Talk:Causal closure

message: :I wonder if it would be better merged into another article. Not sure what potential there is for expansion and how much it overlaps with existing ones. Richard001 (talk) 00:03, 26 August 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: I'm strongly against merger. It is an important topic in its own right, and one that is frequently overlooked: It is not uncommon for philosophers to present theories of consciousness that are really only theories of conscious experience, without acknowledging that the problem of mental causation has been left untouched. (Peter Ells (talk) 20:02, 7 January 2014 (UTC)
thread_title: Merge?

message: I'm not clear on what the difference between these two forms are. They sound synonymous to me. Richard001 (talk) 00:03, 26 August 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: I agree. It would be useful to have an example of a situation in which weak causal closure allowed a particular form of mental causation, but strong causal closure did not. (Peter Ells (talk) 20:02, 7 January 2014 (UTC)
thread_title: Weak and strong form

message: Under the criticism section "ignoring the phenomena" shouldn't the first type of explanation of purposeful behavior be explained with reasons and not causes? Wasn't this a very important distinction to the ordinary language philosophers like Ryle, Anscombe, Wittgenstein?  I don't have enough experience to rewrite that section but I think most philosophers would not say that both of those type of explanation are causal, only the second one.— Preceding unsigned comment added by 96.39.49.154 (talk) 15:34, 24 July 2015 (UTC)
thread_title: reason vs cause

message: Causal closure isn't the mainstream view in
* ontological renormalization (very wide envelopes surrounding an observed wave function, include parts that most probably won't interact with the central object, and if we accept that everything in the universe belongs in the same connectome; afar objects which are not strongly entangled interact very mildly. Afar regions (from an arbitrary observational center) include many wave functions which contribute mildly to the central observed wave function; or better put have a low probability to strongly interact with the center of the Hubble volume (theoretically afar from a Hubble volume, only entanglement allows interaction [due to intermediary Hubble volumes], but entanglement is NOT useful for communicational interaction but for ontological only (entanglement can be used for quantum encryption because its fundamental but not for faster than light data transfer). Still entanglement IS important, because it holds the universe as one BUT WITH ALL ITS MANY-WORLDS (quantum entanglement is ontologically important; also partial entanglement is important; probabilistic entanglement is the claim that entanglements and partial entanglements are also probabilistically tuned, but for an observer its hard to discover them (this is a mathematical question; if we measure many particles, some are entangled and some not.... to be more accurate all particles are entangle [because overall are/comprise the universe] at a different degree. The mathematical question is what would be different in arbitrary comparisons of particles, if probabilistic entanglement were wrong.
* Everettism: Everettism provides a connectome of close by actualities which allow more afar alternatives when we recede from the arbitrary central observer (same as above; with different mathematics). Actually we don't have to compare something outside our Hubble volume to find out (calculationally; as a thought experiment) that Everettism (manyworldness) is correct. For example, thermally collapsed atoms in our cells are NOT maximally collapsed (collapse has degrees), thus alternative realities DO exist (see: photosynthesis).
* bolches yarboclos atte PAOK  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2806:1016:6:277A:DAD:D5A3:F3D9:297B (talk) 04:32, 14 March 2023 (UTC)
thread_title:  The causal closure is an old physicalist staple; [[many-worlds interpretation|Everettism]] and ontological (not merely calculatory) [[renormalization]] don't close the causal connectome, but attribute weights to it according to each different observer 

message: "physical effects have only physical causes", but they belong (immediately, or their previous states) in an Everettian connectome (the wavefuntion; many-worlds theory)
Everettism/many-worlds theory seems unimportant, but without it you reach a dead end if you seek the first causes. Also the ontological renormalization and the Deutschian self-caused constructor of our universe are also necessary; especially if you really care about closure and ask ALL the next questions which emerge; but the result is NOT causal closure, but an Everettian connectome which fades out in ontological strength in relationship to an arbitrary center. Study the Hubble volume, but remember that infinite overlapping Hubble volumes exist; and hold the universe as one (mathematically we can speak about the Hubble volume field, due to the overlapping nature of the Hubble volumes which make up our VERSION of the universe [because different arbitrary central observers have a different Hubble volume field]).  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2A02:2149:8B1C:AC00:E8EA:7BD1:DE4:1C0F (talk) 22:04, 18 June 2022 (UTC)
thread_title:  Modern view: