Case: Arnotts v Trade Practices Commission (1990) 97 ALR 555
Outcome: cited
At the Federal Magistrates Court, I said that I did not attend the hearing because I was sick. This was not true. The reason why I said this was that I did not want to break the promise I made to Mr Marzukie that I would not tell any one that I was working for him as a nanny. At the time, I did not realise that Mr Marzukie had taken advantage of me, and that because of his actions, I may be deported to Indonesia where I could potentially be silenced either by ending up in Jail, or worse, losing my life. 17 The second affidavit was affirmed on 1 December 2007, where the appellant deposed as follows: 1. I like to add this Affidavit to the filed Affidavit that I affirmed on 11 October 2007. 2. Since affirming the Affidavit on 11 October 2007, I have had a chance refresh my memory, and as a result if there is any conflict between this Affidavit and the Affidavit that I affirmed on 11 October 2007, this Affidavit will contain the true information and not the other Affidavit. 3. I arrived in Australia on 22 November 2004, and commenced work with Mr. Erwin Marzukie on 29 November 2004, as a live-in-nanny. 4. I commenced work with Mr. Marzukie on the basis that he was looking for a live-in-nanny. 5. When I commenced work with Mr. Marzukie, I did not know that he was a Migrant Agent until several days after commencing work, when on about 3 December 2004, Mr. Marzukie inquired about my Visa while in Australia. 6. When on about 3 December 2004, I told Mr. Marzukie about my Visa, Mr. Marzukie referred me to another Migrant Agent. 7. Later on about 3 December 2004, before the other Migrant Agent commenced his work, that Migrant Agent informed me of his fees, which I could not afford as I have just arrived in Australia, and had little money with me. 8. When I explained to Mr. Marzukie that I could not afford the fees of the other Migrant Agent, he said he will do the work for me, for free. 9. The following conversation took place when Mr. Marzukie told me that he will act as my Migrant Agent for free: I said: Thank you very much. He said: I will be your Migrant Agent provided you promise not to tell anyone that you are working for me as a live-in-nanny, otherwise we could get in trouble with the government. Can I trust you to do this? I said: Why would we get into trouble with the government if they found out that I was working with you as a live-in-nanny? He said: Don't ask questions. If I cannot trust you that you will not mention that you are working for me as a live-in-nanny, I will find someone else instead. I said: I am very sorry, I will not do that again. You know that I cannot speak English, nor can I read and write English, and that there is nobody in Australia that can help me because I do not have any friends or relatives in Australia, and you are my only hope of escaping with my life from Indonesia, and even now that I am in Australia, I am still afraid because at any time I might be sent back to Indonesia. He said: Do not worry, leave it to me. In your application for the protection visa I will put your residential address being that of one of the staff that work for me, you understand, because I said, there will be problems if I put your residential address as my house. You just have to trust me. I said: You know better than me about these things, I trust you to do the right thing by me. You are the only one in Australia that is able to help me, I fully rely on you. He said: Good, I will pay you $450.00 per week, and you have half a day every Thursday off work. That is, you will work for me six and a half days per week as a live in nanny. Remember, if you tell anybody about working for me, then you would most probably be sent back to Indonesia, do you understand? You tell nobody about this. I said: Thank you very much, I promise I will tell nobody. 10. I have worked for Mr. Marzukie from 29 November 2004 to 23 December 2005, as a live-in-nanny. 11. As stated in paragraph 9 above, Mr. Marzukie paid me $450.00 per week, and I receive free board and lodging, worth about $100.00 per week. 12. As stated in paragraph 9, above, I worked for Mr. Marzukie 6 days and a half per week, where I have half a day off work every week, every Thursday afternoon. The time I spent working per day is on average 17 hours per day. The following is a summary of the work I did at Mr. Marzukie's house: a. I wake up at 6.00am, and start work about 6.10am. b. I then go to the kitchen and boil water for Mr. and Mrs. Marzukie, so that they can have hot water for their coffee when they come downstairs. c. I then prepare Hermione's breakfast, who was about 2 years old. d. For 2 to 3 days per week I prepare breakfast for Mr. and Mrs. Marzukie, which includes fresh fried rice and noodles. e. By about 9.30am, I take a break of 30 minutes and go jogging outside the house. f. By 10.00am Hermione comes down from her parent's bedroom which is upstairs. g. I then wash Hermione, and toilet her, and then feed her breakfast. h. I take care of Hermione while Mr. and Mrs. Marzukie go to the office in the city, and they return home by 8.30 pm. i. While Mr. and Mrs. Marzukie are at the office, I do the cooking for all, the Marzukie family, and I also clean the house. Most of the cooking I do when Hermione is sleeping in my bedroom between 1.30 pm and 3.30 pm. j. I also do all the laundry washing and ironing, for the whole house. k. When Mr. and Mrs. Marzukie come home from the office at about 8.30 pm, I unload their shopping from their car, and they go upstairs to their bedroom