Talk:Strategic nomination

message: About the profile
 * 40 voters preferring candidate A to B to C
 * 35 voters preferring candidate B to C to A
 * 25 voters preferring candidate C to A to B
there is the phrase:
 "With the above preferences and whatever candidate an election method chooses as a winner, another candidate can always secure a majority of votes against that winner by removing the third candidate."
And my calculation shows that if A is the winner chosen by an election method then B cannot secure a majority of votes against A by removing C from the election, because that would create the profile
 * 40 voters preferring candidate A to B
 * 35 voters preferring candidate B to A
 * 25 voters preferring candidate A to B
Thus even more voters in favour of A.
I guess this is either my confusion or the confusion of the paragraph's author. Please comment. --Konrad (talk) 14:39, 21 January 2010 (UTC)
replies: text: You're correct that B cannot gain a majority, but C can (C would have a 60:40 majority in a direct runoff). By "another candidate", the phrase you quoted doesn't mean either candidate can gain a majority, but rather that at least one can. 66.215.156.89 (talk) 04:40, 12 April 2011 (UTC)
thread_title:  Confusion about a specific paragraph 

message: I challenge the validity of the Independence of Clones criteria:  I have not found any mathematical definition of a clone, nor have I found a way to objectively determine what a clone is and isn't.  I can say that clones are a special case of a correlated pair, but that still is not a precise definition.  I would like to promote a discussion on this topic.--Fahrenheit451 18:25, 6 Jun 2005 (UTC)
replies: text: those candidates where every voter ranks them the same relative to every other candidate
Ridiculous!  In an election with a small body of voters, that could easily be coincidence and with a large body of voters, show me where it has ever occured. --Fahrenheit451 20:19, 7 Jun 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  Discussion about ICC criterion in mathematical models and real life voting 

message: I put the npov tag here when F451 added comments about ICC being "flawed" and so on to the article content. That's not there anymore, and the article content seems to be fairly stable now (despite that F451 disagrees with it). Do we have consensus to remove the npov tag? RSpeer 13:47, Jun 8, 2005 (UTC)
I agree that F451's earlier edit was insufficiently neutral. I believe that the page as written, while it can still use some improving, is sufficiently neutral. Hence, I removed the tag. I created categories, which I believe make the article more clear. I'd like to hear dissenting opinions on that if there are any. It seemed confusing to straddle the defn of ICC around the three defns of vote splitting et al... I'd rather not tie those three so closely to ICC.
I wrote "The existence of a clone set in a public election is improbable as it only takes one voter to break up a clone set." Perhaps this accomodates some of F451's concerns. I might be open to adding another sentence here, e.g. "As a result of this fact, some argue that the ICC has a rather limited range of applications." Heck, I think that I'll add this, and if anyone disagrees, they can take it off.
At some point, I'd also like to explore the issue of the degree of ICC failure. For example, Borda and Smith//minimax both fail ICC, but I believe that Borda's ICC failure is much more severe. I'd like to find a way to quantify ICC failure, or at least to arrange it into various degrees. Perhaps a good topic for the EM list.
Hermitage 00:05, 9 Jun 2005 (UTC)
thread_title:  Propose to remove npov tag