mdroth/huggingface-course_section-5_zst huggingface dataset:
Case: Hall v Nominal Defendant [1966] HCA 36 ; (1966) 117 CLR 423 
Outcome: considered
In Hall v Nominal Defendant [1966] HCA 36 ; (1966) 117 CLR 423 at 440 Taylor J, with whom Owen J agreed, said: ...an order made in the course of an action or suit which does not conclude the rights of the parties inter se, although it may, of course, conclude the fate of the particular application in which it is made, is interlocutory only. 30 In the same case at 442 Windeyer J observed that "the distinction between final and interlocutory orders has in England caused much difficulty". At 443-444 his Honour said: In most cases the test that seems to be most satisfactory...is...to look at the consequences of the order itself and to ask does it finally determine the rights of the parties in a principal cause pending between them. It is never enough to ask simply does the order finally determine the actual application or matter out of which it arises; because, subject to the possibility of an appeal, every order does that, unless it be an order that is expressly declared to be subject to variation...The effect of such decisions as there are of this Court on the point seems to me to be that when an action has been commenced between parties then whether an order in that action is interlocutory depends on whether or not it results in a final determination of that action. I say of 'that action' because it appears that the question depends more upon the action actually brought by a writ than upon the cause of action upon which the writ was founded. After citing certain authorities in support of the view which he adopted, Windeyer J at 444 said: These cases are all illustrative of the general proposition that a final order is one which finally disposes (subject only to appeal) of an action or an existing dispute between parties. 31 The action initiated by the filing of the Statement of Claim was not disposed of by the making of an order requiring Citigroup to pay Mr Mason an amount by way of annual leave entitlements plus interest. The claim for a penalty to be imposed on Citigroup remained to be determined. For the same reason, the dispute between the parties, which involved both Mr Mason's annual leave entitlements and the issue of whether a penalty should be imposed on Citigroup, was not finally resolved in the making of that order. 32 No authorities touching on the proper construction of s 853(2) of the WR Act have been identified. Neither party submitted that the subsection should not be construed literally. So construed it discloses a legislative intention, in the specific case of the appeals for which s 853(1) provides, to override the general prohibition contained in s 24(1A) of the Federal Court Act on the bringing of appeals from interlocutory judgments without leave to appeal being granted. 33 I conclude that s 853(2) is to be construed literally. As a consequence I conclude that it is not necessary to obtain leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment of a court of a State or Territory in a matter arising under the WR Act notwithstanding that it is necessary to obtain leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment of the Court in a comparable matter.
Case: Hi-Fert Pty Ltd v Kiukiang Maritime Carriers Inc (No 3) (1998) 86 FCR 374 
Outcome: cited
It may be that the drafter of the notice of appeal overlooked that a judgment as defined by the Federal Court Act and the WR Act is an operative judicial act so that there is no appeal from reasons for judgment alone ( Hi-Fert Pty Ltd v Kiukiang Maritime Carriers Inc (No 3) (1998) 86 FCR 374). Nor does an appeal lie from a verdict alone prior to judgment being given ( Musgrove v McDonald [1905] HCA 50 ; (1905) 3 CLR 132 at 142). I conclude that the reference to "the orders made on 15 October 2007" is to be understood as, or including, a reference to the operative order of the District Court made on that day requiring Citigroup to pay Mr Mason the amount found to be owing to him in respect of annual leave entitlements and interest.
Case: Musgrove v McDonald [1905] HCA 50 ; (1905) 3 CLR 132 
Outcome: cited
It may be that the drafter of the notice of appeal overlooked that a judgment as defined by the Federal Court Act and the WR Act is an operative judicial act so that there is no appeal from reasons for judgment alone ( Hi-Fert Pty Ltd v Kiukiang Maritime Carriers Inc (No 3) (1998) 86 FCR 374). Nor does an appeal lie from a verdict alone prior to judgment being given ( Musgrove v McDonald [1905] HCA 50 ; (1905) 3 CLR 132 at 142). I conclude that the reference to "the orders made on 15 October 2007" is to be understood as, or including, a reference to the operative order of the District Court made on that day requiring Citigroup to pay Mr Mason the amount found to be owing to him in respect of annual leave entitlements and interest.
