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| <title> - DEFEATING TERRORISM IN SYRIA: A NEW WAY FORWARD</title> | |
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| [House Hearing, 115 Congress] | |
| [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] | |
| DEFEATING TERRORISM IN SYRIA: | |
| A NEW WAY FORWARD | |
| ======================================================================= | |
| HEARING | |
| BEFORE THE | |
| SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE | |
| OF THE | |
| COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS | |
| HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES | |
| ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS | |
| FIRST SESSION | |
| __________ | |
| FEBRUARY 14, 2017 | |
| __________ | |
| Serial No. 115-3 | |
| __________ | |
| Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs | |
| [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] | |
| Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ | |
| or | |
| http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ | |
| ______ | |
| U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE | |
| 24-241PDF WASHINGTON : 2017 | |
| ----------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing | |
| Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; | |
| DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, | |
| Washington, DC 20402-0001 | |
| COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS | |
| EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman | |
| CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York | |
| ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California | |
| DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York | |
| STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey | |
| JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia | |
| MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida | |
| TED POE, Texas KAREN BASS, California | |
| DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts | |
| TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island | |
| JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina AMI BERA, California | |
| MO BROOKS, Alabama LOIS FRANKEL, Florida | |
| PAUL COOK, California TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii | |
| SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas | |
| RON DeSANTIS, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois | |
| MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania | |
| TED S. YOHO, Florida DINA TITUS, Nevada | |
| ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois NORMA J. TORRES, California | |
| LEE M. ZELDIN, New York BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois | |
| DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York | |
| F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York | |
| Wisconsin TED LIEU, California | |
| ANN WAGNER, Missouri | |
| BRIAN J. MAST, Florida | |
| FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida | |
| BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania | |
| THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia | |
| Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director | |
| Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director | |
| ------ | |
| Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade | |
| TED POE, Texas, Chairman | |
| JOE WILSON, South Carolina WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts | |
| DARRELL E. ISSA, California LOIS FRANKEL, Florida | |
| PAUL COOK, California BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania | |
| SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania DINA TITUS, Nevada | |
| LEE M. ZELDIN, New York NORMA J. TORRES, California | |
| BRIAN J. MAST, Florida BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois | |
| THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia | |
| C O N T E N T S | |
| ---------- | |
| Page | |
| WITNESSES | |
| Mr. Hassan Hassan, senior fellow, The Tahrir Institute for Middle | |
| East Policy.................................................... 6 | |
| The Honorable Frederic C. Hof, director, Rafik Hariri Center for | |
| the Middle East, Atlantic Council.............................. 13 | |
| Ms. Melissa Dalton, senior fellow, Center for Strategic and | |
| International Studies.......................................... 19 | |
| LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING | |
| Mr. Hassan Hassan: Prepared statement............................ 9 | |
| The Honorable Frederic C. Hof: Prepared statement................ 15 | |
| Ms. Melissa Dalton: Prepared statement........................... 21 | |
| APPENDIX | |
| Hearing notice................................................... 46 | |
| Hearing minutes.................................................. 47 | |
| The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the | |
| State of Texas, and chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism, | |
| Nonproliferation, and Trade: Material submitted for the record. 48 | |
| DEFEATING TERRORISM IN SYRIA: | |
| A NEW WAY FORWARD | |
| ---------- | |
| TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 2017 | |
| House of Representatives, | |
| Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, | |
| Committee on Foreign Affairs, | |
| Washington, DC. | |
| The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:01 p.m., in | |
| room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe | |
| (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. | |
| Mr. Poe. The subcommittee will come to order. | |
| Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit | |
| statements, questions, extraneous materials for the record, | |
| subject to the length limitation in the rules. | |
| I will make my opening statement at this time. | |
| The Syrian war has raged for nearly 6 years. Syria is in | |
| chaos. Terrorists, foreign fighters, rebels, foreign | |
| governments, all are engaged in battle for territory and | |
| control of different aspects of Syria. | |
| On the screen--let's go back to the previous screen--you | |
| will see different areas of Syria. And the different areas that | |
| are controlled by ISIS is in the dark section. | |
| Let's flip to the next screen quickly. I don't know if you | |
| can read that or not. There should be--for at least the panel | |
| in front of you, you should have the different actors, the | |
| state actors on one side and then the nonstate actors on the | |
| other. | |
| The state actors are divided into pro-Assad and actors that | |
| are opposed to Assad, with the Middle Eastern countries at the | |
| top of each list, and then you have non-Middle Eastern | |
| countries at the bottom of each list. And you can see that | |
| there are numerous countries aligned on both sides. | |
| And then there are nonstate actors that are involved, and | |
| those are a multitude of groups. They call themselves different | |
| things at different times. Some are terrorist groups. Some | |
| claim not to be terrorist groups that are terrorist groups. | |
| One of the biggest things that I think we should know is | |
| that we have terrorist groups on both sides. We have Hezbollah | |
| on one side, which is obviously a terrorist group fighting for | |
| Assad; and we have ISIS on the other side that is a terrorist | |
| group. Al-Qaeda is a terrorist group, and they are also | |
| somewhat aligned with the anti-Assad group. | |
| You have a multitude of actors all seeking their own self- | |
| interest in Syria. And this hearing is about really what do we | |
| see happening not only now but, hopefully, what is the end game | |
| after 6 years of war. | |
| The losers in this have been the Syrian people, and I think | |
| they will continue to be the losers because, as the war rages, | |
| the war affects them more than anyone else. Half a million | |
| Syrian people have died, at least, in this war. And I don't | |
| call it a conflict; I call it a war. When you start dropping | |
| bombs on people, that is not a conflict, that is a war. Fifty | |
| thousand of those people, by all estimates, have been children. | |
| Five million Syrians have become refugees; 6 million are | |
| internally displaced. So that has been about 11 percent of the | |
| Syrian population killed or injured since the start of the | |
| violence. | |
| The perpetrator of all of this sits directly at the regime | |
| of Bashar Assad and his backers in Moscow and Tehran. Assad has | |
| pursued a policy of murdering anybody that expresses criticism | |
| of his power. He uses barrel bombs, and it doesn't make any | |
| difference who those barrel bombs fall on as long as he thinks | |
| they are opposed to his regime. | |
| Russia intervened in Syria in September 2015 and began air | |
| strikes against what it called terrorist targets. The Russians | |
| apparently are not very good in their targeting because it | |
| seems as though they have killed thousands of people in Syria | |
| and they haven't all been terrorists. The Syrian Network for | |
| Human Rights suggested last year that Russian strikes killed | |
| more Syrians than ISIS members. | |
| Iran's terrorist proxy, Hezbollah, has also bloodied its | |
| hands in Syria. Since 2013, Hezbollah has operated openly in | |
| Syria, killing on behalf of the Assad regime. It has also | |
| created in Syria a perfect environment for out-of-towners, as I | |
| call them, who show up with their own self-interest, including | |
| terrorist groups. ISIS is there, and while ISIS no longer | |
| controls as much territory as they did in 2014, they still | |
| control major aspects of the Syrian population centers. | |
| I have furnished each of our panelists a map, and there is | |
| also a map on the wall. Due to time constraints, I can't go | |
| into all of the details. But the thin black line in the middle | |
| of Syria and in the southern part of Syria is what is | |
| controlled by ISIS. The Kurds control the northern purple area. | |
| The yellow area is controlled by al-Qaeda and so-called Syrian | |
| dissidents and rebel groups. And then Assad controls the pink | |
| area to the west. | |
| The questions to be asked today are: What is going to | |
| happen in the end game? What is the end game? And, also, I | |
