Talk:Harry Magdoff and espionage/Archive 1

message: It would seem the point requires particular emphasis that evidence was not forthcoming for a lack of prosecution rather than the other way around.  --TJive 20:37, July 27, 2005 (UTC)
: Why no prosecution is stated here Belmont to Boardman, sec. IV. Prosecution, B. Disadvantages,
::"...we do not know if the deciphered messages would be admitted into evidence... the defense attorney would immediately move that the messages be excluded, based on the hearsay ... neither the person who sent the message (Soviet official) nor the person who received it (Soviet official) was available to testify...it would be necessary to rely upon their admission through the use of expert testimony of those who intercepted the messages and those cryptographers who deciphered the messages. A question of law is involved herein. It is believed that the messages probably could be introduced in evidence on the basis of an exception to the hearsay evidence rule
::"... the defense probably would be granted authority by the court to have private cryptographers hired by the defense examine the messages as well as the work sheets of the Government cryptographers. ... This would lead to the exposure of Government techniques and practices in the cryptography field to unauthorized persons and thus compromise the Government's efforts 
:The Moynihan Commission on Government Secrecy reports the same conclusion. nobs 21:01, 27 July 2005 (UTC)
replies: text: Golos made contact with the Perlo group in November 1943 (Haynes & Klehr, chap. 5); Golos died the same month, November 27 1943.  Bentley was put in charge of all Golos contacts then by Earl Browder; five days after Golos death Bentley met with a contact who put her in contact with Golos old Soviet contact. The Soviet's were immediately concerned about having a flaky Vassar girl in control of such a vital element.  But the Soviet's had other problems too, the War, the disbanding of the Comintern created much confussion.  Bentley had her first meeting with the Perlo group at the end of Feb or early Mar 1944, as referenced in detail in Magdoff article.  I can show other Venona decrypts, how the Soviets wanted to take control of the Bentley's operations, but were prevented by Browder. But by the end of 1944, they did just that, they pushed her out of the way and took control. She know roughly 42 or 47 members by personal contact, dating back to 1938; other members she only knew through cut outs, like Harry Dexter White or William Henry Taylor.  That is a big reason for her defection, having been removed from control, she knew she knew too much, and her life was in danger, seeing she was of no more use to the Soviets. And it was the FBI that pumped her for every scrape of information possible, including names of people she was recieving information from through cut outs.  So it is the FBI that can rightly be criticized, for having to rely on second hand information from Bentley, cause they couldn't do their own job right (IMHO, criticism of Bentley is unfair in this regard, and should be placed on the FBI). The Gorsky Report is available at two places on line George Mason University History News Network and John Earl Haynes site .  you will see they are virtually identical, and list Harry Magdoff as a member of the Sound & Myrna groups (Golos & Bentley groups).  nobs 02:30, 28 July 2005 (UTC)

text: I think that would be an excellent fact to mention in her article. Noel (talk) 21:28, 29 July 2005 (UTC)
replies: text:  Thanks for the endorsement, User:Nobs01 keeps removing it. Ruy Lopez 06:18, 30 July 2005 (UTC)
replies: text:  This turns out to be incorrect. The insurer of her co-defendant (NBC) settled because it was cheaper to do that than contest it - pissing off the producer of the NBC show, who was sure they could win. See Clever Girl, pp. 201. She refused to contribute any money to the settlement amount. It's worth noting that Remington later was convicted of perjury, and jailed, on exactly the same point he'd sued her on - whether he'd been involved in Communist activities. Noel (talk) 05:04, 1 September 2005 (UTC)
thread_title: Evidence/prosecution

message: I have discovered shocking evidence that the claims on this page have misrepresented the underlying documentation cited. 
According to an FBI memo dated May 15, 1950, Harry Magdoff was listed as one of a group of "individuals positively or tentatively identified" as part of a KGB set of assets, with the names agreeing with information "furnished me by Elizabeth Bentley."
But in a memo February 1, 1956 discussing in detail the problem of actually properly identifying people in the Venona material when cover names are used, there is a specific reference to the cover name "Magdoff-Kant" followed by the parenthetical phrase "(probably Harry Magdoff)"
So this identification of Harry Magdoff "tentively" and "probably" has been promoted into an actual positive identification.  This assumption is periodically made throughout various government intelligence documents, but in the memo wrapping up the investigation and prosectuion based on this information (in which Magdoff was never indicted) the summary concludes that the identification of Harry Magdoff is still uncertain.--Cberlet 13:46, 27 July 2005 (UTC)
replies: text: The 1 February 1956 memo Belmont to Boardman (1) discusses in detail the problems of prosecution based on Venona material (not "actually identifying people", as misrepresented above); (2) the Belmont to Boardman memo refers to "Magdoff-Kant" as "probably Magdoff"; in the next paragraph it refers to "Kant" as "Magdoff"  (I know it's an old cliche to argue what "is" is,  but "Magdoff-Kant" is a different spelling from "Kant"), as the memo reads, identification of "Kant" is postive as "Magdoff", and the identification of "Magdoff-Kant" is probable as "Magdoff".  And the discussion following those two references sites this as corroboration of Elizabeth Bentley's depositition. nobs 15:41, 27 July 2005 (UTC)
replies: text: Preposterous.--Cberlet 16:04, 27 July 2005 (UTC)

text: Please do not move my comments around.  There is an ongoing vote regarding this page Please respect the democratic process.--Cberlet 16:16, 27 July 2005 (UTC)
thread_title: Misrepresentation of underlying documents

message: This is an example of why I am objecting to these claims.  It is clear to me that you cannot see what I see as the constant misrepresentation and distortion of the underlying documents, but it is very clear to me. I have no doubt that you see me doing the same thing.  THAT IS THE PROBLEM.  We read the same documents and articles, and reach wildly different conclusions. I am not challenging your good faith.  I am saying we are standing on different planets. 
Here is your proposed summery:
::Magdoff's complicity in espionage was corroborated by a message exhumed from the NKVD archives in Moscow in the 1990s. A message from the head of KGB foreign intelligence operations, Lt. General Pavel M. Fitin, to Secretary General of the Comintern Georgi Dimitrov dated 29 September 1944 requested information on Magdoff related to his recruitment into the espionage service of the Soviet Union. 
Let's look at the article and its footnote:
::A NKVD/NKGB Report to Stalin: A Glimpse into Soviet Intelligence in the United States in the 1940's, by Vladimir Pozniakov 
::By Pozniakov, Vladimir 
::The broader spectrum of tasks facing Soviet intelligence in the US required additional personnel, both Soviet and local. The pre-war staff of the NKGB and GRU rezidenturas was rather modest. For example, in the New York consulate and in Amtorg there were only 13 intelligence officers, most of them well known to the FBI.13 Also, because the USSR and the US had become wartime allies, both branches of Soviet intelligence had to limit their usage of the clandestine structures of the American Communist Party (CPUSA).14 The usage of local Communists was also limited by two other reasons: many of them were well known to the FBI, while many others were drafted after Pearl Harbor by the US Army and Navy15 or interned, as had happened to a number of CPUSA members of Japanese extraction on the West Coast.16
::The lack of trained personnel in 1941 and early 1942 was soon supplemented by the growing flow of Soviet military and civilian specialists coming to the United States to work in the Soviet Purchasing Commission (SPC) and other agencies that mushroomed after the USSR became a part of the Lend-Lease program. According to Feklisov, by 1944 the staff of Amtorg and the SPC in New York City alone reached some 2,500, with an equal number of officials, engineers and other specialists serving at the SPC branch in Washington, DC.17 The majority of these people worked directly or indirectly either for the GRU or NKVD.18 Also, the limitations imposed on the usage of the CPUSA membership did not mean that Soviet intelligence ceased recruiting both Americans and non-Americans in America.19
::Footnote:
::19 Feklisov, pp. 65-105; M. Vorontsov, Capt. 1st rank, Chief Navy Main Staff, Intelligence Directorate, and Petrov, Military Commissar, NMS, ID to G. Dimitrov, 15 August 1942, No. 49253ss, typewritten original; G. Dimitrov to Pavel M. Fitin, 20 November 1942, No. 663, t/w copy; P. M. Fitin to G. Dimitrov, 14 July 1944, No. 1/3/10987, t/w copy; P. M. Fitin to G. Dimitrov, 29 September 1944, No. 1/3/16895, t/w copy. All these documents are NMS ID and FCD Chiefs' requests for information related to Americans and naturalized American citizens working in various US Government agencies and private corporations, some of whom had been CPUSA members. The last two are related to a certain Donald Wheeler (an OSS official), Charles Floto or Flato (who in 1943 worked for the "...Dept. of Economic Warfare"), and Harry Magdoff (War Production Board)-the request dated 29 Sept. 1944-and to Judith Coplon who according to the FCD information worked for the Dept. of Justice.-RTsKhIDNI, f. 495, op. 74, d. 478, l. 7; d. 484, l. 34; d. 485, l. 10, 14, 17, 31, 44.
Now let's trace the key document:
::P. M. Fitin to G. Dimitrov, 29 September 1944, No. 1/3/16895 
::Please provide any information at your disposal on the following members of the Comparty of America: 
::1. Charles Floto / Flato /, in 1943 worked in the US Office of Economic Warfare 
::2. Donald Wheeler / Veeler /, works in the Office of Strategic Services. 
::3. Kramer / Kreimer, works in a government institution in Washington. 
::4. Edward Fitzgerald, works on the WPB [War Production Board]. 
::5. Magdoff, works on the WPB. 
::6. Harold Glas[s]er, currently on assignment outside the US. 
::7. P[e]rlo, works on the WPB. 
What is the result?  
#We know that Dimitrov thinks Magdoff is a member of the Communist Party USA
#We know Dimitriv is asking for more information about Magdoff.
#We know the KGB is busy trying to get members and friend of the CPUSA to provide information to the Soviet Union.
#We know that if Magdoff is actually a member of the Communist Party USA
#We do not know if Magdoff has been recruited as a KGB agent of informer
#We do not know if Magdoff is aware that a member of the Perlo group is passing information to the KGB
#We do not know that Dimitrov "requested information on Magdoff related to his recruitment into the espionage service of the Soviet Union" or if Magdoff was ever recruited.
#We do not know that "Magdoff's complicity in espionage was corroborated."
So again, I ask for a compromise that recognizes that one of us is apparently from Neptune, and the other from Pluto.  :-)  --Cberlet 22:45, 29 July 2005 (UTC)
replies: text: That is indeed a valid point as you have argued the case.  There could be inserted an extensive narrative on how an espionage organization vets the bona fidas of a source, how this is routine, how they do not accept any information that is purported to come from a high level government official, and how they go through an extenisve qualifying process to assure they are not being fed disinformation before relying on such material, etc. etc. etc.  Not to be arguementative, but we are making progress. The word "complicity" could be watered down to "involvement", for example, still carries the same thought, yet less explosive. nobs 01:01, 30 July 2005 (UTC)
thread_title: From Neptune and Pluto

message: I disagree with Jnc that the article as originally extracted is too long or unencyclopedic--I think it should be merged back into the main article--but I do believe the generic VENONA comments (both pro and con) are entirely overloading the material.  --TJive 02:05, July 30, 2005 (UTC)
:Simple choice: accept the compromise and save face, or merge the full weight of evidence, and any rebuttals likewise will be rebutted. nobs 02:07, 30 July 2005 (UTC)
thread_title: Overbearing

message: When editors post links to primary documwents and then draw conclusions from those documents, it is original research.
For example, this link:
http://wikisource.org/wiki/Fitin_to_Dimitrov%2C_29_September_1944
::is used to back up the original research claim that:
::"Evidence was unearthed in the Comintern Archives in the late 1980s, Lt. General Pavel M. Fitin, the head of KGB foreign intelligence operations in Moscow, requested of Secretary General of the Comintern Georgi Dimitrov information to complete Magdoff's recruitment. [6] "
This is original research. And a glance at the document shows that it is biased original research. It misrepresents the content of the document.
What would not be original research, would be the published conclusions about Magdoff that it is claimed appear in:
::"...a book by historians Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes, and Fridrikh Igorevich Firsov [7], and also in the memoirs of Alexandre Feklisov [8] (the Soviet Case Officer for Julius Rosenberg and Klaus Fuchs), published in 2001."
As I have requested repeatedly, please supply the actual language used by these published secondary sources to describe Magdoff.
_______________________________________________________
Fill in the blank.
If Magdoff only appears in a list and in copies of primary documents, then the only cite is to the language used to introduce the list or the primary documents.--Cberlet 19:19, 30 July 2005 (UTC)
replies: text: Please see  regarding citation of above material, photographically reproduced in original Russian, with English language translation, Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes, and Fridrikh Igorevich Firsov, The Secret World of American Communism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), Document 90, Another reference to the same Document .  I likewise have made a posting in regard to the same document citing page number & "photographically reproduced".  Will be happy to do so again, if need be. nobs 20:18, 30 July 2005 (UTC)
replies: text: I have reviewed these documents and claims, and discover that once again you have extrapolated information not in the underlying documents in a way that favors your claims but actually misrepresentes the contents of the primary source materials and secondary source materials.--Cberlet 22:47, 30 July 2005 (UTC)
replies: text: Every time Ruy Lopez inserts text into this article, Nobs reverts it and adds more of his side of the debate.  How is this constructive? I think this whole controvery could be summarized in the one paragraph I already proposed.  I was serious.  Most of the material on this page is original research. Vast and vague statements are cited to vast and opinionated documents. Few actual quotations specifically regarding Magdoff have been produced. What is the point? Some people suspect Magdoff was a spy, some say he was an "agent of influence," whatever that is supposed to mean, others say it is clear the KGB saw Magdoff as a source of information, but argue that should not imply he was a witting intelligence agent or informant. One paragraph.  That's all it is worth.  If folks want to put up a website devoted to reliving the McCarthy Period through the Venona papers, they should do so. They can have a special page on Magdoff. We should link to it. But most of this original research on the current page does not belong on Wiki.--Cberlet 14:40, 5 August 2005 (UTC)
thread_title: Original Research