Case: George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 140
Outcome: applied
The applicant further relied on George v Rockett [1990] HCA 26 ; (1990) 170 CLR 104 (' Rockett ') at 116: 'The objective circumstances sufficient to show a reason to believe something need to point more clearly to the subject matter of the belief, but that is not to say that the objective circumstances must establish on the balance of probabilities that the subject matter in fact occurred or exists: the assent of belief is given on more slender evidence than proof. Belief is an inclination of the mind towards assenting to, rather than rejecting, a proposition and the grounds which can reasonably induce that inclination of the mind may, depending on the circumstances, leave something to surmise or conjecture.' 20 CASA submitted that, in deciding whether grounds are 'reasonable', emphasis is to be given to the primacy of the maintenance, enhancement and promotion of air safety, with particular emphasis on prevention of accidents and incidents. The applicant further contended that the establishment of those grounds, though objective, contemplates a reasonable person in the position of CASA, as is apparent from the reference in s 30DE(3) to ss 3A and 9A(1). 21 The principal proposition advanced by the respondents is that it cannot be the case that all that is required is 'reasonable grounds to believe' without taking account of any rebuttal evidence, as such a test would result in CASA's application being successful every time. 22 As to what is involved in 'reasonable grounds for a belief', the passage cited from Rockett is obiter as to belief because that case concerned suspicion. In any case, the respondents said that the High Court really decided in Rockett that 'reasonable grounds for believing' '[r]equires the existence of facts sufficient to induce' an actual belief (at 112-3), so that, to discharge its legal onus, while the applicant does not need to prove on the balance of probabilities that the take-offs at Innamincka constituted a serious and imminent risk to air safety, it must nevertheless prove facts sufficient to induce a belief in that proposition. 25 I do not accept that the establishment of the reasonable grounds for the necessary belief necessarily contemplates a reasonable person in the position of CASA . The point of the requisite approach to the Court is clearly to enable the Court to decide on all the materials before it, whether, objectively, there are reasonable grounds for the requisite belief. The Court is to adjudicate that matter, not CASA. It is not a mere question of considering whether CASA's view was such that no reasonable person could hold it. The Court is to form its own view of what are reasonable grounds for belief. So, the question is: regardless of whether or not there was in fact a serious and imminent risk to air safety, are reasonable grounds shown to the Court's satisfaction to induce an actual belief that there was such a risk? As the High Court said in Rockett (at [116]): 'Belief is an inclination of the mind towards assenting to, rather than rejecting, a proposition and the grounds which can reasonably induce that inclination of the mind may, depending on the circumstances, leave something to surmise or conjecture.' 26 Whereas the fact of such a risk need not be established, it will not, on the other hand, be sufficient to show reasonable grounds for a mere suspicion, even a serious suspicion, that there was a risk of the relevant kind. 27 If the judge is moved by all the evidence to conclude that there was in fact such a risk, it will follow that there were reasonable grounds for that belief. If not, the judge must consider whether, nevertheless, there are, in the judge's opinion, reasonable grounds for so believing.