Talk:Central Commission for Discipline Inspection

message: The New York Times article just added, ""Chinese Officials Vow to Press Political Shake-Up, Saying Corruption Is Focus", is only tangentially related to the Commission, and is intended to be removed once there are more pertinent sources. modify 06:28, 27 September 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  New York Times article is temporary 

message: Hello TIAYN, could you please re-write the following phrase, as I am unsure what it means? 
:Peer-to-peer supervision was defined by the calling of "democratic life meetings" (民主生活会) and regular reporting of the activities of all standing committee, by it at the lowest-level to the Politburo Standing Committee, to the corresponding committee.
Thanks, Colipon+(Talk) 14:57, 5 January 2015 (UTC)
replies: text:  Blah, sometimes I'm not able to write English, sometimes I'm not able to write Norwegian. I may be many things, but not a linguistic genius of any sort :p.... Changed it to "Peer-to-peer supervision is defined as the regular calling of "democratic life meetings" (民主生活会) and the regular reporting by the standing committees of its work to their corresponding party committee."... Its still a heavy sentence. Alternately it could be changed to "Peer-to-peer supervision is defined as supervision of party committee work; a provincial party committee supervises its own work through the opinions of individual cadres. This is done through the regular convocation of "democratic life meetings" (民主生活会) and the regular reporting by the standing committees of its work to their corresponding party committee." .. Is it any clearer? :) --TIAYN (talk) 15:56, 5 January 2015 (UTC)
replies: text: It's a little dense, let me see what I can do, based on what I think is the correct understanding of what you are trying to write. By the way, "democratic life meetings" seem very ill defined. The last time I came across this in literature was in Ezra Vogel's tome on Deng Xiaoping where he talked about the ouster of Hu Yaobang during a "democratic life meeting". The essence of meetings like this is that the party stalwarts gather in one room and they basically criticize each other for all manner of things. In Hu's case, he was accused of a wide range of "deviations from the party line" in the most arcane Marxist-Leninist terminology. He recalled the meetings being an extraordinary ordeal. Over the course of these meetings the peripheral participants can see which way the ideological winds are blowing and "choose the right team". Anyway, I guess it is "democratic" in that everyone has an opportunity to speak but seems awfully like a disorganized gathering of tribal elders. What is your take on it? Colipon+(Talk) 17:33, 5 January 2015 (UTC)
replies: text: As an aside - Hu Yaobang's ouster during one of these meetings is also indication of how little institutional power the General Secretary held during Deng's rule. Hu was thoroughly criticized by party elders of Chen Yun's ilk, but many others chimed in, including people who were ranked much lower than himself in the party hierarchy. Can you imagine the same thing happening in Xi's day? This goes back to what I was trying to say about Deng institutionalizing rules that did not apply to himself. Colipon+(Talk) 17:39, 5 January 2015 (UTC)

text: I think that "democratic life meetings" have a very different meaning below the CC then it does at the CC or the PSC. Reason? No one holds those bodies responsible for anything. Its much harder to get away with such behaviour, as the one meted out to Hua, below the CC. It must also be said that the democratic life meeting was convened to correct Hua's "mistakes"—which it dully did—and not to be nice. I think in this case the "peripheral participants" already knew were the wind was going. My take on it; it depends on who calls the meeting, and for what reason. In Hua's case it was not so much a democratic meeting, as a criticism of his politics, ideology and career. If the central leadership becomes so polarized again then I think it will happen under Xi, but from what we've seen during his term, it seems like he has the full backing of the PSC and the Politburo. The arrest of Zhou Yongkang, at least in my mind, went fairly smooth. Xi could, but I see no reason for why he would. As for "Deng institutionalizing rules that did not apply to himself" is somewhat correct, but I don't think this has anything to do with the regular convocation democratic life meetings. Democratic life meetings are called when there is consensus, or at least majority, for it being called. The problem with Deng, and Chen Yun to some degree, was that he was above everyday decision-making—akin to Mao. The PSC rarely met, and in the late-1980s neither Deng nor Chen participated in all of the meetings of the PSC or Politburo. Deng could not institutionalize his position, since he had none. He was a Vice Premier and CMC Chairman. He did institutionalize the CMC chairmanship when he resigned though. Deng, like Tito, thought he was the exception to the rule; both leaders seemed very adamant that formal rules and procedures should be created, but both of them seemed entirely willing to let those rules go into effect when they died/or in the case of Deng, became too old and retired. The rules Deng institutionalized were for General Secretary, CMC Chairman and the Presidency and to a lesser degree with the PSC, Politburo, Secretariat, the Central Committee and the CCDI. Deng could not institutionalize his own position within the system, since he had none–from an institutional perspective it doesn't make sense that Deng was leader if you don't consider China a military dictatorship (which it is not, but he clearly ruled because he controlled the military). Case in point, Mao took control over the party organization through his control of the Red Army. Deng is similar to Tito, but not as arrogant; Yugoslavia was institutionalized beyond comprehension, China is still institutionalizing very basic features of its system (such as the CCDI and the inner-party supervision system for instance). Deng clearly didn't see the need to create formal procedures for everything unlike Tito. Unlike Gorbachev, Deng never lost faith in the party. This is been seen when looking at the definition of democratic centralism. It remained unchanged. Its still defined as "centralism on the basis of democracy and democracy under centralized guidance". If Deng had believed in political reform, as Ezra Vogel idealistically believes, he would have reedefined it. Deng still believed in the party, but more importantly, believed in the powers vested in the PSC. This partially explains why he did not support CCDI independence, or ever tried to institutionalize the powers of the CC. --TIAYN (talk) 23:21, 5 January 2015 (UTC)
replies: text: I think maybe I didn't make myself understood too well - my asking "can you imagine this happening under Xi" was more meant to demonstrate that the General Secretary now has significant institutional power whereas during the Deng era they did not. Hu Yaobang was criticized by his high ranking colleagues but also by those who ranked much lower than himself. I doubt anyone would criticize Xi openly today during any meeting, "democratic life" or not, as he seems to have gained quite the prestige with the party rank and file. Also the top leadership since Hu gives an impression of acting in a relatively collegial manner (apart from perhaps Zhou Yongkang case). Xi has revived Democratic Life Meetings by the way, they are happening at the provincial level and definitely at local levels, state media has reported on this. Colipon+(Talk) 14:38, 6 January 2015 (UTC)

text: Well, I partially agree with you. It was the CPC General Secretary which ruled the country day-to-day, a point which Vogel makes clear. But its impossible today, simply because a leader has to hold the office of CPC General Secretary. Deng's power came from two things; his CMC chairmanship and PSC seat. And in the PSC (and Politburo) he had a majority. This system has been institutionalized in all communist parties I know of. The problem with communist parties (ruling and non-ruling) is that when the leadership first forms a majority, its very difficult for the party opposition to reach the top, and the party leadership eventually acquires to much power (and does not resign). Even the Italian Communist Party, an electoral machine, suffered from this problem. This is partly to blamed on the powers vested in the party head, and the party head's eventual consolidation of power; appoints close supporters to head the cadre or organization departments, to the Secretarit and the PB and so on.The two-term system has solved this problem; since no one can sit till they die, no faction can attain total dominance (or at least It seems like it if you look at China, Laos or Vietnam). --TIAYN (talk) 14:42, 7 January 2015 (UTC)
replies: text: Yes, I guess I was trying to point out more the fact that Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang were not the real highest authority despite having the title of  "General Secretary". All the real power belonged to Deng, who was somewhat held in check when need be by several other 'elders', notably Chen Yun, Bo Yibo, and Li Xiannian. When Zhao was removed from his post as General Secretary in 1989, he actually complained in his diary that this removal was entirely illegal, as it was a decision by fiat of the party elders, not a decision that received a bona fide endorsement from a full plenum of the Central Committee as stipulated in the party charter. <BR>So Laos and Vietnam both have term limits now as well? Cuba does not appear to. Also, it will be very interesting to see whether Xi stays true to his own term limits, as this is not yet codified in the party constitution, and is, in practice, mostly a rule on mandatory retirement at a certain age. Let's not forget that the rule "67 in 68 out" was fully implemented only in 2007 at the 17th Congress, which was only 8 years ago. Colipon+(Talk) 14:52, 7 January 2015 (UTC)

