Case: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21 ; (1999) 197 CLR 611
Outcome: followed
Observations made in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21 ; (1999) 197 CLR 611 ( Eshetu ) and S20 are, in my view, relevant to both grounds. 259 In Eshetu , at [40], Gleeson CJ and McHugh J stated: Someone who disagrees strongly with someone else's process of reasoning on an issue of fact may express such disagreement by describing the reasoning as "illogical" or "unreasonable", or even "so unreasonable that no reasonable person could adopt it". If these are merely emphatic ways of saying that the reasoning is wrong, then they may have no particular legal consequence. 260 In S20 , after referring to Eshetu , Gleeson CJ stated (at [5]) that if it is suggested that there is a legal consequence of illogical, unreasonable or irrational reasoning: [I]t may be necessary to be more precise as to the nature and quality of the error attributed to the decision-maker, and to identify the legal principle or statutory provision that attracts the suggested consequence. 389 I addressed the question of the duty imposed on ACCC by para (b) of s 152DB(1) in the Earlier Reasons at [164]-[166] where I said: I regard s 152DB(1) as a general exhortatory provision: it exhorts ACCC to strive to achieve broad objectives. Some of those broad objectives, at least if regarded in isolation, are antithetical to one another. The notions of "speed", "proper consideration of the dispute", "careful inquiry and investigation", "quick inquiry and investigation", "inquiry into and investigation of ... all matters affecting the merits" (emphasis added) and "fairness" pull in different directions: cf the discussion of ss 420 and 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in Sun Zhan Qui v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, Lindgren J, 6 May 1997) at 39-41, and see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611 at [49] per Gleeson CJ and McHugh J. It may be noted in passing that achievement of the objectives depends not only on the diligence, awareness and qualifications of ACCC officers: it also depends on the levels of funding and workload of ACCC as they respectively exist at any particular time and from time to time. I do not imply, however, that these extraneous considerations have the potential to give rise to a fluctuating construction of s 152DB(1)(b). I find it difficult to conceive of circumstances in which a court would find that a failure to achieve the goal of speed or that of carefulness would, without more, provide a ground for the granting of relief in respect of an administrative decision. Surely the person aggrieved would have to show that the failure had had consequences in terms of one of the recognised grounds of judicial review. For example, absence of care (perhaps arising indirectly from excessive speed) could give rise to an overlooking of a relevant consideration or a failure to accord procedural fairness. It is not obvious what ground of judicial review, if any, might arise directly from a failure to act "speedily" or to inquire "quickly". It is another question whether the decision-maker could invoke the requirement of speed "in defence" against the consequences, in terms of grounds of judicial review, of a lack of care, but it is to be doubted. [My emphasis] I see no reason why my comments in the first sentence of [166] of the Earlier Reasons do not apply to the Failure to Inquire Ground.