Case: Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (1995) 57 FCR 119
Outcome: cited
My attention was drawn by counsel for the respondent to Order 62 Rule 4(2)(c), and to the observations of von Doussa J in Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (1995) 57 FCR 119 concerning the evident purpose of the Court's power to make costs orders of the kind here presently sought by the respondent, that being to avoid an ongoing counter productive dispute, in the interests of achieving finality, subject always to the need to ensure that unreasonable amounts of costs are not pursued and awarded. I have not approached the task of assessment akin to that of a detailed 'taxation', which cannot sensibly be the judicial task set by the Court Rules, but rather from the perspective of an overview of the nature and extent of the relating broad issues which fell upon me for resolution, being misconceived issues nevertheless of some complexity, raised unsuccessfully by the applicants for resolution at the final hearing of the proceedings. I refer of course to what appears in the detailed reasons apparent in my reasons for judgment of 20 December 2004. 15 Judgment should clearly enough be entered in principle in favour of the respondent and thus adversely to the applicants, in relation to the totality of its legal costs reasonably incurred. My conspectus of the amount of those costs, broadly undertaken in the light of the nature and extent of the issues raised by the applicants in the principal proceedings, leaves little room for any reasonable quantum of adjustment downwards of the assessment of professional costs and disbursements which has been assembled in the material in evidence before me. Adopting a broad approach generally in line with that taken by von Doussa J in Beach Petroleum , albeit that the size of the proceedings there involved was incomparable to that litigated before me, yet nevertheless taking into account the degree of complexity of the proceedings occasioned by the purported issues raised by the applicants, I would assess the costs and disbursements of the respondent broadly in the sum of $20,400 inclusive of counsel's fees, that sum being of course not far short of the total amount claimed, but nevertheless taking into account the respondent's concession. In reaching that figure, I have also considered the submissions of the applicants contained in their notice of objections to the respondent's bill of costs, those being the only submissions before me from the applicants on the costs sought. 16 That leaves unresolved the costs of the present interlocutory proceedings commenced by the respondent by notice of motion filed on 21 October 2005, in relation to which, as I have already recorded, there was no appearance by the applicants. The conduct of the applicants since the conclusion of the hearing, which I have briefly outlined, renders it inevitable that a further adverse order as to the costs of the present application must be made in principle in favour of the respondent, as is sought in its notice of motion filed on 21 October 2005. I say ' in principle ' for the further reason that it is traditional for a successful party to receive on taxation, an award of costs and disbursements incurred in the course of the taxation process, and it was I think reasonable in the circumstances for the respondent to have sought recourse to Order 62 rule 4(2). I certify that the preceding sixteen (16) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Conti. Associate: Dated: 1 February 2006 The Applicants did not appear. Counsel for the Respondent: Mr P T Russell Solicitor for the Respondent: Barringer Leather Lawyers Date of Hearing: 22 November 2005 Date of Judgment: 1 February 2006 AustLII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/2006/26.html