Talk:Modigliani–Miller theorem

message: I believe that line 4 of Proposition 1 (Vu=Vl) should say purchase the shares of firm L and borrow the same amount of money B that firm L does  instead of purchase the shares of firm U and borrow the same amount of money B that firm L does.
If I am wrong, can somebody care it explain it? - Dragonballdbz (talk) 18:46, 22 March 2009 (UTC)
thread_title:  Error in printing  

message: Modigliani and Miller directly contradict the background that was given in their Fall 1988 Journal of Economic Perspectives pieces.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 72.205.60.49 (talk) 18:30, 19 October 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Historical Background  

message: Yes, we can see the formula in the article. However, readers don't know the reason why and how formula is derived. Please add some information on the derivations. Jackzhp 21:21, 11 October 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Derivation should be added 

message: I've seen the formulation provided here to calculate required return on equity for MM Prop II, but have determined that it incorrectly represents the derivation.  The correct derivation would be:
rCE = rW + D/E[rW - rD(1-t)]
Recall that the second proposition states that the cost of equity is a linear function of the debt-to-equity ratio.  The current formulation in this paper provides the perverse (and incorrect) result of DECREASING required return on equity, if WACC is kept the same and the calculations are completed with t=0 and t>0. Insiderman1 16:57, 19 February 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Formula may be incorrect 

message: I think Capital structure irrelevance principle should be merged into this page as it is referring to exactly the same thing. Suicup 10:24, 6 June 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Merge

message: For this graph 
the k's aren't described so it's hard for the reader to know how it relates to the section it's in. Pocopocopocopoco (talk) 04:15, 13 April 2008 (UTC)
thread_title: Problem with Graph

message: consider the following leveraged (L) and un-leveraged (U/L)firm:
Both have the same value of capital
L: Debt=1000, Equity=4000
U/L:=Debt=0, Equity=5000
Both have EBIT=EBIT
Tax T
U/L firm
Interest payed I=0
Net income = EBIT(1-T)
This is payed out as dividends. 
So total payout to stock holders N.I.= EBIT(1-T)
In the L  firm , I is interest payed out
Net Income=(EBIT-I)(1-T)
Dividends payed out= (EBIT-I)(1-T)
Total payed out to all lenders = I+(EBIT-I)(1-T)= EBIT(1-T)+IT
So the firm L pays EBIT(1-T)+I.T in total
In other words obviously if the firm is paying out more "I.T", its value is higher.
From the firm's pocket, it has paid out I.T extra. 
The fact being that the firm has to "pay more" should also be considered. 
so we have a firm L which pays "more" the same capital(5000) and same earnings EBIT compared to a U/L firm.
Since we equate FCF = Payout of the firm, does it make sense to say that the wacc is lower or is it a more pointed fact that the firm is paying more for the same capital?
What the theory misses is "the firm pays more, for the same capital"
Did I miss something?
23:40, 30 July 2013 (UTC)
thread_title:  The Leveraged firm pays more to its investors for the same capital amount

message: For the second proposition there should be also some graph. Otherwise the article is incomplete and inconsistent.  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 31.183.239.35 (talk) 23:49, 3 October 2019 (UTC)
thread_title:  The second graph