Case: Jess v Scott and Others (1986) 12 FCR 187
Outcome: followed
The applicant refers to the authorities of Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133 , Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348-349, and Jess v Scott and Others (1986) 12 FCR 187 , each of which refer to the principles to be considered when dealing with an application under O 52 r 15(2) of the Rules for extension of time. Such rule provides: (2) Notwithstanding anything in the preceding subrule, the Court or a Judge for special reasons may at any time give leave to file and serve a notice of appeal. 64 Order 52 Rule 15(2) of the Rules requires the applicant to demonstrate that 'special reasons' exist justifying the grant of leave to extend time in which to appeal. The Court must consider whether there has been a satisfactory explanation for the delay; whether there is prejudice to any other party; and whether the grounds for appeal satisfy the Court that there are prospects of success: see Hunter Valley Developments Pty Limited v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 349; Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133 ; Jess v Scott and Others (1986) 12 FCR 187. The Court will consider each of the above hereunder. 91 In Jess v Scott and Others (1986) 12 FCR 187 the Full Court said at 195: What is needed to justify an extension of time is indicated in r 15(2) by the words "for special reasons". It is that there be shown a special reason why the appeal should be permitted to proceed, though filed after the expiry of twenty-one days. In that context, the expression "special reasons" is intended to distinguish the case from the usual course according to which the time is twenty-one days. But it may be so distinguished (not necessarily will, for the rule gives a discretion) wherever the Court sees a ground which does justify departure from the general rule in the particular case. Such a ground is a special reason because it takes the case out of the ordinary. We do not think the use of the expression "for special reasons" implies something narrower than this. 92 For the reasons indicated above the Court is unable to find that 'special reasons' exist which would justify an exercise of the Court's discretion to grant an extension of time to appeal in favour of Triad. 93 Triad's application under the slip rule was predicated upon the submission that Order 6 did not reflect the true intention of the Court. Triad sought to have Order 6 varied to read: (a) Declares that other than as provided in these orders the first plaintiff and the second defendant have no subsisting entitlement to consultancy fees from any of the first, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth defendants. (i) after 28 February 2006, and (ii) in an amount exceeding $15,000 (plus GST) per month in respect of the period 20 July 2005 to 28 February, 2006. (b) The Court orders that, subject to sub-paragraphs 1(i)(a) and 1(i)(b) above, and subject to the second defendant issuing to the first defendant proper tax invoices, the second defendant's entitlements to payment of consultancy fees of $20,833.33 per month (plus GST) for the period 1 July, 2000 to 20 July, 2005 (to the extent they are payable) are not otherwise [affected] by sub-paragraphs 1(i)(a) and 1(i)(b) herein.