mdroth/huggingface-course_section-5_zst huggingface dataset:
Case: Bank of Western Australia Limited v Commissioner of Taxation (1994) 55 FCR 233
Outcome: cited
a single judge of the Court I should follow Katz J unless I thought that he was clearly wrong: see Bank of Western Australia Limited v Commissioner of Taxation (1994) 55 FCR 233 at 255 (per Lindgren J) and the authorities there cited. I am not persuaded that his Honour was clearly wrong for the reasons advanced by Ms Crvenkovic or for any other reason. On the contrary, I respectfully agree with His Honour's reasoning. I am fortified in this view by the fact that, although the Full Court in Hurst did not expressly approve Charles , its reasoning assumed that Katz J was correct in his construction of s 46PO(3).
Case: Hurst v State of Queensland [2006] FCAFC 100 ; (2006) 151 FCR 562
Outcome: referred to
has since been applied by other single judges: see Bahonko v Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology [2006] FCA 1325 at [68] (per Weinberg J); Maghiar v State of Western Australia [2002] FCA 262 at [18] (per French J); and Stanislawa Bahonko v Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology [2006] FCA 1492 at [4] (per Tracey J). More recently a Full Court, in Hurst v State of Queensland [2006] FCAFC 100 ; (2006) 151 FCR 562 , accepted that s 46PO(3) imposed "temporal limits" on any claim brought under s 46PO(1). The Court was referred to Charles and its reasoning proceeded on the basis that Charles was correctly decided. As a single judge of the Court I should follow Katz J unless I thought that he was clearly wrong: see Bank of Western Australia Limited v Commissioner of Taxation (1994) 55 FCR 233 at 255 (per Lindgren J) and the authorities there cited. I am not persuaded that his Honour was clearly wrong for the reasons advanced by Ms Crvenkovic or for any other reason. On the contrary, I respectfully agree with His Honour's reasoning. I am fortified in this view by the fact that, although the Full Court in Hurst did not expressly approve Charles , its reasoning assumed that Katz J was correct in his construction of s 46PO(3).
Case: Maghiar v State of Western Australia [2002] FCA 262
Outcome: referred to
has since been applied by other single judges: see Bahonko v Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology [2006] FCA 1325 at [68] (per Weinberg J); Maghiar v State of Western Australia [2002] FCA 262 at [18] (per French J); and Stanislawa Bahonko v Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology [2006] FCA 1492 at [4] (per Tracey J). More recently a Full Court, in Hurst v State of Queensland [2006] FCAFC 100 ; (2006) 151 FCR 562 , accepted that s 46PO(3) imposed "temporal limits" on any claim brought under s 46PO(1). The Court was referred to Charles and its reasoning proceeded on the basis that Charles was correctly decided.
Case: Stanislawa Bahonko v Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology [2006] FCA 1492
Outcome: referred to
has since been applied by other single judges: see Bahonko v Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology [2006] FCA 1325 at [68] (per Weinberg J); Maghiar v State of Western Australia [2002] FCA 262 at [18] (per French J); and Stanislawa Bahonko v Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology [2006] FCA 1492 at [4] (per Tracey J). More recently a Full Court, in Hurst v State of Queensland [2006] FCAFC 100 ; (2006) 151 FCR 562 , accepted that s 46PO(3) imposed "temporal limits" on any claim brought under s 46PO(1). The Court was referred to Charles and its reasoning proceeded on the basis that Charles was correctly decided.
Case: Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 570
Outcome: cited
The Minister submitted that the Tribunal's conclusions were open for the reasons it gives. The Court cannot review the merits of the Tribunal's decision: Minister for Immigration &amp; Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6 ; (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272, and there is no error of law, let alone a jurisdictional error, in the Tribunal making a wrong finding of fact: Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 570 at [137].
Case: Minister for Immigration &amp; Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6 ; (1996) 185 CLR 259
Outcome: cited
The Minister submitted that the Tribunal's conclusions were open for the reasons it gives. The Court cannot review the merits of the Tribunal's decision: Minister for Immigration &amp; Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6 ; (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272, and there is no error of law, let alone a jurisdictional error, in the Tribunal making a wrong finding of fact: Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 570 at [137].
Case: NACB v Minister for Immigration &amp; Multicultural Affairs [2003] FCAFC 235
Outcome: cited
The Minister further submitted that his Honour below correctly held that the Tribunal was entitled to regard the appellant's claims of persecution as undermined by his continuous address at the one location in India, and to reject his claims that the police could not find him. Such reasoning is not illogical, and even if it were, it would not amount to jurisdictional error. Reliance for this submission was placed on what was said by the Full Court in NACB v Minister for Immigration &amp; Multicultural Affairs [2003] FCAFC 235 at [29] , [30]: 'In our view, there is nothing in these remarks which would warrant a departure from the earlier line of decisions in this Court to the effect that illogical reasoning does not of itself constitute an error of law or jurisdictional error. Nor does the want of logic which has been identified in the present case sound a "warning note" of the type referred to in Epeabaka (at 422) as to whether there was only a purported, and not real, exercise of power by the RRT. Accordingly, the conclusion we have reached in the present case is that there is substance in the argument that there was a want of logic in one aspect of the reasoning of the RRT. However, want of logic does not of itself suffice to constitute error of law, still less error of law which is jurisdictional. There is nothing else in the material, apart from the one aspect of illogicality, to cast doubt upon the RRT's reasoning. Moreover, there are several bases upon which that reasoning can, in any event, be supported. Accordingly, on the present state of the authorities, there is no reviewable error.' See also NATC v Minister for Immigration &amp; Multicultural Affairs [2004] FCAFC 52 at [25] ; VWST v Minister for Immigration &amp; Multicultural &amp; Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 286 at [18] ; and VWFP &amp; VWFQ v Minister for Immigration &amp; Multicultural &amp; Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 231 per Young J at [77].
Case: NATC v Minister for Immigration &amp; Multicultural Affairs [2004] FCAFC 52
Outcome: cited
The Minister further submitted that his Honour below correctly held that the Tribunal was entitled to regard the appellant's claims of persecution as undermined by his continuous address at the one location in India, and to reject his claims that the police could not find him. Such reasoning is not illogical, and even if it were, it would not amount to jurisdictional error. Reliance for this submission was placed on what was said by the Full Court in NACB v Minister for Immigration &amp; Multicultural Affairs [2003] FCAFC 235 at [29] , [30]: 'In our view, there is nothing in these remarks which would warrant a departure from the earlier line of decisions in this Court to the effect that illogical reasoning does not of itself constitute an error of law or jurisdictional error. Nor does the want of logic which has been identified in the present case sound a "warning note" of the type referred to in Epeabaka (at 422) as to whether there was only a purported, and not real, exercise of power by the RRT. Accordingly, the conclusion we have reached in the present case is that there is substance in the argument that there was a want of logic in one aspect of the reasoning of the RRT. However, want of logic does not of itself suffice to constitute error of law, still less error of law which is jurisdictional. There is nothing else in the material, apart from the one aspect of illogicality, to cast doubt upon the RRT's reasoning. Moreover, there are several bases upon which that reasoning can, in any event, be supported. Accordingly, on the present state of the authorities, there is no reviewable error.' See also NATC v Minister for Immigration &amp; Multicultural Affairs [2004] FCAFC 52 at [25] ; VWST v Minister for Immigration &amp; Multicultural &amp; Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 286 at [18] ; and VWFP &amp; VWFQ v Minister for Immigration &amp; Multicultural &amp; Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 231 per Young J at [77].
