mdroth/huggingface-course_section-5_zst huggingface dataset:
Case: Bateman's Bay Local Aboriginal Land Council v The Aboriginal Community Benefit Fund Pty Ltd [1998] HCA 49 ; (1998) 194 CLR 247
Outcome: cited
The traditional approach to standing in matters involving the enforcement of statutes was that while interference with private rights could be asserted by individuals, public rights could only be asserted by the Attorney-General representing the public, either in the name of the Attorney or at the relation of some complainant: Boyce v Paddington Borough Council [1903] 1 Ch 109, Gouriet v Attorney-General [1977] UKHL 5 ; [1978] AC 435; Australian Conservation Foundation Inc v Commonwealth [1979] HCA 1 ; (1980) 146 CLR 493, Davis v Commonwealth [1986] HCA 66 ; (1986) 68 ALR 18 per Gibbs CJ at 35-36; Bateman's Bay Local Aboriginal Land Council v The Aboriginal Community Benefit Fund Pty Ltd [1998] HCA 49 ; (1998) 194 CLR 247 at 261. As observed by Mason J in Australian Conservation Foundation 146 CLR at 547-8: Depending on the nature of the relief which he seeks, a plaintiff will in general have a locus standi when he can show actual or apprehended injury or damage to his property or proprietary rights, to his business or economic interests...and perhaps to his social or political interests. Beyond making this general observation, I consider that there is nothing to be gained from discussing in the abstract the broad range of interests which may serve to support a locus standi for, as I said in Robinson v Western Australian Museum [1977] HCA 46 ; (1977) 138 CLR 283 at 327-328: "The cases are infinitely various and so much depends in a given case on the nature of the relief which is sought, for what is a sufficient interest in one case may be less than sufficient in another".
Case: Britannic Merthyr Coal Company Ltd v David [1910] AC 74
Outcome: cited
The respondent submits further that as s 32 DD Act provides that contravention of disability standards is unlawful , public rights are created. However the fact that legislation provides that conduct is "unlawful" does not of itself mean that exclusively public rights of enforcement exist in relation to that legislation. There is an extensive body of law which provides that simply because a statute deems that certain actions are required by law, and failure to comply is unlawful even to the extent of prescribing a penalty, it does not mean that personal actions are therefore excluded (note for example comments of Atkin LJ in Phillips [1923] 2 KB 832; Groves v Lord Wimborne [1898] 2 QB 402 especially at 415-416; Britannic Merthyr Coal Company Ltd v David [1910] AC 74; Knox CJ, Isaacs, Gavan Duffy and Rich JJ in Mallinson v The Scottish Australian Investment Company Ltd [1920] HCA 51 ; (1920) 28 CLR 66 at 70-72; Potter v Ferguson [1979] 1 NSWLR 364 at 372; Toohey J in University of Newcastle v Chopra [1989] HCA 27 ; (1989) 85 ALR 321 at 343; Campbell v University of New South Wales (1992) 44 IR 56 at 68-69; Gooley v Westpac Banking Corporation (1995) 129 ALR 628 at 648; "GS" v News Ltd (1998) Aust Torts Reports 81-466 at 64,906). In all cases, notwithstanding the existence of other remedies (such as penalties), whether personal rights of action exist will depend on the construction of the statute itself.
Case: Bropho v State of Western Australia [2004] FCA 1209
Outcome: cited
In contrast, in the case before me the HREOC Act and the DD Act (including the Disability Standards formulated pursuant to s 31) provide a scheme which allows "a person aggrieved" by alleged unlawful discrimination - including, as I have already noted, conduct deemed unlawful by s 32 DD Act - to lodge a complaint with HREOC (s 46P HREOC Act); and in the event that the complaint is terminated, a person affected by the termination to make application to the Federal Court or the Federal Magistrates Court (s 46PO HREOC Act). Significantly, the HREOC Act also creates a specific structure sanctioning applications to the Court for remedies where the Court is satisfied that there has been unlawful discrimination, including payment of damages by the respondent, employment or re-employment an applicant, an order declaring that the respondent has committed unlawful discrimination and directing the respondent not to repeat or continue such unlawful discrimination as is sought in this case (s 46PO(4) HREOC Act). Indeed the point of the statutory scheme as constituted in this case by the HREOC Act and the DD Act is to make laws with respect to discriminatory conduct, and to allow those who are aggrieved by discriminatory conduct, personal rights to seek redress in respect of such conduct. To adopt the language of the majority of the High Court in Re East, ex parte Nguyen 196 CLR at 365, repeated in Western Australia v Ward [2002] HCA 28 ; (2002) 213 CLR 1 at 96, The elaborate and special scheme...was plainly intended by the Parliament to provide the means by which a person aggrieved by a contravention ... might obtain a remedy, and thus was regarded by Parliament as fulfilling Australia's treaty obligations, bearing always in mind the legal structure and system which formed the context in which the [legislation] was to operate. (That those comments were in respect of the legislation as it stood prior to amendments, and the removal of provisions from the HREOC Act into the DD Act and other statutes, does not in any way minimise their relevance. As observed, in my view correctly, by Nicholson J in Bropho v State of Western Australia [2004] FCA 1209 at [26] - [29] and [51]-[52], they are equally applicable to the scheme as it presently exists.)
