Talk:Majority rule

message: Some examples would be useful, as well as a good reference source or two. - David Oberst 22:59, 25 February 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Yes, and also clarifying how the rule is supposed to operate (when there are more than two choices).  At pages like Arrow's impossibility theorem it seems like "the majority rule" has a technical meaning on voting system research, but it isn't clear from this page what that meaning is. Kingdon 15:40, 29 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Thanks, , for expanding this.  Some of the text at Arrow's impossibility theorem may need tightening, but this page is now in better shape. Kingdon 14:25, 18 June 2007 (UTC)

text: Having received no feedback about my proposal and surmising that there's still agreement that the whole article had problems, I've done what I said I'd feel awkward doing and made a thorough revision of the article.  Though snippets of the previous draft can be found in the article, the only section that really remains the same is Voting on single issues and suboptimality.  Most of the other sections were by and large unrelated to majority rule as a binary decision rule.  (Majorities in the context of voting systems that choose from among three or more options are not directly relevant to majority rule.) SgtSchumann (talk) 01:44, 10 June 2008 (UTC)
thread_title: Untitled

message: very weak
just a comment, 171.64.71.23 12:35, 4 December 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Majority rule and minority rights -- weak 

message: I have two concerns about this section of the article. First, regrettably I feel that although I cite a number of references in this section, I have put information together in a way that constitutes original research. I think we'd do well to put this information into (a) section(s) closer to the beginning of the article about the properties of majority rule.
My other concern is that I highly doubt that a relevant authority would ever say that majority rule is arbitrary. Even a voting theorist who despises unfettered majority rule would be familiar with May's theorem and recognize that majority rule alone satisfies a particular set of desiderata. So unless someone can provide a reference for this claim, I'd like to remove this claim and put the remaining information into other sections.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by SgtSchumann (talk • contribs) 13:29, 31 October 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Arbitrariness 

message: I've made the changes I proposed under Arbitrariness. I've also incorporated some material from simple majority voting, because there is a suggestion on that article's talk page -- a good suggestion, to my mind -- that the articles be merged. --SgtSchumann (talk) 16:19, 31 October 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Merge "Simple Majority Voting" with this article? 

message: Since I'm interested in this subject, I found the following wiki articles which are all about facets of the same thing. There may be more. Is consolidation or at least more cross pollination possible?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majority_vote
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majoritarian
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majority
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ochlocracy
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Appeal_to_the_majority
:Here are some of my thoughts:
:* It would be more appropriate if majority vote redirected the reader to either this article or majority.
:* The article majority vote does link to, "Majoritarianism", is a mess. I complained about the state of affairs on the 12th and have yet to get a response. I suspect that many of the arguments discussed here could be considered arguments for majoritarianism, making "Majoritarianism" redundant. But without having good sources defining majoritarianism in front of me I feel that I should refrain from changing that article in any way.
:* As for the other articles, I think the subjects deserve separate entries, but linking between them can't be a bad thing. --SgtSchumann (talk) 06:07, 26 November 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Consolidation? 

message: On p. 3 of "The Tyranny of the Supermajority" McGann notes that Buchanan and Tullock argue that only unanimity guarantees economic efficiency. I've read elsewhere that they find supermajorities with lower thresholds -- but not a majority -- to be acceptable. I've thought a lot about where and how to include this and haven't come up with anything. Perhaps someone else will. This might go some way towards addressing concerns about bias. --SgtSchumann (talk) 14:57, 25 November 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Buchanan and Tullock 

message: I've restored some content that I'd put into the section currently entitled "Use". One of the reasons I put the content there to begin with was to correct a common misconception about majority rule -- namely, that it is pervasively used in single-seat elections. After this was changed the first time I went to the extra length of adding a section to explain why the change was wrong, complete with citation. In spite of this it has been changed again, so I've reverted it and added a citation to that section as well. If anyone wishes to dispute this, please note the following:
# Majority rule is equivalent to plurality only in the case of two candidates. However, this does not mean that majority rule is used in the case of two candidates, and if it did, it would be arbitrary to say so, since in this case it is also equivalent to Borda, Instant Run-off Voting, Schulze and nearly every other voting system that has ever been invented. There is no need to point out that majority rule is equivalent to plurality in the two-candidate case in the "Use" section, because this is already done in the "Distinction" section.
# More importantly as far as Wikipedia is concerned, the claim that plurality is used in two candidate public elections is verifiable, and it has been cited. Please refrain from removing cited facts from an article or introducing uncited contradictory material.
--SgtSchumann (talk) 16:29, 25 November 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Plurality and Public Elections 

message: Perhaps there's a place in this article for addressing Condorcet's jury theorem and how it relates to majority rule. That is, according to the theorem, only if each voter is more than 50% likely to make the correct decision does majority rule make sense. Otherwise, it is detrimental. On the other hand, Condorcet's theorem makes certain assumptions which are not necessarily generalizable, but nonetheless help to elucidate the problem space we are working in. Thoughts? --Inebrio (talk) 03:10, 26 November 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: I love Condorcet. If you want to mention his ideas, you won't have to twist my arm very hard. Just please be sure to include a well-formatted citation. --SgtSchumann (talk) 06:09, 26 November 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Condorcet's Jury Theorem 

message: I've just created this section. I intend it to supercede the former "Criticisms" section, which was thought to reflect bias. The main difference is that arguments for the use of majority rule (in certain contexts) are now separated from arguments against the use of majority rule (in certain contexts). However, counter-arguments still accompany their corresponding arguments. With these changes I've made content about referendums a subsection of this section, and I've added two new arguments for limiting the use of majority rule. I've also modified a sentence that was marked with a "citation needed" tag and removed the tag. Finally, I've removed the "bias" tag that was at the head of this section; at this point I find it very difficult to believe that a neutral observer would find a pro-majority rule bias in this section.
I have left some material added very recently off the page, because (a) it was unsourced and (b) the sources I have before me contradict the claims found therein. --SgtSchumann (talk) 05:31, 26 November 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Limitations on Majority Rule in Various Contexts 

message: I've removed links to approval voting and instant run-off voting. Though the heuristics of IRV and perhaps approval voting as well show an appreciation for majority rule (e.g. IRV uses a process that narrows the field of candidates to two and selects the one supported on a majority of the transferred ballots), the same can be said of a number of other decision rules, including any that invariably selects the Condorcet winner. I think it's sufficient to link to voting system criteria that are related to majority rule in some obvious way and allow people to follow the links to uncover which methods satisfy those criteria.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by SgtSchumann (talk • contribs) 07:01, 21 August 2009 (UTC)
thread_title:  Non-binary decision rules 

message: I've reverted the "Limitations" section. Characterizing it as criticism and replies to criticism arbitrarily privileges criticism of majority rule (MR). For example, the argument that MR protects minorities by offering them the minimal threshold could easily stand alone as a consideration for the use of MR.
I am, however, a fan of all the other edits that have been made recently.
-- Marie Paradox (talk) 22:39, 3 February 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Reverting "Limitations" section 

message: I've reinserted this, because a citation for it is found in the main body of the text. (The article cites McGann; last I checked his works on majority rule were widely cited, and no expert contradicted his findings on majority rule.) According to the manual of style it isn't necessary to cite text in the lead. However, if anyone wants to do so, I won't object, though I might suggest that for the sake of neutrality we ought to add a citation for the claim about tyranny of the majority as well. -- Marie Paradox (talk) 13:08, 5 June 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: After looking at the article again I think the problem is that after an edit it was no longer clear what content was covered by the citation. I've added another note in the hopes of clarifying this. -- Marie Paradox (talk) 13:15, 5 June 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Majority rule protects minorities 

message: Being anal retentive for a moment, if there's 3 voters, 50% is 1.5, so 50%+1 is 2.5 votes. So technically this definition would require the winner to have MORE than 2.5 of 3 votes, which means a choice needs ALL 3 votes to win!
You might say, winner_votes>=int(total_votes/2+1), where the integer function is a round-down operation (Floor_function), but usually you round up for such things!
Okay, back to reality that people don't understand and don't care. Tom Ruen (talk) 03:46, 11 June 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: No, Tom, you're right.  "50%+1" as the minimum threshold is incorrect (but only slightly) for an odd number of votes.  It should say "more than half of the votes". 70.109.182.22 (talk) 15:56, 11 June 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: Agreed. -- Marie Paradox (talk) 15:46, 14 June 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  50%+1 VERSUS more-than-half 

message: There is currently a glorified pros and cons list that occupies a good part of the current article. After reading Wikipedia's policy on criticism sections I would like to rewrite the article, incorporating as much from the "Limitations" section into the main text as possible. My idea is to make the entire article more or less like the first part of the current article, organized primarily by criteria and theorems. What do others think of this idea?
Also, if there is something you have thought about including in this article but weren't sure how to squeeze in, I would like to read about it
-- Marie Paradox (talk) 01:38, 14 December 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Rewrite 

message: Arno Nymous, I will be reverting your good faith edit. I am surmising that your reason for deleting the "Monotonic election systems" category was that majority rule is not monotonic across elections. However, it is monotonic within the context of a single election (see the citations regarding May's theorem), which is all that the monotonicity criterion is concerned with. -- Marie Paradox (talk) 19:56, 19 April 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: Maybe my edit summary was not detailed enough. I removed the entry because Majority rule - as I understand the article - only applies to two alternatives, whereas I understand "election systems" as a system that have to deal with n alternatives/candidates. So, Majority rule itself - although obviously monotonic for the case of two alternatives - is not a "monotonic election system". But there can be election systems dealing with more than 2 alternatives, obeying Majority rule in some kind (e.g. in form of the Condorcet criterion, which states that an alternative that would be chosen by Majority rule in each pairwise duel, must win), but these systems don't have to be monotonic. However, I leave the decision about reremoving the entry to you. --Arno Nymus (talk) 20:41, 19 April 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: I see where you are coming from now, and I am sorry I was presumptuous about the purpose of your edit. If Wikipedia is to be believed, election system is another term for voting system; it need not involve more than two options. If there is every a proposal to rename the category to "monotonic voting systems", it will have my vote. Until then I will be letting the current wording stand, even though it does lead to the inelegance you have pointed out so well. -- Marie Paradox (talk) 03:13, 21 April 2012 (UTC)
thread_title:  Monotonicity {{DONE}} 

message: I am removing the content about the Borda count and the P. Emerson citations for a host of reasons, some of which are as follows:
# No such content belongs in the lead. Arguments against the view that majority rule protects minorities should be put in the same place as arguments for the view -- in the body of the article.
# Any mention of Borda as an alternative to majority rule in this article would seem to be disproportionate to the attention the idea receives in the relevant literature.
# It is difficult to see why Borda would receive so much attention in an article about majority rule in the general case, considering that majority rule can be used in legislative settings, where, as Anthony McGann points out (The Logic of Democracy p. 22), legislators face "an infinite (indeed uncountable) number of potential alternatives" (and, indeed, the cited op-ed piece focuses on the question of which is preferable with regards to referenda).
# The content lacks an encyclopedic tone. All that is outside the lead has been tagged as inappropriate since last year.
# When it comes to voting systems, "Condordet" is an ambiguous label at best.
Should this article contain content about why voting systems that choose between more than two candidates might be or might not be preferable in some settings? I will let someone else argue that point. I will just say that if it should, we should not privilege it above all other arguments in the article or expect it to focus so much on Borda and Condorcet. -- Marie Paradox (talk) 05:41, 1 March 2015 (UTC)
thread_title:  Borda 

message: Dr. Peleg has reviewed this Wikipedia page, and provided us with the following comments to improve its quality:
We hope Wikipedians on this talk page can take advantage of these comments and improve the quality of the article accordingly.
Dr. Peleg has published scholarly research which seems to be relevant to this Wikipedia article:
*Reference : Bezalel Peleg & Peter Sudholter, 2004. "Bargaining Sets of Voting Games," Discussion Paper Series dp376, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
ExpertIdeasBot (talk) 12:55, 7 June 2016 (UTC)
thread_title:  Dr. Peleg's comment on this article 

message: Dr. Piolatto has reviewed this Wikipedia page, and provided us with the following comments to improve its quality:
We hope Wikipedians on this talk page can take advantage of these comments and improve the quality of the article accordingly.
Dr. Piolatto has published scholarly research which seems to be relevant to this Wikipedia article:
*Reference : Piolatto, Amedeo, 2008. "Electoral systems and the distortion of voters' preferences," MPRA Paper 12610, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Jan 2009.
ExpertIdeasBot (talk) 18:33, 27 June 2016 (UTC)
thread_title:  Dr. Piolatto's comment on this article 

message: I am about to remove the POV tag. The content that one user found to be POV is no longer in the lede, and the conversation about it has remained dormant since 2015.
I am also going to remove the "dubious" claim that majority rule is the "dominant factor" in most Western democracies, and elections are determined by majority rule. This has been marked as dubious since last year, it is not clear, and the sources I have before me say that majority rule is a decision rule and not a seat allocation rule.
-- Marie Paradox (talk) 06:35, 10 July 2018 (UTC)
thread_title:  NPOV and "Dubious" Claim 

