Global Trends in Democracy: Background, U.S. Policy, and Issues for Congress
Released: 2018-10-17T00:00:00

Summary:
Widespread concerns exist among analysts and policymakers over the current trajectory of democracy around the world. Congress has often played an important role in supporting and institutionalizing U.S. democracy promotion, and current developments may have implications for U.S. policy, which for decades has broadly reflected the view that the spread of democracy around the world is favorable to U.S. interests.
The aggregate level of democracy around the world has not advanced for more than a decade. Analysis of data trend-lines from two major global democracy indexes indicates that, as of 2017, the level of democracy around the world has not advanced since around the year 2005 or 2006. Although the degree of democratic backsliding around the world has arguably been modest overall to this point, some elements of democracy, particularly those associated with liberal democracy, have receded during this period. Declines in democracy that have occurred may have disproportionately affected countries with larger population sizes. Overall, this data indicates that democracy's expansion has been more challenged during this period than during any similar period dating back to the 1970s. Despite this, democratic declines to this point have been considerably less severe than the more pronounced setbacks that occurred during some earlier periods in the 20th century.
Numerous broad factors may be affecting democracy globally. These include (but are not limited to) the following:
The growing international influence of nondemocratic governments. These countries may in some instances view containing the spread of democracy as instrumental toward other goals or as helpful to their own domestic regime stability. Thus they may be engaging in various activities that have negative impacts on democracy internationally. At the same time, relatively limited evidence exists to date of a more affirmative agenda to promote authoritarian political systems or norms as competing alternatives to democracy. The state of democracy's global appeal as a political system. Challenges to and apparent dissatisfaction with government performance within democracies, and the concomitant emergence of economically successful authoritarian capitalist states, may be affecting in particular democracy's traditional instrumental appeal as the political system most capable of delivering economic growth and national prestige. Public opinion polling data indicate that democracy as a political system may overall still retain considerable appeal around the world relative to nondemocratic alternatives. Nondemocratic governments' use of new methods to repress political dissent within their own societies. Tools such as regulatory restrictions on civil society and technology-enhanced censorship and surveillance are arguably enhancing the long-term durability of nondemocratic forms of governance. Structural conditions in nondemocracies. Some scholars argue that broad conditions in many of the world's remaining nondemocracies, such as their level of wealth or economic inequality, are not conducive to sustained democratization. The importance of these factors to democratization is complex and contested among experts.
Democracy promotion is a longstanding, but contested, element of U.S. foreign policy. Wide disagreements and well-worn policy debates persist among experts over whether, or to what extent, the United States should prioritize democracy promotion in its foreign policy. Many of these debates concern the relevance of democracy promotion to U.S. interests, its potential tension with other foreign policy objectives, and the United States' capacity to effectively promote democratization.
Recent developments pose numerous potential policy considerations and questions for Congress. Democracy promotion has arguably not featured prominently in the Trump Administration's foreign policy to this point, creating potential continued areas of disagreement between some Members of Congress and the Administration. Simultaneously, current challenges around the world present numerous questions of potential consideration for Congress. Broadly, these include whether and where the United States should place greater or lesser emphasis on democracy promotion in its foreign policy, as well as various related questions concerning the potential tools for promoting democracy.

subsections: section_title: Introduction
paragraphs: For decades U.S. policymakers have connected U.S. national security and other core interests with the spread of democracy around the world. Reflecting this, the promotion of democracy has been a longstanding and multifaceted element of U.S. foreign policy, and one often interrelated with U.S. efforts to promote human rights. Congress has often played an important role in supporting and institutionalizing U.S. democracy promotion by passing key legislation, appropriating funds for foreign assistance programs and other democracy promoting activities, and conducting oversight of aspects of U.S. foreign policy relevant to democracy promotion. 
Widespread concerns exist among analysts and policymakers over the current trajectory of democracy around the world and multiple hearings in the 115 th Congress reflected bipartisan concern over this issue. For the past decade, experts have debated whether, and to what extent, the heretofore global expansion of democracy has halted or even begun to reverse. Many argue that the world has been in the midst of what has been termed a global "democratic recession" that began around 2006. Proponents of this view cite data from global measures of democracy as well as qualitative trends that have heightened concerns over the state of democracy, particularly in recent years. Frequently cited concerns include the rise of authoritarian populist and nationalist leaders, the potential negative influence on democracy from internationally assertive authoritarian states, questions over the enduring appeal of democracy as a political system, new tools nondemocratic governments are using to stifle potential democratizing forces, and others. 
Experts vary in their assessment of the impact of these and other perceived trends and in their appraisal of what current conditions may portend for the future trajectory of democracy around the world. With regard to U.S. policy, there are disagreements over the extent to which the United States should respond to negative trends, as well as over the U.S. capacity to influence them meaningfully and effectively.
This report aims to provide Congress information, analysis, and a variety of perspectives on these issues. In particular, it provides brief conceptual background on democracy and on democracy promotion's historical role in U.S. policy, analyzes aggregate trends in the global level of democracy using data from two major democracy indexes, and discusses some of the key factors that may be broadly affecting democracy around the world. Finally, the report includes a synthesis of debates over democracy promotion in U.S. foreign policy and a selection of related policy issues and questions for Congress in the current period and beyond.
section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Varying Definitions of Democracy
paragraphs: In the most basic sense, democracy means "rule by the people." Attempts to elaborate on this definition in ways useful to policymakers and political scientists are longstanding and contested. Conceptions of democracy may vary across cultural contexts and across time, and ideological biases (conscious or otherwise) as well as the broader "political zeitgeist" of the times may play a significant role in influencing what features are considered essential to the definition of democracy.
While competing conceptions of democracy vary in numerous ways, many can be differentiated by their relative "thickness" or "thinness." Relatively "thin" definitions generally emphasize minimum elements of electoral political competition and participation, such as free and fair elections, universal suffrage, and the right to join political organizations. More expansive "thick" definitions may include these minimum elements as well as broad protections for individual rights and civil liberties (and corresponding constraints on government power and majority rule), the rule of law, well-functioning and transparent government institutions, and/or a democratic political culture, among other elements. These more expansive definitions reflect the notion that democracy consists of more than just basic elements of democratic political competition, such as elections, a contention that is now generally accepted even as the outer boundaries of the concept of democracy remain unsettled. Thus while minimalist, "thin" definitions may suffer criticism for excluding elements that are thought by many to be essential to democracy, broader "thick" definitions may conversely be criticized for including elements that to some are beyond the bounds of its core conception. 
Various adjectives are also frequently employed to denote different conceptions or levels of democracy. The term electoral democracy , for instance, is typically understood to align with more minimalist conceptions of democracy, while liberal democracy refers to those minimalist elements plus elements found in more expansive definitions. As well, while democracy is frequently understood in contrast to authoritarianism or dictatorship , many modern definitions and measures recognize that political systems often exist in middle zones, and are therefore referred to using concepts such as hybrid regime s . Attempts to identify political systems on a continuum of a broader spectrum of concepts in this way may nonetheless require the use of relatively arbitrary divisions between these concepts, given that, as one scholar has argued, "democracy is in many ways a continuous variable," as are many of its key elements. 
The concept of democracy is not explicitly defined in U.S. policy or law. Nonetheless, U.S. law generally implicitly aligns with nonminimalist views or notions of democracy. For example, the ADVANCE Democracy Act of 2007 (Title XXI of P.L. 110-53 ) associated democratic countries with eight characteristics, including some elements found in broader, "thick" definitions of democracy, such as the rule of law and various civil liberties. Similarly, the scope of democracy promotion programs as defined in appropriations bills includes elements such as the rule of law and labor rights. In line with this, unless otherwise noted, the term democracy in this report refers to broader conceptions of democracy typically associated with the term liberal democracy .
section_title: Democracy Promotion, Congress, and U.S. Policy
paragraphs: Encouraging the spread of democracy is a recurrent theme in U.S. foreign policy, though one that has been embraced unevenly given competing objectives and the differing foreign policy priorities and perspectives of presidential administrations. Congress has often advocated on a bipartisan basis for ensuring that support for democracy and human rights is an important component of U.S. policy, and has repeatedly taken legislative action to that effect. Beginning in the 1970s, in particular, Congress passed legislation to institutionalize support for democracy and human rights within the State Department, authorized and appropriated significant resources for democracy promotion programs (more than $2 billion annually in recent years), and sought to restrict aid to governments and to security forces responsible for gross human rights violations, among other measures.
