Talk:Score voting

message: Memphis to memphis = 0
nashvile to memphis  = 312.5
chatanooga  to memphis  = 431.5
Knoxville to memphis  = 555.3
memphis score = 324.825
Nashiville to Nashville = 0
Memphis to Nashville = 312.5
Chattanoga to Nashville = 185.4
Knoxville to Nashville  = 256.6
Nashville score = 188.625
Chattanooga to Chattanooga = 0
Memphis to Chattanooga = 431.5
Nashivile to Chattanooga = 185.4
Knoxville to Chattanooga = 154.9
Chatanooga score = 190.7
Knoxville to knoxville = 0
Memphis to Knoxville  = 555.3
Nashvile to Knoxville  = 256.6
Chattagoona to Knoxville  = 154.9
Knoxville score = 214.7
The score, is the average the distance between cities and nashiville wins with smallest distance.  201.78.176.52 (talk) 12:50, 3 September 2014 (UTC)
thread_title:  Comparision 

message: If each city votes honestly on a scale of 1-10 with their favorite candidate at 10 and their least favorite at 0 and the remaining candidates proportional to their relative distance, the results are:
:Memphis to Knoxville, 554 km
:Nashville to Memphis, 311 km
:Nashville to Knoxville, 255 km
:Nashville to Chattanooga, 183 km
:Memphis to Chattanooga 428 km
:Knoxville to Chattanooga 158 km
:Chattanooga voters;
:Chattanooga, 0 - 10 * 15 = 150 points for Chattanooga
:Memphis, 428 - 0 * 15 = 0 points for Memphis
:Knoxville, 158 - 6 * 15 = 90 points for Knoxville
:Nashville, 183 - 6 * 15 = 90 points for Nashville
:Memphis voters;
:Chattanooga, 428 - 2 * 42 = 84 points for Chattanooga
:Memphis, 0 - 10 * 42 = 420 points for Memphis
:Knoxville, 554 - 0 * 42 = 0 points for Knoxville
:Nashville, 311 - 4 * 42 = 168 points for Nashville
:Knoxville voters;
:Chattanooga, 158 - 7 * 17 = 119 points for Chattanooga
:Memphis, 554 - 0 * 17 = 0 points for Memphis
:Knoxville, 0 - 10 * 17 = 170 points for Knoxville
:Nashville, 255 - 5 * 17 = 85 points for Nashville
:Nashville voters;
:Chattanooga, 183 - 4 * 26 = 104 points for Chattanooga
:Memphis, 311 - 0 * 26 = 0 points for Memphis
:Knoxville, 255 - 2 * 26 = 52 points for Knoxville
:Nashville, 0 - 10 * 26 = 260 points for Nashville
:Chattanooga total; 457
:Memphis total; 420
:Knoxville total; 312
:Nashville total; 603
I plan on editing the results of the example to fit these more accurate figures.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by Monkthatgotfunk (talk • contribs) 21:02, 8 May 2008 (UTC)
replies: text:  Why on earth does "distance" have anything to do with anything? It's totally arbitrary.  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 87.119.183.129 (talk) 10:50, 6 August 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: Because they would want that their city become the capital because its the closest place from the one they are. And so its assumed that closer places would be beter.201.79.64.150 (talk) 15:37, 24 November 2015 (UTC)
thread_title: Inaccurate example figures

