Talk:Demarcation problem

message: This should be 'Demarcation problem" - wiki policy doesn't like caps — Preceding unsigned comment added by Banno (talk • contribs) 21:54, 6 August 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: OK.  It's done. — Preceding unsigned comment added by ChrisSteinbach (talk • contribs) 20:18, 7 August 2004 (UTC)
thread_title:  Capitalization 

message: The last para is just too full of weasels. Unless it can be re-worded to say something, it would be better to leave the discussion hanging… Banno 19:22, Aug 12, 2004 (UTC)
:What would you say is wrong with the paragraph you removed?  I would argue that is does say something.  For one thing it leaves the discussion hanging, as you wished, only explicitly. It's also provocative to both sides of the debate, on the one hand suggesting that the problem might be solved, on the other that it is in tatters. -- Chris 07:41, 13 Aug 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: I started to revise the paragraph and came up with something completely different. Take a look. -- Chris 23:19, 14 Aug 2004 (UTC)

text: Although I am the one responsible for the final sentence, I would be the first (as in fact I am) to admit that your change is an improvement. Chris 20:20, 19 May 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  Conclusion 

message: There is no discussion of the possiblity of partial solutions to the problem. A total solution decides between either science and unscience. Whereas, a partial solution can also decide something is 'maybe science'. I don't know if there is any literature out there on this, but it seems probable that I am not the first to consider it. An example of a partial criterion is Kuhn's paradigm criteria- every science must operate according to a paradigm. An example of a fairly uncontroversial partial criteria is a theory must make at least one prediction about reality. The latter is just a much more inclusive version of falsifiability. Also, it is merely equivalent to the statement that sciences are ontologies, so that rejecting it as a criteria risks an incoherently antirealist stance where even instrumentalist interpretations would be dismissed since instruments do not exist. Such a position quickly leads to a pathological cynicism so bad that one must reject one's own existance. --Intangir 14:38, 30 December 2005 (UTC)
replies: text: Something like Wittgenstein's families of meanings would offer a partial solution. Just as in Philosophical Investigations we are led to the conclusion that the word 'game' has no analytic definition, we might say the same of science, i.e. that the things we consider to be science are not so because they share some essential commonality but because they are connected by a ‘family resemblance’. But you’ll notice that this is not so much a partial solution as a denial that the problem even exists. I don’t think that it will be difficult to find a partial solution or even a number of partial solutions. So I put it to you that it was never really a problem to do so and that a partial solution is in fact no solution. --Chris 22:46, 10 January 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Partial solutions 

message: Just reading the article over and I was curious: What is the difference between a "paradigm" and a "model"? It look a little bit like Kuhn has exchanged the word model for the fancier "paradigm" and made a bunch of controversial statements, que money.
In science all the things he describes as "paradigms" are called "models", so you can see my confusion. It might be of help to the article if we can describe the proper distinction. Jefffire 10:15, 23 August 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Paradigms are more encompassing—they are not just the scientific theories (or models) themselves, they are also a form of pedagogical practices, methodological approaches, laboratory techniques, etc. At least, that's my understanding of it. A model would be only the intellectual component of a paradigm, whereas the paradigm itself covers more than just the intellectual, if that makes sense. --Fastfission 12:42, 23 August 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: I'm afraid I don't fully understand how that description applies in practice. Also your usage here appears to be slightly different to that detailed in the article where the word is used as being simply synonymous with model. I think the article may be oversimplifying (or mabey Kuhn was oversimplifying...). Jefffire 12:50, 23 August 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Distinct 

message: I think the following explanation  should be dumbed down a little i.e. de-jargonized:
::(Robust as in "stable" in the statistical sense, i.e., not very sensitive to occasional outlying data points.)
Specifically the "outlying data points" part. Maybe replace with "not very sensitive to external input." or something like that (but preferably something evem less pretentious sounding). I'm not even really sure its a pureley statistical concept. I see what the person was saying, but I suspect robustness is a more abstract term (and also not so tidy a concept as this contributor made it out to be. Its kind of like "elegance", just something not strictly defined but generally felt to communicate some real quality.) Brentt 06:34, 2 September 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Dumb this down a little

