Talk:Philosophy of mind/Archive 1

message: Why are there so many questions in this article? No less than 25. An encyclopedia is intended to provide answers to questions, not questions to answers. Much of the drafting has to be reformulated.
In response; There are so many questions because they are the questions that the philosophy of mind is struggling to deal with. No answers are provided because no accepted answers exist. If they did it wouldn't be such an interesting subject. I think the article is a reasonable attempt at giving some idea of what Philosophy of mind is about. Teutanic 14:36, 25 January 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Why are there so many questions in this article?

message: Hegel's third major work in the Encyclopaedia, the Philosophy of Mind, needs inclusion here; I'll be attempting to write an article on the work itself sometime later this week, but collaboration would be wonderful CriminalSaint 18:45, 3 Mar 2005 (UTC)
replies: text: Made a little entry, could use some expansion.Poor Yorick 10:32, 16 February 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: I find it odd the fascination you Americans have for continental and post-modern views. It's extremely noteworthy that the German FEATURED ARTICLE WINNER version of the disastrous article makes not the least mention of Hegel or anyone else in the alledgedly continental tradition. I have been studying philosophy in Italy for the last five years (befire that I studied it in the US) and I find that the general attitude toward "existenialism" and the like is that it is just "bad poetry." --Lacatosias 15:44, 16 February 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: I'm trying to get that article translated ASAP, BTW.  It's immensely better than this one.--Lacatosias 15:46, 16 February 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Hegel needs a mention

message: eg functionalism. Sorry to crit and run... Thx, "alyosha" 22:06, 20 December 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  Needs more internal links, 

message: From Joseph LeDoux's "The Emotional Brain: the Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life"; 1996; ISBN: 0684836599; p. 27.
:One of the most important conceptual developments in the establishment of cognitive science was a philosophical position known as functionalism, which holds that intelligent functions carried out by different machines reflect the same underlying process.  
::{According to functionalism, the mental states that make up consciousness can essentially be defined as complex interactions between different functional processes. Because these processes are not limited to a particular physical state or physical medium, they can be realized in multiple ways, including, theoretically, within non-biological systems.} 
     
:For example, a computer and a person can both add 2 + 5 and come up with 7. The fact that both achieve the same answer cannot be explained by the use of similar hardware—brains are made of biological stuff and computers of electronic parts. The similar outcome must be due to a similar process that occurs at a functional level. In spite of the fact that the hardware in the machines is vastly different, the software or program that each executes may be the same. Functionalism thus holds that the mind {software} is to the brain {hardware} as a computer program {applications and data base—software} is to the computer hardware.  
:Cognitive scientists, carrying the functionalist banner, have been allowed to pursue the functional organization of the mind without reference to the hardware that generates the functional states. According to functionalist doctrine, cognitive science stands on its own as a discipline—it does not require that we know anything about the brain. This logic was a shot in the arm to the field, giving it a strong sense of independence. Regardless of whether they do experiments on humans or use computer simulations of the human mind, many cognitive scientists today are functionalists.  
Yesselman 21:35, 30 December 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  LeDoux's Functionalism 

message: I removed one fake entry from this list of philosophers of mind, but there might be more, so I tagged it with a disputed accuracy template. —Ruud 15:00, 3 January 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Done, although I strongly suggest we shrink the section to something like Notable philosophers of mind with just a few entries, rather than attempting some sort of big laundry list of philosophers, which is a job for categories. WhiteCat 08:39, 7 February 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Disputed 

message: Re  AT THE CONGRESS.  The Herren Professoren from Deutschland talked to their Verehrte Kollegen in Amerika about KEHRE, GEVIERT, GESTELL und GEWORFENHEIT. These terms do not mean anything in English. But this does not matter because they do not mean anything in German either, at least not in the sense that they are used by the Herren Professoren from Deutschland.
In return, the Herren Professoren from Amerika talked to their Verehrte Kollegen in Deutschland about the MIND. There is no such concept in the German language. As a matter of fact, there is not even a WORD for it. Does it matter? Certainly not! A good time was had by all.
--BZ(Bruno Zollinger) 09:46, 7 February 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Happy talk, keep talkin' happy talk

message: There needs to be more sections; notably:
# Idealism: everything is just thoughts and ideas
# Dualism: Cartesian and otherwise
# Occasionalism: mind and body are synchronized by God
# Behaviorism, both radical and logical
# Physicalism: Type and Token Physicalism as well as Central State Identity Theory (CSIT)
# Representational Functionalism
Notable people that should be mentioned:
# Colin_McGinn
# Jerry Fodor
# Noam Chomsky
128.6.175.51 16:43, 1 March 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Other types that aren't discussed 

message: are not in the German version. If you include one , you will have to include type identity, behaviorism, functionalism. etc.. But there are already prominent links to these artciles.--Lacatosias 14:03, 8 March 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: I think they make it all the easier to go to the main article if you're interested. But OK, I'll add the others. Kripkenstein 14:08, 8 March 2006 (UTC)
replies: text:  I added the MA links when the main article is actually a decent reference. In the case of intentionality, however, I don't know if it's worth pointing to the main article. Kripkenstein 14:13, 8 March 2006 (UTC)
replies: text:  Sometimes I wonder if it's worth pointing to any of these philosophy articles. Every time I turn around, I find an article that looks almost as if it had been written by my seven-year-old niece. Maybe we should point to the German versions?? And the call it Anglo-American analytic-style philosophy!! Hmm...the continentals seem to know more about it than English speaking folks, if one were to judge by Wikipedia. It  started out with Frege and then the Vienna circle anyway. Alright, never mind...--Lacatosias 14:40, 8 March 2006 (UTC)
replies: text:  I know what you mean, but pointing to the German articles is not an option. What one can do is improve the articles one by one. What happened at the German wiki is that a few guys took upon themselves all the work and excelled. It could happen here too. Kripkenstein 15:44, 8 March 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: That's what I'm trying to get going.--Lacatosias 15:56, 8 March 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  These main article links 