| would like to know from our panelists, what is the national | |
| security interest of the United States? Should we ratchet it | |
| up? Should we do what we are doing now, which is kind of the | |
| Vietnam syndrome? Or should we leave it to the Middle East to | |
| resolve this conflict themselves? I would like the opinion of | |
| all three panelists to those three questions. | |
| And I will turn it over to the gentleman from | |
| Massachusetts, who has fled to Washington to get out of the | |
| snow, for his opening statement. | |
| Mr. Keating. Thank you, Chairman Poe. And thank you for | |
| holding this hearing today. | |
| The situation we have watched unfold in Syria the last 6 | |
| years has been wrought with complexities and, the chairman and | |
| I agree, with chaos and atrocities under the Assad government. | |
| Today, the war and the resulting humanitarian crisis is nothing | |
| short of a global tragedy. | |
| So I am grateful for the attendance of our witnesses--Mr. | |
| Hassan, Ambassador Hof, Ms. Dalton--for their valuable insight | |
| into the ongoing political strife and challenges that the | |
| international community as well as the new administration faces | |
| in the months and years ahead. | |
| If we are going to be smart about terrorism and | |
| specifically the rising role of ISIL, then we must first come | |
| to terms with the reality that their model of terrorism is | |
| built on a foundation of radicalization. To continue fighting | |
| ISIL in the battlefield requires that we recognize this pattern | |
| of recruitment and evolution in fighting tactics. | |
| As we make progress in diminishing their territory, we must | |
| be mindful of their shifts in strategy to prioritize covert | |
| radicalization rather than maintain geographic strongholds. It | |
| becomes essential that we engage in this war of ideas by | |
| providing potential recruits with a choice of narratives. Those | |
| choices should include a path forward other than terrorism. | |
| But, even more importantly, we must recognize that | |
| strengthening the resiliency and stability of communities is | |
| necessary for eradicating terrorism. And when families live in | |
| fear and when no one is accountable for keeping them safe and | |
| protecting their freedom, we will never be able to eliminate | |
| the conditions that produce these terrorists. | |
| Countering ISIL in Syria, however, cannot be viewed as a | |
| one-dimensional prospect. Preventing attacks and limiting | |
| ISIL's capacity to operate within its network caliphates are | |
| also crucial to eliminating the terrorist threat there. | |
| The U.S. cannot do this alone, nor should we. But we should | |
| also be wary of the compromises we are being asked to make, | |
| allegedly in the name of securing peace and combating | |
| terrorism. | |
| I have grave concerns about the role of Russia and Iran and | |
| what they intend to play in countering ISIL and preventing | |
| future terrorists. Left without proper oversight or debate, | |
| this same Congress may 5, 10, or 15 years from now preside over | |
| a hearing of the same subject, examining how a Russian- and | |
| Iranian-led resolution to this crisis allowed ISIL to survive | |
| and become embedded in the region, like other terrorist groups | |
| which continue to pose a threat to the U.S. today. | |
| For the time being, I believe we still have strong allies | |
| in Europe and the Middle East whose interests align with ours | |
| and who can make valuable contributions, along with our own, to | |
| tackle this threat. Our existing partnerships on intelligence- | |
| sharing, security, military strategy are robust, and we are | |
| united with our allies along a common goal for a peaceful | |
| resolution to this gruesome conflict and a stable political | |
| outcome for the people of Syria. | |
| Even with close partnerships, there is still room for even | |
| stronger, more effective cooperation to close some of the gaps | |
| and inconsistencies that ISIL continues to exploit. With all | |
| the progress in the past decades to cement effective security | |
| partnerships among the U.S. and our allies, there is now a | |
| sound foundation to build upon that, together, we can isolate | |
| and destroy these terrorist threats. Neglecting these | |
| partnerships and incredible assets in the fight against | |
| terrorism would be a costly mistake. | |
| Countering terrorism in Syria is a complex, multifaceted | |
| issue. If we fail to craft a comprehensive plan to address it, | |
| aspects of our national security will be compromised. | |
| I look forward to the witnesses' testimony today and | |
| hearing from you on how to balance these diverse and sometimes | |
| seemingly divergent considerations when attempting to combat | |
| ISIL in Syria. | |
| I yield back. | |
| Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts. | |
| The Chair will recognize members for 1-minute opening | |
| statements, and the Chair will follow the 60-minute--60-second | |
| rule, not 60 minutes. | |
| The gentleman from South Carolina is recognized for 1 | |
| minute. | |
| Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Judge Poe. | |
| And he and I worked together very closely on the 60-second | |
| rule, I can assure you. | |
| But I want to thank the chairman for having such | |
| distinguished witnesses. And, already, this has been a helpful | |
| hearing to me, the map showing the level of control, how narrow | |
| it is, Damascus, west and north, but also to see the success of | |
| the Kurdish regional efforts from Iraq. | |
| It is very important to me that we support the people of | |
| the Kurdish region, with the understanding that they are | |
| working to maintain and build a stable Iraq, and by doing that, | |
| by not indicating--expanding beyond the borders. But they are | |
| very successful. And that was very instructive to me, so I am | |
| very, very hopeful. | |
| Additionally, I look forward to hearing of your efforts | |
| regarding counterpropaganda. | |
| Thank you. And I, within the 60 seconds, hereby yield the | |
| balance of my time. | |
| Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman. | |
| The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. | |
| Schneider. | |
| Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Chairman Poe, Ranking Member | |
| Keating, for convening this important hearing. | |
| And thank you to the witnesses for providing your expertise | |
| to inform this incredibly important discussion. | |
| I hope that we all came here today with the recognition | |
| that Syria must be a priority for the new administration. With | |
| 5 million refugees and 6 million internally displaced people | |
| and more than 500,000 mostly civilians killed, the 6-year civil | |
| war is the greatest humanitarian crisis of the new century. | |
| Syria borders key American allies, namely Israel, Jordan, | |
| and Turkey. The civil war is putting extreme pressure on the | |
| bordering states as well as the European nations. For 6 years, | |
| the situation has only gotten worse. | |
| I hope our witnesses can shed light on how to neutralize | |
| and defeat the terrorist groups ISIS and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, | |
| while at the same time working toward a political solution for | |
| the country that does not include Bashar al-Assad or cede | |
| control of Syria to Iran and its proxy Hezbollah nor lead to | |
| further instability and the consequent return of terrorist | |
| groups. | |
| As you have all shared in your testimony, there are no easy | |
| solutions or even mostly good choices, but walking away is | |
| clearly not an option. | |
| Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman. | |
| The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. | |
| Cook. | |
| Mr. Cook. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I think this | |
| is a great hearing. | |
| The problem that I have always with this is that every 6 | |
| months, a year, the players, the situation changes. And for us | |
| to get a grasp on this, it is almost impossible. We just had a | |
| similar hearing in the House Armed Services Committee, a | |
| different approach. | |
| And I did want to thank Ambassador Hof for his service in | |
| Vietnam, where you were awarded the Purple Heart. I understand | |
| that you were involved in the 1983 investigation of the bombing | |
| of the Marine barracks, 1st Battalion, 8th Marines. That was | |
| my--I was not with them. That was my former battalion. And what | |
| happened then still lingers, and I hope we can go back to some | |
| of the causes as they relate to today. | |
| I yield back. Thank you. | |
| Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman. | |
| Mr. Rohrabacher from California. | |
| Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. | |
| When we talk about \1/2\ million people who are dead and | |
| have been killed in this, let's just admit this isn't just | |
| Assad. We keep saying Assad killed all these people. The fact | |
| is, if you look at our allies, whether it be Turkey, Saudi | |
| Arabia, Qatar, even the UAE, and certainly Iran, who is not an | |
| ally but in that region, any of those countries, any of those | |
| governments that faced an insurgency that kept on being | |
| financed over and over again would kill that many people. Assad | |
| is no different than the other dictators, yet we have insisted | |
| that he has to go. And, thus, the conflict goes on, and more | |
| and more people are made refugees and killed. | |
| Who is at fault? I think we should stick our nose out of | |
| this and let them have, yes, Assad and their dictators in all | |
| the rest of these countries, and the United States shouldn't | |
| keep these conflicts going on and on and on. | |
| Thank you. | |
| Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman. | |
| Anybody else wish to make an opening statement? | |
| The Chair recognizes Ms. Titus. | |
| Ms. Titus. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking | |
| Member. | |
| You know, throughout the campaign, we heard from candidate | |
| Trump that he knew more than the generals and he had a secret | |
| plan for fighting ISIS. Now, apparently, he has gone to the | |
| Pentagon to ask for some assistance. | |
