Talk:Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge conspiracy theory/Archive 1

message: I added a bit on "such breaks as existed". Holmes & Blair (& I think Kahn) mention them; evidently, they were only into the additive table. This would be important in the ultimate reading of JN-25B, but I'm not qualified to say (tho the article should!) how the additive table breaks assisted.  Trekphiler 11:03, 14 December 2005 (UTC)
replies: text: Love to be able to tell you, but for "(c) COPEK means what?", it's clear it's a hi-lev/hi-security comm channel, but beyond that, BTHOOM... IIRC, it's the codeword for the USN's top code system, equal (roughly) to the Flag Officers' Code (I think). "Significance"? I think Kahn means, "don't overstate the case", which is what I was getting at. Kahn is doing what Rochefort, Fabian et al. would've been doing: saying, "this change means something's up", without knowing what or where, especially since it was the second change in under 6mo; same change happened before Midway, & guess what? Many see "spottily reading" & think it was a gold mine; I'd say it was more a case of a few words here & there, maybe no more than knowing they were on the right track. And yes, IIRC, it's JN-25B & it went to -25C just before Midway (but I can't find it in Blair & I don't have Holmes or Kahn at hand...) Kahn should say; check the index for the JN-25 refs. BTW, CAST moved to Corregidor 9/41. (I've got Blair open...) Trekphiler 01:45, 27 July 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Breaks

message: What is the fascination with the Germans? Kuhn was a poseur & Popov was a double; Prange deals with them in exhaustive detail, & dismisses them as significant.  Trekphiler 11:19, 14 December 2005 (UTC)
replies: text: You definitely got that right. MacArthur refused to believe it was Japanese pilots hammering him in the Philippines. And the conspiracy nuts don't get one thing: a conspiracy implicitly means the Japanese were too stupid to do it alone...  Trekphiler 02:11, 27 July 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Germans

message: I deleted & rewrote this:
:"In addition, Short had sent coded messages to Washington that, when decoded, said he was making preparations for a possible attack. With Washington thinking Short was understanding the situation there was no need to risk breaking security by being more blunt in the warnings. However, Short had changed his code words without informing Washington; or, as it now known, General Short did in fact notify Washington what his specific alert was, as is on the record with the signature of General Gerow and others, and they did not disabuse that with any specific changes to Short's Alert Level.  Therefore, his messages that indicated he was preparing for a possible attack were meant to say he was preparing to guard against only sabotage which Washington accepted without any change."
As it is, it isn't clear, & his alert level wasn't the issue. Moreover, his instructions were to expect sabotage, not air attack.  Trekphiler 11:42, 14 December 2005 (UTC)
replies: text: Sorry about the delay in reply. I've only just noticed this comment. I think the point here is that had Washington understood Short's changes in the meaning of his report ("I have instituted alert level 3"), there might have been more understanding in DC that Short wasn't preparing for an actual attack, but was thinking sabotage. In short, part of the problem is that what Short was reporting wasn't what DC thought he was doing. And some of htat was due to the redefinition of the meaning of alert level designations. And that was due to Short's innitiative in changing them. ww 16:09, 11 August 2006 (UTC)

text: Sorry about the delay in reply. (I've just come back to this page...). I wasn't aware Short had changed his codewords or alert ratings, so maybe I sounded stupid; as rewritten since I posted, it's clearer & more accurate. I did intend to make the point DC didn't correct him; now I see why not. Nevertheless, I can't help think any error falls on DC as the senior command; if they didn't know, they should have.  Trekphiler 10:22, 13 February 2007 (UTC)

text: Maybe I'm not clear (again, still). I'm of the general opinion it's the responsibility of the senior command to know when Short "was effectively speaking another language", because (unless I'm very mistaken) he'd have to get permission to change the alert status designators, & DC should know about it; if not permission, he should (must?) inform DC, & DC should definitely know about that. Maybe most of all, I have a problem with people (still!) trying to hang it on Short (& Kimmel) & excusing DC. Evidently, senior officers never get punished. (Cf Mi Lai, Tailhook, & Abu Ghraib, just to name 3 offhand; a Lt, a 2.5-striper, & a chicken Col? Four stripers deserved to go down for Tailhook, & the SecDef should be gone for Abu Ghraib.)  Trekphiler 02:19, 27 July 2007 (UTC)

text: Thank you!! That's exactly what I meant!  Trekphiler 02:21, 27 July 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Sabotage

message: Evidence of a "winds execute" is so flimsy, & the "winds" issue adds so little, IMHO it should be deleted.  Trekphiler 12:03, 14 December 2005 (UTC)
thread_title: Windy

message: ===Quote from the Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge debate article===
James Rusbridger and Eric Nave, Betrayal at Pearl Harbor: How Churchill Lured Roosevelt into WWII (Summit, 1991) which posits that while the Americans couldn't read the Japanese naval code (JN-25), the British could, and Churchill deliberately withheld warning because the UK needed US help. Sir Nave was an Australian cryptographer whose diaries were used in writing this book; he later distanced himself from its content. A check against them has made clear that some of the charges Rusbridger makes here are unsupported by Nave's diaries of the time.  The information shown in the Appendix is of interest to note, especially a true copy of SRN-116741.
===Requests===
I think we should provide references substanciating the above mentioned claims :
* If the sentence : he later distanced himself from its content (diff) is true, we should know when this distanciation was made, and in which publication this distanciation was made if it was ever made.
* If the sentence : A check against them has made clear that some of the charges Rusbridger makes here are unsupported by Nave's diaries of the time (diff) is true, we should know who, (when, in which publication) made the check.--Teofilo talk 14:09, 3 January 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  James Rusbridger and Eric Nave, ''Betrayal at Pearl Harbor: How Churchill Lured Roosevelt into WWII'' 

