Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) and Related Funding Programs: FY2005 Assistance
Released: 2005-05-11T00:00:00

Summary:
In 2004, Congress considered a number of issues relating to the Andean region and drugtrafficking. The Administration requested $731 million for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative forFY2005, and $114 million for economic assistance programs. Congress also changed the level ofU.S. military and civilian contractor personnel allowed to be deployed in Colombia, in response toan Administration request. Congress continues to express concern with the volume of drugs readilyavailable in the United States and elsewhere in the world. The three largest producers of cocaine areColombia, Bolivia, and Peru, with 90% of the cocaine in the United States originating in, or passingthrough, Colombia. Regional security issues have also come into sharper focus after the attacks ofSeptember 11, 2001.
The United States has made a significant commitment of funds and material support to helpColombia and the Andean region fight drug trafficking since the development of Plan Colombia in1999. Congress passed legislation providing $1.3 billion in assistance for FY2000 ( P.L. 106-246 )for Colombia and its neighbors. From FY2000 through FY2005, the United States has provided atotal of about $5.4 billion for the region in both State Department and Defense Departmentcounternarcotics funds. Congress appropriated $731 million in FY2005 funds for the AndeanCounterdrug Initiative, with an additional $106.5 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds. The United States also provides funding for Development Assistance, Child Survival and Health,and Economic Support Funds. In FY2005, this economic assistance was estimated to be $115.3million for ACI countries. Since 2002, Congress has granted expanded authority to usecounternarcotics funds for a unified campaign to fight both drug trafficking and terroristorganizations in Colombia. Three illegally armed groups in Colombia participate in drug productionand trafficking, and have been designated foreign terrorist organizations by the State Department.
In the first session of the 108th Congress, the House passed and the Senate considered theFY2004 Foreign Relations Authorization Act ( H.R. 1950 / S. 925 ) withprovisions relating to Colombia and drug interdiction programs in the Andean region. The SenateForeign Relations Committee reported out the FY2004 Foreign Assistance Authorization Act( S. 1161 / S.Rept. 108-56 ) with several modifications on assistance to ACI countries.Neither of these bills received final approval. On March 4, 2004, the Senate Foreign RelationsCommittee reported out S. 2144 , the Foreign Affairs Authorization Act for Fiscal Year2005. It includes several provisions relating to Colombia and the Andean region that are similar tolanguage contained in S. 925. The FY2005 National Defense Authorization Act( H.R. 4200 , H.Rept. 108-767 ) was passed on October 9, 2004, and included provisionsrelating to the Andean region, including raising the statutory caps on U.S. personnel assigned inColombia.
This report will not be updated.

subsections: section_title: The Andean Counterdrug Initiative
paragraphs: U.S. support for Plan Colombia began in 2000, when Congress passed legislation providing$1.3 billion in interdiction and development assistance ( P.L. 106-246 ) for Colombia and six regionalneighbors. (2) Funding forACI from FY2000 through FY2004 totals $3.5 billion. For FY2005, Congress appropriated anadditional $731 million. ACI is managed by the State Department's Bureau of International NarcoticsControl and Law Enforcement Affairs (INCLE). The objectives are to eliminate the cultivation andproduction of cocaine and opium, build Andean law enforcement infrastructure, arrest and prosecutetraffickers, and seize their assets. The countries considered a part of the ACI include Bolivia, Brazil,Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Venezuela, (3) with most funding allocated for programs in Colombia. Funds aredivided between programs that support eradication and interdiction efforts, as well as those focusedon alternative crop development and democratic institution building. On the interdiction side,programs train and support national police and military forces, provide communications andintelligence systems, support the maintenance and operations of host country aerial eradicationaircraft, and improve infrastructure related to counternarcotics activities. On the alternativedevelopment side, funds support development programs in coca growing areas, includinginfrastructure development, and marketing and technical support for alternative crops. It alsoincludes assisting internally displaced persons, promoting the rule of law, and expanding judicialcapabilities. 
INCLE also manages the Interregional Aviation Support program, referred to as the AirWing, that operates a fleet of 164 fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft supporting overflight drug cropimagery and aerial eradication programs in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. FY2005 funding isestimated at $70 million, of which approximately $45 million was allocated for programs in theAndean region. The request for FY2005 maintained funding at $70 million, of which approximately$45 million is proposed for Colombia. ACI also funds the Air Bridge Denial Program that iscurrently operational in Colombia, and temporarily suspended in Peru, after an accidental shootingdown of a civilian aircraft carrying U.S. missionaries in 2001. After the incident, in which twoAmericans died, the program in both countries was suspended until enhanced safeguards weredeveloped. The program in Colombia resumed in August 2003. The program supports an aircraftfleet, pilot training, and logistical and intelligence support. The program tracks aircraft suspectedof being involved in drug trafficking, and forces them to land for inspection. If the aircraft isrepeatedly unresponsive, it may be shot down, at the direction of the commander of the ColombianAir Force. The resumption of a program in Peru is still pending the development of safetyenhancements. The FY2005 request was for $21 million, and Congress approved $11.2 million.
subsections: section_title: Related Funding Programs
paragraphs: Additional funding for the Andean region is provided through the Foreign Military Financing(FMF) program and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, bothmanaged by the State Department. The Defense Department has a counternarcotics account forworldwide programs involving interdiction, training, equipment, and intelligence sharing. In theWestern Hemisphere, these programs are managed by the U.S. Army Southern Command.
Foreign Military Financing. Foreign MilitaryFinancing provides funding grants to foreign nations to purchase U.S. defense equipment, services,and training. The program's objectives are to assist key allies to improve their defense capabilities,to strengthen military relationships between the United States and FMF recipients, and to promotethe professionalism of military forces in friendly countries. The majority of FMF funding goes tocountries in the Middle East, including Israel, Egypt, and Jordan. In the Western Hemisphere, alarge portion of FMF is allocated for Colombia and the Andean region with the objective ofsupporting the efforts of those nations to establish and strengthen national authority in remote areasthat have been used by leftist guerrilla organizations, rightist paramilitaries, and narcotics traffickers. A portion of FMF funding in Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003 went for infrastructure protection of oilpipelines in Colombia. In FY2004, FMF funding for the Andean region totaled $124.1 million, ofwhich Colombia was allocated $109.4 million. The FY2005 request was for $115.5 million, with$108 million for Colombia. Congress approved $106.5 million for the region, with nearly $100million for Colombia.
International Military Education and Training. The IMET program provides training on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly nations. Its objectives are to improve defense capabilities, develop professional and personal relationshipsbetween U.S. and foreign militaries, and influence these forces in support of democratic governance. Training focuses on the manner in which military organizations function under civilian control,civil-military relations, military justice systems, military doctrine, strategic planning, and operationalprocedures. IMET funding for the Andean region is estimated at $2.8 million in FY2004 out of atotal of $13.4 million for all of Latin America. The estimate for FY2005 for the Andean countriesis $3.7 million. 
Department of Defense CounternarcoticsAccount. The Department of Defense has authority for counternarcotics detectionand monitoring under Sections 124, 1004, and 1033 of the National Defense Authorization Act. DOD requests a lump sum for counternarcotics programs worldwide and does not request amountsby country. The estimated amount for Colombia in FY2004 ranges from $122 million to $160million. The request for FY2005 DOD counternarcotics funding for Latin America is $366.9million, of which up to $200 million is planned for Colombia. Activities include detection andmonitoring operations to assist U.S. law enforcement agencies interdict drug trafficking. In theAndean region, support is provided in the form of training, equipment, and intelligence sharingactivities.
section_title: Economic Assistance Programs
paragraphs: Economic assistance programs for the Andean region are not considered part of the AndeanCounterdrug Initiative, although they support many programs which are tangentially related, suchas poverty reduction. From 2001 to 2003, Development Assistance, Child Survival and Health, andEconomic Support Fund programs were requested as part of the President's Andean RegionalInitiative. Development Assistance (DA) seeks to foster sustainable economic growth with a focuson trade and investment, agriculture, education, environment, health, and democracy. The ACIregion received $46.1 million in FY2004 from a total of $260.8 million for Latin America. Theestimate for FY2005 totals $43.3 million out of $255.5 million for Latin America. Child Survivaland Health (CSH) focuses on treating infectious disease, promoting child and maternal health, familyplanning, and reproductive health. Countries in the Andean region received $42.1 million in FY2004out of $149.9 million allocated for Latin America. The estimate for FY2005 for the hemisphere is$143.5 million, from which $39.8 million is proposed for the ACI region. The Economic SupportFund (ESF) program funds initiatives aimed at creating employment and promoting conditions thatsupport international investment and trade. In Latin America, ESF is focused on promoting stabledemocracies, secure borders, anti-corruption, trade-led growth, and counternarcotics. The ACIregion is received $32.2 million in FY2004 and Congress earmarked $36 million in FY2005.
section_title: Congressional Conditions on U.S. Assistance
paragraphs: Since first approving expanded assistance to Colombia for counternarcotics programs in2000, Congress has included a number of conditions on U.S. assistance in both authorization andappropriations legislation. The most recently enacted funding legislation is the FY2005 ForeignOperations Appropriations Act (Division D of H.R. 4818 , the FY2005 ConsolidatedAppropriations Act, signed into law as P.L. 108-447 December 8, 2004), which included a numberof longstanding provisions relating to the Andean Counterdrug Initiative. The FY2005 DefenseAuthorization Act ( H.R. 4200 / P.L. 108-375 ) also includes provisions relating toColombia. The following are provisions of current law as provided in H.R. 4818, DivisionD and, where indicated, the Defense Authorization Act.
