Talk:Battle of Midway/Archive 1

message: __TOC__
(part one of the Japanese plan having been successful just six months earlier at Pearl Harbor)
This is misleading, as it makes Midway seem like part of a one-two punch, along with Pearl Harbor.  The reality is, the Japanese failed to destroy the American carrier fleet at Pearl Harbor (and more generally, to neutralize American naval power in the Pacific), and because of this failure they had to come back and try again.
The attack on Midway was part one of a much larger plan.  Part two was the invasion and conquest of Hawaii.  The Japanese carriers were sailing ahead of troop transports filled with (I believe) 100,000 Japanese troops.  They were all expecting to be landing on Hawaii very soon, once the US carriers were out of the way and the islands defenceless.  This is all in Walter Lord's masterful book Incredible Victory, but it is surprisingly absent in almost every account of the Battle of Midway you will see (including ours - I'd do something about this but I don't have handy  Lord's book or anything equivalent to reference). -- user:TimShell - 10 Aug 2004
:Well, no. IJA didn't have the manpower or shipping to take & occupy, let alone supply, Hawaii. It was a persistent fantasy of Yamamoto's. See Hawaii under the Rising Sun, for instance.  Trekphiler 14:59, 12 December 2005 (UTC)

message: It is today's feature artcle and is being constantly vandalised. Could we get a lock please? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 199.172.246.196 (talk • contribs) 
See Talk:Battle of Midway#Page has been vandalised below. DrKiernan 11:53, 7 June 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Lock the page?

message: There is an error in the third paragraph of the section entitled
"Before the Battle".  In this paragraph, it states that Yamomoto
was on board the Yamata in the southern Aleutians.  This last bit
is clearly in error, because the Yamata and the rest of the main
battle group with Yamomoto was located several hundred miles to
the west of Midway.  This reference to the southern Aleutians
should be corrected.
Yamato.--131.238.92.62 09:45, 17 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Error in "Before the Battle" section. 

message: I removed this paragraph:
:An example of the difference in fighting orders between the American and Japanese navies was evident in that while Admirals Fletcher and Spruance commanded their groups from the carriers, Admiral Yamamoto was safe, impregnable - and impotent - on the heavily armored deck of Yamato, hundreds of miles away in the southern Aleutians. Fletcher and Spruance changed their battle plans on the fly (especially when the loss of Yorktown cost Fletcher his flagship and placed full command of the mission on Spruance, whose flag was in Enterprise), while Yamamoto was locked into his. The fluidity of carrier battle in the Pacific in 1942 favored the Americans and their on-the-scene command style.
This seems rather biased to me. (1) The Japanese were in fact able to change their plans during the battle (preparing to make second strike on Midway, for example). (2) The on-the-scene command style almost led to disaster for the Americans at Leyte Gulf. (3) The Japanese counterpart to Fletcher and Spruance was surely Nagumo (present at the battle), not Yamamoto. Please comment. Gdr 12:21, 2004 Nov 8 (UTC)
::Shows the hazards of amateur analysis. If there's a historian Foo who says this, then it's a "according to Foo, ..." and we can take it as one of several intrepretations. There are plenty of authorities whose analyses we can (and should) quote, shouldn't be inventing our own. Stan 16:21, 8 Nov 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: It's half right. Yamamoto was out of touch of his lead elements because he didn't dare compromise radio silence. Nimitz could & did keep Fletcher (SOPA) in the pic from HI, as Yamamoto should have been doing. Nagumo's "on the fly" decision was based on bad intel, the product of Yamamoto's incompetent starting dispositions: all the cruiser scout planes were covering his heavies, denying their eyes to Nagumo, who desperately needed them--which is precisely why he got caught with birds on deck.  Trekphiler 12:46, 12 December 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  Difference in fighting orders 

message: Quoted from article:
Having scored a decisive victory, American forces retired. The loss of four carriers stopped the expansion of the Japanese Empire in the Pacific, and put Japan on the defensive. It had been six months to the day since the attack on Pearl Harbor. Admiral Yamamoto had predicted to his superiors that Japan would prevail for only six months to a year against the United States, after which American resources would begin to overwhelm the Japanese Navy. He had been exactly correct. This was good.
I'm removing the comment emphasised. This is as non-neutral as it gets. nihil 20:14, 25 Apr 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  POV 

message: A new section on Midways's overall impact.
Sparten
:I just did some copyediting on this interesting new section.  I can't claim to be a great expert on this battle, so I have to wonder if perhaps much of this is your own original analysis?  If so, then regardless of how insightful it might be, it's contrary to official policy and needs to go.  Could you possibly provide a reference? Csernica 05:44, 8 Jun 2005 (UTC)
replies: text: Excellent.  Thank you. Csernica 06:36, 8 Jun 2005 (UTC)
replies: text: Nonsense. If that's your source, you need to redefine what you call history. Cowley is a collection of counterfactuals. And Cook's is fantastic, not accurate. I've read it.  Trekphiler 15:05, 12 December 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  Impact on War 