message: Ok, some of us are apparently unhappy about the changes that I have made to this article and the merger with the now-redundant mind-body problem. Seeking consensus on the matter, I call for a vote:
Keep the current version or revert back to the old one and create a separate page for mind-body problem as before:
===Keep===
*Lacatosias 18:28, 8 March 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: This is an important objection actually. I have reintegrated some of the text of the previous version on Continetals and expanded on it somehat in order to provide some context. It's interesting to observe that the German (and the Spanish which is just a direct tralsnation of the German), the so-called continentals, do not mention anything about phenomenology, etc.. This confirms me in the opinion that "Continental philosphy " versus "Anglo-American" is nonsense and always has been. I aslo point this out in the new section. But there are different "schools" or "styles" of philosophy: analytic, phenonemology, post-modern or what have you. I think the article is, in fact, the better for including this material.  On the other hand, I really don't know how to deal with the "Eastern" question in the context of this artcile. More importanty, the article is getting FAT now. I'll see what I can do though.--Lacatosias 12:57, 9 March 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Yes, well personally I dislike continentals dismissing analytics as boring, and analytics dismissing it, as you put it "bad poetry". I studied in the analytic tradition but I find that both traditions have greatness, I like Kierkegaard & Nietzsche as much as Russell & Wittgenstein; Heidegger as much as Carnap; Marx as much as Rawls.  There's a piece by Richard Rorty about the divide that I find very informative . Cheers on the article, by the way Poor Yorick 13:35, 9 March 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Analytics ARE all too often excruciatingly boring. But never mind...--Lacatosias 14:06, 9 March 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Vote 

message: *Lacatosias 18:28, 8 March 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: This is an important objection actually. I have reintegrated some of the text of the previous version on Continetals and expanded on it somehat in order to provide some context. It's interesting to observe that the German (and the Spanish which is just a direct tralsnation of the German), the so-called continentals, do not mention anything about phenomenology, etc.. This confirms me in the opinion that "Continental philosphy " versus "Anglo-American" is nonsense and always has been. I aslo point this out in the new section. But there are different "schools" or "styles" of philosophy: analytic, phenonemology, post-modern or what have you. I think the article is, in fact, the better for including this material.  On the other hand, I really don't know how to deal with the "Eastern" question in the context of this artcile. More importanty, the article is getting FAT now. I'll see what I can do though.--Lacatosias 12:57, 9 March 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Yes, well personally I dislike continentals dismissing analytics as boring, and analytics dismissing it, as you put it "bad poetry". I studied in the analytic tradition but I find that both traditions have greatness, I like Kierkegaard & Nietzsche as much as Russell & Wittgenstein; Heidegger as much as Carnap; Marx as much as Rawls.  There's a piece by Richard Rorty about the divide that I find very informative . Cheers on the article, by the way Poor Yorick 13:35, 9 March 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Analytics ARE all too often excruciatingly boring. But never mind...--Lacatosias 14:06, 9 March 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Keep

message: Although I am aware that the outside links already contain consc.net twice (the guide and the bibliography, both compiled by Chalmers), the following link contains by far the largest compilation of links to articles on philosophy of mind that are freely available online: http://consc.net/online.html
Meanwhile, it seems to me that the Dale Jacquette link is not especially useful to those seeking information about the whole of philosophy of mind, so perhaps that one could be replaced. Alternatively, a single link to consc.net/chalmers specifically pointing out the "resources" section could also suffice.
:Since there were no objections, I just made the changes I suggested a while ago. --82.73.204.68 02:06, 28 July 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Possible new link to online papers? 

message: When trying to reach reference #3, Sankhya philosophy, my web browser says "www.philo.demon.co.uk could not be found. Please check the name and try again". Is this just temporary or...? /skagedal... 09:29, 21 March 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Don't know. It worked the other day. Strange. I'll try to find another link in any case.--Lacatosias 10:14, 21 March 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: It was a dead link. But I have now replaced it with an "archived" version (not exactly sure what this means, but the link now functions).--Lacatosias 10:20, 21 March 2006 (UTC)
replies: text:  When you write "archived version", I assume you mean the copy of the article that Google uses for indexing and search purposes. There is no guarantee that this archived version will stay, I think. Best if you can find another source. If the philospophy is notable, there should be other sources to draw from , shouldn't there?  DanielDemaret 23:47, 25 March 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: No problem.--Lacatosias 07:17, 26 March 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Originationism link 

message: *Keep and don't tell me how to edit
Keep, since it is good work so far. But I really think you should make rather a few significant entries instead of oh so many miniscule ones. I understand your position, but it's still bad style. --TheOtherStephan 23:38, 31 March 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Vote