text: Cuba has term limits, but it was introduced under Raul Castro in 2012. He will step down in 2017/18 (I think), when his second term ends and will be succeeded by Miguel Díaz-Canel as premier, president and party head (or at least president and party head) and maybe succeeded as premier by Marino Murillo. Vietnam has not had a general secretary sitting more then two full terms since Le Duan (and he died in 1986). Do Muoi was elected for a second term, but resigned in 1997. Since 1986 no president, National Assembly chairmen or party head has served more then two full terms, and the majority of them have served one. But party democracy, in the sense of factionalism, has played an important role in this. The exception to the rule is Nguyen Tan Dung, but he was elected at the very end of a term upon his election. Lao introduced it at the 7th or 8th congress.... Xi won't be allowed to rule more then two terms: I doubt the rest of the party wants that, and since there is actually a party regulation on the matter it would be difficult for Xi to actually move around it. He can rescind it, but do you think the PSC or the Politburo would support that? I doubt it. --TIAYN (talk) 15:37, 7 January 2015 (UTC)

text: Removed it. Non important line. I was not thinking very well when I wrote that section.--TIAYN (talk) 22:27, 5 January 2015 (UTC)

text: Changed to "Despite having the personal backing of Mao Zedong and the central party leadership, the CCDI was often unable to fulfil its duties in the provinces". --TIAYN (talk) 14:38, 6 January 2015 (UTC)
thread_title:  Peer to peer supervision 

message: This sentence also doesn't make much sense: "This is not to say that the CPC is not interested in strengthening inner-party democracy, but rather how it should be pursued." Could you please fix or let me know what you mean? Colipon+(Talk)
: Removed it. Non important line. I was not thinking very well when I wrote that section.--TIAYN (talk) 22:27, 5 January 2015 (UTC)
thread_title: Another sentence

message: This sentence, "It was not powerful enough to topple party officials in the provinces, despite getting the formal support of Mao Zedong and the Central Committee." also does not make sense. Do you mean that even though the CCDI had the backing of Mao to remove a specific official whom Mao wanted removed, but it was unable to do so? Or do you mean that the CCDI had the backing of Mao but were unable to remove provincial officials more generally? Colipon+(Talk) 14:25, 6 January 2015 (UTC)
replies: text: Changed to "Despite having the personal backing of Mao Zedong and the central party leadership, the CCDI was often unable to fulfil its duties in the provinces". --TIAYN (talk) 14:38, 6 January 2015 (UTC)
thread_title: Mao support

message: By the way, Xi Jinping & Wang Qishan have undertaken some very significant reforms of the CCDI in recent months - I'm not sure if sources are even available in English yet that describe what has occurred. In essence, it seems like the new leadership is attempting a serious "judicial separation" experiment from within the party, whereby the control organization severs most of its operational links with the corresponding party committee. For example, according to official sources, since the beginning of 2014, CDI members have gradually removed themselves or resigned from corresponding government or other executive positions, and also have also removed themselves from most "coordination and discussion bodies", i.e., "leading groups", meaning they are seriously reducing involvement in executing day-to-day party committee duties. Furthermore, lower-level CDIs are beginning to report directly into CDIs of the next higher level, not to the party committee it is supposed to hold in check. This is a very pronounced, large-scale reform from the previous generation which not only saw the CDIs operate under direct control of the party committee, but also saw immense executive power vested in CDI chiefs and Zhengfawei (politics+law commission) chiefs, by virtue of their concurrent Standing Committee membership and more importantly their holding concurrent government executive posts such as Vice Governor. It's clear that with these changes Xi, Wang, and co. are doing very serious work to institutionalize control structures. Colipon+(Talk) 18:04, 5 January 2015 (UTC)
replies: text: I've heard of one of those reforms; the CDI reporting directly to the CCDI (and the committee at the higher-level). The "dual leadership" system has been reformed continuously since the year it was first introduced. The 3rd Plenary Session reform is mentioned with one line in the "Lower-levels and inspection teams" section.. What is entirely new is the power separation taking place within the party below the central party leadership. Its not that surprising, since these reforms have been introduced in the state judiciary (this is mentioned in the Western press...) ... Obviously you have to write this (since I doubt another Chinese-reading user will come along and fix this article). We, in reality you :p, should create a subsection in the "Institutional history" section for Xi Jinping. I doubt his reforms will end during the beginning of his third year in office... This is the main reason for signing up for a Chinese course; I need Chinese news for research sake. --TIAYN (talk) 22:27, 5 January 2015 (UTC)
replies: text: Seems like an IP user was kind enough to link the "democratic life meeting" article over at the Chinese WP. :) You are taking Chinese lessons? It can be very challenging especially if you're doing political research - Marxist jargon is taken to a whole new level in the Chinese language. The entire 18th CC 3rd Plenum decision is worth reading, the raft of reforms, at least the ambitions, was quite all-encompassing and really the biggest attempt at reform since Deng Xiaoping, but it's anyone's guess how well it will be implemented in practice. Anyway, I am happy to help write about recent reforms, but I will probably keep it short as it will quickly fall victim to recentism. By the way over at Yang Weize I noticed to edited to say that he has not yet "officially left office" - are you aware of any case where an official was Shuanggui'ed but ended up getting released and continued working in their post? Seems like Shuanggui is a sure sign that they are done. Colipon+(Talk) 14:18, 6 January 2015 (UTC)

