mdroth/huggingface-course_section-5_zst huggingface dataset:
Case: Little v Law Institute of Victoria (No 3) [1990] VR 257
Outcome: cited
The "causes of action" pleaded appear to hinge on CAL's entry into the Packer agreement, an agreement about which it seems to be suggested the other respondents were aware. As against the fifth respondent it is alleged that they owed a duty of care to the Court, their fellow legal practitioners and the opposing parties and that they acted in breach of that duty in astonishingly expressed ways. I can only say that this claim ought never have been made in the way it was. It is offensive. A like duty of care is pleaded against the first to the fourth respondents. It is no more intelligible. A parallel claim is brought against all respondents under s 82 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) for alleged contraventions of s 52 of that Act, this claim relying on the same conduct as in the negligence claim. The rationale for this claim is seemingly that if the conduct was negligent, it also was misleading or deceptive. How that conduct (which all related to circumstances allegedly affecting the conduct of the inquiry as damages application) could be said to be in "trade or commerce" is left as a mystery: cf Concrete Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd v Nelson [1990] HCA 17 ; (1990) 169 CLR 594 at 603-604; Little v Law Institute of Victoria (No 3) [1990] VR 257; WJ Green &amp; Co (1984) Pty Ltd v Wilden Pty Ltd, (unreported, Supreme Court of Western Australia, Parker J, 24 April 1997).
Case: WJ Green &amp; Co (1984) Pty Ltd v Wilden Pty Ltd, (unreported, Supreme Court of Western Australia, Parker J, 24 April 1997)
Outcome: cited
The "causes of action" pleaded appear to hinge on CAL's entry into the Packer agreement, an agreement about which it seems to be suggested the other respondents were aware. As against the fifth respondent it is alleged that they owed a duty of care to the Court, their fellow legal practitioners and the opposing parties and that they acted in breach of that duty in astonishingly expressed ways. I can only say that this claim ought never have been made in the way it was. It is offensive. A like duty of care is pleaded against the first to the fourth respondents. It is no more intelligible. A parallel claim is brought against all respondents under s 82 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) for alleged contraventions of s 52 of that Act, this claim relying on the same conduct as in the negligence claim. The rationale for this claim is seemingly that if the conduct was negligent, it also was misleading or deceptive. How that conduct (which all related to circumstances allegedly affecting the conduct of the inquiry as damages application) could be said to be in "trade or commerce" is left as a mystery: cf Concrete Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd v Nelson [1990] HCA 17 ; (1990) 169 CLR 594 at 603-604; Little v Law Institute of Victoria (No 3) [1990] VR 257; WJ Green &amp; Co (1984) Pty Ltd v Wilden Pty Ltd, (unreported, Supreme Court of Western Australia, Parker J, 24 April 1997).
Case: Williams v Spautz [1992] HCA 34 ; (1992) 174 CLR 509 
Outcome: cited
As best I can understand the claim that Mr Cirillo seeks now to make it is not revealed in his Statement of Claim it is that in defending the application he made for an inquiry as to damages, CAL (seemingly with the knowledge of the other respondents) sought to avail of a ground of defence not open to it in consequence of the "Packer agreement"; that defence (which never had to be considered given the answers to the preliminary questions) was one not open to CAL and yet it is said to have added very significantly to the costs incurred by Mr Cirillo in prosecuting his application; the respondents allegedly abused the processes of the court in this and in a way (unspecified) that gives rise to the tort of abuse of process: cf Williams v Spautz [1992] HCA 34 ; (1992) 174 CLR 509. 28 It is unnecessary for me to speculate further about such a possible claim because there is, in my view, an insuperable obstacle to it as the chronology reveals.
Case: Siminton v Australian Prudential Regulation Authority [2006] FCAFC 118
Outcome: cited
The order for costs of $500,000 made by Olsson AJ involved a determination of the rights and liabilities of the parties to the inquiry application in respect of the costs of and incidental to that application that were incurred by them. Mr Cirillo has not sought to have this order set aside. In consequence it stands as a valid and conclusive order of a superior court of record unless and until it is set aside: see Siminton v Australian Prudential Regulation Authority [2006] FCAFC 118 at [27] - [30] . 30 As best I can understand the changing picture presented by counsel for Mr Cirillo in submissions it has no reflection in the present pleadings the damages claimed for the proposed tort of abuse of process include, it would seem, at least that part of his own solicitor and client costs in the inquiry as to damages which were incurred in consequence of the conduct of the respondents alleged to give rise to the tort. I am uncertain what else the damages would include although it again seems likely that, as in the present application, Mr Cirillo would also be attempting to be relieved indirectly of the obligation to pay some, or part of, the monies he has been ordered to pay under the consent order.
Case: Chamberlain v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [1988] HCA 21 ; (1988) 164 CLR 502
Outcome: cited
Nonetheless, as I have noted, the consent order as to costs determined the incidence of costs as between Mr Cirillo and the first to fourth respondents in respect of all issues of costs in the inquiry as to damages application. For Mr Cirillo to make the claim he now foreshadows without first seeking to have that costs order set aside constitutes, in my view, an indirect challenge to the costs order itself. It is well accepted that a consent order is as efficacious as those pronounced after a contest and can support a plea of res judicata: see Spencer Bower, Turner and Handley, Res Judicata at [38]-[39] (3 rd ed, Butterworths, 1996); Chamberlain v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [1988] HCA 21 ; (1988) 164 CLR 502 at 508. Though the costs order itself reflected the usual rule that costs follow the event, it represented an agreement by the parties that had both judicial sanction in relation to its subject matter and coercive authority: see Spencer Bower et al [39] (1996). For as long as that order stands I do not understand that Mr Cirillo seeks to challenge the substantive judgment of Olsson AJ given on 28 February 2003 the principle of finality embodied in the doctrine of res judicata precludes an examination of the incidence of costs, albeit indirectly, in a tort action such as foreshadowed: see Cabassi v Vila [1940] HCA 41 ; (1940) 64 CLR 130 at 139; Cachia v Westpac Financial Services Ltd [2005] NSWCA 239 at [2] ; Markisic v Department of Community Services of New South Wales (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 321 at [45] ff; see also D'Orta-Ekenaike v Victorian Legal Aid [2005] HCA 12 ; (2005) 214 ALR 92 at [83] . What is envisaged, as I understand it, involves a form of collateral attack on the order made.
Case: Cabassi v Vila [1940] HCA 41 ; (1940) 64 CLR 130
Outcome: cited
Nonetheless, as I have noted, the consent order as to costs determined the incidence of costs as between Mr Cirillo and the first to fourth respondents in respect of all issues of costs in the inquiry as to damages application. For Mr Cirillo to make the claim he now foreshadows without first seeking to have that costs order set aside constitutes, in my view, an indirect challenge to the costs order itself. It is well accepted that a consent order is as efficacious as those pronounced after a contest and can support a plea of res judicata: see Spencer Bower, Turner and Handley, Res Judicata at [38]-[39] (3 rd ed, Butterworths, 1996); Chamberlain v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [1988] HCA 21 ; (1988) 164 CLR 502 at 508. Though the costs order itself reflected the usual rule that costs follow the event, it represented an agreement by the parties that had both judicial sanction in relation to its subject matter and coercive authority: see Spencer Bower et al [39] (1996). For as long as that order stands I do not understand that Mr Cirillo seeks to challenge the substantive judgment of Olsson AJ given on 28 February 2003 the principle of finality embodied in the doctrine of res judicata precludes an examination of the incidence of costs, albeit indirectly, in a tort action such as foreshadowed: see Cabassi v Vila [1940] HCA 41 ; (1940) 64 CLR 130 at 139; Cachia v Westpac Financial Services Ltd [2005] NSWCA 239 at [2] ; Markisic v Department of Community Services of New South Wales (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 321 at [45] ff; see also D'Orta-Ekenaike v Victorian Legal Aid [2005] HCA 12 ; (2005) 214 ALR 92 at [83] . What is envisaged, as I understand it, involves a form of collateral attack on the order made.
