sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.3 Theoretical Analysis: Correctness andSoundness It is easy to see that without knowing the circuit x, V con­ducts all the PCP checks (except the linearity tests, since the commitment has provided linearity tests already) for C. The correctness and soundness of this scheme follows directly from the linear PCP scheme.
Sentence 2: it should be noted that V has access to the pair ((r1||R1) + a0(r0||R0), s1 +  Table 1: Comparison of Commitment Protocols Ishai et al.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note that the AM does not completely encode all the UAS elements or the derived relations as is done by the DB and DRB approaches, respectively.
Sentence 2: this approach can be used to identify undesirable UAS elements (thus indicating undesirable hierarchy design) by querying whether the undesirable set of roles are allowed by the hybrid hierarchy to be activated in a single session.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Although we could consider vari­ous constraints related to users, sessions, and roles investi­gated in [14], we focus attention on the constraints on ca­ 1 When implementing these steps, steps (1) and (2) are usu­ally regarded as a single step, because in general the ca­pability consists of an object identi.er and permissions for this object.
Sentence 2: in our model, to categorize the types of delegation we divide this creation of capability into these two steps.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: More precisely, in the event that the current rendezvous point is taken down, the botmasters simply have to register the next domain in the domain list to regain control of their botnet.
Sentence 2: to the defender s advantage, domain .ux opens up the possibilityof sinkholing(or "hijacking")abotnet,byregisteringan available domain that is generated by the botnet s DGAs and re­turningan answerthatisavalidC&#38;C response(tokeepbotsfrom switching over to the next domain in the domain list).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: By setting 6 Mbps (minimum data rate in DSRC) to Equation (1), we now can derive the upper bound of ad content size xwith respect to interval r. Figure 4 shows that the upper bound of x, according to rin this 100-neighbor scenario.
Sentence 2: in the case of onion voucher based model, due to three-way handshake process among vehicles, the resulting system throughput of the above scenario is 1000 msg/sec ×{[100 r cars ×(120+x) bytes/msg]+[100 ×100 cars ×112 bytes/msg]+ [100 ×100 cars ×280 bytes/msg]} =8 ·{(120 + x) + (392 ×102)}/(r·10) Mbps.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, we could derive such a shared key by using a customer-chosen PIN code that is utilized in PG&#38;E s system such that only a third party that knows the PIN can access the corre­sponding customer s energy usage data [12].
Sentence 2: we should note that in our scheme, such a key is not used for data con.dentiality, authentication, or access control.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The di.erence might be explainable because, in the ab­sence of program-speci.c rules, the tool is doing a better job of understanding one program compared to the other.
Sentence 2: whilst we accept some range of di.erence is to be expected and is unlikely to be signi.cant, we seek to under­stand the range ofissuedensities anddetermineif extremely large di.erences are signi.cant.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The identi.er mapping functionality is very relevant to Pseudonym Service in WS-Federation and Identity Mapping functionality in Liberty ID-FF in that the authority brokers trust relationships between di.erent entities, and issues the appropriate name identi.er unique to the particular entity.
Sentence 2: the assertion composition functionality is very relevant to STS (Security Token Service) in WS-Trust in that the AA converts an original security token into a required one.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This shows how the release of h affects the requirement of the low-equality of the memories from the two related runs: after h is released, traces that disagree on the value of h at the point of release are automatically accepted by the de.nitions.
Sentence 2: traces that agree on the value of h are still required to be related, in order to avoid leaks through other variables.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As a result, least privilege [43] has been adopted as the security goal for integrity protection in commodity systems [33, 31, 27, 54].
Sentence 2: di.erent deployments imply di.erent privileges, so commodity systems try to accommodate this through mech­anisms to compute permissions requested by processes [38, 31, 3] and by providing runtime con.guration options to specify permissions for options.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: What makes it possible for our return channels to be reused is the guarantee (based on the semantic security of ElGamal encryption) that two recipients can not determine whether their return channels are the same or not, and there­fore do not know whether they are replying to the same per­son.
