Talk:Bryson of Heraclea

message: I think Aristotle may have misunderstood Bryson regarding his views on the nonexistence of foul language. Here is a quote from the reference in the article where Bryson's views are examined by Aristotle (Rhetoric 3.2):
Further, there is a third consideration -- one that upsets the fallacious argument of the sophist Bryson, that there is no such thing as foul language, because in whatever words you put a given thing your meaning is the same. This is untrue. One term may describe a thing more truly than another, may be more like it, and set it more intimately before our eyes. Besides, two different words will represent a thing in two different lights; so on this ground also one term must be held fairer or fouler than another. For both of two terms will indicate what is fair, or what is foul, but not simply their fairness or their foulness, or if so, at any rate not in an equal degree. The materials of metaphor must be beautiful to the ear, to the understanding, to the eye or some other physical sense. It is better, for instance, to say "rosy-fingered morn," than "crimson-fingered" or, worse still, "red-fingered morn." The epithets that we apply, too, may have a bad and ugly aspect, as when Orestes is called a "mother-slayer"; or a better one, as when he is called his "father's avenger."...The same effect is attained by the use of diminutives, which make a bad thing less bad and a good thing less good. Take, for instance, the banter of Aristophanes in the Babylonians where he uses "goldlet" for "gold," "cloaklet" for "cloak," "scoffiet" for "scoff, and "plaguelet." But alike in using epithets and in using diminutives we must be wary and must observe the mean.
Aristotle gives examples of descriptions that are softer and harsher that describe the same thing (e.g. mother-killer and father-avenger for someone who killed his mother who had killed her husband (his father)). But, while Aristotle is correct that the same thing can be described in different terms to produce different meanings (or at least emphases), I think it's very possible that Aristotle summarized Bryson's views a bit incorrectly, or perhaps Bryson didn't explain himself fully. Think about this: no one has to worry while speaking polite English about saying a word that was an obscenity in an ancient language precisely because of Bryson's (possibly intended) point - words are just sounds/constructions that carry no meaning in and of themselves and the meaning that the person assigns to them is what they mean.
This of course doesn't mean that someone can invent "English 2.0" where everything is the same as regular English except "Yes" means "No" and vice versa, and then answer "No" for questions where the answer is "Yes" and not consider it lying. For example, breaking someone's window and then "not lying" by speaking English 2.0 and saying "No" (which in "English 2.0" means "Yes") because the meaning and intent behind it are still the same as if one were lying while speaking English (and saying "No") - to evade responsibility.
I think this may have been Bryson's point that was perhaps not very clearly expounded and made Aristotle think that beauty in language doesn't exist according to Bryson. For one, Bryson would have been well aware of the arguments Aristotle makes such as words that are more pleasing than others. The emphasis in Bryson's argument seems to be on meaning, whereas Aristotle's, at least as I see it, immediately turns to the impression made by words, and not specifically their meaning.
For example, "rosy-fingered", "crimson-fingered", and "red-fingered" are examples Aristotle gives of the same meaning but with different impressions. All Bryson would have had to say was - "you see, all of them mean red-fingered even though they all sound different and are different words". That is, if my interpretation of what Bryson meant is correct.
Cornelius (talk) 09:05, 15 May 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: Here's a better example of the above theory I think: If someone grows up thinking that the word for "red" is yellow, when he meets someone who knows the word for "red" is red and they both see a red rose, the first person, if asked what color it is, would naturally say that it is a "yellow rose". To this the second person will correct him and explain that the color's name is red. Both people are correct in describing the rose as "yellow" and "red" because both meant "red", but the first person learned the word yellow to mean red.
Cornelius (talk) 08:20, 17 May 2012 (UTC)
thread_title:  Aristotle and Bryson on the existence of foul language 

message: Blater is a bit far removed from our primary sources on the calculation of Pi.  Can somebody also provide
references to the appropriate scholarly work?  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 68.232.127.59 (talk) 14:14, 21 May 2016 (UTC)
thread_title:  Sources on calculation of pi