sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: dynamic setting of system parameters Since our experience with RTTs is relatively new, we can­not be sure that RTTs that are considered secure today will still be secure in the future.
Sentence 2: we must assume that once RTTs are used to secure something of value they will become the target of many hacking attempts, and at­tackers might .nd a way of e.ciently breaking RTTs.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The auditor commits to the secret values a ' i as well as to the pseudo-random values used in computing si ' .
Sentence 2: a com­putes the following commitments: aJ j gj := g mod N, for 1 = j = s, prf hi := g fkJ (i) mod N, for 1 = i = n. As the values si ' were computed in F, i.e.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: That is, P is the disjoint union of the sets P + , P - and P 0,where P + is the set of up permissions, P - is the set of down permissions and P 0 is the set of neutral permissions.4 Each permission p .P is available to some subset of roles in the hierarchy called the e.ective roles of p and denoted RE (p).
Sentence 2: we de.ne the function RE : P .P(R), where .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Also, among the attack sessions, we observed that 425,719 sessions were related to unknown attacks, because they did not trigger any IDS alerts, but they contained shellcodes detected by Ashula.
Sentence 2: in case of known attacks, they have to be recorded by our IDS, and if a session contains shellcode(s), there is a high possi­bility that it is related to a real attack.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To demonstrate the usability problems in current access control systems and the feasibility of our proposed solution, we have chosen an existing access control mechanism, the WebDAV access control list standard [4], as the starting point for usability improvement.
Sentence 2: the WebDAV (Web-based Distributed Authoring and Versioning) [7] system is designed to create an infrastructure for distributed file systems built on top of the now­ubiquitous foundation of the World-Wide-Web, the HTTP protocol.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: There are two possi­ble solutions: One is to follow the same approach taken by current system backup software, which utilizes the Volume Shadow Copy Service (more details in [18]) of Windows to access the locked .les.
Sentence 2: we can create a shadow copy of the locked .le and instruct VMwatcher to access the shadow copy for VM state pro­curement.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It monitors how the sensitive information propagates within the whole guest system (including the propagation through the kernel and all applications).
Sentence 2: we need to in­vestigate whether the information has propagated into the sample (i.e., whether it has been accessed by the sample) and what the sample has done with the information (e.g., sending it to an external server via the network).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Instead of constructing a cipher of larger block size, Liskov, Rivest, and Wagner [5] and Halevi and Rogaway [4] proposed modes of operations to address the similar problems.
Sentence 2: halevi and Rogaway [4] proposed tweakable the following tweakable en­ciphering mode for storage block level encrypitons: derive the ci­phertext c of a plaintext m as c = Et K (m) where t is the hard disk position that m (c indeed) is stored.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Application # of files echo Select Insert Update Delete PHP-Address book 112 367 35 44 25 7 Serendipity 1,044 1,219 4 1 1 0 PHP-fusions 418 2555 82 4 7 1 Our evaluation approach is as follows: we consider applications with vulnerable code.
Sentence 2: we search in the OSVDB1 database for reported vulnerabilities for these applications (related to XSS and SQLI) and revise different files appropriately to create vulnerable version of applications.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Furthermore, the PKI uses identity-based crypto­graphic techniques whereby a simple string can be used as a public key, which simpli.es signi.cantly public key manage­ment.
Sentence 2: we propose an extension of an identity­based signature scheme to be used in the Security Mediator environment, which represents to our knowledge the .rst signature scheme of this kind.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Thus, for each ßi that was incorrect, A can compute the ith bit of the ¯¯ secret s; so on average A learns m/2 bits of the secret s from each protocol run.
Sentence 2: the probability that B accepts, 2-m is exactly the same that the probability that A¯learns all of the bits of s.  5.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In what follows, we give a theoretical e.ciency analysis of this operation.
Sentence 2: we consider the number of invo­cations of the NEG(·)operation with respect to the number of travel records, n, and the number of locations, l. During each protocol run, the negation service is used for two tasks: (i) to compute the elements of matrix T (see equa­tion (1)), and (ii) to perform the negation of the elements neg of matrix T : ti,j = NEG(ti,j ).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Experimented on the same plat­form, the active Probes features produced a considerably Figure 2: Plot of ROC graphs of six combinations of feature sources better classi.cation performance, compared to the passive features.
Sentence 2: the Probe features incurred a zero false-detection rate (FPR), while achieving a true-detection rate (TPR) of 86%.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Researchers have de­veloped many sophisticated algorithms to trade accuracy for reduced storage overhead [6, 31], but they all amount to ap­proximating information that can be precisely and cheaply tracked by the sender!
