Talk:Eliminative materialism

message: This program seems to want to get rid of phlogiston theory by proposing that fire does not exist. 74.192.15.216 (talk) 12:57, 28 October 2012 (UTC)
thread_title:  Phlogiston 

message: Hey guys, 
While I'm not a native speaker of English, the last sentence seems to be convoluted:
:"Furthermore, the eliminativist's claim that folk psychology cannot explain phenomena such as mental disorders or many memory processes has become often the objectors's premise, namely that it is not at all the task of folk-psychology to account for these phenomena." 
I couldn't find any mention of what is "objectors's premise" (nor "objector's" or "objectors'"). It should be changed to at least a grammatically correct version, however since I'm not sure which version is proper I can't change it.
--olya 04:57, 2 May 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Odd expression - "objectors's premise" 

message: I expanded the article, but we still need a better "Arguments for eliminativism" section, further explaining the theory-theory. --Kripkenstein 12:42, 14 February 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Expanded 

message: "Eliminativists believe that no coherent neural basis will be found for many everyday psychological concepts such as belief or desire and that behaviour and experience can only be adequately explained on the biological level."
In case you didn't notice, neurons are on the biological level.  Either the first half of the sentece is right, or the second half is, but not both.
:You're missing the point of the sentence. The first part refers to the the fact that EM proponents argue that belief and desire cannot be explained on the biological level as they are incoherent (and hence, there is no coherent neural basis for them), the second part to the fact that all experience and behaviour should only be explained in terms of biology.
: - Vaughan 07:08, 17 May 2006 (UTC)
replies: text:  Perhaps, since some people are having difficulty with the sentence, it could be rewritten to be more clear.  How about, "Eliminativists believe that no coherent neural basis will be found for many everyday psychological concepts such as belief or desire, since they are poorly defined. Rather, they argue that psychological concepts of behaviour and experience should be judged by how well they reduce to the biological level." Edhubbard 14:10, 8 August 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Self contradicting statement 

message: Is anyone familiar with Bickle's (1998) ideas about "smooth" versus "bumpy" reductions? In his book, Psychoneural Reduction: The New Wave, Bickle lays out a framework in which reductions are the main framework, and the question is just how much the two frameworks need to be modified so that they fit together.  So, in the case of reductive materialism, he would suggest a fairly smooth reduction, while in the case of eliminative materialism, a fairly bumpy reduction.  The bumpier the reduction, the more theory change required, and the more likely that one of the two frameworks is likely to be eliminated (the extreme case of a bumpy reduction).  Paul Churchland finds this framework quite useful, and has used Bickle's book as the starting point for one of his grad philosophy classes.  Perhaps some mention of that would be useful here? Edhubbard 14:15, 8 August 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Interesting. I haven't Bickle's book, but I have read some of his articles. It seems more appropriate to add to an article specifically on reductionism or perhaps physicalism. You might even write it up as part of an article on John Bickle, seeing as we don't have one yet!! But, if you feel you can work it in here somehow, try to simplify/syntheize it and make into some kind of argument for or against EM. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 18:09, 8 August 2006 (UTC)
replies: text:  Yeah, I think you might be right, in that Bickle's book isn't really an argument *for* or *against* EM, but really more of a metaphilosophical excersise, giving a framework to make sense of where EM falls on the spectrum of possible reductions.  I'll have to go back and think a bit about how it might be added. Edhubbard 18:18, 8 August 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Bickle: PsychoNeural Reduction

message: Hi, I've created a new image for the EM framework. Essentially, I've added some shading to the Folk Psychology box to illustrate two things 1) Different EM theorists make different bets about which bits of FP will be eliminated and which will be reduced (see my additions re: Dennet v. the Churchlands), and this new version illustrates that range of positions and 2) My reading of Dennett and the Churchlands suggests that they do not believe that neuroscience will completely eliminate all higher level theories, of vocabularies.  Therefore, there must be some higher order vocabulary, even if it is radically different from the vocabulary of FP that we currently employ.  If people think that this image and this discussion could improve the article, I will be happy to change the main page.  If not, no worries, it only took a few minutes to add the gradient.  Edhubbard 21:56, 11 August 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: New EM Image Proposal

