Talk:Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki/Archive 7

message: That oft-cited quote from the SBS's Summary Report, that "in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped" does not in any way prove that "Japan was ready to surrender" in August. And reading more of the report is worthwhile:
Chapter II The Effects of the Atomic Bombings 3. The Japanese decision to surrender--
: As early as the spring of 1944, a group of former prime ministers and others close to the Emperor had been making efforts toward bringing the war to an end. This group, including such men as Admiral Okada, Admiral Yonai, Prince Knonye, and Marquis Kido, had been influential in effecting Tojo's resignation and in making Admiral Suzuki Prime Minister after Koiso's fall. Even in the Suzuki cabinet, however, agreement was far from unanimous. The Navy Minister, Admiral Yonai, was sympathetic, but the War Minister, General Anami, usually represented the fight-to-the-end policy of the Army. In the Supreme War Guidance Council, a sort of inner cabinet, his adherence to that line was further assured by the participation of the Army and Navy chiefs of staff, so that on the peace issue this organization was evenly divided, with these three opposing the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and Navy Minister. At any time military (especially Army) dissatisfaction with the Cabinet might have eventuated at least in its fall and possibly in the "liquidation" of the antiwar members. 
: Thus the problem facing the peace leaders in the Government was to bring about a surrender despite the hesitation of the War Minister and the opposition of the Army and Navy chiefs of staff. This had to be done, moreover, without precipitating counter measures by the Army which would eliminate the entire peace group. This was done ultimately by bringing the Emperor actively into the decision to accept the Potsdam terms. So long as the Emperor openly supported such a policy and could be presented to the country as doing so, the military, which had fostered and lived on the idea of complete obedience to the Emperor, could not effectively rebel.
: A preliminary step in this direction had been taken at the Imperial Conference on 26 June. At this meeting, the Emperor, taking an active part despite his custom to the contrary, stated that he desired the development of a plan to end the war as well as one to defend the home islands. This was followed by a renewal of earlier efforts to get the Soviet Union to intercede with the United States, which were effectively answered by the Potsdam Declaration on 26 July and the Russian declaration of war on 9 August.
: The atomic bombings considerably speeded up these political maneuverings within the government. This in itself was partly a morale effect, since there is ample evidence that members of the Cabinet were worried by the prospect of further atomic bombings, especially on the remains of Tokyo. The bombs did not convince the military that defense of the home islands was impossible, if their behavior in Government councils is adequate testimony. It did permit the Government to say, however, that no army without the weapon could possibly resist an enemy who had it, thus saving "face" for the Army leaders and not reflecting on the competence of Japanese industrialists or the valor of the Japanese soldier. In the Supreme War Guidance Council voting remained divided, with the war minister and the two chiefs of staff unwilling to accept surrender. There seems little doubt, however, that the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki weakened their inclination to oppose the peace group.
: The peace effort culminated in an Imperial conference held on the night of 9 August and continued into the early hours of 10 August, for which the stage was set by the atomic bomb and the Russian war declaration. At this meeting the Emperor, again breaking his customary silence, stated specifically that he wanted acceptance of the Potsdam terms.
: A quip was current in high Government circles at this time that the atomic bomb was the real Kamikaze, since it saved Japan from further useless slaughter and destruction. It is apparent that in the atomic bomb the Japanese found the opportunity which they had been seeking, to break the existing deadlock within the Government over acceptance of the Potsdam terms.
—wwoods 04:06, 1 March 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Strategic Bombing Survey 

message: :Some of the reinforced concrete buildings in Hiroshima were very strongly constructed because of the earthquake danger in Japan, and their framework did not collapse even though they were fairly close to the center of damage in the city.
Historically, wood-frame buildings have survived earthquakes very well, which the Japanese certainly understand quite well.  I don't think the buildings discussed in this line were so constructed because of the earthquake danger.  Does anyone know enough about Hiroshima to tell whether this line should simply be deleted as uninformed speculation?  Were the particular buildings "very strongly constructed" to survive air raids, perhaps?  Are we talking about 2 buildings, or several dozen?  Tempshill 19:41, 1 March 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Minor question on why there were strong concrete buildings 

message: Obviously a controversial term -- but people use it, so Wiki must report it. Elimination of the word from the "con" side of the "decision" section would be censorship. Keep in mind, the use of the word is presented as one possible argument that can, and has been, made, along with the citation of a historian (Newman) who defended the use of the bomb in spite of accepting that it was an act of terrorism. The purpose of this article is not to care one way or the next on whether or not the bombings were in fact terrorism, it is only to report the facts about what people have argued along with their reasoning. Lucidish 03:02, 4 March 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: A good, well written addition, IMO. KarlBunker 13:31, 4 March 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Use of word "terrorism" 

