Talk:Philosophy of perception

message: I have replaced the untenable introductory section by one I made from scratch which aims at:
#stating to subject(s) of PhOP,
#distinguishing internalist and externalist positions,
#pointing out the central aspects of immediate objects and perceptual error, and
#introducing the main strains of internalist positions. A sentence on the externalist position should be added.
Allover, I consider the article weak.
#The section on philosophical accounts still needs a rewrite. A segmentation according to central concepts (what is 'given', 'immediate object' etc.), problems (perceptual error etc.), and central positions seems indicated,
#The one on scientific accounts is mislabeled as long as it is not realised that this section should not present scientific accounts of perception (which should go somewhere else), but rather present insights from science that are considered relevant to PhOP, while their connection to problems in PhOP should be explicated, again without presenting too many details of scientific theory of perception. An overview of the fields that scientifically tackle the problem of perception PhOP deals with seems indicated.
#The section Categories of perception seems misplaced to me – even the seemingly helpful identification of exteroception with the concept of perception in PhOP might be disputed.
#The sections on cognitive processing and perceptual space should be removed, as they either pick out details the relevance of which to a general article PhOP is not demonstrated, or are rather anecdotic. Aspects of them might as a start be used to expand the philosophical proper and scientific sections.
I also found a "mid" importance rating justifiable. (--Morton Shumway (talk) 13:33, 24 April 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Introductory section rewritten, 4/2010 

message: EntmootsOfTrolls would have liked this article to be part of User:EntmootsOfTrolls/WikiProject Body, Cognition and Senses, which provides guidelines for articles on those topics, and seeks stronger cross-linkage and cross-cultural treatment of all of these topics.
This article, cognition, perception, the senses and a few others (like perspective, visual perception, pain, irritation, pain control) are very tightly linked and probably a lot of things need to move around, as noted here:
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I'm not sure that the last two paragraphs should go here.  Perhaps on cognition or philosophy of mind, or better yet, on a page about autopoiesis.  I'm really not sure, because I don't know anything about this; this is the first I've heard of Maturana and Varela, probably because they aren't (weren't) philosophers but scientists, and the theory is not well known by philosophers generally. --LMS
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I wondered about that. That's one of the reasons I asked the question about consilience on your personal page.  Perhaps I should gather my courage and write a page on autopoiesis?  Where would it go?  The first time I tried to write a separate page it wound up in a sort of Wikipedian limbo! I think I need help with this.  :)
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Well, I don't know.  It would be great if you could ask advice from a philosopher who is familiar with autopoiesis.  My best guess is life, mind, or cognition, depending on what, exactly, you want to say.  It all depends on what the text in question is about, precisely.  Since we can have articles about nearly anything, there's no excuse not be precise.
I wanted to add that I doubt that we should take the position that just because many philosophers don't know about theory T, an article on T shouldn't be linked to from a philosophy page.  Just because the people who originated the autopoiesis theory are biologists, that hardly by itself means that it won't be of interest on some particular philosophy (and psychology and cognitive science and AI and biology) pages.  But what we (on Wikipedia) should try to do--though I don't know if you and I could do it individually or together--is make it clear that the theory is in fact originated by biologists and that it raises issues in a way that is, in some ways, orthogonal to the way philosophers today raise them.  In other words, it's a different tradition.  That's very important to mention, I think, because a very large part of understanding philosophy is understanding philosophical traditions.  What I'm skeptical that you and I could do is describing the relationship between the traditions; for that I suspect we'd need a philosophically-trained biologist or a biology-trained philosopher. --LMS
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Neither of which I am.  Sigh.  After a lifetime of being a generalist (jack of all trades, so to speak) I find myself wishing I had been more of an expert in SOMEthing! I'll cut the section on autopoiesis from Perception and repost it later after I think a bit about all this.  Thank you for your patience.  F. Lee Horn
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This is something I've been working on for some time. I'm not aware of all that has been written on perception, by any means. I've been reading these pages with great interest! :-) Still, naive and simple though it may be, I would welcome comments on what I call (perhaps a little pompously ;-)) What is reality.  SteveMerrick
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I have a problem with this article as a whole. It seems to me that there is insufficient information contained in the article to allow a recast to a neutral point of view without extensive external information. I would suggest that a base article closer to neutrality would perhaps create a better encyclopedia article The Ostrich.
:There's nothing wrong with this article as it is now, except for its lack of connection to other articles on various things like reality - see the WikiProject link above.
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Epistemology can be very important when researching perception, because there might be mismatches in perception between the observer and that which (s)he is observing.
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At the end of the section titled 'Philosophical ideas about perception' appears the sentence:
'The term neuro-linguistic programming, often abbreviated to NLP, was coined by Richard Bandler and John Grinder for their method of studying the structure of subjective experience.'
This is a non sequitur.  NLP is not a philosophical field (and it is not considered to be a scientific field either).  Unless someone can provide a good reason to retain the sentence I will remove it.   flavius 05:22, 25 November 2005 (UTC)
thread_title: Comments

message: The article suggests that both Locke and Kant followed indirect perception - I don't find this to be entirely accurate.
Locke's argument goes something like this:
P1.) Everything which we visually percieve is coloured
P2.) Nothing phsyical is coloured
C1.) The object of perception cannot be a physical thing
From this Locke arrives at the idea that there are primary (mind independent, e.g. shape and size) and secondary (mind dependent, e.g. colour) qualities - This idea shows that Locke is accurately known as an indirect realist because of the requirement of the object of the external world, and the object of perception (sense-data)
Kant's point however, is that nothing can ever be said of things-in-themselves (the noumenal) - In addition the noumenal does not cause the phenomenal (roughly similar to sense-data) and so Kant may not be considered as an indirect realist as the article suggests.
-Alex Milner
=== On Kant's supposed indirect realism ===
I have come here for the same reason. Arguably, the only philosopher who can be called an indirect realist without any controversy is Nicolas Malebranche. Locke's supposed direct realism was first pointed out, I believe, by Thomas Reid, who called the empiricist's theory of perception the "way of ideas." Most people, as the user above, have no problem citing Locke among the examples of indirect realists and I include myself in this group.
Kant is another matter entirely. He can, against what is said by the user above, be considered an indirect realist. Most of the classical commentaries (e.g. Vaihinger, Kemp Smith) do take him to be saying that our representations are the object of our perception. Against this is the opinion of many current Kant scholars, most notably Henry Allison (and Prauss among the German commentators, I believe). It is all a matter of what do you take to be appearances (Erscheinungen). If there are subjective appearances (Erscheinungen) *and* objective appearances taken as objects of experience (Phaenomena), then a direct realist interpretation might follow. If you take all occurrences of "Erscheinung" to mean "Phaenomenon", then I believe a very strange indirect realist position is the least that might follow (one might argue that what might really follow is the extremest idealism possible).
On account of it being a controversial point of interpretation, I will remove Kant's name and replace it with Malebranche's.
Kripkenstein (talk) 01:38, 4 April 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Kant's supposed indirect realism. 

message: I have come here for the same reason. Arguably, the only philosopher who can be called an indirect realist without any controversy is Nicolas Malebranche. Locke's supposed direct realism was first pointed out, I believe, by Thomas Reid, who called the empiricist's theory of perception the "way of ideas." Most people, as the user above, have no problem citing Locke among the examples of indirect realists and I include myself in this group.
Kant is another matter entirely. He can, against what is said by the user above, be considered an indirect realist. Most of the classical commentaries (e.g. Vaihinger, Kemp Smith) do take him to be saying that our representations are the object of our perception. Against this is the opinion of many current Kant scholars, most notably Henry Allison (and Prauss among the German commentators, I believe). It is all a matter of what do you take to be appearances (Erscheinungen). If there are subjective appearances (Erscheinungen) *and* objective appearances taken as objects of experience (Phaenomena), then a direct realist interpretation might follow. If you take all occurrences of "Erscheinung" to mean "Phaenomenon", then I believe a very strange indirect realist position is the least that might follow (one might argue that what might really follow is the extremest idealism possible).
On account of it being a controversial point of interpretation, I will remove Kant's name and replace it with Malebranche's.
Kripkenstein (talk) 01:38, 4 April 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  On Kant's supposed indirect realism 

message: "Idealism holds that we create our reality whereas skepticism holds that reality is always beyond us".
This is incorrect. Idealism holds that reality is mental in nature.1Z 21:46, 12 January 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Philosophical ideas of Perception 

message: The article currently states that the philosophy of perception is "closely related to" the field of epistemology. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I believe that perception simply falls under the field of epistemology. --68.149.181.145 (talk) 05:18, 22 April 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: I rewrote the relevant section in a way that would hopefully answer your question. JustinBlank (talk) 01:05, 23 April 2008 (UTC)

text: They're closely related, e.g. inasmuch as Ph.o.P. asks about the epistemological status of perception, but it cannot be said to 'fall under' epistemology as soon as possible differences as to what 'knowing' means are taken into account. --Morton Shumway (talk) 20:25, 19 April 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Epistemology 

message: The scope of this article should be the Philosophy of Perception, i.e. not so much neuroscientific, cognitive, psychological etc. accounts of perception - nothing at all against the latter in principle. I ask that the section on philosophical accounts of perception be moved to precede "scientific accounts of perception".
I suggest that parts of the article which loosely list aspects relevant to the notion of perception etc. be moved to articles like Perception.
What is more, the introductory section needs a rewrite since it is a rather loose enumeration of ideas about perception (e.g. "mental processes", "symbols", "the senses", "mental framework", importance for communication etc.). --84.186.210.203 (talk) 20:11, 14 April 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: Basically, I agree. Foremost I think, the introduction completely misses the point. I have formulated a new one, please check whether you're OK with it. --Morton Shumway (talk) 18:37, 19 April 2010 (UTC)

text: Also, I have switched the subsection order. --Morton Shumway (talk) 20:26, 19 April 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: There's no need for a "Scientific theories of perception" section in this article: just point to other relevant articles with wikilinks and See also links. Also, I would expect an article on this topic to have something on subjectivity and objectivity, such as Locke's primary and secondary qualities. That seems more relevant to the topic of perception than ontological questions about reality. MartinPoulter (talk) 14:52, 26 March 2011 (UTC)
thread_title:  Structure of the Article 

message: I did a double take at the description of the illusion presented at the top of the article, which has a gray segment connecting squares A and B as opposed to the standard image, here, and an interesting but quite different illusory effect. 
The article above mentions that the connecting segment is actually one of the ways to verify that the two squares are the same color.  In my experience it also creates an Escher-like depth illusion, where the upper rows of squares flicker between being part of the checkerboard plane and forming an elevated ledge.  I didn't notice this effect being mentioned elsewhere during a cursory check, but if anyone with time to edit can verify my (possibly suspect) perception and fix the caption, it might be a more accurate description of what isn't there. ;)
Kris Dages (talk) 00:37, 20 April 2016 (UTC)
thread_title:  Checkerboard Illusion variant mis-captioned? 

message: — Assignment last updated by Jojo274 (talk) 17:16, 13 April 2023 (UTC)
thread_title: Wiki Education assignment: Human Cognition SP23