Plan Colombia: A Progress Report
Released: 2006-01-11T00:00:00

Summary:
Plan Colombia was developed by former President Pastrana (1998-2002) as a six-year planto end Colombia's long armed conflict, eliminate drug trafficking, and promote economic and socialdevelopment. The Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) is the primary U.S. program that supportsPlan Colombia. In addition, Colombia receives assistance from the Foreign Military Financing(FMF) program and the Department of Defense's central counternarcotics account. ACI funding forPlan Colombia from FY2000 through FY2005 totals approximately $2.8 billion. When FMF andDOD assistance is included, the total level of U.S. support to Colombia is $4.5 billion. Congressapproved the Administration's request to continue support for Plan Colombia beyond FY2005, butit also expressed the need for an evaluation of progress and a plan for future years.
The objectives of Colombia and the United States differ in some aspects, although there isa significant overlap of goals. The primary U.S. objective is to prevent the flow of illegal drugs intothe United States, as well as to help Colombia promote peace and economic development becauseit contributes to regional security in the Andes. The primary objectives of Colombia are to promotepeace and economic development, increase security, and end drug trafficking. Both U.S. andColombian objectives have also evolved over time from a strict counternarcotics focus to encompasscounterterrorism activities.
Because Plan Colombia is a six-year plan that expired at the end of 2005, Congress has beenand will likely continue assessing its progress in light of the Administration's request to continuefunding the ACI account, the latter having no statutory end-date. Congress has expressed theexpectation that funding would begin to decrease in FY2006. Some Members have also expressedthe opinion that the ratio between interdiction and alternative development should become morebalanced, and that the U.S. role should diminish as Colombia develops more operational capabilities.
Measurable progress in Colombia's internal security has been made, as indicated by decreasesin violence and the eradication of drug crops. After many years of stable prices, purity, andavailability of cocaine and heroin in the United States, prices for both drugs have increased, whereaspurity and availability have decreased. Military operations against illegally armed groups haveintensified, but the main leftist guerrilla group seems no closer to agreeing to a cease-fire. Thedemobilization of rightist paramilitary fighters is proceeding, but its is doing so amid controversywith regard to its implementation.
For more information on Colombia and the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, see CRS Report RL32250 , Colombia: Issues for Congress ; CRS Report RL32337 Andean Counterdrug Initiative(ACI) and Related Funding Programs: FY2005 Assistance ; and CRS Report RL33163 , Drug CropEradication and Alternative Development in the Andes , all by [author name scrubbed]. This report will beupdated as new data become available.

subsections: section_title: Plan Colombia and the Andean Counterdrug Initiative
paragraphs: Plan Colombia was developed by former President Pastrana (1998-2002) as a six-year planto end the country's 40-year old armed conflict, eliminate drug trafficking, and promote economicand social development. President Uribe (2002-present) has continued the work of Plan Colombia,but with an increased emphasis on security concerns. It was envisioned that a significant portion ofthe costs of Plan Colombia would be provided by the international community, although to date, theUnited States has been the most significant contributor. (1) 
The Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) is the primary U.S. program that supports PlanColombia, as well as assistance to other nations in the Andean region. In addition to ACI funding,Colombia also benefits from the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program, and the Departmentof Defense's central counternarcotics account. U.S. support for Plan Colombia began in 2000, whenCongress passed legislation ( P.L. 106-246 ) providing $1.3 billion for the region in interdiction anddevelopment assistance. ACI funding for Plan Colombia from FY2000 through FY2005 totalsapproximately $2.8 billion. When FMF and DOD assistance is included, the total level of U.S.support to Colombia is $4.5 billion. 
