sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Unfortunately, this so­lution must still leak the length of a .le s .lename since, under this approach, we cannot encrypt any information necessary for parsing the .le, and the length of a .le s .le­name is necessary information.
Sentence 2: the solution that we prefer is to not encrypt portions of a .le s main .le record and central directory records in-place, but to encrypt (and also authenticate) the main .le record and the cen­tral directory record completely.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We point out that we make no assumptions on the type of private-key encryption we consider, nor on the source of the randomness.
Sentence 2: our results remain valid whether considering encryption of a single block (perhaps padded with random bits) using a pseudorandom function family, or whether considering the encryption of multiple blocks using a specific chaining mode (i.e., randomized CBC mode) with some underlying block cipher.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We next de.ne a second anonymity metric, indistinguisha­bility set size, or indinymity for short, as the size of the smallest buddy-set for a given Nym N. Since we do not know how a real attacker will actually assign probabilities to users, indinymity represents the minimum level of ano­nymity a member of any buddy set can expect to retain, even if the adversary correctly intersects the owner s ano­nymity set down to the members of that buddy set.
Sentence 2: the attacker cannot (correctly) assign a probability greater than 1/|BN | to any user including, but not limited to, the owner of N. One might argue that we mainly care about the buddy set containing the true owner of N, not about other buddy sets not containing the owner.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Given thefactthat mostof thepeopleindevelopedcountriespos­sess a mobile phone and use those phones either for private or forbusinesspurposes, security-andprivacy-relevantdata are stored on mobile phones such as lists with addresses of customers, tasks lists and lists of phone numbers.
Sentence 2: one might assume that security and privacyseemtobeat leastimportant asinthePC world.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In RFLP analysis, the DNA sample is broken into pieces (digested)byrestrictionenzymes and theresulting restrictionfrag­ments are separated according to their lengths bygel electrophore­sis.
Sentence 2: in short, RFLP provides information about the length (andnot the composition) of theDNA sub-sequences occurringbe­tween known sub-sequences that are recognized by particular en­zymes.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 5, we see that at different times, Bellare-Miner Tree, It-tions.
Sentence 2: even when R1 and R * 2 are small, the share of up­erated Sum, and Product each are the most ef.cient when using date and signing for each veri.cation never grows large enough to RSA as the base scheme.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Rules and regulations may changeover time,allowingformorepossibilitiestogatherin­formationaboutpeopleafter the fact.Such functioncreep occurs frequently: once the system, in principle, allows cer­tain ways to collect data, sooner or later government o.­cials or law enforcement will ask for an extension ofpowers.
Sentence 2: the solution must be found in limiting possibili­ties at the outset, through technical means, in the architec­ture and design of the system.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 5.3 Attack Localization In our two-stage map extension scheme, attack tra.c af­fects the attacker and decoy networks, and the tra.c is lo­calized in these networks.
Sentence 2: if we can set up a decoy network near an attacker s network, the attack traf­.c will not a.ect the Internet backbone.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Hence, our .le server must verify PS(uG) = 0 before accepting a write to u s .le from P. Asbestos supports such integrity checks with a fourth (and .­nal) optional label argument to send, the veri.cation label V. The veri.cation label temporarily lowers restricts the receiver s ef­fective receive label.
Sentence 2: the sender proves with V that its labels are below a constraint independent of the receive label.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The waiting time in RDC is much longer than that in RP as the sink may travel to any of the nodes in the network, while, in RP, it walks along a much shorter route visiting only the ren­dezvous points.
Sentence 2: the attacker in RP can locate and wait for the sink at a rendezvous point in a much shorter and expected time.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When u(t) attains its maximum n (meaning that all the tags have been updated), then t reaches its lowest value of 12 + E(s): the privacy restoration has been fully done.
Sentence 2: when 0 <u(t) <n, t value measures the current level of privacy restoration of S at time t.   3.3 Analysis of the Protocol Now we give the security analysis of our protocol follow­ing the classes of adversary de.ned in Section 3.1 and the security properties experiments given in Section 3.2.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As in the previous case, C&#38;C server did not appear to be alive so we implemented our own C&#38;C server that supported Sin­pon.aâA.´ Zs protocol.
Sentence 2: we found out that Sinpon.a does not run on Android 3.0 and above because since Android 3.0 Google has prohibited establish­ing network connection within the appâ A.´Zs main thread.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We ex­tend Unity to prevent this by having each client sign the no­ti.cations they send to the server about new block-versions or replication of a block-version.
Sentence 2: the server cannot forge a new block-version or create an entry that says a client has replicated a block-version when it hasn t. Second, a malicious server could omit or replay new block­versions or omit or replay noti.cations that a block-version has been replicated.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While we follow this assumption for plaintexts, we argue that the probability for a ciphertext or plaintext-ciphertext pair to be disclosed not only depends on the distribution of plain­texts, but also on the probability of a speci.c ciphertext or plaintext-ciphertext pair of being produced by the chosen OPFs.
Sentence 2: in our attacker model, the probability that a ciphertext or plaintext-ciphertext pair is observed by an attacker depends on the probability that the OPFs cho­sen by the used construction scheme contain a respective plaintext-ciphertext mapping.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: RCt-1)-1)R R Rt-1 t-1,9 t-1 Note also that R= R. RCt-1 .
Sentence 2: we RR R know every value in this equation, except for RRt-1.We can therefore go over all 240 possible values of Rt-1, and disre- R gard any value for which this equality does not hold.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 100 100 % of blacklist % of listings 8080 6060 4040 20 20 0 0 0 0.1 1 10 100500 0.1 1 10100500 1 2 5 10 25 listing duration (days) ­­logscale days until relisting ­­logscale quantity of BL listings ­­logscale Figure 3: Listing duration Figure 4: Relisting intervals Figure 5: Listing quantity % of unique IPs   XBL SBL    XBL SBL Botnet operators are aware of these spatial patterns and the ease with which they can be identi.ed.
Sentence 2: at the campaign-level, botnets often leverage their distributed na­ture tospanaddressspace.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: -0.4 -0.6 -0.8 2 2.5 3 3.5 Sample Number x 10 4 Figure 12: Sample Values Modi.ed by Transcoding Process speaker s utterances over the microphone to the receiver s percep­tion as what is played out of the speaker, the PESQ score is 1.1 to 1.3.
Sentence 2: it still remains an audible quality even in the presence of false data points as noise.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It decodes as follows: ver=4.2&#38;­bid=noname&#38;aid=50018&#38;sid=0&#38;rd=1307260520&#38;eng=www.bing.co­m&#38;q=celebrity.
Sentence 2: for each search, the malware reported back to its C&#38;C server the version number of the bot, af.liate ID, the search engine where the query was submitted, and the query key­words.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For a left-to-right topology , the initial prob­abilities 1 are .xed, so only the transition matrix has to be estimated and stored in addition to each state s output distribution.
Sentence 2: for a left-to-right S-states HMM with no skips using M diagonal covariance matrix Gaussian com­ponents (see Equation 8) to model the distributions in each state, the number of free parameters N(S, M ) is N(S, M ) = 2(S - 1) + S(M - 1 + 2M D) (15) Comparisons between the GMM system and the HMM systems are performed trying to keep the number of free pa­rameters in the same range.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, unlike PCs that utilize multi-user operating systems for resource sharing, protection, and management, today s browsers do not employ any operating system abstractions, but provide just a limited all-or-nothing trust model and protection abstractions suit­able only for a single-principal system: There is either no trust across principals through complete isolation or full trust through incorporating third party code as libraries.
Sentence 2: web pro­grammers are forced to make tradeoffs between security and func­tionality, and oftentimes sacri.ce security for functionality.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This can also capture user actions against con.dentiality, as well as the risk of disclosure caused by increased replication (e.g., keeping all of the information in one place), as opposed to slicing it up into pieces.
