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| <title> - [H.A.S.C. No. 114-120] HEARING ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017 AND OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION</title> | |
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| [House Hearing, 114 Congress] | |
| [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] | |
| [H.A.S.C. No. 114-120] | |
| HEARING | |
| ON | |
| NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT | |
| FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017 | |
| AND | |
| OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS | |
| BEFORE THE | |
| COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES | |
| HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES | |
| ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS | |
| SECOND SESSION | |
| __________ | |
| SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING | |
| ON | |
| THE MISSILE DEFEAT POSTURE AND | |
| STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES-- | |
| THE FISCAL YEAR 2017 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET REQUEST | |
| __________ | |
| HEARING HELD | |
| APRIL 14, 2016 | |
| [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] | |
| ______ | |
| U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE | |
| 20-080 WASHINGTON : 2017 | |
| ----------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing | |
| Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; | |
| DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, | |
| Washington, DC 20402-0001 | |
| SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES | |
| MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman | |
| TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JIM COOPER, Tennessee | |
| DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Vice Chair LORETTA SANCHEZ, California | |
| MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado RICK LARSEN, Washington | |
| MO BROOKS, Alabama JOHN GARAMENDI, California | |
| JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma MARK TAKAI, Hawaii | |
| J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska | |
| ROB BISHOP, Utah PETE AGUILAR, California | |
| MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio | |
| JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana | |
| Tim Morrison, Counsel | |
| Leonor Tomero, Counsel | |
| Mike Gancio, Clerk | |
| C O N T E N T S | |
| ---------- | |
| Page | |
| <greek-l>STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS | |
| Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Ranking | |
| Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces....................... 0 | |
| Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, | |
| Subcommittee on Strategic Forces...............................1 deg. | |
| WITNESSES | |
| Cashman, RDML Edward, USN, Director, Joint Integrated Air and | |
| Missile Defense Organization | |
| Gortney, ADM William E., USN, Commander, North American Aerospace | |
| Defense Command, U.S. Northern Command | |
| McKeon, Hon. Brian P., Principal Deputy Under Secretary of | |
| Defense for Policy, Department of Defense | |
| Pike, Barry J., Program Executive Officer, Missiles and Space, | |
| U.S. Army | |
| Syring, VADM James D., USN, Director, Missile Defense Agency | |
| APPENDIX | |
| Prepared Statements: | |
| Cashman, RDML Edward......................................... 98 | |
| Gortney, ADM William E....................................... 39 | |
| McKeon, Hon. Brian P......................................... 29 | |
| Pike, Barry J................................................ 89 | |
| Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, | |
| Subcommittee on Strategic Forces........................... 27 | |
| Syring, VADM James D......................................... 51 | |
| Documents Submitted for the Record: | |
| [There were no Documents submitted.] | |
| Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing: | |
| Mr. Garamendi................................................ 109 | |
| Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing: | |
| Mr. Bishop................................................... 129 | |
| Mr. Cooper................................................... 128 | |
| Mr. Forbes................................................... 129 | |
| Mr. Rogers................................................... 113 | |
| THE MISSILE DEFEAT POSTURE AND STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES--THE | |
| FISCAL YEAR 2017 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET REQUEST | |
| ---------- | |
| House of Representatives, | |
| Committee on Armed Services, | |
| Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, | |
| Washington, DC, Thursday, April 14, 2016. | |
| The committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in room | |
| 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman | |
| of the subcommittee) presiding. | |
| Mr. Rogers. I call this hearing of the House Armed Services | |
| Subcommittee on Strategic Forces to order. Welcome everybody | |
| here today. Today we are holding an oversight hearing on the | |
| missile defeat posture strategy of the United States, the | |
| fiscal year 2017 President's budget request. | |
| And, unfortunately, votes are going to be called on the | |
| House floor between 3:00 and 3:30. So in order to make sure we | |
| can get to the meat of the hearing, which is the Q and A | |
| period, the ranking member and I have agreed that we are going | |
| to dispense with our opening statements and the witnesses' | |
| opening statements, so they will be submitted for the record in | |
| their entirety, and we will go straight to questions. | |
| [The prepared statements can be found in the Appendix | |
| beginning on page 27.] | |
| Mr. Rogers. We are very fortunate today to have a very | |
| distinguished panel. The witnesses we have are the Honorable | |
| Brian McKeon, Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Defense | |
| Policy, Department of Defense; Admiral Bill Gortney, Commander, | |
| North American Aerospace Defense Command, U.S. Northern | |
| Command; Vice Admiral James Syring, Director, Missile Defense | |
| Agency; Mr. Barry Pike, Principal Executive Officer, Missiles | |
| and Space, U.S. Army; and Rear Admiral Edward Cashman, | |
| Director, Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense | |
| Organization. | |
| And Lieutenant General Mann is here somewhere. Or maybe | |
| not. I think--well, that is for the closed session. That is | |
| right. We will have Lieutenant General Mann here for the closed | |
| session. | |
| All right. And with that, like I said, we will dispense | |
| with the opening statements and I will go directly to | |
| recognizing myself for the first series of questions. | |
| This will be for Admiral Syring and Admiral Gortney. Is the | |
| Iran ballistic missile threat to the region, including Israel | |
| or the United States, slowing in any respect since last year? | |
| Admiral Gortney, would you like to go first? | |
| Admiral Gortney. Sir, we have seen, as a result of JCPOA | |
| [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action], the nuclear issue | |
| temporarily, potentially permanently, taken off the table, but | |
| we see them to continue to develop the propellent, the rocket | |
| motor, and we assume they are continuing to develop a reentry | |
| vehicle. So we see, of the three pieces that they need, a | |
| nuclear weapon miniaturized to put on it, a delivery-capable | |
| booster, and a reentry vehicle. We don't see the latter two | |
| being slowed. | |
| Mr. Rogers. Admiral Syring, did you want to offer anything | |
| in addition to that? | |
| Admiral Syring. I agree. I do not see it slowing in any | |
| way. | |
| Mr. Rogers. Great. Admiral Syring, we often talk about the | |
| combatant commanders and military services for the unfunded | |
| requirements list. Do you have an unfunded requirements list? | |
| Admiral Syring. So there are gaps in the BMDS [Ballistic | |
| Missile Defense System], but our---- | |
| Mr. Rogers. Please pull the microphone closer. | |
| Admiral Syring. Sure. There are gaps in the BMDS currently | |
| that are not funded, and they include advanced technology, a | |
| space layer, and additional sensor capability as well. | |
| Mr. Rogers. What funding do you require to meet the | |
| combatant command requirement for THAAD [Terminal High Altitude | |
| Area Defense] and SM-3s [Standard Missile 3]? | |
| Admiral Syring. I am building seven THAAD batteries. The | |
| stated requirement from the Army is nine. So I have a two- | |
| battery gap today to the stated requirement. I am building at a | |
| rate to fill out the seven batteries by the end of the FYDP | |
| [Future Years Defense Plan]. | |
| Mr. Rogers. What about the Aegis system? | |
| Admiral Syring. The Aegis system, 33 BMD [ballistic missile | |
| defense] ships today, going to over 40 by the end of 2020, | |
| 2021; SM-3s, IAs and IBs, about 170 on path to 415 through the | |
| FYDP. I do not have an end inventory objective yet for Aegis. | |
| Mr. Rogers. Great. Are you funded to develop and deploy | |
| defense against boost-glide missiles like those being developed | |
| by Russia and China? How much would such development cost? | |
| Admiral Syring. I am not funded. | |
| Mr. Rogers. How much would it cost to do that? | |
| Admiral Syring. I have asked for $23 million to begin a | |
| low-power laser demonstrator this year to demonstrate the | |
| feasibility by 2021. | |
| Mr. Rogers. And let's see. Mr. Pike, I would like to call | |
| your attention to the screens. You will see red, yellow, and | |
| green highlighted areas which represent different decades of | |
| key systems to the current Patriot radar employed by the U.S. | |
| forces. I note these are the systems employed by the U.S. and | |
| not our partner nations in the Patriot program. | |
| [The graphics referred to are retained in the subcommittee | |
| files and can be viewed upon request.] | |
| Mr. Rogers. If the green represents the radar hardware that | |
| is with 1990s vintage, which are expected to be obsolete in | |
| 2010, and it is now 2016, of course, would I be correct to say | |
| that even under your radar digital processor programs, some of | |
| the newest equipment in the radar, in this radar, the green | |
| shaded area, will be older than any air defender who uses it? | |
| Mr. Pike. Sir, I haven't done the math on that, but it is | |
| aging technology, sir. | |
| Mr. Rogers. So if I am correct, and we are to assume that | |
| 2028 initial funding of a new Patriot radar will occur, we will | |
| have a radar system with components, in some cases, that are 58 | |
| years old? | |
| Mr. Pike. Sir, we are continuing to modify and request | |
| funds to modify the existing Patriot radar until we are able to | |
| field the lower tier air missile defense sensor. The schedule | |
| is not really established yet. It is 2028. The Army is meeting | |
| this afternoon as a part of the Army Requirements Oversight | |
| Council to establish the actual operational requirement. And | |
| once that operational requirement is established, we will be | |
| able to assess the maturity of the technology against the | |
| requirement. And so that schedule that you have seen is not set | |
| in stone. | |
| Mr. Rogers. But you see what I have described. It is | |
| completely unacceptable. Aren't there systems that we have | |
| available that have been developed already that could meet the | |
| needs that this system should be meeting that are available for | |
| us to access from the private marketplace? | |
| Mr. Pike. Sir, the Army conducted an analysis of | |
| alternatives. It was a very broad analysis across all the | |
| department, assessed all the available radars within the | |
| Department of Defense, modifications to those existing radars | |
| and the new radars all together. That analysis of alternatives | |
| is complete through the Army. However, it is within OSD [Office | |
| of the Secretary of Defense] for a sufficiency evaluation. And, | |
| again, once that analysis of alternatives is complete and | |
| delivered to the Congress as a part of the law, then we will be | |
| able to go forward with an acquisition strategy, and a formal | |
| schedule, and a materiel solution, none of which we have | |
| currently today. | |
| Mr. Rogers. I just want to be clear. Speaking only for | |
| myself, I am not turning loose of this one. It is going to have | |
| to be remedied. | |
| Admiral Syring, if MDA [Missile Defense Agency] was | |
| developing and procuring these radars with the missile--with | |
| the acquisitions authorities you have, how much time would it | |
| take for you to take care--or take care of this problem? | |
| Admiral Syring. Mr. Chairman, I haven't---- | |
| Mr. Rogers. Please pull the mike. | |
| Admiral Syring. I haven't looked at their specific | |
| technology, their specific schedule, but I can talk to what we | |
| did with LRDR [Long Range Discrimination Radar], which is the | |
| current radar that is under contract today, where we had a very | |
| defined requirement from the Joint Staff and had that under our | |
| umbrella, had the technology proven actually through the Navy's | |
| AMDR [Air and Missile Defense Radar] competition. So we didn't | |
| have to go through any of the Milestone A to B activity. It is | |
| going to take us 6\1/2\ years from start to finish. | |
| Mr. Rogers. Okay. With that, I yield to the ranking member | |
| for any questions he may have. | |
| Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. | |
| Admiral Syring, the level of funding for MDA is lower than | |
| in previous years. Can you explain this reduction for fiscal | |
| year 2017? | |
| Admiral Syring. Sir, it is lower and it is part of the | |
| overall DOD [Department of Defense] top line reduction as well. | |
| My share of that has lowered, you know, not an equal | |
| percentage, but a similar percentage. | |
| Mr. Cooper. Admiral, do you support successfully flight | |
| testing the redesigned kill vehicle before making a final | |
| production decision? | |
| Admiral Syring. Completely. | |
| Mr. Cooper. Again, Admiral Syring, is the schedule-driven | |
| requirement of deploying 44 ground-based interceptors driving | |
| undue risk in concurrency for acquiring and upgrading the | |
| interceptors? | |
| Admiral Syring. No, sir. We will flight test the last | |
| configuration that will complete the 44 by 2017 in a very | |
| complex ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] intercept | |
| test later this year. | |
| Mr. Cooper. Admiral Gortney, do you remain confident in the | |
| national missile defense system's capability? The Government | |
| Accountability Office stated in its February 2016 report that, | |
| quote, ``several key aspects of missile defense have not been | |
| demonstrated through flight testing,'' end of quote. Do you | |
| agree? | |
| Admiral Gortney. Sir, I am confident of the systems that I | |
| am responsible for, the ballistic missile defense for the | |
| homeland, and that---- | |
| Mr. Cooper. Is your mike on? | |
| Admiral Gortney [continuing]. And that--the ballistic | |
| missile defense for the homeland that I work with MDA, and also | |
| the National Capital Region-Integrated Air and Missile Defense | |
| System, high confidence in its ability to engage the threats | |
| that it is designed to go against. | |
| Mr. Cooper. Admiral Gortney and Admiral Syring, how many | |
| successful flight intercept tests are needed to demonstrate | |
| that interceptors work as intended and are reliable? | |
| Admiral Syring. Sir, going forward, we have scheduled and | |
| it is funded in the program to test before we field. For | |
| example, the version that will go in next year will be flight | |
| tested later this year. For the redesigned kill vehicle, we | |
| have a nonintercept flight test and then an intercept flight | |
| test followed by a second intercept flight test in 2020 before | |
| that configuration will be fielded. | |
| Mr. Cooper. So two successful flight tests make it | |
| reliable? | |
| Admiral Syring. It will be one nonintercept test, which we | |
| will learn a lot, and then two intercept tests. And based on | |
| the engineering that we get from the flight tests, along with | |
| the ground testing that we will do, it will be a complete body | |
| of evidence that will give us confidence in a decision to go to | |
| full production. | |
| Mr. Cooper. Admiral Syring, what is the appropriate level | |
| of investment for boost phase missile defense? | |
| Admiral Syring. I don't know, is the answer, sir. And I | |
| don't know because I need to get to a technology feasibility | |
| demonstration with some confidence in the next 4 to 5 years to | |
| go prove that it is, one, technically feasible and, two, the | |
| cost estimates that I am getting from industry for a long-term | |
| program are affordable. | |
| Mr. Cooper. Mr. Pike, it is kind of shocking that the plan | |
| for Patriot modernization is expected to take 12 years, and | |
| that is assuming, I guess, you get approval this afternoon from | |
| your committee. I join in the chairman's assessment we need to | |
| do what we can to make that much faster. | |
| All witnesses, should we start building an east coast | |
| missile defense site? | |
| Mr. McKeon. Mr. Cooper, we are aware of the requirement in | |
| the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] to look at this | |
| and have something for a radar by 2020, and we have done the | |
| work on environmental impact statement [EIS] for a possible | |
| east coast site pursuant to a prior NDAA. It is not where we | |
| would spend our next dollar in this budget, but it is something | |
| we will be postured to do after the EIS, if a decision is made | |
| to do that. | |
| Mr. Cooper. Any other opinions? | |
| Admiral Syring. I will speak before the commander. | |
| Not at this time. Not this year, is the way I would | |
| respond. | |
| Mr. Cooper. Admiral Syring, a final question. Would | |
| upgrading the Hawaii-based Aegis Ashore testing facility to a | |
| fully operational site improve U.S. missile defense in the | |
| region? | |
| Admiral Syring. Yes, sir, potentially. Any sensor | |
| improvement for Hawaii and, frankly, in the kill chain for the | |
| BMDS, you know, east and west will improve our sensor and | |
| discrimination capability. | |
| Mr. Cooper. But you are talking sensors, not missiles? | |
| Admiral Syring. Sensors first, sir, yes. | |
| Mr. Cooper. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. | |
| Mr. Lamborn [presiding]. Representative Franks. | |
| Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank all of | |
| you. Thank you those that are wearing uniform for your | |
| commitment to protecting America and human freedom. I never | |
| want to miss that moment to tell you how much we appreciate | |
| you. | |
| Admiral Syring, I for one am very grateful that a man of | |
| your acumen is in the position that he is in. In 2011, the | |
| Institute for Defense Analyses conducted a study, and in it, it | |
| concluded a space-based interceptor layer would help defend | |
| against the more challenging missile threats, including direct | |
| ascent antisatellite missiles and antiship missiles. Now, I | |
| know that it is imperative that at the right times we time the | |
| development of these things. It is always good to be looking at | |
| them and being potentially aware of the challenges that we may | |
| face. But can you explain to this committee why this capability | |
| might someday be important and it might be helpful to defend | |
| not only our satellites, but potentially against antiship | |
| missiles? | |
| Admiral Syring. Mr. Franks, we have not in the recent years | |
| studied that in great detail. We have done some costing | |
| analysis of what a program may take and have some idea of the | |
| technical challenges to the said interceptor layer. Obviously, | |
| fielded interceptors in space worldwide from 20, 30 years ago, | |
| work had been done to show that that could help, but, sir, we | |
| haven't looked at it in the Department other than costing it | |
| against the range of alternatives. And, frankly, the cost has | |
| been overwhelming on what it would take and the technical | |
| challenges. | |
| Mr. Franks. Yeah. Well, I guess that might be part of why | |
| some of us would kind of like to begin to reorient at least our | |
| awareness in that direction. | |
| As detailed in a 2014 ``Defense One'' article, in both 2007 | |
| and 2014, China, as I know you well know, tested rockets to | |
| launch kinetic kill vehicles against satellites in low and high | |
| orbits respectively. And both of these tests appear to indicate | |
| that they have the capability to attack our space assets. And | |
| in defending U.S. space assets against those direct ascent | |
| antisatellite weapons, is that something that defending these | |
| assets is ultimately included in the MDA mission? | |
| Admiral Syring. Sir, if we can defer the answer to | |
| classified session, I think we would---- | |
| Mr. Franks. All right. | |
| Admiral Syring [continuing]. Have a very constructive | |
| discussion on that point. | |
| Mr. Franks. Okay. Would it be appropriate to ask if any | |
| other agency has any concurrent mission in research and | |
| development against to--the means to defend against these types | |
| of weapons? | |
| Admiral Syring. Sir, if I can defer that to a classified | |
| session as well. | |
| Mr. Franks. Okay. So let me rephrase this here a little, | |
| because I think you are absolutely right. But it is appropriate | |
| in this setting to suggest that a ballistic missile defense | |
| layer in space would provide not just the U.S. the ultimate | |
| high ground, it could provide a means to defending our space | |
| systems from these ballistic ASATs [antisatellite weapons]. Is | |
| that correct? | |
| Admiral Syring. Sir, if it could--if it was technologically | |
| feasible and affordable, which I think both, in my mind---- | |
| Mr. Franks. Important question. | |
| Admiral Syring [continuing]. At this point are no; the | |
| answer would be yes to your question. I have serious concerns | |
| about the technical feasibility of interceptors in space, and I | |
| have serious concerns about the long-term affordability of a | |
| program like that. | |
| Admiral Gortney. But, sir, that does not mean that the | |
| Department is not looking at another alternative to go after | |
| that problem set. There may be another mechanism, another way | |
| to do that, and I know the Department is working on that. | |
| Mr. Franks. Would you suggest that there is some efficacy | |
| in maintaining an eye on that possibility? | |
| Admiral Gortney. It is a little bit out of my lane here, | |
| but, of course. We are going to look at what is the requirement | |
| and then what is the way, the mechanism that gives us the best | |
| value that is the most effective in order to solve that | |
| particular problem set. And sometimes one overarching system | |
| may be technically very hard and very expensive. But we can | |
| talk to the other mechanisms we are using when we go | |
| classified, sir. | |
| Mr. Franks. Okay. And at this time--well, yeah. Perhaps I | |
| would be running into the same challenge. | |
| So, Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield back here. And thank | |
| you all. | |
| Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Representative Garamendi. | |
| Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. And first, I apologize for not | |
| being here for the opening statements. So I may be covering | |
| some turf already handled. | |
| Missile defense can be done in a couple of different ways. | |
| The one I want to really focus on is directed energy. We have | |
| talked about that in both classified and in open hearing. In | |
| this open hearing, can you bring me up to date on where we are | |
| with the directed energy issue? | |
| Admiral Syring. Yes, sir. Working on two primary | |
| technologies within MDA, the DPALs [diode pumped alkali laser] | |
| technology that is being risk mitigated out at Livermore and | |
| fiber combined laser technology at MIT [Massachusetts Institute | |
| of Technology]. And, frankly, industry has been brought in over | |
| the last year to 18 months in a big way in terms of what they | |
| could potentially do with laser technology. We have asked this | |
| year for funding support for a low-power laser demonstrator to | |
| start this year to test in the 2020, 2021 timeframe to go prove | |
| directed energy in a boost phase mode. | |
| Mr. Garamendi. How much money have you asked for? | |
| Admiral Syring. $23 million in fiscal year 2017 budget. | |
| Mr. Garamendi. Did you miss some zeros? | |
| Admiral Syring. No, sir. The---- | |
| Mr. Garamendi. And what will the $23 million do? | |
| Admiral Syring. The 5-year program is $278 million; $23 | |
| million is the initial increment of funding required to get | |
| concepts and contractors awarded. | |
| Mr. Garamendi. And that is requested for this year's | |
| budget? | |
| Admiral Syring. That is correct, sir. | |
| Mr. Garamendi. I recall something--didn't we do that last | |
| year also? | |
| Admiral Syring. Last year as well, sir. | |
| Mr. Garamendi. Did you get it? | |
| Admiral Syring. No, sir. | |
| Mr. Garamendi. It was in---- | |
| Admiral Syring. It was not appropriated. It was supported | |
| by this committee and the authorizers, both House and Senate, | |
| but was not appropriated. | |
| Mr. Garamendi. Did the House appropriate it? | |
| Admiral Syring. I will have to take that for the record in | |
| terms of what their mark was before conference, but in the end, | |
| it was---- | |
| [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix | |
| on page 109.] | |
| Mr. Garamendi. Well, I guess I am looking for names. | |
| Admiral Syring. Sir---- | |
| Mr. Garamendi. Who killed it? | |
| Admiral Syring. So, sir, part of this is this is new, it | |
| was new last year, and I think there has been an education | |
| required on our part to go explain to people exactly what this | |
| demonstrator will do and that it is not a new airborne laser | |
| 747 project, which actually had benefit. But this is a very | |
| much smaller scale demonstration to inform a future program, | |
| and that is all. There is nothing more, nothing less. And I | |
| believe industry is capable of competing and fielding a | |
| technology demonstrator. | |
| Mr. Garamendi. We have a classified session. I will wait | |
| till that point. Thank you. | |
| Mr. Rogers. The gentleman yields back. | |
| The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. | |
| Lamborn, for 5 minutes. | |
| Mr. Lamborn. Yeah. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. | |
| And, Admiral Syring, I would like to ask you about foreign | |
| military sales [FMS] of an advanced THAAD system to United Arab | |
| Emirates [UAE], and then get the Department's perspective on | |
| that afterwards. But is that something, if they are willing to | |
| front some of the cost of that, that we can afford? And are | |
| there people on record, and including yourself, perhaps, that | |
| would be in favor of this project? | |
| Admiral Syring. Sure. Right now in the budget, we are at | |
| the beginning concept feasibility level in terms of funding. I | |
| don't have a complete program even in my budget yet for THAAD- | |
| ER [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense-Extended Range]. The-- | |
| or a follow-on THAAD. There is industry concepts on it and, | |
| frankly, some good thinking on that, and that, you know, there | |
| would be policy involvement with this question as well in terms | |
| of either a cooperative development on it or a full FMS case on | |
| a development program. But I don't have a stated requirement | |
| yet from the UAE for this capability. But certainly if we got | |
| it, we would consider that along with policy. | |
| Mr. Lamborn. Yeah, Mr. McKeon. | |
| Mr. McKeon. Mr. Lamborn, as a matter of general policy, our | |
| regional missile defense approach is to seek cooperative | |
| partners. So in theory, we certainly would want to encourage | |
| that kind of cooperation, and as Admiral Syring said, we don't | |
| have a program to go market with the Emirates, and nor have we | |
| gotten a request from them for this. So if we got to that | |
| stage, we would obviously need to look at some technology | |
| releasability issues and the funding issues on each side. But | |
| in theory, it is something we would certainly be open to. | |
| Mr. Lamborn. Okay. That is helpful. Thank you both for | |
| saying that. | |
| And, Admiral Syring, let me shift gears and ask about | |
| concurrency. Both the MDA and special forces have some unique | |
| capabilities in terms of rapid acquisition processes, and I | |
| believe concurrency is part of that. And can you talk about how | |
| that has been helpful to the MDA and what your perspective is? | |
| Admiral Syring. Sir, there has been some great examples | |
| recently that the agency has delivered in terms of meeting both | |
| policy and State Department requirements and combatant | |
| commander requirements. The example that comes to mind is | |
| Romania and how quickly we were able to design, build, produce, | |
| test, and field a system from an announcement that was back in | |
| 2009. And to do that in a foreign country with the cooperation | |
| of the Romanian government, and all of the work that went in | |
| not just with MDA, but whole-of-department approach on this, | |
| including the Army Corps of Engineers, including many parts of | |
| OSD, OSD Policy, it was remarkable in terms of us being able to | |
| do that quickly with contracts--requirements, contracts, award, | |
| and production and fielding. And I believe our authorities | |
| enabled that. | |
| Mr. Lamborn. Well, I for one will go on record and say that | |
| I think this is something we need to examine to make broader | |
| than just MDA and special forces as we talk about acquisition | |
| reform, which the chairman of the full committee, to his | |
| credit, is very much wanting to push. So I think that this is | |
| something we need to look at and expand it within the | |
| Department of Defense. | |
| Admiral Syring. Sir, if I can just--you had also asked | |
| about concurrency. I think that is an important point. I think | |
| that is the risk of what I talked about, to make sure that we | |
| are managing concurrency as we go fast properly and not taking | |
| excessive risk with either technology or funding. | |
| Mr. Lamborn. All right. Very good. | |
| Does anyone else want to comment on that concept? | |
| Okay. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. | |
| Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. | |
| The Chair recognizes Mr. Larsen for 5 minutes. | |
| Mr. Larsen. Thank you. Admiral Syring, you are very popular | |
| this afternoon, but I will warn Secretary McKeon, I have a | |
| question for you, so---- | |
| The first question, though, for admiral is back to Mr. | |
| Cooper's question on RKV [redesigned kill vehicle]. And I | |
| understand how you answered it, but I want you to take a little | |
| bit different approach on this and I want to ask you how are | |
| you reducing acquisition risk itself for the RKV? | |
| Admiral Syring. Yes, sir. Great question. The first--the | |
| first part of acquisition of risk starts with design and system | |
| engineering. And if we rush the cycle we are in now without | |
| proper maturity and without meeting the proper technology or | |
| design gates in terms of deliverables at certain points in the | |
| design, you will fail in the end. | |
| So this foundation that we are building with rigor and | |
| depth on the system engineering that are going into the design | |
| of the RKV is, in my view, the most important part. And what my | |
| direction has been to the team that is working this, which is a | |
| fantastic team, cross-industry team working this, is that we | |
| will not proceed past major design review points if the | |
| deliverables have not been met, and not been delivered, and do | |
| not meet our entrance and exit criterias. And, sir, I can get | |
| this to you. There is a very lengthy entrance and exit criteria | |
| list for all of our design reviews and all of the gates that | |
| this design has to pass through. | |
| And the design maturity in the end, sir, will drive when | |
| this thing is ready for test. I am planning for an end of 2018 | |
| test, but if the design maturity is not such, I will not test | |
| in 2018. And to me, that is where we need to hold the line | |
| here, is early on. And rushing programs through the design | |
| phase, they are absolutely doomed to fail. | |
| Mr. Larsen. Also, we had a conversation earlier. And just | |
| help me understand this issue on THAAD and South Korea from a | |
| technical operational perspective. | |
| Admiral Syring. Yes, sir. I will leave the policy and the | |
| State Department discussion to the Secretary. I will speak to | |
| it from a materiel standpoint. There is no doubt that the | |
| system can provide fantastic coverage capability for not only | |
| our ally there, but our U.S. deployed forces. And I am | |
| confident in the design of that system and its intercept | |
| record. And if the decision were to be made, I stand by that it | |
| is the right materiel solution. | |
| Mr. Larsen. Yeah. Great. Well, then the follow-up is on the | |
| policy, especially now in light of the National Assembly | |
| election yesterday where the president's party lost the | |
| majority and what the implications are. And so where are we | |
| from a policy perspective with the South Koreans? | |
| Mr. McKeon. As you know, Congressman, I think even we | |
| discussed it last time I was here, we have made a decision to | |
| begin the formal consultations with our Korean partners. And I | |
| know there have been some meetings out in Korea looking at the | |
| siting and the funding issues. I am not an expert on Korean | |
| politics. I don't think this changes things for President Park | |
| and her approach to this. So I think we are optimistic we will | |
| get to a decision. I just don't have a timeline for you. | |
| Mr. Larsen. Yeah. Okay. All right. | |
| GAO [Government Accountability Office]? Is GAO here? No. | |
| Okay. So we just have a report from GAO on this. Okay. I have | |
| it right here. That is fine. | |
| Who can answer the question for me, the difference between | |
| what used to be called spiral development and now seems to be | |
| called concurrency? Are those the same things? | |
| Admiral Syring. Let me take that, and then maybe Mr. Pike | |
| can add. When we talk of--when I think about--I will give you | |
| my view. When I think about spiral development, I think about | |
| fielding a capability and then improving the capability over | |
| time. | |
| Concurrency is the initial problem in developing that | |
| initial capability, in terms of assuming too much technical or | |
| cost risk as you develop an end item. And to me, they are two | |
| different things. | |
| Mr. Larsen. Mr. Pike. | |
| Mr. Pike. Sir, I absolutely concur. | |
| Mr. Larsen. You concur with concurrency? | |
| All right. Well, I just--with the few seconds, I just don't | |
| believe we had a very good experience with spiral development. | |
| Others may disagree with me on that. It sort of became a | |
| moniker for getting things in the ground before they were | |
| ready. That is my definition of it. And so I guess I would | |
| differ with a few folks here that concurrency is something that | |
| is different than that. | |
| Admiral Syring. Sir, if I can just comment on that. That we | |
| have testified, I have testified in this committee that the | |
| direction was given to field this system quickly, and that very | |
| foundation that I talked about in terms of maybe doing another | |
| design turn or two before it was fielded, everybody says would | |
| have benefited that program. And everything that we are doing | |
| now is to work to improve what has been fielded, and I believe | |
| we are on the right path. | |
| Mr. Larsen. All right. Thank you. | |
| Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. | |
| The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. | |
| Brooks, for 5 minutes. | |
| Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. | |
| Admiral Gortney and Admiral Syring, am I correct that under | |
| the current plan for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense [GMD] | |
| system, there are no operational spare ground-based | |
| interceptors and that there will not be for at least 5 or 6 | |
| years? | |
| Admiral Syring. Sir, we are--that is a correct statement. | |
| We are using everything that has been put under contract in | |
| terms of materiel buys to make our 44 by 2017, and to have | |
| enough interceptors to do the testing that we need to do over | |
| the next 3 or 4 years. Again, the new design, Mr. Brooks, is | |
| paramount to buying additional interceptors. I do not want to | |
| buy more of the same--of the old design. | |
| Mr. Brooks. In your judgment, when exactly will there be | |
| operational spares based on whatever is best designed? | |
| Admiral Syring. Sir, as part of this budget, our first | |
| priority is to get the redesigned kill vehicle tested and get | |
| the older interceptors, the CE-1 interceptors, recapped with | |
| that new design. And then as we work through that upgrade and | |
| fielding path, there will be spares that are generated in | |
| procurement to have some margin against the current inventory. | |
| Mr. Brooks. Do you have a judgment as to what calendar year | |
| we are talking about before we start building up the inventory | |
| and have operational spares? | |
| Admiral Syring. It will be in the 2025 timeframe most | |
| likely, with our priority being fixing what is in the field | |
| first. | |
| Mr. Brooks. Is there anything that we in Congress should be | |
| doing to expedite the availability of operational spares over | |
| the next 9 years? | |
| Admiral Syring. Sir, I would ask you to wait until we prove | |
| the new kill vehicle design and the new booster design and test | |
| it, and then we can talk about buying beyond what is in the | |
| budget today. | |
| Mr. Brooks. Admiral Gortney, do you have anything to add to | |
| what Admiral Syring has just stated? | |
| Admiral Gortney. No, sir. Again, the priorities that | |
| Admiral Syring has put in place, I fully support. We need to | |
| make that which we have as good as we can possibly make it | |
| while we then go to the next stage, and those are the proper | |
| investments. | |
| Mr. Brooks. All right. Back to Admiral Syring. Yesterday | |
| you mentioned in the Senate Subcommittee on Strategic Forces | |
| that MDA made the decision to pivot back to the GMD program and | |
| to increase the capacity and capability of the Ground-based | |
| Midcourse Defense system. With a decrease of $75 million for | |
