Talk:Non-cognitivism

message: What is the relationship between the is/ought distinction and non-cognitivism? They both come to the same conclusion, although one takes the semantic road the other the psychological.  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 118.149.76.127 (talk) 01:07, 22 August 2012 (UTC)
thread_title: Where's Hume?

message: I'm not entirely convinced that the article as it stands gives a fair shake to the Frege-Geach problem.  The last paragraph in the arguments against section seems to treat it, but I think a stronger formulation is that we would consider someone who fails to follow a moral modus ponens to be making a logical error, which of course is only applicable if moral statements are truth-evaluable.  I'm no expert, so I'm not going to edit the page myself, but I think this is a clearer and stronger formulation of the problem than the one in the article right now.  Any thoughts?
*You seem to know the Frege-Greach problem better than I, so you probably should edit the page yourself. Be bold. --Ian Maxwell 17:46, 19 May 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Arguments against not as sophisticated as they could be?

message: This article obviously needs to be merged with cognitivism (ethics). As Aristotle once wrote, opposites are subject to the same science. Velho 00:14, 2 September 2005 (UTC)
thread_title: Merge with cognitivism

message: I may remove the argument that saying "Non-cognitivism is correct" is self-contradictory. In fact, it is not an ethical statement at all, nor even a normative one, but a proposition regarding ethics. "Correct" does not mean ethical but true. (I was also considering leaving it and including an explanation as to why it doesn't work, but it would look unfair to list the arguments against non-cognitivism only to refute them immediately afterward.) --Ian Maxwell 04:59, 2005 Jun 11 (UTC)
It's not much of an argument. I say take it out. Pjrich 7 July 2005 00:01 (UTC)
Isn't 'truth-value' something which non-cognitivists would disavow? If correct=true, then non-cognitivists would presumably not take the statement that "Non-cognitivism is correct" seriously. Am I missing something? --Heyitspeter 00:28, 25 December 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  "Yeah, non-cognitivism"? Not really. 

message: Hi, Ian Maxwell.  I think you did an excellent job with this short article, and, considering that I don't know much about the subject, you may want to take my objections with a grain of salt.  But, from what I understand, non-cognitivism is merely the view that ethical propositions are not truth functional, whereas emotivism is the view that ethical propositions express subjective preferences.  (Likewise, prescriptivism is the view that ethical propositions hide commands behind them, e.g. Giving to charity is morally right = Give to charity.)
If I'm not mistaken, the are only loosely logically related to one another.  Taking "express subjective preferences" to mean expressing a proposition such as "I like giving to charity," would render ethical propositions truth functional.  But, aside from that, you could be an emotivist and a moral realist, or you could be a moral realist and an prescriptivist, or you could be a non-cognitivist and not be an emotivist, etcetera.  Hence, at the very least, emotivism shouldn't redirect to non-cognitivism.  What do you think about this line of reasoning?
Finally, more of a matter of fact question... does the term non-cognitivism specifically pertain to ethical propositions?  Somewhere down the line, I got the idea that it is a general term that, when in the context of a certain subject (in this case, ethics), refers to the view that propositions of that type (in this case, ethical propositions) are not truth functional.  I'm probably wrong, again.  
Thanks!
--Dr. Ebola I replaced your "X-ism" with "prescriptivism". I think that's what You meant. --Velho 19:22, 15 August 2005 (UTC)
replies: text: "I like giving to charity" is not a proposition at all -- wrong. -- 98.108.230.174 (talk) 19:25, 25 October 2010 (UTC)
thread_title: Non-cognitivism apart from emotivism, et al

message: Attempts to translate these sentences in an emotivist framework seem to fail (e.g. "She does not realize, 'Boo on eating meat!'").
How about, say, "she does not agree with 'Boo on eating meat!'" ? Obviously in the context of moral non-cognitivism, a claim that some person does not "realize" some moral knowledge is tantamount to an observation that one does not "agree" with the speaker about it.
Can I get a copy of this article, without the straw men in it? --70.131.60.45 (talk) 09:10, 5 November 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: I added this particular line to the article. I was a non-cognitivist at the time. I'm sorry if you find the argument unconvincing; arguing against one's own opinion is difficult. --Ian Maxwell (talk) 04:27, 8 August 2009 (UTC)

text: I don't see how being for a position is a justification for universalizing your own failure to find a sensible translation -- which is necessarily OR. "She does not realize 'Eating meat is BAD!!!!!'" would be far superior to your expressed failure. -- 98.108.230.174 (talk) 19:31, 25 October 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: Another obvious translation is "She does not realize that eating meat deserves to be booed." -- 98.108.230.174 (talk) 19:34, 25 October 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Nice to see that the article is fair and balanced... wait it isn't. 

message: The article isn't clear on what the differences between these two are. Emotivism seems to be distinctly an individual's preference "Boo Murder" while universal prescriptivism is a command "don't murder". Is the only difference that in universal prescriptivism an individual asserts that everyone should abide by the command, whereas in emotivism an individuals simply expresses their own personal opinion on a moral point? Universal prescriptivism seems to be an extension of emotivism: "Boo murder, nobody should murder".
Jeffrey.Rodriguez (talk) 05:39, 18 July 2012 (UTC)
thread_title: Universal prescriptivism vs Emotivism

message: The article hints that Hare was close to emotivism, but I believe this to be misleading. Hare considered value-judgments, such as "cruelty is wrong", to be in a different category from emotions. You could express this emotionally or without emotion. He also believed value-judgments to be in a different category from statements of fact. Nevertheless, value-judgments could be capable of conveying factual information. For example, if you say "this is a good apple", you are giving some information about the apple, such as it is not rotten, or full of worms. My authority for this is my memory of being his pupil, so I suppose it counts as OR.  Seadowns (talk) 00:56, 3 March 2018 (UTC)
thread_title:  R.M. Hare's View 

message: I'm surprised there has been no mention of Being For or Noncognitivism in Ethics by Mark Schroeder, who is considered by many to be a genius. Someone who does academic philosophy should add those. The former is a huge reductio of expressivism and considered a formidable book even by professional philosophers. The latter is more of an introduction to noncognitivism. Plus, some people on the talk page have mentioned the Frege-Geach Problem. That should be here too. I could theoretically add all of these things myself, but I'd rather leave it to the experts before my brain explodes. CensoredDog (talk) 11:16, 24 March 2019 (UTC)
thread_title: Mark Schroeder and important books to incorporate

message: — Assignment last updated by RudyCarnap (talk) 10:45, 19 April 2023 (UTC)
thread_title: Wiki Education assignment: PHIL 390 Contemporary Philosophy