Iraq War: Defense Program Implications for Congress
Released: 2003-06-04T00:00:00

Summary:
The recent war against Iraq may have implications for various defense programs of interest to Congress. This report surveys some of those potential implications, and will be updated periodicallyas new information becomes available. Three cautionary notes associated with post-conflict"lessons-learned" reports apply to this report: Information about the Iraq war is incomplete andimperfect, so early lessons are subject to change. Each war is unique in some ways, so observersshould avoid "overlearning" the lessons of the Iraq war. And potential U.S. adversaries can derivelessons from the Iraq war and apply them in future conflicts against U.S. forces, possibly devaluingU.S.-perceived lessons. It can also be noted that some persons or organizations offering purported lessons of the Iraq war may have a financial, institutional, or ideological stake in the issue.
Many observers have concluded that the Iraq war validated the Administration's vision for defense transformation, or major parts of it. Other observers disagree. The issue is potentiallysignificant because implementing the Administration's vision could affect the composition of U.S.defense spending, and because the Administration may invoke the theme of transformation to helpjustify or seek rapid congressional consideration of legislative proposals, including proposals thatcould affect Congress' role in conducting oversight of defense programs. The Iraq war mayinfluence debate on whether active-duty U.S. military forces are sufficiently large to carry out currentU.S. military strategy, and on whether greater emphasis should be placed on forces that are lessdependent on access to in-theater bases.
One of the most significant defense-program debates going into the Iraq war - and potentially one of those most significantly influenced by the war - concerns the future size and composition ofthe active-duty Army. Both supporters and opponents of maintaining at least 10 active-duty Armydivisions may find support in the Iraq war for their positions, as may both supporters and opponentsof the current Army plan to shift toward a mix of fewer heavy armored units and a larger number oflighter and more mobile units.
The Iraq war validated the effectiveness of combat-aircraft armed with precision-guided weapons, and may influence discussions about current plans for investing in specific aircraft andmunitions programs. The Iraq war may reinforce support generated by the war in Afghanistan forincreased investment in U.S. special operations forces. It may also highlight questions concerningreserve combat divisions and the potential consequences of extended callups of large numbers ofreserve forces.
The war appears to have demonstrated the value of network-centric operations and timely battlefield intelligence, and the potential value of psychological operations. It appears to haveconfirmed the importance of preparing for urban combat. The war offered a limited real-world testof the Patriot missile defense system. The war may lead to renewed discussions about strategies forreducing friendly fire incidents. It may reinforce support for investing in aerial refueling capabilities,and increase interest in potential new airlift and sealift technologies.

subsections: section_title: Introduction (1)
paragraphs: The recent war against Iraq, known formally as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), was the largestU.S. military operation since the 1991 Persian Gulf war, and may have implications for variousdefense programs of interest to Congress. This report, which is similar to one that CRS preparedfollowing the 1991 Persian Gulf war, (2) surveys someof those potential implications. It will beupdated periodically as new information becomes available.
subsections: section_title: Scope of Report
paragraphs: This report focuses on how the Iraq war may affect defense programs that Congress may address in acting on defense authorization and appropriation bills for FY2004 and subsequent fiscalyears. It does not cover broader defense policy issues such as U.S. national security strategy orCongress' role in declaring war. Nor does it cover the post-war occupation and reconstructionefforts in Iraq or the potential impact of the war on U.S. foreign relations and the U.S. role in theworld. Issues like those are covered in other CRS products.
section_title: Deriving "Lessons" of the War: Some Cautionary Notes
paragraphs: Although the Department of Defense (DoD) and other organizations customarily produce "lessons learned" reports following the conclusion of a major military operation like the Iraq war,this report for the most part avoids using the term "lessons" because it can imply the making ofrecommendations - something that CRS reports do not do. Even so, certain cautionary notesassociated with "lessons-learned" reports apply to this report. These include the following:
Information is imperfect; early lessons are subject to change. Public information about the Iraq war is currently incomplete, and will likely remain so for some time. Although certain aspects of the war, such as the operations of U.S. Army and Marine Corps groundforces moving from Kuwait to Baghdad, received extensive press coverage, many details of theseoperations are not known. Other aspects of the war, such as coalition air operations, were reportedin less detail. And some aspects of the war, such as the activities of special operations forces, havereceived very little press coverage. Knowledge about the war at this point is thus fragmentary andunbalanced. Historically, moreover, early information that is publicly available about a war oftenproves to be inaccurate. Attempts to identify lessons should be tempered by an appreciation for gapsand imperfections in the available information. As information becomes more complete andaccurate with time, early lessons may need to be modified or dropped.
Each war is unique; avoid "overlearning" the lessons of this war. Particularly for U.S. military forces, which fight conflicts in different parts of the world againstvarious adversaries, each war is characterized by a unique combination of variables such asgeographic setting, pre-conflict warning and preparation time, U.S. and enemy war aims, the size andcomposition of enemy military forces, the quality of enemy military training and leadership, theamount and kind of military assistance that the United States or the enemy receives during the warfrom other governments or groups, the enemy government's degree of popular support among itsown population, and the presence or absence of factional divisions within the enemy country'spopulation due to ethnic differences or other factors. Given how at least some of these factorsusually change for the United States from one war to the next, it has long been a staple of U.S.lessons-learned reports to note that lessons from one conflict may not necessarily apply to the next,might need to be applied with caution, or might contradict lessons of previous conflicts. Some ofthe lessons of the Iraq war, for example, may differ from lessons of the U.S.-led war in Afghanistanin 2001-2002 or the U.S. military operation in Kosovo in 1999. In short, the lessons of the Iraq warshould not be "overlearned" because the Iraq war in some ways might not serve as an accuratetemplate for future conflicts.
Non-U.S. observers derive lessons as well, possibly devaluing U.S.-perceived lessons. The United States is not the only country that derives lessons from U.S. militaryoperations; observers in other countries do so as well. Non-U.S. observers keenly observe the U.S.way of war and draw conclusions about its strengths and weaknesses. These conclusions, if correct,can be applied by potential U.S. adversaries to improve their ability to contest U.S. forces in a futureconflict. Serbia, for example, observed the 1991 Persian Gulf war and drew lessons from it on howto counter the effects of U.S. air power. These lessons were applied with some success by Serbianforces in Kosovo in 1999. In short, lessons that U.S. observers reach about a given U.S. militaryoperation can be devalued by lessons that potential adversaries draw from that same operation. Thisis another reason to avoid "overlearning" the lessons of a given U.S. militaryoperation.
Numerous persons or organizations may offer what they contend are the lessons of the Iraq war. In evaluating purported lessons offered by various sources, one factor to consider is whether thosesources have a potential financial, institutional, or ideological stake in the issue. Persons ororganizations identifying the lessons of a war can be influenced, perhaps strongly, by such a stake. Indeed, some persons or organizations may deliberately identify and publicize purported lessons withthe aim of influencing policy decisions on defense programs in a way that promotes their owninterests. Although lessons offered by persons or organizations with a stake in the issue in manycases may be reasonable or correct, policymakers may wish to take such interests into account inevaluating lessons put forward by such sources.
section_title: Organization of Report
paragraphs: The remainder of this report consists of a series of discussions on various defense program issues that might have been affected in one way or another by the Iraq war. The discussions aredesigned to be fairly self-contained, so that readers may browse topics using the Table of Contentsand read those of interest. A footnote at the start of each discussion identifies the CRS analyst whoprepared that section.
section_title: Issues for Congress
subsections: section_title: Defense Transformation (3)
paragraphs: Iraq War Viewed As A Test. In the weeks leading up to the Iraq war, many observers anticipated that the conflict would serve as a test of theadministration's vision for defense transformation - its concept for overhauling the U.S. military toexploit new technologies and counter 21st-Century security threats. (4) Following the war, many ofthese observers concluded that the war validated this vision, or at least major parts of it, and alsostrengthened Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's authority to implement this vision over theobjections of persons or organizations opposed to parts of it. Some observers speculated that the warmay encourage the administration to increase the scope of its planned defense transformation orimplement it more quickly. (5)
Potential Significance for Congress. These conclusions and speculations, if correct - and not all observers agree with them (6) - are potentially ofgreat significance to Congress, for at least two reasons:
Implementing the Administration's vision for defense transformation could substantially affect the composition of U.S. defense spending, shifting defense funding towarddefense programs that are judged to be transformational and away from defense programs that arejudged to be non-transformational or "legacy." Such shifts could significantly affect revenues andemployment levels at companies associated with the affected programs.
The Administration may be encouraged to invoke the theme of transformation to help justify or seek rapid congressional consideration of legislative proposals affecting DoD thatmay or may not be transformational, depending on one's definition of transformation, includingproposals which could, if implemented, affect Congress' role in conducting oversight of U.S. defenseactivities. A potential case in point is the "Defense Transformation for the 21st Century Act," a205-page legislative proposal that the administration submitted to Congress on April 10, 2003 that would,among other things, permit DoD to establish its own policies for hiring, firing, and compensatingits civil service employees; change the terms in office for certain senior generals and admirals; giveDoD increased authority to transfer funds between DoD budget accounts; and eliminate many DoDreporting requirements that were instituted to assist Congress in conducting oversight of DoDactivities. (7)
The Administration's Transformation Vision. The administration identified defense transformation as a major goal for DoD soon after taking officeand has since worked to define its transformation vision. In general, that vision calls for shiftingU.S. military planning away from a reliance on massed forces, sheer firepower, military servicesoperating in isolation from one another, and attrition-style warfare, (8) and toward a greater relianceon speed and agility, stealth, precision application of firepower by widely distributed forces,information technology, joint (i.e., integrated multi-service) operations, and effects-based warfare. (9) Some transformation advocates characterize these changes as shifting from an Industrial Ageapproach to war to an Information Age approach. Transforming the military along these lines, theadministration and its supporters argue, will permit the United States to apply military power morerapidly and flexibly in distant parts of the world, outpace enemy decisionmaking on the battlefield,more effectively counter so-called asymmetric military threats, (10) and generally achieve U.S. militarycombat goals with fewer forces, more quickly, and at lower cost. The Administration'stransformation vision also includes proposals for changing DoD's business practices, particularlywith an eye toward streamlining those practices so as to accelerate the fielding of new weapons andgenerate savings that can be used to invest in them.
Transformational vs. Legacy Programs. Within the discussion on defense transformation, there has been significant debate over which programsqualify as transformational and which do not. Advocates of various defense programs have arguedthat their programs should be viewed as transformational, or at least not as legacy - a label that insome eyes has become synonymous with obsolescence and suitability for reduction or termination.
Defense program areas that have frequently been identified as closely associated with the administration's transformation vision include the following:
precision-guided air-delivered weapons,
lighter and more mobile Army ground forces,
special operations forces,
unmanned vehicles,
smaller and faster Navy surface ships,
space systems and missile defense,
forces for countering terrorists and weapons of mass destruction,and
C4ISR systems that link U.S. and coalition military units into highly integratednetworks possessing superior battlespace awareness. (11)
Defense program areas that have been identified by various observers, correctly or not, as non-transformational or legacy include the following:
unguided weapons,
heavy armored forces for the Army,
manned tactical aircraft,
large, slower-moving Navy surface ships, and
weapons and associated C4ISR systems that operate in an isolated, stand-alonemanner rather than as part of a network.
The Pre-War Debate. Prior to the Iraq war, the Administration had identified transformational programs as a high defense investment priority. Insubmitting its proposed FY2004 defense budget to Congress in February 2003, the Administrationstated that the request was the first to fully reflect its transformation vision and included more than$24 billion in acquisition funding for transformational programs.
Some transformation advocates outside the administration argue that the administration, though rhetorically supportive of transformation, has continued to place too much emphasis on legacyprograms and not enough on transformational programs. They argue, for example, that theadministration's defense budget plans devote too much funding to manned tactical aircraft programsand not enough funding to programs for upgrading or replacing the Air Force's long-range bombers(which can deliver large numbers of precision-guided weapons) or for acquiring unmanned vehicles.
In the weeks leading up to the Iraq war, some observers speculated that the conflict would test important elements of the Administration's transformation vision, including its increased relianceon precision-guided air-delivered weapons, special operations forces, unmanned vehicles, and jointoperations; the use of advanced C4ISR systems for networked operations and improved battlespaceawareness; reduced reliance on massed ground forces; and a war plan reflecting an effects-basedapproach more than traditional attrition-style warfare. Pre-war speculation that the conflict wouldtest the Administration's transformation theories was strengthened by reports that Secretary ofDefense Rumsfeld had played a strong role in shaping the war plan to make it more in keeping withthe Administration's transformation vision, particularly in terms of reducing the planned number ofconventional ground forces to be used in the invasion.
Debate Following the Iraq War. Those who support the idea that the Iraq war validated the Administration's transformation vision, or at leastimportant elements of it, could argue one or more of the following:
The U.S.-led war effort, which produced a quick victory with low casualties, featured a significant and successful use of precision-guided air-delivered weapons, specialoperations forces, unmanned vehicles, joint operations, and advanced C4ISR systems. It alsoemployed a strategy that avoided attrition-style warfare where possible and focused more on effects-based operationsdirected against the key leadership and command-and-control targets and the mostpolitically and militarily significant elements of the enemy's fielded militaryforces.
The number of conventional ground forces making up the invasion force wasnot only fairly small compared to the 1991 Persian Gulf war, but even smaller than theadministration had planned, due to Turkey's decision not to permit the Army's 4th Infantry Divisionto use Turkish territory to invade Iraq from the north and the administration's decision to begin thewar before this division was redeployed to Kuwait.
The speed and precision of the U.S.-led war effort significantly reduced Iraq'sability to mount a coordinated response, leading to scattered and largely ineffective Iraqi defensiveefforts and to many instances of Iraqi military units in the field that were hopelessly uninformedabout the location and movements of U.S. forces.
Lighter and more air-mobile Army forces, which the Army is currentlydeveloping as part of the Administration's transformation plan, would have been useful, followingTurkey's decision, for quickly establishing a more significant U.S. ground presence in northernIraq.
Those taking a more skeptical view on whether the war validated the Administration's transformation vision could argue one or more of the following:
The U.S. military force employed in the war was largely a product of investment decisions made prior to the Bush administration. Although the force incorporated someelements of the administration's transformation plan, it represented only a partial or embryonicversion of the administration's vision for a transformed force. A more fully transformed force wouldhave featured, for example, more (and more capable) unmanned vehicles, a more completelynetworked C4ISR environment, and the use of lighter, more mobile Army forces that are now indevelopment. The war thus did not provide a pure test of a force fully transformed along the linesof the administration's vision.
Iraq's military was significantly inept in mounting a defense of the country. (12) In light of Iraqi military ineptness, it is not clear that the war amounted to a serious test of theAdministration's transformation plan. A more traditional U.S.-led war effort, or an effort reflectinga transformation plan significantly different from the Administration's, might also havesucceeded.
The number of conventional ground forces making up the invasion force wasgreater, according to some press reports, than some transformation advocates had proposed duringthe early stages of planning for the Iraq war. And the larger force that was used came close to beinginsufficient: If Iraqi forces had mounted a more effective effort to cut the extended and thinlydefended supply lines linking U.S. ground forces to supply areas further south, the invasion mighthave experienced a significant setback. In this sense, the relatively small ground invasion force mayhave introduced greater risk into the war plan than anticipated.
Although heavy armored ground forces are not closely associated with theAdministration's transformation plan and have been characterized as legacy forces, the warunderscored the value of heavy armored ground forces. Heavy armored units were successful bothin breaking through Iraqi defenses in the south and in urban combat operations in Baghdad and othercities. They were largely invulnerable to Iraqi rocket-propelled grenades and other light arms and,in drawing fire from such weapons, proved valuable in uncovering the locations of hidden Iraqifighters, who could then be killed. More lightly armored ground forces like those being developedby the Army as part of the Administration's transformation plan would have been more vulnerableto fire from the kinds of weapons used by Iraqi defenders.
Even if Iraqi military operations had been better planned and executed, the warcould not provide a major test of certain elements of the Administration's transformation plan. Forexample, although Iraq laid mines in the Persian Gulf and may have attempted to fire antiship cruisemissiles at coalition naval forces, Iraq's military capabilities and geographic options for counteringenemy naval forces were very limited. The war therefore could not pose a significant test of theAdministration's programs for transforming U.S. naval forces so as to make them effective againstsignificant enemy maritime anti-access/area-denial forces.
A potential intermediate view would combine arguments from both sides of the debate. This view, while noting the success of the war effort and its significant use of force elements associatedwith the Administration's plan, would also acknowledge that the U.S. force used in the warrepresented only a partial fulfillment of the administration's transformation plan, that Iraqi militaryineptness was a significant factor, that the war may offer mixed evidence concerning theAdministration's plan for transforming Army forces, and that the war did not significantly test otherelements of the Administration's transformation plans.
It should also be noted that observers who take a skeptical view on whether the war validated the Administration's transformation vision are not necessarily opposed to that vision. They maysupport the vision but conclude that the war did not happen to offer a clear validation of it.
