sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Speci.cally, %n writes the number of bytes out­put by the printing function (prior to the %n) to the memory location speci.ed by the corresponding argu­ment.
Sentence 2: printing functions do not check the number or types of their variable arguments.1  an attacker can perform unauthorized writes by in­serting unexpected %n s into user-supplied input strings (e.g., command-line arguments) that eventually get passed to print­ing functions.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Of course, this model needs to abstract from individual pro­grams and learn, for example, that the folder c:Program Files contains private directories (these are folders that are supposed to be written only by their respective owners ).
Sentence 2: even when our access activity model is deployed on a system that has a program installed that was never seen before, our model accounts for the fact that this program is expected (and allowed) to write to its sub-folder under C:Program Files.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To reduce the computational and communication com­plexity of these TTP-free schemes, PEREA [22] modi.es the blacklisting requirement: In PEREA, the user produces a one-time random token for each authentication and proves that none of her previous K tokens was blacklisted.
Sentence 2: the window during which she can be e.ectively blacklisted for a given action is limited.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Assuming that the replay detection mechanism is only triggered by the presence of the optional  el­ement, the recipient accepts the message as authentic.
Sentence 2: the attacker has bypassed the replay detection checks and, by replay­ing the message (or some variants of the message), may cause the same request to be processed several times, making the client sub­scriber pay several times for the same query and forcing the server to do redundant work.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, this would a.ect all users in the mobile network and have a negative impact on the energy consumption of mobile devices, which is a major considera­tion of operators due to the advent of smartphones.
Sentence 2: storm detection and mitigation methods are needed that can distinguish between normal and signalling-heavy users so as to reduce the impact of storms while not needlessly punish­ing non-misbehaving users.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When come to return-less ROP, through it does not use ret instruction sequences ending with ret, there are also similar instructions act like ret, e.g., jmp instruction and pop-jmp instructions are used to chain next gadget.
Sentence 2: we can simply monitor the ret-like instructions rather than ret in­struction to apply deRop in return-less ROP.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We show that the composition function h * I) = h ' I)) X,X 1 ( ¯X1 (hX ( ¯is a good randomness extractor.
Sentence 2: during the eval­uation of (S '' , R) = next(S ' ), the value ' ' ]m ' d]m * U = [X · S 1 = [X · S · X 1 + hX,X 1 (I¯) 6The fact that polynomial evaluation can be computed in such on-line manner is called Horner s method.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: These enhanced features come with a cost mobile devices may get lost or stolen and they can be used to launch an attack.
Sentence 2: access to critical resources and services should not only depend on the credentials of Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro.t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the .rst page.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Now, as CL signature are un­forgeable and we can conclude that there must exist some E such RE 1 A 'eS. '
Sentence 2: 1 ' that Z =±Rµ0 (mod n) we have RE = R ej µ 0 11 ' '' (mod n) from which we can conclude that E = e1µ1 (mod pq ) (otherwise n could be factored).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The payload is also quite small, often a single bit to indicate if the target device is to be switched on or o.. Devices are often built provid­ing only sending or receiving capability, but not both to save cost.
Sentence 2: since receivers cannot transmit ac­knowledgements, transmitters send every command multi­ple times, with some devices sending hundreds of packets to ensure reliable operation in a noisy, feedback-less channel.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: GP rule re.nement approach, which will optimise the current set of rules, adjusting the values in the condi­tions (antecedents), for instance.
Sentence 2: some super.u­ous parts on the rules and even complete rules could be removed or improved, obtaining for instance spe­cialisations or generalisations of existing rules which could mean a better performance.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If there are two secrets, s1 and s2, we can de.ne the condi­tional safety of s1 upon the disclosure of s2 as the condi­tional probability of guessing s1 given s2.
Sentence 2: we de.ne absolute safety in a system as being the property that no disclosure of objects whose policies have been satis.ed re­sults in any change in the probability of guessing the value of any object whose policy has not been satis.ed regardless of what inferences might be possible.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Therefore, stan- dard Java runtime systems will not likely conform to the realtime specification, because they target environments without realtime re- quirements, and probably the underlying operating system does not offer any realtime guarantees either.
Sentence 2: we think that a subset of the realtime specification should be integrated into a new version of the standard Java specification, so that applications that depend on scheduling mechanisms - such as mobile agent sys- tems -may run consistently across different JVM implementations.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, with the exception of Triulzi [30], who presented a NIC backdoor that provides a shell running on the GPU, and contrary to our approach, those previous backdoors were only bootstrapped from hard­ware devices, from where they tried to compromise the host machine s kernel.
