mdroth/huggingface-course_section-5_zst huggingface dataset:
Case: Re Felix Resources Limited [2009] FCA 1182
Outcome: cited
28 September 2009, the Court ordered that a meeting of shareholders be convened for the purpose of considering a proposed scheme of arrangement. Directions were also given for the conduct of that meeting and the Court approved under s 411(1) of the Act the explanatory statement to be sent to members pursuant to s 412(1) of the Act: Re Felix Resources Limited [2009] FCA 1182. On 11 November 2009, the Court made further orders approving a supplementary explanatory memorandum to be sent to shareholders and gave directions for dispatching the memorandum to members: Re Felix Resources Limited (No. 2) [2009] FCA 1337.
Case: Re Felix Resources Limited (No. 2) [2009] FCA 1337
Outcome: cited
28 September 2009, the Court ordered that a meeting of shareholders be convened for the purpose of considering a proposed scheme of arrangement. Directions were also given for the conduct of that meeting and the Court approved under s 411(1) of the Act the explanatory statement to be sent to members pursuant to s 412(1) of the Act: Re Felix Resources Limited [2009] FCA 1182. On 11 November 2009, the Court made further orders approving a supplementary explanatory memorandum to be sent to shareholders and gave directions for dispatching the memorandum to members: Re Felix Resources Limited (No. 2) [2009] FCA 1337.
Case: Re Amcor Ltd (2000) 34 ACSR 199
Outcome: cited
have considered all of the material filed in support of the application. I am satisfied that the scheme of arrangement ought to be approved by the Court. The jurisdiction conferred by s 411 of the Act involves the exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court. The role of the Court is to determine whether in the face of all the material, there is any basis for apprehension that the members were oppressed in relation to the exercise of their vote; and whether members were sufficiently enabled by the material put before them, to be capable of reaching an informed decision about whether acceptance of the proposal was in their best interests. Fundamentally, the question of whether the proposal ought to be accepted is a matter for the meeting. It is not for the Court to substitute its own view of the merits of the vote, for that of the meeting. If, of course, the meeting reaches a conclusion which seems inconsistent with an objective assessment of the merits of the proposal based on the material put before the meeting, the Court will look closely at the outcome and seek to be satisfied about any matter that might seem to the Court counter-intuitive. Even so, the will of the meeting is paramount subject to the supervision of the Court. If the material clearly explains the proposal and it is capable of acceptance by individuals exercising their best judgment of what is in their own commercial interests or to their own commercial advantage, the Court ought not to withhold approval of the scheme. In the case of a meeting of a single class of members, the Court would need to be satisfied that the vote and thus the will of the meeting had miscarried before withholding approval: Re Amcor Ltd (2000) 34 ACSR 199 at [33]; Re Sonodyne International Ltd (1994) 15 ACSR 494 at 499; Re Hudson Conway Ltd (2000) 33 ACSR 657; Re Coles Group Ltd (No 2) (2007) 65 ACSR 494; Re NRMA Ltd; Re NRMA Insurance Ltd (2000) 33 ACSR 595.
Case: Re Sonodyne International Ltd (1994) 15 ACSR 494
Outcome: cited
have considered all of the material filed in support of the application. I am satisfied that the scheme of arrangement ought to be approved by the Court. The jurisdiction conferred by s 411 of the Act involves the exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court. The role of the Court is to determine whether in the face of all the material, there is any basis for apprehension that the members were oppressed in relation to the exercise of their vote; and whether members were sufficiently enabled by the material put before them, to be capable of reaching an informed decision about whether acceptance of the proposal was in their best interests. Fundamentally, the question of whether the proposal ought to be accepted is a matter for the meeting. It is not for the Court to substitute its own view of the merits of the vote, for that of the meeting. If, of course, the meeting reaches a conclusion which seems inconsistent with an objective assessment of the merits of the proposal based on the material put before the meeting, the Court will look closely at the outcome and seek to be satisfied about any matter that might seem to the Court counter-intuitive. Even so, the will of the meeting is paramount subject to the supervision of the Court. If the material clearly explains the proposal and it is capable of acceptance by individuals exercising their best judgment of what is in their own commercial interests or to their own commercial advantage, the Court ought not to withhold approval of the scheme. In the case of a meeting of a single class of members, the Court would need to be satisfied that the vote and thus the will of the meeting had miscarried before withholding approval: Re Amcor Ltd (2000) 34 ACSR 199 at [33]; Re Sonodyne International Ltd (1994) 15 ACSR 494 at 499; Re Hudson Conway Ltd (2000) 33 ACSR 657; Re Coles Group Ltd (No 2) (2007) 65 ACSR 494; Re NRMA Ltd; Re NRMA Insurance Ltd (2000) 33 ACSR 595.
