Talk:Battle of Kresna Gorge

message: The fact that the greek army was in the edge of annihilation is the bulgarian POV. In greek histroiography the battle of Kresna is seen as a victory, during which all bulgarian attacks were repulsed, with the greek army eventually dominating the battlefield.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by Xristar (talk • contribs) 23:01, 12 March 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: Thanks for your remark, I pasted it into the article. If you have references for it, or additional information, please add it! Preslav (talk) 18:06, 21 March 2008 (UTC)
thread_title: Untitled

message: Dates do not match up.  According to text in the article, this battle " ... went for ten days and took place between the 29th July and the 7th August 1913."  Then, according to the Campaign Box, this battle was fought "8 July–18 July 1913."  Does anyone know what is correct?  Mkpumphrey (talk) 18:42, 24 October 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: Most of the confusion in dates arises from the fact that the Balkan countries still used the Julian Calendar back then, so there is a difference of 13 days. By that reckoning, the battle began on the 10th, when the Greek army entered Kresna Gorge, and the armistice was signed on the 18th of July. Seehere for details & New Style reckoning. Cheers, Constantine   ✍  19:39, 24 October 2008 (UTC)
replies: text:  Here is the other side of the story in short according to the Bulgarian sources .The operation placed the greek army in a very critical position with both its flanks under severe pressure by the advancing units. They say that the Greek attack in the centre forced the Bulgarians to retreat to new positions north of what is now Blagoevgrad on 14th of July where fresh reinforcments of the First army were begining to arrive. On the next day the Greek army tried to advance in the direction of Blagoevgrad but was pinned down by superior artillery fire, the same thing happened on the 16th and the Greeks were never able to get closer more than 3-4 kilometres to the main Bulgarian positions. On that day general Ivanov was replaced with general Kutinchev who ordered the attacks on the flanks to begin.  Bulgarians on the right flank  and on the 16th of june were continuing the advance while the Greek army was forced to sent its 7th division and parts of ts 6th division to halt the Bulgarian advance on the other flank. On the 17th of June those forces managed to hald the Bulgarian Rodopski detachment and drive it back some 2 kilometres however when they did that their flank was exposed to the other Bulgarian unit which was advancing in this sector the Samokov detachment and as a result the greeks were forced to stop. On the 18th the Bulgarian units were preparing to continue the offensive when the news about the armistice arrived and the army was ordered to cease hostilities.It must be noted that Bulgarian delegates in Bucharest were left unaware of the things happening in Kresna otherwise they wouldn't have accepted the armistice.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by Avidius (talk • contribs) 10:51, 25 May 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: By CMELLAS--You are talking in generalities without presenting the positions of the opposing armies in any detail that can be cross checked. Price's details have been verified against the Telegrams of the Greek headquarters to the fighting units and the Divisional reports of the Greek army. Can you give me the actual names of the locations for the events you are describing? Do you seriously believe that your negotiators at Bucharest did not know the initial successes of your army in Kresna? The only thing I could believe is that the might have been left unaware of the reversals that your army suffered in the closing days of the battle of Kresna. That I could believe if I did not know that in fact the Bulgarian negotiators were briefed on the exact situation at Kresna only hours before they signed the agreement, and it is this reversal that forced them drop their demands on Kavala, which was saved from the Bulgarians. 63.209.227.248 (talk) 14:57, 25 May 2009 (UTC)

text:  I am looking W.H. Crawfurd Prices's "The Balkan Cockpit." Book right now and the first thing I notice is that it is centred entirely on Greek operations in both wars and written mostly in Greek bias especially the last Chapter XXIX called "Bulgarian Atrocities" while leaving out the Greek atrocities.If anyone wants to know about the attrocities they should read  the Carnegie Endowment Inquiry . So I hardly  think "The Balkan Cockpit"  is usefull for much.--Avidius (talk) 11:15, 25 May 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: By CMELLAS - Of course you would thing that Price is not "useful" to your propaganda, because it exposes it. But the fact remains that Price was following the Greek headquarters at the time as a foreign correspondent and he was definitely in better position to describe the situation contemporaneously and admittedly with enough details to make his account very credible, especially when one compares the texts of the orders that emanated from the Greek General Headquarters Staff with the actions described by Price. As for the credibility of the Carnegie Endowment Inquiry, that is a different subject altogether. Needless to say that the Carnegie Comity was biased from the very beginning, and therefore was not suctioned by the Greek side. Their report, at best, does not contain any material coming from the Greek side.63.209.227.248 (talk) 14:57, 25 May 2009 (UTC)
thread_title: Cuffs do not match the collar

