Case: Minister for Immigration of Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6 ; (1996) 185 CLR 259
Outcome: followed
is important to allow some latitude to an administrative decision-maker in the expression of his or her reasons. They are meant to inform readers what the decision-making process covered: see Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6 ; (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ. The trial judge found that the tribunal's conclusion was based on the evidence before it. I too am unable to detect any jurisdictional error in the tribunal's approach. I reject this ground. The appellant complained that the tribunal ignored relevant evidence as to the nature of the close relationship he said he had with Ms L. This argument is nothing more than a claim for merits review, and his Honour was correct to dismiss this ground on that basis. The appellant argued that the tribunal did not approach the question of whether he would be the subject of persecution involving serious harm to him or his family under s 91R(1)(b). That section provided that persecution had to involve serious harm to the person. The tribunal found that were he returned to Bangladesh, and unable to live in a familial relationship with Ms L and their child, his circumstances would not be substantially different to his present circumstances of separation from them - that he had endured in Australia since 2000. The appellant argued that there was a substantive difference, namely that the reason for the separation would be different: in Bangladesh it would be because of the threat of harm to the appellant or his family, whereas in Australia it was by operation of law (there being no visa at the moment allowing the co-habitation). However, his Honour found that the tribunal had concluded, on the merits, that the nature of the relationship between the appellant and Ms L was such that they did not have a strong commitment to live together and that, for that reason, any future separation would not in the circumstances constitute serious harm. I agree. The appellant argued that the tribunal should not have accepted DFAT Report 803. That report informed the tribunal that the Embassy in Bangladesh could not find any documentation there suggesting acts of violence against an atheist or non-believer and that while the Embassy accepted that he may be subjected to some cultural alienation, that did not amount to serious harm for the purposes of s 91R(1)(b). In addition, the tribunal found that there was no real chance that the appellant would suffer persecution due to his religion or conduct, whether religious or cultural, were he to move away from his local area in which there were, on his account, "Muslim extremists" and relocate to Dhakar or another big city. The tribunal accepted that serious harm might include a permanent separation from a person, spouse and child. The appellant did not suggest that the tribunal made any error in that regard. As his Honour found, this ground of challenge amounted simply to a disagreement with the tribunal's findings of fact. The argument relied on a footnote to DFAT Report 803 that referred to another report prepared by the State Department of the United States of America entitled "International Religious Freedom Report". The footnote referred to the latter report "for an overview of religious practices in Bangladesh". The appellant supplied the tribunal with a portion of the latter report in response to its s 424A letter dealing with the DFAT Report. However, it was a matter for the tribunal to assess what evidence on this topic it would accept. I see no error in what his Honour concluded.