Talk:Battle of the Atlantic

message: The article gives no real mention of the Azores air gap. We just have the agreement to base Allied aircraft there appearing in the article, with no explanation of the significance. References for "the other air gap, near the Azores" include Milner, Marc. Battle of the Atlantic (p. 124). The History Press. This is also explained by Mawdsley's War of the Seas. Yet the article does not explain the significance of this arrangement. Other sources also deal with this subject. It seems to be a significant failing of the article. ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 00:13, 11 November 2023 (UTC)
thread_title:  Azores air gap 

message: The article has no mention of the collaboration by French naval dockyard workers. (page numbers in following text are from Hellwinkel 2014, which is already used as a source in the article.) This was very important to the Kriegsmarine as there were limited numbers of German workers who could be moved to France to service German warships and submarines. The first French collaboration was the fitting out of fishing vessels for mine sweeping and harbour defenceinstalling rails for French depth charges and fitting various guns and machine guns, as well as using the ample supply of French Navy minesweeping equipment that had escaped demolition work.(p 34, ) The French Navy carried out some minesweeping activity (under the terms of the Armistice) in their Atlantic ports.(p 35) Most important, though, was the skilled dockyard workforce and the workshops that had not been destroyed.(p 40 - and other pages t.b.a.) That workforce was, by and large, back at their posts by 4 July 1940.(p 114) The German plans for staffing their Atlantic bases was, initially, totally unrealistic. For instance they requested 2,700 skilled shipyard workers to be sent from Germany. Yet the Wilhelmshaven naval shipyard only had a total workforce of around 4,000depleting those staff would bring shipbuilding and repair activity to a virtual standstill.(p 48) The gap was filled by the French naval dockyard workers who were a "willing workforce". Overall, without this French collaboration, the Battle of the Atlantic would have been very different.
The only balancing component of the story is the spying done by, for instance, Jean Philippon, a French Navy officer who provided important intelligence information to the Allies on German shipping movements. (Also Jacques Stosskopf who was executed by the Nazis for spying).(p. 183)
To justify this collaboration, the French dockyard workers had to support their families and otherwise had no way of earning a living.(p 152 and elsewhere)
As a postscript: For example, by February 1941 only 470 German shipyard workers had arrived at Brest, whilst the Naval Arsenal had 6,349 French workers.(p118) Though work on capital ships was generally done by Germans, French employees worked extensively on submarines and the smaller military vessels in the surface fleet. German Navy reports indicate that this was a willing workforce and that there were no incidences of sabotage. As well as working on ship repairs, the French provided a significant fire-fighting force to help negate the effect of Allied air raids. (postscript taken from Brest, France where it appears as a footnote.) ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 15:47, 11 November 2023 (UTC)
replies: text: Here is the link to the French Wikipedia article on Philippon  ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 19:49, 11 November 2023 (UTC)
thread_title:  Collaboration by French dockyard workers 

message: Eric Grove (2019) ‘The Battle of the Atlantic’: A legend deconstructed, The Mariner's Mirror, 105:3, 336-339, DOI: 10.1080/00253359.2019.1589123 may be a useful source. This noted maritime historian provides an overview of the whole subject and certainly presents a view which should be taken into account. ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 08:47, 30 November 2023 (UTC)
thread_title:  Useful source? 

message: The section Shipping and U-boat sinkings each month seems to assemble a small number of views based on Max Hastings and a somewhat outdated German perspective on what happened. Overall it constructs an argument that improved radar was the major component of Allied success. The graphs, in particular, are highly misleading.
Looking to a more recent source,(Overy, War for the Seas, 2019) we find a much more all-encompassing summary of the growth of Allied success. This could be summarised as a coming together of:
*Signals intelligence, but noting that this was not the "central causal factor" of success and that there were significant delays in Enigma decrypts at times.
*Operational research, particularly including civilian input.
*What is emphasised is "British sea/air forces and their highly trained crews and first-rate electronic equipment". This was made up of:
:*New additional escorts, including ships of better design as well as simply more ships.
:*Most of these ships now had centimetric radar.
:*HF/DF had become common on these anti-submarine warships. A number of sources shows how this equipment was integral to many actions.
:*Better talk to ship radios.
:*Intensive training of the crews of anti-submarine ships.
:*Long range aircraft equipped with centimetric radar. The shore based aircraft successes are particularly notable in January 1943 through May 1943.(pg 572)
Whilst centimetric radar is clearly part of the story, it is a very Dönitz-centred view that it is the explanation for the failure of the U-boat campaign. 
Re-writing of this section, together with removal of the graphs, would be a significant improvement of the article. ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 15:28, 6 April 2024 (UTC)
thread_title:  Section: Shipping and U-boat sinkings each month