Talk:Artificial consciousness/Archive 9

message: This is where we are:
*"Real AC" says that some AC can be real C.
*"Not-real AC" says that AC can never be real C.
Some hold the first view, others the second.  What view do you hold?  Paul Beardsell 17:40, 5 Apr 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: The whole Wikipedia idea is continual improvement.  I am glad you are coming around to that view.  Paul Beardsell 04:06, 6 Apr 2004 (UTC)

text: Someone has to keep the non-native English language speakers happy.  Paul Beardsell 10:06, 25 Apr 2004 (UTC)
thread_title: Real vs Genuine

message: I digged it a bit more and found that some experiments indeed show that a process, not an object activates neurons. From a New Scientist article http://www-inst.eecs.berkeley.edu/~cs182/readings/ns/article.html "So they presented monkeys with things like raisins, slices of apple, paper clips, cubes and spheres. It wasn't long before they noticed something odd. As the monkey watched the experimenter's hand pick up the object and bring it close, a group of the F5 neurons leaped into action. But when the monkey looked at the same object lying on the tray, nothing happened. When it picked up the object, the same neurons fired again. Clearly their job wasn't just to recognise a particular object."
For such reaction there must be created a model of the process. Unless we suggest that human has models of all possible processes from birth, awareness of the processes likely includes creating a model of a process without having a prior knowledge of it, only based on the information received through the senses (ie only from the pulses coming from the receptors). To be able to create a model such way distinguish consciousness from other systems, and would be the biggest challenge for artificial consciousness. No conventional software can do that, as it needs too much flexibility. This is also why such proposed mechanisms as absolutely dynamic systems might be necessary. 
Tkorrovi 23:33, 17 Apr 2004 (UTC)
thread_title: Awareness of processes

message: :I especially wait you on AC forum  as this is a silent place to discuss (AC) things. Did you also have problems with registering? Some said that they had, there's something wrong with that in proboards, but you can post without logging in. Tkorrovi 20:57, 22 Apr 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: But we are allowed to discuss AC here. I prefer to post here, and wikipedia has my email address. One can post links to there from here when anything interesting turns up. Matt Stan 15:48, 24 Apr 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: I agree so long as the idle speculation here does not find its way into the article unless it follows uncontroversially from the work of acknowledged experts.  Paul Beardsell 11:01, 25 Apr 2004 (UTC)
thread_title: Where to discuss? What to write?

message: The discontented pony argument is intended to show the "capabilities of the average human" argument is not useful.  I think it does so rather well.  Also:  In deciding if AC can be real/genuine it is useful to consider if any animals other than humans are conscious.  If we allow the dolphin, the pony, the rat or (and this is a Hofstadter/Dennett example) the termite nest consciousness then it becomes easier to allow an artifact real/genuine consciousness.  Paul Beardsell 09:26, 25 Apr 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: Except that the link I deleted was to The Discontented Thermostat, not The Discontented Pony, and I couldn't find any Ladybird or other books with the former title. I think the story about a discontented thermostat is a very good idea however. "The thermostat had been made is a warm country where the hot dry winds swept over the svelt, but it was exported to Sweden where it had to endure cruel cold winters, until one day ... (more to follow). Matt Stan 00:15, 26 Apr 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: ...until one day it decided to stay OFF all night, and the family in the house where the thermostat lived all froze to death. Now the thermostat was a murderer and there were forensic experts creeping all over the place. So the discontented thermostat put in one last effort. As the emergency indicator on the main boiler reached danger level the thermostat kept the power on with an extra boost so that when ignition point was reached and meltdown occurred in the electrics there was a surge of power that made the methane generator below the house explode. All the experts were killed and the discontented thermostat was destroyed for ever. Matt Stan 00:15, 26 Apr 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: The deliberate mistitling of the book was (possibly inaccurately) calculated to amuse.  The thermostat book would, by analogy with the pony story, have the thermostat initially unhappy with its supposed limited consciousness leaving to experience a wider world but returning to home and happiness.  I was attempting to demonstrate that a limited consciousness might still experience a full and complete existence by its own measure.  Pony or thermostat:  No difference.  Paul Beardsell 01:49, 26 Apr 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: From the link I deleted: 'The Discontented Pony' This is a short stroy [sic] about "a pony called Merrylegs who leaves his home to seek the excitement of a life as a round-a-bout [sic] horse at a fair." Merrylegs finds a circus but is pressed into service as a cart horse by a man "dressed only in shirt and trousers and his hair stood on end". The poor pony has a bad trip one evening and haluciantes [sic] about becoming a horse on a roundabout. When he surfaces, home seems much more appealing, so he escapes back to Daisy and Squeaker at the farm. Matt Stan 08:34, 26 Apr 2004 (UTC)
thread_title: The Discontented Pony/Thermostat

message: If by "this sounds a bit like Dennett" you are suggesting either copyright infringement or plagiarism then just quote the name of the book and the page number.  If, on the other hand, you are saying it is a restatement of something Dennett said then I am unaware of it (and in any event I am not responsible for all the text you quote) but that is not the point:  If it sounds like Dennett then that is good.  Wikipedia is supposed to contain the knowledge of the world, not merely the a priori, uneducated, ill-informed ramblings of ourselves.  There are respected authorities in the field of AC and it is their views we should concentrate on representing here.  Paul Beardsell 09:15, 25 Apr 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: I do not think that a pony thinks like a human but I do think that a pony is conscious.  Whether or not that is true is far from obvious:  The possibility must be admitted unless consciousness is defined as something only humans have.  Paul Beardsell 17:45, 25 Apr 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: Yes but personification of a pony does not show that pony is conscious. Tkorrovi 18:20, 25 Apr 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: I do not think that a pony thinks like a human but I do think that a pony is conscious.  Whether or not that is true is far from obvious:  The possibility must be admitted unless consciousness is defined as something only humans have.  Paul Beardsell 17:45, 25 Apr 2004 (UTC)

text: What this article far from always does is represent authoritative sources.  We have the conclusions of an amateur chat room represented as fact together with original (i.e. bad) suppositions of us editors.  Paul Beardsell 17:45, 25 Apr 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: Most books about humans don't explicitly say that people mentioned are conscious. That wouldn't prevent me positing that someone mentioned in a book was conscious. Although Start Wars doesn't say that its robots are intended to be conscious I don't think many would say that they are not artificial and my observation was that they appeared to give a semplance of consciousness - hence their presence in the article. I have suggested elsewhere that the aim of producing a real R2-D2 (rather than to use the artifices of film production, i.e. using an actor) would be an AC project. I am puzzled about why anyone would think that these fictitious implementations are not AC. Matt Stan 07:21, 1 May 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: The movie does not give any reason to consider R2-D2 an AC. What it did was repairing the spaceship and once acting as a simple alarm device, and even then failed when the enemy came. It could well be pre-programmed with no ability of learning and modelling the external processes by learning, no ability to imagine or making predictions of what the enemy might be or what it might do. So it clearly did not have any essential abilities of consciousness. The movie does not clearly show that C-3PO is AC either. In spite that it knew many languages and decrypted a warning message (for what it maybe only had to contain a dictionary), it could as well be a chatterbot what generates its responses by pre-defined rules, and it failed to react to unknown as machines making other machines, its reactions may well been pre-programmed. So there is no evidence that it is learning, or can anyhow pre-plan its actions. in the article you wrote "Artificial consciousness proponents therefore have loosened this constraint and allow that simulating or depicting a conscious machine, such as the robots in Star Wars, could count - not as examples of artificial consciousness, since their personalities are generated by actors, but as models. Hence, some consider that if someone were to produce an artificial C-3PO, which behaved just like the real one, but without needing to be controlled and animated by a human, then it could qualify as being artificially conscious." Who loosened the constraint and where? Tkorrovi 14:19, 1 May 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: Evidently Tkorrovi hasn't seen the Star Wars movies, like some other wikipedia readers perhaps. But if you were to ask people who have seen these films whether these robot impersonations were real, I think most would agree that they are not, but are rather a creative film crew's representation of an idea - the idea being of robots that can interact meaningfully with the rest of the acting team in accordance with the script. But if you were to ask people who saw the film to imagine that these robots were real robots, and then ask whether they thought that these robots were artificially conscious, then I doubt if many would deny it. I have seen all the Star Wars films and can therefore report on their content for the benefit of readers of this encyclopedia, and in the context of what we are calling artificial consciousness. If the point I make is contentions, then perhaps someone could enlighten me and indicate in what way these fictitious creations are not conscious. Matt Stan 22:02, 1 May 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: I have seen it, not all movies though, but I have read about it. For one who is not expert, chatbots also often leave impression that they are conscious, but programmers understand quite quickly how simple and pre-programmed their functions mostly are, nothing to do with AC. It's very unclear for me what *you* think AC is, is it any weak AI, or must it be certain kind of weak AI. At least weak AI should not considered to be AC, or anything else what is a subject of another field, it's already said by others that large part of AC article talks about what should be written in AI article. I explained what you asked, please read. I think you are wrong, these are not AC, but honestly I don't know what else I should explain to you. Tkorrovi 23:18, 1 May 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: When Tkorrovi writes "I explained what you asked, please read." he doesn't give a link to what he is referring to. I was asking whether if fictitious representations of erstwhile conscious machines (such as those in Star Wars) were actual machine implementations rather than dramatic representations then why would he not consider them implementations of AC. (One can argue, incidentally, by Leibniz's law that the very fact that the representations are portrayed by conscious actors means that it necessarily is the case that an actualisation of these robots could not be construed as anything other than implementations of AC.) In terms of what I think AC is, and I might ask Tkorrovi the same question, I'm suggesting that anything that gives a convincing impression of consciousness to the average human must be deemed to be an implementation of same. All androids therefore possess AC. But there is still a gulf between idealised implementations (as evidenced in fiction) and practical implementations such as Kismet. As I've said before, I don't understand the weak/strong argument in relation to AC itself. Matt Stan 09:21, 2 May 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: I don't think it's a question of whether we personally think that C3P0 and the other androids are AC, but whether there was explicit intention for them to be AC (in addition to AI).  I personally believe they (if real) would meet any requirement of AC (but then, I also believe my microwave is AC).  However, people are clearly not in agreement about what constitutes AC, so unless an example from literature/movies was specifically mentioned as AC, I don't think we should include it here.  I think the book 2001 made a good case for saying HAL had consciousness.  Also AM.  But I don't believe there was any such mention of the Star Wars robots being anything other than AI.   Your argument about them being portrayed by human actors is not valid, I believe.  If a human makes a symbolic portraryal of a tree (as is cliche in bad performance art) that does not mean a tree is conscious. Nuffle 12:33, 3 May 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: I don't think it is a question of whether we personally think that Luke Skywalker (and other characters in the films) are conscious, but whether there was explicit intention for them to be conscious (in addition to intelligent). I personally believe he (if a real person) would meet any requirements of consciousness (but then I also believe that President Bush is conscious, although I realise that might be contentions). However people are clearly not in agreement about what constitutes consciousness, so unless an example can be cited of an entity (human or otherwise) that is specifically mentioned as being conscious I don't think we should include them as examples here. But I don't believe there was any such mention of the characters in Star Wars as being even intelligent. My argument about the robots being artificially conscious, by reference to Leibniz's law and the fact that they are portrayed by actors doesn't seem to have been understood by Nuffle. If a human makes a symbolic representation of an unconscious tree (just like a real tree) then that does not mean that a tree is conscious. However if a human made a portrayal of a fictitious conscious tree then one could hypothesise meaningfully (and provide convincing argument as per Leibniz's law) that a complete implementation of that tree that did not employ an actor would be indistinguishable from the actor's representation and would therefore be an impelmentaion of artificial consciousness. Matt Stan 13:01, 3 May 2004 (UTC)

text: Give a link to something what was behind your nose, in the post what you replied? Something what leaves impression of consciousness is not conscious because of that, at least not in scientific terms, and also not by Leibniz's law. Impression what is not based on scientific evidence is subjective. One may have impression that something is beautiful, while other may have impression that it is ugly, it's the same as people just believe that things are certain way, and belief, however strong it is, has nothing to do with science. Kismet is something what is called "artificial emotions". When it was a separate field, it should not be considered AC, it may be considered AC because it cannot be categorized anywhere else. You constantly mix up AC and AI, I did not talk about weak AC, but weak AI, and these are not the same things. I don't like what is called "not genuine AC", but if you like, Kismet may be categorized there, but it is not weak AI, because it is for simulating emotions, what are not intelligence, and so also not artificial intelligence. I don't know, maybe you are just joking, then your only good joke was talking here about Pony the Merrylegs (noted by someone else), but your last joke was probably not understood, and not good. Tkorrovi 12:07, 2 May 2004 (UTC)

text: Something that leaves the impression of consciousness, leaves the impression of consciousness. Something that does not leave the impression of conscious does not leave the impression of consciousness. Can we assume that something that does not leave the impression of consciousness is therefore not conscious? Can we assume that something that leaves the impression of consciousness might be conscious? If we have something that leaves the impression of consciousness, how are we to discriminate whether or not it really is conscious? There is only one answer: ask Tkorrovi. If Tkorrovi says that the impression one has that the entity is conscious is valid, then it is; otherwise it is not. There is no other acceptable answer. If there is doubt then this is known as blasphemy. Matt Stan 15:20, 3 May 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: Try emotional intelligence. Matt Stan 20:03, 2 May 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: emotional intelligence is psychological term, "artificial emotions" is implementation of it by artificial means. Should be study of emotions or such instead, as in most dictionaries intelligence is defined as "The faculty of thought and reason" what excludes emotions. But unfortunately "artificial emotions" or such is not exactly a field yet, as much as I know. Tkorrovi 20:30, 2 May 2004 (UTC)

text: Then read the stuff about Kismet, which is an actual practical example of an implementaiton of artificial emotion coming close to Aleksander's own quite old theoretical work in this area. You may find that your browser can be unlocked to go to web pages apart form wikipedia's artificial intelligence page and your own page (together with its pornographic pop-ups). Try it. See if you can broaden your own consciousness of anything that does not fit your pre-existing ideas, which seem to be based on an incomplete survey of the existing lierature, including that of Aleksander himself. It's a broad subject and is not covered in any dictionary. I'm not what saying don't use a dictionary, though. We all need one sometimes what to ensure what we can be understood. Incidentally, all the books by Aleksander that I tried to find on amazon are out of print. Does that mean they are so popular that the publishers can't keep up, or that they are so unpopular that no one bothers to print them?  Matt Stan 15:20, 3 May 2004 (UTC)

text: Of course we should not use terms from related disciplines. Otherwise we'd get confused. I'm terribly sorry. Perhaps we should also avoid the use of the term intelligence, as that is used also by psychologists, and even educationalists - heaven forbid! It was the philospher Bertrand Russell who wrote: "A stupid man's report of what a clever man says is never accurate because he unconsciously translates what he hears into something he can understand." But Bertrand Russell wasn't a computer scientist, so his output must be discounted. Also he makes use of the term 'unconsciously', which obviously has nothing to do with consciousness. In fact is it the complete opposite. Sorry I mentioned Russell. No, I jest not, but I use irony and sarcasm - most awful things. Emotion is cited by Aleksander (Corollary 12) as one of the characteristics of artificial consciousness. So perhaps we should delete Aleksander from the list of AC exponents, as he must have got it wrong if Tkorrovi can't understand (or hasn't read) what he wrote. ;-) Matt Stan 12:45, 3 May 2004 (UTC)

text: Let us become automata that simply plagiarise what is written in dictionaries and debate which dictionary has the most appeal. I'm all for that. Let's agree on using The Encyclopedia of Stupidity  by Matthijs van Boxsel. Matt Stan 12:45, 3 May 2004 (UTC)

text: But then to think, pony is a very good symbol, maybe one day I would use it as a mascot for DI ;) Tkorrovi 13:35, 2 May 2004 (UTC)

text: This article doesn't suppose to focus on defining consciousness, it only supposed to describe the aspects of consciousness what are relevant for AC, and why they are relevant. I don't know whether AC would exactly be a superset, but I think that it would describe that what is objective, and therefore most likely common in different possible types of consciousness. I don't also see why R2-D2, C-3P0 and HAL are artificial consciousness, and don't see the reason why they were added. I added Vanamonde, what I think is a good example of AC, and Jane, what was mentioned to be artificial sentience. Who thinks R2-D2, C-3P0 and HAL should be there, may explain. Tkorrovi 10:10, 29 Apr 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: They manifested many of the capabilitities of the average human.  HAL suffered from paranoia.  C-3PO verged on being camp.  R2-D2 was a bit of a whinger.  Millions of convinced movie goers were entertained by their personalities.  It seems to me that even if you think they were not genuinely conscious each of them was a pretty convincing simulation of consciousness.  Paul Beardsell 00:06, 30 Apr 2004 (UTC)

text: Yes, we must know how consciousness is generally understood, we may take it from consciousness article, and from dictionary entry, what is even more general, and supposed to be commonly accepted. It seems to be some agreement here that the dictionary should be dictionary.com, what was used in the article also. We should look at consciousness article, and refer there if something is indeed redundancy to describe it in this article. AC cannot go under consciousness article the same way as AI cannot go under intelligence article, these are foremost a different methods of research. Different places were considered here under what to put AC, what clearly shows that it doesn't belong under none of these, and must be separate. (Nice to hear that you live in Estonia. I think the disputes are solved now. I think we should not emphasize at all where we live, or what is our nationality, scientists have no nationality, and this should also not be important here). Tkorrovi 10:48, 29 Apr 2004 (UTC)
thread_title: What should be in the AC article?

message: BTW, one question. Was the "Genuine AC" your own view, or was it based on Dennett or somebody else? I mean not the "Genuine AC" in general, because it is one possible view that AC is an exact copy of consciousness (or brain), but the way how you defend it in the article. I don't find it to be logical, and in that case it is important to know where it comes from. Tkorrovi 14:34, 25 Apr 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: I am not sure that any of what I have written in the article itself contains any central, insightful original ideas.  Here, on the talk page I have had to construct original refutations of some of the obvious unfounded speculation represented here as fact but that wasn't difficult.  It would be arrogant of me to think that I could do better than those who have spent a lifetime at the centre of the field.  By and large I think that what I have written derives from the writings of Dennett and Hofstadter.  I was able to see the flaws in Penrose without being told, however.  This is all in contrast to others here who claim original and important insights every second day.  And the term "Genuine AC" I will let you claim credit for:  That Dennett and Hofstadter see no obstacle to Real AC must be plain to all and that Penrose's objections are plainly cranky also.  Paul Beardsell 17:45, 25 Apr 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: I talked about the way how you defend the "Genuine AC" or "Real AC" view in the article. When it is not your own view and comes from writings of Dennett or Hofstadter, then you should say from what writing it comes from, and include a reference to that writing, unless Dennett or Hofstadter told you that personally. Otherwise it must be considered that your explanation only comes from your own view. Tkorrovi 18:20, 25 Apr 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: Are you saying that Dennett thinks real/genuine AC impossible?  Paul Beardsell 22:28, 25 Apr 2004 (UTC)

text: When something is not logical the flaw is usually easy to point out using logic itself.  Point out the flaw(s) and I will address them as best I can.  Paul Beardsell 18:01, 25 Apr 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: I did, and you did not even reply. A strange policy of frequent archiving of this page doesn't also enable you to do that any more. But I shall certainly do it again. Tkorrovi 18:20, 25 Apr 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: The "strange policy" is not the frequent archiving, which is standard policy.  The strange policy is the selective archiving and the archiving under inappropriate page headings.  I wonder who is doing that?  (But this is a minor point and can be addressed after the logical flaws have been identified.)  Paul Beardsell 14:45, 26 Apr 2004 (UTC)

text: Can anyone remind us of an instance where Tkorrovi has used logic to point out a logical flaw in an argument? The statement, I did, and you did not even reply. does not support the argument; it is just an assertion that is not backed up with any substance. Tkorrovi, can't you be a bit more robust in your debate rather than reverting to an ad hominem stance? Matt Stan 08:56, 26 Apr 2004 (UTC)

text: Put up or shut up.  Paul Beardsell 01:34, 26 Apr 2004 (UTC)
replies: text: Why are you so mean to him? Wikiwikifast 02:41, 26 Apr 2004 (UTC)

text: By responding I do not admit to being mean.  Tkorrovi is skilled at misrepresenting what was said in these discussions both by himself and others.  He has done so again and again.  A recent example was him calling me a racist without due cause which has forced me to defend myself thus.  Once again he now misrepresents history:  "I did [point out the logical flaws]", he has just said.  No, he did not:  He said he did not agree with me but he never pointed out a logical flaw and he cannot do so now.  He continues, "and you did not even reply."  Well, I have invariably responded arguing any substantive points raised.  On the contrary, he dodges arguments made by me which are inconvenient to his POV, and _he_ fails to respond.  Where I have shown logical flaws in his arguments he takes personal offense and responds with ad hominem attacks.  In the circumstances, he once again creating a false impression as to what has passed here, "put up or shut up" is about as reasonable as it is possible to be.  What will happen now is that the issue of my being "mean" will be used as a diversion by Tkorrovi so he need not say what logical flaw(s) he has identified and so that he need not quote where he previously identified a logical flaw.  Paul Beardsell 04:11, 26 Apr 2004 (UTC)
thread_title: Where are the logical flaws?