Case: Bridgeport Advisers &amp; Asset Managers Pty Ltd (2005) 221 ALR 146
Outcome: referred to
Various statutes have used the expression "person aggrieved" and courts have discussed its meaning in numerous cases: compare the much quoted passage in Ex parte Sidebotham; In re Sidebotham (1880) 14 Ch D 458 at 465-466 per James LJ; Northbourne Developments Pty Ltd v Reiby Chambers Pty Ltd (1989) 19 NSWLR 434 (" Northbourne ") at 437-438 per McLelland J; and Bridgeport Advisers &amp; Asset Managers Pty Ltd (2005) 221 ALR 146 (" Bridgeport ") at 162 per Barrett J. As Gibbs CJ said in Koowarta v Bjelke-Peterson [1982] HCA 27 ; (1982) 153 CLR 168 at 184-185, the meaning of the expression must ultimately depend on the context of the particular statute. Having regard to the circumstances outlined above, I find that Mr Spalla has standing under this provision. None of the respondents contended that he did not. 165 The decision to accept a settlement on behalf of Irlmond, and the preliminary decision to sign the Deed, were clearly discretionary decisions of the liquidator. They also involved matters of business judgment. It is well settled that where an appeal is brought against such a decision "the court will reverse the liquidator's decision only when it is satisfied that he was acting unreasonably or in bad faith": see Jay-O-Bees at 575 and the authorities referred to. This is in contrast to an appeal against a rejection of a proof of debt where the Court hears the issue de novo: see Jay-O-Bees at 575-576. The "general approach ... in a case like this is that [the Court] should not interfere with a decision made by the liquidator unless either there is fraud, or it can be said that the discretion has not been exercised bona fide, or it can be said that the liquidator has acted in a way which no reasonable liquidator could have acted": Bridgeport at 161-162 quoting Yeomans v Walker (1986) 5 NSWLR 378 at 383 per Hodgson J. 203 Finally, I turn to the issue of whether the settlement was so unfavourable for Irlmond that it evidences that Mr Rambaldi acted in bad faith. Absent any other evidence of bad faith, the question must be whether or not, in executing the Deed and ultimately settling Irlmond's claim, Mr Rambaldi acted in a way that no reasonable liquidator could have acted: compare Bridgeport at 161-162. In this context, it must be borne in mind that courts are especially reluctant to second-guess settlement decisions. Public policy favours settlement. As Chesterman J said in Dew v Richardson [1999] QSC 192 at [42] , settlement helps "reduce the level of disharmony in society and conserve the resources both of litigants themselves and the community which funds the courts." Others have seen the virtue of settlement in promoting certainty that permits litigants to deal with their affairs in an orderly way looking to the future. For example, in Kelley v Corston [1998] 3 WLR 246 at 259, Judge LJ said: "Every lawyer in practice and every judge knows that there is no such thing as the case which is bound to succeed. Experience shows that cases with the brightest prospects of success somehow fail and it is difficult to underestimate the value of the certainty provided by a settlement as opposed to the continuing risks of litigation through to judgment".