Talk:Grumman F-14 Tomcat/Archive 1

message: The current page organization seems pretty haphazard right now. Unless there's a specific template that needs to be followed for aircraft articles, I'd suggest reorganizing the article into something like this:
    * History
          o Development
          o Operational History
                + United States Navy
                + Imperial Iranian Air Force
          o F-14 in combat
    * Decommissioning of the F-14
    * Specifications (F-14D Tomcat)
    * Characteristics
    * Operators
          o 4.1 United States Navy (USN) squadrons
          o 4.2 Iranian Air Force (IRIAF) squadrons
    * F-14 in fiction and popular culture
    * Related content
    * External links
    * References
Also, I think having the list of operators is a bit superfluous/long - perhaps it should be split off into another article like List of F-14 operators or somesuch to reduce this article's length. Virogtheconq 04:13, 17 March 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: *Good point regarding starting the article with prose - I was thinking more along the lines of putting the specs in a right-justified box (like , but that's a discussion for elsewhere. And rereading the characteristics section, history is better first. I've updated the above table to reflect these; there are still a few other shuffles that I think would make the page better. IMHO the operators aren't as interesting as the specs/characteristics, and fiction/pop culture should always go last, but that's just my opinion. I also suggest integrating the F-14s in combat section as a subsection under History, since having a single paragraph does not a section make. Comments on those?  Virogtheconq 05:15, 17 March 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Organization

message: I thought this was to be a version supposedly developed for the Air Force? bjelleklang 12:25, 6 October 2005 (UTC)
replies: text:  No, never herd that one. USAF got F-15 A/B at the time so very irrelevant to them - never herd USAF crop up anywhere really (as a potential customer). I've herd mutterings about the UK, but nothing else. Pickle 07:53, 20 March 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: F-14C

message: I reverted the F-14D error on Macross Zero in the F-14s in Fiction section. The Macross Zero creators coined a fictional variant since their F-14 has a non-existent ECM/engine config (essentially a F-14B but with new chinpod/ECM). Please see the F-14 note on Bandai Visual's Macross Zero DVD liner notes or Bandai Visual's official Macross Zero site:
http://www.bandaivisual.co.jp/macrosszero/story2.html
Egan Loo 19:28, 4 Apr 2005 (UTC)
thread_title: F-14s in fiction

message: You guys will like this.  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EJDGmgMjAqs&search=F14  teh TK 23:31, 14 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Found a neat video. 

message: The article lists rate of climb as 45,000+ ft/min.  Is that for real or a typo?  -- RoySmith (talk) 21:03, 15 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Sounds right for an initial rate of climb. What's your beef with it? - Emt147 Burninate! 04:02, 16 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: It just seems amazing, that's all.  -- RoySmith (talk) 04:34, 16 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Rate of climb??? 

message: What references (or rather, which links at the bottom) are given for the F-14's apparently "notorious" carrier landing difficulties?  I asked a former pilot about it, and he disagreed wholeheartedly, saying that the F-14 was much easier to land than the F-4 it was replacing (F-4 came in 20 knots faster).  Obviously this is just one pilot's opinion, but I'm still curious.
:::Yeah the stories go that the Tomcat has the tendency to "float". Same as what was said of the S-3  Viking. This could be due to their large wing area (including the pancakes on the Tomcat). One thing's for sure...the older model hornets had a higher landing speed aboard ship than the Tomcat!
Tomcat200 1st June 2006
I believe it is reference to the woman pilot controversy, some believed it was evidence women were either not suited, or given prefernce over better pilots. I added remark that swing wings and flaps should make it easier to land.--Wiarthurhu 15:12, 26 June 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Difficult to land? 

message: Articles about American aircraft are in American English per MoS. Stop converting them to British English. - Emt147 Burninate! 21:47, 4 June 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  English 

message: I moved the following section to the discussion because it is not encyclopedic in its current form:
:* Famous crash footage of an aircraft hitting the stern of an aircraft carrier while attempting a deck landing was used in the films Midway and The Hunt for Red October, is often mistakenly identified as a F-14. However, a closer look at the fuselage of the aircraft reveals it to be a Grumman F9F Panther. In Midway it is supposed to represent the crash of a WWII SBD Dauntless piloted by Charlton Heston's character.  The actual crash footage in the movie Midway is of an F6F Hellcat.
It has the following issues:
* It first implies that this footage is the same in both movies. However, it then goes on to state that the fighter actually filmed is the F9F Panther in one movie, but the F6F Hellcat in another movie. If the footage is the same, it can't be both.
* If in Midway, the actual fighter and the fighter it is supposed to represent are both not the F-14 Tomcat, then that section doesn't belong in the F-14 article at all.
* Furthermore, if it is pointing out is that the "F-14 Tomcat" in one scene of The Hunt for Red October is not a F-14 Tomcat at all, that information doesn't belong in this article either.
* WIthout a sourced citation (for example, a DVD commentary or documentary that states either conjecture), it is original research. This is particularly important since the entry apparently contradicts itself.
Egan Loo 20:19, 10 June 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: In the Hunt for the Red October, the crash scene starts off with an F-14 approaching the deck of the carrier.  The camera cuts to the actors, then when it cuts back to the deck of the carrier the F9F crash footage is shown - this is -really- easy to pick out in the movie because F9F Panthers have enormous, fat forward fuselages.  The rolling nosecone of the F9F doesn't look ANYthing like an F-14, and could only pass as such to someone who is wholly unfamiliar with military jet aircraft.  So the Red October mention is legit.  I can't speak for Midway though. teh TK 11:20, 16 June 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: F-14 in fiction and popular culture: crash footage

message: Keep in mind the paper is primarily about the Air Force, given RAND's institutional history with that service, so treatment of the Navy is an afterthought in this piece:
page 1:
The late 1960s and 1970s witnessed the development of two new Air Force
fighters—the F-15 and F-16—and two new Navy fighters—the F-14 and
F/A-18—that would become the mainstays of America’s tactical fighter forces
for the remainder of the century. In particular, the two Air Force fighters and the F/A-18 represent a substantial change from many of the trends evident in previous fighter modernization decisions. The F-15 was the first Air Force
fighter since the development of the North American F-86 in the late 1940s that
was optimized for maneuverability and agility for dogfights with enemy fighters.
In an even more dramatic departure from recent experience, the F-16 and
F/A-18 programs attempted to reverse the trends toward heavier, more complex
and costly fighters.
Reading between the lines, that means the F-14 was not a departure from previous thinking.
One group of dissenters, later known as the “Fighter Mafia,”
led by John Boyd, Pierre Sprey, and others, began arguing with considerable
effect against such a fighter within the Air Force and the DoD. This group advocated
procurement of a much lighter, highly maneuverable dogfighter optimized
for close-in air combat.
This was the primary impetus for the move toward more maneuverable fighters optimized for WVR - not institutional, but from a small group within the institution. Most notably, their efforts were focused within the Air Force - the similar push within the Navy came from Adm. Kent Lee via the VFAX concept (which itself grew out of remains of the Navy's dropped commitment to the AF's Lightweight Fighter Program).
What happened on the Navy side was quite the opposite:
Indeed, with the unhappy experience of the TFX continuing to unfold, both
Navy and Air Force resistance continued to grow to OSD’s concept of a joint
F-X/VFAX program. As the Air Force struggled to hammer out a consensus on
performance requirements for an all–Air Force F-X, the Navy tactical fighter community, allied with Grumman, increasingly sought to cancel the F-111B program and replace it with a new R&D effort for an all-Navy fighter optimized for fleet air defense and uncompromised by requirements for the Air Force strike-attack or air-superiority missions.
...
The Navy campaign to cancel the F-111B and develop its own fighter gained
momentum at the end of 1967 when OSD appointed the Air Force as the executive
agent for the development of a single new engine for a joint F-X/VFAX. By
this time, both the Navy and Air Force were fully committed to developing their
own fighters uncompromised by mission requirements from the other service,
and the Navy now saw the Air Force as getting the upper hand in the OSDsupported
F-X/VFAX program. The Navy campaign finally succeeded six
months later in July 1968 when Congress agreed to terminate the F-111B program.
That same month, the Navy sent out RFPs to industry for a new VFX fighter, developed solely under Navy auspices and optimized for the fleet airdefense mission. In addition to Grumman, North American, LTV, and
McDonnell-Douglas, General Dynamics also submitted design proposals.
There's your citation, by the way. It was designed primarily to splash bombers threatening the fleet, not establish air superiority by splashing fighters.
So where do the new russian fighters fit in. Well, the added fuel to the Fighter Mafia's fire. But they were in the Air Force. What it did do was to cement support for killing the F-111B:
Insurmountable opposition in the Navy to continuing the F-111B finally emerged in response to the same event that crystallized Air Force support for an F-X optimized for air superiority: the revelation of new Soviet fighters at the Moscow Air Show in July 1967. The existence of new-generation Russian fighters,
combined with the renewed appreciation for the importance of maneuverability
and dogfighting gained from air combat experience over Vietnam, led
the Navy to argue convincingly for the need for a specialized Navy fighter
optimized for carrier-based fleet air defense. The Navy soon awarded a contract
to Grumman for a study evaluating the F-111B’s capabilities in combat
against the new Soviet fighters. In October, Grumman reported that the F-111B
would not be able to cope with the new Russian fighters in a dogfight. More
importantly, Grumman submitted an unsolicited design proposal, based on
company design studies under way since 1966, for a totally new fighter that
could meet the Navy’s fleet air-defense needs.8 Shortly thereafter, two other
historic Navy fighter developers—LTV (Vought) and McDonnell-Douglas—also
submitted design proposals, as did a seasoned Air Force fighter developer,
North American Rockwell.9 All these companies, with the exception of LTV,
were also active participants in the Air Force F-X design studies. At around the
same time, the Navy informed General Dynamics that the F-111B did not meet
its requirements and initiated a new study of alternatives.
It was in effect, the straw that broke the camel's back. Winning over the elements of the fighter mafia within the Navy was enough to kill the F-111B, though there'd already been strong institutional oppositon, as indicated above. However, what resulted was not an RFP for an air superiority fighter. The resulting VFX RFP was for a fleet defense fighter. There is no more in the piece relevant to this article. --Mmx1 04:22, 27 June 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Actually reading the paper

message: === Development ===
The F-14 was developed to take the place of the General Dynamics F-111B, the navalized version of the TFX project. The F-111B was to carry six long range missles for interception, and a heavy fuel load with swing wings for long range, but the concept came before experience with close combat in Vietnam. In 1965, the fighter community was shocked when subsonic MiG-17s down F-105s on a bombing run. [www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR939/MR939.ch5.pdf]  Revival of the Air-Superiority Fighter. The Navy ordered Grumman to study how this affected the F-111B, and they concluded that the F-111B would be unable to cope in a dogfight. With issues of weight and suitability to carrier operations, the F-111B was cancelled in 1968. 
The Navy created the VFX and a lighter VFAX program. The navy needed a fighter for other roles such as escort which require more agility and performance than the F-4 or F-111B. Design changes such as increasing wing area were made to increase agility. The Air Force would choose to build its own FX air superiority fighter, the F-15 with a lighter fixed wing, single pilot, no heavy long range missles, and new technology engines.
--Wiarthurhu 00:30, 27 June 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: You're giving Undue Weight to some tangential examples in one paper. The F-111B was not dropped because it wasn't maneuverable enough; it was simply unfit for naval usage. The second paragraph is wholly irrelevant and relates to the VFAX; the "low" part of the hi/low mix. --Mmx1 03:43, 27 June 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Submitted for Peer Review 

