Talk:Fulda Gap

message: "Defence of the Fulda Gap was tasked primarily to the US V Corps." - that's of course wrong, it was tasked primarily to the German Armed Forces. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 84.159.219.156 (talk • contribs February 11, 2007.
:Response/Comment: What is the source of your information?  Note: Ger III Korps & US V Corps were adjacent, from whatever year III Korps came up to strength following 1954-55 planning of Bundeswehr Heer.  Also, the US 3rd Armored Division replaced the US 4th Infantry Division in the Fulda Gap in 1956 - this reflected a change in US V Corps strategy.  The Bundeswehr was very young in 1956. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 67.108.51.40 (talk • contribs February 22, 2007.Reference: Tankograd Militaerfahrzeug Spezial No. 5002, Die Anfangsjahre des Heeres 1956 - 1966 ("The Early Years of the Modern German Army") - Verlag Jochen Vollert - Tankograd Publishing 2003. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 67.108.49.206 (talk • contribs July 19, 2007.
::It may have varied over the years, but the U.S. Army was very much the sole defender of the Fulda Gap in the 1980s.  The Gap was screened by three squadrons of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, whose sector of defense covered the area from Bad Hersfeld in the north to Bad Kissingen in the south.  German III Corps was to the north of Hersfeld, more in the Kassel area.  Had there been a war, it was the task of U.S. V Corps to reinforce the 11th Cavalry and defend the approaches to Frankfurt/M.  There would have been some German assistance in the form of the BGS and possibly local defense forces, but there was no training with local defense forces that I recall.  The cavalry regularly patrolled with the BGS, so there was potential there for effective cooperation.  Regardless, the bulk of the combat power for 50 kilometers north and 50 kilometers south of Fulda was that of the U.S. forces. W. B. Wilson 14:54, 20 July 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: German III Korps area included defensive positions behind Border patrol areas near Bad Hersfeld.  German 2d PnzGrndr Div was HQ'd at Kassel. Rough examples: http://www.1-33rdar.org/ChangesGermanUnit.jpg  & http://www.history.army.mil/documents/BorderOps/ch6.htm#m11 —Preceding unsigned comment added by 76.14.217.231 (talk) 19:05, 13 July 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: The .jpg provided above shows the corps boundary with the Germans north of Bad Hersfeld.  The sector from Hersfeld to Kissingen was the responsibility of U.S. forces to defend, which were primarily the 14th and 11th Armored Cavalry Regiments.  Cheers, W. B. Wilson (talk) 06:11, 23 January 2010 (UTC)
thread_title: Defence

message: For many years the Armored Cav screening forces along the IGB wore the Seventh Army's Seven Steps to Hell patch even though they were individually assigned as screening forces in front of one of the two Corps assigned to Seventh Army, V Corps and VII Corps.  This reflected the broader mission of an Army level command having two or more assigned corps.   —Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.108.49.206 (talk) 20:51, 15 September 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Armored Cavalry Regiments at the Inner-German Border [IGB]

message: External Links section expanded to reflect "two combat battalion contingent [from Wildflecken] of the Fulda Gap screening force".  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.108.49.206 (talk) 09:24, 3 September 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: 1-68 AR BN in Fulda Gap

message: "In practice it was unknown how effective they would have been in either role due to the vast numbers of tanks and infantry the Soviets were able to field."
The above entry doesn't specify what "in practice" means:  non-nuclear, fully nuclear, or "a little bit" nuclear.  All of those parameters changed over the years, so "in practice" is also a variable.  The implanted Atomic Demolition Devices were the constant. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomic_Demolition_Munitions http://www.1-33rdar.org/Fuldagupbp.htm
http://www.strategypage.com/militaryforums/30-103946.aspx —Preceding unsigned comment added by 76.14.247.204 (talk) 01:21, 15 November 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Misleading 

message: If the Fulda gap was so vulnerable to soviet-commie tank advance, why didn't the NATO fill it in with artifical mountains? Alternatively it could have been prmanenetly flooded by diverting the Rhine, if some coffer-dams were built. Sure, that's a huge expenditure even compared to Gizeh's Great Pyramids, but it's also a one-time cost, while feeding US and West german standing armies and flying super advanced military aircraft is an on-going burden for decades. 82.131.210.163 (talk) 11:20, 6 January 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: Short answer is that the West German government would have fallen because its people would have gone crazy over such projects.  Even just the presence of U.S. cruise missiles in the country in the 1980's ignited huge and long-lasting protests.  The "gap" was one possible avenue of Soviet advance but IMO had it come to war, the northern German plains would have been the scene of the major Soviet assault. And that leads to the conclusion that any terrain projects like you mention assume a Maginot-Line character: the attacker would have attacked on a different part of the front and bypassed the obstruction, so one would still have to maintain standing armies, etc. W. B. Wilson (talk) 16:28, 6 January 2012 (UTC)

text: Few know that the most critical time in the Fulda Gap was during the October 1962 Cuban Crisis.  Berlin was not a likely source of Soviet "distraction", since it had already been played out in the Fall of 1961.  However, the Fulda Gap had never been tested by the Soviets, who were having their subs forced to the surface near Cuban waters.  USAREUR had nuke arty; and, USAREUR combat maneuver battalions (mech inf & armor) had Davy Crocketts in October 1962.  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 76.14.242.44 (talk) 07:30, 8 February 2012 (UTC)
thread_title:  Mountains and seas of questions. 

