mdroth/huggingface-course_section-5_zst huggingface dataset:
Case: House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 449
Outcome: cited
In addressing those considerations it is important to remember that the question of whether in all the circumstances the decision of the primary Judge is attended by sufficient doubt is to be considered in the context of the observation of their Honours Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ in the well known passage from House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 449 at pp 504 and 505. See also Johnston v Cameron &amp; Ors [2002] FCAFC 251 ; (2002) 124 FCR 160 (FC, Branson, Tamberlin and Finkelstein JJ) per Branson J p 163 [9] and Australian Broadcasting Commission v Parish (FC, Bowen CJ, Frankie and Deane JJ) (1980) 29 ALR 228 at p 232 per Bowen CJ. 89 As a result, the conclusion of the primary Judge that RTI's case 'cannot possibly succeed' [16] on the footing discussed at [62] to [88] of these reasons is attended by sufficient doubt as to warrant reconsideration by the Full Court subject to the question of whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused. However, such a conclusion assumes at its centre that the supply of syringes by CMG involves the use by CMG of RTI's confidential information. 104 In those cases where there is no closely substitutable field of common activity (such as the manufacture of immediately substitutable retractable syringes), use of another's confidential information may be more readily identifiable whether in the form of etchings submitted to a publisher, confidential information contained within a manuscript, an instruction manual provided to a third party or a description of a methodology for a manufacturing process or business method. In the absence of very precise identification particularly in the case however of parties involved in closely substitutable fields of common endeavour, of the information, its confidential character and its use, assertions or general conclusionary contentions relied upon to support a claim of use are insufficient and will not give rise to inferences of use. 105 An illustration of the distinction might be that although Charles Darwin received on 18 June 1858 Alfred Wallace's letter setting out a theory of natural selection in the evolution of species, Darwin's address to the Linnean Society in London on 1 July 1858 outlining his central thesis of the origin of species by means of natural selection was the emanation of years of his own research, field studies and thinking. 106 The claims of use of information said to be confidential to RTI made by paragraphs 70(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g); and paragraph 72(b), (d); and paragraphs 73(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i) and (j) against the background of 'SW11' are no more than an assertion. As to the plunger seal, RTI's evidence is that OMI uses the 'specific type' of rubber used by RTI. However, in the light of OMI's response that it uses santoprene and specified santoprene 181 as early as January 2002, RTI says that santoprene is a form of rubber. That controversy of fact seems to be inconsistent with the initial contention of use of the 'specific type' of rubber.
Case: Johnston v Cameron &amp; Ors [2002] FCAFC 251 ; (2002) 124 FCR 160
Outcome: cited
In addressing those considerations it is important to remember that the question of whether in all the circumstances the decision of the primary Judge is attended by sufficient doubt is to be considered in the context of the observation of their Honours Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ in the well known passage from House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 449 at pp 504 and 505. See also Johnston v Cameron &amp; Ors [2002] FCAFC 251 ; (2002) 124 FCR 160 (FC, Branson, Tamberlin and Finkelstein JJ) per Branson J p 163 [9] and Australian Broadcasting Commission v Parish (FC, Bowen CJ, Frankie and Deane JJ) (1980) 29 ALR 228 at p 232 per Bowen CJ.
Case: Australian Broadcasting Commission v Parish (1980) 29 ALR 228
Outcome: cited
In addressing those considerations it is important to remember that the question of whether in all the circumstances the decision of the primary Judge is attended by sufficient doubt is to be considered in the context of the observation of their Honours Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ in the well known passage from House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 449 at pp 504 and 505. See also Johnston v Cameron &amp; Ors [2002] FCAFC 251 ; (2002) 124 FCR 160 (FC, Branson, Tamberlin and Finkelstein JJ) per Branson J p 163 [9] and Australian Broadcasting Commission v Parish (FC, Bowen CJ, Frankie and Deane JJ) (1980) 29 ALR 228 at p 232 per Bowen CJ.
Case: St. George Bank Ltd v Rabo Australia Ltd (2004) 211 ALR 147
Outcome: cited
As to the settled principles to be applied in an application pursuant to O 15A, r 6, the principles are these: the rule is to be beneficially construed and afforded the fullest scope its language reasonably allows; the 'proper brake' upon any excesses in the application of the rule lies in the exercise of the court's discretion ; the test for determining 'reasonable cause to believe' is an objective one; 'reasonable cause to believe' strikes a relationship with whether the applicant has a right to obtain particular relief or whether the applicant may have a right to relief and thus hypothecates a remedial outcome in the proposed proceedings on the assumption the evidence makes out each integer in the applicant's cause of action; such a belief, on either footing, requires more than mere assertion, suspicion or conjecture; a mere possibility of a right to relief is insufficient; the evidence, that is, an assessment of all the evidence, must incline the mind towards acceptance of the existence of a matter or fact in controversy out of which a right to relief arises or may arise; it is no answer to an application under O 15A, r 6 to say that the proceeding is in the nature of a 'fishing expedition'; the rule contemplates that an applicant will forensically examine the field of documents the subject of the order expressly for the purpose of enabling a decision to be made whether to commence a proceeding; although the rule contemplates such an examination of the respondent's documents the subject of the order, the invasive nature of the order is predicated upon an objectively established reasonable cause to believe that the applicant has or may have a right to contended relief; although an applicant does not need to establish a prima facie case, an applicant must establish that there is a reasonable cause to believe that each element of the potential cause of action is made out; although the threshold test may be set at quite a low level, the evidence must establish facts crystallising all the elements of a cause of action grounding the possible grant of the contended relief (see: St. George Bank Ltd v Rabo Australia Ltd (2004) 211 ALR 147 per Hely J [25] [29]; Hooper &amp; Ors v Kirella Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1584 ; (1999) 96 FCR 1 at pp 11 and 12 per Wilcox, Sackville and Katz JJ [35] [40]; Glencore International AG v Selwyn Mines Ltd (2006) 223 ALR 238 at pp 240 and 241 [8] [16] per Lindgren J; C7 Pty Ltd v Foxtel Management Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1864 at [12] per Gyles J).
Case: Glencore International AG v Selwyn Mines Ltd (2006) 223 ALR 238
Outcome: cited
As to the settled principles to be applied in an application pursuant to O 15A, r 6, the principles are these: the rule is to be beneficially construed and afforded the fullest scope its language reasonably allows; the 'proper brake' upon any excesses in the application of the rule lies in the exercise of the court's discretion ; the test for determining 'reasonable cause to believe' is an objective one; 'reasonable cause to believe' strikes a relationship with whether the applicant has a right to obtain particular relief or whether the applicant may have a right to relief and thus hypothecates a remedial outcome in the proposed proceedings on the assumption the evidence makes out each integer in the applicant's cause of action; such a belief, on either footing, requires more than mere assertion, suspicion or conjecture; a mere possibility of a right to relief is insufficient; the evidence, that is, an assessment of all the evidence, must incline the mind towards acceptance of the existence of a matter or fact in controversy out of which a right to relief arises or may arise; it is no answer to an application under O 15A, r 6 to say that the proceeding is in the nature of a 'fishing expedition'; the rule contemplates that an applicant will forensically examine the field of documents the subject of the order expressly for the purpose of enabling a decision to be made whether to commence a proceeding; although the rule contemplates such an examination of the respondent's documents the subject of the order, the invasive nature of the order is predicated upon an objectively established reasonable cause to believe that the applicant has or may have a right to contended relief; although an applicant does not need to establish a prima facie case, an applicant must establish that there is a reasonable cause to believe that each element of the potential cause of action is made out; although the threshold test may be set at quite a low level, the evidence must establish facts crystallising all the elements of a cause of action grounding the possible grant of the contended relief (see: St. George Bank Ltd v Rabo Australia Ltd (2004) 211 ALR 147 per Hely J [25] [29]; Hooper &amp; Ors v Kirella Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1584 ; (1999) 96 FCR 1 at pp 11 and 12 per Wilcox, Sackville and Katz JJ [35] [40]; Glencore International AG v Selwyn Mines Ltd (2006) 223 ALR 238 at pp 240 and 241 [8] [16] per Lindgren J; C7 Pty Ltd v Foxtel Management Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1864 at [12] per Gyles J).
