Talk:Naïve realism

message: My two cents is the addition of a Philosophy section with some references to contemporary writers; please feel free to improve or expand it. 
Like other contributors I think the title 'Naïve realism' is bad, especially when parts of the current article seem to be written with the dubious assumption that belief in naive realism would be naive (in a negative sense).
For example, the science section selectively refers to quantum physics, in which it is trivially true that our "naïve" common sense notions are insufficient for describing quantum phenomena. The lack of supervenience between quantum phenomena and human experience is then used for concluding that "..naïve realism is not a physical theory." Although direct or naive realism is based on a theory of perception it is not a failure to account for physical things which are unavailable for perception; direct realism does not claim that only percieved things exist. The science section simply misunderstands the topic, and the same goes for the section on virtual reality. 
Kopare (talk) 00:37, 12 February 2016 (UTC)
thread_title: Philosophers for 'Direct realism'

message: It is true that this epistemological position has been referred to as 'naive realism' and 'direct realism', but actual adherents of this position reject both these labels.  They claim that the position is true and justified, and hence, not naive.  But more importantly, they make no claim about the directness or indirectness of perception under this position.  (Notice that the level of directness of perception is not mentioned in any of the five defining claims of the positions.  Philosopher Quee Nelson has argued that calling this position 'direct realism' is actually a straw man argument (and worse than calling it naive relaism), since this epistemological theory takes no position about how direct or indirect the perception of objects is (see Nelson 2007, pp. 9-12).  From Nelson:
"...calling it "direct" is even worse than calling it "naive".  Where to label it "naive" or "vulgar" is merely to indulge in mildly prejudicial adjectives, to label it "direct" is to do something worse and commit a fallacy called the Straw Man.  First of all, it's nearly impossible to divide philosophers according to whether or not they think we perceive tables and chairs "directly" (or "immediately") on the one hand, versus perceiving the "indirectly" (or "mediately") on the other.  Are we supposed to imagine, for example, that "direct" realists deny the obvious intermediary role played by eyballs and/or light in order to see tables and chairs?" (p. 10, emphasis removed)
Surely it is reasonable to have an article that presents this epistemological position from the point of view of people who actually believe it, rather than using names chosen by its enemies to impute a smear or straw man claim.  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 122.150.246.79 (talk) 02:59, 5 October 2012 (UTC)
thread_title: Objection to calling this 'direct realism'

message: I just noticed that there is a sentence at the end of a quote that I introduced on the 26th of May 2008, which presents a biased point of view and should be balanced or removed. The sentence is...
"Ultimately, therefore, the most convincing argument for epistemological dualism is the fact that its monistic alternatives have all been refuted on sound logical grounds, which leaves epistemological dualism as the only viable alternative." (at the end of the section "Problems with reprensentative realism")
This implies that monism has been soundly refuted - end of story. This is not true; there is still a heated debate with no clear outcome. Candidates such as neutral monism, Russellian monism, type-F monism have not been "refuted on sound logical grounds" and epistemological dualism does not stand out as the only logical conclusion. The issue is still very much an open question.
Either the sentence should be removed because it goes beyond the scope of the article or there should be a brief discussion within the article, comparing dualist and monist theories of epistemology in relation to naive realism. 
What do others think? Anandavala (talk) 16:33, 13 March 2009 (UTC)
thread_title:  Dualism or Monism? 

message: Putnam defends an original kind of naive realism, after giving up his formerly metaphysical and internal realism. It would be worth doing to add something about. --Gazal Cotre (talk) 21:52, 21 August 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Hilary Putnam 

message: There should probably be only one link to the external page explaining naive realism once.  It might be better still to get a second, more thorough external link or reference.
The introductory page is fine for those not familiar with naive realism or philosophy in general.  A more thorough explanation would consider how such non-naive philosophers as Wittgenstein, Hume and Kant still believe that there is an external world with all the appropriate laws of physics, and objects which have--in some sense--all the properties which we perceive them to have.  In fact, all realists believe this in one way or another.  It's the way in which they interpret these claims which determines whether they are naive or other.  The article should then also explain the difference between realism and idealism.
I don't think, however, that the issues of scientific realism should be removed.  Instead, issues of pure philosophical argument should be added.
—Preceding unsigned comment added by Rdanneskjold (talk • contribs) 17:19, 6 October 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Pure philosophy 

message: This article violates several wikipedia policies. WP:QUOTE and WP::COPYPASTE. The information within the quotes needs to be written in a way that attributes the source and states the facts without actually duplicating the sources themselves.
--☯Lightbound☯ talk 21:11, 23 October 2009 (UTC)
thread_title:  Heaps of copy/paste and direct quotes 

message: There were two criticisms:
That it is a close paraphrase of a copyrighted source, and that it is unencyclopedic.
But since the copyrighted source is academic and authoritative, these two criticisms cannot both be true.
00:59, 28 March 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Cannot be both a close paraphrase of a copyrighted source, and unencyclopedic 

message: I've changed the quality class of this article from B to C. I do not think that the article is broad enough to merit B class yet. The article needs more information on the development of the theory - there is very little about any scholars who have made contributions to this area. Moreover, reactions to the theory (support and critiques) are lacking and there is not sufficient coverage of alternative theories. I also think that the extensive lists of external links/further reading could be better woven into the source as inline citations. ItsZippy (talk • contributions) 19:06, 12 October 2011 (UTC)
thread_title: Quality assessment

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thread_title:  External links modified (February 2018)