message: This is a nice topic.  Some historians of science tend to define science in such broad terms that the demarcation problem almost vanishes.  (As someone who has studied the astronomies of primitive cultures, which can be very precise while finding expression in mythological terms, I admit to being attracted by such approaches).  Here are a few examples:
:For our purpose, science may be defined as ordered knowledge of natural phenomena and of the relations between them.
::William Cecil Dampier-Whetham, "Science", Encyclopædia Brittanica, 11th ed. (1911).
:Science comprises, first, the orderly and systematic comprehension, description and/or explanation of natural phenomena and, secondly, the [mathematical and logical] tools necessary for the undertaking. 
::Marshall Clagett, Greek Science in Antiquity, (1955).
:Science is a systematic explanation of perceived or imaginary phenomena, or else is based on such an explanation.  Mathematics finds a place in science only as one of the symbolical languages in which scientific explanations may be expressed.
::David Pingree, "Hellenophilia versus the History of Science," Isis, 83 (1992): 554-563.
I think a section on those who seek a broad definition of science to avoid putting limits on our understanding of the ways people have done science in the past or in other cultures would be helpful.  --SteveMcCluskey 03:50, 21 October 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Since there have been no comments on this proposal, I will be adding this information shortly. SteveMcCluskey (talk) 13:55, 28 March 2014 (UTC)
thread_title: Some Historians' Perspectives

message: Please disambiguate the trope link in the article.  I can't do it, because I don't understand it well enough. ike9898 20:38, 12 January 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: I understand the word according to this definition from Merriam-Webster 'a common or overused theme or device'. Given that definition, I'm not sure any of the alternatives is entirely accurate. --Chris 23:05, 12 January 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  trope 

message: This article is full of them, e.g. the whole section entitled "Science and religion part ways," contains not a single citation, it does however make various claims for instance 
"The work by Draper and White must???? (emphasis and question marks added) be seen as directly coming out of this social climate, and their model of science and religion as being eternally opposed, if not historically accurate, became a dominant social trope"
This is clearly some form of synthesis if not merely non-reviewed garble.
Even where citation does occur, it is unclear what exactly is being cited, for instance, the entire section on Kuhn, is cited but once at the end -- surely more than just the last sentence is being cited?
My concerns having been voiced, I will wait for responses, none being recieved in a months time, I will begin revisions. Talon138.246.7.148 (talk) 08:40, 17 April 2009 (UTC)
thread_title: Major claims without support

message: The limitations and applicability of the scientific method are not discussed in the article. I thought the demarcation problem also was about that. Or is that discussed in some other article?
I have the following issues in mind:
* Can the scientific = empirical method deal with philosophical issues such as what is right and wrong, does God exist, what political ideology is best, etc?
* Is it possible for humans and the scientific method to ever answer questions such as what are not smallest element of the physcial world, can a  physical "theory for everyhing" be formulated, does multiple universe exist, is the universe a computer simulation, where does the natural laws origin - who created them, etc. 
* Is the scientific method always necessary and useful in developing practical knowledge, for example in engineering, in art, in medicin, etc.  Mange01 (talk) 13:26, 12 May 2009 (UTC)
thread_title:  Does the demaraction problem also include the limitations and applicability of the scientific method? 

message: I just came across an interesting essay on the demarcation problem:  .  Laudan begins with a nice historical introduction to the demarcation problem, discussing its origins and development in Ancient Grece, in 17th c. Europe, and in the late 19th c.  He then notes that "No one can look at the history of debates between scientists and 'psuedo-scientists' without realizing that demarcation criteria are used as machines de guerre in a polemical battle between rival camps" (p. 119).  After considering some of the major 20th c. attempts at a demarcation criteria, Laudan finds all proposed demarcation criteria to be wanting in one or more respects and concludes that "the problem of demarcation between science and non-science is a pseudo-problem (at least as far as philosophy is concerned)" (P. 124).  
Laudan's longer historical perspective and his critical take on the demarcation problem should be reflected somewhere in this article.  --SteveMcCluskey (talk) 20:10, 14 September 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: Sterling suggestion, Steve. Can you tell us a bit more about who Laudan considers to be the major players in the pre-20th century debate? There may be resources on them that are easier to access than Laudan's book.  Skomorokh  21:29, 14 September 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: Here's a quick summary:  Laudan starts with Aristotle (who else) who distinguished science from opinion and from superstition by the certainty of its principles and from the crafts by its comprehension of first causes (p. 113).  Going on to the seventeenth century, he sees Galileo, Huygens, and Newton as continuing to insist on the certainty criterion, but pretty much giving up the insistence on first causes.  That insistence on certainty was almost universal until the nineteenth century.  He then turns to the modern period, the Vienna circle, and the work of Karl Popper (as well as Paul Thagard).  I really think his historical interpretation itself is a valuable resource; the book is on Google Books so it's really accessible.  --SteveMcCluskey (talk) 02:04, 15 September 2009 (UTC)
thread_title:  The demarcation problem's history and critics 

