mdroth/huggingface-course_section-5_zst huggingface dataset:
Case: Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs Ex parte Lam [2003] HCA 6 ; (2003) 214 CLR 1 
Outcome: referred to
Part of the Minister's challenge to the judgment under appeal involves a challenge to findings, if this is what they were, that were in the nature of findings of fact or mixed fact and law. This Court must make its own assessment in light of the judgment under appeal. In a case of this kind, the appellate court is in as good a position as the Federal Magistrate to form a view about any facts in issue: compare Warren v Coombes [1979] HCA 9 ; (1979) 142 CLR 531 at 551-552 per Gibbs ACJ, Jacobs and Murphy JJ and Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22 ; (2003) 214 CLR 118 at 127 per Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ. 62 Although the position in Australia may differ from that in England, the decision in Wednesbury Corporation would support the proposition that an exercise of power that is unreasonable in this sense may ground a finding of jurisdictional error. In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30 ; (2001) 206 CLR 323 at 352, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ held that the concept of jurisdictional error relevant in the present context derives from the general law, as explained in Craig v The State of South Australia [1995] HCA 58 ; (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179. Craig did not refer expressly to Wednesbury unreasonableness, but the High Court accepted that the list of errors to which Craig referred was not exhaustive. In any event, the reference in Craig to the fact that, in some circumstances, erroneous findings or mistaken conclusions provide a ground of error may cover this form of error. This would be consistent with earlier authoritative statements: see Parramatta City Council v Pesell [1972] HCA 59 ; (1972) 128 CLR 305 at 323 per Menzies, 327 per Gibbs J and 332 per Stephen J; Attorney-General (New South Wales) v Quin [1990] HCA 21 ; (1990) 170 CLR 1 at 35-36 per Brennan J; Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40 ; (1986) 162 CLR 24 (" Peko-Wallsend ") at 41 per Mason J and the authorities there mentioned; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21 ; (1999) 197 CLR 611 at 626-627 per Gleeson CJ and McHugh J, 640-641 per Gaudron and Kirby JJ, 648-657 per Gummow J, 669-673 per Callinan J; Abebe v Commonwealth [1999] HCA 14 ; (1999) 197 CLR 510 at 554 per Gaudron J, 583-584 per Kirby J (but see 654, 656-657 per Gummow J); Corporation of the City of Einfield v Development Assistance Commission [2000] HCA 5 ; (2000) 199 CLR 135 at 152-154 per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, and Hayne JJ; Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs Ex parte Lam [2003] HCA 6 ; (2003) 214 CLR 1 at 23 per McHugh and Gummow JJ; Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 198 ALR 59 at 62 per Gleeson CJ, 67 and 76 per McHugh and Gummow JJ and 90-91 per Kirby J.
Case: Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 198 ALR 59
Outcome: referred to
Although the position in Australia may differ from that in England, the decision in Wednesbury Corporation would support the proposition that an exercise of power that is unreasonable in this sense may ground a finding of jurisdictional error. In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30 ; (2001) 206 CLR 323 at 352, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ held that the concept of jurisdictional error relevant in the present context derives from the general law, as explained in Craig v The State of South Australia [1995] HCA 58 ; (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179. Craig did not refer expressly to Wednesbury unreasonableness, but the High Court accepted that the list of errors to which Craig referred was not exhaustive. In any event, the reference in Craig to the fact that, in some circumstances, erroneous findings or mistaken conclusions provide a ground of error may cover this form of error. This would be consistent with earlier authoritative statements: see Parramatta City Council v Pesell [1972] HCA 59 ; (1972) 128 CLR 305 at 323 per Menzies, 327 per Gibbs J and 332 per Stephen J; Attorney-General (New South Wales) v Quin [1990] HCA 21 ; (1990) 170 CLR 1 at 35-36 per Brennan J; Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40 ; (1986) 162 CLR 24 (" Peko-Wallsend ") at 41 per Mason J and the authorities there mentioned; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21 ; (1999) 197 CLR 611 at 626-627 per Gleeson CJ and McHugh J, 640-641 per Gaudron and Kirby JJ, 648-657 per Gummow J, 669-673 per Callinan J; Abebe v Commonwealth [1999] HCA 14 ; (1999) 197 CLR 510 at 554 per Gaudron J, 583-584 per Kirby J (but see 654, 656-657 per Gummow J); Corporation of the City of Einfield v Development Assistance Commission [2000] HCA 5 ; (2000) 199 CLR 135 at 152-154 per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, and Hayne JJ; Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs Ex parte Lam [2003] HCA 6 ; (2003) 214 CLR 1 at 23 per McHugh and Gummow JJ; Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 198 ALR 59 at 62 per Gleeson CJ, 67 and 76 per McHugh and Gummow JJ and 90-91 per Kirby J.
Case: Detsongjarus v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1990) 21 ALD 139
Outcome: referred to
The concept of vitiating unreasonableness has been extended to the manner in which a decision was made. Thus, a failure by a decision-maker to obtain important information on a critical issue, which the decision-maker knows or ought reasonably to know is readily available, may be characterized as so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker would proceeded to make the decision without making the enquiry: see Prasad at 169-170 per Wilcox J; Videto v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 8 FCR 167 (" Videto ") at 178 per Toohey J; Luu v Renevier (1989) 91 ALR 39 (" Luu v Renevier ") at 47-50 per Davies, Wilcox and Pincus JJ; Detsongjarus v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1990) 21 ALD 139 (" Detsongjarus ") at 143 per Pincus J; Rahman at [30] per French J; Tickner v Bropho (1993) 40 FCR 183 at 197-198 per Black CJ; Ahamed v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1325 at [12] per French J; Yang v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 258 ; (2003) 132 FCR 571 (" Yang ") at 579 per Ryan and Finkelstein JJ. This proposition is also discussed in other cases, such as Li v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 74 FCR 275 at 288 per Foster J and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh [1995] HCA 20 ; (1995) 183 CLR 273 at 289-90 per Mason CJ and Deane J and 321 per McHugh J. In this circumstance what vitiates the decision is the manner in which it was made. Since this is a limited proposition, it does not conflict with the larger statement that the Tribunal is under no general duty with respect to making enquiries: see Prasad at 169-170 per Wilcox J and Azzi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 24 ; (2002) 120 FCR 48 at 73-74 per Allsop J; but contrast SZEGT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1514 at [20] - [22] per Edmonds J. 65 Wilcox J adhered to his approach in Prasad in Sun v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 81 FCR 71 at 119. See also Foxtel Management Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2000) 173 ALR 362 at 417 per Wilcox J. Prasad and such cases as Videto , Luu v Renevier and Detsongjarus were proceedings under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ('the Judicial Review Act'). Although not on all fours with the common law, the grounds of review under that Act reflect, to some extent, the common law grounds for judicial review: see Peko-Wallsend at 39-42 per Mason J. The discussion in these cases is of some assistance therefore in the present context.
Case: Tickner v Bropho (1993) 40 FCR 183
Outcome: referred to
The concept of vitiating unreasonableness has been extended to the manner in which a decision was made. Thus, a failure by a decision-maker to obtain important information on a critical issue, which the decision-maker knows or ought reasonably to know is readily available, may be characterized as so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker would proceeded to make the decision without making the enquiry: see Prasad at 169-170 per Wilcox J; Videto v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 8 FCR 167 (" Videto ") at 178 per Toohey J; Luu v Renevier (1989) 91 ALR 39 (" Luu v Renevier ") at 47-50 per Davies, Wilcox and Pincus JJ; Detsongjarus v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1990) 21 ALD 139 (" Detsongjarus ") at 143 per Pincus J; Rahman at [30] per French J; Tickner v Bropho (1993) 40 FCR 183 at 197-198 per Black CJ; Ahamed v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1325 at [12] per French J; Yang v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 258 ; (2003) 132 FCR 571 (" Yang ") at 579 per Ryan and Finkelstein JJ. This proposition is also discussed in other cases, such as Li v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 74 FCR 275 at 288 per Foster J and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh [1995] HCA 20 ; (1995) 183 CLR 273 at 289-90 per Mason CJ and Deane J and 321 per McHugh J. In this circumstance what vitiates the decision is the manner in which it was made. Since this is a limited proposition, it does not conflict with the larger statement that the Tribunal is under no general duty with respect to making enquiries: see Prasad at 169-170 per Wilcox J and Azzi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 24 ; (2002) 120 FCR 48 at 73-74 per Allsop J; but contrast SZEGT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1514 at [20] - [22] per Edmonds J.
Case: Ahamed v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1325
Outcome: referred to
The concept of vitiating unreasonableness has been extended to the manner in which a decision was made. Thus, a failure by a decision-maker to obtain important information on a critical issue, which the decision-maker knows or ought reasonably to know is readily available, may be characterized as so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker would proceeded to make the decision without making the enquiry: see Prasad at 169-170 per Wilcox J; Videto v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 8 FCR 167 (" Videto ") at 178 per Toohey J; Luu v Renevier (1989) 91 ALR 39 (" Luu v Renevier ") at 47-50 per Davies, Wilcox and Pincus JJ; Detsongjarus v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1990) 21 ALD 139 (" Detsongjarus ") at 143 per Pincus J; Rahman at [30] per French J; Tickner v Bropho (1993) 40 FCR 183 at 197-198 per Black CJ; Ahamed v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1325 at [12] per French J; Yang v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 258 ; (2003) 132 FCR 571 (" Yang ") at 579 per Ryan and Finkelstein JJ. This proposition is also discussed in other cases, such as Li v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 74 FCR 275 at 288 per Foster J and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh [1995] HCA 20 ; (1995) 183 CLR 273 at 289-90 per Mason CJ and Deane J and 321 per McHugh J. In this circumstance what vitiates the decision is the manner in which it was made. Since this is a limited proposition, it does not conflict with the larger statement that the Tribunal is under no general duty with respect to making enquiries: see Prasad at 169-170 per Wilcox J and Azzi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 24 ; (2002) 120 FCR 48 at 73-74 per Allsop J; but contrast SZEGT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1514 at [20] - [22] per Edmonds J.
Case: Li v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 74 FCR 275
Outcome: referred to
The concept of vitiating unreasonableness has been extended to the manner in which a decision was made. Thus, a failure by a decision-maker to obtain important information on a critical issue, which the decision-maker knows or ought reasonably to know is readily available, may be characterized as so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker would proceeded to make the decision without making the enquiry: see Prasad at 169-170 per Wilcox J; Videto v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 8 FCR 167 (" Videto ") at 178 per Toohey J; Luu v Renevier (1989) 91 ALR 39 (" Luu v Renevier ") at 47-50 per Davies, Wilcox and Pincus JJ; Detsongjarus v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1990) 21 ALD 139 (" Detsongjarus ") at 143 per Pincus J; Rahman at [30] per French J; Tickner v Bropho (1993) 40 FCR 183 at 197-198 per Black CJ; Ahamed v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1325 at [12] per French J; Yang v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 258 ; (2003) 132 FCR 571 (" Yang ") at 579 per Ryan and Finkelstein JJ. This proposition is also discussed in other cases, such as Li v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 74 FCR 275 at 288 per Foster J and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh [1995] HCA 20 ; (1995) 183 CLR 273 at 289-90 per Mason CJ and Deane J and 321 per McHugh J. In this circumstance what vitiates the decision is the manner in which it was made. Since this is a limited proposition, it does not conflict with the larger statement that the Tribunal is under no general duty with respect to making enquiries: see Prasad at 169-170 per Wilcox J and Azzi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 24 ; (2002) 120 FCR 48 at 73-74 per Allsop J; but contrast SZEGT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1514 at [20] - [22] per Edmonds J.
Case: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh [1995] HCA 20 ; (1995) 183 CLR 273
Outcome: cited
The concept of vitiating unreasonableness has been extended to the manner in which a decision was made. Thus, a failure by a decision-maker to obtain important information on a critical issue, which the decision-maker knows or ought reasonably to know is readily available, may be characterized as so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker would proceeded to make the decision without making the enquiry: see Prasad at 169-170 per Wilcox J; Videto v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 8 FCR 167 (" Videto ") at 178 per Toohey J; Luu v Renevier (1989) 91 ALR 39 (" Luu v Renevier ") at 47-50 per Davies, Wilcox and Pincus JJ; Detsongjarus v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1990) 21 ALD 139 (" Detsongjarus ") at 143 per Pincus J; Rahman at [30] per French J; Tickner v Bropho (1993) 40 FCR 183 at 197-198 per Black CJ; Ahamed v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1325 at [12] per French J; Yang v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 258 ; (2003) 132 FCR 571 (" Yang ") at 579 per Ryan and Finkelstein JJ. This proposition is also discussed in other cases, such as Li v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 74 FCR 275 at 288 per Foster J and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh [1995] HCA 20 ; (1995) 183 CLR 273 at 289-90 per Mason CJ and Deane J and 321 per McHugh J. In this circumstance what vitiates the decision is the manner in which it was made. Since this is a limited proposition, it does not conflict with the larger statement that the Tribunal is under no general duty with respect to making enquiries: see Prasad at 169-170 per Wilcox J and Azzi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 24 ; (2002) 120 FCR 48 at 73-74 per Allsop J; but contrast SZEGT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1514 at [20] - [22] per Edmonds J.
