mdroth/huggingface-course_section-5_zst huggingface dataset:
Case: Treloar v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1990) 26 FCR 316
Outcome: cited
For a disease to be compensable under the SRC Act something more than a mere temporal connection must be found; there must be a material contribution towards either the contraction of the disease or an aggravation of it: See the definition of 'disease' in s 4(1) of the SRC Act and Treloar v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1990) 26 FCR 316. The Tribunal's finding that there had been a temporal connection only between the onset of the applicant's symptoms and his work precludes any finding that the applicant had suffered a work-related disease which was therefore compensable. That finding was a finding of fact: March v (E &amp; MH) Stramare Pty Ltd [1991] HCA 12 ; (1991) 171 CLR 506 esp. per Mason CJ at 515-517.
Case: Friends of Hinchinbrook Society Inc v Minister for Environment (No. 2) (1997) 69 FCR 28
Outcome: referred to
A decision will be vitiated by Wednesbury unreasonableness, unless no decision-maker, acting reasonably, could have made that decision or it is shown that the decision was so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have come to it. In applying this standard a court must proceed with caution lest it exceed its supervisory role by reviewing the decision on the merits: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd at 41 42, per Mason J; Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin [1990] HCA 21 ; (1990) 170 CLR 1 at 36 37, per Brennan J. It is not enough to show that another decision-maker might have reached a different result or even that the Court takes the view that a different decision would have been more appropriate: Eshetu at 626 627, per Gleeson CJ and McHugh J; 'Friends of Hinchinbrook Society Inc v Minister for Environment (No. 2) (1997) 69 FCR 28 at 59 65, per Sackville J.
Case: Metcash Trading Limited v Bunn [2009] FCA 1468 
Outcome: cited
Monday, 7 December 2009 the first applicant applied for further orders restraining the publication of T.I.G.A. 12/2:2009 but, for reasons which I gave at that time, I refused that application: Metcash Trading Limited v Bunn [2009] FCA 1468. I am advised that Mitre 10 held meetings on Monday, 7 December 2009 and that further meetings are to be held today which may lead to the parties negotiating and seeking to agree upon an Implementation Agreement. If an agreement can be reached, the parties will need to apply to the Court and seek shareholder approvals for the schemes of arrangement which are proposed. The first applicant seeks a continuation of the interim orders made on Saturday, 5 December 2009 until at least the schemes of arrangement have been effected, which will be some time in the first quarter of 2010.
Case: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Limited [2001] HCA 63 ; (2001) 208 CLR 199 
Outcome: cited
purpose of an interlocutory injunction is to preserve the status quo until trial when the rights of the parties can be determined: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Limited [2001] HCA 63 ; (2001) 208 CLR 199.
Case: Castlemaine Tooheys Limited v South Australia [1986] HCA 58 ; (1986) 161 CLR 148
Outcome: referred to
Castlemaine Tooheys Limited v South Australia [1986] HCA 58 ; (1986) 161 CLR 148 at 153, Mason ACJ identified the principles which govern the grant or refusal of an interlocutory injunction in both private and public law litigation. He said: In order to secure such an injunction the plaintiff must show (1) that there is a serious question to be tried or that the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, in the sense that if the evidence remains as it is there is a probability that at the trial of the action the plaintiff will be held entitled to relief; (2) that he will suffer irreparable injury for which damages will not be an adequate compensation unless an injunction is granted; and (3) that the balance of convenience favours the granting of an injunction.
Case: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill [2006] HCA 46 ; (2006) 227 CLR 57
Outcome: applied
principles were addressed by the High Court in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill [2006] HCA 46 ; (2006) 227 CLR 57 where Gummow and Hayne JJ said at [65]: The relevant principles in Australia are those explained in Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd . This Court (Kitto, Taylor, Menzies and Owen JJ) said that on such applications the court addresses itself to two main inquiries and continued: The first is whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, in the sense that if the evidence remains as it is there is a probability that at the tiral of the action the plaintiff will be held entitled to relief ... The second inquiry is ... whether the inconvenience or injury which the plaintiff would be likely to suffer if an injunction were refused outweighs or is outweighed by the injury which the defendant would suffer if an injunction were granted. By using the phrase "prima facie case", their Honours did not mean that the plaintiff must show that it is more probable than not that at trial the plaintiff will succeed; it is sufficient that the plaintiff show a sufficient likelihood of success to justify in the circumstances the preservation of the status quo pending the trial. That this was the sense in which the Court was referring to the notion of a prima facie case is apparent from an observation to that effect made by Kitto J in the course of argument. With reference to the first inquiry, the Court continued, in a statement of central importance for this appeal: How strong the probability needs to be depends, no doubt, upon the nature of the rights [the plaintiff] asserts and the practical consequences likely to flow from the order he seeks. (Footnotes omitted.)
