Talk:Munich Agreement

message: The Wikipedia article on the Munich Agreement is sadly unbalanced. It is slanderous to politicians who sincerely and for honorable, if debatable, reasons tried to save the peace. It is written with the Guilty Men hypothesis in mind. The suggestion that a good alternative  title would have been "The Munich Betrayal" is evidence of a lack of objectivity. Titles should be neutral and not prejudicial. The Munich Settlement is a good alternative name. 
It is not widely understood that the Agreement cannot be considered a betrayal, for several reasons. In the first place the Czechoslovak Government accepted the Agreement and President Benesh declared, even after the war, to be proud to have made the sacrifices of his country at Munich to save the peace. He understood that Czechoslovakia could have defended itself not for long and that French assistance would not be helpful in this short period. So to avoid the destruction of their country the government agreed with the settlement. 
In the second place, if there was a betrayal at all, it did not happen at Munich, but a year before, or even much longer. In November 1937 France and Great Britain were already determined that everything should be done to prevent the outbreak of a military conflict between Czechoslovakia and Germany over Sudetenland - Czechoslovakia should give in to German demands. If a military conflict could be prevented, the obligation of France to go to war on the side of Czechoslovakia would not be activated. And a treaty is never breached by efforts to restrain an ally. Winston Churchill, while highly critical of the Agreement, acknowledged this, denying that there was any betrayal.  What happened at Munich was that Czechoslovakia as a strategic asset, in the interest of France pointed at Germany, was given up. Its position in the hart of Europe outside the reach of France and the Soviet Union, but allied to them, and therefore potentially threatening Germany, was deemed dangerous for Europe, and in the end untenable. Surely, this position was no longer profitable for France, and highly risky for Czechoslovakia herself. Czechoslovakia had become even a nuisance for the western democracies while it tried to influence them in more antagonistic policies against Germany, while there were still possibilities for peaceful solutions for which Czechoslovakia itself hold the key. 
In the third place, while in Thirties the Left was highly averse to Hitler, this was only very late translated in approval of firm policies that could have restrained Hitler. Rearmament in France started only in 1936, and not yet full scale. The politicians in a position of responsibility during the Munich Crisis were faced with the consequences of decisions and omissions of a long period before. France and great Britain were not ready for war, and deemed the risk of war much too high. Being aware of their weakness they refused to bluff. That Hitler was bluffing about German strength was uncertain, but more important, it is not the same as bluffing about his willingness of fighting a war.
The policies of appeasement resulting in the Munich Agreement may have been ineffectual, and overall and after all, mistaken. But this a judgment over a generation of politicians from the period 1918-1938. The repugnance to war brought about appeasement - efforts to redress grievances of Germany and win her over to international cooperation. Only in March 1939 when the cup of conciliation was at last emptied, was it possible in France and Great Britain to accept fully the risk of war, now that the price of peace had become unbearable.
2A02:A211:A3A0:600:A079:89C9:67D6:DF67 (talk) 04:37, 12 September 2020 (UTC)
replies: text: You really think these politicians tried to save Europe? Save it from what? They are the ones who created this nonsense state with its too-large-for-a-majority-minority balance size, in an era of pride and bullying, where Germans unlearned their language, were banned from certain positions and in such number to assure they would never control their own affairs. What did Germany actually "gain" in the revision besides giving such people a refuge, anyway? It certainly did not gain the Skoda works. This was like inviting Great Britain to a discussion about Northern Ireland, handing Great Britain Carrickfergus and telling it to go away and be happy it got anything. What about the pressing issue which kept Germany divided in two, East Prussia completely vulnerable to Stalin and subject to the whim of Polish rail? What about that? Surely, if you were truly interested in peace, you would look at that, too. And if you really wanted peace, since the Germans and the Jews were now at each other's throats and the Zionists wanted the Jews anyway, maybe you would look at resettlement in Madagascar, as the Germans proposed, or even Palestine. And maybe you would actually see what those already in Palestine had to say about it. Instead, Britain used this as a prelude to "this but no more" and its guarantee to Poland, which all-but-assured Poland would not consider any proposal by Germany - as the lobbyists who controlled Britain wanted, because the investors they represented had stakes in Polish industry and did not want to lose what they could manipulate and control with cheap European currency. In what Germany took after the Munich agreement, Britain lost nothing. How convenient. They created this entire "peace" conference as a setup so that Germany would be shown to get something and be told to take no more; then the UK would look like they were wonderful peacekeeping heroes, Germany would be put on notice and everything that UK firms were invested in would be safe. Again, how convenient: if Germany did anything next, it would surely lose its support in the UK, and those who did not want appeasement or had taken a hard position on Germany - and had already done their own setup with the Battle of Cable Street - would be one step closer to a united-mind land turned against Germany, based on a fabricated reality that former-Germans who by then lived in the UK, as the Daily Express points out, had been trying to sell the world since 1933. And for what? To destroy Germany and put it back under control of international finance investors? To make sure Germany could not subvert the will of Poland and Poland would not be tied down - like what happens every day in Brussels? To leave Europe to the fate of whether or not Stalin decided to invade and complete the Communist international? Seriously, how can you even write such an assessment of "good altruistic intentions" without considering any of these factors?Lafffingoutloud (talk) 04:32, 24 May 2021 (UTC)
replies: text: It's evident to me that all these issues came about because of improper drawing of boundaries (as is usually the case)...in this instance by the Treaty of Versailles. There were 7 million Czechs and 3 million Germans. The Germans were naturally concentrated in the Sudetenland. And they were being treated badly by the Benes regime. Hitler called them on it but Benes wouldn't budge. Germany, Italy, France, and the UK negotiated a settlement. Benes lost and went into exile in the UK (in a very nice house by-the-way...where did he get his money?). The same kind of thing was going on in what became "Poland" created out of Prussia. It was called E.Prussia, was part of Germany, and was cutoff from the main Germany by poorly drawn boundaries. Germany was landlocked. G'Dansk was its natural port in E.Prussia. Its claim and assumption by force of the land between Germany and E.Prussia was characterized as "invasion of Poland" and brought on WW II. Without this Munich Agreement, there would have been an "Invasion of Czech" which was before Versailles totally  separate from Slovakia. I'm not a historian but I know badly slanted history when I see it. It defies all logic. A true and honest historian needs to give this article an enema...or at least some injection of logical reason and truth. 
See: 3 of 4 videos Adolf Hitler -The greatest story never told (E03) Origins of the swastika 
See: 3 of 4 videos Adolf Hitler -The greatest story never told (E03) Origins of the swastika 
WithGLEE (talk) 17:40, 19 February 2022 (UTC)
thread_title:  Munich Agreement revisited 

message: the original wiki mentions  chamberlains private agreement with hitler on the day after the munich agreement and the wiki called thst private agreement the anglo german naval agreement. thats wrong. the naval agreement was signed im 1935 and a completely different agreement. the private agreement after munch was signed in 1938 58.96.207.41 (talk) 01:51, 24 February 2023 (UTC)
thread_title:  wrong name of abreement 

message: In the opening paragraphs, there is currently a "dubios" tag placed on a claim about Polish and Romanian rejection of Soviet transit rights. I have improved the source and believe the tag should be removed. 
I wanted to receive feedback before doing so, though.  Jcgaylor (talk) 23:06, 29 April 2024 (UTC)
replies: text: I've added the dubius mark there as I recall reading about Romania offering a corridor to USSR. However, I was unable to find the source now. I.e. I'd prefer there to be several independent sources instead of only one, but I won't be challenging removal of the mark in any case.Cimmerian praetor (talk) 10:07, 27 May 2024 (UTC)
thread_title:  Removal of "Dubious" Tag