Talk:Isoroku Yamamoto

message: Incorrect use of the word deranged in this article, it should be derailed. Will the OP please correct it?
Kalpak
It would be nice if someone knowledgable enough would change the image over to the method used in pages like Erwin Rommel instead of using all the ugly tables. --68.82.51.198 22:56, 19 May 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: done. -- Finlay McWalter |  Talk 23:20, 19 May 2004 (UTC)
replies: text:  Thanks. --68.82.51.198 04:17, 25 May 2004 (UTC)

text: Agreed. If anything is the single most responsible reason for the Japanese failing at Midway, it's the lack of damage control measures in the Japanese navy. After sustaining the same type of attack which had sunk four Japanese carriers, the Yorktown still floated, crippled but serviceable. Doovinator 20:07, 5 Aug 2004 (UTC)

text: Well, not just the damage control measures. They also had all sorts of ordnance lying around unstowed (in their rush to switch from land-attack to ship-attack weapons). I'm not sure we can really say for sure which was the biggest factor in the disaster (how exactly does one do the scientific experiment :-), and luck (exact location of hits, for instance) may have also played a role. However, certainly it didn't help that doctine called for carriers to be out front, to screen the "valuable" battleships. And it is true, I believe (without dragging down reference sources), that Yamamoto didn't forsee that the battleship's value had already declined as drastically as it (in actuality) had. Noel (talk) 21:22, 14 Dec 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: Wrong on doctrine. Yamamoto kept the heavies back & led with his carriers (scouts), per doctrine. (Nobody I've read suggests BBs screen CVs.) Had he put his battleships in front, he could have pounded Midway's installations with little risk from air attack, leaving Nagumo to rove & cover him. With all the cruisers' VSs (denied Nagumo in the event), he'd also have found Fletcher in time to strike before Fletcher's birds turned his carriers into funeral pyres.  Trekphiler 22:10, 16 February 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Oldest stuff

message: Someone added a reference to an "Operation Peacock", which I've never heard of. I'm too lazy to go get the ref books down at the moment - this ring a bell with anyone? Noel (talk) 21:22, 14 Dec 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: There's a codeword dictionary I've seen that mentions it.  Trekphiler 22:15, 16 February 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Operation Peacock

message: Changed "most of WW2" to "first third". April 1943 was just the 17th month of a war that would last 45 months. The middle third of the war involved rolling back the outer defense perimeter, while the last third cracked the inner defense perimeter and brought the war to the Home Islands.
:Yeah, "17th month" if you're counting from when the U.S. entered the war. If you weren't so blinkered, you'd know that World War II actually started in September 1939 (not December 1941!!!) and Japan was extremely active in the Pacific well before the sneak attack on Pearl Harbour. (In fact there is a good argument that the "Asian WW2" started in 1937.) -- 219.89.132.103 12:06, 23 July 2005 (UTC)
thread_title: Heading

message: There is a need write NPOV on this page. All familiar language shoud be avoided spur, whim... Big contributions done. Time for a break and a polish.  :-) Gtabary 02:07, 15 December 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  IMO This page needs...

message: This entire section, while having a lot of valuable information, also has a lot of misinformation, particularly about the "controversy" but in other details as well. For instance, Lanphier died in 1987, not 1983. Lanphier's "account" was disputed from the moment the mission ended because he announced on the radio, in defiance of top secret security regarding the "Magic" Operation (not mention good sense), that "I got Yamamoto!" Moreover Lanphier, trained as a journalist, wrote out the citation awards for himself and the others involved and worked tirelessly to get HIS version into print without regard for the consequences to Magic. Rex Barber did not wait until 1983 to object, but made repeated attempts through channels to clear the record from 1943 on, as did Major Mitchell. Lanphier was a competent officer and a good pilot, but he was also a self-aggrandizing individual who gave varying versions of his story depending on time and audience, invented details when necessary, and left out Barber, Mitchell, and Holmes from his early statements to the press, the first of which app. was to the AP correspondent Norman Lodge, a gross breach of security for which Admirals Halsey, Nimitz, and King came down hard on Mitchell and Barber. 
In the end Air Force historians rather wimpishly decided to give each a half credit for the shootdown of Yamamoto (they had earlier awarded Barber and Holmes half credit for shootdown of the staff bomber) despite physical evidence at the crash site supporting Barber's account (attacked from rear, plane crashed in level flight in jungle) and a lack of evidence supporting Lanphier (attack from right angle and right wing shot off before crash). 
Also it's stated Yamamoto was "killed instantly" but then contradicts itself later, coming to a conclusion unsupported by facts. Two post-mortems reported that the admiral's body was not distended as were others at the crash site and lacked the maggots found on them, suggesting he was alive after the crash. If the search party finding the crash site "tidied it up" they not only did so out of respect but to spare themselves criticism (or worse) for not mounting a quicker search in time to save the admiral.
Much of the original information on this mission appears to come from early sources, including Sherrod's official history of Marine Corps aviation in WWII. I have used Glines (who uses primary sources for his material) and later updates.
Work on this section continues, bearing in mind a need for NPOV. Buckboard 09:09, 12 February 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  OPERATION VENGEANCE 

