Talk:Battle of Myriokephalon

message: The "background" section says "...He sent part of the army under Andronicus Vatatzes towards Amasia while his larger force marched towards the Seljuk capital at Iconium. Both routes lay on a heavily wooded route, where the Turks could easily hide and set up ambushes; the army moving towards Amasia was destroyed in one such ambush, and Turkish envoys brought Andronicus's head." whereas the "battle" section says "...The troops were divided into a vanguard of infantry, and cavalry, archers, and other infantry following behind them; the right wing led by Baldwin of Antioch and the Byzantine left wing was led by John Cantacuzenus. The rear was commanded by Andronicus Vatatzes."
How could the rear be commanded by Andronicus Vatatzes if he died before the battle?
Another problem is in the "outcome". The second passage says "Manuel continued to meet the Seljuks in smaller battles with some success, until he died in 1180" but the third says "Manuel never again attacked the Turks". Does it mean there were more battles but the Byzantines were purely on the defensive? Whatever the case, it should be clarified.
Top.Squark 10:33, 28 July 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Contradictions 

message: The result in my opinion is far too biased towards the Seljuks; we seem to have adopted Manuel's mental breakdown in calling this a second Manzikert, when the army did "win" the second part of the battle by defeating further attacks upon it. It is a victory for the Turks, there is no doubt in this manner. But not in military terms, no, because the Byzantine's military strength was preserved for future battles against them. But it was a strategic Seljuk Victory, so I have editted this to reflect it. Tourskin (talk) 18:32, 10 July 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: Ok but, can i request some sources for this "military stalemate"? Lysandros (talk) 11:50, 17 July 2008 (UTC)
replies: text:  This is jut me rewording it according to the article - it says that the remains of Manuel's army drove off the Turks. And that both sides suffered heavy casualties. So, either it was a military stalemate in the battle, or we must re-word the article. I don't know how much of a defeat Myriokephalon was in the short term, Turkish sources talk about destroying the army (funny how they ignore the Battle of the Meander valley in 1177), whilst this articles stresses the indecisiveness of the battle in the short term. Tourskin (talk) 16:09, 17 July 2008 (UTC)
replies: text:  It is self-evident that Kilij Arslan had achieved his paramount objective - he had destroyed the ability of Manuel to take his capital and possibly conquer his whole state.  It is also self-evident that if the sultan had felt that it was within his abilities to destroy Manuel's army following the battle he would have done so.  Therefore Arslan must have considered that further attacks on the Byzantine force would have been too risky to contemplate.  At worst he might have lost the fight utterly and Manuel might have ravaged Seljuk territory as far as Konya (as he had in the 1140s). Even if he won Arslan might have lost such a large proportion of his troops that he would then have become easy prey to his Muslim enemies to the east, and also to internal challenges from his kinsmen.  Instead of further attacks Arslan considered that his best course of action was to extort the maximum political advantage he could from Manuel, whose confidence had been badly dented by the outcome of the battle.  The Seljuks won a considerable victory, but Byzantine losses were not so severe that their army had become unable to defend itself, it obviously still posed enough of a threat that a negotiated truce and withdrawal was more attractive to Arslan than continued fighting.  A number of the authors of secondary sources obviously have a poor grasp of military realities they see the battle as well nigh destroying the Byzantine force and Arslan's subsequent actions as bizarrely generous.  A leader who has just defeated an enemy bent on his and his state's destruction does not seek peace and allow his enemy to withdraw unless circumstances force him to do so.
Urselius (talk) 20:13, 3 August 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: Well done Urselius. I trust that you will incorporate this in the article. Tourskin (talk) 01:47, 4 August 2008 (UTC)

text: Yes, but its still valid. I can clearly draw a line between what they're saying and what is proposed - stalemate militarily. It says the balance of military power was unaffected. That sounds like a stalemate to me in terms of military power. Tourskin (talk) 23:17, 13 August 2008 (UTC)