Case: Azzi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 24 ; (2002) 120 FCR 48
Outcome: referred to
The concept of vitiating unreasonableness has been extended to the manner in which a decision was made. Thus, a failure by a decision-maker to obtain important information on a critical issue, which the decision-maker knows or ought reasonably to know is readily available, may be characterized as so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker would proceeded to make the decision without making the enquiry: see Prasad at 169-170 per Wilcox J; Videto v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 8 FCR 167 (" Videto ") at 178 per Toohey J; Luu v Renevier (1989) 91 ALR 39 (" Luu v Renevier ") at 47-50 per Davies, Wilcox and Pincus JJ; Detsongjarus v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1990) 21 ALD 139 (" Detsongjarus ") at 143 per Pincus J; Rahman at [30] per French J; Tickner v Bropho (1993) 40 FCR 183 at 197-198 per Black CJ; Ahamed v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1325 at [12] per French J; Yang v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 258 ; (2003) 132 FCR 571 (" Yang ") at 579 per Ryan and Finkelstein JJ. This proposition is also discussed in other cases, such as Li v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 74 FCR 275 at 288 per Foster J and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh [1995] HCA 20 ; (1995) 183 CLR 273 at 289-90 per Mason CJ and Deane J and 321 per McHugh J. In this circumstance what vitiates the decision is the manner in which it was made. Since this is a limited proposition, it does not conflict with the larger statement that the Tribunal is under no general duty with respect to making enquiries: see Prasad at 169-170 per Wilcox J and Azzi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 24 ; (2002) 120 FCR 48 at 73-74 per Allsop J; but contrast SZEGT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1514 at [20] - [22] per Edmonds J.
Case: SZEGT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1514
Outcome: cited
The concept of vitiating unreasonableness has been extended to the manner in which a decision was made. Thus, a failure by a decision-maker to obtain important information on a critical issue, which the decision-maker knows or ought reasonably to know is readily available, may be characterized as so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker would proceeded to make the decision without making the enquiry: see Prasad at 169-170 per Wilcox J; Videto v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 8 FCR 167 (" Videto ") at 178 per Toohey J; Luu v Renevier (1989) 91 ALR 39 (" Luu v Renevier ") at 47-50 per Davies, Wilcox and Pincus JJ; Detsongjarus v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1990) 21 ALD 139 (" Detsongjarus ") at 143 per Pincus J; Rahman at [30] per French J; Tickner v Bropho (1993) 40 FCR 183 at 197-198 per Black CJ; Ahamed v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1325 at [12] per French J; Yang v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 258 ; (2003) 132 FCR 571 (" Yang ") at 579 per Ryan and Finkelstein JJ. This proposition is also discussed in other cases, such as Li v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 74 FCR 275 at 288 per Foster J and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh [1995] HCA 20 ; (1995) 183 CLR 273 at 289-90 per Mason CJ and Deane J and 321 per McHugh J. In this circumstance what vitiates the decision is the manner in which it was made. Since this is a limited proposition, it does not conflict with the larger statement that the Tribunal is under no general duty with respect to making enquiries: see Prasad at 169-170 per Wilcox J and Azzi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 24 ; (2002) 120 FCR 48 at 73-74 per Allsop J; but contrast SZEGT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1514 at [20] - [22] per Edmonds J.
Case: Sun v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 81 FCR 71
Outcome: referred to
Wilcox J adhered to his approach in Prasad in Sun v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 81 FCR 71 at 119. See also Foxtel Management Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2000) 173 ALR 362 at 417 per Wilcox J. Prasad and such cases as Videto , Luu v Renevier and Detsongjarus were proceedings under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ('the Judicial Review Act'). Although not on all fours with the common law, the grounds of review under that Act reflect, to some extent, the common law grounds for judicial review: see Peko-Wallsend at 39-42 per Mason J. The discussion in these cases is of some assistance therefore in the present context.
Case: Foxtel Management Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2000) 173 ALR 362
Outcome: referred to
Wilcox J adhered to his approach in Prasad in Sun v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 81 FCR 71 at 119. See also Foxtel Management Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2000) 173 ALR 362 at 417 per Wilcox J. Prasad and such cases as Videto , Luu v Renevier and Detsongjarus were proceedings under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ('the Judicial Review Act'). Although not on all fours with the common law, the grounds of review under that Act reflect, to some extent, the common law grounds for judicial review: see Peko-Wallsend at 39-42 per Mason J. The discussion in these cases is of some assistance therefore in the present context.
Case: NAZH v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2007] FCA 5
Outcome: referred to
The jurisdictional error in this case may possibly be formulated in other ways. It is well established that the Tribunal must consider all the substantive issues raised by the evidence before it, even if the applicant does not clearly articulate all such claims: see NAZH v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2007] FCA 5 at [51] per Madgwick J; MZWPD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 1095 at [69] - [85] per Weinberg J; SBBA v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 90 at [8] per Weinberg, Stone and Jacobson JJ; and Sellamuthu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 247 ; (1999) 90 FCR 287 at 294 per Wilcox and Madgwick JJ. In the present case, it could well be said that the Tribunal did not consider whether the primary decision-maker's perception of what had occurred at the Departmental interview was fundamentally defective because of the mistranslation of Mr Nguyen's statement. As we have seen, this issue was clearly raised on the evidence, including specifically by Mr Nguyen. As this possibility was not the subject of argument, it is unnecessary to consider it further.