Talk:Propaganda in China

message: I just read this http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/02/international/asia/02epstein.html :
"Israel Epstein, a journalist, author and propagandist for China whose passion for Communism was fueled in long interviews with Mao in the 1940's and was not dimmed by imprisonment during the Cultural Revolution, died last Thursday at a hospital in Beijing. He was 90.
His death was announced by the official New China News Agency.
Mr. Epstein edited China Today, an English-language Chinese newsmagazine, translated the sayings and writings of Mao and Deng Xiaoping and advised the Chinese government on how to polish its overseas image. He became a Chinese citizen, joined the Communist Party and served on official government and party committees."
Sounded really interesting and lo and behold, here's a potentially great article needing some work.  Would like to work on the article, but since it seems like a large task needing a lot of work (borrowing some books from the library) and there is this potential deletion hanging over the article, I will hold off for now.  Anyone else thinking about helping out?  Looks like there hasn't been much work on it for a few days.  Should it be advertised somehow?--DownUnder555 19:37, 2 Jun 2005 (UTC)
thread_title: A Lead Worth Following

message: This article covers too little about the present day applications and dissemination of propaganda - such as the dazibao stands found in every university etc. Could someone work on this? Take a few pictures if possible, I can't since I'm not in China. -Hmib 05:45, 23 July 2005 (UTC)
thread_title: Modern propaganda

message: There were loads of slogans, but the part about "Continuous News" is not substantiated. Please provide some kind of evidence. I lived in China for 10 years and intermittently after that, and saw something rougly resembling that line maybe 2 times. -- Миборовский U|T|C|E 05:48, 9 October 2005 (UTC)
thread_title: Slogans

message: The current title of the article is problematic in that CCP propaganda started way before 1949 and in fact was one of the reasons for its dramatic growth.  What do people think?  How do we handle this?--Moveapage 11:58, 22 December 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  pre 1949 propaganda 

message: Before 1978 All the chinese arts are funded by governments,so someone regarded all the pre-1978 cinemas,books are all the communist propaganda ones.It's not the case.--Ksyrie 09:17, 12 April 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: Be careful drawing the line

message: I tagged the assertion as dubious because the statement is uncited, and needs a reliable citation to stay long-term.Ngchen 20:02, 10 November 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  Tiananmen square self-immolation incident 

message: I'm soliciting comment on the presence of links to commercial sites. Generally, per WP:EL, such links should be removed. However, I can see the other side of the argument in this case, namely that the links provide the reader with additional propaganda examples and good information despite being commercial.Ngchen 13:59, 14 November 2007 (UTC)
thread_title:  External links 

message: There is a short list of PRC propaganda films in the article, one of them I never heard of. Does anybody have by chance information on "Grenade War" (year,  director, cast, ...) ? Thanks. Croquant (talk) 15:40, 6 June 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  PRC propaganda films 

message: Where has this article gone, it was here not long ago and now seems to have disapered. I hope it has not been deleted as it was definately a neutral article and was a usefull source of information.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 124.189.116.137 (talk) 06:13, 22 July 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Where is it? 

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thread_title: Image copyright problem with Image:Mao book.jpg

message: this article seems so relevant but so neglected? amazing. I will try to find some time to add information to it based on some of the things I've been reading recently.--Asdfg12345 21:39, 30 August 2009 (UTC)
thread_title: such a neglected article...

message: Am just starting to research this topic a bit during spare time. Any help would be most welcome. 
===Sources===
Sources available on this topic are so diverse, am at a loss where to start. Anyway, if you come across a good source please add below, with a short summary of what the article touches upon:
*The BBC, China's internet 'spin doctors'. A BBC article on China employing "tens of thousands" of paid agents to scour the internet, post comments supporting CCP propaganda, remove/attack information critical of the CCP, etc. A rather interesting article, and could provide info for a "Propaganda on the Internet" sub-section.
*The BBC, China TV faces propaganda charge. BBC article on Chinese intellectuals signing an open letter against CCP's use of state controlled media to "brainwash its audience". The open letter speaks against whitewashing of "serious events like the recent milk contamination scandal", "systematic bias in its news coverage", ...
* Reporters Without Borders, A “Journey to the Heart of Internet censorship” on eve of party congress. A detailed study of how China's internet Censorship system functions.
*Xinhua: the world’s biggest propaganda agency. An in-depth study of the "role of the news agency Xinhua News Agency in the system of propaganda and censorship[in the CCP]" Sources from inside reveal to RSF "how the control imposed by the CCP’s Propaganda Department operates on a daily basis." The article goes on to analyze and expose "the distortion of facts, hatred for its enemies (particularly the United States and Japan) and its support, through the treatment of international news, for the world’s worst regimes." "Hand-picked journalists, who are regularly indoctrinated, produce reports for the Chinese media that give the official point of view and others - classified “internal reference” for the country’s leaders."
*"Living dangerously on the Net" RSF report on Chinese censorship of info on the net, paid agents involved in removal/attack of critical info, etc. Discusses agents paid to engage in "manhunt" for individual users; a bunch of laws which allow "dissemination of information jeopardizing the state" to be punished with a "death penalty".
*Regimenting the Public Mind: The Modernisation of the Propaganda System in the PRC. Dr Annie-Marie Brady, University of Canterbury. "Propaganda work...always been an essential element of the CCP hold on power. The Central Propaganda Department (Zhongyang xuanchuanbu) of the CCP sets guidelines over the Chinese media, film, drama, art, news, literature and education, and disciplines those who break the rules on what can and cannot be presented in these mediums.5 The propaganda system (xuanjiao xitong) remains one of the key groupings of bureaucracies within the Chinese political system."
*Guiding Hand: The Role of the CCP Central Propaganda Department in the Current Era. Anne-Marie Brady, Department of Political Science, University of Canterbury. "The Central Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a central, guiding, role over the whole of Chinese society in the current era. The Central Propaganda Department oversees the Propaganda and Education System (xuanjiao xitong) which monitors, instructs and censors all of China’s newspapers and magazines, film, television and radio broadcasting, the Internet, the publishing industry, and all aspects of cultural and information production from the highest to the lowest levels of society. In this paper I outline the structure and role of the Central Propaganda Department and the system of thought control it oversees."
*CHINA’S PROPAGANDA SYSTEM: INSTITUTIONS, PROCESSES AND EFFICACY by  David Shambaugh, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs writing in The China Journal. Paper focuses "on the scope, structure and mechanisms of the Chinese propaganda system today."
*China’s Propaganda and Perception Management Efforts, Its Intelligence Activities that Target the United States, and the Resulting Impacts on U.S. National Security. I believe there is enough material/ research available to meet WP:N and it merits a topic of its own ( on CCP propaganda outside China ). But as afirst tsep we could cover this tersely in a subsection of this article.
*MASS MEDIA CONTROL IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA by Ashley Esarey.  
*China's New Propaganda Machine By NICHOLAS BEQUELIN From today's Wall Street Journal Asia
Dilip rajeev (talk) 23:28, 14 September 2009 (UTC)
thread_title: Help with research, please..

