Department of Homeland Security: Options for House and Senate Committee Organization
Released: 2004-08-13T00:00:00

Summary:
The 9/11 Commission Report recommended that the House and Senateeach have a "permanent standingcommittee" as the principal committee for conducting oversight and review for homeland security. Earlier, pursuantto PL 107-296, the Homeland SecurityAct, a new Department of Homeland Security was established. Congress began discussions regarding theappropriate congressional structure to conductoversight and fund the new department. Section 1503 of the legislation states the sense of Congress that eachchamber should review its committee structure inlight of the reorganization of the executive branch, and the House, in the 108th Congress, establisheda Select Committee on Homeland Security with a mandateto report recommendations for changes in the House committee system by September 30, 2004.
Each chamber might decide to retain its current structure, make minor alterations to its current jurisdictionalalignment, make extensive jurisdictional changes,create a standing committee, re-establish the existing House select committee, or establish one or more new selectcommittees with revised authorities. Furtherchanges might also be made in the structure of the Appropriations Committees. This report addresses some of theseoptions and will be updated as eventswarrant.

paragraphs: RS21360 -- Department of Homeland Security: Options for House and Senate Committee Organization
Updated August 13, 2004
subsections: section_title: Overview
paragraphs: Since the terrorist attacks of 2001 and the creation of the new Department of Homeland Security, there has been widespread interest in reorganizing the Houseand Senate committee systems to handle homeland security issues more effectively. Some changes to the committeesystems have already been made, but thereare calls for still more comprehensive action.
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. Among the many issues discussed in the report of thecommission were a group of recommendations intended to "strengthen congressional oversight of intelligence andhomeland security." Concerning homelandsecurity, the commission recommended establishment of a standing committee in each chamber to assumeresponsibility over the topic.
Congress should create a single, principal point of oversight and review for homeland security. Congressionalleaders are best able to judge what committee should have jurisdiction over this department and its duties. But webelieve that Congress does have theobligation to choose one in the House and one in the Senate, and that this committee should be a permanent standingcommittee with a nonpartisanstaff. (1)
Two House Homeland Security Committees. The House created a temporary Select Committee onHomeland Security that was directed to coordinate recommendations on the bill made by a half dozen differentHouse standing committees. The HomelandSecurity Committee compiled a comprehensive proposal, led House floor debate on the bill, and served as thecentral negotiating team in resolving differencesbetween the House and Senate versions of the bill. When P.L. 107-296 was signed into law, the Select Committeeon Homeland Security was abolished, butnot before the new law included language in Section 1503 stating, "It is the sense of Congress that each House ofCongress should review its committeestructure in light of the reorganization of responsibilities within the executive branch by the establishment of theDepartment."
The House deferred immediate action, creating in January 2003, a new Select Committee on Homeland Security. This new committee was to serve during the108th Congress as the House focus for legislative and oversight coordination for homeland securityissues, while other House committees retained their morelimited legislative and oversight authority over homeland security. Most significantly, the Select Committee wasdirected to report by September 30, 2004, itsrecommendations for changes in the House committee system. By comparison, the Senate, in the 108thCongress, has continued to consider homeland securityissues within its existing committee structure. 
Appropriations Subcommittee for Homeland Security. The structure of the House and SenateAppropriations Committees have been changed to account for the creation of the new department. In early February2003, the House AppropriationsCommittee approved an internal reorganization plan which abolished the former Subcommittee on Treasury andPostal Service Appropriations and transferredits responsibilities to a renamed Subcommittee on Transportation, Treasury, and Independent AgenciesAppropriations. With this consolidation, a newthirteenth Subcommittee on Homeland Security was established and it was assigned jurisdiction over appropriationsfor the new department and for bureaus inother departments transferred to it. The Senate Appropriations Committee shortly thereafter followed suit, to ensurethat the subcommittee structures of the twocommittees were parallel.
