Case: Crystal Dawn Pty Ltd v Redruth Pty Ltd [1998] QCA 373
Outcome: considered
In Crystal Dawn Pty Ltd v Redruth Pty Ltd [1998] QCA 373 , Muir J, with whom Pincus JA and Williams J agreed, said at par [14]: 'The learned primary judge's failure to give reasons will, if raised by the applicants in their notice of appeal, be a matter for consideration on the appeal but in my view, it is relevant to the question of whether there should be an extension of time within which to appeal. Muir J noted: 'It is well established that there is a duty on the part of judicial tribunals to give reasons for their decisions and that failure to give reasons which ought to be given amounts to appellable error ...' His Honour continued: '[16] In Cypressvale Pty Ltd v Retail Shop Lease Tribunal [1966] 1 Qd R 462 at 483, McPherson and Davies JJA observed "The extent of the duty to give reasons is affected by the function that is served by the giving of reasons. The requirement is considered an incident of the judicial process, the hallmark of which is, as McHugh JA stressed in Soulemezis (1987) 10 NSWLR 247, 278-279,' the quality of rationality', which is what serves to distinguish a judicial decision from an arbitrary decision. The giving of reasons is thus an aspect of judicial accountability, which was identified by his Honour in Soulemezis as the second of the three purposes served by the judicial duty of giving of reasons. The first, his Honour said, is that 'it enables the parties to see the extent to which their arguments have been understood and accepted, as well as the basis of the judge's decision'. The third is that judicial reasoning provides a precedent for the decision of future cases. See, to similar effect, what was said by Mahoney JA in the same case: Soulemezis, at 269, referred to with approval in Sun Alliance Insurance Ltd v Massoud [1988] VR 8, 19, in the Full Court of Victoria." [17] The obligation to give reasons may be affected by the way in which proceedings are conducted. For example, the primary judge may indicate that it is not proposed that reasons be given and there may be a tacit acceptance of this by counsel for the parties. For a discussion of qualifications to the general duty to give reasons see the observations of Mahoney P in Kiama Constructions v Davey (1996) 40 NSWLR 639 at 640. In this case there is no suggestion that there was anything in the way in which the matter was conducted which would lead to the conclusion that the normal principles or expectations in respect of the giving of reasons would not apply. Without wishing to limit the general obligation to give reasons, even on interlocutory matters, I note that the decision under consideration had the potential to prevent the applicants from pursuing the action and was thus one in respect of which reasons should have been given. [18] In my view it is undesirable that there be a judicial determination adverse to a litigant which significantly affects the litigant's rights without reasons being provided for that determination. For that reasons alone I would grant the extension of time. [19] I do not consider the failure on the part of the applicants' counsel at first instance to request reasons to be a matter which negates the concern I have just expressed. The bearing of the absence of reasons on the outcome of the appeal will be a matter for the Court which hears the appeal.'