mdroth/huggingface-course_section-5_zst huggingface dataset:
Case: Zhang v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 30
Outcome: applied
Thus far, I have not found it necessary to refer to the guiding principle, that the reasons of the Tribunal are to be read fairly and as a whole, and not "with an eye attuned to the ready perception of error": see in Zhang v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 30 (" Zhang ") at [14] per Moore, Mansfield and Dowsett JJ, citing Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shang Liang [1996] HCA 6 ; (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 271-272 and 291. This principle confirms that the Tribunal's reason should be read in their entirety, without undue emphasis on individual expressions that, by themselves, can take on a meaning different from that clearly intended when regard is had to their proper context. The appellant's argument, it seems to me, paid insufficient regard to this principle.
Case: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shang Liang [1996] HCA 6 ; (1996) 185 CLR 259
Outcome: applied
Thus far, I have not found it necessary to refer to the guiding principle, that the reasons of the Tribunal are to be read fairly and as a whole, and not "with an eye attuned to the ready perception of error": see in Zhang v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 30 (" Zhang ") at [14] per Moore, Mansfield and Dowsett JJ, citing Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shang Liang [1996] HCA 6 ; (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 271-272 and 291. This principle confirms that the Tribunal's reason should be read in their entirety, without undue emphasis on individual expressions that, by themselves, can take on a meaning different from that clearly intended when regard is had to their proper context. The appellant's argument, it seems to me, paid insufficient regard to this principle.
Case: Alterskye v Scott [1948] 1 All ER 469
Outcome: cited
Early cases, such as Richardson v Hastings (1884) 7 Beav 354 and Reynolds v Godlee (1858) 4 K &amp; J 88, state that discovery may be refused unless the party gives an undertaking that the documents would not be used for any purpose other than the action then proceeding. The principle was stated in Bray on Discovery (1 st ed, 1885) at 238: "A party who has obtained access to his adversary's documents under an order for production has no right to make their contents public or communicate them to any stranger to the suit ... nor to use them or copies of them for any collateral object ... If necessary an undertaking to that effect will be made a condition of granting an order ...". An express undertaking is not now required. It is to be implied in every case: Alterskye v Scott [1948] 1 All ER 469. The modern statement of the rule is to be found in Harman v Secretary of State, Home Department [1983] 1 AC 280.
Case: Distillers Co (Bio-Chemicals) Ltd v Times Newspapers Ltd [1975] 1 QB 613
Outcome: cited
The private interests of the opposite parties are not affected if the documents are handed over. This is because the implied undertaking will bind any person to whom the documents are given ( Distillers Co (Bio-Chemicals) Ltd v Times Newspapers Ltd [1975] 1 QB 613; Sofilas v Cable Sands (WA) Pty Ltd (1993) 9 WAR 196, Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd v Lovell (1998) 19 WAR 316) at least once he is aware that the documents have been obtained by way of discovery (P Matthews &amp; H Malek, Disclosure (2 nd ed, 2000) at [13.09]).
Case: Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd v Lovell (1998) 19 WAR 316
Outcome: cited
The private interests of the opposite parties are not affected if the documents are handed over. This is because the implied undertaking will bind any person to whom the documents are given ( Distillers Co (Bio-Chemicals) Ltd v Times Newspapers Ltd [1975] 1 QB 613; Sofilas v Cable Sands (WA) Pty Ltd (1993) 9 WAR 196, Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd v Lovell (1998) 19 WAR 316) at least once he is aware that the documents have been obtained by way of discovery (P Matthews &amp; H Malek, Disclosure (2 nd ed, 2000) at [13.09]).
Case: Harman v Secretary of State, Home Department [1983] 1 AC 280
Outcome: cited
Early cases, such as Richardson v Hastings (1884) 7 Beav 354 and Reynolds v Godlee (1858) 4 K &amp; J 88, state that discovery may be refused unless the party gives an undertaking that the documents would not be used for any purpose other than the action then proceeding. The principle was stated in Bray on Discovery (1 st ed, 1885) at 238: "A party who has obtained access to his adversary's documents under an order for production has no right to make their contents public or communicate them to any stranger to the suit ... nor to use them or copies of them for any collateral object ... If necessary an undertaking to that effect will be made a condition of granting an order ...". An express undertaking is not now required. It is to be implied in every case: Alterskye v Scott [1948] 1 All ER 469. The modern statement of the rule is to be found in Harman v Secretary of State, Home Department [1983] 1 AC 280.
