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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Pension Plan & Trust v. United States, 194 F.3d 1279, 1289 (Fed.Cir.1999); AG Route Seven P’ship v. United States, 57 Fed.Cl. 521, 527 (2003). The Federal Circuit in First Hartford held: [Such exceptions include suits] by an intended third-party beneficiary, by a subcontractor by means of a pass-through suit when the prime contractor is liable to the subcontractor for the subcontractor’s dam ages, and by a Miller Act surety for funds improperly disbursed to a prime contractor. However, the common thread that unites these exceptions is that the party standing outside of privity by contractual obligation stands in the shoes of a party within privity. 194 F.3d at 1289 (citations omitted) (footnote added); see also Alpine County, Cal. v. United States, 417 F.3d 1366, 1368 (Fed.Cir.2005) . The third-party beneficiary status exception
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that beneficiaries of a trust that signed an agreement with the fhlbb were not in privity or have thirdparty beneficiary status because the government did not make any promises expressly intended to benefit them
B. holding that a federal regulation did not create privity of contract between the plaintiff and the government
C. holding that plaintiff could not prevail as a thirdparty beneficiary where contract was not valid
D. holding that in order for a plaintiff to file suit against the government on a contract claim in the court of federal claims a plaintiff must have either direct privity or thirdparty beneficiary status
E. holding that standing to sue under a contract requires plaintiff to be in privity or be an intended thirdparty beneficiary
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | D | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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of Trooper Weilminster, handcuffed her behind her back. (PI. Aff. ¶ 11; PI. Dep. 108:11-113:10.) Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, whether Trooper Nolan even had probable cause to arrest her is questionable, and there is no indication that she was trying to resist arrest. Plaintiff visited the hospital following her departure from the police barracks, and complained of injuries including bruised wrists. (PL Dep. 196:12-197:10, 201:13-19.) She also testified that she informed the hospital staff that she had sustained an injury to hear head and knees. (Pl. Dep. 194:6-197:10.) A reasonable jury could find that no force was warranted, and that forcibly removing Plaintiff from her car and handcuffing her was excessive force. See, e.g., Robison, 821 F.2d at 923-24 ; Lemmo v. City of New York, No. 08-CV-2641,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that an officer intentionally hitting the plaintiffs head into the top of the police car as the plaintiff was being placed in the police car could be excessive force
B. holding that forcibly removing nonviolent plaintiff from her car could be excessive force
C. recognizing pretrial detainees constitutional right to be from excessive force
D. holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim
E. holding that the use of pepper spray on nonviolent protestors was excessive force
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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its right of judicial review, PLM was required to file the instant lawsuit before this Court within sixty days of the TTAB ruling. See 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b). Although PLM is nominally the “plaintiff and counter-defendant” on the case caption, it is Prolacto who initiated the overall legal dispute here. Moreover, Prolacto has elected to cross-appeal to this Court for further review of the TTAB’s findings, as well as assert stand-alone causes of action under federal law and D.C. common law. Thus, Prolacto has availed itself of not only United States law, but of District of Columbia law. A party that chooses to initiate litigation and invoke the legal protections of the forum should expect to appear for deposition in that jurisdiction. See Cobell v. Norton, 213 F.R.D. 43, 47 (D.D.C.2003) ; see also Dollar Sys., Inc. v. Tomlin, 102
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that an elderly named representative class member failed to present sufficient evidence that his health problems require holding his deposition in montana rather than washington dc
B. holding evidence was sufficient to convict for robbery where two men approached an elderly man on the street grabbed both his arms and demanded his wallet
C. holding that plaintiff failed to offer sufficient evidence to support a finding that a similar position existed after his termination
D. holding that because plaintiff failed to allege invidious discrimination based upon his membership in a protected class his equal protection claim failed at its inception
E. holding that the scope of crossexamination did not extend to any bad acts committed by the defendant during his life where defendant presented evidence of adverse circumstances that he experienced in his early childhood rather than evidence of his general good character
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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that could support a judgment. See, e.g., City of San Antonio v. Pollock, 284 S.W.3d 809, 816 (Tex.2009) ("Bare, baseless opinions will not support a judgment even if there is no objection to their admission in evidence.”); Coastal Transp. Co., Inc. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 136 S.W.3d 227, 233 (Tex.2004) (observing that "conclusory or speculative” opinions are “ ‘incompetent evidence’ ... [that] cannot support a judgment”); Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Gossett, 156 Tex. 252, 294 S.W.2d 377, 380 (1956) ("It is well settled that the naked and unsupported opinion or conclusion of a witness does not constitute evidence of probative force and will not support a jury finding even when admitted without objection.”); Casualty Underwriters v. Rhone, 134 Tex. 50, 132 S.W.2d 97, 99 (1939) . We agree with Gardner that testimony is not
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that bare conclusions of lay fact witnesses did not amount to any evidence at all and that the fact that they were admitted without objection added nothing to their probative force
B. holding exhibits deemed admitted into evidence where they were treated below without objection as if they were admitted
C. holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial
D. holding that the foundational prerequisites are unnecessary where the test result is admitted in evidence without objection when evidence of one of the issues in the case is admitted without objection the party against whom it is offered waives any objection to the evidence and it may be properly considered even if the evidence would have been excluded upon a proper objection
E. holding any error in admission of evidence cured when same evidence later admitted without objection
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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249 (D.D.C.1970) (extending qualified privilege to the minutes and reports of a hospital review committee); Mewborn v. Heckler, 101 F.R.D. 691 (D.D.C.1984) (denying discovery of peer review materials to plaintiff in a case under the FTCA); Laws v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 656 F.Supp. 824 (D.D.C.1987) (finding a letter written by the attending obstetrician to the chairman of the Department of Anesthesiology at defendant hospital privileged as part of a peer review of the attending obstetrician’s work); Doe v. St. Joseph’s Hosp. of Fort Wayne, 113 F.R.D. 677 (N.D.Ind.1987) (finding Indiana privilege statute applicable to federal civil rights claim brought by plaintiff doctor following peer review and loss of staff privileges); Weekoty v. United States, 30 F.Supp.2d 1343 (D.N.M.1998) . 39 . See Nilavar v. Mercy Health
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that in analyzing whether materials are protected from disclosure under exemption 5 of foia which protects materials covered by the deliberative process privilege a court must first be able to pinpoint an agency decision or policy to which these documents contributed and stating that the decision whether to prosecute an individual is the type of decision protected by the privilege
B. recognizing privilege under federal rules
C. recognizing privilege
D. recognizing existence of selfcritical analysis privilege but finding it not applicable to protect investigative materials from discovery
E. recognizing a selfcritical analysis privilege for materials related to hospital morbidity and mortality conferences
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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as appellate courts in reviewing sufficiency challenges to such awards: (1) whether the plaintiff lost the esteem of his/her peers; (2) whether the plaintiff suffered physical injury as a consequence of her emotional distress; (3) whether the plaintiff received psychological counseling or other medical treatment; (4) whether the plaintiff suffered a loss of income; (5) the degree of emotional distress; (6) the context of the events surrounding the emotional distress; (7) the evidence tending to corroborate the plaintiff’s testimony; (8) the nexus between the challenged conduct and the emotional distress; and (9) any mitigating circumstances. Price, 93 F.3d at 1254 (citing Spence v. Board of Educ. of Christina Sch. Dist., 806 F.2d 1198, 1201 (3d C ., 375 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir.2004) . 9 . The DOT contended that Akouri did not
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that almendareztorres remains binding despite apprendi v new jersey 530 us 466 120 sct 2348 147 led2d 435 2000
B. holding that the supreme courts opinion in reeves v sanderson plumbing prods inc 530 us 133 120 sct 2097 147 led2d 105 2000 does not require a pretext instruction to be given in employment discrimination cases and thus does not affect the holding in palmer
C. holding that apprendi v new jersey 530 us 466 120 sct 2348 147 led2d 435 2000 was not violated where the sentence did not exceed the applicable statutory maximum
D. holding that apprendi v new jersey 530 us 466 120 sct 2348 147 led2d 435 2000 did not overrule almendareztorres v united states 523 us 224 118 sct 1219 140 led2d 350 1998
E. holding that apprendi v new jersey 530 us 466 120 sct 2348 147 led2d 435 2000 does not apply to a judges exercise of discretion within a statutory range so long as a defendants sentence is not set beyond the maximum term specified in the substantive statute
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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the juvenile’s potential for rehabilitation; and (14) any other relevant factor related to the juvenile’s youth. See generally Commonwealth v. Knox. We recognize that some of the factors may not apply to a particular juvenile’s case and that some of the factors may overlap. Nevertheless, we believe that providing the trial court with guidance on individualized sentencing for juveniles charged with capital murder comports with the guidelines of Miller. Conclusion The juveniles have failed to show that the holding in Miller requires this Court to dismiss the capital-murder indictments against them. Accordingly, their petitions for a writ of mandamus are denied. 1120140 — PETITION DENIED. 1120202 — PETITION DENIED. STUART, PARKER, MAIN, WISE, and BRYAN, J 012]-P.3d - (Col.Ct.App.2012) ; In re Morgan, 713 F.3d 1365 (11th Cir.2013)
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that because minor defendant was mandatorily sentenced to life imprisonment without parole and because his case was still pending on direct appeal when miller was released the minor defendant was entitled to a new sentencing hearing
B. holding that minor defendant was not entitled to a writ of prohibition directing the trial court to dismiss his capitalmurder indictments where he argued that only statutorily authorized sentences of death and life imprisonment without parole had been declared unconstitutional but the florida courts had established a valid sentencing option under miller
C. holding that prejudice was obvious where counsels failure to seek acquittal on greater offenses caused defendant to be sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment without possibility of parole
D. holding that defendants affirmative acts of driving minor to robbery helping minor enter the building and serving as a lookout for the minor warranted sentencing enhancement
E. holding that a defendant impermissibly sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole in violation of miller should be awarded a new sentencing hearing to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of nc gen stat 15a134019b
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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law recognized the causal link between a complaint and the ensuing arrest, it was in the situation where “misdirection” by omission or commission perpetuated the original wrongful behavior. See, e.g., Hand, 838 F.2d at 1428. If, however, there had been an independent exercise of judicial review, that judicial action was a superseding cause that by its intervention prevented the original actor from being liable for the harm. See Restatement of Torts (Second) § F.3d 1068, 1072-73 (2d Cir.1997) (concluding that the neutral, advisory role played by probation officers prevented the chain of causation from being broken where the sentencing judge adopted a recommended sentence which violated a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights); Lanier v. Sallas, 111 F.2d 321, 324-25 (5th Cir.1985) . The purported misrepresentation here,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing whiting as a maximum security mental health facility
B. holding that a plaintiff can establish a causal link by showing that the employers decision was based in part on knowledge of the employees protected activity
C. holding that a judges decision to commit plaintiff to a mental health facility did not sever the chain of causation where that decision was based in part on a misrepresentation made by defendants
D. holding that experts causation opinion based on statements made by plaintiff was not inherently unreliable
E. holding that an employers decision to terminate the plaintiff based on information supplied by a supervisor satisfies the causation requirement
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” Chase-Baker v. Dep’t of Justice, 198 F.3d 843, 845 (Fed.Cir.1999) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c)). On appeal, Ms. Plasai argues that the settlement agreement should be voided as involuntary. Because Ms. Plasai first questioned the voluntariness of the settlement agreement in a petition for review by the full board, not during the dismissal proceeding with the AJ, she has waived this argument before us. See Bosley v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 162 F.3d 665, 668 (Fed.Cir.1998) (“if the party ... raises an issue for the first time in a petition for review by the full Board, this court will not consider the issue.”); see also Sargent v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 229 F.3d 1088, 1091 (Fed.Cir.2000) . However, even if Ms. Plasai had properly
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding an issue not raised in the bankruptcy court was waived on appeal
B. holding that an issue not raised on appeal is waived
C. holding issue not raised in the bankruptcy court was waived on appeal
D. holding that issues not raised before a district court are waived on appeal
E. holding that the issue of the voluntariness of a settlement agreement is waived on appeal if not raised before the board
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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authority and significant discretion to protect the revenue of the United States by requiring enhanced bonding. Def.’s Resp. Br. 11-12 (citing Section 623 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1623 (2012); 19 C.F.R. § 113.13(d) (2016)). Plaintiff demonstrates inadequate likelihood of success on the merits to warrant granting a preliminary injunction. Even where a movant shows that it will be irreparably harmed in the absence of an injunction, “the movant must demonstrate at least a ‘fair chance of success on the merits’ for a preliminary injunction to be appropriate.” U.S. Ass’n of Imps. of Textiles & Apparel v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 413 F.3d 1344, 1347 (Fed.Cir.2005) (internal citations omitted); Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 690-91, 128 S.Ct. 2207, 171 L.Ed.2d 1 (2008) . The court will only set aside CBP’s enhanced
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the movant had to establish both of the first two factors ie likelihood of success and irreparable harm to receive a preliminary injunction
B. holding that the grant of an injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion but without deference to the legal conclusions of the trial court
C. holding that the standard for permanent injunction is the same as that for preliminary injunction with the one exception being that the plaintiff must show actual success on the merits rather than likelihood of success
D. holding it is an abuse of discretion to grant a preliminary injunction because difficult legal issues are present without even considering likelihood of success
E. recognizing the inappropriateness of a preliminary injunction where credibility determinations must be made but granting a preliminary injunction because the legal and factual issues have been sufficiently illuminated
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | D | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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an implied bias claim “should hesitate before formulating categories of relationships [that] bar jurors from serving in certain types of trials.” Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 527 (9th Cir. 1990). And our precedent disfavors extending implied bias to cover relationships between jurors and Government witnesses. In United States v. Ferri, we held that the occupational acquaintance between the husband of a juror and a Government witness did not justify a presumption of bias. 778 F.2d at 993. Likewise, in Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, we concluded that a juror who was the ex-wife of a non-critical police officer witness, and who interacted with him occasionally, was not presumptively excludable. 502 F.2d at 934. See also Sanders v. Norris, 529 F.3d 787, 793-94 (8th Cir. 2008) ; United States v. Bradshaw, 787 F.2d 1385,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the county coroner who retrieved and autopsied the victims in the defendants murder trial did not fall within a category of jurors presumed biased as a matter of law
B. recognizing county officers as those whose general authority and jurisdiction are confined within the limits of the county in which they are appointed who are appointed in and for a particular county and whose duties apply only to that county and through whom the county performs its usual political functions
C. recognizing that jurors are presumed to follow instructions
D. holding that both saline county and grant county had jurisdiction to try the appellant for murder where the actual killing occurred in one county but the acts requisite to the consummation of the murder and the subsequent disposal of the body occurred in the other county
E. holding that a court may conduct a fair use analysis as a matter of law where the facts are presumed or admitted
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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his disabilities will force him to miss 10 days of work every month. We agree with this contention in part and disagree with it in part. In refusing to give controlling weight to a treating physician’s opinion, an ALJ must adhere to certain agency-imposed procedural requirements. The ALJ must “evaluate every medical opinion [ ] receive[d]” and must “give good reasons in [his] notice of determination or decision for the weight [ ] give[n]” to a treating physician’s opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544. A treating physician’s opinion receives controlling weight when it is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques” and is “not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence.” Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544. Even when h Cir.2001) ; see also Hall v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that where a treating physicians opinion is contradicted by a consulting physician the alj must explain on the record the reasons for rejecting the opinion of the treating physician
B. holding that failure to provide good reasons to discredit a treating physicians opinion requires remand
C. holding that remand was not required and that the aljs failure to mention treating physicians opinion was harmless error because the alj adopted the treating physicians recommendations
D. holding an aljs failure to adequately explain the weight given to treating sources opinions not harmless because the aljs reasoning was not sufficiently specific to make clear that the alj recognized and evaluated the treating relationships
E. holding that where the alj had already obtained and considered reports from treating physicians the alj had before him a complete medical history and the evidence received from the treating physicians was adequate for him to make a determination as to disability
