Talk:Logical positivism

message: # both scientific-method empiricism and logical proofs are accepted
# logic positivism is related but not necessarily tautological to logicalism = the claim that everything that can exist has logical foundations (they don’t have to be scientoempirically observed and be mathematically proven [at least all of them] because the possible substantialities are infinite). Logicalism isn't against proofs, but there cannot be infinite proofs and aren't trivially generalizable/ the omniuniversal axiomatics [omniaxiomatics] = the axiomatic system which includes all axiomatic systems isn't a finite theory (many axiomatic systems are mutually exclusive; but theoretically an infinite axiomatic program [axiomatic programs work better than axiomatic lists in complex systems] would be able to manage it; but existence is always local and never infinite [see: Hubble volume/ an infinite physical computer would face causality fragmentation]
# the axiomatic prerequisites for common mathematics isn't tautological to the axiomatic prerequisites for physical foundations (which are tree-like axiomatic programs and not necessarily typical axiomatic systems)/ The foundations of mathematics have innate logical gaps because mathematics is a generic measuring-calculational-proof-scientific [not ontological in itself] axiomatic system. Any effort to complete the foundations of mathematics is either erroneous, or produces one of the infinite possible allomathematics (mathematics with different axioms). Infinite physics and universes are logically possible. The foundations of a universe have to be built on an axiomatic tree-program without logical gaps, but that produces only biased (one out of many) universe. There's no single universe.
# overscientification: The erroneous claim that science has to focus only on our universe (without proof on why science is limited), usually claimed by mathematicians (like Sabine Hossenfelder) which cancel themselves, because mathematics is compatible (due to logic) but not tautological to physics (and to its foundations)
# problems of axiomaticity/ axiomatic systems: incompleteness, inconsistency, uncalculability. The physical foundations don't have to be a closed system (open systems work better in axiomatic program trees which meet the criteria of physical foundations)
# axiomatic workarounds/ ways of the physical foundations to workaround without to cancel the problems of axiomaticity/ axiomatic systems: Heisenberg's uncertainty principle isn't fundamental in quantum field theory (the overall wavefunction has one definition); but in the infinite series of Wigner's friends it becomes important (still though the overall wavefunction has one definition, but it's not trivially infinite)
# Some people who work on physicalism are Christians, and others are simplistic. Physicalism = the claim that everything that can exist is physical (cyclic and hollow nondefinition), isn't tautological to logicalism = the claim that everything that can exist has logical foundations
# logicalism/logicogony = cosmogony from logical foundations vs nihilogony = cosmogony due to the decay of the permanently nonexistent nothing[ness] into something/ universes
#* If you are a logicalist, you deem the logical foundations self-caused if they are rigorous (the physical foundations can have logical gaps as an open system, but these gaps have to be filled by tree-like axiomatics/ practically logical gaps aren't allowed on the physical foundations, but the logical completeness requires self-interactions and in some cases tree-like axiomatics = family tree of mathematically related universes. Most universes are mathematically nonparallelizable. Not all univeses belong in the same axiomatic tree = multiverse. There is no true omniverse/ the omnimultiverse isn't a true system; the full collection of universes is just a set; not all univeses are mathematically related.
#* nihilogony isn't compatible with logicogony  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2A02:2149:8B27:5500:E8B1:EBBE:FDD:980D (talk) 06:27, 28 April 2023 (UTC)
thread_title:  Things to focus (on) 

message: What more can be said about it? Understandably, those with sufficient interest in topic to spend their time at work on this entry would include cultists. But one might wish for a more neutral point of view.
Badiacrushed (talk) 11:50, 25 April 2017 (UTC)
thread_title: A 'Cultish' article

message: Many sentences are written in appallingly poor English, e.g. missing a vital auxiliary verb.   — Preceding unsigned comment added by 92.2.222.183 (talk) 10:55, 6 July 2014 (UTC)
thread_title: Can someone find the time to edit the whole article properly?