message: Sources available on this topic are so diverse, am at a loss where to start. Anyway, if you come across a good source please add below, with a short summary of what the article touches upon:
*The BBC, China's internet 'spin doctors'. A BBC article on China employing "tens of thousands" of paid agents to scour the internet, post comments supporting CCP propaganda, remove/attack information critical of the CCP, etc. A rather interesting article, and could provide info for a "Propaganda on the Internet" sub-section.
*The BBC, China TV faces propaganda charge. BBC article on Chinese intellectuals signing an open letter against CCP's use of state controlled media to "brainwash its audience". The open letter speaks against whitewashing of "serious events like the recent milk contamination scandal", "systematic bias in its news coverage", ...
* Reporters Without Borders, A “Journey to the Heart of Internet censorship” on eve of party congress. A detailed study of how China's internet Censorship system functions.
*Xinhua: the world’s biggest propaganda agency. An in-depth study of the "role of the news agency Xinhua News Agency in the system of propaganda and censorship[in the CCP]" Sources from inside reveal to RSF "how the control imposed by the CCP’s Propaganda Department operates on a daily basis." The article goes on to analyze and expose "the distortion of facts, hatred for its enemies (particularly the United States and Japan) and its support, through the treatment of international news, for the world’s worst regimes." "Hand-picked journalists, who are regularly indoctrinated, produce reports for the Chinese media that give the official point of view and others - classified “internal reference” for the country’s leaders."
*"Living dangerously on the Net" RSF report on Chinese censorship of info on the net, paid agents involved in removal/attack of critical info, etc. Discusses agents paid to engage in "manhunt" for individual users; a bunch of laws which allow "dissemination of information jeopardizing the state" to be punished with a "death penalty".
*Regimenting the Public Mind: The Modernisation of the Propaganda System in the PRC. Dr Annie-Marie Brady, University of Canterbury. "Propaganda work...always been an essential element of the CCP hold on power. The Central Propaganda Department (Zhongyang xuanchuanbu) of the CCP sets guidelines over the Chinese media, film, drama, art, news, literature and education, and disciplines those who break the rules on what can and cannot be presented in these mediums.5 The propaganda system (xuanjiao xitong) remains one of the key groupings of bureaucracies within the Chinese political system."
*Guiding Hand: The Role of the CCP Central Propaganda Department in the Current Era. Anne-Marie Brady, Department of Political Science, University of Canterbury. "The Central Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a central, guiding, role over the whole of Chinese society in the current era. The Central Propaganda Department oversees the Propaganda and Education System (xuanjiao xitong) which monitors, instructs and censors all of China’s newspapers and magazines, film, television and radio broadcasting, the Internet, the publishing industry, and all aspects of cultural and information production from the highest to the lowest levels of society. In this paper I outline the structure and role of the Central Propaganda Department and the system of thought control it oversees."
*CHINA’S PROPAGANDA SYSTEM: INSTITUTIONS, PROCESSES AND EFFICACY by  David Shambaugh, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs writing in The China Journal. Paper focuses "on the scope, structure and mechanisms of the Chinese propaganda system today."
*China’s Propaganda and Perception Management Efforts, Its Intelligence Activities that Target the United States, and the Resulting Impacts on U.S. National Security. I believe there is enough material/ research available to meet WP:N and it merits a topic of its own ( on CCP propaganda outside China ). But as afirst tsep we could cover this tersely in a subsection of this article.
*MASS MEDIA CONTROL IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA by Ashley Esarey.  
*China's New Propaganda Machine By NICHOLAS BEQUELIN From today's Wall Street Journal Asia
Dilip rajeev (talk) 23:28, 14 September 2009 (UTC)
thread_title: Sources

message: I don't see the use of this, removed. No particular relation to propaganda in the PRC. With source, could be relevant to a wider discussion of the use of language between PRC/Taiwan. Also going to move the other section on "language" (or, as it was called "Chinese connotations of the term") which was all original research. This is useful background, but it needs a source and no opinion. 
Regarding the first one, if some connection to propaganda in the PRC can be explicitly established, and it has a source, then I guess it would belong.
Regarding the second, it needs a source.
A separate issue: does the article need so many songs?--Asdfg12345 03:32, 9 February 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: Original research...? This is such a common knowledge to anyone speaking Chinese that I don't see how anyone would bother to create a reference-able document to be cited here. -su88 (talk) 06:09, 4 September 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: I found this thing, is it enough? http://www.chinapost.com.tw/editorial/taiwan-issues/2010/04/21/253431/Propaganda-is.htm -su88 (talk) 06:10, 4 September 2010 (UTC)
thread_title: moving irrelevant info

