Talk:Nuclear weapons of the United States

message: This article was originally meant to be a sub-set article of The United States and weapons of mass destruction, going into detail about the history of the U.S. program and ending with a bit about the current stockpile and delivery system status. I am imagining that articles of this nature could be constructed for all of the main countries on the WMD template, though obviously it takes time to do so (the initial writeup here took about five hours time, a tremendous effort of procrastination). There was previously no page on Wikipedia which unified the historical and current approaches to the U.S.'s endeavor specifically, so it seemed like a worthwhile addition. Any thoughts on improvements and changes would be appreciated; I tried to cite all of the sources for figures I used. 
I would personally like this to be kept as jargon-free as possible (it should be generally accessible to anyone who understands the basics of U.S. history and nuclear weapons, and there are many other sites which try to be extraordinarily comprehensive in such things), but I understand that with this subject such is not always the case (and I may have committed a few abuses myself in this respect). My original text likely has lots of grammatical atrocities in it (such is what happens when I crank out copy), and so I am appreciative of anyone who corrects any you see! 
I have tried to be neutral in my descriptions of things, I apologise to people who feel I should have leaned more one way than the other. --Fastfission 21:22, 12 Jun 2005 (UTC)
replies: text: Well, In particular I was referring to Luis Alvarez, who I'm faily sure was involved in the final assembly for the Fat Man unit. But anyway, you're right, it is a little cheeky, especially since a number of the other people involved in the assemblies never did win such Prizes! --Fastfission 18:04, 13 Jun 2005 (UTC)

message: I made a little infobox for the side. I wondered if anybody objected to it. This seemed like an appropriate article for such a thing -- a brief summary of the basic numbers and dates. I figured that a map of the world was more useful than the flag of the country for something of a military nature. If nobody objects, I'll make it into a generic template, so that it could be used in other articles of a "((Country)) and nuclear weapons" format. --Fastfission 19:18, 13 Jun 2005 (UTC)
replies: text: Somebody changed the image file to a high-res one. It's fixed now. --Fastfission 04:32, 14 June 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Infobox

message: "The debate over the ethical implications of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, begun in private amongst scientists and statesmen during the war, has continued to this day, both in the lay populace and amongst scholars"
Sorry to nitpik, but I find the combination of terms 'lay populace' and 'scholars' rather offensive and patronizing. Why is a view of mass death and destruction segregrated with this description ?
I would replace lay populace with general public and scholars (?) with something more appropriate like military experts, military historians, military strategists. The word scholar has somewhat loaded and outdated overtones of superiority. Also it may not be strictly relevant; the opinon of a "scholar" may not be as informed as that of someone with experience militarily.
:How about, "general public and historians"? "Lay public" isn't meant to be a patronizing term but I don't mind changing it. The point is that it is something in debate both about people casually discussing it and people whose jobs it is to discuss and study such topics. --Fastfission 13:53, 16 July 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  Patronizing words, request change 

message: What about DU weaponry? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 198.54.202.82 (talk • contribs) 
*Depleted uranium weaponry really doesn't have much to do with this page in my view. DU weapons are not nuclear weapons in the slightest. The strongest statements against them are that they might be considered very weak radiological weapons, but even that is a pretty silly thing to say given how weakly radioactive they are (and their radiation is not in the slightest the property which makes them a useful weapon). --Fastfission 14:39, 11 July 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: 69.158.49.111 21:05, 18 September 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: DU

message: I read today the US is reclassifying numbers of missiles from the cold-war era.  Will this impact Wiki in any way, ie government censors coming in here and editing or anything?  I would hope not.
*No, it won't. What this means in practical terms is that when declassifying documents in the future and potentially with documents currently in archives the government is blacking out old stockpile data. That does not mean that they will attempt to curtail previous or even current publication of such data, or estimates of them. There is very little legal precedent for the latter when the sources in question were undeniably in the open literature originally. (Unfortunately for Igor Sutyagin this is not the case in Russia.) In any case if there were policies which sought to censor the public domain Wikipedia would be pretty down the chain of important places to go (since our info just parrots that of other places). --Fastfission 18:32, 21 August 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Reclassification of Cold War Missile Numbers

