sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In other words, at least d+1 (N) tokens should be scheduled after ti(j-d) at t.As DLP do not have dummy tokens for fi after ti(j-d), DLP uses exactly d+ 1 tokens during [ti(j-d),t(N) + .].
Sentence 2: the necessary number of token for [0,t(l)] and [ti(j-d),t(N)]is T-dand d+1 accordingly.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When, in state s, user U E s.U performs action a on the ob­jects ooE s.0* , a(U, oo)(s.U, s.0, s.,) returns (s" .U, s".0,s" .,)for the new state s" .
Sentence 2: actions can introduce new users and objects, have side efects, and change the authorization state.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The .rst set of feature vectors we con­sider are the exact lux values at the input of each speci.c digit of the PIN.
Sentence 2: we use the timestamp of each in­put event during one PIN input to look-up the corresponding values in matrix M. We represent these values as a vector x = [L1, L2, L3, L4]T, where the subscript refers to a speci.c digit of the PIN.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Furthermore, since we consider policies with  propagation options, if the scanning of the PB does not identify an  access control policy that directly applies to n, we need to verify  whether there exists an access control policy applied to one of the ancestors of n, which propagates to n. This implies to verify, in the worst case, further #depth elements.
Sentence 2: the overall Figure 9 An example of AC-XML document complexity of this access evaluation is equal to O(#nodes*#depth *NP* #obj-cond*#cred-cont).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Given a discrete time series of samples Ht, we can calculate the autocorrelation of this time series by N-k 1 i=0 (hi - h)(hi+k - h) rk = ,k =1, 2, ··· , N, (2) 1 N N N i=0(hi - h) where h is the mean of sample time series, and rk is the auto­correlation of the sample value at k. With some calculation, we can prove that this series is non-stationary.
Sentence 2: traditional autoregressive (AR) and moving average (MA) processes are not suitable to analyze this series.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As for z, the security administrator should keep in mind that z determines the depth in the depth-.rst traver­sal, which has a runtime complexity of O(bz), where b is the branching factor (or the average number of neighbors per parcel).
Sentence 2: z should be > 1, and an assessment of available computational resources should be taken into account to achieve the desired and most practical results.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This .ndings are con­sistent with the experiments conducted in [2], in which a majority voting-based consensus could be reached only for less than 20% of the samples.
Sentence 2: a reference clustering generated via ma­jority voting may miss to represent a large portion of the malware dataset, causing a potential overestimate of the clustering quality, as also suggested in [12].
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The pred­icate canInvoke(m, c, u) indicates that the user u is allowed to invoke method m in class c, and member(u, r) indicates that u is a member of the role r. The predicate canInvoke is not restricted to the methods that a user is directly authorized to invoke; it includes meth­ods invoked transitively.
Sentence 2: canInvoke includes all meth­ods the user can e.ectively run.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: CONCLUSION Given the growing demand for interactive systems, the low cost of computational resources, and the proliferation of sophisticated sensors (in public/private locations and mobile devices) digital traces of our identities and activity patterns are becoming increasingly ac­cessible to third parties with analytics capabilities.
Sentence 2: although sensor systems enhance the quality and availability of digital in­formation which can aid technical innovation, they also give rise to security risks and cause privacy tensions.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, the packets used in a proxy attack must go through the hardware Ethernet MAC (physical serial com­munications port) of the NIC.
Sentence 2: theoretically the fastest time of an Ethernet-based proxy attack is the time that it takes the packets to go through the Ethernet MAC of both the sender s and receiver s NICs, and the time that the data actually spends on the wire.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this case, the j-th constraint can be split into two cases: ( mj - 1 = log T when mj - 1 = l PR i=j mi - 1 = log T when mj - 1 >l In general, l is ordinarily smaller than log T , so N is maximized when mi = l +1, 1 = i = R - 1 and mR = Llog T J +1.
