Talk:Condorcet method/Archive 1

message: Okay, this is downright fishy.  All references to Condorcet's definition of "Ideal Democratic Winner" have been struck from wikipedia by someone in the 62.246.. class-B.  This resolved to p62.246.140.83.tisdip.tiscali.de and may be accurate.  The modifications I've noted follow:
Condorcet Criterion
62.246.160.248
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Condorcet_Criterion&oldid=7253007
Condorcet method
62.246.140.83
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Condorcet_method&curid=44446&diff=0&oldid=0
The rather qualitative "Ideal Democratic Winner" has been replaced each time with "Condorcet winner" or "Condorcet candidate."  I think this change is POV-motivated.  The term is defined by Condorcet and seem clearly indicated as such.  This change seems subtle, yet note how the Condorcet articles have become self-referencing and basically a dead end in the wiki, and conceptually removed from the rest of the voting articles.  It is not just a false dichotemy, but a false isolation.
—Daelin 17:49, 7 Jan 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  What the hell? 

message: The example isn't very clear. More detailed explanation would be helpful. Maurreen 05:31, 1 May 2005 (UTC)
thread_title: Example

message: Why is it that the "basic procedure for casting ballots is" necessarily "identical to most preferential ballots"?  Couldn't I, in principle, submit a ballot saying that I prefer A to B, B to C, and C to A?  The system could handle that.  Is it just that it makes no sense for an individual to have those preferences?  Sorry if I sound confused, because I am—voting theory confuses me quite badly. —Simetrical (talk) 03:26, 4 May 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  In principle . . . 

message: The first sentence currently reads as follows: "Any election method conforming to the Condorcet criterion is known as a Condorcet method. The name comes from a deviser, the 18th century mathematician and philosopher Marquis de Condorcet, although the method was previously devised by Ramon Llull in the 13th century."
I think that this opening gives Condorcet too little credit, and Ramon Llull too much credit. As far as I know, Ramon Llull's procedure used iterative voting rather than ranked ballots. In my opinion, the use of ranked ballots to simulate pairwise elections (rather than just holding actual pairwise elections) is an essential part of Condorcet's method.
I will remove the Llull reference for now. If there is evidence that Llull used ranked ballots, then I apologize for my mistake. I don't mind having some info about Llull in the article, but I would prefer it to be in a separate section later in the article, and I would prefer that it describes precisely how Llull's voting procedures worked.
I suppose that it can be argued that any method passing a preference version of the Condorcet criterion is a Condorcet method. However, this page as written describes methods based on ranked ballots rather than iterative voting. If we define Condorcet methods in part as methods that use ranked balloting, then Llull's method, and the commonly used legislative procedure of voting on amendments (which also passes a preference version of the CC), do not qualify as Condorcet methods. 
Hermitage 22:37, 9 Jun 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  Ramon Llull 

message: are listed on http://accuratedemocracy.com/c_other.htm 80.185.152.212 11:19, 24 July 2005 (UTC)
replies: text: I wouldn't be opposed to the creation of a page for Black, Dodgson, or Kemeny. I don't think that Coombs is Condorcet efficient. --Hermitage 00:06, 25 July 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  More Condorcet Completion Rules 

message: Now that there is an article for Woodall's Plurality criterion, it seems to me that it would be appropriate to mention that some methods using WV satisfy Plurality, but methods using margins don't. I'd like to say the same thing about SDSC, but that's probably more controversial. KVenzke 20:34, August 10, 2005 (UTC)
:Yup, I'd rather see W's PC in the article than SDSC. I think that W's PC is probably more well-defined. --Hermitage 11:13, 13 August 2005 (UTC)
replies: text: I added W's PC to a new paragraph on Defeat Strength.  Now, having added that, I do not think that the margins vs winning votes discussion is "open for debate", as I wrote.  Some methods use them, but they are analytically and logically inferior.  I'm leaving it for the moment, but I could rewrite the paragraph at nearly half the words if I removed that assertion.  I want comment on this, as an earlier assertion that "margins lose information" was once removed, with an implication that it was "POV".  --—Daelin 13:00, 2 October 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  Defeat strength and the Plurality criterion 

message: I'm planning on proposing a rewrite and restructure of the article, using Single Transferable Vote as a skelton.  Because of the current "structure", I'm not sure it's worth the effort to do incremental revisions.  I think the volume of the article can be cut significantly without reducing information or clarity.  Actually, I think it would increase clarity.  I'm fishing for opinions on this act, and how I should go about it.  (eg, shall I post it on the discussion page before commiting it?) --—Daelin 13:11, 2 October 2005 (UTC)
replies: text: This is one of the more usefully informative voting article, to me anyways, just please preserve all the information. JeffBurdges 16:13, 27 November 2005 (UTC)

text: I support this; I stumbled across this article and found it difficulty to read.  This is compounded by all of the related articles containing very similar information (i.e. condorcet winner, condorcet criterion, Condorcet Approval Instant Runoff Voting, and probably others I've left out.)  They could easily be consolidated into a more concise article that would bring all of the information together.  As it stands there is a bit of overlap between them and it's confusing to follow. Peyna 03:57, 30 November 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  Proposing a rewrite 

message: What is generally considered the best "Condorcet like" method for ellecting multiple representatives?  If you need fewer winners than the Smith set provides, I guess you can use Schulze to trim it down until you get all ties or reach the desired number, and maybe use STV to go further if necissary.  But what if you need more representatives than the Smith set provides?  Seems like the computations of STV should be employed in a Condorcet-like way, no?  JeffBurdges 16:13, 27 November 2005 (UTC)
replies: text: I have just uploaded a paper about a proportional version of the Schulze method. (To understand the used terminology, you also have to read this paper.) Comments are welcome! Markus Schulze 15:55, 21 March 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Multi-winner 

message: Hey, if Instant Runoff Voting can be integrated into a Condorcet format somehow, can this please be added, per the merge vote at the discussion above? I'm not an expert on the subject, although I do find it fascinating.
:Many methods can be combined in various ways with Condorcet. I can't see any reason to mention IRV specifically. KVenzke 04:23, 6 December 2005 (UTC)
thread_title: [[Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/Condorcet Instant Runoff Voting]]

message: I strongly recommend that the defeat strength section should be moved from the Condorcet method article to the articles of the individual Condorcet methods. The consequences of the specific choice of the defeat strength measure simply depend too much on the used Condorcet method. Examples:
#MinMax(pairwise opposition) satisfies later-no-harm. However, this is not true for Schulze(pairwise opposition) or Ranked Pairs(pairwise opposition).
#When Ranked Pairs is being used, then pairwise opposition and winning votes are equivalent. However, this is not true for Schulze or MinMax.
#Schulze(winning votes) satisfies Woodall's CDTT criterion. However, this is not true for Ranked Pairs(winning votes) or MinMax(winning votes).
Therefore, I suggest that the defeat strength measures should be discussed only in connection with a concrete Condorcet method. Markus Schulze 00:42, 5 March 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: I disagree. Many Condorcet methods come with different variants depending on how defeat strength is assessed, so the concept itself is generic enough to talk about it on the equally generic Condorcet method article, as long as of course only universal statements are made here. Furthermore, no one is stopping you from expanding on it in the respective Condorcet methods. -- Dissident (Talk) 02:22, 5 March 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Defeat strength 

message: Dear Iota, you have added 4 uses of Nanson's method. However, if I understand McLean's paper correctly, then 3 of these 4 uses are out of date. Markus Schulze 09:05, 21 March 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: My bad. I was simply relying on the Nanson's method article. Tend to forget that Wikipedia can be unreliable sometimes. I've just corrected the out of date information in that article too. Iota 03:27, 23 March 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Nanson's method