Talk:Battle of Chosin Reservoir

message: There is no debate. The U.S. retreated. It's that simple.
— Preceding unsigned comment added by 157.182.191.188 (talk) 16:44, 13 August 2018 (UTC)
thread_title: China won this battle

message: Okay either the map is wrong or the write up is wrong. 31RCT was on the east side of the reservoir, strung out from Hudong to the north. Yet the section makes several references to them being in sinhung. Other maps reference sinhung in the same place, and in many readings about this battle I have never heard of any 31RCT elements on the west side of the reservoir. The article also contains several conflicting, (indeed physically impossible) statements such as being north of hudong yet south of sinhung. It also says hill 1221 commands the road between those two towns and yet it is clearly north of hudong. I am going to make some changes to clear this up over the next few days as anyone reading this section would probably become quickly confused. Outcast95 (talk) 06:02, 19 November 2013 (UTC)
replies: text: I doubt there are any "other maps" outside of copies of the US Army official maps currently displayed on this page, but please read footnote e and Appleman page 32 before jumping to conclusions. There are two towns named Sinhung-ni in the Chosin area. One of them is on the east side of the lake north of Hudong, with Hill 1221 standing between them. Another one is on the south-west side of the lake and south of Yudami and north of Hagaru. RCT 31 was holed up in the first town, while the second town played no notable role in battle (which is why I avoided to mention the second town in this article to avoid this confusion in the first place). Unfortunately, the US Army public domain map is not detail enough to make the distinction, and it is the only map avilable that is not under copyright protection. Jim101 (talk) 14:27, 19 November 2013 (UTC)
thread_title:  Map and Location References in Battle Section 

message: Would it make sense to add a section at the bottom of the article about rememberence/memorials of this battle in the "forgotten war"? A new memorial in Forest Park, St Louis, MO for the battle was dedicated today. I have a great picture of living members of the "The Chosin Few" gathered around the memorial if that is of interest. Apparently I don't have privlidges to upload to wikipeida - but I'd be happy to e-mail to somebody if they are interested.
:As long as you have a reliable news source on the event, you are free to add it yourself. Jim101 (talk) 01:57, 3 October 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: Question, are you talking about the Camp Pendleton memorial? Because that is the only memorial I can find that is backed up by notable news sources. Jim101 (talk) 02:06, 3 October 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: I added the information on Camp Pendleton memorial. Jim101 (talk) 02:31, 3 October 2010 (UTC)
thread_title: Remembrance

message: The US military recently had a large gathering of veterans to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the battle (source) —Ed!(talk) 06:20, 12 November 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: Nice summary on the numbers of MOH awarded during the battle. Jim101 (talk) 07:37, 12 November 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Legacy 

message: While studying military history for a Wikipedia article on Unit cohesion, I came upon this quote:
* ... traditional explanations do not adequately answer why the Marines survived as a fighting force and the 31st RCT was defeated in detail. 
So what was it that led to the disintegration of the RCT? Was it just the rapid loss of two top commanders, or was there something else? --Uncle Ed (talk) 02:06, 25 April 2011 (UTC)
replies: text: First of all, Task Force Faith was annihilated as an unit with most of its records/witnesses lost, so there are really no clear answers to this question nor a clear recounts of the actual event (otherwise I would put it there already). By tracing the Task Force Faith breakout effort on December 1, it appears that heavy Chinese fire managed to pin down most of the soldiers, killed a lot of officers in the process, and command and control just broken down from that point. By viewing from the Chinese account of the same engagement, it appears that Chinese thrown 3 whole divisions against Task Force Faith and attack it non-stop from November 27 to December 1, while at the same time completely giving up on 1st Marine Division after the failure of the November 27 attack. Probably the command and control break down PLUS the sheer weight of Chinese number buried the fate of the Task Force. Jim101 (talk) 02:40, 25 April 2011 (UTC)
replies: text: Thomas Ricks says http://www.uctv.tv/search-details.aspx?showID=21094 that the reason the Marines were all bunched up on the west side while a pitiful Army group had to be put on the east at the last moment is that OPS refused to divide his own force of Marines. Hcobb (talk) 22:32, 8 June 2011 (UTC)

