Talk:Anatoly Dyatlov

message: There is no source claiming his death was result of radioactive exposure, so I removed the claim. Cautious (talk) 20:54, 6 December 2011 (UTC)
replies: text: As of today, the article says: "Dyatlov died of bone marrow cancer in 1995.", citing  Higginbotham 2019 . In other publications, it was heart failure.  Both, cancer and heart failure can follow from a high dose of radiation, not as immediate consequence but a few years later. E.g. patients which are treated with radiotherapy may develop heart problems, if the chest was in the target area and also issues with the bone marrow. Can be investigated, which cause of death was the primordial trigger for his death or what was named in his death certificate? I would not prefer to have two families of citings, one correct and the other one as non-factual invention. Gunnar (talk) 23:18, 10 August 2022 (UTC)
thread_title: Cause of death 

message: It might be informative to add some type of reference either in the article itself and/or as a citation note to give some type of information to the reader of what degree 390 rem is not at all a good level of radiation exposure to receive.
The sentence would be rewritten to something to the effect of :
During the accident, Dyatlov received a radiation dose of 390 rem (5.5 Sv), which causes death to 50-70% of affected persons after 30 days.  He died of heart failure in 1995.
Note cite 
(ref)Nolan, Dennis P. (2016) Loss Prevention and Safety Control: Terms and Definitions, CRC Press, LLC; Boca Raton, Florida p. 225. NOTE:  300-400 rem exposure is a lethal dose to 50-70% of affected persons after 30 days (ref)
If there are no scholarly objections I shall check back in a week or two and make the changes.
SteamWiki (talk) 00:58, 26 April 2016 (UTC)
thread_title:  Point of reference for what 390 rem exposure is 

message: :
I do not have more than a surface understanding of nuclear metrics, but I am confused as how 390 rem is equal to 5.5 Sv. As I understand, after 1977 it was accepted that 1 rem equaled 0.01 Sv / 0.01 J/kg. So would he not have absorbed 3.9 Sv? That would only be 100 mSv away from the LD 50/50, which is close to what the wiki article currently states as fatality risk. If no one objects or provides an answer, I will change the sievert dose to 3.9 Sv, and adjust the mortality rate to 50%.
DeniedClub (talk) 02:05, 16 October 2017 (UTC)
replies: text: The Gray to Sievert ratio is only 1 for gamma and beta radiation. Alpha has a weighting factor of 20 and neutron (depending of the energy) between 5 to 20. So it is plausible to have a higher Sievert dosis than a Gray figure. But with more than 5 Sievert you are almost surely dead. Can you crosscheck the reference? Addendum: 100 rad = 1 Gray; 100 rem = 1 Sievert. All is fine, I mixed it up. --Gunnar (talk) 21:53, 10 January 2020 (UTC)
thread_title:  Conversion confusion 

message: Can this "Later investigations found that reactor design flaws were a more significant factor than operator error" be sourced? I cannot find a source. Plenty of evidence for extreme operator error however. Is it a car "design flaw" that an operator can drive it into a wall full speed? It's a good enough analogy for what happened here. The problem with the graphite tips is not a design flaw in any real sense: they served a useful purpose and presented no problem in normal operation. Ultimately every failure of a system could be attributed to "design flaws". A proper design would have never allowed the problem! This simply isn't how the world works, especially if it's the lack of system features, not the failure of a system. Virtually any system can be overcome by user error in some manner. The failure was in the design of the experiment and extreme ignorance of personnel (say of Xenon poisoning; a common, well understood RBMK phenomenon) as well as complete disregard for safety.
While it is true the accident may not have been so severe without the graphite tips, the reactor was in a state it was not allowed to be in - in multiple respects, all due to cumulative user error. 2003:C4:C724:6E00:3000:CC6A:F911:7E50 (talk) 03:44, 24 February 2023 (UTC)
replies: text: I forgot to add: I have read the INSAG-7 report which is used as a source in other places, but it is quite clear the ultimate problem was user error. The control-rod design and positive void coefficient are not design flaws. Just an "unsafe" design; but what reactor is 100% safe? It's an arbitrary definition. Ultimately I simply believe "design flaw" is too strong of a term. There were weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the design. This is a fact. But a flaw that only becomes a problem after pushing every wrong button is not usually a flaw. The fact this flaw may have been what ultimately triggered the explosion does not give it precedence over all the other things that enabled it to work that way - which is more design choices and even more user error 2003:C4:C724:6E00:3000:CC6A:F911:7E50 (talk) 04:05, 24 February 2023 (UTC)

text: In closing: the control rod design was perfectly intentional. He did it on purpose. It briefly increasing reaction rate in the bottom 2-3m of the reactor was understood and not considered a problem, even by the operator on that day. The critical thing to note here is how they work exactly: When the rod is withdrawn its graphite tip rests in the center of the reactor - it is already there, increasing the reaction rate, and has been there all the while. Now when the rods are inserted deeper the graphite tip travels downwards and only ever leaves the reactor when the control rods are inserted 80% of the way or so. In other words they don't "suddenly" increase the reaction rate. They have been doing so all the time. They merely move this area of increased reaction rate down to the bottom of the core, and then out. It's of marginal importance unless incidentally the bottom of your reactor is about to explode - which doesn't normally happen. 2003:C4:C724:6E00:3000:CC6A:F911:7E50 (talk) 04:15, 24 February 2023 (UTC)
thread_title:  Supposed "design flaws"