Talk:Truth/Archive 12

message: This is too funny. The Icelandic "featured article" is just a translation of this one! --Nate Ladd 05:17, 15 April 2006 (UTC)

message: Of the two reference Kneale & Kneale, one is in quotation marks, the other is not.  Is the second reference a paraphrase?
JA: The whole paragraph preceding the citation is my summary of their information about the Dissoi Logoi.
Since this part of the article is outside the section on philosophy, should the article mention that Kneale & Kneale's views differ from the views of mathematical logic?  Are these views standard in philosophical logic? Rick Norwood 21:11, 24 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Kneale & Kneale

message: JA: Kenosis, yes, I saw you add that before, and I see that superfluists think that asserting is simpler than ascribing truth, but I think that's an assumption that has yet to be examined critically.  Maybe that's not our job, but I think it's fair game to call attention to it, being that it arises from common sense and all.  Jon Awbrey 21:48, 24 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: A reasonable distinction; best to avoid the extra quandary there.  I think the article proper and the "Philosophy" section (boy what a "section", talk about loooong) is close to having a very reasonable summary introduction, and thanks for stating it so straightforwardly there...Kenosis 22:06, 24 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Which is simpler?  Ascribing or Asserting? 

message: It's not worth fighting over, but my change was intended to avoid the implication that the maze is now solved. Rick Norwood 00:17, 25 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: I just saw this Rick.  I apologize then.  My intent was to bring it back to a relatveily non-specific implication that different theorists perhaps have found different ways out, while others may not have.  Collectively it's still up for grabs, as evidenced by the lack of agreement.  I thought it would be too contentious to have it imply that none have found their way out (and along comes the inevitable editors who think, well, my favorite theory has found its way out)..Kenosis 04:37, 25 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Out of the maze

message: JA: Chunking out a long excerpt here to facilitate analysis of the argument.  Jon Awbrey 15:48, 24 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Jon, do you have a hard copy of this, or is it available online?.....Kenosis 16:59, 24 April 2006 (UTC)

text: Thanks....Kenosis 18:27, 24 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: And as a general trend it gets vaguer yet with constructivist and consensus theories....Kenosis 19:36, 24 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Quotes from Ramsey, "Facts & Propositions" (1927)

message: I just removed this, and am putting it here for further development and, if necessary, analysis...Kenosis 16:08, 25 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Where they intersect the studies of language and reasoning, the topics marked by the use of verbs like assert, believe, command, consider, deny, doubt, hunt, imagine, judge, know, want, wish, and a host of others, are technically discussed under the three heads of intentionality, modality, and propositional attitude. .... 16:08, 25 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Jon, more than fair enough, and correct too.  But this can be discussed elsewhere, affording the editor(s) an opportunity to explicate these extremely difficult issues in some kind of summary fashion (if you think that's possible)...Kenosis 16:25, 25 April 2006 (UTC)

text: What I did in that intro paragraph was use the opportunity to give the reader an intuitive perspective on one form of triad out of many that attach (belief/sentence/"fact"-referent), give a couple of real life examples that people can relate to immediately, say that there are, inter alia, two major threads or loci of current theory development (one focusing on belief, one on sentences), and give in the most common of colloquial terms a perspective on inevitable complexity.  It was certainly not my intention to actually deal with those complexities in theoretical terms, at least not in the intro...Kenosis 16:32, 25 April 2006 (UTC)

text: As we can see from both the historical and contemporary discussion, all these terms become problematic every time philosophers get their hands on one for the purposes of analyzing truth.  As we can also see, the word 'fact' has proven sufficiently durable that science (despite theoriteical fallibility) likes it, and law uses it (despite abdication of definitions and analysis of truth), and everyone knows what the question means when the issue is "well, how do you know it's a fact?  There is no need to try to substitute a debatable term of art here...Kenosis 17:03, 25 April 2006 (UTC)

text: I suppose Wittgenstein is culpable here, but ground zero is Bertrand Russell.  Maybe there's some simple way of explaining that in the context of Formal definitions, where the reader, having hopefully gotten some perspectives, can dig in more intensively should she or he wish to do so.  I think it's a trap actually, one of those traps where they--whoever exactly 'they' may be--put leaves on top and you end up falling on the spears in the pit underneath, to try to explain this to the reader in an alticle such as this....Kenosis 17:48, 25 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Sentence moved here from intro to Philosophy of truth for futher discussion and development

message: I notice that the first 13 notes and references are in one form, the rest in another.  This should be standardized. Rick Norwood 22:48, 25 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Notes and references

message: Moore's paradox may have a bearing on this article. --Ancheta Wis 01:12, 26 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Moore's paradox

