Talk:Erich von Falkenhayn

message: I took the liberty of pointing out that, despite Falkenhayn's failures at both areas of conflict, his casualties (in the case of the former) were significantly lower than that which the Allies sustained- and that, in the case of the latter, they were fairly equal in number (mentioning, as well, that the forces he was using belonged to the Ottoman Empire). 65.255.147.8 (talk) 04:32, 25 May 2011 (UTC)
thread_title:  Verdun and Palestine 

message: Falkenhayn in many ways typified the Prussian generals; a militarist in the literal sense, he had undeniable political and military competence but showed contempt toward democracy and the representative Reichstag. In a book on Falkenhayn's strategy, Foley (2005) argues that the Allies, who had larger resources, copied and successfully used Falkenhayn's "blood-mill" approach; in that sense his method would, indirectly, have led to Germany losing World War I.
This is blatant editorializing. The assertions made are completely unsupported and unsourced, and there are gaps in logic large enough to fly the Hindenburg through - for example, (1) how did Falkenhyn typify "Prussian generals", and how are "Prussian generals" different from German generals; (2) what justifies his characterization as a "militarist", and what does it mean to be a militarist "in the literal sense" (as opposed to what, the figurative sense?); (3) how did he show contempt for democracy?
Also if Foley's argument has been accurately characterized it is obviously absurd, since Falkenhyn didn't invent the concept of war of attrition.
Finally, on another note, this section should note that Falkenhyn was the only senior officer on either to argue after Verdun that the war was stalemated and should be ended through a negotiated peace.  Lexington50 (talk) 05:27, 8 March 2013 (UTC)
replies: text: He argued in 1915 that the Germans couldn't defeat decisively the coalition against it and used the crisis on the eastern front to infict enough damage on the Russians to get them to accept a deal and Bethmann-Hollweg went along with it enough to put out peace feelers. When they failed Falky tried again at Verdun, by provoking the French into military operations intended to be as costly as the Herbstschlacht the year before. Falky's strategy was an ingenious (and desperate) attempt to win from a position of weakness, before the military power of the Allies became overwhelming. It was already too late.Keith-264 (talk) 09:08, 14 December 2013 (UTC)
thread_title:  Assessment 

message: I cut "due to Moltke's interference" after "the failure of the Schlieffen plan." It serves no purpose in this biography of Falkenhayn, and it is unnecessarily dogmatic about a very complicated historical dispute. There is a strong argument that (1) the plan was doomed to fail regardless and that (2) Moltke's *lack* of communication with his generals, rather than his "interference," contributed to the Germans' failure. Whatever the merits of this debate, there is no need to treat it as settled one way or the other in a Falkenhayn article. --Tbanderson (talk) 16:19, 9 October 2013 (UTC)
thread_title:  No point in blaming failure of invasion on Moltke 

message: It may have been a strategic failure but perhaps not; what was it supposed to achieve? With the resources at Falkenhayn's disposal, a defensive strategy was doomed and an offensive one beyond the German army's power. As a spoiling offensive which inflicted attrition on the French and substantially reduced the Somme offensive Verdun was a success of sorts, although perhaps not enough to be a strategic one. The magnitude of the Somme offensive was a rude shock despite the diversion of two experienced armies and Falkenhayn's plans after the Anglo-French relief offensive began were unrealistic but operational solutions to strategic problems were all that Germany had left by then. Keith-264 (talk) 17:26, 12 May 2016 (UTC)
replies: text: Well, there's dispute, but the large majority of sources stats that Verdun was supposed to be a battle of attrition, and to work it would obviously needed to bleed "them" more than "us". In that the battle was a sounding failure to the Germans. Frenditor (talk) 20:55, 12 May 2016 (UTC)
replies: text: Newer sources like Foley and Strachan see it in rounder terms than that so the majority is not necessarily right. The battle was part of a strategy not one in itself.Keith-264 (talk) 21:02, 12 May 2016 (UTC)
replies: text: Which strategy exactly? Of course a single battle cannot respond for the entire strategy of a country. Frenditor (talk) 21:17, 12 May 2016 (UTC)

text: Battle of Verdun Keith-264 (talk) 21:19, 12 May 2016 (UTC)
replies: text: The article seems to support the attrition point of view. Frenditor (talk) 21:29, 12 May 2016 (UTC)

text: Not really, the battle at Verdun was to be the catalyst for open warfare and a decisive victory.Keith-264 (talk) 22:17, 12 May 2016 (UTC)
thread_title:  Verdun 

message: Would you cite your edits pls?  Keith-264 (talk) 04:44, 9 April 2021 (UTC)
replies: text: Thanks Keith-264 (talk) 10:15, 28 June 2022 (UTC)
thread_title:  Recent edits