message: Could they have mounted a successful assault against the Hawaiian Islands? It took them four months to beat a polygot American infantry division in the Phillipenes, without adequate supply.
I edited the final paragraphs, because I don't feel comfortable about the inclusion of long term strategic hypotheticals. They are also factually inaccurate, since the IJA had no plans to invade Hawaii should the Midway operation had succeeded; also, the US Navy had two additional carriers in the Pacific, not one, and another one operating in the Atlantic--the USS Ranger--which would have certainly been transferred to the pacific had the Americans lost catastrophically at Midway.
Please read the book I reffered to. The Japanese did have plans to invade Hawaii, if they won Midway. Yamamoto's aide was the man responsible for planning. In anycase the Americans would have given up Hawaii as a bad job, at least for the time being.  USS Ranger was too small. Yamamoto had planned that to win the war, they would have to capture Hawaii and destroy Panama. 
Finally 
Remember the Part about "No original research?."
I am trying to keep this discussion real, not an exercise in counterfact which ignores the logistical difficulties the Japanese army and Navy suffered under.
I recommend the book "Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan" by Mitsuo Fuchida & Masatake Okumiya. It is an in-depth discussion of the battle, its plans and objectives by two Japanese naval aviators who were privy to the plans and personalities involved. They mention nothing about a hawaiian invasion. 
I also recommend that you look at the US Army order of battle for the hawaiian islands in August, 1942.
:Fuchida & Okumiya let Yamamoto off the hook & hang Scout 4, per the Japanese line; I had a history prof parroting it. Not unbiased. See Wilmott (cited in the article & below).  Trekphiler 15:09, 12 December 2005 (UTC)
replies: text: Fuchida's "Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan" is terribly flawed. According to recent research ("Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway", Parshall & Tully, 2005), it is full of outright lies and half-truths. Among the most glaring "inaccuracies" is the bit about the "fateful five minutes": Fuchida says all four carriers had a strike spotted, on deck and ready to take off. The first couple of fighters take off, and then the carriers get hit by dive-bombers, when five minutes could have changed history. The truth is that none of the carriers had anything on deck except a few CAP fighters taking off or landing. They were at least 45 minutes from getting a strike off. There are numerous other falsehoods and distortions carefully dissected by Parshall & Tully.--Shyland 22:43, 27 October 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: It didn't make any difference. Fletcher's strike birds were already on the way. Nagumo had to hit him before he launched to win.  Trekphiler 10:01, 27 March 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Questionable conclusions. 

message: I made a pass through the Battle section, fixing various inaccuracies. This could still use some more editing; I have a lot more respect for historical writers now!
I also edited out the conclusions about Hawaii being abandoned, the Panama canal being closed, the Manhattan project being shelved, and the Pacific campaign being stopped all due to the hypothetical Japanese victory... Sheer idiocy. Japan didn't have the oil or fleet oilers to do much of anything, OK? Japan trying to take and hold Hawaii (with what army???) would have ended the war quicker, given the relative logistics advantages the US enjoyed there.
:I used to think it was that simple, too. I've seen extensive debate in a newsgroup suggesting it wasn't. Could IJA have taken HI? In their dreams. Would it have been a bonanza for the U.S. if they had? Probably not. Would the war have been longer? Maybe. (That's "original research" territory.)  Trekphiler 15:12, 12 December 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  Various Edits 

message: From the "orphaned" references and purple prose, and from the way that sections have been placed without regard to existing text, it would seem that much of this article has been lifted from other sources without attribution.  I agree with the previous poster that it needs work, which I've done; but more is needed.  Others, please lend a hand.  This should be just as well done as the Pearl Harbor article.<BR> — J M Rice 06:12, 15 August 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  I smell plagiarism 

message: I removed the line about Yamamoto's attack plan being bold and ingenious. He divided his forces in a failed diversionary attempt, and thus lost the battle. It couldn't have been that ingenious.
:Well, theoretically it was ingenious.  An ingenious plan can still fail.  With luck Yamamoto's might have succeeded.  If you happened to agree with this POV, I bet you'd have left it alone. ;-)
:Anyway, the kind of editorializing you've flagged again suggests that the article was lifted from another source without attribution.  From all the descriptive language, sounds like it came from a popular history. — J M Rice 22:18, 15 August 2005 (UTC)
replies: text: Theoretically it was ingenious. Factually, it was overcomplicated & stupid. The dispositions were plain wrong, & success didn't depend on luck, it depended (as it often did in IJN planning) on the U.S. doing exactly what was expected. If anything else (such as IJN submarines being late because Yamamoto was in an infernal hurry, & so missing the sorite of U.S. carriers) happened, the plan falls apart. It did. See Wilmott, Barrier & the Javelin.  Trekphiler 12:53, 12 December 2005 (UTC)
replies: text: How about "not stupid"? Yamamoto, per doctrine, led with his carriers & held his heavies back, heavies which were better for destroying island installations & would have been next to immune to U.S. air attack from Midway. Leave Nagumo's CVs for roving & air cover, hammer the island for a day or so, then walk ashore. Or, better still, invade Fiji & Samoa, cut LOC to Oz, & get MacArthur relegated to PR duty in Canberra & USN submarines withdrawn to Pearl. Both will hasten Japan's defeat...but Yamamoto couldn't know that.  Trekphiler 13:05, 15 February 2007 (UTC)

text: Yamamoto kept the heavies back & led with his carriers (scouts), per doctrine. (Nobody I've read suggests BBs screen CVs.) Had he put his battleships in front, he could have pounded Midway's installations with little risk from air attack, leaving Nagumo to rove & cover him. With all the cruisers' VSs (denied Nagumo in the event), he'd also have found Fletcher in time to strike before Fletcher's birds turned his carriers into funeral pyres.  Trekphiler 23:46, 16 February 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  POV. 

