Talk:List of sovereign states/Archive 4

message: I would like to change the vertical "List by country" navigational box on the right of this page to a horizontal one at the bottom. Please discuss at Template talk:Lists by country. --ChoChoPK (球球PK) (talk | contrib) 12:53, 10 January 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  "List by country" navigational box 

message: I believe the entire problem lies in the understanding of this expression. My oppinion is the following: Transnistria does not have this capacity to enter into relations with the other states. Transnistria does not have the capacity to control its foreign commerce, as proves the Ukrainian requirement for Moldovan papers. And from what I know, Transnistria does not have the basic capacity of issuing  de facto accepted passports (this is why every other Transnistrian as a Russian/Moldovan/other passport). Dpotop 20:41, 18 January 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Apart from the fact that your characterization is incorrect, foreign trade, passports, etc are not mentioned in the Montevideo Convention at all and rarely enter into a consideration of statehood issues in international law. On the other hand, what is specifically mentioned is the capacity to enter into relations with other states. Here, not only does Transnistria have the capacity. It has actual relations. Last week alone, 16 agreements were signed with Russia. Agreements have also been signed Moldova, with Ukraine, and numerous with the OSCE who is a "conglomorate" which represents states only. The OSCE keeps a permanent office in Tiraspol, the capital of Transnistria. This is not original research. Sources can be provided for all of the above. - Mauco 21:24, 18 January 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  So, what exactly does qualify as "international relation" as concerns sovereignty? Just about any piece of paper? But then, you have guerillas in Colombia that control their territory and engage in peace talks and hostage exchange with other governments. :) Are they sovereign? Dpotop 06:13, 19 January 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Even a private company can sign agreements with a foreign government. Does it mean that private companies are sovereign states?--MariusM 13:45, 19 January 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  No. The capacity to enter into relations is only one of four criteria which together form a principle in customary international law. The other three are population, territory and government. Transnistria meets these requirements. Private companies do not, nor do Colombian guerilla groups. - Mauco 13:53, 19 January 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Can you describe something which does not, under your definition, have the capacity to enter into relations with other states?  You seem to have diluted this principle to the point of near meaninglessness.  I think what we need here is citations - some sort of textbook explanation of what this principle means would be very helpful here. john k 14:42, 19 January 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  Relations with other states would include official visits (where the head of a state is referred to by his official title by the government of the receiving state). Apart from their lack of the other three criteria of the Montevideo Convention, that is something which guerilla groups or private companies, to name the two extreme examples, can never obtain. - Mauco 15:10, 19 January 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  Well, mentioning self-styled titles is usual when dealing with breakaway/guerilla entities. I presume what you would need to show is actual official documents of another state signed by both Smirnov (or other minister), in his quality of President of Transnistria", and some other chief of state. Something that goes beyond the mere solving of the border conflict. Dpotop 15:32, 19 January 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  I am referring to an official statement (press release) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a foreign country which refers to Igor Smirnov as President of Pridnestrovskaia Moldavskaia Respublica (the official name of Transnistria). This is a U.N. Security Council member. I can assure you that these things are not dealt with lightly and that this is not "usual" (as you claim) when "when dealing with breakaway/guerilla entities" (as you claim). You may want to provide sources to back up the somewhat novel theory that this is usual in international relations. Furthermore, I merely gave this as an example. There are numerous other items of evidence in the "capacity supporting" category, and I would most certainly also include international bilateral Ministry-to-Ministry agreements in that field as well. Last week alone, a further 16 of these were added. - Mauco 18:52, 19 January 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  I presume that by "member of the UN security council" you mean Russia. Well, I find extremely important that even the country that created and supported Transnistria as a breakaway entity (including militarily) refuses to recognize it as a sovereign state. Turkey, for instance, has recognized Northern Cyprus. For me, this means that there's no way Transnistria will be a normal state in the near future. Not even Russia openly supports its sovereignty. It's just another way to create a frozen conflict zone near the EU and NATO. Dpotop 19:49, 19 January 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  I hate to be harsh, but that is really a straw man argument. We are NOT giving sources as to whether or not Transnistria will "be a normal state in the near future". That is, frankly, irrelevant to this list. All we need to determine is if it meets the criteria listed by the Montevideo Convention. We are clear on the first three, and I have given five sources to document that it also meets the fourth. Not content with that, you now change the goal posts? Sorry, but the very same Montevideo Convention is also clear on the recognition issue, as are the sources which I have provided. So please just stick to the topic, and we can quickly close out this discussion.  - Mauco 23:39, 19 January 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: What does "capacity to enter into relations with the other states" means?

message: From "Engaging Eurasia's Separatist States--Unresolved Conflicts and DeFacto States" by Dov Lynch, the first book I've come across that deals with Transnistria, South Ossetia, et al. in a cohesive fashion... Regarding "empirical" claims to statehood: "The classic definition of an entity that may be regarded as a sovereign state was set forth in the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States of 1933. The Montevideo criteria are that an entity have (1) a permanent population, (2) a defined territory, (3) a government, and (4) the capacity to enter into relations with other states. The post-Soviet de facto states fulfill the first three of these criteria and claim to pursue the fourth. However, the empirical qualifications of the de facto state cannot make it legal or legitimate in international society. As [Scott] Pegg [academic expert in international relations teaching at Indiana University] argued, it is 'illegitimate no matater how effective it is'.... The de facto state claims both to be sovereign over its territory and people, and to be constitutionally independent of any other state. The key difference for the de facto state resides in its non-recognition. This status prevents it from enjoying membership in the club of states--the de facto state does not have recognized external sovereignty."
* So, bottom line, is Transnistria et al are not sovereign because they are not recognized. Original research by Wiki editors protesting the "latest" A,B, and C "deals" (versus reputable, non-partisan, recognized expert academic sources) cannot change that.
* From http://www.sgpproject.org/experts/dov_lynch.html: Dov Lynch has been Lecturer in War Studies at King’s College, London since September 1999. Prior to this, he was University Lecturer in International Relations/Russian Foreign Policy at the University of Oxford for 1999, and a Research Fellow at St Antony's College. He was also a Research Fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Russia and Eurasia Programme. He received a doctorate in International Relations from the University of Oxford (St Antony's College) in 1997, and a BA in Soviet Studies from Yale University in 1992. In 2001, he was invited to be a Research Fellow with the EU Institute of Security Studies.  Dov Lynch is currently Director of a two-year project funded by the United States Institute of Peace called 'Exiting from Volatile Impasses: De Facto States in Euro-Asian Security.'  His major publications include  Russian Peacekeeping Strategies towards the CIS, (2000) and co-edited volumes on Energy in the Caspian Region (2002) and The Euro-Asian World: A Period of Transition  (2000). He has also written Occasional Paper 32 and is writing a  Chaillot Paper on Russian-EU Relations. Dr. Lynch’s specialties are EU-Russian relations, security developments in Russia and the former Soviet Union, as well as EU policies towards the region.
Transnistria is not sovereign. Montevideo, as argued here by Mauco and others, does not confer sovereignty on Transnistria; same for the other frozen conflict zones.
* And no commentary would be complete without... "I dispute Mauco's source as partisan." And Mauco's usual "consider the words not the source." ("Do not focus on Zatulin's nationality, please, but on his scolarly credentials in the field. He is the top expert in the State Duma.") Anyone who is a deputy of the Russian State Duma cannot possibly be regarded as non-partisan.  —  Pēters J. Vecrumba 03:15, 30 January 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Montevideo and the so-called "frozen conflict" zones

message: I just thought I'd post this as an example. I took the U.N. members list, defaulted all to recognizing each other (easier), added in a few non-members (like the Holy See, Palestine...), then adjusted Israel to indicate who does not recognize it. I've uploaded a small sampling of the spreadsheet.  —  Pēters J. Vecrumba 22:52, 9 February 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: I applaud your compiling this table and I think it can be a great asset, but I do have to ask: how do you actually know who recognises whom? Do you know whom North-Korea is recognised by? sephia karta 23:53, 12 February 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  Maybe what Vercrumba did is the only NPOV thing that can be done if this article is to be NPOV. Dpotop 11:29, 13 February 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: There is, of course, a distinction to be made between having diplomatic relations with a country and recognizing it as a sovereign state.   There is also a distinction to be made  between not recognizing  the ruling regime of a country, and not recognizing a country itself.  For instance, many countries took a while to recognize the Bolshevik regime in Russia after 1917.  But none of them ceased to recognize Russia as a country.  They just didn't recognize any regime there.  Afghanistan under the Taliban was  a similar case.  Almost no countries recognized the  Taliban regime, but a few did  (I believe it was just Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE).  Others recognized the old Rabbani government that controlled a tiny fraction of the country, and still others did not recognize any  government.  But everyone recognized Afghanistan as  being a de jure sovereign state.  The situation in Somalia today is somewhat similar. The situation of China might be considered similar  - just about everyone recognizes that a country "China" exists.   But  there  is disagreement as to which regime represents that state  - the ROC in Taipei, or the PRC in Beijing.  We should be careful about these distinctions. john k 05:11, 14 February 2007 (UTC)

text:  Dpotop, that is not an answer to my question. john k, I agree. sephia karta 11:04, 14 February 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  To john k, an authority is recognized as de jure or not. In the case of China, PRC is now the majority-recognized authority, the ROC is not, over Taiwan. Again, our mission here is not to determine who is "right" in the disagreement over who is the "appropriate" authority, it is to just report the facts. Basing an encyclopedia article about the sovereignty of states on wishful interpretations of Montevideo and declarative theories of statehood is a vast disservice to Wikipedia's readers. Who recognizes whose sovereignty is the only NPOV solution. —  Pēters J. Vecrumba 23:17, 15 April 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Table Strawman

message: Inclusion of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in this list is a clear promotion of Russian POV. Neither of these entities is a sovereign state but rather is piece of Georgian territory occupied by Russia. This should be clear to anyone who follows the news. They are run by Russian-backed governments (in SO over half of high level officials are on active military duty for Russian army); their borders are protected by Russian soldiers; they have even less autonomy in making their decisions than any autonomous region in Russian Federation (Chechnya anyone?); SO regime stated numerous times that they do not want to be independent – their aim is to be a part of Russia; the separatist governments do not even control all of the territory they want to separate from Georgia (both Abkhazia and SO are divided into parts with pro-Russian and pro-Georgia factions). How can anyone, especially after the events of the last year, claim that Abkhazia and SO are sovereign states?! Irakliy81 05:24, 13 February 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Abkhazia's president is elected by its population rather than being appointed by the Russian president (as Russian regional heads are). Last time the Russian-backed candidate (Khajimba) actually lost the election to Sergei Bagapsh. These are the arguments in favour of the de-facto independence (sovereignty) of Abkhazia. Alaexis 19:16, 20 February 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  You again demonstrate the lack of information you have on the problem. Bagapsh was "elected" by 1/5 to 1/4 of the population of Abkhazia. The rest of people who are Abkhazia's residents and property owners are forcibly restricted from entering the territory by Russian forces and the local regime, just because of their ethnic origin. It is neither legally nor morally correct to speak about "elections", when majority of the population are ethnically persecuted and have no part in the process. Pirveli 18:28, 21 February 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Why is this article promoting Russian POV?!!! (or are we back to where we were a year ago)