message: If we have to admit the truth, in the western part of the front the Bulgarian troops were exhausted and defeated, representing no more threat for the the Greek's left by 17th, as their last attack shown. Not even failed to make any progress but they broke and lost their nerve abandoning their line together with Berovo the key town of the area. Their unexpected broke was a surprise even for the Greek units of the area since only in the next day realized that after the attack Bulgarians failed to withhold even their previous line and that had abandon it together with Berovo. Greeks had send cavalry next day to try to establish contact with the Bulgarians which were nowhere to seen. I believe that their rout is a strong evidence of their over-exhaustion. After 10 days the Bulgarian effort was starting to shown signs of physical tiredness. The troops were not anymore capable of attacking whether their HQ had realized it or not. To me after 17th the Bulgarian army in the west part of front was at best only capable for defense. But I don't believe that either the Greek III & X Divisions were in position to serious counterattack them as the abandonment of the town (Berovo) shown next day. 
The interesting to me is what the Bulgarian HQ was thinking to do with their central front which was by all evidence ready to collapse. Since most of their other units where heavily engaged in their sides. Maybe to make truce as soon as possible. But since the truce came before the collapse, nobody in Bulgaria will admit it, then and possibly now. In sort the Bulgarian plan was good as an idea but the forces to facilitate the directives where simply not enough and for that not the troops nor the truce were responsible. They clearly lacked the necessary forces to close the trap from the south and that was the real problem with it. As it turned out even their side-forces lacked the critical mass to decisive bend their opponent sides. The apple was to big for the available mouth and at the end was in the danger to broke.--Factuarius (talk) 14:23, 25 May 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: CMELLAS - Hi Factuarius. You left me a comment somewhere else, but I can't find the place to answer, so permit me to answer here. I consider Richard Hall's book biased towards the Bulgarian POV, and that is exactly the message I was trying to convey. I think saying that the Bulgarians won the battle of Kresna is a grave injustice. We owe it to the brave men who fought and many died in that god forsaken place called Kresna to tell the story of their triumph. When lesser men would have turned and run toward safer lines, they attacked and beat the Bulgarians. The Idea the the Bulgarian emissaries would've not have signed the truce had they known the situation at Kresna is laughable. It is clear from the proceedings that it was they that were begging for a truce. The pressure by Carol of Romania was on Venizelos to convince Konstantine to agree with the ceasefire. In fact, Venizelos analyzed the situation at Kresna only hours before the treaty was signed, and as a result, he threatened the Bulgarians that if they insisted on wanting Kavala as a price to sign the treaty of Bucharest, that the operations at Kresna would have to decide the final outcome. 63.209.227.248 (talk) 15:36, 25 May 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: I am only telling you what the Bulgarian sources  think but affcourse If your friend here believes his sources are better just because they are Greek then he surely is  right.--Avidius (talk) 18:41, 25 May 2009 (UTC)