Calls for Further Change. Many Members have already endorsed further changes to the committee system. A number of proposals have been offered in the House and Senate to establish a new temporary select, permanentselect, or standing committee on homelandsecurity, to alter the appropriations process, or to make other changes in congressional structures dealing withhomeland security issues. A senior House leaderobserved in 2002 that creation of the new department "probably will require at least a reorganization of the currentcommittees." A Senator active in crafting thefinal version of the Homeland Security Department bill stated "It is hard to see how Congress could do a decent jobof authorizing and overseeing what the newdepartment does without a new Committee of Homeland Security." On the other hand, a number of Members havepublicly opposed any alteration of House orSenate committee structures, while others have endorsed or opposed such action at different times. (2) From the perspective of the executive branch, areductionin committee jurisdiction fragmentation limits the number of panels to which officials of the new agency will beanswerable. 
Although the House and Senate have undertaken some initial steps to revise their committee structures, the report of the 9/11 Commission may add additionalpressure for congressional action. This report examines various options for the House and Senate individually orjointly to consider in reorganizing itsstructures dealing with homeland security and discusses possible advantages and disadvantages of each.
section_title: Options for Congressional Organization (3)
paragraphs: Timetable for Reform. Not only is there discussion about what changes should be made in congressionalstructures, but there is also discussion about when such changes should be made. With the 9/11 Commission'srecent recommendations and the September 30,2004, deadline for committee system reform proposals from the House Homeland Security Committee, some sayreforms are so vital that they should beadopted before Congress adjourns for the election. These advocates can point to the 1974 House committee reformswhich were passed just before the electionsthat year.
Other say it would be best to defer such action until the beginning of the new Congress in January. After the election, the voters will have supplied freshmandates and the House and Senate will have time in January before the inauguration to consider morecomprehensive reform options thoroughly. The Houseadopts its rules for the new Congress on the first session day, and these reforms could include substantial changesto its committee structure. The Senate's rulesare deemed to be in place automatically at the beginning of a new Congress. However, some believe there will beattempts on the first day of the new Congressto change the Senate's Cloture Rule and other rules relating to the consideration of executive nominations. Theseefforts could open the door to considerationof committee system changes as well.
Retain Current Structure. Congress could decide that the current system is sufficient to monitor the work ofthe new department. No changes would be made in either jurisdiction or referral procedures. Some may argue thatit is too soon to know how much legislativeworkload the new department will cause House and Senate committees. In the immediate aftermath of the 2001terrorist attacks, all congressional committeessought involvement in terrorism matters. More recently, the involvement of committees with only minor claimsto jurisdiction seems to have tapered off. 
Historically, there has been no necessary connection between an executive reorganization and congressional committee reorganization. Several House andSenate committees were combined to create the new Armed Services Committees in 1947, at about the same timethat the Department of Defense was created. The Armed Services Committees promptly created subcommittees that closely matched the former standingcommittees that had been merged in the committeereorganization. On the other hand, the Department of Energy was created after the Senate had consolidated energyjurisdiction in its committees, but before theHouse completed a realignment of its energy jurisdictions in 1980. The creation of the Department of Health,Education, and Welfare (now Health and HumanServices) was not accompanied by any change in House or Senate committee jurisdictions.
Reorganize Entire System. Either chamber or both chambers, acting separately or jointly, could undertake anextensive reorganization of the committee system. A substantial House committee reorganization took place in1995, but it has been a quarter century since theSenate comprehensively reorganized its committees. The Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress in the103rd Congress considered numerous optionsfor such reorganization, but did not directly address the issue of terrorism or anti-terrorism jurisdiction. (4) A comprehensive reorganization could allow bothchambers to address other jurisdiction issues which have emerged in recent years. (5) Nevertheless, a comprehensive reorganization is normally controversialand rarely contemplated under very short deadlines.
Realign Committee Jurisdiction. Within the existing system, either or both chambers could choose to realigntheir committee jurisdictions within the existing structure. That would entail changing chamber rules. Pastexperience indicates that Members generally havebeen loathe to overhaul the committee system, especially during a Congress. Rules changes are traditionally adoptedat the beginning of a new Congress. In theSenate, because there is no need to readopt Senate rules at the beginning of a new Congress, a committeereorganization would have to be consideredseparately. 
In either chamber, it would be possible to add jurisdictional aspects of certain homeland security topics to the jurisdiction of specific committees, withoutaltering the existing subject jurisdictions of committees over other topics. For example, jurisdiction over "nationalenergy policy generally" was assigned to theHouse Energy and Commerce Committee in 1980 without significant alteration to other committees' jurisdictions.
Change Referral System. Both chambers typically refer measures to a single committee, by determiningprimary jurisdiction in the House and predominant jurisdiction in the Senate. In the House, most multiple referralsare sequential, although joint referrals werepermitted until 1995. Changing the referral system could enable all interested committees to maintain legislativeand oversight jurisdiction. For example, theSpeaker of the House (who has the discretionary authority to impose time limits on referrals) could be required toimpose one on all committees involved in amultiple referral of a homeland security-related bill. In addition, for legislation on homeland security, the Housecould allow joint referrals. (In the 108thCongress, House rules allow referral without designation of a primary committee "under exceptionalcircumstances.")
In the Senate, which generally requires unanimous consent for multiple referrals, party leaders could invoke their little-used authority to recommend referrals toseveral committees by debate-limited motion. However, major changes in House or Senate bill referral rules couldcomplicate action on homeland securitymatters and could be nearly as controversial as a jurisdictional realignment.
Create New Standing Committee over Homeland Security. A new standing committee could be created ineither or both chambers. Such a panel could have legislative responsibility over all aspects of the Department ofHomeland Security. Questions regardingwhether the new committee would absorb jurisdiction from existing panels or overlap with them would need to bedecided. Would special oversight authority(broader in scope than the committee's legislative jurisdiction) be granted to it? 
Create Select Committee over Homeland Security. The House has created two temporary select committeesto deal with homeland security in the wake of the 2001 attacks. A select committee with the same or a revisedjurisdiction could be established in the 109thCongress, with or without the creation of a companion select committee in the Senate. If such a new panel werecreated, would it have legislative authority (forexample, in the same manner as do the current intelligence select committees)? If it were limited to conductingoversight, how and through what process wouldits findings be converted into legislative recommendations? In view of the recommendations of the 9/11Commission about the House and Senate PermanentSelect Committees on Intelligence, will the views of the House and Senate about creating such select committeeson other subjects change?
Create a Joint Committee on Homeland Security. The House and Senate could create a joint committee tooversee the work of the new department. However, only one joint committee in the last half-century has beengranted legislative jurisdiction. If such a jointpanel were created, the question of sequential referrals to existing standing committees could still be raised. TheHouse and Senate acted separately in the 107thCongress to permit the two intelligence committees to hold an inquiry into intelligence failures prior to the terroristattacks. Nothing in House or Senate ruleswould preclude existing House or Senate committees from holding joint hearings in the interests of greaterefficiency. Some view joint committees as a meansto permit more efficient congressional review of policy areas, while others believe that separate committees help preserve chamber autonomy and encourageindependent committee initiatives.
Create Leadership Committee. A small committee comprised of members named by chamber party leaderscould act to coordinate homeland security legislative and oversight work among other committees in the chamber. The 107th Congress House HomelandSecurity Select Committee was just such a leadership panel, and a similarly constituted panel could be reestablishedon a more permanent basis. (6)
Use less Formal Means to Coordinate Policy. In both the House and Senate, many committees claimingresponsibility for specific policy areas have entered into "memoranda of understanding," or agreements among theconcerned committees, reflecting eachpanel's appropriate jurisdiction over a disputed policy area. These memoranda serve as guidance to theparliamentarians' offices in making bill referrals andmay obviate the immediate need for a formal revision in committee jurisdictions.
The Senate also makes use of "temporary standing orders," unanimous consent agreements typically in force for the current Congress only, that modify thestanding rules of the Senate. One or more temporary standing orders could be used to allocate jurisdiction amongSenate committees over homeland securityissues, subject to renewal or modification at the beginning of each succeeding Congress. If successful, the temporaryorders could be converted into morepermanent changes in Senate procedure; if not, other realignments could be attempted.
Further Realign Appropriations Committees' Subcommittees. The House and Senate AppropriationsCommittees adapted their structures in 2003 to create a new Subcommittee on Homeland Security. (7) Additional recommendations by the 9/11 Commissioninclude a proposal to set out intelligence appropriations in a separate appropriations bill, or to combine authorizationand appropriations for intelligenceactivities in only one panel in each chamber. Additional changes may be required in the AppropriationsCommittees' structures and the procedures throughwhich they draft both regular and supplemental appropriations bills.