The Administration requested Congress to continue support for Plan Colombia beyondFY2005 with an additional $463 million in ACI funds, and $90 million in FMF for FY2006. TheFY2006 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act ( P.L. 109-102 ), enacted in November 2005,provided $469.5 million in assistance to Colombia. The conference report did not earmark FMFfunds to Colombia, but the Senate version approved the Administration's $90 million request. U.S.resources support the eradication of coca and opium poppy crops, the interdiction of narcoticstrafficking, and the protection of infrastructure, through the training and material support forColombia's security forces. U.S. programs also support alternative crop development andinfrastructure development to give coca and opium poppy farmers alternative sources of income, andinstitution building programs to strengthen democracy. Components of U.S. assistance includehuman rights training.
Because Plan Colombia is a six-year plan that expired at the end of 2005, Congress has beenand will likely continue assessing its progress in light of the Administration request to continue ACIfunding, the latter having no statutory end-date. The House-passed FY2005 Foreign OperationsAppropriations Act ( H.R. 4818 ) expressed concern that the FY2005 budget requestincreased ACI levels for Colombia, despite its scheduled conclusion. The language noted theCommittee's expectation that the FY2006 request for Colombia would be less. However, theFY2006 request essentially maintained the same level of funding for Colombia, $463 million. TheHouse version of the FY2006 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act ( H.R. 3057 / H.Rept. 109-152 ), while essentially approving the Administration's request, directed theSecretary of State to report to the Committee on a "future, multiyear strategy" for Colombia.
The House bill, as well as some individual Members of Congress, expressed the opinion thatthe ratio between alternative development and interdiction should be more balanced. The FY2006request maintained the same balance as in FY2005: $124.8 million for alternative development andinstitution building; $27.4 million for rule of law programs; and $310.9 million for interdiction. However, the FY2006 appropriation increased the amount for alternative development to $131.2million. Other Members have suggested the need for an exit strategy that would have Colombiadevelop the capabilities to take over the types of operations for which the United States is nowproviding support. The House appropriation bill included report language that expressed concernwith the Colombian government's ability to assume more operational and maintenance functions ofPlan Colombia.
section_title: Objectives
paragraphs: The objectives of Colombia and the United States for Plan Colombia differ in some aspects,although there is a significant overlap of goals. The primary U.S. objective is to prevent the flowof illegal drugs into the United States, as well as to help Colombia promote peace and economicdevelopment because it contributes to regional security in the Andes. (2) The primary objectives ofColombia are to promote peace and economic development, and increase security. Addressing drugtrafficking is considered a key aspect of those objectives. (3) 
The objectives of each country have evolved over time. This evolution became evident whenPresident Uribe was elected on a platform of taking a tougher approach to the illegally armed groups(IAG) that operate in the country and benefit from participation in drug trafficking. He vowed notto negotiate with any of the armed groups until they declared a cease-fire and disarmed. In addition,Uribe implemented new laws giving the security forces increased powers, and instituted a one-timetax to be used to increase the troop strength and capabilities of the Colombian military. Heincreasingly equated the guerrillas with drug traffickers and terrorists, and initiated a militarycampaign, called Plan Patriota , to recapture guerrilla-controlled territory. 
U.S. policy has also evolved from a strictly counternarcotics focus to support for Colombia'sfight against IAGs. In 2002, the Administration requested, and Congress approved, expandedauthority to use U.S. counternarcotics funds for a unified campaign to fight both drug trafficking andterrorist organizations in Colombia. (4) The three main armed organizations in Colombia -- the leftistRevolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the National Liberation Army (ELN), andthe rightist United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) -- have been designated foreign terroristorganizations (FTOs) by the State Department [pursuant to Section 219 of the Immigration andNationality Act, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ( P.L.104-132 )]. (5) In 2003 theFARC and AUC were designated Significant Foreign Narcotics Traffickers under the ForeignNarcotics Kingpin Designation Act ( P.L. 106-120 ). 
section_title: Assessment of Key Objectives and Issues
subsections: section_title: Drug Flows to the United States
paragraphs: After many years of stable prices, purity, and availability of cocaine and heroin in the UnitedStates, prices for both drugs have increased in 2005, whereas purity and availability have decreased. This represents the first statistics that may indicate that Plan Colombia is having a favorable effecton drug flows to the United States, according to government agencies responsible for tracking drugtrends. Colombia produces most (6) of the world supply, with 90% of the cocaine entering the UnitedStates originating in or transiting through Colombia. The country also produces significantquantities of high quality heroin. 
The supply of drugs is often judged by changes in price, with higher prices signifyingdecreased supply. In November 2005, the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP)announced that from February to September 2005, prices for cocaine increased 19% while puritydecreased 15%. This follows a long trend line, beginning in the early 1980s, of falling cocaineprices. Earlier in the year, ONDCP reported that the availability of South American heroin had alsofallen, with heroin prices increasing 30% and purity decreasing 22%. (7) Heroin purity had beensteadily increasing since the 1980s. Despite increasing prices, the National Institute on Drug Abuse(NIDA) reported that drug use among young people has declined by 11% from 2001 to 2003, andagain by 6% from 2003 to 2004. (8) While these surveys report a declining trend in overall drug use,they also report that the use of cocaine and heroin has remained stable. In fact, the National Surveyon Drug Use and Health reported that "There was no change in the overall rate of illicit drug usebetween 2002 and 2003." (9) The same report showed that cocaine and heroin use has remained stable over the same time periodat 2.3 million persons (not limited to young Americans) and 119,000 users respectively. Someobservers criticize the value of these types of surveys because they rely on self-reporting. (10) 
Some observers have expressed caution in interpreting the ONDCP figures on price, purity,and availability. They maintain that short-term fluctuations are not uncommon and may not besustainable. (11) Thereare several reasons why prices and supply remained stable for such a long period. In testimonybefore Congress in June 2004, John P. Walters of ONDCP argued that interdiction efforts take timeto show their impact on price and availability, and that the effect would begin to show in the next12 months. (12) Someargue that an increase in the street price of cocaine and heroin is unlikely to appear in the near termbecause of the large profit margin. Even if the availability of coca leaf and opium poppies isdecreasing, and consequently the price for the raw materials is increasing, they constitute a verysmall fraction of the U.S. retail price. Traffickers are easily able to absorb this increased cost. (13) 
The interdiction of the final product, rather than the raw ingredients, imposes greater costson traffickers. In June 2004, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) reported that domestic seizuresof heroin had steadily increased from 1,152 kilograms in 1999 to 2,351 kilograms in 2003. Seizuresof cocaine, both domestic and maritime, have increased from 106,623 kilograms in 2000 to 115,725kilograms in 2003. Much of this gain is from maritime seizures in the South Atlantic and Caribbean,and southwest Pacific regions. Operation Panama Express, which targets Colombian cocainetrafficking in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific oceans, resulted in seizures of more than 15.7 metrictons since it began operations in February 2000. (14) In Colombia, the Ministry of Defense reports cocaine seizuresof 148 tons in 2004, a 30% increase from 2003, and heroin seizures of 721 kilograms in 2004, a43.9% increase from 2003.