text: Spitballing from experience it would look to be the work of three major crises the marines didn't suffer. 31st RCT was outnumbered way worse than the Marines. They not only lost their two main officers, they were cut off from contact to hudong when the Chinese took hill 1221. They then failed to clear the roadblock at hill 1221 in their retreat, making impossible to maintain any unit cohesion in the rugged terrain of Korea. Anyone that got out, walked (or was carried) around hill 1221. Anyone staying with the vehicles was crushed between hill 1221 and the Chinese forces coming up behind. As to the "pitiful" Army group, we can blame preparation for that one. 31 RCT was not given any time to consolidate their forces much less resupply before being shoved out there. They were actually missing much of the RCT. Had they stopped at hill 1221 and had they had their whole RCT, we might be reading an entirely different story. Also the loss in cohesion happened when they were cut off from each other. What happened at the end was obliteration, the total destruction of the RCT as a unit.  Outcast95 (talk) 06:02, 19 November 2013 (UTC)
thread_title: [[Unit cohesion]]

message: Jim101, 
Since you are the current owner of this article, tell me why you have written that this battle of the Chosin Reservoir is also called the Chosin Campaign.  Not all military fights are campaigns.  The USMC seems to be the only official agency to call it a campaign, yet they have no campaign streamer for it on their colors.   Not even their parent organization the Department of the Navy, nor the Department of Defense call it a Campaign.  Admittedly some authors have repeated the word from the book of Marine Corps, but repeating a known untruth does not make it correct. Meyerj (talk) 01:12, 23 July 2011 (UTC)
replies: text: USMC seems to be the only official agency to call it a campaign...this is the problem. Per WP:NPOV and WP:COMMONNAME, USMC viewpoint on this matter must be represented, even if it is somewhat ingenious/fringe. As long as this article's itself is not named as Chosin Campaign, then it is a fair compromise between WP:NPOV and WP:UNDUE. Furthermore, Chinese source also refer to this battle as a "campaign", so USMC naming convention is far from minority. Jim101 (talk) 15:36, 23 July 2011 (UTC)
replies: text: Ok. Meyerj (talk) 18:08, 23 July 2011 (UTC)
thread_title:  Why is it a campaign? 

message: What most here don't realize is that there were 15,000 US troops, 12,000 suffered minor to severe frostbite, 3,000 died, 6,000 were wounded. It was one of the most brutally fought battles in the history of the US Military due to the bitter cold conditions. The US Forces killed 43,000 chinese, eliminating two entire divisions which were never seen on the field of battle again. They evacuated 98,000 North Korean (unarmed by law) refugee's as the Chinese and North Korean armies pursued the breakout, they slaughtered thousands, of (unarmed by law) civilians in their wake. Over 1 million descendants can be traced back to the 98,000 evacuated into South Korea.  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 76.201.100.46 (talk) 21:27, 9 January 2013 (UTC)
thread_title:  Thank you to those at the Battle of Chosin 

message: It appears that people still disputing this even after all the professional Chinese and US sources I cited and crossed referenced, so I'll outline my cases more clearly:
1) I cite Professor Xue Yuan of PLA National Defense University in page 59 of his seminar work First Confrontation: Reviews and Reflections on the History of War to Resist America and Aid Korea: 
...The 9th Army casualty exceed 40,000 men, including 30,000 frostbite casualties, plus 1,000 men that were frozen to death. After the battle the entire unit was turned into a "huge hospital", and three months were spent on healing the frostbitten soldiers. This is, in our army's history, the worst lesson on frostbite...
2) The official Chinese history (History of War to Resist America and Aid Korea, Volume II by PLA Military Science Academy) stated that 9th Army accounted for 40% of all Chinese combat forces in Korea until March 1951, and between Jan. to Feb. 1951 the UN forces expelled Chinese forces from South Korea partly due to lack of reinforcement on the Chinese side (this connection was explicitly stated by Patrick Roe in his book The Dragon Strike).
3) No Chinese history ever stated that they destroyed 1st Marine Division or the 7th Infantry Division, the main objectives for the battle as stated in page 113 of official Chinese history. The closest I could find to such claim was on page 126 of official Chinese history, which claims of "near annihilation" of 1st Marine Division and 7th Infantry Division. Allan R. Millett, in his book The War for Korea, 1950–1951: They Came From the North stated on page 356 that the word "annihilation" (歼灭) is a buzzword favored by Chinese media.
4) The complete expulsion of UN forces from Chosin was the direct result of Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River, not this battle. This fact was confirmed in official US Army history Ebb and Flow: November 1950 – July 1951, United States Army in the Korean War in Chapter VIII.
Unless someone can come up with counter arguments that the Chinese somehow gained benefits directly from the Chosin battle that outweighs the above points, I would argue that technically Chinese did not achieve a "Decisive Tactical Victory", and "Chinese Pyrrhic victory" is technically the most accurate description to the outcome of this battle. Jim101 (talk) 17:18, 9 June 2013 (UTC)
replies: text: I would completely agree. The long-term impact of this battle on the units involved says a great deal; the Marine division took several months to recover, but the much larger Chinese 9th Army took substantially longer, and the formations did not return to the previous level of battle readiness. The long term effect of this battle is significant to take into account. —Ed!(talk) 18:23, 9 June 2013 (UTC)

