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	<title> - NEXT STEPS IN THE ``SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP''--IMPACT OF A U.S.-U.K.. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT</title>
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	[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
	[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


	NEXT STEPS IN THE ``SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP''_
	IMPACT OF A U.S. - U.K. FREE
	TRADE AGREEMENT

	=======================================================================

	JOINT HEARING

	BEFORE THE

	SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

	AND THE

	SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS

	OF THE

	COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
	HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

	ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

	FIRST SESSION

	__________

	FEBRUARY 1, 2017

	__________

	Serial No. 115-1

	__________

	Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs


	[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]



	Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
	or
	http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

	___________


	U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
	23-885 PDF WASHINGTON : 2017

	__________________________________________________________________________________________
	For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office,
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	COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

	EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
	CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
	ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
	DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
	STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
	JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
	MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
	TED POE, Texas KAREN BASS, California
	DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
	TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
	JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina AMI BERA, California
	MO BROOKS, Alabama LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
	PAUL COOK, California TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
	SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
	RON DeSANTIS, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
	MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
	TED S. YOHO, Florida DINA TITUS, Nevada
	ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois NORMA J. TORRES, California
	LEE M. ZELDIN, New York BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
	DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
	F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
	Wisconsin TED LIEU, California
	ANN WAGNER, Missouri
	BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
	FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
	BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
	THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia

	Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director

	Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
	Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade

	TED POE, Texas, Chairman
	JOE WILSON, South Carolina WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
	DARRELL E. ISSA, California LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
	PAUL COOK, California BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
	SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania DINA TITUS, Nevada
	LEE M. ZELDIN, New York NORMA J. TORRES, California
	BRIAN J. MAST, Florida BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
	THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia

	------

	Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats

	DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman
	JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
	TED POE, Texas BRAD SHERMAN, California
	TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
	JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
	F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
	Wisconsin ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
	FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
	BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania


	C O N T E N T S

	----------
	Page

	WITNESSES

	Nile Gardiner, Ph.D., director, Margaret Thatcher Center for
	Freedom, The Heritage Foundation............................... 7
	Mr. Simon Lester, trade policy analyst, Herbert A. Stiefel Center
	for Trade Policy Studies, Cato Institute....................... 15
	Daniel S. Hamilton, Ph.D., executive director, Center for
	Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced and
	International Studies.......................................... 21

	LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

	Nile Gardiner, Ph.D.: Prepared statement......................... 10
	Mr. Simon Lester: Prepared statement............................. 17
	Daniel S. Hamilton, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.................... 23

	APPENDIX

	Hearing notice................................................... 60
	Hearing minutes.................................................. 61
	The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the
	State of Texas, and chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism,
	Nonproliferation, and Trade, the Honorable Tom Marino, a
	Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth of
	Pennsylvania, and the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., a
	Representative in Congress from the State of Wisconsin:
	Material submitted for the record.............................. 62
	The Honorable Tom Marino: Prepared statement..................... 64


	NEXT STEPS IN THE ``SPECIAL
	RELATIONSHIP''--IMPACT OF A U.S.-U.K..
	FREE TRADE AGREEMENT

	----------


	WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 2017

	House of Representatives,

	Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade and

	Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats,

	Committee on Foreign Affairs,

	Washington, DC.

	The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m.,
	in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe
	(chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation,
	and Trade) presiding.
	Mr. Poe. The subcommittee will come to order. Without
	objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements,
	questions, and extraneous materials for the record subject to
	the length limitation in the rules.
	The Chair will recognize itself for an opening statement. I
	understand this is one of the first, if not the first, hearing
	since Congress has come back into session. And I think it is
	quite appropriate that we have this hearing dealing with the
	United States and the United Kingdom.
	This past summer British citizens chose to reclaim their
	economic independence. In a landmark referendum, they decided
	to leave the European Union, take charge of their future,
	especially their economic future.
	Now in the wake of Brexit, it is important that we
	preserve, as Winston Churchill once said in 1946, ``the special
	relationship between the United States and the United
	Kingdom.'' The two nations are bound together by a shared
	history, a common language, well, maybe it is a common
	language, I am not sure being from Texas, but anyway, and a
	friendship that reaches back hundreds of years. I think the
	United States and the United Kingdom are an economic family
	separated by a bit of water.
	For over 200 years our countries have partnered
	economically to preserve peace and security worldwide. Even
	from the trenches of World War I to the mountains of
	Afghanistan, men and women in both countries have spilled blood
	together on the battlefield. Our relationship is deep and it is
	special. A trade deal represents another opportunity to deepen
	that relationship to the benefit of both countries.
	The previous administration threatened to put the United
	Kingdom at the back of the queue for a trade deal. But that
	kind of snub to our greatest ally is exactly the opposite of
	what we should be doing. A bilateral agreement will enhance the
	flow of commerce and boost the welfare of our economies. Trade
	deals that do not help the United States are going to be a
	thing of the past. A bilateral trade agreement can be
	beneficial to both of our interests.
	The United Kingdom shares many values and business
	practices with the United States, and our similarities will
	help ensure a smooth negotiation process, as neither side will
	be forced into making hard concessions. For example, because
	Britain's workers are paid about the same rate as Americans, we
	do not have to worry about American manufacturers moving
	factories to the English countryside and jobs will not be sent
	overseas. We will be able to streamline regulations and reduce
	barriers to trade. And that means more consumers for U.S.
	goods.
	Our two countries already enjoy close economic ties. No
	country receives more investment from Britain than the United
	States. And the United States is the largest investor in the
	United Kingdom.
	In my home State of Texas, the United Kingdom is the number
	one foreign direct investor. It sends over $2.5 billion a year
	to the Texas economy. And we like that. This investment has
	helped to bring more than 87,000 jobs to Texas. And Texas is a
	great place to do business. And the United Kingdom sees this.
	These kinds of gains are not limited to Texas alone. Every
	day over 1 million Americans go to work for British companies
	based in the United States. It is critical we do not turn our
	backs on trade.
	Houston is dependent on a free flow of trade. The Port of
	Houston is our economic hub. We are an export port. We make
	things, use as many as we can, and we sell the rest. About 50
	percent of the Houston economy is based on the Port of Houston.
	So trade is vital to our economy. But that does not mean
	that the United States has to give away the ranch to get a
	trade deal done. We can have free trade, and we can have fair
	trade. Fair trade for both countries. Free trade for both
	countries. We can level the playing field for American
	business, give American goods better access to consumers around
	the world, and increase jobs.
	The new administration has expressed its preference for
	bilateral deals over more cumbersome and sometimes very
	political multilateral agreements. A bilateral deal with the
	United Kingdom is a great place to start. Once the U.K. is able
	to throw off the shackles, in my opinion, of the European
	Union's restrictive trade policies, there will be better
	opportunities for growth and investment.
	A free trade deal between the United Kingdom and the United
	States will be an important symbol of our dedication of
	promoting economic freedom. Together we can come up with the
	gold standard for free trade deals. This deal could serve as a
	model for future deals or maybe even open up jobs in other
	nations.
	This hearing gives us a time opportunity to examine what
	the U.S.-U.K. trade deal might look like, and discuss how to
	move forward. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses
	about how we can achieve that goal and take the next step in
	our special relationship.
	I now recognize the ranking member on the TNT Subcommittee,
	Mr. Bill Keating from Massachusetts, for his opening statement.
	Mr. Keating. Thank you, Chairman Poe. And it is great to be
	joined by Chairman Rohrabacher and Ranking Member Meeks as
	well. This is a very timely and important foreign policy issue
	to address in our first hearing of the 115th Congress.
	Thank you as well to our witnesses for being here and
	adding to the discussion with your expertise on the topic of
	trade and our partnership with Europe.
	The United States indeed has a long and enduring special
	relationship with the United Kingdom. Our longstanding alliance
	has withstood numerous wars and conflicts, and in recent
	decades has been a critical force behind efforts to eradicate
	the threat of terrorism.
	Our trade and investment relationship with the United
	Kingdom is substantial, and both our countries benefit greatly
	from these close economic ties.
	This relationship encountered a new diplomatic landscape
	last summer when the people of Britain voted in a referendum to
	leave the European Union. This outcome was surprising to many,
	including myself. And as a close partner to both the U.K. and
	the EU, we in Congress are keenly interested in the process by
	which Britain exits the EU, and how the United States may
	continue to pursue a coherent foreign policy with these
	important partners. It is therefore also necessary to be
	careful that the politics on both sides of the Atlantic around
	Brexit and how it will unfold do not undermine the significance
	of the U.S. relationship with the EU nor of its relationship
	with Britain.
	U.S. ties with the EU in trade, and defense, intelligence,
	and across a broad range of issues has strengthened our economy
	and helped make us more secure. As a co-chair of TTIP caucus, I
	welcome the trade negotiation between the U.S. and the EU, with
	our economies representing nearly half the global GDP. And with
	the U.S. and the EU being each other's largest overall trade
	and investment partner, this agreement would support jobs,
	remove trade barriers, and improve market access for our goods
	and services.
	It would also allow the U.S. and the EU to contribute to
	setting high standards for global trade; standards that reflect
	fair treatment of workers, environmental concerns, safeguarding
	intellectual property and fair trade.
	In the challenges we face, both economic and in terms of
	security, the strategic importance of our relationship with the
	EU is undeniable. Other impacts of Brexit such as the effects
	on the longstanding efforts of the U.S. to help broker Irish
	peace and reduce division there are also of great concern.
	I have become concerned by suggestions that maintaining our
	special relationship with Britain would come at the expense of
	promoting robust transatlantic relations with the rest of
	Europe. These relationships are not mutually exclusive. The
	U.S. benefits in critical ways from each of them. Prime
	Minister May recently spoke to this point, emphasizing that a
	strong EU is positive and critical for security. And I believe
	that security includes strong economic relations.
	So I am pleased that both the European and Trade
	Subcommittees are holding this hearing today to address U.S.-
	U.K. relations and the impact of a U.S.-U.K. free trade
	agreement, because the question is not a question to be
	considered in a vacuum. U.S.-U.K. ties are unique but they need
	not be exclusive. To reinforce a sentiment of Prime Minister
	May, this is not a time to turn inward.
	I yield back.
	Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman. The Chair recognizes the
	subcommittee chairman, Mr. Dana Rohrabacher, for his opening
	statement.
	Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Your Honor. And good
	morning. I would like to welcome all the new and returning
	members of the Europe, Eurasian Subcommittee. And I am looking
	forward to a very productive Congress.
	This is our first hearing, the joint hearing with Judge
	Poe's subcommittee as well. I am happy to be working this
	session again with Ranking Member Gregory Meeks. And we have
	had an exemplary, positive and very, very fruitful
	relationship. And again I would like to thank Chairman Poe for
	initiating this hearing.
	In the lead-up to last year's Brexit vote, there was an
	onslaught of hyperbolic language. It was almost like the
	language that we saw in our own last election as to what would
	happen if there wasn't the outcome that certain people in the
	press wanted to happen. But that language that we heard about
	Brexit regarded many forms of disaster that would result from
	Britain leaving the EU.
	Some naysayers even predicted that if England were to leave
	the EU, the confusion of the exiting, and then the confusion to
	the existing order might be of such a magnitude that America
	would be so confused that we would elect an out-of-control
	President. Okay. It is a joke.
	Mr. Poe. We got it.
	Mr. Rohrabacher. You got it. Okay. Well, last June the
	voters in the U.K. made their wishes known. And Prime Minister
	May is acting accordingly.
	From the perspective of the United States, our interests
	are served when the United Kingdom is strong and has a close
	functioning relationship with the United States, with us.
	The EU was founded on a vision of a Europe, democratic,
	united in principle, efficiently and fairly coordinated by a
	supranational Parliament and a multinational bureaucracy. Well,
	clearly the British people don't think the EU reality is what
	the original visionaries had in mind. The American presence did
	not see the original vision, however, as a slight to the United
	States. Even though we weren't invited.
	President Eisenhower welcomed the beginning of an
	integrated Europe, and Presidents like President Reagan, who I
	think I remember him saying a few words about this, supported
	what he called the European community, hoping that someday the
	Central European countries newly freed from Soviet occupation,
	which of course was our goal, would provide an opportunity for
	stability, progress, and freedom on the entire European
	continent.
	Our discussion today is not about the United States picking
	sides but about working with our most reliable Atlantic partner
	and how recent decisions affect the long-term trends there.
	Perhaps we should be looking at, as Judge Poe just mentioned, a
	new bilateral free trade agreement between the United States
	and the U.K. which could be a model for other countries as
	well.
	While I have yet to fully examine many of the specifics
	about such a deal, I am interested in hearing about that today,
	I think it makes sense to tie down a treaty that is mutually
	beneficial, that is a good deal for the British and a good deal
	for us.
	And with that said, I am looking forward to this hearing.
	Thank you, Judge Poe, for calling this hearing. And I am
	looking forward to hearing from the witnesses.
	Mr. Poe. The gentleman yields back. And the Chair will
	recognize the ranking member--started to make a doctor out of
	you--Mr. Gregory Meeks for his opening statement.
	Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Chairman Poe. And I likewise want to
	also thank Chairman Rohrabacher. We have formed a good team of
	free and open and good debate on the European Subcommittee. And
	I look forward to another exciting 115th Congress and
	continuing bilateral dialogue to further American interests
	abroad regardless of whose party is in power.
	I also want to thank Ranking Member Keating, along with
	Chairman Poe, for having this combined hearing today. And
	today's hearing is an important one, and the first in the House
	to address the Brexit vote and its consequences for
	transatlantic relations. The decision by the EU, combined with
	President Trump's victory here, has set the stage, in my
	opinion, for uncertainty.
	Even today's hearing is very theoretical and based on a
	future successful Brexit negotiation with the EU, whatever form
	that may take, because we don't know what form it will take. So
	it can only be theoretical today. Only then will we be able to
	discuss specific bilateral trade policy with the U.K.
	Now, I do think a strong relationship between the United
	States and the U.K. is certainly in both parties' interests and
	good for the world. This is first and foremost based on defense
	cooperation, intel sharing, and by extension, NATO.
	In the trade world, Prime Minister May says she wants the
	U.K. to be a champion of global trade. President Trump,
	depending on the day, is a protectionist interfering in
	business decisions at home, and threatened to tear apart trade
	deals internationally. Trade negotiations are complicated. And
	when negotiating with the U.K., I am certain we will run into
	roadblocks, for example, on health services and agriculture.
	Our cultural ties will only stretch so far when it comes to
	business, just as we have done a lot of work already dealing
	with TTIP. Furthermore, the Republican administration and Prime
	Minister May have vastly different views on the future of the
	EU and Russia.
	Whereas Mrs. May was clear in her support of a strong EU
	when she told the Republicans in Philadelphia, ``We are not
	turning our backs on the EU or in the interests and values we
	share. It remains overwhelmingly in our interest,'' she said,
	``and those of the wider world that the EU should succeed.''
	On the other hand, Mr. Trump has expressed harsh skepticism
	of the EU and NATO, symbols of our shared values. On Russia,
	Mrs. May's government has been a leader in uniting the EU in
	sanctions on Russia for its war in Ukraine. And has
	continuously encouraged support for a strong NATO presence on
	its eastern borders.
	As we all know, these views are not shared completely by
	our current administration. And this confusion will be tested
	by the Kremlin. Any olive branch to Moscow is naive and,
	frankly, I think dangerous without first assuring our friends
	and allies in the U.K. who share our ideals and commitment to
	freedom.
	In conclusion, I view the future of our special
	relationship as one that is based on mutual security, common
	ideals and values, and, finally, on economics and trade.
	Looking at a future post-Brexit trade deal with all of its
	variables is a difficult task. It may be easy to get a sound
	bite out of support from our President who may not know the
	Lipscomb Treaty, but it would be much more difficult between
	negotiators acting solely on their national interests.
	As a supporter of TTIP negotiations, I remain optimistic of
	the future of transatlantic trade and urge stronger
	transatlantic ties. The European project, after all, is a peace
	project firmly aligned with American interests and designed to
	protect our liberal democratic ideas. And I look forward to
	hearing from our witnesses about how a new U.K.-U.S. trade deal
	can help us in that goal. And I yield back.
	Mr. Poe. The gentleman yields back his time. The Chair will
	recognize any other members for 1 minute if they wish to make
	an opening statement. And the Chair will put all members on
	notice that the 1 minute will be 1 minute.
	Okay. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California,
	Mr. Sherman, for his statement.
	Mr. Sherman. Been here 20 years. Never seen the body
	politic so strained, frayed. Chairman Royce has said this is
	the most bipartisan committee in Congress. I hope it is true.
	We have got to avoid the temptation to evaluate everything,
	even a British trade deal, through the prison of whether it is
	a vehicle to express our support or opposition to President
	Trump. I know Nigel Farage campaigned with Trump. But that is
	not a reason for Democrats to reject, the Republicans to
	support any particular trade deal. A million of the British
	people have signed a petition to exclude Donald Trump from
	their territory. That is not a reason for Democrats to support,
	or Republicans to reject a trade deal. We have got--if we want
	just a symbol, then we don't have to look at the trade deal
	except its cover.
	I suggest instead we not judge it by its cover but by the
	contents that have yet to be written and ask what is in it for
	American working families.I look forward to talking to our
	witnesses about what should be in it and evaluating it in the
	sense of jobs, not a job evaluation for the administration.
	Mr. Poe. The gentleman yields back his time. The Chair
	recognizes the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Cicilline, for
	a 1-minute statement.
	Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
	Chairman Rohrabacher and Ranking Member Meeks for holding this
	joint hearing. And would also like to say, as a new member of
	this subcommittee, I look forward to working with both of you.
	The United Kingdom is one of our oldest and most important
	allies. And it has always been a reliable friend in our times
	of greatest need. In Iraq and Afghanistan, more than 600
	British troops were killed during fighting alongside American
	troops.
	The United Kingdom continues to be a key partner in
	combatting global terrorism. In addition, the United Kingdom is
	a vital trading partner. The U.S. exports more than $51 billion
	in goods to the U.K. annually, including approximately $50
	million from my home State of Rhode Island in 2015.
	In June of last year, the United Kingdom became the first
	country to plan to withdraw from the European Union. This
	decision will have wide-ranging effects on international
	markets and U.S. security relationships in the U.K. and in
	Europe.
	I welcome the witnesses and look forward to hearing from
	you today about what these effects will be and how they will
	shape the special relationship between the United States and
	the United Kingdom in the years to come.
	And with that I yield back.
	Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman from Rhode Island. Are there
	any other members that wish to make an opening statement?
	The Chair will now introduce the three witnesses that we
	have. First of all, without objection, all the witnesses'
	prepared statements will be made part of the record. I ask that
	each witness please keep your presentation to no more than 5
	minutes. After 5 minutes you may hear the sound of a gavel.
	That means stop. But we do have your statements, and they are
	part of the record.
	Mr. Nile Gardiner is director of the Heritage Foundation's
	Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom. Prior to joining Heritage
	in 2002, he was a foreign policy researcher for former British
	Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.
	Mr. Simon Lester is a trade policy analyst with Cato's
	Herbert Stiefel Center for Trade Policies. His research focuses
	on WTO disputes, regional trade agreements, protectionism, and
	the history of international trade law.
	Dr. Daniel Hamilton is founding director of the Center for
	Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins University School of
	Advanced and International Studies. He has held a variety of
	senior positions at the United States Department of State,
	including deputy assistant secretary for European Affairs.
	Dr. Gardiner, we will start with you. You have 5 minutes.

