mdroth/huggingface-course_section-5_zst huggingface dataset:
Case: R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; ex parte Johnson [1998] 4 All ER 635
Outcome: cited
French J made the following observations on the application of non-adjudication to extradition cases in Cabal v United Mexican States (No. 3) (2000) 186 ALR 188 at [104]: "[I]t is important to bear in mind that the general functioning of the judicial system of an extradition country is not a matter for this court. Such judgments, no doubt, have a part to play in the decision of the executive government in entering into the treaty. They may also, at least in theory, have a bearing upon the legislative decision whether or not to disallow particular treaty regulations and in the ultimate decision of an Attorney-General whether or not to surrender a requested person. The acceptability to Australia of the system of criminal justice in an extradition country is an issue "...to be determined by the Government of the Commonwealth when deciding to extend the application of the Extradition Act to the State in question, whether by treaty or regulation, and, in a given case, perhaps before ordering the surrender of the fugitive ... in exercise of the discretion ... given the Attorney-General": Wiest v Director of Public Prosecutions (1988) 23 FCR 472 at 514; 86 ALR 464 per Gummow J. That is not to say that governments and judicial systems of requesting countries may not have changed significantly since a treaty of extradition was entered into. But the continuance of the treaty and ultimate surrender decisions are still matters for the executive and not for the courts. " (Emphasis added.) See also Todhunter v Attorney-General (Cth) (1994) 52 FCR 228 at 250 251; Sun Lau v Australia [1999] BCJ No 2971 at [73] [77] citing United States of America v McVey (1992) 77 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.) at 40 and Schmidt v the Queen (1987) 33 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.); McCrea v Minister for Customs and Justice (2004) 212 ALR 297 at [33] [36] citing R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; ex parte Johnson [1998] 4 All ER 635 at 644, Royal Government of Greece v Governor of Brixton Prison [1971] AC 250 at 280 and Republic of Argentina v Mellino [1987] 1 SCR 536 at 554; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; ex parte Hill [1999] QB 886 at 905.
Case: Re Reference under Ombudsman Act 1976 (1979) 2 ALD 86 
Outcome: cited
After ss 19 and 19A of the AI Act were amended, the decision of Spender J went on appeal and was overturned: Attorney-General v Foster [1999] FCA 81 ; (1999) 84 FCR 582. The Full Court dealt with s 19 of the AI Act before it was amended and held that: (1) s 19 of the AI Act was not merely one in aid of interpretation of legislation but had a substantive effect: at [36]; (2) efficient government administration requires that in many circumstances a Minister act through another, and not personally discharge all powers and functions bestowed on the office by statutes: at [37] citing Staughton LJ in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Doody [1993] QB 157 at 194 (adopted on appeal in the House of Lords: ([1994] 1 AC 531 at 566) and O'Reilly v Commissioners of the State Bank of Victoria [1982] HCA 74 ; (1983) 153 CLR 1 at 11; (3) the appointment of two Ministers to administer the Department of State of the Attorney-General, and the Administrative Arrangements Order that the Extradition Act be administered by " a Minister of State administering " that Department, is itself a sufficient indication that the Executive Council contemplated that the exercise of powers vested in the Attorney-General by the Act would devolve to the Minister for Justice: at [40]; (4) ss 22(2) and 23 of the Extradition Act do not indicate a contrary intention which excludes the operation of s 19 of the AI Act in respect of the exercise of power vested in the Attorney-General: at [42]; (5) in determining whether a statute requires the power to be exercised personally by the person designated depends on the nature of the power and all the other circumstances of the case: at [42] citing Re Reference under Ombudsman Act 1976 (1979) 2 ALD 86 at 93 and O'Reilly at 11.
Case: Republic of Argentina v Mellino [1987] 1 SCR 536
Outcome: cited
French J made the following observations on the application of non-adjudication to extradition cases in Cabal v United Mexican States (No. 3) (2000) 186 ALR 188 at [104]: "[I]t is important to bear in mind that the general functioning of the judicial system of an extradition country is not a matter for this court. Such judgments, no doubt, have a part to play in the decision of the executive government in entering into the treaty. They may also, at least in theory, have a bearing upon the legislative decision whether or not to disallow particular treaty regulations and in the ultimate decision of an Attorney-General whether or not to surrender a requested person. The acceptability to Australia of the system of criminal justice in an extradition country is an issue "...to be determined by the Government of the Commonwealth when deciding to extend the application of the Extradition Act to the State in question, whether by treaty or regulation, and, in a given case, perhaps before ordering the surrender of the fugitive ... in exercise of the discretion ... given the Attorney-General": Wiest v Director of Public Prosecutions (1988) 23 FCR 472 at 514; 86 ALR 464 per Gummow J. That is not to say that governments and judicial systems of requesting countries may not have changed significantly since a treaty of extradition was entered into. But the continuance of the treaty and ultimate surrender decisions are still matters for the executive and not for the courts. " (Emphasis added.) See also Todhunter v Attorney-General (Cth) (1994) 52 FCR 228 at 250 251; Sun Lau v Australia [1999] BCJ No 2971 at [73] [77] citing United States of America v McVey (1992) 77 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.) at 40 and Schmidt v the Queen (1987) 33 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.); McCrea v Minister for Customs and Justice (2004) 212 ALR 297 at [33] [36] citing R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; ex parte Johnson [1998] 4 All ER 635 at 644, Royal Government of Greece v Governor of Brixton Prison [1971] AC 250 at 280 and Republic of Argentina v Mellino [1987] 1 SCR 536 at 554; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; ex parte Hill [1999] QB 886 at 905.
Case: Royal Government of Greece v Governor of Brixton Prison [1971] AC 250
Outcome: cited
French J made the following observations on the application of non-adjudication to extradition cases in Cabal v United Mexican States (No. 3) (2000) 186 ALR 188 at [104]: "[I]t is important to bear in mind that the general functioning of the judicial system of an extradition country is not a matter for this court. Such judgments, no doubt, have a part to play in the decision of the executive government in entering into the treaty. They may also, at least in theory, have a bearing upon the legislative decision whether or not to disallow particular treaty regulations and in the ultimate decision of an Attorney-General whether or not to surrender a requested person. The acceptability to Australia of the system of criminal justice in an extradition country is an issue "...to be determined by the Government of the Commonwealth when deciding to extend the application of the Extradition Act to the State in question, whether by treaty or regulation, and, in a given case, perhaps before ordering the surrender of the fugitive ... in exercise of the discretion ... given the Attorney-General": Wiest v Director of Public Prosecutions (1988) 23 FCR 472 at 514; 86 ALR 464 per Gummow J. That is not to say that governments and judicial systems of requesting countries may not have changed significantly since a treaty of extradition was entered into. But the continuance of the treaty and ultimate surrender decisions are still matters for the executive and not for the courts. " (Emphasis added.) See also Todhunter v Attorney-General (Cth) (1994) 52 FCR 228 at 250 251; Sun Lau v Australia [1999] BCJ No 2971 at [73] [77] citing United States of America v McVey (1992) 77 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.) at 40 and Schmidt v the Queen (1987) 33 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.); McCrea v Minister for Customs and Justice (2004) 212 ALR 297 at [33] [36] citing R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; ex parte Johnson [1998] 4 All ER 635 at 644, Royal Government of Greece v Governor of Brixton Prison [1971] AC 250 at 280 and Republic of Argentina v Mellino [1987] 1 SCR 536 at 554; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; ex parte Hill [1999] QB 886 at 905.
Case: Schmidt v the Queen (1987) 33 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.)