message: I have re-added in the term "propositional attitudes" in reference to the Churchlands' views. since there is a subtle distinction to be made here.  In general, there are different ways to concieve of the Intentionality relationship between our mental contents and the objects in the world.  One common way, related to Searle's thinking (drawing on speech act theory), Fodor's language of thought, and many others, is to think of the Intentionality relationship like a set of sentences (propositions) whose content is identified with a "that" clause. Joe belives that X, Rene assumes that y, etc.  However, there are other ways to concieve of the intentionality relation, for example as an imagistic isomorophism between mental contents and physical objects in the world.  The Churchlands are opposed to this propositional view of Intentionality, but do not deny that there is something like an intentionality relation that needs to be satisfied between our mental contents and the objects in the world.  Pat Churchland's PhD student (and now UCSD faculty member) Rick Grush dealt with the "architecture of representation" in his PhD dissertation, and how a non-propositional attitude system could still be thought of a representational or Intentional system.  Edhubbard 22:57, 12 August 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: I'm aware of all that. See my failed FAC Jerry Fodor. Please remember that this is Wikipedia and not the SEP, though. Simplify radically!! --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 06:52, 13 August 2006 (UTC)
replies: text:  I know you know, Lacatosias. I've spent a lot of time looking at all of the impressive work that you've done, on wikipedia.  But, there's no guarantee that eveyone else coming to this discussion will know these disticntions as well as other people do. My concern is that if we simplify too radically, then we run the risk of caricature. One of the common caricatures/misrepresentations of EM is that they deny the need for any high-level mental vocabulary, whereas the hypothesis (or at least the one advanced by the Churchlands) is that *our current* high-level vocabulary will be eliminated.  So pointing out this subtlety, we briefly indicate that there are bigger issues, even if we cannot dive into every subtlety in the philosophy of the mind. Edhubbard 07:07, 13 August 2006 (UTC)

text: Well, thanks for the compliment, first of all. Secondly, I'm not suggesting that such information be left out. The Churchland's position has definitely changed somewhat over the years (like almost eveything in philosophy).And Dennett's ideas are often delibaretely intended to be difficult to pin-down into simple categories and definite positions. Iìve read some interesting arguments that  Dennet is only eliminativist about a certain subset of qualia ("sensory qualia"), while being realist about others, and istrumenalist about intentional attidudes. But that sort of thing could go on ad infinitum. The main thing is to try to keep it as comprehensible to the average reader as possible (although it's not likely that such a person would read this page anyway (0;) and to document all the claims made. This is all I'm suggesting. I will come back at some point and add in-line cites for the parts that I wrote.  --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 08:34, 13 August 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Propositional attitudes

message: Members of the Wikipedia:WikiProject Good articles are in the process of doing a re-review of current Good Article listings to ensure compliance with the standards of the Good Article Criteria. (Discussion of the changes and re-review can be found here). A significant change to the GA criteria is the mandatory use of some sort of in-line citation (In accordance to WP:CITE) to be used in order for an article to pass the verification and reference criteria. Currently this article does not include in-line citations. It is recommended that the article's editors take a look at the inclusion of in-line citations as well as how the article stacks up against the rest of the Good Article criteria. GA reviewers will give you at least a week's time from the date of this notice to work on the in-line citations before doing a full re-review and deciding if the article still merits being considered a Good Article or would need to be de-listed. If you have any questions, please don't hesitate to contact us on the Good Article project talk page or you may contact me personally. On behalf of the Good Articles Project, I want to thank you for all the time and effort that you have put into working on this article and improving the overall quality of the Wikipedia project. Agne 01:40, 26 September 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: I think we're just about there on this one. Another four or five cites will do the job. Anything else?--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 15:34, 26 September 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Done. Also expanded lead section. Now I just need to add refs to lead section. Anything else?--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 12:17, 27 September 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  GA Re-Review and In-line citations 

message: I'm glad to see this small improvment in the GA process actually. It shuld not be limited to just references though. I was going to delist this myself, even though I wrote the whole thing!! I don't have the time or desire to do the in-line cites now though.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 07:50, 26 September 2006 (UTC)
replies: text:  I agree with Francesco.  It is good that the GA process is becoming more defined.  I will have more time this weekend to start to add some in-line citations, so if we can hold off on delisting until this weekend, perhaps we will be able to avoid having to at all.  Overall, it's not too bad, as many of the important references are in the references section, and most arguments are referred to with in text names, if not citations.  So, it just seems like a matter of cutting and pasting the references into the appropriate place.  I'm happy to do what I can.  Edhubbard 09:04, 26 September 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Yes, this one shouldn't be much of a problem. I'ìll start working on it today and tommorow. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 09:09, 26 September 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: It's about time!!

message: Does anyone oppose eliminativism on the grounds that folk psych not a theory but more akin to a system of classification that ( despite intial appearances) makes no actual emprical claims?
: Yes, for example Peter Hacker, in Bennett/Hacker Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience --Davidlud 04:37, 11 November 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Oh Christ, yet another interesting book  I have to order from the States? I'm NOT RICH, damnit!!--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 11:00, 16 March 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Question 

message: Some are eliminativists about qualia but not propositional attitudes, and vice-versa. This should be included.
:Be my guest.1Z 22:03, 11 June 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: UMMMMMM......it already is included, folks. From the article:
One way to summarize the difference between the Churchlands's views and Dennett's view is that the Churchlands are eliminativists when it comes to propositional attitudes, but reductionists concerning qualia, while Dennett is a reductionist with respect to propositional attitudes, and an eliminativist concerning qualia.[16]
--Francesco Franco 08:14, 12 June 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Suggestion for qualia section

message: Skinner was a materialist.  I think mentioning the psychologist without noting others and explanation of the differences among them is misleading. --Kenneth M Burke 21:18, 8 August 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Skinner 

message: Anyone want to help with the eliminativism section of the reductionism article?  It's unsourced and I know next to nothing about it.  Some cleanup and citations would greatly improve that section of the page.  Thanks.  Cazort (talk) 20:25, 26 November 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Help on Reductionism Page

message: Is there any empirical evidence for this? It's seems to me that Churchland has no real arguments or evidence to support his hypothesis, and that his argument basically boils down to not much more than that he belives most people are stupid, therefore what most people belive can not be true. I see nothing in the article that suggest that this is anything but a crackpot theory. Passw0rd (talk) 19:06, 5 January 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Evidence 

message: I edited the false atheism definition and materialism definition.
Original:
Eliminativism about a class of entities is the view that that class of entities does not exist.[3] For example, atheism is eliminativist about God and other supernatural entities; all forms of materialism are eliminativist about the soul;
Atheism does not equal denial of other supernatural entities (and weak atheism does not deny God).
Materialism does not deny the soul if that is defined as material, which it sometimes is. Materialism can only be said to always deny non-material entities. --Deleet (talk) 08:04, 21 January 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: The material soul is a very unusal claim, a ref would help. 1Z (talk) 10:16, 21 January 2008 (UTC)
replies: text:  I have to agree... a material soul is pretty strange.  I have seen some neuroscintists refer to the brain as "the seat of the soul" (Churchland) or the "astonishing hypothesis" that your soul is nothing more than a pack of neurons (Crick) but this is a sort of verbal wordplay, as neither of them believe that the material brain has the properties normally ascribed to the soul (i.e., that it survives bodily death, etc).  To my knowledge, no one actually defends the idea of a material soul that survives bodily death.  Until you can provide a reference for this, I think that we should go back to the previous version. Edhubbard (talk) 16:23, 21 January 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  False definition of atheism and materialism. 

message: Illusionism (consciousness) redirects here. But this article makes no mention of illusionism (introspective illusion gets a mention but is something else again). In the context of consciousness theory, what is the relationship between eliminative materialism and illusionism? — Cheers, Steelpillow (Talk) 17:00, 19 August 2020 (UTC)
thread_title:  Illusionism 

message: The large amount of content added 5 Oct 2020 needs to be rewritten in encyclopedic voice. It should also be checked carefully against the sources; I suspect more than a little original research. (Actually, it reads as possible copyvio but I can't find any matches to support that.) Schazjmd (talk) 20:14, 1 May 2021 (UTC)
replies: text:  I note there is exactly no evidence of copyvio here; and most of the added material is supported by citations added at the same time, as is usual and correct. The tone and OR-ish style are a matter for editing, possibly drastic, possibly simple deletion of the added material, I'll take a look now. Chiswick Chap (talk) 16:17, 2 June 2023 (UTC)
thread_title:  Tags for essay-like/tone 

message: It's a difficult topic and there's no way around that. At the same time, philosophers are by and large not neuroscientists, so even someone highly informed about the topic may struggle with this section. Is there any way to improve it without dumbing it down? 2603:7081:1603:A300:1141:BDAB:9C4E:6D99 (talk) 18:28, 11 March 2024 (UTC)
thread_title:  The section "Correspondence Theory of Truth" in "arguments against" is egregiously technical