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	<title> - [H.A.S.C. No. 114-117] HEARING ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017 AND OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION</title>
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	[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
	[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]






	[H.A.S.C. No. 114-117]

	HEARING

	ON

	NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

	FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017

	AND

	OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

	BEFORE THE

	COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

	HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

	ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

	SECOND SESSION

	__________

	SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES HEARING

	ON

	FISCAL YEAR 2017 INFORMATION

	TECHNOLOGY AND CYBER PROGRAMS:

	FOUNDATIONS FOR A SECURE WARFIGHTING NETWORK

	__________

	HEARING HELD
	MARCH 22, 2016


	[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]







	U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

	20-077 WASHINGTON : 2017
	-----------------------------------------------------------------------
	For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing
	Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
	DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
	Washington, DC 20402-0001















	SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

	JOE WILSON, South Carolina, Chairman

	JOHN KLINE, Minnesota JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
	BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania JIM COOPER, Tennessee
	DUNCAN HUNTER, California JOHN GARAMENDI, California
	RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
	RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
	TRENT FRANKS, Arizona, Vice Chair DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
	DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska
	MO BROOKS, Alabama PETE AGUILAR, California
	BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
	ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
	Kevin Gates, Professional Staff Member
	Lindsay Kavanaugh, Professional Staff Member
	Neve Schadler, Clerk

















	C O N T E N T S

	----------
	Page

	STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

	Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island,
	Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
	Capabilities................................................... 2
	Wilson, Hon. Joe, a Representative from South Carolina, Chairman,
	Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities.............. 1

	WITNESSES

	Halvorsen, Hon. Terry, Chief Information Officer, Department of
	Defense........................................................ 3
	Levine, Hon. Peter, Deputy Chief Management Officer, Department
	of Defense..................................................... 3

	APPENDIX

	Prepared Statements:

	Halvorsen, Hon. Terry........................................ 26
	Levine, Hon. Peter........................................... 35
	Wilson, Hon. Joe............................................. 25

	Documents Submitted for the Record:

	[There were no Documents submitted.]

	Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

	Mr. Ashford.................................................. 44
	Mr. Lamborn.................................................. 44
	Mr. Langevin................................................. 43
	Ms. Stefanik................................................. 44

	Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

	Mr. Kline.................................................... 52
	Mr. Lamborn.................................................. 53
	Mr. Langevin................................................. 51
	Mr. Wilson................................................... 49







	FISCAL YEAR 2017 INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND CYBER PROGRAMS: FOUNDATIONS
	FOR A SECURE WARFIGHTING NETWORK

	----------

	House of Representatives,
	Committee on Armed Services,
	Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities,
	Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 22, 2016.
	The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:43 p.m., in
	room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Joe Wilson
	(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

	OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE WILSON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
	SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND
	CAPABILITIES

	Mr. Wilson. I call this hearing of the Emerging Threats and
	Capabilities Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee
	to order. I am pleased to welcome everyone here today for this
	hearing on the fiscal year 2017 budget request for information
	technology [IT] and cyber programs.
	Lately the Secretary has been highlighting the need for
	increased innovation in the Department of Defense [DOD] through
	public-private partnerships--and I was grateful that Secretary
	Ashton Carter was here yesterday on this issue, so it is right
	on point--as well as the importance of generating new
	capabilities to offset growing advantages of future potential
	adversaries.
	I believe that information technology and cyber will both
	serve as key enablers and, at the same time, present key
	challenges for the Department as it tries to realize its
	vision.
	In this time of fiscal constraint, I also believe it is
	equally important to enforce management rigor to make sure that
	we are squeezing the most out of every defense dollar where it
	makes sense. We need to learn from industry and use the kinds
	of business analytics and business intelligence methods that
	work so well in the commercial sphere. That also means using
	commercial tools to the maximum extent, especially in areas
	like business systems and cloud computing.
	We need to find better ways to foster and maintain our own
	human capital to support the acquisition and management of
	information technology and cyber systems. In looking through
	this most recent budget request, I want to make sure the
	Department is emphasizing these two complementary tracks--
	increased innovation, as well as increased management
	discipline.
	I would like to welcome my distinguished panel of witnesses
	and appreciate their perspectives on all of these issues. This
	panel includes the Honorable Terry Halvorsen, Chief Information
	Officer [CIO], Department of Defense, the Honorable Peter
	Levine, the Deputy Chief Management Officer [DCMO], Department
	of Defense.
	I would like now to turn to my friend and ranking member,
	Mr. Jim Langevin from Rhode Island, for any comments he would
	like to make.
	[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson can be found in the
	Appendix on page 25.]

	STATEMENT OF JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE
	ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND
	CAPABILITIES

	Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
	convening this hearing. And I want to thank you to our
	witnesses for testifying today on the President's fiscal year
	2017 budget request for information technology and cyber
	programs.
	Last week, we heard about the cyber mission force build and
	operations from Admiral Rogers, and today we will hear about
	the infrastructure our warfighters operate within and defend
	for the enterprise. Cyber Command [CYBERCOM] has advocated for
	the ability to see the network in order to provide better
	defense. The joint information environment, or JIE, is the
	guiding effort for achieving this capability. And today I hope
	to hear about the progress made under the JIE umbrella,
	governance for this effort, and service contributions.
	Another major undertaking I would like to discuss today is
	implementing the Department's cloud strategy. The DOD's
	migration to the cloud has slowed due to laborious
	certification requirements and an acquisition system unable to
	keep up with cloud services procurement. This also seems to
	hinder any efficiency or cost savings that could otherwise be
	achieved.
	Finally, the DOD has been tasked with building and
	maintaining the IT system for OPM's [Office of Personnel
	Management's] new National Background Investigation Bureau.
	While it makes sense the Department provide expertise on
	building a secure system, I am concerned the DOD is assuming
	all the risk by providing resources and assuming responsibility
	for decisions made outside the Department.
	As a long-term advocate for cybersecurity within this
	subcommittee, I am glad we have taken the time to not only
	discuss the build and operations, but also the infrastructure
	our cyber warriors operate within every day over the last few
	weeks.
	Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank our
	witnesses for being here today to discuss this important topic.
	And I yield back the balance of my time.
	Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Langevin. And now welcome again
	to our witnesses. Your written statements will be submitted for
	the record, so we ask that you summarize your comments in 5
	minutes or less, and then after that, each of the persons on
	the subcommittee will go through a 5-minutes process and Kevin
	Gates will make sure it is done correctly.
	So we now begin with Mr. Halvorsen.

	STATEMENT OF HON. TERRY HALVORSEN, CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER,
	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

	Mr. Halvorsen. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
	Member, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank
	you for this opportunity to testify before the subcommittee
	today on the Department's information technology budget
	request.
	As the Department's CIO, I am the principal adviser to the
	Secretary of Defense for information management, IT,
	cybersecurity, communications, positioning, navigation, and
	timing, spectrum management, senior leadership, nuclear command
	control, and communications matters. Those latter
	responsibilities are clearly unique to the DOD.
	My imperative at the CIO in managing this broad and diverse
	set of functions is to ensure that the Department has the
	information and communications technology capabilities needed
	to support the broad set of Department missions. This includes
	supporting our deployed forces and cyber mission forces, as
	well as business and warfighting support functions.
	As Secretary Carter has stated, DOD must address strategic
	challenges across all domains, not just air, land, and sea, but
	increasingly in cyberspace. The Department's budget includes
	funding to address these challenges, including IT and cyber
	investments that are critical to the Department's warfighting,
	intelligence, and business missions.
	As the CIO, I am driving cultural, business, technical
	improvements, and innovation into DOD's IT and cyber to better
	support defense missions and operations. My written testimony
	provides more detailed information on the Department's IT and
	cyberspace budget and priorities.
	I want to emphasize that these efforts require teamwork and
	partnership within DOD, which includes DISA [Defense
	Information Systems Agency], USD [Under Secretary of Defense]
	AT&L [Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics] and Policy, U.S.
	CYBERCOM, DCMO, and other partners.
	External partnerships to DOD will also be critical, to
	include Congress, industry, and our allies. I strongly believe
	an expanded partnership with industry will be essential to
	expanding and maintaining technology advantages, while
	improving our fiscal accountability.
	I thank you for your interest and support, and I look
	forward to your questions.
	[The prepared statement of Mr. Halvorsen can be found in
	the Appendix on page 26.]
	Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Halvorsen. We now proceed to Mr.
	Levine.

