Talk:Maginot Line

message: Thinking of rewriting the leading sentence as follows:
The Maginot Line (French: Ligne Maginot, IPA: [liɲ maʒino]) was a line of concrete fortifications, weapon installations, and obstacles that France constructed during the 1930's.  The line was a response to France's experience in World War I, was constructed during the run-up to World War II, and was named after the then French Minister of War, André Maginot.  It was intended to fortify France against invasion from Germany, Switzerland, and Luxembourg, although German forces ultimately found ways about it.  
That final sentence might be replaced with the ultimate fate of the line, it becoming surrounded by German forces and ultimately surrendering at the order of Maxime Weygand.
Thoughts?  — Preceding unsigned comment added by Walter422 (talk • contribs) 19:16, 20 November 2016 (UTC)
thread_title:  Rewrite of leading sentence 

message: #"Especially to do not removes sources": Mea Culpa. For whatever reasons, the second definition did not appear when I looked at the website earlier (most likely due to the limited internet connection at this work location).
#"Having failed in its purpose...": 
*1) Based off what I can see ("Definition of Maginot Line: 1 :a line of defensive fortifications built before World War II to protect the eastern border of France but easily outflanked by German invaders; 2 :a defensive barrier or strategy that inspires a false sense of security") the citation does not reflect that the line "failed its purpose".
*2) How did it fail in its purpose? What source or inline citation supports the notion that it failed? One will note that the entire section on the Battle of France and the aftermath does not pass judgment on the line, and to boot are mostly un-sourced. The dictionary definition does not attribute the line to be a failure; unless you are basing this off "easily outflanked by German invaders", which is a stretch and inferring meaning (and RS point out, being outflanked was the entire point of the line).
The article (which is unsourced in this respect) states: 
{{quotebox|*To avoid a surprise attack and to give the French an alarm
*To cover the mobilisation of the French Army (which took between two and three weeks)
*To save manpower (France counted 39 million inhabitants, Germany 70 million)
*To protect Alsace and Lorraine (returned to France in 1918) and their industrial basin
*To be used as a basis for a counter-offensive
*To push the enemy to circumvent it while passing by Switzerland or Belgium
*To hold the enemy while the main army could be brought up to reinforce the line
*To show non-aggressive posture, and compel the British to help France if Germany invaded Belgium
*To push Belgium into the war, by leaving it open to an attack from Germany|}
The French were not surprised, mobilized successfully, the line was used as the basis for the limited offensive into Germany, it deterred the main German assault being across the French border, and it forced the Germans to move around the barrier (the fact that the Germans hoodwinked the French in Benelux is not the lines fault). The lede, in this respect, contradicts the main body of the article.
Per RS, such as Jackson, Julian (2003), The Fall of France: The Nazi Invasion of 1940 pp. 30 ff. the point of the line was to deter a cross-border assault, funnel the main German attack around the barrier that would allow the best divisions of the French Army to engage it on foreign soil. Your retort "Agree it's purpose was to funnel the Germans to attack through Belgium, not through Lux and Ardennes. Thus, Fail" is just semantics. You agree with the purpose, yet call it achieving its purpose a fail. You have even reverted an attempt to reword it to avoid controversy, or to even match up with what the source and article states.66.77.160.179 (talk) 16:03, 25 October 2017 (UTC)
replies: text: Is this any different in substance from the discussion just above?  I don't see how consensus here could be different from any consensus there.  Let's not duplicate all the evidence and arguments.  Please either make the very notable distinction of this subject clear, or take this (just sources and quick points) to the existing discussion above.  --A D Monroe III(talk)  16:23, 25 October 2017 (UTC)
thread_title:  Having failed in its purpose... 

message: *The paragraph sourced to "Nichols, Kenneth D. (1987). The Road to Trinity: A Personal Account of How America's Nuclear Policies Were Made. New York: William Morrow and Company. ISBN 0-688-06910-X". Google Books has two copies online (1 and 2). I was unable to locate any pages or index references that mention the Maginot Line, Metz, or General Brousseau. If anyone has access to this source, please insert the correct page numbers into the article.
*Likewise: Zaloga, Steven J. (June 2010). Operation Nordwind 1945: Hitler's Last Offensive in the West. Osprey Publishing. 96 pages;  A page needed tag has been there since March 2013. Copy online does not include page numbers, and it would seem the paragraph is based off several pages (some of which are not included).
*Ambrose: the isbn provided was, per the OCLC, for the 2016 edition that was printed in London (not NY per the article; not sure if that is a minor detail). Updated the info, but we need to ensure that the page number is correct due to the edition vagueness.
*Cain, Not Forgetting James Bond; likewise. What page number? No previews at present on Google Books.
*The first two paragraphs on "Planning and Construction" are not sourced, and the emphasis on Marshal Joffre as the leading proponent may be misleading. It currently reads:
::The defences were first proposed by Marshal Joseph Joffre. He was opposed by modernists such as Paul Reynaud and Charles de Gaulle, who favoured investment in armour and aircraft. Joffre had support from Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain,
:Contrast this with the article by Robert Wilde on Thoughtco.com:
::The Two Schools of Defense
::The first school, whose main exponent was Marshall Joffre, wanted large quantities of troops based in a line of small, heavily defended areas from which counter-attacks could be launched against anyone advancing through the gaps. The second school, led by Pétain, advocated a long, deep, and constant network of fortifications which would militarize a large area of the eastern border and hark back to the Hindenburg line. ... In 1922, the recently promoted Minister for War began to develop a compromise, based largely on the Pétain model; this new voice was André Maginot.
:Further, there is no mention of the Maginot Line in the Wikipedia article on Joseph Joffre but an extensive discussion in the article on Philippe Petain. That discussion describes Petain as advocating armor and aircraft, but the civilian government balking at the cost, forming a commission led by Joffre, and Petain surveying the border regions and reporting back to the commission with a defensive plan. A.T.S. in Texas (talk) 21:39, 24 December 2018 (UTC)
thread_title:  Areas that need some additional help: 

message: This article fails to describe what a failure the Maginot Line was.  They were fighting the last war with their fortifications, expecting trench warfare like WWI, and failing to comprehend the new face of warfare characterized by mechanized mobile infantry, radio communications, improved weaponry, coordinated air support, strafing and bombardment. It reads like a whitewash by antiquarian French apologists trying to rewrite history and cover up the infamy and shame of the French panic, collapse and surrender to Germany in barely six weeks in the Battle of France and the subsequent collaborationist Vichy regime.  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 98.244.137.86 (talk) 16:22, 10 October 2021 (UTC)
replies: text: France did not rely on the Maginot Line to the extent that you are asserting, it was always expected that a mobile campaign would take place at the western end and in Belgium. You are oversimplifying - you must provide sources rather than editorializing about the French. Acroterion (talk) 16:27, 10 October 2021 (UTC)
replies: text: How can something be "strategically effective" when you promptly surrender?  It's like saying most of a blown tire was strategically effective except for the part with the hole in it.  Especially when France poured massive amounts of resources into the white elephant that was the Maginot Line. By the way, no need to provide citations for well-known history on the talk page.  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 173.54.127.168 (talk) 22:46, 8 November 2021 (UTC)
replies: text: Please explain what changes you think should be made to the article, then, with sources - this is not a forum for your views on what was accomplished or not accomplished, it is a place to discuss article improvement. Acroterion (talk) 23:10, 8 November 2021 (UTC)
thread_title:  Total Failure