Case: Cachia v Westpac Financial Services Ltd [2005] NSWCA 239
Outcome: cited
Nonetheless, as I have noted, the consent order as to costs determined the incidence of costs as between Mr Cirillo and the first to fourth respondents in respect of all issues of costs in the inquiry as to damages application. For Mr Cirillo to make the claim he now foreshadows without first seeking to have that costs order set aside constitutes, in my view, an indirect challenge to the costs order itself. It is well accepted that a consent order is as efficacious as those pronounced after a contest and can support a plea of res judicata: see Spencer Bower, Turner and Handley, Res Judicata at [38]-[39] (3 rd ed, Butterworths, 1996); Chamberlain v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [1988] HCA 21 ; (1988) 164 CLR 502 at 508. Though the costs order itself reflected the usual rule that costs follow the event, it represented an agreement by the parties that had both judicial sanction in relation to its subject matter and coercive authority: see Spencer Bower et al [39] (1996). For as long as that order stands I do not understand that Mr Cirillo seeks to challenge the substantive judgment of Olsson AJ given on 28 February 2003 the principle of finality embodied in the doctrine of res judicata precludes an examination of the incidence of costs, albeit indirectly, in a tort action such as foreshadowed: see Cabassi v Vila [1940] HCA 41 ; (1940) 64 CLR 130 at 139; Cachia v Westpac Financial Services Ltd [2005] NSWCA 239 at [2] ; Markisic v Department of Community Services of New South Wales (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 321 at [45] ff; see also D'Orta-Ekenaike v Victorian Legal Aid [2005] HCA 12 ; (2005) 214 ALR 92 at [83] . What is envisaged, as I understand it, involves a form of collateral attack on the order made.
Case: Markisic v Department of Community Services of New South Wales (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 321
Outcome: cited
Nonetheless, as I have noted, the consent order as to costs determined the incidence of costs as between Mr Cirillo and the first to fourth respondents in respect of all issues of costs in the inquiry as to damages application. For Mr Cirillo to make the claim he now foreshadows without first seeking to have that costs order set aside constitutes, in my view, an indirect challenge to the costs order itself. It is well accepted that a consent order is as efficacious as those pronounced after a contest and can support a plea of res judicata: see Spencer Bower, Turner and Handley, Res Judicata at [38]-[39] (3 rd ed, Butterworths, 1996); Chamberlain v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [1988] HCA 21 ; (1988) 164 CLR 502 at 508. Though the costs order itself reflected the usual rule that costs follow the event, it represented an agreement by the parties that had both judicial sanction in relation to its subject matter and coercive authority: see Spencer Bower et al [39] (1996). For as long as that order stands I do not understand that Mr Cirillo seeks to challenge the substantive judgment of Olsson AJ given on 28 February 2003 the principle of finality embodied in the doctrine of res judicata precludes an examination of the incidence of costs, albeit indirectly, in a tort action such as foreshadowed: see Cabassi v Vila [1940] HCA 41 ; (1940) 64 CLR 130 at 139; Cachia v Westpac Financial Services Ltd [2005] NSWCA 239 at [2] ; Markisic v Department of Community Services of New South Wales (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 321 at [45] ff; see also D'Orta-Ekenaike v Victorian Legal Aid [2005] HCA 12 ; (2005) 214 ALR 92 at [83] . What is envisaged, as I understand it, involves a form of collateral attack on the order made.
Case: D'Orta-Ekenaike v Victorian Legal Aid [2005] HCA 12 ; (2005) 214 ALR 92
Outcome: cited
Nonetheless, as I have noted, the consent order as to costs determined the incidence of costs as between Mr Cirillo and the first to fourth respondents in respect of all issues of costs in the inquiry as to damages application. For Mr Cirillo to make the claim he now foreshadows without first seeking to have that costs order set aside constitutes, in my view, an indirect challenge to the costs order itself. It is well accepted that a consent order is as efficacious as those pronounced after a contest and can support a plea of res judicata: see Spencer Bower, Turner and Handley, Res Judicata at [38]-[39] (3 rd ed, Butterworths, 1996); Chamberlain v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [1988] HCA 21 ; (1988) 164 CLR 502 at 508. Though the costs order itself reflected the usual rule that costs follow the event, it represented an agreement by the parties that had both judicial sanction in relation to its subject matter and coercive authority: see Spencer Bower et al [39] (1996). For as long as that order stands I do not understand that Mr Cirillo seeks to challenge the substantive judgment of Olsson AJ given on 28 February 2003 the principle of finality embodied in the doctrine of res judicata precludes an examination of the incidence of costs, albeit indirectly, in a tort action such as foreshadowed: see Cabassi v Vila [1940] HCA 41 ; (1940) 64 CLR 130 at 139; Cachia v Westpac Financial Services Ltd [2005] NSWCA 239 at [2] ; Markisic v Department of Community Services of New South Wales (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 321 at [45] ff; see also D'Orta-Ekenaike v Victorian Legal Aid [2005] HCA 12 ; (2005) 214 ALR 92 at [83] . What is envisaged, as I understand it, involves a form of collateral attack on the order made.
Case: Hanrahan v Ainsworth (1985) 1 NSWLR 370
Outcome: distinguished
Counsel for Mr Cirillo has sought to avoid this conclusion by relying on the decision of Hunt J in Hanrahan v Ainsworth (1985) 1 NSWLR 370 where His Honour refused to strike out an action for abuse of process in which costs and expenses associated with an earlier instituted proceeding against the now plaintiff by the now defendant were held to be recoverable in the latter proceeding if proved. 33 That case is clearly distinguishable from the present. The earlier proceeding had never been set down for trial and in consequence no costs order had been made in it. In consequence, no issue of res judicata or of collateral attack on a final order arose in that case. 34 For the above reasons, I am satisfied that the application should be dismissed as against the first to the fourth respondents.
Case: R v Balfour; Ex parte Parkes Rural Distributions Pty Ltd (1987) 17 FCR 26
Outcome: cited
In relation to Finlaysons' motion, I am equally satisfied that to allow the application to remain on foot would in the circumstances be manifestly unfair to that firm and would itself constitute an abuse of process. The foreshadowed claim would in substance be seeking (amongst other things) to reverse the effect of the consent order and the agreement underpinning it: cf R v Balfour; Ex parte Parkes Rural Distributions Pty Ltd (1987) 17 FCR 26 at 34. If successful it would result in a judgment that conflicted with Olsson AJ's consent order. 36 I have considered the proposed claim notwithstanding the opaque manner in which it has come forth in the course of the hearing before me. I would dismiss the application against all five respondents for the reasons I have given. 37 However, I would in any event dismiss the application without attempting to divine what the proposed claim might comprehend and for this reason: the present application and Statement of Claim are so removed from the type of claim proposed and are so vexatious in character, as to constitute an entirely inappropriate vehicle for possibly giving life to that claim.
Case: Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Rochester [1934] HCA 17 ; (1934) 50 CLR 225
Outcome: cited
The courts have attributed an ordinary meaning, within the "accepted usage of the English language", to the terms "manufactured", "manufacture" and "manufactured goods" in a number of cases: see Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Rochester [1934] HCA 17 ; (1934) 50 CLR 225 at 226 (Dixon J); MP Metals Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1968] HCA 89 ; (1978) 117 CLR 631 at 649 (Menzies J); Jax Tyres at 261; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Jack Zinander Pty Ltd [1949] HCA 42 ; (1949) 78 CLR 336 at 344-355 (Dixon J); Commonwealth v 5 Star Foods Pty Ltd (2002) 167 FLR 214. In 5 Star Foods , Byrne J said at 222: The cases to which I was referred also emphasise that the word ["manufacture"] should be given its meaning in ordinary everyday language: Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) [1981] HCA 26 ; (1981) 147 CLR 297 at 304-305 per Gibbs CJ. To my mind this meaning comprehends the application of a repetitive process, especially a mechanical process, to a thing or things to bring it or them to a form or condition specified. This process may be directed to producing a thing in a state fit for sale, for consumption by the end user, for attachment to or assembly with other things or for some further process. ...
Case: MP Metals Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1968] HCA 89 ; (1978) 117 CLR 631
Outcome: cited
The courts have attributed an ordinary meaning, within the "accepted usage of the English language", to the terms "manufactured", "manufacture" and "manufactured goods" in a number of cases: see Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Rochester [1934] HCA 17 ; (1934) 50 CLR 225 at 226 (Dixon J); MP Metals Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1968] HCA 89 ; (1978) 117 CLR 631 at 649 (Menzies J); Jax Tyres at 261; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Jack Zinander Pty Ltd [1949] HCA 42 ; (1949) 78 CLR 336 at 344-355 (Dixon J); Commonwealth v 5 Star Foods Pty Ltd (2002) 167 FLR 214. In 5 Star Foods , Byrne J said at 222: The cases to which I was referred also emphasise that the word ["manufacture"] should be given its meaning in ordinary everyday language: Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) [1981] HCA 26 ; (1981) 147 CLR 297 at 304-305 per Gibbs CJ. To my mind this meaning comprehends the application of a repetitive process, especially a mechanical process, to a thing or things to bring it or them to a form or condition specified. This process may be directed to producing a thing in a state fit for sale, for consumption by the end user, for attachment to or assembly with other things or for some further process. ...
Case: Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Jack Zinander Pty Ltd [1949] HCA 42 ; (1949) 78 CLR 336
Outcome: cited
In the context of the sales tax legislation, Lockhart J said in Jax Tyres (at 261): The primary meaning of the word "manufacture" when used as a verb is to make something by hand; but since the industrial revolution the word has come to mean manufacture by machinery, often on a large scale and with a division of labour. This accords with the dictionary definition. ... ... To manufacture an article necessarily involves producing a different article from the articles, materials or ingredients from which it was made. As Darling J said in McNicol v Pinch [1906] 2 KB 352 at 361: "I think the essence of making or of manufacturing is that what is made shall be a different thing from that out of which it is made." That passage was approved and applied by Dixon J in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Jack Zinader Pty Ltd [1949] HCA 42 ; (1949) 78 CLR 336 the leading case in this field. Whether the article which results from the process of manufacturing is a different article from the constituents or ingredients from which it was made is a question of fact: the Jack Zinader case. "Production" ... is a word of wide import; but it still involves the element of producing something different from the materials from which it was made. It is not possible to formulate precise definitions of such general terms as "manufacture" and "production"; but they do not bear a restricted meaning. Whatever answers the description of "manufacture" or "production" of goods according to accepted usage of the English language is within the Act. 66 The courts have attributed an ordinary meaning, within the "accepted usage of the English language", to the terms "manufactured", "manufacture" and "manufactured goods" in a number of cases: see Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Rochester [1934] HCA 17 ; (1934) 50 CLR 225 at 226 (Dixon J); MP Metals Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1968] HCA 89 ; (1978) 117 CLR 631 at 649 (Menzies J); Jax Tyres at 261; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Jack Zinander Pty Ltd [1949] HCA 42 ; (1949) 78 CLR 336 at 344-355 (Dixon J); Commonwealth v 5 Star Foods Pty Ltd (2002) 167 FLR 214. In 5 Star Foods , Byrne J said at 222: The cases to which I was referred also emphasise that the word ["manufacture"] should be given its meaning in ordinary everyday language: Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) [1981] HCA 26 ; (1981) 147 CLR 297 at 304-305 per Gibbs CJ. To my mind this meaning comprehends the application of a repetitive process, especially a mechanical process, to a thing or things to bring it or them to a form or condition specified. This process may be directed to producing a thing in a state fit for sale, for consumption by the end user, for attachment to or assembly with other things or for some further process. ...
Case: Commonwealth v 5 Star Foods Pty Ltd (2002) 167 FLR 214 
Outcome: cited
The courts have attributed an ordinary meaning, within the "accepted usage of the English language", to the terms "manufactured", "manufacture" and "manufactured goods" in a number of cases: see Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Rochester [1934] HCA 17 ; (1934) 50 CLR 225 at 226 (Dixon J); MP Metals Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1968] HCA 89 ; (1978) 117 CLR 631 at 649 (Menzies J); Jax Tyres at 261; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Jack Zinander Pty Ltd [1949] HCA 42 ; (1949) 78 CLR 336 at 344-355 (Dixon J); Commonwealth v 5 Star Foods Pty Ltd (2002) 167 FLR 214. In 5 Star Foods , Byrne J said at 222: The cases to which I was referred also emphasise that the word ["manufacture"] should be given its meaning in ordinary everyday language: Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) [1981] HCA 26 ; (1981) 147 CLR 297 at 304-305 per Gibbs CJ. To my mind this meaning comprehends the application of a repetitive process, especially a mechanical process, to a thing or things to bring it or them to a form or condition specified. This process may be directed to producing a thing in a state fit for sale, for consumption by the end user, for attachment to or assembly with other things or for some further process. ...