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | C | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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in McDonnell Douglas Corp.). 43 . McGarry v. Board of County Comm’rs of Pitkin County, 175 F.3d 1193, 1201 (10th Cir.1999) (citing Griffith v. Colorado, 17 F.3d 1323 (10th Cir.1994)); Cole, 43 F.3d at 1381. 44 . Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1957 *25 (D.Kan. February 1, 2002)(quoting Burrus v. United Tel. Co. of Kan., Inc., 683 F.2d 339, 343 (10th Cir.1982)(internal quotations omitted)). 45 . 996 F.2d 1155, 1163 (11th Cir. 1993). 46 . Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 5l) at 20. 47 . Goldsmith, 996 F.2d at 1163. ("The defendant’s awareness of the protected statement, however, may be established by circumstantial evidence.") (citations omitted). 48 . Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F.3d 545, 550 (10th Cir.1999). 49 . See Id. . 50 . Garcia-Paz v. Swift Textiles, Inc., 873
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding the closeness in time between the plaintiffs complaint and the defendants demand for his resignation or firing supports an inference of retaliatory motive
B. holding in the context of a title vii retaliation claim that a twoyear gap between the plaintiffs protected activity and the claimed retaliatory act proves fatal to plaintiffs assertion that there is a causal connection
C. holding that there must be a causal connection between the advertising activity and the injury alleged in the underlying complaint
D. holding that temporal proximity between the alleged retaliators knowledge of a protected activity and an adverse employment action may be sufficient to establish causal connection or retaliatory motive in some cases
E. holding that closeness in time between the alleged retaliatory acts and the protected conduct raises a genuine issue as to a causal connection
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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of the estate the debtor’s "aggregate interest in any property” up to a specified dollar amount. 7 . In his summary judgment opposition, Segal explained he did not disclose these payments because he mistakenly believed he was required to disclose amounts received during the two years immediately preceding the filing of his bankruptcy petition, rather t Act, courts have continued to rely on the standard articulated therei ether the monies due to Segal under the Consulting Agreement are post-petition wages, it is not clear to this Court that wages is the salient classification. Under § 541(a)(1), the dispositive issue is whether the debtor has a legal or equitable interest in the payments as of the commencement of the case, not whether the payments are wages. See Clark, 960 F.2d at 477 . And § 541(a)(6) refers to "earnings from
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that an anticipated tax refund was property of the bankruptcy estate as of the date the bankruptcy case was filed
B. holding a football players earnings from games played after he filed for bankruptcy protection were not property of his bankruptcy estate under 541a1
C. holding that claims harming the debtor corporation that arose from prepetition conduct become property of the estate under 11 usc 541a1
D. holding that bankruptcy court is without jurisdiction to control disposition of chapter 13 debtors property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate unless the property is related to the bankruptcy proceedings of the code
E. holding noncompete payments were not exempt from the debt ors bankruptcy estate as earnings from postpetition services under 541a6 because the noncompete agreement was inextricably intertwined with the debtors sale of stock that was an includable bankruptcy asset that predated debtors bankruptcy petition
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). The benefit of all reasonable presumptions and inferences runs to the party-opposing summary judgment. Matsushita Elec. Indus., 475 U.S. at 587-88, 106 S.Ct. 1348; Monon Corp. v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc., 239 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed.Cir.2001); H.F. Allen Orchards v. United States, 749 F.2d 1571, 1574 (Fed.Cir.1984) (noting that non-moving party shall “receive the benefit of all applicable presumptions, inferences, and intendments”). When resolving a motion for summary judgment, the court may neither make credibility determinations nor weigh the evidence and seek to determine the truth of the matter. Cf. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ; Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 147
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that it was not error for successor trial judge to direct a judgment for defendant based on the statute of limitations where initial judge had denied a motion for summary judgment on the same issue
B. holding that a trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment
C. holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion
D. holding that cjredibility determinations are questions of fact and should only be overturned in extraordinary circumstances
E. holding that cjredibility determinations the weighing of the evidence and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are not functions of a judge ruling on a motion for summary judgment
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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States v. Hancox, 49 F.3d 223, 224 (6th Cir. 1995). 2 . At the revocation hearing, Johnson's counsel cited the corresponding policy statement in the Sentencing Guidelines, which provides: In the case of a defendant who fails a drug test, the court shall consider whether the availability of appropriate substance abuse programs, or a defendant's current or past participation in such programs, warrants an exception from the requirement of mandatory revocation and imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3565(b) and 3583(g). 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(a), 3583(d). United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual ("U.S.S.G.”) § 7B1.4 applic. note 6 (2000). Given that Johnson violated the terms of his supervised release in 2001, this provision applied. See United States v. Cofield, 233 F.3d 405, 409 (6th Cir.2000) , cert. denied, 532 U.S. 952, 121 S.Ct. 1424,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that invitederror doctrine precludes defendant from challenging sentence of supervised release where defendant requested sentence of supervised release
B. holding that failure to explain the effect of a term of supervised release was harmless error where term of imprisonment combined with maximum imprisonment for violation of supervised release was still less than statutory maximum
C. holding that for purposes of revoking supervised release the applicable guidelines are those in effect at the time of the supervised release violations rather than those in effect at the time of initial offense
D. holding that term of supervised release was not automatically terminated when defendant was deported from united states and thus defendants subsequent commission of another offense illegal reentry after deportation prior to expiration of term of supervised release violated condition of supervised release that defendant commit no new offenses
E. holding that further supervised release may be ordered as a sentence for violation of supervised release
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | C | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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sought to be introduced, unless called to testify thereto by the party to whom such intérest is opposed or unless the testimony of such deceased person in relation to such transaction or statemént is introduced in evidence by the party whose interest is opposed to that of the witness or has been taken and is on file in the case. No person who is an incompetent witness under this section shall make himself competent by t follows the lead of such states as Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, and Utah. See J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence ¶ 601[03] (1990). See also 2 J. Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 578 (Chadbourn rev.1979); M. Ladd, Uniform Rules of Evidence —
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding as much
B. recognizing that this courts construction of a statute becomes as much apart of the statute as the words of the statute itself and that change is a matter that addresses itself to the general assembly not this court
C. holding that the lien at issue was not extinguished by silence in the plan as to its survival unless it is dealt with by the plan by a provision for the payment of or securing of the claim
D. holding that art i 2 of the constitution requires that as nearly as is practicable one mans vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as anothers
E. recognizing that the dead mans statute is a survival from an earlier and much broader incompetency statute and characterizing its survival as deplorable
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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the process afforded the parties, the extent to which the decisionmakers utilized the assistance of experts where necessary, and finally the soundness of the fiduciary’s ratiocination.” Chalmers, 61 F.3d at 1344; Exbom v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Health and We 7th Cir.1998) (opining that if a doctor gives his reasons for disagreeing with the opinions of other medical providers, the court must affirm the plan administrator’s decision under the deferential standard). Drs. Kurkjian and Laping provided reasoned medical expert opinion regarding Reagan’s medical condition, and UNUM’s plan administrator did not err in relying upon the one while excluding the other. See Trombetta v. Cragin Fed. Bank for Sav. Employee Stock Ownership, 102 F.3d 1435, 1438 (7th Cir.1996) . Furthermore, Reagan’s assertion that because
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that when the agencys decision was based on an erroneous and completely unsupported assumption the decision was arbitrary and capricious
B. holding that a plan administrators decision may not be deemed arbitrary and capricious so long as it is possible to offer a reasoned explanation based on the evidence for that decision
C. holding that when applying an arbitrary and capricious standard of review the courts role is to determine whether the plan administrators decision was completely unreasonable
D. holding that a reversal of the plan administrators decision is in order under the most deferential arbitrary and capricious standard when no reasonable grounds exist to support the decision
E. holding that evidence contrary to an administrators decision does not make the decision arbitrary and capricious so long as a reasonable basis appears for the decision
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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To the contrary, C.M. implicitly waived her right against self-incrimination and testified in her mother’s defense. Despite appointed counsel s presumed advice, C.M. s testimony exonerated her mother of the charged offense and inculpated herself. Though not clear, appellant appears to suggest that the trial court’s conduct in some manner shaded or inhibited C.M.’s testimony. Appellant does not refer us to any portion of the record to support her contention that C.M.’s testimony was altered in some manner by the trial court’s conduct. To the contrary, on redirect examination, C.M. confirmed that her testimony was the same as the statement that she had given police on the day of her mother’s arrest in this case. See Johnson v. State, 208 S.W.3d 478, 503 (Tex.App.Austin 2006, pet. ref d) . Given the context and circumstances of the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding witnesss prior consistent statement admissible in part because defense counsel implied during opening statement that witness had fabricated her testimony
B. holding that warnings given to a witness by the trial court and the prosecutor concerning the possibility that testifying could place the witness in jeopardy of revocation of his plea agreement and charges of perjury or false statement did not violate the defendants due process rights because the warnings merely corroborated in a straightforward and nonthreatening manner the information given by the witness attorney
C. holding that defense counsels failure to object to testimony did not warrant a new trial because there was no prejudice from admission of the testimony
D. holding that a judges lengthy perjury warnings to a defense witness effectively drove the witness off the stand thereby denying the defendant his due process right to present his defense
E. holding that trial courts perjury admonishment to defense witness did not violate defendants due process rights because it had no effect on trial testimony record revealed that testimony was consistent with previous recorded statement given to defense counsel
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Inc., 731 F.3d 592, 599 (6th Cir.2013); see also Capriotti v. Con-sol. Rail Corp., 878 F.Supp. 429, 434 (N.D.N.Y.1995) (“Under a negligence per se theory, if a plaintiff proves that a statutory violation has occurred[,] he need not prove the traditional negligence elements of foreseeability, duty[,] and breach, but he is still required to prove causation.”). The standard for causation under FELA leans favorably to the injured employee, requiring juries to be instructed that “a defendant railroad ‘caused or contributed to’ a railroad worker’s injury ‘if [the railroad’s] negligence played a part— no matter how small — in bringing about the injury.’ ” McBride, 131 S.Ct. at 2644 (alteration in original); see also Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 181, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 93 L.Ed. 1282 (1949) . Thus, in order to prove the element of
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding when ordinance language is clear courts must give language its plain meaning
B. holding that when language is exactly the same in two statutory provisions the meaning of that language is also identical
C. holding that an agency is not required to undertake a search that is so broad as to be unduly burdensome
D. recognizing that felas language on causation is as broad as could be framed
E. recognizing that duty to warn of dangerous conditions could be based on constructive knowledge of that condition as well as actual knowledge
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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“a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes” by reference to “the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (emphasis added); McKay, 110 F.3d at 373 (same); Thompson v. Holy Family Hosp., 121 F.3d 537, 539-40 (9th Cir.1997) (same). Given that the determination of whether a claimant is disabled is made on an individual basis, and that the court may consider the manner in which a claimant’s personal education and prior work experience limits his ability to pursue employment in other sectors of the economy, the district court’s conclusion that Burns is disabled was reasonable and does not conflict with decisions by this and other circuits that similar lifting restrictions do not render claimants “disabled” und r.1998) . But see Williams v. Channel Master Satellite
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a trained computer technicians carpal tunnel syndrome did not render him disabled under the ada because he could still function as a computer repair technician
B. holding that plaintiffs hernia condition was not sufficient to render her disabled under the ada
C. holding that an entity that serves the disabled lacks standing under the ada
D. holding plaintiff with carpal tunnel syndrome who could not perform heavy lifting failed to meet burden of establishing substantial limitation in major life activity of work
E. holding that the plaintiffs evidence that his back injury precluded him from performing at least 50 of the jobs previously available to him was enough to classify him as disabled under the ada
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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ports. In addition, Special Agent Itnyre saw miscellaneous papers next to the coffee table that also displayed prostitution related information much like the open notebook. (See Hr’g, Gov. Ex. 15. (“escort pandora’s” and “outcall pearl city lhr@300”).) Moreover, Special Agent Itnyre knew that Defendant had identified the hotel room as the room in which he had been staying with Nishimura, and that Nishimura assisted Defendant in his prostitution business. Although only y United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 441 F.3d 767, 771 (9th Cir.2006). Further, the mere opening of the notebooks showed information identical to that of the first notebook and provided substantial probable cause to believe that they were “trick books” associated with criminal activity. See Issacs, 708 F.2d at 1369-70 . Finally, fourth, the agents had a lawful
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that evidence was admissible under the good faith exception where the affidavit contained a detailed description of the nature of the offense the premises to be searched the items for which they were searching and the transaction which led the informant to believe that the drugs would be in this apartment
B. recognizing the propriety of a brief perusal of the books if items validly being searched for might reasonably be located within the book
C. recognizing that the nexus between the place to be searched and the items to be seized may be established by the nature of the item and the normal inferences of where one would likely keep such evidence internal quotation marks omitted
D. recognizing that missing data were located in a laboratory within the constructive control of the state
E. holding that police do not need probable cause or a warrant to search items that have already been searched for inventory purposes
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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repeated attempts to get up and eventually took appellant to the patrol car to prevent “injury to himself or to me or to other persons out on the scene.” The first officer testified these steps were consistent with police protocol regarding how to treat a person who may be violent. She also testified she was still investigating the incident when she went to the patrol car and asked appellant what happened. See id. (“The investigative detention did not evolve into an arrest simply because appellant was escorted to the patrol car and handcuffed. [The officer] did only that which was reasonably necessary to ensure his own safety while investigating appellant’s possible involvementf.]”); see also Turner v. State, 252 S.W.3d 571, 580 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. ref'd) . Appellant has not presented evidence to
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that defendant had the right to refuse to answer questions put to him by police officer who had called him
B. holding that suspect was not in custody when officer handcuffed him for officer safety while transporting him to police station
C. holding that defendant was arrested when the police officer took physical custody of him by grabbing his arm and returned him to the hotel for detention there
D. holding the defendant was not under arrest when police asked him to go to the station and then offered him a ride because he did not have transportation
E. holding in the context of a prosecution for second degree escape that although defendant was not handcuffed he had nonetheless been placed under arrest had had his liberty restrained in that he was not free to leave and at that point the first step in the process of transporting him to the police station had begun consequently the defendants arrest was complete and he was in custody
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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2406. Thus, the problem with the order of the district court before us boils down to a matter of standard of review. Had the district court applied de novo review to the magistrate judge’s order, we would have no need to remand the case. See United States v. Weissberger, 951 F.2d 392, 398 (D.C.Cir.1991) (finding that the magistrate judge exceeded her authority but that any defect was cured by the district court’s de novo review of the original order). However, in its analysis, the district court repeatedly underscored its deferential stance with regard to the magistrate judge’s order. There is simply no way to read the district court’s analysis as a product of its independent judgment. Therefore, we must vacate the district court’s order and remand. See Ocelot Oil, 847 F.2d at 1464 . In light of the accelerated nature of this
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the district courts review of a partial and truncated record was error and remanding the case for review on the entire administrative record
B. holding that review of a partial and truncated record by the district court was error and case remanded for review on the entire administrative record
C. holding that a grant of summary judgment may be affirmed on any independent ground revealed by the record
D. holding that although the district court had reviewed the record thoroughly it had done so constrained by the assumption that the magistrates order must be affirmed absent clear error and therefore remanding for the court to review the record in light of its own independent judgment
E. holding that judgment may be affirmed on any ground supported by the record