Case: Re Hudson Conway Ltd (2000) 33 ACSR 657
Outcome: cited
have considered all of the material filed in support of the application. I am satisfied that the scheme of arrangement ought to be approved by the Court. The jurisdiction conferred by s 411 of the Act involves the exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court. The role of the Court is to determine whether in the face of all the material, there is any basis for apprehension that the members were oppressed in relation to the exercise of their vote; and whether members were sufficiently enabled by the material put before them, to be capable of reaching an informed decision about whether acceptance of the proposal was in their best interests. Fundamentally, the question of whether the proposal ought to be accepted is a matter for the meeting. It is not for the Court to substitute its own view of the merits of the vote, for that of the meeting. If, of course, the meeting reaches a conclusion which seems inconsistent with an objective assessment of the merits of the proposal based on the material put before the meeting, the Court will look closely at the outcome and seek to be satisfied about any matter that might seem to the Court counter-intuitive. Even so, the will of the meeting is paramount subject to the supervision of the Court. If the material clearly explains the proposal and it is capable of acceptance by individuals exercising their best judgment of what is in their own commercial interests or to their own commercial advantage, the Court ought not to withhold approval of the scheme. In the case of a meeting of a single class of members, the Court would need to be satisfied that the vote and thus the will of the meeting had miscarried before withholding approval: Re Amcor Ltd (2000) 34 ACSR 199 at [33]; Re Sonodyne International Ltd (1994) 15 ACSR 494 at 499; Re Hudson Conway Ltd (2000) 33 ACSR 657; Re Coles Group Ltd (No 2) (2007) 65 ACSR 494; Re NRMA Ltd; Re NRMA Insurance Ltd (2000) 33 ACSR 595.
Case: Re Coles Group Ltd (No 2) (2007) 65 ACSR 494
Outcome: cited
have considered all of the material filed in support of the application. I am satisfied that the scheme of arrangement ought to be approved by the Court. The jurisdiction conferred by s 411 of the Act involves the exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court. The role of the Court is to determine whether in the face of all the material, there is any basis for apprehension that the members were oppressed in relation to the exercise of their vote; and whether members were sufficiently enabled by the material put before them, to be capable of reaching an informed decision about whether acceptance of the proposal was in their best interests. Fundamentally, the question of whether the proposal ought to be accepted is a matter for the meeting. It is not for the Court to substitute its own view of the merits of the vote, for that of the meeting. If, of course, the meeting reaches a conclusion which seems inconsistent with an objective assessment of the merits of the proposal based on the material put before the meeting, the Court will look closely at the outcome and seek to be satisfied about any matter that might seem to the Court counter-intuitive. Even so, the will of the meeting is paramount subject to the supervision of the Court. If the material clearly explains the proposal and it is capable of acceptance by individuals exercising their best judgment of what is in their own commercial interests or to their own commercial advantage, the Court ought not to withhold approval of the scheme. In the case of a meeting of a single class of members, the Court would need to be satisfied that the vote and thus the will of the meeting had miscarried before withholding approval: Re Amcor Ltd (2000) 34 ACSR 199 at [33]; Re Sonodyne International Ltd (1994) 15 ACSR 494 at 499; Re Hudson Conway Ltd (2000) 33 ACSR 657; Re Coles Group Ltd (No 2) (2007) 65 ACSR 494; Re NRMA Ltd; Re NRMA Insurance Ltd (2000) 33 ACSR 595.