Case: Campbell v University of New South Wales (1992) 44 IR 56
Outcome: cited
The respondent submits further that as s 32 DD Act provides that contravention of disability standards is unlawful , public rights are created. However the fact that legislation provides that conduct is "unlawful" does not of itself mean that exclusively public rights of enforcement exist in relation to that legislation. There is an extensive body of law which provides that simply because a statute deems that certain actions are required by law, and failure to comply is unlawful even to the extent of prescribing a penalty, it does not mean that personal actions are therefore excluded (note for example comments of Atkin LJ in Phillips [1923] 2 KB 832; Groves v Lord Wimborne [1898] 2 QB 402 especially at 415-416; Britannic Merthyr Coal Company Ltd v David [1910] AC 74; Knox CJ, Isaacs, Gavan Duffy and Rich JJ in Mallinson v The Scottish Australian Investment Company Ltd [1920] HCA 51 ; (1920) 28 CLR 66 at 70-72; Potter v Ferguson [1979] 1 NSWLR 364 at 372; Toohey J in University of Newcastle v Chopra [1989] HCA 27 ; (1989) 85 ALR 321 at 343; Campbell v University of New South Wales (1992) 44 IR 56 at 68-69; Gooley v Westpac Banking Corporation (1995) 129 ALR 628 at 648; "GS" v News Ltd (1998) Aust Torts Reports 81-466 at 64,906). In all cases, notwithstanding the existence of other remedies (such as penalties), whether personal rights of action exist will depend on the construction of the statute itself.
Case: Cooper v Human Rights &amp; Equal Opportunity Commission [1999] FCA 180 ; (1999) 93 FCR 481
Outcome: cited
The applicant submitted in summary: a. the issue of standing to commence an action under the HREOC Act or the DD Act is to be determined on the proper construction of those Acts, not by reference to provisions of other enactments or common law principles: Stephenson v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1996) 68 FCR 290 b. given that the legislation is for the benefit of a burdened class of the public, in the event of ambiguity the legislation should receive a beneficial interpretation: Cooper v Human Rights &amp; Equal Opportunity Commission [1999] FCA 180 ; (1999) 93 FCR 481 c. contravention of a standard may be cause for complaint under s 32 DD Act d. section 46P(2) HREOC Act defines who may lodge a complaint under the HREOC Act. The section contemplates a complaint by an "aggrieved person" on the basis of "alleged unlawful discrimination" e. the provisions of the HREOC Act and the DD Act make it plain that they confer private rights with respect to "unlawful discrimination" as defined in s 3 HREOC Act f. the proceedings in the Court involve a determination of the allegations of unlawful discrimination as set out in the complaint, and are circumscribed by the complaint which was terminated by the President g. the applicant's complaint concerns ss 31 and 32 DD Act , and the terms of the complaint and the proceedings before the Court raise the issue of a contravention of the Disability Standards h. the HREOC Act operates to allow complaints to be made about non-compliance with the Disability Standards. Section 46P(1) HREOC Act creates a private right to make a complaint based on s 32 i. the material clearly identifies a dispute between the applicant and the respondent, namely the failure on the part of the respondent to comply with the Disability Standards j. Australian Conservation Foundation [1979] HCA 1 ; 146 CLR 493 is not relevant in this matter because the High Court found that the provisions of the relevant legislation in that case did not create private rights k. the approach taken by the High Court in Truth About Motorways [2000] HCA 11 ; 200 CLR 591 confirms that the provisions of the HREOC Act and the DD Act permit the applicant to proceed in this Court.