The means by which the United States promotes democracy, broadly defined, include bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, sanctions and other forms of conditionality, foreign assistance programs, educational and cultural exchange programs, and public diplomacy and international broadcasting. U.S. democracy promotion also sometimes has been associated with military intervention. Many democracy promotion experts today draw a distinction between peaceful democracy support and democracy imposition, with military force falling into the latter category.
The traditional rhetorical and official policy embrace of democracy promotion by U.S. policymakers (see discussion below) has not always been reflected in U.S. foreign policy activities. For more information on the history of U.S. democracy promotion and congressional efforts in this area, particularly relating to foreign assistance programs, see CRS Report R44858, Democracy Promotion: An Objective of U.S. Foreign Assistance , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].
subsections: section_title: Identification with U.S. Strategy and Interests
paragraphs: For over a century, U.S. policymakers have emphasized to varying degrees a connection between the state of democracy in the world and U.S. foreign policy and national security interests. An overarching theme in drawing this connection has been a perceived relationship between peace and world order and the existence of partnerships between democracies with shared values. In one of the early articulations of this sentiment, President Woodrow Wilson in 1917 advocated for U.S. entry into World War I in part by arguing that "a steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations." 
Particularly since World War II, U.S. belief in democratic peace and stability has arguably led to democracy promotion's inclusion in a broader, though not comprehensively articulated, U.S. "grand strategy" alongside other elements such as the promotion of free trade and the creation of new international institutions. The efforts of the United States and its allies to construct what some refer to as the post-World War II international order were, in the words of a recent report by the RAND Corporation, "based, in part, on the assumption that no order would be sustainable if not built on a foundation of democracies with shared values," with democracy regarded "as the foundation of other core elements of the order, particularly economic growth and sustainable peace." International relations scholars and policymakers debate, however, the conception and historical importance of the international order within U.S. strategy and as a perceived instrument for peace and stability. More broadly, debates continue over whether and to what extent democracy promotion should be part of U.S. foreign policy. (See " Debates over Democracy Promotion in U.S. Foreign Policy .")
subsections: section_title: Recent Presidential Administration Policies
paragraphs: Recent presidential administrations of both parties have emphasized the view that democracies are more responsible international stakeholders and are more peaceful toward one another. President Bill Clinton's 1996 National Security Strategy (NSS) document, for instance, stated that "democratic states are less likely to threaten our interests and more likely to cooperate with the United States to meet security threats and promote free trade and sustainable development." President George W. Bush's 2006 NSS stated, "Because democracies are the most responsible members of the international system, promoting democracy is the most effective long-term measure for strengthening international stability; reducing regional conflicts; countering terrorism and terror-supporting extremism; and extending peace and prosperity." The Barack Obama Administration NSS documents included more general language connecting democracy promotion and U.S. interests. The 2010 NSS stated, for example, that "America's commitment to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law are essential sources of our strength and influence in the world," and that "our long-term security and prosperity depends on our steady support for universal values, which sets us apart from our enemies, adversarial governments, and many potential competitors for influence."
All three Presidents argued for promoting democracy at times by directly invoking the logic of what has been called the democratic peace theory , or the contention that democracies are less likely to engage in armed conflict with other democracies. The historical relative lack of war between democracies is widely recognized by scholars, though they have debated the causes of this phenomenon and its significance.
section_title: Trump Administration Policy
paragraphs: Unlike the NSS documents of previous administrations, the Trump Administration's December 2017 NSS does not articulate a general intention for the United States to actively promote democracy. The NSS does, however, include references to promoting related elements such as improved governance, anticorruption, and the rule of law, and states that the United States, "will continue to champion American values and offer encouragement to those struggling for human dignity in their societies." It also describes the United States as engaged in "political contests between those who favor repressive systems and those who favor free societies." Echoing to some degree the arguments from previous administrations, it states that "governments that respect the rights of their citizens remain the best vehicle for prosperity, human happiness, and peace," and conversely that "governments that routinely abuse the rights of their citizens do not play constructive roles in the world." Many argue that the Trump Administration has deemphasized democracy promotion relative to other foreign policy priorities, an issue that is discussed in the " Issues for Congress " section.
section_title: Global Trends
subsections: section_title: Measures of the State of Democracy Around the World
paragraphs: Numerous global indexes attempt to measure respect for democracy-related factors in nearly every country. The following discussion analyzes trends as measured by two of the most frequently cited annual indexes: Freedom House's Freedom in the World report and the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index . Examining the trajectory of democracy as measured by these indexes may help quantify and characterize perceived global democratic declines as well as help place them in broader historical context. Background information about the methodology of each report, information on other global indexes not analyzed in this report, and discussion of some of the general critiques of democracy indexes can be found in Appendix A . 
subsections: section_title: Freedom House's Freedom in the World Report
paragraphs: Freedom House's Freedom in the World country ratings are often used as a proxy measure for the level of democracy. They may correspond with relatively "thick" definitions of democracy in that they include protections for various civil liberties, the rule of law, safeguards against corruption, and other elements associated with nonminimalist definitions.
subsections: section_title: Historical Trends
paragraphs: According to Freedom House's time series data, respect for political rights and civil liberties around the globe has increased substantially since the mid-1970s. Since the release of Freedom House's first report covering 1972, the combined average of global political rights and civil liberties was at its lowest point in 1975. By 2005, this combined measure had increased by 50% (according to CRS calculations) and stood at the highest point yet recorded. (See Figure 1 below.) Similarly, the percentage of countries categorized as "free" by Freedom House (as determined by their combined average of political rights and civil liberties) peaked in 2006 and 2007 at 46.63%.
From 2005 to 2017, Freedom House has recorded an overall global decline in ratings for both civil liberties and political rights, with civil liberties having declined by a greater degree (but from a higher base). According to CRS calculations, the combined global average rating of political rights and civil liberties in the Freedom House index decreased by approximately 3.2% from 2005 to 2017. In terms of freedom gains and declines on a per-country basis, Freedom House data show that countries that have gained have been outnumbered by those that have declined every year since 2006, and the gap between these figures has grown wider since 2015. In 2017, 35 countries gained while more than double that (71) declined.
 Table 1 below compares Freedom House's country statuses for the report covering 2005, with the most recent report covering 2017. As illustrated in the table, the number and percentage of countries categorized as "not free" increased in this period. In population terms, according to Freedom House, 53% of the world's population lived in either a "not free" or "partly free" country in 2005, a figure that increased to 61% in 2017.
section_title: Trends by Subcategory
paragraphs: The discussion below breaks down the average global score for both political rights and civil liberties by their subcategories, as measured by Freedom House. As illustrated by Figure 2 and Figure 3 , the average global score for every subcategory was lower in 2017 than it was in 2005; however, the size of these declines varied. In general, civil liberties subcategories showed greater decreases, with comparatively smaller declines in political rights subcategories.
As shown above, within the political rights category, the "functioning of government" subcategory suffered the largest decline. This subcategory includes indicators relating to the extent to which freely elected officials exercise power (as opposed to nonelected actors or nonstate groups), whether there are effective safeguards against official corruption, and the extent of government transparency. The "electoral process" and "political pluralism and participation" categories, which declined more modestly, focus on the constituent components of fair elections and free political competition, including universal suffrage, fair election laws and procedures, freedom to join political parties, and other elements. 
As shown by Figure 3 above, with the exception of the "personal autonomy and individual rights" subcategory, there were larger declines in each of the civil liberties subcategories than there were in any of the political rights subcategories discussed above. This "personal autonomy and individual rights" subcategory includes indicators relating to freedom of movement, property rights, social freedoms, and equality of economic opportunity.
