Talk:Invasion of Dagestan (1999)

message: The article is too simplistic. The conflict began quite a time before the Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade entered (and actually started flashing even in 1998), but it escalated after this. Also unmentioned is role of Khattab, like if Basayev was IIPB's single leader. Also Congress of the Peoples of Ichkeria and Dagestan and Mejlis-ul-Shura. The latter still in existance now in 2006 (and now including whole Russian North Caucasus), while the Congress is defunct since 1999. --HanzoHattori 03:17, 22 August 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Feel free to make changes, its a pretty new article and needs a lot of work. ~Rangeley (talk) 03:35, 22 August 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Old talk

message: "warlords Shamil Basayev and Ibn al-Khattab," changed to 'muslim militants'
Try to keep the article in the 21st century please.
LeGooberman007 (talk) 15:57, 26 February 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: What's the problem with calling them warlords? Even BBC does that. Besides the word 'militants' is usually applied to the rank and file of rebels (or to all of them collectively) and not to their commanders. Alæxis¿question? 09:59, 28 February 2009 (UTC)
thread_title: "Warlords"

message: Kadar, Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi in Buinaksk area of central Dagestan. Read on:
From 1996 on, there were various minor clashes in Dargistan and Avaristan, connected with internal politics, but also connected with a similar tension between Wahhabi moral militias and local civil guards, which was experienced in Chechnya only later, in 1998-1999. Quite many things, including Khattab's Dagestani family life, suggest that both radical Islamism and the influence of Arab agents first got rooted in the Russian-controlled Dagestan, and from there they spread to Chechnya, when the contacts between Basayev's troops and Dagestani Islamists became more frequent on the border area. This means that quite contrarily to the common media myth, which echoes Russian disinformation, it was Dagestan that destabilized Chechnya, not the vice versa.
In December 1997, the villagers of Karamakhi clashed with Russian troops. In March 1998, there were bomb explosions in the district of Akki, and the responsibility was claimed by an unknown organization called "the Sword of Islam". These bombings could be provocations, because the most potential "ethnic conflict" in Dagestan could be provoked in the Akki region ("Novolaksk"), which was annexed in the Soviet times from Chechnya to Dagestan. The original Chechen population of Akki was deported to North Kazakstan (most were killed), while Laks were deported there from elsewhere in Dagestan.
The co-operation between Chechen and Dagestani Islamists began in that spring, 1998, when in April, Basayev founded the "Congress of the Peoples of Chechnya and Dagestan". His information chief Movladi Udugov founded, together with a 68-year-old Dagestani poet Adallo Aliyev, an organization called "the Nation of Islam", which aimed at uniting Dagestan and Chechnya - to "return to unity", as they argued. The alliance was joined by the former Chechen vice president Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, and the Dagestanis Mahomed Tahayev, Sirazhdin Ramazanov, and Djurally, who had ended up in exile in the border area in Basayev's control. The Congress was primarily directed against nationalism (splitting up Muslim unity by separatist movements), although as an Islamist organization, it also opposed Russian colonialism.
In May, 1998, "the Union of Russian Muslims", led by Nadirshah Hachilayev, gathered a couple of hundreds of men and occupied, without significant resistance, the government palace of Mahachkala. The operation was a reaction to a change of Dagestan's constitution, by which the Dargin minority was given a secured power position. Although Hachilayev was also the leader of the national movement of the ethnic group of the Laks, he led an Islamist organization with the aim of preserving the unity of Dagestan as a part of the Russian Federation. He also acted as a Russian Duma deputy, but he had been sacked from the "Our Home is Russia" party, because he opposed the war in Chechnya. Hachilayev's men who occupied the palace, demanded Dagestan's government to step down, and new election to be arranged. The incident ended without violence, but in September 1998, Hachilayev had to flee the internal power struggle of Dagestan to Chechnya, where he came to contact with Basayev.
In summer and autumn 1998, a quite large number of other members of the Dagestani Islamist opposition had been forced to exile in the border area of Chechnya, which was controlled by Basayev. There they united their forces with the Islamist opposition of Chechnya, led by Basayev. The IRP was represented by the Salafi Islamists of Dagestan, led by their spiritual leader Bahauddin Kebedov. Nadirshah Hachilayev led his own distinct Islamist party. Both Dagestanis made strong influence to the functioning of Basayev's grouping.
Inspired by Hachilayev's palace occupation in Mahachkala, the Dagestani Wahhabis occupied the town of Buinaksk for a short time, but they soon withdrew back to the nearby villages. In summer 1998, an Islamic Council (Shura) was elected in Karamakhi, and it declared the village and its surroundings to constitute an autonomous sharia zone. Besides the Dargistan highland, another Wahhabi zone was formed in the mountains of Avaristan, which split from the control of the central administration, and imposed sharia.
