mdroth/huggingface-course_section-5_zst huggingface dataset:
Case: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 63 ; (2001) 208 CLR 199
Outcome: cited
even were FKP and FGUP to file evidence capable of establishing a prima facie case in relation to their claims for final relief, Spirits submits that their application in relation to the Existing Applications and the Further Applications would nevertheless fail. An interlocutory injunction is granted to preserve the status quo pending the determination at trial of the rights of the parties to final relief: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 63 ; (2001) 208 CLR 199. The interlocutory relief sought is in respect of trade mark applications which are not the subject of the cross-claim or any present application for relief by FKP and FGUP. Spirits submits that there is insufficient connection between the orders sought and the preservation of the status quo in relation to the subject matter of the cross-claim to support the present application, even if the Court had before it evidence of a prima facie case. But even assuming to the contrary against Spirits, Spirits submits that there would nevertheless be insufficient grounds for the making of the proposed orders. The orders sought are not proper orders with respect to the conduct of these proceedings, but relate to trade mark applications filed by Spirits in good faith and in the ordinary course of its business. Spirits submits that they are not orders that the Court will make lightly, and in the absence of compelling reasons, the Court should not, in Spirits' submission, intervene to impose conditions and obligations upon Spirits in the ordinary conduct of its business with respect to its trade marks, especially trade marks that not presently in issue in the proceedings. For the reasons outlined below, Spirits submits that even if the present application was to be dealt with as falling outside the class of an ordinary application for interlocutory relief, there is insufficient basis for the making of the proposed orders, including on 'case management grounds'.
Case: Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd [1968] HCA 1 ; (1968) 118 CLR 618 
Outcome: applied
and FGUP submit that the proposed orders are not in the nature of substantive interlocutory relief on the cross-claim (such as rectification of the Register); the orders are procedural rather than substantive. In these circumstances, there is no cause for any rigid application of the principles relating to the grant of interlocutory injunctions discussed in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill [2006] HCA 46 ; (2006) 229 ALR 457 at [19] , [65] [72] and Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd [1968] HCA 1 ; (1968) 118 CLR 618. In particular, there is no need for FKP and FGUP to demonstrate a prima facie case or a serious question to be tried on the cross-claim as a condition of the grant of the relief set out in the draft short minutes of order. Proposed orders 1 and 2 do no more than facilitate the recordal by the Registrar of particulars of claims which are in fact made by FKP and FGUP, and which, for the reasons given above, will have a direct bearing on the fate of the Existing and Further Applications. Spirits submits that it is now well-established that an applicant for interlocutory relief must, as a threshold issue, prove that it has a 'prima facie case' for final relief. The test is sometimes expressed as, in the sense that if the evidence remains as it is, there is a probability that at the trial of the action the applicant will be held to be entitled to the final relief claimed. Australian Broadcasting Corp v O'Neill , restoring (if restoration were needed) Beecham Group v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd .
Case: Concrete Constructions Pty Ltd v Plumbers and Gasfitters Employees' Union (1987) 15 FCR 31
Outcome: applied
there to be a prima facie case that the Court can examine, and examine in accordance with the High Court's instructions, 'there must at least be some evidence' going to each element of the relevant cause of action: Springdale Comfort Pty Ltd v Electrical Trades Union of Workers (1986) ATPR 40-694 at 47,623; OD Transport Pty Ltd v Western Australian Government Railways Commission (1986) 13 FCR 270 at 279; Concrete Constructions Pty Ltd v Plumbers and Gasfitters Employees' Union (1987) 15 FCR 31 at 51; Kevlacat Pty Ltd v Trailcraft Marine Pty Ltd (1987) 79 ALR 534 at 536.
Case: Kevlacat Pty Ltd v Trailcraft Marine Pty Ltd (1987) 79 ALR 534 
Outcome: applied
there to be a prima facie case that the Court can examine, and examine in accordance with the High Court's instructions, 'there must at least be some evidence' going to each element of the relevant cause of action: Springdale Comfort Pty Ltd v Electrical Trades Union of Workers (1986) ATPR 40-694 at 47,623; OD Transport Pty Ltd v Western Australian Government Railways Commission (1986) 13 FCR 270 at 279; Concrete Constructions Pty Ltd v Plumbers and Gasfitters Employees' Union (1987) 15 FCR 31 at 51; Kevlacat Pty Ltd v Trailcraft Marine Pty Ltd (1987) 79 ALR 534 at 536.