message: JA: I won't say that I'm yet in the clear on this — it's forced me to begin excavating some old thoughts, having to do with referential opacity and all that rot, that I layered down my first thunks on more than 30 years ago — but I'm pretty sure that the distinction between speculation and commitment really is generally acknowledged by all of the writers in view, and it's a distinct distinction from the one that we see at issue in the flationary controversy, which is pinned in another place.  Jon Awbrey 20:50, 26 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: There are two separate points of significance in this paragraph, and the language juxtaposes the two unnecessarily.  Let's parse 'em, separate 'em out, and say it so it can be understood...Kenosis 21:13, 26 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: There is too much fluff in there.  Two significant points are being made.  (1) There is a generally acknowledged distinction between merely contemplating or entertaining a proposition, and actually asserting or believing it.  Not all theorists deal with it, and those that do deal with it have not found agreement on how to deal with it.  (2) In ordinary parlance, the things that one says about a subject are expressed in predicates.  If one says that a sentence is true, then one is predicating truth of that sentence.  Is this the same thing as asserting the sentence?  This question serves as a useful touchstone for distinguishing several of the major theories of truth. 'nuff said-- no fluff, no muff the explanation... Kenosis 22:04, 26 April 2006 (UTC)

text: Here it is for further analysis....Kenosis 22:45, 26 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: "There is a generally acknowledged distinction between merely contemplating or entertaining a proposition, and actually asserting or believing it.  What the distinction consists in, however, inspires more answers than general agreement.  Language does not fail to provide us with many ways to mark the distinction, even if we fail to say what it is. " ... 22:45, 26 April 2006 (UTC)

text: This set of statements does not effectively lead into the discussion of truth predicate, and gets lost before the first point is complete.  Please let's fix it, then reinsert it in an appropriate place...Kenosis 22:45, 26 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: OK, I begin to see where the confusion might be here, though.  Are you actually trying to say that the difference between contemplating and asserting is what is driving the issue about where the line should be drawn about "truth predicate"?  These are separate issues, the neglect of contemplation/assertion differentiation and whether language has its own truth predicate (all of which is the fault of excess reductionism of course) ....Kenosis 22:52, 26 April 2006 (UTC)

text: Then we are agreed, as I had hoped, that they are two separate issues.  How do we state the issue of contemplation/belief so that (a) it is clear, and (b) it does not interfere with or unduly confound the issue of predicate that is the subject of the Tarski et al vs. Kripke et al dispute...Kenosis 23:21, 26 April 2006 (UTC)

text: Are we talking about people, or about major theorists, or both?...Kenosis 23:30, 26 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Dis Tincture & Dat Tincture

message: JA: Redness predicates do not tell us about redness, they tell us about barns.  Jon Awbrey 22:08, 26 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Sorry, I was now in the wrong section--meant to respond to the issue in the section above..Kenosis 22:47, 26 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Redness predicates & Truth predicates

message: A note about the following passage in the introduction section of Philosophy of truth: ("Where they intersect the studies of language and reasoning, the topics marked by the use of verbs like assert, believe, command, consider, deny, doubt, hunt, imagine, judge, know, want, wish, and a host of others, are technically discussed under the three heads of intentionality, modality, and propositional attitude.")  The only reason I am not vigorously objecting to the use of this sentence is that it serves as a warning shot across the bow to reader/editors priming for an opportunity to throw in any old choice of their favorite POV's, that this stuff is not simple.  As it stands there are now two additional difficult points thrown into this "introduction," one on monadic and polyadic predicates, and the one I just mentioned.  The average reader, thankfully, is immediately afforded an opportunity after this sentence I just quoted to grab onto something they can take into the rest of the article, hopefully without giving up completely.  One more complicated addition to this intro and it is kaput for most readers.  I think it has said quite enough in its present form, and any additional data should be added elsewhere in the article in a section titled "More on technical terminology in the philosophical analysis of truth" or some such approach...Kenosis 00:47, 27 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: The last sentence of this commentary above brings me back to the dissoi logoi, which is a very apt introduction in my estimation... so who is the "one" here, the writer? or the average-or-median reader (take your pick between average and median) interested in obtaining a manageable perspective to bring into her or his life?...Kenosis 03:27, 27 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: The current intro is, in my judgment (judgment here assumed to a truthbearer [sic], which, if one admits the term, could be true, false, or partially true) a more effective servant to the cause and effect of Wikipedia than the any of the previous versions.  Geez!...Kenosis 04:00, 27 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: On Sartre, Husserl, Heidegger, and the existential truth

message: JA: I'll be putting some stuff in the formal definition section that I've been collecting from some of the primary sources this week.  I'm not saying that it will all end up there, but at least I'll be able to develop it in a continuous context.  If it seems a little disjointed at first, please bear with, it's partly because somebody keeps snipping out every bit of connective tissue in my heels.  Jon Awbrey 04:44, 27 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: NP by me... do have a g'night, OK? .  Nice work Jon; there are, by my review of it at least, some fine insights included in the article (after Banno, JimWae, Rick Norwood, Ancheta_Wis et al managed to hold it together somehow)... more of a core structure to bring into the future here at least, whatever specific course it may take from the current stage of development.... Kenosis 05:17, 27 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Formal definition section

