mdroth/huggingface-course_section-5_zst huggingface dataset:
Case: BHP Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Australian Workers' Union [2000] FCA 430 ; (2000) 102 FCR 97
Outcome: cited
There are some questions as to the proper construction of the section. It is contended for the respondents that intention to make a false and misleading representation is a necessary element of the offence. There is no direct authority in favour of that proposition. It is submitted that the reasoning in relation to other sections included in Pt 10A would be applicable (cf BHP Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Australian Workers' Union [2000] FCA 430 ; (2000) 102 FCR 97 at [77] ; Australian Workers' Union v BHP Iron-Ore Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 3 ; (2001) 106 FCR 482 at [70] [78]). Indeed, such authority as exists is against the proposition contended for by the respondents ( Hadgkiss v Sunland Constructions Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 346 at [31] [34]; Hadgkiss v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 3) (2007) 160 IR 263, [2007] FCA 87 at [288] [289]; see also Riley McKay Pty Ltd v Bannerman (1977) 15 ALR 561; (1977) 31 FLR 129 per Bowen CJ at 134; Given v CV Holland (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1977) 15 ALR 439; (1977) 29 FLR 212). The presence of s 4(7) also tends against it. There is also a question as to whether the section only applies where the false or misleading representation about another's obligation to join an industrial association must be made to that other person. Graham J was of the opinion that the section was not so limited ( Hadgkiss v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 3) (2007) 160 IR 263; [2007] FCA 87 at [287] [291]). Although not raised here, there may also be a question as to the meaning of "obligation" does it refer to legal obligation or practical obligation?
Case: Finance Sector Union of Australia v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2000] FCA 1468 ; (2000) 106 FCR 16
Outcome: referred to
The threat of disruption was a threat of "other action" ( National Tertiary Education Industry Union v Commonwealth of Australia [2002] FCA 441 ; (2002) 117 FCR 114 at [95] ; Laing v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2003] FCA 1018 at [7] and [12] [13]). It can safely be concluded that Lane's intent in making the threats was to coerce the officers of LGB into agreeing to an EBA. The threat of disruption to work on the project by any available means was pressure that was illegitimate and unconscionable. LGB had completion of a project of some $16 million at stake. Any disruption to progress would have significant adverse financial consequences. It was clear enough that the threats also envisaged unlawful action. Threats of picketing were made. There would appear to be no lawful basis for picketing in relation to this site (cf Australian Builders' Labourers' Federated Union of Workers Western Australian Branch v J-Corp Pty Limited (1993) 42 FCR 452 per Lockhart and Gummow JJ at 456 458, although on different legislation). Unlawful conduct had taken place. The direct action by Lane and Primmer on 21 October 2003 fell into that category. The conduct in breach of s 45D and the inducement of breach of contract to be found were unlawful as well as illegitimate and unconscionable. (See generally Finance Sector Union of Australia v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2000] FCA 1468 ; (2000) 106 FCR 16 at [19] [25]; Seven Network (Operations) Ltd v Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia [2001] FCA 456 ; (2001) 109 FCR 378 at [41] ; and National Tertiary Education Industry Union [2002] FCA 441 ; 117 FCR 114 at [97] [103].)
Case: Given v CV Holland (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1977) 15 ALR 439; (1977) 29 FLR 212 
Outcome: cited
There are some questions as to the proper construction of the section. It is contended for the respondents that intention to make a false and misleading representation is a necessary element of the offence. There is no direct authority in favour of that proposition. It is submitted that the reasoning in relation to other sections included in Pt 10A would be applicable (cf BHP Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Australian Workers' Union [2000] FCA 430 ; (2000) 102 FCR 97 at [77] ; Australian Workers' Union v BHP Iron-Ore Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 3 ; (2001) 106 FCR 482 at [70] [78]). Indeed, such authority as exists is against the proposition contended for by the respondents ( Hadgkiss v Sunland Constructions Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 346 at [31] [34]; Hadgkiss v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 3) (2007) 160 IR 263, [2007] FCA 87 at [288] [289]; see also Riley McKay Pty Ltd v Bannerman (1977) 15 ALR 561; (1977) 31 FLR 129 per Bowen CJ at 134; Given v CV Holland (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1977) 15 ALR 439; (1977) 29 FLR 212). The presence of s 4(7) also tends against it. There is also a question as to whether the section only applies where the false or misleading representation about another's obligation to join an industrial association must be made to that other person. Graham J was of the opinion that the section was not so limited ( Hadgkiss v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 3) (2007) 160 IR 263; [2007] FCA 87 at [287] [291]). Although not raised here, there may also be a question as to the meaning of "obligation" does it refer to legal obligation or practical obligation?
