sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While the IGF framework is not explicit in its documentation about what forms of authentication are re­quired, given that the framework is now part of the Liberty Alliance, it can be safely assumed that the Liberty-support­ed authentication technologies will be supported by the IGF.
Sentence 2: web-service providers can choose to de­fine IGF policies, using AAPML, that serve up different levels of attribute data based on the IPF rating of the au­thentication technology used by the end-user.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The second part of the policy can be represented as (p2 : f)where p2 maps every request to its permissions and f is the scoping restriction that checks for appropriate roles of the requesters.
Sentence 2: (p2 : f) maps the the authorization state ((Cathy, jRecord, {readRequest, writeRequest}), (Vinti, jRecord, {readRequest}), (Bill, jRecord, {readRequest})) to the au­thorization state ((Cathy, jRecord, {read, write}), (Vinti, jRecord, {read}), (Bill, jRecord, {readRequest})) the policy expressed in parts 1 and 2 can be ex­pressed as p1;(p2 : f).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Thus, since this quantity is upper bounded by the size of available memory in the RSU, and the maximum number of leaves of the k-ary tree kD is lowerbounded by the number of revoked certificates s, then both conditions can be used to deduce the optimal value for k. In our proposal, the used k-ary tree structure assigns a unique identifier to each revoked certificate to represent it in in order in each one of its leafs.
Sentence 2: an auxiliary structure linking such identifiers with the corresponding certificate serial number is also stored in the RSU.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Moreover, because inserts, removals, and lookups achieve a constant number of memory accesses, with very high probability, in a de­amortized cuckoo-hashing scheme (or with constant expected­time performance in a standard cuckoo hashing scheme), then each operation in a simulation of de-amortized cuckoo hashing in B(N) involves a constant number of accesses with very high probability.
Sentence 2: using a de-amortized cuckoo-hashing scheme, we have the following result.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As a policy model pro­vides an abstract and formal representation of the security properties of a platform, we de.ne trust as follows: trust is the expectation that a policy model will behave in a par­ticular manner for a speci.c purpose, where, the behavior of a policy model refers to the aggregate of its observable actions or reactions in response to its environment.
Sentence 2: in MBA, a target platform is trustworthy for a challenger if each behavior of that policy model is trustworthy, which is followed by the target platform for the speci.c purpose of the challenger.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: More neighboring jammer motes means staying awake more often because whenever a signal is de­tected on the channel, a jammer mote always stays awake for a while to listen for a valid preamble.
Sentence 2: a jammer mote has a higher e.ort ratio in a denser network, and according to Equation 11 and Equation 12, the life­ time advantage becomes lower.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, academic credentials such as position in a university, membership in research group, professional organisations such as ACM, IEEE etc can be grouped into a CAS, while other credential information relating to financial and on-line banking information can be grouped into another set of CAS.
Sentence 2: the user has the flexibility of choosing the credentials that he/she wishes to reveal and hide other unrelated credentials.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Thus, we denote Duser = {Dstack , Dheap , user user Dglobal = {Dstack kernel , Dglobal }, respectively.
Sentence 2: user }, and Dkernel kernel , Dheap kernel Also, note that Dkernel represents the run-time kernel state, is internally maintained by the kernel itself, and is indirectly accessed through OS system calls invoked by P s C. Meanwhile, Dkernel can .ow to Duser and get updated by P s C. we can have P = C(D) = C(Duser , Dkernel ) user , Dglobal = C({Dstack , Dheap }, {Dstack kernel , Dglobal }) user user kernel , Dheap kernel (1) Meanwhile, a process always consumes data within its own , Dheap and Dglobal physical machine, and has its own Dstack user .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: ), so that anyoperation that destroys information can be captured with the value 0:C1:1.
