Talk:Moore's paradox

message: How the hell is this a paradox worthy of discussion?  It's like complaining that your ice cream is too warm.  What the hell do you gain from studying something so absurd?  Since no one would ever truthfully tell you the capitol of NY is Albany but they dont believe it (just like no one would ever complain that their ice cream is too warm), then what is the point? - ME
:The purpose of this page is not to express or answer such questions, it is to discuss how to improve the article; please limit your talk page contributions accordingly.
At 61, I started looking at philosophy for some stuff I'm writing on visualizitions - got all excited about Kant - stuff I guess I knew before but forgot - but now I'm thinking letting college kids major in philosophy is like handling a loaded gun to a toddler - look at Wiggenstein's relatives, acquaintances, and colleagues. Also, are we absolutely sure Wiggenstein wasn't being tongue in cheek or damning with very faint praise? It all sounds tongue-in-cheek or just really obsessive and probably self-destructive after a certain point. Also, woudn't melted ice-cream be too warm? YAC (talk) 04:50, 3 May 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: The purpose of this talk page is to improve the article; please limit you comments accordingly. If you have a reliable source that questions whether Wittgenstein was serious, feel free to preent them. -- 98.108.209.12 (talk) 04:06, 24 May 2010 (UTC)

text: I misbelieve that this is false. :-) --Army1987 22:09, 9 August 2005 (UTC)

text: I think 'unproven fact' is an oxymoron and I think 'the statement Wiggenstein is alleged to have made' is better than 'alleged fact'; 'alleged fact' may be correct but it almost seems like an upside down redundancy - I'm groping here, can anyone help me out?YAC (talk) 15:33, 2 June 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Old discussions 

message: OK, I think the sentence "There is a pink elephant hurtling ... but I do not believe it." is not a Moore's sentence because the assertion "p" is different in the first and second case. The statement "There is a pink elephant hurtling" refers to the hallucination as a mental model, i.e.: there is a pink elephant *inside the mind* of the person hallucinating; the sentence "but I do not believe it" is a different assertion, namely that "I do not believe there really is a pink elephant in front of me". Is this a notable example mentioned by a notable philosopher or is it someone's original research? I think it should be removed. The example given has the syntax or a Moore's sentence but not the semantics. Alex.g 15:59, 3 September 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  hallucinations? 

message: David Hume claimed that even though induction is not justified, he himself believed in it. Is that an example of this paradox?  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 66.45.155.21 (talk) 02:07, 11 May 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: I don't believe so.  This statement is about believing in something that is not known.  Moores paradox is about not believing in something that is known.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by AndyHuston (talk • contribs) 15:13, 8 July 2008 (UTC)
replies: text:  Erm...  Hume was only saying that his belief was without basis -- not that his belief contradicted the facts. —Jemmytc 03:28, 9 August 2008 (UTC)

text: I think it is unrelated, like saying "I have no substantial reason to believe X, nevertheless I believe X". Said: Rursus (☻) 20:37, 18 November 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Hume and Problem of Induction 

message: Isn't Bush's cocaine conundrum an example?
And the writers of Miami CSI were undoubtedly checking if watchers were paying attention in the re-run we saw last night. A couple has bailed out their murdering con-person daughter and Kathryn and the bald stubby cop guy know they helped her get in the wind. Kathryn says "She played you, where ever you think she is, she isn't. (Pause) So tell us where she is, and you won't go to jail."
Philosophy - you can't live with it, can't live without it.YAC (talk) 15:18, 2 June 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  They're popping up everywhere 

message: Is it that "I don't believe in P, but P is true" is an erroneous (not just false - but also failing) statement, given the conventions of logic? I just would pinpoint that, as a rhetorical statement, it would make full sense, like to be reinterpreted as "I don't believe in P, I know it for a fact". Said: Rursus (☻) 20:42, 18 November 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: I had some difficulty with this, too, and so I added a few sentences with the previous poster's commentary in mind. --Beala (talk) 08:49, 4 March 2009 (UTC)
thread_title:  What's the paradox? 

