The Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Released: 2014-03-14T00:00:00

Summary:
In April 2009, then-Secretary of Defense Gates announced he intended to significantly restructure the Army's Future Combat System (FCS) program. The FCS was a multiyear, multibillion dollar program that had been underway since 2000 and was at the heart of the Army's transformation efforts. In lieu of the cancelled FCS manned ground vehicle (MGV), the Army was directed to develop a ground combat vehicle (GCV) that would be relevant across the entire spectrum of Army operations and would incorporate combat lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Army reissued a request for proposal (RFP) for the GCV on November 30, 2010, and planned to begin fielding the GCV by 2015-2017. On August 17, 2011, the GCV program was approved to enter the Technology Development Phase of the acquisition process and, a day later, the Army awarded two technology development contracts: $439.7 million to the General Dynamics-led team and a second contract for $449.9 million to the BAE Systems-Northrop Grumman team.
Starting in May and running through June 2012, the Army tested a number of foreign candidates during a Network Integration Exercise. This test informed the Army's Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), which is a requirement before the GCV program can progress to the next developmental phase. The AoA reportedly found no suitable existing, less expensive combat vehicles that could meet the Army's GCV requirements. On January 16, 2013, the Department of Defense (DOD) initiated a series of major GCV program changes which, while slipping the program schedule to the right and going to a single competitor during Engineering and Manufacturing Development, could save over $4 billion from FY2014 to FY2019.
The Administration's January 26, 2012, Major Budget Decision Briefing not only introduced a new Asia-Pacific strategic focus, but also delayed the GCV program for a year due to the SAIC-Boeing protest.
On February 24, 2014, Secretary of Defense Hagel announced the termination of the GCV program. Army officials contend that this decision was strictly a budgetary one as the GCV program was not experiencing any developmental problems at the time of termination. The Army also notes that some funding might be provided to continue unspecified GCV engineering-related efforts.
The Administration's FY2014 GCV Budget Request was $592.2 million in RDT&E funding. The FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 113-66) recommended fully funding the GCV budget request. The FY2014 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-76) appropriated $100.2 million for the GCV program for FY2014—a $492 million cut to the President's FY2014 budget request. Because DOD concluded the GCV program, there was no FY2015 GCV Budget Request.
Potential issues for Congress include the Army's plans for a Bradley replacement vehicle and whether a previously evaluated foreign vehicle could be a suitable replacement. Another potential issue is the precise program status of the GCV, as DOD pronounced the program was "terminated" but reports suggest the Army will fund and continue selected unidentified GCV science and technology activities in FY2015.

subsections: section_title: Introduction
paragraphs: In April 2009, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced he intended to significantly restructure the Army's Future Combat System (FCS) program. The FCS was a multiyear, multibillion dollar program that had been underway since 2000 and was at the heart of the Army's transformation efforts. It was to be the Army's major research, development, and acquisition program, consisting of 18 manned and unmanned systems tied together by an extensive communications and information network. 
Among other things, Secretary Gates recommended cancelling the manned ground vehicle (MGV) component of the FCS program, which was intended to field eight separate tracked combat vehicle variants built on a common chassis that would eventually replace combat vehicles such as the M-1 Abrams tank, the M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, and the M-109 Paladin self-propelled artillery system. As part of this restructuring, the Army was directed to develop a ground combat vehicle (GCV) that would be relevant across the entire spectrum of Army operations and would incorporate combat lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Congressional interest in this program has been significant, as the GCV is intended to equip the Army's armored brigade combat teams (ABCT). The GCV also represents the only "new start" for a ground weapon systems program and, because of the Army's history of failed weapon systems programs, current and future budget constraints, the program has been subject to a great deal of scrutiny.
section_title: GCV Program
subsections: section_title: Background: Secretary of Defense Gates's April 2009 FCS Restructuring Decision
paragraphs: On April 6, 2009, then Secretary of Defense Gates announced he intended to significantly restructure the FCS program. The Department of Defense (DOD) planned to accelerate the spin out of selected FCS technologies to BCTs, but recommended cancelling the MGV component of the program. Secretary Gates was concerned there were significant unanswered questions in the FCS vehicle design strategy and, despite some adjustments to the MGVs, it did not adequately reflect the lessons of counterinsurgency and close quarters combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. After reevaluating requirements, technology, and approach, DOD would then re-launch the Army's vehicle modernization program, including a competitive bidding process. In addition, the acquisition decision memorandum reaffirmed the establishment of a new ground combat vehicle acquisition program in 2010.
section_title: The GCV Concept3
paragraphs: The Army's 2009 Modernization Strategy focused on quickly developing a new GCV in a technologically versatile approach. This approach, termed the Incremental Development Approach, featured a modular design intended to accommodate vehicle growth in size, weight, power, and cooling requirements so that as technologies matured, they could be incorporated into new versions of the GCV with little or no modification to the basic vehicle.
The original GCV concept, in short, was to
field the GCV by 2015-2017; design the platform with sufficient margin for future capabilities; incorporate only mature technologies for vehicle integration; maintain a continuous armor development; and design the vehicle to accept current and future network capabilities (for example, radios, sensors, and jammers).
Army leadership had indicated the GCV could be either a tracked or wheeled vehicle. The Army had also suggested it saw "a lot of value in common chassis in terms of logistics support," and that it might pursue a common chassis for GCV variants. Other possible GCV features discussed by the Army included a V-shaped hull and side armor to protect against improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The Army also suggested the GCV would be fuel efficient. The air transportability of the GCV has been discussed as a key design consideration, and the Army had said the GCV must be able to fit on C-17 transports. In order for the GCV to be a "full spectrum" combat vehicle, the Army reportedly had required non-lethal weapon systems be incorporated into vehicle design. While the GCV is to have some military equipment directed by the Army, such as radios and chemical protection systems, Army officials are leaving most of the specific solutions to industry recommendations. 
section_title: The Initial GCV Request for Proposal (RFP)10
paragraphs: On February 25, 2010, the Army released the RFP for the GCV as described in the following DOD press release:
Army Ground Combat Vehicle Request for Proposal Released
The Army released last Thursday a RFP for the technology development phase of the Infantry Fighting Vehicle being developed under the GCV effort. The Army has worked extensively with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to develop this program. The GCV acquisition program will follow DOD best acquisition practices and be a competitive program with up to three contract awards. The GCV development effort will consist of three phases: technology development, engineering and manufacturing design and low rate initial production. The Army anticipates awarding the first contracts for the technology development phase in the fourth-quarter of fiscal 2010. 
The technology development phase involves risk reduction, identification of technology demonstrations, competitive prototyping activities, and planned technical reviews. Industry will have 60 days to submit proposals to the Army for this development effort. 
The Ground Combat Vehicle effort is part of a holistic Army plan to modernize its combat vehicle fleet. This includes incorporating Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles into the fleet while modernizing current vehicle fleets including Stryker. The first GCV will be an Infantry Fighting Vehicle offering a highly-survivable platform for delivering a nine-man infantry squad to the battlefield. The GCV is the first vehicle that will be designed from the ground up to operate in an IED environment. It is envisioned to have greater lethality and ballistic protection than a Bradley, greater IED and mine protection than an MRAP, and the cross country mobility of an Abrams tank. The GCV will be highly survivable, mobile and versatile, but the Army has not set specific requirements such as weight, instead allowing industry to propose the best solution to meet the requirements.
Prior to the release of the RFP, the Army engaged with industry through a series of industry days to inform them of the government's intent for GCV development and gain their feedback from potential contractors about GCV requirements and emerging performance specifications. In response to these initiatives the Army received significant feedback and insights on requirements, growth, training, test and the program at large thereby informing the requirements process and indicating the potential for a competitive contracting environment.
section_title: Selected Program Activities
subsections: section_title: Potential GCV Vendors13
paragraphs: In response to the Army's February 2010 RFP, three industry teams submitted technology development proposals to the Army. The first team included BAE Systems and Northrop Grumman; the second consisted of General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and MTU Detroit Diesel; and the third team, SAIC, Boeing, and the German firms of Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW) and Rheinmetall Defence. All three teams also had a number of other firms as part of their teams. The BAE Systems-led team design was an original design, with the team claiming that its design would exceed the survivability of the MRAP and would have enhanced mobility capabilities to allow it to operate in both urban and cross country environments. The General Dynamics team provided no details on its technical approach but stated its chosen design focused on soldier survivability and operational effectiveness and would incorporate mature technologies. The SAIC-led team stated its design would be based on the German tracked Puma IFV that was developed based on lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan. SAIC also emphasized all work, including production, would take place in the United States. 
section_title: Army Cancels the RFP
paragraphs: When the Army released the RFP for the GCV Technology Development (TD) phase in February 2010, it anticipated awarding the first TD phase contracts in the fourth quarter of FY2010. On August 25, 2010, while the Army was reportedly in the process of selecting the winners of the TD RFP, the Army's new Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology [ASA(ALT)], Malcolm O'Neil, cancelled the RFP in order to provide more time for technology integration as well to insure the Army would use mature technologies in order to develop the GCV within the established seven-year time frame. The Army reportedly planned to reissue the RFP within 60 days of the cancellation. It was expected the original industry teams would submit new proposals and other companies might also submit proposals.
section_title: Why the RFP Was Cancelled
paragraphs: The Army, in conjunction with the Pentagon's acquisition office, conducted a Red Team review of the GCV program in order to "review GCV core elements including acquisition strategy, vehicle capabilities, operational needs, program schedule, cost performance, and technological specifications." This review found the GCV had too many performance requirements and too many capabilities to make it affordable and relied on too many immature technologies. In response, the Army pledged the new GCV RFP would "dial back the number of capabilities the new system must have—as well as significantly reworking the acquisition strategy by focusing on early technology maturity and setting firm cost targets." In particular the Army reportedly planned to set a $10 million per vehicle cost limit in response to reports that initial estimates projected that the GCV would cost more than $20 million per vehicle. 
section_title: Revised GCV RFP Issued
paragraphs: On November 30, 2010, the Army issued a revised GCV RFP. Under this proposal, industry had until January 21, 2011, to submit proposals and the proposed vehicle could be tracked or wheeled. The Army included affordability targets of per unit cost for the vehicle between $9 million and $10.5 million and an operational sustainment cost of $200 per operational mile, with both affordability targets being in FY2010 dollars. In addition, the Army will require the GCV fit on a C-17 transport but not on a C-130. The Army was expected to award technology development contracts to three contractors by April 2011, and the Technology Development (TD) Phase is planned to last 24 months. An early prototype vehicle is expected by the middle of FY2014 and the first full-up prototype is expected by the beginning of FY2016. The Army planned for 1,874 GCVs initially, with the first production vehicle rolling off the assembly line in early April 2018, and the first unit should be equipped with GCVs in 2019. 
The new RFP is a fixed price incentive fee contract versus the cost-plus fixed fee contract of the previous RFP. The new contract has a ceiling of $450 million per contractor for the TD Phase. An incentive fee would split 80% to the government if the cost comes in under the negotiated $450 million ceiling cap, with 20% going to the contractor. If the cost comes in over the cap, the contractor assumes 100% of the additional cost.
section_title: Defense Industry Concerns with the Revised RFP23
paragraphs: Reports suggest defense industry had a number of concerns with the revised RFP. According to one report "industry still doesn't get what the Army is looking for," suggesting many of the technical specifications the contractors expected the Army to spell out were left open-ended and industry would have to propose many of the vehicle's technologies and features. Another concern was industry was not clear on how many vehicles the Army intended to build and questioned whether the Army could afford the production in the long run. According to the Army, the GCV is intended to replace infantry fighting vehicles in ABCTs, which would be 50% of the Bradleys in the ABCT. Some analysts suggest the GCV's price tag per vehicle could make it vulnerable to future budget cuts, with one analyst noting the cost was so high "the program is sure to be politically controversial and therefore suffer much the same fate the Marine Corps Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) has." 
Because of concerns the GCV program would not make it to production, issues regarding sustaining the industrial base have been raised. Analysts contend there are very few new combat vehicles currently in production, noting that Bradley A3 production ended in 2012; the last Stryker armored personnel carrier production ended in 2013; and the M-1 Abrams tank remanufacturing program is slated to end after 2014, leaving the improved Paladin self-propelled howitzer in production until the GCV starts production in 2017. Even though congressional action will keep the Abrams production line open, some defense industry analysts are concerned that with so few opportunities to develop and manufacture armored fighting vehicles, some long-standing U.S. defense firms might drop out of the business, thereby limiting bidding on any future armored fighting vehicle programs to foreign manufacturers. 
subsections: section_title: Defense Acquisition Board Approves GCV Entrance into Technology Development Phase26
paragraphs: On August 17, 2011, then Pentagon acquisition chief Ashton Carter signed an acquisition decision memorandum authorizing the Army to award technology demonstration contracts for the GCV program. Secretary Carter also directed the Army to conduct a "dynamic update" of the GCV's Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), which had been criticized by some as being inadequate. Secretary Carter also stipulated:
The GCV average procurement unit cost (APUC) would be less than or equal to $13 million (expressed in FY2011 constant dollars); Combined cost of replenishment spares and repair parts less than or equal to $200 per mile (expressed in FY2011 constant dollars); and Seven years from technology development contract award to first production vehicle.
section_title: Army Awards Technology Development (TD) Contracts27
paragraphs: On August 18, 2011—a day after Secretary Carter issued his acquisition decision memorandum—the Army awarded two technology development contracts. The first contract for $439.7 million went to the General Dynamics-led team and the second contract for $449.9 million went to the BAE Systems-Northrop Grumman team. The technology development phase is expected to last 24 months (not counting the period the contract was under protest). In April 2013, General Dynamics was reportedly awarded $180 million to extend the TD phase by six months and BAE was awarded $160 million for a six-month extension.
section_title: SAIC-Boeing Team Files Protest Over GCV TD Contract Award29
paragraphs: On August 23, 2011, the third team vying for the GCV TD contract, SAIC-Boeing, filed a protest with the Government Accountability Office (GAO) contending there were errors in the evaluation process, claiming the government relied on evaluation criteria outside the published request for proposal and aspects of the team's bid were discounted because of a lack of familiarity with the German Puma infantry fighting vehicle that forms the basis of the SAIC-Boeing vehicle. Because of the protest, the General Dynamics and BAE Systems-Northrop Grumman teams were required to stop work until the protest was adjudicated.
section_title: GAO Denies SAIC-Boeing Team Protest30
paragraphs: On December 5, 2011, GAO denied the SAIC-Boeing GCV protest, stating the Army's award of only two TD contracts was reasonable and consistent with the stated evaluation criteria and did not improperly favor the other two teams in the competition. On December 6, 2011, the Army lifted the stop-work order that had been placed on the General Dynamics and BAE Systems-Northrop Grumman teams so work could resume on the GCV.
section_title: Reported Reasons Why the SAIC-Boeing Team Was Not Selected31
paragraphs: Reports suggest that the SAIC-Boeing GCV proposal was rejected by the Army primarily due to concerns over the vehicle's proposed force protection features. The Army's primary concern appeared to have been the vehicle's proposed active protection system and the underbody armor designed to protect crewmembers from IEDs. As part of GAO's examination of the protest, it was noted that the Army:
Identified 20 significant weaknesses and informed SAIC that it was "of utmost importance" for the firm to address them, and that a failure to do so adequately would result in SAIC's proposal being found ineligible for award.
When the Army asked SAIC to provide more information on underbody armor, SAIC responded the information was classified and was the property of the German Ministry of Defense (MOD). While SAIC and the German MOD offered potential solutions, the Army judged these as inadequate to address its concerns. There were also additional Army concerns—such as insufficient head clearance for crew members, problems with vehicle occupant seating, a risk of toxic fumes in the crew compartment due to battery pack location, and various hazards affecting a soldier's ability to exit the rear of the GCV—that played a role in GAO's denial of SAIC's protest.
section_title: Program Activities
subsections: section_title: DOD Initiates Major GCV Program Changes34
paragraphs: On January 16, 2013, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD AT&L) Frank Kendall issued an Acquisition Decision Memorandum and an accompanying information memorandum detailing major changes to the GCV program to "enable a more affordable and executable program." These changes include the following:
The Technology Demonstration (TD) phase is extended for six months to enable contractors the ability to modify their designs in support of the requirement modifications to the Capability Development Document (CDD). While the contracts for the original 24 month TD were firm fixed price, the parallel work during this phase from the Analysis of Alternatives, Non Developmental Item (NDI) evaluations, and trade space evaluations with the contractors have provided opportunities to modify the requirements for a more affordable and executable GCV design. The additional six months in TD enables the contractors to complete preliminary designs that represent what we really want to produce. The Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) plan is to award both EMD and production options to a single vendor. This single change saves the department nearly $2.5 billion in RDT&E resources. Milestone B will remain as a full and open competition for the EMD phase of the GCV Infantry Fighting Vehicle Program and allows other vendors (including non U.S. NDI product based vendors) to propose modified NDI vehicles. In support of full and open competition resulting in a single award for EMD, the Army's previously planned procurement of long lead materials for test rigs and production prototypes is not authorized at this time. This decision eliminates spending scarce resources on incomplete designs and is consistent with our full and open competitive intent. Lastly, in support of the schedule risk associated with the integration during EMD and the six month TD extension, I have directed Milestone C to move from FY2018 to FY2019 and the associated re-phasing of procurement dollars. I will drive this program to hold this schedule to the maximum extent possible; this shift is both more affordable and executable. All of these changes, when supported with the approval of the requirements changes for the CDD under review, will save a total of $4+ billion over the FYDP [Future Year Defense Plan—FY2014-FY2019].
The major changes include extended the current TD phase by six months, permitting only a single contractor to proceed to the GCV's EMD phase and postponing the program's Milestone C production decision until FY2019, almost a year longer than the previously planned early FY2018 Milestone C decision. There have been concerns expressed by some that designating only one EMD contractor will eliminate cost savings from competition and extending the TD phase by six months and the Milestone C decision by up to a year will add cost to the program. 
section_title: DOD Announces the Termination of the GCV Program37
paragraphs: On February 24, 2014, during a news conference outlining his recommendations to the President for DOD's FY2015 budget, Secretary of Defense Hagel stated:
I have also accepted the Army's recommendation to terminate the current Ground Combat Vehicle program and re-direct the funds toward developing a next-generation platform. I have asked the leadership of the Army and the Marine Corps to deliver new, realistic visions for vehicle modernization by the end of this year.
Discussions with Army officials suggest, however, while the GCV program will not move forward, unspecified funding will be provided by DOD to continue certain GCV-related engineering efforts. The Army also notes the GCV program's termination had nothing to do with performance but, instead, was based entirely budgetary constraints.
section_title: FY2014 Budget Activity
subsections: section_title: FY2014 Budget Request41
paragraphs: The FY2014 budget request for the GCV was $592.2 million for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E).
section_title: FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 113-66)42
paragraphs: The FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act recommended fully funding the Administration's budget request. 
section_title: Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2014 (P.L. 113-76)43
paragraphs: P.L. 113-76 appropriated $100.2 million for the GCV program for FY2014—a $492 million cut to the President's FY2014 budget request. In light of DOD's recent decision to terminate the GCV program, it is not known how the Army will use these funds.
section_title: FY2015 Budget Activity
subsections: section_title: FY2015 Budget Request44
paragraphs: Because of DOD's decision to conclude the GCV program, no funds were requested for the GCV in the FY2015 budget request.
section_title: Potential Issues for Congress
subsections: section_title: What Are the Army's Plans for a Bradley Replacement?
paragraphs: For the second time in less than five years, the Army has cancelled its program intended to develop a replacement for the M-2 Bradley series infantry fighting vehicle. In the wake of this cancellation, there appears to be no clear way ahead for the development of a next generation infantry fighting vehicle. While the Secretary of Defense has called for the Army (and Marines) to "deliver new, realistic visions for vehicle modernization by the end of this year" Congress might decide to engage with Army leadership as they formulate their strategy to develop a replacement for the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle. Such a dialogue could facilitate greater understanding of the Army's future intentions and perhaps eventually facilitate a GCV follow-on program. As the Army will essentially be "going back to the drawing board" to develop a new fighting vehicle, it might also be a potential consideration to reexamine foreign-developed infantry fighting vehicles that were evaluated during the GCV's Analysis of Alternative phase. Some of the vehicles received highly favorable ratings during evaluations and could prove to be viable alternatives to initiating a third developmental effort to replace the Army's Bradleys.
section_title: What Is the True Status of the GCV Program?45
paragraphs: Despite Secretary of Defense Hagel's statement that the GCV program is to be "terminated," reports suggest that the GCV program will continue on as part of still to be defined science and technology effort. Army officials reportedly stated $50 million in FY2015 funding would be set aside from an unidentified account (there was no FY2015 GCV RDT&E budget request) to preserve the engineering base associated with GCV, and that another $100 million in research and development funding would be used in the Army's labs and research and development centers that had been involved in GCV efforts. The report suggests plans for how the Army will continue to manage the terminated GCV program remain unclear, but there would likely be a scaled-down program office and an overall program manager to manage contractor efforts and coordinate science and technology activities.
There appears to be a degree of disparity between DOD and the Army in terms of the true program status of the GCV. While DOD has terminated the GCV program, the Army appears to be continuing program activities and funding various unspecified aspects of the program. This situation could raise a number of issues for Congress. One issue is whether DOD and the Army have a common understanding of the GCV's program status and way ahead or whether disagreement exists regarding the precise status of the GCV program. Another question that might merit examination is, where in the FY2015 budget request is the $150 million for FY2015 GCV-related activities? Additionally, Congress might wish to examine how the Army will manage GCV efforts and what activities will continue to be funded and which entities will be involved in post-termination activities. Finally, Congress might seek greater clarity on how post GCV-termination science and technology efforts will provide "value added" for the next attempt to develop a Bradley replacement vehicle.