mdroth/huggingface-course_section-5_zst huggingface dataset:
Case: Felton v Mulligan &amp; Anor [1971] HCA 39 ; (1971) 124 CLR 367
Outcome: cited
As to the jurisdictional question, s 39B(1A)(a) of the Judiciary Act confers original jurisdiction on the Federal Court of Australia in any matter arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation. Section 39B(1A)(c) confers jurisdiction upon the Court, relevantly for present purposes, in any matter arising under any laws made by the Parliament. The Bank claims that its 'rights and entitlements' as a party to a services contract are not affected by s 106 of the IR Act. That claim seems to me to be the assertion of a right, or reliance upon an answer to a claim for an order under s 106 of the State Act, conferred by or under the Commonwealth Act. The claim thus arises under the Commonwealth Statute ( Ex parte McLean [1930] HCA 12 ; (1930) 43 CLR 472 ; The King v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; Ex parte Barrett [1945] HCA 50 ; (1945) 70 CLR 141 at 154 per Latham CJ; The Queen v Australian Stevedoring Industry Board; Ex parte Melbourne Stevedoring Co. Pty Ltd [1953] HCA 22 ; (1953) 88 CLR 100 ; and Felton v Mulligan &amp; Anor [1971] HCA 39 ; (1971) 124 CLR 367. The controversy also involves a matter arising under the Constitution .
Case: Batterham v QSR Limited [2006] HCA 23 ; (2006) 80 ALJR 995
Outcome: cited
Questions of the tension between the conferral of limited jurisdiction upon the Industrial Court and constraints upon supervisory challenges to the exercise of that limited jurisdiction on grounds of jurisdictional error (before the Supreme Court of New South Wales, the Court of Appeal and ultimately appellate challenges before the High Court) and the reconciliation of that tension, have been considered in Fish v Solution 6 Holdings Ltd (2006) 80 ALJR 959 (' Fish '); Batterham v QSR Limited [2006] HCA 23 ; (2006) 80 ALJR 995 (' Batterham ') and Old UGC Inc v Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales in Court Session [2006] HCA 24 ; (2006) 80 ALJR 1018 ( 'Old UGC Inc '). Those cases do not involve a question of construction of an Act of the Commonwealth Parliament or whether the source of a denial of jurisdiction to the State Commission or Court involves invalidity in the provisions of the State Act conferring jurisdiction, by reason of s 109 of the Constitution . In other words, they do not engage the question of a State Act expressly seeking to limit federal jurisdiction (other than questions going to a possible or purported limitation upon the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by the High Court). 53 In Fish and Batterham the majority concluded that s 179 was not enlivened according to its terms as no decision or purported decision had been made by the Commission in Court Session. In Old UGC Inc , the s 179 point was not argued before the High Court. These cases are not authority for the proposition that notwithstanding s 179 (enlivened according to its terms), a supervisory court has jurisdiction to grant orders of prohibition directed to the Industrial Court to prevent the threatened making of a decision beyond jurisdiction or the conduct of proceedings that might lead to an order beyond jurisdiction as the point was not alive. Moreover, these cases do not in terms deal with constraints upon the exercise of federal jurisdiction.
