Embassy Security: Background, Funding, and the Budget
Released: 2001-10-04T00:00:00

Summary:
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon led to the closing the following day of 50 of the nearly 260 U.S. embassiesand consulates worldwide. A week later, however, all U.S. facilities were open for business. Additionally, threeembassies - in Pakistan, Yemen, andTurkmenistan - allowed for voluntary evacuations immediately after the attack. In the months prior to the attack,travel warnings were issued and embassies wereput on high alert as Osama bin Laden had issued vague, but credible, threats against Americans and Americaninterests around the world.
Earlier this year, Secretary of State Colin Powell had testified before Congress that embassy security is among his highest priorities. He made the case that theU.S. government owes State Department personnel on the front lines of diplomacy the same high level of tools andsecurity given to our military on the front lines. The Administration requested a total of $1.3 billion for embassy security and worldwide security upgrades forFY2002. The House concurred; the Senate passed atotal of $1.07 billion.
Throughout the summer 2001, the United States received credible threats against American embassies and tourists overseas. The Department of State respondedby issuing a worldwide travel warning to American citizens and cancelling Independence Day celebrations atAmerican overseas facilities.
In June 2000 the U.S. Embassy in Amman, Jordan was put on full alert after receiving "credible evidence" that Osama bin Laden followers were planning toattack it. Additionally, the Department of State advised American travelers to be mindful of the August7th anniversary of the bombing of U.S. embassies inKenya and Tanzania. Then, in September 2000, terrorists attacked the U.S.S. Cole Navy destroyer.
The August 7, 1998 terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania resulted in a number of actions by the Administration and Congress. Withevidence that bin Laden was involved in the attacks, the Administration, on July 4, 1999, imposed sanctions on theTaliban government because it refused tocooperate in his arrest. In October 1999, the UN Security Council imposed limited sanctions on the Taliban, andin August 2000 both the United States andRussia agreed to work together to tighten the sanctions.
Embassy security budget ramifications of the 1998 bombings continue. In November 1999, Congress expanded authority for State's FY2000 through FY2004expenditures on overseas security within the Embassy Security, Construction and Maintenance (ESCM)account to $900 million annually, in addition to securityfunds in the Diplomatic and Consular Programs account (D&CP) for FY2000-FY2004 ( P.L.106-113 ).

subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: U.S. embassy security needs have evolved and expanded over recent decades. During the 1950s, U.S. embassieswere intentionally grand and highly visible toshowcase the American way of life and promote democracy. It was believed then that by placing embassies in thecenter of foreign cities, U.S. diplomats andservices would be more accessible and inviting to Americans, as well as local officials and residents. Throughoutthe 1960s, Vietnam-related demonstrations andattacks at embassies, mostly involving destruction of property, were on the rise; and in 1965 the United Stateswitnessed the dawning of a new level of violencewhen 3 embassy employees were killed in the U.S. embassy in Saigon. The 1970s were marked by frequent terroristattacks on embassies; the decade ended withthe hostage taking in Tehran in 1979. 
In response to the increasing frequency and seriousness of incidents, the State Department, with congressional support, initiated the Security EnhancementProgram (SEP) in August 1980. The object of SEP was to improve protection of mission personnel, U.S.government property, and classified information at postswhere the foreign government was unwilling or unable to provide effective protection. Experts were sent abroadto assess certain embassy security needs where ahigh, medium, or low threat of mob violence had been determined, and then recommend improvements. 
The issue of embassy security again gained focus and urgency after the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut, Lebanon in April 1983, the bombing of the Marinebarracks in Beirut in October 1983, and the bombing of the embassy annex in Beirut in September 1984. Theseincidents awakened the United States to thedestructive power of explosive-laden trucks and car bombs.
The bombings resulted in the passage of the 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism ( P.L. 98-533 ), which authorized reward payments for informationleading to the arrest of individuals involved in terrorist acts against Americans or American property and $356.3million for enhanced embassy security. 
Also in the wake of the three Beirut bombings, Secretary of State George P. Shultz formed a commission-the Advisory Panel on Overseas Security-headed byRetired Admiral Bobby Inman, which reported its recommendations (sometimes referred to as the Inman report)in June 1985. (1) The findings andrecommendations, as modified by subsequent reviews, continue to be the standards (often referred to as the Inmanstandards) for today's security measures. 
