Talk:Attack on Pearl Harbor/Archive 2

message: I don't believe that this has been referenced here, as the article appears to be more of a general review.  However, the author may find it useful to research the sinking of MS Automedon by the German raider Atlantis; during this assault (9/10/40 - http://www.nesa.org.uk/html/automedon-ultra.htm) the Germans captured a secret British document indicating an inability of Britain to defend her Far East colonies.
This document was returned thru diplomatic channels from Japan to Germany; after reviewing it, Germany turned it over to its Japanese ally on 12/12/40.  This document told Japan that it would only need to fight one major power in the Pacific; the British torpedo attack on the Italian naval fleet at Taranto  (11/11/40) provided a clear example of how Japan could incapacitate a rival.
From the link above:
"There is no doubt that possession of these documents profoundly affected Japanese war planning in January 1941, this intimate view of Churchill’s War Cabinet decisions and opinions enabled the Japanese to dismiss any serious fears that the British could make a worthwhile military intervention in the Far East, it also provided the Japanese with a clear picture of British knowledge of their armed forces (for example. that we were unaware that the Japanese Air Force possessed torpedo-carrying aircraft).
It is fair to argue, therefore, that the capture of the Chiefs-of-Staff report from the Automedon was the catalyst that sent the Japanese on the path to Pearl Harbour and precipitated the ruinous attack on America’s Pacific fleet.
After the fall of Singapore in 1941, Captain Rogge of the Atlantis was presented with a Samurai sword by the Japanese Emperor in recognition of his achievement, only two other Germans received such an award, Hermann Goering and Erwin Rommel, later, Admiral Kondo was to tell Wenneker on several occasions how valuable this particular document had been in planning the attacks on Pearl Harbour, the Philippines, and Singapore, on the 8th December 1941, thus opening the war between Imperial Japan and the USA"
Thoughts?
:I'm not the author, so apolgies for butting in with these thoughts:  First, intelligence about Churchill's ruling out intervention in the East was no more than confirmation of what the Japanese already knew — that because of the European war, the British, French and Dutch colonies were indefensible.  Second, as Admiral Yamamoto was well aware, the strategic threat to Japanese expansion lay with the United States alone and that no matter how successful the attack on Pearl Harbor, he could at best promise a year for Japan to engage in its expansion unchallenged from the United States, not Great Britain.  Third, the business with the Samurai sword sounds apocryphal.  In short, the Japanese were never concerned about the British, so whatever was found on the Automedon (and Rusbridger's page reveals less than rigorous scholarship) could hardly be considered a "catalyst".
:By the way, since this Rusbridge piece is based on eighties research, it's not much of a basis for any conclusion. Since then, the fifty-year rule has long expired, and if one thought the issue worth taking up, they would have checked the B.M. or P.R.O for the declassified docs.  Frankly, I don't think it's that important. — J M Rice 20:46, 22 Apr 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  Automedon and the Japanese move to war 

message: Just a clarification.  There were three (Enterprise, Lexington, and Saratoga) assigned to the Fleet; only "big E" and "Lady Lex" were nearby that morning; "Sara" was back in Puget Sound under refit.  Trekphiler 08:20, 23 December 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  Pacific Fleet carriers 

message: More important than the machine shops were the power station, without which Pearl could not function, and the Navy Yard, without which major hull repairs could not be done.
   
In the long run, even more important still was the fact the Submarine Base was not attacked, since it was the Sub Force that did more to win the war than any other, by cutting Japan's sea lanes.  Nor did Japan destroy the Force's torpedo store (although, given the problems with the Mk XIV its Mk VI exploder, it might have been a net loss).
   
And by a miracle, untouched was a priceless asset, in the basement of the old HQ Building--Rochefort's crypto unit, Hypo.
     
I rely on Blair's 'Silent Victory', Prange 'Verdict of History', Holmes 'Double-Edged Secrets', & 'Barrier & the Javelin'.  Trekphiler 08:26, 23 December 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  Missed targets 

message: It did include military intelligence; USN had broken JN-25 in December 1940 (though it was not read solid).  What was not routinely read was the lower-grade J-19 consular code, in which the revealling 'bomb plot' signals were sent, due to a perennial lack of manpower (which can be traced to Stimson's scruples over interception and decryption and closing the Black Chamber in 1929.)  The 'winds' messages are a red herring; no important information was carried in them.
     
I rely on Kahn's 'Codebreakers', 'Double-Edged Secrets', 'Verdict of History', 'Silent Victory', Yardley, 'Barrier and Javelin', Stinnett's 'Day of Infamy', and other sources (which I can't recall offhand).  Trekphiler 08:22, 23 December 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  Cypher intelligence 

message: "Did not ignore other ships"? There were some 78 cruisers and destroyers in harbor that morning; far and away the bulk of them did not suffer a scratch. They would form the basis of the carrier task force escorts, which the old battlwagons alongside Ford Island were too slow for anyhow. I rely on Blair and 'Barrier', among others.  Trekphiler 08:22, 23 December 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  Japanese targeting 

message: His excuse, "The location of the American carriers was and remained unknown", does not stand scrutiny.  He had orders to risk the loss of up to half his carriers to find and sink the Americans'.  Nagumo took no action to find them, reflection of continuing Japanese weak reconaissance.  Emphasis on attack puts paid to it.
   
I rely on numerous sources here, most notably 'Barrier' and TME 30-480, U.S. Army Handbook on Japanese Forces.
   
Moreover, being a battleship sailor, why did Nagumo not use his surface assets to SHELL Pearl Harbor?  Surely his six decks could hold off the American three he expected, and certainly the two he actually faced.  Personally, I suspect Nagumo's disapproval of the attack plan led him to subtly undermine it and not give it his best.  The other option seems to be cowardice.  Trekphiler 08:22, 23 December 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  Nagumo's no third strike 

message: The "sleeping US behemoth" of industrial and military capacity, once mobilized, would have made no difference.  Japan was defeated by loss of control of her sea lanes through indifferent, indolent antisubmarine warfare efforts, what Adm Chihaya called "shiftless" (and it is hard to argue).  American submarines cut off the Home Islands from supplies, and deliveries of weapons and supplies to island garrisons.
   
Why, then, did it take 44 months?  U.S. Sub Force torpedoes were abysmally bad, and a colossally stupid decision by U.S. Customs and Intelligence men (one each) prewar caused Japan to change her merchant marine code (which OP-20-G did not have the manpower to break again until January 1943).  Between them, they doubled the effectiveness of U.S. submarines when they became available--in September 1943!  In short, the U.S. Sub Force drove Japan's economy to ruin in just over a year:  by January 1945.
   
Here, I rely on Blair, Kahn, Prange's 'Pearl Harbor Papers', and Barhart 'Japanese Merchant Marine'.  Trekphiler 08:23, 23 December 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  Portents of Japan's defeat 

message: Hitler not obligated under the terms of the agreement...  Trekphiler 08:24, 23 December 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  Tripartite Pact 

message: Actually, AAC was responsible for long-range patrol; local harbor defense was the Navy's responsibility.  Trekphiler 08:24, 23 December 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  Air defense of Pearl Harbor 

message: Yamamoto and all IJN, just like USN and RN prewar, were in the grip of the doctrine of Alfred Thayer Mahan, who advocated "decisive battle" to control the seas in his seminal, overly influential 'Influence of Seapower'.  Mahan had misread the record, ignoring 'guerre de course' (commerce war), and the major navies did, too.  When reduced by circumstance to rely on it, both Germany and the U.S. did--with a vengeance.
    
I rely on various sources here.  Trekphiler 08:26, 23 December 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  Battleship hoarding 

message: This article is the current Spanish Translation of the Week.  Please help in translating this page if you can.  The destination article is at :es:Ataque a Pearl Harbor.
This article has been selected as the Spanish Translation of the Week. However, we're trying something new and we're going to translate from English to Spanish, not the other way around. Any bilingual editors of the article are welcome to go to :es:Ataque a Pearl Harbor to help. Titoxd(?!?) 05:08, 18 October 2005 (UTC)
replies: text: Man, I wish I could help out more, but my old computer isn't fullty compatible with Wikipedia; the accent marks in particular won't translate properly. Could be I just don't know what I'm doing? Hell of a fine job coming along though! Doovinator 03:35, 26 October 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  [[Wikipedia:Spanish Translation of the Week|Spanish Translation of the Week]] 

message: WILLMCW:
Inside Pearl Harbor at time of the attack:
Battleships:  Maryland, Pennsylvania, Nevada, Tennessee, West Virginia, California, Oklahoma, Arizona;
Cruisers:  Raleigh, Detroit, Honolulu, Phoenix, St. Louis, Helena, New Orleans, San Francisco.
Walter Lord in "Day of Infamy" states that there were 96 ships inside Pearl; other books give differing figures, so I said "approximately 50 other ships".
Sunk:  West Virginia, California, Oklahoma, Arizona
Damaged:  Maryland, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Nevada (grounded, not sunk; still afloat, but with her nose in the mud).
Cruisers damaged:  Raleigh (2 torpedos), Honolulu (bomb fragment damage), Helena (torpedo).
Destroyers:  Cassin, Downes, (both constructive total loss in drydock); Shaw (sunk with floating drydock)
Other ships sunk:  Oglala (capsized at 101 dock), floating drydock holding Shaw
Other ships damaged:  seaplane tender Curtiss, repair ship Vestal.  Not including several ships that were strafed.
The other information was elsewhere in the rest of the article; I just made the table consistent with that information.
147.240.236.9 21:58, 8 December 2005 (UTC)
replies: text: Thanks. It's always a good idea to use the "edit summary" to let your fellow editors know what you're up to. Cheers, -Willmcw 01:56, 9 December 2005 (UTC)
replies: text: Can you confirm 4 BBs sunk? I've seen 5 & 6 other places, & 7 or 8 present.  Trekphiler 13:05, 14 December 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  Info on corrections 

message: The article says, "when the Navy requested to use the Army's communications system". I'm unaware of this. In fact, what I've read of Marshall's notorious message was, the Army's system was having trouble & the messenger refused to request aid from the Navy (rivalry again...), so it went via commercial cable.  Trekphiler 13:03, 14 December 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  Dept of corrections 

message: Can somebody settle an issue N covered in the article (tho it should be mentioned!)? I've seen claims the attack was as "Operation Z" (after Togo's pennant) & "Operation AI" (after the Japanese name for Hawaii). I tend to believe AI, but I'm N certain (only 1 source, Prange's Pearl Harbor Papers). Can somebody confirm?  Trekphiler 14:10, 14 December 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  Smooth operator 

message: The atack is not a suprise. A radar station on the island detected a large number of aircraft. They tought it was a B-17 Flying Fortress bomber but it was the enemy planes. An enemy "Mini Sub" was detected by an American Destroyer outside the harbour. They fire at it and succesfuly sunk it. Another one was in Pearl Harbour. Again, sunk by another American destroyer. About 5 mini-subs were found. The destroyer (I only the first one) that sunk the first mini-sub was the USS Ward. An ageing Curtiss P-36 shot down a Zeke. The pilot was rewarded. The P-36 has 200+ bullet holes! Irfanfaiz 02:46, 23 December 2005 (UTC)
replies: text: Other than the bullet holes in the P-36 I think we've included all of that in our article. Have you read it? More generally, Pearl Harbor is popularly known as a "surprise attack". It isn't for us to decide if it was or not, only to provide all viewpoints. If there's some sourced information that you'd like to add, go for it. Cheers, -Willmcw 07:08, 23 December 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  Not a suprise.... 

message: Flagship of the Kido Butai tanker train was Kyokuto Maru, Genda is credited with inventing the CVTF, Pennsylvania (CO by Charles "Savvy" Cooke, Jr.--a former submariner, if I'm not mistaken) was flag of the PacFlt, & Seaman Lawrence McCutcheon (Maryland) was first American KIA, all according to Pearl Harbor Papers (I think). See also Willmott's Pearl Harbor.  Trekphiler 06:40, 24 December 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  Built like a tank 

message: Yeah, this is a bit late, too:
:"Did anyone here actually read R. Stinnett's book? All the way through? I'm dissapointed that some people would call evidence from the US Navy 'conspiracy theories'. To do so is petty slander and simple name-calling. I mean really, denying evidence from the US Navy?! Admit it, we were lied to for 50 years. -- 65.176.192.146 23:07, 16 Sep 2003"
Actually, I have read it. It's a fantasy. It's got fundamental flaws, not least being unable to tell the difference between DF fixes & bearings (not 1 I noticed, I confess), nor being able to realize his premise is wrong, despite quoting one of his sources to that effect.  Trekphiler 07:13, 24 December 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  More Retro