	STATEMENT OF HON. PETER LEVINE, DEPUTY CHIEF MANAGEMENT
	OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

	Mr. Levine. Thank you, Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member
	Langevin, and members of the subcommittee.
	I am Peter Levine, and I am the Deputy Chief Management
	Officer of the Department of Defense. Two years ago, this
	committee enacted legislation which will merge the offices of
	the DCMO and CIO. However, that legislation does not take
	effect until the beginning of the next administration, so until
	that time, the CIO, Mr. Halvorsen, will remain the responsible
	official within OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] for
	IT, cybersecurity, and many of the other issues addressed in
	your letter of invitation.
	The DCMO's role, until such time as this merger takes
	place, is limited to reviewing and approving of investments in
	IT business systems. We do thank you in that regard for last
	year's NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act], in which you
	substantially streamlined and gave us more flexibility in the
	way we do this. We intend to use this flexibility in several
	ways.
	First, we intend to change our focus from the discrete
	review of each individual small investment and focus more on
	portfolios, so we can be more forward-looking in our management
	of business systems. Second, we plan to focus much more on
	return on investment, so that we can ensure that when we invest
	in business systems, we actually realize the benefits that we
	should be able to get out of them, that we actually turn off
	the legacy systems and reduce manning, where we can develop
	more efficient and less manpower-intensive processes.
	And finally, we are going to work to develop a streamlined
	process for business systems where we can align our business
	systems investment process, our CIO process, and our
	acquisition process into a single process so that we don't have
	to sequentially go through one after the other and put the
	program manager through recurring hoops as we go forward.
	We are firmly committed to working with you as we try to
	make the business systems process more efficient and to improve
	the Department's investment process and look forward to your
	questions.
	Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	[The prepared statement of Mr. Levine can be found in the
	Appendix on page 35.]
	Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much. And we will now proceed
	with a 5-minute round. I want to commend Lindsay Kavanaugh and
	Jim Langevin for achieving an extraordinary turnout today. So,
	congratulations. You did good.
	And I will begin with myself. And this is for both of you.
	What do you see as the major budgetary challenges in this
	year's President's budget request? Where are we accepting risk
	based on current budget constraints?
	Mr. Levine. I will give the gentle answer, which is not
	enough money. And I will defer to Mr. Halvorsen as to the IT
	budget specifically.
	Mr. Halvorsen. I certainly echo Peter's first comment about
	not enough money. I think in the IT area, we are taking some
	risk in modernization. Some of it will slow. We are trying to
	balance that and make sure that we don't take that risk in the
	security side.
	The other I think challenge that we are going to have in IT
	may not be exactly in the budget, and it is going to be the
	retention of the IT workforce. And frankly, that is going to
	come down to an economic decision. I happened to be in the
	valley [Silicon Valley] last week, and, you know, Google
	announced they are raising the pay for cybersecurity by another
	20 percent. That is going to keep impacting our ability to
	attract talent.
	If you ask me about the budget, what keeps me up more at
	night, that is probably the answer, sir.
	Mr. Wilson. And thank you very much. And, Mr. Halvorsen,
	Chairman Mac Thornberry's most recent defense reform proposal
	emphasizes prototyping experimentation. Can you tell us what
	the Department is doing with regard to information technology
	and cyber programs that highlight these approaches?
	Mr. Halvorsen. Yes, thank you. I think a couple things that
	we want to think about when we answer this question, much of
	the innovation today being driven in the cyber and IT business
	is coming from the commercial sector. We want to be closer tied
	to the commercial sector, so thanks to some legislation last
	year, I am able to now put people from DOD inside of business--
	and we are doing that today--and also have business people on
	my staff, which we are also doing today.
	I think that partnership that we continue to strengthen is
	a key to us getting the right innovation and getting it on
	time.
	Within the DOD, I want to focus our S&T [science and
	technology] dollars around the areas the industry isn't going
	to focus on, and that is going to be on the weapons systems and
	top-level security systems, where there is not yet much play in
	the commercial sector, and I think our budget reflects that
	that is where our emphasis is and also reflects where we are
	taking risk is around innovation dollars that we would have
	that were inside the budget for commercial areas that we have
	taken some risk and are not spending that much.
	Mr. Wilson. And, again, I am impressed with the efforts by
	Secretary Carter to work for public-private cooperation.
	Additionally, Mr. Halvorsen, in the fiscal year 2017 budget
	request, the Defense Information Systems Agency, the primary IT
	provider for the Department, eliminated the S&T funding it had
	to pursue innovation and technology demonstration. Please
	explain the rationale for that decision and how this aligns
	with the Secretary's emphasis on drawing in innovation from the
	commercial sector.
	Mr. Halvorsen. Yes, we certainly reduced DISA's S&T
	funding. They still have some R&D [research and development]
	money. But in the area we reduced it is aligned exactly--I
	think what we have said before--today, where we are going to
	get our information, and particularly true for most of DISA's
	activities, which are supporting our business functions, is
	from industry and commercial.
	So in a constrained budget, in my opinion, that was where
	we chose to take some risk, because I think I can get that same
	innovation affect by strengthening our relationships with
	commercial industry.
	Mr. Wilson. Additionally, Mr. Halvorsen, section 901 of the
	fiscal year 2015 NDAA mandated that the chief information
	officer begin to exercise authority, direction, and control
	over the Information Assurances Directorate of the National
	Security Agency.
	Recently, this subcommittee was made aware of a DOD
	proposal to place that authority, direction, and control back
	with the Under Secretary for Intelligence. Do you support the
	Department's proposal? What are the pros and cons of keeping
	that authority with the chief information officer?
	Mr. Halvorsen. I don't know that the Department has made a
	formal proposal yet. I know that it is being discussed.
	Candidly, I would have some concerns about moving it away from
	the DOD CIO, but more importantly what we are doing is working
	with the intel side of the Department to form a governance
	structure that will allow both CIO and intel equities in the IA
	[information assurances] money to be addressed.
	Mr. Wilson. Well, with your background, we would all
	appreciate any input at any time as we consider these issues.
	I now yield to Mr. Langevin.
	Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, I want to
	thank both of our witnesses for being here and what you are
	doing in the IT and cyber sphere.
	So one of the questions I had--and, Terry, you talked about
	it just a minute ago in terms of, well, the private sector
	increasing what they are paying their cybersecurity folks, and
	it is going to be particularly challenging now for us to
	compete to get that top-end talent.
	I know in the NDAA last year, we gave more flexibility to
	the Department to try to take advantage of that IT talent. You
	know, for example, allowing potentially--as I envision it--to
	see private sector to be able to detail for maybe a year or two
	these high-end individuals that, you know, it would be
	challenging for us to both afford, attract, and keep for a long
	period of time.
	But, you know, companies have an interest in patriotic duty
	and want to help secure the Nation in cyberspace. So we made
	some progress in that with the NDAA, giving some flexibility to
	the Department. Can you tell me, do you need additional
	authorities to further take advantage of that talent so that we
	have the cyber workforce that is as robust as possible and our
	networks are as secure and as robust as possible?
	Mr. Halvorsen. First, I would thank you for the NDAA last
	year. That is helping some of the work we are able to do, the
	excepted workforce in cyber, being able to bring the people in
	from industry like we are doing now. I do think we will need
	some legislation that probably changes slightly the rule sets
	about what we are allowed to do with the industry people.
	I think exactly what you stated. We really want to be able
	to bring them in and have them sit in a position for a year,
	being able to execute some decisions within the Department, and
	then go back to industry, just like I think there is a market
	space today for us to have some of our civilian employees go to
	industry, and industry would like to have them--and I think we
	will need to tweak some of the legislation so that could happen
	more often.
	I think we share the vision. In the end, we want more of an
	in and out, back and forth. And you could really see the career
	path in cyber IT changing so that it is not an all-civilian or
	all-government career path, but a much more combined career
	path. And I think that would serve the Nation well.
	Mr. Langevin. Good. I mean, that is exactly where I hope
	that we are going to be and that is what we want to get to.
	Please, I hope you will work with us and tell us how we can be
	of help in terms of additional legislation and language that
	you need to get to that point.
	So as I mentioned in my opening statement, I find it
	appropriate the Department of Defense is involved in building a
	new IT system for OPM's new National Background Investigation
	Bureau [NBIB] that will house sensitive personnel information.
	However, I am concerned that the DOD has been given
	guidance and deadlines that are not realistic and is assuming
	all responsibility for performance, when the decision-making
	authority may be shared.
	So my questions are, can you describe the Department of
	Defense's role in building and maintaining a new IT system?
	Specifically, what is the amount requested for fiscal year
	2017, as well as in the out years? Was additional money added
	to the top line for DISA's role in this effort? Or is it coming
	out of hide?
	What are the resources that are being provided for this
	effort? Is the current workforce sufficient to meet the demand
	or will additional personnel be billeted? Will the Department
	have sole decision-making authority in building and maintaining
	the system? Or is it shared with OPM and other communities? And
	what timelines have been established for delivering the system?
	And, Mr. Levine, if I could--Levine, I am sorry--what role
	will you have in doing business process re-engineering to
	change the way NBIB does business so it fits the IT system, not
	the other way around? And if you need me to repeat any part of
	that, I will be glad to. Sorry it is such a long list.
	Mr. Halvorsen. So, sir, what I would like to do, because I
	do think that question deserves a lot of matter, is I will make
	some comments on it, but I will also like to take that for the
	record and get back to you with some of the specific answers.
	[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
	on page 43.]
	Mr. Langevin. Fair enough.
	Mr. Halvorsen. For 2017, it is $95 million. There was a
	top-line increase to DOD for doing some of this. We will get
	you the exact numbers across the FYDP [Future Years Defense
	Program]. And then I would be foolish if I said there is not
	some concern on DOD's part about how this is going to work, and
	what I would assure you is from a standpoint of the build, we
	are going to get the requirements from the group that is
	looking at how we are going to redo the whole investigation
	process.
	When I have those requirements--and that group starts next
	week, and we have members on it--we will build a system that
	supports those requirements that also ensures security. If at
	any time I think that that is not happening, I will be the
	first to let you know.
	I am comfortable right now that we have worked out a
	governance process with OPM and OMB [Office of Management and
	Budget] that makes DOD the decision maker for all of the
	technical decisions and the security decisions, but I am still
	concerned and we will have to see how that goes forward. And I
	will get you more detail on the rest of the question.
	Mr. Langevin. I would appreciate it, whatever additional
	detail you could provide. And I would just assure we stand
	ready to support you in this effort as you make the transition.
	And Mr. Levine?
	Mr. Levine. With regard to the business process re-
	engineering, we definitely have less of a role in that than we
	would have if the entire mission had been transferred to the
	Department of Defense. However, it was never going to be
	entirely the Department of Defense in any case because as you
	know the DNI [Director of National Intelligence] establishes
	security clearance policy, so we are always going to have to
	work with outside agencies and reconcile differences with
	outside agencies.
	We are undertaking with the Under Secretary of Defense for
	Intelligence to re-engineer the DOD part of the process. We are
	looking at continuous evaluation. We are looking at other
	measures to streamline our organization and streamline our part
	of the process. And we do still have a piece--significant
	pieces of the process. It is the investigation piece that OPM
	has, but not the entirety of the process.
	As we do that, we will see places where we are going to
	want help, we are going to want changes in the OPM piece of the
	process, and we will have to work that through the interagency,
	because we don't control it, but we will work it through the
	interagency process.
	Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you. I yield back.
	Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Langevin. We now proceed to
	Congressman Doug Lamborn of Colorado.
	Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. And I will get to the budget
	implications of this in just a minute, but how active are we in
	working with allies, NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]
	allies, Israel, et cetera, in combating cyber threats and cyber
	attacks?
	Mr. Halvorsen. Extremely active. A couple of the things
	that we have done that I can talk about in this forum with the
	Five Eye community,<dagger> we actually established last year a
	CIO Five Eye group that meets physically every 6 months,
	virtually every quarter. Our next meeting is in London, where
	cybersecurity is certainly one of the big topics. We have had
	visits to Israel, exchanging data. That continues.
	---------------------------------------------------------------------------
	<dagger> ``Five Eyes'' is an intelligence alliance involving
	Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United
	States.
	---------------------------------------------------------------------------
	I just came back from Korea and Japan, where that was a
	major topic. I can tell you that the NATO partners, Korea,
	Japan, Germany, have all adopted the DOD cybersecurity
	scorecard as the basis for measuring how effective we are doing
	cybersecurity basics across the board, which I think is a big
	breakthrough.
	So we can probably give you some more detail, and we will
	take that for the record, but they are the major things that we
	are doing to improve our information-sharing.
	[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
	on page 44.]
	Mr. Lamborn. Well, that is good to hear. And do you have
	any recommendations in the budget on maybe making that even
	stronger? Or, I mean, I know you have a good budget that you
	are defending right now, but do you see any room for
	improvement in that area in particular?
	Mr. Halvorsen. You know, I do see room for improvement, but
	I don't think right now that is a money issue for improvement.
	I think it is more of getting all of us aligned to the right
	principles and basics.
	Today we have made good progress within NATO--and as I
	said, Japan and Korea and Germany--there is some other work we
	need to do with other partners.
	I will be in Estonia in June working some of those issues.
	And what I would like to do is when I come back from that, I
	will have a better site picture, is maybe give you some more
	answers on what I think we might need to do to go beyond some
	of our traditional allies.
	Mr. Lamborn. Okay. I appreciate that. I would like to
	follow up on this conversation at another time. Thank you, Mr.
	Chairman.
	I yield back.
	Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Lamborn. We now proceed to
	Congressman Jim Cooper of Tennessee.
	Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, the Santa Claus
	question. Both of you mentioned that you would like to have
	more money. How much? And for what?
	Mr. Levine. I would say that as the DCMO, my responsibility
	is finding efficiencies. I am not actually looking for more
	money. The Department is looking for more money. I am trying to
	identify efficiencies within the Department where I can free up
	money so that we can invest more in the long-range science and
	technology programs and force structure and things that we need
	to keep our force ready to go today and ready to go in the
	future. That is where I need more money.
	I would defer to Mr. Halvorsen as to specific IT
	investments.
	Mr. Halvorsen. I think to upgrade some of our legacy
	systems. And I can get back to you with a number on that. And
	to tie back with Peter, I think some investment in the legacy
	systems--and particularly some of the larger both HR [human
	resources] personnel and pay systems--those investments would
	do two things for us.
	One, we would certainly improve security. There are some
	issues we need to fix there. Secondly, I think we could improve
	efficiency, and after we made those investments, I actually
	think the return on investment would be pretty good. But I will
	come back to you with a number, sir.
	[The information referred to was not available at the time
	of printing.]
	Mr. Cooper. Thank you. Now the Scrooge question. Pentagon
	is the least auditable of all government agencies. It has been
	a risk factor for the GAO [Government Accountability Office]
	for 20 years, the number one risk factor. Will your IT work
	help the Pentagon get audited faster?
	Mr. Levine. The answer is yes. Improved business systems,
	improved financial management systems definitely make an
	impact. We are much closer today to being auditable than we
	were 10 years ago. A significant part of that is because of the
	ERP [Enterprise Resource Planning] investment. But there are
	many, many hurdles we have to get over that are not IT, and IT
	can't solve it by itself.
	We have policy issues that we have been kicking down the
	road 10 years that now that we are facing a 2017 deadline, we
	are finally getting people to be serious about and say, hey,
	yeah, we actually have to make those decisions, we have to
	figure out how we are going to go about that.
	So the DCMO co-chairs the governance board, the FIAR
	[Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness] governance board,
	which is responsible for trying to drive the Department toward
	audit with the Comptroller, with Mike McCord. And since I
	arrived at the Department about 10 months ago, we have been
	trying--we have set the Department on a program of identifying
	what our key interim milestones are that we need to hit in
	order to become auditable.
	We have identified a lot of things that should have been
	addressed 5 years ago or 10 years ago, but we are trying to
	chip away at them one at a time, and we think that the deadline
	is extremely constructive in pushing us toward that objective.
	The Department seems to have an infinite ability to kick
	things down the stream and facing a deadline that is 2 years
	away really helps focus the attention.
	Mr. Cooper. Well, some people would say 2017 is next year,
	not 2 years away.
	Mr. Levine. It is October 1, 2017. I guess we can--a year
	and a half is what that is, yes, sir.
	Mr. Cooper. Doesn't sound like you are very optimistic
	about meeting the deadline.
	Mr. Levine. When I came before the Senate Armed Services
	Committee for my nomination hearing about almost exactly a year
	ago, I testified that I had never been confident the Department
	was going to meet the deadline, and I couldn't change my
	position just because I was testifying for confirmation.
	So I can't change my story now. I am skeptical that we will
	have done everything we need to do. But I am going to push as
	hard as I possibly can to get us there.
	Mr. Cooper. Okay, now the long-awaited question of the
	ghost of Christmas past. The Joint Chiefs hack, there was
	apparently somebody who signed on to an e-mail, like the
	equivalent from the Nigerian prince or something. Has that
	person been identified who opened that foolish e-mail? And
	would it help if they were identified, if they not been
	identified previously?
	Mr. Levine. I will say that the people that opened the e-
	mail have been identified, and we have looked at the reasons
	why, and in some cases, we did some remediation. In other
	cases, they had followed the right procedures, up to a point,
	and we needed to do some more training. That has been put in
	place to do that, but I would also say that was also one that
	was caught very quickly.
	We had very limited exposure--still would like to do
	better--but the system and when you look at the volume of e-
	mail traffic that comes into DOD, how many we get, and the
	number of people that click, great improvement. We are
	certainly holding people accountable to a higher standard now.
	We have signed out the cyber accountability culture
	document that was signed by DEPSECDEF [Deputy Secretary of
	Defense]. Myself, Frank Kendall, and Mike Rogers have signed
	out the accountability procedures document to make it down to
	the individual and command level, so I think we have made
	progress in that area.
	I don't think identifying any more individuals at any more
	level would be helpful right now.
	Mr. Cooper. I see my time has expired, Mr. Chairman.
	Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Cooper. We now proceed to
	Congresswoman Elise Stefanik, of New York.
	Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the
	panelists for being here today. I have two questions. The first
	one will be quite broad. The second one will be quite specific.
	As you are well aware, the threats to the United States have
	evolved dramatically in the last 10 years. State and non-state
	adversaries have adapted to a new digital environment quite
	well. And it is important that the United States invests in the
	time, training, and infrastructure to counter the whole
	spectrum of cyber threats.
	So as we see in the news, cyber provocation against the DOD
	infrastructure continues to increase, what is your assessment
	of the DOD's ability to counter such intrusions today? And what
	can I tell soldiers that I represent at Fort Drum in my
	district what we are doing to ensure that they are protected?
	And what have we learned about the enemy? And how has that
	changed our approach? That is the first broad question.
	Mr. Halvorsen. Again, I will make some comments on it, but
	we will take that for the record, because I think it is a good
	question and we owe you some better details on that.
	[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
	on page 44.]
	Mr. Halvorsen. We certainly have improved training across
	the board in the cyber spectrum. The cybersecurity culture
	issue is one that is on top of the Secretary's desk. We meet
	every month on the cybersecurity scorecard, and a part of that
	gets to what is the training of the individuals. The networks
	themselves are much better today. They are not exactly where we
	want them. We have got three major efforts to improve that.
