Russian Project For The S...
The Times, 1824-06-03T00:00:00

'rue COfl ttionne4which axrrivtdlastnight,contains the glOlowlOt g article, dated Bremen. We can neither voach r, nor question the authenticity of the Russian state pa- ped of hnich it gives an extract; but if it be genuine, our rears need not he remninded that it is important:- .I een' you the text of ian "BREMEN, SIAT 17. and you the text of a Russian note, an extract from a MIe- mOTr 02thc Pacification of Greece, written in the present year. The rmperor, after efforts to destroy in the soutl of Europe the CdSOfdisorder which had ema,de sach dangerous progress, thinks th coment nso~t arrived for attending to the means of pacifying the 'It becomes necessary to put an end to the troubles which agitate Gree TheY roducerwults irnjurious tothe commerceof Russia and eeTvant Paralyzing the industry of a greatpart of the provinces of the Rus<in- empire. The Emperor has made great sacrifices to the Ovi' of pace, and to the desire of strengthening the ties which bind hm to his allie. Thanks to the dexterity of Lord Strnngford, the 'Orte hbr consented to satisfy the just demands of Russira On this, The Emperor despatched the Councillor of State MVSinziaky to VOOstantiple. If he has not sent an Ambassador, as he had an- uld at Czerneirtz, it is because the strongest considerations "7PpaXed to It. The Turks would not fail to regard the pre- ctnes of an Ambassador as a decisive victory over the Greeks; and 1be Russin Ainbassador w7ould not fail to be an object of all the !usPicionM of the Divan. They would suppose him iTI understand. Ing with the Insurgents: his position would be the same as that of ]laron Stregonff, at the time of tlte criminal enterprise of the PZinces Ypsilanti. The protestatiois of this Ambassador were then not listened to, and he himself was obliged to quit Constantinople. i In case of the triumph of the Turks, how could a Russian Am. bassador be able to remain a spectator of all the horrors and cruelties ty chich a. barbarous people would not fail to surrender themselves? lis Presence would give occasion to calumniate the sentiments of the Emnperor-so impute to him the intention of bringing back the }reeks under an anarchical and barbarous power, and thus ranging on the same line Slahometans and Christians. " on the other hand, it is essential that the Powers who have auc1eeded in repressing the revolutionists of the two Peninsulas ahould take steps to prevent their seeing the cause of the Greeks re. infiorecd by the re-union of the revolutionists of all the countries wherc order h5a been re-established. ` It can only be by a prompt co-operation ofthe AlUies that a long auccessionofcalamities can be prevented, and that effusion of hu- man blbod arrestedl which has already flowed through three cam- paign;. According to aU probability, the fourth wiUl not produce re. sults-iore decisive. Xi s2,OPorte, always swollen wvith the pride of its ancient victo. rie .k3fiesirous of arriving at absolute sovereignty, while the grown warlike by three years of Tesistance and success, contemplate an absolute independence. The solution of thepro- blenilie3 between the twoextremes. The Russian Cabinet proposes thefollow-ingimeans of pacification, as a just medium between ex- nggerated end conflicting pretensions, which appear to secure to the Greeks guarartees become necessary, and to the Turks useful and teal advantages, instead of a Sovereignty liable to be zenounced and attacked. " It is thought, then, according to examples which beleng to Tur- key itself, that it may be possible to establish three principalitie6 on the Greek continent The first wil be compsned of Thessaly, of B<eonia and Attica, or eastern Greece. The second will comprise the coast ancietly belonging to Venice, (with the exception of what now belongs tD Austria), Epyrus, and Acarnania, or western Greece. The third 'will comprehend the Alores, to which may be joined the isle of Canrdia, or Southern Greece. " The islands would be subject to a municipal regime, and governj. ed nearly as they are at present. " In 1465, the Turks having Walachia, established Princes in-it, nsuject to the sovereignty of the Divan, having the privilege of dis- pensing Ottoman troops. " la 1536, Soliman I. granted the same privileges to Aolda- via, after having conquered it. Subsequently these privileges have been modified, extended, and placed under the guarautee of Russia. " In 1774, ilustapha III. wished to establish a principality in the Slorea. Unfortunately he died the same year, and the project -was abandoned. It will be objected, perhaps, that the Porte has always shown itself extremely opposed to every foreign intervention in the course of the late negotiations: but the annals of former epochs furnixh likewise examples of the admission of foreign inter. ference by the Diran. "vIn 1774, at the peace of Kainardgi, in 1779,and in 1801 ,the inter; vention of Russia and Prussia was admitted. 'RussiathinksthatttheGreeks cannot reasonably carry their hopes father. They would thus5 enjoy liberty and freedom of commerce, and wouid have their own flag. The Greek Patriarch, who would continue to reside at Constantinople, would there be, in a certain sense, the representative of the nation. The Turs xwould presrve garrisons nnd several fortresses, having a line marked out beyond Vhich they should not go. " There would be, moreover, neither Turkish Pacha nor Gover- 3sor, but eacb of the principalities would pay a tribute proportioned tO its extent and iL5 wealth. " The rules relating to interior organization would become the ob. jectof nsecondnegotiation imong thePowers. The Pozte, on Its side, would find a real advantage in negotiating. A fourth campaign will probably have no better success than the preceding ones; while the proposed arrangement would secure to it peace and tranquillity, to- gether with the regular revenues arising trom the tribute of the dif. ferent principalities. JP to the present time, rebellious Pachas disturb at every in. stant its repose, and reserve for themselves the treasures which they w7rest from the people. These revolts of ambitious and grasping Pacbhs would cease. ' lahomed lI. granted to the islands the privilege of being sim- ple tributaries. This mode of conducting their affiairs would pos. sess this advantage for the Allies-that they could guarantee such an emancipation of Greece without deviating from the principles which compose the basis of their policy, and vwithout having thc appear- ance of wishing to favour projects of an absolute independence. Russia, therefore, proposes " 1. To approve of the views announced in this memoir. " 2. To agree on the point of sending analogous instructions to the Allied Ambassadors and Ministers at Constantinople. " 3. To leave to these Ministers aU the necessary latitude. " 4. Toagree on the Dowver of communicating successively all parts of the plan of pacification proposed by the Alliance. "5r. To inform the Mtinisters that they vrill fulfil the desire of the Allies in causieg the principle of intervention to be adopted by the "6. It would be necessary to represent to the Porte, that the cre. ation of tbree principalities would diminish the efficiency of the Greek forces; and that as the Porte would have the nomination of the Hospodars., Princes, or others, it would thus attach to its in- terests the most important families among the Greeks." RUSsridN PROJECT FOR ?HE SETTLEMBNT OP GREBIX AFFAIRS.