| fiscal year 2017, what aspect of the Ground-based Midcourse | |
| Defense system will assume the most risk? | |
| Admiral Syring. Sir, if I can, we pivoted back to 44 by | |
| 2017, the Secretary of Defense made that decision, and we are | |
| implementing it as MDA. That was a 2013 announcement by | |
| Secretary Hagel in March. The 70, I think it was $79 million, | |
| in terms of less funding than what we requested in 2017 for | |
| GMD, there are no components of that that are going to accept | |
| any appreciable risk because of that reduction. | |
| We requested a large amount of funding in 2016 to get many | |
| of the efforts that had not been started in GMD started, and | |
| you have been very supportive of that request. And then over | |
| time, some of those estimates have been refined. In addition, | |
| the cut that we took in the endgame, based on the budget | |
| agreement, in late 2015 had some effect on the GMD program | |
| carrying part of that cut. | |
| Mr. Brooks. North Korea has been testing ballistic missiles | |
| at an unprecedented rate. And with a projected $800 million | |
| reduction to Future Years Defense Program, what capabilities | |
| are we delaying into the future with respect to the ground | |
| systems and fire control on the one hand and the program | |
| operations on the other? | |
| Admiral Syring. We are not delaying anything that we | |
| planned for or programmed in 2016, based on that reduction. | |
| What we are delaying is--or taking a risk with specifically was | |
| increasing the SM-3 procurement. Nothing associated with the | |
| GMD system in terms of the planned modernization of the ground | |
| system, operations and support, safety, any of those aspects | |
| that are mission critical, have not been affected by that. | |
| Sir, I was planning in fiscal year 2016 for $7.8 billion in | |
| 2017. And based on the budget agreement that came down in the | |
| end, at the end of 2015, my number in the President's budget | |
| was reduced to $7.5 billion as my share of the Department cut. | |
| So it is really not 8.3 to 7.5. My President's budget request | |
| in 2016 was actually 8.1. What was enacted was 8.3. So it was-- | |
| my request was 8.1, 7.8. It was enacted at 8.3. I would have | |
| been 7.8 without the budget agreement. Budget agreement kicked | |
| me down $300 million, kicked us down $300 million. | |
| Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. | |
| Thank you, Admiral Syring and Admiral Gortney. | |
| Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. | |
| Admiral Syring, what are the risks of legislating or | |
| setting in stone a requirement to conduct a set number of tests | |
| before the RKV final production decision? | |
| Admiral Syring. Obviously, in this budget, we have a | |
| proposal and in our acquisition strategy that was signed by Mr. | |
| Kendall that there will be one nonintercept and one intercept | |
| test conducted to inform a production decision by him, not me. | |
| There will be another intercept in 2020 that will happen before | |
| really anything is fielded. | |
| I would ask that you let us go through where we are in the | |
| early stages of design and some of the testing of the | |
| components, all of it very methodical and very laid out in | |
| terms of the ground testing that will accompany our confidence | |
| before a flight test, before we legislate that it needs to be | |
| three or four or five flight tests. | |
| I think what will happen, sir, is that certainly at a | |
| minimum of two, the third flight test will give the warfighter | |
| the final confidence that the configuration is ready to be | |
| fielded. And I would say the third flight test, although not | |
| necessary for an acquisition decision, will be an important | |
| point for us before we go start pulling CE-1 interceptors out | |
| of the ground with new RKVs. | |
| Mr. Rogers. Thank you. | |
| The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Hawaii, Mr. | |
| Takai, for 5 minutes. | |
| Mr. Takai. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Admiral Syring, it | |
| is great to see you. | |
| I have questions for you, Admiral. The first is, | |
| alarmingly, this year North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear | |
| test and also launched a satellite into orbit using long-range | |
| ballistic missile technology. From your perspective, is there a | |
| gap when it comes to missile defense for Hawaii right now due | |
| to this threat? | |
| Admiral Syring. If I can ask the commander to speak to | |
| that, sir. | |
| Mr. Takai. Okay. | |
| Admiral Gortney. No, sir, I do not think there is a gap to | |
| that particular threat. We are prepared to engage and protect | |
| Hawaii, Alaska, and all the rest of the States with the | |
| existing system, and have high confidence in its success. | |
| Mr. Takai. Okay. Thank you. | |
| An Advanced Missile Defense Radar, or AMDR, prototype is | |
| being tested at PMRF [Pacific Missile Range Facility] in 2016. | |
| The AMDR radar would provide significant capability to detect | |
| and track advanced long-range ballistic missile threats. The | |
| prototype will be moved from PMRF for combat systems | |
| integration in 2017 unless a replacement radar is funded. I | |
| have submitted an amendment for advanced funding for planning | |
| and design to get a discriminating radar to Hawaii faster. | |
| Are you, Admiral Syring, supportive of this effort? | |
| Admiral Syring. Sir, as you know, Admiral Harris has been | |
| open about the need for additional sensor capability in Hawaii. | |
| And we are obviously very well aware of that requirement and | |
| are looking at what the sensor options could be. But right now | |
| it is a test site, and it has been a very effective test site. | |
| I think it is fair to say that we in the Department will look | |
| at options, to include sensoring, to see if there is a way to | |
| answer the combatant commander's requirement in this area. | |
| Mr. Takai. Okay. Thank you. | |
| And my final question has to do with the transitioning of | |
| this test site from a testing facility to an operational one. | |
| So in order to operationalize the PMRF, and specifically the | |
| Aegis Ashore facility at PMRF in Kauai, a capability already in | |
| place, it must first be certified against the very ICBMs and | |
| the long-range missile technology that North Korea is | |
| developing and testing. What are the plans to do this? | |
| Admiral Syring. Right now there are no plans to do it, sir, | |
| simply. And I would just characterize it a little differently, | |
| if I can, sir, in terms of the sensor sort of options in that | |
| part of the discussion with Admiral Harris is what additional | |
| sensor capability can we provide the existing Ground-based | |
| Midcourse Defense system in terms of more capability against a | |
| more complex threat for Hawaii specifically. And that is the | |
| discussion that I think needs to happen. And right now there | |
| are no plans moving forward outside the Department to do that. | |
| Not that we haven't heard and don't understand the combatant | |
| commander's desire; it is a matter of what materiel solutions | |
| are available and when, and how much do they cost, frankly. And | |
| then what are the operational impacts, what are the secondary | |
| effects. Operationalizing an Aegis Ashore site is no easy step. | |
| There would be many parts of that in that equation. | |
| And, sir, I don't know if you want to add. | |
| Admiral Gortney. We cover Hawaii today with the sensors | |
| that we have. But one of our key investment strategies in the | |
| way ahead is sensors improvement, because if we get sensor | |
| improvement, not just for Hawaii, but for the entire system, | |
| for the east coast as well, then we drive our effectiveness up, | |
| which drives our reliability way up, which drives our costs | |
| down, when we get that sensor discrimination that we need to | |
| continue to outpace the threat. So where the threat is today, | |
| with the investments that we have, we are confident we can | |
| continue to protect all of the States. And should that change, | |
| then we will adjust fires on that investment strategy. | |
| Mr. Takai. Right. So for us in Hawaii, as well as | |
| discussions occurring in the media, and I think Admiral Harris | |
| has been part of those discussions, there is some indication of | |
| support and interest in operationalizing the facility on Kauai, | |
| number one, and, number two, to use the Aegis Ashore platform | |
| as the way forward. | |
| I guess my question is--oh. I don't have--let me just say | |
| this. I think we can't wait until North Korea launches | |
| something that has precision that can detect and hit something | |
| similar to Hawaii. We have got to be a little bit more | |
| proactive. | |
| Admiral Syring. Sir, let me just add to finish, if I can, | |
| Mr. Chairman---- | |
| Mr. Takai. Okay. | |
| Admiral Syring [continuing]. That there is an ongoing | |
| sensor analysis of alternatives, that is extensive, looking at | |
| all sensor gaps around the world for not just us, but for other | |
| agencies and services, and certainly the Hawaii sensor | |
| capability is part of it. | |
| Mr. Takai. Okay. Thank you. | |
| Thank you, Mr. Chairman. | |
| Mr. Rogers. The gentleman yields back. | |
| The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Chairman | |
| Turner, for 5 minutes. | |
| Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. | |
| Admiral, when you were asked about whether or not we need | |
| an east coast missile defense site, your answer was, ``not at | |
| this time,'' meaning we don't need it now, which is a good | |
| thing we don't need it now, because we can't possibly have one, | |
| because there is a long lead time within which we need to | |
| construct one. | |
| I would like to work with you to clarify your answer, | |
| because I think there are those with your answer of ``we don't | |
| need it at this time'' or ``we don't need it now,'' who might | |
| use that as an answer to indicate that the preparation that | |
| this committee has undertaken for an east coast missile defense | |
| site is needless or unnecessary. You don't mean that, right? | |
| You don't mean that the work that Congress has done to prepare | |
| for an east coast missile defense site is needless or | |
| unnecessary? | |
| Admiral Syring. Absolutely not. | |
| Mr. Turner. Secondly, as you have articulated, I think, | |
| very, very well, the rising threats from North Korea and Iran | |
| are increasing threats that we are seeing that are happening at | |
| just almost a frightening pace. Do you foresee a time at which | |
| we might need the capability to respond to these threats of an | |
| east coast missile defense site? | |
| Admiral Syring. If I---- | |
| Mr. Turner. I was asking you, Admiral, because, again, they | |
| were asking in a manner, I think, to utilize---- | |
| Admiral Syring. Okay. | |
| Mr. Turner [continuing]. Your statement---- | |
| Admiral Syring. Yes, sir. | |
| Mr. Turner [continuing]. To indicate that it is not | |
| necessary. | |
| Admiral Syring. Let me take that. We have a very systematic | |
| investment plan, which we have talked about, in terms of how we | |
| are improving the current fielded interceptors, and that is | |
| extensive and has required funding and budget this committee | |
| has supported, sir. And you are---- | |
| Mr. Turner. Well, you are looking out for the future---- | |
| Admiral Syring. Absolutely. | |
| Mr. Turner [continuing]. You are looking out, and you do | |
| see a time---- | |
| Admiral Syring. I do. | |
| Mr. Turner [continuing]. Where that additional capability | |
| would be? | |
| Admiral Syring. I see a time when additional capacity will | |
| need to be talked about---- | |
| Mr. Turner. Thank you. | |
| Admiral Syring [continuing]. Depending on where Iran goes | |
| with their threat development. | |
| Mr. Turner. Thank you, Admiral. | |
| Mr. McKeon, this committee is charged with the | |
| responsibility of looking at our architecture to be able to see | |
| what our adversaries are doing and also respond to what our | |
| adversaries see we are doing. One of the areas that we are | |
| concerned with, obviously, is the Open Skies Treaty and Russia. | |
| General Stewart, head of the DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency], | |
| testified that Russia gets, quote, ``incredible foundational | |
| intelligence on critical infrastructure, bases, ports, all of | |
| our facilities. So my perspective,'' again being his, ``it | |
| gives them a significant advantage, and I would love to deny | |
| the Russians having that capability.'' | |
| Mr. McKeon, is Russia permitting overflights of | |
| Kaliningrad, which of course are permitted under the treaty? | |
| Mr. McKeon. No. They have placed restrictions on flights | |
| over Kaliningrad. | |
| Mr. Turner. Is that a violation of the Open Skies Treaty? | |
| Mr. McKeon. We have raised that as a compliance concern, | |
| Mr. Turner, and I believe it is highlighted a little | |
| differently in the compliance report we have just submitted to | |
| you. | |
| Mr. Turner. Have you personally advocated that, as in your | |
| role, you make a recommendation that Russia be found in | |
| violation? | |
| Mr. McKeon. Sir, I hesitate to talk about what I recommend | |
| to my Secretary in internal deliberations. What I can say to | |
| you here, and I would be happy to discuss in a little more | |
| detail in the closed session, is we have expressed concern as a | |
| government about Russia's compliance with Open Skies. We have | |
| taken a view within our government that while we have | |
| obligations under the treaty, we will perform under those | |
| obligations and no more; that is, we will not give them any | |
| extra benefit. | |
| Mr. Turner. Well, Mr. McKeon, obviously the concern that we | |
| have is if there are those who believe, perhaps yourself even-- | |
| because our indication is that we are hearing that you do | |
| believe that they are violating the Open Skies Treaty, and | |
| there are others who do believe so as a result of issues like | |
| Kaliningrad and overflights--that by our continued compliance, | |
| especially in light of General Stewart saying that it puts it | |
| as a distinct advantage, that we are in fact, you know, showing | |
| all of our cards while we are allowing them to restrict our | |
| capabilities. I mean, isn't that a significant concern, is we | |
| are letting somebody else see what we are doing and we are not | |
| getting to see what they are doing, supposedly that was | |
| permitted under a treaty? | |
| Mr. McKeon. Well, Congressman, we are overflying the | |
| Russian Federation territory. In fact, we have more Open Skies | |
| flights over Russia than Russia does over the United States. | |
| There are restrictions, as you---- | |
| Mr. Turner. I think it isn't an issue just of number of | |
| flights, but isn't it an issue of advanced sensors? I mean, | |
| hasn't the Supreme Allied Commander indicated he has concerns | |
| over the advanced sensors that might be used in overflights | |
| over Europe? | |
| Mr. McKeon. Yes. As you will recall, Congressman, a couple | |
| of years ago, the Russians sought to certify an electro-optical | |
| sensor on the plane they used to fly over Europe. It is a | |
| digital rather than using wet film. And we went through the | |
| certification process on that and learned a lot of lessons from | |
| that for possible certification of a plane that would overfly | |
| the United States with a similar capability. | |
| Mr. Turner. Mr. McKeon, obviously since we have concerns | |
| that Russia may be violating the Open Skies Treaty, and from | |
| the testimonies we have been receiving, there are serious | |
| concerns about what Russia learns in the Open Skies Treaty. And | |
| also the administration now, although it took forever, is | |
| finally acknowledging Russia's violating of the INF Treaty. | |
| Shouldn't there be a concern for a pause in extending the | |
| START [Strategic Arms Reduction] Treaty for an additional 5 | |
| years? And could you please tell us if you believe it is | |
| premature of the administration? I understand that they are | |
| pushing for a 5-year extension of the New START Treaty. Is | |
| there concern that we might be needing to evaluate Russia's | |
| actions, especially in their aggressiveness that we are seeing | |
| in Ukraine and the overflights? We all just watched the news | |
| and watched their planes buzzing us. Is there a point where we | |
| might--should be pausing? | |
| Mr. McKeon. Congressman, as an administration, we have not | |
| made a decision about whether to seek the extension of the New | |
| START Treaty, which does not expire until 2021. I think---- | |
| Mr. Turner. Would your recommendation be that it is | |
| premature to do that now? | |
| Mr. McKeon. Again, sir, I don't want to give you what my | |
| recommendation would be in internal deliberations. What I would | |
| say is that one of the factors that we need to take into | |
| account is the concerns that you have identified and---- | |
| Mr. Turner. Mr. McKeon, I just want you to know that---- | |
| Mr. McKeon [continuing]. We share. | |
| Mr. Turner [continuing]. I think it is really difficult for | |
| us as policymakers to have people like yourself that have such | |
| important positions as the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of | |
| Defense for Policy to say that you don't want to tell us what | |
| your recommendations are with respect to policy. | |
| Thank you, Mr. Chairman. | |
| Mr. Rogers. The gentleman's time has expired. | |
| The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. | |
| Fleming, for 5 minutes. | |
| Dr. Fleming. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. | |
| And, Admirals Gortney and Syring, this question is for you. | |
| Recently, Bill Gertz of the Washington Free Beacon reported | |
| that North Korea has displayed a new road-mobile ICBM. And does | |
| North Korea, in fact, have such capability and is it testing | |
| solid rocket motors for such a missile? | |
| Admiral Gortney. Sir, the Intel [Intelligence] Community | |
| assesses the probability of North Korea fielding a successful | |
| road-mobile ICBM with a miniaturized nuclear device that can | |
| range the homeland as low. | |
| As the commander accountable for defending the homeland, I | |
| choose to assess that he does have that capability. And I think | |
| it is the prudent course of action, it is what I think the | |
| American people would like me to base my readiness assessment | |
| on, to be prepared to engage it. So we are prepared to engage | |
| it today, 24 hours a day, 365 days out of the year. | |
| As it progresses, the real key piece here is he hasn't | |
| tested the end-to-end capability in order to do it. He has | |
| displayed the ability through the TD-2 space launch to put that | |
| in there, but the reentry vehicle that needs to go with it, the | |
| solid rocket fuel, we need to see that test, that end-to-end | |
| test. But I am not waiting for that end-to-end test on my | |
| assessment. | |
| Dr. Fleming. Okay. And sort of an extension of that | |
| question, can North Korea's KN-08 road-mobile ICBM target all | |
| of the United States if indeed--or I guess a better way to put | |
| it based on your response is, are you assuming that it can | |
| target anywhere in the United States, including the continental | |
| United States? | |
| Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir. I assess that it can range the | |