	The first one is, you are probably aware that the Secretary
	has directed that this year we move as much of DOD as
	possible--the ones that are on Windows operating systems--to a
	Windows 10 baseline. I cannot stress the criticality of us
	getting that done.
	Right now, when you try to look at the visibility of the
	networks, while we are making improvements, you are doing that
	across multiple operational systems, multiple baselines. It is
	impossible to do, do well.
	Getting to a single baseline for Windows--and that is about
	80 percent to 85 percent of the DOD--will give us the ability
	to have better visibility. Windows 10 is the first operating
	system that really thought about security right from the
	beginning and has in-built features that we will take advantage
	of.
	It will also allow us to go to the next step, which is how
	do you then start taking and really using cloud computing
	technology to improve your security? So we are positioned to do
	that. We have got things we have to get done, and the first one
	is to get the Windows 10 done.
	The other big initiative is to complete the joint regional
	security stacks. In its simplest forms, what that does is lower
	our footprint. Today, we have got 1,000 points that you can
	come in. When the joint regional security stacks are done, we
	will have less than 100 points. That is a lot easier to defend,
	and we can focus more on it.
	It also stops us from doing our own self-denial attacks,
	which are also--happen when you are trying to keep aligned over
	1,000 different firewalls. We will reduce the firewalls, have
	better overall security and visibility into the networks. That
	is what we are doing at the big end.
	Ms. Stefanik. Okay, so the specific questions are actual
	follow-ups to your answer. When you reference the cybersecurity
	scorecard process, what is the scorecard exactly? Can you get
	into more specifics? Can this information and will this
	information be shared with Congress? Are there plans to expand
	scorecards beyond cybersecurity? And how does a negative
	scorecard rating of a DOD component, what is the consequence of
	that?
	Mr. Halvorsen. Again, we will give you some more details in
	writing, but here is what I can tell you. The scorecard is
	looking at what we have defined right now as basic areas that
	we should be measuring. One of them is, is everybody using a
	secure token to access DOD systems.
	The advantage of that is, is immediate. If you are using
	the token, A, we know exactly who logged in, when they logged
	in, where they are at, and it is a lot harder to fake that
	access. So it is an immediate improvement.
	Ms. Stefanik. Can that information be shared with Congress?
	Mr. Halvorsen. Actually, I am happy to give it to you. We
	have actually shared it with other committees, and I am happy
	to send one over when I get back, the current scorecard.
	Ms. Stefanik. And the results of the scorecards that are
	shared?
	Mr. Halvorsen. The results is right on it. It will show you
	where we are at. We are not where we want to be in all of the
	areas. We are measuring ourselves to extremely high standards.
	One of the things that I just want to say upfront, when you
	look at cyber, you could hit 80 percent and a lot of people
	would think that would be good. In cyber, that is not good
	enough.
	So when you see that we are in yellow and, in some cases,
	red, it is because we are trying to get above in almost every
	category 95 percent to be green.
	Ms. Stefanik. And the last question is, you talked about
	the Department's plans to move to the Windows 10 operating
	system with a mandate to so by a certain date. What is the cost
	of that transition?
	Mr. Halvorsen. I don't know the exact cost yet. We will get
	that to you. But what I could tell you, the cost not to do that
	would be in the billions.
	[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
	on page 45.]
	Ms. Stefanik. Great, I would look forward to getting more
	of that in writing afterwards. I yield back.
	Mr. Wilson. And thank you, Congresswoman Stefanik. We now
	proceed to Congressman Pete Aguilar of California.
	Mr. Aguilar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Halvorsen, can
	you talk to me broadly about in your testimony you talk about
	cloud computing. Where will cloud computing be in 5 years and
	in 10 years?
	Mr. Halvorsen. In 5 years, I am hopeful that we will be in
	an almost complete virtual cloud environment, and cloud defined
	this way. We will have private clouds, which are completely
	private within segments of DOD. We will have private clouds
	that are just DOD, you know, inside it. And we will have
	private clouds that are DOD and other parts of the Federal
	Government. And then we will have hybrid public clouds.
	Because of the size of DOD and the Federal Government, we
	ought to be able to move into where we would have government
	hybrid clouds hosted in commercial centers as opposed to some
	of the things I talked about earlier, would be on premise, that
	would give us the best combination of mission security and
	value.
	Mr. Aguilar. Is that what you mean when you talk about in
	page 3 of your testimony mission partner environment, when you
	are talking about commercially accessible, reconfigurable, and
	secured data that can be shared with commanders?
	Mr. Halvorsen. A little broader than that. The mission
	partner environment would certainly use cloud technology, but
	in that part of the testimony what I am really talking about is
	how we would be able to support our COCOM [combatant command]
	commanders as they partner with both traditional and non-
	traditional allies to support whatever mission it is, to be
	able to stand up virtual networks on the fly, to be able to do
	that both at a secure level, at a speed level that we need, and
	then to keep it fiscally responsible.
	Mr. Aguilar. Can you talk a little bit about how you
	envision that working and what our stakeholders and coalition
	partners, what their role in that would be?
	Mr. Halvorsen. So as we can move to cloud technology, one
	of the things that we have got to recognize, we have got to
	get--our MPE [mission partner environment] is going to have to
	be commercial-based. We are not going to be able to do this at,
	say, a U.S.-only based system. A, other pieces of our allies
	couldn't afford that, and it is not what they are going to
	agree to do.
	So basing this on a commercial set of technology that also
	uses commercial classified technology, would allow us to, in
	the cloud, put together a virtual network that--let's say we
	had a--this is a really good example, and I think it is in the
	testimony--and we have done this--let's say we had a natural
	disaster that had allies now--like the Chinese, the Cubans, us,
	they are not traditional allies. We could actually stand up a
	network, once we get some of the technologies in place, that
	would allow data to be shared.
	And let's say we want to share data with China, we want to
	share data with Cuba, but not exactly the same data. We could
	do that on a network with the right protections to protect the
	data that we need using almost commercially available
	technology today. There is a few pieces that have to be done,
	but I am--no doubt they will be done by the end of this year.
	Mr. Aguilar. Well, look forward to seeing that development
	and our discussion about that moving forward. Thank you so
	much.
	I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
	Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Congressman Aguilar. We now proceed
	to Congressman Brad Ashford, all the way from Nebraska.
	Mr. Ashford. It is a long trip every morning. Thank you,
	Mr. Chairman, being able to get here.
	Congressman Langevin raised the issue that I am trying to
	understand further. And your answers were good. I want to
	further understand it, though, a little bit, because we talk a
	lot about employee exchanges with the private sector and the
	need for additional authorities to do that.
	It seems to me it is a critical part of the plan going
	forward and with the talent out there and the demands on the
	budget and being able to bring people in. And you have,
	Congressman Langevin, hit it 100 percent, and you did, as well,
	in your answers.
	What do we have to do in order to--I mean, it seems to me
	that is something we should be able to move on. And what sort
	of authorities would we need in order to do that?
	Mr. Halvorsen. Again, I would like to come back on record--
	here is what I would tell you I think the first area. Today
	there are some statutes that actually prohibit us from giving
	decision authority to those type of positions. While we
	certainly want to protect them and make sure that the
	government is in the end responsible for the decision, if I
	have got somebody industry--so let's take cloud.
	The best cloud engineers today are not in the government.
	They are not. We have some really good ones, but the best ones
	today are in industry. We ought to be able to get some of those
	in. I ought to be able to assign one of them, say, okay, you
	are the lead cloud engineer for this year that you are doing
	this work with us, and give them the authority to make
	decisions, and with some oversight, expend dollars.
	Today, under the current authorities, that is hard to do. I
	need to do some work to figure out what that should look like,
	and I will come back to you by the summer, if that is good,
	with some recommendations.
	[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
	on page 44.]
	Mr. Ashford. That is really all I have. That is extremely
	helpful. It seems to me that there are areas where, as you
	suggest, the private sector or the nongovernmental sector have
	those expertise. So thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is all I
	have.
	Mr. Wilson. And thank you, Congressman Ashford. And due to
	how important these issues are, we will proceed with a second
	round.
	And, Mr. Levine, DOD doesn't have a stellar track record in
	deploying business IT systems. What recommendations would you
	have to make to improve our abilities to deploy business
	systems? And, secondly, how can we improve or shape the
	workforce to better configure, deploy, and manage these
	business systems?
	Mr. Levine. First, we don't just not have a stellar record.
	We have a horrendous record of deploying business systems. I
	think that of all the things that we do badly, that is one of
	the ones we do the worst.
	So there are a number of things that we need to do on our
	side of the river to do better. One of the things that we need
	to do is to recognize the business systems themselves are not
	going to solve our problems, that what we need to look at is
	the processes that we are automating, so that if you try to
	automate an old process without looking at it and figuring out
	how it works, you are doomed to failure.
	We have tried many times to buy an off-the-shelf system and
	then said to the users of the system--well, have the users of
	the system come in and tell us, well, that is not exactly the
	data we want. We want this other data, because that is what we
	have actually used, and we start tearing apart the guts of an
	off-the-shelf system. And before you know it, we have spent
	five times as much to re-engineer the system and to rebuild the
	system as the cost of the system itself.
	We have to control our own appetite, and that is something
	that we are working on within the Department. In terms of what
	you could do to help us--so one thing that I would say that you
	could do to help us, that I hope you will think about, is as we
	look at the process that we have to go through for business
	systems, right now, as I said, we are going to try to work with
	the acquisition community to re-engineer that, because we have
	a system where we go through an investment review process, we
	identify a potential solution, and it may be like a $20 million
	fix to a problem where you do a tinker with an existing system.
	We then have to throw it over the threshold, over the
	transom to the acquisition community that may set up a program
	office that in itself would cost $20 million, and they will
	come to us with a solution which is, let's build a whole new
	system from scratch. Well, that is crazy.
	So we are going to try to re-engineer that within the
