Talk:Counterpart theory

message: Please state examples of bad prose and not just add a banner. Maybe then I can write changes. I spend a lot of time writing this piece and as far as I know there is yet nothing more complete about counterpart theory on the web. English is not my mothertongue so exemples will help me improve my prose.
--RickardV 11:48, 8 September 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: In my opinion, the article's far too technical. Wikipedia is an general encyclopedia, not a reference manual, and at the moment I don't think someone who's not an expert in the subject already would understand this. I have a degree in philosophy & two years of a physics degree, so am presumably the "target" audience for this, but in honesty having read the article, I really don't understand what it's about —  iridescent (talk to me!) 14:23, 8 September 2007 (UTC)

text: I found this article extremely helpful as a reference. Please don't delete the formal bits - they are essential. If you edited every formal thing out of every logic article you came across there'd be nothing left!! --NoizHed (talk) 19:24, 5 May 2008 (UTC)

text: This is bizzare. This is an incredibly complex and difficult subject, unlikely to be of interest to those at an undergraduate level but nonetheless of considerable importance to philosophers. Complaints to the effect that it is too technical entirely miss the point. There is no rule that says that all Wikipedia articles must be accessible to an intelligent layperson.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 129.78.64.103 (talk) 09:31, 15 June 2010 (UTC)
replies: text:  Please see the Wikipedia Manual of Style. Wikipedia is a general encyclopedia and this is far too technical. I am also not convinced that Counterpart Theory is irrelevant to undergraduates: any 300-400 level metaphysics class will be discussing Lewisian modality. I will mark this page for attention, hopefully WikiProject Philosophy will get going on this. --Mijelliott (talk) 21:48, 14 December 2011 (UTC)

text: Counterpart theory (CT) is a theoretical framework. It uses the counterpart relation (hereafter C-relation) to replace the identity relation between objects in different possible world/times/spaces. Identity is a reflexive, symmetric and transitive relation. The counterpart relation is only a similarity relation, it doesn’t have to be transitive or symmetric.
Counterpart theory is "a theoretical framework"? Fine. In what field?
What are you referring to when you discuss counterpart and identity relations? What is the significance, in a broad sense, of the former similarity relation replacing the latter reflexive relation?
What's the point, in layman's terms?
76.197.135.132 (talk) 06:44, 1 December 2008 (UTC)

message: Most of this article reads like an intelligent non-native speaker has written it and carefully edited it, with help, to the point where it's more than good enough.
However, the section "Between Times" is so oddly organized, and the grammar and writing so strange, that I can't even understand what it's trying to say.
* Are perdurantism and the stage view the same thing?
* Does Ted Sider both support perdurantism and also oppose it with exdurantism?
* In the paragraph that begins "The point in saying that objects exdure instead of perdure is..." what is the point? It sounds like the point is that perdurantism is needed, and it works... so why would that be a point in saying exdure instead of perdure? Is it the entire next section that's actually the referent to the point?
* How is counting road segments not counting by identity? Is the idea that segments don't have identity or something?
* Finally, when it gets to the quote about fission, my brain shuts down. I'm not even sure where the quote ends, much less how to parse the sentence, still less what it means.
Meanwhile, does any of this have anything to do with C-theory, or is this one (apparently non-notable) philosopher's pet theory that happens to make use of some of Lewis's machinery? --99.35.135.150 (talk) 02:19, 17 September 2009 (UTC)
thread_title: Between Times

message: How does CT make identity statements contingent and a priori?
If the Morning Star and the Evening Star are identical, but only contingently, then they refer to one entity that has two different counterparts in some possible world. f you use this to mean that they are not necessarily identical, then you also have to say that the Morning Star is not identical to itself, because it, being identical with the Evening Star, has both of those same counterparts in that same possible world. So, even self-identity is contingent?
I think that David Lewis has an answer to this, but that this article gets it wrong. --99.35.135.150 (talk) 02:30, 17 September 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: Lewis says that everything is identical to itself and no two things are identical. I would say that "the Morning Star is identical to the Evening Star" is vernacular that breaks down and should be avoided when trying to make ontological or other philosophical inferences. Rather, say -- unproblematically -- that "the Morning Star" and "the Evening Star" are phrases that contingently refer to the same thing. -- Jibal (talk) 10:34, 7 January 2018 (UTC)
thread_title: Counterpart theory and the necessity of identity

message: I have created User:BrideOfKripkenstein/Counterpart_theory as a proposed lede section to attempt to address the context/complexity issues with the article.  I know I'm supposed to be bold but I wanted to get some input here before making changes to the article. If I don't see any bites in a couple of days, I will go ahead and put it in the main article text, but of course even then any input or discussion here is welcome.  Thanks BrideOfKripkenstein (talk) 05:17, 13 December 2009 (UTC)
thread_title: Proposed new lede

message: I'm unsure if I understand this point of view correctly (or Kripke's), but it seems to me that he is mistaking aposteriori or actual existence with identity. I don't know if there is literature on this, but it might be worth considering the point. Basically, it seems to me that though it would have to be true that the x of one world is the same as the x of another world in some essential sense (otherwise x would be another thing), the idea that contradictions of *existence* could therefore arise between the actual world and possible worlds (or between possible worlds) is due to mistaking the identity of x in a possible world with its actual flesh and blood existence. If we assume that there is no actual existence, only logical identity in possible worlds, then we can speak freely about the same identity having contradictory properties without worry since none of them are actual. In other words, it's only good to worry that existences are contrary iff they actually exist. That to me clears up the problems with saying that people exist with conflicting properties (or existences).
Maybe this point could be made if someone is familiar with the literature?
70.72.44.213 (talk) 22:30, 23 May 2012 (UTC)
thread_title:  Existence and Identity 

message: Is this basically saying that what one would think of as "my Universe A self" is no more me than a biological twin would be?199.247.46.171 (talk) 20:45, 10 May 2019 (UTC)
thread_title:  Very rough overview