Sentence 2: n = (R - 1) · (l + 1) + log T +2.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note that, assuming that it is computation­ally di.cult to break RSA, parameter selection should not introduce any attacks that compromise the security of the above computation by the server, namely x d (mod n).
Sentence 2: an attacker can attempt to exhaust all possible vector values fi thereby deriving d. a minimal requirement for c and k is that a brute force attack (which requires 2c×k steps) should be as di.cult as breaking underlying RSA4 .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The de.nition and interpretation of PS will differ according to the appli­cation of DRM, and is dependent ultimately on the implementation of the DRM controller (the system that interprets and implements the use license) and the rights holders, where the rights holders can choosea PS thatisasubsetofthe entiresetavailablefromtheDRM system.Forexample,in the traditional Unix .le system: PS = {read, write, execute} In the Unix .le system,apermission called print has no meaning, and thus cannotbe enforced,evenifitisexpressed aspartof the use license.
Sentence 2: the rights holders can choose to reduce PS to: ´ PS = {read, write} ´ for a use license created with reference to PS, bwill always havetherighttoexecute,even thoughtheDRM controller can tech­nically control that right.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In fact, many OSNs currently only provide an all-or-nothing policy when it comes to application-to-user interactions, without letting OSN users specify which information TPAs can access.
Sentence 2: even if the application only needs one piece of pro.le data, the user has to agree to grant the application full access to her pro.le data; oth­erwise, she cannot use the application at all.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since a worm is designed to infect the targeted host via an exploit on a particular application, it will not infect any proxy who merely relays the tra.c to its ultimate desti­nation.
Sentence 2: we have to make sure the outgoing tra.c terminates at the virtual machine in order to let any worm tra.c be able to infect the virtual machine.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this scenario Alice and Bob are close to each other (within 0.5 meter) and make two kinds of movements in order to equalize their average signal strength captured by Eve: We use commodity wireless Ethernet cards and they are not omnidirectional.
Sentence 2: in order to confuse Eve, Alice and Bob must turn their laptop in ran­domly changing directions (at a reasonable speed).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The study of adatabase of spatio-temporaldata(trajectories) canlead to useful or previously unknown knowledge.
Sentence 2: it is bene.cial to share and publish such databases and let the analysts obtain useful knowledge for example, knowl­edge that can be applied in intelligent transportation, traf­.c monitoring and planing, congestion trends, supply chain management, etc.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Given dataset D, minimum threshold(pmin)and maximumthreshold(pmax), .nd the largest p, pmin = p = pmax, such that after the watermark embedding, at most a fraction t among the edges of the Euclidean minimum spanning tree do not match the MST of the original dataset.
Sentence 2: we would like to discover the largest power p, pmin = p = pmax that guarantees MST-preservation, since larger energies of the embedded watermark provide better detection and resilience to attacks.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.2 Attacks through Frame Confusion In the Android system, interactions with several compo­nents of the system are asynchronous, and require a call­back mechanism to let the initiator know when the task has completed.
Sentence 2: when the JavaScript code inside WebView initiates such interactions through the interface binded to WebView, JavaScript code does not wait for the results; instead, when the results are ready, the Java code outside WebView will invoke a JavaScript function, passing the results to the web page.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Two possible transitions, NULL-to-DATA and DATA-to-NULL are monotonic and glitch-free since only 0 -1 wire transitions are possible for NULL-to-DATA cycle and 1 -0 wire transitions for DATA-to-NULL cycle, respec­tively.
Sentence 2: the proposed NCL S-Box is completely immune to side-channel attacks based on glitch power/noise measurements.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In particular, as depicted in Figure 1, the directory server contains three kinds of entries: the Publishers entry, which is shared by all Publishers and contains all encrypted documents that they are entitled to manage, plus additional information they need for the correct functioning of the system; the Users entry, shared by all the subscribed users, storing common information; and a distinct User ID entry for each single user, containing needed information to verify the security properties.
Sentence 2: after a mandatory registra­tion phase, each user/Publisher receives by the Owner the keys for accessing the corresponding entries in the directory.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: By Hall s matching theorem, there must exist a time period [t,t ' ] where the number of tokens used by S(Fi), which is NS(Fi)(t ' ) -NS(Fi)(t), is more than the number of tokens used by S.(F) during [t,t ' + .].
Sentence 2: the number of tokens used by S(F) during [t-.,t ' ] will be smaller than NS(Fi)(t ' ) -NS(Fi)(t)as S.(F)isadelayed 10 8 6 4 2 0  Delay bound (') Sending rate Figure 7: Relationship between the sending rate and the delay bound .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To see that theprotocol works,observe that for a .Aand b .B such that a .b, theprobability(overpossiblechoicesof the = hash functions) that hj(a)= hj(b) for j =1..d is bounded by 2-d < e .
Sentence 2: by union bound, the probability 4|A|·|B| that there is an a .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, it means that the random sequence of m1, , mJ cannot decrypt uniquely, therefore the alternative equivalent small sequence m 1,, m J which is satisfied SJi=1 mi bi =SJi=1 m i bi and SJi=1 mi di =SJi=1 m i di is exist .
Sentence 2: the real density of this system is estimated with the size of the smallest sequence of m 1, , m J. III.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In our implementation, ROA policies are deployed sep­arately from the major application and enforcement com­ponents.
Sentence 2: an originator can easily maintain and change the policies without requiring changes to sharing ser­ (a) New search and search results (b) Attribute certi.cate creation Figure 7: User Interfaces of ShareEnabler Agent and Administrative Policy Editor vice systems.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.5 Additional Protection for System Calls Unlike virtual memory management functions where it is su.cient to provide cloaked data access to the OS, system calls imply that an application explicitly entrusts the OS to carry out a service on its behalf.
Sentence 2: short of validat­ing each of OS service s functionality [1], SecureME cannot guarantee that the service will be performed correctly, or data that is passed to the OS will not be leaked to attackers.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If N is considered to be composed of Ir and If where these symbols are the real and fake (spurious) impressions, the equation above changes, as only Ir can gen­erate sales.
Sentence 2: we have: Ci × (Ir + If ) = Rc × P × Ir (3) Rc × P × Ir Ci = (4) Ir + If we can see that as If is varied, the Cost per impression for breakeven changes.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: IfBisafniterelationalstrutureandAisalassof strutures,thenwewrite-CSP(AVB)fortheomplement ofCSP(AVB),thatis,thelassofstruturesAsuhthat thereisnohomomorphismh:A-B.FederandVardi [21]providedaunifyingexplanationforthetratabilityof manynon­uniformCSP(B)problemsbyshowingthatthe omplementofeahoftheseproblemsisexpressibleinDat­alog.KolaitisandVardi[39]thenshowedhowDatalogalso providesaunifyingexplanationfortheuniformtratability ofonstraint­satisfationproblems.
Sentence 2: notethat,ingeneral,non­uniformtratabilityresults donotuniformize.tratabilityresultsforeahprob­leminaolletionofnon­uniformCSP(B)problemsdonot neessarilyyieldatratableaseoftheuniformonstraint satisfationproblem(oroftheonjuntivequeryontain­mentproblem).ThereasonisthatbothstruturesAandB arepartoftheinputtotheonstraintsatisfationproblem, andtherunningtimesofthepolynomial­timealgorithmsfor CSP(B)mayverywellbeexponentialinthesizeofB.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: p(d) does not imply a may be performed on d. When a service provider performs action a on datum d, that provider e.ectively performs a on all d. =D d. For example, if Dr. Bob discloses blood test results, he necessarily discloses blood cholesterol levels.
