Talk:Battle of Leyte Gulf

message: I've just removed about a half dozen photos of US ships and aircraft which which took part in the battle but where the photo doesn't show them during the battle. As the purpose of including these photos was presumably only to show what the ships and aircraft looked like they're best placed in the articles on the ships and aircraft rather than the article on this battle, which is already well illustrated with photos and maps. Similarly, I've removed a section on the Fletcher class DDs as this material simply described the ships, and hence really belongs in the article on the class. I have also removed the forced sizing of thumbnail photos in line with WP:MOS which states that "Specifying the size of a thumbnail image is not necessary: without specifying a size, the width will be what readers have specified in their user preferences". --Nick Dowling (talk) 02:07, 1 January 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: *Thank you! I stumbled across this article today and the first thing I noticed was the large images. I'm glad someone knows about the images in the MOS. I've never read up on those. And when i was resizing the pictures of the Fletcher's, I too wondered if the section was necessary. But thanks once again for your work. The page looks much better! Caster23 talk contribs 02:13, 1 January 2008 (UTC)
thread_title: Photos

message: I am with Halsey, they are very very dangerous. They must be treated as if they were the only threat, they must be chased with the largest force.
The enemy battle ships annoy our  slow  auxillary fleet, they were liberating the Phillipines. That wasnt actually required to defeat Japan, in fact its an expensive distraction.. destroy the air craft carriers.
So what if  battleships come through and run into my lesser fleet ? the battle ships will *always* retreat to being a 'fleet in being', or run aground to be a gun platform.
124.179.93.77 (talk) 16:50, 29 June 2013 (UTC)
replies: text: Wikipedia is not about personal opinions it's about what is documented in relevant good sources, I've read most of the books used as primary sources and they all disagree with you. A carrier without planes or pilots is nothing but a nice big target but is worthless as an offensive weapon. That was the case for the Japanese at this point of the war. Their carriers had practically no planes or trained pilots. They wisely used them as the only thing they were good for, as bait to lure Halsey away from the defenseless troop transports. If not for the heroism of the destroyers and jeep carriers of Taffy3 it could have been a true disaster, those Japanese battleships and cruisers could have massacred the defenseless cargo ships and troop transports. --MadScientistX11 (talk) 16:29, 15 March 2015 (UTC)
thread_title:  Halsey overestimated threat of IJN air craft carriers ? 

message: Is it refering to the fist or second, or both? Please disambig. Randomblue (talk) 14:03, 15 January 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: I don't think it refers to one in particular, but I redirected it to the first battle for lack of a better option. Parsecboy (talk) 14:16, 15 January 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Bull Run Battle 

message: This article uses parenthetical referencing, instead of the usual footnotes. Is there a reason?
—WWoods (talk) 16:28, 25 March 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Reference style? 

message: FYI, Anthony Tully, one of the coauthors of Shattered Sword about the Battle of Midway, states on his message board  that he has written a book on the Battle of Surigao Strait that should be out later this year. Cla68 (talk) 02:29, 24 April 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: The book is out now.  I have a copy and it looks to be an excellent source for both the US and Japanese side in the battle. Cla68 (talk) 00:55, 15 April 2009 (UTC)
thread_title: New book on Surigao Strait

message: FYI, a list of sources on this subject can be found here:  . Cla68 (talk) 03:49, 14 August 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  List of sources 

message: I found verification of 9 heavy aircraft carriers ( CV ) at Leyte gulf (under battle of Sibuyan sea by Eugene Cammeron)
             Task force 38
11:47 AM 9/2/2008  TG 38.1 CV-18 Wasp, CV-12 Hornet. CV-19 Hancock,
TG 38.2 CV-11 Intrepid, CV-17 Bunker Hill  TG 38.3 CV-9 Essex.
CV-16 Lexington  TG 38.4 CV-13 Franklin, CV-6 Enterprise also I thought Saratoga (cv 3?) was in the battle?
(B1wilson (talk) 19:34, 1 September 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Heavy Carriers at Leyte Gulf 