Case: Nangkiriny v State of Western Australia (2002) 117 FCR 6 ; [2002] FCA 660
Outcome: cited
The power under s 87(1)(c) has been exercised in a variety of circumstances. In some cases it has been exercised after the Court has reserved its decision following the hearing of all the evidence: Nangkiriny v State of Western Australia (2002) 117 FCR 6 ; [2002] FCA 660. In such cases the Court has before it material on which to assess the appropriateness of the orders sought by consent. 18 Whilst the particular circumstances of each application require individual consideration, some principles are generally applicable. In Lovett it was said at [36] [37]: 36. The focus of the section is on the making of an agreement by the parties. This reflects the importance placed by the Act on mediation as the primary means of resolving native title applications. Indeed, Parliament has established the National Native Title Tribunal with the function of conducting mediations in such cases. The Act is designed to encourage parties to take responsibility for resolving proceedings without the need for litigation. Section 87 must be construed in this context. The power must be exercised flexibly and with regard to the purpose for which the section is designed. 37. In this context, when the Court is examining the appropriateness of an agreement, it is not required to examine whether the agreement is grounded on a factual basis which would satisfy the Court at a hearing of the application. The primary consideration of the Court is to determine whether there is an agreement and whether it was freely entered into on an informed basis: Nangkiriny v State of Western Australia (2002) 117 FCR 6 ; [2002] FCA 660 , Ward v State of Western Australia [2006] FCA 1848.
Case: Ward v State of Western Australia [2006] FCA 1848
Outcome: cited
At the other end of the spectrum are cases where the Court has no evidence before it of the underlying claim but only evidence of the agreement of the parties: Ward v State of Western Australia [2006] FCA 1848. 18 Whilst the particular circumstances of each application require individual consideration, some principles are generally applicable. In Lovett it was said at [36] [37]: 36. The focus of the section is on the making of an agreement by the parties. This reflects the importance placed by the Act on mediation as the primary means of resolving native title applications. Indeed, Parliament has established the National Native Title Tribunal with the function of conducting mediations in such cases. The Act is designed to encourage parties to take responsibility for resolving proceedings without the need for litigation. Section 87 must be construed in this context. The power must be exercised flexibly and with regard to the purpose for which the section is designed. 37. In this context, when the Court is examining the appropriateness of an agreement, it is not required to examine whether the agreement is grounded on a factual basis which would satisfy the Court at a hearing of the application. The primary consideration of the Court is to determine whether there is an agreement and whether it was freely entered into on an informed basis: Nangkiriny v State of Western Australia (2002) 117 FCR 6 ; [2002] FCA 660 , Ward v State of Western Australia [2006] FCA 1848.
Case: Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v DAP Services (Kempsey) Pty Ltd (2007) 157 FCR 564
Outcome: cited
One method for assessing damages is the licence fee or royalty method. Under this approach, the owner of the copyright recovers "a sum equal to the fee that would fairly be charged for use of the copyright work": TS&amp;B at [206]. As Vawdrey properly conceded, such a method is often rejected if the court takes the view that the applicant would not have granted such a licence to the respondent because, for example, the parties are competitors or the copyright work was devised for a particular purpose and that purpose was frustrated or destroyed by the infringing use of the work by the respondent: see Bailey v Namol 53 FCR at 112 (concluding that lost profits is the better measure of damages where the copyright work was created for a specific purposes which has been frustrated by the infringement) and TS&amp;B at [206] (stating that the a lost profits approach is preferable to a licence fee approach where the plaintiff and infringer are "in actual or potential competition in relation to the copyright work"). See also Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v DAP Services (Kempsey) Pty Ltd (2007) 157 FCR 564 at [27]-[29]; Norm Engineering Pty Ltd v Digga Australia Pty Ltd (2007) 162 FCR 1 at [257], appeal allowed in part on other grounds at 166 FCR 268.
