Talk:Inverted spectrum

message: Not a regular wiki contributor but I stumbled on this page. The controversy section doesn't have any citations and reads like it was written by someone with an axe to grind. The central point is also broached in the main article I.e. the thought experiment is precluded by a full scientific understanding of colour perception. There seems to be some good points in there but I would suggest incorporating them into the main text (with citations) rather than a separate section. Right now it reads like someone scoffing at silly philosophers while they stand above them, proudly holding aloft the glorious torch of hard science. Just saying like.
- Chris  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.150.42.22 (talk) 06:43, 25 March 2016 (UTC)
replies: text: I'm inclined to agree, and I've tagged the offending material for clarification. RunasSudo (talk) 10:58, 5 June 2016 (UTC)
thread_title: Controversy Section

message: I think that this article can be improved significantly by identifying studies that were conducted on the introverted spectrum.
In addition to this, I think that you could elaborate on what introverted spectrum consists of.
~~  — Preceding unsigned comment added by Lilroses2 (talk • contribs) 23:26, 26 September 2013 (UTC)
thread_title: Introverted Spectrum

message: "Dark yellow is brown (qualitatively different from yellow), whereas dark blue is blue"
Is it true that "dark blue is blue" among speakers of languages other than English? Dark blue is Navy blue; light blue is azure. --Damian Yerrick (serious | business) 17:28, 21 November 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: It Russian there are different words for light blue and dark blue.--MathFacts (talk) 21:16, 25 June 2009 (UTC)
thread_title:  Anglocentric argument? 

message: It should be stated that the argument is a physical impossibility, due to the nature of electromagnetic frequency.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by SpunkySkunk347 (talk • contribs) 07:27, 21 March 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: Another way to state the argument: Are the signals from cones sensitive to long, medium, and short wavelengths carried on the same "pins" of the optic nerve in everyone's brain? If I were to swap the red and blue "wires", how much would qualitative experiences differ? --Damian Yerrick (talk | stalk) 17:12, 22 March 2009 (UTC)
replies: text:  Imagine that you performed this massively complex brain surgery.  Firstly, you can't actually swap the red or blue wires without taking, respectively the green and yellow ones with (see colour oponency).  Now red/green is blue/yellow, the relations between red and green and between red/green-blue/yellow and blue-yellow are in a sense, 'switched' (an actual inversion would be impossible).  All the proporties previously pinned to blue-yellow cells now apply to green/red cells, these proporties are different and would result in a massive differences detectable in the same way colour-blindness is (e.g. some aspects of depth perception).  So to answer your question yes the signals are carried on the same "pins".Talonx84.152.181.136 (talk) 15:58, 3 July 2009 (UTC)

text:  I imagine swapping the wires in someone's brain is a "physical change in brain or body", so this must be some other argument.  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 83.27.249.158 (talk) 21:50, 23 March 2012 (UTC)
thread_title:  Physically Nonsensical 

message: I smell an equivocation of the word "possible" in premise 4: "If it is conceivable, then it is possible." Premise 5 appears to use "possible" in the sense of "physically possible"; otherwise, the whole argument is a tautology. This would make premise 4 false because some things that are conceivable are physically impossible. --Damian Yerrick (talk | stalk) 17:20, 22 March 2009 (UTC)
thread_title:  If it is conceivable, then it is possible 

message: Seeing as the average person has absolutely no idea what physical changes would cause an inverted spectrum, it is impossible to imagine. Human imagination is not prepared to imagine what we cannot piece together from experience. We can no more envision brain chemistry than we can imagine a penteract. 75.118.170.35 (talk) 22:12, 22 June 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: Try this: A mutation similar to those for color blindness swaps the pigments in the red and green cone cells. So the green sensors are "wired" to red, and the red sensors are "wired" to green. So the argument becomes the following: "Because prot- and deuteranomaly exist, qualia exist." --Damian Yerrick (talk | stalk) 19:37, 26 June 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: It doesn't work that way, the signal a cone cell put's out is actually dependent on the protein's absorption of light, the cells themselves are identical otherwise.  If, however it were possible, the person would likely simply be blind as the proper signals would not reach the proper assemblies of cells for colour perception, those cells would atrophy.Talonx84.152.181.136 (talk) 16:06, 3 July 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: So if the S, M, and L cone cells send qualitatively different kinds of signals, your expertise in explaining these details of color vision would be appreciated. So can we use the analogy of R-Y and B-Y in a YPbPr component connection? --Damian Yerrick (talk | stalk) 01:01, 10 March 2010 (UTC)
thread_title: Inconceivable

message: If you look at the picture with the strawberries in the smallest version (320 x 184 pixels), you can easily view it as an autostereogram ("Magic Eye").  The strawberry seems to flash red and green alternately.  This is of no help to understanding color perception, but it is pretty cool.
Kejo13 (talk) 04:08, 1 July 2013 (UTC)
thread_title: Illustration

message: "Qualia" isn't a very consistently defined concept, one of the definitions, AFAIK, is just "subjective experience", "the way things look", contrasted to the physical stimuli or the resulting neural activity pattern ("neural correlate"). In other words, the non-inverted spectrum would already be qualia, and therefore it's nonsensical to "not exist". Also, supporters of a physical basis don't need to accept a 1:1 correspondence of external physical stimulus and quale. It's only required that the ultimate neuronal activity/synaptic correspondence would be constant, but there's room for developing individual variation in response to stimuli (which is perhaps exemplified by the Himba people and other  cases of shifts in the range of color discrimination without anomalies in photoreceptors or in the brain).--Extremophile (talk) 04:33, 16 January 2014 (UTC)
thread_title:  "Supporters of the existence of qualia" or "supporters of the ''immateriality'' of qualia"? 

message: Depending of one's premises, the "absurd" of inverted spectrum could be just as "absurd" as one language having an "inverted vocabulary" in comparison to another language; or, to something without the etymological-historical improbability, different languages actually existing at all, with different words for the same things in the world outside. It's not a matter of "concepts", but "percepts"; the phenomenal "redness" isn't necessarily intrinsically, meaningfully linked with the light frequency (that's nothing but naive realism, even though it's hardly disputably inherently linked with a neural correlate), unlike the concept of tyranny and its very definition -- but not so much the sound of the word itself, there are plenty of examples of false cognates. I don't know of any succinct counter-argument to that, but perhaps Edmond Wright's "The defence of qualia" may have. I'll take a look someday. --Extremophile (talk) 05:11, 16 January 2014 (UTC)
thread_title:  Counter example to Douglas Hofstadter's?