Talk:Trusted Computing

message: The problem with this article is that it has weasel words. Here's some examples. 
2nd paragraph
*"Advocates of the technology" Who?
*"Opponents believe" Who?
*"which to critics" Who?
3rd paragraph
*"A number of" How many?
The nature of trust
*"security experts define" Who?
*"Critics characterize" Who?
*"While proponents claim" Who?
*"critics counter" Who?
*"Advocates of" Who?
*"Proponents of trusted" Who?
*"There is an amount of" How much?
*"it is suspected that" Speculation
There's still more, but this is enough to warrant the  tag.
: if someone wants to help this article , all this statements can be transformed in citations from the"proponets" and "opponents" links in the external links section Dbiagioli 12:00, 12 November 2006 (UTC)
replies: text:  made some corrections . i'm removing the weasel tag  for exception 2 of http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Avoid_weasel_words#Improving_weasel-worded_statements:"holders of the opinion are too diverse or numerous to qualify" Dbiagioli 20:07, 17 November 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Weasel Words

message: I didn't put the link in originally but I replaced it, they are actually pretty central to this field, they own many patents in the area and have developed things like trusted keyboards &ct. --Gorgonzilla 20:41, 8 June 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: That may be, but there isn't really any useful information there that isn't already in the article. It's a corporate website with various commercial offerings, and there is no obvious notability since Wave Systems Corp. is not mentioned in the article. Since Wikipedia is not a link directory, I say there is no reason to further enlarge the External links section with this link. Haakon 20:47, 8 June 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: I think I'd side with Haakon on this one. Some of the other links could probably do with being re-examined too as the article is somewhat external link heavy at the moment. --Boxflux 06:32, 9 June 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Wave systems 

message: Wow, check out the Italian version of this article, which got FA status.  I don't speak a word of the language, but perhaps there is an opportunity here to improve the English-language version of the article?  -/- Warren 18:03, 15 July 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: hello , i'm one of the contributor to that article and i could also translate some pieces , but it will take some time .. also , my english isn't perfect .however , i'll do my besr Dbiagioli 15:08, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
replies: text:  translations form italian is almost done . Dbiagioli 13:38, 12 August 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Italian version 

message: I hope I'm not screwing up someone's legit system, but I'm going through and removing a lot of non-grammatical spaces (i.e. a space before a punctuation mark or double/triple spaces b/w words.  Sorry if this is any problem
--Gbinal 01:44, 15 August 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  space punctuation??? 

message: The section on "Proposed owner override for TC" seems to be just another disputed issue. Some people think that it is a good idea, and some people don't. I suggest putting it with the Disputed Issues. Also, it is written with a very anti-TC POV. It complains that the TC folks have refused to scrap a feature in order to please the anti-TC folks. Yes, that's right, just like they disagree on other issues. It should just describe the dispute. Roger 01:29, 23 September 2006 (UTC)
replies: text:   frankly , one could also say that remote attestation is a bug as it is of little use to the average PC user , if any ... the TC proponents say that  it's not a bug , it's a feature  .. however  Owner Override is now in the disputed issue section . Dbiagioli 06:17, 23 September 2006 (UTC)
replies: text:  Thanks. The section still has too much of an anti-TC POV. It refers to "problems" and "solution". To those who think that attestation is a feature, there is no problem and owner override doesn't solve anything. I suggest deleting the whole section, except to say that some TC critics have suggested an owner override in order to give owners more control over their own computers, at the cost of making attestations less meaningful. It could just refer the Seth Schoen article for details. Roger 08:50, 23 September 2006 (UTC)
replies: text:   I think that deletion is never a good idea  . perhaps you could add to the section  the reasons for which TC proponents think that owner override is a bad idea ?  Dbiagioli 09:52, 23 September 2006 (UTC)
replies: text:  I have attempted to make the owner override section more factually correct and I have tried to remove (anti-TC) bias.  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.215.156.78 (talk) 10:32, 15 February 2016 (UTC)
thread_title:  Proposed owner override for TC 

