Talk:Aleksandr Akimov

message: Photo of Alexander Akimov: http://i46.tinypic.com/29bkhp5.jpg  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 69.229.113.78 (talk) 06:07, 23 November 2009 (UTC)
thread_title: Untitled

message: This article includes often repeated statement that Akimov did not want to proceed with test, but was ordered to. In some versions he is threatened with being replaced with the previous shift supervisor. In other versions he is threatened with loosing his job. But where is the primary source that supports it?
The Will Mara book that is reference does includes the assertion, but without evidence or reference. It's not clear how an American author can know what is was said in a soviet nuclear reactor control room without a reliable reference. Akimov died after the accident and I can find no reference that reliably records him saying he was threatened or that he didn't want to go ahead with the test. Dyatlov survived both radiation injury and imprisonment, and denied anything other than a calm control room right up to the moment where the reactor explode. No concerns voiced by Akimov and no threats of replacement or firing. The international atomic energy agency report (INSAG 7) makes no mention of it either.
The sequence of events given - a power surge followed by pressing the AZ5 SCRAM button is also suspicious. Dyatlov asserts that the AZ5 was pressed to shut the reactor down as standard procedure as part of the test but this Initiated the surge, because of the control rod design flaw. INSAG7 seems to support this.
And the boron control control rods were not covered with graphite. The boron rod had a graphite rod slung beneath it, with a 1.5 meter separator between them. INSAG7 has a nice diagram that explains this.
The final sentence regarding the crew and directors not following safety guidelines is outdated. This was the story presented by the initial soviet report, which sought to hide the fundamental design flaws in the RBMK reactor, which were vying to the be the first to make it blow up. It became clear later that many of the safety guidelines that the crew were supposed to have ignored did not exist at the time of the accident, but were written later e.g. Not operating reactor at less than 700MWt. Again INSAG7 explains how the soviet authorities Initially released incorrect and misleading information that focuses on crew errors rather than design faults. NickArmstrong21 (talk) 21:59, 28 September 2017 (UTC)
replies: text: Doesn't matter. See WP:TRUTH and WP:VERIFIABLE. As long as the claim is backed up by a WP:RELIABLE SOURCE, in this case a published book by Marshall Cavendish a reputable publishing company, it not up to the editors to decide the providence or accuracy of the statement.81.141.33.185 (talk) 13:29, 15 February 2019 (UTC)
replies: text: 1000 people died 71.10.21.97 (talk) 12:27, 3 September 2022 (UTC)
thread_title:  Speculative and inaccurate ? 

message: Can we find information about his level of education?  — Preceding unsigned comment added by Eahket (talk • contribs) 14:10, 5 June 2019 (UTC)
thread_title:  Education? 

message: When the control rod are fully retracted (inactive during normal operation), the the graphite displacers are not outside, but exactly in the middle of the core:
"When the control rod is fully retracted, the graphite displacer is located in the middle of the core height, with 1.25 m of water at each of its ends"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RBMK#Control_rods
It is true that as the rods are falling down thel lower water column is replaced by the grapithe - but at the same time the former position of the graphite part is replaced by water - and then eventually by the boron. This means that the rectivity in the lower part of the reactor is going a bit up - bat at the same time the reactivity of the middle part of the core is going down. Because the central part of the core was until that OK even with the graphite displacers  -  the lower part of the core can become prompt critical only if the axial power distrubution is changing. But exactly because of that "24 shortened rods are inserted from below and are used to augment the axial power distribution control of the core" (same source). This means that the reactor operators are very well informed about the need to take in account also the axial power distrubution.
But the most important aspect is that primary use of the RBMK type reactors was the production of weapon grade plutonium and the electricity was only a byproduct. Therefore UdSSR exported only WWER types which are not suitable to produce plutononium. It was of course as confidential as in all other countries producing nuclear weapons, but known to the staff. The negligible operational problems with the positive void coefficient and the graphite displacers have been silently accepted as an acceptable trade off. The system trusted the choosen best specialist, because it was not easy to become a reactor operator. Besides the university grade also practice and party membership was mandatory. And for the working intelligentsia it was really very difficult to become a party member.
Additionally Dyatlov was a high grade military submarine reactors expert.
I am wondering nobody was evaluating sabotage or psychical disorder.
Because it is physically it not possible to create more damage and the staff did the worst possible :(
85.216.197.77 (talk) 21:12, 7 June 2019 (UTC)
replies: text: The article has since had a lot of work. Previous versions contained a lot of bad translation which was at least art of the problem. Andrewa (talk) 20:49, 6 June 2020 (UTC)
thread_title:  False mainstream assumptions regarding the graphite displacers 

message: The following Wikimedia Commons file used on this page or its Wikidata item has been nominated for deletion:
* 
Participate in the deletion discussion at the . —Community Tech bot (talk) 21:22, 28 September 2022 (UTC)
thread_title:  A Commons file used on this page or its Wikidata item has been nominated for deletion