Talk:Western Airlines Flight 2605

message: The article doesn't mention how many of the fatalities were crew; I presume from the description that all three pilots perished. Might be good to add that detail.  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2601:186:4500:26FF:C1E0:69E9:B72B:2DC8 (talk) 01:08, 3 May 2022 (UTC)
thread_title: Crew?

message: 'Your other left stupid.'
- the eternal DI
Western was founded by a guy who flew for the RAF in WWI.
Mark Lincoln (talk) 00:45, 2 February 2010 (UTC)
thread_title: Untitled

message: The Spanish language page of Wikipedia cites the other runway, not 23L.
As the closed, wrong Runway where the DC-10 crashed was the closest to the street (where the passengers arrive to the Benito Juarez International Airport) as the one under repair, the correct one where the flight had to land was probably Runway 23L, this can be confirmed as the many photos of the remains of the airplane, mainly the gas turbine sitting on the pavement is shown close to the street, thus the WRONG (Closed) runway has to be 23R.
It has been said that the crew was in a strong disagreement, and that the pilot continued the landing in spite of first officer strong disagreement.  This behaviour was a contributing cause of the accident, but is completely ignored in the article.  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 192.100.180.19 (talk) 01:38, 17 November 2011 (UTC)
thread_title: Wrong Information?

message: - section created by SquisherDa (talk) at 10:16, 24 October 2019 (UTC)
thread_title:   Flying the cleared approach?  

message: - section created (unsigned contribution) by  at 17:40, 24 November 2019
This section states that the pilot saw the dump truck and then exclaimed  "..Jesus Christ". Do we know this is correct? The CVR recording has a violent crashing sound which could be the initial collision with the dump truck and immediately following this is pilot Charles Gilbert's exclamation of "Jesus Christ" and a complete change of intensity in the cockpit. The sound and tone of his exclamation is one of complete shock.  or profound horror - perhaps with a terrible awareness of the fate of the plane. 9 seconds later the CVR ends, or at least what is available on youtube ends. Presumably this is the point of destruction of the plane.    - paragraph added at 17:40 + amended at 17:43 and 17:46, 24 November (unsigned contributions) by , and 23:37, 30 November  (unsigned contribution) by , and 01:17 and  03:22, 1 December 2019 (unsigned contributions) by 
Would touching down (2 g) on the left wheels have elicited such an ominous outcry? Maybe if the pilot saw obstructions ahead. Things moved very quickly. Pilot Gilbert got on the power (100%) before the impact with the truck and after Reichel calmly called to go around after everyone agreed they were at 23L. (Did they know where they were more specifically?) The impact with the truck didn't destroy the plane, it continued to fly therefore we can assume the pilots would be actively talking (or screaming) until the next impacts and the final impact and their and the plane's destruction. Most reports I've read seem to state that Pilot Gilbert saw the truck. I don't know how this can be verified but perhaps it is correct.    - paragraph split at 01:17, 1 December 2019 (unsigned contribution) by 
Reading the "Jumpseat: A Tale of Twisted Fate" book from surviving flight attendant Eduardo Valenciana - he wrote of a violent impact and then a dramatic attempt at a climb with full power - note, not two impacts but one. However, this could very well have been the initial touchdown. The plane then quickly hit the truck, the electric pole, the excavator cab and finally the building. (?)    - paragraph added (unsigned contribution) by  at 23:37, 30 November + amended (unsigned contribution) by  at 01:33, 1 December 2019
In order to have a satisfactory answer to this question the first crashing sound in the cockpit needs to be definitively either the touchdown of the left wheels or a collision with the truck. As a lay person with a recent fascination with this crash, I'm assuming this was the truck collision by the noises on the CVR. But this may already have long been determined to be the left wheel touchdown - but I haven't read a report specifically stating this yet. Making things even more confusing the recorder was apparently pierced and an erase mechanism was reported to have been briefly actuated. So the CVR may in fact be missing details. To be continued..    - paragraph added at 01:17, 1 December 2019 (unsigned contribution) by 
:The report published by the International Civil Aviation Organization states that "On the transcription of the cockpit  voice  recorder the pilot-in-command is heard to have said that he was on the flight path to Runway 23 Left, just before the left landing gear wheels touched down on the grass to the left of Runway 23 Left and the right landing gear wheels on the runway shoulder." The report also states "After covering 224 m and again airborne, the aircraft's right landing gear collided with a truck" and that the CVR and FDR "sustained some damage during the accident, but the  tapes were in good condition and provided the required information". 
:Therefore the sequence of events would be as follows: The Capt. states "No, this is the approach to the goddamned left" - The main landing gear touches down - The First officer states "Yeah, climb to 8,500" as he applies power for a go around - The aircraft becomes airborne - The aircraft's right landing gear collides with the loaded truck - The aircraft remains airborne, the Capt. states "Oh Jesus Christ!", the aircraft crashes to the ground approximately 13 seconds after impact with truck. We also can see that approximately 3.3 seconds passed between touchdown and collision with truck. 
:I will work on making changes to Accident details section in my sandbox and post it here when done. - Samf4u (talk)  20:13, 4 December 2019 (UTC)
replies: text: My proposed changes to the article may be viewed at User:Samf4u/sandbox4. If nobody objects I'll make the changes in five days time. - Samf4u (talk)  22:33, 4 December 2019 (UTC)
thread_title:   Accident details  

message: - section created at 22:08, 25 December 2019 (unsigned contribution) by  
A world wide price increase in oil occurred in 1979 mostly because of reduced supply as a result of the Iranian revolution that doubled the price of crude oil.  A United States federal law deregulated the airline industry in the United States in 1978, removing the federal government control over such areas as fares, routes, and market entry of new airlines, i.e the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. In less than 10 years Western Airlines would no longer exist. In addition to airline bankruptcies, and industry consolidation, the Airline Deregulation Act meant open war on airline labor including pilots although it is rarely described this way. 
Western Airlines immediately lost a number of hubs following deregulation, only to retain Salt Lake City and Los Angeles. Most of the public is or was under the impression that safety would never be negatively impacted by sweeping "free market" legislation. No matter how cut throat, abusive, tyrannical or destructive corporations and finance would be to other aspects of flying the public had to be told the Government would never ever compromise on safety. A few years later the public would be told an Air Florida 737 that crashed into a DC bridge was mostly because the pilots weren't from "the North". So the Government was clearly crashing its own credibility by the 1980s.    - paragraph amended at 23:09, 25 December 2019 (unsigned contribution) by 
What responsibility did Western management have for the crash of 2605?  Was it likely that they didn't have the resources to take safety in to account?  Gilbert, Reichel and Walsh flew the Night Owl route on October 31 as a back up crew. Reichel was described as tired or unfit and he said so at one point in the cockpit. Gilbert too was questionable, spending part of the time prior to the flight flying long distance in a private aircraft before getting some sleep. Walsh's preparedness was unknown. Interestingly Gilbert had specified he didn't want to fly with Reichel and Walsh but was apparently told to fly with them anyway for one last time which of course turned out to be the last time he would ever fly.  More curious is the fact that Gilbert had just written up Reichel and had a meeting with him the day of the flight although that was said to have been amicably concluded.  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 173.120.246.108 (talk) 22:08, 25 December 2019 (UTC)
thread_title:  Western Airlines flies out of the 1970s  

message: A well known problem is the potential for erroneous glideslope and/or localizer indications caused by movement of aircraft or equipment through ILS critical areas. By using the words well known problem, this means historically in the time period of the accident, but also today in 2020, especially when not hand flying in planes more advanced and more automated than the DC-10-10 that Gilbert was hand flying in 1979. 
"There is also the possibility that the ILS signal could have been unstable due
to heavy construction in progress, which may have induced the Captain to vary
the flight path in reaction to the unstable localizer course." - Aeronautical Decision Making Cockpit Resource Management
Flight 2605 didn't just land on the wrong runway, it landed in the grass to the left of the runway and the ILS system could be why because no one was watching data gauges (dials?) that would have shown the ILS inaccuracy. It should be mentioned (perhaps in the main article) that if 2605 had somehow landed "properly" on the "wrong" runway 23L, the accident probably wouldn't have happened. Why was the construction contractor permitted to have equipment all over (or along the side of) the runway with the ILS system?
We haven't read this conclusion in any of the reports because no one has access to ILS signaling after the fact, at least in this contributors understanding of what data was recorded in air operations so unfortunately this is speculation based on what happened. More importantly pilot errors occured. Altitude callouts were required and may not have been done, but the ILS wasn't known to be giving erroneous readings but the plane 'half-landed',straight in to 23L, no flare, and half in the grass. 
Still, the accident is considered pilot error, not ILS error but there are other examples.  Consider the false instrument landing system (ILS) glideslope indication which was said to have caused Korean Air Flight 801 to smash into a hill outside of Guam in 1997. Pilot error but more directly false ILS signal phenomenon. In that accident investigators warned of the danger of trusting ILS signals without checking raw height/distance data. (But the pilots did anyway, probably as they did far more often that didn't end in some kind of horrific hull loss, and perhaps as Gilbert was doing in '79. ) This accident, incidentally, occured 18 years after the crash of 2605 which investigators also pointed out altitude callouts, and fatigue. The ICAO report does not mention the ILS as any possible contributor.
Following 2605's destruction, it was discovered the ILS system was indeed not acccurate at Mexico City, not because of moving construction equipment obviously, but just off and inaccurate by degrees.  The system was apparently adjusted soon after with help from US authorities, this around the same time the US assisted with producing explicit instructions on the "side step" manouver for Mexico presumably so pilot error won't cause another accident but also (less cynically stated) to make airtravel safer - will need to find sources for this.  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 173.120.156.105 (talk) 22:49, 11 January 2020 (UTC)
thread_title:  The Instrument Landing System on 23L 

