Extradition To and From the United States: Overview of the Law and Contemporary Treaties
Released: 2016-10-04T00:00:00

Summary:
"Extradition" is the formal surrender of a person by a State to another State for prosecution or punishment. Extradition to or from the United States is a creature of treaty. The United States has extradition treaties with over a hundred nations, although there are many countries with which it has no extradition treaty. International terrorism and drug trafficking have made extradition an increasingly important law enforcement tool. This is a brief overview of the adjustments made in recent treaties to accommodate American law enforcement interests, and then a nutshell overview of the federal law governing foreign requests to extradite a fugitive found in this country and a United States request for extradition of a fugitive found in a foreign country.
Extradition treaties are in the nature of a contract and generate the most controversy with respect to those matters for which extradition may not be had. In addition to an explicit list of crimes for which extradition may be granted, most modern extradition treaties also identify various classes of offenses for which extradition may or must be denied. Common among these are provisions excluding purely military and political offenses; capital offenses; crimes that are punishable under only the laws of one of the parties to the treaty; crimes committed outside the country seeking extradition; crimes where the fugitive is a national of the country of refuge; and crimes barred by double jeopardy or a statute of limitations.
Extradition is triggered by a request submitted through diplomatic channels. In this country, it proceeds through the Departments of Justice and State and may be presented to a federal magistrate to order a hearing to determine whether the request is in compliance with an applicable treaty, whether it provides sufficient evidence to satisfy probable cause to believe that the fugitive committed the identified treaty offense(s), and whether other treaty requirements have been met. If so, the magistrate certifies the case for extradition at the discretion of the Secretary of State. Except as provided by treaty, the magistrate does not inquire into the nature of foreign proceedings likely to follow extradition.
The laws of the country of refuge and the applicable extradition treaty govern extradition back to the United States of a fugitive located overseas. Requests travel through diplomatic channels, and the treaty issue most likely to arise after extradition to this country is whether the extraditee has been tried for crimes other than those for which he or she was extradited. The fact that extradition was ignored and a fugitive forcibly returned to the United States for trial constitutes no jurisdictional impediment to trial or punishment. Federal and foreign immigration laws sometimes serve as an alternative to extradition to and from the United States.
This report is available in an abbreviated version, CRS Report RS22702, An Abridged Sketch of Extradition To and From the United States, by [author name scrubbed], which appears without the citations to authority, footnotes, or appendices found here.

subsections: section_title: Introduction
paragraphs: "'Extradition' is the formal surrender of a person by a State to another State for prosecution or punishment." Extradition to or from the United States is a creature of treaty. The United States has extradition treaties with over a hundred of the nations of the world, although there are many with which the United States has no extradition treaty. International terrorism and drug trafficking have made extradition an increasingly important law enforcement tool.
Although extradition as we know it is of relatively recent origins, its roots can be traced to antiquity. Scholars have identified procedures akin to extradition scattered throughout history dating as far back as the time of Moses. By 1776, a notion had evolved to the effect that "every state was obliged to grant extradition freely and without qualification or restriction, or to punish a wrongdoer itself," and the absence of intricate extradition procedures has been attributed to the predominance of this simple principle of international law. 
Whether by practice's failure to follow principle or by the natural evolution of the principle, modern extradition treaties and practices began to emerge in this country and elsewhere by the middle 18 th and early 19 th centuries.
The first U.S. extradition treaty consisted of a single terse article in Jay's Treaty of 1794 with Great Britain. Its brevity notwithstanding, the article contained several of the basic features of contemporary extradition pacts:
It is further agreed, that his Majesty and the United States, on mutual requisitions, by them respectively, or by their respective ministers or officers authorized to make the same, will deliver up to justice all persons, who, being charged with murder or forgery, committed within the jurisdiction of the other, provided that this shall only be done on such evidence of criminality, as, according to the laws of the place, where the fugitive or person so charged shall be found, would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial, if the offence had there been committed. The expense of such apprehension and delivery shall be borne and defrayed, by those who make the requisition and receive the fugitive.
Since then, the United States has relied almost exclusively upon bilateral agreements as a basis for extradition. However, the United States has entered into several multilateral agreements that may also provide legal authority for extradition. Such agreements take two forms. One form is a multilateral agreement that exclusively concerns extradition. The United States is currently a party to two such agreements: the 1933 Montevideo Convention on Extradition, which apparently has never served as a basis for extradition, and the Extradition Agreement Between the United States and the European Union, which entered into force in February 2010. The provisions of the U.S.-EU extradition treaty are implemented via bilateral instruments concluded between the United States and each EU Member State. These instruments amend or replace any provisions contained in earlier treaties between the United States and individual EU Member States that conflict with the requirements of the multilateral agreement.