An additional potential implication concerns asymmetric military threats. By demonstrating to the world the formidable capabilities of conventional U.S. military forces, the Iraq war mayencourage other countries to place increased emphasis on developing asymmetric means ofcountering the United States, including terrorism, nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons,cyberwarfare against U.S. military and civilian computer systems, and anti-access/area-denialweapons (such as theater-range ballistic missiles) that are intended to prevent U.S. forces fromgaining a foothold in an overseas operating area. In this sense, the success of the U.S.-led war effort,it might be argued, may strengthen the need for U.S. defense transformation to focus on developingcapabilities for countering such asymmetric threats. (13)
Some of the program areas mentioned above, including Army ground forces, special operations forces, and unmanned vehicles, are discussed in more detail in subsequent sections of this report.
section_title: Size of Military Needed For National Military Strategy (14)
paragraphs: Concern Regarding Size of U.S. Forces. Prior to the Iraq war, some observers had expressed concern that active-duty U.S. military forces areinsufficiently sized to execute the administration's national military strategy, at least not withoutplacing an undue strain on military personnel and equipment or taking undue risks in time of war. The Administration and its supporters argued in response that U.S. forces were of sufficient size tocarry out the strategy.
Administration's Military Strategy. The administration's military strategy is sometimes called the 1-4-2-1 strategy because it calls formaintaining U.S. military forces sufficient for:
[1] "protect[ing] the U.S. domestic population, its territory, and its critical defense-related infrastructure against attacks emanating from outside U.S.borders,"
[4] "maintaining regionally tailored forces forward stationed and deployed in[the four regions of] Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian littoral, and the Middle East/SouthwestAsia to assure allies and friends, counter coercion, and deter aggression against the United States,its forces, allies, and friends,"
[2] "swiftly defeating attacks against U.S. allies and friends in any two theatersof operation in overlapping timeframes," and
[1] "decisively defeating an adversary in one of the two theaters in which U.S.forces are conducting major combat operations by imposing America's will and removing any futurethreat it could pose. This capability will include the ability to occupy territory or set the conditionsfor a regime change if so directed." (15)
Pre-War Debate. Prior to the Iraq war, those who were concerned about whether U.S. forces were sufficiently sized to carry out this strategy pointedto the high operational tempo that certain parts of the military have maintained in recent years, thelarge number of reserve forces that have been activated since the terrorist attacks of September 11,2001 (and the extended length of certain reserve-unit tours of duty since that time), the interestamong certain Army officers for increasing the Army's active-duty end strength so as to bettersupport ongoing commitments in various locations, gaps in forward deployments of Navy ships tocertain overseas regions, and the relationship of the total number of active air wings, divisions, andships to the potential requirements of fighting two regional wars in overlapping time frames.
Some observers expressed concern that going to war in Iraq would stretch certain active-duty U.S. forces too thinly. They argued that a war with Iraq could reduce forces available for pursuingthe global war on terrorism or leave the United States with insufficient forces to deter or respond topotential aggression by North Korea. Forces that were cited as at risk of being in short supply in theevent of a war with Iraq included special operations forces, certain kinds of aircraft (cargo planes,tankers, jamming aircraft, surveillance aircraft, and battle-management aircraft), and specializedinfantry vehicles, combat-support troops, and support gear for the Army. (16) These concerns continuedas the Iraq war began. (17)
Force Commitments During the War. Fighting the Iraq war while also performing other duties - including war-on-terrorism operations inAfghanistan and elsewhere, regional-deterrence operations, and homeland-defense operations -resulted in the following commitments of active-duty U.S. forces:
Army: A large fraction of the Army's 10 active-duty divisions and additional independent combat units were deployed or stationed outside the United States. Three divisions (the3rd Infantry Division, the 101st Airborne Division, and the 4th InfantryDivision), parts of two otherdivisions (the 82nd Airborne Division and the 10th Mountain Division) and one or twoindependentcombat units (the 173rd Airborne Brigade and possibly the 2nd Cavalry Regiment) weredeployed toIraq, part of a division (the 82nd Airborne Division) was deployed to Afghanistan, two divisions (the1st Armored Division and the 1st Infantry Division) were stationed in Germany, and mostof anotherdivision (the 2nd Infantry Division) was stationed in Korea.
Air Force: A high percentage of the Air Force's cargo aircraft, tankers, andcertain other specialized aircraft, and a high percentage of the military's radar-jamming aircraft(which are operated by the Navy and Marine Corps), were deployed to Iraq.
Marine Corps: About 67% of the Marine Corps' operating forces wereforward-deployed in Iraq and elsewhere, and almost 80% were either forward-deployed, forward-based, or forwardstationed. Two of the Marine Corps' three Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS)squadrons were committed to the Iraq war. On April 2, 2003, General Michael Hagee, theCommandant of the Marine Corps reportedly stated: "So, what we have done is we have provided,in my opinion, sufficient combat power to do what needs to be done in Iraq.... We have sufficientforces positioned to swiftly defeat the effort if North Korea decides to do something. And what arewe doing in the other areas - we are taking risks." (18) 
Navy: The Navy put to sea 67%-68% of its ships (54% or 55% in deployedstatus and another 13% in non-deployed operations), (19) including 7 or 8 of its 12 aircraft carriers, (20) 7 of its 11 carrier air wings, (21) 25 to 29 of its 38amphibious ships (22) and, within theamphibious-shiptotal, 9 or 10 of the Navy's 12 "large-deck" amphibious assault ships. (23) Admiral William Fallon,the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, testified on March 18, 2003, on the eve of the war, that "today'ssurge [in deployments] has put a significant strain on every Navy resource." (24)
Special Operations Forces (SOF): A very high portion of the country's10,000 or so combat SOF personnel (25) werecommitted to either Iraq, Afghanistan, or other overseaslocations.
In addition to these active-duty forces, 62% of the Military Sealift Command's prepositioning and surge sealift ships were involved in supporting the Iraq war. (26)
Post-War Debate. Supporters of the view that active-duty U.S. military forces are sufficiently sized to execute the 1-4-2-1 strategy could argue thefollowing:
Even while U.S. forces were preparing for and fighting the Iraq war, the military was able to augment its forces in Korea and the Western Pacific for purposes of deterringpossible North Korean aggression.
Had a major conflict on the Korean Peninsula occurred while the Iraq war wasin progress, substantial additional combat forces were available for use there, including Air Forcebombers and tactical aircraft, Navy carriers and other ships, Marine forces, and Army forces. Available Marine forces included units based in Okinawa and Hawaii and the Marine Corps' thirdMPS squadron, which is based in the Western Pacific. Available Army units included the 25thInfantry Division in Hawaii, the 1st Cavalry Division in Texas, the remaining part of the2nd InfantryDivision in Washington, and the remaining parts of the 10th Mountain Division in New York, plusone or more independent combat units based in other U.S. locations.
The quick and relatively low-cost victory gained by the relatively small U.S.-led force in the Iraq war,together with further technological improvements planned for U.S. militaryforces planned in the future, suggests that future regional conflicts on average might require fewerU.S. forces than currently planned. If so, the current size of U.S. forces might be more thansufficient for fighting two regional conflicts in overlapping time frames.
Post-war demands for peacekeeping and constabulary forces in Iraq, whilesubstantial, are not permanent and can be met in part by forces from allied and friendly countries. Some countries have already offered to provide such forces. (27)
Those skeptical of the view that active-duty U.S. military forces are sufficiently sized to execute the 1-4-2-1 strategy could argue the following:
Fighting the Iraq war while performing other duties left the country with a reduced capability for responding to an additional major emergency on the Korean Peninsula orelsewhere, particularly with regard to specialized Air Force aircraft, Navy carriers and air wings,Navy amphibious ships and Marine Forces, and special operations forces.
While sufficient ground forces may have been available for fighting anadditional conflict in Korea, transporting those forces to Korea in a timely manner might have beenvery difficult, given the large commitment of U.S. airlift and sealift assets to the Iraqwar.
Iraqi military ineptness contributed to the quick and relatively low-cost victoryof the U.S.-led war effort. Future adversaries may not be as inept, and may learn and apply their ownlessons from the Iraq war, suggesting that future regional conflicts on average might require U.S.forces at least as large as those used in the Iraq war. If so, the size of U.S. forces needed in the futureto fight two regional conflicts in overlapping time frames might be larger than suggested by the Iraqwar.
In February 2002, the Air Force was forced to begin making exceptions to therotational cycle for its 10 Aerospace Expeditionary Forces (AEFs) so as to meet overseas demandsfor Air Force personnel in certain career fields. As a result, some Air Force personnel have had todeploy longer or more frequently than the AEF standard.
The Iraq war has created a post-war demand for maintaining tens of thousandsof Army soldiers in Iraq for peacekeeping and constabulary purposes, (28) adding to existing demandsfor Army peacekeeping and constabulary forces in Afghanistan, the Balkans, and other locations. Maintaining significant numbers of peacekeeping and constabulary forces in Iraq and elsewheremight require the Army to use large numbers of activated reserve forces for extended periods of time- a signal that the active-duty force is not sufficiently sized.
The Iraq war, coming at a time of elevated tensions on the Korean Peninsula, may highlight the difference between conflicts that occur in overlapping time frames vs. those that occur simultaneously . U.S. strategy is to have forces sufficient for winning two major regional conflictsthat occur in overlapping time frames, but not necessarily for winning two such conflicts that occursimultaneously. The distinction, though important, is often overlooked in popular descriptions ofU.S. strategy.
The requirement for winning two conflicts that occur in overlapping time frames refers in part to an assumption that the second conflict will start some number of weeks after the first, and thatcertain U.S. forces that are needed primarily or most urgently in the early stages of a regional conflict- such as certain airlift and sealift forces, some kinds of aircraft, cruise-missile-armed Navy ships,and perhaps Marine amphibious forces - can therefore be rotated from the first conflict to thesecond. Such forces are sized closer to the requirements for fighting one conflict rather than two. If this assumption proves incorrect - if the second conflict begins before such forces can be rotatedfrom the first conflict to the second - the U.S. ability to prosecute the second conflict successfullyor at acceptable cost could be reduced. The combination of the Iraq war and the tense situation onthe Korean Peninsula provides policymakers with a potential case study for reviewing the planningassumption of overlapping time frames and the potential risks of planning U.S. forces on that basis.
section_title: Overseas Base Access (29)
paragraphs: Uncertain Access as a Planning Issue. The Iraq war, like the war in Afghanistan in 2001-2002, appears to have underscored how, in the post-ColdWar era, U.S. access to foreign bases and territory in time of war can be uncertain and, whenprovided, can come with restrictions from host nations on how the bases and territory can be used. This is potentially significant, because some military analysts have argued that U.S. defenseprograms must take uncertain access to foreign bases into account in planning U.S. military forces.
War in Afghanistan. In the war in Afghanistan, few air bases in countries close to Afghanistan were made available to support U.S. militaryoperations, and bases in Pakistan that were made available had to be used in a low-profile manner,with a limited U.S. presence and a preference for conducting operations at night rather than duringthe day. As a result of these limitations, sea-based forces operating in the Northern Arabian Sea -carrier-based Navy and Marine Corps aircraft, Marine forces on Navy amphibious ships, and specialoperations forces deploying from a Navy carrier - played a significant role in U.S. militaryoperations in Afghanistan, particularly in the earlier stages of the conflict.
Iraq War. In the case of the Iraq war, protracted negotiations with Turkey ended with a decision by the Turkish government to deny U.S. groundforces and aircraft the use of bases and territory in Turkey. Turkey's decision forced significantalterations to the U.S. war plan: The plan to have the Army's 4th Infantry Division invade northernIraq from Turkey, and thereby confront Iraqi leaders with significant ground invasions from both thenorth and south, had to be abandoned. The 4th Infantry Division was instead redeployed to Kuwait,and the United States conducted the war with a much smaller U.S. ground presence in northern Iraqthat consisted primarily of a few hundred U.S. special operations forces personnel and 2,000personnel from the Army's 173rd Airborne Brigade who parachuted into the area. Fighting the warthis way reportedly complicated the U.S. politically sensitive goal of preventing Turkish forces fromentering northern Iraq and may have broadened escape options for Iraqi leaders fleeing from U.S.forces that were advancing into Baghdad from the south.
Turkey's decision not to allow its air bases to be used by U.S. combat and support aircraft similarly complicated U.S. air operations during the war. Air Force combat aircraft could not fly intonorthern Iraq directly from Turkish bases, forcing them to fly into that area from more distant bases,and sorties of Navy aircraft flying into Iraq from two carriers in the Eastern Mediterranean werereportedly reduced because Air Force tankers needed to refuel the Navy planes had to fly from moredistant bases in Eastern Europe and consequently could provide them with less on-station in-flightrefueling capacity.
U.S. war plans were also complicated by, among other things, Saudi Arabia's reported unwillingness to allow its air bases and its territory near Iraq to be used by most types of U.S. strikeaircraft (30) and invading U.S. ground forces, itsdecision to not permit its ports on the Persian Gulf tobe used by U.S. military sealift ships (which reportedly contributed to a bottleneck at Kuwaiti portfacilities for unloading equipment and supplies from those ships), (31) and Jordan's reportedunwillingness to allow its bases and territory to be used, at least overtly, by U.S. aircraft and regularground forces.
In the weeks leading up to the war, there was uncertainty about whether Saudi Arabia would permit the United States to use the large U.S.-built air operations command center at Prince SultanAir Base south of Riyadh. Although the Saudi government decided to permit the facility to be used,U.S. military planners, as a hedge against the possibility that the Saudi government would decideotherwise, quickly built, at substantial cost, a substitute facility at Al Udeid Air Base near Doha inQatar.
During the war, the failure of several Navy Tomahawk cruise missiles using certain flight paths over Turkey and Saudi Arabia prompted a decision by both countries to close down those flight pathsfor use by Tomahawk missiles for the remainder of the conflict, possibly complicating U.S. planningfor subsequent Tomahawk cruise missile attacks.
Potential Program Implications. Analysts who stress uncertainties about access to foreign bases argue that U.S. defense programs should berestructured to place greater emphasis on forces that are less dependent on such bases. Examplesof such forces that are usually cited include the following:
manned and unmanned aircraft with long operating ranges, fuel-efficient engines, and large payloads (i.e., aircraft that can operate from distant bases, including bases in theUnited States, loiter over distant battlefields for long periods of time, and attack many targets beforehaving to return home, while requiring a minimum amount of in-flightrefueling),
aircraft that can operate from short or austere airfields (which might be the onlykind of air bases available in certain locations),
sea-based forces, such as Navy and Marine Corps forces, that can conduct in-theater operations fromnearby international waters; and
long-range weapons such as cruise missiles and, potentially, directed-energyweapons such as lasers, that can destroy targets hundreds of miles away.
Advocates of both long-range aircraft and naval forces have long cited their relative independence from in-theater land bases as an important characteristic in their favor. (32)
Some observers believe the experience with base access during the Iraq war may lead to increased interest in a new operational concept (i.e., a new approach to warfighting) referred to assea basing, or more formally as enhanced networked sea basing. (33) Although Navy and Marine Corpsforces have long been referred to as sea-based forces, Navy and Marine Corps officials are now usingthe term sea basing more specifically, to refer to a proposed new approach for launching, directingand supporting expeditionary military operations directly from ships at sea. (34) Navy and MarineCorps officials began to discuss the sea basing concept at about the time of the war in Afghanistan. Although the sea basing concept has been proposed primarily by Navy and Marine Corps officials,it can be expanded into a joint concept under which Army or Air Force units might also be stagedfrom bases at sea. DoD officials have expressed some interest in the concept. (35) Restructuring U.S.forces in accordance with the sea basing concept could lead to numerous changes in DoD ship,aircraft, and weapon acquisition programs.
Other observers argue that the issue of overseas base access, while a concern, has been exaggerated. They could argue that although the United States encountered challenges with baseaccess in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States in both cases was able to secure sufficient baseaccess to support its operations, in part by capturing air bases inside both countries. They can alsonote that, following the 1991 Persian Gulf war, many observers argued that Iraq had erred byallowing the U.S.-led coalition to build up forces in the Persian Gulf for six months withoutchallenge, and that U.S. adversaries in the future would not repeat this mistake. In the Iraq war, theycould argue, this expectation proved inaccurate, as Iraq once again allowed U.S. and British forcesseveral months to build up forces in the Persian Gulf. Observers who believe the base-access issuehas been exaggerated can also note that, other things held equal, long-range systems can be moreexpensive than short-range systems. They could argue that given the cost of long-range systems andthe likelihood that the United States will be able to gain at least some access to in-region bases, DoDshould maintain its current mix of long- and short-range capabilities.
section_title: Army Forces (36)
paragraphs: A Pre-War Controversy. One of the most significant defense-program debates going into the Iraq war - and potentially one of those mostsignificantly influenced by the war - concerns the future size and composition of the active-dutyArmy. Issues involved in this debate include, among other things:
the number of active-duty Army divisions to be maintained in the future;
programs for upgrading the Army's M1 Abrams tanks and other heavilyarmored vehicles; and
the Army's plan to shift to a mix of combat forces that includes fewer heavilyarmored combat units and a greater number of lighter and more mobile combatunits.
The Army's Transformation Plan. The Army currently includes 10 active-duty divisions, as well as some additional independent active-dutycombat brigades. Several of the divisions and independent brigades are heavily armored units.
The Army's transformation plan, which was initiated in 1999 by Army Chief of Staff Eric K. Shinseki, would leave the number of active-duty Army divisions unchanged at 10 but shift thecomposition of the Army toward a mix featuring fewer heavily armored units built around armoredvehicles like the M1 Abrams tank and the M2 Bradley fighting vehicle, and a greater number ofmore-mobile Army combat units built around more lightly armored combat vehicles.
The principal goal of the transformation plan is to significantly improve the Army's ability to rapidly deploy significant ground combat forces to conflicts in distant areas. The plan was promptedby the 1999 U.S. military operation in Kosovo, which exposed inadequacies in the Army's abilityto rapidly deploy heavy forces, and by the Army's initial reaction to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait inAugust 1990. In the latter instance, the Army was able to quickly deploy some lightly armed units,such as the 82nd Airborne Division, to northeast Saudi Arabia to defend against a potential Iraqifollow-on attack into that country, (37) but someobservers at the time said that those forces would serveas little more than "speed bumps" in slowing down any such attack.
