sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Now, for any function A1 (including ones which can leave the ini­tial .ow unmodi.ed) the de.nition of look-ahead extractors ensures that the variables V =(X, Z), R = laExt(W ; X), R '' = laExt(W ; X ) satisfy the look-ahead property ((5) in De.nition 12).
Sentence 2: de.nition 12 ensures that the probability of A2 successfully producing (µB ,s ) such that µB = µA and Bob accepts (µB ,s ) is upper-bounded by d. We now proceed to construct a MAC with look-ahead secu­rity.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: (12) L L j=1 This means that the estimator is unbiased, which is de­ sirable.
Sentence 2: when j .= k, E[ZjZk]= P(Zj =1,Zk =1) = Ni-1 P(Zj =1)P(Zk =1|Zj =1) = Ni · and E[Zj]E[Zk]= N N-1 2 )2 (pg(i))=( Ni .N Cov[Zj,Zk]= E[ZjZk] -E[Zj]E[Zk] (13) 1 -pg(i) = -pg(i) , (14) N -1 which leads to " # PL Zj Var[ pg(i)] = Var j=1 (15) L PL P Var[Zj]+ 2 Cov[Zj,Zk] j=1 j<k = (16) L2 1 N -L = · ·pg(i)(1 -pg(i)).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The sequence is repeated for each system call sci.The Pred GSCG guards each sys­tem call sci with an invariant gi.
Sentence 2: there exists some ifor which executing the sequence mci,sci that overrides system call arguments with attacker s values instead of the sequence lci,sci consisting of the legitimate block of instruction lci preceding the system call sci will not follow the program execution paths from which gi has been generated and propagated and will violate gi that summarizes the data .ow in lci.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note also that, when using passwords, the protocol is sus­ceptible to password guessing attacks and the security of the presented scheme is upper bounded by the probability of guessing the password, i.e., 2-|D|, where |D| denotes the size of the password space.
Sentence 2: the goal of BBSAML is to make the dictionary attack the best an attacker can do.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This work also points out that synthetic workloads need to replicate both volumetric and contextual properties of an execution environment in order to provide an accurate indication of a system s performance within that environment.
Sentence 2: we conjecture that access control workloads as well may need to be capable of expressing not only volumetric statistics such as number of documents created, but also contextual statistics such as the type of content in created documents.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In such situations, a site-speci.c white-list would help, but we have not added such white-lists because it would be di.cult for us to systematically decide for all 100 benchmarks what these white-lists should be.
Sentence 2: as we do not use site­speci.c white-lists, our policy violations may not correspond to undesirable .ows.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: combination,wegetacomplexityof16(2 Example 2.
Sentence 2: inExample2,weaddthenotionthattheusers' authorizationtypesmustbedisjointwithrespecttoaset oftypesT.wehaveanarityof2.Twonew functionsmustbecomputed:Trt(u1)andTrt(u2).Inor­dertocomputethesefunctions,weneedtoknowT(u1)and T(u2),sothenewoffunctionsthatneedtobecomputed is4.Usingsummationcombination,wegetacomplexity of8.Usingproductcombination,wegetacomplexityof 2(2arityx4functionsx2new)=32.Usingexponential rt (2+4+2) complexity,wegetacomplexityof2=256.Thead­ditionalcomplexityoftestinganewfunctionishigh.We alsopenalizetheconstraintbecauseTislimitedbyT,and rt thismakessomesenseastheneedtounderstandtwofunc­tionstocomputetheconstraintdoesincreasethecomplexity signifcantly.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This is smaller than the 60 ns lower limit required to detect close range attacks by well funded attackers.
Sentence 2: if the number of processing cycles that the prover requires to receive the veri.er s challenge bit and compute and mod­ulate the response bit can be kept small, it may not be necessary to resort to UWB communication as Hanke and Kuhn have asserted.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Although format-string attacks do not involve a buffer over.ow, they share the key characteristic used in the anal­ysis described above: namely, the forged pointer (i.e., attacker spec­i.ed pointer value such as M) occurs in the middle of attacker­provided data residing in a buffer.
Sentence 2: they can be han­dled by our analysis.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Because of this we use a modi.ed de.nition of edge betweenness: CB (e)= P spathst(e) where pathst(e) is the number of BGP paths =t.V between IP blocks in s and t that use link e. Since each of these routes must be individually withdrawn, recomputed, and re-advertised this will provide an approximation of the number of BGP messages generated if the link were to fail.
Sentence 2: target links are ranked in order of their BGP Betweenness .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4 Another advantage of using Integrity Trees that are relatively infrequently updated means that RSA veri.ca­tions on the client side are amortized, as we envision that many do­mains will use the same set of ILSs, hence the root of the Integrity Tree will remain the same for numerous sites.
Sentence 2: clients mostly only perform ef.cient hash tree veri.cations and only rarely perform signature veri.cations.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The policy ex­pression language, runtime system, and policy authors must ensure that statements of policy result in appropriate addi­tions to or deletions from the authorization set of a resource.
Sentence 2: high-level policy expressions may add many autho­rizations to the authorization set of a resource, while lower­level policy expressions e.ectively remove some of those au­thorizations.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note that C can be re-encrypted again.
Sentence 2: we could ¯ obtain CTI '' =(C,C ' ,C,C ' ), where C ' is obtained from the Reencrypt algorithm with the input of another RKI ' .I '' and C. The decryption cost and size of ciphertext grows linearly with the re-encryption times.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Moreover, accompanying participants hoping to observe their mobile networking activity would have been logistically difficult: people may use an application such as mobile Facebook at any time anywhere, and an observer might have to spend many hours with a participant before witnessing some activity, having to invade their privacy for a prolonged period of time.
Sentence 2: we decided to gather data about participant s mobile Facebook activity by combining two methods: .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since Fj-1f-2 is a product of at most 2N small polynomials, it ij has .8 norm at most (nB)2N , by Corollary 3.3.
Sentence 2: the error is at most errorj = 2 · n · (nB)2N · 2n(.log q.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The number of actual disks dused by S might be different than the number of agreed-upon drives c. The actual .le placement {Dj}dj=1 performed by the server might also deviate arbitrarily from the placement speci.ed by the Map function.
Sentence 2: (As we discuss later, sophisticated adversaries might even store something other than unmodi.ed blocks of G.) At the beginning of a protocol execution, we assume that no blocks of G are stored in the high-speed (non-disk) memory of S. to respond to a challenge Q, S must query its disks to retrieve .le blocks.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.2 Translation Engine Translation engine cannot handle hardware diversities, such as X86 processor and AMD processor, or rtl8139 NIC and e1000 NIC.
Sentence 2: we pre-con.gure QEMU and Xen device emulation module to emulate the same type of de­vices for Guest OS, such as X86 processor, rtl8139 NIC and etc.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.1 Optimal Strategy for the User The adversary observes the pseudolocation r ' output by the LPPM, he knows the function f(r ' |r) implemented by the LPPM, and he also knows the user s pro.le .(.).
Sentence 2: he can form the posterior distribution ' Pr(r, r ' ) f(r ' |r).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We chose to look at the data from a single appli­cation because it increases the di.culty of our task if we believe that users have di.erent mouse behavior for di.er­ent applications.
Sentence 2: the goal of our experiments is to determine whether a user x when running an application M (e.g., Internet Explorer) can be distinguished from the other n-1 users running the same application.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Indeed, the role-to-role as­signment has two meanings: if R2 is activated, R4 should be ac­tivated (moving from the set of deactivated roles to the set of ac­tivated roles); if R2 is deactivated, R4 should be deactivated as well.
Sentence 2: we need two policies for these two cases.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The rewritten code invokes the rewriting function RW on the string, and the URL adserver.com yielding the string tmp10 = box("evil.com", "adserver.com"), if (tmp10.url != "a.com"){ tmp10.taint += ["untrusted"] }, initSettings(tmp10); The if-expression injects the taints to the value re­turned by the implicit getter-call (i.e., the read of tmp10) that yields the value passed to initSettings.
Sentence 2: the argument passed to initSettings carries the taint untrusted , which .ows into searchUrl when the as­signment inside initSettings is executed.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In its essence, such hybrid caching strategies can be implemented by using a PAC as proxy which transparently forwards all static re­quests to the underlying cache optimized for static security policies.
Sentence 2: hybrid caching can be understood as variant of a multi-leveled caching approach using SC or SAAM as .rst-level cache and PAC as second-level cache (see Fig.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: SHIFT is implemented by adding aphasebetweenthephases pass leaf regs and pass sched2 intheGCCback-end.Inthisphase, allregis­ters have been allocated and the instructions are not sched­uled yet.
Sentence 2: the implementation of SHIFT can avoid interference with the register allocation algorithm and the code scheduling algorithm for Itanium, which are two of the most complicatedphasesinGCC.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The results indicate that we only had one-sided errors: an execution path accepted by the attack NFA correlated with a non-conformant padding with 100% accuracy.
Sentence 2: the best strategy for the adversary is to send k requests to the padding oracle for each padding, and stop once an execution is accepted by the attack NFA and consider it to be non-conformant padding.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The attacker can authenticate itself to the server S but can not compute the agreed session key H (IDi | H (x) | H (ni) | EIDi | T) between the user Ui and the server S because the attacker does not know the values of IDi, H (x) and H (ni).
Sentence 2: the proposed protocol is secure against man-in-the-middle attack.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, we might have di.erent levels of trust for di.erent users or we might want to make some of the users more important than the others.
Sentence 2: in such a situation, one way of handling this is to give a larger number of shares to the users we trust more: if we give x shares to the trusted users, then we give y shares to the others, where x>y.the scheme becomes a (ax + by, k)-ThSS, where a is the number of users that we trust more and b is the number of regular users.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We consider an individual who wants to share his genome, yet who is concerned about the subsequent privacy risks for himself and his family.
Sentence 2: we design a system that maximizes the disclosure utility but does not exceed a certain level of privacy loss within a fam­ily, considering (i) kin genomic privacy, (ii) personal privacy preferences (of the family members), (iii) privacy sensitiv­ities of the SNPs, (iv) correlations between SNPs, and (v) the research utility of the SNPs.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Empirical supply model: Quadratic cost functions have been widely adopted in the analyses of power generation sys­tems [15], i.e., ci(x) = aix 2 + ßix + di, where ai > 0.
Sentence 2: to make ci(x) non-negative over x = 0, we have a few addi­ ß2 if .k = ßi, si(.k) (.k - ßi); otherwise, tional conditions: di = 0 if ßi = 0, or di = i 4ai if ßi < 0.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Addition­ally, attackers that try to blacklist benign network nodes by sending faked MRs without having an overlap scenario on the road, have to be considered.
Sentence 2: the following considerations are checked before starting the evaluation of a session: a) Either MRs from all overlapping nodes are received or the number of needed witness reports must be increased with respect to an upper bound.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Therefore, SME con­straints do not only a.ect runtime task execution, they al­ready a.ect the task-to-role and role-to-subject assignment relations at design-time (see, e.g., [21, 25, 27, 32]).
Sentence 2: if we want to de.ne that certain subjects or members of a certain role are allowed to perform two SME tasks in ex­ceptional (emergency) situations, we must explicitly de.ne a corresponding break-glass override via the bbr or bbs map­pings (see De.nition 2).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It is noteworthy that the automated conversion algorithm in Sechduler results in an automaton with provably minimum num­ber of states ensuring that the performance overhead of the runtime monitoring and veri.cation is minimized.
Sentence 2: using a realtime and security-aware scheduling algorithm through continu­ous optimization for timely resource allocations and discrete logic­based monitoring for security veri.cations, Sechduler makes sure to provide both realtimeness and security guarantees simultane­ously if feasible depending on the available time and resources.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: UKeygen1 selects a random skU .Z * q and outputs pkU = e(g1,g2)skU .In the Show1 protocol, the double-spending tag is calculated as E = g1 skU ·F(g1,s)(c(1,T,J))R.Consequently the value sU , returned by Identify1,is g1 skU which is secret informa­tion!
Sentence 2: the VerifyViolator algorithm is de.ned as fol­lows: VerifyViolator (pkI,pkU ,sU ) accepts only if e(sU ,g2)= skU skU e(g1 ,g2)= pkU .Intuitively, because g1 is secret infor­mation, its release signals that this user misbehaved.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: CurrentBestOffer: used by the host H to inform all the auction participants about the current best offer.
Sentence 2: the Transaction Set (TS), of the originator O includes m transactions that look like: {t1=[(suggestOffer, Offer1), Sig1] tk = [(sendWinningTo, Address), sigk] tm = [(suggestOffer, Offerm), Sigm]}  By then the (k, n) secret sharing is used to produce the following set of shares: {{t9 t1n}, {tm1 tmn}}.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To enhance the intra-and inter-block optimizations, we introduce the concept of Linear Lower bound, which interprets memory operands as a series of linear equations: br eg + s × ir eg + d (2) Memory addressing in x86 architectures can be expressed as a linear equation (2).
Sentence 2: it contains two variables for base and index registers (br eg and ir eg ), a coef.cient s for scale, and a constant d for displacement.2 we can say each BBL is associated with a group of linear equations, where each equation represents a distinct memory operand (Fig.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Such a centralized method for global software distribution is not acceptable as it would severely hamper small software developers, as well as open­source software that is distributed by source code and com­piled individually by users.
Sentence 2: we believe the applica­bility of this approach is limited primarily to environments where a single entity is responsible for determining what software can be installed on all machines, such as organiza­tions with centralized IT management, or to environments allowing automatic software updates from trusted entities to be applied to machines for individual users.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the .rst case, the shellcode must up­date the SEH list head pointer at FS:[0], while in the second case, it has to access the current SEH frame in order to modify its Handler .eld, which is only possible by reading the pointer at FS:[0].
Sentence 2: the .rst condition of the SEH-based memory scanning detection heuristic (SEH) is (S1): (i) the linear address of FS:[0]is read or written, and (ii) the current or any previous instruction involved the FSregister.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Enforcing Corporate Security Policies via Computational Intelligence Techniques Antonio M. Mora, Paloma De las Cuevas, Juan Julián Merelo University of Granada Department of Computer Architecture and Technology, ETSIIT/CITIC Granada, Spain {amorag,paloma,jmerelo}@geneura.ugr.es ABSTRACT This paper presents an approach, based in a project in de­velopment, which combines Data Mining, Machine Learning and Computational Intelligence techniques, in order to cre­ate a user-centric and adaptable corporate security system.
Sentence 2: the system, named MUSES, will be able to analyse the user s behaviour (modelled as events) when interacting with the company s server, accessing to corporate assets, for instance.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The tree-based schemes use C= {{i2j,... ,(i+1)2j -1}for all j=0,i>0}.
Sentence 2: 7 tree constructing a-te schemes is reduced to a combina­torial problem of constructing a-separating collections; the number of intervals containing t,for each t, corresponds to the scheme s cost.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To compute the challenges and responses the following publicly known algorithms, that we depict in cal­ligraphic style, are used: T is the algorithm used to gener­ate a threshold to which the vector items are compared (in particular a deterministic PRNG which receives random r as a seed can be used), E is the key extraction algorithm which extracts each key bit by comparing the values ob­tained from the accelerometer to the corresponding value from the thresholds and E"1 is the inverse of the extrac­tion algorithm which tries to recover the key.
Sentence 2: the thresholds are extracted from the committed random values, i.e., t T (r), then the key is extracted, i.e., k E(v, t) and .nally the challenge is computed, i.e., c = Ek (N).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: ReKeyGen(ski, pkj ): This algorithm generates the re-encryption R key by selecting s, t, w .