| As we go through this hearing, I would be curious to know | |
| what you all think about his willingness or ability to stick | |
| with a plan if we come up with it or if our policy is just | |
| going to jump from tweet to tweet. | |
| Thank you. | |
| Mr. Poe. The Chair will now introduce all three witnesses | |
| and then---- | |
| Mr. Garrett. Mr. Chairman? | |
| Mr. Poe. Yes. | |
| Mr. Garrett. If I might? I had not originally not intended | |
| to make introductory remarks. | |
| Mr. Poe. The Chair recognizes for 1 minute. | |
| Mr. Garrett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member. | |
| The comments by the gentleman from California sort of stir | |
| where I am on this. I think that this Nation would be well- | |
| advised never to arm any entity without having an easily | |
| articulable plan for an end state that is preferable to the | |
| current status quo. | |
| And while Assad certainly has blood on his hands, I can't | |
| find, nor could former Secretary of State John Kerry, the Free | |
| Syrian Army. I couldn't tell you who leads it, which leaves us | |
| with two alternative solutions to the Assad problem, that being | |
| Jabhat al-Nusra or Jabhat Fateh al-Sham or ISIS, neither of | |
| which, I think, are a preferable option to a dictator in Assad, | |
| who has provided some level of stability, created a | |
| circumstance wherein 51 percent of college graduates in Syria | |
| are women and a safe zone for individuals of ethnic and | |
| religious minorities. | |
| I would yield back the balance of my time. | |
| Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman. | |
| The Chair will now introduce the witnesses. | |
| Mr. Hassan is a senior fellow at the Tahrir Institute for | |
| Middle East Policy. He is co-author of ``ISIS: Inside the Army | |
| of Terror,'' a New York Times bestseller. | |
| Ambassador Frederic Hof is the director of the Rafik Hariri | |
| Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council. Previously, | |
| Ambassador Hof served as Special Coordinator for the State | |
| Department's Office of the Special Envoy for Middle East Peace. | |
| Ms. Melissa Dalton is a senior fellow and the deputy | |
| director of the International Security Program at CSIS. Her | |
| research focuses on U.S. defense policy in the Middle East, | |
| global U.S. defense strategy, and security cooperation with | |
| U.S. allies. | |
| Mr. Hassan, we will start with you. | |
| Each of you have 5 minutes. When you see the red light, | |
| stop talking. | |
| Mr. Hassan. | |
| STATEMENT OF MR. HASSAN HASSAN, SENIOR FELLOW, THE TAHRIR | |
| INSTITUTE FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY | |
| Mr. Hassan. Thank you very much, Chairman Poe and members | |
| of the subcommittee. It is a privilege to present today here my | |
| views on Syria and terrorism. | |
| I want to basically give, like, an optimistic view first. | |
| Despite the grim situation inside Syria, I think the U.S. | |
| Government has an opportunity to stem the challenges presented | |
| by the two international terrorist organizations operating in | |
| Syria, the Islamic State and al-Qaeda. | |
| In fact, I would argue that the United States has more | |
| options or options it didn't necessarily have 2 years ago, | |
| including a way to prevent not only the Islamic State and al- | |
| Qaeda from operating in Syria or weakening both of them but | |
| also other radical groups from operating in at least 50 to 60 | |
| percent of Syria. The territory I am talking about includes | |
| areas that the Islamic State controls or once controlled since | |
| 2014. | |
| You know, the way ISIS does things is, when they take an | |
| area, they act as a washing powder, I would say, which is | |
| basically to eradicate any Islamist and jihadist cells | |
| operating in the areas where they operate, because they want to | |
| prevent any support system for their rivals. | |
| So they have done that in 50 to 60 percent of Syria--or 50 | |
| percent of Syria, to be more precise. So for al-Qaeda now to go | |
| back and fill the vacuum left by ISIS, it has to revive dormant | |
| cells or rebuild influence almost from scratch. So there is an | |
| opportunity there to shape the communities in which ISIS | |
| operates today. | |
| So the expulsion of the Islamic State offers a rare | |
| opportunity, I would say, to implement a strategy to build an | |
| alternative to jihadist organizations, more so than you were | |
| able in 2014 when dozens of different armed groups operated in | |
| these areas. | |
| So the liberation of these areas by the U.S.-led coalition | |
| creates a de facto American sphere of influence, which both | |
| Russia and the regime have accepted for now, at least. This | |
| counterterrorism strategy involves a more foresighted or | |
| farsighted policy of establishing de facto safe zones in part | |
| of Syria where inhabitants can be protected from jihadists and | |
| from the regime and where the international community can also | |
| ensure that al-Qaeda, which now operates in only 1 to 2 percent | |
| of Syria, at least in a dominant manner, from rolling back into | |
| areas from which the Islamic State is expelled or is being | |
| expelled. | |
| Those safe zones can be established in the areas where the | |
| U.S. and allies have fought ISIS, as I said. The strategy I am | |
| proposing is basically a baseline, meaning it requires minimal | |
| American commitment. It builds on what the Americans are | |
| already doing inside Syria against the Islamic State and | |
| without which any fight against jihadism is doomed to fail. So | |
| this is the baseline. | |
| The war against the Islamic State has reached the point, in | |
| my opinion, where the Americans cannot--or the U.S. forces or | |
| the U.S.-led coalition cannot just pull out from Syria, because | |
| of, obviously, the ongoing fight against ISIS. It can choose, | |
| though--the U.S. can choose to continue with the current | |
| strategy, which I consider disastrous, and allow various forces | |
| to fill the ensuing vacuum after ISIS is defeated in some | |
| areas. | |
| Instead, I would propose that the U.S. must use its pre- | |
| existing leverage to build a sound policy, a sound strategy | |
| that breaks away from the current strategy, which overlooks the | |
| political environment that enabled the rise of ISIS and other | |
| jihadists in the first place. | |
| What is lacking in the current policy is a real kind of | |
| strategy that utilizes this leverage to ensure the removal of | |
| jihadists, to prevent their return, to protect local | |
| communities from indiscriminate bombardments by the Assad | |
| regime, and minimize the conflict that is emerging among the | |
| various allies in northern Syria, namely the Kurds on one hand | |
| and the rebels and Turkey on the other hand. | |
| This strategy, obviously, is not an invitation for an | |
| American occupation of Syria or long-term nation-building that | |
| President Donald Trump has explicitly criticized. Instead, it | |
| is both realistic, essential, and expands on battlefield | |
| victories already scored over the past 2\1/2\ years in | |
| Operation Inherent Resolve against the Islamic State in | |
| northern Syria. | |
| The strategy, again, in my opinion, I think should | |
| acknowledge the fractured nature of the Syrian conflict today. | |
| To get a sense of this fracture, you have to look at kind of | |
| the map that Chairman Poe just presented, which basically | |
| divides Syria into four quadrants. | |
| One is the caliphate terrain, which extends from eastern | |
| Aleppo all the way to Iraq, Iraqi border, all the way to | |
| Palmyra in central Syria. | |
| And then you have the second one, the second quadrant, | |
| which is rebel-held areas in the north and the south. This is | |
| where the Americans and their allies--the Israelis, the | |
| Jordanians, and others--have actually done very well in | |
| ensuring that jihadists don't have dominance in that area and | |
| that there is, like, a relatively reliable moderate rebel | |
| coalition there and where al-Qaeda and Islamic State have some | |
| presence but they don't dominate. | |
| And the problem there, though, is that the rebel presence | |
| there is fragile and requires a policy to ensure that they | |
| would withstand the pressure from jihadists. And, actually, | |
| today is a good example of that, because Jabhat al-Nusra/al- | |
| Qaeda has started to challenge that dynamic in southern Syria. | |
| The third quadrant, very quickly, is the more fragmented | |
| northwest---- | |
| Mr. Poe. The gentleman's time has expired. | |
| [The prepared statement of Mr. Hassan follows:] | |
| [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] | |
| ---------- | |
| Mr. Poe. And the subcommittee will be in recess for votes. | |
| We will start 5 minutes after the last vote has ended. The | |
| subcommittee is in recess. | |
| [Recess.] | |
| Mr. Poe. The subcommittee will come to order. | |
| Ambassador Hof, we will hear your testimony. | |
| STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE FREDERIC C. HOF, DIRECTOR, RAFIK | |
| HARIRI CENTER FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, ATLANTIC COUNCIL | |
| Ambassador Hof. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. | |
| Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Keating, members of the | |
| committee, I would summarize the key points of my testimony for | |
| the record as follows: First, both the Obama and the Trump | |
| administrations have defined defeating terror in Syria largely | |
| in terms of neutralizing two rival descendants of al-Qaeda in | |
| Iraq, namely the so-called Islamic State, ISIL, and the Jabhat | |
| Fatah al-Sham, JFS, formerly known as the Nusrah Front. | |
| ISIL has had mainly a live and let live arrangement with | |
| the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad. JFS has fought the regime | |
| while at the same time trying to dominate nationalist Syria | |
| First armed rebel units. | |
| Second, terminating the military capabilities of both of | |
| these organizations is critically important. But if our goal in | |
| Syria is to kill terror and keep it dead, ultimately, a | |
| political system reflecting legitimacy has to take hold. Absent | |
