prompt
stringlengths 315
115k
| response
stringclasses 20
values | dataset
stringclasses 2
values |
|---|---|---|
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
he received and read the letter. „ He further testified that he was able to read the determination and understand that he disagreed with its conclusions. He argues only that he failed to properly comprehend the notice of his rights to appeal. In support, the only evidence regarding good cause for the late filing was Westbrook’s own testimony, and we defer to the Commission regarding witness credibility. Lucido, 441 S.W.3d at 174 (citation omitted). Although Westbrook broadly argues that it is “illogical” for the Appeals Tribunal to make assumptions based on “facts that are ... not in the record,” we find nothing in the decision that is illogical or based o d not establish good cause by showing he misplaced the document); Taylor v. St. Louis Arc, Inc., 285 S.W.3d 775 (Mo.App.E.D.2009) . Because competent and substantial evidence
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that claimant did not establish good cause because she erroneously thought the determination was not final
B. holding that claimant did not establish good cause by showing he was unable to comprehend the determination
C. holding that the defendant did not establish good faith as a matter of law
D. holding that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she was unable to present evidence that she was qualified for the position
E. holding lack of prejudice to the defendant is not good cause
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
of, or immediately after, the return of the verdict.” Azimi v. Jordan’s Meats, Inc., 456 F.3d 228, 240 (1st Cir.2006) (emphasis added). The Azimi court noted that this rule allows a plaintiff to avoid the tactical dilemma that occurs when a plaintiff is forced to choose between asking for only compensatory damages and risking a zero-dollar verdict, on one hand, or requesting a nominal damages instruction and giving the jury an easy “out” on the other hand. Id. Miller argues that this is the dilemma he faced. Before addressing the tactical dilemma issue, it must first be noted that, although .the First Circuit has adopted an exception to Rule 51(c)(2), many circuits that have addressed similar issues have declined to do so. See Oliver v. Falla, 258 F.3d 1277, 1282 (11th Cir.2001) ; Piaubert v. MacIntosh, 10 Fed.Appx. 503 (9th
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that in an action for breach of contract only nominal damages can be recovered if there is no evidence produced from which the facts necessary to determine damages under the proper rule can be determined
B. holding that plaintiff waived the right to nominal damages in an excessive force case because nominal damages were not requested until after the verdict
C. holding that the right to nominal damages was waived in a breach of duty action when plaintiff failed to raise the issue of nominal damages until after the verdict
D. holding that the right to nominal damages for eighth amendment violations can be waived if such damages are not timely requested
E. holding that the first amendment right to free speech is absolute and an award of nominal damages is required even if the defendant fails to object to the nominal damages instruction
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | D | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
of 1992, and legal review was the “main work” on the film through July of that year. This evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to appellee, does not raise a fact issue as to the existence of actual malice. The evidence, which we have reviewed in its entirety, shows only that the legal department took a protracted amount of time to review Women on Trial. It does not show that the legal review was based on fears that statements in the documentary were untrue and were known to be untrue by those involved in the production. Appellee’s suspicions about the reasons appellant’s legal department chose to “continuously” review the film and decided to indemnify Joseph Feu-ry Productions, Inc. is not sufficient to raise a material issue of fact. See Schauer, 856 S.W.2d at 450 (citing International & G.N.R. Co. v.
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that mere surmise or suspicion of malice does not carry the probative force necessary to form the basis of a legal inference of malice
B. holding that a nonmovant cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment merely on the basis of conjecture or surmise
C. holding that understandable misinterpretation of ambiguous facts does not show actual malice
D. holding that a factual finding must be supported by more than mere surmise or suspicion
E. holding a claimant must prove entitlement to benefits by the preponderance of the evidence which is not sustained by mere surmise or conjecture
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
of Columbia v. Whitley, 640 A.2d 710, 712 (D.C. 1994) (quoting Mason v. United States, 346 A.2d 250, 251 (D.C. 1975)). 3 .The complaining witness had been served with a subpoena, but the government neither sought enforcement of the subpoena nor notified the court that the witness was under subpoena. The trial judge indicated that had he been informed of these facts, he "probably would have not dismissed the case” but only reassessed Lyles’ bond arrangements. 4 . District of Columbia Circuit precedent prior to February 1, 1971, is binding on this court. M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C.1971). 5 . The opinion does not specify whether the oral dismissal was with or without prejudice or dis 1, 466 P.2d 755, 757 (1970)); Gowler v. Oklahoma, 589 P.2d 682, 688 (Okla.Crim. App.1978) . 8 . In Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462,
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that because the plaintiff had not perfected service within 120 days of filing the complaint the complaint was subject to mandatory dismissal
B. holding that a trial judge has unquestionable authority to withdraw an order of dismissal that has not been fully perfected by filing
C. holding that a trial court does not lose jurisdiction in a matter by ordering its dismissal before jeopardy has attached unless there is an abuse of discretion in vacating the order of dismissal and reinstating the case for trial
D. holding the basic purpose of a financing statement is to provide notice to outside creditors that a secured claim has been perfected
E. holding that a federal court must order arbitration once it is satisfied that an agreement for arbitration has been made and has not been honored
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
as defined in section 790.001(13). A “weapon” is defined in section 790.001(13) as “any dirk, knife, metallic knuckles, slungshot, billie, tear gas gun, chemical weapon or device, or other deadly weapon.” § 790.001(13), Fla. Stat. (2008) (emphasis added). Again, since a BB gun is not enumerated, in order to be prohibited under section 790.115(2), the subsection charged, it must be a deadly weapon. See Hutchinson v. State, 816 So.2d 1186, 1187 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (reversing conviction for robbery with a weapon, to wit a starter pistol, because the starter pistol did not fall within the definition of weapon supplied in section 790.001(13), unless the pistol was considered deadly, and there was no evidence to support such a finding); Mitchell v. State, 698 So.2d 555, 559-60 (Fla. 2d DCA) , approved, 703 So.2d 1062 (Fla.1997). “A
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that an unloaded gun used in the commission of an aggravated assault is a deadly weapon
B. holding that a bb gun is not a firearm and thus falls within chapter 790s definition of weapon only if it is an other deadly weapon
C. recognizing that deadly weapon finding may be made even when weapon used is unknown
D. holding hand can be deadly weapon
E. holding that pencil was deadly weapon
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
location upon its return. See Davidson, supra; State v. Prine (Mar. 6, 1991), Summit App. No. 14780, unreported, 1991 WL 35156 (noting that “in resolving any perceived inconsistency between this holding and that of any prior case, the reader is advised that the holding of this case has been approved by a majority of the members of the court”); State v. Brenner (July 30, 1990), Butler App. No. CA8909-127, unreported, 1990 WL 107319; State v. Smoot (1991), 75 Ohio App.3d 702, 600 N.E.2d 772; State v. Burton (Nov. 29, 1991), Lake App. No. 90-L-15-138, unreported, 1991 WL 252865 (stating that it was inclined to follow the interpretation in Prine, supra, but was not required to reach that issue). But, see, State v. Young (Apr. 11, 1991), Delaware App. No. 90-CA-40, unreported, 1991 WL 57176 . Holzapfel does not allege that the
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that under new york law a dismissal for failure to comply with discovery obligations is not a judgment on the merits and does not bar a subsequent suit involving the same parties and issues
B. holding that an administrative agency is not subject to a contempt proceeding for failure to comply with an order
C. holding failure to comply with 851b was harmless error in part because defendant did not comply with 851c procedures for challenging prior convictions
D. holding that a failure to conduct a new rfi survey after removing the instrument for repairs does not comply with ohio admcode 37015302c
E. holding that dismissal for failure to comply with discovery orders is on the merits
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | D | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
that the timing of the wife’s complaints, three months after the alleged threatening calls, as well as the timing of Anura’s application for asylum and generation of documents mere weeks before the deadline, appeared to be the creation of evidence rather than the credible recitation of events. The record does not compel the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., Pal v. INS, 204 F.3d 935, 938 (9th Cir.2000). Further, the IJ found that even if Anura had been credible in his account of the alleged threatening incidents, they would not have amounted to past persecution. Threats standing alone “constitute past persecution in only a small category of cases, and only when the threats are so menacing as to cause significant actual ‘suffering or harm.’ ” Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir.2000) . The IJ also reasonably discounted Anura’s
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that where petitioner testified that some of her cousins had been killed because they served in the military and that she had received two threatening notes she had demonstrated past persecution
B. holding that an alien had a reasonable fear of future persecution because he had received death threats was followed appeared on a death list and because his colleagues who received similar threats were killed
C. holding that alien who had received numerous death threats and whose colleagues were murdered by the military had not proven past persecution
D. holding that threats standing alone generally do not constitute past persecution
E. holding that threats combined with the murder of a fellow preacher constituted past persecution
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | C | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
and the time limitation should be tolled for the 170 days when the application was out of his hands. We disagree. As the district court convincingly noted: “Mr. Marsh chose to rely upon assistance from the prison legal access attorney and an inmate law clerk despite the fact that he was raising in the state courts only the unexhausted claims he already had raised in federal court.” R. doc. 11, at 5-6. The fact that an inmate law clerk was assisting in drafting the state petition does not relieve Mr. Marsh from the personal responsibility of complying with the law. See Henderson v. Johnson, 1 F.Supp.2d 650, 655 (N.D.Tex.1998) (noting that although inmate had received assistance from fellow inmate, he could have filed the petition himself at any time); see also Steed, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 . Finally, Mr. Marsh asserts that between the
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that equitable tolling of the time to file a notice of appeal is not permitted
B. recognizing that equitable tolling doctrines may toll the time period for filing
C. holding that attorneys mental illness may justify equitable tolling
D. holding that attorney miscalculation of aedpa time period did not justify equitable tolling
E. holding that the 120day filing period is subject to equitable tolling and addressing circumstances warranting equitable tolling
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | D | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
U.S. 563, 97 S.Ct. 1963, 52 L.Ed.2d 582 (1977), the Court held that under subsection 1202(a), proof that the possessed firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce was sufficient to satisfy the statutorily required nexus between the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and commerce. Although Scarborough was a possession case rather than a receipt case, the Court noted parenthetically that there was no congressional intent to support a distinction between the two: “Congress was not particularly concerned with the impact on commerce except as a means to insure the constitutionality of Title VII.... All indications are that Congress meant to reach possessions broadly.” Id. at 575 n. 11, 97 S.Ct. at 1969 n. 11. See also United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1347 (5th Cir.1994) ; United States v. Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 996, 999
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing power of states to engage in some regulation of interstate commerce
B. holding that the feloninpossessionofafirearm statute only requires a showing that the firearm at one time traveled through interstate commerce
C. recognizing that the interstate nexus requirement is satisfied by proof of a probable or potential impact on interstate commerce
D. recognizing scarborough holding that commerce nexus satisfied upon showing that possessed firearm had traveled at some time in interstate commerce
E. holding that the connection between the robbery and interstate commerce was much more direct than in wang because at the time of the robbery the victim in walker was selling illegal drugs that had traveled through interstate commerce
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | D | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
his misrepresentations was justifiable. Mr. Ragonese strenuously argues that it was not, based upon the Falcones’ knowledge of certain facts, including the incompleteness of the project, Mr. Ragonese’s history of absence from the project, and the threatened subcontractor’s lien. Although Mr. Ragonese argues cursorily in his brief that the bankruptcy court erred in finding that his misrepresentations caused the Falcones’ loss, he excluded this issue from his Statement of Issues. During oral argument, Mr. Ra-gonese admitted that he had not raised the causation issue below and that he included it in his brief on appeal essentially as an afterthought. We therefore deem the causation issue waived. See City Sanitation, LLC v. Burdick (In re Am. Cartage, Inc.), 438 B.R. 1, 9-10 (D.Mass.2010) . The Falcones argue that their rebanee on Mr.
