Talk:Bayesian game

message: In the example section, the following text appears: "In fact in the second game there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium where...". Yet, there is only one game shown in the picture. Should the text be "In fact in the second stage there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium where..." ?
:Not sure what that was about, got rid of "in the second game". Cretog8 (talk) 03:36, 2 June 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  example PBE 

message: The signaling example is based on an 1973 article by spence. here's the citation:
Spence, A. M. (1973), 'Job Market Signaling', Quarterly Journal of Economics 87(3), 355--74.
would be nice if someone cared to add this citation to the article text... --1-is-blue (talk) 21:54, 24 March 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  citations 

message: "(while the word type is used, it is not actually defined in any game theory texts, and may be lost to the ages.)" This is kinda a distraction in the article. "Type" is a standard term for game theory, and so it's fine to use it without qualification. (BTW, it's defined In Myerson's Analysis of Conflict, "The initial private information that a player has at this point in time is called the type of the player." Cretog8 (talk) 00:16, 22 May 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: Sorry, that's Myerson's Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict.Cretog8 (talk) 00:28, 22 May 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Types 

message: This game can be solved using deletion of dominated strategies and/or Nash equilibria. As such, it doesn't strike me as a very useful example of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in action. First, 2 can infer that 1 will never play U because the payoffs from D dominate the payoffs from D. 2 will always play U' because she knows that 1 will never play U (no matter how much 1 wants 2 to play D'). Second, by converting this game to normal form, the game is easily solvable, either by deletion of dominated strategies or by identifying the Nash equilibrium. A more useful example would demonstrate how PBE refines both Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and Nash equilibrium as solution concepts. I wish I could contribute further by thinking of a game that does this, but nothing's coming. Ideas?
Abu Casey (talk) 23:56, 17 March 2011 (UTC)
replies: text: I agree, this example was really confusing. I replaced it with the Sheriff's dilemma and provided a more detailed and intuitive approach (because this article is very technical in general). It would still be good to have an extensive-form game too, for example by bringing back the previous example but making it less confusing.7804j (talk) 17:13, 16 June 2016 (UTC)
thread_title:  The example in "An example" doesn't require PBE 

message: Is this supposed to be feasibility? I'm familiar with feasibility of solutions in various applied mathematics topics such as linear p, game theory, etc. but can't find anything close in to its' use here on "plausibility" in the current Perfect Bayesian equilibrium § . 76.180.168.166 (talk) 05:44, 9 September 2013 (UTC)
thread_title:  "plausibility" 

message: An editor has identified a potential problem with the redirect :Gioco bayesiano and has thus listed it for discussion. This discussion will occur at Wikipedia:Redirects for discussion/Log/2022 February 12#Gioco bayesiano until a consensus is reached, and readers of this page are welcome to contribute to the discussion.  ~~~~User:1234qwer1234qwer4 (talk) 02:12, 12 February 2022 (UTC)
thread_title:  "Gioco bayesiano" listed at [[Wikipedia:Redirects for discussion|Redirects for discussion]] 

message: As far as I recall, there are different notions of Bayesian Nash Equilibria for different games (In some classes of games they are equivalent, but not in all). I would advocate distinguishing between them, e.g. weak Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, Bayesian Nash Equilibrium etc. The article, to me, is not always clear on the distinction and seems to mix them together from time to time. Oragonof (talk) 11:00, 9 July 2023 (UTC)
thread_title:  Different notions of equilibria