	STATEMENT OF NILE GARDINER, PH.D., DIRECTOR, MARGARET THATCHER
	CENTER FOR FREEDOM, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

	Mr. Gardiner. Good morning. Thank you very much. Chairman
	Poe, Chairman Rohrabacher, and distinguished members, thank you
	for the opportunity to testify before both of your committees
	today. For reasons of time, with your permission, I will be
	summarizing parts of my written statement.
	It is fitting that today's hearing is taking place just
	days after the inauguration of a new U.S. President, and just
	months after a new British Prime Minister entered Downing
	Street. President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Theresa May
	met last Friday in Washington, and declared their intention to
	advance a U.S.-U.K. free trade agreement. The Trump presidency
	is in a strong position to revitalize the special relationship
	by working together with Congress and the Government of the
	United Kingdom.
	The Anglo-American alliance is a vital partnership that
	rests upon deep-seated cooperation in defense, trade,
	intelligence, and a host of other areas stretching from
	educational exchange to the arts. Britain's decision to leave
	the European Union should be viewed as a hugely positive
	development by Congress because it offers tremendous
	opportunities for Britain and the United States to strengthen
	that partnership.
	The Trump administration should make a U.S.-U.K. free trade
	deal a foreign policy priority. There is already strong support
	from Capitol Hill for a free trade agreement, between the
	United States and the United Kingdom, with at least five pieces
	of Congressional legislation urging such a deal. Such an
	agreement between the world's largest and fifth largest
	economies would significantly advance prosperity on both sides
	of the Atlantic. It would be a force generator for economic
	liberty through genuine bilateral free trade based upon the
	principles of sovereignty and economic freedom.
	A free trade agreement would boost both Britain's and
	America's economies while also strengthening the Anglo-American
	special relationship, for decades the engine and beating heart
	of the free world. It would also act as a model for other free
	trade agreements that Britain will likely sign with countries
	across the globe from Australia and Canada to India and
	Singapore.
	A stronger Britain on the world stage, able to act as a
	truly sovereign independent nation, is a far better partner for
	the United States. Outside of an inward-looking, declining
	European Union, Great Britain is uniquely placed to rebuild its
	military might, revitalize the NATO alliance together with the
	Americans, and stand up to the enemies of the free world.
	America has a deep interest in helping Brexit to succeed
	and in Britain flourishing outside the EU. Britain must help
	America to lead the free world with strength, resolve, and
	conviction. The special relationship is a great force for good
	in the world. And its return should be welcomed by all who
	cherish the spirit of freedom and liberty.
	President Trump should instruct the U.S. trade
	representative and the White House National Trade Council to
	fast track the pursuit of a U.S.-U.K. trade pact by putting
	forward clear negotiating objectives pursuant to congressional
	guidance that will advance the special relationship. The free
	trade deal should be implemented within 90 days after Britain
	leaves the European Union, which is expected to be by the end
	of March 2019. The overriding goal should be to sign the best
	deal possible by then.
	Under a free trade agreement, the U.S. and U.K. must make
	it easier for Americans and Britons engaged in lawful finance
	and commerce to work together. The deal should aim for the
	elimination of all tariff barriers between the U.S. and the
	U.K., two nations with highly developed economies, skilled
	workforces, and comparable wage levels. Such a deal would
	create jobs on both sides of the Atlantic and enhance
	investment opportunities.
	Talks between Washington and London on a U.S.-U.K. free
	trade deal can begin immediately. The United Kingdom has the
	full right to begin discussions on trade agreements with
	countries outside of the European Union before it formally
	exits the EU. As the Lawyers for Britain Group has pointed out,
	it is false to claim, as some European commission officials
	have done, that Britain cannot engage in such discussions as an
	EU member.
	I urge President Trump to work closely with Congress. This
	must be a joint initiative by the White House and the House of
	Representatives and Senate. A U.S.-U.K. free trade agreement
	would advance prosperity on both sides of the Atlantic, and
	will be a historic move forward that will benefit future
	generations of both Americans and Britons.
	The free trade pact should be a catalyst for advancing
	freedom to trade and for promoting economic freedom in both
	countries. It would be a powerful statement reflecting a shared
	commitment to a free and open investment environment between
	the two nations. This is a bilateral trade deal, not a
	multilateral one, which makes negotiations far simpler than
	they might otherwise be. In contrast to the hugely flawed
	proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, TTIP,
	between the U.S. and EU, this is not about importing
	regulations and expanding big government. It is about
	empowering individuals and freeing trade. We do not need
	hundreds of pages of fine print to move forward with such a
	deal. It should be streamlined and readily understandable to
	anyone who wishes to read it.
	In conclusion, a U.S.-U.K. FTA would be an outstanding
	example of a special relationship in practice, further bringing
	together two nations with a shared history, culture, and
	language, as well as a deep commitment to liberty. It should
	also act as a role model for future free trade agreements
	between the United States and other key allies across the
	world.
	Britain's exit from the European Union will make the
	partnership between Great Britain and the United States even
	stronger. And a free trade agreement will be at the very heart
	of that alliance. Today, in large part due to the robust
	support of Members of Congress, Britain stands at the front of
	the queue for a trade deal with the United States and not at
	the back.
	Thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify before
	you today. Britain's impending exit from the European Union has
	opened a new world of opportunity for the United Kingdom.
	Opportunities that should also be embraced by the United States
	and all who believe in liberty, sovereignty, and self-
	determination. Thank you.
	[The prepared statement of Mr. Gardiner follows:]
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	----------