message: Right now, this list is using the Montevideo Convention as its yardstick for sovereignty. There are also other ways to define what is and is not a sovereign state, however. Stephen Krasner, in his book "Sovereignty" (), lists four other definitions. Would it help to add those to the list? Perhaps by listing four + Montevideo, and making a ruleset for this list that if a country meets two out of four, sourced of course, then it can be deemed sovereign as regards inclusion in this list.  Krasner is an authority on the matter. He is currently with the United States State Department and a big part of his work relates to the shaping of policy for issues involving questions of sovereignty. - Mauco 00:35, 16 February 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  No, they wouldn't, unless you have reputable sources stating that those disputed entities are sovereign, in which case the definition of sovereignty  is not important. Dpotop 11:37, 18 February 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Excuse me, but this is wholly unscientific. There is no ultimate truth according to which a state is or is not sovereign, definition is everything. If a source sais that a state is sovereign then it it is either using a certain concept/definition of sovereignty and has found it to apply in the case of that state, or it is merely voicing an unfounded opinion. sephia karta 13:27, 18 February 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  Nope, you're on wikipedia here, not in some research institute. The scientific method is not Wikipedia's rule, which instead has its own set of rules. Original research is rejected, even though it may be done in accordance to the scientific method. So, if everybody believes that 1=2, and if all reputable sources say so, then Wikipedia must report it as such. Dpotop 00:06, 19 February 2007 (UTC)

text: Stephen Krasner is considered one of the world's top sovereignty experts. Princeton scholar, State Department expert, etc. I am taken aback by User:Dpotop's kneejerk rejection of every proposal or suggestion made by me. But we can of course just stick to Montevideo, which is quite close to the classical treatment of sovereignty under international law. - Mauco 01:11, 19 February 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  And I've already produced an expert source on the frozen conflict states who has written about Montevideo specifically and that sovereignty cannot exist without legitimacy. Until de jure sovereign countries begin recognizing the separatist states, you cannot claim sovereignty. Your contentions (and 1 out of four, or 2 out of four plus 2 out of some other 4 criteria are sufficient to represent an authority as sovereign) is all WP:OR. If you would like a de facto autonomous or de facto independent list, that's fine, but de facto sovereign, which is what you advocate, is a fundamental and untenable contradiction in terms.  —  Pēters J. Vecrumba 01:54, 19 February 2007 (UTC)

text: On the contrary, we cannot stick to our own interpretations of Montevideo or any other legislation; that is the very definition of original research.  Rather, we must quote experts who state whether or not these areas are "sovereign states". Jayjg (talk) 01:56, 19 February 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Would different definitions of sovereignty help? 

message: I've just visited this page - so I'm not really about its history - but shouldn't Palestine be on here? According to the standards (population - check, defined - check, negotiate - check) it seemingly should.Daniel()Folsom T|C|U 23:35, 19 February 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Oh, I see there's been some discussion - in that case I feel the only debatable thing would be the land, but this article proves that some land does belong to Palestine (note: it's from the Washington Post - which has to be reliable). The population is fairly obvious given the reason for withdrawing and the existance of land (why would you withdraw from an empty space?) and the negotiations are obviously going on per the conflict.Daniel()Folsom T|C|U 23:39, 19 February 2007 (UTC)

text: The de jure state of Transnistria controls no territory (and its very existence is not accepted internationally, which is different from PLO/etc), and de facto the Transnistrian government is not sovereign. So, why do we, editors, discriminate here between these states? Dpotop 07:28, 20 February 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: My understanding was that Trasnistria was a de facto state which de facto controls territory, even if internationally that territory is considered to be part of Moldova. This is not at all comparable to Palestine. john k 15:22, 20 February 2007 (UTC)

text: Ok now that I've looked up de jure - than who legally controls the Gaza Strip - I mean how can one country give land to another - but the latter not legally own the land? It'd  be like if the United States didn't own California or anything west of the mississippi (I can't think of any English examples because my studies have focused on America -but I'm sure there are some)Daniel()Folsom |\T/|\C/|\U/ 12:15, 20 February 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: The Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank are controlled by the Palestinian Authority, which is not a sovereign entity.  The State of Palestine, a de jure entity, is controlled by the PLO, which is a distinct organization from the PA, but controls no territory. john k 15:22, 20 February 2007 (UTC)

text:  this list includes both de facto and de jure states, so if Palestine fits one of these two it can be on the list. but what I am not sure of, does it have defined borders? because I read somewhere that there are some of the groups in Palestine who claim all of Israel as theirs, it is similar to how there were groups in Taiwan until recently and they said that all of China was theirs, AFAIK the official position of Taiwan has backed away from that claiming now. But back to Palestine, what is the border situation, remember  one of the requirements is a defined territory Pernambuco 14:05, 20 February 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  Borders. You mean, the borders revendicated by the Palestinian Authority, as compared to those revendicated by Transnistria? Because, mind you, Transnistria controls certain territories outside Transnistria and does not control certain territories inside Transnistria. Like any normal sovereign state, you would say. Dpotop 14:09, 20 February 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  i was asking about the borders of Palestine, anyone know please? Pernambuco 14:11, 20 February 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Palestine does not have defined borders.  I would think that they at least claim all of the territory of the former Palestine Mandate that was not controlled by Israel before 1967,  but I don't think they've specifically renounced all territories beyond that. The exact borders of the State of  Palestine are to be determined by final status negotiations with Israel. john k 15:22, 20 February 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Palestine?

message: Can someone please change the flagicon template  to  (removing redirect) as the redirect will soon be updated with a new unrelated template.
Thank you. // Laughing Man 02:11, 23 February 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Can someone please help?  // Laughing Man 21:39, 1 March 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Done. Picaroon 22:46, 2 March 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  Thank you. :) // Laughing Man 01:21, 3 March 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  minor change during page protection 

message: I noticed that in Montevideo Convention the word sovereignty is not used. Dl.goe 10:03, 2 March 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  I beefed up your remark. It's far too important in this case. Dpotop 10:26, 2 March 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Montevideo does not use the word "Sovereign" 

message: There's a good, and fairly balanced, run down of Montevideo at The Head Heeb blog from a couple of years ago.  Jonathan Edelstein, who writes the blog, probably doesn't qualify as a reliable source by wikipedia standards - he's a lawyer, but doesn't seem to have any academic credentials or non-self-publications, but he's a smart, well-informed person on these kinds of subjects.  Edelstein's discussion would suggest that a place like Somaliland more or less fits all four Montevideo criteria, at least de facto - he calls New Caledonia a 3.5 on Montevideo, and surely Somaliland's capacity to engage in foreign relations is considerably greater than that of New Caledonia.  But I'm still not sure what to make of Transnistria and the Caucasian entities. Anyway, it's interesting reading, and sheds some light, I think, on how the Montevideo criteria are conventionally interpreted, and on the ways that the whole determination, especially of point 4, is becoming more difficult due to the increasing rights in foreign policy given to entities that are not considered sovereign states. john k 20:21, 5 March 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Montevideo, again 

message: Why isn't Aruba included in the list? Eliko 15:12, 25 March 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: So the article about Aruba includes some wrong information: in the tabulation in the right side - the year of independence is indicated as 1986...Eliko 01:15, 28 March 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: What about [[Aruba]]?

message: Ok - so us determining what states are sovereign based off a critera seems likes it's not working. Why don't we get a list of sovereign states (there has to be one somewhere) and cite the entire thing with that.danielfolsom © 05:46, 9 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: I know it is not a requirement, but I'm just saying ... the page is so controversial that perhaps here we should require one.danielfolsom © 14:32, 9 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: ok how bout this - if you want a country listed here, you have to get a Notable source to confirm it (not say that it should be here, but confirm it)danielfolsom© 21:53, 13 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  This is a minimum requirement, and it would be advisable in contentious cases to require more than one source and request that such sources are peer reviewed. Britlawyer 01:57, 14 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Nono, not more than one - just one - right now there are nonedanielfolsom© 03:04, 14 April 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Source?

message: :::(a) Is rather argumentative when 2/3 of Abkhazian population has been displaced and remains in temporary refugee camps. The situation is even less clear in South Ossetia which is a mosaic of Georgian and Ossetian villages.
:::: Irakliy, check the Soviet 1989 census data (Abkhazia#Demographics). Georgians constituted 240,000 out of 525,000 in the republic then. That's less than half and not two thirds already and we should remember that some Georgians have returned to Gali district. Anyway the current population of Abkhazia is permanent. Alaexis 19:55, 20 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  Not only Georgians left Abkhazia after the war – tens of thousands of Russians, Armenians, Greeks, and even Abkhazians themselves no longer live there. The ‘current’ population of Abkhazia is temporary and it will remain temporary until the refuges are allowed to return. Irakliy81 20:09, 20 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  Russians, Armenians, Greeks, Jews and Abkhazians left the republic voluntarily. There are no neutral sources stating that there was an ethnic cleansing of any of these peoples. A lot of people (Georgians, Russians and others) voluntarily left Georgia also. In both cases the current population is permanent. Check the dictionary for the word's meaning. Alaexis 20:18, 20 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  You are correct, there was no ethnic cleansing against Armenians, Greeks, Russians etc. – only against Georgians. This does not negate the fact that current population of Abkhazia is barely 1/3 of what it before the war. And out of that 1/3 almost 30% are not subjugated to Bagapsh/Khadjimba regime. I don’t want to argue here about the definition of “permanent” but understand this: people who are temporarily displaced are as much ‘population’ of Abkhazia as those who live there now. This fact would have had no relevance if the number of such people was small but given that it is over 50% I hesitate to say that territory controlled by Bagapsh/Khandjimba regime has permanent population. Irakliy81 03:29, 21 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  According to the 2003 census (it's not recognised by Georgia but I don't think there's more reliable information about Abkhazia's population) there were 215,000 people in Abkhazia. That's not 1/3 of the pre-war population. Anyway the population of Upper Abkhazia is about 2,000 according to the Georgian census so it can't possibly be 30% of the total Abkhazia's population. The people who were forcefully displaced account for less than 50%. The amount of people who left Abkhazia voluntarily has nothing to do with this issue. Alaexis 07:26, 21 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: The 215,000 figure is quite exaggerated. I could easily prove to you why but don’t want to be sidetracked into a separate discussion. I believe that the actual number is somewhere between 160,000 and 180,000 which is roughly 1/3 of the pre-war population. When I said that about 30% of the current population do not accept Bagapsh/Khadjimba regime I meant not only the residents of Upper Abkhazia but also those of Gali region as well (about 40,000 people). True, Gali region is not under control of central Georgian authorities but Abkhazian control over that region is also rather nominal – basically the region is controlled by local Georgian population. Irakliy81 18:18, 21 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  I'd ask for sources proving your claims again. UN, for example, criticised Abkhazian authorities for the human rights abuses in Gali district ( 	Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced persons, Walter Kälin - Mission to Georgia). So their control is sufficient to make UN hold them responsible for what's happening there. Alaexis 18:53, 21 April 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: (a) - Abkhazia

