Talk:Continental Army

message: Below is a copy-paste of narrative with its HarvRef footnotes and references for your use here. It is removed completely from American Revolutionary War as too detailed for the survey account of military campaigns there. The effort is part of a trimming project in coordination with the Wikipedia:WikiProject Military history/Assessment/Requests, to promote the ARW article to B-class status. 
Generally throughout the Revolution, inadequate provisioning of the Continental Army led to serious difficulty in maintaining a force in the field. From July 1779 to July 1780, the Army shrunk from twenty-six thousand men to less than fifteen thousand. Only the most committed of revolutionaries persisted throughout the conflict, although some numbers reentered service after leaving at end-of-enlistment, desertion, or mutiny amnesty. Several factors contributed: lack of food regularly distributed in ration quantity, inadequate or no pay, and in 1780-81 the harshest winter of the war.Carp 1990, p 178
Overall, the problem was fundamentally a financial one. The Continental currency depreciated, inflation accelerated.Carp 1990, p 186 The British government maintained a financial campaign counterfeiting a flood of paper currency in Continental dollars to sabotage the war effort.Baack, “Economics of American Revolutionary War” Continental currency became worthless, state treasuries were empty, towns went bankrupt, and the marketplace was paralyzed by Quartermaster and Commissary certificatesCarp 1990, p 186. Both Congress and states shared in the failure of the “specific supplies” system that Congress undertook by committee. From the standpoint of legislation, states did not tell Congressional Boards nor their delegates in Congress what they had, and Congress requisitioned the states for food in resolves that were only published in Philadelphia newspapers. Congressional requisitions to each state were proportionately based on wealth and population, but those formulas did not match the ability to respond in each state.Carp 1990, p 182-3
Even during the emergency of war with national survival at issue, American colonial traditions of local self-government thwarted efforts to supply a national "standing army". States interfered with shipments of army provisions, Continental Army and Navy supply officials were drafted into state militias, and local magistrates would not enforce impressment when farmers withheld food from the military for speculators.Carp 1990, p 220 States either could not or refused to cooperate with Congress, civilians everywhere resisted and then refused to participate in markets to supply and provision the army. When Continental, state or local officials were given authority to impress goods for army use without compensation, it was either actively resisted or only half-heartedly attempted.Carp 1990, p 186-7 State provincialism also played a part.Carp 1990, p 185
As a matter of administration and logistics, the most serious aspect limiting military supply was the immense difficulty in acquiring provisions and transportation. Middlemen and speculators bought up food before it reached market, adding their margins to state expense. French regiments in Maryland and Connecticut paid in gold and silver, preempting state purchase of army requisitions in Continental dollars or worse, by certificates.Carp 1990, p 186 Even when states gathered supply, there was no administrative means provided to take it to the Continental Army. Unaccessed food rotted in state depositories.Carp 1990, p 181 The most serious related event was the mutiny of the Continental Pennsylvania Line in January 1781, followed by that of the New Jersey Line later the same month. The two mutinies followed one years' service without pay of any kind, along with a sporadic supply of inadequate food and clothing.Carp 1990, p 179
Congressional delegates feared for the future of their revolution and the nation's independence. Among the correspondents of George Washington pleading in his daily correspondence for Continental Army support, a Nationalist movement developed within every state. State commissioners met in a Hartford Convention from 11 to 22 November 1780, recommending an end to the administrative Boards of mixed Congressional and civilian advisors. Nationalist majorities in state legislatures increased their Congressional delegations with numbers of former Continental Army officers.Carp 1990, p 203 The Nationalist caucus in Congress replaced the Boards with independent executive Secretaries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, War, and Marine (Oceans). Unfortunately these were likewise mostly secretarial posts accumulating reports to submit to Congress for action.Carp 1990, p 187,203
Late in the war, Congress hoped that shifting direct responsibility onto the state legislatures for each state militia Line regiment in Continental service would result in better provisioning. It asked individual state legislatures to equip their own troops and pay upkeep for their own citizen soldiers in the Continental Army. When the war ended, the United States had spent $37 million at the national level and $114 million at the state level. The United States finally solved its debt problems in the 1790s when Congress assumed all state war debt to attach the states to the Constitution of the United States' central government, and it founded the First Bank of the United States to establish the good faith and credit of the United States.Jensen 2004, p 379
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Sincerely - TheVirginiaHistorian (talk) 20:30, 12 October 2020 (UTC)
thread_title:  American logistics 

message: Joseph Warren also received a commission as major general, but died at Breeds Hill a few days later. Alexgriz (talk) 14:18, 20 February 2024 (UTC)
thread_title:  Joseph Warren