sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This mechanism should satisfy the following properties: Searchability, which means the health server correctly returns the records which match the query, and Privacy, which means the patient can perform the search without revealing any information to the server (in this way, security is still guaranteed even if server has been compro­mised).
Sentence 2: we require that the server learn nothing about what query is being made or about the documents or key­words in the record.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Although protocols like [15, 16] favors equi-width or equi-depth bucketization, our empirical results show that an adversary has higher probability of success for these two approaches than that of the Random bucketiza­tion.
Sentence 2: we conclude that random bucketization ap­proach is more resistant to access pattern based inference attacks than the equi-width and equi-depth ones.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Given that the data sample regards nodes randomly se­lected from the population of nodes in the network of ref­erence, we can conclude that our estimations at the level of the data sample have validity over the entire population of nodes in that network.
Sentence 2: the parameter 6 that indexes the probability density function for the data vector x, which is more likely to have produced the data in our sample, is indeed an estimate of the network vulnerability rate in the case of network vulnerability rate estimation, and an esti­mate of the network infection rate in the case of network infection rate estimation.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.1 Dimensions of the UAQ problem Recall from De.nition 2.1 that a UAQ problem instance (s, Plb,Pub, obj) is de.ned in terms of a RBAC policy RP = (U, R, P, P A, UA, C) and a (valid) history H =[.0,...,.k-1] of RP .
Sentence 2: there are several dimensions that should be taken into account to generate problem instances for the UAQ problem.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The components as well as their combination is driven by speci.ca­tionlanguagesthat abstractfrom cryptographicdetails[2].
Sentence 2: to generate an idemix credential, i.e., the evidence, that ful.lls a given claim, wehavetotranslate claimsintotheidemixproofspec­i.cation language.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Nevertheless, the impact of these attacks was believed to be limited due to the requirement that an adversary had to be physically close to a victim in order to collect the required information.
Sentence 2: it is generally considered suf.ciently se­cure as an authentication factor for common access protection [5], as we observe that many face authentication systems [10, 8, 38, 24, 25, 39] such as Google s Face Unlock and Lenovo s Veriface, are widely available on all kinds of consumer-level computing de­vices.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: some of the proof-theoretic di.erences, particularly some of the surprising consequences of Unit in classical authoriza­ 5.1 Soundness tion logic.
Sentence 2: in the example below, we focus on one di.erence Our .rst soundness theorem for FOCAL states that if f that does not seem to have been explored in constructive is provable from assumptions G, and that if a belief model authorization logic: validates all the formulas in G, then that model must also validate f. any provable formula is valid in the Example 2.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The result of the analysis as presented in Figure 13 con.rms that no attack can be mounted.
Sentence 2: role initiator(A,B,S: agent, Kas: symmetric_key, SND_AB,RCV_AB,SND_AS,RCV_AS:channel(dy)) played_by A def= local State: nat, Kab: symmetric_key, Na,Nb,Ts: text init State:= 0 transition 1.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: an at least equally considerable amount of false negatives for those SaaS-CPs, which called themselves, for exam­ ple, Cloud Service Provider instead of SaaS-CP .
Sentence 2: this ap­ proach would have meant manually analyzing all 100,000 domains including their corresponding subdomains, and possibly also study­ing the provided documentation and external descriptions.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Although oblivious sorting algorithm o.ers hardness of correlation of 1/N between the location of an item in the input and its new location in the output sequence, it requires a fairly costly overhead, as the constant factors and details of this algorithm are somewhat nontrivial.
Sentence 2: it would be nice in applications that don t necessarily require perfectly oblivious shu.ing to have a simple substitute that could be fast and e.ective in practice.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Speci.cally, when a BGP speaker in ASy receives a route update of a pre.x with the correct signature from a speaker in ASx (i.e., the route update is attested by ASx itself),it atteststhe routeupdatebyverifyingthe signatureandputs this route in Adj-RIB-IN for future route selection.
Sentence 2: aSx and ASy build trust between them for this pre.x.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Finally, to compute the Merkle hash value of the root, he/she needs the Merkle hash value of Investment s sib­lings (i.e., the Investment element referring to Partner1).
Sentence 2: the hash values needed by the manager are: MhX(Amount); MhX(Data); h(Inv.content3); h(Inv.tagname); MhX(Inv); h(Investment.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This allows system operators to directly measure the state of the electric power grid in real-time, rather than rely on imprecise state esti­mation.
Sentence 2: pMUs have the potential to enable an entirely new set of applications for the power grid: pro­tection and control during abnormal conditions, real-time distributed control, postmortem analysis of system faults, advanced state estimators for system monitoring, and the reliable integration of renewable energy resources [1].