text: First, very interesting. Second, I think Xi is willing to sacrifice very much for the sake of destroying corrupt elements. The book The New Emperors: Power and the Princelings in China makes the point that Xi was very hard on corruption, by looking at his public pronouncement and theoretical works dating back to the 1990s, if you look at his public pronouncements. Third, I'm thinking Yang Weize's case is similar to Ling Jihua. Ling was placed under investigation by the CCDI on 22 December, but was removed on office 30 December. I'm guessing Yang Weize is still the provincial secretary until he is formally removed from office despite him having no power whatsoever right now.--TIAYN (talk) 14:49, 6 January 2015 (UTC)
replies: text: What about the Shuanggui question? I'm really curious. Colipon+(Talk) 16:10, 6 January 2015 (UTC)

text: No clue actually, but I feel fairly certain thats it has never happened (and won't happen in the foreseeable future). But the world is full of surprises. Who believed that Xi would be a radical reformer of the system when he took power in 2012? --TIAYN (talk) 16:34, 6 January 2015 (UTC)
replies: text: According to a Xinhua press release in June 2014, the Politburo issued a statement which "called to strengthen the leadership of superior discipline inspection agencies over subordinate ones, adding that inspectors must also be sent to top-level Party and State organs.. So from this reading it can be reasonably determined that there were two big changes taking place. 1. Increased oversight of higher-level CDIs over lower level CDIs, and 2. Inspection teams now must be placed in central party and government organs, in addition to the provinces. From this press release alone however it is impossible to determine what "strengthening leadership" actually means in practice, as the "dual responsibility" system is nothing new - it was established at the 12th Party Congress. Colipon+(Talk) 21:05, 7 January 2015 (UTC)
thread_title:  Recent reforms 

message: I'm a little confused by this section - are these duties and responsibilities of the CCDI, or are they the duties and responsibilities of party members in general? Moreover, is the CCDI responsible for these things, facilitating this work, or just defining how the work should be performed? As far as I know, things like democratic life meetings can be called by anyone in the leadership, not by the CCDI's direction alone. Colipon+(Talk) 19:13, 6 January 2015 (UTC)
replies: text: The first sentence says "The CCDI (and its local affiliates) enforces the inner-party supervision system" . Which means it supervises the system. Its the duties and responsibilities of the CCDI, and not ordinary party members. Its the CCDI duty (and responsibility) to supervise the inner-party supervision system, to investigate corrupt officials, petition system and so on. --TIAYN (talk) 00:28, 7 January 2015 (UTC)
replies: text: Sorry, you are right, I should have paid more heed to the opening sentence. Thanks for your response. Colipon+(Talk) 14:01, 7 January 2015 (UTC)
thread_title:  "Duties and responsibilities" 

message: Could you please clarify what "and the next" in parentheses mean in the sentence below? Thanks.
:Despite this, 12th National Congress introduced "dual leadership" in the works of local CDIs—meaning that they were both responsible to the party committee at the corresponding level (and the next) and to the CDI at the higher level.
Colipon+(Talk) 14:38, 7 January 2015 (UTC)
replies: text:  here, didn't say so in the source. --TIAYN (talk) 15:50, 7 January 2015 (UTC)
replies: text: I cannot access the source for some reason. It's probably safe to assume this means that the local CDI is responsible to the party committee at its own level, the party committee of the level above, and the CDI of the level above? Colipon+(Talk) 16:14, 7 January 2015 (UTC)

text: Sorry, wrong section. Rewrote it; "Despite this, 12th National Congress introduced "dual leadership" in the works of local CDIs—meaning that they were both responsible to the party committee at the corresponding level (and the party committee at the level above) and to the CDI at the higher level". --TIAYN (talk) 14:41, 8 January 2015 (UTC)
replies: text: Thanks! You will notice that I made an edit under "Xi reforms" to the effect that the 18th-3rd plenum called for the dual leadership system to be "more defined, procedure-oriented, and institutionalized." I still don't like this translation as it does not quite describe exactly what they are intending, which is that, essentially, the CDI system will become more independent and an institution unto itself, with its responsibilities to local party committees and the CDI of the higher level to become more specified (and presumably, codified), which clear division on what the responsibilities are to the corresponding party committee and what responsibilities are to the higher-level CDI, and that these would be different. Presumably, this means that the corresponding party committee will not be able to directly interfere in the work of the CDI, or at least the specific instances for which this interference is allowed to occur will be clearly set out with a set of written rules. Colipon+(Talk) 15:08, 8 January 2015 (UTC)

text: Eric Li in  "Party of the Century: How China is Reorganizing for the Future" states rather bluntly that from the 3rd Plenary Session on all CDIs report directly to the CCDI. The problem with Li is that he just states it, and doesn't go any deeper.. Good work.  --TIAYN (talk) 15:40, 8 January 2015 (UTC)
replies: text: I don't think the CDI-CCDi reporting structure that Li wrote about is quite accurate, at least it is not immediately visible from my reading of Chinese-language sources, but I can dig a bit further. Colipon+(Talk) 17:57, 8 January 2015 (UTC)
thread_title:  dual leadership 

message: Please clarify what "scientific administration" means for the lay reader. Thanks!
:Even those who shared the Soviet fascination with self-organizational corrections, like Liu Shaoqi and Dong Biwu, did not share their fascination with "scientific administration".
Colipon+(Talk) 14:39, 7 January 2015 (UTC)
replies: text: According to Viktor Afanasyev, editor-in-chief of Pravda, its "The systematically exercised, conscious and purposeful influence by man on the social system as a whole or on its separate aspects.... on the basis of knowledge and use of the objective laws of socialism and its progressive trends, in order to ensure its effective functioning and development." Sandle, Mark. A Short History Of Soviet Socialism, p. 258. --TIAYN (talk) 14:35, 8 January 2015 (UTC)

text: . --TIAYN (talk) 15:37, 8 January 2015 (UTC)
thread_title:  Scientific administration 

message: Hi, with regards to the sentence "The jurisdiction of the CCDI mirrors that of the Ministry of Supervision, with the latter being responsible for cases involving breaches of party discipline and breaches to state law made by Party members", am I correct in saying that the MoS is also responsible for the breaches to state law made by non-party members? Colipon+(Talk) 15:40, 12 January 2015 (UTC)
replies: text: Rewrote to The jurisdiction of the party discipline inspection system mirrors that of the Ministry of Supervision, with the CCDI [...].. Maybe not better written, but its easier to understand. --TIAYN (talk) 22:04, 12 January 2015 (UTC)
thread_title:  Jurisdiction 

message: Could you please clarify with regards to the following passage: 
:Before an investigation is initiated, eight preliminary steps have to be made; "preliminary evidence and complaint management, preliminary confirmation of disciplinary violations, approval for opening the case, investigation and evidence collection, case hearing, implementation of disciplinary sanctions, appeal by the disciplined official, and continued supervision and management of the case"
The passage implies that all eight things must happen before an investigation may even begin. Is this correct? For instance, how could "disciplinary sanctions" be "implemented" before an investigation is even initiated? Please elaborate. Colipon+(Talk) 21:02, 12 January 2015 (UTC)
replies: text:  Big error; wrote "An investigation goes through eighth steps". --TIAYN (talk) 23:24, 12 January 2015 (UTC)
thread_title:  "eight preliminary steps" 

