sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We are motivated by prior work that demon­strated that a placement of mediators that resolves all infor­mation .ow errors is equivalent to a cut of error paths in the data .ow graph [37, 19].
Sentence 2: to make this idea prac­tical, we explore how to produce an information .ow policy for the example web application that resolves its local and remote threats.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The feasibility of applying keystroke dynamics veri.cation to mobile devices has been .rst analyzed in [16] with a neural networks-based approach, which has been further extended in [17] by analyzing the feed-forward multi-layered percep­tron network, the radial basis function network and the gen­eralized regression neural network.
Sentence 2: mobile devises may lack the computing power necessary to employ a neural network-based processing on the device itself [18].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: These tech­niques can help detect some vulnerable IPC usages, which we show in our study still widely exist in popular apps and mobile-cloud ser­vices.
Sentence 2: we are not aware of any prior effort to secure the end-to-end communication between an app and its server across the underlying mobile cloud service, which can have those known vul­nerabilities and the new ones found in our research, and is beyond the control of app developers who need to use it.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This is the first work on honeywords for graphical passwords, whereas all previous methods are only for generating text honeywords and thus inapplicable.
Sentence 2: we use the IPM model to develop the first successful dictionary attacks on Persuasive Cued Click Points (PCCP), which is the state-of-the-art click-based graphical password scheme and robust to all prior dictionary attacks.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Even if persistence is achieved, the cloud comput­ing environment will be minimized with only the data and programs necessary to carry out the required computation, and so will likely be of low value to the attacker.2 In order to escape to the high-value client environment, the attacker must compromise the channel between the client and the cloud.
Sentence 2: the defender has the .exibility to shape the channel s attack surface to make it more defensible.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: That is, the session-key computation of T-KEA takes about 2.2 exponentiations, which is, however, still in sharp contrast to the about 1.27 exponentiations of (H)MQV in such a scenario.
Sentence 2: the session­key derivation of (H)MQV is less .exible than KEA, in the sense that we do not know how to remove the value g ab from the session-key computation of HMQV for applications where HP-deniability takes priority, while still preserving its provable security.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To deal with the delay in sig­nature generation, and particularly to deal with the threat of fast spreading worms, several approaches [22, 17, 33, 26] have been developed to generate (worm) signatures from at­tack tra.c, including polymorphic worms [26].
Sentence 2: all these approaches rely on other means to identify the attack tra.c.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This helps companies and Internet users to keep control over their data: By using an Identity Provider (IdP), they are able to enforce various access control strate­gies (e.g., RBAC) on data processed in the cloud.
Sentence 2: idPs provide a valuable single point of attack: If the IdP can be compromised, all cloud services are a.ected, including well-protected applications such as Google Apps and Salesforce.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.1 Cluster Prediction Table 2: Contribution of feature groups to cluster prediction accuracy for the 2010 dataset FORECAST is incremental and adapts with every sample that is an­alyzed, a dedicated training set is not strictly necessary.
Sentence 2: it is still desirable to bootstrap the system on some initial data, so that predictions can be based on reasonable knowledge.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If subClass(v9)= v6 and subClass(v7)= v8, then we can merge the two by keeping only the more general attribute values as in as(4).
Sentence 2: if subClass(v6)= v9 and subClass(v7)= v8, then we cannot merge the two be­cause the attribute value pairs may represent two di.erent types of users who may be assigned to the role -one with a more general value for a6 and a more speci.c value for a7 and another with a more speci.c value for a6 and a more general value for a7.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, it is very inef.cient for every sensor node to report their raw data back because every data packet need traverse many hops to reach the BS and especially sensor nodes are often constrained by scarce resources in memory, computation, communication, and battery.
Sentence 2: as in many cases sensor nodes in an area detect the common phenomena, there is high redundancy in their raw data.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note that the total number of susceptible nodes in the present model at time tis stochastically smaller than the total number of susceptible nodes in the above simple model at time t. Combined with Lemma 1, we get the fol­lowing upper bound: n E[St] = (1 -av)t .
Sentence 2: (13) v=1 by Eq.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: ... Now, aprocessx can Read an object yonlyifthedynamiclabel of x is DSLeq (less than or equal to) the static label of y. Con­versely, x can Write y only if the dynamic label of x is DSGeq (greater than or equal to)the static label of y.