Sentence 2: while C1 models the equivocation, (1 can be de.ned to model the range of possible mutual information values for the inputs that the above inequality represents, where: I(y;7)= a1(max{I(w;7),I ( ;7)}) + !1((a1(I(w;7) +I( ;7)) -a1(max{I(w;7),I ( ;7)})) the range 0:(1:1 captures the full range of the in­equality for computation dependencies.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Then, we use the described policies to defend against real-world at­tacks to measure their effectiveness as well asfalse alarms.
Sentence 2: 5.1 Attack Detection Policies The maingoalofSHIFTistodetectbothlow-levelmem-thepoliciesincludebothhigh-andlow-levelpolicies.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our main goal, in terms of visualization, is to overcome the limits of the variable-encoding model, based on traditional visual variables (e.g., color, shape, size), which are not as effective as visual structure, physical layout and visual dynamics are in easing pattern recogni­tion, grasping the overall structure of the phenomenon, and .nally fostering insights [9].
Sentence 2: we decided to reduce the importance of color and concentrate on the visual interaction with the timeline, the visual layout of all the elements, and their animation patterns.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Second, NL software documents could be large in size, often consisting of hundreds oreventhousands of sentences(iTrust consistsof37 use cases[23] with448 use-case sentences), where aportion ofthe sen­tencesdescribingACPs(117 sentencesiniTrust) areburied among other sentences.
Sentence 2: it is very tedious and error-prone to man­ually inspect these NL documents for identifying and extracting ACPsforpolicy modeling and speci.cation.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Recall, that as per Figures 4, 5 and 7, 8, qt - pf is the range of [0.3, 0.8].
Sentence 2: as the reward in our revocation scheme is an additional key, the value for b is 1, an honest node has an expectation value of: Ei =(2 · (1 - eni) - 1) · c, c .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Interestingly, neither of the inferior modes AckOn-EncOn and AckOn-EncOff can accommodate this path condition on their own.
Sentence 2: when the potential b c connection is added to the AckOn mode, the automated reachability analysis will report that there may be direct information .ow through the encryption device, from pin a to pin f, when the acknowledgements switch is on, but without a guarantee that the encryption switch is off!
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Users can be tricked by web sites for several reasons: Confusion around server names, where a misspelled name might not be noticed, or worse yet, internationalized names can look identical to the expected name  Confusion around URLs, where understandably users might not know which part of the URL is the real DNS name  Faulty trust anchors, in which an evil-doer manages to trick any of the trust anchors into issuing a faulty certificate  Also, because there are so many cases in which the web site the user wants to visit chooses to use a self-signed certificate or an expired certificate rather than go through the hassle and/or expense of obtaining a certificate from one of the commonly configured trust anchors, users have been trained to ignore security warnings around certificates and accept anything.
Sentence 2: it would be relatively easy for a web site to present itself as any server name, using a self-signed certificate, and many users will merely accept the certificate signed by the unknown trust anchor .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A trusted directory supports more flexible forms of delegation than a CA because a trusted directory implements its delegations instead of just proclaiming them.
Sentence 2: while a CA is limited to delegations which can be expressed in a certificate and processed by client software, a trusted directory can do anything when a client asks it for a key -it can look in its local storage, consult another directory, consult a PKI, consult multiple other directories and PKIs and corroborate the results, and so on.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note that in this case s = p, and thus F can only take the value 0 in Algorithm 1.
Sentence 2: on the other hand, p-1 p is odd 2 qmax = p and thus - 1 p is even 2 1, p is odd |KF1 | = 2, p is even for almost all systems with n states and p sensors, if we use N = n past measurement vectors the complexity of Algorithm 1 is p ·2n-1 if p is an odd num­ p(p-1) 22n-1 ber, or if the system has an even number 2 of sensors.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In contrast, when we pin the two to the same core, performance improved by 70%.
