Talk:Ernest Bevin

message: anyone want to incorporate the famous quote "we have got to have this thing over here whatever it costs... we have got to have [a] bloody Union Jack on top of it..." , , ,  also quoted in the TUBE ALLOYS arricle Pickle 17:43, 22 March 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Query

message: 1) Sirtoyou's edits gloss over the obvious fact that Bevin was an objective failure in not achieving the UK government's publicly-stated goals of arriving at a political settlement in Palestine and avoiding major Arab-Jewish fighting there.  (Whether or not these were also Bevin's personal goals doesn't change the aforementioned fact.)
2) Sirtoyou's edits ignore the conspicuous fact that by his gratuitously tactless remarks and obstinacy in sticking to unproductive high-negative-publicity policies (things which he no doubt saw as West-country bluntness and steely resolve, but which many others saw as at best surly boorish churlishness, and at worst as motivated by racist bigotry), Bevin offended and alienated many of those whose support and goodwill could have facilitated Palestine political negotiations.  AnonMoos 17:23, 30 January 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Objections to Sirtoyou's edits

message: Feel free to add any valid relevant information about Bevin's attitudes and motivations (which throws light on why he did what he did), but please do not remove well-founded information about his failure to achieve the publicly-stated diplomatic goals of the British government, and the widespread negative reactions of many at the time to certain of his statements and actions -- statements and actions which appear to have made it even more difficult to achieve the publicly-stated diplomatic goals of the British government.  Of course, not everybody had a negative reaction, so if you have information on positive reactions, you could add that as well (without removing information  on negative reactions). AnonMoos 09:36, 10 February 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Further general comment

message: He failed to achieve just about all of the British government's publicly-stated policy goals in Palestine (it's hard to think of one he did manage to attain).  Of course, a person would not ordinarily be called a "failure" for not accomplishing an impossible task -- but Bevin gratuitously chose to make his task (however difficult it may have been to start with) even more difficult than it needed to be, so the label sticks.  AnonMoos 22:16, 14 March 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: I don't think anyone would dispute that it was a failure. Do you think the phrasing "he opposed the plans of the Zionist movement to create a Jewish state" may imply that the Zionist movement was alone - as you probably know, at that time the creation of Israel was supported by many states/organizations (notably the US & USSR), for various reasons. ←Humus sapiens ну? 00:26, 15 March 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: AnonMoos:  Your statement ("One of Bevin's prominent failures was in the British Mandated Territory of Palestine, where he opposed the plans of the Zionist movement to create a Jewish state") implies that Britain's failure in Palestine rests solely or mostly on Bevin shoulders, when historians argue that the foundations of Britain's failure were laid decades earlier.  You yourself have stated that "a person would not ordinarily be called a "failure" for not accomplishing an impossible task," and you are right.  The article on Louis Mountbatten, 1st Earl Mountbatten of Burma, the last Viceroy of India, does not blame Mountbatten for the "failure" of British policies or even the unbelievably violent Partition of India. --(Ptah, the El Daoud 18:05, 14 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: There was (and is) a fairly widespread perception that Bevin took on an (admittedly) tough job, and gratuitously and pointlessly made it even tougher by repeatedly making ill-chosen abrasive remarks and insisting on sticking with high-negative-publicity policies far past their point of diminishing political returns.  Furthermore, Mountbatten's Viceroyalty had a lot of fiascos, but he more or less achieved the main goal he was originally sent out to do -- namely, give British India independence -- while it's hard to enumerate one single publicly-stated British government policy goal which Bevin managed to achieve in Palestine.  And in the Louis Mountbatten, 1st Earl Mountbatten of Burma article there ARE in fact statements about his "foreseeing vast disruption and loss of life and not wanting this to occur on the British watch, but thereby actually causing it to occur" and "a particularly harsh critic of Mountbatten in this regard...The horrific casualties of the partition of the Punjab" etc. AnonMoos 03:01, 15 May 2007 (UTC)

text: Furthermore, you attempt to equate opposition to Zionism with failure by merely stating "...he opposed the plans of the Zionist movement to create a Jewish state"--as opposed to "he opposed the plans of the Zionist movement to create a Jewish state, and supported the creation of an independent Palestine."  The sentence that I proposed is a simple substitution: "Bevin opposed the plans of the Zionist movement to create a Jewish state in the British Mandated Territory of Palestine." It avoids both editorializing and pro-Zionist/pro-Palestinian politics; it also leaves plenty of room for the body of the sub-section to illustrate how this opposition was ultimately ineffective. --(Ptah, the El Daoud 18:05, 14 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Please don't put words into my mouth!!!!  I was not actually the one who first united those two clauses into a sentence, and the sentence doesn't necessarily imply any logical connection between the two clauses (I have no objection to breaking it up into two separate sentences).  Bevin was not a failure because of any political position that he took, but rather because he conspicuously failed to achieve any single one of the British government's publicly-stated policy goals for Palestine (and even seemed to go out of his way to take actions which made it even more difficult than it already otherwise might have been to achieve the British government's publicly-stated policy goals for Palestine).  I object to your substitute because it obscures or whitewashes over the fact that Bevin conspicuously failed to achieve any single one of the British government's publicly-stated policy goals for Palestine. AnonMoos 03:01, 15 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Fair enough.  What do you think of my new proposal? --(Ptah, the El Daoud 03:56, 17 May 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Bevin's failure in Palestine

message: If as a result of his tactless boorish remarks ("queue-jumping" etc.) Bevin had managed to get the Arabs to agree to a compromise plan, then he would be remembered today as a brilliant manoeuvering diplomatic strategist.  However, since instead the result was that he caused many Jews to intensely hate him, and offended many Americans, without thereby making the Arabs at all more likely to assent to any proposal which included any element of Jewish sovereignty whatsoever, therefore he is now largely remembered as an overall failure who took an already-screwed up Middle East situation, and gratuitously screwed it up even further through his inability to restrain some of his less endearing personality characteristics. AnonMoos 04:07, 3 July 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: This is editorializing.  Even if Bevin had acted like the proper English gentleman who led his party, he would have been hated by Zionists of all backgrounds (be they judged by nationality, race and/or religion) because of his fundamental political stance on the issue.  The Foreign Office (let alone the ruling Labour Party) was split on the issue, and there is every reason to believe that a Zionist Labour representative would have riled as many feathers by positively infuriating the (already furious) Palestinians (as well as the neighboring Arab states).  Did Bevin fail at his mission? Yes.  Is there any reason to believe that a polite Zionist or a two-stater with genuine sympathy for both sides of the mother of all arguments would have succeeded where Bevin failed? No.  Consequently, while we should recognize that Bevin failed at his mission, and we should recognize that he was dangerously divisive, we should not pretend that his failure is the sole defining element of his career.  Historians who specialize in Labour politics or even British politics in the first half of the last century will argue that Bevin played a vital role in the establishment of the Labour party as a vibrant political force.  --(Ptah, the El Daoud 05:04, 3 July 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Another person might not have succeeded, but another person might not have gratuitously pointlessly and unnecessarily inflamed the situation by his undiplomatic behavior, either.  You can call it "editorializing", but it has a lot to do with why his name is execrated in circles where the internal history of the British Labour Party is not of much interest. AnonMoos 06:09, 3 July 2007 (UTC)

text: He may have been a very fine political trade-union organizer within the British Labor party, but he was was an overwhelming objective failure as a diplomat in middle-eastern affairs (considering that he ignominiously failed to achieve any single one of the British government's publicly-stated goals in that region), and he was widely "execrated" at the time by a very large number of Jews (in Palestine and elsewhere), and by many Americans who had an interest in the region at the time -- and he continues to be execrated by those who did not find his brutal tactlessness or surly boorish churlishness to be endearing, and who remember (or have been told by those who remember) how his failures negatively impacted on them or their families. AnonMoos (talk) 21:24, 28 November 2007 (UTC)