Case: Hadgkiss v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 3) (2007) 160 IR 263; [2007] FCA 87
Outcome: referred to
There are some questions as to the proper construction of the section. It is contended for the respondents that intention to make a false and misleading representation is a necessary element of the offence. There is no direct authority in favour of that proposition. It is submitted that the reasoning in relation to other sections included in Pt 10A would be applicable (cf BHP Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Australian Workers' Union [2000] FCA 430 ; (2000) 102 FCR 97 at [77] ; Australian Workers' Union v BHP Iron-Ore Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 3 ; (2001) 106 FCR 482 at [70] [78]). Indeed, such authority as exists is against the proposition contended for by the respondents ( Hadgkiss v Sunland Constructions Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 346 at [31] [34]; Hadgkiss v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 3) (2007) 160 IR 263, [2007] FCA 87 at [288] [289]; see also Riley McKay Pty Ltd v Bannerman (1977) 15 ALR 561; (1977) 31 FLR 129 per Bowen CJ at 134; Given v CV Holland (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1977) 15 ALR 439; (1977) 29 FLR 212). The presence of s 4(7) also tends against it. There is also a question as to whether the section only applies where the false or misleading representation about another's obligation to join an industrial association must be made to that other person. Graham J was of the opinion that the section was not so limited ( Hadgkiss v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 3) (2007) 160 IR 263; [2007] FCA 87 at [287] [291]). Although not raised here, there may also be a question as to the meaning of "obligation" does it refer to legal obligation or practical obligation?
Case: Hadgkiss v Sunland Constructions Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 346
Outcome: cited
There are some questions as to the proper construction of the section. It is contended for the respondents that intention to make a false and misleading representation is a necessary element of the offence. There is no direct authority in favour of that proposition. It is submitted that the reasoning in relation to other sections included in Pt 10A would be applicable (cf BHP Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Australian Workers' Union [2000] FCA 430 ; (2000) 102 FCR 97 at [77] ; Australian Workers' Union v BHP Iron-Ore Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 3 ; (2001) 106 FCR 482 at [70] [78]). Indeed, such authority as exists is against the proposition contended for by the respondents ( Hadgkiss v Sunland Constructions Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 346 at [31] [34]; Hadgkiss v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 3) (2007) 160 IR 263, [2007] FCA 87 at [288] [289]; see also Riley McKay Pty Ltd v Bannerman (1977) 15 ALR 561; (1977) 31 FLR 129 per Bowen CJ at 134; Given v CV Holland (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1977) 15 ALR 439; (1977) 29 FLR 212). The presence of s 4(7) also tends against it. There is also a question as to whether the section only applies where the false or misleading representation about another's obligation to join an industrial association must be made to that other person. Graham J was of the opinion that the section was not so limited ( Hadgkiss v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 3) (2007) 160 IR 263; [2007] FCA 87 at [287] [291]). Although not raised here, there may also be a question as to the meaning of "obligation" does it refer to legal obligation or practical obligation?
Case: Harris v Digital Pulse Pty Ltd [2003] NSWCA 10 ; (2003) 56 NSWLR 298; (2003) 197 ALR 626 
Outcome: cited
Penalties are sought in relation to the breach of s 170NC. No penalty is sought in relation to breach of s 45D. Damages are sought for breach of s 45D. Damages are sought for inducing breach of contract. The damages, being awarded on tortious principles, would seem to be the same as those appropriate in this case for breach of s 45D. No claim is made for exemplary damages ( Musca v Astle Corporation Pty Ltd (1988) 80 ALR 251; Harris v Digital Pulse Pty Ltd [2003] NSWCA 10 ; (2003) 56 NSWLR 298; (2003) 197 ALR 626).