message: I rewrote the intel section. Jasper's plan didn't call for a message en clair (tho it's often rendered as such) but in a compromised cypher (probably 1 captured at Wake).  Trekphiler 12:55, 12 December 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  Hypo 

message: I rewrote this:
:"full command of the battle—and ultimate credit for its victory—passed from Admiral Fletcher, into the hands of Admiral Spruance." 
Fletcher was still senior officer; credit was still his. Afterward, when described as "victor at Midway", Spruance by tradition (& to his eternal credit) denied it, granting the honor to Fletcher.  Trekphiler 14:33, 12 December 2005 (UTC)
replies: text: "With a life-time record (6-months) of sinking six enemy carriers for the loss of two, and done with the remnants of a depression error fleet while outnumber 10 to four, makes Fletcher the greatest admiral of the 20th Century." In your dreams. Fletcher had no guts, or he wouldn't have run away at Guadalcanal. You don't make a career on 1 battle. Spruance got it right at Midway & again at Saipan (?); had he been at Leyte instead of Halsey, he'd have destroyed Mikawa & Ozawa & won the greatest naval victory in history (until "DS9", anyhow).  Trekphiler 01:35, 30 March 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Error 

message: There's a new book that's just come out called "Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway" that basically says we've got the history of it all wrong: The US did not triumph against overwhelming odds, the Aleutians Operation was not a diversion, the Japanese airplanes were not sitting on deck loaded with fuel and bombs, and Japan's aviators were not wiped out during the battle.  Apologies if this sounds like a teaser or like spam, but I got the book for Christmas and it appears to be very-well researched (It focuses more on Japanese carrier doctrine and flight logs than on memoirs to reach its conclusions).  I'd put more down but I've got several projects going already, but I thought you all should know. Palm_Dogg 01:06, 29 December 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  New Research 

message: The strength field in the infobox should probably list the number of planes deployed by both sides. Fornadan (t) 14:37, 12 February 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Infobox 

message: I'm likely to make some corrections to the main page based on Tony Tully and my research for "Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway."  I'll try not to be too heavy-handed or oaf-like!  ;-)
-jon parshall-
*JP, be as heavy-handed as you like.  I was going to do the same thing eventually.  BTW, am a big fan of your book and website.  If you're thinking of doing some serious editing, I'd suggest that you only use Shattered Sword as a reference for the new research and stick to other works like Incredible Victory or The Nagumo Report just for variety in the bibliography.  Are you and Tully ever getting out to Washington DC? Palm_Dogg 18:16, 14 February 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Shattered Sword 

message: 2.24.2006
I have reverted to an earlier version of my description of the aviator losses.  The notion that Midway's aviator losses somehow represented a "year's worth" of "pilots" for the Japanese is utterly fallacious.  Now, it *is* true that pre-war Japanese pilot training programs had only cranked out a few hundred *pilots* (as distinct from "aviators", which are pilots, navigator/observer, and any other aircrew), but even by the time of Midway that picture was changing radically.  The Japanese had already instituted the "ko" and "otsu" supplemental training classes for high school students, and were gearing up their mainline programs as well.  Remember, Japan lost *50,000* aircraft during the course of the war, the majority of which were manned at the time of their loss.  Granted, the late-war pilots weren't very good, but the point is that the Japanese were eventually able to address their pilot production issues, and actually cranked out a lot of pilots (not to mention aviators in general).  That process was already underway by the time of Midway.  Thus, applying a pre-war statistic for *pilot* losses to the *aviator* losses at Midway is misleading in two different dimensions, and must be corrected.
-jon parshall-
*JP.  Going to spare you some future agony and grief.  People will keep reverting to the "popular" history of Midway unless you give them a reason not to.  I would suggest checking out the Featured article Polish September Campaign; near the bottom they have a section called "Myths" where they talk about similar misconceptions that most people regard as facts.  Have to apologize, since I was going to add your Shattered Sword "Myths of Midway" to the page, but have been detained on other articles. Palm_Dogg 21:12, 24 February 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Aviator Losses 

message: The Plan
"As was typical of many Japanese naval plans during the Second World War, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's Yamamoto was later released from the Japenese Army for beingcaught in the middle of the night performing inappropriate acts on a sleeping man battle plan was complicated and intricate."
Just thought you'd want to know.64.121.192.62 22:08, 2 March 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Vandalized Text 

message: I changed the main article to explicitly note that Capt. Richard Fleming, although the recipient of the Medal of Honor, did not in fact hit Mikuma, either with his bomb or his aircraft.  That's a common myth of the battle, although interestingly contemporary Marine Corps reports make it clear that Fleming went down off Mikuma's fantail by a good distance.  However, the famous photos of Mikuma taken near her sinking seem to show some sort of wreckage on the top of Turret #4, and this has commonly been described as wreckage from Fleming's plane--I remember seeing that very citation in one of the American Heritage books as a child in the early 1970s.  However, this wreckage is, in fact, the remains of Mikuma's mainmast and aft superstructure, as well as torn up lagging sheeting on the roof of the turret.  Finally, of course, the Japanese records make absolutely no mention of having been struck by an American aircraft, and all things being equal they must of course be given greater weight of consideration over American aviator accounts--it was, after all, *their* ship, and the conditions of Mikuma's damage are *very* well documented by the Japanese.
-jon parshall-
I've removed it until you can provide a citation.
Removed Text:  Although contemporary research has revealed that neither Fleming's bomb nor his aircraft actually struck the ship itself.
68.97.2.180 18:09, 6 February 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Fleming's Apocryphal Crash 

message: John Ford directed the film he didn't shot footage of the battle himself. I've just verified from my mp4 copy of the movie. "The following authentic scene were made by U.S. Navy photographers.". Please notice that the film also include some fictional scenes but the US navy didn't care about this at that time. Ericd 17:54, 5 June 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Ford's movie 

message: Can anyone think of a reason why :Image:VT-6TBDs.jpg should not be cropped? savidan(talk) (e@) 01:50, 15 June 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Image 

message: (Tried)to highlight questionable areas Jonathan smith 112281 00:41, 26 July 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  See main page &mdash; Request 

message: In the paragraph about how Midway was confirmed to be the identity of objective "AF", Cdr Rochefort is described as having the idea to get the IJN to confirm this themselves by the intrigue of the supposed drinking water shortage on Midway.  The paragraph concludes with the following: "Rochefort died in 1976; in 1985 he was posthumously awarded the Distinguished Service Medal (United States) and later in 1986 he was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom."  As written, this sentence is off-topic for the paragraph and sounds more like a biographical note on Rochefort.  It should either be removed or re-worded to more clearly point back to Rochefort's intelligence coup.  I have done the latter.  Comments? Mike 15:23, 14 September 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Commander Rochefort