Case: Re Minister for Immigration &amp; Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Durairajasingham [2000] HCA 1 ; (2000) 168 ALR 407
Outcome: cited
The Minister submitted that the Tribunal's findings concerning the appellant's credit are matters of fact par excellence in reliance on what McHugh J had said in Re Minister for Immigration &amp; Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Durairajasingham [2000] HCA 1 ; (2000) 168 ALR 407 at [67] : '... a finding on credibility which is the function of the primary decision-maker par excellence. If the primary decision-maker has stated that he or she does not believe a particular witness, no detailed reasons need to be given as to why that particular witness was not believed. The tribunal must give the reasons for its decision, not the sub-set of reasons why it accepted or rejected individual pieces of evidence. In any event, the reason for the disbelief is apparent in this case form the use of the word "implausible". The disbelief arose from the tribunal's view that it was inherently unlikely that the events had occurred as alleged.'
Case: SZEJF v Minister for Immigration &amp; Multicultural &amp; Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 724
Outcome: cited
The appellant submitted that his Honour was too generous to the Tribunal. While it is true that the Tribunal has exposed its reasoning process as to why it considered the appellant's account to be implausible, the appellant submitted that it is this very reasoning process which is flawed. The Tribunal reasoned that it was not plausible for the appellant to escape the attention of the police by giving them an address that was 30 kilometres distant from where he actually lived. However, the appellant's submission is that the explanation was not implausible. The Tribunal simply asserted that it was and cited no evidence to support the reasoning. The appellant argued that to simply make an assertion to support a finding which does not otherwise flow from the material is simply not a sufficient basis: SZEJF v Minister for Immigration &amp; Multicultural &amp; Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 724 at [59] ; Tran v Minister for Immigration &amp; Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 1229 at [17] . 14 His Honour below dealt with this submission at [20] [22] as follows: 'The Court rejects the claims that the reasoning of the Tribunal was not supported by logical grounds; that the issue was irrelevant, and that the finding was capricious. The determination has a rational basis. The test in Applicant M164/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 16 that on a critical issue the Tribunal do more than reject evidence because it is implausible, was met as the Tribunal undertook a rational examination of the material before it. Also, the test in SZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 995 was complied with. It cannot be said that the Tribunal's decision is arbitrary; its finding was made on logical grounds and on the material before it. The decision in SZEJF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 724 was referred to, in particular the passage in [59] that refers to the Tribunal's "bare, unsupported assertions that objective facts...were 'somewhat implausible'". In the current case, the finding of the Tribunal was properly open to it on the material before it. It did not reach its conclusion on bare unsupported assertions ... The decision in Tran v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 1229 was referred to, in particular paragraph [17] and the finding that "[t]he tribunal did not express any finding or reason for that ultimate conclusion, except that it did not find the evidence compelling." In the present case, the Tribunal set out [its] reasoning process leading to its ultimate conclusion. In Tran , Justice Rares found what amounts to Wednesbury unreasonableness. No such finding could be made here.'
Case: Tran v Minister for Immigration &amp; Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 1229
Outcome: cited
The appellant submitted that his Honour was too generous to the Tribunal. While it is true that the Tribunal has exposed its reasoning process as to why it considered the appellant's account to be implausible, the appellant submitted that it is this very reasoning process which is flawed. The Tribunal reasoned that it was not plausible for the appellant to escape the attention of the police by giving them an address that was 30 kilometres distant from where he actually lived. However, the appellant's submission is that the explanation was not implausible. The Tribunal simply asserted that it was and cited no evidence to support the reasoning. The appellant argued that to simply make an assertion to support a finding which does not otherwise flow from the material is simply not a sufficient basis: SZEJF v Minister for Immigration &amp; Multicultural &amp; Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 724 at [59] ; Tran v Minister for Immigration &amp; Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 1229 at [17] . 14 His Honour below dealt with this submission at [20] [22] as follows: 'The Court rejects the claims that the reasoning of the Tribunal was not supported by logical grounds; that the issue was irrelevant, and that the finding was capricious. The determination has a rational basis. The test in Applicant M164/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 16 that on a critical issue the Tribunal do more than reject evidence because it is implausible, was met as the Tribunal undertook a rational examination of the material before it. Also, the test in SZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 995 was complied with. It cannot be said that the Tribunal's decision is arbitrary; its finding was made on logical grounds and on the material before it. The decision in SZEJF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 724 was referred to, in particular the passage in [59] that refers to the Tribunal's "bare, unsupported assertions that objective facts...were 'somewhat implausible'". In the current case, the finding of the Tribunal was properly open to it on the material before it. It did not reach its conclusion on bare unsupported assertions ... The decision in Tran v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 1229 was referred to, in particular paragraph [17] and the finding that "[t]he tribunal did not express any finding or reason for that ultimate conclusion, except that it did not find the evidence compelling." In the present case, the Tribunal set out [its] reasoning process leading to its ultimate conclusion. In Tran , Justice Rares found what amounts to Wednesbury unreasonableness. No such finding could be made here.'
Case: VWFP &amp; VWFQ v Minister for Immigration &amp; Multicultural &amp; Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 231
Outcome: cited
The Minister further submitted that his Honour below correctly held that the Tribunal was entitled to regard the appellant's claims of persecution as undermined by his continuous address at the one location in India, and to reject his claims that the police could not find him. Such reasoning is not illogical, and even if it were, it would not amount to jurisdictional error. Reliance for this submission was placed on what was said by the Full Court in NACB v Minister for Immigration &amp; Multicultural Affairs [2003] FCAFC 235 at [29] , [30]: 'In our view, there is nothing in these remarks which would warrant a departure from the earlier line of decisions in this Court to the effect that illogical reasoning does not of itself constitute an error of law or jurisdictional error. Nor does the want of logic which has been identified in the present case sound a "warning note" of the type referred to in Epeabaka (at 422) as to whether there was only a purported, and not real, exercise of power by the RRT. Accordingly, the conclusion we have reached in the present case is that there is substance in the argument that there was a want of logic in one aspect of the reasoning of the RRT. However, want of logic does not of itself suffice to constitute error of law, still less error of law which is jurisdictional. There is nothing else in the material, apart from the one aspect of illogicality, to cast doubt upon the RRT's reasoning. Moreover, there are several bases upon which that reasoning can, in any event, be supported. Accordingly, on the present state of the authorities, there is no reviewable error.' See also NATC v Minister for Immigration &amp; Multicultural Affairs [2004] FCAFC 52 at [25] ; VWST v Minister for Immigration &amp; Multicultural &amp; Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 286 at [18] ; and VWFP &amp; VWFQ v Minister for Immigration &amp; Multicultural &amp; Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 231 per Young J at [77].
Case: VWST v Minister for Immigration &amp; Multicultural &amp; Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 286
Outcome: cited
The Minister further submitted that his Honour below correctly held that the Tribunal was entitled to regard the appellant's claims of persecution as undermined by his continuous address at the one location in India, and to reject his claims that the police could not find him. Such reasoning is not illogical, and even if it were, it would not amount to jurisdictional error. Reliance for this submission was placed on what was said by the Full Court in NACB v Minister for Immigration &amp; Multicultural Affairs [2003] FCAFC 235 at [29] , [30]: 'In our view, there is nothing in these remarks which would warrant a departure from the earlier line of decisions in this Court to the effect that illogical reasoning does not of itself constitute an error of law or jurisdictional error. Nor does the want of logic which has been identified in the present case sound a "warning note" of the type referred to in Epeabaka (at 422) as to whether there was only a purported, and not real, exercise of power by the RRT. Accordingly, the conclusion we have reached in the present case is that there is substance in the argument that there was a want of logic in one aspect of the reasoning of the RRT. However, want of logic does not of itself suffice to constitute error of law, still less error of law which is jurisdictional. There is nothing else in the material, apart from the one aspect of illogicality, to cast doubt upon the RRT's reasoning. Moreover, there are several bases upon which that reasoning can, in any event, be supported. Accordingly, on the present state of the authorities, there is no reviewable error.' See also NATC v Minister for Immigration &amp; Multicultural Affairs [2004] FCAFC 52 at [25] ; VWST v Minister for Immigration &amp; Multicultural &amp; Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 286 at [18] ; and VWFP &amp; VWFQ v Minister for Immigration &amp; Multicultural &amp; Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 231 per Young J at [77].