message: While in the Western world the word 'propaganda' bears negative connotations, the Chinese word 宣传, which is liberally translated as "propaganda", actually means "to broadcast" or "to propagate (information)", with no negative connotations that would imply bias or untruthfulness. This explains why many English speakers would consider the use of such a term as an outright acknowledgement of the biased nature of Chinese propaganda, although the term can in fact be used in politically neutral contexts. This is congruent with the pre-WW1 usage of the term in Western Europe, which also does not connotate deception. For example, Chinese "propaganda" has also served to raise public awareness about the law, the need for common courtesy, the importance of embracing science and technology, the need to take preventive measures against SARS and AIDS.
For example:
宣传安全知识 would, in accordance with the literal dictionary definition of "宣传", be translated as propagating public safety awareness. There are absolutely no political connotations surrounding the use of this word, as might be present in
宣传毛泽东思想 translated as propagating Mao Zedong Thought.
This can be likened to the use of 'Agitprop' specifically as political propaganda, and the Spanish word 'propaganda', which simply means advertising.
:Original research...? This is such a common knowledge to anyone speaking Chinese that I don't see how anyone would bother to create a reference-able document to be cited here. -su88 (talk) 06:09, 4 September 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: I found this thing, is it enough? http://www.chinapost.com.tw/editorial/taiwan-issues/2010/04/21/253431/Propaganda-is.htm -su88 (talk) 06:10, 4 September 2010 (UTC)
thread_title: Language issues

message: I don't understand and probably disagree with this edit. Dilip, would you mind explaining what the big idea is? A bunch of good information was deleted from the lead, the section on thought reform was deleted, two unreferenced sections were added back in, and sundry other minor changes were all wiped. Can you please explain all that or fix it up? A lot of edits have happened in the meantime, and it would take some time to put it all back in. It may have been a mistake, in which case, please fix it. If it wasn't a mistake, please explain. If it's not fixed next time I come online, it's not a big deal, I'll fix it myself.--Asdfg12345 17:05, 12 February 2010 (UTC)
thread_title: Explanation requested

message: The reference used for the claim "The later reign of President Jiang Zemin saw the creation of propaganda demonizing Falun Gong as an "evil religion" is the History section is this report by US State Department. I don't have the time to read the entire report, so I am requesting quote from the report which supports this claim. --Defender of torch (talk) 02:29, 13 February 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: The CNN article says China tried to demonize Li Hongzhi. "Demonizing" Li Hongzhi and "demonizing" Falun Gong are not the same. The last reference is the personal view of Haiqing Yu and should be used accordingly. Secondly, the statement "The later reign of President Jiang Zemin saw the creation of propaganda demonizing Falun Gong as an "evil religion" is original research. Where in the State department report the word "propaganda" is used? You need to provide a source which claims China has orchestrated propaganda against Falun Gong. Right now, I will remove the sentence as no source is provided which supports the claim. --Defender of torch (talk) 04:41, 15 February 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: That's fine. I mentioned that that formulation ran the danger of being called out as an original synthesis; often in wikipedia, things stand until someone complains, which is okay. I'll put something else there, more strictly sourced, a bit later.--Asdfg12345 09:55, 16 February 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Request quote 

message: The section Thought reform uses a source which dates back to 1968. Please tell how a 1968 reference (a time when China was ruled by a lunatic hardline communist) can be used as a reliable source to support the claim Propaganda in the PRC is often associated with "thought reform" for 21st century China (a time when China is no more a communist country and is constantly strengthening its capitalist economy). --Defender of torch (talk) 05:10, 15 February 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: Yes, good point. I believe that should be changed to a was. Indeed, chapter three of Brady's text is called "From Thought Reform to Economic Reform: Comparing Propaganda and Thought Work in Different Eras". That it's old shouldn't mean it be excluded; it means it should be put into context. I have been quite busy recently, but want to get back working on this article soon. I agree that the chronology of sources is quite important, and that an is in there now would be inaccurate, failing to account for the changing dynamics in Chinese state propaganda. I have some more tweaks and remarks about your other edits soon, too. Give me some time. I'm liking this rigorous approach of yours, seriously.--Asdfg12345 09:53, 16 February 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: I've replaced the 1968 source with the Shaw source--PCPP (talk) 16:39, 7 March 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  [[Propaganda_in_the_People's_Republic_of_China#Thought_reform|Thought reform]] 

message: I've undone this edit because 1) it makes the paragraph very heavy to read 2) there's more than one person making these statements, and listing them all would make the paragraph even heavier. WP:CLAIM discourages using this word all over the place because it casts doubt on the assertions in a non-neutral way. In my opinion, if someone believes these statements are erroneous, the proper way to reach a neutral POV would be to add the alternative POVs (if any). For instance, if the PRC made any statement regarding this issue, we could add it to the section. Laurent (talk) 16:18, 19 February 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: I agree that if the views being expressed are disputed (by other reliable sources), then it may help to use some other kind of language to buttress the statements, like making clear who said them, and so forth. But if the information comes from highly reliable sources, and there are no reliable sources offering different opinions, then it's as good as factual, and I don't see the need for attributing the information in the text itself (it should still be cited). In many other cases, I think it makes sense to do so--and in this article, if individuals were offering value judgements on the subject, then they should be attributed, but if someone is describing aspects of the CCP propaganda apparatus, I don't see the need to constantly say who is saying it (as long as that information is not controversial or disputed by other RS). I'm not sure I'm right in that assertion, though. If someone could point me to a relevant policy item, or to a public forum where the question could be cleared up, that would be good too. --Asdfg12345 14:54, 20 February 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: Also, I scanned some of the remarks above. I agree with the sentiments that seek to situate the CCP's widespread use of ideological remoulding with a bygone era. At the least, the connection of these techniques with the present does not seem to have been communicated clearly in the article. These techniques are now applied to a much smaller portion of the populace (imprisoned dissidents, the Falun Gong, etc.). I agree that it is important to highlight the relationship of this with the present article, but I would have thought it would be most appropriately framed historically rather than contemporaneously. Of course, if there is a continuity, it should be noted. But nowadays a key point in any discussion of the CCP and its propaganda is how it has evolved and changed, adapting to a modern world. Anne-Marie Brady does an excellent, even tedious, job of depicting this. The historical place of Maoist propaganda techniques, and the adoption of more cut-and-polished Western-derived techniques that we see today do not seem to be explicit in the current article format. I think the lead of the article should introduce these concepts.--TheSoundAndTheFury (talk) 15:41, 25 February 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  [[WP:CLAIM]] 