| homeland that I am tasked to defend, and we are prepared to | |
| engage it for the area that we assess it to be able to reach. | |
| Dr. Fleming. Okay. And can you remind this committee why | |
| road-mobile missiles are a defense challenge for us? | |
| Admiral Gortney. Because they are mobile and they are very | |
| easy to conceal. Previously, you know, when North Korea | |
| assembles a rocket, we have intel that we can detect through | |
| all forms of intel. When you get into a road-mobile target, it | |
| is very, very difficult to be able to track, quickly set up, | |
| and shoot. Most of my career, I dropped bombs for a living, and | |
| mobile targets are what always caused me pause. And that is | |
| exactly why this is a tough challenge for us. | |
| Dr. Fleming. So while it may be difficult to detect, you | |
| suggested a little earlier that its payload may not be as | |
| significant as something that would be ground based. Would that | |
| be fair to say, or what is your opinion on that? | |
| Admiral Gortney. No, sir. We assess that they have the | |
| ability on the KN-08 to--I assess that he has the ability to | |
| miniaturize a nuclear weapon and range to homeland with that | |
| warhead. | |
| Dr. Fleming. I see. Okay. | |
| Admiral Gortney. Again, but we have not seen the end-to-end | |
| test of that. | |
| Dr. Fleming. Right. Okay. Thank you, and I yield back. | |
| Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. | |
| The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. | |
| Coffman, for 5 minutes. | |
| Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. | |
| Mr. McKeon and Admiral Gortney, in your written statement, | |
| you both mentioned, quote, ``left-of-launch,'' unquote, | |
| capabilities. Can you elaborate? Are you talking about | |
| destroying ballistic missiles on the ground before they are | |
| launched at us? Is that the point? | |
| Admiral Gortney. I can go into some detail at the unclass | |
| [unclassified] level and I will go into much greater detail for | |
| you in the classified level. But the current path that we are | |
| on with both theater ballistic missile defense and ballistic | |
| missile defense for the homeland against the ICBM threat is a | |
| very expensive approach. We are shooting down with very | |
| expensive rockets, potentially very inexpensive rockets, and we | |
| are only engaging it in midcourse. For both types of threats it | |
| is midcourse as we go forward. | |
| What we need to be able to do is engage it throughout its | |
| particular kill chain, so keep them from getting on the rails, | |
| detect them, and get them on the rails, hit them while they are | |
| still on the rails before launch, provided we have the rules of | |
| engagement to do that; boost phase engagement, which is why the | |
| laser designation--laser approach that MDA is doing is so | |
| important, multiple times, knock down the raid count; and then | |
| continue to engage it in midcourse, but with more warheads in | |
| space, smarter, more reliable multi-object kill vehicle, maybe | |
| five warheads in space that are actually communicating with | |
| each other to drive the raid count down significantly. And | |
| those are the investments that MDA, with your all's full | |
| support, have put in place to see which of those technologies | |
| throughout a flight of the missile is so important for us. | |
| Mr. Coffman. Okay. What kind of intelligence would we need | |
| for the President to order a preemptive attack against a state | |
| preparing to launch a missile against the United States? | |
| Admiral Gortney. I am going to have to take that at the | |
| classified level. | |
| Mr. Coffman. Okay. How well are we postured to execute | |
| left-of-launch operations? Could we execute left-of-launch | |
| operations today if we had to? | |
| Admiral Gortney. I will defer to the classified session and | |
| answer you there, sir. | |
| Mr. Coffman. What more can Congress do to ensure our | |
| military forces have the capabilities and intelligence they | |
| would need to execute left-of-launch operations? | |
| Admiral Gortney. Continue to make the investments from the | |
| MDA realm, support those investments that we are asking for, | |
| particularly the--make what we have the best as what we | |
| possibly can make it, and then those investments in R&D | |
| [research and development]. | |
| Now, there is another avenue that we can talk about in | |
| classified for those same sorts of investments are absolutely | |
| critical. But I also think it is important to highlight that | |
| what Admiral Syring has put in the budget is research and | |
| development to see what technologies will play out. Once we | |
| make a decision of which of those are going to give us the best | |
| value, then we will be having to come to your committee again | |
| for investments to actually field those capabilities. | |
| Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. | |
| Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. | |
| Admiral Syring, how much longer would it take and how much | |
| more would it cost for you to develop, test, and field a long- | |
| range discrimination radar in the 5000 series in a redesigned | |
| kill vehicle? | |
| Admiral Syring. If I can just clarify, Mr. Chairman, in DOD | |
| 5000? | |
| Mr. Rogers. Yes. | |
| Admiral Syring. Sir, I haven't done that analysis, but I | |
| would be happy to. We were able to--and I will just reiterate | |
| this. We were able to, with Mr. Kendall's help, Admiral | |
| Winnefeld's help at the time, turn our requirement through the | |
| JROC [Joint Requirements Oversight Council] process in about 6 | |
| weeks, 6 weeks, and that is giving me the top cover for this | |
| radar. | |
| And our decision to use existing technology, I thought, was | |
| huge in terms of not having to go through the risk reduction | |
| phase between Milestone A and B, where we chose--and I think I | |
| got a question over here--the similar GaN [gallium nitride], S- | |
| band technology that is in the AMDR [Air and Missile Defense] | |
| radar. So there were some decisions that we made both in the | |
| requirement and in the technology that we chose that enabled us | |
| to go to contract award in less than 2 years. | |
| Mr. Rogers. Okay. Admiral, recently the press reported that | |
| Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov said he had obtained an | |
| agreement with Secretary Kerry to launch a dialogue about the | |
| U.S. missile defense shield in Eastern Europe. Moscow argues | |
| the system is a threat to its security. | |
| As the director of Missile Defense Agency, what do you know | |
| about this dialogue and what has the United States signed up to | |
| discuss? | |
| Admiral Syring. I am not aware of the dialogue, and my | |
| answer is, nothing. | |
| Mr. Rogers. Mr. McKeon, what can you tell us about that, if | |
| anything? | |
| Mr. McKeon. Mr. Chairman, we have been talking to the | |
| Russians on and off since 2009 about what the EPAA [European | |
| Phased Adaptive Approach] is and is not. And I think they have | |
| a pretty clear understanding of the system, but they continue | |
| to make various arguments that it is a threat to them or a | |
| violation of the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] | |
| Treaty, or other statements that we don't agree with and find | |
| unacceptable. Just in the last couple of days, there was an | |
| assertion made by some senior Russian security official that we | |
| were going to put nuclear warheads on missiles at the site in | |
| Romania and threaten Russia, which is just nonsense. | |
| Mr. Rogers. Mr. McKeon, do you understand that in any way | |
| that the United States is willing to depart from its current | |
| position on the EPAA, what we will have laid out to happen with | |
| that? | |
| Mr. McKeon. No. | |
| Mr. Rogers. Okay. Admiral Syring, Secretary Kerry has been | |
| spending quite a bit of time focused on missile defense lately. | |
| He has also invited the People's Republic of China to receive | |
| technical briefings on the capability of THAAD, including if | |
| deployed in South Korea. What do you know about the briefings | |
| the Secretary has offered, if anything? | |
| Admiral Syring. Nothing, sir. We haven't been asked. | |
| Mr. Rogers. All right. Admiral, you are aware of MDA or MDA | |
| contractors being targeted or, quote, ``hacked,'' by groups or | |
| entities linked to China or the Chinese military? | |
| Admiral Syring. Yes, sir. | |
| Mr. Rogers. You are. Can you tell us anything about that in | |
| open session? | |
| Admiral Syring. Let me just give you the answer | |
| unclassified, and then we can go deeper classified, if that is | |
| okay, Mr. Chairman. | |
| Mr. Rogers. Okay. | |
| Admiral Syring. I testified yesterday that I viewed the | |
| cyber threat that I specifically faced with MDA and the systems | |
| that we are fielding on par with any intercontinental ballistic | |
| missile threat that either Iran or North Korea possess. We have | |
| taken inordinate steps to protect both our classified and | |
| unclassified networks from attack, constant 24/7 monitoring | |
| with teams in place, plus good materiel protections of those | |
| systems. | |
| My biggest concern remains in our cleared defense | |
| contractor base and their protections. I think my view is, is | |
| that they are continuing to try to attack my government | |
| networks every day, classified and unclassified, but where they | |
| are going next, and we have gotten examples of this, is to my | |
| cleared defense contractors with the unclassified controlled | |
| technical information. And what we have got to do is get them | |
| up to where we are in terms of our protection levels. And I | |
| view it as a very near term, very real requirement across the | |
| BMDS [Ballistic Missile Defense System]. | |
| Mr. Rogers. Thank you. | |
| The ranking member is recognized for any additional | |
| questions he may have. | |
| Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the | |
| expeditious nature of this public portion of the hearing. I am | |
| going to hold my further questions to the classified session. | |
| Mr. Rogers. Are there any other members that have questions | |
| in this open session? | |
| Mr. McKeon. Mr. Chairman, I could address the question you | |
| gave to Admiral Syring about---- | |
| Mr. Rogers. Please do. | |
| Mr. McKeon [continuing]. Secretary Kerry and China and | |
| THAAD. | |
| Mr. Rogers. Please. | |
| Mr. McKeon. Similar to the Russians, we have offered to | |
| explain to them what THAAD is and is not and why it is not a | |
| threat to their deterrent were we to deploy it in the Republic | |
| of Korea. They have not taken us up on this offer. We have a | |
| firm view, as expressed previously, this is about protecting | |
| our deployed forces and our Korean partners, and has nothing to | |
| do with China or China's deterrent, and they shouldn't worry | |
| about it. | |
| Mr. Rogers. But we are going to talk more about that in the | |
| classified session, but I appreciate that comment. | |
| We are supposed to be called for votes at any minute, so I | |
| think what I will do is rather than get us into the classified | |
| setting and then have to be pulled away, we will just adjourn | |
| until 10 minutes after the next vote series concludes. If they | |
| call us in the next 5 or 6 minutes, you are looking at about 45 | |
| minutes after that, so it will be around 3:45 to 3:50 when we | |
| reconvene for the classified portion of this hearing. | |
| And with that, this hearing is suspend--no, it is not | |
| adjourned. We are not---- | |
| Admiral Gortney. Recessed. | |
| Mr. Rogers. Recessed. There you go. I knew you was good for | |
| something. | |
| [Whereupon, at 3:00 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in | |
| closed session.] | |
| ======================================================================= | |
| A P P E N D I X | |
| ======================================================================= | |
| PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD | |
| April 14, 2016 | |
| ======================================================================= | |
| [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] | |
| ======================================================================= | |
| WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING | |
| THE HEARING | |
| April 14, 2016 | |
| ======================================================================= | |
| RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI | |
| Admiral Syring. Yes, the House Appropriations Committee supported | |
| MDA's PB16 Request of $19.9 million for Directed Energy Prototype | |
| Development in the Technology Maturation Initiatives program element. | |
| [See page 7.] | |
| ======================================================================= | |
| QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING | |
| April 14, 2016 | |
| ======================================================================= | |
| QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS | |
| Mr. Rogers. Is the United States willing to depart in any way from | |
| the EPAA as laid out and planned today? | |
| Mr. McKeon. Our commitment to EPAA remains firm. The approach is | |
| specifically designed to be able to adapt to the ballistic missile | |
| threat posed to our deployed forces and allies in Europe. That said, we | |
| have no plans to depart from the deployment and sustainment of the | |
| missile defense sites in Europe, or any other part of the EPAA, as it | |
| is planned today. | |
| Mr. Rogers. As the ranking DOD witness here today, does the | |
| Department support a partnership between the UAE and the U.S. to | |
| develop a missile defense capability to respond to emerging threats | |
| (e.g., an evolved extended-range THAAD system)? | |
| Mr. McKeon. DOD does support a partnership between UAE and the | |
| United States to develop or acquire missile defense capabilities to | |
| respond to emerging threats. It is premature to speculate on the | |
| specific systems that might be appropriate for addressing those | |
| threats. | |
| Mr. Rogers. I understand the U.S. is discussing a Foreign Military | |
| Sales case with Qatar for THAAD. Why is this case important for Qatar | |
| and THAAD? Can we work together to accelerate this case to make sure | |
| Qatar has these critical missile defense systems prior to the World Cup | |
| in 2022? How? | |
| Mr. McKeon. Qatar is an important partner in missile defense | |
| activities in the Gulf region that has demonstrated its commitment to | |
| acquiring a layered missile defense architecture by purchasing PATRIOT | |
| PAC-3 systems and exploring the possibility of buying the Terminal | |
| High-Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system and an early warning radar. | |
| Qatar has expressed a desire to phase acquisition of these elements. | |
| Qatar signed a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case with the United States | |
| Army for PATRIOT PAC-3 and is in ongoing discussions concerning an | |
| early warning radar. The Department will continue to support Qatar's | |
| acquisition of ballistic missile defense capabilities. Additionally, we | |
| will continue working with Qatar within the context of the Gulf | |
| Cooperation Council to increase interoperable regional missile defense | |
| capabilities. | |
| Mr. Rogers. Why is it important that the European Phased Adaptive | |
| Approach reach its Initial Operating Capability, especially the Romania | |
| Aegis Ashore Site, at the Warsaw Summit this summer? Why is that | |
| important for the United States, our allies, and the NATO alliance | |
| itself? | |
| Mr. McKeon. NATO Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) remains critical | |
| to U.S. and Allied security. As long as Iran continues to develop and | |
| deploy ballistic missiles, the United States will work with our allies | |
| and partners to defend against this threat. The aim of NATO BMD is to | |
| provide full coverage and protection of all NATO European populations | |
| and U.S. forces in Europe from ballistic missiles originating from the | |
| Middle East. Moreover, NATO's declaration of BMD Initial Operational | |
| Capability (IOC) at Warsaw sends three important messages: first, that | |
| the United States is committed to the defense of our deployed forces | |
| and Allies by increasing the capability of NATO BMD; second, that | |
| Allies recognize the importance of this contribution; third, that NATO | |
| follows through on its commitments to field a missile defense command | |
| and control capability. | |
| Mr. Rogers. What is left-of-launch capability? In other words, | |
| you're talking about destroying ballistic missiles on the ground before | |
| they're launched at us? | |
| Mr. McKeon. Left-of-launch capabilities contribute to defeating or | |
| degrading ballistic missiles before they are launched. These | |
| capabilities may be non-kinetic or kinetic; they span a wide range of | |
| tools developed across the Department, and include both active and | |
| passive activities. These capabilities provide U.S. decision-makers | |
| additional tools and opportunities to defeat missiles across the entire | |
| kill-chain. This reduces the burden on our ``right-of-launch'' | |
| ballistic missile defenses. Taken together, ``left-of-launch'' and | |
| ``right-of-launch'' capabilities will lead to a more effective and | |
| resilient approach to defeat adversary ballistic missile threats. | |
| Mr. Rogers. Please detail any exercises, table top exercises, or | |
| war games you have participated in concerning left-of-launch ballistic | |
| missile defeat. In such exercises, were there any areas in which it was | |
| observed that policy guidance was required to successfully carry out | |
| such capability? If so, please identify and describe such observed | |
| areas needing policy guidance from OSD. | |
| Mr. McKeon. Although I have not personally participated in a policy | |
| wargame involving left-of-launch missile defense, the recently- | |
| completed NIMBLE TITAN 16 wargame examined left-of-launch missile | |
| defeat, to include the circumstances under which several partners and | |
| allies would support left-of-launch efforts. | |
| I believe we have sufficient policy guidance at this time to carry | |
| out left-of-launch ballistic missile defeat successfully. | |
| Mr. Rogers. Can the KN-08 road-mobile ICBM target all of the United | |
| States, including the continental United States? Please reply in | |
| detail. Please ensure your response is unclassified to the maximum | |
| extent possible. | |
| Admiral Gortney. DIA assesses at the unclassified level that the | |
| KN08 ICBM has a maximum range of over 12,000 kilometers, which would | |
| enable it to strike all of the continental United States if | |
| successfully deployed. | |
| Mr. Rogers. Recently, Bill Gertz of the Washington Free Beacon has | |
| reported that North Korea has displayed a new road-mobile ICBM. Does | |
| North Korea have a new road-mobile ICBM? Is it testing solid-rocket | |
| motors for such a missile? Please reply in detail. Please ensure your | |
| response is unclassified to the maximum extent possible. | |
| Admiral Gortney. During a parade in October 2015, North Korea | |
| displayed a multi-stage missile that differed in design from the KN08 | |
| ICBMs that were featured in previous parades. However, we don't know | |
| how the new missile is configured, what propulsion system it uses, or | |
