Africa Backgrounder: History, U.S. Policy, Principal Congressional Actions
Released: 2001-01-05T00:00:00

Summary:
Congress has dealt repeatedly with issues related to sub-Saharan Africa since the late 1950s. This report provides basic background on Africa and its history, U.S.policy, and congressional involvement, for the general congressional reader.
The modern human species is believed to have emerged in Africa approximately 200,000 years ago. Perhaps 2,500 years ago, the Bantu people began to expandfrom a West African base, gradually spreading a complex agricultural system over much of the continent. Africanists generally agree that loyalties to large ethnicgroups, a key factor in African politics today, were largely absent in pre-colonial Africa.
The Atlantic slave trade, which began about 1450 and lasted 400 years, removed millions of people in their most productive years from Africa and left thecontinent ill-prepared to cope with the European "scramble for Africa." From the 1870s through the early twentiethcentury, nearly the entire sub-Saharan regionwas divided among the European powers. The Europeans built a basic economic infrastructure; but imposed abureaucratic system of government andstrengthened traditional chiefs and other "big men" to help them rule. These patterns deepened divisions in Africansocieties and strengthened anti-democraticpatterns of government.
After World War II, African nationalists organized political parties and began to demand independence. By the early 1960s, independence had come to most ofeastern and western Africa, but white minority rule persisted in southern Africa, ending only in 1994, whenuniversal-suffrage elections were held in South Africa.
In the first years of the 1960s, there were high hopes that the end of colonialism would bring rapid economic growth. Instead, Africa confronted a number ofproblems, including inefficient, state-centered economic systems; frequent military coups; ethnic strife; andcorruption. The Cold War contributed to Africa'sdifficulties, flooding the continent with arms and strengthening a number of repressive regimes that had superpowerbacking. French policy also tended to bolster authoritarian governments in former French colonies.
In the early 1990s, hopes for Africa's future revived following widespread political and economic reforms and the end of the Cold War. Later in the decade,however, the pace of reforms slowed and central Africa fell into an era of violent conflict. "Afro-pessimists" believethat these developments have gravelydamaged Africa's prospects, but others argue that they are temporary problems masking an underlying "AfricanRenaissance." The Clinton Administration sidedwith the "Afro-optimists," despite frustrations over the war in Congo (formerly Zaire) and other problems.
The 106th Congress passed legislation to strengthen U.S.-African economic ties and to boost spending to fight the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa and worldwide. Previous Congresses acted on a number of African issues, including African food security, apartheid in SouthAfrica, and covert U.S. involvement in Angola.

subsections: section_title: African History: An Overview
paragraphs: Human history is believed to have begun in Africa, probably in the eastern and southern part of the continent,as human ancestors evolved into the species homosapiens , perhaps 200,000 years ago, and began peopling the sub-Saharan region. (1) About 50,000 to 100,000 years ago, according to most current scientificthinking, small bands of these fully modern humans crossed out of Africa into the Middle East, and became theancestors of all human populations elsewhere. (2)
An internal African migration of great significance was launched perhaps 2,500-5,000 years ago, as the Bantu people of West Africa began to expand their area ofsettlement from a base that was probably in the northeast of present-day Nigeria or possibly Cameroon. The Bantueventually became the predominant peopleover most of sub-Saharan Africa, although people speaking so-called Nilo-Saharan languages are widely found inthe Sahel grasslands on the southern border ofthe Sahara and parts of eastern Africa. The Nilo-Saharan languages may have had their origins in the Nile valley,but the term "Nilotic" to describe peoplesexisting today has fallen out of favor with scholars because of the extensive intermingling of Bantu andNilo-Saharan speakers over the centuries. Bantu tropicalagriculture was not suited to the Mediterranean climate of extreme southern Africa, and this region continued to beinhabited by people known as "Khoisan" or"San."
Experts are uncertain about the origins of iron use in Africa, (3) but by about 500 BC, it appears that the Bantu had become skilled in smelting iron and making theiron tools that created a highly successful agriculture and accelerated their expansion. When Europeans began toexplore the African coast after 1450 AD, theyfound that farmers were growing a wide variety of crops, including grains as well foods unfamiliar to Europeans,such as bananas. Some of these had come intoAfrica through contacts with the Indian Ocean region and southeast Asia. (4) Many African farmers also had cattle, although the tsetse fly kept cattle outof thewetter, central part of the continent. After the discovery of America, farmers quickly adopted New World crops,such as maize and peanuts. 
By 1500, an estimated 47 million Africans were living in thousands of farming communities spread across the continent, (5) although in particularly dry regions,such as Kenya's Rift Valley, some lived a purely pastoral life, herding cattle, sheep, and goats. These wereexchanged with farmers for grains and otheressentials. (6) Large towns and cities had notdeveloped, probably because large settlements were likely to be struck down by the parasites and otherdisease-causing organisms that had evolved with homo sapiens in Africa. (7) Human populations outside Africa, by contrast, had largely escaped thesediseasesand hence could more easily build cities. 
subsections: section_title: Pre-colonial Society
paragraphs: There is wide agreement among Africanists that loyalties to large ethnic groups, such as "the Yoruba" in present-day Nigeria or "the Tutsi" of east Africa, werelargely absent in pre-colonial Africa, even though they are a dominant feature of African politics today. (8) Broadly similar languages were spoken over wideareas,and these language areas may have correlated with similar cultural practices and religious beliefs as well. Buthistorians believe that Africans did not perceive thatthey had common interests with other members of these large, amorphous groups. Instead, African loyalties wereembedded in extended families, clans, andpatron-client relationships which offered protection and economic support. Some areas saw the emergence ofpowerful individuals or chiefs, sometimes termed"big men" by scholars, who exercised influence over wide areas through marriage ties and other means, such ascontrol over a critical trade route. (9)
A number of African kingdoms developed as the more successful chiefs consolidated their authority through conquest and alliance. To the south of the CongoRiver estuary, for example, European explorers encountered the Kongo kingdom, where a powerful king ruledseveral provinces through royal relatives. (10) Greatartistic achievements also characterized many of these pre-colonial kingdoms, as evidenced by the naturalisticbronze castings of heads in the kingdom of Benin,in today's Nigeria, and the stylized Congolese masks and carvings that inspired Picasso and other modern artists.