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that where issue raised for first time on appeal was not encompassed or inferred by any listed issue it is waived
B. holding that an issue not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal
C. holding that an issue not raised on appeal is waived
D. holding that court will not consider issue raised for first time on appeal
E. holding issue not raised in the bankruptcy court was waived on appeal
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
with the testimony of the witness. However, contradiction of collateral facts by other evidence is not permitted, as its only effect would be to show that the witness is capable of error on immaterial points, and to allow it would confuse the issues and unduly prolong the trial. State v. Kimble, 140 N.C. App. 153, 167, 535 S.E.2d 882, 891 (2000) (citations and quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 360 N.C. 178, 626 S.E.2d 833 (2005). While the denial of a conviction may be contradicted by extrinsic evidence from a public record, the facts surrounding prior convictions will normally be collateral, and extrinsic evidence is inadmissible if used solely to contradict the witness’ denial of such collateral matters. See State v. Dalton, 96 N.C. App. 65, 70, 384 S.E.2d 573, 576 (1989) ; State v. Monk, 286 N.C. 509, 517, 212 S.E.2d
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a defendants denial of a conviction may be contradicted by introducing public records which prove such a conviction
B. holding counsel must examine public information like prior conviction records prosecutor is likely to use
C. holding that uncounseled conviction could not be considered by court in sentencing defendant after subsequent conviction
D. holding that for sentencing purposes the government does not need to allege a defendants prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact is not an element of the present crime
E. holding that where a statute provides for an enhanced penalty based on a defendants prior conviction the fact of conviction is a sentencing factor to be determined by the court rather than a jury
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
1252, 1256 (10th Cir.1998) (observing that a warrantless arrest is permissible “if facts and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge and of which he or she has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to lead a prudent person to believe that the arrestee has committed or is committing an offense”) (quotation omitted and italics omitted). Owens also stated that the Eidsons’ son had “turned [them] in,” Aplt. App. at 359, when in fact, the mother and grandmother of their son’s girlfriend had contacted law enforcement. Owens’ statement may have led the Eidsons to think that resistance to a search would have been futile, as their unlawful conduct had been exposed by someone with direct knowledge of it. See United States v. Escobar, 389 F.3d 781, 786 (8th Cir.2004) . But it appears that Owens was merely stating
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that because the individual was being illegally detained when he consented to the search of his luggage that consent was tainted by the illegality
B. holding that a dog sniff of the exterior of luggage in a public airport does not constitute a search under the fourth amendment
C. holding that a canine sniff of luggage does not constitute a search
D. holding three to four hour detention of luggage unreasonable
E. holding that defendants consent to a search of their luggage was undermined by officers misrepresentation that a drug dog had alerted to their luggage
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
their actual knowledge may be imputed to the city. A title VII employer has actual knowledge of harassment that is known to “higher management” or to someone who has the power to take action to remedy the problem. See Nash, 9 F.3d at 404. The “management” and “remedial power” standards blur together, however, when we examine who may be considered “management,” for to be considered a “manager,” a person must have the ability to exert control over employees. This includes someone with the power not only to hire and fire the offending employee but also to take disciplinary action, to provide significant input into employment decisions, to instruct the offending employee to cease the harassing behavior, or to implement other means of taking remedial action. See Williamson, 148 F.3d at 466 ; Nash, 9 F.3d at 404; Wattman, 875 F.2d at
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing the continuing validity of negligence as a separate basis for employer liability in action in which employee alleged supervisor harassment
B. holding that if a direct supervisor who had the responsibility to stop harassment knew of and failed to act against it the plaintiff has no further obligation to bring it to the employers attention
C. holding plaintiffs supervisor subject to suit
D. holding that a supervisor was not similarly situated to another supervisor with the same title where the former could not perform the latters duties
E. holding that employer includes supervisor with some authority to address the harassment problem in organization with strong chain of command where supervisor could direct offender to cease and discipline if offender failed to comply
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
621 (2005), to conduct a full resentencing hearing and to impose a non-guideline sentence guided only by the sentencing goals set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). He acknowledges that U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.10, p.s. (2008) limits the scope of the proceeding and the extent of the reduction the district court may make under § 3582(c)(2), but contends. that, after Booker, this policy statement must be regarded as advisory, not mandatory. We affirm. We review an order granting or denying a § 3582(c)(2) motion for abuse of discretion. United States v. Munn, 595 F.3d 183, 186 (4th Cir.2010). Lara-Alvarez’s claim is without merit because Booker is inapplicable to § 3582(c)(2) proceedings. See Dillon v. United States, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 2693-94, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010) ; see also United States v. Dunphy, 551 F.3d
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that booker and kimbrough do not apply at resentencing proceedings under 3582c2
B. holding that 3582c2 does not authorize a resentencing but merely provides for a sentence reduction within the bounds established by the sentencing commission and that booker does not apply to 3582c2 proceedings
C. holding that booker does not prohibit the limitations on a judges discretion in reducing a sentence imposed by 3582c2 and the applicable policy statement by the sentencing commission
D. holding that proceedings under 3582c2 do not constitute a full resentencing of the defendant
E. holding that booker and kimbrough do not apply to 3582c2 proceedings and that booker and kimbrough do not prohibit the limitations on a judges discretion in reducing a sentence imposed by 3582c2 and the applicable policy statement by the sentencing commission
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
basic underlying relationship. Like a switch from a dealership to a “tight agency” or a restructuring that leaves only the premium business in the dealer’s hands, a termination is surely a “change” in the parties’ relationship. Section 135.03 itself does not distinguish, for purposes of the good cause requirement, among actions that “terminate, cancel, fail to renew or substantially change” the dealership agreement. Thus, if Rexnord was entitled to argue that its own economic circumstances constituted good cause for its attempted change and its ultimate termination of Ziegler’s dealership, we see no logical reason why Zenith cannot attempt to do the same with respect to Morley-Murphy’s dealership. Cf. East Bay Running Store, Inc. v. NIKE, Inc., 890 F.2d 996, 1000 n. 6 (7th Cir.1989) . The Wisconsin Supreme Court was careful to
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding unconstitutional ordinance that gave executive director excessive discretion in deciding whether the grant of a permit would be detrimental to the public
B. holding where plan language can be interpreted both to grant discretion and not to grant discretion plan does not unambiguously grant discretion
C. recognizing but not deciding that contrary to what remus held ziegler seemed to contemplate a grant orbased inquiry
D. holding a sentencing court is not required to grant probation
E. recognizing but not deciding argument that failure to verify complaint under supplemental rules may deprive the court of jurisdiction
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | C | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
protected speech. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14, 16-17, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976); see also Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657, 110 S.Ct. 1391, 108 L.Ed.2d 652 (1990). Moreover, contribution regulations need not take the form of absolute dollar limits in order to prompt First Amendment scrutiny; by increasing the effort required to engage in political speech, restrictions on the permissible methods of funding such speech implicate free expression as well. See FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 252, 107 S.Ct. 616, 93 L.Ed.2d 539 (1986) (recognizing a burden on speech when legislation allowed the plaintiff to make political expenditures only from a segregated fund); Pocatello Educ. Ass’n v. Heideman, 504 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir.2007) . By banning a contribution method preferred by
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that persecution was on account of political opinion because petitioners prosecutorial investigation into acts of political corruption was by its very nature political
B. holding that when determining the proper amount for a burdened property that was purchased in a package only two methods suggest themselves as arguably appropriate 1 a determination of the fair market value of the property burdened by the right of first refusal or 2 a determination of the portion of the purchase price which based on the percentage of the fair market value of the entire package represented by the property burdened by the right of first refusal should be allocated to the property burdened by the right of first refusal
C. holding that the plaintiffs right to political speech is fully in accord with the publics interest in free speech and association
D. holding that idahos version of the vca burdened political speech
E. holding that campaign money laundering was in furtherance of political speech but an invalid exercise of free speech rights because it was illegal
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | D | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
Producers’ counsel acknowledged that netting is rational behavior, but stated that “we contend that the way the statute is written in these types of situations ... you have a problem being a buyer in the ordinary course [if you utilize netting].” The Court finds this contention, in light of established practices in the oil and gas industry, to be an untenable proposition. The Downstream Purchasers bought and sold oil and gas on credit with the Debtors agreeing to pay the following month. Although the Downstream Purchasers did not pay for the oil on the sale date, they gave “new value” in the form of a promise to pay, increasing the Debtors’ accounts receivable. This increase in accounts receivable is considered “new value.” See In re Black Diamond Mining Co., 2011 WL 6202905, at *24 . Additionally, payment in the form of oil is
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that plaintiff could not be asked to accept an increase in the contributory negligence percentage and thus a decrease in the judgment as the price of avoiding a new trial
B. holding that dalessio did not justify removal where the gravamen of plaintiffs complaint was that defendants made materially false statements to them in a manner prohibited by new york law and in violation of duties created by new york law and no construction or interpretation of federal law was required
C. holding that new value was created in the form of an increase in accounts receivable
D. holding that documents that are created in the ordinary course of business or would have been created irrespective of litigation are not protected by the work product doctrine
E. holding the application of change in law regarding the timetable for being eligible for parole board hearings was not an increase in punishment violative of the ex post facto clause
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | C | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
property or the validity of the tax assessment, appellant chose to ignore the notice. This citation provided appellant all the notice to which it was entitled when it was originally served with process and gave appellant the opportunity to appear and defend the suit. We overrule appellant’s first point of error. Rule 2 instrument in writing, the damages shall be assessed by the court, or under its direction, unless the defendant demands and is entitled to a trial by jury. Tex.R.Civ.P. 241. A claim is liquidated if the amount of damages may be accurately calculated by the trial court from the factual, as opposed to the conclu-sory, allegations in plaintiffs petition and the instrument in writing. Novosad v. Cunningham, 38 S.W.3d 767, 773 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet. h.) ; Mantis v. Resz, 5 S.W.3d 388, 392
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that district courts order granting motion for default judgment was erroneous because a default judgment cannot be entered until the amount of damages has been ascertained
B. holding that no reporters record was required in suit to recover damages for breach of employment contract because the claim for damages was liquidated and proved by the employment contract attached to the petition
C. holding that suit to recover amount due for professional services was a liquidated claim proved by written instruments where plaintiff attached original invoices to verified petition and motion for default judgment
D. holding that a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment precluded default judgment
E. holding that a liquidated damages amount set by contract is enforceable where the amount bears a reasonable relation to the damages actually sustained
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | C | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
that calls for the exercise of professional judgment (see 12/17/09 Tr. at 103; Defs.’ Mem. at 33 (“no credible argument can be made that there is a systemic lack of professional judgment exercised by treating professionals in the IDD system”)), that proposition is not supported by Youngberg. Youngberg expressly states that a court must “make certain that professional judgment in fact was exercised ” in attempting to protect the rights of an involuntarily committed individual. 457 U.S. at 321, 102 S.Ct. 2452 (emphasis added) (quotation omitted). As other courts have recognized, in order for this requirement to have any substance, it cannot be met purely at the systemic level; rather, professional judgments must be implemented in a timely fashion. See, e.g., Thomas S., 902 F.2d at 252 ; Halderman v. Pennhurst, 901 F.2d 311, 324 (3d
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that traditional allocation of burden of proof to the party challenging the decisions applies to decisions under the tca
B. holding that district court properly imposed liability because it found that many of the decisions of the treating professionals had not been implemented and found areas in which the decisions of the treating professional substantially departed from accepted standards
C. holding that where the alj had already obtained and considered reports from treating physicians the alj had before him a complete medical history and the evidence received from the treating physicians was adequate for him to make a determination as to disability
D. holding that remand was not required and that the aljs failure to mention treating physicians opinion was harmless error because the alj adopted the treating physicians recommendations
E. holding that sources of public policy include legislation administrative rules regulations or decisions and judicial decisions and in certain instances a professional code of ethics
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
any evidence that CHL or McLennan relied upon AEC’s service letters or bulletins or that those letters and bulletins increased the risk to McLennan in any way. To the contrary, both CHL and McLennan ignored those warnings, and the record does not support any reasonable inference that AEC’s service letters and bulletins were misleading or that they masked the potential for danger in any way. We conclude that AEC did not owe McLennan any negligence-based, post-sale duty to warn. Even if McLennan were able to establish the applicability of either the Bradshaw duty or the negligent undertaking theory, any such duty would still be subject to the principle that there is no need to warn of dangers that are generally known. See In re Air Crash at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport, 919 F.2d at 1085 ; see also Argubright, 868 F.2d at 766; Hagans,
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that negligence must be the proximate cause of injury
B. holding in a negligence action that the air traffic controllers failure to warn of an impending danger cannot be the proximate cause of an injury after the pilot himself discovered its presence appreciated the danger and decided to fly ahead into it
C. holding that if a user actually knows of the danger a failure to warn cannot be a proximate cause of the injury
D. holding that a physicians negligence need only be a proximate cause not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury
E. holding danger was so open and obvious to plaintiff that as a matter of law he knew or should have known of danger
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
assert, there is no difference, under the circumstances of the case at bar, between a false imprisonment and false arrest claim, the inclusion of both theories in the complaint will make no difference. If, on the other hand, there is a difference, then plaintiffs are entitled to assert both claims. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e)(2) (authorizing alternative claims, and alternative statements of claims, regardless of consistency). The motion to dismiss the false arrest claim will be denied. IX Finally, the City challenges plaintiffs’ claim for an award of punitive damages against the City, noting that punitive damages are not available against a city under the relevant federal or state law. See e.g., City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981) ; § 768.28(5), Fla. Stat. (indicating that
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that punitive damages are not recoverable under viwda
B. holding that punitive damages are not recoverable against municipalities in actions brought pursuant to 42 usc 1983
C. holding that punitive damages are recoverable in a claim for retaliation under the flsa
D. holding that punitive damages are not recoverable against municipalities under 1988
E. holding that punitive damages are not recoverable under subsection 216b
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | D | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
the fact that the object's incriminating character was not "immediately apparent" to the officer rendered the search outside the scope of Terry and thereby unconstitutional. Id. at 378-80, 113 S.Ct. at 2139. Applying these principles to the present case, we find that the officers properly stopped the car and properly initiated a pat-down search of Jackson. Further, we find that Officer Thompson properly removed the container from Jackson's pocket. We find, however, that Officer Thompson violated Jackson's fourth amendment rights when he seized the contents of the container, the identity of which was not "immediately apparent" to him. First, the officers were clearly justified in stopping the car for the traffic infraction. See Black v. State, 621 N.E.2d 368, 370 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) ; Walker v. State, 527 N.E.2d 706, 708
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding there was no clearly established right to videotape police officers during a traffic stop
B. holding that a vehicles passenger had been seized and was entitled to challenge the traffic stop
C. holding that the sugar tree ruse did not violate the fourth amendment when officers only stopped vehicles for minor traffic violations
D. holding that police officers may stop vehicles when they observe minor traffic violations
E. holding that a traffic stop is reasonable under the fourth amendment when police have probable cause to believe a traffic infraction has occurred
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | D | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
court order that found him to have committed “ethical violations.” Other than making the finding of attorney misconduct, this order neither expressly identified itself as a reprimand nor imposed any sanction, monetary or otherwise. The order was, however, mailed to every court in which Butler had been admitted to practice. Thus, the injury Butler may claim is the damage widely done to his professional reputation. The question of whether we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal, therefore, distills to the question of when, if ever, an order thus affecting an attorney’s professional reputation imposes a legally sufficient injury to support appellate jurisdiction. For the reasons detailed below, we hold that it does. Heretofore we have not directly addressed this question. See id. at 1040 . Instead, we have held that damage to an
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that it is not the courts role to decide whether an experts opinion is correct
B. recognizing that we have not decided whether an attorney is directly aggrieved by an order simply finding misconduct and declining to decide the question
C. holding that the question whether a cause of action exists is not a question of jurisdiction and therefore may be assumed without being decided
D. holding that court lacked jurisdiction on appeal from injunction because the order was simply an interpretation of an earlier order
E. holding that the question of whether a municipal official is a policymaking official is a matter of state law to be decided by the court
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
in conduct that would result in offensive bodily contact. It is undisputed in this case that there was actual force used in restraining and arresting Mr. Cunningham. The evidence presented at the trial demonstrated that the bodily contact was offensive in nature. Therefore, plaintiff has established the first two prongs of the test for a battery — namely, he has proved that there was bodily contact that was offensive in nature. Plaintiff must also prove that the offensive contact was “made with intent.” While the plaintiff must prove intentional contact, he “is not required to prove an intention to cause the specific injuries resulting from the contact.” Masters v. Becker, 22 A.D.2d 118, 120, 254 N.Y.S.2d 633, 635 (2d Dep’t 1964); see also Lambertson v. United States, 528 F.2d at 441 . The contact in this case was unquestionably
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a plaintiff must comply with the notice of claim requirements in order to maintain an action against a government employee even if the plaintiff claims that the employee acted with fraud or malice
B. holding that although incorrect drug report was detrimental to employee employee had no claim against hospital because the report was not intended to primarily or directly benefit the employee
C. recognizing that the survivor of a deceased federal employee has no standing to file an eeo complaint on behalf of that former employee but personal representative of deceased employee can be substituted as plaintiff if deceased employee initiated complaint prior to death
D. holding that federal employee committed a battery when he jumped on plaintiffs back and began to ride plaintiff piggyback resulting in plaintiff falling and being injured even though federal employee intended no harm
E. holding that injured employee failed to state a claim under pwdcra even though he informed his employer that he could return to work in two months
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | D | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
the shipping company records indicated the weight of each shipment, the court estimated the weight of marijuana in each shipment by multiplying the total shipment weight by sixty-two percent — the average weight percentage of marijuana found in the three discovered deliveries. The government prosecuted Willie and Luis Reveles in a joint trial. The jury found them both guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. The jury also found the brothers guilty of possession with intent to distribute the marijuana. The court sentenced Willie to 262 months of imprisonment and Luis to 121 months. II A Willie first challenges his conviction based on Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968) . Before the trial began, the prosecution
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that admission of a postal inspectors testimony about an oral confession by a defendants codefendant violated the defendants sixth amendment right to crossexamine his codefendant who was unavailable because the codefendant asserted his right not to testify
B. holding that the introduction of a jointly tried nontestifying codefendants statement violates the sixth amendment confrontation clause if the statement contains incriminating evidence concerning a defendant