message: "Likewise, it is arguable that reallocation of air and naval resources might have delayed amphibious operations in North Africa, the Mediterranean, and perhaps at Normandy."
I have a small issue with this sentence - as far as I'm aware, the amphibious operations in the Med were limited by the availability of transport shipping, especially landing craft and would therefore have been largely unaffected by any US carrier losses at Midway. One could argue that a US deafeat at Midway would have put the Allies on the strategic defensive in the Pacific, which would have released shipping for use in the Med and in fact brought operations in this theatre [B]forward[/B] and not delayed them. Any thoughts?Rubisco 14:38, 28 September 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: It's speculation, but it's safe to say, had MacArthur & Nimitz had to hold on the defensive a few more months, the dearth of landing craft that delayed Anvil would never have happened, increasing effectiveness & shortening the war. It's also possible Nimitz would have increased emphasis on submarines, calling them back from Oz as too vulnerable & putting them in the Luzon Strait, increasing their effectiveness & also shortening the war...  Trekphiler 01:39, 26 February 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Effects of US defeat on the ETO 

message: This may have been corrected by other scholars, but I thought "Miracle at Midway" and other books stated that Sōryū was sunk by Yorktown's squadron and Akagi and Kaga were sunk by Enterprise.  I understand the issue may be in doubt, but has evidence shown that the current article (Kaga sunk by Yorktown, Sōryū and Akagi by Enterprise) the accepted version?75.25.65.83 04:48, 16 October 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Who sank who? 

message: I don't see much mention of the USMC's part in the battle.  Major Lofton Henderson (for whom Henderson Field on Guadalcanal was named) led a mixed squadron of SBD Dauntlesses and SB2U Vindicators against the Japanese fleet.  See the article on the Midway order of battle. 198.49.81.33 14:30, 24 October 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Marine air units 

message: Currently the "Impact" section states, "worst case", that if they had won Midway, the Japanese could have invaded Australia and Hawaii, "knocking the U.S. out of the Pacific." Maybe they could have established a foothold somewhere on Australia's north coast, but Hawaii was totally beyond their military and logistic capabilities from all that I have read. It needs changing. --Shyland 23:31, 27 October 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: I altered the section and removed the references to possible Hawaii and Australian invasions.  It does seem unlikely that the Japanese Army would have assented to such huge undertakings, to say nothing of the amount of shipping it would have taken.Dallan007 04:25, 8 November 2006 (UTC)

text: I do believe that part of the Japanese plan was to either make Pearl Harbor untenable as a naval base, and possibly to occupy Hawaii in order to attempt to force the US to the peace table. The Japanese strategy for the war was to win a quick victory over the US, after all, since they were utterly screwed over in terms of industrial capacity. --M45k3d N1Nj4 G4R0 17:18, 30 November 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: It's a fantasy. IJA never had the manpower or shipping for invading Hawaii; invading Oz was an opium smoker's dream.  Trekphiler 01:49, 30 March 2007 (UTC)

text: Don't bet on it making any difference. PTO was already getting more manpower than Europe as it was, thanks to Ernie King (betcha didn't know). Germany was far & away a bigger threat, & both FDR & Winston knew it; they might have had to change building priorities, & in the short term, some ops would've been cancelled (Wasp ferry mission of Spitfires to Malta, for instance), but I doubt it'd shift them off "Germany First" (or need to). It's as likely MacArthur would've gotten lower billing, or maybe Oz's PM (Curtin?) would've gotten more diggers from Winnie, or been able to hold back some. If General Ego did get lowered, it's probable Chips Carpenter's subs would've gone to Pearl, & shortened the war (being more effective from there). This, tho, is a mix of speculation & OR....  Trekphiler 01:49, 30 March 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Hawaii!!???? 

message: "Had the Japanese captured Midway, the northeastern Pacific Rim would have been essentially defenseless. Success also would have removed the last capital ships in the U.S. Pacific Fleet, insuring Japanese naval supremacy in the Pacific until perhaps late 1943."
I think this statement is a little over-reaching.  Even if the Japanese had taken Midway, they still wouldn't have taken out Hawaii or the US fleet.--205.157.110.11 16:29, 3 November 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: The statement is somewhat overreaching. The Japanese lacked the shipping to mount an assault on Hawaii and the Army would not release the soldiers needed in any case.  The loss of all three carriers at Midway would have left only Saratoga and Wasp available until Essex was commissioned in December of 1942. Saratoga and Wasp, however, would not have been able to stop Nagumo's four to six carriers from continuing to dominate the Pacific. Dallan007 04:31, 8 November 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: The statement is preposterous. Midway was a trap for a garrison Japan would've been incapable of supporting.  Trekphiler 19:50, 19 November 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Over-reaching statement

message: Article says: "Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard worked around the clock to patch up the carrier. Though several months of repairs was estimated for the Yorktown, 72 hours at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard was enough to restore it to a battle-worthy..." Someone who knows more about this than I and/or has access to the cited book should fix or clarify this apparent contradiction. Thanks.ColinClark 00:37, 30 November 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: I'm damn sure that they didn't drive Yorktown all the way to Puget Sound for a 72 hour repair. I think it's supposed to mean that it would've required 3 months at Puget Sound, but instead took 72 hours at Pearl Harbor. --M45k3d N1Nj4 G4R0 17:21, 30 November 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Thanks. Sounds good now.ColinClark 23:47, 1 December 2006 (UTC)

text: Looks like a proofreading error. Her hull was basically sound, so the "3mo" estimate was off anyhow.  15:57, 6 December 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Location of Yorktown's repairs.  

message: in this article, what is standard of data and Time? US time or Japan time? --Rheo1905 10:45, 24 December 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Seems to me Midway local time makes the most sense. Or is that too sensible?  Trekphiler 01:57, 30 March 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Time? 