message: Need dates - 11th ACR wasn't in the Fulda Gap during the full time that 3rd AD was stationed there . . . what about the 14th ACR?  This isn't a dateless history or a disguised first-person reminiscing site.  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 76.14.242.44 (talk) 07:20, 8 February 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: "Before 1972, the 14th ACR patrolled the Fulda Gap for twenty-four years, and before them, the duties had been performed by the 3rd Constabulary Regiment and the 1st Constabulary Brigade." -- already in the article. W. B. Wilson (talk) 20:19, 8 February 2012 (UTC)

text: One on-line 3rd Armored Division unit lineage does not show the 533rd MI Bn in existence at the time the 14th ACR was replaced in the Fulda Gap by the 11th ACR. . . . So, the dates for the 533rd MI Bn's existence (whether it was assigned to 3rd AD level, or V Corps level, or SEVENTH ARMY level) would make the entry seem less like a personal account.  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 76.14.218.248 (talk) 11:22, 19 February 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: I honestly don't understand the "personal account" comments. Could the article be better written? No doubt. If you'd like to suggest wording that you think is less personalized, please suggest it here on the talk page or edit the article itself.  On the 533rd -- I've found a bit of information on its "calendar" regarding the Fulda Gap and will try to integrate it into the article. W. B. Wilson (talk) 14:49, 19 February 2012 (UTC)
thread_title:  The 3rd Armored Division's 533 MI Battalion, deployed with 11th ACR on the Gap, providing EW assets to the 3rd AD  

message: "When the Cold War Almost Turned Hot", Magazine article; Army Magazine, Vol. 54, No. 7, July 2004, by Albin F. Irzyk (BG, US Army, Ret.)
:Headnote: "The 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment served as NATO's trip wire along the border between East and West Germany during the tense days of the (1961) Berlin Crisis, when it looked as though the wire would be tripped." (Then COL Irzyk commanded the 14th Armored Cav during that time; his headquarters was in Fulda.)
	 
:Excerpts: The article begins, "Many words have been written , documentaries produced and books published about the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. Yet an extremely dangerous situation not nearly as well known but of critical import prevailed not in Cuba, but in Europe a year earlier, in 1961. As in 1962, a direct and troubling face-off occurred between the United States and the Soviet Union. It became known as the Berlin Crisis. That situation came to a head and reached a crisis point in August of that year. It became by far the tensest period of the Cold War up until then. The Russians and Americans could have come as close to World War III as they did a year later. Despite the seriousness of the situation, relatively little is known about the details of that historic episode, and comparatively speaking, little has been written about it."
	 
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"I received the startling information from a staff officer at [V] corps headquarters that a belligerent Khrushchev was threatening to close U.S. ground access to Berlin. . . . I ordered the elements of my regiment to move at once to their operational positions. As our vehicles moved through the streets of the German cities, the inhabitants, as always, were hanging out of their windows. This time their faces showed puzzlement, anxiety and even fear. Somehow, intuitively, they recognized that this was not a normal alert, that something important was afoot. Before we departed, our families were also alerted to be ready in the event we were forced to implement the plan for the evacuation of noncombatants. I reported to corps headquarters that my regiment had moved and was in its forward positions. . . . Everything was now on a hair-trigger alert. . . . On the border, in our deployed positions, tension that had been increasing by the hour now reached an unbelievable pitch. It became so tight and crisp that it virtually crackled. We were holding our breaths. It was not inconceivable that we might soon be in a firefight, so we were leaning well forward in our foxholes. We tried to visualize the possibilities and probabilities. . . . " BG Irzyk has also written about his service in WW2 with the 4th Armored Division, which was assigned to Patton's Third Army during the fighting in France and Germany.
	 
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Near the end of his article Irzyk states in part, "For the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment to be called the NATO trip wire was not hyperbole but a truism. The regiment's mission placed it firmly and directly astride the famous, fabled, historic Fulda Gap. It was at this point that the East butted farthest into West Germany. This was the ancient invasion corridor which had served as the strategic East-West passage for six centuries. In 1961 it was still the likely invasion route into Western Europe for Soviet Bloc forces. This is the frontier where it would happen. The Fulda Gap is a series of river valleys running north and south with distinct hill masses and several open passes running through the hills that create the Gap and that wind like a huge serpent, twisting here and there to avoid rivers and forests. The gap broadens into an exceedingly wide ten-mile-long valley north of a town called Rasdorf. This valley is capable of accommodating vast numbers of mechanized and motorized vehicles. Dominant hills--known as the Three Sisters--create a natural line of defense. The troopers of the 14th had no illusions about the criticality and importance of their trip-wire mission and its ramifications. Every man in the regiment was fully aware that if the Soviets decided to attack and send their hordes across the border, we would be the first of the U.S. and Allied forces to be fired upon--thus, the trip wire. It would immediately signal to the United States and the world that the West and East were at war. Because ours was a small and relatively light force, it was a foregone conclusion that we had absolutely no chance of stopping such an onslaught and would rapidly be overrun. Realistically, our mission was to delay their advance and gain time by fighting fiercely, imaginatively, courageously--even to the last man. By slowing the enemy and gaining time, it would enable heavier forces behind us, the first of which was the 3rd Armored Division, to close up, pick up and join in the fight." — Preceding unsigned comment added by 76.14.218.248 (talk) 14:14, 4 May 2012 (UTC)
thread_title:  14th Armored Cav in the Fulda Gap in August 1961 

message: Copy/Paste:  (Webmaster: the two ASP's in support of V Corps -- Wildflecken and Baumholder -- would probably not have become the two ASP's required to support the 3rd AD and 8th ID in a wartime scenario -- Wildflecken being too close to "the action" and Baumholder too far from the action and on the wrong side of the Rhine River to be of any use).  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 76.14.251.253 (talk) 10:01, 26 February 2014 (UTC)
thread_title:  144th Ord 

message: Edited version from Ivan B. Welch’s compilation, FULDA GAP
Also, note that WP forces transversing the Rasdorf area would have to head NW (OR, N-NW) in order to pass North of the Vogelsberg. 
 
Located in Germany, between the cities of Leipzig and Frankfurt, and oriented along the Fulda River, the Fulda Gap is a name given to a mobility corridor oriented on a line that runs from Leipzig toward Frankfurt.  It is bounded on the south by the Vogelsberg Hills and on the north by high ground north of the autobahn (highway) that transects this area.  Early in the beginning of the Cold War (1947-89) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) war planners developed contingency plans for the defense of Western Europe in the event of a Soviet Union-led invasion.  They considered the Soviet ground combat doctrine, the mechanized and motorized nature of modern forces, and the compartmentalized terrain of both Western and Eastern Germany.  Military planners considered the most likely avenue of approach for the main thrust of an invasion would be down a mobility corridor along a general line from Leipzig to Frankfurt and the Rhine River.  The hub of this corridor begins in the vicinity of the towns of Erfurt and Eisenach and crosses the old border between East and West Germany in the Phillipstal-Rasdorf area. . . .   The broader Northern Corridor that feeds out of the gap runs astride the autobahn north of  the Vogelsberg Hills (in that area the autobahn is also bounded to its north by high ground), and then all the way to Frankfurt.  This area was known by U.S. forces charged to defend it  as the Wetterau Corridor.  The first defensible terrain on the western side of the inter-German border was the Fulda River, which would have to be crossed by any invading force.  The mobility corridor remains somewhat restricted by the high ground to the north and south.  Once past this gap, the terrain opens up allowing for greater maneuvering, and would give an invading force more opportunity to invade Frankfurt and then on to seizing crossing points along the Rhine River.  The European General Defense Plan called for U.S. forces to deploy along a general defense line that could interdict Soviet forces moving into West Germany along routes through geographic areas such as the Fulda Gap.  These operations plans described in detail how the U.S. forces would respond to a Soviet-led attack across the inter-German border.  The concept was to delay invading forces long enough for reinforcements to arrive from the United States.  The plans described the defensive positions and actions of each unit and even laid out the nightmare scenario of use of nuclear weapons by ground forces. . . .   Source:  Ivan B. Welch in Encyclopedia of World Geography, Volume 1, Edited by R. W. McColl, 2005.  The first entry of Welch’s Bibliography is, “The Fulda Gap, A Military History Survey” published by The Marshall Center.  Another entry is the 14th Armored Cavalry pages on the Together We Serve site.  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 64.146.201.36 (talk) 11:30, 11 October 2014 (UTC)
thread_title:  The Wetterau Corridor via the Eisenach Hub/Mittelpunkt; the actual Fulda Gap is proximate to the city of Fulda 

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thread_title:  External links modified 

message: The first two AH-1G Cobra Attack Helicopters arrived at Katterbach Airfield in April/May 1970.
They were assigned to D Troop 2/4th Air Calvary,  4th Armored Division. 
These two Cobra's were equipped with a single 20mm "tank killing" mini gun. They worked in conjunction with the OH-58 Kiowa. 
Their first mission engagement in the field proved their superiority and ability to potentially take out Warsaw Pact Armour. The AH-1 was replaced by the AH-64. 47.5.240.70 (talk) 05:22, 24 July 2022 (UTC)
thread_title:  AH-64 was not the first attck helicopter to deployed to  defend the Fulda Gap 

message: The "547 Engineer Battalion" in this article should be changed to the "54th Combat Engineer Battalion".  There is no such thing as the 547th Engineer Battalion in the United States Army.   MichaelNhutMineLe (talk) 08:51, 1 November 2023 (UTC)
thread_title:  Fulda Gap - Wildflecken 

message: Given the Cold War ended over 30 years ago, why is there no information on what's happened there since?  As part of that, you should bring up actual Soviet/Warsaw Pact plans. Will (Talk - contribs) 12:04, 5 January 2024 (UTC)
thread_title:  Section on post-Cold War events needed