Case: Brutus v Cozens [1972] UKHL 6 ; [1973] AC 854
Outcome: cited
I am also satisfied that the erroneous classification of the products amounts to an error of law. There has been some debate about whether a mistake as to the ordinary meaning of a word used in a statutory provision can of itself amount to an error of law. In Peacock v Zyfert (1983) 48 ALR 549 at 564-565, Lockhart J said: "I now turn to a submission made on behalf of the appellants that the question which was before the Customs for determination in this case was one of fact and that the primary judge erred in treating it as a question of law. Reliance was placed upon the principle that, where a word is an ordinary English word, its meaning is not a question of law and, accordingly, whether the facts of a given case fall within that meaning is a question of fact. Reference was made to Hope v Bathurst City Council (1980) 29 ALR 577 at 580-2; [1980] HCA 16 ; 144 CLR 1 at 6-8 (per Mason J); Blackwood Hodge (Aust) Pty Ltd v Collector of Customs (NSW) (No 2) (1980) 3 ALD 38 at 49-51 (per Fisher J) and at 55-6 (per Sheppard J); and Brutus v Cozens [1972] UKHL 6 ; [1973] AC 854, esp at 861 (per Lord Reid) where his Lordship said: 'The meaning of an ordinary word of the English language is not a question of law. The proper construction of a statute is a question of law. If the context shows that a word is used in an unusual sense the court will determine in other words what that unusual sense is. ... It is for the tribunal which decides the case to consider, not as law but as fact, whether in the whole circumstances the words of the statute do or do not as a matter of ordinary usage of the English language cover or apply to the facts which have been proved. If it is alleged that the tribunal has reached a wrong decision then there can be a question of law, but only of a limited character. The question would normally be whether their decision was unreasonable in the sense that no tribunal acquainted with the ordinary use of language could reasonably reach that decision.' In my opinion this principle has no application in this case. If taken to its logical conclusion the appellants' argument really asserts that it is for the Customs to say in each case whether any, and if so which, provision of the Tariff applies to particular goods. But it is not a question of the Customs simply determining whether particular goods fall within the meaning of ordinary English words. What the Customs would be deciding, if the appellants are correct, is whether the description of particular goods falls within particular chapters, items, sub-items, paragraphs and sub-paragraphs of the Tariff. It must be a question of law whether a given description of goods falls within a particular part of the Tariff. Here the question is what particular part of the relevant Schedule, if any, applies. This necessarily involves a question of construction of the Tariff and is a question of law: see Whitton v Falkiner [1915] HCA 38 ; (1915) 20 CLR 118, per Isaacs J (at 127)." See also Fox J at 555-556. 29 The first qualification arises where a statute uses a word whose meaning is clear but the word is inherently capable of more than one application or outcome in the circumstances of the case. In such a case, the question whether the statutory description is satisfied will often be simply a question of fact: see, for example, the discussion of Brutus v Cozens [1972] UKHL 6 ; [1973] AC 854 by Mason J in Hope v Bathurst City Council [1980] HCA 16 ; (1980) 144 CLR 1 at 7-8; and see also Sharp Corporation of Australia Pty Ltd v Collector of Customs (1995) 59 FCR 6 at 14-15.