The State Department's International Narcotics Strategy Report 2005 (INCSR) credited theAir Bridge Denial (ABD) program (a joint U.S.-Colombian aerial interdiction program) with thedestruction of 13 aircraft, the capture of three aircraft in Colombia and eight in Central America, andthe seizure of about 3 metric tons of cocaine in 2004. This is in addition to the destruction of severalaircraft and the seizure of more than five metric tons of cocaine during 2003. The U.S.-fundedSpecial Reconnaissance and Assault Unit of the Colombian Navy seized 12 metric tons of cocaine,12 kilograms of heroin, 17 "go-fast" boats, 34 outboard motor boats, 2 commercial fishing vessels,and 75 traffickers. The Colombian Police Anti-Narcotics Directorate (DIRAN) is credited withdestroying 83 laboratories, and seizing 48 metric tons of cocaine and cocaine base, 1,539 metric tonsof solid precursors and 755,588 gallons of liquid precursors. (Solid and liquid precursors, such askerosene, are used to process coca leaf into cocaine base.) (15) 
section_title: Cultivation of Drug Crops(16)
paragraphs: Both the State Department and United Nations report decreases in acreage devoted togrowing drug crops since 2001, although the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP)recently reported no significant reduction of coca cultivation during 2004. (17) A key component of PlanColombia is the manual and aerial eradication of coca and poppy crops. (See the tables below foreradication and cultivation statistics.) The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)estimates that at the end of 2003, Colombia had 212,506 acres of coca under cultivation, havingreduced its production by 47% since 2000. Opium poppy under cultivation covered about 10,000acres, from 16,000 acres in 2000. (18) In 2004, ONDCP reports that 337,000 acres of coca and 27,000acres of opium poppy were sprayed. However, its recently completed survey concluded that the areaunder cultivation for coca remained stable in 2004, due to replantings of previously eradicated crops.Although the 282,000 acres of existing coca crops remained stable, ONDCP argues that cocaineproduction fell from 460 to 430 metric tons in the previous year because newly-planted crops are lessproductive. Opium poppy cultivation decreased by 52% between 2003 and 2004. The UNODCrecently reported that cultivation in 2004 had decreased by 7%. (19) 
In order to induce growers to give up illicit crops, ACI funding supports alternativedevelopment programs administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development. The StateDepartment reports that 12,845 families benefitted from this type of assistance in 2004, and a totalof 44,015 families have benefitted since 2001. The program supported the development of 40,791acres of licit crops in 2004, and 136,000 acres since 2001. In 2004, USAID completed 244infrastructure projects, bringing the total to 874 since 2001. 
 Table 1. Eradication of Drug Crops,1999-2004 (in hectares and acres)
Source: U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports , covering 2003and 2004.
The eradication program, including the aerial fumigation of crops, has been controversial. Criticism has centered on the possible environmental and health effects of the fumigant used, andon the pace of development programs to provide farmers with alternatives to drug crop cultivation. Some critics argue that the ratio of security assistance to alternative development programs is skewedtoo heavily in favor of the former. They contend that more resources need to be devoted todevelopment as the only sustainable method to reduce drug crop cultivation in the long run. (20) They believe the focus oncounternarcotics at the level of coca cultivation causes serious problems for growers who rely onillicit crops for their livelihoods. They contend that spray drift has destroyed licit crops and thatgrowers seeking compensation, as provided by law, are regularly denied benefits. (21) Some observers alsocontend that eradication of crops in one area results in their displacement to other areas, and they citecoca production increases in Bolivia of 17% in 2003. In the same period, cultivation in Peru dropped15%. In 2004, cultivation increased slightly in Bolivia and fell slightly in Peru, according toONDCP. This information counters the prediction of an official with Peru's anti-narcotics agencythat acreage devoted to growing coca probably increased in 2004 and that further increases could beexpected in 2005. (22) 
Some observers believe that reporting the acreage of crops sprayed does not reflect actualcultivation, and that the technology used does not produce accurate assessments. Fumigation causesdefoliation, but does not always kill the plant. Further, spraying does not prevent, although it maydiscourage, the replantings of illicit crops. Surveys of the area under cultivation conducted by theUnited States often differ from those of the United Nations. (See tables below.) According to U.S.government sources, the acreage under coca cultivation has dropped by 7% since 1999, while theUnited Nations shows a 50% decrease. There are also indications that growers are resorting tosmaller plots, and are interspersing them with legitimate crops, making the aerial imaging ofplantings difficult. The UNODC reported that the size of single plots had decreased, with themajority on plots of 7.4 acres or less. (23) 
 Table 2. Land Under Coca and Poppy Cultivation in Colombia, 1999-2004 -- U.S. State Department and ONDCP Sources (in hectares and acres)
Sources: U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports covering years20001, 2002, and 2003, and 2004; figures for 2004 are from the Office of National Drug ControlPolicy, "2004 Coca and Opium Poppy Estimates for Colombia and the Andes," March 2005.
