mdroth/huggingface-course_section-5_zst huggingface dataset:
Case: Australian Meat Industry Employees' Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 46 ; (1986) 161 CLR 98
Outcome: cited
As to the first and second of the charges, the company made no apparent attempts to comply with the orders in the times respectively prescribed for compliance. It was only in response to communications from the ACCC that steps were taken in purported compliance with the order. These steps as I have found did not remedy the non-compliance. I am satisfied that the company was indifferent to the obligation imposed on it by the orders and acted, and has continued to act, accordingly up until the time of these proceedings. There has been nothing "casual, accidental or unintentional" about its non-compliance with Orders 3 and 4, rather there has been "wilful disobedience": Australian Meat Industry Employees' Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 46 ; (1986) 161 CLR 98 at 112-113. The company has offered no explanation for its conduct. Indeed its indifference to the matter has been reflected in the approach it has taken to the present proceedings. It needs to be made aware of the seriousness of its conduct: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Info4PC.com Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 949 ; (2002) 121 FCR 24 at [139] , [144]. Its conduct, moreover, needs to be considered in the context of its having consented to the very orders it then proceeded to disregard.
Case: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Info4PC.com Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 949 ; (2002) 121 FCR 24
Outcome: cited
As to the first and second of the charges, the company made no apparent attempts to comply with the orders in the times respectively prescribed for compliance. It was only in response to communications from the ACCC that steps were taken in purported compliance with the order. These steps as I have found did not remedy the non-compliance. I am satisfied that the company was indifferent to the obligation imposed on it by the orders and acted, and has continued to act, accordingly up until the time of these proceedings. There has been nothing "casual, accidental or unintentional" about its non-compliance with Orders 3 and 4, rather there has been "wilful disobedience": Australian Meat Industry Employees' Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 46 ; (1986) 161 CLR 98 at 112-113. The company has offered no explanation for its conduct. Indeed its indifference to the matter has been reflected in the approach it has taken to the present proceedings. It needs to be made aware of the seriousness of its conduct: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Info4PC.com Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 949 ; (2002) 121 FCR 24 at [139] , [144]. Its conduct, moreover, needs to be considered in the context of its having consented to the very orders it then proceeded to disregard. 84 The only penalty sought by the ACCC is the imposition of a fine. There is no doubting the Court's power to impose such a penalty: see Info4PC.com Pty Ltd at [138]. In deciding an appropriate amount for a fine, the Court ordinarily will take into account the contemnor's financial means: Smith v The Queen (1991) 25 NSWLR 1. I am unable to do so in this case as no proper evidence has been put before me on this matter. However I have no reason to believe that the company has significant assets.
Case: Smith v The Queen (1991) 25 NSWLR 1
Outcome: cited
The only penalty sought by the ACCC is the imposition of a fine. There is no doubting the Court's power to impose such a penalty: see Info4PC.com Pty Ltd at [138]. In deciding an appropriate amount for a fine, the Court ordinarily will take into account the contemnor's financial means: Smith v The Queen (1991) 25 NSWLR 1. I am unable to do so in this case as no proper evidence has been put before me on this matter. However I have no reason to believe that the company has significant assets.
Case: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Contact Plus Group Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 2) [2006] FCA 695
Outcome: cited
It is said commonly that the power to impose penalties in cases of civil contempt is to be exercised so as both to ensure that orders are complied with and to deter conduct in contravention of court orders: see e.g. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Contact Plus Group Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 2) [2006] FCA 695 at [57] . In the present matter it is the second of these purposes that is of present significance: on this duality in cases of civil contempt see generally Arlidge, Eady &amp; Smith on Contempt 3-6 ff. It in turn must be viewed in a context in which the principal proceedings brought by the ACCC was to protect the public interest: see generally Truth About Motorways Pty Ltd v Macquarie Infrastructure Investment Management Ltd [2000] HCA 11 ; (1999) 200 CLR 591. 89 The ACCC has sought an award of costs on an indemnity basis. Costs can be awarded on such a basis where it is warranted by the interests of justice. This is commonly found to be so in contempt cases where such proceedings have had to be brought after judgment to vindicate the authority of the Court and to uphold the public interest in the administration of justice: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australian Business Reports Pty Ltd (1997) 19 ATPR 41-577 at 44,010; Contact Plus Group Pty Ltd (in liq) at [67] ff. Such is particularly the case where the proceedings have been brought by the ACCC in prosecution of its charter to act in the public interest: see Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Globex Systems Pty Ltd (2005) 27 ATPR 42-069 at 43,105.