message: I think everyone is missing the point of how important this philosophy is to the advancement of science and civilization.  Philosophy of Science is a major development following Logical Positivism, which followed Empiricism and its offshoot Dialectical Materialism.  These matters are not just armchair mental gymnastics, but precursors to political and sociological events.  Because of the sloppy history of philosophy, science can be promoted as a political theory or psychological aberration.  Besides relegating all of historic philosophy to meaningless babble, LP advances a new definition of Science.  It is our obligation to advance this tighter definition of Science from mysticism in psychology, sociology, political "science", anthropology, medicine, etc., to new physical sciences based on observation, measurement and inter-subjective confirmation. Danarothrock (talk) 09:21, 10 September 2012 (UTC)
thread_title: Section one (originally without title) 

message: User:Knucmo2 has inserted a Cleanup tag. I don't know very well Wikipedia etiquette, but perhaps one can use the talk page to suggest improvements. I don’t see in talk anything from User:Knucmo2. So I ask: what’s the problem? [[Murzim 15:51, 25 March 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: I think that you have made a worthy contribution to the article, and that it should be saved. I also think that the flow of the article could be improved. You have made the intellectual connections clear. However what precisely the logical positivist project is, and how the encyclopeadia is relevant should be retained at the opening of the article. I'll try and edit along these lines. Sholto Maud 02:54, 27 March 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: The article now sounds better: it's well organized. Thanks. [[Murzim 08:15, 27 March 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Cleanup 

message: The definitions of analytic and synthetic statements given in this article are completely wrong.  An analytic statement is one in which the predicate is contained in the subject; the famous example is "all bachelors are men."  Simply through an analysis of the concept of "bachelor," we can deduce that, a bachelor being an unmarried man, man is contained in the subject, bachelor.  Synthetic propositions amplify their subject through their predicate, and, depending on whether one accepts Kant or not, can be either a priori (Kant) or only a posteriori. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 209.243.39.242 (talk • contribs) .
: Could you expand on your definition of synthetic statement. How does one 'amplify' a subject through a predicate? How are you using the term 'amplify' here? And how can one measure the degree of amplification? I think Strawson, and Quine had different definitions. Sholto Maud 11:31, 9 February 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: There are different definitions about analytic and synthetic statements. The first definition was introduced by Kant. An analytic statement is one in which the concept of the predicate is contained in the concept of the subject. A synthetic statement is one in which the concept of the predicate is not contained in concept of the subject. According to Kant, analytic statements explicate the concept of the subject, while synthetic statements add a predicate to the concept of the subject. Kant conjugated this distinction with the distinction between a priori and a posteriori. A statement is a priori when its true does not depend from the experience, otherwise it is a posteriori. Kant recognized three kinds of statements: analytic a priori (e.g. every body occupies a space), synthetic a posteriori (e.g. every body is heavy), and synthetic a priori (e.g. 7+5=12). According to Kant, mathematical statements are synthetic a priori, and the theoretical principles of physics  are synthetic a priori.From the point of view of logical positivism, an analytic statement is one which is true (or false) by means of the meaning of the terms that occur in the statement; otherwise it is synthetic. The distinction between a priori and a posteriori is the same as Kant. According to logical positivism, mathematical statements are analytic a priori; the principles of physics (and in general every scientific statement) are synthetic a posteriori. There are not synthetic a priori statements. Carnap in Philosophical Foundations of Physics distinguishes the following kinds of statements:L-statements, which are true or false by the rule of logic alone: they are true or false by the meaning of the logical terms, such as OR, AND, IF, NOT, EVERY, EXISTS (e.g. rain or not rain). They are a priori.A-statements, which are true or false by the meaning of the term, including not logical terms (e.g. all bachelors are men). They are a priori.P-determined statements (P stands for Postulate, i.e. Axiom), which are implied by the axioms of the scientific theory (they are P-true) or whose negation is implied by the axioms (they are P-false). They are synthetic a posteriori.Not determined statements, which are independent from the axioms. They can be factually true or false. They are synthetic a posteriori.According to Quine, the distinction between analytic and synthetic is untenable.Finally, I think that the distinction between analytic and synthetic in the article is oversimplified. [[Murzim 13:56, 15 March 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Thank you for your considered response. Perhaps you should consider ammending some of the article on this topic. I notice that you have not addressed the first definition of synthetic above that talks about the "amplification" of the subject. Also, the statement "There are not synthetic a priori statements." is that an absolute statement of a staement of how logical positivists view the situation? I have read authors claiming that synthetic a priori statements are possible and necessary. Sholto Maud 21:05, 15 March 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: "There are not synthetic a priori statements" is the basic philosophical principle of logical positivism. From the Vienna Circle Manifesto: "It is precisely in the rejection of the possibility of synthetic knowledge a priori that the basic thesis of modern empiricism lies." (Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener Kreis, 1929; English translation The Scientific Conception of the World. The Vienna Circle, in Sarkar, Sahotra (ed.), The Emergence of Logical Empiricism: from 1900 to the Vienna Circle, New York: Garland Publishing, 1996, p. 330). I cannot address the first definition of synthetic above that talks about the "amplification" of the subject; however, the "amplification" of the subject is a notion introduced by Kant. [[Murzim 18:06, 16 March 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Just Plain Wrong: Analytic/Synthetic 