C. holding that any confrontation right is found in the fourteenth amendments due process clause not the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment
D. holding that sixth amendment not violated when defendant makes incriminating statements after indictment to persons who are not related to the government
E. holding that a defendants sixth amendment confrontation clause rights are violated when a court admits into evidence an incriminating statement given by a nontestifying codefendant
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
the government contractor defense in a subsequent lawsuit. Here, however, Mr. Hayashi’s e-mail to Mr. Jarrett cannot be similarly characterized as a specification of Defendant JTSI’s obligation under the contract for security and information services. II. Count II: Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy Plaintiffs also claim that they were terminated in violation of public oth a Common Law Parnar Claim and a Claim Under § 378-62 Simultaneously Although Parnar claims may be brought where there would otherwise be no remedy for wrongful termination, Parnar claims are generally duplicative, and thus disallowed, where statutes and regulations creating the public policy have their own built in remedy. See Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co., 76 Hawaii 454, 464, 879 P.2d 1037, 1047 (1994) ; see also Batacan v. Reliant Pharmaceuticals,
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that public policy claims are unavailable where the statute in question provides the employee with a wrongful discharge remedy
B. recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy
C. holding that federal law can provide source of state public policy for determining whether discharge of employee violated clear mandate of public policy
D. holding that where statutory or regulatory provisions which evidence the public policy themselves provide a remedy for the wrongful discharge provision of a further remedy under the public policy exception is unnecessary
E. holding a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy is not available where the employee has an existing statutory remedy
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | D | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
is whether the Commission properly found that Williston violated section 154.21 by not charging the rates prescribed in its effective tariff. Section 154.21 provides in relevant part: No natural-gas company shall directly or indirectly, demand, charge or collect any rate or charge for or in connection with the transportation or sale of natural gas subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or impose any classifications, practices, rules or regulations, different from those prescribed in its effective tariff and executed service agreements on file with the Commission, unless otherwise specifically provided by order of the Commission. 18 C.F.R. § 154.21; cf. Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 341 U.S. 246, 251, 71 S.Ct. 692, 695, 95 L.Ed. 912 (1951) . In the instant case, the Commission does not
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that under the filed rate doctrine a question regarding reasonable rates should be addressed to the department of insurance and that the rate plaintiff was charged is conclusively presumed reasonable under the filed rate doctrine
B. holding that a utility can claim no rate as a legal right that is other than the filed rate whether fixed or merely accepted by the commission
C. holding that once a rate is filed with the appropriate agency except for review of the agencys orders the courts can assume no right to a different rate on that ground that in its opinion it is the only or the more reasonable rate
D. holding that with respect to the eaja the local or national market rate for legal services cannot be a special factor used to increase the rate beyond the statutory rate
E. holding that the proper rate for prejudgment interest is the rate fixed by the parties in a contract
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
a single yard sign advocating the opposing position — for example, “Oppose School Vouchers,” or “Abolish the National Guard.” The Supreme Court has “frequently condemned such discrimination among different users of the same medium for expression,” which is another form of content-based speech regulation. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96, 92 S.Ct. 2286; see also First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784-85, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978) (“In the realm of protected speech, the legislature is constitutionally disqualified from dictating the subjects about which persons may speak and the speakers who may address a public issue.” (emphasis added)). Cf. Ackerley Communications of Mass., Inc. v. City of Somerville, 878 F.2d 513, 518 (1st Cir.1989) (striking down 0 (8th Cir.1995) . In short, because some types of signs are
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that an ordinance exempting certain signs from a general sign ban was an unconstitutional contentbased restriction on speech
B. holding that strict scrutiny applies to a prior restraint enforcing a contentbased restriction on speech in a traditional public forum
C. holding that it may not
D. holding that prohibiting external illumination of political signs while allowing it for other signs was an unconstitutional contentbased restriction since the message on the sign determines whether or not it may be externally illuminated
E. holding that an arbitration agreement enforceable against party who signed the agreement even where the other party did not sign it because generally it is enough that the party against whom the contract is sought to be enforced signs it
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | D | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
ordinance. The statutes’ plain language reflects a significant dichotomy of usage. Compare N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-37(a) (1994) (legislating that for an early step in annexation process a municipality has to pass a resolution) with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-49(e) (1994) (describing the final step in municipality’s annexation process as enactment of an ordinance). Furthermore, the distinct usage of the terms within the annexation laws also leads us to believe that a resolution of intent is more in the nature of a proposed ordinance. A resolution is used by a municipality as an early step looking to enactment of the annexation ordinance. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-37(a) (1994); see also Asheville Industries, Inc. v. City of Asheville, 112 N.C. App. 713, 716-17, 436 S.E.2d 873, 875-76 (1993) . In contrast to the contextual usage of
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that resolution of tribal law disputes are not within federal court jurisdiction
B. holding that the relevant intent is not the intent to return ultimately but the intent to return to the united states within a relatively short period
C. holding that a credit card company could not introduce an alternative dispute resolution provision through a bill stuffer where nothing in the original agreement mentioned dispute resolution
D. holding that the only showing of intent required for a vcea claim is the intent to do the act involved
E. recognizing that a resolution of intent marks the beginning of the annexation process
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
every reasonable presumption should be indulged against its waiver.”); see also College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 681-82, 119 S.Ct. 2219, 2229, 144 L.Ed.2d 605 (1999) (recognizing in different context that “[cjonstructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with the surrender of constitutional rights”); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848, 106 S.Ct. 3245, 3255, 92 L.Ed.2d 675 (1986) (recognizing that “Article Ill’s guarantee of an impartial and independent federal adjudication is subject to waiver, just as are other personal constitutional rights that dictate the procedures by which civil and criminal matters must be tried.”); RDO Fin. Servs. Co. v. Powell, 191 F.Supp.2d 811, 813 (N.D.Tex.2002) . The Texas Supreme Court’s recognition in In
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing that courts will indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver of the constitutional right to trial by a jury
B. holding prelitigation waiver of jury trial must be made knowingly and voluntarily and courts will indulge in every reasonable presumption against a waiver of that right
C. recognizing that courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against a testimonial waiver of the fifth amendment privilege
D. holding that jury waiver stating that it was made knowingly and voluntarily raised presumption of same and that burden was on party challenging enforceability of jury waiver to present evidence overcoming presumption
E. holding defendant was not entitled to jury instructions on lesserincluded offenses because his request did not constitute a waiver of the statute of limitations on those offenses such a waiver must be knowingly intelligently and voluntarily made
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
circumstances.”). Because we agree with the rationale in McCloud I, we reject Gulf’s attempt to differentiate this case on the aforementioned basis. 7 . In Carnes, this court applied the "going and coming rule” and declined to adopt the "employee’s own conveyance rule” in finding that a newspaper delivery person was not acting within the course and scope of her employment as she drove her vehicle home after completing her deliveries for the day. 227 Ariz. at 34, VI, 251 P.3d at 413. In general, under the going and coming rule, "an employer is not liable for the tortious acts of his employee while the employee is going to or returning from his place of employment." Id. at 35, V 11, 251 P.3d at 414 (quoting State v. Superior Court (Schraft), 111 Ariz. 130, 132, 524 P.2d 951, 953 (1974) ). The employee's own conveyance rule is a
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a defendant who accepts the benefits of control release waives any argument that application of the control release program in the form of the forfeiture of gain time was an ex post violation because control release was enacted after the date of his or her offenses
B. recognizing that reimbursement of a national guardsmans travel expenses in the form of a mileage allowance did not bestow in the state a right of control
C. holding that the right to control the means by which the work is accomplished is clearly the most significant test of the employment relationship and observing that many of the other factors enumerated in the restatement second are merely evidentiary indicia of the right to control
D. holding that the protest statutes use of the word cumulative means the statute is in addition to the existing right of reimbursement for taxes wrongfully demanded not intended to destroy that legal right
E. recognizing that a suit by the national government against a state does no violence to the inherent nature of sovereignty
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
4 . This part of Rule 705 has been read to allow expert witnesses, in both direct and cross-examination, to describe events, conversations, and the contents of written reports that were otherwise inadmissible, for example, as hearsay. In such cases, the testimony is admitted not as substantive evidence but "for the limited and independent purpose of enabling the jury to scrutinize the expert’s reasoning.” United States v. Wright, 251 U.S.App.D.C. 276, 285, 783 F.2d 1091, 1100 (1986); see abo United States v. 01 (stating that expert’s recounting of statements by codefendants did not violate confrontation clause because statements were not introduced for truth of matter asserted and declarant testified at trial); cf. Bryan v. John Bean Div. of FMC Corp., 566 F.2d 541, 545 (5th Cir.1978) . 5 . Whether the trial court may order
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that evidence of customer inquiries is admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule
B. holding that otherwise hearsay evidence disclosing the basis of an expert witness opinion should be admissible if the impeaching evidence has sufficient guarantee of reliability that the prophylactic effect of the hearsay rule is not necessary to ensure trustworthiness
C. holding that a violation of the hearsay rule was harmless
D. holding that private safety codes are admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule on the basis of trustworthiness and necessity
E. holding that the district court did not err in relying on hearsay evidence where the government offered reasons why its hearsay evidence had indicia of reliability and the court considered the reliability of the evidence in deciding the weight to give the hearsay evidence
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
multiple instructions, “we think it more appropriate to examine the adequacy of the charge that was given”). That is, the bad result instruction sufficiently informed the jury that it could believe that Chesser simply had a bad result with the PEG tube or that the bad result could have been caused by his pre-existing conditions and instructed the jury that a bad result alone would not support a negligence finding against Ap-pellees. See id. at 430 (explaining that unavoidable accident instruction sufficiently informed jury of and submitted defendant’s sole proximate cause inferential rebuttal defense that fatal auto accident was not caused by defendant’s negligence but by presence of cattle on the roadway); Williams v. Viswanathan, 64 S.W.3d 624, 628-29 (Tex.App-Amarillo 2001, no pet.) . Looking to the adequacy of the charge given,
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that doctor who was contacted by patients treating physician to discuss treatment alternatives does not owe duty of care to patient whose case is discussed such as would support medical malpractice claim
B. holding that evidence existed to support bad result instruction when doctor admitted that patients care worsened under his care but denied that he was negligent
C. holding that although compliance with administrative safety regulations did not establish due care it was evidence of due care
D. holding nurses were not entitled to official immunity where it was alleged that they failed to follow orders for a patients care given to them by a doctor
E. holding claim that negligent supervision caused assault was health care liability claim because it was inseparable from the health care and nursing services provided
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
prosecutor’s characterization of the defendant’s case as a ‘fairy tale.’ However, ‘[a] prosecutor is not precluded from vigorous advocacy, or the use of colorful adjectives, in summation.’ ”) (quoting United States v. Rivera, 971 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir.1992)). see also Pineda v. Miller, No. 03 CV 1344(NG)(MDG), 2006 WL 2239105, at *20 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2006) (“[T]he prosecutor’s comments regarding the weaknesses in petitioner’s defense [we]re proper responses to the efforts of defense counsel to attack the credibility of the undercovers.”) (citing United States v. Bautista, 23 F.3d 726, 733 (2d Cir.1994) (“The government is ordinarily permitted to respond to arguments impugning the integrity of its case.”) (citation omitted)); United States v. Elias, 285 F.3d 183, 190-92 (2d Cir.2002) . One habeas court in this Circuit has noted
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the trial judges misconduct at trial did not prejudice the defendant in light of the courts curative instructions
B. holding that prosecution comments during summation that grossly mischaracterized the defenses argument and said that the defense was insulting a battered victim do not require a new trial when they constitute an aberration in an otherwise fair proceeding the trial judge issued a curative jury instruction and the defendant most likely would have been convicted even without the improper remarks
C. recognizing that a curative instruction may make it highly unlikely that improper comments misled the jury
D. recognizing that the defenses response argument at closing can ameliorate the improper prosecutorial comments
E. holding that in a criminal trial the trial court must correct or amend an improper instruction if the proper instruction is necessary for the jury to understand the case
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
or limb of the officer or another may result, and has included in the warrant a direction that the officer executing it is not required to give such notice. [¶ 18] Probable cause determinations must be made after reviewing the facts. presented in a particular case. State v. Van Beek, 1999 ND 53, ¶ 15, 591 N.W.2d 112. It is no longer sufficient to merely allege drugs are present to justify issuance of a no-knock warrant. Herrick I, 1997 ND 155, ¶ 21, 567 N.W.2d 336 (overruling per se rule permitting no-knock warrant in all drug case). “[P]roba-ble cause is not established for a no-knock search warrant where the reviewing court is given information indicating nothing more than probable cause [that] an easily disposable drug is located in a suspect’s residence.” Van Beek, at ¶ h Cir.2001) . However, such circumstances were not shown in
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding sufficient to support conviction under 924c evidence of loaded assault rifle recovered from location near where defendants drug transactions were known to occur
B. holding exigent circumstances demonstrated because officers knew defendant stored drugs in room across from the bathroom making destruction particularly easy
C. holding exigent circumstances found because detailed affidavit alleged drug transactions were conducted near the bathroom for quick disposal of the evidence
D. holding that the twolevel enhancement was appropriate where drugs cash and drug scales were found in defendants parlor and a gun was found in a secret compartment in defendants bathroom vanity
E. holding exigent circumstances existed because bathroom in hotel room was next to hallway door where the narcotics could have been particularly flushed and the suspected drug was crackcocaine which makes it not impossible that drugs were easily disposable
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | C | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
merit-less.” See Rabideau v. City of Racine, 243 Wis.2d 486, 627 N.W.2d 795, 805 (2001) (noting that an action is frivolous when it cannot “be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law”); of. Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 3.1 (describing a claim as not frivolous if it is based on “a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law”). Similarly, a claim is “indisputably meritless” when it clearly is procedurally barred, it asserts the infringement of a legal interest that plainly does not exist, or the record completely contradicts it. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827; Hodges, 332 Ill.Dec. 318, 912 N.E.2d at 1212; see also People v. Alcozer, 241 Ill.2d 248, 350 Ill. Dec. 1, 948 N.E.2d 70, 77 (2011) . A claim lacks an objective, good-faith basis
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that claims raised in a postconviction motion cannot be relitigated in a habeas petition
B. holding that untimely petition for postconviction petition divests trial court of jurisdiction
C. holding that procedural defects can result in a conclusion that a postconviction petition is frivolous
D. holding that a second or subsequent state petition for postconviction relief filed according to the procedural rules of the state constitutes a properly filed application without regard to the merits of the petition
E. holding that second state petition for postconviction relief that was dismissed as frivolous and patently without merit was properly filed
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | C | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
the district court was not clearly erroneous in accepting [the officer's] testimony that he only promised to make [the defendant's] cooperation known to the United States Attorney’s office and gave no guarantee of a reduced sentence. Although [the officer] told [the defendant] that cooperating defendants generally ‘fared better time-wise,’ this statement did not amount to an illegal inducement: 'telling the [defendant] in a noncoercive manner of the realistically expected penalties and encouraging [him] to tell the truth is no more than affording [him] the chance to make an informed decision with respect to [his] cooperation with the government.' ” (Quoting United States v. Ballard, 586 F.2d 1060, 1063 (5th Cir.1978)). Accord United States v. Levy, 955 F.2d 1098, 1105 (7th Cir.1992) ; United States v. Meirovitz, 918 F.2d 1376,
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that federal agents indication to defendant that his cooperation would be reported to the united states attorney did not make defendants confession involuntary
B. holding that united states attorney was not required to abide by a secret service agents promise to a defendant to drop federal charges in exchange for defendants cooperation where the united states attorney never sanctioned the agreement and the promise was clearly outside the agents authority
C. holding that cooperation was insufficient where the defendants cooperation was based on his confession to the charged crimes
D. holding that agents promise to inform prosecutor of defendants cooperation does not render a subsequent confession involuntary
E. holding that an officers promise to bring defendants cooperation to the attention of the prosecutor did not make confession involuntary
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
Constitution’s standing requirements to bring particular actions in federal court.”); Innovative Health Sys., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d 37, 46 (2d Cir.1997) (“The [defendant] appropriately looks to the [Rehabilitation Act’s] language to determine whether Congress granted an express right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules.”). The scope of Title VII’s private right of action therefore depends on whether Congress intended to insulate such an action from prudential concerns. A number of courts have considered whether prudential concerns limit standing under Title VII and have denied standing to plaintiffs alleging injury because of third-party discrimination. See Bermudez v. TRC Holdings, Inc., 138 F.3d 1176, 1180 (7th Cir.1998) ; Childress, 134 F.3d at 1209 (Luttig, J.,
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a white and a black tenant had standing to challenge their landlords acts of discriminating against nonwhite rental applicants
B. holding that white woman who was not object of discrimination but who alleged injury because of race discrimination against another was a person aggrieved within the meaning of title vii
C. holding white female employee lacks standing under title vii to allege injury on behalf of black applicants to employment agency who were discriminated against because of race
D. holding that white female had standing under title vii to challenge her employees alleged racial discrimination against blacks
E. holding that an employers decision to terminate and individuals employment based on race is a violation of title vii regardless of whether that person is white or black
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | C | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
it has no obligation to pay those invoices because Reliable has not shown that it had submitted proper invoices to the City in accordance with the conditions precedent for payment set forth in the contract. In addition, the City maintains that Reliable cannot benefit from the contract (ie. be paid by the City) since it materially breached the contracts when it submitted fraudulent invoices. Although, generally, Reliable would be correct in arguing that its right to payment accrued once conforming goods were delivered to the City, an exception to the rule exists when either a condition precedent has not been fulfilled or when the party has materially breached the contract. John J. Calnan Co. v. Talsma Builders, Inc., 77 Ill.App.3d 221, 32 Ill.Dec. 695, 699, 395 N.E.2d 1076, 1080 (1979) ; Robinhorne Construction Corp. v. Snyder, 113
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a clause making payment by the owner an express condition precedent to payment by the general contractor to the subcontractor was enforceable
B. recognizing that 1983 action does not accrue until conviction or sentence has been invalidated
C. holding that because an indemnitor is not liable until the indemnitee actually makes payment interest does not accrue until the payment is made
D. holding that right to payment does not accrue until condition precedent has been fulfilled
E. holding that an insureds compliance with a condition precedent is not tested by the presence or absence of prejudice to the insurer but only by whether the condition has been fulfilled by the insured under all the circumstances
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | D | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
Act.” 815 ILCS 525/40(c) (emphasis added). That plaintiff did not report the illegal activity directly to the Illinois Attorney General or State’s Attorney is not fatal to his claim of retaliatory discharge. See Michael v. Precision Alliance Group, LLC, 2011 IL App (5th) 100089 ¶ 24, 351 Ill.Dec. 890, 952 N.E.2d 682 (2011) (“[I]n no instance has Illinois required, an employee to make a direct report to a government agency.”). Defendants’ argument that there is no express or implied private right of action under the Illinois Prizes and Gifts Act is also misplaced. Plaintiff is alleging the common law tort of retaliatory discharge, not an implied or express statutory private right of action. See Bea v. Bethany Home, Inc., 333 Ill.App.3d 410, 415, 266 Ill.Dec. 781, 775 N.E.2d 621 (2002) ; Harris v. Bethesda Lutheran Homes, Inc., No.
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing that a texas common law claim for retaliatory discharge is a claim sounding in tort
B. recognizing the difference between statutory cause of action for retaliation and common law tort of retaliatory discharge
C. recognizing retaliatory discharge tort implied by the workers compensation act
D. recognizing the tort of retaliatory discharge
E. recognizing retaliatory discharge cause of action when plaintiff discharged for whistleblowing
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
States, 669 F.Supp.2d 32, 44 (D.D.C.2009); see also Gardner v. United States, 213 F.3d 735, 737 n. 1 (D.C.Cir.2000) (“Mr. Gardner’s defamation claim against the United States is barred, because suits for libel or slander are prohibited under the Federal Tort Claims Act.”). Therefore, the plaintiffs defamation and misrepresentation claims are dismissed for this independent basis. Moreover, with respect to the plaintiffs DCHRA claims, “[t]he D.C. Council, not Congress, enacted the DCHRA, and there is no federal statute that evinces Congress’s intent to waive the United States’ immunity from suit under the DCHRA.” Marcus, 813 F.Supp.2d at 17. Accordingly, the plaintiffs DCHRA claim is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See id.\ see also Jordan v. Evans, 404 F.Supp.2d 28, 31 (D.D.C.2005) . IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above,
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that sovereign immunity barred a wrongful death claim against the board and stating that the only question is whether the boards sovereign immunity protection was waived emphasis added
B. holding that sovereign immunity bars an attorneys lien against the united states
C. holding that sovereign immunity bars dchra claim against the department of commerce
D. holding that state sovereign immunity bars state constitutional claims
E. holding that sovereign immunity barred claim for compensatory sanctions against the government
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | C | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.” TexR. Civ. P. 97(a). There is a split in the courts of appeals regarding whether an order severing a compulsory counterclaim will automatically constitute an abuse of discretion. Compare Rucker v. Bank One Tex., N.A., 36 S.W.3d 649, 651' (Tex.App.-Waco 2000, pet. denied); Goins v. League Bank & Trust, 857 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ); and Mathis v. Bill De La Garza & Assocs., 778 S.W.2d 105, 106-07 (TexApp.-Texarkana 1989, no writ) (all holding that severance of a compulsory counterclaim is an abuse of discretion), with In re Occidental Permian Ltd., No. 07-03-0016-CV, slip op. at 4, 2003 WL 1799012, at *2 (Tex.App.-Amarillo April 7, 2003, orig. proceeding [pet. for mandamus filed]) ; see also Hart v. Attorneys-At-Law, No.
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that so long as trial court abides by rule 41 it is not error to sever and proceed separately with compulsory counterclaim
B. holding it improper to independently review the record to find support for a trial courts decision so long as it is unclear whether the trial court considered statutory factors
C. holding that a defendants attorney can waive the defendants sixth amendment confrontation right so long as the defendant does not dissent from his attorneys decision and so long as it can be said that the attorneys decision was a legitimate trial tactic or part of a prudent trial strategy
D. recognizing further normally the ruling is not a final one it is a red flag to counsel that the evidence is not to be brought before the jury unless and until it is separately taken up with the court at trial
E. holding trial court has jurisdiction to reconsider new trial order as long as case is pending
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
and such opinions may be given on the facts as proved by other witnesses”; see also Ronald L. Carlson & Michael Scott Carlson, Carlson on Evidence 398 (3d ed. 2015). 11 Weeks v. State, 270 Ga. App. 889, 893 (2) (608 SE2d 259) (2004) (punctuation omitted); accord McCrickard v. State, 249 Ga. App. 715, 718 (2) (549 SE2d 505) (2001); see also Burgess v. State, 292 Ga. 821, 822 (2) (742 SE2d 464) (2013) (“A witness need not be formally educated in the field a witness possesses such learning or experience to qualify as an expert witness lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed unless manifestly abused.” (punctuation omitted)); Griffin, 243 Ga. App. at 286 (5) (same); see also United States v. Anderson, 560 F3d 275, 281-82 (1) (C) (5th Cir. 2009) ; United States v. Shamsud-Din, No. 10 CR 927,
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing plaintiffs expert witness to testify when it also allowed defendants expert witness who disputed the methodology used by plaintiffs expert to testify
B. holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing expert testimony from the director of a center specializing in serving victims of sexual exploitation
C. holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of a witness that was not highly probative
D. holding district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing government to ask leading questions of eightyearold witness reluctant to testify regarding sexual abuse
E. holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
R. 347; see also Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 234, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 2341, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987) (concluding SEC has specifically approved arbitration procedures of NASD and NYSE). Ottman agrees he signed the U-4 registration agreement, but argues his defamation claim does not involve significant aspects of the employment relationship and is only tenuously linked to his employment. See Ateas v. Credit Clearing Corp. of Am., 292 Minn. 334, 340-50, 197 N.W.2d 448, 452-57 (1972) (concluding no agreement to arbi trate exists because controversy not within scope of arbitration clause). We are asked to determine whether Ottman’s defamation claim, as described in his complaint, falls within the scope of the U-4 registration agreement. See Morgan, 729 F.2d at 1167 ; Johnson, 530 N.W.2d at 795 (concluding
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding complaint allegations must be examined in light of parties contractual terms
B. recognizing that the allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true on a threshold motion to dismiss
C. holding that arbitration clauses as contractual agreements must be enforced to their terms
D. holding because legislature knew how to include terms within statutory definition and did not do so statutory definition did not include terms in light of the terms contemporaneous inclusion of the same terms in a separate provision
E. holding that where only one interpretation of contractual terms is possible a court may decide the meaning of those terms as a matter of law
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
of life insurance as security for a child support obligation. The child support statute, S.C.Code Ann. § 20-3-160 (1976), has since its inception recognized the availability of life insurance as security for the support obligation. The statute is silent as to the appropriate standard, yet Wife is constrained by longstanding case law to concede that life insurance may not be required to secure the payment of child support in the absence of a compelling reason to do so. The alimony statute, S.C.Code Ann. § 20-3-130, was amended in 1990 to expressly provide for life insurance on the supporting spouse for the benefit of the supported spouse. Before 1990, such relief was available pursuant to case law. See Hardin v. Hardin, 294 S.C. 402, 404-405, 365 S.E.2d 34, 35-36 (Ct.App.1987) . Section 20-3-130(D), like the child support
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that there may be an obligation to defend under an insurance policy even though there is no obligation to indemnify
B. holding that husbands obligation to pay premiums on a life insurance policy for five years with wife as the beneficiary was periodic alimony
C. holding that an order requiring a party to purchase life insurance to secure a support obligation must have the requisite evidentiary basis and reversing for further proceedings to reevaluate the life insurance requirement set forth to secure child support obligations
D. holding that an obligation is in the nature of alimony when it is intended to provide support for the spouse rather than an equalization of property rights
E. recognizing that family court may under special circumstances require a supporting spouse to secure an alimony obligation with a life insurance policy
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
on those more likely to prevail, far from evidence of incompetence, is the hallmark of effective appellate advocacy.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). It has long been settled that a state’s capital sentencing scheme may not allow for the imposition of the death penalty in channeling and limiting of the sentencer’s discretion in imposing the death penalty is a fundamental constitutional requirement for sufficiently minimizing the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.” Maynard, 486 U.S. at 362, 108 S.Ct. 1853. A statutory circumstance that is alone too vague to provide meaningful guidance to the sentencer may be accompanied by a limiting instruction which does provide sufficient guidance. See Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1, 1-3, 111 S.Ct. 313, 112 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990) ; Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653, 110
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding unconstitutionally vague under the reasoning of godfrey an aggravatingcircumstances instruction directing jurors to determine whether the murder was especially heinous atrocious and cruel
B. recognizing that north carolinas heinous atrocious or cruel aggravating circumstance requires a limiting construction
C. holding that oklahomas especially heinous atrocious or cruel aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally vague
D. holding that heinous atrocious or cruel is unconstitutionally vague language
E. holding that a limit ing instruction which defined the terms heinous atrocious or cruel in equally vague language was not constitutionally sufficient
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
markets. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 97, 104 S.Ct. 2237, 2245, 81 L.Ed.2d 71 (1984). 16 . The Supreme Court has acknowledged that there is no bright line separating the cases receiving strict scrutiny from those in which the scrutiny is less strict. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579, 106 S.Ct. 2080, 2084, 90 L.Ed.2d 552 (1986). 17 . The statute struck down in Fort Gratiot Landfill v. Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources read, in relevant part: A person shall not accept for disposal solid waste ... that is not generated in the county in which the disposal area is located unless the acceptance of solid waste ... that is not generated in the county is expli e Disposal Auth., 814 F.Supp. 1566, 1580 (M.D.Ala.1993) . 18 . MMWAC argues that the ordinance is
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding manufacturing exception to pennsylvanias capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce
B. holding that ordinance requiring all municipal solid waste generated within county to be delivered to a particular facility discriminated against interstate commerce
C. holding that the government can satisfy the hobbs act interstate commerce requirement by showing that the robbery resulted in the closure of a business engaged in interstate commerce
D. holding that three municipal flow control ordinances similar to the one here at issue discriminated against interstate commerce
E. holding that mere reference to the interlocal agreement in the citys ordinances even assuming the interlocal agreement impermissibly burdens interstate commerce by restricting the flow of solid waste is not enough to render those ordinances invalid
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | D | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
Construed broadly, plaintiffs’ allegations that the VOA defendants, with intent to defraud, characterized the Gulati segment as a pro bono feature and a public service to the Indian-American community without disclosing the fact that Gulati paid for the segment, thereby inducing plaintiffs’ reliance and causing injury, are sufficient to plead common law fraud. Plaintiffs’ third cause of action therefore withstands the VOA defendants’ motion to dismiss. We remand to the district court to decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. While we conclude that plaintiffs’ pleading of their state law fraud claim survives defendants’ motion to dismiss, we render no opinion as to the ultimate merits of this claim. See Bernheim, 79 F.3d at 321 (internal quotation marks and citations
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that trial court may not consider whether plaintiff will ultimately prevail
B. recognizing that only a claimant is entitled to the secretarys assistance in the development of the facts pertinent to the claim the benefit of the doubt and the determination whether the claim is well grounded
C. holding that the relevant inquiry is not whether the court has discretion to facilitate notice but whether this is an appropriate case in which to exercise discretion
D. holding that in deciding whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity it is not only the evidence of clearly established law that is for the court but also whether a reasonable officer could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful in light of the information the officer had
E. holding that the issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
in dispute. Appellees argued at trial that under the exception to the doctrine, the testimony was admissible. On appeal, Appellees maintain that the admission of Vega’s testimony was proper, but that if the court erred in admitting it, any error was harmless because the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s judgment without Vega’s testimony. We agree. The general rule in Texas is that evidence of other acts by a party with persons not a party to the lawsuit are irrelevant, immaterial, unfairly prejudicial, and thus, inadmissible. See Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Vollmer, 805 S.W.2d 825, 831 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied); see also Tex.R. Evid. 403; Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Roberts, 849 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1993, writ denied) . This Court noted the exception to the
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that proof of a continuous chain of custody is relevant only as to the weight and not the admissibility of the evidence
B. holding that the rules of evidence normally applicable in criminal trials do not operate with full force at hearings before the judge to determine the admissibility of evidence there is therefore much to be said for the proposition that in proceedings where the judge himself is considering the admissibility of evidence the exclusionary rules aside from rules of privilege should not be applicable and the judge should receive the evidence and give it such weight as his judgment and experience counsel
C. holding that the doctrine of res inter alios acta no longer exists independent of texas rules of evidence 401404 governing the admissibility of relevant and character evidence
D. holding that hgn evidence is scientific and therefore must satisfy the pertinent delaware rules of evidence governing the admission of such evidence
E. holding that any relevant mitigating evidence concerning a defendants character should not be excluded
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | C | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
all of the elements of the crime, which appellant challenges beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, we must keep in mind that the credibility of witnesses and the wei t into Burger’s occupied car at close range, causing a bullet to narrowly miss Mandy McConnell who was sitting in the back seat. (N.T., at 24.) It can be inferred that appellant intended to cause serious bodily injury to Mandy because the bullet he fired into the car missed her by only three inches. See Commonwealth v. Thompson, 559 Pa. 229, 739 A.2d 1023 (1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 829, 121 S.Ct. 79, 148 L.Ed.2d 41 (2000) (finding sufficient evidence presented to convict appellant of aggravated assault where appellant shot at and narrowly missed the victim); see also Commonwealth v. Woods, 710 A.2d 626 (Pa.Super.1998) . Further, testimony indicates that when Mandy
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding intent may be inferred from all facts and circumstances
B. holding that direct proof of intent to defraud is unnecessary and that it may be inferred from the act of the parties and from all circumstances
C. holding intent may be inferred from large amount of marijuana
D. holding that employers intent may be inferred through circumstantial evidence
E. holding specific intent to harm may be inferred from the circumstances and that finding is a matter for the jury
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
deprived the defendant of a fair trial and resulted in a deprivation of the defendant’s liberty without due process of law, see People v Jones, 468 Mich 345, 354; 662 NW2d 376 (2003) (improper questioning by the prosecutor is nonconstitutional error); People v Mezy, 453 Mich 269, 285-286; 551 NW2d 389 (1996) (plurality opinion of WEAVER, J.) (applying the nonconstitutional harmless-error standard to review a claim of prosecutorial misconduct), while others hold that it constitutes constitutional error, People v Abraham, 256 Mich App 265, 272, 276; 662 NW2d 836 (2003) (“Generally, a claim of prosecutorial misconduct is a constitutional issue____”), citing People v Pfaffle, 246 Mich App 282, 288; 632 NW2d 162 (2001); but cf. People v Taylor, 159 Mich App 468, 471; 406 NW2d 859 (1987) . Thus, domestic decisions do not settle this
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law
B. holding that nonconstitutional error is harmless if it did not have substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jurys verdict
C. holding that a nonconstitutional error is harmless where an appellate court has a fair assurance that the error did not substantially affect the verdict
D. holding that prosecutorial noncompliance with a discovery order is an error of nonconstitutional magnitude
E. holding that where appellant challenges a nonconstitutional error the criminal appeals reform act requires that he demonstrate that there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | D | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
a warrant can be obtained. Id. at 2505-07. Therefore, ICE officers may make warrantless arrests for suspected immigration violations only when they have both probable cause for the arrest and probable cause that the subject is likely to escape. De La Paz v. Coy, 786 F.3d 367, 376 (5th Cir. 2015) (“[E]ven if an agent has reasonable belief, before making an arrest, there must also be a likelihood of the person escaping before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest.”); Westover v. Reno, 202 F.3d 475, 480 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding arrest was “in direct violation” of § 1357(a)(2) because “[w]hile INS agents may have had probable cause to arrest Westover ... there is no evidence that Westover was likely to escape”); Mountain High Knitting, Inc. v. Reno, 51 F.3d 216, 218 (9th Cir. 1995) ; United States v. Cantu, 519 F.2d 494, 496-97
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that suspicion must be individualized
B. holding that arrests under 1357a2 require an individualized determination of flight risk
C. recognizing that the act provides a detailed outline of traditional factors used to assess risk of flight
D. holding that whether a person has a disability under the ada is an individualized inquiry
E. holding that an alien must be released unless the government demonstrates at a bond hearing that the alien poses a risk of flight or a risk of danger to the community
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
(3)[are] effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.’” Liberty Synergistics Inc. v. Microflo Ltd., 718 F.3d 138, 146 (2d Cir.2013) (quoting Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349, 126 S.Ct. 952, 163 L.Ed.2d 836 (2006)). Defendants’ argument fails because the collateral order exception does not apply to orders denying a motion to withdraw the reference. See In re Chateaugay Corp., 826 F.2d at 1180 (reasoning that “[ojrders denying revocation of a reference to the bankruptcy court do not conclusively determine any substantive issue; they merely address where that issue will initially be decided,” and that such orders remain subject to review on appeal). Mahia’s professed right to a jury trial warrants no different conclusion. See Germain v. Conn. Nat’l Bank, 930 F.2d at 1040 . Further, although Chateaugay addressed the
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that though a trial court is not required to make findings of fact absent a request whether there exists sufficient evidence to support the order ruling on a motion to set aside a judgment is fully reviewable
B. holding that the courts denial of either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is not reviewable
C. holding that an appellate court may not consider an issue not presented to the trial judge on appeal from final judgment on the merits
D. holding the denial of a motion for summary judgment on an issue which is later submitted to the jury is not reviewable
E. holding that ruling as to whether or not there will be a jury trial does not meet the third precondition to immediate appealability under the cohen doctrine for such an order is entirely reviewable on appeal from the final judgment
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
S.W.2d 790, 799 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1986, writ ref d n.r.e.). The Board’s findings and conclusions only cite one reason for granting Redland nonconforming rights — the preexisting leases. But Redland argued two alternative theories before the Board — actual, preexisting use and the diminishing asset doctrine. Redland argues that under Murmur, we must uphold the Board’s decision if there is evidence from which the Board could have granted nonconforming rights based on the latter two grounds, even though the Board only cited the preexisting leases in its findings and conclusions. We rejected this argument on original submission and held instead that we may affirm on a ground not cited by the Board only if we conclude that ground applies as a matter of law. See Flores, 860 S.W.2d at 626 . In their motions for rehearing, Redland and
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency
B. holding that a reviewing court is not to substitute its decision for that of the board
C. holding that reviewing court should accord deference to special masters decision and may not substitute its own judgment for that of the special master
D. holding that reviewing court may consider trial evidence in reviewing denial of motion to suppress
E. holding that a court is not empowered to substitute its judgement for that of the agency
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
that requires special treatment. Each year, the major collections firms handle tens of thousands of payments on behalf of their clients. Requiring clients to endorse each monthly payment would require an extraordinary amount of effort, reduce the efficiency at both the client’s and firm’s office, and as a result, significantly increase the client’s costs. In addition, such a practice would likely delay the deposit of payments and thereby increase the number of insufficiently-funded checks. Although those circumstances are decidedly different from the examples set forth in IMO Opinion 635, there is no language in that opinion indicating that the extraordinary circumstances enu merated therein were intended to be exhaustive. See State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 300, 558 A.2d 833 (1989) . A cost effective collection system reduces
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that admission of rule 404b evidence was proper
B. holding the examples listed in evidence rule 55 now njre 404b were not exclusive
C. holding that rule 404b evidence is admissible in rebuttal
D. holding that proponent of 404b evidence must identify a proper 404b purpose for admission that is at issue in the case
E. holding that a new trial was the remedy for erroneous admission of rule 404b evidence
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
First, she must come forward with evidence either of past persecution or of a well-founded fear of future persecution. See Tamas-Mercea, 222 F.3d at 423. Second, she also must show that the persecution she endured (or is likely to endure in the future) was on account of her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion. See id. “Persecution encompasses more than threats to life or freedom; non-life threatening violence and physical abuse also fall within this category.” Id. at 424. However, to sustain an asylum application, the conduct “must rise above mere harassment.” Roman, 233 F.3d at 1034. This court has recognized that actions such as “detention, arrest, interrogation, prosecution, imprisonment, illegal searches, confiscation of propert . Furthermore, we cannot say that the evidence
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that having to report to the police being subject to regular questioning and surveillance and having difficulty finding employment can reasonably be characterized as mere harassment
B. holding that the employment of some noncivil servants can properly be characterized as noncommercial
C. holding that defendant waived any objection to the accuracy of the presentence report by failing to object after having been given ample opportunity to do so
D. holding that an ex post facto claim can only be successful if the law can be characterized as punishment in the constitutional sense
E. holding that the existence and content of a police report are not properly the subject of judicial notice
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
under a business interruption policy after destruction of one subsidiary’s manufacturing facility); see also 3 Couch on Insurance § 40:15 (3rd ed. 2003) (“Where a parent corporation and it subsidiaries are covered by the same policy, rights of subsidiaries are wholly separate and [the] parent has no right to recover for loss suffered by subsidiary.”); compare Wood Goods Galore, Inc. v. Reinsurance Ass’n of Minn., 478 N.W.2d 205, 210 (Minn.Ct.App.1991) (allowing insured to recover under business interruption policy for lost retail sales at one location after an accident at its remote manufacturing facility since both facilities were owned by a single corporate entity); contra Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Anderson-Prichard Oil Corp., 141 F.2d 443, 446 (10th Cir.1944) . We agree with the district court that, under
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that parent corporation could not recover for its lost profits incurred after subsidiary suffered a fire even though both were listed as named insured on the business interruption insurance policy
B. holding that a close relationship between a parent corporation and a subsidiary may justify finding that the parent engages in business in the jurisdiction through the local activities of its subsidiary
C. recognizing separate corporate identity of parent despite evidence that parent was alterego of its subsidiary and was being sued for acts of its subsidiary
D. recognizing separate corporate identity of parent despite evidence that parent consolidated its profits and losses with that of its whollyowned subsidiary in presenting parents financial reports to shareholders that subsidiary was considered a division of parent and that subsidiary accounted for 60 of parents and subsidiarys combined operations
E. holding that parent corporation could recover under business interruption policy for lost profits of one subsidiary resulting from accident at a separate subsidiary since the two were integrated operations
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
that prepare and administer standardized admissions tests such as the ACT, SAT, LSAT, and MCAT. 9 Section 99.33 provides in relevant part: (a)(1) An educational agency or institution may disclose personally identifiable information from an education record only on the condition that the party to whom the information is disclosed will not disclose the information to any other party without the prior consent of the parent or eligible student. There are certain exceptions to this rule, but none that bear on the questions we must decide in this appeal. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 99.31. 10 Many of the cases cited to us, or which our research uncovered, were based on the obsolete definition of "student" cited above or upon incomplete research. See Tarka v. Franklin, 891 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1989) ; Norwood v. Slammons, 788 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D.
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the statute was ambiguous because it provides no definition of the term violation and provides no specific direction as to the proper unit of prosecution
B. holding 20 usc 1232g provides no private right of action and employs an outdated definition of student
C. holding that no private right of action exists
D. holding that a private right of action exists
E. recognizing private right of action
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
or controversy.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (emphasis added); see also Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923) (denying municipal taxpayer standing to challenge federal spending measure because the taxpayer’s “interest in the moneys of the Treasury— partly realized from taxation and partly from other sources — is shared with millions of others; is comparatively minute and indeterminable”); Hollingsworth v. Perry, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2652, 2662, 186 L.Ed.2d 768 (2013) (“[A]n asserted right to have the Government act in accordance with law is not sufficient, standing alone[.]”). Legislative standing. The general rule that individual legislators lack standing to sue in their official capacity as congressman or senator foll h Cir. 2001) . We held in Baird that to the extent that the
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding testimony of two jurors that they changed their votes because of pressures to return to work was inadmissible because such pressures were not outside influences within the meaning of rule 606b and rule of civil procedure 327
B. holding that the mortgaging or conveying of exempt property to a creditor is not against the public policy of the state of michigan and that that the bankrupt had the power to convey to a creditor his existing exemptions resulting in the exempt property not being property of the debtor or the debtors bankruptcy estate
C. holding that the due process requirements of jurisdiction in michigan had been met for a dispute involving property in tennessee
D. holding that a michigan house member and a michigan state senator lacked standing to challenge gaming compacts that were approved by a concurrentresolution procedure requiring only a majority of votes cast rather than by the ordinary legislative process that would have required a majority of the votes of all members in each house
E. holding that judicial review of final agency action under the administrative procedure act provides the proper procedure to challenge the sufficiency of an eis
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | D | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
305 S.W.3d 141, 152 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied). In this case, appellant seeks to arbitrate a claim against appellees to collect its fees under the contingency fee agreement. In this context, for there to have been a waiver, appellant “must [have], at the very least, engage[d] in some overt act in court that evince[d] a desire to resolve the [same] arbitrable dispute through litigation rather than arbitration.” Haddock v. Quinn, 287 S.W.3d 158, 177 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied). Thus, it is relevant that appellant previously litigated its claim to the same attorney’s fees under the same contract in the suit against Brown in Harris County. See In re Christus Spohn Health Sys. Corp., 231 S.W.3d 475, 481 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2007, orig. proceeding) . Furthermore, we note that appellees contend —
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the current party was sufficiently identified with the parties to the prior litigation
B. holding res judicata did not bar current litigation when prior litigation between the parties involved one breach of obligation under a joint venture agreement and instant litigation was based upon a different cause of action from a subsequent interference with the same agreement
C. holding that a judgment as to the title in a prior litigation was not subject to collateral attack
D. holding hospitals prior litigation conduct in criminal case constituted waiver of right to arbitrate where prior litigation involved developing evidence as part of strategic plan for defense of civil suit for damages
E. holding that determination of the oklahoma and texas common boundary in a prior suit was conclusive in future litigation
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | D | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
and explained that “[b]ecause the law presumes parents will perform their obligations to their children, it presumes their prior right to custody, but this is not an absolute right.” Id. This Court further explained that “[w]hen a parent neglects the welfare and interest of his child, he waives his usual right of custody.” Id. at 437, 119 S.E.2d at 191. See also Wilson v. Wilson, 269 N.C. 676, 677, 153 S.E.2d 349, 351 (1967) (stating that “[w]hile it is true that a parent, if a fit and suitable person, is entitled to the custody of his child, it is equally true that where fitness and suitability are absent he loses this right”); In re Gibbons, 247 N.C. 273, 280, 101 S.E.2d 16, 21-22 (1957) (recognizing that the legal right of a parent to custody may yield to the interests of 551 ; cf. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs.,
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding unwed father entitled to hearing on his fitness as a parent before children could be taken from him after death of their mother
B. recognizing that because a child born out of wedlock may be legitimated by father strictly speaking illegitimacy is not an immutable characteristic
C. holding that an illinois statute that conclusively presumed every father of a child born out of wedlock to be an unfit person to have custody of his children violated the due process clause and that due process required the father to be given an opportunity to present evidence regarding his fitness as a parent
D. holding due process was violated by the automatic rejection of an unwed fathers custodial relationship without granting the father opportunity to present evidence regarding his fitness as a parent
E. holding a state could not conclusively presume that any particular unmarried father is unfit to raise a child
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | C | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
party responsible” therefore turns on which one of the two men was found more credible. This court, in reviewing administrative decisions both in and outside of the labor context, has consistently accorded substantial deference to the credibility determinations of the ALJ. See, e.g., NLRB v. Taylor Mach. Prods., Inc., 136 F.3d 507, 514 (6th Cir.1998) (“We afford even more deference to Board determinations of credibility and will not normally set aside the Board’s choice between conflicting testimony.”); Warner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 392 (6th Cir.2004) (according “great deference” to an ALJ’s credibility determination in assessing whether an applicant’s claim of subjective pain was believable); see also Dantran, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 171 F.3d 58, 72 (1st Cir.1999) . ALJs, after all, are the only judicial
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing a hearing officers latitude in making credibility calls
B. holding that the credibility determinations of hearing officers are afforded special deference
C. recognizing defense counsel must have wide latitude in making tactical decisions
D. recognizing the need to give trial courts latitude in making individualized security determinations
E. recognizing district courts wide latitude in imposing supervised release conditions
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
misconduct has occurred. " 'Prosecutorial misconduct occurs when the prosecutor's comments call the jurors' attention to matters not proper for their consideration and when the comments have a reasonable likelihood of prejudicing the jury by significantly influencing its verdict.'" State v. Wengreen, 2007 UT App 264, ¶18, ed to theft of the computer, making any reference to theft of software irrelevant. Such tactics have been rejected in Utah. See State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ¶ 29, 992 P.2d 951 (finding "[the prosecutor far exceeded appropriate prosecutorial zeal and seriously corrupted the integrity of the truth-finding function of the trial" when he referenced conduct of the defendant that did not in any way relate to the charges); State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 348-49 (Utah 1998) . Therefore, I would conclude that the
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that encouraging the jury to determine its verdict based upon evidence outside the record jeopardizes a defendants rights
B. holding that notwithstanding defendants consent the verdict was a nullity where the trial court proceeded to verdict with a jury of eleven
C. holding that a jury verdict will be sustained on any reasonable theory based on the evidence
D. recognizing that a motion for directed verdict should be granted when there is no reasonable evidence upon which a jury could legally predicate a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party
E. holding that the sixth amendments guarantee of a trial by jury requires the jury to base its verdict only on the evidence presented at trial
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
asked to determine whether, in Wyoming, a commercial easement in gross is freely assignable. Declining the request to answer so broad a question, we affirm the decision of the district court on other grounds. I. ISSUES Appellants state the issues on appeal: 1. Is a commercial easement in gross an assignable easement? 2. Is the grantee of an easement in gross judicially estopped to deny its as-signability when he signs a stipulation in a prior proceeding which conveys to the heirs, executors and assigns? Appellees restate the issue: A Whether the easement granted to Francis and Elvira Thar in 1976 is assignable. II. FACTS In 1976, Edwin N. Moran (Moran), granted an easement across his land to Francis and Elvira Thar (the Thars). The easement provided access to a landloc 946, 947 (1983) ; Newhoff v. Mayo, 48 NJ.Eq. 619, 23 A, 265,
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing that an easement may entitle the easement owner to do acts which were not for the easement would constitute a nuisance
B. holding that an appurtenant easement is an incident of the estate granted and passes with it
C. holding that an easement by prescription may be obtained against the holder of a present interest but that that prescriptive easement is subject to divestment if and when the property passes to the holder of a future interest
D. holding that an easement agreement and an unrecorded easement plan created an easement
E. holding that one who possesses deeded easement need not use the easement to maintain his title and easement cannot be extinguished from nonuser alone
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | C | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
a lien against her property,” 694 So.2d at 1358; and that the statute of limitations should have been tolled until the mother actually discovered that the hen had been filed. This court rejected the mother’s argument that the mother and daughter had a confidential relationship. Noting that the daughter and her husband “had appropriated [over $50,000] to themselves from [the mother’s] bank account, without [the mother’s] consent or permission,” 694 So.2d at 1358, the court held that “it could not be said that there existed such a ‘confidential relationship’ between the parties that [the daughter and son-in-law] occupied a role which inspired confidence that they were acting in good faith for [the mother’s] interest.” Id. Compare Jordan v. Mitchell, 705 So.2d 453, 461 (Ala.Civ.App.1997). In Cannon v. Gilmer, 135 Ala. 302, 304-05, 33
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that no confidential relationship existed between unmarried cohabitants because the female cohabitant neither relied upon any promise nor depended upon any financial expertise of the male cohabitant
B. holding that the consent to search given by the defendants wife and cohabitant was an effective consent because it was consistent with the rationale set forth in united states v matlock
C. holding that superior business expertise among other factors supported a finding of a confidential relationship
D. holding that no special relationship existed between the school and student
E. holding that although cohabitation is not in itself the de facto equivalent of marriage that would warrant modification of spousal maintenance all evidence relating to the economic nature of the relationship between wife and cohabitant would be relevant and admissible to show that wifes support needs have changed
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
The generic offense does not necessarily require, however, one of the specific purposes identified by the MPC. Instead, the generic offense of kidnapping requires restraint plus the presence of some aggravating factor, such as circumstances that create a risk of physical harm to the victim, or movement of the victim from one place to another. See De Jesus Ventura, 565 F.3d at 877-78 (“The most common approach defines kidnapping to include a particular nefarious purpose. And the majority approach requires some kind of heightened intent beyond the mere intent to restrain the victim’s liberty. Most critically, a substantial majority of jurisdictions ... require some additional element of intent or severity.”). See also United States v. Moreno-Florean, 542 F.3d 445, 454 (5th Cir.2008) . The Michigan statute at issue in this case
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a conviction under a texas robbery statute qualifies as generic robbery be cause its elements substantially correspond to the basic elements of the generic offense in that they both involve theft and immediate danger to a person
B. holding force to be an element of pre1994 amendment 111 which may be satisfied by proof of force or threat of force
C. holding that the enhancement requires that the defendant either threaten the codefendant witness or juror in his or her presence or issue the threat in circumstances in which there is some likelihood that the codefendant witness or juror will learn of the threat
D. holding that under 521 the coercive force applied against a plaintiff must result in an interference with a separate constitutional or statutory right and it is not sufficient that the right interfered with is the right to be free of the force or threat of force that was applied
E. holding that in addition to 1 knowing removal and confinement and 2 force threat or fraud the generic contemporary offense of kidnapping requires the specified purposes identified in the mpc or additional aggravating elements
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
is owed to the BIA’s interpretation of the governing statutes and regulations. See Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 535 (9th Cir.2004). We review factual findings for substantial evidence. See, e.g., Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2006). We deny the petition for review. We reject Lopez-Castro’s claim that she is eligible for asylum and withholding of removal based on her membership in a particular social group, namely, decent law abiding citizens of El Salvador who share a common immutable fear of the MS 13 and 18th St. gangs whom the government cannot control. See Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d 849, 855-56 (9th Cir.2009); Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 860-62 (9th Cir.2009); see also Velasco-Cervantes v. Holder, 593 F.3d 975, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Soriano v. Holder, 569 F.3d 1162, 1166
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that government material witnesses do not constitute a particular social group
B. holding that government informants are not members of a particular social group
C. holding that former gang members do not comprise a particular social group
D. holding that persecution of a woman because of her government job or her husbands position as a police officer was not on account of a particular social group
E. holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
of availability and accessibility”). 13 . Id. 14 . Id. 15 . Gardner v. State, 567 A.2d at 414. 16 . See Childress v. State, 721 A.2d 929, 931 (Del.1998) (explaining that “a drug-sale operation is a 'continuing felony' the 'locus’ of which is wherever the defendant keeps his contraband”) (citing Kornbluth v. State, 580 A.2d 556, 560-61 (Del.1990)); see also Wilson v. State, 343 A.2d 613, 618 (Del.1975). 17 . Childress v. State, 721 A.2d at 931-32; Wilson v. State, 343 A.2d at 618. 18 . Childress v. State, 721 A.2d at 931 (citing Del.Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1447A). 19 . Mack v. State, 312 A.2d 319, 320 (Del.1973). 20 . Id. 21 . Id. at 322. 22 . Lewis v. State, 1990 WL 38306, at *1 (Del.Supr. Mar. 19, 1990). 23 . Id., at *4. 24 . Id., at *3-4; see Childress v. State, 721 A.2d at 930-32 ; Wilson v. State, 343 A.2d at 618 (holding
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding evidence was sufficient to support conviction for pfdcf where defendant was arrested immediately outside his residence and an unloaded handgun was found in the residence under the defendants bed and in the same room as the controlled substances and cash
B. holding evidence insufficient for conviction for possession of controlled dangerous substances when the drugs were not found on the person of or in the same room as the defendant but were only found on other persons on the premises
C. recognizing that a protective search of a residence may be justified when the defendant is arrested outside of the home
D. holding that there was sufficient probable cause to search a defendants residence after evidence of drug dealing was found in his car during a traffic stop that was conducted when the defendant was coming from his residence and noting that under such circumstances a practical commonsense conclusion could be made that the drugs and money had been at the defendants residence a short time before the stop
E. holding that a warrant authorizing the search of a residence vehicles at the residence and all persons found in the residence was not overly broad given that search was limited to places were drugs or weapons might be found
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
of “relation back” to give the beneficiary of a constructive trust priority over private intervening interests, this would not be determinative as to the IRS. The priority of a federal tax lien against competing claims is governed by federal law. See United States v. Dishman Independent Oil, Inc., 46 F.3d 523, 526 (6th Cir.1995) (“It is undisputed that when a federal lien is involved, the relative priority between competing liens is a question of federal law determined by the principle ‘the first in time is the first in right.’ ”). Federal law, however, makes no provision for the subordination of a tax lien through the use of the “relation back” doctrine. See id. at 527; United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank of San Diego, 340 U.S. 47, 50, 71 S.Ct. 111, 95 L.Ed. 53 (1950) ; Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 120 S.Ct.
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a lien holder who is not served and joined as a party to a tax suit cannot have his lien extinguished by the tax sale
B. holding that a state tax lien was not judicial lien arising from judgment such that it could be avoided in bankruptcy by a chapter 13 debtor
C. holding that the lien bond releases the property from the lien but the lien is then secured by the bond
D. holding that a property right that comes into existence by court action such as a judgment lien does not relate back to some earlier date to destroy the priority of a federal tax lien
E. holding that a judgment resolving the question of the priority of the federal tax lien constitutes a final and appealable order over which we have jurisdiction
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | D | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
of the trial court should not be disturbed unless the error is manifest. Hill v. State, 477 So.2d 553, 556 (Fla.1985). A potential juror should be excused on motion of a party if there is any reasonable doubt that the juror possesses “that state of mind which will enable him to render an impartial verdict based solely on the evidence submitted and the law announced at the trial.” Id. at 555 (quoting Singer v. State, 109 So.2d 7 (Fla.1959)). A trial court’s ruling on a cause challenge will be sustained on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Kessler v. State, 752 So.2d 545 (Fla.1999). Based on Elledge’s equivocal responses, we disagree with the trial court’s conclusion that Elledge was sufficiently rehabilitated to serve on the jury. See, e.g., Bryant v. State, 656 So.2d 426 (Fla.1995) ; Hamilton v. State, 547 So.2d 630 (Fla.1989)
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a juror need not be excused for cause merely because he gives equivocal re sponses
B. holding that it was error to deny cause challenge because although juror stated he could follow courts instructions his other responses were sufficiently equivocal to cast doubt
C. holding that a jury is presumed to follow a judges instructions
D. holding that a jury is presumed to follow the trial courts instructions
E. recognizing that responses to artful questions and inaccurate responses do not require that a challenge for cause be granted
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
order affirmatively stated that, with the termination of his probation, “there are no conditions on his rights to practice law in the jurisdictions in which he is licensed, other than those conditions and standards that govern all attorneys so licensed.” As a result of the early termination, DeNisco was subject to court scrutiny — and subject to having his license suspended — for a shorter time than called for in the judgment. We also agree with the Commission that the ease is not moot because the substantial rights of the parties will be affected. Our ruling will determine whether DeNis-co’s disciplinary record will reflect the terms of the original judgment or the reduced period of probation. See Pinnacle Gas Treating, Inc. v. Read, 104 S.W.3d 544, 545-46 (Tex.2003) (per curiam) . Finally, we note that this issue appears to
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that court erred in dismissing minors claims with prejudice absent a hearing
B. recognizing under plain error review that the burden to show that substantial rights have been prejudiced is on the party that failed to raise the issue below and for an error to have affected substantial rights the error must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings
C. holding that the trial court erred by dismissing the plaintiffs defamation claim
D. holding live controversy existed in appellate court because whether trial court erred in dismissing first of two condemnation proceedings affected substantial rights of parties
E. holding that district court erred in dismissing the indictment based on sufficiency of evidence
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | D | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
detention so as to allow the seized evidence to be admitted. ¶ 9 In Brown v. Illinois, the Supreme Court applied three factors to detei’mine whether the taint of illegal conduct is sufficiently attenuated from a subsequent search to avoid the exclusionary rule. 422 U.S. 590, 603-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). Under Brown, a court must consider first, the time elapsed between the illegality and the acquisition of evidence; second, the presence of inteiwening circumstances; and third, the pux’pose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. Id. Although Brown involved a confession following an illegal search, Arizona courts have applied the at gardless of how the individual officer came to know about the warrant. See United States v. Hudson, 405 F.3d 425, 439 (6th Cir.2005) ; see also State v. Spreitz, 190 Ariz. 129,
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding a fourth amendment terry detention is not a custodial arrest and the use of handcuffs does not automatically convert a temporary detention into a fourth amendment arrest
B. holding that a warrantless arrest does not violate the fourth amendment if at the time of the defendants arrest police had probable cause to believe that an offense has been is being or will be committed
C. holding that in a situation where the police have probable cause to arrest one party and reasonably mistake a second party for that first party the arrest of the second party is still a valid arrest
D. holding in the alternative that even if handcuffing a suspect did convert the detention into an arrest the arrest was justified by probable cause
E. holding that initial illegal detention does not call into question validity of arrest pursuant to valid warrant wjhere the police effectuate an arrest in an illegal manner but nonetheless have probable cause to make the arrest the proper fourth amendment remedy is to exclude only that evidence which is a fruit of the illegality
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
As the Superior Ironworks court noted, section 38.004 specifically authorizes a trial court to take judicial notice of the usual and customary attorneys’ fees and of the contents of the case file without receiving further evidence in certain circumstances. 789 S.W.2d at 431. However, the award of appellate attorneys’ fees in this case is predicated on section 305.005 of the Finance Code, not section 38.001 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. This court has previously held that section 38.004 cannot be used to justify the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees recovered outside of section 38.001. See Valdez v. Valdez, 930 S.W.2d 725, 732-33 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ); see also London v. London, 94 S.W.3d 139, 147-49 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) . We sustain the Parr defendants’ ninth point
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a party may recover attorneys fees under section 38001 only if the party prevails on a cause of action for which attorneys fees are available and recovers damages
B. holding that trial courts may not use section 38004 to take judicial notice of reasonableness of attorneys fees awarded under statute other than section 38001
C. holding fees mandatory under predecessor statute of 38001
D. holding award of attorneys fees to party prevailing on contract claim is mandatory under section 38001 if there is proof of the reasonableness of the fees
E. holding that predecessor to section 38001 codified with no changes as section 38001 et seq contained no requirement that the contract sued upon have a provision providing for attorneys fees
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
Olano, 507 U.S. at 732. Appellant contends that “[a] conviction on uncorroborated accomplice testimony is valid only if the jury is instructed that such testimony must be carefully scrutinized, weighted [sic] with great care, and received with great caution.” Aplt. Br. at 25 (citing United States v. Chatman, 994 F.2d 1510, 1514-15 (10th Cir.1993)). We have held that when uncorroborated accomplice testimony is the only evidence supporting conviction that failure “to properly apprise the jury of the potentially unreliable nature of the accomplices’ testimony by means of a special cautionary instruction” is plain and reversible error. United States v. Hill, 627 F.2d 1052, 1055 (10th Cir.1980) (internal quotations omitted); see also United States v. Owens, 460 F.2d 268, 269 (10th Cir.1972) . We note, however, that “[a] defendant is not
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that failure to instruct the jury that accomplice testimony must be carefully scrutinized weighed with great care and received with caution was plain and reversible error
B. holding that the district courts failure to instruct the jury as to the proper standard of proof constituted plain error
C. holding failure to instruct jury on requirement of corroboration of informants testimony is error
D. holding failure to instruct jury as to requirement of corroboration of accomplice witness testimony was error
E. holding that district courts failure to give an addict instruction was not reversible error because the instructions to the jury on accomplice immune informant and felon testimony along with the general credibility instruction were sufficient to alert the jury to consider with special care and weigh with caution the testimony of the witness
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
that remand is discretionary with the court. 17 . This local rule provides in relevant part: [I]f a motion requires consideration of matters not established by the pleadings, the moving party at the time of delivery and service of its supporting brief shall file with the Clerk such evidentiary materials, including discovery materials and affidavits, as are being relied upon and have not previously been filed, and shall serve a copy of them upon each other party; such documents shall not be attached to the brief.... Documents must be identified and authenticated by affidavit.... 18 . Converting Ameritrade's motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment would preclude the possibility of Green voluntarily dismissing the action pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 41(a n. 9 (8th Cir. 1997) . 20 . In such event, however, the case once
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that court could consider prospectus that was not attached to complaint
B. holding that court may look both to complaint itself and to any documents attached as exhibits to complaint
C. holding court could consider a mortgage agreement not attached to the complaint in ruling on motion to dismiss because the complaint refers to the mortgage numerous times the mortgage is attached to this motion and is central to plaintiffs claims
D. holding that the court may consider an article not attached to the complaint in determining whether to dismiss the complaint because the article was integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint and because the plaintiffs did not challenge its authenticity
E. holding that it was appropriate for the district court to refer to the documents attached to the motion to dismiss since the documents were referred to in the complaint
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
recognized post-trial motion, defendant has forfeited his argument by failing to raise it in a posttrial motion. We disagree. In Enoch, the court held “when the defendant fails to comply with the statutory requirement to file a post[ ]trial motion,” review is “limited to constitutional issues which have properly been raised at trial and which can be raised later in a post-conviction hearing petition (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 122 — 1), sufficiency of the evidence, and plain error.” Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 190, 522 N.E.2d at 1131-32. Here, because defendant raises constitutional issues of due process and equal protection, these issues are reviewable on appeal under the constitutionality exception in Enoch. See People v. Cox, 295 Ill. App. 3d 666, 670, 693 N.E.2d 483, 485 (1998) . In the alternative, the State argues the
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding defendants argument the court erroneously denied his motion to suppress was reviewable as a constitutional issue even though defendant failed to raise the issue in a written posttrial motion
B. holding that defendant failed to raise a constitutional issue at trial and thus waived appellate review of that issue
C. holding in a capital case that the defendant waived his argument that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a change of venue where the trial court took the motion under advisement but the defendant failed to seek a ruling on the motion and failed to renew the motion after the jurors had been qualified
D. holding that a defendant who fails to raise a specific issue as the basis for suppression in a motion to suppress to the district court has waived the right to raise that issue on appeal
E. holding that defendant failed to raise a constitutional issue at trial and thus failed to preserve the issue for appellate review
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
other areas of criminal law. Plea agreements, for example, commonly contain a provision stating that proffer information that is disclosed during the course of plea negotiations is inadmissible as substantive evidence of guilt, but is admissible for purposes of impeachment. The standard plea agreement provides: “No statements made or information provided by [the defendant] will be used by the government directly against her, except for the purpose of cross-examination or impeachment should she be a witness' in any criminal trial or proceeding and offer testimony materially different from any statements made or information provided during the proffer....” United States v. Nemetz, No. 87-196-C, slip op. at 2-3, 1987 WL 17543 (D. Mass. Sept. 21, 1987) (quoting a standard plea agreement) . Similarly, grand jury testimony, which is
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the constitution does not require the government to disclose impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendant
B. holding that the defendant by signing the plea agreement waives the protection of fedrcrimp 11e6 for the purposes of impeachment
C. holding that although signing arbitration agreement was condition of employment agreement was not void for unconscionability
D. holding parolee waives constitutional searchandseizure rights by voluntarily signing parole agreement
E. recognizing that a voluntary and understanding guilty plea entered without the benefit of a plea bargain waives all nonjurisdictional defects that occurred before the entry of the plea
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
that “[t]his standard does not require ... abject deference, but nonetheless prohibits us from substituting our own judgment for that of the state court.” Snow, 474 F.3d at 696 (quotations and footnote omitted). As the Supreme Court has made clear, Even in the context of federal habeas, deference does not imply abandonment or abdication of judicial review. Deference does not by definition preclude relief. A federal court can disagree with a state court’s ... determination and, when guided by AEDPA, conclude the decision was unreasonable or that the factual premise was incorrect by clear and convincing evidence. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); see also Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005) . IV. GUILT-PHASE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the brecht standard applies on federal collateral review even after passage of the aedpa
B. holding that the aedpa statute of limitations is not jurisdictional
C. holding that the standard for withholding of removal is more demanding than the standard for asylum
D. recognizing that although the term good cause is undefined it is at least as demanding as the excusable neglect standard
E. holding the aedpa standard is demanding but not insatiable
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
has a racially disproportionate impact.” (emphasis in original)); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224, 91 S.Ct. 1940, 29 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971) (“[N]o case in this Court has held that a legislative act may violate equal protection solely because of the motivations of the men who voted for it.”). See also Marsh v. Newton, 134 F.3d 383, at *2 (10th Cir.1998) (unpublished) (“‘To establish a gender-based claim under the Equal Protection Clause, [the plaintiff] must, .as a threshold matter, demonstrate that [the plaintiff has] been treated differently by a state actor than others who are similarly situated simply because [the plaintiff] belong[s] to a particular class.’” (quoting Keevan v. Smith, 100 F.3d 644, 647-48 (8th Cir.1996))); Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1312 (10th Cir.1998) . If the plaintiff can produce evidence of
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding equal protection under the federal constitution applies to similarly situated persons
B. holding that the equal protection clause is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike
C. holding that equal protection claim by prisoner lacked merit where prisoner not similarly situated to others who were permitted to engage in relevant conduct
D. holding that black residents failed to state an equal protection claim where they did not allege the existence of a similarly situated group of white residents who were treated differently
E. holding that to assert a viable equal protection claim plaintiffs must first make a threshold showing that they were differently treated from others who were similarly situated to them
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
plaintiffs evidence was sufficient to support the jury verdict, as is Mathuris evidence in this case. See also Floyd v. Kellogg Sales Co., 841 F.2d 226, 228-29 (8th Cir.1988) (reversing ■ grant of JNOV where plaintiffs evidence of retaliation was centered on three statements); contrast Grizzle, 14 F.3d at 267-68 (upholding lower court’s grant of JNOV overturning jury verdict where evidence of retaliatory motive presented by plaintiff would not support a “reasonable jury finding of retaliation without engaging in impermissible speculation”). In the alternative, SIU argues that Keon was determined to “clean house” and would have terminated Mathur as Department Chair regardless of any retaliatory motive. See McNutt v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill., 141 F.3d 706, 709(7th Cir.1998) . The jury, however, was properly instructed
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the pricewaterhouse mixedmotives defense applies to retaliation claims
B. holding that the mcdonnell douglas burdenshifting framework applies to retaliation claims in the same manner as to discrimination claims
C. holding title vtis mixedmotives framework inapplicable to the adea
D. recognizing similar analysis applies to discrimination and retaliation claims
E. holding that the mcdonnell douglas framework is appropriate for analyzing singlemotive claims but not mixedmotives claims
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
notice in § 1913. In contrast, 25 U.S.C. § 1912, applicable to involuntary termination of parental rights, expressly requires notice to “the parent of Indian custodian and the Indian child’s tribe.” The plain reading of section 1913 requires no notice to the tribe for a voluntary relinquishment of custody. A reading with other statutory sections does not reveal inconsistencies. No ambiguity exists. The ICWA assigns exclusive jurisdiction over an Indian child who resides or is domiciled within the reservation to the tribe. It provides concurrent jurisdiction to both the tribe and state over any Indian child who does not meet the exclusive jurisdiction requirements. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911. For all involuntary State proceedings, notice is required to the parent or Indian custodian and 1996) . Pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1913, no tribal
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that when evidence did not prove dependency of child as alleged in complaint but revealed pure custody dispute juvenile court was without jurisdiction to determine custody of child
B. recognizing the collateral order doctrine for the first time
C. recognizing the draft amendments would for the first time entitle tribes to receive notice when a voluntary child custody proceedings is underway
D. recognizing that a parents liberty interest in the custody of a child is subject to due process protection
E. recognizing that a district court has the authority to award attorney fees in postdivorce proceedings involving child custody
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | C | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
262 F.3d 677, 679 (8th Cir.2001); Larry’s United Super, Inc., v. Werries, 253 F.3d 1083, 1085 (8th Cir.2001); Keymer v. Mgmt. Recruiters Int’l, Inc., 169 F.3d 501, 504 (8th Cir.1999). Under the first part, the court must ascertain whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists between the parties. Gannon, 262 F.3d at 679. The court next determines whether the specific dispute falls within the scope of that valid agreement. Id. If the court answers these inquiries in the affirmative, under sections three and four of the FAA, the court must stay proceedings and compel the parties to submit their dispute to arbitration. Lyster v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, 239 F.3d 943, 945 (8th Cir.2001) (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218, 105 S.Ct. 1238, 84 L.Ed.2d 158 (1985) ; Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Guidant
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the faa mandates courts to direct parties to arbitration on issues to which a valid arbitration agreement has been signed
B. holding that the faa requires arbitration of age discrimination claims when a valid arbitration agreement exists
C. holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added
D. holding that faa was inapplicable where parties involved in action are not parties to an arbitration agreement under which issues are referable to arbitration
E. holding that in ruling on a motion to compel arbitration a court must consider 1 whether the parties have entered into a valid arbitration agreement 2 whether an arbitrable issue exists and 3 whether the right to arbitration has been waived
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
actions. Defs.’ Mot. at 33-35, 40-41. Because the Court concludes that the plaintiff plainly fails to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, it need not consider whether or not the actions at issue qualify as “adverse.” 14 . Neither party submitted affidavits or deposition transcripts from Cooper or Dom, nor does the plaintiff refer to either employee in her opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment. See generally PL's Opp. 15 . The defendants argue that the plaintiff's unsworn declaration is, on its face, inadmissible hearsay, which fails to satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1746 (2000) (Unsworn Declarations Under Penalty of Perjury). Defs.' Reply at 6-7; see Commercial Drapery Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 133 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C.Cir.1998) . Section 1746 states that an unsworn
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court at the summary judgment stage to consider information from an affidavit based on inadmissible hearsay rather than the affiants personal knowledge
B. holding that hearsay in affidavit which would be inadmissible in evidence at trial could not be considered on motion for summary judgment
C. holding that a court may not consider hearsay contained in an affidavit when ruling on a summary judgment motion
D. holding that statements in affidavits based solely on hearsay are inadmissible as summary judgment evidence
E. holding that an affidavit consisting entirely of inadmissible hearsay is not sufficient to survive summary judgment
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
of the interstate nexus element of the crime. Glover contends that, even though the court gave the jury a limiting instruction, ie., that they were free to disregard the expert’s conclusion, the jury did not feel free to consider the evidence on their own, and were forced to either accept or reject the expert’s conclusion. Glover contends that Agent Zim-mer’s testimony should have been limited to p use expert testimony to prove the interstate nexus element of a weapons charge brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922. See, e.g., United States v. Corey, 207 F.3d 84, 88-89 (1st Cir.2000) (noting that an expert may testify that a weapon was manufactured in one state and sold in another, and thus to state their opinion as to that issue); United States v. Privett, 68 F.3d 101, 104 (5th Cir.1995) , cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1226, 116 S.Ct. 1862,
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing that the interstate nexus requirement is satisfied by proof of a probable or potential impact on interstate commerce
B. holding expert testimony provided no evidence as to causation since testimony was not based upon reasonable medical probability
C. recognizing scarborough holding that commerce nexus satisfied upon showing that possessed firearm had traveled at some time in interstate commerce
D. holding after lopez that the interstate nexus element of the hobbs act still requires the government to show only a minimal connection to interstate commerce
E. holding that pjroof of the interstate nexus to the firearm may be based upon expert testimony
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
it appears that the Commissioner has repeatedly been using this same boilerplate paragraph to reject the testimony of numerous claimants, without linking the conclusory statements contained therein to evidence in the record or even tailoring the paragraph to the facts at hand, almost without regard to whether the boilerplate paragraph has any relevance to the case. See, e.g., Angel, 329 F.3d at 1213; Oslin v. Barnhart, 69 Fed.Appx. 942, 947-48 (10th Cir.2003) (unpublished disposition); Clark v. Barnhart, 64 Fed. Appx. 688, 691 (10th Cir.2003) (unpublished disposition). As is the risk with boilerplate language, we are unable to determine in this case the specific evidence that led the ALJ to reject claimant’s testimony. See, e.g., Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009 (10th Cir.1996) . Indeed, we cannot find rec ord support for
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the alj is free to reject the opinion of any physician when the evidence supports a contrary conclusion
B. holding that we must uphold any of the aljs factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence and we owe substantial deference to inferences drawn from these facts
C. holding that where adequately supported credibility findings are for the alj to make
D. holding aljs listing of factors he considered was inadequate when court was left to speculate what specific evidence led the alj to his conclusion
E. holding in the absence of alj findings supported by specific weighing of the evidence we cannot assess whether relevant evidence adequately supports the aljs conclusion
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
So.2d 220 (Fla.1982); Cohen Bros., LLC v. ME Corp., S.A., 872 So.2d 321 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004); Jatar v. Lamaletto, 758 So.2d 1167 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Adams v. State, 436 So.2d 1132 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). An expectation of privacy in a business “is not one which society is willing to protect.” Morningstar, 428 So.2d at 221 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); Hill v. State, 422 So.2d 816 (Fla.1982)). Based on the record before us, it is evident that the defendant made telephone calls to the victim’s business telephone line, located in the victim’s home where he conducted his business. Although the victim may enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in his home, that expectation is not extended to his business. See Morningstar, 428 So.2d at 221 . We find that there was insufficient evidence
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movement from one place to another
B. holding that for purposes of federal constitutional law a person does not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to trash discarded outside the home
C. holding a person who is present at anothers home with permission simply for the purpose of consummating a business transaction does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy there
D. holding that defendant lacked reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage located outside curtilage of home
E. holding that the constitutional protection of an individuals reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her home does not extend to a place of business
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
by a criminal defendant only after conviction. See Workman v. State, 170 Tex.Crim. 621, 622, 343 S.W.2d 446, 447 (1961). There are narrow exceptions to the rule requiring conviction before a criminal defendant may appeal. Wright v. State, 969 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tex. App. — Dallas 1998, no pet.); McKown v. State, 915 S.W.2d 160, 161 (Tex.App.— Fort Worth 1996, no pet.) (per curiam). A defendant may appeal: (1) while on unad-judicated community supervision; (2) the denial of a motion to reduce bond; (3) the denial of a pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus alleging double jeopardy; and (4) the denial of habeas corpus relief in extradition cases. Wright, 969 S.W.2d at 589; McKown, 915 S.W.2d at 161. But see Ex parte Shumake, 953 S.W.2d 842, 846-47 (Tex.App. — Austin 1997, no pet.) . In this case, appellant is attempting to
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that appeal from denial of rule 60b motion raised for review only the district courts order of denial and not the underlying judgment itself
B. holding that the real id act gave us jurisdiction to review a criminal aliens petition for review of an order of removal raising a question of law
C. holding no jurisdiction to review order raising amount of bail and questioning jurisdiction to review denial of motion to reduce bond
D. holding that we lack jurisdiction to review a denial of adjustment of status as a discretionary matter
E. holding that we do not have jurisdiction to consider the underlying final order upon petition for review of a motion to reopen where the petitioner did not earlier seek review of that underlying final order
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | C | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
to be aggregated. Id. at 363. The government asserts that because the same Guideline sections are applicable to May’s offenses, the district court properly aggregated the total losses for May’s convictions under §§ 7201-7202. Despite the initial appeal of the government’s argument, the facts of May’s case differ from those we and other circuits have previously decided. Cseplo involved a scheme whereby the defendant skimmed money from a corporation he owned and converted the money to his own uses. 42 F.3d at 361. See also United States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317, 1323-24 (11th Cir.2003) (adopting Cseplo in the context of a defendant who willfully underreported corporate income and defrauded the United States government); United States v. Spencer, 178 F.3d 1365, 1368-69 (10th Cir.1999) . Therefore, in Cseplo the government was
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding it is appropriate to apply a discount to a closely held corporation
B. holding that aggregation is appropriate where defendant skimmed money from the corporation to supplement his legitimately approved salary
C. holding that dismissal without prejudice was appropriate where a plaintiff failed to name each of the persons alleged to have violated the appropriate standard of care
D. holding that where issues were not considered by the bia remand is appropriate
E. holding that unless remand from the bia is qualified or limited to a specific purpose an ij may consider any and all matters he deems appropriate in the exercise of his administrative discretion or which are brought to his attention in compliance with the appropriate regulations
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
or implied consent to the personal jurisdiction of the court.” 456 U.S. at 703, 102 S.Ct. 2099. For example, the parties may consent to jurisdiction through a forum selection clause in a contract, Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16, 84 S.Ct. 411, 11 L.Ed.2d 354 (1964); Dow Chem. Co. v. Calderon, 422 F.3d 827, 831 (9th Cir.2005); by filing a proof of claim in a bankruptcy proceeding, Tucker Plastics, Inc. v. Pay’N Pak Stores, Inc., 99 F.3d 910, 911(9th Cir.1996) (per curiam); or by filing an original complaint, a counterclaim or a crossclaim, Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67-68, 58 S.Ct. 454, 82 L.Ed. 649 (1938); Schnabel v. Lui, 302 F.3d 1023, 1037-38 & n. 5 (9th Cir.2002); cf. Smith v. Salish Kootenai Coll., 434 F.3d 1127, 1138-40 (9th Cir.2006) (en banc) . The rules governing consent are not as
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that disputes involving questions of interpretation of a tribal constitution and tribal law is not within the jurisdiction of the district court
B. holding that acoma tribal law was the law of the place because the tribal court could have jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claim
C. holding that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to interpret a tribal constitution or tribal laws
D. holding that indian tribes lack tribal jurisdiction over crimes committed by nonmember indians within the tribes reservation
E. holding that a nonmember who files a civil claim in an indian tribal court consents to tribal jurisdiction
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
limiting factor. See R.M., 565 Pa. at 628'30, 777 A.2d at 452'53 (Saylor, J., dissenting). 4 . As the Superior Court noted, courts in several states have cited in loco parentis and related doctrines (e.g., "de facto parent,” “psychological parent”) in granting standing to petition for child custody. See T.B. v. L.R.M., 753 A.2d 873, 884 n. 7 (Pa.Super.2000) (citing cases). Notably, however, most such decisions are grounded in legislative policy pronouncements. See, e.g., Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I.2000); V.C. v. M.J.B., 163 N.J. 200, 748 A.2d 539 (N.J.2000); Ellison v. Ramos, 130 N.C.App. 389, 502 S.E.2d 891 (1998); In re Custody of C.C.R.S., 892 P.2d 246 (Colo.1995); Bodwell v. Brooks, 141 N.H. 508, 686 A.2d 1179 (1996); cf. Geibe v. Geibe, 571 N.W.2d 774 (Minn.Ct.App.1997) ; but see E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 429 Mass. 824, 711
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing in loco parentis as statutory ground of visitation rights but finding it inapplicable on facts presented
B. recognizing the validity of the doctrine but holding no equitable tolling on the facts presented
C. recognizing but finding inapplicable pure question of law exception to doctrine of exhaustion
D. holding that trial court may not grant summary judgment on ground not presented by movant in writing
E. recognizing availability of in pari delicto doctrine as defense to registration violation but finding it inapplicable to facts of the case
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
judgment of witness credibility that is supported by competent, substantial evidence, as found in this case, will stand. See Gonzalez v. State, 990 So.2d 1017, 1024 (Fla.2008) (‘“As long as the trial court’s findings are supported by competent substantial evidence, “this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on questions of fact, likewise of the credibility of the witnesses as well as the weight to be given to the evidence by the trial court.”’ Blanco v. State, 702 So.2d 1250, 1252 (Fla.1997) (quoting Demps v. State, 462 So.2d 1074, 1075 (Fla.1984)).”). There is competent, substantial support within the postconviction evidentiary record for the circuit court’s conclusion that Bailey’s trial lawyers’ actions were part of reasonable trial strategy, and the ). Regarding Bailey’s assertion that Dr. Kubiak
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding the failure to call alibi witnesses promised during opening statement was not ineffective assistance of counsel
B. holding that trial counsels failure to call defendants family members as witnesses during penalty phase was reasonable trial strategy and not ineffective assistance of counsel
C. holding counsels failure to object to victim impact testimony and evidence was not ineffective assistance of counsel when the trial record was silent as to counsels strategy
D. holding that counsels failure to investigate the defendants personal and psychiatric history constituted ineffective assistance during the penalty phase but not during the guilt phase
E. holding trial counsels failure to investigate and present substantial mitigation evidence during the sentencing phase can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
of the facts and circumstances.” D.W. Sandau Dredging, ENGBCA No. 5812, 96-1 BCA ¶ 28,064, at 140,161, 1995 WL 739023 (1995). In this connection, “the amount of money involved, the length of time of the non-payment, and the payment procedur to pay large amounts” could constitute a material breach. Northern Helex Co. v. United States, 197 Ct.Cl. 118, 125, 455 F.2d 546, 550 (1972). However, here, the evidence established that the FBOP never refused to pay Morganti; the FBOP merely delayed payment. While the FBOP’s payment history was not perfect, it is not disputed that Morganti received $82 million in progress payments on a $110 million project that it ultimately failed to complete. In such circumstances, the FBOP’s conduct does not constitute a material breach. Id. at 124, 455 F.2d 546 ; Jones Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 86-1 BCA ¶
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that after jury findings of dual breach unchallenged finding that defendants breach was not excused based on prior material breach of plaintiff constituted implicit finding that there was no material breach by plaintiff
B. holding that a 103day delay in payment did not amount to bad faith because the carrier gave a reasonable explanation for the delay in payment it was continuing its investigation
C. holding that mere delay in payment for a while would not be a material breach
D. holding party in breach could not maintain suit for breach of contract
E. holding contractor liable for total or material breach thus excusing government from payment of contract price
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | C | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
has done.” Ex parte Floyd, 796 So.2d 303, 308 (Ala.2001) (quoting Garrett v. Raytheon Co., 368 So.2d 516, 518-19 (Ala.1979)). For instance, Environ and ATOFINA cite to the case of Smith v. Medtronic, Inc., 607 So.2d 156, 160 (Ala.1992), which involved a defective pacemaker. The court there held that although the pacemaker was implanted in 1981 and its defect was discovered in 1984, the “injury-causing malfunction” did not occur until 1990, when the plaintiff underwent surgery as a result of the defect. See also Pfizer, Inc. v. Farsian, 682 So.2d 405, 407 (Ala.1996) (“Under Alabama law, [a plaintiffs] fear that his [heart] valve could fail in the future is not, without more, a legal injury-sufficient to support his claim.”); Southern Bakeries, Inc. v. Knipp, 852 So.2d 712 (Ala.2002) . '[9] Here, Russell’s negligence and
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that oven removers did not have any present injury from oven owners alleged fraudulent behavior in concealing fact that oven contained asbestos where remover had not sought any medical care and did not plan to get any psychological treatment or counseling for the distress
B. holding that a written statement could not be regarded as an affidavit sufficient in law for any purpose because it was not sworn to by any one or before any officer
C. holding that attorneys testimony was not relevant to any issues contained in the appellants pleadings and that the appellant had failed to demonstrate that the attorneys testimony could not be gained from any other witness or source
D. holding that charging fees for medical services did not violate the eighth amendment where prisoner did not allege denial of medical care
E. holding that remand was required due to fact that final judgment of dissolution did not contain any provision addressing status of any medical insurance for parties child or general responsibility for childs medical care
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
of methamphetamine to the defendant and used that amount to increase his sentence under the Guidelines. See 408 F.3d at 682. The district court’s findings increased the defendant’s Guidelines sentencing range from 63 to 78 months to 121 to 151 months. See 408 F.3d at 682-83. The Tenth Circuit stated that, both before and after Congress’ passage of the Sentencing Reform Act, “sentencing courts maintained the power to consider the broad context of a defendant’s conduct, even when a court’s view of the conduct conflicted with the jury’s t, although the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Alleyne v. United States, ... — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 ... (2013), expands the rule from Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 ... (2000) , to cover facts that increase the mandatory
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that factors increasing a defendants sentence beyond the statutory maximum of the crime charged with the exception of prior convictions must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt
B. holding that facts that increase the maximum sentence a defendant faces must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt
C. holding facts that increase the maximum penalty for a crime must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt
D. holding that territorial jurisdiction must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt
E. holding that any fact that increases a sentence beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
396 (1994). This appeal clearly could have been, and should have been, decided on other grounds. Furthermore, the majority asserts, without analysis, that each of the criteria for application of the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine has been met. 212 Ill. 2d at 382-83. I see nothing in the record to justify the conclusion that any of the criteria have been met. Accordingly, I would dismiss the appeal as moot. Second, the issue in this case concerns whether Girot failed to comply, as a matter of law, with the secure-binding requirement of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/10 — 4 (West 2002)). Where, as here, the issue is a question of law concerning only compliance with the Election Code, due process is satisfied. See, e.g., Ayers v. Martin, 223 Ill. App. 3d 397, 400 (1991) . Consequently, even if this case meets the
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that where the issues are basically questions of law and the trial court has reviewed them de novo due process is provided
B. holding questions of law related to class certification are reviewed de novo
C. holding that in general an agencys conclusion of law that presents mixed questions of fact and law is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard but questions concerning whether an agency has followed proper procedures or considered the appropriate factors in making its determination are questions of law which are reviewed de novo
D. holding that issues concerning the sufficiency of an indictment are reviewed de novo
E. holding that antitrust standing is question of law reviewed de novo
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
v. Kearin, 807 So.2d 659, 663-64 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)). The prejudice to the defendant must be extreme to justify applying the doctrine of laches to a child support matter. Ticktin, 807 So.2d at 664. A mere delay in filing suit is insufficient to establish the applicability of lach-es to “relieve a parent from the obligation to support his or her child.” Hewett, 913 So.2d at 109. Even when the delay is accompanied by a change of financial condition, these circumstances standing alone do not justify the application of laches. See id. Rather, there must be some evidence that the change of financial condition was caused by the delay, such that the change of conditions would render enforcement of the right asserted inequitable. See Logan v. Logan, 920 So.2d 796, 799 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) . The doctrine of equitable estop-pel involves
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the former husband failed to show the required prejudice where he did not testify that he would have acted differently during the period of delay if he had known the former wife would assert the childrens right to child support
B. holding that the state courts determination that the petitioner could not show prejudice because he did not allege that the witness was available to testify was a reasonable application of federal law to the facts of the case
C. holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present
D. holding there was enough evidence to find the defendant abandoned his child when he claimed to have knowledge of cpss involvement he admitted that for periods of two years and six months he did not attempt any contact with his child and from the date he canceled a home study until the petition was filed he did not attempt to contact the child or cps or provide support even when he was out of jail
E. holding that each plaintiff is liable for fees if he would have been entitled to his fees if he had prevailed
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
is a contract and the rules of contract law are applicable to plea agreements. State v. Frazier, 697 So.2d 944 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). A party may waive any right to which he is legally entitled under the Constitution, a statute, or a contract. State, Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. E.D.S. Federal Corporation, 631 So.2d 353 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). A defendant will not be relieved of an obligation that was included as a specific component of a plea agreement that was bargained for and voluntarily entered into by defendant. Allen v. State, 642 So.2d 815 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). 722 So.2d at 907; see also A.D.W. v. State, 777 So.2d 1101, 1104 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (acknowledging that “plea agreements are controlled by contract law”); State v. Frazier, 697 So.2d 944 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) . 7 . Harrell, 721 So.2d at 1187 (holding that
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that plea agreements executed pursuant to fedrcrimp 11c1c are binding on the district court
B. holding that the federal expert witness compensation rules are in direct conflict with the state rules even when the state rules allow for a greater recovery
C. holding that the burden is upon the state under the applicable federal rules of evidence
D. holding that immunity agreements are analogous to plea agreements and are enforced under principles of contract law within the constitutional safeguards of due process
E. holding that the rules of contract law are applicable to plea agreements
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
finding that section 1320a-7 was constitutional as applied to Manocchio. Specifically, the district court found that section 1320a-7 was not punitive, but rather remedial, and.therefore did not violate either the Double Jeopardy Clause or the Ex Post Facto Clause. II. ' ISSUE Whether 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7, a mandatory exclusionary provision, is punitive in nature and violates the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States Constitution. III. DISCUSSION The threshold determination this court must make is whether 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 is punitive in nature and effect because both the Double Jeopardy Clause and the Ex Post Facto Clause apply only to punitive sanctions. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-49, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1901-02, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989) ; Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 613, 80
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that civil forfeitures are neither punishment nor criminal for purposes of the double jeopardy clause
B. holding that the due process clause is violated if the prosecution fails to disclose material evidence that is favorable to a criminal defendant
C. holding that double jeopardy clause is violated when a defendant punished in a criminal prosecution is penalized by a subsequent punitive civil sanction
D. holding double jeopardy clause applicable to civil penalties under the false claims act
E. holding that if double jeopardy clause is not violated because legislature intended double punishment section 7019 is not applicable and merger is not required
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | C | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
that he committed the arson. 3 If Guastella or Wasyluk is proved to have intentionally started the fire, the question will again arise whether arson committed by either or both of them will relieve the insurer, in whole or in part, from indemnifying BLT for the loss. New Jersey law is clear that if the insured is an individual who intentionally sets fire to his own property, an insurer will be relieved from having to compensate him for the resulting fire damage. Olesak v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 215 N.J.Super. 155, 158-159, 521 A.2d 849 (App.Div.1987). The more difficult question is the availability and effect of an arson defense where the insured is a corporation. Compare Miller & Dobrin Furniture Co. v. Camden Fire Ins. Co., 55 N.J.Super. 205, 218-219, 150 A.2d 276 (Law Div.1959) and Italian Fisherman v. Commercial Union
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that arson committed by a dominant fiftypercent stockholder was attributable to the corporation
B. holding that arson committed by stockholder who was the principal managing agent precluded recovery by the corporation
C. holding an insured corporation could not recover for a fire loss caused by its controlling shareholders arson
D. holding that in an arson case there must be other proof that the offense was committed to corroborate a confession by the defendant
E. holding that 10b applies to fraud on corporation by controlling stockholder and that the fact that creditors of the defrauded corporation may be the ultimate victims does not warrant disregard of the corporate entity
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
support of his application for asylum and found that large portions of that statement were copied from “five different asylum declarations filed in five different cases.” The plagiarism was so extensive that the IJ noted that many of the five statements had “full paragraphs identical to those of the respondent.” During the IJ’s hearing, Sliusar was asked to explain these similarities. Rather than explaining them, his testimony produced further inconsistencies with his prior testimony to the court and the asylum officer. Given the obvious plagiarism in his application, his inability to explain why his statement was so similar to others, and the inconsistencies within his own sworn testimony, the IJ properly found Sliusar not credible. Ahir v. Mukasey, 527 F.3d 912, 918-19 (9th Cir.2008) . The record also supports the IJ’s
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that inconsistencies in the aliens statements must go to the heart of the asylum claim to justify an adverse credibility finding
B. holding that inconsistencies between an aliens application and testimony and an inability to explain those ineonsistencies establishes frivolousness by a preponderance of the evidence
C. holding that inconsistencies between an application and testimony can serve as the basis for adverse credibility findings where the testimonial change goes to the heart of a petitioners claim
D. holding that testimony of sixyearold vietim was not incredibly dubious despite some inconsistencies and that such inconsistencies are appropriate to the cireumstances presented the age of the witness and the passage of time between the incident and the time of her statements and testimony
E. holding that a claimant must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence entitlement to an administrative claim
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |