Iran: U.S. Economic Sanctions and the Authority to Lift Restrictions
Released: 2018-05-10T00:00:00

Summary:
On May 8, 2018, President Donald Trump signed National Security Presidential Memorandum 11, "ceasing U.S. participation in the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action] and taking additional action to counter Iran's malign influence and deny Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon." The action sets in motion a reestablishment of U.S. unilateral economic sanctions that will affect U.S. businesses and include secondary sanctions that target the commerce originating in other countries that engage in trade with and investment in Iran.
Prior to this juncture, the United States had led the international community in imposing economic sanctions on Iran in an effort to change the government of that country's support of acts of international terrorism, poor human rights record, weapons and missile development and acquisition, role in regional instability, and development of a nuclear program. The United States' abrogation of its participation in the JCPOA, at least in the near-term, sets the United States apart from its allies and partners in what has been for more than a decade a unified, multilateral approach to Iran's malign activities.
This report identifies the basis in U.S. law for sanctions imposed on Iran, and the nature of the authority to waive or lift those restrictions. It comprises four tables that present legislation and executive orders that are specific to Iran and its objectionable activities in the areas of terrorism, human rights, and weapons proliferation. It will be updated if and when new legislation is enacted, or, in the case of executive orders, if and when the President takes additional steps to change U.S. policy toward Iran.
On July 14, 2015, the United States, China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, European Union, and Iran agreed to a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to "ensure that Iran's nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful.... " In turn, the negotiating parties and United Nations would "produce the comprehensive lifting of all U.N. Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran's nuclear programme, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance, and energy."
On January 16, 2016, the International Atomic Energy Agency verified that Iran had implemented the measures enumerated in the JCPOA to disable and end its nuclear-related capabilities. Secretary of State Kerry confirmed the arrival of Implementation Day (defined in Annex V of the JCPOA). President Obama, the State Department, and the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control initiated steps for the United States to meet its obligations under the JCPOA (Annexes II and V)—revoking a number of executive orders, delisting individuals and entities designated as Specially Designated Nationals, issuing general licenses to authorize the resumption of some trade, and exercising waivers for non-U.S. persons as allowable by various laws. President Trump's May 8 announcement indicates that the United States will, over the next three to six months, reconstruct the U.S. sanctions regime.
Other CRS reports address the U.S.-Iran relationship, including a comprehensive discussion of the practical application of economic sanctions: CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman. See also CRS Report R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement, by Kenneth Katzman and Paul K. Kerr; CRS Report R43492, Achievements of and Outlook for Sanctions on Iran, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report RL32048, Iran: Politics, Human Rights, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report R40094, Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations, by Paul K. Kerr.

subsections: section_title: Recent Events
paragraphs: On May 8, 2018, President Donald Trump announced that the United States was ending its participation in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA is an agreement signed on July 14, 2015, by the United States, Russia, China, France, Britain (all permanent members of the U.N. Security Council), Germany (P5+1), and Iran, to require Iran to limit its nuclear program and, in exchange, require the United States and others to ease economic sanctions affecting Iran's access to some of its hard currency held abroad (see text box, below). The President's decision sets in motion a restoring of U.S. unilateral economic sanctions that will affect U.S. businesses and include secondary sanctions that target commerce originating in other countries that engage in trade with and investment in Iran. The Secretaries of the Treasury and State are required to take appropriate steps to reimpose as quickly as possible, but not later than 180 days, the U.S. sanctions that were waived or lifted in implementing the United States' part of the JCPOA. In addition, the Secretary of Defense is tasked with preparing "to meet, swiftly and decisively, all possible modes of Iranian aggression against the United States, our allies, and our partners. The Department of Defense shall ensure that the United States develops and retains the means to stop Iran from developing or acquiring a nuclear weapon and related delivery systems."
To explain how the United States will reestablish the sanctions regime, the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a new set of Frequently Asked Questions shortly after the President's announcement. The State Department also reported to Congress a set of waiver revocations, determinations, certifications, and findings to establish, in effect, a timeline for the reimposition of sanctions on certain Iranians and those who engage in business with and investment in Iran. 
