sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The scalability of P2P can potentially alleviate the high start-up cost of provisioning large amounts of bandwidth and processing power [22]; therefore, allowing small developers to create MMOG.
Sentence 2: maintaining security in P2P architectures is difficult as the simulation and game state is distributed to un-trusted peer machines; consistency algorithms are required to prevent errors in player s game state; and redundancy must be built in as individual player machines have a high probability of failure.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: RESULTS For developers, the multiplicity of ad libraries on the Android platform provides options, allowing them to select libraries based on privacy concerns as well as functionality and revenue poten­tial.
Sentence 2: for users, who do not choose the ad libraries in their apps, this represents expanded vulnerability, as the presence of any library that ex.ltrates personal data means that the data is poten­tially compromised.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The parameter d in Theorem 1 must be chosen su.ciently close to zero to ensure the correct recovery of d and C with high probability.
Sentence 2: the eavesdropper could tolerate .R a fraction of d = h errors, as these could be corrected upon decoding the possibly noisy coset d ' and the rows of C ' on the (full) mother trellis.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Given a policy P we can compute an irreducible policy P ' equivalent to P by removing authorizations that satisfy the redundancy condition.
Sentence 2: in order to compute the minimum policy P '' we may have to de.ne new authoriza­tions that do not exist in P or remove authorizations in P with the only constraint that the resulting policy P '' must have the same behaviour as the original one.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Fully Automated Analysis of Padding-Based Encryption in the Computational Model Gilles Barthe IMDEA Software Institute Madrid, Spain gilles.barthe@imdea.org Juan Manuel Crespo IMDEA Software Institute Madrid, Spain juanmanuel.crespo@imdea.org Benjamin Grégoire INRIA Sophia Antipolis Sophia Antipolis, France benjamin.gregoire@inria.fr César Kunz Yassine Lakhnech Benedikt Schmidt IMDEA Software Institute U. de Grenoble &#38; VERIMAG IMDEA Software Institute Madrid, Spain cesar.kunz@imdea.org Grenoble, France yassine.lakhnech@imag.fr Madrid, Spain benedikt.schmidt@imdea.org Santiago Zanella-Béguelin Microsoft Research Cambridge, UK santiago@microsoft.com ABSTRACT Computer-aided veri.cation provides e.ective means of an­alyzing the security of cryptographic primitives.
Sentence 2: it has remained a challenge to achieve fully automated analyses yielding guarantees that hold against computational (rather than symbolic) attacks.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, control [30, 1] and data .ow integrity [9] ensure that the program never deviates from statically computed models of control and data .ow, respectively.
Sentence 2: these systems are not gen­eralizable to security problems that do not violate control or data .ow integrity, and they are of limited use in languages that already provide similar guarantees.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As Figure 7 shows, lazy TMI enforcement (STM-TMI/Lazy) always incurs acceptable overheads under 21% in all cases.
Sentence 2: ea­ger TMI-based enforcement (STM-TMI/Eager) has even lower overhead for GradeSheet andTar (which showsa not-statistically­signi.cant1% speedup).eager enforcementisnotagood strategy for FreeCS andWeirdX, where it results in a signi.cant slowdown.Thisis becauseboth FreeCSandWeirdXuseacomplex .ngerprint to identify security-relevant operations, such as joining a forum and creating/mapping windows.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If the BS success­fully veri.es all the MACs it receives, then the protocol terminates at the end of the second epoch.
Sentence 2: if it does not receive the requested MACs or if one or more MACs are invalid, the BS exe­cutes the sliding-window protocol described above to compute the correct value of R. If the probability of compromised nodes be­ing present in the network is low, then this alternative approach is preferable to the extended approach since it will have much lower latency on average.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The corrected conditional entropy test has a mean score for TRCTC that appears somewhat close to that of legitimate, 1.96 for legit­imate and 2.21 for covert.
Sentence 2: if we examine the dis­tribution of test scores for TRCTC and legitimate tra.c, as illustrated in Figure 5, then we can see that, although some scores are in adjacent bins, there is no overlap between the distributions.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This involves tracking computations and origins of subterms just as required by our framework.
Sentence 2: the existing la­beled .-calculi do not re.ect the exact semantics of practi­cal data .ow tracking techniques such as the taint tracking mechanism on which our framework relies, which is why the calculus presented in this paper di.ers from existing ones.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Content-Based Isolation: Rethinking Isolation Policy Design on Client Systems Alexander Moshchuk Helen J. WangYunxin Liu Microsoft Research Microsoft Research Microsoft Research Asia Redmond, WA, USARedmond, WA, USABeijing, China alexmos@microsoft.com helenw@microsoft.com yunliu@microsoft.com ABSTRACT Modern client platforms, such as iOS, Android, Windows Phone, and Windows 8, have progressed from a per-user isolation policy, where users are isolated but a user s ap­plications run in the same isolation container, to an appli­cation isolation policy, where di.erent applications are iso­lated from one another.