 Table 3. Land Under Coca and Poppy Cultivation in Colombia,1999-2004 -- UNODC Surveys (in hectares and acres)
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Coca Cultivation in the Andean Region: ASurvey of Bolivia, Colombia and Peru , June 2005, and World Drug Report, 2004 .
section_title: Violence and Crime
paragraphs: Most observers agree that public safety conditions in Colombia have improved. Police havebeen redeployed to areas from which they had been previously ousted by armed groups, and nowhave a presence in every municipality. A greater security presence has significantly givenColombians more confidence to travel by road. According to the State Department, the ColombianNational Police has trained and deployed 9,176 officers to rural areas, 8,166 to protect majorroadways, and 397 to defend 12 of the country's 16 petroleum pipelines. Although the rate ofkidnappings has decreased significantly, Colombia still has the highest kidnapping rate in the world. Various studies conclude that the cost of the armed conflict to the Colombian economy is between3% and 7% of GDP. (24) 
 Table 4. Measures of Violence 
Source: Ministry of Defense, Government of Colombia.
section_title: Armed Conflict
paragraphs: A major goal of the Colombian government is to end the armed conflict that has plagued thecountry for more than 40 years. Several illegally armed groups of both the right and left operate inthe country and derive profit from participating in the drug trade. The two main leftist guerrillagroups are the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army(ELN). Most of the rightist paramilitary groups are coordinated by the United Self-Defense Forcesof Colombia (AUC). The AUC, with estimated membership ranging from 12,000 to 19,000, hasagreed to demobilize, resulting in their planned disbandment by the end of 2005. Legislation thatwould provide for conditional sentencing for their human rights abuses and other crimes, as well astheir reintegration into society, was approved by the Colombian legislature, and the demobilizationprocess has been proceeding. The new Peace and Justice Law has been controversial in bothColombia and the United States. Critics believe it is too lenient and could interfere with theU.S.-Colombia extradition treaty. Supporters believe it is the only possible way to end paramilitaryactivities. It is estimated that about half of AUC members have demobilized, leaving 10,000 yet tolay down their arms. (25) 
Negotiations with the FARC have not taken place under the Uribe Administration, since theFARC has refused Uribe's demands that they first agree to a cease-fire and demobilization. TheFARC controls vast territory in the country, mainly in the southern and eastern regions. There isconflicting evidence of FARC resources, most likely due to the difficulty in determining the extentof their business activities. The United Nations estimates that the FARC's average annual incomeis $342 million of which $204 million comes from the drug trade. However, the Colombian FinanceMinistry reports FARC revenue in 2003 at $77.16 million, of which drug trafficking accounted for$11.54 million. (26) 
In mid-2003, the Colombian military's Plan Patriota , a campaign to recapture FARC-heldterritory, began operations to secure the capital and environs of BogotÃ¡ from FARC attack. Thisphase was largely seen as successful, based on the decrease in kidnappings and roadblocks in theregion. In 2004, military operations, conducted by up to 17,000 troops, turned to regaining FARCterritory in the southern and eastern regions of the country. Anecdotal evidence indicates that theColombian military has forced the FARC to change tactics by atomizing into smaller cells to avoiddetection and reducing the number of large-scale attacks on military facilities. (27) However, renewed FARCattacks on military facilities and other military engagements in 2005 indicate an offensive capability.
The Colombian military claims that Plan Patriota has reduced FARC ranks from 18,000 to12,000 in the past year. (28) Information provided by the Office of the Colombian Presidentreports that the campaign was able to take back control of 11 FARC-run villages, destroy more than400 FARC camps, capture 1,534 explosive devices and 323 gas-cylinder bombs, kill 2,518combatants, and capture large amounts of ammunition and weapons. With regard to FARC drugtrafficking activities, as of September 2004, it was reported that the Colombian military located anddestroyed more than 47 tons of solid chemical supplies, 18,000 gallons of liquid precursors, half aton of cocaine base, and $34,000 in cash.
The smaller ELN, which some observers believe is less involved in the drug trade, has beenmore amenable to talks with the government. Both the ELN and the Colombian governmentaccepted a 2004 Mexican offer to facilitate peace negotiations, although a cease-fire is not in effect.However, in April 2005, the ELN rejected Mexican facilitation after Mexico voted to condemn Cubaat the U.N. Human Rights Commission. The ELN agreed in November 2005 to begin discussionswith the government, and meetings occurred in Cuba in December, with plans for more talks inJanuary. 
With regard to Plan Patriota , critics argue that because the territory is so rugged andinaccessible, complete defeat of the FARC may be impossible. They further point to the campaign'snegative effects on the civilian population by measuring the number of internally displaced persons(IDP). There are conflicting reports on IDP levels. The Colombian government reports thatdisplaced persons dropped 37% from 2003, while a Colombian human rights groups reported thatlevels increased 39% from 208,000 in 2003 to 289,000 in 2004, many of whom have not registeredwith the Colombian government as displaced. (29) The Department of Defense reports that Southern Command(Southcom) is supporting the development of a civil affairs capability of the Colombian military tomitigate the negative impact of military operations, and to integrate humanitarian assistance intomilitary planning.
Some critics of U.S. policy believe that assistance to the Colombian military serves toincrease its autonomy from civilian authority, and provides a rationale for the military to beconcerned with internal enemies, in the form of drug traffickers, rather than external threats, thestandard function of militaries. This is of particular concern in Latin America where militaries haveoften intervened in civilian politics. Critics contend that the United States should not be expandingthe role of foreign militaries to perform functions that would not be in line with its own laws or thoseof other democracies. (The U.S. Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 established the principle prohibitingthe use of the armed forces in law enforcement activities.) According to this argument, U.S.assistance counters other U.S. objectives, such as to promote democracy by ensuring civilian controlof the military. Instead, it blurs the distinction between police and military functions. (30) 
section_title: Economic Development
paragraphs: Confidence in the economy has increased with the improved security situation, althoughsome observers believe the country's economic rebound may be stalling. (31) The World Bankcharacterizes Colombia as a middle income country, with per capita GDP of $7,040 in 2003,according to the U.N. Development Program. GDP growth was 3.5% in 2004 with an inflation rateof 5.5%. It is estimated that the drug trade contributes between 2.0% and 2.5% to Colombia's annualGDP. (32) Colombia hadthe best performing stock market in the world in 2004. Colombian exports help the economicsituation, especially the benefits it receives under the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug EradicationAct. Colombia, with Peru and Ecuador, is currently negotiating a free trade agreement with theUnited States. 
Colombia has been an important petroleum exporter, but the armed conflict has led toproduction decreases. Oil exports are its largest single source of foreign revenue, accounting for28% of export revenues and 10% of government revenues in 2003. Production declined to 560,206barrels per day (bbl/d) in 2003 from a high of 830,000 bbl/d in 1999. It exported 195,000 barrelsper day to the United States in 2003, a decrease of 25% from 2002. This follows a 13.5% declinethe previous year. (33) Both the FARC and ELN have targeted energy production and transportation infrastructure. A majortarget has been the 490-mile CaÃ±o LimÃ³n CoveÃ±as oil pipeline. In 2001, it was bombed 170 timesresulting in shutdowns for seven months at a cost of approximately $500 million in revenues androyalties to Colombia. Since then, there has been a marked decrease in attacks. Aggressiveexploration of new reserves has been hindered by the fighting and the lack of effective governmentcontrol of all parts of the country. Colombian officials have warned that the country could soonbecome a net importer of oil if no new significant fields are found.
 Table 5. Attacks on Oil Pipelines,2001-2004
Source: Ministry of Defense, Government of Colombia.
section_title: Promotion of Democracy, Rule of Law, and Human Rights
paragraphs: The promotion of democracy and rule of law, and respect for human rights are sharedcomponents of both Colombian and U.S. objectives for Plan Colombia. The State Department'sannual report on human rights for 2004 reported that some progress had been made, but that seriousproblems remained. In 2004, there were between 3,000 and 4,000 civilian deaths due to the armedconflict. While the civilian judiciary is considered independent of the executive branch, it is reportedto be "overburdened, inefficient, and subject to intimidation and corruption by terrorist groups andcommon criminals." (34) The State Department report recognized that the security forces were under the effective control ofcivilian authorities, but that there were still instances in which members of the security forcescommitted serious violations of human rights, including cooperation with paramilitary groups. Labor union leaders continued to be targeted by illegally armed groups, hindering trade unionactivities, but killings of trade union leaders declined 25% during 2004.
The U.S. Agency for International Development supports programs to modernize the criminaljustice system, promote human rights, strengthen local government, and increase transparency. Thirty-seven "justice houses," providing access to legal services, have been created, handling about2.7 million cases since 2001. USAID also helped establish 35 oral trial courtrooms, and providedtraining for judges in oral trials, legal evidence and procedures. The establishment of oralcourtrooms is part of a larger effort to transition Colombia's judicial system from a Napoleonic toan accusatorial system, that it is believed will also improve its efficiency. TransparencyInternational, a non-governmental organization that monitors corruption, reported that Colombia'sranking in its annual survey had improved by 17% between 2000 and 2003.
Non-governmental organizations monitoring human rights have consistently criticized theState Department for certifying that the Colombian government is making progress with regard tohuman rights. U.S. law requires that the Secretary of State annually certify that the Colombianmilitary is suspending any personnel credibly alleged to have committed human rights violations orto have aided paramilitaries; that the government is cooperating with human rights investigationsand is prosecuting those involved in violations; and that steps are being take to sever links betweenthe military and paramilitaries and dismantle paramilitary leadership and financial networks. Criticspoint to the State Department's own annual human rights report indicating that there is still collusionbetween paramilitaries and members of Colombia's security forces and that little progress has beenmade on a number of pending investigations. Human rights organizations have also expressed alarmat the passage of anti-terrorism legislation that grants Colombia's security forces increased powersto detain suspects for up to 36 hours, to search homes, and to tap phones, without a legal warrant. In September 2004, the country's constitutional court ruled the legislation unconstitutional.
section_title: Regional Stability
paragraphs: A justification for U.S. policy in the region is that drug trafficking, with its money launderingand corruptive influences, and armed insurgencies in Colombia have a destabilizing effect on theregion. With porous borders amid rugged territory, and an inconsistent state presence in some areas,border regions are seen as particularly problematic. Colombia shares lengthy borders withVenezuela, Peru and Brazil, and much shorter borders with Ecuador and Panama. The StateDepartment's 2004 Patterns of Global Terrorism report states that Venezuela "continued to beunwilling or unable to assert control over its 1,400-mile border with Colombia," with the FARC andELN using Venezuelan territory as safehavens, and to transship arms and drugs, secure logisticalsupplies, and commit kidnappings and extortion. The situation has at various times heightenedtension between Colombia and Venezuela, the most recent tensions due to the kidnapping of a FARCofficial in Venezuela, who then turned up in Colombian custody. Tensions with Ecuador have alsoincreased, with accusations of incursions by Colombian troops chasing FARC units across theborder. Ecuador also is affected by a flow of displaced Colombians fleeing the fighting in the southof Colombia, according to an organization that monitors human rights in Colombia. (35) 
section_title: Prospects for U.S. Disengagement
paragraphs: Plan Colombia was presented to Congress as a six-year plan, and several committees haveheld hearings since in 2003 to assess its progress. Despite some expectations that U.S. support forPlan Colombia would end, or begin to decrease in FY2006, U.S. and Colombian officials haveargued that significant progress has been made, but that more needs to be done. (36) Colombia has developeda follow-up plan, yet to be publicly released, that would entail continued international support.
There has been measurable progress in Colombia's internal security, as measured bydecreases in violence, and in the eradication of drug crops. Recent price increases for heroin andcocaine in the United States may indicate that supply is being affected. Military operations againstillegally armed groups have intensified, but the main leftist guerrilla group has neither been defeated,nor brought closer to wanting to enter peace negotiations. The demobilization of rightistparamilitary fighters is proceeding, but the new Peace and Justice Law has been criticized for beingtoo lenient on AUC members who have committed gross violations of human rights and drugtrafficking crimes. 
While the demobilization process holds the promise of removing up to 19,000 fighters fromthe conflict, Congress has expressed concerns that the process ensures that illegally armed groupsare dismantled, deters members from resuming illegal activities, and holds accountable those whohave violated human rights and committed other crimes. The FY2005 Consolidated AppropriationsAct ( P.L. 108-447 ) recommended that the State Department not request funding for demobilizationuntil the Department of Justice determines that the process is consistent with U.S. anti-terrorismlaws, that the demobilizing groups are respecting a cease-fire and cessation of illegal activities, andthat the legal framework eventually adopted not prevent the extradition of suspected criminals to theUnited States. 
The FY2006 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act ( P.L. 109-102 ) provided $20 millionfor the demobilization process but conditioned it on a certification from the Secretary of State. Thecertification must demonstrate that assistance will only be provided for individuals who haveterminated their association with foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) and who are meeting therequirements of Colombia's demobilization law. It must also include assurances that the Colombiangovernment is cooperating with the United States on extraditions and is implementing a workableframework for dismantling FTOs. U.S. funds can only be used for verification, reintegration,vetting, recovery of assets for reparations of victims, and investigations and prosecutions.
Some Members of Congress have urged the "Colombianization" of the program, under whichColombian security forces would assume the operational capabilities to take over functions nowprovided by the United States. General James T. Hill testified to Congress in 2004, when he wasthe head of the U.S. Southern Command, that the capabilities of the Colombian military hadmeasurably improved, as evidenced by Plan Patriota . (37) On the other hand, the Government Accountability Officereported in 2003 that Colombia was not capable of assuming more responsibilities in the near future,despite U.S. training programs. (38) The Colombian government is now spending more on itssecurity forces than ever (4.5% of GDP), but some observers doubt the sustainability of the effortwithout fiscal reforms. (39) The House-passed FY2006 Foreign Operations AppropriationsAct ( H.R. 3057 / H.Rept. 109-152 ) included report language that expressed concern withthe Colombian government's ability to assume more operational and maintenance functions of PlanColombia.
Some Members believe the international community should be providing more support forPlan Colombia. The Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the House International RelationsCommittee held hearings on the topic on November 18, 2004. Rates of cocaine abuse have increasedin Europe, yet critics argue that Europe has not provided sufficient levels of assistance. TheColombian Agency for International Cooperation reported that the European Union and its memberstates spent about $120 million in Colombia in 2003. (40) At a February 3-4, 2005 international donors conference heldin Cartegena, Colombia, attended by the United States, Europe, Japan, Canada, Argentina, Brazil,Chile and Mexico, the Colombian government presented its demobilization plan and the need forinternational support. It is estimated that the AUC demobilization will cost about $160 million. (41) Donors expressed supportfor the demobilization process, but insisted that Colombia adopt a legal framework that ensuresdemobilized fighters are prosecuted for crimes, citing the need for "truth, justice, and reparations,"before aid would be committed. (42)