Talk:Axis powers/Archive 3

message: I have added a to-do box so that we can list the things we agree need to be done. That way I hope we can move forward with the things that we all agree should be done. MartinDK 11:22, 14 September 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: To-do box

message: (after edit conflict).
Just to chip in a little here: I noticed the five comments and fortunately a very detailed study of Danish foreign policy was recently published. I'll almost exclusively stick to this in this post. I believe the questions were:
*Question 1: True or false, King Christian X accepted the German ultimatum concerning "protection of the Reich."
*Question 2: True or false, Germany occupied Denmark without resistance.
*Question 3: True or false, Denmark signed the Anti-Comintern Pact and broke diplomatic relations with Germany's enemies.
*Question 4: True or false, Denmark authorized formation of the Danish Free Corps to fight on the Eastern Front.
*Question 5: True or false, 4,000 Danes enlisted in the Danish Free Corps, including many soldiers of the Royal Danish Army.
*Answer 1: True, but the question is misleading. Prime Minister Stauning, Foreign Minister Munch, Defence Minister Andersen, Army Chief leut.general Prior and Navy Chief Admiral Rechnitzer met with King Christian X and Crown Prince Frederick at 5:30 AM in the morning of 9 April 1940 (while shooting was taking place outside of the royal palace and bombers flew over the city). The general argued that Denmark should fight to the end and that the king should try to flee from the city. The king refused to leave the city, and Munch, Andersen and Rechnitzer recommended to stop the fighting immediately. Everybody else agreed. The rationale was that further fighting would only result in the loss of countless Danish lives since Denmark couldn't possibly win a fight with Germany and Renthe-Fink had stated that all 13 demands must be agreed to (naturally hinting at the bombers flying over Copenhagen). The King and cabinet decided to avoid a policy that would mean countless civilian deaths in a virtually undefended Copenhagen. The military HQ Kastellet had been almost undefended and the guard there had already been overpowered by the Germans. I also doubt that anybody had guessed that Denmark would become the object of the world's first combined land, sea and air assault. The German ultimatum on the morning of 9 April had contained a number of promises about respecting Danish sovereignty and Munch repeated them in his official reply in an attempt to make the Germans stick to their word: "German troops have not entered Danish territory with hostile intentions and the German government does not intent to question the territorial integrity and politicial independence of the Kingdom of Denmark, not now and not in the future". The Danish cabinet took the gamble that Germany would honour its own words and acted accordingly. (Bo Lidegaard (ed.) (2003): Dansk Udenrigspolitiks historie [The History of Danish Foreign Policy], vol. 4, most importantly pp. 391-8)
*Answer 2: False. Ask that question to the Danes that died defending e.g. the Royal Palace and Haderslev, just to name the two best known scenes of fighting. I can recommend the memoirs of Colonel Lunding for a pretty detailled description.
*Answer 3: First part true but more complex than it seems. Second part mostly false. On 20 November '41 the Danish government received a German "invitation" to join the Anti-Comintern pact. Finland accepted reluctantly on 25 November and stated that it presumed that Denmark also attended the ceremony (effectively conditioning its own attendence). Erik Scavenius argued that Denmark should sign the pact but the Cabinet ministers refused stating that this would violate the policy of neutrality (ibid. p. 475). Scavenius reported this decision to Renthe-Fink. Fink replied on 21 November that "Germany would be unable to comprehend" a Danish rejection and demanded this decision be reversed before the end of the day. He assuered Scavenius that the pact cotained neither "political or other obligations" (i.e. going to war with the USSR). On a cabinet meeting the same day, it was suggested to seek a written confirmation of this promise in an addendum to the protocol. Stauning agreed on these terms since it would effectively make the signing meaningless. The Danish foreign office drew up a list of four terms that stated that Denmark only committed itself to "police action" in Denmark and that the nation remained neutral. The German foreign ministry agreed to the terms provided that the protocol was not made public (which was the intent of the Danish foreign ministry). As Berlin grew tired of waiting, von Ribbentrop called Copenhagen on 23 November threatening with "cancelling the peaceful occupation" unless Denmark complied. On 23 November, Wehrmacht in Denmark was put on alert and Renthe-Fink met Stauning and Foreign Minister P. Munch at 10 AM stating that there would be no room for parliamentary excuses. It the German demands were not met Germany will no longer be committed by the promises given on 9 April 1940" (= the threat of a state of war, a Nazi government and territorial dismemberment). In a Cabinet meeting at 2 PM that day, Stauning, Scavenius, Munch, Gunnar Larsen + 1 minor minister advocated accession. 7 ministers opposed. In a meeting the same day in the Nine Man committe, three move ministers caved in most notably Vilhelm Buhl stating "Coorporation is the last shred of our defence". To quote from Prime Minister Stauning's notes (Lidegaard, p. 476-7) The objective is a political positioning. But this was established by the occupation. The danger of saying no - - I would not like to see a Terboven here. Sign with addendum - - that modifies the pact. 