Case: Dajon Investments Pty Ltd v Talbot [1969] VR 603
Outcome: cited
Further, it is clear that legislation may create personal statutory rights which can be enforced by an individual in a Court of law: Wool Sliping and Scouring Co Ltd v Central Wool Committee [1920] HCA 21 ; (1920) 28 CLR 51 per Knox CJ at 61-62; Grand Central Car Park Pty Ltd v Tivoli Freeholders [1969] VR 62 at 76; SS Constructions Pty Ltd v Ventura Motors Pty Ltd [1964] VR 229 at 246, Dajon Investments Pty Ltd v Talbot [1969] VR 603 at 613, Australian Conservation Foundation 146 CLR at 537, 542-544; Re East, ex parte Nguyen [1998] HCA 73 ; (1998) 196 CLR 354. As Stephen J observed in Australian Conservation Foundation 146 CLR at 541, referring to s 52 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth): statutes may of course confer standing in express terms...they may also do so by conferring some right the denial of the enjoyment of which gives standing to sue to complain of that denial. Although that very denial might be thought to qualify as the suffering of special damage such as that of which Buckley J spoke, it is, perhaps, preferable in such a case to resolve the question of standing by the direct route of a search for enforceable rights conferred by statute, rather than follow the circuitous course of seeking, in accordance with Boyce's Case, for the existence of special damage. (cf Gibbs J at 532)
Case: Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners [1949] HCA 1 ; (1949) 78 CLR 62
Outcome: cited
The power to dismiss an application summarily must be exercised with great caution and only in the clearest of cases to ensure that an applicant is not deprived of its opportunity for trial of its case: Barwick CJ in General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1964] HCA 69 ; (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 130. As Dixon J said in Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners [1949] HCA 1 ; (1949) 78 CLR 62 at 91: The principles upon which that jurisdiction is exercisable are well settled. A case must be very clear indeed to justify the summary intervention of the court to prevent a plaintiff submitting his case for determination in the appointed manner by the court with or without a jury. The fact that a transaction is intricate may not disentitle the court to examine a cause of action alleged to grow out of it for the purpose of seeing whether the proceeding amounts to an abuse of process or is vexatious. But once it appears that there is a real question to be determined whether of fact or law and that the rights of the parties depend upon it, then it is not competent for the court to dismiss the action as frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of process. 67 I am mindful of the warnings given in such cases as General Steel Industries [1964] HCA 69 ; 112 CLR 125 and Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners [1949] HCA 1 ; 78 CLR 62 in relation to the power of the Court to dismiss an application summarily, and that it should be exercised with great caution. I am satisfied however in this case that it is appropriate to grant the orders sought by the respondents in the application currently before me. Notwithstanding its intellectual and emotional concern in the subject matter of the proceedings, the interest of the applicant is no more than that of an ordinary member of the public; the applicant is not affected to an extent greater than an ordinary member of the public, nor would the applicant gain an advantage if successful nor suffer a disadvantage if unsuccessful. To adopt the language of Lockhart J in Right to Life 56 FCR at 68: Wide and liberal though the laws of standing should be, the courts of this country have drawn the line of demarcation between an open system and the requirement of some form of interest in the subject matter of the proceeding other than a mere emotional attachment or intellectual pursuit or satisfaction.
Case: Farley &amp; Lewers Ltd v AG [1963] NSWR 1624
Outcome: cited
The respondent made written submissions to the following effect: a. the applicant is doing nothing other than attempting to enforce the public law as enacted by the provisions of the DD Act and the Disability Standards b. there is no right subsisting for the benefit of the applicant or its members personally that is sought to be asserted through this litigation c. the application by the applicant is one to assert the effect of the public law of the Commonwealth and the applicant therefore faces the difficulty in relation to standing as the application is a bare attempt to assert a public right or duty: Australian Conservation Foundation [1979] HCA 1 ; 146 CLR 493. The applicant has no special interest or private right asserted by the litigation, and there is no statutory basis providing standing in respect of the complaint: Truth About Motorways Pty Ltd v Macquarie Infrastructure Management Ltd [2000] HCA 11 ; (1999) 200 CLR 591 d. no relator action is brought in the name of the Attorney-General at the applicant's request that such proceeding be undertaken: Farley &amp; Lewers Ltd v AG [1963] NSWR 1624 e. this is not a case where the interference with a public right is such that the applicant suffers special damage peculiar to itself from the interference: Boyce [1903] 1 Ch 109 f. the applicant does not have standing to bring the prosecution. Accordingly, the complaint does not disclose a reasonable cause of action and should be struck out: Australian Conservation Foundation [1979] HCA 1 ; 146 CLR 493.
Case: General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1964] HCA 69 ; (1964) 112 CLR 125
Outcome: cited
The power to dismiss an application summarily must be exercised with great caution and only in the clearest of cases to ensure that an applicant is not deprived of its opportunity for trial of its case: Barwick CJ in General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1964] HCA 69 ; (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 130. As Dixon J said in Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners [1949] HCA 1 ; (1949) 78 CLR 62 at 91: The principles upon which that jurisdiction is exercisable are well settled. A case must be very clear indeed to justify the summary intervention of the court to prevent a plaintiff submitting his case for determination in the appointed manner by the court with or without a jury. The fact that a transaction is intricate may not disentitle the court to examine a cause of action alleged to grow out of it for the purpose of seeing whether the proceeding amounts to an abuse of process or is vexatious. But once it appears that there is a real question to be determined whether of fact or law and that the rights of the parties depend upon it, then it is not competent for the court to dismiss the action as frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of process. 67 I am mindful of the warnings given in such cases as General Steel Industries [1964] HCA 69 ; 112 CLR 125 and Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners [1949] HCA 1 ; 78 CLR 62 in relation to the power of the Court to dismiss an application summarily, and that it should be exercised with great caution. I am satisfied however in this case that it is appropriate to grant the orders sought by the respondents in the application currently before me. Notwithstanding its intellectual and emotional concern in the subject matter of the proceedings, the interest of the applicant is no more than that of an ordinary member of the public; the applicant is not affected to an extent greater than an ordinary member of the public, nor would the applicant gain an advantage if successful nor suffer a disadvantage if unsuccessful. To adopt the language of Lockhart J in Right to Life 56 FCR at 68: Wide and liberal though the laws of standing should be, the courts of this country have drawn the line of demarcation between an open system and the requirement of some form of interest in the subject matter of the proceeding other than a mere emotional attachment or intellectual pursuit or satisfaction.
Case: Gooley v Westpac Banking Corporation (1995) 129 ALR 628
Outcome: cited
The respondent submits further that as s 32 DD Act provides that contravention of disability standards is unlawful , public rights are created. However the fact that legislation provides that conduct is "unlawful" does not of itself mean that exclusively public rights of enforcement exist in relation to that legislation. There is an extensive body of law which provides that simply because a statute deems that certain actions are required by law, and failure to comply is unlawful even to the extent of prescribing a penalty, it does not mean that personal actions are therefore excluded (note for example comments of Atkin LJ in Phillips [1923] 2 KB 832; Groves v Lord Wimborne [1898] 2 QB 402 especially at 415-416; Britannic Merthyr Coal Company Ltd v David [1910] AC 74; Knox CJ, Isaacs, Gavan Duffy and Rich JJ in Mallinson v The Scottish Australian Investment Company Ltd [1920] HCA 51 ; (1920) 28 CLR 66 at 70-72; Potter v Ferguson [1979] 1 NSWLR 364 at 372; Toohey J in University of Newcastle v Chopra [1989] HCA 27 ; (1989) 85 ALR 321 at 343; Campbell v University of New South Wales (1992) 44 IR 56 at 68-69; Gooley v Westpac Banking Corporation (1995) 129 ALR 628 at 648; "GS" v News Ltd (1998) Aust Torts Reports 81-466 at 64,906). In all cases, notwithstanding the existence of other remedies (such as penalties), whether personal rights of action exist will depend on the construction of the statute itself.
Case: Gouriet v Attorney-General [1977] UKHL 5 ; [1978] AC 435
Outcome: cited
The traditional approach to standing in matters involving the enforcement of statutes was that while interference with private rights could be asserted by individuals, public rights could only be asserted by the Attorney-General representing the public, either in the name of the Attorney or at the relation of some complainant: Boyce v Paddington Borough Council [1903] 1 Ch 109, Gouriet v Attorney-General [1977] UKHL 5 ; [1978] AC 435; Australian Conservation Foundation Inc v Commonwealth [1979] HCA 1 ; (1980) 146 CLR 493, Davis v Commonwealth [1986] HCA 66 ; (1986) 68 ALR 18 per Gibbs CJ at 35-36; Bateman's Bay Local Aboriginal Land Council v The Aboriginal Community Benefit Fund Pty Ltd [1998] HCA 49 ; (1998) 194 CLR 247 at 261. As observed by Mason J in Australian Conservation Foundation 146 CLR at 547-8: Depending on the nature of the relief which he seeks, a plaintiff will in general have a locus standi when he can show actual or apprehended injury or damage to his property or proprietary rights, to his business or economic interests...and perhaps to his social or political interests. Beyond making this general observation, I consider that there is nothing to be gained from discussing in the abstract the broad range of interests which may serve to support a locus standi for, as I said in Robinson v Western Australian Museum [1977] HCA 46 ; (1977) 138 CLR 283 at 327-328: "The cases are infinitely various and so much depends in a given case on the nature of the relief which is sought, for what is a sufficient interest in one case may be less than sufficient in another".
Case: Grand Central Car Park Pty Ltd v Tivoli Freeholders [1969] VR 62
Outcome: cited
Further, it is clear that legislation may create personal statutory rights which can be enforced by an individual in a Court of law: Wool Sliping and Scouring Co Ltd v Central Wool Committee [1920] HCA 21 ; (1920) 28 CLR 51 per Knox CJ at 61-62; Grand Central Car Park Pty Ltd v Tivoli Freeholders [1969] VR 62 at 76; SS Constructions Pty Ltd v Ventura Motors Pty Ltd [1964] VR 229 at 246, Dajon Investments Pty Ltd v Talbot [1969] VR 603 at 613, Australian Conservation Foundation 146 CLR at 537, 542-544; Re East, ex parte Nguyen [1998] HCA 73 ; (1998) 196 CLR 354. As Stephen J observed in Australian Conservation Foundation 146 CLR at 541, referring to s 52 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth): statutes may of course confer standing in express terms...they may also do so by conferring some right the denial of the enjoyment of which gives standing to sue to complain of that denial. Although that very denial might be thought to qualify as the suffering of special damage such as that of which Buckley J spoke, it is, perhaps, preferable in such a case to resolve the question of standing by the direct route of a search for enforceable rights conferred by statute, rather than follow the circuitous course of seeking, in accordance with Boyce's Case, for the existence of special damage. (cf Gibbs J at 532) 26 Whether a statute confers upon individuals personal rights and standing to enforce those rights are matters to be determined on the construction of the statute, by reference to the subject, scope and purpose of that statute: Allan v Transurban City Link Ltd [2001] HCA 58 ; (2001) 208 CLR 167 at 174; cf McInerney J in Grand Central Car Park [1969] VR at 74, Kaye and Marks JJ in Thorne v Doug Wade Consultants Pty Ltd [1985] VR 433 at 486 and Atkin LJ in Phillips v Britannia Hygienic Laundry Co Ltd [1923] 2 KB 832 at 841. This case
Case: Groves v Lord Wimborne [1898] 2 QB 402
Outcome: cited
The respondent submits further that as s 32 DD Act provides that contravention of disability standards is unlawful , public rights are created. However the fact that legislation provides that conduct is "unlawful" does not of itself mean that exclusively public rights of enforcement exist in relation to that legislation. There is an extensive body of law which provides that simply because a statute deems that certain actions are required by law, and failure to comply is unlawful even to the extent of prescribing a penalty, it does not mean that personal actions are therefore excluded (note for example comments of Atkin LJ in Phillips [1923] 2 KB 832; Groves v Lord Wimborne [1898] 2 QB 402 especially at 415-416; Britannic Merthyr Coal Company Ltd v David [1910] AC 74; Knox CJ, Isaacs, Gavan Duffy and Rich JJ in Mallinson v The Scottish Australian Investment Company Ltd [1920] HCA 51 ; (1920) 28 CLR 66 at 70-72; Potter v Ferguson [1979] 1 NSWLR 364 at 372; Toohey J in University of Newcastle v Chopra [1989] HCA 27 ; (1989) 85 ALR 321 at 343; Campbell v University of New South Wales (1992) 44 IR 56 at 68-69; Gooley v Westpac Banking Corporation (1995) 129 ALR 628 at 648; "GS" v News Ltd (1998) Aust Torts Reports 81-466 at 64,906). In all cases, notwithstanding the existence of other remedies (such as penalties), whether personal rights of action exist will depend on the construction of the statute itself.