message: What's this nonsense about a loss at Midway removing the last capital ships from the US OOB? There was still the Saratoga and the Wasp--and assuming their subsequent easy loss is a pointless exercise in counterfact. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Steve Dallas (talk • contribs) 08:06, 10 January 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Am I nitpicking by arguing carriers aren't capital ships? Battleships are... (OK, I got your meaning...) As for "off the OOB", it was the Pacific Fleet's OOB in question, no? Sara was laid up, & IIRC, Wasp was detailed to the Atlantic Fleet. And USN only had 6 fleet carriers. (Ranger doesn't count.)  Trekphiler 20:01, 29 September 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Sloppy conclusions. 

message: Added another line to make the Discoveries heading appear underneath the Mikuma image rather than next to it. Probably doesn't even need to be entered here, but I'm bored.JeffKo427 10:18, 3 February 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Minor Edits 

message: The article says, "in the hands of both Nagumo and Yamamoto prior to the battle." This is far from certain. In Yamamoto's, yes; it seems Nagumo (in time-honored military tradition) didn't get the word from Tokyo, & Yamamoto, to conceal the fact Yamato was at sea, didn't tell him...  Trekphiler 04:10, 17 February 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: The omens

message: The article says,
:"In addition, the impending arrival of yet more American air strikes at 07:53 made Nagumo's window of decision quite short.  In the end Nagumo made the fateful decision to wait for his first strike force to land, and then launch the reserve strike force (which would by then be properly armed).Prange, Miracle at Midway, pp. 231-237; Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 170-173"
"Nagumo's window of decision" & his "fateful decision" were irrelevant; Spruance had begun launching at 07.00, & his birds would hit Nagumo before Nagumo's hit him. The outcome was already decided. The problem is, I can't find a historiographer who expressly says so...  Trekphiler 05:10, 17 February 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: "at 07:40 a scout plane from the cruiser Tone"
The first message from Scout 4 was at 0720, with an amplification at 0740; see Willmott, Barrier, & Fuchida & Okumiya.  Trekphiler 10:09, 27 March 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Beat the clock

message: The article notes "several new squadrons (drawn from carrier Saratoga". The Japanese didn't do this for Shōkaku, intact after Coral Sea; mention it? I've never seen a source specifically say they didn't, but no source I've seen says they did, & there were air groups available...  Trekphiler 01:13, 26 February 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: I have to learn to read the article before I post here... Matt Murdock 01:48, 26 February 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Evidence of absence?

message: Aside from the TBDs on the Hornet, there was a detachment on Midway Island which flew the TBF Avenger. They didn't have much better luck, I think 5 of 6 aircraft were lost. The surviving Avenger was damaged, but made it back to Midway: Here are some photos from www.history.navy.mil.
:
I removed the words "sole survivor of VT-8" from the image of George Gay, because a couple of VT-8 aircrew also survived. He ws the sole survivor of VT-8s TBD aircrew though. Anynobody 03:57, 26 March 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: In the context, it was the aircrew being dealt with, not the ship's maintenence people...  Trekphiler 19:46, 29 September 2007 (UTC)

text: "yet more American air strikes at 07:53 made Nagumo's window of decision quite short. In the end Nagumo made the fateful decision to wait for his first strike force to land"
based on Willmott & on Fuchida & Okumiya. As noted above, "the fateful decision" wasn't; it was out of his hands when Strawberry 5 spotted him.  Trekphiler 02:19, 30 March 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  VT-8 

message: I rewrote
:"yet more American air strikes at 07:53 made Nagumo's window of decision quite short. In the end Nagumo made the fateful decision to wait for his first strike force to land"
based on Willmott & on Fuchida & Okumiya. As noted above, "the fateful decision" wasn't; it was out of his hands when Strawberry 5 spotted him.  Trekphiler 02:19, 30 March 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Windows 42

message: In the first paragraph there is too much pointless information that does not pertain to the article at all. I suggest major revisions of that portion are done. Designdroide 23:09 Mountian Tine
:I am serious about this. I see no relavance to having all that pointless jabber inb the first paragraph. I am trying to see if I can get support on this so that I dont get into an agruement after wards, or if I do then I have support. Designdroide 00:21, 27 May 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Getting ride of fluff 

message: in the cryptology section, what does it mean by the cryptoanalysts were "blacked out"? 71.161.41.63 22:25, 22 May 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  phrase 

message: The discovery section (repeated below) has been vandalised - how can it be rolled back to its non juevinille state?
[edit] Discovery
===U.S. vessel was as big as my giant dingaling depth of the ocean in the area of the battle (more than 17,000 feet/5200 m), researching the battlefield has presented extraordinary difficulties. However, on May 19, 1998, Robert Ballard and a team of masterbaters and ball suckers (including Japanese participants) located and photographed Yorktown. The ship was remarkably intact for a vessel that sank in 1942; much of the original equipment, and even the original paint scheme were still visible.
:Vandalism has since been removed. To remove a malicious edit, simply click the history tab at the top of the article, click the "last edit" button for the most recent edit, and click undo. See WP:REVERT for more info on reverting vandalism. -- Hdt83  Chat 02:56, 7 June 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Page has been vandalised 

message: 'The battle was an American victory widely regarded as the most important naval engagement of World War II.'
Let the facts of the article speak for themself rather than peacocking it up with unsourced statements. Narson 11:47, 7 June 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: But it is worth stating... Brutannica 00:14, 8 June 2007 (UTC)

text: I may have been brainwashed, growing up in American schools, but that's how all the textbooks refer to it. I'd say there's a good argument for it being widely regarded that way, whether or not its true. -wizzard2k (C•T•D) 00:24, 8 June 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Just needs a cite putting in from a textbook or a website....best I've found in my books label it as important, but mine are BRitish books and so the Pacific War is not generally covered in the detail I'd like, I'm sure someone with the American books can cite it in. Narson 19:35, 13 June 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: This really is common knowledge, and I don't believe it requires a source. Even the current US President refers to it as the most important naval battle in our history. 24.181.107.187 20:08, 13 June 2007 (UTC)

