Talk:Metaphysics (Aristotle)

message: The first line of the article per 25.04.2011 suggests that Aristotle's Metaphysics is identical with the arborescent structuring of knowledge. I find this a very reductive perspective. The Tree of knowledge is a fairly old metaphor, but isn't this as much a result of hierarchisation with no real scientific or philosophical basis; thus a perspective caused by the glasses through which one is looking? I would argue that the arborescent perspective on knowledge, pertaining to the predominantly anglo-american analytical philosophy, in dialectic opposition to continental philosophy that seem to nurse the rhizomatic (radical) metaphor, may be a valid metaphor for physics, but not metaphysics. In the spirit of the ancient philosophers it would be more accurate to speak of metaphysics as the heart of wisdom, than the first branch of knowledge. Alternatively, seeing metaphysics as the underground rhizomatic structuring. Or is Aristotle specifically using the tree metaphor also in regard of metaphysics? --Xact (talk) 12:10, 25 April 2011 (UTC)
thread_title: The metaphors of knowledge

message: I corrected a couple of common misconceptions in the section on Book VI (Epsilon) of the Metaphysics.
(1) First Philosophy (one of Aristotle’s names for what we call metaphysics) studies all of reality, not just immaterial or immovable substances. The difference is that it seeks the ultimate causes (or, from a different point of view, the first causes) of reality, whether material or not. What Aristotle calls physics (which we would probably call natural philosophy) does not qualify as First Philosophy, because it studies only a limited part of reality (the part that is mobile); moreover it only seeks the “proximate” or “secondary” causes of that portion of reality.
(2) It is common to confuse per accidens with  “accident;” however, these are very different notions. “Accident” refers to realities that do not have an independent existence; rather, they depend on something else. For example, the red color of a Red Delicious apple is an accident: the redness can’t exist apart from the apple that sustains it. (In tongue and cheek, colors don’t pile up in fruit baskets, but colored apples do.)
When Aristotle refers being as per accidens (κατὰ συμβεβηκός) or per se (καθ᾽ αὑτό), he referring to the verb to be (εἰμί) in its capacity to form propositions joining a subject to a predicate. Being—or better put, the word “is” (ἐστί)—is used per accidens if the predicate has no necessary connection to the subject: in English we would render the idea by using the phrase “to happen to be.” For example, if I say “The musician is building the house,” there is no causal nexus (link or connection) between the fact that the man is a musician and that he is building the house. I might just as well say, “The man building the house happens to be a musician.” That is idea that Aristotle is trying to get across with being per accidens.
If, however, there is a causal nexus, however faint, then the verb to be takes on what Aristotle calls a per se meaning. If I say, “The builder is building the house,” then it is evident that the builder is building thanks to the skills (τέχνη) he has acquired as a builder. A causal nexus is necessary for there to be true science, according to Aristotle’s doctrine.
[The above added on 20 May 2013‎ by user:AthanasiusOfAlex - Peter Damian (talk) 08:11, 19 April 2015 (UTC)
thread_title:  Books I-VI: Alpha to Epsilon 

message: Right at the beginning of this article, one could find many subjective statements, such as that the metaphysics is basically an updated version of Plato's theory of forms. This view is now outdated as it belongs to a debate that stretches back to Warner Jaeger's "Aristotle" (1923) and to Ingemar During's reply to it (1966). Whilst always recognizing that Aristotle's metaphysics is the result of different lecture notes, reflecting different periods, the scholarly consensus is that Aristotle provided a reply to Plato's theory and developed his own independent doctrine of substances. Now, rather than venturing on a subjective and controversial interpretation of what are Aristotle's debts with respects to Plato's ontology, I edited the text so as to be as neutral as possible and make it refer only to what Aristotle claims he is doing. I hope this helps.  — Preceding unsigned comment added by Xandreios (talk • contribs) 17:04, 17 June 2019 (UTC)
thread_title:  Editing 

message: Upon reading this article, I noticed that it said that Aristotle's work was mere lecture notes. This may just be my opinion but I feel as though this should be mentioned either more or sooner in the article. I think that since there's such little work, it would be beneficial to the reader to mention either that he did not show much work or did not do much work in this subject. Btmv2c (talk) 16:41, 25 September 2020 (UTC)
replies: text: Being "mere lecture notes" is a common opinion, but it's just an opinion. Maybe that conclusion requires a longer explanation, but it's not immediately evident or true without question. JKeck (talk) 15:07, 23 May 2021 (UTC)
thread_title:  Concern about Style section