Outcome: cited
French J made the following observations on the application of non-adjudication to extradition cases in Cabal v United Mexican States (No. 3) (2000) 186 ALR 188 at [104]: "[I]t is important to bear in mind that the general functioning of the judicial system of an extradition country is not a matter for this court. Such judgments, no doubt, have a part to play in the decision of the executive government in entering into the treaty. They may also, at least in theory, have a bearing upon the legislative decision whether or not to disallow particular treaty regulations and in the ultimate decision of an Attorney-General whether or not to surrender a requested person. The acceptability to Australia of the system of criminal justice in an extradition country is an issue "...to be determined by the Government of the Commonwealth when deciding to extend the application of the Extradition Act to the State in question, whether by treaty or regulation, and, in a given case, perhaps before ordering the surrender of the fugitive ... in exercise of the discretion ... given the Attorney-General": Wiest v Director of Public Prosecutions (1988) 23 FCR 472 at 514; 86 ALR 464 per Gummow J. That is not to say that governments and judicial systems of requesting countries may not have changed significantly since a treaty of extradition was entered into. But the continuance of the treaty and ultimate surrender decisions are still matters for the executive and not for the courts. " (Emphasis added.) See also Todhunter v Attorney-General (Cth) (1994) 52 FCR 228 at 250 251; Sun Lau v Australia [1999] BCJ No 2971 at [73] [77] citing United States of America v McVey (1992) 77 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.) at 40 and Schmidt v the Queen (1987) 33 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.); McCrea v Minister for Customs and Justice (2004) 212 ALR 297 at [33] [36] citing R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; ex parte Johnson [1998] 4 All ER 635 at 644, Royal Government of Greece v Governor of Brixton Prison [1971] AC 250 at 280 and Republic of Argentina v Mellino [1987] 1 SCR 536 at 554; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; ex parte Hill [1999] QB 886 at 905.
Case: Sun Lau v Australia [1999] BCJ No 2971
Outcome: cited
French J made the following observations on the application of non-adjudication to extradition cases in Cabal v United Mexican States (No. 3) (2000) 186 ALR 188 at [104]: "[I]t is important to bear in mind that the general functioning of the judicial system of an extradition country is not a matter for this court. Such judgments, no doubt, have a part to play in the decision of the executive government in entering into the treaty. They may also, at least in theory, have a bearing upon the legislative decision whether or not to disallow particular treaty regulations and in the ultimate decision of an Attorney-General whether or not to surrender a requested person. The acceptability to Australia of the system of criminal justice in an extradition country is an issue "...to be determined by the Government of the Commonwealth when deciding to extend the application of the Extradition Act to the State in question, whether by treaty or regulation, and, in a given case, perhaps before ordering the surrender of the fugitive ... in exercise of the discretion ... given the Attorney-General": Wiest v Director of Public Prosecutions (1988) 23 FCR 472 at 514; 86 ALR 464 per Gummow J. That is not to say that governments and judicial systems of requesting countries may not have changed significantly since a treaty of extradition was entered into. But the continuance of the treaty and ultimate surrender decisions are still matters for the executive and not for the courts. " (Emphasis added.) See also Todhunter v Attorney-General (Cth) (1994) 52 FCR 228 at 250 251; Sun Lau v Australia [1999] BCJ No 2971 at [73] [77] citing United States of America v McVey (1992) 77 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.) at 40 and Schmidt v the Queen (1987) 33 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.); McCrea v Minister for Customs and Justice (2004) 212 ALR 297 at [33] [36] citing R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; ex parte Johnson [1998] 4 All ER 635 at 644, Royal Government of Greece v Governor of Brixton Prison [1971] AC 250 at 280 and Republic of Argentina v Mellino [1987] 1 SCR 536 at 554; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; ex parte Hill [1999] QB 886 at 905.
Case: Todhunter v Attorney-General (Cth) (1994) 52 FCR 228 
Outcome: cited
French J made the following observations on the application of non-adjudication to extradition cases in Cabal v United Mexican States (No. 3) (2000) 186 ALR 188 at [104]: "[I]t is important to bear in mind that the general functioning of the judicial system of an extradition country is not a matter for this court. Such judgments, no doubt, have a part to play in the decision of the executive government in entering into the treaty. They may also, at least in theory, have a bearing upon the legislative decision whether or not to disallow particular treaty regulations and in the ultimate decision of an Attorney-General whether or not to surrender a requested person. The acceptability to Australia of the system of criminal justice in an extradition country is an issue "...to be determined by the Government of the Commonwealth when deciding to extend the application of the Extradition Act to the State in question, whether by treaty or regulation, and, in a given case, perhaps before ordering the surrender of the fugitive ... in exercise of the discretion ... given the Attorney-General": Wiest v Director of Public Prosecutions (1988) 23 FCR 472 at 514; 86 ALR 464 per Gummow J. That is not to say that governments and judicial systems of requesting countries may not have changed significantly since a treaty of extradition was entered into. But the continuance of the treaty and ultimate surrender decisions are still matters for the executive and not for the courts. " (Emphasis added.) See also Todhunter v Attorney-General (Cth) (1994) 52 FCR 228 at 250 251; Sun Lau v Australia [1999] BCJ No 2971 at [73] [77] citing United States of America v McVey (1992) 77 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.) at 40 and Schmidt v the Queen (1987) 33 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.); McCrea v Minister for Customs and Justice (2004) 212 ALR 297 at [33] [36] citing R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; ex parte Johnson [1998] 4 All ER 635 at 644, Royal Government of Greece v Governor of Brixton Prison [1971] AC 250 at 280 and Republic of Argentina v Mellino [1987] 1 SCR 536 at 554; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; ex parte Hill [1999] QB 886 at 905.
Case: Truong v R [2004] HCA 10 ; (2004) 223 CLR 122
Outcome: cited
Consistent with that principle, s 40 of the Extradition Act is not expressed as a source of power. It properly assumes that the power to make a request to a foreign state is vested in the executive: see Truong v R [2004] HCA 10 ; (2004) 223 CLR 122 at [80] ; Oates at [29] and [39]; Barton at 484 (Barwick CJ), 490 491 (McTiernan and Menzies JJ), 498 499 (Mason J), 505 508 (Jacobs J); see also Replacement Explanatory Memorandum, Extradition Bill 1987 (Cth) at 41.
Case: United States of America v McVey (1992) 77 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.)
Outcome: cited
French J made the following observations on the application of non-adjudication to extradition cases in Cabal v United Mexican States (No. 3) (2000) 186 ALR 188 at [104]: "[I]t is important to bear in mind that the general functioning of the judicial system of an extradition country is not a matter for this court. Such judgments, no doubt, have a part to play in the decision of the executive government in entering into the treaty. They may also, at least in theory, have a bearing upon the legislative decision whether or not to disallow particular treaty regulations and in the ultimate decision of an Attorney-General whether or not to surrender a requested person. The acceptability to Australia of the system of criminal justice in an extradition country is an issue "...to be determined by the Government of the Commonwealth when deciding to extend the application of the Extradition Act to the State in question, whether by treaty or regulation, and, in a given case, perhaps before ordering the surrender of the fugitive ... in exercise of the discretion ... given the Attorney-General": Wiest v Director of Public Prosecutions (1988) 23 FCR 472 at 514; 86 ALR 464 per Gummow J. That is not to say that governments and judicial systems of requesting countries may not have changed significantly since a treaty of extradition was entered into. But the continuance of the treaty and ultimate surrender decisions are still matters for the executive and not for the courts. " (Emphasis added.) See also Todhunter v Attorney-General (Cth) (1994) 52 FCR 228 at 250 251; Sun Lau v Australia [1999] BCJ No 2971 at [73] [77] citing United States of America v McVey (1992) 77 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.) at 40 and Schmidt v the Queen (1987) 33 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.); McCrea v Minister for Customs and Justice (2004) 212 ALR 297 at [33] [36] citing R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; ex parte Johnson [1998] 4 All ER 635 at 644, Royal Government of Greece v Governor of Brixton Prison [1971] AC 250 at 280 and Republic of Argentina v Mellino [1987] 1 SCR 536 at 554; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; ex parte Hill [1999] QB 886 at 905.
Case: Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd [1990] HCA 55 ; (1990) 171 CLR 538 
Outcome: cited
The courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory. This principle of non-adjudication is consistent with the international rule of comity which refers to the respect or courtesy accorded by a country to the laws and institutions of another. This was made clear in Attorney-General in and for the United Kingdom v Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd [1988] HCA 25 ; (1988) 165 CLR 30 at 40-41: "The rule is associated with a related principle of international law, which has long been recognized, namely that, in general, courts will not adjudicate upon the validity of acts and transactions of a foreign sovereign State within that sovereign's own territory. The statement of Fuller C.J. in Underhill v Hernandez [(1897) 168 U.S. 250, at 252] that "the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory" has been repeated with approval in the House of Lords ( Buttes Gas v Hammer [[1982] A.C. 888, at 933]) and the Supreme Court of the United States: Banco Nacional de Cuba v Sabbatino [(1964) 376 U.S. 398, at 416]. So, in Oetjen v Central Leather Co . [(1918) 246 U.S. 297, at 304] the Supreme Court said: "To permit the validity of the acts of one sovereign State to be re-examined and perhaps condemned by the courts of another would very certainly 'imperil the amicable relations between governments and vex the peace of nations'." As Lord Wilberforce observed in Buttes Gas v Hammer [[1982] A.C., at 931-932], in the context of considering the United States decisions, the principle is one of "judicial restraint or abstention" and is "inherent in the very nature of the judicial process". See also Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd [1990] HCA 55 ; (1990) 171 CLR 538 at 559 (Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ); McCrea v Minister for Customs and Justice (2004) 212 ALR 297 at [27] [30] (North J) and Gamogab v Akiba (2007) 159 FCR 578 at [32] (Kiefel J).
Case: Zoeller v Attorney-General for the Commonwealth &amp; Ors (1987) 16 FCR 153 
Outcome: cited
Secondly, the executive and administrative arrangements expressly provide that the Justice Minister is one of two Ministers to administer the Extradition Act (including s 40), being arrangements necessary in the interests of efficient government administration: Attorney-General v Foster [1999] FCA 81 ; (1999) 84 FCR 582 at [37] and [42] and Zoeller v Attorney-General for the Commonwealth &amp; Ors (1987) 16 FCR 153 at 165.
Case: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Capalaba Pty Ltd [2004] ATPR 41-976
Outcome: cited
respondent referred me to five decisions in this Court which it contended supported the narrow interpretation of the expression in connection with which found favour with Dowsett J in Worchild [2005] FCA 1792. The five cases in question were: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Maritime Union of Australia [2001] FCA 1549 ; (2001) 114 FCR 472 at [63] and [66] (pp 486-487); Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Davis [2003] FCA 1227 at [21] and [22]; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd [2003] FCA 1225 ; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Capalaba Pty Ltd [2004] ATPR 41-976; and Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v McCaskey [2000] FCA 1037 ; (2000) 104 FCR 8. Those five decisions tend to support the proposition that the connection between the conduct complained of and a supply or possible supply of goods or services to a consumer must be direct and obvious. However, the point was not specifically addressed in any of them and was not the subject of detailed consideration in any of them.
Case: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Davis [2003] FCA 1227
Outcome: cited
respondent referred me to five decisions in this Court which it contended supported the narrow interpretation of the expression in connection with which found favour with Dowsett J in Worchild [2005] FCA 1792. The five cases in question were: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Maritime Union of Australia [2001] FCA 1549 ; (2001) 114 FCR 472 at [63] and [66] (pp 486-487); Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Davis [2003] FCA 1227 at [21] and [22]; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd [2003] FCA 1225 ; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Capalaba Pty Ltd [2004] ATPR 41-976; and Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v McCaskey [2000] FCA 1037 ; (2000) 104 FCR 8. Those five decisions tend to support the proposition that the connection between the conduct complained of and a supply or possible supply of goods or services to a consumer must be direct and obvious. However, the point was not specifically addressed in any of them and was not the subject of detailed consideration in any of them.
Case: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd [2003] FCA 1225
Outcome: cited
respondent referred me to five decisions in this Court which it contended supported the narrow interpretation of the expression in connection with which found favour with Dowsett J in Worchild [2005] FCA 1792. The five cases in question were: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Maritime Union of Australia [2001] FCA 1549 ; (2001) 114 FCR 472 at [63] and [66] (pp 486-487); Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Davis [2003] FCA 1227 at [21] and [22]; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd [2003] FCA 1225 ; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Capalaba Pty Ltd [2004] ATPR 41-976; and Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v McCaskey [2000] FCA 1037 ; (2000) 104 FCR 8. Those five decisions tend to support the proposition that the connection between the conduct complained of and a supply or possible supply of goods or services to a consumer must be direct and obvious. However, the point was not specifically addressed in any of them and was not the subject of detailed consideration in any of them.