section_title: The Slave Trade
paragraphs: The Atlantic slave trade is said to have begun in 1441, when a man and a woman were captured on the coast of Western Sahara and taken to Portugal. (11) Duringthe 400 years that the trade lasted, between 10 million and 13 million people were taken from Africa, according toauthoritative estimates, (12) with most going toBrazil and the Caribbean, and smaller numbers sent to the United States or the British North American colonies thatpreceded its formation in 1776. The peak ofthe trade occurred in the eighteenth century, as plantation agriculture expanded in the Americas. Annual totalsreached 100,000 in some years late in thecentury, (13) at a time when 3,000-4,000 were alsobeing taken from East Africa in the lesser-known Indian Ocean slave trade. (14)
In 1807, the British parliament voted to end the slave trade, and over the next 60 years, the Royal Navy intercepted more than 1,600 ships off Africa's coasts andfreed over 160,000 captives, sending most to Sierra Leone. (15) But many ships evaded the British patrols, and large numbers of slaves continued to be exporteduntil slavery was abolished throughout the Americas in the 1850s and 1860s. U.S. participation in the slave tradewas banned by legislation passed in 1807 andstrengthened in 1819. For a number of years, U.S. Navy ships were stationed off the African coast to participatein efforts to halt the trade, but with limitedsuccess. (16)
The Atlantic slave trade was conducted by European traders based on the West African coast. They purchased slaves from African owners by trading guns,alcohol, cloth, or other European-manufactured goods; as well as cowrie shells, which had monetary value inpre-colonial Africa. Slavery had long been practicedin Africa, where it was customary to enslave people captured during wars, together with condemned criminals, and,in some societies, convicted adulterers andenemies of the king. (17) In addition, some of thosesold into the Atlantic slave trade were kidnap victims. (18) According to historians, slaves in traditional Africansocieties were typically absorbed into families or local armies, and their treatment was generally less harsh than inthe plantations of the New World. Moreover,the children of slaves in Africa often could not be sold. (19)
Effects. Scholars debate the effects of the slave trade on the politics and economies of African societies, (20) butthe era was clearly associated with turmoil and outbreaks of war affecting much of West Africa. The guns thatflooded Africa in exchange for slaves helped fuelthis instability, and the quest for European arms gave warring parties a powerful incentive to constantly seek newcaptives. (21) It seems certain that warfare relatedto the slave trade, the loss of millions of people in their most productive years, and the psychological damage toindividuals resulting from political instability andfear of capture, weakened Africa and left it ill-prepared to cope with the onset of direct European colonization.
section_title: The Colonial Era
paragraphs: As late as 1870, there was little indication that the European powers were about to leave their isolated positions on the coast and partition Africa amongthemselves. Instead, it seemed more likely that indigenous political entities would consolidate their authority andeventually develop into nation-states. In WestAfrica, for example, the kingdom of Ashanti (Asante) had profited from its wealth in gold and the slave trade, andhad acquired a strong central government, anadvanced system of roads, well defined boundaries, and a national language. (22) It seemed destined to grow stronger. Buganda in East Africa, to takeanotherexample, had become the chief naval power on Lake Victoria and was known for its powerful king, the Kabaka;its strong army; and its growing trade. (23)
Meanwhile, a number of "secondary empires" -- secondary in the sense that they relied on imported European military technology -- were emerging. (24) Manyofthese were based in Muslim societies, and their gains did much to promote the spread of Islam in sub-SaharanAfrica. In earlier centuries, Islam had beenspreading slowly in West Africa as a result of trans-Sahara trade contacts, and had made larger gains in northeasternAfrica through trade and Arab immigration. Africans who wanted to associate themselves with the wider Islamic world often converted willingly, and Koranicschools had begun to introduce literacy inArabic across the Sahel. But in the nineteenth century, a series of holy wars or jihads created a vastWest African Islamic empire centered on Sokoto, in modernNigeria. In East Africa, the sultans of the island of Zanzibar were extending their power on the mainland, and Egyptwas expanding its control in northeasternAfrica. With troops on Lake Victoria by 1876, (25) it seemed headed for an empire reaching into central Africa. 
In southern Africa, it was the "Boers" or Afrikaners, practicing a very conservative form of Christianity, who established a nineteenth century secondary empire. Descended from Dutch, Huguenot, and German settlers who had arrived at the Cape of Good Hope in theseventeenth and eighteenth centuries, thousands ofBoers trekked deep into the African interior to escape the cultural influences of the British. (Britain had takencontrol of the Cape during the Napoleonic wars.) With modern rifles and cavalry tactics, the Boers defeated the powerful Zulu in key battles, and established farmsin grasslands areas recently depopulated by aseries of African wars sparked by Zulu expansionism. The Zulu were acquiring modern arms themselves andremained a major force in the region under a kingruling through an aristocracy.
The Scramble. The development of Africa's indigenous political entities was halted by the European scramblefor Africa, which began in competition over the Niger and Congo River basins in the 1870s. The scrambleconcluded in 1920, when British forces, making use ofcombat airplanes developed during World War I, ended the last resistance in Somalia. By this time, all ofsub-Saharan Africa, except for Ethiopia and Liberia,was under European control. Ethiopia had thwarted Italian ambitions to make it a colony by inflicting a humiliatingdefeat on Italian troops at Adowa in 1896. However, Menelik II, the Ethiopian emperor, was unable to oust the Italians from the colony of Eritrea, which theyhad established along the Red Sea coast. (Italy invaded Ethiopia again in 1935, in what some historians regard as an opening phase of World War II. TheItalians were driven from the region by Britishtroops in 1941-1942.) (26)
The scramble was made possible in part by advances in medicine, which for the first time gave Europeans a measure of protection against tropical diseases. Gains in military technology, particularly the development of machine guns and modern artillery, gave Europeanstremendous advantages over even very largeAfrican forces. In 1898, for example, an army of British and Egyptian troops killed 10,800 Sudanese in one dayof fighting, while losing 48 officers and menthemselves. (27) As a result of Europe's militaryadvantages, many Africans chose not to resist the colonial invasion, although the Ashanti, the Zulu, the Boers, theHerero of German Southwest Africa (Namibia), and peoples in French West Africa did launch armed strugglesagainst the colonizers.
Many European leaders were initially reluctant to seize territory in Africa because they doubted that potential financial gains would balance the likely cost. However, in Britain, France, and Germany there were imperialists and nationalists both in and out of governmentwho brought popular and political pressure tobear in support of expansion. Anti-slavery activists felt that direct rule would end the slavery that continued to existin Africa itself, and missionaries saw thattheir efforts could benefit as well. 