Sentence 2: when contemplating performing action a on da­tum d, the policy s issuer must not only check that a .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our work differs from theirs in that they performed an in-depth quantitative study of the likelihood of a particular threat model, whereas we examine the magnitude of harm stemming from a broad range of threat models by comparing participants perceptions with the sensitivity of the data actually stored on their mobile devices.
Sentence 2: we believe our studies are complementary as together they provide a detailed as­sessment of smartphone risks stemming from unauthorized access; a complete assessment of risk requires that the potential effects of [a risk] be combined with the probability of occurrence [33].
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: (b)IfIijisno­form,Aevaluates 5;j-1 g=aij-Imodp(l) Zij-I=sigA(iaij-I)(2) wheresij-IisontainedinthedesriptionofIij inpriniple.Passingthesetestsindiatesthatwj isnoti'sbiddingprie.Ifsij-Iisnotontained orthesetestsarefailed,AperformsDispute(Bi) inordertoremoveBifromthesystemsafely(see setion3.4).
Sentence 2: ()IfIijisyes­form,Averifes =H(g C aij-I modpllaij-I)(3) Zij-I=sigA(iaij-I)(4) whereprf(sij-I)=(He)isontainedasapart ofIijinpriniple.Ifthesetestsaretrue,Biis awinner.Inthisase,Aannotomputedkij-I sineAdoesnotgetthevalueofsij-I.Aannotgetanyusefulinformationofloser'sbids atall.Ifprf(sij-I)isnotontainedorthese testsarefailed,AperformsDispute(Bi)inorder toremoveBi(seesetion3.4).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The challenge ciphertext E is formed as: (T * ,E ' = mµ · Z, {Ej,x = Crj,map(x) }j.U,x.ST* ,f(j,x)=1, * {E * = Crj,map(x) }j..x,x.ST* J j,x If (g, A, B, C, Z) .Dbdh and we let s = c, then we have Y s = e(g, g)abc and Ej,x = Crj,map(x) =(g rj,map(x) )s,E * = j,x ** j,map(x) j,map(x) )s Cr =(g r .
Sentence 2: the ciphertext is a valid random encryption of message mµ Otherwise, if (g, A, B, C, Z) .Drand, we have E ' = mµ ·Z.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Thispro.lede.nes whichattributes are revealed (in WS-Trust attributes are called claims).
Sentence 2: to generate U-Prove evidencein our system, we wouldneed totranslate our claim into a set of U-Prove WS-Token speci.cations, one for each cre­dential (U-Prove token) that shall be used.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Any node that attempts to connect on a stan­dard bridge port (of our 247 bridges, 197 ran on a port in the list {80, 443, 8080, 9001}) and initiate a Tor connection is likely to succeed.
Sentence 2: in the worst case a patient adversary could discover all bridges by simply polling the Internet over the course of sev­eral weeks.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Rootkits op­erate stealthily, and as a result, end users may not even be aware that their phones are infected.
Sentence 2: an attacker can listen­in on several conversations, which violates user privacy, ranging from those that result in embarrassing social situations to leaks of sensitive information.Forexample, an attack that records the con­versationsatacorporate board meeting can potentially compromise corporate trade secrets andbusiness reports to competitors.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If too many nodes in the graph are badly labeled (i.e., their labels are not the hash of their in-neighbors labels) the veri.er will reject the solution with high probability.
Sentence 2: if the veri.er accepts we can use the combinatorial property of the graph to conclude that there must be a long path consisting of nodes that were correctly computed, and from the sequential property of the hash it will follow that the solver must have spent a long time performing the computation.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.1 Constrained Tasks Properties In order to reveal a potential dependency between the set Tk, the applied control-.ow patterns, and the latter entail­ment constraints we specify three properties for Tk that are based on the execution path evaluation of Section 3: 4.1.1 Strict Entailment In case a constrained set of tasks Tk has exactly one par­tial order observable at runtime when applied to a work.ow pattern we call Tk a strict set of constrained tasks.
