sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Mapping Kernel Objects to Enable Systematic Integrity Checking Martim Carbone Georgia Institute of Technology Atlanta, GA, USA mcarbone@cc.gatech.edu Wenke Lee Georgia Institute of Technology Atlanta, GA, USA wenke@cc.gatech.edu  Weidong Cui Microsoft Research Redmond, WA, USA wdcui@microsoft.com Marcus Peinado Microsoft Research Redmond, WA, USA marcuspe@microsoft.com Long Lu Georgia Institute of Technology Atlanta, GA, USA long@cc.gatech.edu Xuxian Jiang North Carolina State University Raleigh, NC, USA   jiang@cs.ncsu.edu ABSTRACT Dynamic kernel data have become an attractive target for kernel­mode malware.
Sentence 2: previous solutions for checking kernel integrity eitherlimit themselves to code and staticdata or can only inspect a fraction of dynamic data, resulting in limited protection.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Well-known re­ e.Welle sults by Chandra and Merlin imply that, unless, there is no polynomial-time algorithm that, given a structure as input, re­turns the core of that structure as output.
Sentence 2: in the context of data exchange, we identify natural and fairly broad conditions under which there are polynomial-time algorithms for computing the core of a universal solution.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The obvious choices for such a set are administrative do­mains and encapsulated ranges (giving rise to RHA-style and ARBAC97-style models respectively).
Sentence 2: these are not the only choices and we may also consider the admin­istration of disconnected hierarchies (such as those de.ned in ERBAC96 [14] and TRBAC [3]).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Besmer et al [4] intro­duced a new application-to-user policy that restricts application s access to user information while still allowing desirable function­ality, which is most similar to ours.
Sentence 2: in addition to the policy model, we also provide a framework that separates applica­tion components for .ner-tuned information .ow controls.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Some have proposed market-based approaches, such as a system in which a privacy-protecting Internet service provider (ISP) may charge more than an ISP that does not provide privacy.
Sentence 2: as Shapiro [3] argues, such market-based approaches make it possible to sell away one s civil liber­ties, and also create a situation where the wealthy are more likely to retain their liberties than the poor.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In storage, systems like SUNDR [17] and Sirius [11] have examined securing block and .le-level storage on untrusted substrates, and similar work exists for databases [20].
Sentence 2: this approach is rarely encountered in the OS litera­ture, with the exception of architecture-level research such as XOM [18, 19] and SP [6, 16].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Interpreting in­equality constraints as equality constraints introduces inaccuracies that prevents the types of some programs to be inferred properly.
Sentence 2: since constraints are only generated in case they cannot be shown to be satis.ed at the point of introduction it is always pos­sible to resolve any such inaccuracies by providing type informa­tion in the form of type annotations.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the case of a dynamic access the temporal autho­rization supports relaxation in terms of serviceability and single-sign-on (SSO) and on the other hand restriction to the maximum time where an access to the requested data is legal in terms of the legal situation.
Sentence 2: the time alone does not reveal whether the access is legal and is therefore used as one of several context facets in our approach.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: SELECT MIN(timestamp), MAX(timestamp) FROM MessageLog [ROWS 100] WHERE outcome = "success" AND serviceId = "5" If this query is executed by the query processor at Level [1, B], no rewriting is needed.
Sentence 2: if the query is executed at Level [T, T ], the query must be rewritten to ensure that it can view only authorized information.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: rx2 receives zero interfer­ence from m1 because the precoded c1m1 is in the null space of h2.
Sentence 2: m1 is decodable at rx1 because c1m1 is not orthogonal to h1 2.2 Physical-Layer Security in MU-MIMO As shown in Eq.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Algorithms with frequent memory references like AES, Blow.sh and SEAL bene.t from multithread when ME number is small (one or two), because their memory access latency could be suf.ciently hidden.
Sentence 2: throughput stops growing linearly for all algorithms from 4 threads to 8 threads, as ME s computing power has already saturated under the 4-thread con.guration.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: PRIVACY PRESERVING POLYNOMIAL EVALUATION The algorithm presented in Section 4 allows users to con­trol the search capability on their data items by de.ning a set of access keys for each data item, and storing all data items controlled search polynomials in servers.
Sentence 2: to protect these polynomials from untrusted servers, privacy preserving polynomial evaluation is needed to allow servers to evaluate f(a) without the knowledge of the polynomial f(x) and the element a.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, we note an important difference: while in [35] the chal­lenge (I , {(i, .i)}i.I ) is randomly sampled, challenges in Fortress are generated pseudo-randomly using the pseudo-random bit gen­erator g with a seed extracted with GetRandomness.
Sentence 2: we argue that this does not bear any practical implication.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Aside from the fact that the central directory is not MACed, our two main concerns with PKWARE s solution are that (1) we believe that protecting against information leakage from an encrypted .le s header should not be an option and (2) archives created with the above option turned on are no longer parsable under the traditional Zip speci.cation [9].
Sentence 2: our proposed .xes involve modifying the main .le and central directory records such that privacy-critical metadata information is always hidden and the resulting Zip archives are still parsable under the traditional Zip speci.­cation [9].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: No information about the mail leaks to the resource server, so this plug-in respects the information .ow policy.
Sentence 2: plugin2 will only download the external resource if a certain property holds for the user e-mail, thus violating the policy: the owner of the resource server can de­duce that the user sent a mail satisfying the isInteresting prop­erty.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Many policies consider a passphrase as a long sequence of characters or words[8, 2, 3, 6] and estimate security met­rics such as size of search space and guessing e.ort accord­ingly[6, 14].
Sentence 2: when users choose sentence-like or phrase-like passphrases, due to grammatical structures the search space and guessing e.ort will decrease.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It re.ects the strength of the authen­tication and how easy it is for an attacker to fool the authen­tication process: The stronger the authentication, the higher the con.dence that a user corresponds with the claimed set of attributes.
Sentence 2: the strength of an authentication method depends on many criteria and these criteria di.er tremendously between di.erent categories of user authenti­cation.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In general, like other types of textual doc­uments, textual requirements written in English are typi­cally unstructured, ambiguous, and include implicit infor­mation, posing challenges for NLP.
Sentence 2: in textual re­quirements, ACP sentences (i.e., textual requirements sen­tences for describing ACP rules) tend to follow speci.c styles such as: [subject] [can/cannot/is allowed to] [action] [re­source] for role-based ACPs.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Business Process-based Valuation of IT-Security Thomas Neubauer, Markus Klemen, Stefan Biffl Institute of Software Technology and Interactive Systems Vienna University of Technology, Karlsplatz 13, A-1040, Austria {neubauer, klemen, biffl}@ifs.tuwien.ac.at Abstract Growing business integration raises the need for se­cure business processes as security problems can affect the profit and the reputation of a company.
Sentence 2: decisions regarding a reasonable level of security in a business environment are often made in a value­neutral way.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If we assume a worst-case scenario where the adversary has compromised at least CERT_TH of A s trusted CAs, A s policy private key, and one or more of A s trusted logs, then the adversary could forge an MSC, and the necessary log proofs or registration receipts.
Sentence 2: even in this case the MSC would have to comply with A s SCP, constraining the malicious MSC.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: [19]J.TidswellandJ.Potter.Adynamicallytypedaccess controlmodel.InProceedingsoftheThird AustralasianConferenceonInformationSecurityand Privacy,July1998.
Sentence 2: managing Access Control Complexity Using Metrics Trent Jaeger IBM T. J. Watson Research Center 30 Saw Mill River Road Hawthorne, NY 10532, USA Email: jaegert@watson.ibm.com ABSTRACT Generalaccesscontrolmodelsenablefexibleexpressionof accesscontrolpolicies,buttheymaketheverifcationof whetheraparticularaccesscontrolconfgurationissafe(i.e., preventstheleakageofapermissiontoanunauthorizedsub­ject)difcult.Thecurrentapproachtoexpressingsafety policyinsuchmodelsistouseconstraints.Whenthecon­straintsareverifed,thentheconfgurationisverifedtobe safe.theadditionofconstraintstoanaccesscon­trolconfgurationsignifcantlyincreasesitscomplexity,so itquicklybecomesdifculttounderstandtheaccesscon­trolpolicyexpressedintheconfgurationsuchthatfuture changescanbemadecorrectly.Weproposeanapproach wherebythecomplexityofeachaccesscontrolconfguration isestimated,sotheadministratorscanseetheefectofa confgurationchangeonthefutureabilitytomaintainthe confguration.Weidentifymetricsformakingcomplexity estimatesandevaluatethesemetricsonsomeconstraintex­amples.Ourgoalistoenabletheuseoffexibleaccesscon­trolmodelsforsafety-criticalsystemsbypermittinglimited useofconstraintsthatdonotcomplicatetheconfguration beyondamaintainablecomplexity.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this .gure, it can be seen that when a biases the system towards behavior, the over­all outlier rate is low, whereas the distance between the old RBAC con.guration and the resulting RBAC con.guration is large.
Sentence 2: when a is biased towards the dis­tance to old RBAC con.guration, the overall outlier rate is high, while the distance between the two RBAC con.g­urations is signi.cantly smaller.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.2 Generalized Signature The key challenge to a successful buffer over.ow attack is how to overwrite the target control-sensitive data structure in the vic­tim application.
Sentence 2: the distance between the over.ow­able buffer (UserID[] in the above example) and the target control-sensitive data structure (the return address of Input()) may vary for different instances of the same network application for the following reasons: .Due to memory alignment requirement, different compil­ers may allocate local and global variables in an order that is completely different from the order they appear in the source code.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If a sys­temis able to exactlyimplement theintendedpolicy and the intended policy is fully known at the outset, then there are no miscon.gurations to detect.
Sentence 2: regardless of the expressiveness of the policy language used by the system, neither of these conditions is likely to be met: the intended policy is often dynamic, i.e., developed in response to new situations; and even when the intended policy is not dy­namic, it is rarely fully speci.ed at the outset.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To illustrate, we varied the amount of mem­ory allocated to the userOS andfound that average suspend durationsfor2GBand4GB memory are11.86 and16.64 sec­onds respectively(std.deviation0.4 and 0.85 respectively).
Sentence 2: we note that if the uApp has lower memory re­quirements than the user OS, the suspend-to-disk code in the user OS could be modi.ed to only write the amount of memory needed by the uApp to disk.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: One may think that system call table manipulation attack can be easily mitigated by making the system call table im­mutable after the system s boot process, and this immutable memory region can be simply protected by hardware-based external monitors.
Sentence 2: we implemented the rootkit with ATRA that successfully manipulates the system call table without involving any changes in protected memory regions and subverts the naive defense mechanism.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.2.2 Retrieving minutia templates from AliceFDrive Theparameters ofbAPI4 HMFVVerify imply thatAliceFDrive s reference templates exist in the clear in memory and we have con.rmed this by running AliceFDrive s authentication program within IDA Pro.
Sentence 2: reading memory of a computer pro­gramusually requires some expertise and may beadaunting task for ordinary users.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: According to rule (ii), both A-1 and B-1 can now be removed leaving C-0, A-2 and B-2, and the system should be recoverable up to a snapshot after the creation of B-2.
Sentence 2: if the two clients replicated the block-version A-2 now fail, the clients will be unable to recover back to a consistent snapshot because the replicas of both A-1 and B-1 have been garbage collected and all replicas of A-2 have been lost, violating the guarantee that the system can recover with up to n - 1 failures.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: [27] propose a memory attestation solution (BIND) to attest routes using trusted computing.
Sentence 2: this solution is quite time-and memory-consuming and may exac­erbate BGP convergence performance, e.g., there are several com­munication rounds for encrypting/decrypting message authentica­tion codes and attesting a received route update in a BGP speaker.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A naive solution to the disclosure control problem is to design ontological fragments that satisfy every permissible access -and thereby incor­porate disclosure control requirements in the design of the ontol­ogy itself.
Sentence 2: this is counter productive, as it interferes with extendibility and produces multiple versions of the original ontol­ogy, thereby giving rise to known dif.culties of version control and meta-data replication.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We can extend Theorem 5 to accom­modate multiple con.gurations that violate condition (1), because Theorem 4 can accommodate this scenario.
Sentence 2: if the goal is to maximize the time that the system can stay in the con.gurations that violate condition (1), the optimal solution is with respect to con.guration Cj,where j is given by Eq.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: There is also no evidence that QUALCOMM employees engaged in any email correspondence or other means for working with the JVT to develop the standard [7].
Sentence 2: all of these claims, and the other denials of involvement, would be proven false after a second round of discovery During trial, counsel for Qualcomm stated to the judge at sidebar that no emails existed between Qualcomm employees and the JVT.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This proved impractical, so we used an highly e.cient implementation of the Lanczos algorithm, with bidiagonalization and partial reorthogonal­ization, which o.ers a complexity of O(p · q · r2), where r is Figure 3: Comparison between the classi.cation of normal tra.c (above) and Nessus tra.c (below) over 50 classes by a principal direction algorithm the rank of the matrix and so r = min{p, q} [18].
Sentence 2: even this algorithm shows di.culties when the cardinality of the training set grows.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Some limitations of the schemes of [30] are lifted in [6].
Sentence 2: a sequential-aggregate based MS scheme will require a number of communication rounds proportional to the number n of signers involved in a signature, as well as napplications of the trapdoor function to verify, while all previous protocols, including ours, are constant-round and have constant veri.cation cost.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In terms of the number of passwords that was completely resistant to shoulder surfing, Line Snaking managed to have about 12% out of the total passwords completely un-captured compared to Disappearing Stroke with just 4%.
Sentence 2: we did not find this difference to be statistically significant (U= 102, z=-1.71, p=0.087, r=-.29).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To the best of our knowledge, the work more closer to our proposition is described in [15], where the authors present a semantic access control aproach based on a context-aware policy model, which treats context as a .rst-class princi­ple for policy speci.cation and adopts a hybrid approach to policy de.nition based on DL ontologies and LP rules.
Sentence 2: as occurs with the existing approaches from the secondgroup,thisapproachpresent a limitedsupporttothe context dimensions (e.g.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: By executing a malware sample multiple times, we are therefore able to gradually and automatically move from partial containment (in case in which part of the generated interacton is still unknown) to full containment, where all the malware network behavior is fully modeled and emulated by the system.
Sentence 2: it should be noted that the full learning of the network behavior of the malware is di.erent from the full knowledge of the protocol.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [7] subsequently constructed an FHE scheme1 based on the worst-case hard­ness of approximating lattice problems such as GapSVP (a promise version of the shortest vector problem on lattices) which have been studied extensively and are by now consid­ered standard cryptographic assumptions.
Sentence 2: they required that the problem is hard to approximate to within a subexponential factor (in the dimension of the underly­ing lattice).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Alternatively we could connect the PAWS router directly to the sharer s internet connection and then connect the sharer s router to the PAWS router, this would have the ad­vantage that we can accurately measure the sharer s network usage and therefore infer the unused capacity that could be made available to the PAWS network.
Sentence 2: this would not work for many reasons: The PAWS router would have to work as a modem therefore would have to be con.gured and suitable for all ISPs and connection methods (.ber, ADSL, etc.).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For the systems with n = 10 states the maximal relative er­ror reaches almost 20% of computed bounds, while for larger system (with n = 20 states) the maximal relative error is 2% of computed bounds.
Sentence 2: it is worth noting here that conservativeness of the presented results is (at least partially) caused by the fact that for each system we only considered random initial points, and random uncorrelated attack vectors and noise pro.les/modeling errors.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We also need to mention that the commercial services of new mobile communication standards, HSPDA (High-Speed Packet Downlink Access) and CDMA2000 EV-DO Revision A, will start in Japan during 2006.
Sentence 2: 3G, the previous generation of cellular phones, has spent nearly 5 years to take the 50 % share of the mobile phone subscriber market (45 million out of 90 million as of January 2006 [13]).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The preceding arguments show that brute force at­tacks are impractical and that search attacks, no mat­ter how clever, will require signi.cantly more time and mental e.ort from victims than is required to log in.
Sentence 2: we cannot analytically determine how users will react when presented with a search attack on their password; for that, we need a user study.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: (R1) Lifetime (R2) The number of activations (R3) The number of creations of new capabilities (R4) The inheritance of permissions related to role hierar­chy (R5) The number of hops of capability transfer There are also other constraints such as the depth of inheri­tance of permission to create new capabilities.
Sentence 2: here we do not consider the constraints on the desti­nation of capability transfer, because it is not plausible from the viewpoint of the implementation.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Surprisingly, the role E1, which is part of Project 1, becomes outside of the con­trol of PSO1 due to the deletion of PL1, because E1 is not in the administrative scope of either PE1 or QE1.
Sentence 2: in ARBAC97 and Oracle, the effects of each operation tend to be sim­pler and easier to understand.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3.4 Enhanced Access Decision Performance The meta model described in the previous section is con­venient for administration, and the access control informa­tion can theoretically be used directly by an access decision mechanism (e.g., as described by the ISO standard in sec­tion 2.1).
Sentence 2: in practical implementations, some ad­ditional constraints for the access decision mechanism of an application system exist:  For business critical applications such as core bank­ing applications, the access decision mechanism must demonstrate optimal performance and availability.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: RELATED WORK A few network layer solution approaches have been pro­posed for anonymous unicast routing in MANETs in the past decade such as [12], [18], [17], [7] and [15].
Sentence 2: research addressing security issues in multicast routing, mainly focused on sender/receiver authentication and key management algorithms instead of secure routing features like anonymity or location privacy.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Both de.­nitions are aimed at unconditional security.
Sentence 2: session key distribution in [27] requires that any coalition of at most t valid group members cannot get any information about another mem­ber s personal secret, while De.nition 2 in our paper requires that the uncertainty of such a coalition to determine another member s personal secret is at least b bits.
Relationship: contrasting