message: Removed this as it's redundant & POV
"As a tactical raid, the attack was a smashing victory, handily achieving its limited objectives at an amazingly low price of 29 aircraft (and five miniature submarines that contributed nothing of value). Hindsight and wishful thinking on the part of the Japanese regarding the attack's flaws, and American unpreparedness should not detract from the appreciation that military forces seldom achieve such complete surprise and devastation in an operation. Credit for husbanding the ambitious brain-child of his talented air subordinates to fruition is Yamamoto's."
exolon 00:34, 18 March 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Removed

message: I reworded the intro, due to the "stellar tactics" which I felt was POV--one could spend hours punching holes in Yamamoto's tactics--and for the "highly respected in the US" line. Most modern US historians--note I am not casting judgement as to whether they're right or not--tend to denigrate his strategic vision and tactics; see the quoted "Shattered Sword".--Steve Dallas 01:23, 30 June 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Intro rewording

message: In "Revision as of 11:49, 22 July 2006", the wording of the second paragraph was changed from
"He is highly respected in Japan, and to a lesser extent, the US for both tactical prowess and for running a "clean" war (in other words, he usually steered clear of committing war crimes)."
to
"He is highly respected in Japan, and to a lesser extent, the US for both tactical prowess and for preventeing his men from committing war crimes."
			
Is there a reference on which this change was based, i.e. a citation about Adm. Yamamoto ordering his men not to commit war crimes, as opposed to him not issuing orders to commit them? After doing a little bit of searching, the only references I can find regarding war crimes committed during operations planned or commanded by him pertain to the murder of captured US Navy pilots during the Battle of Midway.
--Emamid 11:24, 16 August 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Yamato was hundreds of miles away aboard Yamato. His plan was to lurk out of detection range with most of his battleships and heavy cruisers. (I'm still at a loss as to what exactly he intended to do with said battleships eventually...chase carriers on the open ocean in spite of a speed disadvantage?) If the fleet had broken radio silence by that time they must have been keeping communications to a minimum. It seems doubtful that if he even knew of the prisoners, he issued any order one way or the other, to execute them or keep them alive. Naval warfare typically results in few prisoners, but I haven't read anything that indicated he took measures to prevent war crimes. Can anyone cite a source to that effect? --Shyland 23:01, 24 October 2006 (UTC)

text: As I recall, there was some mention in Shattered Sword of Japanese naval aviators having shown they were "no less willing than their American counterparts" to strafe people in parachutes or around sinking ships. I can't find it now. --Shyland 00:51, 25 October 2006 (UTC)

text: ...And, I've got issues with the "highly respected in the US for tactical prowess" part. The attack on Pearl Harbor, while well-planned and well-executed, seems unlikely to have engendered respect in the U.S. And while code-breaking was a very important part of his disastrous loss at Midway, one could argue that Yamamoto's battle plan was also a huge factor. Even if the enemy knows you're coming, he's not guaranteed to win. The IJN had clear superiority in many respects, until it was irretrievably lost forever at Midway. The reasons for that loss are numerous and complex, but among them Yamamoto's plan, and total inflexibility in not deviating from it when circumstances changed, must rank high. The plan involved multiple groups operating in tightly-synchronized fashion, across 1500 miles of ocean, in strict radio silence, and furthermore expecting the enemy to behave exactly as Yamamoto predicted. The Japanese didn't even get out of port on schedule (Nagumo's carrier force was a day late), and no adjustments were made. When it started looking like the Americans weren't following the script, no adjustments were made. --Shyland 00:51, 25 October 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: War crimes reference