| a political system that virtually all Syrians see as | |
| satisfactory with no superior alternative, absent that, | |
| extremists will seek to rise again to fill the vacuum created | |
| by gross corruption, incompetence, and brutality. | |
| Third, the main obstacle to political legitimacy in Syria | |
| is the survival of a regime headed by Bashar al-Assad and | |
| supported by Iran and Russia. The collective punishment and | |
| mass homicide survival strategy of this regime has been the | |
| main factor behind a humanitarian abomination and a political | |
| catastrophe. | |
| Yesterday, the Atlantic Council released a report entitled, | |
| ``Breaking Aleppo.'' This report details and documents the | |
| campaign of terror inflicted by the Assad regime and Russia on | |
| the civilians of Aleppo. It adds to the enormous body of | |
| evidence of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in | |
| Syria over the past 6 years, the overwhelming majority of which | |
| have been committed by the regime and its allies. These crimes | |
| have helped ISIL and JFS enormously in their recruiting. | |
| Fourth, even if the diplomatic pursuit of political | |
| legitimacy in Syria is a long-term project, neutralizing ISIL | |
| and JFS militarily are urgent priorities. Two successive | |
| Presidents have defined both organizations as threats to | |
| American national security. ISIL in Syria, which has planned | |
| and executed major atrocities in Europe, is currently under | |
| attack by a U.S.-led air coalition and a U.S.-advise ground | |
| force, largely Kurdish in composition. | |
| I understand the administration is reviewing this military | |
| approach in light of Turkish objections to the Kurdish role and | |
| the objective desirability of liberating densely populated | |
| areas with highly skilled military professionals. | |
| JFS is under attack by U.S. and Russian air assets | |
| independently with Syrian nationalist rebel forces seeking ways | |
| and means to defeat it. These nationalists will need a tight | |
| Russian leash on Assad and on Iranian-led foreign militias in | |
| order to move effectively against JFS. It is not yet clear that | |
| they will get Russian cooperation. | |
| Fifth and finally, thanks to Russian and Iranian military | |
| intervention, Assad seems secure in at least part of Syria. | |
| Iran, in particular, needs Assad to bind Syria to Lebanon's | |
| Hezbollah, another important Islamist terrorist group. But | |
| Assad's political well-being means the indefinite continuation | |
| of state terror in Syria. | |
| As the United States and its partners move ideally with | |
| dispatch against ISIL and JFS, any temptation to make common | |
| cause with or improve the political prospects of Syria's | |
| premier practitioner of terror, Bashar al-Assad, must be | |
| resisted. Reports of Russian disaffection with Assad and with | |
| Iranian-led militias should be explored. | |
| Killing terror in Syria and keeping it dead will, I am | |
| afraid, be a long-term endeavor for the United States and its | |
| partners, one extending far beyond the defeats of ISIL and JFS. | |
| [The prepared statement of Ambassador Hof follows:] | |
| [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] | |
| ---------- | |
| Mr. Poe. Thank you, Ambassador Hof. | |
| Ms. Dalton. | |
| STATEMENT OF MS. MELISSA DALTON, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR | |
| STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES | |
| Ms. Dalton. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, and | |
| distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to | |
| testify before you today with my excellent colleagues | |
| Ambassador Frederic Hof and Hassan Hassan. | |
| Syria stands today at the epicenter of a regional conflict | |
| with global consequences for U.S. interests. Countering | |
| terrorism is one aspect of a deeper problem set. The Trump | |
| administration and the Congress have the opportunity to change | |
| the course of U.S. policy toward Syria by nesting short-term | |
| operations into a strategy. | |
| Americans have no interest in perennial military | |
| interventions in the Middle East. We have demands for resources | |
| at home and competing geostrategic objectives in Europe and | |
| Asia. However, the United States has compelling reasons to | |
| counter terrorism and to address the broader factors that have | |
| enabled the rise of the so-called Islamic State and al-Qaeda's | |
| affiliate in Syria, Jabhat Fatah al-Sham. The growth of Iranian | |
| proxy groups and a battle-hardened Lebanese Hezbollah in Syria | |
| also pose counterterrorism challenges. | |
| Additionally, the United States has to contend with | |
| intertwined realities that could challenge its ability to | |
| influence outcomes to its advantage. Among these reasons are: | |
| Countering terrorists and the roots of terrorism, which | |
| threaten the U.S. homeland and our allies and partners; | |
| preventing military confrontation with Russia and Iran while | |
| limiting the long-term subversive influence they could have in | |
| the region; and stemming conflict emanating from Syria from | |
| further destabilizing neighboring states in Europe. | |
| Achieving U.S. objectives in Syria will require inherent | |
| tradeoffs in the policy choices the Trump administration could | |
| pursue. Complicating matters, 6 years of war have torn Syria | |
| apart. It no longer exists a unitary whole, requiring different | |
| approaches in the north, south, east, and west. Woven | |
| throughout the options in Syria are geopolitical choices with | |
| which the United States will have to grapple, including how to | |
| manage tensions with Russia in a way that secures U.S. | |
| interests and contests Russian aggression globally while | |
| cooperating where it is advantageous and feasible; how to | |
| calibrate pressure on Iran's destabilizing activities without | |
| provoking blowback to U.S. Forces operating in the area and | |
| while attaining an enduring political outcome in Syria; and how | |
| to manage deeply fraught relations with NATO ally Turkey while | |
| leveraging the highly capable YPG to fight ISIS in northern | |
| Syria. | |
| The Trump administration and Congress should work together | |
| to forge a coordinated U.S. strategy for Syria with allies and | |
| partners. The goals of this strategy should be to degrade ISIS | |
| and JFS, achieve a nationwide cessation of hostilities and a | |
| negotiated transition of power in Damascus, and consolidate | |
| counterterrorism gains by knitting together local security and | |
| governance in the four segments of Syria. | |
| Such an approach will require leveraging multiple tools of | |
| U.S. statecraft, including: Registering strong concerns with | |
| Russia and Iran about their support for Assad's brutal tactics | |
| and their long-term ambitions in Syria and being prepared to | |
| back up those concerns with sanctions and coercion; rebuilding | |
| communication and trust with Turkey. While pressing on human | |
| rights concerns, we should emphasize the criticality of working | |
| through differences as NATO allies. Bolstering support to Iraqi | |
| Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and his efforts to restore | |
| security and stability in Iraq. If Iraq falters, ISIS and other | |
| terrorist groups will regrow in western Iraq and push back into | |
| Syria. Working with the U.N. to leverage and integrate the | |
| Astana process into a U.N.-mediated negotiations, calibrating | |
| sanctions pressure on Putin to convince Assad to accede to the | |
| negotiating table, requiring Russian action before alleviating | |
| sanctions. Ukraine should not be a quid pro quo for Syria. | |
| Synchronizing operations for Raqqa and Mosul to squeeze ISIS, | |
| and aligning covert and noncovert approaches versus ISIS and | |
| JFS. | |
| Letting operational conditions on the ground inform | |
| strategic adjustments and withdrawal timelines. Countering ISIS | |
| and JFS will be a multiyear effort. Increasing both special | |
| operations forces and conventional ground forces in Syria and | |
| Iraq, based on commanders' assessed requirements, conducting | |
| training and combat operations with local partners. | |
| Consolidating gains from operations, knitting connections among | |
| local security forces and governance structures so that | |
| terrorist groups cannot grow back. Being strategic about | |
| deploying the local partner forces that will be the most | |
| credible, accounting for ethno-sectarian differences, even if | |
| it requires a slower pace for operations. | |
| If the United States commits resources to establishing a | |
| safe zone, I recommend constructing one in southern Syria where | |
| operational dynamics are clearer than in the north and to | |
| ensure that it ties to political negotiations to end the civil | |
| war so as to avoid an open-ended commitment. | |
| We should also enhance intelligence sharing and improved | |
| coordination among military intelligence and law enforcement | |
| entities and continue to provide humanitarian assistance to | |
| besieged civilian areas with clear and immediate repercussions | |
| in the case of outside interference. | |
| Finally, we should seek a new authorization for the use of | |
| force for the U.S. intervention in Syria and Iraq providing for | |
| operational flexibility to U.S. commanders. The presence of | |
| ISIS and al-Qaeda in Syria demands our immediate attention. | |
| However, the United States must anchor its counterterrorism | |
| approach in a broader strategy if it is to prevail. | |
| Thank you. I look forward to your questions. | |
| [The prepared statement of Ms. Dalton follows:] | |
| [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] | |
| ---------- | |
| Mr. Poe. I thank all of you all for your testimony. I will | |
| recognize myself for 5 minutes. | |
| First of all, I gave each of you a list of the participants | |
| as I know them as of today. Ambassador Hof, I will just ask you | |
| quickly, is this a fair statement of the lineup of the players? | |
| Ambassador Hof. I think, broadly speaking, Mr. Chairman, it | |
| is a fair lineup. The only--the only thing off the top of my | |
| head I might take issue with here is listing ISIS under the | |
