Talk:Normative ethics

message: I'm not sure it's true that normative ethics doesn't care why something is wrong.  Most normative ethical theories are along the lines of "things of the following sort are wrong: ...; this thing is of that sort; therefore, this thing is wrong."  {A normative ethical theory that failed to provide any reasons for its pronouncements wouldn't be taken very seriously (even religion-based normative ethics provide "God so decreed it" as a "why"). -Delirium 07:18, Sep 11, 2003 (UTC)
Also the further reading link doesn't work.
:Um, really old complaint that was never fixed- I'm changing it.
I also added a "Moral Theories Section" if anyone has additions- please add. Jsn4 08:17, 3 November 2005 (UTC)
thread_title: broken links

message: I don't know if I've put this in the right place, but I don't see a button for starting a new comment.  
Norm, Normal, Normalcy and some related words should include a couple of concepts.  One is the statistical definition of normal, meaning "typical" or "modal," or in the greatest number (a plurality or majority.)  
It should include a sociological concept relating to the most common practices or beliefs.  Commonly, a thing is ethical or unethical in relation to the beliefs and preferences of the greatest number of people (in a region.)  Strongly-held attitudes may be opposed by attitudes of other groups, having other standards which they consider normal.
Thus, heterosexuality is often called "normal" because it is the condition or practice or belief of the greatest number.  Once a majority believe that homosexuality is not deviant or evil, then it would become "normal" in that sense. Similar statements could be made in regard to racial segregation vs. integration. 
It is also statistically normal that people should die or age, because those are universal conditions.
Normal can also refer to perfection, as in a "normal kidney," meaning a kidney without defect. If most 50-year olds have defective vision, that would be statistically normal for them, and the 50-year-old with perfect vision would be statistically deviant, though his vision would also be "normal" with respect to the perfection definition.
Common speech may refer to norms as socially agreed standards, such that it is the norm to accept a certain practice.  There is a command element involved, but a greater suggestion of agreement by the greatest number.
:The word "norm" has at least two distinct meanings. You're talking about norms in sociology, whereas this article is referring to norms in philosophy. Steohawk (talk) 23:24, 5 September 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  The button is now 

message: Isn't "Descriptive ethics deal with what the population believes to be right and wrong, while normative ethics deal with what the population should believe to be right and wrong" a self-referential statement?  The judgment of what should be believed to be right or wrong will have to be based on what is believed to be right or wrong.  Unless the implication is that the person making the judgment of what the population should believe is removed, not a part of, that population.  So say a philosopher looks at a certain society, and decides what they should believe is right or wrong.  The philosopher bases this decision on their own belief of what is right or wrong.  Then should some other philosopher, perhaps, decide what the society of which the philosopher is a member should believe is right or wrong?  Isn't there, in this reading, a sort of infinite regression?--Thomaswoof 21:54, 11 June 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Self-referential or infinitely regressive? 

message: The first sentence was: "Normative ethics is the branch of philosophical ethics concerned with classifying actions as right and wrong." This definition actually belongs to consequentialism. I'm removing it. The second paragraph also began describing consequentialism. Now the first sentence begins "Normative ethics is the branch of philosophical ethics concerned with what people should believe to be right and wrong.." Still a mess, but at least it's more accurate. Chira (talk) 21:45, 23 May 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Normative ethics needs a better definition 

message: This article presents a false dilemma. Most people believe that certain character traits, actions, and consequences may contain intrinsic value. However, this article seems to be written with the assumption that all ethical theories focus on only one of those three categories. Furthermore, no explanation is provided as to why this assumption is made. Steohawk (talk) 23:37, 5 September 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  False Dilemma 

message: The Article previously stated under consequentialist theories "Consequentialist  libertarianism - which holds that liberty should be maximized."
This is an improper place to list consequentialist libertarianism, as a consequentialist libertarian is someone who believes we should maximize liberty because it brings about the best results, or rather libertarianism maximizes utility. It is a justification of libertarianism, a political theory, justified with consequentialism(ie. utilitarianism), a normative theory. The normative theory is still just plain old consequentialism. 
Moreover the definition doesn't seem to grasp this. It actually sounds a lot more like deontological libertarianism, which is the idea that maximizing liberty is the only thing that is morally correct, and that the consequences of maximizing liberty are irrelevant. 
Dark567 (talk) 16:53, 11 February 2011 (UTC)
thread_title:  Consequentialist libertarianism   