Scavernius borded a train and headed for Berlin where he arrived on Monday 24 November. The next crisis came when he was met by Renthe-Fink who informed him that Ribbentrop had informed Fink that there had been a "misunderstanding" regarding the four clauses and that clause 2 would be deleted. This had specified that Denmark only had police-like obligations. Scavenius had a strict mandate not to change a sentence and stated that he would be unable to return to Copenhagen with a different content from the one agreed upon, but that he was willing to reopen negotiations to clarify the matter futher. This reply enraged Ribbentrop (and rumours claim that he was considering ordering the SS to arrest Scavenius). The task fell to German diplomat von Weizsäcker to patch up a compromise. He watered down the wording but left the content pretty intact, but for Scavenius it was a strong setback that the four clauses would now only get the status of a unilateral Danish declaration ("Aktennotitz") with a comment on it by Fink that its content "no doubt" was in compliance with the pact. Furthermore he was instructed to give a public speech while abstaining from mentioning the four clauses but only making general statements about Denmark's status as a neutral nation. Scavenius signed the pact. At the following reception the Italian ambassador described Scavenius as "a fish dragged on land ... a small old gentleman in a suit asking himself how on earth he got to this place". Lidegaard comments that the old man remained defiant: during a conversation with Ribbentrop in which the latter complained about the "barbarous cannibalism" of Russian POWs, Scavenius rhetorically asked if that statement meant that Germany didn't feed her prisoners. (ibid. p. 479)
When news of the signing reached Denmark it left the population outraged, and rumors immediately spread about what Denmark had now committed itself to. The cabinet sent a car to pick up Scavernius at the ferry, to avoid him riding the train alone to Copenhagen. At the same time a large demonstration gathered outside of Parliament (this led the Minister of Justice to remark that he didn't like to see Danish police beating up students singing patriotic songs).
When Scavenius had returned to Copenhagen, he asked the cabinet to debate once and for all where the red lines existed in the Danish relations with Germany. This debate concluded that three red lines existed: 1) No legislation discriminating Jews, 2) Denmark should never join the Axis Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan, 3) No unit of the Danish army should ever fight against foreign forces. To the surprise of many, Scavenius accepted these instructions without hesitation. (the source of these paragraphs is "Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Historie" vol. IV, pp. 474 - 483.)
Regarding the ambassadors: Germany demanded that Denmark withdrew its ambassador from Moscow (Laurits Bolt-Jørgensen) at the outbreak of war with the USSR and he was recalled. It has nothing to do with the Anti-Comintern Pact. In September 1944, a number of leading Danish politicians contacted London (without consulting the Danish Freedom Council) and asked for its help in restoring relations to the USSR. London insisted that the Danish Freedom Council should be included but the initiative failed; the USSR insisted on only talking with Thomas Døssing (representing the Danish Freedom Coucil) who had already arrived in Moscow. Most of the other diplomats remained in place throughout the war: 
:* Washington: Henrik Kauffmann remained on his post but had announced when hearing of the occupation that he would not accept orders from the government of an occupied nation. (ibid., page 405-6) This status was not recognized by the U.S. at first, so effectively Kauffmann was  the one trying to sever relations between the U.S. and Denmark.
:* London: Eduard Reventlow remained on his post 1938-53. He was in doubt regarding his loyalties in 1940 but stayed loyal to the government. He later sided with Henrik Kauffmann and joined the Danish Council in London in 1942 (ibid. p. 407 and 484)
:* Paris: Herman Anker Bernhoft remained on his post (1939-45)
Full diplomatic relations were maintained with Berlin, Oslo, and Stockholm. I have no information specifically but no reason to doubt that Rome falls into the same category.
*Answer 4: False, Answer 5: Partly true, partly false. (I'll treat them as a unit since the questions are related): According to Danish law, it was not illegal to join a foreign army but active recruiting on Danish soil was illegal. The SS disregarded this law and began recruiting efforts - predominantly recruiting Danish Nazis and members of the German minority. (ibid. p. 461). The Danish government found out and concentrated on persuading the Germans not to recruit underage boys. The Frikorps Danmark was set up at the initiative of the SS and DNSAP who approached Lieutenant-Colonel C.P. Kryssing shortly after the invasion of the USSR had begun. The Nazi paper Fædrelandet proclaimed the creation of the corps on 29 June 1941 (ibid., p. 461). General Prior wanted to sack Kryssing and his designated second-in-command but decided to consult the Cabinet. It agreed that Kryssing should be sacked in its meeting on 2 July 1941, but this decision was later withdrawn when Eric Scavenius - who had not attended the original meeting - returned from negotiations and announced that he had reached an agreement with Renthe-Fink that soldiers wishing to join this corps could be given leave until further notice. The government issued an announcement stating that "Lieut.Colonel C.P. Kryssing, Chief of the 5th Artillery reg., Holbæk, has with the consent of the Royal Danish Government assumed command over 'Frikorps Danmark'". The point is that the Danish text only explicitly says that the government recognizes that Kryssing had been given a new command, it does not sanction the creation of the corps which had already happend without consulting the government (ibid. p. 462-3). The government later instructed that the army and navy were not allowed to obstruct applications from soldiers wishing to leave active duty and join the corps. In 1941, Kryssing held a 7 minute long speech in the radio, in 1942 Schalburg held a three minute long speech and in 1943 the third commander held a speech of similar length. (p. 462-3). The Danish cabinet was, however, represented at the funeral of the corp's second commander, von Schalburg, in 1942. A 1998 study showed that the average recruit to Frikorps Danmark was a Nazi and / or a member of the German minority in Denmark and that recruitment was very broad socially. (p. 463). Army experience was far from a given thing, and new recruits underwent a German recruit training (more details in Under Hagekors og Dannebrog, 1999). I don't have the book at hand but - of all sources in the world - the webpage of the Danish Nazis actually quote this book saying that a total of 77 Danish officers had joined between June 41 and July 43. () Just in case everybody wondered, I was googling for reviews of this book. In July 1941 Heinrich Himmler complained that Denmark was unofficially trying to stop recruitment since the word ran in the army that anyone joining would be committing treason. A rumor also existed that King Christian X had commented to an officer "I understand that you wish to join Frikorps Danmark. If you do, I shall no longer require your services. I consider it to be treason if a Danish officer joins Frikorps Danmark." Bo Lidegaard notes: "The relationship between the population and the corps was freezing cold, and legionaires on leave time and again came into fights with civilians meeting the corps' volunteers with massive contempt." (Lidegaard, p. 464). Regarding the number of troops, I don't have a copy of the relevant book at hand. Lidegaard gives the following figures for 1941: 6,000 Danish citizens had signed up to German army duty (1,500 of these belonged to the German minority in Denmark). He compares this number to 3,000 Norwegians and 30,000 Dutchmen doing the same.) Under Hagekors og Dannebrog documents that many recruits for Frikorps Danmark had never received any military training.  
All in all, the situation is a lot more complex than the one you describe. Denmark was a nation occupied by a foreign power which recognized (on paper) that Denmark remained a neutral nation whose domestic affairs and foreign policy had been unaffected by the outbreak of war. At the same time, Danish politicians made a strong attempt not to grant Germany more concessions than absolutely necessary while also making sure that Denmark never crossed the "red line" joining the Axis. The Danish government considered Denmark to be a neutral and democratic nation and it tried to defend this situation for as long as possible. The majority of Danes drew the line more sharply and blamed the government for granting too many concessions. In Moscow, the view was that Denmark should make a clean break and declare war on Germany. In Berlin, opinion about maintaining the Danish situation were divided. In London, the government concluded that it was preferably to have Denmark lead its policy of collaboration since the alternative was the country falling under complete German control. The U.S. reached the same conclusion around 1943-44. (ibid. pp. 625-9). The Danish government continued to deny recognizing the German notion that Germany held the right to rule in Denmark "by right of conquest", and neither the cabinet nor the average Dane sold his soul to Hitler. Valentinian (talk) / (contribs) 18:18, 16 September 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Thank you so much! I think that should settle the dispute once and for all. Can I possibly tempt you to frequent this page more often as you seem very well informed about these things? We have tried to ask for help on the taskforce page but no one ever replied. We could really use more contributers like you! MartinDK 19:24, 16 September 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: In fact the situation before August, 1943 and after differs and possibly there was a war declaration from German side in August. See discussion in Talk:Occupation of Denmark/Archive 1#Declaration of war against Germany? for more detailed view.--Nixer 20:29, 16 September 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: The German ultimatum of 28 August '43? It could very well be true, but alas, I have never seen a copy of the original text. I would certainly love to see it though. Valentinian (talk) / (contribs) 20:40, 16 September 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: I don't think there was ever an actual declaration of war. As far as I know Denmark remained under the control of the German Foreign Office even after 1943 - which I doubt would be the case if there had been an actual declaration of war. But I might be wrong about that. But the dispute here is not really if Denmark was an ally or not - we all know that Denmark as a state didn't actively fight the Germans except on the morning of the occupation. So in that respect Denmark was not an ally as such. The dispute here has been about Denmark being included in this article and I think it should be obvious to everyone by now that Denmark does indeed not belong here. As for Denmark being an ally or a country struggling to remain neutral I think that question is much more complex. MartinDK 21:26, 16 September 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Detailed reply to the five questions

message: * (Amatulic comments: The text below by Garamundi looks like a good start; I'm inserting this comment in front of Garamundi's suggested text, and I'm inserting editing codes below (strikeouts and boldface for deletions and insertions), relying on Wikipedia's change log to record prior versions. My objective here is conciseness by eliminating text that has little value, or seems too POV. I'm also deleting Garamundi's signature because the text below now represents a collaborative effort. Care should be taken to ensure that the text below agrees with the facts cited in the external links included within the text. My edits below are also a "start".) -Amatulic 00:09, 18 September 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: According to the Museum of Danish Resistance about 6000 Danes joined and 2000 died. This link (sadly in Danish....) . confirms this. Even though it is in Danish it is the best source I have been able to find. The people at this museum usually knows what they are talking about. MartinDK 16:18, 20 September 2006 (UTC)
replies: text:  Good! A second question about convicted members of the Frikorps: Were those who participated only between 1941-1943 persecuted? According to the link you gave some/many former members of the Frikorps joined to occupation troops after 1943 which affected to their convictions.--Whiskey 16:26, 20 September 2006 (UTC)
replies: text:  Those who joined other units that operated in Denmark were persecuted and sentenced much harder. People who had fought on the Eastern front usually recieved a light prison sentence. People who had signed up to be actively invloved in units that operated inside of Denmark were sentenced much harder, some were executed after the war. It was considered blatant treason to actively help the German occupation forces in Denmark and to be responsible for deaths and material damage inside Denmark. So to make a long story short those who were lucky enough to make it home from the Eastern front were actually better of than those who joined units in Denmark. MartinDK 16:37, 20 September 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Proposed Denmark article