Case: Singh v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 9 ALN N13
Outcome: distinguished
But, if such difficulties are to be given any weight, consideration must be given to at least the nature of the information which it has been said has been difficult to obtain; the ability to obtain such information; and to the steps which have been taken to secure the availability of such information. It must also be recognised that some information may be more readily available to a Commonwealth respondent or entity than to an unrepresented applicant. Thus, for example, in Singh v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 9 ALN N13, Wilcox J recognised that the applicants there had limited ability to secure information. His Honour observed (at N14 15): ... There may be occasions when the adequate consideration of a relevant matter necessarily involves the making of some inquiry as to the facts. Such a case may arise where the material before the decision-maker indicates cause for concern about a relevant matter but where a person who would be affected by an adverse decision -- and who might normally be expected to put his case to the decision-maker -- had no reasonable opportunity to put the full facts relating to that concern before the decision-maker. An example is furnished by this very case. Mr and Mrs Singh alleged the recent persecution in India -- and particularly in the Punjab -- of members of the Sikh community. In the light of notorious events this was plainly a matter of concern, but it was a matter about which they necessarily had no direct knowledge. Under those circumstances, the matter could be adequately considered only with the benefit of better information than Mr and Mrs Singh might be expected to provide. That information was likely to be obtainable through official channels. Reasonableness required that such information be available to the Panel. The Department recognized that fact in placing before the Panel the information upon the situation in India which it had recently obtained from the Department of Foreign Affairs. 11 In the present appeal, however, the " documents " in issue are documents personal to the now Appellant and information, it would have been thought, available to him to secure and produce. The only explanation provided for those documents not being before the Tribunal is the following account provided in a letter to the Tribunal in October 2007: The RRT Member who interviewed me before found that I had fabricated my claims. I asked for time to get court documents from India. As I had fled from India in fear of persecution, I couldn't find anyone to get me the court documents, to submit to the Tribunal. Most of the time the police authorities falsely framed charges and held me in remand torturing me. When I was taken to courts my case was dismissed. It is very difficult to get any court documents from India as bribery is thriving and people fear to approach the police or the courts to retrieve documents. As I am here I am unable to convince anyone by phone to obtain these court documents in relation to my old case. The Tribunal obviously drew upon this account in its reasons for decision. 12 So construed, the argument is not really an argument as to any denial of natural justice or procedural fairness. Every opportunity was extended to the now Appellant to secure such documents as supported his case and to present the case he sought to advance. No further opportunity was likely to result in the production of more documents. Indeed, it was unlikely that the now Appellant could himself have secured any greater access to documents, let alone an agent or friend on his behalf. In a letter written to the Tribunal in November 2007 he acknowledged that he did not even know the " court " to which he was referring: " I do not understand the difference between a District Court or any other type of court. As far as I understand I know for certain that I was taken to a court in Madras ".