message: From what source is the outline of normative theories adopted? Having read several authors in the field I've found no general consensus concerning this particular categorization.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 83.253.153.210 (talk) 22:32, 26 March 2011 (UTC)
thread_title:  The outline of normative theories 

message: The following paragraph was removed by someone:
Normative ethics and value pluralism
Normative ethics claims that a certain moral theory is "good", or desirable. This can be interpreted in two ways.
* Normative ethics claims, implicitly or explicitly, that the moral theory at hand is the only moral theory possible, and that any other choice is unwarranted or "evil". This can be called moral absolutism. Or,
* Normative ethics makes no claim that the moral theory embraced is the only correct moral theory. Other theories, as described by descriptive ethics, may or may not be warranted, or "good", as well.
The first position holds normative ethics to be in competition with descriptive ethics, whereas the second holds it as complementary to descriptive ethics. In sum, although normative ethics assumes moral universalism, it may or may not assume a degree of (although not full) value pluralism, and it may or may not assume moral absolutism or value monism.
This is an inversion of a similar distinction at the descriptive ethics article. Is it "not exactly true" as the one who removed it claims, and if so, how? Narssarssuaq (talk) 08:25, 26 June 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: First of all normative ethics itself doesn't claim that a moral theory is good or desirable; a normative ethical theory claims that something is good or desirable, and normative ethics is the study of such theories. As such, normative ethics as a whole doesn't (although some particular normative ethical theories may) make any stand on any metaethical issues such as universalism vs relativism or monism vs pluralism, and is always complementary to descriptive ethics, not in competition with it, because they address completely different issues; one asks what really is good/bad/right/wrong/etc, one asks what do people believe is good/bad/right/wrong/etc (although it's possible one's answer to one question may defer to the answer to the other question). You seem to be conflating normativity, universalism, and monism in one camp, and description, relativity, and pluralism in another camp. There is such a thing as normative moral relativism, which is distinct from both meta-ethical and descriptive moral relativism. Normative moral relativism is a normative ethical theory, which stands in competition with universalist normative ethical theories; but descriptive moral relativism is not a normative ethical theory and so is not in competition with any normative ethical theory as it address a different question entirely. Also, "moral absolutism" is a poorly-defined term so I'm not sure what at all you're saying about it in regard to normative ethics here. --Pfhorrest (talk) 09:04, 26 June 2012 (UTC)
replies: text:  Agreed. I think that was an illuminating response. Thank you. Narssarssuaq (talk) 10:09, 26 June 2012 (UTC)

text:  The distinctions between descriptive ethics, normative ethics and meta-ethics are difficult to pinpoint, so I provide some definitions from literature: "Normative ethics research is involved in determining standards of right and wrong, whereas descriptive ethics research is concerned with describing and explaining what exists, most notably ethical and unethical behavior." [Robertson DC (1993) Empiricism in business ethics: Suggested research directions. Journal of Business Ethics 12(8)]. Moreover: "The first sort of ethical inquiry is most commonly called normative ethics and is held to consist in the investigation into what actions are right, are our duty, or ought to be done, what motives are good or praiseworthy, what characters are virtuous, etc., and especially into the most general principles obtainable concerning these matters. The second sort of endeavor open to the moral philosopher is usually known as metaethics, and it is allegedly constituted, at least in part, by questions of the meanings of the various ethical terms and the functions of ethical utterances." [Sumner LW (1967) Normative Ethics and Metaethics. Ethics 77(2)] I still have difficulties grasping how normative ethics as a whole can be seen as "value-free". Does that mean that there is some sort of standardized methodology available in normative ethics as a whole? Narssarssuaq (talk) 07:43, 28 June 2012 (UTC)
replies: text:  Beyond the normal philosophical methodology of appeal to reason and reason alone, there's no special methodology in normative ethics that I'm aware of. As for "value-free", particular normative ethical theories are of course far from value-free, but the field as a whole does not put forth any particular values because the field is defined by the question of what to value, not by any answers to that question. If there was some kind of broad consensus on the answer to that question, you might be able to say that the field put forth some particular values, much like the physical sciences collectively put forth various facts as a result of consensus on the answers to the questions which define them. But like most branches of philosophy there is never such consensus. Saying that normative ethics as a field asserts some sort of values is like saying that ontology as a field asserts something about being; that is what the field is about, but positions within the field diverge greatly so as a whole it doesn't assert anything, it just asks the question, to which there are various contentious answers. --Pfhorrest (talk) 07:58, 28 June 2012 (UTC)
replies: text:  the field is defined by the question of what to value, not by any answers to that question -- I think you have some profound insights here. It would absolutely help the article if this particular issue was included. Narssarssuaq (talk) 09:32, 3 July 2012 (UTC)

text:  Following your logic, descriptive ethics describes moral theories which are actually held by a particular group, whereas normative ethics describes moral theories without connecting them to a particular group. The starting point for inquiry in descriptive ethics is thus a group, whereas the starting point in normative ethics is principles, but apart from this distinction both may end up describing the same matter, except that descriptive ethics is less focused on describing the principles themselves and more interested in the relationship between the principles and the group. Descriptive ethics is thus more connected to social anthropology than to "pure ethics". Or am I mistaken again? Narssarssuaq (talk) 10:56, 3 July 2012 (UTC)

text: Descriptive ethics is appearing in the lede, and yet it (judged by the article alone) seems to be on the periphery of discourse in ethical philosophy. Meanwhile Applied ethics are not constrasted which itself is a huge area of discourse in ethics. Without getting involved in the business of the legitimacy of descriptive ethics, I am going to address it's apparent import. cf. for a RS. (20040302 (talk) 09:46, 4 June 2018 (UTC)
thread_title: Normative ethics and value pluralism

message: a two-page article on ethics that pretends religion doesn’t exist may not have a neutral point of view.  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 98.212.58.117 (talk) 03:43, 6 August 2012 (UTC)
thread_title: avoiding the issue?

message: Normative ethics suggests ethics that are normal, which suggests a meta-ethical narrative of moral relativism. Prescriptive ethics suggests "giving people prescriptions: telling them what to do" which is more accurate and does not betray any a priori commitment to any specific meta-ethical view. I recommend renaming the page "Prescriptive ethics" --BenMcLean (talk) 21:10, 7 September 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: "Normative ethics" is the phrase used by experts in the field, and we would do well to track their usage and not invent our own terms. Besides, you've got your sense-transferral backwards: the sense of "normal" meaning common, typical, or average derives from the assumption that what is common, typical, or average is correct (i.e. metaethical relativism, as you say); the older sense of "normal" was to mean "correct", and "normative" preserves that sense still, "having to do with what is correct". Calling whatever is common, typical, or average "normal" (i.e. correct) is the assumptive usage (in assuming that because it is common, typical, or average, it must be correct), not calling something having to do with what is or isn't correct "normative". --Pfhorrest (talk) 03:03, 8 September 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: My understanding is that "prescriptive ethics" is also used by experts in the field. That is what I have usually heard this referred to as in what I have read. Admittedly, I am not as widely read as I should be - my interest is amateurish. --BenMcLean (talk) 15:58, 12 September 2012 (UTC)
thread_title:  "Normative ethics" misleading term, "Prescriptive ethics" better 

message: While adding citations to the article, I removed Mortimer J. Adler, Jacques Maritain, and Yves Simon from the “Virtue ethics” subsection as I couldn’t find reliable sources explicitly tying these individuals to virtue ethics, specifically. This was in contrast to the ease of finding references for the other scholars listed here, which led me to remove the text rather than add a citation-needed tag. However, I’m not an expert in this field—so I invite anyone with relevant knowledge to add these back with references. Thanks! Magpie7533 (talk) 07:01, 12 March 2024 (UTC)
thread_title:  Removed some names from "virtue ethics" subsection