NATO Enlargement
Released: 2003-05-05T00:00:00

Summary:
This report provides a brief summary of the last round of NATO enlargement. The report analyzes the key military and political issues in the debate over seven prospective members named atNATO'sPrague summit. It then provides an overview of the positions of the allies and of Russia on enlargement, citing theeffectsof the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on the United States. It concludes with a discussion of recentlegislation onenlargement. This report will be updated as needed. See also CRS Report RS21354, The NATO Summit atPrague, 2002,CRS Report RL30168, NATO Applicant States: A Status Report, and CRS Report RS21510,NATO's Decision-MakingProcedure.

paragraphs: RS21055 -- NATO Enlargement
Updated May 5, 2003
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Congress is now considering enlargement of NATO, an issue addressed at the allied summit in Prague, in November 2002. During the last round of enlargement, the Senate voted 80-19 on April 30, 1998, in favor of admitting Poland, theCzechRepublic, and Hungary to NATO. (A two-thirds Senate majority is necessary to admit new states becauseenlargement isconsidered an amendment to the original North Atlantic Treaty.) Other members of the alliance followed suit, andthe threecountries became members in March 1999. It was the fourth time that NATO had admitted new states, withmembershipincreasing from the original 12 to 19 today.
At the previous NATO summit in April 1999, the allies underscored that they were open to further enlargement. Theycreated a Membership Action Plan (MAP), outlining structured goals for candidates, such as ending the danger ofethnicconflict, developing a democratic society with transparent political and economic processes and civilian control ofthemilitary, and pledging commitment to defense budgets to build military forces able to contribute to missions fromcollectivedefense to peacekeeping. (1)
At Prague, on November 21, 2002, the current members' heads of state designated the three Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania,and Estonia), Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania, as prospective members.
section_title: The Current Debate
paragraphs: In 1998, the congressional debate over NATO enlargement covered such issues as costs, mission, and qualifications of thecandidates. The issue of costs has now seemingly been put to rest because entry of Poland, the Czech Republic, andHungary does not appear to have required extra U.S. funds. Most observers believe that the three countries havecontributedto stability in Europe, and have made significant political contributions to the alliance in such matters as enhancingNATO'sunderstanding of central and eastern Europe, Russia, and the Balkans, given the history of the new members'involvementwith these regions. Militarily, their contribution is less apparent; each of the three contributes forces to theNATO-led peaceoperations in the Balkans, and is building forces to defend its borders. Pentagon officials believe that Poland hasmade thegreatest strides in restructuring and modernizing its military, and that the Czech Republic and Hungary have madeconsiderably less progress. (2) It should be noted thata period of years is normally necessary to rebuild a military that has hadan authoritarian tradition and convert it to one having civilian control, purge it of old-guard elements, reform itstraining,and purchase equipment compatible with a new set of allies.
There has been some sentiment that NATO should delay invitations to candidate states until democratic processes are firmlyentrenched. For example, the recent Hungarian government of Victor Orban was criticized for an ethnic "status law"thatsome interpreted as cloaking Hungarian aspirations for territory from neighboring states having Hungarianminorities. (3) Others reject such sentiments, noting that Orban was freely elected, and dismissing the status law as nothing morethan apassing example of nationalist politics before a close election. Nonetheless, it is possible that the period betweennamingcandidate states for accession negotiations at Prague in November 2002 and the moment when current NATOmembergovernments decide whether to admit those candidates (such as the vote in the U.S. Senate), could see debates overwhethereach candidate continues to meet criteria for democracy, particularly if there is an election bringing in a governmentthatmember states view as extremist. The North Atlantic Treaty does not contain a provision for expelling ordisciplining amember state.
Another factor for consideration could prove to be a prospective member's efforts to persuade its people that NATOmembership is desirable. Slovenia held a referendum on March 23, 2003; 66% of those voting, 66% supportedNATOmembership, despite popular opposition to the war in Iraq that approaches 80%. No other candidate state intendsto hold areferendum on NATO membership.
The essence of the current enlargement debate is over qualifications, with no apparent consensus. Of an original ninecandidates, two candidates, Albania and Macedonia, did not receive invitations at Prague. (4) Each of these countries issmall, with comparably small militaries potentially capable of specialized functions, such as transport or medicalcare, forexample, but only minimally capable of building forces able to contribute to high-intensity conflict. In the view ofsomeobservers, to adhere to the letter of the military qualifications outlined in the 1999 summit communiqué,requiring newmembers to contribute to missions from peacekeeping to collective defense, would be tantamount to excluding theirentry.
Many participants in the debate favor different standards that, in their view, reflect the current political situation in Europe,where Russia is no longer a military threat but ethnic conflict, nationalism, and terrorism are a danger. In suchcircumstances, they contend, political stability and a modernized military at least able to contribute to border defenseand topeace operations are an appropriate standard. Secretary of State Powell seemed to suggest such a standard in hisconfirmation hearing when he stressed a need for candidates to modernize their militaries, and to strengthen theirdemocratic structures. (5)
An opposing view is that NATO should first clearly define its mission, above all with an agreement on what types ofout-of-area threats, such as terrorism, proliferation, or a disruption of the flow of oil, should be met with a possiblemilitaryresponse. At that point, enlargement should be considered, with a determination about which prospective membersmightcontribute to the mission. Some observers, also hesitant about enlargement, note that the United States flew over60 percentof combat missions in the Kosovo conflict. They prefer prospective members that could relieve the U.S. burden.
Yet another view is that there is no clear dichotomy between collective defense (high-intensity conflict undertaken inresponse, for example, to the attacks of September 11, 2001) and collective security (peace operations andhumanitarianassistance). In this view, countries contributing to peace operations assist in building stable societies and preventing"blackholes," such as Bosnia or Afghanistan, where terrorism may take root. Countries involved in peace operations, then,arecontributing to the prevention of terrorism, and thereby to collective defense.
The terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, are affecting the enlargement debate. A likely part ofthe enlargement debate will be how prospective members might contribute to the conflict against terrorism or actto stem theflow of weapons of mass destruction. NATO seemed partially to settle one aspect of the debate over its missionshortlyafter the attacks when member states invoked Article V, the alliance's collective defense clause, to come to the aidof theUnited States in the conflict against terrorism. Previously, the European allies had resisted any statement that ArticleVshould be invoked in an out-of-area action against terrorism. At a NATO ministerial meeting in Reykjavik in May2002, theallies agreed that they must be able "to carry out the full range of... missions, ... to field forces wherever they areneeded,sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives." (6)
However, not all member states have sufficiently mobile or appropriately trained forces for the current tasks in Afghanistanand Iraq, for example. Few allies besides the United States have special forces or mobile, large-formation combatforceswith the potential to contribute meaningfully to such conflicts. At the same time, a number of allies have anintelligencecapability, transport, medical units, and political influence that might assist in such conflicts.
As the terrorism conflict unfolds, current members may examine how prospective members might be able to contribute.Contributions might include political influence and support, for example in the United Nations or with Russia orMuslimstates, and not necessarily military potential. They might also examine the level of internal security in the candidatecountries and ability to control borders, disrupt terrorist financial networks or apprehend terrorist suspects on theirsoil.Elements of the MAP that emphasize an end to corruption may be increasingly underscored, given thepost-September 11importance of preventing money-laundering, and combating a black economy.
The alliance experienced sharp divisions over whether to use military force against Iraq. In January 2003, Bush Administration officials applauded the decision of the 7 candidate states (and others) to sign a letter that, in general,endorsed the U.S. position on Iraq; some candidates state representatives complained that they had been bullied bytheAdministration into signing the letter. Six of the seven candidate states joined the coalition. Slovenia was theexception,but allowed overflight by U.S. and UK forces. The failure to achieve consensus in the North Atlantic Council overhow andwhether to aid Turkey in the event of an attack by Iraq exposed serious divisions in the alliance. (7) The fractious debate inthe NAC led some Administration officials and Members of Congress to raise the issue of changing NATOdecision-makingprocedures. (8)
section_title: Views of the Allies
paragraphs: The debate over enlargement is quite different in 2001 than it was in 1998. In 1998, several European allies stronglysupported enlargement. Today, most member states couch discussion of enlargement in careful terms.
Most member states agree that Slovenia is politically qualified for membership; in addition, Hungary urges Slovenia'smembership, once NATO criteria for entry are met, for strategic reasons. Hungary is not contiguous with any otherNATOstate. Slovenia's entry into the alliance would provide Hungary with a land bridge to Italy, a clear advantage givenneutralAustria's refusal during the Kosovo war to permit NATO overflights to Hungary. Slovakia is a credible candidatein someNATO capitals, given the return in September 2002 elections of key elements of its reform government. SomenorthernEuropean allies, such as Poland, strongly support membership for the Baltic states; they contend that the Baltic stateshavemet OSCE and EU political guidelines for democracy, and cite the three countries' work to build stability in theregion andto establish better relations with Russia. U.S. officials state that the Baltic states have made the most progress inmeetingMAP requirements, although there is some criticism of how Latvia has handled sensitive documents.
Italy, Greece, and Turkey are strong supporters of Bulgaria's and Romania's entry. They contend that these two countriescan contribute to stability in the Balkans, where Europe's greatest security needs lie. Critics counter that RomaniaandBulgaria continue to suffer from corruption in their governing structures, and that each must make stronger effortstomodernize its military. Bulgaria has also had a succession of governments that have followed an uncertain coursetowardspolitical and economic reform.
The views of the Russian government play a role in the debate. Putin's softer rhetoric against NATO enlargement since theSeptember 11 terrorist attacks has allayed concerns that his government would strongly oppose enlargement. It ispossiblethat Putin now views a unified front against terrorism, in part due to Moscow's ongoing conflict in Chechnya, asmoreimportant than potential divisions with the allies over enlargement. The Duma and much of Russia's military andintelligence bureaucracy remain adamantly opposed to enlargement, which they view as a U.S.-led effort to movea militaryalliance closer to their territory. Officials from allied states often counter such an argument by underscoring thatenlargement's purpose in large part is to ensure stability in Europe, and that the addition of new member statesprovidesstability, and therefore security, to Russia's west. Putin may also view the entry of Estonia and Latvia into NATO(and theEU, in 2004) as a means to protect Russian minorities in those countries, given NATO and EU strictures over thetreatmentof ethnic minorities.
section_title: Congressional Views
paragraphs: In the spring of 2003, both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee beganhearings on enlargement. Some individual Members have expressed their views, and relevant legislation has beenintroduced. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee produced a report on enlargement, together with theResolution ofRatification (Executive Report 108-6), the instrument on which the Senate will vote to give its advice and consenttorevision of the North Atlantic Treaty.
In the 107th Congress, Rep. Shimkus and others introduced H.Con.Res. 116 , which calls for NATO invitationsto the Baltic states for membership at the 2002 summit, as long as they satisfy the alliance's qualifications. It passedbyvoice vote on October 7, 2002.
On October 24, 2001, legislation was introduced in both Houses supporting further enlargement. Representative Bereuterintroduced H.R. 3167 , the Freedom Consolidation Act of 2001; Speaker Hastert and others cosponsored thebill. An identical Senate bill, S. 1572 , with cosponsors including Senators Durbin, Lieberman, Lott, Lugar,andMcCain, was also introduced. The bill recalled and approved legislation of the four previous Congresses that urgedenlargement and provided funding for particular candidates. The bill designated Slovakia as eligible to receive U.S.assistance under section 203(a) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994 (title II of P.L. 103-447 ). This section givesthePresident authority to establish a program of assistance with a government if he finds that it meets the requirementsofNATO membership.
In the 107th Congress, Representative Gallegly introduced H.Res. 468 , which described NATO as key to U.S.interests in Europe and encourages a continued path of improving relations with Russia. It strongly urged invitationstomembership for the 7 countries ultimately invited at Prague. It passed the House 358-9 on October 7, 2002.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee marked up the Resolution of Ratification on April 30, 2003. The Resolution isthe instrument on which the Senate will vote to give its advice and consent to admission of the candidate states. TheCommittee's report accompanying the Resolution reviews the strengths and weaknesses of the candidate states,assessingtheir political, economic, and military policies. It also reviews NATO's mission and capabilities, relations withRussia, rolein the Balkan wars, and the Prague NATO summit.
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has stirred NATO waters by suggesting the presence of an "old" and "new" Europe, theformer consisting of such countries as France and Germany, the latter consisting of recent new members andcandidatestates. Secretary Rumsfeld has suggested that the alliance's future belongs to the United States and the "new"Europe, withthe "old" Europe increasingly marginalized. European critics, some of them in the candidate states, oppose suchacategorization, noting that Germany has the largest economy in Europe, and that only France, with Britain, has amilitaryable to move its forces considerable distances for engagement in combat. These critics express concern that adividedNATO will not be effective in confronting threats that face each member state. (9)
section_title: Next Steps
paragraphs: Accession negotiations between NATO and the candidate states were completed on March 26, 2003, and the candidate stategovernments signed protocols that have been sent to the 19 member states, each of which will follow itsconstitutionalprocedures to amend the North Atlantic Treaty to admit new members. All 19 members must agree on a prospectivemember's qualifications for it to enter NATO. The Bush Administration would like for the Senate to vote onenlargementbefore that August 2003 recess. NATO hopes to admit the successful candidates in May 2004.