message: Any objections to migrating the footnotes from WP:FN3 to WP:FN? EricR 19:27, 4 March 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Footnotes 

message: Skywriter, the casualty estimates obviously cover a huge range, so there's no question of the article being factually inaccurate, as long as estimates quoted are called estimates rather than factual figures.
As for neutrality, this issue is under very active discussion, so it's premature to tag the article as non-neutral. KarlBunker 19:52, 17 March 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: The article would be factually inaccurate if Frank did not make that statement in his book. I assume that's not what you're asserting. It's presented as an estimate that was written in a book. The prevailing view among WP editors at the moment is that the Frank figures are too low, and the article will be updated in due course. In the meantime, let's try to stay calm and try to make constructive contributions. KarlBunker 20:56, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

text: C'mon Skywriter -- You can put up the NPOV tag if you want to, but the "factually inaccurate" tag would be, you know, factually inaccurate. As for my reverts today, they've been mainly due to a one-against-many edit war that a user has been waging against all the other editors here for the bast 2 weeks.
Although I am not certain, the above comment appears to have been written by KarlBunker.
skywriter 05:19, 19 March 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Neutrality/accuracy tag

message: Although the verifiablity may be disputed, the neutrality of this article holds. The use of the NPOV tag is so incredibly childish, predictable, and indicative of an anti-US agenda. Just come out and say you are an anti-US liberal, don't defile a perfectly good article with milquetoast tags. Haizum 05:10, 21 March 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Yep, that ridiculous NPOV tag is still there. Wait, I thought the facts were being disputed, not the POV of the article...apparently not. Haizum 01:40, 22 March 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Actually Haizum, until recently this article had an NPOV tag at the insistence of an editor who thought the article was too anti-American in tone, and the balance of the article hasn't changed significantly since then. Just goes to show that it's risky to make assumptions about people's political motivations. Anyway, I don't think it belongs there either. If no one objects here in the next day or so, let's remove it. KarlBunker 12:06, 22 March 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Since it's Wikipedia, it's fair that I assume otherwise. Let's face it. Haizum 01:23, 23 March 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: NPOV

message: Since Parkinsons (et al.) is up to his usual tricks, here's what one of his sources, Robert Butow's Japan's Decision to Surrender (1954) has to say (pp.158–182):
: [Meeting of the Supreme Council on 9 August]
: To Japan, the Soviet Union's entry into the war at this time was decidedly iniquitous but not entirely unexpected. The feeling within the government and the Supreme Command was generally expressed with these words: "What had to come has come." This fatalism, however, was but a poor antidote for the shock with which Japan's war leaders viewed the situation as a whole. The blow dealt them by the Kremlin ... was all the more staggering since it followed the atomic obliteration of a vital nerve center in the very heart of the homeland itself. It was at this moment of unparalleled crisis that the end-the-war advocates crowded upon the stage of national policy previously denied them by the machinations of the fanatics. ... In short, they recognized in the atomic bomb and the Soviet entry into the war not just an imperative need to give in but actually a supreme opportunity to turn the tide against the die-hards...
: [footnote] A claim to the effect that Japan had already decided to accept the Potsdam Proclamation prior to the Soviet Union's entry into the war can be validly applied only to the thinking of a very few individuals. The over-all impression created by the mass of evidence is simply this: When the final news of the Hiroshima disaster reached Tokyo, the members of the end-the-war party realized that they must bring the war to an end at once. By that time—or immediately thereafter—Nagasaki had been bombed and the Soviet Union had come into the war. The feeling then was as follows: "Now, indeed we cannot go on with this war any longer."
: In this atmosphere of immediacy made more terrible by the uncertainty of where and when the next attack would occur (rumor had it that Tokyo would be A-bombed on August 12), the Big Six ... met ...
: [footnote] There is no precise or detailed record of what occurred at this meeting or the meetings which immediately followed. The text, therefore, is a reconstruction based on material contained in the following [list of sources].
: Suzuki, as Premier, opened the session by briefly declaring that the developments of the preceding three days had made it impossible to continue the war. ... Navy Minister Yonai, ... then went on to outline the problem as he saw it. Either Japan could accept the Potsdam Proclamation as it stood, with the sole reservation that the imperial house would be maintained, or she could try to negotiate ... on the questions of disarmament, punishment of war criminals, and an Allied occupation of Japan.
: These points, as Yonai well knew, were the only issues at stake, for no one present—not even the War Minister or the chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs—was any longer opposed, in principle, to an acceptance of the Allied terms. The main argument, as soon became apparent, was simply how far to go in drawing the line.
: The Supreme Council meeting, ... had now consumed nearly two hours. ... The Council was deadlocked, with Suzuki, Togo, and Yonai on the one side and Anami, Umezu, and Toyoda on the other. Although the atomic attack upon Hiroshima had made it impossible for anyone present to continue to deny the urgency of Japan's situation, it apparently had not made a deep enough impression upon the chiefs of staff and the War Minister to make them willing to cast their lot outright for a termination of the war.
: While the two sides were still debating the issue, however, the news that Nagasaki had suffered the fate of Hiroshima was carried into the council chamber. ... Certainly the  fact that a second A-bomb had been dropped did not offer much consolation to those who were wistfully speculating about the total number the United States might have on hand. It was similarly quite useless to suggest that the Soviet invasion of Manchuria was nothing more than an unfounded supposition.
: [Imperial conference on 10 August]
: [footnote] Since apparently no minutes were taken at the imperial conference, it has been necessary to reconstruct what occurred from the material found in various sources. Although the material is either from persons who attended the conference or from those who heard the details immediately after the adjournment, there is naturally a certain amount of variation in their recollections ...
: ... Suzuki quickly recapitulated the major points on which the two opposing factions stood firm and reported that there was a 6-3-5 split within the cabinet—six supporting the sole reservation ...; three demanding the inclusion of [three] additional conditions ...; and five remaining neutral but favoring an over-all reduction in the number of terms.
: [Togo and Anami speak to their positions] ... Umezu arose and continued in much the same vein—taking special care to point up the military's confidence in their ability to deal a smashing blow to the enemy. Although Umezu admitted that the Soviet entry into the war had rendered the situation unfavorable, he declared that he could see no need to abandon the plan to fight a decisive battle in the homeland simply because of the new turn of events. ...
: [Baron Hiranuma, president of the Privy Council questions Togo about diplomatic situation and the proposed terms of surrender.] Satisfied in this quarter, Hiranuma now turned to the military men present. In the course of his remarks, he briefly covered all of the sore points: the daily air raids, ..., the scarcity of food, and , finally, the atomic bomb and the Soviet invasion of Manchuria. In short, Hiranuma wanted to know if the army and navy authorities really had any confidence in their ability to continue the war.
: ... Umezu said that he believed the enemy's use of the atomic bomb might be checked if proper antiaircraft measures were taken, ...
: [Toyoda sides with Anami. Suzuki summarizes the deadlock.] Turning toward the Emperor, Suzuki respectfully announced: "Your Imperial Majesty's decision is requested as to which proposal should be adopted—the one stated by the Foreign Minister or the one containing the four conditions."
:: ... "I was told by those advocating a continuation of hostilities that by June new divisions would be placed in fortified positions at Kujukuri-hama [east of Tokyo, where the Allied invasion was expected] so that they would be ready for the invader when he sought to land. It is now August and the fortifications still have not been completed. [Richard Frank says Hirohito "also made specific reference to the greatly increased destructiveness of the atomic bomb", but Butow doesn't have it.] ... I ... give my sanction to the proposal to accept the Allied proclamation on the basis outlined by the Foreign Minister."
: As those who had been present at the imperial conference began to depart, word was passed that a cabinet meeting would be held immediately ... the assembled ministers ... unanimously approved the "imperial decision." thus legalizing the action taken by the Emperor ... With the state thus committed to a positive policy, the ministers turned their attention to drafting identical notes to be dispatched to the Allied powers.
: The real significance of the explosions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki and of the Soviet dash into Manchuria was that these events produced a shock great enough to crack the walls of the prison. Even this shock did not result in an escape but it did force everyone, the guards and guarded alike, to face the full and glaring light of day ... It was not that the military men had suddenly become reasonable in the hours following the Hiroshima and Nagasaki disasters; ... They were also at a loss for words which could make any lasting impression upon the end-the-war faction. Prior to the dropping of the two A-bombs they had been able to pledge their belief in their ability to meet effectively any action taken by the enemy, but now whatever they said made them look foolish and insincere.
: [On 11 August, a statement was issued to prepare people for the surrender.] Containing the usual platitudes about the spirit of the fighting forces and their unflinching destruction of enemy efforts everywhere, the statement warned the people that the Allies were preparing to invade Japan. To this was added a bitter castigation of the Empire's "diabolical enemies" for their use of a "new-type bomb" with which they were ravaging the innocent, the young and the old, and Japan's fair womanhood—spreading death and destruction "unprecedented, in the history of the human race, in ruthlessness and barbarity." Only the concluding sentences had a completely different cast. Referring to the over-all picture—the coming Allied invasion, the introduction of the new-type bomb, and the Soviet entry into the war—the government statement declared: ...
Really, it's surprising how little emphasis there is on the Soviet invasion.
—wwoods 02:28, 22 March 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Interesting. Thank you. As a rule it's a good idea anyhow to stay away from, or at least to view with a skeptical eye, 50-year-old histories. New information does indeed surface from time to time. --Cubdriver 20:21, 22 March 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Salience of Soviet invasion ''vis-a-vis'' the atomic bomb