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<title> - TERRORIST ATTACK IN BENGHAZI: THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VIEW</title> |
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[House Hearing, 113 Congress] |
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[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] |
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TERRORIST ATTACK IN BENGHAZI: |
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THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VIEW |
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HEARING |
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BEFORE THE |
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS |
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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES |
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ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS |
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FIRST SESSION |
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JANUARY 23, 2013 |
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Serial No. 113-11 |
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs |
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ |
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http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ |
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE |
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78-250 PDF WASHINGTON : 2013 |
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS |
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EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman |
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CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York |
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ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American |
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DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa |
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STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California |
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JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York |
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MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey |
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TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia |
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MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida |
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TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York |
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JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California |
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ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts |
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MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island |
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TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida |
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PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California |
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GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois |
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RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, |
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SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts |
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STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California |
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RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California |
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TREY RADEL, Florida GRACE MENG, New York |
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DOUG COLLINS, Georgia LOIS FRANKEL, Florida |
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MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii |
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TED S. YOHO, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas |
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LUKE MESSER, Indiana |
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Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director |
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Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director |
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C O N T E N T S |
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Page |
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WITNESS |
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The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, U.S. |
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Department of State............................................ 4 |
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LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING |
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The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton: Prepared statement......... 9 |
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APPENDIX |
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Hearing notice................................................... 60 |
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Hearing minutes.................................................. 61 |
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The Honorable Tom Marino, a Representative in Congress from the |
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Commonwealth of Pennsylvania: Prepared statement............... 63 |
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The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress |
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from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 66 |
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The Honorable Luke Messer, a Representative in Congress from the |
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State of Indiana: Prepared statement........................... 69 |
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The Honorable Brian Higgins, a Representative in Congress from |
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the State of New York: Prepared statement...................... 71 |
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The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress |
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from the State of New Jersey: Material submitted for the record 72 |
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Written responses from the Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton to |
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questions submitted for the record by: |
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The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress |
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from the State of California, and chairman, Committee on |
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Foreign Affairs.............................................. 77 |
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The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher, a Representative in Congress |
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from the State of California................................. 90 |
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The Honorable Steve Chabot, a Representative in Congress from |
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the State of Ohio............................................ 104 |
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The Honorable Joe Wilson, a Representative in Congress from the |
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State of South Carolina...................................... 107 |
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The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress |
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from the State of Texas...................................... 114 |