Business interests seeking to develop and exploit Africa's resources were also influential, particularly with respect to southern Africa. Diamonds were discoveredat Kimberley, in present-day South Africa, in 1871, and gold was found on the Witwatersrand (in and aroundmodern Johannesburg) in 1885. (It was not until1902, however, that British troops finally subdued the Afrikaners, in the second of the "Boer Wars.") The newcolonial powers also valued Africa's agriculturalpotential. Germany, for example, sought to create a reliable source of raw cotton in its East African colony ofTanganyika. (28)
The profit motive was perhaps strongest with King Leopold II of Belgium, but he successfully hid his real interests for many years amid a show of humanitarianconcerns. Working closely with Henry M. Stanley, the British-American explorer and journalist, Leopold built avast empire under his personal control byfunding the exploration of the Congo River basin and persuading local chiefs to sign treaties, which they littleunderstood, recognizing his authority. At the BerlinWest Africa Conference in 1884-1885, Leopold won recognition of the sovereignty of his International Associationof the Congo (IAC), which controlled Congoand has been described as Leopold's "one-man enterprise." (29) Britain and Germany had come to favor recognition of Leopold's IAC as a means of thwarting thegrowth of French influence in west and central Africa. (30) Leopold had also succeeded in winning the endorsement of U.S. President Chester Arthur for hisplans,which were supported by a Senate resolution as well. (31)
The Berlin conference set rules for the future acquisition of colonies in Africa, requiring that countries exercise effective control of an area before claiming it. This had the effect of limiting most further colonization to the strongest powers -- Britain, France, and Germany,although Portugal secured territories in Angolaand Mozambique, where Portuguese settlers had long been present. Germany lost its colonies in the First WorldWar, and by that time it was clear that Britainwas the dominant power in Africa, with colonies stretching from southern Africa through eastern Africa and Sudanto Egypt, and holding the Gold Coast,including the former Ashanti, as well as Nigeria in West Africa. France, however, also held large territories in Westand in Central Africa. 
The United States did not have colonies in Africa, but the U.S. Navy assisted the American Colonization Society as it began to settle former slaves on the WestAfrican coast in 1820. The first permanent settlement was achieved in 1822, after arduous struggles and near-defeatby disease and unfriendly local warriors. The settlers issued the Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Liberia in 1847, and in subsequent decades, theAmerico-Liberians used firearms to conquerindigenous peoples and extend their control into the hinterland. Some scholars argue that this expansion did notdiffer significantly from the actions of the European colonizers, (32) and that it set the stagefor the violent disintegration of Liberian society in the late twentieth century. In April 1980, indigenous soldiersfrom the hinterland killed the Americo-Liberian president, William Tolbert, setting off a decade of political violenceand human rights violations, followed by a6-year civil war. (33)
Effects. The effects of the colonial era on Africa and its peoples, like the effects of the slave trade, are a subjectof scholarly debate. The consequences of Leopold's rule in his vast Congo colony, however, were quite clearlynegative. Human rights activists and missionaries,including American missionaries, gradually made known the vast scale of the abuses that were taking place inCongo as Leopold tried to extract the maximumprofit from his enterprises. Forced labor, beatings, mutilations, summary executions, and the use of starvation asan instrument of policy (34) were commonplace inCongo and the subject of Joseph Conrad's novel, The Heart of Darkness , published in 1902. Thesituation in Congo became an international scandal, forcing theBelgian government to remove the colony from Leopold's personal control in 1908, and to institute reforms.
In the British and French-controlled territories, the colonial era did provide a backbone of infrastructure, including roads and telephone systems, although ruralareas generally benefitted far less than towns and cities. Standards of public health improved, and some elementaryeducation began to be provided. Christianmissions protected by the colonial authorities played a major role in promoting education and literacy -- winningmillions of converts as a result. (35) Opportunitiesfor higher education, travel, and employment in the modern sector, though limited, empowered a number of Africanswho later became leaders in independentAfrica. Kenya's Jomo Kenyatta and Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah, for example, studied at the London School ofEconomics, and Nkrumah also attended LincolnUniversity in the United States, as did Nigeria's Nnamdi Azikiwe. All were later presidents of their respectivecountries. 
At the same time, European investment in Africa was limited, and colonial governments generally expected African colonies to pay their own way in terms ofdevelopment. In order to generate the necessary revenue, the colonial state was heavily involved in the economy,influencing decisions on what crops should beplanted and regulating prices as well as investment. Many statist systems based on the colonial model persisted afterindependence, retarding the evolution ofmarket economies. Colonial economic policies also made Africa dependent on the export of primary products --minerals, agricultural products, and timber -- tothe developed world in exchange for manufactured goods. The prices of primary products have fared poorly relativeto manufactured goods in the post-colonialworld, contributing to Africa's problems.
Colonial governments had no interest in promoting democracy or developing democratic traditions, which would have complicated their efforts to rule Africa witha minimum of expenditure. In the words of one expert, "the colonial state in Africa was an authoritarian bureaucraticapparatus of control and not intended to be aschool of democracy." (36) As pressure for politicalrights and independence mounted after World War II, colonial regimes often imprisoned their critics and tookother authoritarian measures that set unfortunate precedents for post-colonial rulers. Most Africans had noopportunity for political participation until the very endof the colonial period, when elections began to be held. 
While Britain and France discouraged popular participation for most of the colonial era, they did work closely with local chiefs and other big men, because thecooperation of these traditional authorities was essential in obtaining the labor and tax revenues the colonial regimesrequired. Some contend that in strengtheningbig men, whose influence rested on kinship ties, the granting of favors, and the suppression of dissent, the colonialauthorities contributed significantly to the problems independent Africa has suffered with respect to corruption, nepotism, and authoritarianism. 
Colonial practice, many scholars believe, shaped Africa's present-day ethnic divisions by intensifying language and cultural differences among African peoples. Intheir view, this came about in part because Europeans of the colonial era tended to view the world in terms of"tribes" and "nations," and encouraged Africans todo likewise. Moreover, the colonial authorities, particularly the British, found it administratively convenient togroup peoples together as "tribes" and ruleindirectly through "tribal chiefs," whom they strengthened and in some instances created. (37) Africans found that they could most effectivelyadvance their interestsin the colonial era if they worked through tribal organizations and sought the patronage of tribal leaders, and thistended to strengthen tribal loyalties. Today, theseethnic divisions are the source of much of Africa's violent politics. Even where civil war does not occur, ethnicdivisions typically weaken political institutionsand undermine economies. (38)
The colonial partition of Africa often had the effect of imposing artificial boundary divisions on Africa, separating peoples that had been linked by culture andtrade. After the partition, roads and railroads were built to link the capitals of the new colonial states to theirhinterlands, rather than to one another; creatingdifficulties in transport between African countries that remain to this day. Moreover, by imposing the bureaucraticcolonial state on African societies, theEuropeans suppressed the diverse indigenous political arrangements that had governed Africa before the partition. Whether some of Africa's pre-colonial politicalentities could have continued to develop in ways that avoided or minimized the problems that confront the Africanstate today is one of the unknowns of history. The fact that they were denied the opportunity to develop further is regarded by historian Basil Davidson as the"black man's burden." (39)
End of Colonialism. World War II (1939-1945) severely weakened Britain and France, and hastened the endof the colonial era in Africa. The war aims of the western powers tended to undermine the ideological basis ofcolonialism by stressing the importance ofdemocracy and resistance to aggression -- ideas that resonated with Africa's emerging nationalists. At PresidentRoosevelt's insistence, the United States andBritain had agreed on a set of war aims in the 1941 Atlantic Charter that affirmed "the right of all peoples to choosethe form of government under which they willlive." (40) The United Nations Charter signed at theend of the war committed the colonial powers to developing self government and free political institutions inthe territories under their control (Article 73). 
