mdroth/huggingface-course_section-5_zst huggingface dataset:
Case: Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths Ltd [1999] FCA 1020 ; (1999) 93 FCR 365
Outcome: cited
On the hearing of an application to the Federal Court by way of an appeal under s 56 of the Act from the delegate's decision, the Court may do any one or more of the following, admit evidence orally or on affidavit or otherwise; permit the examination and cross-examination of witnesses, including witnesses who gave evidence before the Registrar; order an issue of fact to be tried as it directs; affirm, reverse or vary the Registrar's decision or direction; give any judgment, or make any order, that in all the circumstances it thinks fit; order a party to pay costs to another party (s 197 of the Act). The appeal proceeding is a hearing conducted "afresh" or de novo on material properly placed before the Court ( Rowntree plc v Rollbits Pty Ltd (1986-1988) 10 IPR 539 per Needham J at 545; Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths Ltd [1999] FCA 1020 ; (1999) 93 FCR 365 at 377; [1999] FCA 1020 ; 45 IPR 411 422-3 per French J; Pioneer Electric Corporation &amp; Anor v Registrar of Trade Marks [1977] HCA 56 ; (1977) 17 ALR 43 per Aickin J at 46; Blount Inc. v Registrar of Trade Marks [1998] FCA 440 ; (1998) 83 FCR 50 at 59 per Branson J; Kowa Company Ltd v NV Organon [2005] FCA 1282 ; (2006) 223 ALR 27 per Lander J at [7]; Pfizer Products Inc. v Karam [2006] FCA 1663 ; (2007) 237 ALR 787 per Gyles J at [5]; and Scotch Whiskey Association v De Witt (2008) 75 IPR 280 per Jessop J at [18]). Although the appeal is conducted as a de novo hearing, the scope of the controversy to be resolved in the appeal is determined by the issues framed by the parties. Order 58, r 5(2) requires a party initiating an appeal to identify each ground relied upon to support the orders sought and particulars of each ground. Similarly, by Order 58, r 5A(2) a cross-appellant must state and thus frame the specific grounds relied upon in support of the orders the cross-appellant seeks. In that sense, an appeal from the Registrar's decision is not simply at large. In this case, NVS seeks to vary the decision by agitating the merits of the matters raised by s 44 of the Act. BAT seeks to agitate all of the matters on which it was unsuccessful.
Case: Pioneer Electric Corporation &amp; Anor v Registrar of Trade Marks (1977) 17 ALR 43
Outcome: cited
On the hearing of an application to the Federal Court by way of an appeal under s 56 of the Act from the delegate's decision, the Court may do any one or more of the following, admit evidence orally or on affidavit or otherwise; permit the examination and cross-examination of witnesses, including witnesses who gave evidence before the Registrar; order an issue of fact to be tried as it directs; affirm, reverse or vary the Registrar's decision or direction; give any judgment, or make any order, that in all the circumstances it thinks fit; order a party to pay costs to another party (s 197 of the Act). The appeal proceeding is a hearing conducted "afresh" or de novo on material properly placed before the Court ( Rowntree plc v Rollbits Pty Ltd (1986-1988) 10 IPR 539 per Needham J at 545; Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths Ltd [1999] FCA 1020 ; (1999) 93 FCR 365 at 377; [1999] FCA 1020 ; 45 IPR 411 422-3 per French J; Pioneer Electric Corporation &amp; Anor v Registrar of Trade Marks [1977] HCA 56 ; (1977) 17 ALR 43 per Aickin J at 46; Blount Inc. v Registrar of Trade Marks [1998] FCA 440 ; (1998) 83 FCR 50 at 59 per Branson J; Kowa Company Ltd v NV Organon [2005] FCA 1282 ; (2006) 223 ALR 27 per Lander J at [7]; Pfizer Products Inc. v Karam [2006] FCA 1663 ; (2007) 237 ALR 787 per Gyles J at [5]; and Scotch Whiskey Association v De Witt (2008) 75 IPR 280 per Jessop J at [18]). Although the appeal is conducted as a de novo hearing, the scope of the controversy to be resolved in the appeal is determined by the issues framed by the parties. Order 58, r 5(2) requires a party initiating an appeal to identify each ground relied upon to support the orders sought and particulars of each ground. Similarly, by Order 58, r 5A(2) a cross-appellant must state and thus frame the specific grounds relied upon in support of the orders the cross-appellant seeks. In that sense, an appeal from the Registrar's decision is not simply at large. In this case, NVS seeks to vary the decision by agitating the merits of the matters raised by s 44 of the Act. BAT seeks to agitate all of the matters on which it was unsuccessful.