message: "The plan was well thought out, well organized and finely timed." Totally POV. My POV is  completely opposite. There are lots of sources ( Parshall & Tully, Lord, Fuchida, etc.) claiming Yamamoto's plan was a big factor in the devastating defeat at Midway. I find it hard to believe Midway was planned & executed by the same people who were behind the overwheming success at Pearl Harbor. I don't think I'm a good candidate to do the rewriting; I'm sure my own POV would creep in.
Yamamoto split his forces THREE ways, nullifying the massive numerical superiority claimed in the article (as of 17Nov2006): two concurrent attacks extremely far apart (Midway and the Aleutians), and a third group originally slated to be roughly two days' sailing(!!??) away from either. As to "finely timed", this phrase hardly fits when your carrier group is a day late leaving port for Midway, and all the other groups proceed according to plan! I could go on and on...see comments above in "War Crimes" section for starters. The whole Midway section needs rewrite. --Shyland 23:24, 17 November 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Wrong. Removing the crypto break is effectively rewriting history. If "Yamamoto tried to cover himself with Operation K and the submarine picket lines", why did he sail his task force before the pickets arrived, & after the flying boats had failed in recon? (And, 1 may ask, why did he allow that stupid stunt in May?) A smart commander plans for the undexpected (like U.S. carriers being closeby...); he didn't need to know his codes were compromised to do that. Are Parshall & Tully "universally correct"? No, but I've seen much the same argument in Willmott's Barrier & the Javelin; don't try & tell me he had no access to decrypts. Yamamoto isn't being "arbitrarily condemned as an idiot", he's being fairly condemned for bad command decisions.  Trekphiler 22:54, 16 February 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Midway: good plan? That's POV

message: I deleted "Sixteen years before Pearl Harbor attack, an English naval expert Hector Bywater uncannily prophesied in detail the war in the Pacific. Could Yamamoto have been influenced by Bywater's remarkable plan too?" Yamamoto wasn't an idiot. He was a professional navy officer. This is on par with the conspiracy theorists' implication, being Japanese, they were incapable of originality or achieving surprise without help. Trekphiler 23:08, 16 February 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Low Bywater mark

message: I rewrote this:
:"advanced across the Pacific until engaging in a climactic "Decisive Battle" in the northern Philippine Sea between the Ryukyu Islands on the west and the Marianas Islands on the east. This battle was intended to take place when the American forces had finally been worn down to parity with the Japanese Navy."
to this: 
:"whittling down the American Fleet as it advanced across the Pacific until the Japanese Navy engaged it in a climactic "Decisive Battle" in the northern Philippine Sea (between the Ryukyu Islands and the Marianas Islands), with battleships meeting in the traditional exchange between battle lines."
This was in line with Mahanian doctrine.  Trekphiler 01:10, 17 February 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Decisive Battle

message: I rewrote this:
:"Surprise attacks were a Japanese military tradition when starting a war"
to this: 
:"Surprise attacks have a long military tradition when starting a war, and Japan could see clear to supporting"
I think Peattie & Evans point out most wars had been started without declarations of war.
On the greater issue, I must question the presumption Nagumo needed to use his aircraft to attack Hawaii. Also, the threat from U.S. aircraft was overblown; his fighters were more than capable of defending him, especially since his aviators had vastly more experience, as well as combat experience, & surprise on their side. Lack of VB or VT strength was not an issue; if he could find Halsey & Brown at night, his cruisers were more than enough to destroy them (as Spruance almost learned, to his detriment, at Midway). Neither does the article say one word to the fact Nagumo had orders to find & sink the carriers, even if it meant loss of half his carriers. Neither would I read too much into Yamamoto's not punishing Nagumo; it was Japanese practise not to criticize senior commanders, regardless their decisions. It seems to me this needs rewriting.  Trekphiler 01:22, 17 February 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: On the attack

