mdroth/huggingface-course_section-5_zst huggingface dataset:
Case: Commissioner of Taxation v Hart (2004) 217 CLR 216
Outcome: cited
[26], the Tribunal noted that in the absence of any variation to the contracts, the amounts that would have been deductible under s 82AAC of the Act as superannuation contributions were in 1997 $27,170.00 (Mr Mark Trail) and $9,782.00 (Mr Allan Trail) and in 1998, $28,620.00 (Mr Mark Trail) and $10,232.00 (Mr Allan Trail). At [27], the Tribunal noted that s 177C(1)(b) requires the making of an hypothesis as to what might reasonably be expected to have happened had the scheme not been entered into or carried out. The Tribunal noted the observations of Gummow and Hayne JJ in Commissioner of Taxation v Hart (2004) 217 CLR 216 at 243 [66] that the enquiry directed by Part IVA requires comparison between the scheme in question and an alternative postulate. The Tribunal also noted that the High Court in Commissioner of Taxation v Peabody [1994] HCA 43 ; (1994) 181 CLR 359 determined that a reasonable expectation requires more than a possibility with the result that the prediction must be sufficiently reliable for it to be regarded as reasonable. The matter is to be remitted to the Tribunal to determine the questions before it by applying the test so as to determine whether there is evidence which supports an hypothesis that the taxpayer would have undertaken or might reasonably be expected to have undertaken a particular activity in lieu of the scheme and whether that activity would or might reasonably be expected to have resulted in an allowable deduction of the same kind as the deduction claimed by the taxpayer under the scheme consistently with the methodology identified in the authorities and in particular, Commissioner of Taxation v Peabody (1994) 181 CLR 359; Commissioner of Taxation v Hart (2004) 217 CLR 216; and Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Lenzo (2008) 167 FCR 255 at 278 [121] to [125] and [128]; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Spotless Services Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 404.
Case: Birdseye v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2003) 38 AAR 55; [2003] FCAFC 323
Outcome: cited
is well settled that an appeal lies to the Federal Court of Australia under s 44(1) of the AAT Act in the original jurisdiction of the Court, "on a question of law" and not in a matter that raises a question of law or involves a question of law. An appeal only lies if there is raised for determination, a question of law and the subject matter of the appeal is the resolution of that question: Birdseye v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2003) 38 AAR 55; [2003] FCAFC 323; TNT Skypac International (Aust) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 82 ALR 175; Comcare v Etheridge (2006) 149 FCR 522; Hussain v Minister for Foreign Affairs (2008) 169 FCR 241. The questions of law to be determined must be properly framed in the notice of appeal supported by the contended grounds of appeal: Order 53, rule 3(2).
Case: TNT Skypac International (Aust) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 82 ALR 175
Outcome: cited
is well settled that an appeal lies to the Federal Court of Australia under s 44(1) of the AAT Act in the original jurisdiction of the Court, "on a question of law" and not in a matter that raises a question of law or involves a question of law. An appeal only lies if there is raised for determination, a question of law and the subject matter of the appeal is the resolution of that question: Birdseye v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2003) 38 AAR 55; [2003] FCAFC 323; TNT Skypac International (Aust) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 82 ALR 175; Comcare v Etheridge (2006) 149 FCR 522; Hussain v Minister for Foreign Affairs (2008) 169 FCR 241. The questions of law to be determined must be properly framed in the notice of appeal supported by the contended grounds of appeal: Order 53, rule 3(2).
Case: Comcare v Etheridge (2006) 149 FCR 522
Outcome: cited
is well settled that an appeal lies to the Federal Court of Australia under s 44(1) of the AAT Act in the original jurisdiction of the Court, "on a question of law" and not in a matter that raises a question of law or involves a question of law. An appeal only lies if there is raised for determination, a question of law and the subject matter of the appeal is the resolution of that question: Birdseye v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2003) 38 AAR 55; [2003] FCAFC 323; TNT Skypac International (Aust) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 82 ALR 175; Comcare v Etheridge (2006) 149 FCR 522; Hussain v Minister for Foreign Affairs (2008) 169 FCR 241. The questions of law to be determined must be properly framed in the notice of appeal supported by the contended grounds of appeal: Order 53, rule 3(2).