message: More information is needed on:
# [Representational Functionalism]] and Sterelny  insignificant form of functionalism
# Computationalism and White, Newell and Simon, Copeland  alreadu linked.
# Nativism (Chomsky's universal generative grammar) and Cummins linguistics
# Modularity (Fodor) --no room.
# Colin_McGinn and Mysterianism -- ro room.
# Jerry Fodor in functionalism.
# Noam Chomsky linguist
# Consciousness Problem and Block, Chalmers yes, it's called Qualia; already there.
# Problem of Intentionality and Searle already there
# Functionalism (philosophy of mind) already there
# Functionalism (psychology) this is a philosophy article.
71.250.15.252 00:55, 15 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text:  you will notice that this raticle is ALREADY nearly 60 KB (the general requirement is to remain below 30!!)
These matters are all linked to and dealt with in in-depth in therr own separate articles. Also, this is a FEATTIRED ARTICLE. Do you know jow mant Featured Articles there are in all of philosophy after five years of exietcne of the Wikipedia: six!!! You're nuts!! Don't even look at it, much less touch it.--Lacatosias 10:12, 15 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  More info 

message: I know that there are a large number of Christian fundamentalist fanatics out there who want to discuss the origin if dualism and attribute it all to something called Judeo-Christian roots (though both of these are in fact Eastern religions with prodound roots in Mesopaotian, Perisn and other mythology). I won't get into this dicusson on this page. This article touches on dualism in only one specific aspect (mind-body duialism). There is a much broader article dualism which deals with the questions of soul-body dualism and ontoloogical dualism in general. Only if specific sources can be coted for the thesis that the soul-body distinction was conceeived as a mind-body disctintion (that is, the soul possessed faculties of intelligence, concsiousness and so on) in some philophy other than the Greek (from which the Jewich concept of soul directly derives) then I will allow it to be added. Otherwise, it will be deleted without comment. An obsevation: one does not have to be a dualist in odre to be a Christian and vice-versa. So not only does dualism not derive from something called Judeo-Cristianity (whatever that might mean) but it is not essential to dualism as such and vieversa. Gottfireid Liebzniz was a monist who believed that there was only ONE fundmantal substance (monads woth mental properties). He was a devout Christian. Spinoza was a neutal monist; he was aslo a Jew. Bishop George Berekely....well, you get the idea.--Lacatosias 09:47, 18 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Dualism 

message: Philosophy of mind is the philosophical study of the exact nature of the mind, mental events,  mental functions, mental properties, and consciousness, and of whether these have a relationship with the physical body: the so-called "mind–body problem."
whether? I gott read up on this more but surely there is some type of relationship. Ka-zizzlMc 06:18, 27 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  I'll bite 

message: In Eastern philosophy, on the other hand, the yogacara tradition, which arose in opposition to Madhyamika, represents a clear example of idealistic monism.
It has certanly been called idealistic, but 'represents a clear example' is quite too much; i read the work the autor of this was reffering to, as, curiously, supporting this assesment; here are some quotes from it:
many contemporary  scholars  have cast   doubt   upon   the   interpretation   of   the Asa^nga-Vasubandhu  phase of Yogaacaara  as a form of idealism.
It  is  also  not  clear  that  the  early Yogaacaara     philosophy     is    straightforwardly "idealistic"   since   there   appears   to  be   the acknowledgment at times that at the highest levels of attainment both citta and vij~napti-maatra  are to be transcended.
An important  point to note is that Asa^nga  here explicitly criticizes the view that denies that there exists  a "bare  given-thing"  (vastu-maatra) as  the basis   for   the   ruupa-skandha.(l2)  Indeed,   the Yogaacaara   school   seems  to  have  accepted   the traditional  Sarvaastivaada  division of dharmas into five  categories: mind  (citta), mental  concomitants (caitasikaa,  form   (ruupa) ,   compounded   factors independent           of           the           mind (citta-viprayukta-sa.mskaara-dharmas)  ,   and    the uncompounded factors (asa.msk.rta).(l3) This seems to be at variance  with  the  "naive  idealism"  usually attributed to Yogaacaara  thought.
It is said that a mass of matter (ruupasamudaaya) is composed  of atoms.  Here the atom  should  be understood   to  be  without   a  physical   body (ni.h'sraiira).  The  atom  is determined  in the final analysis by the intellect (buddhi), in view of the abandonment  of the notion of an aggregate (pi.n.dasa.mj~naa) ,   and   in   view   of   the penetration  into the relativity(15) of matter as a substance (dravyaparini.spattiprave'sa).
This argument  was extended  further by Asa^nga's brother  Vasubandhu  in his  Vi.m'satikaa(16) with an attack upon the realist notion of matter (ruupa) as a substance existing independently  of the experiencing subject.  Whether this is a case of idealism  depends to a large  extent  upon one's  understanding  of the term. 
 Asa^nga   describes   the grasping  subject  of  perceptions  (graahaka) as the material sense-organ (ruupiindriya),the mind (citta), and the mental factors (caitasika).  The inclusion of a gross sense-faculty  in the analysis of the subject is hardly  what one would  expect  from an idealistic analysis. 
and the general conclusion of the article is that only much later yogachara can be though of as idealistic. I really dont understand in what sence was this article used in support of this conclusion???
Such conclusion about Asangas yogachara is also supported by the fact that a  Karl Brunnhölzl, a Kagyu scholar, cosiders yogacara position to be misrepresented, to serve as a straw-man, in tibetan tradition, and that contemporary shentong position is only orthodox yogachara, though its commonly thought of as yogacara madyamaka. And also, it should be noted that yogacharins and shentongpas alike defend their position as skillfull means for meditators (hence the name yogacara), not ontological truths, that they certanly dont believe in existance of a soul, self, or essence, and that in buddhist philosophy, mind is  numbered among other sence organs, just like ear, eye, etc, and even this is considered just practical division, not prularistic ontology; as Bikhu Nyanajivako (Cedomil Veljacic, PhD, noted yugoslavian comparative philosopher) explains in his book Buddhism (Beograd,1977, improvised translation) 'unlike helenic philosophy, indian philosophy never starts with ontological, but exclusively from epistemiological assumptions about knowledge and though.'... I also would consider using western philosophy traditional designations, like idealism, materialism, for eastern philosophy as 'neutral designation' inherently chauvinistic (in this example, a more appropriate term, might be ethernalism), and only usefull when used really carefully, for identifying both commonalities and difference, in context of comparative philosophy.. 
for these reasons, I will remove this claim.--Aryah 08:33, 10 May 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: I think you have done a disservice to the article by removing the only mention of Cittamatra in particular and Buddhist thought in general. You could have changed the passage rather than removing it entirely. The article is called "Philosopy of Mind," not "Western Philosophy of Mind." I will try to work a discussion of this back into the article when I have time.Sylvain1972 19:45, 7 February 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: yogacara

message: Maybe I'm just incredibly dense today, but I don't understand the connection between the topic of this article and Communism, which (elsewhere in Wikipedia) is what's usually signified by the hammer-and-sickle icon.  Assuming that there is a relationship, I would propose it should be explained more explicitly in the article.  If it's not related and someone stuck the icon on as a joke, let's remove it. - Mark Dixon 03:00, 17 May 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Why is the Communism icon here? 

message: To all editors of this page, I am thoroughly impressed, a very well deserved FA. I am a philosophy student and Wikipedia has always felt very thin on philosophy to me; this is a great achievement for the encyclopedia as well as being, as the FA-submitter wrote, one of the best summaries of Philosophy of mind there is! I have my exams in about 10 days, and i'll definitely be reading this article more thoroughly. Once again, congratulations on such a great article. -- Alfakim --  talk  07:25, 17 May 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  WELL DONE! 

message: the image shown is NOT fMRI but just MRI image, probably T2.
someone should correct that...
:You are correct. I have fixed the problem. I was considering changing the caption, but I thought that fMRI really was more important for understanding theory of mind than MRI was, so I changed the picture. Irongargoyle 16:24, 17 May 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  fMRI IMAGE IS WRONG!! 

message: On the first part of the article it looks like something got deleted. I don't know if this was a mistake, vandilism, or my computer just doesn't want to show it. This is what the beginning of the article looks like to my computer, ", if mental states are something material, but not behavior, then mental states are probably identical to internal states of the brain. In very simplified terms: a mental state M is nothing other than brain state B. The mental state "desire for a cup of coffee" would thus be nothing more than the "firing of certain neurons in certain brain regions". 
And you probably see why I think something got deleted, as it starts with a comma and a lowercase letter.
I think deletion of parts seems to happen a lot on featured articles, because everyone sees it on the main page. Hm.
--Ayame The Wolf 18:59, 17 May 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Error? 

message: "Phenomenalism, the theory that all that exists are the representations (or sense data) of external objects in our minds and not the objects themselves, was adopted by Bertrand Russell and many of the logical positivists during the early 20th century."
Is this an accurate description of phenomenalism? It makes no sense as written. If all that exists are representations of external objects in our minds then what can they be representations of since external objects do not exist by definition.
- anonymous 17 May 2006
JA: There may be some nuance to the actual words they used, but that is basically what phenomenalism is.  Alfred Jules Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic (1946), makes for a standard banner-waving celebration of this position at its midcentury summit.  Will look up some exact quotes tomorrow.  Jon Awbrey 04:26, 18 May 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Thanks Jon.  Let me back that up too, working only off of memory at the moment.  Russell's phenomenalism was what we might, in very colloquial terms, call a mildly phenomenalistic orientation.  As a very practical man, Russell himself never fell completely into the trap of subjective idealism characteristic of the most stringent phenomenalists.  He always added to this view (at every stage of his career as far as I know) additional elements of justification to connect what's "up here" in the mind to what's "our there" in the "real world."  Indeed in this regard (if I understand your query correctly) he was arguably closer in overall positioning to Emanuel Kant than to the "die-hard" phenomenalists and positivists.  All this of course skips a proper analysis of the semiotic complications of the word "objects" and other quirky issues such as the meanings of the verb "to be" or what "is" a particular "object."  Too much to get into here. ...Kenosis 04:49, 18 May 2006 (UTC)

text: That, indeed, is the problem with phenomenalism.  See, for example, Empiricism#Phenomenalism, especially the last paragraph, which describes roughly what happened in the 20th Century...Kenosis 14:46, 18 May 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Phenomenalism - is this a correct description?

message: Check this out, from the article: "Since Leibniz' law of the identity of indiscernibles says that for any individual entities x and y and for all intrinsic properties F, if x has the property F if and only if y also has the property F, then x and y are identical, it follows that mind and body are not identical because they have radically different properties, according to Descartes."
That's logically nonsensical.  Leibniz' law says that
"[x and y have identical properties] implies [x = y]."
But this doesn't get you the conclusion of the above paragraph.  What's needed is the converse of Leibniz' law:
"[x = y] implies [x and y have identical properties]," which is logically equivalent to "Not [x and y have identical properties] implies not [x = y]."
I think the converse of Leibniz' law is much more elementary than Leibniz' law itself.  (It's more or less the same as the principle of "substituting equals for equals"... If x=y and x has property P, then, by substitution of equals for equals, y has property P.)  I don't know much philosophy; I'm just a mathematical logician.  But it appears that Descartes' argument has does not need Leibniz' law at all, just the more obvious converse.  And, of course, Descartes preceeded Leibniz by a number of years, so I'm sure it isn't the case that Descartes literally appealed to Leibniz.  I'm going to remove the mention of Leibniz from the article.
Oh, I now see that the paragraph I'm questioning has a reference.  Does the reference cited actually say that Leibniz' law is needed?  If so, I suspect that's an error.  I'm hoping the citation is just for Decartes' argument and not for the specific use of Leibniz' law. (The preceding submitted 18 May 2006 by 70.244.105.170)
:Yo Sarge, the term Leibniz law can be used to refer to either or both of the following principles.
Indiscernibility of Identicals:
for all F (F(x) <-> F(y)) -> x=y 
Identity of Indiscernibles (converse of the other)
x=y -> for all F (F(x) <-> (F(y)) 
In this case, the point was very simply that, according to Leibniz law,  two things which have all the same properties are identical. It follows that mind and body are not identical, according to Descartes' dualism, since they do not have all the same properties!! Give me a break, already.--Lacatosias 17:18, 19 June 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Logical Error 

message: Am I the only one who's reading of "On the Soul" would indicate that Aristotle was not as clearly a dualist as the article indicates?  That is, in the question of the mind he states that the only sort of intelligence that can exist independently of the body is the 'active intelligence' which, from my reading of it, sounds an awful lot like his prime mover, and thus might not be a part of the human mind at all.  Thus, if we're discussing the dualism of the human mind, rather than more 'cosmic' intelligences, it seems debateable that Aristotle is a dualist at all.  But then perhaps I'm showing too much of my own Aristotle exegesis as a student of St. John's College, U. S. and thus, I'm told, an indirect follower of Heidegger in looking at Aristotle.  Or something.
Wilhelm Ritter 17:09, 18 May 2006
I completely agree. The controversy over this aspect of Aristotle's thought is probably greater than any other area. I suggest that there only need be a mention of Plato in the intro, afterall, there is only one reference to Eastern thought and the reference to Aristotle seems superfluous anyway. Mel Thompson in 'Teach Yourself Philosophy' notes that Aristole does rather better than Plato in recognizing the interconnected nature of self and world, and eminent Aristotle scholar Jonathan Barnes, in his 'Aristotle - A Very Short Introduction' points out that souls are not 'bits of spiritual stuff' and notes that Aristotle does not suffer the problem of interaction inherent to all dualism, except when he seems to think that perhaps one aspect of though comes from a divine influence. At the very least, I think that classifying him as a 'dualist' is an oversimplification at best and misleading at worst.
81.131.95.141 00:35, 24 August 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Aristotle

message: May 17, 2006, Philosophy of Mind on Wikipedia, mindhacks.com  -- Cherubino 22:13, 20 May 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Link 

message: "Borrowing from Herbert Simon and also influenced by the ideas of existential phenomenologists such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Martin Heidegger, McClamrock suggests that man's condition of being-in-the-world ("Dasein", "In-der-welt-sein") makes it impossible for him to understand himself by abstracting away from it and examining it as if it were a detached experimental object of which he himself is not an integral part." I feel quite comfident that this idea should indeed be contributed to Martin Heidegger! Thoose of you who may have read Sein und Zeit may correct me!
Mandelum 20:44, 21 May 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Da-sein 

message: A mind appears to be a complex aspect.  And to alter the MIND requires the expression of truth.
Here appears a solution. Peer review. So to change this page require review.
Kinds are the basic outline. And to make the mind is a philosopher's task.
My mind is a some. And I profess to teach a little as Plato.  And enforce the school.
Your school in peer review is understood, but unworthy of Greek recognition because it desires perfection of uncommon kind. To write the mind correctly is a profound thing. Absolute catergory class distinction in particlar effect is the school. A school of arrogance.
Why the writings of Plato?
And so I request a single sentence addition.
The eastern or buddist mind is unrepresented.
If Plato was called a zen master would it worry the reviewers.
Correct it.
--Eaglesondouglas 01:06, 22 October 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: NOnsequitar- Imagination and Mind

message: I'm comparitively inexperienced at editing, so I apologise for clicking 'Save page' several times when I could have just clicked 'Preview page'. Also, one of my edit summaries reads "Erased 'in the west' and 'in the east' in 'dualism' section - I think it's superflous", and I now realise that this could very easily be misunderstood. 
So, to clarify, by 'Dualism section' I was referring to the paragraph dealing with dualism in the introduction, not the section dealing with said subject in the main body of the article; where you will find the East/West divide being firmly upheld. 
Also, I do not at all hold that the distinction between Eastern and Western philosophy is superfluous, but I do hold that it is unnecessary, not to mention clunky, to tell someone reading this article that Plato and Aristotle were from the West and that Hinduism is from the east. In all probability they will already know this and, if they do not, the links to the relevant articles are clearly displayed.
Hope my edits are ok apart from that.
Julian Roberts 14:50, 23 January 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: I don't know. I donìt have enough time to even take a glance at it before I get cut off. You  bastards!!--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 17:51, 23 January 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Some possible ambiguities in my recent edit summaries. 

message: "Descartes' argument fundamentally depends on the premise that what Seth believes to be "clear and distinct" ideas in his mind are necessarily true. Many contemporary philosophers doubt this. 
For example, Joseph Agassi believes that several academic innovations made since the early 20th century have substantially undermined the idea of privileged access to one's own ideas. Freud has shown that a psychologically-trained observer can understand a person's unconscious motivations better than he does, Duhem has shown that a philosopher of science can know a person's methods of discovery better than he does Malinowski has shown that an anthropologist can know a person's customs and habits better than he does. He also asserts that modern psychological experiments that cause people to see things that are not there provide grounds for rejecting Descartes' argument and scientists can describe a person's perceptions better than he can), ."
I have edited this paragraph but I'm still not happy with it. I changed it because it is not at all apparent to me that the views set forth here are representative of those of 'Most modern philosophers'. If we're going to ascribe views to 'Most modern philosophers' we need backup from more than just one book surely?
Also, I'd like to see links to examples of these experiments and I'm not at all sure the views of Joseph Agassi deserve such privileged exposure on this page.
I'll do what I can to rectify this myself, but anyone more knowledgeable who can help with this please do.
Julian Roberts 09:39, 25 January 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Fair point: I'll get to it when I can. My ADSL is installed....but now the rest of my g***** system has gone looney. I can't get this to run on Linux and I have a pirated version of Windows---doesn't allow updates. They want E200!! You sonnamagonyyaaa'!! Greedy SB!!--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 11:06, 8 February 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Hmm...a great deal depends on where you are. Personally, I'm almost Popperian in my distrust and skepticism of Freudianism, Jungianism and all of that sort of thing. But I don't dismiss it outright.
However, Freud continues to exercise enormous influence here in Italy because of some bizarre historical convergence of events which I can't go too deeply into. It seems that there is a much deeper and growing skeptcism about Freud's claim to scientificity over in the US. But the answer is at this point is: I don't really know. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 16:02, 1 March 2007 (UTC)

text: Indeed, Italy is quite a LOONEY place!! Here's an interesting article which may be helpful on this question of Freudian reception. It mostly deals with the reception in philosophy, fails to discuss the enormous influence of Italo Svevo and the huge psyhcoanaltyic literary tradition, but it is fairly accurate.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 10:23, 6 March 2007 (UTC)

text: Hmm...that link seems to be broken. Here's another one.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 10:26, 6 March 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Please read: paragraph in dualism section 

message: Surprised not to find reference to McGinn's important work on this topic.  KD Tries Again 19:54, 5 February 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: McGinn beleives, in essence,  that there are there are epistemlogical limitataions which prevent of human beings from ever being able to explain the first-person phenomenological aspects of consciouenss in terms of third-person scientific explanation: the explanatory gap, in othr word, is neither ontlogical (as dualists would have it) nor semantic (as Witt. and others) but epistemoligical in nature. The positin is simialr to Nagel, but the arguments are slightly different. Not much too it. You just can't do it!! He is given the oddly mystical name of a New Mysterian,even though he as convinced a physicalist as anyone. But this is chatter for the forums. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 16:44, 6 February 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: I don't think he says we can never explain it - just not from where we are now.  Surely important enough to be included?  I can draft a paragraph.  KD Tries Again 18:00, 6 February 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Hmm.....interesting. I'm not sure about that. I know Nagel  suggests the problem is essentially irresolvable based on  current knowledge alone. McGinn seems to me, and to a great many others whence the term Mysterian (as in Chomsky's problems versus mysteries) to be saying that the problem is irresolvable because of natural/biological limitations or some such.  In any case, if you can you provide a specific passage, preferably from a secondary source, to support your interpretation.....Meantime, I'll look into it a little 
further. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 09:15, 7 February 2007 (UTC)

text: No, it's not a difference of opinion; you're just wrong. Looking it it more carefully, the central point of McGinn's "transcendental naturalism" is that such questions are cognitively closed to us in a manner similar to the way that partial differential equations or QCD are closed to elephants. There is an inherent biological limitation. We're not smart enough, as a species, to answer the question. That's all there is to it. If you want to add a paragraph, make sure you get that right!! Might be worth a sentence or two next to Nagel under "qualia". --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 10:02, 7 February 2007 (UTC)

text: Okay, I misremembered.  All I have to hand is McGinn's work, which I haven't picked up in a while, but I'll try to find a secondary account.KD Tries Again 15:51, 12 February 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: No problem. Meantime, I've already added a concise paragraph to the article describing and contrasting McGinn's views with those of others on the explanatory gap. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Lacatosias (talk • contribs) 12:55, 13 February 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Colin McGinn? 

message: This may be too early to include here, but I came across this local group recently: Institute of Advanced Science and Engineering and their information web site .
--Myscience 01:20, 22 February 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  New Theories 

message: I am not comfortable with the definition given here to "non-reductionists" - in general the term is applied in a broader sense to anyone that does not agree with a reductionist approach. This is a heads up that I am likely to change it after some more thought.
--Myscience 20:02, 3 March 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: yes, I have clarified this in the intro, if that is what you are talking about. It was meant to be clear that I was referring to non-reductive physicalists. But I have fixed it. If you are suggesting that non-reductive physicalist means anyone who disagrees with reductionism (i.e. dualists and so on),  then you are either extremely confused or extremely intent on pushing an agenda. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 09:49, 4 March 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: I advocate accuracy, not a bias. The article is a little "brain centric" but I am glad to see the changes that you made. Relax.  --Myscience 01:45, 8 March 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Not comfortable with "non-reductionists" 