Case: Bialkower v Acohs Pty Ltd (1998) 83 FCR 1
Outcome: referred to
Dowsett J helpfully canvassed the principal tort authorities in Louis Vuitton at [148]-[170]; see also Bialkower v Acohs Pty Ltd (1998) 83 FCR 1 , 12. In deciding whether two defendants should be held jointly liable for copyright infringement, his Honour also relied on The Koursk , concluding that it must be shown that they acted in concert; that is, that there was a "concurrence in the act or acts causing damage, not merely a coincidence of separate acts which by their conjoined effect cause damage": Louis Vuitton at [171]. Again, this is such a case. Camerons and Vawdrey concurred in the acts which caused Krueger the damage of which it complains; there was more than a coincidence of separate acts joining together to cause damage to Krueger. Accordingly, each of Camerons and Vawdrey is jointly and severally liable for the copyright infringement.
Case: BUC International Corp v International Yacht Council Ltd (11 th Cir 2008) 571 F3d 1271
Outcome: approved
However, as Krueger accepted in this case, the amount that was received by Krueger in settlement from Camerons must be deducted from any damages awarded against Vawdrey for the same infringement in recognition of the elementary principle of tort law allowing only one recovery for a wrong: BUC International Corp v International Yacht Council Ltd (11 th Cir 2008) 571 F3d 1271, 1278; see also Baxter v Obacelo Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 66 ; (2001) 205 CLR 635 at [37] (per Gleeson CJ and Callinan J) and at [64] (per Gummow and Hayne JJ) (describing the bar against double satisfaction as a universal rule and accepting that credit must given for any amount received in settlement from a co-ordinately liable tortfeasor). Accordingly, any final award of damages must reflect a deduction of the principal sum (but not interest) received by Krueger from Camerons in settlement of the claims against the Cameron parties. 27 As noted earlier, Krueger elected to take damages and seeks two categories of damages: compensatory damages under s 115(2) of the Copyright Act , including damages for loss of goodwill and mitigation costs, and additional damages under s 115(4) of the Copyright Act .
Case: Boyapati v Rockefeller Management Corporation [2008] FCA 995
Outcome: cited
This section has been the subject of previous judicial analysis: e.g. Golden Editions Pty Ltd v Polygram Pty Ltd (1996) 61 FCR 479 ; see also Boyapati v Rockefeller Management Corporation [2008] FCA 995 ; Milwell Pty Ltd v Olympic Amusements Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 63 ; (1999) 85 FCR 436 ; Sheldon &amp; Hammond Pty Ltd v Metrokane Inc [1999] FCA 63 ; (2004) 85 FCR 436 ; Cody Opal (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dimasi (2004) 64 IPR 378 ; Kalamazoo (Aust) Pty Ltd v Compact Business Systems Pty Ltd (1985) 84 FLR 101. Adopting the language of Burchett and Tamberlin JJ in Golden Editions at 480 when considering a s 115(3) defence: [I]n general the question is not whether [Vawdrey] knew the identity of the owner of the copyright but whether [Vawdrey] has established a lack of awareness, and of reasonable grounds for suspecting, that the relevant act was an infringement of the copyright, in whomsoever that copyright might be vested. (Emphasis added.)
Case: Cody Opal (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dimasi (2004) 64 IPR 378
Outcome: cited
This section has been the subject of previous judicial analysis: e.g. Golden Editions Pty Ltd v Polygram Pty Ltd (1996) 61 FCR 479 ; see also Boyapati v Rockefeller Management Corporation [2008] FCA 995 ; Milwell Pty Ltd v Olympic Amusements Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 63 ; (1999) 85 FCR 436 ; Sheldon &amp; Hammond Pty Ltd v Metrokane Inc [1999] FCA 63 ; (2004) 85 FCR 436 ; Cody Opal (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dimasi (2004) 64 IPR 378 ; Kalamazoo (Aust) Pty Ltd v Compact Business Systems Pty Ltd (1985) 84 FLR 101. Adopting the language of Burchett and Tamberlin JJ in Golden Editions at 480 when considering a s 115(3) defence: [I]n general the question is not whether [Vawdrey] knew the identity of the owner of the copyright but whether [Vawdrey] has established a lack of awareness, and of reasonable grounds for suspecting, that the relevant act was an infringement of the copyright, in whomsoever that copyright might be vested. (Emphasis added.)