Case: Truth About Motorways Pty Ltd v Macquarie Infrastructure Investment Management Ltd [2000] HCA 11 ; (1999) 200 CLR 591 
Outcome: cited
It is said commonly that the power to impose penalties in cases of civil contempt is to be exercised so as both to ensure that orders are complied with and to deter conduct in contravention of court orders: see e.g. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Contact Plus Group Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 2) [2006] FCA 695 at [57] . In the present matter it is the second of these purposes that is of present significance: on this duality in cases of civil contempt see generally Arlidge, Eady &amp; Smith on Contempt 3-6 ff. It in turn must be viewed in a context in which the principal proceedings brought by the ACCC was to protect the public interest: see generally Truth About Motorways Pty Ltd v Macquarie Infrastructure Investment Management Ltd [2000] HCA 11 ; (1999) 200 CLR 591.
Case: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australian Business Reports Pty Ltd (1997) 19 ATPR 41-577
Outcome: cited
The ACCC has sought an award of costs on an indemnity basis. Costs can be awarded on such a basis where it is warranted by the interests of justice. This is commonly found to be so in contempt cases where such proceedings have had to be brought after judgment to vindicate the authority of the Court and to uphold the public interest in the administration of justice: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australian Business Reports Pty Ltd (1997) 19 ATPR 41-577 at 44,010; Contact Plus Group Pty Ltd (in liq) at [67] ff. Such is particularly the case where the proceedings have been brought by the ACCC in prosecution of its charter to act in the public interest: see Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Globex Systems Pty Ltd (2005) 27 ATPR 42-069 at 43,105.
Case: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Globex Systems Pty Ltd (2005) 27 ATPR 42-069
Outcome: cited
The ACCC has sought an award of costs on an indemnity basis. Costs can be awarded on such a basis where it is warranted by the interests of justice. This is commonly found to be so in contempt cases where such proceedings have had to be brought after judgment to vindicate the authority of the Court and to uphold the public interest in the administration of justice: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australian Business Reports Pty Ltd (1997) 19 ATPR 41-577 at 44,010; Contact Plus Group Pty Ltd (in liq) at [67] ff. Such is particularly the case where the proceedings have been brought by the ACCC in prosecution of its charter to act in the public interest: see Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Globex Systems Pty Ltd (2005) 27 ATPR 42-069 at 43,105.
Case: Assad v Minister for Immigration &amp; Citizenship [2008] FCA 1039
Outcome: considered
Division 2 of Part 8 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) provides for the manner in which decisions may be reviewed by the Federal Magistrates Court, the Federal Court and the High Court. Section 476 provides for the jurisdiction of the Federal Magistrates Court. Section 476(2)(a) and (d), it has recently been held, are not invalid because they oblige the High Court to exercise exclusively and without remitter the jurisdiction conferred by s 75(v) of the Constitution with respect to certain decisions of the Minister: MZXOT v Minister for Immigration &amp; Citizenship [2008] HCA 28. Section 476A provides for the limited original jurisdiction to be entertained by this Court: eg, Assad v Minister for Immigration &amp; Citizenship [2008] FCA 1039 ; La Bara v Minister for Immigration &amp; Citizenship [2008] FCA 785 at [3] ; Shuster v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 215 at [6] [7], [2008] FCA 215 ; 167 FCR 186 at 188. The appellate jurisdiction of this Court is relevantly that conferred by s 24(1)(d) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). That appellate jurisdiction may be exercised by a single Judge of this Court: s 25(1AA)(a).
