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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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date of April 24, 1996, are given a one-year grace period in which to file their habeas petitions, that is, until April 24, 1997. See Ross v. Artuz, 150 F.3d 97, 103 (2d Cir.1998). Moreover, the grace period will be tolled while “a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent claim or judgment is pending.” 28 U.S .C. § 2244(d)(2). Specifically, “a state court petition is ‘pending’ from the time it ís first filed until finally disposed of and further appellate review is unavailable under the particular state’s procedures.” Bennett v. Artuz, 199 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir.1999), aff'd on other grounds, 531 U.S. 4, 121 S.Ct. 361, 148 L.Ed.2d 213 (U.S. 2000); see also Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 17 (2d Cir.) (per curiam) , cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840, 121 S.Ct. 104,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the statute of limitations period begins to run when the allegedly discriminatory pension plan is applied to the plaintiffs and leaving determination of the actual date the statute begins to run on each claim to the district court
B. holding that the tolling provision excludes time during which properly filed state relief applications are pending but does not reset the date from which the oneyear statute of limitations begins to run
C. holding that the statute of limitations begins to run on the date the alleged malpractice is discovered
D. holding that the oneyear period begins to run when the mandate of the court of appeals issues
E. holding the sixyear limitations period begins to run upon date that payment is made
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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so long as probable cause existed for the one offense). The fact that the offense was a misdemeanor is also immaterial to our Fourth Amendment analysis. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418, 421-24, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (a police officer is permitted to arrest without a warrant if a misdemeanor is committed in the officer’s presence). Thus, the officers in this case had, at least, arguable probable cause to conclude that Smithson had violated the city’s sound ordinance. Accordingly, we conclude that Brown, Westemeyer, McBride, and Richardson are entitled to qualified immunity on appellees’ Fourth Amendment false arrest claim. See Johnson v. Schneiderheinz, 102 F.3d 340 (8th Cir.1996); see also Hannah v. City of Overland, 795 F.2d 1385, 1389 (8th Cir.1986) . B. First Amendment To be successful on his
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that in a 1983 action issue of probable cause is for the jury
B. holding that arrest made with probable cause and without excessive force does not give rise to iied claim
C. recognizing that warrantless arrests with probable cause do not give rise to 1983 claims
D. recognizing the defense of good faith and probable cause in 1983 case involving unconstitutional warrantless arrest
E. holding 1983 action lies for warrantless arrest without probable cause
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | C | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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be filed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 503.” See Official Bankruptcy Form B 10 (Dec.2007) available at www.uscourts.gov/ rules/BK_F orms_Pending_2008/ B_010_1208v4.pdf (last visited September 9, 2009). 5 . The court in In re MicroAge discounted this policy concern because "[a]ny creditor that has received an avoidable transfer may find itself compelled to return that transfer, whether it does business with the reorganized debtor or not.” 291 B.R. at 512. But doing business with the reorganized debtor and filing a request for payment of administrative expenses might have other consequences, such as waiving the vendor’s right to a jury trial in any preference action initiated by the debtor. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 58-59 & n. 14, 109 S.Ct. 2782, 106 L.Ed.2d 26 (1989) ; In re CBI Holding Co., 529 F.3d 432, 438 (2d
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding trustee has not waived the right to bring a preference objection
B. holding trustee has waived the right to bring a preference objection
C. holding defendant to a preference action has a right to a jury trial pursuant to the seventh amendment of the united states constitution but that right can be waived by filing a claim in the bankruptcy proceedings
D. holding that seventh amendment right to jury trial not violated by courts dismissal for lack of jurisdiction
E. holding that seventh amendment right to jury trial not violated by courts dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to rule 12b6 because as a matter of law complaint faded to present an issue for trial
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | C | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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permanent order to prevent the relocation. 4. A proceeding filed pursuant to this subsection must be filed within thirty (30) days of receipt of notice of a proposed relocation. K. The relocating person has the burden of proof that the proposed relocation is made in good faith. If that burden of proof is met, the burden shifts to the non-relocating person to show that the proposed relocation is not in the best interest of the child. 17 The first statute gives the custodial parent a "presumptive right" to relocate. Kaiser v. Kaiser, 2001 OK 30, ¶ 18, 23 P.3d 278, 282. The second statute requires notice of intent to relocate and provides for a hearing procedure if the non-custodial parent objects to relocation. Other than in Harrison v. Morgan, 2008 OK CIV APP 68, ¶ 15, 191 P.3d 617, 621 , there has been no effort to construe the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that 18 usc 1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc 1001
B. holding that 28 usc 2636c did not modify the filing requirement in 19 usc 1516aa2a
C. holding that 10 usc 1201 is a moneymandating statute
D. holding section 10 of faa is procedural and does not preempt state common law
E. holding that section 1123 did not repeal 10 0s2011 19
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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and is not intended to affect, establish, or diminish any liability of commercial builders, contractors or renovators.”). Indeed, part of the court’s rationale was that California homeowners generally would not be insured for an injury suffered after conveyance of the property. Id. at 483. No such analysis has been offered here. Second, unlike Strakos, Preston focused on “ownership and control as a fundamental requirement for ascribing liability,” rather than the creation of a dangerous condition. Id. at 483. Strakos also rejected the accepted work doctrine, a doctrine that eliminated a defendant’s liability after work was accepted because the defendant no longer controlled the property. Strakos, 360 S.W.2d at 790 (explaining that liability should not exist day 704, 706-08 (1989) ; see also Carroll v. Dairy Farmers of Am.,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the current property owner may not assert a public nuisance claim against the former owner
B. recognizing the general rule that a property owner is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor
C. holding that in the context of construction litigation regarding the alleged negligence of design professionals a tort action for negligent misrepresentation alleging damages based purely on economic loss is not available to a party in privity of contract with a design professional
D. holding that section 150002 was satisfied with respect to hotel owners claims against former owners architect for negligent design of foundation and drainage
E. holding former plant owner liable for negligent design of conveyor belt
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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(Tex.App.-Tyler, July 23, 2008, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication) (evidence sufficient to support tampering conviction when defendant, stopped for traffic offense, admitted that he had a "marijuana roach” and then ate it). 1 . Several states have adopted similar approaches. See, e.g., State v. Fana, 109 Conn. App. 797, 953 A.2d 898, 912 (2008) (stating that modification of judgment to lesser-included offense proper when "the element, which the reviewing court found the evidence insufficient to support, was distinct from the other elements of the charged crime”; when that element was eliminated, "the remaining elements were themselves adequate to support a conviction of a lesser included offense”) (citations omitted); Ritchie v. State, 243 Ind. 614, 189 N.E.2d 575, 577 (1963) (emphasis added). ALCALA, J., filed a
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding it is fundamental error to convict a defendant of crime not charged and which is not a lesser included offense of the charged crime
B. holding that a lesser crime cannot be a lesser included offense of a greater crime if the lesser crime contains an essential element not included in the greater crime
C. holding that an offense is factually lesser included if the charging instrument alleges that the means used to commit the crime charged include all of the elements of the alleged lesser included offense
D. recognizing that it is within our power to direct entry of judgment on a lesser included offense when vacating a greater offense if the commission of the lesser offense can be established from facts that the jury actually found citations omitted
E. holding that reviewing court in a proper case may modify a judgment of conviction below and affirm it as a conviction of a lesser degree of the offense charged or of a lesser crime included therein where the errors do not affect the conviction of the lesser offense
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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a breach of the warranty as to what the furnace would do under proper care and operation. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Similarly, in Smith v. Pickands, 148 Mich. 558, 112 N.W. 122 (1907), the plaintiff contracted to sell fruit trees, which the contract warranted would be “delivered in a healthy condition.” Id. at 122. The defendant accepted the trees, some of which later died. The court instructed the jury that the burden was on the defendant buyer to prove that the trees were not, in Mich.App. 308, 225 N.W.2d 742, 745 (1975) (“[A]s to goods accepted, the burden is on the buyer to establish any claimed breach of warranty.”) (citing M.C.L.A. § 440.-2607.(4) ). See also Alberta Ltd. v. Stedelbauer Chevrolet Oldsmobile (1975) Ltd., 2001 ABQB 909, 302 A.R. 316, para. 25 (Can.) . The facts of this case are similar to those
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that burden is on government to show that error in failure to provide notice is harmless
B. recognizing burden
C. holding burden is on the defendant to show applicability of 2d18a2
D. holding that the burden is on the plaintiff
E. holding that burden is on purchaser to show defect that breaches warranty agreement
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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UFOC and Franchise Agreement, and that it had been “advised to seek professional assistance, to have professionals review the documents and to consult with other franchisees regarding the risks associated with the purchase of the franchise.” (Ex. A. Disclosure Ack-nowlegment Statement.). Each was also advised in the body of the Agreement that “BEFORE SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT, FRANCHISEE SHOULD READ IT CAREFULLY WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF LEGAL COUNSEL....” (Ex. A. § 23.12.) This is not the advice of a party engaged in “bargaining naughtiness.” Under these circumstances, plaintiffs’ unsupported assertion of procedural unconscionability rings hollow. On the issue of substantive unconsciona-bility, plaintiffs point to the provision of the Franchise Agr 306 Ill.Dec. 157, 857 N.E.2d 250 (2006) ; Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc., 91
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding arbitration clause added to contract for cellular telephone service unconscionable
B. holding class action waiver to be enforceable under section 2 of the faa notwithstanding claim that waiver was unconscionable under state law
C. holding class action waiver contained in cellular telephone unconscionable under washington law
D. holding class action waiver in cellular phone contract unconscionable under california law
E. holding the class action waiver provision of cellular telephone service contract unconscionable
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976), to support the conclusion that Anderson was denied a fair trial. Anderson, 574 So.2d at 93-94. The district court concluded the Florida Supreme Court’s denial of relief as to this claim was not “contrary to” or “an unreasonable application of ... clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” See id. § 2254(d)(1). Jurists of reason would not debate the correctness of the district court’s conclusion. In Estelle, the Supreme Court held that a defendant’s presumption of innocence is undermined and his right to a fair trial violated when the state compels him to stand trial in prison or jail clothing. 425 U.S. at 504-06, 512, 96 S.Ct. at 1692-94, 1697; see also United States v. Harris, 703 F.2d 508, 509-11 (11th Cir.1983) . As we explained in United States v.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the jurors failure to remember particular facts inquired about on voir dire and the jurors misunderstanding of voir dire questions do not constitute probable prejudice
B. holding a record reflecting that the applicable range of punishment was discussed during voir dire is enough to dispel a claim that appellants substantial rights were violated
C. holding no violation of substantial rights occurred during voir dire where record did not show that defendant was denied fair and impartial trial
D. holding that defendants have a right to be present at voir dire
E. holding a defendants due process rights were violated where he was compelled to wear prison clothing during jury voir dire
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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that intent is not an element of a cause of action for the laundry list violation of “representing that an agreement confers or involves rights, remedies, or obligations which it does not have or involve, or which are prohibited by law.” Id. at 289-90 (citing Tex. Bus. & Com.Code § 17.46(b)(12)). We agree with the court of appeals that the rationale of Crawford v. Ace Sign would not automatically foreclose a DTPA cause of action when a contract or a part thereof is void by operation of law. But a contract is a mutual undertaking. An aspect of an agreement that proves unenforceable because it is against public policy does not, standing alone, constitute a violation of section 17.46(b)(12). There must be something more. Cf. Best v. Ryan Auto Group, Inc., 786 S.W.2d 670, 671-72 (Tex.1990) . There must be a representation “that an
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding evidence legally insufficient
B. holding merely that the evidence was sufficient to support the award of attorneys fees
C. holding evidence legally sufficient under sections d and e
D. holding that evidence of representations outside the contract was legally sufficient evidence to support a section 1746b12 claim
E. holding evidence legally sufficient
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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We have drawn no distinction between the protections offered by Article II, Section 4 of the Montana Constitution and those offered by the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution when analyzing alleged discrimination between similarly situated taxpayers. Roosevelt v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, 1999 MT 30, ¶¶ 16-46, 293 Mont. 240, ¶¶ 16-46, 975 P.2d 295, ¶¶ 16-46; Kottel v. State, 2002 MT 278, ¶ 47, 312 Mont. 387, ¶ 47, 60 P.3d 403, ¶ 47; Montana Dept. of Revenue v. Barron, 245 Mont. 100, 111, 799 P.2d 533, 540 (1990); see also 71 Am. Jur. 2d § 340 (2007) (explaining that there is nothing in the unit method of valuation that is inherently opposed to either the federal or the various state constitutions); Beaver County v. Wiltel, Inc., 995 P.2d 602, ¶¶ 24-26 (Utah 2000) . ¶30 Most of PPLM’s arguments amount to an
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the multicounty signature requirement for initiatives violated the uniform operation of laws clause and the federal equal protection clause
B. holding that state outdoor recreational immunity statute did not violate equal protection clause of united states constitution under rationalbasis test
C. holding that central assessment by the unit method of valuation did not violate the equal protection clause of the united states constitution or the uniform operation of laws provision in the utah constitution
D. holding a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the constitution and laws of the united states to state a claim under 1983
E. holding the exclusion did not violate the equal protection clause of the wyoming constitution or the fourteenth amendment to the united states constitution
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | C | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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authority. Miss.Code Ann. § 79-29-303(1) (emphasis added). Moreover, “[n]o act of a manager or member in contravention of a restriction on authority shall bind the limited liability company to persons having knowledge of the restriction.” Miss.Code Ann. § 79-29-303(4). In this case, the Bankruptcy Court correctly found that Earwood was not authorized to convey title to Northlake and that Northlake had knowledge of the unauthorized act because Earwood owned North-lake. Earwood could not bind Kinwood. Miss.Code Ann. § 79-29-303(1). The question, however, is whether a subsequent BFP thereafter obtains clear title. No Mississippi court has ever considered these statutory provisions in light of a claimed BFP. Thus, this Court considered the rules of statutory construction and th pp.2002) . Although Mississippi has not considered the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that minors have authority to ratify or avoid conveyances upon reaching majority at which point conveyances become void ab initio
B. holding that an action taken in violation of the automatic stay is void ab initio
C. holding void ab initio ordinance proscribing punishment in excess of that authorized in charter
D. holding that a state court judgment that modifies a discharge in bankruptcy is void ab initio and the rookerfeldman doctrine would not bar federal court jurisdiction
E. holding that because there was no quorum of validly appointed board members the nlrb lacked authority to act and the enforcement order was therefore void ab initio
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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did not elevate the telephone call into a Fourth Amendment seizure: That [the detective] told [the suspect] he would secure an arrest warrant if [the suspect] refused [to go to the police station] does not alter the outcome; [the suspect] was free to demand that [the detective] do just that. [The detective] was not even confronting [the suspect] physically; [the suspect] could have hung up the phone. That [the detective] may have been verbally abusive does not elevate the phone call, with the distancing inherent in the tenuousness of a telephone connection and the ease with which [the suspect] could have hung up the phone, into a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 200; cf. Butitta v. Carbajal, No. 96-16553, 1997 WL 345719, at *1 (9th Cir. June 23, 1997) (unpublished) . Because Silvan and Alanna could have
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that police officers have probable cause to arrest an individual with a sufficiently similar appearance to the description in a warrant
B. holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment
C. holding that police officers did not violate the fourth amendment by telephoning an individual and threatening to seize a motorcycle in her possession and to arrest her without a warrant
D. holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment
E. holding that an arrest made by an officer outside his jurisdiction does not violate the fourth amendment
