Talk:Instant-runoff voting controversies

message: Ideally, of course, there would be a simple voting system that is as good as a Condorcet method.  Range voting or Approval voting may be such a system, depending on how you define 'simple' and 'good'.  (Range voting, for instance, is simple for the people counting, but the most complex for the voter.)  All known Condorcet methods are more complex than IRV- and if the average voter doesn't understand the underlying mathematics, how can he trust his vote?  
Approximate ordering of a few systems based on 4 criteria
Simplicity for voter (debated): 
Plurality>(IRV\Approval)>(most other ranked ballots)>Range voting
Simplicity for vote counting: 
Plurality>Approval>Range voting=Borda>IRV>(most other ranked ballots)
Quality of results (very hotly debated*): 
(Condorcet methods\Range Voting)>(IRV\Borda\Approval)>Plurality
Fewest problems with tactical voting (also hotly debated): 
Approval>IRV=Condorcet>Range Voting>Borda>Plurality
If your goal is the best results, Condorcet or Range is the way to go.  If your goal is good results voters can understand, Approval or IRV is the way to go.  If your goal is simplest fair voting possible, Plurality is the way to go.  People shouldn't be arguing about voting systems, people should be arguing about what the most important goals of voting systems are.  For instance, some systems are more likely to elect moderates than others- whether this is a bug or a feature seems to depend on how much you like moderates.  Paladinwannabe2 19:12, 15 October 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: General ranting about voting systems, and the people who argue about them

message: I've started to reorganize this page; unfortunately, it's a bigger job than I could do in one session. I think the plan is reasonably clear. What I've done is to take an argument and then discuss it. I'm a critic of IRV, so I may well be better at criticizing pro-IRV arguments than I am at supporting them, but I've attempted to acknowledge what is true about the arguments.
As an article about controversies, it is not necessary that arguments presented here be true; but they should be sourced. This is an example where the standards of evidence are reduced; it is sufficient, for an argument to be an argument actually being made, that ... someone is actually making it! While it is conceivable that we could accept the minimal standard that someone makes it here, that is, in my view, not adequate. I'm not making up arguments; rather, I'm attempting to present arguments that I have actually encountered being made by proponents and critics. Any argument found on the FairVote site or the Center for Range Voting site would, for example, qualify.
I only presented Pro arguments, which naturally bring up *some* con arguments, but other Con arguments are not rooted in refuting a Pro argument. For example, simulations have shown that average Bayesian Regret is relatively high with Instant Runoff Voting compared to a number of different reforms (Bayesian Regret is pretty much the inverse of, in this case, average Voter Satisfaction with the outcome.) So this would be a Con argument that would be presented as such, with, then, the discussion pointing out the controversy over Bayesian regret as a standard for measuring election method performance, the alleged bias of the researcher, etc. Another related argument would be election performance as shown by Yee diagrams, which, by the way, make pretty pictures.... When someone attempted to add a Yee diagram reference to the IRV article, it was nixed by the edit cabal that was functioning at the time on the basis that the publication was not peer-reviewed; however, there is, in fact, fairly wide acceptance among election methods students of Yee diagrams as a tool for comparing election methods. Yee diagrams would be appropriate for this article, because they *are* being used as arguments against IRV, even though they, in themselves, are merely a graphical display of mathematical results, they aren't arguments.
If we can bring this article up to speed, we can then remove the Pro and Con sections from the Instant Runoff Voting article. One of the problems with Pro and Con bullets is that misleading arguments can easily be communicated that way. I attempted to reduce the problem with warning language in the IRV article, but that was, of course, taken out.
That language was intended to avoid repeating over and over again with each claim "Proponents claim that ....", thus making the bullet points simpler and easier to understand, while still framing it all as arguments, not facts.
Abd 04:39, 16 October 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Reorganization of page begun 