Some of the recommendations by the Inman Panel included (1) a reorganization of the offices in the Department of State that are primarily responsible for securityand counter-terrorism and consolidation of operational security offices into a new bureau for Diplomatic Security;(2) improvements in State's protectiveintelligence, threat analysis, and alerting procedures; (3) improvements in the Department's training of ForeignService personnel and dependents to deal moreeffectively with terrorist threats; (4) improvements in contingency planning at the posts; (5) assigning MarineSecurity Guard detachments to all highly sensitiveposts; (6) revising the Diplomatic Security Service physical security standards; (7) pursuing a substantial buildingprogram to correct security deficiencies; and (8)initiating a capital budgeting procedure to avoid security improvement delays due to budgetary reasons. The panelalso offered a number of classifiedrecommendations.
Contrary to widespread belief, the report specifically did not recommend a 100 foot setback for embassies and 9 foot walls-frequently cited as Inman standards. These criteria resulted from the magnitude of the Beirut bombs and the measures that would have protected thosefacilities at the time. The Inman panel set inmotion the focus on security from which the current standards evolved.
Following the Advisory Panel report, Congress took up the issue of international terrorism and security and passed the Omnibus Diplomatic Security andAntiterrorism Act of 1986 ( P.L. 99-399 ). This Act became the permanent authorization (often duplicated by thebiannual foreign relations authorization act) forembassy construction and security programs.
In 1985, the Advisory panel identified 126 facilities with inadequate security, 50 of them consulates. As of September 1, 1998, 49 facilities have been built orenhanced to meet new security standards. (As of September 2001, the Administration estimates that about 80% ofU.S. overseas facilities do not meet minimumsecurity requirements.) (2)
Immediately following the bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa in August 1998, there was disagreement between the Department of State and Capitol Hill overprimary responsibility for under funding embassy security over the years. Since then, Congress has sought evengreater funding levels that the ClintonAdministration for overseas security purposes. At the same time, State Department experts are somewhat conflictedbetween wanting to maintain embassyvisibility and accessibility overseas, while trying to increase setbacks and barriers which would prohibit terroristactions.
In February, 1999, Secretary of State Albright announced the selection of the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel (OPAP) chaired by Lewis Kaden. The panelreported its recommendations in November 1999 (3) ,including: 1) improving windows and barriers, warning systems, and emergency response training; 2) creatingan interagency committee to determine the right size and locations for U.S. overseas presence; and 3) establishingan Overseas Facilities Authority (OFA) tomanage the building, maintenance, and renovation of American overseas facilities.
In an August 3, 2000 press conference, Secretary Albright responded to a question regarding lack of success in capturing bin Laden: "We [will] never forget thevictims of those bombings...We will continue to do what we must in terms of sanctions and do what we cangenerally with our friends and allies to try to huntdown the terrorists. Their day will come, and there is no statute of limitations and we will pursue them asnecessary." (4)
Slightly more than a year later, after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon with more than 6,000 dead, the UnitedStates is now leading a worldwide effort to end terrorism once and for all.
section_title: Determining Embassy Security Needs
paragraphs: The bombings of the U.S. embassies in Africa in August 1998 reinforced the belief that it is impossible to attain100% security. Even though the embassies inNairobi and Dar es Salaam did not meet Inman standards, the size of the blasts underscored the vulnerabilities ofmajor buildings in densely populated areas. After the attacks, a number of Administration officials asserted that as bombs get bigger and more sophisticated,standards will need to be continually revised, butthere can be no guarantees for complete security overseas. 
Every U.S. overseas post goes through a threat assessment process authorized by the Diplomatic Security Act of 1986. The threat level associated with each postis an evaluation of threat levels for a particular time period and can be changed as events occur or when a newassessment is deemed necessary. The four threatlevel categories are: critical, high, medium, and low. Each post is given a threat level that helps the Department ofState's Diplomatic Security Service allocateresources for overseas security. Given that the assessed threat levels of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzaniawere medium to low, the State Department isreviewing its methodology for evaluating threat levels and the significance the Administration places on threatassessments in its allocation of security resources. According to Secretary of State Albright, "After the Africa bombings, we can no longer consider any post a lowthreat one." (5)
Currently, security resource needs of each post are a reflection of the potential for terrorist activity or unrest within a particular country, and other factors such asthe physical location of the facility (i.e., in a city, in a rural area, close to a busy street, set far back from any streets,etc.). Security determinations are made afterconsultation among State's Office of Diplomatic Security, Office of Foreign Buildings Operations, and the embassysecurity officer in the overseas facility. Responsibility for requesting resources for overseas post security ultimately rests with the Secretary of State, uponreceiving recommendations from the AssistantSecretary of Diplomatic Security and the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Foreign Buildings in the Bureau ofAdministration. 
section_title: Procedures for Dealing with Terrorist Threats
paragraphs: One problem for U.S. security personnel is deciding how to respond to threats against U.S. facilities andpersonnel. Currently, according to State Departmentofficials, 10 - 12 threats are aimed at U.S. overseas posts each day. That amounts to approximately 3,000 to 4,000threats handled each year by the Department ofState.
