Case: Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Wraith [1983] FCA 179 ; (1983) 48 ALR 500
Outcome: cited
introduction of the requirement that administrative decision-makers provide reasons for their decisions (or do so on request from persons affected by those decisions) was a fundamental development in Australia's system of administrative law. In his 1989 Blackburn Lecture, the then Chief Justice of the High Court, Sir Anthony Mason, said that the creation of the obligation to provide a statement of reasons for decisions "was a dramatic advance in arming the individual with effective remedies in the overall scheme to ensure administrative justice" and that "reasoned and principled administrative decisions are an indispensable element in a modern democracy." The provision of reasons serves a number of useful functions: see Osmond v Public Service Board of New South Wales [1984] 3 NSWLR 447 at 463 (per Kirby P); Comcare Australia v Lees (1997) 151 ALR 647 at 656 (per Finkelstein J). Relevantly, the provision of reasons enables the parties, and, particularly, unsuccessful parties, to understand why the decision was made and to make an informed judgment as to whether to seek redress or to accept the decision. To this end "[i]t is necessary that the statement be sufficiently explicit to enable the recipient to determine whether "the making of the decision was an improper exercise of the power conferred by the enactment", "the decision involved in error of law", the decision-maker took into account an irrelevant consideration or failed to take into account a relevant consideration and like matters referred to in ss 5 and 6 of the [ADJR] Act": Hatfield v Health Insurance Commission (1987) 15 FCR 487 at 490. In a frequently quoted passage from his judgment in Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Wraith [1983] FCA 179 ; (1983) 48 ALR 500 at 507, Woodward J explained the obligation, imposed on decision-makers by s 13 of the ADJR Act, as follows: "The passages from judgments which are conveniently brought together in Re Palmer and Minister for the Capital Territory (1978) 23 ALR 176 at 206-207; 1 ALD 183 at 193-4, serve to confirm my view that s 13(1) of the Judicial Review Act requires the decision-maker to explain his decision in a way which will enable a person aggrieved to say, in effect: "Even though I may not agree with it, I now understand why the decision went against me. I am now in a position to decide whether that decision has involved an unwarranted finding of fact, or an error of law, which is worth challenging." This requires that the decision-maker should set out his understanding of the relevant law, any findings of fact on which his conclusions depend (especially if those facts have been in dispute), and the reasoning processes which led him to those conclusions. He should do so in clear and unambiguous language, not in vague generalities or the formal language of legislation." See also ARM Constructions Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1986) 10 FCR 197 at 203; Soldatow v Australia Council [1991] FCA 160 ; (1991) 28 FCR 1 at 2. Because of the view which I have formed as to the operation of paragraph (f)(iii) of Sch 2 it is not necessary for me to express a concluded view as to whether or not sub-paragraph (iv) might also have rendered the decision one to which s 13 of the ADJR Act did not apply. Had I been of the view that s 13(11)(c) did not operate to exclude the operation of that section further issues would have arisen. One would have been whether the order sought should have been refused in the exercise of the Court's discretion: see s 13(7) of the ADJR Act and cf Soldatow v Australia Council [1991] FCA 160 ; (1991) 28 FCR 1 at 2. Moreover, it may have been necessary to make any order for the provision of reasons subject to the provisions of s 13A of the ADJR Act: cf Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Wraith [1983] FCA 179 ; (1983) 48 ALR 500 at 509-10.