Talk:Ethical intuitionism

message: I suspect that there will be some controversy over the definition of "ethical intuitionism" and perhaps some other terms in this entry. I've gone with the minimal definition of "ethical intuitionism" as the epistemological view that there are some basic (i.e., foundational, non-inferential) moral beliefs. So this leaves out as inessential to the view: moral realism, ethical non-naturalism, pluralism, and deontological ethics. It also then is neutral between a rationalist version and empiricist version (moral sense theory). This then allows for people like David Hume to be an ethical intuitionist, which is as it should be.  Hume is a sentimentalist (or moral sense theorist), but he's also standardly taken to be an anti-realist and naturalist. In any event, hopefully this is not too controversial. I think this is pretty standard (see Sinnott-Armstrong, Huemer, and others). -- Jaymay 17:39, 12 October 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Definitions

message: Hi all. I'm starting to work on this article and the moral sense theory article that I created. I'm hoping to clean up and expand them, and distinguish the two (rationalist intuitionism and moral sense theory) from one another. Any help and ideas here would be great. -- Jaymay 22:53, 11 October 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Clean up and expansion

message: The section looks like its all legit stuff, but it doesn't have sources. So you should put those in.  — Preceding unsigned comment added by Polsky215 (talk • contribs) 15:08, 21 June 2012 (UTC)
thread_title: Criticism

message: The format is wrong.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 70.158.33.66 (talk) 16:52, 17 September 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Please be more specific. 68.1.124.88 (talk) 06:53, 10 February 2008 (UTC)
thread_title: Format

message: This section below:
Besides, Occam's Razor is a redundant principle in the wake of particle physics. It was once thought everything is made up of atoms, and this was proved to be true. According to Occam's Razor, we needn't have looked any further than that for the building-blocks of the world. But now it turns out there are particles within particles, and quantum physics shows that the universe is far more complex than was previously imagined. If Occam's Razor cannot aid us even in the precise field of science, how can it be of any use to us in philosophy?
The argument doesn't make sense.   The utility of Occam's Razor is unaffected by discoveries of quantum physics, or indeed, any discoveries.  It may once have been the case that atoms were sufficient to explain our world, just as Newtonian mechanics was once thought to be perfect.  However, those thoughts are a function of the level of awareness of how the world actually works.  When more and better data are gathered, the awareness of what the world is really like deepens.   Once this occurs, many theories are developed in the attempt to explain the updated world view, and then Occam's Razor may once again be used to distinguish between those theories.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 41.241.88.125 (talk) 13:54, 29 January 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: I agree. I cleared up those arguments. 68.1.124.88 (talk) 06:52, 10 February 2008 (UTC)
thread_title: Occam's razor argument

message: I added some counter-arguments. Also, I cleared up the counter-arguments against the Occam's Razor criticism. 68.1.124.88 (talk) 06:51, 10 February 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Counter-arguments 

message: I've tried to add a very basic introduction for the benefit of any non-philosopher surfing around.  I don't think it conflicts with anything in the academic exposition and discussion that follows. Bonniedougall (talk) 16:45, 21 February 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  The Basics 

message: An anonymous user added the following text to the top of the page about mathematical intuitionism:
== Moral Intuitionism ==
G.E. Moore and W.D. Ross, both twentieth century philosophers, have argued that we know what is moral and make moral judgments by way of intuition.  Intuition, among philosophers, does not mean mere instinct or a “guilty feeling.”  It refers to an implicit judgment based on experience, learning, and conclusions.  Intuitionism also places great emphasis on the familiar idea that some things are so basic as to be a prior observation, or self-evident.  Moore argued that we are Intuitionist about that which is good, and Ross argued that we ate so in respect to that which is right. Their fundamental point is that there are basic aspects of morality that we grasp at a fundamental level and that this process differs from the way we come to know empirical facts about the world.
Mich M., Christine W., (2009). Living Ethics An Introduction, 8-704.
It seems like it might be useful here, but I was not sure how to incorporate it.  —Mark Dominus (talk) 00:23, 13 December 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Moral intuitionism 

message: I have tagged the "Another definition" section with .  I have a PhD in Philosophy and I do not think that ethical intuitionism is considered to have any essential connection to motive-based ethics. But I will gladly change my mind if suitable references can be provided -- WikiPedant (talk) 19:55, 3 March 2011 (UTC)
thread_title:  "Another definition" section strikes me as false 

message: What we have (split at sentence boundaries): 
Ethical intuitionism (also called moral intuitionism) is a view or family of views in moral epistemology (and, on some definitions, metaphysics).
It is foundationalism applied to moral knowledge, the thesis that some moral truths can be known non-inferentially (i.e., known without one needing to infer them from other truths one believes).
Such an epistemological view is by definition committed to the existence of knowledge of moral truths; therefore, ethical intuitionism implies cognitivism.
As a foundationalist epistemological position, ethical intuitionism contrasts with coherentist positions in moral epistemology, such as those that depend on reflective equilibrium.
How I reformulated this for my own notes: 
Ethical intuitionism is a foundationalist stance in moral epistemology, positing that moral truths exist (per cognitivism) and can be known non-inferentially (i.e. without inference from other established beliefs).
:
As a foundationalist epistemological position, ethical intuitionism contrasts with coherentist positions in moral epistemology, such as those that depend on reflective equilibrium.
I don't know whether I retained the precise meaning of the original, but my own version is so much more direct, I take it as a major improvement, even if false. 
Somehow I suspect the only real damage I've done in my slimmed version is dropping the word "knowledge", but this is good enough for my purposes with that blemish. — MaxEnt 19:18, 21 May 2021 (UTC)
thread_title:  I'm no dummy, and the lead did not work for me