There is no one set procedure to handle all threats made against American overseas facilities and staff. The U.S. response might differ depending on the country,the type of facility (an embassy, consulate, or living quarters), and whether the threat comes from a walk-in or phonecall. Nevertheless, State Departmentofficials are quick to point out that all threats are taken seriously. 
Generally, procedures include a first level response in which the resident security officer and the regional officer of a facility confer with officials in Washingtonto discuss the credibility of the threat. Subsequent discussions determine whether the local post can handle thethreat alone or whether a greater response iswarranted. Normally, the regional security officer seeks information from the local police to assist in determiningthe credibility and the nature of the threat. U.S.intelligence also tries to verify the significance of the threat. Some of the actions that the Chief of Mission can takeinclude: closing surrounding streets (withlocal police concurrence), putting up concrete barriers, temporarily reducing staff size in the building, andevacuating all personnel from the area or country. StateDepartment officials in Washington with responsibility for security say that Administration officials would not takeany action against a perceived credible threatwithout first consulting with the Chief of Mission. (6)
section_title: History of Congressional Action on Embassy Security Funding
paragraphs: Congress provides the bulk of funds for overseas facility and personnel security in the Commerce, Justice, State(CJS)appropriations for State's Security andMaintenance of U.S. Missions (7) , Diplomatic Security, and regional bureau accounts. (See Table 1 and Table 2.) Smalleramounts are contained in the ForeignOperations appropriations (for U.S. Agency For International Development security funding, for example) andDepartment of Defense appropriations (for salariesand expenses and some housing funds for the Marine guards stationed at the embassies). 
In 1980 the State Department had estimated SEP funding needs for the next five years to be $191 million. Congress appropriated a total of $136.3 million fromFY1980 - FY1984 for the program. 
Following the 1983/84 Beirut attacks, President Reagan submitted a request for a new supplemental appropriation of $110.2 million only for FY1985. Thisreportedly was the difference between the State Department's own budget request and that agreed to by the Officeof Management and Budget (OMB) forsubmission to Congress in the FY1985 President's budget. The $110.2 million was part of a larger authorizationrequest-the 1984 Act to Combat InternationalTerrorism ( P.L. 98-533 ) that, among other things, included $356.3 million program for increased security for U.S.diplomatic missions overseas. Thesupplemental request was in addition to funds already set aside in 1984 for the SEP.
The Inman study, completed in June 1985, recommended $3.5 billion to meet security needs overseas. A subsequent landmark authorization measure, theOmnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986 ( P.L. 99-399 ) became the basic authorization forembassy construction and security programs thatare also authorized by the biannual foreign relations authorization act. Congress authorized $2.1 billion in that Actand, according to State Department officials,it has appropriated $1.2 billion for Inman-related embassy security measures. (At the same time, State Departmentofficials acknowledge that it is impossible toidentify what past funding is or is not linked to the Inman recommendations.) (8)
In contrast, as shown in Table 1 and Table 2 below, the Administration requested $5.8 billion for security within several different State Department accounts forsecurity from FY1987 (the first post Inman appropriation) to FY1998, while Congress appropriated $5.0 billion(excluding any rescissions of unused end-of-yearfunds) over the same time period. By themselves, these reductions (an average of $66.7 million annually) from theDepartment's total requests for security fundsdo not appear to support the implication by some critics that Congress has failed to support the Inman panel'srecommendations, especially since the cuts wereoften made for specific reasons related to construction delays or other practical considerations. Rather, it wouldappear that the State Department has not asked forfunds in the magnitude necessary to implement Inman recommendations, if more than the appropriated $5 billionwas necessary. Furthermore, in at least twoyears-FY1995 and FY1996-Congress rescinded a combined total of nearly $100 million of unobligated funds inState's Security and Maintenance of OverseasMissions account. This suggests that the Department was not spending all the appropriations that it didreceive, although some lack of spending may beattributable to such factors as delays in construction or in negotiating the purchase of property.
Neither the State Department nor congressional appropriators had highlighted embassy security upgrade programs in budgets during the early 1990s. According toState Department budget requests and appropriations conference reports between FY1985 and the embassybombings of August 1998, only two CJS conferencereports had mentioned new security requirements. The State Department budget request mentioned "new diplomaticsecurity funds" only for the FY1987 budgetrequest. Furthermore, neither the Administration's budget requests nor the appropriations reports over the last 12years connect security funding to the Inmanrecommendations.
In FY1996-FY1997, in addition to security funding in the Diplomatic Security account and in the Security and Maintenance of U.S. Missions account, and withouta request from the Administration for such security funds, Congress earmarked funds in the Diplomatic andConsular Programs account for security-$11.6million in FY1996 and $23.7 million for FY1997. Following Congress' lead, the Administration requested in itsFY1998 budget $23.7 million for security fundsin the Diplomatic and Consular Affairs Program account. 
On September 22, 1998, the President submitted to Congress a request for an FY1998 emergency supplemental appropriation amounting to $1.8 billion to addressimmediate expenses resulting from the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania and improve U.S. security andantiterrorism efforts worldwide. StateDepartment officials claimed that since the bills from the August 1998 bombings were paid with FY1998appropriations and since Department officials wanted toavoid being in violation of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, the funding neededto be in the form of an FY1998 emergencysupplemental (as opposed to adjusting FY1999 appropriations, which would exceed FY1999 spending caps). TheAdministration also pointed out that anyincreased hiring for improved worldwide embassy security as a result of an FY1998 supplemental would increasethe State Department out year budget needsbeginning in FY2000.
Of the amended $1.9 billion in the enacted emergency supplemental ( P.L. 105-277 ), $1.56 billion came within the foreign affairs 150 budget account for theDepartment of State. The levels Congress enacted in the omnibus appropriation emergency supplemental provisionsto the Department of State follow:
Congress provided $790.8 million for the Diplomatic and Consular Programs Account , $748 million for reestablishing embassy functions inKenya and Tanzania and for security improvements overseas, as requested. Beyond the P$25.7 million forantiterrorism activities, which can be released onlyafter the President declares an emergency.
Congress provided $677.5 million in the Security and Maintenance Account primarily for rebuilding or relocating the embassy facilities inKenya and Tanzania.
In the omnibus budget act, Congress provided $12 million for the Salaries and Expenses Account for security improvements and for asecurity review panel.
Congress agreed to the $12.9 million requested for the Emergencies in the Diplomatic and Consular Affairs Account for emergencyexpenditures related to the embassy bombings, including expenses for evacuations, rewards, and medical needs ofemployees.
Congress provided $1 million for State's Office of Inspector General , as requested, to enable the Inspector General to carry out additionalsecurity oversight and inspections.
In the omnibus appropriation for FY1999 ( H.R. 4328 / P.L. 105-277 ), (9) Congress provided regular appropriations of $403.6 million for the Securityand Maintenance account (10) and $25.7million (within the supplemental provisions) in the Diplomatic and Consular Programs account foroverseas security. Congress did not set appropriation levels for Diplomatic Security, as it is not a specific line item in thebudget. 
During the early consideration of the FY2000 State Department budget request, Congress criticized the Administration for requesting inadequate funds (a total of$303 million) for worldwide security upgrades. The Administration had testified that much of the emergencysupplemental funds was still in the pipeline to bespent on security needs. On November 19, 1999, after the Administration had resubmitted its request increasingsecurity funding, Congress approved the FY2000State Department appropriation ( H.R. 3421 ) (11) which included a total of $568 million specifically for overseas security. State's FY2000 Diplomaticand Consular Programs account included $254 million for worldwide security upgrades, and the Embassy Security,Construction and Maintenance (ESCM)account contained $313.6 million for worldwide security upgrades. Some additional funds were also available inother accounts for overseas security.
Congress also passed the Foreign Relations Authorization bill ( H.R. 3427 ), which authorizes $900 million for overseas security from FY2000through FY2004-a total of $4.5 billion. For comparison, the Crowe Accountability Review Board report (submittedin January 1999) recommended $1.4 billionbe spent annually over the next ten years. Congress increased security funding for State in FY2001 to a total of$1.07 billion-$661.2 million in Embassy,Security, Construction, and Maintenance , and $409.1 million in Diplomatic and ConsularPrograms. 
section_title: The FY2002 Budget Request for Embassy Security
paragraphs: The Bush Administration FY2002 State Department budget request emphasized three goals: improvinginformation technology, embassy security andconstruction, and additional hiring of Foreign and Civil Service, as well as security personnel. Each of thesepriorities would contribute to improved security atDepartment facilities around the world. The overall State Department budget request for FY2002 represents a 13%increase over the FY2001 enacted level. Forspecific embassy security accounts, the request consists of $487.7 million within the Diplomatic and ConsularPrograms account and $816 million within the Embassy, Security, Construction, and Maintenance account. The House agrees with the Administrationrequest, while the Senate passed $409.4 million withinthe Diplomatic and Consular Programs account and $661.6 million for the Embassy, Security,Construction, and Maintenance account .
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Congress passed the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act forRecovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, FY2001 ( P.L. 107-38 ). This law includes$390,000 for the Diplomatic and ConsularPrograms account , $7.5 million for the Capital Investment Fund (for emergency communicationstechnology, and $41 million for the Emergencies in theDiplomatic and Consular Service account , largely for evacuations and reward money to help apprehendterrorists.
section_title: Accountability Review Boards
paragraphs: Prompted by the August 1998 embassy bombings, Secretary of State Madeline K. Albright and CIA DirectorGeorge Tenet appointed an accountability reviewboard, required by law after such fatal terrorist attacks, headed by retired Admiral William J. Crowe, formerChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The report,submitted in early January 1999, cited Administration agencies and Congress as sharing the responsibility forembassies being inadequately prepared for terroristattacks. The report recommended that the U.S. government spend $1.4 billion a year over 10 years to improvesecurity at U.S. overseas facilities. Numerousspecific recommendations in the report came under three basic categories: 1) enhancement of work place security;2) improvement of crisis management systemsand procedures; and 3) improvement of intelligence and information sharing and assessment. (12) Additionally, the Secretary of State establishedthe OverseasPresence Advisory Panel on February 23, 1999 to make recommendations on the organization of U.S. overseasposts.
In February 1999, Secretary of State Albright announced the establishment of the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel (OPAP) chaired by private sector lawyer,Lewis B. Kaden. Within America's Overseas Presence in the 21st Century , OPAP reported in November 1999 its nine general recommendations (which includedseveral sub-recommendations):
Continue to implement the Accountability Review Boards' (ARB) recommendations of upgrading windows, barriers, training of personnel,and security officers. Also, reinforce lines of accountability and responsibility;
Establish by Executive order a new and permanent Interagency Overseas Presence Committee to determine the optimal size, mix ofexpertise, and location of America's facilities abroad to maximize foreign policy effectiveness and minimizepersonnel risk;
Create a new government-chartered corporation-an Overseas Facilities Authority (OFA)-to be responsible for building, renovating,maintaining, and managing the Federal government's civilian overseas offices and residences by combining the bestpractices of the private sector andgovernment;
Develop a comprehensive human resources strategy which would include improving the quality of life for overseas employees, expandlanguage, management, and leadership training, and improve recruiting and promotion processes;
Immediately upgrade State Department's information technology;
Reinforce and expand consular services and allow the Bureau of Consular Affairs to reinvest its revenue;
Review administrative services overseas-regionalize and upgrade some functions and assign a bigger role to foreignnationals;
Enhance and refocus the role of the Ambassador; require mission statements and budgets, and encourage cross-agency/interdisciplinaryteams;
The President should establish an implementation mechanism by Executive order and appoint a "Coordinator for Overseas PresenceReform." Form a partnership between the Administration and Congressional leaders to reshape U.S. overseaspresence.
Some of these issues were discussed in foreign relations authorization legislation ( H.R. 1646 / S. 1401 ) that Congress is considering.
 Table 1. State Department Security Appropriations and Requests, FY1992-2002 (in millions of dollars;numbers in parentheses are Administration requests)
Source: United States Department of State, Congressional Presentations, FY1986-FY1999 andappropriations reports.
1. Includes regular appropriations and an emergency supplemental ( P.L. 105-277 ) which were passed October 21, 1999. Administration Request. n.a.= notavailable.
2. Estimate.
3. $30 million in unobligated balances in the Security and Maintenance account available in FY1995 wererescinded pursuant to the FY1995 Supplemental andRescissions Act ( P.L. 104-19 ).
4. $65.2 million in unobligated balances in the Security and Maintenance account available in FY1996 wererescinded pursuant to the Commerce, Justice, StateAppropriations for FY1996 ( P.L. 104-134 ).
5. Construction Security Account, primarily security against infiltration at construction sites, was transferredto Acquisition and Maintenance of U.S. MissionsAccount in FY1991.
6. Does not include Border Security accounts funded by fees from Machine Readable Visas for diplomaticsecurity personnel, terrorism and crime, and visa fraudinvestigations. Totals are: FY1996-$1.5 million, FY1997-$13.3 million, FY1998-$12.5 million, FY1999request-$14.9 million, FY2000-$17,365,FY2001-$18,523, and FY2002 request-$19,600. 
 Table 2. Summary of State Department Regional Bureau Security Funding, FY1992-2002 (in Millionsof Dollars ; numbers in parentheses are Administration requests)
Source: United States Department of State, Congressional Presentations, FY1990-FY1999 and appropriations reports.
1. Estimate. 
2. Administration Request. 
n.a. = not available