The first step in the Army's transformation plan is to create 6 new mobile combat brigades over the next few years. These brigades are to be built around the lightly armored Stryker wheeledcombat vehicle and consequently are called Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs) or simplyStryker Brigades. The 6 Stryker Brigades would constitute the core of the Army's "Interim"transformation force.
The second step in the Army's transformation plan would be to create a group of more technologically advanced mobile combat units that would be the eventual successors to both thelegacy force (38) and the Stryker Brigades. Thesemore high-tech combat units would be built aroundthe Future Combat System (FCS), a collection of advanced combat vehicles and supporting systemsthat is now in development. The first FCS-equipped unit is to enter service in FY2008. Army unitsbuilt around the FCS would constitute the Army's longer-term "Objective" transformation force.
To help finance programs for the Interim and Objective forces, funding has been reduced for many programs related to the Army's current "Legacy" force, including programs for upgradingsome of the Army's M1 tanks and other armored vehicles.
Reported Tensions with OSD. Although the intent of the Army's transformation plan - shifting toward forces with greater mobility - appearsbroadly consistent with the Administration's vision for defense transformation, the Office of theSecretary of Defense (OSD) reportedly is dissatisfied with Army transformation efforts, believingthem to be insufficiently aggressive. OSD is widely rumored in the defense trade press to beinterested in reducing the total number of Army active-duty divisions from 10 to 8. OSD alsoexpressed interest last year in reducing the number of Stryker Brigades from 6 to 4, in part to makemore funding available for programs for the Objective force.
There have been numerous press reports of tension between OSD and the Army's senior leadership over the future size and composition of the active-duty Army. Many observers believethat Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's announcement in early 2002 of his preferred choicefor General Shinseki's successor, which was made more than a year before the end of Shinseki'sterm as Army Chief of Staff, reflected this tension and was intended to prematurely turn Shinsekiinto a lame duck. Some observers believe that OSD's views on Army transformation efforts areconditioned by a general OSD preference for air power over ground power. Others believe OSD'sperceived tepid support for the Army's transformation plan is due in part to the fact that it wasinitiated in 1999, during the Clinton Administration. (39)
Pre-War Debate Over the Plan. Independent of reported tensions between OSD and the Army's leadership, the Army's transformation plan hasgenerated significant debate among military analysts.
Merits of Maintaining 10 Divisions. Supporters of the Army's intention to maintain 10 active-duty divisions have argued that this is the correct numberfor carrying out the Army's portion of the U.S. national military strategy. Ten active-duty Armydivisions, together with 3 active-duty Marine Corps divisions, will be sufficient, they have argued,for fighting two regional conflicts in overlapping time frames while carrying out additionalresponsibilities in other areas. If additional U.S. ground forces are needed, they have argued, theycan be mobilized from the Army and Marine Corps reserves.
Some opponents of the 10-division figure have argued that it is insufficient to carry out the Army's portion of the national military strategy. The high operational tempo of active-duty Armyforces in recent years, and the need to mobilize large numbers of Army reserve personnel forextended periods of active duty since September 11, 2001, they have argued, is evidence that a 10-division forceis insufficient to carry out the Army's various ongoing duties around the world,particularly after 9/11. Other opponents of the 10-division figure (including, reportedly, officialswithin OSD) argue that a 10-division force is larger than what the Army will need in the future tocarry out its portion of the national military strategy. They argue that advances in U.S. warfightingtechnology, and changes in U.S. military doctrine, might permit the Army to be reduced to as fewas 6 active-duty divisions - 2 divisions for each of 2 overlapping regional conflicts, and 2 moredivisions for carrying out smaller-scale operations elsewhere.
Merits of Planned Shift to Lighter Forces. Supporters of the Army's plan to shift to a greater reliance on lighter forces have argued that it represents a goodstrategy for making the Army more mobile and responsive. They have argued that Stryker vehiclescan be transported to distant locations aboard Air Force airlift aircraft much more easily than theArmy's current heavily armored vehicles, that Stryker-equipped units will derive their survivabilityon the battlefield from superior situational awareness, stand-off capabilities, and agility rather thanfrom armor, that Stryker vehicles would be more useful than heavily armored vehicles formaneuvering through countryside featuring poor roads and bridges, and that they would be highlyeffective for combat operations in congested urban areas.
Opponents of the Army's plan for shifting to lighter forces have questioned the survivability in combat of more lightly armored vehicles like the Stryker. The Stryker Brigades, they argue, couldprove to be a good way for rapidly deploying Army personnel into combat situations where they willbe defeated by opposing forces. Opponents of the Army's transformation plan have also expresseddoubts about the technical feasibility of the FCS, which is to be significantly more mobile than theArmy's current heavily armored vehicles while at the same time offering a degree of protectionagainst enemy fire similar to that of heavily armored vehicles. Even using new technology,opponents have argued, it will not prove possible for the FCS to offer both things at the same time. (40)
Army Operations in the Iraq War. Active-duty Army combat units, along with Marine Corps and British combat units, played a central role in theIraq war. Major Army units involved in the war included the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized),the 101st Airborne Division, a brigade from the 82nd Airborne Division, and (in northernIraq) the173rd Airborne Brigade. The Army's main fighting forces for most of the war thus totaled less than3 full divisions. U.S. war plans originally called for an additional Army unit, the 4th InfantryDivision (Mechanized), to invade Iraq from Turkey. Following Turkey's decision not to allow itsterritory to be used by U.S. forces for staging an invasion of Iraq, this division was redeployed toKuwait and participated in a few combat operations toward the end of conflict. (41) Thousands ofadditional Army special operations forces were also involved in the war (see the section on specialoperations forces.)
The Iraq war demonstrated that U.S. ground forces are highly capable on the battlefield in conflicts against opposing ground forces. The U.S. and British ground campaign benefitted fromwell-trained soldiers and Marines, good equipment, effective air support from Air Force and Navy,and superior situational awareness. U.S. and British ground forces appeared to have achieved sometactical surprise at the start of the war, in spite of the lengthy pre-war buildup, by starting their attackbefore the 4th Infantry Division deployed to Kuwait and before the start of extensive U.S. air attacks. Once the invasion was underway, U.S. and British ground forces achieved further tactical surprisethrough their high speed of advance, which involved bypassing some Iraqi towns and military units,and their use of unexpected routes. The flexible battle plan and rapid maneuvers used by U.S.ground forces kept Iraqi forces off-balance. Some ground engagements involved fierce fighting, butmost weapons used by Iraqi forces were no match for the Army's M1 tanks and M2 Bradley fightingvehicles.
Potential Program Implications.
Number of Active-Duty Army Divisions. Following the Iraq war, those who support reducing the Army to less than 10 active-duty Army divisions couldargue that the relatively small number of Army divisions used for most of the war - the equivalentof less than 3 full divisions - and the dominance achieved by those units in combat, demonstrate thatthe Army can safely be reduced to less than 10 active-duty divisions while still retaining a capacity,in conjunction with Marine Corps divisions, for fighting two regional conflicts in overlapping timeframes and performing additional duties elsewhere. The Iraq war, they could argue, is consistentwith the planned path of U.S. defense transformation, which envisages the United States fightingfuture conflicts with less reliance on massive ground forces like those assembled for the 1991Persian Gulf war.
Those who support the idea of maintaining at least 10 active-duty Army divisions could argue, following the war, that the original U.S. war plan called for using an additional division (the 4thInfantry Division) throughout the war, that Army supply lines were stretched to the breaking pointand thinly defended as a result of the rapid advance to Baghdad, that the number of U.S. groundforces needed for the invasion was reduced by the contribution of an additional division by acoalition partner (Britain), which is something the United States cannot count on happening in futureconflicts, that about 148,000 Army National Guard and Army Reserve members were activated tohelp fulfill Army commitments during the war, and that the commitment of Army forces for the Iraqwar exacerbated an ongoing situation of high worldwide operational tempo for both active andreserve Army units. (42)
Programs for Upgrading Armored Vehicles. Supporters of reinstituting funding for upgrading the Army's M1 tanks and other heavily armoredvehicles would argue that the Iraq war dramatically demonstrated the continuing value of heavyarmor in modern warfare, not only for defeating enemy forces in open terrain, as many expected, butfor conducting combat operations in urban areas, which many observers did not anticipate. Giventhe importance of operations by heavily armored units in the Iraq war, they could argue, the UnitedStates should ensure that all of its armored forces are fully upgraded, particularly for fighting tworegional conflicts in overlapping time frames against capable enemy forces. They could also arguethat upgrading all the Army's armored vehicles will provide more time to develop the FCS, and thusreduce technical risk in the FCS development program.
Opponents of reinstituting funding for armor upgrades could argue that the war demonstrated that U.S. armored units are already vastly superior to enemy forces and that expending funds onfurther upgrades would therefore be unnecessary and wasteful. They can note that the armoredvehicles that were used successfully by the Army and Marine Corps for most of the war are not themost upgraded versions in the U.S. inventory, and that the Army already has a substantial numberof more highly upgraded versions that can be used, if needed, to fight more capable enemy forcesin the future. (43) In light of this, they might argue,the Army can successfully rely on its current planto maintain a force that includes a mix of highly upgraded and somewhat less upgraded (but still verycapable) armored vehicles.
Plan to Shift to Lighter Forces. Supporters of the Army's plan to shift to a mix of forces including fewer heavily armored combat units and a greaternumber of lighter and more mobile combat units could argue that the battlefield dominance achievedby the relatively small number of Army and Marine Corps armored units in the Iraq wardemonstrated that the United States currently has more than enough heavily armored combat unitsto fight future conflicts. They might also argue that lighter and more mobile units like the plannedStryker Brigades would have been valuable during the Iraq war in helping the United States establisha more formidable ground presence in northern Iraq following Turkey's decision not to allow itsterritory to be used as a staging area for U.S. forces. From their perspective, in the days followingthe end of major fighting in the war, Stryker vehicles would have been useful in Iraqi cities forhelping to reestablish civil order. The effectiveness of the M1 tank in combat operations in Baghdad,they could argue, resulted in part from Baghdad's broad avenues and sizeable public plazas and otheropen areas, which gave the M1s room to maneuver and long lines of sight. Future urban combatsituations, they are likely to maintain, may take place in cities and towns with narrower roads andshorter lines of sight, which could make M1s less effective and potentially more vulnerable to enemyattack.
Opponents of the Army's plan to shift the mix of its forces could argue that the Iraq war, by demonstrating the continued value of heavy armor in modern combat, suggests that the United Statesshould think twice about reducing the number of Army armored units, particularly given therequirement for being able to fight two regional conflicts in overlapping time frames. They couldalso argue that Stryker vehicles would have been vulnerable to some of the weapons that Iraqi forcesused ineffectively against M1 tanks and M2 Bradley fighting vehicles, and that the war thusdemonstrated the inadvisability of shifting the Army toward more lightly armored combat units. Inparticular, they might argue that the Army should be cautious in its planning for the FCS to usesituational awareness as compensation for less armor protection. They may also argue that, althoughheavily armored units are more difficult to transport, the United States was able to deploy sufficientnumbers of them to start the war in a reasonable amount of time, and that given the potentialvulnerability to enemy fire of lightly armored vehicles, the need to improve the Army's rapid-response capabilityshould be met not by lightening Army forces, but by investing in improved airliftand sealift capabilities, such as wing-in-ground aircraft (44) and very high-speed sealift ships (seesections on air mobility and sealift).
section_title: Combat Aircraft and Precision-Guided Munitions (45)
paragraphs: Program Issues Going Into the War. The Iraq waroccurred as Congress was considering a number of significant issues relating to programs for combataircraft and precision-guided munitions, including the following:
the degree to which air power can substitute for ground forces in future conflicts;
the balance of funding for manned aircraft vs. unmanned air vehicles(UAVs);
the balance of funding for shorter-ranged tactical aircraft vs. long-rangedbombers;
funding for specific tactical aircraft programs, including the F/A-22 fighter,the F/A-18E/F strike fighter, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft; and the RAH-66 Comanchehelicopter program;
funding for specialized combat-support aircraft;
funding for specific UAV programs, including the Global Hawk and PredatorUAVs; and
funding for various precision-guided munitionprograms.
Combat Aircraft Operations in the Iraq War. The Iraq war was the latest in a series of U.S. military operations dating back to the 1980s where theUnited States has thoroughly dominated the air war. (46) U.S. and British combat aircraft played acentral role in the Iraq war, as expected, destroying thousands of Iraqi targets of various kinds. Unlike the 1991 Persian Gulf war, when some Iraqi aircraft flew against U.S. and coalition aircraft,Iraq in this conflict, with one reported exception, (47) apparently did not put any manned aircraft intothe air. (48)
An Air Force statistical summary of the war states that a total of about 1,801 U.S., British, Australian and Canadian aircraft (excluding U.S. Army helicopters) were involved in the conflict. These aircraft flew a total of 41,404 sorties (excluding sorties by special operations and Armyhelicopters, and "coalition sovereignty flights"). (49) At the height of the war, roughly 1,500 to 2,000sorties, including roughly 750 to 1,000 strike sorties, were reportedly flown each day. Coalitionforces dropped or fired a total of 29,199 bombs and missiles. Of these, about 19,948, or about 68%,were precision guided - about the same as the 69%-share in the war in Afghanistan, and many timeshigher than the 9%-share in the 1991 Persian Gulf war, but less than the 90%-share that someobservers had predicted prior to the Iraq war. The total of 19,948 precision-guided weapons includes802 Tomahawk cruise missiles fired by U.S. Navy surface combatants and submarines. (50)
Preliminary DoD estimates are that aircraft-delivered precision-guided weapons found their targets as much as 98% of the time, and that the percentage of Tomahawk missiles that found theirtargets might be almost as high. (51) Past experience,however, suggests that as combat records arereviewed in more detail, these percentages may well be revised downward. The success rate for theTomahawk missile in the 1991 Persian Gulf war, for example, was reduced significantly after theresults of Tomahawk attacks in that war were reviewed in detail.
As expected, U.S., British, and Australian combat aircraft in the Iraq war attacked various kinds of targets in Iraq, including leadership targets, command-and-control facilities, air-defense systems,and fielded military forces. Perhaps more surprising to some, fixed-wing aircraft armed withprecision-guided weapons proved useful in providing close air support to U.S. and British groundforces engaged in urban combat operations. (52) Perhaps more than the public realized at the time, U.S.air power decimated key Iraqi Republican Guard divisions defending the southern approaches toBaghdad, facilitating the rapid advance to the city by U.S. ground forces. (53) U.S. and British airoperations benefitted from networking technology that permitted information about Iraqi targets tobe passed quickly from surveillance aircraft to strike aircraft.
DoD reports that 7 aircraft - 1 A-10 Warthog attack plane, 4 AH-64 Apache helicopters, and 2 AH-1W Cobra helicopters - were shot down by Iraqi ground fire. Another 13 aircraft were lostdue to other causes, including 2 fighters (1 U.S. and 1 British) lost in friendly-fire incidents andseveral aircraft lost due to accidents. (54) The smallnumber of aircraft lost due to enemy fire wasconsistent with U.S. experience in other recent military operations. (55)
U.S. and British strike operations were supported by a variety of specialized combat-support aircraft, including Air Force E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, NavyE-2C Airborne Early Warning aircraft (the Navy's analogue to the E-3), Air Force E-8 JointSurveillance, Targeting and Reconnaissance System (JSTARS) ground-surveillance aircraft, andNavy and Marine Corps EA-6B radar-jamming aircraft.
The United States used more than 10 kinds of UAVs in the Iraq war, (56) compared with 3 kindsin the war in Afghanistan and a single kind in the 1991 Persian Gulf war. UAVs proved especiallyvaluable in providing persistent (i.e., round-the-clock) overhead surveillance of Iraqi forces,something that cannot be done with satellites and might be too risky to attempt with mannedsurveillance aircraft. UAVs were used to draw attention from Iraqi air defense systems, permittingthose systems to be located and attacked. Unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs), which areUAVs armed with weapons, were used to attack targets on the ground.
Potential Program Implications. The Iraq war haspotential implications for several issues relating to the Air Force as a whole, combat and combat-support aircraftprograms, and precision-guided weapon programs.
Size and Structure of the Air Force. The recent war in Iraq has raised questions regarding whether the U.S. Air Force is appropriately sized andorganized for meeting operational demands. Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, theAir Force deployed approximately 7,000 personnel globally to meet worldwide commitments. ByDecember 2002, that figure had increased to about 24,000. (57) Continued U.S. military operations inAfghanistan, stabilization efforts in Iraq, anti-terrorism activities in the Horn of Africa and in SouthEast Asia, deterrence operations in North East Asia, and unforseen disaster relief and humanitarianassistance scenarios suggest that this deployment level may not subside soon.
In 1999, the Air Force reorganized itself into a service composed of 10 Aerospace Expeditionary Forces (AEFs). The purpose of the reorganization was to create an organizationalstructure and rotational deployment schedule that would permit the Air Force to effectively meetworldwide contingency demands without placing undue strains on equipment and personnel. EachAEF includes approximately 175 aircraft and 20,000 people from both the active and reservecomponents. (58) The 10 AEFs rotate on a 15-monthtraining and deployment cycle, during which theymay be deployed for up to 90 days. The Air Force wants to be able to deploy an AEF in 48 hours,and up to 5 AEFs within 15 days. Each AEF is tailored to the regional commander's needs.