message: From a very quick scan of Pennock and Ruse's book, it seems that they are concerned with a narrow subset of the Demarcation problem, that of separating science from religion, rather than with the general problem of distinguishing science from non-science.  Pennock's criterion of methodological naturalism seems useful for distinguishing science from religion, but doesn't seem useful for distinguishing science from other activities that some philosophers have considered non-scientific, such as astrology or psychoanalysis.
Since the discussion of Pennock is not applicable to the general problem, it should either be qualified to state its limitations or deleted.  Perhaps someone who's more familiar with Pennock's work could take a stab at making such qualifications.  --SteveMcCluskey (talk) 04:10, 18 November 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: Hey SteveMcCluskey, I agree with your assessment as I have read Pennock's work and other materials. I agree that he is overall focusing on the science/religion debate (which is not really focused on in demarcation debates). As such, I agree that his piece does not really focus on how to separate science from non-science. Actually the whole Ruse-Pennock book IS generally about the science/religion debate as it focuses on two court cases in general and does not sink into the general demarcation issues. Only a few papers like Laudan's "demise of demarcation" piece actually focus on general demarcation issues. Much of Pennock's works elsewhere have also focused heavily on the the science/religion debate too. Since Pennock does not really develop a "methodological naturalism" criterion nor does he focus on it in much depth , but just mentions its practicality on the science/religion debate in "Can't Philosophers Tell the Difference between Science and Religion?", then perhaps deletion would be in order. --Ramos1990 (talk) 07:47, 18 November 2012 (UTC)
thread_title:  Pennock and methodological naturalism 

message: The section on logical positivism is devoted almost entirely to bashing on it and claiming that it's "wrong."  This is ridiculous.  The point of this article is to summarize what various schools of thought believed about philosophy of science and what qualifies as "science."  You're not supposed to take sides.  I don't see anyone going out of their way to explain how Ancient Greek Science is "obviously dead and wrong," so don't do it with positivism.  Just summarize the view and get on with it. 
On a related note, I've seen similar bias in other positivism-related sections.  It's as if some angry philosophy grad student is taking it upon him/herself to trash positivism throughout Wikipedia.  This is not the place for that kind of rhetoric.
:Does the source both say: 'This distinction between science, which in their view possessed empirically verifiable statements, from what they pejoratively called 'metaphysics', which lacked such statements, can be seen as representing another aspect of the demarcation problem.'
:and yet 'However, this is not strictly the demarcation between science and non-science or pseudoscience. "The verificationist proposals had the aim of solving a distinctly different demarcation problem, namely that between science and metaphysics."'
:If we're not going to remove the section perhaps the background text should be restored and edited?—Machine Elf 1735 04:07, 27 August 2014 (UTC)
replies: text: Found it... how about this: "Logical positivism is often discussed in the context of the demarcation between science and non-science or pseudoscience, However, "The verificationist proposals had the aim..."?—Machine Elf 1735 04:25, 27 August 2014 (UTC)
thread_title:  Positivism Section is Biased 

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thread_title:  External links modified 

message: The opening of the article states "The debate continues after over two millennia of dialogue among philosophers of science and scientists in various fields, despite a broad agreement on the basics of the scientific method". This opening line struck me immediately as odd and so went and looked at the source which does not seem to back up this text.
The first source "Scientific Method in Practice. pp. 3–7" (which can be viewed here) in fact directly contradicts this saying: "The mere idea that there exists such things as general principles of scientific method is controversial". It then goes on to say "Many scientists have claimed there is no such thing as a scientific method" which likewise seems to contradict the idea that there is "broad agreement on the basics of the scientific method". 
The only thing that could possibly be construed to support the idea of broad agreement is on page 5 where it mentions that the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) believes "Scientists share basic beliefs and attitudes about what they do and how they view their work". This could not possibly be used as a justification for the above line given that (1) this is not an authoritative source because A) it is merely a group of scientists with an opinion and B) it is not their area of expertise, as the demarcation problem is a philosophical problem, not a scientific one (2) It is a self-published opinion and (3) contradicts the opinion of the Cambridge-published author above.
The second source I could not seem to locate online unfortunately so it cannot be assessed. However the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (a peer-reviewed publication, in contrast to the AAAS) paints a contrasting picture, "it is emphasized that there is much more agreement on particular cases of demarcation than on the general criteria that such judgments should be based upon." 
The "broad agreement on the basics of the scientific method" line therefore does not seem to have any basis in the truly reliable sources and should be amended as such.80.111.17.229 (talk) 15:06, 23 December 2020 (UTC)
thread_title:  "despite a broad agreement on the basics of the scientific method." 

message: haven't read yet.  Maybe will check later if it looks useful. 67.160.203.180 (talk) 05:27, 27 January 2021 (UTC)
thread_title:  diagnosing pseudoscience by getting rid of the demarcation problem