message: This article has a large amount of unreviewed POV material inserted by Asdfg12345 and Dilip rajeev, two single purpose accounts and Falun Gong practitioners that were used to push anti-PRC, pro-FLG material in accordance with their ideological leanings. Their edits consists large amounts of material from singles sources - 38 from Kurlantzick of Freedom House, 5 from Brady, and 14 from Shambaugh. The editing patterns follows the same ideals from the Falun Gong editings, which is using large amounts of POV material from single sources, and present them in the lede and throughout the bodies as such that they appear to be commonly accepted facts while overwhelming their critics.--PCPP (talk) 11:58, 1 March 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: I have removed the material from  which a) is not a suitable academic source as most of its material relies on original research b) is from an organization funded by the US government, and the countries reported happened to be political opponents of the US c) used as such that claims made by the report is presented as factual evidence in disproportionate amounts.--PCPP (talk) 12:30, 1 March 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: Regarding the source, I will make a post on the RS noticeboard. We'll let people who don't have an axe to grind assess whether it's reliable or not. I've reverted all your edits to all these pages, and left a warning on your talk page. I also intend to start a RfC on your conduct over the last several years. --Asdfg12345 22:30, 1 March 2010 (UTC)

text: Okay, there are two issues. One is about reliability of the source, the other is about how it's used. See here for the RS noticeboard post. As for possible misuse of the source, are you able to point out which parts are over the top or need reduction? Or just go ahead and reduce those as you consider appropriate. But I object in the strongest terms to simply blanking out content that doesn't fit a POV. We'll see whether the wiki community thinks it's RS or not. The other things can just be dealt with through discussion (if you stick around for that). An editor above notes possible coatracking in how the source has been used; that may be worth dealing with in more detail. --Asdfg12345 00:09, 2 March 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  POV pushing by Asdfg and dilip_rajeev 

message: ...[Mao]] a “master propagandist” in his own right. His regime employed a variety of “thought control” techniques, including incarceration for "brainwashing," construction of models to be emulated, mass mobilization campaigns, the creation of study groups and ideological monitors throughout society, promulgation of articles to be memorized, control of the educational system, a nationwide system of loudspeakers that reached into every village, control of and propaganda through media, and creation of propaganda teams to indoctrinate segments of the population, among other methods.  
Editors and reporters in China have long risked demotion, dismissal, or more serious punishment by the state when they push the limits of permissible coverage.
Kurlantzick and Link state that the CCP has historically relied more on fear induced self-censorship than administrative censorship. In the Mao-era and the years following, broad and vague directives such as “Criticize Confucius” or “Annihilate Bourgeois Liberalism” would be issued; violations would carry a hefty price and citizens had to monitor themselves and others, guessing at what the government might not like. A “safety in numbers” mentality kept people from asserting themselves, and anyone who dared venture outside the safe area was said to be “break[ing] into forbidden zones.” The same fear-induced self-censorship continues today, with exploration into topics such as the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident, Tibet, Falun Gong, the China Democratic Party, Taiwan Independence, Uyghur autonomy, the Great Leap famine, and corruption among top leaders being forbidden.
The public remains aware that violation of the "forbidden zones," or actions that infringe on the interests of the ruling Party-state, is extremely dangerous. The forbidden areas are smaller in comparison with the Maoist era, the surface of society seems less affected, fear is less constant, and most people sidestep the constraints easily. Behind a surface appearance of ordinariness, however, remains a "ubiquitous police state" in which the central authorities announce policy goals and leave Party officials and hired thugs to accomplish them as seen fit. This results in considerable differences from place to place in the degree of coercion and the techniques employed. Individuals who "step" into a forbidden zone may initially receive a verbal correction. Escalating measures for repeat offenders include being surveilled and followed by plainclothes police, telephone and e-mail surveillance, then job-loss and blacklisting, and, if necessary, labor camp, prison, torture, and execution. Citizens' awareness of these consequences explain why the system of self-censorship works and the existence of a civil society under CCP rule is impossible. NGOs are almost without exception subject to CCP control, and any group whose membership grows to 10 or 20 people may be repressed.
A major tool of the CCP for inducing and ensuring public obedience to the Party is "thought work" (sixiang gongzuo). Propaganda and thought work were pursued "openly, explicitly, and without apology" in the Maoist era. Characteristic of it were practices of "ideological remolding" (sixiang gaizao), ideological purges, ritual humiliation of perceived enemies, political study to ensure allegiance to the Party line, and the targeting of high-profile individuals as symbols of negative tendencies to be eradicated.
Biderman and Meyers wrote in 1968 that while some kind of thought reform is characteristic of all totalitarian regimes, the CCP "set about it more purposefully, more massively, and more intensively than have other ruling groups," including through employing known techniques in new ways. They note, as an example, the presence of daily meetings for criticism and self-criticism during the 1960s; surveillance and sanctions were connected with education to "expose, censure, and correct shortcomings of attitude and conduct." Communist leaders attacked all personal connections between soldiers that were not based on political convictions. "By these and other techniques they exploit[ed] social pressures and personal anxieties brilliantly to ensure conformity."Meyers, Samuel M. and Albert D Biderman. Mass behaviour in battle and captivity: The communist soldier in the Korean war. (1968), Chicago University Press. p.99 While carried out more subtly than in the Mao era, thought work remains crucial to the CCP's maintenance of power. Whereas Mao-era mass mobilization campaigns attempted to transform all of society, including human nature, thought work today focuses more on a narrower range of issues critical to CCP rule. 
The Communist Party's thought work includes both intervention to prevent the expression of proscribed views, and an active cultivation of views that favor the government. The latter aspect, which has been part of the system from the outset, has been given particular attention in recent years. This has included through textbooks, television documentaries, museums, and other media that spread "seriously distorted versions of Chinese history," according to Kurlantzick and Link. The functioning of the two components--the suppression of unfavorable views and promotion of favorable ones--has a powerful impact on public opinion.
Textbooks stress China’s history of humiliation (bainian guochi) at the hands of the West, while the news media simultaneously tells the public that the West wants to “keep China down” and that talk of human rights is only a tool for this purpose. The public is told that Japan refuses to acknowledge its war crimes in China, and that the "wolf-hearted" Dalai Lama wants to "split the motherland." What Kurlantzick and Link term this manipulation through education and media has been especially effective among young urban elites, a portion of whom are called "angry youth" (fenqing). History is selectively erased from textbooks and other media, and in contemporary China it remains difficult or impossible to discuss the Mao-era in any public context. The "true history" of Tibet, Taiwan, World War II, and the CCP itself, is routinely "airbrushed" from textbooks and media, often replaced by names, dates and manipulative slogans. Guidance of opinion through stimulating patriotism and identifying it with support for the CCP has gained footing. 
Thought work is also performed through the use of language. Link and Kurlantzick state that the language the CCP employs "would be recognizable to George Orwell." Putative examples include the political pressure put on an individual being called "help"; the violation of rights being described as the "protection of rights"; thought control of workers through what are labelled "labor unions"; suppressing the Uyghur population called "counterterrorism"; authoritarianism being dubbed democracy while real democracy movements are denounced as "counterrevolutionary rebellions"; and a system of servile courts hailed as the "rule of law." This language draws from the concept of the "Big Lie," according to Kurlantzick and Link: the repetition of a gross falsehood, without challenge, until is accepted as truth, or something that for political purposes is just as solid as truth.
Part of the CCP's modern propaganda apparatus is "market-based censorship," in which media outlets and companies are threatened with economic repercussions, in addition to the traditional political and legal penalties, if they stray from the Party line. While traditional tools of police action and prison sentences continue to be regularly used to silence internet activists, and the state’s technical capacity to censor and control online content remains unrivaled, CCP has been at the forefront of a growing trend toward “outsourcing” censorship and monitoring to private companies. Enterprises, including Internet portals and blog-hosting services, are required to employ in-house staff to handle censorship tasks and risk losing their business licences if they fail to comply with censorship directives.
The CCP has an established bureaucracy of internet police that has been estimated in size at 30,000 or more. Using sophisticated technology purchased from developed countries, filters have been set up to block commentary on sensitive topics and to expunge material with sensitive terms. Use of pseudonyms is banned in cyberspace and collective-responsibility mechanisms instituted allow for entire website to be shut-down, and its operators held responsible, if errant commentary appear on its pages. Techniques of control and monitoring include electronic mailboxes to which any citizen can secretly report violations,.and the use of agents-provocateurs, and hackers.
:Note I did not remove the following Brady source:
The experiences of propaganda and thought work in the Cultural Revolution provided the CCP with a "profound lesson," according to Brady. Virtually all post-Mao era Party leaders had been under attack during that time, and drew two seemingly contradictory lessons: the rejection of mass movements and thought reform as means of transforming China, and the recognition of the "vital role of propaganda and thought work in China's political control." The administration of propaganda and thought work was plagued by these issues through the 1980s, and up to the events of June 4, 1989.p. 39
The events of April and June 1989 were an indication to many elders in the CCP that liberaliation in the propaganda sector had gone too far, and that the Party must re-establish its control over ideology and the propaganda system.p. 44
:The 1969 source was updated with a more recent source by Shaw
:The rest of the material cannot conform to NPOV as it is, they are poorly attributed rhetorics from a partisan organization, described in a way as they're factual evidence, contains several factual errors, and worst of all adds nothing to the article which is not already covered by Brady and other sources. The previous version reads like a blalant attack piece on the Chinese government.--PCPP (talk) 08:31, 8 March 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: Yes I was aware. There was no majority concensus, only one editor responded, and even he asked for the sources to be properly attributed. You've yet to address how these additions confirm to NPOV or add anything to the article not already covered by the countless sources we have.--PCPP (talk) 09:22, 8 March 2010 (UTC)
thread_title: Parts deleted

message: Too many things in this article border on speculation and some are outright falsehoods. Of course, I wouldn't expect anything less, now that this article is beginning to get owned by the Falun Gong cabal of editors. For example, why is it that Wikipedia must report what Anne-Marie Brady thinks about the propaganda system and that it is the "life blood of the party-state". Is this really neutral? WP:UNDUE should teach us some lessons. 
Now let's look at this passage, containing numerous factual errors:
#How is this for 'indirectly represented'
#A bunch of websites of Propaganda departments
#Structure of the CPC's departments
#That the "Information Office of the State Council" is the "Office of Foreign Propaganda" is just someone's opinion, but the article presents this as fact.
#CPD is not part of the Chinese Bureaucratic System. Whoever is the genius that is cited for that sentence might want to learn about the Chinese political system before criticizing it. The CPD is part of the internal Party system. And it is listed on every municipal and provincial website you can find online. 
#The CPD and other PDs are not transparent, much like the Politburo and other functioning organs of the party. But it's no real secret to anyone on how the CPD functions. It's quasi-"10-commandments" list of media faux pas is known to almost every news journalist in China. There is no secrecy on what you can and can't do. It's actually quite black and white how the organ functions - you can report on economic progress and the premier's speeches, but do not report about Tibet or Falun Gong. 
#There is no address or public phone line to any of the Communist party's central internal organs, i.e. United Front, Organization, Propaganda etc. But just in case you were wondering - this is the address and phone number for the Nanjing municipal propaganda department, should you wish to ever make a phone call to them to verify these wildly hyperbolic statements - 江苏省南京市玄武区北京东路41号‎ - 025-83606702‎.
Another problem I have with this article is that it does not talk about how Chinese people react to the propaganda. The Chinese people are not under the control of some propaganda overmind. They take official press releases with a grain of salt. The government controls news agencies such as Xinhua, yes, but in practice this resembles biased reporting (a la Fox News) rather than propaganda (i.e. posters with Mao shining as a bright sun). There is a big, big difference. 
All of these sections aim to paint an utterly misleading picture of propaganda in China. I would try to fix it, but given that the Falun Gong cabal has not yet been banned, I think it will be a waste of my precious time. Colipon+(Talk) 23:41, 13 March 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: There's some good questions there, and Colipon I hope you can contribute further. I've removed the first sentence about its address and contact details as it contain errors of fact.--PCPP (talk) 05:19, 16 March 2010 (UTC)

text: i think this entire article is written with the wrong state of mind. the article talks about all the bad things with Chinese propaganda. but in China propaganda is just advertisement. if you ever been to China, the most common "propaganda" you see on the street is like "Please do not litter", "Obey traffic signals" and "Be polite and respectful to others". These are the "propaganda" that Chinese ppl see everyday. Not that Mao manifesto crap. In fact, when I was in China in July 2011, the ONLY time I saw Mao was at the Beijing Airport souvenir shop!! This article needs to reflect some reality. 216.165.193.118 (talk) 14:31, 6 August 2011 (UTC)
thread_title:  Terrible article with false information 

message: Confucius Institute as a Chinese propaganda tools? Arilang   talk 14:23, 16 March 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: There are some sources questioning its relations with the PRC government, but that doesn't make it a full blown propaganda source.--PCPP (talk) 15:15, 16 March 2010 (UTC)
thread_title: Confucius Institute

message: Well we shouldn't miss out CCTV. Over the years, CCTV produced:
#large numbers of pro-Manchu TV dramas, also kind of propaganda.
#Faked moonwalk?
#Famous and much hated Xinwen  Lianbo 新闻联播?
#Heavily bias news reporting favoring Saddam Huissan during the second Gulf War?
#Massive overseas expansion aiming to create a CNN clone?
#Endless attacks towards NEW western imperilists Arilang   talk 14:40, 16 March 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: You probably need reliable sources for your claims. There's already a mention of CCTV in the external propaganda section, although propaganda is not the sole function of the station.--PCPP (talk) 15:20, 16 March 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: Not related to this, but I removed the section that attempted to 'define' propaganda for the purpose of the article. It was linked to a Sina blog and read a bit like a high-school essay. Homunculus (strange tales) 15:31, 16 March 2010 (UTC)

text: The author  is actually a Chinese language professor and journalist.--PCPP (talk) 15:37, 16 March 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: That's good to know. I still don't think it's appropriate to start an article like this off in that manner. This should be an intellectual resource drawing on the best research on the subject. By making the 'definition' of one Chinese journalist right near the start the article, it seems to give a lot of importance to that view. The linguistic issue, I agree, is important, but it's not that important. And a source better than a blog would be good. For now I will just summarise it and move it down. Homunculus (strange tales) 15:40, 16 March 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: Done. Two other points I would make are that I agree with Colipon's complaints above. The article is rather one sided. Secondly, I actually have a copy of the book TheSoundAndTheFury refers to, which explains how the CCP lost control of the 'propaganda state' for various reasons. I think more explanation along these lines is needed to add perspective. Finally on the terminology issue, there is more at stake than merely the definition. A section discussing the word 'propaganda' and other terms associated with it would certainly be appropriate. One book I have called "Linguistic Engineering" is useful in this connection. Homunculus (strange tales) 15:48, 16 March 2010 (UTC)

text: Homunculus, what do you mean it's one sided? The page draws from the best scholarly sources. If it's "one sided" that's because that's how the best sources look at the issue, not that it's biased. By all means go ahead with adding the source you referred to. Brady's is the most recent scholarship on Chinese propaganda, however. Maybe familiarise yourself again with WP:NPOV, which makes it clear that neutrality is drawn from the correct use of secondary sources, not the viewpoints of editors. We are just collecting the good sources and assembling them. Asdfg12345 04:25, 17 March 2010 (UTC)
thread_title: CCTV

message: My advice to user PCPP, it is OK to work for the Communist Party, and  it is OK to wipe clean your boss's bottom, but please do it in a more discreet, more subtle way. You are yet to learn the art of "channeling public opinion". You fail.
http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2008-04-24-voa21-66815582.htm
 Arilang   talk 13:00, 17 March 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: This is off-topic. Anti-Carrefour protests are reflection of overly dogmatic nationalism, not PRC propaganda. There were many prominent Chinese socialites that openly opposed the Carrefour boycott, and indeed the government never encouraged it. To include this in the article is seems quite far fetched. Colipon+(Talk) 14:14, 17 March 2010 (UTC)

text: Arilang, please assume good faith and no need for personal attacks, especially considering that I expanded your additions on Red Crag and the Rent sculpture. We should discuss and define what constitutes propanganda first--PCPP (talk) 14:18, 17 March 2010 (UTC)

text: PCPP, my comment was not meant to be in any form of "personal attack", it was just a friendly suggestion for you to improve your work skill. That said, we now have users Colipon and PCPP trying to tell us that the multi-billions-dollars extravaganza Beijing Olympic, and the world wide pro-sacred flame students demo had nothing to do with "Propaganda". May be we should open a debate by inviting other editors to join in? If we look at this statement, 
When Newsweek's Melinda Liu said:"state control of Chinese media", "a legacy of  government censorship, Internet policing, selective reporting", PCPP and Colipon, if these kind of Chinese government actions are not called "Propaganda", then what is your definition of propaganda? Arilang   talk 20:45, 17 March 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: Sure, nothing like a fresh set of eyes on the matter. Like I said above, propaganda is different from public relations. I have no doubts that Olympics-obsessed China saw its share of subtle ideological drift which can be construed as propaganda, but I am reluctant to label it as such because it is so far removed from the Maoist shining-leader style propaganda that the word is often associated with. I would argue that the internal blockade of information of the negative international reaction to the torch relay can be seen as a form of propaganda, but the Carrefour protests cannot. We can write about the Olympics in this article, but it should be written with a clear distinction with Maoist-style propaganda. Colipon+(Talk) 20:52, 17 March 2010 (UTC)

text: It is still just a blog. I'm done here. No admins seem to care that this article will be trashed so I am not going to devote any more of my time here to suffer through all of this drama. Best of luck. Colipon+(Talk) 02:10, 18 March 2010 (UTC)

text: Hypocrisy cuts both ways. Colipon is right. There must be better sources for this than a blog. The Sound and the Fury (talk) 03:52, 23 March 2010 (UTC)
thread_title: What about this?

message: http://cmp.hku.hk/~/david-bandurski/
*David Bandurski is writing blogs, if PCPP and Colipon are correct, then Banurski cannot be quoted, is that right?
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/03/new-approach-to-china-update.html
*OK, does it mean we cannot quote "The Official Google Blog" too?
 Arilang   talk 04:57, 23 March 2010 (UTC)
thread_title: What is wrong with "Blog"?

message: I recently added some of the information that had previously been deleted for no good reason. A brief note: Perry Link and Joshua Kurlantzick are serious researchers. You can look them up. The report is published by Freedom House, and contrary to what PCPP says, the site on which it is hosted is not focused on China, but many authoritarian regimes. There's no sense rejecting the report as reactionary or whatever, it certainly passes RS. That said, some of the information was extraneous, so I did not re-include it. But I reiterate my request to PCPP that he discuss things like removing well-sourced, pertinent material. I will take a closer look at the other edits, to see what else was removed. I would much prefer it if the focus was on adding to the article rather than pulling it down. --Asdfg12345 23:37, 17 March 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: Irrelevant. It's a political website, not an academic source. It has not been cited and reviewed by other scholars, and assume it as factual evidence is providing undue weight--PCPP (talk) 03:52, 18 March 2010 (UTC)

text: Bull. WP:RS state that sources with little to no citations and no peer review should be used with caution.--PCPP (talk) 06:35, 18 March 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Recent additions 

message: A Chongqing newspaper decided to publish an 'obituary' for Google despite directives from the propaganda department. Every day there are many of these 'leaks' that appear in Chinese media. Colipon+(Talk) 18:51, 28 March 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: Indeed, the loss of the CCP's ideological control in China is not properly dealt with in this article, which puts the issue in too simplistic terms. Those that built the article to what it is should feel responsible for presenting all these discourses - though I suppose it would not be technically wrong if they did not. Homunculus, you said you had that Lynch study about precisely this topic. Would you consider parsing the important parts and including them as appropriate? The Sound and the Fury (talk) 02:44, 29 March 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Chinese newspaper defies propaganda 'instructions' 

message: PRC moved to China,so should this.--王小朋友 (talk) 05:12, 4 February 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: This is not a simple proposal, as it would change the scope of this and dozens (hundreds?) of other articles.  Currently the page focuses on propaganda in the PRC,  as in after 1949.  If the name were changed to China, it would need to encompass a great deal more.  Propaganda in the PRC is qualitatively distinct enough to merit its own page.Homunculus (duihua) 05:29, 4 February 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: I think when PRC moved to China, people would consider it would change the scope of this and dozens (hundreds?) of other articles. And I think the reason why PRC moved to China can explain why this page should move. --王小朋友 (talk) 07:56, 6 February 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: That was not my observation of the page move discussion.  The page PRC is redirected to 'China' for two reasons, as far as I can tell:  1) it was a rejection of the notion that both the PRC and ROC should be referred to as China, in keeping with the policy on common names, and 2)As is the style with most articles about modern states, it was concluded that the history of the civilization be included in that article.  I never saw any consideration given to the idea that this would change the scope of all articles with PRC in the title.  Again,  propaganda in the modern communist state is qualitatively distinct from propaganda in imperial or republican China, and deserves its own article.Homunculus (duihua) 02:35, 7 February 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: My English is too poor to debate, so I give up.--王小朋友 (talk) 06:07, 7 February 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: I agree with Homunculus. This page is about PRC propaganda and the current title seems apt. Keahapana (talk) 00:20, 13 February 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: Yes, this is not about Propaganda in either Taiwan or Pre-PRC China. No need to move.·ʍaunus·snunɐw· 02:29, 13 February 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: Taiwan would not be referred to as "China" except for people who consider Taiwan as a part of PRC. "Republic of China", maybe, but never "China" alone, because "China" alone always refers to the PRC in the modern context. There's no controversy about it anymore on Wikipedia, and if we wanted to document propaganda in earlier periods, we could have separate marked articles such as Propaganda in the Tang Dynasty or something. But that's unlikely, since there is no such content about "propaganda" in earlier periods now, so the title is fine at "Propaganda in China". Shrigley (talk) 01:50, 27 February 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: Marcus, the objection I raised previously was that this is not a simple matter of naming conventions. Changing the title to China would necessitate a significant change the scope and content of the article as well.  I argued that propaganda of the PRC is a distinct topic that merits a separate article, as propaganda in this era is qualitatively distinct from previous time periods. I can't imagine you would favor changing/merging History of the People's Republic of China to History of China, because these are very different topics. The same principle applies here, in my opinion. If you would like to create an article called 'propaganda in China', you are welcome to, and that page would hopefully include a historical perspective that is not present in the current article. If have you a counterargument, I would like to hear it, and will do my best to treat it with an open mind. "Consensus isn't necessary" is not really a satisfactory rebuttal when a legitimate objection has been presented. Thanks. Homunculus (duihua) 06:31, 27 February 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: There isn't a change in scope. China is PRC (and vice versa). The reason History of the People's Republic of China is the way it is simply because no one has updated it. Marcus Qwertyus  15:18, 27 February 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: I have a suspicion that the force of your logic will not be enough to sway consensus in your favor. The term China is interchangeable with PRC to only in a very narrow context of discussions on contemporary affairs (and even then, there's always the ROC minefield). China has been governed as the PRC for little over 60 years. For the several millennia that preceded 1949, China was not the PRC. Look at articles like Art of China, Religion of China, or History of China, and you will find that the scope of those pages rightly extends back far beyond PRC China. This article deals only with propaganda in PRC China, and should be named accordingly. As to your suggestion that History of China and History of the People's Republic of China should be the same thing...well, what can I say. If you read those articles, you would likely realized how untenable your position is.Homunculus (duihua) 15:55, 27 February 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: If it was untenable we wouldn't have succeeded in moving PRC to China. Marcus Qwertyus  23:13, 28 February 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: Look this isn't an argument, just contradiction. The article about PRC had the country of China including its entire history as its scope, not only the part of China that is now the PRC. This article only has the part of China's history that is PRC as its scope.  Since you are clearly in a minority here, what you need to do is get more input and start a discussion of whether this article falls under the PRC>China move or not.Yu could for example start an RfC, that would be the best way to get a wider consensus.·ʍaunus·snunɐw· 23:29, 28 February 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: The article in the United States has Native American material in it. It's just background material. Marcus Qwertyus  23:39, 28 February 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: That is not an agument for moving the article, but for extending its scope in order to justify a move. The argument that actually applies is that the article on Soviet art does not include material from either the pre or post soviet periods and therefore should not be moved to Russian art.·ʍaunus·snunɐw· 23:46, 28 February 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: We don't have information on propaganda in pre-PRC China on this or a similarly-named page, so the argument that this is a sort of content fork is spurious. "China" first and foremost refers to the PRC, and not some vague transtemporal entity; this much was determined in the China move. We can use "People's Republic" when the meaning of China in the context of a title is ambiguous, such as if we had an article dedicated to propaganda in premodern Chinese regimes. But since we don't have that ambiguity here, we should defer to the common, concise, and consensus title for the state. Shrigley (talk) 23:53, 28 February 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: Ah, now that's a reasonable argue. I still disagree, however. Propaganda in pre-PRC era is a notable topic, and one can readily find scholarship on the subject. In other words, it would be worth having a page called Propaganda in China that traces the use of official propaganda from, I don't know, at least the warring states period onward. I would suggest someone just create the page and start building it out with a chronological and thematic account of the use of political propaganda throughout Chinese history. The PRC would be only one more component of that. I would not advise that someone do that to this page to legitimize a move, because propaganda in the PRC is a distinct topic, and is should have its own page.Homunculus (duihua) 00:19, 29 February 2012 (UTC)

text: In most traditions of logics repeating a statement does not adduce argumentative power or truth value.·ʍaunus·snunɐw· 00:13, 29 February 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: So I'm lying? Marcus Qwertyus  00:17, 29 February 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: The word "lie" implies intent to deceive, you are just wrong.·ʍaunus·snunɐw· 00:21, 29 February 2012 (UTC)

text: I don't think you intend to deceive, but you are actually wrong. When PRC became China, the scope of the article did change significantly.Homunculus (duihua) 00:19, 29 February 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: Diffs please. Marcus Qwertyus  00:23, 29 February 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: Sure. Here's an example of what the page People's Republic of China looked like last year: (note that the title at the time was not actually "china," but it displays as such now because it was renamed). You will see that it did not include any of the pre-1949 history that is currently present on the page titled China.Homunculus (duihua) 00:51, 29 February 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: Speaking of ancient history..., why did you dig back to June 6 when the article was moved Sept. 20? The diff you want is Sept. 18 which talks about pre-PRC rule at length. Marcus Qwertyus  01:02, 29 February 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: If you so like, go make  articles called Propaganda in Imperial China and Propaganda in Republican China. This is a distinct topic. Nuff said. The Sound and the Fury (talk) 02:57, 29 February 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: Please read the bold text. Marcus Qwertyus  03:48, 29 February 2012 (UTC)
thread_title: Move to [[Propaganda in China]]

message: While doing research on Peng Dehuai recently, I came across an academic discussion of the public evaluation of historical and contemporary figures as a form of propaganda in the PRC. I think this is the right article to add this information, but I'm not sure exactly where to put it, so I'm just going to add it into the "domestic propaganda" section. Please move it to a more appropriate section after I'm done adding it; or, if there is a better article for this information, please let me know, and I will move it there.Ferox Seneca (talk) 22:15, 11 February 2012 (UTC)
replies: text: You might have a sub-section called "The use of historical figures" or some such. The Sound and the Fury (talk) 03:40, 27 February 2012 (UTC)
thread_title: Public evaluation of historical figures as propaganda

message: I tagged the lead sentence about xuanchuan with , but since it was reverted, I'll explain some of the obvious problems.
Lead: 
*The term in general use in China, xuānchuán (宣傳), itself originally translated from "propaganda" in western languages, has retained the original neutrality of the word and could be seen as synonymous with the word 'publicity' today.
Terminology section:
*"Propaganda" as defined today is a "form of communication that is aimed at influencing the attitude of a community toward some cause or position so as to benefit oneself." Moreover, the term frequently carries the pejorative connotations of promulgating bias or misinformation. In China, however, the term is used more broadly to refer to the organized dissemination of information, including more mundane messages intended to promote the public good. The Chinese term for propaganda, xuānchuán (宣傳) first appeared in the historical text Records of the Three Kingdoms, written in the 3rd century, but was reclaimed later to be used as a translation of the western term in both Japanese (宣伝) and later Chinese (宣传). The term translates literally as "to proclaim something so that it may be disseminated" and may be translated as "to propagate (information)." Chinese and Japanese[23 Jisho.org definition of Japanese senden] retain the original neutrality of "propaganda," and the term does not imply negative connotations per se.[24 Chinese-language book 新闻学十讲-宣传] Xuanchuan also means to advertise and is a common term used by commercial businesses with no relationship to the government or politics.
Problems:
*Was the term "originally translated" from some western language or used in the Records of the Three Kingdoms? What are the sources?
*What "original neutrality of the word"?
*Xuanchuan is sometimes translated as—not "synonymous" with—publicity. 
*What is the source for this "form of communication that is aimed ..." definition?
*Same question for literal definition "to proclaim something so that it may be disseminated".
*If xuanchuan has "no relationship to the government or politics", why does the zh interwiki  政治宣传 "Political propaganda" link to en Propaganda?
*Neither of these references seem to meet WP:PR. The [23] Denshi Jisho ref translates Japanese senden as "publicity; advertisement; advertising; propaganda", with no mention of xuanchuan. The [24] Chinese-language book was apparently copied from the only ref [1] in the zh interwiki 宣传.
The current articles cites dozens of reliable English-language articles and books referring to xuanchuan, and there are many published Chinese-English dictionaries giving reliable definitions. We could do better this propagandistic folderol. Keahapana (talk) 02:42, 8 October 2014 (UTC)
thread_title:  Verification still needed 

message: There is a move discussion in progress on Talk:Propaganda in the Republic of China which affects this page. Please participate on that page and not in this talk page section. Thank you.  —RMCD bot 15:30, 30 June 2018 (UTC)
thread_title:  Move discussion in progress