Case: Old UGC Inc v Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales in Court Session [2006] HCA 24 ; (2006) 80 ALJR 1018
Outcome: cited
Questions of the tension between the conferral of limited jurisdiction upon the Industrial Court and constraints upon supervisory challenges to the exercise of that limited jurisdiction on grounds of jurisdictional error (before the Supreme Court of New South Wales, the Court of Appeal and ultimately appellate challenges before the High Court) and the reconciliation of that tension, have been considered in Fish v Solution 6 Holdings Ltd (2006) 80 ALJR 959 (' Fish '); Batterham v QSR Limited [2006] HCA 23 ; (2006) 80 ALJR 995 (' Batterham ') and Old UGC Inc v Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales in Court Session [2006] HCA 24 ; (2006) 80 ALJR 1018 ( 'Old UGC Inc '). Those cases do not involve a question of construction of an Act of the Commonwealth Parliament or whether the source of a denial of jurisdiction to the State Commission or Court involves invalidity in the provisions of the State Act conferring jurisdiction, by reason of s 109 of the Constitution . In other words, they do not engage the question of a State Act expressly seeking to limit federal jurisdiction (other than questions going to a possible or purported limitation upon the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by the High Court). 53 In Fish and Batterham the majority concluded that s 179 was not enlivened according to its terms as no decision or purported decision had been made by the Commission in Court Session. In Old UGC Inc , the s 179 point was not argued before the High Court. These cases are not authority for the proposition that notwithstanding s 179 (enlivened according to its terms), a supervisory court has jurisdiction to grant orders of prohibition directed to the Industrial Court to prevent the threatened making of a decision beyond jurisdiction or the conduct of proceedings that might lead to an order beyond jurisdiction as the point was not alive. Moreover, these cases do not in terms deal with constraints upon the exercise of federal jurisdiction. 54 The applicants in this proceeding seek to give expression to rights arising under Commonwealth law. A limitation upon those rights is said to arise by reason of s 179, a State law. Although an argument arises that a State law might, as a matter of construction, be intended by a State parliament to operate in such a way as to foreclose the exercise of jurisdiction by 'every court in the land' including a court exercising 'federal and constitutional jurisdiction' ( Old UGC Inc per Kirby J, [69]), it seems to me, as an aspect of considering an application for transfer, that the proper approach to the application of s 179 of the State Act is that it does not operate to oust or limit the exercise of federal jurisdiction by this Court. I find it difficult to analytically identify how a provision such as s 179 of the IR Act could deprive the Federal Court of invested federal jurisdiction.
Case: Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 1 ; (1986) 160 CLR 16
Outcome: cited
The respondents say that what is necessary is an analysis of the 'totality of the relationship' between the parties to determine whether the contract is one to which an independent contractor is a party. That proposition is based upon Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 1 ; (1986) 160 CLR 16 and the judgment of their Honours Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ in Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 44 ; (2001) 181 ALR 263 and particularly the observations at [24]. However, Hollis involved a question of whether a bicycle courier being one of about 25 to 30 individuals within the bicycle courier cohort providing courier services for and on behalf of Vabu, might properly be characterised as an employee or an independent contractor of Vabu for the purposes of determining whether Vabu was vicariously liable for the negligence of one of its couriers. In determining that question, the Court recognised that each bicycle courier was required to sign a three page document comprising on page 1 a pro forma layout for recording the personal details of the courier; a second page setting out an inventory sheet of radio equipment and uniforms and a third page which set out 11 points comprising terms. The content of the arrangements between Vabu and each of its bicycle couriers comprised not only the pro forma three page document but other important matters not forming part of the document such as the rate of remuneration for deliveries and other elements of work practices for bicycle couriers, adopted by Vabu. The arrangements were found to comprise both the written document and other terms not reduced to writing. The circumstances of the present case could not be further removed from the circumstances of Hollis . This case does not involve episodic arrangements for the provision of routine unskilled services. In this case, there is a significant detailed major commercial document which the respondents plead in their Industrial Court proceedings is one that provides for the establishment and governance of the OMB Agency. It is an agreement establishing and governing a significant commercial undertaking as between the parties to it and one which involves specific collateral documents such as the guarantees and securities given in support of it, a Representations Deed, a Business Term Loan Agreement and guarantees and securities given in support of that agreement.
Case: Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 44 ; (2001) 181 ALR 263
Outcome: cited
The respondents say that what is necessary is an analysis of the 'totality of the relationship' between the parties to determine whether the contract is one to which an independent contractor is a party. That proposition is based upon Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 1 ; (1986) 160 CLR 16 and the judgment of their Honours Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ in Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 44 ; (2001) 181 ALR 263 and particularly the observations at [24]. However, Hollis involved a question of whether a bicycle courier being one of about 25 to 30 individuals within the bicycle courier cohort providing courier services for and on behalf of Vabu, might properly be characterised as an employee or an independent contractor of Vabu for the purposes of determining whether Vabu was vicariously liable for the negligence of one of its couriers. In determining that question, the Court recognised that each bicycle courier was required to sign a three page document comprising on page 1 a pro forma layout for recording the personal details of the courier; a second page setting out an inventory sheet of radio equipment and uniforms and a third page which set out 11 points comprising terms. The content of the arrangements between Vabu and each of its bicycle couriers comprised not only the pro forma three page document but other important matters not forming part of the document such as the rate of remuneration for deliveries and other elements of work practices for bicycle couriers, adopted by Vabu. The arrangements were found to comprise both the written document and other terms not reduced to writing. The circumstances of the present case could not be further removed from the circumstances of Hollis . This case does not involve episodic arrangements for the provision of routine unskilled services. In this case, there is a significant detailed major commercial document which the respondents plead in their Industrial Court proceedings is one that provides for the establishment and governance of the OMB Agency. It is an agreement establishing and governing a significant commercial undertaking as between the parties to it and one which involves specific collateral documents such as the guarantees and securities given in support of it, a Representations Deed, a Business Term Loan Agreement and guarantees and securities given in support of that agreement.
Case: Black &amp; Decker (Australasia) Pty Ltd v GMCA Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1623
Outcome: followed
plaintiff's application relies substantially on the principles stated by the High Court in Queensland v J L Holdings Pty Ltd [1997] HCA 1 ; (1997) 189 CLR 146 . However, in Black &amp; Decker (Australasia) Pty Ltd v GMCA Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1623 , Finkelstein J observed at [2] that: [P]arties do incur losses resulting from delay that can never be compensated by a costs order.
Case: Ingot &amp; Ors v Macquarie &amp; Ors [2004] NSWSC 1219
Outcome: referred to
McDougall J said in Ingot &amp; Ors v Macquarie &amp; Ors [2004] NSWSC 1219 at [21] , the principles stated by Heydon J in Micallef v ICI Operations Pty Ltd &amp; Anor [2001] NSWCA 274 at [63] and [64] need to be taken into account. What Heydon J there said is that justice is the paramount consideration in determining such an application, and this may not necessarily result in complete justice to the party who is in default. Heydon J also pointed out that the ultimate obligation of the court is to strive to attain justice between the parties.
Case: Micallef v ICI Operations Pty Ltd &amp; Anor [2001] NSWCA 274
Outcome: referred to
McDougall J said in Ingot &amp; Ors v Macquarie &amp; Ors [2004] NSWSC 1219 at [21] , the principles stated by Heydon J in Micallef v ICI Operations Pty Ltd &amp; Anor [2001] NSWCA 274 at [63] and [64] need to be taken into account. What Heydon J there said is that justice is the paramount consideration in determining such an application, and this may not necessarily result in complete justice to the party who is in default. Heydon J also pointed out that the ultimate obligation of the court is to strive to attain justice between the parties.
Case: Queensland v J L Holdings Pty Ltd [1997] HCA 1 ; (1997) 189 CLR 146
Outcome: referred to
plaintiff's application relies substantially on the principles stated by the High Court in Queensland v J L Holdings Pty Ltd [1997] HCA 1 ; (1997) 189 CLR 146 . However, in Black &amp; Decker (Australasia) Pty Ltd v GMCA Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1623 , Finkelstein J observed at [2] that: [P]arties do incur losses resulting from delay that can never be compensated by a costs order.
Case: Expectation Pty Ltd v PRD Realty Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 189 ; (2004) 140 FCR 17
Outcome: cited
At the time of the decision of the High Court in HTW Valuers (Central Qld) Pty Ltd v Astonland Pty Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 640 it was well established that, in the case of the purchase of property induced by misleading statements, the correct measure of damages (apart from consequential losses) was obtained by deducting the true value of the property at the date of the purchase from the purchase price. It is not necessary to go beyond the analysis of the authorities by the Full Court in Expectation Pty Ltd v PRD Realty Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 189 ; (2004) 140 FCR 17 at [252] [258]. It is submitted on behalf of the respondents that HTW Valuers 217 CLR 640 fundamentally changed the situation. I do not agree. In that case, the plaintiff, not the defendant, was seeking to rely upon events subsequent to the transaction. The actual decision affirms the Potts v Miller measure of damage but points out that subsequent events can throw light upon the true value of the property at the time of the transaction ( HTW Valuers 217 CLR 640 per Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Heydon JJ at [34] [40]). That principle is well known in valuation law and practice and had been referred to by the High Court in Kizbeau Pty Ltd v WG &amp; B Pty Ltd [1995] HCA 4 ; (1995) 184 CLR 281 , particularly at 291 296 per Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ. The Court went on to consider an alternative approach proposed by the plaintiff, that is, that the measure of damages would be the price paid minus the benefits left in its hands at the time of trial it being a case where there had been a significant decline in value by the time of the trial. The Court indicated that there may be circumstances in which that approach would be appropriate ( HTW Valuers 217 CLR 640 at [63] [67]). The decision in Murphy v Overton Investments Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 3 ; (2004) 216 CLR 388 points in the same direction. This flows from the principle that a plaintiff induced by misleading conduct to enter into a transaction is entitled to be fully compensated. The same principle led to additional consequential losses being awarded in Gould v Vaggelas [1985] HCA 85 ; (1984) 157 CLR 215. That reasoning does not support the view, espoused by the respondents in this case, that the party responsible for the misleading conduct can benefit from an increase in value in the property acquired by the time of trial.
Case: Kizbeau Pty Ltd v WG &amp; B Pty Ltd [1995] HCA 4 ; (1995) 184 CLR 281
Outcome: cited
At the time of the decision of the High Court in HTW Valuers (Central Qld) Pty Ltd v Astonland Pty Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 640 it was well established that, in the case of the purchase of property induced by misleading statements, the correct measure of damages (apart from consequential losses) was obtained by deducting the true value of the property at the date of the purchase from the purchase price. It is not necessary to go beyond the analysis of the authorities by the Full Court in Expectation Pty Ltd v PRD Realty Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 189 ; (2004) 140 FCR 17 at [252] [258]. It is submitted on behalf of the respondents that HTW Valuers 217 CLR 640 fundamentally changed the situation. I do not agree. In that case, the plaintiff, not the defendant, was seeking to rely upon events subsequent to the transaction. The actual decision affirms the Potts v Miller measure of damage but points out that subsequent events can throw light upon the true value of the property at the time of the transaction ( HTW Valuers 217 CLR 640 per Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Heydon JJ at [34] [40]). That principle is well known in valuation law and practice and had been referred to by the High Court in Kizbeau Pty Ltd v WG &amp; B Pty Ltd [1995] HCA 4 ; (1995) 184 CLR 281 , particularly at 291 296 per Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ. The Court went on to consider an alternative approach proposed by the plaintiff, that is, that the measure of damages would be the price paid minus the benefits left in its hands at the time of trial it being a case where there had been a significant decline in value by the time of the trial. The Court indicated that there may be circumstances in which that approach would be appropriate ( HTW Valuers 217 CLR 640 at [63] [67]). The decision in Murphy v Overton Investments Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 3 ; (2004) 216 CLR 388 points in the same direction. This flows from the principle that a plaintiff induced by misleading conduct to enter into a transaction is entitled to be fully compensated. The same principle led to additional consequential losses being awarded in Gould v Vaggelas [1985] HCA 85 ; (1984) 157 CLR 215. That reasoning does not support the view, espoused by the respondents in this case, that the party responsible for the misleading conduct can benefit from an increase in value in the property acquired by the time of trial.
Case: Murphy v Overton Investments Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 3 ; (2004) 216 CLR 388
Outcome: cited
At the time of the decision of the High Court in HTW Valuers (Central Qld) Pty Ltd v Astonland Pty Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 640 it was well established that, in the case of the purchase of property induced by misleading statements, the correct measure of damages (apart from consequential losses) was obtained by deducting the true value of the property at the date of the purchase from the purchase price. It is not necessary to go beyond the analysis of the authorities by the Full Court in Expectation Pty Ltd v PRD Realty Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 189 ; (2004) 140 FCR 17 at [252] [258]. It is submitted on behalf of the respondents that HTW Valuers 217 CLR 640 fundamentally changed the situation. I do not agree. In that case, the plaintiff, not the defendant, was seeking to rely upon events subsequent to the transaction. The actual decision affirms the Potts v Miller measure of damage but points out that subsequent events can throw light upon the true value of the property at the time of the transaction ( HTW Valuers 217 CLR 640 per Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Heydon JJ at [34] [40]). That principle is well known in valuation law and practice and had been referred to by the High Court in Kizbeau Pty Ltd v WG &amp; B Pty Ltd [1995] HCA 4 ; (1995) 184 CLR 281 , particularly at 291 296 per Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ. The Court went on to consider an alternative approach proposed by the plaintiff, that is, that the measure of damages would be the price paid minus the benefits left in its hands at the time of trial it being a case where there had been a significant decline in value by the time of the trial. The Court indicated that there may be circumstances in which that approach would be appropriate ( HTW Valuers 217 CLR 640 at [63] [67]). The decision in Murphy v Overton Investments Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 3 ; (2004) 216 CLR 388 points in the same direction. This flows from the principle that a plaintiff induced by misleading conduct to enter into a transaction is entitled to be fully compensated. The same principle led to additional consequential losses being awarded in Gould v Vaggelas [1985] HCA 85 ; (1984) 157 CLR 215. That reasoning does not support the view, espoused by the respondents in this case, that the party responsible for the misleading conduct can benefit from an increase in value in the property acquired by the time of trial.
Case: VWFP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 231
Outcome: followed
As Young J said in VWFP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 231 ( VWFP ) at [62]: In applying s 424A, it is necessary to focus on matters that, viewed prospectively, would be the reason or a part of the reason for the Tribunal's decision, or viewed retrospectively in the light of the Tribunal's actual decision, can be seen to be the reason, or a part of the reason, for the Tribunal's decision. 39 Justice Young also observed in VWFP at [62] that "...s 424A is concerned with information that is adverse to the interests of the visa applicant". 40 The reference letter was not adverse to the appellant's interests. It did not contradict material contained in the appellant's protection visa application. The reference letter was evaluated by the Tribunal for comparison with what the appellant said in his 1999 statement to the delegate. The Tribunal considered the reference letter did not support the appellant's assertion about the connection between the Network and BNP. The Tribunal did not state that the reference letter contradicted the claims made in his 1999 statement to the delegate but, rather, said that it did not support the claims. At this point in its decision-making, the Tribunal was doing no more than evaluating the evidence. 41 Under the heading "Findings and Reasons" in the decision record, the Tribunal did not rely on the reference letter in rejecting the appellant's claim that the BNP stood behind the Network. I agree with the submission of counsel for the Minister that the Tribunal considered it critical to this aspect of the appellant's claim that he was unable to provide evidence to support his claim. In that sense, the Tribunal relied on a lack of information in dismissing this claim of the appellant, rather than on any particular information. In my view, the Court below correctly determined that the Tribunal did not breach s 424A of the Act in coming to its decision. I certify that the preceding forty-one (41) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Marshall. Associate: Dated: 17 August 2007 Counsel for the appellant: Mr D Patch with Mr I Latham Solicitors for the appellant: Allens Arthur Robinson Counsel for the second respondent: Mr S Lloyd Solicitor for the second respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Date of Hearing: 24 May 2007 Date of Judgment: 17 August 2007 AustLII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/2007/1247.html