message: "...not an axiomatic system that's unable prove its own consistency."
:Under the heading "Philosophy of Science," the following sentence needs fixup. (I suggest changing "and" to "which" and inserting "and" before "while". But I don't want to mess with something that is far from my area of expertise.):
:"Upon the global defeat of Nazism, and removed from philosophy rivals for radical reform—Marburg neo-Kantianism, Husserlian phenomenology, Heidegger's "existential hermeneutics"—while hosted in the climate of American pragmatism and commonsense empiricism, the neopositivists shed much of their earlier, revolutionary zeal.[1]"  RogerKni (talk) 17:54, 11 January 2016 (UTC)
replies: text: I'm going to go ahead and change "removed" to "the removal", and insert "and" before "while". If this isn't right, please correct my correction.  RogerKni (talk) 03:34, 12 January 2016 (UTC)
thread_title:  Grammatical Error? 

message: Do any of the contributors to this page know what the idea of unified science is? It is a topic that is in Enc. Brittanica but not Wikipedia, so it would be great if we could fill the hole. Pcb21| Pete 2 July 2005 22:53 (UTC)
:I think the issue of unified science is that often known as "the unity of science".  I've created a very cursory entry on that rather large topic in philosophy of science. philosofool 12 July 2005
You must read "The International Encyclopedia of Unified Science" by Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap and Charles Morris (Neo-Positivists of the Vienna Circle).  There are discussions of the various approaches to many "sciences" - biology (morphology, physiology, genetics, organism, cell, diversity, structure, chemistry, etc.), cosmology (distance, redshift, expansion, material distribution, relativity, etc., this was before the "Big Bang" 1938), psychology (Mind vs. brain, phenomenological introspection, objectivity, consciousness, intentionalism, functionalism, psychoanalysis, Gestalt, behaviorism, etc.)
Otto Neurath - "I. Unity of Science Movement - Unified science became historically the subject of this Encyclopedia as a result of the efforts of the unity of science movement, which includes scientists and persons interested in science who are conscious of the importance of a universal scientific attitude."  Danarothrock (talk) 09:58, 10 September 2012 (UTC)
thread_title: [[Unified Science]]

message: Aren't those articles talking about the same thing? See sociological positivism (aka positivism in social sciences)? Technical note: at present this article redirects to a section in positivism disambig. --Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus Talk 23:57, 8 September 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  Difference between logical and sociological postivism? 

message: Did logical positivists, Popper, etc distinguish between false assertions made to mislead ("No, I don't have a knife behind my back.", "The Chinese sharpen their teeth.", "There is no global warming."), those that are made through accepted wisdom ("There are fairies in the forest.", "The moon is only half a mile up.", "There are WMDs in Iraq."), and those that are mistakes of cognition, perception and recollection ("My keys are on the table.", "Only a mile or so to go.", "George Bush has cut public expenditure.")?  I include the political examples because they can be considered the result of a concerted effort to deceive, but the people I imagine making the assertions are not all lying. I bring this up
a) because the article does not discuss modes of nonsense
b) because the quote
"Otto Neurath famously compared science to a boat which we must rebuild on the open sea." 
reminds me that I suspect that the main impediment to the development of science and its application outside of the scientific establishment is the utility to a relatively small class of the malicious propagation of fantasies.
Another aspect not discussed in this article is the psychological necessity of fantasy. Did they have anything to say about that? And did Jung, for instance, have anything to say about Logical Positivism?
Mr. Jones 10:56, 18 October 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  Malicious, accepted and mistaken nonsense 

