mdroth/huggingface-course_section-5_zst huggingface dataset:
Case: Hawkins v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (No 2) (1996) 70 IR 213 
Outcome: cited
The Court's adoption of a "purposive" approach to the interpretation of statutory instruments, awards and certified agreements has been explained by various courts: Vision Super Pty Ltd v Poulter [2006] FCA 849 ; (2006) 154 FCR 185 at [66] [69]; Ansett Australia Ltd (Subject to Deed of Company Arrangement) v Australian Licenced Aircraft Engineers Association [2003] FCAFC 209 at [8] ; Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd (1998) 80 IR 208 at 212 and Hawkins v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (No 2) (1996) 70 IR 213 at 218. In Kucks v CSR Limited (1996) 66 IR 182 at 184, Madgwick J put the point in the following terms: "It is trite that narrow or pedantic approaches to the interpretation of an award are misplaced. The search is for the meaning intended by the framer(s) of the document, bearing in mind that such framer(s) were likely of a practical bent of mind: they may well have been more concerned with expressing an intention in ways likely to have been understood in the context of the relevant industry and industrial relations environment than with legal niceties or jargon. Thus, for example, it is justifiable to read the award to give effect to its evident purposes, having regard to such context, despite mere inconsistencies or infelicities of expression which might tend to some other reading. And meanings which avoid inconvenience or injustice may reasonably be strained for. For reasons such as these, expressions which have been held in the case of other instruments to have been used to mean particular things may sensibly and properly be held to mean something else in the document at hand. But the task remains one of interpreting a document produced by another or others. A court is not free to give effect to some anteriorly derived notion of what would be fair or just, regardless of what has been written into the award. Deciding what an existing award means is a process quite different from deciding, as an arbitral body does, what might fairly be put into an award. So, for example, ordinary or well-understood words are in general to be accorded their ordinary or usual meaning."
Case: Kucks v CSR Limited (1996) 66 IR 182 
Outcome: referred to
The Court's adoption of a "purposive" approach to the interpretation of statutory instruments, awards and certified agreements has been explained by various courts: Vision Super Pty Ltd v Poulter [2006] FCA 849 ; (2006) 154 FCR 185 at [66] [69]; Ansett Australia Ltd (Subject to Deed of Company Arrangement) v Australian Licenced Aircraft Engineers Association [2003] FCAFC 209 at [8] ; Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd (1998) 80 IR 208 at 212 and Hawkins v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (No 2) (1996) 70 IR 213 at 218. In Kucks v CSR Limited (1996) 66 IR 182 at 184, Madgwick J put the point in the following terms: "It is trite that narrow or pedantic approaches to the interpretation of an award are misplaced. The search is for the meaning intended by the framer(s) of the document, bearing in mind that such framer(s) were likely of a practical bent of mind: they may well have been more concerned with expressing an intention in ways likely to have been understood in the context of the relevant industry and industrial relations environment than with legal niceties or jargon. Thus, for example, it is justifiable to read the award to give effect to its evident purposes, having regard to such context, despite mere inconsistencies or infelicities of expression which might tend to some other reading. And meanings which avoid inconvenience or injustice may reasonably be strained for. For reasons such as these, expressions which have been held in the case of other instruments to have been used to mean particular things may sensibly and properly be held to mean something else in the document at hand. But the task remains one of interpreting a document produced by another or others. A court is not free to give effect to some anteriorly derived notion of what would be fair or just, regardless of what has been written into the award. Deciding what an existing award means is a process quite different from deciding, as an arbitral body does, what might fairly be put into an award. So, for example, ordinary or well-understood words are in general to be accorded their ordinary or usual meaning."