to change their cloth. l. While Mr. and Mrs. Marzukie are upstairs, I have to have the food heated so that it is hot when they come down stairs to have their dinner. m. I eat with Mr. and Mrs. Marzukie, and when we are finished eating, I do all the dishwashing and tidy up the kitchen. n. By about 10.15 pm, once the kitchen is all clean and tidy, I go to do the laundry and do the laundry for all the towels that were used during the day. o. I then empty all the rubbish bins in the house and take the rubbish outside. p. I am responsible for putting the garbage out every Thursday night. q. Every second weekend, Mr. Marzukie's daughters from his previous marriage, Natasha and Sarah, come on Friday night and leave Sunday afternoon. I have to do extra work when they visit because they leave food all over the TV room which I have to clean up, and when they use the family bathroom they make a big mess which I have to clean up. r. When on the weekend Mr. and Mrs. Marzukie go shopping they take me with them so that I can be with Hermione and so that I can help them carry their shopping bags. s. On the weekends, Mrs. Marzukie will not feed Hermione because Hermione refuses to eat from Mrs. Marzukie, so Hermione only eats from me. t. By 11.00 pm all the work is finished, I go to bed to wake up the next day at 6.00 am and do the above all over again. 13. Based from the above my income per week from Mr. Marzukie is $450.00 plus board and lodging worth about $100.00 per week, a total amount of being $550.00 per week, for working about 110 hours per week, which means my hourly rate while working for Mr. Marzukie is $5.00 per hour, and I am not entitled to sick leave or holiday leave. At $550.00 per week my annual total income from Mr. Marzukie would be $28,600.00. 14. On or about 17 October 2007 or 18 October 2007, after Mr. Marzukie had been served with this Appeal's filed documents, I received 3 phone calls from Mrs. Marzukie, which I did not answer, and an SMS message from her "Offering me part-time work", which I did not respond to. CONSIDERATION 18 The first issue in this appeal is the resolution of the appellant's application seeking leave to adduce further evidence in the appeal. 19 There was debate before me as to the relevant considerations that may lead to the reception of further evidence by reference to a number of authorities: see for example Orr v Holmes [1948] HCA 16 ; (1948) 76 CLR 632 , at 640-642; Arnotts v Trade Practices Commission (1990) 97 ALR 555 at 612; Greater Wollongong City Council v Cowan (1955) 93 CLR 435 at 444, and generally Murdaca v Accounts Control Management Services Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 577. 20 Section 27 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ('the Federal Court Act') permits this Court in its discretion to receive further evidence. The exercise of the discretion to receive further evidence must be exercised judicially and consistently with the judicial process. I am not confined to the common law considerations relating to the reception of fresh evidence. So much is clear from the principles enunciated in CDJ v VAJ (No 1) [1998] HCA 67 ; (1998) 197 CLR 172 at [52] - [53] per Gaudron J in dealing with an equivalent provision in the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). Nevertheless, there are well-established, sound principles surrounding admission of fresh evidence which should normally be considered as relevant to the exercise of the discretion to receive further evidence pursuant to s 27 , but which should not constrain this Court in considering the overall demands of justice. 21 In my view, the demands of justice do not require the admission of the further evidence sought to be relied upon by the appellant for the following reasons: (a) The further evidence was clearly capable of being adduced by the appellant in the court below, and there was no justification for the appellant not raising this evidence in the court below; (b) The appellant submitted that the evidence sought to be tendered substantiated two grounds of appeal. The first ground was that the appellant was denied a real and meaningful invitation because of the conscious deception by her migration agent on the basis of the principles in SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 35 ; (2007) 237 ALR 64. The second ground was that the Tribunal's failure to take a simple administrative step such as calling the appellant on the day of the hearing was a miscarriage of the Tribunal's discretion under s 426A. For reasons set out later, I do not consider these grounds of appeal could succeed even if the further evidence was received in this appeal; and (c) There is the desirability of finality in litigation, particularly in refugee cases involving late allegations of agent fraud. It is highly desirable that those allegations be tested at first instance, and not in the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. I understand that the stakes for the appellant are very high, and that she may hold subjective fears of serious harm or even death, by reason of her actions in Indonesia. The prejudice to the appellant is a factor to be considered. Finality in litigation is a significant factor, although it must be weighed in the balance with other aspects, including what is at stake for an appellant. In view of my conclusions as to the other matters relevant to the reception of further evidence, the consideration of finality simply serves to support the final view I have reached in this appeal. 