Terrorism in South Asia
Released: 2005-08-31T00:00:00

Summary:
This report reviews the recent incidence of terrorism in South Asia, concentrating on Pakistan and India, but also including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. The existenceof international terrorist groups and their supporters in South Asia is identified as a threat to bothregional stability and to the attainment of central U.S. policy goals. Al Qaeda forces that fled fromAfghanistan with their Taliban supporters remain active on Pakistani territory, and Al Qaeda isbelieved to have links with indigenous Pakistani terrorist groups that have conducted anti-Westernattacks and that support separatist militancy in Indian Kashmir. Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Ladenand his lieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahiri, are widely believed to be in Pakistan. A significant portionof Pakistan's ethnic Pashtun population is reported to sympathize with the Taliban and even AlQaeda. The United States maintains close counterterrorism cooperation with Pakistan aimedespecially at bolstering security and stability in neighboring Afghanistan. In the latter half of 2003,the Islamabad government began limited military operations in the traditionally autonomous tribalareas of western Pakistan. Such operations have since intensified in coordination with U.S. andAfghan forces just across the international frontier.
The relationships between international terrorists, indigenous Pakistani extremist groups, andsome elements of Pakistan's political-military structure are complex and murky, but may representa serious threat to the attainment of key U.S. policy goals. There are past indications that elementsof Pakistan's intelligence service and Pakistani Islamist political parties provided assistance toU.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). A pair of December 2003 attempts toassassinate Pakistan's President Musharraf reportedly were linked to Al Qaeda. Lethal, but failedattempts to assassinate other top Pakistani officials in summer 2004 also were linked to AlQaeda-allied groups. Security officers in Pakistan have enjoyed notable successes in breaking upsignificant Al Qaeda and related networks operating in Pakistani cities, although numerous wantedmilitants remain at large.
The 9/11 Commission Report contains recommendations for U.S. policy toward Pakistan,emphasizing the importance of eliminating terrorist sanctuaries in western Pakistan and near theAfghanistan-Pakistan border and calling for provision of long-term and comprehensive support tothe government of President Musharraf so long as that government remains committed to combatingextremism and to a policy of "enlightened moderation." Legislation passed by the 108th Congress( S. 2845 ) seeks to implement this and other Commission recommendations.
The United States remains concerned by the continued "cross-border infiltration" of Islamicmilitants who traverse the Kashmiri Line of Control to engage in terrorist acts in India and IndianKashmir. India also is home to several indigenous separatist and Maoist-oriented terrorist groups. Moreover, it is thought that some Al Qaeda elements fled to Bangladesh. The Liberation Tigers ofTamil Eelam (LTTE) of Sri Lanka have been designated as an FTO under U.S. law, while Harakatul-Jihad-I-Islami/Bangladesh, and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)/United Peoples Front,appear on the State Department's list of "other terrorist groups."

subsections: section_title: Most Recent Developments
paragraphs: In early 2005, the United States began advertizing in mass-circulation Urdu-languagenewspapers and on radio and television stations in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province topromote a rewards program for wanted Al Qaeda suspects. In May, Al Qaeda fugitive Abu Farajal-Libbi, a Libyan native wanted in connection with lethal December 2003 attempts to assassinatePresident Musharraf, was captured in the northwestern Pakistani city of Mardan. Informationprovided by Libbi reportedly led to the arrest of six suspected Al Qaeda members, including twoArabs and four Pakistanis, and the targeted killing of an alleged Al Qaeda bomb expert near theAfghan border. Musharraf claimed that Pakistan had "broken their [Al Qaeda's] back" with recentarrests. Two months later, in the wake of deadly July bombings in Britain and Egypt, Musharrafagain declared that Al Qaeda's ability to operate in Pakistan had been destroyed. (7) Debate over the whereaboutsof fugitive Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden continues to focus on the rugged Afghan-Pakistaniborder region: Pakistani officials generally insist there is no evidence that bin Laden is hiding there,but numerous U.S. officials have suggested otherwise. In June, Director of Central Intelligence Gossclaimed to have "an excellent idea of where [bin Laden] is" and suggested that "sanctuaries insovereign states" and "our sense of international obligation" present obstacles to his capture. (8) The Pakistani president hasissued contradictory statements on the topic.
Efforts to kill or capture Al Qaeda and Taliban militants near the Afghanistan-Pakistanborder continue to bring mixed results. An apparently resurgent Taliban has suffered majorbattlefield losses in eastern and southern Afghanistan during the spring and summer of 2005, butU.S. and Afghan officials continue to claim that insurgents are able to cross into Afghanistan toattack U.S.-led forces before returning to Pakistan and, in June, Afghan officials were complainingof a "steady stream of terrorists" entering their country from Pakistan. The Afghan-Pakistani riftdeepened, spurring President Bush to make a personal call to Musharraf in an effort to smoothrelations between two key U.S. allies in the region. In July, Pakistan reported moving 4,000additional troops to the border region, bringing the total to some 80,000, and Prime Minister Azizvisited Kabul, where he vowed "seamless cooperation" with the Afghan government in fightingterrorism and Islamic extremism. Still, U.S. officials continue to urge Islamabad (and Kabul) to "domore" to end insurgent operations in the region and some reports indicate that Taliban recruiting andtraining continues to take place on Pakistani territory without government interference. (9) 
Pakistan's western tribal regions continue to be the site of tensions and sporadic Islamicmilitant-related violence. Pakistani military operations in South Waziristan wound down in 2004. Late in that year, the regional Pakistani corps commander declared that "peace has been restored inWana," the area where the bulk of combat had taken place. Attention has become focused on theNorth Waziristan district, where scores and possibly hundreds of "unwanted foreigners" have foundrefuge. The Islamabad government is using a carrot-and-stick approach, offering economic andinfrastructure development incentives to encourage cooperation from tribal chieftains whilethreatening use of force in those areas where militants are given haven. Yet cooperative triballeaders have come under lethal attack by militants and resistance to Islamabad's cooperation withU.S.-led efforts in Afghanistan remains widespread. On July 15, U.S. forces based in Afghanistanexchanged heavy weapons fire with militants just across the border in Pakistan, killing 24 of them. Thousands of Pakistani tribesmen later denounced the U.S. action and Pakistan told the United Statesthat border violations would not be tolerated. (10) 
Pakistan continues to struggle with a virulent strain of belligerent Islamism that someanalysts say threatens the survival of the country. In December 2004, President Musharraf called his"biggest fear" the extremism, terrorism, and militancy that has "really polluted society in Pakistan." He also conceded that some of Pakistan's religious schools are part of the problem: "There are many[madrassas] which are involved in militancy and extremism." (11) Major sectarian bombattacks in May again raised questions about the ability of Pakistan's security forces to maintain orderin the country's urban centers (where, not incidentally, the great majority of top Al Qaeda fugitiveshave been found). Positive news did come with July announcements that the Islamabad governmentwould reinvigorate its efforts to curtail indigenous terrorism by detaining suspected militants,shuttering the offices of extremist groups, and regulating the activities of the country's thousands ofreligious schools, some of which are involved in the teaching of militancy.
Pakistan-U.S. counterterrorism cooperation continues apace. In November 2004, thePentagon notified Congress of three possible major Foreign Military Sales to Pakistan involvingeight P-3C maritime reconnaissance aircraft, 2,000 TOW anti-armor missiles, and six Phalanx navalguns. The deals could be worth up to $1.2 billion for Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, the primecontractors. The Department of Defense characterized the P-3Cs and TOW missiles as havingsignificant anti-terrorism applications (a claim that elicited skepticism from some analysts), and itasserted that the proposed sales would not affect the military balance in the region. India's externalaffairs minister later "cautioned the United States" against any decision to sell F-16 fighter jets toPakistan, adding that the "U.S. arms supply to Pakistan would have a negative impact on thegoodwill the United States enjoys with India, particularly as a sister democracy." (12) Yet, in March 2005, theBush Administration announced that the United States would resume sales of F-16 fighters toPakistan after a 16-year hiatus (see CRS Report RS22148, Combat Aircraft Sales to South Asia ).
Separatist-related violence and terrorism in Kashmir has increased in the summer of 2005. The India-Pakistan peace initiative begun in April 2003 continues, most concretely with a formalcease-fire agreement along the Kashmiri Line of Control (LOC) and the entire international border(the cease-fire has held for nearly two years). In April 2005, a new bus service was launched in thedisputed Kashmir region and the Indian and Pakistan leaders called the bilateral peace process"irreversible." However, while New Delhi indicates that rates of militant infiltration across the LOCare down significantly as compared to past years, ongoing separatist-related violence in India'sJammu and Kashmir state has claimed scores of lives and Indian officials have renewed criticismsthat Pakistan has not acted to eliminate the "terrorist infrastructure" on Pakistani territory.
