Talk:Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant

message: F*kin hell! These brits almost managed to level their island (and kill all fish in the north sea). If those 83 m3 of jice they had in the pool for months did condense due to ventillation, there would be a spontaneuos PU and U chain reaction sooner or later. Then Sellafield goes ka-boom and UK, Norway, Iceland are no more. The comparison with Mayak is no joke and most people still do not understand how bad Mayak was. The guys at Sellafield should face musketry, no less! - 12:52, 29 May 2005 195.70.32.136
:The investigation report  looked at the possibility of criticality, and concluded it was impossible with the LEU concentration of leaked liquor in this incident. But they weren't certain of that had it been 4% LEU, the max allowed in the safety case: "the likelihood of criticality would still be low." Also it wouldn't have gone boom, and because of the concrete shielding even nearby workers would have been within thier 5-year limit, well below any "deterministic health effect" or fatality risk. Rwendland (talk) 14:44, 16 December 2008 (UTC)
thread_title: Could pool have dried out?

message: The lines:
:"This is rather low considering the extreme negligence required to omit months of regular gauge checks and the sheer amount of radioactive material involved in the leak (160 kilograms of plutonium is enough to make 15-25 atomic bombs). As a worst-case possibility, the 2005 Sellafield incident could be compared to the 1957 nuclear disaster in the Soviet Union, where a chemical explosion at the Mayak fuel-processing plant sent similar amounts of radioactive material into the air,"
aren't supported by a cite and seem an unfair comparison.  I'll look around for some cites before making a change. Simesa 21:33, 22 September 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  POV? 

message: The source for the text I added:
 
:but these were later removed from the design for seismic uncoupling. However it appears this design change was not evaluated for fatigue, and it is inconceivable a proper review would have permitted this change.
is the board of enquiry report as reported in the "HOW A PIPE FAILED" section of the Nuclear Engineering International external link which says:
:However, when the safety case for the basis of design was produced, the vessels were seismically uncoupled from their steel frame. To accommodate this change, it is clear from visual evidence, said the board of enquiry report, that restraint blocks were not fitted and that some steelwork had been modified to provide additional space between the vessels and the steel frame. <P>It appears that the design intent was modified at some point after the original design, but before early commissioning. No evidence was found that the design was reviewed to consider fatigue following the modification. The board of enquiry found it ‘inconceivable’ that, had fatigue calculations been performed, it would have been thought acceptable to operate the vessels without lateral restraint.
So it is a POV, but from the most authoritative source! In fact my paraphrase reads less critical than the words used by the board of enquiry. -- Rwendland 00:01, 23 September 2005 (UTC)
replies: text: Good source, put it back in. Simesa 04:38, 23 September 2005 (UTC)
thread_title: Seismic uncoupling/proper review source

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thread_title:  External links modified