sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We develop three types of one-gate HT benchmarks based on switching power, leakage power, and delay measurements that are commonly used in HT detection.
Sentence 2: we employ an iterative searching algorithm to .nd rarely switching locations, an aging-based approach to create ultra­low power HT, and a backtracking-based reconvergence iden­ti.cation method to determine the non-observable delay paths.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since the role infrastruc­ture of user permissions A is constructed from B and C, edges represented in B and C must be minimal satisfying Equation 2.
Sentence 2: let the notation |M| represent the number of edges represented by a matrix M. the number of elements in the matrix set to 1, mij =1whereeach mij =1 represents an edge or a relationship between i and j.Using the notation, we have: Problem 2.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Given this, the probability that Requirement (2) is satis.ed, PS(2), is computed as follows: 1 PS(2) =Prob(tgA <tgV )+ Prob(tgA = tgV ).
Sentence 2: (3) 2PS(2) is composed of two components; one corresponds to the event that the block containing TRA is .rst generated and the second to the event where the blocks containing TRA and TRV are generated at the same time, i.e., tgA = tgV .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Because data from untrusted storage is always fetched and stored in the form of a tree paths, we can achieve integrity by simply treating the Path ORAM tree as a Merkle tree where data is stored in all nodes of the tree (not just the leaf nodes).
Sentence 2: each node (bucket) of the Path ORAM tree is tagged with a hash of the following form H(b1 b2 .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.4 Malicious Users and Sybil Attacks While Buddies can measure, and optionally enforce a lower bound on, the number of users comprising a Nym s possi­nymity or indinymity set, Buddies cannot guarantee that all those users are providing useful anonymity.
Sentence 2: if the owner of a Nym N has speci.ed a policy mandating a minimum buddy-set size of K, but up to F other clients may be colluding with the adversary, then N s owner may have to assume that its actual minimum anonymity set size may be as little as K - F , if all F bad clients happen to or somehow arrange to land in the same buddy set as N s owner.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: CONCLUSION We have presented the design, implementation and eval­uation of process out-grafting, an architectural approach to address isolation and compatibility challenges in out-of-VM approaches for .ne-grainedprocess-level execution monitor­ing.
Sentence 2: by e.ectively relocating a suspect pro­cess from a production VM to the security VM for close inspection, process out-grafting e.ectively removes the se­mantic gap for native support of existing process monitor­ing tools.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The new pattern specifies that after matching a single white space, we start counting for [^n]{1024} no matter what the content is.
Sentence 2: it is not hard to see that for every matching substring s that the original pattern reports, the new pattern produces a substring s that is either identical to s or is a prefix of s. the new pattern essentially implements non-overlapping left-most shortest match.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: One obvious choice of l can be derived from the secu­rity lattice L. In particular, note that L is .nite, hence the Hasse diagram7 of L contains a path of maximal length lmax .
Sentence 2: one strategy would be to terminate the search for an approximate response if we do not .nd a path of length less than or equal to lmax between the nodes containing the relevant entities in the dominance graph.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In Figure 7, the non-aggregated attack graph in Figure 6 has been aggregated (automatically) to the level of machines and sets of exploits between them.
Sentence 2: conditions for each machine have been aggregated to a single machine vertex (represented with a machine glyph in the figure), and individual exploits between each pair of attacker/victim machines have aggregated to single vertices.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We establish some basic properties of the interactive in­formation complexity IC(f).
Sentence 2: we show that IC(f) is equal to the amortized (randomized) communica­tion complexity of f. Wealsoshowadirect sum theorem for IC(f)andgive the .rstgeneral connectionbetween informa­tion complexity and (non-amortized) communication com­plexity.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While pi may be tempted to cache a ciphertext cj received from principal pj so that pi will never need to query pj more than once about any assertion within a single session, this is inadvisable because the same random value would be reused multiple times if cj was the encryption of a randomly chosen element of the message space.
Sentence 2: reusing cj would not be indistinguishable from using a fresh element of the message space chosen uniformly at random.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Some vertices may not have any siblings; as they do not contribute to bandwidth over­head, we can conceptually remove them and connect their edges to turn the tree into a full binary tree.
Sentence 2: it is well known that a balanced tree provides the lowest height among d-ary trees of a given degree d. the height of a balanced binary tree with n leaves is plog2 nl, which corre­sponds to the worst-case amount of unsigned hash values in the authentication information of a packet.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Although the individual credentials needed to satisfy a pol­icy can be hidden by using a HCsimpleE with credential indistinguishability, parts of the structure of the boolean expression of the policy may be learned by any recipient.