| roster of anti-Assad forces. There has been, for the past 3 | |
| years, a live and let live relationship between the regime and | |
| ISIS. The regime's military effort, the military effort of | |
| Russia has been directed at elements other than ISIS with rare | |
| exception. | |
| Mr. Poe. Okay. Thank you. And it is a fair statement that | |
| there is an ebb and flow of the anti-Assad forces as to who | |
| they are today, whether they are anti-Assad or whether they are | |
| just working for their own self-interest in particular areas of | |
| the country. Is that a fair statement? | |
| Ambassador Hof. Yes, it is, Mr. Chairman. There is probably | |
| an example of just about everything in Syria today. | |
| Mr. Poe. You have the bona fide rebel forces who want to | |
| overthrow Assad; you have out-of-towners who are criminals that | |
| are looking to loot, pillage the area; you have people coming | |
| in to take over territory. You just have everybody there in the | |
| anti-Assad group. Is that a fair statement? | |
| Ambassador Hof. You have got local elements that, for | |
| criminal purposes, have taken full advantage of local | |
| situations. You also--you also have an ebb and flow of people | |
| depending on resource availability. | |
| One of the great successes of the al-Qaeda elements in | |
| Syria is that they have been pretty well resourced and have | |
| been able to pull away young Syrian men who are anti-Assad, | |
| originally lined up with the Free Syrian Army and so forth, but | |
| who have gone to work for an organization where they know-- | |
| where breakfast is going to come from, they know they have got | |
| a serviceable weapon, they know they have got plenty of | |
| ammunition, so that has been a factor as well. | |
| Mr. Poe. Are any of the Middle Eastern countries, Saudi | |
| Arabia, Qatar, UAE, are they funding any of these groups like | |
| al-Qaeda, quasi-terrorist groups? | |
| Ambassador Hof. I think, Mr. Chairman, the bulk of the | |
| evidence suggests that at an official level, no. These | |
| governments are not funding al-Qaeda or ISIS or any of those. | |
| Mr. Poe. But it would be a fair statement that money is | |
| coming from those countries? | |
| Ambassador Hof. You bet, you bet. It would be a totally | |
| fair statement. There is money coming, I think in recent | |
| reports, Qatar and Kuwait have earned honorable or dishonorable | |
| mentions in this regard. | |
| Mr. Poe. Dishonorable mentions. So you have at least three | |
| terrorist groups. You have ISIS, you have al-Qaeda, and you | |
| have Hezbollah, three terrorist groups, questionable whose side | |
| they are on on any given day. | |
| Let me ask you this. The U.S.--let's talk about the United | |
| States' role. In the past, we decided we would fund 5,000 so- | |
| called moderate rebels. That turned out to be a disaster. It | |
| cost us $\1/2\ billion. Armed 60 of them and they surrendered | |
| after the first day. I say that to say it is difficult to know | |
| who we are dealing with as a country when we turn over American | |
| equipment and American money. | |
| What should the United States do? Should we just stay the | |
| course, give a little money, a little weapon here and there? | |
| Should we go all in with the, you know, with the B-52s? So I | |
| say that, not facetiously, but all in all should we just say | |
| this is not our battle? Which of those three options, and I am | |
| going to ask each of you to give me which option the United | |
| States should take from this point on. | |
| Mr. Hassan, which position should the U.S. take? | |
| Mr. Hassan. I think what the U.S. should be doing and what | |
| should---- | |
| Mr. Poe. Which of those three options? | |
| Mr. Hassan. I think they have to be more--they have to go | |
| all--politically all in, and I think that is where the U.S. has | |
| been lagging behind. They haven't pegged a political track to | |
| the military track as necessary. | |
| Mr. Poe. All right. Ambassador Hof. | |
| Ambassador Hof. I would say all in using a whole-of- | |
| government approach to this. It is not entirely a military | |
| issue. Against ISIL it is, for sure, but there are--you know, | |
| the security of Americans is what is at stake and what is---- | |
| Mr. Poe. Sure, political solution. | |
| Ambassador Hof [continuing]. Bubbling up out of Syria. | |
| Mr. Poe. And Ms. Dalton. | |
| Ms. Dalton. I think we have to go in with a multifaceted | |
| approach that pushes hard politically, that creates leverage | |
| with Russia and Iran to pressure Assad to come to the | |
| negotiating table, and to change the military balance on the | |
| ground by continuing to support the groups that we have been | |
| working with. | |
| Mr. Poe. I thank all three of you. | |
| And I recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, ranking | |
| member, Mr. Keating. | |
| Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. | |
| Ms. Dalton, you mentioned in your opening remarks, | |
| ``Ukraine should not be a quid pro quo for Syria.'' What | |
| prompted those statements from you? | |
| Ms. Dalton. Thank you, Ranking Member Keating. There have | |
| been reports of late that as the new administration is | |
| examining the policy options before it, which are, of course, | |
| global in scale given where the United States sits in the | |
| world, that they might take a different approach to Russia and | |
| that perhaps there is some transactional trade space to be had | |
| in areas where Russia and the United States are conflicting or | |
| have been conflicting. And there is a notion that perhaps an | |
| agreement could be reached with the Russians such that the | |
| United States would turn a blind eye to Russia's activities in | |
| Ukraine in Crimea in exchange for Russian cooperation against | |
| ISIS in Syria and working with Assad. | |
| The reality is that that would be strategically foolhardy | |
| for the United States, in my opinion, to go down that pathway. | |
| Russia responds to strength, and rewarding Russia for bad | |
| behavior by encouraging more bad behavior doesn't seem to be a | |
| recipe for success. | |
| Mr. Keating. Let me follow that up, if I could. | |
| Ms. Dalton. Yeah. | |
| Mr. Keating. The Trump administration has repeatedly | |
| embraced the idea that the U.S. should cooperate with Russia on | |
| counter-ISIS or ISIL operations in Syria. How possible is that | |
| engagement in security in cooperating with Russia without | |
| working with Iran and its affiliates? Any of you. | |
| Ms. Dalton. Yes. I think--before turning to the Iran bit of | |
| that question, I think it is important to note that the vast | |
| majority, up to 80 percent of Russia's air strikes in Syria | |
| have not been on ISIS targets. They have been on other Syrian | |
| opposition groups, some of which have been supported by the | |
| United States and our partners, and against civilian targets in | |
| Syria. So the idea--in a very sort of objective way of looking | |
| at this, our objectives are not aligned with Russia in terms | |
| of---- | |
| Mr. Keating. Professor Hof, same question. | |
| Ambassador Hof. Yes, sir. I would certainly not begrudge | |
| the administration the ability to conduct its due diligence | |
| about the possibility of some kind of diplomatic and even, | |
| eventually, military cooperation with Russia. I have--I have my | |
| doubts as to whether there is any there there, but doing the | |
| diplomatic due diligence, look, there is no doubt whatsoever | |
| that the leadership in Russia has no affection, much less | |
| respect for Bashar al-Assad. Bashar al-Assad has served a | |
| political purpose, to date, for President Putin. For our | |
| Government to explore whether there is a possibility of Russia | |
| using some leverage to push Assad into meaningful negotiations, | |
| I think it is worth a try. | |
| Mr. Keating. Yeah. Mr. Hassan, how--could you--Mr. Hassan, | |
| I mean, could you follow up, but also talk about the ability of | |
| the U.S. and Russia sharing information, vital information in | |
| that quest. | |
| Mr. Hassan. Absolutely. I think it is possible to cleave | |
| away Russia from Iran but only under one condition, which is | |
| that the U.S. pursues the right policy inside Syria, regardless | |
| of how Russia perceives that, which is basically a change in | |
| Syria that has seen legitimate--like as a legitimate change | |
| inside Syria, and the defeat--and focus on the political | |
| environment inside Syria as much as the military challenge that | |
| ISIS and al-Qaeda pose. | |
| Only then would Russia start to maybe work with Americans | |
| in the right way against the interest of Iran. We know that the | |
| priorities of the two countries are different. They are long- | |
| term priorities at least. | |
| Mr. Keating. Perhaps, if I could interrupt just to put this | |
| on the table, we are running out of time, but I think other | |
| people will follow up. I haven't heard you talk about safe | |
| zones. If you could comment on some of the drawbacks of safe-- | |
| and dangers of safe zones, what we should be looking out for, | |
| what is possible. | |
| Ambassador Hof. I think the main--the main thing to try to | |
| understand about safe zones is that it requires very strong | |
| protection not only from 30,000 feet, not just a no-fly zone, | |
| it requires decisive military power on the ground. This is what | |
| distinguishes a safe zone from a killing zone where people are | |
| inadvertently drawn in to a situation where they are not | |
| protected on the ground and as a result, slaughter takes place. | |
| Mr. Keating. Yeah. And infiltration from terrorists. | |
| I yield back. | |
| Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman. | |
| The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. | |
| Cook. | |
| Mr. Cook. Thank you very much. | |
| One of the countries that is not listed right on this list | |
| or your list is Israel, and a lot of the foreign policy that we | |
| have in the United States is very sensitive to Israel's | |
| position. | |
| Do you have any comments in regards to how Israel views | |
| this situation? I know the relations with Russia isn't bad, but | |
| their position against Hezbollah and Iran, I think, is well | |