message: "Although Karl Popper belonged to the Vienna Circle in his early days, he became the main critic of the neo-positivist approach." This contradicts claims that Popper was not part of the Circle, e.g. the Vienna Circle article. Could someone check this out, and clarify in a reply to this message? Thomas Ash 03:26, 1 December 2005 (GMT)
"Although he was friendly with some of the Circle's members and shared their esteem for science, Popper's hostility towards Wittgenstein alienated Schlick, and he was never invited to become a member of the group." 
As to "main critic", Popper supported many of the LP propositions - verifiability, falsifiability, meaninglessness of metaphysics, etc., and was quoted in many LP works.  Danarothrock (talk) 10:22, 10 September 2012 (UTC)
thread_title: Karl Popper

message: I'm now modifying the list of logical positivists. I've listed the members of Vienna Circle. I'll list the members of Berlin Circle, and then non-German speaking philosophers (Ayer, Polish philosophers, Scandinavian philosophers: Ake Petzäll, Eino Kaila, and von Wright, Danish philosopher Joergen Joergensen), and finally the contributors of International Encyclopedia. Suggestions are welcome. [[Murzim 19:50, 18 March 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Murzim has done alot of work. :) If only there were some way of having this formally recognised in formal academic circles. Sholto Maud 00:50, 20 March 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  List of Logical Positivists 

message: Should we move the entire list of publications of the Encyclopeadi of Unified science to it's own separate page, or merge it with the pages on unified science, and make reference to the publication on the logical positivism page so as to cut the overall size down a bit?
Sholto Maud 08:07, 2 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Unified science

message: Surely the analystic/synthetic distinction is standardly associated with Kant? In the introduction it makes it sound like the logical positivists were the first to think of it, and Hume is referenced in stead of Kant. Any thoughts? Cadr 13:09, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Analystic/synthetic

message: As it stands now, the "Criticisms" section is far below the lists of people associated with Logical Positivism.  My concern is that when reading through the article sequentially a reader will get the impression that when these lists start the substantive part of the article is over and stop reading unless he/she is looking for such a list or a bibliography... and thus those readers will never even get to the Criticism section.
So I propose moving the Criticisms section just below the end of the "Unified Science" paragraph.  Or, if the lists of people could be seperated from the bodies of the "Einheitswissenschaft", "International Encyclopedia of Unified Science", and "Monographs on the Scientific World-Conception" sub-sections then the Criticisms section would fit after those, but before the lists of people, as well.  Thoughts?  -- noosphere 22:47, 13 May 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Perhaps "Criticism" can be put after "The assertions and origins of logical positivism". I agree that "Criticism" is now too below. [[Murzim 09:30, 16 May 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Misplaced Criticisms section 

message: Sholto Maud asked clarifications about the statement that “Logical positivism denied the soundness of metaphysics and traditional philosophy, and affirmed that statements about metaphysics, religion and ethics are devoid of cognitive meaning and thus nothing but expression of feelings or desires”. He asked some references. Here there are some references:
Rudolf Carnap, Pseudoproblems in philosophy (1928)
Rudolf Carnap, The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language (1932)
Rudolf Carnap, Philosophy and Logical Syntax (1935), in particular the chapter “The Rejection of Metaphysics”
Alfred Julius Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic (1936), in particular the chapter “A Critique of Ethics and Theology”
Moritz Schlick, What is the Aim of Ethics? (1930)
Charles Leslie Stevenson, The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms (1937)
Perhaps the assertion above can be more clearly formulated in these terms:
“Logical positivism denied the soundness of metaphysics and traditional philosophy, and affirmed that the assertions of metaphysics, religion and prescriptive ethics are devoid of cognitive meaning and thus nothing but expression of feelings or desires”
[[Murzim 20:00, 16 June 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Thankyou again Murzim for your work. I would like to clarify the revised formulation if possible: a) does logical positivism asserts that  expressions of feelings or desires are not "sound"; b) what is "soundness in this sense?; c) what is an example of "cognitive meaning" (there is no entry on this)?; and d) what is the philosophical consequence if something has no cognitive meaning: i.e. why were the logical positivists concerned to emphasise that feelings had no cognitive meaning? (Is this important for the unity of science?) Sholto Maud 10:11, 3 July 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Logical positivism, metaphysics, religion and ethics 