message: There's a lot of silly WP:OR chit-chat this page. The purpose of talk pages about philosophical subjects is not to discuss or debate or propound upon the philosophical issue, it is strictly to improve the article within the Wikipedia framework of cited reliable sources. -- 98.108.209.12 (talk) 04:06, 24 May 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  This is not the place to discuss philosophy 

message: In the section titled "The Problem"
:"(OM) P and NOT(I believe that P), or (COM) P"
and nowhere that I can see are 'OM' and 'COM" explained. Can anyone enlighten? Thanks BrideOfKripkenstein (talk) 04:35, 21 May 2011 (UTC)
thread_title:  Notation question 

message: (I) Don't believe in witches, but that they exist they exist.
I dunno the origin, but that seems a tad famous; is it a version of Moore's paradox? --TiagoTiago (talk) 05:01, 29 October 2011 (UTC)
thread_title:  No creo en brujas, pero que las hay las hay 

message: Isn't this just about what we understand from language.
'It was raining but I did not believe that it was raining' means that at one point you did not know it was raining and thus thought it wasn't but now you know. 
'It is raining but you do not believe that it is raining' means that you do not know if it is raining (or not) but you believe it isn't. However I know that it is because I have extra observation and now you know.
But  'It is raining and I don't believe that it is raining' means that you have knowledge that it rains but you don't think it is. That's obviously absurd.
Changing the tense changes the meaning of the sentence in terms of what you knew at specific times and what you know now. The first two phrases imply an addition of knowledge which proves the belief part now false (but you can still use the past tens to say that 'you believed it in the past'). The third sentence implies that something is known but the false belief is held. This is different; there is no addition of knowledge.
Muffin8or (talk) 17:12, 23 May 2012 (UTC)
thread_title:  Is it not a question of language? 

message: "Subsequent commentators have further noted that there is an apparent residual absurdity in asserting a first-person future-tense sentence such as 'It will be raining and I will believe that it is not raining'.[5]"
They're clearly wrong in general, since there are some situations where that would make perfect sense. For example, suppose I have a drug that I believe (correctly or not) will cause me to believe that it is not raining. I plan to wait until it next rains, and then take the drug. In that situation, "It will be raining and I will believe that it is not raining." is a perfectly sensible thing to say.
More generally, the problem is that the future form of this "paradox" is only an absurdity under the assumption that a person's knowledge monotonically increases. If you have reason to believe that you may forget anything or that you may be subject to any impairment of reasoning in future, then there is no paradox.
Reference 'Bovens, Luc (1995)' is not open-access so I cannot check whether it addresses this point. --David-Sarah Hopwood ⚥ (talk) 01:09, 23 July 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: In addition, even if you have a perfect memory, this is only an absurdity if you specify an exact time: "Friday at noon, it will rain and I will believe it is not raining". Otherwise, it's not just valid but quite likely: I know I am not right all of the time, and it will rain enough times in my life that I will almost surely be wrong at least once.
68.40.49.146 (talk) 04:15, 29 May 2015 (UTC)
thread_title:  The future-tense form is not in general an absurdity 

message: What if we agree that "it's raining" means in fact, that most people agree that it's raining. We may have an argument whether it's raining or not (cause I think it counts just as drizzling and not raining). So you ask 100 people in the street and 98 say in their opinion it's raining. So I accept, that "it's raining" (=according to widely held belief, it counts already as raining), but still believe it's not raining, cause in my opinion it still counts only as drizzle. No paradox in my opinion.
Does any literature hold this view and if yes, could anyone find it and add to citations (I am not versed in this field).46.126.115.125 (talk) 22:04, 11 October 2013 (UTC)
replies: text: Possibly. But note that your opinion (and even, sigh, my opinion) don't really count here; the article is not about our views, but about general and informed views as reflected by reliable sources. As to the point you ponder, you might take a look at Moore's Ethics, where he considers opinions and feelings as bases of moral knowledge. (It is pretty dense.) Also check the sources in this article. ~ J. Johnson (JJ) (talk) 21:58, 4 December 2013 (UTC)
thread_title: Possible non-absurd interpretation exists in literature? Possible to find citation?