With the coming of peace, Africans who had been educated abroad during the 1930s, returned to Africa and began to organize opposition to the colonial regimes. Their thinking had been influenced by European intellectual currents of the day, and many had become socialists. They had also studied the revolutionarymovements sweeping Asia and the struggle of black Americans to achieve social justice. Nkrumah and otherAfrican nationalists were greatly inspired by thework of W.E.B. DuBois, the black American sociologist and civil rights leader. (41)
By the end of the 1940s, British policymakers, who had granted independence to India in 1947, generally recognized that the African colonies would one day beindependent -- but they tended to see that day as many decades in the future. France, by contrast, was following apolicy of "assimilation" that in theory was tolead to the integration of its colonies into a greater France. Individual Africans could be assimilated as Frenchcitizens once they had achieved a certain standardof French education, and some, such as Leopold Senghor, poet, philosopher, and future President of Senegal,represented French Africa in the National Assembly.
All around Africa, however, nationalist sentiments were mounting, and by the early 1950s, the British faced a guerrilla uprising known as Mau Mau among theKikuyu of Kenya. New political parties were organizing and staging anti-colonial protests in Gold Coast (Ghana)and Nigeria. British decision-makers soonconcluded that their weakened country could ill-afford the cost of suppressing rising African nationalism, and theindependence timetable was moved forward. Ghana became independent in 1957, followed by Nigeria in 1960, Tanzania in 1961, and Kenya in 1963. 
Political parties were organizing in the French colonies as well, but President Charles de Gaulle was shocked when, in 1958, the little territory of Guinea voted ina referendum for independence rather than close association with France in a proposed new French Community. In the face of agitation for independenceelsewhere, de Gaulle decided that France would cut its losses, and 14 independent countries emerged fromFrench-held Africa in 1960. Demands forindependence sprang up unexpectedly in the Belgian Congo in 1958, and with little power to resist, Belgium grantedCongolese independence in 1960 as well.
Southern Africa. In most of southern Africa, independence was long delayed because of the presence ofsubstantial white populations which generally opposed majority rule. In several countries in the region, Africanshad to resort to armed struggle to win theirfreedom. In 1965, the tiny white minority of British-descended settlers in Rhodesia issued a Unilateral Declarationof Independence from Britain, which waspushing for democratic reforms. This led to United Nations sanctions against the Rhodesian regime, and Africanslaunched a civil war. Rhodesia finally becamethe independent country of Zimbabwe under a majority-elected government in 1980. Guerrilla wars broke out inAngola and Mozambique in the 1960s, andindependence came only in 1975, after Portuguese military dictator Antonio Salazar was ousted in a 1974 coup inLisbon. Armed struggle also took place inNamibia (South West Africa), which South Africa had taken from Germany in 1914, but independence did notcome until 1990, following a U.N.-supervisedelection.
In South Africa itself, whites of both English and Afrikaner descent had enjoyed self-government since 1910, when Britain had granted what would later beknown as Commonwealth status. (42) Oppositionto white minority rule had existed for decades, but in 1948, the National Party (NP), representing conservative,nationalistic Afrikaners, came to power and imposed an institutionalized system of racial segregation known asapartheid (apart-ness). 
Protests against apartheid mounted in the late 1960s, and in the 1970s, an increasingly violent resistance campaign was met by ever harsher governmentrepression. In the 1980s, as resistance continued to grow, South Africa launched a number of military strikes andcovert operations beyond South Africa's bordersagainst bases and personnel of the opposition African National Congress (ANC). Late in the decade, however,South Africa's white-controlled government wasfacing international isolation, and many Afrikaner leaders came to realize that the costs of defending apartheidwould be unsustainable in the long run. Consequently, the regime undertook secret discussions with the ANC on the outlines of a majority-based systemthat would include protections for minorityinterests. ANC leader Nelson Mandela was freed from prison in February 1990, and difficult constitutionalnegotiations concluded in November 1993. Universal-suffrage elections were held in April 1994, and Mandela became President in May of that year. 
section_title: Independent Africa
paragraphs: In the first years of the 1960s, the future for western and eastern Africa seemed quite bright. Heavy-handedcolonial governments had departed, and a new Africanelite including many individuals with excellent educations and global experience had come to power. GNP percapita was rising at about 1% per year, onaverage, (43) and Africans as well as foreigndevelopment experts expected that the construction of roads, universities, hospitals, hydro-electric dams, and otherprojects would soon result in faster growth. In May 1963, the heads of 30 African states signed the Charter of theOrganization of African Unity (OAU) topromote African solidarity and intensify efforts to improve living standards. Member states pledged to respect theprinciples of non-interference and respect forterritorial integrity in their relations with one another.
Even in these early years, however, serious problems were beginning to emerge. The former Belgian Congo fell into civil war from 1960-1964, and itsmineral-rich Katanga province attempted to secede. In January 1963, the president of Togo, Sylvanus Olympio, wasassassinated in the first of dozens of militarycoups and attempted coups that would plague the region. Nkrumah, who had made Ghana a socialist, one-party statewas overthrown in 1966, and the first ofNigeria's many coups occurred that same year. Ethnic tensions mounted in Nigeria as a result of the coup, and whenthe Ibo people of eastern Nigeria attempted tosecede, a civil war broke out that lasted until 1970. 
Sub-Saharan Africa's annual rate of per capita economic growth fell to .8% in the 1970s, and plunged to a negative 2.2% per year in the 1980s, more than wiping out all previous gains. (44) In these decades, mostAfrican countries were governed by authoritarian regimes, and a few, such as Idi Amin's government in Uganda(1971-1979), were quite violent. Civil wars broke out not only Uganda, but also in Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, andChad, as well as in Angola and Mozambique,where long civil wars followed the wars for independence. When drought struck wide areas of the continent in1982-1984, the highest death tolls occurred in thewar-torn countries, particularly Ethiopia and Sudan, where international relief agencies could not reach the hungry.
The underlying causes of Africa's problems in the post-independence era have been the subject of much discussion and analysis. The impact of the colonial era,which is blamed for inciting ethnic divisions and creating traditions of authoritarian rule as well as bureaucraticinterference in the economy, has already beenmentioned. Colleges and universities began to appear in African colonies only at the end of the colonial period,leaving very small indigenous elites to deal withthe challenges of independence. Independent Africa confronted a major population challenge as well. In 1950, therewere an estimated 200 million people in thesub-Saharan region, but by 1990, the number had grown to 600 million. (45)
subsections: section_title: The Cold War
paragraphs: The Cold War has also been blamed for many of Africa's problems. Vast quantities of arms came into Africa during the Cold War, fueling African conflicts. Most of these arms came from the Soviet Union and its allies, and went to self-proclaimed Marxist regimes inEthiopia, Angola, and Mozambique. In reaction,the United States provided far lesser quantities of weapons, but focused much of its economic assistance onauthoritarian regimes in Zaire, Sudan, Liberia andelsewhere that were perceived as anti-Soviet. This competitive Cold War involvement, critics maintain, tended tostrengthen governments on both sides that wereanti-democratic and following inefficient, state-oriented economic policies, often marked by considerablecorruption. (46)
section_title: Effects of French Policy
paragraphs: The degree to which French policy may have contributed to Africa's problems is a matter of debate. France had remained actively engaged in Africa becauseFrench policy makers believed that a major African role would help give France great power status at a time whenthe two superpowers were dominant elsewhere. By overt and covert means, they cultivated a "special relationship" with the elites of their former colonies, whichthey regarded as France's " chasse gardÃ©e," or"exclusive hunting ground." (47) In addition, Francecapitalized on the tie of language to forge close relations with the "francophone" regimes in Zaire and Rwanda,former Belgian colonies. 
These special relationships with France usually brought both military and economic assistance, as well as a promise of French intervention to protect friendlyregimes from violent unrest. Several thousand French troops were stationed at African bases. French businesses,meanwhile, gained privileged access to tradeand investment opportunities. Critics maintained that French policy was perpetuating corrupt and authoritarianregimes in many countries, but defenders arguedthat France was contributing to stability and, as a result, facilitating development. France began to reduce itsmilitary and financial commitments in Africa afterthe Socialist Party won legislative elections in May 1997, but the future direction of French policy is not yet clear. (48)
section_title: The 1990s
paragraphs: In the later 1980s and early 1990s, as the colonial era fell farther into the past and the Cold War waned, scholars began to focus on characteristics of the Africanstate and African societies to explain the continent's difficulties. This line of analysis led to a number ofdiscouraging conclusions about the continent. Somescholars concluded that African states were too weak to promote societal change and economic development, largelybecause the institutions of the state had beencorrupted. The personal ambitions of leaders, ethnic favoritism, and "pathological patrimonialism," (49) were blamed by some for diverting state resourcesto thepersonal fortunes of ruling cliques, and to the police and military officials who kept them in power. There was muchacademic discussion of the "failed state" inAfrica, amid extensive media coverage of famine and conflict in Somalia, Sudan, and other countries. (50) Economic difficulties continued as well. Despiteagrowth spurt in mid-decade, overall GDP growth for the years 1990 through 1998 was 2.0% per year, less than thepopulation growth rate of 2.6%. (51)
At the same time, there were several positive developments affecting Africa in the early 1990s that gave rise to hopes for a better future. With the end of the ColdWar, some noted, Africa's authoritarian rulers would no longer be able to play the superpowers against one anotherto perpetuate their hold on power. Themomentous changes in South Africa were also highly encouraging because they averted a widely expected and potentially very violent revolution. Manyanticipated that a stable South Africa would soon become an "engine of growth" for the economies of much of thesub-Saharan region. Several African countrieswere already well-advanced in free market economic reforms that they had undertaken at the behest of western aiddonors. Consequently, by the mid-1990s --despite slow growth in the region as a whole -- GDP growth rates in several countries were exceeding populationgrowth rates, and some were achieving annualGDP increases of 5% or better.
Political reforms were also beginning in many of Africa's authoritarian states because of mounting demands for democratization from opposition movements and donors. In some countries, national political conferences convened, and diverse interests in Africa's growing "civilsociety" were represented, including humanrights organizations, nascent political parties, and churches. Multiple political parties were permitted in countriesthat had been one-party states for years, andelections that seemed generally free and fair began to be held. These developments brought favorable reactions froma number of analysts. In 1991, for example,U.S. scholar Richard Joseph, who had been a critic of Africa's patrimonial politics, published an article entitled"Africa: The Rebirth of Political Freedom," whichnoted that a "virtual miracle" seemed to be underway. (52)
section_title: Afro-Pessimism v. Afro-Optimism
paragraphs: For many observers, the hopes of the first half of the 1990s have faded, in part as a result of disappointment over the course of African democratization. Some ofAfrica's authoritarian leaders learned to manipulate the electoral process and divide the opposition, creating whatone authority, Larry Diamond, calls"pseudo-democracies." Diamond argues that the governments of Kenya, Gabon, and Cameroon have played a"cat-and-mouse game with international donors,liberalizing politically in response to pressure while repressing as much as they can get away with in order to hangon to power." (53) A disappointed RichardJoseph wrote in 1998 that Africa's democratic opening at the beginning of the decade had resulted, with fewexceptions, in "virtual democracies." These mayhave the surface characteristics of liberal democracy, such as regularly scheduled elections, but "their governmentssystematically stifle opposition behind a maskof legitimacy." (54)
More recently, events in Zimbabwe and CÃ´te d'Ivoire, two countries with significant economic potential if political stability could be achieved, provedparticularly discouraging to advocates of democratization. In CÃ´te d'Ivoire, a Christmas 1999 military coup,followed by the exclusion of a highly qualifiedcandidate from the Muslim north from presidential and parliamentary elections held in late 2000, left the countrysharply divided along ethnic and religious lines. In Zimbabwe, the opposition made gains in June 2000 parliamentary elections, but the campaign period was marredby political violence, and several members ofthe opposition were killed. Government tactics in its campaign to take over farms owned by whites also led criticsto charge that the rule of law was beingdestroyed in Zimbabwe. (55)
Sub-Saharan Africa's AIDS epidemic continues to intensify. (56) According to a December 2000 United Nations update, some 25.3 million adults and children areinfected with the HIV virus in the region, (57) whichhas about 10% of the world's population but more than 70% of the worldwide total of infected people. Thedisease, much like the slave trade in earlier times, takes away young adults in their most productive years. Ugandaand Senegal have managed to slow the diseasewith effective prevention campaigns, and there are indications that such campaigns are beginning to show resultselsewhere. But the overall infection rate inAfrica is about 8.8% as compared with 1.1% worldwide, and in some countries in southern Africa, 20% or moreof the adult population is HIV-positive. Anestimated 17 million people have already died in the African epidemic, and mortality is rising.
The armed conflicts that continue to afflict Africa, particularly the vast Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and several of its neighbors at the heart of thecontinent, are another concern. The Rwanda genocide of 1994, which saw perhaps 500,000 to one million peoplekilled, followed by the first DRC upheaval in1996-1997 and a new DRC civil war starting in 1998, have set back development prospects and created seriousrefugee problems for several countries. (58) Anumber of countries have troops in Congo pursuing a variety of causes and interests, and creating fears of a widerwar. Armed conflicts are also taking place inAngola, Sierra Leone, Sudan (59) and other countries 
Meanwhile, Africa's economic performance continues to disappoint many observers. According to World Bankdata, the region's GDP grew by 2.1% and 2.3% in1998 and 1999 respectively, while population grew by 2.6% and 2.4% (60) - leaving the region economically stagnant. South Africa's economy grewby just .6% in1998 and 1.2% in 1999, postponing the day when it might be able to spark an economic expansion in southernAfrica. Academic authors, looking at sub-SaharanAfrica's small share of global trade and investment, describe the region as "marginalized" in the global economy. (61)
"Afro-pessimists" consider the totality of these trends and conclude that for at least the next several years the continent's political and economic prospects are notvery bright. A study of global trends in the year 2015, published by the U.S. National Intelligence Council inDecember 2000, (62) concluded that: 
The interplay of demographics and disease--as well as poor governance--will be the major determinants of Africa's increasing international marginalization in2015. Most African states will miss out on the economic growth engendered elsewhere by globalization and byscientific and technological advances. Only a fewcountries will do better, while a handful of states will have hardly any relevance to the lives of their citizens. Assub-Saharan Africa's multiple and interconnectedproblems are compounded, ethnic and communal tensions will intensify, periodically escalating into open conflict,often spreading across borders and sometimesspawning secessionist states. 
This way of thinking about Africa, however, is rejected by many other observers, including some with long experience in African affairs, who argue thatAfro-pessimism results from stereotyped views of Africa and a media tendency to focus on violent, dramatic events.In a 1998 article, two experts with CapitolHill backgrounds argued that there is a "new reality" in Africa "in which governments are becoming accountableto citizens; in which economic policies areempowering a growing private sector; in which real progress is being made in addressing difficult but tractableproblems." (63) An International Monetary FundIssues Brief, released in December 2000, acknowledged "two decades of economic stagnation and little progressin poverty reduction" in Africa. But the brieftook an upbeat approach overall, affirming that as a result of economic policy reforms, "the seeds of an economicrenaissance in sub-Saharan Africa, with fastergrowth and less poverty, have been sown...." (64) President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa has himself repeatedly advanced the idea that an African Renaissance isbeginning, (65) and in a December 1997 speech, thenU.S. Ambassador to South Africa, James Joseph, endorsed the African Renaissance concept, saying that"nothing can stop Africa now." (66)
The optimists, while accepting that there have been setbacks, maintain that the dominant political themes of the 1990s were reconciliation in several formerlyconflict-torn countries, most notably South Africa, and widespread gains in democratization through the electoralprocess. Particularly significant, they argue,were the democratic transitions that took place in South Africa, which held successful universal suffrage electionsin 1994 and 1999, and in Nigeria, where anelected civilian regime took office in May 1999, ending years of military rule. Nigeria is home to more than 120million people, or nearly one-fifth of sub-SaharanAfrica's population. A recent book in the optimistic school, sponsored by the American Assembly, pointed out that in 1996 and 1997 alone, national electionswere held or scheduled in 28 African countries. (67) The optimists argue that the wave of elections in Africa in recent years has established precedents that will bedifficult to erase, thus making further democratization possible in years to come. 
Optimists also accept that there have been disappointments in the economic sphere, but note that several African countries, such as Botswana, Mozambique,Rwanda, and Uganda had projected annual GDP growth rates of above or near 5% in 2000, following comparableperformances in 1999. With continuingeconomic policy reforms, improved governance, and support from the international community, optimists argue,many other countries could begin to lift per capitaincomes, enhancing opportunities and the quality of life for their people. Debt relief in support for poverty reductionprograms has a particularly important role toplay, many argue. (68) Africa's natural resources,including vast, newly-discovered oil deposits off the West African coast, as well as the continent's minerals,tourism potential, and environmental resources, also encourage the optimists to anticipate a brighter future. 
section_title: U.S. Policy
paragraphs: The Clinton Administration's policy toward Africa had a decidedly Afro-optimist tone. President Clinton madean extensive trip to Africa in March-April 1998,visiting six countries in 11 days. (69) He told theSouth African parliament that he was seeing "what Deputy President Mbeki has called an African Renaissance," (70) and in a speech in Ghana, the President said that "democracy and peace and prosperity are not slogans, but theessence of a new Africa." (71) The Presidentacknowledged during his visit that Africa faced continuing economic problems and disruptive conflicts in a numberof countries, but insisted that "from Ghana toMozambique, from Cote d'Ivoire to Uganda, growing economies are fueling a transformation in Africa." (72)
In August 2000, President Clinton again traveled to Africa, visiting Nigeria to underscore U.S. support for what National Security Advisor Sandy Berger called"the most important democratic transition in Africa since the collapse of apartheid." (73) President Clinton warmly praised Nigeria not only for its progress indemocratization, but also for its cooperation with the United States in combating international crime and itsleadership in regional peacekeeping. In addition, heemphasized the importance of combating the African HIV/AIDS epidemic, which had not been a subject during his1998 trip.
The Clinton Administration stressed Africa's potential as a U.S. trading partner, citing possibilities for increased trade and investment and emphasizing thegrowing importance of oil imports from the region. Officials repeatedly argued that Africa was already supplying16% of U.S. oil imports and that it wasprojected to surpass the Persian Gulf as a U.S. supplier within the decade. (74) The Administration gave strong endorsement to a congressional trade andinvestmentinitiative, the African Growth and Opportunity Act, noted above, which first passed the House in 1998 and becamelaw ( P.L. 106-200 ) in May 2000. Administration spokesmen argued that the United States has a number of other interests in Africa as well, such aspreventing weapons proliferation, preservingenvironmental resources of global importance, and combating the drug trade and international terrorism.
To further its objectives in Africa, the Administration launched a number of Africa assistance initiatives, such as the Leland Initiative, aimed at enhancing Africa'saccess to the Internet, and the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI) intended to reduce perennial food insecurityover much of eastern Africa. In July 1999, theAdministration launched a major new effort against the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa and worldwide, known asthe LIFE (Leadership and Investment in Fightingan Epidemic) Initiative. These and other Administration initiatives involved a range of U.S. agencies apart fromthe Department of State and the U.S. Agency forInternational Development, including the Departments of Transportation, Labor, and Commerce, as well as theCenters for Disease Control of the NationalInstitutes of Health - all of which, as a result, boosted their Africa-related capabilities.
Administration policy encountered some difficulties, however, and a defining moment came early, when in October 1993, 18 U.S. soldiers were killed whileparticipating in a United Nations humanitarian relief operation in Somalia. (75) In reaction to this incident, the United States and the United Nationshesitated insending peacekeepers when the Rwanda genocide broke out in 1994, and President Clinton later acknowledged toRwandans that "we did not act quickly enoughafter the killing began." (76)
In the wake of the Somalia and Rwanda experiences, the Administration sought to strengthen Africa's own peacekeeping capabilities through the Africa CrisisResponse Initiative (ACRI), which trains units of African armed forces for peacekeeping duties. Moreover, theAdministration launched a "train and equip"program to help at least five Nigerian battalions prepare for peacekeeping duties in Sierra Leone. (77) U.S. officials often assumed roles as mediatorsin Africanconflicts and claimed the peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea, signed in Algiers on December 12, 2000,as a particular success. Secretary of StateAlbright attended the signing ceremony. Nonetheless, Africa's many other conflicts were a source of frustrationto Administration policymakers, since theyundermined efforts to promote economic growth and political reform.
Trade results during the Clinton years were mixed. U.S. imports from Africa grew by an annual rate of 2.7% from 1995 to 1999, but this pace was considerablyslower than the overall 8.4% annual increase in U.S. imports over the same period. (78) Similarly, exports to Africa grew at an average annual rate of .9%, ascompared to a 4.4% annual growth rate for all U.S. exports. (79) Most trade took place with only a few countries, notably oil producers and South Africa, and morethan half of imports were accounted for by petroleum. African imports and exports accounted for about 1% of theU.S. totals in 1999, while according to 1998data, U.S. investment in the sub-Saharan region, also heavily focused on the petroleum sector, was about 1.2% oftotal U.S. foreign direct investment. (80) Nonetheless, Administration officials pointed out that U.S. firms had made major investments in Africa, includingSouthwestern Bell's acquisition of a share inthe South African telecommunications industry and the establishment of Caterpillar Inc. dealerships in 15countries. (81)
subsections: section_title: Policy in Previous Administrations
paragraphs: Sub-Saharan Africa became a distinct item on the foreign policy agenda in 1958, when President Eisenhower authorized the creation of a Bureau of AfricanAffairs in the Department of State. (82) Over theyears, Africa policy has often been the subject of controversy, with debate typically centering on whether aparticular Administration was doing too much or too little with respect to an issue, such as apartheid in South Africa,African development, or the Soviet/Cubanrole. These controversies cannot be reviewed in any detail here, but the principal issues faced by successiveAdministrations can be briefly noted.
The Eisenhower Administration confronted its first African crisis in 1960, with the Congo rebellion, which it feared would be exploited by the Soviet Union. TheAdministration supported the deployment of a U.N. peacekeeping force, which the Soviets initially agreed to, butthen turned against. The KennedyAdministration (1961-1963) was more favorably disposed toward African nationalists than the EisenhowerAdministration, although Cold War pressures limitedKennedy's policy options. President Kennedy did approve funding for a large and controversial dam Nkrumahsought for Ghana, and toward the end of hisAdministration Kennedy began to press the white regimes of southern Africa for reforms. (83) In 1963, The United States backed aU.N.-sponsored voluntary armsembargo against South Africa, over the objections of Britain and France.
Africa policy during the Johnson Administration (1963-1969) focused on Congo (Zaire), where the United States gave extensive covert aid to suppress rebellionsthought to be communist-inspired or of potential benefit to the Soviet Union. (84) It was during this period that Mobutu Sese-Seko, with U.S. backing,solidified hisposition as Zaire's president -- a position he would hold until 1997. While Washington gave limited militaryassistance to Congo (Zaire), in addition to covertaid, congressional concerns over the emergence of "another Vietnam" prevented deeper involvement. 
In the Nixon and Ford Administrations (1969-1977), the Africa policy focus shifted to southern Africa and the violent upheavals affecting Angola, Mozambique,and Rhodesia. Political controversy over Africa policy sharpened considerably in these years, as critics came tobelieve that policymakers were too sympathetic tothe white minority regimes. However, Henry Kissinger, the most influential policymaker of the period, believedthat the Soviet Union was following a policy of"ruthless opportunism" and "adventurism" in Africa and elsewhere, and this view goes far toward explaining Africapolicy during the period. (85) When Congressbanned further involvement in Angola in 1975, Kissinger claimed that it was unwilling to confront Sovietexpansionism. (86)
President Jimmy Carter's Administration (1977-1981) brought a new emphasis on human rights to U.S. foreign policy, resulting in a strong push for majority rulein Zimbabwe, advocacy of independence for Namibia, and heavy criticism of apartheid in South Africa. Mobutuwas also pressed for economic and politicalreforms, but Zaire policy, like Africa policy generally, continued to be constrained by Cold War considerations. The Administration did not react to the Liberiacoup in 1980, perhaps because reports of human rights violations and corruption had discredited theAmerico-Liberian regime.
The Carter Administration was faced with apparent Soviet and Cuban gains in the sub-Saharan Africa, and came under domestic political pressure to respond. Anoppressive, pro-Soviet regime had emerged in Ethiopia, and in response, the Carter Administration forged ties withSomalia, Ethiopia's neighbor. Somalia thencomplicated the situation by invading a province it claimed in Ethiopia, precipitating the 1977-1978 "OgadenWar." Cuba sent troops to assist Ethiopia, andmany feared that the United States might become militarily involved if Cuban and Ethiopian troops crossed intoSomalia. Cuba and Ethiopia did launch asuccessful counteroffensive against the Somalis, but their advance halted at the Somalia border, averting a crisis. Cold War concerns also played a role in theCarter Administration's opposition to mandatory sanctions against South Africa. (87)
Cuban troops were also in Angola, where they were assisting the Marxist regime in fighting the UNITA resistance movement. This Cuban deployment became amajor concern for Africa policymakers in the Reagan Administration (1981-1989). There was strong support in theReagan Administration for resuming covertaid to UNITA, and a publicly-acknowledged covert aid program was launched in 1986 after Congress had repealedprohibiting legislation in 1985. ChesterCrocker, the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa in those years, favored a policy of "linkage," intended to secureCuban withdrawal from Angola in exchangefor independence for South African-held Namibia. Crocker has written that he faced heavy political opposition fromall sides on this issue, but a 1988 regionalpeace agreement, negotiated under U.S. leadership, finally achieved the goals he sought. (88) With respect to South Africa, Administration critics believed that theUnited States was not pushing hard enough for political change, and in 1986, Congress enacted sweeping sanctionslegislation, over President Reagan's veto.
Africa policymakers in the George H.W. Bush Administration (1989-1993) directed much of their attention to the Horn of Africa. Rebel forces in Ethiopia werepoised to overthrow the regime in 1991, and Bush Administration diplomats, working with both the governmentand the rebels, managed to arrange a peacefultransition, avoiding an ethnic and political upheaval of the sort that devastated Liberia after the 1980 coup. (89) Somalia, however, had fallen into an era of clanviolence, which, combined with drought and famine, had created a humanitarian disaster by 1992. Consequently,just before leaving office, Bush sent U.S. troopsto launch a massive, multi-national humanitarian intervention. The move was credited with saving thousands fromstarvation, (90) despite the loss of American lifethat occurred in 1993. With Cold War tensions easing, the Bush Administration also pushed Mobutu for reforms. This was part of a broader policy of promotingdemocracy and economic liberalization in Africa generally. 
section_title: Principal Congressional Actions
paragraphs: As noted at the beginning of this report, Congress has dealt with a wide range of issues related to Africa. Thissection lists principal actions in recent decades.
2000 . The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA, P.L. 106-200 ), aimed at boosting U.S. trade with Africa as well as U.S.investment, became law. 
--- Under the Global AIDS and Tuberculosis Relief Act of 2000 ( P.L. 106-264 ) Congress authorized $300 million in FY2001 and also inFY2002 for a comprehensive HIV/AIDS effort worldwide. The FY2001 Foreign Operations Appropriations ( P.L.106-429 ) provided $300 million inDevelopment Assistance for HIV/AIDS and slightly more than half of the amount was expected to go towardAfrican programs. 
1998 . Congress enacted the Africa: Seeds of Hope Act ( P.L. 105-385 ) to promoteAfrican food security through U.S. assistance programsand other measures.
1994 . The African Conflict Resolution Act ( P.L. 103-381 ), authorizing U.S. assistance to promote the peaceful resolution of Africanconflicts, was enacted.
1993 . The South African Democratic Transition Support Act of 1993 ( P.L. 103-149 ) committed the United States to supporting theconsolidation of democracy in South Africa.
1990 . Congress created the Development Fund for Africa (DFA), which became Chapter 10 of Part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The DFA, which was first mentioned in FY1988 report language, was intended to protect Africa aid levels in thewake of the Cold War.
1992 . The Horn of Africa Recovery and Food Security Act ( P.L. 103-274 ) was passed. The Act set policy objectives for U.S. assistance inthe Horn and included provisions to promote democracy. 
1986 . Congress enacted the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act ( P.L. 99-440 ) over President Reagan's veto. The Act set policy objectivesfor the United States in South Africa, imposed a number of sanctions, and provided for "positive measures" toimprove the lives of black SouthAfricans.
1985 . Congress passed a large emergency supplemental appropriation for African famine relief ( P.L. 99-10 ). The move followed extensivemedia coverage of famine in Ethiopia and Sudan, and some criticism of the adequacy of the executive branchresponse.
--- The International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 repealed the Clark Amendment (see below,1976).
1980 . Congress created the African Development Foundation to promote grassroots development through small grants to African self-helporganizations ( P.L. 96-533 ).
1977 . Congress, in effect, repealed the Byrd Amendment (see below, 1971) by ending its application to Rhodesia.
1976 . The "Clark Amendment," Sec. 404 of the International Security Assistance Act of 1976 ( P.L. 94-239 , later Sec. 118 of P.L. 96-533 ),prohibited aid that would help any group in Angola conduct military or paramilitary operations. The prohibitioncould be waived by a joint resolution. Theamendment was sponsored by Senator Dick Clark of Iowa. (The Clark Amendment followed an earlier, temporaryban known as the "TunneyAmendment.")
1971 . The "Byrd Amendment," named for its sponsor, Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr. of Virginia, was passed. This amendment to the ArmedForces Appropriation (P.L. 92-156) partially exempted the United States from participating in U.N. sanctionsagainst white-ruled Rhodesia by prohibiting thePresident from enforcing the U.N. trade embargo with respect to imports of critical and strategic materials, such aschromium and nickel.
section_title: Suggested Additional Readings
paragraphs: Bohannan, Paul and Philip Curtin. Africa and Africans , 4th ed. Prospect Heights,Illinois: Waveland Press, 1995.
Davidson, Basil. The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation State. New York, Times Books, 1992.
Gordon, David F., David C. Miller, Jr., and Howard Wolpe. The United States and Africa: A Post-Cold War Perspective . New York: W.W. Norton, 1998
Hochschild, Adam. King Leopold's Ghost . Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998. 
Herbst, Jeffrey. States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2000.
Joseph, Richard, ed. State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa . Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1999.
Pakenham, Thomas. The Scramble for Africa, 1876-1912 . New York: Random House, 1991. 
Reader, John. Africa: A Biography of the Continent . New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998. 
Schraeder, Peter J. United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis, and Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
subsections: section_title: Selected CRS Products
paragraphs: CRS Issue Brief IB95052. Africa: U.S. Foreign Assistance Issues , by [author name scrubbed]. Continuously updated.
CRS Issue Brief IB10050. AIDS in Africa , by [author name scrubbed]. 
CRS Issue Brief IB96037. Congo (Formerly Zaire) , by [author name scrubbed]. Continuously updated.
CRS Issue Brief IB98046. Nigeria in Political Transition , by Theodros Dagne with the assistance of Amanda Smith. Continuously updated.
CRS Issue Brief IB98043. Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis, Peace Talks, Terrorism, and U.S. Policy , by Theodros Dagne. Continuously updated.