Case: Re Luck [2003] HCA 70 ; (2003) 203 ALR 1 
Outcome: considered
Although, because of the construction that I have adopted of s 853(2) of the WR Act, it is not necessary for me finally to determine whether the judgment of the District Court pronounced on 15 October 2007 is interlocutory, I strongly incline in favour of the view that it is interlocutory. In Re Luck [2003] HCA 70 ; (2003) 203 ALR 1 at [4] - [5] McHugh ACJ, Gummow and Heydon JJ said: ...the usual test for determining whether an order is final or interlocutory is whether the order, as made, finally determines the rights of the parties in a principal cause pending between them. That question is answered by determining whether the legal effect of the judgment is final or not. If the legal effect of the judgment is final, it is a final order; otherwise, it is an interlocutory order. The order of Gleeson CJ refusing to grant leave to issue process was an interlocutory order. It did not finally determine Ms Luck's rights against the various defendants, if she has any such rights...(emphasis in original)
Case: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill [2006] HCA 46 ; (2006) 227 CLR 57
Outcome: cited
decision under s 9 of the Protection Act has lapsed. The Minister has made a decision under s 10 but Mr Dates has not made that decision the subject of his application. In order to obtain an injunction, Mr Dates must show that there is a serious question to be tried ( Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill [2006] HCA 46 ; (2006) 227 CLR 57 at [19] per Gleeson CJ and Crennan J) in the sense explained in O'Neill at [65] per Gummow and Hayne JJ and also address the balance of convenience, in the sense of competing inconvenience and injury. The evidence before me and the Minister's reasons relate to the application under s 9 of the Protection Act. In any event, I will consider whether there is a serious question to be tried in respect of the application to this Court concerning the s 9 decision. As to the significance of Alum Mountain as an Aboriginal area for the purposes of s 9 of the Protection Act, the Minister found that the upper slopes and ridge crest outcrops are significant as part of Aboriginal tradition within the meaning of the Protection Act because they are associated with men's business. That finding is not challenged.
Case: Carter v Minister for Aboriginal Affairs [2005] FCA 667 ; (2005) 143 FCR 383
Outcome: considered
appeal in Williams , Gray J with whom Tamberlin J agreed, expressed the view, arguably in obiter dicta, that such power does exist ( Williams v Minister for the Environment and Heritage [2004] FCAFC 58 ; (2004) 132 LGERA 368 at [29] , [30] and [40]). Justice Ryan, in Carter v Minister for Aboriginal Affairs [2005] FCA 667 ; (2005) 143 FCR 383 at [39] - [41] , expressed the view that, as Wilcox and Lindgren JJ concluded, Johns compels the conclusion that such interlocutory relief against the third party is not available.
Case: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend [1986] HCA 40 ; (1985-1986) 162 CLR 24
Outcome: cited
powers of the Federal Court under the ADJR Act are set out in s 16 of that Act. Section 16(1) provides that, on an application for an order for review of a decision, the Court may make certain orders. Subsections (a) to (c) relate to the decision itself, in this case a refusal to make a declaration. If that decision were set aside, it does not follow that the Court is empowered to substitute its own decision as to the making of a declaration for that of the Minster; it is not ( Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited [1986] HCA 40 ; (1985-1986) 162 CLR 24 at 40 per Mason J). Section 16(1)(d) provides that the court may make an order: Directing any of the parties to do, or to refrain from doing, any act or thing the doing, or the refraining from the doing, of which the court considers necessary to do justice between the parties. Mr Dates relies upon s 16(1)(d) as the basis for the orders sought against the RTA, if joined. Mr Dates' complaints go to the merits of the decision and the weight accorded by the Minister to evidence that contradicted the evidence he presented. His complaint is that the Minister came to the wrong conclusion but that does not amount to reviewable error. Not every consideration that a decision-maker is bound to take into account but fails to take into account will justify the court setting aside the impugned decision and ordering that the discretion be re-exercised according to law. A factor may not be significant and a failure to take it into account could be seen not to have materially affected the decision ( Peko-Wallsend at 40). I am not satisfied that, for example, the unspecified archeological sites, if not taken into account, could have materially affected the Minister's state of satisfaction in the light of the matters referred to in the reasons. The application asserts a denial of procedural fairness in the making of the decision and manifest unreasonableness. This was not elaborated on the hearing of the motion and I am not satisfied that the particularisation of those grounds in the application discloses a serious question of reviewable error. The Minister, in his reasons, explained why he was satisfied as to the upper parts of Alum Mountain but not satisfied as to the lower parts. To repeat, the Protection Act requires a positive state of satisfaction as to areas and objects of particular significance to Aboriginals in accordance with Aboriginal tradition. Even if there were power to make an order against the RTA as sought in the notice of motion to preserve the subject matter of the s 9 application, Mr Dates has not established, at a prima facie level, that the Minister's decision should be the subject of orders under s 16(1) of the ADJR Act.