Sentence 2: zq and setting rki.j =(rk1, rk2, rk3, rk4 , rk5 , rk6 )as -ski H4 (s·ski ) H4 (s·ski ) t t w (H0(pki)· pk,g g1,g,g, j )tw e(pkj , pkj ,e(pkj ,g)tw) Note that rk5 cannot be altered due to unknown t and w. the re-encryption key rk cannot be manipulated (Ma­nipulating rk5 , rk6 will be detected in Dec when decrypting .rst level ciphertexts.)
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Thus, we want to collect data with simple VMI techniques from VMs bypassing the complex cloud framework, but we also want to keep the con.dentiality of any sensitive information obtained during this process.
Sentence 2: a VMI system in the cloud, which is able to respond to queries from multiple users or security monitor­ing systems with simple and standardized results would be bene.cial.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: DEFINING COMPLEXITY First,weneedtoidentifyausefuldefnitionforconfgura­tioncomplexity.Byuseful,wemeanthatsuchadefnition mustberepresentativeofsomerealtaskofthesystemad­ministratorsandbepracticallymeasurable.
Sentence 2: anaccesscontrolconfgurationisusedfortwopurposes: (1)authorizationand(2)safetyenforcement.Primarily,we wanttousetheconfgurationtoauthorizerequests.Sec­ondarily,wewanttoverifythatthecurrentaccesscontrol confgurationdoesnotleakanypermissionstoanyunautho­rizedsubjects.thecomplexityofsafetyenforce­mentdependsontheexpressionofboththeauthorization stateandsafetyrequirements.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: PERFORMANCEEVALUATION The adaptive thresholding algorithm proposed in the last section is generic because it does not rely on the detection features andprinciples of the underlyingIDSs.
Sentence 2: in this section we incorporate the adaptive thresholding mod­ule into the six ADSs evaluated in this work and evaluate the accuracies and complexities of these adaptive ADSs.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We recall that the last AES round does not include Mix-Columns transformation.
Sentence 2: a byte xa at the input of the last S-box layer can be viewed as an XOR of the .xed mask na with the known function of a last round key byte kR,ß and a corresponding ciphertext byte cß, xa = na .S-1 (kR,ß .cß).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It consists of three functions, G', S',and V': 1) a randomized key generation al­gorithm G' takes as input a security parameter (e.g., the desired length of the output) and a set of elements, A, and generates a pub­lic/private key pair (pk',sk'); 2) a signing algorithm S' that takes rithm.
Sentence 2: the cost of one public key signature veri.cation can be amortized over the cost of many set-membership veri.cations.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Also, we have used SAT to show that for each AND gate, there is at least one input vector that could activate the malicious cir­cuitry.
Sentence 2: our results indicate that the attacker can use the rare activation condition to trigger the malicious cir­cuitry during the system operation, while the single HT gate with low switching probability is di.cult to detect when the malicious circuitry is dormant.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To revoke a permission, the following command should be substituted for the Revoke statement in the algorithm: setfacl -d u:username:---filename The changes to the algorithm discussed above to add Unix groups are not even necessary as the algorithm in Figure 4 will give the appropriate permissions to users assigned to the roles.
Sentence 2: the only change to the algorithm is to re­place the Grant instructions with setfacl -m commands and replace the Revoke instructions with setfacl -d commands.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 50% of the training instances of C have scores larger than or equal to base score [7].
Sentence 2: we can obtain the normalized aggregate score of s in each class C by the following formula: scoref(s,C)=score(s,C)/basescore(C)) 3) Making decision After obtaining the normalized aggregate score of s in each class C, we can assign to s the class label C, for which the normalized aggregate score is the largest.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The Galaxy S3 stock .rmware already contains this smart card API for the built-in secure element, however, it is not enabled for the Mobile Security card.
Sentence 2: we had to replace the .rmware of the phone with a custom build of CyanogenMod9 [20] based on Android 4.0.3 where we in­ cluded the smart card API patches (version 2.3.2).
Relationship: reasoning