Talk:Empiricism/Archive 2

message: JA: It is incorrect to describe pragmatism as a form of empiricism.  It is better to see it as a philosophy that integrates the basic insights of empirical (experience-based) and rational (concept-based) thinking without going overboard in either direction.  Although Peirce severely criticized many elements of Descartes' peculiar brand of rationalism, he did not reject rationalism outright.  Indeed, he concurred with the main ideas of rationalism, namely, (1) the idea that rational concepts can be meaningful, (2) the idea that rational concepts necessarily go beyond the data given, and (3) he drew some of the same conclusions about the possibility of innate or instinctual ideas.  In later years he even emphasized the concept-driven side of things, in part to counterbalance the excesses to which some of his cohorts had taken pragmatism under the data-driven banner.  Jon Awbrey 18:16, 3 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: OK, duly noted Jon, thanks. Will remove that now...Kenosis 18:33, 3 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Jon, perhaps no one noticed the recent history of this article, in which a number of sections made up out of nothing-- thin air-- had been left here for long periods of time leading up to this current push by Lacatosias, Amerindianarts and myself to get something that is useful in here.  Thanks for the correction on that...Kenosis 18:40, 3 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Jon, I have added some material pretty much verbatim to your 1,2,3 points above.  The way you summarize is quite consistent with his 1877 and 1878 articles, his 1903 lectures, and his other presentations on the issue.  If necessary, this material can be sourced and referenced as we go farther forward with this article...Kenosis 19:34, 3 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Empiricism, Rationalism, Pragmatism

message: ===Historiographic studies===
Within historiography, empiricism refers to empiricist historiography, a school of documentary interpretation and historical teleology derived from the works of Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886).
===Constructive empiricism===
According to a view of science called constructive empiricism, a term coined by Bas C. van Fraassen (The Scientific Image, 1980), we should ask only that theories accurately describe observable parts of the world. Theories that meet this requirement are considered "empirically adequate". If a theory becomes well established, it should be "accepted", meaning that the theory is believed to be empirically accurate, used to solve further problems, and used to extend or refine the theory.
18:40, 3 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Why should a section on constructive empricism be linked to constructive epistemology. Van Frassen simply claims that theories do not necessarily have to be true in order to be accepted. Constructive epistemology is the claim that all  facts are socially invented (or some such nonsense).--Lacatosias 14:03, 4 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Sections put here for further discussion about placement and content 

message: According to a view of science called constructive empiricism, a term coined by Bas C. van Fraassen (The Scientific Image, 1980), we should ask only that theories accurately describe observable parts of the world. Theories that meet this requirement are considered "empirically adequate". If a theory becomes well established, it should be "accepted", meaning that the theory is believed to be empirically accurate, used to solve further problems, and used to extend or refine the theory.
18:40, 3 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Why should a section on constructive empricism be linked to constructive epistemology. Van Frassen simply claims that theories do not necessarily have to be true in order to be accepted. Constructive epistemology is the claim that all  facts are socially invented (or some such nonsense).--Lacatosias 14:03, 4 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Constructive empiricism

message: JA: The first thing that we have make clear in this article is what we mean by "ism".  There are two popular choices.  One is "nothing-but-ism", where X-ism means that only X matters.  The other is "this-too-ism", where X-ism means that X is an important aspect of the world.  People who use the particle "ism" to mean different things, exclusive versus inclusive, have no chance of agreeing on what isms they favor.  Nothing-but-isms tend to be dogmatic, exclusive, reductive isms.  This-too-isms tend to be heuristic in nature, pointing to features of reality that are often worth paying attention to in particular settings.  Jon Awbrey 18:44, 3 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: I currently imagine, given the prurient focus on Kuhn and Fayerabend that keeps popping up, in addition to many other issues, that Empricism will need to be separated out from its scientific usage and devoted to a separate article in the end...Kenosis 18:48, 3 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: I heartily second that proposal. Empricism is a series of philosphical doctrines'with a clear lineage and clear sets of criticms which need to be dealt with (Quine, Khun, Feyerebaend, Chomsky, etc). Empirical methods in science are matter for another article.--Lacatosias 10:48, 4 April 2006 (UTC)

text: Do you know how to unlink "empirical" from this and create a new article, which can be linked to from Empiricism as appropriate?  It is now plain as day that these two uses do not belong together in the Empiricism article.  I propose instead to link relevant sections and threads to that article and any other relevant articles...Kenosis 19:37, 3 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text:  JA: Changing wikilinks is not so hard.  Changing the neural-semiotic links in the brain-minds of a trillion humans is a bit harder.  The fact is that people use the word "empiricism" to mean both these things, so there's nothing for it but to document the species of usage with the appropriate differentia attached.  Jon Awbrey 13:44, 4 April 2006 (UTC)