The "freedom of expression and belief" subcategory, which declined by the greatest degree, includes indicators on the existence of free and independent media as well as respect for religious freedom, academic freedom, and freedom of expression. The "associational and organizational rights" subcategory includes indicators relating to freedom of assembly, the free operation of nongovernmental organizations, and freedom for labor organizations. The "rule of law" subcategory includes indicators that pertain to the existence of an independent judiciary, due process, freedom from the illegitimate use of physical force (including governmental torture, war, and violent crime), and equal treatment under the law.
section_title: The Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index
paragraphs: The Economist Intelligence Unit's (EIU's) Democracy Index is a relatively new global democracy measure, with the first released report covering the state of democracy around the world in 2006. The report indicates both an overall democracy score for each country, which is determined by aggregating scores for five related categories, as well as a corresponding regime type categorization. In addition to political rights and civil liberties-related measures similar to those examined by Freedom House, EIU's index includes more emphasis on the functioning of government as well as on elements such as the level of political participation and the level of public support for democracy and democratic norms.
subsections: section_title: Trends Since 2006
paragraphs: As illustrated by Figure 4 below, the global level of democracy as measured by EIU was slightly lower in 2017 than in 2006, but this decline has not been consistent or uniform. According to calculations by CRS, the global average level of democracy in 2017 was less than 1% lower than it was in 2006. Although the renewed downward trend beginning in 2015 may continue, some might characterize the broader trajectory since 2006 to this point as reflecting stagnation more than outright decline. The discrepancy in overall decline in EIU's index as compared to Freedom House's may be due to improvements in measures of political participation that are included in the EIU index but not measured by Freedom House (see discussion below).
 Table 2 below compares EIU's global regime type categorizations for the report covering 2006, with the most recent report covering 2017. The data indicate a decrease in the number of "full democracies," but also a smaller decline in the number "authoritarian regimes." Accordingly, the two middle regime types, "flawed democracies" and "hybrid regimes," both increased in number and percentage.
section_title: Trends by Category
paragraphs: The relatively modest movement at the global level in EIU's index may mask certain underlying trends. Disaggregating EIU's global average by category demonstrates that a comparatively large increase in the "political participation" category in 2017 as compared to 2006 helped balance out declines in every other category, with the "civil liberties" category particularly negatively affected (see Figure 5 below).
The "political participation" category, which increased by a larger margin than any of the other categories declined, consists of numerous quantitative indicators not included in Freedom House's index. Many of these relate to the level of political engagement by citizens, such as voter participation rates, the rate of membership in political parties, and the level of interest in politics (as captured by public opinion polls). Some might argue that these indicators and some others included in this category, such as the level of adult literacy, while conducive to a healthy democracy, are peripheral to its core definition.
EIU's "electoral process and pluralism" and "functioning of government" categories, which both declined slightly, contain many aspects in common with Freedom House's political rights category, with a focus on the elements of free and fair elections and free political participation as well as the exercise of power by elected officials, corruption, and government transparency, among other elements. EIU's "political culture" category, which suffered a slightly larger decline, consists of measures of the level of support for democratic (or antidemocratic) norms among the population, including the level of popular support for democracy and the level of support for "strong leaders" who bypass elections.
Finally, EIU's "civil liberties" category decreased by the largest margin and includes numerous elements that are roughly analogous to those found in Freedom House's own civil liberties subcategories. These include indicators relating to free media and access to information, freedom of expression for individuals, associational rights, freedom from torture and the enjoyment of basic security, the independence of the judiciary, respect for religious freedom, equal treatment under the law, and others.
Thus, similar to Freedom House's data, EIU's index might be characterized as reflecting relatively smaller declines in elections and political participation aspects of democracy while registering larger declines in civil liberties-related elements. As noted, in the aggregate these declines are in part counter-balanced by improvements in the "political participation" measure, which may indicate increasing levels of democratic political engagement, broadly defined.
section_title: Interpreting the Declines
paragraphs: The above analysis appears to support the growing consensus that the global expansion of democracy has been halted for more than a decade. Freedom House's historical data indicates that the decline since 2005 is the most sustained setback to the gradual expansion of political rights and civil liberties since Freedom House began reporting on these measures in 1972. While declines in EIU's index have been less uniform, EIU's data also indicates that democracy has not advanced since 2006. Findings from another democracy index not analyzed here, the Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem), similarly show a lack of democratic progress at the global level in recent years. 
The magnitude of actual global backsliding during this period, however, is less clear. As noted above, according to the Freedom House data, the combined global average level of political rights and civil liberties was 3.2% lower in 2017 than the all-time high in 2005. According to EIU's data, the overall decline was more modest, with less than a 1% decrease in the global average level of democracy in 2017 as compared to 2006.
These arguably modest declines are potentially more worrying for democracy proponents when examined in terms of relative population sizes. According to Freedom House, while the percentage of "free" countries decreased one percentage point from 2005 to 2017 (from 46% to 45%), the percentage of the world's population living in a "free" country declined by seven percentage points during this same period (from 46% to 39%). EIU's figures similarly indicate that the percentage of the world's population living in either a "full" or a "flawed" democracy was below 50% in 2017, with 4.5% living in the former. This appears to comport with findings from the aforementioned V-Dem measure, which indicate that the global level of democracy is lower when taking population size into account. This difference has become more pronounced in recent years because democratic declines may have disproportionately centered on countries with large populations, such as Brazil, India, and Russia, while many of the improving countries have been those with small populations such as Burkina Faso, Fiji, and Sri Lanka.
Underlying trends in these indexes also point to some level of commonality in terms of what aspects of democracy may have seen the most pronounced declines. As the data disaggregation above illustrates, in both the Freedom House and EIU measures, the aspects of democracy relating to political competition and electoral processes appear to have suffered relatively modest declines as compared to the broader rights and institutions that are associated with well-functioning and truly "free" liberal democratic political systems, such as free and independent media, freedom of expression, freedom of association, and the rule of law. A potential explanation is that some governments may be inclined to focus on improving "what shows," such as elections, while neglecting or actively undermining less visible and less easily measured elements of democracy. This may also comport with research of longer-term trends indicating that "democratic backsliding" has over time become less overt and more incremental, consisting for instance of censorship and media restrictions, relatively subtle tactics to tilt the electoral playing field, or engineered deteriorations in judicial independence, as opposed to outright electoral fraud or blatant and sudden executive power grabs.
subsections: section_title: Outlook and Historical Context
paragraphs: Despite the negative direction of these indexes in recent years, the potential implications for the longer term trajectory of democracy remain unclear. Notably, some experts have previously critiqued the accuracy of measured declines. More broadly, and from a longer term historical perspective, analysts have noted that significant "reverse waves" against democratic expansion have been observed in prior periods before giving way once more to continued democratization. Samuel P. Huntington famously observed two prior such "reverse waves," the first lasting from 1922 to 1945 and the second from 1960 to 1975, during which the number of democracies in the world regressed significantly before giving way to renewed democratic expansion and eventual new highs in global levels of democracy around the world. Experts who have warned of challenges facing democracy in this current period concede that a comparable third such "reverse wave" has not yet manifested itself. 
Those who have cautioned against excessive pessimism about the present state of democracy argue that the number of democracies in the world remains near its all-time peak, and contend that the current alarm is partly the result of an inclination to focus on certain prominent cases of perceived decline while overlooking positive news, such as improvements in certain countries in Asia and Africa (according to EIU's index). Nonetheless, the negative trend lines particularly in the past few years have led to yet unresolved questions over whether democratic setbacks are best characterized as "localized and transitory" or whether a more significant global reversal is underfoot.
section_title: Factors Potentially Affecting Democracy Globally
paragraphs: A number of key factors that analysts believe may be affecting democracy in many countries around the world are discussed below. These broadly relevant, overarching factors may interact with relevant context-specific historical, political, social, and economic circumstances in particular regions or countries. (See Appendix B for a list of CRS reports that contain democracy-related discussions in particular contexts.)
subsections: section_title: Geopolitics and Authoritarian Power
paragraphs: Many observers contend that democracy's prior periods of expansion in the 20 th century were due in part to the influence of the most powerful countries in the international system and their efforts to shape an international environment conducive to democracy. After World War II, the United States and other leading democracies sought to embed democratic norms within multilateral institutions, including the United Nations (U.N.), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), and later the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), among others. Thus to a certain extent democracy was built into the operating system of the international order and was sometimes linked with security and economic benefits in a way that incentivized countries to meet democratic standards. Perhaps not coincidentally, the spread of democracy around the world since the mid-1970s in particular also coincided with an arguably greater emphasis on human rights and democracy in U.S. foreign policy. The economic dominance of the United States in this period also enhanced its cultural influence in ways that may have promoted democratization in closed societies.
