mdroth/huggingface-course_section-5_zst huggingface dataset:
Case: Bell-Booth v Bell-Booth [1998] 2 NZLR 2
Outcome: cited
provision of reasons serves a valuable purpose in the administration of justice: C onnell v Auckland City Council [1977] 1 NZLR 630. Chilwell J there observed, at 634: A matter which I have not mentioned, which is another reason for requiring the stating of reasons, is this: every litigant who loses his action, whether it be in the civil or criminal jurisdiction, is a disappointed litigant. That is inevitable and is a logical result of our judicial system. There is all the world of difference between a disappointed litigant and a disturbed litigant. In the latter category come litigants who cannot understand why the decision went against him. In this case the appellant would be justified in feeling disturbed as he presumably does because he has brought this appeal. He is disturbed that justice did not appear to him to have been done. It is of the utmost importance that Her Majesty's subjects should have faith in our judicial system. By far the greatest number of civil and criminal cases come before the lower court. One should not draw distinctions between courts but it is of fundamental importance that the lower courts, which deal with so much work and with whom the average citizen has greater contact, should maintain respect for and faith in the judicial system. Applied: SZKLO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 735 at [20] , 102 ALD 115 at 120. In a subsequent decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Bell-Booth v Bell-Booth [1998] 2 NZLR 2 at 6 the Court observed: Reasons for judgment are a fundamental attribute of the common law. The affinity of law and reason has been widely affirmed and a Judge's reasoning &#8212; his or her reasons for the decision &#8212; is a demonstration of that close assimilation. Arbitrariness or the appearance of arbitrariness is refuted and genuine cause for lasting grievances is averted. Litigants are assured that their case has been understood and carefully considered. If dissatisfied with the outcome, they are able to assess the wisdom and worth of exercising their rights of appeal. At the same time public confidence in the legal system and the legitimacy and dynamic of the common law is enhanced. The legal system can be seen to be working and, although possibly at times imperfectly, striving to achieve justice according to law.
Case: Civil Aviation Safety Authority v Central Aviation Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 49
Outcome: cited
Commissioner for Railways for the State of Queensland v Peters (1991) 24 NSWLR 407, the Court of Appeal was entertaining an appeal from an award entered in the Compensation Court. The primary Judge in his reasons stated that regardless of any determination of his own, the matter was to be removed forthwith to the High Court. The delivery of " lengthy reasons ", according to the primary Judge, was thus considered to be of " little assistance ". The transcript of submissions was incorporated into the reasons and preference expressed for the submissions of the worker and the State. " The applicant ", the primary Judge concluded, " has discharged his onus in all respects and is entitled to an award ". Kirby P (as His Honour then was) voiced similar concerns to those expressed by the New Zealand Court of Appeal when he observed (in part) as follows, at 416: ... [I]t is worth collecting the reasons which obliged his Honour to provide more than the findings offered in this case. They included: (1) The fact that the High Court had returned the cause to the Compensation Court specifically to permit the ordinary procedures of the law to be followed. These include proper fact finding at first instance. Only if this course is followed will appellate courts be saved the time otherwise taken in determining the facts, isolating the issues, removing issues not seriously in contention and addressing those which are; (2) The judicial reasons at first instance are of benefit not only to the parties and their advisers, but also to the appellate court. The analysis of issues by one legally trained mind will often help others to cut through the issues on appeal to those which are most important. This is especially true in a case where multiple issues are raised, as in this case; (3) It may be possible to conceive an instance where the incorporation of submissions by one party in reasons for judgment would be an adequate compliance with the judicial duty to provide reasons. That was certainly not the case here. ... In applying this decision it has subsequently been held that "... it is generally true that merely to set out two competing sets of reasons and to say that one is preferred ... is not a satisfactory method of complying with the judicial duty to give reasons ": Fyntray Constructions Pty Ltd v Macind Drainage &amp; Hydraulic Services Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 238 at [66] per Heydon JA (Hodgson JJA and Ipp AJA agreeing). See also: Goldsmith v Villanueva [2000] NSWSC 1181 at [13] per Adams J; Civil Aviation Safety Authority v Central Aviation Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 49 at [44] to [45] per Perram J.