text: True, so there should be links between topics, as appropriate.  New article created on "Empirical" for the reason that its current usage is different from the historical philosophic study.  Now as to Phenomenology, that too is a separate topic and should only be briefly referenced and/or described here, with an appropriate link.  What are we supposed to do, discuss Hegel, DeSaussure, Husserl, even Derrida here? We just had a proposal to include more material here on phenomenalist views and phenomenological threads than there is in the current articles on those terms.   At some point it needs to be under control.  This article is mainly about Empiricism, which is primarily a historic philosophic study that basically ends with James and Peirce.  Phenomenalism opens up a can of worms that are best sorted out in that article.  Same with the logical positivists that followed Hume.  Brief mention only, I should think, if at all...Kenosis 20:12, 3 April 2006 (UTC)

text: Empiricism ended with Pierce??? LOOOOOOL!! Give me break. You seem to confuse phenomenalism with phenomenology. These are amost contradictory doctrines. An article that discussed empiricms withput discussing phenomenalism and logical empiricism is not an article on empiricism. It's clear to me your are NOT a philosopher. Am I right or wrong on this?? --Lacatosias 10:48, 4 April 2006 (UTC)

text: And it all starts with the same substance v. attribute conundrum (Emmanuel Kant in this case), which leads in numerous directions, and which always opens up a can of worms on Wikipedia.  You saw which links I left as markers, and obviously chose to take my cue.  This is a cooperative venture currently accessible for editing by upwards of 300 million "English"-speaking persons--surely your expectation was not that I finish the article.  You saw this article before; yet there it all stood just two days ago.   This article was a complete and utter mess. Look through the history: "Naive empiricism" indeed; arguments about quanta and ontology indeed. etc, etc. Now that it is somewhat under control, I believe we should attempt to keep it somewhat under control, and bring it to some sort of stability in the near future before it gets out of control again.  Your addition of a brief section on phenomenalism is not an unreasonable proposal.  And, there plainly is more work to be done on this article in the near future.  Good day, and take care for now...Kenosis 14:16, 4 April 2006 (UTC)

text: I honestly had (and have) no idea what your intentions were. I also do not deny that the article is much better for the complete deletions of the nonsensical sections which you refer to. It was in a disastrous state, but this is true of so many philosphy articles on Wikipedia that I often feel an overwhelming desire to lie down in a nice comfortable coffin and wait 'till my time arrives rather than tyring to deal with even a mimimum part of it. People work differently. Most of the ones in "philosphy of mind", with the imprtant exception of consciousness (subject of infinite insertions of OR, quantum consciouness, neo-gothic mystical technognostsim, etc.), I have essentially been able to rewrite and just impose another version.  The philosophy article, for example, is er one that has been in a shabby state for centuries. But it's hopeless, as far as Iìm concerned, since everyone wants to get their two sentences in, about five seperate people are dvelopeing their own versions of it (some of them of very high quality), so I was left puzzling over what possible contribution I could make. Utlimatey, I decided that no one was going to get a decent version  of an article on such a broad and amorphous topic. In this case, I saw noticed that this artcicle was in bad shape, I made some very superfical changes initially with the intention to dive in more deeply later on. I dove in yesterday finally ith a clear idea of the direction the article should take and noticed  that my insertion was out of harmony with the new direction of the article that you had imposed on it. So I decided to step back and wait to see what would happen: it migh have truned into another philosophy type artcile from which I withdwraw or it might have been moving in the righ direction. I had no idea what all the deletions were leading up to (and I still don't). As to the noumenal and the phenomenal, the phenomenalism article itself was subject to this sort of opening the door to eccentric ideas and POV obviously. But since I rewrote the darned thing and clarified the meaning, important distinction betwen Kan, Berekely, bundle theory and provided the fully documented criticims, such as Chisolm,  which annihilite phenomenalism forvere from the face of the earth, I haven't heard a peep. Well, in any case, somtimes you have to open that door and then you have to know how to shut it very tightly behind you. --Lacatosias 14:59, 4 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Ism, Ism Not, Ism Too 

