mdroth/huggingface-course_section-5_zst huggingface dataset:
Case: Accounting Systems 2000 (Developments) Pty Ltd v CCH Australia Ltd (1993) 42 FCR 470
Outcome: followed
question is whether entering into the Manufacturing Agreement in 2002 in the light of the previous dealings amounted to a representation or representations as pleaded and not whether a contractual promise was made. Reference has already been made to the judgment of Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Heydon JJ in HTW Valuers (Central Qld) Pty Ltd v Astonland Pty Ltd , dealing with the capacity of contractual promises to found representations for the purposes of s 52, which in turn refers to the judgment of Lockhart and Gummow JJ in Accounting Systems 2000 (Developments) Pty Ltd v CCH Australia Ltd (1993) 42 FCR 470 at 503 506 (see also Futuretronics International Pty Ltd v Gadzhis [1992] 2 VR 217 at 233 241). A practical example of the interplay between contractual promises and misleading or deceptive conduct is seen in the decision of Finn J in Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices Australia (1997) 76 FCR 151. Nonetheless, some caution needs to be exercised in too readily equating the two ( Effem Foods Pty Ltd (t/as Uncle Ben's of Australia) v Lake Cumbeline Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 15 ; (1999) 161 ALR 599 per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ at [12] and Callinan J at [60]; Wright v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1988) 15 NSWLR 679; and McWilliam's Wines Pty Ltd v LS Booth Wine Transport Pty Ltd (1992) 25 NSWLR 723).
Case: Effem Foods Pty Ltd (t/as Uncle Ben's of Australia) v Lake Cumbeline Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 15 ; (1999) 161 ALR 599
Outcome: cited
question is whether entering into the Manufacturing Agreement in 2002 in the light of the previous dealings amounted to a representation or representations as pleaded and not whether a contractual promise was made. Reference has already been made to the judgment of Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Heydon JJ in HTW Valuers (Central Qld) Pty Ltd v Astonland Pty Ltd , dealing with the capacity of contractual promises to found representations for the purposes of s 52, which in turn refers to the judgment of Lockhart and Gummow JJ in Accounting Systems 2000 (Developments) Pty Ltd v CCH Australia Ltd (1993) 42 FCR 470 at 503 506 (see also Futuretronics International Pty Ltd v Gadzhis [1992] 2 VR 217 at 233 241). A practical example of the interplay between contractual promises and misleading or deceptive conduct is seen in the decision of Finn J in Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices Australia (1997) 76 FCR 151. Nonetheless, some caution needs to be exercised in too readily equating the two ( Effem Foods Pty Ltd (t/as Uncle Ben's of Australia) v Lake Cumbeline Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 15 ; (1999) 161 ALR 599 per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ at [12] and Callinan J at [60]; Wright v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1988) 15 NSWLR 679; and McWilliam's Wines Pty Ltd v LS Booth Wine Transport Pty Ltd (1992) 25 NSWLR 723).
Case: Foran v Wight [1989] HCA 51 ; (1989) 168 CLR 385
Outcome: applied
first problem for Naturalcare is that promissory estoppel must be based upon conduct that is clear and unequivocal-- Legione v Hateley [1983] HCA 11 ; (1983) 152 CLR 406 at 435 437; Foran v Wight [1989] HCA 51 ; (1989) 168 CLR 385 at 410 411. Conduct not precise enough to form a contract would rarely be the basis for a promissory estoppel. It is sufficient to refer to the discrepancies in the contract case to illustrate the lack of a basis for promissory estoppel
Case: Futuretronics International PtyLtd v Gadzhis [1992] 2 VR 217
Outcome: cited
question is whether entering into the Manufacturing Agreement in 2002 in the light of the previous dealings amounted to a representation or representations as pleaded and not whether a contractual promise was made. Reference has already been made to the judgment of Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Heydon JJ in HTW Valuers (Central Qld) Pty Ltd v Astonland Pty Ltd , dealing with the capacity of contractual promises to found representations for the purposes of s 52, which in turn refers to the judgment of Lockhart and Gummow JJ in Accounting Systems 2000 (Developments) Pty Ltd v CCH Australia Ltd (1993) 42 FCR 470 at 503 506 (see also Futuretronics International Pty Ltd v Gadzhis [1992] 2 VR 217 at 233 241). A practical example of the interplay between contractual promises and misleading or deceptive conduct is seen in the decision of Finn J in Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices Australia (1997) 76 FCR 151. Nonetheless, some caution needs to be exercised in too readily equating the two ( Effem Foods Pty Ltd (t/as Uncle Ben's of Australia) v Lake Cumbeline Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 15 ; (1999) 161 ALR 599 per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ at [12] and Callinan J at [60]; Wright v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1988) 15 NSWLR 679; and McWilliam's Wines Pty Ltd v LS Booth Wine Transport Pty Ltd (1992) 25 NSWLR 723).