The United States is also a party to several multilateral agreements that generally aim to deter and punish transnational criminal activity or serious human rights abuses, including by imposing an obligation upon signatories to prosecute or extradite persons who engage in specified conduct. Although these agreements are not themselves extradition treaties, they often contain provisions stating that specified acts shall be treated as extraditable offenses in any extradition treaty between parties.
section_title: Bars to Extradition
paragraphs: Extradition treaties are in the nature of a contract, and by operation of international law, 
[a] state party to an extradition treaty is obligated to comply with the request of another state party to that treaty to arrest and deliver a person duly shown to be sought by that state (a) for trial on a charge of having committed a crime covered by the treaty within the jurisdiction of the requesting state, or (b) for punishment after conviction of such a crime and flight from that state, provided that none of the grounds for refusal to extradite set forth in [the treaty] is applicable.
Subject to a contrary treaty provision, federal law defines the mechanism by which the United States honors its extradition treaty obligations. Although some countries will extradite in the absence of an applicable treaty as a matter of comity, it was long believed that the United States could only grant an extradition request if it could claim coverage under an existing extradition treaty. Dicta in several court cases indicated that this requirement, however, was one of congressional choice rather than constitutional requirement.
subsections: section_title: No Treaty
paragraphs: Congress appears to have acted upon the assumption that a treaty was not required for extradition in 1996, when it authorized the extradition of fugitive aliens at the behest of a nation with which the United States has no extradition treaty. That same year, Congress passed legislation to implement international agreements made between the United States and the International Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, which were entered into as executive agreements rather than treaties. Pursuant to these agreements, the United States pledged to surrender to the requesting tribunal any person found within its territory who had been charged with or found guilty by the tribunal of an offense.
The constitutional vitality of these efforts was put to the test shortly thereafter when the United States attempted to surrender a resident alien to the International Tribunal for Rwanda. Initially, a federal magistrate judge for the Southern District of Texas ruled that constitutional separation of powers requirements precluded extradition in the absence of a treaty. The government subsequently filed another request for surrender with the district court, and the presiding judge certified the request, holding that an extradition could be effectuated pursuant to either a treaty or an authorizing statute. In a 2-1 panel decision, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld this ruling, concluding that "although some authorization by law is necessary for the Executive to extradite, neither the Constitution's text nor … [relevant jurisprudence] require that the authorization come in the form of a treaty." The Supreme Court subsequently declined a petition for writ of certiorari to review the appellate court's ruling.
A question has occasionally arisen over whether an extradition treaty with a colonial power continues to apply to a former colony that has become independent, or whether an extradition treaty with a prior State remains in effect with its successor. Although the United States periodically renegotiates replacements or supplements for existing treaties to make contemporary adjustments, the United States has a number of treaties that pre-date the dissolution of a colonial bond or some other adjustment in governmental status. Fugitives in these situations have sometimes contested extradition on the grounds that the United States has no valid extradition treaty with the successor government that asks that they be handed over for prosecution. These efforts are generally unsuccessful since successor governments have ordinarily assumed the extradition treaty obligations negotiated by their predecessors.
section_title: No Treaty Crime
paragraphs: Extradition is generally limited to crimes identified in the treaty. Early treaties often recite a list of the specific extraditable crimes. Jay's Treaty mentions only murder and forgery; the inventory in the 1852 treaty with Prussia included eight others; and the 1974 treaty between the United States and Denmark identified several dozen extradition offenses:
1. Murder; voluntary manslaughter; assault with intent to commit murder. 2. Aggravated injury or assault; injuring with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. 3. Unlawful throwing or application of any corrosive or injurious substances upon the person of another. 4. Rape; indecent assault; sodomy accompanied by use of force or threat; sexual intercourse and other unlawful sexual relations with or upon children under the age specified by the laws of both the requesting and the requested States. 5. Unlawful abortion. 6. Procuration; inciting or assisting a person under 21 years of age or at the time ignorant of the purpose in order that such person shall carry on sexual immorality as a profession abroad or shall be used for such immoral purpose; promoting of sexual immorality by acting as an intermediary repeatedly or for the purpose of gain; profiting from the activities of any person carrying on sexual immorality as a profession. 7. Kidnapping; child stealing; abduction; false imprisonment. 8. Robbery; assault with intent to rob. 9. Burglary. 10. Larceny. 11. Embezzlement. 12. Obtaining property, money or valuable securities: by false pretenses or by threat or force, by defrauding any governmental body, the public or any person by deceit, falsehood, use of the mails or other means of communication in connection with schemes intended to deceive or defraud, or by any other fraudulent means. 13. Bribery, including soliciting, offering and accepting. 14. Extortion. 