Case: Dai v Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman [2000] FCA 717
Outcome: followed
On 28 November 2005, the applicant filed an application for leave to appeal, a draft notice of appeal and supporting affidavit the application that is now before this Court (together the 'Application').' The Minister's objection to competency 8 Counsel for the Minister referred as a starting point to s 24(1)(d) of the Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) ('the FC Act'), which provides that the Federal Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from judgments of the Federal Magistrates Court. Thereafter my attention was drawn to s 24(1A) of the FC Act, which provides that an appeal shall not be brought from a judgment referred to in subsection (1) that is an interlocutory judgment, unless the Court or a Judge gives leave to appeal. Section 25(2)(a) of the FC Act thereafter provides that applications for leave to appeal to the Court may be heard and determined by a single judge or a Full Court. 9 The Minister next emphasised that the Federal Magistrate's decision was indeed interlocutory, referring thereby to the distinction between final and interlocutory orders, enunciated for instance in Hall v Nominal Defendant [1966] HCA 36 ; (1966) 117 CLR 423 at 440 by Taylor J as follows: 'So an order made in the course of an action or suit which does not conclude the rights of the parties inter se, although it may, of course, conclude the fate of the particular application in which it is made, is interlocutory only. On this basis an order staying proceedings against one of several defendants on the grounds that they are scandalous, vexatious and an abuse of the process of the court has been treated as interlocutory: Hind v Marquis of Hartington (1890) 6 TLR 267. The same view was taken of an order striking out a plaintiff's statement of claim on the ground that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action: Jones v Insole (1891) 64 LT 703 and of an order dismissing an action as frivolous and vexatious In re Page [1910] 1 Ch 489.' That dictum was more recently applied by a Full Federal Court in Dai v Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman [2000] FCA 717 at [7] (per Beaumont, Whitlam and Lehane JJ). 10 The applicant provided no basis or reason why the course sought to be adopted should be open to him, given the history of the proceedings which speaks for itself. Plainly the plethora of decisions already made unfavourably to the applicant demonstrates that no substantial injustice would be occasioned by any refusal of the current purported further application to the Court. No matter of substance has been raised for my consideration. Nothing more is raised other than bare assertions of error. However no error is apparent on the face of the material before the Court. 11 The application must be dismissed with costs. I certify that the preceding eleven (11) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Conti. Associate: Dated: 4 April 2006 The Applicant appeared in person Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz Date of Hearing: 30 March 2006 Date of Judgment: 4 April 2006 AustLII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/2006/362.html