message: I rewrote this:
:"Nimitz dispatched a destroyer to guard the intended refueling point for Operation K's flying boats,"
to this:
:"Following a foolish nuisance raid by Japanese flying boats in May, Nimitz dispatched a minesweeper to guard the intended refueling point for Operation K"
based on Holmes, Double-Edged Secrets & Undersea Victory. (He mentions the officer who planned in in UV; anybody know who it was?)  Trekphiler 02:46, 17 February 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Special K

message: I rewrote this:
:"With his air power destroyed and his forces not yet concentrated for a fleet battle, Yamamoto was unable to maneuver his remaining units to trap the American forces when Admiral Raymond Spruance prudently withdrew to the east rather than risk a night surface encounter in which his carriers would be at a disadvantage. Correctly perceiving that he had lost, Yamamoto aborted the invasion of Midway and withdrew his forces from the field, having no desire to occupy a distant atoll he no longer had the capacity to support and defend. The defeat ended Yamamoto's six months of success and marked the high tide of Japanese expansion.
:"Yamamoto's plan for MI has been the subject of much criticism. Many commentators state it violated the principle of concentration of force, and was overly complex. Others point out similarly complex Allied operations that were successful, and note the extent to which the American intelligence coup derailed the operation before it began."
to this:
:"With his air power destroyed and his forces not yet concentrated for a fleet battle, Yamamoto was unable to maneuver his remaining units to trap the American forces when Admiral Raymond Spruance prudently withdrew to the east, in a position to further defend Midway, believing (based on a mistaken submarine report) the Japanese still intended to invade.Blair, Clay, Jr. Silent Victory. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1975. (He did not apprehend the severe risk of night surface battle, in which his carriers would be at a disadvantage, not knowing Yamato was on the Japanese order of battle.ibid.) Correctly perceiving he had lost, Yamamoto aborted the invasion of Midway and withdrew. The defeat ended Yamamoto's six months of success and marked the high tide of Japanese expansion.
:"Yamamoto's plan for MI has been the subject of much criticism. Many commentators state it violated the principle of concentration of force, and was overly complex. Others point out similarly complex Allied operations that were successful, and note the extent to which the American intelligence coup derailed the operation before it began. Had Yamamoto's dispositions not denied Nagumo pre-attack reconaissance assets, the cryptanalytic success, and the unexpected appearance of Fletcher's carriers, would have been irrelevant.Willmott, H.P. Barrier and the Javelin. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute Pres, 1983." 
I'm far from convinced Yamamoto had "no desire to occupy a distant atoll he no longer had the capacity to support and defend." He couldn't have supported or defended it successfully had it been taken. Rather, he knew he no longer could take it. As for Spruance, he didn't forsee night battle as much as take a blocking position; I can't recall the name of the sub skipper who got it wrong offhand. The importance of codebreaking in the immediate U.S. success is overblown, as Willmott points out; Yamamoto had sufficient strength to overcome the surprise of Fletcher's unexpected appearance, had his initial dispositions not been ludicrous (quite aside the redeployment of Shinyo or Ryujo, sometimes mentioned).  Trekphiler 03:37, 17 February 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Meet you midway

message: I rewrote this:
:"Particularly harmful were the severe losses of carrier dive-bomber and torpedo-bomber crews in the carrier battles that emasculated the carrier air groups."
to this:
:"There were severe losses of carrier dive-bomber and torpedo-bomber crews in the carrier battles, emasculating the already depleted carrier air groups. Particularly harmful, however, were losses of destroyers in the foolish Tokyo Express supply runs. IJN already faced a shortage, and commerce defense was laughably bad with the existing numbers as it was, thanks to poor doctrine and low priority to the task.Parillo, op.cit."
While the aviators & fleet battles get all the attention, in the long run, the commerce war meant more to Japan's ability to continue fighting. Trekphiler 03:53, 17 February 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: For the defense

message: The whole section about his personal life is painfully POV. I've improved the wording of the chatter about geisha, but I really think the entire section should be jettisoned or, at least, completely rewritten. If there's important about his being a teetotaler, it is wholly unrelated to his gambling which also seems -- from the piece, I have no other knowledge -- to have referred more to enjoyment of games of skill than to any focus on betting per se. Czrisher 18:04, 14 March 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Personal Life

