Talk:Carl Icahn

message: The "Wealth and Philanthropy" section is only partially sourced, violating WP policies. This and the piecemeal nature of earlier sections, which aggregate business snippets, catch-as-catch-can, keep the article far from encyclopedic.  2601:246:CA80:3CB5:B83B:2CC8:1599:130F (talk) 03:40, 1 June 2018 (UTC)
replies: text: The Personal Wealth section now has cited references for the donations noted in that section.Writethisway (talk) 21:17, 25 June 2020 (UTC)
thread_title: Poorly sourced section

message: "Icahn takes large stakes in companies that he believes will appreciate via changes to corporate policy"
I am not a native english speaker, so I can't say whether this is wrong, but for the life of it, I can't make sense of the sentence in the lede.37.49.68.13 (talk) 20:51, 20 April 2022 (UTC)
replies: text: My attempt to rewrite that in a way that may be clearer to a non-native speaker of English: ""Icahn takes large stakes in companies that he believes will increase in value if he is allowed to control how they are run". Maproom (talk) 21:48, 3 May 2023 (UTC)
thread_title:  Meaning of lede not clear 

message: Financial journalist Matt Levine wrote today in his daily newsletter
Yesterday short seller Hindenburg Research released a short report on Carl Icahn’s company, Icahn Enterprises LP, and it is just mechanically very neat. Here is the schematic claim:
You have a company that is 85% owned by one guy. It owns $100 worth of stuff.
Every year it declares a 45% dividend, meaning that it pays out $45 of cash from its $100 worth of stuff.
The main guy says “that’s okay, no dividend for me, just give me my dividend in extra shares.” Everyone else gets cash.
That means the company only has to come up with $6.75 of cash for that 30% dividend.
The market is like “this is amazing, this company has a huge dividend,” and the stock trades up. It trades to a market capitalization of $300, three times its net asset value, purely as a dividend investment. This gives it a 15% dividend yield, i.e., the $45 dividend divided by the $300 stock value is 15%, making it one of the highest-yielding stocks available.
The company takes advantage of this fact to sell stock: It sells 2.25% of the company ($6.75 worth of stock) to raise the money to pay out the $6.75 cash dividend. (Implicitly it also sells $38.25 of stock to the main guy in lieu of his cash dividend, keeping his stake at 85%.[1])
That is, the two central claims here are that Icahn Enterprises is overvalued, relative to its reported net asset value, because investors are too dazzled by its high dividend:
IEP trades at a 218% premium to its last reported net asset value (NAV), vastly higher than all comparables. …
A reason for IEP’s extreme premium to NAV, based on a review of retail investor-oriented media, is that average investors are attracted to (a) IEP’s large dividend yield and (b) the prospect of investing alongside Wall Street legend Carl Icahn. Institutional investors have virtually no ownership in IEP.
Icahn Enterprises’ current dividend yield is ~15.8%, making it the highest dividend yield of any U.S. large cap company by far, with the next closest at ~9.9%.
And that the dividend is in some sense fake, because it comes not from earnings but from selling new stock:
As a result of the company’s elevated unit price, its annual dividend rate equates to an absurd 50.5% of last reported indicative net asset value.
The company’s outlier dividend is made possible (for now) because Carl Icahn owns roughly 85% of IEP and has been largely taking dividends in units (instead of cash), reducing the overall cash outlay required to meet the dividend payment for remaining unitholders.
The dividend is entirely unsupported by IEP’s cash flow and investment performance, which has been negative for years. IEP’s investment portfolio has lost ~53% since 2014. The company’s free cash flow figures show IEP has cumulatively burned ~$4.9 billion over the same period.
There are other claims, including that Icahn Enterprises overvalues some of its assets in computing its net asset value, and that it makes bad investments and so has negative operating cash flow in a way that further shrinks the asset value and makes the dividend unsustainable, but those are less interesting than the main schematic story. ( Icahn Enterprises responded: “We believe the self-serving short seller report published by Hindenburg Research today was intended solely to generate profits on Hindenburg's short position at the expense of IEP's long-term unitholders. We stand by our public disclosures and we believe that IEP's performance will speak for itself over the long term as it always has.”)
That main story is ... what is that? Here’s what Hindenburg calls it:
In brief, Icahn has been using money taken in from new investors to pay out dividends to old investors. Such ponzi-like economic structures are sustainable only to the extent that new money is willing to risk being the last one “holding the bag”.
Look, I personally do not view the term “ponzi-like economic structure” as a pejorative — many of my favorite economic structures are Ponzi-like — and agree that this schematic structure seems Ponzi-like, but in a fun way.
Basically the accusation is that the shares trade for more than they are worth, so Icahn is selling more shares for more than they are worth in order to pay a big dividend to his shareholders. Which … I think is simply correct corporate finance? If your shares are trading for more than they are worth, you should sell as many shares as you can, and if you don’t have any good use for the money you should use it to pay a dividend. It is strange corporate finance, but it checks out. Icahn Enterprises does disclose its indicative net asset value (though Hindenburg quibbles with its calculations), so no one is exactly deceived here. If you buy the stock, you know. you’re paying a huge premium to the net asset value.
But is it “sustainable only to the extent that new money is willing to risk being the last one ‘holding the bag’”? I don’t know. I think if you look at that schematic description, it seems sustainable for a long time, even in the absence of new money (or investing gains or operating cash flow, ha), as long as Carl Icahn is willing to risk being the last one holding the bag. The schematic description is something like: “Carl Icahn is the majority owner of a bag of cash, and he keeps giving people some of the cash in exchange for an increasing share of the smaller bag of cash.”
If — using my schematic numbers above — the stock fell from $300 (overvalued relative to the $100 of assets) to $50 (undervalued relative to the $100 of assets), the main guy might be perfectly happy to keep paying out $6.75 of cash dividends to outside shareholders in order to increase his share of the now undervalued pot. If the shares traded for less than they were worth, Icahn Enterprises should stop selling shares, but the dividend mechanism essentially lets Icahn buy shares: Everyone else gets a cash dividend,[2] but Icahn himself takes his dividend in stock, valued at its current trading price,[3] meaning that if the shares become cheap he is effectively buying shares cheap. He gets an increasing share of a decreasing bag of cash, but his share increases faster than the bag shrinks.[4] When your stock is overvalued, you sell stock; when your stock is undervalued, you buy it back. Somehow Icahn is doing both!
Still in some sense the core of Hindenburg’s thesis is “this stock trades at a 218% premium to net asset value, which is weirdly high,” and it’s hard to argue with that, though also a bit hard to see why the market never noticed it before. The stock closed at $50.42 on Monday; it was trading around $32.69 at noonish today. Still plenty of room to sell stock to fund dividends though.
This has been published by Bloomberg, but I don't have an account with them, and don't know how to cite it. It's fascinating. Maproom (talk) 21:48, 3 May 2023 (UTC)
thread_title:  Matt Levine's article  of today