text: I beg to differ. Tactics are the more nitty-gritty down to earth details. The Byzantines and Turks had killed the crap out of each other so they had a tactical draw. Strategy is a far more grander element encompassing not just military power but other factors, such as its ability to deploy the power. This ability failed miserably when Manuel died and the next two Komnenoi emperors did nothing to relieve the trouble. Thus, strategically it was a failure as Turkish power survived to crush Greek power centuries later. Tourskin (talk) 01:29, 14 August 2008 (UTC)
replies: text:  As I see it there were a number of tactical goals for both sides - I won't comment on strategic goals here. 
Manuel wanted to get his army through the pass intact so that he could continue his campaign of conquest, he probably wanted to force the Seljuks into a pitched battle so that he could defeat their army and weaken resistance - a better prospect for him than if the Seljuks avoided battle and committed themselves to a scorched earth policy.
Arslan wanted to prevent the Byzantines getting through the pass into the heartland of his kingdom, and ideally, to destroy them by his ambushes, failing that to destroy their capability of continuing their campaign and take his capital.  
Manuel's army forced its way through the pass - a Byzantine goal met. He met the Seljuks in a pitched battle - a Byzantine goal met - the Byzantine army had lost its baggage and seige train so it could not continue the campaign - Byzantine failure, the Seljuks did not stop the Byzantines from forcing the pass - Seljuk failure, they did not destroy the Byzantine army - Seljuk failure, they did destroy the Byzantine capability of prosecuting their campaign of conquest - Seljuk goal met.
It seems to me that the Seljuks had achieved a tactical stalemate though an undoubted strategic victory. Once through the pass into the open the Seljuk attacks were very tentative and when, reading between Choniates' lines, Manuel ordered counterattacks the Seljuk soldiers did not stand to fight.  Arslan had a still large and dangerous enemy army on his soil which presented him with a dilemma.  After his troops poor showing in the open ground he probably would rather not attack the Byzantines directly.  If he didn't come to an agreement with them they would probably have headed home through his territory by a different route than the pass they had been attacked in and caused considerable destruction en-route. He obviously considered that a truce, with as much in the way of concessions he could wring out of Manuel, was the best outcome he could see, and he took it. Urselius (talk) 09:37, 14 August 2008 (UTC)

text: To my mind this is a very unbalanced view of keeping balance. Byzantine army before this battle was a state instrument for attacking the Selchuks with the aim of taking back the territories lost. The whole battle arose because I. Manuel had the ability and courage to attack the capital (Konya) of its foe. Never again. With this battle it lost its ability (and nerve) to attack its enemy and the army turned into a different instrument of state; a tool of defence of its frontiers. It has been tactically and strategically defeated. As John Julius Norwich in "Byzantium-The Decline and Fall" states "Never again would ... lead a major campaign in the East. In future, it would be all that ... shattered army could do is to man the frontier." (p.136). Thus, the balance HAS CHANGED with this battle. To claim that Byzantines have defended their frontiers in the future is to ADMIT that the balance has changed. So I shall have to change the claim that balance did not change.Noyder (talk) 22:46, 7 February 2009 (UTC)

text: I was astounded about Tourskin's idea that in a so called Battle of Meander Valley of 1177 the Byzantines show ability to fight and keep military balance. In 1177 a very big Selchuk army makes incursions against the Byzantines along the Meander valley. In a small skirmish between a low Selchuk commander (an Atabek) and some part of the Byzantine army; the Atabek's troops are repulsed. This becomes a Battle of Meander Valley for Mr Tourskin!.... In this incursion very important Byzantine cities Aydin (Tralles) and Yalvac (Psidian Antioch) were taken by the Selchuk forces, were plundered. I suppose the Byzantine army (and aggrieved civilians) were looking at the balance to determine (like Tourskin) whether it has not changed against them or not! I am sure that if Tourskin were a Byzantine civilian in the time of that Selchuk raid living in the Meander valley who has lost all, he would not think of Byzantine army keeping the balance by being reminded of the Battle of Meander Valley!!!Noyder (talk) 22:46, 7 February 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: And I'm sure that if Noyder was more polite, had better English and more importantly, was better educated in this subject, he would find himself in error. Gabr-el 04:08, 9 February 2009 (UTC)