Sentence 2: the .lter s task could be simpli.ed if each sender could be trusted to include its current outbound bandwidth usage in each packet it sent.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Then EK (·) can be used with the parame­ter n = 4096 (note that 1024 bytes are 8162 = 2 × 4096 bits).
Sentence 2: each storage device block unit is one cipher-block of EK (·) and is divided into two parts L and R, each of 4096 bits.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It seems that the most natural way of captur­ing the idea that other principals could punish the violator is to say that there is a sequence of events that they can carry out (either typically or probabilistically) that produce a punishing trace, regardless of what other events occur in the trace.
Sentence 2: (events that produce a punishing trace are sequentially enabled at extensions of the violating trace Tev, even if these are interleaved with unrelated events.)
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Let us now consider the value t* = logs C~: unlike the previous two quantities, t* assumes dif- ferent values in the above two games.
Sentence 2: while in game G2, t* contains information about the message Ma, in game G3, t* is just a random value: denote with [t*]2 and It*]3 the values of t* in game G2 and game G3, respectively.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our main contributions are: (1) We formally de.ne the privacy leakage function, se­lective security and single-dimensional privacy of a tree­based public-key MDRSE in this paper.
Sentence 2: we are among the .rst to distinguish path pattern from tradi­tional access pattern and include path pattern in the privacy R-trees do not guarantee a good worst-case performance [17, 18], but they generally perform well with real-world data.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Another motiva­tion of this paper is to enable the U-Prove technology in TPM 2.0 such that the TPM can be a trusted device for U-Prove, using the same TPM signature primitive for DAA without any additional overhead.
Sentence 2: u-Prove is supported by TPM 2.0 with zero extra cost of the TPM resources.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A good strategy under these circumstances is to place the same topic documents into di.erent groups, so that the likelihood of having documents of the attacker s interest among the false positives is minimized.
Sentence 2: if an attacker is in­terested in documents on, say, computer security, then such documents are distributed among a number of groups, and are mixed with a large variety of documents on di.erent top­ics.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As such, in recent years, it has been intensively investigated and several sys­tems and prototypes [18, 6, 17, 19, 2] have been proposed.
Sentence 2: trust negotiation provides an effective way for two initially untrusted parties to de.ne a distributed, shared declara­tive authorization policy, using as building blocks the parties local policies.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Suppose a client wants to outsource her private data to a semi-honest server in an encrypted form such that she can later on still read and write her encrypted data blocks, while the server should not learn anything other than the number of blocks it stores and the total number of accesses.
Sentence 2: the server should not see the access pattern of the queries (i.e., which element was accessed at which time).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Depending on the number of virtual processors required by the VM, one or more groups may be used.
Sentence 2: this approach is simple to implement, although the biggest drawback is that it may result in under utilization of the platform.if a VM requires cache isolation and uses fewer cores than the sum of all the cores in the groups assigned to it, these unassigned cores cannot be used.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The underlying AES-CTR-then-HMAC-SHA1 core is a provably secure au­thenticated encryption scheme per results by Bellare and Namprempre [1] and Krawczyk [17] and standard assump­tions on AES-CTR and HMAC-SHA1.
Sentence 2: at a high-level, the new WinZip encryption architecture appears quite solid.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: On a multi-CPU system, the SKINIT instruction has additional requirements which must be met for secure ini­tialization.
Sentence 2: sKINIT can only be run on the Boot Strap Processor (BSP), and all Application Processors (APs) must successfully receive an INIT Inter-Processor In­terrupt (IPI) so that they respond correctly to a handshak­ing synchronization step performed during the execution of SKINIT .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This intuitively makes sense since it is only keeping enough information from previous measurements to guarantee that the true value is preserved.
Sentence 2: it is not computing the convex hull at time t as map S and intersect and map S and fuse do (and poten­tially introduce additional points to the fused region), nor is it mapping potentially corrupted polyhedra as does map n. We note, however, that without additional assumptions about the rank of A, map R and intersect and pairwise intersect are not subsets of each other.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If the i - I st server introduces naive (or unin- tentional) errors into its output, these are likely to be de- teeted.
Sentence 2: the (i - 1) st server does not the check- sum in the ciphertext being passed to the i th server, so it is unlikely to be able to determine a way of, e.g., flipping a few bits without being detected.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When B receives a message on b, it checks its MAC and acts upon it, here simply by forwarding on a channel c. Intuitively, we would expect that B forwards on c only a message that A has MACed.
Sentence 2: although an attacker may intercept, modify, and inject messages on b, it should not be able to forge a MAC and trick B into forwarding some other message.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Network forensic investi­gations are typically conducted on the connection meta in­formation level or on the payload level.
Sentence 2: hori­zon Extender focuses on the retention of network forensic evidence for the following generic purposes: Attribution: Attribution deals with assigning leaked con­tent, e.g., to attribute a known .le that has been uploaded to a client and remote server identity.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: ), and it is easy to verify that the above exam­ples do.
Sentence 2: when a fragile permutation family is closed under composition, a mix-cascade completely made by fragile mixes could be vulnerable: An active adversary only need insert a message to the batch, .nd the output cor­responding to its input message, and use this to determine the combined permutation performed by the cascade.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Suppose that with probability at least p, the execution time for a single request is at most Tbig.
Sentence 2: the adversarial insider con­trols execution time but cannot make the probability of exceeding Tbig greater than 1 - p. For some computations, such as blinded cryptographic operations on suf.ciently isolated computers, p can be gained by sampling with randomly generated inputs.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this study, we therefore aim to investigate the e.ect of giving user guidelines to users on the creation phase of our devel­oped click-draw based graphical passwords.
Sentence 2: we conducted two experiments to explore the e.ect of user guidelines in our study with 60 participants and the experi­mental results indicate that by applying user guidelines into the phase of password creation, users can overall create bet­ter click-draw based graphical passwords.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: An important property of a set-membership proof scheme to high­ light is that the signer only needs to compute T and Sonce, regard­ less of how many set elements it will eventually compute member­ ship proofs for.
Sentence 2: the cost of one public key signature com­ putation can be amortized over the cost of many set-membership proofs.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Therefore, cloud providers usually take steps to hide the exact identity of the physical server running the hosted cloud services as well as the structure of their internal network (and of particular servers within it).
Sentence 2: to pre­vent identi.cation of services placement, clouds often use a random mapping between external IP addresses (of hosted services) and the internal IP addresses (of the virtual in­stances running the services), and/or employ other separa­tion techniques, e.g., see [29].
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For functions with a formal parameter of type access vector t, If a kernel module M is recursion-free, all functions in M are but do not refer to any particular access vector (such as D IR R EA D, loop-free, and updates to predicates can be determined precisely D I R W R ITE, or D IR S E A RC H), the analysis returns {(true I .x.x)}(i.e., predicates are not set to Unknown), then Algorithm 2 propa­  (not shown in Algorithm 2 for brevity), which says that the function gates predicates precisely.
Sentence 2: the predicate at statement s is p potentially authorizes any conceptual operation, based upon the ac­if and only if s is reached under condition p. cess vector it is invoked with (the variable x in .x.x denotes the Because Algorithm 2 ignores back-edges on loops, loop bod­ access vector).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Speci.cally, given a graph G =(V,E), we partition V into ck (where ck =l(n/d)j) subsets, V1,V2,...,Vck such that Vi nVj = Ø for i j,|Vi| = d, and .= V , and = iVi the number of edges of E whose incident nodes belong to different subsets is minimized.
Sentence 2: ci =(Vi,Ei), where Ei consists of the edges between the vertices in Vi.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: sign(sQIDASn , [ASn, ASn-1, ... , AS1]); 11: end if 12: return true; With these algorithms, the validity of BGP announcements is guaranteed by enforcing veri.cations and route attestations in the IN/OUT .lters of BGP speakers.
Sentence 2: the identity of a BGP speaker is veri.ed and its route authenticity is guaranteed by the route attestation rules, through which different speakers build a transitive trust relationship.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For the purpose of early detection for terrorists' movements, activities and associations, the enhancement of information gathering and extraction of significant knowledge is required.
Sentence 2: it is Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When m2 is known to the eavesdrop­per, rx2 can decode m1 via interference cancellation [15].
Sentence 2: rx2 .rst removes the interference caused by m2 from y2, and then decodes m1 from the remaining signals as: rx2 (h11f22 - f21h12) h11h22 - h12h21 v m = v (y2 - p2m2)1 p1(h21f22 - h22f21) h11f22 - f21h12 (7)(h11f22 - f21h12) = m1 + v n2 p1(h21f22 - h22f21) where all components, except m1, in this equation are known to rx2, and the sniffed SNR is controlled by the forged CSI, i.e., f21 and f22.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: INTRODUCTION With rising popularity of tablets and M2M applications, Cisco [6] foresees that in 2015, the average smartphone will generate a tra.c of 1.3 109 bytes.month-1, which represents a 16-fold increase over the 2010 average of 79 106 bytes.month-1 .
Sentence 2: aggregate smartphone tra.c in 2015 will be 47 times more than in 2010.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.2 Proof of Theorem 1 The correctness of the generic construction can be easily veri.edfromthecorrectness of the underlyingID-KEM and AE schemes.
Sentence 2: we prove semantic security of ciphertexts in Lemma 1 and information-theoretic privacy of UCP in Lemma 2.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Access control lists implemented in BIND version 8 and 9 5 demand mutual authentication to prevent IP spoo.ng attacks.
Sentence 2: in BIND 8 and 9, it is possible to cre­ate IP address-based access control lists to queries via the named address match list acl and the allow-query substate­ment or the more versatile BIND 9 view mechanism.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since the adversary has no predisposi­tion as to what the correct feedback should be, there is no advantage in receiving any of it.
Sentence 2: given a client adversary that shares a key with probability p with an honest server using the DPD protocol, we can construct an adversary that has the same e.ectiveness against the em­bedded PAKE protocol.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Bitcoin [9] relies on blocks, a hash-based Proof of Work (PoW) concept, to ensure the security of transactions.
Sentence 2: given the set of transactions that have been announced since the last block, and the hash of the last block, Bitcoin miners need to .nd a nonce, that would make the hash of the formed block smaller than a 256­bit number target: hash{Bl || MR(TR1, .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: implies .d 2 d1-ß0 , hence L is (O(d 21 - ß20 ),.O(1))-spread.
Sentence 2: by Theorem 4.1 and (4.10), for every TN 21 +ß0 , we know that X(G, L) 2 is (T, O(d ß0 )T,.O(1))-spread for such T , X(G, L) is (T,NO(1)T,.O(1))-spread.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Comparing our construction to some non-hybrid schemes, we see that it is not as efficient as some of these.
Sentence 2: it is not as efficient as the con- struction of Jakobsson [16], or the repaired version of this protocol by Mitomo and Kurosawa [24], whose asymptotic per-server costs in terms of the number of modular exponen- tiations are O(N) in the expected and O(Nn) in the worst case.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: (c is an aggregate containment) then 17: int count = Exec(SELECT COUNT(*) FROM A_R WHERE subject= u ) 18: if count > 0 then 19: roles.insert(A.R) 20: roleNames.insert(R) 21: 22: return roles  4.3 Answering Capability Queries The hierarchical collection of dynamic views generated by the compilation procedure described in Section 4.1 is well­suited for answering proof of compliance and role member­ship queries precisely because it takes a role-centric view of the system.
Sentence 2: views are explicitly created to manage role memberships.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: {0, 1} * and associated access control lists ACL1,..., ACLN .
Sentence 2: c.The semantics of the access control lists is that only users who have creden­tials for all data categories in ACLi can access Ri.the access control list is a conjunction of keywords; disjunctions can be realized by letting the same record ap­pear multiple times in the database.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Two other participants (10% of 20) said that they were persuaded to use a locking mechanism by a friend or signi.cant other, and oth­erwise would not have done so.
Sentence 2: for some users, social in­.uence or adherence to social norms is the prime motivator, rather than speci.c privacy or security concerns: I guess just that was suggested to be a good idea, my girlfriend uses one (P25) My friend reminded me that this was a smartphone...there was access to lots of my accounts (P27) Finally, another two participants (10% of 20) indicated that they set it up simply because they did not see a reason not to, though could not mention any speci.c concerns: I .gured since it had the feature anyway, it s pretty quick I guess, I might as well use it... (P2) Just like, why not?
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It is easy to see that, any IA-DHKE, where the session­key, and all the pre-computed and stored session-states, can be derived merely from DH-exponents x and y (and pub­lic values), is perfectly HP-deniable.
Sentence 2: both KEA/OPACITY and OAKE are perfectly HP-deniable.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This implies that existing applications are unable to detect the presence of CertShim while allowing CertShim to remain entirely method-agnostic.
Sentence 2: certShim does not interfere with the logic built into existing applications since return values remain true to the OpenSSL and GnuTLS APIs and Cert-Shim itself holds no opinion on which veri.cation methods it should or should not use; CertShim can even be con.gured to take no action for a given application or domain.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We emphasize that homomorphism is a property that message authen­tication techniques may exhibit, but not a tool for automatically au­thenticating general operators/functions (such as the ones examined in this paper) over distributed data.
Sentence 2: we are not aware of any prior work that has addressed the general linear queries such as matrix multiplication and dot products that we study here.
Relationship: entailment