Case: C7 Pty Ltd v Foxtel Management Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1864
Outcome: cited
As to the settled principles to be applied in an application pursuant to O 15A, r 6, the principles are these: the rule is to be beneficially construed and afforded the fullest scope its language reasonably allows; the 'proper brake' upon any excesses in the application of the rule lies in the exercise of the court's discretion ; the test for determining 'reasonable cause to believe' is an objective one; 'reasonable cause to believe' strikes a relationship with whether the applicant has a right to obtain particular relief or whether the applicant may have a right to relief and thus hypothecates a remedial outcome in the proposed proceedings on the assumption the evidence makes out each integer in the applicant's cause of action; such a belief, on either footing, requires more than mere assertion, suspicion or conjecture; a mere possibility of a right to relief is insufficient; the evidence, that is, an assessment of all the evidence, must incline the mind towards acceptance of the existence of a matter or fact in controversy out of which a right to relief arises or may arise; it is no answer to an application under O 15A, r 6 to say that the proceeding is in the nature of a 'fishing expedition'; the rule contemplates that an applicant will forensically examine the field of documents the subject of the order expressly for the purpose of enabling a decision to be made whether to commence a proceeding; although the rule contemplates such an examination of the respondent's documents the subject of the order, the invasive nature of the order is predicated upon an objectively established reasonable cause to believe that the applicant has or may have a right to contended relief; although an applicant does not need to establish a prima facie case, an applicant must establish that there is a reasonable cause to believe that each element of the potential cause of action is made out; although the threshold test may be set at quite a low level, the evidence must establish facts crystallising all the elements of a cause of action grounding the possible grant of the contended relief (see: St. George Bank Ltd v Rabo Australia Ltd (2004) 211 ALR 147 per Hely J [25] [29]; Hooper &amp; Ors v Kirella Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1584 ; (1999) 96 FCR 1 at pp 11 and 12 per Wilcox, Sackville and Katz JJ [35] [40]; Glencore International AG v Selwyn Mines Ltd (2006) 223 ALR 238 at pp 240 and 241 [8] [16] per Lindgren J; C7 Pty Ltd v Foxtel Management Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1864 at [12] per Gyles J).
Case: Minister for Health and Aged Care v Harrington Associates Ltd [1999] FCA 549
Outcome: cited
First , the reference in the authorities to the test for determining 'reasonable cause to believe' as an objective test, recognises that the phrase in O 15A, r 6(a) 'where there is reasonable cause to believe' connotes 'where to the court at the hearing of the application' there is reasonable cause to believe. Secondly , a demonstrated controversy of fact emerging on the evidence in the application, to be resolved by findings of fact in the contemplated proceeding out of which a right to obtain identified relief is said to arise, will not answer a contention that there is reasonable cause to believe that the applicant may have a right to the relevant relief. However, the controversy of fact must demonstrate that first, the contended facts go beyond mere suspicion, assertion or conjecture and secondly, potential findings of fact in favour of the applicant support all elements of the cause of action that may give rise to the contended relief (see Minister for Health and Aged Care v Harrington Associates Ltd [1999] FCA 549 per Sackville J [28]; Paxus Services Limited v People Bank Pty Limited (1990) 99 ALR 728 per Burchett J (NG 670/1990); Hooper v Kirella (supra) [39]; Quanta Software International Pty Ltd v Computer Management Services Pty Ltd (2000) 175 ALR 536 at 541-2 per Sackville J [24]).
Case: Paxus Services Limited v People Bank Pty Limited (1990) 99 ALR 728
Outcome: cited
First , the reference in the authorities to the test for determining 'reasonable cause to believe' as an objective test, recognises that the phrase in O 15A, r 6(a) 'where there is reasonable cause to believe' connotes 'where to the court at the hearing of the application' there is reasonable cause to believe. Secondly , a demonstrated controversy of fact emerging on the evidence in the application, to be resolved by findings of fact in the contemplated proceeding out of which a right to obtain identified relief is said to arise, will not answer a contention that there is reasonable cause to believe that the applicant may have a right to the relevant relief. However, the controversy of fact must demonstrate that first, the contended facts go beyond mere suspicion, assertion or conjecture and secondly, potential findings of fact in favour of the applicant support all elements of the cause of action that may give rise to the contended relief (see Minister for Health and Aged Care v Harrington Associates Ltd [1999] FCA 549 per Sackville J [28]; Paxus Services Limited v People Bank Pty Limited (1990) 99 ALR 728 per Burchett J (NG 670/1990); Hooper v Kirella (supra) [39]; Quanta Software International Pty Ltd v Computer Management Services Pty Ltd (2000) 175 ALR 536 at 541-2 per Sackville J [24]).
Case: Quanta Software International Pty Ltd v Computer Management Services Pty Ltd (2000) 175 ALR 536
Outcome: cited
First , the reference in the authorities to the test for determining 'reasonable cause to believe' as an objective test, recognises that the phrase in O 15A, r 6(a) 'where there is reasonable cause to believe' connotes 'where to the court at the hearing of the application' there is reasonable cause to believe. Secondly , a demonstrated controversy of fact emerging on the evidence in the application, to be resolved by findings of fact in the contemplated proceeding out of which a right to obtain identified relief is said to arise, will not answer a contention that there is reasonable cause to believe that the applicant may have a right to the relevant relief. However, the controversy of fact must demonstrate that first, the contended facts go beyond mere suspicion, assertion or conjecture and secondly, potential findings of fact in favour of the applicant support all elements of the cause of action that may give rise to the contended relief (see Minister for Health and Aged Care v Harrington Associates Ltd [1999] FCA 549 per Sackville J [28]; Paxus Services Limited v People Bank Pty Limited (1990) 99 ALR 728 per Burchett J (NG 670/1990); Hooper v Kirella (supra) [39]; Quanta Software International Pty Ltd v Computer Management Services Pty Ltd (2000) 175 ALR 536 at 541-2 per Sackville J [24]).
Case: Australian Development Corporation Pty Ltd v White Constructions Ltd &amp; Anor 189 ALR 266
Outcome: cited
The evidence does not establish actual knowledge of the terms of any contract between DDGCL and RTI nor any intention to interfere with the contract ( Australian Development Corporation Pty Ltd v White Constructions Ltd &amp; Anor 189 ALR 266 per Handley JA at [89]) nor OMI's actual or constructive (in any analogous sense contemplated by Barnes v Addy (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244 per Lord Selborne at 251-252) knowledge of CMG's contended use of RTI's confidential information and thus the contended error on the part of the primary Judge is not made out.
Case: Barnes v Addy (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244
Outcome: cited
The evidence does not establish actual knowledge of the terms of any contract between DDGCL and RTI nor any intention to interfere with the contract ( Australian Development Corporation Pty Ltd v White Constructions Ltd &amp; Anor 189 ALR 266 per Handley JA at [89]) nor OMI's actual or constructive (in any analogous sense contemplated by Barnes v Addy (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244 per Lord Selborne at 251-252) knowledge of CMG's contended use of RTI's confidential information and thus the contended error on the part of the primary Judge is not made out.
Case: Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41
Outcome: cited
In those cases of bilateral litigation between the originator and primary disclosor of confidential information on the one hand and a recipient from the originator on the other, a court exercising equitable jurisdiction will, independently of any contractual obligation, tort, fiduciary duty or rights derived from copyright, trade mark or patent legislation, grant relief against an actual or threatened abuse of confidential information provided the evidence establishes the well-known three elements derived from the authorities identified by Megarry J in Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41 at 47 applying the observations of Lord Greene in Saltman Engineering Coy Ltd v Campbell Engineering Coy Ltd [1948] RPC 203 at 211 and 215 and Lord Denning in Seager v Copydex Limited [1967] RPC 349 at 366-367. 69 One of the three elements focuses upon whether the confidential information was imparted in circumstances 'importing an obligation of confidence' ( Coco v Clark at p 47) recognising that 'the notion of an obligation of conscience [arises] from the circumstances in or through which the information was communicated or obtained' ( Moorgate Tobacco v Philip Morris at p 438). The relief 'depends on the broad principle of equity that he who has received information in confidence shall not take unfair advantage of it' ( Seager v Copydex per Lord Denning at p 368).
