Talk:Free will/Archive 3

message: I have found the following quote from the Wikipedia Manuel of Style can save a lot of painful circumlocution:
:Nevertheless, it might sometimes be appropriate to use "we" or "one" when referring to an experience that anyone, any reader, would be expected to have, such as general perceptual experiences. For example, although it might be best to write, "When most people open their eyes, they see something", it is still legitimate to write, "When we open our eyes, we see something", and it is certainly better than using the passive voice: "When the eyes are opened, something is seen."
Rick Norwood 22:24, 23 March 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: It is the uncertainty [principle], and all the other quirks [that is part] of quantum mechanics, not that the quantum mechanics is uncertain. An ambiguous statement, not a mistaken one. The particles in the quantum mechanical system are uncertain, as well as potential reactions. Elle vécut heureuse à jamais (Be eudaimonic!) 10:59, 24 March 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  The use of "we" 

message: The second paragraph of the determinism versus indeterminism section makes a meal out of the alleged commitment incompatibilists have to the agent being the "sole originating cause" of an action. This gives rise to a "problem" for incompatibilists that seems to me a false dilemma. To quote:
:In the case that the past conditions, but does not determine potential responses, this creates problems with the stipulation that the agent be the sole originating cause of the free act. Individual choices would be just one outcome amongst multiple possibilities, all of which are ultimately determined by the past; even if the agent arguably exerts the will freely in choosing amongst the available options, they are not the sole originating cause of the action.
Now, as I understand it, the important point for indeterminism is that a free action is unlike a caused action, not that a free action is somehow off in its own little universe (that is even an liberatarian could acknowledge that an agent might do what had worked in the past — the point is that they genuinely could have chosen otherwise, not that there are absolutely no other factors besides the will &mdash such factors, however, are only relevant as they are taken up by the will). The difficulty here seems to be a simple linguistic confusion: first "conditions" is differentiated from "determines" but then taken to mean "determines certain absolute restrictions without eliminating all choices", which it need not, and in this case, clearly does not, mean. Personally, I would favor getting rid of this "sole" originating cause language if it really gives rise to this confusion. Ig0774 10:51, 26 March 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: I wondered about this also, but my understanding of the paragraph is that agency theory goes beyond mere indeterminism, and would claim, for example, that people choose to be homosexual, or criminal, or Christian without any influence on their choice other than that they choose it.  At least, this is what the current article claims that "agency theory" states.  I don't know anything about "agency theory" except what I read in Wikipedia. Rick Norwood 14:39, 26 March 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  "Sole" originating cause 

message: I copy edited this recent addition: "For example, when Jesus was nailed on the cross, the two murderers, one on each side, were about to die. Only one asked Jesus for forgiveness while the other, even at the end of his life with nothing else to lose, mocked Jesus and chose everlasting death over everlasting life." But I do not think it is particularly useful or fitting to the section, and it should be deleted.  Comments? JHunterJ 09:33, 26 May 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: I expanded what you had done a bit.  I think it serves as a useful example of the point of disagreement between Calvinists and Armininians. Rick Norwood 21:32, 26 May 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: New example in Christian thought

message: Excellent quotes, Lestrade. Rick Norwood 23:04, 21 June 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Lestrade's edit 

message: Susan Blackmore and a bunch of other rationalist thinkers (especially those who are into Buddhist meditation) argue that free will is incoherent because no 'agent' actaully exists who can possibly have free will. It would be worth putting that in somewhere.  81.131.72.156 23:07, 29 July 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Argument against free will from no 'self' or 'I'? 

