mdroth/huggingface-course_section-5_zst huggingface dataset:
Case: Public Trustee v Attorney-General (1997) 42 NSWLR 600
Outcome: cited
The political purposes limitation is not well defined and is more difficult of application today having regard to the change in social conditions since 1917 and the involvement of legislatures in areas unthought of at that time: see Santow GFK , " Charity in its Political Voice A Tinkling Cymbal or a Sounding Brass?" (1999) 18 ABR 225. In Public Trustee v Attorney-General (1997) 42 NSWLR 600 at 602, Santow J observed of the High Court decision in Royal North Shore Hospital of Sydney v Attorney-General (NSW) [1938] HCA 39 ; (1938) 60 CLR 396 at 426: The High Court's formulation suggests that a trust may survive in Australia as charitable where the object is to introduce new law consistent with the way the law is tending. In his paper in the Australian Bar Review, Santow J also observed that a trust which has an undoubtedly charitable object does not lose its charitable status simply because it also has an object of changing the law or reversing policy (at 248): The question is always whether that "political object" precludes the trust satisfying the public benefit requirement. 139 In relation to the political purposes question, VWL submitted that it was not formed for the purpose of changing a specific law or laws or government policy. One of its primary activities have been directed to maintaining and educating the community about and enforcing existing laws. The promotion of humanitarian objects and those relating to basic human rights were said to be charitable even though, on occasion, (although not in this case) they might involve or require a change in policy or law. The judgment of Santow J in Public Trustee v Attorney-General (1997) 42 NSWLR 600 was cited and, in particular, his Honour's observation that: There is a range of activity from direct lobbying of the government, to education of the public on particular issues, in the interests of a climate conducive to political change. The line between an object directed at legitimate educative activity compared to illegitimate political agitation is a blurred one, involving at the margin matters of tone and style. VWL submitted that, to the extent to which any of its purposes could be regarded as political, they were incidental to its principal objects. The organisation would not be eviscerated if any reference to legislative change were removed from its constituent documents.
Case: Royal North Shore Hospital of Sydney v Attorney-General (NSW) [1938] HCA 39 ; (1938) 60 CLR 396
Outcome: cited
The political purposes limitation is not well defined and is more difficult of application today having regard to the change in social conditions since 1917 and the involvement of legislatures in areas unthought of at that time: see Santow GFK , " Charity in its Political Voice A Tinkling Cymbal or a Sounding Brass?" (1999) 18 ABR 225. In Public Trustee v Attorney-General (1997) 42 NSWLR 600 at 602, Santow J observed of the High Court decision in Royal North Shore Hospital of Sydney v Attorney-General (NSW) [1938] HCA 39 ; (1938) 60 CLR 396 at 426: The High Court's formulation suggests that a trust may survive in Australia as charitable where the object is to introduce new law consistent with the way the law is tending. In his paper in the Australian Bar Review, Santow J also observed that a trust which has an undoubtedly charitable object does not lose its charitable status simply because it also has an object of changing the law or reversing policy (at 248): The question is always whether that "political object" precludes the trust satisfying the public benefit requirement.
Case: Royal Australian College of Surgeons v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1943] HCA 34 ; (1943) 68 CLR 436
Outcome: cited
The general nature of the inquiries to be undertaken in ascertaining whether an entity is a charitable institution was discussed by Allsop J in Word Investments Ltd 164 FCR 194. His Honour referred to Royal Australian College of Surgeons v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1943] HCA 34 ; (1943) 68 CLR 436 and the analysis of the judgments in that case by Lockhart J in Cronulla Sutherland Leagues Club Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1990) 23 FCR 82 at 90-93. These authorities demonstrated that the question as to the true nature or character of the entity is to be assessed having regard to its objects, purposes and activities (at [11]). Allsop J formulated the task of characterisation thus (at [14]): The relevant task, as stated in the Surgeons' Case is to assess the true character or nature of the entity by reference to its objects, purposes and activities. It is an integrated, holistic enquiry directed to whether a body of facts and circumstances satisfies a legal category or conception. 133 For an association to be characterised as a charitable institution it must exist for a public benefit as distinct from the creation of private benefits. The fourth class of charitable trust in Pemsel [1891] AC 531 brings in the public benefit requirement through the words "beneficial to the community". As Kenny J said in The Triton Foundation 147 FCR at [22]: The public may, however, include a section of the public. An association may have a public benefit purpose although some of its subsidiary or ancillary functions may benefit particular persons such as members of a profession: Royal Australian College of Surgeons v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1943] HCA 34 ; (1943) 68 CLR 436 at 447 and other authorities cited in The Triton Foundation 147 FCR at [23].