message: I removed the following text, because it doesn't make any sense.  Obviously candidate will do everything in their power to win.  That is assumed.  The question is not whether candidate can manipulate voters (isn't that the point of a campaign?) but rather whether voters can manipulate the system by not voting sincerely.  However it can be mathematically proven that any deviations from what the voter sincerely desires will reduce the likelihood of the outcome the voter desires.  If a voter so strongly favor his favorite candidate that he rates other voters lower, that is an expression of his preferences, not a "strategy."  It is also possible to show mathematically that it is not in the best interest to vote either 0 or 1 on everybody (as someone has already pointed out in the disucssion below).  The proof is statistical.  You look only at the case where the person's vote actually decides the outcome.  However, since the person doesn't know what the vote tally will be when he casts his vote there is no way to apportion his vote that will increase the likely of a positive outcome, other than a sincere rating.
:One reason that range voting is not used in any public or private election is that, like approval voting, it is easily subject to candidates' strategic manipulation. A candidate would have an obvious incentive to urge his or her supporters privately to give a low rating to all other candidates even as professing interest publicly in reaching out to other candidates' supporters. Even without a candidate directly communicating this strategy to supporters, they would grasp the adverse impact on their favorite candidate of rating other candidates highly and be in a difficult position of not knowing how best to vote in order to help their preferred candidate.
:Range voting advocates suggest that in most cases (when the population is large or not much is known about how others will vote), the optimal strategy for range voting is to vote as under approval voting, so that all candidates are given (to very good accuracy) either the maximum score or the minimum score.  They also acknowledge that it is possible to devise examples in which voting maximum and minimum scores for all candidates is not optimal.  Because of the near-equivalence of range and approval voting with 100% strategic voters, range voting can only exhibit substantial advantages over approval voting in situations in which at least some voters are actually expressing their personal feelings rather than doing everything they can to cause their most favored outcomes, i.e. in which there are some amount of nonstrategic "honest" (or at least partially honest) voters. Situations where range voting is used such as in judging olympic events are not usually secret ballots so they discourage obvious forms of strategic voting. 
:Approval voting inventor Guy Ottewell now endorses range voting. No elected official in the United States is known to endorse range voting.
Analysis of Range Voting with respect to manipulability (also see: Gibbard-Satterthwaite_theorem)
First I want to examine people's incentives for sincere voting in the absence of perfect information of everybody else's votes.  Perfect information seems like an overly strong assumption, that, for many reasons, would never fully obtain.  (For one, its a condition that is impossible to achieve on a large scale.  I.e., its impossible to give everybody full knowledge of how everybody else will vote, before they have voted.)  Instead the degree of precision in predicting other's votes should be incorporated into the analysis dirrectly.
It can be shown that in a range voting system, even a very small number of voters will generate enough uncertainty about how people are voting, so that it will generally be in the interests of each voter to vote sincerely.
This is because any individual's vote only matters when the outcome is really close.  Thus any guess he can come up with about how the population will vote will only be relevant when his guess is that the population is closely divided between at least couple options.
Say we are using a range voting system where participants can choose any rational number from 0 to 1 for each of three options A, B, and C.
The manipulability concern is that if a voter's sincere preferences were A= 0.0, B=0.9 and C=1.0, he could instead vote A=0.0, B=0.0 and C=1.0, thus increasing the chance that his favorite candidate C, will win.
For example, if the vote tally before he casts his vote is, A=100.1, B=100.5, and C= 100.0, then by casting his insincere vote he can make, B=100.5 and C=101, resulting in his favorite candidate, C, winning.  But by casting his sincere vote he would make, B=101.4 and C=101, resulting in his second favorite, B, winning.  Thus the manipulation argument is that he would have an incentive to cast insincere votes.
The problem with this manipulation is that it also increases the chance that his least favorite candidate, A, will win.  Lets say A has gotten one more point so that the tally before his vote had instead been, A= 101.1, B=100.5, and C=100, then his manipulation would result in A=101.1, B=100.5, and C=101, resulting in his least favorite candidate A winning.  If he voted sincerely the result would have been A=101.1, B=101.4, and C=101, resulting in his second favorite candidate B winning.
Thus his "manipulation" is really an expression of his preferences.  What he is really saying is that his preference for C isn't just .1 more than his preference for B, because in that case it wouldn't be worth risking a victory for A whom he despises.  Instead his preference for C is so much stronger than his preference for B, that its worth taking a higher risk of getting A.  In other words, the difference between A and B isn't so great as the difference between the two of them and C.
This argument assumes that he can't predict the outcome of the vote tallies with a percentage error smaller than 100/(# of voters), which will clearly be true for even very small populations.
However, what if he doesn't believe that all three will be close, but that rather it will look something like this:  A=50, B=100, C=100, plus or minus 0.5 for each option.
In this case he wouldn't need to use his spread to reduce option A because option A isn't a threat.  Instead he can use his entire spread to express his preference between B and C, voting B=0 and C=1.  This case where there are only two close options is the strongest argument for "manipulation," however I think it is still flawed.  In the case where the population has so little desire for A that A has no chance of winning, we would want people to use their spreads to indicate their preferences between the likely winners.  This is adding valuable information.
For instance, we would not want a single extreme right wing Nazi candidate to squeeze voter's assignments to the legitimate portion of the political spectrum into a range of .99- 1.00, just because "anybody is better than that guy."  This is because if mainstream candidates were squeezed into such a narrow range then the outcome between those candidates would end up being essentially random.  So its a positive quality, not a manipulable quality, of the range voting system that voters will have an incentive to express their preferences with respect to the realistic candidates.
Of course there is an equilibrium: the more that mainstream voters ignore the unlikely candidate, and use their spread to distinguish between the likely candidates, the closer the unlikely candidate gets to being likely, because overall scores will be lower.  This in turn gives voters some incentive to use some of their spread to vote against the unlikely candidate (by increasing scores for all other candidates).  The resulting equilibrium would flatten the entire distribution to a limited degree.
On thing is clear however.  Rational voters would never have an incentive to misrepresent their ordinal preferences.  It would always make sense to give a preferred candidate a higher score than a less-preferred candidate (even if it was only a .000001 difference).  (This is a very different result from ranked voting, and borda count, where you are required to vote lower for one candidate in order to vote higher for another.  This trade off doesn't exist in range voting.)
:I don't think this is true. A B C are candidates and you have real preferences 100 90 0.  However, you know that in the population as a whole, 50% will vote 100 for B, and 50% will vote 100 for C. To prevent C winning, you have to make the gap between B and C as large as possible, so you will vote 100 100 0, which harms your true first choice.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 87.194.220.108 (talk) 22:51, 6 January 2008 (UTC)
thread_title: Strategy

