Talk:Gödel's ontological proof

message: The description of the proof seems a bit weak to me -- it spends a long time laying the groundwork and then it says, '(poof), from this we can prove that God necessarily exists'.  I have no background in philosophy or Godel, but surely an entry on his ontological proof which spent so much time explaining the modal logic used in the proof should then also spend more time walking the reader through the proof?  Or maybe I'm missing something obviously.  I am feeling pretty feverish. -- Tlotoxl 10:06, 22 Sep 2003 (UTC)
thread_title: Proof wanted

message: Hi All,
I am a mathematician and my main fields are topology and mathematical logic. In the last five years - as a hobby - I collect mathematical and semi-mathematical articles taking care the notion of God. There are a lot of - some of them seem to be very funny - but fortunately there are a lot of containing really interesting results. One of them is the so-called Gödel's ontological proof. However, in many case the interpretation of these results are misleading. The common problem is that the interpeter does not realize where the math ending and something new - philosophy, theology etc. - starts. 
Gödel who was one of the most talented mathematician in history has to know the difference a mathematical model and the reality. He not just gave a proof, he built up a full mathematical theory for God, similarly as Euclides in his framework presented a mathematical theory for geometry. Now we knows that Euclides geometry is wrong, but for the beginning it was not so bad at all. In geometry using some simple axiom about the geometry we can prove much more complexed sentences, e.g. that the sum of the angle in a triangle is just 360°. Similarly Gödel proved that stated some simple properties about the notion of God a much more complex statement can be prove: the existence of God.
===Modelling God===
There is an old argument against the notion of God: it contains a self-contradiction. This "logical bug" in the notion of God is rooted from those properties of God which start "the most" attribute. This bug in its simplies form was formulized as the Russel's paradox. Taking care the existence of "the set of all subsets of a given set", or just thinking about Cantor diagonalization it is hardly belivable that there is a rich-enough mathematical theory within which a "the most"-type object exists. 
And still, set-theory, model-theory and mathematical logic can exist only because all these theories overcame Russel's paradox.    
 
===Modelling Anselm's realm===
It is amazing that Gödel's model is almost a word-by-word translation of Anselm's original argument. Quoted from Ontological argument:
"While Anselm did not propose an ontological system, he was very much concerned with the nature of being. He stated that there are necessary beings — things that cannot not exist — and contingent beings — things that may exist but whose existence is not needed"
Anselm's words "necessary beings", "contingent beings" are almost fustrating because he use the central notions of modal logic and in later in his  proof he use these notions as if he have known the modal logic (of course not).
Gödel choose the second-order predicate logic S5 for modelling the above situation, I call it S²5. The logic S²5 is not a daily used logic. It's expressiveness much more then the usual first-order predicate logic. However it is a logic it's own. There is a Kripke-tzpe semantics of S²5 for which the logic is complete (i.e. it is complete in the sense of Gödel). S²5 is rich enough to model natural numbers, it means Gödel incompleteness theorem also valid within S²5. This is the logical background to define the notion of God.
For Euclide's Geometry (and many other mathematical theory) this background logic is not stated explicitely, because it use the classical first-order predicate logic (Euclide used the Aristotales's logic - idependently from that it was formilezed or not)
In the next step he start to formilaze
"Now we believe that [the Lord] is something than which nothing greater can be imagined." 
Gödel can not do nothing with "nothing greater". Instead of he start to axiomatize "nothing greater in goodnes". To avoide any attack instead of "something being good" he choose "being positive".  The meaning of predicate P() - sometimes write as Pos() - remains undefined. At first glance it is very disturbing. However all in math the situation is similar. In geometry we do no nothing about point. All our knowledge about "point" is just in axioms and their consequences. Of course we can say that point is something without any dimension, but this is only the intended meaning of the point, which help us to understand the theory and then use it in the practice. 
In our case P() intended meaning is that a property is good. Recently we know nothing about P() only that about any property φ we can state P(φ), and this P(φ) formula can use in any other formulas as well. Next Gödel in five axiom summarize what he think about such a notion of "goodness". Let us call S²5 + Gödel's five axiom as G²5. 
Gödel theorem simply states that 
\begin{array}{rl}
\mbox{Th. 4.} & G^25 \models  \bullet\; \exists x\; G(x)
\end{array}
===What Gödel has proved?===
So now we reach the point where math ends. When I say that "proof is there" is means that the proof of Th.4. is in the article. The proof from mathematical point of view is not a long or compleceted one. Moreover, it is out of quenstion that the proof itself is correct (within G²5). 
It is clear that not only P() has an intended meaning but G() as well. G() is simple states about an x that x is God. Using the intended meaning of these predicates Th. 4. can be transfer into the following:
Our description of Goodness implies the existence of God (in the frame of S²5)
===Summary===
I tried to propose that Gödel did not prove the existence of God at all. Instead of he present a logical model within which some God-related notions became definable. He also prove some statements about these notions to point out that in his model we can examine our knowledge about God and related notions and can mathematically clarify their relations. This is why I'd like to modify the title of this article to Gödel's God Model.
It is very easy to misinterpret Th. 4. Somebody can treate Gödel's axioms as a very weak assumptions about goodness. Next step is that somebody thinks that these assumptions are so weakly that must be true in our reality as well. Moreover, these assumptions is about the notion of goodness, the notion of God. Anselm himself stated that 
But certainly this same fool, when he hears this very thing that I am saying 
Unfortunately this is not true. Anyway, if it is provable that these weak assumption about goodness are ture in our reality, then he or she also can prove the existence of God.
There are still another mathematical problem. Choosing a Kripke-model for S²5 we can construct different P()-s for which G²5 hold. If so then instead of God we has to write God(P) stating that the notion of God depend of the initial choosing of "goodness". This latest formulazation of Gödel's results show that this model far away to give our full knowledge of God. 
Gödel main achievement was to deliver whole armory of mathematical logic for those scientist who try to deep our knowledge about the entity called God.
Best Regards
Csapajev 12:56, 25 July 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: It is incorrect, not only grammatically, to say "Now we knows that Euclides geometry is wrong…." Euclid's plane geometry referred to lines on flat surfaces. As such, it was not wrong. It was plane geometry and therefore did not refer to lines on convex or concave surfaces.Lestrade (talk) 14:08, 24 January 2009 (UTC)

text: As much as one is serious about the premises, Gödel has validly proved God, but the critics shoot at "soundness", of course! But I agree with the above too, Gödel has as a matter of fact provided much definability, much description and put it into the logics context in the most elegant way. Cheers! 109.189.88.76 (talk) 06:44, 7 December 2012 (UTC)
replies: text:  But, naturally, the 'God' proved by Gödel's logic is not the Abrahamic deity, or any of the other deity characterized by the fatal non universality of human scripture. Gödel's is one which, if it wished to be known, would be perfectly known everywhere, and so can not w ish to be known, as the deities manufactured from human egos are made out to be. DeistCosmos (talk) 16:10, 7 December 2012 (UTC)

text: it was not the objective, though, to prove the existence of any specific Abrahamic deity. Simply to prove a God's existence. Nothing about Gödel's proof implies universal perfect knowableness. In fact, the only thing implied about the nature of this god by Gödel's proof is that it has only positive qualities and that no positive qualities exist that are not also a quality of this god. anon (talk) 10:00, 25 November 2018 (UTC)
thread_title: The proof is there

message: I tried to propose that Gödel did not prove the existence of God at all. Instead of he present a logical model within which some God-related notions became definable. He also prove some statements about these notions to point out that in his model we can examine our knowledge about God and related notions and can mathematically clarify their relations. This is why I'd like to modify the title of this article to Gödel's God Model.
It is very easy to misinterpret Th. 4. Somebody can treate Gödel's axioms as a very weak assumptions about goodness. Next step is that somebody thinks that these assumptions are so weakly that must be true in our reality as well. Moreover, these assumptions is about the notion of goodness, the notion of God. Anselm himself stated that 
But certainly this same fool, when he hears this very thing that I am saying 
Unfortunately this is not true. Anyway, if it is provable that these weak assumption about goodness are ture in our reality, then he or she also can prove the existence of God.
There are still another mathematical problem. Choosing a Kripke-model for S²5 we can construct different P()-s for which G²5 hold. If so then instead of God we has to write God(P) stating that the notion of God depend of the initial choosing of "goodness". This latest formulazation of Gödel's results show that this model far away to give our full knowledge of God. 
Gödel main achievement was to deliver whole armory of mathematical logic for those scientist who try to deep our knowledge about the entity called God.
Best Regards
Csapajev 12:56, 25 July 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: It is incorrect, not only grammatically, to say "Now we knows that Euclides geometry is wrong…." Euclid's plane geometry referred to lines on flat surfaces. As such, it was not wrong. It was plane geometry and therefore did not refer to lines on convex or concave surfaces.Lestrade (talk) 14:08, 24 January 2009 (UTC)

text: As much as one is serious about the premises, Gödel has validly proved God, but the critics shoot at "soundness", of course! But I agree with the above too, Gödel has as a matter of fact provided much definability, much description and put it into the logics context in the most elegant way. Cheers! 109.189.88.76 (talk) 06:44, 7 December 2012 (UTC)
replies: text:  But, naturally, the 'God' proved by Gödel's logic is not the Abrahamic deity, or any of the other deity characterized by the fatal non universality of human scripture. Gödel's is one which, if it wished to be known, would be perfectly known everywhere, and so can not w ish to be known, as the deities manufactured from human egos are made out to be. DeistCosmos (talk) 16:10, 7 December 2012 (UTC)

text: it was not the objective, though, to prove the existence of any specific Abrahamic deity. Simply to prove a God's existence. Nothing about Gödel's proof implies universal perfect knowableness. In fact, the only thing implied about the nature of this god by Gödel's proof is that it has only positive qualities and that no positive qualities exist that are not also a quality of this god. anon (talk) 10:00, 25 November 2018 (UTC)
thread_title: Summary

message: The article describes necessary truths as those true by definition, and contingent truths as those inferred from observation.  It should be noted that these descriptions are *not* standard in philosophy.  In traditional philosophical discourse, a truth is necessary if and only if it is true in all possible worlds, and contingent if it is possible that the truth be false; the article does make these definitions later.  A truth is analytic when it is true by definition, and synthetic when it makes a "real" claim about the world -- one that doesn't follow solely from definition.  A truth is a priori when (in principle) it can be known absent any real-world experience, and a posteriori when it can only be known through experience.
The article equates necessity with analyticity, and contingency with a posterioricity.  Whether these equations are justified is an issue that has been hotly debated historically, and is still far from resolved.  As an example, many philosophers of mathematics hold that the statement '2+2=4' is necessarily true -- true in all possible worlds -- but not analytic -- it doesn't follow from the definitions of 2 and 4 that this equation hold.
The point is, making these claims in a definitional sense is misleading, and confusing to the unacquainted reader; moreover, there seems to be no purpose in making them, as far as the rest of the article is concerned.  This sentence -- "The proof uses modal logic which distinguishes between necessary truths created by definitions and contingent truths inferred from observations of a world." -- should be changed to remove these references.
---
Go for it.  :Seth Mahoney 06:21, 29 Sep 2003 (UTC)
thread_title:  Necessary/contingent vs. analytic/synthetic vs. a priori/a posteriori 

message: I did mention a class of things incompatible with God. "Evil" things.  But of course you will say God is omnipotent -- apparently a positive property -- and could be those things if It chose to, but doesn't because (insert some lame excuse).  Could if It were different.  See "free will", which is an an absolute sense an oxymoron.  The distinction between "possible" and "actual" invalidates modal logic as a tool for discussion of ultimate, timeless issues.  If you consider all the was, is, and will be -- put it all in present tense -- then there is no distinction between possible and actual.  Whatever never exists cannot exist.  What exists is all then can exist.  A God that does not create all possible worlds is not omnipotent.  I God that does create all possible worlds is not distinguishable from Nothing, and is certainly not "good" or "positive" in any normal sense.
Of course theologians shift the definition of "God" to suit their argument, so nothing specific will work.
I'm not asking for a precise definition of anything.  I'm saying that if you assert that there are properties that are incompatible with the existence of God, list a few.  Here is my list of a few positive properties: eternal, pleasant, beautiful.
"Eternal"?  God supposedly exists outside of time, thus irrelevant to us.
"Pleasant"?  The God of Abraham?  Oh, come now.
"Beautiful"?  I thought It was invisible.  What color is It? I hope It's blue; that's my positive color.
Now, I have to say that I think it is a fairly big waste of time to try so hard to disprove a proof when the opening section of the article says: "While Gödel was deeply religious, he never published his argument because he feared that it would be mistaken as establishing God's existence beyond doubt."
If it were worthwhile, I would have found the time.
All properties that apply to God, when applied to God, are positive, and God possesses all properties that are positive for God.
Where in the definitions does it say that the positiveness of a property depends on which object it is applied to?
I think this categorization is specious, but even according to you, you should use axiom - you were referring to a single axiom.
I just worked with what was there. Why don't you rewrite the axioms so all the assumptions are given equal weight?  That would definitely be an improvement.
What incompatible properties can axiom 2 combine?
I did that.  See the incompatible properties article.
I don't see in the definitions any restriction on the true/false statements abut an object that can be defined as properties.  That refers to properties that you consider "actions".
"Creation" defies causality.
"Formation" defies causality.  "Creation" is a causal event; it assumes there is "sufficient reason why it is thus and not otherwise" (Leibniz),
The creationist would argue, in fact, that God created causality, but that the act its self was not caused.  As far as referring to the thermodynamic properties of God, I think a lot of people might suggest that He is not physical and therefore has no thermodynamic properties.
Causality cannot be "created".  See above.  Anything that exists has statistical properties (of the numeric kind, not just binary), whether it is "physical" or not.
I never intended to connect possible worlds and block time.  Not sure where you got that idea.  Further, there is no reason I can see to assert that block time applies to God, or that it means that He is unnecessary or worthless.  Why do you think this is the case?
You mentioned block time.  If it applies to all of existence, it applies to any God that exists.  There is not much point in paying attention to an invisible thing that can't change anything.
No, it is vitally important to the argument, and the fact that you so aggressively resist accepting it is important to the validity of your proofs.  In modal logic, possible worlds do not necessarily have any actual existence.  It is a phrase used to describe possible states of affairs in order to talk about things that have not yet happened or may not actually exist.  It is not a metaphysical reference to actual other worlds out there.
I don't know the relevance of this unless you are trying to say Godel's argument attempts to prove uniqueness, which it does not.
Fairandbalanced 21:37, 29 Sep 2003 (UTC)
thread_title: Part 2

