Case: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30 ; (2001) 206 CLR 323
Outcome: cited
the Tribunal did not rely upon any of the earlier enquiries of the third party addressees or responses from them, there can be no jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal in the exercise of its powers so far as those enquiries or responses to them are concerned. It is true that they became part of the historical record of the Tribunal's information gathering activities. However, in the conduct of the review function by the Tribunal as reconstituted, the enquiries of the nominated third parties and their responses to those letters, upon which the appellant relies as a ground of error on the part of the Tribunal, formed no part of the exercise of the statutory power. Thus, the Tribunal did not fall into error in the exercise of its power in the sense contemplated in Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58 ; (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179 and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30 ; (2001) 206 CLR 323. In Yusuf , McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ said this at [82]: It is necessary, however, to understand what is meant by "jurisdictional error" under the general law and the consequences that follow from a decision-maker making such an error. As was said in Craig v South Australia, if an administrative tribunal (like the [Refugee Review Tribunal]): "falls into an error of law which causes it to identify a wrong issue, to ask itself a wrong question, to ignore relevant material, to rely on irrelevant material or, at least in some circumstances, to make an erroneous finding or to reach a mistaken conclusion, and the tribunal's exercise or purported exercise of power is thereby affected, it exceeds its authority or powers. Such an error of law is jurisdictional error which will invalidate any order or decision of the tribunal which reflects it". "Jurisdictional error" can thus be seen to embrace a number of different kinds of error, the list of which, in the passage cited from Craig, is not exhaustive. Those different kinds of error may well overlap. The circumstances of a particular case may permit more than one characterisation of the error identified, for example, as the decision-maker both asking the wrong question and ignoring relevant material. What is important, however, is that identifying a wrong issue, asking a wrong question, ignoring relevant material or relying on irrelevant material in a way that affects the exercise of power is to make an error of law. Further, doing so results in the decision-maker exceeding the authority or powers given by the relevant statute. In other words, if an error of those types is made, the decision-maker did not have authority to make the decision that was made; he or she did not have jurisdiction to make it. Nothing in the Act suggests that the Tribunal is given authority to authoritatively determine questions of law or to make a decision otherwise than in accordance with the law. In order to try and overcome the obvious difficulty of no reliance by the Tribunal in reaching its credibility findings, on the letters to third parties and responses to those letters, the appellant contended before the Federal Magistrates Court that the Tribunal's second decision was fatally tainted by the steps earlier taken by the Tribunal. However, the Tribunal was reconstituted and exercised its powers in a way which fails to reflect any error in the sense contemplated by Craig v South Australia and Minister for Immigration v Yusuf .