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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If the defendant fails to do so and summary judgment is granted against the defendant, he will not be entitled to raise the affirmative defense at a later time in a motion for summary judgment. 2 . Statom seems to argue that Reiswerg’s liability somehow established joint and several liability of CGG and that CGG waived its statute of limitations defense by failing to "raise the statute of limitations defense or any defense to Reiswerg's liability.” Appellee's Brief at 21 (emphasis added). However, Indiana courts have recognized that "[wjaiver is usually a matter of personal privilege; it must be made by the person whose rights or remedies are to be affected.” In re S.L., 599 N.E.2d 227, 229 (Ind.Ct.App.1992); see also Wabash Grain, Inc. v. Smith, 700 N.E.2d 234, 238 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) , reh’g denied, trans. denied. Thus, the fact
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the insurer was not estopped from asserting a policy defense not contained in its reservation of rights letter where the delay was not unreasonable and the insured was not prejudiced
B. holding that dismissal of prior action in louisiana federal court on the grounds of the statute of limitations bar subsequent action filed in minnesota federal district court
C. holding that employer was estopped to assert a statute of limitations defense where the insurer had arranged to have the claimant examined by one of its physicians after the statute of limitations had run
D. holding that grain ele vator operator was not estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense as a result of related corporations action in an identical federal court action
E. holding that the property appraiser was estopped from asserting the statute of limitations where the failure to bring the action within the limitations period was the direct result of the property appraisers failure to timely perform a related duty owed to plaintiff
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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factor listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and made explicit note of its focus on Cogswell’s history and characteristics, the nature and circumstances of the offense, and the need to avoid any unwarranted sentencing disparities among similarly situated defendants. Regarding this last factor, the district court noted that the disparities among the sentences that the court had imposed on the co-defendants were attributable to a number of factors, including that each defendant had different ist the government may receive sentence reductions. See Vázquez-Rivera, 470 F.3d at 449 (finding the defendant’s sentence not to be unreasonable “simply because his co-defendants agreed to help the government in exchange for reduced sentences”); United States v. Rodríguez, 162 F.3d 135, 152 (1st Cir.1998) . Taking into account Cogswell’s age, level of
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that imposition of lengthy sentences did not show prejudice where sentences were warranted by facts shown in the evidence
B. holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to modify hfo sentences where sentences were not illegal and sixty days had transpired since imposition of the sentence
C. holding that any disparity between the defendants sentence and sentences imposed in fasttrack districts was considered appropriately as a single and not controlling factor
D. holding that crackpowder disparity was constitutional stating that ujntil the en banc court of this circuit the us supreme court or congress itself accepts this assertion of disparity and finds it untenable challenges to the sentencing guidelines based on the disparity between sentences for crack cocaine and powder cocaine will continue to fail
E. holding that the law allows the government to offer reduced sentences in exchange for assistance even if it results in sentences of such disparity as would strike many as unfair
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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her experience of “looking at baby brains for 45 years of my life.” Id. at 306. Doctor Shane, on the other hand, insisted that neuroblasts would no longer be present in the brain of a child Mat’s age. Id. at 288. The Court could continue on in this vein, but it should by now be obvious that it takes an expert to make sense of the slides and the literature in the record. Petitioner’s expert witness identifies objects as one thing, and respondent’s expert says they are something else. The Special Master found Dr. RorkeAdams to be more credible than Dr. Shane and provided a detailed explanation for this finding. See Nordwall, 2008 WL 857661, at *8-9. It is not the job of the Court to second guess the credibility judgment of experts or to reweigh the evidence. See Bradley, 991 F.2d at 1575 . As a reasonable fact-finder could rely on Dr.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding the resolution of questions regarding credibility and the weight given to testimony is a function of the family court judge who heard the testimony
B. holding that whether and to what extent a witnesss testimony should be believed is a matter to be decided by the jury that saw and heard the testimony not by an appellate court reviewing a transcript
C. holding that reviewing court should accord deference to special masters decision and may not substitute its own judgment for that of the special master
D. holding that this court will not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative fact finder who heard the testimony and was in a position to evaluate the credibility of witnesses because evidence is weighed by the administrative agency and not by the courts
E. holding that because the special master saw the witnesses and heard the testimony he has broad discretion in determining credibility
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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(claiming ineffective assistance of counsel), he concedes that the basis of his trial counsel’s objection in the trial court did not include his present contention that MAI-CR3d 310.50 and § 562.076 violate his right to due process of law or to present a defense. Rule 28.03 provides that counsel must make specific objections to instructions considered erroneous before the jury retires, stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection. It also provides that the objections must be raised in the motion for new trial in accordance with Rule 29.11. Assignments of error cannot be broadened or changed by raising them for the first time on appeal. State v. Howard, 896 S.W.2d 471, 493 (Mo.App.S.D.1995). See also State v. Reichert, 854 S.W.2d 584, 591 (Mo.App.S.D.1993) . In addition, “[t]o preserve a constitutional
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a sufficiency challenge must be preserved in the trial court in a parental termination case to be reviewed on appeal
B. holding that the point on appeal and the objection in the trial court must be the same in order for it to be preserved for appeal
C. holding that issues must be briefed to be preserved on appeal
D. holding an issue must be raised to and ruled upon by the trial court in order to be preserved for review
E. holding that complaint on appeal must be the same as that presented in the trial court
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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v. State, 166 So.3d 147, 149 (Ala.Crim.App.2014). The record indicates that the circuit court considered the presumptive sentencing standards before it entered a sentence departing from those standards. The record further indicates that Snow did not object to the circuit court’s departure from the presumptive standards on the basis that the State provided no proof of any aggravating factor or on the basis that the circuit court failed to state any reasons for its departure from the recommended sentence under the presumptive standards. The rules of preservation are well settled. “‘Review on appeal is restricted to questions and issues properly and timely raised at trial.’ ” Ex parte Coulliette, 857 So.2d 793, 794 (Ala.2003)(citing Newsome v. State, 570 So.2d 703, 717 (Ala.Crim.App. ). Because Snow did not raise the challenges to
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding circuit courts decision to depart from the presumptive sentencing recommendation and impose a prison sentence was reversible error where defendant objected on the basis that the state failed to give notice of aggravating factors that would justify a dispositional departure from the presumptive sentencing recommendation and the trial court failed to state on the record a reason for its departure
B. holding that notice must state the specific grounds for the departure
C. holding presumptive sentencing standards applied retroactively where defendant objected at sentencing hearing on the basis that the presumptive sentencing standards applied to his case
D. holding it was unfair for the trial court to rely upon factors already considered in the presumptive sentence as a basis for a durational departure
E. holding district court correctly reversed a departure sentence where the trial court failed to provide written reasons for the departure
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
conspirators or participated in every stage of the conspiracy ....” Alred, 144 F.3d at 1415. Thus, the dispositive question is not whether Brown and Hall dealt with each other, but whether each of them participated in the overall conspiracy. We are persuaded that the evidence is sufficient to demonstrate to a rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that Hall and Brown were participants in a conspiracy that furthered a common scheme to supply large quantities of drugs in a haven to meet the demand of their customers. C Brown asserts that “there was insufficient evidence that [he] possessed, much , whereas Brown’s convictions began in 1991, only six years prior to the beginning of the conspiracy charged at trial. See United States v. Matthews, 431 F.3d 1296, 1312 (11th Cir.2005) ; United States v. Lampley, 68 F.3d 1296, 1300
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that collateral crime that occurred twelve years prior to charged offense not too remote in time
B. holding that prior drug convictions that were four ten and eleven years old were not so remote from the charged drug offenses as to render them inadmissible
C. holding that a six year span between the prior offense and the charged conduct did not render the previous conviction too remote to be relevant to the defendants intent in the case then at bar
D. holding that prior distribution and possession convictions that were eight and ten years before the charged conduct occurred were not too remote
E. holding that eight years between prior convictions and the beginning of the charged conspiracy was not too remote
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984). A federal court defining the role of a state official for purposes of determining liability under § 1983 must look to state law. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 484, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1300-1301, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). As explained above, a sheriff or his deputies are state executive officers under the Constitution of the State of Alabama. Ala. Const., art. V, § 112. “Suits against these officials in their official capacities are effectively suits against the entity that those officials represent.” Free v. Granger, 887 F.2d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir.1989). Consequently, in the present case, the § 1983 claim against Deputy Sheriff Hancock, as a state officer, makes the State of Alabama a real party in interest. See Free, 887 F.2d at 1557. . “The eleventh amendment to the Constitution
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a 1983 action against a sheriff made the state of alabama a real party in interest
B. holding that a party does not automatically qualify as a real party in interest merely because it has been named as a defendant in a declaratory judgment action
C. holding that alabama law per mits foreign corporations to lend money to residents of alabama and to take security for such loans in the form of mortgages on real property located within the state and to enforce such obligations in the courts of alabama
D. holding that when a state sues on behalf of its residents without a sovereign or quasisovereign interest it is only a nominal party and thus not the real party in interest
E. recognizing that a narrow reading of missouri would suggest that the state is the real party in interest for diversity purposes only when the relief sought inures to the benefit of the state alone but noting that cases have only required a real interest pecuniary or otherwise in the outcome of the litigation
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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which are not subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction, to open their service territories to competition in the sale of electric generation services, and “confirmed” the authority of the Commission to similarly open the service territories of public service corporations. We reject the Cooperatives’ contention. ¶ 56 Article 15, Section 3 directs the Commission to prescribe just and reasonable rates for services without regard to market structure. Thus, even assuming the legislature is exclusively empowered to implement competition, if the contested rules are reasonably necessary steps in ratemaking within the competitive market, the Commission possesses plenary authority to enact them. Woods, 171 Ariz. at 294, 830 P.2d at 815; see also U.S. West I, 197 Ariz. at 24, ¶ 30, 3 P.3d at 944 . If not, the Commission was only authorized to
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that because the fcc is authorized to promulgate binding legal rules and it issued the order under review in the exercise of that authority its interpretation of the communications act was entitled to chevron deference
B. holding that question involving procedure required of workers compensation agency to promulgate valid rules was of general public interest
C. holding statutory authority of commission to promulgate rules to interpret law does not impose affirmative rulemaking requirement
D. recognizing the inherent common law authority of courts to promulgate rules of practice and procedure
E. holding some competitive rules clearly related to ratemaking power and thus within commissions constitutional authority to promulgate
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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not moot and ruled on the motion for summary judgment. The Tenth Circuit reversed, concluding the case was moot at the time the district court had entered its judgment and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment in a moot case. 949 F.2d at 1095. Unlike the case before us, Beattie was moot before the district court even ruled on it. The Court of Appeals properly concluded no judgment could enter on an already moot case. In Tosco, the Tenth Circuit addressed only briefly the issue of vacatur. It did not illustrate why vacatur was appropriate in that ease but rather cited two distinguishable Supreme Court eases without explanation of their applicability. 826 F.2d at 948 (citing Iron Arrow Honor Society v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 104 S.Ct. 373, 78 L.Ed.2d 58 (1983) ; Great Western Sugar Co. v. Nelson, 442 U.S.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that universitys new policy against discriminatory acts of allmale honorary society mooted the societys appeal seeking to prevent secretary of health education and welfare from interpreting the law to require the university to ban societys activities from campus
B. holding that corporate sponsors of fireworks on a university campus had no duty to control conduct of third party
C. holding that an identity of interest existed between the university and one of its doctors because the university took steps to provide counsel for the doctor and required that all communications concerning the plaintiffs claim be sent to the universitys risk management attorney or to the doctors counsel
D. holding moot the plaintiffs challenge to a universitys requirement that foreign students carry health insurance where named plaintiffs were no longer students at the university
E. holding the university owes a landownerinvitee duty to its students to take reasonable steps to protect against foreseeable acts of violence on its campus and the harm that naturally flows therefrom
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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was not present in the copy of the cross-claim complaint that IICNA filed with the court on February 27, 2007, and the claim was not present in any pleading or motion filed with the court until IICNA filed its motion for summary judgment on June 25, 2007. The claim relating to the invalidity of the Non-Pyramiding endorsements has not been pled, and summary judgment cannot be granted for unpled claims. See Aldinger v. Spectrum Control, Inc., 207 Fed.Appx. 177, 180 n. 1, 181 (3d Cir.2006) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of a claim on the grounds that the party had not raised the issue in its pleadings, but instead first raised the issue in a brief filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment); cf. White v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 899 F.2d 555, 559 (6th Cir. 1990) . Consequently, IICNA’s motion for summary
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the court may consider an article not attached to the complaint in determining whether to dismiss the complaint because the article was integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint and because the plaintiffs did not challenge its authenticity
B. holding that a party could not pursue an employment discrimination claim under one article of a labor agreement when the complaint was framed exclusively in terms of another article of the same agreement
C. holding that a federal habeas court may grant specific performance of a plea agreement in the face of evidence that the state has breached the terms of such an agreement
D. holding that when the type of insurance procured is not listed in article 2104 the article does not apply
E. holding that where one party had received a written agreement and conformed his conduct to that agreement for an extended period of time but failed to sign the agreement he was equitably estopped from denying the validity of the agreement
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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evidence demonstrating that attempts were actually made to separate the fees by claim at the time the fees were incurred and that further separation of the time was impracticable. The trial court’s findings of fact 9-11 and conclusions of law 3-7 show that the trial court based its segregation ruling on both of these legal standards. We conclude that the two legal standards advocated by Britannia are not proper under current Texas law and that Air Routing’s position regarding the legal standard is correct. Britannia correctly asserts that several courts of appeals, in applying the Sterling standard, have compared the essential elements of the claims in question. See Geodyne Energy Income Production P’ship I-E v. Newton Corp., 97 S.W.3d 779, 789-90 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, pet. granted) ; Z.A.O., Inc,, v. Yarbrough Drive Cent. Joint
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding segregation was required in part because the claims have significantly different elements than the claim for which attorneys fees are recoverable
B. holding that contract and tort claims were capable of segregation in part because these claims required proof of different elements
C. holding attorneys fees not generally recoverable unless party prevails under cause of action for which attorneys fees are recoverable and damages are recovered
D. holding segregation was necessary because breachofcontract claim required proof of different elements than other claims
E. holding that a law clerks time is recoverable as part of attorneys fees under 1988
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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grant by Judge Ryan. The trial court found otherwise. This claim has not been resurrected on appeal. 7 . St. Clair’s argument that extreme wantonness is equal to intentional conduct is simply incorrect. While intentional homicides are treated the same as aggravatedly wanton homicides — both being murder — for purposes of determining a defendant’s culpability, that does not mean that the mental states are the same. 8 . Roark went on to say, however, that the fact that the defendant murdered the kidnapping victim could be used to satisfy the require ment of proving a statutory aggravating circumstance under KRS 532.025. That conclusion is questionable in light of this Court's reading of that statute in St. Clair's most recent appeal. See St. Clair Bullitt II, 451 S.W.3d at 643, 649-50, . More importantly, for purposes of the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that if the imposition of the death penalty depends on the existence of aggravating factors a jury must find those factors beyond a reasonable doubt
B. holding that jury must find one of the eight listed statutory aggravators before imposing death
C. holding that only one statutory basis is required to find a child in need of aid
D. holding that to find negligence jury need not find violation of federal motorcarrier regulation
E. holding the death sentence proportional for the firstdegree murder conviction where the aggravators included prior violent felony conviction and hac
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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to make such ecclesiastical decisions was vested was impermissible under First and Fourteenth Amendments); Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16, 50 S.Ct. 5, 74 L.Ed. 131 (1929) (determination of qualifications of a chaplain is canonical in nature); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, supra, 344 U.S. at 118, 73 S.Ct. 143 (appointment of Archbishop is a matter of ecclesiastical government with which courts could not interfere); Protestant Episcopal Church v. Graves, supra (dispute between breakaway local parish and hierarchical parent church over church property is unquestionably doctrinal in nature, the ecclesiastical determination of which only incidentally affects the control over local church property); Elmora Hebrew Center, supra, 125 N.J. at 420, 593 A.2d 725 . Without doubt, matters of church discipline
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a state official can be held individually hable under 1983 for acts taken within the scope of his or her official duties
B. holding that only religious authorities can determine scope of duties of orthodox rabbi
C. holding that the amount of time devoted to managerial duties and the significance of those duties present factual questions
D. recognizing similar duties
E. holding that a breach of duties that a fiduciary contractually assumes beyond those duties imposed by law is considered to arise out of contract
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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$25, and a single gentleman, and they can only attend on Friday night, is $100 charge. (Board Hr’g Tr. at 17.) This pricing structure seems geared more toward maintaining a felicitous gender balance for the operation of a swingers’ club than to the operation of a restaurant. It is therefore highly questionable whether the Property’s use as a club was subordinate to its use as a restaurant. However, the use of the Property as a venue for its patrons to engage in sexual activity is certainly not customary and incidental to its use as a restaurant. MAJ bore the burden of proving that the use of the Property for patrons’ sexual activity was an accessory use to the Property’s use as a restaurant. See Smith v. Zoning Hearing Board of Conewago Township, 713 A.2d 1210, 1213-14 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998) . In attempting to meet this burden, MAJ tries
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that owners of an airport failed to meet their burden of showing that their skydiving business was an accessory use to the airport
B. holding that defendant failed to meet the burden of strict proof required to show abandonment
C. holding plaintiffs principals failed to identify a sufficient market for their services which was an essential element for the success of their proposed business
D. holding in response to a commerce clause challenge that a city that operated an airport was acting as a participant in the market for airport rental car services
E. holding district court order of restitution failed for lack of proof when government failed to meet burden
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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defendant's "expectation of privacy is, if anything, diminished as a consequence of the antagonism between him and the [third party]” and emphasizing that that is "particularly true when the occupant of the premises is prompted to cooperate with the police because the defendant has committed a crime upon that other person); United States v. Moore, 917 F.2d 215 (6th Cir.1990) (upholding consent by defendant's girlfriend — who lived in the same premises as defendant — and stressing that she "assisted the police to avoid possible criminal implication of herself”). 26 . People v. Sanders, 904 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Colo.1995). See also People v. Cosme, 48 N.Y.2d 286, 422 N.Y.S.2d 652, 397 N.E.2d 1319 (1979) (upholding fiancee’s consent to search apartment shared with def las 1990, pet. ref’d) ; Grays v. State, 905 S.W.2d 54,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a defendants sister could consent to a search of only the common areas of their shared house and her own bedroom and explicitly stating that the sister could not consent to search the defendants bedroom because the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her own bedroom
B. holding that child cannot consent to search of parents bedroom
C. holding that appellants mother had the authority to consent to search of defendants bedroom defendant lived with parents rentfree for four years mother owned the house appellants bedroom door was open mother knocked whenever appellants door was locked and there were no restrictions placed on mothers right to enter bedroom
D. holding that appellants father had authority to consent to search of defendants bedroom where house defendant lived in was owned by his parents room was not locked and defen dants family was not denied access to bedroom
E. holding that as owner of the residence the grandfather had actual authority to consent to a search of the defendants bedroom because there was no evidence that grandfather lacked authority to enter defendants room and because defendants bedroom did not have a lock or anything restricting access to the room the court found that the grandfather shared common authority over the bedroom
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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identified as the individual in the field cultivating and caring for the patch, and (3) the final harvesting of the field had been completed immediately pri- or to the search warrant application, the issuing magistrate judge reasonably could have inferred that the defendant had recently harvested a large quantity of marijuana plants and that the most likely place to store these plants and the implements used in the harvesting would be at his residence adjacent to the patch. See United States v. Reyes, 798 F.2d 380, 382 (10th Cir.1986) (“It is reasonable to assume that certain types of evidence would be kept at a defendant’s residence and an affidavit need not contain personal observations that a defendant did keep such evidence at his residence.”); see also Rowland, 145 F.3d at 1205 . The affidavit also included the opinion of
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that issuing judge may draw reasonable inferences from the material presented in the warrant application
B. holding that fact finder may draw reasonable inferences from evidence and choose which inference is most reasonable
C. holding that courts are obligated to draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor
D. holding court obligated to draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor
E. holding that triers of fact may draw only reasonable inferences
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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motion to dismiss. A. Tribal Sovereign Immunity As a threshold matter, we must determine if CNI enjoys tribal-sovereign immu nity. If so, a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was proper. See Lovely, 570 F.3d at 782 n. 2 (6th Cir.2009) (“[Sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional doctrine ....”) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Nair v. Oakland County Cmty. Health Auth., 443 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir.2006) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment is jurisdictional in the sense that it is a limitation on the federal court’s judicial power.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, if CNI enjoys tribal-sovereign immunity, we need not address the issues of diversity jurisdiction and federal-question jurisdiction. See Miner Elec., Inc. v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 505 F.3d 1007, 1011 (10th Cir.2007) . MBF argues that CNI waived its
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit
B. holding that if property is not property1 of the public entity then the public entity cannot be subject to suit under the dangerous condition waiver
C. holding that an official capacity suit should be treated as a suit against the entity
D. holding that the race of the prosecutor is irrelevant
E. holding that if an entity enjoys tribalsovereign immunity federal jurisdiction is otherwise irrelevant and dismissal of the suit is proper
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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business, as well as the source of its revenues. In their motion, Defendants argue that LPI and LPHI are distinguishable entities and that, therefore, the Court should dismiss all of the claims that are based in part on LPI’s business since LPI is not a named Defendant in this case. The' Court disagrees. The record is literally stocked with evidence demonstrating that there is no meaningful difference between LPI and LPHI. For instance, LPI and LPHI share physical offices and have a consolidated Board of Directors. (Dkt. No. 135-4 at 7). Along the same lines, the two companies file consolidated financial statements and LPHI reports on LPI’s litigation in its annual reports.. (Id. at 10). Miller v. MSX-IBS Holding, Inc., No. 09-cv-15046, 2012 WL 458486, at *7 (E.D.Mich. Feb. 13, 2012) . Indeed, even LPHI’s employees and managers do
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the plaintiff that was engaged in the business of placement of contract personnel with other entities was required to be licensedregistered under the peaa
B. recognizing that the lien granted is in consideration of one or more loans letters of credit or other financial accommodation made by jpmc pursuant to the clearance agreement
C. holding a secured creditor has standing to appeal a ruling that impacted its financial interest in collateral
D. holding that consolidated financials are usually necessary for a fair presentation when one of the entities in the consolidated group directly or indirectly has a controlling financial interest in the other entities
E. holding that consolidated cases should be treated as single action for purposes of determining res judicata
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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by Florida. After testing the sufficiency of the statutory aggravating circumstances and weighing all statutory aggravating evidence against the relevant mitigating evidence, the jury returns a recommendation of either life imprisonment or the death penalty. Fla.Stat. § 921.141(2) (1985). A recommendation of life may only be overturned if "the facts suggesting a sentence of death [are] so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ." Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla.1975). Although Florida is not constitutionally obligated to make a jury the sentencing authority in capital cases, Spaziano v. Florida, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984), the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Baldwin v. Alabama, -U.S.-, 105 S.Ct. 2727, 86 L.Ed.2d 300 (1985) , indicates that a state’s greater power to
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing that even a nonunanimous recommendation of death by the jury proved that the jury including the jurors who voted against the recommendation of death had unanimously found the existence of a proffered aggravating circumstance even though the circumstance was not included within the definition of the particular capitalmurder offense charged in the indictment because the trial court had specifically instructed the jury that it could not proceed to a vote on whether to impose the death penalty unless it had already unanimously agreed that an aggravating circumstance existed
B. holding that an aggravating circumstance in the georgia death penalty statute was unconstitutionally vague
C. holding that it was a due process violation where the judge in issuing the death sentence against the recommendation of the jury considered a confidential presentencing report that was not considered by the jury
D. holding that under the alabama death penalty statute because the judge did not consider the jurys recommendation the statute which forced the jury to sentence the defendant to death whenever aggravating circumstances existed was not unconstitutional
E. holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). II. Count I — Challenge to USDA Regulations A. Restrictions on the use of biological products The VSTA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to enact regulations “as may be necessary to prevent the preparation, sale, barter, exchange, or shipment as aforesaid of any worthless, contaminated, dangerous, or harmful virus, serum, toxin, or analogous product for use in the treatment of domestic animals, or otherwise to carry out this chapter.... ” 21 U.S.C. § 154 (emphasis added). The USDA refers to viruses, serums, toxins, and analogous products as “biological products” and has instituted a licensing regime for “[e]very person who prepares biological products” subject to the VS an, 521 U.S. 642, 117 S.Ct. 2199, 138 L.Ed.2d 724 Plaintiff goes on to note that the agency has
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a phrase should be interpreted consistent with the context of the statute in which it is contained
B. holding that the possibility of a mistaken understanding of the phrase preponderance of the evidence on the part of the jury is too remote to constitute plain error when counsel gave the jury an accurate explanation of the legal meaning of the phrase in his closing argument and that meaning is consistent with the common understanding of the words in the phrase
C. holding that the phrase means reasonably designed to prevent expanded the secs authority beyond those acts specifically enumerated in the statute
D. holding however that probation act precludes monetary penalties other than those enumerated in the statute
E. holding that the phrase or ganic diseases of the nervous system contained in 38 usc 11013 was ambiguous because the statute did not define the phrase
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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court nevertheless dismissed these claims in their entirety, concluding that “Section 1981 is not a substitute for an employment discrimination claim.” We have previously noted our “puzzlement” with this conclusion, Leung v. New York Univ., 495 Fed.Appx. 124,125 n. 1 (2d Cir.2012), and we now hold that it was error. Congress “intended § 1981 to apply to employment discrimination” and Section 1981 “provid[es] a vehicle for every employee to remedy racial discrimination in the workplace.” Lauture v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 216 F.3d 258, 263, 264 (2d Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, despite the district court’s concerns, plaintiffs’ failure to point to a specific written contract outside of their employment relationship is not fatal to their claim. See id. at 260 . In addition, “42 U.S.C. § 1981 encompasses
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that an atwill employee may not recover for discriminatory discharge under section 1981 because the atwill relationship was not sufficiently contractual under tennessee law
B. holding that an atwill employee may bring a cause of action under section 1981
C. holding that an atwill employee may not be discharged for refusal to violate the law
D. holding that an atwill employee may sue under 1981 for racially discriminatory termination
E. holding that an atwill employment relationship is contractual and may serve as a predicate contract for a 1981 claim
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Bravo, 203 F.3d at 780. The court, however, failed to analyze the § 3553(a) factors when it denied Frazier’s motion, and summarily held that “the factors in § 3553(a) weigh strongly against any reduction in Frazier’s 360 month sentence.” While it is true that the district court was not required to discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors individually, see Eggersdorf, 126 F.3d at 1322, it was required to provide some explanation as to why it denied Frazier’s § 3582(c)(2) motion. See U.S. v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329-30 (11th Cir.2005) (finding the district court adequately addressed the § 3553(a) factors when it considered “ ‘all the obvious things that you would normally take in consideration,’ particularly, ‘the age of the child.’ ”); U.S. v. Vautier, 144 F.3d 756, 761 (11th Cir.1998) ; U.S. v. Smith, 568 F.3d 923, 928 (11th
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that sentence is reasonable when the district court properly addresses sentencing factors of 3553a
B. holding that nothing in booker or elsewhere requires the district court to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the 3553a factors or to discuss each of the 3553a factors
C. holding that district court adequately considered the 3553a factors when it cited defendants demonstrated violence and all the other considerations that went in to the establishment of this defendants sentence
D. holding that the district court is not required to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the 3553a factors or to discuss each of the 3553a factors
E. holding that plain error review is used for unpreserved challenges to the method by which the district court arrived at a sentence including arguments that the sentencing court failed to explain adequately the sentence imposed under the statutory factors in 3553a
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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compelled action by the Garden. Accordingly, the trial court’s order is reversed in this respect and this action remanded for further proceedings. 2. The trial court also dismissed Appellants’ request for injunc-tive relief; this was proper in part. Appellants sought a permanent and interlocutory injunction prohibiting the Garden “from causing the arrest or prosecution” of licensed individuals who carry weapons at the facility. As Appellants recognize on appeal, however, the Garden is not a government entity and it lacks the power to administer the criminal law. Because the Garden lacks the authority to administer the criminal law, enjoining the Garden from “causing” an arrest or prosecution would be fruitless. See generally State v. Wooten, 273 Ga. 529, 531 (2) (543 SE2d 721) (2001) . Further, this portion of Appellants’
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that given the broad discretion afforded federal prosecutors to enforce the united states criminal laws in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary courts presume that federal prosecutors have properly discharged them official duties
B. recognizing the broad discretion of prosecutors in making decisions about whom to prosecute and what charges to bring
C. recognizing the governments broad discretion to conduct criminal prosecutions including its power to select the charges to be brought in a particular case
D. recognizing the aljs broad discretion to correct mistakes in the record
E. holding that the broad nature of the prosecutors discretion generally bars the judiciary from intervening to limit or otherwise control it
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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facial vagueness challenge as he contends. 8 . Appellant’s first point of error addresses the state constitution and his second point addresses the federal constitution. The corresponding "due process” provision of the Texas Constitution provides: "No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised, except by the due course of the law of the land.” Tex. Const, art. I, § 19. Historically, courts have equated the due course of law clause in the Texas Constitution with the guarantee of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See Norris v. State, 788 S.W.2d 65, 72 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1990, pet. ref’d); see also University of Tex. Med. Sch. v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Tex.1995) . Appellant does not provide substantively
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that there is no due process right to appellate review
B. holding that due process requires at a minimum an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner
C. holding that procedural due process requires adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard
D. holding that there is no distinction in the right to jury trial between sentencing factors and elements
E. holding there is no meaningful distinction between due course and due process
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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the officer testified that he felt the lump in the front pocket of the defendant's jacket and that he examined the lump with his fingers and determined it to be crack cocaine wrapped in cellophane. Id. The Supreme Court adopted the Minnesota Supreme Court's holding that the search was unconstitutional. The rationale for finding the search unconstitutional was because the officer concluded that the lump was contraband only after " 'squeezing, sliding and otherwise manipulating the contents of the defendant's pocket'-a pocket which the officer already knew contained no weapon." Id. at 378, 113 S.Ct. at 2138. Therefore, despite the officer's lawful right to place his hands on the defendant's jacket pursuant to the Terry exc , cert. denied, 498 U.S. 856, 110 S.Ct. 161, 107 L.Ed.2d 118 . Second, the officers were justified in
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a tip may provide the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory stop
B. holding there was no reasonable suspicion which would justify an investigatory stop despite report of a domestic disturbance
C. holding that taillight and license plate violations justify investigatory stop of automobile
D. holding that circumstances created reasonable suspicion for investigatory stop
E. holding that an areas reputation for criminal activity alone cannot justify an investigatory stop