Sentence 2: improvingperformance when sharing a coreispossible without re­  No-RFA 320 640 NormalizedPerformance 1 0.95 0.9 0.85 0.8 0.75 0.7 Figure8: Normalizedperformance(baseline runtime over run-time)forSPEC workloads on ourlocal testbedfor variousRFA intensities.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Like AISE, this scheme supports all forms of IPC and requires no special mechanisms to protect swap memory.How­ever,global countersneedtobelarge(64bits)toavoidover.owand frequent entire-memory re-encryption (32-bit counters cause entire memory re-encryption every few minutes [24]).
Sentence 2: these large counters cache poorly, and predicting counter values is dif.cult be­cause the values are likely non-contiguous for a particular block over time, resultingin little latency-hiding opportunity(weevaluate this in Section 7.2).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: ln 1/2 1/4 256bit 128bit (theoretical) 0.6932 1/8  N:1024bits 0.693151/16 1/32 1/64(measured) 0.6931 1/128 N:1024bits 1/256 1/512 0.69305 (theoretical) 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 length of redundancy bits length of redundancy bits Figure 1: the expected number of existing primes success probability of the Lenstra algorithm itself in the veri­.cation, the probability would be almost 1 in most part, and we cannot distinguish some error.
Sentence 2: we do not use the success probability of the Lenstra algorithm itself in our veri.cation.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The recent proliferation of smartphones offers a promising op­portunity to address these challenges, as these devices offer a gen­eral computing environment with a powerful processor, high-res­olution display, several communication modalities (WiFi, 3G/4G, Bluetooth, NFC), camera, and sensors.
Sentence 2: smartphones can en­able convenient, spontaneous exchanges of public keys.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since the algorithm is called each time the user requires to insert a box in the graph, the non authorized portions of the input streams have al­ready been pruned by the Secure read operator called the .rst time the stream is inserted into the graph.
Sentence 2: if the stream in R.Objs is an internal stream, the algorithm simply stores the Aurora ex­pression corresponding to R.Objs directly into Sec Objs (step 2.a.ii).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If we cannot continue using the website as the logged-in user (e.g., being kicked back to login page), we consider this a successful defense because it implies that at least one of the cookies Zan identi.ed was needed for au­thentication at the website.
Sentence 2: if an attacker had stolen the cookies via JavaScript then the set of cookies they would have access to would not allow authenticated requests.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Because the value of H(Sa|id) is uniformly distributed in the range [0,1), it can be treated as a random variable X that fol­lows a uniform distribution with the pdf (probability density func­tion) j 1, if 0 =x<1 fX (x)= 0, otherwise.
Sentence 2: pd the value of ck ·H(Sa|id) can be treated as another k=1 Pd random variable Y uniformly distributed in [0, k=1 ck), whose pdf is given by ( Pd P1 , if 0 =y< ck d fY (y)= k=1 ck k=1 0, otherwise.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: .Theassumptionthatallinsidersaretrusted2hasnot beenvalidforalongtime.Speifindividualsorre­motenetworksmaybeallowedaesstoallorpartsof theprotetedinfrastruture(extranets,teleommut­ing,et.
Sentence 2: ).thetraditionalnotionofa seurityperimeterannolongerholdunmodifed;for example,itisdesirablethatteleommuters'systems omplywiththeorporateseuritypoliy.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Over the years, researchers have generally reduced the number of states used in HMMs for signature recognition.
Sentence 2: while in 1998 and 1999 between 10 and 30 states [7], respectively between 30 and 40 states [2] have been used, more recently in 2002 between 6 and 12 states [5] and in 2003 as little as 2 states [4] have been shown to be e.ective.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: CONCLUDING REMARKS The POP Method proposed in this paper is a comprehensive solution and basically fits the class 1 Gen 2 passive UHF RFID systems with a little modification to the memory structure of the tag.
Sentence 2: the POP method is good enough to be deployed in product lifecycle as it introduces a feasible tagged-product flow, facilitates robust communication protocol, provides with an anonymous ownership transference mechanism, manages multiple authorizations and thereby enhances the security and privacy while giving the controlling power of the communication to the bearers.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A program would match a malspec if at least one of its paths invokes the system calls of the malspec with ar­guments that satisfy the constraints of the malspec.