In the current period, however, the share of global income accounted for by countries rated "not free" by Freedom House has, according to one calculation, now reached over 30% (as compared to 12% in 1990). As these nondemocratic countries develop economically, their relative capacity to project power in their geographic neighborhoods and beyond is expected to continue to increase. If perceptions about the role of the United States and other liberal democracies in having created favorable conditions for democracy are accurate, this rising authoritarian power arguably has the potential to conversely move the international political environment in a direction less hospitable to democracy.
Democracy scholars increasingly focus on the potentially widespread negative impacts to democracy from influential and "activist" authoritarian regimes. The growing international assertiveness of these countries, China and Russia foremost among them, is said to be putting the leading democracies "on the defensive." Many U.S. policymakers had hoped that Chinese and Russian engagement with the United States and other democracies, their membership in an array of international institutions, and their economic growth from participation in the international trading system might contribute to a gradual political liberalization in both countries, but these hopes have largely not come to fruition. Rather, both China and Russia, according to a RAND report, "resent key elements of the U.S. conception of postwar order, such as promotion of liberal values … viewing them as tools used by the United States to sustain its hegemony." According to a 2017 U.S. intelligence community assessment, Russia has a "longstanding desire to undermine the US-led liberal democratic order." Notably, the Trump Administration's December 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) appears to emphasize some ideological aspects of U.S. competition with these countries.
Some of the foreign policy activities of influential authoritarian countries may already be having negative impacts on democracy internationally, such as by 
attempting to undercut international support for democratic norms or related human rights norms; eroding democracy's appeal by serving as examples of economically successful alternative political systems; providing aid or other support that undermines democracy or the prospects for democratization in recipient countries; subverting democratic institutions or norms within existing democracies through "soft" and "sharp" power projection; and actively or indirectly supporting the diffusion of techniques or tools for repressing political dissent.
Some aspects of these challenges are discussed in the sections that follow.
subsections: section_title: Challenging the Universality of Democratic Norms
paragraphs: The rising international influence of authoritarian states is being accompanied to a certain extent by challenges to the idea that international norms relating to democracy and human rights are universally applicable. Although concerning for democracy proponents, the overall scope and impact of these efforts to date is unclear.
Both China and Russia in particular actively emphasize norms of state sovereignty and "noninterference" in international relations. Russia's emphasis on noninterference can take the form of defending respect for "traditional values." Within Russia, "traditional values" have been invoked to justify discriminatory policies against particular groups, such as lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) communities. Internationally, Russia has pushed for acceptance of its "traditional values" concept within the U.N. Human Rights Council. Russia's restrictive policies for civil society groups operating within Russia, justified on the basis of protecting against foreign influence, have also arguably engendered replication elsewhere (see discussion in the " Modern Methods of Political Control " section).
China's general posture is characterized by one scholar as offering "a critique of Western-style capitalism, liberal democracy and 'so-called universal values,' while presenting itself as a pragmatic, nonjudgmental partner interested only in 'win–win cooperation.'" China's principles of noninterference and respect for what has been termed "civilizational diversity" are said to undergird its engagement with foreign aid recipients such that this aid is largely free of governance conditions. Notably, according to one analysis, the top recipients of Chinese aid from 2000 to 2014 were nearly all nondemocracies. Principles of noninterference also appear to be manifest in China's efforts to promote the concept of "cyber sovereignty," arguably implicit within which is the notion that countries should be free to censor or otherwise control internet content within their borders. As with Russia, China has begun to introduce resolutions and amendments at the U.N. Human Rights Council that some researchers and human rights advocates argue aim to undermine respect for universal human rights norms. 
The multilateral Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which includes China and Russia as influential member states, also operates according to these principles of respect for sovereignty and noninterference. A 2006 joint statement by the SCO reads: "Diversity of civilization and model of development must be respected and upheld. Differences in cultural traditions, political and social systems, values and model[s] of development formed in the course of history should not be taken as pretexts to interfere in other countries' internal affairs." Although the SCO has traditionally been a regional grouping with members composed of largely authoritarian states in Central Asia, India and Pakistan joined as member states in 2017. According to some analysts, SCO's promotion of "civilizational diversity" norms may be undermining regional respect for democratic principles and having a negative impact on the democracy-related work of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
section_title: Promoting Authoritarianism?
paragraphs: Although some of their foreign policy actions may be harmful to democracy, the intentions of particular authoritarian states as they relate to democracy are complex and contested. Many authoritarian leaders are understood to be driven by a desire to maintain power and ensure regime stability, goals that are believed to influence their foreign policy decisions. China's focus on ensuring continued Communist Party of China (CPC) rule, for instance, may influence its foreign policy decisionmaking; the foreign policy actions of other influential authoritarian governments such as Russia and Iran may also be shaped by regime threat concerns. These defensive regime threat imperatives may manifest themselves in the foreign policy of states differently and inconsistently, and thus with varying implications for democracy. In general, to date there is more evidence that some authoritarian governments may hope to "contain" the spread of democracy because of its potential threat to their own regime stability than there is of broad, affirmative agendas to promote authoritarianism.
Some experts contend that authoritarian states often pursue narrow economic and geopolitical interests in their foreign policies, with support for autocrats or the undermining of democracy sometimes instrumental or incidental to the pursuit of these other ends. In this argument, Russia's support for authoritarian governments, for instance, has often been opportunistic, rooted in the desire for control over energy resources or other economic or geopolitical ends. It is also limited in scope by a cultural emphasis on the "Russian world." Some analysts, however, assert that Russia's desire to insulate itself against potential democratic political change does color its foreign policy in ways that include an interest in influencing the regime types of its neighbors. 
China's government is said to maintain a "regime-type neutral" approach to foreign policy by which it seeks good relations with countries where it has particular interests without regard to the nature of their political systems. In the words of one analyst, China to this point has exhibited "no missionary impulse to promote authoritarianism," even as its foreign policy efforts may sometimes undermine democracy or lend prestige to authoritarian systems.
Should their capabilities and opportunities continue to expand, it is possible that powerful nondemocracies could gradually begin to undertake more explicit and affirmative efforts to promote authoritarian political systems. Analysts have noted that the democracy promotion goals adopted by the United States and other democracies emerged over a period of time and expanded in scope and ambition concomitant with the expansion of these countries' international power and influence. That said, those democracy promotion efforts, in the words of one analyst, have arguably been motivated by "a clear normative commitment to democracy as a universal value," and sustained in part by genuine enthusiasm for democratic norms across many societies. While authoritarian political systems may increasingly hold instrumental appeal, it is not clear that affirmative formulations of "authoritarian values" could garner similar normative enthusiasm.
Notably, even the most politically repressive governments tend to continue to couch their own political systems in the language of democracy, using terms such as "socialist democracy," while maintaining elements, such as political parties and elections, that give the appearance of democracy. Moreover, efforts by China and Russia to promote norms of strong respect for noninterference and for differing political systems, while problematic for democracy promotion efforts, would seem to be at odds with more normatively ambitious and activist forms of authoritarianism promotion.
section_title: Challenges to Democracy's Global Appeal as a Political System
paragraphs: Signs of backsliding within existing democracies in recent years have led some experts to question whether the appeal and prestige of democracy as a political system itself is eroding around the globe. Although political conditions are highly contextualized within individual countries, citizens in a geographically and culturally diverse set of democracies have shown apparent willingness to "cast votes in large numbers for candidates whose commitment to liberal democracy was highly questionable." Arguably authoritarian or authoritarian-leaning leaders are currently in power or have previously been elected in countries as varied as Venezuela, Turkey, the Philippines, and Peru. Aspects of liberal democracy such as respect for individual rights, freedom of the press, and the rule of law have come under particular attack in many countries.
Within Western democracies such as Hungary and Poland, leaders and political parties who hold views contrary to democratic norms have also achieved electoral success. Notably, Hungary's Viktor Orbán, who was overwhelmingly elected in April 2018 to a third consecutive term as prime minister, has spoken of constructing an "illiberal state," a project alleged by critics to entail hollowing out pluralism and ensuring the dominance of the ruling party over the long term.
Political scientists have traditionally viewed countries that have reached a certain level of wealth and have experienced peaceful democratic political transitions as being stable, "consolidated" democracies largely impervious to backsliding into nondemocratic forms of government. Arguably weakening support for democracy within some long-established democracies, however, has spurred an emerging and highly contested debate over whether democratic "deconsolidation" is more possible than previously believed.
subsections: section_title: Democracy's Instrumental Appeal
paragraphs: Support for democracy around the world may rest on a combination of its intrinsic and its instrumental appeal. Whereas democracy's intrinsic appeal is rooted in personal and political freedoms, its instrumental appeal is associated with perceived positive outputs resulting from democratic governance, such as economic growth and national prestige. Some analysts assert that particularly after the end of the Cold War, many countries pursued democratizing political reforms at least in part because democracy was seen as the only viable pathway to high economic growth, modernity, and national prestige. As discussed above, democratization was also associated with membership in international institutions that provided instrumental economic and security benefits. 
If traditionally high levels of support for democracy around the world have related at least in part to its instrumental appeal, then challenges within democracies in recent years (including within the United States) may be eroding support for democracy as a political system. According to the U.S. intelligence community, some of these challenges include poor governance, economic inequality, and "weak national political institutions." Many challenges facing newer democracies in particular may relate to difficulties in establishing modern states capable of providing services in line with the demands of their citizens. The connection between democracy and attainment of the economic and security rewards of certain international institutions may also be loosening. Apparent democratic backsliding among some member states in the EU (such as Hungary and Poland) and NATO (such as Turkey) have called into question the ability and inclination of these institutions to enforce democratic standards for countries that have already acceded to membership.
Relatedly, a class of economically successful authoritarian capitalist states has emerged. To the extent that these countries, China foremost among them, are able to continue to grow at high rates while forestalling political liberalization, they may gradually be undermining the appeal of democracy as a political system by disconnecting it from its perceived association with economic success, modernity, and prestige. Recent statements by Xi Jinping have led some observers to assert that China is now openly embracing this role. In October 2017, Xi stated that China's model of "socialism with Chinese characteristics" could serve as a "new choice" for countries hoping to speed up their development and preserve their independence. Xi later stated, however, that China will not "export" its political model or ask that other countries copy China's methods.
section_title: The U.S. Example105
paragraphs: Many believe that democracy's appeal around the world has historically been enhanced by the capacity of the United States to serve as an attractive example. In recent years, some Members of Congress and others have argued that challenges in the U.S. political system are hampering the United States' ability to effectively project democratic values abroad. Experts point to problems such as polarization and polarizing rhetoric, institutional gridlock, and eroding respect for democratic norms as potentially undermining U.S. democracy promotion efforts. According to Freedom House, the United States has suffered a "slow decline" in political rights and civil liberties for several years, a deterioration that it says "accelerated" in 2017. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) for the first time categorized the United States as a "flawed democracy" in its report covering 2017 (although, as noted earlier in this report, its score narrowly missed continued categorization as a "full democracy" according to EIU).
section_title: Measures of Support for Democracy106
paragraphs: Perhaps reflecting some of the dynamics discussed above, a Pew Research Center report summarizing 2017 polling data across a set of 38 geographically and economically diverse countries found mixed attitudes about the performance of democracy. Nonetheless, the same report indicated that support for democracy as a political system remains high, with support far exceeding most nondemocratic alternatives. A median of 78% of respondents approved of representative democracy, while more than 70% disapproved of either rule by a "strong leader" or rule by the military. The only nondemocratic alternative to garner plurality approval was "rule by experts." (See Figure 6 below.) Approximately 23% of respondents expressed support for representative democracy and rejected all three nondemocratic alternatives posed. Pew found that the proportion of these "committed democrats" in a country was correlated with its level of wealth as well as its level of democracy as measured by EIU, suggesting that support for democracy is highest within richer and more democratic countries.
Beyond this broad snapshot, analyses of polling data measuring support for democracy over time and within individual countries does not appear to demonstrate a single, clear overall global negative trend. For instance, an analysis sought to gauge the trajectory of support for democracy across 134 countries since 1990 by statistically aggregating data from a large number of polls. The findings indicated that baseline levels of support for democracy differed between established democracies, new democracies, and nondemocracies (with levels of support generally highest within established democracies), but that recent trend-lines across each type varied across countries and regions. Some countries exhibited a distinct downward trajectory of support in recent years, while others showed marked increases during the same period. Many countries showed relatively stable levels of support. 
This mixed picture is also reflected in trends within regional polls. For instance, according to a 2014-2015 poll of 34 African countries, since 2012 support for democracy had increased in 10 countries, decreased in 14 countries, and had no statistically significant change in 10 countries. Among nine countries in the Middle East and North Africa region, polling data comparing levels of support for democracy in 2010-2011 versus 2012-2014 shows that support remained essentially unchanged in five countries, decreased in two countries, and increased in two countries. Within Latin America, although there have been considerable changes in levels of support within particular countries, the aggregate level of support across the region has reportedly remained largely unchanged since 1995.
These varied trend-lines are perhaps unsurprising given the myriad distinct political, social, and economic contexts and developments within countries around the globe. Nonetheless, they may also indicate that support for democracy as a political system, at least among general publics, is not eroding to the degree that many democracy proponents fear. Rather, to the extent that public opinion polling is a reliable indicator (see text box below), support overall appears resilient to this point. This may buttress the claim, as articulated by one scholar, that "democracy may be receding in practice, but it is still ascendant in peoples' values and aspirations … few people in the world today celebrate authoritarianism as a superior moral system … [or] the best form of government."
section_title: Modern Methods of Political Control
paragraphs: In addition to concerns over their international influence, nondemocracies are also using new and sophisticated tools to forestall the potential formation of democratizing forces within their own societies. Many of these modern tools may be less heavy-handed, and thus less likely to engender societal backlash, than traditional forms of repression. They may also be less resource intensive. These methods, some of which are discussed below, are thus potentially contributing to more durable forms of nondemocratic governance.
subsections: section_title: Civil Society Restrictions115
paragraphs: Civil society organizations (CSOs), which are often viewed as an important component of sustainable democracy, are confronting growing limitations on their ability to operate around the world. From restrictions on the types of funding they are allowed to receive to stringent registration requirements, the measures targeting CSOs are increasingly putting pressure on the entire civil society sector in certain countries. These restrictions are most commonly, but not exclusively, imposed by authoritarian and hybrid regimes seeking to limit the influence of nongovernmental actors. This phenomenon is commonly referred to by researchers and advocates as the "closing space" for civil society work around the world.
The origins of the closing space phenomenon vary and are often country-specific. That said, scholars have pointed to several factors that have contributed to the spread of civil society restrictions. After the end of the Cold War era, Western governments, including the United States, substantially increased funding for pro-democracy CSOs. Concurrently, a number of events caused some governments to view the civil society sector warily, including the color revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, the later Arab Spring movements, and others. Publicly, many states have sought to justify civil society restrictions on national security and counterterrorism grounds; critics argue that such measures are merely pretexts for cracking down on certain civil society sectors or activities. Some countries have also justified civil society restrictions, particularly those concerning foreign funding, on the basis of sovereignty.
Experts cite Russia's suppression of civil society in particular as a model that other states may have sought to emulate. Russian government measures restricting civil society have included requiring groups that receive foreign funding and engage in "political activity," broadly defined, to register as foreign agents. Later measures granted the Russian government the authority to unilaterally declare a CSO a foreign agent, as well as the discretion to shut down or limit the activities of CSOs deemed a threat to national security. 
A broad range of other governments have imposed similar restrictions on civil society. According to the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL), between 2012 and 2015, 60 countries enacted a total of over 120 laws to constrain the freedom of association or assembly (see Figure 7 below). In some cases, restrictions render the structure, funding streams, or activities of CSOs illegal or otherwise impossible to sustain, forcing organizations to cease operations. CSOs that depend on foreign funding or staff are particularly vulnerable, as are those that focus on social or political issues that can be deemed subversive or threatening to national interests pursuant to vaguely written laws. In other cases, governments initiate investigations or legal proceedings against CSOs for alleged violations of laws related to CSO registration, funding, or activities. Such cases may be intended to drain CSOs of resources and/or to intimidate other groups into compliance.
section_title: Technological Tools127
paragraphs: Optimism about the potential democratizing power of new information technologies, the internet, and social media has been tempered in recent years as nondemocratic governments have grown more adept at using technological means to censor, monitor, distort, or otherwise repress potential social and political opposition. In general, many emerging technologies are perhaps best understood as "dual use" in the sense that, depending on how they are utilized, they have the potential for both positive and negative impacts on democracy. Authoritarian governments appear to have shown an ability to mitigate many of the politically threatening aspects of these new technologies, and over time may increasingly have the capacity to actively leverage them in service of social and political control.