Case: Mark Foys Ltd v Davies Coop &amp; Co Ltd [1956] HCA 41 ; (1956) 95 CLR 190 
Outcome: cited
the cross-claim, FKP and FGUP assert rights in relation to a number of registered trade marks which include or comprise one or more of the words STOLI, STOLICHNAYA and MOSKOVSKAYA, and seek relief to give effect to those rights. The Existing Applications all relate to trade marks which include or comprise one or more of the same words, as would any Further Applications, and are in respect of the same or similar goods. In these circumstances, FKP and FGUP say that the Existing and Further Applications are, or would be, derivative of the prior registrations which are the subject of the cross-claim. According to FKP and FGUP the use of a trade mark the subject of an Existing or Further Application would infringe one or more of the prior registrations on the basis that the respective trade marks are substantially identical or deceptively similar: see s 120 of the Act; the words STOLI, STOLICHNAYA and MOSKOVSKAYA are plainly central, distinctive elements of each mark; for those marks which incorporate label devices, the device elements are also similar in many cases. Moreover, the use of additional words or elements (such as a person's name) in conjunction with a registered trade mark does not avoid infringement of the trade mark, provided that it is being used for a trade mark purpose: see Mark Foys Ltd v Davies Coop &amp; Co Ltd [1956] HCA 41 ; (1956) 95 CLR 190 at 205. According to FKP and FGUP, this would necessarily be so in the case of the trade marks the subject of the Existing and Further Applications. Put another way, the determination of the claims made by FKP and FGUP in the cross-claim will have a direct bearing on the validity or acceptability for registration of the Existing and Further Applications, given the similarity of the marks and the fact that the latter fall later in the 'queue'. The claims articulated in respect of the former therefore disclose an interest in respect of the latter.
Case: OD Transport Pty Ltd v Western Australian Government Railways Commission (1986) 13 FCR 270
Outcome: applied
there to be a prima facie case that the Court can examine, and examine in accordance with the High Court's instructions, 'there must at least be some evidence' going to each element of the relevant cause of action: Springdale Comfort Pty Ltd v Electrical Trades Union of Workers (1986) ATPR 40-694 at 47,623; OD Transport Pty Ltd v Western Australian Government Railways Commission (1986) 13 FCR 270 at 279; Concrete Constructions Pty Ltd v Plumbers and Gasfitters Employees' Union (1987) 15 FCR 31 at 51; Kevlacat Pty Ltd v Trailcraft Marine Pty Ltd (1987) 79 ALR 534 at 536.
Case: Springdale Comfort Pty Ltd v Electrical Trades Union of Workers (1986) ATPR 40-694
Outcome: applied
there to be a prima facie case that the Court can examine, and examine in accordance with the High Court's instructions, 'there must at least be some evidence' going to each element of the relevant cause of action: Springdale Comfort Pty Ltd v Electrical Trades Union of Workers (1986) ATPR 40-694 at 47,623; OD Transport Pty Ltd v Western Australian Government Railways Commission (1986) 13 FCR 270 at 279; Concrete Constructions Pty Ltd v Plumbers and Gasfitters Employees' Union (1987) 15 FCR 31 at 51; Kevlacat Pty Ltd v Trailcraft Marine Pty Ltd (1987) 79 ALR 534 at 536.
Case: National Dwellings Society v Sykes [1894] 3 Ch 159
Outcome: cited
The duty and function of the chair is to preserve order and take care that the proceedings are conducted in a proper manner and the sense of the meeting is properly ascertained with regard to any question properly before the meeting ( National Dwellings Society v Sykes [1894] 3 Ch 159 per Chitty J at 162). Upon the chair rests the responsibility for making rulings as to the validity of matters. Some of those matters will be entirely procedural such as decisions concerning the putting of resolutions to the meeting. Others will involve determining an entitlement such as whether a member may vote by proxy having regard to a challenge to the validity of the proxy instrument, compliance with lodgement procedure or by reason of some other deficiency or restriction. The chair may foreshadow a ruling and entertain objections and discussion before deciding the question or invite discussion, then rule and note objections to the ruling.
Case: Triden Contractors Ltd (1992) 30 NSWLR 615
Outcome: cited
In Triden Contractors Ltd (1992) 30 NSWLR 615 at 616, McLelland J considered that, 'The chairman must act in good faith, in accordance with any relevant law [i.e. no error of law] and on reasonable grounds' . The obligation to act in good faith is understood as an obligation to act honestly and without ulterior motive. The obligation to act reasonably is an obligation not to act capriciously. A chair 'who makes an error of law which deprives a member of the statutory right to vote proxy may be corrected by the courts for technical misconduct' ( ANZ Nominees Limited v Allied Resources Corporation Limited &amp; Ors (1984) 2 ACLC 783 per O'Bryan J at 789).
Case: ANZ Nominees Limited v Allied Resources Corporation Limited &amp; Ors (1984) 2 ACLC 783
Outcome: cited
In Triden Contractors Ltd (1992) 30 NSWLR 615 at 616, McLelland J considered that, 'The chairman must act in good faith, in accordance with any relevant law [i.e. no error of law] and on reasonable grounds' . The obligation to act in good faith is understood as an obligation to act honestly and without ulterior motive. The obligation to act reasonably is an obligation not to act capriciously. A chair 'who makes an error of law which deprives a member of the statutory right to vote proxy may be corrected by the courts for technical misconduct' ( ANZ Nominees Limited v Allied Resources Corporation Limited &amp; Ors (1984) 2 ACLC 783 per O'Bryan J at 789).
Case: Byng v London Life Association Ltd [1990] 1 Ch 170; [1989] 1 All ER 560
Outcome: cited
The applicant contends that an error of law might well arise by reference to the analogue of supervisory review of administrative decision-making. In Byng v London Life Association Ltd [1990] 1 Ch 170; [1989] 1 All ER 560, the Court of Appeal applying Wednesbury principles held that a chair exercising powers as chair at a meeting of members of a public company would fall into error of law if the chair, on facts which he knew or ought to have known, failed to take into account all relevant factors, took into account irrelevant factors or reached a conclusion which no reasonable chair properly directing himself or herself to the chair's duties could have reached. Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson, VC observed that the chair's decision 'must also be taken reasonably with a view to facilitating the purpose for which the power exists' ( Byng per Browne-Wilkinson, VC at p 189). In that sense, the question of whether the power is exercised reasonably is a function of the question of whether the decision facilitates the purpose for which the power was conferred. That is an error of law test. 72 If the approach to judicial review of administrative decisions is an applicable analogue for judicial review of decisions of a chair of a meeting of scheme members, having regard in part to the contextual provisions of the Act within which the chair of such a meeting discharges his or her role, the question to be determined in examining conclusions of fact or a process of reasoning leading to a conclusion of fact is whether there is any evidence before the chair upon which the decision could have been made irrespective of whether the Court would have reached that decision or drawn the same inference. However, care must be exercised when applying the authorities as they go to the exercise of the jurisdiction itself. 73 The position derived from the authorities on this question seems to me to be this.
Case: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30 ; (2003) 198 ALR 59
Outcome: cited
Describing a process of reasoning as irrational, illogical or based upon an unsound approach to the assessment of a document (for example) or that findings are not based on inferences of fact supported on logical grounds, may merely be an emphatic way of disagreeing with a finding of fact ( Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30 ; (2003) 198 ALR 59 per Gleeson CJ at [5]). It is necessary therefore to precisely identify the 'nature and quality' of the error of the administrative decision-maker and the legal principle that attracts a particular legal consequence, such as error of law, that is, the 'legal rubric under which a decision is challenged' ( MIMA; Ex parte S20/2002 per Gleeson CJ at [9]). The scope of the legal rubric is conventionally understood in terms of the well known passage from Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58 ; (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179 per Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30 ; (2001) 206 CLR 323 at 351 [82] per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ and as to misconceptions which might suggest an unsupportable supposition on the part of the decision-maker, see Avon Downs Pty Ltd v FCT [1949] HCA 26 ; (1949) 78 CLR 353 at 360 per Dixon J and R v Australian Stevedoring Industry Board; Ex parte Melbourne Stevedoring Co. Pty Ltd [1953] HCA 22 ; (1953) 88 CLR 100 at 120 per Dixon CJ, Williams, Webb and Fullagar JJ. As to the constraints upon a court interfering with the decision-maker's assessment of the evidence, in exercising supervisory review of administrative decision-making, see Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin [1990] HCA 21 ; (1990) 170 CLR 1 at 35-36 per Brennan J.
