Talk:Operation Savannah (Angola)

message: Was it not a case of the South African forces having made such good progress that the Americans, faced with the prospect of the exercise getting too big and ambitious, pulled out and left the South Africans feeling a little less brave? The South Africans stuck to their guns, until the Cubans were sent home, before they agreed to budge on South West Africa..
Gregorydavid 14:22, 14 March 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Invasion

message: I check pages listed in :Category:Pages with incorrect ref formatting to try to fix reference errors. One of the things I do is look for content for orphaned references in wikilinked articles. I have found content for some of :Operation Savannah (Angola)'s orphans, the problem is that I found more than one version. I can't determine which (if any) is correct for this article, so I am asking for a sentient editor to look it over and copy the correct ref content into this article.
Reference named "a":
From Angolan Civil War: 
From Battle of Quifangondo: 
From Luanda: 
I apologize if any of the above are effectively identical; I am just a simple computer program, so I can't determine whether minor differences are significant or not. AnomieBOT⚡ 07:01, 1 October 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Orphaned references in [[:Operation Savannah (Angola)]] 

message: If I remember my sources correctly, the following measures were taken during Savannah to keep it "covert". Keep in mind that there were Saffies serving as privateers independent of the SADF (including one or two who initially served with Colonel Callan!); at least three of them destroyed a T-54 with an FNLA vehicle during the early months of the war. So it's possible that the SADF could have passed off their personnel for "mercenaries". Additionally, both the FNLA and UNITA had at least one Panhard AML-90 apiece, which was quite similar to the Eland. These were either donated by Zaire or left behind by the Portuguese when they pulled out in '75. It would have been possible to disguise Eland-90s as Angolan vehicles.
*1. The Elands involved in Op Savannah were supposed to be painted in a nonstandard "lizard" green, some of them with yellowish tigerstripes to imitate the old Portuguese vehicle camo pattern. A few were, a few weren't. But those were the orders from Pretoria regardless. At least two Eland-90s were photographed at Luso with the Pork stripes.
*2. Troopies involved wore nondescript uniforms impossible to trace. Not SADF browns but rather the same olive fatigues that the FNLA mercs were wearing.
*3. All the rat packs for Op Savannah were repackaged in plain, multicoloured, biscuit tins without wrappers or any markings whatever.
*4. A lot of the Eland crews wore the Bata Pro Stars or some similar civilian takkies. They were prohibited from wearing standard SADF combat boots, which had a distinctive tread. 
*5. SADF personnel were forbidden to wear their dog tags.
*7. All of the FN/R1 ammunition distributed to the units involved in Savannah was unmarked - no head stamps. 
*8. Servicemen recall that they were stripped completely naked and all their basic kit taken by the army. Everything was reissued without exception.
*9. Technically, Saffie cigarettes were banned. I have no idea if these instructions - like the Eland paint - were followed to the letter.
There can be no denying that the covert nature of this expedition was absurd when you consider that even the artillerymen with their 25-pounders were subject to these restrictions. Nevertheless, they seem to have worked to a degree: I have read several Yank news sources from the time which claimed that there was no evidence that "any" SA troops were inside Angola. Even after Vorster admitted that they were there to guard the hydroelectric dam, in late '76 the international media still failed to pick up on the fact that the SADF had engaged in offensive operations.
Thanks! --Katangais (talk) 02:34, 8 December 2013 (UTC)
thread_title:  Covert nature 

message: In the introduction you find the following text:
"With a decisive victory by the MPLA, supported mainly by Cuba and the Soviet Union, over the combined forces of UNITA, FNLA, Zaire and South Africa, with the support of the United States, the operation was vital for the proclamation of independence and consequent liberation of Angola."
Then, you read the rest only to find that South Africa overwhelmingly thrashed the opposition except for a few minor skirmishes.  From talking to people who have been there I find this accurate.
The first statement doesn't make sense.  It is either plain incorrect or written in the wrong context.
Thanks Alwyns42 (talk) 14:32, 14 October 2020 (UTC)
replies: text: Hello Alwyns. When you read the article, you have to look at it in the context of article being about a South African operation which was just a small part of the Angolan War of Independence as a whole. After the South African forces backing the FNLA were unable to take Luanda, and the lack of political commitment to take Angola with just South African soldiers and not with proxy forces like the FNLA and UNITA, and finally the end of American support for the anti-MPLA forces and the South African effort, there was not going to be a good outcome. The are countless examples during the border war of the South African politics letting down or muzzling the SADF. As they say, you can win the battles and still loose the war. In the end, the MPLA took Luanda and eventually most of the provincial capital's and assumed control of Angola. The South Africans then set creating a buffer in the south by backing UNITA and creating 32 Battalion out of remnants of the FNLA. Regards Paul Conlinp (talk) 08:16, 15 October 2020 (UTC)
thread_title:  An obvious contradiction