Case: Houghton v Arms [2006] HCA 59 ; (2006) 225 CLR 553 
Outcome: cited
In my opinion, consistently with the reasons of the Full Court in Hanley [2000] FCA 1188 ; 100 FCR 530, each of CFMEU and CFMEU NSW was liable for breach of s 170NC by reason of the actions of Lane, both under the general law and pursuant to s 349 of the Act. I am also satisfied that Lane and those organisations can all be liable. The reasoning of Merkel J in Seven Network (Operations) Ltd [2001] FCA 456 ; 109 FCR 378 at [45] [47] to that effect receives support from the decision of the High Court in Houghton v Arms [2006] HCA 59 ; (2006) 225 CLR 553.
Case: J T Stratford &amp; Son Ltd v Lindley [1965] AC 269
Outcome: applied
It is quite clear that each of Lane, Primmer and Kelly knew that Silvestri P/L had been engaged to do the excavation work. The opening exchange on 20 October 2003 showed that Lane was aware that the existing contractor had been sacked. Lane and Primmer knew of Antonio Silvestri's proposed involvement on 20 October 2003 and each of them saw Antonio Silvestri working on the site on 21 October 2003. It was obvious that that was the result of a contract for reward with LGB. Silvestri P/L was not a charitable organisation and LGB was not a mendicant. It is not necessary to prove that Lane, Primmer and Kelly had knowledge of the precise terms of the agreement ( J T Stratford &amp; Son Ltd v Lindley [1965] AC 269 per Lord Pearce at 332F G; Schindler Lifts Australia Pty Ltd v Debelak (1989) 89 ALR 275 at 293). The findings that I have already made involve each of Lane, Primmer and Kelly in deliberately taking steps to hinder or prevent Silvestri P/L from carrying out its contract with LGB and were, in fact, intended to cause Silvestri P/L and Antonio Silvestri to be banned from the site and the contract to be terminated. There could not be a clearer case than this of interference with contractual relations. There was no attempt to pursue a defence of justification. (See, generally, Williams v Hursey [1959] HCA 51 ; (1959) 103 CLR 30; Allstate Life Insurance Company v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1995) 58 FCR 26; Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Australian Federation of Air Pilots (1989) 95 ALR 211; and Odco Pty Ltd 29 FCR 104 and the authorities referred to in those cases.)
Case: Laing v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2003] FCA 1018
Outcome: cited
The threat of disruption was a threat of "other action" ( National Tertiary Education Industry Union v Commonwealth of Australia [2002] FCA 441 ; (2002) 117 FCR 114 at [95] ; Laing v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2003] FCA 1018 at [7] and [12] [13]). It can safely be concluded that Lane's intent in making the threats was to coerce the officers of LGB into agreeing to an EBA. The threat of disruption to work on the project by any available means was pressure that was illegitimate and unconscionable. LGB had completion of a project of some $16 million at stake. Any disruption to progress would have significant adverse financial consequences. It was clear enough that the threats also envisaged unlawful action. Threats of picketing were made. There would appear to be no lawful basis for picketing in relation to this site (cf Australian Builders' Labourers' Federated Union of Workers Western Australian Branch v J-Corp Pty Limited (1993) 42 FCR 452 per Lockhart and Gummow JJ at 456 458, although on different legislation). Unlawful conduct had taken place. The direct action by Lane and Primmer on 21 October 2003 fell into that category. The conduct in breach of s 45D and the inducement of breach of contract to be found were unlawful as well as illegitimate and unconscionable. (See generally Finance Sector Union of Australia v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2000] FCA 1468 ; (2000) 106 FCR 16 at [19] [25]; Seven Network (Operations) Ltd v Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia [2001] FCA 456 ; (2001) 109 FCR 378 at [41] ; and National Tertiary Education Industry Union [2002] FCA 441 ; 117 FCR 114 at [97] [103].)
