is remarkably simple.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Infact, aspresented,DRM can solvethe criticalis­sues of a current videosurveillance system, considering their twofold nature: covering and standardizing the automation of the surveillance activity, whileputtingin thehands of the users the appropriate technical means to control the access to their private information.
Sentence 2: tools for protecting the privacy of speci.c individuals in video.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: How­ever, this approach only allows determining the entire set of pro­cesses or .les that were taintedby anyisolation environment.
Sentence 2: for this experiment, we tainted all invocations of an applica­tion and measured the number of tainted .les in the system and the amount of logging that would have occurred over the course of 10-14 days.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Whereas other expressiveness notions allow an analyst to make statements such as, System Y admits a simulation of form S of Z, parameterized expressiveness makes statements such as, If system Z can implement workload W while preserving the set of properties G, then Y can implement W while preserving G, which is more closely aligned with the practical concerns associated with a system s expressiveness.
Sentence 2: 5.2 Cost Measures While the type of expressiveness analysis carried out by an analyst is de.ned by a set of security guarantees that must be upheld, the type of cost analysis is parameterized by the costs to be examined.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.2.3 DataFlowTransformationtoHideTagFlow The .ow of tag propagation is still not resilient enough since it onlyinvolvesnormal useof taggeddata.
Sentence 2: rEFERENCES [1] H.Chen,X.Wu,L.Yuan,B.Zang,P.Yew,andF.Chong.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Public veri.cation can be ob­tained by having the client publish A = e(g, g)a and the vec­tor VKx = e(g, g)R·x (again computed fast using closed-form e.ciency of the PRF), and then anybody can verify the fol­ y lowing vector equation e(xt, g)= Ax· VKx (component-wise).
Sentence 2: so, dividing the two veri.cation i=1 i a by-y equations, we obtain that e( = e(g1 ,g B can V /V, g2) 2) .
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Seat­belt is easy to use; however, it may not detect OpenID lo­gin form .elds precisely, because a simple text matching technique (e.g., openid, oidurl, open-id, open id) is used to identify them.
Sentence 2: studies suggest that security indicators are ine.ective at preventing phishing attacks [10, 34]; and blacklisting of phishing sites has the issue of a high rate of false-positives and false-negatives [48].
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Inthisconstraint,u1andu2mustberestrictedfrom sharinganauthorizationtypeinthesetofrestricted typesrt.Thatis,thesetofauthorizationtypesin rtthataresharedbetweenu1andu2mustbenull.
Sentence 2: ourintuitiondiferedfromthemetric'sordering ofExamples2and3.Inhindsightthismakessomesense.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In Ap­pendix C we prove that µDob(M) and we char­ (A M) = µDob acterize optimal di.erentially private mechanisms (in terms ) in Section 3.3. of µDob 3.3 Characterizing the Dobrushin Coef.cientof Ergodicity In this section we characterize optimal di.erentially pri­vate mechanisms.
Sentence 2: o and for all pairs (i1,i2) of database instances that di.er only in the insertion or deletion of one individual s information, PM(O | i1) = eEPM(O | i2).
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: ..m and the sender inputs a vector of pairs of e-bit strings (x0,x1)i, i =1 ...n. At the end of the protocol, the chooser learns the selected strings xri,i, but nothing about the other strings x1-ri,i whereas the sender learns nothing about the choices ri.
Sentence 2: 2.1.1 Yao s Garbled Circuit Protocol Yao s garbled circuit protocol [Yao86] allows two parties, a server and a client, to jointly compute a function f repre­sented as boolean circuit on their respective private inputs x and y.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Like most complex IT systems, Grid middleware systems exhibit a number of security problems, and there will always be at­tacks that are unknown and can circumvent even the best security measures and intrusion detection systems.
Sentence 2: the main design goal of our work is to periodically refresh the Grid server from a clean read only image every couple of minutes, thus removing any attack code from the Grid system, if it was detected or not.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our results clearly show that we are able to determine the correct PIN out of a set of 50 random PINs within the .rst ten guesses about 80% of the time.
Sentence 2: this means that experiments were performed in o.ce rooms that were uniformly illuminated via tube lights, in a living room with a standard ceiling lamp, and in rooms where the only light source was a window.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While our hash algorithm reads data in a perfectly coalesced fashion, the writes at both levels are highly uncoalesced.
Sentence 2: asistypicalwith .ood-.lling,ifthe initializationwas incorrectthe results mightbe wrong.Wedoa .nal check, using anotherkernel, to see if any inside cell is a neighbor of an outside cell; if so the initialized cells in M causing the con.ict are cleared and the .ood­.ll is restarted from the remaining cells of M. This has produced good results in the examples we tried.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: CONCLUSIONS This paper proposes a new authorization scheme that com­bats untrusted cloud servers by adopting CP-ABE, ElGamal­like masks, proxy re-encryption, and lazy re-encryption to achieve user-centric and end-to-end security.
Sentence 2: for a challenge message, the crypto­graphic cost at a server is CP-ABE encryption (2|L| +2 exponentiations); and for a response message, the computa­ n tion cost at a consumer is CP-ABE decryption (2|IL| +1 pairing operations).
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The code size of parapass-through drivers is expected to be much smaller than that of traditional device drivers: they only need to monitor control I/Os to keep track of states of the devices, and intercept data I/Os to inspect or manipulate contents of I/O data.
Sentence 2: threat Model and Assumptions This section describes the threat model and assumptions we made in designing and implementing parapass-through hypervisors.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior speci.c permission and/or a fee.
Sentence 2: in fact, not many attacks are known on Mobile Java with the exception of Gowdiak s attack on the byte code veri.er of Nokia mobilephones[25]althoughJavasecurityproblemsin general are well-demonstrated [17].
Relationship: neutral