Case: Hooper v Kirella Pty Ltd; Transfield Pty Ltd v Airservices Australia [1999] FCA 1584 ; (1999) 96 FCR 1
Outcome: referred to
In St George Bank Ltd v Rabo Australia Ltd (2004) 211 ALR 147 Hely J stated a series of propositions which his Honour considered had emerged from the authorities in relation to the proper application of Order 15A rule 6 at [26] as follows: '(a) the rule is to be beneficially construed, given the fullest scope that its language will reasonably allow, with the proper brake on any excesses lying in the discretion of the court, exercised in the particular circumstances of each case: Paxus Services Ltd v People Bank Pty Ltd (1990) 99 ALR 728 at 733; 20 IPR 79 at 85; Minister for Health and Aged Care v Harrington Associates Ltd [1999] FCA 549 ; BC9902167 at [27]; (b) each of the elements prescribed in subparas (a), (b) and (c) of the rule must be established: Hooper v Kirella Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1584 ; (1999) 96 FCR 1 at 11 [38] ; 167 ALR 385 at 367; [1999] FCA 1584 ; 47 IPR 21 at 30. Preliminary discovery cannot itself be used to remedy deficiencies in the satisfaction of the conditions themselves: Airservices Australia v Transfield Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 886 ; (1999) 92 FCR 200 at 202 3 [5]; [1999] FCA 886 ; 164 ALR 330 at 332; (c) the test for determining whether the applicant has "reasonable cause to believe", as required by subpara (a), is an objective one: Hooper at FCR 11 12 [39]; ALR 367; IPR 30; Malouf v Malouf [1999] FCA 710 ; BC9902833 at [16]; Quanta Software International Pty Ltd v Computer Management Services Pty Ltd (2000) 175 ALR 536 at 541-2 [24]; 49 IPR 25 at 31; Alphapharm Pty Ltd v Eli Lilly Australia Pty Ltd [1996] FCA 391 ; BC9602085 at 23. Further, the words "or may have" cannot be ignored. The applicant does not have to make out a prima facie case: Quanta Software at ALR 541-2 [24]; IPR 31; Paxus Services at ALR 733; IPR 85; (d) belief requires more than mere assertion and more than suspicion or conjecture. Belief is an inclination of the mind towards assenting to, rather than rejecting a proposition. Thus it is not sufficient to point to a mere possibility. The evidence must incline the mind towards the matter or fact in question. If there is no reasonable cause to believe that one of the necessary elements of a potential cause of action exists, that would dispose of the application insofar as it is based on that cause of action: John Holland Services Pty Ltd v Terranora Group Management Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 679 ; BC200403021 at [13], [14], [17] and [73]; (e) while uncertainty as to only one element of a cause of action might be compatible with the "reasonable cause to believe" required by subpara (a), uncertainty as to a number of such elements may be sufficient to undermine the reasonableness of the cause to believe: Glowatzky v Insultech Group Pty Ltd (1997) 39 IPR 215 ; (f) the question posed by subpara (b) of the rule is not whether the applicant has sufficient information to decide if a cause of action is available against the prospective respondent. The question is whether the applicant has sufficient information to make a decision whether to commence proceedings in the court: Quanta Software at ALR 543 [33]-[34]; IPR 32-3, Alphapharm at 24 6. Accordingly, an applicant for preliminary discovery may be entitled to discovery in order to determine what defences are available to the respondent and the possible strength of those defences, or to determine the extent of the respondent's breach and the likely quantum of any damages award: CGU Insurance Ltd v Malaysia International Shipping Corp Berhad (2001) 187 ALR at 285 [21]; Quanta Software at ALR 543 [33]-[34]; IPR 32-3, Alphapharm at 24 6, Airservices Australia at FCR 202 3 [5]; ALR 332 (g) whether an applicant has "sufficient information" for the purposes of subpara (b) also requires an objective assessment to be made: Minister for Health at [44]; Alphapharm at 23 4, Hooper at FCR 12 [40]; ALR 367; IPR 31. The subparagraph contemplates that the applicant is lacking a piece (or pieces) of information reasonably necessary to decide whether to commence proceedings; (h) it is no answer to an application under the rule to say that the proceeding is in the nature of a "fishing expedition": Paxus Services at ALR 733; IPR 85. Indeed O 15A r 6 "expressly contemplates" what once might have been castigated as "fishing": Bailey v Beagle Management Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 60 ; (2001) 105 FCR 136 at 143 [27] ; [2001] FCA 60 ; 182 ALR 264 at 270-1; 20 IPR 79 at 85. As Burchett J commented in Paxus Services , the rule is (at ALR 733; IPR 85): ... designed to enable an applicant, in a situation where his proof can rise no higher than the level the rule describes, to ascertain whether he has a case against the prospective respondent ...' 76 In relation to the power conferred on the court by Order 15A rule 6 of the Rules Wilcox, Sackville and Katz JJ held in Hooper v Kirella Pty Ltd; Transfield Pty Ltd v Airservices Australia [1999] FCA 1584 ; (1999) 96 FCR 1 at [59] that the Court has the power to grant relief against a prospective respondent even though proceedings claiming substantive relief may never be instituted, if the applicant has asserted a claim arising under a law of the Parliament and done so in proceedings instituted, in the Court under the relevant rule (see also at [61]).