message: With range voting, is it permissible to leave some of the numbers out?
Say allocate a (4) and a (1) and leave the others as (0) and (0).
In this example of range voting, the weights go 4-3-2-1.
If Formula One races, they give the winner an extra weight, something like 8-4-2-1.
Who choses what weights to give?
Syd1435 05:56, 2004 Nov 23 (UTC)
It is up to the voter within the bounds set by the rules. --Henrygb 18:10, 31 Jan 2005 (UTC)
replies: text: But why isn't Borda considered a special case of range voting? I've started a discussion about this at Talk:Borda count#Borda vs. range voting?. --Damian Yerrick (talk | stalk) 23:57, 30 January 2009 (UTC)
thread_title:  Question. 

message: While calculating the average fails the Majority Criterion I don't see how using the median could fail that. If the highest median is shared by several candidates one could fall back to the average as a tiebraker. Does this introduce new bugs?
84.144.91.50 12:58, 25 May 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  Using the Median 

message: I added some wording indicating that this system is not actually in current use "for single seat election", "political elections", etc.  Also, especially in the "Properties" section, the writing seems to be getting fairly close to WP:NOR - it is not a "Condorcet method"  to "many people", but "Center for Range Voting" has improved the relevant definitions to show that it is.  Given that the Center appears to be primarily Warren Smith, who is the key person behind this conception of Range Voting, most non-voting-system-wonk readers such as myself can't help but feeling the article may not be properly neutral.  Is Range Voting studied more widely under other terms, or has Dr. Smith's work been taken up elsewhere.  There are no independent references. - David Oberst 03:06, 26 June 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: I have previously cut the alternate Condorcet interpretation due to WP:NOR. I note that even if it's true that Condorcet need not have been interpreted to apply to rated ballots in the way it typically is (i.e., "if more voters prefer one candidate over another candidate than vice versa, no matter who the other candidate is, then this candidate must win"), noting this fact doesn't teach us anything relevant to range voting. It just allows range voting to satisfy a hypothetical criterion that no one uses. KVenzke 03:51, 26 June 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: I think it would be fine to include the Condorcet line as something like "Range Voting advocate Warren Smith claims that Range Voting satisfies a modified Condorcet criterion" or similar. --54x (talk) 03:51, 2 March 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: My own OR shows that, if there is a single Condorcet winner and all voters have perfect information about all other voters' payoffs, then the Condorcet will win under the Nash equilibrium. The proof is trivial. I wish I could include this fact in the article but it's OR. Homunq (talk) 04:27, 13 June 2009 (UTC)
thread_title: Theoretical

message: Someone with a dial-up internet connection who has not registered as a user continues to make changes to article content without discussion or citation. I am reverting these changes. --Fahrenheit451 22:12, 8 March 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Tendentious editing by ip address users

message: There is an open issue as to whether Range voting satisfies majority criterion.  In reading the Majority criterion wiki entry, it appears to me that range voting does not satisfy it.  Let me try to prove that by contrary example:
Consider this case:
  Three candidates X, Y, and Z.
  Three voters Able, Baker, Charlie.
They vote as follows (scale is 1 to 100):
  Able:    X: 3 of 100  Y:   2 of 100   Z: 1 of 100
  Baker:   X: 3 of 100  Y:   2 of 100   Z: 1 of 100
  Charlie: X: 1 of 100  Y: 100 of 100   Z: 1 of 100
As I am reading the range voting definition, candidate Y wins while a majority (Able and Baker) range candidate X as their first choice.  If my analysis is true, then I contend that it is accurate to state that range voting does not strictly satisfy the majority criterion.  QED.
Is my thinking correct?  Thanks.  WilliamKF 23:57, 12 March 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Likewise, there is an open issue as to whether range voting satisfies the later-no-harm criterion.  If I am understanding this criterion correctly, I believe that the above example demonstrates that range voting does not meet this criteria. WilliamKF 00:03, 13 March 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  Thinking more about this, I think a simple tweak would cause range voting to meet the above criteria.  Perhaps this is the way it already works?  If you take each voter and normalize/scale their votes to an average equal to all others, so that their low vote is stretched to 1 and their high vote is stretched to 100 perhaps the above voting anomalies go away?  Maybe like this:
Formula would be: f(vote) = (vote - voter's low vote) * (high possible vote - low possible vote) / (voter's high - voter's low vote) + low possible vote.
So for Able, their low vote was 1, their high vote was 3, their high possible vote (same for all voters) is 100, their low possible vote (same for all voters) is 1. f(3) => 100 f(2) => 50.5 f(1) => 1.
  Able:    X: 3 => 100 of 100  Y:   2 =>  50.5 of 100   Z: 1 => 1 of 100
  Baker:   X: 3 => 100 of 100  Y:   2 =>  50.5 of 100   Z: 1 => 1 of 100
  Charlie: X: 1 =>   1 of 100  Y: 100 => 100   of 100   Z: 1 => 1 of 100
Now this makes the analysis more complicated.  Can anyone create an example which violates majority criterion or later-no-harm criterion using this change?  If not, the question becomes whether my tweak is part of the official definition for range voting or not. WilliamKF 00:25, 13 March 2007 (UTC)

text: It appears to me that brokenladder has given us a counter example of range voting satisfying majority criterion.  Therefore, unless anyone posts an explanation as to why this is not a counter example, I believe it is accurate to state in the article that it does not satisfy majority criterion.  I think his counter example may also demonstrate that later-no-harm is not satisfied either.  Anyone want to comment on that one too?  WilliamKF 16:20, 13 March 2007 (UTC)

text: Off topic, but it seems to me a system satisfying the (mutual) majority criterion and/or the concordet loser criterion is basically antithetical to democracy (as opposed to ochlocracy / tyrrany of the majority). Krum Stanoev (talk) 08:13, 16 March 2009 (UTC)
thread_title:  Majority criterion 

message: I believe that there is a mathematical proof that in any election with more than two candidates, it is impossible to come up with a fair voting system.  If anyone can find this in the literature, I think it would be useful to cite.  Given there is no such thing as a perfect voting scheme when there are more than two choices, the task them becomes trying to find one that is a good compromise. WilliamKF 21:12, 13 March 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: You are probably thinking of Arrow's impossibility theorem already mentioned in the article.  It doesn't really apply here (relaunch old debate) because it assumes individual cardinal rather than ordinal rankings, but the list of criteria Range Voting fails (of which the most "fair" may be the majority criterion) should be enough.  --Henrygb 23:11, 13 March 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Proof of no fair voting solution when more than two candidates 

message: The article says that range voting is a system "for one-seat elections." I disagree, because range voting ranks all candidates, the very same ballot could be used in a multi-seat election. The top n ranked candidates would win seats. Am I missing something? maxsch 21:55, 25 October 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  multi seat elections 