Case: Commissioner for Railways for the State of Queensland v Peters (1991) 24 NSWLR 407
Outcome: discussed
Commissioner for Railways for the State of Queensland v Peters (1991) 24 NSWLR 407, the Court of Appeal was entertaining an appeal from an award entered in the Compensation Court. The primary Judge in his reasons stated that regardless of any determination of his own, the matter was to be removed forthwith to the High Court. The delivery of " lengthy reasons ", according to the primary Judge, was thus considered to be of " little assistance ". The transcript of submissions was incorporated into the reasons and preference expressed for the submissions of the worker and the State. " The applicant ", the primary Judge concluded, " has discharged his onus in all respects and is entitled to an award ". Kirby P (as His Honour then was) voiced similar concerns to those expressed by the New Zealand Court of Appeal when he observed (in part) as follows, at 416: ... [I]t is worth collecting the reasons which obliged his Honour to provide more than the findings offered in this case. They included: (1) The fact that the High Court had returned the cause to the Compensation Court specifically to permit the ordinary procedures of the law to be followed. These include proper fact finding at first instance. Only if this course is followed will appellate courts be saved the time otherwise taken in determining the facts, isolating the issues, removing issues not seriously in contention and addressing those which are; (2) The judicial reasons at first instance are of benefit not only to the parties and their advisers, but also to the appellate court. The analysis of issues by one legally trained mind will often help others to cut through the issues on appeal to those which are most important. This is especially true in a case where multiple issues are raised, as in this case; (3) It may be possible to conceive an instance where the incorporation of submissions by one party in reasons for judgment would be an adequate compliance with the judicial duty to provide reasons. That was certainly not the case here. ... In applying this decision it has subsequently been held that "... it is generally true that merely to set out two competing sets of reasons and to say that one is preferred ... is not a satisfactory method of complying with the judicial duty to give reasons ": Fyntray Constructions Pty Ltd v Macind Drainage &amp; Hydraulic Services Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 238 at [66] per Heydon JA (Hodgson JJA and Ipp AJA agreeing). See also: Goldsmith v Villanueva [2000] NSWSC 1181 at [13] per Adams J; Civil Aviation Safety Authority v Central Aviation Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 49 at [44] to [45] per Perram J.
Case: C onnell v Auckland City Council [1977] 1 NZLR 630
Outcome: cited
provision of reasons serves a valuable purpose in the administration of justice: C onnell v Auckland City Council [1977] 1 NZLR 630. Chilwell J there observed, at 634: A matter which I have not mentioned, which is another reason for requiring the stating of reasons, is this: every litigant who loses his action, whether it be in the civil or criminal jurisdiction, is a disappointed litigant. That is inevitable and is a logical result of our judicial system. There is all the world of difference between a disappointed litigant and a disturbed litigant. In the latter category come litigants who cannot understand why the decision went against him. In this case the appellant would be justified in feeling disturbed as he presumably does because he has brought this appeal. He is disturbed that justice did not appear to him to have been done. It is of the utmost importance that Her Majesty's subjects should have faith in our judicial system. By far the greatest number of civil and criminal cases come before the lower court. One should not draw distinctions between courts but it is of fundamental importance that the lower courts, which deal with so much work and with whom the average citizen has greater contact, should maintain respect for and faith in the judicial system. Applied: SZKLO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 735 at [20] , 102 ALD 115 at 120. In a subsequent decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Bell-Booth v Bell-Booth [1998] 2 NZLR 2 at 6 the Court observed: Reasons for judgment are a fundamental attribute of the common law. The affinity of law and reason has been widely affirmed and a Judge's reasoning &#8212; his or her reasons for the decision &#8212; is a demonstration of that close assimilation. Arbitrariness or the appearance of arbitrariness is refuted and genuine cause for lasting grievances is averted. Litigants are assured that their case has been understood and carefully considered. If dissatisfied with the outcome, they are able to assess the wisdom and worth of exercising their rights of appeal. At the same time public confidence in the legal system and the legitimacy and dynamic of the common law is enhanced. The legal system can be seen to be working and, although possibly at times imperfectly, striving to achieve justice according to law.
Case: Fyntray Constructions Pty Ltd v Macind Drainage &amp; Hydraulic Services Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 238
Outcome: cited
Commissioner for Railways for the State of Queensland v Peters (1991) 24 NSWLR 407, the Court of Appeal was entertaining an appeal from an award entered in the Compensation Court. The primary Judge in his reasons stated that regardless of any determination of his own, the matter was to be removed forthwith to the High Court. The delivery of " lengthy reasons ", according to the primary Judge, was thus considered to be of " little assistance ". The transcript of submissions was incorporated into the reasons and preference expressed for the submissions of the worker and the State. " The applicant ", the primary Judge concluded, " has discharged his onus in all respects and is entitled to an award ". Kirby P (as His Honour then was) voiced similar concerns to those expressed by the New Zealand Court of Appeal when he observed (in part) as follows, at 416: ... [I]t is worth collecting the reasons which obliged his Honour to provide more than the findings offered in this case. They included: (1) The fact that the High Court had returned the cause to the Compensation Court specifically to permit the ordinary procedures of the law to be followed. These include proper fact finding at first instance. Only if this course is followed will appellate courts be saved the time otherwise taken in determining the facts, isolating the issues, removing issues not seriously in contention and addressing those which are; (2) The judicial reasons at first instance are of benefit not only to the parties and their advisers, but also to the appellate court. The analysis of issues by one legally trained mind will often help others to cut through the issues on appeal to those which are most important. This is especially true in a case where multiple issues are raised, as in this case; (3) It may be possible to conceive an instance where the incorporation of submissions by one party in reasons for judgment would be an adequate compliance with the judicial duty to provide reasons. That was certainly not the case here. ... In applying this decision it has subsequently been held that "... it is generally true that merely to set out two competing sets of reasons and to say that one is preferred ... is not a satisfactory method of complying with the judicial duty to give reasons ": Fyntray Constructions Pty Ltd v Macind Drainage &amp; Hydraulic Services Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 238 at [66] per Heydon JA (Hodgson JJA and Ipp AJA agreeing). See also: Goldsmith v Villanueva [2000] NSWSC 1181 at [13] per Adams J; Civil Aviation Safety Authority v Central Aviation Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 49 at [44] to [45] per Perram J.
Case: Goldsmith v Villanueva [2000] NSWSC 1181
Outcome: cited
Commissioner for Railways for the State of Queensland v Peters (1991) 24 NSWLR 407, the Court of Appeal was entertaining an appeal from an award entered in the Compensation Court. The primary Judge in his reasons stated that regardless of any determination of his own, the matter was to be removed forthwith to the High Court. The delivery of " lengthy reasons ", according to the primary Judge, was thus considered to be of " little assistance ". The transcript of submissions was incorporated into the reasons and preference expressed for the submissions of the worker and the State. " The applicant ", the primary Judge concluded, " has discharged his onus in all respects and is entitled to an award ". Kirby P (as His Honour then was) voiced similar concerns to those expressed by the New Zealand Court of Appeal when he observed (in part) as follows, at 416: ... [I]t is worth collecting the reasons which obliged his Honour to provide more than the findings offered in this case. They included: (1) The fact that the High Court had returned the cause to the Compensation Court specifically to permit the ordinary procedures of the law to be followed. These include proper fact finding at first instance. Only if this course is followed will appellate courts be saved the time otherwise taken in determining the facts, isolating the issues, removing issues not seriously in contention and addressing those which are; (2) The judicial reasons at first instance are of benefit not only to the parties and their advisers, but also to the appellate court. The analysis of issues by one legally trained mind will often help others to cut through the issues on appeal to those which are most important. This is especially true in a case where multiple issues are raised, as in this case; (3) It may be possible to conceive an instance where the incorporation of submissions by one party in reasons for judgment would be an adequate compliance with the judicial duty to provide reasons. That was certainly not the case here. ... In applying this decision it has subsequently been held that "... it is generally true that merely to set out two competing sets of reasons and to say that one is preferred ... is not a satisfactory method of complying with the judicial duty to give reasons ": Fyntray Constructions Pty Ltd v Macind Drainage &amp; Hydraulic Services Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 238 at [66] per Heydon JA (Hodgson JJA and Ipp AJA agreeing). See also: Goldsmith v Villanueva [2000] NSWSC 1181 at [13] per Adams J; Civil Aviation Safety Authority v Central Aviation Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 49 at [44] to [45] per Perram J.
Case: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Singh (1997) 74 FCR 553
Outcome: followed
is equally no injustice to the Applicant in not now entertaining the argument as to the failure on the part of the Tribunal to itself initiate further inquiries, as there is no such general duty imposed upon the Tribunal. In Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Singh (1997) 74 FCR 553 , the Full Court held that there is no duty upon the Tribunal to undertake its own investigation into the authenticity of documents supporting a visa application. Black CJ, von Doussa, Sundberg and Mansfield JJ there noted at 561: Although we have concluded that there may be circumstances in which the Tribunal's obligation to act according to substantial justice requires it to make inquiries, we are respectfully unable to agree with the primary judge's general proposition that where an applicant produces a document which purports to be an official document issued in a foreign country, its disputed authenticity is a matter appropriate for verification by the Tribunal through official channels ... In a particular case the Tribunal may indeed be obliged to verify a document in this fashion, but there is no general rule to that effect. In that case, the purported source of the Tribunal's obligation to make inquiries was s 420 of the Migration Act . Nor can a duty to enquire be sourced from s 427(1)(d) of the Migration Act . This provision empowers the Tribunal to make its own inquiries for the purpose of reviewing a decision, but it creates no obligation on the part of the Tribunal: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32 , 78 ALD 224 per Gummow and Hayne JJ at [43] and Callinan J at [124]; WAGJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 277 per Heerey, Nicholson and Mansfield JJ at [24] to [25]; SZATG v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1595 , 83 ALD 596 per Hely J at [22]. In the present case, there is no error in the Tribunal proceeding to make its decision without pursuing further inquiries of its own initiative into the veracity of the Appellant's documentation.
Case: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32 , 78 ALD 224
Outcome: applied
is equally no injustice to the Applicant in not now entertaining the argument as to the failure on the part of the Tribunal to itself initiate further inquiries, as there is no such general duty imposed upon the Tribunal. In Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Singh (1997) 74 FCR 553 , the Full Court held that there is no duty upon the Tribunal to undertake its own investigation into the authenticity of documents supporting a visa application. Black CJ, von Doussa, Sundberg and Mansfield JJ there noted at 561: Although we have concluded that there may be circumstances in which the Tribunal's obligation to act according to substantial justice requires it to make inquiries, we are respectfully unable to agree with the primary judge's general proposition that where an applicant produces a document which purports to be an official document issued in a foreign country, its disputed authenticity is a matter appropriate for verification by the Tribunal through official channels ... In a particular case the Tribunal may indeed be obliged to verify a document in this fashion, but there is no general rule to that effect. In that case, the purported source of the Tribunal's obligation to make inquiries was s 420 of the Migration Act . Nor can a duty to enquire be sourced from s 427(1)(d) of the Migration Act . This provision empowers the Tribunal to make its own inquiries for the purpose of reviewing a decision, but it creates no obligation on the part of the Tribunal: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32 , 78 ALD 224 per Gummow and Hayne JJ at [43] and Callinan J at [124]; WAGJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 277 per Heerey, Nicholson and Mansfield JJ at [24] to [25]; SZATG v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1595 , 83 ALD 596 per Hely J at [22]. In the present case, there is no error in the Tribunal proceeding to make its decision without pursuing further inquiries of its own initiative into the veracity of the Appellant's documentation.
Case: MZXEN v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 829 , 240 ALR 582
Outcome: cited
relevant to any exercise of discretion is any explanation for the failure to raise the fresh argument sought to be relied upon: e.g. MZXEN v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 829 , 240 ALR 582. In the present proceeding no explanation was forthcoming as to why the argument was not previously relied upon before the Federal Magistrate.
Case: NAJT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 134 , 147 FCR 51
Outcome: cited
to the exercise of any discretion is an assessment as to whether it is " expedient in the interests of justice" to allow the fresh argument to be now relied upon: VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158. Kiefel, Weinberg and Stone JJ there concluded: [46] In our view, the application for leave to rely upon the sole ground of appeal now raised should be refused. Leave to argue a ground of appeal not raised before the primary judge should only be granted if it is expedient in the interests of justice to do so ... [47] In Coulton v Holcombe [1986] HCA 33 ; (1986) 162 CLR 1 , Gibbs CJ, Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ observed, in their joint judgment, at 7: "It is fundamental to the due administration of justice that the substantial issues between the parties are ordinarily settled at the trial. If it were not so the main arena for the settlement of disputes would move from the court of first instance to the appellate court, tending to reduce the proceedings in the former court to little more than a preliminary skirmish." [48] The practice of raising arguments for the first time before the Full Court has been particularly prevalent in appeals relating to migration matters. The Court may grant leave if some point that was not taken below, but which clearly has merit, is advanced, and there is no real prejudice to the respondent in permitting it to be agitated. Where, however, there is no adequate explanation for the failure to take the point, and it seems to be of doubtful merit, leave should generally be refused. In our view, the proposed ground of appeal has no merit. There is no justification, therefore, for permitting it to be raised for the first time before this Court. Applied: NAJT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 134 at [163] , [2005] FCAFC 134 ; 147 FCR 51 at 84 per Madgwick J (Conti J agreeing).