Case: Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Msilanga [1992] FCA 41 ; (1992) 34 FCR 169
Outcome: cited
23 of the Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) ('the Federal Court Act') provides that the Court has power, in relation to matters in which it has jurisdiction, to make orders of such kinds, including interlocutory orders, as the Court thinks appropriate. The section does not itself confer jurisdiction. Where jurisdiction is conferred by an Act that provides an exhaustive code of available remedies or otherwise limits the power of the courts to grant relief, s 23 does not provide a basis for transcending that limitation. ( Thomson Australian Holdings Pty Ltd v the Trade Practices Commission [1981] HCA 48 ; (1980-1981) 148 CLR 150 at 161; Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia [1998] HCA 30 ; (1998) 195 CLR 1 at [27] - [28] ). Section 23 will not generally be read as giving power to grant additional remedies of a kind already specifically provided for in other legislation which is to be seen as a comprehensive statement of the remedies there available. This presents a difficulty to an applicant seeking broader orders than those provided in the ADJR Act: " the stream cannot rise higher than its source " ( Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Msilanga [1992] FCA 41 ; (1992) 34 FCR 169 at 177, 179 per Beaumont J, with whom Black CJ agreed).
Case: Park Oh Ho v Minister for Immigration &amp; Ethnic Affairs [1989] HCA 54 ; (1989) 167 CLR 637
Outcome: cited
was pointed out in Johns v Australian Securities Commission [1993] HCA 56 ; (1992) 178 CLR 408 by Brennan J at 433 that s 16(1)(d) does not enable the Court to make an order against a party in litigation where no ground for relief under the general law is established against that party. There must, his Honour said, be " legal reference points by which to steer ". The power is in addition to the power to quash or set aside an impugned decision ( Park Oh Ho v Minister for Immigration &amp; Ethnic Affairs [1989] HCA 54 ; (1989) 167 CLR 637 at 644). It does not enable orders to be made against persons who were not in any way involved in the processes or procedures which led to the decision under review and who benefit from the decision, if at all, only indirectly; those persons are, in that sense, strangers to the decision ( Johns at 459 per Gaudron J). Johns was applied by Wilcox J in Williams v Minister for the Environment and Heritage (2003) 74 ALD 124 (' Williams No 1 ') to refuse relief by way of a restraining order against a joined third party under s 16(1)(d) of the ADJR Act, even after a refusal to make a s 9 declaration was declared invalid and set aside. His Honour concluded that such an order was beyond power. On the application for interlocutory relief following the decision of Wilcox J, Lindgren J expressed the view in Williams v Minister for the Environment and Heritage [2003] FCA 627 ; (2003) 199 ALR 352 (' Williams No 2 ') at [31] that there was not an arguable case that Wilcox J had erred in his view that Johns obliged him to refuse the interlocutory injunction. That is, Lindgren J expressed the view at [40] that a party seeking an injunction under s 16(1)(d) of the ADJR Act must establish a "right" to it under general law principles. Specifically, his Honour concluded at [44] that the general law does not recognise an Aboriginal person as having an interest in the specified area in an application under the Protection Act, protectable by injunctive relief. The right given by s 9 is to apply for a ministerial declaration and that does not constitute such an interest.