Sentence 2: those kinds of backdoors can be detected and prevented by kernel integrity protection mech­anisms, such as Copilot [25], which is implemented as a PCI device.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We use a Bayesian formulation for de.ning the best correspon­dence between two inverse distribution envelopes It and It-1.As bumps appear or disappear they cause a portion of inverse distribu­tion to move to the left or the right.
Sentence 2: the correspondence can be de.ned in terms of the displacement (in terms of frequency) seen by each point in the It-1 envelope for the latter to have transformed into the It envelope.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The DigestAtCreation in the TPM key structurewill beset to store thePCR17 valueat the key creation time.
Sentence 2: a veri.er with knowledge of a) the hash of the bootstrapping SLB and b) the TTP public key is able to verify that this key was actually created by the bootstrapping PAL as part of a Flicker session and that it is dedicated for the TD of the particular TTP.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: (R2) It is possible, though, that the DOM of a page may change continuously (e.g., via JavaScript) to realize some highly dynamic visual e.ect, while the browser still .ts our de.nition of resting state, i.e., the need of (emulated) user intervention to load other content recorded in the trace.
Sentence 2: even if the DOM keeps changing, we decide that we reached a resting state if the instrumented browser has not issued any new successful (i.e., served from the trace) HTTP request in the last 4 · tpoll intervals.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our goal in designing Clouseau was not to pro­pose a new trust negotiation policy language, but rather to explore the design of e.cient solutions to the type-3 com­pliance checker problem.
Sentence 2: rather than designing Clouseau to check the satisfaction of policies speci.ed in one particular policy language (e.g., Cassandra, RT, TPL, or X -TNL), we instead focus on designing a more general­purpose compliance checker.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: H F Figure 3: A set of delegations  4.3 Time-restricted delegations A further possible extension to the model proposed here is that of time-bound delegations such that: A delegates to B the right R for the next T hours.
Sentence 2: instead of expressing a delegation as: delegate(U1,U2,R), we would modify it to delegate(U1,U2,R, start time, end time) or dele-gate(U1,U2,R, now(), now()+T), where now() is a standard function that returns the current time.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For the successive sub­strings, the k-byte window shifts toward the end of the pay­load one byte at a time.
Sentence 2: p - k + 1 substrings are 1500 20 1000 500 Load Factor (%) 15 10 5  Memory Used (KBytes) 0 0 Substring Length (Bytes) Substring Length (Bytes) (a) Memory Used for TBT (b) Load Factor of TBT Figure 4: TBT Performance when the hash table size is 512 15 20  Memory Used (MBytes) Figure 3: Architecture of the Proposed Scheme extracted for a p bytes packet.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We also consider the analysis of tpmt typically done before pre­scribing6-mercaptopurine toleukemiapatients.
Sentence 2: as shown in[80], two alleles are known to cause the tpmt disorder: (1) one presents a mutation G.Cinposition238 ofgene s c-DNA,(2) the other presents one mutation G.Ainposition 460 and one A.Ginpo­sition 719.4 the resulting .ngerprint contains these 6 (nucleotide,position)pairs.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, there is no guarantee that the best vendor today will be the most reliable partner in the near fu­ture.
Sentence 2: to make the decision of moving data to a public cloud, a company has to: 1. understand the legal requirements and stay au courant with current legislation and service providers offers 2. identify assets which are suitable for keeping beyond organi­zational boundaries 3. identify a reliable cloud service provider and audit his com­pliance with the security policies and legislative requirements 4. understand information management mechanisms, including the security capabilities of the provider  It is easily expected from the previous requirements that most com­panies will consider using cloud services a security and legal has­sle.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: One example is that delaying a task will always in­crease user frustration), but are linear in a set of penalty features.
Sentence 2: given a new weight vector wpnew and a start­ing state xk, one can approximate the optimal policy pnew for the new weight vector based on the already learned pol­icy set C, simply by selecting the one with minimum ex­ ' pected discounted penalty pnew = argminp.C Qp(xk,a), where a' = argmina!
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: All the SP can currently do is set the  attribute in the authentication request to a predefined integer value which the IdP is meant to map into an already known set of attributes published in the SP s metadata.
Sentence 2: we recommend that the SAMLv2.0 specification be enhanced by defining a new request type: the  message, which allows the SP to dynamically request the set of attributes it requires along with its current authentication request.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While we have not derived a closed .. form for the upper bound of ., it follows from Inequation 1 3 that it must be close to 2t .
Sentence 2: for example, for symbols with a size of 16 bits, secure coding with fountain codes or secret sharing leads 1 to a coding rate of around 216 to ensure perfect secrecy.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Therefore, we assume the cost to be ß.