Sentence 2: x can Execute y only if its own IL is lowered to or below the static label of y.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Dependency graph samples and obtained clusters To avoid tracking the information flows with a low risk of propagating malware programs, the rules do not trace most reading operations on files, directories and registry entries, which are frequently invoked but difficult to propagate malware programs.
Sentence 2: subtle malware programs might evade tracing by changing registry entries or configuration files which subsequently affect the processes reading them, so as to run malicious executables, escalate privileges, impose damages on system, etc.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For instance, recent browser designs have signi.cantly improved privilege separation between code com­ponents [4, 5, 16, 21, 25, 33, 46, 63, 69].
Sentence 2: these techniques do not directly allow web applications to enforce control on their data; a compromised component with access to sensitive data can still launder it through its export interfaces.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For a realquerywith mode= ADD , the candidatequery will assign mode= aaa which, being an invalid mode, may actu­ally cause the program to throw an exception.
Sentence 2: the test for mode is done on the real string and hence the candidate query will be an INSERT-query with appropriate values of the candidate input substituted for the real input in the query.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: By increasing k, we can make the ra­tio ./(tsh + tch) arbitrarily close to ./tsh (which is the best we can hope for).
Sentence 2: we pay for this increase by also increasing the computation time for the honest veri.er; thus as k gets larger, the time-gap for the puzzle (the di.erence between the work done by the honest solver and the honest veri.er) becomes smaller.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Results of the analysis of identity protection audio information Scrambling Individual 1 ..11K ..12K ..13K Classical 0,749 0,754 0,759 Virtual 0,812 0,801 0,798 Adaptive virtual 0,992 0,995 0,981 Scrambling Individual 2 K..21 K..22 K..23 Classical 0,372 0,361 0,369 Virtual 0,561 0,564 0,57 Adaptive virtual 0,612 0,601 0,609 Scrambling Individual 3 ..31K ..32K ..33K Classical 0,698 0,699 0,691 Virtual 0,891 0,889 0,894 Adaptive virtual 0,949 0,941 0,953 These results confirm the dependence of the open processes of scrambling from the individual characteristics of the sources of speech information.
Sentence 2: as shown in table 6, these features can significantly affect the quality of information security (individual 2).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Although this is weaker than Bayes Nash incentive compatibility, when expected utility is used, the restriction of Inequality (1) says that, taking the expectation over the potential violator s private type, there is no incentive to com­mit the violation.
Sentence 2: this potential violator will know his own private type before he decides whether to commit the violation; certain principals will have an incentive to commit the violation.2 In the second example (Example 3), we use a ranking function to determine which utility functions are the most typical.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: UndertherolehierarchyreportedinFigure1(c),theuser canactivateonlytheSoftwareEngineerrole(unlessof course,theuserisalsoexplicitlyassignedtotheProgrammer).
Sentence 2: heacquiresmaximalpermissions,thatis,permis­sionsassignedtoboththeroles.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In other words, if an object is corrupted by some noise with level less than sr, then with high probability, the detec­tor should declare that the object is authentic if it is robust.
Sentence 2: if the object is corrupted by some noise with level more than ss, then the detector should be sen­sitive enough to declare that it is not authentic, with very high probability.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Then e the query Q veri.es only if ( s0 - s 0) + i=1( ci - c i)ai = 0, which holds only if a - as = 0 due to (h).
Sentence 2: if A knows a, it would be able to .nd a non-zero tuple (¯s0 -s 0, c¯1 -c 1, .
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Although there were less clients infected by SoBig in our network, the total volume of .ows generated 15000  by its infected clients was 50% greater than MyDoom s. Our data suggests that tra.c analysis on the mail server would be ine.ective against MyDoom, since mail server tra.c dur­ing the MyDoom outbreak does not appear to be distinc­tively unusual.
Sentence 2: for Sobig, it is possible that one can detect its presence due to the large volume increase in 10000 the SMTP .ows.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In principle the system must have had a vulnerability somewhere, and the attacker may be able toreinfect the systempost-veri.cation.
Sentence 2: itis not easy to correlate infected .rmware in one device with a vulnerability in that device s expected .rmware, e.g., the vulnerability may have been in the OS and the driver that updates device .rmware may have been compromised.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The response by eHarmony was similar to that of LinkedIn, where they decommissioned the affected accounts and informed the users via a post on their site and via direct email about being compromised.