Case: Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58 ; (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179
Outcome: cited
Describing a process of reasoning as irrational, illogical or based upon an unsound approach to the assessment of a document (for example) or that findings are not based on inferences of fact supported on logical grounds, may merely be an emphatic way of disagreeing with a finding of fact ( Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30 ; (2003) 198 ALR 59 per Gleeson CJ at [5]). It is necessary therefore to precisely identify the 'nature and quality' of the error of the administrative decision-maker and the legal principle that attracts a particular legal consequence, such as error of law, that is, the 'legal rubric under which a decision is challenged' ( MIMA; Ex parte S20/2002 per Gleeson CJ at [9]). The scope of the legal rubric is conventionally understood in terms of the well known passage from Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58 ; (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179 per Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30 ; (2001) 206 CLR 323 at 351 [82] per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ and as to misconceptions which might suggest an unsupportable supposition on the part of the decision-maker, see Avon Downs Pty Ltd v FCT [1949] HCA 26 ; (1949) 78 CLR 353 at 360 per Dixon J and R v Australian Stevedoring Industry Board; Ex parte Melbourne Stevedoring Co. Pty Ltd [1953] HCA 22 ; (1953) 88 CLR 100 at 120 per Dixon CJ, Williams, Webb and Fullagar JJ. As to the constraints upon a court interfering with the decision-maker's assessment of the evidence, in exercising supervisory review of administrative decision-making, see Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin [1990] HCA 21 ; (1990) 170 CLR 1 at 35-36 per Brennan J.
Case: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30 ; (2001) 206 CLR 323
Outcome: cited
Describing a process of reasoning as irrational, illogical or based upon an unsound approach to the assessment of a document (for example) or that findings are not based on inferences of fact supported on logical grounds, may merely be an emphatic way of disagreeing with a finding of fact ( Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30 ; (2003) 198 ALR 59 per Gleeson CJ at [5]). It is necessary therefore to precisely identify the 'nature and quality' of the error of the administrative decision-maker and the legal principle that attracts a particular legal consequence, such as error of law, that is, the 'legal rubric under which a decision is challenged' ( MIMA; Ex parte S20/2002 per Gleeson CJ at [9]). The scope of the legal rubric is conventionally understood in terms of the well known passage from Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58 ; (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179 per Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30 ; (2001) 206 CLR 323 at 351 [82] per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ and as to misconceptions which might suggest an unsupportable supposition on the part of the decision-maker, see Avon Downs Pty Ltd v FCT [1949] HCA 26 ; (1949) 78 CLR 353 at 360 per Dixon J and R v Australian Stevedoring Industry Board; Ex parte Melbourne Stevedoring Co. Pty Ltd [1953] HCA 22 ; (1953) 88 CLR 100 at 120 per Dixon CJ, Williams, Webb and Fullagar JJ. As to the constraints upon a court interfering with the decision-maker's assessment of the evidence, in exercising supervisory review of administrative decision-making, see Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin [1990] HCA 21 ; (1990) 170 CLR 1 at 35-36 per Brennan J.
