Talk:Ontological argument/Archive 1

message: Here's the original text by Charlesdarwin:
:A fourth criticism is that the very definition of "God" is flawed.  One can imagine something greater than the God of any religion.  For example, the set of all possible worlds is certainly not the God of any religion, but it must be greater than any God, which can belong to only one world.
Technically, this criticism isn't a criticism of the ontological argument itself  but of the attempt to link the perfect being "God" with a "God of any religion".  A defender of the ontological argument would say that CharlesDarwin has only demonstrated that the conception of a God who rules only one world is incomplete, and that the God whose existence is supposedly demonstrated here is not bound to this limited conception.
I've pulled this text and replaced it with a rewritten text that talks about the fallacy of equivocation involved in moving from the perfect being to a particular conception of God.
Populus
I accept your version. --CD
One can conceive of a Superman with absolutely ALL of the attributes of perfection and EVERYTHING that is attributed to God including existence, but it would not be God; it would be your conceived Superman.  The ontological argument is nothing but words which don't prove the existence of this conceived Superman or of God.  --Ellis Elkins  http://ChristianThinkers.InJesus.com
It is impossible, even in principle, to distinguish between two absolutely identical things, so they are the same thing.  On the other hand, the conception of a thing is not identical to the thing itself.  Furthermore, one cannot actually conceive of anything greater (in any way) than the greatest thing one can conceive of.  So you are correct, the argument is invalid.  A Christian questioning Christian arguments.... Are you a scientist? Fairandbalanced 22:17, 5 Dec 2003 (UTC)
replies: text: I think that here disability or handicap should be substituted for "ability". Andres 17:02, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)
thread_title: Problematic fourth criticism

message: Someone check that Hebrew interwiki link, it's a bunch of question marks instead of characters. Alensha 23:29, 28 May 2005 (UTC)
replies: text: That's the way you have your browser set up, I'm afraid.  How you correct that will depend on the browser that you're using. Mel Etitis  (Μελ Ετητης) 09:39, 29 May 2005 (UTC)
replies: text: I can see Hebrew characters in my browser and several other Hebrew interwikis do work, but this seems to lead to an empty page... are you sure the interwiki of this article works? Alensha 13:08, 6 Jun 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  Hebrew interwiki 

message: If I logically prove that, say, unicorns have one horn, I'm really saying "if I imagine a unicorn, then it has one horn".  If you view the ontological argument in these terms, then it boils down to something like "in order for me to properly imagine God, I must imagine that he exists".  It proves that God has existence as a property, but that's not the same as existing.
I know I didn't just come up with this.  The formulation I've heard is "all Gods exist".  I have no reference, though. Ken Arromdee 20:51, 10 August 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  Objection 

message: Folks, I trust you are aware of the Wikipedia:Three-revert rule? Please take care. Banno 20:46, 12 January 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Wikipedia:Three-revert rule 

message: Much of this article is original research, without attribution of many of the various counter-arguments and analysis to anyone in particular.  These counter-arguments and analysis need to be cited or removed.  --  noosphere 19:47, 12 March 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Original research 

message: I can prove a unicorn has one horn.  That really means "If I imagine a unicorn, I must imagine that it has one horn".  For God, the argument proves "if I imagine a God, I must imagine that it exists".
God may exist in this sense (have existence as a property) without existing in the sense of being real.  And I know this isn't original with me.  Can anyone find a source for it? Ken Arromdee 19:05, 7 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Equivocation 