Case: Reynolds v Godlee (1858) 4 K &amp; J 88
Outcome: cited
Early cases, such as Richardson v Hastings (1884) 7 Beav 354 and Reynolds v Godlee (1858) 4 K &amp; J 88, state that discovery may be refused unless the party gives an undertaking that the documents would not be used for any purpose other than the action then proceeding. The principle was stated in Bray on Discovery (1 st ed, 1885) at 238: "A party who has obtained access to his adversary's documents under an order for production has no right to make their contents public or communicate them to any stranger to the suit ... nor to use them or copies of them for any collateral object ... If necessary an undertaking to that effect will be made a condition of granting an order ...". An express undertaking is not now required. It is to be implied in every case: Alterskye v Scott [1948] 1 All ER 469. The modern statement of the rule is to be found in Harman v Secretary of State, Home Department [1983] 1 AC 280.
Case: Richardson v Hastings (1884) 7 Beav 354
Outcome: cited
Early cases, such as Richardson v Hastings (1884) 7 Beav 354 and Reynolds v Godlee (1858) 4 K &amp; J 88, state that discovery may be refused unless the party gives an undertaking that the documents would not be used for any purpose other than the action then proceeding. The principle was stated in Bray on Discovery (1 st ed, 1885) at 238: "A party who has obtained access to his adversary's documents under an order for production has no right to make their contents public or communicate them to any stranger to the suit ... nor to use them or copies of them for any collateral object ... If necessary an undertaking to that effect will be made a condition of granting an order ...". An express undertaking is not now required. It is to be implied in every case: Alterskye v Scott [1948] 1 All ER 469. The modern statement of the rule is to be found in Harman v Secretary of State, Home Department [1983] 1 AC 280.
Case: Sofilas v Cable Sands (WA) Pty Ltd (1993) 9 WAR 196
Outcome: cited
The private interests of the opposite parties are not affected if the documents are handed over. This is because the implied undertaking will bind any person to whom the documents are given ( Distillers Co (Bio-Chemicals) Ltd v Times Newspapers Ltd [1975] 1 QB 613; Sofilas v Cable Sands (WA) Pty Ltd (1993) 9 WAR 196, Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd v Lovell (1998) 19 WAR 316) at least once he is aware that the documents have been obtained by way of discovery (P Matthews &amp; H Malek, Disclosure (2 nd ed, 2000) at [13.09]).
Case: Comcare v Etheridge [2006] FCAFC 27 ; (2006) 227 ALR 75
Outcome: referred to
The Corporation invoked the powers conferred in the Court by s 44(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act and s 5 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act . As Ms Barry advanced no submissions to the Court, and it is not clear beyond argument that the Court's jurisdiction under s 44(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act was properly invoked (see Comcare v Etheridge [2006] FCAFC 27 ; (2006) 227 ALR 75), I prefer to make orders under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act . 30 The orders of the Court will therefore be: 1. The decision, including the order as to costs, of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal given on 2 June 2006 in Sydney concerning matter N2005/1246 be set aside with effect from 2 June 2006. 2. The matter be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to be heard and decided again. 3. The first respondent pay the applicant's reasonable costs of its application to the Court. I certify that the preceding thirty (30) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Branson. Associate: Dated: 15 December 2006 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr A Robertson SC and Mr G Elliott Solicitor for the Applicant: Forners Solicitors Solicitor for the First Respondent: Slater &amp; Gordon Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting appearance Date of Hearing: 6 December 2006 Date of Judgment: 15 December 2006 AustLII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/2006/1751.html
Case: Engler v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) (2003) 52 ATR 642
Outcome: referred to
On 6 May 2003, French J made an order that the statement of claim filed on 5 March 2003 be struck out: Engler v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) (2003) 52 ATR 642. He also gave liberty to amend the statement of claim if it be the applicants' contention that the notices of amended assessment were issued other than in good faith. In the course of his reasons, French J said (at 643 [1]): 'The application they originally filed was struck out on 8 March 2002. They have now filed an amended application and a statement of claim pursuant to the orders which I made then. The amended application and statement of claim have been prepared with the assistance of pro bono counsel who has since ceased to act for them. The respondent moves to strike out that statement of claim or for an order that the application be dismissed or permanently stayed.'