message: Now the following material is stuck in "Propositional attitude":
::"[Also of] interest here is the very basic distinction between belief and an assertion based upon belief (or in the case of something judged to be an intentional falsehood, an assertion not based upon belief).  Some theorists use belief or thought as the focal point in their analyses, while others use statements or assertions as the focal point.  Either way, the analysis is quite complex, and the philosophical discussions reflect this complexity.  In day to day life, both belief and statements commonly come into play in our attempts to discern truth from falsehood ("How could she possibly believe what she just said?," or "He obviously believes it, but he's wrong.," etc.).  And both must be compared with concepts of what the facts are.  As reflected in the discussion in this article, what exactly the "facts" are, and how we are to discern truth from falsehood, truth from partial truth, mistaken belief from true belief, are not at all simple questions."
Perhaps I should have used the words "a statement" rather than "an assertion".  But the purpose of this paragraph is, per the Wikipedia guideline to say it to the reader even if it seems obvious to us the writer/editors, early in the article before getting into the beginning of the major theories.  You may not think so because you're smart, but among the questions that naturally occur to readers, it seems to me, is how the day to day issues such as lies, misstatements, erroneous belief, misunderstandings, mishearing, misreading, etc., fit into the overall picture here.  And an average reader deserves, in my estimation, a reasonable, very understandable review and a statement or two of how, and if possible why, the darn discussion is difficult and complicated.  And the average, even below average, reader should still be able to walk away with the very basics if that's where they choose to stop.  What about the obvious question "whaddya mean, difficult question? facts are facts", or "no, it's all relative and you can't really prove anything."  This paragraph I just gave is not now and was not then intended to be micromanaged and parsed fully for every possible implication from the perspective of every logical positivist, pragmatist or other theories, at least not at the stage of presentation at which it was offered.  It was intended to be a sketch.  Fact is, this kind of sketch would better serve the "average" reader if it completed the issues of belief/statement by the talker (lies and inadvertent mistakes), and statement/belief by the hearer (mishearing, misunderstanding, misreading, or a pretense thereof), which is what it did earlier, and other editors found that one reasonable too, even if not perfect when deleted by Jon Awbrey.  The reader, at that stage of reading, does not need to know what intentionality is in relation to modality and propositional attitude; they already know what the intentions are--either to accurately represent belief, or to inaccurately represent belief, "on purpose" as they say.   The typical reader (not the top ten percenters here) deserves this basic review before diving into the dirt of the myriadic technical "funhouse" of some of the commentators....Kenosis 12:32, 27 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: That is why I didn't refer to the triad per se, but rather stated what the three relationships are.  There is a relationship between belief and fact, there is a relationship between statement and fact, and there is a relationship between belief and statement, all applicable on both the sending and receiving end of a language transaction.  And when you say the words "on purpose" or "intentionally" the three relationships account for all normal notions of truth, approximate truth, lies, half-truths, misstatements, erroneous beliefs, mishearings, misreadings, misunderstandings and pretending to misunderstand.  Simple, no need to dumb this down or obscure it, just state it straight up.  Then go after the tough stuff after putting these things forward for the reader, and stating that the issues have turned out not to be so simple.  The rest of the body text can speak for itself as to the difficulties.  Have a good week Jon...Kenosis 14:05, 27 April 2006 (UTC)

text: And as a matter of fact, if it's said straightforwardly enough, there is even room to include a brief note of caution or introduction to the difficulties about how the word or other signifier and its related associations interpose upon one another within the [thought, concept, image, belief]  corner of the triad here, and even how entertaining/considering and understanding/believing are not strictly separated and ill defined, and how the transaction must be made repeatedly among to gain mutual understanding of what the words are intended to mean, how difficult it can be to pin down what "fact" is, and in the same stokes will be helping the reader to begin to understand some of the difficulties.  This is all do-able without befuddling the later explanations (not all of which necessarily explain that much anyway)...Kenosis 15:28, 27 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: The proposition you assert, that our choices are limited to technical obscurity and falsity, is false.  ( Johnnie and Jimmie are in a room together, and Johnnie hits Jimmie.  Mother comes in and demands an explanation of what happened.  Johnnie says Jimmie hit his head against the wall 'cause he was getting wild.  Mother goes to reveiw the newly installed videotaping system for the playroom, and proceeds to play it back for everybody.  Case closed.  Now, is Johnnie stepping forward to say that it is not a fact that he hit Jimmie and also lied about it? because there is a philosophical problem with what a "fact" is? because there is a very complex conceptual problem with what a lie is?  There is no question among the three whether Johnnie understands what "hit" means, nor about what "wall" means, nor about what "wild" means.  What Johnnie has done is to use already agreed upon symbols whose mutual understanding has long been intersubjectively verified to everyone's satisfaction in the room, and stated a non-correspondent version of events with the intention of using those agreed upon words to create an image in Mother's mind designed to shift blame onto Jimmie. Hi story seemed coherent (hung together), despite Jimmie's protests, until the videotape was played for all to see.  This is what we call a lie, an intentional mis-re-presentation) There are some basics to be explained in the article, well before we encounter any difficulties Jon... Kenosis 17:41, 27 April 2006 (UTC)

text: Nor will anything else except choice of best reasonable generic words for the intro, with a one-sentence or half-sentence note to the customer that the technical terms may vary depending on your location in the minefield... Kenosis 18:19, 27 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: On "dirt-elevating devices" & "average readers"

message: JA: I'll be assembling a budget of quotations here while I try to get them in some kind of (archeo?)logical order for the article.  As usual, for ease of analysis, I will break the longer passages into bite-sized chunks.  Jon Awbrey 13:14, 27 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Truth and a Pinion

message: I notice there does not seem to be any overlap between the people who are working on truth and the people who are working on lie. Rick Norwood 19:10, 27 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Lie 

message: I think the article is now infinitely better than it was a week ago.  Since I haven't done much of the writing, I plan to give it a read through to catch any repetition or inconsistency that the authors may be too close to catch.
I highly recommend the article on truthiness. Rick Norwood 21:43, 27 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: I agree there. For all that I've somewhat resisted some of the changes, the article is shaping out a lot better than it was before. Ig0774 05:26, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Job well done. 

