House Committee System: Jurisdiction and Referral Reform Options
Released: 2004-03-24T00:00:00

Summary:
On January 7, 2003, the House created a Select Committee on Homeland Security withlegislative and oversight jurisdiction over the newly created Department of Homeland Security. The selectcommittee is alsomandated to study House rules, including Rule X, as they apply to homeland security matters, and to recommendchanges to theHouse Rules Committee no later than September 30, 2004. This report briefly addresses jurisdiction and referralreform options. Itwill be updated if events warrant.

paragraphs: RS21643 -- House Committee System: Jurisdiction and Referral Reform Options
Updated March 24, 2004
subsections: section_title: Overview
paragraphs: The committee system is central to the legislative process. Committees are the initial point of referral for measures introduced andoften the place where the fate of a measure is determined, in part because most measures must be reported bycommittee before theycan be considered by the House. Notwithstanding changes which have occurred over time (1) , the Select Committee on HomelandSecurity has been charged with conducting a review of House rules, including Rule X, as they apply to homelandsecurity matters,and recommending changes to the Rules Committee no later than September 30, 2004. (2)
No characteristic of the committee system is more critical than its jurisdictional structure. Critics charge that despite changes inrecent years, Congress has not sufficiently shifted the system's focus toward newly emerged policy areas. Questionshave been raisedconcerning duplication, overlap, or neglect of some issues, and a perceived impediment to policymaking.
Related to the issue of jurisdiction is the committee referral process. Authority is vested in the Speaker to makebill referrals and toidentify a primary committee if a measure is to be referred to more than one panel. In the 108thCongress, pursuant to House RuleXII, clause 2, the Speaker was given authority to refer a measure without designating a primary committee under"extraordinarycircumstances." The Speaker also has the authority to impose time limits on committees receiving a referral,whether a primarycommittee is designated or not. 
Advocates of rules changes believe it necessary to alter committee jurisdictions to facilitate comprehensive policymaking, to reflectcontemporary policy issues in jurisdictional language, and to simplify the referral process. Alternatively, othersbelieve itunnecessary or unfeasible to change current jurisdictions because policy issues cannot be neatly compartmentalized. 
Arguments in favor of altering committee jurisdictions include the following:
Jurisdictions may be outdated, fragmented, and overlapping.
Contemporary problems and issues, such as homeland security, are not reflected in jurisdictionallanguage, andare divided among too many panels to allow comprehensive policymaking.
Congress's need to rely on select committees offers evidence that current jurisdictional arrangementsareinadequate.
Arguments against altering committee jurisdictions include the following: 
Overlap of jurisdictions is impossible to eliminate, in part because contemporary policy issues are broad, havediverse dimensions, and cannot be neatly defined.
Policymaking problems stem largely from difficult, interwoven national problems and not fromjurisdictionalarrangements for addressing them.
Any reduction in panels along with jurisdictional change could deprive Members and interest groupsofmultiple avenues for influencing decision making.
Although the House has used select committees to handle recent homeland security issues, the Housenowgenerally relies less on select committees than it did during the past several decades.
Proposals relating to jurisdiction and referral changes can be seen as sweeping, incremental, or minimal. Somehave suggested asystem of numerous committees with relatively narrow jurisdictions, while others have advocated having a fewcommittees withrelatively broad jurisdiction. Proposals to make House and Senate committee systems parallel, or to correlate themwith federalagency responsibilities or budget functions, have also been put forward. Some have suggested matching thejurisdictions ofauthorizing panels with those of the Appropriations Committee's subcommittees. Some have suggested merelyclarifying Rule X bymaking the terms more explicit or by incorporating new concepts not now in the rule. Some have also called forcodifying in therules informal precedents and agreements between committees. Still others have recommended making Rule Xreflect programmaticresponsibilities by including specific references to particular laws or programs rather than the terminology currentlyused. Some aremerely seeking a more definitive listing of subject responsibilities among committees. 
These options are illustrative, not the only ones available, and they are not mutually exclusive. Underlying all proffered options,however, is the assumption that institutional change is indeed needed, that strict adherence to existing rules andprocedures isinsufficient and unrealistic. Not all Members agree.
Some House Members and outside observers believe that structural change is not necessary. For them, the absence of a policyconsensus on major issues among House Members slows legislative action more than does any kind oforganizational inadequacy. 
Finally, possible jurisdictional realignment and the current House bill referral process are integrally related. Some Members contendthat, had the 1974 rules change permitting multiple referrals been accompanied by a proposed comprehensiverealignment ofcommittee jurisdictions, current referral problems and calls for jurisdictional change might have been lessened. Others note,however, that the House has undertaken major jurisdictional and structural changes in its committee system, mostrecently in 1995;they believe action now is less urgent.
section_title: Options for Realigning Committee Jurisdictions
paragraphs: The following section briefly notes various options that have been suggested, currently or in the recent past, for altering Housecommittee jurisdictions. The primary arguments for and against each approach are noted. The list below isillustrative of the rangeof ideas and approaches under consideration. Additionally, some advocates of jurisdictional change might want twoor moreapproaches combined, depending upon the policy issues to be addressed in a particular reorganization scheme.
Clarify Existing Language Without Shifting Jurisdictions. Clarification couldeliminate ambiguous and unclear rule language and replace outdated terms with more modern ones. Current referralpractices,precedents, and agreements between committees could be written into the rules.
On the other hand, clarification would not necessarily reflect all current issues in rule language and reduce jurisdictional overlap andcompetition. Neater jurisdictions might not get at the heart of the problem, and could deny Members the opportunityto exploredifferent approaches to policy problems between committees.
Extensive Jurisdictional Realignment. Changes could eliminate the most glaringpolicy overlaps and consolidate jurisdiction in a number of key areas, such as homeland security. No committeeswould beeliminated, and jurisdictions could be equalized.
Changes would not necessarily consolidate all fragmented and overlapping policy areas and could create others. In addition, thegreater number of committees affected by jurisdictional realignment, the greater is the likelihood that a coalitionof Members whoopposed different reform proposals could be assembled to defeat a major reform plan.
Numerous Committees with Narrow Jurisdictions. Narrowly focused panels couldcreate committees better balanced in terms of workload and policy attractiveness, permit more in-depth attentionto policy issues, andlessen the chances that issues lose priority on a committee's agenda due to competing demands.
Narrowly focused panels could exacerbate the workload, scheduling, and assignment concerns related to numerous committees. Forexample, Members might not be willing to serve only on two committees if committees have reduced areas of policyconcern.
Few Committees with Broad Jurisdictions. This option would create jurisdictionsaround broad national problems. Committees would be more equal in breadth, workload, and policy attractiveness. As such, thepolicymaking process could be streamlined and the number of committee assignments would be reduced. To somedegree, rulesmight also be changed to have a greater number of Members serve only on one committee.
Too few committees with too much jurisdiction might deny issues the attention they deserve. With excessive consolidation ofcommittees, subcommittees might proliferate, further decentralizing policymaking. Subcommittee proliferation hasoccurred before,for example, after 1946 when the House converted more than 50 committees into 16 more broadly focusedcommittees.
Jurisdictions Based on Budget Functions. Jurisdictions would be defined more inprogrammatic than topical language. In such a situation, the number of committees would be reduced; workloadamong committeeswould be more equal; and the House and Senate would have parallel systems if both chambers adopted such astructure.
Budget terminology was not written to be jurisdictional language and does not reflect contemporary policy issues. If both chambersadopted a budget function-based system, the House and Senate would not have flexibility in devising their owncommittee system. 
Jurisdictions Parallel Between Authorizing and AppropriationsCommittees. Under this option, the jurisdictional alignment current among the 13 Appropriations subcommittees would serveas the basis forrealigning legislative jurisdictions. This plan would have the merit of incorporating a legislative managementstructure with whichmost Members are familiar from appropriations bills. Alternatively, attention could be focused on bringing thejurisdictions of theAppropriations subcommittees into closer alignment with the jurisdictions of the authorizing committees.
The alignment among the Appropriations subcommittees might not be defensible for an authorization structure. Most Appropriationssubcommittees combine agency or function funding in an effort to balance out inherently unrelated issues. Forexample, theDepartments of State, Commerce, Justice, and Judiciary may be an appropriate mix of agencies and activities forpurposes of anappropriations bill. However, combining such diverse subjects into one authorizing committee might makecomprehensivelegislative and oversight initiatives difficult. Similarly, some might question retaining "independent agencies" ina committeeresponsible for HUD; it could be argued that independent agencies more appropriately should be transferred to otherrelevantlegislative committees. This approach could be seen as a radical departure from the current committee system,because only theAgriculture, Armed Services, and (to some degree) International Relations Committees would remain in somethingapproaching theircurrent forms. Finally, this option would bring a major reduction in the number of House committees, forcing manyMembers toalter the policy areas with which they are most directly concerned.
Jurisdictions Parallel Between House and Senate. Parallel systems could facilitateinter-chamber coordination at all stages of policymaking and might help during the conference stage of the process.