| whether it represents a workable missile design. | |
| Mr. Rogers. Can you remind this committee why road-mobile missiles | |
| are a defense challenge for us? And what about such missiles with solid | |
| fuel? | |
| Admiral Gortney. Mobile missiles increase an adversary's | |
| operational flexibility and survivability. This complicates active | |
| defense planning. Changes to fuel types indicate some level of | |
| programmatic advancement, potentially increasing their reliability. | |
| Mr. Rogers. Who is integrating the homeland cruise missile defense | |
| program for the DOD? We have Army systems, Air Force systems, Navy | |
| systems. Who is in charge? Is there a single acquisition authority? | |
| Admiral Gortney. NORAD conducts aerospace warning and control of | |
| North America and, in conjunction with USNORTHCOM, determines the | |
| operational requirements for defense against aerospace threats, to | |
| include cruise missiles. In turn, the Services provide the capabilities | |
| to meet the approved defense requirements, and NORAD operationally | |
| integrates the homeland cruise missile defense capabilities for the | |
| U.S. and Canada. Recommend your acquisition authority questions be | |
| addressed to OUSD (AT&L). | |
| Mr. Rogers. Is JLENS important? Why? Is there a gap in our security | |
| architecture without it? Please reply in detail. Please ensure your | |
| response is unclassified to the maximum extent possible. | |
| Admiral Gortney. [The information referred to is classified and | |
| retained in the committee files.] | |
| Mr. Rogers. Am I correct that under the current plan for the | |
| ground-based midcourse defense system, there are no operational spares | |
| GBIs for, is it 5 or 6 years? It's well into the 2020s, right? What | |
| happens if there is an unplanned failure? Please reply in detail. | |
| Please ensure your response is unclassified to the maximum extent | |
| possible. | |
| Admiral Gortney. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is leading this | |
| effort and thus we recommend contacting VADM Syring for sparing | |
| specifics. MDA remains on track for 44 GBIs emplaced and available by | |
| 2017, in accordance with Secretary of Defense direction. | |
| Mr. Rogers. Is this reality (the lack of operational spares | |
| referenced in the previous question) an artifact of years of under- | |
| investment in the GMD system? What is the best way to mitigate this | |
| risk? | |
| Admiral Gortney. This question is specific to Ballistic Missile | |
| Defense System programmatics; recommend contacting the Missile Defense | |
| Agency regarding investments in the GMD system. | |
| Mr. Rogers. What is left-of-launch capability? In other words, | |
| you're talking about destroying ballistic missiles on the ground before | |
| they're launched at us? | |
| Admiral Gortney. Left-of-launch capabilities encompass all military | |
| efforts to deny the adversary the ability to launch ballistic missiles. | |
| The development of left-of-launch capabilities provides the U.S. | |
| decision-makers additional tools and opportunities to defeat ballistic | |
| missiles before they are launched. | |
| Mr. Rogers. Please detail any exercises, table top exercises, or | |
| war games you have participated in concerning left-of-launch ballistic | |
| missile defeat. In such exercises, were there any areas in which it was | |
| observed that policy guidance was required to successfully carry out | |
| such capability? If so, please identify and describe such observed | |
| areas needing policy guidance from OSD. | |
| Admiral Gortney. USNORTHCOM participated in the Joint Staff-hosted | |
| NIMBLE STAR II TTX (March 2015), as well as the PACAF-hosted NEPTUNE | |
| HAWK TTX (July 2015). For execution of our homeland Ballistic Missile | |
| Defense mission, we have sufficient policy guidance. | |
| Mr. Rogers. What kind of intelligence do we need to possess in | |
| order for the President to order a preemptive attack on a state | |
| possessing nuclear weapons? | |
| Admiral Gortney. The President would likely need timely and | |
| reliable intelligence on the adversary's intentions, as well as | |
| persistent tracking of the adversary's strategic assets to ensure | |
| preemptive attack success and also to mitigate risk of retaliation. | |
| Mr. Rogers. Are we outpacing the threat? How do you evaluate | |
| ``outpacing'' the threat? Based on what criteria? Please provide a | |
| detailed list of adversary developments regarding ballistic missile | |
| capability that affected our ability to ``outpace'' the threat. What | |
| developments by adversaries, if any, have surprised you? Please reply | |
| in detail. Please ensure your response is unclassified to the maximum | |
| extent possible. | |
| Admiral Gortney. The Ground-based Mid-course Defense (GMD) system | |
| is capable of defeating the ICBM threat currently posed by North Korea. | |
| However, the North Korean threat continues to mature, while | |
| developments within the Iranian missile program could lead to the | |
| emergence of an ICBM threat from that country in the coming years as | |
| well. We believe that continued funding of programs, such as the Re- | |
| designed Kill Vehicle, Long Range Discrimination Radar, two/three-stage | |
| selectable Ground-based Interceptor, and the Space-based Kill | |
| Assessment experiment, is necessary to maintain our strategic | |
| advantage. | |
| Mr. Rogers. It has been widely asserted that one of the most likely | |
| ballistic missile threats to U.S. forces would be a raid scenario | |
| involving several enemy ballistic missiles fired near simultaneously. | |
| How is the MDA preparing for this scenario and what testing is planned | |
| to validate our BMDS capabilities against this threat? | |
| Admiral Syring. The BMDS and each of the elements (including | |
| Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD); Terminal High Altitude Area | |
| Defense (THAAD); Aegis; and Command and Control, Battle Management, and | |
| Communications (C2BMC)) are designed and tested to provide performance | |
| against raids with multiple ballistic missile threats in the air | |
| simultaneously. The BMDS Specification includes raid requirements that | |
| are allocated to element-level specifications. | |
| MDA has demonstrated raid defense capability in both ground tests | |
| and flight tests at the system and element levels. MDA has successfully | |
| conducted testing for homeland and regional defense against raids in | |
| numerous integrated ground tests that incorporate hardware-in-the-loop | |
| assets and threat injection, as well as distributed ground tests that | |
| incorporate deployed operational assets. MDA has conducted Flight Test | |
| Standard Missile (FTM) 13, demonstrating Aegis against two near | |
| simultaneous missile launches. For the THAAD system, MDA conducted | |
| Flight Test THAAD (FTT) 12, successfully demonstrating THAAD against | |
| multiple near simultaneous missile launches. At the system level, MDA | |
| conducted Flight Test Integrated (FTI) 01 in 2012 with Aegis, THAAD, | |
| and Patriot engaging three ballistic missile targets and two cruise | |
| missile targets. MDA conducted Flight Test Operational (FTO)-01 in 2013 | |
| with Aegis and THAAD each engaging a ballistic missile target. MDA | |
| conducted Flight Test Operational (FTO) 02 Event 2a in 2015 with Aegis | |
| and THAAD engaging two ballistic missile targets and one cruise missile | |
| target. | |
| MDA will continue to validate BMDS capabilities against raids in | |
| future ground testing. In addition, MDA has planned several flight | |
| tests in the Integrated Master Test Plan version 17.1 that involve | |
| ballistic missile raid scenarios. FTO 03 Event 1 will test Aegis and | |
| Aegis Ashore against two ballistic missiles. FTO 03 Event 2 will test | |
| Aegis, THAAD, and Patriot against three ballistic missiles and two | |
| cruise missiles. FTO 04 will test GMD simultaneously engaging two long- | |
| range ballistic missiles. | |
| Mr. Rogers. We know that the MDA has utilized several low cost | |
| target options to meet schedule and testing requirements against short- | |
| range and medium-range range threats in recent years. What steps is the | |
| MDA taking to identify and develop new low cost target options to meet | |
| emerging testing requirements for intermediate-range (IRBM) and inter- | |
| continental (ICBM) ballistic missile threat scenarios. | |
| Admiral Syring. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is coordinating | |
| with the Intelligence Community to understand assessments related to | |
| emerging threats in order to establish requirements for all target | |
| development and testing needs using intermediate-range ballistic | |
| missile (IRBM) and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) class | |
| targets. Regarding lowering the costs of the current IRBM and ICBM | |
| targets, MDA has implemented innovative solutions to address near-term | |
| threat changes by leveraging previously incurred non-recurring | |
| engineering and making incremental upgrades to meet target requirements | |
| related to evolving missions and threat. Additionally, MDA is | |
| conducting market research through a request for information to | |
| determine interest and capability to design, develop, produce, and | |
| launch multiple range-class targets. The market research will shape | |
| future target acquisition decisions to reduce the cost of flight tests. | |
| Mr. Rogers. We understand that the MDA has successfully flown low | |
| cost, subscale targets utilizing surplus solid rocket motor assets to | |
| meet specific mission requirements and critical schedule milestones. Is | |
| the MDA taking steps to assure that solid rocket motors will continue | |
| to be available to be used for low cost targets in support of BMDS | |
| testing? | |
| Admiral Syring. Current Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Integrated | |
| Master Test Plan baseline includes low cost targets utilizing surplus | |
| solid rocket motors through fiscal year 2022. As a part of the MDA | |
| objective to reduce the cost of targets, the program continually | |
| monitors U.S. Government surplus and solid rocket motor industry | |
| production for applicability to meet MDA's testing requirements to meet | |
| current and future acquisition needs. | |
| Mr. Rogers. Please identify and summarize the studies MDA has | |
| conducted or participated in evaluating missile defense options and | |
| limitations against boost-glide systems and maneuvering systems. | |
| Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is classified and | |
| retained in the committee files.] | |
| Mr. Rogers. Are you funded to develop and deploy a defense against | |
| boost-glide missiles, like those being developed by Russia and China? | |
| What are the anticipated ranges of potential defensive options that | |
| have been considered? | |
| Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is classified and | |
| retained in the committee files.] | |
| Mr. Rogers. Please identify each CAPE review of an MDA program or | |
| proposed program over the past five years and the length/duration of | |
| such review and its cost to MDA. | |
| Admiral Syring. The CAPE reviews from 2006 through 2014 are listed | |
| below. The total cost to MDA is approximately $430,000. | |
| [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] | |
| .epsMr. Rogers. What are current requirements for CAPE AOAs of MDA | |
| programs or proposed programs? What document, memoranda, or regulation | |
| requires such CAPE AOA review of an MDA program? | |
| Admiral Syring. There are no requirements that require CAPE led | |
| Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) for MDA programs. However, MDA and CAPE | |
| periodically receive guidance, and mutually agree to conduct analysis | |
| of MDA programs. In addition, Congress periodically mandates CAPE led | |
| studies of MDA programs. | |
| Mr. Rogers. How much do GAO reviews cost MDA each year? | |
| Admiral Syring. The total approximate annual amount that MDA spends | |
| on GAO reviews is $1,754,008. This calculation is based on total man | |
| hours needed to support varying requirements for audits, including | |
| activities such as composing answers to numerous questions, locating | |
| and transmitting previously approved documentation, and supporting | |
| various meetings and reviews. | |
| Mr. Rogers. Are there duplicative reporting requirements that could | |
| be consolidated or eliminated? If yes, please identify. | |
| Admiral Syring. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) does not currently | |
| have any duplicative congressional reporting requirements. However, | |
| proposed language in the House FY 2017 National Defense Authorization | |
| Act, H.R. 4909, Section 1664, would place significant duplicative | |
| reporting requirements on MDA. This provision requires semi-annual | |
| reporting on the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) test plan, | |
| costs and test plan changes and rationale, which duplicates existing | |
| reporting accomplished through annual submission of the Integrated | |
| Master Test Plan and BMDS Accountability Report, the BMDS Quarterly | |
| Update briefings and annual Staffer Day presentations. | |
| Mr. Rogers. We often ask the combatant commanders and military | |
| services for their unfunded requirements list. Do you have an unfunded | |
| requirements list? What capabilities were requested in the cocom IPLs | |
| for FY13-FY17 that didn't appear on the coordinated PCL or ACL? Please | |
| reply in detail. Please ensure your response is unclassified to the | |
| maximum extent possible. | |
| Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is classified and | |
| retained in the committee files.] | |
| Mr. Rogers. What would be the total funding required, by system, to | |
| meet the combatant command requirement for THAAD and SM-3s and Aegis | |
| BMD software and hardware sets? Please reply in detail. Please ensure | |
| your response is unclassified to the maximum extent possible. | |
| Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is classified and | |
| retained in the committee files.] | |
| Mr. Rogers. Are there program gaps in ballistic missile defense? | |
| Are there gaps you have not yet focused on? Please reply in detail. | |
| Please ensure your response is unclassified to the maximum extent | |
| possible. | |
| Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is classified and | |
| retained in the committee files.] | |
| Mr. Rogers. If MDA was developing and procuring these new Patriot | |
| radars with the acquisition authorities you have, how much time would | |
| it take you to do it? | |
| Admiral Syring. Acquisition timelines for development programs vary | |
| considerably depending on the maturity of the components being | |
| developed and the amount of integration and testing required prior to | |
| deployment. It is difficult to predict acquisition schedules without a | |
| prior knowledge of these variables. For example, Long Range | |
| Discrimination Radar (LRDR) is developing and integrating relatively | |
| mature technology. The LRDR program plan for development and | |
| integration is less than five years from contract award to Initial | |
| Fielding. | |
| Mr. Rogers. During a recent hearing before the House Armed Services | |
| Committee, Under Secretary Sean Stackley testified that, because of the | |
| MDA's unique acquisition authorities, you were able to successfully | |
| deploy in almost record time the Aegis Ashore site in Romania. Do you | |
| agree with this assessment? | |
| Admiral Syring. Yes, MDA's streamlined acquisition authorities | |
| contributed to the rapid development, installation, and deployment of | |
| the Romania Aegis Ashore site. Another significant contributor to the | |
| shortened timeline is the close collaborative relationship between the | |
| MDA Aegis Ashore program office and Navy, including leveraging existing | |
| Navy contracts for acquisition of Aegis Ashore weapon system equipment | |
| common with Aegis BMD ships. | |
| Mr. Rogers. How much longer would it take and how much more would | |
| it cost to develop, test and field Poland Aegis Ashore site on the | |
| planned timeline in the normal 5000 series rules and regulations? Would | |
| MDA be able to meet the President's 2018 goal? | |
| Admiral Syring. It is difficult to assess the additional cost and | |
| schedule required to field the Poland Aegis Ashore site under standard | |
| 5000-series ``rules.'' Poland-specific activity is estimated to be | |
| completed within four years. Initial hardware components were procured | |
| in 4th quarter fiscal year 2014 (4QFY14) and first fabrication on site | |
| was 1QFY16 with planned operations in 1QFY18. Fielding the Poland site | |
| is accelerated because of lessons learned from developing and deploying | |
| Aegis Ashore sites at the Hawaiian Pacific Missile Range Facility and | |
| Romania. Without this advantage and MDA's streamlined processes and | |
| decision making authority, it would be difficult to maintain the | |
| aggressive timeline to meet the European Phased Adaptive Approach Phase | |
| 3 requirement of December 2018. | |
| Mr. Rogers. How much longer would it take and how much more would | |
| it cost to develop, test and field Long-Range Discrimination Radar in | |
| the normal 5000 series and the Redesigned Kill Vehicle? | |
| Admiral Syring. Acquisition timelines for development programs vary | |
| considerably depending on the maturity of the components being | |
| developed and the amount of integration and testing required prior to | |
| deployment. It is difficult to specify the exact differences but MDA | |
| estimates development programs such as LRDR and RKV would take at least | |
| 25 percent longer without the streamlined and tailored MDA acquisition | |
| processes. | |
| In the case of RKV, the formal OUSD(AT&L) gated reviews required by | |
| DOD 5000 series acquisition requirements are estimated to add | |
| approximately one year and $200M to the development effort and initial | |
| deployment costs. The RKV Acquisition Strategy signed by USD(AT&L) in | |
| October, 2015 accounts for streamlined acquisition processes. | |
| Mr. Rogers. I think you're aware of the planned radar modernization | |
| of the Patriot system, which will take as long as 12 years to provide | |
| an improved radar to our soldiers; how long would a comparable effort | |
| take MDA? I ask you to answer this using in your role as the technical | |
| integration authority for IAMD. | |
| Admiral Syring. Acquisition timelines for development programs vary | |
| considerably depending on the maturity of the components being | |
| developed and the amount of integration and testing required prior to | |
| deployment. It is difficult to predict acquisition schedules without a | |
| prior knowledge of these variables. For example, Long Range | |
| Discrimination Radar (LRDR) is developing and integrating relatively | |
| mature technology. The LRDR program plan for development and | |
| integration is less than five years from contract award to Initial | |
| Fielding. | |
| Mr. Rogers. Please provide a detailed explanation of changes to MDA | |
| AQ processes with respect to the 5000 series AQ regulations or JCIDS | |
| process in your tenure as Director. | |
| Admiral Syring. MDA's processes are completely consistent with the | |
| principles of DOD Directive 5000.01 and DOD Instruction 5000.02, but | |
| tailored to match Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)-unique | |
| acquisition and requirements characteristics. | |
| The BMDS warfighter requirements generation is explicitly exempt | |
| from JCIDS (SecDef memorandum dated January 2, 2002). The BMDS | |
| requirements generation process is the USSTRATCOM-led Warfighter | |
| Involvement Process (WIP) (ref: STRATCOM Special Instruction 538-1). | |
| The WIP is focused on BMD and Integrated Air and Missile Defense. | |
| No significant changes were made to MDA's acquisition or | |
| requirements generation processes during my tenure; however several | |
| improvements and tailoring updates have been implemented the past | |
| several years to include: | |
| <bullet> Incorporation of guidance from the recent Defense | |
| Acquisition of Services Instruction (DOD Instruction 5000.74, dated | |
| January 5, 2016) into MDA acquisition policy and processes. | |
| <bullet> Validated that same streamlined processes outlined in the | |
| recent update to DOD Instruction 5000.02 (January 7, 2015) are | |
| incorporated in MDA processes. For example, the new DOD Instruction | |
| 5000.02 describes several acquisition ``models'' or ``tracks'' that | |
| development programs may follow. Several of these tracks have been in | |
| MDA acquisition policy and process since 2009. | |
| <bullet> STRATCOM increased frequency of updates to the | |
| Prioritized Capability List (annual vice biannual) to better | |
| synchronize with the POM cycle. | |
| <bullet> Generation of a BMD Homeland Defense Capability Document | |
| (CD) which was endorsed by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council | |
| (JROC). The VCJCS-signed JROC Memorandum (October 28, 2014) | |
| acknowledged that MDA is not bound by JCIDS. This CD specifically | |
| addressed Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) and redesigned kill | |
| vehicle capability. The CD will be periodically reviewed for update. | |
| <bullet> Incorporation of LRDR program reporting in the Defense | |
| Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) on-line reporting system. LRDR is | |
| a pilot program for BMDS reporting in DAES. | |
| Mr. Rogers. Please provide the full list of NDPC-approved BMDS | |
| information and sharing with Russia and China? | |
| Admiral Syring. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) submitted three | |
| requests for Exception to United States National Disclosure Policy | |
| (ENDP) from 2007-2011 seeking authority to disclose classified | |
| information to the Russian Federation (RF) relating to three ballistic | |
| missile defense flight test events. In each case, authority granted by | |
| the NDPC was limited to oral and visual disclosure only under | |
| controlled conditions. The RF sent attendees to two of the three test | |
| events (in 2007 and 2010). No invitations were extended for the third | |
| event (in August 2011), and no disclosure occurred. MDA has not | |
| submitted any further requests for ENDP for the RF. | |
| MDA has not sought ENDP for release of any information to the | |
| People's Republic of China. | |
| Mr. Rogers. Is the Russian Federation, under current NDPC policy, | |
| permitted to receive any FOUO, ITAR, UCTI, SECRET or TOP SECRET | |
| information about any U.S. missile defense system? If your answer is | |
| other than ``no,'' please reply in detail. | |
| Admiral Syring. No. National Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC) | |
| policy prohibits the release of classified information with a foreign | |
| government without an explicit authorization, such as an Exception to | |
| United States (U.S.) National Disclosure Policy (ENDP), and an | |
| information sharing agreement. No such agreement exists with the | |
| Russian Federation (RF). | |
| We are not aware of any policy permitting the release of any | |
| controlled unclassified information (such as FOUO) or classified | |
| information to the RF on any U.S. missile defense system. We defer | |
| further response to the Defense Technology Security Administration. | |
| Mr. Rogers. Is the People's Republic of China, under current NDPC | |
| policy, permitted to receive any FOUO, ITAR, UCTI, SECRET or TOP SECRET | |
| information about THAAD? Any U.S. missile defense system? If your | |
| answer is other than ``no,'' please reply in detail. | |
| Admiral Syring. No. National Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC) | |
| policy prohibits the release of classified information with a foreign | |
| government without an explicit authorization, such as an Exception to | |
| United States (U.S.) National Disclosure Policy (ENDP), and an | |
| information sharing agreement. No such agreement exists with the | |
| People's Republic of China (PRC). | |
| We are not aware of any policy permitting the release of any | |
| controlled unclassified information (such as FOUO) or classified | |
| information to the PRC on THAAD or any other U.S. missile defense | |
| system. We defer further response to the Defense Technology Security | |
| Administration. | |
| Mr. Rogers. Do you support providing the People's Republic of China | |
| with any detailed technical information on THAAD, including classified | |
| information? Please reply in detail. Please ensure your response is | |
| unclassified to the maximum extent possible. | |
| Admiral Syring. We have not approved release of any controlled | |
| unclassified information (such as FOUO) or classified information to | |
| the Peoples Republic of China on THAAD or any other missile defense | |
| system. | |
| Mr. Rogers. Are you aware of MDA or MDA contractors being targeted | |
| or ``hacked'' by groups or entities linked to China or the Chinese | |
| military? Please reply in detail. Please ensure your response is | |
| unclassified to the maximum extent possible. | |
| Admiral Syring. If a loss, theft, or spillage of MDA Unclassified | |
| Controlled Technical Information (UCTI) occurs, the Missile Defense | |
| Agency (MDA) reviews whether the contractor was in compliance with the | |
| contract terms and conditions established for cybersecurity. If the | |
| review determines the contractor is non-compliant, they are assessed | |
| penalties based on the performance assessment tools defined by the | |
| contract. Penalties have ranged from award fee reductions to contract | |
| termination based on the severity of the incident. MDA has also | |
| utilized the Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS) | |
| to rate contractors who do not manage in accordance with their contract | |
| terms and conditions. CPARS is the Government-wide repository of | |
| contractor performance information. A CPAR, required at least annually | |
| during contract performance per Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) | |
| 42.1502, provides an official record of both positive and negative | |
| contractor contract performance during a specific period of time. Past | |
| performance information (including the ratings and supporting | |
| narratives) is relevant information, for source selection purposes (FAR | |
| Part 15), regarding a contractor's actions under previously awarded | |
| contracts or orders. | |
| MDA is teaming with our industry partners to strengthen network | |
| protections and associated business practices to improve protection of | |
| UCTI. MDA is working with industry to implement multiple cyber-related | |
| efforts that will improve both the government and our industry partners | |
| safeguard Ballistic Missile Defense System information. | |
| Mr. Rogers. What are the capability gaps that could be filled by a | |
| space sensor layer for the BMDS? Please reply in detail. Please ensure | |
| your response is unclassified to the maximum extent possible. | |
| Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is classified and | |
| retained in the committee files.] | |
| Mr. Rogers. Please identify the studies MDA has carried out on its | |
| own or with other agencies or entities on space-based missile defense | |
| sensors? | |
| Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is classified and | |
| retained in the committee files.] | |
| Mr. Rogers. What are the options MDA has studied or is studying to | |
| host a missile defense payload on a USG, allied, or commercial space | |
| vehicle? | |
| Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is classified and | |
| retained in the committee files.] | |
| Mr. Rogers. Is it practical to expect MDA to develop and deploy a | |
| missile defense-only space-based sensor architecture? | |
| Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is classified and | |
| retained in the committee files.] | |
| Mr. Rogers. Can you please describe for me why we see reductions in | |
| SM-3 procurement quantities in your budget request for fiscal year | |
| 2017. Is this budgetary maneuver or is there something else this | |
| committee should be aware of? | |
| Admiral Syring. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) PB16 input | |
| contained an SM-3 Block IB Multi-Year Procurement plan. The decision | |
| was made in PB17 to transition back to single year procurement as the | |
| Agency completed Third Stage Rocket Motor (TSRM) Engineering Change | |
| Proposal (ECP) verification and testing, and quantities were reduced to | |
| remain within the Department's overall funding limits. To address SM-3 | |
| manufacturing quality to ensure readiness for continued procurement, a | |
| comprehensive quality, safety, and mission assurance assessment was | |
| recently conducted. This assessment supported continued production of | |
| SM-3s. | |
| In addition, PB16 included procurement of 8 SM-3 Block IIA guided | |
| missiles in FY17. Included in PB17 is a revised completion plan for SM- | |
| 3 Block IIA, and under this plan the 8 rounds planned for FY17 were | |
| deferred to FY18 to match development milestones. FY17 funds were | |
| realigned from Defense Wide Procurement to Research, Development, Test | |
| and Evaluation in support of remaining SM-3 Block IIA development to | |
| meet the European Phased Adaptive Approach Phase 3 timeline. | |
| Mr. Rogers. What liability does the contractor bear for quality | |
| control failures? Does that liability include costs of failed tests? | |
| How much do those cost the taxpayer? | |
| Admiral Syring. Specific liability is dependent on individual | |
| contract terms and conditions including incentive structure. Most BMDS | |
| testing is part of developmental tests conducted under cost plus-type | |
| contracting vehicles. Tests failed as a result of contractor | |
| performance or quality control issues reduce contractor award fee and/ | |
| or incentive fee and potentially impact Contractor Performance | |
| Assessment Report ratings. Additionally, MDA has delayed acceptance of | |
| Contractor-produced hardware due to known quality issues. | |
| Mr. Rogers. What is the current DOD regulation and policy | |
| concerning MDA's role to develop and maintain BMD capability and its | |
| transfer to the military services? Please detail what systems have been | |
| transitioned to the military services and what systems are currently | |
| undergoing transition study with the military services. | |
| Admiral Syring. The Department is using the Deputy Secretary of | |
| Defense's September 25, 2008, Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) | |
| Life Cycle Management Process (LCMP), and June 10, 2011 memorandum on | |
| ``Funding Responsibilities for BMDS Elements'' to guide program | |
| planning and the transfer process. | |
| Under the BMDS LCMP, DOD continues to transition BMDS capabilities | |
| to the lead Military Departments. The lead Military Departments are | |
| responsible for doctrine, organization, training, leadership, | |
| education, personnel and facilities associated with those elements. MDA | |
| retains the materiel acquisition responsibilities, unless a decision is | |
| made to transfer all responsibilities (full Title 10 Transfer) to the | |
| Military Department. | |
| Figure 1 lists the fielded BMDS elements, lead Military Departments | |
| and the dates elements entered the transition phase. The Department | |
| uses the following terms and definitions to clarify the process, roles | |
| and responsibilities: | |
| Entered Transition Phase: The BMDS element normally enters | |
| the transition phase when the Deputy Secretary of Defense, or | |
| delegated authority, designates a lead Military Department. If | |
| not previously approved, entry into the transition phase is | |
| coincident with the completion of the lead Military Department- | |
| MDA overarching memorandum of agreement (MOA). | |
| Capability Transfer: The BMDS element capability is | |
| transferred to the lead Military Department once the Military | |
| Department accepts operational responsibility. After the | |
| capability transfer, the Military Department and MDA will | |
| assume responsibilities as agreed in the Military Department- | |
| MDA overarching MOA and respective element annexes. Normally, | |
| MDA will retain materiel responsibilities, including Research, | |
| Development, Test and Evaluation, production, and sustainment | |
| of BMD specific equipment. The lead Military Department | |
| normally assumes responsibility for military pay and | |
| allowances, base operations and operations, and sustainment of | |
| common support equipment. | |
| Title 10 Transfer to Lead Service: BMDS element | |
| responsibilities are transferred from MDA to the lead Military | |
| Department. Unless otherwise specified, the lead Military | |
| Department assumes all doctrine, organization, training, | |
| materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities | |
| responsibilities. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, or a | |
| delegated authority, approves the transfer. | |
| Figure 1: BMDS Element Transition and Capability Transfer Status, October 2016 | |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| Entered Transition Title 10 Transfer | |
| Element or Capability Lead Service Phase Capability Transfer to Lead Service | |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC Army N/A N/A February 2003 \1\ | |
| 3) | |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| AN/TPY-2 (Forward Based Mode) Army February 2006 October 2013 Study ongoing \2\ | |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| Terminal High Altitude Area Defense Army November 2006 October 2014 Study ongoing \2\ | |
| (THAAD) | |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| Ground Based Mid-Course Defense Army November 2006 N/A \3\ Not planned \3\ | |
| (GMD) | |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Navy November 2006 October 2008 Not planned | |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| Aegis BMD 3.6.X Navy November 2006 October 2008 Not planned | |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| Aegis BMD 4.0.X Navy March 2007 March 2012 Not planned | |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| Aegis BMD 5.0 (Capability Upgrade) Navy January 2008 December 2015 Not planned \4\ | |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| Aegis BMD 5.1 Navy January 2008 FY 18 Not Planned \4\ | |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| Aegis Ashore (Romania) Navy January 2010 December 2015 Not planned | |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| Sea Based X-Band Radar (SBX) Navy December 2008 December 2011 Not planned | |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| Cobra Dane Air Force February 2006 February 2009 N/A \5\ | |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWR) Air Force November 2006 September 2008 N/A \5\ | |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| Command and Control, Battle N/A \6\ N/A N/A N/A \6\ | |
| Management and Communications | |
| (C2BMC) | |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| Notes: | |
| \1\ PAC 3 was already fielded by the Army when MDA was established | |
| in 2002 and was immediately transferred back to the Army by mutual | |
| agreement. | |
| \2\ Army and MDA have completed a study on the merits of a Title 10 | |
| Transfer. DOD is reviewing the study results. | |
| \3\ The GMD will not be transferred in the foreseeable future. Army | |
| and MDA will coordinate on terms of transition and transfer when the | |
| program is technically mature. | |
| \4\ BMD 5.0CU and 5.1 software packages are integrated into Navy's | |
| Aegis Baseline 9 combat system suite. MDA retains materiel developer | |
| responsibilities for the BMD software. | |
| \5\ Not applicable. Cobra Dane and the Upgraded Early Warning | |
| Radars are previously fielded U.S. Air Force assets that were upgraded | |
| and adapted by MDA for use with the BMDS. A Title 10 transfer is | |
| therefore, unnecessary, | |
| \6\ The C2BMC Tri-Service Structure was approved by the Deputy | |
| Secretary of Defense in March 2014. | |
| Mr. Rogers. Virtually every part of DOD has been the subject of | |
| cyber attacks, whether for espionage or other purposes. Is MDA any | |
| different? Can you describe what you've done to keep MDA ahead of this | |
| threat? Please reply in detail. Please ensure your response is | |
| unclassified to the maximum extent possible. | |
| Admiral Syring. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has been targeted | |
| for cyber-attack like the rest of DOD; however, MDA has successfully | |
| defended or mitigated cyber threats against our internal government | |
| networks and systems. Similar to other DOD programs, persistent cyber | |
| threats directed against defense industry base operated or owned | |
| unclassified networks are a continual vulnerability. MDA is very | |
| cognizant of the growing cyber threat and is aggressively working to | |
| ensure the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) information is | |
| protected, and that missile defenses can operate in a highly contested | |
| cyber environment. To keep MDA ahead of the threat, we have implemented | |
| a rigorous cybersecurity program as described below. | |
| MDA is using and sharing cyber intelligence to reduce our | |
| vulnerabilities. We use cyber intelligence to tune our cyber defenses | |
| and focus our information protection efforts. These efforts are | |
| accomplished in concert with DOD cyber forces (especially U.S. | |
| Strategic Command's USCYBERCOM), intelligence community assets, and law | |
| enforcement authorities. | |
| MDA is improving the cyber hygiene of our missile defense | |
| capabilities by ensuring our cybersecurity infrastructure has the | |
| latest security upgrades and patches. MDA continually assesses our | |
| systems, suppliers, and overall acquisition processes. We are ensuring | |
| robust and secure configurations of our critical software and hardware | |
| to reduce the risk of malicious activities. MDA also has a rigorous | |
| cyber and Supply Chain Risk Management inspection program to examine | |
| everything about our systems from the trusted supply chain to the | |
| fielded capability. This ensures the highest possible levels of | |
| compliance. | |
| MDA is instituting the DOD Cybersecurity Discipline Implementation | |
| Plan to mitigate risks for the information systems we own and manage. | |
| MDA's program implements the DOD four Lines of Effort campaign: Strong | |
| Authentication (to degrade the adversaries' ability to maneuver on DOD | |
| information networks); Device Hardening (to reduce internal and | |
| external attack vectors into DOD information networks); Reducing the | |
| Attack Surface (to reduce external attack vectors into MDA information | |
| networks); and Alignment to Cybersecurity/Computer Network Defense | |
| Services (to improve detection of and response to adversary activity). | |
| These efforts run across all facets of MDA and the BMDS mission systems | |
| and general services infrastructures. | |
| MDA has established an Insider Threat Program in accordance with | |
| the DOD Directive 205.16, ``The DOD Insider Threat Program.'' MDA is | |
| leveraging computer network defense capabilities, in addition to other | |
| information streams, to proactively detect, mitigate, and defeat | |
| potential insider threats. This program also ensures that only trusted | |
| individuals have access to MDA program information and systems. | |
| The MDA Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) continues to | |
| provide Computer Network Defense (CND) services as an accredited Tier | |
| II CND Service Provider to MDA Programs of Record. The MDA CERT | |
| executes a battle rhythm that includes daily monitoring and | |
| collaboration with USCYBERCOM, Joint Force Headquarters-Department of | |
| Defense Information Networks (JFHQ-DODIN), and other sources for the | |
| latest threats to DOD and MDA. As a result MDA CERT tracked and managed | |
| 109 cyber taskings in fiscal year 2015 and approximately 77 cyber | |
| taskings to date in fiscal year 2016, contributing to the overall | |
| cybersecurity posture of MDA networks and resources. | |
| MDA is incorporating cybersecurity requirements early into our | |
| acquisition lifecycle. We are designing and building cybersecurity into | |
| missile defenses, rather than adding it after the fact. MDA is ensuring | |
| that we build cyber resilience into our systems and verifying | |
| cybersecurity protection of deployed systems through realistic | |
| cybersecurity testing. | |
| We are working closely with our industry partners in the Defense | |
| Industry Base (DIB) to ensure they can protect both classified and | |
| unclassified information stored on their systems to prevent exposure to | |
| potential adversaries. MDA knows that malicious cyber actors are | |
| constantly attempting to exfiltrate information from U.S. Industry. We | |
| will continue to work with our DIB partners, the FBI, and other | |
| associates, to identify these issues and reduce the chances of success | |
| for those responsible, in coordination with U.S. National Authorities | |
| and in accordance with U.S. National Policy. | |
| MDA continues to execute a rigorous cybersecurity controls | |
| validation testing program on MDA networks and the BMDS in compliance | |
| with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special | |
| Publication 800-53, Revision 4, ``Security and Privacy Controls for | |
| Federal Information Systems and Organizations.'' We recently | |
| established a mandatory baseline set of technical cybersecurity | |
| controls for implementation within the BMDS system specification. | |
| Moreover, MDA is supporting BMD Warfighters with the joint | |
| development of the Cyber BMD Concept of Operations (with Joint | |
| Functional Component Command-Integrated Missile Defense and Joint | |
| Functional Component Command-Space) to ensure cyber threats can be | |
| rapidly detected, contained, and defeated. These efforts ensure the | |
| Agency remains a strong mission partner, protects and defends MDA | |
| information systems and networks, and optimizes cybersecurity | |
| management and processes at a level commensurate with our critical | |
| national defense mission. | |
| Mr. Rogers. What consequences have there been for contractor | |
| responsibility for such data loss/theft/spillage? | |
| Admiral Syring. Available tools to address Contractor liability | |
| include reducing award and incentive fee, negative Contractor | |
| Performance Assessment Report ratings, decision to not exercise | |
| contract options, and potential debarment from receiving Government | |
| contracts. MDA has used these tools recently to hold Contractors | |
| responsible for data lost/theft/spillage. MDA mandates the inclusion of | |
| Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations Supplement clause 252.204-7012 | |
| (Safeguarding of Unclassified Controlled Technical Information) in | |
| existing and future contracts and other MDA-specific requirements | |
| Mr. Rogers. How concerned are you that it is too easy for the bad | |
| guys to get access to ``unclassified controlled technical information'' | |
| about our missile defense systems? Have you seen examples of where they | |
| have improved their systems thanks to this sort of U.S. data? If yes, | |
| including if based on your suspicion, please provide as much detailed | |
| information as possible concerning such examples. | |
| Admiral Syring. We are very concerned about protecting Unclassified | |
| Controlled Technical Information (UCTI). The Missile Defense Agency | |
| (MDA) is working to ensure our Critical Covered Defense information is | |
| appropriately protected and working Defense contractor supply chain to | |
| implement oversight of defense contractor unclassified and development, | |
| manufacturing, and administrative networks. | |
| The Department issued a new Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation | |
| Supplement clause in August 2015 to protect UCTI, which MDA is | |
| incorporating into every new contract we award. | |
| We have held an MDA Industry Day to discuss protection of UCTI and | |
| appropriate program protection and cybersecurity controls. MDA has | |
| formed an alliance with our key prime contractors and government | |
| partners to assess both technical and non-technical protection | |
| countermeasures that can be implemented to reduce the risk of | |
| information loss and to help mitigate the risks of potential for cyber | |
| exploitation. | |
| A key part of this effort is the requirement to implement the | |
| National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800- | |
| 71 security requirements by December 2017 and to implement appropriate | |
| supply chain risk management countermeasures throughout our Defense | |
| Industrial Base. These efforts should assist in providing enhanced | |
| protection measures that are both cost-effective and reduce the risk of | |
| critical information loss. MDA is leading an effort with our primes and | |
| sub-contractors to identify where MDA specific covered defense | |
| information (CDI) has the greatest protection risk and ensuring | |
| additional security protection measures are implemented where | |
| appropriate to provide better protection for both MDA and our industry | |
| partners' critical information. | |
| MDA defers to the Intelligence Community on how other countries | |
| improve their systems. | |
| Mr. Rogers. In a response to a request for information, MDA | |
| indicated that planned Patriot-THAAD integration will consist of being | |
| able to pass planning data between units via compact disc. It is | |
| understandable that the document describes this as ``very limited THAAD | |
| integration with IBCS''. Is that correct? Is that acceptable? Does this | |
| demonstrate the Chairman of the Joint Chief's vision of integrated air | |
| and missile defense? | |
| Admiral Syring. MDA's response was accurate in that THAAD battle | |
| plans are currently passed via compact discs to Army units. The | |
| capability MDA and the Army are building for future increments does not | |
| use CDs. The Army and MDA have jointly developed an initial integration | |
| plan to provide shared defense design/battle planning and situational | |
| awareness improvements by 2020. | |
| The first integration step includes modification of THAAD software; | |
| adding the Common Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) XML Schema | |
| (CIXS) 3.6 interface to the THAAD Portable Planner; modification of the | |
| IBCS Integrated Defense Design algorithms and user interface; and | |
| remoting of THAAD workstations into a collocated IBCS Engagement | |
| Operations Center functioning as the THAAD Battery command post. | |
| Subsequent integration steps will be defined as part of the | |
| requirements analysis in conjunction with the development of the Army | |
| IAMD System of Systems Increment 3 Capabilities Production Document in | |
| 2018. This plan supports the Chairman of the Joint Chief's vision of | |
| integrated air and missile defense. | |
| Mr. Rogers. I understand the United Arab Emirates has indicated its | |
| willingness to make a considerable investment in development of an | |
| evolved extended-range THAAD system. Can you afford an extended-range | |
| THAAD given your current budget profile? | |
| Admiral Syring. The Department recently received a letter from the | |
| United Arab Emirates (UAE) expressing interest in the Terminal High | |
| Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Extended Range (ER) concept. In response, | |
| the Department clarified that while THAAD ER is not currently a program | |
| of record, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is conducting a THAAD | |
| follow-on study to assess alternative future capabilities to further | |
| enhance the THAAD weapon system against current and future threats. The | |
| Department committed to continue to keep the UAE informed through | |
| ongoing dialogue. MDA is assessing affordability as part of the THAAD | |
| follow-on study. | |
| Mr. Rogers. Is it the case the Army Vice Chief of Staff and | |
| STRATCOM have both stated that they need such a capability (e.g., an | |
| evolved extended-range THAAD system)? What capability gaps have they | |
| identified to MDA? Please reply in detail. Please ensure your response | |
| is unclassified to the maximum extent possible. | |
| Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is classified and | |
| retained in the committee files.] | |
| Mr. Rogers. Do you support such a partnership between the UAE and | |
| the U.S. (e.g., to develop an evolved extended-range THAAD system)? | |
| Admiral Syring. The United Arab Emirates is an important partner in | |
| ballistic missile defense and leader in the region as the first country | |
| to purchase THAAD batteries and interceptors through the Foreign | |
| Military Sales program. While the Department of Defense is not | |
| currently pursuing THAAD ER as a program of record, we are conducting a | |
| THAAD follow-on study to assess alternative future capabilities to | |
| further enhance the THAAD weapon system. As the Department evaluates | |
| findings from the THAAD follow-on study, we have committed to keeping | |
| the UAE informed and ensure that dialogue remains open. | |
| Mr. Rogers. I understand the U.S. is discussing a Foreign Military | |
| Sales case with Qatar for THAAD. Why is this case important for Qatar | |
| and THAAD? Can we work together to accelerate this case to make sure | |
| Qatar has these critical missile defense systems prior to the World Cup | |
| in 2022? How? | |
| Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is classified and | |
| retained in the committee files.] | |
| Mr. Rogers. Recently, Bill Gertz of the Washington Free Beacon has | |
| reported that North Korea has displayed a new road-mobile ICBM. Does | |
| North Korea have a new road-mobile ICBM? Is it testing solid-rocket | |
| motors for such a missile? Please reply in detail. Please ensure your | |
| response is unclassified to the maximum extent possible. | |
| Admiral Syring. The Missile Defense Agency defers to the Department | |
| of Defense Intelligence Community. | |
| Mr. Rogers. Can you remind this committee why road-mobile missiles | |
| are a defense challenge for us? And what about such missiles with solid | |
| fuel? | |
| Admiral Syring. Mobile ballistic missile technology advances and | |
| associated proliferation poses a growing threat to United States, our | |
| allies, and partner forces and territory including the homeland. Road | |
| mobile launchers enable potential adversaries to launch missiles from | |
| unexpected locations. Solid fuel provides more flexibility to the | |
| threats we face by reducing the time required to prepare and launch | |
| these missiles | |
| Mr. Rogers. Am I correct that under the current plan for the | |
| ground-based midcourse defense system, there are no operational spares | |
| GBIs for, is it 5 or 6 years? It's well into the 2020s, right? What | |
| happens if there is an unplanned failure? Please reply in detail. | |
| Please ensure your response is unclassified to the maximum extent | |
| possible. | |
| Admiral Syring. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) will not have | |
| operational spare Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs) until 2020. In | |
| President's Budget 2017, MDA plans to deliver three initial production | |
| Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV) units in fiscal year 2020 (FY20) and two | |
| initial production Configuration 3 (C3) boost vehicles in FY23. One of | |
| the RKVs and one of the C3 boosters will be designated as an | |
| operations/test spare. | |
| In the event of an unplanned failure for one of the operational | |
| GBIs, Ground-based Midcourse Defense Program Manager for Readiness | |
| would task the GBI contractor to repair the interceptor. During the | |
| timeframe for the repair, the warfighter would lose one interceptor | |
| from inventory. | |
| Mr. Rogers. Is this reality (the lack of operational spares | |
| referenced in the previous question) an artifact of years of under- | |
| investment in the GMD system? What is the best way to mitigate this | |
| risk? | |
| Admiral Syring. The lack of operational spares is due to | |
| significantly increasing the amount of operational Ground-based | |
| Interceptors (GBIs). To achieve the SECDEF mandate of fielding 44 GBIs | |
| by the end of calendar year 2017, MDA is emplacing all previously | |
| planned spares in the operational fleet. The following table | |
| illustrates the current program plan and the utilization of GBIs to | |
| meet operational and test requirements. | |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| Total Legacy contract (-0001) Deliveries 47 | |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| Total Development and Sustainment Contract 11 ............................................. | |
| (DSC) Deliveries | |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| Total Deliveries 58 ............................................. | |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| Subtract Flight Tests and Stockpile (12) FTG-06, BVT-01, FTG-06a, CTV-01, CTV-02+, FTG- | |
| Reliability Program (SRP) 07, FTG-06b, FTG-11a, FTG-11b, SRP (2), FTG- | |
| 15 | |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| Total Available 46 ............................................. | |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| Emplace 30 ..................... (Original GM Plan) | |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| IF: 30 are emplaced; THEN: Subtract 30 RESULT: 16 GBIs available to support future | |
| from 46 total Flight Tests, Spares and SRP. Provides 10 | |
| available; 46-30=16 Flight Test assets for fiscal year 2020 | |
| (FY20) through FY28 and 6 for Spares and SRP | |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| Emplace 44 ..................... (March 2013 SECDEF Mandate) | |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| IF: 44 are emplaced; THEN: Subtract 44 RESULT: 2 GBIs are available to support | |
| from 46 total flight tests in FY20 and FY21 | |
| available; 46-44=2 | |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| Our President's Budget 2017 plan mitigates this risk by providing | |
| redesigned kill vehicle spares beginning in FY20 and Configuration 3 | |
| spares in FY23. | |
| Mr. Rogers. Please detail any exercises, table top exercises, or | |
| war games you have participated in concerning left-of-launch ballistic | |
| missile defeat. In such exercises, were there any areas in which it was | |
| observed that policy guidance was required to successfully carry out | |
| such capability? If so, please identify and describe such observed | |
| areas needing policy guidance from OSD. | |
| Admiral Syring. The Missile Defense Agency's (MDA's) wargame and | |
| exercise support is primarily limited to providing modeling and | |
| simulation focusing on right-of-launch ballistic missile defeat for | |
| Warfighter-sponsored wargames and exercises. | |
| MDA defers to the respective combatant commands for specific | |
| details or questions regarding policy guidance observations or | |
| requirements for executing Left-of-Launch activities. | |
| Mr. Rogers. What kind of intelligence do we need to possess in | |
| order for the President to order a preemptive attack on a state | |
| possessing nuclear weapons? | |
| Admiral Syring. This question would be best addressed by the U.S. | |
| Strategic Command. | |
| Mr. Rogers. What do potential adversaries like Russia, China, Iran | |
| and other states know about THAAD and PATRIOT? Do they know more than | |
| they should? What does that tell us about the security of data about | |
| U.S. missile defense? Please reply in detail. Please ensure your | |
| response is unclassified to the maximum extent possible. | |
| Admiral Syring. The Missile Defense Agency defers to the Department | |
| of Defense Intelligence Community. | |
| Mr. Rogers. How much do the TD-2 and KN-08 have in common, in terms | |
| of technology and systems? How much of the KN-08 is it safe to say has | |
| been tested? Please reply in detail. Please ensure your response is | |
| unclassified to the maximum extent possible | |
| Admiral Syring. The Missile Defense Agency defers to the Department | |
| of Defense Intelligence Community. | |
| Mr. Rogers. Are we outpacing the threat? How do you evaluate | |
| ``outpacing'' the threat? Based on what criteria? Please provide a | |
| detailed list of adversary developments regarding ballistic missile | |
| capability that affected our ability to ``outpace'' the threat. What | |
| developments by adversaries, if any, have surprised you? Please reply | |
| in detail. Please ensure your response is unclassified to the maximum | |
| extent possible. | |
| Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is classified and | |
| retained in the committee files.] | |
| Mr. Rogers. How much control do you have over LCMD? How much | |
| insight do you have over something that will go into a system for which | |
| you are responsible? | |
| Admiral Syring. Since 2015, the Missile Defense Agency has provided | |
| technical support to the Office of the Secretary of Defense/Sandia | |
| National Laboratory Low Cost Missile Defeat team, to include systems | |
| engineering, Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense system design, | |
| sensors, and cost estimating. We have also provided technical deep | |
| dives and guidance on the Ballistic Missile Defense System | |
| architecture, system requirements, concept of operations, safety and | |
| mission assurance, and integration information. We will continue to | |
| provide technical support through 2016 in support of a Systems | |
| Requirements Review in July and activities leading to a Preliminary | |
| Design Review. We participate in all of the major reviews and weekly | |
| tag up meetings. | |
| Mr. Rogers. Are there any other missile defense capabilities you | |
| are aware of that are being developed outside of MDA? For example, by | |
| the Strategic Capabilities Office? What is your level of insight and | |
| technical authority over such capability developments. | |
| Admiral Syring. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is an active team | |
| member of the Hypervelocity Gun Weapon System (HGWS) Project sponsored | |
| by the Office of Secretary of Defense Strategic Capabilities Office | |
| (SCO). MDA supports the HGWS systems engineering efforts and is | |
| developing a Prototype Fire Control Radar to support system level | |
| demonstrations in the fiscal year 2018-2019 time frame. MDA actively | |
| participates in Integrated Air and Missile Defense architecture and | |
| requirements development, ballistic missile defense mission performance | |
| analysis, and HGWS system-level test planning, as well as 3-Star-level | |
| Sensor Steering Committee meetings. | |
| In addition, MDA is partnering with SCO on other projects at higher | |
| classification levels. | |
| Mr. Rogers. I would like to give you an opportunity to clarify a | |
| response to a question during the 14 April hearing, are you funded to | |
| develop and deploy defense against boost-glide missiles like those | |
| being developed by Russia and China? How much would such development | |
| cost? | |
| Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is classified and | |
| retained in the committee files.] | |
| Mr. Rogers. Am I correct that, if we assume a 2028 initial fielding | |
| of a new Patriot radar, we will have a radar system with components, in | |
| some cases, that are 58 years old? | |
| Mr. Pike. The average age of all Patriot ground equipment including | |
| the radars and their components across the U.S. Army fleet is 7.5 | |
| years. This average age is achieved through the Patriot | |
| recapitalization program and the Patriot modification efforts and is | |
| cost-effectively enabled by new radar production for foreign partners | |
| and continuous obsolescence management. The Patriot recapitalization | |
| program is a complete depot overhaul effort that returns one battalion | |
| set of Patriot ground system equipment per year (including radars) to | |
| like-new (zero miles/zero hours) condition. The recapitalization | |
| program is conducted at the Letterkenny Army Depot in Pennsylvania and | |
| is funded with Operations and Maintenance Army funding. While the | |
| original design heritage of Patriot goes back to the 1970s, the Army | |
| has implemented a continuous and robust hardware and software | |
| modification effort over the years to address performance, readiness, | |
| and obsolescence. These modification efforts not only replace older | |
| components, but also leverage the substantial investment of our foreign | |
| partners and most recently included the new Radar Digital Processor, | |
| new Modern Adjunct Processor, and the new Modern Man Station. These | |
| components also enable adaptation to the Army's Integrated Air and | |
| Missile Defense Battle Command System (IBCS). | |
| The materiel solution for the Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense | |
| Sensor (LTAMDS) has not been determined nor has a program baseline | |
| (cost, schedule, performance) been established. The LTAMDS effort could | |
| result in an upgrade to the current Patriot radar or a new radar to | |
| replace the Patriot radar. The Army's plan is to conduct a full and | |
| open competition to allow industry to propose and demonstrate materiel | |
| solutions that address the approved LTAMDS requirements. While LTAMDS | |
| is being developed and fielded, Patriot readiness and performance will | |
| be maintained through the recapitalization, modification, and | |
| obsolescence management efforts described above. | |
| Mr. Rogers. How many requirements or objectives can Patriot not | |
| meet today due to obsolescence or adversary threat developments? Please | |
| provide me the complete list. Please reply in detail. Please ensure | |
| your response is unclassified to the maximum extent possible. | |
| Mr. Pike. [The information referred to is classified and retained | |
| in the committee files.] | |
| Mr. Rogers. When you testified, you stated the Army Requirements | |
| Oversight Council was meeting that week to establish an actual | |
| operational requirement for the LTAMD radar. Did it? Please provide | |
| such AROC-approved requirement if so. | |
| Mr. Pike. [The information referred to is classified and retained | |
| in the committee files.] | |
| Mr. Rogers. Please provide the operational availability information | |
| for each Patriot battery for the most recent year for which it is | |
| available. Please reply in detail. Please ensure your response is | |
| unclassified to the maximum extent possible. | |
| Mr. Pike. Over the last twelve months, Operational Readiness was | |
| the driver of availability of Patriot units. Operational Readiness is | |
| reported monthly for the worldwide U.S. Army Patriot fleet and is also | |
| broken out by the following regions: Korea, Pacific Command (PACOM), | |
| Continental United States (CONUS), Europe (USAREUR), and Southwest Asia | |
| (SWA). | |
| The Army's Operational Readiness goal for Patriot is 90 percent. | |
| The most current Operational Readiness data available for the last | |
| twelve months is provided below ending May 2016: | |
| Worldwide 92.67% | |
| Korea 97.75% | |
| PACOM 79.83% <dagger> | |
| --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| <dagger> PACOM failures were in radar, heavy and medium wheeled | |
| vehicles, and trailers. There were three separate months that affected | |
| the PACOM Operational Readiness rate. Radar faults occurred in August | |
| 2015 and were corrected by the end of the month. Issues with vehicles | |
| occurred in October 2015 and were corrected by the end of that month. | |
| Radar faults and trailer issues occurred in APR 2016 and were corrected | |
| later that same month. The most recent month's (May 2016) Operational | |
| Readiness rate for PACOM was reported as 96 percent. | |
| --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| CONUS 93.42% | |
| USAREUR 91.17% | |
| SWA 93.25% | |
| Mr. Rogers. What is the risk that, due to obsolescence, the Army | |
| will not be able to keep the Patriot radar fully functional to your | |
| planned 2028 initial fielding plan? Please explain your answer in | |
| detail and cite Army analysis/analyses that has been conducted to | |
| inform your answer. Please reply in detail. Please ensure your response | |
| is unclassified to the maximum extent possible. | |
| Mr. Pike. Due to the recapitalization program, the modification | |
| efforts, and continuous monitoring as well as the extensive new | |
| production for our foreign partners, the Army categorizes the risk to | |
| Patriot radar functionality (performance and operational readiness) as | |
| low. | |
| The Army continuously monitors component obsolescence in all | |
| Patriot end items. Commercially-available databases are utilized to | |
| assess the availability of electronic components used in the | |
| manufacture, modification, and recapitalization of the radar. The | |
| modification efforts to maintain performance and readiness against the | |
| evolving threat (functionality) produce the latest configuration of the | |
| Patriot ground system (including radars) for the U.S. Army fleet called | |
| Configuration 3+ (C3+). The C3+ modification effort results in a 49.3 | |
| percent reduction in obsolete parts associated with the Patriot radar | |
| compared to the previous radar configuration. The overall obsolescence | |
| percentage of the C3+ radar is assessed at 4.3 percent of the total | |
| radar parts. The Army also monitors field failure data to ensure that | |
| spare and repair programs are not affected by obsolescence issues. | |
| Although the U.S. Army does not currently plan to procure any new | |
| Patriot radars, there is an extensive C3+ production program for our | |
| foreign partners. The new production enables a cost-effective supply | |
| chain to support performance, readiness, and sustainment of the U.S. | |
| Army capability, resolves certain obsolescence issues, and provides | |
| opportunity to reduce obsolescence even further. | |
| Mr. Rogers. Can you please tell me, if you begin fielding the new | |
| radar in 2028, when will it be fully deployed to our Army air | |
| defenders? | |
| Mr. Pike. The Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor effort has | |
| not yet been established/approved as an acquisition program. Therefore, | |
| the program baseline (cost, schedule, performance) has not yet been | |
| established. The program baseline will be informed by results of the | |
| full and open competition using the Army's approved operational | |
| requirements. | |
| Mr. Rogers. As the acquisition lead for the Army for Patriot, can | |
| you please assure us that at the end of the Lower Tier Army Missile | |
| Defense radar modernization program that all, all, capability and | |
| objective requirements gaps will be closed so that they are covered for | |
| our soldiers and joint warfighters who depend upon this system? If not, | |
| what capability and requirement gaps will not be met? Please reply in | |
| detail. Please ensure your response is unclassified to the maximum | |
| extent possible. | |
| Mr. Pike. The Army's approved operational requirement for the Lower | |
| Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS) addresses all of the known | |
| capability gaps based on current threat projections for future years. | |
| The LTAMDS program will be structured to achieve the Army's operational | |
| requirements which will close the gaps. However, threat projections are | |
| simply that--today's predictions of the future threat which may or may | |
| not accurately reflect the threat in the future. Threat projections and | |
| capability gaps are updated on a recurring basis. As the threat | |
| evolves, additional capability gaps and objective requirements may be | |
| identified during development, production, fielding, and/or sustainment | |
| of LTAMDS. Any necessary improvements to address the updated threat | |
| projections/emergent gaps will likely be implemented through | |
| evolutionary software development and hardware modifications (or | |
| product improvement programs) if required based on operational risk | |
| assessments. This is the same process that has been successfully | |
| accomplished in Patriot for decades. | |
| Mr. Rogers. In a response to a request for information, MDA | |
| indicated that planned Patriot-THAAD integration will consist of being | |
| able to pass planning data between units via compact disc. It is | |
| understandable that the document describes this as ``very limited THAAD | |
| integration with IBCS''. Is that correct? Is that acceptable? Does this | |
| demonstrate the Chairman of the Joint Chief's vision of integrated air | |
| and missile defense? | |
| Mr. Pike. Planned Patriot-THAAD integration does not consist of | |
| passing planning data between units via compact disc. Missile Defense | |
| Agency's (MDA) response was accurate in that THAAD battle plans are | |
| currently passed via compact discs to Army units for non-real time | |
| planning purposes. Near real-time target data and engagement status is | |
| currently shared between THAAD and Army mission command elements | |
| automatically via tactical data links. Additionally, the Army and MDA | |
| are building capabilities for future increments of non-real time battle | |
| planning that eliminates the need for compact discs. The Army and the | |
| MDA have jointly developed an initial integration plan to provide | |
| shared defense design/battle planning and situational awareness | |
| improvements by 2020. The work includes modification of THAAD software; | |
| adding the Common IAMD Extensible Markup Language Schema 3.6 interface | |
| to the THAAD Portable Planner; modification of the IBCS Integrated | |
| Defense Design algorithms and user interface; and remoting of THAAD | |
| workstations into a collocated IBCS Engagement Operations Center | |
| functioning as the THAAD battery command post. Subsequent integration | |
| steps will be defined as part of the requirements analysis in | |
| conjunction with the development of the Army IAMD System of Systems | |
| Increment 3 Capabilities Production Document in 2018. This plan | |
| supports the Chairman of the Joint Chief's vision of integrated air and | |
| missile defense. | |
| ______ | |
| QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER | |
| Mr. Cooper. Please give us your views on the efforts to change the | |
| decades-long missile defense policy of defending against a limited | |
| missile defense attack. Would expanding this policy to defense against | |
| all missile defense attacks, including large-scale attacks from China | |
| or Russia, be possible and cost-effective? What would the strategic | |
| stability implications be of such a change in policy? Is there an | |
| operational requirement for this? How do we deter Russian and Chinese | |
| attacks? | |
| Mr. McKeon. It has been long-standing U.S. policy not to seek to | |
| build missile defense capabilities that could threaten China's or | |
| Russia's strategic deterrent. Every U.S. Administration has instead | |
| relied on our nuclear Triad to ensure credible deterrence against | |
| Chinese and Russian Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) attack | |
| against our homeland. Changing this policy would raise profound | |
| questions about whether the United States is now pursuing the | |
| development and deployment of large-scale, advanced missile defense | |
| capabilities to negate either Russia's or China's strategic deterrent. | |
| This development could undermine strategic stability with regard to | |
| both countries, and could lead them to respond by accelerating and | |
| expanding their strategic nuclear forces, or by developing a more | |
| advanced asymmetrical response capability. | |
| Furthermore, the technical challenges and interceptor inventories | |
| associated with building missile defenses to cope with a large-scale, | |
| sophisticated Russian or Chinese missile attack would make the project | |
| cost-prohibitive. | |
| DOD continues to believe that the most effective and reliable means | |
| to deter an attack on the United States by a major nuclear power is to | |
| sustain and modernize our strategic nuclear Triad. | |
| Mr. Cooper. Admiral Syring, you noted that Space Based Interceptors | |
| are neither technically nor financially feasible. Please explain these | |
| feasibility concerns. | |
| Admiral Syring. At a conceptual level, Space Based Interceptors | |
| (SBI) could provide on-demand boost and early post-boost access against | |
| certain classes of threats even in places where terrestrial weapons | |
| would be geographically constrained or politically precluded. However, | |
| the basic feasibility of an SBI layer with operational utility has not | |
| yet been shown in the relevant environment of space and on the | |
| compressed engagement timelines required.\1\ Essential SBI technologies | |
| have been worked only sporadically over the years and consequently are | |
| not feasible to procure, deploy, or operate in the near- to mid-term. | |
| --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| \1\ Note: Delta 180 (Vector Sum) did demonstrate in 1986 the | |
| principle of intercepting in space a target during powered flight | |
| --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| Cost has traditionally been a barrier to space based defenses. | |
| Feasible solutions would depend upon aggressive incorporation of light- | |
| weight technologies, low-cost access to orbit, and selection of a | |
| mission that is bounded enough to be affordable and at the same time | |
| militarily useful. The 2011 IDA report showed costs ranging from $26B | |
| for a limited mission, to greater than $60B for a ``medium'' capability | |
| system that could perform against near-term threats, to over $200B for | |
| a full global defense. | |
| Mr. Cooper. Please give us your views on the efforts to change the | |
| decades-long missile defense policy of defending against a limited | |
| missile defense attack. Would expanding this policy to defense against | |
| all missile defense attacks, including large-scale attacks from China | |
| or Russia, be possible and cost-effective? Is it technologically | |
| feasible? What would the cost be? | |
| Admiral Syring. The Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy | |
| is the most appropriate organization to respond to questions concerning | |
| a change in missile defense policy. | |
| ______ | |
| QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES | |
| Mr. Forbes. We understand that the Department of Defense is | |
| considering deploying JLENS in the Mid-Atlantic region. Would Wallops | |
| Island, Virginia, be a suitable location to deploy JLENS in support of | |
| NORTHCOM/NORAD missions? | |
| Admiral Gortney. A number of sites were considered when planning | |
| for the three-year JLENS Operational Exercise (OPEX) from FY15 through | |
| FY17. Wallops Island was one of the sites considered; however, due to a | |
| number of variables, including current availability of restricted | |
| airspace and the timeframe required to develop new restricted airspace, | |
| Wallops Island was not deemed suitable to support the OPEX in the given | |
| timeframe. The objective of the JLENS OPEX was to assess JLENS | |
| contribution to cruise missile defense within the National Capital | |
| Region and inform an enduring mission decision. If the OPEX results had | |
| supported an enduring mission requirement, an assessment of optimal | |
| JLENS locations, including additional site surveys if necessary, would | |
| be part of the JLENS enduring mission decision. | |
| ______ | |
| QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BISHOP | |
| Mr. Bishop. It is my understanding that you are on schedule to | |
| ensure that 44 Ground Based Interceptors (GBI) are fielded by the end | |
| of 2017. Can you describe for the committee how many back-up boosters | |
| and kill vehicles MDA plans to acquire to support the 44 GBI fleet? | |
| Admiral Syring. The Missile Defense Agency is on track to field 44 | |
| GBIs by the end of 2017. The Agency plans to acquire three spare | |
| redesigned kill vehicles and two spare Configuration 3 boosters from | |
| calendar years 2020-2025 to support the 44 GBI fleet. | |
| Mr. Bishop. Do you believe that you are on schedule to ensure that | |
| the upgraded booster, known as C3, will be able to support the new | |
| Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV) fielding in the 2020-2022 time frame? How | |
| much funding in FY17 is requested to begin C3 development? | |
| Admiral Syring. No, the Configuration 3 (C3) booster will not be | |
| delivered to support RKV fielding from 2020-2022. In order to maximize | |
| system reliability as quickly as possible and to meet the 2016 National | |
| Defense Authorization Act requirement to replace all Capability | |
| Enhancement-1 (CE-I) exoatmospheric kill vehicles (EKV) by 2022, the | |
| Missile Defense Agency (MDA) will initially recap C1 boosters with | |
| RKVs. Beginning in 2023, MDA will deliver C3 boosters with RKVs and | |
| continue until all CE-2 EKVs are replaced. Beginning in 2024, the first | |
| 18 RKVs that were placed on C1 boosters will receive their C3 booster. | |
| This strategy focuses resources on the highest priority GBI component | |
| (replacing all CE-I kill vehicles) while phasing in the C3 booster in | |
| an efficient manner. In PB17, the Agency has requested $20.8 million in | |
| fiscal year 2017 to begin C3 development. | |
| [all] | |
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