Case: Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices Australia (1997) 76 FCR 151
Outcome: cited
question is whether entering into the Manufacturing Agreement in 2002 in the light of the previous dealings amounted to a representation or representations as pleaded and not whether a contractual promise was made. Reference has already been made to the judgment of Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Heydon JJ in HTW Valuers (Central Qld) Pty Ltd v Astonland Pty Ltd , dealing with the capacity of contractual promises to found representations for the purposes of s 52, which in turn refers to the judgment of Lockhart and Gummow JJ in Accounting Systems 2000 (Developments) Pty Ltd v CCH Australia Ltd (1993) 42 FCR 470 at 503 506 (see also Futuretronics International Pty Ltd v Gadzhis [1992] 2 VR 217 at 233 241). A practical example of the interplay between contractual promises and misleading or deceptive conduct is seen in the decision of Finn J in Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices Australia (1997) 76 FCR 151. Nonetheless, some caution needs to be exercised in too readily equating the two ( Effem Foods Pty Ltd (t/as Uncle Ben's of Australia) v Lake Cumbeline Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 15 ; (1999) 161 ALR 599 per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ at [12] and Callinan J at [60]; Wright v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1988) 15 NSWLR 679; and McWilliam's Wines Pty Ltd v LS Booth Wine Transport Pty Ltd (1992) 25 NSWLR 723).
Case: Legione v Hateley [1983] HCA 11 ; (1983) 152 CLR 406 
Outcome: followed
first problem for Naturalcare is that promissory estoppel must be based upon conduct that is clear and unequivocal-- Legione v Hateley [1983] HCA 11 ; (1983) 152 CLR 406 at 435 437; Foran v Wight [1989] HCA 51 ; (1989) 168 CLR 385 at 410 411. Conduct not precise enough to form a contract would rarely be the basis for a promissory estoppel. It is sufficient to refer to the discrepancies in the contract case to illustrate the lack of a basis for promissory estoppel
Case: McWilliam's Wines Pty Ltd v LS Booth Wine Transport Pty Ltd (1992) 25 NSWLR 723 
Outcome: cited
question is whether entering into the Manufacturing Agreement in 2002 in the light of the previous dealings amounted to a representation or representations as pleaded and not whether a contractual promise was made. Reference has already been made to the judgment of Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Heydon JJ in HTW Valuers (Central Qld) Pty Ltd v Astonland Pty Ltd , dealing with the capacity of contractual promises to found representations for the purposes of s 52, which in turn refers to the judgment of Lockhart and Gummow JJ in Accounting Systems 2000 (Developments) Pty Ltd v CCH Australia Ltd (1993) 42 FCR 470 at 503 506 (see also Futuretronics International Pty Ltd v Gadzhis [1992] 2 VR 217 at 233 241). A practical example of the interplay between contractual promises and misleading or deceptive conduct is seen in the decision of Finn J in Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices Australia (1997) 76 FCR 151. Nonetheless, some caution needs to be exercised in too readily equating the two ( Effem Foods Pty Ltd (t/as Uncle Ben's of Australia) v Lake Cumbeline Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 15 ; (1999) 161 ALR 599 per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ at [12] and Callinan J at [60]; Wright v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1988) 15 NSWLR 679; and McWilliam's Wines Pty Ltd v LS Booth Wine Transport Pty Ltd (1992) 25 NSWLR 723).
Case: Wright v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1988) 15 NSWLR 679
Outcome: cited
question is whether entering into the Manufacturing Agreement in 2002 in the light of the previous dealings amounted to a representation or representations as pleaded and not whether a contractual promise was made. Reference has already been made to the judgment of Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Heydon JJ in HTW Valuers (Central Qld) Pty Ltd v Astonland Pty Ltd , dealing with the capacity of contractual promises to found representations for the purposes of s 52, which in turn refers to the judgment of Lockhart and Gummow JJ in Accounting Systems 2000 (Developments) Pty Ltd v CCH Australia Ltd (1993) 42 FCR 470 at 503 506 (see also Futuretronics International Pty Ltd v Gadzhis [1992] 2 VR 217 at 233 241). A practical example of the interplay between contractual promises and misleading or deceptive conduct is seen in the decision of Finn J in Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices Australia (1997) 76 FCR 151. Nonetheless, some caution needs to be exercised in too readily equating the two ( Effem Foods Pty Ltd (t/as Uncle Ben's of Australia) v Lake Cumbeline Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 15 ; (1999) 161 ALR 599 per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ at [12] and Callinan J at [60]; Wright v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1988) 15 NSWLR 679; and McWilliam's Wines Pty Ltd v LS Booth Wine Transport Pty Ltd (1992) 25 NSWLR 723).
Case: Simto Resources limited v Normandy Capital Limited (1993) 10 ACSR 776
Outcome: considered
Simto Resources Limited v Normandy Capital Limited (1993) 10 ACSR 776 , French J (as he then was) followed Molnar Engineering Pty Ltd v Burns (supra) and said at 782 in relation to the judgment of Smithers J: "It was clear from the judgment that his Honour was prepared to consider under the rubric of "sufficient reason" such factors as actual financial incapacity, and the financial difficulties created by diversion to paying legal expenses of funds which might be necessary to meet wider commitments of a company. Factors relevant to the exercise of the discretion to give leave would include the class of company involved, the nature of its undertaking, its financial structure, its ability to retain and pay its staff, the identity of its shareholders and the spread of the shareholding. The fact that a company is the alter ego of a single person who has advantageous educational and technical qualifications might also be important (at 75). Sweeney J did not elaborate upon the principles regulating the discretion but dealt with the case on the basis that the Full Court should not interfere with the discretion of the trial judge. Keely J, who dissented in the result, nevertheless agreed with Smithers J that the discretion was to be "exercised judicially according to the requirements of justice and that it must be exercised in favour of a company where there is sufficient reason". He agreed that: leave should be granted where, having regard to the necessary or reasonable commitments of the company, the appropriation of funds to engage legal practitioners for the litigation in question would create financial difficulties with which the company could not--or with which it ought not to be required to--cope and that in this connection the ability of the company to retain and pay its staff may well be relevant (at 80).'"
Case: Termi-Mesh Australia Pty Ltd v Josu Manufacturing Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1241
Outcome: considered
Termi-Mesh Australia Pty Ltd v Josu Manufacturing Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1241 , French J (as he then was) restated the approach of the Court in the following terms at par [13]: "Nevertheless the policy of the rule is clear that ordinarily a corporation will be required to be represented by a solicitor. Relevant factors for dispensing with that requirement include the financial capacity or lack of capacity of the corporation and those standing behind it, the effect of diverting company resources to paying legal expenses, the nature of the company's undertaking, its financial structure, its ability to retain and pay its staff and the identity and spread of its shareholders. The factual complexities of the case and the capacity of the proposed representative to conduct it effectively are also relevant VN International Video Pty Ltd v West End HK TVB Video &amp; Others (1996) 14 ACLC 1308. " French J refused leave in the circumstances of that case on the basis of the potential factual complexity of the case, the failure of the relevant individual to provide any detailed financial information about the company, the persons who stood behind it or their ability to engage legal representation and the obvious difficulty which that person would have in dealing efficiently with the legal and factual issues involved. I am satisfied, on the material placed before me by Mr Barrow, that the Charitable Trust is impecunious and that it does not have the ability to pay for legal advice or representation in this proceeding. I consider that that is a necessary factor to be established before the leave can be granted but I do not consider that it is a sufficient factor of itself to warrant the exercise or discretion in the applicant's favour. The factors identified in the authorities to which I have referred, need to be taken into account. I place little weight on the "advantageous education qualifications" and "advantageous experience in the superior Federal Court of Australia" relied upon by Mr Barrow. They do not demonstrate an ability similar to that possessed by a solicitor or counsel experienced in the practice of corporations law to make submissions in relation to the legal and factual issues relevant to an application to set aside a statutory demand. In my view, those educational qualifications and court experience are not such that Mr Barrow's position can be equated to that of a qualified legal practitioner so that the Court will have the opportunity of benefiting from Mr Barrow's legal knowledge. He does not possess any legal qualifications and, indeed, is presently in the course of the first year of a primary law degree.
Case: Classic Ceramic Importers Pty Ltd v Ceramica Antiga SA (1994) 13 ACSR 263
Outcome: cited
commercial and practical nature of the statutory process to set aside a statutory demand was explained by Young J in Classic Ceramic Importers Pty Ltd v Ceramica Antiga SA (1994) 13 ACSR 263 at 267 in the following terms: "... The court does not have to consider questions of solvency or abuse of process, it merely has to focus on the matters set out in s 459H, namely, whether there is a genuine dispute and/or whether the company has an offsetting claim: see s 459J. Thus it would seem to me that the present regime involves a much closer connection with the winding up proceedings that have been initiated by the service of the statutory demand than was the case under the previous procedure. Commercially speaking, the person who issued the statutory demand is the attacker and an applicant for an order under s 459G is responding to that attack. I think it is appropriate that this court should follow the Federal Court decisions in cases such as Amalgamated Mining Services Pty Ltd v Warman International Ltd and hold that one should focus on the question as to whether in a commercial sense the defendant to litigation is the aggressor. Even if one takes a different tack and says that one must find a legal aggressor, it seems to me that under the existing structure of the Corporations Law the person who issues the statutory demand is the legal aggressor." In the words of Sundberg J in Aquatown Pty Ltd v Holder Stroud Pty Ltd (1995) 18 ACSR 622 at 625: "[i]n a practical sense the applicant was forced by the respondent to take legal action". See also Willey v Synan [1935] HCA 76 ; (1935) 54 CLR 175 at 184-187.
Case: Aquatown Pty Ltd v Holder Stroud Pty Ltd (1995) 18 ACSR 622
Outcome: cited
commercial and practical nature of the statutory process to set aside a statutory demand was explained by Young J in Classic Ceramic Importers Pty Ltd v Ceramica Antiga SA (1994) 13 ACSR 263 at 267 in the following terms: "... The court does not have to consider questions of solvency or abuse of process, it merely has to focus on the matters set out in s 459H, namely, whether there is a genuine dispute and/or whether the company has an offsetting claim: see s 459J. Thus it would seem to me that the present regime involves a much closer connection with the winding up proceedings that have been initiated by the service of the statutory demand than was the case under the previous procedure. Commercially speaking, the person who issued the statutory demand is the attacker and an applicant for an order under s 459G is responding to that attack. I think it is appropriate that this court should follow the Federal Court decisions in cases such as Amalgamated Mining Services Pty Ltd v Warman International Ltd and hold that one should focus on the question as to whether in a commercial sense the defendant to litigation is the aggressor. Even if one takes a different tack and says that one must find a legal aggressor, it seems to me that under the existing structure of the Corporations Law the person who issues the statutory demand is the legal aggressor." In the words of Sundberg J in Aquatown Pty Ltd v Holder Stroud Pty Ltd (1995) 18 ACSR 622 at 625: "[i]n a practical sense the applicant was forced by the respondent to take legal action". See also Willey v Synan [1935] HCA 76 ; (1935) 54 CLR 175 at 184-187.
Case: Willey v Synan [1935] HCA 76 ; (1935) 54 CLR 175
Outcome: cited
commercial and practical nature of the statutory process to set aside a statutory demand was explained by Young J in Classic Ceramic Importers Pty Ltd v Ceramica Antiga SA (1994) 13 ACSR 263 at 267 in the following terms: "... The court does not have to consider questions of solvency or abuse of process, it merely has to focus on the matters set out in s 459H, namely, whether there is a genuine dispute and/or whether the company has an offsetting claim: see s 459J. Thus it would seem to me that the present regime involves a much closer connection with the winding up proceedings that have been initiated by the service of the statutory demand than was the case under the previous procedure. Commercially speaking, the person who issued the statutory demand is the attacker and an applicant for an order under s 459G is responding to that attack. I think it is appropriate that this court should follow the Federal Court decisions in cases such as Amalgamated Mining Services Pty Ltd v Warman International Ltd and hold that one should focus on the question as to whether in a commercial sense the defendant to litigation is the aggressor. Even if one takes a different tack and says that one must find a legal aggressor, it seems to me that under the existing structure of the Corporations Law the person who issues the statutory demand is the legal aggressor." In the words of Sundberg J in Aquatown Pty Ltd v Holder Stroud Pty Ltd (1995) 18 ACSR 622 at 625: "[i]n a practical sense the applicant was forced by the respondent to take legal action". See also Willey v Synan [1935] HCA 76 ; (1935) 54 CLR 175 at 184-187.
Case: Rogers v Asset Loan Co Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1708
Outcome: considered
I have analysed the extensive Statement of Claim in considerable detail. I have had regard to the reasons for judgment of Greenwood J in Rogers v Asset Loan Co Pty Ltd &amp; Ors [2006] FCA 434 and the reasons for judgment of Collier J in Rogers v Asset Loan Co Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1708.
Case: Appellant P119/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 230
Outcome: referred to
it was apparently not raised as a ground of review in her application in the Federal Magistrates Court, Scarlett FM observed, at [29], that the appellant complained about the standard of interpretation in the Refugee Review Tribunal. His Honour rejected that complaint, referring to an authority of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Appellant P119/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 230. The appellant appeared in person this morning. She was assisted by a Mandarin interpreter. She addressed me orally on the grounds of appeal, which essentially amount to a re-argument of the grounds of review which were rejected by Scarlett FM. As I have already said, the first ground falls into two parts. The appellant expanded very slightly on the first part of this ground this morning. She said that she had been nervous and under what she called "spiritual pressure". In my view, this ground must be rejected for the reasons given by Scarlett FM in [22] of his reasons.
Case: Minister For Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17 ; (2001) 205 CLR 507
Outcome: applied
was nothing in the reasons for decision of the Tribunal or in the evidence which revealed the slightest suggestion that the Presiding Member approached the review with a closed mind, see Minister For Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17 ; (2001) 205 CLR 507. The appellant argued the second ground upon the basis of a breach of section 424A of the Act. She was unable to identify precisely what information the Tribunal was required to disclose to her, but the effect of what she said was that the Tribunal ought to have provided her with information about the inconsistencies in her evidence, so as to give her an opportunity to address those inconsistencies.
Case: Re Refugee Review Tribunal; ex parte H [2001] HCA 28 ; (2001) 179 ALR 425
Outcome: applied
second part of this claim was the claim of a reasonable apprehension of bias. Scarlett FM set out the test stated by the High Court in Re Refugee Review Tribunal; ex parte H [2001] HCA 28 ; (2001) 179 ALR 425. His Honour was of the view that there was nothing in the Tribunal's reasons or in the evidence which disclosed a reasonable apprehension of bias within the test stated by the High Court. The second ground of review was that the Tribunal failed to comply with its obligations under section 424AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act"). His Honour approached the matter upon the basis that the word "information" in section 424AA has the same meaning as it has in section 424A(1). The answer to this submission is to be found in the observations of the High Court in Re Refugee Review Tribunal; ex parte H at [30]. Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ there said that: Where, as in the present case, credibility is in issue, the person conducting inquisitorial proceedings will necessarily have to test the evidence presented often vigorously. Their Honours also said at [30] that: [T]he need to ensure that the person who will be affected by the decision is accorded procedural fairness will often require that he or she be plainly confronted with matters which bear adversely on his or her credit or which bring his or her account into question.