Template talk:Committed identity/Archive 1

message: We're directed here:
* http://www.cs.eku.edu/faculty/styer/460/Encrypt/JS-SHA1.html
If this is to be any use at all, in my opinion, it must be on servers carrying a valid SSL certificate for Wikimedia or a very highly trusted third party. And this document should perhaps be protected to prevent the link being changed by someone for the purpose of phishing. --Tony Sidaway 17:49, 10 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: I found another SHA-1 calculator, but it's a very bad choice because it purposely caches all queries and will "decrypt" any hash values it has previously produced. So it could be quite bad if someone changed that link. Mango juicetalk 17:58, 10 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: The safest thing is to use sha1sum on your own machine. (Humor: all reasonable computers already have it installed, and there must be a windows version available somewhere.) Seriously, can't someone put a cgi script on toolserver to do it? I could, but I don't have a toolserver account. CMummert · talk 18:03, 10 May 2007 (UTC)

text: GPG would be the best option for offline software: MD5, SHA1, RIPEMD160, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, SHA224 -- zzuuzz (talk) 19:42, 10 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Agree with zzuuzz, since you can never trust unknown software to stay offline. The two above sites don't exactly inspire confidence, especially since they appear to be binary distributions. — Feezo (Talk) 19:54, 19 May 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: The site

message: * HashCalc 2.01 Freeware: Free calculator to compute multiple hashes, checksums and HMACs for files, text and hex strings. It allows to calculate hash (message digest), checksum and HMAC values based on the most popular algorithms: MD2, MD4, MD5, SHA1, SHA2 (SHA256, SHA384, SHA512), RIPEMD160, PANAMA, TIGER, CRC32, ADLER32, and the hash used in eDonkey (eDonkey2000,ed2k) and eMule tools. It supports 3 input data formats: file, text string and hexadecimal string.
* Advanced Hash Calculator 1.31  Freeware: Calculates CRC32 control sum, GOST hash, MD2, MD4,.MD5, SHA-1, HA2 (256), SHA2 (384), SHA2 (512), for Windows.
-- Avi 19:37, 10 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: GPG would be the best option for offline software: MD5, SHA1, RIPEMD160, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, SHA224 -- zzuuzz (talk) 19:42, 10 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Agree with zzuuzz, since you can never trust unknown software to stay offline. The two above sites don't exactly inspire confidence, especially since they appear to be binary distributions. — Feezo (Talk) 19:54, 19 May 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Offline software

message: While technically cute, this template seems like too much of a nerd secret handshake club. As someone mentioned it basically implements a backup password, which among other things discloses the user's secret string and IP address to that off-wiki server. Why not just use a good password in the first place, or if secondary passwords are deemed a good idea, implement them in the wiki software? Re 512-bit hashes: Wikipedia generally is willing to reset user passwords and send the new password by unencrypted email, so fancy cryptography stuff is wasted effort once it's harder to break into than the email. I suppose the template could say that if the user's WP account is compromised then admins should assume that the user's email is also compromised (so new password shouldn't be sent by email), but what happens if the user later gives up on the scheme and removes the template? How do we know they're not an imposter?
One alternative idea is to modify the wiki software so that when a user changes their email address, the old address is saved for at least a month or so, and the date/time of the address change is saved. That would help with the recent situation where the admins were reluctant to reset some compromised passwords by email, because the attacker might have changed the addresses on the compromised accounts.
If you really want to do this hashing stuff and get around the IP address and data-in-flight issues, it's probably easiest to use a client side javascript implementation of the hash function, and put it on a static page on the wikipedia server that users would access through the SSL port. Anyone geeky enough to deal with this probably uses PGP anyway though, so can just put a public key on their user page.
75.62.6.237 05:53, 11 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Because this is not meant, and cannot be meant, as a stronger password. This is administrator reaction to the password-hack and desysopping that has occurred recently; it is a way to help restore the sysop flag. However, it is somewhat incongruous in that anyone who, as you say, is "geeky" enough to use a commitment scheme, likely is knowledgeable enough to use strong passwords, making use of this scheme almost unnecessary. C'est la vie  -- Avi 13:41, 11 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Anyone could forget to log out of their account, though, and it's hard to be immune to a trojan horse or to a session hijacking. Anything could happen. Mango juicetalk 11:42, 13 May 2007 (UTC)

text: Cautionary note: the hash given above (A9993E364706816ABA3E25717850C26C9CD0D89D) is for example purposes only and should not actually be used!  It is (one of?) the most easily guessed SHA-1 hash(es) in the world!  Charm ©† 06:59, 9 July 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: The more complex the system, the more likely someone will trip up implementing it. And a badly implemented security system can be worse than no system at all. It is absolutely foolish to use an online hashing tool. Many are simply data collectors for rainbow tables, which then show up at sites like these. Feezo (Talk) 07:31, 9 July 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: ehhhh

message: This may seem a little picky on my part, but would it be possibly to quickly slip in text that would allow border color and background color changes? Changing this line:
 {| cellspacing="0" style="background:#E0E8FF"
To this line:
 {| cellspacing="0" style="background:#E0E8FF; border:1px solid #E0E8FF"
Also, maybe put a return between the end of the table and the includeonly in this line:
 }}<includeonly>
Thanks to the person who does this! └Jared┘┌t┐  18:00, 13 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Please check it now. -- Avi 18:20, 13 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Thank you. └Jared┘┌t┐  18:47, 13 May 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Some changes to the appearance.

message: The template should now automatically pick up if the selected hash function has a page on wiki, and self-wiki link to it. -- Avi 18:08, 14 May 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: #ifexist

message: I realize userboxes are a bit of a touchy subject for some but how about adding an option to get the template down to userbox dimensions? Right now, it looks a bit... bannerish, and a userbox might integrate a bit more smoothly into userpages that are, well, light on content.
I suppose another way would be to use a div to get the template to stay at the bottom of the userpage (regardless of browser and screen resolution used) and keeping the hash on a subpage, like perhaps ~/hash, would work as well (and might in fact be necessary since the hash is too long to not break the standard 45px userbox layout). I think I'm leaning towards the latter since I see little point in keeping the hash sum itself (which isn't actually useful unless there's no other password recovery method available or after an account has been compromised) prominently displayed on a userpage.
Comments? -- Seed 2.0 15:50, 15 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Well, one thing we could do is not actually display the hash. I mean, as long as it's there in the history, it doesn't have to be visible. But yeah, I think a userbox linking to /hash could work. Mango juicetalk 15:55, 15 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Great. I'm a bit busy at the moment but I'll see what I can come up with. -- Seed 2.0 12:34, 16 May 2007 (UTC)

text: That's a good point. I suppose having a separate userbox instead of adding display/formatting options to the template has the added benefit of not having to add clutter to the code. -- Seed 2.0 12:34, 16 May 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Userbox

message: Has nothing to do with the performance and use, but instead, using 'an' before the encryption type, which may or may not be the correct precedor. Could be changed to '...d6a729d38b442 - SHA-512 commitment to this user's real-life identity.' or the whole thing to: SHA-512 Committed real-life identity: a8f95...b442 --Thespian 07:37, 29 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: The easier change would be to add an option to change the article. I did that - you can now use this syntax:  to change the article. CMummert · talk 12:22, 29 May 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Fussy, Writer issue 

message: This is just me being picky. These are just minor changes to the "Usage" part, to make it easier to copy and paste. hash string and hash function need an equal sign after them. And can the parentheses be changed to HTML comments, so they don't have to be removed? Mr.Z-mantalk¢ 02:58, 30 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Never mind the first part, I didn't realize these are actaully numbered params. Mr.Z-mantalk¢ 02:59, 30 May 2007 (UTC)
replies: text:  Done CMummert · talk 03:16, 30 May 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Minor fixes for ease of use

message: Is there an advantage to saying "an" SHA/MD5/TEA/CRC32 (in decreasing order of preference ;))?  Seems like it should be "a".  Jouster  (whisper) 21:17, 7 June 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Since choice of "a" versus "an" depends on whether the following word begins with a vowel sound, I would say "an M-D-5" but "a C-R-C-32". The default article is "an" because the default hash is SHA-512, and no one has come along with a consensus that "SHA" is pronounced like "shake" or "share" rather than "S-H-A". Anyway, the template has an "article" parameter in case "an" is inappropriate for any particular hash function name. Anomie 21:39, 7 June 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Just specify article= . Cheers. --MZMcBride 22:47, 7 June 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Article Awkwardness 

