Case: Northbourne Developments Pty Ltd v Reiby Chambers Pty Ltd (1989) 19 NSWLR 434
Outcome: referred to
Various statutes have used the expression "person aggrieved" and courts have discussed its meaning in numerous cases: compare the much quoted passage in Ex parte Sidebotham; In re Sidebotham (1880) 14 Ch D 458 at 465-466 per James LJ; Northbourne Developments Pty Ltd v Reiby Chambers Pty Ltd (1989) 19 NSWLR 434 (" Northbourne ") at 437-438 per McLelland J; and Bridgeport Advisers &amp; Asset Managers Pty Ltd (2005) 221 ALR 146 (" Bridgeport ") at 162 per Barrett J. As Gibbs CJ said in Koowarta v Bjelke-Peterson [1982] HCA 27 ; (1982) 153 CLR 168 at 184-185, the meaning of the expression must ultimately depend on the context of the particular statute. Having regard to the circumstances outlined above, I find that Mr Spalla has standing under this provision. None of the respondents contended that he did not. 162 I am satisfied that Mr Spalla has standing because of his role in the primary proceeding. Mr Spalla is a moving party in the primary proceeding, which is the subject of the Deed and settlement, and, under the LFA, he (and others) undertook to pay the legal costs in the primary proceeding of Irlmond and Mr Rambaldi. Even though the Spalla Interest claims were not settled (see below), it is reasonable to assume that the settlement of the Irlmond claim would significantly affect Mr Spalla as a party to the primary proceeding and deprive him of the advantage of Irlmond's participation. It also affected his rights and obligations under the LFA. Thus, for example, the Deed did not include any release against costs orders in favour of Mr Spalla and the Spalla Interests. Because of this, Mr Spalla claims that the Deed left him exposed to adverse costs orders in relation to Irlmond's claim in the primary proceeding. Mr Spalla has a "legal grievance": compare Northbourne at 438. Mr Spalla's role in the primary proceeding, both as a principal party and under the LFA, is sufficient to give him the standing as a "person aggrieved" under s 1321. 163 Under r 14.1 of the Rules, Mr Spalla requires an extension of time to bring an appeal pursuant to s 1321 of the Act . Mr Spalla did not purport to bring an appeal under this section until 18 April 2006 well outside the 21 day period for which r 14.1(2)(a) provides. The Court has the power to grant an extension of time under r 14.1(3) of the Rules. When deciding whether to grant such an extension, the Court has regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the extent and circumstances of the delay and any potential prejudice to other parties. In this case an extension is warranted. As Mr Spalla submitted, his notice of motion of 18 May 2005 was filed within 21 days of the challenged act and put Mr Rambaldi on notice of the points he wishes to raise in the appeal. In all the circumstances of the case, and in light of this fact and the fact that the respondents have not opposed an extension of time, I would grant the extension Mr Spalla seeks. 169 In the context of this case, two considerations must be borne steadily in mind. First, s 545(1) of the Act provides that a liquidator is not liable to incur any expense in relation to the winding up of a company unless there is sufficient available property. Secondly (by way of reiteration) the courts are generally "loath to enter into the area where the professional liquidator has made a commercial decision which he considers benefits the stakeholders whom he represents, at least unless something is pointed to which suggests that there are some vitiating factors which entered into the making of the decision": see Star v Silvia (No 1) (1994) 12 ACLC 600 at 604 per Young J; Sanderson v Classic Car Insurances Pty Ltd (1986) 4 ACLC 114 at 116 per Young J; Northbourne at 440; Westpac v Totterdell at 453-454 per Ipp J (with whom Pidgeon and White JJ agreed); and Cook v Northoak Holdings Pty Ltd (1997) 25 ACSR 517.