Discusión:Sensocentrismo

message: Traslado aquí, a continuación de la línea de asteriscos este párrafo que debe ser revisado y eventualmente corregido. En una revisión del original en inglés he encontrado que está 
entresacada obviando parte del texto, lo que la deja descontextualizada: no define solamente el sensocentrismo, sino que lo pone en comparación o contraste con otros planteamientos éticos que considera más amplios, por ejemplo, el biocentrismo, y plantea una reflexión. 
El texto original reza:
Anthropocentric environmental ethics bases concern for the nonhuman natural environment, including animals, on the benefits it provides  
humans. It treats only humans as of direct and intrinsic moral concern. Taking care of a pet or a park is done solely because it is useful to  umans. Anthropocentrism is often defended by appeals to biblical passages that give humans “dominion over . . . every living thing that moves upon the earth” (Genesis 1:28). In contrast, nonanthropocentric environmental ethics bases protection of the environment on its intrinsic  value. It conceives of nonhuman nature as important in ways that surpass its instrumental value to humans.  A sentiocentric environmental ethic holds that sentient creatures—those who can feel and perceive—are morally important in their own right. Some of the best-known  defenders of animals accept this environmental ethic, including Peter Singer. Because it is likely that only vertebrate animals—mammals, birds, fish, amphibians, and reptiles— consciously feel and perceive, a sentiocentric environmental ethic treats nonvertebrate nature as solely of instrumental value for sentient creatures. Such an ethic protects trees and ecosystems, for example, not for their own sake, but 
because they provide habitat and other benefits for sentient creatures.  Sentiocentrism breaks down the boundaries of the traditional human-only moral club and is likely to have radical implications for animal agriculture, animal experimentation, hunting, and other human uses of animals. Nonetheless, from the perspective of a broader  Ethics environmental ethic, sentiocentrism is but a small modification of the traditional, human-centered ethic. It extends moral concern beyond humans only to our closest cousins, the sentient animals, and it
denies direct moral concern for 99 percent of living beings on the planet, as well as species and ecosystems. Sentiocentrists
respond that it makes no sense to care directly about trees or ecosystems for their own sake because they don’t matter to themselves, and experiencing and pursuing one’s own good is what brings into the world the kind of value that we ought to directly morally consider.
Biocentric environmental ethics views all living beings as worthy of direct moral concern. Biocentrists contend that although
plants and invertebrate animals do not have preferences, they nonetheless have benefits of their own that we should morally consider. Although a tree does not care if its roots are crushed by a bulldozer, crushed roots are still bad for the tree, and not just for the  homeowner who wants its shade, or for the squirrel whose nest is there. Insentient living beings have a welfare of their own that should be part of direct environmental concern. Albert Schweitzer’s reverence-for-life ethic is an example of biocentrism.  Ecocentric environmental ethics holds that entire species and ecosystems are morally important in their own right. Ecocentrists reject the idea that only individuals,
for example, a particular animal or plant, are appropriate objects of direct moral concern. They believe that whole ecosystems and species are intrinsically valuable, not simply the individuals in them. Aldo Leopold’s concern to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community is an example of an ecocentric ethic. These broader environmental ethics view concern for animals as only a first step toward extending moral concern beyond humans to include the natural, nonhuman environment. This
broadening of concern creates conflict.
For example, hunters and fishermen can
show great ecocentric concern for the perpetuation
of species and ecosystems while
placing little or no moral value on the
lives and welfare of individual animals.
Conversely, defenders of sentient animals
can have great concern for the well-being
of individual animals while placing little
or no direct moral value on the protection
of plants, the perpetuation of species, or
the preservation of ecosystems.
These conflicts are not simply theoretical.
Feral goats have been shot to protect
rare plants. Conservation of endangered
species like the California condor often
involves captive breeding programs that
harm individuals for the sake of the species.
Preservation of ecosystems often
calls for the elimination of exotics, as
when lake trout introduced into Yellowstone
Lake are poisoned to protect the integrity
of the ecosystem. Restoration of
ecosystems sometimes involves bringing
back predators. This not only disrupts the
lives of the predators, but puts responsibility
for the suffering of their prey in the
hands of humans.
Broader environmental ethics and animal
ethics may also diverge on the alleviation
of animal suffering in the wild.
Some defenders of animals say that only
human-induced suffering and death are
bad things that should be prevented. It
is human violation of animal rights that
needs to be prevented, not natural suffering
and death in the wild. 
However, if one believes that animal rights are logically analogous to human rights, then humans are responsible for failing to assist an animal in distress, just as we are culpable when we fail to assist a human in distress. Equal Consideration | 223 The worry that a consistent commitment to protect the lives and welfare of animals would involve massive human intervention into natural systems has led some to claim that defenders of animals cannot be environmentalists.
Se encuentra en las páginas 264 a 266 del documento. 
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En la primera edición de la Encyclopedia of Animal Rights and Animal Welfare (Enciclopedia de Derechos Animales y Bienestar Animal), editada por Marc Bekoff y Carron A. Meaney, se explica el sensocentrismo de la siguiente manera:
 	