message: The F-14 was developed to take the place of the General Dynamics F-111B, the navalized version of the TFX project. The F-111B was to carry six long range missles for interception, and a heavy fuel load with swing wings for long range, but the concept came before experience with close combat in Vietnam. In 1965, the fighter community was shocked when subsonic MiG-17s down F-105s on a bombing run. [www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR939/MR939.ch5.pdf]  Revival of the Air-Superiority Fighter. The Navy ordered Grumman to study how this affected the F-111B, and they concluded that the F-111B would be unable to cope in a dogfight. With issues of weight and suitability to carrier operations, the F-111B was cancelled in 1968. 
The Navy created the VFX and a lighter VFAX program. The navy needed a fighter for other roles such as escort which require more agility and performance than the F-4 or F-111B. Design changes such as increasing wing area were made to increase agility. The Air Force would choose to build its own FX air superiority fighter, the F-15 with a lighter fixed wing, single pilot, no heavy long range missles, and new technology engines.
--Wiarthurhu 00:30, 27 June 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: You're giving Undue Weight to some tangential examples in one paper. The F-111B was not dropped because it wasn't maneuverable enough; it was simply unfit for naval usage. The second paragraph is wholly irrelevant and relates to the VFAX; the "low" part of the hi/low mix. --Mmx1 03:43, 27 June 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Development 

message: Just to summarize my view as Wiarthurhu seems to misunderstand it and has been misrepresenting it. Maneuverability is important to every fighter - but less so than other performance characteristics, depending on the intended mission. I may have been a bit guilty of synthesis of facts when I wrote that the maneuverability was a byproduct of the dash/carrier landing mission profile, but I stand adamantly behind the factual accuracy of these points:
*As the documentation indicates, the F-14 was designed first and foremost to fill the role of fleet defense - to dash out at high speeds and launch long-range missiles to destroy enemy bombers before they could threaten the carrier group. Everything else was secondary to this aim. 
*Thus, the swing wings, were a result of design considerations that required fast dash speeds and low landing speeds - not maneuverability as is believed.
*The F-14 was NOT designed primarily for a subsonic turning fight - one neither required nor expected as part of its fleet defense mission. It is mentioned nowhere with respect to the Navy's VFX RFP (request for proposals) that resulted in the F-14. Had it been, a swing wing would have only meant additional weight.
*The question of "air superiority" is hazier. There is the mission of air superiority (actually, more accurately, offensive counter-air) which the F-14 has taken. But the F-14 has taken the recce and CAS roles with success (it has had the recce mission for some time, having taken over for the RA-5 Vigilante in the 1970's), but we don't categorize it as a recon or CAS plane. Given its shortcomings in the short-range fight resulting from the fact that it wasn't designed for a short-range turning fight, it fails to qualify as a air superiority fighter. It's a fine point, but I think Wiarthurhu is trying to use it as a backdoor to insert his assertions about the F-14's maneuverability.
I have tried to treat User:Wiarthurhu with good faith given his substantive edits to the article, with which I've had only this one quibble. However, the user has demonstrated a selective reading of the facts which is worrisome and casts doubt on his recollection of sources unavailable to us. The more he argues, the less inclined I am to take his claims at face value. Apparently he has been convinced by his reading of the Rand paper that the main aim of the F-14 was to shoot down Mig-17's. 
Initially, Wiarthurhu claimed that maneuverability was a design aim of the F-14 and motivated the swing-wing design (which is false but poorly sourced either way). Since then, he has gone so far as to say 
*that maneuverability was a the most important design aim of the F-14 (definitely false)
*that the F-14 was designed primarily to fight Mig-17's and other small Soviet fighters (also false; its primary mission was to shoot down Soviet bombers).
Unfortunately, it appears that he as bought into the revisionist meme that the F-14 was the king of ACM, a meme borne of Top Gun. The reality is that the F-14 was an interceptor that adapted quite well to a variety of other roles, including air superiority, tactical recon, precision strike, and CAS. It was remarkably maneuverable for an interceptor, many of which are joked to have turning radiuses measured in kilometers. But it is behind even its counterparts in the "teen series" (F-15/16/18) in maneuverability and was inferior in a turning fight to even the Vietnam-era A-4. Of course, the true answer is that it's the man, not the machine, that determines the outcome. But its subsonic performance was subpar for its era, and the notion that it was an ACM king is absurd and wrong.
Furthermore, no sources have been presented supporting the maneuverability POV. Here are the reliable, publicly available sources at hand:
*Global Security Discusses design criteria as fleet defense; omits WVR/dogfight/maneuverability
*FAS doesn't really discuss design criteria
*MATS Discusses design criteria, nothing relating to maneuverability is listed among the penalties in the contract. Mentions one change (increasing wing area) that increases agility as well as simplifies a mechanical complexity. No indication that maneuverability was a primary design consideration (i.e. worth sacrificing other performance considerations for).
*Aerospaceweb Says the swing wings increased efficiency and range; OMITS any mention of maneuverability.
*RAND Study on Fighter DesignI've fully analyzed it above, but in brief:
**It's a study conducted ABOUT the PROCESS of fighter design, as the abstract indicates quite clearly. Also, as RAND has historically worked closely with the Air Force, the paper is biased (not in POV, but in quantity) towards the AF history. If you read it, it seems like the Naval history is an afterthought. Wiarthurhu harps on some details (Than Hoa incident, 1967 revelation of the Mig-23 and Mig-25) that are told from an AF perspective. Apparently, this has convinced him that the main aim of the F-14 was to shoot down Mig-17's and similarly small fighters. In reality, the Navy wanted a missile platform, got a semi-decent one in the F-4, even if the missiles weren't up to par, and didn't want to to dilute their aims in the TFX with other competing criteria, including the Air Force's air superiority mission. They were only too happy to kill it and start from scratch with a purely fleet defense fighter, which is what the F-14 is.
My recommendation for action: Even if the History Channel said EXACTLY what Wiarthurhu claims it did, it contradicts the above sources. And between a popular media source and professionals, I'll side with the professionals. By the way, the History Channel aired a special tonight where they took psychics to Waco and consulted them on what happened. No kidding. They're slipping. It's a fun pastime but not an academic resource. The Modern Marvels series is fun to watch, but I've seen experts contradict them before.
--Mmx1 07:22, 27 June 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: My view on the POV Dispute