Case: Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union v Prestige Property Services Pty Ltd (2005) 141 IR 105 
Outcome: cited
The Court's task in construing a certified agreement such as the 2005 Enterprise Agreement was described by the High Court in Amcor Limited v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2005] HCA 10 ; (2005) 222 CLR 241 at [30] (per Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ). Adapting the language of that paragraph, the question of construction is to be resolved as follows: "[Clause 17.4] must be read in context. It is necessary, therefore, to have regard not only to the text of [cl 17.4], but also to a number of other matters: first, the other provisions made by [cl 17]; secondly, the text and operation of the [2005 Enterprise Agreement] both as a whole and by reference to other particular provisions made by it; and, thirdly, the legislative background against which the [2005 Enterprise Agreement] was made and in which it was to operate." See also Gleeson CJ and McHugh J at [2]; Kirby J at [93] and [96] and Callinan J at [130] - [131]. See also Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing &amp; Kindred Industries Union v Ardmona Foods Ltd (2006) 155 IR 211 at [27] and Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union v Prestige Property Services Pty Ltd (2005) 141 IR 105 at [48]-[49].
Case: Paramount Pictures Corporation v Hasluck (2006) 70 IPR 293
Outcome: cited
Telstra will be ordered to pay William McDonald $18,194.16 which sum comprises the amounts listed in [9] above. I will also allow pre-judgment interest under s 51A(1)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) calculated at the rate fixed from time to time in accordance with the Penalty Interest Rates Act 1983 (Vic). This follows the usual practice of this Court in adopting the rates of interest applied in the relevant State Supreme Court: GEC Marconi Systems Pty Ltd v BHP Information Technology Pty Ltd (2003) 201 ALR 55; Walker v Citigroup Global Market Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 1866 and Paramount Pictures Corporation v Hasluck (2006) 70 IPR 293. I certify that the preceding fifty-six (56) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Gordon. Associate: Dated: 2 October 2007 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr R Reitano Solicitor for the Applicant: Slater &amp; Gordon Counsel for the Respondent: Mr R Dalton Solicitor for the Respondent: Freehills Date of Hearing: 17 September 2007 Date of Judgment: 2 October 2007 AustLII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/2007/1515.html
Case: Vision Super Pty Ltd v Poulter [2006] FCA 849 ; (2006) 154 FCR 185 
Outcome: cited
The Court's adoption of a "purposive" approach to the interpretation of statutory instruments, awards and certified agreements has been explained by various courts: Vision Super Pty Ltd v Poulter [2006] FCA 849 ; (2006) 154 FCR 185 at [66] [69]; Ansett Australia Ltd (Subject to Deed of Company Arrangement) v Australian Licenced Aircraft Engineers Association [2003] FCAFC 209 at [8] ; Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd (1998) 80 IR 208 at 212 and Hawkins v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (No 2) (1996) 70 IR 213 at 218. In Kucks v CSR Limited (1996) 66 IR 182 at 184, Madgwick J put the point in the following terms: "It is trite that narrow or pedantic approaches to the interpretation of an award are misplaced. The search is for the meaning intended by the framer(s) of the document, bearing in mind that such framer(s) were likely of a practical bent of mind: they may well have been more concerned with expressing an intention in ways likely to have been understood in the context of the relevant industry and industrial relations environment than with legal niceties or jargon. Thus, for example, it is justifiable to read the award to give effect to its evident purposes, having regard to such context, despite mere inconsistencies or infelicities of expression which might tend to some other reading. And meanings which avoid inconvenience or injustice may reasonably be strained for. For reasons such as these, expressions which have been held in the case of other instruments to have been used to mean particular things may sensibly and properly be held to mean something else in the document at hand. But the task remains one of interpreting a document produced by another or others. A court is not free to give effect to some anteriorly derived notion of what would be fair or just, regardless of what has been written into the award. Deciding what an existing award means is a process quite different from deciding, as an arbitral body does, what might fairly be put into an award. So, for example, ordinary or well-understood words are in general to be accorded their ordinary or usual meaning."
