Talk:Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

message: We should be careful when suggesting that the influence of defense contractors was essential to decision making at SALT:
"The combination of these factors meant that the military and political leadership on both sides had an incentive to reduce their arsenals. Factoring in the industrial complex, if the talks led to allowances for fewer but more advanced systems, this would allow for further expenditures and thus keep the military-industrial complex happy."
This is not a neutral analysis. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 213.174.190.59 (talk) 14:38, 24 January 2006 (UTC)
thread_title: Untitled

message: I wonder if this should be included or merits inclusion on a separate page. SALT is the most visible of the treaties, so I can see its utility as a portal of sorts, but still...
Deleting CIA coverup reference :)
Upshotknothole (talk) 09:07, 20 May 2009 (UTC)
thread_title: Section Detailing History of Nuclear Arms Control

message: The photo of Brezhnev and Ford signing a comunique is misleading, it suggests that Ford signed the SALT1 treaty when it was actually Nixon becuase it was signed two years before Ford became president. Also the T in SALT stands for Treaty not Talks.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 90.199.31.127 (talk) 17:36, 28 January 2009 (UTC)
replies: text: Sentence II is wrong. "T" in SALT = Talks. "T" in START = Treaty. Check the links below the article with the text source of the SALT agreements on state.gov with best regards from VINCENZO1492  17:52, 12 November 2015 (UTC)
thread_title: Misleading Photo

message: I've always heard them referred to as the "SALT Talks", so I'm going to create a redirect page with that name. I know, it's a redundant acronym. xxxyyyzzz 20:12, 20 July 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  Salt Talks 

message: There's no definition on this page as to the meaning of the abbreviation 'ABM'.  130.194.157.132 02:00, 3 August 2006 (UTC)
replies: text: Anti-Ballistic Missile.  Basically, a missile that shoots down ballistic missiles.  Rklawton 02:03, 3 August 2006 (UTC)
thread_title:  What is 'ABM' 

message: Was it the SALT treaty where nuclear weapons were banned from outer space by the USSR and USA? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 85.3.95.143 (talk) 14:11, 17 February 2007 (UTC)
replies: text: That was the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which predated SALT. -Ashley Pomeroy (talk) 13:45, 1 August 2010 (UTC)
thread_title:  Which treaty was it? 

message: Why 'Seals And Lambs Treaty'? I understand it to stand for "Strategic Arms Limitation Talks" — Preceding unsigned comment added by Righteous lies (talk • contribs) 11:24, 2 May 2007 (UTC)
thread_title: The title

message: I'm pretty sure that some author has confused SALT I with START I. The SALT I currently reads
SALT I is the common name for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Agreement, also known as Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. SALT I froze the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers at existing levels, and provided for the addition of new submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers only after the same number of older intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and SLBM launchers had been dismantled.
That sounds like START I. If you can verify this, go ahead and change the entry.--Gadlen (talk) 00:34, 19 December 2011 (UTC)
replies: text: You're wrong. "L" in SALT = Limitation = freezing the number of weapons. "R" in START = Reduction = decreasing the number of weapons. with best regards from VINCENZO1492  17:56, 12 November 2015 (UTC)
thread_title:  SALT I confused with START I 

message: A) Defense, self-defense (guns).
B) Inhibiting a water monopoly society from using enslavement principles while maintaining their own arsenals.
A is important, because it limits the potencial of a Walk-IN.
B is important, because it limits any internal putz that would lead to a Water Monopoly Incest cycle, by providing alternate external solutions.
Within the past 40 years, it have been both ´dictators´ and ´water monopolistic´ theologists whom have proposed complete nuclear disarmament. These same individuals also push for internal enslavement within their own nations, under their own ´one god´ principle (supremist fascism orientations), which overal has a deterant called ´a nuclear weapon´.
To mention a few: Middle East Islam Sects, African Dictators, South American social communist. All these want ´walk-in´ rights without there being any potencial of any opposition to those demands, and overal have gone out of their way to not allow the use of guns by citizens, and that last, on pure humanitarian grounds that have no humanitarian reasoning except that humanitarianism where a ´walk-in´ could be shot. (IE: Humanitarianism for the crook or dictator, but for none other).
There is an interesting aspect to this, if you are of that thought and mind, and that aspect is: ´where would you run too, too whom would you run, if there was a severity of abuse under a complete disarmament?´. There is very little doubt that that would be to someone whom could counter, but such an entity/individual would no longer exist.
Increasing disarmament talks is a very, very, very bad idea, a NONE deterant to any individual with a ´I´m now master of the Universe principle¨. These days, that is defacto the ´United States of North America´ itself, and has been since the retraction of Russian sponsored forces in Eastern Europe.  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 190.37.128.210 (talk) 15:09, 16 January 2017 (UTC)
replies: text: We don't have such a section because Wikipedia does not use ideas you made up especially those that bear little relation to reality.  Wikipedia is not the place for you to promote such ideas. Ian.thomson (talk) 22:52, 16 January 2017 (UTC)
thread_title:  You do not have a section: Reasons for not allowing total disarmament. 