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | C | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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(E.D.Va. Aug. 22, 2005) (Memorandum Opinion). 5 . Lentz has sent several ex parte communications to the Court throughout the course of these proceedings, despite repeated admonitions not to do so. Most recently, on January 19, 2006, the Court received an ex parte communication from Lentz consisting of two handwritten notes contained in an envelope that itself included a handwritten note. Although Lentz sought to offer these notes as his Court-ordered handwriting exemplars, these ex parte communications are clearly insufficient in this regard as they were neither written in a controlled situation nor written in the style required of an appropriate handwriting exemplar. Even defendant himself recognizes in his ex parte communication that a handwriting d 1172, 1177 (5th Cir.1979) (citations omitted). 8 .See, e.g., United
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing that the fifth amendment forbids comment by the prosecution on a defendants failure to testify
B. recognizing that handwriting exemplars fall outside the protection of the fourth and fifth amendments and comment on the refusal to provide an exemplar is permissible
C. holding that the equal protection and due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments do not provide a sufficient basis for jurisdiction because they do not mandate payment of money by the government
D. holding that the fifth amendments protection against selfincrimination is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment
E. holding in a prosecution for the interstate transportation of forged securities that the government was permitted to prove and comment on a defendants refusal to produce exemplars as tending to prove his guilt of the offense charged
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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or otherwise, and no disposition, charge, encumbrance, sale or assignment of the income or of the principal of this trust or any part hereof by any beneficiary hereunder shall be of any validity or legal effect or in any way recognized by said TRUSTEE.” Because of the provisions of this classic spendthrift clause, neither Neal’s creditors nor transferees had any right to rely upon the Trust for the satisfaction of their claims. Johnson v. Morawitz, 292 F.2d 341, 344 (1961), citing In re Watts, 160 Kan. 377, 162 P.2d 82, and Sherman v. Havens, 94 Kan. at 657, 146 P. 1030. Cf. Connett v. Justus Enterprises of Kansas, Inc., 1989 WL 65444, *7 (D.Kan.1989) (discussing the inalienability of interests in spendthrift trusts in Kans .1994), rev’d on other grounds 115 F.3d 333 (5th Cir.1997), . Cf. Klebanoff v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 362
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the court is constrained to give a narrow construction to the words bequest devise and inheritance and to conclude such words do not encompass revocable inter vivos trusts
B. holding that ijnter vivos trust distributions are not considered interest obtained by bequest devise or inheritance
C. holding that inter vivos trusts are not considered interest obtained by bequest devise or inheritance
D. holding that payments made to a debtor from inter vivos trusts within 180 days of filing the petition are not interests by way of bequest devise or inheritance and are not part of the bankruptcy estate
E. holding that distributions from an inter vivos trust do not qualify as bequests and 541a5a does not operate to bring such distributions into the bankruptcy estate
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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must be supported by a new probable cause justification. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407-08, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005); Arizona v. United States, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 2509, 183 L.Ed.2d 351 (2012) (“[D]elay[ing] the release of some detainees for no reason other than to verify their immigration status ... would raise constitutional concerns.”). Moreover, although Morales continued to be detained by ACI officials, and not by Donaghy himself, it was also clearly established that a law enforcement officer is “responsible for the natural consequences of his actions.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 n. 7, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961)); see also id. at 344-45, 106 S.Ct. 1092 ; Torres Ramirez v. Bermudez Garcia, 898 F.2d
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant
B. holding that an officer who knowingly processed an invalid warrant could be held liable for the subsequent unlawful arrest
C. holding that an arrest warrant can authorize entry into a dwelling only where the officials executing the warrant have reasonable or probable cause to believe the person named in the warrant is within
D. holding invalid warrant did not create probable cause for arrest
E. holding that an officer whose request for a warrant allegedly caused an unconstitutional arrest can be held liable for the arrest where the warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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by appeal.” See id. Appeals from the general sessions court to the circuit court are governed by Tennessee Code Annotated sections 27-5-101 to - 107 (2000), -108 (Supp.2007). Section 108(a) states that “[a]ny party may appeal from an adverse decision of the general sessions court to the circuit court of the county within a period of ten (10) days on complying with the provisions of this chapter.” (Emphasis added.) The relevant “provision” of chapter five in this case is Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-5-103 and its requirement that an appealing party file a bond for costs of the appeal. Accordingly, filing a bond within the ten-day period is a condition precedent to the timely perfection of an appeal. See Love v. Coll. Level Assessment Servs. Inc., 928 S.W.2d 36, 38 (Tenn.1996) ; see also City of Red Boiling Springs v.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that tenday time limit to appeal is both mandatory and jurisdictional and an appellate court has no jurisdiction over an untimely filed appeal
B. holding that a reviewing court has an obligation to satisfy itself of the jurisdiction of the court below
C. holding that when the district court improperly purported to transfer to the circuit court an action over which the circuit court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction the circuit court was without jurisdiction to enter its judgment which was void and dismissing the appeal from that void judgment
D. holding that the appellants claim that the circuit court failed to make specific findings of fact relating to issues raised at an evidentiary hearing on the appellants postconviction petition was not preserved for review because the appellant did not raise the issue in the circuit court
E. recognizing that an appellants obligation to timely perfect her appeal from the general sessions court is mandatory and if it is not complied with the circuit court has no jurisdiction
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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40, 46 (1953). One of those factors is the civil nature of the proceedings. Id. Assuming the proceedings are civil in nature, as Shetsky and rule 702(f) indicate, rule 115 of the General Rules of Practice reflects the traditional practice for a civil action by implicitly placing the burden on the moving party to obtain a hearing date. Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 115.02 reads: A hearing date and time shall be obtained from the court administrator or a designated motion calendar deputy. A party obtaining a date and time for a hearing on ot guarantee the right to a hearing on all motions. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 43.05 (stating that the court “may direct that [a motion] be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions”); see also Braith v. Fischer, 632 N.W.2d 716, 723 (Minn.App.2001) , review denied (Minn. Oct. 24, 2001). Here, we
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding no abuse of discretion when district court declined to hear oral testimony
B. holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion
C. holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of a witness that was not highly probative
D. holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting testimony to only one witness where additional witnesses would have provided the same testimony
E. holding it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude testimony
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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be complete and that the requested information was therefore not necessary to evaluate her claim. It is the governmental agency that may, pursuant to Bivins, determine when a claim is capable of evaluation. Further, Crockett's eight-month delay in providing the requested information without any explanation of the reason for that delay was not responsive to Insurer's March 26 or May 9 requests for the information within fourteen days. Again, once a request for information to evaluate the claim has been filed, Bivins does not contemplate that the claimant then controls when the 90-day period begins to run. 17 Second, a request for information does not always erase the 90-day time period. See Trent By and Through Trent v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Johnston County, 1988 OK 15, 755 P.2d 615 ; Doe v. Indep. School Dist. No. I-89, 1988 OK
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding the sixyear limitations period begins to run upon date that payment is made
B. holding that limitations period begins to run on date notice was received at claimants residence even if claimant did not receive it until a later date
C. holding that limitation period begins to run at the time of the breach
D. holding that the 90day evaluation period begins to run from the time notice of a claim has been filed even though the public agency requests additional information after that date
E. holding that the statute of limitations period begins to run when the allegedly discriminatory pension plan is applied to the plaintiffs and leaving determination of the actual date the statute begins to run on each claim to the district court
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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desire to reunite with his child. Second, their interaction with Kish gave no reason to doubt his credibility. Kish gave Defendants a detailed account of the alleged plan to accomplish Steiner’s suicide, along with a diagram indicating where he had personally observed the medications. Kish repeated his allegations under oath before the Wayne County Assistant Prosecutor, Stevens, and his testimony remained consistent. Accordingly, Defendants had reasonable grounds to believe they would find medications at Re-gets’s home and Steiner’s hotel room. Re-gets has failed to cite any authority that Defendants were required to more thoroughly investigate Kish and his claims before seeking the issuance of the search warrants. See, e.g., United States v. Kini-son, 710 F.3d 678, 682 (6th Cir.2013) . Regets also argues that Kish’s statement
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding corroboration of named informants statements some of which included suspects hearsay enhanced informants reliability
B. holding that a known informants statement can support probable cause even though the affidavit fails to provide any additional basis for the known informants credibility
C. holding that probable cause may be gleaned from the hearsay statements of informants
D. holding that the subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause
E. holding that probable cause can be established on the basis of unverified hearsay fleeting observations or by tips received by unnamed reliable informants
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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cruel and unusual punishment will be violated since he may be incompetent at the time of execution. These claims have been repeatedly rejected by this Court. See, e.g., Chavez v. State, 132 So.3d 826, 831 (Fla.), cert. denied, — U.S —, 134 S.Ct. 1156, — L.Ed.2d—(2014) (“Summary denial of a lethal injection challenge is proper where the asserted reasons ... are based upon conjecture or speculation.”); Henyard v. State, 992 So.2d 120, 130 (Fla.2008) (‘We [have] previously found section 945.10 facially constitutional and decline to recede from our decision now.”); Hall v. Moore, 792 So.2d 447, 450 (Fla.2001) (explaining that it is premature for a death-sentenced individual to present a claim of incompetency with regard to his execution if a death warrant has not been signed). III. HABEA . Moreover, as discussed above, this issue is
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the defendants habeas claim was procedurally barred because it could have been or was raised in his postconviction motion
B. holding that circuit court should have treated the habeas petition as a motion for postconviction relief
C. holding that claims not raised in a timely postconviction motion are waived
D. holding that claims raised in a postconviction motion cannot be relitigated in a habeas petition
E. holding that a ground for relief not pled in a motion for postconviction relief is waived and cannot be raised on appeal
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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and relies upon the decision in Commonwealth v. Gibson, 597 Pa. 402, 951 A.2d 1110, 1122-23, for doing so. See op. at 482-85, 967 A.2d at 391-92. However, Gibson involved a first post-conviction request for collateral relief in which the petitioner was not required to establish that a miscarriage of justice had occurred. I believe the Majority accords insufficient weight to the fact that Appellant has already had the benefit of collateral review of his death sentence. The consequences of this are of great significance: in the context of a serial PCRA petition, unless Appellant can make a strong prima facie showing that a miscarriage of justice has resulted, he is not entitled to any relief from his judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Lawson, 519 Pa. 504, 549 A.2d 107, 112 (1988) - A petitioner makes a prima facie showing if
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that in the case of state procedural default a federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate among other things that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice
B. holding that request for resentencing based on pepper was not cognizable in a 2255 proceeding absent a showing of a complete miscarriage of justice
C. holding that prima facie eligibility is demonstrated by a showing that there is a reasonable likelihood that the statutory requirements for relief have been satisfied
D. holding that courts may only review claims for fundamental miscarriage of justice
E. holding that a second request for collateral relief will not be entertained unless a strong prima facie showing is offered to demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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flooding, which has, among other things, damaged their home. On June 15, 2012, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit alleging violations of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (Count I), as well as nuisance, trespass, and negligence under Illinois law (Counts II-IV)- Count I is brought under the “citizen suit” provision of the Clean Water Act. At least 60 days before filing their Clean Water Act citizen suit, Plaintiffs were required to give notice of the alleged violation to (1) the EPA, (2) the state in which the alleged violation occurs, and (3) the alleged violator. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1) (“[n]o action may be commenced” without notice to the EPA, the state, and the alleged violator); see also, e.g., Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 31, 110 S.Ct. 304, 107 L.Ed.2d 237 (1989) ; Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that compliance with analogous notice provision of the resource conservation and recovery act rcra was a mandatory condition precedent to suit
B. holding that adequate notice is a mandatory precondition of a clean water act citizen suit
C. holding this requirement to be a precondition to obtaining intercept authority
D. holding that an identical notice requirement in resource conservation and recovery act was a mandatory precondition to suit
E. holding that the 30day notice of appeal requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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claims. The irrelevance of the exception, howevér, is obvious in light of Mr. Chavez’s failure to cite any extraordinary circumstances. Instead, he circles back to his “ripeness” argument and states that “[ujnless the Government can read [his] mind, it has absolutely no idea what the basis — factual or legal — may be for appealing on the grounds of ineffective assistance and so the Government has absolutely no factual basis in which to root an argument that there are no ‘extraordinary circumstances’ lending themselves to a direct appeal.” Resp. at 12. But it is Mr. Chavez’s burden, not the government’s, to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances to justify a.direct appeal of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th Cir.2005) . Last, Mr. Chavez maintains that enforcement
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a defendant must generally raise claims of ineffective counsel in a collateral proceeding not on direct review
B. holding that a petitioner should wait to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel until collateral review
C. recognizing that it is the defendants burden to demonstrate a reason to depart from the general practice that a defendant must generally raise claims of ineffective assistance counsel on collateral review
D. holding that defendant may raise claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if ineffective assistance is conclusive from the record
E. holding that as a general rule a petitioner should wait to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel until collateral review
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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to counts three and five on May 26,1998. Prior to sentencing, defendant moved to have the sentence imposed in accord with the September 15, 1992 Guidelines, which defendant claimed were in effect when he committed the offenses on January 15, 1998. The statewide presumptive plea offer for the subject offenses under the September 1992 Guidelines was 364 days in the county jail as a condition of probation. Defendant argued that a sentence imposed in accord with the February 1998 Guidelines would violate the ex post facto provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions because the application of those guidelines made the punishment for the crime more burdensome than the September 1992 Guidelines. See Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70, 46 S.Ct. 68, 68-69, 70 L.Ed. 216, 217 (1925) . The motion was denied and defendant was
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that every law that changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed is an ex post facto law within the words and the intent of the prohibition
B. holding that the supreme courts ex post facto precedents do not clearly establish that amended section 29336 violates the ex post facto clause
C. holding that district court did not violate ex post facto clause in applying remedial holding of booker at sentencing
D. holding that one way in which the ex post facto provision of the constitution can be violated is by applying a law that makes more burdensome the punishment of a crime after its commission
E. holding that an ex post facto claim can only be successful if the law can be characterized as punishment in the constitutional sense
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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to deliver a subpoena to the witness but was unsuccessful on three separate occasions. Id. at 159-60. The trial court subsequently ruled that the witness's previous testimony could be admitted at trial because Reynolds did not refute that he had been instrumental in concealing or keeping the witness away. Id. at 160. ¶ 39. The Reynolds Court began its analysis with the following: The Constitution gives the accused the right to a trial at which he should be confronted with the witnesses against him; but if a witness is absent by his own wrongful procurement, he cannot complain if competent evidence is admitted to supply the place of that which he has kept away. The Constitution does not guarantee an accused person against the legitima ) overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) ; and Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that reversible error was committed when the court could not determine that the instruction given by the trial justice was sufficient to remove the taint of the statement and such doubt was to be resolved in favor of the defendant
B. holding that under the sixth amendment any fact which increases the penalty for a crime eg by triggering a mandatory minimum sentence must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt
C. holding that defendant was permissibly excluded from going to view the scene of the crime as part of his trial in dicta justice cardozo stated that no doubt the privilege afforded by the sixth amendment may be lost by consent or at times even by misconduct
D. holding a defendant was entitled to a directed verdict when none of the evidence presented by the state placed the defendant at the crime scene and the jury was left to speculate as to the defendants guilt
E. holding that a criminal defendant has a sixth amendment right to counsel at trial
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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is unbiased and unprejudiced."). Such bias or prejudice exists only where there is an undisputed claim or the judge has expressed an opinion on the merits of the controversy before him. Carter, 761 N.E.2d at 435. Adverse rulings and findings by the trial judge do not constitute bias per se. Id. "Instead, prejudice must be shown by the judge's trial conduct; it cannot be inferred from his subjective views." Id. Leo argues that he "has certainly shown the actual personal bias of the trial judge by showing that Joseph and she had improper ex parte communications and failed to comply with Trial Rule 65(B)." Appellant's Reply Brief at 9 n. 17. Further, Leo argues that after the ex parte meeting, " discretion by denying Leo's motion for change of judge. See, eg., Leisure, 589 N.E.2d at 1169 . IL. The next issue is whether the trial court
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for continuance when not in proper affidavit form
B. holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to strike when movant failed to show prejudice
C. holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the appellants motion for change of judge where the appellant failed to demonstrate actual bias
D. holding that a trial judge has discretion to exclude evidence of pending charges and that where the defendant was given a full opportunity outside the presence of the jury to develop a foundation for bias but failed to do so the trial judge did not abuse its discretion
E. holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Rather, this litigation is before the Court on the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 24), under which this Court must decide whether the allegations in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint (Doc. # 22), viewed through the prisms of Rules 9(b) and 12(b)(6) and the PSLRA, state a claim for relief. The Plaintiffs merely seek to have the Court consider the allegations set forth by the Trustee in his complaint, when it engages in that analysis. In effect, the Plaintiffs are requesting that the Court give them leave to amend to include the allegations set forth by the Trustee in his complaint. Such an amendment would be appropriate, even though it would occur after the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #22) had been fully briefed. Cf. E.E.O.C. v. Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d 541, 546 (6th Cir.1993) . However, rather than treating Plaintiffs’
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding in an appeal from the dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint pursuant to rule 12b6 that when the papers before the sixth circuit indicate that the plaintiff could submit an amended complaint that would state a claim upon which relief can be granted the proper course is to remand to permit the plaintiff to amend
B. holding that a court should not dismiss a complaint pursuant to rule 12b6 for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief
C. holding that the trial court properly struck the amended complaint when the plaintiff offered no reason to refute the trial courts finding that the new allegations in the amended complaint were based on facts the plaintiff had known since the beginning of the action
D. holding that amendment is futile if the proposed amended complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted
E. holding that a plaintiff is not required to file an amended complaint when his complaint is involuntarily dismissed without prejudice and that for the purposes of appeal such a dismissal is a rule 41b adjudication on the merits
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters states herein.” The declarations of Kurokawa and Hart complied with HRCP Rule 56(e). “In instances where Hawaii case law and statutes are silent, this court can look to parallel federal law for guidance.” Gold v. Harrison, 88 Hawai'i 94, 104, 962 P.2d 353, 363 (1998) (quoting State v. Ontai 84 Hawai'i 56, 61, 929 P.2d 69, 74 (1996)). As the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are substantially similar to the HRCP, we look to federal ease law for guidance. The Ninth Circuit has indicated that the Rule 56(e) requirement of personal knowledge and competence to testify may be inferred from the affidavits themselves. See Barthelemy v. Air Lines Pilots Ass’n, 897 F.2d 999, 1018 (9th Cir.1990) ; Lockwood v. Wolf Corp., 629 F.2d 603, 611
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that evidence of the defendants personal cocaine use was relevant to their knowledge regarding the charge of conspiring to import marijuana because it demonstrated their familiarity with illegal drugs
B. holding that ijnsurance policies are contracts and as such they are to be enforced according to their provisions and ijnsurance companies must be able to rely on their statements of coverage exclusions disclaimers definitions and other provisions in order to receive the benefit of their bargain
C. holding that it was proper for court to rely on affidavits of defendants representatives in negotiations because their personal knowledge and competence to testify are reasonably inferred from their positions and the nature of their participation in the matters to which they swore
D. holding that plaintiffs may plead on information and belief if matters are not within their personal knowledge
E. holding that even though defendants response does not affirmatively state in the document itself that they are competent to testify as to the facts to which they swore does not necessarily doom their testimony so long as the record taken as a whole demonstrates that their testimony meets the requirements of rule 56
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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implied by silence or failure to act after the nonbreaching partners learn of the breach”). A rule that acquiescence, waiver, or ratification is sufficient would be consistent with analogous rules governing corporate opportunities. See, e.g., Impala Platinum, Ltd. v. Impala Sales (USA), 283 Md. 296, 324, 389 A.2d 887 (1978) (fiduciary duty is "to make full disclosure of all known information”); Maryland Metals v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 46-47, 382 A.2d 564 (1978) (shareholder may pursue corporate opportunity when corporation makes clear its lack of interest or abandons previously expressed interest). Contrary to the Partnership's contention, we have not resolved this question in the partnership opportunity context. See Dixon v. Trinity Joint Venture, 49 Md.App. 379, 431 A.2d 1364 (1981) . 11 . See, e.g., Thomas v. Schmelzer, 118
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that under the texas uniform partnership act the government was entitled to collect the tax liability indisputably a partnership debt from any one of the general partners
B. holding that when former partners continued business in same place with same name and continued use of trademarks and brands in canning business after dissolution of partnership goodwill existed separate and apart from individual partners
C. holding that general partners must notify limited partners of partnership opportunity to purchase adjacent property but not addressing whether 9404 requires affirmative consent of partners after such notice
D. holding that partners may not agree to eliminate the fiduciary character of their relationship
E. holding that under california law partners are personally liable for the debts and liabilities of the partnership including its tax liability
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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and grand jury testimony were revealed before the State placed them in witness protection. Specifically, rsonal safety in this case outweighs the defendants’ right of confrontation, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in this ease by ordering disclosure of the witnesses’ current addresses and telephone numbers. The district court’s disclosure order ignores the safety concerns articulated by the prosecution which the court itself acknowledged in its order delaying disclosure of the witnesses’ identities. Furthermore, the disclosure order defeats the purpose of placing the witnesses under witness protection, which is designed to protect the safety of prosecution witnesses by making their location unknown. See United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149 (2d Cir.) , modified, 690 F.2d 15 (2d Cir.1979); United
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the defendants due process rights were violated when the trial judge singled out the only defense witness and indicated to that witness that he expected the witness to he and would personally ensure that the witness was prosecuted for perjury and thereby effectively drove that witness off the stand
B. holding that the state could ask leading questions of its witness a codefendant who had entered a plea after witness initially refused to answer questions in violation of her plea agreement
C. holding that trial court properly barred certain questions about witness who was in federal witness protection program
D. holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness
E. holding that mistrial was warranted for trial court allowing questions concerning prior malpractice lawsuits against witness because evidence of prior malpractice actions against a witness is not relevant to the witness competency or knowledge
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Health Care Fraud Information No. 09-CR421, which charged him with health care fraud of $2.9 million. The Government contends petitioner’s claim is meritless as he was never prosecuted for the health care fraud violations in 1999 because he fled the jurisdiction on the date of his scheduled court appearance. Therefore, the 2009 N.D.N.Y. prosecution was the first time any jeopardy could attach to the petitioner’s prosecution. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that no person shall “be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const, amend. V. The Double Jeopardy Clause affords a defendant protection from: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense af Cir.2007) . Petitioner failed to appear in the M.D. Fla.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the dismissal of criminal charges for evidentiary insufficiency is an acquittal for purposes of the double jeopardy clause
B. recognizing that an indictment must contain the elements of the offense charged fairly inform a defendant of the charge and enable the defendant to plead double jeopardy as a defense in a future prosecution for the same offense
C. holding that defendant did not have standing to raise facial challenge to validity of aggravated assault statutes for their risk of creating double jeopardy grounds because he himself was not charged in way that created double jeopardy
D. holding that the dismissal of an indictment before trial and institution of a superseding indictment does not trigger double jeopardy
E. holding that in order for a pretrial dismissal to trigger the protections of the double jeopardy clause there must be an adjudication of elements of the offense charged in a way that reflected a genuine risk of conviction
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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similar to that of the district corad; in this case. That is, they refuse to view the guideline restrietively, and allow the enhancement where a direct implication of death follows from the 10th Cir.)(stating without detailed discussion that robber’s statement to teller to put money in bag or “the person behind me will shoot someone” is considered an express threat under the guidelines, citing the commentary), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 926, 114 S.Ct. 333, 126 L.Ed.2d 278 (1993); United States v. Smith, 973 F.2d 1374, 1378 (8th Cir.1992)(concluding that combination of threatening teller with statement “You don’t want to find out” and appearance as if he had gun under his coat constituted express threat of death); United States v. Strandberg, 952 F.2d 1149, 1151 (9th Cir.1991). In so ruling, these courts have looked to the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a defendant fails to establish prejudice if he does not allege that the state could not have brought him to trial within the recapture window
B. holding that sjection 2b31b2f does not require that the defendant state that he intends to mil the teller if his demands are not met
C. holding that if both willful and malicious are not met the debt is dischargeable
D. holding that even if the standard for waiver is clear the standard was not met
E. recognizing that rule 8 pleading standard does not require detailed factual allegations but it demands more than an unadorned thedefendantunlawfullyharmedme accusation
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Because we agree with the district court that the inner layers of claim 1 must be construed as closed to unrecited resins, including LDPE, we see no error in the district court’s conclusion that dependent claim 10 is invalid. Independent claim 1 excludes LDPE from the inner layers, while dependent claim 10 includes it. As such, claim 10 is inconsistent with claim 1 and, indeed, contradicts claim 1. A dependent claim that contradicts, rather than harrows, the claim from which it depends is invalid. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(d) (requiring that “a claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed” (emphasis added)); Pfizer, Inc. v. Ranbaxy Labs. Ltd., 457 F.3d 1284, 1291-92 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ; Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that only the words step for raise the presumption that 35 usc 112 6 applies
B. holding a claim invalid under preaia 35 usc 112 4 for claiming subject matter that was nonoverlapping with the claim from which it depended
C. holding that jurisdiction to hear appeal from resolution of a rule 35 motion arises under 18 usc 3742 rather than 28 usc 1291
D. holding that an original claim sufficiently described itself and that njothing more is necessary for compliance with the description requirement of the first paragraph of 35 usc 112
E. holding that the argument that an additional limitation be read into claims 1 3 and 4 was only correct with respect to claim 1 and thus only claim 1 was invalid
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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caught in the middle of acrimonious custody battles, I agree with the Court’s holding that the Texas Family Code does not afford a trial court such discretion. But the treatment of attorney’s fees in modification and enforcement proceedings has been more complicated than the Court might indicate. I write separately to briefly explain this history and to illuminate why this subject has resulted in a lack of uniformity among the courts of appeals. I. The Common-Law Doctrine of Necessaries As the Court notes, the underpinnings of the doctrine of necessaries may be traced back over three centuries to English courts. 419 S.W.3d 292, 298-99 (citing Note, The Unnecessary Doctrine of Necessaries, 82 Mioh. L.Rev. 1767, 1767 (1984)). The doctrine implied a contract between a 101-02 (1889) ; see also In re H.V., 252 S.W.3d 319, 327 n.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that attorneys fees are necessaries in a civil suit to recover money or property for the minor
B. holding that attorneys fees are necessaries for the criminal de fense of a child
C. holding that trial court properly assessed mothers attorneys fees as necessaries against father in case in which trial court ordered father to pay mothers attorneys fees as child support but did not state that the fees were necessaries
D. holding that reasonable attorneys fees for the benefit of a minor in defending the minor against a criminal charge were necessaries
E. holding that attorneys fees are necessaries for the criminal defense of a child
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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failed to foresee or expect the damage caused by the installations of the foundations. Ante, at---. I do not believe that this is correct. The complaints allege that the failure to satisfy code requirements regarding the footers may not have been intentional. See, e.g., J.A. 277, 289-90 (first Ellerbe complaint alleging that “[t]he defective footers” may be “due to and based upon a systematic and fundamental misunderstanding [of] ... the requirements for footers in the State of Maryland”). And, although the complaints allege some intentional torts, they also allege causes of action against the parks for, among other things, negligent misrepresentation, violation of building code, negligence, breach of warranty, and torts arising from breach of contract. See Brohawn, 347 A.2d at 850 ; Minnick’s, Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 47
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the insurer had no duty to defend the insured because the allegations of the initial complaint did not allege facts which would bring the case within the coverage of the title insurance policy
B. holding that liability insurer had duty to defend insured against complaint that alleged intentional tort and negligence in the alternative even when policy excluded coverage for intentional torts
C. holding despite authority for the general proposition that the duty to defend is determined based on the allegations of the complaint that an insurer had no duty to defend where the underlying claim was covered by the policy based on the facts pleaded in complaint but other facts not appearing in the complaint excluded coverage
D. holding that section 101106 applied to intentional torts even though these are excluded from the tort claims acts coverage
E. holding comparative negligence not defense to intentional tort
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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it does bear on the propriety of fees awarded under § 1988,” id. at 114, 113 S.Ct. 566, and in a concurring opinion, Justice O’Conner wrote that “[wjhen the plaintiffs success is purely technical or de minimis, no fees can be awarded,” id. at 117, 113 S.Ct. 566 (O’Conner, J., concurring). The Court disagrees with defendants’ characterization of plaintiffs victory in this case. First, rather than a nominal sum, the $30,000 in compensatory and punitive damages awarded by the jury was substantial and easily distinguishable from the cases cited by defendants. See Carroll v. Blinken, 105 F.3d 79, 81-82 (2d Cir. 1997) (affirming district court’s reduction of requested attorneys’ fees because, inter alia, “[tjhere was no damage award”); Pino v. Locascio, 101 F.3d 235, 238-39 (2d Cir. 1996) . In Pino, the Second Circuit specifically
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that plaintiff waived the right to nominal damages in an excessive force case because nominal damages were not requested until after the verdict
B. holding that the right to nominal damages was waived in a breach of duty action when plaintiff failed to raise the issue of nominal damages until after the verdict
C. holding that district court erred in awarding attorneys fees in civil rights action where plaintiff only recovered 1 in nominal damages
D. holding that in an action for breach of contract only nominal damages can be recovered if there is no evidence produced from which the facts necessary to determine damages under the proper rule can be determined
E. holding trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to physicians in absence of any evidence of attorneys fees
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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held that an action for breach of warranty was a contract action, and therefore governed by the statute of limitations for contract actions. The court explained that: [Wjhile an action for breach of a statutorily implied warranty of fitness may involve, incidentally, some showing of negligence, the contract breached is not merely one to use due care, but is a separate (implied) contract of guaranty that the goods are fit for the purpose for which they are bought and sold. Id., 305 N.Y. at 147 (emphasis added). The court overruled two earlier cases where lower courts had held that breach of warranty claims sounded primarily in tort for statute of limitations purposes. See Buyers v. Buffalo Paint & Specialties, Inc., 199 Misc. 764, 769-70, 99 N.Y.S.2d 713, 719 (Sup.Ct.Erie Co. 1950) ; Schlick v. New York Dugan Bros., Inc., 175
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that an action for the negligence of an architect in the performance of professional services is an action for breach of contract
B. holding that an employees action against her employer for negligent supervision lies not in tort but with an action for breach of contract
C. holding the twoyear period for filing a particular tort action such as assault and battery controls over the more general threeyear statute of limitations for tort actions
D. holding that while the fourteenth amendment is directed against state action and not private action the state action requirement is met in a civil action where state law is applied whether by statute or common law
E. holding that an action for consequential damages to property whether the action is brought in contract or in tort is an action for injury to property within the threeyear statute of limitations
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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that the new therapies might “negatively impact[]” the sales of certain flea and tick products. (CAC at 92). Plaintiffs say this was too little, too late. It was too little, they argue, because the statement was merely a “benign reference” to the new therapies, insufficient to adequately warn investors. (CAC ¶ 92). It was too late, they suggest, because subsequent SEC filings addressed the competitive potential of the new therapies more thoroughly. However, “Mere allegations that statements in one report should have been made in earlier reports do not make out a claim of securities fraud.” Acito v. IMCERA Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 53 (2d Cir.1995) (defendants’ lack of clairvoyance simply does not constitute securities fraud), citing Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 470 (2d Cir.1978) ; DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627-28
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that failure to predict future law or to anticipate arguments that blossomed after trial is not a basis for ineffective assistance of counsel claims
B. holding that defendants failure to anticipate future events did not constitute securities fraud
C. holding that reliance is not an element to be proven under securities fraud in indiana
D. holding that even assuming that the defendants attorney had misadviced the client that his previous convictions could not be used to enhance future sentences njeither the court nor counsel is required to anticipate a defendants future recidivism
E. holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid the securities fraud exception by pleading mail fraud or wire fraud if the conduct giving rise to those offenses also amounts to securities fraud
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Credle-Brown v. Conn. Dep’t. of Children & Families, No. 04-CV1167, 2009 WL 1789430, at *1 (D.Conn. June 24, 2009) (“[T]he Court finds that a plaintiff cannot bring a claim under section 1983 where the deprived federal rights are only those rights guaranteed by the ADA.”); South Middlesex Opportunity Council, Inc. v. Town of Framingham, No. 07-CV-12018, 2008 WL 4595369, at *15-16 (D.Mass. Sept. 30, 2008) (finding that “the FHA contains a comprehensive enforcement mechanism for the rights cited by the Plaintiffs under [42 U.S.C.] § 3604” and therefore concluding “that the FHA enforcement mechanism forecloses complementary relief through § 1983.”); Homebuilders Ass’n of Mississippi Inc. v. City of Brandon, Miss., No. 07-CV-716, 2009 WL 1635763, at *11 n. 3 (S.D. Miss. June 10, 2009) ; Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Examiners,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing the validity of the holding in south middlesex with respect to parallel claims under 3604 of the fha and section 1983
B. holding that in the case where patentee was attempting to argue that parallel meant perpendicular with respect to a particular claim and a claim ended with an incomplete limitation the claims at issue were indefinite
C. holding that the invalidity of a provision for a de novo trial in superior court in the appeal section of an act did not affect the validity of the remainder of the appeal section
D. recognizing such a claim under 1983
E. holding that the states personal injury statutes of limitation should be applied for claims under section 1983
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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the Court of Special Appeals’ decision in Evans is that Respondents’ constitutional rights were violated only when the police decided not to “arrest” them, and let them go. In this regard, we agree with the intermediate appeals court of Massachusetts: Under that principle, it cannot be said that [the defendant’s] constitutional rights were violated when he was first searched; if he had been arrested immediately afterwards ..., no question could now arise as to the constitutional validity of the search. It is thus apparent that the defendant is contending for a nonsense proposition: that his constitutional rights were violated at the moment when the police decided not to arrest him and instead let him go. Commonwealth v. Skea, 18 Mass.App.Ct. 685, 470 N.E.2d 385, 393 (Mass.Ct.App.1984) . Accordingly, we hold that the failure of the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the searehincidenttoalawfularrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest
B. holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises
C. holding that while search incident to arrest could not justify search in that case probable cause plus exigency justified search
D. holding that consent searches do not require probable cause to justify the search of a home
E. holding that reasoning which would justify the arrest by the search and at the same time justify the search by the arrest will not do
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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shall forthwith be mailed to all parties. Within ten days after being served with a copy, any party may serve and file written objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as provided by rules of court. A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). “A party ‘may file objections within ten days or he may not, as he chooses, but he ‘shall’ do so if he wishes further consideration”. Negron v. Cir.1993) (stating that “[o]bjeetion to a magistrate’s report preserves only those objections that are specified”); Keating v. Secretary of H.H.S., 848 F.2d 271, 275 (1st Cir.1988); Borden v. Secretary of H.H.S., 836 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir.1987) . See generally United States v.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that appellant was entitled to a de novo review however he was not entitled to a de novo review of an argument never raised
B. holding that we review constitutional challenges de novo
C. holding that review of the construction of a sentencing statute is de novo
D. recognizing de novo standard of review
E. holding statutory interpretation is subject to de novo review
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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courts have held that “the UCC is a party’s exclusive remedy when statutory provisions are applicable to the factual circumstances of a given case.” Peters Family Farm, Inc. v. Sav. Bank, No. 10CA2, 2011 WL 497476, at *4 (Ohio Ct.App. Jan. 28, 2011); see also Dice v. White Family Cos., 173 Ohio App.3d 472, 480, 878 N.E.2d 1105 (Ohio Ct.App.2007) (“[T]he UCC provides the exclusive remedy where the dispute is governed by its statutory provisions. Common law causes of action may not be raised to circumvent the UCC’s rights, claims, and defenses where the statute applies.”); NCS Healthcare, Inc. v. Fifth Third Bank, N alternative legal theories, the above authority makes clear that the Ohio UCC provides the exclusive remedy to enforce negotiable instruments. Cf. NCS, 2005 WL 1484025 at *8 . Under these circumstances, Plaintiff fails to
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that no substantial question of federal law was required to be answered to determine the plaintiffs statelaw legal malpractice negligence and breach of contract claims
B. holding the government liable to plaintiffs for breach of contract
C. holding that plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial on claim of breach of fiduciary duty where underlying claim was a common law negligence action
D. holding that a plaintiffs common law breach of contract and negligence claims cannot be raised where the ucc already governs
E. holding that plaintiffs negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims are not independent of the breach of contract claim and summary judgment is warranted on these claims
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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to accept transfer of Mrs. West and the undisputed evidence shows,that Dr. Huxol never refused to accept transfer of Mrs. West. 1. No Prívate Cause of Action under EMTALA against Individuals EMTALA provides a private cause of action directly- against participating hospitals for violation of the duties created -by the statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A) (authorizing private suits “against the participating hospital”). However, courts, including the .Sixth Circuit, have held that EMTALA does not provide a plaintiff with a private cause of action against a physician. Moses v. Providence Hosp. & Med. Ctrs., Inc., 561 F.3d 573, 587 (6th Cir.2009) (“EMTALA does not authorize a private right of action against individuals.”); see Eberhardt v. City of L.A., 62 F.3d 1253, 1256-57 (9th Cir.1995) ; King v. Ahrens, 16 F.3d 265, 271 (8th
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that emtala does pot give patients a private cause of action against their physicians
B. holding suits against state officials for prospective injunctive relief are permissible because they are in effect suits against the officials in their individual capacities
C. holding that emtala does not allow private suits against physicians
D. holding that emtala does not provide a private cause of action against individual physicians or against physicians medical corporations
E. holding that eleventh amendment bars federal suits against state courts
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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issue of Claimant’s initial eligibility for benefits under the Act. Furthermore, the cases cited by the Department in support of its position are inapposite because they relate to circumstances in which a government entity has made a mistake in enforcing the law or administering its duty to the public at large, and do not relate to statutorily bestowed entitlements of government employees or specific private citizens. See Otte v. Coving-ton Township Road Supervisors, 589 Pa. 44, 650 A.2d 412 (1994) (Department of Environmental Resources mistakenly believed it was estopped from enforcing the provisions of the Sewage Facilities Act, Act of January 24, 1966, P.L. (1965) 1535, as amended, 35 P.S. §§ 750.1-750.20(a)); Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Company, 455 Pa. 392, 319 A.2d 871 (1974) ; Commonwealth v. Western Maryland R.R. Co.,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the party did not waive its right to enforce the arbitration clause
B. holding that the commonwealth did not waive its right to enjoin the pollution of public waters by a mining company
C. recognizing the importance of public welfare and conservation of water in administering its public waters
D. holding that waters in utah are of two classes private and public and title to public waters is in the public all are equal owners that is have coequal rights therein
E. recognizing the right to waive a jury trial
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Corp., 440 F.Supp. 1237 (D.N.J.1976). There the patentee had granted the licensee the right to make and sell its product in specialty form only, but not in bulk for sale to others. The court reasoned that a patentee’s right to shut off all competition must necessarily include the lesser right to restrict the exercise of the granted privilege so long as the patentee does not attach a condition that enlarges his monopoly beyond that given by the patent statute and the patent itself. See United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 118 F.Supp. 41, 226 (D.Del.1953) (upholding license which limited the licensee’s output to a specific quantity), aff’d 351 U.S. 377, 76 S.Ct. 994, 100 L.Ed. 1264 (1956); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 62 S.Ct. 1070, 86 L.Ed. 1461 (1942) ; Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the deadmans statute should not be extended by judicial construction to cases not clearly within its terms
B. recognizing that enhancement requires control over a participant in the scheme not only control over the scheme itself
C. holding that the statutes 30 day provision is mandatory and may not be extended and dicta that it may not be extended by release from incarceration
D. holding invalid scheme by which patentee extended patent monopoly by requiring pricefixing arrangement between itself and each of its licensees
E. holding that the defrauding of different people over an extended period of time using different means and representations may constitute but one scheme
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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in this court. Beyond the record provided for a direct appeal, Golden is not entitled to free transcripts to assist in the preparation of either a postconviction motion or a petition for extraordinary relief. Goggins v. Pinellas Co., Cir. Ct. of Sixth Jud. Cir., 685 So.2d 1334, 1335 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). As the trial court pointed out in its dismissal order, the transcripts requested are a part of the record for his direct appeal. Golden is not entitled to anything more. A motion to credit jail time is normally a motion authorized by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Hines v. State, 842 So.2d 999, 1000 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). However, rule 3.800(a) prohibits the filing of such a motion during the pendency of a direct appeal. See Day v. State, 770 So.2d 1262 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) . Since Golden filed his motion during the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that since district court of appeal properly found that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on a 3850 motion during the pendency of a direct appeal the district court of appeal should have vacated the order rather than affirming on the merits
B. holding that a rule 3800a motion that does not allege that the court records show the defendants entitlement to additional jail credit is facially insufficient
C. holding that the failure of a written sentence to conform to the courts oral pronouncement cannot be raised in a rule 3800a motion
D. holding that the public defender was not authorized to file a motion collaterally attacking the defendants sentence and affirming the trial courts dismissal of perrys rule 3800a motion filed by the public defender without prejudice to perrys right to file such a motion pro se
E. holding that effective january 13 2000 a party may not file a rule 3800a motion during the pendency of a direct appeal
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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between the funds seized and the illegal activity was that the tainted funds had previously passed through the same interbank account. II At the time of the seizure, the civil forfeiture statute provided that the United States could acquire through forfeiture “[a]ny property, real or personal, involved in a transaction or attempted transaction in violation of ... section 1956 [money laundering] ... or any property traceable to such property.” 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). The Government concedes that the funds in the Banamex account were not “involved in” or “traceable to” the money laundering enterprise and, thus, were not subject to forfeiture under the statute as it stood at the time of the seizure. See United States v. $448,342.85, 969 F.2d 474, 476-77 (7th Cir.1992) . Instead, the Government argues that the funds
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that proceeds as that term is used in the money laundering statute means gross receipts from illegal activity rather than profits
B. holding that the court of appeals erred in declining to consider whether the arrest was illegal and whether the consent was tainted by the potentially illegal police activity
C. holding that illegal gambling activity may be enjoined even though these operations are also subject to criminal prosecution
D. holding that countersurveillance driving is a fact indicative of illegal activity
E. holding that money seized from a bank account must be traceable to illegal activity in order to be subject to forfeiture even if account previously contained proceeds of illegal activity
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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the undisputed allegations of the underlying complaint, there is no plausible way that Hanft could be legally entitled to the personal profit he gained, and therefore, application of the exclusion need not await final adjudication of the underlying action. Moreover, it is unlikely that the issue of whether Hanft was “legally entitled” to the loan proceeds will ever be adjudicated in the underlying action. In the underlying action, the Diehls have asserted causes of action against Hanft for rescission and breach of contract. Whether Hanft was “legally entitled” to the loan proceeds is not an element of either of these causes of action which the factfinder in the underlying case would be required to determine. See Shane v. Hoffmann, 227 Pa.Super. 176, 324 A.2d 532, 536 (Pa.Super.Ct 1974) a false representation of an existing fact; 2)
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding basic elements of due process are notice and a right to be heard
B. recognizing that a claim under mcl 6002932 includes all actions to decide interests in land even when the claim involves fraud or rescission and holding that the 15year period of limitations applies to such an action rather than the shorter periods applicable to typical claims for fraud and rescission
C. holding that the two elements of a copyright infringement claim are 1 the plaintiff owns a valid copyright right and 2 the defendants copied constituent elements of the work that are original
D. holding that party affirming contract is precluded from later seeking rescission
E. holding elements of rescission are 1
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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bring a RCRA ISE claim is evidence that the defendant’s discharges, and Little Hocking’s reasonable concerns about the effects of those discharges, directly affected its economic interests in running a water distribution Facility. If this Court or a jury finds that Defendant is liable under RCRA for the environmental contamination of Plaintiffs Wellfield, then Plaintiffs injury may be redressed through injunctive relief. 2. Notice Defendant argues that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Count I because Plaintiff failed to meet mandatory pre-filing notice requirements under 42 U.S.C.A. § 6972(b)(1)(A) in order to make a claim under § 6972(a)(1)(A) for violations of RCRA. See Sierra Club Ohio Chapter v. City of Columbus, 282 F.Supp.2d 756, 763 (S.D.Ohio 2003) (Marb-ley, J) . Specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiff
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that late notice of the bond did not excuse supplier from its obligation to comply with statutory notice requirements
B. holding that clean water acts notice provision is a condition precedent to all claims
C. holding that adequate notice is a mandatory precondition of a clean water act citizen suit
D. holding notice provision in rcra and clean water act are virtually identical and citizens notice to violators under either act must strictly comply with statutory notice requirements
E. holding that the limitation act does not apply to claims brought under the clean water act
