Case: Batistatos v Road Traffic Authority of New South Wales [2006] HCA 27
Outcome: applied
is clear that superior courts of justice, including the Federal Court of Australia, have the power to control and supervise proceedings brought within their jurisdiction, including the power to stay proceedings which are an abuse of process (cf Jago v District Court (NSW) [1989] HCA 46 ; (1989) 168 CLR 23 per Mason CJ at 25, 28, Deane J at 58, Gaudron J at 74, 76; Williams v Spautz [1992] HCA 34 ; (1991-1992) 174 CLR 509 at 518 per Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ; Walton v Gardiner [1992] HCA 12 ; (1992-1993) 177 CLR 378 at 393; Lord Diplock in Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police (1982) AC 529 at 536; Miller v University of New South Wales [2003] FCAFC 180 at [77-81] ; and note the consideration of this issue by the majority of the High Court in Batistatos v Road Traffic Authority of New South Wales [2006] HCA 27 at [5-8] and by Kirby J at [121-128]). There was no suggestion at any stage of the case that the plaintiff had acted vexatiously, or that there had been an abuse of process in any sense other than that the defendants had been irretrievably prejudiced by reason of the delay in the commencement of the proceedings. The majority noted the application of s 52 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) suspending the running of limitation periods for the duration of a person's disability. They noted also however: 'the "right" of the plaintiff with a common law claim to institute an action is not at large. It is subject to the operation of the whole of the applicable procedural and substantive law administered by the court, whose processes are enlivened in the particular circumstances. This includes the principles respecting abuse of process.' [[2006] HCA 27 at [65]] In concluding that there was no error of principle in the decision of the Court of Appeal, the majority of the High Court said: '... in the circumstance of the present case, attention must be directed to the burdensome effect upon the defendants of the situation that has arisen by lapse of time. The Court of Appeal held that this was so serious that a fair trial was not possible. The result was that to permit the plaintiff's case to proceed would clearly inflict unnecessary injustice upon the defendants. What Deane J said in Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Company Inc v Fay [1988] HCA 32 ; (1988) 165 CLR 197 at 247, with respect to the staying of local proceedings, is applicable also to a case such as the present one. His Honour emphasised that there is no 'requirement that the continuance of the action would involve moral delinquency on the part of the plaintiff'; what was decisive was the objective effect of the continuation of the action. In assessing that effect there must be taken into account the consideration expressed by Dixon in Cox v Journeaux [No 2] [1935] HCA 48 ; (1935) 52 CLR 713 and set out earlier in these reasons. Bryson JA in terms did so. He went on to remark in that connection that the defendants had not shown that the plaintiff's action was "clearly without foundation". But, he concluded that there was "in practical terms nothing of utility to place in the balance against the defendants' claim for a permanent stay.' [[2006] HCA 27 at [69-71]]