message: Only Godel's axioms and definitions matter here.
That's true, and Godel's axioms and definitions don't require a property that is positive for one object be positive for all objects!
:Nonsense.  Oh well, then I'll just define all the properies of me to be positive.  I'm God.  Worship me and send money or else!  Unfortunately, positiveness is an attribute of properties, not of objects.  But I could still use the money.
::Now, I'm not saying that you can define the properties any way you like, but that properties only have positiveness or negativeness when applied to things.  Godel may have been referring only to universally positive properties though the idea seems to me to be ridiculous.
:::Positiveness is entirely arbitrary.  That is a standard theological objection to Godel's proof.  Since you find Godel's definition ridiculous, we agree.
A third easy and reasonable response would be to say that it is not just belief in a higher power that is a positive property, but belief in the higher power that actually exists, and that, even if it is required that positive properties be positive for all things, all this means to God is that He believe in the higher power that exists, namely himself.
All infinite things are God or, maybe even better, God is all infinite things.  Sure.
:All infinities are not equal, see Georg Cantor (if I have the first name right), and God is not a higher infinity than Itself.  It would be interesting 
::I'm familiar with Cantor, and we've been over this before.  Cantor also defined uncountabily infinite sets, which are all, for all intents and purposes, the same size.  The whole point is that, by definition, the only thing higher than God is God (in Anselm's argument, "that which none is greater").  The fact is, though, that belief in a power higher than one's self isn't considered a positive property by religious people, but the belief in a power higher than  humans, or higher than nature is.  Either property as a universally positive property presents no paradox when applied to God.
:::Insufferably silly.  Read about sets of all subsets.  Cantor never showed that there was an actual utlimate limit, he just liked the idea.
::::Oh good!  Now we've degenerated from such name-calling as "silly" to "insufferably silly"!  Fabulous.  Perhaps you should read the article you linked to.
Look, I know I've not been the friendliest person to argue with at times throughout this conversation, but my goal here isn't to make you look like an ass.  I think that wikipedia is a great idea, and I want it to be a success.  Because of that, I want this article to be a good one, and just constructing counterarguments all pell mell with no regard for whether or not they are convincing or even sound isn't a good way to do that.  All three of the arguments I have presented here are valid counter-counterarguments, and if you actually want to present your ideas in a manner that contributes to the overall quality of the article, it is worth your time to consider them and respond.
:and long-winded.  They were silly arguments.
::See?  Again, you don't bother to actually respond.  I assume, reasonably, that you are incapable, and rather than actually admit that you could possibly be mistaken or could have not considered all posibilities when constructing your criticisms, you resort to characterizing my arguments as silly.
I agree, and if Godel is trying to prove the existence of God, his definitions and axioms likely approach God as something that, while present in the universe, isn't contained in it.  If the "null world" is a possible world then God must be a part of it, in a sense.  However, again, possible worlds do not actually have to exist - they are just logically possible.  Therefore, if for any reason the "null world" is not logically possible, it is not a possible world.  Now, you have indicated you have no reason for believing that the "null world" is a possible world.  If this is the case, then you must think it is not logically possible and, thus, you must think that this particular argument fails.  If you're not even convinced that an argument is sound, you can't expect others to be either.
:No, he asserts his God is the object in a world that satisfies G(x).
::That is certainly what the article seems to suggest.  In that case, you might take as an additional criticism of Godel's argument the fact that Godel's God, as an object in the world, doesn't correspond to many notions of God as a transcendent being.  Regardless, though, you haven't established that a "null world" is logically possible.
:::I maintain that a null world is consistent with the definitions and axioms.  If you can show otherwise, I'll withdraw it.
It doesn't matter if you think it is nonsense.  Only Godel's beliefs, definitions and axioms matter here.  I'm saying that Godel's proof addresses a God that is one throughout all possible worlds, so God here is the top level object, in a sense.
:Nonsense.  If you can't read, go watch Fox News.
::Again!  What the hell?  Is your position really so weak that you have to resort to insults?  Does criticism of your POV really hurt so much that you can't respond with reasoning?
:::According to Godel, each world has a God.  He said all worlds were identical, but the revised Anderson version does not.  If you don't like it, you can watch Fox News instead.
::::I would rather pull out my eyes and serve them up on skewers than watch that especially vacuous news network.  Regardless, according to Godel, each world should have *the same* God, not just a God.
First, after doing a quick search, the only articles I have found that you have contributed toward, with one possible exception, have been articles concerning religious belief.  Second, your goals in each article are generally the same (suggesting your user name "Fairandbalanced" is a misnomer).  Third, you don't seem interested in actually backing up any of your arguments.  Fourth, you are unwilling to provide definitions you are using.  Fifth, when you either are unable to or don't feel like responding to an objection, you often resort to insulting language (suggesting that the former situation is the more likely).  I therefore conclude that you aren't interested in writing a really good article and are just interested in making counterarguments that you don't even take seriously enough to back up.
:Perhaps I have a purpose-driven life.  I helped clean up some articles full of religious propaganda, made them more fair and balanced.  Religion is, after all, the greatest threat to human civilization, rather important to counteract.  Maybe you should spend your time understanding the subject matter.
::If you were truly fair and balanced, you would also go into aggressively anti-religious articles and make sure that they presented both sides of the article with equal respect.  Sigh.  As far as religion being the greatest threat to human civilization, now you're the one making silly statements.
:::I have not rean such an article, but I have corrected some overstatements. I don't think they are helpful.  If you discover a greater threat, let me know.  And be sure to tell the usurper President too.
::::First, religion is not a threat to human civilization, much less the greatest threat.  Dogmatic beliefs and the abuse of religion are threats though.  Basing all religion on wonderful examples like Jerry Falwell, the inquisition and the crusades is an unfair and unrealistic characterization.  Second, I would suggest that such non-religious items as nuclear weapons and industrial pollution are far more dangerous to all human life, and therefore human civilization, than religion could ever be.  Finally, I'll let you know if I see any articles that are unfairly critical of religious views, so you can have a shot at living up to your user name.
:::::Name an Abrahamic religion that does not breed fundamentalist extremists who want to seize control and impose their views on everyone else.  The danger of weapons depends on who controls the United States, and religious zealots are the only real threat.  You apparently don't know the source of my user name, and I'm not telling.
::::::It doesn't matter how many "fundamentalist extremists" a religion or set of religions "breeds".  It is still not reasonable to characterize all practitioners in a certain way.  Further, your statement said "religion is, after all, the greatest threat to human civilization", thereby characterizing ALL religion in the same way, not just the Abrahamic religions.  Further, the danger of nuclear weapons is inherent.  They are simply not safe.  They are not safe to make, they are not safe to store, they are not safe to use.  The danger to civilization is there no matter who is in control, although yes, the danger does increase when someone like GW gets into a position of control.  You're right, I haven't figured out the source of your user name, and if you want to act like a six year old and "not tell", I don't really care.
:::::Yes, it might be more precise to say Abrahamic religion is the most serious threat to civilization, although Hindu fundamentalism could become one if India produces more nukes and a long-range delivery system.  Buddhism has a pretty good record overall, I guess.  Communism is no longer a threat.  Anyway no non-Abrahamic religions are a serious threat, so I don't really care about them.  Without religion, there would be no fundies, so my statement was correct.
::::::Without humans there would be no wars resulting in the destruction of civilizations.  Therefore I conclude that humans are the greatest threat to human civilization.
:::I thought we agreed that we could be more specific, like "Abrahamic religions".  I agree that humans are a threat, but at this point also the only solution.
Condition 2 is so dubious that Anderson's version substitutes for it the condition that being God-like is positive
I am really not sure what you read the second axiom as saying.  Perhaps you would care to share?
:Follow the links at the end of the article.  Maybe they weren't yours.  The axiom is pretty simple, but does not make it valid in a non-null real world.
::Seriously!  Why don't you just tell me what you think the second axiom says?
:::OK. If P1, P2, P3, ... are positive properties, then the property (P1 AND P2 AND P3 ...) is positive as well.
::::So how is it dubious that a set of positive properties is also positive?
:::::As I have shown, and because it cannot be proven.
::::::You have neither shown that such a statement is dubious, nor have you shown that it cannot be proven.  It seems absolutely self-evident to me.
:::::Self-evident truths are often false.  As to your first claim, I have, and professional mathematicians have.
::::::That's true, but they have to be proven false.  You have not done so.  Professionaly mathematicians may have, but such proofs are not present in this article.
:::It is mentioned in at least one of the linked outside articles.  The incompatible properties of God or sufficient disproof for theistic purposes.  Things that are false are false even if not proven false.  Dubiosity is sufficient for me.
Substitute "incompatible with God" for "positive" as the attribute of an acceptable property.
The first question: "Where are you having us make this substitution?"  You addressed the second question.  Therefore I replied that you still haven't addressed the first.
:So you can prove the nonexistence of God.
::That doesn't address the question!
:::That is why you would make the substitution.
::::Okay, what I'm asking is, where would you make this substitution, not why would you make this substitution.
:::::Look for "positive", make substitution.
::::::In which case it is no longer anything like Godel's proof, and no longer carries even the level of certainty Godel's proof carries, because there is no evidence that the property "exists" is necessary for a thing that is incompatible with God to possess, while in Godel's proof, if you accept that "exists" is a positive property and that God definitionally possesses all positive properties, God must possess the property "exists".
:::::It is exactly Godel's proof with only one essential substitution, and it carries exactly as much certainty as Godel's original (zero).  I could also start with Gasking's assumptions (in the Anselm article) since they are superior to Anselm's, but that would be too far off topic.
::::::If Godel's axioms are true (this is really the big question), his conclusion is true.  If your axioms are true, your conclusions may be true.  There is clearly a difference in the level of certainty here.  Yours is not exactly Godel's proof with one modification, because the modification you made undermines the proofness of the proof, as I outlined above.
:::Since the same logical derivation applies to both, there is no difference.
Actually, this world must be a possible world.  This world is not entirely good, or we don't understand the nature of good.  Therefore theologians and Godel, unless they are completely insane, obviously do think that God could create *all* possible worlds.  There is a fairly famous bit of speculation in theodicy that goes something like this: God can do anything that is logically possible.  An entirely good world wherein there are free agents who can choose between good and evil is impossible.  Therefore God cannot create an entirely good world.  Another (in my opinion weaker) older argument is simply that we do not understand what "good" means, or that our idea of good is rooted in our finiteness.
:Do you actually believe this rubbish or are you merely attempting to debate?  Yes, I have read the problem of evil article.  I believe it points out that a God that creates all possible worlds cannot be "good."  Anyway, no entity can do otherwise than what it does, period.  Try it sometime, do what you don't do.
::I actualy believe that this world must be a possible world, that either this world isn't entirely good or that we don't understand good, that the fact that this world isn't entirely good or that we don't understand good when combined with the fact that this world is a possible world and with belief in God necessarily renders that conclusion that God could create all (logically) possible worlds.  I also believe that there is a famous bit of speculation in theodicy that has to do with God being able to do all things that are logically possible.  As far as being able to do other than what it does, what does that have to do with anything?  I mean, seriously, that is the biggest piece of tautological nonsense I have heard in a while.
:::You should read what you write.  You are saying that what you said is nonsense.  I agree.
::::I don't recall saying that a being is unable to do what it does, and as this is what I referred to as "tautological nonsense", I don't see the point you're trying to make here.
:::::Neither did I.
::::::You don't recall my saying that a being is unable to do what it does, or you don't see the point you're trying to make here?
:::::Neither of us recall you saying that.
::::::Then where have I supposedly said that what I was saying is nonsense?
:::I replaced a "could" with a "would", or something like that, 
G is the "no-God" property and an object x that has any no-God property prevents the existence of a God, since incompatibility means the two cannot coexist.
I obviously do not understand how your argument even mirrors Godel's, much less how it leads to its conclusion.  You need to spell it out - remember, this is supposed to be an encyclopedia, a reference source.  If you are unable or unwilling to actually demonstrate your proof, you need to remove it.
:Apparently you don't understand Godel's argument, so no surprise.  I aim for brevity.  If Godel's argument is expanded in the article, I'll tie mine more closely to it.
::It doesn't matter whether or not I understand Godel's argument.  In fact, with the hope of making this a better article, let's assume I, like the average person stumbling on this article don't understand the proof.  You, as the author of the so-called proof of God's non-existence, need to actually establish God's non-existence!  If you can't, or for some insane reason wont, then it is not a proof and no one should be expected to accept it, and if no one should be expected to accept it, it doesn't belong in an encyclopedia, as you are neither a historical figure nor a celebrity and thus your opinions and half-truths are not significant.  If you can construct a full proof, go for it.  Include it.  If you can't, or wont, don't bother doing it halfway.
:::It is Godel's proof with a couple of substitutions.  It is available elsewhere.  Someone should put more of it in this article, but between the Wikipedia server, a buggy computer here, and your comments, I can't get to higher priorities.
::::Yeah, the server issues are pretty obnoxious.  If you don't want to respond to my comments, don't.  I thought this would be a good way to prevent an all-out edit war and maybe get to a point where we're starting with some of the same ideas.  Anyway, it is not Godel's proof with a couple substitutions.  Godel attempted to rigorously set up a system wherein God must possess all positive properties, and these properties include existence.  You seem to be trying to set up a system wherein you prove God can't exist because negative properties (like evil) don't exist - in other words, formalizing the argument from evil.  Its a fine argument (though your formalization isn't especially rigorous), but it is not "Godel's proof with a couple of substitutions".
I don't necessarily think it is improper to criticize religion.  I do, however, think that this is not the place for it.  Perhaps you can start an article at religious criticism or something.  You can present valid counters to Godel's argument (and I have been willing to accept some of yours as valid throughout this discussion), but if all you are doing is using this forum as a way to express your anti-religious POV, this is not the place for it, and Fairandbalanced is not an appropriate name to use.  Now, as I said (and you seem to think I said the opposite of what I said for some reason), if you are really, seriously interested in pointing out reasonable flaws in the argument or actually research the proof and present common retorts, that is fine, but if you aren't going to take your arguments seriously there is no reason for me to do so either.
:Showing that Godel's "God" does not conform to standard doctrines and has not been shown to exist is not a criticism of religion.
::You haven't yet shown that you even understand standard concepts of God, much less Godel's personal concept of God or anyone else's.  You can't construct a very valid criticism if you aren't even willing to explore what people mean when they say "God".
:::This belongs in Talk:God, not here.
::::Considering you are writing here, and that this is an article about a proof of God's existence, I'm sure this is a fine place for it.  Normally I'm fine with putting things where they belong, but this is a cop-out.
Seth Mahoney 17:33, 3 Oct 2003 (UTC)
replies: text: Fairandbalanced 18:52, 6 Oct 2003 (UTC)
replies: text: Fairandbalanced 00:56, 8 Oct 2003 (UTC)
thread_title: More nested arguments

message: #I believe it is more important to explain some of Godel's reasoning for not attempting to prove God's uniqueness rather than criticize the proof, which I would remind editors, Godel didn't even believe absolutely proved God's existence, and is a part of this encyclopedia for historical and biographical reasons, as well as for those who have an interest in formal logic, not as an article saying, "see!  I have proven God's existence!  Bow down and worship him!"
#The goal of any logical or mathematical proof is essentially a tautology, to demonstrate that x = x (more specifically, that the left hand term equals the right hand term).
#Nowhere does Godel define positiveness to be either an attribute of properties alone or to properties only when applied to specific objects, though common sense would suggest that many of the properties Godel had in mind only have meaning when applied to objects.
#God's color, or lack thereof, is irrelevant to the article, and irrelevant to the proof.  Godel doesn't assert that positiveness, in the sense that he means here, can be meaningfully applied to all properties.
#* Eh?  From the article:  "Axiom 4: If P is a property, then either P or its negation is positive, but not both." Capedia 06:52, 24 August 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Reasoning behind revert

message: very nice article. The result of the existence of only a single world may be seen as an unintended, but all the more satisfying by-product, doing away with parallel universes dab 11:42, 2 Nov 2004 (UTC)
thread_title: one world

message: Here's something I thought of while reading this article. If a property P is positive and P entails Q, then by axiom 2, Q is positive. However, let Q be the (trivial) property that is always true (let's call it 1): for all x, Q(x) holds. Assuming that there is any positive property at all, then Q must be positive. But isn't that a contradiction to axiom 1? Of course, axiom 1 is more of a philosophical axiom than a mathematical one, so I'm not necessarily talking about contradictions in the strict mathematical sense, but can the trivially true property be considered "positive" in a moral sense? (This is probably similar to asking whether 0 is a positive integer or not - something I'd also say is not the case, since if 0 was positive, then -0 must be negative, which is a contradiction because no number should be both positive and negative at the same time. The analogy is not good, of course, since the negation of 1 is not 1, but I still think it's a similar philosophical issue.)
I'm pretty sure someone else must've wondered about that already - does anyone know anything about that? If a reference can be found, it should probably be added to the "Critique" section. -- Schnee (cheeks clone) 14:58, 23 Mar 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  Another criticism 

message: It says that the god property is the infinite conjunction of all the positive properties, but it's only defined as being coextensive with this infinite conjunction.  More importantly, it only follows from axiom 3 that a finite conjunction of positive properties is itself positive.  The positivity of the god property doesn't follow from axioms 2 and 4 either, unless there are a finite number of atomic positive properties, in which case the god property would follow from the finite conjunction of those, which would be positive by axiom 3. Michael Keats 18:39, 15 January 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Mistake in 'derivation' section 

message: I think we should be careful about claiming that Gödel was or was not "religious", a fairly ambiguous word. There is no question that Gödel believed in the existence of something beyond the material world. Religion, however, is (at least in my usage of the term) more a matter of social observance than personal belief (there are lots of religious people who don't believe in God, and non-religious people who do). I am not aware that he was a church-goer (or synagogue- or mosque- or temple-goer), so in that sense he was probably not religious. --Trovatore 21:51, 11 April 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  "religious" 

message: I plan to add citations for the biographical/historical data about the proof, correcting what I don't think can be verified as I go.  I've recently studied the sources on this proof and Gödel's life and they are fresh in my mind.  If I change something which can be verified, I hope Wikipedians will revert with citation.
Guidelines for Evidence: Mathematicians are notoriously lousy biographers, and they don't get any better when talking about Gödel.  When I was in grad school in CS (~1977) Gödel was alive and there was much talk about him.  I can't prove that everything I was told was wrong, but I do know that none of it is verified in first-hand or careful scholarly sources.
It's therefore necessary to be careful in evaluating evidence.  I use these rules:
1.)  Nothing second-hand is considered evidence unless from a source carefully edited for biographical accuracy.  The only secondary sources I know of that meet this criterion are the authoritative biography of Gödel by John Dawson, and the apparatus in Gödel's Collected Works.
2.)  Other math books, even when scholarly, and even when punctilious about math, when they veer into biography usually report stories which if they can be traced to a source at all, have changed in the telling.  I've learned to discount anything in them not fully confirmed by another source.
3.)  While lousy biographers, mathematicians are good witnesses.  They are usually accurate about what they observe first-hand.  I treat all first-hand accounts as evidence.
My rewritings will obey the above criteria and always be accompanied with a citation.
Jeffreykegler (talk) 23:10, 23 February 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  My Edits to the Biographical/Historical data about the Ontological Proof 

message: I included material about Gödel's beliefs, to the extent they are relevant to the subject matter of the proof.  It can be useful in trying to understand what Gödel intended to know if he intended the proof to be convincing, or merely as a logical exercise.  To this extent, it's relevant whether he was a believer or not.
Some scholars have also seen Gödel's assumptions as opening the way to proving the existence of ghosts.  In evaluating such claims it's useful to know that Gödel believed in a very wide variety of supernatural entities, ghosts among them (see Dawson 1997, p 165).
In keeping the neutral point of view, I was presented with a real problem of evidence.  With regard to Gödel's intent, we have Morgenstern's diary entry, contemporaneous, from a usually reliable source in a good position to know, specifically addressing that question and quoting Gödel.  Ordinarily, you'd just quote a source like that and that would end the question, and a few commentators do exactly that.
The problem is that Morgenstern's report that Gödel did not believe in God is contradicted by just about every other piece of evidence there is.  Dawson, his definitive biographer states outright that Gödel (p. 6) was a believer.  Hao Wang who recorded more of Gödel's philosophy then anyone shows a man who many would call not just religious, but superstitious.
The solution I adopted was to quote Morgenstern (I didn't think there was a fair way to ignore him), then cite some of the overwhelming evidence that conflicts with his account of Gödel's motives for doing the proof.
Some material I eliminated because I simply could not find any backing for it in the sources.  In particular I regret replacing this:
Although Gödel was religious, he never published his proof because he feared that it would be mistaken as establishing God's existence beyond doubt.
I thought this was a very intriguing idea.  It hints at a Gödelian inconsistency result -- that God may exist, but if proof beyond doubt of his existence came out, some kind of harm might result.  I like to think Gödel would have been intrigued by this idea.  The problem is that nothing in the record indicates that Gödel had any objection to establishing God's existence beyond doubt.  As I say, I like this idea, and I'd been pleased if someone finds I've overlooked evidence in support of it.
Jeffreykegler (talk) 01:57, 25 February 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Explaining my edit of the historical material 

message: The annotated proof in this transcript is somewhat more traceable than the proof in the article.
http://img253.imageshack.us/my.php?image=goedelsontologicalproofzh0.jpg
Maybe one will add annotations to the proof in the article, too.
Perhaps maybe one will even upload this transcription to Wikipedia.
Two remarks:
1. I've never seen the original of Gödel's proof. So I do not know whether the annotations are from Gödel himself or whether they have been added later by someone else.
2. I guess the initials J.R.B. in this transcript stand for 'Julius Richard Büchi'.
--87.78.160.96 (talk) 21:26, 25 May 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  A old transcription of the proof 

message: Someone at IP address 195.189.104.34 left a note here saying simply: "The compactness theorm [sic] proves axiom 3". I'm not sure "axiom 3" here means the one that says that any conjunction of positive properties is positive ("Axiom 3" in the article) or the one that says that "having all positive properties" is itself a positive property ("Ax. 3" in the initial formal presentation in the article). Neither of these seems to me to follow from the compactness theorem, and indeed I don't see how they could. Perhaps one can use the compactness theorem to show that certain properties that the proof requires positivity to have are consistent -- e.g., that if you can have something with all finite combinations of positive properties then you can have something with all positive properties, or something like that -- but (1) that doesn't seem to have much to do with proving axiom 3, and (2) I think we need to see more details :-). 195.189.104.34, if you're reading this, would you care to elaborate? Gareth McCaughan (talk) 14:17, 23 February 2009 (UTC)
thread_title:  Axiom 3 and the compactness theorem 

message: Hi,
The description of the axioms seems not to fit to the symbolical proof!
Is this on purpose?
62.178.21.227 (talk) 14:50, 16 June 2009 (UTC)
thread_title:  Wrong description? 

message: I just applied a version of the ontological proof to try to demonstrate that there must be an optimal cut of leberwurst in my lunchbox, but still had to go hungry. 
Poor Gödel. He must have been far gone at this point to have forgotten of philosophers as early as Kant who made us aware that existence preceeds essence, i.e., the existence is not an attribute, so that it would be nonsense to say that an optimal form of some thing (dragons, leberwurst in my lunchbox, etc.) must possess the attribute of existence. Gödel also forgets the many philosophers of language (Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle...) who systematically studied the conundrums following from such misuse of language.. 
I still greatly respect Mr. Gödel, and tend to look upon attempts to direct attention to his manias on the deathbed in the same way as I regard people who, say, focus on Bobby Fisher's late deteriorated state instead of giving recognition to him for his accomplishments. Could it be, in the case of Mr. Gödel, that such people are driven by an external motive and hope to appropriate Mr. Gödel as their instrument?
--Philopedia (talk) 12:49, 15 January 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: Sooo... you just posted to say that you don't like his theism. Okay. Philosophers always find contradictions and conundrums with other philosophers. Or are you claiming that theists are trying to make use of his arguments for an "external motive?" Aren't we, as editors, supposed to assume good faith on Wikipedia, you know, assume that editors are trying to do their best to fix and edit articles? Hmmm. Well, darn, I guess when someone disagrees with me I can call out bias too. 98.198.83.12 (talk) 16:35, 28 January 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Optimal Leberwurst Ontological Proof 

message: The pre-edit sentence stated that Gödel's proof is a "formalization" of Anselm's.  I had no particular objection to that statement, but there is a small literature devoted to trying to formalize Anselm's proof. Gödel's ontological proof is not a "formalization" of Anselm's, when the word "formalization" is taken in the sense it is used in that literature -- to mean a formal analysis attempting to elucidate the direct meaning of Anselm's words.  At least one serious scholar I know of felt that the original lead sentence of this Wikipedia article was simply wrong, and that it greatly diminished the quality of the Wikipedia article.
My edit attempts to preserve readability, and to make the same point intended when the word "formalization" was used.  It tries to steer clear of any charges that Wikipedia is making unsupportable claims about the usefulness of Gödel's proof as an method for a careful word-by-word analysis of what the original text by Anselm of Canterbury really meant.
--Jeffreykegler (talk) 17:22, 10 April 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Did Gödel "formalize" Anselm? 