text: . As for AnonMoos, the comment above is difficult to square with WP:NPOV and can be ignored. Anyway, here's some of the great heap of published material *about* Bevin. Anyone who cared to do the necessary research could write a quality article on Bevin which didn't give undue weight to any part of his career or any single viewpoint. Have fun, Angus McLellan  (Talk) 12:45, 29 November 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Whatever -- my comments directly above could not be incorporated into the article in that particular form (and I was not proposing that they be incorporated into the article in that particular form), but nevertheless they are a basically factual explanation of why it is that Bevin's memory is far from being universally venerated (and it's an objective fact that his memory IS far from being universally venerated).  We can discuss his trade union and internal labor party successes in the sections devoted to those aspects of his career, and can discuss his middle-eastern diplomacy failures in the section devoted to that particular aspect of his career, without any necessary conflict between the two. AnonMoos (talk) 00:20, 30 November 2007 (UTC)

text: You're probably right in that this is just a typographical error.  The Wikipedia way is to just make the correction on the main page yourself (you could mark this one as a 'minor' edit by ticking the box at the bottom).  Politely noting the reasons for your change on this page (as you have done) is also a good idea.  In Wikipedia every user is an editor and you don't have to ask permission before diving in.Blakkandekka (talk) 10:28, 24 February 2010 (UTC)
thread_title: The issue in a nutshell

message: I edited the paragraph
'Bevin was undeniably a plain-spoken man, some of whose remarks struck many as insensitive, but his biographer Alan Bullock rejects suggestions that he was motivated by personal anti-Semitism. The historian Howard Sachar cites a source which suggests otherwise. Sachar quotes a remark by Richard Grossman, a Labour Party MP and a member of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry into the Problems of European Jewry and Palestine, who met Bevin on 4 August 1947. Sachar claims that Grossman described Bevin's outlook as:
"corresponding roughly with the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, a notorious anti-Semitic canard of the 1920s[6]. The main points of Bevin's discourse were ... that the Jews had successfully organised a worldwide conspiracy against Britain and against him personally."[7]'
last night to include a comment that the references to [Richard] Grossman should be replaced by references to [Richard] Crossman. This edit was deleted without the suggested changes being made. 
There was no Labout MP Richard Grossman in 1947. I have checked lists of members of parliament published in Whitakers Almanac for for 1946 (the first year after the 1945 general election) and for 1950 (the last publication before the 1950 general election).  In addition I have checked against the possibility that someone of this name entered parliament at a by-election after 1946 and left before 1950 on the page "List of United Kingdom by-elections (1931–1950)".  The fact that additional material in footnote 7 ascribes very similar sentiments to Richard Crossman, and that Richard Crossman fits the description given exactly, suggests that Grossman is just a mis-typing of Crossman. I don't know whether such a mis-typing arose in Howard Sachar's work or in the writing of this Wikipedia page.  However it arose, I do think that it could usefully be corrected, and therefore I am disappointed that this was not done when the error had been highlighted. 
Martin Lunnon  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 91.125.99.127 (talk) 20:48, 23 February 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: You're probably right in that this is just a typographical error.  The Wikipedia way is to just make the correction on the main page yourself (you could mark this one as a 'minor' edit by ticking the box at the bottom).  Politely noting the reasons for your change on this page (as you have done) is also a good idea.  In Wikipedia every user is an editor and you don't have to ask permission before diving in.Blakkandekka (talk) 10:28, 24 February 2010 (UTC)
thread_title: Minor point/correction

message: Who put the text in this article about the Palmach? It was NOT an American Zionist organisation, as the text implied, but a military unit of the Haganah.Scott Adler 23:13, 3 July 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Palmach??

message: 1. Has it been established who in the British government allowed al-Kaukji's army into Palestine in February, 1948? 
2. Who was responsible for the transfer of the Arab Legion to "Transjordanian" control, with its British personnel infrastructure in place? Was the Imperial General Staff still in control during the Battle of Latrun? 
3. Who ordered the RAF to intervene in unmarked aircraft in the later stages of the war? 
4. Who was responsibile for isolatint UN representatives and preventing them from doing their jobs?
5. Who ordered "Operation Chaos" -- the British government's policy of shutting down the mandate by ripping out phones, burning files, and doing whatever it could to prevent an orderly transfer of power to any successor state?
Was Bevin responsible for any of this? And does Bevin share any blame for the Indian partition disaster?
When I have time, I'll add some text regarding the amusing behavior of UK diplomats at the UN following the withdrawal. It demonstrated remarkably childish stubbornness. Scott Adler 00:39, 3 July 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Request details of the Mandate Collapse: Who gave the orders?

message: Don't want to monotonously harp on a single theme, but the recent edit of an anonymous IP, boiling down all references to Bevin's quasi-inflammatory remarks (and their effects) to the clause "his policies inspired resentment and violence from both Arabs and Jews", is completely inadequate. Arabs were of course disappointed that Britain didn't side with the Arabs against the Jews outright -- but many Arabs were in fact moderately or guardedly satisfied with the general trend of British Palestine policy under Bevin, while many Jews had feelings of resentment and even rage.
In 1946-47, Jewish leaders didn't necessarily insist that the problems of Jewish displaced persons in Europe were worse than other problems of displaced persons (whatever the word "worse" would even mean in such a context), but they did insist that the problem of Jewish displaced persons had certain very special and unique features, and that the Jewish displaced persons had some needs (beyond food, clothing, and shelter) that had to be dealt with almost immediately (and which couldn't wait for the slow negotiation of the Ultimate Grand Diplomatic Settlement of All European Problems and/or the Ultimate Grand Diplomatic Settlement of All Middle-Eastern Problems). If staying "in the queue" meant that the special problems of the Jewish situation would not be recognized, and that urgent needs of Jewish refugees would not be dealt with, then Jewish leaders were not willing to wait in the queue, and they were not in the slightest degree ashamed or embarrassed about not being willing to wait in the queue -- and many Jews became grimly determined to make Britain pay as high a price as possible for Bevin's attempts to make them wait in the queue (something which did not lay a foundation of goodwill for the success of British middle-eastern policies). AnonMoos (talk) 08:45, 8 July 2008 (UTC)
thread_title: "His policies inspired resentment and violence from both Arabs and Jews"

message: AnonMoos, please provide reliable sources if you want to keep the sentence: Bevin failed to secure the stated British objectives in this area of foreign policy.  
When somebody's bluff is called, it means that, when challenged, they fail to carry out a threat. In this case, Bevin threatened, then did, hand the problem of Palestine to the UN to solve.
-- ZScarpia (talk) 00:14, 17 March 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: The stated British policy objectives were a peaceful settlement of the situation, above all avoiding involuntary population transfers and anything that could be considered a religious war.  It's hard to think of one single publicly-stated significant British policy objective which Bevin did manage to achieve in Palestine itself; the most that can be said is that he managed to salvage some of Britain's influence and alliances with Arabs elsewhere from the unmitigated Palestine fiasco (until Suez 1956 later blew much of that away, of course). It says something similar further down in the article: "the very opposite of what Bevin seems to have wanted" etc.  Furthermore, I only inserted the "call bluff" wording as a desperation maneuver to insert some kind of finite verb in a sentence which is somewhat incomprehensible without one.  Feel free to reword it -- as long as what results is not an incomprehensible sentence lacking punctuation, and not having any finite verb present until four clauses and over 25 words in... AnonMoos (talk) 05:47, 17 March 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: I'll change the latter sentence, but you've managed to transform its meaning to the complete opposite of what it should mean: the source actually says that Bevin "called the bluff" of the other parties. The rules say that sources should be provided when statements are likely to be challenged, meaning that, if they are challenged, which they are likely to be if they are not clearly true or non-controversial, they can be justified. If you want to keep the text about Bevin failing to secure the stated British objectives, then please provide a source stating that or, failing that, a sources listing the stated British objectives.      -- ZScarpia (talk) 11:30, 17 March 2010 (UTC)

text: On second thoughts, maybe there was some mutual bluff calling going on. My dictionary's definition of calling someone's bluff is: to expose or challenge someone's show of strength, confidence, etc.. It would be correct to say that the Jewish representatives, at least, were "challenging" Bevin's "show of strength" (the Arab representatives didn't care whether Bevin carried out his threat or not).   -- ZScarpia (talk) 12:54, 17 March 2010 (UTC)
thread_title: Bevin, Palestine and Israel - British policy objectives