message: When using SHA-512, the annotation wraps in the middle of "SHA-512 commitment" on my display. Further, the template consumes a preceding bullet.
--Jtir 19:22, 12 June 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: You can't assume other people have the same screen size and font size as you. But you can add spaces to the hash, as on my user page, to let it wrap more easily. — Carl (CBM · talk) 00:07, 13 June 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  formatting problems when using SHA-512 

message: It is utterly poor security practice to instruct people to send their supposedly secret strings to an unknown, untrusted server to be hashed. Thus, http://www.johnmaguire.us/tools/hashcalc/ should be removed, or listed with the caveat that it only be used for test purposes.
The other link, http://www.cs.eku.edu/faculty/styer/460/Encrypt/JS-SHA1.html, is acceptable as it runs in client side javascript. However, it should link to http://people.eku.edu/styere/460/Encrypt/JS-SHA1.html, where the current link now redirects. Feezo (Talk) 16:50, 16 July 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: If what the user says is true, which I don't doubt, then I would agree with what the user says. It makes sense. └Jared┘┌t┐  16:56, 16 July 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: The documentation is on an unprotected subpage, so there is no need for an editprotected request. I edited it some, and everyone else is also able to edit the doc page. — Carl (CBM · talk) 17:49, 16 July 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Oh, heh. Oops. Thanks. Feezo (Talk) 18:40, 16 July 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Edit request 

message: I don't get how this works. Could somebody explain this to me? RuneWiki777 18:38, 13 August 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Help 

message: This cumbersome phrase is equivalent to "octillion" in modern short scale of US and British standards. See names of large numbers. Since I cannot edit the template page info here I would like someone else to do it, no matter how trivial it seems. People should learn their numbers, y'know.204.56.7.1 20:36, 16 August 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: You can do this yourself — only the template itself is protected. The documentation is transcluded from Template:User committed identity/doc, which you should be able to edit. By the way, there's a template you can use on talk pages to make requests such as this; just prepend  to your message. Feezo (Talk) 05:06, 18 August 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Uh, thousand trillion trillion? 

message: You think we can change an to a(n)? Thanks. -Domthedude001 22:27, 18 October 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Use  if you prefer "a."  I think better not to modify the template, some people like it one way while others like it the other way.  Mangojuicetalk 02:33, 19 October 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: See the archive for the last time this came up. Anomie 02:39, 19 October 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: You know, actually, I think we should change the default to "a".  "SHA" is pronounceable as a word, so I think most people pronounce it that way.  Plus, see this from GoogleFight: "a SHA-1" is much more popular on the web.  Mangojuicetalk 02:54, 19 October 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: That "GoogleFight" site doesn't seem to be very good. It claimed 0 to 226, but actually running the searches gives about 15,200 to about 46,600. For SHA-512, it seems to be 2,020 to 1,730, and SHA-256 gives 1,330 to 637. Personally, I suggest just using the article parameter to match your pronunciation on your userpage. Anomie 03:24, 19 October 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Sorry, you should adjust your searches to include "-wikipedia."  The use on Wikipedia (probably from this template) seriously skews the results.  For SHA-512 without Wikipedia hits, I get 1310 to 191 in favor of "a"; for SHA512 (no dash), I get 297 to 75 in favor of "a".  For SHA-256, I get 600 to 1190 in favor of "an", but for SHA-1, I get 43,700 to 12,800 in favor of "a".  Also instructive is to look at where those hits occur: "a SHA-1" is used at prominent sites like apple.com, rsa.com, and Bruce Schneier's blog.  So I am going to make the change: you're quite right, people should have the choice, but this makes it clear that "a" is much more popular, and therefore should be the default.  Mangojuicetalk 03:43, 19 October 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: I have suggested changing the choice of indefinite articles to the definite article, "the".  "The SHA-512" "The MD-5" etc. This removes one more parameter that confuses the non-techie. Less is more. Occam's razor. Principle of least privilege. KISS. "“Perfection is achieved, not when there is nothing more to add, but when there is nothing left to take away.” -- Antoine de Saint-Exupery Regards, Unimaginative Username (talk) 06:01, 15 June 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Grammar mistake 

message: I have been wondering for a while, since the main Login page has warnings against phishing, etc., why this login page isn't secure. Non-secure sites like Yahoo still use secure connections for the transmission of login info. I didn't know where to ask, but this seems like a good place. Unimaginative Username 09:02, 11 November 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Well, using an encrypted connection wouldn't help with phishing since that's an off-site issue. Packet sniffing, possibly, but that shouldn't be an issue unless your wikistalker happens to live across the street. =] — xDanielx T/C\R 09:23, 21 November 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Can't many people along the Net view the traffic? Why else would banks, etc. use SSL? That's why Yahoo uses SSL for the login. My Wikistalker could live anywhere, work for a Net backbone provider, etc. "Best Practice" is that logins aren't sent in the clear. I know it isn't a phishing issue; I was just contrasting the care exhibited in that area with the lack of security in the login area. Regards, Unimaginative Username (talk) 05:15, 15 June 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Secure the login page 

message: 15 alphanumeric characters means about 10^23 possible combinations, not 10^27.  There are 37 different kinds of alphanumeric characters, and 15 of them together means 37^15 different combinations, which works out to 10^23.523
--Simon80 (talk) 13:38, 18 November 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: 26 lowercase letters, 26 uppercase letters, 10 digits, and space is 63 characters, not 37. \log_{10}\left(63^{15}\right) \approx 26.9901082. Anomie⚔ 15:47, 18 November 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Factual error about brute forcing 

message: Can someone please explain to me what this whole thing is exactly? Thanks.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 70.146.3.191 (talk) 23:14, 6 December 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: To answer both queries: look at Template:User committed identity; both things are pretty well-documented.  Mangojuicetalk 20:22, 17 December 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Basically, you put something in a hash calculator (it encrypts/encodes text) like [this one] and take the result, then put it on your userpage. If your account gets hacked, you can tell someone what the original text was, and when they encrypt it and get the same result, they'll know you're you. Simpler example: Pretend reversing the letters in a word is a secure code that you can't figure out. Just pretend that you can never figure out that tac backwards is cat. So you use the word cat, and get tac. You put tac on your profile, so if you get hacked, the word cat proves that you're you, because no one else would know that the original word was cat. See also Commitment_scheme --cuckooman4 (t/c) 04:24, 19 December 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: It seems the documentation is not so clear; I found what looks like a misuse at User:Q_Valda where the user just typed in his chosen string, without getting a hash.  I agree with NBahn that simple instructions (with examples of a chosen text, resulting hash string, and a template using that hash string) would be helpful.  Reading through the instructions it speaks of choosing a string and entering the hash string; the equivocal uses of the word "string" might be part of the problem; maybe speaking of choosing a text and entering a hash string would help clear up that ambiguity.  --SteveMcCluskey (talk) 23:07, 19 February 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: Please see if this new section below is helpful. Thanks, Unimaginative Username (talk) 06:15, 15 June 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  What is this? 

message: I had a thought recently: what if someone were to simply copy the commitment and use it as their own, say on some other site? If this person were to then do something malicious with his/her account at that site, it would appear (at least to a naïve person) that the perpetrator is the same person who originally made the commitment. I'm sure it's extremely foolish and/or useless to do something bad with one's own identity committed, so this might not fool anyone, even someone who didn't try to prove the identity.
Still, for the sake of paranoia, I think there is an easy fix: tie the commitment to the page on which it appears, by including the URL or the name of the site, or something similar, in the secret. Does this sound...well...sound? Maybe something to consider suggesting in the template docs? Ddawson (talk) 00:35, 25 February 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: A naive person could just as easily be fooled by a user perpetrating abuse elsewhere that shares a username with a Wikipedian, or claims to be them explicitly.  The commitment itself proves nothing, it's the ability to open it up that proves something.  That said, someone could copy a committed identity, and if they are able to observe the original user actually opening it, they could open theirs as well.  That said, I see no reason why the secret string shouldn't include all sorts of corroborating data, like "this is for Wikipedia only" or whatever.  I hesitate at the idea of adding this to the docs, but only because this whole concept is hard enough for users to understand without the more subtle aspects being highlighted.  Mangojuicetalk 06:21, 26 February 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Suggestion for commitment value 