Sentence 2: reply blocks based on Chaum s technique can not be reused with di.erent players for if they were these players could simply compare their reply blocks and learn that they are communicating with the same person.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The program onthispathfollows a di.erent control path(going through the else-block), andgenerates aquery whose struc­tureisquite unlike thequery structure obtainedbypursuing the if-block.
Sentence 2: substituting vc in the symbolic ex­pression exp yields Q2: SELECT * FROM employdb WHERE name= aaaaaaaaaa which is indeed the correct query structure on pursuing the if-block.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: It is difficult to formalize the resulting intensities because there are many other electronic devices around the experimental setup and the emanation source might not be approximated by a reduction model of near EM fields based on an ideal antenna structure.
Sentence 2: we can estimate the boundary of near and far EM fields from the results, where the intensity fell exponentially up to 50 cm comparable to the wavelength of the leakage frequency, and then reduced linearly from greater distances.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: An attacker can try to recover kd using k and data from pre­viously recorded runs of the protocol (e.g., the n pairs of messages (Re 1k, R2ek,...,Rek) and signatures (R1kd , R2kd ,..., Rnkd )).
Sentence 2: now, the nattacker can recover the various Rei by multiplying a message with k-1 mod N. the attacker is unable to isolate kd from the signatures.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In comparison with the only known unidirectional PRS with private re-signing keys (suggested in section 3.4.2 of [5]), this one features shorter second level signatures that must include a Schnorr-like [30] proof of knowledge in addi­tion to 3 group elements in [5].
Sentence 2: signa­tures of [5] are strongly unforgeable unlike ours.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: All recipients in G know that Al­ice is the sender of the protected message based on informa­tion provided by the sharing platform, but they should not .nd out the identity of other recipients in G. In a straight­forward solution, Alice could perform the steps described earlier for each recipient U in G, using shared keys kAU and hkAU .
Sentence 2: this solution results in poor performance for large groups of recepients, because Alice must encrypt the message m for each recipient, and then compute and register di.erent (hd, elc) values with HD.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note that Prot assertions do not de­scribe multiple-step, transitive .ows over multiple processes, but rather describe direct, one-step .ows between pairs of processes.
Sentence 2: a programmer can typically de.ne poli­cies using only a few Prot assertions by de.ning the Prot assertions over process templates that correspond to pro­gram points reached immediately before a process writes or reads any information.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Factor Acolor (or A r ) is larger than 1 and thus boosts M-index (i.e., less memorable) if the point is in a less dissimilar region and thus less likely distinguishable from other points in its neighborhood.
Sentence 2: the factor is smaller than 1 and thus lowers M-index (i.e., more memorable) if the point is in a more dissimilar region and thus more likely distinguishable from other points in its neighborhood.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Finding more bartering opportunities requires modi.ed choking policies designed for fairness and clustering; interestingly, the currency overhead aligns greater fairness, through barter, with reduced computational bur­den.
Sentence 2: achieving these results in practice may be more di.cult: we do not simulate node churn, failure, nor do we attempt to integrate currency budgets or debt-reckoning at certain intervals into the choking policy.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Z - rP = sP 2RA 4) T= E[-r]*E[-s+s+r] PKG2PKGARA2D[T*E[s]]=s-s PKGPKGPKGA Figure 9: Secured Version of Step 4 of Registration Protocol One can claim that the registration protocol is compli­cated and maytake quite a long time.
Sentence 2: this compli­cation canbe tolerated since it is executed only once for each user initially or in case of secret share refreshment which oc­curs notveryfrequently.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Previous mathematically founded analyses abstract the Tor network by ignoring character­istics of Tor, such as the path selection algorithm, the varying en­trusted bandwidth of different Tor nodes, or the user s requested ports [6, 15 18, 21].
Sentence 2: these real-life characteristics of Tor signi.cantly in.uence a user s anonymity, which renders the previ­ously proven bounds inaccurate.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A user s digital identity plays a very crucial role in determining which services and data can be accessed by that user and thus is a corner stone in the security building blocks of any system.
Sentence 2: what is often overlooked are the issues surrounding data identity, which also plays a crucial role as there is a need to ascertain that the user has the correct access permissions for a unit of digital data.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 1.1 State of the Art For high speed NIDS/NIPSes, the de facto standard approach is to employ regex (regular expression) based matching engines.
Sentence 2: vulnerability signatures [9, 10, 29] have been proposed, but still have not been used in NIDS/NIPSes due to the low matching ef.ciency.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: On the one hand, if the correct plaintext has enough redundancy that it can be recognized by inspec­tion of the candidate list, then the resulting at­tack by the server will be completely o.ine, and there is nothing one can do about it except pick an encryption password that is su.ciently hard to guess.
Sentence 2: if the correct plaintext is not recognizable by mere inspection, then its appear­ance on a short list of possible candidates may not be very helpful, since the attacker still has to separate the correct plaintext from the other candidates.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION As noted previously, if the host sets the quota to be larger than the workload s requirement, then on-demand mapping achieves a steady state where the workload s pages are mapped and no DMA remapping is needed, i.e., we achieve maxi­mal performance from the point of view of DMA mapping.
Sentence 2: if the workload size is equal to the entire guest memory size, then we might as well use persistent mapping.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We also stress that auditability is an important property of a logging scheme, since the relationship between the log server and the data processor is a fragile one: the data processor trusts the log server to log as instructed, for the correct user, while the log server trusts the data processor to encrypt for the cor­rect user.
Sentence 2: both trusted hardware and auditability are outside the scope of this paper.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Before drive-by download attack emerged, researchers [41, 29, 28] had found some viable methods to identify ma­licious network .ows by detecting the plain text or light­encoded shellcode within these .ows.
Sentence 2: in drive-by download attacks, by utilizing the powerful capacities pro­vided by the script engine of browsers or their plug-ins, at­tackers can encode their shellcode in much more variable ways during transfer, and then decode them just before the exploitation.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The three Feitian devices cor­rectly limit C_SetAttributeValue so thata sensitivekey can never be changed into nonsensitive.
Sentence 2: this is of no use, since these tokens let any user directly access sensitive and unextractablekeys (see attacks a3 and a4), disregarding the standard.The Sata and the Gemalto SafeSiteClassicV2 devices are the only ones which allow the sensitive attribute to be unset with no limitation; this is in a perverse sense coherent, as just like the Feitian devices, they let any user access sensitive/unextractable keys.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Among all studies on binary analysis, protocol reverse engi­neering work, such as [8 10, 21, 39], is also closely related to AUTO PROB E. We adopt similar approach as in [6] to .gure out the semantics meanings of malware s request.
Sentence 2: one difference between AUTO PROB E and existing work is that AUTO PROB E does not attempt to understand the complete protocol of malware s communication, and AUTO PROBE uses many other different techniques to aid the generation of .ngerprints.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Previousresults[1,7]gaveone­wayfuntionsthatare atleastashardtoinvertasapproximatingtheshortestlin­earlyindependentvetorproblem(SIVP,seenextsetionfor adefnition)withinafatorO(n 3+c).Itfollowsfromgen­eralredutionsfromSVPtoSIVP[10,]thattheone­way funtionof[1,7]isatleastashardtoinvertasapproxi­matingSVPwithinO(n 4+c).Expressingthehardnessof invertingafuntionintermsoftheomplexityofapproxi­matingSVPisimportantbeauseSVPisbyfarthemost famousandwidelystudiedomputationalproblemonlat­ties.However,asbasingryptographifuntionsonthe worstasehardnessofSIVPallowstoreduetherequired inapproximabilityfatortoO(n 3+c),SIVPseemsabetter startingpointinthestudyoflattiebasedryptography thanSVP,andthismotivated[5]tostudytheomputa­tionalomplexityofSIVPandproveNP­hardnessresults forthisproblem.
Sentence 2: ourimprovedonstrutionbasedonthehardnessofap­proximatingtheoveringradiusproblem(CRP)suggests thatCRPmightbeanevenbetterstartingpointtobeused inthestudyofryptographifuntions.Besidethesmaller inapproximabilityfatorrequiredbytheryptographiap­pliations,wesuggestthattheoveringradiusis,byitself, aninterestingproblemtobestudiedasapotentialsoure ofomputationalhardness.NoNP­hardnessresultforthe problemisknownatthetimeofthiswriting.for theexatversion,itisnotevenknownhowtosolvethe CRPinnondeterministipolynomialtime,andtheanalo­gousproblemforlinearodesisknowntobeompletefor theseondlevelofthepolynomialhierarhy[12],alassof problemspresumablymuhharderthanNP­ompleteones.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Privacy-Friendly Planning of Energy Distribution in Smart Grids Tassos Dimitriou Ghassan O. Karame Computer Technology Institute NEC Laboratories Europe Athens, Greece Heidelberg 69115 Kuwait University, Kuwait Germany tassos.dimitriou@ieee.org ghassan.karame@neclab.eu ABSTRACT The smart-grid is gaining increasing attention nowadays, owing to its premise to o.er increased reliability, perfor­mance, and a balanced utilization of energy.
Sentence 2: the current design of smart-grids raises serious concerns with re­spect to the privacy and anonymity of users.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However A gets at most t(t +1)+ t = t2 +2t values from t wires, controlled by it in top band.Hence A lacks one value imply­ing m = Q(0, 0) s perfectly security.Moreover if A controls at least one wire in the bottom band, then during Phase II A will know the information corresponding to the con.ict graph.
Sentence 2: this information will not give any extra information to interpolate Q(x, y)and retrieve m. D lemma 1.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.1 AnOverviewofArchitecturalSupporton Itanium To hide the high latency of memory operations, Itanium is built with the supportfor control speculation, which allowsinstructions to be speculatively executed before knowing whether they need to be executed or not.
Sentence 2: executing such speculative instruc­tions might cause exceptions, which might not belong to the nor­mal behavior of the program.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: (ii) Non-repudiation: Based on the identi.cation algo­rithms, the accused traitor with index h has found to have   at least l1/w many matchings with the pirate codeword at the outer level.
Sentence 2: this does not necessarily mean that the traitor was actively using its private input in all of these l1/w a.liated pirate inner codewords.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: {Converge, Diverge, Restrict, Extend, Shu.e}be sim­ilarity values.
Sentence 2: if pm speci.es Permit Override and pn speci.es Deny Override , the policy similarity between pm and pn is com­puted as follows: RPermit Deny {Converge,E xtend ,Ri }= Extend RPermit Deny {Diverge ,Ri }= Diverge RPermit {Restrict,Shuffle,Ri Deny }= Shuffle if pm speci.es Deny Override and pn Permit Override , the policy similarity between pm and pn is computed as follows: RPermit Deny {Converge,Restrict ,Ri }= Restrict RPermit  {Diverge ,Ri Deny }= Diverge RPermit  {E xtend,S huf f le,Ri Deny }= Shuffle .
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: (Unrestrictedactivation-onlyhierarchyorA­hierarchy)Letxandyberolessuchthat(xCty),thatis, xhasanunrestrictedactivation-onlyrelationovery.Then thefollowingcondition(c2)holds: 8u(xCty)^can activate(uxt)!can activate(uyt) xissaidtobeaseniorroleofy,andconverselyyissaid tobeajuniorroleofx,withrespecttotheunrestricted A-hierarchy.
