India's Nuclear Separation Plan: Issues and Views
Released: 2006-12-22T00:00:00

Summary:
On July 18, 2005, President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announcedthe creation of a "global partnership," which would include "full" civil nuclear cooperation betweenthe United States and India. This is at odds with nearly three decades of U.S. nonproliferation policyand practice. President Bush promised India he would persuade Congress to amend the pertinentlaws to approve the agreement, as well as persuade U.S. allies to create an exception to multilateralNuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines for India. India committed to, among other things,separating its civilian nuclear facilities from its military nuclear facilities, declaring civilian facilitiesto the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and placing them under IAEA safeguards, andsigning an Additional Protocol. See CRS Report RL33016 , U.S. Nuclear Cooperation With India:Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed], for further details on the agreement.
The separation plan announced by Prime Minister Singh and President Bush on March 2,2006, and further elaborated on May 11, 2006, would place 8 power reactors under inspection,bringing the total up to 14 out of a possible 22 under inspection. Several fuel fabrication and spentfuel storage facilities were declared, as well as 3 heavy water plants that were described as"safeguards-irrelevant." The plan excludes from international inspection 8 indigenous powerreactors, enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing facilities (except as currently safeguarded), militaryproduction reactors and other military nuclear plants and 3 heavy water plants. Administrationofficials have defended the separation plan as credible and defensible because it covers more thanjust a token number of Indian facilities, provides for safeguards in perpetuity, and includes upstreamand downstream facilities.
U.S. officials acknowledge the importance of a credible separation plan to ensuring that theUnited States complies with its Article I obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty(NPT) -- to not in any way assist a nuclear weapons program in a non-nuclear weapon state. Foralmost 30 years, the U.S. legal standard has been that only nuclear safeguards on all nuclear activitiesin a state provides adequate assurances. The Administration is apparently asking Congress to backa lower level of assurance by proposing that the separation plan take the place of comprehensivesafeguards.
Congress is likely to consider this issue as well as others when the Administration eventuallysubmits its cooperation agreement with India for approval by both chambers. P.L. 109-401 , signedon December 18, 2006, provides waivers for a nuclear cooperation agreement with India fromrelevant Atomic Energy Act provisions, and requires detailed information on the separation plan andresultant safeguards. This report, which will be updated as necessary, provides background onIndia's nuclear fuel cycle, a discussion of various issues involved in separating civilian and militarynuclear facilities and potential concerns for Congress as it considers whether the United States hasadequate assurances that its nuclear cooperation does not assist, encourage, or induce India's nuclearweapons development, production, or proliferation.

subsections: section_title: Introduction
paragraphs: On July 18, 2005, President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed a jointstatement that announced the creation of a "global partnership," which would include "full" civilnuclear cooperation between the United States and India. This is at odds with nearly three decadesof U.S. nonproliferation policy and practice. President Bush committed to persuading Congress toamend the pertinent laws to approve the agreement, as well as persuading U.S. allies to create anexception to multilateral Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines for India to allow for nuclearcooperation. India committed to separating its civilian from its military nuclear facilities, declaringcivilian facilities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and placing them under IAEAsafeguards, and signing an Additional Protocol, which provides enhanced access and informationfor IAEA inspectors. (1) 
The United States is obligated under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to ensurethat any cooperation it provides to a non-nuclear weapon state does not contribute to that state'scapability to produce nuclear weapons. In 1978, Congress passed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act,which strengthened the restrictions on U.S. nuclear cooperation to include comprehensive(full-scope) safeguards on all nuclear material in non-nuclear weapon states, specifically to helpensure that peaceful cooperation would not be diverted to weapons purposes. The 1978 Actfollowed India's 1974 peaceful nuclear explosion, which demonstrated to most observers that nucleartechnology originally transferred for peaceful purposes could be misused. That test also providedthe impetus for creating the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). (2) In 1992, the NSG adopted thefull-scope safeguards condition for nuclear exports, and the 1995 NPT Extension Conference andthe 2000 NPT Review Conference both endorsed the NSG's new requirement.
India shares a unique status with Pakistan and Israel as de facto nuclear weapon statesoutside the NPT that have been treated politically, for nonproliferation purposes, as non-nuclearweapon states. (3) The threestates do not have comprehensive nuclear safeguards. Instead, they have safeguards agreements thatcover only specified facilities and materials. (4) Presently, very few of India's nuclear facilities are subject tointernational inspections. 
The Bush Administration made a "credible" and "defensible" -- from a nonproliferationstandpoint -- separation plan a prerequisite for asking Congress to create an exception to current lawfor nuclear cooperation with India. P.L. 109-401 , the law that provides the executive branch withauthority to waive restrictions under the Atomic Energy Act with respect to India, requires thePresident to determine that the following actions had occurred:
India has provided the United States and the IAEA with a credible plan toseparate civil and military facilities, materials, and programs, and has filed a declaration regardingits civil facilities with the IAEA;
India and the IAEA have concluded all legal steps required prior to signatureby the parties of an agreement requiring the application of safeguards in perpetuity in accordancewith IAEA standards, principles, and practices (including IAEA Board of Governors DocumentGOV/1621 (1973)) to India's civil nuclear facilities, materials and programs as declared in the plan,including materials used in or produced through the use of India's civil nuclearfacilities;
India and the IAEA are making substantial progress toward concluding anAdditional Protocol consistent with IAEA principles, practices, and policies that would apply toIndia's civil nuclear program;
India is working actively with the United States for the early conclusion of amultilateral treaty on the cessation of the production of fissile materials for use in nuclearweapons;
India is working with and supporting U.S. and international efforts to preventthe spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology to any state that does not already possessfull-scale functioning enrichment or reprocessing plants;
India is taking the necessary steps to secure nuclear and other sensitivematerials and technology through the application of comprehensive export control legislation andregulations, and through harmonization and adherence to Missile Technology Control Regime(MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines; and
the NSG has decided by consensus to permit supply to India of nuclear itemscovered by the guidelines of the NSG.
Indian and U.S. officials engaged for several months in discussions on identification ofcivilian facilities. U.S. officials encouraged India to make a comprehensive declaration of its civilianinfrastructure. (5) In variouswritten and oral statements to Congress, State Department officials seem to suggest that morefacilities under safeguards would be better than fewer, but critics (on both the U.S. and Indian sides)have suggested that some facilities would be more important to include or exclude. For example,the CIRUS reactor, reportedly the source of plutonium for the 1974 nuclear test, despite India'spledge to use it only for peaceful purposes, is important to some critics to declare as civilian and place under safeguards because of its controversial past. To U.S. officials, facilities associated withthe fast breeder reactor program, which could produce plutonium for weapons in the future,reportedly would be key to get under safeguards, particularly if the United States wants to cooperatewith India in the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership program. (6) To Indian officials, however,the fast breeder reactor program is key to the future of India's three-stage nuclear fuel cycle and mustbe kept out of safeguards for maximum flexibility and energy independence. (7) 
Several nonproliferation critics of the potential agreement have suggested that no matter howmany facilities India places under safeguards, the opening of the international uranium market --forbidden to India since 1992 by the NSG -- in effect frees up India's domestic uranium for itsnuclear weapons program, and therefore, would assist the Indian nuclear weapons program. (8) Consequently, only India's haltin the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons would ensure that U.S. assistance does notaid India's nuclear programs. (9) Indian officials note that the peaceful nuclear cooperationagreement is not about limiting their strategic program, just about expanding their peaceful nuclearprogram. Some critics have suggested various options for placing specific facilities under safeguardsto diminish the potential "surplus effect" of opening up that uranium market. (10) 
One observer, Robert Einhorn, has suggested that in the absence of a fissile materialproduction halt, safeguards on Indian facilities serve primarily a symbolic role in demonstratingIndia's commitment to nonproliferation. (11) Nonetheless, the safeguards approach, according toAdministration officials, is key to assuring that the United States complies with Article I of the NPT-- that U.S. cooperation does not in any way assist a nuclear weapons program in a non-nuclearweapon state. U.S. officials have stated that a voluntary safeguards arrangement like those of theother five nuclear weapon states would not meet our NPT Article I obligations. In their view, Indiamust accept some kind of safeguards arrangement that allow safeguards to endure in perpetuity. Indian officials, on the other hand, suggested that having the same responsibilities and practices asother advanced nuclear states translates into a voluntary safeguards arrangement. (12) 
This report provides background on India's nuclear fuel cycle, a discussion of various issuesinvolved in separating civilian and military nuclear facilities and potential concerns for Congress asit considers whether the United States has adequate assurances that its nuclear cooperation does notassist, encourage, or induce India's nuclear weapons development, production, or proliferation. 
section_title: Background
paragraphs: India's nuclear program, from its inception in 1948, has been described as inherentlydual-purpose. (13) Withthe establishment of its Atomic Energy Commission in 1948, India pursued both civilian and militaryapplications of nuclear energy. The first indigenous research reactor, Apsara, was developed in the1950s. Canada provided early assistance under the Colombo Plan, as did the United States underthe Atoms for Peace program. A humiliating defeat in a border war with China in 1962, followedby China's first nuclear test in 1964, intensified India's drive for nuclear weapons. India turned tothe CIRUS (Canada-India Reactor United States) reactor, as the source for plutonium for its 1974"peaceful nuclear explosive" test. Foreign assistance dwindled after the 1974 test, but Canada hadalready transferred the blueprints for heavy water reactors under an agreement for peaceful nuclearcooperation. As a result, India developed a fairly independent nuclear infrastructure that supportedboth civilian and military purposes. For example, plutonium separated in India's reprocessing plantshas been used both for weapons and to make mixed oxide fuel (plutonium mixed with uranium) fornuclear power plants.
India's nuclear fuel cycle development has been driven by an acknowledged lack of uraniumreserves. In India's view, energy independence could not be derived from domestic uranium reserves-- estimated at 0.8% of world reserves, or 50-60,000 tons -- but could be from production ofplutonium, recycling of spent fuel, and utilization of thorium (estimated at 32% of worldreserves). (14) As a result,India planned 40 years ago to develop a three-stage fuel cycle to reduce its reliance on uranium anduse thorium. The first stage would rely on natural uranium-fueled reactors to make plutonium; thesecond stage would use that plutonium in fast reactors blanketed with thorium to produce U-233(and more plutonium); and the third stage would use U-233 fuel and thorium fuel in fast reactorsblanketed with thorium to produce more U-233 for use for future fuel. India has not advancedbeyond the first stage of the fuel cycle, aside from running a fast breeder test reactor (40 MWth FastBreeder Test Reactor or FBTR) based on a French design and a small research reactor that usesU-233 fuel (Kamini). 
The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. Anil Kakodkar, asserted in a speechin March 2005 that indigenous uranium resources would support 10 GWe of nuclear installedcapacity but that breeder reactors, using plutonium bred from indigenous uranium, could support 500GWe of power generation. (15) The current energy plan is to have 12 GWe installed capacityby 2015 and 20 GWe by 2020. Reportedly, the increase to 20 GWe would be achieved through amix of pressurized heavy water reactors (PHWRs), light water reactors and fast breeder reactors,including construction of 5 fast breeder reactors of 500 MWe each and the import of 8 light waterreactors of 1000 MWe each. (16) India's indigenous, pressurized heavy water reactors (fueled withnatural uranium) are planned to provide just half of that 20 GWe capacity (i.e., 10 GWe), but someobservers have suggested that indigenous supplies of uranium may not support that many reactorsand that India's uranium crisis is already acute. (17) For example, India's Jaduguda uranium mill produces just 220tons of yellowcake a year, whereas the 13 operating natural-uranium fueled reactors require 300 tonsper year, and consequently have reduced their operating capacity from 90% in 2002-2003 to 81%in 2003-2004 and 76% in 2004-2005. (18) According to two reports, the Department of Atomic Energy hasbeen unable to mine certain uranium deposits because local governments have not yet givenclearance. (19) 
subsections: section_title: India's Nuclear Facilities(20)
paragraphs: Figure 1 depicts key sites and facilities of India's nuclear industry; not included are India'sheavy water plants and associated research facilities. Apart from two light-water reactors fueled withlow-enriched uranium from foreign suppliers (at Tarapur) and two under construction by Russia(VVERs at Kudankulam), India's power reactors rely on natural uranium in reactors that are cooledand moderated by heavy water, known as pressurized heavy water reactors, or alternatively asCANDU-type. (21) Canada built the first two CANDU-type reactors at Rajasthan, and India built the remaining eleven. Most of these produce about 220 MWe, whereas the new Russian reactors at Kudankulam willproduce 1000 MWe. The foreign-supplied reactors (Tarapur, Rajasthan and, eventually,Kudankulam) are under IAEA safeguards, but the remaining domestic facilities are, largely, notsafeguarded.
Figure 1. Indian Nuclear Facilities
Sources: Dr. Frederick Mackie, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and the CongressionalResearch Service.
At present, India's nuclear facilities include the following:
research reactors (3);
power reactors (15 operating, 8 under construction and 3planned);
breeder reactors (1 operating, 1 under construction);
uranium enrichment (1 operating)
spent fuel reprocessing (3);
heavy water production plants (6);
uranium processing (3 mines; 2 copper-mine tailing extraction units, 1 mill(uranium ore concentration) many uranium conversion facilities, 3 or 4 fuel fabricationplants).
Research Reactors. India has three operatingresearch reactors (CIRUS, Dhruva, and Kamini) and four decommissioned reactors. (22) In addition, India's oldestreactor, Apsara, may be considered operational, but is awaiting refurbishment, reportedly to test anew indigenous design of a 5-10 MWt research reactor. It has been used for various experiments,research and production of radioisotopes, and training. CIRUS and Dhruva are located at the BhabhaAtomic Research Center (BARC) in Trombay, while Kamini is located at Kalpakkam. 
The CIRUS reactor has been the subject of controversy between the United States and Indiafor much of its life. The United States supplied heavy water, which was not subject to a safeguardsagreement, under a 1956 contract in which India pledged to use the material for peaceful purposesonly. Yet this reactor reportedly produced the plutonium used in India's 1974 peaceful nuclearexplosion. Many nonproliferation experts maintain that India violated its 1956 contract with Canadaas well as its contract with the United States. Most recently, according to answers to questions forthe record submitted by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on November 2, 2005, the StateDepartment notes that:
At the time, the debate on whether India had violatedthe contract was inconclusive owing to the uncertainty as to whether U.S.-supplied heavy watercontributed to the production of the plutonium used for the 1974 device and the lack of a mutualunderstanding of scope of the 1956 contract language on "peacefulpurposes."
Several nonproliferation experts have criticized the Administration for not taking thisopportunity to resolve this 30-year-old controversy. (23) The Canadian government in December 2005 encouraged theUnited States and India to declare the CIRUS reactor as a civilian reactor and place it under IAEAsafeguards. Doing so, would "respect the peaceful uses assurance of our original agreement." (24) 
The Dhruva reactor is a larger, 100 MWt reactor that began operation in 1985. It is the otherreactor that most observers assume is dedicated to India's nuclear weapons program. CIRUS andDhruva together can produce between 25 and 35 kg of plutonium per year, or enough for 3 to 4bombs. (25) The Kaminireactor is located at the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR) in Kalpakkam. Itbecome operational in 1996 and uses U-233 as fuel. 
Power Reactors. Table 1 shows India's 22 powerreactors (excluding the prototype fast breeder reactor, which is discussed below). Of the total 22,15 are currently operating, while 7 are under construction. Three more reactors are planned.
 Table 1. India's Power Reactors 
Sources: IAEA Power Reactor Information System, Dr. Frederick Mackie of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and the Congressional ResearchService.
Notes: Those in italic print are under IAEA safeguards (INFCIRC-66) now or are scheduled to be under safeguards, irrespective of the separation plan. Those reactors in bolded print are the reactors scheduled additionally to be placed under safeguards under the separation plan. The difference betweengross capacity and net capacity is the electricity needed to run the reactor. "Connected to Grid" means when the reactor is connected to the electricitygrid (versus commercial operation).
Abbreviations: PHWR stands for Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor (CANDU-style); BWR stands for Boiling Water Reactor (use low-enriched uraniumfuel).
Of the 15 operating power reactors, four are under safeguards -- the twoU.S.-supplied reactors at Tarapur and the two Canadian-supplied reactors atRajasthan. Two pressurized water reactors under construction by the Russians atKudankulam will be under IAEA safeguards also. There are 11 remaining reactorsoperating not under safeguards and five PHWRs under construction. In addition tothe reactors under construction, there are five more planned: two at Kaiga (Kaiga 5and 6); two at Rajasthan (RAPS 7 and 8); and the Advanced Heavy Water Reactorat Trombay.
The 15 operating power reactors have a net capacity of 3602 MWe. Nuclearenergy now accounts for about 3% of India's electricity consumption, and India plansto increase the electrical generation capacity from the nuclear sector dramaticallyover the next few years. Estimates vary from an increase of 8000 MWe additionallyby 2015, (26) to a total of 20GWe by 2020. (27) However,India's indigenous pressurized heavy water reactors will likely account for less thanhalf of the total increase.
Breeder Reactors. The breederreactor program is integral to the second stage of India's three-stage nucleardevelopment plan. "Breeder" reactors have the potential to make more fissilematerial than they burn up, hence the term "breeder." Stage two envisionsplutonium-fueled breeder reactors blanketed with thorium to produce uranium-233. India has run a 40 MWth (13 MWe) Fast Breeder Test Reactor since 1985 at theIndira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR) and has successfullyreprocessed a small amount of the unique fuel irradiated in that reactor. Constructionof the 500 MWe prototype breeder reactor has begun, but the initial operatingcapability is not expected until 2010.
Uranium Enrichment. India begana uranium enrichment program in the 1980s. A gas centrifuge uranium enrichmentfacility at Mysore (called Rattenhalli) reportedly enriches uranium for naval fuel. There is also a pilot-scale gas centrifuge plant at Trombay for research anddevelopment, some laser enrichment-related activities also located at Trombay, anda laser enrichment facility at the Center for Advanced Technology in Indore forresearch. 
Spent Fuel Reprocessing. Plutonium in India is produced for both civilian and military needs. The TrombayPlutonium Plant separates plutonium primarily for weapons purposes, whereasplutonium separation for civilian uses is performed at the Power Reactor FuelReprocessing Plant (PREFRE) at Tarapur and at Kalpakkam Reprocessing Plant(KARP). The Fast Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant and the Lead Minicell facility,both at Kalpakkam, also perform plutonium separation.
Heavy Water Production. Indiahas six heavy water production plants in operation, all of which were developedindigenously. Such plants are not required to be safeguarded under comprehensivesafeguards agreements, because they do not contain source or special nuclearmaterial, but would be required to be reported under an Additional Protocol. Itremains to be seen whether India would report any of these under an AdditionalProtocol or perhaps just a portion of those that are not required for the militaryproduction of plutonium. The extent to which India requires more unsafeguardedplutonium for weapons or as fuel for unsafeguarded breeder reactors woulddetermine how many heavy water plants would remain unreported.
Uranium Recovery and Conversion. India has three uranium mines, two copper-mine tailing extraction units, one mill, manyuranium conversion facilities, and three fuel fabrication plants. Under a comprehensivesafeguards agreement, the starting point of safeguards is when "any nuclear material ofa composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for being isotopically enrichedleaves the plant or the process stage in which it has been produced." (28) In other words,the material would be inspected at the end of the uranium conversion process and at thestart of the fuel fabrication process. Under an Additional Protocol, a state is required toreport on all nuclear fuel cycle activities, including uranium ore, mining, milling, andconversion. It is not clear how or if India will declare some or all of those front end fuelcycle activities.
section_title: Factors Influencing the Separation Plan
subsections: section_title: U.S. Guidelines: Credible, Defensible, and Transparent
paragraphs: On November 2, 2005, Under Secretary of State Joseph told members of theSenate Foreign Relations Committee that India's separation of facilities must becredible, transparent, meaningful, and defensible from a nonproliferation standpoint. Further, Under Secretary Joseph told Members that a separation plan and resultantsafeguards must contribute to U.S. nonproliferation goals, but did not elaboratewhich particular goals those might be. He noted that the more civil facilities Indiaplaces under safeguards, the more confident the United States can be that anycooperative arrangements will not further India's military purposes. Specifically,Under Secretary Joseph said that safeguards would have to be applied in perpetuity,and that voluntary safeguards arrangements would not be defensible from anonproliferation standpoint. The Administration also asserted that "The safeguardsmust effectively cover India's civil nuclear fuel cycle and provide strong assurancesto supplier states and the IAEA that material and technology provided or createdthrough civil cooperation will not be diverted to the military sphere." (29) 
One interpretation of those phrases suggests that a credible plan would (1) beperceived to strengthen the nonproliferation regime; (2) be a complete and defensibledeclaration of its civil nuclear facilities and programs; and (3) mitigate perceptionsof nuclear weapons status for India. (30) Such a plan would be guided by the assumptionthat power reactors, regardless of their potential to produce plutonium for weapons,have a civilian use and should be declared as civilian and safeguarded, as well astheir associated fuel fabrication and reprocessing and spent fuel storage facilities.
India's breeder reactors would be safeguarded in this approach because thetest reactor has been connected to the electricity grid since 1997, and the prototypefast breeder reactor will have a rating of 500 MWe and thus is meant to be connectedto the electrical grid as a source of energy. (31) Since otheradvanced nuclear states with fast breeder reactors have placed them under safeguards(Japan and France), placing Indian breeder reactors under safeguards would mitigateperceptions of a double standard for India. Given their ability to produceweapons-grade plutonium, fast breeder reactors have been a proliferation concernfor many years. Moreover, safeguarding breeder reactors would limit the amount ofweapons-usable plutonium worldwide that is not safeguarded, which is clearly anobjective of U.S. nonproliferation policy. 
section_title: Indian Guidelines: Credible and Defensible from a Different View
paragraphs: It can be argued that India also approached creating a separation plan that iscredible and defensible from its perspective. Although India had hoped for asafeguards arrangement like those of the nuclear weapon states, where facilities canbe put on and taken off a safeguards list at will, the United States has said that sucha voluntary safeguards arrangement would not be acceptable. Therefore, in thisscheme, placing a facility on the civilian list would eliminate it from any potentialuse for the weapons program. While Indian officials have said that the July 18thagreement is not about their weapons program, their decisions about the separationplan were fundamentally guided by their future needs in the weapons program. Prime Minister Singh told the Indian Parliament on February 26, 2006 that indeciding on the scope of the separation plan, India took into account its
current and future strategic needs andprogramme after careful deliberation of all relevant factors, consistent with ourNuclear Doctrine...[which envisions] a credible minimum nuclear deterrent to inflictunacceptable damage on an adversary indulging in a nuclear first-strike. (32)
From this perspective, a key factor for India is whether there is enough fissilematerial to meet the requirements of its minimal credible deterrent. If not, India mustconsider whether to "hedge" its future requirements by keeping some existingfacilities out of safeguards so that they can produce plutonium or highly enricheduranium for weapons in the future, or to build new production facilities in the future. The July 18 agreement does not restrict India from doing so, at least until a fissilematerial production cutoff treaty is in force, but there are obvious costs to such anapproach.
Some Indian observers argued to keep a handful (1-2 or preferably 2-4)indigenous pressurized heavy water reactors (PHWRs) out of safeguards for futurefissile material production for weapons. (33) Others argued that a phased approach for placingPHWRs under safeguards would be sufficient to give India time to determine if itcould meet its minimal credible deterrent. (34) In a controversial interview, AEC Chairman AnilKakodkar suggested that some of the PHWRs could not be under safeguards becausethe breeder program, which he recommended not come under safeguards, wouldrequire unsafeguarded plutonium for fuel. (35) 
Other commentators in India took a different perspective on this point. In aDecember 13, 2005, discussion at the India International Center, former DefenseResearch and Development Organization (DRDO) scientist and Institute of DefenseStudies and Analysis (IDSA) Director K. Santhanam suggested that India couldcontinue to meet all of its weapons plutonium needs from the CIRUS and Dhruvareactors and that plutonium from power reactors was unsuited for weapons. In aDecember 12, 2005 article in The Times of India , K. Subrahmanyam suggested that"Given India's uranium ore crunch and the need to build up our minimum crediblenuclear deterrent arsenal as fast as possible, it is to India's advantage to categorize asmany power reactors as possible as civilian ones to be refuelled by imported uraniumand conserve our native uranium fuel for weapon-grade plutonium production." (36) 
India's need to exclude its breeder reactor program from safeguards appearsto be based several factors. Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Dr.Kakodkar argued that the breeder program could not be put on the civilian list "fromthe point of maintaining long-term energy security and for maintaining the 'minimumcredible deterrent.'" (37) India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told theIndian Parliament on February 26, 2006, that 
We will ensure that no impediments areput in the way of our research and development activities. We have made it clear thatwe cannot accept safeguards on our indigenous fast breeder programme. Ourscientists are confident that this technology will mature and that the programme willstabilize and become more robust through the creation of additional capability. Thiswill create greater opportunities. (38)
In general, Indian officials seemed guided by a strong predilection to continuewhat has been their past approach to safeguards -- to place under safeguards onlythose facilities that have a foreign component (e.g., fuel or technology). AECChairman Kakodkar noted in August 2005 that "Anything coming from...externalcooperation...will be put under facilities-specific safeguards," and that no researchand development will be put under safeguards, including the prototype fast breederreactor and facilities at the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR). (39) 
Another consideration influencing Indian views are the potential financial andeconomic costs of separation. In some cases, facilities serve both civilian andmilitary purposes. A. Gopalakrishnan, former chairman of the Atomic EnergyRegulatory Board, suggested that certain critical plants at the Nuclear Fuels Complexat Hyderabad were not duplicated and should be kept out of safeguards until theycould be replicated. (40) 
Finally, assumptions about India's prestige and independence may also haveplayed a role. Some Indian officials have rejected the notion of placing any researchand development facilities under safeguards because they equate such safeguardswith attempts to constrain India's independence. AEC Chairman Kakodkar told the Indian Express in February 2006 that:
There is a more fundamental question. If I am treated as an advanced country, where is the compulsion for me to do it? Iwill do R&D in an autonomous manner, finished. (41)
section_title: The Separation Plan
paragraphs: On March 2, 2006, during President Bush's visit to India, U.S. and Indianofficials agreed upon a final separation plan. According to India's official report,India was guided by the following principles:
Credible, feasible, and implementable in a transparentmanner;
Consistent with the understandings of the 18 JulyStatement;
Consistent with India's national security and R&D requirementsas well as not prejudicial to the three-stage nuclear programme inIndia;
Must be cost effective in its implementation;and
Must be acceptable to Parliament and public opinion. (42)
Regarding the application of safeguards, India identified its "overarching criterion"as whether "subjecting a facility to IAEA safeguards would impact adversely onIndia's national security." Moreover, facilities were excluded from the civilian listif they were located in a larger hub of strategic significance (e.g., BARC), even ifthey were not normally engaged in activities of strategic significance. (43) This lastcriterion appears to suggest that the plan did not really seek to separate facilities.
The key elements of India's separation plan are (44) 
eight indigenous Indian power reactors (RAPS 3, 4, 5, 6; KAPS1, 2; NAPS 1, 2) in addition to 6 already under safeguards;
future power reactors may also be placed under safeguards, ifIndia declares them as civilian;
some facilities in the Nuclear Fuel Complex (e.g., fuelfabrication) will be specified as civilian in 2008; and
nine research facilities and three heavy water plants would bedeclared as civilian, but are "safeguards-irrelevant."
The following facilities and activities were not on the separation list:
eight indigenous Indian power reactors (Kaiga 1, 2, 3, 4; MAPS1, 2; TAPS 3, 4);
Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FTBR) and Prototype Fast BreederReactors (PFBR) under construction;
enrichment facilities;
spent fuel reprocessing facilities (except for the existingsafeguards on the Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing (PREFRE)plant);
research reactors: CIRUS (which will be shut down in 2010),Dhruva, Advanced Heavy Water Reactor;
three heavy water plants; and
various military-related plants (e.g., a prototype navalreactor).
The eight additional reactors would be put under safeguards between 2007and 2014. 
The implementation document presented to Parliament stated that "India isnot in a position to accept safeguards on the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR)and the Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FTBR), both located at Kalpakkam. The FastBreeder Programme is at the R&D stage and its technology will take time to matureand reach an advanced stage of development." As for future reactors, the documentstated that "India has decided to place under safeguards all future civilian thermalpower reactors and civilian breeder reactors, and the Government of India retains thesole right to determine such reactors as civilian." (45) In responseto a question about whether it was possible for there to be non-civilian breederreactors that India would build in the future, Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burnsstated that "India could build reactors that would service their nuclear weaponsindustry...but the great majority of the growth we think will come on the civilianside." (46) 
As for research reactors, CIRUS would be shut down in 2010 and notsubjected to safeguards. The fuel core of the Apsara reactor would be taken out ofBARC and made available to be safeguarded. Some facilities in the Nuclear FuelComplex would be specified as civilian in 2008, and the Tarapur and Rajasthan spentfuel storage pools would be made available for safeguards (Tarapur 1-2 andRajasthan 1-2 reactors themselves are already safeguarded.) In addition, India woulddeclare 3 heavy water plants (Thal, Tuticorin and Hazira) as civilian, but these wouldnot be subject to safeguards; 9 research facilities would be declared as civilian also,but these would be considered "safeguards-irrelevant." 
India's enrichment facility would not be covered, and India's offering up theTarapur Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant (PREFRE) for "campaign" modesafeguards after 2010 is a continuation of its current policy. The Dhruva researchreactor is excluded.
Under Secretary of State Burns stated that India "would enter into permanentsafeguard arrangements with the International Atomic Energy Agency." However,the Indian statement that an Indian-specific safeguards agreement would "guardagainst withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear material from civilian use at any time aswell as providing for corrective measures that India may take to ensure uninterruptedoperation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuelsupplies"raises questions about exactly what kind of safeguards arrangement isenvisioned. Burns noted that the arrangement "achieved a degree of transparency andoversight and impact on the Indian nuclear program that was not possible for threedecades." (47) 
Figure 2 shows a rough depiction of how the final separation applies toIndia's civilian and military nuclear facilities. 
Figure 2. India's Separation Plan
Sources: Dr. Frederick Mackie, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and the Congressional Research Service.
subsections: section_title: Assessing The Separation Plan
paragraphs: Congressional views on the separation plan, particularly whether it is credibleand defensible from a nonproliferation standpoint, may have an impact on Congress'sconsideration of the overall peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement. 
Quantity vs. Quality. UnderSecretary of State Nicholas Burns told reporters on March 2, 2006, that "It's not aperfect deal in the sense that we haven't captured 100 percent of India's nuclearprogram. That's because India is a nuclear weapons power, and India will preservepart of its nuclear industry to service its nuclear weapons program." (48) Althoughfew observers would have expected to get 100% of India's nuclear program undersafeguards, one question that arises is whether the 65% mark meets theAdministration's own standard that "The safeguards must effectively cover India'scivil nuclear fuel cycle." (49) 
The Administration has defended the separation plan most recently ascredible and defensible in this way:
For [the separation plan] to be credibleand defensible from a nonproliferation standpoint, it had to capture more than justa token number of Indian nuclear facilities, which it did by encompassing nearlytwo-thirds of India's current and planned thermal power reactors as well as all futurecivil thermal and breeder reactors. Importantly, for the safeguards to be meaningful,India had to commit to apply IAEA safeguards in perpetuity; it did so. Once a reactoris under IAEA safeguards, those safeguards will remain there permanently and on anunconditional basis. Further, in our view, the plan also needed to include upstreamand downstream facilities associated with the safeguarded reactors to provide a trueseparation of civil and military programs. (50)
It should be noted that although declaring 65% of India's reactors as civilianwill result in placing almost two-thirds of the current reactors under safeguards,power reactors constitute just one part of the nuclear fuel cycle. Reprocessingcapabilities are key to India's three-stage nuclear fuel cycle development plan, andthe separation plan provides nothing beyond the intermittent safeguards applied at thePower Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant (PREFRE) already.
Some observers could argue that a strictly quantitative approach does notaddress the question of whether the plan is defensible from a nonproliferationstandpoint. Here too, the kinds of facilities included could be key. For example, interms of preventing terrorist access to fissile material, safeguarding facilities likereprocessing and enrichment plants and breeder reactors would provide a greaternonproliferation benefit because the materials produced by these plants are a fewsteps closer to potential use in a bomb. In addition, safeguards on enrichment,reprocessing plants, and breeder reactors would support the 2002 U.S. NationalStrategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, in which the United Statespledged to "continue to discourage the worldwide accumulation of separatedplutonium and to minimize the use of highly-enriched uranium." (51) 
Breeder Reactors. As notedearlier, breeder reactors, which are key to India's intended second stage of fuel cycledevelopment, have been generally regarded as a proliferation concern because of theirproduction of weapons-grade plutonium. (52) India plans to build at least five commercial-scalebreeder reactors and would have the option of dedicating any one or more of thoseto its military program. Public statements by Indian officials suggest that they haveconsidered the breeder reactor's usefulness in producing plutonium for the strategicarsenal, and some domestic critics have suggested that India should clarify thepurpose of the breeder program once and for all. A key obstacle may be the amountof unsafeguarded plutonium available as initial fuel, raising the question of howfuture civilian breeder reactors would be fueled. Would plutonium from the 10additional reactors India will be placing under safeguards be used to fuel the reactors,or would India purchase safeguarded plutonium from other states? If the latter case,would this conflict with the Administration's policy of discouraging the worldwideaccumulation of separated plutonium? 
Other Facilities. Prime MinisterSingh told the Indian Parliament on February 26 that "We will offer to place undersafeguards only those facilities that can be identified as civilian without damagingour deterrence potential or restricting our R&D effort." (53) AlthoughCIRUS, Dhruva, the Fast Breeder Test Reactor, and the planned Advanced HeavyWater Reactor have been described by Indian facilities as being research facilities,they are not included. The 9 research facilities that will be declared as civilian areconsidered safeguards-irrelevant, probably because they will have little if any nuclearmaterial in them to be safeguarded. 
The absence of research facilities could call into question how far India'sseparation plan has ventured into the mainstream of nonproliferation. IAEAsafeguards for non-nuclear weapon states include all facilities where nuclear materialis present, including research and development facilities. The case of precedents inother nuclear weapon states is not applicable, since the IAEA tends not to inspectvery many of the sites or facilities on the voluntary safeguards eligible lists.Likewise, the absence of reprocessing and enrichment facilities on the separation planalso could be interpreted by some as falling short of the objective of bringing Indiainto the mainstream of nonproliferation. In particular, the Bush Administration hasidentified enrichment and reprocessing technologies as sensitive parts of the nuclearfuel cycle that should be limited and has proposed specific arrangements for assuredsupplies of nuclear fuel that would obviate the need for states to conduct their ownenrichment and reprocessing. (54) 
India's one operating facility at Rattenhalli is reportedly used to enrichuranium for the prototype naval fuel reactor. Naval fuel occupies a curious place inIAEA safeguards. Full-scope safeguards agreements, the kind that non-nuclearweapon states have, include a provision for the non-application of safeguards tonuclear material to be used in non-peaceful activities -- and naval fuel would be onesuch non-peaceful activity. However, no non-nuclear weapon state has everimplemented this provision for the non-application of safeguards. Under Paragraph14 of the INFCIRC/153, a state is required to inform the IAEA that 
the use of the nuclear material in anon-proscribed military activity will not be in conflict with an undertaking the Statemay have given and in respect of which Agency safeguards apply, that the nuclearmaterial will be used only in a peaceful nuclear activity; and that during the periodof non-application of safeguards the nuclear material will not be used for theproduction of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosivedevices.
Brazil has placed its enrichment facilities under safeguards, despite havinga naval fuel program, which also raises the question of how far India's separation planconforms to the standards of the nonproliferation mainstream. The five nuclearweapon states have not encountered this problem thus far, since they have not placedany naval-related facilities on their safeguards-eligible lists. It is not clear whichprecedent would be less desirable -- placing India's naval fuel facilities undersafeguards and then going through steps for the nonapplication of safeguards, orsimply not safeguarding them at all on the grounds that they are of direct nationalsecurity significance. 
section_title: Issues for Congress
paragraphs: U.S. officials acknowledge the importance of a credible Indian separationplan for ensuring that the United States complies with its Article I obligations underthe Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) -- to not in any way assist a nuclearweapons program in a non-nuclear weapon state. For almost thirty years, the U.S.legal standard has been that only nuclear safeguards on all nuclear activities in a stateprovides adequate assurances. The Administration has sought, and Congress hasprovided, backing for a lower level of assurance by proposing that the separation plantake the place of comprehensive safeguards.
From a broad perspective, Congress may consider whether opening upinternational cooperation to India after all these years has a net positive effect onIndia's nuclear weapons program. Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns toldreporters on March 2, 2006, that the agreement will not have an impact on India'sstrategic program. (55) However, some observers believe that unlessIndia stops production of fissile material for weapons purposes, nuclear safeguardswill do little to ensure that assistance is not diverted. 
From a narrower perspective, the text of a peaceful nuclear cooperationagreement is necessary for Congress to assess whether or not the United States cancomply with its NPT obligations not to assist India's nuclear weapons program. P.L.109-401 , which gives the President authority to waive certain requirements of theAtomic Energy Act, still requires the Administration to send Congress not only thetext of a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement, but also a Nuclear ProliferationAssessment Statement (NPAS), which must address the extent to which U.S. treatycommitments are met. 
Under P.L. 109-401 , the following sections require reports to Congressrelated to the separation plan:
Under the Submission to Congress provision of Section 104(Section 104. (c) (2) (A)), the Administration will be required to provide "a summaryof the plan provided by India to the United States and the IAEA to separate India'scivil and military nuclear facilities, materials, and programs, and the declarationmade by India to the IAEA identifying India's civil facilities to be placed under IAEAsafeguards, including an analysis of the credibility of such plan and declaration,together with copies of the plan and declaration." 
Under the Reporting to Congress provision of Section 104(Section 104.(g)(1)) the Administration will be required to keep committees informedof
(A)(ii): material noncompliance with the separationplan;
(B): "construction of a nuclear facility in India after thedate of enactment of this title";
(C): "significant changes in the production by India ofnuclear weapons or in the types or amounts of fissile material produced";and
(D): "changes in the purpose or operational status of anyunsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activities in India."
Under the Implementation and Compliance Report provisionof Section 104 (Section 104.(g)(2)), the Administration is required to report, 180 daysafter entry into force of the Section 123 agreement and annuallythereafter:
(A): a description of any additional nuclear facilities andnuclear materials that the Government of India has placed or intends to place underIAEA safeguards;
(F): an analysis of whether U.S. civil nuclearcooperation with India is in any way assisting India's nuclear weaponsprogram;
(H): an estimate relating to India's production ofuranium, fissile material for nuclear explosives;
(I): an estimate of the amount of electricity produced byIndia's declared and undeclared reactors; and
(J): an analysis of whether imported uranium hasaffected the rate of production in India of nuclear explosivedevices.
In the President's signing statement on December 18, 2006, he noted that theexecutive branch would construe "provisions of the Act that mandate, regulate, orprohibit submission of information to the Congress, an international organization, orthe public, such as sections 104, 109, 261, 271, 272, 273, 274, and 275, in a mannerconsistent with the President's constitutional authority to protect and controlinformation that could impair foreign relations, national security, the deliberativeprocesses of the Executive, or the performance of the Executive's constitutionalduties." This could suggest that the executive branch might limit the scope ofreporting required by Congress in those sections. Limiting the scope of reportingcould have an adverse impact on Congress's ability to assess the nuclear cooperationagreement at three different times: when the agreement is submitted forcongressional approval; at random times when there are certain developments inIndia's nuclear fuel cycle; and on an annual basis when the Administration reports onimplementation and compliance.