Talk:Stop and identify statutes

message: This section has been marked as needing sources by User:198.239.71.118.  It is merely a legal-analysis extrapolation based on the information provided previously in the article and should require no additional sources. Jkatzen 03:48, 15 June 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Maybe so, but where are the sources for that? [Note:Different person] 68.39.174.238 03:55, 16 August 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Sources for section 'How to satisfy the minimum required duties'

message: Don't forget Texas. 205.240.146.58 21:51, 21 July 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: So ... what about Texas should not be forgotten? JeffConrad 22:17, 21 July 2007 (UTC)

text: It too has this kind of thing, only its called "Failure to ID", a criminal offense. 205.240.146.58 03:12, 22 July 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  Texas Statutes, Penal Code, §38.02(a) (2003) applies only to a person who has been “lawfully arrested”, so it isn’t really a “stop-and-identify” law in the sense of the others. The law once applied to anyone who refused to identify himself “... to a peace officer who has lawfully stopped him and requested the information.”; I assume it was revised in response to Brown v. Texas, . The current version probably would be a good example for the Arrest section, however. JeffConrad 05:41, 22 July 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: List

message: As helpful as this section is for someone not familiar with the law, I do not believe that it belongs in an encyclopedia.  If someone feels the same way, please remove this section (or rephrase it).  As mentioned above, Wikipedia should not be in the business of advising people on the law.  It should only state facts which can be cited.  Now, if you could find a reliable source for this information, and you rephrased it so that it wasn't directly advice on how to give the cops the least information possible, then I would be OK with it.Njerseyguy 05:52, 24 August 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: You are totally right. Even though it pretends not to be so, this section is legal advice, and therefore amounts to an illegal practice of law. Even if it weren't it doesn't add anything that a sensible person cannot figure out from the first part of the article. I deleted it. --151.203.239.219 07:29, 11 December 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: I disagree.  I would characterize it as a more detailed explanation of what the law involves and how it operates.  I feel like the first questions any reader will have when seeing the initial information is, "How does this work in practice, what rights are triggered, and what does it entail?" Jkatzen 08:48, 12 December 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  On the "How to satisfy the minimum required duties" 

message: With the current configuration of the New York Legislature web site, there is no obvious way to provide a direct link to CPL 140.50. Is a link to the New York law lookup better than nothing? JeffConrad 20:00, 4 September 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: I added the link to the New Mexico lookup page. DavidForthoffer (talk) 14:44, 7 July 2012 (UTC)

text: I updated the NM link to be direct 67.177.27.19 (talk) 15:55, 25 September 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: The NM link is not working and seems to use session variables now. It is over here someplace. Thanatos (talk) 04:40, 17 June 2014 (UTC)
thread_title:  Links to “stop-and-identify” statutes 

