Case: Peacock v Zyfert (1983) 48 CLR 549
Outcome: cited
I am also satisfied that the erroneous classification of the products amounts to an error of law. There has been some debate about whether a mistake as to the ordinary meaning of a word used in a statutory provision can of itself amount to an error of law. In Peacock v Zyfert (1983) 48 ALR 549 at 564-565, Lockhart J said: "I now turn to a submission made on behalf of the appellants that the question which was before the Customs for determination in this case was one of fact and that the primary judge erred in treating it as a question of law. Reliance was placed upon the principle that, where a word is an ordinary English word, its meaning is not a question of law and, accordingly, whether the facts of a given case fall within that meaning is a question of fact. Reference was made to Hope v Bathurst City Council (1980) 29 ALR 577 at 580-2; [1980] HCA 16 ; 144 CLR 1 at 6-8 (per Mason J); Blackwood Hodge (Aust) Pty Ltd v Collector of Customs (NSW) (No 2) (1980) 3 ALD 38 at 49-51 (per Fisher J) and at 55-6 (per Sheppard J); and Brutus v Cozens [1972] UKHL 6 ; [1973] AC 854, esp at 861 (per Lord Reid) where his Lordship said: 'The meaning of an ordinary word of the English language is not a question of law. The proper construction of a statute is a question of law. If the context shows that a word is used in an unusual sense the court will determine in other words what that unusual sense is. ... It is for the tribunal which decides the case to consider, not as law but as fact, whether in the whole circumstances the words of the statute do or do not as a matter of ordinary usage of the English language cover or apply to the facts which have been proved. If it is alleged that the tribunal has reached a wrong decision then there can be a question of law, but only of a limited character. The question would normally be whether their decision was unreasonable in the sense that no tribunal acquainted with the ordinary use of language could reasonably reach that decision.' In my opinion this principle has no application in this case. If taken to its logical conclusion the appellants' argument really asserts that it is for the Customs to say in each case whether any, and if so which, provision of the Tariff applies to particular goods. But it is not a question of the Customs simply determining whether particular goods fall within the meaning of ordinary English words. What the Customs would be deciding, if the appellants are correct, is whether the description of particular goods falls within particular chapters, items, sub-items, paragraphs and sub-paragraphs of the Tariff. It must be a question of law whether a given description of goods falls within a particular part of the Tariff. Here the question is what particular part of the relevant Schedule, if any, applies. This necessarily involves a question of construction of the Tariff and is a question of law: see Whitton v Falkiner [1915] HCA 38 ; (1915) 20 CLR 118, per Isaacs J (at 127)." See also Fox J at 555-556. 27 Subsequently, the issue was discussed at some length by Burchett J in Baxter Healthcare Pty Limited v Comptroller-General of Customs (1997) 72 FCR 467 (" Baxter Healthcare ") in a most helpful judgment. His Honour said at 471-472: "A preliminary point should be mentioned, since it is important, although little attention was paid to it in argument. Where there is a question whether something falls within a verbal description in a statute (as in a case raising the application of a tariff item), the answer may depend simply on findings of fact as to the meaning of the words constituting the description and as to the nature of the thing itself. With regard to the words, '[t]he question what is the meaning of an ordinary English word or phrase as used in [a] Statute is one of fact not of law': Australian Gas Light Co v Valuer-General (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 126 at 137 per Jordan CJ. Nevertheless, once the nature of the thing has been found as a fact, whether it falls within the verbal description will, in many cases, be a question of law. For, in the first place, it may not be a matter of applying merely the ordinary English meaning of words or phrases, but of applying a meaning derived from the statute by a process of construction, which is a process of law: Hope v Bathurst City Council [1980] HCA 16 ; (1980) 144 CLR 1 at 10 per Mason J, with whose reasons Gibbs, Stephen and Aickin JJ stated their agreement. The principle that construction is a process of law has never been doubted, although the completeness of the proposition derived from it that '[t]he effect or construction of a term once its meaning or interpretation is established is a matter of law': Agfa-Gevaert Ltd v Collector of Customs (1994) 124 ALR 645 at 648 per Gummow J; Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd (at 287), and the relationship between that proposition and the proposition that the meaning of an ordinary word or phrase is a matter of fact, were left in some doubt when Agfa-Gevaert v Collector of Customs was reversed on appeal by the High Court: see Collector of Customs v Agfa-Gevaert Ltd [1996] HCA 36 ; (1996) 186 CLR 389 at 395-397. Gummow J, in Agfa-Gevaert Ltd v Collector of Customs , also held (ibid) that it is a question of law 'whether the facts as found fall within the terms of the law as properly construed; to this there is the qualification that, where the statute uses words according to their ordinary meaning and it is reasonably open to hold that the facts as found fall within those words, the decision as to whether they do so fall generally is a matter of fact'. His Honour added that the limitation 'generally' was required, even in this last case, 'because the law may use a word in an ordinary sense, but there may be a number of ordinary senses and it then is necessary to select that which is appropriate, and because whilst the word may have but one ordinary meaning that is imprecise, the word will take its colour from the context and that will require construction of the law, a lawyer's task. The result in such cases will be more than the matching of a set of facts with plain words'. The proposition that 'whether facts fully found fall within the provisions of a statutory enactment properly construed is a question of law' was stated to be sustained by '[m]any authorities' in the judgment of Mason J in Hope v Bathurst City Council (at 7). The same proposition was subsequently applied by Full Courts of this Court to cases where what was in issue was whether facts as found fell within the provision of a tariff item: Peacock v Zyfert (1983) 48 ALR 549; Rheem Australia Ltd v Collector of Customs (NSW) (1988) 78 ALR 285 at 293, 306."