Case: Walker v Citigroup Global Market Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 1866
Outcome: cited
Telstra will be ordered to pay William McDonald $18,194.16 which sum comprises the amounts listed in [9] above. I will also allow pre-judgment interest under s 51A(1)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) calculated at the rate fixed from time to time in accordance with the Penalty Interest Rates Act 1983 (Vic). This follows the usual practice of this Court in adopting the rates of interest applied in the relevant State Supreme Court: GEC Marconi Systems Pty Ltd v BHP Information Technology Pty Ltd (2003) 201 ALR 55; Walker v Citigroup Global Market Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 1866 and Paramount Pictures Corporation v Hasluck (2006) 70 IPR 293. I certify that the preceding fifty-six (56) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Gordon. Associate: Dated: 2 October 2007 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr R Reitano Solicitor for the Applicant: Slater &amp; Gordon Counsel for the Respondent: Mr R Dalton Solicitor for the Respondent: Freehills Date of Hearing: 17 September 2007 Date of Judgment: 2 October 2007 AustLII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/2007/1515.html
Case: Hicks v Ruddock [2007] FCA 299 ; (2007) 156 FCR 574
Outcome: cited
In the proceedings in this Court, the Commonwealth had attempted, one way and another, to have determined separately and early the question of whether there was a justiciable duty of care by the Commonwealth to its citizens as alleged, in order, if there were not, to narrow the factual issues in the case. That legal question is, at present, an open one: Hicks v Ruddock [2007] FCA 299 ; (2007) 156 FCR 574. In the course of interlocutory proceedings related to such procedural attempt by the Commonwealth, Mr Habib first made the allegation that he had actually been in the Australian High Commission to the knowledge of at least one Commonwealth officer, Mr Adams. Counsel for the Commonwealth then conceived, correctly as it appears to me, that such an allegation would bear strongly on whether the Commonwealth had a duty of care of the kind alleged. 7 I was then persuaded, over the opposition of the applicant, to try the discrete question, whether Mr Habib had ever been at the Australian High Commission in Islamabad, separately pursuant to O 29 r 2 of the Federal Court Rules . As I indicated in the course of discussion with counsel, prima facie it seemed unlikely that any participation by an Australian officer in the maltreatment of Mr Habib, or turning of a blind eye to it, would have occurred at Australian diplomatic premises. Further, the circumstances alleged by Mr Habib as to how he came to believe and to assert late in the piece that he had been at the High Commission, viewed in the light of the bad treatment he says that he received in Pakistan, Egypt and at a US military base, made it unlikely that to decide the issue I would need to cast any reflection on Mr Habib's truthfulness or even general reliability, such as might prejudice or embarrass a manifestly unbiased trial of the other factual issues in the case. Because of my impending departure from the Court, the trial of other factual issues, and of the legal issues, in the case will be before (or as directed by) another judge. 8 This is now my judgment on a final trial of the factual issue: was Mr Habib ever in the Australian High Commission in Islamabad before he was taken to Egypt?
Case: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Chats House Investments Pty Ltd (1996) 142 ALR 177 
Outcome: referred to
Section 33V(1) of the Act provides that a representative proceeding may not be settled or discontinued without the approval of the Court. The purpose intended to be served by s 33V was stated succinctly by Branson J in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Chats House Investments Pty Ltd (1996) 142 ALR 177 at 184. Her Honour said: It is appropriate for the court to be satisfied that any settlement or discontinuance of representative proceedings has been undertaken in the interests of the group members as a whole and not just in the interests of the applicant and the respondent.