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our approach to mitigating this threat is fragility, i.e., requiring that the secrecy of all input-to-output mappings depends on the secrecy of each of them.
Sentence 2: this approach leverages the presumption that the mix ad­ministrator is interested in protecting the privacy of some messages (e.g., his own); our approach requires him to pro­tect all the messages to do so.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Theobviousproblemofamirroristhepotentialfordata repliationandspaeonsumption.Again,theYGuard Modelprovidesanappropriatesolution.Beauseset­based AportionoftheObjettree:               AportionofthePremissionstree:   <SACLEntryID="2"who="*'eo'wartsRus'om" xset="//*FROG" operation="read"thru="*'wartsRus'om"/>  Figure11:Aboveisaportionoftheobjettreeor­respondingtoFigure1.Theportionofthepermis­sionstreeshownbelowitissuÆienttograntthea­essshowninFigure2,namelyreadaesstoallfrog elementstoanyoneineologyatWartsRus.oma­essingthesitethroughaWartsRus.omomputer.
Sentence 2: permissisonsspeifationtendstowardpermissionsbeing speifedinoneplaetomanyobjets,thenumberofob­jetsmirroredisgenerallymuhfewerthanthenumberof objetsproteted.thetotalspaerequiredforaess ontrolinformationisreduedomparedtoaessontrol listsduetothereduedquantityofSACLs.Additionally, thepermissionstreeisonlyrequiredtomirrortheobjet treetothedeepestlevelatwhihpermissionsarespeifed.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This pro­cess continues with .t >.t-1 used for week t. Even though PCA is retrained from scratch each week, the training data includes events not caught by the previous detector.
Sentence 2: each successive week will contain additional malicious train­ing data, with the process continuing until the week of the DoS attack, when the adversary stops injecting cha.. 2The full proof is ommitted due to space constraints.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To allow a quantitative analysis of security, we use the following standard de.nition [9]: Definition 6.
Sentence 2: asignature scheme §is (t,q,e)-secure over message space M, if for any adversary who runs in time t and makes =q oracle queries, the success probability is at most e. an adversary (t,q,e)-breaks the scheme, if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algo­rithm that runs in time t, makes at most q oracle queries and succeeds in the above game with probability at least e. The development of provably secure signature schemes is an active area of research, as not every cryptographic sig­nature satis.es this security property.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Static, application-centric, one-for-all permissions are simply not feasible for applications which can be used in completely di.erent contexts, processing the same user data.
Sentence 2: de­spite the restrictions Constroid imposes on the developer and in the face of the introduced overhead we think that Constroid takes an important .rst step towards an alterna­tive to currently established permission systems.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When a client sends a re­quest to Dovecot, the process running in the domain dovecot auth t establishes connections to the client .rst.
Sentence 2: when the pro­cess running in the domain dovecot auth t executed the accept sys­tem call, we de.ned that Dovecot transited from the initialization phase to the POP processing phase.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The .rst example makes it clear that creating network con­nections to discover vulnerabilities is circumscribed, but the second indicates that connecting to Web servers is implic­itly authorized (since this is what Web crawlers do) so long as they do not impair their function.
Sentence 2: we operate un­der the interpretation that connecting to Web servers from within EC2 is implicitly authorized so long as we are not disrupting them nor attempting to discover vulnerabilities therein (which we do not).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Therefore, the head of the rule cando({al­ ice, bob{alice}}, {login}, +, {Ø}) evaluates to be true un­der the three valued (Kleene) truth table.
Sentence 2: f0(P) (cando({alice, bob{alice}}, {login}, +, {Ø})) = T .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3), we de.ne a set ConstA1 of process templates such that if a tag is created erates worst-case constraints that assert that the process always tries to send information with its lowest possible la­bel, and receive information with its highest possible label.
Sentence 2: if a solution to the constraint system exists, it guarantees that a compromised process acting in such an extremal way will not be able to violate the desired information-.ow policy.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: But in any server query, if adversary does not use the legitimate password, wj is masked with a random value in both G3 and G4; otherwise if adversary uses the legitimate password, un­less event F happens, the number of distinct servers which adver­sary contacts is bounded by t - t ' .
Sentence 2: unless event F happens, the maximum number of xi shares that is effectively used in either game is bounded by t. CLAIM 9.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The return address, i.e., the i7 register in the callee, is decrypted with usrkey when a jmpl instruction uses the i7 register (or o7 in case of leaf subroutine) to change the control .ow (ret instrunction).
Sentence 2: the modi.ed processor will return to the (%i7 XOR usrkey)+8 address.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When the spy-process re-executes its branches, measures the execution time of all its branches, it can simply infer that the cipher had not modi.ed the BTB, and the target branch was not taken by the crypto pro­cess.