Going forward, the sequence of what may happen next, based on OFAC's FAQs and State Department's reports, includes the following:
Treasury establishes two wind-down periods—90 days (August 6, 2018) or 180 days (November 4, 2018)—for those involved in certain commercial or financial activities with Iran to complete those transactions and withdraw. On or after August 6, 2018, OFAC will reimpose sanctions affecting the government of Iran's ability to purchase or acquire U.S. dollars; trade in gold, precious metals, graphite, raw or semi-finished metals, including aluminum and steel, coal, and software; trade in or purchase of the rial ; maintenance of accounts outside of Iran denominated in rial ; trade in Iran's sovereign debt; and trade in Iran's automotive sector. On or after August 6, 2018, OFAC will revoke licenses that allow importation into the United States of Iranian carpets and foodstuffs; and specific licenses that allow export or reexport of commercial aircraft and related parts and services. On or after November 4, 2018, OFAC will reimpose sanctions relating to ports, shipping, shipbuilding; petroleum- and petrochemical-related transactions; transactions between foreign financial institutions and the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) or other Iranian financial institutions; certain specialized financial messaging services; underwriting services, insurance or reinsurance; and Iran's energy sector. On or after August 6 or November 4, depending on how it relates to sectors and other factors described above, the President is expected to reimpose the relevant provisions of several executive orders that were revoked to implement the United States' part of the JCPOA. The President could issue a new executive order, or amend the Executive Order 13716 of January 16, 2016, which revoked the original order (in effect, unrevoking the original language). Effective November 5, 2018, OFAC will revoke previously issued authorizations that were permitted under General License H of January 16, 2016—relating to foreign entities owned or controlled by a U.S. person. No later than November 5, 2018, those individuals and entities removed from the OFAC's Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list to effectuate the JCPOA will be redesignated, "as appropriate." No later than November 5, 2018, those identified pursuant to Executive Order 13599, relating to trade with Iran's energy and petrochemical sectors, will be moved to the SDN list. They will, however, also have "additional sanctions information—subject to secondary sanctions" attached to their SDN designation.
Of particular interest to other countries that purchase oil from Iran is how, or if, the United States will implement secondary sanctions on foreign financial institutions to deter such purchases, as provided for in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. The law requires the President to assess the world petroleum market and whether foreign countries have reduced their consumption of Iran-origin petroleum over the previous six months. If they have not, the United States may deny access to the U.S. financial system. Foreign countries may, however, seek exception. OFAC provides that
[t]he State Department will evaluate and make determinations with respect to significant reduction exceptions provided for in section 1245(d)(4)(D) of the NDAA at the end of the 180-day wind-down period. Countries seeking such exception are advised to reduce their volume of crude oil purchases from Iran during this wind-down period. Consistent with past practice, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Energy, and the Director of National Intelligence, would make such determinations following a process of rigorous due diligence. For the initial set of such determinations, the State Department intends to consider relevant evidence in assessing each country's efforts to reduce the volume of crude oil important from Iran during the 180-day wind-down period, including the quantity and percentage of the reduction in purchases of Iranian crude oil, the termination of contracts for future delivery of Iranian crude oil, and other actions that demonstrate a commitment to decrease substantially such purchase. The State Department expects to engage in consultations with countries currently purchasing Iranian crude oil during the 180-day wind-down period.
Based on determinations to waive the application of section 1245 from 2012 to 2015, when the JCPOA entered into effect, countries that are possibly facing renewed pressure to reduce their Iranian petroleum consumption include China, India, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Turkey. Countries that benefited from exemptions during that period include Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
The regime of economic sanctions against Iran, at its height beginning in 2012, was arguably the most complex the United States and the international community have ever imposed on a rogue state. Iran's economy was once integrated into world trade, markets, and banking. As relations deteriorated, for the United States dating back to Iran's 1979 revolution and hostage-taking at the U.S. embassy, and for the larger international community over more recent human rights, regional stability, and nuclear and missile proliferation concerns, this complete economic integration offered seemingly limitless opportunities to impose economic restrictions and create points where pressure could be applied to bring Iran back into conformity with international norms.
subsections: section_title: The Role of Congress
paragraphs: Congress remains seized of the matter of Iran's illicit activities, particularly monitoring Iran's reported activities related to military power, international terrorism, terrorism financing, illicit cyber activities, and ballistic missile research and development. Substantive reports required of the administration include the following:
In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 ( P.L. 111-84 ; October 28, 2009; §1245; 10 U.S.C. 113 note), as amended, Congress requires the Secretary of Defense to provide a wide-sweeping annual report on the current and future strategy, capabilities, and composition of Iran's military force. In the Intelligence Authorization Act, FY2016 (Division M, Consolidated Appropriations Act for 2016; P.L. 114-113 ; December 18, 2015; §514 [22 U.S.C. 8701 note]), Congress requires the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, to report regularly to Congress on the monetary value of sanctions relief Iran has received and if it has made use of the funds to support international terrorism, the regime of Bashar al Assad in Syria, nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles development at home or elsewhere, human rights abuses, or personal wealth of any senior government official. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 ( P.L. 114-328 ; December 23, 2016, §1226), as amended, Congress requires the Secretaries of State and the Treasury, quarterly through 2022, to report on unilateral and multilateral efforts to impose sanctions on entities or individuals connected with Iran's ballistic missile launches. In the Countering Iran's Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017 ( P.L. 115-44 , Title I; §103, 22 U.S.C. 9402), Congress requires the Secretaries of State, Defense, the Treasury, and the Director of National Intelligence to report within 180 days and biennially thereafter a "strategy for deterring conventional and asymmetric Iranian activities and threats that directly threaten the United States and key allies in the Middle East, North Africa, and beyond." In the Countering Iran's Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017 ( P.L. 115-44 , Title I; §104(e), 22 U.S.C. 9403), Congress requires the President to report to Congress within 180 days and every 180 days thereafter on those who contribute to Iran's ballistic missile program. In the Countering Iran's Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017 ( P.L. 115-44 , Title I; §109, 22 U.S.C. 9408), Congress requires the President to report to Congress within 180 days and every 180 days thereafter on the designation for sanctions made by the European Union related to Iran's ballistic missile program, terrorism, or human rights abuses.
section_title: Authority to Waive or Lift Economic Sanctions
paragraphs: The ability to impose or ease economic sanctions with some nimbleness and responsiveness to changing events is key to effective use of the tool in furtherance of national security or foreign policy objectives. Historically, both the President and Congress have recognized this essential requirement and have worked together to provide the President substantial flexibility. In the collection of laws that are the statutory basis for the U.S. economic sanctions regime on Iran, the President retains, in varying degrees, the authority to tighten and relax restrictions. 
The President has the authority to impose a wide range of economic sanctions under the National Emergencies Act (NEA) and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)—the authority on which sanctions-initiating executive orders are most often based. Using these statutes, the President maintains that Iran poses an "unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States…." On March 15, 1995, President William Clinton declared that Iran's proliferation activities posed a threat to the United States that constituted a national emergency; this declaration has been renewed annually since 1995, as required by statute, and is the basis for subsequent executive orders that have expanded restrictions on economic relations with Iran. If or when President Trump restores the provisions of the executive orders that President Obama had revoked to implement the U.S. responsibilities under the JCPOA (see Table 4 ), he is likely to cite the 1995 national emergency as the legal basis for his actions.
In the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA; P.L. 111-195 , as amended; 22 U.S.C. 8501 et seq.), Congress grants to the President the authority to terminate most of the sanctions imposed on Iran in that act as well as those provided for in the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-158 ; 22 U.S.C. 8701 et seq.), and Iran Freedom and Counter-proliferation Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-239 ; 22 U.S.C. 8801 et seq.). Before terminating these sanctions, however, the President must certify that the government of Iran has ceased its engagement in the two critical areas of terrorism and weapons, as set forth in Section 401 of CISADA—
SEC. 401 [22 U.S.C. 8551]. GENERAL PROVISIONS.
(a) Sunset.—The provisions of this Act (other than sections 105 and 305 and the amendments made by sections 102, 107, 109, and 205) shall terminate, and section 13(c)(1)(B) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, as added by section 203(a), shall cease to be effective, on the date that is 30 days after the date on which the President certifies to Congress that—
(1) the Government of Iran has ceased providing support for acts of international terrorism and no longer satisfies the requirements for designation as a state sponsor of terrorism (as defined in section 301) under—
(A) section 6(j)(1)(A) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)(1)(A)) (or any successor thereto);
(B) section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780(d)); or
(C) section 620A(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371(a)); and
(2) Iran has ceased the pursuit, acquisition, and development of, and verifiably dismantled its, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launch technology.
(b) Presidential Waivers.—
(1) In general.—The President may waive the application of sanctions under section 103(b), the requirement to impose or maintain sanctions with respect to a person under section 105(a), 105A(a), 105B(a), or 105C(a) the requirement to include a person on the list required by section 105(b), 105A(b), 105B(b), or 105C(b), the application of the prohibition under section 106(a), or the imposition of the licensing requirement under section 303(c) with respect to a country designated as a Destination of Diversion Concern under section 303(a), if the President determines that such a waiver is in the national interest of the United States.
subsections: section_title: International Terrorism Determination
paragraphs: To lift the majority of the economic sanctions imposed by CISADA, the President must determine and certify that the government of Iran no longer supports acts of international terrorism. The government of Iran is designated as a state sponsor of acts of international terrorism, effective January 1984, pursuant to the Secretary of State's authorities and responsibilities under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979. Various statutes impede or prohibit foreign aid, financing, and trade because of that designation. Three laws (§620A, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 [22 U.S.C. 2371]; §40, Arms Export Control Act [22 U.S.C. 2780]; and §6(j), Export Administration Act of 1979 [50 U.S.C. app. 2405(j)]) form the "terrorist list." Because these statutes are not Iran-specific, they are not included in Table 1 .
The President holds the authority to remove the designation of any country from the terrorist list. Though each of the three laws provides slightly different procedures, the authority to delist Iran resides with the President, and generally requires him to find that
there has been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the government; the government is not supporting acts of international terrorism; and the government has assured that it will not support terrorism in the future. 
Alternatively, the President may notify Congress that the terrorism designation will be rescinded in 45 days, and that the rescission is justified on the basis that
the government has not supported an act of terrorism in the preceding six months; and the government has assured that it will not support terrorism in the future. 
In the case of foreign aid, the President also is authorized to provide aid despite the terrorism designation if he finds that "national security interests or humanitarian reasons justify" doing so and so notifies Congress 15 days in advance. In practical terms, the process of removing a state from the list of sponsors of international terrorism is studied and argued throughout the entire executive branch interagency, with those departments that are tasked with administering the restrictions—primarily State, Commerce, Treasury, Justice, and Defense—each weighing in. For a state to be delisted—which has occurred, most recently, to North Korea and Libya—the Secretary of State publishes a public notice that the respective government no longer supports acts of international terrorism; that starts the 45-day countdown required by legislation. After 45 days (or later), both the President and the Secretary of State issue determinations and announcements, which is followed by a rewriting of each department's regulations governing exports, arms sales, transactions, and other related matters. The requirement that the foreign government has not supported terrorist acts for six months may be retrospective.
section_title: Legislation and Executive Orders
paragraphs: The first two tables presented in this report identify the legislative bases for sanctions imposed on Iran, and the nature of the authority to waive or lift those restrictions. Table 1 presents legislation, and Table 2 shows executive orders that are specific to Iran and its objectionable activities in the areas of terrorism, human rights, and weapons proliferation.
The latter two tables identify legislative and executive authorities that have been exercised to meet the requirements agreed to in the JCPOA on Implementation Day. Table 3 presents legislation, and Table 4 shows executive orders that have been waived, revoked, or altered to provide sanctions relief, based on Executive Order 13716 of January 16, 2016, and Departments of the Treasury and State Guidance Relating to the Lifting of Certain U.S. Sanctions Pursuant to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Implementation Day , also issued on January 16. It is the authorities summarized in these latter two tables that will be the focus of the reestablishing of economic sanctions to implement President Trump's May 8 announcement.
Public laws that are not specific to the objectionable activities of the government of Iran but have been invoked to impede transactions or other economic or diplomatic relations are not included here. Failure to achieve human rights standards as a condition for foreign aid (e.g., the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, and related annual appropriations), or refusal to comply with international nonproliferation norms (e.g., Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991), for example, can trigger a range of economic sanctions. These and other authorities have been applied to Iran. It is unlikely that these statutes would be amended if and when they no longer apply to Iran. Sanctions authorized by these statutes are applied, and lifted, by executive branch decision. 
On the other hand, because the President holds sole authority to renew, alter, and revoke executive orders he issues pursuant to the National Emergencies Act (NEA) and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), Table 2 includes actions taken that are specific to Iran and also actions taken that are not specific to Iran (e.g., Executive Order 13224 and 13382 target terrorists and proliferators, respectively) but have been applied to that country. The authorities in these orders have been exercised to affect Iran in a significant way. Executive orders are subject to their underlying statutory authorities: economic sanctions are most often based on the President's authorities established in IEEPA. These are applied and lifted by the President; often their implementation and administration are delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury, who in turn assigns the task to Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control. Many of the Iran-specific sanctions in statute cite the President's authority to curtail transactions under IEEPA. In some instances, Congress has enacted restrictions on the President's unilateral authority to revoke an order, and the economic restrictions therein, until specific conditions are met.
subsections: section_title: Appendix. Key U.S. Legal Authorities That Remain in Place After Implementation Day
paragraphs: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Guidance Relating to the Lifting of Certain U.S. Sanctions Pursuant to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Implementation Day
* * * * * *
VII. Key U.S. Legal Authorities That Remain in Place After Implementation Day
A number of U.S. legal authorities that are outside the scope of the JCPOA and are directed toward, or have been used to address, U.S. concerns with respect to, Iran remain in place after Implementation Day. A non-exhaustive list of such authorities is set out below:
A. Trade Sanctions
1. Trade Embargo : The U.S. domestic trade embargo imposed on Iran under the national emergency declared in E.O. 12957, as implemented through the ITSR, also referred to as U.S. primary sanctions, remains in place following Implementation Day. Pursuant to the ITSR and with limited exceptions, U.S. persons, as defined in section 560.314 of the ITSR, continue to be broadly prohibited from engaging in transactions or dealings directly or indirectly with Iran or its government. In addition, non-U.S. persons continue to be prohibited from knowingly engaging in conduct that seeks to evade U.S. restrictions on transactions or dealings with Iran or that causes the export of goods or services from the United States to Iran.
Please note that, under the ITSR, the clearing of transactions involving Iran through the U.S. financial system, including foreign branches of U.S. financial institutions continues to be prohibited.
2. Export Controls : U.S. controls on the exportation or reexportation of goods, technology, and services to Iran imposed pursuant to the ITSR, including sections 560.204 and 560.205, as well as the Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. parts 730-774 (EAR), and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 CFR parts 120-130 (ITAR), remain in place. Pursuant to these authorities and unless exempt from regulation or authorized under the relevant regulations, the exportation or reexportation by a U.S. person or from the United States to Iran or the Government of Iran, as well as the reexportation by non-U.S. persons of items that contain 10 percent or more U.S.-controlled content with knowledge or reason to know that the reexportation is intended specifically to Iran or the Government of Iran, generally requires a license.
B. Designation Authorities and Blocking Sanctions
In addition, the United States retains a number of authorities that are directed toward, or have been used to address, U.S. concerns with respect to Iran. Generally, these authorities provide for the imposition of blocking sanctions on persons meeting certain criteria or engaging in specified conduct, as well as their support networks.
Designation authorities:
The activities targeted by these authorities include the following:
1. Support for terrorism : E.O. 13224 (blocking property and prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism);
2. Iran's human rights abuses :
E.O.s 13553 and 13628 (implementing sections 105, 105A, and 105B of CISADA (related to persons who are responsible for or complicit in human rights abuses committed against the citizens of Iran; transfers of goods or technologies to Iran that are likely to be used to commit serious human rights abuses against the people of Iran; and persons who engage in censorship or similar activities with respect to Iran)); and E.O. 13606 (relating to the provision of information technology used to further serious human rights abuses);
3. Proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, including ballistic missiles : E.O.s 12938 and 13382;
4. Support for persons involved in human rights abuses in Syria or for the Government of Syria : E.O.s 13572 and 13582;
5. Support for persons threatening the peace, security, or stability of Yemen : E.O. 13611;
6. Transactions or activities described in section 1244(c)(1)(A) of IFCA if the transaction involves any person on the SDN list (other than an Iranian financial institution whose property and interests in property are blocked solely pursuant to E.O. 13599) : Section 1244(c)(1) of IFCA;
7. Diversion of goods intended for the people of Iran : CISADA 105C, as added by section 1249 of IFCA (relating to the diversion of goods, including agricultural commodities, food, medicine, and medical devices, intended for the people of Iran, or the misappropriation of proceeds from the sale or resale of such goods);
8. Knowingly and directly providing specialized financial messaging services to, or knowingly enabling or facilitating direct or indirect access to such messaging services for a financial, institution whose property or interests in property are blocked in connection with Iran's proliferation of WMD or their means of delivery, or Iran 's support for international terrorism : Section 220 of the TRA [ITRSHRA];
9. Officials, agents, and affiliates of the IRGC : Section 301 of the TRA (providing for the designation of officials, agents, or affiliates of the IRGC); and
10. Foreign sanctions evaders : E.O. 13608 (authorizing the imposition of prohibitions on transactions or dealings by U.S. persons involving persons determined to have: (i) violated, attempted to violate, conspired to violate, or caused a violation of U.S. sanctions with respect to Iran or Syria (including sanctions imposed under counter-proliferation or counter-terrorism authorities); or (ii) facilitated deceptive transactions for or on behalf of any person subject to U.S. sanctions concerning Iran or Syria).
Blocking authorities:
The persons targeted by these authorities include the following:
1. The Government of Iran and Iranian Financial Institutions : E.O. 13599, section 217(a) of the TRA, section 560.211 of the ITSR; and
2. Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting and its president under section 105(c) of CISADA : Section 1248 of IFCA.
C. Correspondent and Payable-through Account Sanctions
After Implementation Day, FFIs may be subject to correspondent or payable-through account secondary sanctions for:
1. Knowingly facilitating a significant financial transaction with designated Iranian financial institutions that remain or are placed on the SDN List (section 1245(d) of NDAA 2012);
2. Knowingly facilitating a significant financial transaction on behalf of any Iranian persons that remain or are placed on the SDN List (section 1247(a) of IFCA);
3. Knowingly facilitating a significant financial transaction or providing significant financial services for any other person on the SDN List with the "[IFSR]" identifying tag (i.e., the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and any of its designated officials, agents, or affiliates; individuals and entities designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 in connection with Iran's proliferation of WMD or their means of delivery; and individuals and entities designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 in connection with Iran's support for international terrorism) (section 104(c)(2)(E) of CISADA);
4. Knowingly facilitating a significant financial transaction for the sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of significant goods and services used in connection with the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors of Iran where the transactions involve persons who remain or are placed on the SDN List (section 1244(d)(2) of IFCA); or
5. Knowingly conducting or facilitating a significant financial transaction for the sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and software for integrating industrial processes that have been determined pursuant to section 1245(e)(3) of IFCA to be used as described in that section if the transactions involve (i) persons on the SDN List; (ii) the sale, supply, or transfer of materials described in section 1245(d) of IFCA that have not been approved by the procurement channel established pursuant to paragraph 16 of UNSCR 2231 and section 6 of Annex IV of the JCPOA, in cases in which the procurement channel applies; or (iii) the sale, supply, or transfer of materials described in section 1245(d) of IFCA if the material is sold, supplied, or transferred, or resold, retransferred, or otherwise supplied directly or indirectly, for use in connection with the military or ballistic missile program of Iran (section 1245(c) of IFCA).
D. Menu-based Sanctions
After Implementation Day, menu-based secondary sanctions continue to attach to:
1. Persons who materially assist, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of: the IRGC or any of its officials, agents, or affiliates blocked pursuant to IEEPA; persons that engage in significant transactions with (i) any of the foregoing or (ii) persons subject to financial sanctions pursuant to the UNSCRs that impose sanctions with respect to Iran, or a person acting for or on behalf of, or owned or controlled by, such person (section 302(a) of the TRA);
2. Non-U.S. persons who engage in transactions or activities described in sections 1244(d)(1) and 1246(a) of IFCA if the transactions involve persons on the SDN List; and
3. Non-U.S. persons who sell, supply, or transfer directly or indirectly to or from Iran graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and software for integrating industrial processes that have been determined pursuant to section 1245(e)(3) of IFCA to be used as described in that section if the transactions involve (i) persons on the SDN List; (ii) the sale, supply, or transfer of materials described in section 1245(d) of IFCA that have not been approved by the procurement channel established pursuant to paragraph 16 of UNSCR 2231 and section 6 of Annex IV of the JCPOA, in cases in which the procurement channel applies; or (iii) the sale, supply, or transfer of materials described in section 1245(d) of IFCA if the material is sold, supplied, or transferred, or resold, retransferred, or otherwise supplied directly or indirectly, for use in connection with the military or ballistic missile program of Iran (section 1245(a) of IFCA).
E. Non-Proliferation Sanctions
On Transition Day, the United States will seek such legislative action as may be appropriate to terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, the nuclear proliferation-related statutory sanctions set forth in paragraph 4.9 of Annex II of the JCPOA, including sanctions under the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act on the acquisition of nuclear-related commodities and services for nuclear activities contemplated in the JCPOA, to be consistent with the U.S. approach to other non-nuclear weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The JCPOA does not address the application of a number of generally- applicable non-proliferation statutes related to transfers of proliferation-sensitive equipment and technology, or statutes that provide for sanctions for activities that would be outside the scope of the JCPOA.
F . Terrorism List Sanctions
Iran remains designated as a state sponsor of terrorism under relevant laws (section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act; section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act; and section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act), and the JCPOA does not alter that designation. A number of different sanctions laws and restrictions are keyed to this designation, including restrictions on foreign assistance (22 U.S.C. § 2371), a ban on defense exports and sales (22 U.S.C. § 2780), controls on exports of certain sensitive technology and dual-use items (50 U.S.C. App. § 2405), and various financial and other restrictions.