Case: Courtney v Medtel Pty Ltd (No. 5) 212 ALR 311
Outcome: referred to
I do not consider that it is necessary to take the step which was taken by Sackville J in Courtney v Medtel Pty Ltd (No. 5) 212 ALR 311 at [57] to [60]. His Honour there suggested that evidence should be presented from an independent cost consultant. Here I have such evidence in Mr Thompson's affidavit. 75 The third objection was as to the possible destruction of documents. However, the objection is based on a misreading of cl 10(a) of the Deed of Settlement. The destruction of documents contemplated by that clause does not authorise the destruction of the primary evidence in the possession, custody or power of Telstra. It provides only for destruction of documents in the possession of, or controlled by, Mr Taylor. 76 The final objection deals with the exclusion of certain group members from participation in the settlement. The confidential affidavit of Mr Fowlie of 9 November 2007 dealt with this in [26], [28] and [29]. I did make an order for confidentiality of the whole of the affidavit but Mr Gageler SC has this afternoon waived the confidentiality of the provisions of those paragraphs and it is convenient to refer to them because they explain why the eligible participants in the settlement comprise fewer than all of those who are members of the group defined in the statement of claim.
Case: Haslam v Money for Living (Aust) Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) [2007] FCA 897
Outcome: referred to
More recently in Haslam v Money for Living (Aust) Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) [2007] FCA 897 Gordon J said at [19] to [20] said that she did not consider that the analysis undertaken by Goldberg J ought to be read as seeking to incorporate into Part IVA of the Act the requirements of the rules of court of an overseas jurisdiction. 66 She said at [20]: The analysis provided and continues to provide a useful guide in considering applications for approval under s 33V...It should, in appropriate cases and subject to the circumstances of any particular case, continue to be employed as a useful guide.
Case: Lopez v Starworld Enterprises Pty Ltd [1999] FCA104
Outcome: referred to
In Lopez v Starworld Enterprises Pty Ltd [1999] FCA104, Finkelstein J pointed out at [16] that the Court's task under s 33V is an onerous one. His Honour observed at [15] that he was not concerned so much with the position of the applicant, who was represented by solicitors and counsel, but with other group members, many of whom are not protected in this way.
Case: Williams v FAI Home Security Pty Ltd (No. 4) (2001) 180 ALR 459
Outcome: applied
In Williams v FAI Home Security Pty Ltd (No. 4) (2001) 180 ALR 459 at [19], Goldberg J said: Ordinarily the task of a court upon an application such as this, is to determine whether the proposed settlement or compromise is fair and reasonable, having regard to the claims made on behalf of the group members who will be bound by the settlement. Ordinarily...the court will take into account the amount offered to each group member, the prospects of success..., the likelihood of group members obtaining judgment for an amount significantly in excess of the settlement offer, the terms of any advice received from counsel and from any independent expert in relation to the issues which arise in the proceeding, the likely duration and cost of the proceeding... and the attitude of the group members to the settlement. 59 His Honour referred to a nine-factor test which has been adopted in the United States in considering whether to approve settlements as fair and reasonable.
Case: Airservices Australia v Canadian Airlines International Ltd [1999] HCA 62 ; (2000) 202 CLR 133
Outcome: cited
At the outset, I reject the Commissioner's submission that I should elevate the UK decisions or the dicta contained therein to decisions or dicta which I should presume the Commonwealth Legislature treated as correct and adopted in relation to the meaning of the words now under consideration in s 160ZH(3)(c): see, eg, Airservices Australia v Canadian Airlines International Ltd [1999] HCA 62 ; (2000) 202 CLR 133 , at [282]-[283]; and PT Ltd v Maradona Pty Ltd (No 2) (1992) 27 NSWLR 241, 251.