message: : "Many problematic situations in real life arise from the circumstance that many different propositions, in many different modalities, are in the air at once.  In order to compare propositions of different colors and flavors, as it were, we have no basis for comparison but to examine the underlying propositions themselves."
This seems to say that propositions underlie propositions.  Earlier, I thought those colorful, flavorful things in the air were "statements", and that propositions underlie statements.  Rick Norwood 01:27, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Propositional attitudes

message: I note that Wikipedia has an article Deflationary theory of truth but no article Substantive theory of truth.  Is this because authors of this article belong to the deflationary school, or is it just because nobody has had the time to write the companion article? Rick Norwood 01:35, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Robust or substantive...

message: : "These theories all hold that truth is some kind of substantive quality or a relation between things beyond what is expressed by the surface grammar of sentences that truth predicate truth or falsity." 
I am unable to parse this sentence.  In particular, I don't understand the last five words.  Rick Norwood 01:39, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: "These theories all hold that truth is some kind of substantive quality or relation between things beyond what is expressed by the surface grammar of sentences that predicate truth or falsity, such as "Snow is white is true".
JA: So I think it was probably just an edit error.  Jon Awbrey 02:10, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Theories of truth as substantive

message: Just reading through the article and I stumbled across this little gem:
:If one says that a sentence is true, then one is predicating truth of that sentence.
Now, I see where it is going, but doesn't this kind of prejudge the issue of truth? After all, some deflationary theories hold just that "if one says sentence, then one is predicating the truth of that sentence" (and now to tread on people's toes and get myself thoroughly reprimanded for being so bold) and this is quite like what Derrida says somewhere, that when I say something, I am promising that I will say the same thing tomorrow (which is as close to "truth" as you can get with Derrida). Plus, to say that a sentence is true but not assert it strikes me as being either dishonest or mad... Ig0774 18:01, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: I'm not saying that sort of thing should be censored. There are really two concerns: one is the prejudgment of the issue that this is supposed to introduce (I don't buy into the deflationary stuff, but some people seem too) and the other is the common meaning. It strikes me that in everyday speak, that sentence says "If ones says that a sentence is true then one says that the sentence is true". It might be easier just to say "if one says a sentence is true, is that the same as asserting the sentence?". Ig0774 18:19, 28 April 2006 (UTC)

text: Ok. Just a minor quibble about words. I'll leave it alone. Ig0774 18:21, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Stepping on toes...

message: I'm sure this can be resolved without revert wars.  Rick Norwood 19:15, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: I'm sorry and a bit disheartened to observe that this article is turning into an attempt to override several very well established encyclopedias of philosophy with an approach that uses the other theories of truth as a mere lead in to the work of Charles Peirce and Awbrey.  This trend should be reversed and the article given back over to its cause, the broader cause of Wikipedia and its readers...Kenosis 19:29, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: But we were getting along so well!

message: JA: Did WP just convert to proportional spacing, right & left justified?  Or is that just something in my monad?  Jon Awbrey 03:08, 29 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Proportional spacing?

message: JA: Having carefully considered the matter for several weeks now, and pending the day when somebody shows me that Aristotle described his theory of truth as "substantive" — it's actually conceivable, but I will wait for the citation — I will be re-labeling traditional accounts as traditional, in accord with the applicable "truth in labeling" statutes.  Jon Awbrey 04:10, 29 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: NP by me; how 'bout main theories. ;-) Point being, well, maybe the religious perspectives are correct ("know thyself," said Jesus of Nazareth; why does Goedel come immediately to mind here — you can't know yourself, at least not fully, etc etc.  Sometimes one needs to back up a bit, as this is extremely tough material for everyone unless you have a surprise videotape to draw upon — and suddenly Sartre seems to have a handle on it and is looking mighty pretty, until........).  Turns out Aristotle didn't say half of what was later pinned on him; neither did Plato, yet the analogies are apt as to the context in which the two originally argued.  Then again, I listened to Derrida in person and up close in 1994, maybe 1995, and he said he keeps going back to Aristotle — go figure.  If we stay on the task, and if overall perspective is kept, we'll get the article as right as right can be.....Kenosis 06:02, 29 April 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Jon, just put a reasonable summary paragraph up front, take a break, and come back to it with a fresh perspective, OK? Maybe another editor will have a fresh perspective on the material you've added too.  The extensively peer-reviewed encyclopeidas have already, by and large, covered all the main material here, and somewhere in the English language there is a reasonable way of summarizing it...Kenosis 06:42, 29 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Traditional theories of truth

message: JA: Re:
Obviousely, these questions can not be answerd (even in principle) without clear definition of truth.
JA: Enormousdude, your persistent remarks have been noted, considered, and consistently rejected on account of the fact that they miss from the outset what are some of the main questions of the article, which are precisely whether truth is something that demands definition and whether it can be defined if so.  One of the tasks of the article is to present the various answers to these questions that have been brought forward over three millennia.  Jon Awbrey 13:56, 29 April 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Ignoratio elenchi

message: I have moved the long set of quoted material from Ramsey over to the article on Redundancy theory of truth.  I am wondering how much of this material is necessary to the article on Truth. Or is it currently being worked on in some fashion?...Kenosis 02:17, 2 May 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Anything further on this?  Can we collapse this and link to the article on redundancy theory?  Or is there a plan currently being developed here? ....Kenosis 02:09, 5 May 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Redundancy theory article

message: Regarding this dif  - this can't be what Kneal & Kneal said, surly?
:Escape from befuddlement seems easy enough if one observes that it is not the verbal expression, the sentence, to which the predicates of truth and falsity apply but what the sentence expresses, the proposition that it states. (Cf. Kneale & Kneale, 16). (Banno's emphasis)
Did they really claim that one cannot attach truth or falsity to a sentence? Frege was mistaken, presumably? 
If this is indeed a correct statement of their point of view, I strongly recommend that we use another source! But since the paragraph in which this befuddlement occurs is superfluous, perhaps it should just be removed? Banno 03:32, 3 May 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: recent trends in linguistic-analytic philosophy tend to focus on sentences and their corresponding abstract contents, called propositions. 
Few analytic philosophers talk of propositions - it is far more common to speak of sentences. hence the change. Banno 03:35, 3 May 2006 (UTC)

text: The distinction here is between "statements" which do not contain variables and "sentences" which may contain variables.  Every statement is, by definition, either true or false.  Sentences, on the other hand, cannot take truth values unless modified in some way, as by a quantifier.  Thus "He is an initiate." is a sentence containing the variable "he" and its truth value is dependent on the value of the variable.  A sentence containing a variable can be viewed as a function, in this case between the domain of all persons and the range {T, F}.  If the sentence is quantified, then it takes on a truth value:  "All persons are initiates" and "No person is an initiate." are false, "Some persons are initiates." is true. Rick Norwood 16:03, 3 May 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Befuddlement

message: JA: I'll collect a few quotations here as I get the time.  Jon Awbrey 17:14, 3 May 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: DBfuddlement

message: Re: "rev -- accounts, treatments, etc. are perfectly standard terms in lit, "theories", however, they are not":  ?? I say give'm a B just to get 'm outta my classroom.  Whatever...Kenosis 02:57, 4 May 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: On the traditional accounts of truth

message: JA: Subject and predicate are not essences, they are roles that terms play in a particular discussion or "theory".  For example, a discussion of grammar will have as subjects of discussion certain grammatical categories, among which are the noun phrase (NP) and the verb phrase (VP), etc.  02:50, 5 May 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Gobbledigook (that's intended to be a euphemism).  That collides nearly head-on with the truthbearer camp.   I don't think you've seen the bottom of the well here yet.  Personally I'll bear with you on this because you've asked for forbearance while you're working on it, but there remain some major organizational issues to be resolved here. ...Kenosis 03:03, 5 May 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Well, best to separate 'em out from truthbearers then...Kenosis 03:22, 5 May 2006 (UTC)

text:  If it's specious, then get it out of there, or explain it straight up.  Today, the term truth bearer is variously and often loosely applied according to the definition we provided. Right now those sections are self-contradictory and do not present a useful picture of the lay of the land in philosophy as of today.  What are we trying to say, that when a "philosopher" applies the words "is true" then it's a truth predicate, but when an amateur applies the words "it's true" it is a truth bearer subject to the additional application of the words "is true" or "is not true" by a professional philosopher??  ... Kenosis 14:40, 5 May 2006 (UTC)

text:  If the intent is to present the historical use of "truth predicate" and the quirksome legacy it has left us, then please do so without being so oblique about it.  The question presented at the end of the truth predicate section is not only a useful touchstone, but rather the source of about half the confusion in the field.  Best to say so straight up.. Kenosis 14:40, 5 May 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Subjects & Predicates

message: JA: Reflecting on the current state of the article overall, it's main defect at present seems to be its lack of balance with respect to anything beyond literal-minded language-bound truth, and a rather geeky pinheaded take on that.  I'm all for giving geeky pinheads their due — some of my best friends are geeky pinheads — but even the average reader we hear so much about knows that there's much more to the subject of truth than that.  Previous complaints from others about this issue once led to the inclusion of a token statement about aesthetics and artistic truth, but that seems to have gotten lost somewhere along the way.  Approaching the relation between literal truth and figurative truth requires a broader perspective at the outset, one in which truth-in-so-many-words and truth-in-terpsichory are seen as special cases of truth in general.  Just a little something to think about as you muse on that picture of Truth.  Jon Awbrey 14:12, 5 May 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: State of the Art-icle

message: This material placed here for reconsideration:...Kenosis 15:30, 7 May 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: "Truthfulness refers to when one says what he thinks is the truth in good faith. Even though a habitual liar may say the truth for deception purposes, he would not be characterized as truthful. However, someone who is truthful may unwillfully say something false, thinking it is true."15:30, 7 May 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Brief paragraph removed from new section on "Truth and the conduct of life"

message: The table of contents is out of control. It needs to be collapsed. The "truth in religion" section is perfect for collapsing, either as a part of the 'disciplines' section (I don't see what's so objectionable about that) or as a subsection of a new section on 'truth in ethics'. In any case, I'm really quite puzzled about what the subsections of the religion section are doing. Lucidish 17:08, 7 May 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: I disagree.  What there is, in my estimation of it, is too lengthy a treatment of Truth in philosophy, and that section is perfect for collapsing as to several section within.  By all means go for it if you can get it past other editors.  The section on Truth in Religion, which crosses over into non-rational, non-empirical revealed and doctrinal beliefs, is shorter than about half the sections in Philosophy of truth.  The evidence thus far is that people occasionally check in here wanting to deal with the question of truth in religion, a separate one from truth in science, law, etc., and also a separate issue from the treatment of truth in philosophy...Kenosis 17:18, 7 May 2006 (UTC)
replies: text:  What do you disagree with? I just want to get rid of the subsection parititioning, not the material. Lucidish 18:05, 7 May 2006 (UTC)

text: The subsections in the Truth in religion section are currently placed to delineate separate issues, from separate traditions, in separate time periods, placed by separate editors, from one another.  Presumably we haven't heard the last of the slants yet; Wikipedia's only five years old or so, and there's still, well, a long time to go here... Kenosis 19:02, 7 May 2006 (UTC)
replies: text:  Ok. I think that's unnecessary, because if they're single paragraphs then they don't deserve subsections, and if they grow to be more than what they are, they'd be pushing the boundaries of the irrelevant. This article is huge right now, and it doesn't need irrelevant material. Lucidish 19:18, 7 May 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: I beg to differ.  I could, without even drawing on other Wikipedia articles, expand any single one of those three or four main topics currently in that little section to a 50KB article with a little bit of time on my hands--easily--and also find a number of new relevant slants without being the least dismissive of issues of credibility because they are "revealed" or "doctrinal".  And as you already know, some of the real fun then starts when such truths meet up with "rational" and "empirically derived" "truths"...Kenosis 21:46, 7 May 2006 (UTC)

text: While the Truth in Religion section obviously needs work, it is an important view of Truth that is almost entirely different from Truth in Philosophy.  Revealed religions claim to know the truth in an absolute form, as indicated by the bumper sticker, "God said it.  I believe it.  That settles it."  Rick Norwood 20:47, 7 May 2006 (UTC)

text: I find the arguments here severely misplaced, because these little sections are mere tokens prepared for future development-- if they do not work out in the end, they can always be removed down the road.  One thing I have noticed is that having the section on Religion allows editors with a religious slant a distinct place for their views.  Another thing: if you look back through the talk page you will see that there remains some more interesting material to include in the section on Truth in law.  Just haven't gotten around to it quite yet....Kenosis 20:58, 7 May 2006 (UTC)

text: I have taken the step of removing some of the more offensive material in terms of length from the Philosophy of truth section, which is excessively lengthy without significant improvements in what it explains and/or summarizes.  I have shortened, for now, the section on Coherence theory, which was disproportionately focused in specifics rather than summaries, and also very significantly shortened the Redundancy theory section, which was widely disproportionate in its focus on specifics (originally it was 6-7 times the length of the "main article" on that theoretical approach).  There's more to do here, but now there's room for the previously designated (by other editors) sections on Law, Math, Religion, you name it...Kenosis 20:54, 7 May 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Jon has worked hard on those sections.  I hope he understands that there is a place for that work, but in a more specialized article. Rick Norwood 21:03, 7 May 2006 (UTC)

text: All this material is in the relevant articles word for word.  The additional material in the Coherence theory section did not say much more than the summary paragraphs already did; except to drop a couple names and cites, and that's what the "main article" is supposed to be for.  The redundancy theory section was even more in the same vein.  I analyzed that series of quotes, took my time with it, and at the end of the day, what they said was already summarized in the first summary paragraph of that section.  Jon did some good work and diligent work with it, but at the end of the day you end up in exactly the same place:  "Snow is white is true" is the same as "Snow is white" at least according to Ramsey.  Fact is, half of what is now the second paragraph of the Redundancy section also doesn't add much to the article, except that the second paragraph helps explain quickly what Ramsey meant by "linguistic muddle" and reinforces certain ideas about propositions that were introduced earlier in the article, leaving the more specific analysis for the "main article" on the subject.  ..Kenosis 21:36, 7 May 2006 (UTC)
replies: text:  I see I won't be able to help in this wiki. Oh well. Lucidish 18:16, 8 May 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Truth in religion etc 

message: JA: Critics, they just gotta be bitchin' about something all the time, even if it's outa both sides of their mouths.  No sooner do they get done railing against "academic" language then they turn to lambasting this or that casual phrase or natural idiom.  It think it must arise from some need to destroy at all costs.  Jon Awbrey 17:36, 8 May 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Enough with the hyperbole.  Critics my foot-- you asked for patience while you were formulating these various concepts.  I researched diligently as well, and took complimentary tacks with you both actively and, in the last two weeks, more passively in response to your request to allow you liberty to work on some of these difficult concepts that many of the best philosophers have had major problems with.  And I have engaged you in friendly bantering and sometimes challenging arguments while steadfastly seeking a readable article. The result of this sometimes challenging discussion between us, and among other editors as well, is a more useful and articulate article on the whole...Kenosis 18:09, 8 May 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Avoiding unnecessary obliqueness does not mean backsliding into musing and meandering.  You've done this sort of thing before (musing in real time while editing), and you've pulled yourself out of it before.  Why begrudge thoughtful edits?  I don't begrudge your points in the slightest, and when they show a point that appears useful for the reader, you know darn well I always submit to you and other editors on such points. When they are merely proprietary and stubborn, I feel differently about it. I will get back to this process of content management later...Kenosis 18:09, 8 May 2006 (UTC)

text: Geez here.  All our contributions, revisions and deletions are a matter of public record. Show me an axample of something of significant importance to readers that went down the crapper on my initiation, preferably one that is just BBT&S without being primarily BS. And even if there are one or more instances of what you just asserted, why wasn't it retrieved and replaced in an appropriate setting?  I speculate the most likely reason is insufficient importance to the presented topics here on Wikipedia. If by "crapper," you mean "relevant main article", if want to apologize that offshooting the specifics of the various subtopics is often required because the marquee article doesn't necessarily have room for all of the desired meanderings, including those I myself fancy. If by "crapper" you mean an organizational or heirarchical schema other than your preferred one at any given moment, then I must plead guilty to a number of counts on that charge...Kenosis 19:59, 8 May 2006 (UTC)

text: And incidentally, not only have I had my own share of contributions flushed completely (an event most editors will readily recognize as quite familiar to their experience), but also, I have withheld large quantities of specifics in favor of summaries and links, as an encyclopedia of this kind expects as a method of presentation.  Such a method allows readers of varying levels of interest to link if they choose, or pass it up in favor of a quick summary if that's their preference...Kenosis 19:59, 8 May 2006 (UTC)

text: As we all know, or should know, these are not necessarily complaints, but quick summary notes justifying or explaining the edits.  We also know, or in my estimation should know, that occasionally such a comment may be interpreted to be a complaint, especially when there is a succession of specific small edits, even if it is not intended to be argumentative or directly critical. And if it is directly critical, so what?...Kenosis 21:17, 8 May 2006 (UTC)

text: On the other hand if such an edit was judged to be trivial, then the relevant edit(s) should have been left standing as is.  I would summarize without going into detail at the moment, that my last full reading of this article (today) leads me to arrive at a personal judgment that the article is significantly better organized and informative than a month ago.  That does not mean we put a lock on it, at least not without a clearly determined consensus that we should raise the ante of justification for succeeding edits at some point. Plainly there is a bit more work to be done.  I see your request for specifics below--I'll deal with this point by point soon as I have a chance.  Talk with ya' a bit later...Kenosis 21:17, 8 May 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Hypo-Critics

message: JA: I realize that there's some redundancy between the 1st and 2nd non-quote paragraphs of the PA section, but I'm about to insert some more material from Quine in the gap, when I can get a round tuit.  Jon Awbrey 02:50, 10 May 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: The introductory section of Philosophy of truth is turning into a monster.  What are we to do about this Sargasso Sea situation that is inexorably developing?   Where is all the shunt-off material in the articles proper (Propositional attitude is 1/6th the size of the section on Propositional attitude in the article on Truth.  Even if it were the same length or larger, all this does not belong in the lead-in to the major theories of truth.  There is nothing in that section that couldn't be summarized in a couple brief paragraphs, with a caution that one must be prepared to see that there are different attitudes and modes and intentions, and link to elsewhere.  Problem is, there is no bottom to this well, and we ought stop this expansion before anyone gets too invested in what they've put out into the public domain here...Kenosis 03:17, 10 May 2006 (UTC)

text: I disagree.  The relationship between belief and statement explains most of the issues in daily life for most readers, allowing them something to take home, so to speak, prior to proceeding to the theories section.  But, I'm going to remove all that stuff as of now, and experiment at home and/or on the talk page to see if a separate section can be developed for more average readers in the near future.  I think we should be able to get each of the introductory sections down to two paragraphs each, three very short ones max, so we don't deaden the minds of near everyone before they get to the theories.  We need just enough up front so they can understand what all the minimalist bantering is about, and ne plus ultra...Kenosis 03:48, 10 May 2006 (UTC)

text: What sort of name shall we give to verbs like 'believe' and 'wish' and so forth?  I should be inclined to call them 'propositional verbs'.  This is merely a suggested name for convenience, because they are verbs which have the form of relating an object to a proposition.  As I have been explaining, that is not what they really do, but it is convenient to call them propositional verbs.  Of course you might call them 'attitudes', but I should not like that because it is a psychological term, and although all the instances in our experience are psychological, there is no reason to suppose that all the verbs I am talking of are psychological.  There is never any reason to suppose that sort of thing.  (Russell 1918, 227).
In linguistics and logic, the formal properties of verbs like assert, believe, command, consider, deny, doubt, hunt, imagine, judge, know, want, wish, and a host of others, are treated under the headings of intentionality, modality, and propositional attitude.  (Cf. Quine 1956).
What a proposition is, is one thing.  How we feel about it, or how we regard it, is another.  We can accept it, assert it, believe it, command it, contest it, declare it, deny it, doubt it, enjoin it, exclaim it, expect it, imagine it, intend it, know it, observe it, prove it, question it, suggest it, or wish it were so.  Different attitudes toward propositions are called propositional attitudes, and they are also discussed under the headings of intentionality and linguistic modality.
Many problems in human communication, and even personal integrity, arise from the circumstance that the same proposition may be affected by various propositional attitudes and expressed in sundry linguistic modes at one and the same time.  In order to compare propositions of different colors and flavors, as it were, we have no basis for comparison but to examine the underlying propositions themselves.  Thus we are brought back to matters of language and logic.  Despite the name, propositional attitudes are not regarded as psychological attitudes proper, since the formal disciplines of linguistics and logic are concerned with nothing more concrete than what can be said in general about their formal properties and their patterns of interrelation.
Key comparisons of multiple modalities involve the relationship between, assertion and belief, belief and knowledge, and the discrepancies that occur among observations, expectations, and intentions.  Deviations of observations from expectations are commonly perceived as surprises, phenomena that call for explanations to reduce the shock of amazement.  Deviations of observations from intentions are commonly experienced as problems, situations that call for plans of action to reduce the drive of dissatisfaction.  Either type of discrepancy forms an impulse to inquiry (Awbrey & Awbrey 1995).
Some theorists consider assertions and propositions to be the raw material of their analyses, while others suppose beliefs and thoughts to be the focus of their examination.  In either case, the ensuing analyses of concrete situations can be quite complex, and the philosophical discussions reflect this complexity. ...04:05, 10 May 2006 (UTC)

text: Does that Russell citation seem a little... strange... to anyone else? I mean, we are talking about "propositional attitudes" and in support, we quote a guy who says "Of course you might call them 'attitudes', but I should not like that"... I mean, I realize he's a pretty standard source for the term, but still... iggytalk 06:26, 10 May 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Having recently had an e-mail discussion with a French author in which I chided him for his almost mind-numbing use of "nous" (we), I'm happy to see the "we" go as it is ambiguous in its purpose.  Is it the royal we?  Is it in respect to things "believed" by the majority of people.  Is it merely the author's way of goading people into agreeing with him -- "I write "we" as my position is one all must share, and if you don't you are an outcast"? •Jim62sch• 09:20, 10 May 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Propositional Altitudes

message: Placed here for preservation and analysis as to content.  Some of this is redundant to the the sentence that contains another long list of propositional attitudes... Kenosis 15:36, 10 May 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: "In linguistics and logic, the formal properties of verbs like assert, believe, command, consider, deny, doubt, hunt, imagine, judge, know, want, wish, and a host of others, are treated under the headings of intentionality, modality, and propositional attitude.  (Cf. Quine 1956)." 15:36, 10 May 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: sentence from Propositional Attitudes section placed here for preservation

message: Placed here for preservation and analysis as to content.  A close reading of the Russell quote indicates that it is not necessarily correct that propositional attitudes are not psychological attitudes proper.  The list of verbs given as examples of propositional attitudes includes examples to which psychological attitudes are either directly attached or inextricably intertwined.  A more thorough explanation of this highly complex situation can perhaps profit the reader if put in another section or article (e.g., the article on Propositional attitude, which currently has vast potential). ... Kenosis 15:49, 10 May 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: "Despite the name, propositional attitudes are not regarded as psychological attitudes proper, since the formal disciplines of linguistics and logic are concerned with nothing more concrete than what can be said in general about their formal properties and their patterns of interrelation." ... 15:49, 10 May 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: another sentence from Propositional Attitudes section placed here for preservation

message: JA: Jim is forgiven for being in medias res — then again, who isn't — and I would not wish on anybody the misery of reading the archives of past "truths", but many things that would be obvious to the veterans of our local version of the "truth" no doubt need to be explained in the article.
# We often have, er, discussions are often had with regard to mathematics writing about this business of "we-ism".  In the ∀day discourse of mathematicians, this is neither the royal "we" — it is well-known that mathematics, unlike psychology, has no El Camino Royale — nor the "we" of plural authorship, but instead the democratic or participatory "we", as in "We, the People".  It is so prevalent in casual math speech precisely because of the importance of exercises and proofs, which one is supossed, as they say, "to read with a pencil".  In other words, math is a form of inquiry most of whose sense is missed if disembodied spirits do not bother to embody themselves in chalk-smudged and elbow-greasy bodies.  Jon Awbrey 13:14, 10 May 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: We-ism & Recent Discussions

message: JA: With regard to this query:
: Does that Russell citation seem a little... strange... to anyone else? I mean, we are talking about "propositional attitudes" and in support, we quote a guy who says "Of course you might call them 'attitudes', but I should not like that"... I mean, I realize he's a pretty standard source for the term, but still... iggytalk 06:26, 10 May 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: I believe I have neglected to compliment Jon Awbrey on his prolific research and understanding of so many of the details of this immensely complex set of subjects, particularly the technical aspects and subtleties of the formal linguistic, semiotic and logical aspects.  Seems like we now have about ten new articles to work on all of a sudden... Kenosis 15:57, 10 May 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Ockham Chainsaw Massacre