Case: Blount Inc. v Registrar of Trade Marks (1998) 83 FCR 50
Outcome: cited
On the hearing of an application to the Federal Court by way of an appeal under s 56 of the Act from the delegate's decision, the Court may do any one or more of the following, admit evidence orally or on affidavit or otherwise; permit the examination and cross-examination of witnesses, including witnesses who gave evidence before the Registrar; order an issue of fact to be tried as it directs; affirm, reverse or vary the Registrar's decision or direction; give any judgment, or make any order, that in all the circumstances it thinks fit; order a party to pay costs to another party (s 197 of the Act). The appeal proceeding is a hearing conducted "afresh" or de novo on material properly placed before the Court ( Rowntree plc v Rollbits Pty Ltd (1986-1988) 10 IPR 539 per Needham J at 545; Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths Ltd [1999] FCA 1020 ; (1999) 93 FCR 365 at 377; [1999] FCA 1020 ; 45 IPR 411 422-3 per French J; Pioneer Electric Corporation &amp; Anor v Registrar of Trade Marks [1977] HCA 56 ; (1977) 17 ALR 43 per Aickin J at 46; Blount Inc. v Registrar of Trade Marks [1998] FCA 440 ; (1998) 83 FCR 50 at 59 per Branson J; Kowa Company Ltd v NV Organon [2005] FCA 1282 ; (2006) 223 ALR 27 per Lander J at [7]; Pfizer Products Inc. v Karam [2006] FCA 1663 ; (2007) 237 ALR 787 per Gyles J at [5]; and Scotch Whiskey Association v De Witt (2008) 75 IPR 280 per Jessop J at [18]). Although the appeal is conducted as a de novo hearing, the scope of the controversy to be resolved in the appeal is determined by the issues framed by the parties. Order 58, r 5(2) requires a party initiating an appeal to identify each ground relied upon to support the orders sought and particulars of each ground. Similarly, by Order 58, r 5A(2) a cross-appellant must state and thus frame the specific grounds relied upon in support of the orders the cross-appellant seeks. In that sense, an appeal from the Registrar's decision is not simply at large. In this case, NVS seeks to vary the decision by agitating the merits of the matters raised by s 44 of the Act. BAT seeks to agitate all of the matters on which it was unsuccessful.
