Talk:Substance theory

message: Quality is the substance that makes an object/entity what it is. A quality is inherent, a property is relative. A quality is typical of the whole, a property is typical of a part.
Property is relative. Quality is absolute.
An object can survive without some properties, but not without its quality.
A property is comon in all members of a class. Properties are of two kinds.
Group 1 property shows the limits (contains constraints). If they disappear, the object itself disappears.
They are substantial (not substance) properties. The constraints here are not the same as the specifics of an object, though.
Group 2 properties are simple properties. They do not delimit objects. 
It is the quality that makes a difference among objects.
The number of qualities of an object is endless.
A particular quality may be the property of different objects, and vice versa.
A quality itself is a propetry, it is relative as any other property, i.e. it does not depend on the object that it is a quality of, but on other objects associated with that object.
Or: what is a quality for one object is a property only for another. (Example: an ability to do something – with an amateur and a professional).
A quality is not complete specifics. Therefore we have a separate sense for it (quality). If two substantial properties make up a quality, then  combined, they are again a substantial property. The complete set of qualities is what you call the specifics.
Apogr 20:16, 9 Jun 2005 (UTC)
thread_title: Property and quality

message: There are very few names given in the article - who are the current (20thC+) proponents of substance theory - and do their ideas converge?  Who are the current opponents to substance theory, and are all of them proponents of bundle theory?
To me the article appears to dichotomise all thinkers into bundlists and substantists - is that fair or correct? (excuse the neologisms) (20040302 00:22, 31 October 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  Substance theory in praxis 

message: Could someone who understands this stuff take a look at Accident (philosophy)? Is the term accident used in substance theory, and is it used differently than in modern theories about essence? I'm coming at this issue from transubstantiation. The explanation of accidents on Wikipedia doesn't seem to exactly correspond to the usage of this term in the transubstantiation doctrine. This causes unnecessary confusion.--Srleffler 01:59, 4 November 2005 (UTC)
thread_title: Help with accidents

message: Someone wrote that for Spinoza, substance meant "what stands under". Actually, Heidegger showed that the concept of "subject" came from the Greek "Hypokeimenon", which meant "what stands under". Henceforth, Heidegger demonstrated that any criticism of the substance, as in Nietzsche's philosophy, was necesarily a criticism of the subject (i.e. something like a historical subject can't exist, it is an oxymoron). In other words: the subject was thought by classic philosophy as the core of a "personality", i.e. the substance of personality. Any criticism of permanency is therefore a criticism on the unity of the subject. Henceforth, it may be a good idea to generalize Spinoza's understanding of substance, as it is the real signification of substance - backing it with Heidegger's etymology (this last being important, as Heidegger also loved obscure etymologies...). Lapaz 03:28, 19 January 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: That which stands beneath in Greek is hypostasis, substance or essence in Greek is ousia.LoveMonkey (talk) 00:04, 16 November 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: Lapaz wrote: "Heidegger showed that the concept of 'subject' came from the Greek 'Hypokeimenon,' which meant 'what stands under.'" Heidegger's definitions and word origins were very idiosyncratic. He tried to out–Hegel Hegel in the employment of neologisms and deliberately confusing terminology (depth = obscurity). It must be obvious that "subject" comes from the Latin for "thrown under" and has nothing to do with "standing." [sub = under; jacere (or iacere) = throw]Lestrade (talk) 14:10, 22 April 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Substance, "what stands under" - Spinoza & Heidegger 

message: :QUOTE: "For Heidegger, Descartes means by "substance" that by which "we can understand nothing else than an entity which is in such a way that it need no other entity in order to be." Therefore, only God is a substance as ens perfectissimus..."
:
I was just wondering, what does 'ens perfectissimus' mean?
DonkeyKong the mathematician (in training) 15:18, 17 May 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: "Most perfect entity." Usually means "God."Lestrade (talk) 14:14, 22 April 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  What does 'ens perfectissimus' mean? 

message: I can't make any sense of the following.
For this reason, Althusser's "anti-humanism" and Foucault's statements were criticized, by Jürgen Habermas and others, for misunderstanding that this led to a fatalist conception of social determinism. For Habermas, only a subjective form of liberty could be conceived, to the contrary of Deleuze who talks about "a life", as an impersonal and immanent form of liberty.
What has the existence or otherwise of "stuff" got to do with "social determinism"? 1Z 19:19, 17 January 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: I agree, this still exists, and its still confusing. Someone should get around to clarifying this more. Shaded0 (talk) 07:30, 9 June 2012 (UTC)
thread_title:  Incomprehensible Continental 

message: The article needs a section on the Argument from Change and Endurance.1Z 19:34, 17 January 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Missing argument 

message: Everyone has a (different)definition for Quality. 
If American cars have so much Quality built into them as the big 3 advertise , than why do they lose so much money. Quality is in the eyes of the customer, perception is everything. Even though these cars are made to high standards and are made with ' quality components ' they are not perceived as a Quality product as compared to other cars , which are made , basically, to the same standards.
  I work in a sector where our products are perceived to be better than our American competitors products and maybe the best in the world.
Even though in some ways our products are indeed inferior to some competitors models and more expensive , but made to the same DOT-Dept of Transportation- standards.
  Customers are the highest boss and will always be , if they are taken care of - Quality-wise.
6 sigma head —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 67.38.225.2 (talk) 15:19, 26 February 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Like many other words, "quality" is ambiguous because it is used to designate more than one concept. Do not make the mistake that Robert Pirsig made. Philosophically, "quality" means "characteristic," "property," or "attribute." It does not mean "high grade" or "superior excellence."Lestrade (talk) 14:19, 22 April 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Defining Quality 

message: not to be picky, but 8 1/2 by 11. 
nora 15:42, 20 March 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  8 1/2 by 11 

message: I've heard of the term anti-substantialism being applied when talking about opposition to substance theory. Perhaps this term could be mentioned if adequate sources were gfound.  ADM (talk) 14:11, 2 June 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: Please clarify. Do you mean anti-substance theory as the philosophy that opposes ousia or the theory that opposes that there is a singular substance that all things reduce to (metaphysics, ontology) or nihilism which is Reductio ad absurdum. Do you mean the absences of objective substantialism or subjective substantialism or the Essentialism of (Anaxagoras). Or strictly anti as against, rather then the abscences there of? Or are you going to either dodge an answer or do as you have already done so often in the past and just ignore me? I mean since Roman Catholicism denies the sumbebekos and anomalism of the being of God as being incomprehesible won't that kinda make Roman Catholicism what your looking to address? Abit of Anaxagoras goes a long way.LoveMonkey (talk) 18:20, 2 June 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: I meant a bit of all those things. There are various post-modern philosophical currents of relativism that are arguably anti-substantial because they reject any kind of moral reference point, which may be called substance. ADM (talk) 07:36, 3 June 2009 (UTC)

text: Roman Catholicisms' strange is strange the substance, yes! Nominalism is but a wacky bird! The number one is a conscious constructed concept that reflects noesis! Wacky Wacky Wacky. For nominialism the number one is all in the mind. But the Arabs created their numbering convention not from one, BUT FROM ZERO. Zero is a validatiable (epistemological) experience, aka you can experience nothing and live to talk about it. Nominalism denys the validity and or value and existence of noesis (it is down the rabbit hole to reduce it to the absurd. So love though not a material or external world substance is nothing but a construct of the mind. If love is an energy then it is a substance. So if something is experienciable is it substantive? Here we are again at the tired old debate that is the limits of philosophy. Our noesis is created or finite and various philosophies like to play of that incompleteness (Godel again) in order to abuse Socrates' famous dialectical method to invalidate the position they oppose. It would be better to approach the topic of anti-substanstive  as one from the position of a validatible (epistemelogical) experience of zero-Ex nihilo, Ex nihilo nihil fit.
LoveMonkey (talk) 13:23, 3 June 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: Stop with the insults it is unbecoming of a Christian. Besides we are Russian Orthodox we hate noboby least of all other Christians. So just discuss, pretty please. You are Catholic we all agree on sobornost.
LoveMonkey (talk) 13:41, 3 June 2009 (UTC)

text: Well yes, it is bloody difficult to articulate. Noesis is to take large arrays of data (experiences) and calculate with them. How can one balance specific with general? Can I truly speak of a forest if I deny it's trees? This is the stupidity of philosophy. 
LoveMonkey (talk) 13:53, 3 June 2009 (UTC)
thread_title: Anti-substantialism

message: It is disturbing that the introduction of this article links to Ousia, which article begins by apparently stating the usage here in Substance theory is incorrect: “Ousia is often translated (sometimes incorrectly) to Latin as substantia and essentia, and to English as substance and essence” It is arguable that the introduction of the word ousia in the introduction to this article is an unfortunate injection of theology into the subject before the subject has gotten properly laid out. Brews ohare (talk) 16:18, 23 August 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  ousia 

message: Seems worth asking. There is also an article called Accident (philosophy).--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 10:36, 17 November 2010 (UTC)
replies: text:  In a declarative sentence there is a subject (substance), a copula (the verb "to be" or "to have"), and a predicate (attribute). The one predicate that is indispensably necessary for the definition of the subject is called the essential predicate or essence. Other predicates are called accidents.Lestrade (talk) 16:46, 17 November 2010 (UTC)
replies: text:  Presently, the intros of all three articles I mentioned appear to me to make it clear that they are about the Aristotelian approach to "being", and nothing to do with what you've just said? Note, we are on the talkpage of Substance theory.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 17:58, 17 November 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  how do editors of this article see it contrasting with [[essence]]? 

message: The section entitled "The concept of substance in Western philosophy" contains the following words: "Essentially, matter does not disappear, it only changes form." This implies that the essence of substance is matter, that is, substance is matter. This may be true but is usually kept secret and unspoken. "Matter" is a physical concept. "Substance," on the other hand, is a metaphysical concept.Lestrade (talk) 19:13, 25 July 2012 (UTC)
thread_title: Substance is ...

message: 1. It is not immediately clear how what appears to be skepticism in the domain of ethics bears on metaphysics——even if, say, the world is first structured ethically.
2. If rejection is a dogmatic negation, skepticism does not appear to entail rejection. But the article presently says that early Pyrrhonism rejects substance.  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2601:647:4100:54E0:7868:28BA:9DF3:FCC1 (talk) 12:40, 2 July 2020 (UTC)
thread_title:  Pyrhonism 

message: Ciao fellow Wikipedians: From a philosophical perspective, there can be no doubt that the concept of "substance" is certainly substantial in nature!! (Sorry, I could not resist the pun). I have added a reference and links to the philosopher Colin Murray Turbayne and his work on the use and abuse of metaphor as it relates to the development of modern epistemology within the Western world. I hope that this does not "muddy the waters" and helps readers to view "substance" in a whole "new light". As always, it was a pleasure to lend some small assistance to such a thought provoking discussion. Best of luck-- Ciao 160.72.80.178 (talk) 17:25, 26 September 2023 (UTC)
thread_title:  Criticism section....