A German journalist, Christian Neff, visited the Wahhabi villages and reported that their sharia courts were functioning peacefully and justly. According to Neff, the sharia had first time in ages provided stability and order to the area, which the corrupt Russian colonial administration had failed to provide. A woman, whose cow had died as a result of the neighbor's action, appealed to the court, and got immediately a compensation for her cow, whereas in the official system the issue would have taken years, and the demanded bribes of hundreds of rubles would still not have guaranteed that the woman would have got justice. Now the man had to pay his neighbor's cow without complaints, and the village considered the court decision to be fair.
Neff also described that the sharia had brought about security and order, when the Wahhabis had expelled the corrupt militia. The men of the sharia court's General Sharullah "have also cut down the fields in the neighboring village, Varukh, where six peasants were growing opium for the mafia of the Buinaksk county center. For years, the police had watched this without doing anything. Next, Sharullah's men took care of the problem of blackmailing protection money on the county highway, where the criminals used to rob bypassing trucks. Sharullah found out who the blackmailers were, brought them to the square in front of the Karamakhi mosque, and threatened to beat them into pieces in front of the crowd, if they would not stop their business. As a result, highway banditry decreased radically."
The pro-Moscow regime of Dagestan, however, hated the Wahhabis: As early as in 1997, the supreme religious leader of the official clergy, Said Muhammad Haji Abubakarov had promised that anyone who would kill a Wahhabi, or be killed fighting them, would get directly to the paradise. Abubakarov was assassinated with a car bomb in August 1998, and the Wahhabis were blamed, although later also rivals among the higher clergy have been suspected.
In December 1998, Dagestan adopted a new law on religion, ordering all religious communities less than 15 years old into state control, as well as all publishers, printing houses, and book imports. Those religious movements, which were considered "dangerous", could not have meetings or build mosques (the religion laws were also used against "non-traditional" Christian churches). An opposition newspaper was banned on the basis that it was claimed to be Wahhabi. All this meant that Dagestan ended up in the same path Karimov's Uzbekistan had taken earlier, and also the results were similar: the Islamist opposition was radicalized, and the Wahhabis started to move from their original fundamentalist piety movement towards militant jihadism.
In July 1999, the storm clouds started to gather, as the Russian Interior Ministry troops suddenly violated the peace treaty with Chechnya, destroyed a Chechen border post, and on 29th July, captured a road section of 800 meters. Chechens replied by shooting in nights to Russian positions. On 2nd August, 1999, Bahauddin Kebedov and Nadirshah Hachilayev, with their men, tried to return from their exile to the Tsimudin district and the Avar villages of Rikvan, Gagatli and Dacha in Dagestan. However, the returnees met Dagestani security troops, and a clash broke out. The Dagestani authorities, too, confirmed that they clashed with Dagestanis attempting to return, not with Chechens. Moscow, however, immediately seized the opportunity and started creating a myth about "Chechen" incursion to Dagestan. The myth turned into reality, when a mixed group of about one thousand men (mostly Dagestanis but including some 300 Chechens), led by Basayev and Khattab, and invoked by the appeals of Hachilayev and Kebedov as well as the Russian propaganda, rushed to the aid of their Dagestani comrades.
The decision that Basayev and Khattab had made to intervene in Dagestan was decisively provoked by Russia's cruel bombing of the peaceful Wahhabi villages of Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi, which had no part in the clash between the militants of the Kebedov-Hachilayev opposition and the Dagestani nomenclature. The bombing of the villages raised great anger among Dagestanis as well as among the troops of Basayev and Khattab, because the villagers had done no other crime except being pious Muslims. They had been associated with the politically active Islamists, Kebedov and Hachilayev, in propaganda. Besides, there were probably relatives of Khattab's wife among the victims. There have also been theories about Boris Berezovski having paid Basayev for the provocation, or the FSB having lured the provocateurs into a trap. The President of Ingushetia Ruslan Aushev has announced he knew that Berezovski had been in keen contact with Basayev and Udugov before the provocation.
According to Professor Vahid Akayev, there were two overlapping reasons for the course of events: On one hand, Moscow had been planning for starting a new war against Chechnya for some time already. On the other hand, the internal power struggle within Dagestan had tempted the Islamists to start a provocation, which they hoped would help to overthrow both the Dargin communists holding power in Mahachkala, and Maskhadov's government in Djokharkala (Grozny). Both these governments were on the way of the plans of the internationalist Islamists.
