Case: Williams v Spautz [1992] HCA 34 ; (1992) 174 CLR 509
Outcome: cited
observed by the majority of the High Court in Williams v Spautz [1992] HCA 34 ; (1992) 174 CLR 509 at 518, it is well established that Australian superior courts have inherent jurisdiction to stay proceedings which are an abuse of process. So, a superior court has power to prevent an abuse of process when process is predominantly used as a means of obtaining an advantage for which the proceedings were not intended ( Williams v Spautz [1992] HCA 34 ; (1992) 174 CLR 509 at 521-522, 529, Goldsmith v Sperrings Ltd (1977) 1 WLR 478 , Metall &amp; Rohstoff AG v Donaldson Inc [1990] 1 QB 391). A manifestation of this principle can be seen in cases where a litigant, having been unsuccessful in respect of one application, seeks to bring substantially the same application in the same or another court ( Reichel v Magrath (1889) 14 App Cas 665 at 668-669, Williams v Hunt [1905] 1 KB 512 , Wilson v Commonwealth of Australia [1999] FCA 1308 at [11] - [12] ), Lindsey v Philip Morris Ltd [2004] FCA 797 , Coffey v Secretary, Department of Social Security [1999] FCA 375 ; (1999) 86 FCR 434). First, in the circumstances of this case it is not clear to me how the commencement of proceedings by the applicant in the Federal Court is an "abuse of process". To paraphrase comments in Williams v Spautz [1992] HCA 34 ; (1992) 174 CLR 509 , it is not clear to me how the process was issued for some collateral advantage, nor how the proceedings are being used by the applicant to obtain some advantage for which they were not designed. In support of her claim of abuse of process, the respondent contends in summary that: In my view, the highest at which the respondent can place her case for abuse of process is in terms of Mr Griffin QC's contention that the applicant has sought to "stifle the respondent's legitimate claims" under the Family Law Act . However, no evidence to that effect has been produced, nor motive demonstrated to substantiate that claim other than the lawful entitlement of the applicant to pursue his rights under the Bankruptcy Act , and put a case based upon those rights to the Court. Second, in my view a more accurate articulation of the respondent's claim in these interlocutory proceedings is that the Federal Court lacks jurisdiction to deal with the applicant's claims, allegedly because the correct forum for the claim of the applicant is the Family Court, and because the applicant should have commenced proceedings pursuant to s 90K of the Family Law Act in the Family Court. Clearly this Court has power to permanently stay or dismiss proceedings where the Court has no jurisdiction because of lack of power, absence of legislative grant of jurisdiction, or otherwise ( Rahman v Director-General Department of Education &amp; Training [2005] NSWCA 285 , Ramsay v Accident Compensation Corporation [2007] NZCA 367 , Simundic v University of Newcastle [2007] FCA 676 , Mentyn v Westpac Banking Corporation [2003] FCA 1521 , Coffey v Secretary, Department of Social Security [1999] FCA 375 ; (1999) 86 FCR 434). A claim by a litigant that the court has no jurisdiction is however distinguishable from a claim that the litigation constitutes an abuse of process, unless of course the commencement of process for an improper purpose in the sense explained in Williams v Spautz [1992] HCA 34 ; (1992) 174 CLR 509 can also be identified. Absence of jurisdiction is commonly pleaded as an alternative to a claim for abuse of process. However even if I am wrong as to the basis of the respondent's claim in these interlocutory proceedings, the respondent has clearly contended that it was appropriate for the Court to permanently stay the substantive proceedings on the grounds that the proper course of the applicant in seeking to impugn the transfer of the Carrara property by Mr Jensen was to apply to the Family Court to have the entire financial agreement set aside pursuant to s 90K(1)(aa) of the Family Law Act . For reasons to which I now turn, I do not agree.