message: IJN (Imperial Japanese Navy) introduced its navy system from Royal Navy, IJN had the official name for the Fleets in English.
:No IJN men used the words Combined Fleet in the era of Japan.
:It was Rengo Kantai (in Japanese),Grand Fleet (in English). Isoroku Yamamoto was called Admiral of GF, that was Admiral of Grand Fleet, like Admiral of the Fleet (Royal Navy). —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Shun Zero (talk • contribs) 16:22, 5 May 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  The official name of the IJN Fleet 

message: The article previously speculated that the name "Kaigun ko-jiken" (海軍乙事件) for Yamamoto's death had something to do with the game of Go.  This is incorrect: in Chinese and formal Japanese, 甲 kō is A, 乙 otsu is B, 兵 hei is C, etc, so the name just means "Incident A".  The subsequent death of Yamamoto's successor Mineichi Koga was hence referred to as Kaigun otsu-jiken (:ja:海軍乙事件), or "Incident B". Jpatokal 14:19, 7 June 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Kaigun ko-jiken

message: From Talk:Attack on Pearl Harbor:
:"Yamamoto didn't want war with America. He knew he was awakening a giant. Why was he so convinced that America would come to terms after a surprise attack? 
:"Was it all Japanese mistakes or were they also 'encouraged' to think this way? A Japanese perspective would be very helpful.
:"Allmedia (talk) 01:06, 25 December 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: "'Why was [Yamamoto] so convinced that America would come to terms after a surprise attack?'" That is the US$64000 question.... My suspicion is, he was not, but IJA leaders were, & he went along, lacking the courage to resist; I suggest he should have threatened not resignation but hara kiri, & carried it out, if he was ignored: it was the one thing all Japanese would understand, & if someone so senior was so convinced IJA was wrong..." Comment? Trekphiler 11:23, 29 December 2007 (UTC)

text: I think hara kiri can be taken as a protest against intolerable action, against being forced into a position of doing something dishonorable. It appears Japanese officers, including Yamamoto, took loyalty to the Crown as superseding loyalty to the nation. Anybody know for sure? "it lacked nuance"? Looks to me like the same can be said of the mokusatsu at the end of the War, too.  TREKphiler hit me ♠  23:20, 16 October 2008 (UTC)
thread_title: Just gimme a reason

message: What is the "Imadu" that's after Yamamoto's name at the start of the article? Is that supposed to be a Japanese word? I don't see any Japanese writing present following just the name, "Yamamoto Isoroku." Can anyone shed some light on this? -Tadakuni (talk) 03:08, 6 February 2008 (UTC)
thread_title: "Imadu"?

message: Since somebody doesn't think the Tokyo Express was foolish, let me clarify. IJN had a desperate, overweening need to protect trade, for which it needed DDs. Japan had insufficient capacity even to replace her losses. Ergo, wasting DDs on supply runs was foolish in the extreme. Cf Parillo, Japanese Merchant Marine.  TREKphiler hit me ♠  23:20, 16 October 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: The Tokyo Express was meant to supply Japanese ground forces on Guadalcanal by using the night to avoid American warplanes. This meant that these forces could continue to fight, where they otherwise would have been lost or more warship losses would be risked in escorting slow transports, which also were in short supply. The Japanese decision to contest Guadalcanal and expose themselves to the slow drain on irreplaceable resources can be questioned, but in the context of that decision the Express makes sense. More importantly, the word "foolish" indicates there is a historical consensus which I do not believe exists. Lastly, there were much more important problems regarding the utilization of the Japanese merchant fleet, especially their lack of convoying throughout the war. Thus, even if the Express had not utilized destroyers, they probably would not have been used in merchant protection the way USN and Royal Navy destroyers guarded the Atlantic convoys. Lord asriel (talk) 03:10, 19 October 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: Given the pitiful trickle of supplies DDs could deliver, & the importance you attach to Guad (with which I disagree, but that's irrelevant), & the evident importance IJA attached to Guad, supply convoys made more sense, even given the risk. As to "historical consensus", I don't think it's strictly necessary; a source or 2 arguing it was foolish (& between Parillo & Kaigun, there is some agreement) should do it. As to what use the DDs would've been put, you're right, they probably wouldn't have gone to convoys; that isn't an argument for wasting them, it's an argument against it, since every one lost is one not available to Kido Butai, hence one less available to convoy from the (already too small) pool. Which is foolish.  TREKphiler hit me ♠  09:02, 19 October 2008 (UTC)
thread_title: Court jester