message: :::(b) Neither Abkhazia nor South Ossetia controls the territories they claim. Abkhazian regime controls less than 70% of pre-war Abkhazia and South Ossetian regime controls even less (around 50%). Irakliy81 20:09, 20 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  That's not mandatory. India, Cyprus and Serbia also don't control all the territory they claim. The (b) qualification requires the entity to have a defined territory. Alaexis 19:55, 20 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  Don’t call it “Abkhazia” then, call it Lower Abkhazia. Same thing for SO – call it Tskhinvali region because most of territory of former SO is not controlled by Kakoyti regime. Irakliy81 20:14, 20 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  Again, we are talking about the entities "Republic of Abkhazia" and "Republic of South Ossetia". The territory they control is easily defined. Alaexis 20:36, 20 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  Try defining it. The territory that is under ‘de facto’ control of those regimes is pretty difficult to pinpoint. Irakliy81 03:40, 21 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  In Abkhazia it's not difficult at all. Basically it's all the territory of the Abkhaz ASSR with the exception of Upper Abkhazia. See this map for the territories controlled by Georgia and RSO. Alaexis 07:26, 21 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: In Abkhazia, the Bagaphs/Khadjimba regime does not really control Gali region. In SO, the notion of ‘control’ outside of the conflict zone near Tskhinvali is rather ambiguous (see what I wrote above). Irakliy81 18:38, 21 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  I've written about Gali higher. Even though you don't understand how could the authorities control a village the International Crisis Group ngo apparently does (see map). And the threshold for inclusion in Wikipedia is verifiability, not truth (see Wikipedia:Verifiability). Alaexis 19:06, 21 April 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: (b)

message: :::(c) The “governments” of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are not sovereign – they depend on Russia in almost anything they do. Moreover, South Ossetian “government” never even said that they want to be a sovereign nation – all they want is to integrate into Russia (which they stated more times than I can count). Why do we assign “sovereignty” to entities that explicitly say that they don’t want to be “sovereign”? Irakliy81 18:48, 20 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  See my arguments about Abkhazia higher. It's true that Mr. Kokoyty expressed the desire to unify both Ossetias inside Russia  but it has not happened yet. Could you bring some neutral references that prove that S. Ossetia's government depends on Russia in almost anything they do? Alaexis 19:54, 20 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  Kokoyti refused multiple times to have peace talks with Georgian government directly without Russian intermediaries. Morevoer, Kokoyti is not the only SO president. There are actually two SO governments working in parallel. Why do you disregard that fact? Irakliy81 20:20, 20 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  Could you bring some neutral references that prove that S. Ossetia's government depends on Russia in almost anything they do? Alaexis 20:36, 20 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  Again, there would be no ‘neutral’ references to show that. Such things are usually not made public and when they are there is not enough interest in ‘neutral’ countries to record them. If you want to see that RSO government is completely dependent on Russia just read the names/biographies of its ministers (prime minister, defense minister etc.) They are people who were born and grew up in Russia and never even visited SO before they were appointed to their posts. Irakliy81 18:45, 21 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  That's not true (about neutral sources). I've already gave quite a few references to various neutral sources like ngos, UN, bbc etc. Otherwise your arguments would be original research. Alaexis 19:11, 21 April 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: (c)

message: I propose we create two lists. The first for all countries recognized by the United Nations, the second for every other state with disputed sovereign status, with a note explaining the reason for this status.Souris2005 20:53, 17 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Not necessary, there is already a List of unrecognized countries. Editors have been busy trying to duplicate that list here as "sovereign" countries using the WP:OR part of part of Montevideo criteria. —  Pēters J. Vecrumba 03:49, 20 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  Original research is not required to interpret the Montevideo Convention or the concepts of international law upon which it rests. This is an area already well covered in the literature (references upon request).  Britlawyer 15:32, 23 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  To follow up on this, Montevideo has been amply covered in legal literature precisely because it was ratified by, inter alia, the United States. Even a small law library will have at least half a dozen sources. For purposes of defining inclusion criteria for a list such as this, an adequate source is "International Law", Third Edition, by Barry E. Carter (Professor of Law, Georgetown University) and Phillip R. Trimble (Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles), page 462, section A, part 1, entitled What Is a "State"?  Britlawyer 23:28, 26 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  Do these texts refer explicitly to the cases under discussion here? If not, we'd still be left with original research. Fut.Perf. ☼ 16:16, 27 April 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Create two lists on this page 

message: There seems to be some inconsistency if the list includes Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus but not Transdniestria and Abkhazia. Britlawyer 15:37, 23 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: All of them are not states and as per UN resolutions (latest SC Resolution) and recognitions Abkhazia is part of Georgia for good (de facto or not), as per the rest, the article title is "List of sovereign states." None are sovereign and none are even close to be sovereign. They all should be removed. Ldingley 16:00, 23 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: I agree with Ldingley that all unrecognized countries should be removed from this "sovereign states" list and I propose to have a "See also" section where we will link to the List of unrecognized countries.--MariusM 19:36, 23 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  I would not object to removing these states from the list as well. Although, I should point out that do not know enough about Nagorno-Karabakh / Somaliland / Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to make an educated decision (as I can in case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia). Irakliy81 18:56, 24 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  All of them should be dealt with separately taking into account the inclusion criteria. Alternatively you could create a list of states recognised by UN. Alaexis 20:27, 24 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Inclusion in the list means the entity is a "sovereign state". Is Wikipedia setting the criteria for what constitutes a "sovereign state"? Sounds like WP:OR and POV pushing.--Ploutarchos 21:04, 24 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  No; no. The states that satisfy the inclusion criteria are listed here. Alaexis 05:42, 25 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: And who decides if a particular entity satisfies the criteria? You? That's original research. Unless we have a reliable source saying that Transnistria etc are "sovereign states", they have no business in this list.--Ploutarchos 10:46, 25 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  This is easily settled. If it quacks like a duck, one needs merely apply the test of qualifications. Doing so is not original research, or how else would one be able to compile a similar list. However, on 9 April 2007 and 14 April 2007 I wrote on this page that a source should be required for each contentious edit inclusion. Britlawyer 23:49, 26 April 2007 (UTC)

text:  I'm with Ploutarchos on this one. It may be just a duck test, but it's an original-research duck test all the same. And sorry, Britlawyer, your last argument doesn't hold: If you need original research in order to compile such a list, then the logical consequence is not that you should tolerate original research, but that you shouldn't be compiling the list. Fut.Perf. ☼ 07:32, 27 April 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Nagorno-Karabakh / Somaliland / Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

message: Reading the comments on this page it seems that there is some confusion over how to interpret the Montevideo Convention as well as a belief that it is recognition by other states which makes a state a state in international law (the discarded "constitutive" theory of statehood).
The qualifications set forth in Montevideo adhere to the body of international law, inasmuch as they now form the basis for foreign relations law of most states in the world today. For example the Restatement of the Law Third, Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, repeats the Montevideo qualifications, and its Comment elaborates on them. I refer to Restatement Section 201:
* Defined territory: An entity may satisfy the territorial requirement for statehood even if its boundaries have not been finally settled, if one or more of its boundaries are disputed, or if some of its territory is claimed by another state. 
* Permanent population: To be a state an entity must have a population that is significant and permanent. 
* Government: A state need not have any particular form of government, but there must be some authority exercising governmental functions and able to represent the entity in international relations.
* Capacity to conduct international relations: An entity is not a state unless it has competence, within its own constitutional system, to conduct international relations with other states, as well as the political, technical and financial capabilities to do so. 
It would also be appropriate to mention Comment h of the Restatement Section 201: "Even if a state does not recognize another state, the Restatement agrees that the state is required to treat an entity as a state if it meets the standards of section 201." As it usual in public international law, enforcement is a different matter altogether, yet for the purposes of compiling a list we need not concern ourselves with enforcement but merely with the appropriate legal theory. Britlawyer 23:49, 26 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Until sources are produced which specify that this applies to Transnistria etc, WP:OR applies. Either you have sources or you don't, are you going to be wasting our time for much longer? Or am I disrespectful for believing that you are not competent to decide whether individual regimes satisfy those criteria? I could easily interpret those as proving that Transnistria etc are not sovereign states - you wanna see how creative I can be?--Ploutarchos 08:03, 27 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: I am a legal expert on international law. I don't have the time to assist your debate here BUT I can confirm under international law criteria Transnistria IS a sovereign country. The dispute is over its recognition and the rightful territorial ownership which the vast majority of countries believes that the territory currently controlled by the administration ( government) in Transnistria should be under the governance of Moldova. For now it is a sovereign state operating independently of its de-jure claimaint Republic Of Moldova Buffadren 08:13, 27 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: NOTICE: Buffadren is a sham, a sock-puppet of banned supposed "Tiraspol Times" editor Mark Street. —  Pēters J. Vecrumba 01:35, 14 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  And I am the Pope of Rome incognito. (this is not meant as a personal attack, but as a reminder that Wikipedia already has a history of people lying about academic credentials). Dpotop 10:23, 27 April 2007 (UTC)

text:  BTW, I think you forgot that being an "expert in international law" should be useless on Wikipedia unless you have citations for your statements. Dpotop 10:23, 27 April 2007 (UTC)

text: Have you any citations that "Transnistria is a sovereign country"?--Ploutarchos 08:17, 27 April 2007 (UTC)

