mdroth/huggingface-course_section-5_zst huggingface dataset:
Case: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40 ; (1986) 162 CLR 24 
Outcome: cited
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40 ; (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 42 Mason J noted that the Court should proceed with caution in cases where it was suggested that a decision-maker had erred by giving too much or too little weight to particular considerations '... lest it exceed its supervisory role by reviewing the decision on its merits'. He said that a close analogy existed between the judicial review of administrative action and appellate review of a judicial discretion. He pointed to the fact that in cases of the latter kind appellate courts could review discretionary judgments that had failed to give proper weight to a particular matter, but were slow to do so because the mere preference for a different result was not sufficient to disturb the exercise of the discretion by the judge at first instance (162 CLR at 42).
Case: Australian Communist Party v The Commonwealth [1951] HCA 5 ; (1951) 83 CLR 1 
Outcome: applied
a court exercising its power to review an administrative decision concludes that, in accordance with the above principles, the decision is 'unreasonable' its conclusion must be a finding that in truth the power conferred by the statute has not been exercised and so a jurisdictional error has occurred. This a feature of the rule of law which forms a fundamental assumption upon which the Constitution is based: Australian Communist Party v The Commonwealth [1951] HCA 5 ; (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 193 per Dixon J; Plaintiff S157/2002 v The Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2 ; (2003) 211 CLR 476 at 513-514 [103] - [104] per Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ. The recognition by the Parliament, in statutory provisions like ss 368 and 430 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), that administrative decision-makers should give reasons for their decision and set out their findings, is a reminder to administrative decision-makers of an important aspect of the rule of law: namely, that they must provide the justification, in the reasons required by the statute to be given, for the exercise of the power with which they have been entrusted. And, the requirement to provide reasons is a means of ensuring that courts, when exercising the power of judicial review, are not obliged to approach their consideration of the exercise of the discretion in the same speculative way as in a case like Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1949] HCA 26 ; (1949) 78 CLR 353 at 360.
Case: Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1949] HCA 26 ; (1949) 78 CLR 353 
Outcome: applied
in Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1949] HCA 26 ; (1949) 78 CLR 353 at 360, Dixon J said, in a case where the Commissioner was not required to give reasons, that: 'The conclusion that he has reached may, on a full consideration of the material that was before him, be found to be capable of explanation only on the ground of some such misconception. If the result appears to be unreasonable on the supposition that he addressed himself to the right question, correctly applied the rules of law and took into account all the relevant considerations and no irrelevant considerations, then it may be a proper inference that it is a false supposition. It is not necessary that you should be sure of the precise particular in which he has gone wrong. It is enough that you can see that in some way he must have failed in the discharge of his exact function according to law.' When a court exercising its power to review an administrative decision concludes that, in accordance with the above principles, the decision is 'unreasonable' its conclusion must be a finding that in truth the power conferred by the statute has not been exercised and so a jurisdictional error has occurred. This a feature of the rule of law which forms a fundamental assumption upon which the Constitution is based: Australian Communist Party v The Commonwealth [1951] HCA 5 ; (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 193 per Dixon J; Plaintiff S157/2002 v The Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2 ; (2003) 211 CLR 476 at 513-514 [103] - [104] per Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ. The recognition by the Parliament, in statutory provisions like ss 368 and 430 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), that administrative decision-makers should give reasons for their decision and set out their findings, is a reminder to administrative decision-makers of an important aspect of the rule of law: namely, that they must provide the justification, in the reasons required by the statute to be given, for the exercise of the power with which they have been entrusted. And, the requirement to provide reasons is a means of ensuring that courts, when exercising the power of judicial review, are not obliged to approach their consideration of the exercise of the discretion in the same speculative way as in a case like Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1949] HCA 26 ; (1949) 78 CLR 353 at 360.
Case: Kumaraperu v Minister for Immigration (1998) 88 FCR 381
Outcome: cited
I had begun delivering lengthy ex tempore reasons at the conclusion of the hearing, I formed the opinion that I was not able to decide the appeal without further assistance. Accordingly, I reserved my decision. I withdraw any oral reasons. As I have noted above, I was then of the view that the Tribunal had made two jurisdictional errors, one in respect of cl 845.216, the other in respect of the appellant's English language. In that context I directed the parties to make any further submissions about whether the grant of relief would be futile because, even if the language issue were revisited the appellant had no realistic prospect of obtaining the 20 extra points he needed: cf: Kumaraperu v Minister for Immigration (1998) 88 FCR 381 at 396G per Weinberg J and Peng v Minister for Immigration [2000] FCA 1672 ; (2000) 105 FCR 63 at 67 [14] per Hely J.