Case: Kowa Company Ltd v NV Organon (2006) 223 ALR 27
Outcome: cited
On the hearing of an application to the Federal Court by way of an appeal under s 56 of the Act from the delegate's decision, the Court may do any one or more of the following, admit evidence orally or on affidavit or otherwise; permit the examination and cross-examination of witnesses, including witnesses who gave evidence before the Registrar; order an issue of fact to be tried as it directs; affirm, reverse or vary the Registrar's decision or direction; give any judgment, or make any order, that in all the circumstances it thinks fit; order a party to pay costs to another party (s 197 of the Act). The appeal proceeding is a hearing conducted "afresh" or de novo on material properly placed before the Court ( Rowntree plc v Rollbits Pty Ltd (1986-1988) 10 IPR 539 per Needham J at 545; Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths Ltd [1999] FCA 1020 ; (1999) 93 FCR 365 at 377; [1999] FCA 1020 ; 45 IPR 411 422-3 per French J; Pioneer Electric Corporation &amp; Anor v Registrar of Trade Marks [1977] HCA 56 ; (1977) 17 ALR 43 per Aickin J at 46; Blount Inc. v Registrar of Trade Marks [1998] FCA 440 ; (1998) 83 FCR 50 at 59 per Branson J; Kowa Company Ltd v NV Organon [2005] FCA 1282 ; (2006) 223 ALR 27 per Lander J at [7]; Pfizer Products Inc. v Karam [2006] FCA 1663 ; (2007) 237 ALR 787 per Gyles J at [5]; and Scotch Whiskey Association v De Witt (2008) 75 IPR 280 per Jessop J at [18]). Although the appeal is conducted as a de novo hearing, the scope of the controversy to be resolved in the appeal is determined by the issues framed by the parties. Order 58, r 5(2) requires a party initiating an appeal to identify each ground relied upon to support the orders sought and particulars of each ground. Similarly, by Order 58, r 5A(2) a cross-appellant must state and thus frame the specific grounds relied upon in support of the orders the cross-appellant seeks. In that sense, an appeal from the Registrar's decision is not simply at large. In this case, NVS seeks to vary the decision by agitating the merits of the matters raised by s 44 of the Act. BAT seeks to agitate all of the matters on which it was unsuccessful.
Case: Pfizer Products Inc. v Karam (2007) 237 ALR 787
Outcome: cited
On the hearing of an application to the Federal Court by way of an appeal under s 56 of the Act from the delegate's decision, the Court may do any one or more of the following, admit evidence orally or on affidavit or otherwise; permit the examination and cross-examination of witnesses, including witnesses who gave evidence before the Registrar; order an issue of fact to be tried as it directs; affirm, reverse or vary the Registrar's decision or direction; give any judgment, or make any order, that in all the circumstances it thinks fit; order a party to pay costs to another party (s 197 of the Act). The appeal proceeding is a hearing conducted "afresh" or de novo on material properly placed before the Court ( Rowntree plc v Rollbits Pty Ltd (1986-1988) 10 IPR 539 per Needham J at 545; Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths Ltd [1999] FCA 1020 ; (1999) 93 FCR 365 at 377; [1999] FCA 1020 ; 45 IPR 411 422-3 per French J; Pioneer Electric Corporation &amp; Anor v Registrar of Trade Marks [1977] HCA 56 ; (1977) 17 ALR 43 per Aickin J at 46; Blount Inc. v Registrar of Trade Marks [1998] FCA 440 ; (1998) 83 FCR 50 at 59 per Branson J; Kowa Company Ltd v NV Organon [2005] FCA 1282 ; (2006) 223 ALR 27 per Lander J at [7]; Pfizer Products Inc. v Karam [2006] FCA 1663 ; (2007) 237 ALR 787 per Gyles J at [5]; and Scotch Whiskey Association v De Witt (2008) 75 IPR 280 per Jessop J at [18]). Although the appeal is conducted as a de novo hearing, the scope of the controversy to be resolved in the appeal is determined by the issues framed by the parties. Order 58, r 5(2) requires a party initiating an appeal to identify each ground relied upon to support the orders sought and particulars of each ground. Similarly, by Order 58, r 5A(2) a cross-appellant must state and thus frame the specific grounds relied upon in support of the orders the cross-appellant seeks. In that sense, an appeal from the Registrar's decision is not simply at large. In this case, NVS seeks to vary the decision by agitating the merits of the matters raised by s 44 of the Act. BAT seeks to agitate all of the matters on which it was unsuccessful.
Case: Scotch Whiskey Association v De Witt (2008) 75 IPR 280
Outcome: cited
On the hearing of an application to the Federal Court by way of an appeal under s 56 of the Act from the delegate's decision, the Court may do any one or more of the following, admit evidence orally or on affidavit or otherwise; permit the examination and cross-examination of witnesses, including witnesses who gave evidence before the Registrar; order an issue of fact to be tried as it directs; affirm, reverse or vary the Registrar's decision or direction; give any judgment, or make any order, that in all the circumstances it thinks fit; order a party to pay costs to another party (s 197 of the Act). The appeal proceeding is a hearing conducted "afresh" or de novo on material properly placed before the Court ( Rowntree plc v Rollbits Pty Ltd (1986-1988) 10 IPR 539 per Needham J at 545; Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths Ltd [1999] FCA 1020 ; (1999) 93 FCR 365 at 377; [1999] FCA 1020 ; 45 IPR 411 422-3 per French J; Pioneer Electric Corporation &amp; Anor v Registrar of Trade Marks [1977] HCA 56 ; (1977) 17 ALR 43 per Aickin J at 46; Blount Inc. v Registrar of Trade Marks [1998] FCA 440 ; (1998) 83 FCR 50 at 59 per Branson J; Kowa Company Ltd v NV Organon [2005] FCA 1282 ; (2006) 223 ALR 27 per Lander J at [7]; Pfizer Products Inc. v Karam [2006] FCA 1663 ; (2007) 237 ALR 787 per Gyles J at [5]; and Scotch Whiskey Association v De Witt (2008) 75 IPR 280 per Jessop J at [18]). Although the appeal is conducted as a de novo hearing, the scope of the controversy to be resolved in the appeal is determined by the issues framed by the parties. Order 58, r 5(2) requires a party initiating an appeal to identify each ground relied upon to support the orders sought and particulars of each ground. Similarly, by Order 58, r 5A(2) a cross-appellant must state and thus frame the specific grounds relied upon in support of the orders the cross-appellant seeks. In that sense, an appeal from the Registrar's decision is not simply at large. In this case, NVS seeks to vary the decision by agitating the merits of the matters raised by s 44 of the Act. BAT seeks to agitate all of the matters on which it was unsuccessful.
Case: Bell Wholesale Co. Ltd v Gates Export Corporation (No. 2) (1984) 2 FCR 1
Outcome: cited
BAT relies upon the broad unfettered discretion conferred upon the Court by s 56 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 to order an applicant to give security for the payment of costs that may be awarded against that party. The jurisdiction is not delimited by Order 28, r 3 ( Bell Wholesale Co. Ltd v Gates Export Corporation (No. 2) (1984) 2 FCR 1 ; Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 496 ; James v Australia &amp; New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No. 1) (1985) 9 FCR 442). In exercising the discretion under s 56 , the practice in Australia for a very long time has been that a party who is not ordinarily resident in this country and has no assets within the jurisdiction, is normally ordered to give security for costs. These two factors are regarded as circumstances of "great weight" in determining whether such an order should be made ( Chellaram &amp; Co. Ltd v China Ocean Shipping Co. [1991] HCA 36 ; (1991) 102 ALR 321 ; (1991) 65 ALJR 642). The qualification upon the weight to be attributed to these factors was put by McHugh J in Chellaram at p 323 (ALR) and at p 643 (ALJR) in these terms, "... unless that party can point to other circumstances which overcome the weight of the circumstance that that person is resident out of and has no assets within the jurisdiction". These well established principles have been applied more recently in Logue v Hansen Technologies Ltd [2003] FCA 81 ; (2003) 125 FCR 590 at [38] and [39]; Tan Kah Hock v AWAP SGT 26 Investment Ltd [2008] FCA 540 [7] and [8]; Cheng XI Shipyard v The Ship "Falcon Trident" [2006] FCA 759 at [9] .
Case: Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 496
Outcome: cited
BAT relies upon the broad unfettered discretion conferred upon the Court by s 56 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 to order an applicant to give security for the payment of costs that may be awarded against that party. The jurisdiction is not delimited by Order 28, r 3 ( Bell Wholesale Co. Ltd v Gates Export Corporation (No. 2) (1984) 2 FCR 1 ; Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 496 ; James v Australia &amp; New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No. 1) (1985) 9 FCR 442). In exercising the discretion under s 56 , the practice in Australia for a very long time has been that a party who is not ordinarily resident in this country and has no assets within the jurisdiction, is normally ordered to give security for costs. These two factors are regarded as circumstances of "great weight" in determining whether such an order should be made ( Chellaram &amp; Co. Ltd v China Ocean Shipping Co. [1991] HCA 36 ; (1991) 102 ALR 321 ; (1991) 65 ALJR 642). The qualification upon the weight to be attributed to these factors was put by McHugh J in Chellaram at p 323 (ALR) and at p 643 (ALJR) in these terms, "... unless that party can point to other circumstances which overcome the weight of the circumstance that that person is resident out of and has no assets within the jurisdiction". These well established principles have been applied more recently in Logue v Hansen Technologies Ltd [2003] FCA 81 ; (2003) 125 FCR 590 at [38] and [39]; Tan Kah Hock v AWAP SGT 26 Investment Ltd [2008] FCA 540 [7] and [8]; Cheng XI Shipyard v The Ship "Falcon Trident" [2006] FCA 759 at [9] .
Case: James v Australia &amp; New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No. 1) (1985) 9 FCR 442
Outcome: cited
BAT relies upon the broad unfettered discretion conferred upon the Court by s 56 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 to order an applicant to give security for the payment of costs that may be awarded against that party. The jurisdiction is not delimited by Order 28, r 3 ( Bell Wholesale Co. Ltd v Gates Export Corporation (No. 2) (1984) 2 FCR 1 ; Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 496 ; James v Australia &amp; New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No. 1) (1985) 9 FCR 442). In exercising the discretion under s 56 , the practice in Australia for a very long time has been that a party who is not ordinarily resident in this country and has no assets within the jurisdiction, is normally ordered to give security for costs. These two factors are regarded as circumstances of "great weight" in determining whether such an order should be made ( Chellaram &amp; Co. Ltd v China Ocean Shipping Co. [1991] HCA 36 ; (1991) 102 ALR 321 ; (1991) 65 ALJR 642). The qualification upon the weight to be attributed to these factors was put by McHugh J in Chellaram at p 323 (ALR) and at p 643 (ALJR) in these terms, "... unless that party can point to other circumstances which overcome the weight of the circumstance that that person is resident out of and has no assets within the jurisdiction". These well established principles have been applied more recently in Logue v Hansen Technologies Ltd [2003] FCA 81 ; (2003) 125 FCR 590 at [38] and [39]; Tan Kah Hock v AWAP SGT 26 Investment Ltd [2008] FCA 540 [7] and [8]; Cheng XI Shipyard v The Ship "Falcon Trident" [2006] FCA 759 at [9] .
Case: Logue v Hansen Technologies Ltd (2003) 125 FCR 590
Outcome: cited
BAT relies upon the broad unfettered discretion conferred upon the Court by s 56 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 to order an applicant to give security for the payment of costs that may be awarded against that party. The jurisdiction is not delimited by Order 28, r 3 ( Bell Wholesale Co. Ltd v Gates Export Corporation (No. 2) (1984) 2 FCR 1 ; Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 496 ; James v Australia &amp; New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No. 1) (1985) 9 FCR 442). In exercising the discretion under s 56 , the practice in Australia for a very long time has been that a party who is not ordinarily resident in this country and has no assets within the jurisdiction, is normally ordered to give security for costs. These two factors are regarded as circumstances of "great weight" in determining whether such an order should be made ( Chellaram &amp; Co. Ltd v China Ocean Shipping Co. [1991] HCA 36 ; (1991) 102 ALR 321 ; (1991) 65 ALJR 642). The qualification upon the weight to be attributed to these factors was put by McHugh J in Chellaram at p 323 (ALR) and at p 643 (ALJR) in these terms, "... unless that party can point to other circumstances which overcome the weight of the circumstance that that person is resident out of and has no assets within the jurisdiction". These well established principles have been applied more recently in Logue v Hansen Technologies Ltd [2003] FCA 81 ; (2003) 125 FCR 590 at [38] and [39]; Tan Kah Hock v AWAP SGT 26 Investment Ltd [2008] FCA 540 [7] and [8]; Cheng XI Shipyard v The Ship "Falcon Trident" [2006] FCA 759 at [9] .
Case: Tan Kah Hock v AWAP SGT 26 Investment Ltd [2008] FCA 540
Outcome: cited
BAT relies upon the broad unfettered discretion conferred upon the Court by s 56 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 to order an applicant to give security for the payment of costs that may be awarded against that party. The jurisdiction is not delimited by Order 28, r 3 ( Bell Wholesale Co. Ltd v Gates Export Corporation (No. 2) (1984) 2 FCR 1 ; Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 496 ; James v Australia &amp; New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No. 1) (1985) 9 FCR 442). In exercising the discretion under s 56 , the practice in Australia for a very long time has been that a party who is not ordinarily resident in this country and has no assets within the jurisdiction, is normally ordered to give security for costs. These two factors are regarded as circumstances of "great weight" in determining whether such an order should be made ( Chellaram &amp; Co. Ltd v China Ocean Shipping Co. [1991] HCA 36 ; (1991) 102 ALR 321 ; (1991) 65 ALJR 642). The qualification upon the weight to be attributed to these factors was put by McHugh J in Chellaram at p 323 (ALR) and at p 643 (ALJR) in these terms, "... unless that party can point to other circumstances which overcome the weight of the circumstance that that person is resident out of and has no assets within the jurisdiction". These well established principles have been applied more recently in Logue v Hansen Technologies Ltd [2003] FCA 81 ; (2003) 125 FCR 590 at [38] and [39]; Tan Kah Hock v AWAP SGT 26 Investment Ltd [2008] FCA 540 [7] and [8]; Cheng XI Shipyard v The Ship "Falcon Trident" [2006] FCA 759 at [9] .
Case: Cheng XI Shipyard v The Ship "Falcon Trident" [2006] FCA 759
Outcome: cited
BAT relies upon the broad unfettered discretion conferred upon the Court by s 56 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 to order an applicant to give security for the payment of costs that may be awarded against that party. The jurisdiction is not delimited by Order 28, r 3 ( Bell Wholesale Co. Ltd v Gates Export Corporation (No. 2) (1984) 2 FCR 1 ; Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 496 ; James v Australia &amp; New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No. 1) (1985) 9 FCR 442). In exercising the discretion under s 56 , the practice in Australia for a very long time has been that a party who is not ordinarily resident in this country and has no assets within the jurisdiction, is normally ordered to give security for costs. These two factors are regarded as circumstances of "great weight" in determining whether such an order should be made ( Chellaram &amp; Co. Ltd v China Ocean Shipping Co. [1991] HCA 36 ; (1991) 102 ALR 321 ; (1991) 65 ALJR 642). The qualification upon the weight to be attributed to these factors was put by McHugh J in Chellaram at p 323 (ALR) and at p 643 (ALJR) in these terms, "... unless that party can point to other circumstances which overcome the weight of the circumstance that that person is resident out of and has no assets within the jurisdiction". These well established principles have been applied more recently in Logue v Hansen Technologies Ltd [2003] FCA 81 ; (2003) 125 FCR 590 at [38] and [39]; Tan Kah Hock v AWAP SGT 26 Investment Ltd [2008] FCA 540 [7] and [8]; Cheng XI Shipyard v The Ship "Falcon Trident" [2006] FCA 759 at [9] .