text: I believe that, in fact, sources have been cited, at least for Transnistria. john k 17:18, 27 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  No. No source was cited saying explicitly that "Transnistria is sovereign". Dpotop 17:58, 27 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: A source was cited which argued that Transnistria fulfilled the Montevideo criteria for statehood, iirc.  The fact that "sovereignty" was  not mentioned in Montevideo (also said below) is irrelevant.  The use of "sovereign" in this article is merely disambiguation to distinguish sovereign states from states which are administrative subdivisions, like the states of Australia or the United States. john k 18:57, 27 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  I still don't understand why you say Montevideo=sovereignty. On one hand, the text of the Montevideo convention does not even contain the word "sovereignty". On the other, from "A implies B" and "B implies C" you should not deduce "A implies C" according to Wikipedia rules. Dpotop 19:31, 27 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  Montevideo provides a definition of a state.  But what it obviously means is a "sovereign state," since it's not defining things like Brazilian or US states.  That's all that "sovereign state" means - a state that isn't a subnational division.  The use of "sovereign" is entirely to disambiguate.  List of states would  be ambiguous, since it would imply that Alabama and New South Wales and Minas Gerais and Sarawak should be listed.  That is the only reason that "sovereign" appears in the title, so harping on the fact that Montevideo doesn't discuss "sovereignty" is silly. john k 19:53, 27 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  You still don't get it, do you? "Obviously" means nothing here, and "truth" or "common sense" or "common law" mean nothing unless you find sources to support it without making syllogisms. Dpotop 19:59, 27 April 2007 (UTC)

text: What source? Tiraspol Times?--Ploutarchos 19:27, 27 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: I don't recall.  It was above. john k 19:53, 27 April 2007 (UTC)

text: Obviously that is what is being dealt with, however.  john k 17:19, 27 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: No, who recognizes whom is absolutely not "the only legitimate litmus test," and sovereignty is not about recognized legality of authority.  All sovereignty means is "supreme and independent power or authority in government as possessed or claimed by a state or community."  It means the same thing as List of independent states.  Again, I'm not going to say that Montevideo should be the way we do this, but it sums up one of the two main ways that states have historically been defined, and it is apparently the more broadly used one.  The claim that recognition is the only valid way to define statehood is ridiculous.  And the basic issue we are debating here is the question of statehood.   john k 00:03, 29 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  Correct, as recognition is merely an indicator of sovereignty but one which in itself does not confer sovereignty onto an entity,. Nor does it follow that a state is necessarily absent of sovereignty in cases where it is, temporarily or permanently, absent of recognition. In other words, while there is a link, the link can clearly not be applied in factitious manner to make recognition a criteria for sovereignty as this would be inconsistent with international law. I shall provide references if requested. Britlawyer 16:38, 1 May 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Qualifications for sovereign statehood

message: Geopolitical incentives of external players have favoured partition in
Cyprus and Moldova. This brings us to Turkish interests in Cyprus, which aim at protecting
the Turkish Cypriots against the much larger Greek Cypriot community It is equally important to secure the country’s southern
coastline as Turkey’s only ‘secure supply line’. With plans to build a pipeline to carry oil
and gas from Azerbaijan and Central Asia to the southern Turkish bay of Ceyhan, the strategic
importance of Northern Cyprus for Turkey has increased. The key outside player in Moldova is Russia
and to a large extent, the continuation of Transnistrian secession will depend on the negotiations
between Russia, Ukraine and Romania. Russia is interested in keeping Moldova in its sphere of influence that has traditionally served
as Russia’s gateway to the Balkans and remains vital considering the events in former Yugoslavia.--ARISTOKLES 21:21, 1 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Could you present your arguments in a more concise manner? See also the discussion about the renaming of the article above and seek the consensus before making substantial changes. Alaexis 21:37, 1 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: To present my arguments in a more concise manner: there aren't any recognized, sovereign states the one that I delisted. Good bye.--ARISTOKLES 21:41, 1 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  While it's true that those states are not recognised that doesn't mean they are not sovereign/de facto independent (I prefer the second term, see discussion above). See Montevideo Convention, for example. If you want I could give the examples of these countries called de facto independent in neutral sources. Alaexis 21:45, 1 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: No sources that the Montevideo criteria are fulfilled in the cases of these entities. Clear case of WP:OR.--Ploutarchos 21:48, 1 May 2007 (UTC)

text: I know Montevideo Convention by heart, what exactly are you trying to say? Be more concise please, if you can. ΑΡΙΣΤΟΚΛΗΣ (πείτε μου) 21:54, 1 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Is the debate here whether the TRNC can be referred  to as a state, or whether it is sovereign? --A.Garnet 22:06, 1 May 2007 (UTC)

text:  I do not know much about some of the ‘de facto’ independent states listed in this article but I know a lot about Abkhazia and South Ossetia. By no means should these entities be considered ‘sovereign’ or any kind of states. They are not ‘de facto’ independent. If anything they are ‘de facto’ part of Russia. The best way to refer to them is “disputed territories.” Irakliy81 01:58, 2 May 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: External actors 

message: I still don't have a clear answer from JohnK and the others concerning the proposed RfM. I saw that JohnK proposed the transformation of "List of Sovereign States" into "List of States". I think this is a good first step if you want to preserve Transnistria, Abkhazia, and the likes in the list. If you all accept this step, I see no need for mediation. Dpotop 07:15, 2 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Well, I am actually against preserving Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the list. They are not states; neither "sovereign" nor any other. Irakliy81 16:45, 2 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: I sort of agree with Irakliy.  Not about whether Abkhazia or South Ossetia should be on the list - I remain agnostic about that.  But I do agree that the key question is whether or not they are "states".  If they are states, then they are by necessity sovereign states.  If they are not states, then they're not.  That's the real issue.  If List of states or List of independent states would make people happier, that's fine with me, but it doesn't resolve the issue. john k 17:19, 2 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: What sovereign states are Abkhazia or South Ossetia or Transnistria or TRNC? That's the worst joke. --ΑΡΙΣΤΟΚΛΗΣ (πείτε μου) 19:01, 2 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  No its a funnies joke Ldingley 20:07, 2 May 2007 (UTC)

text: This article is a subject of debates for long time, I don't see anything new appearing in the debates, only repetition of old arguments. I agree with Irakliy, states without any recognition must not be in this list. I am confused about Taiwan, which was an UN member for a time (it had international recognition), but even in this case if we keep it, we need clear explanations about its status (Taiwan itself never officially asked secession from China, it claims being the "true" representant of entire chinese nation). I understand that there are people with other views, instead of revert warring maybe mediation can be an option. Let see for the begining the opinion of editors, to see if mediation is necessary, and if yes, how we start it.--MariusM 19:14, 2 May 2007 (UTC)

text: If the purpose of this article is to list independent entities of the world de facto independent ones should be present (with appropriate footnotes). How to name this list is another question (List of states, List of independent states, List of independent countries or something else). Alaexis 20:38, 2 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: What in the world are you talking about?  How is it biased and POV to have one list for "generally recognized  states" and then another list on the same page noting de facto states with little to no diplomatic recognition?  That Abkhazia, et al, are de facto states is not OR - the status of these entities is widely written about. john k 22:54, 2 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: How about because it forks List of unrecognized countries? IMO that article needs looking at too - real encyclopedias like Britannica call them things like "separatist enclaves" etc. If the term "unrecognized country" exists in a real encyclopedia, I'd very much like to hear of it.---Ploutarchos 23:17, 2 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Forking like that isn't necessarily a POV issue, and sometimes there's reason to have the same information in multiple articles.  "Unrecognized country", btw, is certainly a stupid term, in that it doesn't make sense.  It ought to be "unrecognized de facto state" or "unrecognized state." Certainly Somaliland qualifies as that, and Britannica describes it, btw, as a "self-declared independent country." john k 23:32, 2 May 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Mediation, part 2