message: Add a section on the partisan objections of RMS and the GNU project as well as from the Free Software Foundation on how they claim this impurifies Alan Turing's Universal computer Theory -- That is a computer is a machine that can do the same function as any other existing machine (printing press, fax, polygraph, cassette tapes, records, radio, television, etc) and how trusted computing can possibly limit the computers' abilities to do these things.
Thanks, --Mofomojo 06:10, 27 September 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: pelase revert as soon as possible the paragraph "key concepts " , "possible uses" ,"disputed issues " to the original order .the article is unreadable and  illogic now .Dbiagioli 15:23, 27 September 2006 (UTC)
replies: text:  i've done it myself as i've not received any response Dbiagioli 05:41, 30 September 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Universal Computer 

message: ``The U.S. army has also stated that every new PC bought by the army must support trusted computing [3]" - the referenced article DOES NOT state this.
: Thanks for spotting this; I've removed the statement from the article.  -/- Warren 17:28, 6 October 2006 (UTC)
replies: text:  well, the 'referenced article' _stated_ ' this  : see http://www.fcw.com/article95422-07-26-06-Web http://www.securityfocus.com/brief/265 ... and ,, by the way , if you look at the 'suggested models' https://ascp.monmouth.army.mil/scp/cb/cb_products.jsp and if you check them one by one (take for example https://ascp.monmouth.army.mil/scp/cb/cb_item_details.jsp?cat_id=4&ven_id=9 ) you 'll discover that everyone has got a TPM ... the US army has just decided that it does'n want to  publicize that fact . Dbiagioli 06:45, 7 October 2006 (UTC)

text: well , if' you re able to find proof of the fact that the army still requires a TPM , i'll be happy to change the page. I haven't found it Dbiagioli 14:06, 21 October 2006 (UTC)

text: the problem is , we have not any evidence that the requirement is still in force , so ,giving the fact that the army changed the page, we have to suppose that it was cancelled ... f course in my personal opinion the requirement was not dropped ,but , without the proof that the requirement is still in place , what should be written on the page ? we think the requirement is still in place but we've got no evidence of that ?? Dbiagioli 18:18, 21 October 2006 (UTC)

text: that's enoug for me -- page changed .Dbiagioli 21:24, 21 October 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  US army & trusted computing support 

message: From an inexperienced person perspective (hence why I'm reading a Wikipedia article on the subject!) there is a missing bit of information in the Endorsement Key section on how the signing of a random number proves the identity and validity of the TPM involved. I presume it is because the manufacturer or other trusted third party holds a copy of the public key and this is retrieved by the inquirer for the purpose of communication? If this or otherwise is the case I think it would be worthy of noting. Thanks. George Jenkins 21:22, 4 November 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: no ,the new protocol the TCG uses to prove a TPM's identity (direct anonymous attestation) is much more complex and involves a lot of  advanced math  . i've added a link to its stub , but explaining  it in a wikipedia article is very difficult ,IMHO . Dbiagioli 07:41, 5 November 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Endorsement Key Section 

message: Does anyone know how this is different from the P3 PSNs? I seem to remember that they didn't catch on.
:The PSNs didn't have a lobby group bribing the politicians... Fosnez 02:26, 28 January 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Relation to Pentium 3 PSN 

message: I got a question for any experts on the subject: On the internet, there is an abundance of sources (all of them several years old, AFAIK) speaking of the Lucky Green patent incident. For underinformed laymen like me: The story goes something like he filed a patent on using T.C. for commercial purposes right after a conference where some Microsoft spokesperson talked about it, negating a commercial intent of Microsoft on the grounds of "we didn't even know it could be used for that". Sorry for any inaccuracies... I just wondered why there is no mention of that incident anywhere? Mostly I'd like to know how things finally turned out, because there don't seem to be any up to date sources. Kncyu38 14:47, 30 December 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Lucky Green 

message: There's an amusing video http://www.lafkon.net/tc/ mirrored http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mdr/teaching/modules06/security/video/trustedComputing.html and on youTube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K1H7omJW4TI --Bah23 13:46, 6 February 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  TC video 