Case: Saltman Engineering Coy Ltd v Campbell Engineering Coy Ltd [1948] RPC 203
Outcome: cited
In those cases of bilateral litigation between the originator and primary disclosor of confidential information on the one hand and a recipient from the originator on the other, a court exercising equitable jurisdiction will, independently of any contractual obligation, tort, fiduciary duty or rights derived from copyright, trade mark or patent legislation, grant relief against an actual or threatened abuse of confidential information provided the evidence establishes the well-known three elements derived from the authorities identified by Megarry J in Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41 at 47 applying the observations of Lord Greene in Saltman Engineering Coy Ltd v Campbell Engineering Coy Ltd [1948] RPC 203 at 211 and 215 and Lord Denning in Seager v Copydex Limited [1967] RPC 349 at 366-367.
Case: Seager v Copydex Limited [1967] RPC 349
Outcome: cited
In those cases of bilateral litigation between the originator and primary disclosor of confidential information on the one hand and a recipient from the originator on the other, a court exercising equitable jurisdiction will, independently of any contractual obligation, tort, fiduciary duty or rights derived from copyright, trade mark or patent legislation, grant relief against an actual or threatened abuse of confidential information provided the evidence establishes the well-known three elements derived from the authorities identified by Megarry J in Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41 at 47 applying the observations of Lord Greene in Saltman Engineering Coy Ltd v Campbell Engineering Coy Ltd [1948] RPC 203 at 211 and 215 and Lord Denning in Seager v Copydex Limited [1967] RPC 349 at 366-367. 69 One of the three elements focuses upon whether the confidential information was imparted in circumstances 'importing an obligation of confidence' ( Coco v Clark at p 47) recognising that 'the notion of an obligation of conscience [arises] from the circumstances in or through which the information was communicated or obtained' ( Moorgate Tobacco v Philip Morris at p 438). The relief 'depends on the broad principle of equity that he who has received information in confidence shall not take unfair advantage of it' ( Seager v Copydex per Lord Denning at p 368).
Case: Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd (No. 2) [1984] HCA 73 ; (1984) 156 CLR 414
Outcome: cited
The foundation of Equity's intervention is the exclusive jurisdiction to enforce an obligation of conscience arising out of the demonstrated circumstances ( Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd (No. 2) [1984] HCA 73 ; (1984) 156 CLR 414 per Deane J at 437 and 438. 69 One of the three elements focuses upon whether the confidential information was imparted in circumstances 'importing an obligation of confidence' ( Coco v Clark at p 47) recognising that 'the notion of an obligation of conscience [arises] from the circumstances in or through which the information was communicated or obtained' ( Moorgate Tobacco v Philip Morris at p 438). The relief 'depends on the broad principle of equity that he who has received information in confidence shall not take unfair advantage of it' ( Seager v Copydex per Lord Denning at p 368). 90 In seeking the court's intervention to restrain use of confidential information it is essential that the applicant demonstrate with precision the information said to be confidential and the content of use sought to be attached. Assertions of confidentiality at high levels of abstraction will not establish a basis for relief against a disclosee. In the case of an innocent third party who simply seeks reliance upon a contract struck without notice of a relationship of confidentiality between the primary disclosor and any other party or breach, the requirement for precision is even more acute. The starting point is the identification of the relevant confidential information ( Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd (No. 2) (supra) per Deane J at 438; Corrs Pavey Whiting &amp; Byrne v Collector of Customs (Vic) &amp; Anor (1987) 14 FCR 434 per Gummow J at 443; O'Brien v Komesaroff [1982] HCA 33 ; (1982) 150 CLR 310 per Mason J at pp 326 328; Liberty Financial Pty Ltd &amp; Anor v Scott &amp; Anor (No. 4) [2005] VSC 26 ; (2005) 11 VR 629 per Harper J, [13], [35]; Pioneer Concrete Service Ltd v Galli (1985) VR 675 per Crockett, Murphy &amp; Ormiston JJ at 711).
Case: Best Australia Ltd &amp; Ors v Aquagas Marketing Pty Ltd &amp; Ors (1989) 13 IPR 600
Outcome: cited
The same principles derived from the in personam jurisdiction apply to the position of third parties ( Best Australia Ltd &amp; Ors v Aquagas Marketing Pty Ltd &amp; Ors (1989) 13 IPR 600 at 603). Accordingly, the circumstances in which the third party received the confidential information require close attention to determine whether the conscience of the third party ought to be bound.