text: Through most of his reign central Anatolia was a low priority for Manuel. He was far more interested in the threat posed by western Europeans. His main goals were stabilising his hold on the Balkans, especially the western Balkans, excercising control over Hungary, enforcing his rights of overlordship over Antioch and establishing a Byzantine protectorate over the Kingdom of Jerusalem. In the early 1160s he managed to bring Kilij Arslan into his orbit and once he had extracted a level of homage from the sultan was quite content. Of course Manuel established the sultan's brother and rival, Shahinshah, in Ankara to act as a counterweight to Arslan's ambitions, but did little else except fortify his Anatolian borders. This changed by the 1170s, Arslan was no longer acting as the dutiful vassal, he expelled Shahinshah and took lands from the weakened Danishmends in northeastern Anatolia. These acts effectively negated the treaties of 1162-63 and Manuel was forced to move against Arslan. Manuel's reaction was massive and there is every reason to believe that he was quite seriously attempting to destroy the Sultanate of Iconium in its entirety. Manuel failed in this ambition, and Myriokephalon was decisive in preserving the Sultanate. However, the balance of power within Anatolia was not greatly different than it had been in the period 1170-1176, before the battle. Manuel's ambition and ability to destroy the Rumi Sultanate had gone but the Byzantine frontier in Anatolia did not collapse and a major retaliatory raid by the Seljuks was defeated at Hyelion and Leimocheir. The title atabeg (literally a sultan's father-in-law) was a very high one, atabegs had ruled whole emirates in Syria in the previous generation, and the atabeg's army was apparently destroyed, rather than repulsed.Urselius (talk) 21:40, 13 June 2009 (UTC)
thread_title: Result

message: I just realised how odd Choniates description of the Turkish soldiers deliberately shooting the Byzantine draught animals is.  Many of Arslan's troops were Turcoman tribesmen, semi-nomadic pastoralists, scratch a nomad and a cattle-rustler is not very far beneath the surface.  It would have been very much against their instincts to kill draught oxen, mules and horses, it would be like a modern person burning high denomination currency notes. They would have wanted to secure as many of them as they could and take them away.  The fact that they seem to have deliberately killed these beasts suggests that they were under specific orders to do so, and that the baggage and seige train was probably very deliberately targeted.  It shows evidence of a considerble military sophistication on the part of the Seljuk sultan. Urselius (talk) 11:20, 18 August 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: People burn valuables that they cannot use.Tourskin (talk) 16:58, 18 August 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Interesting slant 

message: Thanks for the additional information regarding the Hungarian contingent.
I have toned down the prominence of the Hungarians within the text as they are not mentioned as a separate entity within the cited primary source, and therefore, presumably, did not compose the whole of a distinct division within the army.
I took the liberty of changing the titles of the Hungarian leaders to comply with standard English usage.  In English "palatine" is an adjective meaning 'of the palace' rather than a noun, so that a noun such as 'count' must be added to which the adjective 'palatine' refers.  The title, of Slavic origins, 'voivode', is given a terminal 'e' in English usage.
Just thought I would clarify the reasons for my edits. Urselius (talk) 10:28, 28 August 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Hungarians 

message: The reference style edits seem to have deranged the "edit" flags from the sections to a random place within the Battle section where they occur one after the other. A bit beyond my abilities, which are limited to textual matters.Urselius (talk) 21:16, 19 December 2009 (UTC)
thread_title:  Edits 

