mdroth/huggingface-course_section-5_zst huggingface dataset:
Case: Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond and Others [1990] HCA 33 ; (1990) 170 CLR 321
Outcome: cited
PCR claims that such finding was critical in the chain of reasoning which led to ABA's decision, and relies upon the decision of the Full Court in Curragh Queensland Mining Limited v Daniel and Others (1992) 34 FCR 212 (especially at 220-221). It submits that there was no evidence upon which ABA could have reached its decision and it is therefore invalid according to the principles referred to in Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond and Others [1990] HCA 33 ; (1990) 170 CLR 321 and in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs and Another v Peko-Wallsend Limited and Others [1986] HCA 40 ; (1986) 162 CLR 24. 71 The approach to be adopted in cases of judicial review was also explained by the High Court of Australia in Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond and Others where the Court said at [341]: 'The expression "judicial review", when applied to the traditional review functions of the superior courts in our system of justice, exercisable by means of the prerogative writs and the grant of declaratory relief and injunction, ordinarily does not extend to findings of fact as such. To expose all findings of fact, or the generality of them, to judicial review would expose the steps in administrative decision-making to comprehensive review by the courts and thus bring about a radical change in the relationship between the executive and judicial branches of government. Amongst other things, such a change would bring in its train difficult questions concerning the extent to which the courts should take account of policy considerations when reviewing the making of findings of fact and the drawing of inferences of fact.' 93 Mason CJ in Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond and Others referred to grounds of review in circumstances where there is no evidence to support a finding. He referred to the ' no sufficient evidence ' test in the context of judicial review of findings of fact and stated at page 356: 'Thus, at common law, according to the Australian authorities, want of logic is not synonymous with error of law. So long as there is some basis for an inference in other words, the particular inference is reasonably open even if that inference appears to have been drawn as a result of their illogical reasoning, there is no place for judicial review because no error of law has taken place.' 94 Although some letters were written prior to the incorporation of GCB, and others were from persons who were legally still 'members' of NCB, I do not think that this fact leads to the conclusion that there was no evidence upon which the ABA could rely in relation to the letters. There was no legal requirement that only members of GCB could support GCB's application. The letters were provided by persons who wished to support the service, and whether they were actually 'members' of GCB was not a critical matter for determination. 95 I consider that the ABA was correct in considering that the letters that it had received indicated widespread support for GCB's proposed service. Accordingly, the ABA did not err as alleged by PCR.
Case: Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor [1996] HCA 25 ; (1996) 186 CLR 541
Outcome: cited
The High Court in Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor [1996] HCA 25 ; (1996) 186 CLR 541 considered the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) and held that where an applicant sought an extension of time in which to bring proceedings it was necessary to show that prejudice would not result to the other party. McHugh J referred to the need to limit the time in which actions should be brought (see 552-553). McHugh J observed at 555 that a plaintiff's claim is: '... seldom likely to be strong enough to warrant a Court reinstating a right of action against the defendant who, by reason of delay in commencing the action, is unable to fairly defend itself or is otherwise prejudiced in fact and who is not guilty of fraud, deception or concealment in respect of the existence of that action.'
Case: Buck v Bavone [1976] HCA 24 ; (1976) 135 CLR 110
Outcome: referred to
If the Court is satisfied that the ABA has misdirected itself in law or has failed to consider matters that it was required to consider, or taken irrelevant matters into consideration, its decision will have miscarried: see Buck v Bavone [1976] HCA 24 ; (1976) 135 CLR 110 (at 118-119 per Gibbs J). However, the failure of a decision maker to take into account an insignificant matter may not warrant a Court setting aside the decision: see Minister for Aboriginal Affairs and Anor v Peko-Wallsend Limited and Ors at 40. If the Court should conclude that there is inadequate factual material to support a finding by the ABA, it could lead to the inference that the Tribunal has applied a wrong test or has not otherwise satisfied the requisite matters which it was obliged to consider under s 84(2) of the Act: see The Queen v Australian Stevedoring Industry Board and Another: Ex parte Melbourne Stevedoring Company Proprietary Limited [1953] HCA 22 ; (1953) 88 CLR 100 at 120. In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajamanikkam and Another [2002] HCA 32 ; [2002] 210 CLR 222, Gaudron and McHugh JJ said at page 241: 'Whether a decision would or would not have been made without a particular factual finding depends on indications to that effect in the decision, the reasons for decision or the decision making process. And unless it is possible to say on a proper analysis of the decision, the reasons for decision or the decision making process that, had a particular finding not been made, the decision in question would not have been reached, it is, in our view, impossible to say that the decision was based on that finding.'
Case: Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 280
Outcome: cited
Upon reading the whole of the challenged decision, a Court must be satisfied that the Tribunal applied its mind to the correct issues, and decided those issues by findings based on evidence or material which was reasonable. In Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 280 the Court said at 287: 'The Court will not be concerned with looseness in the language of the Tribunal nor with unhappy phrasing of the Tribunal's thoughts: Lennell v Repatriation Commission (1982) 4 ALN N 54 (Northrop and Sheppard JJ); Freeman v Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority (1985) 5 AAR 156 at 164 (Sheppard J); Repatriation Commission v Bushell (1991) 13 AAR 176 at 183 (Morling and Neaves JJ). The reasons for the decision under review are not to be construed minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error: Politis v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1988) 16 ALD 707 at 708 (Lockhart J).'
Case: Curragh Queensland Mining Limited v Daniel and Others (1992) 34 FCR 212
Outcome: referred to
PCR claims that such finding was critical in the chain of reasoning which led to ABA's decision, and relies upon the decision of the Full Court in Curragh Queensland Mining Limited v Daniel and Others (1992) 34 FCR 212 (especially at 220-221). It submits that there was no evidence upon which ABA could have reached its decision and it is therefore invalid according to the principles referred to in Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond and Others [1990] HCA 33 ; (1990) 170 CLR 321 and in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs and Another v Peko-Wallsend Limited and Others [1986] HCA 40 ; (1986) 162 CLR 24.
Case: Doyle v Chief of General Staff (1982) 42 ALR 283
Outcome: referred to
The merits of the substantive application are to be taken into consideration (see Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd at 349). In these proceedings, the Court considers that PCR's claims are arguable. However, PCR's application must be considered with reference to all parties who might be affected and the question of prejudice being occasioned to GCB is a matter for the Court's consideration: see Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd at 349; Doyle v Chief of General Staff (1982) 42 ALR 283 at 287; Lovett v Le Gall (1975) 10 SASR 479 at 485; Wedesweiller and Others v Cole and Others (1983) 47 ALR 528 at 533-534.
Case: Elias v Commissioner of Taxation [2002] FCA 845 ; (2002) 123 FCR 499
Outcome: referred to
PCR submits that the approach by the ABA relating to ' needs' was erroneous. It submits that the brief analysis as to the extent to which ' needs' within the Gosford community would be met by the services proposed to be provided by GCB was meaningless and that no real consideration has been provided of the statutory requirement of s 84(2)(a) of the Act. PCR claims that the ABA mistakenly considered letters of support as being relevant to the concept of ' needs ', when in fact they did not address such issue. As such there is both common law jurisdictional error and a breach of s 5(1)(e) and 5(2)(b) of the ADJR Act. PCR relies upon the principles referred to in Elias v Commissioner of Taxation [2002] FCA 845 ; (2002) 123 FCR 499 at [62] .
Case: F Hoffmann-La Roche &amp; Co AG v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (1975) AC 295
Outcome: cited
In Re Refugee Review Tribunal and Another; Ex parte Aala [2000] HCA 57 ; [2000] 204 CLR 82 Gaudron and Gummow JJ referred to circumstances which might prevent the Court exercising its discretion in favour of granting prerogative relief and at [57] quoted Lord Denning in F Hoffmann-La Roche &amp; Co AG v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (1975) AC 295 at 320 (CA) where His Lordship said of a plaintiff who delays commencing proceedings: 'He may be debarred from relief if he has acquiesced in the invalidity or has waived it. If he does not come with due diligence and ask for it to be set aside, he may be sent away with nothing (145). If his conduct has been disgraceful and he has in fact suffered no injustice, he may be refused relief (146).'
Case: Gamaethige v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 565 ; (2001) 109 FCR 424
Outcome: referred to
In considering the approach to be taken by the Court to the Decision of the ABA, the Court must be satisfied that the ABA's Reasons considered the relevant factual matters required by s 84(2) of the Act, and that the ABA did not take into account irrelevant considerations. The Court must also be satisfied that the power provided to the ABA has been exercised reasonably: see Kruger and Others v Commonwealth of Australia [1997] HCA 27 ; (1997) 190 CLR 1 at 36 per Brennan CJ. The process adopted by the ABA in its application of s 84(2) must be logical. In Hill v Green [1999] NSWCA 477 ; (1999) 48 NSWLR 161, Spigelman CJ said (at 174-175): 'In my opinion, where a statute or regulation makes provision for an administrative decision in terminology which does not confer an unfettered discretion on the decision-maker, the court should approach the construction of the statute or regulation with the presumption that the Parliament or the author of the regulation intended the decision-maker to reach a decision by a process of logical reasoning and a contrary interpretation would require clear and unambiguous words.' For similar observations, see Gamaethige v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 565 ; (2001) 109 FCR 424 at [28] ; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21 ; (1999) 197 CLR 611 at [145] .
Case: Hickey and Others v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1983) 72 FLR 291
Outcome: referred to
The principles to be applied in relation to an application for extension of time are conveniently referred to in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348-349 and in Hickey and Others v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1983) 72 FLR 291.
Case: Hill v Green [1999] NSWCA 477 ; (1999) 48 NSWLR 161
Outcome: cited
In considering the approach to be taken by the Court to the Decision of the ABA, the Court must be satisfied that the ABA's Reasons considered the relevant factual matters required by s 84(2) of the Act, and that the ABA did not take into account irrelevant considerations. The Court must also be satisfied that the power provided to the ABA has been exercised reasonably: see Kruger and Others v Commonwealth of Australia [1997] HCA 27 ; (1997) 190 CLR 1 at 36 per Brennan CJ. The process adopted by the ABA in its application of s 84(2) must be logical. In Hill v Green [1999] NSWCA 477 ; (1999) 48 NSWLR 161, Spigelman CJ said (at 174-175): 'In my opinion, where a statute or regulation makes provision for an administrative decision in terminology which does not confer an unfettered discretion on the decision-maker, the court should approach the construction of the statute or regulation with the presumption that the Parliament or the author of the regulation intended the decision-maker to reach a decision by a process of logical reasoning and a contrary interpretation would require clear and unambiguous words.' For similar observations, see Gamaethige v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 565 ; (2001) 109 FCR 424 at [28] ; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21 ; (1999) 197 CLR 611 at [145] .
Case: Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344
Outcome: referred to
The principles to be applied in relation to an application for extension of time are conveniently referred to in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348-349 and in Hickey and Others v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1983) 72 FLR 291. 28 The merits of the substantive application are to be taken into consideration (see Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd at 349). In these proceedings, the Court considers that PCR's claims are arguable. However, PCR's application must be considered with reference to all parties who might be affected and the question of prejudice being occasioned to GCB is a matter for the Court's consideration: see Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd at 349; Doyle v Chief of General Staff (1982) 42 ALR 283 at 287; Lovett v Le Gall (1975) 10 SASR 479 at 485; Wedesweiller and Others v Cole and Others (1983) 47 ALR 528 at 533-534.
Case: Kruger and Others v Commonwealth of Australia [1997] HCA 27 ; (1997) 190 CLR 1
Outcome: referred to
In considering the approach to be taken by the Court to the Decision of the ABA, the Court must be satisfied that the ABA's Reasons considered the relevant factual matters required by s 84(2) of the Act, and that the ABA did not take into account irrelevant considerations. The Court must also be satisfied that the power provided to the ABA has been exercised reasonably: see Kruger and Others v Commonwealth of Australia [1997] HCA 27 ; (1997) 190 CLR 1 at 36 per Brennan CJ. The process adopted by the ABA in its application of s 84(2) must be logical. In Hill v Green [1999] NSWCA 477 ; (1999) 48 NSWLR 161, Spigelman CJ said (at 174-175): 'In my opinion, where a statute or regulation makes provision for an administrative decision in terminology which does not confer an unfettered discretion on the decision-maker, the court should approach the construction of the statute or regulation with the presumption that the Parliament or the author of the regulation intended the decision-maker to reach a decision by a process of logical reasoning and a contrary interpretation would require clear and unambiguous words.' For similar observations, see Gamaethige v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 565 ; (2001) 109 FCR 424 at [28] ; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21 ; (1999) 197 CLR 611 at [145] .
Case: Lovett v Le Gall (1975) 10 SASR 479
Outcome: referred to
The merits of the substantive application are to be taken into consideration (see Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd at 349). In these proceedings, the Court considers that PCR's claims are arguable. However, PCR's application must be considered with reference to all parties who might be affected and the question of prejudice being occasioned to GCB is a matter for the Court's consideration: see Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd at 349; Doyle v Chief of General Staff (1982) 42 ALR 283 at 287; Lovett v Le Gall (1975) 10 SASR 479 at 485; Wedesweiller and Others v Cole and Others (1983) 47 ALR 528 at 533-534.
Case: Lucic v Nolan and Others (1982) 45 ALR 411
Outcome: referred to
PCR asks the Court to exercise its discretion to grant an extension of time. In exercising its discretion, the Court must consider interests beyond those of an applicant. Whilst s 11 of the ADJR Act does not specifically impose a burden of proof upon an applicant for the extension of time, an applicant is required to show why ' in all the circumstances, the extension of time should be granted ': see Lucic v Nolan and Others (1982) 45 ALR 411 at 416. Further, the ' prescribed period ' of 28 days is not to be ignored: see Ralkon Agricultural Co Pty Ltd v Aboriginal Development Commission (1982) 43 ALR 535 at 550.
Case: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs and Another v Peko-Wallsend Limited and Others [1986] HCA 40 ; (1986) 162 CLR 24
Outcome: followed
PCR claims that such finding was critical in the chain of reasoning which led to ABA's decision, and relies upon the decision of the Full Court in Curragh Queensland Mining Limited v Daniel and Others (1992) 34 FCR 212 (especially at 220-221). It submits that there was no evidence upon which ABA could have reached its decision and it is therefore invalid according to the principles referred to in Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond and Others [1990] HCA 33 ; (1990) 170 CLR 321 and in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs and Another v Peko-Wallsend Limited and Others [1986] HCA 40 ; (1986) 162 CLR 24.
Case: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21 ; (1999) 197 CLR 611
Outcome: referred to
In considering the approach to be taken by the Court to the Decision of the ABA, the Court must be satisfied that the ABA's Reasons considered the relevant factual matters required by s 84(2) of the Act, and that the ABA did not take into account irrelevant considerations. The Court must also be satisfied that the power provided to the ABA has been exercised reasonably: see Kruger and Others v Commonwealth of Australia [1997] HCA 27 ; (1997) 190 CLR 1 at 36 per Brennan CJ. The process adopted by the ABA in its application of s 84(2) must be logical. In Hill v Green [1999] NSWCA 477 ; (1999) 48 NSWLR 161, Spigelman CJ said (at 174-175): 'In my opinion, where a statute or regulation makes provision for an administrative decision in terminology which does not confer an unfettered discretion on the decision-maker, the court should approach the construction of the statute or regulation with the presumption that the Parliament or the author of the regulation intended the decision-maker to reach a decision by a process of logical reasoning and a contrary interpretation would require clear and unambiguous words.' For similar observations, see Gamaethige v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 565 ; (2001) 109 FCR 424 at [28] ; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21 ; (1999) 197 CLR 611 at [145] .
Case: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajamanikkam and Another [2002] HCA 32 ; (2002) 210 CLR 222
Outcome: cited
If the Court is satisfied that the ABA has misdirected itself in law or has failed to consider matters that it was required to consider, or taken irrelevant matters into consideration, its decision will have miscarried: see Buck v Bavone [1976] HCA 24 ; (1976) 135 CLR 110 (at 118-119 per Gibbs J). However, the failure of a decision maker to take into account an insignificant matter may not warrant a Court setting aside the decision: see Minister for Aboriginal Affairs and Anor v Peko-Wallsend Limited and Ors at 40. If the Court should conclude that there is inadequate factual material to support a finding by the ABA, it could lead to the inference that the Tribunal has applied a wrong test or has not otherwise satisfied the requisite matters which it was obliged to consider under s 84(2) of the Act: see The Queen v Australian Stevedoring Industry Board and Another: Ex parte Melbourne Stevedoring Company Proprietary Limited [1953] HCA 22 ; (1953) 88 CLR 100 at 120. In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajamanikkam and Another [2002] HCA 32 ; [2002] 210 CLR 222, Gaudron and McHugh JJ said at page 241: 'Whether a decision would or would not have been made without a particular factual finding depends on indications to that effect in the decision, the reasons for decision or the decision making process. And unless it is possible to say on a proper analysis of the decision, the reasons for decision or the decision making process that, had a particular finding not been made, the decision in question would not have been reached, it is, in our view, impossible to say that the decision was based on that finding.'
Case: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30 ; (2001) 206 CLR 323
Outcome: referred to
Identifying a wrong issue or asking a wrong question may be indicative of jurisdictional error: see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30 ; (2001) 206 CLR 323 at 351. 74 The above principles form the basis of the approach to be taken when considering challenges made under the ADJR Act and at common law. 75 The Reasons show that the ABA considered the type of service that would be provided by GCB. It found that some of the programs to be broadcast would be the same as those broadcast by NCB being programs directed at furthering Christian beliefs. As was explained in oral evidence by John Ian Marks, general manager of NCB, the term Rhema which is used in the trading names of both NCB and GCB, is derived from the Greek word meaning the s poken word and is used to connote the furtherance of the Christian religion. The ABA referred to the information provided by GCB that community needs would be met through a range of 'spoken word programming', such as broadcasts by a Christian psychologist on relevant issues, including raising children, building better marriages and ' hope for the seriously ill '. Accordingly, it was apparent that the type of programs broadcast by NCB trading as Rhema FM Newcastle would not be dissimilar to those proposed for GCB trading as Rhema Gosford. However, the ABA found that local content would be incorporated in GCB's programs.