Sentence 2: here,theactivation-onlysemanticsintroducesanewcan activate"semanticsbetweenauserandarole.Axiom(2) statesthatauserabletoactivatearolethroughexplicit assignment,whereastheA-relationallowsthatthroughre­lationsbetweenroles,withoutaneedforexplicituser-role assignment.Condition(c2)statesthatifuserucanac­tivaterolex,andxhasA-relationovery,thens/hecan activateroleytoo,evenifuisnotexplicitlyassignedto y.notethatanexplicitassignmentofutoyis possiblebutwillberedundanthere.Thesetofaxiomsand conditionc2togetherallowauseruassignedtorolexto activateallofy'sjuniors.asconditionc1does notapplytoanA-hierarchy,if(xCty),thenucannotac­quirey'spermissionsbyjustactivatingx.Notethatthe can activate(uxt)predicatemakesA-hierarchytransitive thesamewaythepredicatecan be acquired(pyt)makes anI-hierarchyso.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: There are also some works [27, 9, 17, 5, 32] that these authors employ to prove AND, OR and NOT statement about attributes, e.g., a user has attribute a OR b, basically by showing that some committedvalue equalsagivenvalueOR some othergivenvalue.
Sentence 2: we achieve such proves by showing that some given attribute value (encoded as a prime) divides (or does not divide) a committed value, which turns out to be much more ef.cient (of course to show that such relations hold we employ some of the mentioned techniques).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This decision provided that port scanning, by itself, does not create a damages claim (i.e., that direct harm must be shown to establish damages under the CFAA).
Sentence 2: we are also sensitive to the ethical issues re­sulting from the perception of a threat, especially when no greater good is achieved, and thus we are careful to re­strict our network probes to services that are designed to be publicly facing TCP port 80 (the standard port for HTTP Web service) and TCP port 443 (the standard port for HTTPS Web service).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In particular, researchers have proposed designs for secure processors which utilize hardware-based mem­ory encryption and integrity veri.cation to protect the privacy and integrity of computation even from sophisticated physical attacks.
Sentence 2: currently proposed schemes remain hampered by prob­lems that make them impractical for use in today s computer sys­tems: lack of virtual memory and Inter-Process Communication support as well as excessive storage and performance overheads.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.7 UnifyingRule/PolicyCombiningAlgorithms Problem: Inthe sequentialrange rule representation, there is onlyone rule combining algorithm, whichis First-Applicable.
Sentence 2: xACML supportsfour rule(orpolicy) combining algorithms: First-Applicable, Only-One-Applicable, Deny-Overrides, and Permit-Overrides.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Demo Overview: Privacy-Enhancing Features of IdentiDroid Daniele Midi Oyindamola OluwatimiBilal Shebaro Purdue University Purdue University Purdue University dmidi@cs.purdue.edu ooluwatimi@cs.purdue.edu bshebaro@cs.purdue.edu Elisa Bertino Purdue University bertino@cs.purdue.edu ABSTRACT As privacy today is a major concern for mobile systems, network anonymizers are widely available on smartphones systems, such as Android.
Sentence 2: in many cases appli­cations are still able to identify the user and the device by means di.erent from the IP address.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, information for establishing verti­cal trust in an entity can be gathered from digital certi.­cates such as X.509 credentials, LDAP directories operated by trusted organizations, quasi-certi.ed attribute data in social networking pro.les, or public databases (e.g., voter registration databases).
Sentence 2: information gathered from reputation/recommendation systems, infor­mal polls run by various web sites, logs generated by intru­sion detection systems, or historical QoS data can be used as a basis for establishing horizontal trust in an entity.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Several articles target issues related to developing secu­rity education within the scope of full scale educational pro­grams, see, e.g., [7, 13], but detailed information on secu­ rity courses of various kinds also exist, see, e.g., [8, 9, 12].
Sentence 2: speci.c information regarding courses with sim­ilar prerequisites as the one described herein, i.e., a short course especially tailored towards military o.cers with lim­ited computer knowledge, has not been published widely.
Relationship: contrasting