Talk:Central Intelligence Agency/Archive 4

message: I've put in a fair bit of time on the article, both in verifying/cleaning content and filling in material, enough that I think I can say I have gone over things in detail.
Look, for example, at Korea and the Caribbean/Cuba/Cuban missile crisis; those are a start on what I think is encyclopedic coverage. Just to say, with no other background, that the CIA trained police or set up an Operation Gladio network really doesn't give information; I'd recommend waiting for more background and context.
There are news reports from reputable journalists, but there are also quite a number from activists for varying positions. I'm afraid I don't give equal credit to a staff writer for the Washington Post and for the Revolutionary Worker.
The article is impossibly long, yet its covert operations section is full of fragments. It's going to have to break up so those fragmentary sections can be edited; it's taking a long time to save the file now.  Note that I was able to put estimative/analytic material in for Korea and Cuba. Much data of that sort is available, often in the form of the actual declassified documents. Not to put in relevant reports, National Intelligence Estimates, etc., gives the impression that the agency is purely covert operations, since the reports were almost never mentioned for countries I saw--just controversial "dirty tricks". That's not NPOV.
Many sources are available for the report literature, including the George Washington University National Security Archives, the Avalon Project at Yale, the archives at Mount Holyoke, the military staff colleges and research institutes, the Foreign Relations of the United States series, and even the CIA FOIA Reading Room. There is, for example, a huge amount of analytic reporting about Southeast Asia from 1945 to 1975, including strong disagreements among the CIA, military, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and White House (Sam Adams' book, War of Numbers is excellent, but also see the Pentagon Papers).
I'd like to suggest that people editing this look at some of my articles on the process of intelligence, which may help understand things that aren't just covert destabilization. Start with Intelligence cycle management, which will take you through a hierarchy of articles. The HUMINT sections do deal with clandestine rather than covert activity; I'm actively working on them. The article on Clandestine HUMINT and Covert Action is particularly relevant both in history, and balance between clandestine and covert activities. Especially in WWII, there was often a conflict between operations and intelligence gathering. 
Please let me help, but understand that my reaction is that things come across as very accusatory and unbalanced. Believe me, I am very aware of both improprieties and just plain incompetence in intelligence agencies, and they need to be brought out -- but in an encylopedic, not fragmentary and accusatory way. Howard C. Berkowitz (talk) 05:05, 20 December 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Still concerned about balance 

message: I've put some sourced detail under the Directorate of Intelligence, which I may make into a graphic. Unfortunately, I can't find any organization charts online for the ever-changing organization on the DDP/DO/NCS. While I know where to get a number of books that gave a snapshot at some point in time, I have most of my hardcopy books in storage, so I can't source the reference.  For anyone that has them,  Richelson's The American Intelligence Community is probably most neutral. There are versions, certainly reorganized by now, in Agee, Marchetti & Marks, and (IIRC) Stockwell, among others. Does anyone have access to these books for sourcing?  Here's some general text, but it's from my memory rather than something I can cite.
===General Organization of the NCS/DI===
More than most government agencies, the organization of a service that does clandestine intelligence collection, and covert operations, changes frequently. Some reorganizations will be based on geopolitical considerations. Most services, not just the CIA have a set of divisions and subordinate "branches" or "desks" organized around regions and countries.  During the Cold War, for example, there was a Soviet Russia Division, where another division might have all of Latin America.
In general, however, the CIA operations side was structured into geographic areas, and then a set of "staffs" that provide various services:
:*counterintelligence/counterespionage (Counterintelligence Staff under Angleton)
:*cover materials (e.g, Central Cover Staff)
:*paramilitary (e.g., Special Activities Division
:*psychological operations
:*other information operations (e.g., computer)
:*technical support ("Q's shop", eavesdropping equipment, lock and seal opening, etc.)
There was usually a unit that worked with NSA to put SIGINT and other sensors into denied areas or diplomatic facilities. At one point, this was "Division D", and may now be the "Special Collection Service".
There has been a trend, visible in the DI, to structure not just geographically, but also by function, especially for transnational issues. For example, Plame worked for a Counterproliferation unit that mixed DO and DI personnel.
At various times, CIA operations has had its own information technology unit, as they did not want information on specific HUMINT assets on the general CIA computers, even though those computers are designed to be secure.
The Counterintelligence Staff was most dominant under James Jesus Angleton. While it was reorganized periodically to get rid of Angleton, there is no question that field operators, clandestine and covert, need a counterintelligence support unit. Counterintelligence, for example, would do name checks and other research on potential asset recruitments, to be sure they have not been associated with a foreign intelligence service.
====Rationale for Secrecy====
All large bureaucracies, certainly including the CIA, periodically reorganize for reasons such as trying to improve efficiency, or to recover from a scandal.  Another factor, specific to intelligence services, is that they do not want details of their organization to be known externally.  Some of this is a tradition of secrecy, but there are practical reasons. For example, if a foreign service knows the number of people working in a division, it will give rough priorities. Most importantly, the association of particular people with assignments is sensitive. If, for example, someone posted to an embassy, under  diplomatic cover is known to have worked in the paramilitary division, that alerts the country that a covert military operation may be planned.
Alternatively, that paramilitary officer may be assigned to work closely with the government in that area,to help them run paramilitary activities against neighboring country, or for counterinsurgency. 
If another officer is assigned to an embassy, and is known to be a scientific rather than geographic specialist, that can alert the host nation that the intelligence service either is going to try to get more information in that field, or may have already recruited human assets that need a specialist case officer, a case officer who will understand their reporting.
Howard C. Berkowitz (talk) 20:25, 20 December 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Directorate of Operations/National Clandestine Service organization 

message: More than most government agencies, the organization of a service that does clandestine intelligence collection, and covert operations, changes frequently. Some reorganizations will be based on geopolitical considerations. Most services, not just the CIA have a set of divisions and subordinate "branches" or "desks" organized around regions and countries.  During the Cold War, for example, there was a Soviet Russia Division, where another division might have all of Latin America.
In general, however, the CIA operations side was structured into geographic areas, and then a set of "staffs" that provide various services:
:*counterintelligence/counterespionage (Counterintelligence Staff under Angleton)
:*cover materials (e.g, Central Cover Staff)
:*paramilitary (e.g., Special Activities Division
:*psychological operations
:*other information operations (e.g., computer)
:*technical support ("Q's shop", eavesdropping equipment, lock and seal opening, etc.)
There was usually a unit that worked with NSA to put SIGINT and other sensors into denied areas or diplomatic facilities. At one point, this was "Division D", and may now be the "Special Collection Service".
There has been a trend, visible in the DI, to structure not just geographically, but also by function, especially for transnational issues. For example, Plame worked for a Counterproliferation unit that mixed DO and DI personnel.
At various times, CIA operations has had its own information technology unit, as they did not want information on specific HUMINT assets on the general CIA computers, even though those computers are designed to be secure.
The Counterintelligence Staff was most dominant under James Jesus Angleton. While it was reorganized periodically to get rid of Angleton, there is no question that field operators, clandestine and covert, need a counterintelligence support unit. Counterintelligence, for example, would do name checks and other research on potential asset recruitments, to be sure they have not been associated with a foreign intelligence service.
====Rationale for Secrecy====
All large bureaucracies, certainly including the CIA, periodically reorganize for reasons such as trying to improve efficiency, or to recover from a scandal.  Another factor, specific to intelligence services, is that they do not want details of their organization to be known externally.  Some of this is a tradition of secrecy, but there are practical reasons. For example, if a foreign service knows the number of people working in a division, it will give rough priorities. Most importantly, the association of particular people with assignments is sensitive. If, for example, someone posted to an embassy, under  diplomatic cover is known to have worked in the paramilitary division, that alerts the country that a covert military operation may be planned.
Alternatively, that paramilitary officer may be assigned to work closely with the government in that area,to help them run paramilitary activities against neighboring country, or for counterinsurgency. 
If another officer is assigned to an embassy, and is known to be a scientific rather than geographic specialist, that can alert the host nation that the intelligence service either is going to try to get more information in that field, or may have already recruited human assets that need a specialist case officer, a case officer who will understand their reporting.
Howard C. Berkowitz (talk) 20:25, 20 December 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: General Organization of the NCS/DI

message: All large bureaucracies, certainly including the CIA, periodically reorganize for reasons such as trying to improve efficiency, or to recover from a scandal.  Another factor, specific to intelligence services, is that they do not want details of their organization to be known externally.  Some of this is a tradition of secrecy, but there are practical reasons. For example, if a foreign service knows the number of people working in a division, it will give rough priorities. Most importantly, the association of particular people with assignments is sensitive. If, for example, someone posted to an embassy, under  diplomatic cover is known to have worked in the paramilitary division, that alerts the country that a covert military operation may be planned.
Alternatively, that paramilitary officer may be assigned to work closely with the government in that area,to help them run paramilitary activities against neighboring country, or for counterinsurgency. 
If another officer is assigned to an embassy, and is known to be a scientific rather than geographic specialist, that can alert the host nation that the intelligence service either is going to try to get more information in that field, or may have already recruited human assets that need a specialist case officer, a case officer who will understand their reporting.
Howard C. Berkowitz (talk) 20:25, 20 December 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Rationale for Secrecy

message: Hi, I took off the NPOV and length tags because it seems these issues have been largely addressed.
If anybody has an NPOV or length issue now, please add the tag back on and discuss here.
Thanks, Erxnmedia (talk) 02:14, 30 December 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Took off the tags

message: Don't many Wikipedia articles have a cultural trivia section?  To me, it seems like the perfect receptable into which we could sweep all the "not verifiable" or alleged "conspiracy theory" or alledged not "neutral point of view" elements of this article.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 204.111.123.49 (talk) 19:09, 31 December 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Cultural trivia section?

message: This is a pedant speaking, so ignore this freely! :D  Anyway, unless the text accompanying the logo is an officially-defined symbology, shouldn't the paragraph read that the coat of arms of the CIA is a white compass star on a white background, with an eagle for the crest? Or some other heraldically-accurate description? I know that this is quite an unimportant issue of no consequence as to whether it is like-this-or-like-that, but maybe it can be looked into by someone more comfortable with this article. 202.89.153.149 (talk) 03:24, 4 January 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Seal 

message: I seem to remember reading a NYTimes article in the recent past about an inadvertent reveal of the scope of the CIA budget (perhaps through an FOIA request for testimony of a hearing that was mistakenly not closed? Can't remember at the moment). I'll look around and see if I can find the cite, but does anyone remember off hand? If its been revealed by someone who ought to know, then we should put that in as an estimate in the infobox and include "Exact budget remains classified." Avruchtalk 04:33, 5 January 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: Steven Aftergood, at the Federation of American Scientists, has been after this for years. There's a very recent discussion, which I have to reread, on the front page of the http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/ blog today (January 5, 2008). Part of the confusion that exists now is there was an agreement to publish the total budget for the CIA, prior to the 2004 reorganization of the Intelligence Community. The interpretation now is probably to publish the budget for the DNI, since CIA is subordinate to the DNI. I'm not sure if there has been an agreement to publish the total budget of the subordinate agencies, such as NRO, NGA, CIA, NSA, FBI (intelligence only broken out of law enforcement), and the military agencies that have different budget slots for national-level intelligence and intelligence in direct support of military operations Howard C. Berkowitz (talk) 15:42, 5 January 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Classified budget 

message: There is too much secrecy to tell which agencies might be involved, but if this dispute is getting too heated...  A bit of intelligence perspective could come from http://worldblog.msnbc.msn.com/archive/2007/07/20/280529.aspx.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by Hcberkowitz (talk • contribs) 15:53, 5 January 2008 (UTC)
thread_title: Perspective

message: When trying to tell what the CIA has or has not done, especially with respect to recent events, do remember that its bureaucratic position has changed. From 1947 (in theory, more like 1952, to 2004, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) "wore two hats". One was to run the CIA. The other was to coordinate the entire Intelligence Community.
In late 2004, the position of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) was created, and the position of DCI abolished, as well as most of the IC-wide responsibilities, which moved to the office of the DNI. CIA position titles and functions were changed, for a variety of reasons. Most importantly, the head of the CIA is now the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCIA).
I've seen some references saying where the CIA did something, where it really happened in the DNI or sometimes the White House/National Security Council. This is not a simple matter to explain CIA activities, since prior to 2004, the National Intelligence Estimates and similar documents, as well as the Presidential/NSC committee action authorizations, could both be under the CIA for a given year. Now, some of this information goes under several agencies.
It's worth noting that the reorganization still left major intelligence analysis function in CIA, as well as the National Clandestine Service, which does both clandestine intelligence gathering and covert action. 
I don't have a simple answer moving forward, but I hate to see covert actions alone presented without the directly relevant intelligence estimates and NSC authorization. This is not too much of a problem right now, since the more recent actions are classified, but it is something to consider when discussing things like "budget". Howard C. Berkowitz (talk) 16:03, 5 January 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Effects of US intelligence reorganization