Sentence 2: unlike LinkedIn, some security pundits like Graham Cluley from Sophos, chided eHarmony for not using this as an opportunity to explicitly inform its members to change their passwords on other websites where they use the same password.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Torealizeprivacy-preserving computation of J(A,B), we only need secure computation of |AnB|, since J(A,B)= |AnB|/(|A|+ |B|-|AnB|), andthis canbedone usingPSI-CA(seeSection 2.3).
Sentence 2: when two parties compute the Jaccard index, with or without privacy, they incur computation and communication com­plexity(at least)linear in the size of their sets.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Finding suitable and secure proxy re­signature schemes required a substantial e.ort.Natural ex­tensions of several standard signatures were susceptible to the sort of problems above.To illustrate the intuition be­hind this, consider a naive proxy re-signature construction based on the popular Schnorr [23] signature.Let || denote concatenation.Recall Schnorr signatures with key pairs of the form (pkA,skA)=(g a ,a) and signatures of the form (r,s)=(g k,aH(m||r)+ k).One might think to give the proxy rkA.B =(b- a), so that it can re-sign messages as (r .
Sentence 2: ,s )=(r,s + rkA.B H(m||r)).as in the BBS scheme, anyone can compute rkA.B =(s .
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Although the event is localized, it is reasonable to assume that it will become visible to all the users to other levels in the hierarchy, say in the whole .oor or in the whole building.
Sentence 2: thus, on the one hand, we have a spatial hierarchy that maps a physical location p into a set of logical locations, P toL(p), containing p. every localized event ev, generated in a physical loca­tion p is associated with a set of logical locations in which it should be visible, i.e., EV isible(ev).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Unfor­tunately, management agencies often assume that insiders are trustworthy, and only worry about outsider attacks.
Sentence 2: iT security solutions traditionally deal with prevention mechanisms such as authentication, access con­trol, software security; detection mechanisms such as intru­sion detection and malware .ltering as well as resilient ar­chitectures such as separation of duty [9].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: One called Foo-Read would contain members who should have only read access to Foo­related documents, and one called Foo-full whose members should have full control (write and manage access) to those same docu­ments, making it clear how those groups should be used in acces control lists.
Sentence 2: our sample of DocuShare groups were much less or­ganized.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A TCG-based attestation for an entire component may be the strictest way to verify its integrity.
Sentence 2: if the TCG-based attestation is demanded by all of the components, only some of the components that can participate in the domains, because the attestation strength that each domain calls for is different according to its usage scenario, so the strictest method is not always needed for all of the scenarios.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: With the traditional PKI-based [1] digital signature schemes like RSA [2] and ElGamal [3], the public key certificate is used; this is issued and maintained by one or more trusted entities named as Certificate Authorities (CAs), which helps to DXWKHQWLFDWH WKH XVHU¶V SXEOLF NH with its owner.
Sentence 2: the PKI-based system needs to execute lots of computation and huge storage space to manage the public keys and the certificates.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The .rst one is from the introduction: l := h; c; l := declassify(h) where c is a command that does not update h. This example is accepted by delimited release because h is considered released even before the declassi.cation statement is reached.
Sentence 2: localized delimited release rejects this program because when the set of released expressions is empty, then the memories are required to maintain low-equality as they pass through assignments.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Of the systems listed previously, RiskRanker has the most incommonwithPiOS,inthatboth employprogramslicing tobetter understand appbehavior.
Sentence 2: piOS targets iOS binaries for information leaks while RiskRanker looks forpotential security risks(includingplatform-levelroot ex­ploits and background SMS message-sending) for zero-day Android malware detection.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Research into conference session recordings (Adams &#38; Sasse, 1999b) has identified that those interviewed often rated the sensitivity of multimedia session data on the basis of its technical content (primary level).
Sentence 2: users noted that the recorded sessions were invasive if they were viewed, at their secondary level such as: ­ i) As an educational tool in how not to present at a conference ii) As a research resource to evaluate how people from different ethnic backgrounds act and react in an argument A second issue relating to the acceptability of multimedia data capture and usage is that users perceptions are often reliant on implicit assumptions.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In addition, a recent study by Shay et al., which compared system-assigned passphrases and passwords, found no signi.cant bene.t to either [75].
Sentence 2: that study controlled for guessability by forc­ing relatively low entropies for the distributions from which passwords and passphrases were drawn, thus failing to take advantage of the much larger space of words than characters.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Key Management At first glance, this key chain appears more complex than nec­essary.