message: I came because a notice was posted at Wikipedia:Administrators' noticeboard/Incidents, alleging that a WP:3RR violation had occurred here.  (Incidentally, the correct place for such notices is WP:AN3RR.)  Looking at the history, a technical 3RR violation has not occurred.  However, it is clear that one user is repeatedly inserting the same material, and not really participating in two way conversation on this talk page.  So this sentence in WP:3RR applies: "Editors may still be blocked even if they have not made more than three edits in any given 24 hour period, if their behavior is clearly disruptive."  I'm going to leave a clear warning on the talk page of the named user that has been adding the disputed paragraph.  I assume the IPs are the same person, but since they change there is little point in warning them also, so I also leave a warning here.
Wikipedia:Attribution is a core content policy on Wikipedia.  Wikipedia is an encyclopedia, so relies on previously published reliable sources for all of its content.  The ability to cite sources for all proposed content is more important than either logic or getting it right.  The disputed paragraph is being added without any sources cited, so the correct answer about whether or not to include it on Wikipedia is obivious - without sources, it does not belong in the article.  Repeatedly adding the same material without trying to address this fundamental flaw with it is disruptive.  GRBerry 16:41, 28 March 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Thanks for stepping in here. I haven't had much time to deal with this person and am not an admin. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 17:44, 28 March 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Reversions 

message: William Hasker, a philosopher of the mind, has developed a theory called emergent dualism in his book The Emergent Self. It has significant advantages over Cartesian dualism, reductive materialism, and idealism. It's also a theory to which I subscribe, which is one reason in particular that I'd like to see its addition to Wikipedia. It could be said to be a sister to property dualism, which states that properties emerge from complex physical arrangements. However, unlike property dualism, it accounts for the unity-of-consciousness, which one might call a soul.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 68.1.124.88 (talk) 19:08, 4 October 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Emergent Dualism - William Hasker 

message: Hi, this is an exellent article, but I get the impression that the Philosophy of mind is all about the mind-body problem. Now I just found that there are a lot of books about the Philosophy of mind: 
* 2007, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, Keith Maslin, 352 pp.
* 2006, Philosophy of Mind A-Z, Marina Rakova, 207 pp.
* 2005, Philosophy of Mind, George Ladd, 428 pp.
* 2005, Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind, David Woodruff Smith, Amie Lynn Thomasson, 336 pp.
* 2004, Philosophy of Mind, Jaegwon Kim, 312 pp.
* 2005,  A Brief Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, Neil Campbell, 213 pp.
* 2004, Philosophy of Mind, door Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, 132 pp.
* 2004, Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction, John Heil, 262 pp.
* 2003, Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings, Timothy O'Connor, David Robb en John Heil, 592 pp.
* 2003, Mind, Reason and Imagination: Selected Essays in Philosophy of Mind and Language, Jane Heal, 316 pp.
* 2003, Philosophy of Mind, Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva, 400 pp.
* 2002, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, E. J. Lowe, 332 pp.
* 2002, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, David J. Chalmers, 688 pp.
* 2001, Holism in Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of Physics, Michael Esfeld, 366 pp.
* 2001, Philosophy of mind, Maurice Schouten.  
* 2000, What Is a Mind?: An Integrative Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, Suzanne Cunningham, 274 pp.
* 2000, Mind's Landscape: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, Samuel D. Guttenplan, 358 pp
I wonder if all those books only focuss on the mind-body problem. Isn't there something more going on in this field? - Mdd (talk) 00:22, 27 November 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  What is Philosophy of mind? 

message: References 32-73 seem to be missing.  Anyone know that happened with that? Enigma00 (talk) 05:04, 10 December 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Fixed. - Mdd (talk) 19:55, 10 December 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Citations 

message: I take issue with this passage:
"The main argument in favor of dualism is that it seems to appeal to the common-sense intuition of the vast majority of non-philosophically-trained people. If asked what the mind is, the average person will usually respond by identifying it with their self, their personality, their soul, or some other such entity. They will almost certainly deny that the mind simply is the brain, or vice-versa, finding the idea that there is just one ontological entity at play to be too mechanistic, or simply unintelligible.[8] The majority of modern philosophers of mind think that these intuitions, like many others, are probably misleading and that we should use our critical faculties, along with empirical evidence from the sciences, to examine these assumptions and determine if there is any real basis to them."
I don't think any of those philosophers would call this argument dualism's "main argument". I think it conflicts NPOV because it gives the reader a sense that this lame excuse for an argument is the best most dualists can muster. Perhaps it would be more appropriate it call it the "most popular position" or something to that effect. -- The Fwanksta (talk) 00:32, 10 January 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: Maybe "crucial argument" or "central argument" -- Mdd (talk) 00:39, 10 January 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: Apologies, but I'm not a fan of those. "Crucial" makes it seem as if it's actually important (which any philosopher worth his or her salt would vehemently disagree with), and "central" has much the same effect as "main". Sorry if I'm not being clear. The Fwanksta (talk) 03:22, 10 January 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: I've just decided to go ahead and do it. Apologies for the delay. -- The Fwanksta (talk) 02:26, 23 November 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Dualism's "main argument" 

