Refugee and Asylum-Seeker Inflows in the United States and Other OECD Member States
Released: 2009-01-06T00:00:00

Summary:
A refugee is a person fleeing his or her country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Asylum-seekers are individuals that claim to be refugees and apply for sanctuary from within a potential host country, but whose claim for refugee status has not yet been evaluated and determined. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) collects data on the millions of refugees and asylum-seekers worldwide and their inflows to the United States and other countries, including Member States of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The recent economic downturn could lead to an escalation in the worldwide supply of refugees and asylum-seekers. Thus, a potential issue for Congress is whether the United States should increase admissions of asylum-seekers and refugees during a worldwide economic downturn, maintain current admission levels, or whether the economic circumstances warrant diverting refugee resources to other concerns.
In terms of refugee populations, the United States is one of 13 OECD countries that participates in large-scale resettlement of refugees. Its leadership role in refugee resettlement is substantial. For every year since 1994, the total UNHCR-registered refugee resettlements to the United States have exceeded the cumulative total for all other OECD Member States. Resettlement levels relative to the rest of the OECD, however, have declined since the mid-1990s.
Because of security concerns and political sensitivities over immigration, numerous OECD countries have moved to restrict the inflows of asylum-seekers through unilateral measures or multilateral agreements, particularly in countries that are members of the European Union (EU). In the United States, numerous measures for inflow control have been implemented, some of which other OECD countries have mirrored. Efforts such as the safe third-country agreements and various cost control programs—as well as forthcoming security-based efforts in the European Union—have lowered asylum-seeker inflow rates in the major receiving OECD countries in recent years. The United States' proportion of asylum-seeker inflows in 2007 registered at 17% of the OECD cumulative total. Germany, France, Canada, and the United Kingdom each received approximately 6%-9% of the asylum-seeker inflows.
The data in this report show that there is no uniform inflow trend across OECD countries relating to refugees or asylum-seekers. One of the main observations is that several OECD countries with historically greater numbers of asylum-seekers (such as the United States) have had the levels of their asylum-seeker inflows converge with each other. Moreover, the level at which these asylum-seeker levels have converged is in most cases markedly lower than asylum-seeker inflows during the 1990s. Other OECD countries—mainly those on the periphery of the EU—have recently experienced an upward trend in asylum-seeker inflows. This pattern is likely due to safe third country provisions and their geographic proximity to non-European Union countries.
One set of comparative measures frequently employed is the relative burdens for countries hosting refugees. When placed in the context of national income, the United States, on average, took on a larger refugee hosting burden than almost every other OECD country from 2002 to 2006. Only Germany had a higher relative burden than the United States. The United States' average relative burden was lower than that of 14 other OECD countries between 2002 and 2006. This report will be updated as necessary.

subsections: section_title: Introduction
paragraphs: Worldwide there are millions of people that flee their homes and cross international borders due to threatening circumstances, including refugees and asylum-seekers. A refugee is a person fleeing his or her country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Asylum-seekers are individuals that claim to be refugees and apply for sanctuary from within a potential host country, but whose claim for refugee status have not yet been evaluated and determined. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)—an agency mandated to lead and coordinate international action to protect refugees and resolve refugee problems worldwide—attempts to register and assist as much of this population as possible. UNHCR contributes to a statistical database that allows for the tracking and analysis of what it describes as "populations of concern," that includes asylum-seekers and refugees. Specifically, this database allows for the comparison of refugee and asylum-seeker inflows and populations in the United States and other countries, such as Member States of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). UNHCR data generally show that the United States ranks among the highest recipients of refugees and asylum-seekers in the OECD. 
While the refugee and asylum-seeker situation has been of concern to policymakers for many years, the recent economic downturn may hold implications for the worldwide population of concern. International slowdowns in the availability of capital, as well as the accompanying unemployment, means that resources shortages are developing due to tightening government revenues. Some countries may develop shortages of vital food and agricultural imports, which could lead to food-based migration and displacement. Resource shortages have historically also served as the basis for conflict, which could mean an escalation in the worldwide supply of refugees and asylum-seekers. Yet, the United States is also being severely impacted by the economic downturn, and the demand for government assistance is growing. Thus, a potential issue for Congress is whether the United States should increase its admissions of asylum-seekers and refugees during a worldwide economic downturn, maintain current admission levels, or whether the economic circumstances warrant diverting refugee resources to other concerns. 
Providing a comparative and historical analysis of refugee and asylum-seeker inflows to the United States is of particular informational value, especially relative to other OECD countries. Such information informs Members of Congress as to how policies in the United States and the rest of the OECD are impacting refugee and asylum-seeker inflows and populations. Other CRS products provide extensive discussion of United States refugee and asylum policy. The aim of this report, however, is to provide Members of Congress with a comparative data context. Various patterns will be extracted from the data and the inflows to the United States will be analyzed in comparison to other OECD Member States. The policy analysis will provide some discussions regarding policy developments in OECD countries that may impact their respective inflows of refugees and asylum-seekers. The vast majority of these policies relate to the flows of asylum-seekers, since this group tends to foster less political support in the OECD.