message: Interesting that the WP is the only F-14 article on the web which omits air superiority as a role, as the US Navy lists air superiority as its primary role? I'd say this was a severe violation of POV. This has been in the article from its inception, certainly before 2004, but has just been removed. This is a serious error. This individual has a POV, that
the F-14 is not, was not, and was never intended to be an air superiority fighter, 
which is contradicted by all references, and not stated by any other reference directly
in print, broadcast, or on the web. He nevertheless insists on enforcing this POV across all related WP articles.
--Wiarthurhu 20:05, 27 June 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: And that would make you correct, and every article just listed as incorrect and unverifiable, right? --Wiarthurhu 20:12, 27 June 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Please learn to use indents (preface your lines with colons (:) to indent the text. Your replies are unreadable. No, it means Mr. Lorell of RAND is correct, and everybody else is talking about the mission in a colloquial, not technical way. --Mmx1 20:15, 27 June 2006 (UTC)

text: I'm not even going to address the amateur lists. the U.S. Navy states that it has the mission of air superiority, not that it's classified as a air superiority fighter. It actually nowadays reclassified it as a strike fighter as that's the role it took in the 1990's. But from a historical perspective it's classification it is more accurate to describe it for the mission it was designed for and served during the cold war. I am not opposed to reintroducing language about its air superiority mission; I am opposed to classifying it as an air superiority fighter. --Mmx1 20:32, 27 June 2006 (UTC)

text: Victory? Is this a war? Do you OWN this article? Please take a step back and look at how you are communicating with other editors. Also, why would opposed be a POV term? That's like saying "isn't" is a POV term. ericg ✈ 18:33, 29 June 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: POV: Why is the WP the only article that omits air superiority??

message: Because a PhD defense analyst from the RAND corporation says otherwise:
From the Rand paper you repeatedly miscite:
As the Air Force struggled to hammer out a consensus on
performance requirements for an all–Air Force F-X, the Navy tactical fighter
community, allied with Grumman, increasingly sought to cancel the F-111B
program and replace it with a new R&D effort for an all-Navy fighter optimized for fleet air defense and uncompromised by requirements for the Air Force strike-attack or air-superiority missions.
...
That same month, the Navy sent out RFPs to industry for a new VFX
fighter, developed solely under Navy auspices and optimized for the fleet airdefense mission.
This paper, written by a PhD-wielding defense analyst, would trump any other colloquial usage of the term "air superiority". Did it take the air superiority role, yes. Was it designed to? No. Google results of popularity are not an arbiter of truth and colloquial descriptions should not cloud industry terms.
There are two distinct issues at hand: The term "air superiority" is used both to describe a mission, and a type of fighter; the two are not equivalent. An air superiority fighter is a fighter developed solely to fill that mission, e.g. the F-15.
However, the air superiority role has been filled by many diverse aircraft, including interceptors (the F-14), strike fighters (F/A-18E), light strike fighters (F/A-18C and F-16 in export countries) and multi-role aircraft (Typhoon, Rafale, etc). Just because an aircraft took a role does not mean it was that type of aircraft. The F-14 took over the RA-5's recon mission with great success. Does that make the F-14 a recon bird? no. The F-14 became an excellent CAS platform due to the pilot's close interaction with Marine FAC's in the 1990's. Does that make the F-14 a CAS bird? No.
--Mmx1 19:53, 27 June 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: And that would make you correct, and every article just listed as incorrect and unverifiable, right? --Wiarthurhu 20:12, 27 June 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Please learn to use indents (preface your lines with colons (:) to indent the text. Your replies are unreadable. No, it means Mr. Lorell of RAND is correct, and everybody else is talking about the mission in a colloquial, not technical way. --Mmx1 20:15, 27 June 2006 (UTC)

text: I'm not even going to address the amateur lists. the U.S. Navy states that it has the mission of air superiority, not that it's classified as a air superiority fighter. It actually nowadays reclassified it as a strike fighter as that's the role it took in the 1990's. But from a historical perspective it's classification it is more accurate to describe it for the mission it was designed for and served during the cold war. I am not opposed to reintroducing language about its air superiority mission; I am opposed to classifying it as an air superiority fighter. --Mmx1 20:32, 27 June 2006 (UTC)

text: Victory? Is this a war? Do you OWN this article? Please take a step back and look at how you are communicating with other editors. Also, why would opposed be a POV term? That's like saying "isn't" is a POV term. ericg ✈ 18:33, 29 June 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Reply

