mdroth/huggingface-course_section-5_zst huggingface dataset:
Case: Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321
Outcome: cited
However, at common law, want of logic is not synonymous with error of law ( Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 , per Mason CJ at 356, with whom Brennan, Toohey and Gaudron JJ agreed) and as to inferences , 'so long as there is some basis for an inference in other words, the particular inference is reasonably open even if that inference appears to have been drawn as a result of illogical reasoning, there is no place for judicial review because no error of law has taken place.' (his Honour's emphasis, Bond , per Mason CJ at 356). On the other hand, where a statute requires the decision-maker to discharge particular duties, 'irrationality of the kind described by Deane J in Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond may involve non-compliance with the duty' ( MIMA; Ex parte S20/2002 per Gleeson CJ at [9]). In the context of the particular statutory framework relating to protection visas under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and the role and duty of the Refugee Review Tribunal, Gummow and Hayne JJ (with whom Gleeson CJ agreed) in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32 ; (2004) 207 ALR 12 observed at [38] that although the question of whether protection obligations relevantly arose included a consideration of factual matters, 'the critical question is whether the determination [by the Tribunal] was irrational, illogical and not based on findings or inferences of fact supported by logical grounds' and 'inadequacy of the material before the decision-maker concerning the attainment of that satisfaction is insufficient in itself to establish jurisdictional error' .
Case: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32 ; (2004) 207 ALR 12
Outcome: cited
However, at common law, want of logic is not synonymous with error of law ( Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 , per Mason CJ at 356, with whom Brennan, Toohey and Gaudron JJ agreed) and as to inferences , 'so long as there is some basis for an inference in other words, the particular inference is reasonably open even if that inference appears to have been drawn as a result of illogical reasoning, there is no place for judicial review because no error of law has taken place.' (his Honour's emphasis, Bond , per Mason CJ at 356). On the other hand, where a statute requires the decision-maker to discharge particular duties, 'irrationality of the kind described by Deane J in Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond may involve non-compliance with the duty' ( MIMA; Ex parte S20/2002 per Gleeson CJ at [9]). In the context of the particular statutory framework relating to protection visas under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and the role and duty of the Refugee Review Tribunal, Gummow and Hayne JJ (with whom Gleeson CJ agreed) in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32 ; (2004) 207 ALR 12 observed at [38] that although the question of whether protection obligations relevantly arose included a consideration of factual matters, 'the critical question is whether the determination [by the Tribunal] was irrational, illogical and not based on findings or inferences of fact supported by logical grounds' and 'inadequacy of the material before the decision-maker concerning the attainment of that satisfaction is insufficient in itself to establish jurisdictional error' .
Case: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Epeabaka [1999] FCA 1 ; (1999) 84 FCR 411
Outcome: cited
In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Epeabaka [1999] FCA 1 ; (1999) 84 FCR 411 , Black CJ, von Doussa and Carr JJ at [25] observed that want of logic in drawing an inference will not of itself constitute an error of law. Their Honours also noted, however, that a want of logic 'may sound a warning note to put one on inquiry whether there was indeed any basis for the inference drawn' : see also NAMM of 2002 v MIMIA [2003] FCAFC 32 per French, Lindgren and Finkelstein JJ; MIMIA v W306/01A [2003] FCAFC 208 per French, Hill and Marshall JJ; NACB v MIMIA [2003] FCAFC 235 per Tamberlin, Emmett and Weinberg JJ; W404/01A of 2002 v MIMIA [2003] FCAFC 255 per French, Lee and Carr JJ; NATC v MIMIA [2004] FCAFC 52 per Heerey, Sundberg and Crennan JJ; VWST v MIMIA [2004] FCAFC 286 per Kiefel, Marshall and Downes JJ, applying these principles. The question of whether there is evidence of a fact is a question of law and whether an inference can be drawn from facts is itself a question of law. In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Al-Miahi [2001] FCA 744 ; (2001) 65 ALD 141 , Sundberg, Emmett and Finkelstein JJ, said this: [34] The question whether there is any evidence of a particular fact is a question of law. Likewise, the question whether a particular inference can be drawn from facts found or agreed is a question of law. That is because, before the inference is drawn, there is a preliminary question as to whether the evidence reasonably admits a different conclusion. Accordingly, in the context of judicial review, the making of findings and the drawing of inferences in the absence of evidence is an error of law. On the other hand, there is no error of law simply in making a wrong finding of fact. Even if the reasoning whereby the court reached its conclusion of fact were demonstrably unsound, that would not amount to an error of law. A party does not establish an error of law by showing that the decision-maker inferred the existence of a particular fact by a faulty process, for example by engaging in an illogical course of reasoning. Thus, at common law, want of logic is not synonymous with error of law. So long as the particular inference is reasonably open, even if that inference appears to have been drawn as a result of illogical reasoning, there is no place for judicial review because no error of law has taken place.