message: There is a POV tag on this article, placed by StrengthOfNations probably as an outcome of discussions at Wikipedia:Articles_for_deletion/Range_voting, which had been started by that editor. However, the problem with the article is not a POV problem, necessarily, but the use of sources not acceptable (or at least not fully acceptable) under Wikipedia policies, see WP:SOURCE. This is not a POV dispute, which is a content dispute, and no significant content dispute is apparent from Talk, nor is there any edit war going on. In other words, if an editor disputes content here, the editor is free to fix it instead of placing a POV tag, which should be connected with either a specific dispute -- which should be discussed here for resolution -- or a general characterization of the article as being unbalanced, which, again, should be discussed here so that the nature of the dispute is clear and likewise the remedy.
As an example of a *general* POV dispute, see Instant-runoff voting. The tag there was placed by a user not specifically involved in a content dispute, and specific problems were not asserted as part of the placing of the tag, but, the difference is, editors did confirm the reasonableness of the tag placement, and continue, there, to discuss and negotiate, either directly in Talk or indirectly through a series of edits, the remedy to both specific problems with the article and the overall balance problem. It's a process that takes time.
However, here, there has been no assertion of specific POV problems. I could agree that there is an overall balance problem, but the solution to that *in the absence of specific problems* would be to begin to add balancing material. Given that no attempt to do that has appeared either from the editor placing the tag or anyone else, I plan to remove the tag. *However*, any editor is free to put it back, and, if this is accompanied by any sign of an intention to act to remedy either specific problems or an overall balance problem, I would not contest this. I'm only contesting a general placement with no assertion of specific problems and no participation in remedying either them or a general imbalance problem. In that case, it is merely a drive-by shooting, which we must always meet with quick protection of the victim, first, and resolution of any legitimate dispute, later.
In my decision on this, I have also considered the likelihood that StrengthOfNations is a sock puppet or straw puppet (see WP:SOCK), which is reasonably clear to me from Special:Contributions/StrengthOfNations. Because I consider it largely a waste of time to try to *prove* this, at this point, I have not filed the suspicion or a checkuser request, and this consideration alone cannot be used as a counterargument to any edit. Sock puppet contributions, in my opinion, are only to be disregarded, in terms of judging the balance of opinion or the disregard and reversion of clearly meritless edits. Sock puppets may often make good contributions, which is why there is no automated process to remove reversible edits merely on the basis that the user was found to be a sock, and all editors, including suspected sock puppets, have the right of WP:AGF.
In any case, if any editor doesn't like my removal of the POV tag, please, justify its replacement here, preferably with examples of what is wrong with the article, aside from the obvious need for better sourcing, and put it back! (Lots of articles have poor sourcing and are still NPOV, because what is not sourced is still either generally accepted as true or is properly attributed as an opinion.)
--Abd (talk) 02:29, 24 November 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Removal of POV tag 

message: A merge tag has been placed in this article, proposing a merge with Allocation voting. This would be a blatant error: Range and Allocation voting are quite different methods, quite the same as Approval is different from Plurality. Allocation voting *is* similar to (or identical with) Cumulative voting. So, if no objection appears here in short order -- the merge proposer did not start a discussion; the proposer is an obvious sock puppet (see Special:Contributions/Yellowbeard and look at the registration of the account and then the immediate activity) who has been, for a long time, acting to kill voting systems articles (with AfDs and, now, directly) -- I plan to remove the tag.
--Abd (talk) 19:46, 15 December 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  [[Allocation voting]] merge? 

message: This article states: Guy Ottewell, who coined the term approval voting, now endorses...
The Approval voting article states The system was described in 1976 by Guy Ottewell and also by Robert J. Weber, who coined the term "approval voting."
Who coined the term "approval voting," Guy Ottewell or Robert J. Weber?  One of these articles is wrong.
Geoffrey.landis (talk) 03:22, 1 September 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: Could be awkward grammar: '(by Guy Ottewell and also by Robert J. Weber), who coined the term "approval voting."'  You might also look to whether the "also" section was added afterwards, without consideration of the coining issue. GreenReaper (talk) 05:39, 18 January 2013 (UTC)
thread_title: Guy Ottewell

message: Is there any good way to contact the guy behind RangeVote.net? --AB (talk) 22:19, 21 November 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  RangeVote.net 

message: This phrase in the article is quite misleading: " Range voting systems (including Approval voting), unlike any more commonly-used voting systems, give no reason to ever dishonestly rank a less-preferred candidate over a more-preferred one." It doesn't give an incentive to rank a less-preferred candidate OVER a more-prefered one," but it mostly certainly creates an incentive to rank such a candidate EQUALLY in trying to defeat a least-preferred candidate. This would be an ongoing dilemma if this system were ever used.
Note that the main strategic issue would be backers of candidates giving minimal support to other candidates while hoping that less savvy voters will give some degree of support to more than their most preferred candidate.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 72.83.213.24 (talk) 16:54, 11 June 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: I believe I've addressed this issue. Homunq (talk) 14:31, 12 June 2009 (UTC)
thread_title:  new comments on strategy/advocacy are misleading 

message: I removed the advertising copy for the Center for Range Voting and attempted to restore a neutral tone to this section. I wonder though, why is this section here at all? Other Electoral Methods articles do not include an Advocacy section. Links to the advocacy sites are already included as External links, indeed at the top of the list, so all this section really adds to the article is the statement that no elected official endorses this method. Yappy2bhere (talk) 21:10, 8 January 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Advocacy 