message: What is definitely missing is a part on the issue of negative majority, which is the case when the majority of the parliament agrees to disagree, so they're not able to decide on anything constructively as they have a majority to down-vote anything (usually out of very different, often contrary reasons) but never find a positive majority to actually make a decision, possibly leading to a constitutional crisis in parliamentary systems, when following an election no government can be formed because every possible candidate for the head of government is voted down by a negative majority. Practically, this happens when you have a winning party (or coalition/alliance) in an election with less than 50 %, but none of the other parties wants to work with the winning party and (which marks the difference compared to a rather harmless hung-parliament) also rejects any form of tolerating a minority government, while all the other parties are unable to form a government together because of heavy ideological differences. (As most heads of government in modern parliamentary systems need to be elected by the parliament and cannot just be appointed like in the UK, this situation constitutes a heavy problem.) The Weimar Republic is a famous example, where that happened very often (with many governments falling in no-confidence votes and with finally a stable, unbreakable Nazi-Communist negative majority since 1932, which only could have been solved through a military coup but instead led to Hitler being appointed), but actually there are many unstable countries in Europe, which had that problem, and particularly in the last years following growing fragmentation of parliaments and individualisation of the society with more and more different parties there have been quite a few examples of parliaments being blocked for years: Spain has been having a negative majority continiously since 2015 and still didn't find any way to stop it because of extremely egoistic and unexperienced party leaders (the initial reason had been the corruption in Rajoy's PP), the Netherlands could prevent it in 2017 in the by far longest government formation of their nation's history, in Belgium year-long periods without an elected government seem to become the norm now, Turkey would have been fucked (sorry) at the moment when the AKP loses its long-held majority (which was the case in 2015, and currently again since 2018), if they wouldn't have turned to an autocratic presidential system where Erdogan can issue what he wants, Israel is currently in such a situation permanently for the first time in their history and will (after two elections with very similar results) soon hold the third election in approximately only a half year! That's negative majority at its very "best", and this should appear in the article.
P. S.: Another example would be the 2019 Thuringian state election in Germany, which is actually the first time since 1933 that a German parliamentary election has produced a negative majority because the far-left "The Left" and the far-right "AfD" together have more than 50 % of the seats, but could never ever cooperate together. Because of the CDU refusing any thinkable support for a Left government (as demonising the Left for proposing democratic socialism and being the legal succesor of the East German SED has been a core part of any CDU campaign in Germany since 1990) and because of the FDP behaving the same towards a potential minority government of Left, SPD, Greens, it is impossible to form a positive majority in any way. This could actually lead up to a full parliamentary period of 5 years with an Acting Minister-President and acting government and without electing any new government for the whole period (a szenario which has happened in a few states in the Weimar Republic) although a snap election will propably be more realistic, but such can be the most drastic consequence of a negative majority.
P.P.S.: Actually, the situation in the British parliament between the first time May had put her deal to a vote until Johnson's win in the general election has clearly been a time of negative majority, as the parliament couldn't agree on anything except from ditching everything the government came up with. The whole opposition (including the DUP, which strongly rejected the deal) had been against the minority government, showing the text book situation of an irreversible negative majority, but I guess it wasn't called like that in the British public as everyone still delusionally wanted to try and keep working with this disfunctional parliament. The only times this parliament could agree on anything Brexit-related was when they wanted to extend the deadline and prevent Johnson from fouling them with prorogation, while there was no hope that this heterogenous group would ever find a solution together how to go on after the extension. To be honest it almost had constitutional dimensions, as Johnson had permanently lost his majority, but somehow it was rather down-played by the media, so it might be hard to include it as an example in the article. --SamWinchester000 (talk) 12:28, 25 December 2019 (UTC)
thread_title:  Negative Majority 

message: A discussion is taking place to address the redirect Majoritarian. The discussion will occur at Wikipedia:Redirects for discussion/Log/2020 May 26#Majoritarian until a consensus is reached, and readers of this page are welcome to contribute to the discussion.  Sangdeboeuf (talk) 16:49, 26 May 2020 (UTC)
thread_title:  "Majoritarian" listed at [[Wikipedia:Redirects for discussion|Redirects for discussion]] 

message: Right now the article tries to cover both political philosophy and social choice results like May's theorem. I'd prefer to separate these topics out into two articles, one on the majority rule function (i.e. Condorcet's principle restricted to acyclic elections) and another spinning off the criticisms of "majority rule" into some article on political philosophy. –Sincerely, A Lime 16:06, 21 May 2024 (UTC)
thread_title:  Split into a political philosophy article and a social choice article