Case: NAMM of 2002 v MIMIA [2003] FCAFC 32
Outcome: cited
In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Epeabaka [1999] FCA 1 ; (1999) 84 FCR 411 , Black CJ, von Doussa and Carr JJ at [25] observed that want of logic in drawing an inference will not of itself constitute an error of law. Their Honours also noted, however, that a want of logic 'may sound a warning note to put one on inquiry whether there was indeed any basis for the inference drawn' : see also NAMM of 2002 v MIMIA [2003] FCAFC 32 per French, Lindgren and Finkelstein JJ; MIMIA v W306/01A [2003] FCAFC 208 per French, Hill and Marshall JJ; NACB v MIMIA [2003] FCAFC 235 per Tamberlin, Emmett and Weinberg JJ; W404/01A of 2002 v MIMIA [2003] FCAFC 255 per French, Lee and Carr JJ; NATC v MIMIA [2004] FCAFC 52 per Heerey, Sundberg and Crennan JJ; VWST v MIMIA [2004] FCAFC 286 per Kiefel, Marshall and Downes JJ, applying these principles. The question of whether there is evidence of a fact is a question of law and whether an inference can be drawn from facts is itself a question of law. In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Al-Miahi [2001] FCA 744 ; (2001) 65 ALD 141 , Sundberg, Emmett and Finkelstein JJ, said this: [34] The question whether there is any evidence of a particular fact is a question of law. Likewise, the question whether a particular inference can be drawn from facts found or agreed is a question of law. That is because, before the inference is drawn, there is a preliminary question as to whether the evidence reasonably admits a different conclusion. Accordingly, in the context of judicial review, the making of findings and the drawing of inferences in the absence of evidence is an error of law. On the other hand, there is no error of law simply in making a wrong finding of fact. Even if the reasoning whereby the court reached its conclusion of fact were demonstrably unsound, that would not amount to an error of law. A party does not establish an error of law by showing that the decision-maker inferred the existence of a particular fact by a faulty process, for example by engaging in an illogical course of reasoning. Thus, at common law, want of logic is not synonymous with error of law. So long as the particular inference is reasonably open, even if that inference appears to have been drawn as a result of illogical reasoning, there is no place for judicial review because no error of law has taken place.
Case: MIMIA v W306/01A [2003] FCAFC 208
Outcome: cited
In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Epeabaka [1999] FCA 1 ; (1999) 84 FCR 411 , Black CJ, von Doussa and Carr JJ at [25] observed that want of logic in drawing an inference will not of itself constitute an error of law. Their Honours also noted, however, that a want of logic 'may sound a warning note to put one on inquiry whether there was indeed any basis for the inference drawn' : see also NAMM of 2002 v MIMIA [2003] FCAFC 32 per French, Lindgren and Finkelstein JJ; MIMIA v W306/01A [2003] FCAFC 208 per French, Hill and Marshall JJ; NACB v MIMIA [2003] FCAFC 235 per Tamberlin, Emmett and Weinberg JJ; W404/01A of 2002 v MIMIA [2003] FCAFC 255 per French, Lee and Carr JJ; NATC v MIMIA [2004] FCAFC 52 per Heerey, Sundberg and Crennan JJ; VWST v MIMIA [2004] FCAFC 286 per Kiefel, Marshall and Downes JJ, applying these principles. The question of whether there is evidence of a fact is a question of law and whether an inference can be drawn from facts is itself a question of law. In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Al-Miahi [2001] FCA 744 ; (2001) 65 ALD 141 , Sundberg, Emmett and Finkelstein JJ, said this: [34] The question whether there is any evidence of a particular fact is a question of law. Likewise, the question whether a particular inference can be drawn from facts found or agreed is a question of law. That is because, before the inference is drawn, there is a preliminary question as to whether the evidence reasonably admits a different conclusion. Accordingly, in the context of judicial review, the making of findings and the drawing of inferences in the absence of evidence is an error of law. On the other hand, there is no error of law simply in making a wrong finding of fact. Even if the reasoning whereby the court reached its conclusion of fact were demonstrably unsound, that would not amount to an error of law. A party does not establish an error of law by showing that the decision-maker inferred the existence of a particular fact by a faulty process, for example by engaging in an illogical course of reasoning. Thus, at common law, want of logic is not synonymous with error of law. So long as the particular inference is reasonably open, even if that inference appears to have been drawn as a result of illogical reasoning, there is no place for judicial review because no error of law has taken place.
Case: NACB v MIMIA [2003] FCAFC 235
Outcome: cited
In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Epeabaka [1999] FCA 1 ; (1999) 84 FCR 411 , Black CJ, von Doussa and Carr JJ at [25] observed that want of logic in drawing an inference will not of itself constitute an error of law. Their Honours also noted, however, that a want of logic 'may sound a warning note to put one on inquiry whether there was indeed any basis for the inference drawn' : see also NAMM of 2002 v MIMIA [2003] FCAFC 32 per French, Lindgren and Finkelstein JJ; MIMIA v W306/01A [2003] FCAFC 208 per French, Hill and Marshall JJ; NACB v MIMIA [2003] FCAFC 235 per Tamberlin, Emmett and Weinberg JJ; W404/01A of 2002 v MIMIA [2003] FCAFC 255 per French, Lee and Carr JJ; NATC v MIMIA [2004] FCAFC 52 per Heerey, Sundberg and Crennan JJ; VWST v MIMIA [2004] FCAFC 286 per Kiefel, Marshall and Downes JJ, applying these principles. The question of whether there is evidence of a fact is a question of law and whether an inference can be drawn from facts is itself a question of law. In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Al-Miahi [2001] FCA 744 ; (2001) 65 ALD 141 , Sundberg, Emmett and Finkelstein JJ, said this: [34] The question whether there is any evidence of a particular fact is a question of law. Likewise, the question whether a particular inference can be drawn from facts found or agreed is a question of law. That is because, before the inference is drawn, there is a preliminary question as to whether the evidence reasonably admits a different conclusion. Accordingly, in the context of judicial review, the making of findings and the drawing of inferences in the absence of evidence is an error of law. On the other hand, there is no error of law simply in making a wrong finding of fact. Even if the reasoning whereby the court reached its conclusion of fact were demonstrably unsound, that would not amount to an error of law. A party does not establish an error of law by showing that the decision-maker inferred the existence of a particular fact by a faulty process, for example by engaging in an illogical course of reasoning. Thus, at common law, want of logic is not synonymous with error of law. So long as the particular inference is reasonably open, even if that inference appears to have been drawn as a result of illogical reasoning, there is no place for judicial review because no error of law has taken place.
Case: W404/01A of 2002 v MIMIA [2003] FCAFC 255
Outcome: cited
In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Epeabaka [1999] FCA 1 ; (1999) 84 FCR 411 , Black CJ, von Doussa and Carr JJ at [25] observed that want of logic in drawing an inference will not of itself constitute an error of law. Their Honours also noted, however, that a want of logic 'may sound a warning note to put one on inquiry whether there was indeed any basis for the inference drawn' : see also NAMM of 2002 v MIMIA [2003] FCAFC 32 per French, Lindgren and Finkelstein JJ; MIMIA v W306/01A [2003] FCAFC 208 per French, Hill and Marshall JJ; NACB v MIMIA [2003] FCAFC 235 per Tamberlin, Emmett and Weinberg JJ; W404/01A of 2002 v MIMIA [2003] FCAFC 255 per French, Lee and Carr JJ; NATC v MIMIA [2004] FCAFC 52 per Heerey, Sundberg and Crennan JJ; VWST v MIMIA [2004] FCAFC 286 per Kiefel, Marshall and Downes JJ, applying these principles. The question of whether there is evidence of a fact is a question of law and whether an inference can be drawn from facts is itself a question of law. In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Al-Miahi [2001] FCA 744 ; (2001) 65 ALD 141 , Sundberg, Emmett and Finkelstein JJ, said this: [34] The question whether there is any evidence of a particular fact is a question of law. Likewise, the question whether a particular inference can be drawn from facts found or agreed is a question of law. That is because, before the inference is drawn, there is a preliminary question as to whether the evidence reasonably admits a different conclusion. Accordingly, in the context of judicial review, the making of findings and the drawing of inferences in the absence of evidence is an error of law. On the other hand, there is no error of law simply in making a wrong finding of fact. Even if the reasoning whereby the court reached its conclusion of fact were demonstrably unsound, that would not amount to an error of law. A party does not establish an error of law by showing that the decision-maker inferred the existence of a particular fact by a faulty process, for example by engaging in an illogical course of reasoning. Thus, at common law, want of logic is not synonymous with error of law. So long as the particular inference is reasonably open, even if that inference appears to have been drawn as a result of illogical reasoning, there is no place for judicial review because no error of law has taken place.
Case: NATC v MIMIA [2004] FCAFC 52
Outcome: cited
In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Epeabaka [1999] FCA 1 ; (1999) 84 FCR 411 , Black CJ, von Doussa and Carr JJ at [25] observed that want of logic in drawing an inference will not of itself constitute an error of law. Their Honours also noted, however, that a want of logic 'may sound a warning note to put one on inquiry whether there was indeed any basis for the inference drawn' : see also NAMM of 2002 v MIMIA [2003] FCAFC 32 per French, Lindgren and Finkelstein JJ; MIMIA v W306/01A [2003] FCAFC 208 per French, Hill and Marshall JJ; NACB v MIMIA [2003] FCAFC 235 per Tamberlin, Emmett and Weinberg JJ; W404/01A of 2002 v MIMIA [2003] FCAFC 255 per French, Lee and Carr JJ; NATC v MIMIA [2004] FCAFC 52 per Heerey, Sundberg and Crennan JJ; VWST v MIMIA [2004] FCAFC 286 per Kiefel, Marshall and Downes JJ, applying these principles. The question of whether there is evidence of a fact is a question of law and whether an inference can be drawn from facts is itself a question of law. In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Al-Miahi [2001] FCA 744 ; (2001) 65 ALD 141 , Sundberg, Emmett and Finkelstein JJ, said this: [34] The question whether there is any evidence of a particular fact is a question of law. Likewise, the question whether a particular inference can be drawn from facts found or agreed is a question of law. That is because, before the inference is drawn, there is a preliminary question as to whether the evidence reasonably admits a different conclusion. Accordingly, in the context of judicial review, the making of findings and the drawing of inferences in the absence of evidence is an error of law. On the other hand, there is no error of law simply in making a wrong finding of fact. Even if the reasoning whereby the court reached its conclusion of fact were demonstrably unsound, that would not amount to an error of law. A party does not establish an error of law by showing that the decision-maker inferred the existence of a particular fact by a faulty process, for example by engaging in an illogical course of reasoning. Thus, at common law, want of logic is not synonymous with error of law. So long as the particular inference is reasonably open, even if that inference appears to have been drawn as a result of illogical reasoning, there is no place for judicial review because no error of law has taken place.
Case: VWST v MIMIA [2004] FCAFC 286
Outcome: cited
In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Epeabaka [1999] FCA 1 ; (1999) 84 FCR 411 , Black CJ, von Doussa and Carr JJ at [25] observed that want of logic in drawing an inference will not of itself constitute an error of law. Their Honours also noted, however, that a want of logic 'may sound a warning note to put one on inquiry whether there was indeed any basis for the inference drawn' : see also NAMM of 2002 v MIMIA [2003] FCAFC 32 per French, Lindgren and Finkelstein JJ; MIMIA v W306/01A [2003] FCAFC 208 per French, Hill and Marshall JJ; NACB v MIMIA [2003] FCAFC 235 per Tamberlin, Emmett and Weinberg JJ; W404/01A of 2002 v MIMIA [2003] FCAFC 255 per French, Lee and Carr JJ; NATC v MIMIA [2004] FCAFC 52 per Heerey, Sundberg and Crennan JJ; VWST v MIMIA [2004] FCAFC 286 per Kiefel, Marshall and Downes JJ, applying these principles. The question of whether there is evidence of a fact is a question of law and whether an inference can be drawn from facts is itself a question of law. In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Al-Miahi [2001] FCA 744 ; (2001) 65 ALD 141 , Sundberg, Emmett and Finkelstein JJ, said this: [34] The question whether there is any evidence of a particular fact is a question of law. Likewise, the question whether a particular inference can be drawn from facts found or agreed is a question of law. That is because, before the inference is drawn, there is a preliminary question as to whether the evidence reasonably admits a different conclusion. Accordingly, in the context of judicial review, the making of findings and the drawing of inferences in the absence of evidence is an error of law. On the other hand, there is no error of law simply in making a wrong finding of fact. Even if the reasoning whereby the court reached its conclusion of fact were demonstrably unsound, that would not amount to an error of law. A party does not establish an error of law by showing that the decision-maker inferred the existence of a particular fact by a faulty process, for example by engaging in an illogical course of reasoning. Thus, at common law, want of logic is not synonymous with error of law. So long as the particular inference is reasonably open, even if that inference appears to have been drawn as a result of illogical reasoning, there is no place for judicial review because no error of law has taken place.
Case: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Al-Miahi [2001] FCA 744 ; (2001) 65 ALD 141
Outcome: cited
In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Epeabaka [1999] FCA 1 ; (1999) 84 FCR 411 , Black CJ, von Doussa and Carr JJ at [25] observed that want of logic in drawing an inference will not of itself constitute an error of law. Their Honours also noted, however, that a want of logic 'may sound a warning note to put one on inquiry whether there was indeed any basis for the inference drawn' : see also NAMM of 2002 v MIMIA [2003] FCAFC 32 per French, Lindgren and Finkelstein JJ; MIMIA v W306/01A [2003] FCAFC 208 per French, Hill and Marshall JJ; NACB v MIMIA [2003] FCAFC 235 per Tamberlin, Emmett and Weinberg JJ; W404/01A of 2002 v MIMIA [2003] FCAFC 255 per French, Lee and Carr JJ; NATC v MIMIA [2004] FCAFC 52 per Heerey, Sundberg and Crennan JJ; VWST v MIMIA [2004] FCAFC 286 per Kiefel, Marshall and Downes JJ, applying these principles. The question of whether there is evidence of a fact is a question of law and whether an inference can be drawn from facts is itself a question of law. In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Al-Miahi [2001] FCA 744 ; (2001) 65 ALD 141 , Sundberg, Emmett and Finkelstein JJ, said this: [34] The question whether there is any evidence of a particular fact is a question of law. Likewise, the question whether a particular inference can be drawn from facts found or agreed is a question of law. That is because, before the inference is drawn, there is a preliminary question as to whether the evidence reasonably admits a different conclusion. Accordingly, in the context of judicial review, the making of findings and the drawing of inferences in the absence of evidence is an error of law. On the other hand, there is no error of law simply in making a wrong finding of fact. Even if the reasoning whereby the court reached its conclusion of fact were demonstrably unsound, that would not amount to an error of law. A party does not establish an error of law by showing that the decision-maker inferred the existence of a particular fact by a faulty process, for example by engaging in an illogical course of reasoning. Thus, at common law, want of logic is not synonymous with error of law. So long as the particular inference is reasonably open, even if that inference appears to have been drawn as a result of illogical reasoning, there is no place for judicial review because no error of law has taken place.
Case: Sleep v Repatriation Commission [2008] AATA 1100
Outcome: affirmed
applicant sought a review by the AAT of both those decisions. On 10 December 2008, in Sleep v Repatriation Commission [2008] AATA 1100 , the AAT made the following decision: The Repatriation Commission decision of 5 July 2004, as affirmed by a review officer on 10 August 2007, which reduced Mr Sleep's rate of service pension with effect from 20 July 2004 in reflection of an assets test which included the value of property at $140,000, is affirmed.