Case: Anstella Nominees Pty Ltd v St George Motor Finance Ltd (2003) 21 ACLC 1,347
Outcome: cited
There are a number of principles relevant to the exercise of the Court's power under s 477(2B) which are worth restating: (1) the court does not simply "rubber stamp" whatever is put forward by a liquidator. As Giles J said in Re Spedley Securities Ltd (In liq) (1992) 10 ACLC 1,742 at 1,745 in relation to the powers of a liquidator to compromise claims: "[T]he Court is necessarily confined in attempting to second guess the liquidator in the exercise of his powers, and generally will not interfere unless there can be seen to be some lack of good faith, some error in law or principle, or real and substantial grounds for doubting the prudence of the liquidator's conduct. The same restraint must apply when the question is whether the liquidator should be authorised to enter into a particular transaction the benefits and burdens of which require assessment on a commercial basis. Of course, the compromise of claims will involve assessment on a legal basis, and a liquidator will be expected (as was made plain in Re Chase Corporation (Australia) Equities Ltd ) to obtain advice and, as a prudent person would in the conduct of his own affairs, advice from practitioners appropriate to the nature and value of the claims. But in all but the simplest case, and demonstrably in the present case, commercial considerations play a significant part in whether a compromise will be for the benefit of creditors." (2) a court will not approve an agreement if its terms are unclear: Re United Medical Protection (No 4) (2002) 20 ACLC 1,647; (3) the role of the Court is to grant or deny approval to the liquidator's proposal. Its role is not to develop some alternative proposal which might seem preferable: Corporate Affairs Commission v ASC Timber Pty Ltd (1998) 16 ACLC 1,642; (4) in reviewing the liquidator's proposal, the task of the Court is: "[not] to reconsider all of the issues which have been weighed up by the liquidator in developing the proposal, and to substitute its determination for his in....a hearing de novo [but]... simply to review the liquidator's proposal, paying due regard to his or her commercial judgment and knowledge of all of the circumstances of the liquidation, satisfying itself there is no error of law or ground for suspecting bad faith or impropriety, and weighing up whether there is any good reason to intervene in terms of the "expeditious and beneficial administration" of the winding up." See ASC Timber at 1,650; see also Re Gate Gourmet Australia Pty Ltd (in liq) (2005) 23 ACLC 834 at [10] and Warne v GDK Financial Solutions; Peridon Village Nominees [2005] FCAFC 265 ; (2006) 24 ACLC 1,019 at [60]. The Court's approval is not an endorsement of the proposed agreement but is merely a permission for the liquidator to exercise his or her own commercial judgment in the matter; (5) further, in judging whether or not a liquidator should be given permission to enter into a funding agreement (whether retrospective or not), it is important to ensure, inter alia, that the entity or person providing the funding is not given a benefit disproportionate to the risk undertaken in light of the funding that is promised or a "grossly excessive profit": Anstella Nominees Pty Ltd v St George Motor Finance Ltd (2003) 21 ACLC 1,347 at [11] and Re ACN 076 673 875 Ltd (2002) 20 ACLC 1,551 at [28]; (6) generally, the Court grants approval under s 477(2B) of the Act only where the transaction is the proper realisation of the assets of the company or otherwise assists in the winding up of the company: GDK Financial Solutions at [58] and the cases cited therein.