Talk:Hard problem of consciousness

message: Someone called Gazelle55 removed the section on Idealism -> https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Hard%20problem%20of%20consciousness&diff=984228526&oldid=982535962
Given that this solution to the mind-body “hard problem” goes back to Plato, it’s difficult to see how a supporter of panpsychism (which arguably gives no explanatory power in this area) can just remove this section. 
The “hard problem” was defined by David Chalmers, who writes “Overall, I think cosmic idealism is the most promising version of idealism, and is about as promising as any version of panpsychism. It should be on the list of the handful of promising approaches to the mind–body problem”. In this paper he explicitly refers to Kastrup as a key contributor to this “promising approach”
https://philpapers.org/archive/CHAIAT-11.pdf
I’m confused why people would be pushing a certain agenda, rather than trying to inform people about where our understanding sits, and what the potential solutions are? Simonadams (talk) 22:46, 13 February 2021 (UTC)
replies: text: Appears that the section should be restored. J-Wiki (talk) 05:18, 27 February 2021 (UTC)
replies: text:  Hi , thanks for posting here to clarify the issue, and my apologies for not noticing your post until now. I certainly wasn't trying to push my POV... in fact I think idealism is just as promising as panpsychism, though my views have evolved and these days I tend towards illusionism. My concern before was WP:DUE, since the only source cited was Bernardo Kastrup, who didn't used to have any academic credentials on the topic (though I see that he now does and has been praised by Chalmers). You have also added references to academics like Hoffman and Chalmers so I am satisfied that this satisfies WP:DUE. If there are any other issues with my edits feel free to post on my talk page or ping me so that I receive a notification! Thanks for contributing to Wikipedia. Cheers, Gazelle55 (talk) 17:29, 11 April 2021 (UTC)

text: No worries, , it is always challenging trying to reflect the body of available sources fairly on a contentious topic such as this one, and I appreciate having people to correct my edits. And I appreciate your willingness to defend material you don't agree with. No doubt this page still has a long way to go. Gazelle55 (talk) 13:30, 1 September 2021 (UTC)
thread_title:  Removal of Idealism 

message: Hi everyone. I noticed that in the Philosophical responses section was not sticking to consistent labelling conventions when dealing with different philosophical frameworks. This lead to a lot of overlap (various sections unknowingly dealing with the same topic) and undo weight to certain views to the exclusion of others (for example, there was about three sections on Type-A materialism but no sections on either Type-E dualism or Type-C materialism).
To deal with this issue, I have reorganised the 'Philosophical responses' section to reflect the taxonomy of views given by David Chalmers in 2002. This taxonomy can be found here.
In my experience, this taxonomy has become the standard jargon within philosophy of mind, from both people who take the hard problem seriously and those that do not. But do not take my word for it: this can be seen simply by poking around at some of the more contemporary literature on the topic. For example, the Journal of Consciousness Studies did a special volume on the Meta-Problem of Consciousness. Anyone who takes the time to look through it will find that materialists, dualists, physicalists, eliminative materialists, and the like, are all frequently making use of Chalmers 2002 labelling convention. Similarly, searching on Philpapers.org for the keywords 'Type-A Materialism', 'Type-B Materialism' and so on will yield hits to papers with titles like In Defense of Type-A Materialism or Taking Type-B Materialism seriously. And many of these papers are written by relatively well known philosophers (that last one was written by Janet Levin). These and a number of other examples demonstrate that Chalmers' 2002 labelling convention has become standardised within contemporary Analytic philosophy.
Since that is the case, it is best practice for us to adopt this labelling convention in this Wikipedia article, too. That said, this comes with certain difficulties, because some of the labels are currently just empty sections, and some sections need more expansion and clarification than they currently have.
That is why I am writing this: I would like to ask any editor that is interested in improving this article to take a look at Chalmers original naming convention and fill out the sections in the taxonomy that are currently too-short or completely empty. The original taxonomy can be found here. The paper is long, but it doesn't need to be read from top-to-bottom, since if functions as more of a reference work (Chalmers has all the categories in the taxonomy organised into their own sections, which can be found with a quick control-f). If anyone would like to include additional information about the category beyond what is included in Chalmers' original taxonomy, this can be found by going to Philpapers.org and searching for the relevant label in the search-bar. This should pull up papers other philosophers have written on the topic.
A.gee.dizzle (talk) 21:51, 22 June 2023 (UTC)
thread_title:  The '[[Hard problem of consciousness#Philosophical responses|Philosophical responses]]' section should use labelling conventions consistent with those used by analytic philosophers 

message: A lot of very educated people saying "We don't know, but we're confident we will someday" is less helpful than it seems. That in itself doesn't explain why these people deny that the hard problem exists. It reduces a very rich debate to a few radical materialists pooh-poohing something that seems strange but is at worst a nuisance, not a threat. It's a criticism section by a nicer name, and is actually unfair to the more radical materialist side.
Most major breakthroughs in scientific understanding are preceded by a plateau of poor understanding. It's not particularly interesting that we might be currently be on such a plateau, only what the nature of that plateau is.
Do we have anything better than a lengthy quote by the philosopher Chalmers himself, followed by a few materialists saying "Nuh-uh?" 2603:7081:1603:A300:1141:BDAB:9C4E:6D99 (talk) 19:25, 11 March 2024 (UTC)
thread_title:  "Neural correlates" section is kind of frivolous.