Case: Johnson v Williams (2000) 58 ALD 1
Outcome: followed
For the above reasons, I would dismiss the application with costs. Further, if I am wrong in any of those reasons, I would, in the exercise of my discretion, refuse to grant the relief sought. In Johnson v Williams (2000) 58 ALD 1 at [24] and [25], the Full Court of this Court said: "One matter that is properly to be taken into account in proceedings to quash or have declared invalid an administrative decision is whether there has been delay in bringing the proceeding. Courts quite properly take the view that there is a need for a speedy determination of the validity of an administrative decision. The interests of good administration and third parties are at stake: O'Reilly v Mackman [1983] UKHL 1 ; [1983] 2 AC 237 at 284; Caswell v Dairy Produce Quota Tribunal for England &amp; Wales [1990] UKHL 5 ; [1990] 2 AC 738. Unreasonable or unaccounted for delay cannot be tolerated. The timely action that is required is the commencement of proceedings for or in the nature of judicial review." (The emphasis is mine.) In that case, the relief sought from and refused by the primary judge was an order to quash a decision of the Attorney-General to refuse to withdraw a request for extradition. 57 In the present case, the warrant was issued on 13 February 2004 and executed the following day. The notice was issued and served on 19 February 2004. The application was filed on 21 December 2005: over 22 months after the events that gave rise to it occurred. The applicant has failed to explain his inordinate delay in commencing proceedings. His attempt to do so by the affidavit of Philip Cadman (of his solicitors) fails. Mr Cadman deposed that: "The ... warrant ... and the ... notice ... form part of a clandestine investigation conducted in circumstances of confidentiality and secrecy. Prior to the [Commission] releasing details of actions taken in the course of their investigations ... [by way of certain press releases issued in June 2005 and exhibited to Mr Andrew's affidavit], it was not possible for the applicant or any other members of the public to be aware that materials outside the scope of the warrant and the notice ... were being acted on by the [Commission]." Apart from being hearsay, this is beside the point. The applicant complains that the Commission's exercise of coercive power in the form of a substantial interference with his personal property was unlawful because it was done pursuant to an unlawful warrant and notice. What happened afterwards is irrelevant to the basis upon which that complaint is made. At most, it merely to put it colloquially raised the stakes for the applicant in his attempt to impugn the warrant and the notice. 58 In any case, Mr Cadman's evidence is contradicted by other evidence adduced by the applicant. Michael Carr (of other solicitors for the applicant) deposed that on 19 February 2004 a member of the Commission advised the applicant in the presence of himself and Mr Galbally QC who appeared for the applicant before me that "the investigation being conducted by the [Commission] would be broadened to include other persons who the applicant had dealings with, as identified in correspondence contained on the applicant's computer [and] stated words to the ... effect [that] '[t]here will be another search warrant'." It is neither here nor there that no such warrant was obtained.