message: Since there's some debate on it, "inveterate gambler, he enjoyed nothing more than a competitive round of chess (shogi), poker, or bridge. Often Yamamoto would challenge anyone on hand to play poker all night with the specific understanding that whoever quit first would lose the hand.", and Cpn Watanabe Yasuji is quoted saying, "In all games Yamamoto loved to take chances. He Had a gambler's heart.", both from Prange et al., At Dawn We Slept (Penguin, 1991), p.13. Add?  TREKphiler hit me ♠  22:21 & 22:38, 19 December 2008 (UTC)
thread_title: ''Shogi''

message: As it is claimed that the subject of this article was the architect of the attack on Pearl Harbor--notwithstanding his attendance at Harvard University--should this article be written in a more balanced way?  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.6.237.211 (talk) 18:07, 21 August 2009 (UTC)
thread_title: "Architect of the Attack on Pearl Harbor"

message: Seeing the page got changed from "practice" (U.S.) to "practise" (Brit) I have to ask, is Amlish or Britlish the correct usage, here, & should it be changed back?  TREKphiler hit me ♠  17:22, 12 November 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: I don't know what the wiki guideline is, but when in my head I separate American and British spellings, I include the close enemies of America and Great Britain. I think German/British warfare subjects should be spelled the UK way (whatever that is) and the Japanese/American warfare subjects should be spelled the American way. Binksternet (talk) 01:26, 13 November 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: I was less interested in a guideline than what prev practise had been, honestly, but that makes a lot of sense.  TREKphiler hit me ♠  05:57, 14 November 2009 (UTC)
thread_title: Practise makes perfect?

message: In reply to the deleted cmt by WesUGAdawg (in case anybody else wondered), let me say: the other 40 or so would've been VSs of the escorts, not used in the attack.  TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura  06:22, 25 November 2009 (UTC)
thread_title: Count off?

message: Yamamoto did not attend the U.S. Naval War College as a student, though he did visit that institution on a single day in 1924.  
According to the official U.S. Naval War College website http://www.usnwc.edu/About/History/Chronology-of-Courses-and-Significant-Events/1920s.aspx, then-Captain Yamamoto visited the U.S. Naval War College on February 13, 1924.  Many online sources repeat and cite the statement that Yamamoto attended the United States institution as a student but that is incorrect.  He was an alumnus of two of Japan's naval educational institutions - the Japanese Navy's War College dating from 1914(US Navy Naval History and Heritage Command http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/prs-for/japan/japrs-xz/i-yamto.htm) as well as an alumnus(1904) of the Japanese Naval Academy ("The Pearl Harbor papers: Inside the Japanese plans" By Donald M. Goldstein, Katherine V. Dillon, Page 111... .
The confusion seems to perhaps stem from people combining the two different countries' Naval colleges/academies.  A source of the meaning and wording repeated in various online sources is possibly found in the 2007 book "Navy: An Illustrated History: The U.S. Navy from 1775 to the 21st Century" By Chester G. Hearn on Page 76: "After graduation from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1904... he attended the U.S. Naval War College, studied at Harvard University..." Shearonink (talk) 14:15, 29 May 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: Good work! Thanks for the note. Binksternet (talk) 15:08, 29 May 2010 (UTC)
thread_title: Naval War College clarification

message: Shouldn't the "Japanese Gamblers" category in the Category List be deleted since that description is perhaps only an alleged aspect of Isoroku Yamamoto's personality but is not an activity that the man was known for?  I had deleted it but then decided I maybe did the deletion without the proper amount of thought so put the Category back in the List.  
Any Mega-Editor types out there with an opinion?  It doesn't seem to me that Yamamoto is or was known for being a gambler as a profession, the term is perhaps a single aspect of his complicated personality.  I'm not sure most members of the general public would look up Isoroku Yamamoto as a "Gambler". Shearonink (talk) 20:57, 10 June 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: Enjoying gambling as a pastime is not the same as professional gambler. Binksternet (talk) 05:06, 11 June 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: After a casual glance at the categorized U.S. gamblers, it looks like they're all professionals. Which suggests to me a need for a sub-cat for enthusiastic amateurs, into which IMO Yamamoto would certainly fall.  TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura  10:11, 11 June 2010 (UTC)
thread_title: Japanese Gamblers?