message: Saratoga was relegated to a training ship and then was almost
sunk at Chichigima Feb of 1945 then later sunk at operation crossroads and is now part of a reef at Bekini atoll. It is interwsting to note Saratoga was originally laid down as a battlecruiser and entered the war with sister ship Lexington as fast carriers. Japanese carrier Kaga was also a battleship at the start and had one flight deck and two hanger decks which could also launch airplanes. (B1wilson (talk) 20:08, 1 September 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  CV-3 Status of Saratoga circa Oct 1944 Battle of Leyte Gulf 

message: I added some information regarding Kurita's perspective, derived from "Sea of Thunder" by Evans. His actions appear to be illogical given what we know of the battle, but they take on a different perspective given the fact that he believed he'd been engaging Third Fleet rather than Taffy 3. He genuinely believed that he had defeated a segment of Halsey's fleet and sunk at least three Essex-class carriers. He also thought that the rest of Third Fleet was close enough to finish him off by air attack at any moment, and that entering Leyte Gulf would only lead to the destruction of the only remaining battle force in the IJN. Kurita felt that he could gain nothing by sinking a few transports, nor could he inflict further damage on "Third Fleet", since it was sheer luck that the carriers had come under his guns in the first place. Given that, his retreat makes much more sense from his perspective. Had he known that Ozawa's plan had worked, he might have acted differently. 24.116.241.223 (talk) 03:30, 19 October 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: You also need to keep in mind that Kurita thought that he was facing fleet carriers that could easily outrun him and attack from over the horizon.  Shifting his ships from anti-submarine formation into a proper battle line would take hours that he didn't have to spare, making his General Attack signal the only way he could get his ships into range to do some damage in the narrow window of opportunity that he thought he had. JDZeff (talk) 03:41, 24 May 2022 (UTC)
thread_title:  Kurita's View of the Battle 

message: My external to link to the animated map for Battle of Leyte Gulf was deleted a while ago see http://www.historyanimated.com/LeyteGulf.html
The animations on the site are thoroughly researched and take about 250 hours each to complete.  
They were just recommended by the US Naval Institute - see http://blog.usni.org/?p=3121#more-3121
They are used by hundreds of military worldwide as well as schools and universities. I can document.
Would it be OK if I restore the link? Leyte Gulf is one of my best ones.  The link directly to the animation does not promote the site nor myself.  It follows Wiki guidelines for external liks
Thank you for your considerationGeorge11Williams (talk) 14:11, 6 June 2009 (UTC)
thread_title:  Can I add external link to Leyte Gulf animated map - was recommeded by US Naval Institute 

message: The 8th paragraph on "Background" beginning "On 12 October 1944, the US 3rd Fleet under Admiral Halsey began..." quotes a loss of 600 Japanese aircraft. No reference is provided, nor can I find one. This number is the oft-cited number if aircraft lost in the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot in June.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 216.18.201.36 (talk) 17:19, 29 August 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Paragraph 8 seems like a report of the Great Marianas Turkey shoot 

message: In the debates over the years over "Bull's Run", an interesting thought gets left out: composition of 3 rd. fleet. Adm. Nimitz, CINCPAC, could have solved the issue before it even arrived by simply seperating the carriers in 3 rd fleet by type, in effect creating a permant 5 th. fleet, and assigning it to adm. Lee for the op.  3 rd fleet had 4 groups within it. by placing the CVL class ships in groups .3 and .4, suffient air strength would be available for the covering force, as 5 th. fleet, while groups .1 and .2, with the big cv class, remained available to Halsey, AS A SEPERATE ENTITY.
Also of interest are 2 battle cruisers available, with 12 inch guns which never get mentioned , Alaska and Guam, which would augument Halsey's firepower even with TF-34 staying behind ..
Alaska and Guam didn't get into the war until January of 1945, long after the Battle of Leyte Gulf was over.  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 97.64.209.102 (talk) 16:51, 19 March 2015 (UTC)
thread_title:  Additional thoughts. 