	Mr. Poe. Mr. Lester, 5 minutes.

	STATEMENT OF MR. SIMON LESTER, TRADE POLICY ANALYST, HERBERT A.
	STIEFEL CENTER FOR TRADE POLICY STUDIES, CATO INSTITUTE

	Mr. Lester. Good morning. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member
	Keating, Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking Member Meeks, and
	members of both subcommittees, thank you very much for the
	opportunity to come here today and speak on this important
	topic. I will be giving a summary of my written statement.
	With the sometimes harsh rhetoric on trade during the
	recent Presidential campaign, and continuing over the past
	couple months, I and other free traders have been worried about
	the direction of U.S. trade policy. However, the positive talk
	from both Congress and the incoming administration about a
	U.S.-U.K. trade agreement has offered us some hope.
	Trade negotiations have been struggling in recent years
	with more failures than successes. Perhaps a U.S.-U.K.
	agreement is just what we need to regain some momentum for
	trade liberalization. At the same time, we need to be realistic
	about its chances. Despite much early enthusiasm for an
	agreement, there will be significant hurdles on both sides of
	the Atlantic.
	Turning first to the U.S. side, some advisers to the
	President Trump administration have talked about the
	possibility of a quick trade agreement with the U.K. However,
	just getting started will take some time. The United States has
	a model for trade agreements that has been fairly consistent
	for a decade now, with slight tweaks depending on which party
	holds power. However, given its criticism of U.S. trade policy
	during the campaign, the Trump administration is likely to re-
	evaluate this model. And its revision may take a little while
	to complete. Competing views within the administration will
	need to be reconciled, and stakeholders will need to be
	consulted. I am confident that the new administration will
	reach a decision on what it wants to see in a trade agreement.
	But this process could take a few months if not more.
	But it is the U.K.'s side where the real challenges lie.
	The reason we can even have this discussion is because the U.K.
	is leaving the EU. But keep in mind, all that has happened so
	far is a referendum in which the British people voted to leave
	the EU. The formal withdrawal process has not even started yet.
	When the withdrawal process does begin, the U.K.'s limited
	government resources in this area will be strained, as it has
	relied on the European Commission to negotiate trade deals for
	decades now. This could slow down its efforts to negotiate new
	trade agreements.
	In addition, there are political and legal hurdles to the
	U.K. negotiating an agreement with the U.S. right away. Some
	argue that there are legal limits on the extent to which the
	U.K. may negotiate its own trade agreements while it is still a
	member of the EU. In my view, the U.K. actually has a fair
	amount of leeway on this. But U.S. proponents of a U.S.-U.K.
	trade agreement should be aware of the issue. Even if it does
	not act as a legal bar to U.S.-U.K. talks, it could be a
	political hurdle. The U.K. needs to establish a new economic
	relationship with the EU, its most important trading partner,
	and thus will have to take into account the views of the
	Europeans on this.
	Despite these hurdles, the size of the U.S. and U.K.
	economies and their significant trading relationship means that
	there would be great benefits from liberalizing trade between
	them. And that it is worth pursuing a deal.
	In terms of the specific content of a U.S.-U.K. trade
	agreement, the two countries are at similar development levels
	and have many shared values. That should make negotiations
	easier. There will not be the sensitivities that arise for
	trade with certain developing countries. And some of the more
	controversial trade agreement provisions may, therefore, not be
	necessary. In this regard, labor protections and special
	dispute procedures for foreign investors could be excluded, and
	this could speed up the negotiating process.
	The more issues that are included in the trade agreement,
	the longer it will take to complete the negotiations, and the
	more controversial the agreement will be. With these
	considerations in mind, the focus of a U.S.-U.K. trade
	agreement should be on eliminating tariffs, as many as
	politically possible, as well as adopting mutual recognition of
	standards and regulations so as to facilitate trade, in
	particular products and services. With the issues relating to
	domestic regulations, however, our ambitions should be modest.
	There is no need to deal with all products and services at
	once, which would take a long time and would delay completion
	of the agreement. Instead, it makes sense to select a few
	sectors, such as automobiles, pharmaceutical drugs, financial
	services, to address now, and then have a framework agreement
	under which the governments could deal with other sectors
	later.
	Overall, in my view, prospects for a timely and
	economically significant U.S.-U.K. trade deal that focuses on
	these core trade issues are good. The successful negotiation
	here would be the first positive step forward for trade
	liberalization in quite some time, and could generate momentum
	for liberalization more broadly.
	Thank you for your time, and I look forward to answering
	your questions.
	[The prepared statement of Mr. Lester follows:]
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	----------

	Mr. Poe. The gentleman yields back.
	And, Dr. Hamilton, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

	STATEMENT OF DANIEL S. HAMILTON, PH.D., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
	CENTER FOR TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS, JOHNS HOPKINS SCHOOL OF
	ADVANCED AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

	Mr. Hamilton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished
	members of the committee, if I could also submit my testimony
	to the record.
	I would just like to indicate I have two appendices in the
	testimony that try to provide the latest data on jobs, trade,
	and investment between not only the United States and Europe,
	but most of the States here represented by members of the
	subcommittee. This is the latest data. We have an annual survey
	on the transatlantic economy. So maybe it is of some interest.
	It affirms what the members of the committee said at the
	beginning. Mr. Chairman, we estimate, if you take indirect and
	direct jobs together, it is about 1 million Texas jobs related
	to commerce with Europe. And the U.K. is the number one source
	of onshore jobs in Texas.
	Mr. Rohrabacher, and the other California delegates, about
	1.2 million California jobs directly and indirectly related to
	commerce with Europe. Again, the U.K. a major source of that.
	Mr. Keating, for Massachusetts, about 450,000 jobs in
	Massachusetts directly or indirectly related to this. And the
	U.K., again, the number one source of onshore jobs in
	Massachusetts.
	And for the Congressmen from New York, Congressman Meeks
	and others, also about 1 million jobs put together, roughly
	estimated, and again, the U.K. the number one source of onshore
	jobs.
	So the data does tell us that a trade and investment
	arrangement, when the U.K. leaves the EU, is absolutely in the
	interest of the United States and to the U.K. But my basic
	message is such an agreement will do even more for our
	economies if it is embedded in a broader North Atlantic
	initiative for jobs and growth with our closest allies. Because
	the rest of Europe also provides not only as much but actually
	more jobs, trade, and investment to each of our States.
	And we should avoid a false choice between three points of
	the transatlantic stool, if you will, between the U.S. the
	U.K., the U.S. and the EU, and the U.K. and the EU. Each of
	those stools have to be strong and sturdy when we all face
	intensified winds of global competition. We cannot afford to
	let ourselves, you know, fall in between the cracks of that or
	open up false alternatives.
	Back to those numbers again, in Texas and in New York, for
	instance, two thirds of the jobs to both of those States
	actually come from the rest of Europe. And three-quarters of
	those jobs in--I am sorry--in Massachusetts and in California
	come from the rest of Europe. So the U.K. is important, but the
	rest of Europe provides even more to all of us. We have to make
	sure we do this in a simultaneous way.
	Much of the reason why American companies are invested in
	the U.K. is because of the access it brings them to the
	European market. American companies based in the U.K. export
	more to the rest of Europe than American companies based in
	China export to the rest of the world. And so a major
	motivation of our companies is to understand how the U.K.-EU
	relationship will work and what is our position on that as we
	move forward with the U.K. itself.
	So just a bit of point on process. As Mr. Lester said, the
	U.K. has to negotiate a number of things here. And it is
	likely, frankly, that it will be about 6 years before the U.K.
	and the EU have a new type of trade agreement beyond Brexit. So
	we need to orient ourselves to a different type of time scale.
	I don't mean not starting the conversations as Dr. Gardiner
	said. I think we can explore them. I think you can in fact get
	a framework in place. But we should be attune to the dynamic
	here.
	We should understand the U.K. sells twice as much to the EU
	in goods and services as does the United States. So it will
	absolutely be looking at what this relationship will be. But
	what would be the parameters of a deal? I agree with Mr. Lester
	that it is not just about trade. Trade is not the driver of our
	relationship with the U.K. or with Europe. It is investment.
	That is what drives everything. And so it must be a broader
	arrangement than just a trade deal.
	Because actually trade tariffs across the Atlantic,
	traditional things, are pretty low. That actually is going to
	get done, somebody said, on a weekend. It is not going to be a
	tough part of it. The real advantage and where we can really
	open up opportunity is in other areas. Services. We are each
	other's most important services markets. That is where the jobs
	are. That is with sleeping giant of the transatlantic economy.
	Because there are so many barriers. It is a huge strength to
	the United States as well as the EU.
	Regulatory procedures, it is not about convincing one side
	to take the other's procedures about how can we align them and
	conform them and recognize each other.
	And the last point is to take the global system forward. We
	can pioneer standards that are not like bringing Vietnam or
	other countries up to some standards, but taking two high-
	standard entities and taking the rest of the world with them by
	establishing a high bar for the way we can conduct our
	commerce. That is a broad package we can conduct with the U.K.
	But we must do something very similar with the rest of our
	allies in Europe.
	And if we can do that together in a mutually reinforcing
	way, I think we will all advance better and it will be a North
	Atlantic project in which the U.K. will continue to play a
	major and important role.
	Thank you.
	[The prepared statement of Mr. Hamilton follows:]
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	----------

	Mr. Poe. Thank you, Dr. Hamilton.
	The Chair recognizes itself for questioning for 5 minutes.
	Thank all of you for your testimony. It seems to me that, I
	agree with you, Dr. Hamilton, that just because the United
	States and the United Kingdom are working on a trade deal
	doesn't exclude the European Union on working with them from
	the U.K.'s point of view or from the United States' point of
	view.
	It just seems to me, though, also that this trade deal is
	something that we should move forward too for all of the
	reasons all of the members have said at some point. A couple of
	you mentioned that there are some issues dealing with the fact
	that the United Kingdom is still part of the European Union and
	hasn't really exited yet. There is kind of a limbo land.
	What procedures are in play to limit what we can do
	regarding the fact that Brexit is still not done yet? So what
	are some of the sticking points between the relationship
	between the United Kingdom and the European Union during this
	limbo time? Dr. Hamilton?
	Mr. Hamilton. Well, and this was mentioned, they have to
	trigger what is called article 50 of the European Treaty. So
	they have not yet done that. They anticipate doing it in March.
	It has a 2-year timeline in which they could then negotiate
	their exit, if you will. But if they all agree that the
	timeline should be extended because they are not done, they can
	do that.
	So we should orient ourselves to March 2019 as the starting
	point. It is likely the U.K. Government, at that point, would
	probably, with one bill, say all existing EU legislation that
	is now currently in the U.K. will be U.K. legislation. They can
	change it after that, but that will be the baseline.
	At the same time, the U.K. has to do three other important
	things. One, it has to give the World Trade Organization, of
	which it would then be a member, a new set of commitments on
	goods and services, tariffs, and all sorts of things like that
	that it doesn't do now because it is part of EU. That has to
	receive unanimous consent by all members of the World Trade
	Organization. Let that sink in for a minute. The EU itself
	could block that. China could block it. Russia could block it.
	Anybody disgruntled. India could block it. So that will force
	the U.K. to have also pre-negotiations with the whole set of
	countries to make sure that that moves slowly. But that is
	going to take some time.
	The second thing it must do is then negotiate a free trade
	agreement or some sort of trade and investment agreement with
	the European Union itself. That is what I mentioned. That, I
	believe, will take 6 years. And it will arrange probably for a
	transition period, then, with the EU that does not, at the
	moment, require Parliamentary approval, to sort out their
	arrangements. So as you said, it will be a little twilight
	zone, but it will I think the twilight zone will extend for
	some years.
	And then third, it has to negotiate new agreements with
	everybody else; the United States, all other non-EU countries.
	So it will be very preoccupied with how it does that. And so I
	think we should have this timeline in mind and use the timeline
	to our advantage.
	So there is nothing wrong with starting, as Dr. Gardiner
	said, these kinds of exploratory discussions to find where the
	stumbling blocks are, the problems, and the issues. One could
	even move then to almost a shadow negotiation that could set up
	and tee up a U.S.-U.K. framework so that when we would be ready
	and the U.K. is able, we could then move quickly.
	Mr. Poe. All right. Dr. Hamilton, I am going to reclaim my
	time. Let me reclaim my time.
	You have lost me on the number of years. Starting with
	March of this year, how long is it going to take before--
	approximately, how long is it going to take before there could
	actually be a negotiation between the United States and the
	United Kingdom on a bilateral trade? Approximately.
	Mr. Hamilton. Formal negotiation could happen as soon as
	they leave the EU. So in 2 years. They are unlikely to want to
	finalize a deal with the United States unless they understand
	what the EU dimension is of their trade since that is actually
	their major partner.
	So my estimate told, to implement both of those, is 8
	years.
	Mr. Poe. Okay. Dr. Gardiner, do you want to weigh in on
	that?
	Turn your microphone on.
	Mr. Gardiner. Yes. I would like to respond too to that.
	Firstly, with regard to the amount of time it would take
	Britain to negotiate a trade agreement with the European Union,
	that is not going to take 6 years. I believe that deal will be
	conducted very, very swiftly. It is in the EU's interest to
	have a good trade agreement with the United Kingdom. The United
	Kingdom, of course, is a very, very powerful economy. The
	world's fifth biggest economy. It is going to overtake Germany
	by 2030 as Europe's largest economy. It is not in the EU's
	interest to delay a deal with the United Kingdom. I would
	expect that deal will be struck within this 2-year period
	before Britain exits the European Union.
	Secondly, I would point out that, you know, the United
	Kingdom can begin negotiating a trade agreement with the United
	States now. They do not have to wait before Britain exits the
	European Union. You cannot of course implement such a deal
	until Britain leaves the EU in March 2019. But you can do all
	of the discussions and negotiations ahead of Britain's exit.
	So those discussions can already begin. And there is
	nothing to stop Great Britain from doing that. So that is a
	very important----
	Mr. Poe. Thank you, Dr. Gardiner. My time has expired.
	Thank you.
	The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts,
	ranking member, Mr. Keating.
	Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. American trade with
	the U.K. represents one-fifth of the trade with the European
	Union as a whole. The other four-fifths deals with the rest of
	the European countries, including Germany, our largest EU
	trading partner. So moving ahead on this, and I think it is
	unsettled, Mr. Gardiner, whether or not legally that can be
	done. Clearly it is unsettled. I won't say one way or the
	other.
	But moving ahead bilaterally, the message it sends to the
	rest of the EU, which is 80 percent of our trade that is left,
	plus the message it sends politically, and let's face it, trade
	deals are political, is the wrong message. So I am not saying
	one excludes the other, as I said in my opening remarks. But
	there is a danger in having a prioritized bilateral agreement
	and leaving the rest of Europe by the side, including allies
	like Germany. I would like Mr. Hamilton to comment on that.
	Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Congressman, thank you. That is
	essentially my point. Many of these countries are also our
	allies. There are geostrategic issues here having to do with
	common defense as well. And the message is important. So the
	message I suggest we consider is in fact to move ahead with a
	bilateral arrangement, as I said, but to embed it in a broader
	initiative across the North Atlantic with our close allies for
	jobs and growth. That would underpin the NATO alliance. That
	would give us all more opportunities. And we would be the
	global leader setting standards for the rest of the world.
	Whether the other leg of this, is a TTIP-like thing or
	something else, that is probably not this discussion. But I
	would simply say the three points I outlined for a U.S.-U.K.
	arrangement that, besides tariffs, services, regulatory
	conformity, or a recognition, and new standards, pioneering new
	standards, is essentially the framework we could also use with
	the European Union.
	Mr. Keating. I would suggest, from my opinion, that it is
	precisely the time to be talking about this. The fact, whether
	you call it TTIP or some revision of that, this is the time to
	be talking about this, not moving ahead with one and leaving
	the other 80 percent of our allies by the wayside or giving
	that impression unintentionally. Because impressions are
	important in that regard.
	Quickly I would like to just touch on a couple of other
	points. One is how can we make sure the U.S. companies
	currently in the U.K. continue to have access to the EU single
	market for our companies that are there? I would just like any
	suggestion about how we are going to navigate that.
	And if you could, I will go to my third question because we
	are running out of time, if you could mention particularly the
	financial markets. How that could be the case?
	Mr. Hamilton. Yes, well, this is again important. The U.K.-
	EU dimension of this will determine how U.S. companies based in
	the U.K. will in fact access the single market. So those
	companies are reliant on the nature of that U.K.-EU deal. And
	with all due respect to the notion that they will do this
	quickly, EU and Canada have been negotiating an agreement for 7
	years now. They have got it pretty far, but it is still not
	done. And that is just with Canada where there haven't been all
	those major types of issues. This is pulling the EU and the
	U.K. in a new way. I think it will just take longer.
	So on financial services is exactly where all of this comes
	together because the U.K. banks, financial institutions,
	anything based in the U.K. will lose, as a matter of the
	Brexit, their automatic right called passporting rights to
	provide services throughout the rest of the European Union.
	They will lose that. Many U.S. banks and financial institutions
	rely on that passporting right to do their business in the rest
	of Europe, as I mentioned. There is now a U.K. equivalents
	regime, which is different, which says the EU says any non-EU
	jurisdiction that has equivalent procedures, say in financial
	services to the EU, they will accept some of those rights.
	But it is a new regulation. It is inconsistent. It is
	uncertain whether it will continue for both the U.S. and the
	U.K. So this shows how we have to move in tandem with both
	tracks here and make sure that the U.K.-EU track also is in
	American interests. We should be actively engaged to square
	that triangle, if you will, with a view to our own interests.
	Because they are going to be massively effective.
	Mr. Keating. Thank you. And I will actually leave--I yield
	back a few seconds since we are a dual committee.
	Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman.
	The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California,
	Chairman Rohrabacher, for his questions.
	Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, thank you very much. I noted perhaps
	in a humorous way about the disruptive nature of our new
	administration. But let me just note that many of us on this
	side of the aisle, and especially yours truly, applauds the
	disruption of the way the system worked before. And clearly
	what we have here is an affirmation by the British people that
	the system needed to be disrupted for their wellbeing. They
	made that decision.
	The EU and this getting into these large multilateral trade
	agreements was not to their benefit. That is why they voted not
	to stay in, what they--of course what appears to be, when
	people are negotiating, such bilateral agreements, what appears
	to be some sort of idealization of what could happen that is
	beneficial quite often results in what I think, the British
	people, found resulted in not a free trade but in controlled
	and regulated economic activity. Economic activity that was
	controlled and regulated by multinational bureaucrats set in
	Brussels. Or perhaps there is other places they have their
	offices as well.
	Let us note that our President, Mr. Trump, has made himself
	very clear that all this talk about free trade. And I know our
	conservative and Republican think tanks have this image in
	their mind of what free trade means. I think free trade is
	something--I have always said I believe in free trade between
	free people. And if there is ever an example of two free
	people, it has to be Britain and the United States.
	But in terms of how our free trade between us relates to
	the very other complications that you are talking about, they
	are the complications of what happens when you decide to
	organize your economic--international economic activity through
	a multilateral basis rather than a unilateral basis. And that
	is what President Trump is all about. He wants to shift away
	from the old system which gave too much power to people who are
	not involved with America's interests but perhaps a
	bureaucratic and systematic allegiance.
	And just something you said, Mr. Hamilton, struck me. So
	the WTO is going to have to approve any agreement between
	England and the United States. Is that right? What is it? Where
	does the WTO come into this?
	Mr. Hamilton. The U.K. right now has a set of commitments
	by virtue of its membership in the European Union to the WTO.
	So if it leaves the European Union, it has to show the WTO its
	new commitments. So it is the WTO. It is nothing to do with any
	negotiation with us. But if we don't know what those
	commitments are, it is hard to start a negotiation. We don't
	know what the tariffs will be in the U.K. until they do that.
	They will have to do that first.
	And within the WTO, any member of the WTO could veto that
	until the U.K. does something that everyone will agree to. So I
	am just saying I think that it will get done. I don't want to
	make too much of it, but I think it will just prolong the
	timing. That was my main point.
	Mr. Rohrabacher. So what we have now is the greatest cheat
	and the greatest undermining of the wellbeing of American
	people, the Beijing regime, the clique that runs China, now has
	some sort of veto power of what kind of agreement we are going
	to have between Britain and the United States. They will
	determine whether or not it is consistent.
	I remember when I first got here how several of us opposed