message: I consider myself rather computer literate, but after reading this page I am still not sure how to 'commit myself'. If somebody can create an 'dummy guide' for a user using Windows it would be great. My guess is that one should go to http://www.hashemall.com/ ; enter some text in the top box, and then use it as the hash string parameter in the template, leaving the hash function used blank. But if this is the case, the current geek-to-enlightened geek text does not make it obvious (remember that most people have trouble editing a wiki or understanding what a strong password is, so if we want them to have a 'committed identity' we should make the 'how to' as clear as possible.--Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| talk  22:57, 3 March 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: No, don't use an external service to get the hash value! You don't want to have the secret string available outside your own computer (otherwise it's not really a secret). Don't trust anyone else with it (at least unless you have to open the commitment); you never know what some web server out there will do with the secret. Better to use a hash generator that you can run on your own system. Best to use one that's open-source, so it's verifiably clean. Ddawson (talk) 11:34, 4 March 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: Piotr, I can help you set one up: email me.  Ddawson is right that you shouldn't use a web hash calculator.  Mangojuicetalk 13:48, 4 March 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: Template talk:User committed identity/Archive 1#Offline software -- Avi (talk) 17:23, 4 March 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: I see; it would be a good idea to clarify that point in the template how to and provide links to those softs.--Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| talk  17:53, 4 March 2008 (UTC)

text: I've added them to the doc; thanks for the suggestion. -- Avi (talk) 17:58, 4 March 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: Your wish is my command. Dummy guide here, and I added a new topic to this page to try to help others who come here looking. Regards, Unimaginative Username (talk) 05:46, 15 June 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Easy how to 

message: There needs to be some clarification in the instructions for using the Whirlpool algorithm. When entering SHA-1, the parameter is

but the correct parameter for use with whirlpool is

  — C M B J   00:10, 19 May 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Whirlpool 

message: so...would I place this on my Userpage or something?
Would it be something like
:
to get
???--AutoGyro (talk) 19:54, 21 May 2008 
:Or do I enter the email/phone number combination into something that would give me a code, and then I take that code and enter it into the hash string field? What's the point of the "article" field?--AutoGyro (talk) 19:57, 21 May 2008 (UTC)
replies: text:  Enter the email/phone number combination into something that gives you a code, as described at Template:User committed identity#Getting the hash. The 'article' field is to select "a" versus "an" for correct grammar. Anomie⚔ 22:39, 21 May 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  I don't get how to use this.... 

message: Can we get an option to remove the padding? I'd like to have the ability to incorporate it into my userpage better. Or perhaps an option to override the entire header and footer (everything before and after the text itself)? +Hexagon1 (t) 02:02, 25 May 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: I don't think that's going to be such a common request.  Why not just subst the template and then modify the result however you like?  Mangojuicetalk 14:03, 26 May 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: I was assuming there's some sort of horrible code construction and subst'ing it would break the Internet.. +Hexagon1 (t) 06:05, 6 June 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: Here's one more of those uncommon requests: I don't know what the heck "subst"-ing is, but I would like to enter some text at the end, after "...user's real-life identity", and keep it inside the same orange box, with no more than a typical sentence space between "identity" and the next sentence. Can anyone tell this dummy in *simple English* how to modify the template to do this? Thanks, Unimaginative Username (talk) 05:44, 12 June 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: You have to subst it.  Here's what you do.  Instead of putting "", put "", save your page, and then edit it again.  The text inside the box will now be there, and you can just add some more stuff after "user's real-life identity" or modify it however you like.  You can't do this without substing the template.  Mangojuicetalk 16:03, 13 June 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: Excellent! A nice, simple, plain-English explanation, and now I've learned about "subst". I also had to move the </div> things around, take out some space, etc., but I got it done. Thanks for helping the markuply-challenged! Unimaginative Username (talk) 04:38, 14 June 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Code override option 

message: The first version was simplified and shortened considerably, with substantial help from Anomie's suggestions. Everyone else is invited to review and provide additional feedback or suggestions. I hope this helps spread the adoption of the Committed Identity. Thank you all so much, Unimaginative Username (talk) 00:15, 19 June 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: Much better, by the way! I like the personal tone without the bad jokes. I fixed a few minor typos for you, and in the process found an error in your instructions: you say to use , but the pipe after the hash makes the template use "" instead of the default "SHA-512". I didn't fix that because I don't know how you would like to adjust your instructions, either to remove the extra pipe or just use "SHA-512" explicitly. Oh, and "YMMV" is an abbreviation for the idiom "your mileage may vary". Anomie⚔ 01:24, 19 June 2008 (UTC)
replies: text:  :-) I fixed the typo. That's another reason I asked for review -- it is a well-known principle of Human Factors Engineering that it is physically impossible for any single human to do anything exactly right; outside review is always required. The funny thing is, I test-drove ("drove" -- "mileage", get it?) all of my simplified templates in my own sandbox, copying them without the nowiki, to make sure that they parsed properly. Don't know how this one slipped by, or, as you said, just a clumsy finger on the keyboard. Whenever you have a spare moment, could you be kind enough to double-check that? Hate to ask, as you've done so much for it already, but clearly, you've a sharp eye. Thanks for helping this old dog to learn new tricks -- your mileage is outstanding. Unimaginative Username (talk) 04:41, 19 June 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: Oops. Realized that fixing that single pipe error required editing a number of the other templates and instructions. No wonder you didn't want to touch it! :-) Don't know how they made it past the test-drive. I think it's correct now -- but what do I know? Thanks in advance to all who review and respond, Unimaginative Username (talk) 05:36, 19 June 2008 (UTC)
thread_title: Revised using above feedback

message: I am making some changes to the documentation. In the example parameter for a SHA-1 hash, I replaced aaaa with ef7c4c55a176bd20ed558aaefde21c4803080195 (which is the hash of the following sentence: This is an example secret text string.) The reason is that for users who have not previously worked with hashes, it needs to be made obvious that their own hash is supposed to look pretty ugly, not something neat and short. Also I am going to eliminate the term "hash string" in the documentation and replace it with "hash". SteveMcCluskey pointed out above that it is less confusing to neophytes if the documentation uses "string" to refer to the item being hashed only. (Even though the resulting hash value is also a string.) Finally I notice that the documentation currently links to hashemall.com, which is a server-side hash calculator. Isn't that a potential security leak? Or is the risk considered negligible? I won't change that; it seems to have been discussed above so maybe someone thought it should stay there? --Mathew5000 (talk) 10:43, 25 August 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: All of the discussion I see above includes several recommendations not to use a server-side hash calculator, so I suggest removing it. Anomie⚔ 11:20, 25 August 2008 (UTC)
replies: text:  I agree. --Mathew5000 (talk) 11:32, 25 August 2008 (UTC)

text: Also, some expansion is needed to the instructions at the end about what to do if your account is hacked. The instructions currently say “contact an admin, perhaps from the e-mail account that is linked to your account, and tell of your account having been stolen”. But it doesn’t say how to find an admin that you can email. As far as I can tell, if a hacker steals your account from you, then you will have to create a new account before you can get back control of your original account. Is that correct? If so it should be mentioned in the instructions. And even then, I’m still not sure exactly what procedure you would follow to provide your secret string (corresponding to the hash published on the user page) and thus get back your original account. Do administrators even have the power to transfer control of an account, and if so, would a typical administrator be comfortable using that power, without first reading up on the security of hash functions? --Mathew5000 (talk) 12:05, 25 August 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: And, emailing an admin doesn't help anyway because admins can't reset passwords.  I don't think Bureaucrats can either.  But presumably there's some users out there who can really do this; developers, maybe?  Mangojuicetalk 14:34, 25 August 2008 (UTC)

text: *Mathew5000, thank you for your review and thoughtful comments. I don't actually know the exact procedure for regaining an account. I am not an admin. I would hope someone with that knowledge would provide it, here or where easily located if needed. I was trying only to give the neophyte some idea of the purpose of all this time and effort. With regard to secrets and passwords, that has been a subject of much controversy at levels of the cryptographic and human-factors communities far, far above me. One problem is that people who can't remember passwords tend to do things like put them on sticky notes in that most secret of all places, the bottom of the keyboard (like hiding your door key under the doormat). Yet, truly random passwords/encryption keys/secrets are very difficult to memorize if you are not Rain Man. One answer has been the passphrase, if not obvious, or if created using Diceware or similar methods. But you are right, it should be recorded *somewhere* very safe, as human memory fails us all at times, even on the easiest of things. I'll edit the piece accordingly. Thanks again, Unimaginative Username (talk) 04:26, 25 September 2008 (UTC)