message: I removed a discussion on infinite collections because it was tangential to the point, which is 
the claim that axiom 3 is false: the positiveness of a property can alter depending on what other properties are present, and positivity can be mutually exclusive. The existence of infinite collections of positive properties is irrelevant. The claim is that there exist finite examples of contradictory positive properties, and hence axiom 3 is false.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by Winterstein (talk • contribs) 08:59, 27 May 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Critique: infinity not an issue in Drange's criticism 

message: I lost the thread of the prose description of the proof in part because it looks like the axioms are numbered in a way that doesn't match the way they are numbered in the formalized proof itself. It's also not clear to me where to fit in the axiom that any property that is positive is necessarily positive. Can someone who has a more confident sense of this than I do please clarify it? MJM74 (talk) 00:24, 16 August 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Axiom numbering 

message: What's the damn proof in plain language? Sn't Anselm's ontological argument was stupid but Gödel is an intelligent man, here the article is abotu his proof but we are nto given his proof only a logical representation of it, he has to have made it in words, where is it?Undead Herle King (talk) 22:22, 7 January 2011 (UTC)
replies: text: Why would he have made it in words? He was a logician. --Gwern  (contribs) 18:04 17 January 2011 (GMT)
As an example of Gödel's logic, he starved himself to death because he thought that someone was trying to poison him.Lestrade (talk) 16:22, 19 January 2011 (UTC)
thread_title:  THE DAMN PROOF

message: I have a real problem with nonsense such as this discussion page, and with reference [sic] works where no authorship is attributed.  How do I know anyone posting here knows their own ass from a hole in the ground?  Certainly, based on the stunningly inept commentary here, I can only conclude that this encyclopedia [sic] is the result of some centralized planning committee's anointed vision of the "People's Encyclopedia," in which all knowledge must be rendered to the lowest common denominator of humanity.  Thus, attempting to explain any of Kurt Gödel's work by showcasing it through the distorted and defective lens that is the ignorance of a bunch of nearsighted Wiki Wangs strikes me as just trying to bell the cat.  I'm sure Kurt Gödel and God have shared a laugh more than once while pondering this dreck.  Just something to think about.  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.169.203.158 (talk) 03:52, 2 November 2011 (UTC)
thread_title:  Seems to me the Wiki Wangs are belling the cat 

message: I've placed a lead rewrite tag on the article because it does not comply with WP:LEAD. The lead should summarise the entire article - nothing should be in the lead that is not in the article. At the moment, it is being used as an extra section. I recommend the current lead (copyedited) is moved into its own section and a new lead is written, summarising the entire article. I'll do this at some point; if someone gets to it first, that is what I'd recommend. ItsZippy (talk • contributions) 20:21, 9 December 2011 (UTC)
replies: text: You mean you recommend it be moved into its own section? --Trovatore (talk) 21:22, 9 December 2011 (UTC)
thread_title:  Lead rewrite 

message: If the article goes into detail of what the proof supposedly proves, given that the subject matter is modal logic, the article really should specifically state the "few other axioms from modal logic", since they have a very significant effect on proofs. Modal logic isn't a single thing but essentially a framework of separate logics that behave very differently depending on the axioms used. -- 88.192.19.110 (talk) 16:35, 19 May 2015 (UTC)
thread_title: "Few other axioms"

message: Oops, I seem to have stumbled into a wasps nest of argument here.
I added a criticism section. Nobody seems to have pointed out the main flaw in this "proof": it depends on its axioms and we don't know whether the axioms are "true" or not.
The article as it was was misleading: It presents axioms and conclusions based on them. However, unlike for other logical systems, these axioms are questionable: it's basically disguised assumptions as axioms, and it needs to be clear that philosophers acknowledge that they're not necessarily true, and in fact attempts have been made to show that they are actively false, rather than just unknown. H123b wiki (talk) 12:14, 8 November 2015 (UTC)
thread_title: Criticism

message: What about these results:
* http://page.mi.fu-berlin.de/cbenzmueller/papers/C55.pdf
* http://page.mi.fu-berlin.de/cbenzmueller/papers/C40.pdf
Should we mention them?
--Pokipsy76 (talk) 12:19, 8 May 2016 (UTC)
replies: text: The article dishonestly only mentions C55 claiming that Gödel is wrong, and does not include C40 which claims that Gödel is right. Actually, both papers prove Gödel is right. C55's only claim is that there is a "bug" in Gödel's proof if you introduce the bug yourself, so it only serves to clarify that there is one definition provided by Leibniz and Scott that cannot be ommitted from the final proof. 5.151.198.248 (talk) 17:07, 18 December 2016 (UTC)
thread_title: Results by automatic theorem provers

message: Note 3 currently says:
If one considers the partial order  \preceq  defined by  \varphi \preceq \psi  iff  \square \forall y (\varphi(y) \to \psi(y)) , then Axioms 1-3 can be summarized by saying that positive properties form an ultrafilter on this ordering. Definition 1 and Axiom 4 are needed to establish the Godlike property as principal element of the ultrafilter.
I suggest to change the definition of  \varphi \preceq \psi  to  \forall y (\varphi(y) \to \psi(y))   — i.e. without the "necessarily" square. With this definition, it is easy to prove that P corresponds to an ultrafilter with principal element G as follows:
* G \preceq \varphi implies P(\varphi) by Ax.3 and 1.
* Conversely, P(\varphi) implies G(x) \to \varphi(x) for each x by Df.1, that is, G \preceq \varphi.
Hence, P(\varphi) \iff G \preceq \varphi. 
This proof could be included in the note.
Ax.4 isn't yet involved. This is as it should be, since Ax.4 shouldn't be mentioned before Th.2 and Df.2, to ease following the "Symbolic notation" outline.
I guess,  \varphi \preceq \psi  defined by  \square \forall y (\varphi(y) \to \psi(y))  — i.e., now including the square — can be shown to lead to an ultrafilter with principal element  G as well, using Ax.4 in an appropriate way. However, being unexperienced in modal reasoning, I'm unable to come up with a proof for this. Provided there is one, a corresponding note should be added at an appropriate later place (I suggest right after "Requiring positive properties being positive in every possible world (axiom 4),"), and Note 3 could be shortened or even omitted. - Jochen Burghardt (talk) 10:17, 3 June 2019 (UTC)
thread_title:  Ultrafilter 

message: Some remarks on modal collapse:
Benzmüller and Woltzenlogel have shown that Godel's proof (in Scott's version) implies modal collapse, that is, it implies that \diamond p is equivalent to p, and in turn equivalent to \Box p. Using these equivalences (I'll call them MCE for short), the proof from section Gödel's_ontological_proof#Symbolic notation can be drastically simplified to:
\begin{array}{rl}
\text{Ax.1'.} & \left(P(\varphi) \;\wedge\; \forall x (\varphi(x) \Rightarrow \psi(x))\right) \;\Rightarrow\; P(\psi) \\
\text{Ax.2.} & P(\neg \varphi) \;\Leftrightarrow\; \neg P(\varphi) \\
\text{Th.1'.} & P(\varphi) \;\Rightarrow\; \exists x \; \varphi(x) \\
\text{Df.1.} & G(x) \;\Leftrightarrow\; \forall \varphi (P(\varphi) \Rightarrow \varphi(x)) \\
\text{Ax.3.} & P(G) \\
\text{Th.2'.} & \exists x \; G(x) \\
\end{array}
Here, the dashed variants are obtained from the original ones by removing all modal operators per MCE. This proof is the one mentioned in [note 4].In presence of modal collapse, it is pointless to use modal logic. 
Whoever likes to stick to modal logic, may apply MCE to Th.2'. to obtain the original Th.4. (" \Box \; \exists x \; G(x)"). This proof doesn't use Df.2,3 and Ax.4,5, but only some consequences of them (viz. MCE). That is, it needs weaker assumptions than Godel's/Scott's proof. Therefore, it would be preferred by logicians.
Many (or all?) philosophers would interpret modal collapse as determinism, including absence of free will ("If it is possible that I kill somebody, then it is necessary that I do that"). As discussed in footnote [11], Godel may have been aware that his axioms imply modal collapse, but he wanted it to follow from the existence of God. 
As far as I saw, Benzmüller and Woltzenlogel never said that modal collapse is not necessarily a flaw. Neither did they say it is a flaw. They just pointed out some consequences along the above lines. 
Maybe the remarks on modal collaps in the article should be collected in an own subsection, and maybe, some of the above remarks should be included there, too. - Jochen Burghardt (talk) 10:59, 30 June 2019 (UTC)
thread_title: Modal collapse / ("Dubious")

message: The following passage: 
 A truth is necessary if it is true in all possible worlds. By contrast, a truth is contingent if it just happens to be the case. For instance, "more than half of this planet is covered by water" is a contingent truth, that relies upon which planet "this planet" is. If a statement happens to be true in our world, but is false in another world, then it is a contingent truth.
is misleading at best, if not outright mistaken. Specifically, it's worded in such a way that many readers not familiar with modal logic will think that "our world" and "this planet" are being used synonymously. If they are being used synonymously, then "If a statement happens to be true in our world, but is false in another world, then it is a contingent truth" is a wrong explanation of the notion of contingent truth in modal logic. If they aren't meant to be synonymous here, then it ought to be made clear that "our world" means the actual world among the possible worlds, in the modal-logic technical sense, and not the planet Earth. 
I'd also say that if you are going to define necessary truth in terms of possible worlds ("A truth is necessary if it is true in all possible worlds"), then the subsequent definition of non-necessary (contingent) truth should also be given in terms of possible worlds. "A truth is contingent if it just happens to be the case" doesn't do that, and is unnecessarily vague. JohnMason 16:38, 29 July 2020 (UTC)
replies: text: I agree, but I am unable to come up with a good example to illustrate what "possible world" means without introducing the Kripke-semantics formalism. Do you have an idea for that? - Jochen Burghardt (talk) 19:17, 29 July 2020 (UTC)
replies: text: Why not just link to the Wikipedia article Possible world? Anyway, even if an explanation isn't explicitly given, the definitions ought to be parallel, I'd say.JohnMason (talk) 21:13, 29 July 2020 (UTC)
replies: text: I removed the misleading planet example and the "happens to be the case" definition, for now. However, I feel, a better  example would be necessary here. - "Possible world" is already linked in that section, and I prefer its current target, the mathematical possible worlds, over the philosophical Possible world, since Godel's proof is a mathematical one. - Jochen Burghardt (talk) 08:08, 30 July 2020 (UTC)
replies: text: I understand your preference for that "possible worlds" target (even if I'd regard Gödel's proof as more metaphysics than mathematics), but that level of technical detail is probably going to be impenetrable for a lot of readers of this article. The "philosophical" possible world target is (somewhat) more approachable, and is enough to give a general reader a sense of the relevant notion of "possible world." Thank you for making those changes.JohnMason (talk) 14:00, 30 July 2020 (UTC)

text: Also, as an example of the kind of parallel definition I had in mind, for the level this section is pitched at, I think it would be fine to say, e.g., "A truth is necessary if it is true in all possible worlds. By contrast, a truth is contingent if it is true in some, but not all, possible worlds." (including the link to the 'philosophical' Possible world page.) This looks fine to me as a general, not very technical explanation of the notion.JohnMason (talk) 14:09, 30 July 2020 (UTC)

text: I see that you've changed the passage -- thank you for that, and for correctly stating that a contingent truth has to be true in the actual world, not just "some, but not all, possible worlds" (as I carelessly got it wrong above).JohnMason (talk) 11:41, 31 July 2020 (UTC)
thread_title:  'This planet/our world' confusion 

message: Wang reports that Gödel's wife, Adele, two days after Gödel's death, told Wang that ... - didn't Adele die before Gödel ?? DamjanB52 (talk) 12:53, 25 October 2020 (UTC)
replies: text: No, she survived him by several years.  Quick web search indicates that she died in 1981.  2601:648:8200:970:0:0:0:1A5F (talk) 10:10, 25 March 2021 (UTC)
thread_title:  Adele, two days after Gödel's death, told Wang ... ? 

message: Maybe add this?
https://u.osu.edu/friedman.8/files/2014/01/ConMathThe122512-1iea8ps.pdf
I don't know if it was formally published.  It's entry #74 from Friedman's manuscripts page, which says it was submitted in 2012.  2601:648:8200:970:0:0:0:1A5F (talk) 10:18, 25 March 2021 (UTC)
thread_title:  Friedman 

message: :The following is a closed discussion of a requested move. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on the talk page. Editors desiring to contest the closing decision should consider a move review after discussing it on the closer's talk page. No further edits should be made to this discussion. 
The result of the move request was: not moved. (closed by non-admin page mover) ~ Aseleste (t, e | c, l) 06:23, 19 May 2021 (UTC)
replies: text: Gödel's ontological proof →  – "Gödel's ontological proof" is slightly more common on Google Scholar, but I would consider this to be a WP:POVTITLE since many people would not agree that this argument proves the existence of God. This title would also be WP:CONSISTENT with the more general article on ontological arguments. (t · c) buidhe 23:01, 1 May 2021 (UTC)
thread_title:  Requested move 1 May 2021 

message: As per my !vote above, IMO this is something of a line call. It's POV either way, and both titles can claim to be the common name depending on who you consider reliable and how you compare the attestation counts.
Gödel's ontological proof will tend to be preferred among:
* Sources who believe in God (with an exception noted below)
* Sources who are particularly interested in proof theory and computer-assisted proof
* And as proof theory is relatively recent and computers even more so, recent sources may support it, but that brings up a can of worms... how do we compare the count of attestations (or occurrences) in publications in two different fields?
Gödel's ontological argument will tend to be preferred among:
* Sources who do not believe in God
* Sources who are particularly interested in the history of similar arguments
* Perhaps surprisingly, sources who are particularly concerned with the theology of faith (which I disclose is my personal POV, see this off-this-wiki essay, and note that my !vote goes against this personal bias but for other reasons)
Food for thought? Andrewa (talk) 08:39, 17 May 2021 (UTC)
thread_title: Discussion