Case: Musca v Astle Corporation Pty Ltd (1988) 80 ALR 251
Outcome: cited
Penalties are sought in relation to the breach of s 170NC. No penalty is sought in relation to breach of s 45D. Damages are sought for breach of s 45D. Damages are sought for inducing breach of contract. The damages, being awarded on tortious principles, would seem to be the same as those appropriate in this case for breach of s 45D. No claim is made for exemplary damages ( Musca v Astle Corporation Pty Ltd (1988) 80 ALR 251; Harris v Digital Pulse Pty Ltd [2003] NSWCA 10 ; (2003) 56 NSWLR 298; (2003) 197 ALR 626).
Case: National Tertiary Education Industry Union v Commonwealth of Australia [2002] FCA 441 ; (2002) 117 FCR 114
Outcome: cited
The threat of disruption was a threat of "other action" ( National Tertiary Education Industry Union v Commonwealth of Australia [2002] FCA 441 ; (2002) 117 FCR 114 at [95] ; Laing v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2003] FCA 1018 at [7] and [12] [13]). It can safely be concluded that Lane's intent in making the threats was to coerce the officers of LGB into agreeing to an EBA. The threat of disruption to work on the project by any available means was pressure that was illegitimate and unconscionable. LGB had completion of a project of some $16 million at stake. Any disruption to progress would have significant adverse financial consequences. It was clear enough that the threats also envisaged unlawful action. Threats of picketing were made. There would appear to be no lawful basis for picketing in relation to this site (cf Australian Builders' Labourers' Federated Union of Workers Western Australian Branch v J-Corp Pty Limited (1993) 42 FCR 452 per Lockhart and Gummow JJ at 456 458, although on different legislation). Unlawful conduct had taken place. The direct action by Lane and Primmer on 21 October 2003 fell into that category. The conduct in breach of s 45D and the inducement of breach of contract to be found were unlawful as well as illegitimate and unconscionable. (See generally Finance Sector Union of Australia v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2000] FCA 1468 ; (2000) 106 FCR 16 at [19] [25]; Seven Network (Operations) Ltd v Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia [2001] FCA 456 ; (2001) 109 FCR 378 at [41] ; and National Tertiary Education Industry Union [2002] FCA 441 ; 117 FCR 114 at [97] [103].)
Case: New South Wales v Lepore [2003] HCA 4 ; (2003) 212 CLR 511
Outcome: cited
Each of the individual respondents was a full time official of either the CFMEU or CFMEU NSW. Each was engaged in what may broadly be called union business on the days in question. No one was on a frolic of his own. For relevant purposes, officers of each organisation were cooperating or acting in concert to achieve a result. The conduct of each was in the course of employment. Each organisation is liable on ordinary principles of vicarious liability in tort ( New South Wales v Lepore [2003] HCA 4 ; (2003) 212 CLR 511 per Gleeson CJ at [40] [41]). 86 I reject the submission that the interference with contract was limited to the couple of hours for which the car was parked across the vehicular access to the site on 21 October 2003. It follows from the findings previously made that the intention of the officials of the Union was to ensure that the contract was terminated and that Silvestri P/L did not return to the site. Whilst closure of the site on 21 October 2003 might be directly attributed to the Council, the closure of the site for that reason was not the effective cause of the termination of the contract with Silvestri P/L. That result was achieved by the concerted action of the Union officials. 87 Liability can be summarised as follows: (1) Lane, CFMEU and CFMEU NSW contravened s 170NC. (2) Lane, Primmer, Kelly, CFMEU and CFMEU NSW contravened s 45D. (3) Lane, Primmer, Kelly, CFMEU and CFMEU NSW induced a breach of the contract between LGB and Silvestri P/L.
