Talk:Zhuge Zhan

message: ===Zhuge's failure===
Most people blame Zhuge for his lost as a result of refusing Huang's suggestion. But I would like point out that Huang might actually be the source of failure. As I can tell, Zhuge's first war was his last, so it's natural for him to be fearful in face of a much experienced and well-known foe. Therefore, he refused to take the risk to do battle with Deng, but Huang at the time recklessly pushed Zhuge to engage the enemy, stating that strategic terrain must be seized. But what are the "strategic positions?" According to my military knowledge, the single most important strategic position was the exit of Yinping Trail, during the time Wei Yan defended Hanzhong, he chose to block the exits of trails to target of defense and was always successful to repel his enemies. The second important strategic holding was Jiangyou fortress, because it was the nearest supply base an invading force could find after coming out from the trail. However, both of them were seized by Deng already, so it doesn't make much sense to me Huang gave Zhuge that suggestion at the time. 
In brief, Zhuge and his aide, Huang Chong, had different agenda in the beginning and differed on how to handle the crisis before them. As a result, Zhuge's command became inconsistent and absurd -- under influence of Huang, Zhuge engaged Deng at Fu and was defeated. Knowing Deng was resupplied at Jiangyou, Zhuge should have hold the fortress and awaited reinforcement instead of venturing out. When they got to Mianzhu, they should mimic Jiang Wei to stay behind fortifications, but again Huang came out and gave a "heroic speech" to "bolster the morale so soldiers were willing to fight to the death." (祟帥厲軍士，期於必死) Huang was quite an agitator, and Zhuge was again incited to move out and fight Deng. The result? All of them indeed fought to death as they wished.
----EkmanLi (talk) 08:31, 22 March 2011 (UTC)
thread_title: A few things about Zhuge Zhan

message: Most people blame Zhuge for his lost as a result of refusing Huang's suggestion. But I would like point out that Huang might actually be the source of failure. As I can tell, Zhuge's first war was his last, so it's natural for him to be fearful in face of a much experienced and well-known foe. Therefore, he refused to take the risk to do battle with Deng, but Huang at the time recklessly pushed Zhuge to engage the enemy, stating that strategic terrain must be seized. But what are the "strategic positions?" According to my military knowledge, the single most important strategic position was the exit of Yinping Trail, during the time Wei Yan defended Hanzhong, he chose to block the exits of trails to target of defense and was always successful to repel his enemies. The second important strategic holding was Jiangyou fortress, because it was the nearest supply base an invading force could find after coming out from the trail. However, both of them were seized by Deng already, so it doesn't make much sense to me Huang gave Zhuge that suggestion at the time. 
In brief, Zhuge and his aide, Huang Chong, had different agenda in the beginning and differed on how to handle the crisis before them. As a result, Zhuge's command became inconsistent and absurd -- under influence of Huang, Zhuge engaged Deng at Fu and was defeated. Knowing Deng was resupplied at Jiangyou, Zhuge should have hold the fortress and awaited reinforcement instead of venturing out. When they got to Mianzhu, they should mimic Jiang Wei to stay behind fortifications, but again Huang came out and gave a "heroic speech" to "bolster the morale so soldiers were willing to fight to the death." (祟帥厲軍士，期於必死) Huang was quite an agitator, and Zhuge was again incited to move out and fight Deng. The result? All of them indeed fought to death as they wished.
----EkmanLi (talk) 08:31, 22 March 2011 (UTC)
thread_title: Zhuge's failure

message: Many people believed Zhuge should await reinforcement from Chengdu when he faced Deng at Mianzhu. That is a myth because Liu Shan already sent reinforcement to Zhuge! In the main article you would notice a Li Qiao, who was the Right-Commander-of-Feathered-Forest-Imperial-Guards. I have to explain a bit on the Feathered-Forest-Guards first: they were some private guards responsible for the protection of the imperial palace; i.e. if their commander appeared in Mianzhu, the imperial guards must also be there. And if the the emperor's guards were sent, more lower soldiers must also be already sent.
----EkmanLi (talk) 08:59, 22 March 2011 (UTC)
thread_title: Reinforcement from Chengdu

message: Many people deem Zhuge's giving up of Fu as an act of cowardice, which may not be Totally correct. Actually, my analysis in provision two above partially explains why Zhuge gave up Fu for Mianzhu. The probable situation might be quite different from our beloved novel and most online articles: when Zhuge arrived Fu, he got wind that Deng had already acquired Jiangyou, so he reported back to Liu Shan and requested a lot of reinforcements. In order to better connect his position with Chengdu and feed his would-be huge army, Zhuge moved to Mianzhu, where he asked Liu to send relief forces to. Also, if you look into the SGZ, Biography of Liu Yan, you would find out massive construction was done there under Liu Yan's reign, so I'm convinced Mianzhu must be a better place to station a huge army.
----EkmanLi (talk) 08:59, 22 March 2011 (UTC)
thread_title: Why Zhuge retreated to Mianzhu