	Department. There may be places where we come to you for
	assistance in doing that re-engineering. And there is one place
	in particular I would point to, which is right now for what I
	presume are historic reasons, we have one set of thresholds for
	what are called major defense acquisition programs [MDAPs].
	We have another set of thresholds for what are called major
	automated information systems [MAIS] programs. MDAPs and
	MAIS's. The MAIS thresholds are way, way lower, an order of--I
	don't know, a couple of orders of magnitude lower than the
	thresholds for MDAPs, but we treat them as the same thing.
	What that means is, that when we have an IT--a business
	system investment, we trigger a process on the acquisition side
	which is as big and as clumsy as the process we have on the
	acquisition side when we are buying an aircraft carrier or a
	fighter aircraft or something like that. And if you are buying
	a business system, I am not sure that makes sense.
	And so I think if you would look at where you treat MAIS
	systems and MDAPs the same and whether you need to treat them
	in the same way in legislation, I think that is something
	constructive that could help us in streamlining our own
	internal processes.
	Mr. Wilson. Well, thank you for being so candid. And
	additionally, too, hey, technology changes overnight, and so I
	know it is an extraordinary challenge, but we appreciate both
	of you on what you are doing. Also, I am grateful--Mr.
	Halvorsen, I notice your association with Rotary International,
	your service as a Paul Harris fellow. I am happy to be with
	you.
	So a question, Mr. Halvorsen. Spectrum is a vital resource
	for the Department. However, it is also one that we are in
	increasing competition with the commercial sector. What
	challenges do you see over the next 10 years when it comes to
	the DOD's use of spectrum? What recommendations would you make
	to improve the responsiveness of the regulatory process to
	including national security concerns and economic priorities?
	Mr. Halvorsen. So I think today we are in a good spot, hard
	work with spectrum. We did well with the last auction. And the
	money is there to change where DOD can move and share spectrum.
	What I worry about right now is that the private demand for
	spectrum is going to exceed our ability to keep pace. And we
	could, if we are not careful, put some national systems at
	risk.
	Some of this takes time. And in this business, I get that
	time is really valuable and it is money, but there is a
	physical limitation to how fast we can move the DOD systems
	either into the ability to share spectrum or out of some
	spectrum. And I worry--maybe because we are victims of our own
	success--we have done very well, and the legislation that has
	been written and the sharing has all worked to date.
	But what I hear from industry right now is, well, we want
	to go faster. And I don't know that we can go much faster today
	on how we look at spectrum, make the decisions where we can get
	out, and how we would share.
	I would also tell you that while I think industry is
	starting to look at making their own investments in helping us
	share, they are just starting that.
	And I think one of the things we need to look at is, I am
	happy to be measured on how DOD is making investments to
	share--and we ought to think about some measurements that we
	would give industry to say, how are you doing in making the
	investments to--your contributions to helping us get to that
	state?
	Mr. Wilson. Well, thank you very much. And now Ranking
	Member Jim Langevin.
	Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thanks to our
	witnesses for being here.
	So yesterday I had the opportunity to have a sit-down with
	Deputy National Security Adviser Avril Haines and the Homeland
	Security Adviser, Lisa Monaco, to discuss the Comprehensive
	National Cybersecurity Initiative [CNCI]. And I have certainly
	been an advocate for many of the proposals under the CNCI for
	some time, and specifically the appointment of an individual at
	the executive level to oversee Federal cybersecurity
	enterprise.
	And it is one of the problems that I think previously on
	the .gov side they really don't have anybody in charge with
	both policy and budgetary authority that can reach across
	government and compel departments and agencies to do what they
	need to do in cyber. Hence, you have things like the OPM breach
	that happened.
	And I think DOD, by the way, is doing a much better job in
	terms of defending the .mil network. And all of that, as
	difficult and challenging as it is, it is important. And they
	are doing good work. But can you describe how DOD fits into the
	overall CNAP [Cybersecurity National Action Plan], as it is
	called? And more specifically, how DOD will interact with the
	new individual, the Federal Chief Information Security Officer
	who will be appointed to coordinate cybersecurity policies and
	activities?
	Mr. Halvorsen. Today, and even before the legislation, we
	partner extensively with the Federal CIO, Tony Scott. I mean,
	Tony when he came in brought some new ideas to the Federal
	side. We are certainly supportive of that, and we will continue
	to do so.
	As the areas that the Federal Government is looking at are
	applicable to DOD, we will play, and we will play hard, and we
	will support those. We will continue to advise Tony and the new
	individual that is appointed on where we think there are things
	that DOD is doing that should be applied to the rest of the
	Federal Government, and we will take those things that are
	really working and apply them within DOD.
	I think the establishment of an individual to do that is
	key to success inside the rest of the Federal Government. And I
	think there are some opportunities for us to really set that
	tone.
	One of them is, as we rebuild the NBIB and we look at the
	lessons learned, I know Tony and I have agreed today that we
	ought to take those lessons learned and apply them across the
	Federal Government at any place that we see that that is
	applicable, we will do that.
	Mr. Langevin. Okay. What progress has DOD made on cloud
	computing, specifically integration of capabilities provided by
	essential service providers, and are there enough certified to
	create a competitive field? And how are security concerns being
	addressed?
	Mr. Halvorsen. As for the progress, two things I think I
	would like to point. We say a lot of times that DOD is behind
	in cloud. So I wanted to really know if that was true. So I
	have asked my staff and some outside to take a look at, how
	does DOD compare in the use of cloud with other Fortune 50 or
	peer competitors?
	We are actually slightly ahead of most of the Fortune 50 in
	the use of cloud. We are now embarking on doing more, but I
	don't think DOD is behind. If you look particularly at the
	financial industry, which has some very strong security
	similarities to us, they have done exactly what we have done.
	They take some of their public-facing stuff and they put it
	into cloud. We have done that with good success.
	The next two things that we are doing--and we have now
	gotten certifications, enough of them, to start being
	competitive--is to look at how we bring industry into on-
	premise cloud offerings. We do that right now very limitedly
	through the NGEN [Next Generation Enterprise Network] contract
	that the Navy put in place, where actually HP [Hewlett-Packard]
	is running Navy data centers, to include Navy data centers at
	the secure level, on-prem [premises], for the Navy.
	We are using that model, and we are going to expand that
	across the rest of DOD.
	I will have a couple RFIs [requests for information] out
	here in the next month. We have a couple contracts that we are
	going to let that will allow four commercial entities to come
	in at the Level 4 level in certification, which is right below
	the classified data. And we have some work being done to allow
	more companies to partake in the classified space, too. So I
	actually think we are making good progress. We have got to stay
	on top of that.
	I hope this summer, if the Windows 10 thing goes well, the
	next announcement that we will make will be that DOD has
	decided to go to a more complete cloud environment, similar
	to--and I just used this as an example--this is not a
	decision--but similar to what a Windows 365 cloud environment
	would do. You have to get to that next phase to really take
	full advantage of the cloud across the board.
	Mr. Langevin. Thank you. I just--I know my time is expired,
	but I will say, I hope along with all of this we are paying
	maximum attention to the security of the cloud. It does still
	concern me that, you know, we have the crown jewels in some
	ways all in one place. And my colleague, Jim Cooper, likes to
	refer to the cloud as the acronym for Chinese Love Our Uploaded
	Data. And so security can't be tight enough, as far as I am
	concerned.
	Mr. Halvorsen. So, Mr. Chairman, can I take one more
	minute? We agree. And one of the reasons that we are where we
	are with cloud, it is the same reason the financial industry is
	where it is with cloud.
	We do have some things we have to make sure, and security
	is right. And one of them is, how do you achieve virtual
	separation so that you don't get the effect of everything being
	loaded in one spot and it can be exfiltrated? And if it does
	get penetrated, how do you quickly shut that off and isolate
	it? And we are spending a lot of time working with the industry
	experts in how to do that.
	Mr. Langevin. Thank you. Thank you very much.
	Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Langevin, and thank you for your
	expertise in acronyms. We now proceed to Congresswoman Elise
	Stefanik, of New York.
	Ms. Stefanik. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. My final question
	relates to the personnel side of this issue. So one of the
	challenges that I think we clearly face is ensuring that our
	cyber, technical, and workforce capabilities can scale
	economically. And a significant issue for the industry is the
	clearance process.
	Is there any thought being given to an approach for fast-
	tracking clearance processing for critical skills position,
	such as computer network operations programmers, to better
	enable effective support as your mission requirements expand?
	Mr. Levine. We have a problem with security clearances
	across the Department of Defense and across the industry. And
	the problem with prioritizing is how many competing priorities
	we have. So, yes, that would be a priority, but I can't look
	across the Department of Defense and say we don't have a dozen
	other priorities that are at least equal to that. I mean, the
	number of priorities we have is extraordinary.
	The security clearance problem is a problem not only for IT
	professionals, but also for contractors who are working on
	weapons systems. It is a problem for the hiring process within
	the Department of Defense.
	That is why we are working to re-engineer our internal
	processes and why we hope that we will be allowed to help re-
	engineer some of the OPM processes, as well, as we go forward
	with this. One of the things that we are very hopeful for is
	continuous evaluation as a tool that will help speed things up
	and lower the burdens.
	But I have got to say, right now we are runnning continuous
	evaluation as a pilot program, which means we are running it in
	addition to all the other requirements. And we are hoping that
	we can prove it out so it can be a substitute for some of the
	requirements that we are going to expedite. We are not there
	yet.
	But it is a hard question, not just for this area, and I
	don't think the Department can afford to solve it by carving
	off one universe and treating them better, because the other
	universes of people we need to get through the security
	clearance process are also vital to our national security.
	Ms. Stefanik. Mr. Halvorsen, do you have anything to add?
	Mr. Halvorsen. No, I think Peter summed that up very well.
	Ms. Stefanik. Okay, thank you very much. I yield back.
	Mr. Wilson. And thank you, Congresswoman Stefanik, for your
	insight, too. There being no further, we are adjourned.
	[Whereupon, at 4:38 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]