Case: Golden Editions Pty Ltd v Polygram Pty Ltd (1996) 61 FCR 479
Outcome: applied
This section has been the subject of previous judicial analysis: e.g. Golden Editions Pty Ltd v Polygram Pty Ltd (1996) 61 FCR 479 ; see also Boyapati v Rockefeller Management Corporation [2008] FCA 995 ; Milwell Pty Ltd v Olympic Amusements Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 63 ; (1999) 85 FCR 436 ; Sheldon &amp; Hammond Pty Ltd v Metrokane Inc [1999] FCA 63 ; (2004) 85 FCR 436 ; Cody Opal (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dimasi (2004) 64 IPR 378 ; Kalamazoo (Aust) Pty Ltd v Compact Business Systems Pty Ltd (1985) 84 FLR 101. Adopting the language of Burchett and Tamberlin JJ in Golden Editions at 480 when considering a s 115(3) defence: [I]n general the question is not whether [Vawdrey] knew the identity of the owner of the copyright but whether [Vawdrey] has established a lack of awareness, and of reasonable grounds for suspecting, that the relevant act was an infringement of the copyright, in whomsoever that copyright might be vested. (Emphasis added.)
Case: Kalamazoo (Aust) Pty Ltd v Compact Business Systems Pty Ltd (1985) 84 FLR 101
Outcome: cited
This section has been the subject of previous judicial analysis: e.g. Golden Editions Pty Ltd v Polygram Pty Ltd (1996) 61 FCR 479 ; see also Boyapati v Rockefeller Management Corporation [2008] FCA 995 ; Milwell Pty Ltd v Olympic Amusements Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 63 ; (1999) 85 FCR 436 ; Sheldon &amp; Hammond Pty Ltd v Metrokane Inc [1999] FCA 63 ; (2004) 85 FCR 436 ; Cody Opal (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dimasi (2004) 64 IPR 378 ; Kalamazoo (Aust) Pty Ltd v Compact Business Systems Pty Ltd (1985) 84 FLR 101. Adopting the language of Burchett and Tamberlin JJ in Golden Editions at 480 when considering a s 115(3) defence: [I]n general the question is not whether [Vawdrey] knew the identity of the owner of the copyright but whether [Vawdrey] has established a lack of awareness, and of reasonable grounds for suspecting, that the relevant act was an infringement of the copyright, in whomsoever that copyright might be vested. (Emphasis added.)
Case: LED Builders Pty Ltd v Eagle Homes Pty Ltd (1996) 35 IPR 215
Outcome: referred to
Vawdrey's submission at this hearing that because it did not have "direct access or reference to, or direct knowledge of, the ... Kruger Drawings ... there can be no basis to conclude that Vawdrey had direct knowledge of the ... Drawings or ... of any copyright in them" is also rejected. Merely stating the argument demonstrates the fundamental flaws in it. First, there can be copyright infringement without direct access to the copyright work, and this was such a case: see [132] of the reasons for decision, citing LED Builders Pty Ltd v Eagle Homes Pty Ltd (1996) 35 IPR 215 , 225; see also Tamawood Ltd v Henley Arch Pty Ltd (2004) 61 IPR 378 at [21].
Case: Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v Toea Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1443 ; (2006) 156 FCR 158
Outcome: followed
In the present case, there is a single course of infringement (the creation of the Vawdrey Engineering Drawings and the resulting manufacture of trailers) of a single copyright (the Krueger Drawings). Both Camerons and Vawdrey joined in that infringement in that Vawdrey could not have completed its drawings and manufacture without receiving instructions, based on the Krueger Drawings, from Camerons, and Camerons could not have completed the infringement without the execution by Vawdrey of those instructions. Each participated in committing the wrong of which Krueger now complains and thus the liability of each for the damage sustained by Krueger as a consequence of commission of that wrong is to be determined as if each was a joint tortfeasor with the other: The Koursk [1924] P 140 , cited with approval in Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v Toea Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1443 ; (2006) 156 FCR 158 at [149] ; see also Balkin and Davis, Law of Torts (3rd 2004) at [29.24]-[29.41]. 25 Dowsett J helpfully canvassed the principal tort authorities in Louis Vuitton at [148]-[170]; see also Bialkower v Acohs Pty Ltd (1998) 83 FCR 1 , 12. In deciding whether two defendants should be held jointly liable for copyright infringement, his Honour also relied on The Koursk , concluding that it must be shown that they acted in concert; that is, that there was a "concurrence in the act or acts causing damage, not merely a coincidence of separate acts which by their conjoined effect cause damage": Louis Vuitton at [171]. Again, this is such a case. Camerons and Vawdrey concurred in the acts which caused Krueger the damage of which it complains; there was more than a coincidence of separate acts joining together to cause damage to Krueger. Accordingly, each of Camerons and Vawdrey is jointly and severally liable for the copyright infringement.