text: *Done. When you have a moment, please review Para. 4 and see if you think it suffices. Also, please note that I have always recommended your own local hash tool versus online calculators. Thanks, Unimaginative Username (talk) 04:38, 25 September 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: *It’s one thing to remember a passphrase that you use several times a month. Some people are capable of that, some aren’t. But here we are contemplating a passphrase that you won’t use regularly; you won’t ever use it until you need it, which might be years in the future. And at that time you will have to remember the passphrase exactly. I would argue that almost nobody is reliably capable of that. I like your recent change to paragraph 4, but if it were up to me I would go further and emphasize that if you can’t remember your passphrase after your account has been hacked you will be worse off than if you had never used the user-committed-identity template in the first place. I would also emphasize the need to remember it exactly (including punctuation, spacing, and capitalization) — if you mostly remember the passphrase then again you will be worse off than if you had never used the template in the first place. --Mathew5000 (talk) 17:23, 25 September 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: Yes, you're right about frequency of usage. I thought that using the word "recorded", as in, "most important... that it be recorded (emphasis added)..." covered that, but if you have a suggestion for improved language, please do post it on my talk page. Thanks again, Unimaginative Username (talk) 02:04, 26 September 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Revising documentation 

message: Consider this thought-experiment. Suppose my name is Herbert Bloggs, my Wikipedia username is HJBloggs, and following the suggestions in the documentation, I choose the following for my secret string: My name is Herbert Jason Bloggs and I can be contacted at: sexyboy@example.com. I compute the SHA-512 hash and post it on my userpage. Now jump ahead three years, when a hacker has broken into my account and changed the password. I remember that I used my name and email address as my secret string, but when I now compute the hash for "My name is Herbert J. Bloggs and I can be contacted at sexyboy@example.com", it comes out to something different. Well, maybe I used my telephone number as well, so I try that, but still can't match the hash. Well, there's a few different formats I could have used for the phone number; was it an unbroken string of ten digits, or did I use parentheses around the area code, or hyphens, or what? I could try all of those, and of course it still wouldn't hash to the right value because in fact I didn't use my phone number at all. But then I think, what if I put my name as "H.J. Bloggs" or "Herbert Bloggs" or something else, rather than "Herbert J. Bloggs"? Did I put a period at the end of the sentence or not? Did I say "and I can be contacted at sexyboy@example.com", or "my email address is sexyboy@example.com", or maybe I spelled it "e-mail". Well, even if I remember with certainty that my secret string was just an expression of my name and email address, there are still dozens of combinations of how specifically I could have expressed it; am I supposed to write myself a script to test them all? Well I have no idea how to write scripts so I have to test them all by hand. And I might still never get it, because it hasn't occurred to me that I originally included a colon before the email address.
And what if the hacker who now controls my account decides to delete my user page with ? Then, I have no way of checking my recollection of my secret string against what it is supposed to hash to. I have to figure out where to go to protest the deletion of that userpage, and even then it may be greeted with skepticism if I say, posting from an unregistered IP or from a new account I just made for this purpose, "I am really HJBloggs and someone stole my account, and I can't remember exactly what secret string I used, so please undelete the user page so I can see the hash value and then I will hopefully be able to provide the secret string."
But let's say that I manage to recollect my secret string exactly. Now, there's no specific instructions in the template documentation on where precisely I find a Wikipedia functionary to help me out. After looking around through the Wikipedia documentation, I come across Wikipedia:Requests for administrator attention, which still doesn't tell me specifically where to go for this issue. Meanwhile, the HJBloggs account is making all sorts of mischievous edits in my name (or if I am an Admin, then the hacker may be abusing the sysop functions in my name). It might take a couple of days to find the person with the power to return control of the account to me, but it is imperative that the account be blocked as soon as possible. The fastest way to get this done would probably be to post the following on Wikipedia:Administrators' noticeboard:
:I am HJBloggs but a hacker has taken over my account. Please block that account immediately until I can get control of the account returned to me. The proof that I am the real HJBloggs is that my secret string is My name is Herbert Jason Bloggs and I can be contacted at: sexyboy@example.com and if you take the SHA-512 hash of that string, it will agree with the hash published at User:HJBloggs -- and in addition you could email me at that email address for additional confirmation.
If I make this posting from either a new account or an unregistered IP number, any administrator could reasonably use that information to issue a 24-hour block on the HJBloggs account, likely within minutes of my making the posting. But that requires me to tell everyone that my email address is sexyboy@example.com which might be embarrassing. And then, now that I've given up my secret string, the hacker knows it too, and the hacker can just say, "that is my secret string, I am the real HJBloggs but I lost control of my old email address, sexyboy@example.com when someone hacked it." So now, how can I ever get back access to the HJBloggs account? First of all, since I posted that message on WP:ANB from an unregistered IP number, how can I now prove that I was the one who posted it? And second, the real hacker who stole the HJBloggs account from me has a reasonable argument in favour of maintaining control of that account, because it is plausible that someone who hacked the email account could then have come up with the secret string (which constists essentially of a name and email address — as recommended in the template documentation).
I did not intend to be so verbose here, but I think the scenario I pose here is realistic, and exposes some problems with the recommended use of the template. Here are partial solutions that I would propose to deal with these problems:
*Instruct users to place the template on their Talk page, not their User page, because Talk pages are not subject to deletion under WP:CSD#U1.
*Instruct users to choose (at least) two different secret strings and include the hash values of both. The first is for requesting an "ex parte" temporary block of the account by an Admin as soon as it is hacked. The second secret string would be used in the process of persuading a Steward to return control of the account permanently to the rightful owner (this might take some time because the hacker currently in control of the account would be given reasonable notice and have a chance to make submissions).
**The phrasing within the template should also provide the purpose explicitly (as in the French version). For example, one version could say "Please block User:[accountname]" for 48 hours if anyone presents a passphrase of which the SHA-256 hash is [hash value]", and the other version could say "In case of an allegation that the account User:[accountname] has been compromised, please give control of the account to the individual who presents a passphrase of which the SHA-512 hash is [hash value]".
*Remove the instruction to choose a secret string that is "easily remembered exactly by you" because that is unrealistic considering that the user may need to remember the string years in the future, without ever having thought about it in the meantime. Instead users should be instructed to write down the secret string and store it somewhere that will be secure and accessible over the long term.
Sorry again to be so verbose but I hope this is helpful. --Mathew5000 (talk) 02:54, 27 August 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: The hash is not a panacea, you are correct. However, a couple of points. Unless the user page has been oversighted, any admin can see the deleted page. Also, talk pages may be subject to CSD#U1 as sub-pages if the parent is deleted. The admin can be approached by e-mail if the hash is too personal. This, by the way, is another reason to also use a public-key based system like PGP, where if you have already accepted that Key "X" is related to E-mail "Y" and User "Z", sending a signed e-mail from "X" will be sufficient to return control of "Z" to the sender. -- Avi (talk) 03:04, 27 August 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: User Talk pages are not subject to CSD#U1 because a Talk page is not a subpage. Approaching an admin by email is problematic where time is of the essence i.e. you want the account blocked within minutes. --Mathew5000 (talk) 04:04, 27 August 2008 (UTC)
replies: text:  If you want an account back within minutes, you're screwed anyway. If someone is really using the account for vandalism and such, getting someone to block it probably is not going to be the problem. Anomie⚔ 10:35, 27 August 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: If the account is being used for vandalism it can be blocked on that basis alone. The issue is where the hacker is using the account in nonvandalistic ways, for example taking positions on Talk pages or RfAs that you do not agree with. There are lots of ways to do mischief with someone else's account that are not obviously vandalism. And it's worse if the account has sysop powers. Also I never said you should be able to get the account back within minutes. My point is that you would want the account blocked within minutes of when you realize that someone else is using it. After the account is blocked, there presumably would be some process for getting it returned to you, and for that second stage it would be useful to have a second hash value. --Mathew5000 (talk) 12:07, 27 August 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Remaining problems with the user-commitment scheme 

message: Forgive me if I'm missing something... but what is there to stop a hacker getting rid of the hash on your profile, or even updating it to a new hash? Then it wouldn't matter what my secret phrase was, as it would come out wrong compared to the one the hacker has installed! Unless every person I decided to talk to saves my has in advance in case anything happened.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by Ronius (talk • contribs) 22:41, 24 September 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: I think maybe the admins could look at previous versions of the page, before the change, and see if your secret hashes to that. Keeping in mind that *all* previous versions and revisions to pages are stored here forever. Unimaginative Username (talk) 04:14, 25 September 2008 (UTC)
thread_title: The point in this?

