Talk:Schulze method/Archive 1

message: Sorry! But I don't think the article made 100% clear the fact on what kind of a voting ballot voters are given. Are they supposed to rank in numerical order their preferences? --Tmh 12:53, 13 Sep 2004 (UTC)
thread_title: Untitled

message: I agree with the move from CSSD to Schulze method. CSSD is a very clumsy name. My own preferred name for the method is "beatpath", but Markus was indeed the first to propose the method, and indeed he does prefer "Schulze method". 
By the way, I'm curious who moved the page. Did you forget to log in, 70.28.246.48? Hermitage 04:12, 19 May 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  move from CSSD 

message: Please explain the heuristics and vote resolution process in terms that can be easily understood by a general audience, both for the benefit of the general public (if this voting method is proposed to replace an existing system, somewhere, this article should be comprehensible), and for the benefit of the Wikipedia community (there is a proposal to adopt this system for the Arbitration Committee elections).  ‣ᓛᖁ[ ᑐ] 20:40, 10 November 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  Technicality 

message: One of the arguments for such a complicated system over something simple such as Approval voting is that groups of people can "target" candidates and not vote for them in an Approval voting system.  Well, so what? That means they don't approve of that candidate.  Which is the point of asking for their approval.  If he were to win, they would oppose his policies as well, dunning his effectiveness.  Otherwise, the individuals in the group should disapprove of the group, because the group disapproves of a candidate they approve of.
This all occurs in plural voting as well.  And the Schulze method doesn't stop politicking from creating voting blocs.  It just makes the math harder, and the bloc members less likely to do their own study and more likely to take the word of the bloc leaders as to which votes to cast...
--216.237.179.238 18:36, 7 December 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  Illogic 

message: I'm having trouble with the use of the term 'heuristic' here, because it suggests a crude and unreliable approach as opposed to a watertight algorithm. Perhaps something like 'paradigm' would be a better choice here. -- Dissident (Talk) 16:01, 26 December 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  Heuristic 

message: Dear Dissident,
suppose R1(X) is the number of voters who strictly prefer at least one other candidate to candidate X. Suppose R2(Y) is the number of voters who strictly prefer candidate Y to at least one other candidate.
Then Schulze(winning votes) satisfies the following two criteria:
*Criterion 1: Suppose d[A,B] > R1(A). Then candidate B is elected with zero probability.
*Criterion 2: Suppose d[A,B] > R2(B). Then candidate B is elected with zero probability.
The first criterion says that, when sufficiently many voters rank candidate A tied for top, then candidate B cannot be elected. The second criterion says that, when sufficiently many voters rank candidate B tied for bottom, then candidate B cannot be elected.
You claim that, when Schulze(winning votes) is being used, then it is always advantageous to give different preferences to the least preferred candidates. However, criterion 2 says that it can also be useful to give the same preference to the least preferred candidates. Markus Schulze 23:11, 22 February 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: No, I already withdrew that too strong statement in Talk:sincere expectation criterion. Instead, I'm saying that given a uniform distribution over all possible rankings for each other voter, breaking the ties at the bottom gives a better expected benefit from the point of view from the voter. I also tried to give a proof for this there, for which I'd appreciate feedback from your side. -- Dissident (Talk) 01:22, 23 February 2006 (UTC)

text: Dear Dissident, when someone introduces a criterion that is original research and then starts claiming that this method satisfies this criterion and that that method violates this criterion, then it isn't "hypocritical" to ask this person to explain his statements. Markus Schulze 12:25, 1 March 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Read again. The hypocrisy I'm referring to is a different matter, namely you making the article assert the compliance of Schulze with the SEC (regardless of strength measurement) without supplying proof, which you did here, here, here, here and here. -- Dissident (Talk) 16:18, 1 March 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Dear Dissident, I want you to remember that it is you who started making unverifiable statements about SEC and the different strength measures . Markus Schulze 16:44, 1 March 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: When I did it, I supplied what I at the time thought was adequate support in the form of an informal proof, which you refused to critique and which I have now withdrawn based on my own findings with no thanks to you. But bringing that as an argument to excuse your reintroducing the criterion in the article (and not just moving it) seems to me like a petty form of retaliatory disruption. Only if you did it because you honestly believed Schulze satisfies the SEC in general, would it have been justified. -- Dissident (Talk) 17:35, 1 March 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  [[Sincere expectation criterion]] 

message: Assume there are 2 other votes (including possible "blank" votes). Then the following are all the cases where a change from A>B=C to A>B>C changes the set of winners:
Other voter 1: B=C>A
Other voter 2: A=B=C
Winners change from: A B C to: A B 
Change in utility: +1/6
Other voter 1: C>B>A
Other voter 2: A=B=C
Winners change from: A C to: A B C 
Change in utility: -1/6
Other voter 1: B>C>A
Other voter 2: A=C>B
Winners change from: A C to: A 
Change in utility: +1/2
Other voter 1: C>A>B
Other voter 2: B>A=C
Winners change from: A C to: A 
Change in utility: +1/2
Other voter 1: C>A=B
Other voter 2: B>A=C
Winners change from: A B C to: A B 
Change in utility: +1/6
Other voter 1: A=C>B
Other voter 2: B>C>A
Winners change from: A C to: A 
Change in utility: +1/2
Other voter 1: C>A>B
Other voter 2: B>C>A
Winners change from: C to: A B C 
Change in utility: +1/3
Other voter 1: A=B=C
Other voter 2: B=C>A
Winners change from: A B C to: A B 
Change in utility: +1/6
Other voter 1: B>A=C
Other voter 2: C>A>B
Winners change from: A C to: A 
Change in utility: +1/2
Other voter 1: B>C>A
Other voter 2: C>A>B
Winners change from: C to: A B C 
Change in utility: +1/3
Other voter 1: B>A=C
Other voter 2: C>A=B
Winners change from: A B C to: A B 
Change in utility: +1/6
Other voter 1: A=B=C
Other voter 2: C>B>A
Winners change from: A C to: A B C 
Change in utility: -1/6
Total change in expected utility: +3/169
-- Dissident (Talk) 20:00, 28 February 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Proof by exhaustion Minimax(winning votes) and Minimax(margins) violate the sincere expectation criterion

message: If we're going to be consistently stringent here, then mention of Condorcet doubly-augmented top tier should also be removed from the article (for now) even if Woodall mentioned it a draft paper, because, as far as I know, it hasn't been officially published anywhere (yet). -- Dissident (Talk) 01:35, 8 March 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: CDTT (2)

message: Substituted at 22:03, 3 May 2016 (UTC)
thread_title: Assessment comment