Case: Cronulla Sutherland Leagues Club Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1990) 23 FCR 82
Outcome: cited
The general nature of the inquiries to be undertaken in ascertaining whether an entity is a charitable institution was discussed by Allsop J in Word Investments Ltd 164 FCR 194. His Honour referred to Royal Australian College of Surgeons v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1943] HCA 34 ; (1943) 68 CLR 436 and the analysis of the judgments in that case by Lockhart J in Cronulla Sutherland Leagues Club Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1990) 23 FCR 82 at 90-93. These authorities demonstrated that the question as to the true nature or character of the entity is to be assessed having regard to its objects, purposes and activities (at [11]). Allsop J formulated the task of characterisation thus (at [14]): The relevant task, as stated in the Surgeons' Case is to assess the true character or nature of the entity by reference to its objects, purposes and activities. It is an integrated, holistic enquiry directed to whether a body of facts and circumstances satisfies a legal category or conception.
Case: Scottish Burial Reform and Cremation Society Ltd v Glasgow City Corporation [1967] UKHL 3 ; [1968] AC 138
Outcome: cited
Importantly, the Commissioner had submitted to the Full Court that a charitable institution could conduct commercial activities but only as incidental or ancillary to its charitable activities. After referring to relevant authorities, Allsop J observed that the cases did not support the submission. He cited Scottish Burial Reform and Cremation Society Ltd v Glasgow City Corporation [1967] UKHL 3 ; [1968] AC 138 and The Incorporated Council of Law Reporting of the State of Queensland v Commissioner of Taxation [1971] HCA 44 ; (1971) 125 CLR 659 and said (at [18]): ... both stand as authority for the proposition that the making of a profit from the conduct of the charitable activity does not necessarily destroy the charitable nature of the purpose exhibited by the activity. Stone J agreed with Allsop J.
Case: The Incorporated Council of Law Reporting of the State of Queensland v Commissioner of Taxation [1971] HCA 44 ; (1971) 125 CLR 659
Outcome: cited
Importantly, the Commissioner had submitted to the Full Court that a charitable institution could conduct commercial activities but only as incidental or ancillary to its charitable activities. After referring to relevant authorities, Allsop J observed that the cases did not support the submission. He cited Scottish Burial Reform and Cremation Society Ltd v Glasgow City Corporation [1967] UKHL 3 ; [1968] AC 138 and The Incorporated Council of Law Reporting of the State of Queensland v Commissioner of Taxation [1971] HCA 44 ; (1971) 125 CLR 659 and said (at [18]): ... both stand as authority for the proposition that the making of a profit from the conduct of the charitable activity does not necessarily destroy the charitable nature of the purpose exhibited by the activity. Stone J agreed with Allsop J. 135 VWL cited examples of judicially enunciated criteria for identifying purposes falling within the spirit and intendment of the Preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth. According to such criteria qualifying purposes are those: . which "must tend to the improvement of society": Barby v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd [1937] HCA 64 ; (1937) 58 CLR 316 at 324 (Dixon J); . " whose fulfilment may reasonably be thought to minister to the safety or happiness or wellbeing or good conscience of the community and which may reasonably be the subject of outlay at the public expense ... [and] could fairly be regarded as a possible subject of public responsibility": Re Belcher [1950] VLR 11 at 13 (Fullagar J); . which to some extent satisfy "an obligation of the community recognised generally in the community": Re Lowin [1965] NSWR 1624 at 1626 (Jacobs J); . which make "provision of some of the indispensables of a settled community" and are "socially fundamental": Incorporated Council of Law Reporting of the State of Queensland v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1971] HCA 44 ; (1971) 125 CLR 659 at 669 (Barwick CJ); . which uplift the moral tone of the community: Re Weaver [1963] VR 257 ; Re Inman [1965] VR 238 at 242; or . which raise the standard of life: Re Blyth [1997] 2 Qd 567 at 581 (Thomas J).
Case: Commissioner of Taxation v The Triton Foundation [2005] FCA 1319 ; (2005) 147 FCR 362
Outcome: cited
The approach taken by the Full Court is consistent with that set out by Kenny J in Commissioner of Taxation v The Triton Foundation [2005] FCA 1319 ; (2005) 147 FCR 362. After extensively reviewing the authorities relating to charitable institutions her Honour said (at [20]): It is also settled law that whether a particular corporate body is a charitable institution depends on the central or essential object of the institution as determined by reference to its constitution and activities ... If the main purpose of such a body is charitable, it does not lose its charitable character simply because some of its incidental or concomitant and ancillary objects are non-charitable. 133 For an association to be characterised as a charitable institution it must exist for a public benefit as distinct from the creation of private benefits. The fourth class of charitable trust in Pemsel [1891] AC 531 brings in the public benefit requirement through the words "beneficial to the community". As Kenny J said in The Triton Foundation 147 FCR at [22]: The public may, however, include a section of the public. An association may have a public benefit purpose although some of its subsidiary or ancillary functions may benefit particular persons such as members of a profession: Royal Australian College of Surgeons v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1943] HCA 34 ; (1943) 68 CLR 436 at 447 and other authorities cited in The Triton Foundation 147 FCR at [23].
Case: Royal College of Surgeons v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1943] HCA 34 ; (1943) 68 CLR 436 
Outcome: cited
The general nature of the inquiries to be undertaken in ascertaining whether an entity is a charitable institution was discussed by Allsop J in Word Investments Ltd 164 FCR 194. His Honour referred to Royal Australian College of Surgeons v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1943] HCA 34 ; (1943) 68 CLR 436 and the analysis of the judgments in that case by Lockhart J in Cronulla Sutherland Leagues Club Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1990) 23 FCR 82 at 90-93. These authorities demonstrated that the question as to the true nature or character of the entity is to be assessed having regard to its objects, purposes and activities (at [11]). Allsop J formulated the task of characterisation thus (at [14]): The relevant task, as stated in the Surgeons' Case is to assess the true character or nature of the entity by reference to its objects, purposes and activities. It is an integrated, holistic enquiry directed to whether a body of facts and circumstances satisfies a legal category or conception. 133 For an association to be characterised as a charitable institution it must exist for a public benefit as distinct from the creation of private benefits. The fourth class of charitable trust in Pemsel [1891] AC 531 brings in the public benefit requirement through the words "beneficial to the community". As Kenny J said in The Triton Foundation 147 FCR at [22]: The public may, however, include a section of the public. An association may have a public benefit purpose although some of its subsidiary or ancillary functions may benefit particular persons such as members of a profession: Royal Australian College of Surgeons v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1943] HCA 34 ; (1943) 68 CLR 436 at 447 and other authorities cited in The Triton Foundation 147 FCR at [23].
Case: Halpin v Seear [1977] Ch Com Rep
Outcome: cited
Some reliance was placed on the judgment of Whitford J in Halpin v Seear [1977] Ch Com Rep. That case considered the validity of a trust established in 1926 to promote the equality of women with men in political and economic opportunity. Under the trust payments were to be made to the London Society for Women's Service for so long as it should, in the opinion of the trustee, continue to promote the objects of the trust. Whitford J noted that it was not suggested that the society as such was a charity in the eyes of the law although some of the activities would undoubtedly qualify as charitable. The question before him related to the object of the founder of the trust (at 34): So the question is whether the dominant or essential object here revealed is a political one, for it stands accepted in argument before me that if the object be a political object and if this be a purpose trust then it must be invalid. I think that it cannot seriously be contended that the object here is essentially a political object. It seems to me quite clear that the dominant or essential object is the achievement of equality albeit in political and economic fields, that the founder in no sense is concerned with any particular political or economic doctrine or cause; she is concerned merely to ensure that within these fields there should be equality of status between women and men.
Case: Taylor v Taylor [1910] HCA 4 ; (1910) 10 CLR 218
Outcome: cited
The Commissioner contended that VWL was not a charitable institution. He argued that not all purposes which are beneficial to the public are in fact charitable. A trust of the fourth class in Pemsel [1891] AC 531 must be of direct and general benefit to the public. The mere fact that it is for purposes which may tend to be of general public utility would not be sufficient. He cited Taylor v Taylor [1910] HCA 4 ; (1910) 10 CLR 218 at 237 and Barby v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd [1937] HCA 64 ; (1937) 58 CLR 316 at 324. He did not dispute that a trust for the promotion of the mental or moral improvement of the community could sometimes fall within the fourth class. The requirement of benefit to the public was said to commonly exclude from the status of charitable institutions organisations such as professional bodies established to help those persons who furnish the organisation's funds. These would usually be members or persons eligible for membership but could also be contributors or sponsors. If the main objects of an institution were the protection and advancement of persons practicing in a particular profession, the institution would not be regarded as charitable because the element of direct public benefit was lacking.
Case: Barby v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd [1937] HCA 64 ; (1937) 58 CLR 316
Outcome: cited
VWL cited examples of judicially enunciated criteria for identifying purposes falling within the spirit and intendment of the Preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth. According to such criteria qualifying purposes are those: . which "must tend to the improvement of society": Barby v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd [1937] HCA 64 ; (1937) 58 CLR 316 at 324 (Dixon J); . " whose fulfilment may reasonably be thought to minister to the safety or happiness or wellbeing or good conscience of the community and which may reasonably be the subject of outlay at the public expense ... [and] could fairly be regarded as a possible subject of public responsibility": Re Belcher [1950] VLR 11 at 13 (Fullagar J); . which to some extent satisfy "an obligation of the community recognised generally in the community": Re Lowin [1965] NSWR 1624 at 1626 (Jacobs J); . which make "provision of some of the indispensables of a settled community" and are "socially fundamental": Incorporated Council of Law Reporting of the State of Queensland v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1971] HCA 44 ; (1971) 125 CLR 659 at 669 (Barwick CJ); . which uplift the moral tone of the community: Re Weaver [1963] VR 257 ; Re Inman [1965] VR 238 at 242; or . which raise the standard of life: Re Blyth [1997] 2 Qd 567 at 581 (Thomas J). 142 The Commissioner contended that VWL was not a charitable institution. He argued that not all purposes which are beneficial to the public are in fact charitable. A trust of the fourth class in Pemsel [1891] AC 531 must be of direct and general benefit to the public. The mere fact that it is for purposes which may tend to be of general public utility would not be sufficient. He cited Taylor v Taylor [1910] HCA 4 ; (1910) 10 CLR 218 at 237 and Barby v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd [1937] HCA 64 ; (1937) 58 CLR 316 at 324. He did not dispute that a trust for the promotion of the mental or moral improvement of the community could sometimes fall within the fourth class. The requirement of benefit to the public was said to commonly exclude from the status of charitable institutions organisations such as professional bodies established to help those persons who furnish the organisation's funds. These would usually be members or persons eligible for membership but could also be contributors or sponsors. If the main objects of an institution were the protection and advancement of persons practicing in a particular profession, the institution would not be regarded as charitable because the element of direct public benefit was lacking.
Case: Douglas v Commissioner of Taxation (1997) 77 FCR 112
Outcome: cited
In Douglas v Commissioner of Taxation (1997) 77 FCR 112 , Olney J said of s 23(g)(v) (at 118 ): The absence of a statutory definition and the very broad ambit of the words "community service" justify resort to the explanatory memorandum to identify more precisely the legislative intention. His Honour held in that case that the trust deeds of a "Protestant Hall" did not fall within the exemption provided in s 23(g)(v) because it held the title to the relevant land and kept a building on it for use by other organisations but did not carry out any activity for the benefit or welfare of the community.
Case: National Council of Women of Tasmania v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1998) 38 ATR 1174
Outcome: cited
In National Council of Women of Tasmania v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1998) 38 ATR 1174 , the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the AAT) considered whether the National Council of Women of Tasmania fell within the scope of the exemption. It was an unincorporated association, the objects of which included the advancement of the interests of women and children and humanity in general. It also brought together representatives of other women's organisations including the promotion of their activities and projects directed to community welfare. The AAT held that the Council's predominant purpose was not that of a social club or discussion group. Its political and lobbying activities had been minimal. It played an active role in community service activities and not a passive one. 156 The AAT found that the Council would hold one annual general meeting each year, nine monthly general meetings, ten monthly executive meetings and a number of lunches and seminars. One of the "subtle roles" of the Council was to widen the support network of its affiliated organisations. Delegates and members who attended Council meetings and executive meetings would support the activities of affiliated organisations financially and by doing unpaid work. Council delegates and members assisted by donating and collecting goods for the needy such as baby clothes and by knitting items for the needy during general meetings. Most of the member organisations appeared to qualify as community service organisations. 157 The AAT held that the predominant purpose of the Council's meetings involved the coordination of community service work and the provision of exchange of information for the purpose of facilitating such work. It held the Council to be an association established for community service purposes, not being political or lobbying purposes and so exempt from income tax.
Case: Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63 ; (2000) 205 CLR 337
Outcome: applied
considered Mr Slaveski's application that I disqualify myself, I refuse it. The High Court in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63 ; (2000) 205 CLR 337 identified the relevant considerations for an application of this kind. I have had regard, in particular, to whether there is any realistic possibility that the outcome of this litigation could affect the value of my shareholding in the CBA. I am satisfied that there is no possibility that the outcome of this litigation could have any affect on the value of my shareholding with the CBA. In the circumstances, it could not be said that a fair-minded lay observer may reasonably apprehend that I might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the application before me. Accordingly, I reject the application and will consider when the matter should be listed for hearing. I certify that the preceding four (4) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Bromberg. Associate: Dated: 23 December 2009 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr B Basavanand Solicitor for the Applicant: Rotstein Lockwood Reddy Lawyers Pty Ltd The respondent appeared in person Date of Hearing: 18 December 2009 Date of Judgment: 18 December 2009 AustLII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/2009/1590.html
Case: Dinyarrak Investments Pty Ltd v Amoco Australia Ltd (1982) 45 ALR 214
Outcome: referred to
For Mrs Wall to acquire an interest in Warwick's shares, by the operation of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel, it would be necessary to establish the following matters: (a) an expectation or belief by Mrs Wall, created and encouraged by Warwick, that Mrs Wall was to be regarded as the beneficial owner of the shares in the Company held by Warwick, (b) knowledge by Warwick of Mrs Wall's expectation or belief, (c) some conduct on the part of Mrs Wall, to her detriment, in reliance upon that expectation or belief, encouraged by some conduct of Warwick's or lack of conduct on his part. In those circumstances, it may be unconscionable for Warwick to rely on his ownership of the shares to defeat his mother's expectation and belief (see Dinyarrak Investments Pty Ltd v Amoco Australia Ltd (1982) 45 ALR 214 and Repatriation Commission v Tsourounakis [2004] FCAFC 332).