message: The Openid efforts encourage people to define multiple "personas" secured under one strong password or other authentication method.
I just registered a myopenid.com account (see Openid reference to JanRain and recent Press Release )
I created a persona "Wikipedia User: X" and I see that the persona has the URL 
"https://www.myopenid.com/persona_chooser?chosen_persona_id=NNNNNNN&tid=XXXXXXXX"
It occurs to me that the above URL would be a good choice for part of the secret string. 
If one assumes the security of Openid (and your usage of it) is sufficient, can't one even use the URL as the entire secret string? Using such a secret string is a clear message to the Admin that you claim to be the owner of that Openid persona, and you are suggesting using Openid authentication to verify and reclaim your true identity and your compromised Wikipedia account.
Apologies for the anon., I'm trying to be less insecure. If this method is secure, I will identify myself here later.
75.60.29.223 (talk) 06:08, 29 November 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: Cryptographic hashs take plaintext (your string), an algorithm (publicly known), and turn it in to a one-way hash.  Hashes are traditionally part of an integrity check (to ensure that one plaintext is identical to another plaintext), to use it for authentication as described here, there are two constraints: (1) The original plaintext must be kept secret until validation; (2) it can only ever be used once for authentication (as the authentication process will cause the plaintext to no longer be secret).  Having someone else create your secret plaintext violates constraint #1 above.  — xaosflux Talk 17:24, 30 November 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: You could always use the URL as only part of your secret string.  As long as you can convince someone to give you your account back, it doesn't matter how that is accomplished.  Mangojuicetalk 05:26, 2 December 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Can I, should I, use an Openid persona "Wikipedia User: X" to provide part of the secret string? 

message: I happened on this interesting topic as a tyro, and don't know at what point in a Wiki career someone would need to worry about this issue, nor what the consequences might be, nor a guess at how much trouble is it worth to avoid those anticipated consequences.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.246.234.139 (talk) 02:13, 21 December 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: See Wikipedia:Wikipedia Signpost/2007-05-14/Compromised accounts and Wikipedia:Wikipedia Signpost/2007-05-14/Committed identity for a description of the events leading to the creation of this template. The short version is that there was a rash of admin account hacks, and some users decided this would be a good way for a user that was the victim of this sort of thing to regain access to their account, instead of having to start over with a new account. Anomie⚔ 03:17, 21 December 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: Also note that it's not difficult for someone to accidently compromise an account if, for example, if one leaves his/her account logged in on a public computer, or if (s)he has relatives or friends at home that go onto his/her computer when (s)he has his/her account logged in, but the user would likely be experience the same problem as (s)he would if his/her account had been deliberately hacked. Also, if someone gets a virus in his/her computer, hackers might make malicious edits just to screw with the editor, even if the main purpose wasn't just to hack a Wikipedia account, but rather to give an internet user a headache. However, there are other ways to get unlocked than to have one of these codes. PCHS-NJROTC (Messages) 18:11, 22 December 2008 (UTC)
thread_title: Who needs this?

message: Please change the foreground color, or don't change the background color.
I have the light on dark preference set, which makes this close to unreadable.--Elvey (talk) 23:08, 12 May 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: Please read the documentation; there already are variables that will allow you to set your own colors. -- Avi (talk) 00:06, 13 May 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: What documentation are you talking about? this?  The template contains this: "background:#E0E8FF;" however the text color is not set.  Perhaps you don't understand what I'm saying.  Are you familiar with the light on dark preference (inside http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:Preferences ? )   When I go to a random page that uses this template, it it close to unreadable.  The way to fix that isn't via use of the "background" parameter, that's for sure.  The template itself needs changing.  Understand?--Elvey (talk) 07:05, 31 July 2009 (UTC)
thread_title:  Fix colors, please 

message: Hi! 
I think it would help to put an link - somewhere in the lead section of the 'How' section - to the version for dummies that user 'Unimaginative Username' has created here (User:Unimaginative_Username/Simple_Committed_ID_Instructions). Something like - "Much longer but simpler version of instructions for User with less technical knowledge." 
I am computer interested but I just didnt get these instructions. So I think a link would help. Those with some knowledge can speed-read or skip the obvious. 
Regards, --Kmw2700 (talk) 15:51, 19 January 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Link to simpler version for user with much less knowledge 

message: There should be an example in order to calculate the sum in Python. It's easy:
 import hashlib
 hashlib.sha512('my-secret-string').hexdigest()
Thanks, Andewz111 (no 'r') (nudge me) 19:28, 2 April 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Add Python example 

message: The SHA hash functions article was recently split into SHA-1 and SHA-2. Please change the "SHA-512" link to SHA-2 (or just avoid the pointless pipe in the first place, it makes splitting articles a PITA). -- intgr [talk] 20:59, 5 April 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: , you can use  next time to draw attention to such small changes to protected pages. —TheDJ (talk • contribs) 13:50, 7 April 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Disambiguate [[SHA hash functions]] 

message: Is there any way so that when a person is browsing someone's committed identity and their browser is small that the some of the string wont appear out of the box. I browse the internet in a browser that is smaller than usual and when I see a SHA-512 string, the overflow appears out of the box and makes me have to scroll horizontally to see the remainder of the string. Forentitalk 07:51, 7 April 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: I have added "word-wrap: break-word" to the CSS of the template. Browsers that support it will break the string if needed. —TheDJ (talk • contribs) 12:13, 7 April 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: Thanks a lot, it's perfect now - it has always bothered me. Forentitalk 12:56, 7 April 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Text overflow 

message: The example should be joe.schmoe@example.com, not joe@schmoe.com, as per RFC2606.  --Doradus (talk) 18:15, 27 April 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Example domain name 

message: MD5 is completely insecure: "MD5 is a broken hash function" and "no one should be using MD5 anymore." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MD5#cite_ref-24.  Alternate secret strings (collisions) can be generated programmatically, thus are not secure nor provable for identity purposes. Groxx (talk) 16:36, 4 May 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: To be fair, MD5 is still secure for identity confirmation-purposes -- because the input is supposed to be a secret anyway (you need a preimage attack for that, but MD5 is only vulnerable to a collision attack. See hash function security summary). But you are right, we should stop promoting MD5 and SHA-1 for new users, because attacks only get better. -- intgr [talk] 16:41, 4 May 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Recommend removing the md5sum suggestion 

message: What if somebody stole the hash, then contacted Wikipedia claiming to be the owner?  —Preceding unsigned comment added by Yckepedia-111 (talk • contribs) 23:57, 18 September 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: The goal is that the only person who knows what words will make the hash is you. Hashes only go one way. Vistro (talk) 00:17, 19 September 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: Yep, that's right. My hash is "8e6ad9971299e6264a17e1ef8dd6a27511b094fe9aff2539dd029da7fa07033660b844abbcac39632b00bcaa27fbd04967c6921a0b9f496ffdecc39cb6ef68a1", and that's freely visible (as they have to be). However, nobody knows the plain text that I encrypted to make that hash, because I've kept it confidential, and there's no practical way to reverse the encryption and recover the text. If my account were to be compromised and I wished to recover it, I would send the original plain text to the appropriate Wikipeople. However, if you disclosed your original plain text to other people, they would indeed be able to gain control over your account as you suggest. -- Boing! said Zebedee (talk) 07:48, 19 September 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Hmmmm. 

message: i am trying to use this powershell code (below)given inthe template instructions to get a hash.
this gives me an error at character 87.
is there a correction or some other way i can get my hash, i have a secret phrase i will always rememeber exactly, and i would like to use it. TIA
[bitconverter]::tostring((new-object security.cryptography.sha512managed).computehash([text.encoding]::utf8.getbytes("Secret phrase here"))).replace("-", "")Sam90403 (talk) 17:06, 1 July 2011 (UTC)
thread_title:  windows powershell code in template  

message: I'd remove "real-life" from "...this user's real-life identity", since it could be easily misinterpreted as requiring that the string contain identifying personal information. Feezo (send a signal | watch the sky) 11:13, 2 July 2011 (UTC)
thread_title:  Wording 

message: I just archived old topics/sections from the current talk page, and they're not here, but they're not displaying on the Archive 1 page, although they're in the edit field of that archive page. I've archived from other talk pages before and don't recall ever seeing this problem. I didn't see anything between the prior topics/sections in the archive and the new ones I added that might not belong. My second attempt was apparently rejected by a server, as would be normal if the new saved page is identical to the previous, as it should be, and the second attempt does not appear in my watchlist, but the display is still wrong. (In the meantime, the missing topics/sections can be seen through the talk page's history.) What should I do? Nick Levinson (talk) 21:23, 29 October 2011 (UTC)
replies: text: Interesting. There were actually a lot more invisible sections than the ones you just archived. I think I have tracked the problem to where an editor originally wanted to disable a section by enclosing it in  and . However, sometime later the closing tags appear to have been removed. I have tried to fix the situation by ; please feel free to sanity check what I did. – Wdchk (talk) 16:46, 30 October 2011 (UTC)
replies: text: Thank you. I guess that worked (I'm not doing a line-by-line comparison, so I hope it did). It might raise a question for Wikipedians generally about what to include in posts that might unintentionally prevent display, especially of posts that don't have that but are denied display, as a spillover effect. But I don't know enough about what to say. I'll likely post something shortly to Village Pump (Technical) referring to this instance, so someone can consider it. Nick Levinson (talk) 21:53, 30 October 2011 (UTC)
replies: text: If you want to look closer at what happened,  is the original edit. (We're going back to 2007 here.) The editor explained why he/she did it, and it seems at the time it had the desired effect of only hiding that one section. The closing tags </includeonly></noinclude> must have been removed later, but I haven't trawled through the history to find where. Cheers, – Wdchk (talk) 00:07, 31 October 2011 (UTC)
thread_title:  archive failure 

message: In the section Getting the Hash, in the last paragraph, an example of a hash is given on a single line. It is useful, but long enough to require some of us to horizontally scroll. When I do, the hash goes all the way to the edge of the browser display. Because there's apparently no space or other end-of-hash indicium after it, it looks like there may be more to the hash on the right end. That makes it impossible for some of us to be sure (experts can view source code for a page but most people don't know how to do that and some public or shared terminals don't allow that). To solve this, one or two spaces after the hash should fix that, provided they stay on the same line with the hash and line-breaking is prevented there, and the way to make sure of that is to add a nonbreaking space or two. May I add    to the end of the hash? I'm asking because I don't want to cause a misleading display, in case anyone knows the security issues and thinks it might do that. Nick Levinson (talk) 19:41, 29 October 2011 (UTC)
replies: text: I see your point. Your proposed solution might well make things clearer, but then I got to thinking we could just allow the hash string to wrap within the table. I have added some code to make this happen; at least, it works in my browser. A counter-argument could be that the wrapping might itself confuse people. However, if you copy-paste the wrapped string (into a Unix terminal, for example) you should get one continuous string with no inserted end-of-line. Again, this works fine for me, but we can take another shot if my solution is flawed. – Wdchk (talk) 18:25, 30 October 2011 (UTC)
replies: text: I'm not sure how to allow word wrap for a single punctuationless spaceless string without introducing a character or more, and that would confuse some users. We could say "without the ... characters", but that makes it more complicated. Editors using smaller screens (I assume one can edit from a cell phone) would need word wrap at several points, and artificially breaking the line at multiple points to accommodate almost all users makes it still more complicated for wide-screen users. Arguably, the people who would commit identities and understand the shortcomings are likely to be experts before they see Wikipedia's ID option, but assuming that is exclusionary of nonexperts who might need the ID protection more, having fewer other options. Most Wikipedia editors don't use Unix, or don't know that they are (like Macintosh users). Suggestions? Or should I try nonbreaking spaces after the end? Nick Levinson (talk) 21:42, 30 October 2011 (UTC)
replies: text: In the documentation, are you still seeing an unwrapped line of text for the example hash? (If so, you could try clicking "purge" at the top right of the blue box.) I thought I had taken care of it; at least it works in my browsers (Firefox 3.6 and IE 7). Take a look at the style I applied . The wrapping is performed by the property word-wrap:break-word. Doing it this way, the hash should behave as one contiguous string if you copy-paste it. There are no introduced spaces or end-of-lines. For me, this layout looks cleaner and avoids scrolling. I'm hoping you can see the same. – Wdchk (talk) 23:47, 30 October 2011 (UTC)
replies: text: I'm not getting word wrap for the hash on either the doc page or the transcluding template page in Firefox 3.3.4 on Fedora 10 Linux and that's my only Internet-ready platform at home (my new laptop won't be ready for a while). But I'll accept your judgment, since I'm not usually involved in Wikipedia's technical issues and don't have the same level of expertise as you and others likely have. So if wrapping is the better choice then I'll leave it at that and if I need to be sure of seeing the whole without it then I can view the source. Thanks for your work on the issue. Nick Levinson (talk) 00:37, 31 October 2011 (UTC)
thread_title:  apparent completeness of the example hash 

message: The template help seems to give conflicting advice. It says:
"For example, a string of 'joe' will be less convincing than 'My name is Joe Schmoe, and I can be contacted at: joe@example.com; random bits:fFfwq0DuDmMXj8hYTM3NTKeDhk'"
but then goes on to say:
"It is important that this string be [..] easily remembered exactly by you"
Possibly remove the "random bits"? SD5 21:56, 28 March 2012 (UTC)
thread_title:  Conflicting advice 

message: Is is really a good idea to list the weaknesses of hash on this page? It may aid hackers considerably. Interchangeable|talk to me 01:23, 30 December 2011 (UTC)
replies: text: Obfuscating those details about the nature of hashing functions will not inconvenience the bad guys. On the contrary, instructing others helps people to avoid misusing them in a way that might give attackers an opportunity. ErikHaugen (talk | contribs) 05:08, 30 December 2011 (UTC)

text: "The enemy knows the system." —Claude Shannon, Kerckhoffs's principle. AllenZh (talk) 20:22, 12 May 2012 (UTC)
thread_title:  Weaknesses 

message: Committed identity:  is a  commitment to this user's real-life identity.

-->
Committed identity:  is  commitment to this user's real-life identity.

--Olli (talk) 07:29, 28 July 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: Why don't you want this to wrap? ErikHaugen (talk | contribs) 17:31, 28 July 2012 (UTC)
replies: text:   Not done: please establish a consensus for this alteration before using the  template. Anomie⚔ 18:44, 31 July 2012 (UTC)
thread_title:  Change request 

message: Please update teh jsSHA calculator to:
http://caligatio.github.com/jsSHA/
Thank you,  Stillwaterising (talk) 09:54, 29 September 2012 (UTC)
replies: text:  edit to the documentation page. – Wdchk (talk) 12:43, 29 September 2012 (UTC)
thread_title:  Changed URL 

message: Has this template ever served its intended purpose? That is, proving that a user's account was hijacked?--Atlantima (talk) 20:45, 1 March 2013 (UTC)
thread_title:  Just wondering: Has this ever worked? 

message: In the syntax section, the numerical identity link doesn't actually go to any specific section of the intended page. It just goes to the top of the page. Numbermaniac - T- C 10:59, 30 March 2013 (UTC)
replies: text:  edit to the documentation page. No admin edit required. – Wdchk (talk) 02:28, 31 March 2013 (UTC)
replies: text: If I knew that, I could have done it myself. Numbermaniac - T- C 02:34, 31 March 2013 (UTC)
thread_title:  Broken link 

message: Hello!  Shouldn't the default value for the  parameter be "an" instead of "a"?  As the default value for "hash function used" parameter is SHA-512, which is pronounced as es-aitch-ei, "an" is required as the pronounciation starts with a vowel.  Thoughts? — Dsimic (talk | contribs) 23:33, 23 September 2014 (UTC)
replies: text: I think many people pronunce it as "shaw". But it should probably be written in a way that doesn't require an article in front of a parameter. -- intgr [talk] 07:49, 24 September 2014 (UTC)
thread_title:  Default article 

message: The current template supports only HEX and not Base64. Can anyone please fix it? --QEDK ♠ T ♥ C 05:55, 7 February 2015 (UTC)
replies: text: Hello!  Sorry, but why would you need base64 for outputs of hash algorithms, and what do you refer to with "HEX"? — Dsimic (talk | contribs) 08:15, 7 February 2015 (UTC)
replies: text:  Base64 and HEX are interchangeable. You can get outputs using either but it should support both, I mean why not? --QEDK ♠ T ♥ C 09:14, 5 April 2015 (UTC)
replies: text:  What do you refer to with "HEX"? — Dsimic (talk | contribs) 21:34, 5 April 2015 (UTC)
replies: text:  Presumably base-16. A more interesting question is why they think the template doesn't support base64, since it does absolutely nothing with the provided value besides output it. Maybe they don't know about either escaping '=' with  or using an explicit ? Anomie⚔ 19:37, 6 April 2015 (UTC)
replies: text:  Right, and there's pretty much no need to encode anything. — Dsimic (talk | contribs) 21:30, 6 April 2015 (UTC)
thread_title:  No support for Base64 output variant Suggestion 