Sentence 2: the adversary can simply determine the complete execution .ow of the cipher process by continuously per­forming the above very simple spy strategy, i.e., just exe­cuting spy branches and measuring their overall execution time.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: After one next-ror with n = 10, S1 = HK(I||0), S2 = 0,  S3 = 11 and R = 0.
Sentence 2: a obtains a 10-byte string in the last next-ror­oracle query that is predictable whereas this event should occur with probability 2-80 .
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Although there exist e.cient MILP solvers, MILPs are e.ectively NP hard.
Sentence 2: iCCPS'14, April 14-17, 2014, Berlin, Germany the natural next step would include trans­forming the l0 state estimator into a convex program based on l1/lr optimization (e.g., r = 2) as done in [8].
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In a keyword auction, winners and paymentsare determined not onlybyadvertiser bids but also bya parameter calledCTR, which is speci.c to each advertiser and is determined by the auctioneer.
Sentence 2: by knowing the values of the bids, an insincere auctioneer can manipulate the CTRs to increase his revenue.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A could utilize this information to give more con.dence to bits b in its .ngerprint FCA that A knows to originate from such environmental events.
Sentence 2: he could limit the search space of bit positions to be .ipped to fab­ricate F ' , thus decreasing the e.ective length |FC | of the CA .ngerprint in Eq.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The offset of the values are 0 and 1, respectively, and recall that the ses­sion identi.er is 4, so the keys are 1000 and 1001.
Sentence 2: the SDP inserts two nodes into the HWDS: insert(1000, 01000000) and in­sert(1001, 00010100).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The correctness of the protocol is due to the fact that the left side of the outermost intersection (Equation 5) will still return an empty set if no result exists for t, or a set where each element appears at most once.
Sentence 2: it is su.cient to intersect this result of the element reduction with the set of elements that appear in all input sets, using the simple encoding instead of the multiplicity encoding (menc).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Stephen McLaughlin &#38; Patrick McDaniel Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA {smclaugh,mcdaniel}@cse.psu.edu cannot ascertain how secure the computer they are using to access their data is.
Sentence 2: all of their information is potentially at risk if the system is compromised.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Improved Anonymous Proxy Re-encryption with CCA Qingji Zheng Department of Computer Science University of Texas at San Antonio, TX, USA qingjizheng@gmail.com  Security Wei Zhu Julymobile Tech Co., Ltd Anhui, China zhuweijm@sina.com Xinwen Zhang Huawei Research Center Santa Clara, CA, USA Jiafeng Zhu Huawei Research Center Santa Clara, CA, USA edwardzhu95@gmail.com  xinwenzhang@gmail.com ABSTRACT Outsourcing private data and heavy computation tasks to the cloud may lead to privacy breach as attackers (e.g., malicious outsiders or cloud administrators) may correlate any relevant information to penetrate information of their interests.
Sentence 2: how to preserve cloud users privacy has been a top concern when adopting cloud solutions.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If the ad­dress passed to this API is a converted address, the loader would return a value indicating that the lookup has failed, causing a semantic change to the program, if not a crash.
Sentence 2: we hook the call to this API, check the dwFlags, andifits0x4bitisset,weconvertbacktheaddressspeci"ed as the argument lpModuleName.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: has a one-step transition probability matrix P : q(x, y)axy, if x= yP (x, y) = 1 - z q(x, z)axz, if x = y =x It can be shown that for the above P , the Markov chain is re­versible and has a stationary distribution p, equal to the target dis­tribution.
Sentence 2: once the chain has reached the steady state, the sequence of samples we get from the MH method should fol­low the target distribution.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Four rootkits (fuuld, hide_lkm, SucKIT, and superkit) manipulate kernel memory by using the /dev/kmem memory device, among which two rootkits (fuuld and hide_lkm) directly manipulate only ker­nel data and do not violate kernel code integrity.
Sentence 2: they are not detected by code integrity-based defense sys­tems [23, 24].
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Note that healthcare providers such as hospitals are legally responsible for ensuring appropriate protection of data in­cluding access control [6].
Sentence 2: autonomy of informa­tion systems to implement access control policies indepen­dently from the LSP is an important property; this, how­ever, is not currently possible due to the fact that the EPD centralizes authorization in the LSP.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: At this point, the sequence of values (eip1, eip2, ..., eipn) in the queue is used to construct the CFG: Each distinct eipi value represents a different basic block, and hence, a different node in the control .ow graph.
Sentence 2: for each eipi .i :1 = i = n, we check whether there exists already a corresponding node in the CFG.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Executing a certain sequence of branches in the spy process which evicts just the Front-End BTB might not necessarily su.ce to completely enforce the CPU not to .nd the target address of the target branch in some of the BTB s. A certain hidden interaction between Front-End BTB and Trace-Cache BTB might allow for some short-term victim address evictions, but still store the tar­get branch in one of the BTB s .
Sentence 2: we decided to let the spy process continuously do the following.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In order to keep the price of the integrated-chip as low as possible thisalsoservesasakeyfactorintheincrease of the tpm manufacturing and shipping with commodities hardware -only a small number of critical functionalities are implemented in the hardware.
Sentence 2: the additional and optional functionalities are implemented in the software component known as the tcg Software Stack (tss),which is explained in the tss speci.cation [13].
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, in each of our case studies we needed precision constraints for fewer than 50% of the candidate .ngerprints mined 9/18 for ext2, 24/115 for X server, and 4/38 for PennMUSH.
Sentence 2: we believe that our current approach strikes a good balance between simplicity and precision of candidate .ngerprints.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: B : {NB +1}KAB Figure 10: Proposed .x for the Wide Mouthed Frog protocol Once this identity is added to the message, the intruder is not able to initiate the nonce challenge in protocol run i by replayingmessage 3from run ii:The required mes­sage is {NA,B}KAB , yet, as can be seen in Figure 11, only {NA,A}KAB can be obtained from run ii.
Sentence 2: both protocol runs will be terminated.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This is due not only to the ongoing research in the .eld but also due to the fact that a classi.er may work well in combination with a certain feature set, while other classi.ers may perform much better in cases where it is weak.
Sentence 2: it is highly desirable that the Itus framework be able to add support for many classi.cation algorithms with­out the development overhead of coupling them tightly with the rest of the IA framework.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Fortunately, there is a large class of such applications such as ACL rules, IDS and IPS patterns and tokens, tokens used in protocol parsing, load balancing and traffic engineering tuples, transitions of near static finite automata, etc.
Sentence 2: we believe that our hash table can be extremely useful in realizing fast and deterministic lookups in highly parallel, high performance packet forwarding systems.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Each of the polyhedra (e.g., m(P1(t))nP1(t + 1)) computed after pairwise intersection is a subset of the corre­sponding polyhedron when no history is used (e.g., P1(t+1)).
Sentence 2: the fusion polyhedron will always be a sub­set of the fusion polyhedron obtained when no history is used.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The courses that are required for the Information Security option have our two course programming sequence (CS 150 and CS 151), our introduction to computer systems courses (CS 250), and our software engineering course (CS 263) as prerequisites that are in the core.
Sentence 2: a student starting the Information Security option should have a solid background in object-oriented programming and software engineering, and be comfortable with assembly language, the key concepts in the hardware implementation of the assembly language interface, language translation, and operating systems.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To see why this helps, notice that since the coe.cients of g, s, f, e are all bounded by 2B + 1.8 By Corollary 3.3, we know that the 8In fact, the coe.cients of g, s and e are bounded by B and that of f is bounded by 2B + 1. coe.cients of gs (mod x n + 1) and fe (mod x n + 1) are both bounded by n(2B + 1)2 .
Sentence 2: the coe.cients of fc are bounded by 4n(2B + 1)2 + B 72nB2 , a fresh ciphertext generated by Enc is guaranteed to decrypt cor­rectly.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: First, the achievability of the region given in the theorem can be demonstrated by setting X = G1 + G2, where G1 and G2 are two independent Gaussian vectors with zero means and covariance matrices S - A * and A * , where A * be an optimal solution to the optimization prob­lem on the right-hand side of 6.
Sentence 2: setting U = G1 and V = X allows verifying the achievability of the region.  )
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Under hypothesis A.1, set AE cannot contain more than twoedges, since thenodethat was visited right before A is already marked, and the corresponding edge does not satisfy the condition of line 3.
Sentence 2: every call of Find-Paths applies itself recursively twice on a subnetwork with one node less than the original one; this leads us to conclude that a .rst upper bound for the complexity of the algorithm is O(2n) (which is already an improvement over O(n!)).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the second stage of transmission, all the relays simultaneously transmit to the ith user s des­tination.
Sentence 2: the received signal at the ith destination is T TT given by yi = gti + zdi = gW ifisi + gW izri + zdi , i ii where zdi ~CN(0,sd2) is the AWGN at the destination.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: l o c a t i o n ; i In ad-based URL shortening services, however, it is the un­trusted party that is framed and can perform the exact same check, escaping the iframe and redirecting the entire tab of the user s browser.
Sentence 2: an attacker can redirect the vic­tim from the service s Waiting Page , to browser-exploiting pages, scams and phishing attacks.
Relationship: reasoning