message: I beg your pardon for my english's skill, I'm a french speaking student.
I find the section about dualism frankly partial.  Expressions like "The main argument in favor of dualism is that it seems to appeal to the common-sense", "Descartes's argument crucially depends on the premise that what Seth believes to be "clear and distinct" ideas in his mind are necessarily true.  Many contemporary philosophers doubt this."  After a reading it seems that dualism is out of date.  Thought it is not the main position now, dualism is not an unlogical statement, and, as far as I know the subject, is not impossible at all to reconciliate with science.  There is a whole paragraph about opposants to the "Descartes's argument", but not a line on the position of Karl Popper.
By the way the article doesn't mention even one time the name and the position of Bergson, which wrote a whole book on the subject (Matter and memory), where he tried to reconciliate the reality of the mind and the reality of the matter.  This philosopher is too important to be ignored in a encyclopedy talking about this subject.
Unfortunately, in regard to my english's skill, to write something in english on his complex philosophy.  But up to that moment, this laconism is huge for a "featured article".
J.S.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 66.131.56.27 (talk) 17:07, 20 February 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Partiality and laconism in dualism section 

message: I have noticed that the lead section has been somewhat altered, and I suspect that some, possibly most, of these changes were of a destructive nature, i.e. vandalism 84.194.237.100 (talk) 16:45, 4 June 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  lead section 

message: "Thus, for example, the idea that Herodotus was a historian refers to Herodotus and to the fact that he was an historian. If the fact is true, then the idea is true; otherwise, it is false. But where does this relation come from? In the brain, there are only electrochemical processes and these seem not to have anything to do with Herodotus.[20]"
What an odd question! One can also write down on paper that Herodius was a historian. Put, paper is only wood fibres and ink - how can wood fibres and ink have anything to do with Herodius?
For that matter, I can build you a machine, made out of lego, that will compute the next eclipse of the moon (although it might take a while) . What does a pile of lego have to do with the moon?
Paul Murray (talk) 02:46, 5 July 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Intentionality 

message: Our perceptual experiences depend on stimuli which arrive at our various sensory organs from the external world and these stimuli cause changes in our mental states, ultimately causing us to feel a sensation, which may be pleasant or unpleasant
I think this is a little bit of a leading assumption.  Could it not be that our feeling of a sensation is only and exactly the change in the mental state?  There seems to be an assumed causality and thus an implied duality between sensation and mental state.
I would propose it to be changed to "...and these stimuli cause changes in our mental states, and cause us to feel a sensation,..."  Or something along those lines.
--DerwinUMD (talk) 23:13, 10 October 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Proposed Change in Duality section 

message: The notion of mind (or spirit for that matter) should be reflected in our rational view of the universe, in particular through the concept of a non-physical dimension. 
If we take the word 'dimension' to mean a fundamental aspect of our reality, where a minimum set of dimensions can fully envelope (or provide a framework) for describing our reality, then I would say that the universe has five dimensions. These are 4-d spacetime currently accepted in the mainstream scientific view, plus a fifth dimension - a non-physical dimension of mind or spirit. The fifth spiritual dimension does not influence the mechanics of the physical universe, however it encapsulates things such as perceptions, emotions, and a sense of right or wrong (just to name a few examples). People with a purely physical view of the universe would say that mind (or spirit) is comprised of the purely physical, ie. just chemical and electrical signals in the brain. People with a bit more imagination might agree that thoughts and feelings, perceptions, memories, dreams, expectations, love for family and friends, concepts of ownership, concepts of tribe or nation, concepts of right and wrong - are more than just chemical and electrical signals in the brain. In other words, if we want a rational scientific view that can encapsulate all aspects of our reality, it needs to include the non-physical (mind/spirit). This theory need not be falsifiable, because at its very roots scientific understanding rests on assumptions based on common sense. String Theory (from theoretical physics) suggests there may be 10 or 11 or so higher dimensions. But if these are just more physical/spatial dimensions at a sub-atomic scale, then wouldn't they be redundant? (ie. overlapping with 4-d spacetime.)Crazygrandpa (talk) 11:35, 29 October 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: Why are you writing this on this talk page? Looie496 (talk) 16:27, 29 October 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Scientific Worldview 

message: There are emerging theories of consciousness, experience, and emotion that you may want to consider as you compile your reference material. What makes these theories unique is thier ability to span across science and philosophy. There is theory on how the brain processes consciousness which is based on "activity" rather than attempting to explain everything through structural elements. The "Mind and Thought Series" provides several books based on Consciousness Theory. You can find more information on the website, [ http://www.mindandthought.com], for your consideration.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by Bishopclinics (talk • contribs) 14:16, 4 November 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Consciousness Theory 

message: I am not an expert on the topic, but I am knowledgeble enough to be disturbed by the sections on Qualia and Intentionality. For instance, the first three sentences of the section on qualia are presented as fact, but are clearly the opinion of the author. These opinions are not shared by all experts in the field.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 128.138.64.228 (talk) 21:32, 12 January 2009 (UTC)
thread_title:  Unbiased? 

message: I added the globalize tag (accidentally under the IP 71.112.243.181) because of the minimal inclusion of Eastern philosophy of the mind. Hindu concepts are mentioned passingly in a single paragraph and in the introduction, and Buddhism and Buddhist concepts aren't mentioned at all. I'm no expert on Eastern philosophies, but I'd bet that plenty has dealt with the mind and very little is mentioned here.Tyharvey313 (talk) 09:36, 13 January 2009 (UTC)
thread_title:  Lack of Eastern Philosophy 

message: Substituted at 15:34, 1 May 2016 (UTC)
thread_title: Assessment comment