message: Existing theories of state formation struggle to explain such practices, as they overlook the crucial role that the construction of collective interests and identities plays in state formation. Materialist accounts explain the development of states and the states system as a function of the world economy, and regard the ‘homogenisation’ of peoples as a necessary function of this process which is driven by economic interests. Institutionalist accounts also take the economic motivation of actors as a given, though from a position of methodological individualism. In both accounts the construction of interests and identities within the state is left unexplored. Power-based explanations take for granted the interest of state-builders in the accumulation of the means of violence within the sovereign state. Although such explanations pay attention to the processes of internal pacification that were an important part of early modern state-building, they see this as a function of the administrative centralisation of states, rather than a phenomenon that needs further
explanation.
The central argument of my explanation is that state formation has a crucial cultural dimension, a dimension overlooked by other theories of state formation, which regard culture, if they mention it at all, as merely an instrument of either economic or procrustean interests. State-builders must establish their right to rule, as well as the legitimacy of the political order they seek to establish or consolidate. This involves two tasks: the construction of a unified political community within the bounds of their territorial rule – a community with a single, cohesive identity – and the identification of the monarch or the national government as the political embodiment or representative of that unified community. 
State-builders cannot do otherwise than draw upon the prevailing cultural resources available to them as they seek to build a unified collective identity, and in doing so mark out the boundaries of the sovereign state as the boundary of a moral community. 
In drawing on the available cultural resources, state-builders contribute towards changing the very framework on which they draw. For example, early modern state-builders drew on the prevailing religious world view when defining insiders and outsiders, but in so doing they contributed towards the development of the secular world view as they rearticulated religious beliefs which no longer had universal normative purchase across Western Europe.
===What is sovereign state===
There are many aspects to the modern sovereign state. The term is used by me here in two ways: the first to denote the state as government, ‘the collective set of personnel who occupy positions of decisional authority in the polity’. The second is to denote a ‘normative order’, which, in turn, elites play an important, though by no means exclusive, part in constructing.
The term state-building refers to those practices which elites have more or less consciously employed to consolidate and centralise power
within clearly demarcated territorial boundaries. As we shall see, these practices draw on symbolic as well as material resources. For example, early modern state-builders, such as Ferdinand and Isabella, who in the fifteenth century laid the foundations for the Spanish state, were much less consciously engaged in ‘state-building’ than contemporary leaders such as Slobodan Milosevic, who was intent on building a strong (and expanded, to take in all Serbs) Serbian state in the wake of the breakdown of Yugoslavia. Yet the Spanish monarchs and modern nationalists have been involved in similar projects of political consolidation, and the strategies of symbolic manipulation they employ as they attempt to legitimate their authority have much in common.
Despite their many differences, these two cases share the use of what I term ‘pathological homogenisation’ as a means of state-building. This
refers to the methods state-builders have used to define the state as a normative order and to cultivate identification through targeting those designated as outsiders for discriminatory and often violent treatment. According to current international standards of human rights and legitimate state behaviour these means are unacceptable. No such standards existed in the earliest phases of state-building, as Christian universalism lost its normative purchase and state-builders abrogated the authority of the Church, but to describe such methods as ‘pathological’ is not anachronistic. Such practices have without exception damaged the body politic, despite the benefits that state-builders may perceive, and they have invariably caused human suffering on a vast scale. From very early on in the development of the international system, voices have been raised to question policies so destructive in human and other terms. For example, in the early seventeenth century, Cardinal Richelieu described the expulsion of the Moriscos (Christianised Moors) from Spain as ‘barbaric’, giving voice to misgivings felt by many at the time about the methods used in this action by the Spanish monarchy, including taking small children
from their families.
I use the term ‘pathological homogenisation’ to designate a number of different strategies that state-builders have employed to signify the unity of their state and the legitimacy of their authority through the creation of an ostensibly unified population. These strategies range from attempts to legally exclude minority groups from citizenship rights, to strategies of forced conversion or assimilation, expulsion and extermination. Although these strategies have had very different impacts on those unfortunate enough to be subjected to them, they are all a means to the end of creating a ‘homogeneous’ population within the boundaries of the sovereign state. For those who pursue such policies, they serve to symbolise and create a ‘purer’ and thus more unitary sovereign identity within the state, a more unified ‘imagined community’ to use Benedict Anderson’s phrase. 
In the pursuit of a homogeneous collective identity within the state various assimilatory policies have been practised. Forced religious conversion is one means of forcibly assimilating a minority within a dominant identity. Such policies often result in the mass movement of people attempting to avoid forced conversion, as occurred in late seventeenth-century France, when French Protestants fled their homeland when their religion was outlawed. In some cases, forced conversion may be posed as a choice: convert or leave. This was the ‘choice’ presented to Spanish Jews in the fifteenth century. Many did convert to Christianity while others who wished to maintain their Jewish identity were expelled from the state, resulting in the end of the official existence of the Jewish community in Spain. Expulsion may also be ordered with no ‘choice’ of any other alternative, except perhaps death or imprisonment. In 1609 the Moriscos were not presented with any other alternative but to leave Spain and numerous examples of expulsions can be found in the history of the international system. These include ‘population exchanges’ such as those between Greece and Turkey early in the twentieth century; the massive displacement of
ethnic Germans in Europe following World War II; and the exchange of populations between India and Pakistan at partition, to name just a few.
In the twentieth century, as the bureaucratic and technological capacity of the state has increased, mass murder and genocide have increasingly been used as pathological means of homogenisation by state-builders. The intent here goes beyond expulsion to the wholesale removal of the targeted group through obliteration. Forced conversion (though by no means an attractive option) has become less thinkable in the age of national criteria of identification, linked, as these often are, to notions of racial or ethnic identity as inherent in the individual and therefore unchanging. In the case of the genocide of the Armenian people of 1915– 16, there were cases of Christian Armenians converting to Islam in order to avoid death (particularly children who were taken into Muslim families), but few were given this option in a genocide in which religious criteria had become inextricably bound up with national criteria of identification. A conception of racial identity as inherent in the person was also behind the Holocaust. A similar view of ‘ethno-national’ identity as inherent in the person and
unchanging, ironically marked out through religious affiliation, informs the virulent ethno-nationalism seen in action during the attempts at statebuilding which followed the fragmentation of Yugoslavia. From such a viewpoint, expulsion or extermination become much more likely policy ‘options’ than conversion.
I have sought to trace the role this process plays in the construction of the boundaries of states as moral boundaries. Where a number of scholars investigate how the sovereign state is ‘written’, through the practices of theorists and diplomats.
State interests are considered relevant but the most basic interests are assumed to be identical for all states and driven by the nature of the system: all states have an interest in survival in an anarchical system, which is best pursued through strategies of self-help based on zero-sum calculations. Neoliberal theorists, though interested in how states cooperate under anarchy, accept the realist model
of states as self-interested, rational and unitary actors. As a consequence, they too explicitly bracket off the role of collective identity construction in state-building as they also take the identities and interests of actors on the international stage for granted. Over the last two decades of the twentieth century mainstream approaches have been subjected to criticisms from a number of different
perspectives. Once the state was ‘brought back in’ to both social theory and international relations theory in the 1980s, this opened up consideration of how states, rather than being pre-social ‘facts’, are constituted through social, political and cultural practices. From this perspective, the state is seen as a normative order, and it is intersubjectively constructed normative values that provide the unifying standards and symbols that legitimate authority and allow us to perceive the state as a unitary and sovereign actor. Thus, sovereignty ‘is negotiated out of interaction within intersubjectively identifiable communities’ and it is this institution which legitimates ‘the state’ as an agent in international social life. 
====Cyprus, Abkhazia, Transnistria, South Ossetia====
Why, then, was a homogenised population deemed desirable as sovereign states emerged from the breakdown of heteronomous and imperial structures of authority? To answer this question a different understanding of ‘interests’ that recognises that they can be constructed
in different ways, is necessary. This allows consideration of how the perceived need for an unambiguous unitary identity could become the highest priority of state-builders, despite the economic and political costs this might entail. This question will be taken up at greater length in the section below on the role of culture in political life, and will be returned to in each of the case studies on pathological homogenisation.
If we look at the competitors to the sovereign state we see a great many differences. City leagues had no internal borders, no hierarchy, no agreements on weights or currency, and diverse legal codes. Sovereign actors benefited from the leagues’ lack of unity. Importantly, lack of a clearly defined sovereign authority made it hard for the leagues to credibly commit to international agreements. 
Of particular importance in understanding this widespread culture of various forms of abuse is one central and overriding fact: virtually all
governments regarded how they treated those under their control and the policies they pursued as a matter exclusively within their own jurisdiction. Emperors, pharaohs, caesars, khans, sultans, tsars, kings and eventually prime ministers and presidents all argued that they and the territory they ruled were completely independent and sovereign. How they treated their own people and how they advanced their own interests, including the use of violence and the waging of war as the final arbiter of disputes, were considered their own business and not subject to any outside international standards, scrutiny, criticism or interference.
The Treaty of Westphalia signed in 1648 following the Thirty Years War provided recognition, in law as well as in fact, of the power and the authority of sovereign, independent states. Only they could be considered subjects of international law and no international jurisdiction existed to hold individuals criminally responsible for their actions. They recognized no universal authority, such as that of an emperor or a pope or an international organization from above, and no claims from feudal barons or subjects from below. The publication of Leviathan only three years later provided even further theoretical justification for the doctrine, particularly when Thomas Hobbes addressed what he described as ‘‘the essence of sovereignty’’. Here he left no doubt about his belief that the sovereign powers of the state and the absolute monarch who acted in its name ruled without challenge, doing ‘‘whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done’’. This is my full explanation of what 'sovereign state' is and is not. --ΑΡΙΣΤΟΚΛΗΣ (πείτε μου) 19:29, 2 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Abkhazia violates even the so called Montevideo Convention and does not meets its standards of the state. The population of Abkhazia (majority of it) was expelled by force by the small well armed separatist insurgency. This separatist regime has no “foreign relations” with any state officially (even with its political master, Russia). Anyway, you cant harmonize all so called de facto “independent” “states” because all of them differ radically. UN resolutions which emphasize the territorial integrity of Georgia for example, OSCE, EU Parliament, EU Counsel and NATO proclamations and resolution go hand in hand with UN. There is attempt on this article to say otherwise due to some allegiances for separatist causes. This is unacceptable for encyclopedia web. There are no valid and reliable sources (primary or secondary) which indicate that those de facto “independent states” are sovereign countries. Primary source which are UN resolutions put Abkhazia within Georgian jurisdiction. Therefore, this claim which is not only dubious but extremely biased and controversial should be removed from this article. Ldingley 20:01, 2 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Just to note, the point of the Montevideo point of "ability to engage in diplomatic relations" is so as to exclude entities which, according to their own internal constitutions, cannot engage in diplomatic relations.  This is referring to entities like Alabama or Gibraltar or Scotland.  It does not refer to de facto states which have foreign ministers, and so forth, but which simply are not de jure recognized by other countries.  At least, this is the  gloss on that point given by just about every gloss of it I've  ever come across. john k 22:52, 2 May 2007 (UTC)

text: Wikipedia rules are against original research, not to mention POV pushing. Not only this article violates international law, jurisprudence but also Wikipedia guidlines. Ldingley 20:15, 2 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  Wikipedia is not governed by international law, nor jurisprudence. The only rules that apply here are the rules of Wikipedia. Dpotop 20:51, 2 May 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: About sovereignty

