Case: Guo Wei Rong v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1995) 38 ALD 38
Outcome: cited
The Tribunal's reasons " are not to be construed minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error" : Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 280 at 287. They are to be read fairly as a whole and not over zealously: Minister for Immigration &amp; Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6 ; (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 271-272. Moreover, the reasons are not required to refer expressly to every argument and all the evidence that might be relevant to its determination of factual issues: cf Guo Wei Rong v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1995) 38 ALD 38 at 52-53. 48 In the present case, it cannot be said that the Tribunal's reasons for decision were formulaic. All of the medical reports were read by the Tribunal and the basis on which the Tribunal approached the question of medical reports in its reasons for decision was identified. The fact that the Tribunal referred to extracts from some medical reports and failed to mention other medical reports does not, of itself, constitute an error of law: cf Guo Wei Rong at 52-53. No error of law was identified. 49 In submissions, Mr Samaras placed considerable emphasis on the failure of the Tribunal's reasons for decision to refer to a medical report provided by his treating general practitioner, Dr Elean To dated 9 August 2005. That medical report stated: "I believe that [Mr Samaras] has a significant degree of multiple medical illnesses that warrants him unable to work, he has multiple conditions affecting his heart, lungs, mobility, back, hips, mental state, depressions, stomach etc. I believe the ongoing disability that [Mr Samaras] suffers cannot possibly allow him to return to work. He cannot be retrained in other fields of education. He will not make significant recovery in the future to enable him to work as the nature of most of his conditions are that they are irreversible or will worsen with time." 50 The failure of the Tribunal to mention this report is not surprising. It was dated 9 August 2005, the date of the decision of the Trustee, and on its face did not address or contain material relevant to either limb of the definition of TPD. The illnesses were described in only the most general of terms. No attempt was made to identify which illnesses existed when Mr Samaras was insured and which of those illnesses affected his capacity to work in August 2005. In any event, the mere failure to mention this specific report did not, of itself, constitute an error of law: cf Guo Wei Rong at 52-53. 51 The second aspect of Mr Samaras' complaint under this ground of appeal was that taking into account all of the medical reports, the Tribunal could not reasonably have found that the Trustee's decision was fair and reasonable. That contention is unfounded. Once the proper construction of the definition of TPD is identified, much of the medical evidence referred to by Mr Samaras was irrelevant because it concerned illnesses which were not present in Mr Samaras while he was insured. Those illnesses were identified by the Tribunal as hip pain, gastritis, osteopaenia and fibromyalgia. 52 In relation to the illnesses that were present in Mr Samaras while he was insured, the Tribunal listed each illness and then reviewed the medical evidence to determine whether the decisions of the Trustee and the Insurer to reject Mr Samaras' claim for a TPD benefit were fair and reasonable in their operation to Mr Samaras in the circumstances. Such an approach was consistent with authority: see [20] above. The Tribunal was not required or indeed permitted to determine whether the Trustee's decision was the correct or preferable one or whether Mr Samaras, in its opinion, suffered disablement that came within the Policy or the Deed. No error of law was identified.