Case: Thomson Australian Holdings Pty Ltd v the Trade Practices Commission [1981] HCA 48 ; (1980-1981) 148 CLR 150
Outcome: cited
23 of the Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) ('the Federal Court Act') provides that the Court has power, in relation to matters in which it has jurisdiction, to make orders of such kinds, including interlocutory orders, as the Court thinks appropriate. The section does not itself confer jurisdiction. Where jurisdiction is conferred by an Act that provides an exhaustive code of available remedies or otherwise limits the power of the courts to grant relief, s 23 does not provide a basis for transcending that limitation. ( Thomson Australian Holdings Pty Ltd v the Trade Practices Commission [1981] HCA 48 ; (1980-1981) 148 CLR 150 at 161; Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia [1998] HCA 30 ; (1998) 195 CLR 1 at [27] - [28] ). Section 23 will not generally be read as giving power to grant additional remedies of a kind already specifically provided for in other legislation which is to be seen as a comprehensive statement of the remedies there available. This presents a difficulty to an applicant seeking broader orders than those provided in the ADJR Act: " the stream cannot rise higher than its source " ( Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Msilanga [1992] FCA 41 ; (1992) 34 FCR 169 at 177, 179 per Beaumont J, with whom Black CJ agreed).
Case: Williams v Minister for the Environment and Heritage (2003) 74 ALD 124
Outcome: considered
was pointed out in Johns v Australian Securities Commission [1993] HCA 56 ; (1992) 178 CLR 408 by Brennan J at 433 that s 16(1)(d) does not enable the Court to make an order against a party in litigation where no ground for relief under the general law is established against that party. There must, his Honour said, be " legal reference points by which to steer ". The power is in addition to the power to quash or set aside an impugned decision ( Park Oh Ho v Minister for Immigration &amp; Ethnic Affairs [1989] HCA 54 ; (1989) 167 CLR 637 at 644). It does not enable orders to be made against persons who were not in any way involved in the processes or procedures which led to the decision under review and who benefit from the decision, if at all, only indirectly; those persons are, in that sense, strangers to the decision ( Johns at 459 per Gaudron J). Johns was applied by Wilcox J in Williams v Minister for the Environment and Heritage (2003) 74 ALD 124 (' Williams No 1 ') to refuse relief by way of a restraining order against a joined third party under s 16(1)(d) of the ADJR Act, even after a refusal to make a s 9 declaration was declared invalid and set aside. His Honour concluded that such an order was beyond power. On the application for interlocutory relief following the decision of Wilcox J, Lindgren J expressed the view in Williams v Minister for the Environment and Heritage [2003] FCA 627 ; (2003) 199 ALR 352 (' Williams No 2 ') at [31] that there was not an arguable case that Wilcox J had erred in his view that Johns obliged him to refuse the interlocutory injunction. That is, Lindgren J expressed the view at [40] that a party seeking an injunction under s 16(1)(d) of the ADJR Act must establish a "right" to it under general law principles. Specifically, his Honour concluded at [44] that the general law does not recognise an Aboriginal person as having an interest in the specified area in an application under the Protection Act, protectable by injunctive relief. The right given by s 9 is to apply for a ministerial declaration and that does not constitute such an interest.