message: There are many aspects to the modern sovereign state. The term is used by me here in two ways: the first to denote the state as government, ‘the collective set of personnel who occupy positions of decisional authority in the polity’. The second is to denote a ‘normative order’, which, in turn, elites play an important, though by no means exclusive, part in constructing.
The term state-building refers to those practices which elites have more or less consciously employed to consolidate and centralise power
within clearly demarcated territorial boundaries. As we shall see, these practices draw on symbolic as well as material resources. For example, early modern state-builders, such as Ferdinand and Isabella, who in the fifteenth century laid the foundations for the Spanish state, were much less consciously engaged in ‘state-building’ than contemporary leaders such as Slobodan Milosevic, who was intent on building a strong (and expanded, to take in all Serbs) Serbian state in the wake of the breakdown of Yugoslavia. Yet the Spanish monarchs and modern nationalists have been involved in similar projects of political consolidation, and the strategies of symbolic manipulation they employ as they attempt to legitimate their authority have much in common.
Despite their many differences, these two cases share the use of what I term ‘pathological homogenisation’ as a means of state-building. This
refers to the methods state-builders have used to define the state as a normative order and to cultivate identification through targeting those designated as outsiders for discriminatory and often violent treatment. According to current international standards of human rights and legitimate state behaviour these means are unacceptable. No such standards existed in the earliest phases of state-building, as Christian universalism lost its normative purchase and state-builders abrogated the authority of the Church, but to describe such methods as ‘pathological’ is not anachronistic. Such practices have without exception damaged the body politic, despite the benefits that state-builders may perceive, and they have invariably caused human suffering on a vast scale. From very early on in the development of the international system, voices have been raised to question policies so destructive in human and other terms. For example, in the early seventeenth century, Cardinal Richelieu described the expulsion of the Moriscos (Christianised Moors) from Spain as ‘barbaric’, giving voice to misgivings felt by many at the time about the methods used in this action by the Spanish monarchy, including taking small children
from their families.
I use the term ‘pathological homogenisation’ to designate a number of different strategies that state-builders have employed to signify the unity of their state and the legitimacy of their authority through the creation of an ostensibly unified population. These strategies range from attempts to legally exclude minority groups from citizenship rights, to strategies of forced conversion or assimilation, expulsion and extermination. Although these strategies have had very different impacts on those unfortunate enough to be subjected to them, they are all a means to the end of creating a ‘homogeneous’ population within the boundaries of the sovereign state. For those who pursue such policies, they serve to symbolise and create a ‘purer’ and thus more unitary sovereign identity within the state, a more unified ‘imagined community’ to use Benedict Anderson’s phrase. 
In the pursuit of a homogeneous collective identity within the state various assimilatory policies have been practised. Forced religious conversion is one means of forcibly assimilating a minority within a dominant identity. Such policies often result in the mass movement of people attempting to avoid forced conversion, as occurred in late seventeenth-century France, when French Protestants fled their homeland when their religion was outlawed. In some cases, forced conversion may be posed as a choice: convert or leave. This was the ‘choice’ presented to Spanish Jews in the fifteenth century. Many did convert to Christianity while others who wished to maintain their Jewish identity were expelled from the state, resulting in the end of the official existence of the Jewish community in Spain. Expulsion may also be ordered with no ‘choice’ of any other alternative, except perhaps death or imprisonment. In 1609 the Moriscos were not presented with any other alternative but to leave Spain and numerous examples of expulsions can be found in the history of the international system. These include ‘population exchanges’ such as those between Greece and Turkey early in the twentieth century; the massive displacement of
ethnic Germans in Europe following World War II; and the exchange of populations between India and Pakistan at partition, to name just a few.
In the twentieth century, as the bureaucratic and technological capacity of the state has increased, mass murder and genocide have increasingly been used as pathological means of homogenisation by state-builders. The intent here goes beyond expulsion to the wholesale removal of the targeted group through obliteration. Forced conversion (though by no means an attractive option) has become less thinkable in the age of national criteria of identification, linked, as these often are, to notions of racial or ethnic identity as inherent in the individual and therefore unchanging. In the case of the genocide of the Armenian people of 1915– 16, there were cases of Christian Armenians converting to Islam in order to avoid death (particularly children who were taken into Muslim families), but few were given this option in a genocide in which religious criteria had become inextricably bound up with national criteria of identification. A conception of racial identity as inherent in the person was also behind the Holocaust. A similar view of ‘ethno-national’ identity as inherent in the person and
unchanging, ironically marked out through religious affiliation, informs the virulent ethno-nationalism seen in action during the attempts at statebuilding which followed the fragmentation of Yugoslavia. From such a viewpoint, expulsion or extermination become much more likely policy ‘options’ than conversion.
I have sought to trace the role this process plays in the construction of the boundaries of states as moral boundaries. Where a number of scholars investigate how the sovereign state is ‘written’, through the practices of theorists and diplomats.
State interests are considered relevant but the most basic interests are assumed to be identical for all states and driven by the nature of the system: all states have an interest in survival in an anarchical system, which is best pursued through strategies of self-help based on zero-sum calculations. Neoliberal theorists, though interested in how states cooperate under anarchy, accept the realist model
of states as self-interested, rational and unitary actors. As a consequence, they too explicitly bracket off the role of collective identity construction in state-building as they also take the identities and interests of actors on the international stage for granted. Over the last two decades of the twentieth century mainstream approaches have been subjected to criticisms from a number of different
perspectives. Once the state was ‘brought back in’ to both social theory and international relations theory in the 1980s, this opened up consideration of how states, rather than being pre-social ‘facts’, are constituted through social, political and cultural practices. From this perspective, the state is seen as a normative order, and it is intersubjectively constructed normative values that provide the unifying standards and symbols that legitimate authority and allow us to perceive the state as a unitary and sovereign actor. Thus, sovereignty ‘is negotiated out of interaction within intersubjectively identifiable communities’ and it is this institution which legitimates ‘the state’ as an agent in international social life. 
====Cyprus, Abkhazia, Transnistria, South Ossetia====
Why, then, was a homogenised population deemed desirable as sovereign states emerged from the breakdown of heteronomous and imperial structures of authority? To answer this question a different understanding of ‘interests’ that recognises that they can be constructed
in different ways, is necessary. This allows consideration of how the perceived need for an unambiguous unitary identity could become the highest priority of state-builders, despite the economic and political costs this might entail. This question will be taken up at greater length in the section below on the role of culture in political life, and will be returned to in each of the case studies on pathological homogenisation.
If we look at the competitors to the sovereign state we see a great many differences. City leagues had no internal borders, no hierarchy, no agreements on weights or currency, and diverse legal codes. Sovereign actors benefited from the leagues’ lack of unity. Importantly, lack of a clearly defined sovereign authority made it hard for the leagues to credibly commit to international agreements. 
Of particular importance in understanding this widespread culture of various forms of abuse is one central and overriding fact: virtually all
governments regarded how they treated those under their control and the policies they pursued as a matter exclusively within their own jurisdiction. Emperors, pharaohs, caesars, khans, sultans, tsars, kings and eventually prime ministers and presidents all argued that they and the territory they ruled were completely independent and sovereign. How they treated their own people and how they advanced their own interests, including the use of violence and the waging of war as the final arbiter of disputes, were considered their own business and not subject to any outside international standards, scrutiny, criticism or interference.
The Treaty of Westphalia signed in 1648 following the Thirty Years War provided recognition, in law as well as in fact, of the power and the authority of sovereign, independent states. Only they could be considered subjects of international law and no international jurisdiction existed to hold individuals criminally responsible for their actions. They recognized no universal authority, such as that of an emperor or a pope or an international organization from above, and no claims from feudal barons or subjects from below. The publication of Leviathan only three years later provided even further theoretical justification for the doctrine, particularly when Thomas Hobbes addressed what he described as ‘‘the essence of sovereignty’’. Here he left no doubt about his belief that the sovereign powers of the state and the absolute monarch who acted in its name ruled without challenge, doing ‘‘whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done’’. This is my full explanation of what 'sovereign state' is and is not. --ΑΡΙΣΤΟΚΛΗΣ (πείτε μου) 19:29, 2 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Abkhazia violates even the so called Montevideo Convention and does not meets its standards of the state. The population of Abkhazia (majority of it) was expelled by force by the small well armed separatist insurgency. This separatist regime has no “foreign relations” with any state officially (even with its political master, Russia). Anyway, you cant harmonize all so called de facto “independent” “states” because all of them differ radically. UN resolutions which emphasize the territorial integrity of Georgia for example, OSCE, EU Parliament, EU Counsel and NATO proclamations and resolution go hand in hand with UN. There is attempt on this article to say otherwise due to some allegiances for separatist causes. This is unacceptable for encyclopedia web. There are no valid and reliable sources (primary or secondary) which indicate that those de facto “independent states” are sovereign countries. Primary source which are UN resolutions put Abkhazia within Georgian jurisdiction. Therefore, this claim which is not only dubious but extremely biased and controversial should be removed from this article. Ldingley 20:01, 2 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Just to note, the point of the Montevideo point of "ability to engage in diplomatic relations" is so as to exclude entities which, according to their own internal constitutions, cannot engage in diplomatic relations.  This is referring to entities like Alabama or Gibraltar or Scotland.  It does not refer to de facto states which have foreign ministers, and so forth, but which simply are not de jure recognized by other countries.  At least, this is the  gloss on that point given by just about every gloss of it I've  ever come across. john k 22:52, 2 May 2007 (UTC)

text: Wikipedia rules are against original research, not to mention POV pushing. Not only this article violates international law, jurisprudence but also Wikipedia guidlines. Ldingley 20:15, 2 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  Wikipedia is not governed by international law, nor jurisprudence. The only rules that apply here are the rules of Wikipedia. Dpotop 20:51, 2 May 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: What is sovereign state

message: Why, then, was a homogenised population deemed desirable as sovereign states emerged from the breakdown of heteronomous and imperial structures of authority? To answer this question a different understanding of ‘interests’ that recognises that they can be constructed
in different ways, is necessary. This allows consideration of how the perceived need for an unambiguous unitary identity could become the highest priority of state-builders, despite the economic and political costs this might entail. This question will be taken up at greater length in the section below on the role of culture in political life, and will be returned to in each of the case studies on pathological homogenisation.
If we look at the competitors to the sovereign state we see a great many differences. City leagues had no internal borders, no hierarchy, no agreements on weights or currency, and diverse legal codes. Sovereign actors benefited from the leagues’ lack of unity. Importantly, lack of a clearly defined sovereign authority made it hard for the leagues to credibly commit to international agreements. 
Of particular importance in understanding this widespread culture of various forms of abuse is one central and overriding fact: virtually all
governments regarded how they treated those under their control and the policies they pursued as a matter exclusively within their own jurisdiction. Emperors, pharaohs, caesars, khans, sultans, tsars, kings and eventually prime ministers and presidents all argued that they and the territory they ruled were completely independent and sovereign. How they treated their own people and how they advanced their own interests, including the use of violence and the waging of war as the final arbiter of disputes, were considered their own business and not subject to any outside international standards, scrutiny, criticism or interference.
The Treaty of Westphalia signed in 1648 following the Thirty Years War provided recognition, in law as well as in fact, of the power and the authority of sovereign, independent states. Only they could be considered subjects of international law and no international jurisdiction existed to hold individuals criminally responsible for their actions. They recognized no universal authority, such as that of an emperor or a pope or an international organization from above, and no claims from feudal barons or subjects from below. The publication of Leviathan only three years later provided even further theoretical justification for the doctrine, particularly when Thomas Hobbes addressed what he described as ‘‘the essence of sovereignty’’. Here he left no doubt about his belief that the sovereign powers of the state and the absolute monarch who acted in its name ruled without challenge, doing ‘‘whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done’’. This is my full explanation of what 'sovereign state' is and is not. --ΑΡΙΣΤΟΚΛΗΣ (πείτε μου) 19:29, 2 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Abkhazia violates even the so called Montevideo Convention and does not meets its standards of the state. The population of Abkhazia (majority of it) was expelled by force by the small well armed separatist insurgency. This separatist regime has no “foreign relations” with any state officially (even with its political master, Russia). Anyway, you cant harmonize all so called de facto “independent” “states” because all of them differ radically. UN resolutions which emphasize the territorial integrity of Georgia for example, OSCE, EU Parliament, EU Counsel and NATO proclamations and resolution go hand in hand with UN. There is attempt on this article to say otherwise due to some allegiances for separatist causes. This is unacceptable for encyclopedia web. There are no valid and reliable sources (primary or secondary) which indicate that those de facto “independent states” are sovereign countries. Primary source which are UN resolutions put Abkhazia within Georgian jurisdiction. Therefore, this claim which is not only dubious but extremely biased and controversial should be removed from this article. Ldingley 20:01, 2 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Just to note, the point of the Montevideo point of "ability to engage in diplomatic relations" is so as to exclude entities which, according to their own internal constitutions, cannot engage in diplomatic relations.  This is referring to entities like Alabama or Gibraltar or Scotland.  It does not refer to de facto states which have foreign ministers, and so forth, but which simply are not de jure recognized by other countries.  At least, this is the  gloss on that point given by just about every gloss of it I've  ever come across. john k 22:52, 2 May 2007 (UTC)

text: Wikipedia rules are against original research, not to mention POV pushing. Not only this article violates international law, jurisprudence but also Wikipedia guidlines. Ldingley 20:15, 2 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  Wikipedia is not governed by international law, nor jurisprudence. The only rules that apply here are the rules of Wikipedia. Dpotop 20:51, 2 May 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Cyprus, Abkhazia, Transnistria, South Ossetia

message: There is no point in further discussing political criteria as a measure of sovereignty. On that basis, anyone can find sources to claim that many, and perhaps most, of the ~200 entities on this list are in some ways not sovereign: Politicians of all stripes issue statements on a weekly basis, arguing that taking out a loan with the IMF undermines sovereignty of country A, that accepting a NATO base on its soil means that country B is no longer sovereign, that a coup of country C by supporters of country D is a loss of sovereignty, etc, ad absurdum.
The only way to build a list is to follow established criteria accepted in international law such as those listed in the article's introductions, past and present, so it would be preferable to exclude political considerations from any discussions of inclusion criteria.  Britlawyer 14:38, 3 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Until you don’t present any support (Primary and secondary sources) which support your claims (which are obvious POV), you can not simply rv the article. If you are lawyer as you claim to be, you should know better about presenting support and evidence for the claim which is highly disputed. No references and sources, your claims are just empty words and your rv are just another step of POV pushing. Ldingley 15:12, 3 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  I am not making any claims, but merely requesting contributors to please apply objective international law criteria to the list rather than any necessarily subjective political consideration. Two such sources are given  here which also ends with the mention of three concurring authorities and the mention of the existence of other states who subscribe to these criteria.  I have no opinion on individual entities, and have indeed requested sources to be put forward. Until this is the case, I support your inclusion of the "dubious / neutrality contested" tag on each of those until such time they are either removed or the requested sources are provided. I urge that list criteria remains consistent with international law and free of political considerations for or against any of the entities whose inclusions are disputed.Britlawyer 15:23, 3 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  Again Mr Brit, where are sources (primary and secondary) for the claim that Abkhazia and rest of those so called de facto "states" are suvereign? In case you fail to find primary source (international legal document) where Abkhazia and the rest of those “states” are sovereign and recognized as such by even one state, I don’t see any point keeping them on the list and deceiving the public with false information based on biased and dubious research of some wikipedians.  Ldingley 15:30, 3 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  If these states meet the requirements for statehood under international law there is no objective reason to exclude them, and if they do not, then there is no justification for including them. It all boils down to the establishment of objective criteria for list inclusion, after which for each entity which is proposed for inclusion, a source for each is required. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:List_of_sovereign_states#Source.3F Britlawyer 15:37, 3 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  Nop, It all boils down to you using reliable sources for claiming that those separatist enclaves are SUVEREIGN. I wish Britain can be so sympathetic to independence causes when it comes to Scotland but alas. Ldingley 15:45, 3 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  p.s according to you logic than Scotland and North Ireland are suvereign states too Ldingley 15:46, 3 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  Blissfully, this is not for me to decide. I am merely asking that contributors help define a solid set of criteria for list inclusion, and then deal with each entity separately, with sources to support that the states proposed for inclusion meet the criteria for statehood under international law. If South Ossetia and the others do not meet the threshold, they will be removed from the list and your concern is resolved. This, however, will necessarily pass through a clarification of the current inclusion criteria which is limited to Montevideo but which can and should be both expanded in scope and in depth. In other words; more sources to bolster the Montevideo criteria if it is indeed the valid inclusion criteria and a clarification of how Montevideo is understood and how similar criteria are interpreted in international law.--Britlawyer 16:26, 3 May 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Use of legal criteria overriding political criteria 

message: * Concerning the dangers of using "international law" as an inclusion criterion, I invite to read the edits of User:Britlawyer in section Talk:List of sovereign states#The conflict, as I see it. You will see how the conclusion that the 4 entities should be included is obtained by stacking arguments in complex inferences, which is the very definition of WP:OR. Moreover, as usual in law, these inferences can be easily disputed. :( Dpotop 15:40, 3 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: I am not sure if the point has been made, but an important reason for keeping sovereign in the name is that it avoids confusion over the inclusion of none sovereign states such as Virginia. The advantage of sovereign over independent. Is sovereign is a concept understood  in international relations while there is far more latitude in the words "independent state", particularly post World War II with the rise in treaties that bind the actions of states. A sovereign state like France has lost some if its independence by being a member of the European Union. The French states still has full sovereignty but is it as independent as the state of India? (I don't want an answer to that question, it was just to illustrate that independent is a less precise word than sovereign.)  --Philip Baird Shearer 10:52, 6 June 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Comments

message: My impression was that no editor should change the article while it is blocked, with exceptions allowed only for clear-cut non-controversial data. Am I wrong in believing this? Dpotop 07:43, 7 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Reverted myself for consensus.But I dont think that you are right.See two example in my revert.Regards.Must.T  C  11:50, 7 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  In fact, the list was marked as protected, but was actually not protected. I wrongly deduced that you abused some admin rights, which is not the case. Sorry. Dpotop 13:17, 7 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  Just for explanation: this had been a temporary protection set to expire automatically, and I'd just forgotten to take off the tag when that happened. Sorry about that. Mustafa isn't an admin so he wouldn't have had any tools to abuse :-) --Fut.Perf. ☼ 15:53, 8 May 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Last edits by [[User:Makalp]] 

message: Given the importance given by some editors to these expressions, and the will to promote "de facto sovereignty", let me point to the intrinsic problem of relying on "de facto" notions: The fact that they obviously didn't manage to rally enough consensus to make them pass into law, which is the "de jure" domain. De facto notions are by definition still disputed, and it is not the job of Wikipedia to promote one side or the other of the dispute until there is not a clear winner. Dpotop 07:37, 10 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: "De facto" vs. "de jure" is not a very precise way of putting it.  As has been pointed out numerous times, one of the principal definitions of a state in international law is basically "if it's a de facto  state, it's a state."  So the issue is "states which function as states, but aren't recognized diplomatically by other countries," not "states which are de facto but not de jure."  The question of whether they are de jure states is, in fact, the precise question at isse for de facto states.  One legal theory states that they are.  Another denies it.  Secondly, I think that those of us who are in favor of keeping an open mind for Transnistria, et al, want to make the list as inclusive as possible.  That Iraq, in many ways, does not exercise all the attributes of sovereignty should not be sufficient to exclude it from the list, given that it's a UN member and recognized as a sovereign state throughout the world.  Similarly, the fact that  Somalia has not had a functioning central government in more than 15 years does not mean it should not be listed.  I have absolutely no interest in coming up with a completely consistent rule for who to  include.   What I want is to have several sets of criteria, any one of which would allow something to be listed.  So Somalia, as a de jure state with little in the way of effective de facto government should be listed.  But so should Somaliland, a de facto  state which functions pretty much in the normal way states function but whose independence is not recognized by the outside world.  They are both, in their way, states, and there's no  particular reason not to list both. john k 08:28, 10 May 2007 (UTC)

text: Just to note, once again, that the fact of these conflict zones actually being de facto states needs to be demonstrated, and should not be taken as given.  But there's no point in arguing about that unless the basic point, that genuine de facto countries ought to be listed, is conceded.  Anyway, I'm entirely and completely frustrated with this.  There's more of you than there is of me, and you all obviously care about this way more than I do.  None of you is interested in actually coming up with a worthy compromise.  You, Dpotop, constantly put forth different statements and variations on the case, but you aren't actually interested in trying to come up with something that would be acceptable to everyone - you just want your way.  I'm sick of this.  I won't say I'm done, because I'll probably be back, but I'm tired of writing this whole stream of words when there's absolutely no hope of actually convincing anyone that I'm  right.  I'm  done with this page for a while.  Do whatever kind of monstrous thing you want. john k 08:33, 10 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  Sorry to disapoint you JohnK, but you keep forgetting that Wikipedia has some rules. An NPOV is negotiable within the limits defined by these rules. All I'm trying to do here is to point out that some of the proposed solutions are not compliant with Wikipedia rules. BTW, I do not reject "De facto" altogether. Instead I point to the fact that you seem to apply it arbitrarily. As I put it before: It seems that everybody in this list has decided which entities must be in this list, and then is willing to twist the rules to include exactly (or at least) those entities. And twisting the rules is acceptable only while Wikipedia rules are not broken. Dpotop 12:21, 10 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  A) You are not disappointing me, you are doing exactly what I would have expected you to do. B) I absolutely don't care what countries are listed.  I just think that recognition is not the proper criterion for whether something is a state.  C) I don't understand where NPOV speaks in favor of your view.  I am trying to be inclusive of different POVs about what constitutes a state, while you are trying to exclude states you don't like.  I don't see how I'm on the wrong side of that one.  D) What on earth does "twisting the rules is acceptable only while Wikipedia rules are not broken" mean?  E) What do you mean that I am applying "de facto" arbitrarily?  I hold no brief for any particular one of  these disputed countries (although I think Somaliland has the best claim to de facto statehood of the lot).  I have repeatedly stated that if you will concede the principle that de facto states should be included in the list, I am willing to remove Transnistria, et al, until reliable sources can be found which consider them to be de facto states, and that they should be set out on the list as different from regular states in some way.  I don't see how I'm the one being unreasonable here, or trying to do anything arbitrarily. john k 15:11, 10 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  "Being inclusive", as you put it, corresponds to no clear criterion and this is the source of all the problems here. BTW, I see that you are not really "inclusive" towards the "recognition" criterion, so what exactly "inclusive" means. Does it mean "If I find it appropriate, then I include it, otherwise not?". Dpotop 09:43, 11 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: What I mean by being inclusive is that there ought to be various different "clear criteria", but that any of those criteria should qualify something for being listed somewhere on this page.  One criteria ought to be something along the lines of Montevideo - i.e., does the entity qualify as a state under the declarative theory of statehood?  The other could involve diplomatic recognition and the like. You say that being inclusive is somehow mutually exclusive of having "clear criteria", but that's not true at all.  One can have perfectly clear criteria which also make for a reasonably inclusive list. john k 22:22, 11 May 2007 (UTC)

