Talk:Robert Vansittart, 1st Baron Vansittart

message: Shouldn’t the title be Robert Vansittart, Baron Vansittart given that he had no son and that the title became extinct at his death? Or is it customary to mention "1st" anyway? 83.199.82.153 (talk) 17:09, 20 July 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: First is kept anyway. Also bear in mind that Her Majesty can recreate the peerage whenever she pleases. I have redirected the page you mentioned to this one. = ) --Cameron* 17:16, 20 July 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: Yes but if she recreates it the new one will also be 1st  Baron Vansittart, as the number start again with a new creation… 83.199.82.153 (talk) 17:47, 20 July 2008 (UTC)

text: This also avoids confusion with courtesy titles. For instance, Henry Hyde, Viscount Cornbury is not the first and last Viscount Cornbury, but the heir apparent to the Earldoms of Clarendon and Rochester who died vita patris. Choess (talk) 21:30, 21 July 2008 (UTC)
replies: text: "Vita patris" means dying before the father had done so. A lot of Wikipedia articles on the peerage use far more Latin and obscure language than is necessary. I'm aware, for example, that "issue" can't always simply be replaced by "children", but even so. 81.159.58.45 (talk) 05:04, 9 November 2008 (UTC)

text: And, of course, in the case of Barons, with life peers (who are themselves distinguishable from courtesy Barons by the use of "Baron" rather than "Lord"). Proteus (Talk) 14:34, 14 August 2008 (UTC)
thread_title:  Baron Vansittart 

message: This statement that Vansittart saying that Germany could take Czechoslovakia is sourced to a reliable source, namely Igor Lukes 's book, but sometimes even reputable historians are wrong. Lukes is giving one a serious misunderstanding of a British policy at the time towards Czechoslovakia, which was the so-called "Canadian solution". For those unfamiliar with the subject, the two men most responsible for founding the Republic of Czechoslovakia, namely Tomáš Masaryk and Edvard Beneš, both happened to be great Francophiles and modelled many of the institutions of the new state after those of France. Just like France is an unitary state (there are only levels of government, the national and the municipal), so too was Czechoslovakia was an unitary state. The problem with this is that what worked for France did not work for Czechoslovakia. The vast majority of the French are French in terms of language and culture, and even those groups that are not such as the Alsatians, the Corsicans, and the Bretons generally see themselves as French. Czechoslovakia had a mixture of Czechs, Slovaks, Sudeten Germans, Magyars, Poles, and Ukrainians. The Czechs along with a number of Slovaks saw themselves as Czechoslovaks, but that was the limit of Czechoslovakiaism. If the Sudeten Germans were more like the Alsatians and less like themselves, that Czechoslovakia as an unitary state might had worked. But as it was, the vast majority of the Sudeten Germans did not see themselves as Czechoslovaks, and regarded themselves as living under a sort of Czech occupation. The stories about Czech mistreatment of the Sudeten Germans were vastly exaggerated, but that does not mean the grievances in the Sudetenland were widely and sincerely felt. To be fair, it was really unwise on the part of Sudeten Germans to be disloyal to Czechoslovakia in the way that they were. Under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, Czechoslovakia had to sign the Minorities Treaty which made it mandatory for German-language education in districts where 50% or more of the people spoke German. By and large, Czechoslovakia abided by the Minorities Treaty and provided the German-language schools in the 50%+ districts where it was required. In 1945, all of the Sudeten Germans went "home to the Reich" in a way that none wanted to, namely all 3 million of them were expelled into Germany, which is why the people in the Sudetenland today speak Czech rather than German. From even the narrow self-interest viewpoint of the Sudeten Germans, being loyal to Germany and disloyal to Czechoslovakia was not a smart thing to do because it got them all expelled. Leaving all that aside, it was quite clear in the interwar period that the overwhelming majority of Sudeten Germans were deeply unhappy with Czechoslovakia and that something needed to change. And the same was also true with the majority of the Slovaks, the Poles, the Ukrainians, and the Magyars who all demanded that Czechoslovakia become a federation. It was the opinion of British decision-makers, amongst them Vanisittart, was that Czechoslovakia could not last as an unitary state and needed to be transformed into a federation with powers devolved down from Prague.  The British model for Czechoslovakia was Canada, which is a multi-ethnic federation where English-Canadians, French-Canadians and other groups more or less get along, hence the term "Canadian solution" to the problems of Czechoslovakia. 
This might seem like an odd thing for decision-makers to worry about in London, but one has to remember that Czechoslovakia was allied to France. So if the internal problems of Czechoslovakia caused a conflict between the Sudeten Germans and Prague, it was likely that Germany would get involved, which was Vansittart's main fear. And if the Reich invaded Czechoslovakia, then that would activate the Franco-Czechoslovak alliance. British decision-makers took it for granted that France could not defeat Germany, and a German victory over France would alter the balance of power too much in Europe for the comfort of British decision-makers. There are only two ways to exit the North Sea into the Atlantic, namely the gap between Scotland and Norway and the Straits of Dover. From the British perspective, as long as the German Navy's main bases were at Kiel and Wilhelmshaven, it was easy to bottle it up in the North Sea. By contrast, if the German Navy had the use of the French Atlantic ports, it would be very difficult from the British viewpoint to bottle up the German Navy (which is precisely what happened after June 1940). Likewise, having the use of the French Atlantic ports would give the Germany Navy access to the Western Approaches, which are the main shipping lane into and out of the United Kingdom. Finally, if the Luftwaffe had to fly from Germany, it would take hours to reach British airspace, but if the Luftwaffe were flying from France, it would take only minutes to reach British airspace (which gave the RAF a lot of problems during the Battle of Britain). From the viewpoint of London, they would have no choice, but to intervene if France became involved in a war with Germany. For this reason, for people like Vansittart the problems of Czechoslovakia were a major concern.     
I know that everybody hates Neville Chamberlain, but just because Chamberlain was for something does not automatically make it wrong in the way that some people seem to think that it does. It was a bit arrogant on the part of the British to tell President Beneš that he needed to turn his country into a federation, but essentially they were correct. All of the experts at the time believed that Czechoslovakia could not last as an unitary state, and the only hope of saving Czechoslovakia was turning the country into a federation, advice that Beneš resisted. To be fair towards Beneš, he always stated correctly that it was a waste of time to negotiate with Konrad Henlein because every time he made a concession Henlein just upped the ante by making a new demand. Henlein had orders from Berlin to ensure that there was no solution to the problems of Czechoslovakia. Gerhard Weinberg in his seminal study The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany Starting World War Two 1937-1939 makes the point that British Foreign Office from February 1937 onward were pressuring President Beneš to turn his country into a Canadian-style federation and were clearly frustrated that Beneš kept saying that there is no point in talking to Henlein about federalism or anything else. Weinberg argues that Beneš should had just tried because it would had shown that Henlein was the obstinate one who negotiated in bad faith. Hence, this idea held by British decisionmakers-which seems utterly absurd today-that Beneš was the "pig-headed" one causing all of the problems largely came from his unwillingness to talk to Henlein about transforming Czechoslovakia into a federation. Lukes is writing like Hitler was claiming the Sudetenland in 1937, which is not true at all. Hitler only claimed the Sudetenland in his speech on the 12th of September 1938 at the annual Nazi party rally at Nuremberg. Up until then, the stated demands of Hitler and Henlein were only for autonomy for the Sudetenland. This apparent moderation held a sinister purpose. Just like in the Danzig crisis a year later, Hitler made only reasonable-sounding demands that he expected to be rejected in order to make it seem like he was driven into war. Not to the same extent in the Danzig crisis, but in the Sudetenland crisis, British decisionmakers tended to take Hitler's claims at face value.  Vanisttart's remarks to Henlein in November 1937 about Britain being unwilling to defend Czechoslovakia really should be put into context, namely as part of the effort to pressure Beneš into the "Canadian solution". --A.S. Brown (talk) 01:17, 26 February 2023 (UTC)
replies: text: User:A.S. Brown It would be great if you could improve the article to reflect some of the nuance that is currently missing.  All the best: Rich Farmbrough 13:40, 8 May 2024 (UTC)
thread_title: The "Canadian solution"