Sentence 2: the upper bound on the in­security metric is for con.dentiality is: (1 - DD) × I × V where I is the amount of information moved and V the value of that information.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Thus, for any pair (s,r), with r = n-L, E * ((s,r))=|s|+A * ).
Sentence 2: we get the following upper­ L(Dr+1,nbound on E * ((s,r)): UBL((s,r))= |s|+ AL* (Dr+1,n) Clearly, UBL is a much tighter upper-bound than UBnaive.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The SNPs with the highest ratios represent those where LD correlations cause the highest de­crease in the genomic privacy of family member k and/or provide low utility to the optimal solution y *D computed in Subsection 3.2.
Sentence 2: these should be removed .rst from the set in order to meet the privacy constraint of individual XD k again, and to cause the smallest decrease in utility.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When a node received all packets from 1 to k - 1, it can verify any packets from k to m with any order, where m - k> k. Concretely, if there are w hash values in an index packet, there are w l packets in level l. If a node receives all w l packets in level l, it can receives the next w l+1 packets in level l + 1 with any order.
Sentence 2: this hash tree scheme can be applied to current reliable data delivery schemes of sensor networks with little extra cost.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: On the other hand, multiple .ow handling on memory-based implementations requires duplicating on­ly the .ow-speci.c active state information (and not the automata).
Sentence 2: a practitioner may prefer to adopt low-stride logic-based implementations (which have lower s­lice usage), and use the available FPGA resources to process multiple .ows (rather than to achieve higher peak perfor­mance on a single packet stream).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Second, the low user can observe keystore K, but the decryption results are low-equivalent.
Sentence 2: we have the following rules that recursively de.ne the low-equivalent relation between values: label(K) = L v L v c1.K.i1 L c2.K.i2 label(K) = L (decrypt(ci.K.i),W ).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the case of a disjunction of a predicate on the result of an abnormal ContextQuery and another predicate eval­uating to True, perhaps we should return True because the pred­icate result based on the abnormal ContextQuery (either True or False) will not affect the .nal evaluation.
Sentence 2: the ac­cess decision relevant to the predicate result (True) should be re­turned.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, on the IND-CCA secure KEM scheme based on the ring-LWE problem [40], our rough es­timation says that the sizes of encapsulation key and ciphertext are about 540 kbits.
Sentence 2: the AKE protocol from the KEM scheme also are ine.cient on the communication costs, 1.12 Mbits (see 7-th rows in Table 1).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: is needed to ensure CL freshness during the PBBL instal­lation.
Sentence 2: we introduce a new PBBL version state blob B, denoted as: B =[CL.serno, rnd]CPBBL (3) where CL.serno is the latest CL serial number and rnd is a random value created by the PBBL during installation.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We can at least infer that the widget is displayed to the user, andthus that the widgetis reachable from the root panel.For example, suppose an application createsbutton bt if the value of a secret boolean v is true, andbutton bf if the value is false; a listener to bt can then infer the value of v upon invocation of the onClick method.
Sentence 2: the In parameter for bt must be at least as restrictive as the security label for the boolean v. More generally, if a Widget[fw,f']w is added to a Panel[f,f']p, w the security label f'must be at least as restrictive as the security w label of widget w. In addition, since an event on w can only occur if the panel p is itself added to the UI, we also require that f'is at w least as restrictive as f'.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Interestingly, we also obtain a tighter security reduction than Goh and Jarecki: assuming texp is 100 times larger than =260 =230 the time to evaluate H and letting t = qh , qs , and |q|=160, we obtain the (essentially) optimal: '' t t, e e, whereas Goh-Jarecki [18] obtain a (small) 28 decrease in se­curity.
Sentence 2: our reduction carries no decrease in security, and our signature scheme is as hard to break as the underly­ing DDH problem is to solve.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: What is new in our approach is an integrated executable and declarative framework that incorporates both time and the domain-speci.c reasoning (via constraint systems) re­quired for dealing with roles and other important abstrac­tions.
Sentence 2: building on the line of algebraic approaches to policy composition [11, 42, 43], and in contrast to other executable state machine approaches [28, 40, 38, 13], we describe a declarative algebra of temporal operators.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: From (13) and (14) it follows that |.yk| j ¯dk + dk j 2dk Accordingly, to provide a bound on l.xl2 we con­sider the following problem max l.xl2 (16) .x lF(.x) - Oll0 = 2q (17) O j 2.
Sentence 2: (18) Since q = qmax, we can increase the feasible space by relaxing constraint (17) to lO - F(.x)ll0 = 2qmax (19) our goal is to bound .x for which there exists O .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The time needed to complete the proof stands in sharp contrast with the six man-monthes that were reported needed to repro­duce the proof of OAEP in CertiCrypt [5].
Sentence 2: our work provides further evidence that, as stated in [4], EasyCrypt makes a signi.cant step towards the adoption of computer­aided proofs by working cryptographers .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, princi­pal KA binds a subject KU1 to its local name KA CID411U sers by constructing mA1 as shown below and .nding rA1 such that CHKA (MA, RA) = CHKA (mA1 , rA1 ) = XA, holds.
Sentence 2: kU1 can use the commitment  as its member­ship proof to .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As a result, it is hard for a mobile guest to compromise the escort box and use it as an attack agent against the wireless LAN.
Sentence 2: although the escort box is the single point of failure/­compromise of the guest (while a centralized server is a single point of failure of the entire domain), a tamper resistance argument is a valid one to justify its robustness against attacks.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Such features in an IP F S play a key role in deducing data privacy, and thus are called as Key Inferring Privacy Feature Set (KIPFS).
Sentence 2: the protection techniques are only needed to apply on these KIP F S instead of the whole IP F S. Generally, the range of KIP F S is far smaller than that of IP F S, which consequently helps to enhance the performance of subsequent data analysis and thus is greatly desired.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: P0If Ln0 =3.T0 =70 then .T0 =70* 3 =210.
Sentence 2: n0 n0 the source n0 considers the target n4 as trust node since: 0 = (P0(Pt4)=152) = (.Tn0 0 =210) 1476 Figure 4: The Trust Propagation  6.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: of the Gaussian distribution is made up of 6 parameters denoting the variance of the a.ne param­eters, s2 af.
Sentence 2: x, sy2 , s. 2 , ss 2 , s2 and s2 p(Xt|Xt-1)= N (Xt; Xt-1, .).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To check the statistical signi.cance of the dif­ference in con.dence, we performed a Mann Whitney U Test: N = 38,U = 322.5,pexact < 0.001.
Sentence 2: we strongly reject the null hypothesis and conclude that for Task 6, users of get/setfacl were signi.cantly more con.dent.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Incremental Deployment: Wenowdescribeageneralizationoftheaboveschemethatwillfacilitateincrementaldeployment.InadditiontothethreeassignmentsordelegationslistedabovethatC mayperformforagivenpre.xyIk,anadditionaloptionisallowed: 4.
Sentence 2: (C,yIk,U),i.e.,C sdelegationorassignmentofyIkisUNAUTHENTICATED;  Todescribethesemanticsofoption4considerthedelegationgraphforyIk.Option4addsanedgefromCtoeverynodebutCinVU ASV.Inaddition,option4hassubtreesemantics.Thede.nitionofavalidpathremainsexactlythesame:theownershipsourcemustbeIANA,thepathmustbeacyclic,andtheedgeassignmentmustbeASN-respecting.Asbefore,Cwillcomputeanddistributeaproofthat(C,yIk,U)isinitsdelegationpolicy.(Itmightputtheproofinapublicdirectory,suchasthosede.nedbyS-BGP[30],whereotherorganizationscanobtainit.)itwillstillbepossibleforanorganizationtocreateaproofofvalidityforavalidpathandforotherorganizations,i.e.,thosereceivingtheBGPannouncementofapre.x,toverifythevalidityofthedelegationpathproof.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our .ve detectors are discussed in the paragraphs below: Detector for too few successful system calls: We expect to see a reasonably large number of successful system calls that re.ect the normal interactions of a process with its environment and the OS.
Sentence 2: when our system does not observe any system calls (or too few of them), this is an indication of insuf.cient progress.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In duction hypothesis, in .i T , u1 is a member of Sys.ra and u satis.es Proceedings of the 1992 IEEE Symposium on Security and the condition c. From the translation and the construction of .iT +1, .iT +1 has the following statements: u1.r .- u, Sys.r .- Sys.ra.r, and Sys.r .- Sys.name n tmpRole (where tmpRole corresponds to the precondition c).
Sentence 2: furthermore, in .iT +1, u1 is a member of the role ra and u satis.es the condition c. u is a member of the Sys.r role in .iT +1.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Every (X, J) has probability 21 k. Therefore IxxI2 2 = ( )2 ( )2 yI2 1 xI2 yI21 1 Ix= k · and Ix= Ix= = .
Sentence 2: 2 2k 1 124 ( )2 ()2 1 11 -1 31 f(µk)= 4k· 2k -2· 2 = k 2 , and sk(µk)= 4 -2k.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 2.1.3 Choice of the parameters In[15]ithasbeenshownthat,usingn,M,Sandd,these­   ;k`) cretkeycanberecoveredinO(ClogC)stepswithC:=k.
Sentence 2: ontheotherhand,in[14]thisattackhasbeenshowntobe optimalwithinthemodelofgenericalgorithms.inouranalysisofRSA-S1wewillconsiderparametersm,k,` ;) k`.264 with.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: QUANTIFICATION OF GENOMIC PRI-VACY AT THE MEDICAL CENTER From the results of genetic tests, the MC can learn more information than it is authorized by using (i) the charac­teristics of the exposed SNPs, and (ii) disease markers and their contributions.
Sentence 2: in this section, we will quan­tify the genomic privacy of the patient from the MC s point of view as a result of the genetic tests he encounters.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, location information is explicitly shared with entities we trust, rendering BBC news/videos on iPlayer is constrained by geographical region, i.e., only those living in the UK can play the videos, music tracks and movies in digital form must be purchased before they can be played and rendered on devices.
Sentence 2: rights manage­ment is not only about constraining how digital information is obtained, but also constraining the dissemination of in­formation further such as copying, transferring and sharing with others.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Suppose Chas at least k +1 v0 U Figure 1: Reduction from Set Cover to MTMP v0 vm+1 vn-1 Figure 2: Infection topology of a Flash worm in [1] members, then the last member S of Creceiving the worm at time at least T1 =(na +(k +1)W )/r1 +L1 = n +k +2.
Sentence 2: this last member will have to infect nodes in TS (there is at least one node in this set), which takes time at least T2 = W/r2 +L2 = 1/(2n)+m -k>m -k. the total infection time is at least T1 +T2 >n +m +3/2.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This is for two reasons: .rstly, we believe that this approach places an unnecessary burden on the syntax of the speci.cation scheme; and, secondly, that the constraints should be en­forced by the reference monitor.
Sentence 2: we also propose a simple implementation model that can be used to enforce a restricted set of the authorization constraints supported by our speci.cation scheme.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Obviously, the predicate V ulnerableSadmind is in both Prereq(SadmindBufferOverflow) and ExpCon­seq (SadmindPing).
Sentence 2: we have an equality constraint Vict­imIP = VictimIP for (SadmindPing, SadmindBufferOver.ow), where the .rst VictimIP comes from SadmindPing, and the second VictimIP comes from SadmindBufferOver.ow.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To overcome this, we combine the car­rier packet generation and ESP trailer oracle steps.
Sentence 2: for each choice of R used in a normal attack, we must splice R,Ci * onto a sequence of trial packets, with each trial start­ing with a base packet and attempting to manipulate the TTL .eld, correct the checksum, pass ESP trailer process­ing,passAHprocessing,and .nallygenerateanICMP mes­sage.
Relationship: reasoning