Talk:Third man argument

message: There is mention that Aristotle's analysis of the issue is the source of the coined phrase "third man" but there is no reference to when he does so or what he says on the matter.  Seems a pretty glaring ommission.  128.239.45.99 (talk) 10:07, 19 December 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: I've added some. --Cyfal (talk) 21:00, 18 January 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: Hello Rosa Lichtenstein, maybe OUGL is Odegaard Undergraduate Library. Hello Jedibob5, I tried some modifications to make it clearer. If now it's understandable, please remove the cleanup-jargon-tag — if it's not: then I didn't managed it, sorry. --Cyfal (talk) 20:35, 18 January 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: It seems comprehensible enough to me, which means it would probably be comprehensible to your average person. Tag removed. Jedibob5 (talk) 02:53, 21 January 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: Fine, thank you. --Cyfal (talk) 16:49, 21 January 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: I still think this article is rather confusing and a tad technical. I think it should be accessible to those who are more or less new to philosophy... I broke the article down a little and added a brief summary of the argument at the beginning.  --j4vier  —Preceding undated comment was added at 11:44, 14 January 2009 (UTC)

text: In Wikipedia, there does not exist any "you" who is responsible for writing articles and also no "us" who are the readers. Just change the article yourself if you have a better solution, you are welcome. --Cyfal (talk) 14:02, 13 April 2009 (UTC)
thread_title:  Which work? 

message: Where does Aristotle make this argument?  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 147.126.10.40 (talk) 04:37, 29 November 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  References 

message: But in that case L1 partakes of L2, and by Non-Self-Partaking, L1 is not identical to L2. So there are at least two forms of largeness, L1 and L2. This already contradicts Uniqueness, according to which there is exactly one (and hence no more than one) form of largeness.
I have to disagree.
This is analogous to another problem in which the following two truths appear to be contradictory by the same token of limited accommodation cited above, namely...
1. We are each and every one of us unique; and
2. We are each and every one of us infinite.
So, how can one infinity become two unique infinities? A wise man said we'll have to wait until we remember our state of infinity (since our current state of forgetfulness is a mirage -- maya).
Taking a different approach...
L1 and L2 are archetypically unique allowing an infinite scope of variety within the boundaries defined by their uniqueness. We know largeness whenever we see it, but we can't predict what largeness will appear -- as any particular form -- since any prediction cannot take the infinite variety of forms of largeness into account within the boundaries of its particular definitive prediction (which can only be finite in its existence as a particular prediction among the infinite scope of possible predictions).
...he posits that if a man is a man because he partakes in the form of man, then a third form would be required to explain how man and the form of man are both man, and so on, ad infinitum.
Also, L1 partakes of L2, because both share infinity in common.
In other words, both L1 and L2 have a duo-existence of being infinite and finite at the same time (another apparent contradiction). This duo-existence allows for the ad-infinitum progression as a finite terminus to the successful conclusion to this line of reasoning. Thus, we're dealing with a subtext -- the aleph number designating a cardinality or size -- to the theory of infinite sets.
So...
As two unique expressions of the infinite possibility to the form of largeness:
L1 partakes of L2 >>> true.
...and...
L1 is not identical to L2 >>> true.
Vinyasi (talk) 01:51, 13 March 2014 (UTC)
thread_title:  The third man argument is too insubstantial of merit to retain the appearance of being, or becoming, a non-assailable truth.