Talk:Euthyphro dilemma

message: See Talk:Divine command theory --Tagishsimon 10:33, 14 Mar 2004 (UTC)
thread_title: Comments

message: Is a JayZ reference to the dilemma really important enough to be included in the introduction to the topic?
A Laughton (talk) 03:01, 21 September 2011 (UTC)
thread_title: JayZ Reference

message: The See Also section should provide a link to Divine command theory. So to anyone who can edit: please consider it! 160.36.37.249 (talk) 14:45, 2 September 2011 (UTC)
thread_title:  Divine command theory 

message: I think this is a very bad article:
* The three paragraphs presenting the dilemma in Plato are terrible. They are an incoherent mishmash of conflicting edits. And they even fail to explain the central dilemma. The third paragraph appears to be original research.
* The two paragraphs presenting the dilemma for monotheists are not good. None of the potential problems on either side are supported by citation or historical reference. And the invocation of Moore's naturalistic fallacy is, in my judgment, deeply confused.
* The 'attempts to resolve the dilemma' section is very bad. It is not supported by citation. It does not touch on historically prominent responses to the dilemma. It instead focuses on insignificant individuals like Fr. Owen Carroll and John Frame. When it cites prominent historical figures like Aquinas and Anselm, it lapses into misinformation: e.g., as far as I know, Aquinas never actually addressed the Euthyphro dilemma, and Anselm's affirmation of divine impassibility was never intended as a response to the Euthyphro dilemma. The discussion of prominent figures in contemporary philosophy of religion like Swinburne and Adams is welcome, but their views are not adequately explained.
I would like to improve this article:
* The dilemma in Plato should be given a straightforward and neutral presentation.
* The dilemma for monotheists should be presented with potential problems cited from contemporary and/or historical philosophical discussions of the Euthyphro dilemma. For example, prominent (recently deceased) philosopher of religion William P. Alston could be cited for the following potential problem: "If God should command us to inflict pain on each other gratuitously we would thereby be obliged to do so". Or perhaps prominent historical figure Ralph Cudworth: "Whence it follows unavoidably, that nothing can be imagined so grossly wicked,or so foully unjust or dishonest, but if it were supposed to be commanded by this omnipotent Deity, must needs upon that hypothesis forthwith become holy, just and righteous." Who should be cited? I'm thinking of people like: Scotus, Ockham, Suarez, Cudworth, Leibniz, Clarke, Price, as well as Alston, Adams, Quinn, Swinburne, and Wainwright. In other words, prominent historical figures and working philosophers of religion (or perhaps well-known quasi-philosopher figures such as C. S. Lewis or Voltaire or Richard Dawkins).
* In addition to potential problems, the section should also mention figures who come out as taking one or the other side. For example, the 'because it is good' side includes Cudworth and Leibniz and Clarke and Price, as well as Swinburne and (according to Suarez) Gregory of Rimini. And the 'because God commanded it' side includes Scotus and Ockham and Descartes and Arnauld and Paley, as well as (perhaps) Luther and Calvin, and contemporary hyper-Calvinists.
* The 'attempts to resolve the dilemma' section should leave Aquinas out of it, except inasmuch as contemporary scholars can be cited supporting an interpretation. Instead, it should present the resolution of Suarez, who explicitly addresses the dilemma in De legibus. It should also be mentioned that the 'because it is good' side has typically not concluded that morality is independent of God; instead, it has explained morality in terms of ideas in God's intellect, rather than acts of God's will. This could be illustrated with e.g. Leibniz and Clarke. It could also be illustrated with the contemporary views of William P. Alston and William Lane Craig (here criticisms from Wes Morriston and others could perhaps be included). The views of Swinburne, Adams, and Quinn should also be presented, with an explanation of how they address the potential problems listed in the previous section.
* Some discussion of Islamic theology should be included. I am no expert, but I believe the Mu'tazilites tended intellectualist, whereas the Ash'arites tended voluntarist. I will consult Wolfson's Philosophy of the Kalam or other reference works.
* In general, the article should be supported by citations from the books of real scholars: Terence Irwin's The Development of Ethics, William Wainwright's Religion and Morality, Jerome Schneewind's Invention of Autonomy, Knud Haakonssen's Natural Law and Moral Philosophy, introductory textbooks in the philosophy of religion, and the works of contemporary philosophers of religion.
Does anyone have any objections or suggestions? Thanks. Fsdjfsdfk (talk) 03:39, 28 December 2009 (UTC)
thread_title:  Salvaging this article? 

message: Has anyone suggested accidentalism as a solution for this dilemma? That that the gods love what is pious is simply a happy coincidence? Pmurray bigpond.com 04:08, 20 Apr 2005 (UTC)
replies: text: Wouldn't that imply that piety is independent of the gods? Hairouna 02:34, 8 December 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  Accidentalism 

message: has been making extensive changes to the article.  Some of them changed clear and precise to less clear and precise language (such as "implies that" to "leads to the view that"), some changed one stylistic approach to another, and some turned U.K. in to U.S. English, but the main section is this:
:"The second horn of the dilemma (known as divine command theory) runs into five main problems. First, it implies that the moral status of things is wildly contingent—if he had wanted to, God could have made rape, murder, and torture morally right. Secondly, it threatens the  normative force of the claim that God is good—it turns into the mere claim that God is consistent, or that God approves of himself. Thirdly, it commits the naturalistic fallacy; to analyze evaluative claims (e.g., that murder is wrong) in terms of what God has or hasn't said is to reduce evaluative claims to mere descriptions of God's activity. Fourthly, it seems to make morality subjective, with moral truths determined by the mere attitudes of an individual. Fifthly, it threatens the conception of God as a  rational being. For, supposing God had a reason for forbidding rape, this reason should also be the reason that rape is wrong. Otherwise, God's decision would have been based on the wrong reason. But if the reason rape is wrong is that God has forbidden it, then it can't be God's reason for forbidding it, on pains of circularity. So God's moral decisions were based either on the wrong reason, or on no reason at all."
Some of this can usefully added, but some isn't really acceptable: "is wildly contingent" is not only unencyclopædic style, but is less clear than "is arbitrary, based merely upon god's whim".  It also introduces technical terms where they're not needed (as does "normative force" which, in addition, surely misses the target; it's not the normativity of "god is good" that's at issue, but its status as a meaningful evaluation).  His or her fourth point isn't very commonly raised, and is surely implicit in the other points.  The final point contains material that could be made use of, but is in fact a discussion of the article's first point. --Mel Etitis  (Μελ Ετητης) 21:42, 20 August 2005 (UTC)
replies: text: In Euthyphro discussions "arbitrary" means based on no reason, which is quite different from "contingent" meaning could have been different—the current article conflates the two. As far as normative force goes, I take it that's exactly what distinguishes evaluations from mere descriptions—would "evaluative force" make it clearer? In any case, the problem isn't that divine command theory makes "God is good" meaningless. Far from it. The problem is that it gives it the wrong kind of meaning, by construing it as a neutral description of God's activity or nature. The point regarding reasons is arguably the main point of the discussion in the Euthyphro and is found in, e.g., Francis Snare's Nature of Moral Thinking. The fourth point on the current page badly misconstrues divine command theory ("what is wrong is simply to disobey god"), thereby missing the point that, if God gives things their moral status, then he can easily give things different moral statuses. If you know of a better way to fix these misrepresentations and confusions, then please let me know.
#In this context, "arbitrary" means (as usual) something like "subject to pesonal whims", which is what the problem is; "contingent", however, raises further and different problems (if god is a necessary being, then his decisions and actions are necessary, but that might not make them less arbitrary).  Moreover, while arbitrariness is an immediate and obvious problem for the foundation of morality, contingency isn't.
#Normativity is certainly at the heart of discussions of the concept of morality, but I don't see that it's particularly relevant here; indeed, I know of no discussion of the dilemma that focusses on normativity.
#You say: "the problem isn't that divine command theory makes 'God is good' meaningless"; well, it's a problem that is frequently cited, and in those terms.  If "good" means no more than "whatever god commands", then in what sense can god be said to be good?  As "good" is essentially evaluative, then a use involving no evaluation is a misuse, and the result is nonsense.
#The fourth point is again to be found in much of the literature, and is the way that many writers have construed (and developed) DCT.  Moreover, many writers would deny that the fact that god gives things moral status means that he can change that status (for that would involve changing his mind, and that would imply imperfection).  perhaps you mean (which is widely accepted by Divine Command Theorists) that he could have given them a different status.
#Your most recent edit adds the unnecessary and uninformative qualification: "In the relevant passage" (where else?), and makes some stylistic changes that involve no clarification (in fact, to my eye, make the text slightly less clear).  --Mel Etitis  (Μελ Ετητης) 16:40, 21 August 2005 (UTC)
thread_title: Text moved from article

message: From the article:
:"Thirdly, it commits the naturalistic fallacy; to explain the evaluative claim that murder is wrong (or the prescription that one should not commit murder) in terms of what god has or hasn't said is to argue from a putative fact about the world to a value (to argue to an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’)."
This is covered in divine command theory, and I don't think it necessarily applies. Saying that morality is defined as God's will does not necessarily mean to be a motivation for acting morally. After all, some people would say we should follow God's will simply because he will reward us for it. This does not commit the fallacy, and neither do other possible responses. The fallacy only pertains if someone says, "we should be moral because God wants us to", without providing further explanation.  --Catquas 04:31, 3 March 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Divine command theory is the theory that what is good just is what god commands; that has nothing to do with motivation  (a different argument has been offered with regard to that).  --Mel Etitis  (Μελ Ετητης) 15:37, 3 March 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Is this part of the E. dilemma?

message: There was a lot of discussion of this issue in Islamic philosophy/theology... AnonMoos 15:48, 10 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: I know something of it (though I don't recall anything very distinctive), but if you're up on the area, why not add it? --Mel Etitis  (Μελ Ετητης) 18:22, 10 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Islam

message: "Gnosticism and other dualistic schools similarly postulate that God is identical with goodness, which turns the dilemma into a tautology."
In Gnosticism The True God didn't have anything to do whit this material world, and so had nothing to do whit morals. 
In dualism Good and Bad belong together, one cannot excist whitout the other. What is considered good or bad is matter of opinion 
culture and religion. Not something that has anything to do whit even, well gods.
82.215.228.44 (talk) 21:49, 7 December 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Are you intentionally misspelling "with"?  I've never seen that consistant of a typo before.. 74.227.255.79 (talk) 22:04, 13 January 2009 (UTC)
thread_title:  Small missunderstanding? 

message: I deleted the following:
:Swinburne's account depends upon a clear distinction between necessary and contingent moral values — however, it is not clear that such a distinction can be maintained. Certainly it is implied by, e.g., the Old Testament, in which the Hebrews are commanded by God in the Torah to follow certain political laws that clearly were only appropriate for that race at that time, rather than everyone at all times. The Ten Commandments, on the other hand, are interpreted by many as having universal and necessary application.
Firstly, I think we need a source for the section as a whole.  Secondly, can we perhaps get some indication of why such a distinction cannot be maintained?  I don't think this added anything to the article as it now stands. Thoughts? Gabrielthursday (talk) 20:53, 3 October 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Swinburne on contingent and necessary moral laws 

message: Positing the non-existence of God would solve this dilemma in a flash... but I guess that would go against the tone of the article, which assumes existence throughout. 94.192.99.211 (talk) 08:56, 24 October 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: Replacing it by the problem "Is there any objective standard of morality", of course... AnonMoos (talk) 01:54, 30 May 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: Yes, but thats at least a real problem. 82.196.174.104 (talk) 07:54, 16 July 2009 (UTC)
thread_title:  An obvious solution to the 'dilemma' 

message: Should have something on Islamic discussions of the subject... AnonMoos (talk) 01:54, 30 May 2009 (UTC)
thread_title: Islam

message: A while ago, an editor removed a link in the References section saying "A Christian Answer to the Euthyphro Dilemma" was not acceptably credentialed. More recently though, one of the world's leading Christian websites, creation.com, linked to this article from their Euthyphro Dilemma article, at: http://creation.com/what-is-good-answering-euthyphro-dilemma 
The article itself is *archived* at one of the web's most popular theology forums, TheologyOnline.com. Also, it is ranked *6th* out of 96,000 by Google for "euthyphro dilemma". The article's popularity seems to arise because it does add significant content to the debate. Is there a chance for a reconsideration?
*A Christian Answer to the Euthyphro Dilemma - by Pastor Bob Enyart, Denver Bible Church, 2008
or perhaps:
*A Christian Answer to the Euthyphro Dilemma - by Pastor Bob Enyart, Denver Bible Church, 2008, linked to from Creation.com What is ‘good’? Answering the Euthyphro Dilemma
Call-in talk show host, M-F 5pm E.T. at KGOV.com 800-8Enyart (talk) 05:06, 29 October 2009 (UTC)
thread_title:  Reference added, popular ED article was removed: reconsideration? 

message: This article is tagged for copy editing. I am planning to copy-edit it in the next few days as part of this month's Guild of Copy Editors' copy editing drive. 
I would also like to clean up the References. Right now, they are formatted in a multitude of ways, with lots of op. cit. references (some of which may be unclear, since some authors have multiple titles cited). I am planning to introduce shortened footnotes, probably using . Is there any reason why I should not do so? – Jonesey95 (talk) 03:55, 4 November 2013 (UTC)
replies: text: . I have converted almost all of the references to use  and , and I have completed a copy edit of the article. The prose was already in great shape, so the copy editing was easy, but the references needed fleshing out so that they would be consistent and accessible to people without a specialized knowledge of the field. Feel free to clean up any mistakes I may have made along the way. – Jonesey95 (talk) 03:42, 6 November 2013 (UTC)
thread_title:  Copy editing and cleaning up references 

message: When talking about rejection of the dilemma, it should be very clearly espoused that these people are arguing for a "Trilemma" to reject the dilemma - and what this 3rd horn is. 182.255.99.214 (talk) 11:06, 10 August 2015 (UTC)
thread_title:  "Trilemma" 

message: I saw at the bottom of the article that there was a reference to a Youtube video by 'Darkmatter2525' about the dilemma. Is that really important enough to be included in this article? 
Randomresearcher42 (talk) 03:09, 17 March 2016 (UTC)
thread_title:  Do we need the Youtube Reference? 

message: Hello fellow Wikipedians,
I have just modified one external link on Euthyphro dilemma. Please take a moment to review my edit. If you have any questions, or need the bot to ignore the links, or the page altogether, please visit this simple FaQ for additional information. I made the following changes:
*Added archive https://web.archive.org/web/20060303082233/http://www.str.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5236 to http://www.str.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5236
When you have finished reviewing my changes, you may follow the instructions on the template below to fix any issues with the URLs.
Cheers.—InternetArchiveBot (Report bug) 21:18, 4 September 2017 (UTC)
thread_title:  External links modified