message: I had started a rough draft of a page that could be considered an actual policy for Wikipedia:Committed identity. Any help with this task is welcome. Steel1943 (talk) 19:53, 25 May 2015 (UTC)
thread_title:  Draft for "Committed identity" proposal at [[Draft:Wikipedia:Committed identity]] 

message: I just tried removing the last character from my hash and the template gave no indication of a problem. Certain types of errors like that would be easy to make. I know nothing of template coding, but is it feasible for the template to check parameter 1 for these errors?
*Not contiguous characters; i.e., contains one or more imbedded blanks.
*Contains one or more non-hex characters.
*Number of characters is incorrect for the hash function specified; i.e., not 128 for SHA-512. ―Mandruss ☎ 18:07, 13 August 2015 (UTC)
thread_title:  Hash error checking 

message: SHA-512 is the most secure algorithm and it is now readily available to all users (provided on multiple websites, in-house version coming per preceding talk section). Is there any reason to mention anything else in the doc? Is there the possibility of a situation where a user who wants to use a local method would be forced to use one of the older algorithms? The doc currently refers to at least four other algorithms in various places, and it could be simplified by removing those and assuming SHA-512. I can do the first cut at the changes if consensus is reached. ―Mandruss ☎ 10:40, 19 December 2015 (UTC)
replies: text: Hm, it might be debatable whether less secure hash algorithms should be kept around.  For example, even MD5, which is much less secure, is still used rather frequently for verifying the integrity of downloaded files.  IMHO, it's all about providing multiple options and letting everyone use whichever seems to fit. — Dsimic (talk | contribs) 03:12, 27 December 2015 (UTC)
thread_title:  Obsolete algorithms 

message: Hello!  Shall we rename/move this template to Template:User-committed identity?  That would be grammatically correct because "user-commited" is a compound adjective, and should be much less confusing to the people that see this template for the first time.  Seeing it for the very first time without a hyphen was rather confusing to me. — Dsimic (talk | contribs) 20:21, 16 April 2016 (UTC)
replies: text: Sorry I'm late! I got stuck in traffic!My first reaction was I have no problem with that, and the hyphen is technically correct.My second reaction was: Look at the template's output. It says "Committed identity". Apparently someone felt those two words were enough to unambiguously describe this thing. How about Template:Committed identity? ―Mandruss ☎ 20:09, 5 May 2016 (UTC)

text: I now see that would be a move over redirect. That redirect was created in Sep 2007 by someone who apparently felt those two words were enough to unambiguously describe this thing. The template has never had that title. ―Mandruss ☎ 20:11, 5 May 2016 (UTC)
replies: text:  No worries about the delay, there's no hurry.  Ending up with  sounds like a reasonable choice to me, it's a shorter name while it would remain unambiguous because we'd hardly have someone else commit one's identity than the user themselves. :) — Dsimic (talk | contribs) 23:11, 7 May 2016 (UTC)
replies: text: Ok. If no objection by the end of this month, I'll submit a request for uncontroversial technical move. And I guess the same for its doc page, and any other subpages. ―Mandruss ☎ 16:56, 8 May 2016 (UTC)
replies: text:  Sounds like a plan, thanks.  Surely, we'd need to rename all associated pages as well. — Dsimic (talk | contribs) 19:15, 11 May 2016 (UTC)
replies: text:   ―Mandruss ☎ 04:49, 2 June 2016 (UTC)
replies: text:  Awesome, thank you! — Dsimic (talk | contribs) 00:22, 3 June 2016 (UTC)
thread_title:  Move proposal 

message: Is the link to an online-ad supported SHA hash service (after instructing users to put a lot of personal info into their hash) really appropriate here, after Wikimedia has gone so far as to move to SSL-only? I get that a lot of users are on Windows and don't want to install a utility to do this, but at least we should find an HTTPS site. Also, if there is a way to do this with PowerShell, we should include that and then fewer users would feel the need to use a web service. BlAcKhAt9(9 (talk) 01:17, 20 November 2016 (UTC)
replies: text: Possibly we could host our own javascript implementation of a SHA calculator?  A special page with a use javascript link to execute perhaps? — xaosflux Talk 03:21, 20 November 2016 (UTC)
replies: text:  See Template talk:Committed identity#wmflabs committed identity generator. The job was half done, then the person doing it appeared to lose interest without explanation. ―Mandruss ☎ 18:34, 1 February 2017 (UTC)
thread_title:  Link to unencryted SHA hash service? 

message: If a user has enabled two-factor authentication on their account, is there any reason for them to publish a committed identity hash?  The instructions for 2FA says that the supplied list of one-time-use scratch tokens are "the only way to rescue your account" if you lose your 2FA device.  If I were to enable 2FA, then lose my phone and lose my saved list of one-time-use scratch tokens, but I had set up a committed identity hash, would proving that I knew my committed identity info be of any help to me in recovering my account?  — Richwales (no relation to Jimbo) 07:51, 1 February 2017 (UTC)
replies: text: Your committed identity is to a degree very similar to your 2FA recovery codes. It's value has significantly diminished, but it won't hurt having both. 2FA requires you to know both the password and the 2FA code, but for committed identity, just the passphrase of your committed identity will be enough (but as a procedure, committed identity is much more involved). —TheDJ (talk • contribs) 12:47, 1 February 2017 (UTC)

text: I for one have no device supported by 2FA. I'm getting old and probably never will. Suggest waiting until every human has a smartphone surgically implanted at birth. ―Mandruss ☎ 18:37, 1 February 2017 (UTC)
replies: text: Thanks.  So, if I were to lose my phone and my 2FA scratch tokens, I could (in theory) still have some hope of convincing a wizard to get me back into my account based on my committed identity info?  I wasn't sure if, perhaps, the 2FA mechanism might make it technically impossible for anyone to do this, no matter how personally satisfied they were of my identity.  — Richwales (no relation to Jimbo) 20:33, 1 February 2017 (UTC)
replies: text:  Oh. I have no clue on that. Perhaps better raised at 2FA? ―Mandruss ☎ 20:35, 1 February 2017 (UTC)

text: Technically no, and you may possibly be able to use a committed identity to convince a developer to remove 2FA from your account. — xaosflux Talk 01:39, 2 February 2017 (UTC)
thread_title:  Does 2FA make committed identity useless? 

message: Can someone with rights to do it, please add a  tag around ?
Wondering why this hasn't been done initially. — Superuser27  contributions  -  talk 05:45, 15 August 2017 (UTC)
replies: text: Or even better -  — Superuser27  contributions  -  talk 06:13, 15 August 2017 (UTC)
thread_title:  'code' tag 

message: At Template:Committed identity/doc#Example, the example hash value overflows the box (and my Firefox window, requiring horizontal scrolling). At one time that was addressed by a , as seen here. That may not be the best possible solution, but I don't think the status quo is the best we can do, either. ―Mandruss ☎ 05:26, 4 February 2018 (UTC)
replies: text: how is it now? I was able to get it to look bad with a low resolution, it's a bit different now.  Only other option would be to force some line wrapping in the output. — xaosflux Talk 05:31, 4 February 2018 (UTC)
replies: text:  Actually it's better seen on the template page at Template:Committed identity#Example. I see no difference, even after purge. ―Mandruss ☎ 05:33, 4 February 2018 (UTC)

text: how narrow is your screen?  (How many characters do you get per line?) — xaosflux Talk 05:38, 4 February 2018 (UTC)
replies: text: I have no way of counting characters per line. I am maximized on a 1366x768 display. ―Mandruss ☎ 05:40, 4 February 2018 (UTC)

text: I have 110 characters of the hash inside the gray box, 18 outside. 115 of 128 visible without scrolling right. ―Mandruss ☎ 05:47, 4 February 2018 (UTC)

text:  If you don't see the same problem, have you tried a smaller window size? ―Mandruss ☎ 05:57, 4 February 2018 (UTC)
replies: text:  at 1920*1080 it is fine for me.  Obviously resolutions change for people - what do you want to happen here? (e.g. a L/R scroll window, text wrapping, etc?) — xaosflux Talk 16:31, 4 February 2018 (UTC)
replies: text:  Have you tried reducing your window width? I think you would then see the problem.I would prefer something like this, perhaps with a modification to change the font to Courier New (or whatever is used for ). I don't think it's a good idea to force a line break in the middle of what is meant to be a continuous string (); things should wrap naturally according to individual display characteristics. ―Mandruss ☎ 20:40, 4 February 2018 (UTC)

text:  I don't see any problems with that, go for it. — xaosflux Talk 21:06, 4 February 2018 (UTC)
replies: text:  -  ―Mandruss ☎ 21:24, 4 February 2018 (UTC)
thread_title:  Box overflowed (overflown?) by hash value 

message: This template, frankly, is complete nonsense. The claim is "This template gives you a way to later prove that you are the person who was in control of your account on the day this template was placed." This is not true at all. All that can be proved is that the one who calculated the hash knew the secret string. It is not provable that this person is identical to you, or to the person specified in the contact information (which can be chosen freely), or to the person placing the template, or that any of those persons are identical to any other. Neither does it prove that the secret string was actually secret at any point in time and that nobody except the person calculating the hash knew it.
Users of this template weaken their account security. Before using the template, the only risk was the password being compromised. After using the template, in addition, you have the additional risk of the secret string being compromised.
Further, the template causes systemic risk. It introduces risks for anyone who is not using it. Given someone forgets to logout. The password is not stored in memory anymore, but the authenticated session is still open. Then an attacker can place the template and claim it to be his account.
Please get rid of this template. --rtc (talk) 08:02, 17 April 2018 (UTC)
replies: text: That's just bull^$%@. No security is ever 100% to begin with, so your whole premise is flawed. This is a calculated risk/benefit scenario that has proven itself to work well enough to accomplish its intended goal (allowing account recovery in scenarios where that otherwise might not be possible). While the lingo might indeed be more accurate, this thing is intended for a non-auditer audience. Further, the whole system is embedded in social conventions, which further helps to strengthen the security. It's not a token that you enter and get access. It's a token that MIGHT give you access, if enough people believe the token to be valid and there are no suspicious circumstances. —TheDJ (talk • contribs) 09:36, 17 April 2018 (UTC)
replies: text: Bullshit? I beg to differ. There's no premise about 100% security in my argument at all. I merely argued that this is one of those cases where promises are made that are not fulfilled, using cryptography to make snake-oil-like claims of benefits, while actually introducing additional risks -- not merely for users using the template, but for everyone. "It's not a token that you enter and get access." That's right, sorry if I misrepresented that. The secret protects the user's identity, not control of the account. leaking the secret,  the user's identity is disclosed. That clearly is an additional risk. And the account can be compromised for those not using the template, as described. This is a completely realistic attack scenario, given that the template description itself mentions "remembering to log yourself out when using a computer to which others may have access" And BTW, the example is nonsense, too. It uses a secret string that contains about 144 bits of entropy. As the weakest link in the chain, this severely decreases the overall security, far below what the SHA512 hash itself provides. Further, SHA is known to be prone to length extension attacks. The possible implications seem not to have been considered at all. --rtc (talk) 10:49, 17 April 2018 (UTC)

text: If set up correctly, it's not just that an attacker has to know the hashed string, they also have to be able to impersonate the editor based on information contained in that string (for example, they would also have to take control of your email address and phone number, if you include those in the string). An administrator evaluating a request to reset a password based on a confirmed identity would likely not accept the request if the hash was recently placed or modified. --Ahecht (TALKPAGE) 16:33, 10 May 2018 (UTC)
thread_title:  Complete nonsense 

message: How do we know this isn't all one giant plot by  to take over the world? EEng 16:59, 4 June 2018 (UTC)
replies: text: We don't, and that was kind of the gist of something I said in late 2015before Fastily entered the picture. No traction, obviously. ―Mandruss ☎ 17:07, 4 June 2018 (UTC)
replies: text: Personally I do these kinds of calculations by hand, to avoid all doubt. EEng 17:11, 4 June 2018 (UTC)
replies: text: All doubt? Your fingers might be hacked by the Russians. ―Mandruss ☎ 17:12, 4 June 2018 (UTC)
replies: text: That would be a digital hack, I guess. EEng 17:16, 4 June 2018 (UTC)

text: Oh no, you've discovered my plan!  But you're all much too late. All your hashes are belong to us 😉 -FASTILY 22:25, 4 June 2018 (UTC)
thread_title:  [[User:Fastily]], evil genius 

message: So this is clearly intended to function as a salt.  So while I love having the utility of an example secret key in case someone wants to generate one themselves, the temptation I think would be far too great to just use the given one, and that completely defeats the purpose of a salt to begin with.
Despite having a very old account, I am actually quite unaware of the utilities available to Wikipedia editors, so please forgive me if this is an obvious impossibility, but would it be feasible to generate this key every pageload or at worst every few hours using a bot?  (This has the quite obvious drawback of making the history completely illegible, but would it be possible in that case to simply make the key portion a separate template?)
OmnipotentEntity (talk) 14:51, 1 July 2018 (UTC)
thread_title:  Secret Key Example 

message: I think we should add overflow: auto to the CSS style of the main  object. This should prevent the problem on Wikipedia:Village pump (technical)#Committed identity template displaying oddly in some browsers, as the template will right now extend behind a floated userbox table, which leads to word-wrapping issues. Does anyone see any potential problems with this? Daß Wölf 23:49, 18 August 2018 (UTC)
replies: text: Done. And moved to template styles at the same time. —TheDJ (talk • contribs) 09:33, 19 August 2018 (UTC)
thread_title:  Word wrapping issues with floating objects 

message: Just a little nitpick, but if the passphrase is not supposed to be a quote that someone might easily recognise or come up with, then correct horse battery staple is not an example of a good passphrase... --IByte (talk) 13:04, 6 October 2018 (UTC)
replies: text: Well, when you put it that way, any phrase we mention immediately becomes not a good example. It's a bit of a paradox. EEng 19:00, 6 October 2018 (UTC)
replies: text: Just use Swordfish. Nobody will ever guess that one. --Guy Macon (talk) 19:52, 6 October 2018 (UTC)
thread_title:  Quotes 

message: I'm a new user, and this is my first time doing anything like this, but I believe I have discovered a possible problem with Committed Identity hashes generated with Fastily's browser tool. The algorithm labelled "sha3-512 (strong)" on the website is actually using Keccak-512. Say a user wants to verify their identity and they used this website, any administrator who doesn't use the exact same tool but uses sha3-512 will get a different hash. Because of this, Wikipedia users might not be able to verify their identity.
 I opened an issue on your GitHub repository. I am not sure how to address this for all the Wikipedia Users this may impact.
MFScalzo (talk) 04:44, 16 June 2020 (UTC)
thread_title:  Issue if using Fastily's browser tool 

message: I propose to change the bolded part of the template from the numbers to "committed identity" at the start. It's more important to specify what the template actually is than to highlight the string of numbers.  talk 22:32, 23 August 2020 (UTC)
replies: text: So bold the link back to the template it's self over the ID number? Side note your signature is a blank.--Moxy 🍁 22:45, 23 August 2020 (UTC)
replies: text: Yes. And I'm not sure what's causing that for you; if you figure it out, feel free to put in a request to fix it wherever that would be needed.  talk 23:36, 23 August 2020 (UTC)

text: Let's try it out see if any object.--Moxy 🍁 02:59, 24 August 2020 (UTC)
thread_title:  Formatting change 

message: *Template:Committed_identity/doc#Password_reset
Anyone feel free to edit or point to prior existing documentation of this. I could not find any.  Blue Rasberry (talk) 14:34, 30 October 2020 (UTC)
thread_title:  Documentation of how to use this 

message: ...which as of 2020 recommends posing the request to Wikipedia:Administrators' noticeboard. On the ... Paptilian (talk) 23:20, 10 December 2020 (UTC)
thread_title:  spell check 

message: Please replace spelling error 
:"...recommends posing the request to..."
with  
:"...recommends posting the request to...".
Thanks to User:Paptilian for catching this error. --Guy Macon (talk) 03:33, 11 December 2020 (UTC)
replies: text: This text is on the unprotected page Template:Committed identity/doc and can be edited by any editor. —⁠andrybak (talk) 11:14, 11 December 2020 (UTC)
thread_title:  Template-protected edit request on 11 December 2020 

message: There should be an example in order to calculate the sum in Python3. This is the easiest and least error-prone method:
import hashlib
hashlib.sha512(b'my-secret-string').hexdigest()
Note on Unicode: The suggested method of using sha512sum is a Bad Idea since it doesn't behave as a user expects if your terminal works with unicode input. Simply doing echo -n "my-secret-string" | sha512sum does not work correctly on modern linux as you'd expect and will produce a result different than the suggested website.
This is an updated suggestion from long ago by Andewz111 in the archived talk page.
Teque5 (talk) 17:26, 29 March 2021 (UTC)
thread_title: Python3 Implementation & Unicode Issues