Case: Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321
Outcome: cited
Section 65 of the Act imposes an obligation on the Minister to grant a protection visa to an applicant if satisfied of particular matters. The satisfaction of the Minister is a condition precedent to that obligation. The delegate of the Minister is in the same position as the Minister. The Tribunal exercises all of the powers and discretions conferred on the decision-maker under the Act . By s 420 of the Act , the Tribunal in reviewing a decision, is not bound by technicalities, legal forms or rules of evidence and must act according to substantial justice and the merits of the case. In undertaking the review function, the Tribunal is to pursue the objective of providing a mechanism of review that is fair, just, economical, informal and quick. By s 424(1) , the Tribunal in conducting a review may obtain information that it considers relevant and must have regard to that information in making the decision on the review. Provisions which confer upon the Tribunal a capacity to inform itself by information it considers relevant and provisions which free the Tribunal from technicalities and the formal rules of evidence are, like s 33 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), facultative provisions ( Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21 ; (1999) 197 CLR 611 at 628 [49] per Gleeson CJ and McHugh J) although the extent of that freedom in any given case might be "another question" ( Eshetu at [49]). Nevertheless, the Tribunal must reach conclusions which have a basis in evidence having rational probative force ( Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Pochi [1980] FCA 85 ; (1980) 31 ALR 666 at 685 per Deane J; Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 at 367 per Deane J). 11 At common law, want of logic is not synonymous with error of law ( Bond , per Mason CJ at 356 with whom Brennan, Toohey and Gaudron JJ agreed) and, as to inferences : ... so long as there is some basis for an inference in other words, the particular inference is reasonably open even if that inference appears to have been drawn as a result of illogical reasoning, there is no place for judicial review because no error of law has taken place. [emphasis Mason CJ at p 356] 12 Where a statute requires the decision-maker to discharge particular duties, "irrationality of the kind described by Deane J in ( Bond ) may involve non-compliance with the duty" ( S20/2002 per Gleeson CJ at [9]). In the context of the particular statutory framework relating to protection visas under the Act and the role and duty of the Tribunal, Gummow and Hayne JJ with whom Gleeson CJ agreed, in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32 ; (2004) 207 ALR 12 observed at [38] that although the question of whether protection obligations relevantly arose included a consideration of factual matters, the critical question is whether the determination [by the Tribunal] was irrational, illogical and not based on findings or inferences of fact supported by logical grounds ... inadequacy of the material before the decision-maker concerning the attainment of that satisfaction is insufficient in itself to establish jurisdiction error. [my emphasis]