In India's northeastern states , decades-old separatist movements continue. After twoAssamese separatist leaders reportedly surrendered in February, United Liberation Front of Assamterrorists conducted a series of coordinated bomb attacks in March, spurring Indian security forcesto launch a 2,000-man operation against militants there in April. In May, New Delhi signed a trucewith the National Democratic Front of Bodoland, a leading Assamese separatist group designatedas terrorists by the Indian government. Moreover, rebels continue to make deadly assaults ongovernment forces in Manipur. (13) Meanwhile, attacks perpetrated by Maoist "Naxalites" operating in India (the two largest organizations being U.S.-designated terrorist groups) became morenumerous and have cost scores of lives 2005. Maoist militants are said to have expanded theiroperations into more than half of India's 28 states, spurring some observers to issue dire warningsabout India's deteriorating internal security circumstances. New Delhi vows to bolster thecapabilities of security forces battling the militants. (14) Other recent terrorist violence in India included a July incidentin which six militants, including a suicide bomber, were killed in the midst of an unsuccessful attackon the site of a controversial temple that is claimed by both Hindus and Muslims in the Uttar Pradeshcity of Ayodhya. Ensuing protests by Hindu activists led to thousands of arrests. The culpritsreportedly were linked to the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist group. (15) 
India-U.S. counterterrorism cooperation appears set to further expand. In June, the UnitedStates and India signed a ten-year defense framework agreement which lists "defeating terrorism andviolent religious extremism" as one of four key shared security interests, and which calls for abolstering of mutual defense capabilities required for such a goal. (16) 
On August 17, about 350 small bombs exploded almost simultaneously across Bangladesh ,killing at least two people and injuring more than 125 others. No one claimed responsibility for theattacks, but leaflets produced by the banned militant Jamatul Mujahideen and calling for Islamic lawin Bangladesh were found at most sites. Numerous suspects subsequently were arrested, includingmany suspected members of the Jamatul Mujahideen. The United States offered law enforcementassistance to Dhaka in its ongoing investigation of the blasts. (17) After meeting with U.S.Assistant Secretary of State Christina Rocca, on May 12, 2005, in Dhaka, Bangladesh ForeignMinister M. Morshed Khan reportedly stated that he was optimistic that Bangladesh would receiveAmerican assistance for capacity building to improve the law and order situation inBangladesh. (18) It wasalso reported that the two discussed the need to better protect the coastal zone from piracy and tobuild up Bangladesh's capacity to face any terrorist challenges. (19) During her visit, Roccareportedly urged Bangladesh to "go after those who would undermine its long tradition of tolerance,moderation and peace." Rocca welcomed Bangladesh's ban on the Jamatul Mujahideen and theJagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh for their alleged role in recent bombings. (20) Foreign Minister MorshedKhan met with Secretary of State Rice during his visit to Washington later in May 2005. At thattime, he reiterated Bangladesh's commitment to work with the United States in the war against terror.Rice described Bangladesh as "a democratic force and a voice of moderation." (21) Foreign Minister Khanreportedly described the U.S. view of Bangladesh as "an unavoidable partner" in bridging religiousdivides across the world." (22) Bangladesh recently assumed the Chair of the BIMSTECgrouping comprised of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Burma, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. The June1, 2005 BIMSTEC meeting in Dhaka reportedly reviewed progress of a joint working group onterrorism which met in Delhi in December 2004. (23) 
Assistant Secretary Rocca also traveled to Nepal during her May 2005 trip to South Asia.There is rising concern among some analysts that King Gyanendra's February 1, 2005 takeover hasbroadened the divide between the king and democratic elements in the country and thereby weakenedthe government's ability to fight the Maoists. Such a situation favors the Maoists as it appears topreclude a unified front against them. Violence has increased in recent months and the death toll ofthe conflict with the Maoists is now thought to exceed 11,500. India may be increasingly concernedthat the conflict in Nepal could spill over into neighboring areas. Maoist tactics are reportedlychanging with increased daytime attacks and increased use of roadblocks and blockades. In August,Kathmandu accused Maoist rebels of "executing" 40 captured soldiers in the deadliest incident sincethe king's February power seizure, spurring analysts to again conclude that the government'scounterinsurgency efforts are making little headway. (24) 
The Sri Lanka peace process has come under new threat after the August 12 assassinationof Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, an ethnic Tamil known for his vehement anti-rebelstance. Kadirgamar also was one of President Kumaratunga's closest allies. The Liberation Tigersof Tamil Eelam (LTTE) denied playing any role in the murder, but the cease-fire may not hold. (25) The peace process hadalready been stalled with growing instability as divisions within the LTTE ranks has devolved intointernecine warfare and targeted assassinations amongst the Northern and Eastern factions. TheLTTE leadership has also attempted to apply pressure on both the Sri Lankan Government and theNorwegian-backed Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) by staging isolated attacks on Sri Lankanunits accompanied by monitors. The LTTE also announced in May 2005 that it is looking atacquiring an air capability, which is in violation of the cease-fire and could be destabilizing due tothe possibility that such capabilities could be used in terrorist suicide-bombings. Divisions withinthe Sri Lankan government have hampered talks as well, as there are internal disagreements overnegotiating strategies and possible concessions to the LTTE in any eventual peace agreement. TheU.S. Administration has voiced continuing support for negotiations and the possibility of peace inSri Lanka and continues to call on the LTTE to disarm and disavow violence.
section_title: Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and Pakistani Extremism(26)
subsections: section_title: The Al Qaeda-Taliban Nexus
paragraphs: Among the central goals of Operation Enduring Freedom are the destruction of terroristtraining camps and infrastructure within Afghanistan, the capture of Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders,and the cessation of terrorist activities in Afghanistan. (27) Most, but not all, of these goals have been achieved. However,since the Taliban's ouster from power in Kabul and subsequent retreat to the rugged mountain regionnear the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, what the U.S. military calls its "remnant forces" have beenable to regroup and to conduct "hit-and-run" attacks against U.S.-led coalition units, often in tandemwith suspected Al Qaeda fugitives. These forces are then able to find haven on the Pakistani sideof the border. (28) Onesenior Pakistani official was quoted as saying that South Waziristan, a district of the traditionallyautonomous Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), had by mid-2002 become "the hub of AlQaeda operations in the whole world." Three years later, some analysts continue to call Pakistan "theglobal center for terrorism and for the remnants of Al Qaeda." (29) Al Qaeda founder Osamabin Laden and his lieutenant, Egyptian Islamic radical leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, are believed bymany to be in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province, an area roughly the size of Virginia. Pakistani officials generally insist there is no evidence that bin Laden is hiding in the borderregion, (30) but numerousU.S. officials have suggested otherwise. (31) In June 2005, Director of Central Intelligence Goss claimed tohave "an excellent idea of where [bin Laden] is" and suggested that "sanctuaries in sovereign states"and "our sense of international obligation" present obstacles to his capture. (32) The Pakistani presidenthas issued contradictory statements on the topic of bin Laden's whereabouts. (33) Some analysts speculatethat bin Laden's capture in Pakistan could create a backlash among his sympathizers there and somereports suggest growing U.S. frustration with the lack of progress in finding "high value targets" inthe region. (34) 
Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations. The frequencyof attacks on U.S.-led coalition forces in southern and eastern Afghanistan increased throughout2003 and, in October of that year, then-U.S. Special Envoy and Ambassador to Afghanistan ZalmayKhalilzad warned that resurgent Taliban and Al Qaeda forces presented a serious threat to Afghanreconstruction efforts. In the wake of spring 2004 military operations by Pakistan near the Afghanborder, the Afghan foreign minister praised Pakistan for its role in fighting terrorism, but AfghanPresident Karzai expressed concern that militants trained on Pakistani territory continue to cross intoAfghanistan to mount anti-government attacks there. (35) Karzai paid a visit to Islamabad in August 2004, where PresidentMusharraf assured him that Pakistan would not allow extremists to use Pakistani territory to disruptupcoming Afghan elections. Just days before those October 2004 elections, Islamabad announcedhaving moved extra troops and "quick reaction forces" near the Afghan border to prevent militantinfiltrations. Although the top U.S. general in Afghanistan had earlier expressed concerns that AlQaeda-linked operatives were actively encouraging militants to disrupt the elections, the successfuland mostly peaceful polling led him to later declare that the Taliban were no longer a meaningfulthreat to Afghan stability. (36) 
However, the influence of Pashtun tribal animosities and lingering pro-Taliban sentiments-- combined with reports that some elements of Pakistan's security apparatus and Islamist religiousparties remain sympathetic to anti-U.S. forces -- have some analysts concerned that the Musharrafgovernment is insufficiently committed to pacifying the border. (37) Political tensions relatedto Afghan instability and Pakistan's role again rose in 2005, reaching alarming levels in mid-year. In January, a "misunderstanding" led to a cross-border exchange of artillery and machinegun firebetween Afghan and Pakistani troops. (38) In April, a top U.S. military commander in Afghanistan claimedthat Pakistan was preparing to launch military operations in North Waziristan near the Afghanborder. A Pakistani general later denied the claim and called the comments "highlyirresponsible." (39) AMay Newsweek magazine report claimed that a Koran had been desecrated at the U.S. facility atGuantanamo Bay, allegedly spurring violent anti-U.S. protests in both Afghanistan and Pakistan(senior U.S. and Afghan officials later disputed the connection). (40) Subsequent questions wereraised about a possible role of Pakistan's intelligence service in sparking the riots; some Pakistanistrategists may oppose a long-term U.S. presence in Afghanistan, viewing it as inimical toIslamabad's interests in the region. (41) 
Revived Taliban insurgent activity killed many hundreds in Afghanistan during the springof 2005. In May, a U.S. Army colonel in Kabul commended Pakistan's "considerable" militaryefforts in Waziristan, but said insurgents continue to cross into Afghanistan to attack U.S.-led forcesbefore returning to Pakistan. (42) By June, Afghan officials were complaining of a "steady streamof terrorists" entering their country from Pakistan, and the Afghan president made a personal appealto his Pakistani counterpart to halt the exfiltration. President Musharraf issued assurances of fullsupport for the Kabul government, but Afghan authorities reported arresting three Pakistani nationalsminutes before they planned to kill the outgoing U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad,in Kabul. The Afghan-Pakistani rift deepened, spurring President Bush to make a personal call toMusharraf in an effort to smooth relations between two key U.S. allies in the region. (43) In July 2005, Pakistanreported moving 4,000 additional troops to the border region, bringing the total to some 80,000, andPrime Minister Aziz visited Kabul, where he vowed "seamless cooperation" with the Afghangovernment in fighting terrorism and Islamic extremism. Still, U.S. officials continue to urgeIslamabad (and Kabul) to "do more" to end insurgent operations in the region and some reportsindicate that Taliban recruiting and training continues to take place on Pakistani territory withoutgovernment interference. (44) 
Al Qaeda and Related Groups in Pakistan. Linksbetween Al Qaeda and Pakistani Islamic militant groups, while possibly extensive, are believed tobe mostly informal, with existing Pakistani religious extremists facilitating Al Qaeda activities inthat country without being considered "members." (45) Al Qaeda reportedly was linked to several anti-U.S. andanti-Western terrorist attacks in Pakistan during 2002, although the primary suspects in most attackswere members of indigenous Pakistani groups. (46) With the post-9/11 capture of numerous Arab Al Qaeda leaders(most of them in Pakistani cities), there are indications that a new wave of ringleaders is made upof Pakistani nationals. (47) President Musharraf's further efforts to crack down on outlawed groups -- along with his suggestionsthat Pakistan may soften its long-held Kashmir policies -- may have fueled even greater outrageamong radical Islamists already angered by Pakistan's September 2001 policy reversal, whenMusharraf cut ties with the Afghan Taliban regime and began facilitating U.S.-led anti-terrorismoperations in the region. (48) Musharraf and his top lieutenants themselves became targets ofAl Qaeda and Al Qaeda-linked violent extremism: (49) 
On December 13, 2003, a remote-controlled bomb destroyed a Rawalpindibridge less than one minute after Musharraf's motorcade had passed over it. A U.S.-suppliedelectronic jamming device is believed to have delayed detonation.
On December 25, 2003, dual suicide car bomb attacks on Musharraf'smotorcade in Rawalpindi failed to harm the Pakistani president, but killed 15 people, including theattackers. (50)
On June 10, 2004, militants attacked the motorcade of a top Pakistan Armycommander and Musharraf ally in Karachi, killing ten, but leaving the generalunharmed.
On July 30, 2004, a suicide bomber killed eight other people in a failed attemptto assassinate the Prime Minister-designate, Shaukat Aziz, who was unharmed.
The F.B.I. played a role in the investigations into attempts on President Musharraf's life andthe United States has undertaken to provide improved training to Musharraf's bodyguards. Nonetheless, it is considered likely that future assassination attempts on Musharraf will occur. (51) Low-level Pakistanisecurity officers and soldiers were convicted for involvement in the attacks on Pakistani leaders,heightening concerns that the Musharraf government is finding it difficult to control domesticextremism, especially among some elements of Pakistan's security apparatus. (52) As more evidence arisesexposing Al Qaeda's deadly new alliance with indigenous Pakistani militants -- and militaryoperations continue to cause death and disruption in Pakistan's western regions -- concern aboutPakistan's fundamental political and social stability has increased. (53) 
The United States also notes past indications of links between Al Qaeda and Pakistani armyofficers, intelligence agents, weapons experts, and militant leaders. There also have been reports thatPakistan allows Taliban militants to train in Pakistan for combat in Afghanistan and that Al Qaedacamps near the Afghan Pakistani border remain active. (54) Signs of collusion between some elements of Al Qaeda,Lashkar-e-Taiba, and influential Pakistanis fuel skepticism among those who doubt the sincerity ofPakistan's commitment to moderation. For example, of three major Al Qaeda figures captured inPakistan, one (Abu Zubaydah) was found at a Lashkar-e-Taiba safehouse in Faisalabad, suggestingthat some LeT members have facilitated the movement of Al Qaeda members in Pakistan. (55) Another (Khalid SheikhMohammed) was seized at the Rawalpindi home of a member of the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), one ofPakistan's leading religious Islamist political parties. In fact, at least four top captured Al Qaedasuspects had ties to JI. In August 2004, Pakistan's interior minister asked the JI leadership to explainwhy several important Al Qaeda fugitives were captured in the homes of party workers, and a leaderof the ruling Muslim League party acknowledged that terrorists were linked to "individual" JIleaders. JI chief Qazi Hussain Ahmed responded by denying that the party had any ties to Al Qaeda. When asked about the issue, President Musharraf expressed "the greatest disappointment ... thatthere are some political elements" in Pakistan that "keep on instigating" foreign terrorists. He deniedimplicating any specific religious parties as a whole while conceding that individual terroristsuspects have been JI members. (56) 
During the time that Islamabad was actively supporting the Afghan Taliban regime it hadhelped to create, Pakistan's powerful Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency is believed to have haddirect contacts with Al Qaeda figures. (57) Sympathetic ISI officials may even have provided shelter to AlQaeda members in both Pakistan and Kashmir. (58) At least one source suggests the ISI collaborated with Al Qaeda'sshift into South Waziristan in 2002. (59) Two senior Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly met withOsama bin Laden in 2001 to conduct "long discussions about nuclear, chemical and biologicalweapons." (60) In July2005, six Pakistan army officers, including two colonels, were convicted on charges of plotting withAl Qaeda members. (61) Moreover, known Islamic extremists with ties to Al Qaeda appear to have remained active onPakistani territory. For example, longtime Pakistani terrorist chief Fazlur Rehman Khalil, whoco-signed Osama bin Laden's 1998 edict declaring it a Muslim's duty to kill Americans and Jews,has lived openly in Rawalpindi, not far from Pakistan's Army General Headquarters. (62) Khalil is the leader ofHarakat ul-Mujahideen, one of the many Pakistan-based terrorist groups opposed to both thecontinued rule of President Musharraf and to U.S. policy in the region.
Mid-2004 saw significant developments in the fight against Al Qaeda-linked militants inPakistan, including the capture or killing of several allegedly senior Al Qaeda operatives and otherwanted fugitives (Al Qaeda suspects Masrab Arochi, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, and MohammedNaeem Noor Khan were captured in Pakistani cities in June and July; see "Notable Al Qaeda FiguresCaptured or Killed in Pakistan," below). Pakistan's interior minister said that security agencies hadcaptured 12 foreign and 51 Pakistani "terrorists" between mid-July and mid-August 2004. As manyas ten of these were suspected Al Qaeda members whom the Pakistani government said wereplanning attacks on Pakistan government and Western targets, including the U.S. Embassy, tocoincide with Pakistani Independence Day. (63) In mid-August 2004, Pakistan published pictures of six"most-wanted terrorists" along with offers of major monetary rewards for information leading totheir capture. (64) InSeptember, Pakistan reported having killed one of these fugitives, suspected top Al Qaeda operativeAmjad Farooqi, and two other militants during a 4-hour gunbattle in the southern city of Nawabshah. Farooqi was described as having been the chief Al Qaeda contact in Pakistan and a longtimeassociate of Khalid Sheik Mohammed. (65) Within days, Pakistan said 11 more militants had been captured,including members of Jaish-e-Mohammed wanted in connection with a May 2002 car bombing inKarachi that killed 11 French military technicians. Pakistan's interior minister declared that thearrests had "broken the back of Al Qaeda in Pakistan," a claim identical to that made by another topPakistani official two years earlier. In September 2004, then-Deputy Secretary of State Armitagecalled the activities of Pakistani security forces "very noteworthy" and "extraordinarilyappreciated." (66) 
While developments in 2004 marked notable strides in Pakistani and multilateral efforts toeliminate Al Qaeda and other Islamic extremist elements in the region, the problem for Pakistan isfar from resolved. Reports indicate that Pakistan's western border regions -- especially thetraditionally autonomous Wazir districts of the FATA -- remain a sanctuary for scores or evenhundreds of non-Pakistani militants with Al Qaeda links or sympathies. (67) Pakistani forces continueto hunt suspected Al Qaeda members in both urban areas and western border regions. (68) In a controversial turn,the Islamabad government has made large cash payments to Pashtun tribal commanders in an effortto sever Wazir ties to Al Qaeda (see "Pakistani Military Operations" section below). (69) 
In 2005, the United States has bolstered efforts to capture wanted Al Qaeda fugitives in partwith local-language television, radio, and newspaper advertising offering large monetary rewardsfor information leading to the arrest of 14 most wanted terrorists. (70) An apparent rift betweenArab Al Qaeda members and their Central Asia (primarily Uzbek) allies reportedly has beenexploited by U.S. and Pakistani intelligence services; such internal Al Qaeda conflict may haveallowed for the capture of Abu Faraj al-Liby in May 2005. (71) The arrest spurredPresident Musharraf and Pakistan's interior minister to (again) insist that their security forces had"broken the back" of Al Qaeda in Pakistan. (72) Yet, in June 2005, a senior fugitive Taliban leader appeared onPakistani television to claim that Osama bin Laden and Taliban chief Mullah Omar were both aliveand in good health, spurring the outgoing U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan to claim that the twofugitives were not in Afghanistan. (73) 
Following deadly July 7, 2005 bombings in London, and subsequent confirmation that atleast two of the culprits had made recent visits to Pakistan, Islamabad was faced with renewedinternational scrutiny of the country's links to Islamic extremism. President Musharraf launched anew nationwide crackdown on suspected militants and officials began investigating possible tiesbetween the London attack and Pakistan-based terrorist groups with known links to Al Qaeda. Bymonth's end, Musharraf was again declaring that Al Qaeda's operational structure in Pakistan hadbeen destroyed and he excluded the possibility that the terrorist network could have carried outrecent attacks in Britain or Egypt. (74) 
 Notable Al Qaeda Figures Captured or Killed in Pakistan
Narcotics. Compounding the difficulty of battling regional extremists has been a major spike in Afghan opium production, spurring acute concerns thatAfghanistan may become or already is a "narco-state," and that terrorist groups and their supportersin both Afghanistan and Pakistan are reaping huge profits from the processing and trafficking ofheroin. (75) A bumperopium crop in 2004 was two-thirds larger than the previous year's, with Afghan opium now said tocomprise up to 90% of the world's supply and the opium trade accounting for about half ofAfghanistan's gross domestic product. The director of Pakistan's Anti-Narcotics Force has estimatedthat 70% of narcotics produced in Afghanistan is trafficked through Pakistan. Some analysts expressworry that Pakistan is forced to divert scarce security resources to counternarcotics efforts. (76) There is congressionalconcern that heroin trafficking has become a major source of funding for Al Qaeda. (77) 
section_title: Indigenous Pakistani Terrorism
paragraphs: Pakistan is known to be a base for numerous indigenous terrorist organizations. Manyanalysts locate the genesis of this now serious problem in the Islamization process initiated by Z.A.Bhutto after 1971 and greatly accelerated by Gen. Zia-ul-Haq in the 1980s. Some also hold theUnited States complicit, given its overt support for Zia, an authoritarian military leader whorepresented a "frontline ally" against Soviet expansionism. Zia sought greater domestic politicallegitimacy in part by strengthening the country's conservative religious elements which would laterplay a major role in Pakistan's Afghan and Kashmir policies. (78) 
Pakistan has in the past demonstrated inconsistency in its efforts to rein in Islamic militantsoperating inside its borders. The United States has for many years been aware of the existence ofoutlawed groups both in Pakistan-held Kashmir and within Pakistani cities. In July 2000 testimonybefore the House International Relations Committee, a senior U.S. counterterrorism official calledPakistan's record on combating terrorism "mixed," noting that "Pakistan has tolerated terrorists livingand moving freely within its territory" and is believed to have provided "material support for someof these militants, including the Harakat ul-Mujahidin, a group that [the United States] hasdesignated as an FTO [Foreign Terrorist Organization]." (79) 
In the past, sectarian and Kashmir-oriented militant groups in Pakistan generally operatedwithin their own distinct geographic and functional spheres, separate from one another and also frommostly non-Pakistani militants who came to the region intent on fighting an international jihad. These distinctions have become less clear in the post-9/11 period. (80) In January 2002, Pakistanbanned five extremist groups, including Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), andSipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). The United States officially designates LeT and JeM as terroristgroups; SSP appears on the State Department's list of "other selected terrorist organizations." (81) Following Al Qaeda's2001-2002 expulsion from Afghanistan and ensuing relocation of some core elements to Pakistanicities such as Karachi and Peshawar, some Al Qaeda activists are known to have joined forces withindigenous Pakistani Sunni militant groups, including LeT, JeM, SSP, and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ),an FTO-designated offshoot of the SSP that has close ties to Al Qaeda. (82) The United Nations listsJeM and LJ as "entities belonging to or associated with the Taliban and Al Qaedaorganization." (83) 
In his landmark January 2002 speech, President Musharraf vowed to end Pakistan's use asa base for terrorism, and he criticized religious extremism and intolerance in the country. In thewake of the speech, about 3,300 extremists were detained, though most of these were soon released(including one man who later tried to assassinate Musharraf). (84) Among those releasedwere the founders of both Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad. Although officially banned,these groups continued to operate under new names: LeT became Jamaat al-Dawat; JeM becameKhudam-ul Islam. (85) In November 2003, just two days after the U.S. Ambassador expressed particular concern over thecontinuing activities of banned organizations, Musharraf moved to arrest members of these groupsand shutter their offices. Six groups were formally banned, including offshoots of both the JeM andSSP, and more than 100 offices were raided. Musharraf vowed to permanently prevent bannedgroups from resurfacing, and his government moved to seize their financial assets. (86) Some analysts called theefforts cosmetic, ineffective, and the result of external pressure rather than a genuine recognition ofthe threat posed. (87) 
Nearly two years later, and in the wake of deadly July 2005 bombings in London that had apossible Pakistan connection, both President Musharraf and Prime Minister Aziz restated theirstrident intention to combat religious extremism. From 800 to as many as 3,000 arrests were madein nationwide sweeps when security forces raided numerous mosques and religious seminaries. However, there is widespread scepticism among analysts that Musharraf's most recent initiatives willlead to more effective action; many contend that such assurances have been given by the Pakistanileader numerous times in the past without meaningful result. (88) Moreover, reports thatmilitant training facilities remain operative on Pakistani-controlled territory have become morecommon in mid-2005 and emanate from such disparate quarters as government officials in Kabuland New Delhi, as well as from local and Western media. (89) 
Since 2003, Pakistan's domestic terrorism mostly has involved Sunni-Shia conflict. Sectarianviolence has plagued Pakistan for decades. (90) According to one report, Pakistan's sectarian conflict is "thedirect consequence of state policies of Islamization and marginalization of secular democratic forces"wherein Sunni orthodoxy and militancy have been bolstered and manipulated by successivemilitary-dominated governments in Islamabad. (91) Repression of religious minorities in Pakistan is noted by theUnited States. (92) Majorsuicide bombings in Islamabad and Karachi left dozens dead in May 2005, and again raised concernsabout Pakistan's sectarian violence and domestic stability. Some analysts believe that, by redirectingPakistan's internal security resources, an increase in such violence may ease pressure on Al Qaedaand affiliated groups and so allow them to operate more freely there. (93) 
section_title: Madrassas and Pakistan Islamists
paragraphs: The Taliban movement itself began among students attending Pakistani religious schools(madrassas). Among the 10,000-20,000 or more madrassas training up to two million children inPakistan are a small percentage that have been implicated in teaching militant anti-Western,anti-American, anti-Hindu, and even anti-Shia values. Secretary of State Powell identified these as"programs that do nothing but prepare youngsters to be fundamentalists and to be terrorists." Thereis, however, little evidence that madrassas are producing known anti-Western terrorists. (94) Many of these madrassasare financed and operated by Pakistani Islamist political parties such as Jamaat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI,closely linked to the Taliban), as well as by multiple unknown foreign entities, many in SaudiArabia. (95) As many astwo-thirds of Pakistan's seminaries are run by the Deobandi sect, known in part for a traditionallyanti-Shia sentiment and at times linked to the Sipah-e-Sahaba terrorist group. (96) Some senior members ofJUI reportedly have been linked to several U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations. (97) The JUI chief, FazlurRehman, is a vocal critic of Pakistan's cooperation with the United States. In May 2004, he wasnamed Leader of the Opposition in Pakistan's Parliament. In September 2004, Musharraf reportedlyassured an audience of leading Pakistani religious seminarians that his government would notinterfere in the affairs of madrassas and was under no foreign pressure to do so. He did, however,acknowledge that a small number of seminaries are "harboring terrorists" and he asked religiousleaders to help isolate these by openly condemning them. (98) 
In July 2005, international attention to Pakistan's religious schools intensified after Pakistaniofficials acknowledged that three of the four suspects in the 7/7 London bombings visited Pakistanduring the previous year and two may have spent time at a madrassa near Lahore. (99) An ensuing crackdownon Pakistani religious extremists included a (new) government deadline for madrassa registration,the expulsion of 1,400 foreign nationals from Pakistani religious schools, and police raids on somesuspect seminaries. Pakistani Islamist leaders criticized the government's moves as human rightsabuses and vowed to take action to block them. Moreover, a small percentage of seminaries haverefused to participate in the registration program and the country's leading madrassa grouping -- theWafaq-ul-Madaris -- has been critical of certain requirements, including an obligation to reportfunding sources. (100) 
Since 2002, the U.S. Congress has allocated tens of millions of dollars to assist Pakistan inefforts to reform its education system, including changes that would make madrassa curriculumcloser in substance to that provided in non-religious schools. The 9/11 Commission Report recommends U.S. support for better Pakistani education and legislation passed by the 108th Congress( P.L. 108-458 ) calls for the devotion of increased U.S. government attention and resources to thisissue. (101) WhilePresident Musharraf has in the past pledged to crack down on the more extremist madrassas in hiscountry, there is little concrete evidence that he has done so. According to two observers,Musharraf's promises "came to nothing. His military government never implemented any programto register madrassas, follow their financing or control their curricula." (102) Many speculate thatMusharraf's reluctance to enforce reform efforts is rooted in his desire to remain on good terms withPakistan's Islamist political parties, which are seen to be an important part of his political base. (103) 
The Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) -- a coalition of six Islamist opposition parties -- holdsabout 20% of Pakistan's National Assembly seats, while also controlling the provincial assembly inthe North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and leading a coalition in the provincial assembly ofBaluchistan. Pakistan's Islamists denounce Pakistani military operations in western tribal areas, resistgovernmental attempts to reform religious schools that teach militancy, and harshly criticizeIslamabad's cooperation with the U.S. government and movement toward rapprochement with India. The leadership of the MMA's two main constituents -- the Jamaat-i-Islami and theJamiat-Ulema-Islami-Fazlur -- are notable for their rancorous anti-American rhetoric; they have attimes called for "jihad" against what they view as the grave threat to Pakistani sovereignty thatalliance with Washington entails. (104) One senior MMA leader went so far as to suggest thatWestern governments may have "engineered" the 7/7 London bombings. (105) In addition to decryingand seeking to end President Musharraf's cooperation with the United States, many also are viewedas opposing the U.S.-supported Kabul government. In September 2003, Afghan President Karzaicalled on Pakistani clerics to stop supporting Taliban members who seek to destabilize Afghanistan. Two months later, the Afghan foreign minister complained that Taliban leaders were operatingopenly in Quetta and other cities in western Pakistan. In the wake of a March 2004 battle betweenthe Pakistan Army and Islamic militants in the traditionally autonomous western FederallyAdministered Tribal Areas (FATA), Pakistan's interior minister accused MMA politicians of givinga "free hand" to terrorists. (106) Musharraf repeatedly has called on Pakistan's Muslim clericsto assist in fighting extremism and improving Pakistan's image as a moderate and progressive state,but there continues to be evidence that Pakistan's religious parties are becoming even more brazenin challenging these efforts. (107) 
section_title: Pakistan-U.S. Counterterrorism Cooperation(108)
paragraphs: According to the U.S. Departments of State and Defense, Pakistan has afforded the UnitedStates unprecedented levels of cooperation by allowing the U.S. military to use bases within thecountry, helping to identify and detain extremists, and deploying tens of thousands of its ownsecurity forces to secure the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. The State Department's Country Reportson Terrorism 2004 characterized Pakistan as one of the most important U.S. partners in the war onterrorism. A revived high-level U.S.-Pakistan Defense Consultative Group -- moribund since 1997-- has meet three times since 2001. Pakistan was designated as a Major Non-NATO Ally of theUnited States in June 2004, and top U.S. officials regularly praise Pakistan's anti-terrorismefforts. (109) The StateDepartment indicates that Islamabad has captured more than 600 alleged terrorists and theirsupporters. Several hundred of these have been transferred to U.S. custody, including some topsuspected Al Qaeda leaders. (110) Pakistan also has been ranked third in the world in seizingterrorists' financial assets. (111) In July 2005, President Bush said Pakistani PresidentMusharraf "has been a good partner in the global war on terrorism and in the ideological struggle thatwe're now engaged in." (112) 
In August 2004, then-State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism Cofer Black wasin Pakistan for a meeting of the U.S.-Pakistan Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism and LawEnforcement, the first since April 2003. In September 2004, President Bush met with PresidentMusharraf in New York, where the two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to broaden and deepenthe U.S.-Pakistan relationship, and Musharraf also visited Washington to inaugurate a newCongressional Pakistan Caucus at present comprised of 65 U.S. Representatives. In December 2004,Musharraf made a brief stopover in Washington, where President Bush praised the Pakistani leaderfor working to combat terrorism, saying that the Pakistani army "has been incredibly active and verybrave in southern Waziristan." Four months later, President Bush said that the United States is moresecure "because Pakistani forces captured more than 100 extremists across the country [in 2004],including operatives who were plotting attacks against the United States." Top U.S. government andmilitary officials regularly meet with Musharraf in Islamabad to discuss counterterrorism and forconsultations on regional security. (113) 
subsections: section_title: Obstacles
paragraphs: Many experts aver that, beginning most substantively with the policies of President Gen. Ziain the early 1980s, Islamabad's leaders have for decades supported and manipulated Islamicextremism as a means of forwarding their perceived strategic interests in the region. Thus, despitePakistan's "crucial" cooperation, there continue to be doubts about Islamabad's full commitment tocore U.S. concerns in the vast "lawless zones" of the Afghan-Pakistani border region where Islamicextremists find shelter. (114) Until September 2001, Islamabad's was one of only threeworld governments to recognize the Afghan Taliban regime, and Pakistan had been providingmaterial support to the Taliban movement throughout the 1990s. Especially worrisome areindications that members of the Taliban continue to receive logistical and other support insidePakistan. Senior U.S. Senators reportedly have voiced such worries, including concern that elementsof Pakistan's intelligence agencies might be helping members of the Taliban and other Islamicmilitants. (115) InAugust 2003, at least three Pakistani army officers, including two colonels, were arrested onsuspicion of having ties to Al Qaeda. Soon after, then-Deputy Secretary of State Armitage wasquoted as saying he does "not think that affection for working with us extends up and down the rankand file of the Pakistani security community." (116) 
In October 2003 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, AssistantSecretary of Defense Peter Rodman said, "There are elements in the Pakistani government who wesuspect are sympathetic to the old policy of before 9/11," adding that there still existed innorthwestern Pakistan a radical Islamic infrastructure that "spews out fighters that go into Kashmiras well as into Afghanistan." In July 2004, a senior Pakistan expert told the same Senate panel that,"in the absence of greater U.S. guarantees regarding Pakistan's long-run security interests, it isdangerous [for the Pakistani military] to completely remove the threat of extremism to Kabul andDelhi." He went on to characterize a full and sincere decision by Islamabad to eradicate extremismas "tantamount to dismantling a weapons system." (117) Until mid-2004, the number of Al Qaeda figures arrested inPakistan had been fairly static for more than one year, causing some U.S. military officials toquestion the extent of Islamabad's commitment to this aspect of U.S.-led counterterrorismefforts. (118) 
A July 2004 hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee focused specifically onPakistan and counterterrorism. One area in which there appeared to be consensus among thethree-person panel of veteran Pakistan watchers was the potential problems inherent in a U.S.over-reliance on President Gen. Pervez Musharraf as an individual at the potential cost of morepositive development of Pakistan's democratic institutions and civil society. Many analysts believesuch development is key to the long-term success of stated U.S. policy in the region. According toone expert, the United States is attempting to deal with Pakistan through "policy triage and byfocusing on the personal leadership of President Musharraf," both of which are "flawed concepts." Another provided similar analysis, asserting that Musharraf is best seen as a "marginal satisfier" whowill do only the minimum expected of him. This analyst recommended that, "The United Statesmust alter the impression our support for Pakistan is essentially support for Musharraf," a sentimentechoed by many Pakistani commentators, as well. These perspectives suggest that many observersreject the specific conclusion of the 9/11 Commission Report that Musharraf's government is the"best hope for stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan." (119) 
section_title: Pakistani Military Operations
paragraphs: Background. In an effort to block infiltrationalong the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, Islamabad had by the end of 2002 deployed some 70,000troops to the region. In April 2003, the United States, Pakistan, and Afghanistan formed a TripartiteCommission to coordinate their efforts to stabilize the border areas. In June 2003, in what may havebeen a response to increased U.S. pressure, Islamabad for the first time sent its armed forces into theFederally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in search of Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters who haveeluded the U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan. By September 2003, Islamabad had up to 25,000troops in the tribal areas, and a major operation -- the first ever of its kind -- took place incoordination with U.S.-led forces on the Afghan side of the border. A firefight in early October sawPakistani security forces engage suspected Al Qaeda fugitives in South Waziristan, the southernmostof the FATA's seven districts which borders Afghanistan's Paktika province. (120) The operationsencouraged U.S. officials, who saw in them a positive trend in Islamabad's commitment to trackingand capturing wanted extremists on Pakistani territory. Still, these officials admitted that thePakistani government was finding it more difficult politically to pursue Taliban members who enjoyethnic and familial ties with Pakistani Pashtuns. (121) 
