Talk:Moral objectivism

message: This page was voted on for deletion at Wikipedia:Votes for deletion/Objective morality.  dbenbenn | talk 23:12, 24 Mar 2005 (UTC)
replies: text: This article is going to need a lot of work - so, for now, I'm just serving notice of my intention. Among other things, I find it surprising that a marginal figure to moral philosophy like Ayn Rand gets mentioned in the lead, while there is little if any focus on the most important thinker who argued for an objectively binding morality, namely Kant. Metamagician3000 03:58, 23 December 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  History 

message: I read the moral objectivism and moral relativism article, but I did not find that either position accomodated the notion that moral judgments are rooted in human nature, by which I mean biological fact, and that this is probably a nessesary part of the evolution of organisms that form societies of autonomous individuals.
Thus, helping people is "good" in much the same way that soap "tastes disagreeable". It's rooted in the kind of animals we are.
So, to what article does the position that morals are neither objective in the sense of being unrelated to human experience, nor subjective in the sense of being different from person to person, belong? —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Paul Murray (talk • contribs) 04:06, 16 January 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: No, moral relativism is essentially opposed to such a view (morality can't be relative to culture if it's rooted in our nature as human beings).  Objectivism says something like this, but not in crude social-Drawinism terms (which essentially explaine morality away rather than explaining it).  When I've had a chance to expand this article properly, it should bring this all out. --Mel Etitis  (Talk) 23:28, 27 April 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Biology 

message: As Canuck-Errant and Metamagician3000 have pointed out, Moral realism covers precisely the same topic as this article. If "moral realism" is in fact distinct from "moral objectivism", I don't see any indication of that in either article, so I think they should be merged. — Elembis (talk) 03:04, 7 March 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Moral objectivism is sometimes called moderate realism, so it might make sense to merge -- but there is so much to say about each position that separate articles would be a more realistic option. --163.1.43.125 13:59, 24 April 2007 (UTC)

text: Moral objectivism is the epistemological claim that ethical statements have mind-independent truth-values. Moral realism is one way of explaining that claim: by making the further, metaphysical, claim that moral facts or moral values really exist. 1Z 15:55, 24 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: That's not the way the terms are used in the literature.  The anon is right to say that objectivism is often called moderate realism; it developed in part as a result of the response to attacks on realism by writers like Mackie.  McDowell explicitly makes this point in his development of the thesis, pointing out that Mackie's arguments from queerness assume that realism must be "extreme" (treating moral values as like primary qualities), but realism can be "moderate" (objectivism — treating moral values as like secondary qualities).  I think that merging the two articles would be a mistake.  --Mel Etitis  (Talk) 22:18, 24 April 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Agreed. The quote given from Richard Boyd is particularly misleading, as well, as he is a moral naturalist which a) is only one type of moral realism and b) is quite distinct from McDowell's theory, to the point of having barely anything in common with it - particularly since McDowell openly despises "scientism". I'm not even sure why that's on there, unless someone's confused enough to be conflating Cornell Realism and moral objectivism. In any case, moral objectivism is a sub-class of moral realism, not the other way around, so if any merging is to be done it should be moral objectivism into moral realism. 129.234.4.76 14:03, 7 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: What name would you give to the claim that moral propositions have mind-independent truth values, but that moral values don't exist at all, primarily , secondarily, naturally, or whatever? (cf mathematical formalism) 1Z 15:49, 7 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: You'd have to tell me what would allow moral propositions to have mind-independent truth values if there were no such thing as moral values in order for me to answer that - i.e., what is it by reference to that makes them true or false? There's quite a few different options, so being specific would help narrow things down a bit. Unless your point is that moral propositions have mind-independent truth values without reference to anything, in which case I'd say Mackie's error theory is the closest to that - although don't quote me on it, since it's been a while since I've looked at anything of Mackie's other than his queerness arguments. Certain forms of expressivism might come close, as well - possibly Blackburn's quasi-realism. 129.234.4.76 16:19, 7 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: "You'd have to tell me what would allow moral propositions to have mind-independent truth values if there were no such thing as moral values in order for me to answer that - i.e., what is it by reference to that makes them true or false?" -- I don't see why. It is not usually necessary to fully defend a claim in order to put a label on it. Arguably , no claim has been been fully defended, although many have been labelled. 1Z 16:44, 7 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: I'm not entirely sure what your point is. I asked for clarification because I need it; the answer to your question will be entirely different dependent upon whether the referent of the moral propositions actually exists or not. If it actually exists, then I would need further clarification because dependent on the referent, the theory may be realist or anti-realist, and the specifics of that clarification would allow me to name a type within those categories. If there is no referent, then, as I said, either Mackie or Blackburn - so either error theory or quasi-realism - would be closest to what you've said. I cannot answer your question until you give me the information I need, because the lack of information means that it could go almost anywhere. You're asking me to name the species of something you've only described as an animal. 129.234.4.76 17:14, 7 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: The claim that moral propositions have truth values is obviously not an error theory, and the claim that they do not refer at all is hardly realism. Blackburn may feel that they need to function as if they do but not all people-who-believe-moral-propositions-have-mind-independent-truth-values  (I cannot yet use the convenient term "moral objectivists") need agree. 1Z 20:10, 7 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Same anon here, different IP. I'm afraid you're betraying your ignorance of the topics you're arguing about here: "The claim that moral propositions have truth values is obviously not an error theory" being a prime example, because it's wrong. Mackie's error theory is that moral propositions *do* have truth values, but that they're all false. Your summary of Blackburn is an oversimplification, as well, but that's not much of a problem seeing as Blackburn is difficult to fully understand, and that simplification is as accurate as a simplification can be, despite your apparent misconception of what quasi-realism is. The "quasi" is important. From your overall comments, it would appear that you're arguing for your own theory (or your own idea of a theory) and not attempting to learn about the actual academic classifications currently extant, and thus Wikipedia is not the place for this discussion. If you want to learn more about these topics, I would suggest the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy as a good starting place, in particular - given the context here - the articles on Moral Naturalism, Moral Non-Naturalism, and Moral Realism. The references in those articles should provide sufficient further reading to enlighten you of the information you are missing. At that point, I will be glad to reopen this discussion, should you feel willing. 81.76.88.183 20:51, 7 May 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Merging ''Moral realism'' here 

message: This basically says a debate has lead some into a philosophy neither side of the debate favors ... I'd like to see a source for that. I mean, it's like "Says who?" It can be (and sometimes is) argued that all moral relativists choose that philosophy for entirely unrelated reasons.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 69.243.242.58 (talk) 19:46, 31 May 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  The debate has lead some? 

message: I've just removed the following two paragraphs from the article: the former seems a better fit for moral universalism, as it obliquely references universalist forms of ethical subjectivism such as divine command theory (and I'm about to see if it can be adapted for that article in a moment); the latter, as far as I can tell, is just original research.
Models of objective morality may be atheistic, deistic (in the case of Enlightenment philosophers), monotheistic (in the case of the Abrahamic religions), or polytheistic (in the case of Hinduism). The moral codes may stem from reason, from the divine, or from a combination of the two. These various systems differ on the meta-ethical question of the nature of the objective morality, but agree on its existence. It is this diversity between existing codes of objective morality, and the continued debates over  the meta-ethical justification of morality, that lead some to reject the concept entirely, in favour of ethical subjectivism or other forms of moral relativism.
Advocates of objective morality have proposed a number of means to bridge the gap between the objective and subjective.  Others dismiss the need to do so altogether due to the allowance of objectivity from relativistic opposition.
-Pfhorrest (talk) 06:43, 2 October 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Moved from article page