Sentence 2: this is not enough because mutually distrusting content can interfere with one another inside a single application.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: There are also many approaches [35, 37, 4, 16, 13, 5, 33] for controlling access to services and trust manage­ment in distributed systems and an advanced standardiza­tion process for policies and access control (see for instance the OASIS proposals [12, 26]).
Sentence 2: with the notable exceptions of provisional access control [22] and trust nego­tiation [36], access control models rest on the idea that the server picks the evidence you sent on who you are (creden­tials) and what you want (request), checks its evidence on what you deserve (policies) and makes a one-o.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Of course, we could also think of the terminal that per­forms the export or import operation as being a translation server.
Sentence 2: we make a distinction between the termi­nal translation architecture and the translation server archi­tecture as there is a sign.cant practical di.erence between using one of the user s own terminals as the translator, as compared to having to contact an on-line third party to perform the transaction.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This ex­tension preserves the security properties of Octopus in that the node-link relationship remains the same and hence the content key can be obtained by possessing a directed path from the Personality node to the User node (via the Domain node as the intermediary).
Sentence 2: it is assumed in our im­plementation that the shared domain is managed locally by a domain manager that the service provider trusts.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 3 The RM uses Firefox s SOP implementation, so it handles domains like cnn.co.uk.
Sentence 2: the SOP alone does not prevent JavaScript in two different zones from colluding to leak con.dential data; a script in one zone can communicate with a script in an­other zone using cross-domain channels like the fragment-ID channel and postMessage described in Section 4.3.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This method works by representing those patterns as a set of signatures to be compared against packet contents using exact matching algorithms.
Sentence 2: string matching is always Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In distributed systems, different parties may make connections and do business without being previously known to each other, different resources are shared across organizational boundaries and a potentially unbounded number of users and resources exist with few guarantees regarding pre-existing trust relationships.
Sentence 2: the traditional security model, where the identity of all possible requesting subjects must be pre-registered in advance, is not suitable for the distributed environments.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Schulman s work was followed by a .ow of other works [7, 8, 4, 5, 3, 2], culminating in the recent elegant result by Brakerski and Kalai [1] that shows how to e.ciently simulate any interactive protocol in the pres­ence of constant-rate adversarial noise, with only a constant overhead in the communication complexity.
Sentence 2: none of these works gives any bound on the value of C(E).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In KRISHNA, in order to compute clus­ters, each node needs accurate information of the entire net­work topology, facilitated by network-wide link state up­date which by itself is extremely vulnerable to node mo­bility.
Sentence 2: we found that both HEED and DECA are quite resilient to node mobility in that they can generate 0 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 node maximum speed (m/s) Figure 9.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, if u receives v s response to u s HELLO before u responds to v s HELLO, u will suppress its own response.
Sentence 2: if u and v .nish their neighbor discovery step sep­arately, in the pairwise key establishment step they will have two di.erent pairwise keys, Kuv and Kvu.In this case, they may choose Kuv as their pairwise key if u<v.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The main contribution of our work is to introduce the MP meta­model and specializations of it for personalized access control (in the form of SMAC policies).
Sentence 2: another source of origi­nality is methodological: rather than attempting to .nd specialized solutions to access control problems, we aim to identify and for­mally represent the foundational concepts of access control and to then construct general axiomatic frameworks from which special­ized solutions to access control problems may be derived.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For example, subject­usersof types1-2haveaccessto most of theinformationthat is processed/recorded by the videosurveillance system.
Sentence 2: subject-users corresponding to object-user types3-6(or even usertypes1-2 notin charge of operating the videosurveillance system) should nothave access to these data.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: While we admit it is practically possible to create sucha view-generating function within the monitored guest OS, view generation using knowledge of the hardware architecture is always best done externally for one primary reason: Any view-generating function that makes use of hardware architectural knowledge canbe implemented fromwithin the VMM and gains allof thebene.ts associated with such an approach (i. e., isolation, consistency, etc.).
Sentence 2: implementing a view-generating function in the guest OS brings no advantages over an approachin which the function is implemented externally.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: 4.PC:adefnitionforprediateAuthpandadefnition forprediateAuth,obtainedbyextratingfromthe rulespresentedinTable3rules21and22.
