Case: Commissioner for Superannuation v Scott (1987) 71 ALR 408 
Outcome: applied
The Tribunal next drew attention to the following dicta of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (comprising Deputy President R A Layton and B C Lock and J T B Linn as members) in Re Schlatter and Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority and Brown (1985) 8 ALD 133 at 136, in a context of eligibility for defence force retirement pension and death benefits, where dependency was explained as 'a financial concept as distinct from an emotional concept...' . To similar effect in Commissioner for Superannuation v Scott (1987) 71 ALR 408, the notions of 'financial dependency', 'necessities of life' and 'lower order needs' were emphasised . Those authorities were apparently cited to the Tribunal by the Trustee for the propositions that the statutory notion of 'dependence' the subject of ss 8A and 8B of the Superannuation Act relates to financial support for 'necessities of life' or 'lower order needs' and that 'financial dependence' , in the situation of an applicant for relief meant being 'primarily, essentially or in the main dependent upon the person' . Moreover the words 'in the main' were said by the Tribunal to indicate that total dependence is not required, and further that the Tribunal indicated its expectation that so much would be less so for the notion of ' substantially dependent ' (the s 8A(4)(a) expression) than for financial dependence without qualification. As for the terms ' necessities of life ' and ' lower order needs ', the Tribunal considered on the other hand that the same should not be taken to mean ' bare necessities' , that is, the minimum needed to survive in indigent circumstances. Faull was said by the Tribunal to seemingly support the view in any event that a more reasonable interpretation should be adopted having regard to the person's station in life, and the Tribunal observed indeed in that context of its reasoning as follows: 'There is no suggestion from the evidence that the [appellant's] lifestyle was excessive, yet she appears to have been having some difficulties in meeting her normal expenditure without the financial support given by the [deceased].' 24 Nevertheless in the Tribunal's concluding view, the position here involved was properly addressed and dealt with by Scott, the reasoning whereof the Tribunal purportedly adopted. The Tribunal summarised the reasoning in Scott on what may be described as the 'wholly or substantially dependent' issue (that is, picking up reference to 'wholly and substantially ' in s 8A(4)(a)) as follows: 'In that case, the Federal Court was considering the meaning of the expression "wholly or substantially dependent" in the definition of "spouse" in s 3 of the Relevant Act (as it then was; the current s 3 does not contain a definition of "spouse"). The Court came to the view that where the word "substantially" finds its place in the phrase "wholly or substantially dependent", it must be construed having regard to the whole phrase. This was because where the word "substantially" is placed within that phrase, connotations of the term "substantially" is governed by the conjugational position of the word "wholly" immediately before it. In other words, that "substantial" does not stand alone, but is related to "wholly". On this basis, the Court came to the view that "substantially" does not simply mean something more than trivial, minimal or nominal, instead it meant in relation to a person in the expression "wholly or substantially dependent" that the person is primarily, essentially or in the main dependent upon a person (that is, upon the Deceased Member). The Court also cautioned against the use of percentage and instead suggested as the approach to consider whether the person (the Complainant) is primarily, essentially or in the main dependent upon the other person (the Deceased Member) in the context of that particular relationship.' The Tribunal proceeded to point out that the foregoing view as to whole or substantial dependence, summarised by the Full Federal Court in Scott , was applied in the context of the joint judgment of Branson and Hely JJ in Graovac .