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	A P P E N D I X

	March 22, 2016

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	PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

	March 22, 2016

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	WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

	THE HEARING

	March 22, 2016

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	RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

	Mr. Halvorsen. The funds for NBIB in DISA's FY17 budget and out
	year plans were a top line add. The FY17 President's Budget submission
	requested $20M of O&M and $75M of RDT&E. The initial out year funding
	profile is presented in the following table:

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	No additional funds from outside of this line are expected to
	be spent on DOD's effort to support the new IT system. In FY16, OPM
	will reimburse DOD for initial pre-acquisition prototyping efforts and
	legacy system support. Funding for these efforts is in the range of
	$5M.
	Forty additional FTEs were added to DISA for the Background
	Investigations Information Technology (IT) System based on an analogous
	estimate of the number of FTEs required to architect, design, acquire,
	implement and sustain a new start IT system. The estimate was generated
	using a review and analysis of historical programs with the closest
	scopes and scales of capabilities, adjusted for the high level of
	concurrency necessary for the rapid delivery of operational capability.

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	The organization structure, specific job descriptions/role, and
	position grades have not yet been determined and will be confirmed by
	July as we perform the pre-acquisition planning for the IT system.
	The timeline for delivery of the IT system is in the planning
	phase. A schedule will be developed as part of the pre-Acquisition
	planning that is currently underway with an expectation to be approved
	as part of an overall Acquisition Strategy in October 2017.
	The DOD CIO is solely responsible for building and maintaining the
	IT system based on NBIB requirements. The CIO is advised by the
	Director of OPM and the Federal CIO as part of the NBIB IT Governance
	Council. [See page 7.]
	______

	RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ASHFORD
	Mr. Halvorsen. The Department believes the NDAA FY17 House & Senate
	provisions related to private industry exchanges and ITEP provide the
	Department the flexibilities needed. We appreciate the support of
	Congress on this matter. [See page 14.]
	______

	RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
	Mr. Halvorsen. The DOD CIO International engagement efforts have
	grown exponentially in the last several years as cyber has emerged as a
	domain. These objectives align with regional cooperation, information
	sharing, and interoperability initiatives. Working closely with
	OUSD(P), the Joint Staff, NSA, DISA, US STRATCOM, US CYBERCOM and
	Regional Combatant Commands, and the interagency, DOD CIO has
	established enduring and lasting relationships focused on increased
	information sharing, promoting foreign disclosure and release, and
	enhancing communication and collaboration with our allies and partners.
	DOD CIO led efforts to continue key relationships with the Five Eye
	(FVEY) partners through the establishment of coordination groups such
	as the Defense CIO Forum, sharing information and developing
	mitigations on key cyber issues such as access control, identity
	management, supply chain security, and secure mobility. Successes in
	other FVEY fora include information sharing at the classified and
	unclassified level through the use of U.S. issued FVEY PKI
	certificates, and exercising incident response information sharing. DOD
	CIO continues the critical work of fostering objectives of regional
	cooperation, information sharing, and interoperability across North
	Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Allies, and Partners. Additional
	key focus areas include:
	<bullet> Cybersecurity Posture of NATO: Align security initiatives
	with NATO mission objectives; ensure that NATO information assets,
	technologies and data are adequately protected and that NATO's CS
	workforce is highly skilled and capable.
	<bullet> Secure Interoperability in Coalition Operations: Ensure
	the secure interoperability of shared systems between and among the
	U.S. DOD and coalition partners; identify shared systems and apply the
	NIST RMF, including developing baselines. Continue development of the
	Mission Partner Environment (MPE) and continue exercising federated
	environments with partners.
	<bullet> Cyberspace Workforce Development: Engage in security
	cooperation activities that assist coalition partners in developing
	strategies and policies to build skilled and capable CS workforces. For
	example recently extended training and exercise participation to
	partners.
	<bullet> Cybersecurity Posture of Critical Infrastructure owned by
	Partner Nations: Engage in activities that assist collation partners in
	developing strong CS postures of their national critical infrastructure
	on which DOD missions may depend, including identifying critical
	systems and applying the security policies.
	<bullet> Asia Pacific Engagements: Longstanding regular senior
	allied and partner nation consultations with DOD CIO counterparts in
	Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Singapore to promote a wide range of
	information exchange, sharing of best practices, and technical
	discussions on improving interoperability. [See page 8.]
	______

	RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. STEFANIK
	Q1. What is your assessment of the DOD's ability to counter cyber
	threats?
	Mr. Halvorsen. The DOD continues to improve its ability to secure
	its information systems and networks from adversarial activity. In
	addition to initiating the Cybersecurity Scorecard, transitioning to
	Windows 10, and implementing the Joint Regional Security Stacks, the
	Department is also engaged in protecting our Internet-facing systems,
	identifying key terrain, and integrating cybersecurity into our
	evaluation of readiness. In order to ensure the protection of our
	service members, civilians, contractors, and other DOD personnel, the
	Department is also engaged in an effort to secure all of its systems
	that store personally identifiable information. In combination with
	other ongoing orders and directives, the Department will continue to
	assess and engage in any areas where we can improve our cybersecurity.
	[See page 11.]
	Q2. What can she tell Fort Drum Soldiers what the Department is
	doing to ensure that are protected?
	Mr. Halvorsen. As noted above, the Department of Defense is engaged
	in multiple enterprise-wide efforts to counter cyberspace adversaries.
	The interconnected nature of DOD systems means that we aim to enhance
	the cybersecurity of the Department as a whole. We recognize that the
	security of information systems at one DOD component may rely on the
	security of information systems at another. Cybersecurity orders,
	directives, and policies apply across the Department, including the
	information systems at Fort Drum. The Department will continue to
	ensure the protection of their information, as well as the information
	of all our other personnel. [See page 11.]
	Q3. What have we learned about the enemy?
	Mr. Halvorsen. The DOD faces a number of cyberspace adversaries
	ranging from malicious individuals, terrorist organizations, and
	nation-states with a wide variety of skill levels, capabilities, and
	resources. These adversaries aim to penetrate our information systems
	and networks for a number of reasons, including to steal sensitive data
	or to affect our ability to operate. We have learned that many of these
	same actors also target a range of other organizations, including the
	Federal Government, the Defense Industrial Base, and private sector
	businesses. [See page 11.]
	Q4. How has that changed our approach?
	Mr. Halvorsen. The Department actively understands the types of
	cyber actors that target the DOD. The DOD Cyber Strategy released in
	April 2015 is driving how the Department is adapting its cyber forces
	to respond to ever-evolving threats. The strategy guides multiple
	cybersecurity lines of effort across the Department, including the
	development of 133 cyber mission force teams by 2018 to strengthen our
	cyber defense and deterrence postures. The DOD also recognizes the
	critical need to maintain and improve its proactive, progressive, and
	coordinated approach for detecting and responding to cyber events and
	incidents. The DOD's Cyber Incident Handling Program ensures an
	integrated capability to continually improve the DOD's ability to
	rapidly identify and respond to cyber incidents that adversely affect
	the DOD Information Network. It does so in a way that is consistent,
	repeatable, quality driven, measureable, and understood across DOD
	organizations. Lastly, to protect the interests of national security,
	cyber incidents must be coordinated among and across DOD organizations
	and sources outside the Department, including law enforcement, the
	intelligence community, and critical infrastructure partners. For
	example, the DOD interfaces with the Department of Homeland Security on
	major cyber vulnerabilities via the Cyber Collaboration, Assessment,
	and Response inter-agency sessions led by the National Cybersecurity
	and Communications Integration Center. The Department also works
	closely with the Defense Industrial Base to enhance their cybersecurity
	capabilities by sharing unclassified and classified information on
	cyber threats. [See page 11.]
	Mr. Halvorsen. DOD Components maintain ``software assurance'' (SA)
	on licenses for the Microsoft Windows operating system. In addition to
	the product support and client access licenses that SA provides, SA
	also includes the right to upgrade to the latest software versions at
	no additional cost. Therefore, it is expected that DOD Components will
	be able to upgrade to the Windows 10 operating system with little or no
	additional expenditures for the operating system software. [See page
	12.]

	?


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	QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

	March 22, 2016

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	QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON

	Mr. Wilson. What is the Defense Department strategy for increasing
	use of mobility tools, as well as increasing mobile security? What does
	the DOD intend to do with regard to Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) and
	BYOD policy?
	Mr. Halvorsen. DOD is already integrating mobility tools in several
	areas including developing Geospatial Intelligence logistics, and
	targeting applications. In addition, DOD is establishing Wi-Fi networks
	to improve coverage and performance. These investments enable improved
	mobility capabilities for deployment across DOD's enterprise.
	DOD is increasing mobile security by migrating to Secure Hash
	Algorithm 2 (SHA-2), developing a mobile credentialing solution that
	derives certificates from a DOD user's Common Access Card (CAC), and
	streamlining the security approval process for devices and software.
	Following nationally recognized practices enhances security, commercial
	mobile products must be validated in accordance with National
	Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) Protection Profiles (PP) for
	all parts of the mobile ecosystem (e.g., mobile devices, mobile device
	management (MDM), mobile apps, wireless infrastructure). Commercial
	mobile products that process classified information must be approved by
	the NSA's Commercial Solutions for Classified (CSfC) program.
	DOD is continuing to evaluate different private sector proposals to
	determine if they satisfy Federal security and legal requirements.
	Initially, a low risk approach of a BYOD implementation would make the
	most sense for low threat unclassified environments where there would
	be minimal impact if a data compromise did occur, such as training and
	student environments. The Department of Navy is currently piloting
	BYOD. DOD will evaluate lessons learned to determine adoption across
	the Department.
	Mr. Wilson. What activities does the Department have underway to
	improve the agility of its spectrum-dependent systems? Do you see
	commensurate activity in the commercial sector?
	Mr. Halvorsen. The complex spectrum environment and evolving
	threats that warfighters face compel DOD to constantly evaluate a broad
	array of technology advancements to meet mission requirements. The
	Department continues to foster efforts, throughout the Military
	Departments, DARPA, and OSD, that improve agility for DOD's spectrum-
	dependent systems, which also help military users share better with
	other spectrum users.
	The Department's continued investment in its Electromagnetic
	Spectrum Strategy is geared toward addressing these needs. The
	Department's leadership in other efforts such as the National Advanced
	Spectrum and Communications Test Network, under the auspices of the
	Commerce Department, its own new Spectrum Access Research and
	Development Program, as well as the collaborative effort via the
	National Spectrum Consortium are enabling complementary initiatives to
	identify and foster development of innovative technologies and
	techniques for greater agility and flexibility of DOD capabilities, but
	also improve spectrum sharing and access.
	With regard to commensurate activity in the commercial sector, DOD
	believes that industry is starting to look at making investments to
	help in their own ability to share with DOD, but they are just at the
	beginning of that process. As expected of DOD, industry would also need
	to be held accountable for their own investments in spectrum sharing
	technologies and how they are contributing toward improved spectrum
	access. The Department is hopeful that with balanced investment and
	commitment by agencies and the commercial sector, these efforts will
	bear lasting results in enabling flexible access to all users in all
	spectrum bands.
	Mr. Wilson. What suggestions do you have to improve coordination
	and deconfliction for sharing spectrum bands with commercial entities?
	Mr. Halvorsen. It is important to recognize the existing spectrum
	management and governance mechanisms through the national regulators,
	i.e., NTIA and the FCC regulatory processes, continue to effectively
	facilitate shared use of spectrum among Federal users as well as
	sharing between Federal and non-Federal users (i.e., including
	commercial entities). Streamlined coordination and deconfliction
	processes are critical for successful sharing once a national policy
	decision is made to implement sharing in a band, noting that sharing
	requirements differ depending on the band and use scenarios.
	Technology, sound engineering, balanced policy and regulation, and
	enforcement are keys tenets that enable successful sharing. Automated
	coordination and deconfliction capabilities play a critical role, among
	other necessary tools (e.g., direct human coordination for continued or
	iterative risk and tradeoff evaluation) for sharing spectrum bands with
	commercial entities. Continued investment and improvements to
	automation capabilities would contribute to improved coordination and
	deconfliction.
	Mr. Wilson. You stated in your testimony that DOD shares the same
	concerns with security in a commercial cloud environment as the
	financial industry and that the challenge with off-premise commercial
	cloud is ``how do you achieve virtual separation in the cloud so that
	you don't get the effect of everything loaded in the one spot where it
	can be removed, and if it does get infiltrated, how do we immediately
	shut that off and isolate it?'' How have you worked with the leading
	commercial cloud providers to better understand the security mechanisms
	they use to achieve virtual isolation or physical separation in their
	commercial offerings?
	Mr. Halvorsen. DOD CIO continues to collaborate with industry
	through the on-going updates to the DOD Cloud Computing Security
	Requirements Guide and cybersecurity assessments in support of DOD and
	FedRAMP provisional authorizations.
	Identifying and understanding the threats in a multi-tenant cloud
	environment remain an on-going challenge. Virtual separations rely on
	the vendor's software to protect one customer from both malicious
	attacks and unintentional impacts from other customers. While some
	vendors have been willing to share information on their mechanism
	supporting virtual separation, other vendors have been reluctant to
	share detailed information as it represents the vendor's sensitive
	intellectual property. Even when the details are shared, fully
	evaluating these solutions is a significant challenge as each vendor
	implements their own, proprietary solutions.
	In addition to the software itself, weaknesses in the software's
	configuration and on-going management can also create vulnerabilities.
	When evaluating multi-tenant cloud services, the Department closely
	evaluates the vendor's processes for configuration and operations
	management. All of these factors are taken into account when issuing a
	provisional authorization at a particular impact-level. Through the
	Cloud Computing Security Requirements Guide, the Department has
	implemented a risk management approach that allows Components to match
	the security and cost of specific cloud services to their specific
	cybersecurity needs.
	Mr. Wilson. We understand that the Marine Corps has implemented a
	successful ``Comply-to-Connect'' program that has helped it increase
	its compliance during network inspection reviews. a. How are those
	lessons being applied throughout the Department? b. Are requirements
	for this Marine Corps system reflected in enterprise requirements for
	network security? c. Are those requirements being integrated into
	existing programs, like the Host Based Security System, or planned
	future network defense tools?
	Mr. Halvorsen. Comply-to-Connect (C2C) is a framework addressing
	several key functions: network access control, deliberate and secure
	orchestration with other cybersecurity tools (such as vulnerability
	scanners, software patching tools, and trouble-ticket generation tools)
	and continuous reporting for the purpose of managing risk. C2C
	satisfies the asset management/asset detection problem and increases
	the efficiency by which technical personnel are able to make decisions
	as to whether an asset has `complied' with the local enclave/network's
	security policy to initially connect and remained connect to the
	network. C2C closes the asset management/asset detection gap in the
	Department's Information Security Continuous Monitoring (ISCM) Program.
	The US Marine Corps has successfully implemented C2C as part of a
	three-year regional effort covering 3,000 end-points at Camp Lejeune
	NC. During that period, the effort enabled USMC to meet the objectives
	of DOD Command Cyber Readiness Inspections (CCRI) with a 90% compliance
	rate when Marine Corps White Teams conducted a `no notice' pre-CCRI
	inspection; and, 93% compliance rate during regularly scheduled
	inspections executed by DISA. The Marine Corps has successfully enabled
	the orchestration features of the C2C tools to automate the on-boarding
	process of new assets ``out of the box,'' to scan and remediate
	vulnerabilities upon discovery, harden the asset through integration
	with the Host Based Security System, and register systems into the
	network security information and event management tool (SIEM). These
	major muscle movements, in most cases, were executed with minimal touch
	labor.
	The Marine Corps has recently formally validated C2C as a Service-
	wide requirement and will implement a wider-pilot across Marine Corps
	assets in the National Capitol Region in FY16. Eventually, the Marine
	Corps will implement C2C globally on all Service assets. Comply-to-
	Connect is endorsed by the Enterprise Cybersecurity Computer Network
	Defense Senior Steering Group (ESSG). The ESSG is tracking C2C
	implementation across several Combatant Command, Service and Agency
	components. The ESSG has directed the development of a Comply-to-
	Connect concept of operations with a guideline to standardize
	implementation across component C2C implementations. Department
	discussions consider C2C as an enhancement to overall cybersecurity
	across DOD enclaves and networks. The full scope of C2C capabilities
	have not yet been decomposed into an operational set of requirements.
	C2C requirements will be considered as part of the Next Generation End
	Point security strategy and future network defense tools as the
	Department moves toward assisted automation.
	Mr. Wilson. What do you see as the major challenges to improving
	the management of the Department of Defense? Do you have the business
	intelligence and business analytics capabilities to provide the same
	type of support to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary that any CEO in
	the private sector would have access to?
	Mr. Levine. The major challenges to improving management of the
	Department of Defense are threefold. First, the Department is working
	toward getting the employees at all levels from senior management to
	worker to understand that there remain ample opportunities for shared,
	standard processes and procedures that cut across component boundaries.
	This is particularly true for support activities within the Department.
	Second, the Department must continue to work with external stakeholders
	such as veteran support organizations; unions; the White House; and
	Congress to allow new approaches to these support activities, even if
	it means changing the structures and processes those stakeholders
	currently understand and are comfortable with. Finally, in order to
	provide a basis for both the internal and external engagements, the
	Department must have a reasonable set of performance measures that show
	both how the job is being performed today, but also shows at what cost
	the job is accomplished.
	The assessment above leads directly to the answer to the second
	question. The Department has a robust set of performance information
	that it can draw upon to make decisions. The DCMO is working with the
	staff to make this information more readily visible to the senior
	leadership. For example, the DCMO just provided a detailed progress
	report on the various efficiency initiatives that Secretary Carter
	approved in our plans for FY17-20. The DCMO also supported a detailed,
	performance-based report on how the Department is doing on making
	progress toward audit readiness. Both these reviews were done with
	military department Under Secretaries; service vice chiefs of staff;
	the OSD Under Secretaries; commanders of combatant commands; and the
	Deputy Secretary of Defense and Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
	Comparing to what a CEO in private sector has accesss to, the
	Department needs to improve these measures by providing a better means
	to measure how much it costs the Department to achieve the performance
	outcomes. The Department is working to that end. In fact, achieving an
	auditable condition will help us move in the direction of measures that
	show outcomes per dollar spent or per person involved.
	Mr. Wilson. What are you doing to improve the quality of data
	senior leaders have and use for management of the Department?
	Mr. Levine. The DCMO has been working with the Joint Staff and OSD
	components to identify performance measures that better describe the
	major initiatives the Secretary and Deputy Secretary have set for the
	Department. The DCMO will then use the Deputy's Management Advisory
	Group (DMAG) to present focused progress reports based on those
	measures to the military department Under Secretaries and Vice Chiefs;
	the OSD Under Secretaries; and the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Vice
	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The DCMO and CIO just presented
	detailed progress status on the various efficiency initiatives approved
	by Secretary Carter for the FY17-20 period, including measured updates
	on major headquarters efficiencies; services contracts efficiencies;
	defense retail; and information technology efficiencies. Working with
	the OSD Comptroller, we also provided data on Departmental progress
	toward achieving audit readiness. DCMO is still working with Joint
	Staff to ensure that progress on readiness is presented and reviewed
	regularly to the same group.
	______

	QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
	Mr. Langevin. Mr. Halverson, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency is
	conducting research & development and prototyping for a Countering
	Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Situational Awareness Information
	System utilizing a cloud-based architecture called Constellation.
	Constellation is intended to provide an information sharing platform
	for the Department of Defense, interagency and international users to
	be deployed on NIPRNET, SIPRNET, SUN NET and JWICS networks using
	cross-domain solutions to transfer data across security domains.
	What is the role of the Chief Information Officer and Defense
	Information Systems Agency in Constellation research, development and
	prototyping? Specifically, what was the role in establishing a security
	plan to achieve an accredited cross-domain solution, including security
	milestones and review of proposed security architecture? Has this
	effort been reviewed in order to determine if architecture elements and
	applications could be met with existing capabilities, to include
	computing tools and architectures, or those already being developed? If
	so, please describe the review and unique capability gaps identified.
	Mr. Halvorsen. The Constellation program is presently in the
	formative stages of development and prototyping activities needed to
	identify and mature information technology capabilities to meet CWMD
	Situational Awareness requirements
	DISA and the DTRA Constellation program office are collaborating
	via the TCRI (Tactical Cloud Reference Implementation) community since
	the core of Constellation's architecture is DISA's Big Data Platform
	(BDP), a component of the TCRI.
	The Constellation program will eventually require the capability to
	move data across multiple security domains and DTRA intends to use
	existing, accredited cross-domain solutions to meet this requirements.
	DTRA will not develop a new cross-domain solution. The DTRA program
	office is collaborating with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
	Enterprise Cross Domain Services (ECDS) to meet DOD Instruction 8540.01
	``Cross Domain (CD) Policy'' requirements. Using an ECDS provider
	allows Constellation to rely upon existing and proven computing tools
	and architectures, while reducing initial cost and deployment time. The
	program expects DIA's ECDS to meet Constellation's requirements to pass
	information between NIPRNet, SIPRNet, and JWICS. Regarding the cross-
	domain requirement between the public network (SUNet) and our NIPR DOD
	network, DTRA expects to use Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) products
	to perform deep-content filtering and sanitization of public data prior
	to ingestion into Constellation on the DOD networks.
	Mr. Langevin. Can you provide an update on DOD's process for
	completing the instruction manual for DOD Directive 8140 and when this
	process might be completed? How is it being accepted by the services?
	Mr. Halvorsen. DOD Directive 8140.01 will be supplemented by an
	Instruction and at least one Manual. The Instruction will establish
	policy and procedures and assign responsibilities for the DOD
	Components to identify, code, track, and report on their respective
	cyber workforces. A draft of the Instruction completed a first round of
	informal coordination with DOD Components in December 2015. In the
	interim, the Department will publish policy guidance to implement the
	identification and coding requirements of the Cybersecurity Workforce
	Assessment Act of 2015. The Instruction is scheduled to be completed in
	2017 and will incorporate the interim policy guidance.
	The Manual(s) will establish procedures, standards, and
	requirements for qualifications of the DOD cyber workforce, as required
	by DOD Directive 8140. In 2015, the Department commissioned a study to
	identify the standards for qualification criteria across cyber work
	roles. The study, completed in March 2016, provides an analysis of
	current government, academia, and industry best practices in
	recruiting, developing, professionalizing, and retaining cyber
	personnel. In May 2016, the DOD CIO will convene subject matter expert
	panels to develop specific qualification criteria for each respective
	information technology and cybersecurity work role. The Manual(s) are
	scheduled to be completed in 2018.
	The Services and Defense Agencies have been involved in the
	Department's transition to a holistic view of cyber from the onset and
	continue to play an important role in shaping the policies and DOD
	Cyber Workforce Framework that will govern and shape the Department's
	cyber forces into the future.
	______

	QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KLINE
	Mr. Kline. What is your assessment of the impact of one service
	acquiring commercial satellite communications on behalf of the
	Department of Defense as required under section 1610 of the FY16 NDAA?
	Mr. Halvorsen. In the past two years, the Department has realized
	successes in the commercial satellite communications (COMSATCOM) domain
	as a result of improved COMSATCOM planning, acquisition and management
	reforms discussed in the responses to Senate Report 113-44, page 167,
	accompanying S. 1197 of the NDAA for FY 2014 and Sections 1603 and 1605
	of the FY 15 NDAA. Specifically, the cost of COMSATCOM services has
	been declining, DISA's operational responsiveness has improved, and
	DISA's SATCOM pathfinders are yielding efficiencies in the use of the
	acquired services. Likewise, the Air Force pathfinders are providing
	valuable lessons related to investments in COMSATCOM solutions that
	will further drive acquisition and utilization efficiencies as part of
	our Wideband SATCOM Plan. To the extent they can, these lessons learned
	will be folded into the Wideband SATCOM Analysis of Alternatives
	directed by Section 1611 of the FY 16 NDAA.
	With that in mind, the Department is concerned that restructuring
	this approach by assigning a single agent for acquisition of COMSATCOM
	services and investment in COMSATCOM capability may ultimately result
	in increased cost and decreased operational responsiveness for DOD
	customers with no noticeable improvement in DOD's overall SATCOM
	``planning, acquisition, and management'' processes and governance. To
	that end and in response to Section 1610 of the FY 16 NDAA, my office
	has tasked the Air Force to evaluate, and provide the cost estimates to
	implement, alternative courses of action to satisfy the intent of
	Section 1610. These plans and cost estimates will be evaluated and
	coordinated with the Services and Combatant Commands with their inputs
	incorporated in the DOD response to Section 1610.
	Mr. Kline. Section 1610 of the FY16 NDAA requires the Department of
	Defense to designate a single acquisition agent to acquire commercial
	satellite communications. Have the major users (services and combatant
	commanders) of commercial satellite communications provided input to
	the Chief Information Officer regarding changes to commercial satellite
	acquisition and management required in the FY16 NDAA?
	Mr. Halvorsen. In response to Section 1610 of the FY 16 NDAA, DOD
	CIO has tasked Air Force to evaluate, and provide the cost estimates to
	implement, alternative courses of action to satisfy the intent of
	Section 1610. These plans and cost estimates will be evaluated and
	coordinated with the Services and COCOMs with their inputs incorporated
	in the DOD response to Section 1610.
	______

	QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
	Mr. Lamborn. What is the status of the DOD Commercial Partnership
	Data Distribution Center you mentioned in last year's testimony, and
	when will you have a secure commercial cloud capability operating from
	within a DOD data center facility?
	Mr. Halvorsen. IBM's Cloud Managed Services for Government (IBM-
	CMSG) is an Infrastructure as a Service cloud provided from the Navy's
	Allegany Ballistics Laboratory (ABL) in West Virginia. It was granted a
	DOD provisional authorization at level 5 (Unclassified-FOUO) for use by
	the Defense Logistics Agency and Naval Sea Systems Command in February
	2016.
	Two additional acquisitions of a secure, on-premise clouds are
	currently underway in the Army and the Defense Information Systems
	Agency:
	The Army's effort will assess the feasibility and value of an on-
	premises, commercially owned/commercially operated cloud service
	offering at Redstone Army Arsenal. The Army is taking a ``statement of
	objectives'' approach to obtaining this capability in order to fully
	partner with industry, learn from its experts and implement commercial
	best practices for cloud migration and security. The intent of the
	pilot is to produce a secure, commercial cloud capability by fiscal
	year 2017 that meets all requirements for hosting sensitive National
	Security Systems at information security impact levels 5 (FOUO) and 6
	(Secret). The Army released a request for information in November 2015
	and held an industry day on 21 January 2016 with interested parties.
	DISA is also exploring the use of commercial infrastructure
	services residing in DOD facilities to implement an ``on-premises
	private'' infrastructure service for the DOD community and mission
	partners. The initial phase of this effort is referred to as milCloud
	2.0 Phase 1 (M2P1). DISA released an RFI (PL83220028) on February 12,
	2016, to assess the marketplace's interest in providing on-premises
	infrastructure services from within DOD data center facilities and to
	get advice on refining the businesses model process. DISA is currently
	reviewing RFI responses and refining their approach for a planned award
	in first quarter FY17.
	Mr. Lamborn. The DOD has access to a vast amount of data generated
	by its own IT devices, networks, and equipment. How is the Department
	leveraging this data to reduce costs, improve operations, and
	strengthen cybersecurity?
	Mr. Halvorsen. DOD leverages data from a wide array of DOD IT
	devices, networks, and equipment to guide it in reducing costs,
	improving operations and strengthening cybersecurity (CS) across the
	department in support of warfighting and business mission areas. DOD is
	committed to constant improvement in its data collection and analytic
	efforts to ensure the best possible mission outcomes for our
	warfighters and the most efficient use of taxpayer dollars.
	DOD CIO led the development of the SECDEF Cybersecurity Scorecard
	populated with internal DOD data against 11 key cyber measures. The
	measures were informed by our understanding of how we are vulnerable to
	adversary attacks as described in the 2015 DOD Cybersecurity Discipline
	Implementation Plan. This management tool therefore allows the
	Secretary to assess progress against goals which will tangibly reduce
	vulnerability. Further, it focuses each of the Department's 46
	component organizations and the Department as a whole on assessing and
	addressing vulnerabilities. Most of the Scorecard data is pulled from
	automated cybersecurity tools currently deployed across the Department
	and we are actively working to build on this momentum to improve how
	data is automatically collected, integrated, analyzed and reported
	across the Department.
	The SECDEF Cybersecurity Scorecard is one very visible element of
	the Department's overall effort to use data to reduce costs, improve
	operations, and strengthen cybersecurity. The Defense Information
	Systems Agency (DISA), working with the Military Departments and
	USCYBERCOM, is leading the effort to build a joint interoperable
	(common) platform to collect and visualize vast amounts of data. This
	capability is called the Big Data Platform (BDP).
	The BDP's value is three-fold:
	First, it is a computing information system infrastructure
	(software) that can be easily shared. Sharing this infrastructure
	enables the ability to create common visualization analytics that can
	then be distributed across operational centers, ultimately reducing
	work efforts, re-work and overall costs. Moreover, it leads to a common
	way of operating, strengthening Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
	(TTPs) to aid in the cybersecurity mission.
	Second, the BDP is data agnostic. The platform can collect vast
	amounts of data in any mission area (cyber, business, personnel, etc.).
	The concept is that the data can be collected and queried (correlating
	analytics) to answer an infinite amount of operational questions (use
	cases/scenarios). Data drives situational awareness and an operational
	use case drives what data should be collected and visualized. The BDP
	inherently drives the DOD toward the development and implementation of
	data standards. An example would be the Structured Threat Information
	eXpression and Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator Information
	(STIX)/TAXII) efforts.
	Third, the BDP is a critical part of an information ecosystem that
	includes cybersecurity sensors, information sharing systems and
	security and incident management (SIEM) capabilities. As the DOD
	collectively consolidates security architectures and TTP's, the BDP is
	being architected to support this consolidation. An example is the
	design and implementation of the Joint Regional Security Stack (JRSS)
	within Joint Information Environment (JIE) Framework.
	Mr. Lamborn. Recently, the Secretary of the Air Force stated that
	over time, the AF wants to transition more and more of network
	operations and maintenance to the private sector. You also spoke of
	leveraging the private sector as well, specifically as it relates the
	use of cloud computing capabilities. Currently these potentially
	outsourced functions are performed by military personnel as well as DOD
	civilians. What happens to the thousands of civilians when this occurs?
	Will they all get re-rolled to defensive operations? Do current legal
	authorities permit the use of title 5 civilian personnel in title 10
	defensive cyber activities? If not, what authorities would the Congress
	need to change or add within the U.S. Code?
	Mr. Halvorsen. The Air Force, like all DOD Components, is
	responsible for deploying capabilities and aligning their workforce to
	meet mission needs. Any military personnel or DOD Civilian efficiencies
	realized as a result of transitioning network operations and
	maintenance functions to the private sector will be available for the
	Services and Agencies to repurpose. At the Department-level, DOD
	Directive 8140.01 unites the management of all cyber skill areas under
	a single governance construct. This construct is bolstered through the
	use of the DOD Cyber Workforce Framework, which will be used to develop
	qualification criteria for all cyber work roles. These qualification
	criteria will provide the Components with the training requirements for
	military and civilian personnel who will remain in cyber work roles.
	DOD civilians currently serve across the Cyber Mission Forces (CMF) and
	can, consistent with law and policy, participate in the CMF's Title 10
	activities.

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