mdroth/huggingface-course_section-5_zst huggingface dataset:
Case: Re Jarra Hills Pty Ltd and the Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1997) 37 ATR 1022
Outcome: referred to
Moreover, even if the applicant were able to formulate a question of law raising the issues considered by the Tribunal in this case, it is unlikely that error would be shown in the Tribunal's decision. Section 37 of the SGA Act does provide for the amendment of assessments but it was not suggested, and the circumstances do not indicate, that the power to amend might properly have been exercised in the case of the applicant. As the Tribunal noted, there would appear to be no legislative provision that would accord a decision-maker the power to remit all or part of the SGC, or nominal interest and administrative component: see, in this regard, the discussions in Re Jarra Hills Pty Ltd and the Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1997) 37 ATR 1022; Re Truelove and the Commissioner of Taxation [2000] AATA 276 ; Re Kancroft (acting as trustee for the Roberson Family Trust) and Commissioner of Taxation [2004] AATA 113 ; Iwec Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2007] AATA 1051 ; and Victorian Patient Transport Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2007] AATA 1239. Certainly, the applicant has been unable to refer me to a source of power to do so. It seems to me, therefore, that not only is the draft notice of appeal fundamentally defective, but any possible appeal has little prospect of success.
Case: Re Truelove and the Commissioner of Taxation [200] AATA 276
Outcome: referred to
Moreover, even if the applicant were able to formulate a question of law raising the issues considered by the Tribunal in this case, it is unlikely that error would be shown in the Tribunal's decision. Section 37 of the SGA Act does provide for the amendment of assessments but it was not suggested, and the circumstances do not indicate, that the power to amend might properly have been exercised in the case of the applicant. As the Tribunal noted, there would appear to be no legislative provision that would accord a decision-maker the power to remit all or part of the SGC, or nominal interest and administrative component: see, in this regard, the discussions in Re Jarra Hills Pty Ltd and the Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1997) 37 ATR 1022; Re Truelove and the Commissioner of Taxation [2000] AATA 276 ; Re Kancroft (acting as trustee for the Roberson Family Trust) and Commissioner of Taxation [2004] AATA 113 ; Iwec Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2007] AATA 1051 ; and Victorian Patient Transport Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2007] AATA 1239. Certainly, the applicant has been unable to refer me to a source of power to do so. It seems to me, therefore, that not only is the draft notice of appeal fundamentally defective, but any possible appeal has little prospect of success.
Case: Re Kancroft (acting as trustee for the Robertson Family Trust) and Commissioner of Taxation [2004] AATA 113
Outcome: referred to
Moreover, even if the applicant were able to formulate a question of law raising the issues considered by the Tribunal in this case, it is unlikely that error would be shown in the Tribunal's decision. Section 37 of the SGA Act does provide for the amendment of assessments but it was not suggested, and the circumstances do not indicate, that the power to amend might properly have been exercised in the case of the applicant. As the Tribunal noted, there would appear to be no legislative provision that would accord a decision-maker the power to remit all or part of the SGC, or nominal interest and administrative component: see, in this regard, the discussions in Re Jarra Hills Pty Ltd and the Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1997) 37 ATR 1022; Re Truelove and the Commissioner of Taxation [2000] AATA 276 ; Re Kancroft (acting as trustee for the Roberson Family Trust) and Commissioner of Taxation [2004] AATA 113 ; Iwec Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2007] AATA 1051 ; and Victorian Patient Transport Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2007] AATA 1239. Certainly, the applicant has been unable to refer me to a source of power to do so. It seems to me, therefore, that not only is the draft notice of appeal fundamentally defective, but any possible appeal has little prospect of success.
Case: Iwec Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2007] AATA 1051
Outcome: referred to
Moreover, even if the applicant were able to formulate a question of law raising the issues considered by the Tribunal in this case, it is unlikely that error would be shown in the Tribunal's decision. Section 37 of the SGA Act does provide for the amendment of assessments but it was not suggested, and the circumstances do not indicate, that the power to amend might properly have been exercised in the case of the applicant. As the Tribunal noted, there would appear to be no legislative provision that would accord a decision-maker the power to remit all or part of the SGC, or nominal interest and administrative component: see, in this regard, the discussions in Re Jarra Hills Pty Ltd and the Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1997) 37 ATR 1022; Re Truelove and the Commissioner of Taxation [2000] AATA 276 ; Re Kancroft (acting as trustee for the Roberson Family Trust) and Commissioner of Taxation [2004] AATA 113 ; Iwec Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2007] AATA 1051 ; and Victorian Patient Transport Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2007] AATA 1239. Certainly, the applicant has been unable to refer me to a source of power to do so. It seems to me, therefore, that not only is the draft notice of appeal fundamentally defective, but any possible appeal has little prospect of success.