message: In The Debate About 1948 chapter of The Israel/Palestine Question (edited by Ilan Pappé), Avi Shlaim writes about the differences between the new and old history accounts of the events of 1948, including the role of Ernest Bevin and British policy:
"Zionist historiography, reflecting the suspicions of Zionist
leaders at that time, is laden with charges of hostile plots that are alleged to have been
hatched against the Yishuv during the twilight of British rule in Palestine. The central
charge is that Britain armed and secretly encouraged her Arab allies, and especially her
client, King Abdullah of Jordan, to invade Palestine upon expiry of the British Mandate
and do battle with the Jewish state as soon as it came into the world. For Ernest Bevin,
the foreign secretary in the Labour government headed by Clement Attlee, is reserved the
role of chief villain in this alleged conspiracy."
"The key to British policy during
this period is summed up by Pappé in two words: Greater Transjordan. Bevin felt that if
Palestine had to be partitioned, the Arab area could not be left to stand on its own but
should be united with Transjordan. A Greater Transjordan would compensate Britain for
the loss of bases in Palestine. Hostility to Hajj Amin al-Husayni, who had cast his lot
with the Nazis during World War II, and hostility to a Palestinian state, which in British
eyes was always equated with a Mufti state, were important and constant features of
British policy after the war. By February 1948, Bevin and his Foreign Office advisers
were pragmatically reconciled to the inevitable emergence of the Jewish state. What they
were not reconciled to was the emergence of a Palestinian state."
"The policy of Greater Transjordan implied discreet support for a bid by Abdullah ... to enlarge his
kingdom by taking over the West Bank. At a secret meeting in London on 7 February
1948, Bevin gave Tawfiq Abul Huda, Jordan’s prime minister, the green light to send the
Arab Legion into Palestine immediately following the departure of the British forces. But
Bevin also warned Jordan not to invade the area allocated by the UN to the Jews. An
attack on Jewish state territory, he said, would compel Britain to withdraw her subsidy
and officers from the Arab Legion. Far from being driven by blind anti-Semitic prejudice
to unleash the Arab Legion against the Jews, Bevin in fact urged restraint on the Arabs in
general and on Jordan in particular."
"If Bevin was guilty of conspiring to unleash the Arab Legion, his target was not the
Jews but the Palestinians. The prospect of a Palestinian state was pretty remote in any
case because the Palestinians themselves had done so little to build it. But by supporting
Abdullah’s bid to capture the Arab part of Palestine adjacent to his kingdom, Bevin
indirectly helped to ensure that the Palestinian state envisaged in the UN partition plan
would be stillborn. In short, if there is a case to be made against Bevin, it is not that he
tried to abort the birth of the Jewish state but that he endorsed the understanding between
King Abdullah and the Jewish Agency to partition Palestine between themselves and
leave the Palestinians out in the cold."
"The Zionist charge that Bevin deliberately instigated hostilities in Palestine and gave
encouragement and arms to the Arabs to crush the infant Jewish state thus represents
almost the exact opposite of the historical truth as it emerges from the British, Arab, and
Israeli documents. The charge is without substance and may be safely discarded as the
first in the series of myths that have come to surround the founding of the State of Israel."
    ←   ZScarpia   00:34, 23 April 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: Not sure why there's such emphasis on 1948, when Bevin actually did most of his damage before 1948.  What happened in 1948 was pretty much paying the piper for his multitudinous pre-1948 failures... AnonMoos (talk) 00:57, 23 April 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: P.S.  In any case, a rather large number of Palestinian Arabs in early 1948 thought that Palestine would naturally be annexed by whichever Arab state managed to play the leading role in throwing the Jews into the sea during the upcoming battles, and many of them were not too upset by the idea, viewing it as another step on the way to the goal of pan-Arab unification.  The main individuals who were strongly attached to the idea of a separate Palestinian Arab state were a relatively small group of personally ambitious "notables" (of whom Nazi collaborator Haj Amin al-Husseini was the most prominent figure), who had shown a lot more talent for self-seeking political intrigues than for any of the hard work involved in constructively building a nation. As far as I can tell, most of the material in your quote refers to Bevin simply choosing not to put the weight of British support behind the Husseini faction -- and considering the history of the preceding dozen years (from Husseini being one of the leading figures behind the 1936 revolt against the British in Palestine, to his more recent meeting with Adolf Hitler) I don't really see any compelling reason why Bevin should have chosen to go out on a limb in supporting Husseini at that point.  If the British had simply refrained from appointing Husseini as Mufti of Jerusalem in 1921, then history might have turned out a lot better for all sides... AnonMoos (talk) 11:21, 24 April 2010 (UTC)
thread_title: Avi Shlaim - The Debate about 1948