| known, and they consider them a, you know, a major threat to | |
| the country. Anyone? | |
| Ms. Dalton. Thank you, Congressman. I believe that, from a | |
| security perspective, Israel is very concerned about the growth | |
| and development of IRGC-backed groups, not just Lebanese | |
| Hezbollah but the up to 115,000 Iranian-backed groups that are | |
| present in Syria and bolstering the Assad regime, and what that | |
| portends for the long-term presence of those groups in Syria | |
| and how that could potentially serve as a beachhead for IRGC | |
| activities that could threaten Israel and its interest. | |
| On top of that, the fact that Lebanese Hezbollah has | |
| acquired further operational refinement and capability | |
| development through its activities in Syria that could then be | |
| taken back to Lebanon and threaten Israel, I think is also | |
| something that the Israelis are very concerned about from a | |
| security perspective. | |
| Mr. Cook. I noticed Hamas was not listed on there. Do you | |
| have any comments about Hamas? Anybody? No? They are a | |
| nonplayer? | |
| Ambassador Hof. I think, Congressman, Hamas has been | |
| essentially a nonplayer in Syria for--there used to be an | |
| office in Damascus. It left, and I believe it has been a | |
| nonplayer for awhile in the Syrian context. | |
| Mr. Cook. Okay. Going back to Assad. I still--being a | |
| history major, and the history of Hezbollah and in Iran and | |
| their conduct there, it is very hard for me to accept the | |
| Russian position in Syria and some of the other countries | |
| there. The pro-Assad forces, I think they are very accurate | |
| there. Pro-Assad, obviously Iran, North Korea, China, and | |
| Hezbollah. And so I am still very, very nervous about any | |
| Russian affiliation with Assad and because of his conduct, both | |
| the present ruler and his father, which has been going on for | |
| years, and the number of people that have been killed in that | |
| country. | |
| I yield back. Thank you. | |
| Mr. Poe. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Nevada, | |
| Ms. Titus. | |
| Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. | |
| I would just like to ask you about the perception of the | |
| United States in the region within Syria. You know, with the | |
| travel ban, with our unwillingness to do our part to help | |
| refugees, the recent announcement, perhaps, that they are going | |
| to continue to go down this path, what kind of perception will | |
| we have to overcome to be successful in the area? And is this | |
| working in the hands of some of the terrorist groups to use as | |
| propaganda against us in making the situation worse? Anybody, | |
| or all of you? | |
| Mr. Hassan. Sure. I think many people, especially people | |
| who are in charge of the campaign against ISIS and al-Qaeda, | |
| recognize that the framing of the fight against these | |
| organizations is as important as the military challenge. So if | |
| your--if you have like 60 countries fighting ISIS and ISIS is | |
| telling everyone that these are crusaders, these are not | |
| fighting us because we are terrorists but fighting the Sunnis, | |
| look at the devastation in Mosul but also look at the | |
| devastation at Aleppo. These are two separate powers doing work | |
| in two countries against Sunnis. | |
| So I think the framing of the fight against ISIS is as | |
| crucial as the military challenge. The ban itself is not as | |
| much discussed in the region as here, obviously, but I think | |
| there is a--perception matters a lot in Syria and Iraq. And | |
| that is why there is a danger in working with the Russians | |
| without really working out the political formula in the two | |
| countries. | |
| Ms. Titus. Ms. Dalton, or Ambassador? | |
| Ambassador Hof. I would say, Congresswoman, there is--the | |
| United States does have a--definitely an image and a perception | |
| problem in Syria. It was not born with the executive order. | |
| Okay? It goes back. It goes back a few years. Expectations that | |
| the Obama administration, for example, would do something short | |
| of invading and occupying the country to protect Syrian | |
| civilians from mass murder. The fact that that never happened, | |
| unintended consequence for sure, but it does bear on our | |
| reputation in the country. | |
| My organization, the Atlantic Council, recently published | |
| what I consider to be a very, very important nonpartisan | |
| bipartisan effort. Steve Hadley and former secretary Madeleine | |
| Albright have published a Middle East Strategy Task Force | |
| report. And what comes through clearly in this report is the | |
| absolute need we and our transatlantic partners have for | |
| partnerships within the region. | |
| Ultimately, if terror is going to be killed and kept dead | |
| in the Middle East, it is going to be Muslims in the lead. All | |
| right? And again, nobody begrudges the President of the United | |
| States, his authorities, his views about the national security | |
| of the United States, but when we do these things, I think--I | |
| think we have to keep in mind the imperative of partnership in | |
| the region, who our partners need to be. And I suspect the | |
| administration will be doing a better job in that respect. | |
| Ms. Titus. Thank you. Ms. Dalton. | |
| Ms. Dalton. I would completely align myself with Ambassador | |
| Hof's remarks in terms of the necessity of reaching out, not | |
| only to our traditional partners, but also civil society | |
| organizations on the ground. The best messenger of countering | |
| violent extremism is local actors, local religious leaders, | |
| community activists. They are credible in the eyes of the | |
| people that we are trying to reach. And I think bolstering | |
| resourcings for those efforts through third-party means is | |
| exceptionally important. And really creating a coalition of not | |
| just government to government but also public-private | |
| partnerships also must be part of the equation. | |
| Ms. Titus. Thank you. | |
| I yield back. | |
| Mr. Poe. I thank the gentlelady. | |
| The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. | |
| Perry. | |
| Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. | |
| Ambassador Hof, thanks for your service. In 2015, ICE, | |
| Immigration and Customs Enforcement, reported through their | |
| intelligence sources that ISIS had been able to co-opt or to | |
| obtain passport information data, biometric data, facilities, | |
| equipment, et cetera, in Syria, and they were able to falsify | |
| or manufacture passports in that regard with that information. | |
| I am just wondering, since that time, this is the end of | |
| 2015, as I understand it and as I recall it, did we ever verify | |
| that? And does ISIS or al-Qaeda, for that matter, currently | |
| maintain access to Syrian Government facilities, equipment, | |
| biometric data, passport information, et cetera, that would | |
| allow either one of those groups to forge passports and/or | |
| falsify identities? Anybody? | |
| Mr. Hassan. Sure. Just quickly. I think the only place | |
| that, you know, people inside Syria talked about with little | |
| evidence was Aleppo, but ISIS did not go to Aleppo. So if there | |
| was another--if there was one group that took the--you know, | |
| seized these ones, it wouldn't be ISIS. It would be Free Syrian | |
| Army groups. | |
| Mr. Perry. But involved in the Free Syrian Army--I mean, we | |
| have a hard time, I think, distinguishing who's who, and it | |
| changes, in some respects, seems to be month to month or if you | |
| want to say year to year. Could those--that information have | |
| fallen into the hands of al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda operatives, even | |
| if they weren't particularly ISIS operatives? | |
| Mr. Hassan. I can't say, to be honest. | |
| Mr. Perry. Based on that, I mean, and maybe in conjunction | |
| with that, I mean, what confidence should the United States | |
| Government have in the Government of Syria and the actors in | |
| Syria to accurately confirm the identities of immigrants or | |
| refugees from Syria? | |
| Ambassador Hof. Congressman, my sense, and I am certainly | |
| not an expert in consular affairs, my sense is that there is a | |
| very intensive and very long vetting process for Syrian | |
| refugees to come to the United States. My suspicion is that the | |
| administration will probably find some tweaks, if you will, to | |
| improve that on the margins, but my--again, not being a | |
| consular specialist, you know, my sense from people who are in | |
| this business is that Syrian refugees considered to come to the | |
| United States get a pretty thorough scrubbing. | |
| Mr. Perry. I am not doubting at all the capabilities, the | |
| diligence, et cetera, of the people in the United States doing | |
| the vetting. What I am questioning or trying to determine is | |
| the validity of the information that they compare against, who | |
| is giving it to them, what their interests may be, those who | |
| are giving the information, and the validity and the competence | |
| in the validity of that information coming from--does all that | |
| information come from the Assad Government or is there anybody | |
| else providing information? If you don't know, you don't know, | |
| but I am just--you know, looking at the map, I mean, obviously | |
| there is a lot of different players, right? | |
| So when a refugee comes from here, are they getting the | |
| information from Damascus, they being the United States, to vet | |
| this person, or is somebody in this region or any of these | |
| other regions providing some form of governance or tyranny or | |
| whatever you want to call it--where is that information coming | |
| from? Do we know? Do you know? | |
| Ambassador Hof. Congressman, speaking for myself, I don't | |
| know. Syrian refugees in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, elsewhere in | |
| Europe who apply to come to the United States have, in most | |
| cases, documentation from the Syrian Government: Passport, | |
| I.D., and so forth. That, I think, is where the investigation | |
| starts. | |
| There are numerous, numerous agencies of the United States | |
| Government involved in this, numerous international | |
| organizations as well. And I, although I don't know, I strongly | |
| suspect that the kinds of questions that you are putting your | |
| finger on as to the validity of basic identity documents | |
| probably rates high in these investigations. | |
| Mr. Perry. Thank you, Ambassador. | |
| Mr. Chairman, I yield. | |
| Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman. | |
| Ms. Dalton, I understand that you need to leave. There may | |
| be questions that members of the committee have not been able | |
| to ask you and they may turn those in in writing, which will be | |
| forwarded to you, and we would expect you to answer those | |
| questions within a week of when you received them. With that | |
| understanding, then you can leave. | |
| Ms. Dalton. Thank you so much, Chairman. And I beg the | |
| subcommittee's forgiveness. I have a flight to catch today, but | |
| thank you so much for the opportunity to testify, and I would | |
| be glad to answer any followup questions. Thank you. | |
| Mr. Poe. Thank you, Ms. Dalton. | |
| Mrs. Torres, you probably had all your questions for Ms. | |
| Dalton, but you are recognized. | |
| Mrs. Torres. Absolutely, but that is okay. Thank you so | |
| much, Mr. Chairman. | |
| Terrorism, in many ways, is fueled by poverty and poor | |
| governance. In the long run, if Syria doesn't see better | |
| governance and prosperity, then even if ISIS is defeated, | |
| something else will take its place. | |
| Getting back, Ambassador Hof, to, you know, what you were | |
| trying to get at earlier when you said, you know, who should | |
| our partners in the region be, who should we be working with | |
| there, I wonder if you can sort of look at your crystal ball, 5 | |
| years from now, down the road, you know, what are the prospects | |
| for the Syrian economy and Government? Will the Syrian economy | |
| and Government be better off if Russia and Iran are in the main | |
| outside powers shaping events in Syria, or should--what would | |
| that look like if the U.S. and Europe are the main outside | |
| powers shaping events in Syria? | |
| Ambassador Hof. Thank you for your--thank you for your | |
| question, Congresswoman. I would say off the top of my head | |
| that if Iran, in particular, is playing a decisive role 5 years | |
| from now in Syria, Syria will be basically a smoking pit, and | |
| it will be hemorrhaging human beings in all directions. | |
| Iran--Iran needs Bashar al-Assad for one thing and one | |
| thing only. He is--he and his entourage are the only people in | |
| a very nationalistic country willing to subordinate Syria 100 | |
| percent to Iran on the issue of Hezbollah. Iran knows there is | |
| nobody else in the country willing to go that far. So from | |
| Iran's point of view, it is Bashar or nothing. | |
| Now, there are estimates out there that the rebuilding of | |
| Syria is going to take something on the order of $350 billion | |
| worth of investment, in some cases aid, grants. We are not even | |
| talking about humanitarian assistance here. Reconstruction. | |
| Okay? And there is a practical problem here, and I think the | |
| Russians get this, okay, because the Russians know the Assad | |
| regime probably better than any of us. | |
| Mrs. Torres. But do they understand the rule of law? | |
| Ambassador Hof. I don't think that is a--I don't think that | |
| is a high priority. I think--I think what the Russians do | |
| understand is it is going to be very difficult for | |
| international financial institutions, for the United States, | |
| for Japan, for Western Europe to make the kinds of investment, | |
| make the kinds of grants and loans if you have got Bashar al- | |
| Assad and his entourage sitting there with their hands cupped | |
| ready to take a piece of this. | |
| Now, you know, as an American, like everybody else here, I | |
| am--I guess I am basically an optimist. Yes, 5 years from now I | |
| do see Syria in a much better place, but that--that is going to | |
| require very, very, very strong efforts for all of us. There is | |
| a formula out there for moving toward a national unity | |
| governing scheme. It was agreed in June 2012 by Russia, China, | |
| the United States, Great Britain, and France. Our diplomatic | |
| challenge right now, I think, is to try to convince the | |
| Russians to get that back on track. | |
| Mrs. Torres. But meanwhile, you know, we have thousands of | |
| people that are--continue to be slaughtered in the region and | |
| with very little control. You, yourself, stated that there is | |
| very little protection in some of these camps for folks. What | |
| more can be done to get our regional partners involved, if not | |
| Russia? | |
| Ambassador Hof. I think--I think for all of our regional | |
| partners there is a--there is an obligation that needs to be | |
| met in terms of providing sufficient funds for the humanitarian | |
| assistance that needs to take place. Thanks to you ladies and | |
| gentlemen and your colleagues in the appropriations process, | |
| the American taxpayer has been very generous in this respect. | |
| Mrs. Torres. Thank you. | |
| And I yield back. | |
| Mr. Poe. I thank the gentlelady. | |
| The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. | |
| Garrett. | |
| Mr. Garrett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. | |
| Mr. Hassan, I want to clear up the record based on some | |
| questions asked by my colleague from Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry. | |
| He queried you whether or not there might have been access to | |
| equipment in Aleppo that might allow individuals to forge | |
| Syrian passports, official documents, and your response, as I | |
| recall, was that ISIS was not in Aleppo, that that was the Free | |
| Syrian Army. Is it not also true, however, that a significant | |
| faction in Aleppo was Jabhat al-Nusrah or Jabhat Fatah al-Sham? | |
| Mr. Hassan. Inside Aleppo, Jabhat al-Nusrah Arpar was never | |
| dominant. That was true until it was expelled--until the | |
| Russians and the regime expelled the rebels from Aleppo. | |
| Mr. Garrett. Okay. But there were factions of Jabhat al- | |
| Nusrah and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham in Aleppo, correct? | |
| Mr. Hassan. Absolutely. | |
| Mr. Garrett. And Aleppo was, prior to this upheaval, the | |
| largest city in the nation and a seat for a significant amount | |
| of government activity, correct? | |
| Mr. Hassan. Yes. Remember, this was in 2012, and the | |
| jihadists were not yet there in that sense. | |
| Mr. Garrett. Well, Mr. Hassan, the people who I have spoken | |
| with who were there on the ground indicated that when the Arab | |
| Spring occurred, the uprising was of individuals who had | |
| dissatisfaction with the regime but not necessarily an intent | |
| to overthrow. Ultimately, that leadership was co-opted or even | |
| killed and replaced by elements affiliated with al-Qaeda, | |
| originally known as al-Nusrah, right, and then an evolution of | |
| names. | |
| I guess what I am driving at is, the answer to Mr. Perry's | |
| question was, if they controlled the proper parts of Aleppo, | |
| al-Qaeda-affiliated elements may have had access to equipment | |
| that could be used to forge government documents. And they were | |
| in Aleppo, were they not? | |
| Mr. Hassan. In all honesty, I can't tell, because I have | |
| no--I have not--I have no evidence to that or the contrary. But | |
| it is all possible. The regime still had presence inside | |
| Aleppo, so the equipment would have been taken very quickly to | |
| the west side of Aleppo where the regime was there. There was | |
| rumors that--there were rumors that some biometrics machines | |
| were still there. | |
| Mr. Garrett. And we know that there were elements of what | |
| was originally al-Nusrah, which is morphed into an al-Qaeda | |
| affiliate, that were in control of portions of Aleppo over | |
| periods of time. | |
| Mr. Hassan. Yes, lately. | |
| Mr. Garrett. Okay. I wished that Ms. Dalton didn't have to | |
| leave. We have talked a lot, and her comment was, ``our | |
| objectives are not aligned with those of Russia.'' What would | |
| either of you gentlemen or both articulate as our objectives? | |
| Ambassador Hof. I would say, Congressman, our principal | |
| objective is to defeat terror in Syria and keep it dead. This | |
| is--this is a national security objective, okay. Part of that | |
| involves going after ISIL directly militarily as quickly as | |
| possible. This organization has been sitting in its Syrian | |
| capital of Raqqa for a few years now. It has planned and | |
| executed some major atrocities in Europe. I mean, I have been | |
| asking myself, you know, for quite some time now how lucky do | |
| we think we are, okay. But killing that organization is one | |
| thing. Ultimately, there has to be something resembling decent, | |
| responsive, legitimate governance in Syria to keep it dead, and | |
| this is going to be the work of several years. | |
| Mr. Garrett. So I don't want to be disrespectful, and I | |
| appreciate your time, but I have limited time. So our objective | |
| is decent, responsible government in Syria that will protect | |
| Syrians. Okay. And right now, there--you can see that the vast | |
| bulk of, quote, anti-Assad military power on the ground is | |
| Kurdish in nature if you extract ISIS and al-Qaeda-affiliated | |
| elements. Combat power on the ground, we both served, that | |
| aside from ISIS and al-Qaeda-affiliated elements, the most | |
| powerful player that is <greek-l>quote, deg.``anti-Assad is | |
| the Kurds.'' | |
| Ambassador Hof. I would say, Congressman, the Kurdish | |
| military power on the ground in Syria, the YPG, this is | |
| predominantly our ground combat component against ISIL. They | |
| are not--they are not fighting--they are not fighting the | |
| regime. | |
| Mr. Garrett. I agree, and that is why I used quotes when I | |
| said anti-Assad, because they are included on this form as | |
| anti-Assad. They are really pro-protecting themselves. And we | |
| have had wonderful success working with Kurdish minorities, but | |
| one thing we have learned is the Kurdish minorities protect | |
| Kurdish regions and then say why are we going this direction, | |
| right. And so the question becomes, and I know I am almost out | |
| of time, who is the viable entity to replace the Assad regime, | |
| because it is not ISIS or al-Qaeda? So who is there that can do | |
| it? | |
| Ambassador Hof. Congressman, there is--there is--there is a | |
| process, again, that was agreed to by the permanent five | |
| members of the Security Council on June 30, 2012. I was there | |
| as part of the American delegation when this agreement was | |
| reached. | |
| If we can somehow get back to that process in forming a | |
| national unity entity that will include, inevitably, members of | |
| the Syrian Government, you know, who are not--who are not | |
| covered in blood over the past few years, if we can get that | |
| way, that is--that is the beginning of the end for terrorism in | |
| Syria. | |
| Mr. Garrett. Mr. Chairman, I respect that my time is up. | |
| Mr. Poe. All right. The gentleman's time is expired. | |
| The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Florida, Ms. | |
| Frankel. | |
| Ms. Frankel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be quick. I | |
| have to go to another meeting. | |
| Thank you both for your testimony, and I just wanted to | |
| make two points. I think it was Ms. Dalton, but maybe somebody | |
| else, that talking about the necessity, perhaps, of making some | |
| type of deal or cooperative arrangement or using sanctions | |
| against Russia in order to influence Assad. And I think this | |
| paper we were given just shows there is such a complicated web | |
| of players, andunraveling it is a phenomenal exercise. | |
| But I want to say that if we are going to have any hope of | |
| working with Russia, then I want to respectfully suggest that | |
| this Congress needs to know the relationship of Russia to the | |
| folks currently in the White House. And the resignation today | |
| of General Flynn, I think, calls in serious question as to what | |
| exactly who knew what, what did they know, when did they know | |
| it, and what is the real relationship between the White House | |
| and Russia. That is number one. | |
| Number two, I think it was the Ambassador that said--called | |
| what was going on in Syria a humanitarian abomination. And was | |
| that you, sir? Yes. I agree with you. I think everybody here | |
| agrees with you. I think our chairman laid out initially in his | |
| remarks the horrors of what is going on. And I can just say | |
| this, I heard the sadness in your heart of what is going on. | |
| What is it, \1/2\ million people probably killed, 50,000 | |
| children, the President bombing his own people. | |
| And so I wanted to say what I think is another abomination, | |
| and that is the position of the United States of America that | |
| we do not want to take any of these Syrian refugees into this | |
| country. I think that is an abomination. And I yield back. | |
| Mr. Poe. I thank the gentlelady. | |
| And the Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. | |
| Rohrabacher. | |
| Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. | |
| Let me get to the nitty-gritty. First of all, this is a | |
| hearing that is represented by think tanks. One of the think | |
| tanks, she had to leave, but let me ask this: Do either of your | |
| think tanks receive contributions from Gulf State countries? | |
| Ambassador Hof. Sir, the case of the Hariri Center for the | |
| Middle East, we receive no government funding at all. | |
| Mr. Rohrabacher. Or from private sector people from the | |
| Middle East? | |
| Ambassador Hof. Our principal donor is of Lebanese | |
| citizenship residing in Europe. | |
| Mr. Rohrabacher. A Lebanese citizen? | |
| Ambassador Hof. Yes. | |
| Mr. Rohrabacher. And what about from your think tank? | |
| Mr. Hassan. No government money. | |
| Mr. Rohrabacher. No Arab money comes from---- | |
| Mr. Hassan. Not that I am aware of, no. | |
| Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. And where does your money come from? | |
| Mr. Hassan. Oh, Arab, sorry, and Egypt, yes. | |
| Mr. Rohrabacher. But Arab money, yes. | |
| Mr. Hassan. Egyptian businessman, the principal---- | |
| Mr. Rohrabacher. And what Arab money goes into your---- | |
| Mr. Hassan. Just Egypt. | |
| Mr. Rohrabacher. Who? | |
| Mr. Hassan. Egypt. | |
| Mr. Rohrabacher. Oh, Egypt. I didn't know Egypt had enough | |
| money to send over here. We just got back from there. | |
| Mr. Hassan. Not the government. | |
| Mr. Rohrabacher. Not the government. All right. | |
| Well, thank you. Let me just note that I have just got some | |
| specific questions for you. If Assad--if we are going to | |
| compare Assad, this brutal horrible man, to the other countries | |
| in the Gulf, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, even UAE, or now we are | |
| finding maybe Erdogan in Turkey. We know the Iranians are very | |
| brutal. But if, let's say, with Qatar, let's use that as an | |
| example, if there was an uprising against the royal family in | |
| Qatar and it was financed by people from the outside trying to | |
| overthrow, basically, an insurgency to overthrow the royal | |
| family and replace it with, of course, let's say you have all | |
| of those nine out of ten people in Qatar are guest workers, | |
| let's say they are declaring themselves for ISIL, and they get | |
| some support from the outside like that, basically, do you | |
| think that the Government of Qatar or these other governments | |
| would be less bloody than Assad when Assad was faced with an | |
| insurgency movement in his country? Either one of you. These | |
| are more benevolent than Assad? | |
| Ambassador Hof. I would say--I would say, Congressman, that | |
| I would find it very, very hard to imagine anyone else in the | |
| region adopting a political survival strategy that focuses | |
| almost exclusively on civilians---- | |
| Mr. Rohrabacher. On what? | |
| Ambassador Hof. On civilians and on civilian terror. | |
| Mr. Rohrabacher. Uh-huh. | |
| Ambassador Hof. Okay. I think, you know, whether we look at | |
| the Independent International Commission of Inquiry and its | |
| work, if we--if we--if we look at the work of major American | |
| NGOs---- | |
| Mr. Rohrabacher. I cut what you--reclaiming my time. | |
| Ambassador Hof [continuing]. I think the record is clear. | |
| Mr. Rohrabacher. I have got 5 minutes. How about you? Do | |
| you think these other countries are more benevolent than Assad? | |
| Mr. Hassan. To be honest, I don't think they would do the | |
| same. | |
| Mr. Rohrabacher. They wouldn't do the same. | |
| Mr. Hassan. What happened in Syria never happened. | |
| Mr. Rohrabacher. I am sorry, but I have got a limited | |
| number of time. You both think that these powerful forces that | |
| have--that are armed to the teeth would permit an insurrection | |
| to succeed in their countries and not utilize their weapons to | |
| destroy and obliterate anyone who is supporting the insurgency. | |
| I think you are wrong. We will leave that to whoever is | |
| listening to this and reading the transcript. | |
| We have \1/2\ million people who have been dead. Many of | |
| them are refugees, there is no doubt about that. There are, of | |
| course, a lot of people who are dead who became refugees and | |
| survived who are leaving and fleeing ISIL, wasn't it? I mean, | |
| didn't we have the ISIL people at the same time murdering | |
| Christians by lining them up, and in the grossest fashion, | |
| cutting off their heads and engaged in--yes, bombing people | |
| from the air is brutal and kills children, et cetera. Cutting | |
| people's heads off is a way to frighten large numbers of people | |
| and turn them into refugees. We know that happened. | |
| I don't have to tell you, I do not see--I do not believe | |
| that this regime and Assad's regime is any different than the | |
| rest of the regimes that I have seen for the last 28 years. And | |
| there is no reason why--you stated when we asked what our | |
| objective is. Our objective is to eliminate these terrorists? | |
| No, terrorism and the terrorist forces there. What we have done | |
| is our major focus is getting rid of Assad when, in fact, it | |
| should be eliminating the ability of the terrorist forces in | |
| that region to commit acts that threaten our security, and we | |
| have not done that. | |
| Instead, by focusing instead on one dictatorial regime as | |
| compared to all the rest of those authoritarian and brutal | |
| regimes that exist in that area of the woods, one regime has to | |
| go, and our focus is on getting rid of that regime. That makes | |
| no sense to me. It is not in our interest any more than it | |
| would be in our interest if another regime was under attack by | |
| an insurgency from its own people. | |
| And in this case, let us not forget this insurgency has | |
| gone on and on and on. The amount of death that has happened | |
| has happened because we and others have given the Assad-- | |
| insurgents against Assad the idea that we are going to give | |
| them the means to succeed. And I will have to say that you are | |
| repeating. We have to go back to agreement made by outsiders, | |
| outside powers way back in 2012. I am sure that gives all of | |
| those people who are fighting Assad a reason to keep on going | |
| rather than ending this struggle. And if it ends with Assad | |
| still in power, I don't think it is going to be any different | |
| than having the royal family in Qatar or UAE or Iran or Saudi | |
| Arabia or now even Erdogan in Turkey remain in power. | |
| So with that said, thank you, Mr. Chairman. | |
| Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman. | |
| And the subcommittee is adjourned. I thank the witnesses | |
| for being here. | |
| [Whereupon, at 4:07 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] | |
| A P P E N D I X | |
| ---------- | |
| Material Submitted for the Record | |
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| Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Ted Poe, a | |
| Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, and chairman, | |
| Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade | |
| [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] | |
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