Expanded Authority. Current law maintainslanguage, first approved by Congress in 2002, authorizing support for a unified campaign againstnarcotics trafficking and activities by organizations designated as terrorist organizations. Reportlanguage notes that counternarcotics, alternative development, and judicial reform should remain theprincipal focus of U.S. policy in Colombia.This authority shall cease if the Secretary of State hascredible evidence that the Colombian Armed Forces are not vigorously attempting to restoregovernment authority and respect for human rights in areas under the effective control ofparamilitary and guerrilla organizations.
Personnel Caps. The FY2005 National DefenseAuthorization Act ( H.R. 4200 , P.L. 108-375 changed current law with regard to the capon the number of U.S. military and U.S. civilian contractors that can be deployed in Colombia insupport of Plan Colombia. The cap on military personnel was raised from 400 to 800, and forcivilian contractors, from 400 to 600. The cap does not apply to personnel conducting search andrescue operations, nor to U.S. personnel assigned as part of their regular duties to the U.S. Embassy. As of late November 2003, there were 278 temporary and permanent U.S. military personnel and 373U.S. citizen civilian contractors in Colombia in support of Plan Colombia. These numbers vary asprograms are begun, expanded, or completed. During 2003, they have varied between 208 and 396military personnel, and 247 to 400 civilian contractors. The personnel caps also do not apply toforeign national contract employees. 
Helicopters. Current law maintains languagerequiring that if any helicopter procured with ACI funds is used to aid or abet the operations of anyillegal self-defense group or illegal security cooperative, the helicopter shall be immediately returnedto the United States.
Reports. Current law requires that the Secretaryof State, in consultation with the Administrator of USAID, provide to the Committees onAppropriations a report within 45 days of enactment and prior to the initial obligation of funds onthe proposed uses of all ACI funds on a country-by-country basis for each proposed program, project,or activity. The National Defense Authorization Act requires a report from the Secretary of Statewithin 60 days of enactment (in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Director ofCentral Intelligence) on any relationships between foreign governments with organizations inColombia that have been designated foreign terrorist organizations by the United States. The reportis to describe what direct or indirect assistance these groups are receiving and the U.S. policiesdesigned to address such relationships.
Human Rights. Current law allows the obligationof 75% of assistance to the Colombian Armed Forces without a determination and certification fromthe Secretary of State regarding respect for human rights and severing ties with paramilitary groups. The remaining 25% can be released in two installments of 12.5% each. The first installment can bemade provided that the Secretary of State certifies that (1) the Commander General of the ColombianArmed Forces is suspending members who have been credibly alleged to have committed grossviolations of human rights or to have aided or abetted paramilitary organizations; (2) the Colombiangovernment is vigorously investigating and prosecuting members of the military who have beencredibly alleged to have committed gross violations of human rights or to have aided or abettedparamilitary organizations; (3) the Colombian Armed Forces have made substantial progress incooperating with civilian prosecutors and judicial authorities in such cases; (4) the ColombianArmed Forces have made substantial progress in severing links to paramilitary organizations; and5) the Colombian Armed Forces are dismantling paramilitary leadership and financial networks byarresting commanders and financial backers. The last installment can be made after July 31, 2005,if the Secretary of State certifies that the Colombian Armed Forces are continuing to meet the aboveconditions and are conducting vigorous operations to restore government authority and respect forhuman rights in areas under the effective control of paramilitary and guerrilla organizations. It alsorequires that not later than 60 days after enactment, and every 90 days thereafter, the Secretary ofState shall consult with internationally recognized human rights organizations regarding progressin meeting these conditions. It denies visas to anyone who the Secretary of State determineswillfully provided any support to leftist guerrilla organizations or rightist paramilitaries, or hasparticipated in the commission of gross violations of human rights in Colombia.
In addition to these provisions that are specific to Colombia, the act includes a provision fromprevious legislation, often called the Leahy amendment, that denies funds to any unit of a securityforce for which the Secretary of State has credible evidence of gross human rights violations. TheSecretary may continue funding if he determines and reports to Congress that the foreign governmentis taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of these security forces to justice.
Earmarks. Current law designates that, forFY2005 funding, not less than $264.6 million of ACI funds be made available for alternativedevelopment and institution building, of which $237 million shall be allocated to USAID. Of thislatter amount, USAID is directed to use $125.7 million for programs in Colombia. It requires thatnot less than $6 million be made available for judicial reform programs in Colombia and not lessthan $6 million for programs to protect human rights. It also earmarks not less than $2 million forprograms to protect biodiversity and indigenous reserves in Colombia. 
Aerial Fumigation. Current law requires that notmore than 20% of funds used for the procurement of chemicals for aerial coca and poppy fumigationbe made available unless the Secretary of State certifies that 1) the herbicide mixture is in accordancewith EPA label requirements for comparable use in the United States and any additional controlsrecommended by the EPA; and 2) the herbicide mixture does not pose unreasonable risks or adverseeffects to humans or the environment. Further, the Secretary of State must certify that complaintsof harm to health or licit crops caused by fumigation are evaluated and fair compensation is beingpaid for meritorious claims. These funds may not be made available unless programs are beingimplemented by USAID, the Colombian government, or other organizations, and in consultationwith local communities, to provide alternative sources of income in areas where security permits forsmall-acreage growers whose illicit crops are targeted for fumigation.
Prohibition on Combat. Current law continuesthe prohibition on U.S. military personnel or U.S. civilian contractors participating in any combatoperations in Colombia. This provision has been included in authorization and appropriationlegislation since the original Plan Colombia law approved by Congress in 2000.
Air Bridge Denial Program. In order to resumeU.S. support for a Peruvian air interdiction program, the Secretary of State and the Director ofCentral Intelligence must certify to Congress 30 days prior to resuming the program that enhancedsafeguards and procedures have been developed.
Bolivia. It allows assistance to the Bolivianmilitary and police forces only if they are respecting human rights and cooperating withinvestigations and prosecutions of alleged violations of human rights.
Colombian Demobilization. Current law requirescongressional consultation and notification prior to USAID obligating any funds for peace initiativesin Colombia. The conference agreement expressed concern that the demobilization process is notensuring the dismantling of FTOs or deterring members from resuming illegal activities and that thegovernment of Colombia is not prosecuting those involved in drug trafficking and human rightsviolations. It further recommends that the State Department not request FY2006 funds fordemobilization unless the Department of Justice determines the activities are consistent with U.S.anti-terrorism laws and that 
1) the FTO is respecting a ceasefire and cessation of illegal activities; 
2) the Colombian government has not adopted any law or policy inconsistent with its obligationsunder the U.S.-Colombian extradition treaty and has committed to the U.S. that it willcontinue to extradite Colombians, including members of illegally armed groups; 
3) the Colombian legal framework governing demobilization provides for prosecution andpunishment in proportion to the crimes committed of those responsible for gross violationsof human rights, violations of international humanitarian law, and drug trafficking, as wellas providing for reparations of victims and the monitoring of demobilized individuals; 
4) the Colombian government is implementing a policy of dismantling such groups, includingseizure of financial and property assets; and 
5) the Colombian government is taking actions to enable the return of stolen assets, including realproperty, to their original owners.
The conference report also requests that before any U.S. funds are provided to the OASMission in Colombia for demobilization purposes, the Secretary of State report to the Committeeson Appropriations that the OAS Mission is strictly adhering to its verification role, that FTOs areconcentrated in demobilization zones, that the legal framework governing demobilization conformswith (3) above, and that the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights is providing advice tothe OAS Mission.
section_title: Administration FY2005 Request
paragraphs: ACI Request. On February 2, 2004, PresidentBush submitted his budget request for Fiscal Year 2005. The Administration proposed spending$731 million for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, the same amount it requested for FY2004. Partof this amount, $21 million, is designated for the Air Bridge Denial Program, which would continuecontractor logistical support and training for programs in both Peru and Colombia.
Colombia. The single largest amount, $463 million,is designated for Colombia. Of this amount, $313 million is proposed for drug interdiction efforts,and $150 million for alternative development and institution building programs. Contending thatthis year marks a "tipping point" in the program, the Administration maintains that the objectivesof FY2005 funding are to support drug interdiction and eradication efforts of the ColombianNational Police and the Army, for infrastructure improvements, police training, and secure andinteroperable communications and intelligence systems. ACI funds would be used to support 71Colombian military helicopters for both counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts. Funding willalso support eight helicopters for infrastructure security in the province of Arauca. On thedevelopment front, ACI funds will be used for strengthening a licit agricultural economy, assistinggroups that have been displaced because of the fighting, and supporting programs that strengthendemocracy and promote the rule of law, human rights, and judicial reform.
Peru. Peru is the second largest recipient of ACIfunding with $112 proposed for FY2005; $50 million for alternative development and institutionbuilding, and $62 million for interdiction. Interdiction funds are proposed for both the forced andvoluntary eradication of coca and poppy cultivation by providing training, advisors, vehicles, aircraftmaintenance, ground-based infrastructure, communications, and support equipment. Alternativedevelopment funds are designated for the building of roads, bridges, potable water systems,electricity systems, irrigation systems, and schools and health facilities.
Bolivia. ACI funding for Bolivia is proposed at $91million -- $42 million for alternative development and institution building programs, and $49 millioninterdiction efforts. Alternative development includes economic development in coca growing areas,demand reduction education programs, and the expansion of physical infrastructure. Interdictionfunding would provide operational support for specialized counterdrug police and military units, andwould improve data collection for law enforcement activities. The United States would alsocontinue to provide support for a U.S.-owned helicopter fleet, and to maintain and purchase vehicles,riverine patrol boats, training and field equipment, and construct and refurbish antiquatedcounternarcotics bases.
Other Countries. Ecuador is the next largest recipientof ACI funds, with $26 million proposed for FY2005 -- $15 million for alternative development andinstitution building, and $11 million for interdiction. The objective of assistance to Ecuador is tostop or prevent any spillover of drug trafficking and guerrilla activity from Colombia, and to stopthe transit of drugs destined for the United States. Requested FY2005 ACI support in Brazil ($9million), Panama ($6 million), and Venezuela ($3 million) are also aimed at preventing spilloversfrom Colombia, and to provide interdiction support.
FMF and IMET Request. The FY2005 requestfor FMF for the Andean region totals $115.5 million, with Colombia receiving the largest portion,$108 million. Funding for FY2005 would be used to establish and strengthen national authority inremote areas that are being used by illegally armed groups and are cocaine producing areas. Boliviawould receive $3 million, Ecuador $2 million, Panama $1.5 million, and Peru $1 million tostrengthen their capabilities to interdict drug production and trafficking. The FY2005 IMET requestfor the Andean region is $3.8 million, of which $1.7 million is designated for Colombia. The IMETprogram focuses on civil-military issues for junior and mid-grade military officers.
Defense Department Counternarcotics Request. The estimate for FY2005 DOD counternarcotics funding for all of Latin America is $366.9 million. Activities include detection and monitoring operations to assist U.S. law enforcement agenciesinterdict drug trafficking. In the Andean region, support is provided in the form of training,equipment, and intelligence sharing activities. A country-by-country breakdown of DODcounternarcotics funds is not available. However, in testimony before the House GovernmentReform Committee on March 2, 2004, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations andLow Intensity Conflict Thomas W. O'Connell, reported that $200 million of the portion allocatedfor Latin America would go "to support Andean Region initiatives, primarily in Colombia." Fundingin previous years has averaged about $150 million per year.
Economic Assistance Request. Peru and Boliviaare the primary beneficiaries of Development Assistance and Child Survival and Health funds. ForDA, Peru would receive $10.5 million and Bolivia $14.5 million in FY2005. Brazil and Ecuadorwould each receive $7 million, and Panama $5.4 million. For Child Survival and Health, Peru wouldreceive $13 million, Bolivia $16.1 million, Brazil $7.6 million and Ecuador $351,000. EconomicSupport Funds in FY2005 would be divided between Bolivia ($8 million), Ecuador ($13 million),Panama ($3 million), Peru ($8 million), and Venezuela ($500,000).
section_title: Assistance to Colombia and Neighboring Countries
paragraphs: The Andean Counterdrug Initiative was designed to provide assistance to seven countries inthe broadly defined Andean region: Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, andVenezuela. The region is important to the United States because it includes three major drugproducing countries (Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru) where virtually all the world's cocaine andsignificant quantities of high quality heroin destined for the United States are produced. It alsoincludes two major oil producing countries (Venezuela and Ecuador), members of the Organizationof Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which supply significant quantities of oil to the UnitedStates. While the seven countries have diverse trading relationships, the United States is the majortrading partner for all of them. For the five traditional Andean countries (Colombia, Venezuela,Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia), the Andes mountain range that runs through South America posesgeographical obstacles to intra-state and inter-state integration, but the countries are linked togetherin the Andean Community economic integration pact. The ACI countries are some of the mostheavily populated in Latin America, including first (Brazil), third (Colombia), fifth (Peru), sixth(Venezuela) and eighth (Ecuador) most populous. Although Colombia and Venezuela have largelyEuropean-Indian mixed race (mestizo) populations, Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador have significantindigenous populations. (See appendices at the end of this report for funding tables.)
subsections: section_title: Colombia(4)
paragraphs: Colombia's spacious and rugged territory, whose western half is transversed by three parallelmountain ranges, provides ample isolated terrain for drug cultivation and processing, and contributesto the government's difficulty in exerting control throughout the nation. The country is known fora long tradition of democracy, but also for continuing violence, including a guerrilla insurgencydating back to the 1960s, and persistent drug trafficking activity. Recent administrations have hadto deal with a complicated mix of leftist guerrillas, rightist paramilitaries (or "self-defense" forces),and independent drug trafficking cartels. The two main leftist guerrilla groups are the RevolutionaryArmed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). The rightistparamilitaries are coordinated by the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). All threegroups participate in drug production and trafficking, regularly kidnap individuals for ransom, andhave been accused of gross human rights abuses. The three groups have been designated foreignterrorist organizations by the United States. The AUC and Colombian military have been accusedof collaborating in fighting the FARC and ELN. There are additional paramilitary groups thatoperate independently from the AUC.
U.S. Policy Debate. Recent debate on U.S. policytoward Colombia has taken place in a context of concern over the sheer volume of illegal drugsavailable in the United States and elsewhere in the world, and security concerns that have come intosharper focus after the attacks of September 11, 2001. The U.S. policy debate has focused on anumber of related issues, such as the effectiveness and implementation of the program in general,the nature of U.S. support to address what many consider to be a purely civil conflict, and thesocioeconomic factors that many observers claim are the underlying cause of the continuing conflict. 
Because Plan Colombia was developed as a six year plan, Congress will most likely reviewits progress in light of considerations of proposals to continue U.S. assistance after 2005. In additionto the basic debate over what role the United States should play in Colombia's struggle against drugtrafficking and illegally armed groups, Congress has repeatedly expressed concern with a numberof related issues. These include continuing allegations of human rights abuses; the expansion of U.S.assistance for counterterrorism and infrastructure protection; the health and environmentalconsequences of aerial fumigation for drug control; the progress of alternative development toreplace drug crops with non-drug crops; judicial reform and rule of law programs; the level of riskto U.S. personnel in Colombia and the continued captivity of several American hostages held by theFARC. 
In response to a request by the Administration and a report by the Council of ForeignRelations that recommended increasing the number of U.S. military and civilian personnel allowedto be deployed in support of Plan Colombia, the Senate approved the Administration request to raisethe statutory caps on military personnel from 400 to 800, and on civilian contractors from 400 to 600in the FY2005 National Defense Authorization Act ( S. 2400 / S.Rept. 108-260 .) (5) The House-passed NationalDefense Authorization Act ( H.R. 4200 / H.Rept. 108-491 ) raised the military personnelcap to 500 and maintained the civilian cap at 400. The Conference Report (108-767) was passed byboth chambers on October 9, 2004, and sent to the White House on October 21, 2004 ( P.L. 108-375 ). It raised the cap on military personnel to 800 and civilian contractors to 600.
Supporters of U.S. policy argue that Colombia is a beleaguered democratic ally under siegeby powerful armed forces of the left and right fueled by drug money. In the context of the global waron terrorism, and with the growing recognition of the relationship between drug trafficking and theguerrilla insurgency, proponents argue that Colombia and its neighbors should be supported withcounternarcotics and counterterrorism assistance before the situation deteriorates further. They favorexpanding the scope of military assistance to strengthen the ability of Colombian security forces tocombat the leftist guerrillas and to expand their control throughout rural areas, thereby undercuttingthe rationale and support for paramilitary groups. They also argue that guerrilla forces regularlycross borders using neighboring countries' territory for refuge and supplies, and that this has apotentially destabilizing effect in the region. The FARC and ELN have also claimed responsibilityfor attacking infrastructure necessary for Colombia's continued economic development. This isparticularly important in oil exploration and transport. Colombia exported 256,000 barrels per dayof crude to the United States in 2002, which is approximately half of Colombia's output. (6) 
Opponents of U.S. policy argue that the counterdrug program uses a repressive militaryapproach to curbing drug production which could provoke a popular reaction in rural areas. Theyargue for halting aerial fumigation of drug crops and aid to the Colombian military, believing thatcoca farmers cannot be expected to abandon coca farming voluntarily until adequate economicalternatives are in place. They fear that forcing such farmers to give up coca growing will only drivemany to the ranks of the armed groups, or to become displaced persons dependent on the state. Further, they argue that any decreases in coca cultivation in Colombia will be offset by increases inneighboring countries, as was witnessed in 2002 when reported acres of coca cultivation in Peru andBolivia increased. Instead, many urge that counternarcotics policy should stress interdiction ratherthan eradication so that the direct costs to peasant producers would be less. Some critics of U.S.policy would support a policy that focuses largely on economic and social aid to combat what theyconsider to be the conflict's root causes, curbs the still rampant human rights abuses by paramilitarygroups, provides vigorous support for a negotiated end to the fighting, and emphasizes illicit drugdemand reduction in the United States. Still others urge a regional and multilateral approach, inwhich drug consuming countries would fund land reform and rural development programs, ascomplementary to interdiction efforts. (7) 
Uribe Administration. Alvaro Uribe ran for theColombian presidency as an independent on a platform focusing on defeating the guerrillainsurgents, eliminating the paramilitaries, and ending narcotics trafficking. Upon taking office onAugust 7, 2002, he took a number of steps, some of which have proven to be controversial. (8) He promulgated a decreeinvoking emergency powers, allowing security forces to make arrests without warrants and imposingcontrols on movements in war-torn parts of the country. Under Colombia's 1991 Constitution, statesof emergency may be declared for 90 days, and then can be renewed for two additional 90-dayperiods. The country's constitutional court has, on several occasions, ruled unconstitutionalcomponents of the state of emergency that give security forces increased powers. In response, theUribe Administration introduced legislation in April 2003, which the Congress passed late in theyear, that would change the Constitution in order to give security forces permanent powers to tapphones and search homes without warrants in all parts of the country. At the end of 2004, theColombian Congress passed legislation amending the constitution allowing for the consecutivere-election of presidents. It is widely believed that Uribe will run for a second term.
President Uribe has taken a hard-line approach to negotiations, declaring that the governmentwould only negotiate with those groups who are willing to give up terrorism and agree to acease-fire, including paramilitary groups, with which former President Pastrana had refused tonegotiate. Uribe has increased the size of the military and police, largely through a one-time 1.2%war tax on wealthy individuals and businesses, and created a "civilian informers" program. Withregard to ending narcotics trafficking, President Uribe substantially increased resources for the aerialfumigation program, vowing to spray all coca crops by the end of his term in 2006.
There are indications that this hard-line approach has produced measurable results. PresidentUribe announced at the end of 2003 that 4,294 members of armed groups had deserted, an 80%increase over the previous year. Police are being redeployed to areas from which they had beenpreviously ousted by guerrilla groups. The homicide rate dropped 22%, and the rate of ruralmassacres dropped by 37% from 2002. The number of kidnappings fell by 32% over the same timeperiod. On the economic front, private investment increased 17% and the economy grew by 3.3%in 2003. Growth projections for 2004 are in the 3.5% to 4% range. (9) 
AUC Demobilization and Amnesty Proposal. OnJuly 15, 2003, the Uribe Administration announced an agreement with leaders of the AUC thatwould result in the demobilization of its members by the end of 2005. It is estimated that as manyas 5,000 fighters operate outside of the AUC, some of whom are negotiating separately with thegovernment, and others who are not participating at all. The Organization of American Statesestablished a Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia in February 2004 to mediate thedemobilization process.As part of demobilization, President Uribe has proposed controversiallegislation that would grant conditional amnesties to illegal combatants, which means that it couldalso apply to FARC and ELN fighters if they decide to enter into negotiations with the government.The United States has designated the AUC a foreign terrorist organization and has requested theextradition of two top AUC leaders, Carlos CastaÃ±o and Salvador Mancuso, on five indictments ofconspiracy to import cocaine into the United States. The State Department has confirmed that theUnited States will not drop its requests for the extradition of any Colombians under indictment inthe United States.
The Uribe Administration argues that without the inducement of amnesties, or the possibilityof paying reparations to victims instead of serving jail sentences, paramilitary leaders and fighterswill be unwilling to demobilize, and a spiral of violence will continue in Colombia. Critics of theproposal include Colombian legislators, political commentators, and international human rightsorganizations. They argue that AUC forces have been responsible for some of the worst violationsof human rights, including massacres of civilians, and that the International Covenant on Civil andPolitical Rights, to which Colombia is party, requires that states will ensure that violators are broughtto justice. Other critics argue that the paramilitaries are not respecting the accord and are continuingmilitary activities. President Uribe's proposal would allow the president to determine whichmembers of illegal armed groups would qualify for suspended sentences. Combatants who qualifywould have to agree to disarm and to demonstrate support for the peace process. Combatants wouldalso agree to make reparations, of money or assets, to victims directly, or into a government fund forvictims. The amnesty process requires that fighters appear before a criminal court where crimes willbe admitted and penalties imposed. Fighters would be convicted of crimes and then alternativepenalties to prison would be determined by a judge. In response to criticism, President Uribesubmitted revised legislation that requires minimum jail sentences of at least five years. Theproposal is pending before the Colombian Congress.
Coca Cultivation and Eradication. Upon takingoffice, President Uribe announced that aerial eradication, (10) along with alternative crop development, would form asignificant basis of the government's efforts. The Plan Colombia eradication spraying programbegan in December 2000 with operations by the U.S. funded counternarcotics brigade in Putumayo. Despite early indications that coca cultivation had increased by 25% in 2001, Colombian and U.S.officials reported decreases of 15% in 2002. The United Nations, using a different method of surveyand calculation, estimated a 30% decrease over the same time period. According to the StateDepartment, cultivation of opium poppy declined by 24% in 2002, and 10% in 2003. Cocacultivation in 2003 declined by 21%, according to the State Department. It is believed that the PlanColombia goal of having sprayed 50% of the country's coca crop by the end of 2005 may have beenaccomplished two years ahead of schedule. At the same time, however, the Office of National DrugControl Policy reported that coca cultivation remained stable in Colombia in 2004. It should benoted, however, that spraying does not prevent, although it may discourage, the replanting of illicitcrops.
Aerial fumigation has been controversial. Critics charge that it has unknown environmentaland health effects, and that it deprives farmers of their livelihood, particularly in light of a lack ofcoordination with alternative development programs. Proponents argue that both eradication andalternative development programs need time to work. The Secretary of State, in consultation withthe Environmental Protection Agency, certified on December 15, 2003 that the chemicals used inspray operations do not pose a risk to health or the environment.
Funding and Request for Colombia.
Under the P.L. 106-246 Plan Colombia funding, Colombia received $832million in State Department funds for assistance to the Colombian police and military, economic andalternative development assistance, aid for displaced persons, human rights, administration of justice,and other governance programs. In addition, $300.6 million was appropriated to the DefenseDepartment to assist the Colombian military's anti-drug efforts through interdiction support and thetraining and equipment of Colombian counternarcotics battalions. This amount also includedsupport for Andean regional counternarcotics programs. 
Under ACI allocations for FY2002, Colombia received $373.9 million, with$243.50 million in counternarcotics assistance, and $137 million in economic and social programs. 
Under the Emergency FY2002 Supplemental, the Administration requested $4million of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funding for police postsupport in areas of weak government control, $6 million of FMF funding (which Congress directedto be transferred to the INCLE account) for counter-terrorism equipment and training, and $25million of Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism and Demining (NATD) funding for counter-kidnappingtraining. The enacted legislation specifically provided $6 million for infrastructure protection forthe Cano-LimÃ³n CoveÃ±as oil pipeline, and fully funded the other accounts.
For FY2003, Colombia received $526.2 million in ACI funding for Colombia,including $377 million for narcotics interdiction and eradication, $149.2 million for alternativedevelopment. The FY2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental included an additional $54 millionin ACI and FMF funding bringing the total to $580.2 million. In addition, $110.1 million in FMFfunding was provided to train and equip a Colombian army brigade to protect an oil pipeline in thecountry. 
For FY2004, the Administration allocated $463 million for ACI, consisting of$150 million for alternative development, and $313 million for narcotics interdiction and eradicationprograms. The allocation for FMF was $98.5 million.
For FY2005, the Administration requested $463 million in ACI funding,consisting of $150 million for alternative development and $313 million for narcotics interdictionand eradication. The request for FMF was $108 million. Congress approved $466.5 million in ACIfunding and $100 million for FMF.
section_title: Peru
paragraphs: Peru, which shares its northern border with Colombia, is the second largest cocaine producerin the world and exports high purity cocaine and cocaine base to markets in South America, Mexico,Europe, and the United States. Nevertheless, it has been viewed as a success story incounternarcotics efforts because joint U.S.-Peru air and riverine interdiction operations, aggressiveeradication efforts, and alternative development programs have significantly reduced cocaproduction. Facing mounting protests, the Peruvian government temporarily suspended the drugeradication program in the Upper Huallaga Valley in early July 2002, but resumed the program inSeptember 2002 once concerns were addressed, in part to be eligible for Andean Trade PreferenceAct benefits. The State Department reports that coca cultivation had decreased in Peru by 15% in2003, after an 8% increase in 2002.
Peru has worried about spillover effects of illicit drug activities from Colombia. Respondingto press reports that FARC forces had penetrated into Peruvian territory, Peruvian officials stated inearly 2002 that there are no permanent FARC forces in Peru, but they conceded that they may crosstemporarily into border areas. Because of these threats, Peru moved military bases from its borderwith traditional rival Ecuador, where tensions have diminished, to the border with Colombia.President Alejandro Toledo, inaugurated on July 28, 2001, has had to deal with many strikes andprotests, with his popularity reaching new lows in 2003. With regard to drugs, Toledo labeled drugtrafficking a national security problem for Peru, and established a drug czar to better coordinatecounternarcotics initiatives. When President Bush visited Peru on March 23, 2002, the twoPresidents agreed to enhance cooperation on counternarcotics and counterterrorism issues. However,U.S. military aid to Peru was suspended on July 1, 2003, because Peru has not signed an agreementexempting U.S. citizens from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, which would resultin the loss of $2.7 million in assistance in FY2004, and $1.3 million in FY2005.
Representatives of Peru and the United States launched an investigation into thecircumstances and procedures leading to an incident on April 20, 2001, in which a Peruvian militaryplane shot down a small plane, killing an American missionary woman and her infant daughter, aftera CIA surveillance plane had indicated that the small craft might be involved in drug traffickingactivities. As a result of this accident, U.S. surveillance of drug-related flights in Peru and Colombiawas suspended pending clarification of procedures. The State Department released a report of theU.S.-Peruvian investigative team on August 2, 2001, concluding that "communications systemsoverload" and "cumbersome procedures" played a role in the accident. Current law ( P.L. 108-199 )requires the Secretary of State to notify Congress 30 days prior to resuming U.S. support for the airinterdiction program and to provide assurances that greater safety enhancements are in place. 
Funding and Request for Peru.
As part of the FY2000 Plan Colombia funding, Peru received $25 million forKMAX helicopters for the Peruvian National Police. 
Under ACI allocations for FY2002, Peru received $142.5 million in ACI funds,with $75 million in counternarcotics aid and $67.5 million for alternative development. No fundswere requested for Peru in the FY2002 supplemental.
Under the ACI allocation for FY2003, Peru received $128.1 million in ACIfunds, with $59.5 million in counternarcotics aid and $68.6 million for alternative development. Peru received no FMF funding.
For FY2004, the Administration allocated $116 million in ACI funds, with $66million in counternarcotics aid and $50 million for alternative development. Peru is to receive $1.7million for FMF funding.
For FY2005, the Administration requested $112 million for ACI funding,consisting of $62 million in counternarcotics aid, and $50 million for alternative development. Therequest also included $1 million of FMF funding. Congress approved $116.3 million in ACI fundingand $1 million for FMF.
section_title: Bolivia(11)
paragraphs: Landlocked Bolivia shares no border with Colombia, but Bolivia's significant gains inreducing illegal coca production could be threatened by any successes in controlling production inColombia. Once the world's foremost producer of coca leaf, Bolivia made great strides in reducingcoca cultivation under the Banzer-Quiroga administration (1997-2002). (12) However, forcibleeradication of coca has become a source of social discontent, exacerbating tensions over class andethnicity that may foment political instability in Latin America's poorest country. Moreover,according to the State Department, coca cultivation increased 23% in 2002 and 17% in 2003. (13) Nevertheless, Bolivia'scoca cultivation is still about half of its 1995 levels. It should be noted that Bolivian law allows upto 12,000 hectares of coca cultivation for traditional use. Bolivia has signed an article 98 agreementexempting U.S. citizens from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. In July 2003, andprevious to an agreement being signed, the Bush Administration had waived the withholding of U.S.military aid from the country.
For some 20 years, U.S. relations with Bolivia have centered largely on controlling theproduction of coca leaf and coca paste, which was usually shipped to Colombia to be processed intococaine. In support of Bolivia's counternarcotics efforts, the United States has provided significantinterdiction and alternative development assistance, and it has forgiven all of Bolivia's debt fordevelopment assistance projects, and most of the debt for food assistance. Bolivia, like Peru, hasbeen viewed by many as a counternarcotics success story, with joint air and riverine interdictionoperations, successful eradication efforts, and effective alternative development programs reducingillegal coca cultivation to the lowest level in five years, with a net reduction of approximately 70%between 1996 and 2001. Others, however, view the forced eradication as a social and politicaldisaster that has fueled popular discontent and increased the political support for oppositioncandidates. 
Current President Carlos Mesa took over the office upon the resignation of President GonzaloSÃ¡nchez de Losada, of the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR), who was forced to step downin response to widespread public protests in 2003. The protests were the result of long simmeringtensions over coca eradication policies, the continuing economic marginalization of the poorersegments of society, and a controversial government proposal to export natural gas via a port inChile, an historic adversary of Bolivia. The new President faces many difficulties in governing apolitically fractured society, one of the poorest nations in the hemisphere, within the context of ahighly mobilized indigenous community led by Evo Morales who finished a close second in the 2002presidential elections. Mesa also will be challenged to obtain congressional approval of revisionsto Bolivian law governing the natural gas industry after a national referendum endorsed Mesa'sproposed changes.
Funding and Request for Bolivia.
As part of the FY2000 Plan Colombia funding, Bolivia received $25 millionfor regional interdiction assistance and $85 million in alternative development assistance. 
Under ACI allocations for FY2002, Bolivia received $81 million in ACI funds,consisting of $48 million in drug interdiction and eradication, and $33 million in alternativedevelopment, and $500,000 in Foreign Military Financing. 
Under the FY2003 ACI allocation, Bolivia received nearly $91 million in ACIfunding, consisting of $49 million in interdiction and eradication, and $41.7 million in alternativedevelopment. In addition, Bolivia received $2 million in Foreign Military Financing.
For FY2004, the Administration allocated $91 million in ACI funds, consistingof $49 million for interdiction and eradication, and $42 million in alternative development. Inaddition, the Administration allocated $4 million in Foreign MilitaryFinancing.
For FY2005, the Administration requested $91 million in ACI funding,consisting of $49 million for interdiction and eradication, and $42 million for alternativedevelopment. The request also included $3 million in Foreign Military Financing. Congressapproved $91 million for ACI and $2 million for FMF.
section_title: Ecuador(14)
paragraphs: On Colombia's southern border, Ecuador is the most exposed of Colombia's neighborsbecause it is situated adjacent to areas in southern Colombia that are guerrilla strongholds and heavydrug producing areas. As a major transit country for cocaine and heroin from Colombia and Peru,Ecuador cooperates extensively with the United States in counternarcotics efforts. In November1999, the United States signed a 10-year agreement with Ecuador for a forward operating location(FOL) in Manta, on the Pacific Coast, for U.S. aerial counterdrug detection and monitoringoperations. Although the agreement is solely for the detection of drug trafficking flights in theregion, some human rights groups and politicians in Ecuador fear that the facility could be used tosupport operations against guerrillas in neighboring Colombia. Ecuador has not signed an agreementto exempt U.S. citizens from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, and it becamesubject to U.S. sanctions on July 1, 2003, with the possible loss of $15.7 million in FMF funding andIMET education in FY2004, and $2.3 million in FY2005. 
According to press reports, Colombian guerrillas pass into Ecuadoran territory for rest,recuperation, and medical treatment, and FARC camps have been detected in Ecuador's northernprovince of Sucumbios, where it was reported that barracks, ammunition, explosives and radioequipment were found. (15) Ecuadoran officials say they have uncovered and destroyedseveral small cocaine processing labs in the area. The Ecuadoran border region is experiencing aconstant flow of Colombian refugees into the poor areas, and fighters with Colombian paramilitaryorganizations have been arrested for running extortion rings in Ecuadorian border regions. Ecuadorand Colombia are cooperating with regard to border issues and improved communications. Ecuadorhas reinforced its northern border with Colombia as Colombian anti-guerrilla operations intensifiedfollowing the breakdown of the peace talks in 2002, and increasing pressure on guerrilla forces bythe Colombian military. (16) President of Ecuador, Lucio Gutierrez, has said that the armedconflict in Colombia is having an adverse affect on Ecuadoran peasants in border areas, and he hasclaimed that the aerial fumigation in Colombia is harming the Ecuadoran environment andnegatively affecting Ecuadorans' health. (17) 
Funding and Request for Ecuador.
As part of the FY2000 Plan Colombia funding Ecuador received $20 millionin U.S. assistance, of which $12 million was to support drug interdiction efforts, and $8 million wasfor alternative development assistance. Another $61.3 million has been allocated for theconstruction of a Forward Operating Location in Manta, Ecuador for counternarcotics aerialsurveillance. 
Under ACI allocations for FY2002, Ecuador received $25 million in ACIfunding, consisting of $15 million in interdiction and law enforcement programs, and $10 millionin alternative development. Under the Emergency FY2002 Supplemental, Ecuador received $3million in FMF funding.
Under the FY2003 ACI allocations, Ecuador received nearly $30.9 million inACI funding, consisting of $15 million for interdiction and law enforcement programs, and $15.9million for alternative development. In addition, Ecuador received $1 million in Foreign MilitaryFinancing.
For FY2004, the Administration allocated $35 million in ACI funding,consisting of $20 million for interdiction and law enforcement, and $15 million for alternativedevelopment. Ecuador received no Foreign Military Financing. 
For FY2005, the Administration requested $26 million in ACI funding,consisting of $11 million for interdiction and law enforcement, and $15 million for alternativedevelopment. The request also included $2 million in Foreign Military Financing. Congressapproved $26 million for ACI and $1 million for FMF.
section_title: Brazil
paragraphs: Brazil's isolated Amazon region, populated largely by indigenous groups, forms Colombia'ssoutheastern border. Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of the leftist Workers Party was inaugurated asPresident on January 1, 2003, after decisively winning the second round presidential election inOctober 2002, with support from a wide range of parties.
Brazil is not a significant drug-producing country, but it is a conduit for the transit of cocapaste and cocaine from Colombia to Europe and the United States. With increasing drug use withinthe country, a major action in 2002 was the passage of an omnibus Brazilian federalcounter-narcotics law. Brazilians have long been concerned about the sparsely populated territoryin the huge Amazon region, and they have been fearful historically of foreign designs andintervention in this territory. In an effort to exercise control over this vast territory Brazil hasconstructed a $1.4 billion sensor and radar project called the Amazon Vigilance System, or SIVAMfrom its acronym in Portuguese, and it has offered to share data from this system with neighbors andthe United States. It has established a military base at Tabatinga, with 25,000 soldiers andpolicemen, with air force and navy support. In 2000, it launched COBRA, an inter-agency bordersecurity program to deal with spillover effects from Colombia. In 2003, Brazil expanded COBRAto its northern borders with Peru, Venezuela, and Bolivia. The program focuses on controlling landand air entry into Brazil and is headquartered at Tabatinga.
Press accounts suggest evidence of Colombian drug traffickers encouraging indigenouscommunities in Brazil to plant coca, Brazilian drug traffickers linked to Colombian traffickers, andFARC incursions along the border. (18) In late June 2003, Brazil announced that it would increase thenumber of troops in states that share a border with Colombia. Brazil has not agreed to exempt U.S.citizens from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, and in July 2003 it became subjectto sanctions that could result in the loss of $500,000 in IMET military education and training fundsin FY2004.
Funding and Request for Brazil.
Brazil received only a small amount of Plan Colombia assistance, but under ACI allocations for FY2002 Brazil received $6 million in ACI funds, nearly all in law enforcementfunding. 
Under the FY2003 ACI allocation, Brazil received $6 million, nearly all in lawenforcement funding.
In FY2004, the Administration allocated $10.2 million in ACI funding, nearlyall in law enforcement funding. 
For FY2005, the Administration requested $9 million in ACI funding, nearlyall for law enforcement activities. Congress approved the $9 million request.
section_title: Venezuela(19)
paragraphs: Venezuela, Colombia's eastern neighbor, is a major transit route for cocaine and heroindestined for the United States and Europe. It shares a 1,370 mile border with Colombia of ruggedand poorly controlled territory. There has been increasing concern about the guerrilla conflict inColombia spreading to Venezuela. At times, Colombian guerrillas and paramilitaries have enteredVenezuela territory causing frictions in Colombian-Venezuelan relations. Late in 2003, Venezuelanofficials accused paramilitary forces of killing seven of its National Guard soldiers. Colombianparamilitaries have also been implicated in the creation of the United Self-Defense Forces ofVenezuela (AUV), a newly formed paramilitary organization. (20) Opponents of PresidentHugo Chavez regularly accuse him of harboring FARC guerrillas, but these accusations have notbeen substantiated. A controversial press report claims that there are as many as ten FARC campsin Venezuela. (21) TheFARC has issued communiques in support of President Chavez's Bolivarian revolution, leadingsome analysts and Chavez opponents to believe that the Venezuelan government is turning a blindeye to the presence of guerrilla camps. (22) 
There is some coca cultivation in Venezuela and the government has conducted someeradication efforts. In 2001, some coca fields were located and eradicated, and processing labs weredetected and destroyed. There were no eradication efforts in 2002, but both eradication and seizurestook place in 2003. Despite various policy disagreements with the United States, Venezuela hascooperated with the United States in counternarcotics efforts. The country is presently led byPresident Hugo Chavez, a populist and leader of an unsuccessful military coup in the early 1990s,who was initially elected in 1998 on a campaign to rewrite the constitution, rid the country ofcorruption, and more adequately meet the needs of the people. Under President Chavez, Venezuelahas undergone enormous political changes, with a new constitution and revamped politicalinstitutions.
Under the Chavez government, there has been friction at times in U.S.-Venezuelan relations,and Chavez has at times used anti-U.S. rhetoric. He denounced Plan Colombia as a U.S.-dominatedmilitary strategy, and denied the United States overflight rights over Venezuela territory for druginterdiction. Venezuelan officials have refused to exempt U.S. citizens from the jurisdiction of theInternational Criminal Court, and in July 2003, the country became subject to sanctions that led tothe loss of $700,000 in Military Education and Training funds in FY2004 and could lead to the lossof $50,000 in FY2005. The Senate Foreign Operations Bill for FY2004 ( S. 1426 / S.Rept. 108-106 ) contained a provision that would have denied Venezuela assistance if theSecretary of State certifies that Venezuela is assisting, harboring, or providing sanctuary toColombian terrorist organizations. In the conference report accompanying P.L. 108-199 , thisprovision was changed to a reporting requirement on Venezuela's alleged support for these groups.
Funding and Request for Venezuela.
While Venezuela received only a small amount of Plan Colombia assistance,under the final ACI allocations for FY2002, Venezuela received $5 million, consisting of lawenforcement and administration of justice programs.
Under FY2003 ACI allocations, Venezuela received $2.1 million in ACIfunding, consisting of law enforcement and administration of justiceprograms.
For FY2004, the Administration allocated $5 million in ACI funding,consisting of law enforcement and administration of justice programs.
For FY2005, the Administration requested $3 million in ACI funding. Congress approved the $3 million request.
section_title: Panama(23)
paragraphs: Panama, a part of Colombia until 1903, is separated from Colombia along its southern borderby the difficult and environmentally sensitive wetlands and rain forest of the "Darien Gap." Panama'shistory has been heavily influenced by its strategic location and the transit of commerce through thePanama Canal in the center of the country, where the major cities are located. Despite considerableeffort in the period leading up to the U.S. withdrawal from the Canal, Panama and the United Stateswere not able to complete negotiations to retain a formal U.S. military presence in Panama forcounternarcotics surveillance purposes. This led the United States to develop the Forward OperatingLocations (FOLs) in El Salvador, Aruba/Curacao and Ecuador as substitute locations for suchactivities. U.S.-Panama relations have been very friendly, however, and Panama did agree to exemptU.S. citizens from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court shortly before PresidentMoscoso's late June 2003 official visit to Washington, D.C. 
Panama is not a drug producing country, but it is a major transshipment point for cocaine,smuggled from South America, and it is a major site for money-laundering activity. In recent years,Panama has cooperated with the United States in bilateral counternarcotics efforts, seizing significantamounts of illicit drugs and enforcing recently passed anti-money laundering legislation. The twocountries signed a maritime interdiction agreement in 2002. In January 2004, Panama extradited analleged Colombian drug lord to the United States for prosecution on drug charges. The StateDepartment reports that Panama seized increased amounts of drugs in 2003, including significantamounts of heroin. (24) Panama's border with Colombia has been the scene of cross-border incursions by Colombianguerrillas and paramilitary groups. There is some evidence that paramilitary groups are beingfounded in Panama, with support from Colombian groups, because of the perception that thePanamanian government has left some areas unprotected. Shipments of small arms for theColombian guerrillas have been seized in Panamanian territory as well. In April 2003, Panama andColombia signed a border security agreement to strengthen security and prevent incursions byColombian guerrillas and paramilitary forces.
Funding and Request for Panama.
While Panama received only a small amount of Plan Colombia assistance,under allocations for FY2002, Panama received $5 million in ACI funding, consisting largely ofborder control and law enforcement funds. 
For FY2003, Panama received $4.5 million in ACI funds, consisting largelyof border control and law enforcement funds. In addition, Panama received $1 million in ForeignMilitary Financing.
For FY2004, the Administration allocated $6.5 million in ACI funds,consisting largely of border control and law enforcement funds. In addition, the Administrationallocated $2 million in Foreign Military Financing.
For FY2005, the Administration requested $6 million in ACI funding,consisting largely of border control and law enforcement activities. The request also included $1.5million in Foreign Military Financing. Congress approved $3 million for ACI and $1 million forFMF.
section_title: Major Legislative Activity in the 108th Congress on Andean Counterdrug Initiative Issues
subsections: section_title: Legislative Activity in 2004
paragraphs: FY2005 Foreign Operations Appropriations. OnJuly 15, 2004, the House passed H.R. 4818 ( H.Rept. 108-599 ) that fully funds the ACIat $731 million. However, the report stated the committee's expectation that ACI funding wouldbegin to decrease in FY2006 in light of the six-year Plan Colombia coming to an end. The billmaintained many of the provisions from previous law. (See section on "Congressional Conditionson U.S. Assistance.") These provisions included authority for a unified campaign, conditioned onthe Colombian military's respect for human rights. The bill also maintained the prohibition oncombat operations by U.S. military and civilian personnel, and reporting and certificationrequirements with regard to human rights. The bill also maintained the requirement for 30-dayadvance notification before resuming the Air Bridge Denial Program in Peru, and it maintained therequirement that helicopters procured with U.S. funds be returned if they are used for illegalactivities. The report directed that $5 million be provided to support programs benefitting internallydisplaced persons in Colombia and states the Committee's support for USAID alternativedevelopment programs in Colombia. With regard to Peru, the committee expressed concern thatalternative development funding is inadequate, with too much of a focus on forced eradication. Similarly, the committee stated its concern that alternative development programs in coca-growingregions of Bolivia should have local participation and financial support from the Boliviangovernment. The report also encouraged the Secretary of State to negotiate with European allies forlarger contributions to counternarcotic, alternative development, and judicial reform programs in theAndean region. 
The Senate Appropriations Committee reported S. 2812 ( S.Rept. 108-346 ) onSeptember 15, 2004. On September 23, 2004, the Senate passed H.R. 4818 , substitutingthe language of S. 2812 . The bill provided $731 million for the Andean CounterdrugInitiative; $272 million directed for alternative development and institution building programs. Ofthe $272 million, $240 million was apportioned to USAID, including $140 million for Colombia. The bill stated that "responsibility for policy decisions for the use of such funds, including whatactivities will be funded and the amount of funds that will be provided for each of these activities,shall be the responsibility of the Administrator of the United States Agency for InternationalDevelopment in consultation with the Assistance Secretary of State for International Narcotics andLaw Enforcement Affairs." The bill directed that not less than $6 million be available for judicialreform programs in Colombia, that not less than $6 million be made available for programs to protecthuman rights, and that not less than $2 million be made available for programs to protect biodiversityand indigenous reserves in Colombia. The bill provided authority to support a unified campaignagainst narcotics trafficking and terrorist activities, as provided in previous legislation. Thisauthority shall end if the Secretary of State has credible evidence that the Colombian military is notconducting vigorous operations to restore government authority and respect for human rights in areasunder the control of illegally armed groups.
The Senate also included a number of reporting requirements similar to previous years. TheSecretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of USAID, is required to submit a reportnot later than 45 days after enactment on the proposed uses of all funds on a country-by-countrybasis. The Secretary of State must also certify to Congress that the herbicide mixture used in aerialfumigation programs is being used in accordance with EPA requirements for comparable use in theUnited States and with Colombian law, and that the herbicide mixture does not pose unreasonablerisks to humans or the environment. This certification must be provided in order to release 20% ofthe funds used for the procurement of chemicals. The remaining 80% may be spent without acertification.
The bill required that no funds may be made available for aerial fumigation unless theSecretary of State certifies that complaints of harm to health or licit crops caused by fumigation areevaluated and fair compensation is being paid for meritorious claims. In addition, the bill requiredthat these funds may not be spent unless programs are being implement by USAID, the governmentof Colombia, or other organizations, in consultation with local communities, to provide alternativesources of income in areas where security permits for small-acreage growers of illicit crops. TheSecretary of State is also required to certify that the aerial fumigation in Colombia's national parksor reserves is in accordance with Colombian laws and that there are no effective alternatives toreduce illicit cultivation in these areas.
The bill continued a prohibition on any U.S. military or civilian contract personnel fromparticipating in any combat operations. Similarly, if any helicopters procured with funds providedin the bill are used to aid or abet the operations of any self-defense group, the helicopters must bereturned to the United States. With regard to the AUC demobilization process in Colombia, the billprovided that funds may be made available to support the process only if the Secretary of Statecertifies that 1) the Colombian legal framework governing the process provides for prosecution andpunishment in proportion to the crimes committed, of those responsible for gross violations ofhuman rights and drug trafficking; 2) the Colombian government is taking actions to ensure thedismantling of the underlying structures fo such groups; 3) the Colombian government is takingactions to enable the return of civilians forcibly displaced by such groups, and 4) the United Statesmay continue to extradite Colombian citizens in accordance with existing extradition treaties.
The bill maintained current law with regard to the Secretary of State certifying that theColombian government is taking actions to respect human rights and to prosecute violations. It alsocontinued the general prohibition on U.S. assistance to any units of security forces that are crediblyalleged to have committed gross violations of human rights. Further, it prohibited the issuance ofvisas to any alien suspected of providing support to any of Colombia's illegally armed groups.
Assistance to the Bolivian military and police forces was conditioned on their respect forhuman rights and cooperation with civilian judicial authorities, and the Bolivian government's effortsto prosecute and punish those responsible for violations of human rights.
Foreign Operations Conference Report. H.R. 4818 , the FY2005 Foreign Operations Act, became the base bill for theConsolidated Appropriations Act, FY2005, that was passed by both the House and Senate onNovember 20, 2004 ( P.L. 108-447 ). The conference agreement provides $731 million for theAndean Counterdrug Initiative and specifies that $264.6 million of this amount is for alternativedevelopment and institution-building programs. It further directs that of the amounts for alternativedevelopment and institution-building programs, USAID is to receive $237 million, including $125.7million for programs in Colombia. The agreement includes a 0.83% rescission for FY2005appropriations.
The conference report maintains current law with regard to support for a unified campaign,the use of U.S. funded helicopters, and prohibiting U.S. personnel from combat. It continues tocondition funding on a certification on human rights from the Secretary of State, and funding foraerial fumigation on a certification from the Secretary of State. As in FY2004, it requires that fundsfor aerial fumigation cannot be spent unless programs are being implemented to provide alternativesources of income for growers. It maintains the Leahy amendment on security forces and prohibitsvisas to anyone suspected of aiding Colombia's illegally armed groups. It also requires a 30-daynotification before resuming an Air Bridge Denial program in Peru. The Secretary of State isrequired to submit a report on the proposed use of funds on a country-by-country basis. It allowsassistance to the Bolivian military and police only if they are respecting human rights andcooperating with investigations and prosecutions of alleged violations of human rights. It alsoearmarks not less than $6 million for judicial reform programs in Colombia, not less than $6 millionfor programs to protect human rights, and not less than $2 million for programs to protectbiodiversity and indigenous reserves in Colombia.
With regard to the demobilization process in Colombia, the conference report removes aSenate provision on assistance to support the demobilization of illegal armed groups. Theconference agreement requires congressional consultation and notification prior to USAID obligatingany funds for peace initiatives in Colombia. The agreement also expresses concern that thedemobilization process is not ensuring the dismantling of foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) ordeterring members from resuming illegal activities and that the government of Colombia is notprosecuting those involved in drug trafficking and human rights violations. It recommends that theState Department not request FY2006 funds for demobilization unless the Department of Justicedetermines the activities are consistent with U.S. anti-terrorism laws, and that 
1) the FTO is respecting a ceasefire and cessation of illegal activities; 
2) the Colombian government has not adopted any law or policy inconsistent with its obligationsunder the U.S.-Colombian extradition treaty and has committed to the U.S. that it willcontinue to extradite Colombians, including members of illegally armed groups; 
3) the Colombian legal framework governing demobilization provides for prosecution andpunishment in proportion to the crimes committed of those responsible for gross violationsof human rights, violations of international humanitarian law, and drug trafficking, forreparations to victims, and for monitoring of demobilized individuals; 
4) the Colombian government is implementing a policy of dismantling such groups, includingseizure of financial and property assets; and 
5) the Colombian government is taking actions to enable the return of stolen assets, including realproperty, to their original owners.
It also requests that before any U.S. funds are provided to the OAS Mission in Colombia fordemobilization purposes, the Secretary of State report to the Committees on Appropriations that theOAS Mission is strictly adhering to its verification role, FTOs are concentrated in demobilizationzones, the legal framework governing demobilization conforms with (3) above, and theInter-American Commission for Human Rights is providing advice to the OAS Mission.
FY2005 National Defense Authorization. Boththe House and Senate passed defense authorizations acts with provisions relating to the Andeanregion ( H.R. 4200 / S. 2400 ). Both acts provided continuing authority fora unified campaign against drug trafficking and related terrorist activities, as well as maintaining aprohibition on U.S. personnel engaging in combat operations. The Senate act approved theAdministration's request to raise the cap on U.S. military personnel allowed to be stationed inColombia in support of Plan Colombia from 400 to 800 and the cap on U.S. civilian personnel from400 to 600. The House version raised the cap on U.S. military personnel to 500. The Senate actincluded a provision requiring a report from the Secretary of State within 60 days of enactment (inconsultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence) on anyrelationships between foreign governments or organizations with organizations in Colombia thathave been designated foreign terrorist organizations by the United States. Currently, this wouldapply to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army(ELN), and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). The report must describe whatdirect or indirect assistance these groups are receiving and the U.S. policies designed to address suchrelationships. Finally, the report ( S.Rept. 108-260 ) recognized the progress made by the UribeAdministration and the Colombian Armed Forces in combating narco-terrorist groups. 
The conference report ( H.Rept. 108-767 / P.L. 108-375 ) maintained language authorizing aunified campaign against drug trafficking and terrorism for FY2005 and FY2006. It raise the capon military personnel allowed to be deployed in support of Plan Colombia from 400 to 800, and thecivilian cap from 400 to 600. It maintained a prohibition on U.S. personnel participating in combatoperations. It also kept the Senate provision calling for a report on the relationship between foreigngovernments or foreign organizations and the Colombian organizations that have been designatedforeign terrorist organizations by the State Department. 
FY2005 Foreign Affairs Authorization. (25) On February 27, 2004,Senator Richard Lugar, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, introduced S. 2144 , the FY2005 Foreign Affairs Authorization Act. The bill authorizedappropriations for the Department of State, the Peace Corps, and foreign assistance programs. Thebill was reported out of committee on March 4, 2004; no further action was taken before the end ofthe 108th Congress. With regard to the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, the bill authorized $731million in FY2005, the same as the President's request. It maintained current law allowing funds tobe used to support a unified campaign against narcotics trafficking and terrorist activities. It alsomaintained the current cap on U.S. military and U.S. contractor personnel at 400 each, and prohibitstheir participation in combat operations. It also maintained conditions on U.S. assistance pendingcertification from the Secretary of State with regard to Colombia's human rights practices. Theseprovisions were also contained in S. 925 , the FY2004 Foreign Relations AuthorizationAct, and S. 1161 , the FY2004 Foreign Assistance Authorization Act, neither of whichwere enacted.
H.Res. 535. Introduced on February25, 2004 by Representative Jerry Weller, H.Res. 535 expresses concern and support forlocal elected officials under threat of assassination, kidnapping, forcible displacement, and coercionby terrorist organizations operating in Colombia. The bill was referred to the House InternationalRelations Committee.
section_title: Pending Legislation from 2003
paragraphs: FY2004 Office of National Drug Control PolicyReauthorization. The House passed H.R. 2086 , to reauthorize theOffice of National Drug Control Policy, on September 30, 2003 ( H.Rept. 108-167 , Part 1 and 2). The act would require a South American Heroin Strategy Report to be submitted to Congress within90 days of enactment on a strategy to fight the increased threat of heroin from the Andean region. S. 1860 was introduced in the Senate on November 14, 2003 and referred to the SenateCommittee on the Judiciary. The bill included a provision on a Latin American Heroin StrategyReport similar to the House bill.
FY2004 and FY2005 Foreign RelationsAuthorization. The House approved H.R. 1950 , the Foreign RelationsAuthorization Act for FY2004 on July 16, 2003. The act included language requiring the Secretaryof State to certify Colombia's compliance with accepted human rights practices. It also wouldrequire a report of the impact of U.S. assistance in support of Plan Colombia on Colombia'sneighbors. Language is also included which would extend U.S. counterdrug assistance for interdiction to arms trafficking. It would also require the Secretary of State to ensure, not later than180 days after enactment, that pilots of the opium poppy aerial eradication program be Colombiannationals, with preference given to members of the Colombian National Police. 
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported out S. 925 ( S.Rept. 108-39 ),on April 24, 2003 with one provision related to Colombia and the Andean region. Section 801would repeal the requirement in the Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Act for FY2000 ( P.L.106-246 ) that the State Department report semi-annually on the extradition of narcotics traffickersfrom Andean countries. During floor consideration in July 2003, two amendments relating toColombia were approved by voice vote. Amendment 1194 added Section 2522 commending theleadership and people of Colombia for progress made against drug traffickers and terrorists. Amendment 1162 added Section 815 changing the frequency of reports on U.S. personnel deployedin Colombia from bimonthly to quarterly. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee also reportedout S. 1161 , the FY2004 Foreign Assistance Authorization Act ( S.Rept. 108-56 ) onJune 10, 2003. The bill would authorize the ACI at $700 million (rather than the $731 millionrequested by the Administration.) It maintains language supporting a unified campaign against drugtrafficking and terrorist organizations, and personnel caps on U.S. military and civilian contractorsat 400 each. It would prohibit any U.S. personnel from participating in combat operations. It wouldalso maintain reporting requirements on human rights practices in Colombia.
Temporary Protected Status. Several bills wereintroduced to designate Colombian and Peruvian citizens under section 244 of the Immigration andNationality Act as eligible for temporary protected status (TPS). H.R. 2843 , introducedon July 24, 2003, would grant TPS to both Colombians and Peruvians. H.R. 2853 ,introduced the same day, would grant TPS to just Colombians. Both bills were referred to the HouseJudiciary Committee. In the Senate, S. 986 would designate Colombians as eligible forTPS. The bill was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. (26) 
section_title: Enacted Legislation from 2003
paragraphs: FY2004 Foreign Operations Appropriations. TheHouse and Senate Foreign Operations Appropriations bills were included in the FY2004Consolidated Appropriations Act ( H.R. 2673 ). The measure passed the House onDecember 8, 2003 and the Senate on January 22, 2004 ( P.L. 108-199 Division D). The conferencereport ( H.Rept. 108-401 ) provides $731 million for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, the same asthe President's request. It also provides a total of $4.294 billion in Foreign Military Financing, ofwhich the Administration estimates spending $124.1 million in the Andean region. The enactedlegislation maintains current law with regard to support for a unified campaign against drugtrafficking and terrorist organizations. It keeps the caps on U.S. military and civilian contractorpersonnel at 400 each, and prohibits them from participating in combat operations. It also maintainslanguage barring the use of ACI-procured helicopters if they are used to aid or abet the operationsof any illegal self-defense group. It continues to require a report on the use of ACI funds on acountry-by-country basis. It requires a certification on human rights practices in Colombia in orderto release 25% of ACI funding. It allows for the immediate release of 80% of funds for aerialfumigation. To release the remaining 20% requires certification from the Secretary of State, inconsultation with the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, on the health andenvironmental effects of the herbicide mixture used in spraying operations. The law also designatesthat $25 million be made available for justice and law programs in Colombia, and that an additional$13 million be made available for organizations and programs that protect human rights. It allowsfumigation operations in Colombia's National Park Service if the Secretary of State determines thatit is in accordance with Colombian laws and that there are no effective alternatives.
FY2004 Department of Defense Authorization. The House and Senate passed the FY2004 Defense Authorization Act in November 2003( H.R. 1588 / S. 1050 ). It was signed into law on November 24, 2003 ( P.L.108-136 ). With regard to counternarcotics, Section 1021 provides authority for the Department ofDefense to provide support for counterdrug activities by extending authority in Section 1033 of theNational Defense Authorization Act for FY1998 ( P.L. 105-84 ) for counterdrug support to Colombiaand Peru. Section 1022 authorizes the Department of Defense joint task forces to provide forcounterterrorism activities to law enforcement agencies, as it does for counterdrug activities. Section1023 extends for an additional two years expanded authority to use Defense Department counterdrugfunds to support a unified campaign against narcotics cultivation and trafficking, and againstassociated terrorist organizations in Colombia.
FY2004 Intelligence Authorization Act. TheHouse and Senate passed the FY2004 Intelligence Authorization Act in November 2003( H.R. 2417 / S. 1025 ). It was signed into law on December 13, 2003 ( P.L.108-177 ). Section 502 authorizes the use of intelligence funds for a unified campaign against drugtrafficking and terrorism in Colombia. It also maintains the prohibition on U.S. military or civiliancontractors from participating in combat operations in Colombia.
section_title: Appendix A. Map
paragraphs: Figure 1. Andean Counterdrug Initiative Countries
section_title: Appendix B. FY2003 Allocations
paragraphs:  Table 1. FY2003 Andean Counterdrug Initiative and RelatedPrograms; Allocations by Purpose and Functional Account
($ millions)
Source: U.S. State Department, Congressional Budget Justifications, Foreign Operations FiscalYear 2004, Fiscal Year 2005 . Prepared by CRS, March 29, 2004.
a. ACI is managed by the State Department's Bureau on International Narcotics Control and LawEnforcement.
b. Includes supplemental funding of $54 million: $34 million for ACI and $20 million from FMF,which could be transferred to ACI. In addition, the Administration used $17.1 million inFMF for programs in Colombia.
section_title: Appendix C. FY2004 Allocations
paragraphs:  Table 2. FY2004 Andean Counterdrug Initiative and RelatedPrograms; by Purpose and Functional Account
($ millions)
Source: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations FiscalYear 2006 . Prepared by CRS, May 10, 2005.
a. ACI is managed by the State Department's Bureau on International Narcotics Control and LawEnforcement.
section_title: Appendix D. FY2005 Estimates
paragraphs:  Table 3. FY2005 Andean Counterdrug Initiative and RelatedPrograms; Estimate by Purpose and Functional Account
($ millions)
Source: U.S. State Department, Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, FiscalYear 2006 . Prepared by CRS, May 10, 2005.
Note: For FY2005, Congress appropriated $1 million each for Guatemala and Nicaragua from theACI account.
a. ACI is managed by the State Department's Bureau on International Narcotics Control and LawEnforcement.
b. Total for ACI does not include $21 million for the Air Bridge Denial Program.
section_title: Appendix E. FY2000-FY2005 Funding
paragraphs:  Table 4. FY2000 to FY2005 ACI and DODFunding
($ millions)
Source: U.S. State Department, Congressional Budget Justifications, Foreign Operations FY2003,FY2004, FY2005, FY2006 . Prepared by CRS, May 10, 2005.
a. Includes $300.60 provided in P.L. 106-246 Plan Colombia legislation for counterdrug activitiesin the Andean region. Figures for FY2001-FY2004 are for Colombia alone. Amount forFY2003 includes supplemental funding of $34 million.
b. DOD estimate.