message: http://www.fairvote.org/?page=1165&articlemode=showspecific&showarticle=831
Some editors -- in this case anonymous, it would be appreciated if editors identify themselves -- may be confused by the normal Wikipedia practice of being conservative with regard to claims. This is an article about a political controversy, not directly about pure facts (i.e., objective fact other than the fact of an argument being made by someone in some significant way). Political activists don't use weasel words unless they are attempting to put argument into Wikipedia!
We need to either discover existing policy about how to present controversy, or develop new policy. The round outlines are fairly clear to me.
In any case, this article is not about Instant Runoff Voting, but about the *controversy* over it. That controversy includes political polemic and puffery on all sides. I've never seen the argument that "Instant Runoff Voting will eat American babies," but this is sometimes the tone from some critics....
We would not include, here, arguments that are:
(1) made by an isolated writer with no evidence that this writer is influential.
(2) straw men set up by those who actually oppose the supposed implication of the argument.
My intention in listing Pro arguments what that these be arguments actually being made, in public, and thus verifiable even though I have not yet provided sources, by proponents of Instant Runoff Voting. There are isolated proponents who make preposterous arguments; I would not include these. But the argument here is actually being made, and not just by anyone, but by Rob Richie, Executive Director of FairVote, in a prominent newspaper.
Is the argument true? Of course not, not if we insist on the literal and absolute meaning. It will not "end" the spoiler effect, but, as I wrote, it is not controversial that it will reduce it. In other words, the *substance* of Richie's claim is relatively true, as is commonly accepted in political puffery. When we get to details, that is perhaps another matter.
Abd 13:22, 16 October 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: This is a rather bizarre article - Why not rename it to: "Why all argument points in favor of IRV are wrong"? Tom Ruen 02:11, 18 October 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: It seems to be making some progress. Captain Zyrain 02:56, 18 October 2007 (UTC)

text: That's the argument my delegate used in reference to IRV. He wrote, "I'll take a look at it. But my first impression is that it may deprive voter of time for another look at the two remaining candidates. Sometimes run-offs sharpen the debate. Frankly, I think our system runs well now. Do you have an example of where it hasn't worked well in Virginia?" I would say the "if it ain't broke..." argument could also have been used to oppose the 17th Amendment to the US Constitution, since appointment of Senators by legislatures produced such legendary senators as Henry Clay, who greatly influenced Abraham Lincoln. Captain Zyrain 15:49, 18 October 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  "Instant runoff would end spoiler effect in elections." 

message: Some point to the fact that most elections in the U.S. use plurality voting, and voters seem to accept plurality winners as legitimate. The fact that some revered leaders, such as Abraham Lincoln did not receive a majority of the vote is sometimes mentioned. Others argue that a voting method that allows a candidate to win who is the LEAST favorite choice of a majority of voters (as is the case with plurality voting) is a disaster waiting to happen, and that majority rule should be a bedrock of our democracy. Plurality voting also increases the likelihood of "spoiler" scenarios, with all that that entails.
:That's the argument my delegate used in reference to IRV. He wrote, "I'll take a look at it. But my first impression is that it may deprive voter of time for another look at the two remaining candidates. Sometimes run-offs sharpen the debate. Frankly, I think our system runs well now. Do you have an example of where it hasn't worked well in Virginia?" I would say the "if it ain't broke..." argument could also have been used to oppose the 17th Amendment to the US Constitution, since appointment of Senators by legislatures produced such legendary senators as Henry Clay, who greatly influenced Abraham Lincoln. Captain Zyrain 15:49, 18 October 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: '''Anti:''' "If it ain't broke don't fix it" or "Plurality Voting is Good Enough" 

message: I mention above that I might be casting a jaundiced eye at this series of edits, but it looks to me like both editors were really working well to attain NPOV statements of the arguments, I couldn't find one single problem insert or removal. In some cases, additional argument might need to be added to be fully balanced, but nothing seemed incomplete. If, however, someone who really believes the "one person, one vote" con argument shows up, we might see some more cogent argument for that. In fact, it seems to be that I've come across some argumentation on this point that was more cogent than what was presented. (Because IRV does, in some implementations, completely discount ballots containing only votes for eliminated candidates, there is a bit of loss of one-person, one-vote in that. I didn't make up this argument!) But this is fine for now!
We are indeed making progress. My wonder now is that User:Tomruen felt it necessary to complain with that sarcastic header! (I'm mainly jealous for lack of time to play. Tom Ruen 18:06, 18 October 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Thanks to Tbouricius and Tomruen for a very helpful series of edits. 

message: I suppose a strategy of good leaders is to set a bad example to inspire others with higher standards to clean things up. Well, I'm caught. Hopeless to do anything but near-full rewrites of two sections. At least I believe my content is sound, even if wording and inability to step back from technical details that obscures perspective means I'm also leaving lots of room for clean up. Tom Ruen 23:31, 23 October 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: You can always put up some cleanup tags to alert editors of the need for cleanup. See Wikipedia:Template messages/Cleanup. StrengthOfNations 06:43, 15 November 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Bad to less bad? 

message: Earlier today, I rewrote two of the Pro argument sections, in one case to expand and in the other to replace a convoluted argument about "Condorcet" that I have never seen from pro-IRV advocates with one which is actually being promoted, the Core Support argument. An anonymous editor reverted that, and also added slightly more coherent argument that was still poorly written and still not, to me, actually intelligible. I don't have a lot of tolerance for IP editors who use reverts to insist upon the text without discussion, hence I have reverted those changes.
If any editor thinks that what I put in was irrelevant or inappropriate for the article, then it would be a courtesy to discuss the reasons here before removing material, especially sourced material (the article badly needs better sourcing). Since the Condorcet argument was poorly expressed, not sourced, and also unfamiliar -- I've been following IRV arguments for quite some time -- I don't think it is ready for this article now, and perhaps ever. But, again, if anyone disagrees, by all means, discuss it here.
However, this article is not a place to develop novel theories about election methods. It is about actual controversies, not original research, and is only unsourced at this point where arguments are familiar or very clear and the work to source them has not been done yet.
The diffs for my reverts are [http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Controversies_regarding_instant-runoff_voting&diff=173619856&oldid=173613873 and  --Abd (talk) 04:25, 25 November 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Pro arguments. 

message: http://zesty.ca/voting/sim/ has some useful visualizations demonstrating the myriad problems with instant runoff voting.  These are probably the best illustration of voting system results in practice.  Users have removed these links because they say they do not understand them - this is unhelpful.  Please do not remove material just because it doesn't make sense to you. - McCart42 (talk) 22:01, 4 December 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Sorry, that was me. To me they were lacking in explanation, so were unhelpful. I found the text explanation (which was in the reference I added) much more helpful. But if others think that the pictures genuinely explain the problem then sure, they can stay in. Peter Ballard (talk) 23:06, 4 December 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  Not wanting to be a bad guy since I think the visualizations are cool, and I appreciate all thoughtful sources myself, but Wikipedia:Verifiability#Self-published_sources_.28online_and_paper.29. Tom Ruen (talk) 23:49, 4 December 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  The author of the link in question was contacted for a published review for the state of California on electronic voting machines.   The visualizations are notable, and the author's credibility is established by publications in the very similar field. - McCart42 (talk) 13:48, 5 December 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Do not remove visualizations! 

message: * It seems rather strange to link to [] which was BASED off an older version of Wikipedia's IRV article! Tom Ruen (talk) 20:57, 12 December 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  wiki.electorama.com/wiki 

message: For juicey senseless quotes against IRV, great website of opinions and disinformation to quote! Yay! http://www.mnvoters.org/IRV.htm Of course the Minnesota Voters Alliance may yet only exist as a single person, but that's democracy right? No wait, there's at least five people, two with PhDs! http://www.mnvoters.org/About%20Us.htm  Seriously, I do agree with their position that eliminating the primary is a bad idea, that reducing the field is an important quality of primaries. [Tom Ruen wrote this, comment added by Abd]
:Yes. Some of the arguments there are, shall we say, weak. However, they are worth looking at.
:Part of the problem is that FairVote has made a lot of arguments available that are just as misleading. There definitely is a problem in Minnesota for any kind of alternative vote, contrary to the propaganda. While FairVote is contending that Brown v. Smallwood only applies to Bucklin because of the Approval-like aspect of Bucklin, that analysis seems based on only a small part of the decision. It appears that BvS is negating any kind of alternative vote, and there has been recent legal opinion to that effect.
:What will happen when IRV hits the fan in Minnesota? It's not clear to me. The just outcome would be that Brown v. Smallwood is reversed, period, which would open the door for IRV *and* Approval or Bucklin in Minnesota. The reasoning in BvS is clearly defective and was contrary to prevailing legal opinion at the time, I don't think there is any particular peculiarity in the Minnesota Constitution that prohibits either method. The argument of "impairment" is phony from start to finish. However, there are two other possibilities:
:(1) Brown v. Smallwood is confirmed. Tough luck, Minneapolis. I'm hoping that voting reform activists, including those opposed to IRV, will help prevent this outcome. While my opinion is that IRV is defective in many ways, it is not more defective than what we have as a standard, and it is an improvement in some ways, albeit an expensive one. The decision should be up to the voters, and IRV does not violate one-person, one-vote, not in any clear way that should make it unconstitutional. (There are, in some implementations, problems with majority failure, but that's another issue, and plurality is worse in this respect.)
:(2)Brown v. Smallwood is overturned, but only with respect to the alternative vote with sequential elimination, approval-style simultaneous comparison of votes for multiple candidates remains illegal. Terrible outcome, and likewise not supported by legal opinion anywhere. Except in opinions issued by FairVote activists.
:--Abd (talk) 19:56, 24 December 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  IRV critics in Minnesota 

message: I'm not claimng that the section is perfect, for sure, it still contains some disputable statements that are not explicit from the sources, but I also wouldn't object to those being taken out. If someone takes something out and I think it should be there, it's up to me to provide sourcing. Meanwhile, for some reason, though we did discuss sources above, they didn't make it into the article. I've fixed that, and found another, for this section. And there is more that can be found. In particular, some of the Minnesota sources go into other arguments about IRV, including the monotonicity failure, etc. I took out the tag, which was originally placed by a sock puppet of a banned user, User:MilesAgain. --Abd (talk) 23:32, 20 May 2008 (UTC)
thread_title: taking out the disputed tag from this section

message: Currently the article is just a couple pro and con lists. Wikipedia policy states that this sort of split should be avoided. For example, there can be a spoiler effect section that addresses all the arguments in a neutral manner. --Explodicle (talk) 17:42, 13 May 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: It might seem so. Actually, "fixing the spoiler effect" is a pro argument, and what is currently called a "spoiler effect" in the con section is actually what's known to voting systems experts as "center squeeze." I've sometimes called it a spoiler effect on steroids, but, in fact, the term "spoiler affect" is really inappropriate for it. So what is two separate pieces now would still be two separate pieces in a better-written article. The article is 'not' just a "couple of lists." What is ignored by this comment is that, yes, arguments are listed, but then each argument is examined in detail. These examinations should be NPOV, with proper sourcing, normal reliable source. Categorization by argument is not the only way to approach this, but, in fact, it is simpler and clearer than what seems to be implied by Explodicle. The arguments presented in the article are really being made, and that should be established with reliable attribution. The difficulty is in the grey area of what is and what is not notable argument, but, as a bottom line, everything in the article should be clearly verifiable. Note that to state that there is an argument that "IRV fixes the spoiler effect" is verified by verifiable attribution, which does *not* establish or show that IRV actually fixes the spoiler effect. Often attribution, for well-known arguments, has been skipped, which is why we all agree, I think, that the article needs work! (Plus POV material has crept into the article. The overall plan of the article is not POV.) --Abd (talk) 03:38, 14 May 2008 (UTC)

text: Ok, whatever. --Explodicle (talk) 14:02, 14 May 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Segregated sections 

message: This article is about a controversy, and in particular about arguments being presented in the political arena in favor of or opposed to the implementation of Instant-runoff voting. Generally, advocacy groups present arguments on their own web sites, and, if the organization is notable in its field, may be reliable source for a statement that the argument is being made. In putting together this article, as well as in the main article, advocacy organizations have not been -- or should not have been -- used as sources for fact, other than the fact of an argument being made. Originally, in the IRV article, the Pro and Con section consisted only of arguments stated in few words, without sources at all, like "Fixes the spoiler effect," or "Reduces negative campaigning," and without any examination of these claims based on what is available from reliable source, or comparison with counterclaims. Some of that has crept into this article, and it will take some work to remove this or properly source it.
There are charges in the current AfD that this article is a POV fork, i.e., a fork of the article designed to express a particular POV. However, which POV would this be? I've just started going over the article and find some FairVote argument inserted, for example, referenced to FairVote, presented as fact and not attributed. I.e., instead of the original plan that arguments were presented (and attributed, which could be to notable advocacy sites or sources), but the discussion of the arguments would be strictly NPOV, with reliable source required, POV sourcing for *fact* has been inserted. Is this a pro-IRV POV fork or an anti-IRV POV fork. Actually, it is neither, but there are pieces which have, to some extent, become one or the other.
In any case, there is quite a bit of material in the article which is not properly sourced. I'm familiar with the topic, and much of it *can* be sourced, it's simply that sources weren't originally added, or, I suspect, some sources have been removed where an editor believed the source was improper, which, with an article like this, in some cases, may have been incorrect. The nominator for the AfD seemed to think that the Center for Range Voting couldn't be used as a source for anything, and that is not true. Generally, it cannot be used as a source for fact, but sometimes might be appropriate as a source for argument, or, in one case, hosts a readily available copy of the Minnesota decision, Brown v. Smallwood, which is quite relevant and not so easily obtained elsewhere. (the URL, if used, would be to the Brown v. Smallwood page, not to Center for Range Voting discussion of it, as to reliable source, though argument from that source *might* be cited as argument, if notable.
--Abd (talk) 03:28, 14 May 2008 (UTC)
thread_title: About the use of advocacy groups as sources for this article.

message: Edits to Wikipedia, from the IP range of 87.112-87.115, when connected in some way with me or certain other editors, have always been edits from User:Fredrick day, blocked for incivility. He follows my contributions, and, I assume, when he saw my comments in the AfD for this article, he jumped in. I'm generally more free with reverts of IP edits, particularly when they come from such an identifiable source. Some admins have removed edits from Fd on sight, as have I, and the only time it caused any fuss was when the edits were, essentially, a trap: he removed allegedly unsourced material from articles on porn stars. The nature of the material would cause someone who didn't research it to think that it was improper for a biography of a living person....
Now, as to the edits. I've just reverted his removal of sourcing for arguments to the Center for Range Voting (http://rangevoting.org). This is certainly a notable organization critical of instant-runoff voting. Note that the nominator of the AfD himself referred to it as a prominent critical organization. There used to be an article on it, but back in 2006, the same editor who previously nominated this article ("controversies"...), who was an SPA dedicated to AfDing articles relevant to election methods, showing blatant sock characteristics, though the master hasn't been identified, successfully AfD'd it, as one of his first edits. It probably was not sufficiently notable then. It is now, see Gaming the Vote, by William Poundstone.
CRV has collected and presents many of the arguments against IRV; it is, itself, prima facie evidence that the arguments are being advanced, but it is better if other sources be used if they can be found, as they generally can. Those writing this article referenced the Center for convenience. Further, with election methods, many facts are well-known, they are like reporting that A plus B equals C, when anyone can verify it by learning how the method works and looking at sample elections, so a lot of the basic facts about IRV and other methods are tricky to source. It can be done, and should. --Abd (talk) 15:06, 15 May 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  edits to this article by a block-evading sock of [[User:Fredrick day]] 

message: In the current AfD, it was written, It should be noted that most of the "CON" arguments apply to any voting method, so, even if they were sourced, they shouldn't apply to this article or the parent article.  — Arthur Rubin  (talk) 22:23, 18 May 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: Non-montonicity occurs in any system other than simple weighted voting.  I seem to recall a theorem to that effect.  What distinguishes IRV with non-I RV? — Arthur Rubin  (talk) 03:21, 21 May 2008 (UTC)

text: An editor, without discussion here, removed a link added to the article to aid in reader understanding. That wasn't inserted as a source, but because an article exists which covers the topic. However, the statement about Condorcet methods was incorrect. I'll remove it, but restore the link and see if I can find, also, a source to put in both articles. It's well-known, by the way. This isn't controversial; the debate over it centers over how commonly it occurs, not over it being possible.--Abd (talk) 14:28, 21 May 2008 (UTC)

text: Actually, this whole section is thoroughly confused, and it led me into that as well. There is the Condorcet criterion, which IRV fails, and that's related to center squeeze. By definition Condorcet methods satisfy the Condorcet criterion. There is Favorite Betrayal, which is a separate issue, and which should have a separate Con section. I'll try to fix the current section today. For starters, wrong heading. Robert's Rules of Order calls it a failure to find a compromise winner, as I wrote above, so the section, renamed, will probably use that language. I'm going to take the whole section out, pending.--Abd (talk) 14:40, 21 May 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Do the CON arguments in this article apply to "any voting method"? 

message: This is failure of the monotonicity criterion. For starters, see monotonicity criterion for a list of methods which satisfy and those which fail. IRV is unusual in failing. --Abd (talk) 21:47, 20 May 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: Non-montonicity occurs in any system other than simple weighted voting.  I seem to recall a theorem to that effect.  What distinguishes IRV with non-I RV? — Arthur Rubin  (talk) 03:21, 21 May 2008 (UTC)
thread_title: With IRV, voting for a candidate can cause the candidate to lose

message: This one is stated in a bit of a confused and confusing manner, and, as with much of the article, it was laid out to be a skeleton to be cleaned up with sources. The sources abound. The "spoiler effect" is not the correct word, that is synthetic. What should be here is what is known as "center squeeze." Robert's Rules calls it a failure to find a "compromise winner." IRV does ordinarily solve the spoiler effect, which refers specifically to a situation where there is a minor party with no chance of winning, itself. The problem happens under IRV when a third party rises to parity. IRV becomes very erratic, and can elect, under those conditions, a candidate who is opposed by two-thirds of the electorate, with just three candidates in the race. With more candidates, running neck and neck, it can be even worse. This is, of course, a rare situation. And apparently IRV acts to help prevent it from happening, by effectively suppressing third parties. At least that is how one line of argument goes. The point, though, is that center squeeze doesn't happen with any Condorcet method, nor does it happen with Range voting, Approval voting, or Bucklin voting. --Abd (talk) 21:47, 20 May 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: An editor, without discussion here, removed a link added to the article to aid in reader understanding. That wasn't inserted as a source, but because an article exists which covers the topic. However, the statement about Condorcet methods was incorrect. I'll remove it, but restore the link and see if I can find, also, a source to put in both articles. It's well-known, by the way. This isn't controversial; the debate over it centers over how commonly it occurs, not over it being possible.--Abd (talk) 14:28, 21 May 2008 (UTC)

text: Actually, this whole section is thoroughly confused, and it led me into that as well. There is the Condorcet criterion, which IRV fails, and that's related to center squeeze. By definition Condorcet methods satisfy the Condorcet criterion. There is Favorite Betrayal, which is a separate issue, and which should have a separate Con section. I'll try to fix the current section today. For starters, wrong heading. Robert's Rules of Order calls it a failure to find a compromise winner, as I wrote above, so the section, renamed, will probably use that language. I'm going to take the whole section out, pending.--Abd (talk) 14:40, 21 May 2008 (UTC)
thread_title: IRV suffers from the spoiler effect

message: This *charge* is made against every voting system reform, but it's only true for a few. The exact meaning of the "one person one vote mandate" isn't clear, which explains the ambiguities. However, IRV counts some votes and doesn't count others, and some have argued that this is a violation of 1p1v. IRV advocates have argued that Bucklin violates this mandate, and that is one interpretation of Brown v. Smallwood, though one rejected by independent legal authorities I've seen, and by analogy this could apply to all preferential voting systems. Nobody, though, has raised this argument against Plurality, nor against top-two runoff. --Abd (talk) 21:47, 20 May 2008 (UTC)
thread_title: IRV violates the one person one vote mandate

message: This argument obviously does not apply to plurality, but also not to top-two runoff; it's a general status-quo argument, and is actually seen. Here is an interesting fact, expect to see some reliable source on this soon. (The data is easy to find and confirm, but the conclusions haven't been published yet, to my knowledge, though they are blatantly obvious.) In all 9 IRV elections in the U.S. which went to runoff rounds, the frontrunner in the first round won the election. And the runner-up was still the runner-up. No exceptions. However, in one out of three top-two runoff elections held in the same places prior to IRV, the runner-up in the primary won the runoff. We *could* conclude from this that IRV is usually reproducing the results of Plurality and not normally coming close to changing them, so ... if it ain't broke, don't fix it. Plurality is good enough, would be the argument. And it is the argument. I don't claim that, by the way. Plurality is broken, but if it were very expensive to fix it, and IRV is very expensive, plus unreliable under certain conditions, I'd say, indeed, stick with Plurality. It usually works. Every one of the 23 elections that have taken place with IRV since 2004, Plurality would almost certainly have produced the same result. But, of course, this is debatable. The point here is that, no, this argument does not apply to all voting systems. There is one reform that is blindingly simple that it's a wonder we didn't implement it long ago. Just Count All the Votes. Which is a good idea in any case. --Abd (talk) 21:47, 20 May 2008 (UTC)
thread_title: "if it ain't broke don't fix it" or "plurality voting is good enough"

message: This is, again, obviously not an argument applicable to all voting systems. Here is source for it: australianpolitics.com This is not an advocacy site. It takes a neutral point of view (at least on this topic, I haven't read the rest of it). It gives, as an advantage of "the preferential system" -- which is we call "instant runoff voting" here, "It promotes a strong two-party system, ensuring stability in the parliamentary process." And as a disadvantage it gives "It promotes a two-party system to the detriment of minor parties and independents."
Yet we see the opposite arguments also. When IRV was thrashed in Ann Arbor, after one election where the Democrat won due to the single IRV election that was held, an argument made was that IRV would destroy the two-party system. And some third parties in the U.S. similarly argue that IRV will help them. But the general opinion among election experts is that IRV does, in fact, stabilize a two-paty system. The Republicans who ran the campaign against Ann Arbor IRV probably did not understand this, though I'm pretty sure their real motive was to win some more elections. And there are a few prominent supporters of third parties who have apparently realized that IRV isn't so great for them after all.
Does this argument apply to all voting systems? Probably not. The biggest problem facing third parties, though, is single-winner elections. The ultimate goal of FairVote is proportional representation, and this is where FairVote and most election experts do agree. The STV method, when used for proportional representation, especially with large districts, does allow third parties more effective participation. The Range Voting people generally think that Range Voting, while it obviously won't give minor parties election wins, will free the public to accurately express their support for third parties without risking a spoiler effect. And there is some evidence for this, whether or not it could be put in this article is another matter. --Abd (talk) 21:47, 20 May 2008 (UTC)
thread_title: IRV will help preserve the two-party system

message: None of the arguments apply to "all voting systems." --Abd (talk) 21:47, 20 May 2008 (UTC)
thread_title: Summary

message: As I noted in the AfD, much of the "debate" (if adequately sourced) could be rewritten without much difficulty to discuss relative "pros and cons" of various (single-winner) voting systems, and placed in a general article about choices of voting systems.  — Arthur Rubin  (talk) 19:01, 21 May 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Yet another merge proposal