text:  Please, remember that this is a WP talk page, not an edit war. So, take my edits as genuine interrogations, not an attempt to mine your position. Dpotop 09:43, 11 May 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  [[De facto]] vs. [[De jure]]

message: The list includes all states officially recognized by the UN and by the majority of countries, plus special exceptions that are de facto states or other sovereign entities recognized by a large number of de jure states. Chechneya does not hold any special qualification for inclusion, and is like any other de facto separatist regime.
What makes Chechnya different? Because one country recognizes it? That is hardly enough. Northern Cyprus is equal in this respect, if not more independent. In fact, many "unrecognized" states are recognized by one or two entities. 
The exceptions listed in the article, apart from Chechnya, are all supported by a large number of official states, and so they merit special mention. But Chechnya should not be included unless the list is going to include EVERY self-declared "state."--Supersexyspacemonkey 21:22, 10 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Chehcnya clearly should not be listed, as it is not even a de facto state - Russia controls Chechnya. john k 23:49, 10 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  Do we also agree that Russia "de facto" controls Transnistria? Don't take it bad, I'm just trying to understand the limits of "de facto" in your acception. Dpotop 09:38, 11 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: The issue, of course, is that Chechnya is both controlled by Russia and internationally recognized to be part of Russia, and the de facto government of Chechnya considers itself to be part of Russia.  Transnistria could be argued to be under de facto Russian control, but it is internationally considered to be part of Moldova, and the government of Transnistria, while perhaps desiring Russian annexation, considers itself to be a sovereign country.  Nor does  Russia consider Transnistria to be part of  Russia.  The situations are not analogous.  Also, what Britlawyer says below. john k 22:19, 11 May 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Remove Chechnya From List 

message: ::Alæxis, so you and Britlawyer are suspected to be sockpuppets?:) What a surprise... Pirveli 16:14, 15 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  That's a Bonaparte's idea of a joke, I presume. For a list of users who are not me for sure please visit my userpage. Alæxis¿question? 16:25, 15 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  Btw, is anyone going to answer my questions here and in the 'Abkhazia' section? Alæxis¿question? 16:28, 15 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  It is answered in the Problem section, as you can see. Pirveli 06:23, 16 May 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Other issues

message: Sovereignty is the exclusive right to exercise supreme political (e.g. legislative, judicial, and/or executive) authority over a geographic region, group of people, or oneself. A sovereign is the supreme lawmaking authority, subject to no other. Thus the legal maxim, There is no law without a sovereign.
: You've taken this definition from here, right? Please read  this also, then. 
: Actually even if this definition were the only possible one there would still be argument about whether a country like Abkhazia is sovereign or not. Alæxis¿question? 19:54, 18 May 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: '''Sovereignty'''

message: I restored the template. The discussion about it was here.Dl.goe 10:04, 19 May 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Template 

message: there is the need for exclusion paragraph, otherwise non-sovereign states appear suddentl
What do you mean by "exclusion paragraph"? The whole idea of john k's compromise is to list the unrecognised countries in the subsection. What kind of exclusion paragraph is needed then? Alæxis¿question? 10:40, 21 May 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Question 

message: *Also not listed below are various disputed territories which cannot be justifiably assigned to the latter category, including Jubaland, Somaliland and Puntland (Somalia), Cabinda (Angola), Kosovo (Serbia), Kurdistan (Iraq), Kurdistan (Turkey), Abkhazia (Georgia), South Ossetia (Georgia), Transnistria (Moldova) and numerous others. For a more inclusive list that includes dependent territories and areas of special sovereignty, see list of countries.
*Active autonomist and secessionist movements are not included in this list.
*Areas with the status of demilitarised Zone, Neutral Zone. 
*Military bases abroad.        
*Any other entity not included in the general criteria or above, that results of a political fiction (Embassies or other offices abroad, monuments, religious entities not having a state status, agencies of international Organisation outside of their seat).
::Jubaland, Kosovo, and Kurdistan are entirely different cases from Somaliland, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria.  The former do not claim to be sovereign, the latter do.  Acting as though they are the same seems unwise. john k 22:04, 21 May 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Criteria for exclusion

message: San Marino should not be on the list. --87.101.240.36 12:14, 22 May 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: San Marino

message: The inclusion of The "Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic" as a sovereign state is completely wrong. It is a government-in-exile, based in Algeria. While recognised by some 40 countires, it is not recognised by the UN, nor by the Arab League (it is Arab), nor by the Islamic Conference (it is Islamic), let alone the rest of the world. The Palestine Authority is not in exile, is based in Gaza and has some control on part of the territory it claims, but is not listed, as is the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. If these two are not listed, There is less reason for listing a self-declared republic for a territory that the UN considers as in dispute, and is trying to solve the issue, either with independence - only then we can talk about a sovereign state- or integration with Morocco.--A Jalil 12:54, 6 June 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: The issue is: What is a sovereign state?. Obviously, this list does not comply with the Montevideo Convention of 1933: it is much more restrictive. Since the list doesn't match to custom lists of states neither (due to the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic in the list), we must consider it as unsourced. --Juiced lemon 13:33, 6 June 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Unsourced? How is this unsourced? The criteria listed are: (a) a permanent population, (b) a defined territory, (c) government, and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states. The list includes all states that satisfy these criteria and claim independence. The SADR has a permanent population (the refugees in Tindouf), defined territory (Western Sahara), government (the SADR and its several organs), and the capacity to enter into relations with other states (it has diplomatic relations with over 40 states). The source for this list is Article I of the Montevideo Convention. -Justin (koavf)·T·C·M 14:22, 6 June 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: This list of sovereign states is unsourced because there are much more countries which fulfill the requirements of the Montevideo Convention of 1933, like the Principality of Sealand, or the countries in list of countries: the used criteria to select a fewer number of countries are unknown. --Juiced lemon 15:03, 6 June 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Not unsourced That doesn't make it unsourced, that makes it incomplete. Also, Sealand does not fit your example; it does not meet criterion (d). If you have an example that actually does fulfill the criteria and isn't on the list, add it. The criteria are known; they are listed in the intro to the article. -Justin (koavf)·T·C·M 15:06, 6 June 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Is “Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic”  a sovereign state?

message: If a resident of Nagorno-Karabakh (to take one from the list of De facto independent states) wishes to travel to the Untied States (to vist for example the UN in New York) or the Schengen area what do they use for a passort or document to be allowed entry? --Philip Baird Shearer 17:15, 6 June 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Armenian passport, maybe. Btw, there already exists a list of internationally recognised countries - United Nations member states. Alæxis¿question? 17:19, 6 June 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: UN member states That list is a list of UN member states, not of internationally-recognized states. For instance, the Holy See is not a member, nor was Switzerland prior to 2002. -Justin (koavf)·T·C·M 17:27, 6 June 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Lets not go around the UN loop again in this section there are lots of other sections on this talk page which can and are used for that discussion. --Philip Baird Shearer 17:34, 6 June 2007 (UTC)

text: Well said Philip. I strongly agree with you. That is a strong proof.--A Jalil 17:38, 6 June 2007 (UTC)

text: I'd subscribe to this, were it not WP:OR. Someone should write a paper on this, so that we can use it later. Dpotop 21:19, 6 June 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Support.:Dc76 13:49, 7 June 2007 (UTC)

text: The last conclusion you've made is not that evident. The entity may have the capacity but it could be unrealised. Besides, in absence of formal recognition informal relations are usually present. Anyway, it's really WP:OR. Alæxis¿question? 12:01, 10 June 2007 (UTC)

text: This is constitutive theory of statehood. There exists another one, namely declarative theory of statehood. Look at this article also. Alæxis¿question? 19:01, 10 June 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: I think you are wrong, because they can not have the "capacity to enter into relations with the other states" unless those other states recognise that they may enter into relations with them. --Philip Baird Shearer 23:03, 10 June 2007 (UTC)

text: BTW, anyone wants to count and correct 192+3=200, please. Modifying the list without the proper change of numbers is, IMHO, cat writing not human writing.:Dc76 20:36, 10 June 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: IMO, The list can include the states for which there is recongnition, plus a sending to a list where the entities without recognition are listed, and a short reference to the existing dispute about the interpretation of Montevedeo convention. :Dc76 20:36, 10 June 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Travel documents 

message: Please next time write about your intentions in the talk first (or at least in the edit summaries). You could also use your sandbox to create your version of the article and then propose it. Alæxis¿question? 15:30, 14 June 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: I perfectly understand your concerns, but please understand me as well - it is much more work any other way, or/and (in the case of a sandbox) I can not propose the changes with a link in the article history showing them precisely. Consequently I sometimes opt to "be bold" and then to "politely revert myself" so that people can see this is a proposal. I would obviously not do this with an article listed in a high quality category. But, when we have an article that for several weeks says "192+3=200", some changes of mine that last barely a few minutes/one hour would hardly damage anything. Obviously, "192+3=200" automatically makes the article of low quality, despite it having imho a high potential for being of a good or even very good quality. (It is very informative if one takes one hour to correct the mistakes! but how many readers have this extra hour?):Dc76 16:05, 14 June 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Please, see below the description of my proposal. cheers.:Dc76 16:05, 14 June 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  I don't think putting "see talk in a few minutes" in the edit summary takes a lot of work :) Alæxis¿question? 16:13, 14 June 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Oh, you mean that. Sure, I'll do so next time. I thought you wanted me to describe evertyhing in the talk page in advance. :-) I have a mindset not of a computer engineer (I have a different profession), I'm more comfortable with discussiing structure and organization, thinking and judging propsals as a whole rather than making comments. Keeping logs is a pain for me, and commenting always bring the question: what else except "copyedit" I can write here? :-) Commenting each small change is unnatural for my mindset, I'm much more comfortable to comment the general principles and important featues of a change/issue/notion/property/whatever, and the details are left for the reader to check.:-)  :Dc76 17:03, 14 June 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  2Dc76 

message: This proposal has received little interest to respond to, hence forget it. "Clean up 2" below is better organized and more simple.:Dc76 15:54, 6 July 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: I mean to say independentist. :-) :Dc76 16:30, 16 June 2007 (UTC)

text: I am glad we don't contradict on this. :) :Dc76 16:30, 16 June 2007 (UTC)

text: The problem is we still have two lists, not one. I think we should either merge them into the list or erase them at all. Otherwise it seems we have one version for one reader and another version for another. Seems like content forking to me. The introduction should mention the 6 - as "included" or as "not included" is a different question. Also, to #1, either 192+3=195, or 192+3+5=200, or 192+3+6=201. I have serious issues :-) with 192+3=200, and I'm ready to start an edit war over incorrect arithmetic. :-) :Dc76 16:30, 16 June 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Clean up (please see "Clean up 2" below)