The size of the House compared to the Senate, and the House's greater reliance on its committees, might necessitate a more extensiveHouse realignment if the House adapted its organization to the Senate's. However, the Senate has not acted latelyon joint or parallelefforts (for example, the House proposal, H.Con.Res. 190 , to study the need for joint rules and procedures). 
Jurisdictions to Correspond with Executive Branch Structure. Thisapproach mightimprove inter-branch relations, facilitate comprehensive oversight of the executive branch, reduce duplicativeappearances byexecutive branch witnesses, and enhance public understanding of the policy process.
Matching committees with executive entities might be problematic, especially in determining which entities would be reflected inthe committee structure. For example, independent agencies, government corporations, and other structures do notgenerally fitwithin the purview of Cabinet departments. The executive branch is not necessarily optimally organized, andwhatever organizationalproblems effect the executive branch could be transferred to a committee system that mirrors it. Finally, if anexecutive departmentand a parallel committee become too closely connected, energetic oversight might be inhibited.
Minimal Jurisdictional Realignment. Instead of a more comprehensive change inHouse committee jurisdictions and structures, a more narrowly focused change could be undertaken. For example,a new standingCommittee on Homeland Security could be created with some or all jurisdiction relating to that topic moved fromthe Housecommittees that currently hold that jurisdiction to the new panel. These jurisdictional changes might alsoaccompany a selectedgroup of additional changes. For example, a committee or group of committees having relatively narrow policyjurisdictions or smallworkloads could be consolidated into larger relevant panels. The end result might be the creation of a newhomeland securitycommittee as part of an overall reduction in the number of House committees.
Small jurisdiction realignments are nearly as contentious as proposals for a comprehensive realignment. Although only one or a fewsubjects are involved in the realignment, the policy interests of many House committees could be affected by theproposal. This isespecially true in the area of homeland security where many committees have, or claim to have, a legitimate concernfor parts ofhomeland security legislation. Even if the jurisdictional problems relating to homeland security were solved, anumber of otherfragmented policy areas among House committees might be left unaddressed.
Declarations of Jurisdictional Primacy. House committee jurisdictions could berevised to grant a committee principal or primary policy responsibility for a subject, without necessarily removingrelated policy areasfrom the jurisdiction of other committees. For example, in 1980, the House renamed the Interstate and ForeignCommerceCommittee the Committee on Energy and Commerce and assigned to it new responsibility for measures dealing with"nationalenergy policy generally." However, the House left largely untouched the major energy policy jurisdictions assignedto the thenInterior and Insular Affairs Committee (now called the Committee on Resources) and the Committee on Scienceand Technology(now called the Committee on Science). Written agreements among the three committees delineated thejurisdictional boundariesamong them. With regard to homeland security jurisdiction (or other complex contemporary policy issues), a similardesignationcould be made, setting aside the question of a more comprehensive restructuring.
Opponents of this solution suggest that the 1980 reform was largely symbolic and cosmetic. On contentious issues of energy policy,the three committees often pursued different priorities, arguably detracting from House efforts to enactcomprehensive energylegislation. However, supporters of the "1980 type changes" claim that enactment of comprehensive energylegislation would havebeen extraordinarily difficult regardless of the jurisdictional arrangements among House committees. The Senatehad, by then,largely unified its energy jurisdiction in one committee and was not significantly more productive in moving energypolicy questionsthan was the House. 
section_title: Arguments Against Committee System Change
paragraphs: The options discussed above respond to an interest in the House membership that favors restructuring of the House committeeprocess. This belief may be limited in that, traditionally, Members and outside observers support the concept ofreorganization in theabstract. Support lessens markedly when concrete proposals are offered and the benefits and disadvantages of aspecific reform canbe evaluated. There may be some benefit in allowing more time to pass before the House decides on additionalcommittee reforms. Its system has been revised substantially in recent years: the abolition of long-time select committees in 1993, theabolition of threestanding committees and related jurisdictional realignment in 1995, the recodification of House rules in 1997, therealignment ofcommerce and banking jurisdiction in 2001, and the ad hoc arrangements for handling homeland security in 2002and 2003. 
Others may claim that the House and its Speaker now possess sufficient authority to handle problems in the committee system,without resorting to a major change in the rules. The Speaker's flexible authority in making bill referrals can forcelegislative action. The ability of the House to establish ad hoc committees has once again been used with regard to homeland security. Use of selectcommittees could be continued until the House is more sure about the long-term direction homeland securitylegislation will take. Even more informal processes, such as leadership task forces, might permit the development of comprehensivepolicy solutions,regardless of any inadequacies in the House's committee structure.