mdroth/huggingface-course_section-5_zst huggingface dataset:
Case: Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1376 ; (2001) 115 FCR 1
Outcome: cited
With respect to the first ground, in order for the appellants to succeed they need to establish by probative evidence that: (a) the standard of interpretation at the Tribunal hearing was so inadequate that the appellants were effectively prevented from giving evidence at the hearing; or (b) errors made by the interpreter at the Tribunal hearing were material to the conclusions of the Tribunal adverse to the appellants. See generally Appellant P119/2002 v Minister for Immigration &amp; Multicultural &amp; Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 230 at [17] ; WACO v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 171 ; (2003) 131 FCR 511 at [64] ; (see also Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1376 ; (2001) 115 FCR 1 at 6 [27] ; Mazhar v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 183 ALR 188; Ismail v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 59 ALD 773 at 782 [25]; Perera v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 507 ; (1999) 92 FCR 6 at 22 [38] - [41] ; NAUV v Minister for Immigration &amp; Multicultural &amp; Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1319 at [42] ).
Case: Soltanyzand v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1168
Outcome: cited
The appellants have not filed a transcript of evidence that demonstrates error on the part of the interpreter. In the absence of transcript or other suitable evidence, I cannot infer that the standard of interpretation at the Tribunal hearing was so inadequate that the appellants were effectively prevented from giving evidence at the hearing or errors made by the interpreter at the Tribunal hearing were material to the conclusions of the Tribunal adverse to the appellants. I can ascertain no breach of s 425 of the Act. See generally Soltanyzand v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1168 at [18] . 23 The appellants did rely upon part of the transcript said to be "carried out by" the appellant husband. However, the appellant husband himself required an interpreter for the Tribunal hearing and before me. The Federal Magistrate considered this issue and implicitly found that the evidence of the transcript carried out by the appellant husband was not probative. The asserted errors in translation are based on the opinion of a person whose understanding of English was not of a sufficient level to undertake the task of translation. 24 To be accepted as having any probative value, evidence would need to be led by a person competent in English and Indonesian to indicate the matters that had been mistranslated or not translated at all. This has not been done. I can find no merit in the first ground of appeal.
Case: WACO v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 171 ; (2003) 131 FCR 511
Outcome: cited
With respect to the first ground, in order for the appellants to succeed they need to establish by probative evidence that: (a) the standard of interpretation at the Tribunal hearing was so inadequate that the appellants were effectively prevented from giving evidence at the hearing; or (b) errors made by the interpreter at the Tribunal hearing were material to the conclusions of the Tribunal adverse to the appellants. See generally Appellant P119/2002 v Minister for Immigration &amp; Multicultural &amp; Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 230 at [17] ; WACO v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 171 ; (2003) 131 FCR 511 at [64] ; (see also Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1376 ; (2001) 115 FCR 1 at 6 [27] ; Mazhar v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 183 ALR 188; Ismail v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 59 ALD 773 at 782 [25]; Perera v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 507 ; (1999) 92 FCR 6 at 22 [38] - [41] ; NAUV v Minister for Immigration &amp; Multicultural &amp; Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1319 at [42] ).
Case: McKellar v Container Terminal Management Services Ltd [1999] FCA 1101 ; (1999) 165 ALR 409
Outcome: applied
The principles governing the exercise of the Court's power summarily to dismiss a claim on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action, the principles which govern pleadings in this Court and the relevant authorities are conveniently summarised by Weinberg J in McKellar v Container Terminal Management Services Ltd [1999] FCA 1101 ; (1999) 165 ALR 409 at 415-421. It is not necessary to restate, at length, his Honour's exposition of the relevant rules and the statements of principle which emerge from the cases to which he refers. It is sufficient, for present purposes, to note that: &#8226; The power to dismiss a claim because it discloses no reasonable cause of action will not lightly be exercised: see Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners [1949] HCA 1 ; (1949) 78 CLR 62 at 91; General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1964] HCA 69 ; (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 128-130; Webster v Lampard [1993] HCA 57 ; (1993) 177 CLR 598 at 602-603. &#8226; The purpose of pleadings is to define the issues with sufficient clarity such that respondents understand, and have the opportunity to meet, the case made against them: see Dare v Pulham [1982] HCA 70 ; (1982) 148 CLR 658 at 664; Mitanis v Pioneer Concrete (Vic) Pty Ltd [1997] ATPR 41-591 at 44, 151ff. &#8226; A statement of claim must plead all the material facts necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action. If it does not it is liable to be struck out: Mitanis ; Bruce v Odhams Press Ltd [1936] 1 KB 697 at 712-713. &#8226; It is not sufficient for the pleader to state conclusions drawn from unstated facts: see Trade Practices Commission v David Jones (Australia) Pty Ltd [1985] FCA 228 ; (1985) 7 FCR 109 at 114-5. &#8226; There will be cases in which the power to strike out pleadings will not be exercised notwithstanding a failure to plead all material facts. Such restraint will be appropriate where the deficiency causes no confusion and does not raise issues of substantive principle ( HECEC Australia Pty Ltd v Hydro-Electric Corp [1999] FCA 822 at [59] ), and where deficiencies can be overcome by ordering the provision of particulars or the furnishing of affidavits ( State of Queensland v Pioneer Concrete (Qld) Pty Ltd [1999] ATPR 41-691 at 42,828-9). &#8226; Not all conclusionary pleadings will be struck-out as being deficient: see Charlie Carter Pty Ltd v The Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees' Association (WA) (1987) 13 FCR 413 at 417. Whether or not such a pleading should be struck out will depend on whether or not the facts are pleaded at too great a level of generality: see Kernel Holdings Pty Ltd v Rothmans of Pall Mall (Australia) Pty Ltd [1991] FCA 557.
Case: Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners [1949] HCA 1 ; (1949) 78 CLR 62
Outcome: cited
The principles governing the exercise of the Court's power summarily to dismiss a claim on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action, the principles which govern pleadings in this Court and the relevant authorities are conveniently summarised by Weinberg J in McKellar v Container Terminal Management Services Ltd [1999] FCA 1101 ; (1999) 165 ALR 409 at 415-421. It is not necessary to restate, at length, his Honour's exposition of the relevant rules and the statements of principle which emerge from the cases to which he refers. It is sufficient, for present purposes, to note that: &#8226; The power to dismiss a claim because it discloses no reasonable cause of action will not lightly be exercised: see Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners [1949] HCA 1 ; (1949) 78 CLR 62 at 91; General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1964] HCA 69 ; (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 128-130; Webster v Lampard [1993] HCA 57 ; (1993) 177 CLR 598 at 602-603. &#8226; The purpose of pleadings is to define the issues with sufficient clarity such that respondents understand, and have the opportunity to meet, the case made against them: see Dare v Pulham [1982] HCA 70 ; (1982) 148 CLR 658 at 664; Mitanis v Pioneer Concrete (Vic) Pty Ltd [1997] ATPR 41-591 at 44, 151ff. &#8226; A statement of claim must plead all the material facts necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action. If it does not it is liable to be struck out: Mitanis ; Bruce v Odhams Press Ltd [1936] 1 KB 697 at 712-713. &#8226; It is not sufficient for the pleader to state conclusions drawn from unstated facts: see Trade Practices Commission v David Jones (Australia) Pty Ltd [1985] FCA 228 ; (1985) 7 FCR 109 at 114-5. &#8226; There will be cases in which the power to strike out pleadings will not be exercised notwithstanding a failure to plead all material facts. Such restraint will be appropriate where the deficiency causes no confusion and does not raise issues of substantive principle ( HECEC Australia Pty Ltd v Hydro-Electric Corp [1999] FCA 822 at [59] ), and where deficiencies can be overcome by ordering the provision of particulars or the furnishing of affidavits ( State of Queensland v Pioneer Concrete (Qld) Pty Ltd [1999] ATPR 41-691 at 42,828-9). &#8226; Not all conclusionary pleadings will be struck-out as being deficient: see Charlie Carter Pty Ltd v The Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees' Association (WA) (1987) 13 FCR 413 at 417. Whether or not such a pleading should be struck out will depend on whether or not the facts are pleaded at too great a level of generality: see Kernel Holdings Pty Ltd v Rothmans of Pall Mall (Australia) Pty Ltd [1991] FCA 557.
Case: General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1964] HCA 69 ; (1964) 112 CLR 125
Outcome: cited
The principles governing the exercise of the Court's power summarily to dismiss a claim on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action, the principles which govern pleadings in this Court and the relevant authorities are conveniently summarised by Weinberg J in McKellar v Container Terminal Management Services Ltd [1999] FCA 1101 ; (1999) 165 ALR 409 at 415-421. It is not necessary to restate, at length, his Honour's exposition of the relevant rules and the statements of principle which emerge from the cases to which he refers. It is sufficient, for present purposes, to note that: &#8226; The power to dismiss a claim because it discloses no reasonable cause of action will not lightly be exercised: see Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners [1949] HCA 1 ; (1949) 78 CLR 62 at 91; General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1964] HCA 69 ; (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 128-130; Webster v Lampard [1993] HCA 57 ; (1993) 177 CLR 598 at 602-603. &#8226; The purpose of pleadings is to define the issues with sufficient clarity such that respondents understand, and have the opportunity to meet, the case made against them: see Dare v Pulham [1982] HCA 70 ; (1982) 148 CLR 658 at 664; Mitanis v Pioneer Concrete (Vic) Pty Ltd [1997] ATPR 41-591 at 44, 151ff. &#8226; A statement of claim must plead all the material facts necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action. If it does not it is liable to be struck out: Mitanis ; Bruce v Odhams Press Ltd [1936] 1 KB 697 at 712-713. &#8226; It is not sufficient for the pleader to state conclusions drawn from unstated facts: see Trade Practices Commission v David Jones (Australia) Pty Ltd [1985] FCA 228 ; (1985) 7 FCR 109 at 114-5. &#8226; There will be cases in which the power to strike out pleadings will not be exercised notwithstanding a failure to plead all material facts. Such restraint will be appropriate where the deficiency causes no confusion and does not raise issues of substantive principle ( HECEC Australia Pty Ltd v Hydro-Electric Corp [1999] FCA 822 at [59] ), and where deficiencies can be overcome by ordering the provision of particulars or the furnishing of affidavits ( State of Queensland v Pioneer Concrete (Qld) Pty Ltd [1999] ATPR 41-691 at 42,828-9). &#8226; Not all conclusionary pleadings will be struck-out as being deficient: see Charlie Carter Pty Ltd v The Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees' Association (WA) (1987) 13 FCR 413 at 417. Whether or not such a pleading should be struck out will depend on whether or not the facts are pleaded at too great a level of generality: see Kernel Holdings Pty Ltd v Rothmans of Pall Mall (Australia) Pty Ltd [1991] FCA 557.
Case: Webster v Lampard [1993] HCA 57 ; (1993) 177 CLR 598
Outcome: cited
The principles governing the exercise of the Court's power summarily to dismiss a claim on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action, the principles which govern pleadings in this Court and the relevant authorities are conveniently summarised by Weinberg J in McKellar v Container Terminal Management Services Ltd [1999] FCA 1101 ; (1999) 165 ALR 409 at 415-421. It is not necessary to restate, at length, his Honour's exposition of the relevant rules and the statements of principle which emerge from the cases to which he refers. It is sufficient, for present purposes, to note that: &#8226; The power to dismiss a claim because it discloses no reasonable cause of action will not lightly be exercised: see Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners [1949] HCA 1 ; (1949) 78 CLR 62 at 91; General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1964] HCA 69 ; (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 128-130; Webster v Lampard [1993] HCA 57 ; (1993) 177 CLR 598 at 602-603. &#8226; The purpose of pleadings is to define the issues with sufficient clarity such that respondents understand, and have the opportunity to meet, the case made against them: see Dare v Pulham [1982] HCA 70 ; (1982) 148 CLR 658 at 664; Mitanis v Pioneer Concrete (Vic) Pty Ltd [1997] ATPR 41-591 at 44, 151ff. &#8226; A statement of claim must plead all the material facts necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action. If it does not it is liable to be struck out: Mitanis ; Bruce v Odhams Press Ltd [1936] 1 KB 697 at 712-713. &#8226; It is not sufficient for the pleader to state conclusions drawn from unstated facts: see Trade Practices Commission v David Jones (Australia) Pty Ltd [1985] FCA 228 ; (1985) 7 FCR 109 at 114-5. &#8226; There will be cases in which the power to strike out pleadings will not be exercised notwithstanding a failure to plead all material facts. Such restraint will be appropriate where the deficiency causes no confusion and does not raise issues of substantive principle ( HECEC Australia Pty Ltd v Hydro-Electric Corp [1999] FCA 822 at [59] ), and where deficiencies can be overcome by ordering the provision of particulars or the furnishing of affidavits ( State of Queensland v Pioneer Concrete (Qld) Pty Ltd [1999] ATPR 41-691 at 42,828-9). &#8226; Not all conclusionary pleadings will be struck-out as being deficient: see Charlie Carter Pty Ltd v The Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees' Association (WA) (1987) 13 FCR 413 at 417. Whether or not such a pleading should be struck out will depend on whether or not the facts are pleaded at too great a level of generality: see Kernel Holdings Pty Ltd v Rothmans of Pall Mall (Australia) Pty Ltd [1991] FCA 557.
Case: Dare v Pulham [1982] HCA 70 ; (1982) 148 CLR 658
Outcome: cited
The principles governing the exercise of the Court's power summarily to dismiss a claim on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action, the principles which govern pleadings in this Court and the relevant authorities are conveniently summarised by Weinberg J in McKellar v Container Terminal Management Services Ltd [1999] FCA 1101 ; (1999) 165 ALR 409 at 415-421. It is not necessary to restate, at length, his Honour's exposition of the relevant rules and the statements of principle which emerge from the cases to which he refers. It is sufficient, for present purposes, to note that: &#8226; The power to dismiss a claim because it discloses no reasonable cause of action will not lightly be exercised: see Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners [1949] HCA 1 ; (1949) 78 CLR 62 at 91; General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1964] HCA 69 ; (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 128-130; Webster v Lampard [1993] HCA 57 ; (1993) 177 CLR 598 at 602-603. &#8226; The purpose of pleadings is to define the issues with sufficient clarity such that respondents understand, and have the opportunity to meet, the case made against them: see Dare v Pulham [1982] HCA 70 ; (1982) 148 CLR 658 at 664; Mitanis v Pioneer Concrete (Vic) Pty Ltd [1997] ATPR 41-591 at 44, 151ff. &#8226; A statement of claim must plead all the material facts necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action. If it does not it is liable to be struck out: Mitanis ; Bruce v Odhams Press Ltd [1936] 1 KB 697 at 712-713. &#8226; It is not sufficient for the pleader to state conclusions drawn from unstated facts: see Trade Practices Commission v David Jones (Australia) Pty Ltd [1985] FCA 228 ; (1985) 7 FCR 109 at 114-5. &#8226; There will be cases in which the power to strike out pleadings will not be exercised notwithstanding a failure to plead all material facts. Such restraint will be appropriate where the deficiency causes no confusion and does not raise issues of substantive principle ( HECEC Australia Pty Ltd v Hydro-Electric Corp [1999] FCA 822 at [59] ), and where deficiencies can be overcome by ordering the provision of particulars or the furnishing of affidavits ( State of Queensland v Pioneer Concrete (Qld) Pty Ltd [1999] ATPR 41-691 at 42,828-9). &#8226; Not all conclusionary pleadings will be struck-out as being deficient: see Charlie Carter Pty Ltd v The Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees' Association (WA) (1987) 13 FCR 413 at 417. Whether or not such a pleading should be struck out will depend on whether or not the facts are pleaded at too great a level of generality: see Kernel Holdings Pty Ltd v Rothmans of Pall Mall (Australia) Pty Ltd [1991] FCA 557.