Case: Williams v Minister for the Environment and Heritage [2003] FCA 627 ; (2003) 199 ALR 352
Outcome: considered
was pointed out in Johns v Australian Securities Commission [1993] HCA 56 ; (1992) 178 CLR 408 by Brennan J at 433 that s 16(1)(d) does not enable the Court to make an order against a party in litigation where no ground for relief under the general law is established against that party. There must, his Honour said, be " legal reference points by which to steer ". The power is in addition to the power to quash or set aside an impugned decision ( Park Oh Ho v Minister for Immigration &amp; Ethnic Affairs [1989] HCA 54 ; (1989) 167 CLR 637 at 644). It does not enable orders to be made against persons who were not in any way involved in the processes or procedures which led to the decision under review and who benefit from the decision, if at all, only indirectly; those persons are, in that sense, strangers to the decision ( Johns at 459 per Gaudron J). Johns was applied by Wilcox J in Williams v Minister for the Environment and Heritage (2003) 74 ALD 124 (' Williams No 1 ') to refuse relief by way of a restraining order against a joined third party under s 16(1)(d) of the ADJR Act, even after a refusal to make a s 9 declaration was declared invalid and set aside. His Honour concluded that such an order was beyond power. On the application for interlocutory relief following the decision of Wilcox J, Lindgren J expressed the view in Williams v Minister for the Environment and Heritage [2003] FCA 627 ; (2003) 199 ALR 352 (' Williams No 2 ') at [31] that there was not an arguable case that Wilcox J had erred in his view that Johns obliged him to refuse the interlocutory injunction. That is, Lindgren J expressed the view at [40] that a party seeking an injunction under s 16(1)(d) of the ADJR Act must establish a "right" to it under general law principles. Specifically, his Honour concluded at [44] that the general law does not recognise an Aboriginal person as having an interest in the specified area in an application under the Protection Act, protectable by injunctive relief. The right given by s 9 is to apply for a ministerial declaration and that does not constitute such an interest.
Case: Williams v Minister for the Environment and Heritage [2004] FCAFC 58 ; (2004) 132 LGERA 368
Outcome: considered
appeal in Williams , Gray J with whom Tamberlin J agreed, expressed the view, arguably in obiter dicta, that such power does exist ( Williams v Minister for the Environment and Heritage [2004] FCAFC 58 ; (2004) 132 LGERA 368 at [29] , [30] and [40]). Justice Ryan, in Carter v Minister for Aboriginal Affairs [2005] FCA 667 ; (2005) 143 FCR 383 at [39] - [41] , expressed the view that, as Wilcox and Lindgren JJ concluded, Johns compels the conclusion that such interlocutory relief against the third party is not available.
Case: Applicant VEAL of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 72 ; (2005) 222 ALR 411
Outcome: applied
fact that the appellant had not satisfied the points test in each criterion in a decision which is set aside would be a matter that the Tribunal could take into account, if it had to complete its review, although it would be able to review the question afresh, as Gummow and Hayne JJ pointed out in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Wang [2003] HCA 11 ; (2003) 215 CLR 518. Indeed, in Applicant VEAL of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 72 ; (2005) 222 ALR 411 Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Heydon JJ held that a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal was affected by jurisdictional error where the tribunal had reached a decision to refuse a visa to an applicant and had said that it had given no weight to a confidential letter. The visa applicant was ignorant of the existence of the letter which contained credible, relevant and significant material which was adverse to the visa applicant. Their Honours said: 'It follows that asking whether, despite what was said in its reasons, the Tribunal may have been subconsciously affected by the information distracts attention from the relevant inquiry. The relevant inquiry is: what procedures should have been followed? The relevant inquiry is neither what decision should the decision-maker have made, nor what reasons did the decision-maker give for the conclusion reached.' (222 ALR at 417 [19])
Case: Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporations [1947] EWCA Civ 1 ; [1948] 1 KB 223 
Outcome: cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21 ; (1999) 197 CLR 611 at 627 [44] per Gleeson CJ and McHugh J, 656-657 [144]-[147] per Gummow J, 672-673 [194] per Callinan J, the distinction between a decision which the court finds no reasonable decision-maker could have come to and one which the court considers simply to be unreasonable, was discussed. The latter characterization involves a broad spectrum at the extreme end of which may be found decisions of the former category in the sense of unreasonableness of the kind recognized in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1947] EWCA Civ 1 ; [1948] 1 KB 223 at 230. The existence of that spectrum reminds the courts that between its extreme ends are many categories of decision with which courts might not agree or which they could regard as unreasonable but which a reasonable person could have made. The latter category of decision is immunized from judicial review because the legislature has confided to the decision-maker the task of forming the opinion or arriving at the state of satisfaction on the materials before him or her.