15. Receiving or transporting any money, valuable securities or other property knowing the same to have been unlawfully obtained. 16. Fraud by a bailee, banker, agent, factor, trustee, executor, administrator or by a director or officer of any company. 17. An offense against the laws relating to counterfeiting or forgery. 18. False statements made before a court or to a government agency or official, including under United States law perjury and subornation of perjury. 19. Arson. 20. An offense against any law relating to the protection of the life or health of persons from: a shortage of drinking water; poisoned, contaminated, unsafe or unwholesome drinking water, substance or products. 21. Any act done with intent to endanger the safety of any person traveling upon a railway, or in any aircraft or vessel or bus or other means of transportation, or any act which impairs the safe operation of such means of transportation. 22. Piracy; mutiny or revolt on board an aircraft against the authority of the commander of such aircraft; any seizure or exercise of control, by force or violence or threat of force or violence, of an aircraft. 23. An offense against the laws relating to damage to property. 24. a. Offenses against the laws relating to importation, exportation or transit of goods, articles, or merchandise. b. Offenses relating to willful evasion of taxes and duties. c. Offenses against the laws relating to international transfers of funds. 25. An offense relating to the: a. spreading of false intelligence likely to affect the price of commodities, valuable securities or any other similar interests; or b. making of incorrect or misleading statements concerning the economic conditions of such commercial undertakings as joint-stock companies, corporations, co-operative societies or similar undertakings through channels of public communications, in reports, in statements of accounts or in declarations to the general meeting or any proper official of a company, in notifications to, or registration with, any commission, agency or officer having supervisory or regulatory authority over corporations, joint-stock companies, other forms of commercial undertakings or in any invitation to the establishment of those commercial undertakings or to the subscription of shares. 28. Unlawful abuse of official authority which results in grievous bodily injury or deprivation of the life, liberty or property of any person, [or] attempts to commit, conspiracy to commit, or participation in, any of the offenses mentioned in this Article, Art. 3, 25 U.S.T. 1293 (1974).
While many existing U.S. extradition treaties continue to list specific extraditable offenses, the more recent ones feature a dual criminality approach, and simply make all felonies extraditable (subject to other limitations found elsewhere in their various provisions).
section_title: Military and Political Offenses
paragraphs: In addition to an explicit list of crimes for which extradition may be granted, most modern extradition treaties also identify various classes of offenses for which extradition may or must be denied. Common among these are provisions excluding purely military and political offenses. The military crimes exception usually refers to those offenses like desertion which have no equivalents in civilian criminal law. The exception is of relatively recent vintage. In the case of treaties that list specific extraditable offenses, the exception is unnecessary since purely military offenses are not listed. The exception became advisable, however, with the advent of treaties that make extraditable any misconduct punishable under the laws of both treaty partners. With the possible exception of selective service cases arising during the Vietnam War period, recourse to the military offense exception appears to have been infrequent and untroubled. 
The political offense exception, however, has proven more troublesome. The exception is and has been a common feature of extradition treaties for almost a century and a half. In its traditional form, the exception is expressed in deceptively simple terms. Yet it has been construed in a variety of ways, more easily described in hindsight than to predict beforehand. As a general rule, American courts require that a fugitive seeking to avoid extradition "demonstrat[e] that the alleged crimes were committed in the course of and incidental to a violent political disturbance such as a war, revolution or rebellion."
Contemporary extradition treaties often seek to avoid misunderstandings over the political offense exception in a number of ways. Some expressly exclude terrorist offenses or other violent crimes from the definition of political crimes for purposes of the treaty; some explicitly extend the political exception to those whose prosecution is politically or discriminatorily motivated; and some limit the reach of their political exception clauses to conform to their obligations under multinational agreements. Separately, several multinational agreements contain provisions that effectively incorporate enumerated offenses into any preexisting extradition treaty between parties. A few of these multilateral agreements also specify that enumerated activities shall not be considered political offenses for purposes of extradition.
section_title: Capital Offenses
paragraphs: A number of nations have abolished or abandoned capital punishment as a sentencing alternative. Several of these have preserved the right to deny extradition in capital cases either absolutely or in absence of assurances that the fugitive will not be executed if surrendered. More than a few countries are reluctant to extradite in a capital case even though their extradition treaty with the United States has no such provision, based on opposition to capital punishment or to the methods and procedures associated with execution bolstered by sundry multinational agreements to which the United States is either not a signatory or has signed with pertinent reservations. Additionally, "though almost all extradition treaties are silent on this ground, some states may demand assurances that the fugitive will not be sentenced to life in prison, or even that the sentence imposed will not exceed a specified term of years."