message: I propose that a substantial amount of information added to the article after April 15th, 2017 be removed. The chart below contains the entries where I believe removal is warranted. Please note that the individual reasons for each entry removal are noted in the Notes section under lowercase letters "A" through "L". 
 
The text as it now reads in the </br>Wikipedia article                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       	The text as it's written in the </br>Source material                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      	Action taken
"In order to confirm that the both the [sic] United States and the Soviet Union were in compliance with all provisions set in the SALT II agreement, both countries used NTM, or National Technical Means of verification, which included photo-reconnaissance satellites."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  	"To insure that the United States will be able by its own means to verify Soviet compliance with the terms of SALT II...the treaty explicitly states that verification will be by “national technical means” belonging to the other side. National technical means include satellites (such as photoreconnaissance satellites)"                                           	
"The second verification method was confirming that the Multiple Independently Targetable Re-Entry Vehicle (MIRV) limits were being adhered to. Both the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that if a missile had been tested using MIRVs, then it would be presumed that every missile of that type would be equipped with MIRVs, even if they had been tested previously using non-MIRV methods [sic]."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             	"...The agreement sets forth a set of MIRV counting rules which provide that: (a) all missiles of a type that has been tested with MIRV's shall be counted as MIRV’ed, even if they are deployed with single RV's, and (b) all launchers of a type that has contained or launched MIRV’ed missiles will be counted as MIRV’ed, even if they contain non-MIRV'ed missiles."	
"This third element, the "Joint Statement of Principles" was to accomplish three main goals: further reduction of available strategic arms, further qualitative limitations on these strategic arms, and finally to resolve the issues in the Protocol [sic] of the SALT agreements."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        	"....The joint statement of principles and basic guidelines for subsequent negotiations, which declares that the two sides have agreed to work for further reductions and for further qualitative limitations on their strategic forces and to attempt to resolve the issues included in the protocol to the treaty."                                                     	
"...agreement on banning the deployment of mobile ICBM launchers and flight-testing of those ICBMs from launchers. Development of these systems was permitted though, as long as there was no deployment action."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            	"The deployment of mobile ICBM launchers and the flight-testing of ICBM's from such launchers are banned. Development and testing of the launchers alone, however, are not restricted."                                                                                                                                                                                   	
"Additionally, the Protocol banned the deployment of long range cruise missiles on ground and sea based launchers. Finally, the Protocol banned the flight-testing and deployment of air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs)."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             	"The deployment of ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles is limited to cruise missiles not capable of a range of more than 600 kilometers, or about 350 miles. The flight-testing and deployment of air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs) with ranges over 600 km are banned. "                                                                            	
"The first objective of the two SALT agreements was to permit the United States and the Soviet Union to be essentially equivalent in their arsenal of strategic forces."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     	No equivalent statement in the source material.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           	
"The U.S. panel stated that if there was a failure to include them in the total, it could potentially lead the Soviets, at the rate of their production, to have approximately 400 Backfire bombers by 1988, therefore exceeding the limitations set by the SALT agreement."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 	"the Backfire in the aggregate total would mean that the Soviets by 1985 (if they do not increase present production rates) could have a force of some 400 Backfires deployed. Those 400 Soviet Backfires would be above and beyond the total aggregates of ICBM's, SLBM's, and bombers permitted by SALT I."                                                             	
"Not very many constraints for weapon systems development detailed in the plan. This allowed the United States to continue testing and developing new weapon systems."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       	"Perhaps the most important is the minimal constraints associated with continued compliance. Adhering to SALT II would not disturb any US plans for modernizing its weapons systems."                                                                                                                                                                                     	
"prevented them from developing and implementing several different types of missile launchers."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              	"The treaty imposed numerical ceilings on launchers."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     	
"When Reagan came into office, there was not a better solution than SALT II that could be immediately implemented, so he and his administration decided to follow its guidelines in order to appease Congress."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              	"The Senate had even passed a resolution indicating that the US should continue to support SALT II provisions. In the absence of any alternatives, the administration used adherence to SALT II as a symbolic means of demonstrating good faith and preventing an erosion of support."                                                                                    	
"His goal was to continually strengthen the regulations proposed in SALT I and push forward into more advanced future arms control plans."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   	"the answer is to strengthen our grip and keep climbing... . to prepare the ground for broader arms control measures."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    	
"The goal of both SALT I and SALT II was to create a set of policies that would gradually evolve through revisions and adjustments. The initial policies set forth in SALT I would gradually change according to current situations, and policymakers would be able to more easily adjust to new rules and regulations. Additionally, incrementalism in policymaking, and therefore treaty making, allows for there to be similarity and consistency between multiple iterations of the same plan. This consistency helps ensure that both sides of the treaty are on the same page and that their relationships with one another would not become strained."	"The process by which policy evolves through small, gradual deviations from existing standards and practices. Rather than reconstruct policy anew at each interval, decision makers rely on past actions, making only slight adjustments as they go along."                                                                                                               	
In addition to what was removed above, information added under this specific reference was also removed, as it was unlocatable.
 
Spurious reference                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      	Action taken
United States. Department of State. Office of Public Communication. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Washington: Dept. of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication : for Sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1978. Print. Department of State Publication. General Foreign Policy Ser. ; 308.	
Any editor wishing to dispute this proposal is invited to address the issues I've raised here on the talk page. If there are no dissenting opinions, it is my intention to delete the entries within 7 days. Editors wishing to dispute this removal after the fact are free to begin a new discussion here on the talk page or to make a dispute resolution request at the ANI Noticeboard. 
Regards,
 Spintendo  ᔦᔭ  20:14, 25 October 2017 (UTC)
replies: text: The first 1978 source can be found here. Uglemat (talk) 20:39, 25 October 2017 (UTC)
replies: text: Thank you for adding this information. I've updated the tables to reflect my evaluation of the information taken from this source and rephrased for the wiki article.  Spintendo  ᔦᔭ  23:12, 25 October 2017 (UTC)
replies: text: As one editor has pointed out to me, almost the entirety of the information I'm seeking to have removed was placed in the article by two editors whose user accounts (and the edits made under them) were created as part of a class assignment — a class which ended May 2017 — and in all liklihood the editors involved won't be returning to defend their additions. In light of this, my previously specified wait period of 7-days is abrogated.  Spintendo  ᔦᔭ  04:54, 27 October 2017 (UTC)
thread_title:  Section deletion proposal 

message: The article doesn't mention the term "Basic Principles Agreement" which I do see mentioned from the National Cold War Exhibition from the Royal Air Force Museum of the UK. So they have there:
3. The Basic Principles Agreement 
This laid down some important rules for the conduct of nuclear warfare. The USA and the USSR pledged 'to do their utmost to avoid military confrontation' and 'to exercise restraint' in international relations. 
 
I first heard this term used in a lecture by Professor Daniel Sargent of UC Berkeley in Lecture 15 of HIST 186: International and Global History Since 1945 (it's at about 34:47 in the audio file).
Sargent says:
The first, and the one which attracts least attention in the United States, is the so-called Basic Principles Agreement. What the Basic Principles Agreement does is to lay down a basic sort of code of conduct for the waging of the Cold War.
It commits the powers you know to do a bunch of mundane things -- like notifying each other about military maneuvers such that military maneuvers cannot be misunderstood, misconstrued, as offensive escalatory moves.
It establishes a sort of framework for stabilizing the adversary relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. There's also a symbolic importance to the Basic Principles Agreement. It's very existence as a document suggests that the United States is willing to recognize the Soviet Union as a coequal superpower.
So perhaps some content ought to be added on the Basic Principles Agreement aspect of the talks.
Jjjjjjjjjj (talk) 10:03, 26 February 2019 (UTC)
replies: text: Okay, I added a few sentences on the basic principles agreed upon during SALT I in this edit.  Jjjjjjjjjj (talk) 04:23, 7 March 2019 (UTC)
thread_title:  Basic Principles Agreement