message: So in the infobox it says that the Japanese had 300+ aircraft, but under the losses section it says they lost around 500... could the number of planes in the infobox be updated to 500+ because if they lost 500, they had to have atleast that many, or would that be considered WP:SYNTH?  Thanks in advance! Jeancey (talk) 15:35, 3 November 2011 (UTC)
replies: text: Yeah, I noticed the same thing. Here are the edits where the two numbers were introduced - may be useful for determining accuracy:   — RockMFR 02:36, 20 December 2011 (UTC)
replies: text: As a casual reader, I noted that the discrepancy remains.  I do not consider myself to be competent enough regarding this issue to make any call on what change is appropriate.--Rpclod (talk) 16:44, 3 April 2013 (UTC)
replies: text: Does anyone know about this reference The Encyclopedia of Modern War?? There are no copies in my local library and when I looked it up on Amazon it has Zero user reviews and no reviews by anyone really. I'm wondering if the use as a reference might be self promotion by whoever wrote the book. I found the following though in Sea of Thunder -- "the [Japanese] navy had cobbled together about 200 planes at airfields..." and then a bit later "Ozawa had managed to put together an odd lot collection of 108 fighters and bombers" (pp. 209-210)  I.e. about 200 land based planes and 100 on the actual carriers. So a total of about 300 and therefor at most casualties of around 300. I'm going to revise the article accordingly for now but may make more changes as I read other books on the topic. Mdebellis (talk) 14:01, 7 July 2013 (UTC)
thread_title:  Number of Japanese Aircraft 

message: " ... burning patches of fuel were most likely the source of the myth of Fuso blowing up. It is extremely unlikely that a vessel as strongly built as a battleship could be blown in half and the halves remain upright and afloat, so the classic version of Fuso's fate is also extremely improbable. Accordingly, it is likely that the Morison account is incorrect in this detail."  This and the rest of the paragraph are not cited - if the earlier cite is where this supposition comes from, it should be added again to point that out - there are many other RS sources that dispute this, showing precedents of capital ships being split into two and remaining afloat, and that the Japanese military today agrees with the U.S. Naval War College report that is based on many different eyewitnesses, both Japanese and American, from PT boats to destroyers, that the Fuso did indeed break into two and remained afloat for some time.  Before putting in the tag, I would like the existing portion of the article referenced, and we will go from there. HammerFilmFan (talk) 14:57, 3 August 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: Japanese battleship Mutsu-- While anchored near Hashirajima on 8 June 1943, the battleship was cut in two by an unexplained detonation of the magazine for #3 turret. The bow sank quickly, but the inverted stern remained afloat for 14 hours.
--Naaman Brown (talk) 19:34, 18 June 2013 (UTC)

