Talk:Philosophical presentism

message: Buddhists cannot be said to be presentists per se as they do not hold that any perceived object is actually real, past present or future. At least some schools of buddhism teach that perceptions are delusions of awareness unrelated to ultimate reality which is devoid of any rational descriptions or apprehensions.  Experiences are facts, beliefs about them are mental fictionsJiohdi (talk) 14:27, 24 April 2008 (UTC)
thread_title: buddhism?

message: There have been tags put on this page asking for expert input etc. Presentism in the philosophy of time is not described perfectly by the article but it is not so bad as to need tags to say it is inexpert. Before placing tags to undermine the article please read around the subject. Such tags should definitely be accompanied by a proper discussion on this talk page explaining why they have been placed, otherwise they are just malevolent. Geometer 20:06, 26 September 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Please read the link to the Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics before making comments/placing tags 

message: I made a minor change, from the claim that presentism is probably incompatible with relativity to the claim that it is probably incompatible with relativity in conjunction with certain relatively uncontroversial philosophical claims.  I don't think anyone would seriously suggest that there is an incompatability purely between the two theses: one at least needs claims such as 'what exists is not relative to a reference frame' etc.
:there is no incompatibility with relativity as the observer, existing in the present, observes not the events themselves from any still existant past but the photons or other sensory data that is also in the present. The adjustments for travel time allowing the observer to calculate the events origin point in spacetime does not change the fact that his observation is happening only in the present and that in that same present the event he is witnessing is no longer occurring but has occurred and has moved on...which he can guestimate by experience.Jiohdi (talk) 18:14, 22 April 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: The article links "the modern theory of relativity" to the page on Einstein's theories commonly known by that name (and which are Lorentz Invariant) and also links to the "relativity of simultaneity" so clearly it is not referring to Lorentz's aether-based theory which used Galilean Relativity and in which simultaneity is absolute. Presentism is perceived to be in conflict with Einstein's theories because the "present", as it would be depicted within spacetime, would be a "plane" moving through the "volume" (actually a 3D surface moving through a 4D manifold). The normal to that plane would then identify a unique "preferred axis" corresponding to Newton's Absolute Time which of course is incompatible with relativity. Objects whose worldlines are not parallel to that normal then exhibit phenomenological behaviour which again is not compatible with the modern formulation of physical laws but strongly implies the need for an aether-based alternative or something closely equivalent, and that approach has yet to be successfully reconciled as an alternative theory of gravitation. While the section on the conflict with Relativity could perhaps benefit from some clarification, it is not wrong. George Dishman (talk) 20:39, 8 September 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Relativity 

message: clarity of concept is primary. the older version is very misleading.
:firstly it is a faith, in that there is no way to demonstrate that only the present exists, as the only evidence we have is our own mental perceptions which contain past present and future all at the same time.
:2ndly, presentism is a statement relating to the true nature of reality which no one can know, and so this needs to be clarified in that objects can be mental or physical or other.
:while I have faith in the concept of presentism, I find there is no way to prove I am right.Jiohdi (talk) 18:54, 25 April 2008 (UTC)
thread_title: recent edits

message: There is a serious error on the definition of presentism offered in this article on presentism.  The article states "Presentism is the belief that the 'A Series' is fundamental and that B Series facts can be explained or reduced to A series facts".  That isn't what presentism is, although presentism does require that.  Presentism is the view that only the present exists.  Many people believe that the 'A Series' is fundamental, but are not presentists.  For example, C.D. Broad.
76.235.72.169 (talk)  —Preceding undated comment was added at 00:09, 4 September 2008 (UTC)
thread_title: Error in definitions

message: This link is broken: Four Dimensionalism. M.C.Rea. The Oxford Handbook for Metaphysics. Describes Presentism and how four dimensionalism contradicts it.  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 41.72.103.95 (talk) 19:12, 7 October 2012 (UTC)
thread_title:  Broken Link:http://www.nd.edu/~mrea/Online%20Papers/Four%20Dimensionalism.pdf 

message: I did a bit of copyedit on the article and removed the maintenance template.  Here are my notes:
#I thought there was some ambiguity in the sentence, .  Does this mean, (a) other early presentist philosophers include those of the Indian Buddhist tradition, or (b) other early presentist philosophers include the Indian Buddhist tradition in presentist philosophy?  Or does it mean something else entirely?
#There is a quote, .  Would it be alright to insert [ity] immediately after "real"?
# feels a bit awkward to me, with modifiers before and after .  Would it be possible to change that to:  In modern relativity theory?  Or would that have other issues?
Please post any comments here, thanks! – Reidgreg (talk) 23:35, 22 November 2016 (UTC)
thread_title:  copyedit November 2016 

message: What is Presentism?
Daniel Deasy
Noûs 51 (2):378-397 (2017)
Authors
Daniel Deasy
University College Dublin
Abstract
Different versions of the A-theory of time are traditionally defined in terms of whether everything is present, or whether there are also past and future things. In this paper I argue that the traditional way of defining A-theories should be abandoned. I focus on the traditional definition of presentism, according to which always, everything is present. First, I argue that there are good reasons to reject all the most plausible interpretations of the predicate ‘is present’ as it appears in the traditional definition of presentism. It follows that there are also good reasons to reject the most plausible interpretations of the traditional definitions of the other A-theories. I then argue that there is a better way of defining the A-theories, in terms of the question of whether existence has a beginning and an end. Finally, I argue that what goes for the traditional definition of presentism goes for the traditional definition of its modal analogue actualism, according to which necessarily, everything is actual : there are good reasons to reject the traditional definition of actualism in favour of a definition in terms of contingent existence.PhilPapers, Presentism.Arnlodg (talk) 17:21, 23 November 2019 (UTC)
thread_title:  Abstract of added ref. to lead sentence 

message: What am I? Descartes’s Various Conceptions of Self
Colin Chamberlain
Journal of Modern Philosophy (forthcoming)
Authors
Colin Chamberlain
Temple University
Abstract
In the Meditations and related texts from the early 1640s, Descartes argues that the self can be correctly considered as either a mind or a human being, and that the self’s properties vary accordingly. For example, the self is simple considered as a mind, whereas the self is composite considered as a human being. Someone might object that it is unclear how merely considering the self in different ways blocks the conclusion that a single subject of predication—the self—is both simple and composite, which is contradictory. In response to this objection, this paper develops a reading of Descartes’s various ways of considering the self. I argue that the best reading of Descartes’s qualified claims about the self, i.e. about the self qua mind or the self qua human being, ultimately presupposes an account of the unqualified self, that is, of the self simpliciter. I argue that the self simpliciter is not a mind, and that it is not a human being either. This result might suggest the pessimistic conclusion that Descartes’s view of the self is simply incoherent. To avoid this result, I introduce a new metaphysical account of the Cartesian self. On my view, the self is individuated by a unified mental life. The self is constituted by the beings that jointly produce this mental life, and derives its unity from it.PhilPapers, Self.Arnlodg (talk) 16:43, 26 November 2019 (UTC)
thread_title:  Abstract of added ref. to Self-evident, 2nd paragraph