Sentence 2: in practice, it is has proven to be extremely effi­cient for several reasons: Deriving a symmetric encryption key from the user s pass­word makes sure that access to the data is only possible with the knowledge of the password, which is only available during active sessions.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our system is different from FDR in that it records architectural events inside a VM and does not address mul­tiprocessors and DMA, while FDR is an actual design of a hard­ware recorder for multiprocessors.
Sentence 2: fDR only enables replay intervals of approximately 1 second, does not cap­ture disk state, and does not provide a fully-implemented replayer.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In most cases, the oracle mechanism can be embedded in the exploit itself, for example by crafting an exploit so that it will gen­erate side e.ects that can be used to determine if the exploit was successful.
Sentence 2: in some cases it is not possible to generate evidence of the e.ectiveness of an attack as part of its execution, and, for those cases, an external oracle that re­ports on the outcome of speci.c attacks has to be developed.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Pro.ling apparently addresses some of these shortcomings today (e.g., many legitimate clients behind a NAT would cause the NAT s external IP address to have a higher baseline rate in the server s pro.le).
Sentence 2: in principle such behavior­based techniques can also be fooled : a set of savvy bots could, over time, build up their pro.le by appearing to be legitimate clients, at which point they could abuse their pro.le and attack.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Particu­larly, a user can authorize or invoke a security sensitive oper­ation such as token delegation or authentication by tapping his phone to the NFC reader.
Sentence 2: the following aspects have to be considered when using NFC proximity to autho­rize security sensitive operations: First, in case the NFC interface is handled by the operating system, the malware can emulate the proximity to the NFC reader by pretending to receive data from the NFC interface.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The brow­ser runs in a virtual machine and, hence, virtualization is used to isolate the agent from the browser and to provide a trusted path to the user.
Sentence 2: they use a type 2 virtual machine monitor (VMM)4 and the agent runs on the host OS (Windows Vista), and they have no further protection of the agent, i.e., no secure storage like binding the agent data to the platform con.guration.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.3 Gadget Discovery The na¨ive method to locate gadgets within the target bi­nary is to simply disassemble it and search for indirect jump or call instructions.
Sentence 2: instructions on the x86 plat­form are of variable length, so decoding the same memory from one o.set versus another can yield a very di.erent set of operations.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Preserving User Privacy from Third-party Applications in Online Social Networks Yuan Cheng Jaehong Park Ravi Sandhu ycheng@cs.utsa.edu jae.park@utsa.edu ravi.sandhu@utsa.edu Institute for Cyber Security University of Texas at San Antonio San Antonio, TX, USA ABSTRACT Online social networks (OSNs) facilitate many third-party applica­tions (TPAs) that offer users additional functionality and services.
Sentence 2: they also pose serious user privacy risk as current OSNs provide little control over disclosure of user data to TPAs.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Likewise, a Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test indicated that participants observed experimental passwords were signi.cantly shorter than their self-reported longest pass­words (µobserved = 8.57, µreported = 12.34, Z = -9.217, p < 0.005).
Sentence 2: we found that reused passwords were not observably weaker than the passwords of those who claimed not to have reused passwords.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In general, a threshold value of 1 when used with a crypto­graphic hash function is equivalent to standard unordered tree­to-tree algorithms.
Sentence 2: a threshold value of 0 regardless of the hash function is equivalent to comparing every element to every other element and impractical for any modern web site due to the sheer number of possible combinations, which is why a reduction of potential matches is essential.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, when a network attack, infected host, or unauthorized machine is detected on the network, the security administrator must be able to locate the relevant device(s)  topologically and sometimes even physically in order to perform detailed analysis, cleanup, or removal.
Sentence 2: networks are constantly changing in a variety of dimensions: the machines that are connected, the network devices and their configurations, and the connectivity between machines and/or network devices are all in flux.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Michael Waidner IBM Zurich Research Lab Säumerstrasse 4 CH-8803 Rüschlikon, Switzerland wmi@zurich.ibm.com there should be single signon or one-click features across the en­tire world-wide web, i.e., transactions should essentially work without remembering anything and typing anything in, except typically for one master password and some OKs.
Sentence 2: un­less designed very carefully, such features make the situation for trust and privacy even worse and are thus counterproductive.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If a user has access to a truly random bit-string, he can use a deterministic (or cryptographic) PRNG to ex­pand this short seed into a longer sequence which distribu­tion is indistinguishable from the uniform distribution to a computationally-bounded adversary (which does not know the seed).
Sentence 2: in many situations, it is unrealistic to assume that users have access to secret and perfect random­ness.
Relationship: contrasting