Case: Re NRMA Ltd; Re NRMA Insurance Ltd (2000) 33 ACSR 595
Outcome: cited
have considered all of the material filed in support of the application. I am satisfied that the scheme of arrangement ought to be approved by the Court. The jurisdiction conferred by s 411 of the Act involves the exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court. The role of the Court is to determine whether in the face of all the material, there is any basis for apprehension that the members were oppressed in relation to the exercise of their vote; and whether members were sufficiently enabled by the material put before them, to be capable of reaching an informed decision about whether acceptance of the proposal was in their best interests. Fundamentally, the question of whether the proposal ought to be accepted is a matter for the meeting. It is not for the Court to substitute its own view of the merits of the vote, for that of the meeting. If, of course, the meeting reaches a conclusion which seems inconsistent with an objective assessment of the merits of the proposal based on the material put before the meeting, the Court will look closely at the outcome and seek to be satisfied about any matter that might seem to the Court counter-intuitive. Even so, the will of the meeting is paramount subject to the supervision of the Court. If the material clearly explains the proposal and it is capable of acceptance by individuals exercising their best judgment of what is in their own commercial interests or to their own commercial advantage, the Court ought not to withhold approval of the scheme. In the case of a meeting of a single class of members, the Court would need to be satisfied that the vote and thus the will of the meeting had miscarried before withholding approval: Re Amcor Ltd (2000) 34 ACSR 199 at [33]; Re Sonodyne International Ltd (1994) 15 ACSR 494 at 499; Re Hudson Conway Ltd (2000) 33 ACSR 657; Re Coles Group Ltd (No 2) (2007) 65 ACSR 494; Re NRMA Ltd; Re NRMA Insurance Ltd (2000) 33 ACSR 595.
Case: Re Equinox Resources Ltd (2004) 49 ACSR 692
Outcome: cited
also seeks an order relieving it from the requirement contained in s 411(11) that a copy of an order of the Court made under s 411(4)(b) be annexed to every copy of the Constitution of Felix issued after the making of the order. There seems to be no utility in the order. The proposed order does not affect any change to the Constitution of the company. Accordingly, there is no need to insist upon compliance by Felix with s 411(11) of the Act: Re Equinox Resources Ltd (2004) 49 ACSR 692 at [22] and [23]; Re Kalgoorlie Lake View Pty Ltd (2005) 56 ACSR 144 at [30] - [32]; and Mincom Ltd v EAM Software Finance Pty Ltd (No 3) (2007) 64 ACSR 387 at 409.
Case: Re Kalgoorlie Lake View Pty Ltd (2005) 56 ACSR 144
Outcome: cited
also seeks an order relieving it from the requirement contained in s 411(11) that a copy of an order of the Court made under s 411(4)(b) be annexed to every copy of the Constitution of Felix issued after the making of the order. There seems to be no utility in the order. The proposed order does not affect any change to the Constitution of the company. Accordingly, there is no need to insist upon compliance by Felix with s 411(11) of the Act: Re Equinox Resources Ltd (2004) 49 ACSR 692 at [22] and [23]; Re Kalgoorlie Lake View Pty Ltd (2005) 56 ACSR 144 at [30] - [32]; and Mincom Ltd v EAM Software Finance Pty Ltd (No 3) (2007) 64 ACSR 387 at 409.
Case: Mincom Ltd v EAM Software Finance Pty Ltd (No 3) (2007) 64 ACSR 387
Outcome: cited
also seeks an order relieving it from the requirement contained in s 411(11) that a copy of an order of the Court made under s 411(4)(b) be annexed to every copy of the Constitution of Felix issued after the making of the order. There seems to be no utility in the order. The proposed order does not affect any change to the Constitution of the company. Accordingly, there is no need to insist upon compliance by Felix with s 411(11) of the Act: Re Equinox Resources Ltd (2004) 49 ACSR 692 at [22] and [23]; Re Kalgoorlie Lake View Pty Ltd (2005) 56 ACSR 144 at [30] - [32]; and Mincom Ltd v EAM Software Finance Pty Ltd (No 3) (2007) 64 ACSR 387 at 409.
Case: Bropho v Western Australia [1990] HCA 24 ; (1990) 171 CLR 1
Outcome: cited
The express reference to binding the Crown means that the Court is concerned with a different question from that which arose in Bropho v Western Australia [1990] HCA 24 ; (1990) 171 CLR 1 and Jacobsen v Rogers [1995] HCA 6 ; (1995) 182 CLR 572 where the statutes did not in terms mention the Crown. Nevertheless it is to be noted that in Jacobsen at 585 their Honours said that in Bropho the Court "denied the stringency and inflexibility" of the presumption that the Crown is not bound by a statute and affirmed that "it must be the legislative intention which ultimately prevails". This perhaps less deferential approach was, at least in part, based on the recognition of the "multifarious functions" which the Crown carries out in modern times (at 587).
Case: Jacobsen v Rogers [1995] HCA 6 ; (1995) 182 CLR 572
Outcome: cited
The express reference to binding the Crown means that the Court is concerned with a different question from that which arose in Bropho v Western Australia [1990] HCA 24 ; (1990) 171 CLR 1 and Jacobsen v Rogers [1995] HCA 6 ; (1995) 182 CLR 572 where the statutes did not in terms mention the Crown. Nevertheless it is to be noted that in Jacobsen at 585 their Honours said that in Bropho the Court "denied the stringency and inflexibility" of the presumption that the Crown is not bound by a statute and affirmed that "it must be the legislative intention which ultimately prevails". This perhaps less deferential approach was, at least in part, based on the recognition of the "multifarious functions" which the Crown carries out in modern times (at 587).
Case: IW v City of Perth [1997] HCA 30 ; (1997) 191 CLR 1 at 12
Outcome: cited
The context in which the present question arises includes two important elements. First, the Anti-Discrimination Act is beneficial legislation and ought to be given a generous and liberal construction: IW v City of Perth [1997] HCA 30 ; (1997) 191 CLR 1 at 12; Waters v Public Transport Corporation [1991] HCA 49 ; (1991) 173 CLR 349 at 359, 394; Commonwealth v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1998) 152 ALR 182 at 189.
Case: Waters v Public Transport Corporation [1991] HCA 49 ; (1991) 173 CLR 349 at 359, 394
Outcome: cited
The context in which the present question arises includes two important elements. First, the Anti-Discrimination Act is beneficial legislation and ought to be given a generous and liberal construction: IW v City of Perth [1997] HCA 30 ; (1997) 191 CLR 1 at 12; Waters v Public Transport Corporation [1991] HCA 49 ; (1991) 173 CLR 349 at 359, 394; Commonwealth v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1998) 152 ALR 182 at 189.
Case: Commonwealth v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1998) 152 ALR 182 at 189
Outcome: cited
The context in which the present question arises includes two important elements. First, the Anti-Discrimination Act is beneficial legislation and ought to be given a generous and liberal construction: IW v City of Perth [1997] HCA 30 ; (1997) 191 CLR 1 at 12; Waters v Public Transport Corporation [1991] HCA 49 ; (1991) 173 CLR 349 at 359, 394; Commonwealth v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1998) 152 ALR 182 at 189.
Case: Cain v Doyle [1946] HCA 38 ; (1946) 72 CLR 409 at 424
Outcome: cited
The assumptions underlying that argument are not necessarily correct. For example, even if sanctions for discriminatory conduct could be characterised as criminal, which seems unlikely, the Crown may still be bound. There is a presumption against a statute imposing criminal liability upon the Crown, and it has been said to be a very strong one ( Cain v Doyle [1946] HCA 38 ; (1946) 72 CLR 409 at 424) but it remains a presumption and thus can be overcome by a clear indication of legislative intention to the contrary. At the very least, this is what has occurred in the Anti-Discrimination Act with the Crown in the right of Tasmania. 31 In any event, it does not follow that, because some remedies are incapable of exercise against some categories of person, Parliament did not intend such persons to be subject to the Act at all. Even if orders of the kind mentioned could be made against the Commonwealth, that would not be because of any lack of intention on the part of the Parliament, but rather because of the operation of s 109 and/or the impairment of capacities doctrine. Parliament in s 4 expressly recognised that the extent of its powers in respect of the Crown in capacities other than in right of Tasmania were not unlimited. Its intention was to bind the Crown as far as it was able. 32 A similar argument based on the obligations of organisations to make their members, officers, employees and agents aware of the kind of conduct which the Act prohibits (s 104) must meet the same fate.
Case: CUNA Mutual Group Ltd v Bryant [2000] FCA 970 ; (2000) 102 FCR 270
Outcome: cited
The present case is neatly bracketed by two authorities concerning deceased persons and anti-discrimination legislation. In Stephenson v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1996) 68 FCR 290 a complainant under the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) died after her complaint was lodged. The Full Court of the Federal Court held that the complaint survived and could be pursued by the complainant's executrix. In CUNA Mutual Group Ltd v Bryant [2000] FCA 970 ; (2000) 102 FCR 270 the alleged discrimination occurred after death. An insurer under a loan protection policy refused payment because the deceased insured had falsely declared that he had never tested positive for HIV. Branson J held that no claim lay under the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth). In the present case the alleged discrimination occurred before death but the claim was lodged after death.
Case: O'Grady v Northern Queensland Co Ltd [1990] HCA 16 ; (1990) 169 CLR 356 at 367
Outcome: cited
It seems to me at least arguable, on the very limited evidence so far available, that Mr Smith may have discriminated against Ms Campbell in that he treated her less favourably (s 14(2)) because she had an association with (was the mother of) Eleanor who was young and a female. Ms Campbell may be able to argue that if her child was an adult male Mr Smith would not have told her that he would not give her reasons why her son should resign and that he (Mr Smith) would not put anything in writing. This was arguably a matter in connection with the area of training. The Air Training Corps (as its name suggests) was a body whose raison d'&ecirc;tre was training. Ms Campbell herself was not involved in training, but there was a connection between the discrimination alleged and training. What passed between Mr Smith and Ms Campbell concerned the membership of Eleanor, her child, in a body that conducted training of children and young people. There was, arguably a relationship between Mr Smith's conduct vis-&agrave;-vis Ms Campbell and the training activity that was relevant, having regard to the object and purpose of the Anti-Discrimination Act : see O'Grady v Northern Queensland Co Ltd [1990] HCA 16 ; (1990) 169 CLR 356 at 367; J &amp; G Knowles and Associates Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2000] FCA 196 ; (2000) 96 FCR 402 at [22] - [29] .
Case: J &amp; G Knowles and Associates Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2000] FCA 196 ; (2000) 96 FCR 402 at [22] - [29]
Outcome: cited
It seems to me at least arguable, on the very limited evidence so far available, that Mr Smith may have discriminated against Ms Campbell in that he treated her less favourably (s 14(2)) because she had an association with (was the mother of) Eleanor who was young and a female. Ms Campbell may be able to argue that if her child was an adult male Mr Smith would not have told her that he would not give her reasons why her son should resign and that he (Mr Smith) would not put anything in writing. This was arguably a matter in connection with the area of training. The Air Training Corps (as its name suggests) was a body whose raison d'&ecirc;tre was training. Ms Campbell herself was not involved in training, but there was a connection between the discrimination alleged and training. What passed between Mr Smith and Ms Campbell concerned the membership of Eleanor, her child, in a body that conducted training of children and young people. There was, arguably a relationship between Mr Smith's conduct vis-&agrave;-vis Ms Campbell and the training activity that was relevant, having regard to the object and purpose of the Anti-Discrimination Act : see O'Grady v Northern Queensland Co Ltd [1990] HCA 16 ; (1990) 169 CLR 356 at 367; J &amp; G Knowles and Associates Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2000] FCA 196 ; (2000) 96 FCR 402 at [22] - [29] .
Case: Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58 ; (1985) 184 CLR 163
Outcome: cited
A feature that commonly distinguishes administrative tribunals and other administrative decision-makers from courts is that the former are made the sole repository of questions of fact and policy. Judicial review or appeal is typically limited to questions of law, as for example in s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), or confined to statutory grounds such as those contained in ss 17 and 20 of the Judicial Review Act 2000 (Tas) or common law grounds: Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58 ; (1985) 184 CLR 163. A full appeal on fact and law suggests that the body whose decisions are subject to such rights is a court because it is a part of a system which resolves, at trial and appellate level, legal and factual disputes between citizens and between state and citizen. 65 Other features relied on by the applicants are at best equivocal as to the characterisation of the Tribunal as a court of a State. For example, to provide that the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence is to do no more than legislate as to the law of evidence which is to be applied in a particular Tasmanian court. The common law of evidence has already been substantially modified by the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas).