mdroth/huggingface-course_section-5_zst huggingface dataset:
Case: Collector of Customs v Agfa-Gevaert Ltd [1996] HCA 36 ; (1996) 186 CLR 389
Outcome: cited
In Collector of Customs v Agfa-Gevaert Ltd [1996] HCA 36 ; (1996) 186 CLR 389 at 398, Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ cited with approval the statement of Lord Simon of Glaisdale in Maunsell v Olins [1975] AC 373 who said at 391: 'Statutory language, like all language, is capable of an almost infinite gradation of "register"- ie, it will be used at the semantic level appropriate to the subject matter and to the audience addressed (the man in the street, lawyers, merchants, etc). It is the duty of a court of construction to tune in to such register and so to interpret the statutory language as to give to it the primary meaning which is appropriate in that register (unless it is clear that some other meaning must be given in order to carry out the statutory purpose or to avoid injustice, anomaly, absurdity or contradiction). In other words, statutory language must always be given presumptively the most natural and ordinary meaning which is appropriate in the circumstances.' The notion of a practical and purposive approach to construction, rather than a detached and literal one, is entirely compatible with the view that language should be given presumptively the most natural and ordinary meaning which is appropriate in the circumstances. I propose to approach the construction of the Deed, and the meaning of the word 'interest', with these principles in mind. 69 It is convenient to commence with the language, structure and purposes of cl C.4.10 of the Deed. Under cl C.4.10, a member who resigns his or her employment before attaining 55 years and who elects to accept a deferred retirement benefit (as each of the respondents did) thereupon becomes entitled to a retirement benefit calculated under cl C.4.2 of the Deed. The structure of paragraphs (a) and (b) of cl C.4.10 makes it plain that the deferred retirement benefit falls 'due' when the employee makes his or her election. However, the benefit does not become payable before the member attains the age of 55 years, unless one of the conditions set out in cl C.4.10(b) is met. This may explain why Mr Poulter's member statement for the year ended 30 June 2002 referred to his benefit as a 'vested benefit'. 70 Under cl C.4.10(a)(2), the member is entitled to interest ' on the amount of that retirement benefit from the date on which that benefit falls due until the date it is paid' (my emphasis). The words 'the amount of that retirement benefit' refer to a fixed and ascertained sum, namely the benefit referred to in subcl (1) that has been calculated under cl C.4.2 as at the date upon which the member made his or her election.
Case: Adams v Paul's Properties Ltd [1965] NZLR 161
Outcome: cited
There is no definition of 'interest' in the Deed. As a matter of ordinary language 'interest' is 'the return or compensation for the use or retention by one person of a sum of money belonging to or owed to another': see Adams v Paul's Properties Ltd [1965] NZLR 161 at 169 per Woodhouse J; Australian Finance Direct Ltd v Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria [2004] VSC 526 at [82] per Kaye J; Consolidated Fertilizers Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1992) 36 FCR 1 at 6 per Cooper J; and Riches v Westminster Bank Ltd [1947] AC 390 at 400 per Lord Wright.
Case: Australian Finance Direct Ltd v Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria [2004] VSC 526
Outcome: cited
There is no definition of 'interest' in the Deed. As a matter of ordinary language 'interest' is 'the return or compensation for the use or retention by one person of a sum of money belonging to or owed to another': see Adams v Paul's Properties Ltd [1965] NZLR 161 at 169 per Woodhouse J; Australian Finance Direct Ltd v Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria [2004] VSC 526 at [82] per Kaye J; Consolidated Fertilizers Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1992) 36 FCR 1 at 6 per Cooper J; and Riches v Westminster Bank Ltd [1947] AC 390 at 400 per Lord Wright.
Case: Consolidated Fertilizers Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1992) 36 FCR 1
Outcome: cited
There is no definition of 'interest' in the Deed. As a matter of ordinary language 'interest' is 'the return or compensation for the use or retention by one person of a sum of money belonging to or owed to another': see Adams v Paul's Properties Ltd [1965] NZLR 161 at 169 per Woodhouse J; Australian Finance Direct Ltd v Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria [2004] VSC 526 at [82] per Kaye J; Consolidated Fertilizers Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1992) 36 FCR 1 at 6 per Cooper J; and Riches v Westminster Bank Ltd [1947] AC 390 at 400 per Lord Wright. 73 Rand J's classic description of the concept of interest in Reference as to the Validity of Section 6 of the Farm Security Act 1944 of the Province of Saskatchewan [1947] SCR 394 at 411-412 is frequently cited, but it bears repeating: 'Interest is, in general terms, the return or consideration or compensation for the use or retention by one person of a sum of money, belonging to, in a colloquial sense, or owed to, another.' Most recently, this description was referred to, with approval, by Morris J in Director of Consumer Affairs v City Finance Loans (Credit) [2005] VCAT 1989 at [13] ; see also Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 99 ATC 5193 at 5210 [72] and Consolidated Fertilizers Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1992) 36 FCR 1 at 6.