Sentence 2: an unquali.ed recipient may be able to deduce that a message s policy is of the form ((X AND Y )OR Z)even though he can t decrypt any part of the message.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this way, at the same time the CA will no longer be a bottleneck and OBUs will not have to download the entire CRL.
Sentence 2: the used perfect k-ary trees are based on the application of a duplex construction of the Secure Hash Algorithm SHA-3 that was recently chosen as standard [3], because the combination of both structures allows improving efficiency of updating and querying of revoked certificates.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The basic idea of such relationship-based access con­trol mechanisms is to decide distinctly privileged user groups by tracking the existence of relationship of particular type and/or depth between the access requester and the target resource or its owner.
Sentence 2: carminati et al [7] identi.ed aggregated trust value to denote the level of rela­tionship between users, and utilized trust metric along with relationship type and depth on a path between users as de­cisive factors for access control.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: (1) w .StprS* (Sw) d d Here, prS* (Swd)denotes the total weight on the coset Swd.
Sentence 2: prS* (Swd)may be viewed as the probability that a passkey ensemble drawn from the distribution W belongs to L the coset Sw, i.e., prS* (Sw):= pr(wc).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Thecompletegraphresultingfromthegraphapproximationpro­ cessonthedatacitedabovecanbeviewedat: http://www.pdmcdan.com/bgp/delhier.html Theapproximatedgraphshowsthat2,112ofoutof14,912total organizationsdelegatepre.xestootherorganizations.Thisseem­ inglysmallnumberofaddressdelegatingorganizationsisconsis­ tentwiththegrowthoftheInternet:addressspacehaslargelybeen handedoutbyproviderstocustomerorganizations.Customersdo notfrequentlyfurtherdelegatereceivedaddressspacetoothers.In­ terestingly,theIANAandBGPdataledtoonly114,183delegations andassignmentsrequiringproofs.9 InFigure3werankeachnodeaccordingtothenumberofdel­ egationsfromthatnodeinthedelegationgraphandthenplotthe numberofdelegationsversusrank.Whenviewedonalog-log scaletheplotisessentiallylinearandhenceconformstotheclas­ sicalZipfdistribution[36].
Sentence 2: (InadditiontoconformingtoaZipf distributionthedelegationstructurealsofollowsapowerlaw.thenumberofnodesn(d)thateachhaveddelegationsfrom thatnodevsdisgivenbyn(d).lIdiforsomeconstantf[1, 4,8].ThepowerlawdelegationdistributionimpliestheZipfdis­ tributionfornumberofdelegationsandweomitthegraphofitfor lackofspace.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In particular, we require an e.cient and system-centric monitoring that con­trols communication channels in Android s middleware and in the Linux kernel, and tackles the known confused deputy attacks without false positives, but is also .exible enough to cover future privilege escalation attacks.
Sentence 2: our contributions are the following: We present the design and implementation of a security framework which extends the Android s reference mon­itor concept at both middleware and kernel level, that monitors communication links between applications and veri.es them against rules de.ned in a security policy.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Table 2 reports the number of SK-DNSSEC (which is abbreviated to the shorter SK ) operations that can be computed per second on a Pentium III (800Mhz) machine.
Sentence 2: creating a SK authoritative answer requires the name server to .rst open and verify the symmet­ric certi.cate sent by the resolver and then compute a MAC over the answer.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this work, we consider the identity-based attack can be present at any time.
Sentence 2: di.erent from the pre­vious work, which only considers the presence of such an attack during the authentication phase, we take the view point that the identity-based attacks could be present at any time in real-world scenarios even when building pro­.les for legitimate users.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Because the bits of the protected content reach and physically stay on the user s machine, the protection of these bits is only as strong as the extent to which the DRM client software can protect itself.
Sentence 2: although the bits are usually in encrypted form and accessing the bits is enforced by the rights policies, the client software must be tamper-resistant so that it is difficult for an attacker to modify the rights enforcement code of the DRM client software.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The server can build a circuit that computes a function other than f, we denote the function computed by the circuit as f ' .
Sentence 2: be­cause f is the server s private input, it is essentially same as the server inputs f ' instead of f. such ad­versarial behavior in the real model can be simulated by the execution of computing f ' in the ideal model.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: AType 1 constraint (., s, s1)is satis.ed by a plan a if (a(s),a(s 1)) .. and is not satis.ed ( violated ) otherwise.