Sentence 2: the total cost, from our description above can be summarized as follows: total cost = (1 × C M P ) + (2 × AN D) + (2 × OR) + (1 × C ON C AT ) + ß (11) Assuming t is the time required to perform logical oper­ations, such as C M P , AN D, OR and C ON C AT , we can further approximate Equation 11 to determine the approxi­mate execution time for HiveSign as shown in Equation 12: approximate execution time = (6 × t) + ß (12) Table 6 presents a comparison of the computational costs of Drira et al.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: How­ever, some additional subtleties arise (see Section 4.2 for details): in particular, we must ensure that the ack mes­sage both (1) does not leak information about sk (in a com­putational sense); yet (2) corresponds to a unique possible sk.
Sentence 2: for example, the ack message cannot simply be computed as v = Fsk(r), where F is a pseudorandom function and r is a random value: in this case (even if r is public), v would not necessarily correspond to a unique sk.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: You may have noticed that Eliminate is the functional com­plement of Introduce, and EgressTransfer is the complement of IngressTransfer.
Sentence 2: it should not be surprising that we use Introduce and IngressTransfer as the suggested transformations for negated reasons: SR(NotHasAttr(e, a)) = {Introduce(e, a)}.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As explained before, with increasing m, the sample mean and variance of perturbing data will converge to their expected values.
Sentence 2: ac­curacy improves with increasing m. 5.2.2 Level of Perturbation We conducted experiments using ML data while varying the parameters of perturbing data to show how the levels of perturbation a.ect accuracy.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To sam­ple Qk(p, l, y) enough for this analysis to function requires about log d-4/ log(1 - d/256 · (1 - d/256)38) samples, which for our d is 17,720.
Sentence 2: our second round attack has a full computa­tional complexity of 4 · 220 · 17, 720 236 to extract the full AES key.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The jamming probability of the .rst bit is at most |C1 p| , the jamming probability of the last bit is at most Pe0 = 1 , and the jamming probability of Bi (2 = n+1 i = ls - 1)is atmost Pp0 == 1 .
Sentence 2: the jamming Pe0 n+1 probability of the seed is at most 1 Preal-time =1 - 1 - (1 - Pp0 )ls-1 .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this case, for each group signature produced by an unrevoked user, the revocation check alone will require around 2 × 105 pair­ing operations in, or 105 exponentiations on pairing group in: Neither is satisfactory in real life.
Sentence 2: the investiga­tion of more e.cient revocation check is of interest to both academic research and practical applications.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.2 Self-protection If a malware or rootkit attempts to invade SPAD s mem­ory space which is under the management of guest OS, it just tampers with SPAD s virtual memory space to deprive it of its functionality.
Sentence 2: sPAD takes advantage of hardware virtualization and memory remapping techniques toconcealitselfsothatthethreat ofexternal attack couldbe eliminated.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, it is important to notice that our implementation of ClickMiner is based on Selenium-WebDriver [4], which in turn is compatible with most major browsers, including some mobile versions.
Sentence 2: with only minor adjustments ClickMiner could be used to replay web tra.c within other browsers, for example selected according to the user-agent string that appears in the recorded network traces.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: b· · · b every non-zero state appears exactly once per period, there 0 l-1 exists a d such that 0=d=2l-2 and Sd = (sd, · · · , sd+l-2, sd+l-1) = (0, · · · , 0, 1) .
Sentence 2: ad  [[[[[ is nonsingular since it can be written as 0 0 · · · 0 1 00 1 sd+l .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: where wehaveused thefactthat Z ' is uniformly distributed over V(.).
Sentence 2: the embedder will be interested in looking for the value of a that maximizes(17), which after shown to be 2replacing sW in(17) by the rightmostterm of(14) canbe  De(4s2 -De) whichisthesamevalueobtainedinSect.4 whenthe random codebook based stegosystem was analyzed.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For any parameter, the maximum .tness score di.erence between a secure and insecure setting is 594 points, the di.erence between six partial scores of 1 and six partial scores of 100.
Sentence 2: for both GA+PVM and GA+PDM, the .tness increases of 9, 956 and 15, 508 over the 40 generations, shown in Fig.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: An obligation is an action which some sub ject must carry out during some timeframe.
Sentence 2: we model an obligation as a tuple obl(s, a, O, [ts,te]), where s is a sub ject, a is an action, [ts,te] is a time window during which s is obliged to take action a,and O is a .nite sequence of zero or more objects on which the action must be performed.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Unlike in the simpler TEA and RC4 algorithms, the .rst and the last of these rounds are done outside the main loop of AES, as they are functionally di.erent than the other inner rounds.
Sentence 2: when a comparison with an AES reference implementation is made with Aligot, only the I/O relationship for the inner rounds, i.e.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We did not choose dynamic root of trust in our design because the trusted code does not only need to insert passwords (which would be a relatively small func­tionality), but we also need to authenticate the server, verify the authenticity of the SSL channel, and provide a trusted GUI so that the user can always be sure about the application interacting with.
Sentence 2: signi.cant parts of the system need to execute very often or in parallel, which would introduce a noticeable performance overhead when using dynamic root of trust.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In LP, as the se­cret key is chosen according to a Gaussian distribution with parameter s, the number of bits to store is ni plog(13s)l. Here we choose a maximum threshold of 13s for the Gaus­sian sampling such that larger entries of the secret key have a negligibly small probability (less than 2-100 according to Lyubashevsky [Lyu12]).
Sentence 2: we compute the key sizes as shown in Table 6.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Notice that now, H(v)= U0 i.V Ui outputs the key K. = g bF(v)+J(v), where V is the set ofindexes i for which Analysis of A s response If A has won the game, K = the ith bit of the string at hand equals to 1. .
Sentence 2: b can solve the BDDH prob­ .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While this is indeed our long-term research goal, we think its adoption will likely take a long time, given the long history of the traditional online patching model and the fact that it is an entrenched part of today s IT prac­tices, ranging from software development and distribution to sys­tem administration.
Sentence 2: we believe that an interim solution that is backward compatible with existing patch format, and yet works in an of.ine manner and provides much improved scalability, would be desirable.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: av(1 -ßv)t ßv(1 -av)t =1 - + av -ßv av -ßv v=1 nt-1 v)t-j-1 =1 -(1 -av)t -av (1 -ßv)j(1 -a. v=1 j=0  3.2 Full-.edged Case In this model, we further consider edge-infections, mean­ing that vertices could become infected also because of their infected neighbors.
Sentence 2: each edge (u,v) .E is associated with an infection probability, .vu.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The parameter In of a widget is an upper bound on informa­tion that maybegainedby knowing anevent occurred on the wid­get.
Sentence 2: if a ButtonListener[f,f'] is added as a listener to a Button[f,f'] object, f' is an upper bound on information that the listener may learn by having the onClick method invoked.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Player P1 then can determine possible values of y (using a gcd computation, etc.).
Sentence 2: this protocol should not be used when x can take the value of 0, or, alternatively, the coe.cients (1 and (2 could be constructed in a way to minimize the probability of a successful attack when x = 0 (see [4] for more information).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: There have been various approaches proposed for top-down approaches (e.g., [20, 17, 15]), but given the time­consuming and costly nature of this approach, it has limited adoption in real settings [17].
Sentence 2: over the past decade, there has been a growing in­terest in bottom-up approaches, which enables role engineer­ing to be automated with signi.cantly lower cost.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our method leverages existing work on attack graphs [7, 6, 9] and privilege graphs [2, 3, 5], but extends the attack graph concept by creating executable models driven by the attack preferences of individual adversaries.
Sentence 2: an analy­sis using our method can be customized to re.ect the attack behavior of di.erent types of adversaries with di.erent at­tack objectives, attack preferences, resource levels, attack skill levels, system access, and system knowledge.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Given a message body such as t = B·A·Na ·Nb, the recipient knows that the next component must be f(t).
Sentence 2: if tags in V occur only in the context t·f(t), then there is never any am­biguity about the body to which the tag applies, and every occurrence of a tag contributes to representing an authen­ticated message [ t]]f with no choice about what t is being tagged.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: av, .v (see text) ßv Figure 2: State transition of vertex v in the full­.edged case Let .v(t) be the probability that at time t+1 a node v becomes infected because of its neighbors that are in infected state at time t.We have .v(t)=1 - [1 -.vu iu(t)].
Sentence 2: (5) (u,v).E the model implies: sv(t)= [1 -av -(1 -av) .v(t-1)] sv(t-1), (6) iv(t)=[av +(1 -av) .v (t-1)] sv(t-1) + (1 -ßv ) iv (t-1), (7) rv(t)= ßv iv(t-1) + rv(t-1).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: And it is impossible to measure the risk of either.
Sentence 2: the focus of this paper is twofold: .rst, it is about methods for using data input factors across multiple dimen­sions that provide meaningful and measurable con.dence about whether or not someone is who they say they are, and that they are not, for example, performing a masquerade at­tack [31] by presenting stolen, forged, duplicated, guessed, or mimicked credentials.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Clearly, near-optimal evasion is su.cient to achieve this goal, but in real-world evasion, once a low­cost negative instance is located, the search can terminate.
Sentence 2: instead of quantifying the query complexity required for a family of classi.ers, it is more relevant to quantify the query performance of an evasion algorithm for a .xed number of queries based on a target cost.
Relationship: reasoning