Basayev explicitly told that he had went to Dagestan, in summer 1999, to liberate the country from Russian imperialism. The Chechen President Maskhadov, however, immediately condemned Basayev's operation, accusing foreign secret services for it. It was then not obvious whether Maskhadov meant Russia or the Arab countries, but Chechens whom I have interviewed later, have referred to the Russian FSB and GRU as well as the agents of Saudi Arabia (maybe rather the agents of the Saudi radical Islamists). Maskhadov tried his best to get his government's unambiguous condemnation of extremist activity heard, and he even gathered a demonstration of 5,000 people in Djokharkala to protest against Basayev's operation. According to Williams, "Maskhadov, like most Chechens, was horrified of Basayev's military operations on Russian soil, and the Chechen government was strictly critical against Basayev, making all possible efforts to distinguish from his dangerous activities against the Russian Federation".
Christian Neff again reported on the atmosphere in Dagestan, this time in the historical village of Himri: "Now the inhabitants of Himri are silently standing in front of their houses and observing how a Russian armed column is breaking up the road that was paved with great hardship. Not that they would feel overwhelming sympathy for the Chechen Shamil Basayev, whose volunteer troops have kept Dagestan in the state of anxiety for weeks. But Russians are even less welcome here. What have they brought to Dagestan so far? ... Dagestan, the Caucasian Babylon, on the third-last position of the Russian welfare statistics among all the 89 provinces, is sunk in corruption and crime. Without baksheesh nothing works in Mahachkala. ... Like the neighboring village Chabanmakhi, also Karamakhi is considered as a cradle of puritan Islam - a center of 'Wahhabism', like the Russians say, grotesquely oversimplifying."
From the second week of August on, events rushed forward, as the Russians first attacked the villages of Dagestan's Botlikh district, which were besieged by the guerrillas. Two weeks earlier, Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin had promised that there would not be a new Chechen War, but he was sacked and replaced with a supporter of the hawkish approach, the head of the secret service, Vladimir Putin. First thing Putin did was to vow he would destroy all the rebels, and he declared the Moscow Treaty between Russia and Chechnya to be abolished. All promises were torn in pieces within a couple of days, and a wave of terror began in Moscow against "persons of Caucasian appearance". In the Wahhabi villages, the Shura declared the Islamic Republic of Dagestan founded.
Next week, from 15th August on, Russia started to shoot missiles also to Chechnya. Maskhadov declared martial law. Russia started to limit radically the activities of the media, and Dagestan was entirely isolated from electronic communications. Still on 20th August, the AFP told that fighting continued in Dagestan of the control of Rakhata, Ansalta, Shadrota, Askhino, Ziberkhali, and Tando. At this stage, it was told that the commander of the guerrilla troops was Rahmatullah Mahomedov, the "prime minister" was Sirazhdin Ramazanov, and the head of information was Mahomed Tahayev. Less than a week later, Russia started to bomb the town of Serzhen-Yurt in Chechnya, as well as a number of Chechen villages.
At the same time, the nearby training camps of the radical Islamists, headed by Basayev and Khattab, remained in peace, and Russians did not attack them. Instead, Russian troops were ordered to secure safe passage for the Islamist provocateurs back into Chechnya. The new Russian invasion to Chechnya was clearly directed against the moderate, secular government of President Maskhadov, who had unambiguously condemned Basayev's provocation, and some time earlier, clashed against the Islamists, even asking Moscow's help for the struggle against Islamist extremists.
In Dagestan, fighting was still going on around Karamakhi in September, although Russia had declared the rebellion crushed for several times. Masses of non-militant Wahhabis were arrested in the counties of Gubden, Ghunib, Kizilyurt, Tsumada, and Kazbek. Russia repeatedly claimed that it was not its intention to start a full-scale war against Chechnya, but it was clear by then that this was happening, and the war was directed against the very government and troops, who had from the beginning condemned Basayev's incursion to Dagestan. Basayev, in turn, was not prevented from returning to his support area in Chechen mountains.
Nadirshah Hachilayev continued his political activity both in Dagestan and in Russia, until he was murdered in August 2003, soon after the US administration had added Basayev to its terrorist list, as the first and only Chechen so far.
:the Russians provoked and not the terrorists (freedom fighters who behead hostages)? Impossible as the rain on the moon.--TheFEARgod 23:48, 23 August 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: ehm, I would include this as a background section but avoid unconfirmed details--TheFEARgod 23:58, 23 August 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: "Kadar zone" events ommited - only Botlikh in the article