Case: Milwell Pty Ltd v Olympic Amusements Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 63 ; (1999) 85 FCR 436
Outcome: cited
This section has been the subject of previous judicial analysis: e.g. Golden Editions Pty Ltd v Polygram Pty Ltd (1996) 61 FCR 479 ; see also Boyapati v Rockefeller Management Corporation [2008] FCA 995 ; Milwell Pty Ltd v Olympic Amusements Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 63 ; (1999) 85 FCR 436 ; Sheldon &amp; Hammond Pty Ltd v Metrokane Inc [1999] FCA 63 ; (2004) 85 FCR 436 ; Cody Opal (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dimasi (2004) 64 IPR 378 ; Kalamazoo (Aust) Pty Ltd v Compact Business Systems Pty Ltd (1985) 84 FLR 101. Adopting the language of Burchett and Tamberlin JJ in Golden Editions at 480 when considering a s 115(3) defence: [I]n general the question is not whether [Vawdrey] knew the identity of the owner of the copyright but whether [Vawdrey] has established a lack of awareness, and of reasonable grounds for suspecting, that the relevant act was an infringement of the copyright, in whomsoever that copyright might be vested. (Emphasis added.)
Case: Norm Engineering Pty Ltd v Digga Australia Pty Ltd (2007) 162 FCR 1
Outcome: cited
One method for assessing damages is the licence fee or royalty method. Under this approach, the owner of the copyright recovers "a sum equal to the fee that would fairly be charged for use of the copyright work": TS&amp;B at [206]. As Vawdrey properly conceded, such a method is often rejected if the court takes the view that the applicant would not have granted such a licence to the respondent because, for example, the parties are competitors or the copyright work was devised for a particular purpose and that purpose was frustrated or destroyed by the infringing use of the work by the respondent: see Bailey v Namol 53 FCR at 112 (concluding that lost profits is the better measure of damages where the copyright work was created for a specific purposes which has been frustrated by the infringement) and TS&amp;B at [206] (stating that the a lost profits approach is preferable to a licence fee approach where the plaintiff and infringer are "in actual or potential competition in relation to the copyright work"). See also Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v DAP Services (Kempsey) Pty Ltd (2007) 157 FCR 564 at [27]-[29]; Norm Engineering Pty Ltd v Digga Australia Pty Ltd (2007) 162 FCR 1 at [257], appeal allowed in part on other grounds at 166 FCR 268.
Case: Sheldon &amp;Hammond Pty Ltd v Metrokane Inc [1999] FCA 63 ; (2004) 85 FCR 436
Outcome: cited
This section has been the subject of previous judicial analysis: e.g. Golden Editions Pty Ltd v Polygram Pty Ltd (1996) 61 FCR 479 ; see also Boyapati v Rockefeller Management Corporation [2008] FCA 995 ; Milwell Pty Ltd v Olympic Amusements Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 63 ; (1999) 85 FCR 436 ; Sheldon &amp; Hammond Pty Ltd v Metrokane Inc [1999] FCA 63 ; (2004) 85 FCR 436 ; Cody Opal (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dimasi (2004) 64 IPR 378 ; Kalamazoo (Aust) Pty Ltd v Compact Business Systems Pty Ltd (1985) 84 FLR 101. Adopting the language of Burchett and Tamberlin JJ in Golden Editions at 480 when considering a s 115(3) defence: [I]n general the question is not whether [Vawdrey] knew the identity of the owner of the copyright but whether [Vawdrey] has established a lack of awareness, and of reasonable grounds for suspecting, that the relevant act was an infringement of the copyright, in whomsoever that copyright might be vested. (Emphasis added.)
Case: Tamawood Ltd v Henley Arch Pty Ltd (2004) 61 IPR 378
Outcome: referred to
Vawdrey's submission at this hearing that because it did not have "direct access or reference to, or direct knowledge of, the ... Kruger Drawings ... there can be no basis to conclude that Vawdrey had direct knowledge of the ... Drawings or ... of any copyright in them" is also rejected. Merely stating the argument demonstrates the fundamental flaws in it. First, there can be copyright infringement without direct access to the copyright work, and this was such a case: see [132] of the reasons for decision, citing LED Builders Pty Ltd v Eagle Homes Pty Ltd (1996) 35 IPR 215 , 225; see also Tamawood Ltd v Henley Arch Pty Ltd (2004) 61 IPR 378 at [21].