text: Please calm down everyone. This is not the place to debate whose grandfathers were the greatest, OK? Clearly the battle ended in an effective stalemate, before any decision could be reached. Therefore anyone can believe whatever one prefers, as always with history's "what ifs". I remind you that this is a place about facts, so let's stick to them. The facts are, the Bulgarians had relocated much of their army, and had engaged the Greek army in a very tough fight, but the Greeks, as of the armistice, were holding their ground and launching local counter-attacks. Bulgarian sources indicate that they held back the Greek counter-strikes and threatened their flanks, Greek sources that their own offensive was proceeding well. Another fact is, I've read from Greek historians (admittedly Venizelists, so not sympathetic to Constantine and therefore biased), that the Greek Army's position was certainly not as rosy as some later accounts make it, especially in Manousogiannakis' sector (he is reported to have told Constantine to seek an armistice, otherwise they would indeed enter Sofia, but with "bells hung around our necks"). Bear in mind, the Greek army had been advancing and fighting since the war began, and was at the end of a rather long supply line. This does not belittle the courage or bravery of the Greek soldiers, just the opposite, but it has to be taken into account. Anyway, I think Hall's somewhat prematurely triumphalist "Cannae-style annihilation" (the very phrasing is a clear indication of where his sympathies lie, IMO) ought to be removed. I propose that the outcome be also changed to "tactical stalemate brought about by truce". Then we can discuss as to a more neutral presentation of the whole battle, OK? Regards, Constantine   ✍  19:14, 25 May 2009 (UTC)
replies: text:  Tacticly the battle may have been inconclusive but did it have a significant impact on the Greek side wanting to sign the armistice?--Avidius (talk) 19:27, 25 May 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: Quite possibly, if by "Greek side", you mean the King. Venizelos for one had been pressuring for it for days, but it was certainly the toughness of the Kresna battle that convinced Constantine to assent. On the other hand, one could argue that Constantine, knowing that he could accept the armistice whenever he wanted to (with the Romanians poised to advance on Sofia, there was not much choice for the Bulgarian government), chose to try and win an all-out victory, but miscalculated. At any rate, strategically, the war had been decided way before Kresna. Constantine   ✍  19:39, 25 May 2009 (UTC)

text: What I am telling you Avidius is that I don't want both of us to go back in an unpleasant climate that leading to nowhere. I just told my opinion and took yours. Trying both of us to play the oracle in a battle that never ended is just pointless whatever I will say and whatever you will say. I never tried to persuade you that Greeks wined a never ended battle because I finding it ridiculous. You are the guy who everywhere the battle is mentioning have put "Bulgarian victory" in the info boxes. Even the most nationalist Bulgarians of that era, even Hall are not agreeing with you saying at least that they WILL WIN the battle. You are insisting that they win it. Must I agree with you? Allow me at least to agree with the ultra nationalists around Ferdinand who where so sad to lose the opportunity to win the battle. But I really believe that a never ended battle is by definition inconclusive not a win for anyone. You disagree. All we have to do is to start delete his other entry or to leave the article in that ridiculous form in which the texts saying that was inconclusive and the infoboxes that was a Bulgarian victory. --Factuarius (talk) 19:56, 25 May 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: Oh really I have some news for you I am not the one who wrote this article and the two of us have never before discussed this battle so there is no way I could have claimed Bulgarian victory and Hall clearly says that the battle was a success for the Bulgarians but you  read his book like the Devil reads the Bible so i will leave you to your convictions now that I have been found to be the "greatest nationalist in history" according to you.--Avidius (talk) 20:29, 25 May 2009 (UTC)

text:  You can't compare yourself to Hall and are in no position to tell us which statement made by profesional historians is a "lie" . As for the rest back then I was undoing unexplained edits of something that had existed for a long time and for Cannae I said that the army "faced a Cannae-style defeat" and for people like you I will explain that it means the army was threatened with encirclement which is true even if you don't like it. But continue to exaggerate other peoples words at least we  see who is more nationalistic around here.--Avidius (talk) 21:06, 25 May 2009 (UTC)
replies: text:  It is quite obvious that under "lie" you mean Hall because this article was originally based on his book as were many of the other articles and it is him who I've used in the past so you are calling him a lier and it is not your first time you do so. So spare me your accusations.--Avidius (talk) 21:29, 25 May 2009 (UTC)

text:  And for a third time you are calling Hall and perhaps all the Bulgarian historiography a lie well forgive me for not  regarding Greek sources which you  extensively use higher then the rest.And I have never accused you of being a probulgarian agitator so stop making up things.With that said I eagerly await what other univesal truths you will produce in the near future.--Avidius (talk) 21:55, 25 May 2009 (UTC)

text:  I am not familiar with this Melas and you can wait as long s you like but I am done for now.--Avidius (talk) 22:10, 25 May 2009 (UTC)

text: Can we please stop calling each other names? And can we please go back to the issue? To sum up, Avidius, would you agree to what I proposed before ("tactical stalemate brought about by truce" etc?)? If not, what do you propose? Constantine   ✍  23:00, 25 May 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: OK--Avidius (talk) 12:17, 26 May 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: Good, I am changing it now. If I may also suggest, let's take a couple of days off to calm down, and then see whether we can edit/expand the article to a more informative and mutually acceptable form. Regards to all. Constantine   ✍  17:14, 26 May 2009 (UTC)

text:  I am yet to see a source that says that any part of the Bulgarian forces was threatened with destructuon on the contrary most sources indicate the Greek army was in the worse position.--Avidius (talk) 15:01, 27 May 2009 (UTC)
replies: text:  Hi Avidius, Please see below for at least two sorces. 63.209.227.248 (talk) 15:57, 27 May 2009 (UTC)

text: To me the map is imaginative, the starting line of Greek army is wrong (the Nigrita f.i. was in Greek hands) and the glorious arrows around Kresna took place only in the dreams of the Bulgarian HQ. CMELLAS welcome back, what you say is 100% corrected by the very-very analytic 1932 edition of the war study of the Greek Army by dates and hours which I have in my hands. I also read Prices' book which is a real document --Factuarius (talk) 16:06, 27 May 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: Hi Factuarius. Thanks for the correction. I only reviewed the positions of the Greek and Bulgarian armies on the map at the closing days of the Second Balkan War, and even though is very rough, it is basically ok. Of course the "glorious arrows" never came even close to materialize. Could you give me the reference to the 1932 edition of the Greek Army study? Thanks, C. Mellas, 63.209.227.248 (talk) 16:22, 27 May 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: Hi Avidius, I think the point of the passage you are referring to is that the Bulgarian back was broken before Romania entered the war. There is no doubt that Bulgaria was much superior Militarily that any one of the other combatants alone, but as the battle of Bregnalitza and Kilkis-Doiran proved, Bulgaria was not strong enough to take up Greece and Serbia together, never mind if we add Romania and Turkey into the mix. I think you would agree that a lot of live were lost in the mountain passes of Pirin and that if Venizelos had his way, the second Balkan war would have never happened. Regards, C. Mellas. 63.209.227.248 (talk) 17:30, 27 May 2009 (UTC)
replies: text:  You will allow me to disagree on that matter as the battles of Kalimantsi and this battle clearly showed that the Bulgarian army was far from beaten and also when we look at the troop numbers which Factuarius claims are the real ones it seem the Bulgarian army was bigger then the Serbian and greek Army put toghether.--Avidius (talk) 17:35, 27 May 2009 (UTC)

text:  Hi Avidius, I look forward to your "order of battle." The only danger is that I may quote you. Thank you in advance. C. Mellas. 63.209.227.248 (talk) 17:42, 27 May 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: "Ο Ελληνικός Στρατός κατά τους Βαλκανικούς Πολέμους του 1912 - 1913", Τόμος Γ', Επιχειρήσεις κατά των Βουλγάρων (Εθνικό Τυπογραφείο Αθήναι 1932). σελίδες 512 έχω και τον πρώτο τόμο που είναι οι χάρτες του Α' Βαλκανικού αλλά όχι τον Β' που είναι οι επιχειρήσεις του Α' Βαλκανικού. Είναι εξαιρετική έκδοση και πολύ σπάνια. Έχω την εντύπωση ότι είσαι εκτός Ελλάδας, εάν βρεθείς κατά τα δω θα χαρώ να σου το δώσω να βγάλεις μια σειρά. Ενδιάμεσα είμαι στη διάθεση σου για οποιαδήποτε πληροφορία από το βιβλίο. Κατά τ' άλλα καλή δύναμη και κουράγιο. --Factuarius (talk) 17:24, 27 May 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: Σε ευχαριστώ φίλε Factuarius. Γράφω από την Βοστόνη των Η.Π. Θα σου γράψω όταν είναι να πάω για Αθήνα να τα πούμε από κοντά. Χαιρετίσματα, Χ. Μελλάς  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 63.209.227.248 (talk) 17:38, 27 May 2009 (UTC)

text: Hi Avidius, Of course the Greeks were eager to stop. Especially the front line units. Also Venizelos, on his way to Bucharest, stooped by the Greek headquarters and tried to convince King Konstantine, who new that with International pressure mounting the ceasefire was near. But make no mistake, The Greeks left the battlefield victorious. Regards, C. Mellas.63.209.227.248 (talk) 18:05, 27 May 2009 (UTC)
replies: text:  Oh really so perhaps you want to write Greek victory in the infobox. Sorry but the only reason the Greek troops were eager to stop fighting was because they feared defeat not victory unlike the Bulgarians who it seems were not in a hurry to sent truce envoys of their own.--Avidius (talk) 18:11, 27 May 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: Hi Avidius, I’m not going to even try to change your mind. Your personal beliefs are yours to cherish and keep. But, I presented enough evidence here to justify my request to either remove the sentence following content:
“In the pass of Kresna the Greeks were ambushed by the Bulgarian 2nd and 1st Army newly arrived from the Serbian front that had already taken defensive positions there. By 30 July the Greek army outnumbering by the now counterattaking Bulgarian Armies was facing a defeat in a Cannae-type battle.[1]” 
Clearly, the Greeks were not ambushed in Kresna, and the Bulgarians never came even close to the Kresna pass to endanger the Greeks with encirclement. 
In the box itself I propose that we replace “Stalemate brought about by truce” with “Battle stopped as a result of the armistice” and leave it at that.
I don’t think it is productive to be discussing anecdotal evidence from either side as to who was eager to stop the battle and why, when Sophia was at the mercy of you northern Neighbor and you did not have a single battalion to oppose it. My personal opinion though is that the Greeks had nothing more to gain in that war, and it was not necessary to continue the bleeding. 
C.Mellas.
63.209.227.248 (talk) 18:49, 27 May 2009 (UTC)

text: How many opposite cases you want to give you I have plenty. I never thought to made use of them because in such chaotic situation I found it natural. But I don't want to continue.--Factuarius (talk) 18:02, 27 May 2009 (UTC)
replies: text:  And who is answering to me. Whoever he is it will be nice if he learns to sign his post.--Avidius (talk) 17:58, 27 May 2009 (UTC)

text: Well, if Hall is accused of unreliability and bias because he makes little use of Greek sources and is sympathetic to the Bulgarians, then this should apply to Crawford Price as well, since I doubt he made use of any Bulgarian source, and spending the war in the Greek GHQ undoubtedly coloured his views. There are always many ways to view an event, and a battle where both sides claim victory is certain to keep discussion going. Again, the resume from the whole story is: the Bulgarians planned a pincer movement, but, until the armistice, the Greek army was resisting successfully and even counter-attacking at places. The amount of headway they were making is disputed, but in the event  unimportant. Both sides were fighting each other to a standstill. What could have happened if it had gone on for a few more days is debatable (the Greeks breaking through, Bulgarian reinforcements arriving, etc), but not historical. I too object to the Cannae-reference in the text, simply because of this: one may plan a Cannae-type battle, and position his forces accordingly, but unless and until the forces actually manage to encircle the enemy, it remains a plan. E.g. Schlieffen planned a Cannae-type battle on a massive scale in WWI, but it failed at Marne. If an armistice had been called then and there, with the Germans deep inside France, no one would then claim that the French army was being threatened by a "Cannae-style envelopment". Constantine   ✍  18:40, 27 May 2009 (UTC)
replies: text:  Ok Cplakidas perhaps it can be replaced with something like the Bulgarians planned a Cannae style battle instead of the Greek army faced a Cannae style defeat. What is your opinion on the Romanian intervention because Mr.Mellas is very eager to convince me that it was alomost irrelevant for the outcome of the war.--Avidius (talk) 18:56, 27 May 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: Hi Avidius, On the contrary I believe the fact that Romania entered the war sealed the fate of Bulgaria. That is an indisputable fact. What could have happened if Romania did not enter the war is mere speculation on anyone’s part. Putting Cassavetti’s or Prices speculations on the article would be just as valid as putting Hall’s ridiculous statements. That is my point, and that is why I insist that we either take out Hall’s statement or include Prices and Cassavety’s statement.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 63.209.227.248 (talk) 19:08, 27 May 2009 (UTC)

text: The Greeks were reluctant to sign armistice with Bulgaria and after Romania intervened in the war that became the Bulgarian goal and with the battle of Kresna Gorge our Command forced the Greeks to accept the armistice. Otherwise Bulgaria's enemies preferred to dictate the peace in Sofia. And somewhere here I read that the Bulgarian army was defeated in the west but that is not true at all. The Serbs were defeated at Kalimantsi and there were Bulgarian troops to the north on the border with Serbia who had previously led indecisive actions against the Serbs and were intact. With the battle of Gresna Gorge the Bulgarian army achieved its goal so it should be marked as a Bulgarian victory especially when that was sourced. --Gligan (talk) 10:22, 29 May 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: Gligan, please read the discussions above. Hall and the Bulgarians say one thing, the Greeks another. Both sides claim victory, but the battle was never resolved. At the moment of armistice, both armies were still standing and fighting. Please do not unilaterally revert an arduously reached consensus. Constantine   ✍  10:29, 29 May 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: What consensus. The Bulgarians say the we haven't lost the battle of Kukush because our aim was to retreat to more favourable positions as the Bulgarian army actually did. The Greeks consider that battle for being a great victory which is not true and they push that POV and now you are talking for consensus. --Gligan (talk) 10:33, 29 May 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: The consensus that was reached between three Greek users and a Bulgarian user, namely that no result was actually reached at the battle, because the armistice interveneed. As for the battle of Kilkis/Kukush (which is not the point here) may be presented in whatever way you wish, but there was a battle, against heavily fortified positions, and the Greeks were left in possession of the field. To me, that counts as victory. Kresna would have been a Bulgarian victory had the Greeks retreated, or if the Bulgarians had managed to isolate and destroy a part of the Greek army. That did not happen. it was a brutal slogging match which (thank God) was ended by the armistice. But at the time, both sides held their positions. Constantine   ✍  10:40, 29 May 2009 (UTC)
thread_title: Just an opinion

message: Let me explain this change. The Romanians were in the vicinity of Sofia already on July 10. However Constantine continued to push north until July 15 - the time when the Bulgarians attacked his flanks and forced him to halt the advance on Gorna Dzhumaya. So the Romanian factor was not decisive for the Greek actions (the Russian diplomacy neither, by the way). On the other hand, Constantine's telegram to Venizelos from July 16/17 is pretty well known to scholars. --85.130.31.181 (talk) 22:01, 28 June 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: I think that you have not given any justification for the changes your have made to the entry. In particular, you quoted three words from a telegram that King Constantine sent to Venizelos, but you are not giving any source where we can read the telegram and the associated analysis, rather, you just make innuendos. This is not a way to write an encyclopedic entry. In edition, you are disregarding the entire discussion earlier. Please provide any documentation you have, otherwise a lot of your entries will have to be reverted. Thank you in advance for your cooperation. Acstamos (talk) 16:15, 8 January 2013 (UTC)
thread_title:  Romanians at Sofia and the King's telegram to Venizelos 

message: To me it is crystal clear, that all articles on the Second Balkan War and even the First Balkan War are written by pro-Greek authors, quoting pro-Greek sources. Even the main article about the FBW shows the Bulgarians in very negative shades. The problem is that most sources defend the pro Entente forces (Serbia and Greece) and of course, the winning side. If you look even at the size of the Greek army it is visible, that it cannot be of any concern for the Bulgarians, especially after is is already on Bulgarian territory and after the Serbs are stopped at Kalimantsi. Quoting Greek telegrams as an official source is ridiculous. I last checked this article about 2 years ago and the battle for Kresna Gorge was listed as stalemate. Now it turns out that Greek forces have entered Gorna Dzhumaya (Blagoevgrad). I fear that in 2 years I will see quotes from Greek generals claiming they have captured Sofia and are advancing towards Varna.
I realize that the Bulgarian sources cannot be impartial and show its army in the best light possible, but they also show the mistakes and the mention some facts, which might be misinterpreted. Have some dignity and accept the weaknesses of the Greek state at the time, after all back then things were quite different.  
BraikoT  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 212.122.187.76 (talk) 09:32, 4 August 2014 (UTC)
thread_title: Greek point of view