text: I found one that seemed to indicate its importance. (As for it being common knowledge, I don't know, I would certainly think Pearl Harbour was a pretty important Naval Battle, without it Midway et al wouldn't have happened, though I suppose one could argue that Pearl Harbour wasn't strictly a naval battle as the ships were in dock. Midway certainly receives very little focus in European education) Narson 20:18, 13 June 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Peacock phrase 

message: This paragraph frankly seems almost apologetic for the Japanese. That the captured American flyers were murdered is fairly well documented, by Prange and others.
128.165.87.144 22:01, 11 July 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Allegations of war crimes 

message: The page for William Satterlee Pye states that Admiral Pye ordered seven battleships sortied from San Fran to Midway, but they are not mentioned here. Does anyone have any information on this? --Daysleeper47 16:16, 29 August 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Not as clear as that. Nimitz had them available, but knew they were too slow to keep up with Fletcher, so he decided not to attach them. Too bad he wasn't so clearheaded about his sub dispositions. (And him a sub engineer officer. For shame.)  Trekphiler 20:10, 29 September 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Battleships 

message: I'm rather surprised that this article doesn't even contain a cursory reference to American cryptanalysis. It's surely not controversial to assert that breaking the JN-25 naval code was a major factor in the American victory, is it? Shouldn't there be at least a few links, if not a paragraph in the before-the-battle section? NewEnglandYankee 19:30, 5 February 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Not having noted any objections, I've added a brief paragraph summarizing these events, with links to more detailed articles. If this information would be better presented elsewhere, feel free to move it. Also, I don't have my books handy, so more citations couldn't hurt. NewEnglandYankee 21:33, 16 February 2007 (UTC)

text: "an officer was sent to Midway with verbal orders". Well, no. There's debate who's idea it was (some credit Joe Rochefort, others Jasper Holmes), but the orders were sent via cable. And what I've seen leaves some doubt whether it was a compromised cypher (one captured at Wake) or en clair; it wasn't "a code that they knew the Japanese had broken", because AFAIK, Japanese cryppies were incompetent to break even the simplest codes. It is one more example of how a single brilliant officer can tip the balance; had Rochefort not twigged to AF, the signal would never have gone on the cable. Unfortunately, it gives rise to the myth (which I've had a history prof spout) intel & radar won Midway. Sheesh. Give more credit to bad planning by Yamamoto, & even more to the PBY guys who gave Fletcher the eyes Nagumo didn't have. (Thanks to Ann Medina for calling my attention to that one.)  Trekphiler 19:57, 29 September 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Codebreaking

message: === Spotting ===
what does "Spotting" in the sentence "Spotting his flight decks and launching aircraft would require at least 30–45 minutes to accomplish." mean?
:I believe its similar to spotting in weight-lifting, where someone is there watching from the outside making sure nothing goes wrong. -wizzard2k (C•T•D) 16:15, 8 June 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Putting the aircraft on the flightdeck, making them ready for immidiate take-off. --89.54.185.75 12:08, 17 June 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: As in "on their spots", ready to be moved for launch as needed. They weren't all "ready for immediate takeoff"; they had to be spotted to make it possible to select what was needed & move those to ready positions. Gerry Carroll describes it "like a Chinese fire drill", & he'd know; the deck of a carrier is just short of complete chaos at the best of times, & it seems like everything is constantly in motion in all directions. It is; as Gerry notes, it's all too easy to FOD a  sailor & not realize it til the engine loses power.  Trekphiler 19:43, 29 September 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Jargon 

message: what does "Spotting" in the sentence "Spotting his flight decks and launching aircraft would require at least 30–45 minutes to accomplish." mean?
:I believe its similar to spotting in weight-lifting, where someone is there watching from the outside making sure nothing goes wrong. -wizzard2k (C•T•D) 16:15, 8 June 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Putting the aircraft on the flightdeck, making them ready for immidiate take-off. --89.54.185.75 12:08, 17 June 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: As in "on their spots", ready to be moved for launch as needed. They weren't all "ready for immediate takeoff"; they had to be spotted to make it possible to select what was needed & move those to ready positions. Gerry Carroll describes it "like a Chinese fire drill", & he'd know; the deck of a carrier is just short of complete chaos at the best of times, & it seems like everything is constantly in motion in all directions. It is; as Gerry notes, it's all too easy to FOD a  sailor & not realize it til the engine loses power.  Trekphiler 19:43, 29 September 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Spotting 

message: Not challenging, but would like to know why the romance in the movie would/should be considered a "preposterous romance".  Thx.
:Besides the fact the writing was terrible, it was extremely convenient considering who was involved... And I'm far from convinced interracial romance was as common, or accepted, in 1942 as in 1976. Also, honestly, what was the idea of putting it in a war movie? (Yeah, I know, the producer wanted to bring women into the theatre...) Trekphiler 19:33, 29 September 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Midway Movie 

message: Excellent article.  Perhaps this is a nit, but did the Japanese call their attack against the Aleutians "Operation AL"?  "Operation MI" is a little more believable, but were the Japanese war plans drafted in English?  How would you spell "AL" in kana?
65.114.23.6 19:12, 1 September 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: The Japanese (habitually) used the first two letters of the Japanese name, which (as I understand it) was a close translation of the English.  Trekphiler 19:30, 29 September 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Operation AL? 

