Case: Harris v Newcastle-upon-Tyne Health Authority [1989] 2 All ER 273
Outcome: cited
The main issue that was argued before me was whether, within the meaning of O 15A r 6, there is reasonable cause to believe that the respondents may have the right to obtain relief from KPMG. On this question, some preliminary observations can be made: &#8226; It is necessary to examine the various elements of the potential cause of action that is sought to be relied upon to determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that each of the necessary elements exist. That task requires the Court to conclude at least that there is a reasonable cause to believe that each of the elements of the relevant cause of action might be established. The test is an objective one, and it is not necessary to prove that each of the elements do in fact exist. The rule contemplates that there be reasonable cause to believe that the respondents may have a right to obtain relief: see Austrac Operations Pty Ltd v New South Wales [2003] ATPR 41-960 at [11] and Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd v Page Kirkland Management Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 288 at [5] . &#8226; If the cause of action on which an application for preliminary discovery is based could not succeed, is bound to fail, is ill-founded or is doomed to fail, then discovery ought not be ordered: Bradley v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd [1989] 1 All ER 961 at 963 to 964; Harris v Newcastle-upon-Tyne Health Authority [1989] 2 All ER 273 at 277. If the potential cause of action would not survive an application for summary judgment pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 ('Federal Court Act'), then discovery ought not to be ordered. &#8226; "Belief" under O 15A r 6 requires more than mere assertion, a "hunch", conjecture or suspicion. Belief is an inclination of the mind towards assenting to, rather than rejecting, a proposition: see: John Holland Services Pty Ltd v Terranora Group Management Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 679 at [13] to [14]; St George Bank Ltd v Rabo Australia Ltd (2004) 211 ALR 147 at 154. &#8226; The availability of preliminary discovery under O 15A r 6 depends upon the evidence before the Court. . The evidence must incline the mind towards the matter of fact in question: see Austrac Operations [2003] ATPR at [37]; John Holland Services [2004] FCA at [13] to [14], [17] and [73] and St George v Rabo 211 ALR at 154. &#8226; The rule is one which should be construed beneficially. In Paxus Services Ltd v People Bank Pty Ltd (1990) 99 ALR 728 at 733 Burchett J said: It is no answer to the applicant's application under r 6 to say that the proceeding is in the nature of a fishing expedition: cf Meth v Norbert Steinhardt &amp; Son Ltd (1959) 33 ALJR 78 at 81. Rule 6 is designed to enable an applicant, in a situation where his proof can rise no higher than the level the rule describes, to ascertain whether he has a case against the prospective respondent -- that is, to "fish" in the old sense... It would be unfortunate if a rule designed to amplify the court's power to penetrate obscurities and uncertainties in the interests of justice were to be weakened by restrictive and unnecessary glosses. I think the rule is of a beneficial kind within the meaning of the well known principle of interpretation, and should be given the fullest scope its language will reasonably allow. The proper brake on any excesses in its use is the discretion of the court, which is required to be exercised in the particular circumstances of each case. See also CGU Insurance Ltd v Malaysia International Shipping Corporation Berhad (2001) 187 ALR 279 at [23] per Tamberlin J.