Talk:Problem of universals

message: The text is indicative of uncertainty, e.g.
: "Three facts about universals, or constraints ... (if these constraints have been correctly stated) ... In other words, we can (if they are correctly stated) take these three facts as background assumptions. Definitely, we have to have some background assumptions, or else we would not have any tools to evaluate any theory of universals.
Are these three facts, or constraints, generally accepted as the criteria for evaluating how well a theory resolves the Problem of Universals?
:- Universals can be multiply instantiated
:- Universals are abstract
:- Universals are referents of general terms - rparker@patmedia.net
:: In philosophy, there is no consensus on anything. However you have to start from something (no, there's no consensus on that either) and as far as these things go, these criteria are pretty useful and indeed often used. I use them myself :o) - MWAK--217.122.44.226 09:30, 7 Jul 2004 (UTC)
replies: text:  Universals are at least the first---i.e. multiply instantiated. There is then room to have different views about whether they are always abstract or the referents of general terms. One can still hold that some universals are concrete (e.g. Aristotle). And it's not a primarily semantic issue, so it shouldn't be formulated in terms of the referents of terms. - Jaymay (talk) 22:50, 26 June 2008 (UTC)
replies: text:  And there is consensus in philosophy about many things. Philosophy is not as different from other disciplines in that respect. I understand many people think otherwise, but it's a misconception. Not all scientists agree about everything in their field. Maybe there is more consensus in the empirical sciences than in philosophy, but that's compatible with there being some consensus on some things in philosophy. - Jaymay (talk) 21:22, 29 June 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  3 Facts or Constraints about Universals 

message: I think this page needs better introductory material that sums up what the general problem of universals IS before going into the details of its philosophical history.
:Agreed - I went here expecting a good summary of the problem to get me started on a philosophy assignment, but it jumped from saying it is a problem (not what the problem is) in several areas to discussing Buddha's lectures on nominalism. 141.218.136.102 16:53, 12 July 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: I tried to improve the intro along these lines. Hopefully it's better. - Jaymay (talk) 22:53, 26 June 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Summary/Intro 

message: Ayn Rand, the philosopher and creator of Objectivist philosophy has solved this problem.
Basic summary is here: http://www.aynrand.org/site/PageServer?pagename=objectivism_pobs2
Has there been any updates on this?
Shall I being writing a summary for this wikipage? -- Oleksandr 22:50, 6 March 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: I'm afraid I don't see anything new or different in this summary that hasn't been covered by earlier philosophers.  Therefore, I would not be in favor of including Ayn Rand in this page. - Aldrichio 22:08, 7 March 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Include Ayn Rand's solution 

message: Nt. - 1Z 20:15, 11 March 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Wot, no Kant?

message: Does this topic have anything to do with the concept of qualia? There seems to be at least some similarity between it, quality (philosophy), and qualia, but IANAP, so don't quote me. Mmortal03 12:09, 25 September 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: I read the other article, and yes, I also think there are similarities.  However, I believe these these similarities to be coincidental:  Take any object, and the vast majority of other objects will share some relationship with it. 68.144.80.168 (talk) 13:07, 24 June 2008 (UTC)

text: No, there is no need to mention qualia in this article. - Jaymay (talk) 22:51, 26 June 2008 (UTC)
thread_title: Relationship with Qualia?

message: In the article, Conceptualism is grouped in as a type of nominalism.  However, I think this is incorrect.  Conceptionalism is better seen as a middle ground between nominalism and realism and, therefore, should probably have its own distinct heading/section.
Also, the way that Berkeley's nominalism is described is a bit misleading.  Berkeley did not deny the existence of general ideas.  Instead, he denied that general ideas can be developed in the way that Lockean abstraction develops them.  This could probably be made more clear in the section (not that Berkeley was exactly clear about it himself).  I can probably go ahead and make these changes myself, but I was curious about others opinions on this and/or if this has already been suggested in the past.Diehl1am (talk) 00:54, 25 February 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: Nominalism is the doctrine that universal properties do not exist in things, or more generally that they do not exist in the world. Realism, in this context, is the doctrine that particulars do have universals in them (e.g., 'blackness' inheres in some fashion in particular black marbles, which is what makes the marbles identifiable as being alike black). These two options exhaust all possibilities: either (at least some) universals are real (realism), or they are not real (nominalism). Conceptualism agrees with nominalism on this one relevant issue (and therefore is a form of nominalism): there is no 'blackness' of any sort in black objects. (Indeed, there isn't even a 'blackness' out there in the world like a Form. It simply does not exist in external reality, in any sense.) The only thing distinguishing conceptualism from other nominalist philosophies is that it tries to provide a certain sort of psychological explanation for the epistemological fact that we do identify different instances of blackness as 'the same blackness'—by saying that 'universals' are in fact mental. But clearly nominalism does not entail 'there are no mental entities which account for our recognizing similarities in objects', which is the only way conceptualism could be extracted from nominalism. -Silence (talk) 18:11, 27 September 2009 (UTC)