message: Sidebar shows age as 58 in parentheses, but I calculate 59 based on date of birth and date of death. Am I wrong?  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 97.88.169.138 (talk) 15:22, 29 December 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: Infobox had a typo --MChew (talk) 04:03, 30 December 2012 (UTC)
thread_title: Age

message: I figured this might be controversial so I'd bring it up for discussion first but since this seems to be a pretty open and shut assassination shouldn't this article have the categories :Category:Assassinated_Japanese_people and :Category:Assassinated military personnel?  The article for Operation Vengeance already has the category for military assassinations on it, which could also be added here I think. If nobody replies or objects in a reasonable amount of time I'll be bold and just put them in but this should be discussed if it peaks anyone's interest. Cat-fivetc  ---- 06:24, 27 February 2013 (UTC)
replies: text: Cat-fivetc  ---- 00:58, 1 March 2013 (UTC)
thread_title:  Assassinated people categories 

message: The section on Midway states:
<quote>Recent scholarship[21] using Japanese language documents has revealed it was, rather, an unrelated venture of the Naval General Staff which Yamamoto agreed to conduct concurrently with the Midway operation, in exchange for the latter's approval.</quote>
The "recent scholarship" in this sentence refers to Parshall and Tully's Shattered Sword. If you look at the book's notes, the authors credit Robert Elmer Barde's Ph.D. thesis as coming up with this revelation. There is moreover no evidence that the Shattered Sword's authors examined Japanese language documents to corroborate Barde's account of the planning of Operation MI. This passage should be removed or changed to reflect the reality of the matter.  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 216.214.188.112 (talk) 20:20, 2 October 2015 (UTC)
thread_title: Correction needed for section on planning of Midway

message: According to the New York Times obituary, Thomas G. Lanphier Jr., 71, Dies; U.S. Ace Shot Down Yamamoto:
Thomas G. Lanphier Jr., the World War II fighter pilot who shot down the Japanese airplane carrying the architect of the attack on Pearl Harbor, died Thursday at the San Diego Veterans Administration Hospital at La Jolla, Calif. He was 71 years old.
Reading through the comments on the Talk page, it appears the credit for shooting down Yamamoto's transport is contested. However, the current article does not mention Lanphier even though its cite-able from a credible source.
It seems like the events surrounding Yamamoto's death should credit both Barber and Lanphier. I understand this is an article about Yamamoto, so I would not expect to see a protracted discussion about it. Rather, I would expect to see both mentioned in downing the aircraft.
Jeffrey Walton  (talk) 01:59, 10 July 2017 (UTC)
replies: text: Lanphier's account is disputed by most historians and observers who have commented on the battle. His radio transmission claiming a VIP kill was an execrable breach of security. His claim of a Zero was invalidated, removing him from the list of aces. I don't see any need to name Lanphier in this biography of Yamamoto, since he didn't shoot Yamamoto down. His role in the engagement is discussed in detail in the article Operation Vengeance which is the proper place, in my opinion. Binksternet (talk) 02:52, 10 July 2017 (UTC)
replies: text: I'm with Binksternet on this one. An obit isn't exactly the most reliable source for anybody's achievements, when they're claimed to be so historic...& Lanphier's role really doesn't meet the test for inclusion on this page.  TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 19:11, 10 July 2017 (UTC)
thread_title: Lanphier and New York Times Obituary

message: Does anybody have a book source describing how Yamamoto decided to take his last morale-boosting visit? I think it would be interesting for the reader if an author can be found saying Yamamoto based his decision on the known range of enemy fighters in the area, and that he assumed he would be safe enough. Binksternet (talk) 05:49, 4 March 2019 (UTC)
thread_title:  Studying a map and deciding to go 

message: This term is incorrect and biased.  He was killed when the aircraft he was in was shot down in a military operation. We don’t call military casualties of high ranking officers in a military operation “assassinations”. History is full of examples of snipers etc targeting battlefield commanders, this is no different. 71.121.191.133 (talk) 13:53, 31 July 2022 (UTC)
thread_title:  “assassination”