Case: Hussain v Minister for Foreign Affairs (2008) 169 FCR 241
Outcome: cited
is well settled that an appeal lies to the Federal Court of Australia under s 44(1) of the AAT Act in the original jurisdiction of the Court, "on a question of law" and not in a matter that raises a question of law or involves a question of law. An appeal only lies if there is raised for determination, a question of law and the subject matter of the appeal is the resolution of that question: Birdseye v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2003) 38 AAR 55; [2003] FCAFC 323; TNT Skypac International (Aust) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 82 ALR 175; Comcare v Etheridge (2006) 149 FCR 522; Hussain v Minister for Foreign Affairs (2008) 169 FCR 241. The questions of law to be determined must be properly framed in the notice of appeal supported by the contended grounds of appeal: Order 53, rule 3(2).
Case: Price Street Professional Centre Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2007] FCAFC 154
Outcome: cited
of fact are generally not susceptible of challenge unless the manner of their making gives rise to a question of law: Price Street Professional Centre Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2007] FCAFC 154. The question of whether the Tribunal has isolated the relevant legal test is plainly a question of law. The question of whether the Tribunal has applied a correctly identified test or in applying the test so identified, has in fact applied a different test, is a question of law. The question of whether facts found fall within the statute properly construed is generally regarded as a question of law: Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 280. In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Al Miahi 65 ALD 141, Sundberg, Emmett and Finkelstein JJ said this: [34] The question whether there is any evidence of a particular fact is a question of law. Likewise, the question whether a particular inference can be drawn from facts found or agreed is a question of law. That is because, before the inference is drawn, there is a preliminary question as to whether the evidence reasonably admits a different conclusion. Accordingly, in the context of judicial review, the makings of findings and the drawing of inferences in the absence of evidence is an error of law. On the other hand, there is no error of law simply in making a wrong finding of fact. Even if the reasoning whereby the court reached its conclusions of fact were demonstrably unsound, that would not amount to an error of law. A party does not establish an error of law by showing that the decision-maker inferred the existence of a particular fact by a faulty process, for example by engaging in an illogical course of reasoning. Thus, at common law, want of logic is not synonymous with error of law. So long as the particular inference is reasonably open, even if that inference appears to have been drawn as a result of illogical reasoning, there is no place for judicial review because no error of law has taken place.
Case: Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 280
Outcome: cited
of fact are generally not susceptible of challenge unless the manner of their making gives rise to a question of law: Price Street Professional Centre Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2007] FCAFC 154. The question of whether the Tribunal has isolated the relevant legal test is plainly a question of law. The question of whether the Tribunal has applied a correctly identified test or in applying the test so identified, has in fact applied a different test, is a question of law. The question of whether facts found fall within the statute properly construed is generally regarded as a question of law: Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 280. In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Al Miahi 65 ALD 141, Sundberg, Emmett and Finkelstein JJ said this: [34] The question whether there is any evidence of a particular fact is a question of law. Likewise, the question whether a particular inference can be drawn from facts found or agreed is a question of law. That is because, before the inference is drawn, there is a preliminary question as to whether the evidence reasonably admits a different conclusion. Accordingly, in the context of judicial review, the makings of findings and the drawing of inferences in the absence of evidence is an error of law. On the other hand, there is no error of law simply in making a wrong finding of fact. Even if the reasoning whereby the court reached its conclusions of fact were demonstrably unsound, that would not amount to an error of law. A party does not establish an error of law by showing that the decision-maker inferred the existence of a particular fact by a faulty process, for example by engaging in an illogical course of reasoning. Thus, at common law, want of logic is not synonymous with error of law. So long as the particular inference is reasonably open, even if that inference appears to have been drawn as a result of illogical reasoning, there is no place for judicial review because no error of law has taken place.
Case: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Al Miahi 65 ALD 141
Outcome: cited
of fact are generally not susceptible of challenge unless the manner of their making gives rise to a question of law: Price Street Professional Centre Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2007] FCAFC 154. The question of whether the Tribunal has isolated the relevant legal test is plainly a question of law. The question of whether the Tribunal has applied a correctly identified test or in applying the test so identified, has in fact applied a different test, is a question of law. The question of whether facts found fall within the statute properly construed is generally regarded as a question of law: Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 280. In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Al Miahi 65 ALD 141, Sundberg, Emmett and Finkelstein JJ said this: [34] The question whether there is any evidence of a particular fact is a question of law. Likewise, the question whether a particular inference can be drawn from facts found or agreed is a question of law. That is because, before the inference is drawn, there is a preliminary question as to whether the evidence reasonably admits a different conclusion. Accordingly, in the context of judicial review, the makings of findings and the drawing of inferences in the absence of evidence is an error of law. On the other hand, there is no error of law simply in making a wrong finding of fact. Even if the reasoning whereby the court reached its conclusions of fact were demonstrably unsound, that would not amount to an error of law. A party does not establish an error of law by showing that the decision-maker inferred the existence of a particular fact by a faulty process, for example by engaging in an illogical course of reasoning. Thus, at common law, want of logic is not synonymous with error of law. So long as the particular inference is reasonably open, even if that inference appears to have been drawn as a result of illogical reasoning, there is no place for judicial review because no error of law has taken place.
Case: Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
Outcome: cited
identifying whether the administrative decision-maker (in this case the Tribunal) has engaged in an error of law giving rise to a question of law , it is necessary to precisely identify the "nature and quality" of the error and the legal principle that attracts a particular legal consequence, that is, the "legal rubric under which a decision is challenged": Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 198 ALR 59 per Gleeson CJ at [9]. The scope of that legal rubric is conventionally understood in terms of the well known passage from Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179 per Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ, adopted and applied in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 at 351 [82] per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ. As to misconceptions which might suggest an unsupportable supposition on the part of the decision-maker, see Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1949) 78 CLR 353 at 360 per Dixon J and R v Australian Stevedoring Industry Board; Ex parte Melbourne Stevedoring Co. Pty Ltd (1953) 88 CLR 100 at 120 per Dixon CJ, Williams, Webb and Fullagar JJ. As to the constraints upon a court interfering with a decision-maker's assessment of the evidence in exercising supervisory review of administrative decision-making, see Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1 at 35-36 per Brennan J. At common law, want of logic, is not synonymous with error of law: Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 per Mason CJ at 356 with whom Brennan, Toohey and Gaudron JJ agreed. As to inferences, Mason CJ said this at 356 in Bond : So long as there is some basis for an inference in other words, the particular inference is reasonably open, even if that inference appears to have been drawn as a result of illogical reasoning, there is no place for judicial review because no error of law has taken place. [the emphasis is his Honour's emphasis]
Case: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323
Outcome: cited
identifying whether the administrative decision-maker (in this case the Tribunal) has engaged in an error of law giving rise to a question of law , it is necessary to precisely identify the "nature and quality" of the error and the legal principle that attracts a particular legal consequence, that is, the "legal rubric under which a decision is challenged": Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 198 ALR 59 per Gleeson CJ at [9]. The scope of that legal rubric is conventionally understood in terms of the well known passage from Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179 per Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ, adopted and applied in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 at 351 [82] per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ. As to misconceptions which might suggest an unsupportable supposition on the part of the decision-maker, see Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1949) 78 CLR 353 at 360 per Dixon J and R v Australian Stevedoring Industry Board; Ex parte Melbourne Stevedoring Co. Pty Ltd (1953) 88 CLR 100 at 120 per Dixon CJ, Williams, Webb and Fullagar JJ. As to the constraints upon a court interfering with a decision-maker's assessment of the evidence in exercising supervisory review of administrative decision-making, see Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1 at 35-36 per Brennan J. At common law, want of logic, is not synonymous with error of law: Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 per Mason CJ at 356 with whom Brennan, Toohey and Gaudron JJ agreed. As to inferences, Mason CJ said this at 356 in Bond : So long as there is some basis for an inference in other words, the particular inference is reasonably open, even if that inference appears to have been drawn as a result of illogical reasoning, there is no place for judicial review because no error of law has taken place. [the emphasis is his Honour's emphasis]
Case: Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1949) 78 CLR 353
Outcome: cited
identifying whether the administrative decision-maker (in this case the Tribunal) has engaged in an error of law giving rise to a question of law , it is necessary to precisely identify the "nature and quality" of the error and the legal principle that attracts a particular legal consequence, that is, the "legal rubric under which a decision is challenged": Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 198 ALR 59 per Gleeson CJ at [9]. The scope of that legal rubric is conventionally understood in terms of the well known passage from Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179 per Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ, adopted and applied in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 at 351 [82] per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ. As to misconceptions which might suggest an unsupportable supposition on the part of the decision-maker, see Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1949) 78 CLR 353 at 360 per Dixon J and R v Australian Stevedoring Industry Board; Ex parte Melbourne Stevedoring Co. Pty Ltd (1953) 88 CLR 100 at 120 per Dixon CJ, Williams, Webb and Fullagar JJ. As to the constraints upon a court interfering with a decision-maker's assessment of the evidence in exercising supervisory review of administrative decision-making, see Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1 at 35-36 per Brennan J. At common law, want of logic, is not synonymous with error of law: Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 per Mason CJ at 356 with whom Brennan, Toohey and Gaudron JJ agreed. As to inferences, Mason CJ said this at 356 in Bond : So long as there is some basis for an inference in other words, the particular inference is reasonably open, even if that inference appears to have been drawn as a result of illogical reasoning, there is no place for judicial review because no error of law has taken place. [the emphasis is his Honour's emphasis]
Case: R v Australian Stevedoring Industry Board; Ex parte Melbourne Stevedoring Co. Pty Ltd (1953) ADH CLR 100
Outcome: cited
identifying whether the administrative decision-maker (in this case the Tribunal) has engaged in an error of law giving rise to a question of law , it is necessary to precisely identify the "nature and quality" of the error and the legal principle that attracts a particular legal consequence, that is, the "legal rubric under which a decision is challenged": Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 198 ALR 59 per Gleeson CJ at [9]. The scope of that legal rubric is conventionally understood in terms of the well known passage from Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179 per Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ, adopted and applied in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 at 351 [82] per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ. As to misconceptions which might suggest an unsupportable supposition on the part of the decision-maker, see Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1949) 78 CLR 353 at 360 per Dixon J and R v Australian Stevedoring Industry Board; Ex parte Melbourne Stevedoring Co. Pty Ltd (1953) 88 CLR 100 at 120 per Dixon CJ, Williams, Webb and Fullagar JJ. As to the constraints upon a court interfering with a decision-maker's assessment of the evidence in exercising supervisory review of administrative decision-making, see Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1 at 35-36 per Brennan J. At common law, want of logic, is not synonymous with error of law: Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 per Mason CJ at 356 with whom Brennan, Toohey and Gaudron JJ agreed. As to inferences, Mason CJ said this at 356 in Bond : So long as there is some basis for an inference in other words, the particular inference is reasonably open, even if that inference appears to have been drawn as a result of illogical reasoning, there is no place for judicial review because no error of law has taken place. [the emphasis is his Honour's emphasis]
Case: Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1
Outcome: cited
identifying whether the administrative decision-maker (in this case the Tribunal) has engaged in an error of law giving rise to a question of law , it is necessary to precisely identify the "nature and quality" of the error and the legal principle that attracts a particular legal consequence, that is, the "legal rubric under which a decision is challenged": Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 198 ALR 59 per Gleeson CJ at [9]. The scope of that legal rubric is conventionally understood in terms of the well known passage from Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179 per Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ, adopted and applied in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 at 351 [82] per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ. As to misconceptions which might suggest an unsupportable supposition on the part of the decision-maker, see Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1949) 78 CLR 353 at 360 per Dixon J and R v Australian Stevedoring Industry Board; Ex parte Melbourne Stevedoring Co. Pty Ltd (1953) 88 CLR 100 at 120 per Dixon CJ, Williams, Webb and Fullagar JJ. As to the constraints upon a court interfering with a decision-maker's assessment of the evidence in exercising supervisory review of administrative decision-making, see Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1 at 35-36 per Brennan J. At common law, want of logic, is not synonymous with error of law: Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 per Mason CJ at 356 with whom Brennan, Toohey and Gaudron JJ agreed. As to inferences, Mason CJ said this at 356 in Bond : So long as there is some basis for an inference in other words, the particular inference is reasonably open, even if that inference appears to have been drawn as a result of illogical reasoning, there is no place for judicial review because no error of law has taken place. [the emphasis is his Honour's emphasis]