Case: Avon Downs Pty Ltd v FCT [1949] HCA 26 ; (1949) 78 CLR 353
Outcome: cited
Describing a process of reasoning as irrational, illogical or based upon an unsound approach to the assessment of a document (for example) or that findings are not based on inferences of fact supported on logical grounds, may merely be an emphatic way of disagreeing with a finding of fact ( Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30 ; (2003) 198 ALR 59 per Gleeson CJ at [5]). It is necessary therefore to precisely identify the 'nature and quality' of the error of the administrative decision-maker and the legal principle that attracts a particular legal consequence, such as error of law, that is, the 'legal rubric under which a decision is challenged' ( MIMA; Ex parte S20/2002 per Gleeson CJ at [9]). The scope of the legal rubric is conventionally understood in terms of the well known passage from Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58 ; (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179 per Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30 ; (2001) 206 CLR 323 at 351 [82] per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ and as to misconceptions which might suggest an unsupportable supposition on the part of the decision-maker, see Avon Downs Pty Ltd v FCT [1949] HCA 26 ; (1949) 78 CLR 353 at 360 per Dixon J and R v Australian Stevedoring Industry Board; Ex parte Melbourne Stevedoring Co. Pty Ltd [1953] HCA 22 ; (1953) 88 CLR 100 at 120 per Dixon CJ, Williams, Webb and Fullagar JJ. As to the constraints upon a court interfering with the decision-maker's assessment of the evidence, in exercising supervisory review of administrative decision-making, see Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin [1990] HCA 21 ; (1990) 170 CLR 1 at 35-36 per Brennan J.
Case: R v Australian Stevedoring Industry Board; Ex parte Melbourne Stevedoring Co. Pty Ltd [1953] HCA 22 ; (1953) 88 CLR 100
Outcome: cited
Describing a process of reasoning as irrational, illogical or based upon an unsound approach to the assessment of a document (for example) or that findings are not based on inferences of fact supported on logical grounds, may merely be an emphatic way of disagreeing with a finding of fact ( Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30 ; (2003) 198 ALR 59 per Gleeson CJ at [5]). It is necessary therefore to precisely identify the 'nature and quality' of the error of the administrative decision-maker and the legal principle that attracts a particular legal consequence, such as error of law, that is, the 'legal rubric under which a decision is challenged' ( MIMA; Ex parte S20/2002 per Gleeson CJ at [9]). The scope of the legal rubric is conventionally understood in terms of the well known passage from Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58 ; (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179 per Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30 ; (2001) 206 CLR 323 at 351 [82] per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ and as to misconceptions which might suggest an unsupportable supposition on the part of the decision-maker, see Avon Downs Pty Ltd v FCT [1949] HCA 26 ; (1949) 78 CLR 353 at 360 per Dixon J and R v Australian Stevedoring Industry Board; Ex parte Melbourne Stevedoring Co. Pty Ltd [1953] HCA 22 ; (1953) 88 CLR 100 at 120 per Dixon CJ, Williams, Webb and Fullagar JJ. As to the constraints upon a court interfering with the decision-maker's assessment of the evidence, in exercising supervisory review of administrative decision-making, see Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin [1990] HCA 21 ; (1990) 170 CLR 1 at 35-36 per Brennan J.
Case: Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin [1990] HCA 21 ; (1990) 170 CLR 1
Outcome: cited
Describing a process of reasoning as irrational, illogical or based upon an unsound approach to the assessment of a document (for example) or that findings are not based on inferences of fact supported on logical grounds, may merely be an emphatic way of disagreeing with a finding of fact ( Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30 ; (2003) 198 ALR 59 per Gleeson CJ at [5]). It is necessary therefore to precisely identify the 'nature and quality' of the error of the administrative decision-maker and the legal principle that attracts a particular legal consequence, such as error of law, that is, the 'legal rubric under which a decision is challenged' ( MIMA; Ex parte S20/2002 per Gleeson CJ at [9]). The scope of the legal rubric is conventionally understood in terms of the well known passage from Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58 ; (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179 per Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30 ; (2001) 206 CLR 323 at 351 [82] per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ and as to misconceptions which might suggest an unsupportable supposition on the part of the decision-maker, see Avon Downs Pty Ltd v FCT [1949] HCA 26 ; (1949) 78 CLR 353 at 360 per Dixon J and R v Australian Stevedoring Industry Board; Ex parte Melbourne Stevedoring Co. Pty Ltd [1953] HCA 22 ; (1953) 88 CLR 100 at 120 per Dixon CJ, Williams, Webb and Fullagar JJ. As to the constraints upon a court interfering with the decision-maker's assessment of the evidence, in exercising supervisory review of administrative decision-making, see Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin [1990] HCA 21 ; (1990) 170 CLR 1 at 35-36 per Brennan J.