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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S.Ct. 716, 160 L.Ed.2d 734 (2005). 2. Non-Delegation The Constitution provides that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.” U.S. Const, art. I, § 1 (emphasis added). Consistent with this text and the principle of separation of powers, the non-delegation doctrine generally permits “no delegation” of legislative powers to another branch of government. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 581 U.S. 457, 472, 121 S.Ct. 908, 149 L.Ed.2d 1 (2001); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-72, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989). Among Congress’s legislative powers is the authority to determine the temporal scope of a statute. See, e.g., City of New York v. Permanent Mission of India to the U.N., 618 F.3d 172, 195 (2d Cir.2010) . That determination is particularly
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the rule announced in simmons v south carolina 512 us 154 114 sct 2187 129 led2d 133 1994 doesnt apply retroactively on collateral review
B. holding that although contempt and sanctions are not identical the principles the supreme court articulated for cases of contempt in international union united mine workers of america v bagwell 512 us 821 114 sct 2552 129 led2d 642 1994 guide our determination of what procedural protections are necessary in imposing sanctions under a courts inherent powers
C. recognizing congresss responsibility for fundamental policy judgments concerning the proper temporal reach of statutes quoting landgraf v usi film prods 511 us 244 273 114 sct 1483 128 led2d 229 1994
D. recognizing that references to and descriptions of the jurys verdict as advisory as a recommendation and of the judge as the final sentencing authority are permissible under romano v oklahoma 512 us 1 114 sct 2004 129 led2d 1 1994
E. holding that regulations that are unrelated to the content of speech are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny quoting turner broad sys inc v fed commcn commn 512 us 622 642 114 sct 2445 129 led2d 497 1994 plurality opinion
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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address as 55-03 Van Doren Street; such repetition of one address indicated that the applications might include fraudulent statements; and he ordered all files in the file cabinets seized — even the ones that he had not individually searched. These actions bear none of the hallmarks of a general search: They suggest a fairly systematic inventory, not “indiscriminate rummaging,” and a search for items enumerated in the warrant, not an “exploratory” search for items not mentioned there. Indeed, federal courts have repeatedly held that such actions as were taken by the INS agents in this case, standing alone, do not support a finding that government agents have flagrantly disregarded the terms of a warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Hargus, 128 F.3d 1358, 1363 (10th Cir.1997) (collecting cases). Accordingly, even assuming
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant
B. holding that officers were entitled to rely on the judicial officers finding of probable cause in issuing the search warrant unless they knowingly made false statements to obtain the warrant and that a challenge to the adequacy of the officers investigation does not rise to level of clearly established constitutional violation
C. holding that the government made a prima facie showing of authenticity of a warrant of removal where the immigration agent who maintained the defendants immigration file testified at trial as to his recordkeeping practices and that the warrant admitted was a true and correct copy of the warrant in the defendants file
D. holding that a warrant lacking a description of items to be seized was not facially invalid and finding in the alternative that even if the warrant were found to be deficient the seized evidence was admissible under the good faith exception
E. holding that where government agents were authorized by a warrant to search for broad categories of documentary evidence and records belonging to each category were found in every drawer of some file cabinets the officers did not grossly exceed the terms of the warrant when they seized entire file cabinets so that complete suppression was required
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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one of ADVA’s statutory duties is to assist veterans in presenting and pursuing claims against the United States for veteran’s benefits arising under laws of the United States or of Alabama if that veteran has given ADVA a power of attorney. Ala. Code § 31—5—4; see also Ala. Admin. Code r. 920-X-3-.01. But, an allegation that ADVA made an improper misrepresentation amounts to a negligence or legal malpractice claim, just as an allegation of improper medical care would amount to a medical malpractice claim. And, “[a] malpractice [claim] will not lie under [Section] 1983” because it is a claim arising under state common law—not a constitutional violation. Bass v. Sullivan, 550 F.2d 229, 232 (5th Cir.1977); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) . Accordingly, any malpractice claim alleged
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that plaintiffs claim that medical providers did not comply with baker act was not subject to medical malpractice statutes ajlthough a medical diagnosis is necessary in order to involuntarily commit a patient the process of complying with the statute does not require medical skill or judgment
B. recognizing that prison officials should defer to medical professionals on medical matters
C. holding the provisions of a comprehensive medical malpractice act unconstitutional
D. holding that the ada does not create a remedy for medical malpractice
E. recognizing that even when a prisoner files suit under section 1983 alleging medical malpractice against prison medical officials medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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removable. This distinction is important because the BIA’s reopening of a case vacates the final order of removal and reopens the administrative removal proceedings. See id. During administrative removal proceedings, the government has the burden of proving by “clear and convincing evidence” that the petitioner is subject to removal on the basis of his convictions. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A); see also Pickering v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 525, 527 (6th Cir.2006) (concluding that, once the petitioner produces evidence that his conviction has been vacated, “the [pjetitioner is deportable only if the* government can show, with clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence, that the conviction was vacated solely for immigration reasons”); Cruz-Garza v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 1125, 1130 (10th Cir.2005) ; Sandoval v. INS, 240 F.3d 577, 581 (7th
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that in a case where the petitioner obtained postconviction relief reducing his felony conviction to a misdemeanor the evidence of record is legally insufficient to satisfy the inss stringent burden of proof and thus the order for removal must be reversed
B. holding petitioners failure to present any witnesses or submit the trial record into evidence at hearing led to conclusion that petitioner did not meet his burden of proof for postconviction relief
C. recognizing that evidence may be legally insufficient where there is variance between indictment allegations and proof
D. holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant
E. holding evidence legally insufficient
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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stating that “[an] argument that the trial judge exceeded his discretion by enjoining the appellants beyond the time specified in the ... contract is without merit”). We agree with Guy Carpenter. The expiration of the one-year contract limit does not make this issue moot. If this Court remands, the district court has the power under Texas law to craft an injunction that extends beyond the expiration of the non-solicitation covenant. Exercising this equitable power might be particularly appropriate given the district court’s year-long delay before ruling on the motion to reconsider. We note that neither case Provenzale cites in support of his mootness argument is relevant to the facts of this case. See Hi-Line Electric Co. v. Dowco Electrical Products, 765 F.2d 1359, 1363 (5th Cir.1985) ; John R. Ray & Sons, Inc. v. Stroman, 923
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the injunction did not constitute a claim
B. holding plaintiffs appeal of the denial of a preliminary injunction moot where defendants directive no longer in effect
C. holding that where a noncompetition clause in a contract had expired by its own terms the plaintiffs appeal from the district courts denial of the plaintiffs request for a preliminary injunction enforcing the clause was moot
D. holding an appeal of injunction moot where the injunction expired three months before the appellate court heard arguments in the case
E. holding that where a district courts preliminary injunction preventing the appellant from terminating its agreement with the defendant had expired the appellants appeal of the district courts decision to grant that injunction was moot
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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consumers from this nuisance and privacy invasion.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Senator Fritz Hollings, the sponsor of the TCPA, stated that “[e]omputerized calls are the scourge of modern civilization. They wake us up in the morning; they interrupt our dinner at night; they force the sick and elderly out of bed; they hound us until we want to rip the telephone right out of the wall.” Mims, 132 S.Ct. at 752. Initially, the Court notes that several district courts, including district courts within the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, have held that a plaintiff demonstrates a violation of privacy interests, and therefore an injury-in-fact, after receiving automated calls. See, e.g., Schumacher v. Credit Prot. Ass’n, No. 4:13-CV-164, 2015 WL 5786139 (S.D.Ind. Sept. 30, 2015) ; Ikuseghan v. Multicare Health Sys., No.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the plaintiff had standing because the defendant violated her privacy by making unsolicited automated calls to her cell phone
B. holding over
C. holding that a claim that is constitutional in name only does not create jurisdiction over an appeal from the veterans court
D. holding that the plaintiff had constitutional standing because he received over fifty calls over three months from an automated caller
E. holding that directors who sat on over fifteen boards and received over 50000 in compensation were not interested
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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(referring to “reason to know” as a “finding of fact”). Constructive knowledge. The government argues that Bertucco had “reason to know” of the presence of dyed fuel because (i) he signed the stamped ticket, and (ii) as a matter of settled law, his act of signing the ticket charged him with constructive knowledge of its contents. The district court agreed: Here, regardless of whether Bertucco ... paused to read the whole delivery ticket, [he] had constructive knowledge of the presence of dyed diesel by virtue of the “RED DYED” stamp. ConEd, 34 F.Supp.2d at 165. The district court equated constructive knowledge with “reason to know,” an equation the parties do not contest, and that is consistent with precedent. See, e.g., Holzapfel v. Town of Newburgh, 145 F.3d 516, 524 (2d Cir.1998) ; Hayman, 992 F.2d at 1262. In general,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a 1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury
B. holding such service satisfies due process
C. holding that constructive knowledge satisfies the reason to know standard
D. holding that actual or constructive possession satisfies the uses or carries requirement of section 924c1
E. recognizing that duty to warn of dangerous conditions could be based on constructive knowledge of that condition as well as actual knowledge
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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withstand a motion to dismiss should be denied. Richardson v. United States, 193 F.3d 545, 548-49 (D.C.Cir.1999). The second amended complaint does not cure the deficiencies outlined in the proceeding text of this opinion; however, the plaintiffs maintain that "§ 1983 claims brought against city officials in their personal capacity are not subject to the exhaustion requirement.” Pls.' Supp. Mem. at 4 n. 2. But, there appears to be no basis in law for this distinction. See Johnson v. Dist. of Columbia, 368 F.Supp.2d 30, 34 (D.D.C.2005) (maintaining claims against defendants in their individual capacities because District of Columbia's motion to dismiss explicitly restricted scope of motion to defendants in their official capacities); Runkle v. Gonzales, 391 F.Supp.2d 210 (D.D.C.2005) . The court, therefore, denies the plaintiffs'
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that partys failure to file a timely internal administrative appeal as required by regulations of the department of agriculture constituted failure to exhaust administrative remedies and precluded judicial action
B. holding there is no statutory requirement that a taxpayer exhaust administrative remedies before filing a complaint in the tax court
C. holding that constitutional claims against defendants in their individual capacities were precluded by plaintiffs failure to exhaust administrative remedies under pertinent statutory scheme
D. holding that claims not presented to the ij and bia should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies
E. holding that plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies by failing to include issue in case brief
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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in order “to protect the public from the possibility that a revolver would fall into untrained or perhaps malicious hands.” Id. at 443, 93 S.Ct. 2523. Because the search was a result of a function “totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute,” it was permissible. Id. at 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523. Although Dombrowski involved the search of a vehicle, some lower courts have relied on the community caretaking rationale in upholding warrantless searches of homes. United States v. Quezada, 448 F.3d 1005, 1007 (8th Cir.2006); United States v. Stafford, 416 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir.2005); United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1521-22 (6th Cir.1996). But see United States v. Bute, 43 F.3d 531, 535 (10th Cir.1994) ; United States v. Pichany, 687 F.2d 204,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding state has burden of showing exception to prohibition against warrantless searches applies
B. recognizing the community caretaking exception but holding it inapplicable to justify the police action at issue
C. holding that community caretaking exception applies only to automobile searches
D. recognizing that the community caretaking exception is distinct from the emergency aid or emergency assistance exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement
E. recognizing that the community caretaking function as an exception and enunciating a test for its application
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to all remaining counts. 4) Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs Counter-Statement of Material Facts is DENIED. 1 . A shakedown is a routine procedure on the RHU, wherein corrections officers search inmates' cells for contraband. (Barnes Dep. 18:16-19:1.) 2 . 42 U.S.C. § 1985 requires the action of "two or more persons.” 3 . To the extent that Plaintiff is arguing the Defendant Macon had a history of making racially inappropriate comments (see Doc. 32, Ex. SS, TT, UU), Barnes has not shown that any of those comments were made toward him or ever even heard or perceived by him. Even if Barnes did hear of these incidents second-hand, they would not be sufficient to create a hostile work environment. See Caver, 420 F.3d at 263 . 4 . The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that comments not directed at plaintiff including a supervisor who called another worker the nword were relevant to the evaluation of hostile work environment claim
B. holding that a viable hostile work environment claim requires an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive
C. holding that supervisors routine vulgar references to plaintiff could not support a hostile work environment claim because plaintiff was unaware of the comments and to show that he or she perceived the environment as hostile a title vii plaintiff must at least have been aware of those comments
D. recognizing a hostile work environment claim under section 1983
E. holding that plaintiff cannot meet hostile work environment threshold simply by pointing to comments directed at other individuals
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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activities of Cooper’s enterprise affected interstate commerce. See, e.g., Keltner, 147 F.3d at 669 (interstate commerce requirement satisfied when defendants traveled between several states and committed some of the RICO predicate acts in another state); United States v. Norton, 867 F.2d 1354 (11th Cir.1989) (interstate commerce requirement satisfied when group members traveled between states to discuss and carry out RICO conspiracy). Second, Cooper argues no enterprise was in existence in 1993. However, every enterprise begins somewhere. There is no requirement that an enterprise be in existence before the first predicate act is committed as long as that first act relates to and is continuous with the subsequent acts in the pattern. See H.J., Inc., 492 U.S. at 239, 109 S.Ct. 2893 , Cooper’s third argument, that the Griffin
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that speech must be a threat or coercion to be actionable
B. recognizing that by accepting bribes in exchange for allowing violations of a collective bargaining agreement the defendant was conducting the rico enterprise local union through racketeering activity even though the union was harmed by the racketeering activity
C. holding that racketeering predicates must be related and amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity
D. holding that a pattern of racketeering activity required multiple illegal schemes
E. holding that plaintiff stated pattern of racketeering activity where defendants allegedly committed various predicates with common design of defrauding plaintiffs of money and obtaining control of coal mine
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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(1987) (noting that the plaintiffs decision to sue only under the state law theory, eschewing a claim under the CBA, was entitled to deference under the well-pleaded complaint rule). Regardless of whether this choice serves them well on the merits, it is entitled to deference under the well-pleaded complaint rule. Id. (“Caterpillar’s basic error is its failure to recognize that a plaintiff covered by a collective-bargaining agreement is permitted to assert legal rights independent of that agreement, including state-law contact rights, so long as the contract relied upon is not a collective bargaining agreement”). If Plaintiffs do not wish to press their additional CBA rights in this case, federal law does not force them to do so. Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637, 639, 646 (7th Cir.1995) ; Chavez v. Don Stoltzner Mason Contractor,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that erisa does not preempt professional malpractice claims
B. holding that plan administrator of an erisa health plan did not have to anticipate the confusion of a plan participant
C. holding that district courts order remanding an erisa benefits determination to a plan administrator was nonfinal and therefore not appealable after the remand to plan administrator plan participant still could appeal the district courts decision that erisa preempted her state law claim and if successful she would be able to pursue punitive damage
D. holding that erisa does not preempt the plaintiffs claim that the erisa plan administrator is liable for medical malpractice where the plaintiff premised the claim solely on state law and did not invoke the erisa plan
E. holding that erisa did not preempt hospitals claims against erisa plan administrator for misrepresentation under texas insurance code because hospitals claims were not dependent on or derived from the beneficiarys right to recover benefits under the plan
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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standard has been met in this case, I would vacate the district court’s order and remand with instructions to reconsider the balance of the public and private interests consistent with this opinion. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 1 . This sentence represents the entirety of the state court’s factual findings regarding the parties' private interests in this case. As discussed infra, however, the district court described these findings differently in its order. 2 . Plaintiffs' interest in being present for trial is a private interest weighing in favor of ' Plaintiffs' choice of forum which should be considered separate and apart from the issue of whether Guatemala provides an adequate forum. See Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F.Supp.2d 1134, 1150 (C.D.Cal.2005) ; Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F.Supp.2d 1116,
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding plaintiffs are not deprived of a liberty interest because they cannot have the best job in their field
B. holding that only relevant factors must be considered