Case: Engler v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2003) 54 ATR 211
Outcome: referred to
An application for leave to appeal from the order made by French J on 6 May 2003 was dismissed by Lee J on 21 October 2003: Engler v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2003) 54 ATR 211.
Case: Engler v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (No 3) (2003) 54 ATR 617
Outcome: referred to
The applicants filed a further statement of claim. The Commissioner moved the Court for an order that that statement of claim be struck out and that the proceedings be dismissed generally. That motion came on for hearing before French J and, on 23 December 2003, his Honour made an order that the application be struck out and that the applicants pay the respondent's costs of the proceedings: Engler v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (No 3) (2003) 54 ATR 617. French J noted that Ms Engler and Mr Gates had had great difficulty in formulating a viable statement of claim, despite the fact that they had had assistance from three different legal practitioners, two of whom acted on a pro bono basis. He made the following observations (at 626 [34] and 627 [36]): 'The outline of the statement of claim which I have just essayed indicates no basis beyond bold assertion for the contentions of bad faith action on the part of the respondent. The statement of claim is, like its predecessors, a welter of confused and irrelevant allegations which, as the respondent submits, not properly engaged the jurisdiction of the Court. The analysis of paragraph [59] exemplifies the ways in which the applicants will allege fraud on foundations which cannot logically support such an allegation. The statement of claim cannot stand and the point has now been reached where I am not prepared to allow this proceeding to continue any further. The applicants have demonstrated that they are unable to frame in a responsible and careful way a cause of action which is amenable to determination by the Court. They have had the assistance of two pro bono lawyers, one of whom is Queens Counsel. They have now had a number of opportunities to formulate a viable statement of claim.' 24 To return to the present proceedings, Mr Gates had the opportunity to make a submission about the proposed hearing dates, but he did not do so. As I have said, he did not respond to the letter from the officer of the Registry dated 5 May 2006. He was given adequate notice of the dates fixed for the hearing, but he did not appear at the hearing. 25 Mr Gates' amended statement of claim clearly does not comply with the rules as to pleadings and, in fact, it is not possible to say that it discloses a cause of action. All of this has occurred in the context of a long history involving previous proceedings in this Court in which Mr Gates was given every opportunity to formulate his claim, but failed to do so.
Case: Li Tian &amp; Ors v Minister for Immigration &amp; Anor [2009] FMCA 930
Outcome: affirmed
is an appeal from an order made in the Federal Magistrates Court dismissing the appellants' application pursuant to s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and Part 8 Division 2 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Migration Act ) for judicial review of a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) dated 7 May 2009 and handed down on 8 May 2009: Li Tian &amp; Ors v Minister for Immigration &amp; Anor [2009] FMCA 930. The appellants are all citizens of the Peoples Republic of China. The first appellant is the wife of the fourth appellant and the mother of the second and third appellants. The second, third and fourth appellants' visa applications are dependent upon the success of the first appellant's visa application. I shall call the first appellant simply the appellant. The appellant has entered Australia on a number of occasions since 17 July 2000, sometimes entering Australia on a Business Long Stay visa and sometimes on a Business Short Stay visa which are two subclasses of a Class UC visa. Relevantly, the appellant entered Australia on 2 April 2003 on a Business Long Stay visa on the basis that she would be employed by a standard business sponsor employer, Adcom Strategies Pty Ltd as a sales and marketing manager.
Case: O'Keeffe Nominees Pty Limited v BP Australia Limited (No 2) (1995) 55 FCR 591
Outcome: discussed
is considerable authority which deals with the issue of the appropriate order to make as to the costs of proceedings where the proceedings are either sought to be discontinued or do not proceed to a final hearing. I have been referred to a number of those authorities, in particular J T Stratford &amp; Son Ltd v Lindley (No 2) [1969] 3 All ER 1122; Australian Securities Commission v Aust-Home Investments Limited (1993) 44 FCR 194; O'Keeffe Nominees Pty Limited v BP Australia Limited (No 2) (1995) 55 FCR 591; Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of the Commonwealth of Australia; Ex parte Lai Qin [1997] HCA 6 ; (1997) 186 CLR 622; and One.Tel Limited v Commissioner of Taxation [2000] FCA 270 ; (2000) 101 FCR 548.
Case: Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of the Commonwealth of Australia; Ex parte Lai Qin [1997] HCA 6 ; (1997) 186 CLR 622
Outcome: applied
is considerable authority which deals with the issue of the appropriate order to make as to the costs of proceedings where the proceedings are either sought to be discontinued or do not proceed to a final hearing. I have been referred to a number of those authorities, in particular J T Stratford &amp; Son Ltd v Lindley (No 2) [1969] 3 All ER 1122; Australian Securities Commission v Aust-Home Investments Limited (1993) 44 FCR 194; O'Keeffe Nominees Pty Limited v BP Australia Limited (No 2) (1995) 55 FCR 591; Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of the Commonwealth of Australia; Ex parte Lai Qin [1997] HCA 6 ; (1997) 186 CLR 622; and One.Tel Limited v Commissioner of Taxation [2000] FCA 270 ; (2000) 101 FCR 548.
Case: One.Tel Limited v Commissioner of Taxation [2000] FCA 270 ; (2000) 101 FCR 548
Outcome: cited
is considerable authority which deals with the issue of the appropriate order to make as to the costs of proceedings where the proceedings are either sought to be discontinued or do not proceed to a final hearing. I have been referred to a number of those authorities, in particular J T Stratford &amp; Son Ltd v Lindley (No 2) [1969] 3 All ER 1122; Australian Securities Commission v Aust-Home Investments Limited (1993) 44 FCR 194; O'Keeffe Nominees Pty Limited v BP Australia Limited (No 2) (1995) 55 FCR 591; Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of the Commonwealth of Australia; Ex parte Lai Qin [1997] HCA 6 ; (1997) 186 CLR 622; and One.Tel Limited v Commissioner of Taxation [2000] FCA 270 ; (2000) 101 FCR 548.
Case: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6 ; (1996) 185 CLR 259
Outcome: cited
First, in relation to the question of law concerning the lack of evidence supporting the findings of the Tribunal, it is clear that, as observed by the Tribunal itself, and as demonstrated by my summary of the evidence before the Tribunal, there was a dissent of opinion amongst the reporting psychologist and psychiatrists. In such a case, the weighting of the evidence by the Tribunal, including the preference given to the views of the relevant medical practitioners, is an issue of fact, and any errors in so weighting the evidence do not give rise to errors of law appellable to this Court: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6 ; (1996) 185 CLR 259.
Case: Cirillo v Consolidated Press Property Ltd (No 2) [2007] FCA 179
Outcome: cited
The Court's power to award costs is discretionary and is unfettered, except that it must be exercised judicially: s 43 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth); s 1335(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The Court's discretion to order costs pursuant to the power in s 43 is at large, and that section provides a broad and ample power which ought not be read down otherwise than in accordance with accepted principle: Cirillo v Consolidated Press Property Ltd (No 2) [2007] FCA 179 at [3] per Finn J. The purpose of an order for costs is to compensate the successful party, not to punish the unsuccessful one: Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534 at 543 per Mason CJ.