message: Based on various sources I was able to dig up some intereting info on the ancient Greek precursors and so on. It's not my particalr field, but I HATE to see stubs. This is just to inform of the change. --Lacatosias 17:12, 4 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: The summary material you added is quite consistent with Frederick Copleston, S.J. A History of Philosophy, Volume 1: Greece and Rome (1946), and W.T. Jones' History of Philosophy: The Classical Mind (2nd Ed, 1969) and Jones' History of Philoposhy: Hobbes to Hume (2nd ed., 1969).  ...Kenosis 01:02, 5 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Made minor expansion to pre-history section 

message: JA: Does anybody actually like this footnoted citation style?  I find it all but unreadable, the next worst thing to XML, especially when working in the edit window.  I suggest an alphabetized list of "references" (works cited) and a separate "further reading" (bibliography).  Jon Awbrey 02:25, 7 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: I agree it's clumsy making edits now.  Perhaps "they" should instead have automated the fn numbering system in some way, e.g. with a separate window as most word processors allow.  Whatever-- I certainly don't have those skills...Kenosis 05:43, 7 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Citation style

message: Rmvd these qualifications to the Peirce observation about the paripatetic axiom and put them here for now, because it was already a stretch to mention Peirce in that section.  And the mention of fallibility is, I think, already stretching it a bit farther down in the article, except that that mention was quick and cursory, in addition to well stated by its author...Kenosis 05:43, 7 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: "This in no way conflicts with the fallibility and the correctability of scientific concepts, since it is only the immediate percept in its unique individuality or "thisness" that is beyond control and correction.  Scientific concepts, on the other hand, are general in nature, and transient sensations do in another sense find correction within them."05:43, 7 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Peirce qualifications in "Early forms of empiricism" section placed here for now

message: JA: I'm noticing a generic phenom in WP.  The problem that we've encountered just recently here with the 2-cultural meanings of "empiricism" is not the worst case I've seen — for that you must visit the article on Truth — but it has the family resemblance.  There seems to be the expectation among ∃ people that WP is supposed to come up with the "1 true meaning of X, ∀ terms X", rather than just facing the fact, as mere lexicographers do, that many words have many meanings.  The end result that we find at the beginning of some articles is the lowest common denominator of everybody's pet meaning, which is in most cases a sheer triviality.  If Peanuts© cartoons ever come out of copyright, the problem will be solved, but in the meantime we end up with totally uninformative and not very appetizing word soups or salads.  Jon Awbrey 03:50, 8 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Take a look at consciousness sometime. The intro is essentially a disambiguation list of links to other pages. How is a collaborative, open-source effort to write about consciousness even thinkable though?  --Lacatosias 09:30, 8 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: We Are The Wikest Link — Goodbye

message: Logical positivism was one of the major philosophical movements of the last century, for better for worse, with such figures as Ayer and Carnap indebted to such thinkers as Hume.  Quine's empiricist project is another well known idea too.  I know there is already a "See Also" section on the page for LP, but surely this movement needs some documentation in this article.  Your thoughts? --Knucmo2 10:57, 10 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Sir, I absolutely 100% agree. In fact, I can write up a paragraph or two summarizing the subject in short order. I have been distracted by other matters lately and haven't gotten around to it. But I am not busy just now, since it is Election Day in Italy and I have to wait around for two or three more hours to get some indication of the exit poll results and so on (I will say nothing on my personal political preferences) . I'll write up a brief summary then and if it is unwelcome,  you are all invited to remove it or whatever the consensus decides. Good luck to.......the side which I think will win. (0:--Lacatosias 11:45, 10 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Nice work thus far.  Now it starts to take some form.  Sure would be nice to see a photo of Bertrand Russell you know where...Kenosis 16:03, 10 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Kenosis, et. al. Your efforts are a vast improvement on what this article formerly was.  Great job.Amerindianarts 22:18, 10 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Lacatosias has brought to bear a lot of knowledge, prolific research, diligent sourcing and a fine ability to work with this newer Wikipedia offshoot of XML (at least I think that's what it is); Knucmo2 has added significant perspectives, quickly filling some of the important gaps; Jon Awbrey has added extremely keen insight into Charles Peirce's work, and a couple other editors have breifly weighed in too...Kenosis 00:00, 11 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Thanks for the kind words. I too think the article has vastly improved from what it was. Kudos to everyone who has contributed with organization (mostly Kenosis), with writing or just constructive criticism. --Lacatosias 08:23, 11 April 2006 (UTC)

text: I removed the section on Ethical naturalism, which was picking up on Ethics and was starting to get pretty far afield for the Objectivity article--very POV and not at all informative as it was written, in any event.  This section you propose to add to, on Objectivism and probability, has possibilities ;-)  It is, though, sufficiently off-point for this article that I will stop now, except to thank you for calling it to our attention...Kenosis 03:13, 11 April 2006 (UTC)

text: Oops, I'll go revert then.  See you on another talk page later...Kenosis 04:04, 11 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Logical empiricism

message: Kenosis, concerning your edit: "Rmv "Mill's empiricism thus said that knowledge of any kind is not from direct experience but an inference from direct experience". His point was, upon analysis, different than this".  I am quite confused by this: I made this edit on the basis of several sources (check out the one at Stanford) and from what I gathered to be a commonly accepted understanding of Mill's empiricism, based on my lectures at University also.  Instead of removing it, all you needed to do was ask for a citation.  I am going to reinstate it, since the summary is based on several credible sources. --Knucmo2 16:14, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: I'm not exactly sure I understand this statement myself though.  By inference from direct exprience do you mean that Mill was a representative realist rather than a direct realist? How does this distinguish him from almost all empiricists? Hume and Locke were certainly indirect realists. The only people I can think of who might believe that knowledge does not require some kind of inference are "naive" or direct  realists. But this almost the opposite of empiricism, many of whose exponenets don't even accept an external world (reality).--Lacatosias 18:09, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Of course he had his roots in Locke and Hume, but he rejected Berkeley's view that only direct consciousness can justify beliefs about objects, which was obviously idealist, instead saying that it was an inference from experience. --Knucmo2 18:19, 12 April 2006 (UTC)

text: The "permanant possibilies of sensation" which I mentioned ealier in the article. Yes, that is a significant point. That's fine. I just misunderstood the context.--Lacatosias 18:26, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: The reason I removed it was that it failed to capture the extent to which Mill's position falls into the phenomenalist trap, appearing to negate or dismiss the just-presented summary in the article.  The sentence I removed said:  "Mill's empiricism thus said that knowledge of any kind is not from direct experience but an inference from direct experience."  What at first blush seems like a reasonable position (at least to the uninformed reader) ends up, upon further analysis, failing to give credence to the issue of how these "permanent possibilities of sensation" got there in the first place.  It also fails to consider the full range of mathematical analysis, which is dependent on a concordance of mathematical methodology with the structure of the natural world (though via a non-empirically-based set of procedures).  In the end, lacking an acknowledgement of an aspect of "reality" that goes beyond a mere possibility of sensation, such a position leads to another slant of subjective idealism.  Berkeley's placement of God in that gap will not do here; what Berkeley fills in with God becomes for the phenomenalists a neglect of a necessary condition precedent for the "permanent possiblity of sensation," specifically a structure of the natural world that must first exist in order to permit a possibility of sensation...Kenosis 18:42, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Removal

message: JA: The last time I checked, the old-fangled footnote, ibid, loc cit, op cit rigamarole was not dictated by WP style guidelines, so I will stick to a human-consumable format that is more or less a compromise between several journal style sheets.  Maybe someday WP will be written entirely by bots, but until that day arrives it is necessary to use un-X-treme unctions that mere mortals can maintain in edit window views.  Jon Awbrey 04:36, 13 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: My last edit was intended to be of assistance, not of some kind of competition of style.  I too understand how cumbersome it is to edit body text with the current format.  We are not going to change the Wikipedia style guidelines (at least I don't think so — maybe you can convey this issue to Central Command here).  Why revert it after I chose to deal with the pain in the &*#%@.  Geez...Kenosis 04:59, 13 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: No sweat. It's all for a good purpose (leading towards the singularity of the conceptual salvation of humankind in the postmodern phenomenon of adequate intersubjective communication?).  Take care...bye for now...Kenosis 06:17, 13 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Well, it may all be a moot point by now. There are  already bots that are going around and automotically converting to the WP:CITE style. Personally, I've always though the idea of  "in-line cites" was asking too much, considering that probably 99% of Wikipedia articles lack more than two or three references in any case.But the point is supposed to be to try to keep the styles and formats consistent, I think.--Lacatosias 09:01, 13 April 2006 (UTC)

text: Don't worry. Jon. The most important thing, I most certainly agree, is content. You write the way you see fit and then we can deal with references and such  afterward if anyone doesn't approve. BTW, I think it's anal retentives not anal-recitatives!! At least, I've never heard of the latter term. Is this some new syndrome?--Lacatosias 13:39, 13 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Citation style

message: JA: Sigh.  Maybe after lunch, and a couple'o'beers.  Jon Awbrey 14:20, 13 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: In any case, WP:Cite seems to suggest that footnotes (i.e. numbered citations) are deprecated and so on. However, if you look at the featured articles, such as Katyn Forest (the fellow who write this one has about 17 other FAs, BTW), they almost all use the   Getrude, FE.(1942) "Anal Recitativity". New York:Framing House. etc.  style of numbered references. I don't know if this is required or not. But I've been beaten over the head with it myself more than once in trying to get an article thorugh the Featured Candidate process. My interpretation, for what it's worth: we can use the Harvard style of in-line cites (but with full citations in a "References" section) or we can follow the style in Katyn Forest and number the references using <nowiki> <ref>  which is the general approach that we've been following to this point. OR, we can use both and just try to ensure that al the info. abut the sources is complete and accurate in the "References" section.  Also, we can create a separate section called "Notes" for real footnotes in the sense of breif comments or we can leave it as it is now: Notes and References. That's my take in the question. But I'm not being anal retetentive and I will NOT insist on any particular approach. Other opinions on this crucial, life-or-death determining matter??--Lacatosias 14:45, 13 April 2006 (UTC)

text: Since I do NOT consider this matter of pressing importance AT ALL (this is said just to knock this implicit accusation of anal retentiveness out of the ballpark), but you apparently take it extremely seriously, I will defer to your approach (unless others weigh in with their own thoughts on this matter). I will change all of the current references which use   blab,blah, blah   to the Harvard style (name, year) and so on. But it's really a pain in the gizzard and I'll try to get around to it tomorrow.--Lacatosias 15:47, 13 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: There, I've converted about half of them. It's an extreme pain in the ass and I have other things to do with my time. If you (and the others) like it this way, please FINISH IT YOURSELVES. Im talking this page off my watchlist. Farewell.--Lacatosias 08:23, 14 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: It sounds like hypocrisy coming from me Lacatosias (see Talk:Continental rationalism), but I'd appreciate it (as I am sure Wikipedia in general would) if you kept contributing towards this article, of which you have improved immensely.  If this page is going to make you be a bit shirty (don't take this personally, you just sounded a bit rattled in your post above) then yes, take it off your watchlist and do some other stuff for a few days, as I am sure you'll be able to. --Knucmo2 11:29, 14 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: It's not a problem. What do you think of this reference format as opposed to the other? I'm not parriculalrly impressed. It seems bulkier and more confusing than the "robot" version.--Lacatosias 12:19, 14 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: In any case, given all the edits I've already done (and that I have some extra time on my hands) I might a well continue playing the robot and finish changing to the other format. JUST DO NOT ASK ME TO CONVERT BACK LATER!!--Lacatosias 12:23, 14 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Gosh, any system is any better than the MHRA one that I am forced to use at University!  The Harvard one would be a blessing for me, esp. in terms of footnotes.  I do agree, as Lacatosias says, that if we are going to convert then we should be pretty sure on the style now before we make any more edits. --Knucmo2 12:34, 14 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Discussion of [[WP:CITE]] and [[WP:FN]]

message: With the Harvard in-line citation style that I'm currently using, we have a small but significant problem. Many of our references are to encylcloepdia articles with no author specified. Hence, one has to write things like (Encylopeid of Philosophy, vol.8. p978) and such, which is rather obtrusive-looking in the text. Also, it is not very informative in any case. Is it possible to find out the authors of these entries?--Lacatosias 12:31, 14 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Good point. There are only two or three here, so that's easily done.--Lacatosias 13:48, 14 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: When the Encyclopedia of Philosophy was first published in '69 in 8 vols., and until the late 90's it needed no qualification such as an extra reference to "Macmillan".  Today, though the first edition is still regarded as definitive through the time it was published (a second ed. was published just last year in 10 vols., and today there's the Routledge as well), it needs the qualifier such as "Macmillan", what with "Joe's Encylopedia of Philosophy" and Dick's Encyclopedia of Philosophy on the market.  Where in the Harvard style does one put necessary qualifications such as this?.  I'll add reference to the authors when I have a chance...Kenosis 14:26, 14 April 2006 (UTC)

text: I now see the refs to the publisher have been returned.  Thanks...Kenosis 14:35, 14 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Small problem

message: I'm noticing a heavy amount of attention and intervention it the lead section. This is just a warning: I've seen a similar pattern in several other articles  in which the lead sections eventually ended up trying to explain everything that the article was supposed to. Be careful with all the clarifications of clarification,etc.. Now I have to get off line. --Lacatosias 16:46, 14 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Beware of introduction bloat