Sentence 2: notethat,duetolakofspae,indefningthemapping, wehavemadetheassumptionthatauseranonlyestablish loginsessionwithhisownaesslass.themap­pinganbeextendedwithproperuserdefnedprediatesto relaxsuhassumptionandthusallowingausertoestablish anyloginsessionwhoseaesslassisdominatedbythea­esslassoftheuser.Werefertheinterestedreaderto[4] forthedetails.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Many of today s networks, especially those of large ISPs, deploy intra-domain load-balancing mechanisms based on the Equal-Cost Multi-Path (ECMP) algorithm [22]; e.g., approximately 40% of Internet routes [4] are load balanced by it.
Sentence 2: eCMP is insu.cient to prevent routing bot­tlenecks.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A solution to this problem is the massively popular OAuth protocol [7] that allows a user to grant access to a consumer on his data residing on a server.
Sentence 2: the current OAuth protocol suffers from a major flaw: once a user grants access to a consumer, it is possible (with knowledge of the consumer s security tokens) to access the user s data anytime and from anywhere [11].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As discussed in Section 2, the bad measurement detec­tion algorithm computes the L2-norm of the corresponding measurement residual to check whether there exist bad mea­surements or not.
Sentence 2: if the attacker uses Hc as the attack vector a (i.e., a = Hc), then the L2-norm of the mea­surement residual of za is equal to that of z,as shown in Theorem 1.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The di.erences between our caching service and a real web proxy are as follows: A web proxy typically only caches static HTML pages and ignores the dynamic HTML pages, and it will not cache responses with the private/no-cache/no-store cache control setting in the request header.
Sentence 2: our caching service needs to store every web resources trig­gered by the analyzer.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: {e}) · · · xn update(update({pay}, neutral, 1), confirm, 1) = update(update({pay}, confirm, 1), neutral, 1) Hence independence of events is a choice of abstraction one may make when designing an event-structure model (be­cause one is not interested in the particular order of events, or because the exact recording of the order of events is not feasible).
Sentence 2: note that this is not a limitation of event structures: in a scenario where this order of events is rele­vant (and observable), one can always use a serialized event structure in which this order of occurrences is recorded.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In RepCloud, when all the nodes hosting the VMs of an appli­cation are tampered, they may report each other as trust­worthy without being identi.ed, and hence tamper the tar­get application.
Sentence 2: with the multi-tenancy nature of the cloud, each of these hosts may at the same time host VMs from other applications, which may communicate to nodes in the cloud TCB of the those application.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Ben Sangster Department of Computer Science US Military Academy West Point, NY 10996 at network defense, an information assurance team must en­sure intense scrutiny of tra.c, develop fresh intrusion detec­tion rules to prevent new attacks and exploits, and deploy immediate patches for the latest vulnerabilities.
Sentence 2: all of this is done within the physical perimeter of the net­work.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: i 1 and go back (a), otherwise it goes to end.
Sentence 2: f. Encryption rate The encryption rate r of KMN-PKC is   since V + L of a denominator can be erased if the all of a1, a2, , aJ is set to 0, the encryption rate r is  If such a real encryption rate is considered as a density of the low density attack of conventional knapsack PKC, it will be said that the density of this PKC is very small.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: More recentframeworks[1,3,44] andtheirdiscrete com­ponents[15,19] attemptto o.er or mimic alevel oftrans­parencyanalogous tothat of a non-instrumentedOS running onphysicalhardware.
Sentence 2: given thatnearly all ofthese approaches reside in or emulate part of the guest OS or its underlyinghardware,little e.ortis requiredby aknowledge­able adversary todetecttheir existence and evade[26,39].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Property 1 in Def­inition 7 guarantees that there exists a reachable state y1Ethat is equivalent to yqp1; thus ¢1Eis true in ycE1; therefore, the in­stance in , (ycEE e¢1EE [yBE, e:q), is also true.
Sentence 2: if(yEe¢E,yEe:q)is true, then there exists a reachable state y1Ein which ¢1Eis true.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Both providers marked with U be­lieved either our religious complaint (global-4) or our phishing one (regional-7), warning the website owner about the possibil­ity for his account to be suspended if the offending content was not removed within a few days.
Sentence 2: contrarily to what was promised, the content of the websites was left untouched and none of these providers took any action to block the user s account after the ultimatum expired.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Overall the visual view­ing quality is heavily impaired since a bucking e.ect with blurring is introduced when a su.cient number of temporal frames are encrypted.
Sentence 2: when only the highest tem­poral layer is encrypted the skipping of every second frame is actually nearly not noticeable since the merging of tem­porally adjacent frames partly conceals the missing frame.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Unlike the local rerouting solution discussed in Section 5.1, MPLS recon.guration can perform .ne-grained tra.c steering to avoid collateral damage on the other links.