message: Hi - could you please clarify why the previous intro stated that the CCDI is tasked with "enforcing democratic centralism" of the Central Committee? Does this mean that the CCDI has a mandated duty to enforce that the regions follow the rule of the centre? If this were true - then it is much more than just an anti-corruption body, it implies that it is also charged with enforcing the party's ideological line across the entire organization, which is not my impression from what I know. Colipon+(Talk) 22:19, 3 February 2015 (UTC)
replies: text: Article 44: "The main tasks of the Party's commissions for discipline inspection at all levels are as follows: to uphold the Constitution and other statutes of the Party, to check up on the implementation of the line, principles, policies and resolutions of the Party and to assist the respective Party committees in improving the Party's style of work and in organizing and coordinating the work against corruption." The CCDI and the CDIs supervises the implementation of the "line, principles, policies and resolutions of the Party [CC, PB, PSC]". To not implement the orders of the CC is by definition a breach of party discipline, and in this case, by definition a breach of democratic centralism... I would also argue, maybe a touch bit too arrogant, that this should not be a surprise; the party basic organizational principle is democratic centralism (meaning in this instance Id argue how the CPC operates). If they did not supervise the proper functioning of democratic centralism, how could they ensure the CPC's "health"? This goes back to the debate in the 1980s on wether the CCDI should be a political or apolitical; it was decided it was, and would remain, a political weapon. --TIAYN (talk) 23:29, 3 February 2015 (UTC)
replies: text: Ok, thanks for your response. Fair enough, although I would also contend that what the party constitution says and what happens in practice is often two completely different things. Anyway, you will notice that I edited the lede to open with "The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) is the highest internal control institution of the Communist Party of China (CPC), tasked with enforcing party discipline and combating corruption and malfeasance in the party." Do you find this description ok? I figured that "enforcing party discipline" speaks to, in laymen's terms, what is written in the constitution and what you spoke to above. Do you have any specific examples where the CCDI acted as more of a "party whip" on policy issues rather than just a straightforward anti-corruption body? I was under the impression that "supervising implementation of the line, principles... etc" was the role of the Secretariat. Colipon+(Talk) 01:53, 4 February 2015 (UTC)

text: The CPC constitution defines it as the working body of the Politburo. The Secretariat supervises the implementation of central directives and is responsible for communication between central and lower-levels. It can only supervise the implementation, It doesn't have the formal power to punish a cadre (which the CCDI does). But I'm guessing, I don't know. Its a good question. But as you know, there has been a lot in the press about the failure of lower-level committees in implementing central-level directives. This does fall under the auspices of the CCDI. The CCDI is not an anti-corruption agency, its rather a constitutional court-cum-Party Bureau of Investigation. It ensures that party by-laws are adhered to in practice, and arrests and initiates investigations against people who breach these same party by-laws. Simply calling it an anti-corruption agency is by definition wrong.... So instead of " the highest internal control institution of the Communist Party of China (CPC), tasked with enforcing party discipline and combating corruption and malfeasance in the party", what about " the highest internal control institution of the Communist Party of China (CPC), tasked with enforcing party by-laws and combating corruption and malfeasance in the party"? --TIAYN (talk) 09:34, 4 February 2015 (UTC)
replies: text: Ok, I see. I guess my hesitation comes from the fact that the CCDI's anti-corruption role is much higher profile than its "constitutional review" role. I am ok with the revision, but I feel there may be a more accessible way to say it. Maybe, "enforcing the party's internal rules." As for its constitutional role, has it ever been in a position where it needed to interpret the party charter and 'rule' on it? Colipon+(Talk) 14:05, 4 February 2015 (UTC)

text: My analogy is incorrect. As mentioned in the article; "DICs at every level have the power of issuing and interpreting regulations [party rules]", however, the CDIs do not have the power to interpret the party constitution (as far as I know, no one in official capacity has that power). But the party constitution is vague, and is supplemented by party regulations when need be. Therefore, while the CCDI does not interpret the constitution, the CCDI interprets all resolutions passed by the CC which is nearly the same. --TIAYN (talk) 16:44, 4 February 2015 (UTC)
thread_title:  "Enforcing democratic centralism" 

message: Hi , have a look at this page. Recently the CCDI promulgated a new set of "disciplinary regulations" (中国共产党纪律处分条例) and "self-discipline rules" (中国共产党廉洁自律准则). This is a highly relevant 'codification' of CCDI rules. Colipon+(Talk) 13:13, 4 November 2015 (UTC)
replies: text:  Sorry, not very active as of late. --TIAYN (talk) 09:50, 24 November 2015 (UTC)
replies: text: i think we need to wait until the commentariat and scholars get hold of this and flesh it all out, don't we? interesting days in the 天朝, that is for damned sure.Happy  monsoon day  04:35, 27 November 2015 (UTC)
thread_title:  New regulations 

message: "Article 45: The Party’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection shall function under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Party", from the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party:  TheUzbek (talk) 08:35, 12 January 2024 (UTC)
thread_title:  Central Committee leadership