message: The Yucca Mountain radioactive waste facility is almost exclusively designed to receive the radioactive waste originating from civilian nuclear power plants and used nuclear power reactor fuel.
However, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, which is already in operation in New Mexico, is almost exclusively dedicated to the disposal of radiologically contaminated waste originating from the production of nuclear weapons.
As such, the latter facility should certainly be mentioned in the list of nuclear weapons production related sites in the article, and not Yucca Mountain. AWeishaupt (talk) 19:04, 26 April 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Yucca Mountain 

message: The table under current arsenal is two years out of date. I tired to update it myself but managed to screw up the page formatting so I undid the change. If someone wants to the information is here: http://bos.sagepub.com/content/67/2/66.full.pdf+html. It's the same source just for 2011 and not 2009.
:Changes were made to the table data in Nov 30, 2014, by Abattoir666. There is an HTML comment on the table that it is taken from the article New START, but with the changes even that is no longer true. There must be references on this table to the data. I'm tagging it. SkoreKeep (talk) 22:52, 1 December 2014 (UTC)
thread_title:  Out of date table 

message: Hello fellow Wikipedians,
I have just added archive links to  on Nuclear weapons and the United States. Please take a moment to review my edit. If necessary, add  after the link to keep me from modifying it. Alternatively, you can add  to keep me off the page altogether. I made the following changes:
*Added archive http://web.archive.org/web/20080621075459/http://afp.google.com:80/article/ALeqM5jujIhYgbkZqmcHmmcXzVQiivkwVA to http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5jujIhYgbkZqmcHmmcXzVQiivkwVA
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thread_title:  External links modified 

message: I'm not very good at source editing, so could someone update the link or add a {citation needed}?
EDIT: The first link is also dead.
Thanks, –UserDude 06:28, 6 May 2017 (UTC)
thread_title:  Second citation leads to a dead link 

message: The table headed Operational American strategic nuclear forces, July 1, 2016 in the United States strategic nuclear weapons arsenal section cites https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2016/259273.htm in support. That url redirects to page on the target website which says that the page cannot be found. The 20170808 archive (currently most recent) also leads to a similar page. OK, WP:Linkrot.
The table is as of July 1, 2016. The July 14 archive is not retrievable (). The 20160822 archive is retrievable, but does not agree with the table in the article. A note in the source says that the table will be updated every six months, but the first retrievable archive beyond that six months is the first one to show linkrot.
I've changed the link in the supporting cite to point to the un-rotted 20160822 archive. Since that source does not agree with the table asserted in the article, I've tagged the Ref as . Wtmitchell  (talk) (earlier Boracay Bill) 00:59, 12 January 2018 (UTC)
thread_title:  Operational American strategic nuclear forces, July 1, 2016 

message: The US government had also advocated the "peaceful" uses of nuclear weapons as part of Project Plowshare. This was a program for the development of techniques to use nuclear explosives for peaceful construction purposes. Shot Sedan of Operation Storax in July 1962 (see section on testing, above), was a demonstration testing the feasibility of using nuclear weapons for "civilian" and "peaceful" purposes as part of Operation Plowshare. The aim of the Plowshare program was to generate favorable publicity for and acceptance of nuclear weapons.Energy Commission |page=529 |date=1989 |publisher=University of California Press |location=B>Stone, Oliver and Kuznick, Peter, "The Untold History of the United States" (Gallery Books, 2012), page 283-84 Lewis Strauss, chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, stated that the goal of the Plowshare project was to "highlight the peaceful applications of nuclear explosive devices and thereby create a climate of world opinion that is more favorable to weapons development and tests." "Semiannual report to Congress in January 1958. Other mentions of Strauss making statements in Feb 1958 or hearings being held are on p 447, and 474: Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on Control and Reduction of Armaments, Feb. 28-April 17, 1958, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1958) pp.1336-64.
:This last subsection is excellent and has no problems with POV. loupgarous (talk) 20:48, 15 March 2018 (UTC)
thread_title: Use for civilian purposes

message: The latest 2018 totals provided by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists are at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/figure/10.1080/00963402.2018.1438219?scroll=top&needAccess=true
Can someone update the article to reflect? I have updated the infobox.  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 129.246.254.12 (talk) 17:49, 14 March 2018 (UTC)
thread_title:  Latest 2018 numbers 

message: Reading the "Development History - Post Cold-War" section, I was struck by a few things.
First, the reference to "bunker-busting nukes" lacks proper weight. The George W. Bush administration asked Congress for funds for the bunker-busting nukes, other specialty nuclear weapons and for restoring the National Nuclear Security Administration's capacity to fabricate plutonium pits for life extension of existing weapons such as the W76 on a more rapid basis that the existing small-throughput facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory.  These funds weren't approved by the House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development until the Trump administration's budget requests were approved in 2017-2018.  
The section needs to mention that we were never close to bunker-busting nukes until 2017, with the life-extension program for the B-61 nuclear gravity bomb, because Congress wouldn't pay for them. Even in 2013, the House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development was skeptical about the desirability of that life-extension program.
Second, prior to 2017, the only Post-Cold War changes in the US nuclear arsenal to reach late implementation stages were the 1997 Mod 11 and proposed Mod 12 upgrades to the B-61 nuclear gravity bomb.  These are notable enough changes to the post-Cold War US nuclear arsenal to merit mention:
* The Mod 11 upgrade of the B-61 is able to penetrate several meters into the ground prior to detonation, giving it some bunker-busting capacity.  The limited accuracy of the B-61 (striking from 110-170 meters from its intended target) required it to be set to a 400-kiloton (strategic) yield to reliably damage the structures it was intended to destroy.  About 50 B-61s were modified in this way.
* The Mod 12 upgrade's addition of a JDAM "tail kit" makes the B-61 a "smart bomb" capable of much greater precision (hitting within 30 meters of a target as opposed to the Mod 11's 110-170 meter accuracy) than existing B-61s, and enabling it to be carried internally in F-35 Joint Attack Fighters.  
* The Mod 12 upgrade also allows the B-61-Mod 12 to be set for one-eighth the B-61-Mod 11's nuclear yield (50 kilotons instead of 400 kilotons) with correspondingly lower fallout and collateral civilian damage while still reliably destroying enemy targets. This modification's still in development and is mentioned as part of the future US nuclear arsenal in the US Department of Defense's 2018 Nuclear Posture Review.
Third, Post-Cold War policy on development of new US nuclear weapons and delivery systems has evolved since this section was last edited. 
The US Department of Defense's 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report described a reduction in the role of nuclear weapons in the defense of the United States, declaring "Russia is not an enemy, and is increasingly a partner in confronting proliferation and other emerging threats."  
According to the 2010 nuclear posture review, "In summary, the following principles will guide U.S. nuclear policies:
* The United States will meet its commitment under Article VI of the NPT to pursue nuclear disarmament and will make demonstrable progress over the next five to ten years. 
* We will work to reduce the role and numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons while enhancing security for ourselves, and our allies and partners. 
The Obama administration expanded on that policy in its July 2013 FACT SHEET: Nuclear Weapons Employment Strategy of the United States:"After a comprehensive review of our nuclear forces, the President has determined that we can ensure the security of the United States and our allies and partners and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent while safely pursuing up to a one-third reduction in deployed strategic nuclear weapons from the level established in the New START Treaty.  The U.S. intent is to seek negotiated cuts with Russia so that we can continue to move beyond Cold War nuclear postures."</Blockquote>
The most recent US announcement of policy on development of nuclear weapons, the US Department of Defense's 2018 Nuclear Posture Review describes the current perception of nuclear threats faced by the United States: "While the United States has continued to reduce the number and salience of nuclear weapons, others, including Russia and China, have moved in the opposite direction. They have added new types of nuclear capabilities to their arsenals, increased the salience of nuclear forces in their strategies and plans, and engaged in increasingly aggressive behavior, including in outer space and cyber space. North Korea continues its illicit pursuit of nuclear weapons and missile capabilities in direct violation of United Nations (U.N.) Security Council resolutions. Iran has agreed to constraints on its nuclear program in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Nevertheless, it retains the technological capability and much of the capacity necessary to develop a nuclear weapon within one year of a decision to do so.
There now exists an unprecedented range and mix of threats, including major conventional, chemical, biological, nuclear, space, and cyber threats, and violent nonstate actors. These developments have produced increased uncertainty and risk.
 
This rapid deterioration of the threat environment since the 2010 NPR must now shape our thinking as we formulate policy and strategy, and initiate the sustainment and replacement of U.S. nuclear forces. This 2018 NPR assesses previous nuclear policies and requirements that were established amid a more benign nuclear environment and more amicable Great Power relations. It focuses on identifying the nuclear policies, strategy, and corresponding capabilities needed to protect America in the deteriorating threat environment that confronts the United States, allies, and partners. It is strategy driven and provides guidance for the nuclear force posture and policy requirements needed now and in the future."  
The boldfacing in that quote is mine, and indicates where US emphasis on development of new nuclear weapons has changed since the prior administration.  Further in the 2018 NPR, there's repeated emphasis on "sustainment and replacement of U.S. nuclear forces", which includes new nuclear delivery systems such as the Long Range Stand-Off nuclear cruise missile for carriage on the B-52 strategic bomber, replacement of the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine with the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, and replacement of the Minuteman III (LGM-30G) land-based ICBM with a new land-based ICBM, the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent.
The 2018 NPR specifically mentions the development of low-yield "non-strategic" nuclear weapons to counter Russian deployment of such weapons to support its stated policy of first use of small nuclear weapons in non-nuclear conflicts:"Enhancing Deterrence with Non-strategic Nuclear Capabilities
Existing elements of the nuclear force replacement program predate the dramatic deterioration of the strategic environment. To meet the emerging requirements of U.S. strategy, the United States will now pursue select supplements to the replacement program to enhance the flexibility and responsiveness of U.S. nuclear forces. It is a reflection of the versatility and flexibility of the U.S. triad that only modest supplements are now required in this much more challenging threat environment.
These supplements will enhance deterrence by denying potential adversaries any mistaken confidence that limited nuclear employment can provide a useful advantage over the United States and its allies. Russia’s belief that limited nuclear first use, potentially including low-yield weapons, can provide such an advantage is based, in part, on Moscow’s perception that its greater number and variety of non-strategic nuclear systems provide a coercive advantage in crises and at lower levels of conflict. Recent Russian statements on this evolving nuclear weapons doctrine appear to lower the threshold for Moscow’s first-use of nuclear weapons. Russia demonstrates its perception of the advantage these systems provide through numerous exercises and statements. Correcting this mistaken Russian perception is a strategic imperative."
This indicates that the future US nuclear arsenal will include ways of effectively delivering small-yield nuclear weapons in order to create a proportional nuclear deterrent to use of small nuclear weapons by other nations. The stated goal of adding this capacity is to keep the "nuclear threshold" high enough to deter use of nuclear weapons at any yield level.
I don't want to add all of the above material to my proposed changes to this section of our article, but to present enough information here in the talk page to give other editors an idea of how post-Cold War US nuclear weapons development policy has evolved. I hope we can get discussion started so that our article represents a consensus on the topic of post-Cold War US nuclear weapons development policy.
My change would be along the lines of "We went from seeking bunker-busters (comparatively low-yield precision-delivered nuclear weapons to destroy hardened enemy command and control bunkers) to a policy of reducing the nation's total nuclear arsenal, and most recently back to a policy of deterring a range of nuclear threats to the United States by widening the range of flexible responses available to the National Command Authority", with citations to document each point. --loupgarous (talk) 19:16, 19 April 2018 (UTC)
thread_title:  "Development History - Post Cold-War" section needs updating 

message: The table in this section seems helpful but is actually a bit confusing. Why are vehicles, warheads and launchers totalled together? Isn't this double-counting or is there a reason relevant to the treaty? What about other launchers, if any? Is there comparable data for other countries? 2600:1700:6530:2F00:C99E:7183:1077:9E51 (talk) 18:22, 1 January 2023 (UTC)
replies: text: The source explains it. New START Treaty in 2011 between USA & Russia defined respective limits of 700, 1550 and 800 pieces of equipment for both USA & Russia. As to why exactly these equipment categories were agreed upon you must ask Medvedev and Obama.--J. Sketter (talk) 16:22, 15 January 2024 (UTC)
thread_title:  United States strategic nuclear weapons arsenal 

message: The diagram shows under "First Fission Bombs" the "Fat Man" as Mk IV (1945) but the first Fat Man (1945) was "Mark III", replaced by Mark IV (Mark 4 nuclear bomb) in 1949. Hugo999 (talk) 23:21, 7 April 2023 (UTC)
thread_title:  Diagram 

message: There is a move discussion in progress on Talk:France and weapons of mass destruction which affects this page. Please participate on that page and not in this talk page section. Thank you.  —RMCD bot 00:31, 6 December 2023 (UTC)
thread_title:  Move discussion in progress