Case: La Bara v Minister for Immigration &amp; Citizenship [2008] FCA 785
Outcome: considered
Division 2 of Part 8 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) provides for the manner in which decisions may be reviewed by the Federal Magistrates Court, the Federal Court and the High Court. Section 476 provides for the jurisdiction of the Federal Magistrates Court. Section 476(2)(a) and (d), it has recently been held, are not invalid because they oblige the High Court to exercise exclusively and without remitter the jurisdiction conferred by s 75(v) of the Constitution with respect to certain decisions of the Minister: MZXOT v Minister for Immigration &amp; Citizenship [2008] HCA 28. Section 476A provides for the limited original jurisdiction to be entertained by this Court: eg, Assad v Minister for Immigration &amp; Citizenship [2008] FCA 1039 ; La Bara v Minister for Immigration &amp; Citizenship [2008] FCA 785 at [3] ; Shuster v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 215 at [6] [7], [2008] FCA 215 ; 167 FCR 186 at 188. The appellate jurisdiction of this Court is relevantly that conferred by s 24(1)(d) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). That appellate jurisdiction may be exercised by a single Judge of this Court: s 25(1AA)(a).
Case: MZXOT v Minister for Immigration &amp; Citizenship [2008] HCA 28
Outcome: followed
Division 2 of Part 8 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) provides for the manner in which decisions may be reviewed by the Federal Magistrates Court, the Federal Court and the High Court. Section 476 provides for the jurisdiction of the Federal Magistrates Court. Section 476(2)(a) and (d), it has recently been held, are not invalid because they oblige the High Court to exercise exclusively and without remitter the jurisdiction conferred by s 75(v) of the Constitution with respect to certain decisions of the Minister: MZXOT v Minister for Immigration &amp; Citizenship [2008] HCA 28. Section 476A provides for the limited original jurisdiction to be entertained by this Court: eg, Assad v Minister for Immigration &amp; Citizenship [2008] FCA 1039 ; La Bara v Minister for Immigration &amp; Citizenship [2008] FCA 785 at [3] ; Shuster v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 215 at [6] [7], [2008] FCA 215 ; 167 FCR 186 at 188. The appellate jurisdiction of this Court is relevantly that conferred by s 24(1)(d) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). That appellate jurisdiction may be exercised by a single Judge of this Court: s 25(1AA)(a).
Case: Shuster v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 215 , 167 FCR 186
Outcome: considered
Division 2 of Part 8 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) provides for the manner in which decisions may be reviewed by the Federal Magistrates Court, the Federal Court and the High Court. Section 476 provides for the jurisdiction of the Federal Magistrates Court. Section 476(2)(a) and (d), it has recently been held, are not invalid because they oblige the High Court to exercise exclusively and without remitter the jurisdiction conferred by s 75(v) of the Constitution with respect to certain decisions of the Minister: MZXOT v Minister for Immigration &amp; Citizenship [2008] HCA 28. Section 476A provides for the limited original jurisdiction to be entertained by this Court: eg, Assad v Minister for Immigration &amp; Citizenship [2008] FCA 1039 ; La Bara v Minister for Immigration &amp; Citizenship [2008] FCA 785 at [3] ; Shuster v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 215 at [6] [7], [2008] FCA 215 ; 167 FCR 186 at 188. The appellate jurisdiction of this Court is relevantly that conferred by s 24(1)(d) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). That appellate jurisdiction may be exercised by a single Judge of this Court: s 25(1AA)(a).
Case: SZLZM v Minister for Immigration &amp; Citizenship [2008] FMCA 887
Outcome: cited
The Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision by way of a decision signed on 10 January 2008. On 18 June 2008 the Federal Magistrates Court dismissed an application seeking to review the decision of the Tribunal: SZLZM v Minister for Immigration &amp; Citizenship [2008] FMCA 887. 4 The Appellant now appeals to this Court. He appeared today unrepresented, albeit with the benefit of an interpreter. He read to the Court (via his interpreter) a detailed statement in support of his appeal. That statement fully addressed the issues sought to be canvassed. Although he maintained that a copy of the Respondent Minister's submissions had only been received by him on 13 August 2008, he accepted that his statement made orally today fully set forth his case. Any further opportunity to respond would be for the purpose of reducing to writing the statement made orally. Such a further opportunity was not considered necessary. The interpreter experienced no difficulty in translating the Appellant's oral contentions. 5 Although the present proceeding is an appeal from the decision of the Federal Magistrates Court, the Grounds of Appeal as filed in this Court do not attempt to identify any error made by the learned Federal Magistrate. Those Grounds merely set forth the errors alleged to have been committed by the Tribunal.
Case: SZIBR v Minister for Immigration &amp; Citizenship [2008] FCA 502
Outcome: followed
This Ground should be rejected. It was (most probably) not raised before the Federal Magistrates Court and no reason has been exposed as to why it should now be entertained. In those circumstances where this Court has a discretion to permit a new ground to be raised on appeal, there should generally be an adequate explanation for not raising the ground before the Federal Magistrates Court ( SZIBR v Minister for Immigration &amp; Citizenship [2008] FCA 502 at [38] [41]) and leave should only be granted if it is expedient in the interests of justice to do so ( VUAX v Minister for Immigration &amp; Multicultural &amp; Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158 at [46] [48]).
Case: Thang Gia Uy Vo v Minister for Immigration &amp; Citizenship [2007] FCA 1599 , 101 ALD 57
Outcome: considered
Notwithstanding the deficiency in the content of the Notice of Appeal , it nevertheless remains clear that the Appellant sought to invoke the appellate jurisdiction of this Court and not its original jurisdiction. Whatever other deficiencies there may be in his Notice of Appeal , that Notice does state (without alteration) that " the appellant appeals from the whole of the judgment of the Federal Magistrate Court given on 18.6.2008 at Sydney ". In some circumstances, it may be accepted, it is not appropriate for this Court to deal with an application before it solely upon the basis of " procedural errors committed by an unrepresented applicant ": eg, Thang Gia Uy Vo v Minister for Immigration &amp; Citizenship [2007] FCA 1599 at [12] , [2007] FCA 1599 ; 101 ALD 57 at 59. 11 In the present appeal no submission was advanced on behalf of the Respondent Minister that the appeal should be dismissed by reason of the failure of the Appellant to identify any error alleged to have been committed by the learned Federal Magistrate; indeed, the Minister's written submissions addressed the substance of each of the three purported Grounds of Appeal . 12 But, even if the Grounds of Appeal be construed as an identification of the errors which were said to have been committed by the Tribunal, and an implicit contention that the Federal Magistrate erred in not concluding that there were such errors, no different conclusion -- it should be noted -- would have been reached and the appeal would have been dismissed.
Case: VUAX v Minister for Immigration &amp; Multicultural &amp; Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158
Outcome: followed
This Ground should be rejected. It was (most probably) not raised before the Federal Magistrates Court and no reason has been exposed as to why it should now be entertained. In those circumstances where this Court has a discretion to permit a new ground to be raised on appeal, there should generally be an adequate explanation for not raising the ground before the Federal Magistrates Court ( SZIBR v Minister for Immigration &amp; Citizenship [2008] FCA 502 at [38] [41]) and leave should only be granted if it is expedient in the interests of justice to do so ( VUAX v Minister for Immigration &amp; Multicultural &amp; Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158 at [46] [48]).
Case: Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal [2002] HCA 30 ; (2002) 190 ALR 601
Outcome: considered
The appeal is based on three grounds. The first is that the Federal Magistrate failed to find error of law, jurisdictional error or lack of procedural fairness in the Tribunal's reasons. A second ground refers to the High Court judgment in Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal [2002] HCA 30 ; (2002) 190 ALR 601. The third ground simply refers to the High Court judgment in Plaintiff S157 of 2002 v Commonwealth of Australia [2003] HCA 2 ; (2003) 211 CLR 476. 12 Finally, it is said that the Federal Magistrate and the Tribunal erred in not finding that the appellant satisfied the definition of refugee. This is simply a generalised statement and no indication of any specific error has been asserted. I should add that in this case there is no evidence of any lack of procedural fairness and the case does not come within the principles enunciated in Muin. There is nothing pointed to by the appellant to indicate that the reasoning in that case has any application. 13 I have also considered the reasoning of the Federal Court Magistrate who deals with the arguments, some of a different nature, which were advanced before him and I can find no error in that reasoning. 14 Accordingly for the above reasons the order of the Court in this matter is that the appeal is dismissed with costs. I certify that the preceding fourteen (14) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Tamberlin. Associate: Dated: 28 May 2007 Counsel for the Appellants: None Solicitor for the Appellants: None Counsel for the Respondents: Ms R. Francois Solicitor for the Respondents: Clayton Utz Date of Hearing: 14 May 2007 Date of Judgment: 14 May 2007 AustLII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/2007/818.html
Case: Plaintiff S157 of 2002 v Commonwealth of Australia [2003] HCA 2 ; (2003) 211 CLR 476
Outcome: referred to
The appeal is based on three grounds. The first is that the Federal Magistrate failed to find error of law, jurisdictional error or lack of procedural fairness in the Tribunal's reasons. A second ground refers to the High Court judgment in Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal [2002] HCA 30 ; (2002) 190 ALR 601. The third ground simply refers to the High Court judgment in Plaintiff S157 of 2002 v Commonwealth of Australia [2003] HCA 2 ; (2003) 211 CLR 476.
Case: Kennedy v Queensland (2002) 190 ALR 707
Outcome: cited
I am satisfied that I have power to make the orders. Although I do not have a formal minute of consent, the provisions of s 86G(2) sufficiently cover an application made co-operatively as is done in the present case. If authority is needed for this proposition, it may be found in the decision of Sackville J in Kennedy v Queensland (2002) 190 ALR 707 at 24-26. 8 I will make orders in terms of the short minutes provided by the parties. The Minister has agreed to pay the Applicant's costs of the application and I will therefore make an order in those terms. I certify that the preceding eight (8) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Jacobson. Associate: Dated: 20 January 2009 Counsel for the Applicant: M R Hall Solicitor for the Applicant: Solari Legal Solicitor for the First Respondent: NSW Crown Solicitor Counsel for the Second Respondent: S Phillips Solicitor for the Second Respondent: NTSCORP Limited Date of Hearing: 2 September and 17 December 2008 Date of Judgment: 17 December 2008 AustLII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/2008/1934.html
Case: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Ascot Four [2008] FCA 1295
Outcome: cited
On 21 August 2008 I found the defendant guilty of 11 counts of making a false or misleading representation about the price of goods, contrary to s 75AZC(1)(g) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (the TP Act): Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Ascot Four [2008] FCA 1295. The question of the appropriate penalty to be imposed for those contraventions was then deferred. That matter has now been addressed. 2 Each contravention related to the advertising of the price of jewellery items in the defendant's 2005 Christmas Sale Catalogue (the catalogue). There were some 2.6 million copies of the catalogue. Generally there was a depiction of the jewellery item, a printed description of the item, a printed price in black print which had been struck through (the strike-through price) and a different and highlighted price printed in red and in a larger print (the sale price). I found that by that conduct the defendant represented to consumers or potential purchasers of the 11 jewellery items that, during the sale period from 24 November 2005 to 24 December 2005, the consumer would be saving the difference between the sale price and the strike-through price, or that there was a group of ordinary and reasonable members amongst prospective purchasers of those items who would understand the sale catalogue in that way in respect of the jewellery items. 3 In fact, none of the 11 jewellery items had been sold at the strike-through price. All but the Count 1 item had been offered for sale at least from 1 July 2005, and the Count 1 item had been offered for sale only from 24 November 2005. In each instance, the jewellery item had been ticketed at the strike-through price, at least for the period from 1 July 2005 (apart from the Count 1 item), but the highest price at which each of those items of jewellery had been sold over that period was significantly less than the ticketed price. The explanation given by the defendant is that the defendant operates in a "discount jewellery market" and its staff are encouraged to offer competitive price discounts to customers if that is required to secure a sale. At least in respect of the 11 jewellery items, there had been (over the period covered by the evidence) no sales at the ticketed price, and as noted all sales had been at a substantial reduction from the ticketed price.