Case: Guo Wei Rong v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1995) 38 ALD 38 
Outcome: cited
Secondly, where, as here, HREOC decided not to continue to inquire into an act or practice in respect of which a complaint was made to it, HREOC was required " forthwith [to] give notice in writing to the complainant of that decision and of the reasons for that decision" : s 20(4) of the HREOC Act. It did so. Those reasons " are not to be construed minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error" : Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 280 at 287. Moreover, the reasons are not required to refer expressly to every argument and all the evidence that might be relevant to its determination of factual issues: cf Guo Wei Rong v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1995) 38 ALD 38 at 52-53. 54 Secondly, HREOC's reasons for decision are not required to deal with every aspect of the material provided by the Department or the applicant: Guo Wei Rong v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1995) 38 ALD 38. It follows that, even if the applicant had been able to show that the decision did not make express reference to some aspect of the material that he had advanced, this, standing alone, would not establish that HREOC had not observed the procedures required of it by law. 55 Thirdly, HREOC's decision was a decision clearly open to it on the material before it. Much of the applicant's complaints, both in respect of the complaint about failure to comply with procedures and more generally, proceeded from the position that it was enough for him to demonstrate reviewable error to show that HREOC had accepted the NDPSC's view, and thereby rejected the applicant's view, of the plant. That premise is not right. In general terms, the NDPSC considered that the plant, as a known hallucinogenic substance with potential hazards and risks both to users and the wider community, posed a serious risk to public health and safety. The applicant held a contrary view. He claimed that there was no evidence that the plant was a risk to national security, public safety, health or morals; that it had not been demonstrated that the plant was a hallucinogen; that no deaths, injuries, hospitalisation or serious complications had been linked to the plant and that there was no evidence that the plant could become a substance of abuse through its importation into Australia. The question for HREOC was not which of these views was to be preferred. The immediate question, as pointed out earlier in these reasons, was whether to continue to inquire into the complaint. That, in turn, invited attention to whether the decision of NDPSC was inconsistent with or contrary to a human right. That was the question that HREOC considered and determined. 56 Many of the matters relied upon by the applicant were cast in terms that appeared to be directed to seeking a review of the merits of the decision made by HREOC but, on further analysis, were directed to challenging the initial decision of the NDPSC to place the plant into Sch 9 of the Poisons Standard. Merits review of any decision is beyond the duty and jurisdiction of this Court in the exercise of its judicial review power. In the present case, the position is further removed - the applicant, in substance if not in form, seeks merits review of a decision that is not before the Court. That is not permitted or possible. 57 Some of the matters raised by the applicant appeared to be a complaint that HREOC took into account irrelevant considerations or that HREOC was motivated by improper purposes. These matters may raise other and different grounds of review, namely s 5(1)(e) , (2)(a) and 2 (c) of the ADJR Act . However, these matters may be put to one side. There is nothing to suggest that HREOC exercised its power to not to continue to inquire into the complaint made by the applicant under s 20(2)(a) of the HREOC Act for a purpose other than that for which it was conferred. Further, there is no evidence that HREOC was motivated by " factors other than legal factors, such as the time-consuming nature and complexity of this case, the lack of prospects for a reasonable settlement and a desire to remove the case from the Commission's ongoing commitments" or that NDPSC was motivated by improper purposes including " religio-political factors" . 58 The applicant contended that HREOC took into account an irrelevant consideration. The 'irrelevant consideration' was described by the applicant as the 'slippery slope' argument. That assertion fails at the outset. 59 HREOC addressed the 'slippery slope' argument by summarising the positions adopted by NDPSC and the applicant in relation to the matter in the following terms: "The Department states that in addition to being a consideration that is not currently required under the TGA Act and the Regulations in the scheduling of substances in the Poisons Standard, the result would be catastrophic if, despite the strict scheduling of substances (such as Schedule 9 substances), individuals would be allowed to use hallucinogenic substances such as LSD and cannabis for religious reasons or beliefs, despite the known health and safety risks of these substances. The Department maintains that an individual would not only risk harm, injury or death to himself, but to other members of the public as well. ... [The applicant denies] that if the plant were made available for religious purposes that this would contribute to a 'slippery slope' whereby 'others could seek the de-scheduling of other hallucinogenic substances.'" 60 HREOC considered the parties' respective position as part of its evaluation of the information provided to it. At its highest, the argument was a factor put to HREOC by the NDPSC to which the applicant responded. HREOC's treatment of the 'slippery slope' argument does not reveal that it took into account an irrelevant consideration in the exercise of its power.