Talk:Property dualism

message: I can't understand anything on this page. The 'reducible' doesnt link to a definition of reducible, and the analogy to water and light makes no sense. The writing is also painfully difficult to parse.24.61.92.71 (talk) 03:04, 15 June 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: You're quite wrong; Identity theory holds that mental properties are physical properties. But the article is even more wrong, horribly so; non-reductive physicalism is most certainly not dualism; as the Physicalism article says, "physicalism is generally a form of monism", Physicalism is essentially monist". -- 71.102.200.232 (talk) 08:18, 27 January 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Horrific article 

message: His view is that although mental states are not ontologically irreducible to physical states, they are causally reducible (see causality).
Am I missing something or should it read "although mental states are not ontologically reducible to physical states, they are causally reducible...
--Golden Eternity (talk) 03:35, 19 September 2012 (UTC)
thread_title:  Bad Sentence in Biological Naturalism? 

message: Note according to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Property_dualism, Epiphenomenalism is defined as Non-reductive physicalism.
If Epiphenomenalism is Non-reductive physicalism, then both of these statements cannot be correct;
1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalism;
"Non-reductive physicalism is the idea that while mental states are physical..."
2. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epiphenomenalism; 
"In philosophy of mind, epiphenomenalism ... is a view according to which some or all mental states are mere epiphenomena (side-effects or by-products) of physical states of the world... while mental states are caused by physical states, mental states do not have any influence on physical states."
Is Epiphenomenalism Non-reductive physicalism?
(Note I have already updated http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Property_dualism with a new definition of Non-reductive physicalism which includes Epiphenomenalism [non physical mental states]. However, in light of the definition provided at Physicalism, either a) on http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Property_dualism the new definition will have to be reverted and Epiphenomenalism will have to be dissociated from Non-reductive physicalism, or b) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalism will have to be updated with the new definition which includes Epiphenomenalism [non physical mental states]).  
Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 12:12, 24 April 2009 (UTC)
replies: text:  I have now assumed that there was originally a mistake in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Property_dualism and that Epiphenomenalism is not Non-reductive physicalism (based upon the definitions given of non-reductive physicalism in both http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mind and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalism, and the definition given of Epiphenomenalism in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epiphenomenalism). I have updated http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Property_dualism to reflect this (including separating Epiphenomenalism from the Non-Reductive Physicalism heading). If this change is wrong, and Epiphenomenalism is in fact Non-reductive physicalism, then this latest change can be undone. Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 02:32, 26 April 2009 (UTC)

text: Thanks Heligan for your response, and I am sorry for the delayed reply. One of the main problems is that this method of definition is incompatible with the Philosophy of Mind page (and relevant children) in its original and current forms, in which non-reductive physicalism and epiphenomenalism are described as being incompatible; "non-reductive physicalism ... this is what distinguishes it from epiphenomenalism". I understand the problem from a technical point of view (ontological verses causal reducibility), and it would make perfect sense to classify it this way also. However, although I conducted a search myself , I could not find clear references that talk about them in this way, and no one has appeared so far particularly apt to change it (or accept its being changed). The references I found where these concepts were brought together (made compatible) involved the equation of these concepts rather than epiphenomanilism being talked about as a subset of non-reductive physicalism. I could imagine that there might be other reasons for this (for example, context - for the purposes of making an argument). Please let me know how you would like to proceed. Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 15:17, 13 February 2011 (UTC)
thread_title:  Is Epiphenomenalism Non-reductive physicalism? 

message: Does anyone know if anyone actually calls him or herself a "property dualist?"  It seems like a position invented in the secondary literature. Though supervenience tends to involve two sets of properties, and hence a kind of property dualism, advocates of supervenience in phil-mind are typically physicalists.  In regards to this article, if there are self-proclaimed property dualists they should be cited; if not then that somewhat remarkable fact should be noted, I think. Jyoshimi (talk) 17:28, 6 February 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Extant Property Dualists? 

message: pan-psychism is clearly the non-emergent form of property dualism. Pan-psychism is dualistic, it's not substance dualism since it claims that mind and matter are codependent and necessarily involve one another but the logical inconceivability of mind emerging from mindless matter because they are qualitatively different 'things' is the justification for pan-psychism to begin with. (Unsigned edit by IP 174.89.56.237 posted here at 21:01 23 May 2013. For the sake of tidyness, I have taken the liberty of this mark-up and attribution Chjoaygame (talk) 23:53, 30 March 2019 (UTC)
thread_title: pan-psychism

message: Substituted at 20:12, 1 May 2016 (UTC)
thread_title: Assessment comment

message: This article has a lead statement about property dualism, but it is not evident to me that there is in the body of the article a section about property dualism as such; absent citations of reliable sources in the lead, I would expect to find them in such a section. The lead statement assumes that the dual properties belong to a physical substance, an assumption that seems to me to rule out pan-psychism; perhaps the meaning of the word 'physical' may be questioned. I am not familiar enough with the literature to know whether the assumption is well enough supported there to pass without a reliable source citation.Chjoaygame (talk) 00:09, 31 March 2019 (UTC)
thread_title:  This article 

message: — Assignment last updated by Jovanna.lanbaxter (talk) 17:34, 25 December 2022 (UTC)
thread_title: Wiki Education assignment: Mind-Body, section 16

message: — Assignment last updated by Willraschkowan (talk) 18:51, 19 October 2022 (UTC)
thread_title: Wiki Education assignment: Mind-Body, section 18