22 In relation to the ability of the appellant to provide the further evidence and whether there was a justification in not adducing the further evidence in the court below, it is necessary to examine the position as it existed before the Federal Magistrate on 11 July 2007, the date of the hearing. 23 At the outset I indicate that I do not accept as contended by the appellant that in the circumstances of this case, it can be said that the ground of appeal based upon the High Court decision in SZFDE [2007] HCA 35 ; 237 ALR 64 was not available because the High Court decision now relied upon was not handed down until 2 August 2007. The ground itself was known and was capable of being agitated, even if only formally, in view of the earlier Full Federal Court's different position. In any event, the reality of the position is that the appellant, unrepresented before the Federal Magistrate, probably had no knowledge of the legal position, but could and should have sought to put to the Federal Magistrate the true factual position in support of her appeal . This, she simply did not do. I do not consider that the fact that the ground of appeal now sought to be agitated would necessarily have been unsuccessful before the Federal Magistrate was the reason that the further evidence now sought to be adduced was not tendered before the Federal Magistrates Court. The appellant in full knowledge of the facts, chose to misinform the Federal Magistrate of the true position. 24 It is important to realise that, as the appellant herself deposes, on or about 23 December 2005 Mr Marzukie terminated the appellant's employment as a nanny and told her that he would no longer help her in relation to her visa, and stated that she was on her own. Another migration agent was found by the appellant to help with her application before the Federal Magistrates Court. The appellant suggests she had trouble communicating with this new migration agent due to language difficulties and was not in fact able to communicate her circumstances to anyone until August 2007. 25 Be that as it may, the facts and circumstances that are now sought to be relied upon by the appellant were obviously well-known to her at the time of the hearing of the Federal Magistrates Court. The appellant was no longer under the influence of Mr Marzukie or dependent on him for her livelihood, and had a new migration agent. 26 Before the Federal Magistrate no mention was made of any of the facts and circumstances now relied upon, and the appellant misinformed the Federal Magistrate that she was sick and that this was the reason she could not attend the Tribunal hearing. 27 The appellant now accepts that this was not true, and says that the reason why she misinformed the Federal Magistrate was because she did not want to break the promise she made to Mr Marzukie that she would not tell anyone that she was working as a nanny. She said she did not realise Mr Marzukie had taken advantage of her and that because of his actions she could be deported to Indonesia with possible serious consequences. 28 I should interpolate that these reasons for misinforming the Federal Magistrate were not sought to be put before this Court on this appeal, in that they were not read as being part of the evidence tendered by the appellant. However, the part of the affidavit containing these reasons was tendered by the first respondent as admissions of the appellant being contained in her first affidavit as filed (see par 31). 29 In my view, such reasons could only assist the appellant, as they seek to provide a justification for her deliberate misinforming of the Federal Magistrate. Without such evidence, this Court is only left with the fact that the appellant deliberately misinformed the Federal Magistrate that she was sick, and this was the reason she did not attend the Tribunal hearing, with no explanation sought to be made to explain the reason for the appellant so deliberately misinforming the Federal Magistrate. In the end, nothing turns upon the acceptance or otherwise of the reasons given for the appellant's conduct before the Federal Magistrates Court, but I have taken her explanation into account. 30 If Mr Marzukie still had some control over the appellant as at 11 July 2007 (the Federal Magistrates Court hearing date), and the appellant did not have a migration agent to assist her (even if only in a limited way), I could perhaps understand the appellant misinforming the Federal Magistrate. However, by 11 July 2007 (nearly one year and six months after being sacked by Mr Marzukie), the appellant freely chose not to inform the Federal Magistrate of the facts and circumstances now relied upon, and instead said she was sick at the time of the Tribunal hearing and for this reason could not attend. 31 Even accepting that the discretion to accept the further evidence now sought to be adduced is very wide, and is not to be limited by enumerating an exhaustive list of relevant considerations, an important consideration is whether the evidence was capable of being adduced by the appellant in the court below and whether there is any justification for the evidence not being adduced. The hearing before the Federal Magistrates Court was the appellant's opportunity to advance her case, and inform the Federal Magistrates Court truthfully of the facts. I am satisfied that the appellant did have the free choice and the ability to inform the Federal Magistrate of the facts and circumstances now relied upon. If the reason for not doing so was because of her promise not to tell about her employment, that was not a proper basis for misinforming the Federal Magistrates Court.