Talk:Reliabilism

message: I appreciate the work that went into the earlier drafts of this article, but basically, they were obviously written by someone who lacks the philosophical sophistication to do this topic justice.  It would have been OK if I had to rearrange a little here and there, change a few words, add a few qualifiers.  In fact, I had to completely rewrite the thing--nary a sentence was left standing in its original form.  Maybe I'm a little sensitive since Swain was on my dissertation committee, but jeez.
Basically, I think we should write articles about what we know enough about to be able to do an acceptable job, where "acceptable job" means "a job such that an expert on the topic would not have to completely rewrite the article from the beginning and change every sentence in it."  Unless we have this attitude when we work on the 'pedia, it's going to get filled up with a lot of really bad cruft. --Larry_Sanger
:Plantinga at least, would resist your assertion that reliabilism can be understood as just a further analysis of what justificaiton means.  His book "Warrant the Current Debate" clearly possitions his views as a departure from the classical view of justification.  In fact, he intentionally refuses to use the word justification in describing his own theory of knowlege.Mark Christensen
::It's been a while since I've read that book, but I disagree that it offers a radical departure from the classical view of justification.  He says, as most epistemologists do, that justification is a deontological concept (as I say in Ch. 1, Sect. 1 of my dissertation), and says that warrant, allegedly not a deontological concept, is a more interesting concept to analyze--that's how I remember it.  In fact, I believe it's of the concept of warrant that Plantinga gives his account, not either of knowledge or of justification.  Besides, on any account Plantinga would certainly not deny that reliabilism can be understood as an analysis of what justification means; any epistemologist knows that. --Larry_Sanger
:::That's true as far as it goes, but you have to admit that warrant, knowlege and justification are inherently going to be bound together conceptually, so that one cannot give a full acount of one of the three without at least commenting on the other two. If my memory serves, Plantinga argues that the deontological nature of classical justification is an inherent flaw, which can best be addressed by accepting his particular brand of externalist reliabilism based on an analysis of proper function.   His account of warrant is thus intended to be free from both the normative and internalist aspects of classical justification (which he takes to be the two essential components of a theory of justification), and is therefore intended as an account of a reliabilism as a theory of knowledge which is explicitly not just a clarification of the classical notion of justification.
:::It may be that Plantinga is wrong, and that his view is actually compatible with the classical understanding of justification, or it may be that Plantinga's view is inherently problematic, but unless my memory is very faulty, Plantinga is very intentional about attempting to offer a critique of, and an alternative to, the classical view of justification. Mark Christensen
::I'm not sure what your point with this long discussion is, Mark.  Yes, your interpretation of Plantinga is correct.  It doesn't have a lot of bearing on the present article, though. --LMS
::: My point is that Plantinga and other reliablists sometimes seem to me to believe that they are providing an alternitive to the clasical JTB theory, and we should probably take them at their word.  Certianly to say they are wrong is a controvercial claim which should be attributed.  I have changed the article to reflect this point.
::The article didn't, or at least shouldn't have, said that they're wrong to regard reliabilism as an alternative to the JTB analysis.  Yes, many people have so regarded it.  Apparently, a line or part of a line I wrote was deleted somehow--the claim in question wasn't even grammatical. --Larry_Sanger
:::Perhaps there was a missing line -- how would I know? But the article is better now, so thanks.  One thing is still not clear in that paragraph  -- some versions of reliablisim may be compatable with JTB theory, while others may not.  This is not just a matter of some reliablists believing and others not beliving relaiablism to be compatable.  As it is I think the paragraph suggests that these acounts can all be seen as compatable, but some reliablists, aren't willing to do this. 
If "Reliabilism" is the correct spelling why isn't "reliabilist" instead of realiablist"? Ted Longstaffe
:::Plantinga isn't a reliabilist, he's a proper-functionalist.  One can be a reliabilist without being a proper-functionalist and one can be a proper-functionalist without being a reliabilist.  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 188.220.247.19 (talk) 18:18, 21 July 2012 (UTC)
thread_title: comment

message: visual sense-perception through opaque surfaces in daylight
This seems too obvious of a mistake to not have been corrected, so I must be mistaken about it being a mistake, right?? -- SS 18:24, 23 Aug 2004 (UTC)
thread_title:  oops? 

message: Extensive discussion of Brandom's parrot example but no citation. Please provide.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 152.16.225.228 (talk) 19:33, 7 March 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Citations??? 

message: Can anyone confirm source for this part of the intro:
One knows that p (p stands for any proposition--e.g., that the sky is blue) if and only if p is true, one believes that p is true, and one has arrived at the belief that p through some reliable process.
I only ask as this base principle seems to be shown lacking as per the 'Farmer Field' scenario. Also, I dont think Ive ever read Goldman (or any published reliabilist) proposing this principle. Foolosofur (talk) 02:50, 25 August 2013 (UTC)
thread_title:  Page intro