message: I deleted this
:"Worse for the Japanese, their habit of leaving expert pilots in combat was detrimental to the training of their forces. The U.S. Navy, by contrast, rotated its best aviators home on a regular basis to teach pilot trainees the techniques they would use to defeat Japan."
and this
:"In the subsequent battles around Guadalcanal in late 1942, such as Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz, Japanese naval aviation was ground down by attrition despite roughly equal losses on both sides;"
and this
:"Although wartime Japanese training programs produced pilots, they were insufficiently trained as the war continued, an imbalance that became worse as increasingly potent U.S. fighters became available that outmatched Japanese aircraft."
as irrelevant to Midway; put it in Pacific War, if you think it's of value. I also deleted this
:"(Had there been a defeat at Midway, the U.S. might not have struck at such an early date or had the same degree of success.)"
and this
:"The importance of the Battle of Midway can also be assessed by considering the hypothetical scenario of an American defeat and the destruction of the U.S. aircraft carrier fleet. With only two carriers (USS Saratoga and USS Wasp) available, the U.S. would have been forced onto the strategic defensive for at least the remainder of 1942. The Japanese could have continued their advance on the New Hebrides and cut off communication with Australia, and completed their conquest of New Guinea. Furthermore, a catastrophic failure at Midway might have resulted in the removal of key figures like Nimitz and Spruance from their positions. Offensive operations in the Pacific might have been delayed until as late as mid-1943, when Essex and Independence-class carriers became available in appreciable numbers.
:"A hypothetically longer Pacific War does raise the question of the role the Soviet Union would have played in Japan's demise, and whether the USSR would have gained a postwar presence in a partitioned Japan, similar to Germany. The actual implications of an American defeat are unknowable, but there is little question losing at Midway would have narrowed U.S. options dramatically, at least in the short term.Willmott, Barrier and the Javelin, pp. 519–523; Prange, Miracle at Midway 396–397; Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 424–430. A defeat at Midway, by implicitly jeopardizing Hawaii and Pearl Harbor, might have put the "Germany First" priority of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs in grave political peril.Weinberg, World at Arms p. 339. Had the United States been obliged to focus its efforts on Japan, American intervention in Europe might well have been delayed, with incalculable implications for Germany and the Soviet Union."
as speculation. It's equally probable it would have shifted forces out of the SWPA, away from MacArthur, as FDR realized he didn't have the luxury of a "dual road" strategy; moving Oz submarines to Pearl would have significantly shortened the war, as would the preclusion of MacArthur's obsessive "return" to the Philippines. It would also have freed up landing craft, which would have made it possible to execute ANVIL and NEPTUNE</SMALL> similtaneously, as originally intended, which would (probably) have shortened the war. It might also have freed up Oz & AUS troops, making it more likely (if not extremely so) NEPTUNE</SMALL> might go off in 1943, instead; now, it's speculation about whether the Italian campaign would have happened, & whether a "disaster" at Midway would've given FDR leverage with Winston to call off Italy: that would indubitably have shortened the war. The bigger question is, would Japan have been defeated without use of the Bomb; it it wasn't, it's been suggested there might have been a major nuclear war, as the Soviets (or Stalin) doubt the West's willingness to actually use it. (I have a suspicion this was Spinrad's vision in Iron Dream.) And there's enormous flexibility in planning, economic & military; loss of two carriers, against the number actually built, was trivial. (The Essexes wouldn't arrive until 1943 in any case, but it might have put pressure on the earlier development of bulk carrier MAC-conversions, & on the priority for LCs; realizing carriers could not be built faster without significant diversion, LCs might have ended up with higher priority than historically, with results like above, plus the ability to land more men at ANVIL and NEPTUNE</SMALL>: a French corps, say...?) Regardless, this is no place for speculation; want to speculate, write a novel. (Don't bet on FDR replacing Nimitz; he wasn't near as quick to fire people as Winnie was.)  Trekphiler 19:30, 29 September 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Cut and print? 

message: "Another 40 minutes elapsed before Tone's scout finally detected and radioed the presence of a single carrier in the American force"
I was reading Decision at Sea by Craig L. Symonds, and I think he actually says the time between Nagumo's demand for a confirmation from the scout plane and the plane actually finding a carrier was 10 minutes rather than 40. I may have to check again, though Masterblooregard 10:38, 30 September 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: It was about 30, IIRC, between the two reports. Nagumo, when he passed the information along, suggested they were nearly similtaneous.  Trekphiler 14:10, 30 September 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Nagumo's decisions 

message: Hi,
How to decipher "CAP" in "CAP fighters", etc.? Thanks in advance. Сергей Олегович (talk) 09:43, 2 November 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: Combat air patrol. Jehochman Talk 10:33, 2 November 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: Which raises something that's nagged at me for awhile: should we be using a U.S. term for IJN practise? And, to nitpick, was it combat air patrol then? Or carrier? I've seen both.  TREKphiler hit me ♠  10:38, 2 November 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: These valid criticisms that should be investigated. Jehochman Talk 10:54, 2 November 2008 (UTC)

text: TY (means "thank you"). Сергей Олегович (talk) 11:18, 2 November 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  CAP 

message: A source is given for This operation was considered preparatory for further attacks against Fiji and Samoa, as well as an invasion of Hawaii. it is "For a detailed discussion of anticipated follow-on Hawaiian operations, see Parshall & Tully, pp. 43–45, & Stephan, Hawaii under the Rising Sun." But what does the source say for example what was the name of the contingency plan if it existed for an invasion or was it just a contingency plan for a raid?  Or is it speculation by the author that the Japanese might have been planning an invasion or a raid. --Philip Baird Shearer 10:43, 10 October 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Looks like I'll be hunting down a copy of that book so I can see what the name of the notional operation(s) would have been. I understand Parshall and Tully uncovered a true invasion, not a raid. Personally, I think it would have been the Japanese's Bridge Too Far as they had no way to stream materiel out to Hawaii in greater quantity than the US could have. Binksternet 20:20, 10 October 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  "Bridge too Far"? Raid or putative invasion (it was a dream of Yamamoto's for years, from what Stephan sez) doesn't make any difference, because invading Hawaii was a fantasy beyond IJA means to execute, in manpower or shipping. If you want to read fantasy, read Stephan.  Trekphiler 21:51 & 22:16, 10 October 2007 (UTC)

text: No, they didn't. It was beyond IJA shipping & manpower even Fletcher lost his entire force at Midway. It was a pipedream.  TREKphiler hit me ♠  08:09, 23 November 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Invasion of Hawaii 

message: The "untrained" pilots remark got del, but it's not completely wrong. Some of the crews hadn't completed training yet. I just can't recall if they came from Midway or 1 of Fletcher's airwings... I think they were from Midway's Windindicator squadrons. Can somebody check?  Trekphiler (talk) 13:38, 22 January 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Untrained melody? 

message: The article currently reads:
As darkness fell, both sides took stock and made tentative plans for continuing the action. Admiral Fletcher, obliged to abandon the derelict Yorktown and feeling he could not adequately command from a cruiser, ceded operational command to Spruance. Spruance knew the United States had won a great victory, but was still unsure of what Japanese forces remained at hand and was determined to safeguard both Midway and his carriers. To aid his aviators, who had launched at extreme range, he had continued to close Nagumo during the day, and persisted as night fell.
But Prange and other authors mention that Spruance withdrew to the east until midnight and then turned back west. This decision was critical because it avoided a possible night engagement with Kondo's battleships, who were pursuing the Americans at the time. Should this not be corrected? Dallan007 (talk) 22:42, 11 February 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: It's true. Spruance turned east in response to Murphy's sighting, which led Spruance to believe the Invasion Force was inbound still, when in fact Yamamoto had ordered his cruisers (which Murphy spotted) to turn back. Murphy's signal was at 02.15 (Blair, p.246-8).  Trekphiler (talk) 10:39, 9 March 2008 (UTC)
thread_title: Spruance Changing Course Night of June 4

message: More mention here should be made that Midway was won with fantastic luck and skill by a small group of diver bombers lead by Wade McCluskey.
It was McCluskey decision to go further then they should have. It was then his decision to go north-west where they were lucky to sight the Japanese destroyer Arashii. Following the direction this destroyer was going, the US diver bombers found the Japanese fleet then they perfectly executed an assault.
Also mention here should be made of Lt. Richard Best miracle shot that took out the Akagi. 
Solomon is Wise (talk) 14:47, 13 March 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: And if Nautilus hadn't fired on Soryu (?), Arashi would never have been there to chase...  Trekphiler (talk) 17:22, 14 March 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: As I understand the Japanies forces were already discovered at the moment of the divers' attack and assaulted by Torpedo Squadron. So what was the reason of divers weren't directed acordingly? Radio comm inadequate? Сергей Олегович (talk) 05:27, 10 November 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: Without solid sourcing in front of me, I can offer 2 possibilities: Intersquadron comm was pretty bad (recall, VFs couldn't always find their own VT/VBs, so cross-air wing comm had to be bad), & Fletcher, who could (if "Midway" is to be believed) hear everything wouldn't open up, at risk of giving his pos away. Don't forget, the idea (or capability) of an airborne "CP", in the fashion of Hillsboro in 'nam, didn't exist yet.  TREKphiler hit me ♠  17:21, 10 November 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: Sounds reasonable. Thanks for the explanation. Сергей Олегович (talk) 05:42, 11 November 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  The dive bombers 

message: I have renamed External links Further reading and moved all the books that are not cited out of "References" into "Further reading" and copied all the books I could find in Notes into References sorting them on the surname of the author. See WP:CITE and WP:LAYOUT, I was surprised that as this is a Featured Article this had not already been done. 
Some of the entries in the reference list now need additional information such as: edition/year of publication, publisher, and ISBN--Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 11:07, 10 May 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  References and Further reading 

message: Would someone add in information about the squadron of Marine dive bombers based on Midway?  It was led by Major Lofton Henderson, who was killed during the attack on the Japanese fleet, and for whom Henderson Field on Guadalcanal was named.  This is a pretty big omission. 74.194.82.219 (talk) 02:48, 4 June 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Maj. Lofton Henderson 

message: When showing the Strength of  Japanese forces in table on the right side of the article, it shows 264 carrier aircraft, and 16 floatplanes.
When showing the Casualties and Losses, it shows 332 aircraft destroyed.
The losses are more than the total forces indicated. Something is wrong here.
98.203.18.250 (talk) 03:16, 11 September 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: This Office of Naval Intelligence report estimates 275 Japanese planes lost. Clarityfiend (talk) 06:42, 11 September 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Number of Japanese Planes 

message: Conventional wisdom Nagumo didn't have time to launch his strike birds before the inbound strike arrived is contradicted by Bicheno's Midway (which I just read, but don't have in front of me...), which says Nagumo had time but was persuaded against it by his staffers (not Fuchida or Tomonaga, but Kobayashi & Kikumi, IIRC). If somebody's got a copy handy, the "quandry" bears revision.  TREKphiler hit me ♠  22:15, 17 October 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: Looking at my notes, Bicheno (p134) says there were 18 Vals each abd Hiryu & Sōryū ready to launch immediately, & half the CAP detail could've been sent. There's a clear contradiction.  TREKphiler hit me ♠  08:46, 19 October 2008 (UTC)
thread_title: Timecop

message: In reply Clarityfiend, no, USN boats wern't so effective yet. They were, however, easily reaching Home Waters, Tsushima Strait, Yellow Sea, & Luzon/Formosa Straits with virtually no interference from Japanese ASW for the duration. The need for bases to (try to) plug the gaps was fairly clear, even to IJN's incompetent ASW command.  TREKphiler hit me ♠  02:08, 20 November 2008 (UTC)
thread_title: Porosity