message: Wish me luck, let's see what happens...
Citation: 
http://www.csd.uwo.ca/~pettypi/elevon/baugher_us/f014.html#RTFToC2
Consequently, even before the F-111B project was officially
terminated, Grumman began work on a company-funded project known as
Design 303. The basic goals of Design 303 were to combine the
particular aptitudes of the F-111B with capabilities that would be
superior to those of the McDonnell F-4 Phantom, particularly in the
air superiority, escort fighter, and deck-launched interception role.
::Who wrote that? One Joe Baugher, a physicst by training, and amateur writer of aircraft articles. So who do we believe, Joe Baugher or Mark Lorell, a Senior research fellow at the RAND Corporation. Moreover, Baugher goes on to say
The RFP issued to the industry a month later specifically mentioned a requirement for a fleet defense fighter with tandem two-seat crew accommodations, a mix of short, medium, and long-range missiles, an internal cannon, two TF-30 turbofans, and track-while-scan long-range radar. The new fighter was to be capable of patrolling 100-200 miles from its carrier, remaining on station for up to two hours. A secondary close support role was also envisaged for the aircraft, and the plane was to be capable of carrying up to 14,500 pounds of bombs. Maximum speed was to be Mach 2.2.
::Range, station, speed, and strike capability were mentioned.....nothing about turning radius, nor ability to fight new Russian fighters. Guess not. --Mmx1 00:36, 28 June 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Who determines if his statement is true? That's where you start comparing credentials. Keep in mind that the Grumman 303 had 6 versions  and the final choice was ultimately determined by the Navy's requirements, not Grumman's. --Mmx1 01:35, 28 June 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Attempt to insert "air superiority" into article

message: The final undoing of McNamara's vision would be the one factor ommitted from the TFX specification, that had been decisive in every prior air war. What was thought to be obsolete by the missle age was maneuverability in a dogfight. In 1965, the fighter community was shocked when the F-111's forerunner, the supersonic F-105 was shot down by post-Korean war vintage Mig-17s which were slow but nimble.Rand report: Return of the Air Superiority Fighters The Sparrow medium range missle was unreliable and ineffective at close range, but guns, deleted as excess weight from the F-4, often were effective.  When the Navy ordered Grumman to study the effectivess of the F-111B in such a scenario, they concluded it was much less maneuverable than the F-4, and would not survive, much less win in a dogfight. The F-111B was cancelled in 1968, but the silver lining was that the F-111s dogfight performance was so abysmal, and the accountants approach to fighter design was so discredited, that both the Navy and USAF embarked on studies on what would become a generation of 4 new air superiority fighters. The Navy would soon start realistic air combat training that would become Top Gun, and the F-14 would be the first of the famous teen-series fighters that embraced a new philosiphy that incorporated agility as at least one of the primary design goals. 
:problems with this:
:*much of this paragraph is irrelevant to the F-14 and is trying to draw an uncited link between the Than Hoa incident and the development of the F-14 that is not supported by the cited source.
:*The RAND report actually reads
The Navy soon awarded a contract
to Grumman for a study evaluating the F-111B’s capabilities in combat
against the new Soviet fighters. In October, Grumman reported that the F-111B
would not be able to cope with the new Russian fighters in a dogfight. More
importantly, Grumman submitted an unsolicited design proposal, based on
company design studies under way since 1966, for a totally new fighter that
could meet the Navy’s fleet air-defense needs.
:and the florid language "survive, much less win a dogfight" is inappropriate.
:The "accountant's" approach to fighter design was not discredited by this study nor were the "accountant's" directly in opposition with the "fighter mafia". In fact, the Air Force had to scramble to prevent the consolidation of their F-X with the Navy's VFX proposal. There were three main influences on fighter design in the 1970's
:*The "accountant's" view (which as a derisive title is not wholly appropriate either) was not a approach to fighter design per se, but just the idea that costs could be cut by combining requirements, championed by the "whiz kids" headed by McNamara. This was heavily opposed by most military officers, including members of both of the following:
:*The institutional, BVR, "need a big radar and lots of missiles" camp, softened by the lessons of Vietnam but still strong.
:*The "fighter mafia" of Boyd, Spey, et al that wanted to move away from the interceptor mentality towards ACM.
:The following is a good read on the Air Force history w.r.t. the fight between the latter 2 camps. . What's important to note is that the "accountant's" view was not an internal struggle between officers, but an imperiative that came from the civilian control that both camps resisted. The paragraph in question paints a simplistic picture that the failure of the F-111B to match up to the purported abilities of the Mig-23 and Mig-25 marked victory for the "fighter mafia" over the "accountants" and the institutional interceptor view and spurred everything from a shift in fighter design to an emphasis in ACM, is wrong. The reality is more complicated and nuanced than that, and this account does reality little justice. --Mmx1 18:26, 28 June 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Removed para 

message: So you're a software engineer that can't close tags properly. And that's something you are purportedly a professional in. Let's dissect this.
*First of all, and most egregiously, you're putting words in Admiral's mouths. You wrote:
Gentlemen, there isn't enough thrust in Christen-dom to make that F-111 into a [agile] fighter
Now, I'm not sure if it's you or Mr. Tillman (your source) who put in the "[agile]", but either way, Connolly definitely didn't say "agile". He has variously been quoted as saying "...make a [carrier] fighter" or "...make a fighter", but google turns up no version of the quote where agile is used. So having done that, how am I supposed to believe the rest of your assertions and that they weren't taken out of context? Funny, because Connolly contradicts you. He doesn't say "there isn't enough wing area", he doesn't say "there isn't enough lift", he says "there isn't enough thrust". Clearly his conception of a fighter involved something other than turning really tightly.
*Even if I assume good faith and presume that Mr. Brown spoke exactly as quoted, is he a reliable source? He was not just a test pilot for Grumman, he was later a VP for Grumman. That's like asking Bill Gates or Steve Ballmer about MS-DOS. Sure...they were there....can you trust them to give an unbiased picture? Um...no. I've already established above the Modern Marvels is nothing less than a circle-jerk about technology and hardly an unbiased (nor unflawed) source.
*You're daring editors to revert you? "I dare you to revert that, unless you believe you are a more reliable source than Grumman's original test pilot" You know what, I'll take you up on it. I wouldn't have originally, but putting words in Adm. Connolly's mouth is so egregious that I can't assume good faith about other sources that so far only you've seen.
*Moreover, the analogy to AH-1 and M-1 are
::*original research
::*flawed. Since you're talking about the decision to "keep" the AH-1, I assume you're talking about the 2000's acquisition of the AH-1Y upgrade, which was motivated primarily by the ability to keep a common logistical train between the AH-1 and the UH-1 - they're 70-80% common in parts, particularly the drivetrain and tail assembly. It also involved simply rebuilding existing airframes as opposed to buying new....so money was indirectly a factor, but it was not as simple as (X is cheaper than Y).
p.s. according to tv.com, the program misidentified Mig-25's as Mig-23's, which is about par with the Marine Corps/Army switch they did in the M-16 episode. Okay...27's as 23's I can understand - same airframe, different nose. Mistaking a fixed wing plane for a swing-wing? These are the people you're using as a source????!??!?
p.p.s. watching Modern Marvels:Aircraft carrier now.....let's see what other fun stuff I can find. 
--Mmx1 04:47, 29 June 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Response - making shit up again

message: I propose the involved parties take a one week break from editing this article or commenting in the talk space. ericg ✈ 09:31, 29 June 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  calm. down. 

message: The VFX and FX are virtual twins spec and philosiphy wise except for Phoenix. If the FX was built for dogfighting, then the VFX was .... not??
http://www.sci.fi/~fta/atf-1.htm
The USAF initiated its FX program, while the USN discarded its troubled F-111B bomber turned interceptor in favour of the new VFX. Both the VFX and FX exploited new propulsion technology, discarding afterburning turbojets in favour of afterburning turbofans which offered much better specific fuel consumption in dry thrust and a higher ratio of afterburning thrust to dry thrust. Experience in Vietnam clearly indicated that the endurance/combat radius of the 400 NM class F-4 was inadequate and hence the VFX and FX were designed to a 1000 NM class combat radius. Climb and turn performance dictated low wing loading and good AoA performance this in turn shaping the wing and inlet designs. 
First to fly was Grumman's VFX, designated the F-14A, a large twin with swing wings and a pair of TF-30 fans. The F-14A had a large bubble canopy for good visibility during dogfights, a Head Up Display (HUD) gunsight, computer controlled automatic wing sweep and glove vane positioning, a massive AWG-9 pulse Doppler air intercept/fire control radar system capable of tracking multiple targets in ground clutter and an internal M-61 gun. It was bigger, more complex and more expensive than the F-4, but it also offered agility and manoeuvrability without precedent. The first of the teen series fighters had thus made its mark. --matador300 00:46, 1 July 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  VFX vs FX 

message: http://www.georgespangenberg.com/a13.htm
Exhibit A-13. A Retype of a paper by GAS published by the Association
of Naval Aviation, The Gold Book of Naval Aviation - 1985 Naval
Aviation Planning A Retrospective View (and some lessons for 1995)
This 1960's VFAX concept was a two place, twin-engined, variable sweep
design which 
** bettered in all respects the characteristics of the F-4 as a fighter  **
and the A-7 as an attack airplane. New technology engines
and a new weapon system were required to meet these goals in a design
about the size and weight of the F-4. VFAX became part of the Navy's
plan for the future, until the F-111B proved itself unusable,
eliminating the constraint which had justified it.
The final step in the developments of the F-111B period was what
proved to be a real solution to the carrier fighter problem. In
essence, this was done by adding Phoenix and AWG-9 to VFAX, thereby
completing the circle, nearly returning to where we had been in 1961
with the "Navy TFX". Still another "Fighter Study" was completed
showing that 
*** VFX, as it was called, was more effective and more cost
effective than the F-111B plus F-4, VFAX, *****
or other alternatives. After a competition, VFX became the F-14 Tomcat
when a contract was awarded to Grumman in early 1970.
****** The F-14's design mission was in the air superiority role
carrying four Sparrows on a fighter escort mission.  *****
A radius of 565 miles using internal fuel was estimated by the Navy.
The FAD mission was treated as an overload, carrying six Phoenix
missiles and external fuel. An attack capability carrying a wide
variety of conventional stores with a visual delivery accuracy equal
to the A-7E was also provided for in the basic design.
http://www.georgespangenberg.com/vf1.htm
** VFAX was designed to complement F-111B, F-14 would replace both **
The F-111B was most nearly useful when employed in a fleet air defense
role, in effect acting as a MISSILEER but with half the capability.
Other fighter missions, such as escorting attack airplanes, 
*** had to be done with a higher performance, more maneuverable, ***
and more versatile airplane than the F-111B. Grumman, associated with
General Dynamics, had performed F-111 improvement studies, under
contract, ranging from minor changes to complete redesigns. McDonnell
had also studied, under contract, various improvements to the F-4,
including a design with a variable sweep wing. A new airplane, to
complement the F-111B, was also under study by everyone. This design
finally evolved as a multi-mission airplane, VFAX, capable of
performing better than a F-4 as a fighter, and better than the A-7 as
an attack airplane. The concept was valid only under the premise that
it was complementary to the AWG-9 and Phoenix capability represented
by the F-111B. However, as the latter design degraded in
attractiveness, by 1967 and 1968, very serious study efforts were
undertaken to find a true solution of the Navy's fighter problem. In
essence, this finally evolved as upgrading the VFAX to carry the AWG-9
fire control system and the Phoenix missiles. The first definitive
studies were completed by Grumman and provided the information by
which the Navy convinced itself and the Congress, if not OSD, that a
new fighter, VFX, could be produced which was more effective and less
costly than continuing the F-111B and providing an adequate
complementary fighter. 
*** The F-14, the only fighter designed to counter the full spectrum
of the projected threat against the fleet, was finally on its way.  ***
--matador300 01:07, 1 July 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  VFAX was to be better fighter than F-4, replaced by VFX 

message: I have made changes to the article that will hopefully resolve dispute, and I am posting a list here:
*lowercase "j" in jets
*cut "much less win" from sentence "survive, much less win a dogfight." if it won't survive then it's obvious it won't win, extra phrase is redundant
*added ' to indicate possessive
*rm hopefully unneeded hidden message
*rm widely spaced engines adding hardpoints, F-14 doesn't make use of extra space
::What do you mean, doesn't make use of the extra space?  The center four AIM-54 racks go between the engine pods, or the center four Sparrows in semi-recessed mounts (in a different arrangement).  And please sign your posts.  Georgewilliamherbert 06:37, 1 July 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Dispute, and changes to article 

message: Okay, I'm open to compromise and I recognize I've taken a hardline stance. But I remain adamant that maneuverability was neither a primary design consideration for the Tomcat nor a primary reason for the cancellation of the TFX. The Navy didn't like the TFX from the day they were ordered to cooperate with the Air Force.
Now regarding the first edits by LWF, I feel they are fine, but there are some serious issues that still need to be addressed:
*it would be the F-4 Phantom, the plane that the F-111 was intended to replace, that would be the last US fighter to fly in all three American air arms using fast jets, excelling in all fighter and bomber roles.
:*well, I don't know what "using fast jets" is supposed to mean, and "excelling in all fighter and bomber roles is a stretch given its Vietnam era criticisms.
*The final undoing of McNamara's vision would be the one factor omitted from the TFX specification, that had been decisive in every prior air war. What was thought to be obsolete by the missile age was maneuverability in a dogfight.
:Should be deleted from everywhere it appears in wiki, including the F-111. Maneuverability was not decisive in "every prior air war". And any statement to the effect of "decisive in every ___ war" ought to be viewed with a healthy dose of skepticism. It should read: "What finally convinced civilian oversight to accede to military demands to cancel the TFX were its dismal performance as compared to the (now known to be overestimated) abilities of the newly revealed Mig-23 and Mig-25" This whole paragraph needs to be heavily rewritten to strike the POV (accountant's view was so thoroughly discredited? This is another area where Wiarthurhu's bias shows. While joint programmes lost steam, systems analysis essentially took over weapons acquisitions and is now present at every level of it. Hell, just a few years later the AF/Navy did another joint program in the LWF, which the Navy pulled out of. And now we're at it again with the JSF.
:Discussion of the development should foil developer(Grumman) claims against Navy requirements.
*If you're to compare Sparrows and guns.....where's the Sidewinder?
*A lighter airframe gave a better thrust to weight ratio than the smaller Phantom, 
:*This makes no sense. The Tomcat has a higher empty weight than the F-4. It's the increased thrust that improved t/w....not by much though.
*It also handily beat A-4 Skyhawk aggressors simulating the Mig-17 which had caused so many problems over Vietnam, and sealed the fate of the F-111B.
:*Uncited and goes against all anecdotal evidence. Also "sealed the fate"? The F-111B was already dead. 
:What should be included is a comparison of the Tomcat against other interceptors and swing-wing planes, because it is unique in that it's computer-assisted variable swing makes it probably the most maneuverable in either class.
*"tradition of retaining less expensive but still effective weapons like the AH-1 and M-60"
:*OR statement that oversimplifies reality. The Corps tends to turn down expensive purchases, as it did the AH-64. But the Corps then went to purchase an upgraded AH-1W after rejecting the AH-64, and is currently rebuilding the AH-1. The Corps did also eventually purchase the M-1. You could also say that the Corps has a "tradition of retaining less complex but still effective weapons". I just think this questionable judgement call should be nuked altogether.
--Mmx1 03:07, 1 July 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: The VFAX was a lightweight aircraft designed to mix short-range aerial combat with a strike ability to complement the F-111B. The VFX could not have been as simple as VFAX + Phoenix (and AWG-9), because the VFX had no strike capacity. Hell, if they wanted fleet defense + short-range aerial combat + strike....that was the TFX. --Mmx1 03:29, 1 July 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Revisions 

message: My main problem with Wiarthurhu's edits is that they grossly oversimplify the issue. He takes something true, like "maneuverability is important to fighters" and twists it into "maneuverability was decisive in every previous air war". Similarly, regarding the VFAX:
:The VFAX was a lightweight aircraft designed to mix short-range aerial combat with a strike ability to complement the F-111B. The VFX could not have been as simple as VFAX + Phoenix (and AWG-9), because the VFX had no strike capacity. Hell, if they wanted fleet defense + short-range aerial combat + strike....that was the TFX. --Mmx1 03:29, 1 July 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Oversimplification

message: Well, I have spent quite a bit of my Friday night reading these sources. I'd found Mr. Spangenberg's recollections  interesting, and as he was part of NAVAIR he seemed to be an unbiased source. Bad assumption. He was a supporter of the F-14 against the hi/low mix and efforts to buy the F-18.
It seems clear that those who advocate high/low mixes in the fighter field should provide a rationale to support the concept. At the moment, the net result will be a lower capability at a higher cost -- hardly the goal being sought.
For the Navy, the F-18 fighters are costing much more than an equal number of F-14s would have cost.
Gee, he'd have no reason to hype the capabilities or history of the F-14!
Let that be a warning to you. History is a difficult nut to crack and biases are rampant. --Mmx1 05:08, 1 July 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  The danger of selective quotation 