After the two December 2003 attempts on President Musharraf's life, the Pakistan militaryincreased its efforts in the FATA. Many analysts speculated that the harrowing experiences broughta significant shift in Musharraf's attitude and caused him to recognize the dire threat posed by radicalgroups based in his country. In February 2004, Musharraf made his most explicit admission to datethat Muslim militants were crossing from Pakistan into Afghanistan to battle coalition troops there. In the same month, the Vice Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff told a Congressional panelthat the Islamabad government had "taken some initiatives to increase their military presence on theborder, such as manned outposts, regular patrols, and security barriers." By August 2004, 75,000Pakistani troops were in the western border areas. Islamabad's more energetic operations in thewestern tribal regions brought vocal criticism from Musharraf's detractors among Islamist groups,many of whom accuse him of taking orders from the United States. (122) 
Operations in 2004. In March 2004, up to 6,000Pakistani soldiers took part in a pitched, 12-day battle with Islamic militants in South Waziristan. More than 130 people were killed in the fighting, including 46 Pakistani soldiers, but no"high-value" Al Qaeda or Taliban fugitives were killed or captured. Pakistani officials called theoperation a victory, but the apparent escape of militant leaders, coupled with the vehement and lethalresistance put up by their well-armed cadre (believed to be remnants of the Islamic Movement ofUzbekistan), led many observers to call the operation a failure marked by poor intelligence and hastyplanning. (123) Duringthe course of the battle, Pakistani troops began bulldozing the homes of Wazirs who were suspectedof providing shelter to "foreign terrorists," and the United States made a short-notice delivery of2,500 surplus protective vests to the Pakistani military. (124) 
Concurrent with these developments, the Islamabad government made progress inpersuading Pashtun tribal leaders to undertake their own efforts by organizing tribal "lashkars," ormilitias, for the purpose of detaining (or at least expelling) wanted fugitives. (125) Political administratorsin the district, impatient with the slow pace of progress, issued an "ultimatum" that included threatsof steep monetary fines for the entire tribe, as well as for any individuals who provide shelter to"unwanted foreigners." (126) After March's military setback, a deadline was set forforeigners living in the tribal areas to register with the government and surrender their weapons withthe understanding that they would be allowed to remain in Pakistan if they forswore terrorism. Theoriginal date passed without a single registrant coming forward and the government extended thedeadline on several occasions.
On April 24, 2004, the five most-wanted Pashtun tribesmen "surrendered" to governmentauthorities and were immediately granted amnesty in return for promises that they would not provideshelter to Al Qaeda members or their supporters. All five were reported to be supporter's of MaulanaFazlur Rehman's JUI Islamist party. Islamabad insisted that this "Shakai agreement" would markno diminution of its counterterrorism efforts, but the top U.S. military officer in Afghanistan at thetime, Lt. Gen. David Barno, expressed concern that Pakistan's strategy of seeking reconciliation withmilitants in western tribal areas "could go in the wrong direction." Almost immediately uponmaking the deal, the most outspoken of the tribal militants, 27-year-old Nek Mohammed, who hadfought with the Taliban in Afghanistan, issued threats against Islamabad and pledged his fealty tofugitive Taliban chief Mohammed Omar. During the following weeks, a series of what someanalysts called "spurious" deals were struck between the government and foreign militants, but theseproved unsuccessful after the foreigners failed to register, and numerous tribal militias sought butfailed to capture any of them. (127) 
In response to this apparent failure of its conciliatory approach, Islamabad ordered authoritiesin South Waziristan to shutter more than 6,000 merchant shops in an effort to use economic pressureagainst uncooperative tribesmen, and a "massive mobilization" of federal troops was reported. Then,in June, the government rescinded its amnesty offer to the five key militants noted above and issueda "kill or capture" order against them. The next day, fixed-wing Pakistani warplanes bombed threecompounds being used by militants in South Waziristan, including one that was described as aterrorist training camp. More than 20,000 troops were said to be involved in a sweep operation thatleft about 72 people dead, including 17 soldiers, after three days of fighting. (128) On June 18, NekMohammed was located, apparently through signals intelligence, and was killed along with sevenothers by a missile that may have come from an American Predator drone. (129) 
In early September 2004, some 55 suspected Islamic militants were killed when Pakistanwarplanes attacked an alleged Al Qaeda training camp in South Waziristan. The military claimedthat 90% of the dead were foreigners (mostly Uzbeks and Chechens), but other reports said half werelocals, and eyewitnesses told of numerous civilian casualties. Intense fighting continued throughoutthe month, bringing renewed criticism of the government by both human rights groups and Islamistleaders. The Islamabad government is said to be paying reparations for property damage, and forthe death or injury of innocents. (130) 
In mid-September 2004, Abdullah Mahsud -- a Pakistani Pashtun militant who lost a legfighting for the Taliban in Afghanistan and who was held for more than two years at the U.S. facilityat Guantanamo Bay before being released in 2004 -- reportedly refused to allow Pakistan securityforces to use a key road connecting North and South Waziristan. Mahsud was believed to be tryingto fill the shoes of Nek Mohammed, a leading tribal militant killed in June. In October, two Chineseengineers traveling through South Waziristan along with two Pakistani security officers werekidnaped by Mahsud and his followers, who threatened to kill their hostages. Pakistani commandosstormed the militants' hideout and killed five kidnappers inside, but Mahsud was not found (oneChinese national was freed, but the other was killed in the shootout). Later in the month, a groupof tribal leaders who had been trying to broker Mahsud's surrender came under attack from what themilitary called rockets fired by "miscreants." Fourteen were killed in a sign of growing intra-tribalconflict over government policy in the FATA. (131) 
In the midst of ongoing and lethal military operations, the five most-wanted Pashtun tribalmilitant leaders in South Waziristan "surrendered" to government authorities in November 2004 bypromising to remain peaceful and provide no shelter to foreign militants. In return, the governmentreportedly vowed to pay reparations for property damage and to release tribal prisoners. Soon after,the regional corps commander declared that "peace has been restored in Wana," the area where thebulk of combat took place in 2004. The general also announced that all but 3,000 troops and ninecheck posts would be withdrawn from the Wana region, where less than one hundred militants weresaid to remain. A U.S. State Department spokesman later said the United States was assured thatPakistani forces were not withdrawing from Waziristan and that Pakistan remained "fully committedto continuing the campaign against Al Qaeda and Al Qaeda supporters." (132) The Peshawar CorpsCommander reported that 35 military operations in Waziristan left 250 militants (and 175 Pakistanisoldiers) dead and 600 captured in 2004, but no "high-value targets" are known to have been amongthese, and the militants swept out of South Waziristan were believed to have found refuge in otherareas where Pakistani troops are not active. (133) 
Operations in 2005. During 2005, attentionshifted to the North Waziristan district where Pakistani security forces made sporadic raids in whichscores of suspected militants -- local Pashtun tribals, Afghans, and other foreigners such as Uzbeksand Arabs -- were killed or captured. (134) In early spring, Pakistani commanders issued warnings toWazir tribal leaders that failure to expel foreign militants from the region would result in large-scalemilitary operations and, in April, hundreds of Pakistani troops reportedly launched search operationsfor foreign militants in North Waziristan near the Afghan border. (135) A top U.S. militarycommander in Afghanistan claimed Pakistan was launching new major operations in the region,eliciting strong denials from a Pakistani commander who called the claim "highlyirresponsible." (136) Reports suggest that tensions in North Waziristan remain high. (137) 
The Islamabad government's "peace deals" with South Waziristan militants appear to havelargely ended overt conflict there in 2005. (138) However, there are indications that underlying tensions remainsignificant and could bring future unrest. (139) In March, Islamic militants in the Wana area warned the peacethere could unravel if the government reneged on promises to remove checkpoints and paycompensation for damage to local homes and, in May, a bomb exploded at the home of a tribal leaderin South Waziristan, killing two women and four children. On the first anniversary of NekMohammed's June 2004 death, Muslim clerics and "thousands" of Taliban in South Waziristanreportedly marked occasion by vowing to continue their jihad against America. One month later,gunmen killed nine tribesmen, including five pro-government tribal elders, in three separate attacksin South Waziristan. The elders had been assisting army efforts to capture or kill fugitive Islamicmilitants in the region. (140) Despite this violence, Pakistani officials insist that AlQaeda-linked militants have been completely eradicated from South Waziristan. (141) 
Fallout. As was noted above, PresidentMusharraf's post-September 2001 policy reversals and his efforts to crack down on Islamic extremistgroups likely motivated the two deadly December 2003 attempts to assassinate the Pakistani leader. As Pakistan's coercive counterterrorism policies became more vigorous, numerous observers warnedthat increased government pressure on tribal communities and military operations in the FATA werecreating a backlash, sparking unrest and strengthening pro-Al Qaeda sentiments both there and inPakistan's southern and eastern cities. (142) Developments in 2004 appeared to have borne out theseanalyses. As his army battled militants in South Waziristan in June of that year, President Musharraftold an interviewer that he was concerned about "fallout" from the recent military operations, anda Pakistan Army spokesman drew direct links between a six-week-long spate of mostly sectarianbombings and killings in Karachi and government efforts to root out militants in South Waziristan. A leading pro-Taliban militant in the tribal areas accused Islamabad of "conniving" with the U.S.government to kill Nek Mohammed, and he warned that military operations in South Waziristanwould lead to further violence across Pakistan. Several international aid organizations suspendedtheir operations in the Baluchistan province after receiving threats of suicide attacks. (143) 
Islamic militant outrage appeared to again peak in mid-summer 2004: During the weekspanning July and August, a suicide bomber killed a senior Pakistani intelligence officer in Kohatnear the tribal areas; another suicide bomber murdered nine people in a failed attempt to assassinatePakistan's Prime Minister-designate (an Al Qaeda-affiliated group claimed responsibility for theattack); and gunmen killed a police officer in a failed effort to assassinate the Baluchistan ChiefMinister. As conflict and bloodshed in Pakistan increased, analysts again expressed acute concernsabout the country's fundamental political stability. (144) 
section_title: U.S. Military Presence
paragraphs: The issue of small-scale and sporadic U.S. military presence on Pakistani soil is a sensitiveone, and reports of even brief incursions from neighboring Afghanistan have caused tensionsbetween Islamabad and Washington. (145) In March 2004, U.S. and Afghan forces conducted OperationMountain Storm southern and eastern Afghanistan, employing new tactics and in coordination withPakistani troops across the international border. (146) A press report earlier in the year had suggested that the U.S.military in Afghanistan had plans for a spring offensive that would "go into Pakistan withMusharraf's help" to neutralize Al Qaeda forces, a suggestion that President Musharraf's said was"not a possibility at all." The Commander of U.S. Central Command, Gen. Abizaid, stated that hehad no plans to put U.S. troops in Pakistan against Islamabad's wishes, and a senior U.S. diplomatand senior U.S. military officer later told a House Armed Services Committee panel that it is"absolutely" the policy of the United States to keep its troops on the Afghan side of theAfghan-Pakistani border. In April 2004, the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan caused some furtherannoyance in Islamabad when he said that the Pakistani leadership must solve the ongoing problemof militant infiltration into Afghanistan or "we will have to do it for ourselves." American artilleryreportedly can be fired onto militant forces with Islamabad's permission. (147) U.S. military officialsin Kabul say that Pakistan has agreed to allow "hot pursuit" up to ten kilometers into Pakistaniterritory, although this is officially denied by the Islamabad government. (148) 
Since the spring of 2002, U.S. military and law enforcement personnel reportedly have beenengaging in direct, low-profile efforts to assist Pakistani security forces in tracking and apprehendingfugitive Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters on Pakistani territory, especially with signals and otherintelligence. U.S. forces in Afghanistan reportedly provide significant support to Pakistani forcesoperating near the Afghan border -- including spy satellites, electronic surveillance planes, armedaerial drones, and sophisticated ground sensors -- and law enforcement efforts within Pakistanreportedly benefit from CIA- and FBI-supplied surveillance equipment and other backing. Therealso have been reports that the United States is assisting Pakistan in the creation of a 700-man"Counter-Terrorism Cell," and Pakistan's air force chief said in September 2004 that U.S. forcescontinued to make use of several air bases near the Afghan border. (149) 
section_title: U.S. Government Assistance
paragraphs: Security-related U.S. assistance programs for Pakistan are said to be aimed at bolsteringIslamabad's counterterrorism and border security efforts, and have included U.S.-fundedroad-building projects in the Northwest Frontier Province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas,the provision of night-vision equipment, communications gear, protective vests, 26 transporthelicopters, and, currently in the pipeline, six used C-130 transport aircraft. The United States alsohas undertaken to train and equip new Pakistan Army Air Assault units that can move quickly to findand target terrorist elements. (150) The Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff reports thatthe Pakistani Army has "significantly improved their counterterrorism capabilities, thanks in part toequipment we are providing them, and has played a vital role in enhancing security in thisregion." (151) 
In September 2004, the Pentagon notified Congress of the possible Foreign Military Sale toPakistan of $78 million worth of military radio systems meant to improve Pakistani communicationcapabilities and to increase interoperability between Pakistani and U.S.-led counterterrorist forces. In November, potential sales to Pakistan of eight P-3C maritime reconnaissance aircraft, six Phalanxnaval guns, and 2,000 TOW anti-armor missiles were announced. The deals could be worth up to$1.2 billion for Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, the prime contractors. The Department of Defensecharacterizes the P-3Cs and TOW missiles as having significant anti-terrorism applications (a claimthat has elicited skepticism from some analysts), and it asserted that the proposed sales would notaffect the military balance in the region. India's external affairs minister has "cautioned the UnitedStates" against any decision to sell F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan, adding that the "U.S. arms supplyto Pakistan would have a negative impact on the goodwill the United States enjoys with India,particularly as a sister democracy." The Pentagon reports Foreign Military Sales agreements withPakistan worth $27 million in FY2002, $167 million in FY2003, and $176 million in FY2004. (152) 
With FY2005 appropriations included, Pakistan will have received $1.1 billion in direct U.S.security-related assistance since September 2001 (Foreign Military Financing totaling nearly $675million plus about $437 million for other programs, see Figure 1). (153) Congress also hasallocated billions of dollars in additional defense spending to reimburse Pakistan and othercooperating nations for their support of U.S. counterterrorism operations. Pentagon documentsindicate that Pakistan received coalition support funding of more than $1.3 billion for the periodJanuary 2003-September 2004, an amount roughly equal to one-third of Pakistan's total defenseexpenditures during that period. A report of the House Armed Services Committee ( H.Rept. 109-89 )said the Secretary of Defense expects to disburse another $1.2 billion to Pakistan in FY2005. 
Figure 1. U.S. Assistance to Pakistan, FY2001-FY2005 and 2006Administration Request 
Sources: U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development
Notes:
P.L. 109-13
During 2004, there were clear indications that both the United States and Pakistan werere-invigorating their efforts to find and capture those terrorists and their supporters remaining inPashtun-majority areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Moreover, during mid-2005, PresidentMusharraf has taken further steps to crack down on indigenous Pakistani extremist groups. Manyof these groups have links not only to individuals and organizations actively fighting in Afghanistanand Pakistan, but also with groups that continue to pursue a violent separatist campaign in thedisputed Kashmir region along Pakistan's northeast frontier. A November 2003 cease-fire agreementbetween Pakistan and India holds at the time of this writing, and appears to have contributed to whatNew Delhi officials acknowledge is a major decrease in the number of "terrorist" infiltrations. (154) However, separatistmilitants vowed in January 2004 to continue their struggle regardless of the status of the nascentPakistan-India dialogue.
section_title: Terrorism in Kashmir and India(155)
paragraphs: As a vast mosaic of ethnicities, languages, cultures, and religions, India can be difficult togovern. Internal instability resulting from diversity is further complicated by colonial legacies suchas international borders that separate members of the same ethnic groups, creating flashpoints forregional dissidence and separatism. Separatist movements in the northwestern Jammu and Kashmirstate, and in remote and underdeveloped northeast regions, confound New Delhi and createinternational tensions by operating out of neighboring Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Bhutan, andNepal. Moreover, indigenous Maoist rebels continue to operate in eastern states, possibly incollusion with Nepali Maoists at war with the Kathmandu government. The Indian Home Ministryreported to Parliament that a total of 7,458 people were killed in 10,788 incidents of separatist andMaoist "Naxalite" violence in India during the year ending October 31, 2004. More than half ofthese deaths and incidents occurred in Kashmir. (156) 
subsections: section_title: Kashmiri Separatism
paragraphs: Separatist violence in India's Jammu and Kashmir state has continued unabated since 1989. New Delhi has long blamed Pakistan-based militant groups for lethal attacks on Indian civilians, aswell as on government security forces, in both Kashmir and in major Indian cities. (157) India holds Pakistanresponsible for providing material support and training facilities to Kashmiri militants. Pakistandenies rendering anything more than diplomatic and moral support to separatists, and it remainscritical of India's allegedly severe human rights violations in Jammu and Kashmir. (158) Disagreement over themeaning of the word "terrorism" has been a sticking point in India-Pakistan relations. (159) According to the U.S.government, several anti-India militant groups fighting in Kashmir are based in Pakistan and areclosely linked to Islamist groups there. Many also are said to maintain ties with international jihadiorganizations, including Al Qaeda: 
Harakat ul-Mujahideen (an FTO-designate), based in Muzaffarabad (AzadKashmir) and Rawalpindi, is aligned with the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Fazlur Rehman party (JUI-F),itself a main constituent of the MMA Islamist coalition in Pakistan's NationalAssembly;
Hizbul Mujahideen (on the State Department's list of "other selected terroristorganizations"), believed to have bases in Pakistan, is the militant wing of Pakistan's largest Islamicpolitical party and leading MMA member, the Jamaat-i-Islami;
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) (an FTO-designate), based in both Peshawar andMuzaffarabad, also is aligned with JUI-F; and
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) (an FTO-designate), based in Muzaffarabad and nearLahore, is the armed wing of a Pakistan-based, anti-U.S. Sunni religious organization formed in1989. (160)
JeM claimed responsibility for an October 2001 suicide bomb attack on the Jammu and Kashmirstate assembly building in Srinagar that killed 31 (it later denied the claim). In December 2001, theUnited States designated both LeT and JeM as Foreign Terrorist Organizations shortly after theywere publically implicated by New Delhi for an attack on the Indian Parliament complex that killednine and injured 18. This assault spurred India to fully mobilize its military along the India-Pakistanfrontier. An ensuing 10-month-long standoff in 2002 involved one million Indian and Pakistanisoldiers and was viewed as the closest the two countries had come to full-scale war since 1971,causing the U.S. government to become "deeply concerned ... that a conventional war ... couldescalate into a nuclear confrontation." (161) 
Pakistan's powerful and largely autonomous ISI is widely believed to have providedsignificant support for militant Kashmiri separatists over the past decade and a half in what isperceived as a proxy war against India. (162) In March 2003, the chief of India's Defense IntelligenceAgency reported providing the United States with "solid documentary proof" that 70 Islamic militantcamps were operating in Pakistani Kashmir. In May 2003, the Indian defense minister claimed thatabout 3,000 "terrorists" were being trained in camps on the Pakistani side of the Line of Control(LOC). Some Indian officials have suggested that Al Qaeda may be active in Kashmir. (163) Then-U.S. DeputySecretary of State Armitage reportedly received a June 2002 pledge from Pakistani PresidentMusharraf that all "cross-border terrorism" would cease, followed by a May 2003 pledge that anyterrorist training camps in Pakistani-controlled areas would be closed. Yet, in September 2003,Indian PM Vajpayee reportedly told President Bush that continued cross-border terrorism fromPakistan was making it difficult for India to maintain its peace initiative, and a series of bloodyattacks seemed to indicate that infiltration rates were on the rise. (164) 
President Musharraf adamantly insists that his government is doing all it can to steminfiltration at the LOC and he has called for a joint Pakistan-India monitoring effort there. Positivesigns have come with a November 2003 cease-fire agreement between Pakistan and India along theentire LOC and their shared international border (holding at the time of this writing) and a January2004 pledge by Musharraf reassuring the Indian Prime Minister that no territory under Pakistan'scontrol could be used to support terrorism. Ensuing statements from Indian government officialsconfirmed that infiltration rates were down significantly. However, separatist-related violencespiked in Indian Kashmir in the summer of 2004, with shootouts and bombings causing scores ofdeaths. While on a July 2004 visit to New Delhi to meet with top Indian leaders, then-DeputySecretary of State Armitage told reporters that "the infrastructure [in Pakistan] that supportscross-border activities [in Kashmir] has not been dismantled." Still, by year's end, the Indiangovernment acknowledged that infiltration rates were at their lowest ebb in many years, perhapspartly due to the completion of fence structures along the entire LOC. (165) New Delhi hasconfirmed that "the level of violence and tension in Jammu and Kashmir in 2004 was significantlylower as compared to 2003." (166) 
Despite waning rates of infiltration, the issue continues to rankle leaders in New Delhi andremains a serious potential impediment to progress in the current India-Pakistan peace initiative. InAugust 2004, India's ruling Congress Party claimed that Pakistan continues to support ongoing"cross-border terrorism" in Kashmir (Pakistan's outgoing prime minister rejected the claims). InSeptember, former Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee said that President Musharraf was not fulfillinghis January 2004 pledge to end the use of Pakistani territory by terrorist groups and, just beforemeeting Musharraf in New York, current Indian Prime Minister Singh said that India would continuetalks with Pakistan "provided that the threat by terrorist elements can be kept under control." India'sforeign minister issued an even stronger statement of the same demand in October. In May 2005,in a somewhat anomalous departure from the milder rhetoric associated with improvedIndia-Pakistan relations, the Indian prime minister again chided Pakistan for doing too little todismantle the "terrorist infrastructure" on Pakistani-controlled territory. (167) Even as thenormalization of India-Pakistan relations continues -- and to some extent in reaction to their apparentmarginalization in the face of such developments -- separatist militants continue their attacks on bothcivilians and Indian security forces, and some in India believe that active support for Kashmirimilitants remains Pakistani policy. In August 2005, India's national security advisor expressedconcern that terrorist attacks by or on behalf of Kashmiri separatists were showing a "much higherlevel of sophistication" and were taking place in many areas of India beyond Kashmir. (168) 
section_title: Indigenous Indian-Designated Terrorist Groups
paragraphs: Northeastern Separatism. Since the time ofIndia's foundation, numerous separatist groups have fought for ethnic autonomy or independence inthe country's northeast region. Some of the tribal struggles in the small states known as the SevenSisters are centuries old. The United States does not designate as terrorist organizations most ofthose groups that continue violent separatist struggles in India's northeastern states. Many of thesegroups have, however, been implicated in lethal attacks on civilians and have been designated asterrorist organizations by New Delhi under the 2002 Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA). (169) More than 6,000people, one-third of them insurgents, are estimated to have been killed since 1992 in related violencein the states of Nagaland, Assam, Manipur, and Tripura. (170) Among the dozens of insurgent groups active in the northeastare:
the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA); (171)
the Nationalist Social Council of Nagaland;
the National Liberation Front of Tripura;
the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB);and
the United National Liberation Front (seeking an independentManipur).
The Indian government has at times blamed Bangladesh, Burma, Nepal, and Bhutan for"sheltering" one or more of these groups beyond the reach of Indian security forces, and it hasaccused Pakistan's intelligence agency of training members and providing them with materialsupport. (172) InDecember 2003, after considerable prodding by New Delhi, Bhutan launched military operationsagainst ULFA and NDFB rebels based in border areas near India's Assam state. The leader andfounder of ULFA was captured and, two months later, India's army chief declared that nearly 1,000militants in Bhutan had been "neutralized" -- killed or captured. (173) Yet the rebelsappeared to regroup and attacks on civilians did not end: in August 2004, a bomb exploded at anIndependence Day parade in Assam, killing 18 people, many of them children. Police blamed ULFAfor the blast. Six weeks later, a spate of bombings and shootings in Assam and Nagaland left at least83 people dead in what was called a joint operation by ULFA and NDFB. Although two seniorULFA leaders surrendered in February 2005, the rebels later launched a series of coordinated bombattacks across the Assam state. In a further sign that Assamese rebels remain a serious problem,2,000 Indian security forces moved against ULFA positions in April 2005. (174) Both Burma andBangladesh may increase pressure on Indian rebels based on their territory; New Delhi has suggestedcoordinated military operations in the border areas and has increased its counterterrorism cooperationwith Kathmandu and Thimphu. (175) 
Maoist Militancy. Also operating in India are"Naxalites" -- communist insurgents ostensibly engaged in violent struggle on behalf of landlesslaborers and tribals. These groups, most active in inland areas of east-central India, claim to bebattling oppression and exploitation in order to create a classless society. Their opponents call themterrorists and extortionists. According to the U.S. Department of State, major Naxalite groups areenlarging the scope of their influence, and analysts contend that the abilities of Indian Maoistmilitants to conduct insurgency has spread to nearly half of India's 28 states, in part through theforging of cross-border links with Nepali insurgents. (176) As the Naxalites' range of operations has increased, so too hasrelated bloodshed. Most notable of India's Maoist groups are the People's War Group (PWG),mainly active in the southern Andhra Pradesh state, and the Maoist Communist Center of WestBengal and Bihar. In September 2004, the two merged to form the Communist Party of India -Maoist. In 2004, for the first time and without public explanation, these groups appeared on the U.S.State Department's list of "other terrorist groups" (it is likely that the move was spurred by a U.S.interest in assisting both New Delhi and Kathmandu in efforts to combat Maoist insurgents inNepal (177) ). Both alsoare designated as terrorist groups by New Delhi; each is believed to have about 2,000 cadres. PWGfighters were behind an October 2003 landmine attack that nearly killed the Chief Minster of AndhraPradesh. (178) 
In July 2004, the government of Andhra Pradesh lifted an 11-year-old ban on the PWG inpreparation for planned peace talks. A September 2004 rally in Hyderabad, the PWG's first since1990, attracted tens of thousands of supporters. Yet the concord was short-lived: in January 2005,the Maoists accused the state government of breaking a cease-fire by "staging" several encountersthat left 15 people dead and they withdrew from negotiations. (179) The U.S. Ambassadorto India later expressed concerns about Naxalite violence in Andhra Pradesh and the impact it mighthave on foreign investors in the state, and at least one Indian commentator has opined that the scaleand growth of Naxalite violence "is a direct challenge to [India's] vaunting pretensions to superpowerstatus, and its ambitious quest for dramatic economic growth and inclusion in the elite club of theworld's 'developed countries.'" In August, just days after suspected Maoist rebels shot dead tencivilians, the Andhra Pradesh government formally banned the Communist Party of India -Maoist. (180) 
section_title: India-U.S. Counterterrorism Cooperation
paragraphs: One facet of the emerging "strategic partnership" between the United States and India isincreased counterterrorism cooperation. The U.S.-India Joint Working Group on Counterterrorismwas established in January 2000 to intensify bilateral cooperation; this body met for the sixth timein August 2004. In November 2001, President Bush and then-Indian Prime Minster Vajpayee agreedthat "terrorism threatens not only the security of the United States and India, but also our efforts tobuild freedom, democracy and international security and stability around the world." (181) In May 2002, Indiaand the United States launched the Indo-US Cyber Security Forum to safeguard criticalinfrastructures from cyber attack. The State Department believes that continued engagement withNew Delhi will lead to India's playing a constructive role in resolving terrorist insurgencies in Nepaland Sri Lanka. Calling New Delhi a "close ally of the United States in the global war on terrorism,"the Bush Administration has undertaken to provide India with better border security systems andtraining, and better intelligence in an effort to prevent future terrorist attacks. Moreover, the twocountries' militaries have continued to work together to enhance their capabilities to combatterrorism and increase interoperability. (182) U.S. military sales to India are to include $29 million worthof equipment meant to enhance the counterterrorism capabilities of India's special forces, and Indiamay also purchase chemical and biological protection equipment. (183) 
The seating of a new left-leaning national government in New Delhi in May 2004 had nosignificant effect on continued U.S.-India security ties. A sixth meeting of the bilateral DefensePolicy Group in June ended with a joint statement that recognized "growing areas of convergenceon fundamental values," including combating terrorism. Shortly after, while on a visit to New Delhito meet with top Indian leaders, then-U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Armitage told reporters that thenew Indian government appeared to be just as desirous of enhanced U.S.-India relations as theprevious one and that the United States has "absolute confidence that the U.S.-India relationship isgoing to grow in all its aspects." (184) President Bush met with new Indian Prime MinisterManmohan Singh in New York in September 2004 and noted the U.S.-India relations are as closeas they have ever been. Secretary of State Rice and the Indian external affairs minister separatelyhave echoed the sentiment in 2005. (185) In June 2005, the United States and India signed a ten-yeardefense framework agreement which lists "defeating terrorism and violent religious extremism" asone of four key shared security interests, and which calls for a bolstering of mutual defensecapabilities required for such a goal. (186) 
section_title: Other South Asian Countries
subsections: section_title: Bangladesh(187)
paragraphs: Bangladesh's political and economic development continues to be hampered by the forces ofcorruption, radicalism, and partisan fighting. Rivalry between the leaders of the nation's two largestpolitical parties has led to an ongoing series of demonstrations, strikes, and increasingly to politicallymotivated violence. The frustration caused by the combination of poverty, corruption, and the lackof good governance due to a stalemated political process is thought by some to contribute toincreasing radicalization of society and thereby to the recruitment of Islamist radicals to the causeof terrorism.
Bangladesh's form of moderate Islam is increasingly under threat by radical elements. In early2005 there was increased concern over the rise of Islamic extremism in Bangladesh. Khaleda Zia'sBangladesh National Party (BNP) has coalition partners in government that are thought to have tiesto radical Islamist elements that give cause for concern. Some view the government's coalition withhardline Islamist coalition members as promoting the spread of violence. (188) The radicalHarkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI) is thought to have ties to both Al Qaeda and the Islamic Oikya Jote,which is a coalition partner in the government. HuJI is on the United States State Department list ofother terrorist organizations and is thought to have been behind an assassination attempt on thenPrime Minister Sheikh Hasina in July 2000. (189) HuJI also signed the 1998 fatwa by Usama bin Laden whichdeclared American civilians to be legitimate targets. (190) 
Fundamentalist leader Bangla Bhai, who promotes Islamic revolution in Bangladesh, hasbeen accused of having ties to the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) which is another coalition partner with theBNP government. Bangla Bhai fought in Afghanistan and is thought to seek to install a Taliban-stylegovernment in Bangladesh particularly in areas bordering India. His supporters have reportedlyterrorized communists, leftists, liberal intellectuals, Hindus, Christians, members of the IslamicAhmadiyya sect and Buddhists in the cause of promoting Islamic extremism. (191) The government ofBangladesh was criticized by the Awami league for denying the existence of fundamentalistorganizations in Bangladesh. The Bangladesh government banned Bangla Bhai's organization in2005. (192) 
Political infighting is debilitating to Bangladesh. Former Prime Minister Sheik Hasina of theAwami League survived an assassination attempt in August 2004 when a grenade was thrown at herwhich killed 20 others. Hasina has accused the BNP-Jamaat alliance of being involved in theassassination attempt. (193) Prime Minister Khaleda Zia has reportedly stated that thereare no Islamic fundamentalists in Bangladesh. (194) Such attacks have undermined political stability in Bangladesh.A recent government of India report has found an "alarming rise" in political assassinations inBangladesh and is also concerned with the smuggling of arms to insurgents in India's northeast aswell as the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh. (195) 
Former State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism Cofer Black reportedly stated thathe was concerned over "the potential utilization of Bangladesh as a platform for internationalterrorism" when visiting Dhaka in September 2004. (196) Media reports in India increasingly are concerned thatBangladesh has the potential to become a "center of extremist Wahhabi-oriented terrorism." (197) Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI) reportedly sent a letter to the Indian High Commission toBangladesh in December 2004 threatening to kill the Indian cricket team if they entered Bangladesh. The team planned to play a series of test matches in Bangladesh in December including in theChittagong region. (198) One source reported in September that the number of radicalmosques and madrassas in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) region of Bangladesh had grownconsiderably and that HuJI continued to maintain several terrorist training camps in the CHTregion. (199) Anothersource also linked the camps to Harkat and indicated that they receive funding from Islamic charitieswith ties to Al-Qaeda. (200) HuJI is thought to remain active in the area south fromChittagong to Cox's Bazar and the border with Burma. A report sourced to a former senior Indianintelligence official alleges that HuJI is training Burmese Rohingya, as well as small groups fromThailand, Cambodia, Indonesia and Brunei. (201) 
There is concern among analysts that Bangladesh might serve as a base from which bothSouth and Southeast Asian terrorists could regroup. There have been reports that up to 150 Talibanand Al Qaeda fighters fled to Bangladesh from Afghanistan in December 2001 aboard the MVMecca, which reportedly sailed from Karachi to Chittagong. (202) This was evidently notthe beginning of Al Qaeda connections with Bangladesh. Al Qaeda had reportedly recruited BurmeseMuslims, known as the Rohingya, from refugee camps in southeastern Bangladesh to fight inAfghanistan, Kashmir and Chechnya. (203) An Al Qaeda affiliate, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI) wasfounded by Osama bin Laden associate Fazlul Rahman. (204) HuJI is also on the State Department's list of other terroristorganizations. (205) Rahman joined bin Laden's World Islamic Front for the Jihad Against the Jews and the Crusadersin 1998. (206) It hasthe objective of establishing Islamic rule in Bangladesh. HuJI has recruited its members, thought tonumber from several thousand to 15,000, from the tens of thousands of madrassas in Bangladesh,many of which are led by veterans of the "jihad" against the Soviets in Afghanistan. The organizationis thought to have at least six camps in Bangladesh as well as ties to militants in Pakistan. (207) The BangladeshNational Party coalition government includes the small Islamic Oikya Jote party which hasconnections to HuJI. (208) It was reported that French intelligence prompted the arrestof 16 Bangladeshis on December 4, 2003, in Bolivia for allegedly planning to hijack a plane to attackthe United States. According to reports, they were later released for lack of evidence. ElevenBangladeshis were arrested in Saudi Arabia on August 14, 2003, on suspicion of planning a terroristact. (209) 
The Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) is the largest organization representing the over120,000 Rohingyas in Bangladesh. (210) The number of Rohingyas varies depending on the level ofpressure they are under in their homelands in Burma. The Rohingya also speak the same languageas Bangladeshis from the Chittagong area. These "destitute and stateless people" have proved to bea "fertile ground" for recruitment to various militant Islamist groups. (211) The RSO hasreportedly received support from the Jamaat-e-Islami in Bangladesh. Afghan instructors are reportedto have been seen in RSO camps. 
There are also reports, based on information derived from the interrogation of JemaahIslamiya (JI) leader Hambali, who was arrested in Thailand in August 2003, that indicate that he hadmade a decision to shift JI elements to Bangladesh in response to recent counter-terrorist activity inSoutheast Asia. The decision to move operations west may also be evident in the arrest of 13Malaysians and six Indonesians, including Hambali's brother Rusman Gunawan, in Pakistan inSeptember 2003. Bangladeshis have been among those arrested in Pakistan on suspicion of beinglinked to terrorist organizations. (212) Some have speculated that JI militants, thought to be fromMalaysia and Singapore, would not have made it to southeastern Bangladesh without some degreeof tacit agreement from the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence of Bangladesh which isthought, by some, to have close ties with ISI. (213) It is also thought that Fazlul Rahman's Rohingya SolidarityOrganization, which is based in southeast Bangladesh, has also established ties with JI. (214) These reports aredifficult to confirm. 
The Government of Bangladesh has denied that Bangladesh has become a haven for Islamicmilitants, such as the Taliban or Al Qaeda. (215) The Bangladesh government has also denied allegations madeby former Indian Deputy Prime Minister Advani that Bangladesh had aided Pakistan's Inter-ServicesIntelligence and Al Qaeda elements. (216) It has also been reported that the Bangladesh Rifles and police have captured weapons during anti-terrorist operations in the southeastern border region with Burmain August and September 2003. (217) (For further information on Bangladesh, see CRS Report RS20489, Bangladesh: Background and U.S. Relations , by [author name scrubbed].)
section_title: Nepal(218)
paragraphs: The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)/ United Peoples Front has been identified as anOther Terrorist Group by the U.S. Department of State. (219) On October 31, 2003, the United States Government wentfurther and announced that for national security reasons it was freezing Maoist terrorist assets. Thesecurity situation in Nepal has deteriorated since the collapse of the cease fire between the Maoistsand the government on August 27, 2003. The numbers of Nepalese killed since August has risensignificantly. This brings the total number killed since 1996 to 11,500 by some estimates. Indiaremains concerned over linkages between the Maoists and leftist extremists in India. (220) 
The Maoists' message frequently calls for the end of "American imperialism" and for the"dirty Yankee" to "go home." The Maoists' Chief Negotiator and Chairman of the "People'sGovernment," Baburam Bhattarai, reportedly threatened the United States with "another Vietnam"if the United States expands its aid to Nepal. (221) In September, Bhattarai sent a letter to the U.S. Ambassadorin Kathmandu which called on the United States to stop "interfering" in the internal affairs ofNepal. (222) Maoistsclaimed responsibility for killing two off-duty Nepalese security guards at the American Embassyin 2002, (223) and theMaoists have made it known that American trekkers are not welcome in Maoist-controlledNepal. (224) Further,the Maoists stated on October 22nd that American-backed organizations would be targeted. Rebelleader Prachanda is reported to have stated that groups funded by "American imperialists" would notbe allowed to operate in Nepal. (225) 
After the cease fire, the Maoists appeared to be shifting from large-scale attacks on policeand army headquarters to adopting new tactics that focused on attacks by smaller cells conductingwidespread assassinations of military, police and party officials. (226) The unpopularity ofthis policy appears to have led the Maoists to shift policy again and declare that they would not carryout further political killings or further destroy government infrastructure. Despite this guarantee,attacks continue. In May 2005, Maoist commander in the Parsa District threatened attacks againstAmericans and American interests. (227) The Maoists' guarantee against terrorist attacks did not extendto projects "run directly by the United States." (228) The United States Agency for International Development andSave the Children both operate in Nepal. On October 27, Maoist leader Prachanda stated that "wewill ensure that no American citizens -- tourists or officials -- except those who come to thebattlefield with the Nepal Army would be caused any harm by the Maoist militia." (229) (For further details onthe Maoists and Nepal, see CRS Report RL31599 , Nepal: Background and U.S. Relations , by BruceVaughn.)
section_title: Sri Lanka(230)
paragraphs: The United States Department of State continues to designate the Liberation Tigers of TamilEelam (LTTE) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 2005. More than 64,000 people are thoughtto have died during this conflict over the last 20 years and the LTTE has consistently been one of themost effective and active users of suicide-bomber tactics in the world. In addition, some analystsclaim to have observed or heard of efforts by the LTTE recently to establish an air capability by theacquisition of two Cessna-class light aircraft. If true, this represents a worrisome event, as theLTTE's past history shows a penchant for adapting other means of transportation such as cars,motorbikes, and naval craft for suicide bomb attacks and it is not far-fetched to assume that the samecould be done with these aircraft. The Black Tigers unit, the elite special-operations cadre of theLTTE, are those charged with carrying out such terrorist operations and it could be appropriate towatch for signs that these cadre members are receiving flight training to further verify any new aircapabilities. 
A Norwegian-brokered peace process has produced notable successes, though it wassuspended by the LTTE in the spring of 2003 due to differences over interim administrationarrangements. In February 2002, a permanent cease-fire was reached and generally has beenobserved by both sides. In September 2002, the government in Colombo and the LTTE held theirfirst peace talks in seven years, with the LTTE indicating that it was willing to accept autonomyrather than independence for Tamil-majority regions. The two sides agreed in principle to seek asolution through a federal structure. However, LTTE leader Prabakaran has stated that there may bea return to fighting. The period from 2004 to early 2005 has witnessed increasing instability withinthe ranks of both the Sinhalese government and the LTTE which has led to increasing concern overthe future of the peace process. In June of 2005, Christina Rocca, the Assistant Secretary for SouthAsian Affairs, told a House International Relations Committee panel that 
the United States continues to support Norway'sfacilitation of a peace settlement in Sri Lanka. The cease-fire of 2002 is holding, although violenceis ongoing and the peace process has stalled. This is due in part to divisions within the Sri Lankangovernment and the absence of trust between the government and the LTTE, which continues to useassassinations and suicide bombers, underscoring their character as an organization wedded toterrorism and justifying their designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. (231) 
The LTTE has also, of late, experienced instability and intra-factional disagreements. InMarch 2004 there was a major rupture within the LTTE ranks. Vinayagamoorthi Muralitharan, aliasCol. Karuna (who, as Special Commander, Batticaloa-Amparai District, was in over-all charge ofthe LTTE's military operations in the Eastern Province) split with the Northern command of theLTTE headed by the supreme commander of the LTTE (Veluppillai Prabhakaran) and took anestimated 6,000 soldiers with him. Col. Karuna then called for a separate truce with the government. Factional fighting ensued between Karuna's splinter group and the Northern faction of the LTTE andresulted in Prabhakaran's reassertion of control over the eastern areas which Karuna had previouslyoperated. 
Since that time there have been numerous instances of political and military operatives beingkilled by each side as they jockey for power in the East. The LTTE has accused Col. Karuna andthose loyal to him of cooperating with Sri Lankan Army (SLA) paramilitaries and special forces inraids and targeted killings of forces under their command, which the SLA denies. Karuna has sincewithdrawn to a fortified base in the jungles of eastern Sri Lanka where they have repelled severalLTTE attacks. (232) Between February and April 2005 there were several recorded instances of serious violations of theceasefire. First was the death of a high level LTTE political officer, E. Kousalyane, in early Februarywhich was followed by an increase in politically motivated killings of individuals throughout theeastern provinces. (233) In early April there was also a much publicized incident when a Sea Tiger unit attacked a Sri LankanNavy vessel carrying a peace monitor, slightly wounding him. This led to a formal censure of theLTTE by the ceasefire monitoring group, the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), and markeda particularly brazen attack as the Sri Lankan Navy vessel was flying the SLMM flag indicating thatmonitors were abroad. (234) 
Figure 2. Map of South Asia
Adapted by CRS from Magellan Geographix. Boundary representations not authoritative.
Figure 3. Map of Pakistan