message: I've reverted the edits by 67.165.70.81; a quick glance should show that no further explanation is required. If this sort of nonsense needs to be reverted several times a day, then so be it. But it would make far more sense to consider several options and try to find one that's more or less acceptable to the substantive contributors here. I suggest several possibilities, not all viable, illustrated using a condensed version of the section Detention.
Masculine: A person is detained when circumstances are such that a reasonable person would believe he is not free to leave. Police may detain a person if they have reasonable suspicion that the person is involved in a crime. Many states have “stop and identify” laws that require a person so detained to identify himself to a police officer. The Court’s opinion in Hiibel implied that a detainee was not required to produce written identification, but could satisfy the requirement merely by stating his name.
:Arguably the most natural, and as the references demonstrate, still common in legal writing. But offensive to many and presumably violative of WP:MOS.
Feminine: A person is detained when circumstances are such that a reasonable person would believe she is not free to leave. Police may detain a person if they have reasonable suspicion that the person is involved in a crime. Many states have “stop and identify” laws that require a person so detained to identify herself to a police officer. The Court’s opinion in Hiibel implied that a detainee was not required to produce written identification, but could satisfy the requirement merely by stating her name.
:Similarly natural in form, but uncommon, and presumably as violative of WP:MOS as generic masculine.
Neuter: A person is detained when circumstances are such that a reasonable person would believe it is not free to leave. Police may detain a person if they have reasonable suspicion that the person is involved in a crime. Many states have “stop and identify” laws that require a person so detained to identify itself to a police officer. The Court’s opinion in Hiibel implied that a detainee was not required to produce written identification, but could satisfy the requirement merely by stating its name.
:Absurd perhaps, but commonly used for infants and young children. There is ambiguity in the final sentence because its could refer to detainee, identification, or requirement.
Both genders: A person is detained when circumstances are such that a reasonable person would believe he or she is not free to leave. Police may detain a person if they have reasonable suspicion that the person is involved in a crime. Many states have “stop and identify” laws that require a person so detained to identify himself or herself to a police officer. The Court’s opinion in Hiibel implied that a detainee was not required to produce written identification, but could satisfy the requirement merely by stating his or her name.
:One instance of both genders is manageable, but it gets extremely tedious, almost to the point of unreadability, after much repetition. For an actual example, see the 1 November 2009 version under Arrest.
Singular they: A person is detained when circumstances are such that a reasonable person would believe they are not free to leave. Police may detain a person if the officer has reasonable suspicion that the person is involved in a crime. Many states have “stop and identify” laws that require a person so detained to identify themselves to a police officer. The Court’s opinion in Hiibel implied that a detainee was not required to produce written identification, but could satisfy the requirement merely by stating their name.
:Jarring to many who consider the number disagreement grammatically incorrect. WP:GENDER recognizes this by suggesting that singular they only as a last resort. Though commonly used with anybody and nobody, themselves with other singular antecedents seems to find less support, and less usage, than does similar use of they.  The last two sentences here may be initially confusing to many, prompting the question, “Who are the other people?” It’s clear enough after a re-read, but seems an unnecessary obstacle to place in the reader’s path.
Singular they, variant: A person is detained when circumstances are such that a reasonable person would believe they are not free to leave. Police may detain a person if the officer has reasonable suspicion that the person is involved in a crime. Many states have “stop and identify” laws that require a person so detained to identify themself to a police officer. The Court’s opinion in Hiibel implied that a detainee was not required to produce written identification, but could satisfy the requirement merely by stating their name.
:Themself (which MS Word corrects to themselves) is, to my ear as well as Garner’s, an abomination. There may be less confusion from the penultimate sentence than in the previous example because there’s less of an implied sense of plural.
Plural: People are detained when circumstances are such that reasonable people would believe they are not free to leave. A police officer may detain people if the officer has reasonable suspicion that those people are involved in a crime. Many states have “stop and identify” laws that require people so detained to identify themselves to a police officer. The Court’s opinion in Hiibel implied that detainees were not required to produce written identification, but could satisfy the requirement merely by stating their names.
:Manageable, perhaps, but at least to my ear, quite awkward. Care must be taken to preclude confusion of police and detainees.
Nouns repeated: A person is detained when circumstances are such that a reasonable person would believe that the person is not free to leave. Police may detain a person if they have reasonable suspicion that the person is involved in a crime. Many states have “stop and identify” laws that require a person so detained to identify that person to a police officer. The Court’s opinion in Hiibel implied that a detainee was not required to produce written identification, but could satisfy the requirement merely by stating the detainee’s name.
:No possibility of gender bias, but to my ear, a nearly unreadable abomination. Were I the reader, my impression would be that the writer should not quit his or her day job.
No pronouns: A person is detained when circumstances are such that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave. Police may detain a person if they have reasonable suspicion that the person is involved in a crime. Many states have “stop and identify” laws that require a person so detained to provide identity to a police officer. The Court’s opinion in Hiibel implied that a detainee was not required to produce written identification, but could satisfy the requirement merely by stating a name.
:Similar to the previous example. The common technique of replacing the pronoun with an article fails in the last sentence, because the requirement is for the detainee to state his or her name rather than just a name such as “Puddin Tane” (see People v. Quiroga, under Obligations in California on this page, for the details). 
This article may be a more difficult case than many others, because I see no obvious way to avoid at least some instances of possessive and reflexive pronouns. There may be some way of recasting the wording to eliminate them, but I wasn't able to find one. I see no need to consider approaches, such as that taken by 67.165.70.81, that ignore rules of grammar and have absolutely no precedent.
Obviously, none of the above is perfect. As I suggest, I think the first approach is by far the most natural, as is the second; however, either would seem to violate WP:MOS and would be certain to draw frequent objection, as we have seen. At least to me, the other approaches range from awkward to abominable. The greatest advantage I see in alternating masculine and feminine is that the writing style is fairly natural, with the slight additional overhead of ensuring a reasonable balance of the two. Use of a natural style would seem to make it easier for both the reader, who doesn't need to decipher unfamiliar constructions, and for the writer, who can concentrate on content rather than jump through hoops to devise awkward and unnatural phrasing.
A hallmark of good editing is to tread as lightly as possible. Different authors have different styles, and one is not necessarily better than another. I think Wikipedia encourages somewhat bolder editing, but at some point, unless correcting an obvious error or making an arguable improvement, stare decisis must govern. This would seem common courtesy as well as common sense, lest we have the version of the hour. Though I'm not aware of a formal general policy on this, it's widely held informally, and there is much precedent for it with regard to individual areas such as reference styles, American vs. British English, typography of some mathematical material, etc.
This article was created using the generic masculine where pronouns could not be avoided. As some sections were expanded, I added masculine/feminine alternation to avoid accusations of gender bias and to comply with WP:MOS as I understand it. I personally have no problem with the generic masculine, but it's been deprecated for at least 25 years, so I've learned to avoid it. And I don't think the MOS allows it. But I'm willing to give it a shot if that's what others want.
To be honest, I'm getting weary of making what seem a simple matter into a dissertation, especially because it's been driven by anonymous edits, some of which have been ludicrous. But I wanted to do something more constructive than a brusque revert. Thoughts? JeffConrad (talk) 22:49, 22 January 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Possibilities to consider 

message: I had meant to say in the comment that California's “stop-and-identify” law, Penal Code §647(e), voided by the U.S. Supreme Court in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983), was finally repealed in 2007 (Stats. 2007, Ch. 302,  SB 425, Margett); the repeal was initiated at the request of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. In recommending repeal, the California Assembly's Committee on Public Safety found that the law “has served no purpose other than to cause confusion since 1983.” JeffConrad (talk) 08:19, 15 January 2009 (UTC)
thread_title:  Edit of 14 January 2009 

message: I removed reference to People v. Quiroga (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 961. I had relied somewhat on its mention in the California Peace Officers Legal Sourcebook, but upon a careful re-read, I think that generalizing beyond the circumstances of that case the claim that “the court held that refusing to identify oneself was not a violation of Penal Code §148 unless the person had been arrested for a felony” is stronger than can be justified. Extending the circumstances to a detention would seem to rely on the holding in In re Gregory S (1980), 112 Cal.App.3d 764, discussed at 969, fn 2. That holding apparently relied on the citation of Justice White's concurring opinion in dicta in Berkemer v. McCarty , at 439. Post Hiibel, it seems doubtful that that part of Gregory S. is still good law.
I am unaware of a holding that refusal to identify oneself constitutes a violation of §148, but I am also unaware of a definitive holding that it does not. People v. Long (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 77, relied on by the Alameda County DA's Office, apparently held that a detainee was obligated to present written identification upon request by a peace officer, but plaintiff Long complied with the request, so the issue of violation of §148 was not before the court. People v. Garcia (2006), 145 Cal.App.4th 782, held that a pat search for identification was unconstitutional, but again did not address violation of §148.
I think what remains in the note about a person's obligations in California is reasonably balanced, but perhaps someone else has additional thoughts on what this article can safely say about this. JeffConrad (talk) 09:59, 21 January 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Obligations in California 

message: I personally think FlexYourRights.com is a useful site, but are we getting carried away to the point that the article isn't NPOV? This link might also be seen as a commercial promo. JeffConrad (talk) 02:15, 21 April 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: No, the link is okay; their website says they are a a 501(c)(3) educational nonprofit organization. 5Q5 (talk) 17:23, 18 May 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  External links 

message: See my comments in the Talk for the Hiibel article. JeffConrad (talk) 06:20, 26 June 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Fifth Amendment holding in ''Hiibel'' 

message: It seems that there should be some sort of mention of Brown v. Texas in this article, but I'm not exactly sure where.  Any help? 99.73.189.231 (talk) 20:45, 14 July 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: It actually is briefly mentioned (in Note 12 as of 14 July 2010); it's also mentioned in the article on Hiibel. I don't know whether it merits additional discussion here. Because the Court were able to resolve Brown on the grounds that the stop was violative of the Fourth Amendment, they did not consider the validity of the identification requirement. Since Brown was decided, Texas Penal Code § 38.02 has been amended twice, in 1991 and again in 1993, and the section now applies to a person “lawfully arrested” rather “lawfully stopped”. The change may have been in response to Brown, but I'm just guessing. If indeed that was the reason for changing the language, it might be worth adding to this article, but obviously, we'd need to be sure. The previous wording required a person stopped to give an address as well as a name; the Court has yet to consider the validity of the former, but post Hiibel, there presumably would be no problem with requiring a person “lawfully stopped” to provide a name. For whatever reason, the Texas legislature have thus far declined to revisit that statute. JeffConrad (talk) 01:48, 15 July 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  ''Brown v. Texas'' 1979 

message: There probably are many different ways that “stop and identify” laws can be classified, but a quick look reveals several things.
Four states' laws (Arizona, Indiana, Nevada, and Ohio) explicitly impose an obligation to provide identifying information.
Fifteen states grant a peace officer authority to ask questions, with varying wording, but do not explicitly impose an obligation to respond:
* In Montana, a peace officer “may request” identifying information;
* In 13 states (Alabama, Delaware, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Utah, Wisconsin), a peace officer “may demand” identifying information;
* In Colorado, a peace officer “may require” identifying information of a person.
Identifying information varies, but typically includes
* Name, address, and an explanation of the person's actions;
* In some cases it also includes the person's intended destination, the person's date of birth (Indiana and Ohio), or written identification if available (Colorado).
* Arizona's law, apparently written specifically to codify the holding in Hiibel, requires a person's “true full name”.
* Nevada's law, which requires a person to “identify himself”, apparently requires only that the person state his name.
Six states (Arizona, Florida, Indiana, New Mexico, Ohio, and Vermont)
explicitly impose a criminal penalty for noncompliance with the obligation
to identify oneself.
In Ffive states (Alaska Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island),
failure to identify oneself is one factor to be considered in a decision
to arrest.  In all but Rhode Island, the consideration arises in the
context of loitering.
In states whose “stop and identify laws” do not directly impose penalties, a
lawful arrest must be for violation of some other law, such as one to the
effect of “resisting, obstructing, or delaying an officer”.  Wording and
interpretation by state courts of both “stop and identify” and “obstructing”
laws varies; in some cases, such as New York, a physical act (such as forcible
resistance or sometimes simply “going limp”) is required, and in others,
such as Nevada and Utah, no physical act is required.
State courts (which determine guilt or innocence) and federal appellate
courts (which hear actions for civil rights violations) are not bound by
each others' precedents, and interpretations by state and federal courts
are not always consistent.  The Nevada Supreme Court noted that the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals had found the Nevada “stop and identify” law
violative of the Fourth Amendment, but in Hiibel v.  Dist.  Court
declined to follow their the Ninth Circuit's precedent.
 in Hiibel v.  Dist.  Court. At least one Illinois appellate court, in
Love noted above, concluded that for the Illinois “stop and identify”
statute, an officer's authority to demand that a suspect identify himself
did not impose an obligation to comply.  Post-Hiibel decisions by the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals (e.g., Cady v.  Sheahan [2006] and
Hardrick v.  Bolingbrook [2007]) clearly do not share this view.
And as noted in Hiibel, different federal circuits do not always agree.
For example, in Oliver v.  Woods (10th Cir. 2000) the court apparently
held that an officer's authority to demand identification in Utah's stop
and identify law imposed a duty to respond, and that Oliver's “refusal to
perform any act required by lawful order” violated Utah's obstructing law
because Oliver's duty to identify himself made Officer Woods's order to do
so lawful.
Conclusion
The slightly expanded list of “stop and identify” laws that were given in Hiibel makes for a handy reference, but it seems obvious that for the majority of states for which we list such laws, the effect of a “stop and identify” law cannot be determined without knowing some other law, typically one for “obstructing an officer”, and interpretation by state and sometimes federal courts of both laws, preferably in a case similar to Hiibel in which a person specifically challenged a conviction for obstructing. Though I've only looked at a handful of jurisdictions, such cases seem few and far between. Consequently, though it would appear that the current listing of states may be accurate, absent additional information, it's probably misleading.
Providing the necessary information would be a tall order, and doing so might prove almost impossible; in some states, the legal questions may even be unsettled. I'm not sure it makes sense to remove the list, but I think we need to make it more clear that the list is not a reliable indicator of whether a suspect must identify himself. If it's thought more enlightening than confusing, we could perhaps include some of the examples above to illustrate the complexity.
I have a bit of a problem with the subsection Obligations under “stop and identify” laws, because that title seems to imply that if a state has a  “stop and identify” law, there is an obligation, and absent such a law, there is not an obligation. Moreover, absent definitive decisions such as Hiibel, any statement of obligations is little more than a guess, which I don't think we should (or even can) do. To me, the material in that subsection seems largely a continuation of the material that immediately precedes it. One simple option would be to eliminate the subsection title. JeffConrad (talk) 07:05, 29 November 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Cursory analysis of listed “stop and identify” laws 

message: I reverted the note for Florida’s “stop and identify” law because, although arguably useful, it made a mess of the list. There’s also no more reason to explain Florida’s law than that of any other state, and adding similar notes to the list would make it something other than a list. If we think more explanation is needed, I think it should go in the text rather than the list. The question then would be how far to go; I’m not sure it makes sense to discuss every state law in detail (WP is not a repository for primary sources, and we have the links to the actual texts), so perhaps a summary like I have discussed above would be appropriate. JeffConrad (talk) 00:09, 11 December 2010 (UTC)
thread_title: Detailed explanation of various state laws

message: I’ve revised the sections States with “stop and identify” laws and Obligations under “stop and identify” laws in attempt to address concerns that we currently oversimplify the issue, and the recent edit explaining Florida’s “stop and identify” law. Toward that end, I’ve incorporated much of the material above. I’ve tried to maintain a balance of positions, and avoid stating any conclusions that aren’t unambiguously supported by decisional law (in other words, very few). I realize that there now is an ocean of quoted material, but without it, I don’t think the statements that rely on it can reasonably be included.
I changed the section title to lessen the impression that the article provides a dispositive list of states and the attendant obligations.
I put the table of states with “stop and identify” laws at the right and let the text flow around it to better give the impression that it’s a starting point rather than a dispositive guide to obligations; if this makes the text column to the left too narrow on some displays, we can move the table (if we do, I’d put it at the end of the section in another subsection to lessen the urge for a reader to simply look at the list and assume that determines her obligations).
See if this works. JeffConrad (talk) 03:08, 12 December 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Edit of 12 December 2010 

message: I'd like to see this page to be expanded to hold information from other countries.  Specifically, I'm interested in Canada (because that's where I live).  24.78.50.156 (talk) 03:58, 29 November 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  International Laws (specifically for me, Canada) 

message: Texas Penal code 38.02 clearly is not a “stop and identify” statute; the requirement to identify oneself applies only to a person who has been arrested, as was discussed above under List and Brown v. Texas 1979.
The requirement to carry and present a license applies only to the driver of a vehicle, so it’s not a “stop and identify” statute, and not properly part of this article. As nearly as I know, every other state has the same requirement, so there’s nothing special about Texas.
The article carefully balances masculine and feminine gender; making changes to one section upsets that balance. This again has been discussed many times. JeffConrad (talk) 20:23, 29 December 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Texas statutes 

message: I think the article gives an extremely misleading view of Florida's law.  FL law does not allow police to arrest simply for failure to identify one's self.  Your presence must "warrant a justifiable and reasonable alarm or immediate concern for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity," and the statute allows you other means to dispell the idea that you are a danger beyond identification.  207.244.179.96 (talk) 01:26, 20 January 2011 (UTC)
replies: text: All “stop and identify” laws require reasonable suspicion of involvement in a crime for a peace officer to even detain a suspect, and I think we make this pretty clear. I also think we make it clear that in Florida, as well as four other states, that failure to identify is only one factor that can lead to arrest. What would you suggest as an improvement? In the interim, I’ve interchanged the last two bullet items to place the “only one factor” before the mention of criminal penalties, in attempt to give the former more emphasis. JeffConrad (talk) 02:08, 20 January 2011 (UTC)
thread_title:  Florida statutes 

message: It seems clear that, just as with the Wikipedians who make significant contributions to the MOS, there is not, nor will there ever be, consensus on how to handle gender neutrality here. I think, however, that the MOS nonetheless provides a means of resolution. As with most other aspects of writing style, there are many ways of addressing gender neutrality, all admittedly imperfect, and it is simply impossible to incorporate them all. The MOS guidance in such a situation is clear: the article should follow the style used in the first non-stub version. In this instance, that is the alternation of masculine and feminine gender when other workarounds prove awkward.
Several editors have suggested that gender alternation is violative of the MOS. If that is indeed the case, the current approach need not be (and cannot be) followed. The question, then, is whether gender alternation can be regarded as gender neutral. Although I think most of it has previously been covered, I’m not sure even I could find it amidst the clutter, so I shall review the issue de novo.
# Policy is given in WP:MOS, which simply says, “Use gender-neutral language where this can be done with clarity and precision”, and directs the reader to the linked guideline. The stated exceptions would seem to prove the rule that generic masculine (or generic feminine) are disallowed.
# The Gender-neutral language guideline clearly states the objective: “Gender-neutral language avoids constructions that might be interpreted by some readers as an unnecessary reinforcement of traditional stereotypes”; I fail to see how gender alternation as used in this article comes anywhere close to reinforcing stereotypes. That guideline does include “A masculine or feminine pronoun to refer to a generic or hypothetical person” as an example of “non-neutral language that can often be easily avoided”. Perhaps the operative words are often and easily, but in any event, the language (as well as the guideline) is advisory rather than proscriptive. The guideline includes several examples of ways to avoid gender bias, including “Using he or she (‘Each politician is responsible for his or her constituency’)”, but also notes that “this can be ungainly if repeated within a short space”.
# The article Gender-neutral pronoun includes gender alternation as a “modern solution” for addressing gender neutrality. This article is neither policy nor guidance, and is not even directed to Wikipedia editors, but it nonetheless suggests alternation is one commonly used technique.
# Gender alternation is given as a technique in many widely used style guides, including Garner’s Modern American Usage, the Oxford Style Manual, and the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association; endorsement in the last guide is tepid at best, but the operative question here is whether alternation is an acceptable technique rather than whether it is the best technique.
It would seem to me that gender alternation is clearly a well-established, acceptable technique for achieving gender neutrality. Whether it is the best technique is a subjective question to which there is probably no “right” answer, and on which we are unlikely to reach unanimous agreement here. But unless I’ve missed something significant, MOS:STABILITY governs, and changing the current style is clearly out of bounds.
As previously noted, use of the current style was hardly a capricious decision.
The article’s original author used generic masculine, probably a technical violation of the MOS, but with only an instance or two, hardly a significant issue.
As the article was expanded and the instances increased, the general masculine bias became more prominent, and I used several techniques to address it, including pluralization, use of nouns rather than pronouns, and where either of these seemed contrived and awkward, constructions like “his or her”.
With regard to the last, the reason for the caveat in Gender-neutral language quickly became evident, particularly demonstrated in the final paragraph under Arrest. Although the actual wording in the 1 November 2009 version previously cited was slightly different, a complete transformation of the current wording would read to the effect of
Whether an arrestee must identify himself or herself to police may depend on the jurisdiction in which the arrest occurs. If a person is under arrest and police wish to question him or her, they are required to inform the arrestee of his or her Fifth-Amendment right to remain silent by giving a Miranda warning. However, Miranda does not apply to biographical data necessary to complete booking.[15][16] It is not clear whether a “stop and identify” law can compel the arrestee to give his or her name after being arrested, although some states have laws that specifically require an arrestee to give his or her name and other biographical information,[17] and some state courts[18][19] have held that refusal of an arrestee to give his or her name constitutes obstructing a public officer. As a practical matter, an arrestee who refused to give his or her name would have little chance of obtaining a prompt release.
Ya gotta be kidding . . .
Some other commonly used techniques cannot be used here without unacceptably altering meaning. For example, it usually is necessary to say “state his name” (or “state her name”) rather than simply “state a name”.
Remaining alternatives might be to pluralize everything or repeat nouns (as was done in Arizona’s “stop and identify” statute); I think the wording in the examples I previously gave could be slightly improved, but the constructions would still be contrived and would hurt rather than improve the article.
I hardly expect everyone to agree with my reasoning on the final points above, but I repeat that, to avoid paralysis, it was necessary to choose among various techniques, and a choice was made. Unless that choice violates the MOS, stare decisis governs.
As I’ve indicated, if I’ve somehow erred in my analysis, and someone can make the case with something more than a different personal preference, I’m more than willing to stand corrected. JeffConrad (talk) 22:19, 9 March 2011 (UTC)
thread_title:  Resolution 

message: The seemingly incessant edit warring does a disservice to the article’s readers, and I’m also growing weary of it. Though alternation seemed an uncontroversial to me , it found at best tepid support at WT:MOS and it obviously has found little favor with some here. I repeat my thoughts above and suggest we take one of three approaches:
Find a rationale for using generic masculine that we can reconcile with WP:GENDER ad defend if necessary. Perhaps that the vast majority of arrests (and presumably also detentions) involve men would be one element. If we can find a supportable rationale, we can also cite MOS:STABILITY if others have a problem with it. My greatest concern is that this approach would also invite ongoing edit warring.
Use the plural whenever we cannot avoid a pronoun, e.g.,
Police may detain persons if they have reasonable suspicion that those persons are involved in a crime; persons are detained when circumstances are such that reasonable persons would not feel free to leave.  Many states have “stop and identify” laws that require the detainees to identify themselves to police. The Court’s opinion in Hiibel implied that detainees are not required to present written identification, but can satisfy the requirement merely by stating their names.
To me, persons seems a bit contrived and jargony; as suggested above, people or individuals are possible alternatives, though individuals also seems to smack of police jargon. In some cases, suspects could serve to describe persons police wish to detain, though this may be arguably less neutral than persons or the other alternatives.
Eliminate pronouns when we use the singular, e.g.,
Police may detain a person if they have reasonable suspicion that the person is involved in a crime; a person is detained when circumstances are such that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave.  Many states have “stop and identify” laws that require a detainee to identify that the detainee to police. The Court’s opinion in Hiibel implied that a detainee is not required to present written identification, but can satisfy the requirement merely by stating the detainee’s name.
Again, suspect might serve in some cases to lessen the unnatural repetition of person, though as suggested above, it may imply a slight bias.
Decisions like this are usually made by those who have been involved in developing this article, so I’d be especially interested in Jkatzen’s thoughts. In any event, we could put the time spent on this to far better use, like debating the use of en dashes  JeffConrad (talk) 04:57, 12 April 2011 (UTC)
thread_title:  We need to get past the pointless edit warring 

message: The link to Colorado Session Laws of 2001, Ch. 261, added on 11June 2011, is shaky because it leads to an Act that was approved over ten years ago rather than the current code. The link to CRS 16-3-103(1) has long been a problem, breaking almost monthly, despite several creative efforts to find a stable link. Unless someone has a better idea, I suggest that we return to the general link to the Colorado Revised Statutes, which, though less convenient, seemed to be stable. JeffConrad (talk) 00:09, 12 June 2011 (UTC)
thread_title:  Link to Coloroado’s “stop and identify” law 

message: NMSA §30-22-3, as linked in the article, is somewhat ambiguous as to the actual process of providing identity. In Full:
:30-22-3. Concealing identity.
:Concealing identity consists of concealing one's true name or identity, or disguising oneself with intent to obstruct the due execution of the law or with intent to intimidate, hinder or interrupt any public officer or any other person in a legal performance of his duty or the exercise of his rights under the laws of the United States or of this state.   
:Whoever commits concealing identity is guilty of a petty misdemeanor.   
The law states that, in short, if you are detained by an officer in the course of his duties (executing the law of NM), and you attempt to obstruct, intimidate, hinder, or interrupt him/her by concealing your identity, then you are guilty of a petty misdemeanor. To me, this makes it sound like you may say, "I do not need to provide you with my identification, but my name is X," and still be in the right (as long as you don't lie about your name).
Just a thought. ThatOneRoadie (talk) 05:20, 8 August 2011 (UTC)
replies: text: A ruling was made on this in KEYLON v. CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE in the United States Court of Appeals,Tenth Circuit, No. 07-2071, on August 05, 2008. "Believing that she was being “untruthful and evasive,” Officer Barnard asked for Ms. Keylon's identification.   Aples' Br. at 8. Ms. Keylon did not produce identification, and instead approached her van.   Officer Barnard put his hand up, preventing Ms. Keylon from getting in.   He asked her where her identification was, and she told him that it was in her purse, which was in the house.   She started walking up the driveway towards her home, at which point Officer Barnard said, “Ma'am, I need to see your ID.” Ms. Keylon responded, “Well, I'll get my ID when I'm ready.”   Tr., at 225.   Officer Barnard then placed her under arrest for concealing her identity, in violation of N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-22-3.   All of this occurred on the sidewalk and lawn in front of Ms. Keylon's home." The court ruled against her. I think you have a different understanding of the word "conceal."  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 66.55.214.116 (talk) 16:45, 24 May 2012 (UTC)
thread_title:  New Mexico SAI statute is ambiguous? 

message: Your article lists Michigan as one of 24 states with stop and identify statutes, but there is no information about Michigan or its applicable laws in the article.  Your list of states does not even have Michigan on it. 2601:4:1180:8B9:5C75:A034:F8DC:864B (talk) 04:53, 6 October 2014 (UTC)
thread_title:  MI stop and identify statutes. 

message: The IP/anon editor is partially right. Law enforcement can also be conservators of the peace. It's not just judges. It's a whole slew of persons, both state and federal, operating within the justice system. But, the editor is correct that it's not a S&I statute. It's about refusing to bring a suspected person to the LEO when ordered to deliver up said offender, not about refusing to show one's ID or state one's information. -- Foofighter20x (talk) 03:23, 28 May 2015 (UTC)
thread_title:  Virginia conservator (18.2-464) 

message: The statement “hence Wisconsin is not a must ID state” makes a pretty
sweeping conclusion without citing any authority.  Perhaps it draws on
the Illinois cases People v.  Love (2000) and People v.  Fernandez
(2011), but those cases have no binding authority in another
state.  Given that the distinction between a demand for identification
and the obligation to provide it was addressed in dictum in
Fernandez and that Love was reversed—albeit on other grounds—the
cases may not carry much persuasive authority, either.
Reliance on other jurisdictions would seem unnecessary; the issue was
addressed in Henes v.  Morrissey, 194 Wis.2d 338 (1995), which held
that failure to identify oneself was not a violation of Wisconsin’s
“obstructing” statute,
§946.41.;
the case is linked after the text of the statute.
It is not clear that this means that Wisconsin is not a “must ID” state, however,
because it’s not clear what that term means.  Although failure to
identify oneself is apparently not a basis for arrest, State v.  Flynn
(cited in the article) nonetheless sanctions a search for
identification.  And Flynn strongly implies that the Court do not
see a distinction between a demand and a requirement to comply, though
it does not attempt to show that this was the legislature’s intent.
Like the California court in People v.  Garcia, I honestly don’t see
how Flynn can be reconciled with Terry v.  Ohio—but ’tis as
’tis; the decision was apparently unanimous, and it appears to remain
good law.
Once again: the interpretation of state laws is the prerogative of state
courts.  The duty of Wikipedia is to observe and report rather than
analyze or comment.
JeffConrad (talk) 05:54, 3 March 2016 (UTC)
thread_title:  “citation needed” tag for statement about Wisconsin “stop and identify” law 

message: I think that Utah v. Strieff (2016) doesn't say what an editor thinks it says: "Prior to the recent Supreme Court decision (see Utah v. Strieff (2016)), if a person was not reasonably suspected of committing a crime, they were not required to provide identification, even in states with stop and identify statutes."
The supreme court held in Utah v. Strieff that "that Strieff was a shortterm visitor, Officer Fackrell should have asked Strieff whether he would speak with him, instead of demanding that Strieff do so" and that the officer's stop of Strieff was unlawful.
It was only because Strieff happened to have an outstanding warrant that, post facto, the court could say that evidence gained pursuant to the unlawful stop was admissible.
Utah has a stop-and-identify statute which requires probable cause to demand ID from a suspect: https://le.utah.gov/xcode/Title77/Chapter7/77-7-S15.html
If anything, Utah v. Strieff affirms at the supreme court level that the officer didn't have probable cause to stop Strieff, and, potentially more generally, that officers must abide by stop and identify statutes.  — Preceding unsigned comment added by Mowster (talk • contribs) 20:27, 28 June 2016 (UTC)
thread_title:  See Utah v. Strieff (2016) 

message: Drive-by comment from an unregistered reader.  I think this article should be titled "Stop and identify statutes in the USA".  Other countries have a wide range of stop and identify laws, which are entirely unmentioned.  Thanks  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 88.97.32.239 (talk) 13:38, 16 July 2017 (UTC)
thread_title:  National Applicability 

message: The statute reference is correct and applicable, however, the link itself is not accessible, "404 - File or directory not found."  By drilling down through georgia.gov, the root and link of the Nexis DB have changed.  The link I can obtain is incredibly long, so will put in the last reasonable link, at least leading the reader to the proper place to get into the DB.   The topic is of current interest, so brand new Wiki contributor at the helm attempting to captain.  God save us all.  
 FirstGoWikiHelp (talk) 17:07, 22 January 2019 (UTC)
thread_title:  Link to Georgia's "Obligation to Identify" is not accessible 

message: Shouldn't there be a section or a See Also that notes what federal law requires?  I distantly recall a case where 2 terror suspects were taken in by the FBI and the FBI couldn't convict them of any prior crime but since each had refused to identify himself, they were convicted of a felony and got 5 years for it.  Trouble is, I can't find anything on the internet regarding having to identify oneself to a federal agent, or to this particular case. --Petzl (talk) 18:06, 24 April 2019 (UTC)
thread_title:  US federal law 

message: Does the court case for North Carolina really fall in line with the spirit of this entry? The case linked describes how a passenger in a motor vehicle refused to ID himself AFTER the officer told him he would be giving him a ticket for not wearing a seat belt. Generally, Stop and ID laws pertain to reasonable suspicion and investigating, not IDing once an officer is arresting or writing a ticket. It follows that a person must be identified if they are arrested or given a ticket, else the state lacks enforcement ability of its laws. Stop and ID laws pertain to a persons obligations during an investigation, before someone is accused of a crime.  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2603:6080:F502:33BC:69CA:A1CC:DA92:154 (talk) 19:14, 15 November 2021 (UTC)
thread_title:  North Carolina Court case 

message: Fla. Stat. §901.15 does not require a detainee to identify. It only gives law enforcement the power to detain for the purpose of identification. 2601:985:4201:1F60:8D87:8C92:259:44DB (talk) 01:38, 26 January 2022 (UTC)
thread_title:  Florida identify statute 

message: This statement here in the article is unsourced:  "While the police officer must have reasonable suspicion to detain a person, the officer has no obligation to inform the person what that suspicion was."  There is no reference for this claim.  There are a number of other places on the web where it says that a detainee has a right to know the reason for their detainment.  So which is it?  Can someone please source the statement in the article that says a police officer can lawfully detain you and not tell you any justifiable reason for it?  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2601:602:980:DDE0:C4BB:D04E:1911:8186 (talk) 08:34, 16 January 2023 (UTC)
thread_title: Article lacks source for detainment claim

message: There is a list of states that the article states have stop and id laws, each state listed has a hyperlink to a statute. Maryland is listed, but the hyperlink points to statutes about handling handgun possession during a terry stop, id is never mentioned. Furthermore in a proceeding map shown earlier in the article maryland is clearly indicated as NOT having a stop and id statute. 71.121.234.94 (talk) 03:53, 10 May 2023 (UTC)
thread_title:  Maryland incorrectly listed as having a stop and id law 

message: Wisconsin is NOT a stop and identify state.  As an attorney practicing civil rights and criminal justice in the state for over a decade, this is one of the most common misconceptions, and it is lazy maps like this that are partially to blame.  
''
968.24 Temporary questioning without arrest. After having identified himself or herself as a law enforcement officer, a law enforcement officer may stop a person in a public place for a reasonable period of time when the officer reasonably suspects that such person is committing, is about to commit or has committed a crime, and may demand the name and address of the person and an explanation of the person's conduct.  Such detention and temporary questioning shall be conducted in the vicinity where the person was stopped.''
 968.24 Temporary questioning without arrest.  After having identified himself or herself as a law enforcement officer, a law enforcement officer may stop a person in a public place for a reasonable period of time when the officer reasonably suspects that such person is committing, is about to commit or has committed a crime, and may demand the name and address of the person and an explanation of the person's conduct.  Such detention and temporary questioning shall be conducted in the vicinity where the person was stopped. 
This statute misleads people into believing they have a duty to respond to such a demand. They do not. There is no portion of this section that imposes a duty upon a citizen to respond to an officer's demand for identification. There is no criminal or civil penalty listed for failing to do so. And the language that restricts any detention to temporary and localized detention specifically prohibits arrest, which would be available if it were a violation of the law to refuse to provide identification.  
Looking closely, this statute merely states what the federal courts already have allowed: it allows the officer to demand identification and briefly detain someone who does not provide it in an attempt to identify them.  
I really do not feel a need to discuss this point very far, as this is a commonly discussed matter amongst legal professionals and experts in this state.  There is broad consensus on everything I have stated.  Unless someone has something to offer to convincingly contradict this, then someone needs to remove Wisconsin from the list of states with stop and identify laws. Jsingleton82 (talk) 19:41, 19 February 2024 (UTC)
thread_title:  Wisconsin is not a stop and identify state