Case: VAF v Minister for Immigration &amp; Multicultural Affairs (2004) 206 ALR 471 
Outcome: applied
appellant misconceives the Tribunal's statement as involving information as distinct from the thought processes of the Tribunal. Information refers to 'knowledge of relevant facts or circumstances communicated to or received by the Tribunal'. It does not encompass the Tribunal's 'subjective appraisals, thought processes or determinations': VAF v Minister for Immigration &amp; Multicultural Affairs (2004) 206 ALR 471 at [24] per Finn and Stone JJ. The characterisation of the persecutory acts as localised and the corollary to that proposition, namely that they would not be performed when the appellant was not in that location were the Tribunal's thought processes, not information. Section 424A did not apply to them. Moreover, if the relevant information for the purposes of s 424A of the Act is the fact that the daughter's name was one widely used in Bangladesh and had a Koranic origin, this is information falling within the exception in s 424A(3)(a) with the result that the Tribunal was not required to give any particulars in writing in respect of it. If the information is the fact that the use of such a name casts doubt on the claim to a religious conversion, this is simply a conclusion based on the evidence before the Tribunal and therefore is not 'information' within s 424A: VAF at [24] per Finn and Stone JJ. This refers to information that 'the Tribunal doubted the veracity of the appellant's claim that his wife is slowly learning about Christianity because the appellant did not give his daughter a recognisably Christian name'. This is likewise a conclusion based on the evidence before the Tribunal and is not caught by s 424A: VAF at [24] per Finn and Stone JJ. This alleged contravention of s 424A is said to arise from inferences drawn by the Tribunal as to the omission, in statements by fellow Christians who provided written material in support of the appellant's application, of any reference to their suffering persecution themselves. The inference drawn is that it would be possible for the appellant similarly to avoid harm in Bangladesh. The short answer is that neither the Tribunal's observation as to the existence of such an omission, nor the inference drawn from it, is 'information' for the purposes of s 424A. 'Information' in that section does not encompass the Tribunal's subjective thought processes, or extend to identified gaps, defects or lack of detail or specificity in evidence or to conclusions reached by the Tribunal in weighing up the evidence by reference to those matters: VAF at [24] per Finn and Stone JJ. This ground alleges that the Tribunal constructively failed to exercise jurisdiction by not acting judicially in carrying out its functions under the Act. A number of examples are particularised; most, if not all, were not relied on below before his Honour and, in those cases, it is difficult to comprehend any error on the part of his Honour. Particular (b) alleges that the Tribunal 'selectively used the available independent country information to inappropriately find that the appellant "has given no basis for his belief that he would be mistreated on his return"'. No particulars of this allegation are given. Nevertheless, it is for the Tribunal, as part of its fact-finding function, to determine what weight it will give to the country information before it: NAHI at [11]. In the present case, it was open to the Tribunal to find, as it did, that on the basis of the evidence as to guarantees of freedom of religion in Bangladesh and the tolerant practice of their religion by most Bangladeshi Muslims, it was not satisfied the appellant had experienced the rejection he claimed from his family (which it considered to practice a tolerant form of Islam) or that he would face persecution within the meaning of the Convention if he returned to Bangladesh. Particular (c) alleges there was no evidence for the finding that the appellant would have been able to escape the particular consequences he claimed by remaining in India. However, the Tribunal clearly specifies the evidence it relies on to make this finding: the fact that the particular consequences the appellant claimed in the case of his own conversion arose from family and community ostracism and disadvantage in employment. It is clear that the complaint of disadvantage in employment, like the claims of ostracism, related to the treatment the appellant received, or would receive, from those who knew him, namely, his work colleagues. As such, it was plainly open to the Tribunal to find that by remaining in a place away from his family and community, and work colleagues, the appellant would not face the ostracism and disadvantage he claimed. Particular (d) alleges that it was irrational to find that the appellant's conversion was unlikely to attract the opposition referred to in the country information, notwithstanding that the conversion was a fact known to those who knew him. However, as indicated in respect of particular (b) above, this was a finding open to the Tribunal on the basis of the country information before it. Particular (e) alleges there was no proper basis for the finding that the appellant would be able to obtain effective assistance from the authorities against extra-legal treatment under Sharia law. The finding was explicitly based on country information as to the Bangladeshi government's commitment to maintaining a secular Bangladesh and, in those circumstances, there is no substance in the argument that the finding was made without proper basis. Particular (f) appears to make some complaint based on country information to the effect that (i) police were ineffective in upholding law and order and (ii) there were objections and resistance to conversions from Islam to other religions. The nature of the complaint is not particularised. It suffices to say, as noted in respect of particular (a) above, that it was for the Tribunal to give what weight it deemed appropriate to the country information before it.