text: Realise this is a reply to something from 2009, but I would like to reignite this question. There is some conceptual (ironically) confusion between nominalism and conceptualism. Their difference isn't adequately explained in the article, and what's more is that some individuals are frequently included under both headings (eg. Hume and Abelard). Some clarity I think would be helpful. Yr Enw (talk) 11:30, 23 August 2023 (UTC)
thread_title: Conceptualism

message: At the beginning section of realism, the claim that Bertrand Russell as a Realist has an original research flag. This should be changed to a citation to (Russell, Bertrand (1912). "The World of Universals," in The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford University Press.) which is in fact listed in the further reading, and contained within (Loux 2001) which has been cited. Sorry I can't fix this myself(Lucas(CA) (talk) 19:30, 22 July 2010 (UTC)
thread_title: Bertrand Russell& Realism

message: Okay, this article is still a mess. I've made a few changes, but I reckon it might be easier to rewrite it completely.
I think the primary problem is that it is organised historically rather than synoptically. May I suggest something like this instead:
* Lede
* Realism
** Platonic realism
** Aristotelian realism
** Contemporary realisms
*** Armstrong
** Arguments
*** Third-man
*** (etc.)
* Nominalism
** Medieval nominalists
** Contemporary nominalists
** Arguments
* Other views
** Trope theory
** Conceptualism
** Pragmatism
** Idealism (maybe?)
This may not be such a good layout if you simply want to understand the historical origin of the problem of universals. It's a synoptic/philosophical layout rather than a chronological one. But I think it would provide a better overview for someone trying to understand the dialectical back-and-forth between the two views and most importantly the philosophical reasons for why people have adopted certain views. Shall I just be bold and rewrite it? 'Cos it really is a bit rubbish at the moment. Heh. —Tom Morris 14:52, 3 January 2011 (UTC)
replies: text: You have my support, you may proceed. la gaie (talk) 03:35, 5 April 2011 (UTC)
thread_title:  Ideas towards a rewrite 

message: This page has an abundance of views from medieval philosophers (which is understandable, considering it was one of the most widely discussed problems in philosophy at the time), but Berkeley is the only modern philosopher on this page. I'd like to see Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Hume, and Kant listed on here. --75.154.246.100 (talk) 14:32, 3 January 2012 (UTC)
thread_title: Why no modern philosophy?

message: *Add moderate realism
*Add conceptualism (two varieties?)
*Grealy reduce Kant (I sure got what I asked for)
*Add exemplar theory
*Add trope theory
*Expand Penrose
*Add Katz
1Z (talk) 15:23, 5 December 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: I didn't reduce Kant but did move Kant. Wrote a new "Idealism" lead, too. The Kant stuff still needs to be re-written though. (Also, and most importantly, I re-wrote that junky, wonky opening paragraph.) Check it out! CircularReason (talk) 12:19, 7 December 2012 (UTC)
thread_title: TBD

message: Despite its length, and the interesting quality of the contributions, this article seems like an intellectual trompe l'oeil to me.  The first line of the introduction states:
"In metaphysics, the problem of universals refers to the question of whether properties exist".
While defining the concept: "properties", even though in my opinion somewhat vaguely, it does not define the concept: "existance".  How can there be a debate about a question whose terms are undefined?  The question: "Does a thought exist?" can only be answered if one is clear about the terms.  If a thought is considered to be a chemical message in a human brain then the answer would be probably be yes, assuming we consider chimical and brains and the like exist, which in normal parlance we do.  Other definitions of thought though would require greater precision than normal about the term "existance", as clearly being hit by a thought is not the same as being hit by a brain (or a 2x4)!
Perhaps it is possible to deduce the debate from the commentaries in the article, but imo it would be helpful to set the issue out more plainly, proceeding from definitions and predicates to theory / evidence.  At present the article seems to be strenuously nailing fog to the wall.
LookingGlass (talk) 17:05, 25 January 2013 (UTC)
replies: text: You may want to fix the typographical errors which cast a shadow on your contribution. __Ancheta Wis    (talk  | contribs) 20:26, 16 February 2013 (UTC)
thread_title:  Interesting but .... 