section_title: Want of Dual Criminality
paragraphs: Dual criminality addresses the reluctance to extradite a fugitive for conduct that the host nation considers innocent. Dual criminality exists when the parties to an extradition treaty each recognize a particular form of misconduct as a punishable offense. Historically, extradition treaties have handled dual criminality in one of three ways: (1) they list extraditable offenses and do not otherwise speak to the issue; (2) they list extraditable offenses and contain a separate provision requiring dual criminality; or (3) they identify as extraditable offenses those offenses condemned by the laws of both nations. Today, "[u]nder most international agreements ... [a] person sought for prosecution or for enforcement of a sentence will not be extradited ... (c) if the offense with which he is charged or of which he has been convicted is not punishable as a serious crime in both the requesting and requested state.... "
Although there is a split of authority over whether dual criminality resides in all extradition treaties that do not deny its application, the point is largely academic since it is a common feature of all American extradition treaties. Subject to varying interpretations, the United States favors the view that treaties should be construed to honor an extradition request if possible. Thus, dual criminality does not "require that the name by which the crime is described in the two countries shall be same; nor that the scope of the liability shall be coextensive, or, in other respects, the same in the two countries. It is enough if the particular act charged is criminal in both jurisdictions." When a foreign country seeks to extradite a fugitive from the United States, dual criminality may be satisfied by reference to either federal or state law.
U.S. treaty partners do not always construe dual criminality requirements as broadly. In the past, some have been unable to find equivalents for attempt, conspiracy, and crimes with prominent federal jurisdictional elements (e.g., offenses under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations [RICO] and Continuing Criminal Enterprise [CCE] statutes). Many modern extradition treaties contain provisions addressing the problem of jurisdictional elements and/or making extraditable an attempt or conspiracy to commit an extraditable offense. Some include special provisions for tax and customs offenses as well.
section_title: Extraterritoriality
paragraphs: As a general rule, crimes are defined by the laws of the place where they are committed. There have always been exceptions to this general rule under which a nation was understood to have authority to outlaw and punish conduct occurring outside the confines of its own territory. In the past, U.S. extradition treaties applied to crimes "committed within the [territorial] jurisdiction" of the country seeking extradition. Largely as a consequence of terrorism and drug trafficking, however, the United States now claims more sweeping extraterritorial application for its criminal laws than recognized either in its more historic treaties or by many of today's governments. Success in eliminating extradition impediments by negotiating new treaty provisions has been mixed. More than a few call for extradition regardless of where the offense was committed. Yet perhaps an equal number of contemporary treaties permit or require denial of an extradition request that falls within an area where the countries hold conflicting views on extraterritorial jurisdiction.
section_title: Nationality
paragraphs: The right of a country to refuse to extradite one's own nationals is probably the greatest single obstacle to extradition. The United States has long objected to the impediment, and recent treaties indicate that its hold may not be as formidable as was once the case. U.S. extradition agreements generally contain three types of nationality provisions:
The first does not refer to nationals specifically, but agrees to the extradition of all persons. Judicial construction, as well as executive interpretation, of such clauses have consistently held that the word "persons" includes nationals, and therefore refusal to surrender a fugitive because he is a national cannot be justified.... The second and most common type of treaty provision provides that "neither of the contracting parties shall be bound to deliver up its own citizens or subjects.... " [Congress has enacted legislation to overcome judicial construction that precluded the United States from surrendering an American under such provisions. ]…. The third type of treaty provision states that "neither of the contracting parties shall be bound to deliver up its own citizens under the stipulations of this convention, but the executive authority of each shall have the power to deliver them up if, in its discretion, it be deemed proper do so." 
These three types of treaty provisions have been joined by a number of variants. A growing number go so far as to declare that "extradition shall not be refused based on the nationality of the person sought." Another form limits the nationality exemption to nonviolent crimes. A third bars nationality from serving as the basis to deny extradition when the fugitive is sought in connection with a listed offense. Another variant allows a conflicting obligation under a multinational agreement to wash away the exemption. Even where the exemption is preserved, contemporary treaties more regularly refer to the obligation to consider prosecution at home of those nationals whose extradition has been refused.
section_title: Double Jeopardy
paragraphs: Depending on the treaty, extradition may also be denied on the basis of a number of procedural considerations. Although the U.S. Constitution's prohibition against successive prosecutions for the same offense does not extend to prosecutions by different sovereigns, it is common for extradition treaties to contain clauses proscribing extradition when the transferee would face double punishment and/or double jeopardy (also known as non bis in idem ). The more historic clauses are likely to bar extradition for a second prosecution of the "same acts" or the "same event" rather than the more narrowly drawn "same offenses." The new model limits the exemption to fugitives who have been convicted or acquitted of the same offense and specifically denies the exemption where an initial prosecution has simply been abandoned. 
section_title: Lapse of Time
paragraphs: Lapse of time or statute of limitation clauses are also prevalent in extradition treaties:
Many [states] ... preclude extradition if prosecution for the offense charged, or enforcement of the penalty, has become barred by lapse of time under the applicable law. Under some treaties the applicable law is that of the requested state, in others that of the requesting state; under some treaties extradition is precluded if either state's statute of limitations has run. ... When a treaty provides for a time-bar only under the law of the requesting state, or only under the law of the requested state, United States courts have generally held that time-bar of the state not mentioned does not bar extradition. If the treaty contains no reference to the effect of a lapse of time neither state's statute of limitations will be applied.
Left unsaid is the fact that some treaties declare in no uncertain terms that the passage of time is no bar to extradition, and others rest the decision with the discretion of the requested state.
In cases governed by U.S. law and in instances of U.S. prosecution following extradition, applicable statutes of limitation and due process determine whether pre-indictment delays bar prosecution, and speedy trial provisions govern whether postindictment delays preclude prosecution.
section_title: Other Common Features
paragraphs: U.S. extradition treaties commonly contain a number of other features, including provisions concerning the allocation of extradition-related expenses between the parties; the appointment of legal representation for the requesting country in extradition hearings; the transfer of evidence along with the extradited person; and the transit of a fugitive through the territory of either of the parties to a third country.
subsections: section_title: Expenses and Representation
paragraphs: U.S. extradition treaties, particularly the more recent ones, often have other less obvious, infrequently mentioned features. Perhaps the most common of these deal with the expenses associated with the procedure and representation of the country requesting extradition before the courts of the country of refuge. The distribution of costs is ordinarily governed by a treaty stipulation, reflected in federal statutory provisions, under which the country seeking extradition accepts responsibility for any translation expenses and the costs of transportation after surrender, and the country of refuge assumes responsibility for all other costs. Although sometimes included in a separate article, contemporary treaties generally make the country of refuge responsible for legal representation of the country seeking extradition. 
section_title: Transfer of Evidence
paragraphs: Contemporary treaties regularly permit a country to surrender documents and other evidence along with an extradited fugitive. An interesting attribute of these clauses is that they permit transfer of the evidence even if the fugitive becomes unavailable for extradition. This may make some sense in the case of disappearance or flight, but seems a bit curious in the case of death.
section_title: Transit
paragraphs: A somewhat less common clause permits transportation of a fugitive through the territory of either of the parties to a third country without the necessity of following the treaty's formal extradition procedure. 
section_title: Constitutionality
paragraphs: The Constitution provides that the judicial power of the United States extends to certain cases and controversies. Historically, this has led to discomfort whenever an effort is made to insert the federal courts in the midst of an executive or legislative process, such as the issuance of purely advisory opinions. The fact that extradition turns on the discretion of the Secretary of State following judicial certification has led to the suggestion that the procedure established by the extradition statute is constitutionally offensive to this separation of powers. First broached by a district court in the District of Columbia, subsequent courts have rejected the suggestion in large measure under the view that much like the issuance of a search or arrest warrant, the task is compatible with tasks constitutionally assigned to the judiciary.
section_title: Procedure for Extradition from the United States
paragraphs: A foreign country usually begins the extradition process with a request submitted to the State Department sometimes including the documentation required by the treaty. When a requesting nation is concerned that the fugitive will take flight before it has time to make a formal request, it may informally ask for extradition and provisional arrest with the assurance that the full complement of necessary documentation will follow. In either case, the Secretary of State, at his discretion, may forward the matter to the Department of Justice to begin the procedure for the arrest of the fugitive "to the end that the evidence of criminality may be heard and considered."
The United States Attorneys' Manual encapsulates the Justice Department's participation thereafter in these words:
1. OIA [Office of International Affairs] reviews ... requests for sufficiency and forwards appropriate ones to the district [where the fugitive is found].
2. The Assistant United States Attorney assigned to the case obtains a warrant and the fugitive is arrested and brought before the magistrate judge or the district judge.
3. The government opposes bond in extradition cases.
4. A hearing under 18 U.S.C. §3184 is scheduled to determine whether the fugitive is extraditable. If the court finds the fugitive to be extraditable, it enters an order of extraditability and certifies the record to the Secretary of State, who decides whether to surrender the fugitive to the requesting government. In some cases a fugitive may waive the hearing process.
5. OIA notifies the foreign government and arranges for the transfer of the fugitive to the agents appointed by the requesting country to receive him or her. Although the order following the extradition hearing is not appealable (by either the fugitive or the government), the fugitive may petition for a writ of habeas corpus as soon as the order is issued. The district court's decision on the writ is subject to appeal, and extradition may be stayed if the court so orders.
subsections: section_title: Arrest and Bail
paragraphs: Although the United States takes the view that an explicit treaty provision is unnecessary, extradition treaties sometimes expressly authorize requests for provisional arrest of a fugitive prior to delivery of a formal request for extradition. Regardless of whether detention occurs pursuant to provisional arrest, as a consequence of the initiation of an extradition hearing or upon certification of extradition, the fugitive is not entitled to release on bail except under rare "special circumstances." This limited opportunity for preextradition release may be further restricted under the applicable treaty.
section_title: Hearing
paragraphs: The precise menu for an extradition hearing is dictated by the applicable extradition treaty, but a common checklist for a hearing conducted in this country would include determinations that
1. there exists a valid extradition treaty between the United States and the requesting state; 2. the relator is the person sought; 3. the offense charged is extraditable; 4. the offense charged satisfies the requirement of double criminality; 5. there is "probable cause" to believe the relator committed the offense charged; 6. the documents required are presented in accordance with United States law, subject to any specific treaty requirements, translated and duly authenticated ...; and 7. other treaty requirements and statutory procedures are followed.
An extradition hearing is not, however, 
in the nature of a final trial by which the prisoner could be convicted or acquitted of the crime charged against him.... Instead, it is essentially a preliminary examination to determine whether a case is made out which will justify the holding of the accused and his surrender to the demanding nation.... The judicial officer who conducts an extradition hearing thus performs an assignment in line with his or her accustomed task of determining if there is probable cause to hold a defendant to answer for the commission of an offense.
The purpose of the hearing is in part to determine whether probable cause exists to believe that the individual committed an offense covered by the extradition treaty. The rules of criminal procedure and evidence that would apply at trial have no application at the hearing. Warrants, depositions, and other authenticated documents are admissible as evidence. The individual may offer evidence to contradict or undermine the existence of probable cause, but affirmative defenses that might be available at trial are irrelevant. Hearsay is not only admissible but may be relied upon exclusively; the Miranda rule has no application; initiation of extradition may be delayed without regard for the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial or the Fifth Amendment right of due process; nor do the Sixth Amendment rights to the assistance of counsel or cross examine witnesses apply. Due process, however, will bar extradition of informants whom the government promised confidentiality and then provided the evidence necessary to establish probable cause for extradition.
Moreover, extradition will ordinarily be certified without "examining the requesting country's criminal justice system or taking into account the possibility that the extraditee will be mistreated if returned." This "noninquiry rule" is a judicially created rule premised on the view that "[w]hen an American citizen commits a crime in a foreign country, he cannot complain if required to submit to such modes of trial and to such punishment as the laws of that country may prescribe for its own people, unless a different mode be provided for by treaty stipulations between that country and the United States." 
section_title: Review
paragraphs: If at the conclusion of the extradition hearing, the court concludes there is some obstacle to extradition and refuses to certify the case, "[t]he requesting government's recourse to an unfavorable disposition is to bring a new complaint before a different judge or magistrate, a process it may reiterate apparently endlessly."
If the court concludes there is no such obstacle to extradition and certifies to the Secretary of State that the case satisfies the legal requirements for extradition, the fugitive has no right of appeal, but may be entitled to limited review under habeas corpus. "[H]abeas corpus is available only to inquire whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, whether the offense charged is within the treaty and, by a somewhat liberal extension, whether there was any evidence warranting the finding that there was reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty." In this last assessment, appellate courts will only "examine the magistrate judge's determination of probable cause to see if there is 'any evidence' to support it." 
Limitations on review or application of the rule of noninquiry may be modified by treaty or statute. Whether a particular treaty or statute precludes review or application of the rule, however, can be a complicated issue. For example, the U.N. Convention Against Torture (CAT) provides that no State Party "shall expel, return ... or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture." Following U.S. ratification of CAT, Congress enacted Section 2242 of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA), which requires all relevant federal agencies to adopt appropriate regulations to implement this policy. Some fugitives have argued that CAT or FARRA operate as exceptions to the noninquiry rule. The argument has produced hollow victories at the appellate court level. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the rule of noninquiry posed no obstacle, but went on to hold that FARRA itself barred habeas review of a fugitive's torture claim. The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, concluded that FARRA required the Secretary of State to pass upon on a fugitive's torture claim, but that "[t]he doctrine of separation of powers and the rule on non-inquiry block[ed] any [judicial] inquiry into the substance of the Secretary's declaration." 
section_title: Surrender
paragraphs: If the judge or magistrate certifies the fugitive for extradition, the matter then falls to the discretion of the Secretary of State to determine whether as a matter of policy the fugitive should be released or surrendered to the agents of the country that has requested his or her extradition. The procedure for surrender, described in treaty and statute, calls for the release of the prisoner if he or she is not claimed within a specified period of time, often indicates how extradition requests from more than one country for the same fugitive are to be handled, and frequently allows the fugitive to be held for completion of a trial or the service of a criminal sentence before being surrendered. Extradition treaties may also provide that, in cases where a fugitive faces charges or is serving a criminal sentence in a country of refuge, he may be temporarily surrendered to a requesting State for purposes of prosecution, under the promise that the State seeking extradition will return the fugitive upon the conclusion of criminal proceedings. 
section_title: Extradition for Trial or Punishment in the United States
paragraphs: The laws of the country of refuge and the applicable extradition treaty govern extradition back to the United States of a fugitive located overseas. The request for extradition comes from the Department of State whether extradition is sought for trial in federal or state court or for execution of a criminal sentence under federal or state law.
The Justice Department's Office of International Affairs must approve requests for extradition of fugitives from federal charges or convictions and may be asked to review requests from state prosecutors before they are considered by the State Department. Provisions in the United States Attorneys' Manual and the corresponding Justice Department's Criminal Resource Manual sections supplement treaty instructions on the procedures to be followed in order to forward a request to the State Department and thereafter.
The first step is to determine whether the fugitive is extraditable. The Justice Department's checklist for determining extraditability begins with an identification of the country in which the fugitive has taken refuge. If the United States has no extradition treaty with the country of refuge, extradition is not a likely option. When there is a treaty, extradition is an option only if the treaty permits extradition. Common impediments include citizenship, dual criminality, statutes of limitation, and capital punishment issues.
Many treaties permit a country to refuse to extradite its citizens even in the case of dual citizenship. As for dual criminality, whether the crime of conviction or the crime charged is an extraditable offense will depend upon the nature of the crime and where it was committed. If the applicable treaty lists extraditable offenses, the crime must be on the list. If the applicable treaty insists only upon dual criminality, the underlying misconduct must be a crime under the laws of both the United States and the country of refuge.
Where the crime was committed matters; some treaties will permit extradition only if the offense was committed within the geographical confines of the United States. Timing also matters. The speedy trial features of U.S. law require a good faith effort to bring to trial a fugitive who is within the government's reach. Furthermore, the lapse of time or speedy trial component of the applicable extradition treaty may preclude extradition if prosecution would be barred by a statute of limitations in the country of refuge. Some treaties prohibit extradition for capital offenses; more often they permit it but only with the assurance that a sentence of death will not be executed. 
Prosecutors may request provisional arrest of a fugitive without waiting for the final preparation of the documentation required for a formal extradition request, if there is a risk of flight and if the treaty permits it. The Justice Department encourages judicious use of provisional arrest because of the pressures that may attend it. The Criminal Resource Manual contains the form for collection of the information that must accompany either a federal or state prosecutor's application for a Justice Department request for provisional arrest.
Although treaty requirements vary, the Justice Department suggests that prosecutors supply formal documentation in the form of an original and four copies of
a prosecutor's affidavit describing the facts of the case, including dates, names, docket numbers and citations, and preferably executed before a judge or magistrate (particularly if extradition is sought from a civil law country) copies of the statutes the fugitive is said to have violated, the statutes governing the penalties that may be imposed upon conviction, and the applicable statute of limitations if the fugitive has been convicted and sentenced: identification evidence; certified documentation of conviction, sentence, and the amount of time served and remaining to be served; copies of the statutes of conviction; and a statement that the service of the remaining sentence is not barred by a statute of limitations if the fugitive is being sought for prosecution or sentencing: certified copies of the arrest warrant (preferably signed by the court or a magistrate) and of the indictment or complaint if the fugitive is being sought for prosecution or sentencing: evidence of the identity of the individual sought (fingerprints/photographs) and of the evidence upon which the charges are based and of the fugitive's guilt in the form of witness affidavits (preferably avoiding the use grand jury transcripts and, particularly in the case of extradition from a common law country, the use of hearsay).
If the Justice Department approves the application for extradition, the request and documentation are forwarded to the State Department, translated if necessary, and with State Department approval forwarded through diplomatic channels to the country from which extradition is being sought.
The treaty issue most likely to arise after extradition and the fugitive's return to this country is whether the fugitive was surrendered subject to any limitations such as those posed by the doctrine of specialty.
subsections: section_title: Specialty
paragraphs: Under the doctrine of specialty, sometimes called speciality, 
a person who has been brought within the jurisdiction of the court by virtue of proceedings under an extradition treaty, can only be tried for one of the offences described in that treaty, and for the offence with which he is charged in the proceedings for his extradition, until a reasonable time and opportunity have been given him after his release or trial upon such charge, to return to the country from whose asylum he had been forcibly taken under those proceedings. 
The limitation, expressly included in many treaties, is designed to preclude prosecution for different substantive offenses but does not bar prosecution for different or additional counts of the same offense. And some courts have held that an offense whose prosecution would be barred by the doctrine may nevertheless be considered for purposes of the federal sentencing guidelines, or for purposes of criminal forfeiture. At least where an applicable treaty addresses the question, the rule is no bar to prosecution for crimes committed after the individual is extradited.
The doctrine may be of limited advantage to a given defendant because the circuits are divided over whether a defendant has standing to claim its benefits. Additionally, one circuit has held that a fugitive lacks standing to allege a rule of specialty violation when extradited pursuant to an agreement other than treaty. Regardless of their view of fugitive standing, reviewing courts have agreed that the surrendering State may subsequently consent to trial for crimes other than those for which extradition was had.
section_title: Alternatives to Extradition
paragraphs: The existence of an extradition treaty does not preclude the United States acquiring personal jurisdiction over a fugitive by other means, unless the treaty expressly provides otherwise.
subsections: section_title: Waiver
paragraphs: Waiver or "simplified" treaty provisions allow a fugitive to consent to extradition without the benefit of an extradition hearing. Although not universal, the provisions constitute the least controversial of the alternatives to extradition.
section_title: Immigration Procedures
paragraphs: The removal of aliens under immigration law has traditionally been considered a practice distinct from extradition. Unlike extradition, the legal justification for removing an alien via deportation or denial of entry is not so he can answer charges against him in the receiving State; rather, it is because the removing country has sovereign authority to determine which nonnationals may enter or remain within its borders, and the alien has failed to fulfill the legal criteria allowing noncitizens to enter, remain in, or pass in transit through the sovereign's territory.
Whether by a process similar to deportation or by simple expulsion, the United States has had some success encouraging other countries to surrender fugitives other than their own nationals without requiring recourse to extradition. Ordinarily, U.S. immigration procedures, on the other hand, have been less accommodating and have been called into play only when extradition has been found wanting. They tend to be time consuming and usually can be used only in lieu of extradition when the fugitive is an alien. Moreover, they frequently require the United States to deposit the alien in a country other than one that seeks his or her extradition. Yet in a few instances where an alien has been naturalized by deception or where the procedures available against alien terrorists come into play, denaturalization or deportation may be considered an attractive alternative or supplement to extradition proceedings. 
section_title: Irregular Rendition/Abduction
paragraphs: Although less frequently employed by the United States, "irregular rendition" is a familiar alternative to extradition. An alternative of last resort, it involves kidnaping or deceit and generally has been reserved for terrorists, drug traffickers, and the like. Kidnaping a defendant overseas and returning him to the United States for trial does not deprive American courts of jurisdiction unless an applicable extradition treaty explicitly calls for that result. Nor does it ordinarily expose the United States to liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act or individuals involved in the abduction to liability under the Alien Tort Statute. The individuals involved in the abduction, however, may face foreign prosecution, or at least be the subject of a foreign extradition request. Moreover, the effort may strain diplomatic relations with the country from which the fugitive is lured or abducted. 
Besides receiving persons through irregular rendition, the United States has also rendered persons to other countries over the years, via the Central Intelligence Agency and various law enforcement agencies. During the George W. Bush Administration, there was controversy over the use of renditions by the United States, particularly with regard to the alleged transfer of suspected terrorists to countries known to employ harsh interrogation techniques that may rise to the level of torture. Little publicly available information from government sources exists regarding the nature and frequency of U.S. renditions to countries believed to practice torture, or the nature of any assurances obtained from them before rendering persons to their custody. It appears that most, if not all, cases in which the United States has irregularly rendered persons have involved the transfer of noncitizens seized outside the United States, perhaps because persons within the United States (and U.S. citizens outside the country ) are provided procedural protections against being summarily transferred to another country under federal statute and the Constitution. The legal limitations against the rendition of noncitizens seized outside the United States are much more limited, though it would be a violation of both CAT and U.S. criminal law for a U.S. official to conspire to commit torture via rendition.
section_title: Foreign Prosecution
paragraphs: A final alternative when extradition for trial in the United States is not available, is trial within the country of refuge. The alternative exists primarily when a U.S. request for extradition has been refused because of the fugitive's nationality and/or when the crime occurred under circumstances that permit prosecution by either country for the same misconduct. The alternative can be cumbersome and expensive and may be contrary to U.S. policy objectives.
Appendix A. Countries with Which the United States Has a Bilateral Extradition Treaty
Appendix B. Countries with Which the United States Has No Bilateral Extradition Treaty