message: Engineers blamed the design of hydraulic lines in the DC-10 as a contributing factor to the deadly March 3, 1974 Turkish Airlines DC-10 crash caused primarily by a cargo door failure and the subsequent violent decompression. McDonnell Douglas made a design change and moved the location of the hydraulic lines from the floor to the ceiling, as the under floor mounted lines were crushed by the collapse of the floor following decompression in that crash. (Ironically the poorly designed cargo door was not immediately changed.)
The May 25, 1979 American Airlines DC-10 crash involved the separation of the left engine from the left wing and the shredding of hydraulic lines with it. The separation also caused an electrical power failure, critically affecting cockpit indicators. A key result of the engine detachment and hydraulic failure was the atypical slat retraction of the DC-10 in these circumstances. 
Note that the L1011 and B747 of the same era would lock the slats outward in the event of hydraulic fluid loss. Those locks prevent an unbalanced aerodynamic condition in which one wing has more lift than the other. 
A July 19th, 1989 United DC-10 crash was caused by an engine failure which damaged the hydraulic system and reduced control to a point that the pilots could utilize only engine power to prepare the aircraft for an emergency landing. McDonnell Douglas made three more hydraulic system design changes following this accident.  
Gilbert probably screamed "Oh Jesus Christ....turn left!" after the truck collision. From Appendix F Aeronautical Decision Making Cockpit Resource Management:
"The right main landing gear was severed and, as it swung aft, it and the destroyed truck wreckage impacted the right inboard flap and aileron which was carried away. This wreckage continued aft, tearing away all
but 18 inches of the right horizontal stabilizer, along with the right inboard and outboard elevators. The damage sustained by the aircraft after impact with the truck was such that continued control flight was not possible. The aircraft continued flying just clear of the ground near taxiway Alpha."  
Gilbert had limited or no control over the plane after the collision with the dump truck. One wing clearly had more lift than the other.  The right wing obviously was damaged. The hydraulic system may have been destroyed. This would certainly result in limited to no control over the aircraft. Can we correlate these similarities to previous and future accidents at that time of the DC-10? 
Flight 2605's "hydraulic systems" - as far as this contributor is aware - are not discussed in any crash analysis or publication. 
The DC-10 included no cable backup for the hydraulic-powered flight controls because it was considered nearly impossible for three hydraulic systems to fail during one flight. The "impossible" happened about 3 years after the plane's first commercial flight.  
https://www.upi.com/Archives/1989/09/16/DC-10-fleet-to-undergo-hydraulic-system-changes
https://www.designnews.com/aerospace/designed-disaster-dc-10-airliner-part-4
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1979/08/04/engineer-balks-at-changes-in-critical-dc10-systems
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McDonnell_Douglas_DC-10
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a205115.pdf  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 173.153.142.87 (talk) 00:18, 18 January 2020 (UTC)
thread_title:  DC-10 Hydraulics  

message: I have made some edits to the CVR transcript as it was not written in line with WP:TONE, and seems to be based largely on two YouTube videos rather than an actual written transcript released by the NTSB.
However, I also question the necessity of including the transcript at all. It seems to have been included out of sheer morbid fascination, given that it is a recording of the cockpit crew dying.
If the transcript truly has encyclopedic relevance, then it should be left in, albeit based on an official transcript rather than a lurid YouTube video; if it does not, it should be taken out, as it is not notable for any reason other than morbid curiosity, and I'm not sure Wikipedia is the place to go for that. Editor510 drop us a line, mate 11:31, 1 December 2023 (UTC)
thread_title: Is the CVR transcript actually necessary?