message: I deleted the following section.
:It can be argued that nonexistence is greater and more perfect than existence.  The elements of existence are asymmetric and interact because of their imperfections.  If they were perfect they would be static.  Nonexistence is boundless, timeless, omnipresent, simple, etc.  Existence is defined by its limitations.  Furthermore, for any number of things that exist, one can imagine twice as many that do not exist, or the set of all sets of them, etc.
First of all, the elements of existence are asymmetric?  According to who?  Things interact because of their imperfections?  What?  Does perfection have to be static?  I can conceive of a perfectly changing perfect thing, at least in the abstract.  Nonexistence is nothing by definition and can not be either timeless nor omnipresent nor simple, nor anything else for that matter.  Who defines existence by its limitations?  Existence can be infinite.  And I'm pretty sure one can not imagine anything that does not exist, as if you can imagine it it at least exists as an idea.  I know various philosophers have argued otherwise, but these conclusions need cites from reputable philosophers if they are to be reinserted. Roy Brumback 09:39, 27 August 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Problematic Section

message: One of the most important thing about Anselm, from a historical point of view, is not his proof, per se.  Rather, it is the way he used reason, or perhaps I should say, the way he understood the capacity of reason.
Note that in Proslogium Anselm repeatedly writes that something is better than something else.  In order for his to think that one thing is better than another, it must be true that he has a capacity to compare things.  Thus, when Anselm says that God is "a being than which nothing greater can be conceived," we can consider not only the content of the claim but the capacity implied in order to make such a claim.
In Anselm's way of seeing things, this comparative faculty is crucial.  It is, if I can use a simile, like a ladder: by comparing things, seeing one thing as better than another, one begins a process that ultimately leads toward God.  Since God can be thought of as the best, or the most perfect, the means by which we understand (this comparative faculty) is the means by which one understands both the world and God.
I do not have, at hand, a resource that affirms this to be true--but surely someone does.  And, surely, this is an important idea, as regards Anselm's argument.Dr. Davidson 04:34, 9 September 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Anselm and reason 

message: Recent addition by anon:
	 
(A being with all perfections) is equal to (a being that exists[A being that possess existance]).
: This is not true, unless you accept that I am a being with all perfections.  If what is being said is that "if a being has all perfections then that being exists", it is (arguably) true, but that's not what "is equal to" means.  
In a similar way, we can replace the variables with other nouns. This form works for things other than God. 
	 
(Rabbit) is equal to (a being with hair). 	 
(A being with hair) is equal to (a being that flies.) 	 
Therefore, (Rabbit) is equal to (a being that flies.) 	
 
The reason that the Rabbit example doesn't make sense is because you must accept all of the terms (A,B,and C) as true before the argument makes sense. 	
: This seems to be a confused expression of the difference between a valid argument and a sound one.  The example is not sound, but it is valid.  It isn't at all clear what "makes sense" means - "is sound", probably.
 	 
People usually accept the B and C parts of the Ontological argument with regards to God because it makes sense. 	
: Unlike this sentence.  "People usually accept" that a supremely perfect being must exist and therefore God exists?  Really?  Where's the proof? 
--ajn (talk) 21:36, 27 September 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  "Mathematical form" 

message: The idea of a sound argument is semantics, but I'm willing to accept your criticism.  The statement should probably say "is sound" rather than "makes sense."
The idea is that the Ontological argument is NOT sound.  The Mathematical Form is a criticism of the Ontological argument expressed through mathematical logic.
The final statement should probably go something more like "People who accept the Ontological argument probably except it because they are willing to accept that B and C are true, not because the argument itself is sound."
: It is your criticism of the ontological argument, and therefore original research.  Don't put it back into the article again.  --ajn (talk) 06:21, 28 September 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  "Response to Mathematical Form" 

message: The use of logic to justify belief in God is a reasonable act.  That God is justifiable by logic is an incorrect assumption.  I have never met anyone who could sustain an argument about proof of God's existence or non-existence.  That this page is not linked strongly to one entitled "Belief versus Objectivity" is harm to our children who may read this.
In my review of this article I found it biased towards BELIEF.
That BELIEF is ANTITHETICAL to SCIENCE should be obvious to a scientist .
That logic is not infallible has been proved by logic ("This statement is false."), but is besides the point of God's existence.
There is no room in an encyclopedia, a SCIENTIFIC endeavor, for BELIEF.
Xchanter 03:17, 20 October 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  This article appears to ignore the fundamental problems with this section