Talk:Enabling Act of 1933/Archive 2

message: John Toland's publishers Doubleday considered it perfectly on-topic all I included . I deny the use of off-topic as a justification. This is a growing WP issue , and you will force it to become more so . Please leave and accept the source. EffK 00:32, 26 November 2005 (UTC)
thread_title: Protest [[User:Str1977]]  Removals

message: A Decree signed with the Amnesty Decree appears below , and requires key attention. (Testimony by Franz von Papen was characterised by the Trial as self-serving, and 'double faced', but in the Nuremburg trial is relevant to the 23 Reichstag Enabling Act. The Decree is The Formation of Special Courts and Article 2 clarifies:
:The Special Courts have jurisdiction over crimes and offenses enumerated in the decree of the Reich President for the protection of people and State of 28 February 19333  and in the decree concerning the defense against insidious attacks against the government of the national revolution of 21 March 19334, provided that such crimes and offenses are not within the jurisdiction of the Reich Supreme Court or the courts of appeal. From:[] (fair use/educational/public)
===Nuremburg Trial allusion to Hindenburg Presidential Decrees of 21 March===
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, will you now describe the events leading up to the Enabling Act of 23 March 1933. 
VON PAPEN: The Enabling Act arose out of the necessity to have the economic measures carried out in an untroubled Reichstag session. Negotiations were conducted with the Center Party to obtain a 1-year parliamentary truce, but these negotiations failed. Hence this law which had some parallels in the past became a necessity. The Prosecution has emphasized this law as clear proof for the existence of a conspiracy. May I say, therefore, that I myself tried to provide for a certain check by desiring to maintain the veto power of the Reich President. The Cabinet records of 15 March show, however, that State Secretary Meissner did not consider the participation of the Reich President necessary. 
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to refer to Document Number 25, which is identical with Exhibit USA-578, to the attitude taken by Von Papen in this Cabinet discussion and to the standpoint just mentioned of State Secretary Meissner. 
"Meissner, State Secretary of the minority Cabinet, of the Cabinet of the Reich President, and his excellent assistant." 
I should also like to refer to Document 23, because from the enumeration of the emergency decrees in that document it is clear that in the state of emergency which obtained then it was not possible to govern by means of Reichstag laws and that the Enabling Act was to be a substitute for these emergency decrees which were being repeatedly issued. 
I must make one correction: The standpoint of State Secretary Meissner is contained in Document 91, Exhibit USA-578. 
[Turning to the defendant.] On 21 March 1933, an amnesty decree was issued. The Prosecution has described this decree as an unheard-of law. What can you say about it? 
VON PAPEN: The Prosecution calls this law "sanction of political murder." 
I should like to say the following about it: This law was issued in an emergency decree of the Reich President, not of the Cabinet; and it was a natural end of a revolutionary period which had lasted 7 weeks. There are very many historical parallels for this amnesty decree; for example, the law which was issued by the young German Republic on 21 July 1922 and which includes murder in the amnesty measures. 
DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I now refer to Document 28, Page 99 of Document Book 1. This contains the law of 21 July 1922, which 
272 
17 June 46 
concludes "the period of a state of unrest which obtained in the years 1920 and 1921." May I also refer to Page 100 of this Document Number 28 which contains the law of 20 December 1932 which has been mentioned. 
On 23 March the law dealing with the special courts was issued. What can you say in that connection? 
VON PAPEN: These special laws, or special court laws, are also not entirely new. I, personally, as Chancellor of the Reich issued such a law on 9 August 1932; and I based my action then on a directive of the Bruning Cabinet dated 6 October 1931. In revolutionary periods punishable political acts must be brought to speedy trial under the law. 
DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I now point out Document 27, Page 89 of Document Book 1, especially the introduction preceding Paragraph 1, which shows that this emergency decree was based on the Bruning emergency directive of 1931. 
From http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/06-17-46.htm,[] Copyright linked .Fair Use/Educational/Pubic.)
[Key because:"The Prosecution has emphasised this law as clear proof for the existence of a conspiracy."  Highlights-EffK]
From Monday 22 July 1946 at http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-19/tgmwc-19-183-09.shtml[]  I place this Kubuschok clarification (he was representing the defence)
::Since in the framework of this trial we do not have to judge considerations of political expediency and not even moral conceptions, but only whether what happened was done with a criminal purpose, in the sense of the Charter, the task set for the defence is comparatively simple.
EffK Note:The Special Courts Decree was signed by Hitler on 21 March and came into force after the second succeeding day. It was not the sole Decree signed, and in fact can have no constitutional bearing upon the ' dormancy ' of sovereign (the people's) Deputies( as eg KPD deputies). EffK 12:56, 4 December 2005 (UTC)
thread_title: Nuremburg Testimony by von Papen re:"Special Courts Decree" of 21 March 1933

message: DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, will you now describe the events leading up to the Enabling Act of 23 March 1933. 
VON PAPEN: The Enabling Act arose out of the necessity to have the economic measures carried out in an untroubled Reichstag session. Negotiations were conducted with the Center Party to obtain a 1-year parliamentary truce, but these negotiations failed. Hence this law which had some parallels in the past became a necessity. The Prosecution has emphasized this law as clear proof for the existence of a conspiracy. May I say, therefore, that I myself tried to provide for a certain check by desiring to maintain the veto power of the Reich President. The Cabinet records of 15 March show, however, that State Secretary Meissner did not consider the participation of the Reich President necessary. 
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to refer to Document Number 25, which is identical with Exhibit USA-578, to the attitude taken by Von Papen in this Cabinet discussion and to the standpoint just mentioned of State Secretary Meissner. 
"Meissner, State Secretary of the minority Cabinet, of the Cabinet of the Reich President, and his excellent assistant." 
I should also like to refer to Document 23, because from the enumeration of the emergency decrees in that document it is clear that in the state of emergency which obtained then it was not possible to govern by means of Reichstag laws and that the Enabling Act was to be a substitute for these emergency decrees which were being repeatedly issued. 
I must make one correction: The standpoint of State Secretary Meissner is contained in Document 91, Exhibit USA-578. 
[Turning to the defendant.] On 21 March 1933, an amnesty decree was issued. The Prosecution has described this decree as an unheard-of law. What can you say about it? 
VON PAPEN: The Prosecution calls this law "sanction of political murder." 
I should like to say the following about it: This law was issued in an emergency decree of the Reich President, not of the Cabinet; and it was a natural end of a revolutionary period which had lasted 7 weeks. There are very many historical parallels for this amnesty decree; for example, the law which was issued by the young German Republic on 21 July 1922 and which includes murder in the amnesty measures. 
DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I now refer to Document 28, Page 99 of Document Book 1. This contains the law of 21 July 1922, which 
272 
17 June 46 
concludes "the period of a state of unrest which obtained in the years 1920 and 1921." May I also refer to Page 100 of this Document Number 28 which contains the law of 20 December 1932 which has been mentioned. 
On 23 March the law dealing with the special courts was issued. What can you say in that connection? 
VON PAPEN: These special laws, or special court laws, are also not entirely new. I, personally, as Chancellor of the Reich issued such a law on 9 August 1932; and I based my action then on a directive of the Bruning Cabinet dated 6 October 1931. In revolutionary periods punishable political acts must be brought to speedy trial under the law. 
DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I now point out Document 27, Page 89 of Document Book 1, especially the introduction preceding Paragraph 1, which shows that this emergency decree was based on the Bruning emergency directive of 1931. 
From http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/06-17-46.htm,[] Copyright linked .Fair Use/Educational/Pubic.)
[Key because:"The Prosecution has emphasised this law as clear proof for the existence of a conspiracy."  Highlights-EffK]
From Monday 22 July 1946 at http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-19/tgmwc-19-183-09.shtml[]  I place this Kubuschok clarification (he was representing the defence)
::Since in the framework of this trial we do not have to judge considerations of political expediency and not even moral conceptions, but only whether what happened was done with a criminal purpose, in the sense of the Charter, the task set for the defence is comparatively simple.
EffK Note:The Special Courts Decree was signed by Hitler on 21 March and came into force after the second succeeding day. It was not the sole Decree signed, and in fact can have no constitutional bearing upon the ' dormancy ' of sovereign (the people's) Deputies( as eg KPD deputies). EffK 12:56, 4 December 2005 (UTC)
thread_title: Nuremburg Trial allusion to Hindenburg Presidential Decrees of 21 March

message: As from above last link, (highlight EffK):
The fact that in the laws of that time National Socialist doctrines appear only rarely and in moderate terms shows sufficiently that the composition of the Cabinet of that time had a retarding influence on the implementation of National Socialist ideas. 
Without this influence it would not be understandable why Hitler undertook a relatively unpopular limitation of the previously advocated aims of the Party. 
The hand of the defendant which checked and corrected the shaping of the individual laws is clearly discernible. The classic example for this is his endeavours in connection with the Enabling Act. It was a technical necessity for the legislation during the crisis of that time. The preceding years had shown that owing to the protracted deliberations in the Reichstag, urgently needed legislation was not acted upon satisfactorily. Therefore, even in Bruening's time, almost all the legislative power was practically put in the hands of the Reich President, so that the important laws were issued in the form of emergency decrees by unilateral legislative acts of the Reich President. If, due to these compelling reasons, the legislative power could not in practice be left in the hands of the Reichstag, the legislative power thus transferred to the Cabinet constituted a compromise. As shown by the result of the Reichstag vote concerning the Enabling Act, none of the parties, including the Zentrum [Centre] party, failed to recognize this. 
The question now arises as to whether the right of the Cabinet, since according to the constitution the Reich Chancellor had to establish the fundamental lines of policy, would be limited by the fact that the right of promulgating laws was reserved for the Reich President. The State Secretary of the Reich President himself declared, in a Cabinet session, that he did not think it necessary to burden Hindenburg with the responsibility of the entire legislation because of the latter 's right to promulgate laws. Von Papen's direct intervention with Hindenburg immediately afterwards remained without success, as stated by the witness Tschirschky. 
Mr. President, would this be an appropriate time for me to present the essential points of the questionnaire which was answered by Tschirschky? 
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you can comment on it, but you aren't going to read the whole document, are you? 
DR. KUBUSCHOK: With your approval I will give a summary of it. 
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. 
DR. KUBUSCHOK: This is Document 103, which I submitted a while ago. 
Question 1 I have already read. 
Question 3 concerns the controls just discussed. The witness says that they were surely intended to prevent Hitler and the NSDAP from carrying out their policy. 
In the next question the witness affirms the alleged aim of the conservative block: Black-White-Red. 
In question 5 the witness confirms the development, which I still have to present, y toward an authoritative government by Hitler. 
The answer to question 7 shows that Papen, in the Cabinet, strongly resisted the w suggested legislation in many points. 
Question 10 concerns the attitude of Papen toward the Church. The last sentence is particularly important: "Von Papen believed, by the conclusion of 
[Page 219]
the Concordat[ Reichskonkordat ], that Hitler and the NSDAP would be placed under such strong contractual obligations that the anti- clerical attitude would be arrested." [EffK:NB]
The answer to No. 11: "I do not consider it possible that von Papen himself participated in a later violation of the Concordat, or that he used his political conviction to exercise political pressure."
*What could be considered original-research, would be to try to elucidate or check the strange last words political conviction . This could refer to his politics as a conviction, or to his catholic conviction in politics or to his political conviction affecting the negotiations towards the Concordat, or affecting thereby the after-math of it:It comes from the summary by the defense for von Papen .
EffK 10:48, 4 December 2005 (UTC)
thread_title: Nuremburg re:von Papen ,Enabling Act and Reichskonkordat

message: From[]http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/document/nca_vol1/chap_07.htm,  (Copyright linked:Fair-use/educational/Public), highlight EffK,:
Acquistion of Totalitarian Political Control, 2.B Control Acquired ,3:
'Taking advantage' of the Presidential decree of 28 February 1933 suspending constitutional guarantees of freedom, Goering and other Nazi conspirators immediately caused a large number of Communists, including party officials and Reichstag deputies, and a smaller number of Social Democratic officials and deputies to be placed in 'protective custody'. (2324-PS; 2573-PS; L-83) Thus all Communist deputies and a number of social Democratic deputies were prevented from attending the new session of the Reichstag. -On 9 March 1933-, Frick announced that the Communists would be prevented from participating in the first session of the Reichstag on March 21st, because of their being more usefully occupied. (2403-PS) As Frick cynically stated:
"When the reichstag meets the 21st of March, the Communists will be prevented by urgent labor elsewhere from participating in the session. In concentration camps they will be re-educated for productive work. We will know how to render harmless permanently sub-humans who do not want to be re-educated." (2651-PS)
At a meeting of the Reich Cabinet on 15 March 1933, the problem of securing the necessary two-thirds majority in favor of an Enabling Act was again considered. Frick stated his belief that the Act would have to be broadly conceived, in a manner to allow for any deviation from the clauses of the Constitution of the Reich. Goering thought the two-thirds majority would be forthcoming and that if necessary some of the Social Democrats could be excluded from the room during the voting. (2962-PS) 
At a meeting of the Cabinet on 20 March 1933, there was further discussion of means for securing the majority and quorum necessary to secure passage of the Act (2963-PS). On 23 March, Hitler spoke in favor of an Enabling law proposed by the Nazi conspirators and in the course of the debate said:
"The Government insists on the passage of this law. It expects a clear decision in any case. it offers to all the Parties in the Reichstag the possibility of a peaceful development and a possible conciliation in the future. But it is also determined to consider a disapproval of this law as a declaration of resistance. it is up to you, gentlemen, to make the decision now. It will be either peace or war." (2652-PS)
Thus subject to the full weight of Nazi pressure and terror, the Reichstag passed the proposed law, 441 deputies voting in its favor, and 94 Social Democrats being opposed (2579-PS). the following day, the law was promulgated. it provided:
"the Reichstag has resolved the following law, which is, with the approval of the Reichsrat, herewith promulgated, after it has been established that the requirements have been satisfied for legislation altering the Constitution. 
*There is no reference here to any legalising Deputy arrests by (parallel) Presidential Decree of 21 March or of the 'Dormancy' announced by Frick at either 21 Decree, or 21 Opening of the Rechstag, or, 23 March Decree or Frick /Council of Elders 'procedural change' to shed light or clarify . Here it says  conspirators...taking advantage of the Fire Decree, with a 9 March statement and requirements satisfied...
*At the foot of this Nuremberg document, no possibly relevant Decree is sourced but the Fire Decree and the Amnesty (Court?) Decree . I have remarked before that neither the Fire decree nor the Enabling Act as placed in Wikipedia allow for the constitutionality(legality) of the taking advantage . It would appear here that the trials term advantage means extra-legal, making the Weimar Germany Article correct in specifying illegal Deputy arrests and detention(& murder). It was , of course, legal to judicially execute the thousands of non-Deputy Communists found guilty under the Fire Decree. 
On the same page link, this, from 7 March March 1933 In-judicially relevant to the deputy arrests is Hermann Goering's following 
::"Fellow Germans, my measures will not be crippled by any judicial thinking. My measures will not be crippled by any bureaucracy. Here, I don't have to give justice, my mission is only to destroy and exterminate, nothing more! This struggle, fellow Germans, will be a struggle against chaos and such a struggle, I shall not conduct with the power of any police. A bourgeoise state might have done that. Certainly, I shall use the power of the State and the police to the utmost, my dear Communists! So you won't draw any false conclusions; but the struggle to the death, in which my fist will grasp your necks, I shall lead with those down there-those are the Brown Shirts." 
*I remind that it was Goering to whom Pope PIus XI delivered his 10 March 1933 accolade for Hitler.
EffK 13:55, 4 December 2005 (UTC)
thread_title: Nuremberg:9 March Frick statement and Enabling Act