Case: In the matter of Arc Energy Limited [2008] FCA 1396
Outcome: referred to
These reasons concern the issue of costs following my judgment on the merits in this matter: In the matter of Arc Energy Limited [2008] FCA 1396 ("Arc Energy"). The reasons in that judgment give relevant context and background to these reasons. I heard oral submissions as to costs after judgment was delivered but gave Arc Energy Ltd ("Arc") and Buru Energy Ltd leave to put in further written submissions directed to the case of Re Crusader Limited (1996) 1 Qd R 117 cited by Oil Basins. Arc submits that Oil Basins Limited ("Oil Basins") ought pay the Plaintiff's costs of responding to the application filed by Oil Basins during the afternoon of Thursday, 7 August 2008, which occupied much of the hearing on the afternoon of Friday, 8 August 2008. It also opposes Oil Basins' application for a costs order in its favour. 13 Furthermore, the litigation was instituted so close to the members meeting as to ensure, objectively speaking, that Arc would not be able to advise the proxy voters of it or of the companies response to it prior to the meeting. The long delay in commencing the litigation was unexplained. The claims made in the litigation are deficient of supporting material and obvious legal merit: Arc Energy at [9]. As I said in Arc Energy at [10]: I invited counsel for Oil Basins to explain why the adjournment was being pressed, when obviously Oil Basins has no personal standing to protect the interests of Arc shareholders. Its interests would have been served by the making of the orders sought under s 413(1)(c) of the Act. I was not given any answer which I found to be satisfactory. Oil Basins' conduct in bringing such a belated application upon a paucity of fact and without a satisfactory explanation leads me to conclude that its real reasons are for some commercial gain or advantage, by putting a roadblock in front of the progress of the scheme. It should not be allowed to succeed in that course unless of course there is, objectively viewed, a proper basis for granting the orders sought. 14 It was appropriate for Oil Basins to bring the matter of the litigation and the situation of the proxy voters to the attention of the Court. I am satisfied however that the application for an adjournment with associated orders was made for an ulterior purpose: Arc Energy at [10]. It unnecessarily added to the costs of the hearing. Even if Oil Basins may be considered to be an objector this finding is an exceptional circumstance warranting a costs order against it: Re Crusader at 231-232; Re Matine Ltd at 494.
Case: Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534
Outcome: cited
The Court's power to award costs is discretionary and is unfettered, except that it must be exercised judicially: s 43 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth); s 1335(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The Court's discretion to order costs pursuant to the power in s 43 is at large, and that section provides a broad and ample power which ought not be read down otherwise than in accordance with accepted principle: Cirillo v Consolidated Press Property Ltd (No 2) [2007] FCA 179 at [3] per Finn J. The purpose of an order for costs is to compensate the successful party, not to punish the unsuccessful one: Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534 at 543 per Mason CJ.
Case: Re Ampol Ltd (1989) 14 ACLR 772
Outcome: cited
Oil Basins submits, correctly, that generally the costs of objectors should be paid by the Company (Plaintiff): Re Crusader (1995) 120 FLR 219; and Re Matine Ltd (1998) 28 ACSR 492 ; Re Arrowfield Group Ltd (1995) 17 ACSR 649 ; Re Castlereagh Securities Ltd [1973] 1 NSWLR 624 ; Re Ampol Ltd (1989) 14 ACLR 772 , which were cited with approval by Hansen J in his decision to award the objectors their costs in Quatro Ltd v Argo Investments Ltd and Others (1999) 32 ACSR 480.
Case: Re Arrowfield Group Ltd (1995) 17 ACSR 649
Outcome: cited
Oil Basins submits, correctly, that generally the costs of objectors should be paid by the Company (Plaintiff): Re Crusader (1995) 120 FLR 219; and Re Matine Ltd (1998) 28 ACSR 492 ; Re Arrowfield Group Ltd (1995) 17 ACSR 649 ; Re Castlereagh Securities Ltd [1973] 1 NSWLR 624 ; Re Ampol Ltd (1989) 14 ACLR 772 , which were cited with approval by Hansen J in his decision to award the objectors their costs in Quatro Ltd v Argo Investments Ltd and Others (1999) 32 ACSR 480.
Case: Re Castlereagh Securities Ltd [1973] 1 NSWLR 624 
Outcome: cited
Oil Basins submits, correctly, that generally the costs of objectors should be paid by the Company (Plaintiff): Re Crusader (1995) 120 FLR 219; and Re Matine Ltd (1998) 28 ACSR 492 ; Re Arrowfield Group Ltd (1995) 17 ACSR 649 ; Re Castlereagh Securities Ltd [1973] 1 NSWLR 624 ; Re Ampol Ltd (1989) 14 ACLR 772 , which were cited with approval by Hansen J in his decision to award the objectors their costs in Quatro Ltd v Argo Investments Ltd and Others (1999) 32 ACSR 480.