Prior to the Iraq war, signs emerged that the Air Force was being tasked to do more than its reorganized force structure would easily allow. In February 2002, it was reported that Air Forceleaders had begun making exceptions to the AEF deployment schedule to meet overseas demandsfor personnel in certain career fields, and that as a result some Air Force personnel would have todeploy longer or more frequently than the AEF standard. (59) In September 2002, it was reported thatthe Air Force plans to modify the AEF structure by embedding personnel and materiel from two on-call air wingsin the 10 AEFs while expeditionary combat-support assets from throughout the AirForce are "leveled." (60) In January 2003, the AirForce again made exceptions to the AEF rotationalscheme by deploying indefinitely several aircraft squadrons of various types (bombers, fighters,helicopters, UAVs) to augment AEFs 7 and 8, which were deploying to the Persian Gulf. (61) Normally, Air Force personnel are not allowed to serve temporary duty of more than 180 days in onelocation. In April 2003, however, Secretary of the Air Force James Roche issued a blanket waiverauthorizing all Air Force personnel supporting contingency operations to exceed the180 day limit.
What do these recent events suggest for the size and organization of the Air Force? Should Air Force end strength be increased to more easily satisfy demands for personnel in certain career fields? If so, what changes, if any, need to be made to Air Force recruitment, training, and retentionprograms? Are there alternatives to increasing Air Force end strength? Could more cooperationwith other services help alleviate this shortfall? Air Force military policemen (MPs), for example,have reportedly been in high demand. Could increased numbers of Army personnel be used to helpguard Air Force air bases? (62)
When conceived, the AEF concept was lauded as the key organizational component to the Air Force's transformation strategy. Do the recent exceptions to the AEF rotational schedule suggestthat the AEF concept is broken? If so, how should the AEF concept be modified?
Aircraft Carriers and Sea-Based Aircraft. Five Navy aircraft carriers and a total of 408 Navy aircraft (almost all of them operating from the carriers) wereinvolved in the Iraq war. Another 372 Marine Corps aircraft (many operating from Navy amphibiousships) were also involved. The combined naval (i.e., Navy and Marine Corps) total of 780 aircraftrepresented about 43% of the 1,801 aircraft (excluding Army helicopters) used in the war. Navalaircraft flew 13,893, or about 34%, of the 41,404 sorties (excluding sorties by special operations andArmy helicopters, and "coalition sovereignty flights") in the war. (63) The contribution of naval aircraftto U.S. air operations in the war in Afghanistan was even more pronounced. Supporters of aircraftcarriers and sea-based aircraft could argue that the Iraq war, like the war in Afghanistan,demonstrated the value of aircraft carriers and carrier-based aircraft for conducting U.S. militaryoperations where access to in-theater land bases is limited. 
Balance of Air and Ground Forces. Some observers argued that a primary lesson of the U.S. military operation in Kosovo in 1999 was that air poweralone could now be used to defeat U.S. adversaries. They argued that while air power in previousU.S. military operations had supported ground operations, the U.S. operation in Kosovo haddemonstrated that air power by itself could achieve U.S. war aims. (64) Air power advocates arguedthat the war in Afghanistan in 2001-2002, which employed few ground forces relative to air forces,reinforced this argument.
Debate following the Iraq war over the relative value of air power vs. "boots on the ground" has been muted to date. The prominent use and success of U.S. heavy ground forces appears to havesuppressed arguments from air power advocates that air power "can do it all." Even so, analysts maydebate the relative contributions of air operations and operations by U.S. armor and artillery indestroying Iraq's army. This debate could influence views on how much air power can or shouldreplace armor and artillery in future conflicts, and thus views on how much funding to invest in eacharea.
Reports suggest that U.S. and British air strikes severely weakened Iraq's Republican Guard Divisions - Iraq's toughest ground forces - making them easy prey for advancing Army and MarineCorps divisions. Some observers estimate that the Republican Guard divisions lost half their tanks,armored personnel carriers and artillery before their first encounter with U.S. ground forces on April1, 2003. (65) Other observers estimate that by April4, U.S. air power had reduced Republican GuardDivisions to between 18 and 44 percent of their full strength. (66)
Other observers, however, caution that the effectiveness of air operations in destroying Iraqi ground forces is still being assessed. They note that many of the early assessments of theeffectiveness of air operations against Iraqi ground units in the 1991 Persian Gulf war were laterdowngraded. Some analysts, for example, now estimate that coalition aircraft were responsible foronly 17 percent of the Iraqi tanks that were destroyed in the 1991 war. (67) These observers also pointout that even though Iraqi ground forces in the Iraq war were destroyed by U.S. and British airstrikes, U.S. Army and Marine Corps forces still encountered stiff resistance from some Iraqi units.
Armor, artillery, ammunition, and fuel are among the most challenging military materiel to transport long distances. Some observers argue that if U.S. ground forces begin relying more oncombat aircraft than on armor and artillery, U.S. forces in the future could be more rapidlydeployable and remain just as lethal. Advocates of shifting to a greater reliance on aircraft note thatthe Marine Corps fields fewer large artillery pieces than does the Army, and relies more on MarineCorps combat aircraft (AV-8B attack planes and F/A-18 strike fighters) for fire support. Thoseskeptical of substituting aircraft for Army armor and artillery note that unlike aircraft, the availabilityand effectiveness of artillery is not degraded by adverse weather. Recent combat in the mountainsof Afghanistan, they could argue, suggest that ground forces might have been more effective andmight have suffered fewer casualties if they were supported by artillery rather than solely combataircraft.
Close Air Support (CAS) vs. Other Missions. The military strategy pursued in the Iraq war may add fuel to a long-running discussion on the relativebalance, within U.S. air power operations, between close air support (CAS) missions vs. attackingmore strategic targets in attempts to topple enemy governments and power centers. Was the Iraqiregime toppled by the strategic bombing that destroyed key regime targets in Baghdad, or becauseof CAS missions that contributed to the rapid destruction of Iraqi military forces in the field? Viewson this debate could influence decisions on the kinds of aircraft and associated systems DoD shouldacquire in coming years.
Long-Range Bombers. (68) Long-range B-1, B-52, andB-2 bombers played a significant role in the Iraq war, as they did in the war in Afghanistan in 2001-2002. In bothconflicts, relatively small numbers of bombers dropped large numbers of precision-guided bombs and traditionalunguided bombs, destroying many enemy ground targets, (69) and wereable to loiter over the battlefield for extended periods of time, which made them readily availablefor attacking so-called time-sensitive targets - targets that emerge suddenly and remain susceptibleto attack for only short periods of time. For example, the B-1 bomber that carried out the April 7,2003 bombing attack on a building in Baghdad where Saddam Hussein and his close associates were thought to be located had been loitering above Iraq waiting for just such an emerging target, anddropped its bombs just 12 minutes after being given the coordinates.
The performance of long-range bombers in the Iraq war and the war in Afghanistan may influence a long-simmering the debate on the balance of funding for bomber programs vs. tacticalaircraft. Specific questions relating to this debate include the following:
What is the best mix of long-range bombers and shorter range tactical combat aircraft?
Should bombers be emphasized more in the overall structure of the AirForce?
Is DoD shortchanging bomber modernization to finance its tactical combataircraft programs?
Should planned early retirements of B-1s be slowed, or evenreversed? (70)
Should the Air Force implement a proposal it is now considering to replace theengines on its B-52s?
Prior to the Iraq war, bomber supporters argued that programs for modernizing the bomber force are underfunded relative to tactical aircraft programs in DoD budgets, (71) that DoD's current plan toretire certain B-1 bombers early is unwise, (72) andthat the current DoD plan for developing a next-generation bomber to replace the aging bombers in the current fleetis not sufficiently aggressive. (73) Supporters of current DoD plans argued that the force-structure and modernization needs of thebomber force are properly reflected in DoD planning and budgeting.
Bomber supporters could argue that the Iraq war and the war in Afghanistan demonstrated that the value of bombers in combat operations has been significantly enhanced by the advent ofprecision-guided weapons. They could also argue that the two conflicts underscored the value ofbombers for reducing the need for in-theater bases and for maintaining aircraft with precision-guidedweapons over the battlefield for long periods of time. In light of the enhanced role of bombers, theycould argue, DoD should place greater emphasis on bomber programs in its plans and budgets.
Supporters of DoD's current plans for modernization of the bomber force could argue the Iraq war and the war in Afghanistan show that the United States has enough, or more than enough, long-range bombersfor fighting regional conflicts, particularly given how precision-guided weapons havemultiplied the number of targets that each bomber can attack during a single sortie. They could alsoargue that the good reviews given to bomber operations in both of these wars shows that theseaircraft are receiving sufficient amounts of modernization funding and that there is no urgent needto develop and procure a next-generation bomber. Rather than devoting funding to maintaining alarger bomber force or developing a new bomber design now, they could argue, the successful useof bombers in Iraq and Afghanistan shows that funding should instead be used to maintain thereadiness of the currently planned bomber force and increase its effectiveness by funding additionalimprovements to precision-guided weapons and associated targeting systems.
Tactical Fighter Aircraft in General. (74) Prior to the Iraqwar, proponents of DoD's three main tactical aircraft modernization programs - the F/A-22 Raptor,the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter - have argued that proceeding with allthree programs as currently planned represents the best way to guarantee continued U.S. airdominance in future conflicts. They have argued that the successful operations of current U.S.aircraft in recent military operations does not imply that they would achieve similar success in futureconflicts. Air-defense technology, they have argued, is developing and proliferating rapidly, makingtomorrow's adversaries potentially more capable than yesterday's. Stealthy, agile tactical aircraftwith advanced avionics, they have argued, will be required in the future for successful operationsagainst adversaries armed with highly-capable air-defense systems such as the Russian-built long-range SA-10 andSA-12 surface-to-air missile systems. The F/A-22, F/A-18E/F, and JSF, they havealso argued, will field flexible technologies that will permit these aircraft to take on new capabilities,if needed, for responding to changes in the international security environment. For example, theyhave argued, if cruise-missile defense becomes a much more prominent mission for tactical aircraft,these new aircraft will be well suited to incorporate this mission.
Critics of DoD's tactical aircraft modernization program have argued that DoD simply cannot afford to proceed with all three tactical aircraft programs as now planned, at least not withoutrequiring significant cutbacks in other critical DoD programs. They have argued that the tremendoussuccess in recent U.S. military operations of current U.S. aircraft such as the F-15 and F-16 fighterdemonstrate that the margin of U.S. superiority in air operations is so significant that it is likely tolast for some number of years. (75) They have alsoargued that with the growing importance to U.S.air operations of precision-guided weapons, associated surveillance and targeting systems, andtechnologies for networked air operations, investing in new tactical aircraft designs is now lesscritical for insuring future success in U.S. air operations than investing in these other air-relatedtechnologies. In optimizing investments in future air power capability, they have argued, DoDshould move away from its traditional "platform-centric"focus on developing new aircraft designs,and toward a "system-of-systems" approach that more fully recognizes the importance of thesesupporting technologies in contributing to total U.S. air power capability.
F/A-22 Program. (76) As the most capable, mostexpensive, and most air-to-air oriented aircraft in DoD's tactical aircraft modernization plan, theF/A-22 has often been at the center of the debate over the merits of DoD's tactical aircraftmodernization plan. Following the Iraq war, critics of the F/A-22 program could argue that thedegree of U.S. air dominance in the Iraq war and other recent conflicts demonstrates that the F/A-22program has become the "Seawolf of the sky" - i.e., a program, like the Navy's Seawolf submarineprogram, that was initiated in the 1980s with the goal of producing an expensive, high-capabilityplatform for addressing a projected Soviet military threat that never materialized. (77) Successful U.S.air operations in the Iraq war and previous conflicts, they could argue, demonstrate that today'stactical combat aircraft are more than sufficiently effective, and that upgrades to these aircraft cantherefore maintain DoD's air power dominance until less- expensive manned aircraft such as the JSFor unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) are fielded. As a result, they could argue, the F/A-22program can either be terminated or procurement of the aircraft can be reduced from the currentlyplanned total of about 276 to a smaller "silver bullet" force of no more than 100 aircraft.
Supporters of procuring 276 or more F/A-22s could argue that the air-to-air capabilities of Iraq, like those of Afghanistan and enemy Serbian forces operating in Kosovo, were known to be virtuallynonexistent, and that none of these wars consequently do anything to invalidate the projected futurethreat for which the F/A-22 will be needed - an enemy equipped with modern, highly capablefighters and surface-to-air missile systems. In addition, F/A-22 supporters could argue, the F-22 wasrecently redesignated the F/A-22 to reflect the fact that it is no longer a pure air-superiority fighter,but a rather strike fighter that can also perform valuable air-to-ground strike missions like thoseconducted in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kosovo. (78)
F/A-18E/F and F-35 (JSF) Programs. (79) Someobservers, including Admiral Vernon Clark, the Chief of Naval Operations, argue that the Iraq war,like the war in Afghanistan, has underscored the need for the Navy to replace its shorter-ranged F/A-18C/D strikefighters with longer-ranged F/A-18E/F strike fighters and F-35 Joint Strike Fighters. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, Clark and others have argued, Navy F/A-18C/Ds performing long-range, long-durationmissions (including missions in which aircraft orbit over target areas whilewaiting for targets of opportunity to emerge) required multiple in-flight refuelings per sortie. F/A-18E/Fs or F-35s,he and others argue, can perform such missions with fewer in-flight refuelings ornone at all, reducing the Navy's need for aerial refueling, which was in short supply in the Iraq war. During the Iraq war, the number of strike sorties flown from carriers was reduced in some instancesdue to insufficient in-flight refueling assets. Replacing F/A-18C/Ds with F/A-18E/Fs and F-35s,they now argue, will reduce the chances of such problems occurring in future operations.
V-22 Tilt-Rotor Aircraft. (80) Current DoD plans callfor procuring a total of 458 V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft, mostly for use by Marine Corps forces asreplacement for aged Marine Corps transport helicopters. Supporters of the V-22, which hasexperienced considerable controversy over the years due in part to fatal crashes during testing, arguethat the V-22 offers numerous operational advantages over helicopters, including a higher cruisingspeed for transporting Marine personnel and equipment from ship to operating area.
Supporters of the V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft could argue that in both the Iraq war and the war in Afghanistan, Marine forces conducted ground combat operations 350 or more miles from shore, andperhaps 450 or more miles away from their Navy amphibious ships at sea. These are much longeroperating distances than Marine forces have traditionally experienced. V-22 supporters could arguethat the Marines' deep-inland operations in Iraq and Afghanistan could be repeated in futureconflicts, which would underscore the value of replacing the Marine Corp's aged helicopters withfaster-flying V-22s. V-22 supporters could also argue that difficulties experienced in the Iraq warwith maintaining the readiness of the aged heavy-lift helicopters underscores the need to proceedwith V-22 procurement.
Other observers could argue that although the V-22 can be of value in replacing aged heavy-lift helicopters and in supporting deep-inland Marine Corps operations, the Iraq war, like the war inAfghanistan, does nothing to alter the need for the strict testing program for the V-22 DoDestablished in the wake of fatal V-22 crashes. They could argue that although there may be a need,even an urgent need, for the V-22, this V-22 program's past development difficulties resulted in partfrom efforts to rush its development. If the V-22 is to serve as an effective replacement for today'shelicopters, they could argue, the V-22 testing program must continue to proceed as planned.
Helicopters. The Iraq war is the third consecutive major U.S. military operation, following the operation in Kosovo in 1999 and the war in Afghanistanin 2001-2002, where helicopter performance was mixed. In Kosovo, the Army was criticized for notbeing able to quickly deploy and use Task Force Hawk, a group of 24 AH-64 Apache attackhelicopters. Critics emphasized that the task force had grown into a 5,000-soldier force that required500 C-17 sorties to deploy, and that the Army had kept its helicopter operations separate from thedaily air tasking order (ATO) - the document issued each day by the air operations center thatcoordinated the operations of most U.S. aircraft. Keeping Army helicopters out of the ATO, criticsargued, made Army helicopter operations in Kosovo less integrated with the operations of other U.S.forces and thereby reduced helicopter effectiveness. (81)
In Afghanistan, critics noted a similar lack of coordination between Army helicopter operations and the operations of other U.S. forces, especially during a combat operation in March 2002 calledOperation Anaconda. (82) In addition, the highelevation of the Afghanistan theater of operations madesome helicopter operations difficult, and U.S. special operations forces experienced a shortfall inMH-47 heavy-lift helicopters, leading some observers to argue more strenuously in favor of the V-22Osprey as one potential solution to both of these problems.
In the Iraq war, helicopters encountered problems with survivability and maintainability. With regard to survivability, an attack on a Republican Guard division by 34 AH-64 helicopters from theArmy's 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment has been described as a near disaster: Every helicopter washit by ground fire, one helicopter was lost, and 27 of the 33 that returned to base were too damagedto fly again without repair. (83) Some observerssuggest that, reminiscent of problems with Armyhelicopter operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan, an Army failure to coordinate the Apache attackwith supporting Air Force and Navy aircraft operations may have played a significant role in the pooroutcome of this attack. (84) By using different tacticsand by more closely integrating their efforts withfixed-wing attack aircraft and Army artillery, AH-64s from the 101st Air Assault Division conducteda raid on the city of Karbala four days later with much less damage. (85)
One traditional role for Army attack helicopters is conducting close air support - i.e., attacking enemy forces that are directly in contact with, or near contact with, friendly forces. Early in the Iraqwar, attack helicopter pilots complained that they were being sidelined - that U.S. war planners wererelying more on fixed-wing aircraft (many armed with precision-guided weapons) than on helicoptersfor performing close air support missions. (86) Thisperceived preference for fixed-wing aircraft, ifaccurate, may have been due in part to concerns regarding helicopter survivability following resultsof the attack by the 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment.