Sentence 2: the widely used o.ine MPLS recon.guration cannot be very e.ective since it can recon.gure tunnels only on a time scale ranging from tens of minutes to hours and days [14, 57].
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Because the classi.cationdependsonprocessing incomingresponses, RequestRodeo does not scale well to web 2.0 applications, as it sometimes misses some crucial context information, and is not able to detect all dynamically created links in the re­sponses.
Sentence 2: stripping implicit authentication and using an external proxy as a means of protecting the user against CSRF is considered to be an important contribu­tion of RequestRodeo, and was a direct inspiration of the approach presented in this paper.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: By Proposition 2.7, queries that are unions of conjunctive queries give the same answers (the certain answers) when applied to either y Jor m2J, since both solutions are universal.
Sentence 2: consider the conjunctive query with one inequality: n((X o)W:JZy:JZw2(T((XoZy )T( oZw2 )(Z(yW=Zw2))d no y Then returns ((aa)})when evaluated on J, and returns the empty set when evaluated on J2.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Usefulness: Note that while the trapdoor re­covery, which results in ., gives only a random value, it involves performing the costly (computationally intensive) dual-receiver message recovery algorithm R. In our imple­mentation (Section 3.1) this is an operation over the curve (the pairing) and is conceptually analogous to exponentia­tion over a .nite .eld, if somewhat more complex in terms of the actual operations involved.
Sentence 2: the mes­sage decryption by the server involves only bit-wise XOR, and a check of a simple hash function (which is much more e.cient).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: RFID attacks can also happen at the Domain Name System (DNS)/Object Name Service (ONS) level [17].Because the backend database is often the furthest point away from the RFID tag, both in a data sense and in physical distance, it may seem far removed as a target for attacking an RFID system.
Sentence 2: it bears pointing out that they will continue to be targets of attacks because they are asking, where the money is.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If we adopt the DO method, the .nal decision should be Deny in the case mentioned in the beginning of this section.
Sentence 2: becausewesupport theevaluation of policies in ab­normal situations, decisions like PNA, DNA, PD, and PDNA still may appear during policy evaluation and/or decision aggrega­tion even if we adopt some aggregation methods.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In our integer programming attack, individual SNP frequencies and pair-wise frequencies are actually such marginals.
Sentence 2: existing techniques [58] cannot be directly applied to recover SNPs from them, because of the scale of our problem: up to our knowl­edge, prior research can only handle as many as 16 attributes [26], while our attack needs to work on 174 attributes.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: [20] gave a system where the sensitive information displayed in the public terminal is blurred or redacted, whereas the mobile device displays the content in the subregion around terminal s mouse pointer in clear.
Sentence 2: the location of the mouse is sent by the termi­nal and hence potentially a malicious terminal could send the wrong location without begin detected, and thus com­promise message integrity.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Context-sensitive authorization in interaction patterns Vincent Hourdin Jean-Yves Tigli MobileGov and I3S I3S (UNS -CNRS) 930 Route des Colles -BP 145 930 Route des Colles -BP 145 06901 Sophia-Antipolis France 06903 Sophia-Antipolis France ferry@polytech.unice.fr tigli@polytech.unice.fr Stéphane LavirotteGaëtan ReyMichel Riveill I3S (UNS -CNRS) I3S (UNS -CNRS) I3S (UNS -CNRS) 930 Route des Colles -BP 145 930 Route des Colles -BP 145 930 Route des Colles -BP 145 06903 Sophia-Antipolis France 06903 Sophia-Antipolis France 06903 Sophia-Antipolis France stephane.lavirotte@unice.fr rey@polytech.unice.fr riveill@unice.fr ABSTRACT Main requirement of recent computing environments, like mobile and then ubiquitous computing, is to adapt applications to context.
Sentence 2: access control generally trust users once they have authenticated, despite the fact that they may reach unautho­rized situations.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: More speci.cally, in Ours, given a CPA secure KEM, we apply the transform described in Sec­tion 3.1 and obtain a CCA secure KEM.
Sentence 2: in NY, given a CPA secure KEM, we .rst construct a CPA secure PKE by combining with DEM, and then apply the original Naor-Yung transform for the PKE to obtain a CCA secure PKE.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: By their nature, black-box and gray-box detectors detect anomalous behavior, i.e., behavior di.erent from normal runs, regardless of whether it results from an intrusion or an execution path that was not encountered during training.
Sentence 2: white box detectors detect actual deviations from the program text, for which an intrusion is virtually the only conceivable explanation (assuming that the program is not self-modifying).
Relationship: contrasting