message: I'm thinking that the content of the texts referred to here might go better in separate articles each dedicated specifically to the publication. Any objections if I move the contents to separate articles? Sholto Maud 11:44, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Unified Science

message: As far as I know the statement about Quine in the last paragraph is dubious, it need's to be explained and there should be a citiation. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 58.105.111.91 (talk) 
:Yes, and I've tagged it as such.  Quine had criticisms of logical positivism of course, but it's quite inaccurate to say that one of his criticisms was that logical positivism tried to "provide truth conditions for science independent of its historical paradigm". I assume that this is a reference to Quine's confirmation holism, but unlike Kuhn, Quine didn't have a particular interest in the sociology of science or "historical paradigms", so it would be misleading at best to summarize his view on confirmation holism as a claim that science is (or ought to be) situated within historical paradigms. But in any case, this misses the bigger point of his attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction. --Delirium 09:09, 22 January 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: I think that the reference is to Quine's criticism of analytic-synthetic and of reductionism in Two Dogmas of Empiricism, and thus I've consequently updated the text. Murzim 19:59, 28 January 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Quine 

message: Why are many of the linked names near the middle of the article bolded as well? It is distracting. If it serves no purpose, either remove it, or give me the OK and I'll remove it. Thanks. --Steevven1 (Talk) (Contribs) (Gallery) 16:01, 23 March 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Bolded names? 

message: I think that the presence of De Finetti in the section dedicated to the influences of logical positivism on Italian philosophy is probably a misunderstanding. I cite from M.C. Galavotti, Kinds of Probabilism.
"Reichenbach, Carnap and de Finetti represent divergent conceptions of probability, in many ways irreconcilable, despite the fact that all of these authors share an empiricist approach rooted in the work of authors like E. Mach and H. Poincaré . In addition to this common background, Reichenbach and Carnap share the logical empiricist matrix, while de Finetti embraces the pragmatism of C.S. Peirce and W. James, though filtered through the work of the Italian thinkers M. Calderoni, G. Vailati and A. Aliotta. The main consequence of this philosophical choice is the different attitude taken towards rationality. Albeit based on different notions of probability, the theories of both Carnap and Reichenbach are sustained by a strong notion of rationality, while de Finetti perspective is deeply anti-rationalist. In addition, de Finetti subjectivism is inspired by what today we would call an anti-realist philosophy, whereas Reichenbach and Carnap seem rather oriented towards some form of realism, at least taken as methodological realism."
I'll remove the reference to De Finetti, if there are not oppositions. Murzim 18:48, 24 April 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  De Finetti 

message: I thought there used to be such a category, was it deleted? Is there any objection for creating one? Nadavvv 18:13, 2 July 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  category: logical positivsm 

message: Does anyone mind if I delete the link to Cosma Rohilla Shalizi's essay 'Logical Positivism'? It is, IMHO, neither informative nor well-informed. I was particularly struck by his comment that there are no living verificationists. -- (Iolasov 01:39, 23 July 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Editing Links 

message: This version for the criticism section is easier to understand and, more importantly, it is more interesting to read than the current version. What do you think? A.Z. 01:18, 10 September 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Criticism 