message: I removed this:
: Key Point - Trusted Computing is not about your computer being trusted by you, but about your computer being trusted by authorities, and organisations providing the hardware, software and content you will use on your computer. With TC, the term your computer may be inaccurate - it is more a piece of equipment such organisations have granted you the use of and may disable that use if they consider your use contrary to their interests.
This isn't correct. If you have TC features on your computer, then those features can be used to assure that you can trust your computer. Also, there is not necessarily any ability for others to be able to disable your computer. Roger 18:29, 4 March 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Urm, I agree that it's not encyclopedic but your argument against it is just as flawed ("[TC] features can be used to assure that you can trust your computer"). Prehaps we can compromise by using a FSF quote in it's place? 172.213.231.215 12:16, 3 September 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  The FSF view is already described. Roger 15:22, 3 September 2007 (UTC)

text: The section should not be there since the tone is non-encyclopedic, not because it is wrong.  Frankly, the TC features don't protect you from anything.  They protect anything from you.  TC stops you from cheating in online games, but it doesn't stop your opponents who may be running on a pre-TC machine.  So the trust there is entirely misplaced.  You can run TCP, and sure enough, your opponents are still able to see through walls, aim perfectly and never miss, etc.  You can only really 'trust' that you yourself are not cheating.  However, if you need a hardware solution to know if you downloaded or wrote a cheat patch for a game... you need to get into therapy.  And this goes down the line of 'benefits.'76.118.215.233 (talk) 05:20, 7 March 2008 (UTC)
thread_title: Key Point not right

message: This article seems implicitly biased in support. In particular it makes no mention of the considerable controversy surrounding the issue in the introductiory paragraphs, deferring that until after masses of technical details have been unloaded. (It's overly long in any case.) Also it seems to very much play along with the rhetoric of the proponents (overuse of truisms essentially like: trusted computing is computers that are trustworthy and that have trustworthy components). The statements about spam have been widely discredited and certainly shouldn't appear unopposed as they do. It's an unenlightening greywash. I'm not well informed enough to redress the balance but I feel expert attention is needed. 172.203.199.18 17:49, 10 August 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Implicit pro bias?

message: "The Linux kernel has included trusted computing support since version 2.6.13, and there are several projects to implement trusted computing for Linux." 
Link anyone? or reference ?
:"trusted computing support"?. Only as of Linux Kernel 2.6.36 is there even a patch to enable trusted encryption keys for the IMA. A trusted encrypted file system and IMA for attestation, etc. is able to be hacked together but is not fully supported by the mainline kernel. http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/ Try building a trusted linux platform for yourself and you will realize the current state of affairs.
VmZH88AZQnCjhT40 (talk) 05:00, 8 January 2011 (UTC)
thread_title: Linux Kernel

message: It should be mentioned that the 2048-bit strong encryption requires significant processing power, which in turn means increased energy requirements. In the case of protected high-resolution videos this will mean a LOT of energy.
It's interesting to compare this with the current efforts to save the environment by not wasting energy. Nokia phones will warn you to unplug the charger when not used to eliminate its small quiescent current draw, while your computer will happily waste the double of the normally necessary power to play back a film.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 85.181.100.68 (talk) 15:16, 31 October 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: The 2048 bit key will only be used to encrypt small, critical bits of information (such as other keys of less strength, and a digital signature), not entire files.  
Leotohill (talk) 01:31, 27 May 2009 (UTC)
thread_title:  Encyption -> increased power requirements 

message: Does the header "Possible uses of TC" mean that they haven't been implemented yet?
I just want to make sure that DRM isn't a function of TC yet. (ZtObOr 03:45, 11 November 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: today , there are only prototypes (like Turaya.FairDRM application of the EMSCB   ) that use use TC hardware in order to enforce DRM . Dbiagioli 17:41, 11 November 2007 (UTC)

text: DRM is inherently a "function" of the TC as designed and specified by the Trusted Computing Group, just as turning left and right is a "function" of cars. As for implementation, (?)most(?) laptop computers and (?)many(?) desktop computers you buy are already shipping with the Trust chip fused to the motherboard and carry CPUs with explicit support for it. However Microsoft has delayed releasing explicit Operating System usage of Trust chips and very little software out there accesses these Trust chips yet. So the answer to your question is a complicated mix of yes and no. Pretty much yes the DRM hardware is already out there and yes they might already have shoved it down your throat hidden in the last computer you bought, but no they haven't really activated it... yet. Alsee 19:55, 4 December 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  Bitlocker uses TC as of Vista. The primary function of TC is quite far from DRM. As a windows or macos user you already bought into DRM. Linux won't support it, so what will change?VmZH88AZQnCjhT40 (talk) 05:05, 8 January 2011 (UTC)
thread_title:  "Possible" uses? 

message: More than a year ago I posted to the Cell_(microprocessor) talk page that the Cell processor had hardware DRM / Trusted Computing support and asking for some sort of coverage in the main article, and all that has come of it is a Talk Page accusation that this is "fantasia talk" and someone else all-too-typically sweeping it under a generic "security" rug and of course dismissing all Trusted Computing / DRM issues. However the fact of explicit DRM in the hardware is documented in the very title of IBM's own PDF publication on the Cell: "Cell Broadband Engine Support for Privacy Security and Digital Rights Management", and Trust design explicitly covered on the very first page. (IBM took down the PDF at the original link I had posted, but the Google link I just gave finds the paper at multiple other locations). I have read some other papers from IBM itself documenting crypto keys and crypto mechanisms embedded in the Cell chip, however I have been having a very difficult time locating adequate coverage and explanation on it. I have only a piecemeal understanding of the ultimate DRM/TrustedComputing implications of the design, and I do not feel confident writing it up in the main Cell article. Is there maybe anyone over here who happens to be familiar with these aspects of the Cell design who could add some mention of this issue to the Cell article? I hesitate to do a half-assed writeup myself, and I don't relish the prospect of digging around for enough technical documentation trying to to develop personal expertise on the Cell design. I already spend all too many hours studying the entire low level technical design of the TPM chip, chuckle. Alsee 19:33, 4 December 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: i'm not faimliar with the cell architecture, but i can assure that your paper exactly describe a TCG architecture, including trusted boot , the hypervisor kernel (you can see the general trusted stack architecture here  ) . I'm not sure if the cell engine is *officially* TCG-compliant .Dbiagioli 20:08, 4 December 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Cell Processor 

message: i have a question : how many links should be in the "extenal links " section ? how many references can have an article ? is there a wikipedia guideline about it ? Dbiagioli (talk) 20:57, 18 December 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  external links 

message: The article includes this sentence: "Contrast Trusted Computing with secure computing in which anonymity, not disclosure, is the main concern." Clicking on the link to secure computing takes you to an article about computer security. However, anonymity is NOT the primary concern of secure computing as described there, and if "secure computing" is in fact a different concept forcused on anonymity, then I haven't found anything about it online.
Could someone please either explain or correct this?James mcl (talk) 18:27, 31 January 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: corrected Dbiagioli (talk) 14:33, 10 February 2008 (UTC)
replies: text:  Thank you Dbiagioli! James mcl (talk) 14:19, 20 February 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  "Secure Computing" which focuses on anonymity 

message: I do not know much about trusted computing, so please bear with me. I would like to understand what (if anything) trusted computing is about aside from its contraversial role in preventing unauthorized copying of music and programs. After reading the article, I still do not think I understand the whole story.
I have only seen three use cases for trusted computing that seem at all interesting: large-scale distributed computations ("grid computing") where the owner of the client machines should not necessarily be trusted, like SETI@home; DRM; and games. (I think the others described in this article require a counter-productive assumption that separate computers ought to be distinguishable. In the 'Protecting hard-drive data' example, what if the motherboard breaks so I must replace it and I need access to my data? In the ' Identity theft protection', what if I have to switch from one computer to another in the middle of a transaction, or what if the bank changes servers to deal with increased number of customers, or relocation? But I digress.) The first of these use cases (grid computing) is not emphasized at all in this article, but it sounds like just the sort of thing that would get a researching excited about ideas like trusted systems.
Did the model of trusted computing described in this article come from academic work, and what motivated it? What was the early history of its implementation like? What originally motivated manufacturers to include trusted computing chips, before this became such a big political issue in connection with copyright and trade secrets? Or was copyright the original motivation for the work?
I think it is the Endorsement key that people have a problem with and connect with the idea of trusted computing. After all, a trusted I/O path, memory protection, encrypted storage, and attestation of various facts by trusted parties are not new ideas and are often made possible through the (implicitly trusted) operating system. Why should we consider hardware more trustworthy than software? But the endorsement key means that a user does not have full specifications of all the relevant details of his computer and he has sacrificed some control for other benefits. Thus all the talk (in the "Possible applications" section) of the benefits of a trusted path, verification of identity, and digitial signatures did not seem to be very convincing or relevant. Am I missing something?
Projects like SETI@home face a real problem in the possibility of a malicious user ruining the whole project with fake data. It is really exciting if we have found a way to surmount that problem. Does trusted computing provide this? If so, how? These are the kind of questions I wished this article had answered!
Thanks for your work so far in maintaining this article on a contentious issue. 209.252.104.131 (talk) 01:01, 26 April 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: Consumer and commercial operating systems have demonstrated an abysmal track record with regards to security and trustworthiness. Memory protection is non-existent after the kernel is compromised. x86 lacks write protection for memory. The same concerns in grid computing apply to the use of a single-core workstation due to the poor security architecture of consumer and commercial operating systems as they have classically evolved from performance and multi-tasking/user pressures, security has always been second. TC provides a record of execution and file access that is not subject to subversion from untrusted code (kernel/user).VmZH88AZQnCjhT40 (talk) 05:10, 8 January 2011 (UTC)
thread_title:  Trusted computing and grid computing 

message: "^ Tony McFadden (March 26, 2006). TPM Matrix. Retrieved on 2006-05-05."
http://www.tonymcfadden.net/tpmvendors.htm The page does not longer exists. I hope someone can find an equivalent reference.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 81.202.73.10 (talk) 15:26, 25 May 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Outdated reference 

message: every Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is required to sign a random numb 
This is NOT true. The endorsement key cannot be used for signing.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 147.188.192.41 (talk) 13:43, 30 May 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  The endorsement key CANNOT be used for signing 

message: Someone removed the text on how opponents/critics of Trusted Computing call it Treacherous Computing.  Here are numerous sources: , and  many of which are reliable, backing up the use of this term in this context.  It belongs on this page.  Cazort (talk) 15:05, 3 March 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: Even if a source is verified, it can still be very biased, so the content was removed for a good reason. Perhaps if you can get a strong enough consensus, then you can change it without any retaliation. ZtObOr 01:12, 3 May 2009 (UTC)
replies: text:  The term Treacherous Computing by opponents of the technology is discussed not only in numerous computer news sources as I showed above, but also in scholarly books published by Springer, such as these two:  and .  The 2004 article by R. Anderson is listed by google scholar as having 76 citations, which places it is among the authoritative works on the subject.  These sorts of sources are about as good as it gets when it comes to editorial integrity and influence.  Perhaps the old text relied more on biased sources...but even there, wikipedia has no business excluding sources just because they are biased--the use of the term "treacherous computing" has more than enough coverage in news sources...it's not just that Richard Stallman and the Free Software Foundation have released documents coining some new term...it's that doing so attracted media coverage of the stance and the new term.  Not only did the Sydney Morning Herald:  and BusinessWeek:  publish Stallman's opinions, but you have people then writing ABOUT Stallman's opinions, e.g.: .  Cazort (talk) 15:15, 4 May 2009 (UTC)
thread_title:  Treacherous Computing

message: I think it's not constructive to keep deleting and re-adding this text.  The text needs to be sourced.  In the absence of sources I think it's better to omit it than include it.  However, I think some of the existing sources already included on the page actually back some of it up.  We need to go through these sources and read them, and find out what of this paragraph can be backed up, by what sources...and if anything cannot (and I supect all of it can be backed up probably by existing sources) then it should be deleted.  Cazort (talk) 20:38, 9 March 2009 (UTC)
thread_title: Edit war on trust section

message: Protection of biometric authentication data
This argument is a straw man as from a security context biometric data is always public. It would be completely infeasible to prevent anyone from taking a picture of your face or finger, and forming a biometric model of you.Scientus (talk) 19:05, 2 May 2009 (UTC)
thread_title:  Dubious 

message: The Digital Rights Management is almost exactly repeated under possible application as well as criticisms. I'm not sure which should be removed/changed, but I think that we don't need the same information repeated twice. Luminite2 (talk) 19:35, 5 May 2009 (UTC)
thread_title:  Repeat Section 

message: This section has some problematic claims:
1) "However, Microsoft has denied that any such functionality (virus protection) will be present in its NGSCB architecture.
This needs a reference.  Even then, MS's failure to include virus protection in NGSCB may have little bearing on whether TC can indeed be used for this purpose.  Without further information, it's hard to know. 
2) "In practice any operating system which aims to be backwards compatible with existing software will not be any safer from malicious code.
I can't find anything in Anderson's document that supports this.  (Maybe I missed it?)  I also find it dubious:  closing ANY attack vector makes a system safer.  It may not be "safe enough", but it is safer.    If TC can be used to close any attack vector (can it?) then it can be used to make a system safer. 
If we remove these claims, there's not much left for this section. I'd then be inclined to delete the whole thing unless we can find some more material for it. I'd like to see a description of how TC can be used to prevent malware infections. 
Leotohill (talk) 01:52, 27 May 2009 (UTC)
thread_title:  Protection from viruses and spyware section 

message: This section contains speculative claims.  The sensitivity to machine configuration depends upon the characteristics of the software that is implementing restrictions.   TPM provides multiple registers that record different aspects of the configuration.  A process that uses the TPM to provide security can choose which of these it cares to be sensitive to. Since there is no current DRM scheme that uses TPM, any claims about its sensitivity to machine configuration, beyond the TPM root key, are speculative. 
Leotohill (talk) 00:16, 30 May 2009 (UTC)
thread_title:  Sealed Storage - platform sensitivity 

message: I don't know where these "key concepts" came from, but some are incorrect.   
1) the text stated that Secure I/O is a key concept, but it isn't mentioned in the spec.  I've removed it from the article. 
2) nor does the TPM spec mention curtained memory.  Nor do any of the other references listed below.  A web search will find a number of documents that refer to curtained 
memory and the TPM, I haven't found any that provide a definitive reference. These may have come from early design proposals for a TPM that didn't make the final version of the spec.
The TPM spec does describe "shielded location" which "is a place (memory, register, etc.) where data is protected against interference and exposure, independent of its form.  However, unlike Intel's Trusted Execution Technology and other general discussion of memory curtaining, a shielded location is not owned by a process, and is not directly accessible by the CPU. In the TPM, the content of a shielded location is only available via the purpose-specific commands that the TPM provides.
The TPM overview document also describes "protected storage"  which I read as a special case of "shielded location".  Again, it is not memory that is accessible by the CPU.
So I see the term "curtained memory" as incorrect here, and I'm inclined to edit out the references to it, unless someone can provide a better answer. 
These are the references I searched for "curtain" with no hits:
http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/files/resource_files/AC652DE1-1D09-3519-ADA026A0C05CFAC2/TCG_1_4_Architecture_Overview.pdf
http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/resources/tpm_specification_version_12_revision_103_part_1__3
http://www.amazon.com/Practical-Guide-Trusted-Computing/dp/0132398427/ref=pd_bxgy_b_text_b#
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0750679603/ref=s9_cart_gw_tr02?pf_rd_m=ATVPDKIKX0DER&pf_rd_s=center-4&pf_rd_r=0F6ZXMXAM6BSTS9QEV0P&pf_rd_t=101&pf_rd_p=470939031&pf_rd_i=507846#
http://www.amazon.com/Trusted-Computing-Platforms-Design-Applications/dp/0387239162/ref=pd_bxgy_b_img_c#reader
I plan to rewrite this section as soon as I feel comfortable with the material - but I encourage others to go ahead. 
Leotohill (talk) 15:28, 19 June 2009 (UTC)
thread_title:  Key concepts section is largely incorrect 

message: The start of the article defines Trusted Computing as what the Trusted Computing Group does. Given that definition, the sub-section Trust says "In some proposed encryption-decryption chips...", thus surely that text must be out of scope. It is also full of citation needed marks, so I will delete that portion.
Dids (talk) 05:09, 27 October 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: The common reader does not fully understand AES and public key encryption, in order for the section to be understandable and not gibberish to 95% of readers it has to be written the way it was.    Scientus (talk) 03:16, 9 March 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Trusted Computing versus trusted computing 

message: I volunteer to contribute a significant amount of new text, replacing all existing text up to the section “Known applications” and leaving the rest (including the criticism) untouched. I was recently told of the current page and was struck that it is sketchy or silent on many aspects of trusted computing. I can provide a description of Trusted Computing that has been honed over 11 years of designing and describing the technology. My standard spiel mentions what technology exists (and some of what doesn’t), the real reason why it’s called “Trusted Computing”, the way that Trusted Computing protects data (plus its security properties), the essential difference from secure computing, and what Trusted Computing insiders consider to be the core principles of the technology. I (obviously) believe that Trusted Computing is a “good thing” but every technology has aspects that can be difficult to implement, and lots of technologies can be used in undesirable ways.  My spiel therefore also mentions difficulties with the technology, and describes the concerns that have been told to Trusted Computing insiders over the years, plus the status of attempts to resolve those concerns.  According to Wikipedia’s help pages, someone in my situation should discuss my intentions here before editing the main page, so here I am. I’m in no way a Wikipedia expert. What’s next?
Walklooker (talk) 17:50, 20 January 2010 (UTC)
replies: text:  your proposal was technically correct , and it is possible that there are some errors in the current version; however ,your version is difficult to read for a user who is not an expert . your version als does not describe in detail how a TC-compliant  platform really works ; however , if you start doing some minor edits , and not replace entire paragraphs ,we could improve the current version .Dbiagioli (talk) 20:02, 13 April 2010 (UTC)
replies: text:  i'll help , perhaps in the weekends ,when  i've got enough time . The 'DRM application ' section could be a nice idea . Perhaps we could also add a section on the  'trusted software stack ?  ' Dbiagioli (talk) 18:56, 20 April 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Proposed revamp 

message: I bought a new computer in 2012 that did not come with this, so article is wrong. --209.188.32.201 (talk) 17:17, 12 July 2013 (UTC)
replies: text: Hm, where actually the article is wrong?  Of course that not all recent PCs come with this capability. — Dsimic (talk | contribs) 08:48, 5 August 2014 (UTC)
thread_title:  Not all new computers have one of thest 

message: The 'Trusted third party' section in this article has had a 'needs cleanup' tag on it since May 2010 because it has no citations and is not written in an encyclopedic tone. I'm replacing this entire section with a link to Trusted third party, because that article appears to cover the topic much more thoroughly and more properly. It would be nice for the 'Trusted third party' section here to have a brief summary of the topic in addition to the link, but I wasn't able to learn enough from that other article to summarize it in a useful way. - Brian Kendig (talk) 17:26, 7 January 2024 (UTC)
thread_title:  Removing 'Trusted third party' section and linking to that article 

message: A substantial portion of this article is devoted to speculation about potential applications of computer security.
Speculation about potential application for new technologies isn't knowledge. 99 44/100ths% of it is as ephemeral as a soap bubble and yet less captivating and entertaining. 
Its enough to say that the cost of being unable to prevent altered and malicious software from interfering with the intended function of everything from industrial machines to music players is sufficient to inspire innovators to apply every available tool, including trusted computing initiatives. 
 
A final reason not to put speculative applications here is that experience has shown that security concepts simple enough to explain in a few sentences have proven to be easily defeated. Application proposals sufficiently complex to worth knowing about will also be long enough to merit a Wikipedia article of their own.
As an editorial comment on the pro/con optimist/defeatist saga here; computing technologies have been proposing and speculatively promising more than could be delivered in a generation since the 1950's. Like the bubbles on top of a glass of champagne, without them it would be much less, but they don't really add anything. TPM is the most recent in a long line of timely initiatives to increase the difficulty of defeating computer security. Its good and its helpful but without being able to prevent physical access to the platform it remains the same problem as communicating over an open channel. The time and cost to intercept and alter can be increased, but never insurmountably. PolychromePlatypus (talk) 22:15, 5 May 2024 (UTC)
thread_title:  Speculative content is not encyclopedic knowledge