Case: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30 ; (2003) 198 ALR 59
Outcome: cited
Although the Tribunal is not bound by rules of evidence, the underlying rules of rationality that guide notions of relevance and deductive and inductive reasoning inform the process of reaching a decision that is supported by evidence ( Rationality and Judicial Review of Administrative Action : Dr. G. Airo-Farulla, Vol. 24, Melbourne University Law Review, p 453: see also Reasonableness, Rationality and Proportionality : Dr. G. Airo-Farulla, Australian Administrative Law, edited by Groves and Lee, Cambridge University Press, 2007, Ch. 14; French J, Administrative law in Australia: Themes and values , Australian Administrative Law, Ch. 2). Describing the process of reasoning as irrational, illogical or based upon an unsound approach to the assessment of documents or that findings are not based on inferences of fact supported on logical grounds, may merely be an emphatic way of the appellant disagreeing with a finding of fact ( Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30 ; (2003) 198 ALR 59 per Gleeson CJ at [5]. Thus, it is necessary to identify the nature and quality of the contended error and the precise legal principle that attracts a particular legal consequence, such as error of law. The scope of the legal rubric is conventionally understood in terms of the well known passage from Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58 ; (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179 per Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30 ; (2001) 206 CLR 323 at 351 [82] per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ. As to misconceptions which might suggest an unsupportable supposition on the part of the decision-maker, see Avon Downs Pty Ltd v FCT [1949] HCA 26 ; (1949) 78 CLR 353 at 360 per Dixon J; R v Australian Stevedoring Industry Board; Ex parte Melbourne Stevedoring Co. Pty Ltd [1953] HCA 22 ; (1953) 88 CLR 100 at 120 per Dixon CJ, Williams, Webb and Fullagar JJ. As to constraints upon a court interfering with a decision-maker's assessment of evidence, in exercising supervisory review of administrative decision-making, see Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin [1990] HCA 21 ; (1990) 170 CLR 1 at pp 35-36 per Brennan J. 12 Where a statute requires the decision-maker to discharge particular duties, "irrationality of the kind described by Deane J in ( Bond ) may involve non-compliance with the duty" ( S20/2002 per Gleeson CJ at [9]). In the context of the particular statutory framework relating to protection visas under the Act and the role and duty of the Tribunal, Gummow and Hayne JJ with whom Gleeson CJ agreed, in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32 ; (2004) 207 ALR 12 observed at [38] that although the question of whether protection obligations relevantly arose included a consideration of factual matters, the critical question is whether the determination [by the Tribunal] was irrational, illogical and not based on findings or inferences of fact supported by logical grounds ... inadequacy of the material before the decision-maker concerning the attainment of that satisfaction is insufficient in itself to establish jurisdiction error. [my emphasis]