With regard to helicopter maintainability, keeping helicopters flying in the harsh desert conditions of Iraq appears to have been a challenge. Early reports indicate that many differenthelicopters, but perhaps especially Marine Corps heavy-lift CH-53Es, were frequently grounded dueto sand-induced engine problems. While some maintenance difficulties may always be expected forforces operating in the field in time of war, some observers argue that little improvement inhelicopter maintainability has been made since the 1991 Persian Gulf war, and that the desertconditions in which these helicopters must operate are well known. (87)
In light of the mixed results with helicopter operations in Iraq and other recent operations, there is speculation that DoD may consider the option of placing less emphasis on helicopters in its plansand budgets. The helicopter program that might most be affected by this is the Army's RAH-66Comanche helicopter program. The Comanche is a stealthy, armed reconnaissance helicopter thatthe Army has been developing for about 20 years, during which time it has been a frequent topic ofdebate. In late 2002, DoD restructured the program, reducing the Army's planned procurement ofthe helicopter by about half, from about 1,200 to about 600, and including in the program a neweffort to develop companion UAVs for each helicopter. These companion UAVs could be used toimprove situational awareness for the crews flying the Comanches, or to attack targets on the groundthat might threaten Comanches. (88)
Supporters of reducing the planned procurement of Comanche programs further, or of terminating the program entirely, could argue that the Iraq war demonstrated that attack helicopterscan be significantly vulnerable to ground fire in modern combat operations, and that missionspreviously performed by helicopters can now be performed by higher-flying fixed-wing aircraftarmed with precision-guided munitions.
Supporters of the Comanche program could argue that the problems with helicopter survivability in the Iraq war reflected incorrect tactics (including lack of coordination with Air Forceand Navy fixed-wing aircraft) rather than inherent problems with helicopters, and that adjustingtactics produced better results. They could also argue that the Comanche helicopter, with its stealthfeatures and support from companion UAVs, will be much more survivable on the modern battlefieldthan today's attack helicopters. Helicopters, they could argue, will retain their effectiveness relativeto fixed-wing aircraft in responding with agility to enemy maneuvers on the battlefield - somethingthat Iraqi forces did little of in the Iraq war, but which enemy forces on future conflicts could dosignificantly. (89)
Some observers argue that difficulties with helicopter maintenance in the Iraq war were due in part to the advanced age of the helicopters in question. The Marine Corps' heavy-lift helicopters(i.e., its CH-53s and CH-46s) are generally quite old, in part because acquisition of the V-22 Ospreytilt-rotor aircraft, which is to replace these helicopters, has been slowed. Following the Iraq war, onepotential issue concerns what contingency plans DoD has in place for modernizing or replacingexisting heavy-lift helicopters if the V-22 program is delayed further or cancelled.
Combat-Support Aircraft. (90) The Iraq war highlightedthe effectiveness of specialized combat-support aircraft such as the U-2 surveillance plane and theE-8 Joint Surveillance, Targeting and Reconnaissance System (JSTARS) aircraft. The JSTARS'ground-surveillance radar proved particularly useful, in one instance detecting and tracking Iraqiarmored vehicles that were attempting to use a sandstorm to evade detection by U.S. forces. Specialized combat-support aircraft like the U-2, the E-8, and the Navy/Marine Corps EA-6B radar-jammingaircraft, however, are examples of so-called high-demand, low-density (HD/LD) assets -assets that are in great demand, but which exist in limited numbers. In the wake of the Iraq war,supporters of combat-support aircraft programs could argue that funding for modernization andprocurement of such aircraft should be increased.
Unmanned Air Vehicles. (91) The value of UAVs washighlighted by the war in Afghanistan, and following that war, unmanned vehicles became a moreprominent element in DoD's defense transformation plans. Some observers expect that thesuccessful use of more than 10 kinds of UAVs in the Iraq war will reinforce support generated bythe war in Afghanistan for expanding and accelerating DoD's UAV programs. (92) UAV programs thatmight be affected include the Global Hawk and Predator long-range UAV programs, severalprograms for developing and procuring smaller and shorter-ranged UAVs for all the services, andthe joint Air Force-Navy program to develop a high-capability unmanned combat air vehicle(UCAV).
Air-Delivered Precision-Guided Munitions. During the war in Afghanistan, some observers expressed concern for inventory levels of certain precision-guidedmunitions, particularly the relatively new GPS-guided Joint Direct Attack Munition(JDAM). (93) Following the highly successful useof JDAMs and other precision-guided munitions inthe war in Afghanistan, production rates for these weapons were increased. As a result, U.S. militaryplanners expressed less concern about the size of the inventory at the start of the Iraq war, and afterit was completed. (94) DoD plans to procure largenumbers of JDAMs and other precision-guidedweapons in coming years, and the success of these weapons in the Iraq war may reinforce supportfor funding these plans.
The JDAM currently exists in 2,000-pound and 1,000-pound versions. A 500-pound version, now in development, was not available at the time of the Iraq war; some pilots reportedly believe itwould have been useful, particularly for attacking certain targets while limiting damage to nearbynon-targeted structures. The Iraq war may thus reinforce support for proceeding with developmentand procurement of the 500-pound version of the weapon.
An even smaller GPS-guided weapon, the 250-pound Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), is now being developed. Large numbers of SDBs could be carried by strike aircraft, permitting aircraft toattack even more aim points in a single sortie than is now possible. Following the Iraq war,supporters of this weapon could argue that it might prove particularly useful for supporting groundforces in urban combat operations - a mission for fixed-wing aircraft that was elevated inprominence by the Iraq war, and one where concern for avoiding damage to civilians and civilianinfrastructure can be paramount.
Prior to the start of the Iraq war, it was well known that the Iraqi regime had built an elaborate network of bunkers, command centers, living quarters and tunnels deep under Baghdad. Theeffectiveness of U.S. attempts to destroy such targets with "bunker-busting" weapons is not yetknown. Post-war analysis of these attacks, when complete, may influence views on whether toproceed with development of improved bunker-busting weapons.
Tomahawk Cruise Missile. A total of 802 Tomahawk land- attack missiles (TLAMs) were used in the Iraq war, (95) or more than 40% of the reported pre-warinventory of 1,890 to 2,000 TLAMs, (96) which itselfmay have been much smaller than called for inDoD plans. The most capable version of the Tomahawk in the inventory is called the Block III. Most of the Tomahawks used in the Iraq war were likely Block IIIs. Procurement of new Block IIIsended in FY1999. Procurement of the next version of the Tomahawk, called the Block IV or theTactical Tomahawk (TacTom for short), began in FY2002. Thirty-two Block IVs were procured inFY2002, and another 167 were procured in FY2003. The missiles take roughly 18 months to build,so the first Block IVs may enter the inventory in 2004.
The FY2004-FY2009 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), submitted to Congress in February 2003, prior to the start of the Iraq war, calls for procuring 267 Block IVs in FY2004, 218 in FY2005,422 in FY2006, 406 in FY2007, 471 in FY2008, and 410 in FY2009. Given the large number ofTomahawks used in the Iraq war, and the currently low remaining inventory of Tomahawks, someobservers have proposed increasing the planned number of Block IVs to be procured in FY2004 andsubsequent years, so as to replenish the Tomahawk inventory sooner. To support this plan, they haveproposed increasing the capacity of the Tomahawk production line from 38 missiles per month (456missiles per year) to 50 missiles per month (600 per year) or 75 missiles per month (900 missiles peryear). (97)
section_title: Special Operations Forces (98)
paragraphs: SOF Profile Elevated By Afghanistan Operations. The successful use of significant numbers of SOF personnel in the war in Afghanistan elevated theprofile of special operations forces in U.S. defense planning. Following the war in Afghanistan,enhancing the capabilities U.S. SOF came to be viewed as a key element of the administration'splans for transforming the U.S. military to meet 21st-Century threats. The Administration's proposedFY2004 defense budget, which was submitted to Congress in February 2003 (i.e., before the Iraqwar) proposes increasing the number of U.S. SOF personnel (currently about 47,000) by 1,890, andincreasing the non-personnel portion of the SOF budget by 48% over the FY2003 figure. Much ofthe proposed funding increase will support efforts to modernize the fleet of specialized helicoptersand C-130 fixed-wing aircraft that support U.S. SOF operations. (99)
SOF in the Iraq War. As many observers had expected, U.S. special operations forces (SOF), along with British, Australian, and Polish SOF units,played a significant role in the Iraq war, conducting operations in southern, western, and northernIraq, and in and around Baghdad. The total number of U.S. SOF personnel involved - more than9,000 or 10,000 personnel from the Army, Navy, and Air Force, according to press reports - wasconsiderably larger than the 6,000 or so reportedly used in Afghanistan in 2001-2002, and muchlarger than the number used in the 1991 Persian Gulf war. (100) Although relatively few details aboutSOF operations in the Iraq war have been reported, observers have generally concluded that SOFoperations in the Iraq war, like those in Afghanistan, were highly effective and made adisproportionately large contribution to the success of the U.S.-led war effort. (101)
Potential Program Implications. Some observers believe the successful use of significant numbers of SOF in the Iraq war will reinforce the supportgenerated by the war in Afghanistan for increasing the size and budget of U.S. special operationsforces. (102) Advocates of such increases arguethat they are not only justified by operationalexperience in Afghanistan and Iraq, but necessary if U.S. SOF forces are not to be stretched too thinin carrying out their recently expanded responsibilities for conducting key parts of the U.S. military'sglobal war on terrorism.
Some observers, however, caution that the elite nature of special operations forces could make it difficult to rapidly expand the size of U.S. special operations forces without eroding their very highselection and training standards. Another potential concern is that enthusiasm for special operationsforces could lead to under-investment in regular U.S. forces or support for using SOF units to carryout military operations for which they might not be well suited.
section_title: Reserve Forces (103)
paragraphs: Post-9/11 Reserve Activations. From September 11, 2001, through April 25, 2003, the United States has involuntarily activated more than 286,000reservists for federal service to support the ongoing global war on terrorism and more recently theIraq war. In addition, at least 47,500 more reservists have been activated in other statuses - forexample, to serve as members of the National Guard under state control, or as volunteers for activeduty. Some reservists who were called up after September 11, 2001 were released from active dutyand returned to civilian life prior to the start of the Iraq war. At the time of the Iraq war, roughly220,000 reservists were on active duty. (104)
The callup of reservists since September 11, 2001 represents the second-largest reserve callup since the end of World War II in 1945. Only the Korean War mobilization of 858,000 reservists in1950-1953 was larger. (105)
The post-9/11 reserve mobilization appears to have experienced many fewer administrative and bureaucratic problems than the somewhat smaller 1990-1991 callup for the 1991 Persian Gulf war,which involved a total of about 265,000 total reservists. Lessons learned from the 1990-1991 callup,as well from smaller activations in the 1990s for contingencies in places such as Bosnia, Haiti, andKosovo, are likely responsible for these improvements.
Potential Program Implications. Although the post-9/11 reserve mobilization has experienced fewer problems than previous callups, it has alsohighlighted, and possibly even exacerbated, two issues regarding reserve force structure andaccessibility which began to emerge during the 1990-1991 callup. One of these issues concerns theArmy National Guard's combat divisions and separate brigades; the other concerns reserve recruitingand retention in an era of repeated callups.
National Guard Combat Divisions And Separate Brigades. The Army National Guard has 8 combat divisions and 15"enhanced" separate brigades. (106) No Guarddivisions have been called to active duty for an actualor potential foreign conflict since the 1961 Berlin Crisis, and none of the separate brigades has beencalled up for such purposes since the Vietnam War in 1968.
Three Army Guard combat maneuver brigades were mobilized for the 1991 Persian Gulf war. All three were "roundout" units designated to bring parent active Army divisions to full strengthupon mobilization. These three brigades, however, were not activated until several months after thecrisis began with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. The two brigades whose parentdivisions fought in the war did not deploy with those divisions; none of the three brigades left theUnited States; and the only one to be "validated" as combat-ready was so judged on the date the warofficially ended. The brigades' experience in the conflict generated much controversy about theviability of the "roundout" concept and the active Army's relationship with the National Guard, inparticular engendering great bitterness in official relations between the Guard and the Army's senioruniformed leadership. (107)
None of the Guard divisions and brigades have been activated to serve as whole divisions and brigades since September 11, 2001. A substantial number of the combat battalions that make upthese divisions and brigades, however, have been activated since that date, mostly to providephysical security for military installations (including Air Force bases) in the United States. (A fewof the battalions have been deployed to provide rear-area security in Kuwait and Iraq.)
Given the number of active-duty Army units committed to Iraq and other locations at the time of the Iraq war, some observers suggested that some Guard divisions and brigades should beactivated to reconstitute a strategic reserve against possible threats elsewhere, such as the KoreanPeninsula. There is no indication, however, that DoD has contemplated taking such an action. DoDand the administration have argued that more forces have not been needed. Other observers argueGuard divisions and brigades have not been called up because the senior uniformed leadership of theArmy is anti-National Guard and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld is anti-Army in general.
The history of the Army Guard's combat divisions and separate brigades since 1990 raises the following potential questions for Congress: If these divisions and brigades are not to be activatedunder circumstances short of a total national mobilization - which has not happened since WorldWar II, 60 years ago - of what use are they in the foreseeable future? If some of the subordinatebattalions of the divisions and brigades are considered useful during less extensive mobilizations,as their recent activations indicate, then should some or all of the smaller component units of thedivisions and brigades be maintained while the expensive and officer-heavy brigade and divisionheadquarters are eliminated? There appears to be a persistent assumption by senior active Armygeneral officers that Guard combat brigades and divisions cannot be made combat ready withoutlengthy post-mobilization training. Is this belief supported by solely realistic analysis and judgment,or is it influenced by organizational and contractual relationships and loyalties? (108)
Recruiting and Retention In Era of Repeated Callups. The role of the reserve components has undergone a dramatic shift since the Cold War effectivelyended with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. During the Cold War, the reserve components wereprimarily a force of last resort and were activated fairly infrequently - about once every 10 years -in response to a major war or crisis. In the post-Cold War era, however, they have been activatedmuch more frequently. Since 1990, there have been 6 involuntary activations of reservists, severalof which are ongoing today. (109) For most ofthese activations, affected reservists have been requiredto serve about 6 to 9 months before being released back to their civilian lives. Many reservesmobilized after September 11, 2001, however, have been required to serve on active duty for a year,and some may have to serve for two years.
Callups can pose significant challenges for reservists. Some reservists suffer mobilization-related financial hardships due to income loss, increased expenses, or erosion of their professionalpractices. Others experience family problems due to the strain of separation from family members. In light of these hardships, there has been significant concern since at least 1990 that more-frequentand more-lengthy reserve callups would lead to recruiting and retention problems for the reservecomponents. The size and duration of the post-9/11 mobilization has increased those concerns. 
To date, the data indicate that reserve recruiting and retention have not suffered due to increased use of the reserve components. Reserve recruiting in FY2002 was very robust, with every reservecomponent exceeding its recruiting goals, sometimes by substantial margins. Several scholarlystudies have looked at the link between the mobilization for the 1991 Persian Gulf war and reserveretention. (110) These studies found that themobilization had no significant impact on reserve retentionrates. This is consistent with studies of active-component personnel, which indicate that, providedthey are well managed and not excessive, deployments do not have a negative impact on retention- and can even enhance retention by providing participants with a sense of accomplishment. (111)
Some of these active-component studies, however, also indicate that beyond a certain threshold level, deployments can have a negative effect on retention. In light of this finding, there might bereason to believe that repeated or prolonged mobilization of reservists might have an adverse affecton reserve retention, and possibly reserve recruiting as well. Some observers are concerned that,although reserve recruiting and retention has held up in recent years, the post-9/11 mobilization ofreservists might begin have a negative impact on recruiting and retention, especially if it continuesfor an extended period of time. If the current reserve mobilization does at some point begin to erodereserve recruiting and retention, Congress may examine options for redressing the situation. Potential questions for Congress under such circumstances could include the following: Shouldreserve pay and benefits be increased to maintain the attractiveness of reserve service? Should activeduty and reserve force structure be modified to reduce active component reliance on the reserves? Could some of the missions currently requiring reserve component support be scaled back?
section_title: Network-Centric Warfare (112)
paragraphs: A Key Element of Defense Transformation. The Iraq war focused attention on the U.S. military's increasing ability to gather, share, and analyzeinformation, and make rapid decisions based on it. Improvements in these areas were alsodemonstrated in the war in Afghanistan. These improvements reflect an initial implementation ofthe concept of network-centric warfare (NCW), also known as network-centric operations (NCO). NCW, which is a key element of U.S. plans for defense transformation, refers to using networkingtechnology - computers, data links, and networking software - to link U.S. military personnel,ground vehicles, aircraft, and ships into a series of highly integrated local- and wide-area networkscapable of sharing critical tactical information on a rapid and continuous basis.
