Talk:1998 Auckland power crisis

message: This tiny article raised more questions than it answers.  Without thinking much, here are some:
* Why did it take five weeks to string some new wires?  Did work commence immediately?
* Why hadn't the wires which were already passed their lifetime already been replaced?
* How long was it after the failure from four to three wires, etc.?
** If it was long enough, why weren't blackouts or brownouts implemented to prevent overload?
—EncMstr (talk) 01:10, 31 March 2009 (UTC)
thread_title:  expansion ideas 

message: As an interesting somewhat related example it seems they had similar problems of very long (weeks in some cases) blackouts in Quebec particularly Montreal in 1998 due to massive ice storms (which of course also caused other problems) rather then poor maintenance. They used derailed train engines in some instances as portable generators  . Despite these massive problems, they were able to fix things in weeks as well too it seems. Considering the closeness in timing, was there much talk of the Quebec situation/comparison in NZ? Nil Einne (talk) 12:06, 20 October 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: I don't recall any mention of Quebec during the crisis. However, I wasn't in Auckland during the first few days.-gadfium 18:26, 20 October 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  [[North American ice storm of 1998]] 

message: This external link reference is broken:
http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/Page____12136.aspx  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 198.48.2.1 (talk) 08:02, 15 July 2013 (UTC)
replies: text: Thanks for pointing this out. I've linked to an archive of the original page.-gadfium 09:07, 15 July 2013 (UTC)
thread_title:  broken link 

message: I'm a little surprised at the lack of background analysis.
It's worth noting that this occurred in mid-summer, during a particularly warm week, in a geographic area dominated by commercial buildings which were fully air conditioned - unlike the surrounding residential suburbs.
It was well known among Mercury staff at the time that this entire incident was largely due to the intransigence of the then-CEO who refused to allow planned blackouts so that emergency preventative maintenance could be undertaken, for fear that these short blackouts "would harm the reputation" of the company.
I was working in the Newmarket head office of Mercury as this disaster slowly unfolded, and I have a fairly vivid recollection of the sense of disbelief among the entire engineering staff as repeated requests to allow an urgent maintenance shutdown were rebuffed.
About 2 hours before the last cable failed on 20 February, the temperature monitors on the last cable indicated that it was operating well outside its safety margins. This news spread quickly by word of mouth among staff at the Newmarket head office; the sense of impending doom was palpable.
Shortly after the last cable failed, an ambulance arrived, and remained in the courtyard for what seemed like a very long time. It eventually left without a patient. Shortly afterwards it was announced that the CEO had suffered a heart attack and, sadly, died in his office.
It is difficult not to come to the conclusion that this was a direct result of realizing that his previous concerns about "reputation" were laughably misplaced compared with the impact of a shutdown that would lasts for months, and that the whole fiasco would be laid entirely at his feet.
Obviously this amounts to personal anecdote or original research, but surely at least some of it has been published in the intervening 24 years?  — Preceding unsigned comment added by Martin Kealey (talk • contribs) 06:30, 16 January 2022 (UTC)
replies: text: That's interesting, but can't be included in the article without a source.-gadfium 07:53, 16 January 2022 (UTC)
thread_title:  Human Factors