Case: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21 ; (1999) 197 CLR 611
Outcome: applied
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21 ; (1999) 197 CLR 611 at 627 [44] per Gleeson CJ and McHugh J, 656-657 [144]-[147] per Gummow J, 672-673 [194] per Callinan J, the distinction between a decision which the court finds no reasonable decision-maker could have come to and one which the court considers simply to be unreasonable, was discussed. The latter characterization involves a broad spectrum at the extreme end of which may be found decisions of the former category in the sense of unreasonableness of the kind recognized in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1947] EWCA Civ 1 ; [1948] 1 KB 223 at 230. The existence of that spectrum reminds the courts that between its extreme ends are many categories of decision with which courts might not agree or which they could regard as unreasonable but which a reasonable person could have made. The latter category of decision is immunized from judicial review because the legislature has confided to the decision-maker the task of forming the opinion or arriving at the state of satisfaction on the materials before him or her.
Case: Minister for Immigration v SGLB [2004] HCA 32 ; (2004) 207 ALR 12 
Outcome: applied
in Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 198 ALR 59 at 67 [36]-[37], McHugh and Gummow JJ, having applied the passage just cited said that the particular circumstances disclosed by the written statement required by s 430 (here s 368) of the Act was important in this regard (see too at 198 ALR at 71 [52], 98 [173] per Callinan J agreeing). In Minister for Immigration v SGLB [2004] HCA 32 ; (2004) 207 ALR 12 at 20 [38] Gummow and Hayne JJ said that: '...the critical question is whether the determination was irrational, illogical and not based on findings or inferences of fact supported by logical grounds ( Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant 20/2002 (2003) 198 ALR 59 at 67 [37], 71 [52], 98 [173]). If the decision did display these defects, it will be no answer that the determination was reached in good faith ... However, inadequacy of the material before the decision-maker concerning the attainment of that satisfaction is insufficient in itself to establish jurisdictional error.'
Case: Minister for Immigration v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30 ; (2001) 206 CLR 323
Outcome: applied
Minister for Immigration v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30 ; (2001) 206 CLR 323 at 346 [69] McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ referred to s 430 of the Act, a cognate provision of s 368. They said that: 'The Tribunal's identification of what it considered to be the material questions of fact may demonstrate that it took into account some irrelevant consideration or did not take into account some relevant consideration.' (emphasis in original)
Case: Norbis v Norbis [1986] HCA 17 ; (1986) 161 CLR 513 
Outcome: considered
decision-making, of its nature, involves the formation of value judgments as to such matters as credibility, the strength or compellingness of the particular case, the importance of consistency in decision-making and the simple formation of the relevant opinion which the statute prescribes as the occasion for the exercise of the power. Thus, s 65 of the Act requires the Minister, as the decision-maker, to be satisfied of particular matters if she is to grant a visa. Value judgments are ones in respect of which there is room for reasonable differences of opinion, no particular opinion being uniquely right: cp Norbis v Norbis [1986] HCA 17 ; (1986) 161 CLR 513 at 518 per Mason and Deane JJ; 540-541 per Brennan J; see too at 535 per Wilson and Dawson JJ. As Brennan J said, there is no difference in principle between the review of a judicial discretion and the review of an administrative discretion (161 CLR at 540). He pointed out that if a discretionary power were exercised in a way which a reasonable repository of the power might exercise it, that exercise of power is supported by the statute which conferred it, whether the discretion be judicial or administrative in nature. Brennan J went on to point out that appellate courts were more familiar with the usual confines within which judicial discretions might be exercised and were therefore more sensitive to an unreasonable exercise of such a discretion and more confident of their ability to detect error in its exercise. He said: 'It is harder to be satisfied that an administrative body has acted unreasonably, particularly when the administrative discretion is wide in its scope or is affected by policies of which the court has no experience.' (161 CLR at 541)
Case: Peng v Minister for Immigration [2000] FCA 1672 ; (2000) 105 FCR 63 
Outcome: cited
I had begun delivering lengthy ex tempore reasons at the conclusion of the hearing, I formed the opinion that I was not able to decide the appeal without further assistance. Accordingly, I reserved my decision. I withdraw any oral reasons. As I have noted above, I was then of the view that the Tribunal had made two jurisdictional errors, one in respect of cl 845.216, the other in respect of the appellant's English language. In that context I directed the parties to make any further submissions about whether the grant of relief would be futile because, even if the language issue were revisited the appellant had no realistic prospect of obtaining the 20 extra points he needed: cf: Kumaraperu v Minister for Immigration (1998) 88 FCR 381 at 396G per Weinberg J and Peng v Minister for Immigration [2000] FCA 1672 ; (2000) 105 FCR 63 at 67 [14] per Hely J.
Case: Plaintiff S157/2002 v The Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2 ; (2003) 211 CLR 476
Outcome: followed
a court exercising its power to review an administrative decision concludes that, in accordance with the above principles, the decision is 'unreasonable' its conclusion must be a finding that in truth the power conferred by the statute has not been exercised and so a jurisdictional error has occurred. This a feature of the rule of law which forms a fundamental assumption upon which the Constitution is based: Australian Communist Party v The Commonwealth [1951] HCA 5 ; (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 193 per Dixon J; Plaintiff S157/2002 v The Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2 ; (2003) 211 CLR 476 at 513-514 [103] - [104] per Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ. The recognition by the Parliament, in statutory provisions like ss 368 and 430 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), that administrative decision-makers should give reasons for their decision and set out their findings, is a reminder to administrative decision-makers of an important aspect of the rule of law: namely, that they must provide the justification, in the reasons required by the statute to be given, for the exercise of the power with which they have been entrusted. And, the requirement to provide reasons is a means of ensuring that courts, when exercising the power of judicial review, are not obliged to approach their consideration of the exercise of the discretion in the same speculative way as in a case like Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1949] HCA 26 ; (1949) 78 CLR 353 at 360. At the very least the Tribunal's conclusion that it was not satisfied that the appellant had met the criteria in cl 845.216 ensured that he could not be granted the visa because s 65(1) so provided. The Tribunal was required to conduct its review according to law. And a failure to do so is a failure to follow the requirements which the Tribunal had to follow in order to come to a decision that could be valid. The Tribunal had an imperative duty to consider the criteria which the Act and Regulations prescribed and to form a view on those criteria for the purposes of conducting its review: see Plaintiff S157/2002 v The Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2 ; (2003) 211 CLR 476 at 506 [76] . It did not do so and committed a jurisdictional error for the reasons I have given.
Case: R v Australian Stevedoring Industry Board; Ex parte Melbourne Stevedoring Co Ltd [1953] HCA 22 ; (1953) 88 CLR 100 
Outcome: applied
inadequacy of the material relied on by an administrative decision-maker while, not itself, being a ground for prohibition is a circumstance which may support, in a case like the present, the inference that the Tribunal was applying the wrong test or was not in reality satisfied of the requisite matters. As Dixon CJ, Williams, Webb and Fullagar JJ held in R v Australian Stevedoring Industry Board; Ex parte Melbourne Stevedoring Co Pty Ltd [1953] HCA 22 ; (1953) 88 CLR 100 at 120: 'If there are other indications that this is so or that the purpose of the function committed to the tribunal is misconceived it is but a short step to the conclusion that in truth the power has not arisen because the conditions for its exercise do not exist in law and in fact.'
Case: Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 198 ALR 59 
Outcome: applied
in Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 198 ALR 59 at 67 [36]-[37], McHugh and Gummow JJ, having applied the passage just cited said that the particular circumstances disclosed by the written statement required by s 430 (here s 368) of the Act was important in this regard (see too at 198 ALR at 71 [52], 98 [173] per Callinan J agreeing). In Minister for Immigration v SGLB [2004] HCA 32 ; (2004) 207 ALR 12 at 20 [38] Gummow and Hayne JJ said that: '...the critical question is whether the determination was irrational, illogical and not based on findings or inferences of fact supported by logical grounds ( Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant 20/2002 (2003) 198 ALR 59 at 67 [37], 71 [52], 98 [173]). If the decision did display these defects, it will be no answer that the determination was reached in good faith ... However, inadequacy of the material before the decision-maker concerning the attainment of that satisfaction is insufficient in itself to establish jurisdictional error.'
Case: Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs Ex parte Palme [2003] HCA 56 ; (2003) 216 CLR 212 
Outcome: cited
a decision-maker does not give any reason for his or her decision, the court may be able to infer that he or she had no good reason ( Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs Ex parte Palme [2003] HCA 56 ; (2003) 216 CLR 212 at 224 [39] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Heydon JJ).
Case: Stead v State Government Insurance Commission [1986] HCA 54 ; (1986) 161 CLR 141
Outcome: applied
am not satisfied that the appellant has suffered no injustice ( SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 215 ALR at 184 [80], 203 [170], 212 [211]) having regard to the jurisdictional error I have found and to the fact that on reconsideration he may be able to satisfy the Tribunal conducting the review in accordance with law of the matters which it had previously not been satisfied about under the points test. I am not confident that the jurisdictional error I have found could have had no bearing on the outcome and thus I should not refuse relief: Stead v State Government Insurance Commission [1986] HCA 54 ; (1986) 161 CLR 141 at 145, 147.
Case: SZEEU v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 2 ; (2006) 150 FCR 214 
Outcome: applied
SZEEU v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 2 ; (2006) 150 FCR 214 at 265 [231] - [233] Allsop J, (with whom Weinberg J agreed on this point at 150 FCR 252 [155]) considered the consequences of failure to comply with the operation of s 424A of the Act. He held that if it could be shown that there was a basis for the Tribunal's decision which could be seen to be entirely independent of a failure to follow the requirements of procedural fairness mandated by s 424A , then by analogy with the reasons of Gaudron and Gummow JJ in Re Refugee Review Tribunal Ex parte Aala [2000] HCA 57 ; (2000) 204 CLR 82 at 108-110 [57] - [62] and, in particular at 109 [58], the court could withhold constitutional or prerogative writ relief in the exercise of its discretion.
Case: SZEPZ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCAFC 107
Outcome: applied
question of how the review, if one is ordered, is to be further conducted, would be a matter for a member constituting the Tribunal for the purposes of that review. In a similar context, a Full Court of this court recently considered, when a matter was remitted by the court, what the Refugee Review Tribunal was required to do when further conducting the review, and whether it was obliged to start afresh or was entitled to take account of what had already been looked at by the Tribunal, differently constituted on the earlier occasion, whose decision had been set aside by a consent order made by the court: SZEPZ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCAFC 107. I am of opinion that when a matter is remitted (under Div 4 Pt 5 of the Act) to the Tribunal for further hearing and determination according to law, similar reasoning applies. The way in which that review is undertaken is similar to the task of the Refugee Review Tribunal in like circumstances see: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Wang [2003] HCA 11 ; (2003) 215 CLR 518 and SZEPZ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCAFC 107 (see esp at [35]-[36]).
Case: Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design and Developments Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 55 ; [2006] 231 ALR 663
Outcome: followed
One of the claims in the first category is that the Federal Magistrate who heard the case did so in a way which demonstrated actual bias or reasonably apprehended bias. In Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design and Developments Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 55 ; (2006) 231 ALR 663, the High Court of Australia dealt with a claim, which had been upheld by the Full Federal Court of Australia, that a judge of that court had conducted himself in a way which would give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. In the course of giving their judgment in the appeal, Crennan and Kirby JJ, with whom Gummow ACJ agreed on the point, stated at [117]: "An intermediate appellant court dealing with allegations of apprehended bias, coupled with other discrete grounds of appeal must deal with the issue of bias first". Accordingly, I must deal first with the bias claims made on behalf of the appellant. I note, however, that it is the second group of claims which address the question of whether the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal is tainted with appealable error. Were I to uphold the claim of bias (see Concrete at [117]), it would seem that the proper course would be for me to send the matter back for reconsideration by the Federal Magistrates Court rather than to deal with the substantive issue relating to the validity of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal. 9 I propose to say at the outset that I think that the claim of bias, whether actual or apprehended, is entirely without foundation. I have read large parts of the transcript which has been put before me and I have, in particular, read all the parts of the transcript that were specifically referred to by the appellant's solicitor and to the parts of the transcript that are reproduced in the appellant's written submissions. I had played to me a substantial section of the recording of the hearing and had the opportunity to listen to that while I read through the recorded parts as they appeared in the written transcript. My first impression of my reading of the transcript and of listening to the recording of the hearing was that the proceeding took place in a way which is entirely normal and acceptable and in a way which occurs in courts in Australia every day of the week. 10 I particularly thought that in the way she addressed the appellant's solicitor, the learned Federal Magistrate proceeded with moderation. I did not notice her at any stage to raise her voice in any way that was untoward. The appellant has urged upon me that from time to time she interrupted. All I can say about that is that if interruptions by judges of counsel can give rise to a claim of apprehended bias, then there would be very many such claims that could be made. I noticed, although the appellant's solicitor did not refer to it, that there were occasions when he interrupted the Federal Magistrate.