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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applicable under the contract; and (3) what volume of gas is covered by the properly redetermined price. Under the parties’ agreement, however, the extent to which these “additional matters” are nonarbitrable is open to serious question. For example, in varying degrees, the plaintiffs’ three examples of “additional matters” appear to fall within the scope of the parties’ dispute on price rede-termination. As such, the three issues may be arbitrable as necessary sub-issues, to be resolved by the arbitrators in their ruling on the price redetermination question. See Prudential Lines, 704 F.2d at 59 (noting that the resolution of an arbitrable dispute may “necessarily implicate[] resolution of several sub-issues); McAllister Bros. v. A & S Transp. Co., 621 F.2d 519, 523 (2d Cir.1980) . In any event, even if the plaintiffs’ fifth
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that whether the contract was abandoned by movant was inextricably tied up with the merits of the underlying arbitrable dispute regarding the adequacy of the movants contract performance
B. holding that contract promise to litigate any dispute arising from the contract in the english courts was prima facie valid quoting underlying contract
C. holding that for a suit to be brought in the venue in which the contract was to be performed the contract must expressly state where the performance of the contract was to occur
D. holding that a settlement agreement is an arbitrable subject when the underlying dispute is arbitrable
E. holding that the plain language of the parties contract which limited the cases eligible for submission to arbitration rendered the underlying dispute not arbitrable
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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P.2d 164, 167 (Colo.App.1998) (excluding an employer’s contribution to an employee’s pension plan from the calculation of weekly benefits); Luce v. United Techs. Corp., 247 Conn. 126, 717 A.2d 747, 755 (1998) (finding that the calculation of “wages” under the state’s workers’ compensation laws does not include pensions); Rainey v. Mills, 733 S.W.2d 756, 758 (Ky.Ct.App.1987) (declining to find statutory support to include fringe benefits, such as employer pension plan contributions, in weekly wage calculation); Barnett v. Sara Lee Corp., 97 Md.App. 140, 627 A.2d 86, 90-91 (1993) (finding that pension plans could not be considered in the calculation of weekly wages for the purpose of determining a claimant’s industrial loss of use); In re Gagnon, 158 N.H, 391, 965 A.2d 1154, 1159 (2009) ; Shaw v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 362 N.C. 457, 665
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the statute of limitations applicable to a section 301 suit was the same as that which applies to suits against an employer for breach of the collective bargaining agreement
B. holding that an employers contributions to an employees retirement account are not included in the calculation of a weekly wage for workers compensation purposes
C. holding that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union
D. holding that weekly wages are calculated using a claimants pretax pay and therefore it was not unjust for the collective bargaining agreement to exclude employer payments to an employees pension plan from the definition of wage
E. holding that the claim accrued after the employer denied a request for arbitration as untimely under the collective bargaining agreement
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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in a matter in which neither alone could serve the client as proficiently. Id. 1.5 emt. The referral agreement between Hollender and Eggen complied, at least in part, with Minn.R.Prof. Conduct 1.5(e). The record demonstrates: (1) Hollender met with the client, evaluated internal reports from an expert witness, referred the medical malpractice case to Eggen, and consulted on the case; (2) by letter to Eggen, Hollender confirmed his entitlement to a referral fee of one-third the amount of Eggen’s fees; (3) Eggen advised the client in writing that he would be consulting with Hollender on the ease, and that he and Hollender would share the attorneys’ portion of any recovery; (4) the client did not object to the fee as a complete defense in a civil suit. See Minn.R.Prof. Conduct Scope . While the professional rules may evidence
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing that the federal rules of evidence do not apply to sentencing hearings
B. recognizing professional rules do not augment substantive legal duties or extradisciplinary consequences
C. holding professional rules do not provide basis for civil liability
D. recognizing professional rules are not intended to run to personal benefit of attorneys adversaries
E. holding that pleading rules are substantive
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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when Officer Brinson interviewed Thu-mann or Broderick. Nor does it provide any information about Thumann or Bro-derick, other than appellant’s alleged longtime friendship with Broderick’s family. Nor does it establish any reason for believing the information of either informant to be reliable and credible other than the confirmation of their information from the results of execution of the search warrant itself. And ex post facto confirmation of the reliability of information in a search warrant affidavit cannot be used to establish reliability for the purpose of establishing probable cause to obtain the warrant in the first place. There is, therefore, no basis for the magistrate to have relied upon the credibility and reliability of these informants. See Wilkerson, 726 S.W.2d at 545 ; McKissick, 209 S.W.3d at 212 (including
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that magistrate must have substantial basis for concluding that probable cause exists
B. holding that the plaintiff must show that there was a lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution
C. holding that hearsay may be relied on to show probable cause when substantial basis exists for crediting it
D. holding that probable cause may be gleaned from the hearsay statements of informants
E. holding that probable cause may be determined on basis of collective knowledge of police
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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CURIAM. Anton Cross appeals from the sentence the District Court imposed after he pleaded guilty to a drug-conspiracy offense. His counsel has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), arguing that the District Court (1) erred in determining that the Fair Sentencing Act did not apply retroactively to Cross and (2) abused its discretion in sentencing him. As to the District Court’s determination regarding the applicability of the Fair Sentencing Act, we find no error in light of this Court’s recent decision in United States v. Sidney, 648 F.3d 904, 910 (8th Cir.2011) . As to the court’s imposition of sentence, we
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that section 1981a does not apply to cases arising before its enactment
B. recognizing that new law did not apply to claims that accrued prior to enactment
C. holding that the fair sentencing act does not apply retroactively to defendants whose criminal conduct occurred before its enactment even if those defendants were sentenced after its enactment
D. holding that floridas current statutory scheme that provides defendants with a choice of either electrocution or lethal injection as the method of execution is constitutional and could be retroactively applied to criminal defendants sentenced prior to the statutes enactment
E. recognizing that aedpa would not apply to a habeas petition that was pending at the time of its enactment
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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than in Steve Jackson Games and Konop. Defendant’s proemail operated to obtain the e-mails before they were received by its intended recipients. While the e-mail in Steve Jackson Games was retrieved from storage in a computer and the website in Konop was accessed under false pretenses, the e-mails in this case were accessed by the procmail as they were being transmitted and in real time. However, the presence of the words “any temporary, intermediate storage” in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) controls. On the facts of this case, it is clear that the electronic communications in this case were in a form of electronic storage. It may well be that the protections of the Wiretap Act have been eviscerated as technology advances. See United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1047-51 (11th Cir.2003) . As the stipulation reached by the parties
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that plaintiff could recover damages under both the lanham act and the copyright act because the profits awarded under the federal trademark statute constitute compensation rather than a penalty while statutory damages are awarded under the copyright act are designed to serve a variety of purposes other than compensation including deterrence and punishment
B. holding that acceptance of payments under the louisiana state compensation act does not constitute an election of the remedy under state law precluding recovery under the longshoremens act
C. holding intercept did not occur because there was no contemporaneous acquisition but commenting that under the narrow reading of the statute few seizures will constitute interceptions under wiretap act
D. holding that there was no federal subject matter jurisdiction under the private cause of action provision of the act
E. holding that alleged breach of child abuse reporting act did not amount to negligence per se because analysis of statute indicated no private cause of action could be implied under the act
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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must run while defendant is incarcerated for parole violation); cf. N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-i(3)(x)(D) (stating that harshest penalty for violating post-release supervision served after determinate prison sentence is “reincarceration up to the balance of the remaining period of post-release supervision, not to exceed five years”). In these circumstances, there is no denying that Bussey’s 22-month term of incarceration was served “in connection with” his conviction for a state crime. See Kamagate v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 144, 154 (2d Cir.2004) (stating that “in connection with” is expansive term synonymous with “relating to,” “associated with,” “with respect to,” and “with reference to” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. Jackson, 426 F.3d 301, 304-05 (5th Cir.2005) . United States v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 640 F.3d
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that work release qualified as incarceration
B. holding that the parole commission is required to state reasons for its finding that an inmate continues to be a poor candidate for parole release
C. holding that habeas petition challenging the state boards decision to defer his scheduled parole release date was rendered moot by prisoners release from custody on parole and subsequent incarceration for violating his parole
D. holding federal supervision tolled under 3624e during state incarceration for parole violation
E. holding a sentence is not limited to period of incarceration
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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the standard of care. See Hyman & Armstrong, P.S.C. v. Gunderson, 279 S.W.3d 93, 114(Ky. 2008) (concluding that, although information about a drug in the package insert and the Physicians’ Desk Reference “is relevant and useful information regarding the prescribing physician’s standard of care, it is not the sole determinant of the standard of care”); Richardson v. Miller, 44 S.W.3d 1, 16-17 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (observing that such materials are “intended to comply with the FDA’s regulations, to provide advertising and promotional material, and to limit the manufacturer’s liability” and cannot, by themselves, be considered prima facie evidence of the prescribing physician’s standard of care; Morlino v. Medical Center of Ocean County, 684 A.2d 944, 949 (N. J. Super. App. Div. 1996) ; Craft v. Peebles, 893 P.2d 138, 151 (Haw.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that where a treating doctor is called to give an expert opinion on the standard of care that doctor is properly labeled an expert witness and must be disclosed to the other party along with other experts
B. recognizing that a defendant physicians own practice was at least some evidence of the standard of care and concluding that the case was properly submitted to the jury notwithstanding the plaintiffs failure to call an independent expert on the standard of care
C. holding expert testimony is ordinarily required in legal malpractice cases to establish the standard of care
D. holding that a manufacturers insert in and of itself may not establish the relevant standard of care in a medical negligence action but may be considered by the fact finder along with expert testimony to define the standard of care
E. holding that package inserts and parallel physicians desk reference information may be considered by the jury along with expert testimony to determine the appropriate standard of care
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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(per curiam). In response, Ms. Bon-illa-Holguin’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw and an Anders brief. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967) (authorizing counsel to request permission to withdraw where counsel conscientiously examines case and determines that appeal would be wholly frivolous). Counsel states that the only arguable nonfrivolous issue presented in the record is ineffective assistance of trial counsel in negotiating the appeal waiver, but that argument should be raised in a collateral proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, rather than on direct appeal, since the district court has not had an opportunity to develop the factual record on the issue. See, e.g., United States v. Ibarra-Coronel, 517 F.3d 1218, 1222 (10th Cir.2008) . We gave Ms. Bonilla-Holguin an opportunity to
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be brought in collateral proceedings not on direct appeal
B. holding that a defendant must generally raise claims of ineffective counsel in a collateral proceeding not on direct review
C. recognizing claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel usually must be raised in collateral proceeding
D. holding that under oregon law a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be raised in the initial habeas proceeding
E. recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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by the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, in which the Court, without citation to any cases, held that a wife was not bound by the limited tort election made by her ex-husband. Kail v. Kalsek, Case No. GD99-15479 (Allegheny Cty. Ct. of Common Pleas May 31, 2001). Although the facts in Kail seem identical to Bujfetta (the wife was covered but not the named insured on her ex-husband’s policy and only became the named insured after her ex-husband was removed from the policy), the Court determined that a new policy was created and the ex-husband’s election could not bind the wife. Despite this contradiction, we cannot revisit our conclusion in Bujfetta simply on account of a Court of Common Pleas decision. See Smith v. Calgon Carbon Corp., 917 F.2d 1338, 1341, 1343 (3d Cir.1990) (quoting Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 914
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that court is bound by prior panels interpretation of supreme court decision
B. holding that an order issued by the pennsylvania supreme court in which it refused to exercise its kings bench jurisdiction to overturn gag orders issued by a lower state court did not implicitly reject the plaintiffs claim that the gag orders violated the first amendment as pennsylvania law authorized the pennsylvania supreme court to decline to exercise its kings bench jurisdiction where the case did not present an issue of immediate public importance
C. holding that we are bound by the theory or reasoning underlying a supreme court case not just by its holding
D. holding that we are required to predict the position which the pennsylvania supreme court would take in resolving this dispute and in the absence of a clear statement by the pennsylvania supreme court to the contrary or other persuasive evidence of a change in pennsylvania law we are bound by the holdings of previous panels of this court
E. holding that the supreme court of pennsylvania is a state entity for purposes of the eleventh amendment
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Cir.1992) (upholding Section 1983 claim where plaintiffs complaints concerned the routine use of sexually suggestive language by police officers toward all female officers as well as systemic instances of other forms of sexual harassment), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1644, 123 L.Ed.2d 266 (1993); Auriemma v. Rice, 910 F.2d 1449, 1460 (7th Cir.1990) (in banc) (finding public interest where there was a “wholesale change in the highest police echelons allegedly only on a racial basis”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2796, 115 L.Ed.2d 970 (1991). Here, however, there has been no violation of the First Amendment, because Saulpaugh’s complaints were “personal in nature and generally related to her own situation.” Ezekwo v. NYC Health & Hospitals Corp., 940 F.2d 775, 781 (2d Cir.) , cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 657, 116
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that residents complaints about aspects of residency program that negatively affected her did not implicate matters of public concern
B. recognizing a public employees first amendment right to address matters of legitimate public concern
C. holding that issues of prison security public safety and official corruption are matters of public concern
D. holding that the complaints of a public employee about a reorganization plan were on a matter of public concern even though the employee was primarily motivated by the adverse effect of the plan on himself
E. holding in part that complaints focused on individual compensation do not involve a matter of public concern
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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a jury that they rose to the level of a “meeting” as defined by the Freedom of Information Act, and consequently, would not be prohibited by the statute. See Conn. Gen.Stat. § 1-200(2) (" 'Meeting' means any hearing or other proceeding of a public agency, any convening or assembly of a quorum of a multimember public agency, any any communication by or to a quorum of a multimember public agency ... to discuss or act upon a matter of which the public agency has supervision, control, jurisdiction or advisory power. 'Meeting' does not include ... any chance meeting, or a social meeting neither planned nor intended for the purpose of discussing matters relating to official business”); Lawson v. East Hampton Planning and Zoning Comm’n, 2005 WL 3662907 at *1-3 (Conn.Super.Ct. Dec. 13, 2005)
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding annexation ordinance only voidable due to procedural irregularities
B. holding that contract failed for indefiniteness because there were essential terms upon which there was no agreement
C. recognizing that the necessary inquiry is not whether there was a warrant or whether there was time to get one but whether there was probable cause for the arrest
D. holding that procedural irregularities do not amount to a denial of fundamental fairness even where there was a recess during which there were unrecorded conversations between commission members
E. holding that even when there is a conflict of evidence before the commission and the evidence was such that the commission could have reasonably reached a contrary decision the commissions decision was not arbitrary and capricious
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wholly independent right the resolution of which demands the exercise of a judicial power substantially different in scope than the power to decide a particular claimant’s entitlement to compensation under the Vaccine Act. What petitioners seek is a declaratory-judgment respecting the constitutional legitimacy of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14(c) — the statute that authorizes the Secretary to promulgate regulations modifying the Vaccine Injury Table. That relief raises an issue that is intimately tied to the power to review the Secretary’s regulations and, as such, it is an issue appropriate for consideration by a United States court of appeals pursuant to Section 300aa-32 of the Vaccine Act. See Oklahoma v. Civil Service Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 138-139, 67 S.Ct. 544, 551-552, 91 L.Ed. 794 (1947) The issue lies beyond our jurisdiction to hear
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the improper appointment of a judge to a case deprived the court of jurisdiction to rule on any motions pending before that judge the orders entered by that judge were entered without jurisdiction of the court and were thus void
B. holding that remand orders are also appealable orders under 28 usc 1291
C. recognizing that a court granted jurisdiction by statute to review the legality of administrative orders is also empowered to examine the constitutionality of the statute by virtue of which such orders were entered
D. holding that court of appeals statutory jurisdiction over final orders of removal extends to reinstatement orders
E. holding that the court had jurisdiction to decide issues relating to the fsp conveyance orders and an agreement entered pursuant to the conveyance orders
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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premium payments owed to the insurer which the client then paid to the broker. Id. (citing Unified Servs., Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 218 Ga.App. 85, 460 S.E.2d 545 (Ga.Ct.App.1995)). 24 . In making these determinations, I have not relied on the Expert HR defendants' response to LM’s Rule 56.1 Statement. Under Local Rule 56.1(b), responses must contain "in the case of any disagreement, specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon.” The Expert HR defendants have not done so, but instead have issued unsupported denials for the vast majority of LM's Rule 56.1 Statement. This response is improper, and is therefore stricken. 25 . See, e.g., Am. Home Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 122 Cal.App.3d 951, 966, 175 Cal.Rptr. 826, 834 (1981) . 26 . As noted above, even if some other basis
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding jurisdiction over an individual may not usually be predicated on jurisdiction over a corporation unless the corporation is the alter ego of the individual or when the individual perpetrates a fraud
B. holding an alter ego action could be brought by the debtor corporation under texas law
C. recognizing that the corporate entity is disregarded to prevent fraud or an injustice not to inflict an obligation on an innocent corporation and that the fraud or inequity sought to be eliminated must be that of the party against whom the alter ego doctrine is invoked
D. recognizing that the alter ego doctrine is an equitable doctrine which should be used to prevent inequitable results
E. recognizing that pursuant to the traditional application of the alter ego doctrine corporate form may be disregarded when the corporation is the mere instrumentality or business conduit of another corporation or person
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In an attempt to prove such a fact, Electric Mobility points to the rather feeble deposition testimony of Michael Flowers, the President of Electric Mobility, who testified that he believed that the time period in which Electric Mobility ordered and received Bourns potentiometers from Hall-Mark “was a broader period of time.” See Kenneth M. Denti Out-of-Pocket Expense Aff., Ex. F (Flowers Dep.) at 715. In sum, I conclude that this is not an “appropriate” case in which to exercise my discretion to excuse the consequences of Electric Mobility’s judicial admission. Cf. MacDonald, 110 F.3d at 340 (finding that trial court was within discretion to conclude attorney’s remarks were not “deliberate voluntary waivers” and did not constitute judicial admissions); Belculfine, 527 F.2d at 944 ; United States v. Brewton, Crim. No.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that district court did not abuse discretion in not binding government to casual statements made by its attorney
B. holding district court did not abuse its discretion in not granting plaintiffs leave to amend complaint for a third time
C. holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of a witness that was not highly probative
D. holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in striking fact statements that did not comply with the local rules
E. holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its ruling whether to proceed with a declaratory judgment action
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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and has not competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence depriving him of his life or his liberty.” Id. at 494, 114 S.Ct. at 1737 (emphasis added) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). Thus, Custis contemplated that the procedural bar applied in cases where defendants waived their right to counsel. [¶ 7.] The federal circuits analyzing Custis confirm that conclusion. See United States v. Rubio, 629 F.3d 490, 493-94 (5th Cir.2010) (denying collateral attack on prior convictions because the defendant failed to meet his burden of showing an invalid waiver of counsel); United States v. Reyes-Solano, 543 F.3d 474, 478 (8th Cir. 2008) ; United States v. Krejcarek, 453 F.3d 1290,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding right to testify was federal constitutional right
B. holding that a defendant cannot collaterally challenge a prior conviction used to calculate criminal history points
C. holding that the prior conviction was valid for calculation of the defendants criminal history because his waiver of the right to counsel was valid
D. holding mississippi convictions counted as criminal history points because the defendant did not testify that he was unaware of his right to counsel or that his waiver was invalid
E. holding that an express waiver of the right to appeal the sentence was invalid because the trial court had failed properly to advise the defendant and that the defendant therefore did not waive his right to appeal the legality of his sentence
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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(1982). “Mere approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives of a private party” does not constitute state action in the First Amendment context. See id. at 1004-05, 102 S.Ct. 2777; see also Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (“[I]f, for constitutional purposes, every private right were transformed into governmental action by the mere fact of court enforcement of it, the distinction between private and governmental action would be obliterated.”). Thus, when a court merely enforces obligations explicitly assumed by the parties, there is no state action. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669-70, 111 S.Ct. 2513. To hold otherwise would mean that courts could never enforce non-disclosure agreements. See United Egg Producers v. Standard Brands, Inc., 44 F.3d 940, 943 (11th Cir. 1995) . Formal constitutions and bylaws of
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that court enforcement of a settlement agreement is not state action for constitutional purposes
B. holding that the plaintiffs lawsuit which was filed despite a general release in the parties settlement agreement constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement
C. holding that because the alleged settlement was never approved by the court under rule 9019 the settlement agreement was unenforceable
D. holding that a settlement agreement is not a court order and therefore a violation of the settlement agreement would not subject a party to contempt
E. holding that a district court may order restitution despite a settlement agreement
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Section 90.403, Florida Statutes (2007), establishes a limitation on the introduction of relevant evidence: “Relevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” The “neighborhood code of silence” testimony at issue often arises in prosecutions involving crimes occurring in prison or stemming from gang activity, but also in cases where victims or witnesses are generally reluctant to cooperate with law enforcement. It is relevant on the issue of a witness’s credibility and to explain why witnesses may have given conflicting statements concerning a crime. See United States v. Montes-Diaz, 208 F. App’x 565, 566 (9th Cir.2006) ; People v. Trujillo, 2002 WL 31474459
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting gangrelated evidence
B. holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony on inmate code of silence to show witness bias and help explain why the government failed to call certain witnesses
C. holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony
D. holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting testimony to only one witness where additional witnesses would have provided the same testimony
E. holding that prosecutor free to comment on defendants failure to call certain witnesses or present certain testimony
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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and the claim needs no new grounds of jurisdiction to support it.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1) (emphasis added). Rule 8(a)(1) is satisfied if the complaint generally “say[s] enough about jurisdiction to create some reasonable likelihood that the court is not about to hear a case that it is not supposed to have the power to hear.” Hammes v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 33 F.3d 774, 778 (7th Cir.1994). Thus, it is “not essential that a complaint set forth the statutory basis for the court’s jurisdiction in order to assume jurisdiction, if the facts alleged provide a basis for the assumption of jurisdiction.” AmSouth Bank v. Dale, 386 F.3d 763, 779 (6th Cir.2004) (quoting Rohler v. TRW, Inc., 576 F.2d 1260, 1264 (7th Cir.1978)). See also Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648 (4th Cir.2006) ; Blanchard v. Terry & Wright, Inc., 331 F.2d
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that exercise of jurisdiction over plaintiffs state law claims was proper on the basis of supplemental jurisdiction even though the plaintiffs had erroneously claimed diversity jurisdiction because a legitimate federal question was also presented and the state law claims formed part of the same case or controversy as the federal claim
B. holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law
C. holding that when all federal claims have been dismissed the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims
D. holding that the federal district courts dismissal of the plaintiffs federal claims deprived the court of its jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims arising from the same incident
E. holding that the court of federal claims had pendant jurisdiction over a state law contract claim that was part of the same case as a claim over which the court of federal claims had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 usc 1498b
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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that any of the shareholders participated in any fraudulent or unlawful activity. As a mere passive recipient of the ShowBiz stock, a defendant here has only a small number of possible individual defenses, such as the claim that he only acted as a conduit for the actual recipients of the stock, or that he had a smaller number of shares than alleged. In such circumstances, a court’s conclusions regarding the primary legal and factual issues in the first case would not only form the basis for the application of stare decisis in subsequent eases; they would almost inevitably prove dispositive in those cases. See Lynch Corp. v. MII Liquidating Co., 82 F.R.D. 478, 483 (D.S.D.1979) (certifying defendant class of shareholders under (b)(1)(B)); Guy v. Abdulla, 57 F.R.D. 14, 18 (N.D.Ohio 1972) . Also significant is the fact that, were the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that b1b certification of a defendant class is appropriate for the purpose of deciding common issues in a bankruptcy trustees action to recover voidable preferences and fraudulent conveyances
B. holding that tolling applies to a subsequent class action when class certification was granted in a prior case
C. holding that a district of columbia consumer protection statute that authorized representative actions and did not reference class action requirements or mandate class certification was a separate and distinct procedural vehicle from a class action and thus did not constitute a class action under cafa
D. holding that individualized factual determinations precluded finding that common issues predominate reversing the class certification order
E. holding that putative class members are not parties to an action prior to class certification
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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exceeds the original equipment cost — i.e., factors that, according to New § 1-201(37)[3], are consistent with true lease status); Owen, 221 B.R. at 61 (concluding that Brighb-Line Test did not establish a per se security agreement and then applying the following criteria in its reversionary interest analysis: (1) whether the option price is nominal; (2) whether the present value of the rental payments exceeds the original cost of the leased property; and (3) whether the lease term covers the total useful life of the equipment); Taylor, 209 B.R. at 487 (determining existence of significant rever-sionary interest by applying a mix of the Residual Value Factors contained in New § 1 — 201(37)[2] and the factors set forth in New § l-201(37)[3](a), (b), and (c)); Murray, 191 B.R. at 316 ; Howell, 161 B.R. at 289-90 (determining that
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that factors cited by the debtor including the fact that present value of total rental payments exceeds the equipments cost and the agreement contains net lease provisions do not establish that the lessor relinquished its reversionary interest
B. holding that net lease provisions in agreement together with other factors establish that the transaction is a sale
C. holding that the debtor could not treat a lessor as a secured creditor by paying the present value of the purchase option price of the lease through her chapter 13 plan
D. holding the lessee in providing free gas to the lessor owed the lessor the same duty of care as a regulated public utility would owe its customers despite express lease language placing the risk of using the gas on the lessor
E. holding that option prices contained in two purported lease agreements are nominal where they constitute 10 of original equipment cost and total payments exceed the initial cost of the equipment under agreement 1 by approximately 50 and under agreement 2 by approximately 29
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County[, 387 Md. 52, 874 A.2d 470 (2005)]? (4) Whether the highly restricted Agricultural Zone area may be used for an S.M. facility, private driveway, and lot area for lots developed in the adjoining Rural-Residential Zone Area, where the Agricultural Zone itself would not permit that lot density? (5) Whether the Court of Special Appeals allowed the equivalent of a disguised rezoning or unauthorized density transfer (a.k.a. De facto rezoning of the property)? 20 . We focus, for the purposes of this opinion, primarily on the purposes and underlying reasons for establishment of the R.C. 2 and R.C. 5 zones. For a more extensive historical discussion of the Resource Conservation Zones in Baltimore County, see Security Mgmt. Corp. v. Baltimore County, 104 Md.App. 234, 655 A.2d 1326 , cert. denied, 339 Md. 643, 664 A.2d 886
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that extension of exclusive liability to project owners did not violate due process or equal protection rights of injured workers
B. holding that placement of property in baltimore countys rc4 resource conservation zone did not constitute a deprivation of the landowners constitutional rights to either equal protection or substantive due process
C. recognizing privilege for adjoining landowners defamatory statements about plaintiff to zoning board given landowners private interest in the protection of her property to advance
D. holding transfer eligibility rule did not deny the student equal protection of the laws or procedural or substantive due process under the fourteenth amendment
E. holding that florida statute did not constitute an unreasonable exercise of the states police power and rejecting due process and equal protection challenges
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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the VE. See Evans v. Chater, 55 F.3d 530, 532 (10th Cir.1995) (concluding there was error when ALJ omitted from hypothetical functional limitations arising from impairment). Even if the ALJ could be faulted for not including standing and walking in the hypothetical, any error was harmless in light of the ALJ’s unchallenged finding that Williams can perform a full range of light work. And the VE understood that Williams had an RFC to perform the full range of light work. Further, no medical evidence suggests Williams’ ability to walk or stand was limited. Lastly, we reject Williams’ contention that reversal is necessary because the ALJ allegedly failed to ask the VE whether the VE’s testimony can be reconciled with the DOT. See Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1175-76 (10th Cir.2005) . Because Williams does not contend that the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding court could infer from lack of detail in testimony and lack of corroboration that party made not much if any effort to obtain a lawyer despite partys testimony that she made numerous calls and could not obtain one
B. holding that prosecutor cannot obtain conviction with the aid of false testimony where the prosecutor knows such testimony is false
C. holding that alj must ask ve how ves testimony corresponds with dot and obtain reasonable explanation for any conflicts between testimony and dot
D. holding that plaintiffs own testimony and hearsay testimony constituted weak and insubstantial evidence
E. holding that when an alj improperly rejects a claimants testimony regarding his limitations and the claimant would be disabled if his testimony were credited the testimony must be credited as a matter of law
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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see also Custer v. Coward, 293 Ga. App. 316, 319 (2) (667 SE2d 135) (2008) (acknowledging, in a dog-bite case, that the plaintiff’s cause of action could be based either on the premises-liability statute or the dangerous-animal-liability statute); Wade v. Am. Nat’l. Ins. Co., 246 Ga. App. 458, 461 (1) (540 SE2d 671) (2000) (same). Notably, although Tackling’s complaint did not indicate which theory of liability she was suing under, she references both OCGA § 51-3-1 and OCGA § 51-2-7 in her appellate brief. 7 Abundant Animal Care, LLC v. Gray, 316 Ga. App. 193, 195 (1) (728 SE2d 8 2d 206) (2009) (noting that evidence that a dog barked at a child amounted only to menacing behavior and did not serve as evidence of the dog’s vicious propensity); Custer, 293 Ga. App. at 319 (1), (2) ; Wade, 246 Ga. App. at 460 (1) (holding that
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a county was entitled to summary judgment where the claims against the individual defendants had failed
B. holding a condominium association had no duty to a woman who had committed suicide after the association removed the womans dog because while the association knew the dog was essential to the womans will to live the association had no authority to prevent the womans suicide
C. holding that one who brings action under a dogbite statute is not required to establish dogs past conduct or owners knowledge thereof
D. holding that an animal clinic was entitled to summary judgment in a personalinjury action in which the plaintiff was bitten by one of its dogs when it was undisputed that the dog had never bitten or harmed anyone before the relevant incident
E. holding that dog owners were entitled to summary judgment either under the premisesliability or dangerousanimalliability theories when the dog that bit the plaintiff had never previously attacked or bitten a human and the owners had no superior knowledge of the dogs propensity to bite
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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to defendant’s motion to admit the deposition testimony, nor did plaintiff’s counsel raise it orally when he renewed his motion to exclude the deposition on the first morning of trial. Plaintiff’s failure to present this argument to the trial court operates as a waiver on appeal. Hudson v. Town of East Montpelier, 161 Vt. 168, 180, 638 A.2d 561, 569 (1993). Accordingly, we decline to address it. ¶ 16. Finally, the cases cited by plaintiff are unavailing. For example, in Cameron v. Burke, this Court upheld the trial court’s ruling that the defendant was not unavailable for purposes of Rule 32(a)(3)(E) because she decided not to appear at a trial in which she was a party. 153 Vt. 565, 574, 572 A.2d 1361, 1366 (1990); accord King v. Int’l Harvester Co., 181 S.E.2d 656, 661 (Va. 1971) ; see also Avis Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Cooper, 641
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing in context of fraudulent nondisclosure cases that a defendant may reasonably expect the plaintiff to make his own investigation draw his own conclusions and protect himself
B. holding that defendant was not resident of his mothers household even though his drivers license listed his mothers address and he received mail there because he expressed a belief that his residence was in a different location than his mothers home he rented and occupied his own residence and he testified that he was only living with his mother after expiration of his lease until he could find another place to live
C. holding that an appellant has no standing to raise a due process issue where he has not shown that the alleged deficiency in the notice had any connection in fact with his own failure to seek review of the denial of his claim
D. holding that outofstate plaintiff had procured his own absence at trial of his case where record contained no intimation that his absence resulted from any reason other than his own volition
E. holding that disbarment was proper where the attorney misappropriated payments from clients of his firm for his own use and took steps to conceal his conduct from his firm
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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over the years to reverse its position, I and my colleagues would not have undertaken this litigation on a contingent fee basis had it been thought that there was any likelihood of a fee being restricted to a small percentage of the amounts recovered. Although I knew that the Court ultimately sets the fee, and that no amount was guaranteed, I was specifically aware in taking the matter on that the usual range of fee awards in common fund cases was 20-30 percent. Additionally, Michael Malakoff, e because other class action attorneys refused to represent Plaintiffs and Adelman had difficulty finding co-counsel. The district court erroneously ignored these facts in concluding that it would not apply a risk multiplier. With respect to Plaintiffs’ counsel’s ho d 562, 583 (3rd Cir.1984) . We hold that risk should be assessed when an
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that risk is measured at the point when the attorneys time was committed to the case
B. recognizing the same point
C. holding that a defendants sentence is controlled by the law in effect at the time he committed the offense
D. holding that risk must be measured at the time the lawsuit is filed
E. holding that the point of accrual is better linked to a time at which the indemnitee is injured not the time at which the original plaintiff was injured
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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to find at least one aggravating circumstance before it may impose death. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 162-67, 96 S.Ct. at 2920-22 (reviewing Georgia sentencing scheme); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247-51, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 2964-66, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976) (reviewing Florida sentencing scheme). By doing so, the sentencing authority narrows the class of persons eligible for the death penalty according to an objective legislative definition. See Zant, 462 U.S. at 878-79, 103 S.Ct. at 2743-44. The legislature must provide “clear and objective standards,” so that the sentencing authority is given “specific and detailed guidance,” and the process of imposing the death penalty is “rationally reviewable” on appeal. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 1765, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980) . Appellant contends, in part, that the use of
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a sentencing judge sitting without a jury may not find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty
B. holding that an aggravating circumstance in the georgia death penalty statute was unconstitutionally vague
C. holding the same nevada aggravating circumstance unconstitutionally vague under godfrey
D. holding that oklahomas especially heinous atrocious or cruel aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally vague
E. holding a similar nevada aggravating circumstance unconstitutionally vague under godfrey
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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which it relates. Thus, when the affirmative defense of comparative negligence is raised, a negligence claim and the affirmative defenses of comparative and/or contributory negligence are inextricably intertwined.”). In a case raising the same issue as the one before us, the Kansas Court of Appeals reasoned as follows: The process of determining comparative fault, when only two parties are involved, is a “zero sum game.” When negligence is moved out of the plaintiffs column, it must move into the defendant’s column. Evidence that tends to exculpate plaintiff in a comparative fault case places fault upon the defendant, and evidence of subsequent remedial conduct to prove negligence is prohibited [by Rule 407]. DiPietro v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 28 Kan. App.2d 372, 16 P.3d 986, 991 (2000) . ¶ 19 We agree with the analysis in DiPie-tro
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding evidence of other crimes inadmissible when identity is not at issue
B. holding that the bar against the admission of evidence of subsequent remedial measures comes into play only where negligence or other culpable conduct is alleged
C. holding that to the extent plaintiffs present action is based on conduct subsequent to the original action it is not barred by the prior litigation
D. holding first offender plea admissible to disprove or contradict testimony of the plaintiff
E. holding that evidence of subsequent remedial conduct to disprove a plaintiffs comparative fault is inadmissible
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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jury from the accused and isolating its sentencing decision from the fact that the death sentence, if imposed, will actually result in the execution of a fellow human being.” J. Sullivan, supra, 15 N.M. L. Rev. 63. Consequently, “[t]he right to speak without threat of disclosing otherwise undisclosed information such as a prior record may prove valuable or decisive, to a capital defendant seeking to avoid the death penalty.” Id., 42. Moreover, I see “no reason why a capital defendant should have a lesser right to explain his position and ask for mercy by being sworn and subject to cross examination than a non-capital defendant, who has an unfettered right to allocute.” (Emphasis added.) United States v. Chong, supra, 104 F. Sup. 2d 1236; see State v. Strickland, supra, 243 Conn. 354 . As this court has stated, statutes must be
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the general rules of preservation apply in probation revocation proceedings
B. recognizing right of allocution in probation revocation proceedings
C. holding that probation revocation proceedings are clearly not criminal proceedings
D. holding that standard for revocation of probation is preponderance of the evidence
E. holding that a right to confrontation exists in parole revocation proceedings
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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its attendant inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 760. However, we do not even reach the application of this stringent standard here because defendant failed to preserve the sufficiency of the evidence issue for appeal. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 provides that “[m]otions for judgment as a matter of law may be made at any time before submission of the case to the jury.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(2). This case was submitted to the jury on February 24, 2003, judgment was entered on February 26, and Autocentro moved for judgment as a matter of law for the first time on March 10. Simply put, defendant’s failure to move for judgment as a matter of law at the close of evidence procedurally defaults this claim on appeal. See, e.g., Keisling, 19 F.3d at 758 . As we observed in Keisling: “[rjequiring the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that defendants failure to renew their motion for judgment as a matter of law which was denied by the district court when they made it at the close of the evidence limited the relief the appellate court could grant to a new trial
B. recognizing that to preserve a claim of insufficiency of the evidence a defendant must move for judgment of acquittal when the government rests or at the close of all the evidence
C. holding that even when a defendant moves under rule 50 at the close of plaintiffs evidence and autocentro did not even do that if a defendant wishes to renew a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the posttrial stage with a view to having denial of that motion considered by the court of appeals the defendant is required to have moved for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence
D. holding that a party who fails to comply with rule 50 by moving for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence wholly waives the right to mount any posttrial attack on the sufficiency of the evidence
E. holding that court erred as matter of law in failing to enter judgment for employer at close of plaintiffs implied employment contract action
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Circuit’s decision in Krishna. In TWU-NYC Private Bus Lines Pension Trust v. Adams, a court in this District held that, where the provisions of the plan clearly indicate that the designated joint survivor annuitant could not be changed once the participant retired, enforcing a waiver in a marital settlement agreement would violate the requirements of § 1104. See No. 99 Civ. 10784, 2003 WL 22383288, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2003). “Unless a pension plan provides otherwise, once a participant retires, the designation of surviving annuitant is irrevocable even if the named annuitant waives all rights to the annuity.” Id. (citing Anderson v. Marshall, 856 F.Supp. 604 (D.Kan.1994)); see also Oglesby v. AT & T Corp., 527 F.Supp.2d 528 (N.D.Tex.2006), aff'd, 257 Fed.Appx. 770 (5th Cir.2007) . Hallingby attempts to differentiate the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that erisa preemption does not apply where the plan itself would not be liable even though a successful plaintiffs damages would be measured in part by the lost pension benefits the plaintiff would have received had he been a participant in the plan
B. holding that because an erisa plan is not a participant beneficiary or fiduciary subject matter jurisdiction did not exist under 502e of erisa over a suit brought by such a plan
C. holding that an extended earnings plan was not an employee pension benefit plan because the payment of benefits was not contingent upon retirement or the employee attaining a certain age
D. holding that the son of a pension plan participant who had not been designated to receive any of his fathers pension benefits stood no closer to beneficiary status than any other person
E. holding that a waiver would not be enforceable where the participant has retired and the pension plan clearly states that beneficiary election is irrevocable upon retirement
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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is supported by and entirely consistent with our recent decision in Patel v. State, supra, where we held violative of OCGA § 17-8-57 a trial court’s statement before jurors that “[v]enue is proper in Fayette County.” Although the trial court in the instant case did not specifically reference “venue” in its statement, we find no substantive difference between a court’s statement that “[v]enue is proper in Fayette County” and a statement that the crime “happened in Muscogee County.” Both statements inform or intimate to the jury the trial court’s opinion as to a critical element of the State’s case, thereby potentially influencing jurors in their evaluation of whether the State has met its burden of proof at trial. See also State v. Anderson, 287 Ga. 159, 161 (695 SE2d 26) (2010) . The State asserts that reversal is not
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that trial courts question whether venue had been established and questioning of a witness as to the location of the crime followed by the comment i just wanted to make sure constituted an improper expression of opinion that venue had in fact been proven
B. holding that if a modification petition is filed in a county where venue is appropriate it is improper to transfer the venue to another county merely because venue also would have been proper in the other county however once an enforcement proceeding is undertaken in an appropriate venue venue is improper in a different county over a subsequently filed petition to modify the decree which was the subject of the enforcement proceedings
C. holding that where a defendant if given the opportunity to renew a motion for a change of venue immediately prior to trial but fails to do so the right to challenge venue is waived
D. holding that the failure of three defendants to object to venue did not waive a fourth defendants objection and therefore affirming the trial courts decision to transfer venue
E. holding that even if venue was improper the case should have been transferred not dismissed
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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testimony of the appellants girlfriend that Reed was “excluded” from entering the bedroom without express permission. Notably, several courts have applied a different test and a different presumption. Mainly, these courts have followed the view that, when two autonomous adults jointly occupy a dwelling and have separate bedrooms, each occupant generally has a higher expectation of privacy in his or her own bedroom. Absent some showing that one occupant has exercised control, retained control, or come to an understanding with other occupants that control will be shared over the others’ bedrooms, these courts start from the presumption that an occupant exercises sole control over his own bedroom and has no joint access to others’ bedrooms. The State can overcome this presumption 1990) ; Glenn v. Commonwealth, 48 Va.App. 556, 633
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that while a mother could consent to a search of her sons room she did not have authority to consent to a search of a locked footlocker within the room
B. holding that officers had a reasonable belief that defendants father had authority to consent to the search of his sons room and computer because he owned the home and had access to the room and computer at will
C. holding that defendants mother had common authority over defendants room in her house even though defendant paid rent and installed a lock in his room where he sought her permission to install the lock and gave her the only other key to the room
D. holding that where the accused lived in his grandmothers home for approximately three months paid a portion of the bills and the grandmother knocked on the door before entering the room the accuseds occupancy of the room was not so exclusive as to deprive the grandmother of her authority to consent to a search of the accuseds room
E. holding that the accuseds grandmother could consent to a search of the accuseds bedroom grandmother owned the home grandmother lived in the upstairs portion of the house while the accused slept in the basement and grandmother had not been in basement more than six times in the past three years
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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matrix_8.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2011). Because the plaintiff does not indicate when Hamlett graduated from law school, the court has calculated her appropriate hourly rate based on her bar admission date. 5 . Although the District of Columbia is statutorily limited in the award that it may pay, the court may award attorney’s fees and costs greater than the cap. Calloway v. District of Columbia, 216 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C.Cir.2000). The court, however, cannot enforce the payment of any award above the fee cap amount. See Jaclcson, 603 F.Supp.2d at 96 (limiting the plaintiffs' recovery to $4,000 but noting that the court is not precluded from awarding fees above the cap); see also Pullins-Graham v. District of Columbia, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27805, at **11-12 (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 2004)
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the defendants could not be held in contempt for failure to pay more than the fee cap amount because the court cannot order the djefendants to violate an act of congress to pay the total award
B. holding that the termination of the fee cap did not affect litigation in progress when the fee cap was in effect
C. holding that contingency fee contract did not cap award of attorneys fees where johnson had so held
D. holding that it is plain error for a trial court to require a defendant to pay courtappointed attorney fees in the absence of legally sufficient evidence that defendant has the ability to pay the amount imposed
E. holding that an award of back pay is an issue for the court
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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court's rejection of the defendant's insufficiency-of-the-evidence claim was not unreasonable under AEDPA); Knowles, 556 U.S. at 114, 129 S.Ct. 1411 (finding that the Ninth Circuit erred because the state court’s decision that the defendant was not deprived of effective counsel was not "contrary to, or ... an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Wright, 552 U.S. at 126, 128 S.Ct. 743 (reversing the Seventh Circuit and stating, "because our cases give no clear answer to the question presented, let alone one in [the defendant's favor, it cannot be said that the state court unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Carey, 549 U.S. at 72, 127 S.Ct. 649 ; Rice, 546 U.S. at 334, 126 S.Ct. 969 (finding
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the sixth circuit erred in granting habeas relief because the state courts upholding of jury instructions and verdict forms regarding the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law citation and internal quotation marks omitted
B. holding that the federal habeas courts task is to determine if the state courts decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the supreme court of the united states
C. holding that the ninth circuit improperly granted habeas relief because the state courts decision that it was not inherently prejudicial when court spectators wore buttons depicting the murder victim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law
D. holding that the ninth circuit improperly granted habeas relief because there exists no clearly established right under federal law to access a law library while in jail
E. holding that the sixth circuit erred in finding that the state courts jury instructions were contrary to clearly established federal law
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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of the corporation to proceed unaffected by frivolous litigation and protects the directors’ ability to pursue appropriate levels of risk without fear of liability, so long as their actions are consistent with the duty of loyalty.”). 21 . See id. at *12. 22 . See App. to Zhongpin Opening Br. at 541 (Oral Arg’t Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, July 24, 2014). 23 . See Zhongpin, 2014 WL 6735457, at *12 ("Although In re Cornerstone questioned the merit of forcing disinterested directors to face the same pleading standard as interested fiduciaries in cases subject to entire fairness, the Court’s examination of precedent left it with no other choice.”). 24 . Id. 25 . See Zhongpin, 2014 WL 6735457, at *12; Cornerstone, 2014 WL 4418169, at *12. 26 . See, e.g., Malpiede, 780 A.2d 1075, 1094 (Del.2001) ; Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch.2002).
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that plaintiff bears the burden to timely allege facts supporting equitable tolling
B. holding that on a motion to dismiss a plaintiff must allege wellpleaded facts stating a claim on which relief may be granted had plaintiff alleged such wellpleaded facts supporting a breach of loyalty or bad faith claim the section 102b7 charter provision would have been unavailing as to such claims and this case would have gone forward
C. holding that plaintiff had failed to state a claim for relief under section 1983
D. holding that the burden is on the plaintiff to allege facts sufficient to establish jurisdiction
E. holding that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must be raised on direct appeal when the facts supporting the claim are presented on the face of the record
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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the costs of an expert witness, that it is the service of the subpoena on the witness, not the service of the subpoena on the opposing party, which is dis-positive. Town of Chapel Hill v. Fox, 120 N.C. App. 630, 632, 463 S.E.2d 421, 422 (1995). Plaintiffs concede that subpoenas were served on both expert witnesses for which defendants sought costs. In sum, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s award of either deposition costs or of expert witness costs. Accordingly, the trial court’s order awarding costs to defendants is affirmed. AFFIRMED. Judge TYSON concurs. Judge JACKSON concurs in the result by separate opinion. 1 . We acknowledge that this Court’s opinions have been inconsistent with regard to deposition costs. Compare Oakes, 173 N.C. App. at 520, 620 S.E.2d at 48 , with Morgan, 173 N.C. App. at 581, 619 S.E.2d
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding if a deposition is taken for discovery only not for use at trial the deposition is not a stage of trial for which the defendant must be present
B. holding that personal grooming expenses are not deductible
C. holding that expenses includes costs
D. holding that a deposition that was not presented to the trial court could not be considered on appeal
E. holding that deposition expenses are not an allowable cost
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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has established sufficient case law on the issues in the instant case. As was in Herman, the disputed issues in this case include: (1) whether the Plan was an ERISA-covered pan, (2) whether Holman was a fiduciary as defined by ERISA, and (3) whether Holman breached his duty under ERISA. The Sixth Circuit has defined when a person is a “fiduciary” under an ERISA plan. See, e.g., Seaway Food Town, Inc. v. Medical Mut. of Ohio, 347 F.3d 610 (6th Cir. 2003) (discussing ERISA fiduciary status); Hamilton v. Carell, 243 F.3d 992, 998 (6th Cir.2001) (same). Similarly, several Sixth Circuit cases have discussed whether a fiduciary has breached his duty to ERISA plan participants. See, e.g., Abbott v. Pipefitters Local Union No. 522 Hosp., Medical, and Life Ben. Plan, 94 F.3d 236 (6th Cir.1996) ; Berlin v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 858
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that breach of fiduciary duty claim was preempted by fehba
B. holding that plaintiffs did not plead fraud where the complaint only alleged a breach of fiduciary duty
C. holding that trustees fiduciary duty exists independent of any clause in trust agreement
D. holding that trustees did not breach their fiduciary duty by deciding to set independent contribution rates for each local union
E. holding that plan trustees do not breach their fiduciary duty by failing to reverse a companys decision to amend an erisa plan
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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was surrendered,” or those that “have only a peripheral relation to the reason the amendment was submitted.” Id. at 1841, 62 USPQ2d at 1712. Nor is recourse to the doctrine of equivalents foreclosed where there is “some other reason suggesting that the patentee could not reasonably be expected to have described the insubstantial substitute in question.” Id. at 1842, 62 USPQ2d at 1714. The patentee bears the burden of overcoming the presumption by “showing that the amendment does not surrender the particular equivalent in question.” Id. at 1842, 62 USPQ2d at 1713. An estoppel also may be found on the basis of arguments made during prosecution of the application to secure the allowance of claims. See Elkay Mfg. Co. v. Ebco Mfg. Co., 192 F.3d 973, 979, 52 USPQ2d 1109, 1113 (Fed.Cir.1999) ; Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that evidence of the scope of a particular claim can be found on review of other claims
B. holding that the scope of coverage of the claims may change if a patentee has relinquished a potential claim construction in an amendment to the claim or in an argument to overcome or distinguish a reference
C. holding that in order for claim to be within scope of coverage of title insurance policy it must be specifically provided for
D. holding that claim construction is an issue of law for the court not a question of fact for the jury
E. holding that claim construction is a matter of law for the court to determine
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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that a person whom an officer has formally and “physically” arrested is “in custody” for purposes of article I, section 10. See State v. Vallesteros, 84 Hawai'i 295, 301, 933 P.2d 632, 638 (1997) (“arrest” involves, inter alia, “talcing an alleged violator into extended physical custody”); State v. Wyatt, 67 Haw. 293, 301 n. 6, 687 P.2d 544, 550 n. 6 (1984) (observing that “[i]f the defendant had been arrested before being asked if she had been drinking, Miranda warnings were clearly in order”); State v. Amorin, 61 Haw. 356, 360, 604 P.2d 45, 48 (1979) (noting that “it is undisputed that after his arrest, the defendant was in the custody of [the police]” (citing, generally, Patterson, 59 Haw. 357, 581 P.2d 752)). Cf. State v. Nakoa, 72 Haw. 360, 366, 817 P.2d 1060, 1064 (1991) ; State v. Ryan, 62 Haw. 99, 101, 612 P.2d 102,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that once the defendant has submitted to the control of the officer and the process of taking him or her to the police station has commenced his or her arrest is complete and he or she is in custody for the purposes of the escape statute
B. holding in the context of a prosecution for second degree escape that although defendant was not handcuffed he had nonetheless been placed under arrest had had his liberty restrained in that he was not free to leave and at that point the first step in the process of transporting him to the police station had begun consequently the defendants arrest was complete and he was in custody
C. holding that the defendant was placed in official detention when two police officers approached him and told him that he was under arrest as the defendant could not reasonably have believed that he was free to leave
D. holding that suspect was not in custody when officer handcuffed him for officer safety while transporting him to police station
E. holding that accused was not in custody when told he was not under arrest and was free to leave and did in fact freely leave the interview
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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by the age of the older maintenance person. In the second hypothetical, a company with a phone bank lays off the oldest operator. The company could not prevail on a motion for judgment as a matter of law in such a case on the theory that a desire to eliminate the particular phone used by that operator was the sole motive for the lay-off. We proffer these extreme hypotheticals to clarify our decisions in similar cases. We have stressed that the similarity of the jobs held by an older and younger employee is the touchstone for determining whether a lay-off of the older may be found to be an ADEA violation by a trier of fact. In Maresco v. Evans Chemetics, Div. of W.R. Grace & Co., 964 F.2d 106, 111-12 (2d Cir.1992), for example, we held that an inference of discrimin 771 (10th Cir.1988) ; Meinecke v. H & R Block, 66 F.3d 77, 84 (5th
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that plaintiff need only point to sufficient evidence to support an inference that the employer did not act for its proffered nondiscriminatory reasons
B. holding that evidenee that an employer fired qualified older employees but retained younger ones in similar positions is sufficient to create a rebuttable presumption of discriminatory intent and to require the employer to articulate reasons for its decision
C. recognizing that an employer is liable for an employees action if the employer knew or should have known about an employees acts of harassment and fails to take appropriate remedial action
D. holding that in producing nondiscriminatory reasons for its challenged action the employer is not obligated to support these reasons with objective evidence sufficient to satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard
E. holding that both the cfra and the fmla require the employee to provide notice to the employer of the employees intent to take leave
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Machete called Machete Kills, that the Program is unconstitutional because it violates rights protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Machete Productions, L.L.C. v. Page, 809 F.3d 281 (5th Cir.2015). The court held that because the Program statutes and regulations made clear that grants were discretionary, Machete Productions could not demonstrate that it had a clearly established right to the grant funds such .that it had a property interest in a Program grant that triggered the Due Process Clause. Id. at 290. The court also held that the Program's statutes and regulations were not unconstitutionally vague. Id. (citing National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 588-89, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 141 L.Ed.2d 500 (1998) ). 14 . Because of our disposition of Machete's
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the due process clause protects only those liberty interests created by the state
B. holding that montana constitutions equal protection clause protects against arbitrary and discriminate state action
C. holding that when the consequences of the conviction are not severe and imminent an appeal is moot when the judgment is voluntarily satisfied
D. holding that while due process clause protects against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of vague standards when government is acting as patron rather than as sovereign the consequences of imprecision are not constitutionally severe
E. holding that the due process clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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immunity is an affirmative defense. Perry v. Texas A & I Univ., 737 S.W.2d 106, 110 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Thus, the burden is on the defendant to establish all elements of the defense. Montgomery v. Kennedy, 669 S.W.2d 309, 310-11 (Tex.1984). Government employees are entitled to official immunity from suit arising from the performance of their (1) discretionary duties in (2) good faith as long as they are (3) acting within the scope of their authority. Baker v. Story, 621 S.W.2d 639, 644 (Tex.Civ.App in pursuit and roadblock entitled to immunity). Several states that have recently considered the issue have also held that the actions of a police officer during a high-speed chase are discretionary. See, e.g., Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W.2d 38 (Minn.1992) ; Youngblood v. Clepper, 856 S.W.2d 405, 408
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding state immune from suit brought in state court
B. holding fleeing police officers in a vehicle was a violent felony under the acca
C. holding that immunity did not shield officers involved in 25mile highspeed chase of traffic violator because decisions by officers to continue the chase were operational rather than discretionary acts
D. holding that police officers who engaged in a dangerous highspeed chase of a fleeing suspect were immune from suit
E. holding a police officer who was pursuing a fleeing suspect was immune from his torts when he ran a red light and collided with plaintiffs vehicle
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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269, 196 P.3d 970 (stating that a party may not seek a declaratory judgment when additional fact-finding or agency expertise is necessary). Thus, despite the fact that both the Smiths and the Stillmans presented identical and purely legal questions, the Smiths were required to comply with the administrative process they started, while the Stillmans remained free to seek a declaratory judgment. Smith, 2007-NMSC-055, ¶¶ 17, 23-25, 27, 142 N.M. 786, 171 P.3d 300. In Smith, the question of law was limited to whether the agency “had [the] right to even make a decision.” Id. ¶ 17; see Baca, 2008-NMSC-047, ¶ 21, 144 N.M. 530, 189 P.3d 663 (stating that the validity of a contract presents a purely legal question); Stennis v. City of Santa Fe, 2008-NMSC-008, ¶ 14, 143 N.M. 320, 176 P.3d 309 . In declaratory judgment actions, arguments
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a determination that precluded an alien from even applying for relief under section 1255 is a purely legal question that is reviewable
B. holding that whether a city has the authority to enact a particular statutory scheme is a purely legal question
C. holding that where the statutory scheme is clear the inquiry should end
D. holding that city attorneys promise in an oral settlement agreement for city to annex and rezone land was within the legal authority of the city of joliet to accomplish and were not absolutely void acts per se therefore city could be estopped from avoiding enforcement of contract
E. holding that the question of whether police had a reasonable basis for finding that a third party had authority to consent to search is a question of law
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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court after December 19, 2004. Martin maintains that Local Rule 7 conflicts with Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that he in fact timely submitted his response because the federal rules trump the local rules, which gave him an additional three days to file his response. Rule 6(e) extends deadlines tied to service of process by mail. It states, “[wjhenever a party must or may act within a prescribed period after service and service is made under Rule 5(b)(2)(B), (C), or (D), 3 days are added after the prescribed period would otherwise expire under subdivision (a).” Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(e). Because Local Rule 7 requires action within twenty days of filing, as opposed to service, Rule 6(e) is inapplicable. See Lauzon v. Strachan Shipping Co., 782 F.2d 1217 (5th Cir.1985) . Rule 6(e) applies to those obligations
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that rule 6e did not extend the period in which a workers compensation carrier was required to pay a compensation award under the longshore and harbor workers compensation act where the act required payment within ten days of filing of the order as opposed to within ten days of service of notice provided for in the rule
B. holding that the trial courts authority to initiate workers compensation benefits before the final adjudication was not divested by the legislature and was consistent with the stated purpose of the workers compensation act
C. holding that the longshore and harbor workers compensation act specifically relates to business of insurance
D. holding that carrier was entitled to intervene as of right where the states workers compensation law permitted subrogation of a compensation carrier
E. holding that a second motion to reconsider served within ten days of the denial of the first motion does not extend the time period for filing a notice of appeal from the underlying judgment
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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of any of the other witnesses. Thus, only a small, albeit important, portion of the testimony admitted at trial was erroneously admitted. Defendant calls to our attention several cases in which courts, when faced with similar situations, have found that the admission of expert testimony, in sexual abuse cases, which vouches for the credibility of other witnesses constitutes reversible or even plain error, and our own research has unearthed several other such cases. See, e.g., Whitted, 11 F.3d at 786-87 (plain error); United States v. Birdsall, 47 M.J. 404, 410 (C.A.A.F.1998); see also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Colin C, 419 Mass. 54, 643 N.E.2d 19, 23 (Mass.1994); State v. Gokey, 154 Vt. 129, 574 A.2d 766, 772 (Vt.1990). But see, e.g., Brown v. State, 523 So.2d 729, 730 (Fla.Ct.App.1988) ; Commonwealth v. Rather, 37 Mass.App.Ct. 140,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding doyle violations harmless where evidence of guilt overwhelming
B. holding that prosecutorial misconduct was harmless in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt
C. holding that the admission of a family photo was harmless error in light of the overwhelming evidence in support of the conviction
D. holding the error harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt
E. holding improperly admitted evidence was harmless error given the overwhelming evidence of guilt
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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mandatory language must always be construed as jurisdictional. Similarly, we conclude here that although the language requiring the trial to be held within thirty days is mandatory, the language is not necessarily jurisdictional because there are limited instances where the court would retain jurisdiction beyond the thirty-day time period, most notably where a continuance for good cause or in the interest of justice has been granted under section 394.916(2). The district courts in Kinder, Reese, and Osborne also made determinations that the language was not jurisdictional. Kinder, however, is the only decision that appears to recognize the analytical distinction between jurisdiction and whether the provision should be construed as mandatory or directory. See Kinder, 779 So.2d at 515 . Furthermore, because these indefinite
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the crossappeal time limit is jurisdictional
B. holding that the thirty day time limit was mandatory but not jurisdictional
C. holding 30day limit to be mandatory and jurisdictional
D. holding that time limit for filing petition for review is mandatory and jurisdictional
E. holding that this time requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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had been taken over by Jamaicans, thereby suggesting that it was more likely that the defendant was guilty of the drug sales with which he had been charged. Although the government argued that these references were “fleeting” and “insignificant,” the Court concluded that the “fairness, integrity [and] public reputation of judicial proceedings” were “seriously affected.” Id. at 26. Similarly, in United States v. Cabrera, 222 F.3d 590 (9th Cir.2000), the Court found that the government’s references to the drug market falling under the control of Cuban dealers, its suggestion that the Cubans were flight risks, and its description of how Cubans tended to package their drugs, were plain error where defendant was also Cuban. See also Withers v. United States, 602 F.2d 124, 125 (6th Cir.1979). While we find the government’s mention of
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that prosecutors reference to code of silence among witnesses to shooting not plain error where argument finds support in record
B. holding that prosecutors reference to cooperation agreements with government witnesses was not plain error
C. holding prosecutors reference to defendant being only witness in courtroom during testimony as tailoring opportunity not plain error
D. holding that prosecutors reference to the fact that not one white witness has produced contradictory evidence was plain error
E. holding the prosecutors statement there was no contradictory evidence to those facts was only a general observation about the strength and clarity of the governments evidence presented at trial and not grounds for plain error relief for alleged prosecutorial misconduct
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | D | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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process. Assuming arguendo that a protestor has standing to bring a bid protest, it would seem that the standing requirement to challenge an override should not be any higher. Such a determination, however, does not end the court’s inquiry since panels of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit have taken different approaches regarding the evidence required to satisfy the “substantial chance” doctrine in a bid protest ease. Compare Information Tech. & Applications Corp. v. United States, 316 F.3d 1312, 1319 (Fed.Cir.2003) (a protestor must establish “that its chance of winning the award was ‘greater than ... insubstantial ... if successful on the merits of the bid protest.’ ”); with Alfa Laval Separation, Inc. v. United States, 175 F.3d 1365, 1367 (Fed.Cir.1999) ; with Data General Corp. v. Johnson, 78 F.3d
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a protester is not required to show that but for the alleged error the protester would have been awarded the contract instead a protester must show there was a substantial chance it would have received the contract but for the alleged error
B. holding the appropriate standard is that to establish prejudice a protestor must show that had it not been for the alleged error in the procurement process there was a reasonable likelihood that the protestor would have been awarded the contract this is a refinement and clarification of the substantial chance language
C. holding that a protester must show that the governments error in a bid evaluation was so significant that the government had no reasonable basis for its best value determination
D. holding that a contractor lacked standing because it failed to show a substantial chance it would have received the contract award but for agency error
E. holding that a contractor failed to show a substantial chance it would have received the contract award but for agency error
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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be said to have reached a consensus that the inhumane treatment of a huge number of persons accused of no crime and held in confinement is a violation of the law of nations.”). But see Sarei, 221 F.Supp.2d at 1162 n. 190 (concluding that “plaintiffs have not demonstrated that prohibitions against cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment (other than torture) and gross violations of human rights constitute established norms of customary international law”); Xuncax, 886 F.Supp. at 186 (finding that “it is evident that the prohibition against [cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment] poses more complex problems of definition than are presented by norms forbidding torture, summary execution, disappearance or arbitrary detention”); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F.Supp. 707, 711-12 (N.D.Cal.1988) . e. War crimes “After the Second World War,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a case is moot when the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome
B. holding claim is not cognizable
C. holding that defendants claim for ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest was not cognizable on direct appeal
D. holding claim is cognizable
E. holding that there is no cognizable claim for cruel inhuman and degrading treatment due to the lack of a precise definition
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |