sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Thus, most solutions that address the trust evaluation make one of the following assumptions: (i)The trust initialization is not a problem of the model, it is the responsibility of the actor of the system.
Sentence 2: this task is not necessarily obvious, especially when it comes to evaluating numerically atrustedthirdparty(eg0.1,0.2, or 0.15).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We could still use our decomposition and re-stitching approach to .nd bugs in malware, because the sig­nature veri.cation is a basically a free side-condition that can be ignored.
Sentence 2: we could only build a exploit for our modi.ed bot, as other bots will verify the (incorrect) signature in the mes­sage and reject it.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: CONDENSED GRAPHS Like classical datallow [1], the Condensed Graphs (C~) model [8, 11] is graph-based and uses the flow of entities on arcs to trigger execution.
Sentence 2: condensed Graphs are directed acyclic graphs in which every node contains not only operand ports, but also an operator and a desti-nation port.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As one would expect, ECDSA signs messages faster than RSA.
Sentence 2: moore s Law lends a word of caution on those results: they are meant to demonstrate the feasibil­ity of MobiRate but not to hold in the future -in few months time mobile phones will become more powerful, and Mobi-Rate is expected to run seamlessly on them.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While there have been .rst stabs in the direction of improving Web-based password authentication, previous approaches expose at least one of the following problems: Web authentication di.ers from most other authentica­tion scenarios: It exposes many characteristics that resemble properties from security protocols.
Sentence 2: it lacks a se­curity protocol s rigorous enforcement of message sequence and integrity, resulting, for instance, in enabling the inser­tion of messages in authenticated work.ows via Cross-site Request Forgery.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since the length of a token can be different from that of the history token so an SXOR operation, which is shown in Figure !, is performed: transaction token = token (generated by grammar) SXOR history token The XOR of a clear text with a repetitive pattern to generate a ciphertext (encrypted version of the clear te~tt) is usually not recommended in cryptography.
Sentence 2: the SXOR operation is not the main cryptographic feature of the proposed algorithm.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Finally, there is one limitation which is di.cult to address: it is possible that MARK simply will not work, due to our limited understanding of FMM revenue models.
Sentence 2: it is our .rm belief that injecting unpredictability into the del­icate .nancial equilibrium online is likely to have some e.ect on the robustness of the models.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This typi­ cally does not hold in practice, in which case we would need to ob­ .FM .RS 0.02 .JC 0.2 0 0 -0.02 -0.2 0 500 1000 0 500 1000 Noise Index Noise Index (a) Rand (b) Jaccard 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.2 .F1 0.2 tain the name mapping before being able to apply majority voting.
Sentence 2: vAMO is agnostic to differences in the termi­nology that the AVs use to assign malware family names, because VAMO will automatically learn the relationships between different malware family names through the AV Label Graph construction, as discussed in Section 4 and Section 5.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: W1 n(b)= H1 n(b)+ D1 n(b) = neH(X0)+ D1 n(b) -s(i) = ne(W (X0) - D(X0||2))+ D1 n(b) (29) To our knowledge at the time of writing, it is not possible to further expand D1 n(b) as for D0 n(b) in (25).
Sentence 2: for one encrypted unit D1 n(b)= D(X0||2-s(i)), hence, W1 n(b)= W (X0).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Authorizationfailures and se­ curity exceptions account for a large fraction of errors, and they are no easier to handle than other errors [6, 24].
Sentence 2: much software simpli.es this problem by treating all errors equally: by either ig­noringthemorby haltingexecution[57].server software must correctly deal with the corner cases resulting from errors and authorization failures.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A Multi-layer Tree Model for Enterprise Vulnerability Management Bin Wu Southern Polytechnic State University Marietta, GA, USA bwu@spsu.edu ABSTRACT Conducting enterprise-wide vulnerability assessment (VA) on a regular basis plays an important role in assessing an enterprise s information system security status.
Sentence 2: an enterprise network is usually very complex, divided into different types of zones, and consisting of hundreds of hosts in the networks.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Earlier, in a single Assertion-usage or single-AP model, the AP was guaranteed that all the services by the members of the CoT, were completely based on its As­sertion of the User.
Sentence 2: in this extended scenario, this AP is not in a position to gauge how much of the decision for providing a service at a RP, was based on its Assertion and how much based on Assertions from other APs.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: By keeping track of a thread s stack boundaries both in the kernel and the userland3, PVE component can identify the thread that is running by referring to the ESP register at any given point.
Sentence 2: if it encounters a value in the ESP register that does not belong to any of the known threads, it is possible that a new thread has started or that a thread s stack frame has grown.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: between accuracy and sensitivity in network anomaly detection.
Sentence 2: even when the time window Table 3: False Positives and False Negatives of SPRT Attribute S-1-A S-1-B S-1-C S-2-A S-2-B S-2-C N-1 N-2 Detection 970 5,179 2,420 437 4,536 1,777 66 2,368 True Positives 966 5,108 2,369 320 3,510 1,558 - - False Positives 4 71 51 117 1,026 219 66 2,368 True Negatives 290,889 1,156,085 596,979 1,634,307 8,895,993 4,266,100 687,390 15,941,150 FP/(FP+TN) 1.4e-5 6.1e-5 8.5e-5 7.2e-5 1.2e-4 5.1e-5 9.6e-5 1.5e-4 Spam Connections 958 570 324 329 1,351 969 - - Missed Connections 8 2 0 6 27 13 - - MissedConnRatio 0.008 0.004 0 0.018 0.020 0.013 - - .
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Clearly, executing the Traust resource access protocol takes longer than using a more traditional means of acquiring resource access tokens (e.g., obtaining a Kerberos ticket).
Sentence 2: this comparison means very little, as traditional access control systems cannot be used in open systems en­vironments since the identities of authorized users may not be known a priori, requiring users to resort to out-of-band methods to gain access (e.g., sending written requests to re­source providers).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The most obvious kinds of data that can be retrieved from a phone are call logs, contact lists, and text messages.
Sentence 2: in an investigation, other features of a modern mobile phone, such as ring tones, T9 dictionaries, canned responses, video files, image files, calendar events, miscellaneous documents and data files, and location information can also provide valuable clues.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As for Android, we discovered that many mobile service providers were not directly invoking their relying party applications (e.g., using Intents), but rather sending data through the return values of their own applications (e.g., when invoked by a relying party).
Sentence 2: when passing data through return values, additional checks are needed to verify that the caller application matches with the intended recipient of the data.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Determining a Parallel Session Attack on a Key Distribution Protocol using a Model Checker Vladimir Pa¸sca Data Communications Security Laboratory, University of Limerick, Limerick, Ireland vladimir.pasca@ul.ie Anca Jurcu¸t Data Communications Security Laboratory, University of Limerick, Limerick, Ireland anca.jurcut@ul.ie  ABSTRACT The use of security protocols to protect sensitive information is critical.
Sentence 2: .aws in the design of security protocols can make them ine.ective.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Current solutions to defend WSNs against such cheap jammers(e.g.,channelsur.ng[2], randomizedSFDs[1]) are all based on hiding an ongoing packet transmission from re­activejammers that onlyjam when theythink orknow there is an active data transmission.
Sentence 2: these solutions require tight syncrhonization between each sender-receiver pair to ensure successful data delivery.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In §5.3, we examine the addition of annotations extra group or role in­formation that accompanies accesses into the prediction engine to recover some of the bene.t, but we .nd this offers only incre­mental improvement.
Sentence 2: we show in §5.4 that by moving to an ED con.guration, where the prediction engine can leverage all information deducible from past accesses, bene.t can be more substantially increased (though still not to the levels promised by an ND evaluation).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The paradigm is particularly useful for several reasons: many national demographics are having increasing number of aged people; health providers are facing shortages of health workers; costs of healthcare are skyrocketing; and incidences of medical errors are at all-time high [25].
Sentence 2: as desirable as Scenario-B seems, sev­eral things could go wrong when we consider several aspects Figure 2: A Desirable Emergency Response Sce­nario of security and privacy of electronic health records (EHRs), some of which are highlighted in what follows.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: PiOS generates an application s control-.ow graph by backtracking all Objective-C calls and by reconstruct­ing the class inheritance relationships.
Sentence 2: piOS suf­fers from some shortcomings: First, its analysis does not cover embedded metaclasses (i.e., root classes of Objective-C classes), which frequently occur in iOS applications.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: All values are statistically signi.cant with p<.001 the platform owners (i) to avoid granting the full privileges to third party apps, and (ii) to possibly recognize apps with anomalous permission request patterns for triaging the man­ual review process.
Sentence 2: as it is with other security problems, the permis­sion systems will not be e.ective if users do not comprehend how they work, or if the permission systems contradict other signals the users receive.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 100 and 5 respectively), the optimal scheme will be Product using RSA instead.
Sentence 2: as we noted above in our analysis of RSA based schemes alone, in this region all three of MMM, Product, and Iterated Sum have nearly identical perfor­mance, so Iterated Sum is the wiser choice in case predictions of * R1 and R 2 are wrong.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: These so­lutions can be categorized in compiler-based solutions [19, 59, 15, 40, 48]; instrumentation-based solutions [37, 16, 1, 2, 29, 55]; and hardware-facilitated solutions [26, 25].
Sentence 2: as we discuss in detail in related work (Section 6), the exist­ing solutions su.er from various shortcomings and practical de.ciencies: They either cannot provide complete detection of ROP attacks [16, 29, 37], or require side information such as debugging information [1, 2] or source code [19, 59, 15, 40, 48], which are rarely provided in practice.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since the traces are generated from the same model that the classi­.er uses, this is obviously an arti.cial experiment that over­estimates the success rate of our attack.
Sentence 2: the IMDB model underestimates the success rate due to the arti.cial transition probabilities described above, so, together, these two experiments provide rough bounds on the performance of our attack.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: They track the time evolu­tion of the RSSI and observe that the pattern of the sampled energy reports can be useful to separate information signal from jamming.
Sentence 2: they conclude that these metrics alone are not able to de­tect every type of RF jamming and propose the combined analysis of di.erent metrics (e.g., geographic position, medium access de­lay, PDR and RSSI).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Because our ap­proach does not attempt to recover the original instructions, but rather attempts to capture the relevant behavior of the code, it will not match those results for accuracy.
Sentence 2: our approach is more general, and can be applied to a wider range of obfuscation techniques.Thus,it shouldbeseenascomplementing existing ap­proachesbyprovidinginformation when others cannot.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In addition to the Bayesian calculation schema, the security ontology is used to enrich the Bayesian network with concrete information security domain knowl­edge.
Sentence 2: the high dependence on realistic input val­ues (attacker pro.le, control implementation e.ectiveness, and a priori threat probabilities) requires further research on sound methods and techniques to gather, store, and pro­vide these crucial threat probability calculation components.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For pages that allow the use of plug-in code, wikilaunch launches wiki.py with I = {iv} to allow v s plug-in code to par­ticipate in the page s rendering.
Sentence 2: the plug-in relies on FlumeWiki code during processing, which it cannot read off the disk: FlumeWiki s code does not have iv in its integrity label.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The trustworthiness associated with public keys is similar to PGP [16].
Sentence 2: whilst in PGP the trustworthiness associated with a key determines to what extent the user is trusted to act as 'introducer' (i.e., for authentication); in this paper, the trustworthiness associated with the key determines to what extent the user is trusted to sign assertions.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As a concrete example, the browser may be rendering a page that uses asynchronous requests to periodically update a component of the page with some real-time news feed.
Sentence 2: these asynch­ronous requests are of little interest for the purpose of mining sub­sequent user-browser interactions, and therefore we would like to .nd a way to determine whether the user had in fact moved on to request another page, rather than waiting inde.nitely on a page that periodically updates its content.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Hence e = e ',¢::.~ wl = w2mod q ¢~:, [(u. q + al) .v q/p+ (u q + al) bt/pJ = L(u q + al) bl/ pJ mod q In general, (u q + at) " v "q = a (b - (b mod q)) > p. Ifp I (u .q + at) v, wl = w2 mod q.
Sentence 2: it is impossible, since (u q + al) <pandv<p.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 2.3 Adversary Model We consider an adversary who intends to acquire sensitive user information and has a full control of the public cloud.
Sentence 2: we assume that the private cloud is trustworthy: speci.cally, the adversary has no access to the nodes on the cloud and its under­lying network, and therefore cannot launch such attacks as eaves­dropping.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In an Escudo-enabled browser, Set-CookieSub is equivalent to Set-Cookie.
Sentence 2: in a non-Escudo browser, the Set-CookieSub header will be ignored, so no subsession ID will be set as cookies on the browser side; therefore, requests from a non-Escudo browser will not attach any subsession ID.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 2.4 Attribution Systems There has been a major research e.ort over the last sev­eral years to design and implement feasible network tra.c traceback systems, which identify the machines that directly generated certain malicious tra.c and the network path this tra.c subsequently followed.
Sentence 2: these approaches re­strict the queries to network .oods, connection chains, or the entire payload of a single packet in the best case.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If the attacker is able to scan the network and see that a particular address was veri.ed, the attacker can then send spoofed packets for that address since not every UDP packet can be veri.ed.
Sentence 2: the number of legitimate users currently authenticated is much smaller than the usual IPrange usedbyspoo.ng DoS attacks and the attackermust be able to see that a particular address has been authenti­cated, thus TrueIP seriously reduces the e.ectiveness of the DoS attack.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: One worry of eagerly sandboxing before the loop is it might change the program behavior.
Sentence 2: if we assume good code will always have pointers that point into the data region, then eager sandboxing should be an idempotent opera­tion for good code and it breaks only programs that would violate the policy.4  4Certain programming practices use pointers that are out­  (3) A range analysis is then performed to decide if any check is unnecessary.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In [28], some primitive concepts that relate to the authorization of joint actions are discussed and are of relevance to the notion of cooperative action that we have considered.
Sentence 2: the work in [28] is based on a different view of collective action than the one that we adopt and, unlike action control, there is no discussion of any formal aspects of joint action, no formal security model is proposed, and no details of any implemented system are provided.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In all test cases, however, CLAMP omitted the time to fork a new virtual machine and assumed that virtual machines are pre-forked, which makes their performance numbers appear signi.cantly better than they might be in practice, when new sessions would require forking new virtual machines.
Sentence 2: silverLine s end-to-end performance measurements also include time taken to spawn a new process that serves that client.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We can use VMI tools to simplify this complex system, and obtain the entire state of a VM from the safer outside, namely the Dom0 or host for virtual systems running on Xen or KVM, respectively.
Sentence 2: many companies pay for public cloud services to store their data and run com­putational applications, because of the ease of con.guration and maintenance.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, when a user located in Santa Barbara plans to  Figure 1: HengHa Detection System Architecture go to Chicago for business, the majority of the searches she does on a trip planning web site will be about Chicago, the .ight from Santa Barbara to Chicago, the hotels and car rentals in Chicago, etc.
Sentence 2: data harvesting attackers input different binding values on the search form and change predicate values much more frequently in their sessions.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The WS-* family of security schemes [1] aims to provide a security framework that addresses all the security issues around web services.
Sentence 2: this strong security frame­work is built on weak foundations: McIntosh and Austel [13, 12] have shown that the content of a SOAP message protected by an XML Signature as speci.ed in WS-Security can be altered without invalidating the signature.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While the letters appear very distinct to the human eye, when represented on the RGB spectrum they are so close that it is almost impossible to use the CFS [32] or the Anti-pattern techniques on it.
Sentence 2: as visible in .gure 6, an effective way to counter this defense is to have the breaker work on a different color representation that is closer to the human perception, namely the HSV or HSL [29] ones, and binarize the captcha by using a threshold based on the hue or the saturation.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: (.p (nh)=black..p (nk)=black) then .p (nh,nk)=black else if .pi (nh,nk)=white..pj (nh,nk)=white then .p (nh,nk)=white return(p) Figure 7: Composition of two permissions As an example, with reference to the authorizations in Figure 5 and query q2 in Figure 6, the set of authorizations applicable includes p1 and p4.
Sentence 2: neither p1 nor p4 authorize the query.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Firstly, as just described, important system programs can be cryptographically protected to pre­vent privileged malicious processes from modifying these to leak decryption keys.
Sentence 2: even if the attacker has the ability to bypass the security kernel s controls and write di­rectly to the storage device itself, this will cause the MAC value stored in GPRIV to not match that which will be cal­culated when the program is next accessed.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In many situations we have furthermore not even de­.ned or agreed on the security attributes to measure on [8].
Sentence 2: when we actually have de.ned and agreed on such attributes, like in the common criteria [2], the measures are often qualitative, i.e., based on experience, and do not carry enough information about its values to allow formal analy­sis.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 2 We antic­ipated that the test suite would not be complete, due to new functionality that needed to be tested and due to function­ality that is intrinsically hard to test (such as, for example, key migration).
Sentence 2: we expected that for the straightforwardly test­able and previously tested TPM functionality, the suite would provide us a push-button ability to tell us that our TPM driver and TSS were functioning correctly, and would thus enable us to test the more sophisticated features and sce­narios.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, to express hierarchical role­based access-control (RBAC) [14] in XACML requires a fairly cumbersome encoding [1].
Sentence 2: its more direct request evaluation strategy suggests that policies writ­ten in XACML are more transparent than policies written in languages based on .rst-order logic (as we motivate in Section 2).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Within our test range, the runtime varies from a few seconds up to a few hours, which seems well suited, e. g., for a distributed privacy-preserving scheduling application or an electronic voting system.
Sentence 2: with a large number of inputs k, e. g. k = 100, the protocols are not suitable for real-time applications or applications in which the result of the reconciliation is instantly needed.
Relationship: contrasting