text: Given that "the Chinese and North Korean forces drove the UN forces out of North Korea within two months" in a completely different battle on the other side of Korea, while losing 40% of their total forces in this battle, I think my original cases is still stands. Jim101 (talk) 16:13, 27 April 2018 (UTC)
thread_title:  Chinese  Pyrrhic victory 

message: It should be noted that the Chinese 9th Army Group was one of the most experienced force in the entire Chinese Army and unlike what the article states it was at full strength. The actual enemy strength may have been 67,000 at the start of the battle but it grew to over 120,000 during the course of the battle. Most Chinese sources admit that the casualties suffered by the 9th Army were heavy. The numbers quoted are around 40,000. The article further states that the 9th Army took 40% losses. 40,000 out of 67,000 is closer to 70%.  — Preceding unsigned comment added by Palermoga (talk • contribs) 16:37, 27 November 2013 (UTC)
replies: text: Aside from the fact that 9th Army was an elite formation (which is stated in the Forces and strategies section), the rest of the analysis is incorrect (unless you can provide sources to counter my below points). The Chinese initially committed six divisions, not ten divisions as you inferred. It only grew to ten divisions after the Chinese 26th Corps arrived in December. Also, the Chinese 26th Corps was never fully committed, since the Chinese 78th and 88th Division never arrived at Chosin because they were too stationed too far way due to the food shortage. Furthermore, Chinese prisoner interrogation by US X Corps confirmed that Chinese forces were suffering hundreds, if not thousands of cold casualties per day between November 10th to 27th. Finally, the article only states that Chinese 9th Army accounted for 40% (12 out of 30 Divisions) of all Chinese forces in Korea and were put out of action by the end of battle...the Chinese 13th Army accounted for the other 60% at Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River. I do concede to the point that ten understrength Chinese divisions could number somewhere between 70,000 to 90,000 (I do hear the number 80,000 get thrown around a lot when broaching the matter with Chinese sources, but so far unable to trace the source of that number), but again due to WP:RS, the number 67,000 is the best scholarly analysis I can come up with given the above constraints. Jim101 (talk) 23:06, 27 November 2013 (UTC)
thread_title:  Forces 

message: "Under Mao's urgent orders"
"Chosin" is the Japanese pronunciation of the Korean name, "Changjin".
The name Chosin is the Japanese pronunciation of the Korean place name Changjin, and the name stuck due to the outdated Japanese maps used by UN forces.
You want to put the first sentence in the intro?66.234.58.131 (talk) 18:54, 17 April 2016 (UTC)
thread_title:  are there unurgent orders? 

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thread_title:  External links modified 

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thread_title:  External links modified 

message: Crediting Mao as a commander here is inaccurate. While it's true he was the leader of the PRC during this time, he was not in military command. Unless Harry Truman is listed as the first American commander here then it's inaccurate. The equivalent of Douglas MacArthur in this battle was Peng Dehuai--Wordbearer88 (talk) 04:57, 3 August 2017 (UTC)
replies: text: Unlike Truman, Mao did micromanaged both Peng and Song Shilin during the battle. Jim101 (talk) 16:27, 27 April 2018 (UTC)
thread_title:  Mao as a commander 

message: None of the six sources provided support the assertion that the Marines' actions can be linked to the determination of the outcome of the war, so I've tagged the first sentence in the second para of the "Outcome assessment" section with cite needed. Factotem (talk) 11:37, 1 July 2018 (UTC)
thread_title: Explaing <nowiki>{{cn}}</nowiki> tag

message: The statement "Sources have described the outcome as a draw, characterizing it neither as an American defeat nor a Chinese victory." is sourced to p. 338 of U.S. Marines in the Korean War. That page makes no statement about the outcome of the battle, let alone what "sources" say about the outcome. Factotem (talk) 18:51, 2 July 2018 (UTC)
thread_title: failed verification - outcome as a draw

message: As I said above, I think we need to look at what the consensus of sources is. Here is how some sources describe the battle:
*Max Hastings, The Korean War (ch 8): "But X Corps's battle was lost...The communist army endured privations more dreadful than those of the Americans...But the formations of the People's Liberation Army who inherited the wreckage of Hamhung in the last days of 1950 could at least exult in the certainty of strategic achievement. They had driven the US X Corps headlong out of North Korea.
*Bruce Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun (p 286): "...major forces crossed the Yalu...dealing the Americans their terrible defeat at the Changjin (Japanese name, Chosin) reservoir." 
*Stanley Sandler, The Korean War (p 127): "But even Hungnam was no victory. One is put in mind of Churchill's famous dictum after Dunkirk. 'Wars are not won by evacuations'. The UNC had been severely defeated in North Korea."
*The National Museum of the US Army: a "nightmare".
*Roy Appleman: "Its hallmarks were misery, soul-crushing cold, privation, exhaustion, heroism, sacrifice, leadership of high merit at times, but finally, unit and individual disaster... It would be hard to find a more nearly hopeless or more tragic story in American military history" .
*Michael Pembroke, Korea (p 123): "Beijing, however, celebrated...both the Marine and Army units of the United States X Corps had been repulsed. The American-led incursion into North Korea was over."
*Paul M Edwards, The Mistaken History of the Korean War (pp 65–66): the "greatest defeat and rout of military forces in American history: the Chinese advance from the Chosin Reservoir"... "a massive strategic victory pulled off by the communist leader Song Shi-Lun, who won a serious victory over the Allies under the field command of General Oliver P. Smith"..."Yet, through the miracle of propaganda, political denial, selective memory, and historical adjustment, the retreat has become a moment of heroic history".
*Carter Malkasian, The Korean War (p 36): "However, the Marines' heroism at Chosin cannot mask the catastrophic results of the Chinese intervention for the UNC. The UNC fell all the way back to the 38th Parallel in the longest retreat in American military history".
I don't think there is any equivocation in sources that this was a victory for the Chinese and a defeat for the US/UN.--Jack Upland (talk) 07:30, 1 July 2018 (UTC)
replies: text: Not even the sources that you are referring to establish the consensus that you want, which is that the PVA won: I've already addressed the Museum and Appleman sources in the NPOV section; the Hastings source notes the accomplishments that both sides could point to (e.g. tactical for the UNC, strategic for the PVA); I can't access the Pembroke source but from what you've quoted it reads like it's Beijing's and not Pembroke's view of what happened; Sandler is referring to the overall outcome of the Second Phase Campaign and not Chosin specifically; the same applies with Malkasian; and that leaves you with only the Edwards and Cumings sources which says unambiguously that it was a defeat for the US - hardly a "consensus". The only consensus from the sources is that the battle ended in a draw but you refuse to acknowledge this and instead try desperately at every opportunity to represent the consensus as pro-PVA because you are strongly pro-Communist (Party rule)/anti-US, stances which you don't even try to hide as your editing record proves. (E.g. your contributions here and here) You really should stop editing this page/article already because it's clear that you just aren't here to contribute. Wingwraith (talk) 08:17, 1 July 2018 (UTC)
replies: text: The point of this section was to look at what sources say. Do you have a source that says it was a draw?--Jack Upland (talk) 08:25, 1 July 2018 (UTC)
replies: text: I don't need to because the motivation for your creation of this section is entirely corrupt (as I insinuated in my comment immediately preceding yours). Wingwraith (talk) 08:48, 1 July 2018 (UTC)

text: Unless the allied forces at Chosin were not part of the UNC, both Sandler's and Malkasian's assertions are relevant to this article. Both talk of a UN defeat in the context of the action at Chosin, Sandler by reference to Hungnam, Malkasian explicitly. Factotem (talk) 10:28, 5 July 2018 (UTC)

text: That is a distortion of what Hammel is saying, which is that Chosin ultimately wasn't a defeat because he and others like him survived the defeat; afterall, it's hard to imagine how a book which contains a contrasting narrative (i.e. your pro-PVA narrative) could contain a foreward that essentially praises the actions of X Corps at Chosin and be entitled Chosin: Heroic Ordeal of the Korean War. Wingwraith (talk) 08:48, 1 July 2018 (UTC)
replies: text: You are distorting what he says. He says that it was a "defeat" multiple times.--Jack Upland (talk) 08:52, 1 July 2018 (UTC)
replies: text: No I am not your (Google-mined) summary distorts both the spirit and letter of what he wrote. Wingwraith (talk) 09:08, 1 July 2018 (UTC)
replies: text: You accuse me of corruption and distortion, but you don't put forward any quotations to support your point of view. That proves my point.--Jack Upland (talk) 17:07, 11 August 2018 (UTC)
thread_title:  Victory or defeat — sources 

message: The sub-topics in the Aftermath section "Outcome assessment" and "Wider effect of the war." as now written have a lot of problems. 
(1) There are four statements in these two subsections that have tags: two "not in citation", one "discuss," and one "citation needed."  
(2) There are three appearances of weasel words: two say "sources" and one says "some assessments." Those weasel words need to be eliminated and the origin of the information needs to be identified.
(3) We are told twice that the 9th Chinese Army didn't return to the field until March 1951.  One of these repetitive statements needs to be eliminated.  
(4) One enthusiastic editor has deleted material that contradicts his bias.  For example, he deleted a quote from Mao Zedong congratulating the 9th Chinese army on its victory was inappropriate -- but does not object to a quote from Mao in the sideboard that favors his bias.  That's only one example of referenced material from reliable sources that has been deleted or minimized. At the same time General MacArthur's view is cited.  If Mao's views are inappropriate, then why are MacArthur's views appropriate?    
So, how do we proceed to fix this important article? I would say delete all the questionable, repetitive material as a start -- and undertake a thorough balanced re-draft of these two sections. 
The weasely info box which says "See Aftermath" should also have a conclusion.  I would propose, as a compromise, "Strategic victory for China. Successful withdrawal by UNC forces." Smallchief  (talk)
: Given that I had years to read Shu Guang Zhang's book from end to the front, I am pretty sure Shu Guang Zhang's opinion is not stated correctly in the article. Section IV did not mention that Chosin battle alone affected the Chinese outlook on the battle. Jim101 (talk) 00:00, 4 July 2018 (UTC)
replies: text: "See Aftermath" was proposed as some kind of compromise, but the Aftermath section as it stands seems to be designed to say that the Chinese did not have any kind of victory.--Jack Upland (talk) 09:48, 5 July 2018 (UTC)
thread_title: Present status of the Aftermath section

message: :For the second point, the article already stated that "Although the Chinese believed RCT-31 to be a reinforced regiment, the task force was actually understrength, with one battalion missing, due to the bulk of the 7th Infantry Division being scattered over northeast Korea." While Yu Bin is correct in stating that it is important part of Chinese POV to view the combat actions they took against UN forces at east of Chosin as an important victory, this does not override that fact that 32nd Regiment was NOT wiped out at Chosin. By stating "wiped out the entire 32nd Regiment of the 7th Infantry Division" without any context has crossed the threshold from presenting an important Chinese POV to presenting an incorrect fact. Jim101 (talk) 12:48, 5 July 2018 (UTC)
replies: text: I've changed it to read Task Force Faith, and added a note to explain why Yu Bin references a different unit. Fair? Factotem (talk) 14:19, 5 July 2018 (UTC)
replies: text: Good enough for me. Jim101 (talk) 14:31, 5 July 2018 (UTC)
thread_title:  Which unit query (resolved) 

message: Probably as a result of the efforts of diverse editors over the years, this article has multiple referencing styles. I would like to standardize them, if no one objects. In particular, I would alter them to rely on  to link to the references. Will wait about ten days for replies. ♦ Lingzhi.Random (talk) 08:25, 27 August 2021 (UTC)
thread_title:  Multiple referencing styles 

message: In the midst of reformatting the references (finished!), I discovered that Duncan (2013) is self-published. I'm leaving it in for the time being, so someone can find a replacement. But it probably needs to be removed at some point:
*  ♦ Lingzhi.Random (talk) 12:46, 16 September 2021 (UTC)
thread_title:  Duncan is self-published, probably needs to be removed at some point 

message: User:49.179.183.11 as with your edits on Hungnam evacuation you are mixing together separate and distinct aspects of the PVA offensive. This page deals with the Battle of Chosin Reservoir only. The entire Request for Nuclear Weapons was a result of the offensive, not this battle. I am fine with you adding these details to the Aftermath section of Second Phase Offensive or UN retreat from North Korea, but they don't belong here. Mztourist (talk) 03:46, 31 October 2021 (UTC)
thread_title:  October 2021 

message: While this bridge is somewhere near Funchilin Pass and south of Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri, it doesn't seem like the western world has had a name for it. I found mention of this no-name bridge at Marine Corp University's Frozen Chosin US Marines at the Changjin Reservoir PCN 19000410000 (usmcu.edu). See page 98. Any expert here?  Supermann (talk) 01:15, 1 November 2021 (UTC)
replies: text: I'd assume that it refers to the Treadway bridge in Funchilin Pass covered in the Breakout section. Mztourist (talk) 02:49, 1 November 2021 (UTC)

text: It was called "Water Gate House #1" by 1st Engineer Battalion, 1st Marine Division in 1st Engineer Battalion - Historical Diary - December 1950, File 1483 because it was not a traditional bridge, but a concrete passage over a water gate blown by PVA. "Treadway bridge" was a later name when steel-treadway bridge M2 was used to bridge the gap. --Happyseeu (talk) 03:00, 5 December 2022 (UTC)
thread_title:  Water Gate Bridge 

message: The infobox cites Escaping the Trap to say the nominal strength of UNC is 103,520. I don't have a copy of the book, but preview from Google book shows the number to be 114,313, not 103,520. Can someone verify the number 103,520 is correct? Happyseeu (talk) 22:13, 12 July 2022 (UTC)
thread_title:  UN nominal strength at 103,520? 

message: The article says the duration of the battle is from November 27– December 13 1950, so casualty figures should cover only that period. However, the article uses the numbers from Montross & Canzona 1992, which covers the period of Oct. 8 - Dec. 24, leading to a higher figure and it diverges more from the numbers from X Corp., which was for Nov. 27 - Dec. 10. I'd adjust the total using the numbers from the Navy (by Field) which covers Nov. 27 - Dec. 11 and are more in line with the period used by X Corp. If someone wants to use the rows in Montross & Canzona 1992 to adjust for the period to include up to Dec. 13, I'm OK with it, too, though it seems more complicated than it's worth IMO. Happyseeu (talk) 18:56, 6 December 2022 (UTC)
thread_title:  Casualty figures 

message: should this be added on how Tootsie Rolls Saved Troops at the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir if you want to do some research here is a link -> https://americangimuseum.org/tootsie-rolls-saved-troops-at-the-battle-of-the-chosin-reservoir/ https://tootsie.com/letters-stories/5 2604:3D09:A984:F000:246B:307E:EB7D:22C2 (talk) 17:22, 28 December 2023 (UTC)
replies: text: Trivia. Mztourist (talk) 02:56, 29 December 2023 (UTC)
replies: text: Umm this is wikipedia not fandom. 2604:3D09:A984:F000:246B:307E:EB7D:22C2 (talk) 15:34, 29 December 2023 (UTC)

text: Umm this is wikipedia not fandom 2604:3D09:A984:F000:38F7:22F8:686D:8A66 (talk) 20:16, 30 December 2023 (UTC)
thread_title:  Tootsie Rolls Saved Troops at the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir 

message: Probably noteworthy to mention in the lead paragraph that the evacuation at Hungnam was the very last time American or South Korean troops would fight in North Korea. And that the US intelligence had failed to notice a quarter of million Chinese advancing only at night and camping camouflaged and marching 100 miles from the border to Chosin Reservoir, and that intelligence mishap was what lead to them effectively ending their control of North Korea. Saturdaysuggestion (talk) 09:52, 13 January 2024 (UTC)
thread_title:  Suggestion