message: Please look at The Battle of Waterloo. In this battle commanders are known down to regimental level and lower, but in the infobox of this "good article" only those leaders exercising a level of control over the course of the battle as a whole are named. If we do want to go down the road of naming every commander involved at Myriokephalon this should be limited to those described in the primary source as commanding divisions of the Byzantine army, to whit: Manuel I Komnenos, Andronikos Angelos, John Angelos, Baldwin of Antioch, John Kantakouzenos, Andronikos Lampardas, Theodore Mavrozomes, Constantine Makrodoukas and Andronikos Kontostephanos.  The Hungarian leaders were present, we know that much, but are not noted as being divisional commanders and were presumably under the command of Baldwin of Antioch with the other Latin troops. They should therefore not be placed in the infobox. Urselius (talk) 09:04, 22 July 2014 (UTC)
replies: text: Please check, for instance, Battle of the Nations, Battle of Dresden, Battle of Berlin etc. there are lot of names of sub-commanders. "were presumably under the command of Baldwin of Antioch with the other Latin troops"- is this your opinion? Because I've not found this info in the article. --188.143.26.234 (talk) 10:02, 22 July 2014 (UTC)
replies: text: There is only one primary source that describes he battle in any detail, the history written by the Byzantine historian Choniates, of which I have the English translation. He describes the divisions of the army and names the commanders of each division. Given that the Hungarian commanders are known from other, presumably Hungarian, sources but are not named by Choniates, they must not have been divisional commanders. A number of secondary sources suggest that the Hungarians would have been brigaded with the Antiochenes under Baldwin, as they were co-religionists. I would be happier with the Hungarian commanders being named in the body of the text (rather than in a footnote as now) and clear the infobox of too many names. I dislike overlong infoboxes on stylistic grounds as they intrude into the text. If you want lots of names in the infobox then all the named divisional commanders should be given precedence over the Hungarians, as they were not divisional commanders as far as we know. I wrote 80-90% of the artcle. Urselius (talk) 17:20, 30 July 2014 (UTC)
thread_title:  Sub-commanders in infobox 

message: Following the link, the battle is located in the middle of Lake Beyşehir; however, the article points to a location 20-30 km north of the lake, possibly east of the geolocation of the Battle of Philomelion appears on the GeoHack map. Can someone provide a reasoning -- or better a reliable source -- for where this battle was actually fought? -- llywrch (talk) 07:02, 16 January 2015 (UTC)
replies: text: One of the downsides of Wikipedia is that the templates for articles demand an accuracy that often, for Ancient and Medieval topics, does not exist. As the precise location of the battle is unknown, and likely to remain unknown, there should not be any geolocation information provided. I vote for the map location information to be removed from the article as it is nonsense - we only have an approximate area for the site of the battle. Urselius (talk) 08:38, 16 January 2015 (UTC)

text: Gelendost,Isparta Nasty32 (talk) 18:45, 16 April 2023 (UTC)

text: An unknown past editor has used the positioning of the crossed swords on a map in the Treadgold book, and extrapolated from this purely visual information that the battle was near Lake Beyshehir. Interpretation from a map to this extent is definitely 'own research'. Looking at the map myself, the crossed swords symbol is actually placed about halfway between the lake referred to as Lake Caralis (the Ancient name for Beyshehir Golu) and the city of Iconium, so 'near the city of Iconium' would be just as valid an interpretation, as 'near Lake Beyshehir'. Neither can be used in an encyclopaedic context, because the two names used by contemporaries for the location of the battle, Tivritze Pass near Myriokephalon, are unknown to modern geographical scholarship. Urselius (talk) 19:16, 18 September 2023 (UTC)
replies: text: What do you think about ? Beshogur (talk) 20:40, 18 September 2023 (UTC)
replies: text: I'm not sure if there is enough information to be certain that the battle was within the Konya provincial boundaries. The Treadgold map is probably not sufficient evidence, I imagine that the location of the battle symbol on the map was really just approximate, a guess. If you look on the map on the article page, it has the battle much further north than it is on the Treadgold map. Urselius (talk) 21:36, 18 September 2023 (UTC)
thread_title:  Geolocation of the battle