message: I think we should provide references substanciating the above mentioned claims :
* If the sentence : he later distanced himself from its content (diff) is true, we should know when this distanciation was made, and in which publication this distanciation was made if it was ever made.
* If the sentence : A check against them has made clear that some of the charges Rusbridger makes here are unsupported by Nave's diaries of the time (diff) is true, we should know who, (when, in which publication) made the check.--Teofilo talk 14:09, 3 January 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Requests

message: What about the B 17s being caught on the ground un-camouflaged on Clark Field, well after Pearl Harbor?  What about the dive bomber pilots in the Philippines without their airplanes?  What about canceling the plan to stock food and other supplies on the Bataan Peninsula?
:The ticky-tacky response is that Phillipines wasn't Federalized until after MacArthur made most of his monumental misjudgements and too late to repair them before the Japanese arrived on a roll. More substantially, MacArthur was at least thinking, though deranged thinking, about a land invasion by the Japanese, and making preparations, though wrongfooted ones. Pearl Harbor didn't even take that much precaustion against an attack -- no torpedo nets, minimal long distance partolling by the B-17 and PBYs they actually had, thought that wasn't enough to manage an all directions, continuous surveillance, actually ready anti-aircraft guns (ammunition was in locked sotage when the attack began!!), failure to get the radar stations in actual operation as opposed to training mode (where they had long been) or to get the early warning center at Pearl (where Lt Tyler was) actually operational, etc, etc  
:As for the mismanagement in Phil of those planes, leading to their total loss, it clearly wasn't due to any plot from Washington to deprive MacArthur of information. Those planes were hit about 9 hours after the Pearl Harbor attack. There was pleanty of warning time to do something more effective than burn on the runway.
:Guam, Wake, the Canal, etc all took seriously the late Nov warnings and would not have cuaght so flatfooted as was Pearl. Smashed to be sure, but at least they were awake enough to notice the attack before the planes came around the mountains on their attack runs. There was more disdain for what they'd been warned about in Pearl (on all sides) than would have been acceptable to me had I been Marshall or Knox or Roosevelt. ww 00:54, 23 March 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  " All other Pacific commands took appropriate measures for their situations." 

message: The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Warning of an Attack on Pearl Harbor, 27 January 1941
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[Telegram: Paraphrase]
TOKYO, January 27, 1941-6 p.m.
[Received January 27-6: 38 a.m.]
125. A member of the Embassy was told by my ------- colleague that from many quarters, including a Japanese one, he had heard that a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor was planned by the Japanese military forces, in case of "trouble" between Japan and the United States; that the attack would involve the use of all the Japanese military facilities. My colleague said that he was prompted to pass this on because it had come to him from many sources, although the plan seemed fantastic.
GREW
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Source: U.S., Department of State, Publication 1983, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S., Government Printing Office, 1943), pp. 617-618
:The note was mentioned in the discussion of intelligence about the attack at Attack on Pearl Harbor. It is not now thought, nor was it then, to have been 'real'. And in fact, given the timing, it was almost certainly not as Yamamoto had only just begun to consider it. No planning, even preliminary, was underway at the time, if memory serves. If it reflected a real proposal, it was not the one which actually resulted in 7.12.41. This was one of several reports which suggested such a thing. None came with sufficient evidence that they compelled belief. ww 21:33, 4 June 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Why is there no mention of this documented note ? 

message: This article was split from attack on Pearl Harbor sometime ago, and has rather grown since then. The bibliography has also grown, though it remains unsatisfactory as of now. Splitting it out would force a reader interested in the subject to chase down three articles, before even getting to any of the original sources. I don't think we've so much of a problem with the article as it stands that it makes much sense to force the reader to those lengths, despite a longish article. It will make no difference to WP hardware/software, and will not unduly increase load time over even a slow Net connection (this article is essentially all text). I see no reason to bother, and a couple not to. 
It would be a little neater though, evening off article lengths a little. ww 05:23, 2 July 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Proposal to split out bibliography? 

message: Here is a intresting article on US Gov using Problem-reaction-solution: . --Striver 20:27, 7 August 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Intresting article

message: I added "This is evidence of lack of manpower"; I'm inclined to also add, "CAST only had one." (because I'm fairly sure). Can somebody who has sources at hand confirm & add? I also added clarification here:
:"Mentioned, for instance in Blair, Silent Victory, & Holmes, Double-Edged Secrets; it is also mistakenly used to explain the intercepts at the time of Midway in the film of the same name.</ref> to mislead enemy intelligence into believing the units and commands of the Kido Butai were continuing to exercise off Kyūshū and the Western Inland Sea; such commnuications in a combat zone (where radio silence was essential) would be by flag or blinker (another factor Stinnett and others conveniently ignore)."
And I added
:"In addition, Roosevelt authorized U.S. destroyers to report U-boats, then later authorized "shoot on sight". Neither is the act of a disinterested neutral." 
(which I mention above).  Trekphiler 04:54, 20 July 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Learning to add