C. holding that the plaintiffs first amendment retaliation claims are deficient because in each case the incidents upon which plaintiffs base their pleadings concerned personal grievances expressed as employees generally relating to their official duties work schedules working conditions or employer administrative policies and internal operations rather than to any matters of public concern raised by plaintiffs as private citizens
D. holding that because plaintiffs would be able to file their case in colombia plaintiffs concerns as to their safety are more appropriately considered in the private interest factors analysis
E. holding banks that bought securities on behalf of their clients had sufficient interest in the case to serve as lead plaintiffs
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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work is done once they have ruled proffered evidence admissible or inadmissible” instead of assessing whether the expert’s testimony fits the task at hand). 32 . Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). 33 . Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). 34 . Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). 35 . Cole, supra note 31, at 819-24. 36 . Id. 37 . 928 S.W.2d 550 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (discussing the importance of assessing the reliability of scientific evidence and how trial judges must act as gatekeepers to weed out "junk” science; concluding that the scientific testimony of a psychologist on the reliability of eyewitness identification is relevant and may be admissible). 38 . 354 S.W.3d 425, 435-36 (Tex.Crim.App.2011) ; see also State v. Esparza, 413 S.W.3d 81, 94
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a specific instruction was unnecessary because eyewitness was crossexamined and the eyewitness testimony was discussed in defense counsels opening statement
B. holding that any deficiency in counsels failure to object to alleged hearsay testimony that repeated statement of witness regarding identity of murder perpetrator did not prejudice defendant and thus was not ineffective assistance when testimony was cumulative of other eyewitness testimony
C. holding admissible expert testimony concerning factors that may impair eyewitness identification and rejecting that concerning a particular eyewitness credibility and the statistical probability of eyewitness misidentification
D. holding that psychologists testimony on the reliability of eyewitness testimony was both relevant and reliable and thus should have been admitted
E. holding the error harmless due to eyewitness corroboration of the victims testimony
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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interest in monitoring probationers. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 876, 107 S.Ct. 3164. In Samson, the Supreme Court held that the state had a legitimate supervisory interest in warrantless, suspicionless searches of parolees. Samson, 126 S.Ct. at 2200-01. Specifically, this interest was considered legitimate because parolees are more likely to commit crimes in the future, and expeditious supervisory measures are required in order to prevent parolees from having the opportunity to “anticipate searches and conceal criminality.” Id. at 2201. This rationale finds foundation in the impracticability of obtaining a search warrant, a rationale similar to the underlying motivation used to support the administrative or “special needs” exception. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826 . The search at issue in Samson involved a
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding officer liable for deprivation of constitutional rights despite argument that officer although present was not in control of the situation
B. holding a search permissible where the officer reasonably believed he faced an emergency situation that would result in the destruction of evidence
C. recognizing emergency exception
D. holding that the court must consider the totality of the circumstance when determining whether a law enforcement officer faced an emergency that justified acting without a warrant
E. holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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(“The underlying idea [of double jeopardy] ... is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty"). 13 . Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672-73, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982). 14 . Id. at 676, 102 S.Ct. 2083. 15 . Bauder v. State, 921 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). 16 . Peterson, 117 S.W.3d at 815, n. 37 (citing Bauder, 921 S.W.2d at 699). 17 . Id. at 816-17. 18 . See, e.g., People v. Batts, 30 Cal.4th 660, 666, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67, 68 P.3d 357, 361 (2003) (emphasis in original); see also United States
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the double jeopardy clause bars retrial when the commonwealth intentionally undertakes to prejudice the defendant to the point of the denial of a fair trial
B. holding that the double jeopardy clause precludes a second trial once the reviewing court finds the evidence legally insufficient and that the only just remedy is the direction of a judgment of acquittal
C. holding that the state constitutional double jeopardy clause may bar retrial when the prosecutor subjectively believes that an acquittal was likely when he intentionally committed misconduct and the court determines from an objective perspective that the misconduct actually deprived the defendant of the reasonable prospect of an acquittal
D. holding that the dismissal of criminal charges for evidentiary insufficiency is an acquittal for purposes of the double jeopardy clause
E. holding that a sua sponte dismissal of the charges during trial was not an acquittal that barred retrial based on double jeopardy
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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is essential.”) As fuel break maintenance is necessary and foreseeable, the effects of such maintenance must be addressed within the EIS. See Save the Yaak Committee v. Block, 840 F.2d 714, 720 (9th Cir.1988) (“[A]n EIS must cover subsequent phase of development when ‘[t]he dependency is such that it would be irrational, or at least unwise, to undertake the first phase, if subsequent phases were not also undertaken.’ ”); Blue Mountains, 161 F.3d 1208, 1214-15 (9th Cir.1998) (requiring EIS to consider five related timber sales where actions part of one recovery strategy and were reasonably foreseeable); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (requiring that EIS consider reasonably foreseeable future actions); Cf. Wetlands Action Network v. United States Army Corps, 222 F.3d 1105, 1119 (9th Cir.2000) . Accordingly, the Court concludes that the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that defendant had not committed tort because its agents collateral comment had been made in good faith
B. holding eis did not need to consider subsequent phases of project where impractical to do so because subsequent phases had not received approval and many planning decisions had not been made
C. holding that the trial court did not violate due process in considering the defendants motion to dismiss because the defendant had corrected its error in not serving its motion to dismiss on the plaintiff and because the plaintiff had received adequate time to consider and respond to the arguments made in the motion
D. holding that plaintiffs who had been served and received responses to interrogatories on personal jurisdiction had had such a fair opportunity
E. holding that where a witness had been convicted seventeen years earlier but had been given probation and had not been confined the date of the conviction controlled
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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the above-mentioned classes employing any person in this Commonwealth.” 8 . See Second Supplemental Memorandum of Law of Plaintiff Scungio Borst & Associates in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment of Robert DeBolt, undated, at 1-3 (R.R. at 66-68). 9 . 410 SLD and Kenworth did not appeal the judgment against them and are not involved in the instant appeal. 10 . See, inter alia, Ward v. Whalen, Í8 Pa. D. & C.3d 710 (Ct.Com.Pl.Allegheny 1981) (Wettick, J.) (interpreting Section 260.2a as permitting actions against agents in their personal capacities); Amalgamated Cotton Garment and Allied Indus. Fund v. Dion, 341 Pa.Super. 12, 491 A.3d 123 (1985) (approving Ward but limiting it to instances where an employer itself defaults); Mohney v. McClure, 390 Pa.Super. 338, 568 A.2d 682 (1990) . 11 . Act of Feb. 17, 1994, P.L. 73, No. 7 §
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that such classifications are permissible only when suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest
B. recognizing that employment actions can be adverse even if such actions are subsequently withdrawn
C. holding that causes of actions against directors of corporations for breach of fiduciary duty are contract actions
D. holding that a city police officers negligent actions involved in the pursuit of a speeding automobile were entitled to the protection of sovereign immunity
E. holding that such actions are permissible only against officers and agents involved in salient decisionmaking
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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with Appellee’s chiropractic business. Though Appellant contends that Mr. Bodkin’s testimony was not based upon a sound valuation method and competent evidence, as required by Helfer I, this Court disagrees. Mr. Bodkin reviewed both experts’ written reports and his testimony revealed that he was clearly knowledgeable with regard to their valuation calculations. He explained, in detail, why he found the valuation calculation of Appellant wife’s expert to be seriously flawed and why he concurred with the valuation formulated by Appellee husband’s expert. Both Mr. Bodkin and Mr. Costanzo agreed that the business has no excess earnings, which supported Mr. Bodkin’s conclusion that there is no enterprise goodwill to be valued. See May, 214 W.Va. at 406 n. 18, 589 S.E.2d at 548 n. 18 ’” (quoting Alicia Brokars Kelly, “Sharing a
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing that goodwill is excess earning power once the normal rate of return for identifiable tangible and intangible assets is determined any rate of return in excess of a normal return is attributable to unidentifiable intangible assets goodwill
B. holding that with respect to the eaja the local or national market rate for legal services cannot be a special factor used to increase the rate beyond the statutory rate
C. holding that the proper rate for prejudgment interest is the rate fixed by the parties in a contract
D. holding that state property tax liens are not entitled to the states statutory interest rate as a matter of law rather the appropriate rate of interest is determined by the equities of each case
E. holding that once a rate is filed with the appropriate agency except for review of the agencys orders the courts can assume no right to a different rate on that ground that in its opinion it is the only or the more reasonable rate
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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the Hughes Unit {e.g., the potentially small number of Native American religious adherents). That issues of fact remain as to the neutrality of the application of TDCJ’s volunteer policy differentiates this case from those we have previously considered. Requiring neutrality ensures that the prison’s application of its policy is actually based on the justifications it purports, and not something more nefarious. Were we to ignore Turner’s neutrality requirement, we would allow prison regulators to justify a policy based on a legitimate interest applicable to the overall prison population, while applying the policy in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner in violation of a particular subgroup’s First Amendment rights. Cf. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Cit 69 (7th Cir.2008) ; Dingle v. Zon, 189 Fed.Appx. 8, 10 (2d.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that issue of material fact as to neutrality in application of prison regulation required reversal of district courts grant of summary judgment
B. holding that summary judgment was appropriate because no genuine issue of material fact existed and no expert testimony was required to explain the nature of the patented invention but observing that district courts should approach summary judgment motions in patent cases with great care
C. holding that a grant of summary judgment in favor of one party creates a final judgment allowing appellate review of denial of opposing partys summary judgment motion
D. holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment
E. holding that there were genuine issues of material fact and reversing the district courts grant of summary judgment because in part the everchanging nature of the proffered reasons given for plaintiffs termination could be viewed as evidence tending to show pretext
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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751 (1888) (“The provision of the present constitution enlarging the homestead exemption cannot be given retroactive application ... so as to embrace in 1877 all property which in 1859 did not exceed in value the enlarge exemption prescribed by the constitution of 1876, without regard to value in 1877.”); Wright v. Straub, 64 Tex. 64, 66 (1885); McLane v. Paschal, 62 Tex. 102, 106-07 (1884). 12 . See Dallas Power & Light Co. v. Loomis, 672 S.W.2d 309, 310 (Tex.App.—Dallas, writ ref'd n.r.e.). 13 . See In re Niland, 825 F.2d 801, 807 n. 2 (5th Cir.1987) (suggesting that earlier amendments were not retroactive until Tex. Prop. Code § 41.002(c), passed in 1984, applied changes in the definition of homestead to homesteads "whenever created”); In re Starns, 52 B.R. 405, 413 (S.D.Tex.1985) ; In re Barnhart, 47 B.R. 277, 282
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that amendment receives retroactive application because tex propcode 41001c provides retroactivity
B. recognizing that the application of a retroactive amendment is discretionary
C. holding retroactive application
D. holding that retroactive application of statute turns on legislative intent and whether retroactivity works either unconstitutional interference with vested rights or manifest injustice
E. holding no retroactive application
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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to stay. This Court reviews the decision of the Bankruptcy Court to decline to award the requested sanctions under an abuse of discretion standard. Jones v. Illinois Central Ry. Co., 617 F.3d 843, 850 (6th Cir.2010) (reiterating that the Sixth Circuit reviews the decision of the District Court to award sanctions under Rule 11 under an abuse of discretion standard). The Docket Sheet of the Adversary Proceedings identifies Judge Clark’s decision of February 13, 2003, as Adv. Doc. #287. That document is not, however, part of the record on appeal in this matter. This Court is unable to review this assignment of error since Wenrick, the Appellant, neglected to include Judge Clark’s decision in the record on appeal. Hicks v. Floyd County Bd. of Ed., 99 Fed.Appx. 603, 605-06 (6th Cir.2004) . See also United States v. Johnson, 584 F.2d
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that since district court of appeal properly found that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on a 3850 motion during the pendency of a direct appeal the district court of appeal should have vacated the order rather than affirming on the merits
B. holding that evidence not submitted to the district court cannot be part of the record on appeal
C. holding that where record did not substantiate assertion that defendant was arraigned in february 1981 issues premised on the alleged arraignment were not properly before appellate court on defendants direct appeal of his criminal conviction since that court was bound by the certified record on appeal
D. holding that it could not review the district courts rulings on the admissibility of exhibits since they were not included in the record on appeal
E. holding that the district courts review of a partial and truncated record was error and remanding the case for review on the entire administrative record
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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if it has “good cause therefor” and if “the dismissal is not to avoid the provisions of Rule 8.” See State v. Johnson, 113 Ariz. 506, 508, 557 P.2d 1063, 1065 (1976) (“Absent a showing of bad faith on the part of the prosecution or prejudice to the defendant, the State may move to dismiss a prosecution, and the court may grant the motion, at any time.”). Once the case is dismissed, the Rule 8 time limits begin anew. State v. Mendoza, 170 Ariz. 184, 187, 823 P.2d 51, 54 (1992). ¶ 21 In this case, the State sought dismissal of the information so that it could present the case to the grand jury under the correct theory of the offense. A trial court could reasonably find that this was “good cause” and “not to avoid the provisions of Rule 8.” See Johnson, 113 Ariz. at 508, 557 P.2d at 1065 . The law does not support the statement that
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a violation of the forum defendant rule is a jurisdictional defect
B. holding that the district court which erred in its conclusion that there was jurisdictional defect abused its discretion in denying a plaintiffsmotion for leave to amend his complaint because the proposed amendment would not cure the jurisdictional defect
C. holding that if the states criminal complaint against defendant had a jurisdictional defect the prosecution had the right to attempt to correct the defect and a motion to dismiss is one method of doing this
D. holding that notice of a defect could not be imputed to a defendant inasmuch as it created the defect
E. holding jurisdictional defect voids judgment when defect exposes such personal jurisdictional deficiencies as to violate due process
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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that will trigger heightened federal substantive due process protection from statutory sex offender registration schemes. See Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 479 (6th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1053, 120 S.Ct. 1554, 146 L.Ed.2d 460 (2000); Doe v. Pataki, 3 F.Supp.2d 456, 467 (S.D.N.Y.1998); Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1094 (9th Cir.1997), cert. denied sub nom. Russell v. Gregoire, 523 U.S. 1007, 118 S.Ct. 1191, 140 L.Ed.2d 321 (1998); E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1102-04 (3rd Cir.1997), cert. denied sub nom. W.P. v. Verniero, 522 U.S. 1109, 118 S.Ct. 1039, 140 L.Ed.2d 105 (1998); Artway v. Attorney Gen. of New Jersey, 81 F.3d 1235, 1268-69 (3rd Cir.1996); see also Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 6, 123 S.Ct. 1160, 1164, 155 L.Ed.2d 98 (2003) ; Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712, 96 S.Ct.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that although the parking citation that the plaintiff received did not indicate where and how to contest the allegation the plaintiff was not deprived of procedural due process because he received a summons to appear in court via first class mail before he was deprived of any liberty interest
B. holding inmate sentenced under the 1998 act enjoys liberty interest in receiving mandatory sex offender treatment and is entitled to due process protections before treatment can be withheld
C. holding that a prisoner cannot be deprived of a protected liberty interest in goodtime credits without procedural due process
D. holding that because process is not an end in itself once a court has found that the petitioner does not have a valid liberty interest a challenge to both procedural and substantive due process must fail
E. holding convicted sex offender had not been deprived of liberty interest for purposes of procedural due process challenge to sorp
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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the M.T. Cole “A” lease, we hold there is no evidence of the factors enumerated in section 2.03(a) of the Act of an intent of the parties to create a partnership for any business purpose other than the purpose that is unenforceable under the statute of frauds. There is no evidence that Phelps and Helms had a right to receive a share of profits from any business other than the development of the M.T. Cole “A” lease and there is no evidence of a written agreement to share any specific percentage of profits with respect to any specific ownership interest in the lease. There is no evidence of an intent to be partners in anything other the development of the field, which would require the establishment of a joint venture and a joint operating agreement, both 4 S.W.2d 334, 335 (1939) . Accordingly, we sustain issues four and six.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that there was no evidence or inferences to be drawn from the evidence to support the damage award
B. holding that halper does not apply when a monetary damage award has not been imposed
C. holding that property damage occurred when homeowners noticed damage not when house was improperly constructed
D. holding damage award immaterial when no liability
E. holding that to offset a jurys damage award a separate thirdparty insurance award must cover the same loss which served as the basis for the jury award
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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that the ensuing loss provisions do not provide coverage for the claimed loss. Bad Faith and CPA Claims Capelouto also contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his bad faith and CPA claims. Our review of the trial court’s dismissal of these claims is de novo, and we note that we may sustain the trial court’s judgment on any theory established by the pleadings and proof. Stuart v. American States Ins. Co., 134 Wn.2d 814, 818, 953 P.2d 462 (1998); Weiss v. Glemp, 127 Wn.2d 726, 730, 903 P.2d 455 (1995). In Coventry Associates v. American States Insurance Co., 136 Wn.2d 269, 961 P.2d 933 (1998), our Supreme Court recently held that a first party insured may have a cause of action against an insurer for bad faith even in the absence of coverage. See Coventry, 136 Wn.2d at 277-83 . Our laws require insurance companies to “be
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding however that a first party insured is not entitled to a rebuttable presumption of harm
B. holding that guidelines create a rebuttable presumption
C. recognizing a rebuttable presumption of reliance in rule 10b5
D. holding that in case of a short term marriage a presumption against awarding permanent alimony arises but such presumption is rebuttable
E. holding that any sentence that is properly calculated under the guidelines is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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and without proper instructions, the probability of prejudice is great); see also State v. White, 246 S.C. 502, 144 S.E.2d 481 (1965) (finding where the jury had absolute discretion with regard to the issue of mercy, it was impossible to determine whether the solicitor’s improper argument actually prejudiced defendant; however, the probability of prejudice was great, and defendant was entitled to a new trial). The solicitor’s improper comments prevented petitioner from having the jury fairly consider the possible sentencing alternatives. Further, the jury instructions failed to cure the prejudice caused by these comments. Thus, because the probability for prejudice is great, we grant petitioner a new trial on the burglary charge. See Chubb v. State, 303 S.C. 395, 401 S.E.2d 159 (1991) . As to the portion of the closing argument
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing that determination of appropriate sentence to be imposed should ordinarily be determined by the trial court on remand rather than at the appellate level
B. holding that defense counsel need only consult and be governed by his clients wishes when the question arises as to whether or not a plea of guilty should be entered trial by jury waived or whether the defendant should take the witness stand in his own defense
C. holding because determination of guilt and whether mercy should be recommended should be made in one proceeding by the same jury petitioner is entitled to a new trial on the burglary charge
D. holding that the issue of defendants actual knowledge should not be resolved on summary judgment but should be left to the trier of fact
E. holding new trial should not have been granted because jury was properly instructed
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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wrong” but she was correct. In Civil Action No. l:03-CV-023-C, Plaintiff complained that “Nurse Janet” had denied him medical tre or Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 138, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 53 L.Ed.2d 629 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (applauding the institution of grievance procedures by prisons but not suggesting that such procedures are constitutionally required); Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir.1996) (“[A] state’s inmate grievance procedures do not give rise to a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.”); Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir.1994) (“[T]he Constitution creates no entitlement to grievance procedures or access to any such procedure voluntarily established by a state.”); Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir.1993) (quotation omitted) ; Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the first amendment does not by itself give rise to a cause of action for damages
B. holding that state statutes which merely establish procedures and do not mandate any particular substantive result do not give rise to a statecreated liberty interest
C. holding that a jail inmate does not have a constitutional entitlement to an adequate grievance procedure and the ineffectiveness or even absence of a grievance procedure does not give rise to a constitutional claim
D. holding that a prison grievance procedure is not a substantive right and does not give rise to a protected liberty interest requiring the procedural protections envisioned by the fourteenth amendment
E. holding that inmates have no constitutionallyprotected liberty interest in access to grievance procedure
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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of harm posed by the conditions. Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 875 (8th Cir.2004); Smith v. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265, 267-68 (8th Cir.1996). Even if the Court accepts as true all of Plaintiffs allegations regarding the conditions he encountered at the CCDC, he has failed to establish that those conditions created a substantial risk of harm to his health or safety. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992) (explaining that “extreme deprivations” are required in order to sustain a conditions of confinement claim, and that “only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis” of a constitutional violation); Wilson v. Setter, 501 U.S. 294, 305, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) . Furthermore, as to the subjective element,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that conduct actionable as state claim for defamation does not rise to level of liberty deprivation simply because government officials are involved
B. holding that harassment or discrimination does not rise to the level of persecution under the ina unless it is accompanied by physical punishment infliction of harm or significant deprivation of liberty
C. holding that nothing so amorphous as overall conditions can rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment when no specific deprivation of a single human need exists
D. holding that yelling spitting at and threatening an inmate do not rise to the level at which prevailing doctrine sets the constitutional bar to establish cruel and unusual punishment
E. holding that transfer involving no reduction in pay and only a minor change in working conditions does not rise to the level of a material adverse employment action
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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of the United States, 497 F.3d 972 (9th Cir.2007). In that case, the Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (“Cedars-Sinai”) brought a state-law action against the administrator of a federal employees’ benefit plan alleging, inter alia, breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation in connection with partial reimbursement of claims for medical treatment. The administrator removed the suit to federal district court. Id. at 974. The district court dismissed the suit on the ground that Cedars-Sinai’s claims were preempted by the Federal Employee Health Benefits Act (“FEHBA”), 5 U.S.C. § 8901. FEHBA and ERISA are different federal statutes, but their preemption provisions are analytically similar. See, e.g., Botsford v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mont., Inc., 314 F.3d 390, 393-94 (9th Cir.2002) . Indeed, our opinion in Cedars-Sinai was based
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding removal and preemption are distinct concepts erisa preemption does not allow removal unless complete preemption exists
B. holding that fehbas complete preemption provision closely resembles erisas express preemption provision and precedent interpreting the erisa provision thus provides authority for cases involving the fehba provision
C. holding that defendants testimony that he did not see a provision in the agreement because the plaintiffcounterparty failed to direct him to the provision was insufficient as a matter of law to establish fraud and defendant was therefore bound to the terms of the provision
D. holding that 502a may serve as an independent basis for preemption where 514a the blanket erisa preemption provision is inapplicable
E. holding that a provision of the constitution is to be construed in the sense in which it was understood by the framers and the people at the time of its adoption but that if new products or circumstances that did not exist at the time the constitutional provision was enacted fall within the meaning of the provision the constitutional provision applies to them
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 321 F.Supp.2d 642, 647 (D.Md.2004) (finding that' conduct undertaken for personal reasons by law enforcement officers while they were off-duty and driving their personal cars was outside the scope of their employment under Maryland law). Indeed, the Maryland Court of Appeals has held that an employer is not liable for an employee’s off-duty operation of the employee’s personal vehicle, even where the employee is negligent in driving his personal vehicle to or from his place of employment. Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 32-32, 660 A.2d 423 (1995). Additionally, where an employee engages in criminal conduct, such conduct is typically considered outside the scope of employment. See Tall ex rel. Tall v. Board of Sch. Comm’rs, 120 Md.App. 236, 259, 706 A.2d 659 (1998) . In this case, Dyar was off-duty at the time
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that inter alia employees criminal conviction for alleged tortious act demonstrated employee was not acting in scope of his employment
B. holding that even when employee was driving employers vehicle employee was not acting within the scope of his employment absent evidence that he had undertaken a special mission at his employers direction
C. recognizing the doctrine reaches even intentional torts such as an employees alleged assault provided the tortious conduct at issue occurred within the scope of employment
D. holding that the doctrine of respondeat superior in maryland allows an employer to be held vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of its employee when that employee was acting within the scope of the employment relationship citations omitted
E. holding that whether the tortious act was committed during the time the employee was on duty and whether the tortious act was committed while the employee was on the employers premises were both factors weighing in favor of finding the activity within the scope of employment
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Trotter, No. 07 C 4749, 2012 WL 4060308, at *5 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 14, 2012) (citing First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Standard Bank & Trust, 172 F.3d 472, 480 (7th Cir.1999)). As for the accrual date, however, courts in this district have held that “it is reasonable for the [City] to have time to review plaintiffs’ fee petitions, like a client would have, without being charged interest.” Blackwell, 2012 WL 469962, at *12 (internal quotations omitted). Consistent with these rulings, the interest will accrue not from the date of judgment, but from “30 days after [P]laintiff submitted his fee information to the defense as required by Local Rule 54.3(d)(l)-(2).” Ragland, Slip Op., at 40. See also Judah M. v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, Dist. 299, 798 F.Supp.2d 942, 953-54 (N.D.Ill.2011) . Plaintiff submitted his Local Rule 54.3(d)
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that prejudgment interest should accrue 30 days after fee petition was filed
B. holding that the court lacks jurisdiction where a complaint was filed more than 30 days after the filing of the summons
C. holding that 120 days notice was satisfied by 30 days work plus 90 days pay
D. holding that petitioner was dili gent for equitable tolling purposes where petitioner filed state petition two months after conviction was final and filed federal petition seven days after discovering state had denied petition on the merits
E. holding that a habeas petition filed more than 30 days after the effective date of the real id act cannot be transferred to the court of appeals as a petition for review for lack of jurisdiction
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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extinguished and “the patentee’s only protection is that afforded under the patent law.” Id. This black-letter rule is rooted in principles of the supremacy of federal law. Id. (“These provisions of federal patent law prevail over any inconsistent State remedies.”). Here, plaintiff contends that its agent, William Cohen, contacted Reebok in May 1986 “for the purpose of exploring Reebok’s interest in manufacturing and/or marketing athletic footwear utilizing plaintiffs air bladder trade secret.” (First Am.Compl. ¶ 12.) The gravamen of plaintiffs state law claims is thus that Reebok used plaintiffs trade secret in the development of The Pump shoe line. Plaintiff Stutz’s Rule 30(b)(6) designee, Warren Liu, has stated in deposition testimony that the trade secr .Supp. 523, 533 (D.Cal.1958) . Here, it is undisputed that Reebok did not
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the defendants were entitled to recover as costs not only bond premiums but the additional cost to obtain a letter of credit that was required by the surety as collateral before the issuance of bond
B. holding that plaintiff could recover royalties only for products manufactured by defendant after disclosure of secret but before issuance of patent
C. holding that plaintiff could recover only damages sustained as a result of the sale of the accused product by defendant prior to the issuance date
D. holding that but for merger plaintiff could have sued predecessor that manufactured defective equipment as third party but not analyzing basis for such a suit
E. holding that disclosure of trade secret without protection of express confidentiality agreement was not fatal to trade secret protection where disclosure occurred during sale negotiation
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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by incorporation of federal law. The United States Supreme Court has resolved only a handful of cases in the civil rights area over the years. The literature is full of documentation of various splits in the federal circuits on numerous questions that the Supreme Court has not resolved. The stability of incorporating a handful of Supreme Court precedents is outweighed by dragging into Iowa law the many controversies in the federal caselaw that have not been resolved. 23 .No one would suggest, for instance, that if Iowa were to adopt a statute modeled after the statute of another state, we would be compelled to follow the interpretations of the supreme court of the other state in interpretation of Iowa law, See Crosby v. Alton Ochsner Med. Found., 276 So.2d 661, 665 (Miss. 1973) . 24 . For an interesting discussion, see Tyler
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding unconstitutional the provision in a georgia abortion statute limiting abortions to georgia residents
B. holding under the mississippi constitution that it is always and in every case reversible error for the courts of mississippi to deny an accused the right to have a jury decide guilt as to each and every element
C. holding that georgia refund statute signifies state waiver of immunity only to the extent provided by the express terms of the statute
D. holding that when mississippi adopted a statute modeled after a georgia enactment decisions of the georgia courts did not bind mississippi courts in interpretation of the statute
E. recognizing twoyear statute of limitations for section 1981 claims filed in federal court in georgia
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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This determination is consistent with cases from other courts that have emphasized the distinction between the product and the process of tattooing and have held that the physical process of tattooing is conduct subject to Spence’s “sufficiently imbued” test. See, e.g., Hold Fast Tattoo, 580 F.Supp.2d at 660 (analyzing tattooing under Spence’s framework based on the premise that “[t]he act of tattooing is one step removed from the actual expressive conduct”); Yurkew, 495 F.Supp. at 1253-54 (regardless of “whether ... the image conveyed by the tattoo[ ] is an art form or amounts to art,” “the process of tattooing is undeniably conduct” that is subject to the Spence test). These courts then held that tattooing fails the Spence test. See, e.g., Hold Fast Tattoo, 580 F.Supp.2d at 660 ; Yurkew, 495 F.Supp. at 1253-54 (holding that
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that statements that merely convey an impression or understanding of a fact do not constitute a promise
B. holding that the failure to carry out an oral promise to convey land standing by itself is not fraud
C. holding that possession of a weapon is not in an of itself a crime
D. holding that the act of tattooing itself is not intended to convey a particularized message
E. holding that the act is not retroactive
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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we have jurisdiction over the appeal from that order and vacate it because the legislature has specified that such registration orders must be entered at the time of sentencing. 1 . Serrano still may seek relief pursuant to Rule 32.1(f), Ariz. R.Crim. P. See State v. Whitman, 684 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 7, n. 2, 234 Ariz. 565, 324 P.3d 851, 2014 WL 1385396 (Ariz. Apr. 9, 2014). 2 . The terms of § 13-3821 do not prohibit a trial court from requiring sex offender registration following a suspended sentence and revocation of probation, and we do not address that situation here. Similarly, this case does not concern registration of a juvenile offender, for whom the statute prescribes different procedures. See § 13-3821(D); In re Javier B„ 230 Ariz. 100, ¶ 1, 280 P.3d 644, 645 (App.2012) . 3 . The current language in § 13 — 4033(A)(3)
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that an order was interlocutory in nature despite the trial courts certification of the order as a final appealable judgment
B. holding that there can be only one final appealable order
C. holding because an initial order contemplated the subsequent entry of a judgment the initial order was not considered a final adjudication
D. holding an order imposing sex offender registration after the juvenile courts initial disposition can be a final appealable order
E. holding adjudication order based upon a determination on the merits in juvenile court is a final and appealable order
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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identity of the owner and operator of Hospital Damas) and that the issue was actually litigated before and adjudicated by the bankruptcy court—were erroneous. Along similar lines, L.C.V. does not make any argument with respect to prongs three and four: that the bankruptcy court decided the issue in a final judgment and that the resolution of the issue was essential to the bankruptcy court’s judgment on the merits. In light of L.C.V.’s failure to offer a discrete argument that any of these issue-preclusion prerequisites have not been met, we need not dwell on them. See Robb Evans, 850 F.3d at 32 (sidestepping consideration of three prerequisites that were not challenged by party resisting issue preclusion and limiting analysis to only prerequisite in dispute); Daniels, 736 F.3d at 88 . Instead, we proceed to tackle L.C.V.’s
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that party resisting issue preclusion waived for lack of developed argumentation any argument that issue was not the same in earlier and later cases
B. holding that issue in motion for rehearing is waived if original brief is not sufficient to acquaint the court with the issue and does not present an argument that would allow the court to decide the issue
C. holding that the petitioners failure to address an issue in the argument portion of his opening brief waived the issue
D. holding that the appellant developed his argument sufficiently to raise the issue for appellate review
E. holding that the doctrine of issue preclusion applies in removal proceedings
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (stating that “[t]his Court consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”). The recipient of a mailed item, on the other hand, has a reasonable expectation that the mail will not be detained by postal employees beyond the normal delivery date and time. In other words, an addressee’s possessory interest is in the timely delivery of a package, not in “having his package routed on a particular conveyor belt, sorted in a particular area, or stored in any particular sorting bin for a particular amount of time.” United States v. Demoss, 279 F.3d 632, 639 (8th Cir.2002) (Hansen J., concurring). See also England, 971 F.2d at 420-21 ; United States v. Vasquez, 213 F.3d 425, 426
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that an initially reasonable seizure can become an unreasonable seizure that violates the fourth amendment when officers refuse to return seized property
B. holding seizure of evidence in plain view reasonable under fourth amendment
C. holding that a seizure occurs when there is a significant interference with a persons possessory or ownership interest in property
D. holding that there was no fourth amendment seizure where delivery of package was not delayed because it is the extent of the interference with the defendants possessory interest in the property that determines whether a seizure has occurred
E. holding that in the fourth amendment context a seizure of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individuals possessory interests in that property
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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an enterprise which was engaged in racketeering activity. Government Brief at 27. According to the Government: Although many of the substantive offenses in the [Redacted Superseding] Indictment charge only some of the [Defendants, all of those counts are charged as schemes in connection with the RICO conspiracy. Thus, although each defendant may have had a different role in the RICO conspiracy, all defendants were centrally involved in the conspiracy. Id. at 27-28; see United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 447, 106 S.Ct. 725, 731, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986) (explaining that joinder of multiple defendants in a single trial is proper under Rule 8 when an indictment “charge[s] all the defendants with one overall count of conspiracy”); United States v. Price, 13 F.3d 711, 719 (3d Cir.1994) , cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1372, 131
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the district court made sufficient factual findings and adequately determined the scope of defendants participation in a conspiracy under 1b13 even though the district court did not expressly determine the scope of the defendants participation
B. holding that a master conspiracy with subschemes to sell speed was a single conspiracy
C. holding that there was a sufficient basis for joinder of seven defendants in a single trial where all the defendants were charged with participation in a single overarching drug conspiracy
D. holding that evidence of defendants recruitment of single drug courier was sufficient to support section 3b11c enhancement
E. holding that evidence tending to show knowing participation in the conspiracy is sufficient to sustain conspiracy conviction
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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checkpoint. He asserts that the defendants unconstitutionally retaliated against his exercise of that right when they arrested him for doing so. The district court dismissed this claim after finding it was reasonable to restrict filming at an airport security checkpoint, a nonpublic forum. The defendants add that they are entitled to qualified immunity because they reasonably believed they had probable cause to arrest Mocek, and at the time of the arrest, it was not clearly established that plaintiffs could maintain retaliation claims for arrests supported by probable cause. We agree. To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege “(1) he was engaged in constitutionally protected activity, (2) the government’s actions caused him injury that w (3d Cir.2010) ; McCormick v. City of Lawrence, 130 Fed.Appx.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that police officer may order passengers to remain in vehicle with hands up during traffic stop
B. holding police officers making a traffic stop could order passengers out of the stopped car
C. holding that police officers may stop vehicles when they observe minor traffic violations
D. holding there was no clearly established right to videotape police officers during a traffic stop
E. holding the right to record police activity on public property was not clearly established
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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United States v. Resto, 824 F.2d 210, 211-12 (2d Cir.1987) (upholding sufficiency of evidence to support defendant’s conviction for aiding sale of narcotics, including expert testimony explaining that “steerer” typically stands short distance from dealer to solicit and screen potential buyers and guide them to dealer); United States v. Cruz, 797 F.2d 90, 96 (2d Cir.1986) (sustaining admissibility of expert testimony concerning practice of exchanging food stamps for narcotics); United States v. Khan, 787 F.2d 28, 34 (2d Cir.1986) (upholding trial court’s admission of expert testimony concerning customs of narcotics dealers in Pakistan, including testimony about heroin prices and transfers of heroin with payment deferred); United States v. Daniels, 723 F.2d 31, 32-33. (8th Cir.1983) ; United States v. Pugliese, 712 F.2d 1574,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding admissible police officers expert testimony that narcotics dealers often use intermediary in making delivery to buyer under mistaken assumption that intermediary would insulate dealers from criminal liability
B. holding admissible expertwitness testimony that drug dealers commonly register cars and apartments in names of female friends to conceal narcotics activities
C. holding admissible police officers testimony that firearms are commonly used in drug trafficking
D. holding admissible expert testimony concerning countersurveillance techniques commonly used by narcotics dealers specifically including practice of using vehicle to observe in advance area where distribution was intended to occur
E. holding that guns were properly admitted to prove intent to distribute drugs because it has uniformly been recognized that substantial dealers in narcotics possess firearms and that such weapons are as much tools of the trade as more commonly recognized drug paraphernalia
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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regarding the failure of the trial court to conduct an in camera inspection. CONCLUSION We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 1 . Appellees are the Texas Department of Public Safety Officers Association (“DPSOA”); Billy Don Ivey, Jerry Moore, and Charlie Adams (members of the Board of Directors of DPSOA); Mary Pat Becnel, now Maty Pat Holt (a former employee of DPSOA); and Jeff Heard, individually and d/b/a Jeff Heard & Company, and Jeff Heard & Company, P.C. (DPSOA’s accountant and his firm). 2 . Although Ginsberg involved the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the decision is premised on self-incrimination cases. See, e.g., Henson v. Citizens Bank, 549 S.W.2d 446 (Tex.Civ.App. — East-land 1977, no writ) . 3 . The supreme court in Republic Insurance
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the drug tax violated the privilege against selfincrimination
B. holding that a plaintiff in a civil action could be forced to either elect to invoke the privilege against selfincrimination or abandon the claim
C. holding that a witness may invoke the privilege against selfincrimination at trial despite testifying previously before a grand jury in the same case
D. holding that waiver of privilege against selfincrimination is proceeding specific
E. recognizing commonlaw privilege against selfincrimination
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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of. A. Error as to Jury Instructions Given 148 We will first dispose of the Gorostietas' argument regarding jury instructions 16, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, and 28. "It is well established that a reviewing court will not address arguments that are not adequately briefed." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998); see also State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, 111, 974 P.2d 269; Walker v. U.S. Gen., Inc., 916 P.2d 908, 908 (Utah 1996). Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that the "[bJrief of the appellant shall contain ... [an] argument [that] shall contain the contentio . 3655, 1995 WL 1315955, 1995 Phila. Cty. Rptr. LEXIS 11, **17 (affirming admission of bills where physician testified as to reasonableness and necessity); Martinez v. Kurdziel, 612 A.2d 669, 676 (R.1.1992) ; Castillo v. Am. Garment Finishers Corp., 965
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the government must satisfy its burden of proving contract damages
B. holding that the burden of proving lack of negligence is on the owner
C. holding that statute does not eliminate plaintiffs burden to prove reasonableness and necessity of past medical expenses
D. holding that statute does not remove plaintiffs burden of proving causation and reasonableness
E. holding that the burden of proving that the employee did not make reasonable efforts is on the defendant
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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inconsistent out-of-court statements of a state witness which had implicated a defendant in the murder of a cashier at a gas station. The witness in Moffett, like the witnesses in the instant case, admitted making the prior statement but insisted that the contents were untrue. Moffett, 456 So.2d at 717. The Court in Moffett explained that where a nonparty witness admitted making the prior out-of-court statements, the statements where reduced to written form, should never be introduced into evidence. Id. at 719. The basis for not allowing such prior inconsistent written statements into evidence is that no necessity for further proof exists with respect to such statements once an admission of the prior inconsistency has been made. Id.; see Davis v. State, 431 So.2d 468, 473 (Miss.1983) ; Sims v. State, 313 So.2d 388, 391 (Miss.1975)
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing that evidence of extra judicial statements by nonparty witness was admissable only to impeach
B. holding that counsels failure to impeach a witness by showing bias was ineffective assistance
C. holding in rule 3850 proceeding that trial counsel s failure to impeach witness with statements he made on night of murder was not reasonable under the circumstances
D. holding that counsel was ineffective for inter alia failing to impeach a witness with prior inconsistent statements
E. holding that the state could not impeach an expert witness with evidence concerning past issues with the payment of taxes
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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L. King, 6 Collier on Bankruptcy § 727.16[1] at pp. 727-72, 727-73. To the extent necessary, the Motion to Dismiss will be treated as a motion for summary judgment on stipulated facts. 3 .FRCP 12(b)(6) is incorporated in Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7012, applicable in adversary proceedings in bankruptcy. 4 . The opinion of another court in this District in Caughey v. Succa (In re Succa), 125 B.R. 168 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1991) (Monroe, Bankr. J.), has been cited as holding that equitable tolling applied to § 727(e)(1). See Roost v. Reynolds (In re Reynolds ), 189 B.R. 199, 201 (Bankr.D.Or.1995). The court in Sueca, unlike many courts addressing the issue, held that equitable tolling applies to § 727(e)(2). See e.g., Davis v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 187 B.R. 984 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1995) ; contra, Dwyer v. Peebles (In re Peebles)
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding title vii subject to equitable tolling
B. holding that equitable tolling principles apply to suits against the united states in the same manner as they apply to private parties
C. holding that we lacked jurisdiction to review the veterans courts determination that equitable tolling did not apply in the case before it
D. holding that equitable tolling does not apply to 727e2 malloy v frank in re frank 146 br 851 bankrndokla1992 same
E. holding that the 120day filing period is subject to equitable tolling and addressing circumstances warranting equitable tolling
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Encinitos fails to discuss how it was harmed as a result of any delay. See id. Accordingly, we conclude ExxonMobil did not waive its right to mandamus relief. CONCLUSION We conclude the trial court abused its discretion in denying ExxonMobil’s motion to abate. Accordingly, we conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus. The trial court is ordered to (1) vacate the June 21, 2010 Order Denying Defendants’ Amended Motion to Abate, and (2) enter an order granting Defendants’ Amended Motion to Abate. The writ will issue only if the trial court fails to comply within fourteen days. 2 . Encinitos Ranch, et al. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., et al., No. 07-12-14420-CV (79th Dist. Ct., Brooks County, Tex.). 3 . See In re AutoNation, Inc., 228 S.W.3d 663, 668 (Tex.2007) (orig.proceeding) ; In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 109, 118
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a permissive forum selection clause containing a waiver of any claims of forum non conveniens amounts to a mandatory forum selection clause at least where the plaintiff chose the designated forum
B. holding that mandamus was appropriate for forum selection clauses because failing to enforce such a clause resulted in judicial inefficiency by enabling forumshopping wasting judicial resources delaying adjudication on the merits and skewing settlement dynamics contrary to the parties contractedfor expectations
C. holding enforceable forum selection clauses in arbitration agreements
D. holding that claims were not related to a license agreement which contained a forum selection clause in part because the bulk of the claims were against a defendant who was not a party to the agreement for breaches of employment contracts which did not contain forum selection clauses and for disclosure of trade secrets
E. holding that a forum selection clause was not enforceable against defendants that were not parties to the contract
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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shown that the Defendants had sufficient minimum contacts with New York to exercise personal jurisdiction over them without violating due process and offending traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Jurisdiction Over NIBC Has Not Been Established With respect to NIBC Capital, Aquiline has not cited to a New York contact of jurisdictional significance. As noted above, the Plaintiff has not contested the facts set forth in the Verhoog Declaration. While Plaintiff alleges that NIBC Capital sent certain emails and faxes to New York in response to Aquiline’s solicitation of business in Belgium, those sporadic contacts are not sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction over NIBC Capital. See, e.g., Pryor, Cashman, Sherman & Flynn v. Haisfield, 1990 WL 165687, at **2-3 . Bernstein acknowledges in her affidavit that
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that outofstate defendants transmittal into new york of ceaseanddesist letter to new york plaintiff for purported trademark infringement was insufficient to create jurisdiction over defendant in a new york declaratory judgment action
B. holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york
C. holding that for purposes of longarm jurisdiction because plaintiff was employed in new york the original event causing his injury occurred in new york
D. holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership
E. holding that two meet ings in new york and numerous telephone calls and correspondence to new york were not sufficient to confer jurisdiction
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Michael M. Hachigian appeals a summary judgment in favor of Transcontinental Insurance Co. (“Transcontinental”) in a diversity action alleging the breach of an insurance contract and a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. We affirm the grant of summary judgment. Hachigian’s malpractice insurance policy covered “claims made against [Hachigian] and reported to [Transcontinental] during [the] policy term.” The policy defined “claim” as “the receipt of a demand for money or services, naming [insured] and alleging a wrongful act.” Because California’s notice-prejudice rule does not apply to “claims made” policies, the terms of Transcontinental’s contract with Hachigian should be strictly enforced. See Burns v. International Ins. Co., 929 F.2d 1422, 1425 (9th Cir.1991) . Accord Helfand v. National Union Fire Ins.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that procedural bar rule does not apply to ineffectiveness claims
B. holding that the exclusionary rule generally does not apply to immigration proceedings
C. holding that exclusionary rule does apply to civil forfeiture proceedings
D. holding that rule does not apply where defendant made false representations
E. holding that noticeprejudice rule does not apply to claimsmade policies
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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standard is satisfied only if she actually suffered a physical impairment that substantially limited one or more of her major life activities.”). Additionally, neither Jackowski’s knowledge of Coming’s health conditions nor human resources employees’ awareness of, or maintaining a file pertaining to, Coming’s FMLA leave establishes that Corning had a record of disability. See Shepard v. UPS, Inc., 470 Fed.Appx. 726, 730-31 (11th Cir.2012) (“Shepard cannot demonstrate that he had a record of having an impairment based solely on his pri- or medical leaves of absence and testimony that it was common knowledge at UPS that he had leukemia, because he failed also to produce evidence that his impairment substantially limited him in a major life activity.”); Reis, 442 F.Supp.2d at 1248-49 ; Coleman v. Ga. Power Co., 81 F.Supp.2d 1365,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that plaintiffs claim that she was disabled because her major life activity of breathing was substantially limited by her respiratory condition would provide a basis for protection under the ada
B. holding that plaintiffs evidence showing that defendant refused to allow her to work as flight attendant because of her weight failed to demonstrate that defendant perceived her as substantially limited in any major life activity
C. holding that evidence of discussions with a supervisor regarding a health condition submission of various doctors notes to a former supervisor hospitalization and the occurrence of several telephone calls reporting her hospitalization was insufficient to show a record of disability because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that her impairment substantially limited a major life activity
D. holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment
E. recognizing that to establish a disability a plaintiff must prove a substantial limit with specific evidence that his particular impairment substantially limits his particular major life activity
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | C | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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of the doubt or should have questioned the prosecutor’s credibility. We conclude that this determination was an unreasonable determination of the facts because the prosecutor failed to offer any credible justification for striking Jurors 016 and 019. First, we note that the prosecutor consistently identified Jurors 016 and 019 as “both young.” However, the record re veals that Juror 019 was at least a middle-aged grandmother. Indeed, Juror 019 informed the court that she was a retired nurse with seven grown children, the youngest of which had five children of her own. A prosecutor supplied with this information could not credibly identify Juror 019 as young. This incorrect factual statement supports Collins’ argument that the prosecutor was not credible. See McClain, 217 F.3d at 1222 ; Caldwell v. Maloney, 159 F.3d 639, 651 (1st
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that where a treating physicians opinion is contradicted by a consulting physician the alj must explain on the record the reasons for rejecting the opinion of the treating physician
B. holding that the white defendants association with a black defendant was not sufficient to give them standing to join in the black defendants batson challenge
C. holding that clear and convincing reasons are not required to reject contradicted conclusions of a treating physician
D. holding that reasons for excusing black jurors that were objectively contradicted by the record provided evidence of purposeful discrimination
E. holding that the alj must make findings setting forth specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in order to reject the contradicted opinion of a treating physician
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | D | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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— was visible from the location of the first sign. The operational plan to be implemented by the checkpoint was two-fold. Law enforcement officers stationed at the checkpoint itself were to request and examine motorists’ driver’s licenses and vehicle registration cards and be alert for impaired drivers. In addition, narcotics officers observing from unmarked vehicles nearby were to watch for motorists who threw items out of their vehicles or who made u-turns or other evasive actions upon seeing the “K-9 CHECK POINT AHEAD” signs. The narcotics officers planned to investigate any vehicle involved in such conduct. The narcotics on was properly admitted as evidence seized pursuant to a lawful arrest. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) ; United States v. Nelson, 102 F.3d 1344, 1346
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a search incident to a lawful arrest does not violate the fourth amendment
B. holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment
C. holding that an arrest made by an officer outside his jurisdiction does not violate the fourth amendment
D. holding that an officer may search a suspects vehicle incident to a lawful arrest
E. holding that a lawful custodial arrest is a prerequisite to a search since the arrest is the authority of law justifying the search
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |