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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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arrest, or “seizure,” has been removed. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 204, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979). Therefore, the first step in our inquiry is to determine whether or not Appellant was “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 206-07, 99 S.Ct. 2248. A law enforcement officer can seize a person by either the use of physical force or a show of authority to which the person submits. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 625, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991); Johnson v. State, 912 S.W.2d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). A show of authority occurs when, considering the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988) ; United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that in determining whether a seizure has occurred a court must consider if in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was not free to leave
B. recognizing that a person has been seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment only if in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave
C. holding that an encounter is a seizure if in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave
D. holding that a person is seized when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave
E. holding that an individuals liberty is restrained only if in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Barnes, 295 F.3d at 1368; see also Jennings, 323 F.3d at 275 (stating that the defendant “has other avenues he can pursue to fall within the ... exception of 18 U.S.C. § 921 (a)(33)(B)(ii)”). Consequently, we agree with those circuits holding that, in states where civil rights are not removed for a misdemeanor conviction of a crime of domestic violence, an individual convicted of such a misdemeanor “cannot benefit from the federal restoration exception.” Smith, 171 F.3d at 623. One circuit has disagreed, seeing an inconsistency in a scheme that bars misde- meanants who have never had their civil rights removed from possessing a gun, but allowing those who have had their rights removed, but then restored, to possess a gun. See United States v. Wegrzyn, 305 F.3d 593, 595 (6th Cir.2002) . We do not believe this reasoning is sound.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that crimes subject to a minimum sentence of 15 years under 18 usc 924e1 are properly characterized as class a felonies under 18 usc 3559
B. holding that a defendant cannot collaterally attack his sentence under 18 usc 3582c2
C. holding that misdemeanants under michigan law cannot be convicted under 18 usc 921a33bii because their civil rights were never lost
D. holding that when the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination federal law provides appropriate guidance for analyzing claims brought under the michigan civil rights act
E. holding that the state law of collateral estoppel applies in civil rights actions brought under 42 usc 1983
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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their guns and worrying about prosecution for possessing large capacity weapons). That argument might have some force if the Act banned large capacity weapons outright instead of licensing them. For example, in Peoples Rights Organization, Inc. v. City of Columbus, 152 F.3d 522 (6th Cir.1998), where the plaintiffs challenged successfully on vagueness grounds a municipal ordinance banning assault weapons, the preenforcement challenge was ripe for review because the law presented those plaintiffs with a “Hobson’s choice[:][t]hey [could] either possess their firearms in Columbus and risk prosecution under the City’s law, or, alternatively, they [could] store their weapons outside the City, depriving themselves of the use and possession of the weapons.” Peoples Rights Org., 152 F.3d at 529 . Here, the plaintiffs have a third option:
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding search of armed robbery defendants suitcases and between mattresses of hotel room proper where at time of arrest officers were aware that the defendants had used several different weapons during the robberies and that one weapon a loaded revolver was in plain view concluding officers reasonably feared that someone else was going to come to the room who knew where the other weapons were or that the defendants would position themselves to take advantage of any hidden weapons or instrumentalities
B. recognizing as reasonable an officers inference that a driver could be hiding weapons in his car when his passenger had an outstanding warrant for a weapons violation
C. holding enhancement not appropriate because of two and onehalf month lapse between the criminal activity and the discovery of the weapons and no evidence that weapons were present when defendant committed charged offense
D. holding that city ordinances ban on assault weapons was vague because the ordinance lacked a scienter requirement and its definitions of assault weapons inter alia unfairly required gun consumers to ascertain the developmental history of particular weapons or monitor the precise types of ammunition available for their weapons
E. holding inter alia that sending a victim out into the focal point of law enforcement officers weapons is not a safe place
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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the extent that these arms of the state were citizens, they would unquestionably be diverse from defendants. Thus, one might argue that the fact that they are not citizens at all should not destroy federal juris diction, just as the fact that they are not citizens cannot create it. 22 .See, e.g., World Trade Center Props., L.L.C. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 345 F.3d 154, 161 (2d Cir.2003) abrogated on other grounds in Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 126 S.Ct. 941, 163 L.Ed.2d 797 (2006) ("Defendant Port Authority presents a closer question on jurisdiction because it is a state-created body, thereby raising the possibility that it is a not a "citizen” of any state, the effect of which would be to destroy diversity.”); Long v. District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 409, 416 (D.C.Cir.1987) ; Chisholm v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co.,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the federal district court had no subject matter jurisdiction to review the courts denial of a particular application for admission to the district of columbia bar
B. holding that substantive admiralty law applies though suit was filed in federal court under diversity jurisdiction
C. holding that absent dismissal of the district of columbia federal diversity jurisdiction would be lacking in suit against a diverse codefendant
D. holding that a federal court in diversity jurisdiction must apply state substantive law
E. holding that the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the district of columbia
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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control,” id. at 248, 111 S.Ct. 1227 (internal quotation marks omitted), the statute’s langu riminate [made in the United States] ... does not create a claim under the civil rights acts — there must be an act.” (citing Landrigan v. City of Warwick, 628 F.2d 736, 742 (1st Cir.1980))). Accordingly, Section 1981’s territorial limitation is defined by the location of the subject of the discrimination, not by the location of the decisionmaker. We agree with those courts that have held “that an individual, whose primary workstation is abroad, cannot characterize otherwise extraterritorial employment as domestic solely because employment decisions were made ... in the United States.” Shekoyan v. Sibley Int’l Corp., 217 F.Supp.2d 59, 68 (D.D.C.2002); see also Pfeiffer, 755 F.2d at 559 ; DeYoreo v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 785
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding before the amendment providing the adea with extraterritorial force see note 2 ante that an adea claim by an american employee against an american employer was properly dismissed because the employee lived and worked overseas
B. holding that determination of whether someone is an employee under the adea must be made in accordance with common law agency principles
C. holding that attorneys fees under adea may not be recovered against a defendant who was not an employer of the plaintiff
D. holding that an employees private arbitration agreement with her employer precluded her from filing suit against the employer under the adea
E. holding that directing a verdict for employer on claim for willful violation of adea was harmless error because given jurys rejection of underlying adea claim it could noi have found willful violation of adea
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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in the separation of church and state cannot substitute for requirement of injury in fact). Thus even if the crosses offend plaintiffs, that offense is insufficient to entitle them to maintain suit. Notwithstanding the insufficiency of psychological injury, the Supreme Court has held that the required injury need not be severe and need not be economic. An example of a non-economic injury which the Supreme Court has held confers standing is the deprivation of a citizen’s beneficial use of a public park. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 686, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 2415, 37 L.Ed.2d 254 (1973) (claimed impediment to plaintiffs’ recreational use of natural resources is sufficient to confer standing). The rationale 1088 (D.D.C.1971) ; rev’d 495 F.2d 65 (D.C.Cir. 1973). Here,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that establishment clause claim need not be predicated on coercion
B. holding that rluipa violates establishment clause
C. holding that establishment of christmas day as legal public holiday did not violate establishment clause
D. holding no violation of federal establishment clause
E. holding that inclusion of cross on government seal violated federal establishment clause
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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the fairness of the trial or in any way materially impaired or prejudiced the judicial power of the court”). The People offer an additional argument about how Kendall’s opinion prejudiced the Ford case. According to the People, Kendall “deliberately contaminated the jury pool” by “publicly argu[ing] that the People lacked sufficient evidence to convict the Ford defendants,” directly resulting in Paris’s acquittal. People’s Br. at 19. This is pure conjecture, and as conjecture it is belied by the fact that Judge Carroll was ultimately able to select an impartial jury for Ford’s trial. More importantly, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court did not rely on this theory in convicting Kendall. Nor can we. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73, 85 S. Ct. 546, 13 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1965) ; TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the sixth amendments guarantee of the right to trial by jury
B. holding that the sixth amendments guarantee of a trial by jury requiresthe jury to base its verdict only on the evidence presented at trial
C. holding that the constitutional guarantee of a right to trial by jury includes the right to a complete and correct charge of the law so that each issue of fact raised by the evidence will be submitted to the jury on proper instructions
D. holding that the sixth amendments guarantee of the assistance of counsel is made obligatory upon the states by the fourteenth amendment
E. holding that it is wellsettled that the sixth and fourteenth amendments of the united states constitution guarantee a defendant on trial for his life the right to an impartial jury
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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U.S. 756, 767 n. 8, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 3109 n. 8, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987) (“We normally presume that a jury will follow an instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to it, unless there is an overwhelming probability that the jury will be unable'to follow the court's instructions and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be devastating to the defendant”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); United States v. Walker, 99 F.3d 439, 443 (D.C.Cir. 1996) ("We have no cause to doubt that the jury followed the court's curative instructions [to disregard improper testimony], therefore we do not believe the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial.”); United States v. Burroughs, 935 F.2d 292, 295 (D.C.Cir.1991) . 7 . See United States v. Glover, 153 F.3d
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the sixth circuit erred in finding that the state courts jury instructions were contrary to clearly established federal law
B. holding that ujnless there is some good reason for finding otherwise courts proceed on the basis that the jury does comply with cautionary instructions
C. holding that sometimes the risk of prejudice can be allayed by proper cautionary instructions
D. holding that a jury is presumed to follow the trial courts instructions
E. holding that the law presumes that the jury will follow the courts instructions
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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does not itself offend the Constitution, the fact that each official does not ‘represent’ the same number of people does not deny those people equal protection of the laws.” (citing Sailors)). Moreover, contrary to plaintiffs’ contentions (see Warden Compl. ¶ 51), this is the ease whether or not the body is appointed by officials who are themselves elected, see Sailors, 387 U.S. at 109-10, 87 S.Ct. 1549; Oliver, 306 F.Supp. at 1289, and whether or not the elected officials could theoretically appoint themselves to fill the positions at issue. See, e.g., Rosenthal v. Board of Educ., 385 F.Supp. 223, 22A-26 (E.D.N.Y.1974) (three-judge panel), aff'd, 420 U.S. 985, 95 S.Ct. 1418, 43 L.Ed.2d 667 (1975); cf. Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 109 S.Ct. 1433, 103 L.Ed.2d 717 (1989) . In short, notwithstanding the similarities
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing absolute immunity for attorneys and board members of the texas medical board
B. holding that when a superintendent who opposed the winning slate in a school board election was terminated his speech and association involved matters of great public concern the performance of elected officials
C. holding that the statute that established new york citys board of estimate violated the equal protection clause even though the boards officials were not directly elected because borough presidents when elected became members of the board ex officio
D. recognizing absolute immunity for board members and the director of the mississippi state board of nursing
E. holding that plaintiff had standing to sue a board even though board was far from sole participant in the application of the challenged statute
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). See discussion supra. By its terms, the release agreement at issue here is to be construed according to the contract law of Illinois, and the Court so construes it. See Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 243 n. 8, 102 S.Ct. 252, 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1981) (stating that “a [federal] court ordinarily must apply the choice-of-law rules of the state in which it sits” (citing Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941)); In re Marriage of Adams, 133 Ill.2d 437, 141 Ill.Dec. 448, 551 N.E.2d 635, 638 (1990) (citing Reighley v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 390 Ill. 242, 61 N.E.2d 29, 33 (1945) ). Federal courts’ “role in interpreting a
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing the applicability of choice of law clauses in contracts
B. holding that party waived an objection to choice of law
C. holding even though idaho law does not permit the enforcement of noncompete clauses in employment contracts erisa statutes allow forfeiture of pension benefits in excess of erisas minimum vesting requirements in noncompete clauses
D. holding that under texas choice of law principles contractual choice of law provisions are generally upheld
E. holding that government contracts must be read as if they included clauses required by law
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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big difference in this case, but the City Council members never testified to any such legitimate, good-faith belief, and we can find no evidence to that effect in the record.. Therefore, it seems that the City Council terminated Singleton simply because of the conversation between his wife and daughter. In this country, guilt is individual. We do not, as a general rule, punish A for the sins of B. Nor does the law today generally impute the actions of one spouse to another, or the actions of an adult child to the parent. See Forbes v. Arkansas Educational Television Comm’n, 93 F.3d 497, 501-02 (8th Cir.1996) (“We do not think any general inference can be drawn from the opinion of one spouse to that of the other.”), rev’d on other grounds, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 1633, 140 L.Ed.2d 875 986) . And courts have held that a parent is not
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the deceased defendant trustees wife was a representative of her husbands estate and a proper party for substitution purposes where the wife was the primary distributee of her deceased husbands estate
B. holding that the former wife did not waive her attorneyclient privilege simply because the credibility of her claim that she relied on her husbands representations could be impeached by deposing her former attorney
C. holding that a wifes minimal involvement in her husbands business coupled with the lack of evidence that she knew of or intended to further her husbands fraudulent schemes was insufficient evidence of conspiracy
D. holding that a wife is not liable simply by virtue of the marital relationship for her husbands fraudulent acts
E. holding that a wifeis not liable simply by virtue of the marital relationship for her husbands negligent acts
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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70 . The dissent does not challenge our statement that the Supreme Court in Frisby expressed a special solicitude for the home. Dissent at 81. But it does imply that we are "penalizing rhetoric because it may have encouraged listeners to contact [Carpenter]." Dissent at 81. That is not what we are doing. We are instead recognizing that harassment of even public figures is actionable if the claimant can prove the elements of IIED and can prove that the intended purpose of the words was merely to harass. If Leykis had merely "encouraged listeners to blanket Carpenter with objections to the show's cancellation," his speech would not have been intended to "merely harass" and would not be actionable. 71 . Gormley v. Dir., Conn. State Dep't of Prob., 632 F.2d 938, 941-42 (2d Cir.1980) ; United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783, 787
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that connecticut may criminally punish harassing phone calls because the statute punishes both harassing conduct and speech
B. holding that harassing conduct not sufficiently severe and pervasive where conduct would not have affected the work environment of a reasonable person
C. holding that employee failed to preserve hostile work environment claim when only timely allegation of discrimination was based on termination because termination is not itself harassing conduct
D. holding that making phone calls and sending facsimiles into the forum may be sufficient to confer specific jurisdiction
E. holding that an oral warning may be sufficient where the harassing conduct is not extremely serious
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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in his cross-appeal, that the new evidence of subtle neurological impairments would not have significantly affected the jury’s deliberations during the guilt/innocence phase. Given the weakness of the new mental health evidence and the overwhelming evidence of the intentional and deliberate nature of Lance’s crimes, we conclude that it is essentially beyond possibility that the jury would have failed to convict Lance of the murders. We further conclude that it would have been highly unlikely that the new mental health evidence would have led the jury to render a verdict of guilty but mentally ill, which would not foreclose a death sentence in any event. See OCGA § 17-7-131 (a) (2) (defining “[mjentally ill”). See also Lewis v. State, 279 Ga. 756, 764 (12) (620 SE2d 778) (2005) . B. Evidence from Forensic Experts Lance
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a jury verdict of guilty constitutes a conviction for purposes of the federal firearms statute and therefore the defendant was convicted of a felony during the interval between the jurys return of its guilty verdict and his scheduled sentencing
B. holding that the verdict must be sustained if there is any competent evidence to support the verdict
C. holding that where the evidence offered by the state and admitted by the trial court whether erroneously or not would have been sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict the double jeopardy clause does not preclude retrial
D. holding that the trial court erred in granting the school boards posttrial motion for directed verdict because although the school board timely moved for a directed verdict during trial it did not serve its motion for directed verdict until the eleventh day after the verdict
E. holding that the statute that provides for a verdict of guilty but mentally ill does not preclude a death sentence as the result of such a verdict
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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to the Alabama authorities. The Government argued that Benton’s prior convictions were all entitled to a presumption of regularity. The District Court, after reviewing Benton’s arguments with counsel in open court, agreed with the Government. Benton’s criminal history was pegged at Category IV. Using the total offense level of 23, the resulting Guidelines range was 70-87 months’ imprisonment. The District Court next discussed its sentencing rationale, and sentenced Benton to 70 months, which was the bottom of the suggested Guidelines range. Pursuant to the exception stated in his appellate waiver, Benton appealed the District Court’s calculation of his criminal history We apply a presumption of regularity to court proceedings. See United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688, 698 (3d Cir.2003) . On appeal, Benton contends that the District
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a patent is presumed valid until the contrary is shown
B. holding that absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary a defendant is bound by his representations made during a plea colloquy
C. recognizing that jurors are presumed to follow instructions
D. holding that absent specific evidence indicating otherwise va is presumed to have reviewed all evidence in the record when making a determination as to service connection
E. holding that absent evidence to the contrary court proceedings are presumed to be procedurally proper
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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tends to invade the privacy of others.” S.C.Code. Ann. § 16-17-470(A) (2003). “Peep” has been defined alternatively as “to look cautiously or slyly; a brief look: glance; a furtive look.” Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 867 (9th ed.1990). There is clearly evidence that Caldwell peeped at each of the young victims’ privates. Finally, even if we were to assume arguendo subsection (D) of the statute applied, we find there is evidence Caldwell did intentionally look at the privates of the three young victims for more than just a brief period of time in other than a casual or cursory manner. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing reasons, we find no reversible error in the trial court’s refusal to sever the trials, denial of Caldwell’s motion to suppress th 17 S.E.2d 92, 93 (1992), . 5 . Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that witness had an independent basis to support incourt identification where the description made prior to any pretrial identification was substantially an accurate description of the defendant
B. holding when the defendant timely objected to an incourt identification by an eyewitness the trial judge should have directed the government to provide an outofcourt lineup or other protective procedure to avoid an impermissibly suggestive incourt identification
C. holding that the bond was intended to and did substantially comply with sjection 71323 therefore because its conditions were not broader and more protective than the statute required the contention that the bond was a common law bond failed
D. recognizing that no bond or a nominal bond may be appropriate in cases involving the public interest
E. holding in camera hearing was needed to determine whether the incourt identification was of independent origin or was the tainted product of the circumstances surrounding a bond hearing where a witness saw a suspect at a bond hearing prior to his incourt identification of the suspect and the witness may have gotten a fix on the suspect at the bond hearing
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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discrimination claims occurred well over two years before Smith commenced this litigation. Thus, they are barred by NJLAD and § 1983’s statutes of limitations. Smith’s claims cannot be saved under the continuing violation theory, because an employer’s failure to promote is quintessentially a dis Crete employment action. See AMTRAK v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (U.S.2002)(“Each discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act. Discrete acts such as ... failure to promote ... are easy to identify. Each incident of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision constitutes a separate actionable ‘unlawful employment practice.’ ”); see also Rush v. Scott Specialty Gases, 113 F.3d 476, 484 (3d Cir.1997). Likewise, discriminatory discipline actions
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the continuing violation doctrine does not apply to discrete acts of discrimination such as termination failure to promote denial of transfer or refusal to hire
B. holding that plaintiffs failure to promote claim and train claims are discrete instances of alleged discrimination that are not susceptible to a continuing violation analysis
C. holding that repeated failure to promote where promotion is not based on specific vacancies may constitute a continuing violation
D. holding failure to promote was an isolated incident of discrimination which is insufficient to prove a continuing violation
E. holding that the plaintiff was precluded from asserting her failure to promote claim as a continuing violation
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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warranty of merchantability claim because no warranty attached to the custom designed Kona Pacific meal feed, which was for an unknown species and thus had no ordinary purpose. Plaintiff counters that a warranty attaches to all products, even those that are custom made. Plaintiff submits that the issue of whether the feed was defective or unfit for the ordinary purposes for which it was used is disputed. The implied warranty of merchantability is arguably the broadest warranty in the Uniform Commercial Code, and is “implied by operation of law into every sale of goods by a merchant seller.” Ontai v. Straub Clinic and Hosp. Inc., 66 Haw. 287, 249-50, 659 P.2d 734, 744 (1983) (citations omitted). Merchantability means, among other things, tha pp.3d 594, 798 N.E.2d 618, 624-25 (2003) . The Court does not refute that these cases
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that granting of summary judgment was proper as to breach of implied warranty of merchantability claim because the product at issue was a newly created component made especially for the plaintiff and no average or usual standards for determining ordinary performance or quality for the components eould be determined because the parts had never previously been manufactured
B. holding bottling company liable for breach of implied warranty of merchantability for presence of deleterious substance in product that resulted in consumers illness
C. holding plaintiff had to commence his breach of implied warranty action under the dtpa within two years because tjhis special statute of limitations denies plaintiffs alternative proposal of entitlement to recover for breach of the common law implied warranty
D. holding that an implied warranty of merchantability does not create a labeling requirement different from or in addition to those mandated by fifra because the implied warranty of merchantability arises from the sale itself not from a state labeling regulation citation omitted
E. holding that an action for breach of implied warranty of merchantability under the uniform commercial code is a product liability action within the meaning of the products liability act if as here the action is for injury to person or property resulting from a sale of a product
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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the following Conclusions of Law: 1. Sections 501 and 502 are complementary sections which together provide for filing and allowing pre-petition claims and certain enumerated types of post-petition claims. 2. Section 50S, which needs no complement, is set apart from sections 501 and 502 by its scope and its terminology. 3. To subject administrative expense requests filed under § 503, which also provides for their allowance, to preemptive disallowance under authority of § 502 discounts the plain meanings of both sections. L Section 502(d) does not apply to administrative expenses that are allowable under § 503. ORDER IT IS THE ORDER OF THIS COURT that Movants’ request for administrative expenses is GRANTED. 1 . Compare In re Lids Corp., 260 B.R. 680, 683 (Bankr.D.Del.2001) (Walrath, J.) ; Camelot Music, Inc. v. MHW Adver. and Pub.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that administrative expense claims are accorded special treatment under the bankruptcy code and are not subject to section 502d
B. recognizing that rights under article i section 11 are subject to reasonable limitations
C. holding that the eleventh amendment does not bar a bankruptcy court from issuing a money judgment against a state under the bankruptcy code
D. holding that creditors rights are subject to any qualifying or contrary provisions of the bankruptcy code
E. holding that claims under the adea and the nyshrl are subject to the same analysis
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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to the bankruptcy estate and, if so, whether 1) the claims are subject to a statutory exemption from the estate or 2) the bankruptcy trustee has abandoned them. 1. Plaintiffs Causes of Action The First Circuit Court of Appeals has held that upon a filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 7, the trustee “steps into the shoes of the debtor for the purposes of asserting or maintaining the debtor’s causes of action.” DiMaio Family Pizza & Luncheonette, Inc. v. The Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 448 F.3d 460, 464 (1st Cir.2006) (quoting In re Rare Coin Galleries, Inc., 862 F.2d 896, 901 (1st Cir.1988)). Courts have held that the definition of “property” as used in § 541(a)(1) extends to causes of actions such as present in this case. See, e.g., In re Smith, 640 F.2d 888, 890 (7th Cir.1981)(citing cases). Thus, this Court must first
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that in a declaratory judgment action it is the character of the impending action not the plaintiffs defense that determines whether there is federal question jurisdiction
B. holding that the scope of section 541 is broad and includes all kinds of property including causes of action
C. holding that no private causes of action exist for violations of the ucpa
D. holding that causes of action for age and sex discrimination that arose prepetition were property of the bankruptcy estate
E. holding that there is no question that the estate includes causes of action such as the truth in lending claims
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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phone calls, and his car was stolen, but then returned by the police without any payment to the FARC. Such threats and acts of intimidation, without any significant harm, do not rise to the level of past persecution. See id. Turning to future persecution, we cannot say that the record compels the finding that Alzate will more likely than not be subjected to persecution upon removal. See Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022, 1029 (11th Cir.2004) (en banc), cert. denied, — U.S. --, 125 S.Ct. 2245, 161 L.Ed.2d 1063 (2005). The BIA concluded that Alzate’s fear was not objectively reasonable. As the BIA noted, despite Alzate’s subjective fear of the FARC, Alzate was able to return to Colombia several times without suffering any harm. See Hakeem v. INS, 273 F.3d 812, 816-17 (9th Cir.2001) . During one of his return visits, Alzate made
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that documentary evidence pertaining to the asylum applicant himself and to the events in which he was involved can independently establish facts essential to an asylum claim
B. holding that an asylum applicant must make a showing of a particularized threat of persecution
C. holding that an applicants claim of asylum is weakened even undercut when the applicant has returned to the country without incident
D. holding that an asylum applicants submission of false documents without an adequate explanation supported adverse credibility findings
E. holding that the agency need not analyze separately a withholding of removal claim based on the same facts as an applicants asylum claim
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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River. The trial court overruled appellee’s exceptions, finding no case holding access to navigable water prevents property from being landlocked. Trial Court Opinion, 5/19/08, at 3. An en banc Commonwealth Court vacated and remanded, finding the Board should have considered evidence regarding river access. In re: Private Road in Speers Boro, II, Washington County, No. 1016 C.D. 2008, unpublished memorandum at 13-14 (Pa.Cmwlth. filed November 20, 2009). The court further noted the Monongahela River has long been considered a public highway and “place of necessary resort,” and other jurisdictions have considered water access in determining whether necessity exists. Id., at 12-13 (citing Balliet v. Commonwealth, 17 Pa. 509, 514 (1851); In re Daniel, 656 N.W.2d 543, 546 (Minn.2003) ). Thus, the court concluded, “a proper
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding lake on private land was not navigable in fact and there was no right of public use and enjoyment as lake was not fed by or part of a navigable stream
B. holding access to property by navigable lake was per se bar to finding of necessity
C. holding that retention of some access rights does not preclude a per se taking
D. holding that denial of access per se is noncompensable
E. holding such agreements to be per se illegal
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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to the beginning of any unreasonable delay. General Provision 76(c) clearly states: "Unless specifically authorized by the Contracting Officer in writing, no construction will be started until the CQC plan is approved” (emphasis added). No written authorization to proceed was given to Avedon and' Avedon’s CQC plan had not been approved. The court thus finds no basis for Avedon’s reliance on this NTP and no basis for an unreasonable delay claim based on this incident. Even assuming arguendo it had a right to rely on the NTP, Avedon would be hard pressed to show the Navy delayed unreasonably subsequent to the NTP. The delay time after August 22 attributable to the Navy was only six days from August 31 to September 6. Cf. Joseph Corman Corp. v. United States, 246 F.Supp. 602 (D.Mass.1965) ; Chaney, 190 Ct.Cl. at 712-13, 421 F.2d at 735
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a notice of deficiency was invalid where it was the second notice mailed for that year and the taxpayer timely petitioned the court as to the first notice
B. holding a three and onehalf year delay was unreasonable
C. holding a delay approaching one year is presumptively unreasonable
D. holding a delay of notice to proceed from march 4 to september 26 of the same year was not improper
E. holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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dismissed on June 20, 2009. Both actions were consolidated on June 24, 2009. 3 . The district court dismissed Cooper's Title VII race discrimination claims concerning his transfer to Harvey as barred because Cooper’s EEOC charge addressing those claims was untimely filed. The district court did analyze Cooper’s adverse employment action claims under § 1981, noting that the Title VII framework was equivalent. Cooper does not challenge the dismissal of his Title VII race discrimination claims concerning his transfer to Harvey, and accordingly, we do not review the district court's dismissal of those claims. However, we do evaluate, as the district court did, Cooper’s § 1981 claims concerning his transfer to Harvey. 4 . Cf. Keeton v. Flying J, Inc., 429 F.3d 259, 265 n. 2 (6th Cir.2005) ; Policastro v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 297 F.3d
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that termination is an adverse employment action
B. holding that denial of a bonus was not an adverse employment action
C. holding that where an employee was transferred to a new job site over 120 miles away that transfer while not per se an adverse employment action was an appropriate factor for the jury to consider in determining whether an adverse employment action occurred
D. holding that a transfer of job duties can constitute an adverse employment action
E. holding that a transfer to a worksite 180 miles away from plaintiffs home did not necessarily constitute an adverse employment action while noting that such a transfer could under some circumstances constitute an adverse employment action
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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pursuit of a court action to enforce the resulting agreement, without violating the Act.” Id. at 260. Several circuit cases have held that interest arbitration clauses survive the expiration of section 8(f) collective bargaining agreements, and the interest arbitration awards have been enforced in those cases. See Sheet Metal Workers Local 20 v. Baylor Heating and Air Conditioning, Inc., 877 F.2d 547, 556 (7th Cir.1989) (enforcing interest arbitration award even though employer refused to negotiate and the col lective bargaining agreement had expired), abrogated on other grounds by International Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 150 v. Rabine, 161 F.3d 427, 430 (7th Cir.1998); Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, Local 206 v. R.K. Burner Sheet Metal, Inc., 859 F.2d 758, 762 (9th Cir.1988) ; Sheet Metal Workers Local 57 Welfare Fund v.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that collective bargaining agreements cannot compel the arbitration of statutory rights
B. holding that when plaintiff sought arbitration and neither the award nor the arbitration agreement mentioned interest the plaintiff was not entitled to preaward interest
C. holding that interest arbitration clauses survive the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement and rejecting the argument that contractual interest arbitration obligations are canceled by the absence of a statutory duty to bargain
D. holding that notwithstanding the expiration of the original labor contract the employer was bound by a renewal contract issued by the arbitration panel according to the interest arbitration clause
E. holding that the claim accrued after the employer denied a request for arbitration as untimely under the collective bargaining agreement
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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1124 (9th Cir.2008) (citing Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 583-92, 73 S.Ct. 921). In Triton Marine, however, we found it unnecessary to conduct a Lauritzen choice-of-law analysis because the contract at issue contained a choice-of-law clause. See Triton Marine, 575 F.3d at 413; see altso Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 588-89, 73 S.Ct. 921 (“Except as forbidden by some public policy, the tendency of the law is to apply in contract matters the law which the parties intended to apply.”). Relying on prior Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit case law, we concluded that “absent compelling reasons of public policy, a choice-of-law provision in a maritime contract should be enforced,” and a Lauritzen choice-of-law analysis was unnecessary. Triton Marine, 575 F.3d at 415; see also Bominflot, Inc., 465 F.3d at 148 . Thus, for the reasons set-forth in Triton
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that tort law and the law of punitive damages are not controlled by the contract choice of law provision
B. holding that under texas choice of law principles contractual choice of law provisions are generally upheld
C. holding that the choice of law question was made easy by the partys contractual provision agreeing that english law would apply
D. holding that party waived an objection to choice of law
E. holding that a choice of law provision in a lease did not serve as a basis for jurisdiction
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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rigorous review. Because a statement’s factuality “does not divorce the speech from its moral or ideological implications,” Stuart, 774 F.3d at 246, a person’s rig ave emerged, which in their own way have become as significant for. expressive liberty as the right not to be silenced by a disapproving public entity. One of those adjunct rights is the right to listen. See Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 522 (4th Cir. 2003) (observing that the-First Amendment “protects both a speaker’s right to communicate information and ideas to a broad audience and the intended recipients’ right to receive that information and those ideas”). Another is the right to express oneself through conduct. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty, Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969) . Yet another is the right not to utter
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that once a state establishes a public school system and require s its children to attend public school officials may not take away a students legitimate entitlement to a public education without adhering to the minimum procedures required under due process
B. holding that a public school may not without evidence of substantial disruption punish students for wearing armbands protesting the vietnam war
C. holding that a school may not prohibit expressive activity unless there are facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities
D. holding that wearing black armband to school to protest vietnam war was expressive conduct
E. holding that students action wearing black armbands was expressive conduct entitled to first amendment protection
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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in lieu of intended loss.” United States v. es allegedly received in the June 18, 1988, accident amounted to $23,-019, $10,000 of which was for “pain and suffering.” Three months later, he settled for $4,000. Most of the claims were settled in a similar manner, at least until the scheme began to unravel. The use of an objective “probable loss” analysis is particularly appropriate in a case such as the one before us. Each substantive count was tied to a different accident and a corresponding attempt to defraud. Many of these discrete facets of the ongoing scheme had flowered into fully realized crimes for which the actual loss, i.e., the settlement with the insurance company, provides conclusive evidence of the probable loss. See United States v. Bailey, 975 F.2d 1028 (4th Cir.1992) . We find no clear error in the court’s
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that loss of an arm includes loss of the hand
B. holding that proof of loss is not evidence of extent of loss and insured is not precluded from showing his damages were greater than shown in proof of loss
C. holding that the loss of a contract failed to constitute ascertainable loss under cutpa
D. holding that intended loss applies to attempt crimes only and that outofpocket loss is the relevant figure under 2f11 for fully realized crimes
E. holding that a sentencing judge may consider the face value of deposited checks as sufficient evidence that it was the intended loss although it cannot mechanically be assumed and the defendant can then produce evidence of his or her own in an attempt to convince the court that another figure was intended
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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of Withdrawal” of the Rule 59 motion and a notice of appeal to this court. On January 5, 2011, the clerk of this court ordered briefs on whether this court should summarily dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The order framed the issue as follows: Whether this court has jurisdiction where the notice of appeal was filed more than 30 days after entry of final judgment on September 27, 2010, and where the appellant withdrew his motion to vacate? See 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a); Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(A); Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 127 S.Ct. [sic] 2360, 2366 [168 L.Ed.2d 96] (2007) (“To day we make clear that the timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement”). See also Vanderwerf v. Smithkline [sic] Beecham Corp., 603 F.3d 842 (10th Cir.2010) . De Leon v. Marcos, No. 10-1578 (10th Cir.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to alteramend judgment where the plaintiff raised the choice of law issue for the first time after the entry of summary judgment
B. holding that the statute of limitations period begins to run when the allegedly discriminatory pension plan is applied to the plaintiffs and leaving determination of the actual date the statute begins to run on each claim to the district court
C. holding that a postjudgment motion to incorporate a sanction as part of the final judgment is a motion to modify the judgment and extends the trial courts jurisdiction
D. holding that a motion to continue a hearing on a postjudgment motion was ineffective to extend the period for the trial court to rule on the motion absent the express consent of the parties
E. holding that where the appealing party withdraws its postjudgment motion and the district court does not issue an order on the motion or the withdrawal the time to appeal begins to run from the entry of final judgment
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Use Act (“CUA”) and the Medical Marijuana Program Act (“MMPA”) do not change the probable cause analysis. Although “[pjrobable cause depends on all of the surrounding facts, including those that reveal a person’s status as a qualified patient or primary caregiver under” [the CUA or MMPA], People v. Mower, 28 Cal.4th 457, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 335, 49 P.3d 1067 (2002) (citations omitted), Carpenter has not alleged that Deputy Beuer possessed any information suggesting that Carpenter had such a status. Moreover, the police are not required to investigate the existence of affirmative defenses under the CUA or MMPA once probable cause has been established. See Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1032 (9th Cir.2003); People v. Fisher, 96 Cal.App.4th 1147, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 838, 839, 841 (2002) ; People v. Wright, 40 Cal.4th 81, 85, 51
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding mmpa is an affirmative defense to be raised at trial
B. holding cua is an affirmative defense to be raised at trial
C. holding that fair use is an affirmative defense
D. holding that an affirmative defense is ordinarily lost if not timely raised
E. holding that laches is an affirmative defense
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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of electronic communications. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 2511(l)(e) (placing restrictions upon “any person who . . . intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic commu nication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication”). The Court correctly observes that these are “content-neutral law[s] of general applicability" which serve recognized interests of the “highest order”: “the interest in individual privacy and ... in fostering private speech.” Ante, at 526, 518. It nonetheless subjects these laws to the strict scrutiny normally reserved for governmental attempts to censor different viewpoints or ideas. See ante, at 532 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that attorneys admission to an element of the offense in the petitioners presence at a deportation hearing was binding on the petitioners
B. holding that the denial of petitioners appeal to the bia would have put a reasonable person in the petitioners position on notice that something was wrong with his attorneys preparation for the removal hearing
C. recognizing conflict between interests of the highest order
D. holding that petitioners have not established the requisite need of the highest order
E. holding that a docket entry in the orphans court need not summarize the contents of the order but need only show that an order was filed
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Lerer, Inc. v. District Court, 111 Nev. 1165, 1168, 901 P.2d 643, 645 (1995); NRS 34.170; NRS 34.330. 9 See Pan v. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 222, 224, 88 P.3d 840, 841 (2004) (noting that if appellate jurisdiction is proper, writ relief is inappropriate because an appeal is an adequate remedy). 10 See Nev. Const, art. 6, § 4; Taylor Constr. Co. v. Hilton Hotels, 100 Nev. 207, 678 P.2d 1152 (1984). 11 NRAP 3A(b)(1). 12 109 Nev. 662, 665, 856 P2d 244, 246 (1993). 13 See Lee v. GNLV Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 426, 996 P.2d 416, 417 (2000) (clarifying that “a final judgment is one that disposes of all the issues presented in the case, and leaves nothing for the future consideration of the court, except for post-judgment issues”). 14 Cf. State v. Ducker, 35 Nev. 214, 225-26, 127 P. 990, 993-94 (1912) . 15 Ashokan, 109 Nev. at 665, 856 P.2d at 246.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing that the lawofthecase doctrine applies to preliminary injunctions and stating that tjhe exception to law of the case where evidence on a subsequent trial is substantially different is inapplicable where by the prior appeal the issue is not left open for decision
B. holding that rule 11 applied to a letter sent with the intent to influence the court with respect to injunctive relief
C. recognizing that in the case provided for by law as mentioned in a former version of nrs 2090 with respect to injunctive relief refers to the sections of the statutes concerning injunctions
D. holding that application of equitable principles in evaluating requests for permanent injunctions under the patent act should not differ from treatment of permanent injunctions in other fields of law
E. holding that a court may award injunctive relief against a state officer
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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been committed. See id. at 642-43, 78 S.Ct. 932 (citations omitted); NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 258, 263, 90 S.Ct. 417, 24 L.Ed.2d 405 (1970). The availability of an award of backpay before the NLRB “does not mean that Congress necessarily intended this discretionary relief to constitute an exclusive pattern of money damages for private injuries.” Russell, 356 U.S. at 645, 78 S.Ct. 932. Indeed, the LMRDA, which was passed after the NLRA, authorizes federal courts to award “such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate.” 29 U.S.C. § 412. Courts have interpreted this provision to mean that punitive damages, compensatory damages, and attorney fees may be available under the LMRDA. See generally Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 9, 93 S.Ct. 1943, 36 L.Ed.2d 702 (1973) ; Vandeventer v. Local Union No. 513 of the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a court may award attorneys fees in a successful lmrda action
B. holding that an award of attorneys fees under supreme court rule 38 precursor to rule 222 did not preempt an award of attorneys fees to which one is otherwise entitled and thus appellant could seek an award of attorneys fees pursuant to section 1577300 which permits an award of fees for a party prevailing in an action against a state agency
C. holding that a district court may award attorneys fees while the merits are on appeal
D. holding that a court may award attorneys fees under rule 41d
E. holding trial court had no authority to award attorneys fees when arbitrator had stated he would not award attorneys fees
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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According to the court, the requirement that ERISA plans be maintained in writing precludes oral modifications of such plans, and the doctrine of estoppel cannot be used to alter this result. Id. Further, the court explained that ERISA requires that each plan shall “ ‘provide a procedure for amending such a plan, and for identifying the persons who have authority to amend the plan.’” Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3)). The court stated that by explicitly requiring that each plan specify the amendment procedures, Congress rejected the use of informal written agreements to modify an ERISA plan. Id. (citation omitted); see also Adams v. Thiokol Corp., 231 F.3d 837, 843 (11th Cir.2000) (citing Nachwalter); Smith v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin. Bd., 36 F.3d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir.1994) (emphasis in original). Nevertheless, a
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that any modification or amendment to an erisa plan can be supplemented or ap plied only after the amendment has been appropriately adopted in a formal complete and written form
B. holding that the eighth amendment applies only after the state has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with the due process of law
C. holding public had fair notice of adopted zoning amendment where uses permitted in adopted amendment were a subset of those permitted in the proposed amendment
D. holding that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the sixth amendment right to counsel
E. holding the sixth amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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retain jurisdiction. 1 413 U.S. 433, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). 2 626 F.3d 170 (3d Cir.2010). Ray was decided after the motion judge denied defendant’s suppression motion. 3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 4 Officer Sztukowski testified that eight officers and police cars appeared at defendant’s home, and Officer D'Onofrio testified that four or five officers met him at the home. 5 See State v. Stott, 171 N.J. 343, 361, 794 A.2d 120 (2002) (stating that for community caretaker exception to apply police must be totally divorced from their criminal investigation responsibilities but citing to cases and factual circumstances applying the emergency aid exception); State v. Garbin, 325 N.J.Super. 521, 525-27, 739 A.2d 1016 (App.Div. 1999) , certif. denied, 164 N.J. 560, 753 A.2d 1153
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing emergency exception
B. recognizing exception
C. holding that community caretaker exception applied but citing and relying on cases discussing the emergency aid exception
D. recognizing the community caretaker or public safety1 doctrine as an exception to the warrant requirement
E. recognizing that the community caretaking exception is distinct from the emergency aid or emergency assistance exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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the Report, the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the objection and motion for de novo review, and the papers filed in support of and in opposition to defendant’s motion to quash, the Court deems the matter suitable for decision on the papers, VACATES the hearing scheduled for January 21, 2005, and rules as follows: 1. The deadline to file an objection to the Report is ten court days after October 28, 2004, the date of service of the Report, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 72(b), ie., November 11, 2004, to which date three days are added to account for the service of the Report by mail, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(e), thus extending the deadline to November 14, 2004, to which date, because November 14, 2004 was a Sunday, one court day is added, see Fed.R.Civ 573, 580 (N.D.Cal.1999) . 3. The Court, having reviewed the file de
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that where plaintiff reata failed to demonstrate waiver of citys immunity from liability under tort claims act plaintiffs claims were properly dismissed and plaintiff was not entitled to replead
B. holding plaintiff must make some showing that an act giving rise to civil liability actually occurred finding plaintiff entitled to conduct discovery to learn identity of defendant where plaintiff offered evidence sufficient to demonstrate defendants committed an unlawful act
C. holding that plaintiff must present such evidence
D. holding that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity where the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that speech was public concern
E. holding that in order to establish liability under the ada the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant was an employer within the meaning of the statute
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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administrative code); Regan v. City of New Brunswick, 305 N.J.Super. 342, 353-55, 702 A.2d 523 (App.Div.1997) (reinstating complaint, where employee did not identify until appeal the criminal statutes he believed were being violated, on the basis that they were identifiable from the record and from the employee’s description of the nature of the illegal conduct he suspected). However, the court must make that identification before permitting trial of a CEPA claim under N.J.S.A. 34:19-3c. It “must first find and enunciate the specific terms of a statute or regulation, or the clear expression of public policy, which would be violated if the facts as alleged are true.” Fineman v. New Jersey Dep’t of Human ane v. Gilian Instrument Corp., 271 N.J.Super. 476, 493-94, 638 A.2d 1341 (App.Div.) , certif. denied, 136 N.J. 298, 642 A.2d 1006
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the trial court should have dismissed the employees breach of contract claim
B. holding cepa claim to have been properly dis missed because the court found that the disclosure involves nothing more than a policy dispute
C. holding cepa claim to have been properly dismissed because the challenged conduct was contrary to employees principles or sense of company priorities but was not illegal or wrongful
D. holding that a party must at least have a subjective belief that litigation was a real possibility and that belief must have been objectively reasonable
E. holding cepa claim to have been properly dismissed because employees general invocation of federal labor and tax law was inadequate basis for reasonable belief in illegal activity
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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the traditional purposes for similar fact evidence. Id. In this case, the prior kidnapping was clearly not similar fact evidence. Therefore, the focus of the inquiry is on whether it is relevant to the issue of premeditation; that is, whether the prior kidnapping is evidence that the murder in this case was not a heat-of-passion crime. And even if this evidence is probative, an important question still must be asked: whether the prejudicial effect of admitting the prior crime substantially outweighs its probative value. Although McWatters does not support the view that the prior kidnapping was relevant, I recognize that the prior kidnapping may be relevant under the case law relied upon by the trial court below in allowing the evidence. See Spencer v. State, 645 So.2d 377 (Fla.1994) ; King v. State, 436 So.2d 50 (Fla.1983)
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that in order to convict a defendant of firstdegree murder on a theory of accomplice liability proof of his own premeditation is required
B. holding that although premeditation is outside the heartland of seconddegree murder guideline upward departure from seconddegree murder guideline based on premeditation was improper because commission considered the defendants state of mind in assigning a higher base offense level to firstdegree murder than to seconddegree murder
C. holding as relevant in a murder case a history of domestic violence involving defendant and his victim
D. holding that evidence of two prior incidents of violence by the defendant toward his wife in the months before the murder were relevant to premeditation where defendant claimed that it was a heat of passion killing
E. holding any error in admitting allegedly irrelevant testimony that the defendant loved music was harmless in capital murder prosecution where the defendant admitted killing the victim and evidence supported the conviction
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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1981 but, rather, reflect only conclusions. Those conclusions, being based on faulty if unexpressed premises, are unsupportable. As such, this court finds that those cases do not represent a helpful, or appropriate, mode of analysis for the resolution of the issue presented here. A second approach, adopted by many courts, allows Hispanic plaintiffs and those of other ethnic groups to state a claim under section 1981 sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Nonetheless, these courts have required the plaintiffs to amend their complaints to allege “racial” discrimination and/or to bear the burden of producing evidence that the alleged discrimination was of a “racial,” as opposed to a national origin, character. See, Bullard v. OMI Georgia, Inc., 640 F.2d 632, 634 (5th Cir. 1981) ; Khawaja v. Wyatt, 494 F.Supp. 302, 304-05
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding official immunity is available in claims of discrimination if plaintiff fails to establish his treatment by defendants was so at variance with what would reasonably be anticipated absent racial discrimination that racial discrimination is the probable explanation
B. holding that racial discrimination is not a personal injury tort
C. recognizing that the distinction between national origin and racial discrimination is an extremely difficult one to trace and holding that plaintiffs allegations of racial discrimination were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss
D. holding that racial discrimination is a personal injury tort
E. holding accent discrimination may be actionable as national origin discrimination under title vii citing with approval eeoc guidelines defining national origin discrimination to include discrimination based on the linguistic characteristics of a national origin group
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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[to satisfy these elements], for on a motion to dismiss [the court] presume[s] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). We conclude SCWF alleged facts sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for lack of standing. SCWF asserted that construction of the Connector would harm its members’ ability to use and enjoy the relevant area for a variety of educational, scientific, recreational, and aesthetic purposes, and that one or more of its members currently use the land for such purposes. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738-39, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972) (an organization may sue on behalf of its members); id. at 738, 92 S.Ct. 1361 ; see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562-63, 112 S.Ct.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that deference is warranted only when it appears that congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority and discussing united states v mead corp 533 us 218 22627 121 sct 2164 150 led2d 292 2001 and chevron usa inc v natural res def council inc 467 us 837 84245 104 sct 2778 81 led2d 694 1984
B. holding that harms to aesthetic conservational and recreational as well as economic values are cognizable injuries for the purposes of demonstrating standing quoting assn of data processing serv orgs inc v camp 397 us 150 154 90 sct 827 25 led2d 184 1970
C. holding in suit under the cwa that environmental plaintiffs adequately allege injury in fact when they aver that they use the affected area and are persons for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened quoting sierra club v morton 405 us at 735 92 sct 1361
D. holding that if the harm alleged in fact affects the recreational or even the mere aesthetic interests of the plaintiff that will suffice for standing purposes citing sierra club v morton 405 us 727 73436 92 sct 1361 31 led2d 636 1972
E. holding that plaintiffs had established an injury in fact because the challenged activity directly affected their recreational aesthetic and economic interests
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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characterization of losses as passive or nonpassive be treated as an affected item. From such silence petitioners conclude that the section 469 issue involves a nonpartnership item within the meaning of section 6231(a)(4), to which section 6229 does not apply. Petitioners state in this regard that “Since the partnership items adjusted by the decision [i.e., the amount of losses] are irrelevant to the nature, duration, or quality of petitioners’ participation in the partnership’s activities, the [section] 469 issue cannot be an affected item under section 6231(a)(5).” Although the affected items regulations do not expressly mention section 469, we do not think that the regulations are meant to provide an exhaustive list of such items. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. at 555 . Furthermore, we question petitioners’
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that section 72504 barred application of voluntary payment defense to payment of excessive commissions
B. holding that section 104a classification by partner of a guaranteed payment is an affected item
C. holding that a criminal defendants right to an impartial jury is guaranteed by article 1 section 9 of the pennsylvania constitution
D. holding that the term reverse payment is not limited to a cash payment
E. recognizing that the due process guaranteed under the alabama constitution is coextensive with the due process guaranteed under the united states constitution
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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may be situations in which a publicity campaign, ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor and the application of the Sherman Act would be justified.” 365 U.S. at 144, 81 S.Ct. at 533. When the defendant claims that it is immune from liability based upon activities before an adjudicative body, the immunity can be overcome if the sham exception applies, although the elements of the exception are not entirely certain. Compare Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Board, 542 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940, 97 S.Ct. 1571, 51 L.Ed.2d 787 (1977), noted in 30 Vand.L.Rev. 75 (1977) with Associated Radio Service Company v. Page
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the governments lack of direct evidence as to defendants knowledge does not demonstrate that its case was baseless
B. holding that the noerrpennington doctrine applies to collective presentations in litigation
C. holding that the combination of investigatory and adjudicatory functions in one judicial disciplinary agency does not violate due process
D. holding that repeated baseless opposition before an adjudicative body does not result in loss of noerrpennington immunity absent conduct external to or abusive of the adjudicatory process
E. recognizing that although there was no property in a dead body at common law the one whose duty it is to care for the body of the deceased is entitled to possession of the body as it is when death comes and that it is an actionable wrong for another to interfere with that right by withholding the body or mutilating it in any way
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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(Miss.1989); Whitehurst v. State, 540 So.2d 1319, 1327 (Miss.1989); Gangl v. State, 539 So.2d 132, 135-36 (Miss. 1989); Griffin v. State, 533 So.2d 444, 447-48 (Miss.1988). The statute does not discuss amendments to the indictment, but permits the submission of lesser included offense instructions. Sanders v. State, 479 So.2d 1097, 1105 (Miss.1985). Larceny is a lesser included offense of robbery, in that larceny contains all of robbery’s elements save force or threat of force. Jones v. State, 567 So.2d 1189, 1192 (Miss.1990). Moreover, several other states allow prosecution-sponsored amendments to lesser included offenses because the defendant is presumed to be on notice of lesser included offenses to the original charge. Williams v. United States, 641 A.2d 479, 482-83 (D.C. 1994) . See also Green v. State, 619 So.2d 952, 953
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a defendants fifth amendment rights were violated when an interpreter was withdrawn by the court
B. holding fifth amendment not violated under above rationale
C. holding that the fifth amendment did not apply to tribal government
D. holding the same with respect to violations of the fifth amendment
E. holding that the statement ill take the fifth was an assertion of the fifth amendment privilege
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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by 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2), thereby “fulfilling their duties to safeguard the future of the Tree Boa.” Tree Boa, 918 F.Supp. at 902. Alternatively, Judge Finch found that he was compelled to dismiss plaintiffs’ ESA claims with respect to the Tree Boa for failure to provide proper notice to the Secretary and the alleged violator as required by 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A). Judge Finch did not address the merits of plaintiffs’ claims brought pursuant to § 9. C.Alternative Holdings Because Judge Finch determined that he did not have the power to hear plaintiffs’ ESA claims, any findings made with respect to the merit of those claims are not essential to the judgement and cannot support the application of collateral estoppel. See Stebbins v. Keystone Ins. Co., 481 F.2d 501, 508 (D.C.Cir.1973) ; Bokunewicz v. Purolator Products, Inc., 907
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the apprendi decision is not applicable on collateral review
B. holding that collateral estoppel is not applicable to finding against plaintiff on merits where court also held that plaintiff lacked standing
C. holding that a summary judgment is a determination on the merits for res judicata and collateral estoppel purposes
D. holding that collateral estoppel applies to 1983 claims
E. holding collateral estoppel elements met considering changed circumstances in the context of an exception to the general rule of collateral estoppel
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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the court acknowledged: [I]t is extraordinary for dischargeability litigation that hinges on a debtor’s medical condition to actually hinge on medical testimony. This is because all dis-chargeability litigation involves real persons who are debtors under the Bankruptcy Code, and cannot afford to hire medical experts to testify to the effect of their disease on their disease on their earning capacity. When medical testimony is offered by the debtor it is to lay skepticism to rest, and in this writer’s experience the medical condition of any debtor has never been the subject of dueling experts in § 523(a)(8) litigation. 219 B.R. 665, 669 (Bankr.W.D.N.Y.1998). Yet despite this awareness, courts often hold that the debtor has failed to sustain his burden of proof. See Lowe, 321 B.R. at 860 ; Folsom, 315 B.R. at 165 (holding that the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding petitioner has the burden of proof under the strickland test
B. holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment
C. holding without any substantive evidence to corroborate the debtors testimony regarding her medical conditions the court must find that the debtor has failed to sustain her burden under the second prong of the brunner test
D. holding that the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact regarding her retaliation claim because she failed to offer any evidence of a causal relationship between her involvement in protected activity and the adverse employment action
E. holding victim waived physicianpatient privilege by authorizing her doctor to release her medical records to the department of criminal investigation because the information contained in her medical records was no longer confidential between herself and her physician
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir.2007) (quotations omitted). Although we do not automatically presume that a sentence within the guidelines range is reasonable, we ordinarily expect that to be the case. United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir.2008). A sentence well below the statutory maximum sentence also signals reasonableness. See Gonzalez, 550 F.3d at 1324. Moreover, we have held that a defendant’s sentence was reasonable in light of the command to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities where, due to a defendant’s leadership role, he received a sentence greater than the sentences of his eodefendants. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 446 F.3d 1348, 1350, 1357 (11th Cir.2006) . Ultimately, we will vacate a sentence only if
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the defendants 121month sentence was reasonable even though his codefendants sentences ranged from 41 to 53 months imprisonment because the defendant had coordinated the offense
B. holding that a sentence of twelve months imprisonment was unreasonably lenient where the defendant engaged in wire fraud and caused 90000 in losses and the guidelines range was sixtythree to seventyeight months imprisonment
C. holding that the defendant was prejudiced by the rule 41 violation because had the magistrate judge followed rule 41b the search of defendants computer would not have occurred
D. holding that even though the offense was not of a sexual nature requiring the defendant to register as a sex offender following his conviction for false imprisonment of a minor was rationally related to the government interest in protecting the public and did not violate the defendants right to due process or equal protection under the law
E. holding upward departure from 41 months of imprisonment to statutory maximum of 120 months for unrepentant conartist with long criminal history reasonable
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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in this court on direct review,” Santos v. Reno, 228 F.3d 591, 597 (5th Cir.2000) (quotation omitted), and asserts that this “requirement of exhaustion” is maintained in the permanent rules by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d). Aplee. Br. at 10-11. But under § 1252(d), “[a] court may review a final order of removal only if — (1) the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right....” Appealing a decision of the BIA through a petition for review is not an administrative remedy-it is a judicial remedy. The government has apparently confused the concept of exhaustion of administrative remedies with the concept of procedural bar. Generally, a habeas petition cannot be used to substitute for direct appeal. Cf. United States v. Warner, 23 F.3d 287, 291 (10th Cir.1994) ; United States v. McBride, 788 F.2d 1429,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that any claim that was raised or could have been raised on direct appeal is barred from review on post conviction under the doctrine of res judicata
B. holding claims must be raised on direct appeal or waived
C. holding that 2255 is not available to test the legality of matters which should have been raised on appeal quotation omitted
D. holding that habeas proceedings are not available to test the legality of matters which should have been raised on direct appeal
E. holding that claims alleging prosecutorial misconduct which were based on facts in the record could have and should have been raised on direct appeal and were thus not cognizable in postconviction proceedings
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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(1966) (reversing conviction where bailiff said of defendant to juror “[o]h, that wicked fellow, he is guilty.”). The question that we must initially address, however, is whether the court erred in finding that the Roberts Affidavit was obtained in violation of Local Rule 5.01(d). This is a factual finding that we reverse only if clearly erroneous. See United States v. Floyd, 281 F.3d 1346, 1348 (11th Cir.2002). Having considered the bri t contact with jurors, the district court’s use of these powers is informed by interests important to the integrity of the judicial process. One such interest is the court’s strong 'interest in protecting jurors from threats and needless harassment from unsuccessful parties. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267, 35 S.Ct. 783, 784, 59 L.Ed. 1300 (1915) . Indeed, this circuit’s pattern instruction
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the trial court was without authority to set aside entry of default on motion to set aside default judgment
B. recognizing that a trial court can set aside verdict
C. holding that the trial courts denial of a motion to set aside the verdict for insufficient evidence is reviewable only for abuse of discretion
D. recognizing that jurors have the right to reject that part of the evidence believed by them to be untrue and to accept that found by them to be true
E. recognizing that jurors should be protected from being harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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must also be justiciable; it must be within the competency of the court.”); Int’l Mgmt. Svcs. Inc., 80 Fed. Cl. at 9. In this case, the court is unable to provide Plaintiff with the requested injunctive relief. As discussed infra, PlaintifPs failure to appeal the April 28, 2009 SBA size determination to the OHA prior to the May 8, 2009 award to VETS, as a matter of law, created a presumptively valid contract that now cannot be invalidated by the court. Chapman, 63 Fed.Cl. at 35. When the United States Court of Federal Claims has exercised jurisdiction to review SBA and OHA size determinations, it has recognized the non-justiciability of such cases, if the contract becomes presumptively valid by virtue of an award prior to the CO being notified of an appeal to the OHA. Id. at 35-36 ; see also Int’l Mgmt. Svcs. Inc., 80 Fed Cl.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding an appellate court need not review remaining issues when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive of the appeal
B. holding that a party had failed to preserve an argument for appellate review when that party had failed to argue the issue to the trial court either at trial or in his postjudgment motion
C. holding that the court had jurisdiction to review an sba size determination but plaintiffs claim was nevertheless not justiciable because the plaintiff failed to file an appeal to the oha prior to award which made the contract at issue unchallengeable
D. holding that defendant failed to raise a constitutional issue at trial and thus failed to preserve the issue for appellate review
E. holding the trial court was without authority to dismiss an appeal on the ground that the amount of the judgment required the appellant to file an application for discretionary review
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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at 756; Hughes, 401 F.3d at 547. Turner argues that her base offense level should have been 14, because she pled gui rner had not accepted responsibility for clear error. Denial of the adjustment because of continued criminal conduct after indictment is not clearly erroneous. United States v. Kidd, 12 F.3d 30, 34 (4th Cir.1993). We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in denying Turner the adjustment for continued drug use on pretrial release. Finally, in her supplemental brief, Turner asserts that the district court erred in applying the guidelines as a mandatory scheme to deny her a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The court undeniably regarded the guidelines as mandatory, and therefore erred. United States v. White, 405 F.3d 208, 216-17 (4th Cir.2005) . However, a defendant must show that the error
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing that under the booker remedial regime the guidelines are no longer mandatory but are only advisory
B. holding that the fact that a sentence imposed under the prebooker mandatory guideline regime was at the bottom of the mandatory range is not enough to create a reasonable probability that the defendant would have received a different sentence upon resentencing under an advisory guidelines system
C. holding that even in the absence of a sixth amendment violation the imposition of a sentence under the former mandatory guidelines regime rather than under the advisory regime outlined in booker is plain error
D. holding that judicial factfinding at sentencing is permissible indeed required under an advisory guidelines regime
E. holding that sentencing under the mandatory guidelines regime creates a presumption of prejudice that the government must rebut with clear and specific evidence that the district court would not have sentenced the defendant to a lower sentence if it had treated the guidelines as advisory
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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is invalid. OAR 291-124-0016(2) held invalid; Health Policy and Procedure #P-A-02.1 held invalid. 1 ORS 423.075 is one of the statutes that OAR 291-124-0016 implements. 2 DOC makes other arguments about the validity of OAR 291-124-0016(2). We reject them without further discussion. 3 Smith v. TRCI, 259 Or App 11, 312 P3d 568 (2013), presented a similar issue. The petitioner in that case argued that a newsletter that announced a change in DOC rules was a rule that should have been adopted through rulemak-ing procedures. Id. at 15. We held that the newsletter’s “pronouncement of the necessary effect of valid rules *** [was] not itself a rule that was subject to the formalities of rulemaking.” Id. at 17. 4 See Burke v. Children’s Serv. Div., 26 Or App 145, 151-52, 552 P2d 592 (1976) ; Gray Panthers v. Pub. Wel. Div., 28 Or App
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that appeal from a decision of the attorney general denying legal representation was before the appellate division as of right to review the final decision of a state officer
B. holding that the attorney generals decision not to provide representation to an employee is reviewable by the appellate division not by the law division where the actions against the employee are pending
C. holding that the chancery division lacked jurisdiction under njsa 2a1655 to determine medicaid eligibility where the authority to do so was vested in the division of medical assistance and health services
D. holding that the childrens court exceeded its authority in prohibiting the human services department from placing a child with her brother
E. holding that the childrens services division decision to stop making child care payments for recipients of public assistance was not an internal management directive because the decision did not affect individuals solely in their capacities as members of the agency involved the plaintiff and others similarly situated were entitled to proper notice and an opportunity to be heard before childrens services division or the department of human resources could issue a rule terminating the program of direct childcare payments
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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crew drilled for oil and gas. However, before the crew could drill, the barge was used to transport its specialized drilling equipment over water to the drilling site. 2. Another line of cases developed in this Circuit concludes that certain structures that float upon the water are not vessels. The clearest examples of such floating craft that do not qualify as vessels are dry docks and similar structures that maritime law has never considered, at least while secured to land, to be vessels. Cook v. Belden Concrete Prods., Inc., 472 F.2d 999, 1000-01 (5th Cir. 1973); see also Atkins v. Greenville Shipbuilding Corp., 411 F.2d 279 (5th Cir.1969). In Cook, the structure at issue was a large flat-deck barge upon which the defendant’s employees fabricated concrete barges. The barge w 978) . Bernard v. Binnings Constr. Co., Inc., 741
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that evidence consisting of the testimony of three witnesses who each had motives to lie was not overwhelming and that prosecutorial misconduct therefore was not harmless error
B. holding that platform consisting of four flatdeck barges moored to banks of mississippi river more or less permanently by steel cables was not a vessel
C. holding a plaintiff failed to show an actual injury to challenge an epa rule when the plaintiff alleged he would not have purchased a piece of property or would have paid less because the plaintiffs allegations showed only that the property was worth less to him not that the property was in fact worth less
D. holding that a delay of more than four years caused largely by the state making pretrial appeals was reasonable under the circumstances
E. holding that relevant evidence has a tendency to establish a fact in controversy or to render a proposition in issue more or less probable
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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and the legitimate justifications provided for the challenged practice, and we determine whether the anti-competitive aspects of the challenged practice outweigh its procompetitive effects.” (footnote omitted and emphasis added)); Eleventh Circuit: U.S. Anchor Mfg., Inc. v. Rule Indus., Inc., 7 F.3d 986, 1001 (11th Cir. 1993) ("The elements of a conspiracy to monopolize under Section 2 are (1) an agreement to restrain trade, (2) deliberately entered into with the specific intent of achieving a monopoly rather than a-legitimate business purpose, (3) which could have had an anticompetitive effect, and (4) the commission of at least one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy,''); D.C. Circuit: Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1087 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ; Fed. Circuit: Intergraph Corp. v. Intel
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding ban violated the sherman act
B. holding that standing is component of subjectmatter jurisdiction and subjectmatter jurisdiction is essential to courts authority to hear case
C. holding that same activity violated 2 of the sherman act
D. holding that plaintiffs complaint failed to state a claim under section 1 of the sherman act
E. holding within discussion on courts subjectmatter jurisdiction that a wouldbe monopolist or member of a conspiracy to monopolize comes within the condemnation of the sherman act when it engages in anticompetitive conduct quoting spectrum sports 506 us at 456 113 sct 884
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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results to be imbalanced while the other reader found four of the strips to show imbalances. The defense expert found five of the- strips to be imbalanced. No court can accurately assess those conclusions, because the dots fade and begin to disappear almost immediately. With such gross disparities in an admittedly subjective test, the Court cannot conclude that dot-intensity analysis is reliable. D. Even if dot-intensity analysis were presumed to be generally accepted, the evidence should have been rejected here because the assumptions underlying it were so numerous, complex, problematic, and potentially flawed as to render it substantially more confusing and prejudicial than probative in this specific context. See N.J.R.E. 403; Cavallo, supra, 88 N.J. at 520, 443 A.2d 1020 . Expert testimony, especially testimony such
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that federal rule of evidence 702 superceded the frye standard of admissibility of scientific evidence and that under rule 702 the district court had to determine that proffered expert testimony was both reliable and relevant
B. holding that inextricably intertwined evidence is intrinsic evidence that is admissible if its probative value outweighs the danger of prejudice
C. holding that expert evidence even if admissible under njre 702 must be excluded if it poses the danger that prejudice confusion and diversion of attention exceeds its helpfulness to the fact finder
D. holding that under fedrevid 702 expert testimony must be reliable to be admissible
E. holding that expert testimony may be admissible even if not generally accepted in the relevant scientific community provided that it qualifies in some other way as reliable under federal rule of evidence 702
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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that reasonable suspicion exists ... need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277, 122 S.Ct. 744. Thus, reasonable suspicion exists even though the facts at hand could evidence a legitimate transaction. Finally, the length of Mr. Cervine’s detention did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Based on the troopers’ testimonies and the dispatch log records, the district court concluded that the traffic stop, detention, and canine search of Mr. Cervine’s vehicle lasted approximately fifty minutes. Cervine, 169 F.Supp.2d at 1214-15. We have upheld similar waiting periods as satisfying the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Villa-Chaparro, 115 F.3d 797, 802-03 (10th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 926, 118 S.Ct. 326, 139 L.Ed.2d 252 (1997) . III. Conclusion Considering the totality of
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing that the justification for a protective sweep of even a few minutes would be questionable in light of the officers concession that after arresting the defendant in front of his house the officer could have just put the defendant in the car and driven away
B. holding that an officer stopped the defendant when he ordered the defendant to take his hand out of his pocket
C. holding that the arresting officer acted reasonably in detaining defendant for five minutes from the time he stopped defendant and for an additional thirtyeight minutes while he waited for the canine unit to arrive
D. holding suspect for 20 minutes constituted an arrest
E. holding that motion for mistrial was untimely where defendant waited two or three minutes after the objectionable testimony occurred to make objection
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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the officials designated in it, including judges, were over a year away from the end of their term of office. It rejected an equal-protection challenge by several Texas judges hoping to run for the higher judicial office without being forced to resign. As discussed above, the Court observed that the law served the purpose, among others, of ensuring that a judge will not neglect duties or devote less than the judge’s full time and energies to the responsibilities of the judicial office. Id. at 968. Conversely, the Court noted that the burden on potential candidates, who were not barred from running for o Haw. 1990) (rejecting equal protection and First Amendment challenges to resign-to-run clause in Hawaii Constitution); Acevedo v. City of North Pole, 672 P.2d 130, 135-36 (Alaska 1983) ; In re Dunleavy, 2003 ME 124, ¶ 22, 838 A.2d
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that states interests were sufficiently important to justify the rule prohibiting dual officeholding
B. holding that states legitimate interests in enacting constitutional provision prohibiting judges from holding other public office far outweigh the burdens put upon the petitioners right to be a candidate for office
C. recognizing but not ruling on basis of federal rule prohibiting tolling during a successive class action
D. holding that reasoning which would justify the arrest by the search and at the same time justify the search by the arrest will not do
E. holding on a motion to dismiss that plaintiffs allegation that defendants actions were without justification based on the legitimate business interests of the employer and were performed maliciously was sufficient to prove actions taken to serve personal interests
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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CFEPA and Title VII. Therefore, the court shall assume that Pecoraro’s CHRO case qualifies as "an investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under Title VII. 5 . Additionally, courts outside this Circuit, faced with factual circumstances similar to the facts at bar, have also read the participation clause in a broad and expansive manner to honor Title VII's remedial goals. See, e.g., Glover v. S.C. Law Enforcement Div., 170 F.3d 411, 413-14 (4th Cir.1999) (finding that the use of participation clause claim is not determined based on an employee’s testimony regardless of how unreasonable that testimony may be, and to hold otherwise "would do violence to the text of that provision and would undermine the objectives of Title VII.”); Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir.1997) ; Smith v. Columbus Metro. Hous. Auth., 443
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a title vii plaintiff could not hold coworkers liable in their individual capacities under title vii
B. holding that the antiretaliation provision of title vii reaches to employees who involuntarily participate in such proceedings and employees who do not seek to assist title vii claimant
C. holding individual employees may be liable under title vii
D. holding that individual employees are not liable under title vii
E. holding that relief granted under title vii is against the employer not individual employees whose actions constituted a violation of title vii emphasis in original
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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mental institutions, like prisoners, are deprived of unrestricted association with friends, family, and community; they must contend with locks, guards, and detailed regulation of their daily activities. In addition, a person who has been hospitalized involuntarily may to a significant extent lose the right enjoyed by others to withhold consent to medical treatment. . . . We should not presume that he lacks a compelling interest in having the decisions to commit him and to keep him institutionalized made carefully, and in a manner that preserves the maximum degree of personal autonomy. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 384-86 (1983). 30 Rachel, 254 Wis. 2d 215, ¶ 61 (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)). 31 Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1091 (three-judge district court) . 32 State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 330, 541
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the possibility that a sex offender could face civil commitment under a state statute was a collateral consequence because civil commitment does not flow automatically from the plea
B. holding that attorneys mental illness may justify equitable tolling
C. holding prior version of wisconsin mental illness civil commitment statute constitutionally defective
D. holding that for an initial civil commitment the state has the burden of proof
E. holding that a mental illness limitation limiting the maximum payment for care of mental illness or care of nervous conditions of any type or cause is ambiguous because the plan contains no definition or explanation of the term mental illness and thus construed against the insurance company does not include physically based illnesses
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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with the children, is well within its discretion to award primary physical custody to the other parent. Also on appeal from the divorce decree, Colleen argues that the district court abused its discretion by not compelling Terry to prepare and turn over certain tax returns for the purpose of the division of community property and debt. Yet, in her opening brief, Colleen states that she does not challenge the district court’s division of community property and debt, but rather is challenging the fact that the court declined her request for pretrial discovery. Since Colleen does not challenge the ultimate distribution of community property and debt, we do not reach her argument concerning pretrial discovery. See Cottonwood Cove Corp. v. Bates, 86 Nev. 751, 476 P.2d 171 (1970) . 10 See Sims v. Sims, 109 Nev. 1146, 865 P.2d
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing that to preserve right the aggrieved party must file request with clerk
B. holding that a party failed to preserve error by not pursuing a ruling at trial where the courts motion in limine ruling invited the party to attempt to admit the evidence during trial
C. holding that a party is not aggrieved by a district court ruling in that partys favor
D. holding that courts must draw all justifiable inferences in the nonmoving partys favor and accept the nonmoving partys evidence as true
E. holding that a party waives an objection by failing to request a ruling on the admissibility of the evidence before the district court
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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mischaracterize the precedent examining whether such transactions involve securities. Contrary to Defendants’ position that such transactions are analyzed solely as potential investment contracts, the precedent views such agreements as constituting both a note that is potentially a security and an agreement that is a potential investment contract. See, e.g., American Fletcher, 635 F.2d at 1251; Provident Nat. Bank v. Frankford Trust Co., 468 F.Supp. 448, 451 (E.D.Pa.1979). This is the correct approach, but all but one of the eases cited by Defendants applied overruled or outdated law. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 64-65, 110 S.Ct. 945 (adopting “family resemblance” test over “investment-commercial” test for notes); S.E.C. v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 394, 124 S.Ct. 892, 157 L.Ed.2d 813 (2004) . And the one post-1990 case cited by
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that plaintiffs express contract with the surety company precludes an implied contract with defendant
B. holding that an investment contract with a fixed return can still be security
C. holding that whether a tic investment could be characterized as a security was a factbased inquiry
D. holding that although a financing statement may be used to assist in the interpretation of the security agreement the financing statement does not create a security interest and cannot extend a security interest beyond what has been unambiguously described in a security agreement
E. holding as an investment for future development
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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hearsay rule if they have “equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness,” and certain other requirements are met. Fed.R.Evid. 807. Although no such express residual exception exists under New York law, New York courts have recently recognized a constitutionally-based exception to the hearsay prohibition for certain evidence offered by defendants in criminal cases. See People v. Robinson, 89 N.Y.2d 648, 657 N.Y.S.2d 575, 579, 679 N.E.2d 1055 (1997) (allowing defendant, on constitutional principles, to introduce grand jury testimony of unavail able witness, even though such testimony did not fall within recognized hearsay exception); People v. James, 242 A.D.2d 389, 661 N.Y.S.2d 273 (2d Dep’t 1997) (same); People v. Esteves, 152 A.D.2d 406, 549 N.Y.S.2d 30, 35 (2d Dep’t 1989) ; see also People v. Seeley, 186 Misc.2d 715,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that an objection on hearsay grounds did not preserve for appeal an exception to the hearsay rule that was not specifically raised
B. holding florida drivers handbook hearsay and not within any recognized exception to hearsay rule
C. recognizing that the united states constitution may require courts to admit exculpatory hearsay statements that do not fall within any recognized hearsay exception
D. holding that the rejection of the exculpatory hearsay testimony of a government witness was in error particularly in view that accusatory hearsay was admitted
E. holding that statements within a firmly rooted hearsay exception do not violate the confrontation clause
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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each room with a telephone breached such motel’s duty to protect guests from assault by third parties); Lewis v. Roescher, 193 Ark. 161, 98 S.W.2d 956, 957 (1936) (declining, as a matter of contract law, to impose a duty upon innkeepers to furnish guests with working telephones after a guest fell ill in his room and was unable to summon aid). Others still have considered whether innkeepers can be liable for failing to maintain particular staff positions or provide particular services. See Zerangue v. Delta Towers, Ltd., 820 F.2d 130, 132-33 (5th Cir.1987) (invoking an innkeeper’s duty to provide safe premises where a guest was locked out of a hotel in New Orleans at 3:00 a.m. and subsequently assaulted); Gumbart v. Waterbury Club Holding Corp., 27 F.Supp. 228, 229-30 (D.Conn.1938) ; Fortney v. Hotel Rancroft, 5 Ill.App.2d 327,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the preexisting duty exception does not apply where the preexisting duty is a limited one and the alleged negligence is the failure to provide a level of assistance beyond that required by the preexisting duty
B. holding that a corporation has a duty under rule 80b6 to provide someone who is knowledgeable in order to provide binding answers on behalf of the corporation
C. holding that an innkeeper does not have a duty to provide each guest with a key maintain staff at the front door of the inn during the night or provide a wakeup call
D. holding that fraudulent oral misrepresentation of the level of benefits does not provide the basis for a nonpreempted claim even though erisa may also provide no remedy
E. holding that 1983 does not provide a remedy if there is no violation of federal law
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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questions in this appeal, we touch on a few preliminaries. Because the district court denied WMAS’s motion to compel arbitration and to stay judicial proceedings, this court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(A). See May v. Higbee Co., 372 F.3d 757, 761-62 (5th Cir.2004). We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration and to stay judicial proceedings pursuant to the FAA. Tittle v. Enron Corp. 463 F.3d 410, 417 (5th Cir.2006). Although there are various rules for determining whether to grant a motion to compel arbitration, this case turns on a single and fundamental rule: Arbitration is a matter of contract, and, absent federal law to the contrary, this court must apply the contract law of the particular 08 (2d Cir.1990) ; Roney & Co. v. Goren, 875 F.2d 1218, 1223
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding in a case factually similar to patten securities that a forum selectionconsent to jurisdiction clause should be understood as complementary to an agreement to arbitrate
B. holding the trial court may determine issue of condition precedent to enforcement of agreement to arbitrate
C. holding similar language to be an agreement to arbitrate only before the selfregulatory organizations whose rules were to be applied
D. holding that a party who has not expressly or implicitly agreed to be bound by an arbitration agreement cannot be compelled to arbitrate
E. holding the plain language of the collective bargaining agreement did not manifest an intent to require trustees to arbitrate contribution claims
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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1995; Morgan from January 1995 to March 1995. 3 . R.C. 119.12; Our Place, Inc. v. Ohio Liquor Control Comm. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 570, 571, 589 N.E.2d 1303, 1305. 4 . Univ. of Cincinnati v. Conrad (1980), 63 Ohio St.2d 108, 111, 17 O.O.3d 65, 67, 407 N.E.2d 1265, 1267. 5 . Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621, 614 N.E.2d 748, 750-751. 6 . Univ. Hosp., Univ. of Cincinnati College of Medicine v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 339. 343-344. 587 N.E.2d 835. 838-839. 7 . Geroc v. Ohio Veterinary Med. Bd. (1987), 37 Ohio App.3d 192, 199, 525 N.E.2d 501, 507; Keaton v. State, Dept. of Commerce (1981), 2 Ohio App.3d 480, 2 OBR 606, 442 N.E.2d 1315. 8 . Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examiners (1957), 353 U.S. 232, 238-239, 77 S.Ct. 752, 756, 1 L.Ed.2d 796, 801 . 9 . Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a professionals license is a protected property interest
B. holding that a broadcasting license was property of the estate but not subject to a security interest
C. holding that the verification of mishlers medical license was part of the protected property interest in the license and reversing the district courts dismissal of his complaint
D. holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property
E. holding that the debtors interest in a broadcasting license constitutes property of the estate
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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the costs associated with these actions prohibitive and would effectively preclude plaintiffs from bringing such claims. Id. Second, a number of Circuits have altered or invalidated arbitration agreements where they interfered with the recovery of statutorily authorized damages. See, e.g., Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 47-48 (1st Cir.2006) (severing as unenforceable a provision of an arbitration agreement limiting availability of treble damages under the Sherman Act); Hadnot v. Bay, Ltd., 344 F.3d 474, 478 n. 14 (5th Cir.2003) (severing a restriction on available remedies from an arbitration agreement after finding that a “ban on punitive and exemplary damages is unenforceable in a Title VII case”); Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (11th Cir.1998) . Parisi asserts Title VII claims and, as a
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding an entire arbitration clause is void and arbitration cannot be compelled where contract contained unconscionable clause and has a nonseverability clause
B. holding that nothing necessarily prevents a court from finding an arbitration clause unenforceable in a contract that it later finds is enforceable
C. holding that the best way to harmonize a choice of law clause and an arbitration clause is to apply the substantive case law of the named state to the entire agreement including the arbitration clause
D. holding that there was no conflict between a contracts arbitration clause and its venue clause
E. holding that when an arbitration clause has provisions that defeat the remedial purpose of the statute the arbitration clause is not enforceable and that the language insulating an employer from damages and equitable relief renders the clause unenforceable
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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effort to recruit A.L.T., however, the district court acquitted Vargas of that count. Therefore, Vargas argues that the evidence of her recruitment of A.L.T. is irrelevant and inadmissible for the purpose of showing that Vargas’s sex trafficking of E.R.J. affected interstate or foreign commerce. See Fed. R. Evid. 402, 403. Because we conclude that other evidence is sufficient to support the interstate/foreign commerce nexus, we need not address this argument. 2 . Cf. United States v. Thomas, 159 F.3d 296, 297 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that the Government sufficiently proved an interstate nexus under the Hobbs act by pointing to evidence that the cocaine an informant had planned to sell to defendants was from South America); United States v. Chesney, 86 F.3d 564, 570 (6th Cir. 1996) . 3 . Although Bolar is not “controlling
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the government need not prove that interstate transport was foreseeable in order to obtain a conviction under 18 usc 2314 which prohibits the interstate transportation of stolen goods
B. holding that statute which prohibited gun possession near a school zone exceeded congresss authority under the commerce clause because the statute did not regulate activity that had a substantial effect on interstate commerce
C. holding that the government can satisfy the hobbs act interstate commerce requirement by showing that the robbery resulted in the closure of a business engaged in interstate commerce
D. holding that conviction for possession of ammunition by a convicted felon in violation of 18 usc 922g is valid under the commerce clause as long as the ammunition had previously moved in interstate commerce even though the possession did not have a substantial affect on same
E. holding that the defendants stipulation that the gun had moved in interstate commerce was sufficient evidence to support his conviction under 18 usc 922g1
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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However, deterring harm to oneself is innate in all of the analyses of special governmental needs in similar circumstances when individuals are engaged in dangerous or safety-sensitive activities- and our discussion regarding harm to others did not limit that additional risk in any way. Id. at 323 (validating harm to oneself as part of Linn State’s primary concern arising from students under the influence while engaging in a safety-sensitive program when addressing the nature and immediacy prong of the balancing analysis). For example, in Skinner, the Court acknowledged the axiomatic nature of the governmental interest in ensuring the safety of the public “and of the employees themselves.” Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621, 109 S.Ct. 1402; see also Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 669-71, 109 S.Ct. 1384 . Accordingly, the court erred in declining to
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that even though some of employees duties appeared to satisfy the directly related element the element was not satisfied where those duties were not part of his primary duty
B. holding that probation department employees are not county employees
C. recognizing that not only is the physical safety of border employees themselvesthose involved in drug interdiction and those who otherwise are required to carry firearmsthreatened in that line of work but also the safety of others at large should those employees carry out their duties in an impaired state
D. holding that under the first amendment speech can be pursuant to a public employees official job duties even though it is not required by or included in the employees job description or in response to a request by the employer
E. holding that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties the employees are not speaking as citizens for first amendment purposes and the constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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or manner” of production, and the parties are unable to agree, the trial court may, upon motion, enter an order under Rule 1.380(a) specifying the time, place and manner, and may further order who shall pay the cost of transporting the documents to the specified place of inspection. Cf Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(b); 4A J. Moore, J. Lucas & D. Epstein, Moore’s Federal Practice § 34.19 (2d ed. 1984). In this case, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling the petitioner’s objection as to the requested place of production. Discovery which is otherwise appropriate should not be refused solely because production of documents would hamper a party’s business operations. Id. at § 34.19[2], See also Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc. v. LeMay, 93 F.R.D. 379 (S.D. Ohio 1981) . Consequently, we deny the writ insofar as it
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that an unwieldy recordkeeping system requiring heavy expenditures of time and money to produce relevant documents is not an adequate excuse to refuse discovery
B. holding that it was within the trial courts discretion to refuse any additional discovery and that the courts refusal to allow additional discovery was not an abuse of discretion
C. holding that the relevant inquiry is not whether hindsight vindicates an attorneys time expenditures but whether at the time the work was performed a reasonable attorney would have engaged in similar time expenditures
D. holding that 727a6a clearly includes orders requiring the debtor to produce documents relating to his or her financial condition
E. holding that the relevant time is the time of the employment decision
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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the prevailing party could seek enforcement of the award as a judgment under the predecessor arbitration statutes. Generally, the prevailing party could, upon compliance with the statute’s provisions, secure a judgment on the award as on the verdict of a jury in most instances. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1927, ch. X, par. 1; Rev. Stat. 1845, ch. VII, par. 8; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1917, ch. X, par. 9; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, ch. 10, par. 9. However, strict compliance with the statute’s provisions was necessary before the circuit court could exercise its subject-matter jurisdiction and enter judgment on the award. Absent such compliance, the court lacked the authority to enter judgment, and the prevailing party was relegated to his common law remedies. See Low v. Nolte, 15 Ill. 368, 374 (1854) ; Eisenmeyer v. Sauter, 77 Ill. 515, 516 (1875)
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that where the arbitration agreement was silent on feesplitting and the costs imposed upon the plaintiff by the aaa were not prohibitive the plaintiff had presented little evidence to indicate that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive and the fees and costs of arbitration did not render the arbitration scheme unconscionable
B. holding that an order remanding an arbitration award is not a final appealable order when the order does not also vacate the arbitration award
C. holding that arbitration award is binding on the parties
D. holding the conditions imposed by the arbitration statute were indispensable formalities in order to give the court jurisdiction to enter judgment upon the arbitration award and explaining that where these formalities were not met the parties must be left to their common law remedies
E. recognizing that an action at common law can be maintained on an arbitration award rendered under the parties submission that does not comply with the arbitration statute
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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2001, more than two months after their requests for hearings were made. On July 11, 2001, the Henrys and Skarphol moved the ALJ to dismiss the administrative actions against them based on the Commissioner’s failure to abide by the time limits set forth in N.D.C.C. § 10-04-12(2). The ALJ de nied the motions to dismiss and the Commissioner adopted the ALJ’s decision. The Henrys and Skarphol appealed to the district court, which affirmed the Commissioner’s order. On appeal to this Court, the Henrys and Skarphol contend the administrative actions against them should be dismissed because the Commissioner violated N.D.C.C. § 10-04-12(2) by faffing to set the hearings within 30 days of their requests. ' II [¶ 5] Before we consider the merits of an appeal, we must have jurisdiction. Nodak M 6) . [¶ 9] In line with this reasoning, this Court
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable
B. holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable
C. holding that a rehearing order is interlocutory and not appealable
D. holding that the denial of a motion to remand is interlocutory and not immediately appealable
E. holding that an order was interlocutory in nature despite the trial courts certification of the order as a final appealable judgment
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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court found that the maternal grandmother was not fit and qualified to receive and care for the children so that she should be given preference over a nonrelative caregiver. See § 12-15-314(a)(3)e. (“Unless the juvenile court finds it not in the best interests of the child, a willing, fit, and able relative shall have priority for placement or custody over a non-relative.”). In light of that finding, which we conclude was fully supported by the evidence in the record, although that evidence was in some respects conflicting, we hold that the juvenile court did not err in determining that the best interests of the children would not be served by placing the children in the custody of the maternal grandmother. See M.H.J. v. State Dep’t of Human Res., 785 So.2d 372 (Ala.Civ.App.2000) . AFFIRMED. THOMPSON, P.J., and PITTMAN, J.,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that defendants failed to carry burden of proof to show that plaintiffs failed to mitigate damages when among other things they offered no evidence contradicting the plaintiffs evidence
B. holding that defendant did not breach oral agreement because among other things the plaintiff had not established that the term in question was part of the oral contract
C. holding that grandmother in loco parentis of her three grandchildren had protected liberty interest in their future care and custody
D. holding that grandmother who among other things had failed to detect obvious signs of neglect affecting the health of her grandchildren was not a suitable relative resource
E. holding that pleading was insufficient where the plaintiff failed to among other things set forth the dates of any fraudulent statements
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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The manslaughter [instruction] says legal duty. That’s one of the elements the Commonwealth has to prove. We’re asking that that duty be defined.” As noted above, the jury acquitted Barrett of involuntary manslaughter. Accordingly, because Barrett failed to put this argument before the trial court in relation to the instructions pertaining to felony child neglect, we do not consider it for the first time on appeal. See Rule 5A:18; see also West Alexandria Prop. v. First Va. Mort., 221 Va. 134, 138, 267 S.E.2d 149, 151 (1980) (“On appeal, though taking the same general position as in the trial court, an appellant may not rely on reasons which could have been but were not raised for the benefit of the lower court.”); Floyd v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 575, 584, 249 S.E.2d 171, 176 (1978) . For the reasons stated above, we affirm the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that an issue not presented to the trial court will not be considered on appeal
B. holding that to preserve an issue for appellate review the specific legal argument or ground upon which it is based must be presented to the trial court
C. holding that appellate court will not consider an argument on appeal that is different from the specific argument presented to the trial court even if it relates to the same general issue
D. holding that even when the issue is constitutional in nature an argument is not preserved on appeal unless the appellant raised and made the argument at trial and obtained a ruling on it nor will a particular theory be addressed on appeal if it was not presented below
E. holding that an appellate court may not consider an issue not presented to the trial judge on appeal from final judgment on the merits
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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written in "John Doe” on the line designated for the name of the person applying for medical care on behalf of the individual in custody; he had not checked the box indicating that he is a D.C. police officer or given his rank; he did not complete the portion for Harris’ name, address, and age; and he did not fill out the sections requesting the facts which led him to believe that Harris was mentally ill and a threat to himself and/or others. 2 . We therefore do not decide whether the record creates a triable issue of "deliberate indifference.” We are quite doubtful, however, that the evidence shows more than some degree of negligence, which may not violate the due process clause, see Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332-34 & n. 3, 106 S.Ct. 662, 665-66 & n. 3, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986) . 3 . State tort liability may of course bear
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that negligence in the context of a tort claim relating to bodily injuries allegedly sustained by an inmate because of lack of maintenance of a prison stairway does not constitute a violation of constitutional due process but reserving the question of whether recklessness or gross negligence is sufficient to trigger the protections of constitutional due process
B. holding that doctrine does not violate due process
C. holding that mere negligence does not implicate the right to due process
D. holding that ordinary negligence and gross negligence are not separate causes of action
E. holding that negligence does not violate the due process clause but reserving the question whether gross negligence does
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Willis, 98 N.M. 771, 773, 652 P.2d 1222, 1224 (Ct.App.1982), illustrates the point. In Willis, we held that an unborn viable fetus is not a “human being” within the meaning of the vehicular homicide statute. The Court reasoned that since the Legislature first enacted homicide statutes, in which the killing of a human being and the killing of an unborn infant child were separately addressed, “it does not follow that the Legislature meant to include viable fetus within the definition of human being without specifically making provision therefor.” Id. {8} Since Willis, the Legislature has enacted statutes that demonstrate its intention to distinguish an unborn viable fetus from “human being.” See NMSA 1978, § 30-3-7 (2006) (stating that “[i]njury to 190, 894 P.2d 733, 737 (Ct.App.1995) ; State v. Dunn, 82 Wash.App. 122, 916 P.2d
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that mother may not be prosecuted criminally for child endangerment for prenatal substance abuse
B. holding that the defendant mother could not be charged with endangering the welfare of a child based upon prenatal acts endangering an unborn child
C. holding that mother could not be charged with criminal endangering the welfare of her child based upon prenatal acts of smoking cocaine
D. holding a woman may be prosecuted for child neglect and endangering a child for prenatal substance abuse
E. holding that mother could not be prosecuted under child abuse statute for prenatal use of heroin
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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reasonable to require an employer to have two people doing one person’s job in the name of accommodation. Assistance is one thing, but performing a significant portion of the essential functions of another person’s job is another thing altogether.” Hershey v. Praxair, Inc., 969 F.Supp. 429, 435 (S.D.Tex.1997) (Kent, J.). Moreover, the ADA does not require an employer to eliminate or reallocate essential functions of a position in order to provide accommodation. See Bradley v. University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center, 3 F.3d 922, 925 (5th Cir.1993) (citing Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 407-08, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 2367-68, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979)); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (1995). “Such redefinition exceeds reasonable accommodation.” Bradley, 3 F.3d at 925 . Furthermore, Plaintiff presents no evidence,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that an employer did not regard the employee as disabled because it called the employee back from disability leave to work on a special project
B. holding an employee is an agent of his employer where the employer assumes the right to control time manner and method of work
C. holding that when an employer takes steps to accommodate an employees restrictions it is not thereby conceding that the employee is disabled under the ada or that it regards the employee as disabled
D. holding that the ada does not require an employer to hire an assistant to help a disabled employee fulfill his work responsibilities
E. holding that an employer did not regard the plaintiff as disabled
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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See also Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enter., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 554, 111 S.Ct. 922, 112 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1991) (affirming the imposition of sanctions on a represented party, sophisticated in prosecuting copyright infringement actions, who had through its officers signed a pleading in violation of Rule 11 certification requirements); Project 74 Allentown, Inc. v. Frost, 143 F.R.D. 77, 83 n. 7 (E.D.Pa.1992), aff'd, 998 F.2d 1004 (3d Cir.1993) (noting that Rule 11 permits a court “to sanction the individual who signed a paper on behalf of a corporation as well as the corporation itself’); Calloway v. Marvel Entm’t Group, 854 F.2d 1452, 1475 (2d Cir.1988), rev’d sub nom., Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Group, 493 U.S. 120, 110 S.Ct. 456, 107 L.Ed.2d 438 (1989) . Neither Jazz nor Benun has identified any
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a criminal defendant is entitled to know the charges against him and to be tried solely upon the charges against him internal quotation marks and citation omitted
B. holding that an order imposing sanctions against an attorney for one of the parties in a pending case is final and therefore immediately appealable by the attorney
C. holding that where the party does know that the filing and signing is sic wrongful and the attorney reasonably should know then sanctions against both are appropriate
D. holding that it is always appropriate to assume that our elected representatives like other citizens know the law
E. recognizing that each party to a contract has a duty to read and familiarize himself with its contents and generally is presumed to know the terms of the agreement
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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indicate that this is a decision that lies solely with the trial court. After reviewing the plain lan guage of section 39-13-208, along with the provisions of Rules 3 and 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we conclude that interlocutory review is appropriate. In 1990, the Tennessee General Assembly, following the lead of the Georgia and Maryland state legislatures, made the policy decision to prohibit the execution of any defendant “with mental retardation at the time of committing first degree murder.” Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-203(b) (2003). This statutory prohibition was followed by this Court’s decision in Van Tran v. State, 66 S.W.3d 790 (Tenn.2001), in which we held that execution of mentally retarded persons was constitutionally prohibited as well. Id. at 809 . Noting that a national consensus prohibiting
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding execution of mentally retarded individuals fails to achieve legitimate penalogical objectives for punishment as required by the eighth amendment to the united states constitution and article i 16 of the tennessee constitution
B. holding that the eighth amendment to the united states constitution prohibits the execution of mentally retarded individuals
C. holding that under the eighth amendment to the united states constitution the government may not execute a mentally retarded person
D. holding execution of the mentally retarded constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment
E. holding that execution of the mentally retarded is prohibited under the eighth amendment to the united states constitution
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Minnesota Loan & Trust Co., 17 N.D. 409, 117 N.W. 354, 357 (1908). A statutory dedication is “in the nature of a grant,” while a common-law dedication “rests upon the principles of estoppel in pais.” Cole, at 357. The dedication, therefore, is regarded not as transferring a right, but as operating to preclude the owner from resuming his right of private property, or indeed any use inconsistent with the public use. The ground of the estoppel is that to reclaim the land would be a violation of good faith to the public and to those who have acquired private property with a view to the enjoyment of the use contemplated by the dedication. Ark. State Highway Comm. v. Sherry, 238 Ark. 127, 381 S.W.2d 448, 451 (1964); Whittom v. Alexander-Richardson Partnership, 851 S.W.2d 504, 508 (Mo.1993) . Indeed, we have previously stated “the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that because the property owner argued only a theory of taking that was no longer a valid theory property owner did not demonstrate his entitlement to relief
B. holding the effect of a common law dedication is that the public acquires an easement to use the property for the purposes specified while the fee remains with the dedicator
C. holding the effect of a commonlaw dedication is to create only such an estate or right in the public as is necessary to enable it to enjoy the uses for which the dedication is made and to reserve the fee to the dedicator
D. holding because dedication is a theory premised on estoppel the owner can be precluded from resuming rights over the property if the public acts upon the owners manifestations
E. holding that intent need not be express and in fact need not actually exist in the owners mind but may be implied from acts and conduct of the owner which are unequivocally and convincingly indicative of a dedication and upon which the public has a right to and does rely
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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or was. At trial, Fromhold explained, Extrapolation refers to being able to relate a particular concentration from one point in time to a time before or after. Retrograde extrapolation implies we’re going back in time before we have a specific value. Scientific principles that are involved that deal with the alcohol absorption, distribution, and elimination. The very factors that come into play to be able to make that type of estimate. See id. at 908-09 (defining retrograde extrapolation as “the computation back in time of the blood-alcohol level — that is, the estimation of the level at the time of driving based on a test result from some later time”). Danielson and Fromhold identified the Widmark formula as the technique used when conducting retrograde extrapolation. See id. at 909 . The experts also testified regarding the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that ridas elimination of habeas corpus does not violate the suspension clause where the petitioner had a means for seeking relief direct review and simply failed to pursue the relief that the statutory scheme allows
B. holding that a son could be bound by a contract that he signed even though his fathers name and not his appeared in the body
C. recognizing burdixdana represents the majority view but rejecting its interpretation of 18 usc 3282
D. recognizing the collateral order doctrine for the first time
E. recognizing emp widmark first calculated absorption and elimination rates in the body and his work still represents the benchmark for other scientists studies today
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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effect that defendant’s request to speak with his mother was at least an equivocal invocation of the right to silence because "[a]fter all defendant could not speak to both the officers and his mother at the same time,” post at 579, 34 A.3d at 769, is not persuasive because it proves too much. Using that logic, a request to speak with anyone would amount to an invocation. We decline to adopt so broad a rule. 9 It is for this reason that we reject defendant's argument that the officers were obligated to re-administer his Miranda\ warnings to him after the call to his mother ended and before they continued with their interrogation. Because he had never invoked the right to silence, there was no impediment to the continuation of questioning. Hartley, supra, 103 N.J. at 256, 511 A.2d 80 . Justice ALBIN, dissenting. Defendant
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that because miranda warnings make defendant aware of right to counsel and of consequences of waiving sixth amendment rights defendants waiver of right to counsel after receiving such warnings is valid
B. holding that the initial questioning was merely investigatory and miranda warnings were not necessary until after police found incriminating evidence
C. holding that fresh miranda warnings are necessary after right to silence has been invoked
D. holding that the warnings in their totality satisfied miranda
E. holding that selfinitiated statements volunteered after miranda warnings had been given are admissible
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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of other federal circuits which have addressed the question, that the | ^McDonnell Douglas framework still applies to ADEA cases in the wake of Gross. In Cervantez v. KMGP Services Co. Inc., 349 Fed.Appx. 4 (5th Cir.2009) (unpublished per curiam), the U.S. Fifth Circuit noted: The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Gross rejected the application of Title VIPs ‘motivating factor’ standard to ADEA mixed-motive cases. That holding has no affect on today’s analysis because, on appeal, [the plaintiff] did not advance a motivating-factor theory ... As [the plaintiffs] ADEA claim is based on circumstantial evidence, the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green applies. Id. at n. 7. See also Velez v. Thermo King de Puero Rico, Inc., 585 F.3d 441, 446-447 (1st Cir.2009) ; Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that mcdonnell douglas burdenshifting approach applies to claims brought under the adea
B. holding that mcdonnell douglas framework which is used in title vii cases applies to ada cases when only circumstantial evidence of discrimination is offered
C. holding that the mcdonnell douglas framework applies equally to ada and rehabilitation act cases
D. holding that the mcdonnell douglas framework still applies to adea cases postgross
E. holding that adea and phra claims proceed under the mcdonnell douglas framework
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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cure the defect; but where a claim is dead (because it has been forfeited prior to the assignment by the party who could have brought it but failed to), then an assignment cannot resurrect it. Whit-tington’s theory sounds plausible, but he points to no law really supporting it — and as is discussed below, there are numerous cases running in the other direction, including in practically the exact same context as here. a. Constitutional Standing Whittington does not clearly delineate whether his “standing” argument is Article Ill/constitutional or prudential/statutory in nature. Insofar as Whit-tington challenges Plaintiffs’ constitutional standing, that challenge is plainly wrong, under clear Fifth Circuit law. See, e.g., Ensley v. Cody Res., 171 F.3d 815, 819-20 (5th Cir.1999) . Constitutional, “injury in fact” standing
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that troxel opinion did not affect issue of grandparent standing because texas family code standing statute does not overrule parental presumption
B. holding that lack of justiciable interest resulted in lack of standing to pursue claim and that lack of standing deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to act
C. holding that the lack of shareholder standing under texas law does not implicate constitutional standing
D. holding that preservation of error in the trial court is not necessary as to lack of standing
E. holding that standing existed
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Former federal prisoner David A. Oh-man appeals pro se the district court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition, which challenged the calculation of his good conduct time credits by the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). We dismiss this appeal as moot. Ohman contends that he was deprived of good conduct time credits under the BOP’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1). Because Ohman has been released from BOP custody, we lack the ability to grant habeas remedy for his alleged injury. See Munoz v. Rowland, 104 F.3d 1096, 1097 (9th Cir.1997); see also United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 58-60, 120 S.Ct. 1114,146 L.Ed.2d 39 (2000) . Without a live case or controversy, Ohman’s
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a former inmates supervised release term may not be credited with undisputed excess time in prison
B. holding that a statute requiring a threeyear term of supervised release did not eviscerate the district courts discretion to adjust the term of supervised release pursuant to 3583e
C. holding that further supervised release may be ordered as a sentence for violation of supervised release
D. holding that deportation does not extinguish term of supervised release
E. holding that excess prison time served by a defendant on invalidated criminal convictions cannot be credited to the supervised release period to reduce its length
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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be removed notwithstanding the well-pleaded complaint rule). “The pre-emption clause is not limited to ‘state laws specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans.’” Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 47, 107 S.Ct. 1549 (quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97, 103 S.Ct. 2890). Rather, “common law causes of action ... based on alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits .. undoubtedly meet the criteria for preemption under § 514(a).” Id. at 48, 107 S.Ct. 1549. Recent cases on the bread determination before the injury occurred, alleging an imminent threat to life or health, this Court would have had the statutory authority to provide prospective relief for benefits allegedly due under the plan, perhaps averting this catastrophe. Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. at 531, 107 S.Ct. 1931, 95 L.Ed.2d 458 ; Turner at 198-200 (holding that 29 U.S.C. §
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a subclass of plan participants could sue where the remedy sought by plaintiffs would benefit the plan as a whole and cure any harm that the plan suffered
B. holding that erisa permits suits to recover benefits only against the plan as an entity and thus the beneficiary had erred by suing her exhusbands employer and plan administrator when proper party would have been the benefits plan itself
C. holding that making intentional representations about the future of plan benefits may be an act of plan administration
D. holding that insureds declaratory judgment class action claims seeking to retain tort settlements following their insurers claims for reimbursement were claims to enforce their rights under the terms of the plan and to clarify their rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan under erisa
E. holding under the exclusive civil enforcement provisions of 502a as set forth in 29 usc 1132a that a beneficiary may sue to recover benefits due under the plan to enforce the participants rights under the plan or to clarify rights to future benefits
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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from the discretionary function of interpreting the plan, see 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21), is co-extensive with, and reviewed under the same standard as, its authority to construe plan documents. Varity Corp., 516. U.S. at 514-15. Because § 1303(f) does not provide various specific remedies for different types of fiduciary conduct, but simply provides a broad right of action that is not explicitly limited according to the substance of a participant’s claim, there is no reason that plaintiffs cannot frame their claim as involving PBGC’s breach of its fiduciary duties of care and loyalty in interpreting Plan documents, even though they could, in theory, bring a separate action to appeal the denial of their benefits. Cf. Devlin v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 274 F.3d 76, 89 (2d Cir.2001) . As trustee, PBGC had the power “to do any act
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that monetary damages may be awarded in a 1132a3 claim because when sought as a remedy for breach of fiduciary duty restitution is properly regarded as an equitable remedy because the fiduciary concept is equitable
B. holding that a plaintiff seeking individual relief under erisa 502a3 under a breach of fiduciary duty theory did not have a cause of action when the alleged breach of fiduciary duty was a failure to distribute benefits in accordance with the plan
C. holding a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty will not lie where the claim of breach is dependent upon the existence of a contractual relationship between the parties
D. holding that a cause of action for breach of contract accrues at the time of the breach
E. holding that in the context of title i varity corp did not eliminate a private cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty when another potential remedy is available
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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certain an individual is armed; rather, the issue is whether a reasonably prudent person would justifiably believe that he or others were in danger. Id. (citing O’Hara v. State, 27 S.W.3d 548, 551 (Tex.Crim.App.2000)). In the present case, Sgt. Meisel observed a bulge in the front of appellant’s pants, and believed the object was a weapon. Sgt. Meisel conveyed this information to the uniformed officer who patted appellant down. According to Deputy Palcios, the object was located in an area where people commonly carry weapons. Deputy Palcios also explained they thought it suspicious appellant had not entered the metal detector area at the airport. These specific and articulable facts reasonably led the officers to conclude appellant might possess a weapon. See Roy, 55 S.W.3d at 157 ; see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing the search of incoming international mail at or near the arrival airport to be a search at the functional equivalent of the border
B. holding that use of deadly force was justified against a suspect when officer forced to make a splitsecond decision relied on his reasonable belief that another officer had seen a gun in the suspects hands even though the suspects hands were handcuffed in front of him and the defendant officer never saw a weapon
C. holding the escalating intrusiveness of airport screen search from metal detector to pat down to emptying and searching pockets was minimally intrusive
D. holding pat down at airport justified after officer observed bundle under suspects clothing near waist
E. holding detention occurred after officer observed large bundle near suspects waist and handcuffed suspect for further investigation
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Both were behaving nervously. Appellant tries to dismiss this behavior by asserting that nervousness “is an entirely natural reaction” to the presence of law enforcement and that Ms. Lewis might have “had any number of reasons” to give the police a “single inaccurate statement.” Even if these assertions were true, “[a] determination that reasonable suspicion exists ... need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). Instead, Officer Chih reasonably could suspect that Ms. Lewis and her son had been trying to mislead the police so they would not find appellant and his brother and that appellant’s nervousness reflected his fear of being caught— both reasonable possibilities which lent furt . 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). III. Did
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a temporary detention designed to last only until a preliminary investigation here the showup identification procedure either generated probable cause or resulted in the release of the suspect is consistent with the fourth amendment
B. recognizing that for fourth amendment purposes an arrest warrant supported by probable cause carries with it limited authority to enter a dwelling in which a suspect lives when there is reason to believe that the suspect is within
C. holding that pretrial detention resulting from legal process unsupported by probable cause violates the fourth amendment
D. holding a fourth amendment terry detention is not a custodial arrest and the use of handcuffs does not automatically convert a temporary detention into a fourth amendment arrest
E. holding that statute allowing issuance of detention order based on reasonable grounds not amounting to probable cause to arrest to suspect the person described in the affidavit committed the offense did not violate the fourth amendment
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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of the doctrine of equitable subrogration, the Government violated a “duty, implicit in the three-party relationship between [the Government], the contractor, and the surety,” to administer the contract in a responsible manner. PI. Mot at 18-19. This argument, however, fails to recognize that the court’s jurisdiction is dependant on the doctrine of equitable subrogation. United Surety, 87 Fed.Cl. at 587 (“Because United Surety became a performing and paying surety for Selpa, United Surety has satisfied the jurisdictional requirements of the Tucker Act under the doctrine of equitable subrogation.”). Although a surety bond creates a third-party relationship, the surety does not assume privity of contract with the Government. Ransom v. United States, 900 F.2d 242, 244-45 (Fed.Cir.1990) . Without privity, the surety may only satisfy
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a federal regulation did not create privity of contract between the plaintiff and the government
B. holding that there is no privity of contract between the government and a surety since the government is not a party to the agreement between the surety and the contractor the government never undertakes an obligation to the surety
C. holding that absent privity between plaintiffs and the government there is no ease
D. recognizing that the gjovernment as obligee owes no equitable duty to a surety unless the surety notifies the government that the principal has defaulted under the bond notice by the surety is essential before any governmental duty exists
E. holding that a surety has standing to sue for a progress payment released by the government after notification by the surety of unpaid subcontractors
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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that the Notice of Appeal pertained to Omar Tecat in CR 02-575) App. at 7. 5 . That docket entry stated: Clerk's Quality Control Message: Document [3] NOTICE OF DOCKETING filed by the USCA should have been filed in the traditional manner, on paper, as this case is not subject to e-filing at this time, as previously explained on 7/19/05. (ck) App. at 2. 6 . The question has recently arisen in the courts of appeals as to whether Rules 3 and 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure are rules that govern subject-matter jurisdiction (that may not be waived) or are merely "inflexible claim-processing” rules (that may be waived). This concern was sparked by the Supreme Court’s recent holdings in Eberhart v. United States, - U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 403, 407, 163 L.Ed.2d 14 (2005) (per curiam) , and Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455-456,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that an issue not raised on appeal is waived
B. holding that kontrick and eberhart require the conclusion that rule 59e is a claimprocessing rule
C. holding that rule 33 of the federal rules of criminal procedure is an inflexible claimprocessing rule that may be waived if not raised
D. holding that the time limit to move for a new trial under federal rule of criminal pro cedure 33b2 is claimprocessing rule forfeited by governments failure to timely raise it
E. recognizing a presumption that a plea of guilty is final and binding if the plea was made during a properly conducted hearing pursuant to rule 11 of the federal rules of criminal procedure
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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as fact for more than 200 years.” (Id. at 7). It is clear that the claims of excessive noise levels and the analysis of the OSHA regulations dealing with time weighted averages “present technical issues beyond the common experience and understanding of the average jury.” In re Amtrak “Sunset Ltd.” Train Crash, 188 F.Supp.2d at 1347. Although fellow employees with extensive experience in the Patchogue Yard may be able to offer testimony on their subjective impressions of the noise level of the DE and DM warning devices, they lack the technical expertise necessary to analyze whether the decibel levels of the horns were in fact higher than those of the older trains’ horns or whether these horns caused plaintiffs loss of hearing. See Thirkill v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc. 950 F.Supp. at 1107 . While plaintiffs expert, Dr. Danziger, opines
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the plaintiffs experts were not qualified to offer a medical opinion as to the cause of death because they are not physicians nor otherwise properly qualified to offer a medical opinion
B. holding beneficiaries under a will are qualified to testify to execution
C. holding that an expert could testify that unguarded elevator buttons constituted a design defect despite the experts lack of a specific background in design and manufacture of elevators
D. holding that njeither the plaintiff nor fellow crewmen are qualified to testify as design experts
E. holding that generally qualified experts do not require a subspecialty in order to testify to things within their expertise
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Given the unique circumstances of this case, we disagree. The victim initially told police that Peals attacked her for no reason. At trial, the victim testified that she was intoxicated and was the aggressor. Further, the victim testified that she lied to the police because she was angry with Peals. The portions of the record attached to the trial court’s order show that the victim was the only witness to testify at trial about her intoxication. Because the victim admitted at trial that she lied, the jury may have been disinclined to believe her testimony. Peals, who asserted self-defense, may have been prejudiced by counsel’s failure to corroborate her testimony concerning her intoxication with the testimony of medical personnel. Cf. Kegler v. State, 712 So.2d 1167 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) . Accordingly, the trial court is directed to
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that counsel was ineffective for inter alia failing to impeach a witness with prior inconsistent statements
B. holding that counsels failure to impeach a witness by showing bias was ineffective assistance
C. recognizing that evidence of extra judicial statements by nonparty witness was admissable only to impeach
D. holding that the state could not impeach an expert witness with evidence concerning past issues with the payment of taxes
E. holding in rule 3850 proceeding that trial counsel s failure to impeach witness with statements he made on night of murder was not reasonable under the circumstances
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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arisen in an action “for the recovery of money only, or specific real * * * property.” Nor are we persuaded that appellants’ counterclaims transformed the action into one “for the recovery of * * * personal property.” Even if we were to so characterize appellants’ counterclaims, based upon their prayer for a declaration requiring the intestate distribution of the property, such relief would merely be incidental to the declaratory relief sought and would ripen only upon the entry of declaratory relief favorable to appellants. See Murello Constr. Co., supra, 29 Ohio App.3d at 334, 29 OBR at 461-462, 505 N.E.2d at 638. We conclude, instead, that the relief sought was primarily and predominantly equitable. See Gearhart, supra, 109 Ohio St. 418, 142 N.E. 890, paragraph one of the syllabus ; accord Sessions, supra, 163 Ohio St. 409, 56
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the statute of limitations cannot bar appellants claim that a constructive trust should be imposed because a constructive trust is an equitable remedy and therefore not subject to the statute
B. recognizing that the determination is an equitable one
C. holding that under california law a constructive trust may be sought only by the equitable owner of the trust res not by a creditor of the equitable owner
D. holding that an action construing a will creating a trust is equitable in nature
E. recognizing constructive trust as appropriate equitable remedy
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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he failed to adequately supplement the record, and to challenge the competency of trial counsel. The failure of the appellate counsel to provide effective assistance resulted in the petitioner being denied his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, the provisions of the Alabama Constitution, and Alabama law.” (C.R. 41.) This paragraph constitutes Madison’s entire argument on this issue. The circuit court when denying relief stated: “Madison does not argue his appellate counsel was disbarred because of his performance in Madison’s case nor does he proffer any facts in his Rule 32 petition indicating how he was prejudiced due to his appellate counsel being disbarred. See Adkins v. State, [930 So.2d 524] (Ala.Crim.App.2001) . Madison also fails to identify in ... his
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding no error was committed when trial court held defense counsel in contempt in front of the jury though it would have been the better practice to reprimand counsel and impose the fine in the absence of the jury
B. holding counsel will be held ineffective if he made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the sixth amendment and such performance prejudiced the defense
C. holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his petition for reinstatement where membership in good standing in the state bar was required before attorney could be admitted to the federal bar and applicant had not been readmitted to state bar
D. holding that review is de novo where there has been no adjudication on the merits in state court
E. holding that the fact that adkins defense counsel have been disciplined by the alabama state bar on unrelated matters has no bearing on their performance in adkins trial
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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disposition of the action roughly corresponds with the framework we outlined in Meyer-land for disposing of a case which is being appealed in state court when removal is effected. According to Meyerland, "the district court [should] take the state judgment as it finds it, prepare the record as required for appeal, and forward the case to a federal appellate court for review.” Id., 960 F.2d at 520; see also Matter of 5300 Memorial Investors, Ltd., 973 F.2d 1160, 1162 (5th Cir.1992) (citing Meyerland). We further note that the district court's failure to reenter the state court judgment on a document separate from its order, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 58, does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction. See Bankers Trust Co. v. Mollis, 435 U.S. 381, 387, 98 S.Ct. 1117, 1121, 55 L.Ed.2d 357 (1978) . 10 . We reject at the outset the plaintiffs’
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that identification of appellant in notice of appeal is a jurisdictional requirement and that the failure to name a party in a notice to appeal constitutes a failure of that party to appeal
B. holding that there was appellate jurisdiction under principle that a premature notice of appeal from a nonfinal order may ripen into a valid notice of appeal if a final judgment has been entered by the time the appeal is heard and the appellee suffers no prejudice
C. holding that technical inadequacy in the notice of appeal did not deprive the court of jurisdiction
D. holding that the 30day notice of appeal requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional
E. holding that the same principles of commonsense that led the court to conclude that the technical requirements for a notice of appeal were not mandatory where the notice did not mislead or prejudice the appellee demonstrate that parties to an appeal may waive the separatejudgment requirement of rule 58
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly and intentionally became a member of the single conspiracy alleged in the indictment as opposed to some other conspiracy. Proof that the defendant was only a member of some other conspiracy is not enough to convict. However, proof that a defendant was a member of some other conspiracy would not prevent you from returning a guilty verdict if the government also proved that the defendant was also a member of the conspiracy charged in the indictment. (J.A. at 3839, 3849.) The first portion of this instruction is a correct statement of law. A jury need not find that a defendant conspired with all the alleged co-conspirators in order to convict a defendant of conspiracy. See United States v. Sandy, 605 F.2d 210, 217 (6th Cir.1979) ; see also United States v. Thomas, 348 F.3d
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a prior acquittal does not preclude the admission of evidence of a defendants other alleged crimes in a prosecution for the bank robbery on the basis of collateral estoppel principles because the prior acquittal did not determine an ultimate issue in the present case
B. holding that the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction requires that the outofstate coconspirator was or should have been aware of the acts performed in the forum state in furtherance of the conspiracy
C. holding testimony admissible as showing context of relationship with coconspirator prior to conspiracy
D. holding that an acquittal of sole coconspirator does not re quire reversal of defendants conviction
E. holding the acquittal of several jointly tried codefendants in a conspiracy case was not grounds for reversing the conviction of a codefendant and alleged coconspirator
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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of promissory estop-pel. We grant transfer to address these matters. The essence of the employment-at-will doctrine is that an employment contract of indefinite duration is presumptively terminable at the will of either party. McClanahan v. Remington Freight Lines (1988), Ind., 517 N.E.2d 390, 392; Streckfus v. Gardenside Terrace Cooperative, Inc. (1987), Ind., 504 N.E.2d 273, 275. The doctrine is deeply rooted in Indiana jurisprudence. See Campbell v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1980), Ind.App., 413 N.E.2d 1054, 1060. The doctrine has only rarely been limited. See, e.g., Bochnowski v. Peoples Fed. Sav. & Loan (1991), Ind., 571 N.E.2d 282, 285 (allowing claim for tor-tious interference with at-will employment relationship); McClanahan v. Remington Freight, Inc. (1988), Ind., 517 N.E.2d 390, 393 ; and Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co. (1983),
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the plaintiffs complaint stated an enforceable claim for wrongful discharge where the employee was wrongfully discharged in retaliation for refusing to testify falsely in a medical malpractice case
B. recognizing a tort action for wrongful discharge when employee was terminated because he refused to commit a criminal act
C. holding that an employee was wrongfully discharged for refusing to submit to a polygraph test
D. holding the complaint stated a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy where the employee was discharged for refusing to comply with his employers demand that he continue to operate a commercial vehicle for periods of time that violated federal regulations
E. holding that employee stated claim by alleging he was wrongfully discharged for refusing to commit criminal act for which he would be held personally liable
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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judge refused to allow the testimony. Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in excluding this evidence. An accused in a criminal case is allowed to introduce evidence of a specific good character trait to show that it is improbable that he committed the offense charged, where that character trait is relevant to the offense. See Tex.R. Evid. 404(a)(1); Thomas v. State, 669 S.W.2d 420, 423 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, pet. ref'd). If evidence of a person’s character or character trait is admissible, proof may be made through reputation or opinion testimony. See Tex.R. Evid. 405(a). However, specific instances of conduct are inadmissible to show an inference that the accused did or did not commit the offense. See, e.g., Schmidt v. State, 449 S.W.2d 39, 40 (Tex.Crim.App.1969) ; Garcia v. State, 819 S.W.2d 667, 668
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that defendant may be entitled to selfdefense instruction even though he did not testify
B. holding that it may not
C. holding a defendant may testify that he lacked intent while also arguing that if the jury concludes otherwise then it should consider whether his intent was the product of government inducement
D. holding that right to testify not denied where inter alia defendant made no objection to his attorneys statements that defendant would not testify and made no request to testify
E. holding that while the defendant may offer reputation evidence on his lawabiding character he may not testify that he has never been in trouble
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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has not detected •any changes or. mood swings in appellant. Plunkett also testified that appellant’s family is supportive. The family has visited appellant in inpatient care, along with the child born from appellant’s 1999 pregnancy. Plunkett said that there have been no problem with the family visits. As with Dr. Howland and Dr. Moeller, Plunkett opined that appellant is ready to be transferred to outpatient care. Plunkett also signed a report finding that appellant “has reached the maximum benefit from hospitalization.” This evidence does not support the trial court’s finding that appellant is likely to cause serious harm to others as a result of her mental illness. Not a single expert testified that appellant is aggressive, either verbally or physically. See K.E.W., 315 S.W.3d at 24 . The only evidence of aggressive behavior in
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that an overt act may be a verbal statement or a physical act
B. holding that a conspiracy is an agreement to commit an illegal act into which the defendant knowingly and voluntary enters and which is manifested by an overt act
C. holding proof of an overt act is not required to establish a violation of 846
D. holding that proof of an overt act is not required in a 846 conspiracy
E. holding that proof of overt act is not required to support admission of evidence of statement of coconspirator during course of conspiracy
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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on Same Criminal Transaction or Common Scheme A person commits capital murder if: (1) the person commits murder as defined under Section 19.02(b)(1); and (2) the person commits one of the nine aggravating circumstances listed in Sections 19.03(a)(1) through 19.03(a)(9). Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a) (West 2013). In the instant case, Saenz was charged with the aggravating circumstance contained in Section 19.03(a)(7), which requires the person to have murdered more than one person: (A) during the same criminal transaction; or (B) during different criminal transactions but the murders are committed pursuant to the same scheme or course of conduct. Id. at § 19.03(a)(7). Each of the ni 46098, *2-3 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi Jan. 19, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) . Saenz contends that subsections (A) and (B)
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that where a jury returned with a unanimous finding of no proximate cause but could not reach a unanimous finding on the question of negligence the jury verdict was simple to harmonize and such a finding compelled a judgment for defendant internal quotation marks omitted
B. holding jury verdict unanimous where jury was charged with alternate aggravating circumstance of robbery or burglary against any one of five named victims
C. recognizing that even a nonunanimous recommendation of death by the jury proved that the jury including the jurors who voted against the recommendation of death had unanimously found the existence of a proffered aggravating circumstance even though the circumstance was not included within the definition of the particular capitalmurder offense charged in the indictment because the trial court had specifically instructed the jury that it could not proceed to a vote on whether to impose the death penalty unless it had already unanimously agreed that an aggravating circumstance existed
D. holding jury trial waiver valid although district court did not inform defendant of right to unanimous verdict
E. holding jury verdict unanimous where jury was charged with alternative aggravating circumstance of burglary involving two different victims
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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of wrongful manipulation of the WSSC by either the Council or the Planning Commission. 281 Md. at 21-22, 376 A.2d 505. The court held that the dedication to the public of the property valued at $800,000 did not create any vested rights. 281 Md. at 23, 376 A.2d 505. The court’s rationale was that there was no evidence that TKU had been guaranteed a permit to redevelop and that no valid promises by appropriate officials had been made to the developer. The court concluded: [I]n order to obtain a vested zoning status, there must be cons 6 Md. 117, 125-26, 291 A.2d 672 (1972); City of Hagerstown v. Long Meadow Shopping Ctr., 264 Md. 481, 494-96, 287 A.2d 242 (1972); Mayor of Baltimore v. Shapiro, 187 Md. 623, 624, 51 A.2d 273 (1947); Lipsitz v. Parr, 164 Md. 222, 228, 164 A. 743 (1933) ; County Comm’rs v. Arundel Corp., 82 Md.App.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that it is well settled that there is no constitutional right to an appeal
B. holding that it is not
C. holding that if precise issue is not clear in statute reviewing court must not simply impose its own construction but must determine whether agencys construction is permissible
D. holding a defendant is not vested with a right to be absent from trial
E. holding that even if construction commences but it is based on an illegally issued permit no vested right is created
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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sanctions is to compel compliance with the court’s orders and not to punish, the continuing contempt sanctions end when the contemnor complies. A civil contempt defendant “carries the keys of his prison in his own pocket. He can end the sentence and discharge himself of contempt at any moment by doing what he has previously refused to do.” State v. Pothier, 104 N.M. 363, 364, 721 P.2d 1294, 1295 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Civil contempt sanctions may be imposed by honoring the most basic due process protections-in most cases, fair notice and an opportunity to be heard. Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827, 114 S.Ct. 2552, 129 L.Ed.2d 642 (1994); see Turner v. Rogers, — U.S. —,—, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 2520, 180 L.Ed.2d 452 (2011) . {26} Criminal contempt proceedings are
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that constitutional due process in civil contempt proceedings requires notice and a hearing but not the right to counsel
B. recognizing due process right to notice and informal hearing in school disciplinary process
C. holding that due process requires an evidentiary hearing when parties submissions in contempt proceedings raise disputed issue of material fact
D. holding that due process requires a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case
E. holding that due process encompasses the right to counsel in a civil contempt proceeding
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |