North Korean Crisis: Possible Military Options
Released: 2003-07-29T00:00:00

Summary:
North Korea has confronted the United States with its decision, failing other securityaccommodations, to pursue production of nuclear weapons. The Bush Administration has stated that, although thesituation isunacceptable, it will pursue its resolution through diplomatic means. Military means, however, could be consideredat some point andbecome a serious issue for Congress. This short report discusses the geography and military balance on the KoreanPeninsula,presents the range of military options that might be applied there to specific U.S. political objectives, and assessespossibleconsequences. Military options discussed are: status quo, improved defensive posture, enforce sanctions,preemptive strike againstnuclear facilities, and preemptive war. Also see CRS Issue Brief IB98045 on U.S.-Korean relations and CRS Issue Brief IB91141 onNorth Korea's nuclear weapons. This report will be updated if major changes occur.

paragraphs: RS21582 -- North Korean Crisis: Possible Military Options
July 29, 2003
subsections: section_title: Background: Geography and Military Balance
paragraphs: The Korean peninsula lies at a nexus of military, economic, and political concerns with global implications. From North Korea'sperspective, it is surrounded by world powers: to the west and north are China and Russia, to the East is Japan, andto the South isSouth Korea and military forces of the United States. Since the Korean War began in 1950, the North Koreandictatorship haspresented continuous military and economic challenges to its neighbors. Recent challenges have included a specterof economiccollapse and a threat to develop a nuclear arsenal.
North Korea, with a population of 22 million, maintains a large military force of over 1 million active soldiers and 4.7 millionreservists. Its force structure includes some 20 army corps with armor, mechanized infantry, and infantry units;notable enhancementsinclude 88,000 special purpose forces and a range of artillery, rocket, and missile forces (some reportedly capableof deliveringchemical and biological agents) (1) . Naval forcesinclude some 300 patrol and coastal combatants, 26 submarines, and 66inshore/coastal submarines for inserting special forces. Air forces deploy over 500 Russian fighter and attackaircraft and some 300utility helicopters. Detracting from the potency of this large force are the age and obsolescence of many combatsystems and lowtraining hours afforded to their crews. Many draftees may reflect weakness stemming from ten years of malnutrition.
Directly facing the North Korean threat is South Korea with some 48 million people. It has 686,000 personnel on active military dutyand can muster 4.5 million reservists. The South Korean Army is organized into some 10 corps, with equipmentgenerally better thanthat found to the North -- for example, half of its tanks are comparable to the U.S. Abrams tank. Its fleet of over350 helicoptersincludes U.S. AH-1 Cobras, CH-47 Chinooks, and UH-60 Blackhawks. The Navy deploys 26 submarines, 39principal surfacecombatants, 84 patrol and coastal combatants, and a 2-division force of 28,000 Marines. The Air Force flies over530 combat aircraft, including the F-16C/D. The South Korean level of training is considered generally higher than that of North Korea.
Integral to the defense of South Korea is the direct presence of some 37,000 U.S. military personnel. Major units are two brigades ofthe 2d Infantry Division, combat and support units of the Eighth Army (including Patriot missile batteries), and U.S.Air Force unitsdeploying 90 combat aircraft. Dedicated reinforcement and supporting forces are considerable, including a newStryker Brigade (2) and a corps headquarters in Fort Lewis, Washington and the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii. Powerful Air Force, Marine Corps, andNavy forces (totaling 48,000 personnel) are nearby in Japan, including the Seventh Fleet. Availability of additionalArmy forces inthe near term, however, would be limited by ongoing commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans, and otherplaces. (3)
A unique strength of the defense of South Korea resides in the command arrangements, both joint and combined. A U.S. officer,General Leon J. LaPorte, as Commander of the Combined Forces Command, would command all allied forces inSouth Korea duringwartime, as well as all U.S. forces. A South Korean general would be the ground component commander and haveoperationalcontrol of U.S. ground forces assigned to him by General LaPorte. Higher headquarters integrate both U.S. andSouth Koreanintelligence and operational planning, an area of frequent testing and exercise.
Major military action on the Korean Peninsula could create a challenge exceeding that recently met by the United States and its alliesin Iraq. Some 80% of the peninsula, about the size of Utah, is covered by rugged hills and mountains. (4) The winters are bitterly cold,while the summers are hot and humid with periodic torrential rains and flooding. Much of the North Korean forceis protected by asystem of underground caves and tunnels. About two-thirds of the North Korean force is forward deployed alongthe DemilitarizedZone (DMZ), the northern boundary of South Korea. Complicating military defensive planning is the location ofSeoul, the capital ofSouth Korea. Seoul, a metropolis of some 10 million people, sits astride the major trafficable corridor betweenNorth and SouthKorea, as close as 25 miles to the DMZ. In a surprise attack, the North could inflict artillery and missile devastationupon Seoul --referred to by the North as a "sea of fire" (5) -- andpossibly reach the city with a coordinated ground and special operations attack.
section_title: U.S. Military Alternatives
paragraphs: Should resort to force be deemed necessary, there are several military actions that the United States could contemplate to achievepolicy objectives on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea, unfortunately, has a history of unpredictable, and oftenviolent, reactions toeven slight provocations. Therefore, even the most modest U.S. military action risks escalation to higher levels ofconflict and mostanalysts agree that no military option should be chosen without full recognition of such danger. Also, acombination of options couldbe chosen or even anticipated to ensue. U.S. allies and other nations in Northeast Asia are aware of these dangersand the UnitedStates would likely undertake some form of consultation with them -- their active or passive cooperation could beneeded. Some suggest that, in light of potentially large casualties, proceeding without South Korean agreement "would be immoralas well asill-advised." (6)
Status Quo. Current U.S. policy involves maintaining a stable military situationwhile diplomacy proceeds to solve the North Korean nuclear crisis. South Korea and the United States maintainstrong defenses alongthe DMZ. Periodic military exercises elicit complaints from North Korean officials, but, over time, they generallyseem accustomedto and respect the existing military situation. (7) Somehave suggested withdrawal or drawdown of U.S. forces, but other analystsbelieve this could, in a time of tensions, send unintended messages to North Korea or even to one or more of itspowerful neighbors. Ongoing studies and negotiations propose to relocate U.S. ground forces and headquarters, primarily by movingthe U.S. 2d InfantryDivision from the north to the south of Seoul. (8) Sucha move would give U.S. forces greater flexibility to maneuver and make themless vulnerable to a surprise attack -- essentially lessening the "tripwire" effect of having U.S. forces close to theDMZ. Whethersuch an action will make the military situation more or less stable could be argued either way, (9) but the overall effect should notunduly change the military status quo on the Korean Peninsula. 
Improve Defensive Posture. Recognizing that the current situation is unusuallytense, the United States and South Korea could adopt a policy of temporarily increasing military preparedness todeter a NorthKorean military strike, (10) improve allied odds todefeat such a strike, or reinforce diplomatic firmness. The least provocative actionmight be to add more robust intelligence and warning activities, both those based in South Korea and those usingspace assets andadjoining air and sea access. Other options include: upgrading and testing alternate command headquarters,including thoseunderground, as well as information and communications networks; adding more air and missile defense assets toprotect additionalkey government and military facilities in South Korea and Japan; and, strengthening unit reception plans andfacilities forreinforcements. In so far as the North Korean crisis is recognized as a priority military challenge to the UnitedStates, the measuresabove are, in some cases, underway, according to recent press reports. (11) Although possible, it is unlikely that North Korea wouldattack solely in response to such gradual, defensive measures. It might, however, feel greater pressure to either reacha diplomaticsolution or expend more resources on its own military establishment.
Calling up South Korean reservists or moving additional U.S. combat forces into the Peninsula might also be considered. Unlessdone in response to overtly hostile North Korean actions or intentions, such actions would most likely be construedas a seriousprovocation or possibly a prelude to an allied attack. North Korean sensitivity is illustrated by statements of concerneven whentemporary U.S. buildups and exercises are held in Okinawa. (12)
Military Enforcement of Sanctions. Should North Korea attempt to export weapons of mass destruction, longer range missiles, or the materials to create such things, interception on the highseas or in the air bymilitary forces might be considered. (13) U.S. andinternational policy objectives would be to enforce nonproliferation goals and,perhaps secondarily, to restrict hard currency gains from such transactions. Such a "blockade," "quarantine," or"containment," to beeffective, would require large, dedicated U.S. Navy and Air Force participation, and at least some Coast Guardassets. It wouldrequire the cooperation of other nations and international organizations, not least being a commitment from Chinaand Russia toactively seal their land, sea, and air borders from penetration by North Korean conveyances and those of theircustomers. 
Risks for such an operation are that innocent trade and other activities of many nations could be inconvenienced; North Korea mightcircumvent even sophisticated intelligence and interception operations; and, since a blockade is considered an actof war, North Koreamight respond with military action. (14)
Preemptive Strike on Nuclear Facilities. The Administration's National SecurityStrategy reserves the option for the President to order a preemptive strike to forestall a weapons of mass destructionattack against theUnited States, its military forces, or its allies. (15) In this case, the possession of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles could threaten,now or in the short term, U.S. forces and allied populations in South Korea and Japan. In the longer term, a fewobservers areconcerned that North Korea could threaten more distant targets, to include parts of the U.S. homeland. (16) There is also the possibilitythat North Korean nuclear materials and weapons could be exported to third parties -- terrorist groups or rogue states-- that mightwish to harm the United States. In any event, a policy option would be to destroy identified weapons and materialsand associatedproduction facilities in North Korea; it would be complicated by the North Korean's ability to hide or protect suchtargets, oftendeeply underground. 
The United States has the ability to deliver both conventional and nuclear weapons against some underground targets, and is studying "robust nuclear earth penetrators." (17) Some targetscould presumably also be neutralized with special forces operations. A risk with apreemptive strike option is that all identified targets, if they do exist, might not be accurately located and that somemay be deeply oreffectively protected against U.S. weapons. (18) Surviving capabilities might be used in retaliatory strikes, possibly creating calamitiesthat U.S. policy was trying to prevent. U.S. strikes would undoubtedly be considered acts of war, and North Koreacould attempt tolaunch selective or massive conventional attacks against South Korea in response. (19) It is, therefore, unlikely that South Korea wouldsupport a preemptive strike option under most circumstances.
Preemptive War. Initiating general war with North Korea is an unlikely option forthe United States, as South Korea would be unwilling to sustain the resultant, huge costs on its population withoutextremeprovocation. In theory, however, two policy objectives might be met. First, should regime change in North Koreabecome a prioritypolicy objective, a military march to Pyongyang might be the only sure means available. Second, should a majorNorth Korean attacksouth appear imminent, the policy of preemptive attack might offer advantages: the initial allied targeting andassaults could reduceNorth Korean capabilities to destroy Seoul, WMD could be destroyed or captured, and allied commanders wouldbe able to executetheir plan with nonattritted forces -- a particular advantage if the United States followed a doctrine of rapid, joint,and coordinatedattacks throughout the depth of North Korea.
In considering a war option, certain assumptions and risks would need to be assessed. First, international support for the war wouldbe desirable, given U.S. reliance on global communications and transport; China's reaction would be key -- at theminimum it wouldhave to be neutral. Next, it would be difficult to mask attack preparations by U.S. and South Korean forces. NorthKorea couldlaunch its own preemptive attack, possibly creating some of the adverse consequences U.S. policy was trying tocircumvent. Also,timing is a problem -- due to heavy commitments in Iraq and many other places, the U.S. Army is currently stretchedvery thin, andwould find it difficult to contribute the major ground forces needed. (20) To sustain such an operation, it is likely that many ArmyNational Guard and Army Reserve units not already on active duty would have to be mobilized, as well asconsiderable numbers ofindividual reservists to fill out units and replace casualties. It is likely that much of any post-war occupation ofNorth Korea requiredcould be accomplished by South Korea.
Finally, American public acceptance of a more difficult and protracted war than it might expect based on recent, quick U.S. militaryvictories in Southwest Asia and the Balkans may be a requisite. In addition to geographic problems highlightedabove and a largerenemy force that has possibly learned through observation how the United States fights, the North Korean soldiermay not surrendereasily. The Korean War of 1950-1953 is a cautionary example: one U.S. veteran of that conflict said, "I'd ratherfight the Chinese anyday than the North Koreans, who were more tenacious, more fanatical, and more disciplined." (21) Others would point out that today'sNorth Korean soldier is physically weaker, may resent state oppression, is severely outclassed in weaponry andexperience withmodern warfare -- and the current limits of his tenacity are not known. Should a military option be deemednecessary, the Executivewould be expected to consult with appropriate congressional bodies.