U.S. Occupation of Iraq? Issues Raised by Experiences in Japan and Germany
Released: 2003-01-30T00:00:00

Summary:
This report provides background on the U.S. occupation experiences in Japan andGermany after World War II, and discusses four sets of factors from this period that could be relevant to a U.S.occupation of Iraq. These are: (1) acceptance of U.S. goals, (2) homogeneity of the occupied populations, (3) ability to manage theirown affairs, and (4)international legitimacy and support. This report will not be updated

paragraphs: RS21404 -- U.S. Occupation of Iraq? Issues Raised by Experiences in Japan and Germany
January 30, 2003
subsections: section_title: Major Features of U.S. Occupations in Japan and Germany
paragraphs: Planning, Duration, Force Size. (1) Planning for both occupations, which began asearly as 1942, was marked by sharp disagreements within the Roosevelt administration that continued into the earlyphases of theoccupations. The first of many documents discussing the post-war political configuration of Japan , in particular the status of theemperor and the possibilities and particulars of democratization, was issued in March 1943. The final directives,which provided theparticulars of political reform, were issued by the inter-agency State, War, and Navy departments' coordinatingcommittee (SWNCC)after the Japanese surrender. For Germany , initial moderate plans of the State Department andthe Army were replaced by morepunitive measures that would hold the economy to subsistence level through severe deindustrialization, as reflectedin a January 1945revision of what became the occupation blueprint, the Joint Chief of Staff Document 1067 (JCS 1067). In the end,it was the leadingU.S. official of each occupation who proved a major voice in redirecting early punitive policies.
It was presumed that both military occupations would be relatively short. For Japan , the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers(SCAP) Gen. Douglas MacArthur judged the occupation would last no more than three years. (2) It lasted six years and eight months(August 1945-April 1952). For Germany , the first Military Governor of the U.S. sector, Gen.Dwight D. Eisenhower, anticipated thatthe U.S. military would "provide a garrison, not a government, except for a few weeks." (3) Instead, direct military government lastedfour years, the important first phase of the occupation (May 1945 - May 1949). (Some analysts believe the U.S.military occupationof Germany was prolonged by problems in establishing self-government because of differences with the otheroccupying powers:Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union, each of which controlled its own sector.) 
In both cases, a substantial drawdown of U.S. occupation forces occurred after the first year, as there was virtually no armedresistance. In Japan , a peak level of 385,649 was reached by November 1945, but dropped to160,000 by the end of May 1946. In Germany , the 1.6 million troops in Germany in May 1945, dropped to 277,584 in 1946, 119,367in 1947, and 79,370 by 1950. (4)
In Japan , most major reforms had been accomplished within four years and six months. In Germany , the U.S. occupation wasphased out in two stages. Germans in the U.S., British, and French sectors jointly gained control of most domesticaffairs in May 1949with the ratification of a new constitution, dubbed the Basic Law, establishing a parliamentary democracy, theFederal Republic ofGermany or 'West Germany." Until 1955, these occupying countries retained emergency powers, a veto over lawsinconsistent withoccupation policy, and authority over such matters as foreign relations, foreign trade, the level of industrialproduction, and militarysecurity. In its zone, the Soviet Union created an authoritarian Soviet-style state, the German Democratic Republicor "EastGermany." (The "West" and "East" entities persisted until reunification in 1990.) 
Objectives. The objectives of the U.S. occupations of both countries have beensummed up in two lists of four "d"s. In both Japan and Germany , the primary objective was demilitarization . All U.S. plannersagreed that the ability of both countries to wage war in the future should be destroyed. This included destroyingelements of militarypower, including the economic apparatus that fueled war, and punishing war criminals. In Japan ,the next goals were the disarmament and decentralization of the economic apparatus, the latter through thedismantling of the large industrial and bankinggroups. In Germany , they were denazification and deindustrialization . Regarding the fourth "d", democratization , many U.S.policymakers and occupation planners doubted that the Japanese and Germans had the cultural background andpsychologicaldisposition necessary to function in a democracy. After the occupations began, democratization assumed greaterweight in bothexperiences, as those forces who had argued that the inhabitants of those countries were capable of establishingdemocracies gainedcredibility, and as the start of the Cold War fostered the concept of a community of democracies as a counterweightto the SovietUnion. 
Humanitarian Situation. The occupations commenced amidst a grave humanitarian situation, with large parts of the population homeless, and on subsistence diets or below. In Japan , according to onesource, the war had produced 1.8 million military and civilian casualties, and destroyed 25% of Japan's nationalwealth. Air attacks had destroyed 20% of the country's housing (and a greater amount in some cities), and 30% of its industrialcapacity. (5) In Germany ,between a quarter to a half of housing and transport had been destroyed, leaving some 20 million homeless in theWestern zones. (6)
Although the United States provided humanitarian aid at the outset to ward off mass hunger and starvation,occupation authorities andoversight officials soon worried that the U.S. will to continue such relief efforts would flag well before the needfor aid diminished. This trepidation was one consideration reorienting economic policies. In 1949, under pressure from Congress,Military GovernorLucius D. Clay abandoned a central feature of occupation policy in Germany (with which he hadoriginally agreed): the punitivedismantling of what was left of Germany's industrial base to make Germans pay for waging war. (7) Instead, he actively promotedGermany's economic revival. In Japan , the inter-agency SWNCC approved in January 1948 aneconomic recovery program"intended to make Japan self-sufficient through the 'early revival of the Japanese economy'" and encouragingindustrial growth andforeign trade to enable Japan to "make its 'proper contribution to the economic rehabilitation of the worldeconomy.....'" (8)
Accomplishments. In both countries, the occupations are credited with the construction of functioning democracies. In Germany , the direct occupation period ended in theWest with the 1949 establishmentof the Federal Republic of Germany, a parliamentary system built on improvements in the constitution andinstitutions of Germany'smajor experience with democracy, the 1919-1933 Weimar Republic. In Japan , the SCAPrevamped the laws, institutions, and moresof the country's "divine right" monarchy. The key reform was a new constitution, largely drafted by the SCAP staff,which transferredsovereignty from the Emperor to the people (while retaining the Emperor in a largely symbolic role) and banneda military, arms, andparticipation in war. It also dismantled the feudalistic structure, creating a more decentralized and representativegovernment throughreforms in the Japanese legislature (the Diet), local governments, and the civil code, among other measures. (9) Other political changesin Japan included the separation of church and state, the enfranchisement of women, the promotion of a free press,and theliberalization of education. Important economic changes, including the dismantling of the large, family-run industrialand bankinggroups, and a wide-scale agrarian reform, are seen as essential to the creation of a functioning democracy, becausethey broke thepower of economic and military elites. 
Recent assessments of the importance of the occupation governments in establishing these democracies give much greater weight totheir contribution in Japan than in Germany. Indeed, one academic believes that while the United States wasimportant to ademocratic outcome in Japan, "by contrast the strength of democratic forces in West Germany was such that theAmericancontribution appears relatively marginal." (10)
section_title: Implications and Questions for U.S. Policymakers (11)
paragraphs: Some historians have noted that unique preconditions and circumstances contributed to the success of these occupations, particularlyin Japan. Four crucial points of convergence often cited as important to the success of those occupations inestablishing democracies,raise questions concerning the applicability of these models to a U.S. occupation of Iraq. Although there ispredictably disagreementover their relevance, these issues provide a backdrop for post-Saddam planning. 
Populations' Acceptance of U.S. Occupations and Democratization Objective Occupation. Occupation by U.S. forces, and democratic reforms, were widely accepted by the JapaneseandGermans themselves, who came to blame their own leaders for the war. Indeed, although historically much iscredited to the UnitedStates for remaking these democracies, many analysts believe that the high degree of cooperation from post-warJapanese and Germanleaders was also crucial to their success.
Analysts writing during the occupation of Japan attributed success there "largely...to the wholehearted cooperation of the averageJapanese citizen," (12) a conclusion whichsubsequent research supports. This cooperation has been attributed to several factors,including Emperor Hirohito's plea, before the landing of U.S. forces that the population cooperate fully withoccupation directives. This ensured not only the cooperation of the average citizen, but more importantly of Japan's powerful bureaucracy. Moreover, thegreat majority of Japanese rejected the old political system and military leadership, and were receptive to change.In the early 20thcentury, Western-style democratic political institutions had begun to develop, with increasing influence exercisedby political partiesand greater democratization of parliamentary practices, culminating in 1920 - 1932. (13)
In Germany, U.S. occupation officials quickly became convinced that most Germans thoroughly rejected Nazi Fascism, and desiredpolitical change to a successful democracy in line with democratic developments before Adolf Hitler took power. Germany hadexperience with a limited democracy and the rule of law, within an authoritarian culture and political context, duringthe "SecondReich" (or the German Empire) of 1871-1918, even before its experience with democracy during the WeimarRepublic. Manydemocratic leaders of the Weimar Republic had remained in Germany, and were eager to work towards therestoration of democracy. Prospects for democracy may have been further enhanced because the areas of U.S. occupation had more of ademocratic ethos, incontrast to the legacy of Prussian authoritarianism in the Soviet occupation zone.
To what extent would a model of Western democracy be acceptable to the Iraqis? Even if Iraqis accepted such a model, mightproblems arise from Iraq's lack of experience with democracy? If such a model is not acceptable to Iraqis, to whatextent do theyshare a common purpose of unifying their country around a political model acceptable to the United States? Giventhe history ofWestern colonialism in the Middle East, U.S. support for Israel, and the drastic effects of current U.S. backedeconomic sanctionsagainst Iraq, would the United States have the nearly unanimous backing of the Iraqi population for an occupation,as it did in Japanand Germany? If not, would a U.N. force enjoy greater support? What difficulties could arise from the lack ofgeneral consent? 
Homogeneity of Occupied Populations. Although politically diverse, the Japaneseand the German populations as of 1945 were each ethnically homogeneous, and largely without religiousanimosities.
To what extent will ethnic and sectarian differences among Iraqis impede effective government by a U.S. occupation force? Giventhose differences, will Iraqis be able to govern themselves within a short period of time? If not, what arrangements(such asco-government, as exists in Afghanistan) might be desirable to promote effective government? What likelihoodis there that such agovernment would succeed? 
Ability to Manage Their Own Affairs Largely Using Existing Institutions. Although the U.S. military governments held power and issued orders, most of the functions of government werecarried out byJapanese and German institutions. This delegation of functions was the decision of the two dominant figures in theoccupationgovernments, MacArthur in Japan and Clay (14) inGermany. The decision was based in their assessments of the willingness and abilityof Japanese and German citizens to perform these duties, and the scarcity of suitable Americans to do so. 
In Japan, MacArthur retained and worked through Japan's existing, and centralized, governmental institutions, issuing orders thatwere then carried out by the Japanese government. (15) (He also insisted on autonomy from U.S. agencies to interpret instructions as hesaw fit.) Military government teams, usually of military and civilian personnel, and local liaison offices were alsoestablished at theprefecture (i.e., state) level, and charged with observing, investigating and reporting on compliance. However,according to oneauthor, the "lack of an established policy for local military government activity" resulted in abuses, and a"patchwork of wide localvariations developed." (16) MacArthur entrustedthe Japanese government with demobilizing its forces.
In the U.S. sector of Germany, the Office of the Military Government, United States (OMGUS) proceeded immediately to reconstructGerman government institutions to administer occupation laws and policies, even before all U.S. officials wereconvinced thatGermans were ready for it. With the German defeat, the Nazi government collapsed, leaving the allies to replaceofficials andstructures. From the beginning, Clay sought to turn government over to Germans as quickly as possible, starting atthe local level. Insome cases, the OMGUS appointed former German government officials from the pre-1933 period. As early asOctober 1945, Clayissued an order that limited local OMGUS military activities to observing government activities at the city, countyand state level, andreporting problems to higher headquarters. Elections for village officials were held in January 1946, followed bycounty officials inMarch and city officials in May. Clay then pushed for the drafting of state constitutions and establishment of stategovernments. 
To what extent would Iraqi existing institutions continue to function? What governmental functions would U.S. or other militaryforces have to assume, and for how long? What new institutions would have to be created? To what extent mightgrievances of thosedisplaced from existing institutions, or of those removed and punished for crimes related to participation in theHussein regime, beviewed as legitimate by other Iraqis, and other Middle Eastern governments and populations? To what extent couldsuch sympathiesundermine effective administration by occupation forces? How much autonomy would a U.S. or U.N.administration have to adapt tolocal conditions? 
International Legitimacy and Support. The U.S. occupations in Japan andGermany were viewed by other countries as morally and legally legitimate, and there was widespread support forthem. Thisinternational consensus meant that U.S. policy could be developed relatively free of competing foreign policyinterests. This wasespecially true in the case of Japan. For Germany, however, the development of economic policy was complicatedby considerationsregarding other European economies. 
If the United States were to invade Iraq without the full backing of the international community, to whatextent would this lack ofconsensus or agreement undermine the basis of U.S. international legitimacy or support? What U.S. interests wouldbe affected bythe presence of a U.S. occupation force in Iraq? Should the United States expect significant opposition to a U.S.occupation amongthe leaders or populations of neighboring countries? To what extent would its short-term success be judged by itsability to meethumanitarian needs?