Case: Victorian Patient Transport Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2007] AATA 1239
Outcome: referred to
Moreover, even if the applicant were able to formulate a question of law raising the issues considered by the Tribunal in this case, it is unlikely that error would be shown in the Tribunal's decision. Section 37 of the SGA Act does provide for the amendment of assessments but it was not suggested, and the circumstances do not indicate, that the power to amend might properly have been exercised in the case of the applicant. As the Tribunal noted, there would appear to be no legislative provision that would accord a decision-maker the power to remit all or part of the SGC, or nominal interest and administrative component: see, in this regard, the discussions in Re Jarra Hills Pty Ltd and the Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1997) 37 ATR 1022; Re Truelove and the Commissioner of Taxation [2000] AATA 276 ; Re Kancroft (acting as trustee for the Roberson Family Trust) and Commissioner of Taxation [2004] AATA 113 ; Iwec Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2007] AATA 1051 ; and Victorian Patient Transport Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2007] AATA 1239. Certainly, the applicant has been unable to refer me to a source of power to do so. It seems to me, therefore, that not only is the draft notice of appeal fundamentally defective, but any possible appeal has little prospect of success.
Case: Cytel Pty Ltd v Peoplebank Recruitment Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 985
Outcome: referred to
The Court's discretion to grant leave to a company to carry on proceedings other than by a solicitor has been considered from time to time. Recently, Bennett J commented in Cytel Pty Ltd v Peoplebank Recruitment Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 985 at [6] that such discretion must be exercised judicially according to the requirements of justice and in favour of the company where sufficient reason is demonstrated. 36 I accept that, as the respondent argued, Mr Bellin produced very little evidence in support of his application to represent the applicant. In other circumstances, this would be reason enough to decline the leave that has been sought. It would appear, however, that a controller has been appointed to the applicant. Given the nature of the application and the particular circumstances of the case, including Mr Bellin's familiarity with the matter, I would grant Mr Bellin the leave he seeks solely for the purposes of my hearing and determining this application. I certify that the preceding thirty-six (36) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Kenny. Associate: Dated: 5 June 2007 Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant was represented by its director, Mr H. Bellin Solicitor for the Respondent: Mr S. Linden of the Australian Government Solicitor Date of Hearing: 5 June 2007 Date of Judgment: 5 June 2007 AustLII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/2007/861.html
Case: Baird v State of Queensland [2006] FCAFC 162 ; (2006) 156 FCR 451
Outcome: cited
I have carefully considered the evidence of the applicant, and it does not, even at its highest, provide any support for the view that she has been treated unlawfully because of race, colour or ethnicity. To the contrary, the evidence supports the conclusion that there was no causal relationship between the removal of the applicant from the University's premises and any contravention of her human rights or unlawful deprivation of equal opportunity. There must be a connection between the impugned act and the prohibited ground as opposed to a mere belief that there has been a discriminatory course of conduct, and when ascertaining whether this connection exists, a broad interpretation of s 9 of the Act should be preferred: see Baird v State of Queensland [2006] FCAFC 162 ; (2006) 156 FCR 451 at 468. In the present case, the applicant is of the belief that she has been unlawfully discriminated against in the basis of her race or ethnicity. The evidence before the court does not establish the necessary basis for forming a view that a causal relationship existed. For these reasons, I am satisfied that there is sufficient substance in the submissions made for the University to warrant summary judgment being entered in its favour. 16 It is not necessary for me to deal with the other prayers contained in the University's notice of motion as they were all posited in the alternative. However, I will briefly state my position on two of the other prayers. 17 First, I would grant prayer five in the notice, which seeks a stay in this proceeding until the applicant provides security for costs. Given the lengthy history of the matter, the cumbersome detail of the affidavits filed to date, and the period over which the proceedings will be heard, it would be reasonable and appropriate for the proceedings to be stayed until the applicant provides security for costs in the amount of $10,000. In the circumstances, this figure, which was proposed by the University, would be extremely modest. Accordingly, even if I was convinced that there was some reasonable prospect of success in this present application, I would still consider that the proceedings should be stayed until security for costs had been given.
