Talk:Artificial consciousness/NPOV Version/discuss

message: I consider it necessary to answer here a question asked in the beginning of the dispute over "artificial consciousness" article, because due to the dispute my answer may remain unclear.
"To say Artificial Consciousness is not Consciousness is simply to define Consciousness as being something human beings cannot build. If "it", whatever "it" is, is built by humans, then by definition it would not be conscious." (Paul Beardsell)
Yes, I said that artificial consciousness is not consciousness and I insist it, considering that we determine consciousness as the totality of a person's thoughts and feelings. This is the most general description of consciousness, the more narrow definitions supposed to be used in specific context, but it may again be understood differently by different people. That way we determine consciousness through human abilities, to be a totality of human abilities. And this may remain so, as we measure consciousness through our own abilities. As consciousness is subjective (Searle etc, feelings), then we can never determine if there is an equivalent to it. So if there is something similar to human consciousness in other than human, then we should call it with some other name, not just consciousness. But there will always be many subjective abilities or aspects like certain feelings etc even because there will always be new conditions to what different people react differently and therefore understand related ideas or experiences differently, what means that these ideas or experiences will be subjective. And we cannot build a machine to fully satisfy subjective concepts, at least just because people can never determine whether such machine finally does what it supposed to do or not. Therefore machine is something made by humans based on what they objectively know, not even anything what theoretically can be emulated by algorithm. So yes, by that if a machine is built by humans, then by definition it cannot be conscious. I don't know any AC effort to build a machine equivalent to human, so it is not commonly considered that AC must be equivalent to consciousness. But in spite I don't agree with that, I was not against including opposite point of view into the article. Tkorrovi 20 Mar 2004
So is the human being only a machine or is it something more than a machine?   Paul Beardsell 11:32, 22 Mar 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: Paul, this is a very interesting philosophical problem, and this article may be worth to be in Wikipadia even only because of mentioning this problem. It has its origins in writings of Dennett probably. The main problem there is what is a machine. If we consider that machine is anything what satisfies Church-Turing thesis, then the logic is correct. But the question is, are humans capable of making all possible machines what satisfy Church-Turing thesis? If by any reason they cannot, then the difference between human and machine is simply what we don't know yet or cannot objectively model because it is subjective (what different people understand differently), what may be rational and satisfy Church-Turing thesis (at least maybe when applied to everything), not necessarily soul or "magic spark". And in spite that we learn more all the time, there still remain things what we don't know, even just because people are constantly changing and interdependent on their environment and each other. So the dilemma remains and none of the views are proved wrong. Tkorrovi 22 Mar 2004
By Occam's Razor, the simplest explanation consistent with the facts is likely to be the correct one, and the Copernican principle, that no special or priveleged position should unnecessarily be given to any part of the problem,
Artificial Consciousness will be real consciousness.  The Church Turing thesis says we need new physics before two computing machines are different, by Occam's Razor we should not posit new physics without good reason.  By the Copernican principle we should claim no special position for human beings without good reason.  The only good reasons we have are arrogant ones:  Humans are too complicated, too special, too something for their brains to be built or copied artificially.  Surely, here you are correct:  we have lots to learn, we learn more all the time, many things are possible, each POV must be in the article.  But where you are wrong, if you hold this view, is that each POV has equal merit.  No, the approach consistent with the scientific method says:  Artificial consciousness is likely to be real consciousness, by Occam's Razor and the Copernican principle.  And that will remain the most likely true POV until contradictory evidence is discovered.  Paul Beardsell 16:43, 22 Mar 2004 (UTC)

text: Background on Penrose:  Most (practically all) scientists do not agree with Penrose, he is widely regarded as a crank in this field.  He posits that human consciousness depends on quantum processes in microtubules in the neurons of the brain!  Other scientists correctly ask:  What is your evidence for that?  Penrose ultimately has to resort to the circular argument that something special is required for consciousness.  Paul Beardsell 08:58, 26 Mar 2004 (UTC)

text: NPOV: Wikipedia rules do not say that all views must be included.  We can fairly leave the more cranky ones out.  But, I agree, Penrose's views must be included.  But it is neutral to expose his views to the fair criticism of others.  And, before you complain, I think you are saying nothing different.  Paul Beardsell 08:58, 26 Mar 2004 (UTC)
thread_title: Is AC equivalent to consciousness or not