	the WTO entry in by China. We said, you know, again, free
	trade, free people. China is not in any way a free country. And
	much less in terms of their economics.
	So let us just point out again that perhaps in the long
	term President Trump may have his finger on the right
	direction--pointed in the right direction. Let's start
	emphasizing good relations and economic activity on a bilateral
	basis with free people around the world like the Brits rather
	than putting our faith in multilateral organizational trade.
	Thank you.
	Mr. Poe. The gentleman yields back his time.
	And the Chair recognizes the ranking member, Mr. Meeks,
	from New York.
	Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Let me just make a quick comment. I am almost just the
	opposite of my chair. I think that the world is interconnected,
	and we are better interconnected, we are safer interconnected.
	When--one reason why that is, you just need to look at history,
	and if you look at World War II, for example, when everybody
	was looking at their own individual interest, it was war. They
	were fighting one another.
	The reason why people came together, the
	interconnectedness, is to have more of a peacetime and to have
	a better future collectively. And so to say--and to have rules
	and order. The reason you have a WTO of multilateral
	organizations, so that you can set a rules-based society so
	that you don't have something where everyone is just going at
	it free willy-nilly, because then in this internet connected
	world, where would we be, where would we go?
	So even when we are talking about Brexit and the
	possibility why I think that this--you know, I agree with Mr.
	Hamilton, you know, you can have some conversations
	understanding that it is, you know, something that is not going
	to happen for way down the road, you can be the cause of this
	happening. I think that if, in fact, there was negotiations on
	a free trade agreement, a bilateral free trade agreement with
	the U.K., that hurts the U.K. also. Because why would the EU--
	in the negotiation with the U.K. and the EU, they have got to
	negotiate, and if they see that Britain is trying to say, as I
	think, Mr. Gardiner, you can tell me if I heard you correctly,
	that you basically were advocating, because in your opening
	statement, everything you said about the EU was jump off this
	sinking ship, you know, it is bad, leave it alone, that you
	were somewhat advocating for the end of the EU as we know it,
	that it is out worn its relationship or its need of being, that
	USA, forget about the EU, just focus on United Kingdom. Is that
	correct?
	Mr. Gardiner. If I could respond to that. And firstly, in
	my testimony, I made the point that Britain is far better off
	outside of the European Union. And I believe the Brexit is very
	good for the United States and for the British people because
	this is an issue of sovereignty and self-determination of
	freedom. You are not a sovereign nation if you are a member of
	the European Union. But I did not make a, you know, an
	assertion that----
	Mr. Meeks. Your exact quote, if I am not mistaken, is the
	declining EU.
	Mr. Gardiner. Yes. It is a declining EU, that is correct.
	And if other nations within the EU wish to leave the European
	Union, that is their call.
	Mr. Meeks. Well, even Prime Minister May, in her statement,
	says we need a strong EU. It seems to me that even in the
	U.K.'s best interest, as stated by the Prime Minister herself,
	that she is advocating for a strong EU, that we need a strong
	EU, that in fact we don't need a declining EU, we have got to
	make sure that it is strong.
	Mr. Gardiner. Well, that is up to European leaders to
	decide whether they are able to advance a strong European
	Union. There is no evidence at this time that the EU is
	becoming a stronger entity. It is certainly weakening, and the
	winds of change are blowing across Europe, and there is a drive
	toward sovereignty and self-determination that many EU elites
	simply do not accept.
	Mr. Meeks. Let me reclaim my time because I am running out.
	Mr.--Dr. Hamilton, let me just ask you a question. You
	mentioned that negotiations do not happen in a vacuum and that
	with the active negotiations with the WTO and Asia, the EU,
	that these all, these negotiations will be intertwined. So my
	first question would be--but all that seems like a lot to me.
	Does the U.K. even have the manpower? Because there is a lot of
	manpower, you got all of this negotiation, you got to do all
	this. Do they have--you know, I think the last time they
	negotiated a deal by themselves, I don't know when it was, to
	be quite honest with you.
	So it seems to me--my first question is, you know, do they
	have the manpower to do this? Is it--you know, can you give me
	your thoughts on that?
	Mr. Hamilton. The government is quickly trying to get up to
	speed to get a bigger bench on trade, but as you correctly
	point out, they haven't been doing this for a long, long time
	since the EU has the authority to negotiate trade deals. So I
	was asked by the State Department some time ago to go brief a
	number of them coming over to try to figure out how to do all
	of this. But you are right, this is part of the issue.
	The capacity, the sheer capacity of the U.K. to do all
	these things will be stressed. We should probably help them, to
	the extent we can. But my point again is we should be realistic
	about the timeline that will be in front of us, givenall these
	things the U.K. itself has to do, regardless of our piece of
	it. It will just take some time.
	Mr. Meeks. I am out of time.
	Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman.
	The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Colonel
	Cook, for his 5 minutes.
	Mr. Cook. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
	This very illuminating hearing, I was really getting
	involved in this, and then I heard the chair talk about limbo
	time, and I thought it was a flashback when I was in college at
	Fort Lauderdale, and maybe he was there at the same time, but I
	haven't heard that expression in quite awhile.
	Anyway, some of the comments that you made there, a number
	of years ago, I was probably--had a much more favorable
	viewpoint of the EU, some of the things that happened in
	Greece, Italy, maybe the tremendous influence that Germany
	exercised. So you caught my attention, Dr. Hamilton,
	particularly about the World Trade Organization. And, you know,
	I respect a country; if the U.K. wants to leave the EU, I
	understand that.
	The problem I am hearing is, I guess it is like anything in
	this world, because it is run by you guys, which are lawyers,
	is that you better know exactly what you are getting into,
	because it might not be that easy to get out of. And I want to
	know, is that an accurate--if you have advice for us, if we
	could influence this decision, at least I am hearing is, before
	we start--and by the way, I am all for more trade with the U.K.
	I think everything that has been mentioned about the past and
	everything like that.
	But before we get into this, are there certain hidden
	things that if something goes south that--one comment, I think,
	Dr. Hamilton, you mentioned 8 years, and I know, Dr. Gardiner,
	you had a much shorter time in your argument about it.
	But the point, I am trying to get your viewpoint, Dr.
	Hamilton, maybe you will give it, is that you better have your
	eyes wide open when you get into any trading arrangements. You
	know, I am a big NATO person, support the alliance and
	everything else, but you have to know exactly what you are
	getting into, and that is my takeaway. Can you comment on that
	briefly, anybody?
	Mr. Hamilton. You had referred to me. If I could, just
	briefly, you know, on the EU, much of this, these are our
	allies, almost all of them, and they have said this is the way
	they are trying to organize the peace in Europe, and as was
	mentioned, after World War II, after a world war, the survivors
	of war decided this is--by melding their economies, it is the
	way to prevent war. The United States provided, through NATO,
	an umbrella under which they could reconcile and create this
	type of effort.
	American workers, consumers, companies all profit from that
	deep, deep relationship with the U.K. and also with the rest of
	our allies. So I think we should think about it in that, if I
	may.
	You say keep your eyes open. Here are some issues. We say
	tariffs won't be a problem, but agriculture, that is likely to
	be a problem. British farmers are about to lose the subsidies
	that they get through the common agricultural policy through
	the EU, and then they will be in a trade agreement facing U.S.
	competition. That will be a domestic political issue in the
	U.K., I can guarantee it to you. We have an issue with
	financial services on both sides of the Atlantic because the
	city of London believes that is their advantage.
	We have resisted including financial services in the same
	kind of negotiation that we have had with the EU and TTIP
	because of other kinds of concerns. We will have to address the
	financial services issue in the way that I describe because it
	is so interlinked. So there are issues. I am not saying there
	aren't, even with the U.K., but if we don't go forward with
	this kind of agreement, then we will be looking at the WTO
	baseline, which is, as I mentioned, which means tariff barriers
	to U.S. products and services that otherwise we will--wouldn't
	have if we have an agreement.
	Mr. Cook. Yeah. But my comment, you know, the takeaway from
	this is, obviously, the British people were unhappy with the
	situation. It is just like us. I understand the commitment to
	Europe, I understand the commitment to our allies and
	everything else, but it all comes back to our constituents. I
	don't represent anybody in the U.K. you know, I am worried
	about the issues in--and sometimes I think we all run the
	danger of getting out of touch with the people that we serve.
	That is--you know, I love the Brits, I love the Europeans,
	I love everybody, kumbaya. But first and foremost, you know,
	the people of the 8th Congressional District, and that is, you
	know, why I raise my hand.
	Some of the talk, as I said--and I am running out of time--
	is just to convey that fear that, you know, the World Trade
	Organization, and when certain things are happening in the
	economy and we get those cards and letters, we have to read
	them and respond to them.
	I yield back.
	Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman.
	The Chair recognizes another gentleman from California, Mr.
	Sherman.
	Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
	We have had an election. The clear message is the American
	people are on the side of trade skeptics who don't think that
	the trade deals we have entered into in the past have been
	good. And what we are going to see is a bait-and-switch,
	because now we are being told that the only problem is
	multilateral trade deals.
	Well, TTIP is a bilateral trade deal. Of course, we are a
	union of 50 States, they are a semi-union of dozens of states.
	NAFTA, which is held out to be the worst deal, you could call
	it a bilateral deal, but all the controversial provisions are
	the U.S.-Mexico provisions. If it was just a U.S.-Canada deal,
	I don't think it would be discussed much.
	So NAFTA's controversial positions are, in effect, a
	bilateral deal. The South Korea deal, which cost us as much in
	jobs as any on a pound-for-pound basis, is a bilateral deal. So
	what we are going to be told is that the Wall Street elite
	should control American trade policy to the destruction of the
	American middle class, but we should insist that they do it on
	a case-by-case country-by-country basis.
	I would submit that American workers should not compete
	with 40 cent an hour Vietnamese labor that cannot organize and
	has no freedom, whether it is part of a TPP or whether it is an
	individual deal.
	Now, I have been told that our witnesses are generally
	trade-ophiles rather than trade skeptics. Is that a
	mischaracterization of any of you? No. And so, notwithstanding
	the wave and the message, the only loud message that came from
	the American people, those who support these trade deals
	continue to dominate the discussion here in Washington.
	In looking at a trade deal, and there are some worthy of
	support, the issues that come up are investor-state, low wages,
	labor rights, environmental protection, currency manipulation,
	and balance of trade. Well, with Britain, low wages, I think,
	is one of the big problems because, in theory, a trade deal
	should equalize wages in both contracting parties. Well,
	British wages are relatively high. Labor rights, they have got
	stronger labor rights than we do.
	Are any of our witnesses familiar with American right-to-
	work laws?
	I don't see any, but I will point out that the State
	Department has testified before Judge Poe and my subcommittee
	back in the day that our right-to-work laws are a violation of
	the U.N. declaration of human rights and international labor
	standards because they, in effect, make it impossible to
	organize unions. Environmental protections are strong in
	Britain, viewed on a world standard, and I haven't seen serious
	currency manipulation.
	So let's go back to investor-state. We are told, in other
	trade agreements, that we have to surrender our sovereignty and
	give giant corporations a second way to attack our
	environmental protections and consumer protections in order to
	give our corporations a fair shot when they are doing business
	abroad.
	Do our witnesses generally agree that American business can
	get a fair shake in British courts, and therefore, it is not
	necessary to have investor-state protections for American
	corporations? Dr. Hamilton, if you can just give me a yes or
	no. I have to get through the list.
	Mr. Hamilton. Yes.
	Mr. Sherman. Mr. Lester?
	Mr. Lester. Yes.
	Mr. Sherman. Dr. Gardiner?