Case: Riches v Westminster Bank Ltd [1947] AC 390
Outcome: cited
There is no definition of 'interest' in the Deed. As a matter of ordinary language 'interest' is 'the return or compensation for the use or retention by one person of a sum of money belonging to or owed to another': see Adams v Paul's Properties Ltd [1965] NZLR 161 at 169 per Woodhouse J; Australian Finance Direct Ltd v Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria [2004] VSC 526 at [82] per Kaye J; Consolidated Fertilizers Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1992) 36 FCR 1 at 6 per Cooper J; and Riches v Westminster Bank Ltd [1947] AC 390 at 400 per Lord Wright. 72 In Commissioner of Taxation v Myer Emporium Ltd [1987] HCA 18 ; (1987) 163 CLR 199 at 218, Mason ACJ, Wilson, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ explained the nature of interest: 'But the interest which becomes due is not the produce of the mere contractual right to interest severed from the debt for the money lent. Interest is regarded as flowing from the principal sum ( Federal Wharf Co Ltd v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation ) and to be compensation to the lender for being kept out of the use and enjoyment of the principal sum: Riches v Westminster Bank Ltd . A covenant to pay interest on a principal sum may, according to the terms of the lending agreement, be independent of or accessory to a covenant to repay the principal sum or the covenants may be integral parts of a single obligation, but it is of the essence of interest that it be referable to a principal sum: per Rand J in Reference as to the Validity of Section 6 of the Farm Security Act, 1944, of the Province of Saskatchewan.'
Case: Commissioner of Taxation v Myer Emporium Ltd [1987] HCA 18 ; (1987) 163 CLR 199
Outcome: cited
In Commissioner of Taxation v Myer Emporium Ltd [1987] HCA 18 ; (1987) 163 CLR 199 at 218, Mason ACJ, Wilson, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ explained the nature of interest: 'But the interest which becomes due is not the produce of the mere contractual right to interest severed from the debt for the money lent. Interest is regarded as flowing from the principal sum ( Federal Wharf Co Ltd v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation ) and to be compensation to the lender for being kept out of the use and enjoyment of the principal sum: Riches v Westminster Bank Ltd . A covenant to pay interest on a principal sum may, according to the terms of the lending agreement, be independent of or accessory to a covenant to repay the principal sum or the covenants may be integral parts of a single obligation, but it is of the essence of interest that it be referable to a principal sum: per Rand J in Reference as to the Validity of Section 6 of the Farm Security Act, 1944, of the Province of Saskatchewan.'
Case: Reference as to the Validity of Section 6 of the Farm Security Act 1944 of the Province of Saskatchewan [1947] SCR 394
Outcome: cited
In Commissioner of Taxation v Myer Emporium Ltd [1987] HCA 18 ; (1987) 163 CLR 199 at 218, Mason ACJ, Wilson, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ explained the nature of interest: 'But the interest which becomes due is not the produce of the mere contractual right to interest severed from the debt for the money lent. Interest is regarded as flowing from the principal sum ( Federal Wharf Co Ltd v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation ) and to be compensation to the lender for being kept out of the use and enjoyment of the principal sum: Riches v Westminster Bank Ltd . A covenant to pay interest on a principal sum may, according to the terms of the lending agreement, be independent of or accessory to a covenant to repay the principal sum or the covenants may be integral parts of a single obligation, but it is of the essence of interest that it be referable to a principal sum: per Rand J in Reference as to the Validity of Section 6 of the Farm Security Act, 1944, of the Province of Saskatchewan.' 73 Rand J's classic description of the concept of interest in Reference as to the Validity of Section 6 of the Farm Security Act 1944 of the Province of Saskatchewan [1947] SCR 394 at 411-412 is frequently cited, but it bears repeating: 'Interest is, in general terms, the return or consideration or compensation for the use or retention by one person of a sum of money, belonging to, in a colloquial sense, or owed to, another.' Most recently, this description was referred to, with approval, by Morris J in Director of Consumer Affairs v City Finance Loans (Credit) [2005] VCAT 1989 at [13] ; see also Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 99 ATC 5193 at 5210 [72] and Consolidated Fertilizers Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1992) 36 FCR 1 at 6.
Case: Director of Consumer Affairs v City Finance Loans (Credit) [2005] VCAT 1989
Outcome: cited
Rand J's classic description of the concept of interest in Reference as to the Validity of Section 6 of the Farm Security Act 1944 of the Province of Saskatchewan [1947] SCR 394 at 411-412 is frequently cited, but it bears repeating: 'Interest is, in general terms, the return or consideration or compensation for the use or retention by one person of a sum of money, belonging to, in a colloquial sense, or owed to, another.' Most recently, this description was referred to, with approval, by Morris J in Director of Consumer Affairs v City Finance Loans (Credit) [2005] VCAT 1989 at [13] ; see also Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 99 ATC 5193 at 5210 [72] and Consolidated Fertilizers Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1992) 36 FCR 1 at 6.
Case: Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 99 ATC 5193
Outcome: cited
Rand J's classic description of the concept of interest in Reference as to the Validity of Section 6 of the Farm Security Act 1944 of the Province of Saskatchewan [1947] SCR 394 at 411-412 is frequently cited, but it bears repeating: 'Interest is, in general terms, the return or consideration or compensation for the use or retention by one person of a sum of money, belonging to, in a colloquial sense, or owed to, another.' Most recently, this description was referred to, with approval, by Morris J in Director of Consumer Affairs v City Finance Loans (Credit) [2005] VCAT 1989 at [13] ; see also Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 99 ATC 5193 at 5210 [72] and Consolidated Fertilizers Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1992) 36 FCR 1 at 6.
Case: Houssein v Under Secretary, Department of Industrial Relations &amp; Technology (NSW) (1982) 48 CLR 88
Outcome: cited
From time to time courts have expressed reservations about this maxim, and it is always applied with caution: see Houssein v Under Secretary, Department of Industrial Relations &amp; Technology (NSW) (1982) 48 CLR 88 at 94 per Stephen, Mason, Aickin, Wilson and Brennan JJ; see also the authorities collected in Pearce and Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia , supra, at paras [4.24]-[4.27]. 95 Bearing these reservations in mind and recognising the need to proceed with caution, I have concluded that the contrast between cl C.4.10 and these other provisions is capable of providing some support, albeit in a very subsidiary way, for the construction of cl C.4.10 that I prefer. The short point is that the drafters of the Deed could have specifically included a provision in cl C.4.10 entitling the applicant to deduct negative interest (as defined) from a member's deferred retirement benefit, but they did not do so. However, given the history of the LAS Act and the Deed and the way in which different divisions have been introduced at different times to accommodate different sub-schemes, I would treat the point very cautiously. 96 The applicant also sought, somewhat inconsistently, to gather some support for its construction of cl C.4.10 from these other provisions. It pointed out that each of cll B.3.2, D.4.5, G.2.2 and H.4.2 provided for a crediting of interest at the declared rate (if positive) and a debiting of interest at the declared rate (if negative). It submitted that these provisions show that the Deed contemplates the concept of negative interest. In my opinion, these provisions do not assist the proper construction of cl C.4.10. They simply show that it is possible to adopt special definitions that alter the ordinary meaning of a word such as 'interest', and to use those definitions for specified purposes.
Case: Mazukov v University of Tasmania [2004] FCAFC 159
Outcome: cited
The hearing before me is a hearing de novo: Mazukov v University of Tasmania [2004] FCAFC 159 ; Pattison v Hadjimouratis [2006] FCAFC 153 ; (2006) 155 FCR 226. The right to review arises because the Registrar has exercised the judicial power of the Commonwealth and, as such, is subject to the supervision of the Court. The Registrar's orders are reviewable by hearing de novo: Harris v Caladine [1991] HCA 9 ; (1991) 172 CLR 84 per Dawson J at 124. A hearing de novo contemplates a complete rehearing. The moving party before the Registrar has the responsibility of satisfying the Court that the orders should have been made. The parties may adduce further evidence before the Court and the rehearing is determined on the evidence put before the Court which may include the evidence put before the Registrar. The judge determines the rehearing without being fettered by the decision of the Registrar: Southern Motors Pty Ltd v Australian Guarantee Corporation Ltd [1980] VR 187. The parties did adduce the further evidence to which I have referred and the applicant cross-examined the first plaintiff.
Case: Pattison v Hadjimouratis [2006] FCAFC 153 ; (2006) 155 FCR 226
Outcome: cited
The hearing before me is a hearing de novo: Mazukov v University of Tasmania [2004] FCAFC 159 ; Pattison v Hadjimouratis [2006] FCAFC 153 ; (2006) 155 FCR 226. The right to review arises because the Registrar has exercised the judicial power of the Commonwealth and, as such, is subject to the supervision of the Court. The Registrar's orders are reviewable by hearing de novo: Harris v Caladine [1991] HCA 9 ; (1991) 172 CLR 84 per Dawson J at 124. A hearing de novo contemplates a complete rehearing. The moving party before the Registrar has the responsibility of satisfying the Court that the orders should have been made. The parties may adduce further evidence before the Court and the rehearing is determined on the evidence put before the Court which may include the evidence put before the Registrar. The judge determines the rehearing without being fettered by the decision of the Registrar: Southern Motors Pty Ltd v Australian Guarantee Corporation Ltd [1980] VR 187. The parties did adduce the further evidence to which I have referred and the applicant cross-examined the first plaintiff.
Case: Harris v Caladine [1991] HCA 9 ; (1991) 172 CLR 84
Outcome: cited
The hearing before me is a hearing de novo: Mazukov v University of Tasmania [2004] FCAFC 159 ; Pattison v Hadjimouratis [2006] FCAFC 153 ; (2006) 155 FCR 226. The right to review arises because the Registrar has exercised the judicial power of the Commonwealth and, as such, is subject to the supervision of the Court. The Registrar's orders are reviewable by hearing de novo: Harris v Caladine [1991] HCA 9 ; (1991) 172 CLR 84 per Dawson J at 124. A hearing de novo contemplates a complete rehearing. The moving party before the Registrar has the responsibility of satisfying the Court that the orders should have been made. The parties may adduce further evidence before the Court and the rehearing is determined on the evidence put before the Court which may include the evidence put before the Registrar. The judge determines the rehearing without being fettered by the decision of the Registrar: Southern Motors Pty Ltd v Australian Guarantee Corporation Ltd [1980] VR 187. The parties did adduce the further evidence to which I have referred and the applicant cross-examined the first plaintiff.
Case: Southern Motors Pty Ltd v Australian Guarantee Corporation Ltd [1980] VR 187
Outcome: cited
The hearing before me is a hearing de novo: Mazukov v University of Tasmania [2004] FCAFC 159 ; Pattison v Hadjimouratis [2006] FCAFC 153 ; (2006) 155 FCR 226. The right to review arises because the Registrar has exercised the judicial power of the Commonwealth and, as such, is subject to the supervision of the Court. The Registrar's orders are reviewable by hearing de novo: Harris v Caladine [1991] HCA 9 ; (1991) 172 CLR 84 per Dawson J at 124. A hearing de novo contemplates a complete rehearing. The moving party before the Registrar has the responsibility of satisfying the Court that the orders should have been made. The parties may adduce further evidence before the Court and the rehearing is determined on the evidence put before the Court which may include the evidence put before the Registrar. The judge determines the rehearing without being fettered by the decision of the Registrar: Southern Motors Pty Ltd v Australian Guarantee Corporation Ltd [1980] VR 187. The parties did adduce the further evidence to which I have referred and the applicant cross-examined the first plaintiff.
Case: Re Peter Conyers Holdings Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) (1996) 14 ACLC 1835
Outcome: cited
The first question to be determined is whether the applicant is a person entitled to be heard in opposition to the order sought for reinstatement? The applicant is being presently sued for $290,000. He has a vital interest in the question and he is entitled to be heard: r 2.13 Federal Court (Corporations) Rules 2000 ; Re Peter Conyers Holdings Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) (1996) 14 ACLC 1835 at 1849; Payne v Wizard Industries Pty Ltd (1997) 15 ACLC 1012. He need not be or become a party: r 2.13 Federal Court (Corporations) Rules 2000 .
Case: Payne v Wizard Industries Pty Ltd (1997) 15 ACLC 1012
Outcome: cited
The first question to be determined is whether the applicant is a person entitled to be heard in opposition to the order sought for reinstatement? The applicant is being presently sued for $290,000. He has a vital interest in the question and he is entitled to be heard: r 2.13 Federal Court (Corporations) Rules 2000 ; Re Peter Conyers Holdings Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) (1996) 14 ACLC 1835 at 1849; Payne v Wizard Industries Pty Ltd (1997) 15 ACLC 1012. He need not be or become a party: r 2.13 Federal Court (Corporations) Rules 2000 .
Case: Ealing Corporation v Jones [1959] 1 QB 384
Outcome: cited
The next question to be addressed is whether the first plaintiff is a person aggrieved by the deregistration. The first plaintiff was the director and company secretary, but not a shareholder of ACMF. Although the expression 'person aggrieved' is not defined in the Corporations Act , the term is understood in a different sense to its literal meaning. A person aggrieved is not someone who is merely dissatisfied by an event. A person aggrieved must be a person who has been damaged or injured in a legal sense: a person who has a legal grievance: Ealing Corporation v Jones [1959] 1 QB 384 at 391; Re G A &amp; R J Elliot Pty Ltd; ex parte Mitcham (1978) 3 ACLR 523 at 525; GIS Electrical Pty Ltd v Melsom [2002] WASCA 302 ; (2002) 172 FLR 218. The applicant contended that merely being a director is not enough: Casali v Crisp [2001] NSWSC 860 ; (2001) 165 FLR 79. 51 The authorities suggest, as the applicant contended, that merely because a person is a shareholder or a director that is not enough to establish that a person is a person aggrieved. In this case, the first plaintiff is merely a director. However, upon his own evidence, the first plaintiff is the person who, by his own inaction, caused deregistration of ACMF. There is presently no suggestion that the first plaintiff might be prosecuted for a contravention of s 188 of the Corporations Act . As the secretary of ACMF, it was his responsibility to attend to the various matters in s 188(1) of the Corporations Act . Although there is presently no suggestion that any proceedings might be brought against the first plaintiff in relation to whatever breach of duty he committed, that is a risk, it seems to me, which would entitle the first plaintiff to say that he is a person aggrieved. The first plaintiff's conduct might have put some sort of legal burden on him that would be partly relieved by ACMF's reregistration: Ealing Corporation [1959] 1 QB at 391. In those circumstances, notwithstanding that the first plaintiff is a director and secretary only, in my opinion, he is a person aggrieved because he has a real and direct interest in the reregistration of ACMF: Denis &amp; Ors v McMahon (1989) 7 ACLC 283.
Case: Re G A &amp; R J Elliot Pty Ltd; ex parte Mitcham (1978) 3 ACLR 523
Outcome: cited
The next question to be addressed is whether the first plaintiff is a person aggrieved by the deregistration. The first plaintiff was the director and company secretary, but not a shareholder of ACMF. Although the expression 'person aggrieved' is not defined in the Corporations Act , the term is understood in a different sense to its literal meaning. A person aggrieved is not someone who is merely dissatisfied by an event. A person aggrieved must be a person who has been damaged or injured in a legal sense: a person who has a legal grievance: Ealing Corporation v Jones [1959] 1 QB 384 at 391; Re G A &amp; R J Elliot Pty Ltd; ex parte Mitcham (1978) 3 ACLR 523 at 525; GIS Electrical Pty Ltd v Melsom [2002] WASCA 302 ; (2002) 172 FLR 218. The applicant contended that merely being a director is not enough: Casali v Crisp [2001] NSWSC 860 ; (2001) 165 FLR 79.
Case: GIS Electrical Pty Ltd v Melsom [2002] WASCA 302 ; (2002) 172 FLR 218
Outcome: cited
The next question to be addressed is whether the first plaintiff is a person aggrieved by the deregistration. The first plaintiff was the director and company secretary, but not a shareholder of ACMF. Although the expression 'person aggrieved' is not defined in the Corporations Act , the term is understood in a different sense to its literal meaning. A person aggrieved is not someone who is merely dissatisfied by an event. A person aggrieved must be a person who has been damaged or injured in a legal sense: a person who has a legal grievance: Ealing Corporation v Jones [1959] 1 QB 384 at 391; Re G A &amp; R J Elliot Pty Ltd; ex parte Mitcham (1978) 3 ACLR 523 at 525; GIS Electrical Pty Ltd v Melsom [2002] WASCA 302 ; (2002) 172 FLR 218. The applicant contended that merely being a director is not enough: Casali v Crisp [2001] NSWSC 860 ; (2001) 165 FLR 79.