Implementing NCW is expected to significantly improve the capability of U.S. military forces by giving them vastly improved battlespace awareness (i.e., real-time knowledge of the location andidentify of friendly and enemy forces), an ability to more quickly pass information about enemytargets from surveillance systems to forces with the right weapons for attacking them (i.e., shorteningthe "sensor-to-shooter" cycle), an ability to quickly make and execute decisions on the battlefield,and an ability to use widely distributed forces to mass fires on enemy targets. NCW is also expectedto improve pre-conflict planning, including intelligence preparation of the battlefield. Under NCW,the network elements can become as important to combat capabilities, if not more important, thanthe platforms (e.g., tanks, aircraft, and ships) that they link. Some observers suggest that underNCW, the network itself becomes a weapon. (113)
C4ISR Programs for NCW. The concept of network-centric warfare emerged in the late 1990s, and U.S. military forces are now in the earlystages of developing and acquiring systems for forming various local- and wide-area networks. Numerous C4ISR (114) programs are consideredimportant to achieving NCW. (115)
NCW in the Iraq War. Many observers believe the effectiveness of U.S. forces in the Iraq war was likely due in significant part to the early stagesof NCW that were implemented in time for the war. A principal case in point concerns U.S. airoperations, which featured rapid transmission of information from sensors to shooters, particularlyfor attacking time-sensitive targets. NCW might have figured even more strongly in the Iraq war hadthe Army's 4th Infantry Division - the division with the highest degree of NCW implementation -played a more significant role in the war. (116)
Potential Program Implications. The success of U.S. forces in the Iraq war may serve to reinforce interest in implementing NCW more fullythroughout the services. This is potentially significant, because investing in NCW might result inreduced investments in traditional military platforms: C4ISR programs for achieving NCW requirefunding that might otherwise go to traditional military platforms, and the improved forceeffectiveness generated by NCW may permit military tasks in the future to be performed by U.S.military forces consisting of fewer numbers of platforms. Should C4ISR programs for NCW beaccelerated or expanded? If so, which other DoD programs should be reduced to serve as the "billpayers?"
Advocates of NCW could argue that DoD plans and budgets should be adjusted to place greater emphasis on C4ISR programs and less emphasis on procurement of traditional combat platforms,because funding invested in C4ISR programs will result in a greater increase in overall combatcapability, dollar per dollar, than funding invested in traditional military platforms. Supporters ofinvesting in combat platforms, while acknowledging the importance of NCW and C4ISR programs,could argue that creating a network requires platforms just as much as it requires systems to linkthem, that today's platforms are aging and growing increasingly expensive to operate, and that next-generationplatforms will be designed to take better advantage of networking technology than today'splatforms, ensuring that U.S. forces gain maximum benefit from the implementation of NCW. 
A key current constraint on achieving NCW concerns communications bandwidth capacity (i.e., simultaneous data transmission capacity), especially for non-line-of-sight systems. Networkingsystems require large amounts of bandwidth, and U.S. operations during the Iraq war placed strainson current bandwidth capacity. (117) Althoughsteps can be taken to reduce the amount of bandwidthrequired by individual C4ISR systems, wider implementation of NCW will likely require DoD tosubstantially increase bandwidth capacity. One DoD effort to improve bandwidth capacity involvesinvesting in satellites that transmit data using lasers rather than radio waves.
Another NCW issue concerns the potential vulnerability of NCW-related C4ISR systems to potential enemy cyberwarfare attacks. As implementation of NCW grows, the dependence of U.S.forces on NCW-related C4ISR systems could also grow. Observers concerned about this growingdependency could argue that although Iraq may not have been well prepared for conductingcyberwarfare attacks against U.S. C4ISR systems, other future potential adversaries might be. Theycould note that DoD computers are now being attacked on a regular and even daily basis bycomputer operators in foreign countries, in some cases in large-scale organized operations thatsuggest possible support by foreign governments. What steps is DoD taking to ensure that NCW-related C4ISRsystems will remain secure against cyberwarfare attack? What is DoD's plan forensuring the security of these systems while keeping them affordable and user-friendly? (118)
NCW also has potential implications for joint (i.e., integrated multi-service) operations and for combined operations in which U.S. military forces operate in conjunction with foreign militaryforces. (119)
section_title: Urban Combat (120)
paragraphs: A Pre-War Concern. In the early days of the Iraq war, many observers expressed concerns about the likelihood that U.S. and British forces wouldparticipate in urban combat operations. Such operations, they feared, could lead to significant U.S.and civilian casualties and significant damage to civilian Iraqi infrastructure. These concerns werebased in part on urban combat operations in previous wars, which have often resulted in highcasualty rates for invading forces, large numbers of civilian deaths, and massive damage to buildingsand supporting infrastructure. Observers expressed particular concerns about the likelihood of urbancombat operations in Baghdad, given the large size of the city and its importance to the Iraqiregime. (121) Iraqi officials before and during theIraq war stated that enemy forces would be killed inlarge numbers in urban fighting, and that the invasion effort as a whole would be defeated in thestreets of Iraq's cities. (122)
Urban Combat in the Iraq War. As expected, fighting in urban areas proved necessary in the Iraq war. Fighting in and around Iraqi towns andcities appears to have accounted for a sizeable share of U.S. and British combat casualties. U.S. andBritish forces were drawn into more extensive urban fighting in southern Iraqi cities than they hadplanned, but U.S. forces were able to take control of Baghdad much more rapidly, and with fewerU.S. and civilian casualties, than many observers had anticipated. Bold advances into centralBaghdad by columns of U.S. Army armored forces - a tactical innovation that was created on thespot by U.S. unit commanders - proved instrumental in accelerating the collapse of organized Iraqiresistance in the city. U.S. aircraft armed with precision-guided munitions proved useful inproviding an urban version of close-air support for U.S. and British ground forces, and unmannedair vehicles proved valuable in providing persistent overhead surveillance of urban areas for locatingand tracking the movements of Iraqi forces. (123)
Potential Program Implications. The Iraq war may serve to highlight the importance of training and equipping U.S. forces for urban combatoperations. Programs closely associated with preparing for urban combat operations include thefollowing:
training facilities, including mock-ups of urban areas and "laser-tag" weapon simulators, for conducting realistic training in urban combat tactics;
UAVs and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) equipped with cameras, signals-intelligence-gatheringequipment, other sensors, and weapons, for finding, tracking, and killingenemy forces hiding around corners and inside buildings;
the Land Warrior program for developing an improved ensemble - acombination of protective clothing, weapons, and equipment for situational awareness - forindividual soldiers;
the Objective Individual Combat Weapon - a next-generation rifle scheduledto enter service in FY2009 that is to be capable of shooting at non-line-of-sight targets (i.e., at targetsaround a corner);
small explosive charges designed for breaking through building walls, so thatU.S. forces can enter and pass through buildings without using doorways that may be heavilydefended or booby-trapped;
a secure, intrasquad radio, which the Army is nowdeveloping;
night-vision devices for operating at night (particularly when electrical powerhas been knocked out) or in darkened interiors of buildings;
acoustic or other sensors for quickly determining the origin of enemy sniperfire;
small, air-delivered, precision-guided weapons, such as the 250-pound SmallDiameter Bomb now in development, that can be used to destroy enemy weapons or targetedbuildings while avoiding damage to neighboring structures; and
non-lethal weapons, also called less-than-lethal weapons, for reducing civiliancasualties when attempting to counter enemy fighters interspersed amongcivilians.
Realistic training in urban combat tactics can prove highly useful in reducing, perhaps significantly, casualty rates for U.S. forces involved in urban operations. Some observers believethat current U.S. urban training facilities need to be larger, more realistic, and better instrumentedto support joint (i.e., multi-service) training operations.
Among UAVs, smaller and miniature UAVs, including UAVs capable of perching on urban structures, may prove particularly valuable in urban settings. Among UGVs, larger models includethe Marine Corp's Gladiator, which was sent to the Iraqi theater. Smaller models include the Army'sMATILDA, which was also sent to the Iraqi theater, and the Marine Corps' Dragon Runner, whichis now in development.
As mentioned in the section on the size and composition of the Army, supporters of heavily armored vehicles like the M1 tank and the M2 Bradley fighting vehicle could argue that the Iraq wardemonstrated the value of such vehicles in urban combat situations, confounding the pre-warexpectations of some observers. The M1 and M2, they can note, were largely invulnerable to theweapons Iraqi fighters used to attack them, and in drawing fire from these weapons in urban fightsproved highly valuable in uncovering the location of hidden Iraqi fighters, who could then be killed. Without the M1 and M2, supporters could argue, the Army would not have been well equipped tocarry out the bold advances into central Baghdad that played a critical role in rapidly collapsingorganized Iraqi resistance in the city while incurring few U.S. and civilian casualties. More lightlyarmored vehicles like the planned Stryker wheeled combat vehicle, they could argue, would havebeen vulnerable to some of the weapons that Iraqi forces used ineffectively against the Army's M1and M2 armored vehicles.
As also mentioned in the section on the size and composition of the Army, however, other observers could argue that the effectiveness of the M1 tank in combat operations in Baghdad resultedin part from Baghdad's broad avenues and sizeable public plazas and other open areas, which gavethe M1s room to maneuver and long lines of sight. Future urban combat situations, they could argue,may take place in cities and towns with narrower roads and shorter lines of sight, which could makeM1s less effective and potentially more vulnerable to enemy attack. They could also argue that inthe days following the end of major fighting in the war, Stryker vehicles would have been useful inIraqi cities for helping to reestablish civil order.
section_title: Ballistic Missile Defense (124)
paragraphs: Ballistic Missile Defense In The 1991 Persian Gulf War. Missile- defense operations were a prominent component of the 1991 PersianGulf war, during which Iraq fired a total of about 80 Scud ballistic missiles against targets in SaudiArabia, other Persian Gulf countries, and Israel. U.S. and coalition forces in the 1991 war attemptedto shoot down the Scuds with the Patriot PAC-2 missile system, an air-defense system originallydesigned for shooting down aircraft and then modified for shooting down short-range ballisticmissiles as well. The Patriot system was initially credited with a high rate of effectiveness inshooting down Iraqi Scuds. Later analysis, however, showed that the system's effectiveness againstScuds was lower, with some analysts suggesting it was close to zero. Debate about the success rateof the Patriot system in the 1991 Persian Gulf war contributed to the general debate about thetechnological feasibility and potential operational effectiveness of missile-defense systems. (125)
PAC-2 and PAC-3 Patriot Missiles. In the years since the 1991 Persian Gulf war, DoD has spent about $3 billion dollars improving the Patriotsystem's ability to track and intercept ballistic missiles. For the recent Iraq war, the United Statesdeployed improved versions of the Patriot PAC-2 and the newer PAC-3. The PAC-3 is designed tofly higher and farther than the PAC-2. In contrast to the PAC-2, which attempts to destroy its targetwith an explosive charge, the PAC-3 attempts to destroy its target by colliding with it. The latterapproach, called hit-to-kill, has been the primary U.S. technological approach to missile defensesince 1984 and is now being used for almost all other U.S. missile-defense systems now indevelopment.
Ballistic Missile Defense in the Iraq War. The Patriot system is currently the only operational U.S. missile defense system, and the recent Iraq warrepresented the first opportunity for using the PAC-3 version in combat. The success rate of thePatriot, and particularly the PAC-3 version, in the Iraq war was thus a matter of particular interestto those following missile defense programs.
DoD states that a total of 9 Iraqi ballistic missiles were targeted by the Patriot system. Another 6 missiles launched by Iraq were not targeted because they were projected to land in places wherethey would cause no harm. (126) The ballisticmissiles that Iraq fired were not Scuds but rather shorter-ranged and slower-flying missiles such as Al Samoud-2sand Ababil-100s. It is not yet clear whetherthe lack of Scud attacks in the Iraq war was due to successful U.S. operations to suppress suchattacks before they could occur, a decision by Iraq to withhold its purported Scuds for future use, orbecause Iraq at the time of the war did not have any operational Scuds.
DoD says the Patriot system successfully intercepted all 9 of the ballistic missiles that it targeted. Seven of the intercepts, DoD says, were made by PAC-2 missiles, while the remaining 2intercepts were made by PAC-3 missiles. Most of the Patriots fired were PAC-2s; 4 of them werePAC-3s. (The standard firing doctrine is to fire two Patriots at each ballistic missile.) The one Iraqimissile that reportedly may have eluded the Patriot system's radar was a low-flying Iraqi cruisemissile fired from Iraq's Faw Peninsula that hit the seawall at Kuwait City. The Patriot system wasalso involved in 3 friendly-fire incidents which resulted in the loss of 1 U.S. and 1 British aircraft(see discussion below on friendly fire). (127)
Potential Program Implications. Advocates for and against missile defense are likely to find something from the performance of missile defensesystems in the Iraq war that supports their perspective. Because of this and the still-ongoingcontroversy over Patriot performance in Operation Desert Storm in 1991, debate over the viabilityof hit-to-kill technology for missile defense today is likely to continue.
Supporters of the Patriot system and missile defense programs in general could argue that the Iraq war underscored the need for missile defense systems and demonstrated the effectiveness of thePatriot system for defending against short-range ballistic missiles. They could argue that thesuccessful use of the PAC-3 missile in the Iraq war demonstrated that hit-to-kill technology worksand is the preferred means of seeking to destroy attacking ballistic missiles. They could also arguethat U.S. military operations in Western Iraq suggest that operations intended to prevent the launchof enemy ballistic missiles may contribute to an overall missile-defense effort.
Skeptics concerning missile defense programs could argue that the Iraq war involved too small a number of missile engagements to support firm conclusions, particularly about the effectivenessof the PAC-3 version and its hit-to-kill technology. They could argue that the Iraq war did notvalidate the effectiveness of the PAC-3 version against the Scud missile - one of the most likelysystems it is designed to counter, but one that it has never been used against in either combatoperations or peacetime tests. They could also argue that the successful use of PAC-3s does notnecessarily validate the soundness of the hit-to-kill approach for other missile-defense systems thatare being developed to shoot down intercontinental-range ballistic missiles in mid-flight, becausesuch intercepts would take place in a different physical environment (i.e., outside the atmosphere)and at much higher intercept velocities. They could also argue that the failure of the Patriot to stopthe cruise missile that hit the seawall at Kuwait City raises questions about the effectiveness of thesystem against low-flying cruise missiles.
Although not confirmed, the 3 friendly-fire incidents involving the Patriot system may be due primarily to operational procedures and issues associated with the complexity of the modernelectromagnetic battlefield. If so, these incidents might not have implications for missile defense per se , but rather for modern complex weapon systems of all kinds.
section_title: Friendly Fire (128)
paragraphs: Modern Warfare and Friendly Fire. The accidental killing or wounding of friendly forces in combat - called friendly fire or fratricide - is atragic yet not uncommon aspect of warfare. Friendly fire incidents have been recorded throughouthistory. (129) Observers argue over whethermodern warfare raises or lowers the risk of fratricide. Onthe one hand, modern weapons are very lethal, and frequently delivered over great distances. Modern combat also emphasizes conducting non-linear operations and missions behind enemy lineswhile simultaneously conducting strikes deep inside enemy territory. This can increase the risk offratricide because the complex battlefield no longer is made up of clearly drawn battle linescomposed of fronts and flanks and rear echelons. On the other hand, today's military has far bettercommunication, navigation, targeting, and identification systems, which should reduce the mis-communications thatoften lead to friendly fire incidents. In addition, widespread use of self-protection equipment, such as new types ofbody armor, greatly reduces casualties, as do modernmedical and evacuation capabilities.
A Concern From the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Casualties due to friendly fire emerged as a significant topic of discussion following the 1991Persian Gulf war, in which about 23% of U.S. combat deaths (35 of 148) were attributed to friendlyfire. Combat losses due to friendly fire can be particularly difficult to accept, especially for thefamilies of those killed, and the percentage of combat deaths in the 1991 Persian Gulf war attributedto friendly fire was much higher than many people had anticipated. As a result of the experiencewith friendly-fire incidents in the 1991 Persian Gulf war, minimizing casualties due to friendly firewas elevated as an issue, and remained a topic of some concern going into the Iraq war.
Friendly Fire Casualties in the Iraq War. Although DoD has not officially announced the number of friendly fire casualties in the Iraq war,one press account shows that out of 151 total U.S. combat deaths, at least 15 coalition deaths weredue to fratricide - a rate of about 10%. The article stated that an additional 10 incidents with 20deaths were still under investigation, so this rate could rise over the next few months. (130) Fratricideincidents in the Iraq war suggest that modern warfare remains susceptible to equipment malfunctionsand human error, and may focus attention on how much military capabilities for mitigating fratricidehave improved since the 1991 Persian Gulf war. 
Is a rate of friendly fire casualties in the Iraq war acceptable? Some argue that a certain level of fratricide is inevitable. Others argue that one friendly fire death is too many. One widelycirculated rule of thumb is that fratricide typically accounts for 2% of an army's casualties. Butmany researchers dispute this conventional wisdom, saying that in the 20th Century, 10% to 30% ofcasualties have been caused by friendly fire. A 1993 study by the Office of Technology Assessmentestimated that 15% to 20% of those killed or injured in World War II, the Korean War and Vietnamwere due to friendly fire. (131)
Types of Friendly Fire Incidents. Friendly fire incidents are often categorized by the types of engagements involved: surface-to-air, air-to-air, air-to-surface, andsurface-to-surface. No air-to-air friendly fire incidents were recorded in OIF and veryfew surface-to-surface incidents. (132) Fratricidedid occur in the other engagement regimes, andexamining these specific instances may help identify the issues for Congress to address.
Surface-to-Air Incidents. Surface-to-air incidents were among the most widely noted friendly fire incidents in the Iraq war. On March 23, 2003, aPAC-2 Patriot surface-to-air missile mistakenly shot down a British Tornado aircraft, killing its crewof two. Two days later, another fratricide incident appears to have been narrowly avoided when aU.S. Air Force F-16 fighter destroyed the radar of a Patriot battery after the Patriot system hadmisidentified the F-16 as a possible target. And on April 2, 3003, a PAC-3 Patriot missile shot downa U.S. Navy F/A-18C fighter, killing its pilot. (133)
As the causes of these cases are being investigated, some observers are asking why the Patriot system - which can defend against both faster-flying tactical ballistic missiles and slower-flyingmanned and unmanned aircraft - was engaging aircraft at all. They argue that the Tornado and F/A-18Cshoot-downs could have been avoided by simply instructing the Patriot system to ignore slower-flying mannedaircraft. Since 100% of the manned combat aircraft flying over Iraq and Kuwaitduring the war were U.S. or British, they argue, Patriot batteries and other air defense systems couldsafely have been instructed to focus solely on shooting down ballistic missiles.
Although Iraq's air force never got off the ground, Iraq did launch at least seven cruise missiles at military and civilian targets in Kuwait on March 20, March 28, and April 2, 2003. (134) Cruisemissiles appear very much like manned aircraft to air defense systems because they fly at speeds andaltitudes similar to manned aircraft. Did concerns for potential Iraqi cruise missile attacks deter U.S.and British air defense forces from instructing the Patriot system to ignore slower-flying aircraft? If so, does this incident suggest that additional funding should be devoted to improving the Patriot'sability to distinguish cruise missiles from aircraft?
One theory that has been advanced is that the presence on the battlefield of many Patriot systems close to one another and to other U.S. electromagnetic-emitting systems may have createda situation of electromagnetic interference that confused the Patriot system, preventing it fromproperly distinguishing aircraft from ballistic missiles. According to this theory, Patriot systemoperators in both the Tornado and F-18C/D incidents thought they were firing at enemy ballisticmissiles rather than aircraft. (135) Ifelectromagnetic interference was involved in one or more of theincidents, then reducing such interference may be elevated as a concern in designing U.S. weaponsystems and developing procedures for using them.
The shot-down British Tornado reportedly failed to re-enter Kuwait from Iraq through one of the air corridors that had been cleared for allied warplanes. (136) If so, then pilot error could havecontributed to this friendly fire incident. Human error in time of war is difficult to prevent entirely,but training and exercises can help reduce its frequency. Could this mistake have been avoidedthrough better coalition training?
It was also reported that the Tornado's identification-friend-or-foe (IFF) beacon was unable to communicate with the U.S. air defense crew due to separate damage to the aircraft as it returned fromits bombing mission. (137) IFF problems werealso reportedly a contributing factor in the mistakenshoot-down of an Iranian airliner by a U.S. Navy cruiser in the Persian Gulf in July 1988. Do IFFtechnologies merit closer attention? Are IFF systems subject to too many technical glitches? Dothey need to be made more user friendly?
In the F-16 incident, it was reported that the Patriot crew was taking cover from Iraqi artillery and had placed their system in automatic mode when their radar mistakenly identified the U.S. jetas a target. (138) What implications, if any, doesthis incident have for maintaining a "human-in-theloop" in the design and operation of sophisticated weapon systems? As military systems takeincreasing advantage of information technologies, there may be a temptation among weapondesigners and operators to increase the level of a weapon's autonomy. Does the F-16 incidentsuggest that the pendulum is swinging too far away from human control of weapons?
Many digital battle-management and communications links currently being fielded by U.S. forces are designed to improve situational awareness and - as a byproduct - reduce the chances offratricide. One such communication link, called Link-16, is touted as a high-fidelity, robust, jam-resistant link thatwill help reduce fratricide. What, if anything, do the Iraq war fratricide incidentsimply for Link-16 funding and implementation plans? Was the F/A-18C using Link-16? Were thePatriot batteries - including the one that engaged the F/A-18C - using it?
Air-to-Surface Incidents. Some widely noted air-to-surface fratricide incidents also occurred in the Iraq war. On March 28, 2003, an Air Force A-10attack plane attacked five British ground vehicles, striking two of them with 30mm cannon. Theaircraft made two passes against the vehicles, killing one British solider and wounding four. U.S.aircraft flying over northern Iraq also mistakenly bombed a friendly Kurdish military convoy onApril 6, 2003, killing 19 Kurds and wounding three Army Special Forces soldiers. On April 3, 2003,U.S. Central Command officials reported another possible friendly-fire incident, stating that an AirForce F-15E may have fired on U.S. Army forces, killing one soldier and injuring several others. (139)
Many believe that air-to-ground fratricide is a much tougher problem to solve than surface-to-air fratricide. Aircraft fly at hundred of miles an hour, and at altitudes high enough - normally morethan 15,000 feet - to be above the effective range of enemy shoulder-fired air-defense missiles. Atsuch heights, distinguishing friendly personnel and ground vehicles from enemy personnel andground vehicles can be very difficult. Ground vehicles can change their positions rapidly, andfriendly and enemy vehicles are often in close proximity. Some analysts argue that the onlydependable safeguards against air-to-ground fratricide are procedural - having one's ground forcesstay away from suspected enemy targets when friendly aircraft are attacking those targets,establishing positive identification with the forward air controllers on the ground who direct friendlyaircraft, and knowing where friendly aircraft are going to strike before moving. (140)
The British vehicles that were fired on by the U.S. A-10 were fitted with combat identification equipment such as thermal imaging panels and strips and infrared emitters. (141) Why did thesemeasures fail to warn U.S. aircraft? DoD and NATO allies are currently pursuing an AdvancedConcept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) project for Coalition Combat Identification to developtechnologies that would reduce the risk of surface-to-surface and air-to-surface fratricide. What isthe status of this program? What is the balance within DoD development efforts for preventingfratricide between air-to-surface and surface-to-surface programs? DoD invested millions of dollarsin the Battlefield Combat Identification System (BCIS) before canceling the project in 2001. Whatlessons were learned from this program? (142)
section_title: Intelligence (143)
paragraphs: Intelligence In The 1991 Persian Gulf War. The 1991 Persian Gulf war revealed inadequacies in intelligence for support to U.S. combat troops. Inparticular, observers concluded that U.S. commanders in the field had insufficient access to certaintime-sensitive battle-relevant intelligence due to inadequate communications links with bothnational-level and theater-level U.S. intelligence-collecting systems. Following the Gulf War, DoDinitiated efforts to ensure that U.S. battlefield commanders could gain rapid access to relevantintelligence collected by disparate sources. (144)
A DoD Priority. The role of intelligence in supporting U.S. combat operations has been elevated in DoD planning by the new operationalconcepts (i.e., new approaches to warfighting) and associated military doctrines, especially network-centric warfare,that have been widely articulated in official DoD publications since the early 1990s. Intelligence is a key element of the administration's vision for defense transformation, whichemphasizes collecting intelligence through multiple sources and sharing it rapidly betweendistributed U.S. forces so as to provide those forces with a complete, real-time picture of thebattlefield. Reflecting this focus, the administration states that it has accorded high-priority in DoDbudget planning to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) programs. (145)
Intelligence Successes in the Iraq War. The Iraq war appears to have validated the central importance of detailed, accurate, and real-time intelligencein U.S. military operations. The availability of good intelligence was a major factor in the successof the war effort, enabling U.S. forces to carry out precision strikes against critical Iraqi leadershiptargets and military formations while bypassing other targets that were not critical to the U.S. warplan. As a result, Iraqi military command-and-control capabilities were rapidly degraded, criticalIraqi military formations were decimated before they had a chance to engage U.S. and British groundforces, civilian casualties were reduced, and (significantly for the future of Iraq) damage to theinfrastructure needed for reconstruction was minimized. (146)
Intelligence in the Iraq war was collected and made available to operating forces without many of the communications problems that had existed in the 1991 Persian Gulf war, the U.S. militaryoperation in Kosovo in 1999, and even the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan in 2001-2002. Some of theimprovements resulted from the availability of new equipment; others resulted from more responsiveorganizational relationships that facilitated the effective use of perishable intelligence data. Pressreports indicate in particular that there was closer intelligence coordination between ground and airunits, enabling air strikes against enemy ground forces with fewer casualties to nearby friendlyforces. (147)
A key form of intelligence was precise data on the location of important Iraqi military installations. Iraq was mapped in detail by U.S. intelligence agencies prior to the war, and regularupdates were made available to battlefield commanders during the conflict. U.S. agencies obtainedcommercial overhead imagery and used it widely to supplement information collected by U.S.government satellites. (148)
U.S. intelligence agencies also made extensive use of human intelligence (humint) before and during the war. (149) Many of the principalbombing targets were reportedly identified by human agentsoperating in Iraq. U.S. intelligence operatives reportedly made contact with internal oppositionforces that assisted the U.S.-led war effort. And some reports indicate that contacts made by U.S.intelligence elements with certain Iraqi military leaders may have led to several Iraqi divisions optingout of the conflict without formally surrendering. In addition, cooperation between U.S. specialoperations forces (SOF) and paramilitary forces of the CIA (many of whom reportedly are ex-SOFpersonnel) enabled coalition forces to secure oil fields before they could be destroyed, inhibit Iraqiballistic missile attacks on friendly targets, and rescue U.S. prisoners of war.
Some Questions Raised By Iraq War. The Iraq war appears to have highlighted certain questions about the analytical effectiveness of U.S.intelligence agencies. The extent to which U.S. intelligence agencies accurately identified sites atwhich Iraqi nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or materials were manufactured or stored is notyet known, though some sites at which such weapons and materials were thought likely to be locatedhave been searched by U.S. forces and been found empty. Some observers argue that there wasinsufficient intelligence information about Iraqi possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)to have warranted military attack. Some also question whether U.S. intelligence agencies accuratelyestimated the reaction of Iraqi civilians, particularly Iraqi Shiites in the south, to the U.S.-ledinvasion, and the ability of various ethnic groups in Iraq following the war to be integrated into ademocratic polity without an extended foreign military occupation. (150)
Although there were not many reports of insufficient intelligence resulting from too few collection assets, observers have noted that the war involved the use of a considerable portion oflimited inventories of so-called high-demand/low-density (HD/LD) platforms such as unmannedaerial vehicles (UAVs). Some observers suggest that the Iraq war stretched available intelligenceresources and that U.S. operations in a wider or longer-lasting conflict could have been constrainedby limits on available surveillance capabilities. (151)
Potential Program Implications. The Iraq war appears to have validated the concept of centering U.S. military planning on the use of precise, real-time intelligencefor supporting precision strikes on key enemy targets. In this sense, the Iraq warmay reinforce the emphasis in DoD planning on programs for improving ISR capabilities. Examplesof such programs include reconnaissance satellites; airborne reconnaissance platforms, includingUAVs; sensors of various kinds (particularly miniaturized ones); and computers, datalinks, andnetworking software for rapidly processing and sharing intelligence data among distributed U.S.forces. Some supporters of ISR programs argue that the administration, in spite of its nominalsupport for improved ISR capabilities, is funding programs that are not primarily focused onintelligence (such as manned tactical aircraft) at the expense of ISR programs such as the GlobalHawk and Predator UAV programs. For them, the Iraq war may serve as an opportunity to argue infavor of adjusting funding within the DoD budget for some non-ISR programs so as to financeincreases for ISR programs. (152)
The Iraq war may also draw attention to the relationship between U.S. military special operations forces and CIA paramilitary forces. Have organizational and command relationshipsbetween these two types of forces been sufficiently delineated? To what extent are the capabilitiesof SOF units and paramilitary forces complementary, and to what extent are they redundant? To theextent that they are redundant, does this imply an opportunity to reduce planned expenditures for onegroup or the other?
section_title: Psychological Operations (153)
paragraphs: Psychological Operations in the Iraq War. DoD has ceased using the term "psychological operations," often abbreviated as "psyops," believing itsconnotation to be too pejorative. These activities are now subsumed under the broader rubric of"information warfare." (154) The activitiesformerly referred to by DoD as psychological operations,which are carried by special operations forces, seek to affect the morale and behavior of anadversary's military and civilian population through print and broadcast media.
The Iraq war reportedly featured the most extensive psychological operations effort in U.S. military history:
Since October, American and British planes have dropped 36 million leaflets on Iraqi positions across the country. They have distributed scores ofsolar-powered and hand-crank short-wave radios with instructions for tuning in to Arabic-languagebroadcasts that urge cooperation with coalition troops. Wanted posters with photographs of BaathParty and fedayeen militia leaders are being posted inside towns.
Iraqi opposition leaders have ridden into villages in Special Forces trucks to urge citizens to support the American-led campaign. Trucks withloudspeakers and drones have blared recordings of rumbling tanks, trying to confuse Iraqi troops intothinking assaults were under way....
In contrast to the first Persian Gulf war, when psychological operations were incorporated into the mission relatively late, this time the plannershad been working closely with senior officers in Central Command headquarters since long beforethe war began. (155)
Primary objectives of the U.S. psychological operations effort in the Iraq war included the following:
emphasize that the coalition's military campaign was against the government regime, not the people or the nation;
persuade Iraqi military personnel to desert or to surrender upon contact withcoalition forces; and
persuade Iraqi military commanders not to use chemical or biological (CB)weapons or sabotage oilfields.
Initial assessments of the psychological operations effort have been generally positive. Though mass surrenders did not occur on the scale they did in the 1991 Persian Gulf war, some larger-scaledesertions did occur. Some Iraqi units that did surrender followed the distributed leaflet instructionsfor procedure. Iraqi oilfield workers indicated that leaflets were also instrumental in their decisionsto not carry out sabotage orders. The role of these activities in the lack of Iraqi chemical-biological(CB) weapons use remains an open question, particularly since no CB weapons have been found todate. The campaign's effect on the civilian population's attitude toward coalition forces was judgedpositive by U.S. officials, despite instances of popular opposition.
Some reports on the psychological operations effort have been more critical. Two noted that the part of the effort intended to encourage senior Iraqi military and civilian leaders to surrenderfailed to produce any significant defections, and attributed this failure to overly optimistic pre-warU.S. assessments concerning the potential for encouraging such defections through telephone ande-mail messages and cash inducements. (156) Other reports criticized the U.S. psychological operationseffort for not including earlier attacks on Iraq's capability to broadcast pro-regime TV messages toits own people. (157) And one report, based oninterviews with U.S. participants in the war, stated thatthe U.S. psychological operations effort may have been undercut by the decision to accelerate thestart of the U.S. ground offensive by one day, which prevented the final pre-war elements of theeffort from being implemented before the onset of combat operations. (158)
Potential Program Implications. On the whole, the experience with the U.S. psychological operations effort in the Iraq war suggests that suchoperations can be a relatively cost-effective means of positively affecting combat operations, but thatthe success of such operations can be affected by numerous factors. From the standpoint ofplanning, one potential conclusion is that psychological operations can provide an advantage for U.S.forces, but that uncertainties about the extent of that advantage might make it somewhat risky forU.S. military planners in future conflicts to count on psychological operations as a reliable substitutefor a certain amount of conventional U.S. combat power.
section_title: Chemical-Biological Warfare (159)
paragraphs: Pre-War Concerns About Use of CB Weapons. In the weeks leading up to the Iraq war, numerous observers expressed concern over the possibilitythat Iraq would use chemical-biological (CB) weapons to disrupt the U.S.-led invasion. By forcingU.S. and British ground forces to wear bulky CB protective suits, Iraqi use of such weapons,observers feared, could slow-down the operations of U.S. and British ground forces, particularly onhot-weather days. There were also concerns prior to the war that the U.S. military's inventory of CBprotective suits might be insufficient or might include some incorrectly-manufactured suits thatwould not provide their wearers with proper amounts of protection.
CB Weapons Not Used. Despite repeated warnings to expect Iraqi use of CB weapons, and warnings from U.S. military officials early in theconflict that release authority for these weapons had been given to regional subordinate Iraqicommanders, no CB weapons use was encountered. Estimates of when CB use was to be expectedunderwent several revisions, ranging from pre-emptive strikes against deploying U.S. forces to "lastditch" use in defense of Baghdad. None proved accurate. No CB munitions were discovered withthe Iraqi ground force units engaged by coalition forces, and through May 2003, no CB munitionstorage facilities had been located.
Because U.S. troops never encountered CB weapons, their protective equipment and trainingwas not tested under combat conditions in a contaminated environment. Nevertheless, troops hadto operate as though the threat was imminent, and the full array of U.S. CB defensive capabilitieswere brought to the campaign. Overgarments were worn routinely by U.S. troops - withaccompanying hoods, gloves, masks, and boot covers close to hand. Two newly-developed chemicalagent detectors were deployed, as were biodetection and CB decontamination systems. Though fullanalysis will have to wait for official after-action assessments, no significant problems were reportedfor any of this equipment.
section_title: Airlift and Aerial Refueling (160)
paragraphs: A Test of Post-1991 Enhancements. Congress has closely tracked issues relating to U.S. airlift and aerial refueling (i.e., air mobility) capabilitiesin recent years because they are critical, along with U.S. sealift capabilities, for supporting U.S.expeditionary military operations. The Iraq war provided a test of enhancements for U.S. airmobility capabilities that were funded following the 1991 Persian Gulf war, when certain air mobilityinadequacies were exposed. These enhancement programs included, among other things, thefollowing:
the procurement of new C-17 airlift aircraft to replace older C-141 airlift aircraft;
modernizing the avionics of the Air Force's existing C-5 airlift aircraft;and
modernizing the Air Force's existing KC-135 tanker aircraft by updating theircockpits, replacing their 1950s-era engines with more fuel efficient models, and outfitting some KC-135s withwing-tip, hose-and-drogue systems to refuel U.S. Navy and alliedaircraft.
In addition to constituting a test of these enhancements, the Iraq war occurred as DoD and Congress are considering four current program issues relating to air mobility:
how many C-17s to procure, beyond those already procured; 
how many C-5s should be modernized, re-engined, and kept in the activeinventory;
whether to implement a somewhat controversial program, authorized byCongress as part of its action on the FY2003 defense budget, to lease (rather than purchase) 100Boeing 767 airliners for use as Air Force tanker aircraft; and
whether to modify the contractual arrangements for the Civil Reserve Air Fleet(CRAF).
Prior to the start of the Iraq war, some observers believed that supporting the war would severely tax U.S. air mobility resources. They predicted that the long flight distances from theUnited States and its forward bases in Europe to the Persian Gulf, the difficulty in gaining access toair bases in countries neighboring Iraq, and the ongoing U.S. military operations in Afghanistan andthe Horn of Africa would combine to create real challenges to U.S. air mobility.
Air Mobility In The Iraq War. Air mobility operations, as expected, played a significant role in the Iraq war. (161) Although information on airmobility efforts in the Iraq war is still preliminary, early reports suggest that airlift operations werelargely satisfactory, and that the Air Force's new C-17 airlift aircraft performed well. Early reportsalso suggest, however, that aerial refueling operations were less than satisfactory in some respects. While many pilots involved in the Iraq war praised aerial refueling efforts in print and electronicinterviews, they also reportedly complained that refueling shortages were a significant impedimentto operations, especially at the war's beginning. (162)
Aerial refueling (and airlift) operations in the Iraq theater of operations were complicated by limits on foreign basing and overflight rights, (163) the simultaneous conduct of air and ground combatoperations in the Iraq war (which increased the number and types of air combat missions that hadto be supported), and possibly the rapid northward advance of U.S. ground forces through Iraq(which prompted combat aircraft supporting those forces to fly further into Iraq).
To improve aerial refueling coverage, Air Force tanker aircraft reportedly operated more aggressively than in past conflicts, flying closer to hostile territory than in previous conflicts suchas the 1991 Persian Gulf war. While this improved tanker support for some U.S. combat aircraft,it may have reduced it for others. Navy aircraft flying from carriers in the Persian Gulf reportedlycould not reach Air Force tanker aircraft operating deep inside Iraqi airspace. (164) In addition, it wasreported that sorties of Navy aircraft flying into Iraq from two carriers in the Eastern Mediterraneanwere reduced due to limits on aerial refueling capability. (165)
Requirements For Air Mobility Aircraft. The experience with air mobility operations in the Iraq war will likely inform congressional debate ona number of general issues relating to requirements for air mobility aircraft, including the following:
How much total airlift and aerial refueling capability does the United States need to support current and future U.S. military operations?
What number of airlift and aerial refueling aircraft, with what mix ofcharacteristics (e.g., range, payload, offload speed, number and type of fuel dispensers), will bestmeet this requirement?
How will requirements for airlift aircraft change as a result of planned changesin U.S. Army forces, particularly efforts to make Army forces lighter and moremobile?
How will requirements for airlift and aerial refueling aircraft change as a resultof potential changes in the future mix of combat aircraft (long-range bombers, fighters, andunmanned air vehicles) to be supported? 
Are current Air Force aerial refueling aircraft modernization efforts sufficientlyjoint, particularly in terms of taking into account the aerial refueling needs of the Navy and MarineCorps? (166)
With regard to the total airlift capability required to support current and future U.S. military operations, the current requirement to have 54.5 million ton-miles per day of airlift capability (167) wasconceived prior to September 11, 2001. In light of the Iraq war, the war in Afghanistan, and theglobal war on terrorism in general, how valid is this requirement today? Do the underlyingassumptions and analyses behind this figure still hold? Will increased attention on fighting terrorismabroad lead to more numerous deployments? What kinds of forces will need to be deployed tocombat terrorism and how might they differ from the force packages anticipated by defense plannerspre-September 11th? Will increased attention to homeland security lead to decreased overseasdeployments? 
With regard to the changing mix of combat aircraft to be supported, fighter aircraft tend to be more airlift- and aerial refueling-intensive than either long-range bombers or unmanned air vehicles(UAVs). Some observers argue that airlift and aerial refueling requirements, which can be expensiveto meet, can be lowered by reducing planned DoD investments in fighters and increasing fundingfor long-range bombers and UAVs.
Potential Program Implications. The Iraq war may have implications for specific air mobility program issues, including the following.
C-17 Procurement. The Air Force in FY2003 completed a multi-year procurement of 120 C-17 airlift aircraft and began a follow-on multi-yearprocurement of 60 additional C-17s, bringing the total planned C-17 procurement to 180 aircraft. The general in charge of the U.S. Transportation Command said in 2002 that he wanted a total of222 C-17s to meet airlift demands. (168)
In addition to citing these DoD studies, supporters of increasing C-17 procurement beyond 180 planes could argue, following the Iraq war, that the war validated the continued importance of airliftcapability for supporting U.S. military operations, that it showed the effectiveness of the C-17 as anairlift aircraft (particularly in transporting larger cargo loads over long distances to airfields withshorter runways), and that it demonstrated how limits on foreign basing and overflight rights can leadto increased demands for airlift. They could also argue that the planned transformation of the Armytoward lighter and more mobile forces could lead to an increased demand in the future for usingairlift aircraft (rather than ships) for rapidly transporting Army forces to distant conflicts, and fortransporting them directly to the combat theater, rather than to a forward staging area.
Opponents of increasing C-17 procurement beyond 180 planes could argue that the general success of the airlift effort in the Iraq war shows that the United States in the future will notnecessarily need more than 180 C-17s. They could argue that the Iraq war and the war inAfghanistan suggest that the United States in the future will fight wars with fewer ground forces thanin the past, and that this, combined with the Army's planned shift toward lighter forces, could leadto a reduction in airlift requirements. They could also argue that airlift requirements in the futuremight be reduced as less airlift-intensive UAVs begin to replace manned fighters and DoD makesgreater use of high-speed sealift ships. Future airlift requirements, they could argue, can be partlymet by modernizing the C-5 fleet and by pursuing new types of airlift aircraft approaches, such ashigh-tech airships and wing-in-ground aircraft (see discussion below on future airlift technologies).
C-5 modernization and engine replacement. Following the Iraq war, debate will continue on the number of C-5s to modernize and re-engine. Most observers agree that in the near term, some mix of C-17s and C-5s are required to meet DoD's54.5-million-ton-mile-per-day airlift requirement. But how many C-5s should be modernized andre-engined?
Those who support modernizing and re-engining a majority of the C-5 fleet could argue that the Iraq war showed that the United States needs all the airlift volume that it can muster. The easiestway to maintain and build upon our current airlift volume, they could argue, is to keep in service asmany C-5s as possible. The C-5's maximum payload of 281,000 lbs is 76% greater than the C-17'smaximum payload of 160,000 lbs. Thus, it takes almost two new C-17s to replace the lost payloadvolume of every C-5 that is retired. The C-5, supporters could also argue, can carry many pieces ofmilitary equipment too bulky or too irregularly shaped for any other aircraft. They can point out thatalthough the C-17 is capable of carrying much outsize and oversize cargo, only the C-5 can carryitems such as the Mark V special operations boat or the 53-foot mobile medical hospital. (169) Inaddition, C-5 supporters could argue, modernizing and re-engining all the C-5's will substantiallyincrease the C-5 fleet's readiness rate, ensuring that the maximum amount of airlift payload volumeis available at any given time.
Those who support modernizing and re-engining fewer C-5s argue that the Iraq war showed that overall airlift volume is important, but being able to move large payloads directly to short or austereairfields in the combat theater is more important. Airfields near Iraq were limited in the recent war,and the C-17 was the only long-distance airlift aircraft that could use the full range of airfieldsavailable in the Iraq theater of operations. Fewer C-5s, they could argue, should be modernized sothat funds are available to procure more C-17s, ensuring that the future U.S. airlift fleet will be betterable to move payloads directly from the United States to the theater of combat, and not just from theUnited States to a forward airbase located in, for example, Europe. They could also argue that theoutsize cargo that can be carried only by the C-5 is of secondary importance, and that the C-17 cancarry all important outsize military equipment. What cannot be carried by C-17s, they could argue,can be delivered by ship. While the C-5's readiness rate can be improved through modernization,they could argue, it will still be lower than the C-17's readiness rate. If readiness rates of airliftaircraft are a concern, they could argue, fielding fewer C-5s and more C-17s will result in a higheroverall readiness rate for the total airlift fleet.
Lease of Boeing 767s For Use as Tankers. DoD and Congress in recent years have considered how to address the issue of the aging of the Air Force'sfleet of KC-135 tankers. Options considered have included extending the service lives of the KC-135s, procuringnew tanker aircraft, and leasing Boeing 767 airliners for use by the Air Force astankers.
The last of these options - the leasing arrangement - was authorized by Congress as part of its action on the FY2003 defense budget. DoD has since considered how to implement thisarrangement. In general, supporters of the arrangement argue that it is a cost-effective way toquickly improve the Air Force's tanker capabilities, particularly at a time when the Air Force isstruggling to finance the acquisition of several other kinds of aircraft. Opponents argue that theleasing arrangement will violate the spirit, if not the letter, of the full funding provision that normallygoverns procurement of DoD weapons and equipment, (170) and that in the long-run it will prove moreexpensive, and less cost effective, than the option of procuring new aircraft.
Following the Iraq war, supporters of the leasing arrangement could argue that the shortage of aerial refueling assets in the war demonstrates a need for quickly improving U.S. capabilities in thisarea, particularly if U.S. forces need to fight two regional conflicts in overlapping time frames (anofficial DoD requirement for sizing U.S. military forces). They could argue that extending theservice lives of the KC-135s would provide only a short-term fix, and that procuring new tankerswould provide little near-term relief to the situation and require procurement funding for severalyears at levels that the Air Force cannot afford.
Supporters could also argue that the Iraq war exacerbated a situation of reduced civilian air travel that began with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 - a situation that has substantiallyreduced orders from commercial airline operators for new large commercial aircraft. This situation,they can argue, has significantly damaged the financial health of Boeing, the only U.S. maker oflarge commercial aircraft. The leasing arrangement, supporters could argue, will help shore up thefinancial health of Boeing, a major defense contractor involved in numerous defense programsimportant to DoD's future.
Opponents of the leasing arrangement could argue that the Iraq war does nothing to resolve the most important question facing the proposal - whether the Boeing 767 the best platform to replacethe KC-135s. Several aircraft characteristics, they could argue, must be weighed in determining themost appropriate airframe for use as a tanker, including range, payload, fuel throughput, and typeof fuel dispenser. Typically, a formal study called an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) is conductedto determine the best airframe. Such an analysis can be particularly important if the aircraft to beacquired is a joint asset. Lease opponents could argue that, the Iraq war notwithstanding, no AOAhas been conducted to determine that the 767 is the optimal platform. Considering the importanceof aerial refueling and the long time that air mobility aircraft tend to remain in the active inventory,lease opponents could argue that the Iraq war does not obviate the need to conduct a rigorous, jointAOA before deciding how to replace today's air refuelers.
Opponents of the leasing arrangement could argue that providing indirect government financial assistance to a particular defense contractor like Boeing is questionable public policy, and that theneed for providing such assistance Boeing's case is not clear, because while September 11, 2001 andthe Iraq war may have reduced Boeing's civilian commercial aircraft business, they also may haveincreased Boeing's military business due to the resulting increase in U.S. defense spending. Opponents could also argue that even if providing financial assistance is appropriate and necessaryin this case, the leasing arrangement may not be the most cost-effective way to provide it.
Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), established in 1951, is an arrangement under which commercial and charterairline operators agree to provide aircraft and crews to DoD in time of war to augment military airliftcapabilities. In return for making their aircraft available, these operators are allowed to bid duringpeacetime on DoD contracts for transporting military personnel and cargo - business that is worthbillions of dollars. For the Iraq War, DoD mobilized 47 CRAF aircraft. This is only the second timethat the CRAF was mobilized; the first was in 1990-1991 to support the 1991 Persian Gulf war. 
While CRAF is a voluntary program and provides steady business to U.S. carriers during peacetime, some observers have expressed concern that financially troubled U.S. commercial airlinesmight no longer be able to afford continued participation in the CRAF program as currentlystructured. These observers have suggested that new deals might need to be struck between DoDand airlines to ensure the continued participation of airline operators in the CRAF program.
Supporters of making such new deals could argue that the use of CRAF aircraft in the Iraq war demonstrates DoD's continuing need for the program, that larger numbers of CRAF aircraft mightbe needed in future times of emergency, particularly for fighting two regional conflicts inoverlapping time frames, that the participation of commercial airline operators is critical to theprogram's success, and that all necessary steps, including new deals between DoD and thecommercial airliners, should therefore be taken to ensure that the program remains healthy.
Supporters of staying with the current CRAF arrangement could argue that although commercial airlines are financially troubled and the Iraq war demonstrated the usefulness of theCRAF program, the U.S. government has already taken steps to shore up airline finances, the airlinesthemselves are now restructuring their operations to further improve their financial health, and thateven if some U.S. commercial airlines continue to experience weak finances, the actual number ofCRAF aircraft used in the Iraq war - a military operation of significant size - suggests that sufficientnumbers of civilian aircraft to meet U.S. needs for such a conflict can be secured for the CRAF fromthe more financially healthy commercial operators.
Future Airlift Technologies. Some observers, including Arthur Cebrowski, the director of DoD's Office of Force Transformation, have statedfollowing the Iraq war that DoD should consider developing and acquiring new kinds of airliftaircraft, such as such as high-tech, modified blimps capable of transporting 1,000 tons of cargo atspeeds of up to 100 miles per hour, or "wing-in-ground effect" aircraft capable of transportinghundreds of tons of cargo at speeds of a few hundred miles per hour. (171) Developing and acquiringairlift aircraft like these, they argue, could fill in the current gap between today's airlift aircraft(which transport much smaller payloads at higher speeds) and sealift ships (which transport muchlarger payloads at much slower speeds). (172)
section_title: Sealift (173)
paragraphs: A Test of Post-1991 Enhancements. Congress has closely tracked issues relating to U.S. sealift capabilities in recent years because they are critical,along with U.S. air mobility programs, for supporting U.S. expeditionary military operations. TheIraq war provided a test of enhancements for U.S. military sealift capabilities that were fundedfollowing the 1991 Persian Gulf war, when certain inadequacies in U.S. military sealift capabilitieswere exposed. These enhancement programs included, among other things, the following:
the acquisition of 19 additional sealift ships called LMSRs (for Large, Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off (174) ships) foruse in surge sealift from U.S. ports and overseasprepositioning of Army equipment and supplies,
the acquisition of additional ships for enhancing the three MaritimePrepositioning Ship (MPS) squadrons that are used for prepositioning of Marine Corps equipment,and
investments to improve the mobilization readiness of the Ready Reserve Force(RRF), a group of government-owned sealift ships that are kept in reserve for potential activationin time of war.
Sealift In The Iraq War. At the peak of the Iraq-war sealift effort, 62% of the Military Sealift Command's prepositioning and surge sealift ships wereinvolved in supporting the war. (175) An articleon the sealift effort states:
More than 90 percent of all combat gear and supplies used in the rapid advance to Baghdad was shipped by sea in record time.... [DoD's Military SealiftCommand, or MSC] moved 16.6 million square feet of equipment for the U.S. Army and MarineCorps and hauled 377 million gallons of fuel across oceans, helping deliver materiel to the fight threetimes faster than during the 1991 Gulf War while relying on fewer chartered foreignships.
The logistics campaign built on vast stores of equipment positioned in the region over the last decade, including 2 million square feet of equipmentdelivered between July and January to support exercises. That equipment remained in place whenhostilities began in March. Extensive planning, a new war game and a decade-long investment inships capable of carrying large loads facilitated the quick delivery by sea.... In January, MSC beganintensive dispatches to the gulf region of equipment that U.S. forces would need. Tanks, trucks, food,power generators, ammunition and more were loaded on ships at 10 U.S. and five European ports,joining ships already filled with equipment in Diego Garcia....
During the Gulf War, the Pentagon chartered 215 foreign ships to help ferry cargo. This time, thanks to MSC's "large organic fleet," few other shipswere needed.... Turkey's decision to deny U.S. troops access to its ports kept 40 ships with the 4thInfantry Division's equipment treading water in the eastern Mediterranean Sea for weeks, promptingMSC to charter 43 non-U.S. ships to help keep other suppliesmoving. (176)
General Richard B. Myers, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was quoted as saying: "Without our large, medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ships (LMSR) and other strategic sealift,we would have been dead in the water. We win or lose wars based on our logistics capability andthe ships were the big story in Iraq. DoD's investment and attention to that part of our infrastructurepays dividends." (177)
On the other hand, General John Handy, the commander of the U.S. transportation Command, was quoted as saying on March 12 that "in the air[lift] side of things and in some degree the sealiftside, we are transportation constrained, not dramatically, but transportation constrained." (178) It wasalso reported that the unavailability of port facilities in Turkey and Saudi Arabia for offloadingequipment and supplies from U.S. military sealift ships led to a bottleneck at the Kuwaiti ports ofShuwaikh and Shuaiba. (179)
Potential Program Implications. If limits on overseas port facilities are judged to be a potential feature of future U.S. conflicts, one possibleoption would be to invest in sealift capabilities for moving equipment and supplies from ship toshore without need for host-nation port facilities. In addition, Arthur Cebrowski, the director ofDoD's Office of Force Transformation, has said that the Iraq war did not feature any majorinnovations in logistics or transportation, and that DoD should consider potential improvements inthese areas, including very high-speed sealift ships capable of moving at speeds of 80 knots ormore. (180)