Case: W148/00A v Minister for Immigration &amp; Multicultural Affairs (2001) ALR 703
Outcome: cited
The Minister submitted that provided there was evidentiary material on which it was open to the Tribunal to reach its conclusion on the appellant's credit, no error is demonstrated: W148/00A v Minister for Immigration &amp; Multicultural Affairs (2001) ALR 703 (FCAFC) at [64] [69] per Tamberlin and R D Nicholson JJ.
Case: Ex parte Durairajasinghan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] HCA 1 ; (2000) 168 ALR 407
Outcome: cited
If, of course, there is simply no evidence to support the contended inconsistency, that becomes a relevant matter but in the face of an evaluation of the evidence and having had the benefit of seeing the appellant, the conclusions as to inconsistency were open to the Tribunal irrespective of whether another Tribunal may have reached, or this Court or another Court, may have reached a different conclusion. In Ex parte Durairajasinghan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] HCA 1 ; (2000) 168 ALR 407 at 423 at paragraph 67, McHugh J makes plain that findings of credibility are a matter for the Tribunal. His Honour observed: 'However, this was essentially a finding as to whether the prosecutor should be believed in his claim. A finding on credibility is the function of the primary decision maker par excellence.'
Case: W148/00A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 185 ALR 703
Outcome: cited
Similar observations have been made as to those matters. In W148/00A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 185 ALR 703, the Full Court of the Federal Court, per Lee, Tamberlin and R.D. Nicholson JJ observed at [65]: 'It is important to identify, in this case, the precise question for determination by the minister and the tribunal. The relevant question is whether the minister and the tribunal could be "satisfied" that the case for refugee status has been made out: see ss 65 and 415 of the Act. The High Court in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6 ; (1996) 185 CLR 259; per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ, considered this requirement of satisfaction and observed that the decision under review is of a subjective nature and is not the same as a review of an entirely objective determination of refugee status. This distinction underlies the need for care when viewing the decision of the tribunal, especially in relation to the question of credibility, because the review is as to the satisfaction of the minister or his delegate and not as to the determination of the minister or the delegate.'
Case: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6 ; (1996) 185 CLR 259
Outcome: cited
Similar observations have been made as to those matters. In W148/00A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 185 ALR 703, the Full Court of the Federal Court, per Lee, Tamberlin and R.D. Nicholson JJ observed at [65]: 'It is important to identify, in this case, the precise question for determination by the minister and the tribunal. The relevant question is whether the minister and the tribunal could be "satisfied" that the case for refugee status has been made out: see ss 65 and 415 of the Act. The High Court in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6 ; (1996) 185 CLR 259; per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ, considered this requirement of satisfaction and observed that the decision under review is of a subjective nature and is not the same as a review of an entirely objective determination of refugee status. This distinction underlies the need for care when viewing the decision of the tribunal, especially in relation to the question of credibility, because the review is as to the satisfaction of the minister or his delegate and not as to the determination of the minister or the delegate.'
Case: McKinnon v Pattison [2009] FMCA 695
Outcome: referred to
his first judgment, Phipps FM dismissed an application by the appellants that he disqualify himself from hearing an application to review a decision of a Registrar of the Court below made on 25 May 2009 ("the First Judgment"); see McKinnon v Pattison [2009] FMCA 695. The substantive application before Phipps FM was for an extension of time under s 33(1)(c) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ("the Act") for the appellants to give a taxing officer notice of their wish to have the costs and remuneration of their trustee in bankruptcy taxed pursuant to reg 8.09 of the Bankruptcy Regulations 1996 (Cth) ("the Regulations").