Sentence 2: (., s, s1) is violated by a if (a(s),a(s 1))... Equivalently, a constraint (., s, s1) is violated i.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While lazy enforcement can match .ngerprints once and for all, before commit, eager en­forcement checks for a match on every security-relevant access.
Sentence 2: the x11perf/create benchmark creates and maps several hundred subwindows; with eager enforcement, each of the create and map operations entails .ngerprint matching and policylookup, which resultsinavery signi.cantslowdownofWeirdX.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: the structural model of learning can be likened to a musical instrument and the process of learning to a musical score that depicts a succession and combination of notes played on the instrument over time Since each Information Assurance class contains students utilizing each learning style, Kolb s model indicates that moving the class through each quadrant should optimize learning.
Sentence 2: optimizing the learning process requires an appropriate succession and combination of learning activities.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our crawler allows us then to match the identi.er to login names of users that did not yet choose to change the default setting of their pro.les, so as to not display the login names.
Sentence 2: even Number of profiles (Millions) 4.5 4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 Profiles Numeric IDs Logins     5 10 15 20 25 30  Time (Hours) Figure 2: Cumulative number of gathered pro.les in function of crawling time.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This paper proposes a statistical design of experiments approach that will enhance the quantitative aspects of the risk assessment exercise and will make risk assessments smarter, more precise and more efficient.
Sentence 2: our paper demonstrates that a Plackett-Burman design can be used to: (a) identify the subset of security controls that are critical to the enterprise; (b) determine the configuration of these controls; and (c) quantitatively analyze the impact of security enhancements.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Specifically, Threat 1 can be solved by using access control mechanisms like [2,6,15] (both in the VMM and in the kernel) and end-to-end encryption mechanisms.
Sentence 2: [6] protects a mobile device against this threat by running two isolated do­mains, called Secure Domain and Normal Domain, on top of the VMM.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For copydependencies, the equality that must hold is: I( ;7) = I(y;7) Computation dependency: If a data object y is computed as a function of one or more other data objects, e.g., w and x, its mutual information with the taint source depends not only on the mutual in­formation of the inputs with the taint sourcebut also on the mutual information between these inputs(J(wi x)).
Sentence 2: if two inputs are based on different source data we should add their taint values, but if there is the minimum joint entropy between them we should take the maximumvalue(max{J(wi T),J(xi T )})instead of addi­tion.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If not, however, we now choose rj ,tj , and skj uniformly at random (rather than computing these values as the output of Hk(C.,p)), and then continue as before.
Sentence 2: if there is a subsequent Send3 query using the correct value of tj then the server instance .j accepts and outputs the U. session key skj := skj .
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In order to mea­sure the integrity of the hypervisor, the measurement agent needs to access the hypervisor s code, data and CPU state.
Sentence 2: it needs the VMX data structures, which con­tain contextual information essential to integrity measure­ment (e.g., current VMX operation, the hypervisor s VM exit handler and its CR3 register value).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: INTRODUCTION Does it make sense for an application to self-encrypt an encryption key?
Sentence 2: if Es represents an encryption func­tion with key s, would it ever be the case that an application Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro.t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the .rst page.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our earlier analysis indi­cates that it is very dif.cult for the adversary to prevent two non­compromised sensors from establishing a pairwise key.
Sentence 2: the grid-based scheme is intrusion tolerant in the sense that even if the current pairwise key between two sensors are compro­mised, as long as these sensors are not compromised, they can re­establish another pairwise key with a high probability.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: There is an additional restriction on where we can place the end of the data region, which is described below, but the idea is to leverage this ability to control where in a program s execution sYSMALLOc() is called a subsequent time.
Sentence 2: the program makes a number of calls to malloc() and free() and one of the buffers allocated by malloc() is passed to read().
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: BLOCK GENERATION IN BITCOIN To generate a block, peers work on solving a PoW problem.
Sentence 2: given the set of transactions that have been announced since the last block s generation, and the hash of the last block, Bitcoin peers need to .nd a nonce that would make the SHA-256 hash of the formed block smaller than a 256-bit number (target ): SHA-256{Bll || MR(TR1,..., TRn)|| No}=target , (4) where Bll denotes the last generated block, MR(x)denotes the root of the Merkle tree with elements x, TR1 || ... || TRn is a set of transactions which have been announced (and not yet con.rmed) since Bll s generation, and No is the 32-bit nonce.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: PA]} GTRBAC Model [4] The GTRBAC model incorporates a set of language constructs for the specification of various temporal constraints on roles, including constraints on their activations as well as on their enabling times, user-to-role assignments, and permission-to-role assignments.