	Mr. Gardiner. Yes.
	Mr. Sherman. Balance of trade. Would a deal with Britain
	that simply eliminated all tariffs be good or bad for reducing
	America's trade deficit? Dr. Gardiner. Or it is possible that
	it can't be estimated, but if you have an estimate, let me
	know.
	Mr. Gardiner. Well, it would be good for the trade deficit.
	It would be good for the U.S. economy.
	Mr. Sherman. I didn't ask the economy.
	Mr. Gardiner. Yeah.
	Mr. Sherman. Would it--we have the largest trade deficit in
	the history of a million life. Would a trade deal with Britain
	make that worse or better or you don't know?
	Mr. Gardiner. It would not make it worse. I think that the
	United States would benefit from such a deal.
	Mr. Sherman. Okay. Mr. Lester?
	Mr. Lester. I can't estimate it, but I also don't think
	trade deficits are bad for the economy.
	Mr. Sherman. We lose 10,000 jobs for every billion dollars
	of trade deficit. And if you are not one of those 10,000
	people, then your statement--go on, Dr. Hamilton.
	Mr. Hamilton. U.S. has a trade deficit in goods with the
	European Union and the U.K., but it has a trade surplus in
	services.
	Mr. Sherman. Yeah, and I am looking for the unified. Some
	trade skeptics only focus on goods and----
	Mr. Hamilton. And my point was----
	Mr. Sherman [continuing]. The services matter as well.
	Mr. Hamilton [continuing]. If it can open up the services
	economy across the Atlantic, the United States stands to
	benefit considerably.
	Mr. Sherman. Okay. And finally, I will point out that
	Britain has a health system that makes ObamaCare look like it
	came from the Cato Institute. And I yield back.
	Mr. Poe. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South
	Carolina, Mr. Wilson.
	Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Judge Poe and Chairman Rohrabacher,
	for calling this very important meeting and hearing. And thank
	you for being here today. It is very meaningful to me.
	I was born into this special relationship with the U.K. I
	grew up in the most British city of North America, Charleston,
	South Carolina, and so we have always had such a great
	appreciation. And in my home State, the benefits of this have
	been immeasurable. Also, it is the birthplace of Congressman
	Greg Meeks, so I am sure he and I share the appreciation.
	And it was really the British investment Bowater that was
	the first foreign investment in our State, which then led to
	Michelin of France and Bridgestone of Japan, Continental of
	Germany, Getty of Singapore. And now South Carolina is the
	leading manufacturer and exporter of tires to any State in the
	United States.
	Additionally, we have foreign investments, working with
	Governor Carroll Campbell and the late Governor Jim Edwards, in
	BMW, and now soon Volvo and Mercedes Sprinter Benz. South
	Carolina is the leading exporter of cars of any State in the
	United States, and so trade is very important, and we love to
	see those X5s in London and anywhere else.
	But that in mind, Dr. Gardiner, the new--a trade agreement,
	would this enhance the prospects of new jobs? What would be the
	prospects?
	Mr. Gardiner. That is an excellent question, and I should
	point out that already 1 million U.S. jobs depend upon British
	investment here in the United States, and 1.25 million British
	jobs depend upon U.S. investment in the U.K. And I do believe a
	free trade agreement would be a job creator. It will advance
	prosperity on both sides of the Atlantic. There are similar
	wage levels in the U.K. and the U.S. It is not going to
	threaten American jobs.
	And also, this is a--you know, this is a bilateral trade
	deal as opposed to TTIP, which is not a bilateral trade deal,
	as one of the members suggested earlier that it was a bilateral
	deal. TTIP simply is not. It is a multilateral deal, very, very
	different to a U.S.-U.K. free trade deal. And I believe that
	encouraging more British investment in the United States will
	create a considerable number of additional jobs here in the
	U.S., and that is good for the U.S. economy. It is good for
	American workers. The American worker has nothing to fear from
	a free trade deal with the United Kingdom, but really should
	embrace it.
	Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much. And again, I am grateful.
	My home State of South Carolina has certainly benefited.
	And, Dr. Hamilton, we have such an extraordinary bilateral
	security situation and friendship, partnership with the U.K.
	Would additional trade agreements enhance our security
	relationships?
	Mr. Hamilton. I believe they would. I believe, while not an
	economic NATO, as people have said, a balanced agreement both
	with the U.K. as a strong NATO ally and our other European
	allies would be a second anchor to our alliance. It would
	reassure our allies of our commitment to NATO because we would
	again be tying our economies together in ways that we had not
	yet done. It would reassure us that those allies will be
	outward looking and open to American goods, services, and
	ideas.
	So it would be mutually reinforcing to the NATO alliance
	itself. If it creates jobs and greater prosperity on both sides
	of the Atlantic, it also allows us to afford the military
	expenses that we need to expend for NATO and help our European
	allies to step up their military contributions, which is what
	the Trump administration, I think Democratic administrations
	have all asked them to do.
	If I could just say on the nature of a U.S.-U.K. deal. It
	is not the fact of the deal that is going to bring jobs. It is
	what is going to be in it. And I agree with all the points that
	have been made, but I return to this one point, which was so
	many American companies are based in the U.K. because of the
	access they have to the rest of Europe. And if this deal is
	done to the exclusion of that access, many American companies
	are going to rethink their presence in the U.K.
	So we have to assure that as we move ahead on this
	bilateral track with the U.K., we also consider this other
	piece because it is actually so vital to all those jobs back
	here that we just discussed.
	Mr. Wilson. And other jobs, Mr. Lester, are with financial
	services. And with the Trump administration's efforts to
	eliminate or repeal Dodd-Frank, wouldn't this be beneficial to
	both of our countries to reduce regulations?
	Mr. Lester. Yes, it would. And in the TTIP, one of the
	hurdles was demands from Europe to loosen financial services
	regulation, make it easier for European financial services
	companies to operate in the U.S. And in this new context with
	the new administration, you know, sort of maybe rolling back
	Dodd-Frank a bit, that can only help our negotiations with both
	the rest of Europe and also U.K., in particular, should
	facilitate the trade deal. You know, we are sort of giving them
	what we want because we think it benefits us.
	Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
	Mr. Poe. The gentleman yields back his time.
	The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr.
	Cicilline.
	Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Dr. Gardiner, if I understand your testimony, both your
	testimony and your written testimony in which you say, ``A free
	trade agreement would boost Britain and America's economies
	while also strengthen the Anglo-American special relationship,
	for decades the engine and beating heart of the free world.''
	``A stronger Britain on the world stage, able to act as a truly
	sovereign, independent nation, is a far better partner for the
	United States.''
	That sounds to me like a very romantic view of times past
	and really disregards the current world context and is not even
	an economic argument but more of an idealogical or political
	argument. And the reason that I am questioning this is Prime
	Minister May said very clearly that it is in all of our best
	interest that the EU succeed. And she is very clear that that
	is critical to the future of the U.K. as well as the economic
	relationships.
	She is the leader of the United Kingdom. Why is she wrong
	and you are right that a declining European Union and a
	relationship between the United States and the U.K. is better
	for the U.K. and the United States?
	I mean, it seems that Dr. Hamilton's testimony about,
	thinking about this in a little more sophisticated way, of the
	U.S.-U.K., the U.K.-the EU and the U.S.-EU, particularly when
	these economies are all integrated and related and people's
	interest in markets are so dependent on each other's access to
	those markets, it seems like a kind of America first idea of
	just U.K. and U.S. over here, sort of disregarding the reality
	of these economic relationships. And why shouldn't we, as a
	matter of trade policy, be looking at engaging in these
	conversations simultaneously to maximize the benefits to
	American jobs, American workers, and the growth of the American
	economy?
	What is the basis for your claim that we are better off
	just having Britain and the U.S. do a trade agreement? I mean,
	it doesn't seem like that--that doesn't make common sense to
	me, let alone be supported by any kind of economic analysis. I
	mean, is it simply, is it, sir, this yearning for those days of
	old?
	Mr. Gardiner. Well, firstly, thank you very much for all
	your questions and to respond to them. First, this is not a
	romanticized view. The special relationship is a reality. It
	has been a reality for over 70 years. It is the engine of the
	free world. And when U.S. and British Forces fight together on
	the battlefield, as they have done on countless occasions
	defending the cause of freedom, that really does matter.
	So I think that it is a tremendous reality. It is a very,
	very powerful force. And clearly, for the British people, they
	decided they were better off outside of the European Union. And
	with the--with the new British Brexit approach, Britain is
	going to be an even more outward looking nation that is going
	to work together with its allies and confront the enemies of
	freedom. And I think that, you know, this is not a romanticized
	view. This is the reality.
	As for the future of the European Union--and Theresa May
	rightly pointed out that it is good to have a strong Europe for
	the United Kingdom, but, you know, the reality is within the
	European Union, there is deep-seeded discontent. You do have
	European leaders who seem to be deeply out of touch with a lot
	of their own electorates. European countries cannot control
	their own borders, and many of the rules that govern the
	European Union simply, you know, are unrealistic in this day
	and age with the rise of Islamist terrorism in Europe, the
	tremendous threats that we face across the world. And I think
	that, you know, Europe needs to adapt to the new realities. And
	the British people, their desire for freedom is shared by, you
	know, tens of millions of people across the EU as well.
	Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Doctor.
	Dr. Hamilton, could you speak to this? You know, I am not
	sure that the new administration takes the same view as Prime
	Minister May, the same view that all the Prime Ministers have
	taken about the importance of the success of the European
	Union.
	Could you speak to what the benefits of that are as well as
	the dangers to the United States and the U.K. or to our
	interest if the EU fails and what we might do as Members of
	Congress to support the strength of the EU?
	Mr. Hamilton. Thank you. Well, as I said also about my
	question about trade, it is not the fact of the EU, per se,
	that is an American interest. It is what kind of EU, and how
	does it relate to the interest we actually do have.
	You know, since the end of the Cold War and even before,
	Ronald Reagan, George Bush, every--both Bushes, and the
	Democratic Presidents have held the vision of a Europe whole
	and free. That has animated our policies toward Europe for a
	long time.
	If we are facing or actively engaged in creating a Europe
	that is fractured and anxious, I would argue that is not an
	American interest and it will shortchange the American economy
	as well. It will mean a Europe that is beset by various
	nationalisms. That has not proven to be a good thing for
	America in our history. It is likely to be a Europe that is
	closed, in fact, then to American goods, services, and ideas,
	not one that is open. It is likely to be a Europe that at some
	point would come under the influence of a country or a group of
	countries hostile to the United States. We have experienced
	that in our history. Also not good for us. And if it is a
	fractured Europe, it is not going to be a partner. It is not
	going to be an ally. It is going to be a squabbling set of
	countries that will get us into trouble and draw blood and
	treasure away from all the other issues we have to deal with.
	So if the EU can work toward the kind of Europe that I just
	identified, the opposite of all of that, we should support it.
	If it does things that don't do that, we should object. We
	should be--have a very clear-eyed view of our own interests
	regarding the European Union or NATO or our bilateral
	relationships. But at the moment, the kind of EU that is there
	is the one we need to deal with, and we need to see that we can
	work with it to steer it in this direction of a Europe that is
	whole, free, confident partner of the United States.
	Mr. Poe. The gentleman's time has expired.
	Thank you, Dr. Hamilton.
	The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Nevada, Ms. Titus.
	Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be
	on this committee.
	I have two questions. One is more politically oriented, and
	the other, policy. My political question is, is it not possible
	that those who are pushing this so-called special agreement
	between the U.S. and the U.K. now aren't just using this as a
	stalking horse to improve England's or the U.K.'s position in
	the Brexit negotiations?
	And then my policy question has to do with you, Dr.
	Hamilton. You mentioned a lot about the service side of this,
	and I think that is very important, but most of the focus has
	been on financial services. I represent Las Vegas, so the
	tourist side of services is very important to our economy. If
	you look at the figures, just last year, over 5 million people
	came from the U.K. as tourists to the United States, 400,000 of
	those came to Las Vegas. They are our third largest visitor
	source after Canada and Mexico.
	So I wonder if anybody is talking about the tourist aspects
	of any kind of special agreement and realizing that we can't
	wait 8 years for this to be looked at. And there is some very
	big issues. You look at the fact that the U.K. is part of the
	Visa Waiver Program. How does that continue? You look at policy
	toward refugees, policy toward immigrants, travelers, business
	travelers. I would just ask if anybody is investigating that or
	recognizing the importance of it, after you answer my political
	question.
	Mr. Gardiner. If I could answer your first question, which
	is an excellent question about the Brexit negotiations with the
	European Union, how the U.S.-U.K., you know, free trade
	agreement impacts that.
	I would point out firstly that Britain is already in trade
	discussions with a wide range of countries stretching from
	Australia, Canada, New Zealand, to India, and even South Korea
	with regard to free trade agreements. So of course, the United
	States free trade deal is the most important deal for the
	United Kingdom, but they are in discussions with many, many
	other countries. And I don't think that, you know, this is, you
	know, politically motivated, vis--vis, the Brexit negotiations
	with the European Union, which are an entirely different
	course.
	And I think that, you know, if Britain was not in the
	European Union and had not been tied to the EU for the last
	four decades plus, Britain would already have signed a free
	trade agreement with the United States a very, very long time
	ago. And it is astonishing in this day and age that European
	countries are not able to negotiate their own free trade deals.
	There are countries that are part of the European Union, 28
	countries, that do not have that freedom unless they leave the
	European Union. And that kind of centralized political power
	being asserted by Brussels is really a, you know, slap in the
	face for national sovereignty. And that was a big reason why
	the British people decided to exit the European Union, to
	exit--in order to implement that freedom to negotiate their own
	free trade agreements.
	Ms. Titus. Okay. Thank you.
	Mr. Hamilton. Madam, if I may, on your--the other part, on
	services. So there are, of course, a variety of services.
	Services are where all the jobs are across the Atlantic, and
	they are highly protected on both sides of the Atlantic. So
	instead of the goods tariffs, we should focus on services,
	including on people flows. And you are right, it is unclear
	exactly what the arrangements will be if the U.K. leaves the
	EU. We have to sort that out. I don't think it will be a
	problem, but I think we will need to sort it out.
	But let me show you where we could move ahead. The digital
	economy. U.S. and Europe are the leaders in the digital
	economy. We are most linked with each other. And the U.S. And
	the U.K., in terms of e-commerce, are each other's most
	important partners in the world. Seventy percent of e-commerce
	buyers in the U.K. go to American sites to buy, and 49 percent
	of American consumers go to British sites to buy things. And
	yet the digital world is still in flux.
	So it is about making sure we have high standards, we can
	set that pace because we are so deeply interlinked, and the
	digital economy is becoming the economy. So this would be, I
	think, very considerable.
	Services are about qualifications. If an architect wants to
	work here or in the U.K., do we recognize those qualifications,
	legal qualifications? When I mention about mutual recognition,
	it might be to try to break down some barriers there that would
	facilitate the flow of highly professionalized services.
	So these are the kinds of things that I think a U.S.-U.K.
	deal could actually set the pace on, but it needs to be done,
	as I keep saying, in some sort of balance with how we are going
	to work with the rest of our European allies.
	Ms. Titus. Never mind the tourism issue with the gaming
	issue, which is very important in Nevada, now you have got
	another complication.
	Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Mr. Poe. The lady yields back her time.
	The Chair recognizes Mr. Rooney from Florida for his
	questions. Perfect timing.
	Mr. Rooney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Mr. Poe. Microphone.
	Mr. Rooney. Yeah. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Mr. Lester, I would like to ask you a question. I would
	like to thank you for taking time to testify.
	If a U.S.-U.K. trade agreement is going to be a gold
	standard, what are the building blocks we should look for that
	we can use to build future trade agreements on?
	Mr. Lester. This is a great question because one thing that
	we really need to talk about is what is the model of trade
	agreement that we are using? We spent the last decade with the
	same model, and it has worked well in some cases, you know, a
	few years ago, but lately we have been stuck. You know, we had
	the TPP and we had the TTIP following the same model, and we
	didn't get them done, and, you know, that is a problem.
	And so the question is, if we do the same thing in the
	U.S.-U.K. trade agreement or any other bilateral trade
	agreement that we take on in the next couple of years, do they
	not get done? Do we spend the next 4 years negotiating
	something and then we don't have anything at the end of it? And
	that would be a huge problem if we go down that road.
	So the question is what should be in this trade agreement?
	What are the building blocks?
	And as much as people like to say tariffs are low, I would
	just like to point out some of them are high. There are these
	tariff peaks and tariffs are still a burden. They are taxes on
	trade, and we should do our best to get rid of as many as
	possible. So I think that is one of the--it has always been at
	the core of trade agreements and it should be at the core of
	trade agreements, get rid of as many tariffs as politically
	possible.
	Beyond that, we talked a lot about regulations. Mr.
	Hamilton talked a lot about this already. And so there is this
	ambition out there in trade agreements that we are going to
	deal with all the regulatory trade barriers. And I am
	sympathetic and I would like to see it happen, but I think we
	should use caution and not try to overstate it.
	We are probably not going to be able to have harmonized
	regulations between the U.S. and U.K., and I don't think we
	necessarily should. But there are more limited things we can
	do, and again, Mr. Hamilton has alluded to this. We can have
	mutual recognition. You know, sort of an accountant who is
	licensed to work in the U.S. Aren't they--you know, shouldn't
	they also be qualified to work in the U.K.? Can't we have some
	certification program to make that easier? So I think mutual
	recognition of certain products and services should be a core
	part of trade agreements.
	So, now, beyond those tariffs and dealing with regulatory
	barriers, we have a lot of other issues that have traditionally
	been in trade agreements. Intellectual property and labor and
	the environment have been there for awhile. With the TPP, we
	brought in things like e-commerce and state-owned enterprises.
	All of this complicates the negotiation, and we just need to
	think carefully about what makes the most sense in the context
	of each specific negotiation.
	So, you know, when we are talking about a U.S.-U.K.
	agreement, what should be in there, and, you know, how can that
	serve as a model for other agreements? You know, my personal
	preference is to focus on something like e-commerce. You know,
	a lot of our trade agreements, you know, haven't really adapted
	to the modern era of digital trade, so I think there is more we
	can do on e-commerce. But I do think we need to think carefully
	about what are all the elements that should be in there, what
	maybe could be excluded from the U.K. to get a trade agreement
	done more quickly and not go down the road of the TPP or TTIP
	where at the end of the day we don't have it.
	Mr. Rooney. Thank you.
	I would also like to ask Dr. Gardiner a question here. I
	have got a little more time. Thank you for taking time to be
	here. As a banker and investor, I am especially concerned--and
	knowing London's preeminent position in the financial world, I
	am concerned about the asymmetries between the horrendous Dodd-
	Frank regulations and the free market capitalism of London,
	how, in this trade agreement process, can we resolve that, and
	do you have any advice for us what the Congress might do to
	reduce that asymmetry?
	Mr. Gardiner. That is a very good--that is a very good
	question. And it should be pointed out the city of London is
	far bigger in terms of its financial clout than all of the
	other major European Union financial centers combined. And the
	city of London has prospered extremely well outside of the
	European single currency and I believe will continue to prosper
	outside of the European Union. And you do raise, you know, an
	important question about asymmetry, and that is going to be, I
	think, a very, you know, significant issue in terms of the
	negotiations.
	In my view, I believe that on both sides it is in the
	interest of the U.S. and British negotiators to ensure that
	U.S. investment can flow through the city of London and,
	similarly, for British investment to flow into New York and
	other U.S. financial centers. This is a tremendous creator of
	jobs and prosperity in the United States and also for the
	British people as well. There is a great deal at stake, and
	London and New York are the world's two largest financial
	centers, and no center in Europe can even compare to either of
	those. And it is in both sides interest to ensure that there
	are no barriers in place to doing--conducting deals between the
	two most important financial centers in the world.
	Mr. Rooney. Thank you. I yield back, sir.
	Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman.
	The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr.
	Boyle.
	Mr. Boyle. Thank you. And I thank the chairman and the
	ranking members of the subcommittees for holding this important
	hearing today.
	I first wrote to Chairman Royce and Ranking Member Engel
	back in April, some 9 months ago requesting a hearing on what
	was then the possibility of Brexit. This is about 2 months
	before the--yeah, 2 months before the vote at that point,
	because I was concerned that many people in this town and on
	this side of the Atlantic were not taking the threat of a
	potential Brexit vote very seriously. And since late June, when
	that vote was made, I have been pushing for a hearing, because
	it will have great effect, not just on the U.K. and the EU, but
	also, of course, on the United States.
	While I respect the right of the British voters to, of
	course, peacefully determine their own future as it relates to
	Europe and the rest of the world, and I look forward to
	maintaining the strong relationship that the U.S. and the U.K.
	currently enjoy, I do find Brexit deeply concerning for a
	number of reasons.
	First, there is the question that some of my colleagues
	have mentioned on the future of the European Union itself.
	After centuries and centuries of warfare, the last 70 years
	that we have seen in Europe is the greatest time of peace and
	prosperity in the history of the continent. The European Union
	has played a incredibly important role in that integration, and
	anything that would threaten that is a threat not only to
	Europe, but frankly, the peace and prosperity that this country
	has enjoyed over that same period of time.
	Second, Brexit does affect the U.K.'s overall influence
	within the EU. This is an issue, obviously, for the U.K., but
	it is also an issue for the United States. There are times in
	the 1980s, and especially when Tony Blair was prime minister,
	when the U.K.'s influence within the EU was able to benefit the
	U.S. and U.S. foreign policy interests. Will that now be
	jeopardized as the U.K. takes a step back from being a member
	of Europe?
	Third, and the issue that hasn't been raised at all here
	today, I believe that it is a responsibility of the United
	States as one of the three guarantors of the Good Friday
	Agreement to make sure that there is nothing about Brexit that
	threatens the Good Friday Agreement.
	The exit of the U.K. from the EU potentially threatens the
	commitment of the U.K. to human rights, brings in to question
	funding for peace-building initiatives in Northern Ireland, of
	which the European Union has been a major contributor, and the
	common travel area between Ireland and Northern Ireland. There
	simply cannot be any backsliding into the bad old days of
	border checkpoints.
	So my question is to Mr. Hamilton. Given the outsized role
	that immigration and open borders had in fueling the Brexit
	vote and the potential tough line the EU will take in
	negotiations, how can the U.K. really negotiate a<greek-l>,
	quote, deg. ``no hard border'' on that which is their only land
	border that exists between the EU and the U.K.?
	Mr. Hamilton. Thank you. Well, that is one more issue that
	will have to be resolved. It is unclear, I think, particularly
	to people in Ireland, about the impact of Brexit on their
	border and on this common travel space. Prime Minister May has
	said while it is a clean Brexit, as she said, they do want some
	sort of more porous arrangements between Northern Ireland and
	Ireland. How that will work is very unclear, given the British
	Government's attitude to really checking flows of people. So I
	think it is just one more detail that is unresolved.
	Again, back to, as you said, we have a stake in some of
	this because of the role we played in bringing peace to that
	region, but we also have an economic stake. Ireland is also a
	major base for American companies exporting not only to Europe
	but to the rest of the world. American companies based in
	Ireland export more into world than, you know, companies in
	Mexico do. I mean, it is a major base. And if that is again
	unsettled, it is an interest that we have to look to.
	So our interest is to make sure these things progress in
	some mutually reinforcing way that advance our own interests.
	That means we have to play an active role, not dictating to the
	other parties what should happen, but to make sure that our
	interests are made clear and we are seen as defending the
	rights of the American workers and consumers and companies. And
	the U.K.-Ireland relationship is one more unsettled issue that
	we have a very strong stake in.
	Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman.
	The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
	Issa. I wasn't going to put you in Colorado yet, but----
	Mr. Issa. Well, you know, last night I was honored to be
	with a gentleman from Colorado who is going to be our next
	Supreme Court justice, so I feel very Colorado right now. Of
	course, I am from the 9th Circuit, so I'm jealous of the 10th
	Circuit at times too.
	Dr. Gardiner, in the last round of questioning, things
	devolved into British or England versus Ireland, but I want to
	bring you back to the U.S. versus Great Britain as there are
	opportunities. One of the reasons that the transatlantic trade
	deal was never going to happen is they waited on agricultural
	issues till the end.
	Can you tell me, in your opinion, and Mr. Lester, you may
	be able to do too, how much better, easier, or more possible if
	Great Britain leaves--when Great Britain leaves the European
	Union, will it be for us to resolve some of the perennial
	issues of GMOs and other aspects that often make it impossible
	for U.S. agricultural products to have a fair opportunity to
	enter those markets?
	Mr. Gardiner. Thank you for your question, Congressman.
	That is a great question to ask.
	I would say, you know, firstly, that with regard to TTIP
	that you mentioned earlier, there were major problems in terms
	of U.S.-EU discussions because of the EU's common agricultural
	policy, which some in Britain would describe as a vast
	protectionist racket basically.
	Mr. Issa. That, we can agree on both sides of the aisle.
	Mr. Gardiner. Yes. And you know, the common agricultural
	policy really is a disastrous policy, in my view. And once
	Britain leaves the European Union, it will not be subject to
	the common agricultural policy. That may impact some British
	farmers, but the common agricultural policy largely serves the
	interest of French farmers actually, rather than British
	farmers.
	The agricultural sector in the United Kingdom is relatively
	small. About 80 percent of the U.K. economy is service
	oriented. Agriculture will be an issue, but I believe that the
	British Government will be advancing really, you know, the
	elimination of all tariff barriers. They will be looking not to
	have a system of subsidies in place for farmers as it currently
	is with regard to the European Union.
	So I do believe there will be a lot of areas of common
	interest there. There will be, of course, frank detailed
	discussions on this that may be difficult at times, but I think
	the barriers involved in those discussions are far, far less
	significant than they are with regard to the TTIP.
	Mr. Issa. Well, in following up on that, and Mr. Lester may
	be able to weigh in too, there are always two agricultural
	issues. There is the agricultural principal products, meat,
	poultry, and so on, but there is also the enhanced technologies
	the United States leads the world in, in enhancing the yield
	for farmers.
	How would you contrast where you think Great Britain would
	be on a willingness--and this is a democracy's question--a
	willingness to begin looking at technologies that enhance
	yield? Because one of the reasons for the disparity between
	Great Britain's production and the U.S. production is historic
	land. It is a smaller, rockier environment, but it is also the
	fact that the seed and other technologies are not accepted
	sometimes in the European continent that are used commonly here
	to increase yield.
	Mr. Lester. It is hard to say anything definitive about it
	because the U.K. hasn't had to make these decisions in a long
	time. It has all been outsourced to the European commission, to
	the EU institutions to do this. And so we are left with, you
	know, sort of looking at what U.K. consumers have said,
	consumer groups, what their farm groups say and try to
	speculate about it.
	I agree with Dr. Gardiner. It would be better dealing with
	the U.K. than it has been dealing with the EU, but how much
	better? I mean, you know, to get into specifics, can we sell
	hormone-treated beef in the U.K.? You know, can we sell all
	these--as you point out, there is advanced technology products,
	GMOs. Can we sell those in the U.K.? Will we be able to?
	I think there is a better chance. I would like to see this
	process go forward. I am hopeful. But I recognize that, you
	know, throughout Europe, there are--there are concerns that
	people express, some legitimate, some not, some just purely
	protectionist, and so I think there is no way to know until we
	try. Let's give it a shot. Let's make our best arguments for
	why these products are safe. Let's see what they say.
	I do think we have to be careful. If it is the U.S.
	Government pushing this view on the U.K., there will be people
	there who react badly.
	Mr. Issa. Sure.
	Mr. Lester. So I think there is a way to do it where, you
	know, the companies come forward with evidence: Here is our
	products and here is why they are safe, and I think that can
	help.
	Mr. Issa. And that may be ultimately what we talk about in
	a process to get to those approvals. But let me close with one
	question.
	Intellectual property. We have tried to harmonize
	intellectual property, including copyright and others, in the
	last agreement and around the world, and we failed. Quite
	frankly, in some cases, we are less progressive than Europe.
	How do you see the smaller bilateral agreement giving us
	the ability to harmonize on patent, trademark, and copyright?
	Mr. Lester. Well, it is harder to harmonize because we do
	it on a bilateral basis, you are doing it, you know, one-on-
	one, and you might end up with 20 agreements that say slightly
	different things, depending on who you are negotiating with. So
	I think that is a definite harm, a definite problem with taking
	a bilateral approach. At the same time, maybe we have more
	leverage and so we can push a little bit harder on specific
	issues.
	Mr. Issa. Well, let me just give you an example. If
	terrestrial radio play in the United Kingdom, the Beatles or
	the Beach Boys or anybody gets a royalty. In the United States,
	they don't. In a harmonized world where we are trying to bring
	that together, is that, for example, something that could be on
	the table that would be much more difficult when you are
	looking at 22 nations or whatever number?
	Mr. Lester. That is right. First of all, everything is on
	the table, but, yes, if we have specific interests in common
	with the U.K. on these issues, we can use that as a model. We
	can put that--we can set a precedent in the U.S.-U.K. trade
	agreement to say, look, this is now binding international law.
	We have it in the text here. Now let's try to push it on to
	other countries to do. We can certainly take that approach with
	that issue or other similar ones.
	Mr. Issa. Excellent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Mr. Poe. The gentleman yields back.
	The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Florida, Ms.
	Frankel.
	Ms. Frankel. Thank you, Mr. Poe. Thank you, gentlemen.
	So let me just start by saying, I hope that Brexit was not
	just a extreme nationalistic reaction with unintended
	consequences of gigantic proportions because this is not just a
	simple divorce. The way I am looking at this, there is a lot of
	children and a lot of property out there, right?
	So--and it sounds very complicated with a lot of moving
	parts, so but getting away from the politics, my first question
	is what do you see in terms of the new gateway? If Great
	Britain is divorcing itself from the European Union, and so
	much of our business has to do with the--what is the current
	situation, do you--what country, if any, or countries do you
	see as becoming the new gateway?
	Mr. Gardiner. If I could respond to your question.
	Ms. Frankel. Yes.
	Mr. Gardiner. And I think that, you know, regardless of,
	you know, Brexit, U.S. investment will continue to flow into
	Great Britain. Great Britain will continue to be the gateway
	for U.S. companies operating in Europe. In fact, I would argue
	actually that, you know, with the strength of the British
	economy, Britain is the fastest growing economy in the G7, and
	the economic outlook actually for Brexit, Britain is extremely
	positive. That is good news for U.S. companies and investors.
	And just as Britain thrived outside of the European single
	currency, many warned at that time that Britain would lose a
	lot of U.S. business, for example, by staying out of the euro,
	but quite the opposite happened, actually. And I think that you
	will see U.S. companies continuing to invest in a major way in
	the United Kingdom. After all, there is $5 trillion worth of
	U.S. corporate assets in the United Kingdom. That is 22 percent
	of all U.S. overseas corporate assets. I expect that to grow in
	the coming years.
	Ms. Frankel. Do you gentlemen agree?
	Mr. Lester. I would--I mean, I agree in the sense that,
	yes, there will still be continued investment in the U.K. But
	if your question is, if U.S. companies want to participate in
	the single market, want to be part of the single market, where
	else in the EU might they invest in order to be able to do
	that? Just off the top of my head, I mean, Ireland is a prime
	candidate, and I know a lot of U.S. companies, you know, set up
	operations there.
	You also look at maybe places like Germany, because it is
	so big, or the Netherlands, but I think it is a great question.
	It is not something I had thought about before. I don't know
	if--you know, a lot of what we are talking about today is kind
	of speculative so, you know, those are sort of my initial
	speculations.
	Mr. Hamilton. This relates back to the point that the terms
	between the U.K. and the EU will affect U.S. corporate
	decisions. So the U.K. is the gateway to the rest of Europe for
	many companies. American companies and our trade negotiators
	will want to know how open is that gateway, how wide is it, how
	strong is it going forward before they want to make their own
	investment decisions? I agree there will continue to be U.S.
	flows, but again, this is not an exclusive thing.
	U.S. investment in the Netherlands is greater than in
	Britain. Ireland, as I mention, is another--the next biggest
	investment location. If the gateway is cracked and if it is not
	so open and it is not very wide, then they will make other
	decisions. There are already many alternatives. On the
	financial services, I think you will look to other centers like
	Frankfurt, which is the heart of the eurozone to benefit from
	U.S. corporate decisions.
	So it is very speculative, as was said. But again, I come
	back to the basic point. We cannot look at this in some
	exclusive bilateral way. There are many other factors that will
	affect the position and the future of U.S. corporate presence
	in Europe and in the U.K.
	Ms. Frankel. So let me--I see we only have 37 seconds, so
	maybe you can--I think I am the only one left, right?
	Mr. Poe. Yes, you are.
	Ms. Frankel. I am between them and lunch here.
	One of the--so just following from that, Dr. Hamilton, what
	are some practical consequences for American businesses as we
	wait for a decision? What is some action?
	Mr. Hamilton. Business usually doesn't like uncertainty or
	volatility. So I agree, if we can have some discussions
	bilaterally with the U.K., I think that helps. I think if we
	can have other discussions with the EU colleagues, that helps.
	And we need to understand the state of the U.K.-EU discussions
	to be able to provide some sort of sense of orientation.
	My point is this will go on for a number of years. It is
	not something we can resolve easily now. And we should
	understand that, as you said, Brexit has set forth now a whole
	series of interconnected pieces of a puzzle, and we should be
	very clear about U.S. interests on all of those pieces going
	forward and that each piece of that stool, as I said, the
	transatlantic stool have to be strong and sturdy. That is the
	fundamental U.S. interest going forward, to convey some
	reassurance, not only to our allies, but also to our own
	companies and workers.
	Ms. Frankel. Thank you.
	I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chair
	Mr. Poe. I thank the lady from Florida.
	Without objection, a letter from the Software and
	Information Industry Association supporting the bilateral
	agreement between the U.K. and the U.S. will be admitted into
	the record for all purposes.
	I want to thank all the witnesses for being here. I think
	it has been a very informative discussion. I am just glad I am
	not involved in trying to make an agreement between anybody
	now, but thank you for your expertise. And this subcommittee is
	adjourned.
	[Whereupon, at 11:58 p.m., the subcommittees were
	adjourned.]

	A P P E N D I X

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