message: Is this claim true?
: Although Popper's philosophy of science enjoyed great popularity for some years, if his criterion is construed as an answer to the question the positivists were asking, it turns out to fail in exactly parallel ways.
Not only is the claim unsourced, but it seems untrue.
I don't see how Popper's falsifiability criterion is liable to the same objections as positivism. Positivism failed because it defined all statements outside of empirical observation and tautology as meaningless, which would include their statements. But Popper does not claim that unscientific statements are meaningless, so he could easily claim that his statements are unscientific but true nevertheless, or at least useful. He could simply claim that he is discussing the philosophy of science which is not scientific itself but which is nevertheless true and important.
If the claim from the article is true, then it's not supported sufficiently.Twerges (talk) 23:48, 3 June 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Sentence from "Karl Popper's Objections" 

message: The section Criticism and influences says:
:The verifiability criterion of meaning did not seem verifiable; but neither was it simply a logical tautology, since it had implications for the practice of science and the empirical truth of other statements. This presented severe problems for the logical consistency of the theory.[citation needed] [My emphasis of dubious statement]
As much as I know and have read by myself, there is no such logical inconsistency. The trouble is not illogics, it is a double standard, rejecting metaphysics while defining itself metaphysically. This might be perceived as a logical inconsistency, so I believe the statement is some kind of confusion of "inconsequency" with "inconsistency". I believe the sentence is badly formulated, instead of being an ad-hoc-statement out of the blue. Any ideas for a replacement? Maybe Popper or other contemporary critics had some on this theme? ... said: Rursus (bork²) 09:10, 17 July 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: Not everyone agrees with that point of view.  See this quotation from http://www.basicincome.com/bp/whatwasalmost.htm "What was almost comically typical of Britain’s, and especially Oxford’s, parochialism is that a completely effective demolition of logical positivism had already been published before A. J. Ayer introduced it [in his book Language, Truth and Logic, 1936] into the English-speaking world in the first place. In 1934, in Vienna, a book had appeared called Logik der Forschung, by Karl Popper. It was not to come out in English translation until a quarter of a century later, when it was published in 1959 under the title The Logic of Scientific Discovery. In it there were many criticisms of logical positivism, including some I have mentioned already, but its central and most devastating one was that logical positivism claimed to be first and foremost a (indeed the) scientific view of the world, and yet its central tenet, the Verification Principle, wiped out the whole of science. This criticism, if clinched—and few people today would deny that Popper’s book pretty well clinched it—spelt total shipwreck for logical positivism."  Perhaps the section could be rewritten to attribute the idea to someone else.190.234.212.43 (talk) 17:22, 10 December 2009 (UTC)
thread_title: Replaceable statement

message: I removed recent edits by Shiki2, including a section entitled "The Forlorn German Philosophy" and a reference in the "Declining Use" section to Logical Positivism being "forlorned by contemporary German philosophers."  These additions were baffling, non-encyclopedic in tone, and apparently reflected a confused sense of the meaning and usage of the English word "forlorn." Thefellswooper (talk) 20:17, 30 July 2009 (UTC)
thread_title: The Forlorn German Philosophy

message: It seems inappropriate to highlight this article as "Part of a series on
Philosophy of religion" (i.e. via the box at the top of the page).  What is your opinion?
Tcolgan001 (talk) 15:49, 9 April 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: I agree entirely, and as nobody has voiced any contrary opinion since your post several months ago, I'm removing it. Charles Lowe (talk) 18:42, 28 August 2012 (UTC)
thread_title:  Philosophy of Religion??? 

message: According to the article, “by the late 1960s, it became obvious that the movement had run its course.” This statement is made under the assumption that there is a course that "movements" run. They start at a given time, run their course, and become defunct in accordance with some transcendent plan. Such an  analogy is Fichtean-Hegelian, which should please academics. No “movement,” then, except for one, could ever express an eternal, or, at least, enduring truth. That one is the very “movement” that expresses the dogma that ”movements” run courses. If not, then the very statement that “movements” run courses would have resulted from a “movement” that, itself, would run its course and therefore would have only a temporary validity. This is similar to the self-destructiveness of Fichtean-Hegelian “dialectic” in which all theses generate antitheses that then become syntheses, including the dogma of Fichtean-Hegelian dialectic itself. To whom are these courses supposed to be evident? Do all of the collected members of a specific group of people cognize these courses? Does the group consist only of academic “philosophers” or can other people obtain knowledge of the courses that “movements” run? Is there then a priesthood that has privileged cognition, not available to laymen, of the courses that “movements” run? Might not logical positivism have professed one or several enduring truths that cannot be merely dismissed as belonging to a “movement” that has “obviously” run a course that has been assigned to it by some transcendent authority?Lestrade (talk) 21:00, 14 May 2012 (UTC)
thread_title: Movements running courses