text: I don't find most of your arguments that convincing. Your examples (except for the Mutsu which does support your argument) show that a battleship can be blown in two. As I read the text it says that what is unlikely isn't that a battleship can be blown in two but that a battleship can be blown in two and one half of it can still remain afloat for a long time. However, I also don't find the basic argument all that convincing. There is a lot of chaos involved in these kinds of events and unexpected things can happen. Also, the fact that battleships were designed to be the most unsinkable ships probably in history actually makes it more likely IMO that of all ships a battleship might be blown in half but the explosion could happen in such a way that enough watertight compartments remained in tact that one half remained afloat for a long time. I'm currently reading some of the source documents here and plan to clean up the article after I've done that but thought I would add some comments before hand in case people want to give more input. Mdebellis (talk) 21:13, 5 July 2013 (UTC)
replies: text: I just read Sea of Thunder and all it says about the Fuso's destruction was that it was blown in half. Mdebellis (talk) 19:47, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
replies: text: The situation as it is now is unsatisfactory.  The paragraph beginning "The classical account summarized" says that Fuso did not break in half.  Five paras later, beginning "The rear of the Southern Force" unequivocally says the two halves sank separately, but then the next paragraph appears to dispute that.  Whatever is the "truth" it needs to be consistent.  If there is doubt, then that doubt needs to be consistently applied throughout the section.  You simply can't have "Fuso didn't actually break in two" in one place and "the two halves of Fuso ..." later on.Baska436 (talk) 10:51, 26 October 2013 (UTC)
replies: text: Thanks for pointing that out. I started editing this when I was away from home and planned to finish up when I was home and could use the much larger local city library rather than the resources I had on the road. Then I got home and forgot about it. I want to get the Tulley book used as a reference to double check the story. I just put a reserve on it at the library and will check it and then address this at that time, should be within a week or less. BTW, I'm mdebellis, I've been using various nick names, from this point on I'm sticking with RedDog. RedDog (talk) 14:48, 26 October 2013 (UTC)
replies: text: Perhaps the best (or easiest) way of fixing it would be to go right through with the conventional story, then near the end (second last para of the section??) have a new para starting something like "An alternative account of the destruction of the Fuso is based on ...." and gather all those strands together in this one place.  Note that I don't have any opinion on which explanation might be correct.   Baska436 (talk) 23:53, 27 October 2013 (UTC)
replies: text: That is one possibility. However, at this point I've read just about every major reference that is cited here (all the books except Tully and even some of the DOD documents) and so far I've seen nothing that supports the alternative account.  Everything that I've seen just says the Fuso blew up and usually uses some variant of the phrase "blown in half".  If Tully really does support the alternative view then I think the course you described makes sense, if he actually doesn't -- and that is my guess -- then I think the alternative theory should be classified as OR and just removed. I should get the Tully book in a few days. RedDog (talk) 15:03, 28 October 2013 (UTC)
replies: text: I reviewed the Tully book. It absolutely supports the text and it is very convincing. I updated the text accordingly. Some of the statements supporting the alternative view were a bit too point of view so I toned them back. RedDog (talk) 00:36, 29 October 2013 (UTC)

text: http://www.combinedfleet.com/atully06.htm has a lot of good info from Tully on Fuso as well - a lot of it outdated (at the time there was debate over if Fuso or Yamashiro was sunk first) but the summary at the end is a good quick bit on Fuso blowing in two also. Statalyzer (talk) 08:02, 10 March 2018 (UTC)

text: !!EDITORS!! In 2012 the need for proper citations was brought up - lots of changes to the text have taken place, but as of now, this section is completely unreferenced.  Tagged to that effect - needs immediate attention!  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 50.111.9.62 (talk) 02:46, 1 March 2020 (UTC)
thread_title:  disputed - needs better referencing 

message: There was a note in the Background section that a point required clarification, the claim that the meeting with FDR, McCarther, and Nimitz wasn't conclusive. There was a valid reference just a little further down. Its a report on various military planning decisions and it goes into the decision to invade the Phillipines and it does state that the meeting was not conclusive. I made it clear where the reference belonged and excerpted a quote that I thought was relevant to make the case. Mdebellis (talk) 20:23, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
thread_title:  removed tag requiring additional clarification 

message: The article currently only shows the images of a few allied ships burning and sinking. For a battle that the japanese lost and which ended the japanese navy as a formidable force in the war, shouldn't there be at least a few pictures of visibly destroyed sinking hulks of japanese navy vessels? 67.243.29.174 (talk) 15:40, 4 March 2015 (UTC)
replies: text: The question is do such pictures exist? My guess is the Japanese weren't real keen on taking pictures of their sinking ships. If you know of such pictures that are in the wikipedia:commons or are in the public domain and could be added to the article please leave a link to the image(s) here and I'll add them. --MadScientistX11 (talk) 17:17, 4 March 2015 (UTC)
replies: text:  There are some public domain photographs at ibiblio.org: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/OnlineLibrary/photos/sh-fornv/japan/japsh-a/akizuki.htm, http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/OnlineLibrary/photos/sh-fornv/japan/japsh-c/chikuma2.htm, http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/OnlineLibrary/photos/sh-fornv/japan/japsh-m/musashi.htm.  Mostly from U.S. aircraft, reiforcing MadScientistX11's point. --Yaush (talk) 18:32, 4 March 2015 (UTC)
replies: text: Are those in the public domain in terms of copyright? My guess is they would be but I don't know how to tell for sure and the copyright stuff is so complicated to me that I usually just stick to stuff that is already in the commons. --MadScientistX11 (talk) 21:48, 4 March 2015 (UTC)
replies: text: The original site has a statement that to the best of their knowledge all images at the site are in the public domain. A rather huge number of images from that site have been moved into Commons based on that statement. I think we're okay here. --Yaush (talk) 22:30, 4 March 2015 (UTC)

text: I agree with the original statement here.  There are plenty of public domain pictures, and whoever has chosen to show only American ships burning seems to have an anti-American bias.  I would have changed the pictures myself, but sadly, I am not very proficient with Wikimedia, and do not know how.  Please change at least the title picture to something more appropriate, such as the Musashi getting bombed.  (Plenty of pictures of that!) DeeJaye6 (talk) 03:07, 15 March 2015 (UTC)
replies: text: But the article doesn't "show only American ships burning"... There seem to be about an equal mix of photos of damaged US and Japanese ships. It also includes a photo of Musashis sister ship "getting bombed" - why have two similar images? Nick-D (talk) 03:16, 15 March 2015 (UTC)
thread_title:  damaged japanese ships 

message: They mean the same thing, they are simply alternative spellings. Google gives identical results for "run the gauntlet" or "run the gantlet". I am not going to revert but I suggest we go with what is more commonly used. I see no evidence either way. 
DMorpheus2 (talk) 16:47, 7 December 2016 (UTC)
thread_title:  "Gauntlet" vs. "Gantlet" 

message: The page https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Largest_naval_battle_in_history has listed "The opposing fleets carried a total of about 200,000 personnel." so I was curious to see more details about the battle. However, this page doesn't seem to have that tidbit, nor anything about the allied total number of combatants. 
First talk topic, please be gentle!
Lamperta (talk) 17:51, 16 January 2018 (UTC)
thread_title:  Possible to add total number of personnel involved in battle? 

message: The sentence "(the failure to promptly recall McCain on 23 October had also effectively let some 4 heavy cruisers of the 3rd Fleet sink)." is quite bizarre and needs more than just a citation, it needs an explanation. 3rd fleet didn't lose 4 CA all war long, much less at Leyte Gulf. How does a ship "effectively" sink? What is this quote even referring to? Statalyzer (talk) 07:57, 10 March 2018 (UTC)
replies: text: Seconding this sentiment. I highly doubt the Morison citation backs these claims and think the whole sentence ought to be scrapped. The significance of the departure of TG 38.1 is that it was by far the strongest task group available to TF38 in the lead up to the battle, not that its absence somehow contributed to the sinking of 3rd Fleet cruisers. This is doubly puzzling if the author was referring to Canberra or Houston since those both stayed afloat, were torpedoed weeks prior, and one of them isn't even a heavy cruiser. Finktron (talk) 09:48, 5 June 2018 (UTC)

text: Seconding as well. Haven't checked Morison, but the US Navy lost only one cruiser of any kind during or after Leyte: the Portland Class heavy cruiser Indianapolis, which was torpedoed by Japanese submarine I-58 on June 30, 1945, i.e., some 8 months after Leyte. The previous US cruiser to be sunk was the St. Louis Class light cruiser Helena, sunk in the battle of Kula Gulf on June 6, 1943 or more than a year before Leyte. The US Navy lost 7 heavy cruisers during the Pacific War, but five of those already in 1942 and one in 1943, all well before Leyte, while the seventh was the aforementioned Indianapolis.--Death Bredon (talk) 22:28, 6 December 2018 (UTC)
replies: text: I also agree. I don't have the Morison book but I have a Kindle version of the book Last Stand of the Tin Cans and I did a search for "cruiser" and didn't find anything about any US cruisers getting sunk. I'm just going to remove the parenthetical comment for now although if I get a chance I'll try and get the Morison book both to double check in case we're wrong (which I doubt) and also to check that overall section, where there's one error there may be more. --MadScientistX11 (talk) 04:36, 7 December 2018 (UTC)
replies: text: Just wanted to close the loop on this. I got the Morrison book and of course we were correct there were no US cruisers sunk.  --MadScientistX11 (talk) 17:30, 24 December 2018 (UTC)
thread_title:  Four Cruisers Sinking? 

message: Military historians, especially armchair ones, like to pick over the decisions of battle commanders. I think it is all well and good, and in fact can prove instructive for future engagements. I do find that this section needs a little organization, and to be tightened up. People have vented their spleens, but run on a bit doing so. The content is largely fine, it just needs some editing, to make it clearer. best regards 184.69.174.194 (talk) 21:42, 17 February 2019 (UTC)
replies: text: There is no doubt in my mind that Halsey was one of the best US admirals in history. That doesn't mean he was never wrong. Few great commanders ever are. Napoleon invaded Russia and had Waterloo, Lee had Gettysburg, etc. I think the criticism section as it is now is very balanced. If you read any history of this battle there is no doubt that many of the commanders were furious with Halsey and all the authors I've read agree that he clearly made a mistake here that cost the lives of many sailors and aviators from the Taffy3 task force. I think the tonnage of the Yamato alone was equal to or greater than the tonnage of the entire Taffy3 task force. That the whole task force wasn't sunk was only due to some incredible bravery and sacrifice from some of the commanders of the destroyers and destroyer escorts in Taffy3. But the main point is I don't see any "spleen venting" in that section (btw, I didn't write it so I'm not defending it for that reason) it seems very balanced in presenting the criticism that many people made of Halsey. --MadScientistX11 (talk) 17:13, 18 February 2019 (UTC)

text: It may be worthwhile, if you think the section is too splenetic, to mention that Halsey underwent the kind of severe shuttle bombing he claimed to be worried about during Leyte Gulf not even two weeks prior, during the Formosa Air Battle. Two cruises were torpedoed and minor damage was done to some other ships during that multi-day engagement; the air groups were run dog tired by the end of it and the disposition of Halsey's forces at the dawn of Leyte Gulf was a direct consequence of this fact. Not to defend Halsey since I think he was definitely in the wrong here, but the fear of shuttle bombing was a real one, if overblown.Finktron (talk) 18:21, 29 April 2019 (UTC)
thread_title:  Halsey Criticism section Editing needed 

message: The last paragraph of the Aftermath section, that starts "Months after the battle, the U.S. Navy knew the American public had to be told something...", needs to just be removed. The cited reference is just a link to the Feb. 1945 Popular Mechanics article (which seems to be more pro-Halsey hagiography than actual reporting). The paragraph reads like a speculative retro-justification for the existence of the uncritical PM article, and not based on any references to the stated goal that the American public "had to be told something". And certainly not: "It was several years before the true story of Halsey's decision to leave the San Bernardino Strait unguarded became known to the American public."
As a counterexample to the claim of the paragraph, I added references to a 3-part series of articles in Collier's, that all came out in January. From the first installment in the Jan 13, 1945 issue:
: As Oldendorf prepared, Admirals Halsey and Mitscher in Ring Two, up north, had made their decision—a hard decision, and probably the most important of the entire battle. They had decided to take the main strength of the Third Fleet north to meet the expected attack by the Jap carrier force coming from the Formosa area. They knew of the impending action in Surigao Strait and figured that Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet was capable of repelling it. Their last reports from the all-day action in Ring Two specified that the central Jap force had been badly crippled and had been seen at dusk retreating to the west across the Sibuyan Sea. Presumably this force was out of the picture and could not carry out its intended attacks on the Leyte landings.
: Why not, then, concentrate striking power on the enemy carrier force to the north? Of course, this would leave the Leyte beachhead covered only by the little escort carriers in the Seventh Fleet. They would be helpless against a strong surface attack, but Halsey figured they were safe because the Japs had retreated in Ring Two. He ordered several of his carrier task groups to rendezvous and steam north. Other units, refueling far to the east, could be called upon in case of emergency.
: The decision was made—and it became the subject of hot controversy, but that was later, after we had narrowly escaped disaster.
The Collier's articles were a collaboration by Quentin Reynolds (reporting from Pacific Fleet HQ), George E. Jones (United Press correspondent, from aboard Mitscher's flagship), Ralph Teatsorth (United Press correspondent, with Vice Admiral Kinkaid), and Frank D. Morris (reporting from Washington). The cited passage above was indicated in the article as Reynolds's reporting.
The point being, the press was clearly embedded with the fleet, and reporting from all over the military (both in theater, and at HQ, and in DC). Halsey's decision was clearly known to be controversial even at the time, and was published to the American public at the very latest in January 1945. Certainly not the "kept from the people for several years" rosy coverage released to Popular Mechanics (of all places) that the article states. –– sbb (talk) 20:00, 18 February 2019 (UTC)
replies: text: I went ahead and removed the last paragraph, and added the Popular Mechanics ref to list of magazine/newspapers (). — sbb (talk) 08:08, 1 March 2019 (UTC)
thread_title:  Last paragraph of Aftermath section should just be deleted 

message: The following Wikimedia Commons file used on this page has been nominated for deletion:
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Participate in the deletion discussion at the nomination page. —Community Tech bot (talk) 14:53, 28 June 2019 (UTC)
thread_title:  A Commons file used on this page has been nominated for deletion 

message: " ... never sailed in comparable force thereafter, stranded for lack of fuel in their bases for the rest of the war " - there was no way they could have moved in such force again even if their fuel depots were filled to the brim - the Japanese had lost a great number of warships in this battle and had no way to replace them - this fact should be prominent in this line/section 50.111.9.62 (talk) 02:17, 1 March 2020 (UTC)
thread_title: lede needs adjusting

message: * Technical and Military Imperatives: A Radar History of World War 2 — 1999
Page 412, 415 have excellent material on just how important various advances in radar proved to be in the Leyte time frame. (Pages 414, 416 continue this discussion, not available in my preview.) 
In particular, Bell Labs 10 cm phased-array mark 8 fire-control radar was responsible for the devastating accuracy at range of Kincaid's battleships. 
Moreover, ships fitted with PPI that helped to reduce confusion about radar reflections were effective in this environment, while ships with the reflection-prone A-scopes struggled to engage. 
Finally, the proximity fuze had the entered the conversation at this point, and contributed to the Kamikaze tactics of the Japanese being far less effective than the Japanese intended. 
By 1944, a large proportion of the American electronics industry concentrated on making the fuzes.
Procurement contracts increased from $60 million in 1942, to $200 million in 1943, to $300 million in 1944 and were topped by $450 million in 1945.
As volume increased, efficiency came into play and the cost per fuze fell from $732 in 1942 to $18 in 1945.
This permitted the purchase of over 22 million fuzes for approximately one billion dollars.
* Carriers from heaven or how much did they cost? — 4 December 2009
Unlike the popular 1936 song and Bing Crosby movie Pennies from Heaven, aircraft carriers would cost a great deal more than "pennies from heaven."
I recently queried the folks at (now) Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding in Newport News, Virginia and here is what they came up with ...
The original contract called for Essex class carriers to be constructed at the $40 million mark, but after many improvements and upgrades made during the hectic days of the war the price was closer to $70-78 million per carrier.
As a conservative estimate, the American radar fuze program was the monetary equivalent of 12 Essex class carriers. 
It was extremely secretive back in the day, and it's obviously easier to count aircraft carriers, but still, perhaps a little more balance is due in retrospect? 
I've seen numbers in the 5–7 fold range for the effectiveness of fuzed version unfuzed AA ship defense—with the same guns. 
The radar assisted fire control systems also matter a great deal, and would surely have factored into the following assessment: 
However, Morison states that Admiral Lee said after the battle that he would have been fully prepared for the battleships to cover the San Bernardino Strait without 'any' large carrier support, as each of the escort carriers of TF 77 had up to 28 planes on them, but little surface ship protection, from Kurita's traditional naval force, which lacked air support.
There's some trouble in finding sources that explicitly put these pieces together, but I think we should at least try. I'm not myself a military historian, so I'm leaving this note here for the next person with more command of the literature available. — MaxEnt 18:52, 8 July 2020 (UTC)
replies: text: In expectation of a fall 1945 invasion, the Japanese devised a simple method for the immediate organization of fully equipped and completely staffed "Special Attack" (kamikaze) formations – they assigned existing training units to the suicide mission.
This mid-July mass conversion of training units into combat units not only added thousands of experienced flight instructors, but also 5,400 largely wood and fabric trainer planes plus other outmoded aircraft types containing varying amounts of wooden construction.
U.S. intelligence analysts speculated on what the Japanese were up to; but perhaps because they perceived Japan's interest in wood as related to its perpetual aluminum shortage, the Americans made no connection to the fact that the sputtering antiques were nearly impervious to some of America's most state-of-the-art technologies – early warning radar and the [] anti-aircraft artillery projectile fuze, which used radio waves reflected off a target to detonate the projectile at the optimum distance to achieve maximum explosive impact.
But again, this is not really my bag, and others here are far more qualified to sort this out. — MaxEnt 19:07, 8 July 2020 (UTC)
thread_title:  More discussion of radar needed 

message: For a long time, this article's quotation of the message read,
 
(It was recently edited to correct the spelling to "Bernardino", but left the  tag). I believe the parenthetical never existed in the original message. The article cites Cutler's book p.111, but Cutler's book says, "If the enemy sorties [through San Bernardino Strait], TF 34 will be formed when directed by me." (letter-for-letter, no edits by me).
Halsey states in USNI _Proceedings_, “IF THE ENEMY SORTIES, TASK FORCE 34 WILL BE FORMED WHEN DIRECTED BY ME.” No parenthetical statement.
In Bull Halsey: A Biography, E. B. Potter quotes Halsey's autobiography, saying "I told them later by TBS, 'if the enemy sorties [through San Bernardino Strait], TF 34 will be formed when directed by me.'"
I have edited the article to lower-case the parenthetical, and removed the typo/sic (which probably wasn't in the original message anyways). sbb (talk) 20:00, 16 July 2020 (UTC)
thread_title:  Parenthetical in Halsey's 1710 message, "IF THE ENEMY SORTIES ..." 

message: The POWs lost on the hell ship should not be considered as casualties of this battle. They've previously been listed as casualties as "prisoners of war" from prior events and did not serve as combatants in this issue. 2600:387:F:4B19:0:0:0:2 (talk) 16:33, 1 January 2023 (UTC)
thread_title:  POW losses 

message: Weren't there Flipino soldiers and some leaders there? Sheanobeano (talk) 04:58, 7 May 2023 (UTC)
replies: text: This article is about the naval action between the US and Imperial Japanese navies. There weren't any Filipino navy units in the actions in this this battle.  — sbb (talk) 22:51, 15 September 2023 (UTC)
thread_title:  Filipinos in Leyte: