Talk:Evolutionarily stable strategy

message: If someone could add an example of an ESS to the page that would be great.  -Owen Jones 11:05, Sep 24, 2004 (UTC)
:This is still a major problem with the article.  An example in the opening paragraph would be ideal.  TitaniumDreads (talk) 19:03, 5 August 2013 (UTC)
thread_title: Comments

message: Moved from main article
:"As it turns out, every ESS corresponds to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, but (as illustrated in the above examples) not every pure strategy Nash equilibrium corresponds to an ESS."
I think this isn't true (mixed ESSs are definitely ESSs, and not pure Nash).  I'm wondering if there is a point here that I'm just not seeing.  "All ESSs are Nash equilibria, but not necessarily vice versa" is true, is this the original point, or was it something more subtle? Pete.Hurd 20:45, 10 October 2005 (UTC)
thread_title: ESS & Nash equil

message: User:Trialsanderrors tagged Bishop-Cannings theorem for merging into Evolutionarily stable strategy on June 24.  I seem to remember some discussion of the merits of this idea, but can't find it now.  I think the best argument in favor of merging is that BCt is very stubby and stands poorly on its own.  Arguments against are that, 1) if it were properly expanded (eg by incorporating the appropriate material from the external link on the BCt page) then it would e far longer than the ESS page. 2) The BCt applies equally to Nash equilibria as it does to ESS, and therefore putting it under ESS makes little sense (and neither does putting it under Nash equil, if only for historical reasons - it's always been discussed in terms of the ESS). Thoughts, comments? Pete.Hurd 17:46, 7 August 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: It does look like there is a lot to say.  I just skimmed the external link, so I don't know how much of that should be included in the article.  But if most of it could be, I would vote for keeping it as its own article.  In general, I don't mind keeping stubs around, so long as they can become longer.  But I don't really feel strongly about the matter.  --best, kevin [kzollman][talk] 18:07, 7 August 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: I'll check see what User:Trialsanderrors thinks, maybe he's got some persuasive argument I ought to hear. Pete.Hurd 01:45, 8 August 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Thanks for the heads-up, Pete. I'm ok with keeping if someone is willing to properly expand it, but as a stub it has only very limited legitimacy as a stand-alone article. I think the proper protocol would be to put it in the ESS article temporarily and see if it gets expanded. As soon as it has enough detail in the ESS article it can easily be turned back into a stand-alone article. My issue is mostly that the link in the game theory topics box creates the false impression that we have anything substantial to say about it. ~ trialsanderrors 02:01, 8 August 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Makes sense to me.  I wish I had time to expand the stub, but I don't, so I'll merge with the hope that it won't stay that way... Pete.Hurd 02:37, 8 August 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Merge Bishop-Cannings theorem?

message: *The lead devotes a paragraph to the history of this subject, but this is not mentioned further in the article. A "History" section would be a good addition, didn't somebody get a Nobel prize for some of this work?
*"It also allows for a natural definition of other concepts like a weak ESS or an evolutionarily stable set" Unfortunately if there are no articles on these terms, they will have to be defined in the text.
*The example could be improved by connecting it to a real-life situation.
*I've tried to rewrite the section on "ESS vs. Evolutionarily Stable State" but am still not really sure what this section intends to do. Is it just to define two commonly-confused terms? It isn't very clear and I may not have improved it much by tinkering! :)
::Hope this helps, Tim Vickers 16:04, 15 July 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Suggestions

message: We should add a sentence to the lead about the history.  I wrote this, but realized I don't really know what the proper names for all of the biology fields are.  Can you fix it up, Pete?
:First developed in 1973, the ESS has come to be widely used in behavioural ecology and economics, and has been used in evolutionary psychology, philosophy, and political science.
Thanks --best, kevin [kzollman][talk] 03:38, 27 August 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Looks fine to me, perhaps I'd have left EP out, considered it a subset of Behav. Ecol., but I see no need for tweaks. Pete.Hurd 18:08, 27 August 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Sentence for the lead 

message: Hey Kevin, I don't quite get this sentence: "While technically a constraint on strategies, the ESS concept is often interpreted as an equilibrium refinement of the Nash equilibrium" Pete.Hurd 01:02, 7 September 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: I've been toying with how to express this idea.  The ESS is a property of individual strategies, that is, a strategy satisfies MS's definition or not.  A Nash equilibrium is a property of strategy sets (specifications of strategies for each player).  It is natural to extend the concept of ESS to be about strategy sets (i.e. a strategy set is an strategy-set-ess if and only if every strategy in that set is an ESS) formally the ESS is not about strategy sets.  Since ESS is about strategies and NE about strategy sets, ESS (as defined by MS) doesn't refine the NE, only the extension does.  Maybe this is a stupid technical point, that isn't worth mentioning... --best, kevin [kzollman][talk] 19:50, 7 September 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Hmmm, right, now I know exactly what you mean. Nash equilibria are traditionally thought of as strategy profiles (with the implication that these consist of two different roles), whereas ESSes are traditionally thought of as single strategies since biological problems have a strong tradition of using symmetric games(* some exceptions apply, see below).  ESSes get applied to asymmetric games all the time, sometimes by Seltenizing the game (and making strategies specify which move to make when playing either strategy, and forcing the m*n game to become (m×n)*(m×n) symmetric), or simply explicitly applying the ESS conditions to an asymmetric strategy profile solution (I'm pretty sure I used such a definition in one of my papersnope, not in the published version, at least).  It used to bother me when I heard people parroting the definition of an ESS as "a strategy which is the best when played against itself" because such a definition obviously can't be applied to signalling games (where ESSes get spoken of a lot).  I see what you mean, and I can almost certainly dig up published exceptions, but either way I don't think it's going to pay it's rent living in the lead section. Pete.Hurd 20:37, 7 September 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Yeah, I don't know why I put it there.  I must have been feeling overly pedantic that day... --best, kevin [kzollman][talk] 22:04, 7 September 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Well, if there's an appropriate place to go when feeling overly pedantic, it's just gotta be wikipedia! Pete.Hurd 03:04, 8 September 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  interpreted as an equilibrium refinement 

message: I get the feeling that this section is using the PD to illustrate a larger point, that the topic at hand isn't necessarily the PD.  I'm inclined to chop it out... Thoughts? Pete.Hurd 22:46, 13 September 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  "Prisoner's dilemma and ESS" 

message: Is there somewhere on wikipedia where we talk about Hamilton's sex ratio model?  I noticed someone asked about it recently at WP:RD/S, but every article they were referred to failed to mention the underlying theory.  We used to talk about it here, but it's been removed.  There really isn't much mention at sex ratio.  Is it somewhere I'm missing?  Perhaps we should put it back here or at sex ratio.  --best, kevin [kzollman][talk] 21:14, 28 October 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: No, not that I can find right now.  The closest article to do that seems to be Bateman's principle, which I keep meaning to fix, but the original Bateman article isn't on-line, and I'm lazy... good intentions, bad habits...  Ummm, Parental investment and Sex allocation need work too.  An article on Sex ratio evolution linking all of these together with Trivers-Willard hypothesis etc., would be a Very Good Thing. Pete.Hurd 23:01, 28 October 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  sex ratio redux 

message: I think Dawkins was probably trying to be provocative when he said that "evolutionary" was a "common grammatical error." It is only a grammatical mistake if you hyphenate the two modifiers into a compound modifier (i.e., it is a mistake to use "evolutionary-stable strategy"). As is, "evolutionary stable strategy" means an "evolutionary strategy" (which defines the kind of game being played) and a "stable strategy" (which defines the equilibrium). The space between the two terms just indicates that the order of the adjectives cannot be reversed. Arguably, the order can be reversed, and the term could be accepted as "evolutionary, stable strategy", but then that allows for "stable, evolutionary strategy" which is inconsistent with the acronym ESS. Regardless, the two modifiers are both adjectives that modify "strategy", and that is perfectly OK. Consult Wikipedia's own WP:MOS for more information about modifiers and hyphenation. Furthermore, "evolutionarily stable strategy" is arguably the bigger grammatical mistake because "evolutionarily" isn't a word in many dictionaries. Consequently, I'm removing comments about grammar from main document. —TedPavlic (talk/contrib/@) 19:03, 1 July 2011 (UTC)
thread_title:  Revisiting the grammar question 

message: I'm failing to find a description of "polymorphic equilibrium". I strongly suspect such a description belongs here?Cretog8 (talk) 04:49, 30 April 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Polymorphic equilibrium 

message: I have not cited a reference for this statement, and in the strictest sense it may be called original research. But it appears to me as a self-evident mathematical fact. Please provide comments.
Geeteshgadkari (talk) 06:16, 19 June 2009 (UTC)
thread_title:  Prisoner's Dilemma and ESS 

message: Dr. Schlag has reviewed this Wikipedia page, and provided us with the following comments to improve its quality:
We hope Wikipedians on this talk page can take advantage of these comments and improve the quality of the article accordingly.
Dr. Schlag has published scholarly research which seems to be relevant to this Wikipedia article:
*Reference : Sjaak Hurkens & Karl H. Schlag, 1999. "Communication, coordination and efficiency in evolutionary one-population models," Economics Working Papers 387, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
ExpertIdeasBot (talk) 18:58, 27 June 2016 (UTC)
thread_title:  Dr. Schlag's comment on this article 

message: Dr. Heller has reviewed this Wikipedia page, and provided us with the following comments to improve its quality:
We hope Wikipedians on this talk page can take advantage of these comments and improve the quality of the article accordingly.
We believe Dr. Heller has expertise on the topic of this article, since he has published relevant scholarly research:
*Reference : Heller, Yuval, 2013. "Language, Meaning, and Games: Comment," MPRA Paper 49375, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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thread_title:  Dr. Heller's comment on this article 

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