message: The text currently suggests that Bevin's opposition to Jewish actions in Palestine was "motivated by personal anti-Semitism"
This is based on a quotation from Crossman ("(Bernie) had become convinced that the Jews were organising a world conspiracy against poor old Britain and, in particular, against poor old Ernie"), but IMO it is taken out of context. In context, it reads like this:
"Ernest Bevin felt himself unbearably provoked when the Jews wantonly rejected his solution of their problem. The provocation grew when he discovered that the Russians were exploiting the issue against him and, and even worse, the Americans were ganging up with the Russians. Driven by a frightening mixture of anger and violent self-pity, he became convinced that the Jews were organising a world conspiracy against poor old Britain and, in particular, against poor old Ernie. Of course, there were plenty of sound reasons why any British Foreign Secretary at this time would have been angry with Mr. Truman..."
Thus, Crossman is describing Bevin's emotional reaction to a specific, unusually strained moment in the crisis, in which the two other Great Powers, who were each other's main Cold War rivals, seemed to be be uniting against him. Crossman is not describing Bevin's preliminary opinion about the Jews in general, or some kind of principled, ingrained anti-Semitism that he had always held. It cannot be claimed that his conviction (that the Jews were organising a conspiracy), which is cited here as evidence of anti-Semitism, had "motivated" his position in the Palestinian conflict, because this conviction arose only in a certain critical moment in that conflict, when his overall position had already long been a fact. The tense is not past perfect ("had become"), as in the quote in the text, but past simple ("became").
The significance of this quotation is first exaggerated by Sachar, who compares it to the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion", when he does not even have a direct quotation from Bevin but only a very approximate description of Bevin's alleged feelings by Crossman. Still, judging from the available excerpts, even Sachar does not state directly that Bevin was personally anti-Semitic, and he does not venture to claim that a pre-conceived anti-Semitic bias had motivated Bevin's overall position on the Palestinian conflict from the start. These steps are taken by the Wikipedia editor here - and they constitute Original Research.--91.148.159.4 (talk) 23:01, 1 June 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: Well written. I agree.       ←   ZScarpia   15:39, 27 August 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: yes i agree too.  Rjensen (talk) 22:14, 25 September 2015 (UTC)
thread_title:  Allegation of anti-Semitism - OR 

message: Perhaps it's me but IMO the picture showing his bust looks nothing like him at all.
Wouldn't be the slightest surprised if it's a mistake.  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.31.250.123 (talk) 09:56, 25 September 2015 (UTC)
thread_title:  Picture: Bust of Bevin 

message: The claim the Israel and Transjordan had reached an agreement not to attack each other is, as far as I can tell, a pet fringe theory promoted by Avi Shlaim, and debunked by multiple other historians (not to mention being clearly false - see Battles of Latrun (1948)). In any case, the statement in the article was not sourced, and I replaced it with a sourced one. It is questionable if any of this even belongs in a biography of Bevin, unless sources are provided to show that he personally participated in the alleged collusion. Bad Dryer (talk) 15:58, 19 October 2015 (UTC)
thread_title:  Jordan 

message: Isaac Herzog, leader of the Israeli ZU alliance (i.e. old Israel Labor party) compared Jeremy Corbyn to Bevin, saying: "Corbyn represents a consistent stance of hatred toward Israel, like the infamous Ernest Bevin, and like Bevin, who failed, Corbyn will fail, as well." --- AnonMoos (talk) 23:15, 2 July 2016 (UTC)
thread_title: Bevin in the news (late June 2016)

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thread_title:  External links modified 

message: Aneurin Bevan is the only person listed in section # 8 See also (and in an unusual way). Is he listed only because he and Bevin are sometimes confused? Mcljlm (talk) 18:30, 20 July 2022 (UTC)
thread_title:  See also