message: I've updated further the many innovations that made the F-14 agile, incorporating the latest sweep of the internet and my reference books that I could find. I also pulled the long history out of the main page. The F-14 page is probably now the most extensive network of articles of any WP aircraft, and I only have Mmx1 to thank to get me angry enough amass such a huge pile of research.  Enjoy, and please I need wingmen to help keep Mmx1 off of my tail, though he may succeed in shooting down a couple of other innocent WP articles in the melee. --matador300 16:33, 4 July 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: For reasons of verifiability and copyright, it is customary to add references to material added to articles. Though you may have a stack of books, other wikipedia editors have no idea if you have directly copied the information or misrepresented it somehow. Though I assume good faith this seems to be a controversial issue and it might be best to cite your sources for the statements.  can be useful, but I find that m:Cite/Cite.php is most useful. It makes nice footnotes that are easy to follow and easy to cite multiple statements with the same source. This article has some references at the bottom, but having general references can be misleading and its better to cite through-out the article. This article will never be a "good article" or a featured article until it is cited properly. I sure someone could help cite if you have problems. --Dual Freq 17:04, 4 July 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Comments on latest F-14 revision 

message: Several uses of the word operational in the list despite being non-operational. I'm not sure how to fix those, several wouldn't be true if it was simply changed to formerly operational. I would also think the entire section belongs at the end of the article. No point in having a list right up front, but I'm not sure where it should go towards the end. I didn't change the section due to the mediation issue. --Dual Freq 01:49, 7 July 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Frankly, I think it should be dropped.  This article is filling up with trivia and only peripherally related topics.  How is the Plymouth Superbird relevant?  The section "Hi Lo" is not about the F-14; it's about a related naval aviation tactic and really doesn't belong in an F-14 article.  It's also in the wrong location, embedded in the USN operational history section.  And what's the obsession with the F/A-18?  Isn't it sufficient to say that the F-14 was replaced by the F/A-18E/F?  Is it really necessary to mention is fourteen different times?  I'm in favor of a top-to-bottom edit of the article to streamline and re-focus it. Dabarkey 05:22, 7 July 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Problem with first and most section

message: There aren't any images in the article clearly showing it unswept. How about including
:Image:Wing.tomcat.unswept.750pix.jpg? -- Jeandré, 2006-07-16t20:19z
Um, other than the one at top? --Mmx1 16:42, 4 August 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Unswept image?

message: Hell, this term even appears on the F-14 Tomcat Wikipedia discussion page.
An article has been created defining this term, and subsequently nominated for deletion by purists who have identified him/themselves there.  If you believe that the concept "Hornet Mafia" is as real as "UFO sighting", or if you believe that WP should not have an article for anything that isn't the the Brittanica, please participate at Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/Hornet Mafia --matador300 17:15, 10 August 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Hornet Mafia, Article Deletion Nomination

message: *Didn't know how best to include at least the dates of the final traps into the article, but thought I would pass it along to the group for input.  Also added it to the external links. — MrDolomite | Talk 18:16, 17 August 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  NavyTimes.com Final Flight Video 

message: To satisfy a certain editor who insisted on scattering useless tags all over the article challenging obvious facts I already showed him before, I've supplied references. Sheesh, and I don't get any thanks for the work I do. --matador300 18:00, 21 August 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Got rid of !@#$% verification tags 

message: -Wiarthurhu, before creating a seperate page for the F-14s Iranian service history I think we need a general consensus weather it should be incorporated into the text of the F-14s general history, or really deserves its own seperate article. Aircraft articles must be comprehensive and stand on their own. All the other aircraft articles I've written and edited have included the service history of the plane for all of its users. In other words we don't have one article about the Spitfire in RAF service, another for its U.S. service history, and another for Australian operations, and so on. I believe that the plane's Iranian operations belong in the body of the text on the F-14s overall history to be consistant with aviation articles on this site.--Ken keisel 17:10 21 August 2006 (UTC)
:First off, please note the citations used, (11) is not acceptable. Please use the Citation tags that I have added. Second, this 2 kills with 1 AIM-54 sounds ridiculous and in my opinion casts doubt on the entire reference. Since this reference seems unreliable, I wouldn't mind if the whole section was deleted. Yeah, I read the bit above that it was in the Smithsonian mag, but it still comes down to some pilot saying, I saw two blips, shot 1 missile and the two blips went away. More likely is the targets detected the launch with a radar warning receiver and they went low flying in different directions resulting in losing both targets. Depending on the range the phoenix flew, it would have lost a lot of inertia / maneuverability and wouldn't likely hit 1 fighter let alone 2. (Or 4 as this author originally asserted) Has there ever been a 2 kills, 1 missile incident outside Iran? If not, I bet this story is not true. Dual Freq 02:16, 22 August 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: We can debate endlessly on the validity of Tom Cooper's writings. He's certainly not the best writer in the world (he has a tendency to cite quotes before introducing the reader to the speaker), and he's offered such ridiculous statements as four kills with one AIM-54, unfortunately he's really the only author who's gotten anywhere trying to document the use of the F-14 in Iran. In fairness to him, what he's reporting is no different than what was being published in England and the U.S. about the kills during the "Battle of Britian" which were generally exaggerated by roughly 600%. Aerial combat is confusing and very difficult to document, and far more so when it's occuring in a secretive country like Iran during a war that we could only watch through the eyes of AWACS, and then only occassionally. Since the Smithsonian felt it worthy to publish a downplayed version of his accounts I'd say we have to go along with their decision until something better comes along.-Ken keisel 10:20, 23 August 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: We need a consensus on moving the Iranian service to a seperate article

message: What about the attrition and numbers, anyone have any better source for that information so I can add it to the variants section? Dual Freq 22:37, 23 August 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Attrition