Case: Mitanis v Pioneer Concrete (Vic) Pty Ltd [1997] ATPR 41-591
Outcome: cited
The principles governing the exercise of the Court's power summarily to dismiss a claim on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action, the principles which govern pleadings in this Court and the relevant authorities are conveniently summarised by Weinberg J in McKellar v Container Terminal Management Services Ltd [1999] FCA 1101 ; (1999) 165 ALR 409 at 415-421. It is not necessary to restate, at length, his Honour's exposition of the relevant rules and the statements of principle which emerge from the cases to which he refers. It is sufficient, for present purposes, to note that: &#8226; The power to dismiss a claim because it discloses no reasonable cause of action will not lightly be exercised: see Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners [1949] HCA 1 ; (1949) 78 CLR 62 at 91; General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1964] HCA 69 ; (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 128-130; Webster v Lampard [1993] HCA 57 ; (1993) 177 CLR 598 at 602-603. &#8226; The purpose of pleadings is to define the issues with sufficient clarity such that respondents understand, and have the opportunity to meet, the case made against them: see Dare v Pulham [1982] HCA 70 ; (1982) 148 CLR 658 at 664; Mitanis v Pioneer Concrete (Vic) Pty Ltd [1997] ATPR 41-591 at 44, 151ff. &#8226; A statement of claim must plead all the material facts necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action. If it does not it is liable to be struck out: Mitanis ; Bruce v Odhams Press Ltd [1936] 1 KB 697 at 712-713. &#8226; It is not sufficient for the pleader to state conclusions drawn from unstated facts: see Trade Practices Commission v David Jones (Australia) Pty Ltd [1985] FCA 228 ; (1985) 7 FCR 109 at 114-5. &#8226; There will be cases in which the power to strike out pleadings will not be exercised notwithstanding a failure to plead all material facts. Such restraint will be appropriate where the deficiency causes no confusion and does not raise issues of substantive principle ( HECEC Australia Pty Ltd v Hydro-Electric Corp [1999] FCA 822 at [59] ), and where deficiencies can be overcome by ordering the provision of particulars or the furnishing of affidavits ( State of Queensland v Pioneer Concrete (Qld) Pty Ltd [1999] ATPR 41-691 at 42,828-9). &#8226; Not all conclusionary pleadings will be struck-out as being deficient: see Charlie Carter Pty Ltd v The Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees' Association (WA) (1987) 13 FCR 413 at 417. Whether or not such a pleading should be struck out will depend on whether or not the facts are pleaded at too great a level of generality: see Kernel Holdings Pty Ltd v Rothmans of Pall Mall (Australia) Pty Ltd [1991] FCA 557.
Case: Bruce v Odhams Press Ltd [1936] 1 KB 697
Outcome: cited
The principles governing the exercise of the Court's power summarily to dismiss a claim on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action, the principles which govern pleadings in this Court and the relevant authorities are conveniently summarised by Weinberg J in McKellar v Container Terminal Management Services Ltd [1999] FCA 1101 ; (1999) 165 ALR 409 at 415-421. It is not necessary to restate, at length, his Honour's exposition of the relevant rules and the statements of principle which emerge from the cases to which he refers. It is sufficient, for present purposes, to note that: &#8226; The power to dismiss a claim because it discloses no reasonable cause of action will not lightly be exercised: see Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners [1949] HCA 1 ; (1949) 78 CLR 62 at 91; General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1964] HCA 69 ; (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 128-130; Webster v Lampard [1993] HCA 57 ; (1993) 177 CLR 598 at 602-603. &#8226; The purpose of pleadings is to define the issues with sufficient clarity such that respondents understand, and have the opportunity to meet, the case made against them: see Dare v Pulham [1982] HCA 70 ; (1982) 148 CLR 658 at 664; Mitanis v Pioneer Concrete (Vic) Pty Ltd [1997] ATPR 41-591 at 44, 151ff. &#8226; A statement of claim must plead all the material facts necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action. If it does not it is liable to be struck out: Mitanis ; Bruce v Odhams Press Ltd [1936] 1 KB 697 at 712-713. &#8226; It is not sufficient for the pleader to state conclusions drawn from unstated facts: see Trade Practices Commission v David Jones (Australia) Pty Ltd [1985] FCA 228 ; (1985) 7 FCR 109 at 114-5. &#8226; There will be cases in which the power to strike out pleadings will not be exercised notwithstanding a failure to plead all material facts. Such restraint will be appropriate where the deficiency causes no confusion and does not raise issues of substantive principle ( HECEC Australia Pty Ltd v Hydro-Electric Corp [1999] FCA 822 at [59] ), and where deficiencies can be overcome by ordering the provision of particulars or the furnishing of affidavits ( State of Queensland v Pioneer Concrete (Qld) Pty Ltd [1999] ATPR 41-691 at 42,828-9). &#8226; Not all conclusionary pleadings will be struck-out as being deficient: see Charlie Carter Pty Ltd v The Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees' Association (WA) (1987) 13 FCR 413 at 417. Whether or not such a pleading should be struck out will depend on whether or not the facts are pleaded at too great a level of generality: see Kernel Holdings Pty Ltd v Rothmans of Pall Mall (Australia) Pty Ltd [1991] FCA 557.