Efforts to restrict free expression online have accelerated in some countries since the aforementioned color revolutions and the Arab Spring movements, which saw activists and citizens share information and organize mass protests via social media in an unprecedented fashion. According to Freedom House, internet freedom restrictions can be divided into three main categories: obstacles to access, limits on content, and violations of user rights. Obstacles to access may relate to poor infrastructure or high costs, but also to blanket and deliberate outages, such as during politically sensitive periods or in politically sensitive areas. Content limitations consist of proactive efforts to shape the information environment online such as through technical filters or censors to block websites and/or certain content. In some cases, governments may also use forms of offline punishment such as criminal or extralegal detention to deter individuals from engaging in certain online speech or political organizing. Relatedly, government-sponsored cyberattacks on media outlets, opposition leaders, and activists are also reportedly on the rise. 
Increasingly, government efforts also extend to active manipulation of online discourse through automated bots or paid commentators, which artificially spread pro-government messages or use misinformation to distract or confuse online audiences, thereby "drowning out" the online speech of individuals seen as threatening to the government. According to the U.S. intelligence community, the use of these tactics by governments around the world has "increased dramatically in the past 10 years." 
Human rights organizations argue that well-resourced and technologically advanced authoritarian states are also developing and deploying advanced technologies to more comprehensively track the online and offline activities of their citizens in ways that may be aimed, at least in part, at anticipating and repressing sources of political dissent. China's efforts are foremost among these and include facial recognition-enhanced public surveillance and the use of "big data" information collection and aggregation technologies. These and other emerging technologies may increasingly use efficient and scalable forms of artificial intelligence (AI) that could lower the costs required for maintaining social control. 
Although the most advanced of these technologies are being developed in a small number of countries, they may increasingly spread to other governments over time. Analysts have noted, for instance, reports of Chinese-developed facial recognition technologies having already been marketed and sold to some foreign government customers. 
section_title: Structural Conditions
paragraphs: Some analysts contend that the lack of global democratic expansion in recent years, and its arguably modest backsliding, is rooted in unfavorable conditions for democratization in many of the world's remaining nondemocracies. These arguments draw on academic research indicating that structural conditions such as wealth, international linkages, and levels of inequality may have considerable impact on a country's likelihood of sustained democratization. Thus, according to some analysts, challenges in the current period are not particularly surprising, and might be expected to continue, because "nearly every country with minimally favorable conditions for democracy" had already democratized by the mid-2000s. 
These arguments may be buttressed by the fact that many factors that were previously understood by scholars to support democratization are increasingly believed to have more ambiguous effects. Increasing levels of wealth, for instance, may not be as closely associated with democratization as previously believed, and may contribute to regime stability for democracies and some authoritarian states alike. Relatedly, the relationship between state capacity and democracy is complex and, according to some experts, not necessarily mutually supportive. Within authoritarian regimes, strong state capacity may help forestall democratization by enhancing what scholars call "performance legitimacy" through the government's ability to provide valued public goods, as well as its capacity to monitor and respond to dissent. Some research also supports what has been referred to as the "oil curse," or the notion that countries with natural resource wealth are less likely to democratize. This may be because their governments can use abundant revenues from these resources to similarly undercut societal demands for democracy (among other theorized causal factors). 
How much any of these or other factors alone or together may affect the prospects for democratization in a given country is a complex and contested question. Experts who have emphasized these factors as helping to explain the challenges to democracy in the current period concede that favorable conditions are not always necessary for democratization, but contend that they are causally important. Some analysts argue against excessive emphasis on these conditions and point to prior examples of democratization in countries where the scholarship would indicate this to be unlikely.
section_title: Debates over Democracy Promotion in U.S. Foreign Policy
paragraphs: Rationales for U.S. democracy promotion are varied. As noted, U.S. leaders have long drawn links between the state of global democracy and U.S. national security and economic interests. In addition, Members of Congress and others have sometimes asserted that the United States has a moral obligation to promote democracy and human rights, and some scholars argue that an inclination within U.S. foreign policy for "values promotion" derives from fundamental aspects of American political culture. Nonetheless, analysts continue to debate the extent to which the United States should promote democracy and what the proper balance of emphasis is between this objective and other foreign policy priorities. Some have questioned the appropriateness of democracy promotion at a basic level, such as by asserting that it constitutes an imposition of American values on other societies. There are also debates over whether these efforts constitute violations of sovereignty or improper interference in the politics of other countries. Supporters of democracy promotion have defended these activities as legitimate and generally argue that aspirations for, and values reflecting, democratic freedoms are universal. 
More broadly, many disagreements over the proper placement of democracy promotion within U.S. foreign policy tend to relate to the extent to which democracy promotion is seen as supportive of U.S. national interests, the extent of its potential tension with the pursuit of other objectives, and whether the United States has the means and capacity over the long-term to effectively support the spread of democracy and prevent backsliding. These thematic trends are summarized below.
subsections: section_title: Relationship to U.S. Interests
paragraphs: Scholars, democracy promotion advocates, and U.S. policymakers have associated the spread of democracy around the world with U.S. interests in various ways. As noted earlier, the rationale for democracy promotion has rested on the contention that democracies are generally more reliable and trustworthy international partners of the United States, and on the argument that democracies are considerably less likely to go to war with one another. Regarding the former argument, some argue that democratic transparency may make democracies particularly conducive to supporting the international agreements and institutions that populate the current international order. Accordingly, many believe that greater numbers of democracies supports the resilience of this order, which has arguably brought myriad economic and security benefits to the United States. Scholars continue to debate, however, the order's importance as compared to traditional relative power dynamics between countries.
With regard to democratic peace, most scholars agree that, as a historical matter, democracies have rarely engaged in major military conflict with one another. Some of the potential (and potentially mutually supportive) explanations for this include that the democratic and rights-respecting character of liberal democracies inculcates genuine mutual shared respect among democracies and also makes war against such a government less easily justified; and that democratic leaders operate within political systems that make them more inclined to peaceful resolution of conflicts, and expect leaders of other democracies to be similarly predisposed. That said, scholarly debate remains over the purported causal explanations for the democratic peace theory, with some arguing that these explanations have not been convincingly evidenced in the historical record, as well as other critiques of the theory. 
Moreover, observers note that existing threats to U.S. security, including "rogue" or revisionist governments and terrorist organizations, tend to be associated with or emanate from nondemocracies. Some claim that liberal democratic political systems may be inherently less likely to suffer from internal armed conflicts or terrorism.
section_title: Potential Tension with Other U.S. Policy Objectives
paragraphs: Democracy promotion may in some instances conflict with the pursuit of other U.S. foreign policy objectives, and the United States may thus face difficult trade-offs in its democracy promotion agenda. At a general level, U.S. emphasis on democracy promotion may contribute to greater levels of tension and distrust between the United States and nondemocratic governments, which can hamper the prospects for cooperation toward other objectives. For instance, the United States must often choose whether and to what extent to partner with and support nondemocratic governments such as those of Egypt and Saudi Arabia in the pursuit of shared counterterrorism or regional geopolitical goals. Similarly, in the midst of arguably growing geopolitical competition in Asia between the United States and China, some analysts argue that nondemocratic governments of key third countries such as Vietnam may be less inclined to align with the United States if it insists on strong adherence to democratic standards. On the other hand, some argue that the United States' shared democratic values with its allies, as contrasted with the repressive political systems of its major authoritarian competitors, can be powerfully emphasized in its efforts to compete geopolitically with these countries.
Scholarly research indicates that new democracies or countries in political transition may for a period be more nationalistic, less stable, and more likely to engage in conflict than other countries. New democratically elected governments may also in some instances be accountable to electorates that possess anti-American views, and may thus be less likely than the governments they replaced to see their interests as aligned with other U.S. objectives. Although democracies are generally believed to perform better at protecting human rights than nondemocracies, in some cases the introduction of democratic political competition in the absence of strong protections for individual rights may negatively affect the treatment of ethnic and religious minorities or other marginalized communities. 
Conversely, unwavering support for repressive authoritarian governments in the pursuit of security interests can create anti-American resentments among the populations of these countries. This may create significant long-term negative impacts on relations in the event that these governments are toppled. Moreover, some argue that support for democracy may in many instances have an underappreciated role in addressing security concerns over the longer term. For instance, promoting political inclusion and pluralism and the rule of law may help address the root causes of terrorism.
section_title: Capacity and Effectiveness
paragraphs: Democracy promotion skeptics question the capacity of the United States to spread democracy in other countries whose societal, historical, and cultural contexts can differ markedly from the United States. They cite unsuccessful, and sometimes counterproductive, efforts to promote democracy, particularly after military interventions, such as those undertaken in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Among democracy promotion supporters and detractors alike, there has been increasing understanding that democratization is a protracted, uncertain, and nonlinear process, with often considerable constraints on the ability of the United States (or others) to positively influence the process. Democracy promotion experts acknowledge that democratic transitions should be largely driven by internal forces, but contend that the United States or other external actors can in some instances play a productive supporting role. They cite numerous instances in which U.S. support may have done so, although attempting to evaluate the precise impact of U.S. democracy promotion efforts in specific instances is challenging given the complex factors affecting democracy in any given country at a given time. 
section_title: Issues for Congress
paragraphs: Congress plays a key role in influencing and shaping many aspects of U.S. policy and programs relating to democracy promotion. As it carries out its legislative and oversight responsibilities, Congress may consider a number of questions in the current period and beyond.
subsections: section_title: How does the Trump Administration view democracy promotion?
paragraphs: The Trump Administration's views on democracy promotion may conflict with those of Members of Congress who support democracy promotion as a priority in U.S. foreign policy. Statements by the President and senior administration officials arguably have indicated a preference for downgrading democracy and human rights promotion in favor of greater emphasis on economic and security issues in U.S. foreign relations. Former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, in articulating the Administration's "America First" policy as it relates to foreign affairs, drew a distinction between U.S. foreign policies and U.S. values, the latter of which he described as relating to "freedom, human dignity, the way people are treated." He argued that "in some circumstances, if you condition our national security efforts on someone adopting our values, we probably can't achieve our national security goals or our national security interests … it really creates obstacles to our ability to advance our national security interests, our economic interests."
This stated distinction between U.S. policies and values, and the absence of an explicit democracy promotion goal within the Administration's National Security Strategy (NSS), may represent a shift from recent prior administrations. The Administration has also proposed significant cuts to democracy promotion foreign assistance programs (specific figures are discussed in the following section) that have drawn criticism from some Members of Congress. More broadly, some scholars and analysts charge that the Administration is failing to adequately defend the institutions of the international order, which, as discussed in earlier portions of this report, may support and/or be supported by shared democratic values. In light of these and other developments, some observers contend that the Trump Administration may intend to move away from a U.S. leadership role in promoting democracy overseas. 
The Administration's degree of interest regarding democracy promotion may evolve over time, however, as has arguably been the case with prior administrations. The White House's February 2018 decision to cut foreign aid to the Cambodian government because of setbacks to democracy there led one analyst to assert that the Trump Administration's approach to democracy promotion is "not so clear cut." Tillerson's successor, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, has indicated support for democracy promotion. At his nomination hearing in April 2018, Pompeo stated that "if we do not lead the calls for democracy, for prosperity, and for human rights around the world, who will? No other nation is so equipped with the same blend of power and principal." At the same hearing, when asked, he affirmed that promoting democracy is in the national interest of the United States. Also, as the Trump Administration has continued to develop and expound on its particular foreign policy strategies, some officials have emphasized democracy-related elements within these strategies. The Administration has also emphasized democracy with regard to countries seen as hostile to the United States such as Venezuela and Iran. Nonetheless, there may continue to be points of tension between the Administration's approach to and prioritization of democracy promotion as compared to the preferences of some Members of Congress. 
section_title: How much emphasis should the United States place on democracy promotion?
paragraphs: S upporters of democracy promotion have argued that challenges in the current period necessitate greater U.S. efforts and commitment in order to help forestall a more protracted decline. Some contend that democracy promotion can usefully play a greater role in top-level U.S. foreign policy as it arguably has during some prior periods by seeking "transformative change in strategically important countries," and complementing and reinforcing ongoing U.S.-funded democracy promotion programs. This could conceivably entail tools such as high-level diplomacy, significant trade or aid conditionality, or multilateral initiatives, and could potentially involve modifications of U.S. relations with certain non democracies . Such efforts might to a certain extent tie into broader efforts to defend the norms and institutions of the international order. Some of these issues are noted in subsequent questions below.
Given arguments that democracy promotion may entail trade-offs with regard to other U.S. interests, however, some analysts advocate a "triage" approach that weighs potential downside risks when determining which countries the United States should prioritize for democracy promotion. 
Those particularly critical of democracy promotion tend to argue that the United States should curtail these efforts in pursuit of a foreign policy that, in their view, more closely reflects U.S. capacity and the pursuit of vital U.S. interests . Given present challenges in the U.S. political system , some also assert that one of the best means of promoting democracy abroad is for the United States to focus on shoring up democracy at home.
section_title: What tools exist for targeted U.S. foreign policy responses to particular challenges?
paragraphs: Given that democratic declines in recent years may relate particularly to erosions in respect for freedom of expression and association, media freedom, and rule of law-related elements (see " Interpreting the Declines "), the United States may consider prioritizing new or continuing diplomatic, programmatic, or other tools that focus on these democracy elements. Toward this end, Congress may take stock of U.S. efforts to date to combat the impacts of closing space for civil society in countries around the globe. While the United States has engaged with and promoted civil society in other countries for decades, the U.S. government during the Obama Administration began to take specific actions aimed in part at addressing the closing space challenge. This included a Presidential Memorandum that directed executive departments and agencies to work with CSOs even when there are restrictive local laws and to oppose restrictions on civil society and fundamental freedoms (among other directives), funding for new CSO assistance programs, and other initiatives.
Other new or existing tools might also focus on countering international efforts by nondemocratic governments in the media space that are corrosive to democracy. Notably, Congress in 2016 broadened the mandate of the State Department's Global Engagement Center (GEC) to include countering state-sponsored propaganda and disinformation (Section 1287 of P.L. 114-328 ). GEC is in the process of awarding Public Diplomacy (PD) grants that are part of an "Information Access Fund," which the department says will "support public and private partners working to expose and counter propaganda and disinformation from foreign nations." Also potentially relevant is the work of U.S. international broadcasting entities overseen or funded by the U.S. Agency for Global Media (formerly the Broadcasting Board of Governors, BBG).
Congress may also consider whether and how to directly promote democracy through capacity building partnerships with other legislatures such as those carried out under the auspices of the House Democracy Partnership. The House Democracy Partnership was established in 2005 and is composed of 20 Members of the House of Representatives. It aims to promote "responsive, effective government and strengthening democratic institutions by assisting legislatures in emerging democracies." As of 2018, it has worked with partner legislatures in Afghanistan, Burma, Colombia, Georgia, Haiti, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Liberia, Macedonia, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste, and Ukraine.
section_title: How much funding should be provided for democracy promotion programs?
paragraphs: Congress may consider whether the current challenges to democracy have implications for the amount of funding appropriated for democracy promotion programs. In determining funding levels, Members of Congress may weigh a potential desire to respond to these challenges against the opportunity costs of these resources in light of numerous other funding priorities. On average, Congress has appropriated more than $2 billion annually in the past decade for democracy programs, broadly defined. The Trump Administration's FY2018 request proposed $1.689 billion for democracy promotion assistance, an estimated 32% decrease as compared to FY2017-enacted levels. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P.L. 115-141 ), ultimately specified approximately $2.479 billion for democracy promotion programs. The Administration's FY2019 budget has proposed $1.480 billion in democracy promotion assistance, an approximately 40% decrease from FY2018-enacted levels. 
section_title: How can democracy programs be meaningfully evaluated and/or usefully targeted?
paragraphs: Difficult to measure objectives, long time horizons, and other factors may make democracy promotion programs inherently more difficult to measure than many other foreign assistance programs. Moreover, according to one democracy aid expert, aid providers "too rarely fund the sort of in-depth, independent studies that examine the underlying assumptions, methods, and outcomes in a sector of democracy aid." Although an evaluation commissioned in 2006 by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) found that USAID and democracy and governance programs had a positive impact on democracy, no comparable study has been conducted since.
Many analysts have argued for what they consider to be more strategic targeting of democracy promotion resources, particularly in light of funding constraints. Some argue that such targeting is important because of perceived competing and more narrowly concentrated democracy-eroding external influences in some countries. A broader policy of "triage," as mentioned above, could potentially help inform funding allocations. Analysts contend that these allocations may be usefully informed by criteria such as whether programs can be coupled with broader diplomatic efforts and/or whether conducive structural conditions are present. Given recent democratic backsliding within existing democracies, some scholars have also warned against prematurely cutting off aid to new democracies. Researchers have found that democracy programs are more effective when their goals align with broader U.S. policy and are supported by the use of diplomatic tools such as sanctions or aid conditionality. Congress has a direct role in shaping these tools. 
Some experts have also argued for a more differentiated allocation of democracy promotion resources between the major funders (including USAID, the State Department, and the National Endowment for Democracy) based on the particular strengths of their funding models in relation to the type of project to be funded and the extent of political openness in the target country. Scholars have noted that many programs carried out under the banner of promoting democracy may relate more closely to arguably tangential goals such as good governance, and some have questioned the assumption that these goals support democratization.
section_title: Should the United States work to form new international initiatives to defend democracy?
paragraphs: In the view of some analysts, the more challenging international terrain for democracy and the growing influence of authoritarian countries in the current period calls for renewed and more robust international collaboration in defense of democracy and democratic norms. To that end, the United States might consider new initiatives among like-minded democracies, potentially including those outside of Western Europe and North America. Multilateral initiatives may usefully combat perceptions among some abroad that democracy promotion is linked to narrow U.S. geostrategic interests. Relevant existing democracy-focused initiatives that might be utilized include the Community of Democracies and the Open Government Partnership.
Some argue that the United States and other democracies should focus on countering efforts by nondemocracies to contest the universal applicability of democratic norms within international institutions. Various U.N. bodies, the OSCE, and others should be increasingly viewed, in the words of one analyst, as "arenas of competition over democracy norms," and the United States should "do more to build up explicit democracy caucuses within these institutions" while also placing greater emphasis on the democracy elements of organizations such as NATO. Relatedly, some analysts have argued for establishing multilateral groupings of democracies centered on combating political interference activities by authoritarian countries.
Multilateral efforts may face limitations, however, because they are inherently complex and must account for differing ideas and interests among participating nations. They may entail participation from many newer democracies that have arguably not shown the same inclination to defend or promote democracy abroad as have the United States and other older democracies. Some also contend that shared democratic principles alone may be insufficient as an organizing principle for collective action among nations. Notably, in withdrawing from the U.N. Human Rights Council and pledging to cut funding to the council and to the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Trump Administration has arguably exhibited a preference against promoting "values" issues within certain multilateral venues. Relatedly, the withdrawal from the council also removes the ability of the United States to vote against resolutions that are perceived to be aimed at undermining respect for democracy or human rights norms.
section_title: Outlook
paragraphs: Looking forward, the trends analyzed and described in this report likely portend continued near-term constraints on democratic expansion around the world, and in some cases have the potential to pose a range of persistent challenges for policymakers. Congress may continue to grapple with policy considerations within and in light of this difficult context in the near future. As the above discussion illustrates, some of these considerations may relate to the overarching strategic orientation of U.S. foreign policy and democracy promotion's place within that, while others concern second order questions about particular means, resources, and resource allocation. To the extent that there are differences in interest in democracy promotion between Members of Congress and the executive branch, these considerations may also entail questions about the institutional role of Congress in democracy promotion and in U.S. foreign policy generally.
Appendix A. Background Information on Democracy Indexes
Background on Freedom House's Freedom in the World Report
Freedom House's Freedom in the World report has measured the level of civil liberties and political rights in each country annually since 1972. Freedom House reporting has also rated a varying number of territories each year; the ratings for these are not included in the data discussions in this report. According to Freedom House, its methodology is derived largely from the United Nations (U.N.) Universal Declaration of Human Rights and "operates from the assumption that freedom for all people is best achieved in liberal democratic societies." Freedom House uses both in-house and external analysts and advisers to determine country ratings. Scores in each category, which are tabulated to determine overall political rights and civil liberties ratings, are guided by a set of methodological questions. For instance, under civil liberty's rule of law category, one of the questions is "Is there an independent judiciary?" along with associated sub-questions, such as "Do executive, legislative, and other governmental authorities comply with judicial decisions, and are these decisions effectively enforced?" Analysts use a range of sources including news articles, scholarly analysis, NGO reports, and in-country research. 
Background on the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index
The Economist Intelligence Unit's (EIU's) Democracy Index began coverage in 2006; new reports were issued biannually until the report covering 2010, and have been issued on an annual basis since then. EIU's index is based on an array of 60 indicators, some of which are may be at the outer bounds of democracy's core definition. For instance, its political participation category includes indicators that measure rates of participation in political parties or political nongovernmental organizations, the rate at which adults follow politics in the news, and public confidence in the government and political parties, among other measures. In addition to assessments by experts, many indicators are also determined by public opinion surveys, such as the World Values Survey and others. For example, an indicator in the political participation category measuring citizens' political engagement uses a measure of the "percentage of people who are very or somewhat interested in politics" as measured by the World Values Survey, if available.
Other Democracy Indexes
Numerous other democracy-related indexes and databases, some expansive in scope and others focused on particular regions or on particular components of democracy, are also used by policymakers and scholars. A relatively new global democracy measure, the Varieties of Democracy Project, or V-Dem, consists of over 350 indicators covering five indexes associated with differing conceptions of democracy. Another measure, Polity IV, is frequently cited in the academic literature and has been characterized as a relatively minimalist measure that focuses on procedural aspects of democracy. Despite this, it has been shown to be highly correlated with Freedom House's measure; this correlation is attenuated when countries at the democratic/authoritarian extreme are excluded, indicating (sometimes wide) disagreement over more middling countries. Other major indexes or aggregation of indexes include (but are not limited to) Freedom House's Nations in Transit report, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, the Electoral Integrity Project, The World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (particularly the Voice and Accountability indicators), and International IDEA's Global State of Democracy report.
Critiques of Global Democracy Indexes
Experts note that different indexes are organized around overlapping but different conceptions of democracy, and they sometime disagree widely on the state of democracy in a particular country, especially with regard to middling "hybrid regimes." Differences between indexes may also be exacerbated by the use of differing sources and methods of evaluation, differing and contested aggregation methods, the selection of flawed or redundant indicators, flaws or inconsistencies related to the use of expert coding, and other factors. Some have also argued that popular indexes may suffer from ideological biases or may sometimes favor advocacy at the expense of scientific rigor. Organizations that produce the indexes have emphasized processes designed to reduce political bias and ensure methodological rigor. CRS does not endorse the value or accuracy of any particular index.
Appendix B. Selected CRS Reports 
This appendix presents a list of selected CRS reports that are referenced elsewhere in this report or that include significant discussions of democracy-related developments in a particular region or country context.
CRS Report R44858, Democracy Promotion: An Objective of U.S. Foreign Assistance , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R44891, U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R44775, Russia: Background and U.S. Policy , by [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R41007, Understanding China's Political System, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R44897, Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress , by [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R45200, Internet Freedom in China: U.S. Government Activity, Private Sector Initiatives, and Issues of Congressional Interest , by [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R44037, Cambodia: Background and U.S. Relations , by [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R43132, Human Rights, Civil Unrest, and Political Reform in Burma in 2013 , by [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R44017, Iran's Foreign and Defense Policies, by [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R44793, Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues, Challenges, and U.S. Responses , by [author name scrubbed] et al. CRS Report R43166, Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and U.S. Relations , by [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R45120, Latin America and the Caribbean: Issues in the 115th Congress , coordinated by [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R44841, Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations , coordinated by [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R44822, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 115th Congress , by [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R43888, Cuba Sanctions: Legislative Restrictions Limiting the Normalization of Relations , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R43311, Iran: U.S. Economic Sanctions and the Authority to Lift Restrictions , by [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R43521, U.S. International Broadcasting: Background and Issues for Reform , by [author name scrubbed] CRS Report RL32427, Millennium Challenge Corporation , by [author name scrubbed]