Sentence 2: the tuple (Tk,<) de.nes an antisymmetric order on Tk.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While it is very computationally expensive to factor this number and furthermore, given its fac­tors, not possible to deterministically di.erentiate be­tween factors of ( and y, we still would like to lower the possibility of success as much as possible.
Sentence 2: we require that .j and (j are at least as large as M A XI N T /2, which gives us .x/rx ?
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.1 Attacker Assumptions We assume that the adversary has no special access to served content, and attempts to inject malicious scripts oc­cur as described in the previous section, e.g., by upload­ing malicious content to a wiki or phishing with creatively­formed URLs.
Sentence 2: we assume that the web site is trusted by site visitors, up to the limits of the same-origin policy [28]: visitors are willing to execute scripts in site con­tent, since they assume scripts to be tacitly endorsed by the site.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In [7], a 256x256 grid is used to plot the scans, where the x and y coordinates are the third and fourth bytes of the destination IP addresses scanned ( c and d in the address a.b.c.d), and the color represents metrics based on statistical information regarding the arrival time at that IP address.
Sentence 2: the explored approach is focused on determining if some low-complexity graph algorithms can be used to .lter noise and aid detection of sophisticated scans.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: (Even if users themselves are not malicious, one might worry about malware on a user s machine, or information leaked unintentionally through side channels.)
Sentence 2: we argue that it is still a very important open prob­lem to design an e.cient and secure multi-authority ABE scheme without a trusted CA, and this is one of the problems we will attempt to solve here.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.1 Code-level countermeasures As described above, the root cause of Session Fixation problems is in general a mismatch in the implementations of the session handling, which usually is done on the frame­work level, and the authentication management, which is realized on the application layer.
Sentence 2: to be se­cure against Session Fixation, the application s developer has to renew a user s session identi.er manually every time this user s authentication state changes (see Listing 1).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, since the number of infected machines could be small in real-world, the high fan-in feature may not hold and thus will probably miss the botnet packet­ s. As illustrated in Table 8 in Appendix A, this condition causes very low sampling rates on botnet packets in our traces.
Sentence 2: we modify the condition and only use the condition related to .ow size for FlexSample.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This is because the lazy intruder technique never instantiates vari­ables whose concrete value is irrelevant for the attack (this is why we call it lazy in the .rst place); these still admit ill­typed instantiations (confusing P1 and P2), but they always also admit well-typed instantiations.
Sentence 2: we can show that there exists an attack against P1 in isolation or against P2 in isolation.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Comparing to group-enabled dissemination-centric access control systems enables our anal­ysis to more directly compare the e.ect of the group-centric paradigm, whereas comparing to non-group-enabled systems would be more likely to highlight simply the advantage of the additional level of indirection provided by groups.
Sentence 2: we evaluate the following dissemination-centric systems.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The resultant vec­tor is actually the component-wise maximum among the t signed vectors given as input.
Sentence 2: once all partial signa­tures embed the same vector, the Combine algorithm com­putes (modi.ed) Lagrange coe.cients for each partial sig­nature and interpolates the signing key sk in the exponen­ t. the output of the algorithm is a full signature .d v[k] .d -(v [k]-v[k]+1) k=1 ekk=1 ek ß = H(c)sk = H(c) mod N on the vector v. Notice that in addition to requiring all vectors to be stretched to be identical, the context of these vectors must also be the same for the Combine algorithm to success­fully produce a full signature.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Although the GBZ requirements are an important (.rst) step towards improving the security of systems that are part of the EPD, it is obviously not possible to guarantee correct­ness of all systems hardware, operating systems, application programs, and usage of all systems that are part of the EPD especially because the EPD is an very large system con­sisting of a large number of GBZ systems which themselves may consist of a large number of (sub)systems and (desk­top) PCs.
Sentence 2: the GBZ requirements should not be viewed as a complete answer regarding the security of GBZ systems, even though they are sometimes presented as such.
Relationship: reasoning