message: At the village pump tkorrovi asked what I thought about this version.  And I replied I would comment here.
I think that a lot of work has gone into it and in some important ways it is better than the main article.  I also think that the main article is better than this one in some important ways.
I can spot some obvious minor flaws (e.g. grammar, wording) here.  I also can spot one or two larger mistakes made when tkorrovi made what is an obviously honest and well-meaning attempt to incorporate views that he himself does not hold.  Experience tells me that correcting these errors here might be problematic.
I want to incorporate some of the main article's talk page into the article itself.  Then the two pages need merging.
Paul Beardsell 14:23, 22 Mar 2004 (UTC)
thread_title: Preparing for a merger

message: I am puzzled about the idea of consciousness being associatd with prediction. I thought that perhaps it meant anticipation in the short term, i.e. immediate cogent reaction to imagined possible events (including internal events as might emanate from thought processes). Can anyone explain, in relation to consciousness, what is being predicted and by whom, and why this is thought to be an essential component of consciousness? Matt Stan 08:49, 25 Mar 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: I think that Ability to predict changes that result from action depictively is a bit too abstract for an encyclopedia, but your subsequent explanation gets the point across. I'm not sure, however, that the heuristic process that you describe above regarding learning is necessary for consciousness per se, although it is important for artificial intelligence, and I'm concerned that we shouldn't confuse the two - though they must indeed go together to some extent in any implementation. I think your point is perhaps important for a machine that has to learn, and therefore might be important in order to attain consciousness, i.e. part of the engineering/programming process aimed at achieving consciousness. However, once consciousness has been achieved then the ability to go on learning is not essential in order for consciousness to continue. I can remain conscious in a totally chaotic environment in which it is not possible to predict anything accurately. You seem to be saying that it is my constant and continuous attempts to predict what is going to happen next, moment by moment, every moment, that are a defining part of my consciousness. Whilst I am writing this, you might say that in the process of making my utterances I am having to predict what I am going to write next. But I would put that differently. I don't predict what I am going to do - I just do it, in what is called a stream of consciousness. Therefore I still question whether predictive capability has to be accepted into the definition of what constitutes AC. Matt Stan 19:39, 25 Mar 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: Almost all "potential" AC systems (neural networks, genetic algorithms etc) are trainable, ie the abilities are not necessarily attained during engineering/programming process, but during training, so necessary condition to have certain ability is to be capable to achieve that ability. It's the same with humans, the only possibility to achieve certain abilities is to learn from childhood, so abilities what enable us to learn are important part of our consciousness, especially thinking. You said "I can remain conscious in a totally chaotic environment in which it is not possible to predict anything accurately" -- are you sure, many people loose their mind during chaotic periods like wars. And you must think what you write before you write, maybe this is part of stream of consciousness, but then it necessarily don't exclude prediction. That predictive capability is necessary condition for AC is a view of several scientists, therefore it must be included in the article. And other views, what you support, must be included too. Tkorrovi 20:13, 25 Mar 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: It's Ok to cite authorities to back up one's own understanding. But it's no good citing authorities to back up one's lack of understanding or lack of capability to put across one's understanding. I keep trying to work back to a definition of consciousness which is exclusive of the things one associates with consciousness but which are not the same as consciousness. I disagree with Paul about inanimate passive objects possessing consciousness, e.g. a thermostat. I have to work from a human model, as this is the only real thing one can relate consciousness to. A new born baby is either conscious - while it is awake, or unconscious, while it is asleep. Is that not a good starting point? Can anyone disagree with that and if so on what grounds? Now a new born baby, with its mind half formed, has an enormous capacity for learning, but it doesn't become more conscious as it grows up; it stays conscious while it is awake and unconscious while it is asleep, right thoughout its whole life. It learns to think, it learns to anticipate, but what it starts off with, which it has right from the start and never leaves it throughout its life, is the ability to be attentive, first to its parent who feeds it, to sounds, to colours, to movement. It does none of these things while it is asleep. Surely this is the basis upon which we can start to define simple consciousness. Never mind what abstract scientists may have said, which none of us can understand. We can't write about things we don't understand - only things that we do understand. Matt Stan 01:16, 26 Mar 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: "A new born baby is either conscious - while it is awake, or unconscious, while it is asleep. Is that not a good starting point?" Not at all. If we want to model mental abilities of the functioning human being, then we must define consciousness in the widest possible sense, from consciousness to be a totality of all mental abilities, otherwise the model will not be very good. This is why in many cases at least thinking is considered to be an aspect of consciousness. This is the view I support, but this doesn't mean that I consider the views of others a lack of understanding. There are different and often opposite views, and even in two opposite views, something may be right in both Tkorrovi 12:21, 26 Mar 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: I'm wondering whether Tkorrovi's rejection of small humans as a model of consciousness is indicative that Tkorrovi is actually a chat bot that has gone wrong, and hence Tkorrovi fails the Turing test, I'm afraid! :-) Matt Stan 14:30, 26 Mar 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: But I did not reject small humans as a model of consciousness, I said here before that children are mostly capable to achieve all the abilities of consciousness of average human, therefore they are very good "models" of consciousness, at least for AC. This idea is also reflected in science fiction, for example Vanamonde was an artificial being with immense potential, but with almost no maturity, it was built so that it would develop itself to the level necessary to win the Mad Mind. Tkorrovi 15:56, 26 Mar 2004 (UTC)