Case: Riley McKay Pty Ltd v Bannerman (1977) 15 ALR 561; (1977) 31 FLR 129
Outcome: cited
There are some questions as to the proper construction of the section. It is contended for the respondents that intention to make a false and misleading representation is a necessary element of the offence. There is no direct authority in favour of that proposition. It is submitted that the reasoning in relation to other sections included in Pt 10A would be applicable (cf BHP Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Australian Workers' Union [2000] FCA 430 ; (2000) 102 FCR 97 at [77] ; Australian Workers' Union v BHP Iron-Ore Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 3 ; (2001) 106 FCR 482 at [70] [78]). Indeed, such authority as exists is against the proposition contended for by the respondents ( Hadgkiss v Sunland Constructions Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 346 at [31] [34]; Hadgkiss v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 3) (2007) 160 IR 263, [2007] FCA 87 at [288] [289]; see also Riley McKay Pty Ltd v Bannerman (1977) 15 ALR 561; (1977) 31 FLR 129 per Bowen CJ at 134; Given v CV Holland (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1977) 15 ALR 439; (1977) 29 FLR 212). The presence of s 4(7) also tends against it. There is also a question as to whether the section only applies where the false or misleading representation about another's obligation to join an industrial association must be made to that other person. Graham J was of the opinion that the section was not so limited ( Hadgkiss v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 3) (2007) 160 IR 263; [2007] FCA 87 at [287] [291]). Although not raised here, there may also be a question as to the meaning of "obligation" does it refer to legal obligation or practical obligation?
Case: Rowe v Transport Workers' Union of Australia (1998) 90 FCR 95
Outcome: cited
It is not necessary for me to come to any independent view about those issues. Counsel for the respondents points out that it is only conduct which falls within the scope of s 298D s 298H (inclusive) that is proscribed. Authority is hardly necessary for that proposition in view of s 298C, but, cf Rowe v Transport Workers' Union of Australia (1998) 90 FCR 95 at 106G. The only hook to hang this proceeding upon would be s 298D(c) providing that the Part applied to: "conduct carried out with a purpose or intent relating to a person's membership or non-membership of an organisation." 76 In my opinion, that hook is not available. The statements by Kelly to Veljanov were an explanation of, or commentary upon, what was occurring. They were answers to inquiries with no intent or purpose as such relating to the membership of the Union either by Veljanov or Antonio Silvestri. That conclusion is assisted by bearing in mind that Kelly was only a casual participant in the events, having been brought along by Primmer. 77 Even if it were not for Div 2 of Pt 10A , I would have been inclined to construe s 298SC as requiring a greater connection between the false or misleading representation and the obligation than established by these facts.
Case: Schindler Lifts Australia Pty Ltd v Debelak (1989) 89 ALR 275 
Outcome: cited
It is quite clear that each of Lane, Primmer and Kelly knew that Silvestri P/L had been engaged to do the excavation work. The opening exchange on 20 October 2003 showed that Lane was aware that the existing contractor had been sacked. Lane and Primmer knew of Antonio Silvestri's proposed involvement on 20 October 2003 and each of them saw Antonio Silvestri working on the site on 21 October 2003. It was obvious that that was the result of a contract for reward with LGB. Silvestri P/L was not a charitable organisation and LGB was not a mendicant. It is not necessary to prove that Lane, Primmer and Kelly had knowledge of the precise terms of the agreement ( J T Stratford &amp; Son Ltd v Lindley [1965] AC 269 per Lord Pearce at 332F G; Schindler Lifts Australia Pty Ltd v Debelak (1989) 89 ALR 275 at 293). The findings that I have already made involve each of Lane, Primmer and Kelly in deliberately taking steps to hinder or prevent Silvestri P/L from carrying out its contract with LGB and were, in fact, intended to cause Silvestri P/L and Antonio Silvestri to be banned from the site and the contract to be terminated. There could not be a clearer case than this of interference with contractual relations. There was no attempt to pursue a defence of justification. (See, generally, Williams v Hursey [1959] HCA 51 ; (1959) 103 CLR 30; Allstate Life Insurance Company v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1995) 58 FCR 26; Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Australian Federation of Air Pilots (1989) 95 ALR 211; and Odco Pty Ltd 29 FCR 104 and the authorities referred to in those cases.)