message: I tagged the statement that the Spartan "shout" is equivalent to range voting as original research. The New York Times article cited to support the statement is about social fragmentation on the Internet. The Spartan "Shout" was introduced as analogous to the deterioration of Internet discussions into name-calling, rants, and flaming, an example of an "impoverished form of democracy." There is no mention of range voting or any other voting system. Though it's a very colorful addition to the article lead, it's inaccurate per its cited source and must go. Yappy2bhere (talk) 22:00, 8 January 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: I also agree this is a poor example.  Might be better later in the article or just leave it on rangevoting.org 71.167.65.155 (talk) 23:07, 11 December 2016 (UTC)
thread_title:  Article lead 

message: It was discussed in the book Gaming the Vote by William Poundstone. I point this out, because in the article there was a question as to this piece of info's origin. I believe he was quoting someone else also, but I don't remember whom. HighbulpIII (talk) 08:12, 2 March 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Nursery Effect 

message: I'm considering moving the article to Score voting; I'll tell you why. The major sources have been shifting to refer to the system this way. Electology does, and now even Rangevoting.org:
:There's a better way: score voting (also known as "range voting").
:You've all seen score voting in action as the Olympic scoring system...
Also, perhaps there should be an Etymology section. The lede is heavy with boldface.
– RVJ (talk) 02:04, 10 December 2011 (UTC)
replies: text: The following is a closed discussion of a requested move. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on the talk page. Editors desiring to contest the closing decision should consider a move review. No further edits should be made to this section. 
The result of the move request was: Not moved. No consensus established.  -- Dane talk  04:54, 6 February 2017 (UTC)

text: Range voting →  – Agree Electology and rangevoting.org both seem to prefer "score" over "range", and it sounds less like "ranked" 71.167.65.224 (talk) 00:32, 19 January 2017 (UTC)

text: Both terms might be confusing. Scoring doesn't clearly have anything to do with voting, more a term in game playing. We might better call it Rating voting given the counting method is ratings summation.  Tom Ruen (talk) 07:51, 19 January 2017 (UTC)

text: The above discussion is preserved as an archive of a requested move.  Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on this talk page or in a move review. No further edits should be made to this section.
=== Reviving this move request (December 3, 2017) ===
Came to suggest the same move. Both https://electology.org and http://rangevoting.org, two of the biggest advocates for this method, now use the primary name "Score Voting", with "Range Voting" as a secondary name. In my dozens of anecdotal experiences explaining this method to a new audience, they often mishear or confuse "Range" for "Ranked" (which many more people are already familiar with). Strongly advocate we rename this page to Score voting to make the distinction more clear. Again, in my anecdotal experience, the name "Score voting" makes sense to a new audience: "you give each of the different options a score". – dsernst (talk) 15:57, 3 December 2017 (UTC)

text: - I agree. Given that  and  also agree and nobody has objected, I think we can move forward with this. Feel free to move the article (WP:MOVE) or I will in a week or so. But reading the above more carefully -  noted that both are confusing. But Tom did not disagree that score voting might be less confusing than range voting. II | (t - c) 05:57, 26 April 2018 (UTC)
thread_title:  Move to "Score voting" 

message: Came to suggest the same move. Both https://electology.org and http://rangevoting.org, two of the biggest advocates for this method, now use the primary name "Score Voting", with "Range Voting" as a secondary name. In my dozens of anecdotal experiences explaining this method to a new audience, they often mishear or confuse "Range" for "Ranked" (which many more people are already familiar with). Strongly advocate we rename this page to Score voting to make the distinction more clear. Again, in my anecdotal experience, the name "Score voting" makes sense to a new audience: "you give each of the different options a score". – dsernst (talk) 15:57, 3 December 2017 (UTC)
replies: text: - I agree. Given that  and  also agree and nobody has objected, I think we can move forward with this. Feel free to move the article (WP:MOVE) or I will in a week or so. But reading the above more carefully -  noted that both are confusing. But Tom did not disagree that score voting might be less confusing than range voting. II | (t - c) 05:57, 26 April 2018 (UTC)
thread_title:  Reviving this move request (December 3, 2017) 

message: The excessive use of the "rangevoting.org" page as a source here worries me a bit, since I do not feel like citations to this website on a scientific topic satisfy WP:SCHOLARSHIP, as it is practically just an unreviewed blog-post. I am also not too sure about better citations, though. Jannikp97 (talk) 01:06, 23 February 2024 (UTC)
thread_title:  Sources on this page