The data in this report shows that there is no uniform inflow trend across OECD countries relating to refugees or asylum-seekers. One of the main findings is that several OECD countries with historically greater numbers of asylum-seekers (such as the United States) have had the levels of their asylum-seeker inflows converge. Moreover, the level at which these asylum-seeker levels have converged is in most cases markedly lower than asylum-seeker inflows during the 1990s. Other OECD countries—mainly those on the periphery of the EU—have recently experienced an upward trend in the asylum-seeker inflows. This pattern is likely due to their geographic proximity to non-EU countries and the existence of safe third country provisions (a concept discussed later in this report). Additionally, refugee data demonstrates that the United States continues to be the main host country of resettled refugees, both in the OECD and worldwide. Despite lower numbers of refugee resettlements in the United States from a decade ago, the number of refugee resettlements in other OECD countries has also declined. Therefore, the resettlement burden of the United States as compared to other OECD countries has remained consistent. 
section_title: Concepts and Definitional/Contextual Background
paragraphs: Refugee policy in the United States and other OECD countries is rooted in a post-World War II context. As state parties to the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 and the subsequent 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees , all Member States of the OECD have committed themselves to admitting an unspecified number of individuals fleeing persecution. The intent of the Convention was to end an ad hoc approach to refugee admissions and resettlement that had previously characterized refugee policy. The United States has adopted the principles of the convention in statute. After a state officially grants sanctuary to an individual under the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, the state is obligated to provide law-abiding admitted refugees with many of the same rights and privileges that citizens enjoy, such as access to courts, the right to pursue gainful employment, public education, medical access, artistic expression, and the like. These rights and privileges do not necessarily extend to individuals that have not been officially granted protective status. Yet, under the principal of nonrefoulment —which prohibits the expulsion or involuntary return of a refugee or a person seeking asylum to a territory where his/her life or freedom would be threatened—all parties to the 1951 Convention or 1967 Protocol must provide some evaluation of claims for sanctuary from persons within its jurisdiction. In OECD countries, sanctuary is normally offered on a permanent basis.
subsections: section_title: U.S. Context
paragraphs: For the United States, two historical elements were essential in shaping current U.S. law: (1) the conflicts in South and Central America in the 1970s and 1980s; and (2) the collapse of the former Soviet Union. Each of these factors compelled policymakers to examine the mechanisms for dealing with displaced populations seeking admission. These events caused policymakers to conclude that the previous ad hoc refugee efforts were inadequate for dealing with such populations, and in the late 1970s steps were taken by Congress towards codifying such measures into statute that eventually became part of current law.
The admission of refugees to the United States and their resettlement are authorized by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended by the Refugee Act of 1980. The 1980 Act had the dual purposes of providing a uniform procedure for refugee admissions and authorizing federal assistance to resettle refugees and promote their self-sufficiency. Under the INA, a refugee is a person who is outside his or her country and who is unable or unwilling to return because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Refugees are processed and admitted to the United States from abroad.
In addition to refugees, the INA also employs the notion of "asylees." Aliens present in the United States may apply for asylum with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Bureau (USCIS) in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) after arrival into the country, or they may seek asylum before the Department of Justice's Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) during removal proceedings. Aliens arriving at a U.S. port who lack proper immigration documents or who engage in fraud or misrepresentation are placed in expedited removal; however, if they express a fear of persecution, they receive a "credible fear" review with an USCIS asylum officer and—if found credible—are referred to an EOIR immigration judge for a hearing.
U.S. law also specifically addresses certain populations. When civil unrest, violence, or natural disasters erupt in spots around the world, concerns arise over the safety of nationals from these troubled places who are in the United States. Humanitarian provisions exist in the INA to offer temporary protected status (TPS) or relief from removal under specified circumstances. The INA also contains other ongoing provisions for certain country nationals.
section_title: UNHCR's Global Context
paragraphs: While the U.S. approach to refugee issues is anchored in the INA, the UNHCR approach for dealing with refugee issues is rooted in a global context. Refugees and asylum-seekers are a subset of a larger population that UNHCR refers to as "populations of concern." This larger population can also include such individuals as internally displaced persons (IDPs), stateless individuals, or other victims who have been displaced or are in need of protection. While both asylum-seekers and refugees claim to have been persecuted or fear they could become victims of persecution under UNHCR's definition, they are distinct populations for classification purposes. Before their request for asylum has been granted, however, these individuals are classified as "asylum-seekers." For classification purposes, UNHCR categorizes most people fleeing their home country as refugees if they have not specifically applied for sanctuary from the host country. 
Refugees and asylum-seekers that are registered as part of the UNHCR population of concern undergo a "status determination." These status determinations are a set of evaluation procedures used to determine their eligibility for sanctuary in a host country. While the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol establish a standard by which to evaluate claims for sanctuary, individual states receiving applications retain the right to determine their own procedures for recognizing and granting protective status. Evaluations of refugees and asylum-seekers are usually conducted by a national government-sponsored program, through a program administered by UNHCR, or through a jointly operated program shared by UNHCR and the respective national government. Yet, despite the existence of UNHCR evaluation programs, the potential host country has the final authority to grant sanctuary within its borders. 
section_title: Overview: UNHCR's Population of Concern
paragraphs: As mentioned above, the UNHCR tracks official data worldwide on groups and individuals labeled as "UNHCR populations of concern"—a classification that includes several categories such as refugees, asylum-seekers, IDPs, and other populations of concern. In 2007, the worldwide population of concern was approximately 31.7 million. Of this population, approximately 36% were refugees, 2% were asylum-seekers (with pending cases), 43% were internally displaced persons, and the remaining 19% were other populations of concern (e.g., stateless persons). Note that these figures represent those registered with UNHCR, but do not represent the full total worldwide (as many are not registered).
As shown in Figure 1 , the period between 1998 and 2007 witnessed a shift within the UNHCR's population of concern. For most of the time period there was a downward trend in the refugee population. Yet in 2007, the year-over-year growth number of refugees rose by 15% to approximately 11.4 million, due mainly to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Asylum-seekers experienced declining numbers during the latter half of the 10-year period. Asylum-seekers dropped from a peak in 2001 of 1.1 million asylum-seekers to roughly 740,000 at the end of 2007, a decline of 32%. Persons categorized as "other populations of concern" increased notably in recent years before declining in 2007 to 5.7 million. Yet, the population that has undergone the largest absolute change in the previous few years has been the worldwide population of IDPs. At the end of 2007, UNHCR-registered population of IDPs had grown to nearly 13.7 million persons—an approximately twofold increase since 2005.
The regions of origin for the populations of concern are predominantly Africa and Asia, as shown in Figure 2 . The people from Asia and Africa constituted 38% and 35% of this population in 2007, respectively. The third-largest contributing region during the same year was Latin America and the Caribbean, which was responsible for producing 12% of the population of concern. The persons of concern originating from Europe represented 4% of the estimated total population. North America's population (excluding Mexico and the Caribbean) represented less than 1% of the total population—similar to persons of concern from Oceania. The category of other populations such as stateless persons (labeled "various" in Figure 2 ) accounted for 11% of the worldwide population.
section_title: Refugee Resettlement in OECD Member States
paragraphs: As mentioned above, those refugees determined by the UNHCR to be most at risk are eligible to be screened and processed for permanent resettlement in a country with an existing resettlement agreement. Mandated by the UNHCR's charter, resettlements are used as a protection tool and durable solution for resettled individuals. Among OECD countries, the United States is somewhat unique in its continued participation in large-scale resettlement of refugees. The majority of OECD countries do not participate at all in refugee resettlement and fulfill 1951 Convention terms by processing asylum-seekers that arrive within their borders. In the past decade, only 12 other OECD Member States have participated in refugee resettlement, and one of those countries—Japan—has not resettled any refugees since 2001. By contrast, countries such as Australia, Canada, and the United States have consistently resettled thousands of refugees on an annual basis, thereby constituting the states most involved in refugee resettlement over the past 10 years.
subsections: section_title: Resettlement Inflows
paragraphs: The depiction of refugee resettlement in industrialized countries in Figure 3 below reveals the large refugee resettlement inflows into the United States relative to other OECD countries. For every year since 1994, the total inflows to the United States have exceeded the cumulative total for all other OECD Member States. Although the inflow level was multiple times higher than the remaining OECD countries during the mid-1990s, the two levels nearly converged in 2002 and 2003. This trend toward convergence was mostly due to declining inflows into the United States following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. U.S. refugee inflow levels dropped by approximately 76% from 1994 to 2002. Since 2002, the United States has experienced a general upward trend, and in 2007 the United States resettled over 48,000 refugees. Comparatively, the cumulative total for other OECD countries has remained more consistent, fluctuating in a range between 22,000-32,000 resettlements annually from 1996 to 2007.
Another notable aspect of Figure 3 is the depiction of refugee resettlement to the United States and other OECD countries in relation to UNHCR's worldwide refugee population total. While the OECD as a whole has annually resettled at least 50,000 refugees, since 1994 these inflows have not exceeded 1% of the worldwide refugee population for a given year. Because the process for refugee resettlement is challenging and resource-intensive, relatively few refugees are chosen (or even eligible) for resettlement. According to UNHCR, "the selectivity of resettlement ... must remain focused on protecting refugees who are at risk." In addition, refugee resettlement requires close coordination with national governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). These agencies frequently work with UNHCR in the identification and screening of resettlement candidates, and facilitating such interaction can be both time- and resource-intensive. Although some observers argue that the 1% proportion indicates that more refugees could be resettled in industrialized countries, the numbers in Figure 3 speak equally to the significant size of the refugee population in the world.
What is more apparent from Figure 3 is that the fluctuations in the proportion of refugees resettled to the worldwide refugee total could be largely attributed to the changes in inflows to the United States. From 1994 through 2001, the contribution of the United States to refugee resettlement in all OECD countries hovered between 73% and 77%. Consequently, the ratio of the worldwide population being resettled in other OECD countries largely mirrored the resettlement pattern to the United States. This mirroring pattern continued when this same ratio experienced a large drop in 2002. Since 2003, the mirroring pattern has continued, although the relatively large change in the ratio is likely more attributable to worldwide decline in the refugee population during this period than due to changes in United States inflows. Also, the share of refugee inflows to the United States as a percentage of total OECD refugee resettlement inflows ranged between 58%-67% from 2003 to 2007. Consequently, while the United States still accounts for roughly two-thirds of refugee resettlements in OECD countries, its share has diminished somewhat since the mid-1990s.
section_title: Migration Concerns and Political Values
paragraphs: The policy approaches that countries have taken towards refugees and asylum-seekers has been largely intertwined with the political value countries have placed on immigration in general. While countries such as the United States, Canada, and Australia have traditionally had relatively proactive immigration policies, many European countries have not historically accepted many immigrants and have practiced highly restrictive legal immigration policies. These divergent immigrant experiences are partly reflected in the United States' willingness to accept hundreds of thousands of permanent immigrants annually. Consequently, refugees have constituted a smaller share of permanent inflows into the United States. By comparison, most European countries tend to prefer admitting foreign nationals on a temporary basis, and in many European countries asylum has become a main avenue for entry and a perceived "loophole" for immigration. 
The sizable inflows of asylum-seekers to many European countries has led to a perception in a number of states that their asylum systems are overburdened. In many countries, the expenditure of resources towards special accommodations, financial assistance, and providing temporary employment, has led to dissatisfaction with the asylum system. Additionally, the wave of migrants that arrived in Western Europe with the collapse of the Soviet Union and Communist control over Eastern Europe placed a burden on public resources that many European policymakers are not eager to see repeated. Thus, many of the restrictive policy trends that are noted in subsequent sections have emerged out of these political developments in Europe over the last two decades. Moreover, the lack of geographic barriers make travel to Europe less strenuous, and, as a result, make some countries on the European periphery especially susceptible to asylum-seeker inflows. 
An additional development affecting asylum-seeker and refugee policies in European OECD Member States has been the expanded number of Member States in the European Union (EU). For EU Member States, their nationals may freely travel, settle, and seek employment in other Member States. While such an arrangement should benefit the economic development of the entire EU area in the long term, political and cultural concerns have been raised about the impact this openness may have on various countries. Moreover, since countries cannot restrict flows from within the EU area, they have shown a greater eagerness to restrict unwanted flows from outside. Thus, asylum-seekers have become a prominent target for certain proponents of immigration restriction. EU countries are increasingly attempting to coordinate immigration and asylum-seeker policies, such as the recently passed European Pact on Immigration and Asylum. The inflow of large numbers of unauthorized immigrants has prompted security concerns amongst policymakers in Europe (as it has in the United States). The new European security-based provisions are likely to impact asylum-seekers since the proposed changes to EU policy will be based upon the concept of "country reception capacity"—thereby suggesting that inflows to each country beyond the level of "reception capacity" constitutes a security risk.
For many OECD countries, however, the most confounding factor is illegal migration. The difficulty for many countries is separating illegal economic migrants from actual asylum-seekers that have migrated inside their borders. Moreover, asylum-seekers may have economic considerations when migrating to a destination country. Although less than 1% of UNHCR populations of concern are admitted into OECD countries, these countries are frequently desirable destinations for asylum-seekers because of the stronger performing economies and potential for social and economic upward mobility. Thus, the question for many OECD policymakers has been how to develop adequate inflow control measures without excluding genuine asylum-seekers.
section_title: Asylum Policy Shifts, Cost Control, and Security Mechanisms
paragraphs: Empirically, OECD countries with strongly performing economies are likely to be recipients of relatively higher rates of asylum applications. Strong economies serve as an incentive for economic migrants to travel to these states (in either an authorized or unauthorized manner), but not necessarily for asylum-seekers. More recent asylum-seeker policies throughout the OECD, however, have seemingly been based upon the assumption that asylum-seekers are economically rational actors, similar to many illegal immigrants. The response in the United States and throughout other OECD states has been to develop proactive measures to control the flows of asylum-seekers, by way of unilateral measures or via multilateral agreements. Efforts such as safe third-country agreements and various cost control programs have been the likely cause of the convergence of asylum-seeker inflow levels in certain OECD countries with historically higher inflow rates (a convergence that is depicted in Figure 4 ).
subsections: section_title: Inflow Control
paragraphs: A number of efforts to control the inflow of asylum-seekers embrace a concept that political scientists refer to as "beggar thy neighbor." Commonly used to refer to protectionist trade barriers, the term describes a policy whereby the objective or benefit sought by one country is achieved at the expense of others. In the case of asylum flows, a number of OECD countries have employed mechanisms and advocated policies that transfer the asylum-hosting obligations (and costs) to other countries. While some advocates view this shift as avoiding obligations, others contend that it constitutes an equitable distribution of cost in sheltering asylum-seekers and refugees. A few of these policy mechanisms—discussed in the sections below—are employed in the United States, while others are more unique to other OECD member states.
subsections: section_title: Asylum-Seekers in the United States
paragraphs: Controlling the mass inflow of asylum-seekers has been a concern of U.S. policymakers for decades. Prior to 1996, aliens arriving at a port of entry to the United States without proper immigration documents were eligible for a hearing before an immigration judge to determine whether the aliens were admissible. Aliens lacking proper documents could request asylum in the United States at that time. If the alien received an unfavorable decision from the immigration judge, he or she also could seek administrative and judicial review of the case. Critics of this policy argued that illegal aliens were arriving without proper documents, filing frivolous asylum claims, and obtaining work authorizations while their asylum cases stalled in lengthy backlogs. 
The Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) made substantial changes to the asylum process, including establishing expedited removal proceedings; codifying many regulatory changes; adding time limits on filing claims; and limiting judicial review in certain circumstances, but it did not alter the numerical limits on asylee adjustments. Foreign nationals arriving without proper documents who express to the immigration officer a fear of being returned home must be kept in detention while their "credible fear" cases are pending. Moreover, the reforms established serious consequences for aliens who file frivolous asylum applications.
IIRIRA also codified many regulatory revisions of the asylum process that the former George H.W. Bush and Clinton Administrations made. Most notably, aliens are statutorily prohibited from immediately receiving work authorization at the same time as the filing of their asylum application. Now the asylum applicant is required to wait 150 days after the USCIS receives his/her complete asylum application before applying for work authorization. The USCIS then has 30 days to grant or deny the request. IIRIRA also added a provision that enabled refugees or asylees to request asylum on the basis of persecution resulting from resistance to coercive population control policies, but the number of aliens eligible to receive asylum under this provision was limited to 1,000 each year.
section_title: Safe Third Country
paragraphs: One form of cost shift and inflow control in the OECD has been through "safe third country" provisions. A safe third country is a country the asylum-seeker has passed through en route to the receiving country and with which the receiving country has a reciprocal agreement. Under a safe third-country agreement, the receiving country can refuse to make an asylum determination, if the safe third country (the country an asylum-seeker passed through) is technically responsible for examining the application. These types of arrangements are most common among the OECD states that belong to the EU. Major recipients of refugee flows in the EU have generally advocated such agreements between the EU Member States, as it allows these countries to shift some asylum determination responsibilities to other countries without violating the direct terms of the 1951 Convention or 1967 Protocol. The UNHCR has stated that responsibility-sharing agreements between states can, when appropriate safeguards are in place, enhance the international protection of refugees by ensuring the orderly handling of asylum applications.
The United States has only one similar arrangement in place: the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country Agreement. Effective since December 29, 2004, the program is run through a cooperative agreement between Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) and three U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agencies: Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). As part of the agreement, UNHCR independently monitors and reviews the implementation of the program and offers recommendations for improvement and compliance. The impact, however, has been small. In the United States, during the first year of implementation, there were 66 such claims at land border points of entry (POE). Of those 66 claimants, 62 were subject to the agreement. The other four claimants were Canadian citizens, who are not subject to the agreement. During the same time period, Canadian authorities returned 303 individuals to the United States as a result of the application of the agreement.
The concept of a safe third-country mechanism first emerged in 1990 as part of the so-called Dublin Convention of EU Member States. The objective of this convention was to determine which Member State would be responsible for examining an application for asylum—a matter not explicitly declared in the 1951 Convention or 1967 Protocol. The parties agreed to abide by the order of responsibility laid out in the Dublin Convention, and subsequent agreements included conditions for accepting third country asylum-seekers. Critics, however, have contended that adequate safeguards are sometimes not in place.
One of the main concerns about the concept of safe third countries for asylum-seekers has been its potential for unilateral application by a receiving country. Without a bilateral agreement, removing asylum-seekers from a receiving country to a third country could result in a refusal by the third country to accept the asylum-seeker. Critics have referred to such a phenomenon as "refugees-in-orbit," wherein the asylum-seeker is deported from country to country until a government chooses to accept the asylum-seeker. In the EU, third country responsibilities are required between Member States, but the same requirements are not applicable to non-Member States. EU countries have historically attempted to make arrangements with countries that are frequently stopovers before a final European destination. But the bilateral approach to safe third country agreements has resulted in numerous EU Member States having mismatched lists of safe third countries (presumably because of different interpretations of what constitutes compliance with the 1951 Convention). Since 1999, the EU has been working toward harmonizing minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, including creating an EU list of third countries as safe countries of origin. Several other OECD countries outside the European Union have set up their own bilateral safe third country provisions.
Safe third-country provisions have likely caused some shift in the distribution of asylum-seekers among OECD countries with high inflow rates, such as the United Kingdom. As a country located in the northeastern region of Europe—and thus effectively containing a buffer zone from many asylum-seeker countries of origin—one would expect to see a notable number of asylum-seekers categorized as "not subject to asylum consideration" because of the availability of a safe third country. Cumulatively from 1996 through 2007, the United Kingdom refused consideration to roughly 20,200 principal applicants, but annually it never accounted for more than 8% of all asylum applications during that time period.
section_title: Deterrence Mechanisms
paragraphs: A notable cause of shifting burdens of asylum-seeker inflows in some OECD countries has been policy mechanisms designed to control flow rates and deter fraud and abuse. Working on the belief that asylum-seekers are economically rational, numerous governments and immigration critics across the OECD area have argued that some migrants engage in so-called "asylum shopping"—the practice of applying for asylum in several countries in order to maximize the likelihood of a positive asylum determination and/or receiving the most generous public benefits. The United States has implemented deterrence mechanisms, among other ways, through the previously discussed expedited removal mechanism, as well as the ongoing efforts to implement the provisions of the REAL ID Act. Several tactics have been attempted or implemented in various other OECD countries. Most widespread has been the development of shared databases on asylum-seekers. The inclusion of fingerprints and other biometric identifiers in systems like Eurodac, as well as the issuance in some cases of special identification cards, provides governments with improved tools for tracking asylum-seekers to ensure that they do not migrate from the first country of asylum to claim improved public benefits. The European Pact passed by the EU in October 2008 requires that Member States should start issuing biometric visas from January 1, 2012, establish an EU-wide electronic entry/exit system to record the movement of people, and only regularize the status of unauthorized individuals on a "case-by-case" basis.
subsections: section_title: Voucher Program
paragraphs: The United Kingdom, which has been a vocal advocate of asylum policy reforms in the European Union, introduced two programs in the past decade that some observers believe were designed specifically to prevent asylum shopping. Officially, these programs were aimed at preventing asylum fraud, illegal immigration, and human smuggling. The first of these efforts was a voucher program for asylum-seekers that was implemented in place of cash-based social security benefits. Although small cash allowances were also received, asylum-seekers were required to collect vouchers for most purchases at the post office and use the voucher in place of cash or credit at businesses. A review of the program by the UK Home Office found that the voucher scheme had encountered a number of operational problems such as business owners refusing to accept vouchers. Moreover, complaints from asylum-seekers and advocates claimed that the program was causing a further stigmatization of asylum-seekers and that many users suffered embarrassment. The UK government eventually did away with the voucher program in 2002, and instead instituted "smart card" identification requirements, including biometric identifiers such as fingerprints. In the United States, such a voucher program has not been attempted as the INA bans asylum-seekers from receiving any public benefits until they become legal permanent residents.
section_title: Dispersal Actions
paragraphs: The second program associated with preventing asylum shopping in the United Kingdom has been the government's effort to disperse asylum-seekers. Following the Immigration and Asylum Act of 1996 and its mandate that local authorities be responsible for the care of asylum-seekers, a few local governments began their own dispersal actions (through private contracts) and lobbied for greater burden sharing. Subsequently, the government implemented the Immigration and Asylum Act of 1999, which included a dispersal scheme to send asylum-seekers throughout the United Kingdom with the objective of controlling asylum-seeker inflows. The national government has maintained that dispersion has been necessary to more widely distribute service costs among municipalities, yet some observers believe the policy has been "unduly harsh." In addition, news reports have sometimes linked the dispersal policy with increased incidences of racism, harassment, and violence against refugees and asylum-seekers. Studies have suggested that improved communication efforts between local authorities, national government, and refugee groups could potentially improve the tensions between asylum-seekers and local populations.
Whether or not these mechanisms effectively deterred asylum remains unclear. From 1996 to 2002, new asylum applications in the United Kingdom increased by 248% to 103,080 applications in 2002. Yet, in subsequent years, the levels dropped by 73%, to a level of 27,905 in 2007. Because of the cluster of asylum flow control measures being implemented in both the United Kingdom and European Union during this time period, multiple factors likely contributed to the downturn in applications. For advocacy groups, however, the introduction of programs partially aimed at controlling asylum flows raises numerous normative questions about asylum policy in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. Thus, despite the recent reduction in new asylum applications, tensions surrounding deterrence mechanisms and asylum-seekers remain a catalyst for political and social divisions.
section_title: The Effects of New Asylum-Seeker Policies
paragraphs: The "beggar thy neighbor" policy approach within the European Union has elevated concerns among numerous observers, causing some advocates and academics to label the EU as "Fortress Europe." While empirical data do not support the implication that the EU Member States (nor other OECD countries for that matter) are closing off asylum-seeker inflows entirely, statistics do indicate that there have been marked inflow level shifts downward in several traditionally larger receiving countries for asylum-seekers. Asylum-seekers represent the largest inflow population into OECD countries. Table A-1 in Appendix shows that the inflows of asylum-seekers into OECD countries has declined in recent years (the table also includes information for EU countries). In total, the OECD took in 638,539 asylum-seekers in 2001, while in 2005 this number had been reduced to 319,050, a drop of 50%. The corresponding drop in the worldwide asylum-seeker population was 29%. Although these trends are likely the results of inflow control policies implemented by the various countries, other factors such as regional stability cannot be ruled out as causal variables.
subsections: section_title: Convergence and Increases
paragraphs: Within the OECD, data shows that the larger states have begun converging in the number of asylum-seeker admissions. The convergence point sits at a lower inflow level than during the previous decade for most of the countries. In other countries, however, a pattern of increasing inflows has emerged. Overall, asylum-seeker inflows to the OECD still exceed historical lows from the past two decades.
subsections: section_title: Convergence of Asylum-Seeker Inflows
paragraphs: To illustrate the aforementioned convergence pattern, Figure 4 below maps out the asylum-seekers from 1996 to 2007 of five recipient countries in the OECD with historically large inflow levels: the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Canada. From the illustration, the convergence trend of these five countries becomes evident. While these countries still vary in their respective annual refugee admissions, the range of these admissions in 1996 was 2.8 times greater than in 2007. This convergence has been driven by both decreases in some countries and increases in others. For example, the United States' inflow rate dropped by 35% from 1995 to 2007. By 2001, Germany and the United Kingdom were each experiencing higher asylum-seeker inflows than any other OECD Member States. Although the five major recipient countries included in Figure 4 witnessed fluctuations in their annual inflow levels over the entire interval, all the countries exhibited a downward trend beginning around 2002. Consequently, asylum-seeker inflows have been more evenly distributed among major OECD recipient states.
The plotted lines in Figure 4 stem from data presented in Table A-1 of Appendix . These data indicate that since 1996, the United States has been one of the main recipients of asylum-seeker inflows among OECD countries. From 2002 to 2007, the U.S. share of OECD asylum-seeker inflows fluctuated between 13% and 19% annually. This proportion represents an increase from 1999, when the United States received 9% of the OECD asylum-seeker inflows. The proportion of asylum-seeker inflows in 2007 registered at 17% of the OECD cumulative total. Germany, France, Canada, and the United Kingdom each received approximately 6-9% of the asylum-seeker inflows in 2007. During this same time period, other OECD countries accounted for shares of asylum-seeker inflows that ranged from a low of 26% in 1996 to a high of 51% in 2007.
section_title: Escalating Asylum-Seeker Inflows
paragraphs: A development that may be partially attributed to the third-country policies in the European Union is the significant increase in asylum-seeker inflows in certain smaller Member States. These countries generally border non-EU states and serve as either land- or sea-based access points to the EU. Unlike certain OECD states that are geographically prohibitive for refugees to reach other than by expensive and restrictive air travel (such as Australia, New Zealand, or Japan), European states are easily accessible by land and sea, making certain countries especially subject to asylum-seeker inflows and third-country asylum application responsibilities. Figure 5 below depicts three of the states that have experienced increases in their asylum-seeker inflows: Greece, Poland, and Sweden.
As the plots in Figure 5 show, all three countries experienced upward trends in asylum-seeker inflows from 1996 to 2007. The largest of these increases in absolute terms was the inflow to Sweden. Its annual inflows numbered less than 6,000 in 1996, but by 2007 this number had climbed to over 36,000—a more than sixfold increase. The same observation holds true for Poland and Greece. The inflow rate in Poland increased by over threefold over the same time period, from a level of 3,211 in 1996 to an inflow of 10,047 in 2007. Greece had the highest relative increase of the three countries, increasing over 15-fold, from 1,643 asylum-seekers in 1996 to 25,113 in 2007. Several other European "portal countries" have also witnessed increases over the same span, although most did not exhibit similar sized shifts in their relative inflow rates.
section_title: Asylum Decisions
paragraphs: In countries with relatively high inflow levels of asylum-seekers, anti-immigrant groups have criticized their respective governments for being "too permissive" in their admissions policies—a factor that is in some cases cited as attracting more asylum-seekers. In response, governments have focused their efforts on reducing incentives for asylum-seekers with respect to public benefits, as those discussed above. Yet, for some critics the question remains whether higher rates of positive asylum decisions could create higher asylum-seeker inflows (a causal relationship that could lend credence to the assumption of informed asylum-seekers conducting rationalized "asylum shopping"). If such a relationship did exist, one would reasonably expect that the countries with higher positive decision rates should demonstrate higher asylum-seeker inflow rates.
The average annual rate of positive decisions for asylum applications where a decision was taken (shown in Figure 6 ) indicates a markedly large range between OECD countries from 2004 to 2007. On the one hand, Turkey had an annual positive decision rate of roughly 78%, the highest of all OECD countries. By contrast, Greece granted positive asylum decisions in 1% of cases where a decision was taken. This disparity in the decision rate occurred despite the inflows of thousands of asylum-seekers annually to each country. In the United States, the average positive decision rate for 2004-2007 was higher than the majority of OECD countries. The OECD average for this time period was 28%, 7% below that of the United States. Moreover, these figures do not account for the additional number of asylum-seekers that are granted asylum on appeal.
The main analytical conclusion that may be drawn from Figure 6 is that the positive decision data demonstrate almost no relation to the inflow levels of asylum-seekers during the given time period. For example, in spite of different trends shown in Figure 4 from Figure 5 , Canada and Poland have similar average positive asylum decision rates. Greece has one of the highest rates of increase in asylum-seeker inflows in the OECD from 2004 to 2007, while simultaneously accounting for the lowest positive decision rate. Statistical analysis performed by CRS confirms these visual observations. Therefore, while so-called "asylum shopping" might occur based on the public benefits a country offers, the evidence suggests that the recent rates of positive asylum decisions have been of little consequence for such behavior on asylum-seeker inflow levels in general. More likely, the driving factors behind asylum-seekers are the accessibility of a country, cultural and linguistic ties, the existence of a diaspora or family members, and similar considerations.
section_title: Sanctuary Capacity and Contributions of OECD Countries
paragraphs: The preceding data analysis has largely been based on inflow levels. While such analysis is both informative and valid in an overview of capacity for and contributions towards these populations, it does not fully address the relative costs that countries experience from such inflows. Employing additional economic and demographic indicators would provide a fuller view of refugee inflows in OECD Member States. Therefore, this section attempts to place these inflows into a comparative context that emphasizes the relative burden of refugee populations in terms of economic costs and population size.
One approach to contextualizing inflows in OECD countries is to analyze a country's existing refugee population relative to the size of the national income and productivity. The map shown in Figure 7 shows these data and uses gross domestic product (GDP) adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP) to account for a given country's potential, relative financial burden. Specifically, Figure 7 maps out the average number of refugees per $1 GDP (PPP) per capita from 2002 to 2006, thereby adjusting national income to both exchange rates and the size of the population. This measure makes no assumption about the long-term net cost/benefit of refugee because such factors are entirely dependent on how economically integrated into the host country this population becomes.
The map in Figure 7 demonstrates that when placed in the context of national income, the United States has taken on a larger refugee hosting burden than almost every other OECD country. Only Germany, with 26.3 refugees per $1 GDP (PPP) per capita, had a higher relative burden than the United States (10.9). On a worldwide basis, both the United States and Germany ranked in the top 35 for this same measure. Moreover, the map shows that the majority of OECD countries had an average population of one refugee per $1 GDP (PPP) per capita or less. Consequently, the United States had an average burden at least 11 times greater than most OECD countries for the 2002-2006 time period relative to national income. The lowest-ranked country in the OECD for this measure was Iceland, which had over 100 times fewer refugees than the United States relative to national income.
Another way to contextualize burden sharing worldwide is to consider a given country's existing population. Such an approach removes economic conditions and considers refugees in terms of the number of residents in a country. This measure serves as one type of indicator for the demographic impact of refugee inflows. Depicted in Figure 8 is a world map showing the 2002-2006 average cumulative number of refugees to every 1,000 inhabitants in each country. Unlike the measure for national income, the United States—with 1.7 refugees per 1,000 inhabitants—figured more toward the median of OECD countries for this demographic measure. Overall, the ratio for the United States was lower than that of 14 other OECD countries and ranked 56 th worldwide. The highest ratios among OECD countries were for Sweden, Denmark, Germany, and Norway. Sweden's ratio ranked 11 th worldwide. Thus, the top 10 hosting countries for refugees per 1,000 inhabitants worldwide were all outside the OECD. A plurality of OECD countries averaged 1.0 or fewer refugees per 1,000 inhabitants from 2002 to 2006.
Overall, refugees constitute the costliest recipients of public benefits on a per person basis in the United States. Yet, as advocates will note, the costs either presented or implied in the figures above do not convey the benefits of hosting refugee (or asylum-seeker) populations. Many benefits cannot be quantified in monetary terms, but nonetheless have affected host countries enormously. In the United States, for example, refugee populations frequently contribute to multicultural diversity and global awareness in the population. Moreover, some refugees that chose to remain have become successful entrepreneurs and strong contributors to economic development. Historically, recipient countries have benefitted from the human capital that refugee populations have represented by using that human capital for intellectual and technological advancement. In this regard, notable refugees to the United States include Nobel Prize winner and scientist Albert Einstein and former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. While costs of refugee resettlement and asylum-seeker programs are necessary considerations for any government, these costs must also be weighed against the many contributions to the political, economic, cultural, and religious life that these populations make in OECD countries.
section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: The findings of this report indicate that currently the United States resettles more refugees and has a higher inflow rate of asylum-seekers than any other OECD country, despite having numerous deterrence mechanisms in place. Additionally, the rate of positive asylum decisions (when a decision is taken) is above the OECD average. But the data also indicate that there are millions of refugees and other populations of concern worldwide, and in recent years these populations have grown. And with the worldwide economic downturn occurring, these populations are likely to increase. Yet, the United States is also being severely impacted by the economic downturn, and the demand for government assistance is growing. Thus, balancing the availability of resources against the demand for refugee assistance will likely continue. 
subsections: section_title: Appendix. Asylum-Seeker Flows