message: --HanzoHattori 14:47, 7 September 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Do you have a link that could be used as a reference? I believe that is the issue. --Bobblehead 21:51, 7 September 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: "36" <- source?

message: This conflict is not known as "Dagestan War" (at least in Russia), but rather as "Invasion of Dagestan" or "Attack on Dagestan". Shouldn't this article be moved? Conscious 20:10, 7 October 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: hmm those names would be very disinformative (attacked by who of the two sides?). I would rather opt for 1999 Dagestan conflict.  --TheFEARgod (Ч) 12:09, 18 October 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Move this article

message: The article really needs more citations; it's quite difficult to guess at where this material is coming from. Kirill Lokshin 00:55, 21 October 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Assessment

message: Strenght 600 and casaulties 700? --HanzoHattori 10:23, 23 October 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Oh wow

message: A transcript is a 'a written, typed, or printed copy or manuscript made by transcribing'. How can it be an absolute proof of the existence of the conversation? Alæxis¿question? 10:18, 16 May 2008 (UTC)
thread_title: Transcript?

message: Is there a source for the claim "militant casualties = ~2,500 dead"?
p.230 of the book "Chechnya: From Past to Future" (Mike Bowker's article) says: Russian and local Dagestani soldiers repelled the intervention, but only after 1,500 (including 270 Russians) had been killed.
So this would mean 1,230 killed militants, or maybe civilians is included as well? Offliner (talk) 07:15, 28 May 2009 (UTC)
thread_title: Militant casualties

message: According to Berezovski: Allegedly, Udugov proposed to start the Dagestan war to provoke the Russian response, topple the Chechen president Maskhadov and establish new Islamic republic made of Chechnya and Ingushetia that would be friendly to Russia. Berezovsky asserted that he refused the offer, but "Udugov and Basayev conspired with Stepashin and Putin to provoke a war to topple Maskhadov..., but the agreement was for the Russian army to stop at the Terek River." 
I am an ace at Geography. I've gotten 99th percentiles on all of my scores, including a test conducted by UCLA. The point? When invading Chechnya, the Russians don't really need to cross the Terek River on the Chechen-Dagestani Border. In other words, Putin could have stopped the Russians at the Terek River, and still taken over Chechnya. Please, study this map: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/98/Caucasus_region_1994.jpg. Zoom in! Notice how the railroads run. Notice how the roads run. Neither the railroads, nor the major roads, cross the Terek River on the Chechen-Dagestani border. Now take a look at two cities, Mozdok and Mahachkala. Let's say these are the Russian bases. Now look at the Terek River on the Chechen Dagestani Border: say the Russians are traveling from Mozhdok to Groznyy, or from Mahachakala to Groznyy. Do they ever need to cross that river stretch? This isn't conspiracy theory, this is basic, first grade Geography. Well maybe not first grade anymore, after the "EG" Reform in Russia, but it used to be, basic, first grade Geography. 
Of course Basaev, who was fighting in Chechnya, would know all of the major landmarks. He would know that the Russians wouldn't need to cross to Terek on the Chechen-Dagestani border in order to invade Chechnya. Doing so would be superbly idiotic on the part of the Russian Army. We may all do dumb things, but no army is going to try to ford a river when there's a bridge nearby. For Basaev to offer such a deal to Putin, is the same as offering Putin Chechnya. 
Furthermore if one looks at the Terek River, one would notice that it splits Chechnya in half. Why would Basaev offer Putin half of Chechnya? What is more likely, is that someone was inventing a conspiracy theory, had no clue about what the Geography of the region looks like, but knew vaguely that the Terek River split up Chechnya and Dagestan, and so inserted the Terek River quote. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 05:15, 9 November 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: The entire article also discredit's Berezovski's Theory; if Putin pre-planned the Chechen Invasion, why the wait? Why such a slow response? And people knew about the war with Chechnya, the apartment blasts didn't prove to be a factor. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 11:53, 9 November 2009 (UTC)

text: I understand that this is a touchy subject, as people are passionate about Conspiracy Theories. If you believe that my edits were inappropriate, you should undo them, right after you post on the discussion page why they were not appropriate. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 08:48, 11 November 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: I am sorry, but this is worst example of WP:OR. First, you quote something from the book Death of a Dissident (the book was written by Alex Goldfard, not by Berezovsky; and Goldfarb reveals some very embarrassing facts about Berezovsky, like giving money to Basayev). Then, you provide your own interpretation of everything to disprove this WP:RS. Please quote another WP:RS that disputes this specific information from the book by Goldfarb.Biophys (talk) 23:45, 18 February 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: Umm, sorry Biophys, but citing Google Maps is NOT WP:OR. Additionally I pointed you to the facts that showed that Russia did not pre-plan it, such as no initial opposition by Russia the rusing of the T-90s to the front, the gradual evolution of Russian troops as they poured into Dagestan, etc. Looking at a map and stating facts is not original research. Stating the location of the Terek River, is not WP:OR. You also pointed out that Goldfarb reveals embarassing facts about Berezovsky, but listed a single fact. Do you have more facts? And there is the whole Basaev denying the whole deal, that you just flat out ignore. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 04:26, 6 March 2010 (UTC)
thread_title: Berezovki's Conspiracy Theory, aka why we all should learn Georgraphy

message: Please cite the following, or I will have to remove it from the text: 
1. Makhachkala: The rebels came within a mere five kilometers of the major city of Khasavyurt and threatened the republic's capital, Makhachkala. Considering that the Russians have a base at Makhachkala, I don't see how the rebels could have threatened it. Attacking remote villages is one thing; taking over a Russian military base? 
2. On August 27, Putin, then the new Prime Minister of Russia (since August 9, the third of the fighting), flew to Dagestan and ordered a punitive attack against the Dagestani Wahhabi villages of the Kadar zone (to which his predecessor Sergei Stepashin had granted limited autonomy a year earlier), even though they had not participated in the uprising. Got a source for them not participating in the uprising? HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 11:22, 9 November 2009 (UTC)
thread_title: Citations:

message: The revert I am challenging is this one: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Invasion_of_Dagestan_(1999)&action=historysubmit&diff=325281982&oldid=325186121
Basically the revert argues that instead of being a trigger for the Second Chechen War, the Invasion of Dagestan was one of the triggers for the Second Chechen War. 
A trigger is a small projecting tongue in a firearm that, when pressed by the finger, actuates the mechanism that discharges the weapon. In other words, you can only have one trigger per barrel. Once a trigger is pulled, the barrel is discharged. You can pull the trigger multiple times, but once the barrel is discharged, you pulling the trigger is extremely useless, unless you are in a close range, in which case you should be using the butt of the gun to go after your opponent. Case in point: firearm barrels have only one trigger. 
The trigger definition of military history evolved from that concept. Wars usually have a bunch of causes, and a single triggering event. The Murder of ArchDuke Francis Ferdinand triggered World War I, and Hitler's invasion of Poland triggered World War II. The Tonkin Gulf Incident triggered the Vietnam War, Saddam's Invasion of Kuwait triggered the Persian Gulf War, bin Laden's attacks on 9/11 triggered the Afghanistan War. What I am getting at, is that all of the wars have a single trigger. There is no such thing as multiple triggers of the war. Some historians may dispute what the trigger was for messy wars, or their own POV purposes, but there's a single trigger for the war, the rationale being that once the trigger is pressed, nothing can stop the war. 
A trigger may start the war instantaneously, or the trigger may start the war later on, as that depends on the size of the "barrel". Pistol barrels discharge instantly, sniper rifle barrels take time to discharge. 
In the case of the Second Chechen War, there is no doubt, that once the Invasion of Dagestan occurred, the Second Chechen War was going to take place. The rationale being, is that if the Chechen Wahhabi Warlords invade Dagestan today, it could the North Caucasian Region tomorrow; the warlords were admitting to the concept. Even Berezovky's "blame everything on Putin" attitude, admitted that the Invasion of Dagestan was the trigger, as the Berezovsky Clique argued that the Apartment Bombings were there to shore up support for Putin's decision to "invade"; in other words, the decision was already made. 
So I fail to see why you are arguing, Colchicum, that this is merely one of the triggers, can you explain that? HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 02:08, 14 November 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: What about the apartment bombings, weren't they also a trigger? In any case it's better to find reliable source dealing with this problem and use its wording. Alæxis¿question? 07:45, 14 November 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: Fair enough, I will change it to a "possible trigger". It could have been the war, or the apartment bombings, but it can only be a single trigger. Or better yet, how about "one of the causes"? HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 07:42, 18 November 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: ok with me. Alæxis¿question? 11:09, 18 November 2009 (UTC)
thread_title: Guns usually have a single trigger, and so do wars...Colchicum, please explain why the revert, I just want to know...

message: They're not working. Since we had a non-working picture deleted, in the spirit of consistency, we should delete or fix the non-working links. I believe a week was given for the picture, so the same time limit should apply to the links. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 10:12, 21 November 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: I've removed the links. They seemed unnecessary anyway. Offliner (talk) 10:55, 21 November 2009 (UTC)
thread_title: External Links Problem

message: I removed the "conspiracy" section. Any objections?Biophys (talk) 01:21, 8 February 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: If you have objections , please explain them here. Two important points. 1. Please do not claim something to be a "conspiracy theory" (meaning an unsupported speculation, small minority view), unless this has been indeed described in multiple reliable secondary sources as "conspiracy theory". 2. Let's not include non-notable conspiracy theories anywhere.Biophys (talk) 19:26, 16 February 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: We have already established that to be a conspiracy theory at the Russian Apartment Bombings Article. Additionally, no one except pro-Berezovsky sources, not even Basaev, confirm Berezovsky's conspiracy theory on this matter. I've already pointed out, that the claim that "Russians promosed to stop at the Terek River and Basaev agreed" is bullshit, as Russians could have stopped at the Terek River, north or south, and would've still taken Chechnya. The Terek River doesn't divide Russia and Chechnya, anymore than the Nile divides Egypt and Sudan. I guess someone should have paid attention in geography classes. Considering that Basaev knew the area like the back of his hand, he would never make a compromise that would place Chechnya in Russia's hands. And Basaev pointed out, a lot, that no such compromise took place. Basaev fought a war against Russia, so he's not exactly a pro-Russian source. And it's all listed earlier in the article, I guess you missed it, and undid an edit without discussing it first, Biophys; here you go: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Invasion_of_Dagestan_(1999)#Berezovki.27s_Conspiracy_Theory.2C_aka_why_we_all_should_learn_Georgraphy HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 08:47, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

text: And don't promote one conspiracy theory over another. You gave Berezovsky, whom you clearly support, a quarter of the background section, you gave Ilyukhin, a Duma Member, one sentence. NPOV is da bomb, and I intend to follow it. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 09:01, 18 February 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: No one established anything here. You are giving links to discussions on wiki. Wiki is not a reliable source. Moreover, this discussion did not produce consensus (you simply stated your personal view and no one agreed). Please provide good secondary sources, such as books, claiming the meeting of Basyev with others to be a "conspiracy theory".Biophys (talk) 22:06, 18 February 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: I looked more for sources and found this article by Dunlop. 
Preparing for a New War in Chechnya: 
On 5 March, a group of Chechens who were armed and wearing masks brazenly seized General Gennadii Shpigun, the plenipotentiary representative of the Russian MVD in Chechnya, as he was about to board a plane at “Severnyi” airport in Groznyi. Shpigun’s kidnapping served as a pivotal justification for the beginning of planning for a second war in Chechnya. (Roughly a year later, the murdered Shpigun’s remains were discovered in Chechnya.44) At the beginning of the
year 2000, “Former Interior Minister and Premier Sergei Stepashin told Interfax on 27 January that preparations for a new military operation in Chechnya began in March 1999, shortly after the abduction in Groznyi of [Shpigun]… But Stepashin said that only local operations to create a ‘security zone’ extending to the Terek River were envisaged, and not ‘large-scale hostilities.’”45 We shall examine the question of what groups were responsible for Shpigun’s kidnapping later on in this essay.
At the end of March 1999, a meeting was held of the Russian power ministers—MVD
chairman Stepashin, Defense Minister Igor’ Sergeev, head of the General Staff of the Armed Forces Anatolii Kvashnin, and FSB director Vladimir Putin—which adopted a plan of intervention in Chechnya that would result in the creation of a sanitary cordon around the republic; the creation of a zone of occupation that would extend to the Terek River in northern Chechnya; and also the taking under control of Chechnya’s border with Georgia. “In April, this plan received the approval of the Security Council, which Putin had just taken command of.”
Yeltsin had named Putin secretary of the Security Council on 29 March. While Yeltsin had to have officially approved this plan—the Security Council was an advisory body to him—it is known that Prime Minister Evgenii Primakov had strong objections to it. Primakov, citing budgetary exigencies “which prevented the diverting of a single kopeck [to a new military operation],” also underlined
the fact that the Georgian authorities were not giving permission to Russian forces to cross Georgian territory in order to take control of the border with Chechnya.
Primakov’s fierce objections seem to have prevented an implementation of this plan until after his removal in mid-May. Biophys (talk) 06:00, 21 February 2010 (UTC)

text: Biophys, once again, your claims are based around a geographical impossibility. The fabricators of your conspiracy theory failed their geography classes. According to all of these "Putin promised Basaev to stop North of the Terek River". The problem? The Russians could stop north of the Terek River, and still overrun Chechnya. You posted a ton of links, but of those, you have forums, a spam cite, and some anti-Putin sites. You are arguing against a Georgraphic impossibility. Additionally, Basaev stated, in crystal clear language, that he never made such a deal. Same with Putin. And such a deal would not have worked, cause the Russians could have stopped North of the Terek, and still overran Chechnya. This was all pointed out here, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Invasion_of_Dagestan_(1999)#Berezovki.27s_Conspiracy_Theory.2C_aka_why_we_all_should_learn_Georgraphy and you really should not call me restating basic georgraphys as the worst example of WP:OR - if you want a source, I cite Google Maps. Or any credible map will work. Facts that you don't like aren't WP:OR. HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 04:28, 6 March 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: If this is all wrong (as you say), why do you restore large segments of text about this? It should be only briefly mentioned here, or one could create a separate article Conspiracy in Nice, specifically about this meeting.Biophys (talk) 17:36, 7 March 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: I am giving both conspiracy theories equal weight. You are promoting the pro-Berezovksy conspiracy theory, and demoting the anti-Berezovsky conspiracy theory. I am trying to be NPOV! HistoricWarrior007 (talk) 07:17, 11 March 2010 (UTC)
thread_title: "Conspiracy" section

message: See Talk:Insurgency_in_the_North_Caucasus#infobox_problems. Alinor (talk) 08:42, 16 October 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Dubious 

message: This article has been revised as part of a large-scale clean-up project of multiple article copyright infringement.  Earlier text must not be restored, unless it can be verified to be free of infringement. For legal reasons, Wikipedia cannot accept copyrighted text or images borrowed from other web sites or printed material; such additions must be deleted. Contributors may use sources as a source of information, but not as a source of sentences or phrases. Accordingly, the material may be rewritten, but only if it does not infringe on the copyright of the original or plagiarize from that source. Please see our guideline on non-free text for how to properly implement limited quotations of copyrighted text. Wikipedia takes copyright violations very seriously. MkativerataCCI (talk) 18:19, 15 January 2011 (UTC)
thread_title:  Possible copyright problem 

message: In the light of recent "Russia military-style arrest of mayor in Dagestan", I'd like to point how he was a pro-Moscow paramilitary leader during this conflict when he "formed and armed a so-called international brigade of 300 men from amongst his supporters and, together with hundreds of other volunteers, they rushed to western Dagestan to hold off Basaev's men until the arrival of Russian troops. Some weeks later, Amirov formed from this brigade an armed city police force of fifteen hundred men, under his personal command." 
He also appealed that "every Dagestani has to react as a patriot and join the volunteers" and in 2005 said that "leaders of bandit groups that attacked Dagestan in 1999 made a mistake. All people of Dagestan stood up to defend common interests of Russian and Dagestani peoples", etc. --Niemti (talk) 10:37, 4 June 2013 (UTC)
replies: text: I am not sure why this article was renamed from Invasion of Dagestan (1999). Maybe current title is a good one, but perhaps there were many other wars in Dagestan? My very best wishes (talk) 14:13, 4 June 2013 (UTC)
thread_title:  [[Said Amirov]] 

message: I removed this text from the article, immediately after the mention of the T90 being deployed:
"This showed the Putin Government's willingness to use innovation when fighting military conflicts, contrasting with the Yeltsin Government's approach, that did not introduce any new units or tactics in the First Chechen War."
The T90 was only just entering larger scale production during the First Chechen War. It was not yet in use by the units that led the attack. So we can't say Yeltsin should have used it, we might as well say that Churchill should have used jets in the Battle of Britain. (In any case, the T90 would have been just as unsuitable as any other tank during the Battle of Grozny as it has the same limitation of elevation in the barrel which makes it useless for urban combat, like most tanks)
So we disregard "new units" and now we have "did not introduce any new tactics". This view is incorrect too: http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/grozny.htm
Relevant quote: "the Russian army performed poorly initially, but adapted and eventually triumphed in urban combat. These recent Russian lessons are now being incorporated in Russian urban tactics." The prevailing view is that Russian military adapted to the disaster at the beginning of the First Chechan War and systematically overwhelmed the Chechan fighters using improved tactics.
Finally, military operations are not micromanaged by the president, they are carried out by the military, so to attribute particular operational choices during war to Yeltsin or Putin seems unrealistic. For all these reasons I removed the quoted lines, but I am happy to discuss if someone has a contrary view. 203.217.150.76 (talk) 04:28, 1 May 2014 (UTC)
thread_title:  "Did not introduce new units or tactics" 

message: If the strengths was around 2000 how can 2500 die?????? It looks like 500 were turned into zombies and was killed agian
112.134.88.87 (talk) 05:18, 1 June 2014 (UTC)
replies: text: I've added another estimate of the strength of the militants, then these losses make sense. Alæxis¿question? 19:31, 5 June 2014 (UTC)
thread_title:  Islamic deaths