message: Why is it that the oriental orthodox are now speaking for all the orthodox and removing philosophical works about freewill by orthodox christians?
LoveMonkey 03:26, 12 August 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  removal of eastern orthodox opinions 

message: In spiritual science
Spiritual science research finds that : 
*35% of our lives are ruled by our free will (ie. are within our control)
*65% are ruled by destiny (ie. are not within our control). Examples of destined events include: birth, marriage, major accidents, death, etc.
However it is thought that we can overcome the 65% of our destiny part, by correctly using the 35% of our free will.
''
Comment:1) "Spiritual science" gets about 5 hits on Google. This may therefore be considered Original Resarch.  1) The article is already way too long and looks like a miscellanous grab-bag of "every possible topic or position that one can imagine that has ever been or will ever be remotely related to Free Will".  2) There is already more-than-sufficent discussion of spiritual views in this article, IMO. 3) Since we are in the midst of a process of Featrured Article Rewview and this article is obviously controversial, from now one any substanital new edits must first be discussded on the talk page and consensused. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 06:57, 15 August 2006 (UTC)
replies: text:  I don't mean to pick on your specific edits. It just seems fairly cleaer that this article suffers from a kind of dis-integration, in the strictest possible sense of that term. There is no idntifiable structure at all. It is just Free will according to X, Free will to Y, Free Will according to Q, Free will (or lack) according to Q1, Q2, Q3, etc.. This sort of thing has to have a limit somwhere. Soon, it will get down to the level of indivuals: free will according to Agnarius Pupillius the little-know 12th centruy Hessian monk, or Free will (better exampls) acording to scientology, Mormonims, Jehovah's witeness, Pentecostal denominationalism, an Ashante tribe of southwertsren Uganda, Swedenborgianim, etc... But whether it is kept or not, the larger problems from the FAR ponin of view  are copyediting and citations. Now, this is not my particualr areas of expertise and I'm a bit short on resources in this area (excpet what I can grab off the Web). First of all, we need to have a consistent citatation style.
The style I suggest is the one used in philosophy of mind, Bernard Williams and other articles. 
That is,  text blah, blah, blah.Gogilardi, F. (2004) The death of free will. New York: Macmillan. ISBN:009888 Text, blah, blah, blah... In fact, we can try it this way, I'll start copying out text and asking for specific, complete references. Anyone who has (or can find) reliable and complete sources for the text can post it underneath the text. Then, I will insert the full citations into the text. We can work on copyedit later.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 07:34, 16 August 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Text moved to talk page for discussion and consensus building

message: It may be a point of semantics, but the words "free will" are seemingly ill-defined in the opening paragraph of the article.  Free will should perhaps be defined by saying "Free will is degree to which, and in what sense, rational agents exercise control over their actions and decisions."  The rest of the article then deals with the debate concerning the existence of free will.    
As the opening sentence/paragraph currently stands, it sort of implicitly defines the words "free will" by talking about the main question associated with free will:  "The question of free will is whether, and in what sense, rational agents exercise control over their actions and decisions."  Note the lack of direct reference to the words "free will".
I'm not a philosopher, so I thought I would only point this out and leave the page edits to those who are experts.
137.82.36.10 20:46, 7 August 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Opening paragraph and definition of free will