Case: Boston Commercial Services Pty Ltd v GE Capital Australasia Pty Ltd (2006) 70 IPR 146
Outcome: cited
Section 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) empowers the Court to give summary judgment against an applicant if it is satisfied that the applicant has "no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding". This is a less onerous test than that previously stated and applied in General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1964] HCA 69 ; (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 130, namely that the allegations are "so clearly untenable that [they] cannot possibly succeed". Section 31A was designed to make it easier for an opposing party to strike out a claim or defence: see Boston Commercial Services Pty Ltd v GE Capital Australasia Pty Ltd (2006) 70 IPR 146 at 158; Duncan v Lipscombe Charles Care Service Inc [2006] FCA 458 at [6] . Of course it is essential that the Court must be careful not to do an injustice by summarily dismissing proceedings, or denying an applicant an opportunity to ventilate their case. However, in the present case, the material placed before the Court is not sufficient to satisfy the threshold raised by s 31A(2) because it does not raise a reasonable argument to the effect that there has been a contravention of the Act . The version of the evidence for which the applicant contends merely indicates a reference to the applicant's colour of skin or ethnic origin as a way of identifying her for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of the Inclosed Lands Protection Act 1901 (NSW), a piece of legislation which applies equally to people of any ethnic origin. Merely to identify a person by reference to characteristics of clothing, ethnicity or skin for the purpose of the application and enforcement of a generally applicable law is not a contravention of the Act .
Case: Duncan v Lipscombe Charles Care Service Inc [2006] FCA 458
Outcome: cited
Section 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) empowers the Court to give summary judgment against an applicant if it is satisfied that the applicant has "no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding". This is a less onerous test than that previously stated and applied in General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1964] HCA 69 ; (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 130, namely that the allegations are "so clearly untenable that [they] cannot possibly succeed". Section 31A was designed to make it easier for an opposing party to strike out a claim or defence: see Boston Commercial Services Pty Ltd v GE Capital Australasia Pty Ltd (2006) 70 IPR 146 at 158; Duncan v Lipscombe Charles Care Service Inc [2006] FCA 458 at [6] . Of course it is essential that the Court must be careful not to do an injustice by summarily dismissing proceedings, or denying an applicant an opportunity to ventilate their case. However, in the present case, the material placed before the Court is not sufficient to satisfy the threshold raised by s 31A(2) because it does not raise a reasonable argument to the effect that there has been a contravention of the Act . The version of the evidence for which the applicant contends merely indicates a reference to the applicant's colour of skin or ethnic origin as a way of identifying her for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of the Inclosed Lands Protection Act 1901 (NSW), a piece of legislation which applies equally to people of any ethnic origin. Merely to identify a person by reference to characteristics of clothing, ethnicity or skin for the purpose of the application and enforcement of a generally applicable law is not a contravention of the Act .
Case: General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1964] HCA 69 ; (1964) 112 CLR 125
Outcome: considered
Section 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) empowers the Court to give summary judgment against an applicant if it is satisfied that the applicant has "no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding". This is a less onerous test than that previously stated and applied in General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1964] HCA 69 ; (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 130, namely that the allegations are "so clearly untenable that [they] cannot possibly succeed". Section 31A was designed to make it easier for an opposing party to strike out a claim or defence: see Boston Commercial Services Pty Ltd v GE Capital Australasia Pty Ltd (2006) 70 IPR 146 at 158; Duncan v Lipscombe Charles Care Service Inc [2006] FCA 458 at [6] . Of course it is essential that the Court must be careful not to do an injustice by summarily dismissing proceedings, or denying an applicant an opportunity to ventilate their case. However, in the present case, the material placed before the Court is not sufficient to satisfy the threshold raised by s 31A(2) because it does not raise a reasonable argument to the effect that there has been a contravention of the Act . The version of the evidence for which the applicant contends merely indicates a reference to the applicant's colour of skin or ethnic origin as a way of identifying her for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of the Inclosed Lands Protection Act 1901 (NSW), a piece of legislation which applies equally to people of any ethnic origin. Merely to identify a person by reference to characteristics of clothing, ethnicity or skin for the purpose of the application and enforcement of a generally applicable law is not a contravention of the Act .
Case: Hagan v Trustees of the Toowoomba Sports Ground Trust [2000] FCA 1615
Outcome: cited
In the present proceeding, the applicant asserts that University security officers and the NSW Police Service identified and removed her from the University's premises by reference to her dark complexion and Sri Lankan background. However, in my view, this belief of the applicant is not determinative when one considers that the appropriate test for unlawful racial discrimination under s 9 of the Act is whether a person has suffered unfair treatment based partly or wholly, or sufficiently connected to, his or her race, colour, descent or national or ethnic background: see Macedonian Teachers' Association of Victoria Inc v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1998) 91 FCR 8 at 33; Hagan v Trustees of the Toowoomba Sports Ground Trust [2000] FCA 1615 at [39] . In broad terms, under the Act it is unlawful to do any act involving a distinction based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise on an equal footing of any human right. Moreover, where an act is done for one or more reasons, it is enough that one of the reasons is the race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin of the relevant person, irrespective of whether it is the dominant or substantial reason for doing the act: see Jones v Scully [2002] FCA 1080 ; (2002) 120 FCR 243 at 273. The applicant claims that she comes within this requirement.
Case: Jones v Scully [2002] FCA 1080 ; (2002) 120 FCR 243
Outcome: cited
In the present proceeding, the applicant asserts that University security officers and the NSW Police Service identified and removed her from the University's premises by reference to her dark complexion and Sri Lankan background. However, in my view, this belief of the applicant is not determinative when one considers that the appropriate test for unlawful racial discrimination under s 9 of the Act is whether a person has suffered unfair treatment based partly or wholly, or sufficiently connected to, his or her race, colour, descent or national or ethnic background: see Macedonian Teachers' Association of Victoria Inc v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1998) 91 FCR 8 at 33; Hagan v Trustees of the Toowoomba Sports Ground Trust [2000] FCA 1615 at [39] . In broad terms, under the Act it is unlawful to do any act involving a distinction based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise on an equal footing of any human right. Moreover, where an act is done for one or more reasons, it is enough that one of the reasons is the race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin of the relevant person, irrespective of whether it is the dominant or substantial reason for doing the act: see Jones v Scully [2002] FCA 1080 ; (2002) 120 FCR 243 at 273. The applicant claims that she comes within this requirement.
Case: Paramasivam v University of New South Wales [2006] NSWSC 1189
Outcome: considered
In the proceeding brought before the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Sully J dismissed the applicant's statement of claim on the basis that the proceedings, although not frivolous, could properly be characterised as vexatious and as an abuse of process of the Court: Paramasivam v University of New South Wales [2006] NSWSC 1189. The claims in that proceeding arose out of claims substantially overlapping those brought in the present proceeding.
Case: Macedonian Teachers' Association of Victoria Inv v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1998) 91 FCR 8
Outcome: cited
In the present proceeding, the applicant asserts that University security officers and the NSW Police Service identified and removed her from the University's premises by reference to her dark complexion and Sri Lankan background. However, in my view, this belief of the applicant is not determinative when one considers that the appropriate test for unlawful racial discrimination under s 9 of the Act is whether a person has suffered unfair treatment based partly or wholly, or sufficiently connected to, his or her race, colour, descent or national or ethnic background: see Macedonian Teachers' Association of Victoria Inc v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1998) 91 FCR 8 at 33; Hagan v Trustees of the Toowoomba Sports Ground Trust [2000] FCA 1615 at [39] . In broad terms, under the Act it is unlawful to do any act involving a distinction based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise on an equal footing of any human right. Moreover, where an act is done for one or more reasons, it is enough that one of the reasons is the race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin of the relevant person, irrespective of whether it is the dominant or substantial reason for doing the act: see Jones v Scully [2002] FCA 1080 ; (2002) 120 FCR 243 at 273. The applicant claims that she comes within this requirement.
Case: SZMDG v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2008] FMCA 1075
Outcome: affirmed
This appeal is from a judgment of the Federal Magistrates Court, delivered on 1 August 2008 and published as SZMDG v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2008] FMCA 1075. The learned federal magistrate dismissed the appellant's application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal"), signed on 27 February 2008 and handed down or sent on 18 March 2008. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent to this appeal, the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship ("the Minister"), to refuse to grant to the appellant a protection visa. 2 By s 36 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Migration Act "), there is a class of visas to be known as protection visas. A criterion for a protection visa is that the person applying for it be a non-citizen in Australia to whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol. The terms "Refugees Convention" and "Refugees Protocol" are defined in s 5(1) of the Migration Act to mean respectively the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951 and the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on 31 January 1967 . It is convenient to call these two instruments, taken together, the "Convention". For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that, pursuant to the Convention, Australia has protection obligations to a person who: owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country 3 The appellant is a citizen of Indonesia, who arrived in Australia on 14 August 2007. On 27 September 2007, he applied to the Department of Immigration and Citizenship for a protection visa. The decision of the Minister's delegate refusing to grant the visa was made on 15 November 2007. The appellant then applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate's decision.