message: The opening statement misstates the issue; it would be better stated "In metaphysics, the problem of universals refers to the issue of how concepts or terms in language can be universal, while everything to which they purport to refer are individuals." (my phraseology).
As Gyula Klima put it, "Indeed, one may safely assert that as long as there is interest in the questions of how a human language obviously abounding in universal terms can be meaningfully mapped onto a world of singulars, there is a problem of universals, regardless of the details of the particular conceptual framework in which the relevant questions are articulated. Clearly, in this sense, the problem of universals is itself a universal, the universal problem of accounting for the relationships between mind, language, and reality."Klima, Gyula, "The Medieval Problem of Universals", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy  (Fall 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/universals-medieval/>  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 69.174.113.20 (talk) 00:42, 24 December 2014 (UTC)
thread_title:  Addendum to Interesting but .... 

message: Gentelmen,
I'm used to compare the same lemmas in different languages (really necessary in many cases). Usually the english versions are great and have more detail and erudition. In this case however the german lemma on the subject seems to be much more detailed and firmly grounded in current research. Since I'm not from the the philosophy field, please allow me to leave just this remark here and not to act on it, since in this case event trying to translate seems to be futile for a non-expert.
CommonsRooke (talk) 07:03, 30 March 2013 (UTC)
thread_title:  hint to the german lemma on this subject as source 

message: In metaphysics, the problem of universals is the problem of explaining how individuals which differ in number (such as Socrates and Plato) can have properties in common, such as being a man or being white. Peter Damian (talk) 18:15, 20 April 2015 (UTC)
replies: text: That paper is unavailable Mr Damien and if I have grasped the concept, your statement refers only to an individual aspect. Would you please respond to my query below which I posted oblivious to this post. There is almost certainly an obvious error going on with the section unless I am totally off base, and the article proper is so meandering and referring and not really descriptive at all. I'm sure there is a simple leading explanation to be had here... ~ R.T.G 21:58, 12 August 2019 (UTC)
thread_title:  The introduction 

message: Within the introduction I added a bit more depth to the explanation of the "problem of universals" and also included, what I believe to be a clearer example of the problem referenced from the sources added to the bibliography. 
These sources include: 
I would appreciate any feedback on not only my edit, but on my references as well.Preciousg11 (talk) 04:56, 20 February 2019 (UTC)
thread_title: Addition

message: There seems to be an obvious error in the lead section here in that it describes a property as a universal, by claiming that a property is a property which is shared, obvious error. However, rewriting it is not straightforward in the sense of ensuring a description in practical laymans terms. Would I be correct thusly:-
* The problem of universals arises when attempting to describe a universal property as separate from the entities which share it.
Also I am finding the example of cup holders to be problematic:-
This concept seems to relate to nature in the sense of asking the question, does the shape of a flower form uniquely in each circumstance, or do the flowers parts attempt to exemplify a separately existing flower shape. 
Whereas the idea of a cup holder referencing or being tied to a metaphysical circle, does not strike in me with same mode of enquiry...
I haven't studied deeply into it. I am not prepared to rewrite the section. But it needs a rewrite. Can anyone be a little more succinct before I attempt to discern it for myself? ~ R.T.G 21:50, 12 August 2019 (UTC)
replies: text: All I can say is that the article is a bit of a mess, and always has been. Peter Damian (talk) 06:25, 14 August 2019 (UTC)
replies: text: Wisdom flows from your words. A reduction so simple as my proposal will never be accepted, but perhaps if I read the whole article over the weekend, and try to describe that thereafter, that it then falls between the guides too... And whoever is watchful of the thing might be encouraged to water it a bit... ~ R.T.G 13:49, 14 August 2019 (UTC)

text:  I've tried an edit, Peter. Apologies for the delay. I can see issues with it already, but I believe it is on the right track now. Previously it was not strictly following the sources. What do you think? ~ R.T.G 02:17, 20 May 2020 (UTC)
thread_title:  Properties are not... 

message: Hello, I saw that this page was on the Philosophy project template and so I thought I would have a go at adding some meat to the various bones here. I have added a little on Duns Scotus (though I simultaneously wonder if he can be subsumed under the medieval realism section?) I have added to Boethius's entry, as he is an important figure in this field. I read a few articles on the matter and have mainly taken a lead from the Stanford Encyclopaedia page. My explanation is probably utterly dreadful, so any thoughts are welcome. Knucmo2 (talk) 21:23, 5 March 2020 (UTC)
replies: text: I think it would be good to split the medieval section properly into: 1) Boethius 2) Realists (following either Plato or Aristotle, broadly speaking) 3) Nominalists and 4) All of the rest. --Knucmo2 (talk) 00:53, 8 March 2020 (UTC)
replies: text: I am working away at the medievalists, but it is going to take a lot of reading to get their thoughts in encyclopaedic form. Please feel free to fine-tune what I have written. Knucmo2 (talk) 16:04, 22 March 2020 (UTC)
thread_title: Medieval matters