Sentence 2: a malspec is not designed to represent malicious behavior that encompasses multiple distinct executions of the pro­gram and in particular the use of covert channels, which consist of observable di.erences between multiple program executions.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The proof is divided in two parts as follows: Case 1: If dx <k + f, we still need each node to be hidden among at least k other possible senders, and hence our algorithm will pick the nodes in its nearest neighborhood which contains at least k nodes before building a clique.
Sentence 2: because a clique of k nodes has (k+f)(2 k+f-1) edges, the maximum number of edges are introduced when the nodes lie on a line topology.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: was chosen such that exp(n 2ß) - 2n 2ß ln(2n(1 + 1/e(n))) = ln(2n(1 + )) = n .
Sentence 2: 2n Lemma 3.3 of [MR07] reveals ln(2n(1 + 1/e(n))) .e(L) =· .n(L) p ß 2ß nn =· .n(L) = v · .n(L) p p and therefore breaking LP is not easier than solving GIVP v 8·n1+ß = SIVP(n, .)
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: SPICI is intended to help organizations identify the capabilities they need, and to negotiate how they will provide those capabilities via technologies and business processes, so that they can share identity and supporting information in a way that protects individual privacy as well as organizational interests.
Sentence 2: sPICI complements, and provides a usage context for, automated negotiation systems that can implement organizational agreements [2, 3].
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: An important technical point is that since dx,y ' contains both pieces multiplied together, an attacker will be unable to sep­arate these pieces out and decrypt the tracing and broad­cast portions of the system separately.
Sentence 2: for a key to be useful for decrypting a ciphertext it must be both in the broadcast set of the ciphertext and have an index greater than or equal to the encrypted index.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 5.3 Related Work on Puzzles Early work defending against resource depletion attacks focused around the concept of the cookie, an opaque bit­string that the initiator of a connection request needs to return verbatim to the server before the request is allowed to proceed.
Sentence 2: cookies were used only to establish the va­lidity of the peer in terms of network address reachability; in other words, cookies protect against attackers spoo.ng their IP address.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Ideally, the only way for the storage facility to mount an o.ine guessing attack should be based exclusively on the .nality of the plaintext: that is, not merely by inspecting a candidate decrypted plaintext, but by attempting to use it in its intended application.
Sentence 2: if the .nality of the plaintext happened to involve an online transaction (e.g., authenticating to a third party), the server would not be able to test the validity of a password guess without going online, even if it had the ability to enumerate them all o.ine.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Without the position (and thus the pass loss) information of the pas­sive eavesdropper, it is impossible to adaptively optimize the power allocation between the information-bearing signal and the jamming signal.
Sentence 2: we examine two .xed power allocation schemes: one is equal power allocation, i.e., Ps = Pw = P/2, and another is without the jamming signal, namely Ps = P and Pw = 0.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: An application may even need multiple ar­chitectures to meet varying requirements on performance and se­curity.For instance, Chromium provides users with command-line switches to choose from several architectures, from everything in one process to .ne-grained separation [22].
Sentence 2: what is de­siredisa mechanismthathelpsdevelopersexplorethe architectural design space and easily describe the alternative architectures.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Based on these results, we can calculate that the time required for com­puting three checksums blocks(T per )on the NIC is about compT normal - (T cpu + T cpu 827 nanoseconds, (i.e., T per = )= comp comp send recv 2202 ns - 1375 ns = 827 ns).
Sentence 2: the overhead caused by the theoretical fastest proxy attack over 1 Gbps Ethernet is (T per +T per )- T per about 325 nanoseconds(T proxy = recv comp = overhead send 1152 ns - 827 ns = 325 ns).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Such mechanisms, like SELinux [26] or TOMOYO Linux [22], are already by default features of the Linux kernel and provide mandatory access control on various aspects of the OS, including the .le system and the Inter-Process Communication.
Sentence 2: by employing such a MAC mechanism, TrustDroid achieves the isolation of domains on .le system and IPC level.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This requirement e.ectively thwarts attack attempts in which the adversary tries to leak the password via tampering with the password .eld s form element in the timespan between the auto.ll process and the form submis­sion.
Sentence 2: our proposed implementation of a secure pass­word manager e.ectively hinders an attacker who utilizes XSS attacks against his victim.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: By our revised semantics, the most recently created rule takes precedence.
Sentence 2: if thebox corresponding to Jana s read access for the Four-part Harmony.doc .le is red because of her membership in Theory 101 TAs 2006, but a policy author clicks on the box to make a rule that allows Jana ac­cess, this new rule will take precedence over the denyrule from the group and the box will turn green; Jana will now be allowed to access the .le.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Box 900460, 14440 Potsdam, Germany {Hosnieh.Rafiee, Ahmad.Alsadeh, Christoph.Meinel}@hpi.uni-potsdam.de  ABSTRACT Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) is an essential protocol in IPv6 suite, but it is known to be vulnerable to critical attacks.
Sentence 2: sEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) is proposed to counter NDP security threats.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A false negative occurs when the interaction factor is greater than 1 (right of the vertical line) and the test fails to reject the null hypothesis.
Sentence 2: the fact that the curve for the facilitation test is low over the interval [0, 1] indicates con­trolled false positive rates, and the fact that it is relatively high over the interval {1, 3] indicates low false negative rates.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In our experiments, the adversary and victim measure­ments of gettimeofday() sometimes di.ered by one bit; the response time (about 0.3µs) of the system call may at most cause a single microsecond discrepancy.
Sentence 2: to recover the pid upon initialization of the PRNG the adversary needed to perform a (trivial) o.ine brute-force guessing attack in 216 a search space of size 220 = × 24 (space 216 for the pid and 24 for four invocations of gettimeofday()).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To put it formally, at some point, the following must occur: KA A = B : .= A KB B = A : .= B However, simply receiving a public key does not assure a device that it is the authentic public key of the intended target device.
Sentence 2: the goal in this protocol is more stringent, speci.cally, it is assurance the public key of the sending device is authentic, or to put it formally: A| Kb .= B B | Ka .= A 452 Note that both components are required for mutual device authentication to occur.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In general, one can say that if an attacker manages to execute JavaScript on the target domain, then she can control the whole Web page navigated at by the victim.
Sentence 2: a recommended miti­gation strategy would be to deactivate/limit JavaScript code execution for security reasons, employing tools such as No-Script [33], Content Security Policy (CSP) [43], or, alter­natively, making use of HTML5-sandboxed Iframes.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our calculations show that both n and log q grow almost linearly in the maximal ciphertext degree D (more precisely, they grow as D log D).
Sentence 2: the bit length of the cipher­text grows quadratically in D and that of the public key (including the evaluation key) grows cubically.5 A phenomenon worth explaining is that of discontinuity in the security levels in Table 1.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: So, once we have shown that X and Y are independent, we can write pX,Y (x,y)= pX(x)· pY (y)= pX(x)· pX(y), as the perfect steganography condition establishes that pY = pX.
Sentence 2: systems approaching a H(X)capacity must verify X pU,X,Y (u,x,y)= pX(x)· pX(y), U yielding the following embedding distortion D * e = X (x -y)2 pX(x)pX(y)= X x 2 pX(x) x.X,y.X x.X !
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: (If Xi N (µ, d2) with µ (l + u)/2 and d 8 (u - l)/2, then the above bound is too conservative by roughly a factor of two; however, it is sim­pler to ignore these small constant factors.)
Sentence 2: rms= * (f , k) ~ rms(f ) + (u - l)k/n.
Relationship: reasoning