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thread_title:  External links modified 

message: Too technical was the best flag I could find.  The text regarding Popper seems pompous and almost deliberately dense.  What does the last phrase in this sentence mean:
 Popper thus identifies falsifiability to demarcate not meaningful from meaningless but simply scientific from unscientific — a label not in itself unfavorable.
The use of language would be more appropriate in a 16th century Court circular:
 Popper finds virtue in metaphysics
As summarized this too seems to be nonsensical:
 Something is referred to as "observational" if it is observable directly with our senses. Then an observation term cannot be applied to something unobservable. If this is the case, there are no observation terms.
Something is termed observable if it is observable with our senses.  The term cannot be applied to something unobservable.  So .....??? 
Can anyone translate the section into something less flamboyant and more straightforwardly comprehensible?
p.s
I added an article flag, again the best I could find, as the style of the section is common throughout the article.
LookingGlass (talk) 09:11, 7 September 2016 (UTC)
replies: text: I think the biggest flaw here is the lack of accessibility in the wording to people who aren't philosophers.  I'm going to go through and attempt to revise some of the language while not misrepresenting the original contentLartola (talk) 07:30, 25 September 2019 (UTC)
thread_title:  Too technical  - needs rewriting 

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thread_title:  External links modified 

message: The entry gives the impression that all logical positivists were emotivists/non-cognitivists. This is not true. Schlick, the leader of the circle, was a cognitivist (of the naturalist variety) and he defended his views at length in his book on ethics. Please fix the article to reflect this. On the whole, the article gives the impression of being written by people who want logical positivism to be a more united movement than it ever was.  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 88.83.60.122 (talk) 18:03, 20 January 2019 (UTC)
thread_title:  Ethics 

message: It's in the 'see also' section. Is there something I'm missing?--Phil of rel (talk) 18:24, 19 January 2022 (UTC)
replies: text: I came here to ask the exact same question. There’s no obvious relationship, and nobody ever replied to you, so I’ll remove it. Foxmilder (talk) 23:52, 29 December 2023 (UTC)
replies: text: I’ve removed the link entirely, as it has no obvious relationship to the subject of the article. If, for some reason, another editor disagrees — if somebody believes the concept of a moral panic is, in fact, sufficiently relevant as to warrant inclusion here — please discuss this on the talk page first. Foxmilder (talk) 00:26, 30 December 2023 (UTC)
thread_title:  What does moral panic have to do with logical positivism? 

message: Well I'm the exception to this rule. As Well, the rule that this proposal in almost every instance would be obsured! Please don't restrict my usage, for this is the first and last talking point. I encourage you to question my statment? Meagan Shadrick (talk) 08:04, 30 January 2022 (UTC)
thread_title:  There's always an exception. 

message: — Assignment last updated by RudyCarnap (talk) 10:45, 19 April 2023 (UTC)
thread_title: Wiki Education assignment: PHIL 390 Contemporary Philosophy

message: Logical positivists criticize "metaphysicians" in a similar way to Mao Zedong. Is there some overlap there? Was Mao influenced by the Vienna circle at all? Mao wrote his "On Contradiction" in 1937, just a year after the Vienna Circle stopped regularly meeting. Or was there perhaps just something in the general discourse of intellectuals at that time in terms of "metaphysics"? 
Clearly Mao's work isn't the same as the verificationism of logical positivists but I perceive a similar sort of hewing to material reality in opposition to abstraction/rationalism/idealism. AslanFrench (talk) 01:06, 20 January 2024 (UTC)
thread_title:  Was Mao a logical positivist or influenced by them?