Case: Archibald Howie Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) [1948] HCA 28 ; (1948) 77 CLR 143
Outcome: considered
It is then convenient at this point to consider the notion of a share. A share was described by Williams J in Archibald Howie Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) [1948] HCA 28 ; (1948) 77 CLR 143 at 156: In Borland's Trustee v. Steel Bros. &amp; Co. Ltd. (1901) 1 Ch. 279, at p 288, Farwell J., in a passage which Lord Russell of Killowen in Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Crossman (1937) A.C. 26 , at p 66 described as an accurate exposition of the nature of a share, stated that a share is the interest of a shareholder in the company measured by a sum of money for the purpose of liability in the first place and of interest in the second, but also consisting of a series of mutual covenants entered into by all the shareholders inter se in accordance with ... the Companies Act ... a share is an interest measured by a sum of money and made up of various rights contained in the contract, including the right to a sum of money of a more or less amount. (emphasis in original) More recently, the joint judgment of McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ in Pilmer v Duke Group Limited (in Liquidation) [2001] HCA 31 ; (2001) 207 CLR 165 , 179 cited the statement of Farwell J as the classic description of a share. However, their Honours went on to say that 'the reference to measuring the interest of a shareholder in a company by a sum of money is no longer apt under present corporations law in Australia following the abolition of the concept of par value and of authorised capital' (at [19]). 46 More specifically, a share comprises 'a congeries of rights in personam ' ( Archibald Howie [1948] HCA 28 ; 77 CLR 143 at 154 per Dixon J) which includes the right to participate in dividends, the right to participate in a distribution of assets upon a winding up, and the right to receive capital upon a reduction of capital by the company: Sydney Futures Exchange Ltd v Australian Stock Exchange Ltd [1995] FCA 1106 ; (1995) 56 FCR 236 at 255.
Case: Bradbury v English Sewing Cotton Company Ltd [1923] AC 744
Outcome: cited
It may be said that these aspects contribute to the economic content of a share. Some commentators make mention of the 'economic' character of a share. For example, Professor R Pennington in (1989) 10 Company Lawyer 140 concluded that 'they are a species of intangible movable property which comprise a collection of rights and obligations relating to an interest in a company of an economic and proprietary character, but not constituting a debt'. After all, a share is a fractional part of the capital, and thus confers upon the shareholder a certain 'interest' to a proportionate part of the assets of the corporation whether by way of dividend or of distribution of assets in winding up (see Bradbury v English Sewing Cotton Company Ltd [1923] AC 744 , 767 per Lord Wrenbury), and that that 'interest' might come to represent in value far more than the original capital which had been contributed (see Ord Forrest Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1974] HCA 57 ; (1974) 130 CLR 124 , 132 and 133 per Stephen J). 48 It was on the basis of these bundle of rights in personam , the taxpayer submitted that capital expenditure in relation to shares will be 'reflected' in the 'state or nature' of the shares where the amount of the contribution increases shareholders' equity thereby increasing their value, and the amount of the contribution remains available for return to the shareholders pursuant to the rights attaching to the shares. 49 In the present case, the payment of the capital contribution to shareholders' funds of NMSLAL was made for the purpose of, and to the extent of [sterling]42.912 million had the effect of, increasing the embedded value of NMSLAL and the embedded value of NMUK, and thus, the value of the shares in NMUK. The benefit of the contribution to the extent of [sterling]42.912 million remained reflected in the value of shares in NMUK at the time of their disposal. Moreover, after April 1993 and until the date of sale, the amount of the contribution to the extent of [sterling]42.912 million remained in existence and was available to be returned to the shareholders' funds of NMSLAL, and distributed as capital to NMUK and by NMUK to the taxpayer pursuant to the rights attaching to the shares. This is how, as it was argued by the taxpayer, the capital contribution was reflected in the 'state or nature' of the shares in the context of s 160ZH(3)(c). 50 I was taken to a number of dictionary definitions of the words 'state', 'nature' and 'value'. Relevantly, the first definition given by the Macquarie Dictionary (4 th ed) for 'state' is 'the condition of a person or thing, as with respect to circumstances or attributes'. The definition of 'nature' relevantly refers to 'the particular combination of qualities belonging to a person or thing by birth or constitution', referring to the inherent qualities of a person or thing. 'Value' is relevantly defined as 'material or monetary worth, as in traffic or sale' and 'the worth of a thing as measured by the amount of other things for which it can be exchanged, or as estimated in terms of a medium of exchange'.