Sentence 2: gTRBAC makes a clear distinction between role enabling and role activation.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: V (x1, x2) = ej }, where ej = sup ß(x, x ' , t).
Sentence 2: t.[tj-1,tj ],x .Bd(x) ej is an upper-bound on the value of V for two executions .x and .x starting from within Bd(x) over the time interval [tj-1, tj ].
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This paper presents the .rst systematic design of vulnerability signature based parsing and matching engine, NetShield, which achieves multi-gigabit throughput while offering much better ac­curacy.
Sentence 2: we made the following contributions: (i) we proposed a candidate selection algorithm which ef.ciently matches thousands of vulnerability signatures simultaneously re­quiring a small amount of memory; (ii) we proposed an auto­matic lightweight parsing state machine achieving fast protocol parsing.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To address such an issue, we recently proposed a multiparty ac­cess control (MPAC) model [22] to capture the core features of multiparty authorization requirements, which have not been accom­modated by other access control systems for OSNs (e.g., [10, 11, 16, 17]).
Sentence 2: we introduced a systematic con.ict detection and resolution approach [21] to cope with privacy con.icts occur­ring in collaborative management of data sharing in OSNs, balanc­ing the need for privacy protection and the users desire for infor­mation sharing by quantitative analysis of privacy risk and sharing loss.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The de.nition of privacy in these models are as follows: retrieved data from a database should not reveal any extra information to the querier about the record owner compared to simply not letting him/her re­trieve the data, even if the querier already knows some in­formation about the owner from separate resources [42].
Sentence 2: these models aim to decrease the probability of identifying individuals even though his/her speci.c at­tributes are included in the information retrieved form a database.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We then show an impossibility result indicating that a sim- ilar equivalence does hot hold for Multiparty Computation (MPC): we show that even if protocols are given black-box access for free to an idealized secret sharing scheme secure for the access structure in question, it is not possible to han- dle all relevant access structures efficiently, not even if the adversary is passive and static.
Sentence 2: general MPC can only be black-box reduced efficiently to secret sharing if extra properties of the secret sharing scheme used (such as linearity) are assumed.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Considerasimple system withtworequest types A and B (for clarity we index request types with letters), and consider a mitigator with these prediction functions p(N, r) for N =1: Assume the following input history: (2,A), (4,B), (6,A), and (30,B).
Sentence 2: two inputs of type A arriveat times2and6,and two of type B arrive at times4and 30.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: (., s, s1) is satis.ed, where def .
Sentence 2: =(u, u 1) .U ×U :(u, u 1)...   AType 2 constraint (., s, S1), S1 .S is violated if (., s, s1) is violated for all s 1 .S1.(., s, S1) is violated i. the constraint expression (., s, s1) si.Si is satis.ed.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The TCG-MPRA speci.es that Mandatory engines are required to be supported by a Mobile Remote owner Trusted Module (MRTM) which supports secure boot and does not permit a local Operator to remove the stakeholder from the engine .
Sentence 2: the security of a mandatory engine cannot be compromised by any other local or remote stake­holder of the platform.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: CONCLUSION Existing smartphone operating systems, such as Google Android, provide no data and application isolation between domains of di.erent trust levels.
Sentence 2: there exists no e.cient solution to isolate corporate and private applications and data on Android: the existing security extensions for Android only focus on one speci.c layer of the Android software stack, and hence, do not provide a general and system-wide solution for isolation.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Informally, .i and qi describe the current instruction and the contents of memory for a single execution of a program, and capture the state of the system just before executing the encrypt or decrypt primitive.
Sentence 2: if the execution of the program is suspended for a brief time, .i,qi would describe a snapshot of the stack, the value stored in the in­struction pointer (IP) register, the values of all dynamically allocated variables (i.e., those on the heap), etc.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The Impromptu prototype, an application for ad-hoc peer-to-peer file sharing, was developed as a testbed to explore both the concept of integrating action and configuration and the concept of dynamic visualization of activity.
Sentence 2: impromptu was not designed to be the best file sharing interface, but simply an application with which we could explore our design principles in a scenario that would be comprehensible to test subjects.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Robustness Even though the primary purpose of our tool so far has been to evaluate existing .ows (a scenario under which we don t need to worry about malicious code trying to subvert our system), our framework does in fact protect its internal data structures from being maliciously modi.ed.
Sentence 2: our tool disallows a user JavaScript program from referencing any of the variables and .elds used for taint tracking such as TSET.
Relationship: entailment