message: I don't believe that is pointful to discuss genetics and biology if we are discussing causal determinism, unless we make it clear that these scientisms are the manner in which causal determinism would make itself felt, i.e. we are genetical biological organisms. But quite simply, if there is no 'will' or 'soul', then the universe is deterministic, there can be nothing that makes a decision ex nihilo, a decision is only chemicals in the brain acting as is necessary. Quantum mechanics seems to have no effect on determinism; it only shows that this is 'indeterminable determinism', and therefore it is impossible to predict the future. 
To wit, the world is deterministic, but this is really not a big deal, because, as modern biology and psychology shows us, the necessary choices we make are a result of the long line of causal events stretching to our birth which constitutes that which we think of as our 'self' (and earlier of course, but this 'we' do not experience). But it is important to note that scientific explanations merely confirm what is already known, namely that the universe is inherently deterministic; however, at the same time one realises that the consequences are not really that profound anyway. 
The one major impact though is the end of moral responsibility, as Friedrich Nietzsche expounded in Human All Too Human (1878). This means that justice and punishment are never in reality warranted, they are merely dispensed in order to scare other citizens into not committing further acts of criminality. Eventually, we will probably begin to treat the sources of criminality, such as economic inequality, boredom and general crapiness, instead of using fear. 
This second part is a little less important. The article does however need rewriting to show that biological and genetic determinism is merely the flesh on the bones, so to speak, of causal determinism, and is what should be expected given that we are human beings. If we were machines, we'd probably be writing about the determinism inherent in semi-conductor       encoding.
In summation, I visited the website sometime ago and emerged with a half-arsed understanding, but it does not seem that hard to give a coherent explanation of causal determinism that explains that biology and genetics are just what we are, i.e. causally determined beings. The explanation given is long-winded and dependent on historical arguments that no longer seem relevant, especially when the entirety of the issue can be explained in half as many words. It might be nice however to give an account of the development of the idea after one has given the rudimentary explanation of why free will is a linguistic fantasy. As far as I am aware, no scientist has ever observed a 'will'. So why do we waste our time arguing about whether such an imaginary object is 'free'? Tsop 13:37, 3 June 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  This article is in need of revising

message: Re: the Libet (1983) ref.  There are numerous previous articles by Libet on timing of actions, but this is the first to introduce the rotating dot/second hand manipulation to get at the timing of the sensation of conscious will question; it is also considered the most important reference on this subject by modern commentators (see e.,g the Haggard 2005 TiCS paper).  The closest previous is: 
* Libet et al., 1982 Libet, B., Wright, E.W. Jr, Feinstein, B. and Pearl, D.K. (1982), ‘Readiness potentials preceding unrestricted “spontaneous” vs pre-planned voluntary acts’. Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology, 54, pp. 322–35.
But this only focuses on the fact that the RP precedes spontaneous actions (previous studies had used actions in response to commands). User:edhubbard forgot to sign... It was posted about 10:00, 18 August, 2006 (UTC)  
:Ok, I just wasn't casting doubt. I just wanted confirmation from someone who knows about it, whethere that would be the appropriate citation. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 10:38, 18 August 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Don't worry, I know. I was just saying that I had gone back and double-checked.  I make plenty of reference mistakes (even a couple in published OR papers!) so no worries.  Edhubbard 10:44, 18 August 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Libet refs

message: Hi all. The first sentence of this article seems wrong: free will is a philosophical problem, surely, not a particular (libertarian) answer to that problem. How about this (as a first go): 
:The problem of free will is the prpblem of whether human beings really at freely, and therefore of what freedom of action means. Addressing this problem requires both understanding the relation between freedom and causation, and determining  whether all events are subject to causation. Positions taken on the problem therefore argue both over determinism versus indeterminism - whether all events are caused or not - and over compatibilism against incompatibilism - whether freedom can coexist with determinism or not. So, for instance, hard determinists about free will argue that determinism is true, and that this makes real free will impossible.
Any thoughts? Cheers, Sam Clark 11:17, 19 August 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: I've edit that para a bit: main problem was just the term pessimsism. I think "hard determinism" is more commonly used for that position. Pessimism, I think, is the idea that free will is false, whether determinism ois true or not.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 12:02, 19 August 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Agreed. Pessimism is a possible and by no means necessary psychological consequence tied more with fatalism than strict determinism. Zeusnoos 13:23, 21 August 2006 (UTC)

text: Hey Sam. I've worked mostly on trying to find sources, restructring and copyediting up to this point. There is still much work to be done on the old boy, espcially in the phi section. I thought I would leave the lead for last. Besides the problems you hae noted, it is not even close to a summary of the article.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 12:10, 19 August 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Lead para

message: Ok, I've changed the intro. The previous version did beg the question and there was that horrible, out-of-the blue,  sentence about Marx and Engles versus relgious authroties. I've devoped the determinims section so as to get the varios determinisms we are not interetested in discussin out of the way. I don't think we can adress all dtermeiens in this artcile. But if someone disagree, please leave a note. Now, I'm just going to add refs for that part. Then, I have to get off for the day.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 12:49, 19 August 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: New determinism section

message: Well, whatever the quality, one thing that cannot be said now is that this article lacks references. LOL!!
--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 13:04, 21 August 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Lost all?? There was only one when I first looked at it: an hyper-inflated image of D'Holbach in about the middle of the page. It was almost scary. I cut it down to 100pp and then, seeing that it still looked awkward with no other images, I just cut it out. t was weird. I will check in the history to see if there were any others. In any case, I agree there should be a few judiciously placed images added. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 07:12, 22 August 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Hmmm=

message: Great image!! I will get the link to the transcipt of the whole trial. Darrow makes one of the most impsiring, near-philosophical, speeches I've ever heard from a lawyer. He just comes right out and says it: I could never be a prosecutor. What a horrible occupation. You have to try to fix blame on soemone in a universe as screwed up as this one. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 08:17, 22 August 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Leopoldus and Lobulus

message: I was going to put in the following paragraph, but as this article is being reviewed for had at one point Featured status, I decided to throw my contribution to the dogs and see what people think.  I think it should go in the "Science and free will" section, but whether under the new subheading "Computability and free will" or under "Physics..." or "Neuroscience...", I don't know.  Here it is:
:In his controversial book A New Kind of Science, author Steven Wolfram suggests that it may be possible for what fully appears to be free will to exist in a deterministic world because of what he calls the principle of computational equivalence.  This principle posits that many computations of sufficient complexity are basically equivalent in the scope of what they can compute, and that their results cannot be obtained by any simpler computation.  
:If the workings of one's brain can be thought of as a "computation", then there is technically no such thing as free will.  Yet if the principle of computational equivalence applies to the brain's workings, then there exists no way even in principle to determine what the outcome of the thought process will be that is any simpler than just observing the outcome of the process itself.  So for every conceivable practical purpose, free will exists as an intrinsically intractable illusion brought on by the principle of computational equivalence.
To get some feel for the principle of computational equivalence, examples of such computations where that principle applies would (most likely) include NP-hard computations.  
The early word "controversial" sounds like POV, but I believe that can be demonstrated.  On the other hand, it certainly ins't essential.  I am sure this could use some other rewording, but I think it may be a valuable contribution.  Comments? Baccyak4H 15:29, 22 August 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: I was interested in this computability aspect to free will as well, although maybe my idea of it is different from yours. Basically I caught wind of the idea in a footnote in Dennett's Freedom Evolves (ch. 3, footnote 6, pg. 91), where it mentions that, because of the halting problem, even someone with a complete description of a deterministic universe and knowledge of the laws of physics would not be able--in principle--to determine his own future actions. Dennett says that this subject is discussed in the following sources: Ryle, Gilbert, 1949, The Concept of Mind, London:Hutchinson; Popper, Karl, 1951, "Indeterminism in Quantum Physics and Classical Physics", British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1, pp. 179-88; and MacKay, D.M., 1960, "On the Logical Indeterminacy of a Free Choice," Mind, 69, pp. 31-40. I have not looked at these, but I think I'll try digging them up--you may be interested in doing so, too. More to the point, if the idea I'm talking about here is essentially the same as the idea that you cite from Wolfram's book, then you might want to base your contribution on those instead. I don't have any personal opinion on Wolfram and have never read more than a few pages of his stuff, but I do know that his book was not peer reviewed (or at least, self-published), and that there are at least some people who explicitly accuse him of quackery and of being less than rigorous in citing sources. Even if this is all heresay, it raises a red-flag, I think, for the acceptability of Wolfram as a source for a Wiki, and if there's less controversial references we could make, we should use those. -David Morris 70.137.167.58 09:14, 15 June 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Computability and free will

message: We may have to fork off the science section. Especially if we start adding the Wolframs, computational versus connectionist free will, free will as decsribed by Jennifer Lopez, etc........--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 16:12, 22 August 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: I agree that we have to be careful about adding any more to the science.  From a philosophical point of view, this is a sign of an active field and question.  However, from the standpoint of the free-will encyclopedia entry, we have to keep it on track.  My vote is that we not add more stuff right now, as the article is still under FAR, but once that passes, we think about forking off the science and free will section, and then we should add the Wolfram thing... Wolfram's arguments remind me of Hofstader and Dennett's arguments about "as if" semantics/intentionality, given the recursive level-jumping abilities of human cognition.  Perhaps Wolfram is on to something here, but it seems too speculative to include at this point.  Discussing Wolfram's idea, and any controversy around it would definitely push us into forking.  It's so close right now, I keep holding my breath when I look at the change log... Edhubbard 16:21, 22 August 2006 (UTC)

text: This sounds like a sub-variety of emergentist theory.  Would it make more sense to rephrase the "Determinism and Emergent Behaviour" section to include computation complexity arguments?  That stuff is already partly forked to Emergence.  Let promote the Emergence link to a partial fork but leave the rest of the science for now. Bmorton3 16:24, 22 August 2006 (UTC)

text: The question is never really what should be added to this article, but what short summaries should be left in it. Ideally, ALL the sections should be like the physics and free will, theology and free will, biology and free will section. There hsould be a link to main article: compatibilism (that should be seprated from incompatibilism, BTW) , for example, with a summary of three of four paras. [Determinism], same thing. The neuroscience section may need to be fairly extended. But, the point is, even if it were taken out, we should ask; "What needs to be left in this (main) overview article?"--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 16:36, 22 August 2006 (UTC)

text: Bmorton3, I like your first go through.  Much more concise than my suggestion, in the right place, with reference. Baccyak4H 17:10, 22 August 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: The subject is infinite!!

message: Does anyone know why older books don't have ISBN numbers on them? What the heck does ISBN stand for anyway?
Never mind. I got the answers at ISBN.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 11:11, 24 August 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: ISBN numbers

message: ooh I like the Libet image!!! I looked for a good one and couldn't find one! Schopenhauer is good too.
Bmorton3 20:06, 24 August 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Images

message: After the work that was put in by vasrious people here, I would hope that the intention is not to go back to the sort of mess that we inherited from the previous editors.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 13:55, 25 August 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Not go back!!

message: I tend to be a very visual thinker, so I thought that perhaps some people would appreciate this simplified diagram of the possible philosophical positions regarding the problem of free will.  I created the image using MS Word, and then converted to png going through Photoshop.  I have the original text and can modify the image to specs if anyone wants a higher resolution version, of if you have any thoughts about chaning it around.  One thing that I noticed is that my thinking seems clearer if I put the question of determinism first, and the question of whether free will exists or not as secondary.  If we just reorder the two quesions in the intro this will flow, and there will be a good fit between the image and the text.  Let me know what you think. Edhubbard 23:23, 25 August 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: I've uploaded an improved version of the image.  Now all the possible philosophical positions are located at the same level, so we aren't putting on above another.  I have also added question marks for the two main questions, and colored those boxes orange.  The blue and gray have been lightened, as they appeared somewhat too dark on my screen at thumbnail size (although it was ok at full size).  Let me know if you have any other changes.  Edhubbard 23:53, 25 August 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Great thanks!Bmorton3 13:45, 28 August 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: New image

message: Many of you have done amazing work on this article in roughly two weeks. I finally looked at the state of this article when nominated for FAR—what a difference! (I am almost done with my own copy review of it.) Truly the best of Wikipedia here! Outriggr 09:10, 27 August 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Yes, it was almost intimidatingly bad. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 09:24, 27 August 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Featured article review