 
También se puede encontrar la definición de sensocentrismo en la segunda edición de la Encyclopedia of Animal Rights and Animal Welfare (Enciclopedia de Derechos Animales y Bienestar Animal), pags.221-222http://www.politicalavenue.com/PDF/Encyclopedia%20of%20Animal%20Rights%20and%20Animal%20Welfare%20%5B%20POLITICALAVENUEdotCOM%20%5D.pdf
Cock Sparrow (discusión) 08:06 30 jun 2017 (UTC)
thread_title:  Supuesta definición 

message: Las «críticas» al sensocentrismo no son críticas a este, sino a posturas derivadas del mismo. La base, tanto «bienestarista» como «abolicionista», es el sensocentrismo, que sostiene la «sintiencia» como la base de la consideración moral (la base, y no, por tanto, las valoraciones y consecuencias morales derivadas de la misma, como lo serían las dos a las que las críticas van referidas: el «bienestarismo» y el «abolicionismo»). Por tanto, las críticas derivadas a las cuestiones sustantivas del sensocentrismo no son críticas al fundamento, sino a las interpretaciones morales que derivan del mismo. Así, el sensocentrismo trata de dar un punto de partida, y, a su vez, argumentar el porqué la vida «sintiente» debe ser considerada moralmente. Sin embargo, establecer si la ética debe ser aplicada desde un punto de vista deontológico o utilitarista, es una interpretación dada a posteriori del reconocimiento del fundamento, y, por tanto, constituyen interpretaciones del mismo. 
«Proponentes del veganismo y de la liberación animal y el antiespecismo han criticado al sensocentrismo por su abierto utilitarismo». Esto parte de una premisa errónea: el sensocentrismo carece de perspectiva inherente, no tan solo utilitarista, sino tampoco deontológica. El sensocentrismo no dictamina ni trata de esclarecer un bien y un mal de acuerdo a unos principios, sino que trata de establecer dicho principio, fundamental, como punto de partida, basándose en una serie de datos (biológicos, fisiológicos, psicológicos), supuestamente «empíricos» (y en relación con esta cuestión podrían ir encaminadas las verdaderas críticas al sensocentrismo), y acordes al preestablecido orden moral que rige la sociedad: la consideración moral de los «humanos». 
En conclusión, las críticas a las dos posturas mencionadas deberían hacerse en sus respectivos artículos, o, de lo contrario, indicarse como lo que son: críticas a las dos principales «vertientes» o cuestiones sustantivas al sensocentrismo. Y, las verdaderas críticas al sensocentrimo deberían responder a preguntas como: ¿qué es la sintiencia?, ¿por qué importa?, ¿qué es un ser sintiente?, ¿cómo se llega a tal conclusión?, etc.  Ivanmarribas (discusión) 13:58 23 ene 2024 (UTC)
thread_title:  Las «críticas» al sensocentrismo no son críticas hacia este