Talk:X.509

message: The only cited reference doesn't actually seem to have been a 
source for the article, as it is actually about a compromise
of the mechanism, and, although it may cover some of the facts
in passing, it certainly doesn't cover most of them.
I've moved it to external links.
It was:
Arjen Lenstra, Xiaoyun Wang and Benne de Weger, Colliding X.509 Certificates, 1 March 2005, ePrint archive, .
--David Woolley 11:27, 15 November 2005 (UTC)
replies: text: I've added a line about the X.509 certificate collision, and so moved the citation back to the "References" section. — Matt Crypto 12:36, 15 November 2005 (UTC)
replies: text: There is still a problem that all but one paragraph lacks sources.  Unfortunately, there doesn't seem to be a template for this article's references are largely incomplete.  --David Woolley 12:47, 15 November 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  Cited Reference wasn't a Reference 

message: This article was linked from another article (the latter in "common-man's" English).
But after two quick glances my eyes just glazed over.  
There's got to be a better way....
--angrykeyboarder (a/k/a:Scott) 14:03, 4 September 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Thought people should be informed that the "better way" link mentioned above takes one to a commercially supported website named "webopedia.com"; "commercial" in the sense that that are numerous ads on the site. I would agree that the quality of this X.509 article needs improving - both for the "common man" as well as the computer science learner and/or practitioner. Dan Aquinas (talk) 18:11, 31 May 2012 (UTC)
thread_title:  Sometimes I forget Wikipedia isn't necessarily for the "common man" 

message: As of Internet Explorer 7 CRL validation is on by default.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.232.96.62 (talk) 03:19, 7 October 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  CRL Validaton 

message: Much of this article is written in a casual style, especially this paragraph:
This is an example of a self-signed certificate; note that the issuer and subject are the same. There's no way to verify this certificate except by checking it against itself; we've reached the top of the certificate chain. So how does this certificate become trusted? Simple - it's manually configured. Thawte is one of the root certificate authorities recognized by both Microsoft and Netscape. This certificate comes with the web browser (you can probably find it listed as "Thawte Server CA" in the security settings); it's trusted by default. As a long-lived (note the expiration date), globally trusted certificate that can sign pretty much anything (note the lack of any constraints), its matching private key has to be one of the most closely guarded in the world.
I lack enough knowledge of the subject matter to rewrite it though...  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 64.112.227.142 (talk) 00:50, 12 December 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: Looks fine to me; I removed the maintenance tag. grendel|khan 14:04, 28 August 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Not Encyclopedic 

message: The Certificates section suggests that large CA venders paid fee to make their root certificates pre-installed.  On the other hand, a web page from the Mozilla Project clearly states no such fee.  I see that pre-installation requires some kind of audit, such as WebTrust, and CA venders might pay money to the auditor.  It would be great if some parts of the section is rewritten, so that readers will not get confused.Iida-yosiaki (talk) 14:11, 13 February 2009 (UTC)
thread_title:  pre-installation fee 

message: How on earth did we get over 100 root certificates, all trusted unconditionally to authenticate any site whatsoever?  Can someone please explain to me how https is any more secure than plain old http? Deepmath (talk) 22:35, 1 August 2009 (UTC)
thread_title:  >100 root certificates trusted unconditionally 

message: Article could benefit from a criticism section. The recent certificate attacks on Comodo and DigiNotar are the system showing some strain. http://dankaminsky.com/2011/08/31/notnotar/ suggests he's been criticizing the standard for years, maybe others have meaningful things to say here too.  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 204.87.16.4 (talk) 12:08, 1 September 2011 (UTC)
thread_title:  Criticism 

message: Why do you say dv certs are junk certs? EV is the same, just more expensive. Every CA can be promised and DV is the only thing that can be technically verified to ensure that the ssl connection to that given domain is not intercepted. --217.229.5.160 (talk) 05:55, 7 September 2012 (UTC)
thread_title:  DV = junk?! 

message: Some troll is adding necessaries citations needed on every paragraph for no reason.
--200.123.176.161 (talk) 15:29, 12 October 2012 (UTC)
thread_title:  Article being vandalized with {{citation needed}} everywhere 

message: If you are going to toss around acronyms, at least define them or link to a defining article.  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 66.168.159.111 (talk) 21:14, 5 August 2014 (UTC)
thread_title:  What's a "DN"? 

message: The following text was added to "Certificate chains and cross-certification" section in 18-05-2015:
certificate "User 1" is signed by "CA1" and the corresponding private key.  But there are two different certificates named "CA 1", each of which has been signed differently.  "User 1" does not contain the serial number of the signing certificate, either will suffice so long as they have the correct public key.
An X.509 certificate contains its own serial number, but is not required to include the serial number of the CA certificate used to sign it. Even if it was included, the algorithm defined in RFC5280 (Chapter 6) would ignore it when validating the certificate chain. Serial numbers are used for checking CRLs, but they are not relevant for explaining the basics of certificate chains, so I think that paragraph should be removed. M. Quijada 14:20, 1 September 2015 (UTC)
thread_title:  "User 1" does not contain the serial number of the signing certificate 

message: Hello fellow Wikipedians,
I have just modified  on X.509. Please take a moment to review my edit. If you have any questions, or need the bot to ignore the links, or the page altogether, please visit this simple FaQ for additional information. I made the following changes:
*Added archive http://web.archive.org/web/20130103202328/http://www.ssltools.com:80/certificate_lookup to http://www.ssltools.com/certificate_lookup
*Added archive http://web.archive.org/web/20130108010738/http://www.ssltools.com:80/manager to http://www.ssltools.com/manager
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thread_title:  External links modified 

message: The article says the following:
::The expiration date should be used to limit the time the key strength is deemed sufficient. This parameter is abused by certification authorities to charge the client an extension fee.
This is bad advice. Without an expiration date, the size of the CRL will grow in an unbounded fashion, which is unacceptable for all but the smallest CAs. The absence of a reasonable expiration date would also make it difficult to force switches to new CA root certificates and decommission old ones. I recommend this language be removed. Darco (talk) 23:27, 12 June 2018 (UTC)
replies: text: With no regard to the relative merits or demerits of the statement itself, I strongly agree this line should be removed and, as no one has raised any reasonable counter-argument for keeping it in over a year since this was pointed out, have done so. The entire thing read as unsourced editorializing and a blatant violation of WP:NPOV. If someone wishes to reinstate it, they should rephrase it with citation to a notable source that presents this viewpoint. Dorm41baggins (talk) 16:15, 19 September 2019 (UTC)
thread_title:  Bad advice about expiration date

message: The article says that MD2 was vulnerable to a preimage attack, but I haven't found any reference to this. The Wikipedia page says the reverse---that no efficient attack was ever discovered. Simsong (talk) 01:01, 11 September 2020 (UTC)
thread_title:  What is the citation for the MD2 vulnerability to a preimage attack? 

message: It’s been broken for well over a year. The link reports a database connection error and the root site says it’s being migrated. 2600:8803:74A3:E600:A90F:7D7C:4F36:F67F (talk) 17:42, 3 December 2022 (UTC)
replies: text: Removed. Thanks for the suggestion! Brandon (talk) 07:51, 5 December 2022 (UTC)
thread_title:  Should External Link to SeSeLe be Removed?