Case: Walton v Gardiner [1992] HCA 12 ; (1993) 177 CLR 378
Outcome: followed
His Honour concluded that the substantive application had no merit at all. I am of opinion that that is an unimpeachably correct finding. In Walton v Gardiner [1992] HCA 12 ; (1993) 177 CLR 378 at 392-393 Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ said: 'The inherent jurisdiction of a superior court to stay its proceedings on grounds of abuse of process extends to all those categories of cases in which the processes and procedures of the court, which exist to administer justice with fairness and impartiality, may be converted into instruments of injustice or unfairness. Thus, it has long been established that, regardless of the propriety of the purpose of the person responsible for their institution and maintenance, proceedings will constitute an abuse of process if they can be clearly seen to be foredoomed to fail (see e.g. Metropolitan Bank v Pooley (1885) 10 App Cas 210 at pp 220-221; General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways ( NSW) [1964] HCA 69 ; (1964) 112 CLR 125 at pp 128-130). Again, proceedings within the jurisdiction of a court will be unjustifiably oppressive and vexatious of an objecting defendant, and will constitute an abuse of process, if that court is, in all the circumstances of the particular case, a clearly inappropriate forum to entertain them (see, generally, Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd [1990] HCA 55 ; (1990) 171 CLR 538). Yet again, proceedings before a court should be stayed as an abuse of process if, notwithstanding that the circumstances do not give rise to an estoppel, their continuance would be unjustifiably vexatious and oppressive for the reason that it is sought to litigate anew a case which has already been disposed of by earlier proceedings (see e.g. Reichel v Magrath (1889) 14 App Cas 665 at p 668; Connelly v Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] AC 1254 at pp 1361-1362). The jurisdiction of a superior court in such a case was correctly described by Lord Diplock in Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police ([1982] AC 529 at p 536) as the "the inherent power which any court of justice must possess to prevent misuse of its procedure in a way which, although not inconsistent with the literal application of its procedural rules, would nevertheless be manifestly unfair to a party to litigation before it, or would otherwise bring the administration of justice into disrepute among right-thinking people".' 9 The basis on which the applicant sought leave to appeal is set out in his affidavit sworn 12 December 2005 and the draft notice of appeal of the same date. Before I embarked on the hearing of this matter I had the matter called outside the court. The applicant was given notice in a letter from the court dated 23 February 2006 that the matter would be heard today. Mr Markus who appears for the Minister, informed me that he had received a copy of that letter in his office on 24 February. Mr Markus said no communication had been received from the applicant in relation to today's hearing and there is no record of the court of any such communication. 10 The notice of appeal asserts that the trial Judge in the Federal Magistrates Court erred in holding that the delegate of the Minister had not given a biased decision based or that the original decision was not full of unreasonable and illogical applications in the delegate's mind.