text: Absolutely. I maintain that it is attentiveness that is the primary characteristic of consciouness, which any simulation must demonstrate. The point about prediction fails to indicate whether the prediction has to be a correct prediction. If we are to accept prediction/anticipation as an acceptance criterion then surely it must be qualified by whether the predictions are correct. Since I do not believe it is possible to predict the future with any degree of reliability at all, then we are left with asking how reliable any set of predictions must be before they qualify. If the AC machine makes predictions that are always wrong then what value is that to the model? The AC machine can't make predictions that are always right, so should it be right 5% of the time 15%, 30%, 50%, 60%, or what? Matt Stan 14:30, 26 Mar 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: This is also something the fuzzy logic is meant to deal with. Tkorrovi 16:04, 26 Mar 2004 (UTC)
thread_title: Prediction

message: I was interested to read in the articles starting with Artificial intelligence (which, incidentally, cover much of the ground we have been attempting to cover here) that one of the commentators had indicated that a body is an essential prerequisite for digital sentience. I need to go back to those articles to resolve what in effect are the intersections/distinctions between AC and other forms of artificial humanity (or whatever we want to call it), but I pose here the question as to whether the artifact that we are postulating for the purposes of proving the existence of AC must necessarily have some robotic element, i.e. that it cannot be entirely entirely absorbed in self-awareness, or put rather more crudely, onanistic. For example, even if we decided not to build a mechanical robot to demonstrate AC, the representation of an image on a screen, coupled with a camera pointing at whoever was watching that screen, could help to give the AC machine the necessary response mechanisms to be verifiable. Without such, or similar, could it ever be convincing? I suppose I am specifying something very basic, i.e. that the thing needs outputs, in order that we can observe it; and inputs, in order that we can test it. These may not be prerequisites of AC per se, but for the purposes of testability I am suggesting that they are prerequisites of any verifiable implementation. Matt Stan 07:50, 29 Mar 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: Stephen Hawking has very few ways to express himself, but he understands things much better than you. In computer the pulses go in and the pulses go out, we can interpret them as text, as images, as sounds etc. The same happens in brain. Tkorrovi 12:28, 29 Mar 2004 (UTC)
thread_title: A Body

message: In this section I suggest we list those attributes of consciousness which are necessary.  I.e.  If any one of the listed attributes is missing from an entity then the entity is not conscious.  Having all these attributes does not necessarily make the entity conscious either!  
===Self-awareness===
The conscious entity should know something about its own state.  The thermostat knows if it is too cold or too hot.  
It should know its own physical limits, it's (real or simulated) body.  Insects qualify here.  Trivially:  A tamper resistant device could be said to have this.
It should understand something about its identity.  That it is distinct from other possibly similar objects.  Many vertebrates seem to get this right.  Trivially:  Some devices (e.g. RFID) are accutely aware of their own serial number.
Paul Beardsell 05:10, 30 Mar 2004 (UTC)
thread_title: Necessary attributes of consciousness

message: The conscious entity should know something about its own state.  The thermostat knows if it is too cold or too hot.  
It should know its own physical limits, it's (real or simulated) body.  Insects qualify here.  Trivially:  A tamper resistant device could be said to have this.
It should understand something about its identity.  That it is distinct from other possibly similar objects.  Many vertebrates seem to get this right.  Trivially:  Some devices (e.g. RFID) are accutely aware of their own serial number.
Paul Beardsell 05:10, 30 Mar 2004 (UTC)
thread_title: Self-awareness

message: My problem here is with know. How do you know if a thermostat knows anything, as distinct from how I know you know anything. In your case, I can ask you, 'How do you know you are too hot?' as opposed to just 'Are you too hot?'. Not so with a thermostat. there is a distinction between knowing and just being - it's an epistemological question that needs addressing in terms of AC entities. Matt Stan 08:08, 30 Mar 2004 (UTC)
thread_title: Epistemology

message: This page was copied to Talk:artificial consciousness. As NPOV version is merged, we should continue the discussion there. Tkorrovi 12:34, 26 Mar 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: The discussion has continued here.Matt Stan 08:10, 27 Mar 2004 (UTC)
thread_title:  Dicussion continues on AC talk page