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The Honorable Tom Marino, a Representative in Congress from the |
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Commonwealth of Pennsylvania................................. 123 |
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The Honorable Jeff Duncan, a Representative in Congress from |
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the State of South Carolina.................................. 132 |
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The Honorable Adam Kinzinger, a Representative in Congress from |
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the State of Illinois........................................ 134 |
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The Honorable George Holding, a Representative in Congress from |
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the State of North Carolina.................................. 139 |
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The Honorable Trey Radel, a Representative in Congress from the |
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State of Florida............................................. 143 |
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The Honorable Doug Collins, a Representative in Congress from |
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the State of Georgia......................................... 144 |
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The Honorable Mark Meadows, a Representative in Congress from |
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the State of North Carolina.................................. 146 |
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The Honorable Ted S. Yoho, a Representative in Congress from |
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the State of Florida......................................... 158 |
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The Honorable Luke Messer, a Representative in Congress from |
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the State of Indiana......................................... 164 |
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TERRORIST ATTACK IN BENGHAZI: |
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THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VIEW |
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WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 23, 2013 |
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House of Representatives, |
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Committee on Foreign Affairs, |
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Washington, DC. |
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The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:02 p.m., in |
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room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ed Royce |
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(chairman of the committee) presiding. |
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Chairman Royce. This hearing of the Committee on Foreign |
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Affairs will come to order. |
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Welcome, Madam Secretary. |
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Secretary Clinton. Thank you. |
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Chairman Royce. Madam Secretary, on behalf of the entire |
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committee, let me say how glad we are to see you healthy, and |
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how much we appreciate your desire to testify about Benghazi |
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before you leave office. |
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And let me also say that our appreciation extends to the |
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work that you have performed on behalf of our country. |
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This is our committee's opening hearing of this Congress. |
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It is my initial hearing as its chairman. Examining the first |
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murder of a U.S. Ambassador in nearly 35 years and the killing |
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of three other brave Americans, is not a welcome place to |
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start, but it is necessary. |
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The State Department must learn from its mistakes to better |
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protect its employees, many of whom serve in hostile |
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environments. Unfortunately, threats to Americans abroad are |
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growing. Particularly, those threats are growing in North |
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Africa. The attacks last week in Algeria again show the nature |
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of the danger. |
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I support having a wide diplomatic presence. We can't |
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retreat, as you recognized in your testimony, but it has to be |
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done with the safety of our personnel foremost in mind. |
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This committee intends to work with your department in a |
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bipartisan way and to work to improve security. Every |
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organization has its shortcomings; few welcome them being |
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highlighted. But it is this committee's job to get answers to |
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the tough questions. Our goal is to identify where State |
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Department management broke down, thus failing to protect our |
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people in Benghazi. It is clear that the problem was not |
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confined to a few individuals. |
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The Accountability Review Board, convened by you, Madam |
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Secretary, found ``systemic failures and leadership and |
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management deficiencies at senior levels within two bureaus of |
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the State Department.'' According to the board, these systemic |
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failures led to the ``grossly inadequate security in Libya.'' |
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The Benghazi compound was facing a storm of militancy, a |
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flood of weapons, and a deteriorating security environment. |
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Attacks were escalating on the compound, yet the compound was |
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inexplicably forced to rely on unarmed Libyan guards and a |
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militia that included extremist elements. No wonder the board |
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found a pervasive realization among those in Benghazi that |
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security was not a high priority for Washington. According to |
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the report, the board found that responsibility stopped at the |
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Assistant Secretary level, below the department's most senior |
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management. This seems to contrast with the recommendation of |
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the 1999 Accountability Review Board on the East Africa |
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bombings, which said that, ``The Secretary of State should take |
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a personal and active role in security issues.'' |
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This committee is concerned that the department's most |
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senior officials either should have known about the worsening |
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security situation in Benghazi or did know something about that |
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security situation. Either way, the point is that security |
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requests were denied. I am not sure the board saw the full |
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picture. And if not, its report is not a complete blueprint for |
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fixing things. |
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The State Department must get this right. Al-Qaeda and its |
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affiliates will very likely be targeting other diplomats for |
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years to come. |
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Madam Secretary, the committee stands ready to help. |
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I learned this morning that you and the administration have |
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proposed legislation to fix the review board, which the |
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committee looks forward to considering. |
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Today's discussion may turn to funding. But when reading |
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the conclusions of the board, one must ask how more money would |
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have made a difference in a bureaucracy plagued by what the |
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board called systemic failures. After all, as the security |
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situation in Libya worsened, the State Department turned away |
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free security assets from the Department of Defense. |
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State Department officials have testified that funding was |
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not an issue. More resources may have been needed in some |
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areas, but the tragedy of Benghazi was rooted in bad decisions. |
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Finally, the Benghazi perpetrators must be apprehended, or |
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they must be killed. It is troubling that Tunisia recently |
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released a key suspect. Poor Libyan cooperation has hampered |
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the FBI's investigation. Success here is a matter of justice. |
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And it is also a matter of signaling to militants that there is |
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no place for them to hide if they attack U.S. personnel. |
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I will now turn to the distinguished ranking member, Mr. |
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Engel, for his opening remarks. |
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Mr. Engel. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding |
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this important meeting. I hope we can use this as an |
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opportunity to seriously examine the steps we need to take to |
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prevent a repeat of the tragedy in Benghazi, rather than |
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engaging in gotcha politics that make it more difficult to |
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achieve this bipartisan goal. |
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Madam Secretary, as the new ranking member on the Foreign |
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Affairs Committee, let me say on behalf of the Democratic |
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members of this committee, we would like to welcome you back to |
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our committee, and we are glad that you are feeling better. |
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This will likely be your final appearance before our committee. |
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And I want to take this opportunity to let you know how much we |
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appreciate your outstanding and tireless efforts to represent |
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our country in the international community. I have no doubt |
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that you will continue to serve our Nation in some capacity, as |
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you have for so many years, and I look forward to working with |
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you in the future. |
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And might I add, as a New Yorker, I feel especially proud |
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of the wonderful and outstanding job you have done as Secretary |
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of State. I think that when we look at the outstanding |
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Secretary of States in our history of our country, you will be |
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right up there at the very, very top. The way you have worked; |
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the tireless effort you have made crisscrossing the globe so |
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many times. You have just been indispensable to all of us as |
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Americans. I want to thank you personally on behalf of all the |
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Democrats, and on behalf of all Americans, Democrats and |
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Republicans. We really want to thank you. |
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Mr. Chairman, the committee has no greater responsibility |
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than making sure that the men and women of the State Department |
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and USAID, and other public servants who work abroad, are |
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provided the security they deserve. We must do what we can to |
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minimize the threats faced by our diplomats and aid workers, |
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but we also must recognize that some risk is inherent in the |
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practice of effective diplomacy. We cannot advance America's |
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interests around the world if we isolate behind Embassy walls |
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or limit the deployment of our diplomats to low-risk |
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environments. Let's not learn the wrong lesson from today's |
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hearing. |
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The Accountability Review Board, or ARB, convened by |
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Secretary Clinton, found a number of failures that resulted |
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from a lack of leadership in two State Department bureaus, as |
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well as woefully inadequate local security in Benghazi. |
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Clearly, mistakes were made. But let's be absolutely clear. |
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Barack Obama was not responsible for the Benghazi attack any |
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more than George W. Bush was responsible for the 9/11 attacks, |
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or Ronald Reagan was responsible for the attacks on our Marine |
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barracks in Beirut, which killed over 200 Marines. |
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And frankly, whether it was called a terrorist attack or |
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not in the immediate aftermath, as far as I am concerned, is |
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irrelevant. We just have to make sure that it never happens |
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again so that in the future our people are protected. That is |
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what I want to get out of all of this. |
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So, Madam Secretary, we commend you for accepting all of |
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the ARB recommendations, and welcome your commitment to begin |
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implementing them by the time you leave the department. Even |
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before the ARB submitted its conclusions, the department moved |
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to address certain shortcomings through its increased security |
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proposal. The vast majority of the funding for this proposal |
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would come from funds previously appropriated for lower |
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priority programs. I hope Congress will move without delay to |
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give the department the transfer authority it needs to start |
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applying these changes. It is important to remember that |
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security is not a one-off endeavor. Indeed, it is a long-term |
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responsibility and investment. |
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In that context, the members of the ARB, led by Ambassador |
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Pickering and Admiral Mullen, highlighted the State |
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Department's struggle to get the resources it needs. The |
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ongoing problem had led to a culture at the department in which |
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some senior managers appear to be more interested in conserving |
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resources than in achieving specific goals. The ARB report |
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says, ``The solution requires a more serious and sustained |
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commitment from Congress to support State Department needs.'' |
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Regrettably, it is clear that Congress is still failing to |
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meet this commitment. In the most recent State Department |
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funding bill approved by the House Appropriations Committee, |
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the administration's request for Embassy security, |
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construction, and maintenance was cut by $112 million, and |
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worldwide security protection reduced by $149 million. The |
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Senate, by comparison, did not cut either account. |
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So let me again reiterate what I just said about Congress' |
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responsibility. Over the past 2 years alone, the |
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administration's requests for diplomatic security funding has |
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been slashed by more than $0.5 billion in Congress. This makes |
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it impossible for the State Department to build enough new |
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secure diplomatic facilities or improve those that already |
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exist. |
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The current appropriations bill for Fiscal Year 2013 |
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continues this negative trend. The measure reported out of the |
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House Appropriations Committee hacked base funding for |
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worldwide security protection and Embassy security, |
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construction and maintenance by more than $260 million. The |
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Senate Appropriations Committee fully funded both requests. |
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So what I am saying here is that we have much work to do |
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for ourselves. If we truly want to maintain a global reach, |
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then we need to make the necessary investments in safeguarding |
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our personnel who serve in dangerous environments. |
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So, Mr. Chairman, you have indicated your intention to work |
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on a State Department authorization bill. And I would like to |
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work with you in a bipartisan manner to craft legislation that |
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improves the department's ability to manage its resources and |
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provide the funding necessary to secure our people and |
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facilities globally. |
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So I thank you, and I look forward to the Secretary's |
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testimony. |
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Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Engel. |
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To help us understand the State Department's response to |
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the Benghazi attack, we are joined today by Hillary Rodham |
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Clinton, the 67th Secretary of State. She has had a long career |
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in public service, and for the past 4 years, Secretary Clinton |
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has served as President Obama's Secretary of State. She will |
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soon move on to the next chapter in her distinguished career. |
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Madam Secretary, without objection, your full statement |
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will be made part of the record. |
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And all members here will have 5 days to submit statements |
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and questions for the record, subject to the limitations of the |
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committee rules. |
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Madam Secretary, please begin. |
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STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, SECRETARY OF |
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STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE |
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Secretary Clinton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. |
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And I thank you and the ranking member and members of the |
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committee, both of longstanding tenure and brand new members. |
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And I appreciate your patience for me to be able to come to |
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fulfill my commitment to you, actually to the former |
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chairwoman, that I would be here to discuss the attack in |
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Benghazi. |
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I appreciate this opportunity. I will submit my full |
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testimony for the record. |
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I want to make just a few points. First, the terrorist |
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attacks in Benghazi that claimed the lives of four brave |
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Americans, Chris Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen |
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Doherty, are part of a broader strategic challenge to the |
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United States and our partners in North Africa. I think it is |
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important we understand the context for this challenge as we |
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work together to protect our people and honor our fallen |
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colleagues. |
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Any clear-eyed examination of this matter must begin with |
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this sobering fact: Since 1988, there have been 19 |
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Accountability Review Boards investigating attacks on American |
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diplomats and their facilities. Since 1977, 65 American |
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diplomatic personnel have been killed by terrorists. In |
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addition to those who have been killed, we know what happened |
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in Tehran with hostages being taken in 1979; our Embassy and |
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Marine barracks bombed in Beirut in 1983; Khobar Towers in |
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Saudi Arabia 1996; our Embassies in East Africa in 1998; |
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consulate staff murdered in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in 2004; the |
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Khost attack in Afghanistan in 2009; and too many others. |
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But I also want to stress the list of attacks that were |
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foiled, crises averted, and lives saved is even longer. We |
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should never forget that the security professionals get it |
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right more than 99 percent of the time, against difficult odds, |
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because the terrorists only need to get it right once. |
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That is why, like all my predecessors, I trust the |
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Diplomatic Security professionals with my life. Let's also |
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remember that, as the chairman and the ranking member pointed |
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out, administrations of both parties, in partnership with |
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Congress, have made concerted and good-faith efforts to learn |
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from the tragedies that have occurred to implement |
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recommendations from the review boards, to seek the necessary |
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resources to better protect our people in a constantly evolving |
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threat environment. |
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In fact, Mr. Chairman, of the 19 Accountability Review |
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Boards that have been held since 1988, only two have been made |
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public. I want to stress that, because the two that have been |
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made public, coming out of the East Africa Embassy bombings and |
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this one, are attempts, honest attempts by the State |
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Department, by the Secretary, Secretary Albright and myself, to |
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be as transparent and open as possible. |
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We wanted to be sure that whatever these independent, |
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nonpartisan boards found would be made available to the |
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Congress and to the American people, because as I have said |
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many times since September 11, I take responsibility, and |
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nobody is more committed to getting this right. I am determined |
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to leave the State Department and our country safer, stronger, |
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and more secure. |
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Now, taking responsibility meant not only moving quickly in |
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those first uncertain hours and days to respond to the |
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immediate crisis, but also to make sure we were protecting our |
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people and posts in high-threat areas across the region and the |
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world. It also meant launching an independent investigation to |
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determine exactly what happened in Benghazi, and to recommend |
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steps for improvement. And it also meant intensifying our |
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efforts to combat terrorism and support emerging democracies in |
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North Africa and beyond. |
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Let me share briefly the lessons we have learned up until |
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now. First, let's start on the night of September 11 itself and |
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those difficult early days. I directed our response from the |
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State Department and stayed in close contact with officials |
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from across our Government and the Libyan Government. So I did |
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see firsthand what Ambassador Pickering and Chairman Mullen |
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called timely and exceptional coordination. No delays in |
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decision-making. No denials of support from Washington or from |
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our military. And I want to echo the review board's praise for |
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the valor and courage of our people on the ground, especially |
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our security professionals in Benghazi and Tripoli. The board |
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said our response saved American lives in real time, and it |
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did. |
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The very next morning I told the American people, and I |
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quote, ``Heavily armed militants assaulted our compound,'' and |
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vowed to bring them to justice. And I stood later that day with |
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President Obama as he spoke of an act of terror. Now, you may |
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recall, at the same time period, we were also seeing violent |
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attacks on our Embassies in Cairo, Sana'a, Tunis, and Khartoum, |
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as well as large protests outside many other posts, from India |
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to Indonesia, where thousands of our diplomats serve. So I |
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immediately ordered a review of our security posture around the |
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world, with particular scrutiny for high-threat posts. And I |
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asked the Department of Defense to join Interagency Security |
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Assessment Teams and to dispatch hundreds of additional Marine |
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security guards. I named the first Deputy Assistant Secretary |
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of State for High Threat Posts so that missions in dangerous |
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places get the attention they need. And we reached out to |
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Congress to help address physical vulnerabilities, including |
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risks from fire and to hire additional Diplomatic Security |
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personnel and Marine security guards. |
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Second, even as I took these steps, I quickly moved to |
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appoint the Accountability Review Board because I wanted them |
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to come forward with their report before I left, because I felt |
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the responsibility, and I wanted to be sure that I was putting |
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in motion the response to whatever they found. What was wrong? |
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How do we fix it? I have accepted every one of their |
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recommendations. Our Deputy Secretary for Management and |
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Resources, Deputy Tom Nides, who appeared before this committee |
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last month, is leading a task force to ensure all 29 are |
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implemented quickly and completely, as well as pursuing |
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additional steps above and beyond the board. |
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I pledged in my letter to you last month that |
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implementation has now begun on all 29 recommendations. We have |
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translated them into 64 specific action items. They were all |
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assigned to specific bureaus and offices, with clear timelines |
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for completion. Fully 85 percent are on track to be completed |
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by the end of March, with a number completed already. But we |
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are also taking a top to bottom look to rethink how we make |
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decisions on where, when, and whether our people should operate |
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in high-threat areas and how we respond. We are initiating an |
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annual high-threat post review, chaired for the first time in |
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American history, I suppose, by the Secretary of State, and |
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ongoing reviews by the deputy secretaries to ensure that |
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pivotal questions about security reach the highest level. And |
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we will regularize protocols for sharing information with |
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Congress. |
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Now, in addition to the immediate action we took, and the |
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review board process, we are moving on a third front, |
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addressing the broader strategic challenge in North Africa and |
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the wider region. Benghazi did not happen in a vacuum. The Arab |
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revolutions have scrambled power dynamics and shattered |
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security forces across the region. Instability in Mali has |
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created an expanding safe haven for terrorists who look to |
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extend their influence and plot further attacks of the kind we |
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just saw last week in Algeria. And let me offer our deepest |
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condolences to the families of the Americans and all the people |
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from many nations killed and injured in the Algerian hostage |
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crisis. We remain in close touch with the Government of |
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Algeria, ready to provide assistance if needed, and also |
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seeking to gain a fuller understanding of what took place so we |
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can work together to prevent such terrorist attacks in the |
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future. |
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Now, concerns about terrorism and instability in North |
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Africa are not new, of course. Indeed, they have been a top |
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priority for this entire national security team. But we need to |
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work together to accelerate a diplomatic campaign to increase |
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pressure on al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and other terrorist |
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groups in the region. I have conferred with the President of |
|
Libya, the Foreign Ministers and Prime Ministers of Tunisia and |
|
Morocco. Two weeks later, after the attack, I met with a very |
|
large group of regional leaders at the U.N. and was part of a |
|
special meeting focused on Mali and the Sahel. In October, I |
|
flew to Algeria to discuss the fight against AQIM. In November, |
|
I sent Deputy Secretary Bill Burns on an interagency group to |
|
Algiers to continue that conversation. And then, in my stead, |
|
he co-chaired the Global Counterterrorism Forum that was held |
|
in Abu Dhabi and a meeting in Tunis, working not only on |
|
building new democracies but reforming security services. |
|
These are just a few of the constant diplomatic engagements |
|
that we are having focused on targeting al-Qaeda's syndicate of |
|
terror, closing safe havens, cutting off finances, countering |
|
their extremist ideology, slowing the flow of new recruits. We |
|
continue to hunt the terrorists responsible for the attacks in |
|
Benghazi, and are determined to bring them to justice. And we |
|
are using our diplomatic and economic tools to support the |
|
emerging democracies, including Libya, in order to give them |
|
the strength to provide a path away from extremism. |
|
But finally, the United States must continue to lead in the |
|
Middle East, in North Africa, and around the globe. We have |
|
come a long way in the past 4 years, and we cannot afford to |
|
retreat now. When America is absent, especially from unstable |
|
environments, there are consequences: Extremism takes root; our |
|
interests suffer; and our security at home is threatened. |
|
That is why Chris Stevens went to Benghazi in the first |
|
place. I asked him to go. During the beginning of the |
|
revolution against Ghadafi, we needed somebody in Benghazi who |
|
could begin to build bridges with the insurgents and to begin |
|
to demonstrate that America would stand against Ghadafi. Nobody |
|
knew the dangers or the opportunities better than Chris, first, |
|
during the revolution, then during the transition: A weak |
|
Libyan Government, marauding militias, even terrorist groups, a |
|
bomb exploded in the parking lot of his hotel. He never |
|
wavered. He never asked to come home. He never said, let's shut |
|
it down, quit, and go somewhere else, because he understood it |
|
was critical for America to be represented in that place at |
|
that pivotal time. |
|
So, Mr. Chairman, we do have to work harder and better to |
|
balance the risks and the opportunities. Our men and women who |
|
serve overseas understand that we do accept a level of risk to |
|
represent and protect the country we love. They represent the |
|
best traditions of a bold and generous Nation. They cannot work |
|
in bunkers and do their jobs. But it is our responsibility to |
|
make sure they have the resources they need to do those jobs |
|
and to do everything we can to reduce the risks they face. |
|
For me, this is not just a matter of policy; it is |
|
personal, because I have had the great honor to lead the men |
|
and women of the State Department and USAID, nearly 70,000 |
|
serving here in Washington and at more than 275 posts around |
|
the world. They get up and go to work every day, often in |
|
difficult and dangerous circumstances, thousands of miles from |
|
home, because they believe the United States is the most |
|
extraordinary force for peace and progress the Earth has ever |
|
known. |
|
And when we suffer tragedies overseas, the number of |
|
Americans applying to the Foreign Service actually increases. |
|
That tells us everything we need to know about the kind of |
|
patriots I am talking about. They do ask what they can do for |
|
their country. And America is stronger for it. So today, after |
|
4 years in this job, traveling nearly 1 million miles and |
|
visiting 112 countries, my faith in our country and our future |
|
is stronger than ever. Every time that blue and white airplane |
|
carrying the words ``United States of America'' touches down in |
|
some far off capital, I feel again the honor it is to represent |
|
the world's indispensable Nation, and I am confident that with |
|
your help, we will continue to keep the United States safe, |
|
strong, and exceptional. And I would be very happy to answer |
|
your questions. |
|
[The prepared statement of Secretary Clinton follows:] |
|
|
|
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] |
|
|
|
---------- |
|
|
|
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Madam Secretary. |
|
Our State Department personnel do certainly accept a level |
|
of risk. And they do so in order, as you have said quite |
|
properly, to continue to lead. And we recognize that hindsight |
|
is 20/20. |
|
But with regard to the Benghazi attacks, what is probably |
|
most disturbing, as the question comes before the committee and |
|
as the media looks at the situation, is that the dots here were |
|
connected ahead of time. The State Department saw this risk |
|
coming. And the State Department didn't act in order to prevent |
|
what could have been handled by answering the requests by our |
|
personnel. |
|
If we look at the State Department e-mail exchange on top |
|
officials in the bureau, written right after the assassination |
|
attempt on the British Ambassador in June 2012, here is the |
|
exchange, |
|
|
|
``This is very concerning when you start putting the |
|
events together, the anti-American demonstration, the |
|
attack on our compound, and now the U.K. Motorcade |
|
attack. If the tide is turning and they are now looking |
|
for Americans and westerners to attack, that is a game |
|
changer. We are not staffed or resourced adequately to |
|
protect our people in that type of environment. We are |
|
a soft target.'' |
|
|
|
Here is the point. Senior officials fully appreciated the |
|
grave threats in Benghazi. They knew that al-Qaeda was there. |
|
They knew that our security was insufficient. But instead of |
|
adding security, in this case, they took it away. They withdrew |
|
mobile security detachment teams. They sent packing a special |
|
team that the Defense Department provided at no cost. If senior |
|
officials knew that our diplomats weren't safe and weren't |
|
adequately staffed, then why did they continue to withdraw |
|
security? I think that is the first question. |
|
In testimony this morning, you said you never saw those |
|
requests, and I understand that. Last month, though, Deputy |
|
Secretary Burns testified that memos regarding the |
|
deteriorating security situation did make their way to the |
|
seventh floor, to top management. So which senior official was |
|
he referring to when he talks about top management there? Who |
|
in the senior management was responsible for responding to |
|
those requests that were coming from the field? That would be |
|
my question. |
|
Secretary Clinton. Well, there are a lot of important |
|
questions in that, Mr. Chairman. |
|
And let me begin by saying that I was aware of certain |
|
incidents at our facility, and the attack on the British |
|
diplomat. I was briefed on steps taken to repair the breach in |
|
the perimeter wall after the June bombing, steps taken to |
|
reduce off-compound movements. Our team, led by security |
|
professionals, but also including intelligence professionals |
|
and others, did not recommend, based on those incidents, |
|
abandoning Benghazi, in part because over the last years, we |
|
have become accustomed to operating in dangerous places in |
|
Pakistan, in Iraq, and Afghanistan, and Yemen, and elsewhere. |
|
And we do, as by necessity, rely on security professionals to |
|
implement the protocols and procedures necessary to keep our |
|
people safe. And as I said in my opening statements, I have a |
|
lot of confidence in them because, you know, most of the time, |
|
they get it right. |
|
But I was also engaged, and I think this is what Deputy |
|
Secretary Burns was referring to, in the issues related to the |
|
deteriorating threat environment, particularly in Libya--there |
|
were other places across the region we were also watching--to |
|
try to see what we could do to support the Libyan Government to |
|
improve the overall stability of their country, to deal with |
|
the many militias. We have many programs and actions that we |
|
were working on. I had a number of conversations with leading |
|
Libyan officials. I went to Libya in October 2011. In fact, |
|
shortly before the attack on Benghazi, we approved Libya for |
|
substantial funding from a joint State-DoD account for border |
|
security, CT capabilities, and WMD efforts. |
|
Chairman Royce. I understand that, Madam Secretary. |
|
Secretary Clinton. So I want to just clarify that there |
|
were specific instances and assessments going on primarily by |
|
the security professionals related to individual posts, |
|
including Benghazi. |
|
Chairman Royce. But what I saw was a communique, which |
|
indicated that those assets, like the security site team, were |
|
in fact pulled. You had free of cost here, from the Department |
|
of Defense, a team in place. And on about August 15, some weeks |
|
before the attack, the question was, can we extend that |
|
security team? And the answer is no, it would be embarrassing |
|
to our agency if that agency is providing the protection. That |
|
struck me as a little bit of the problem that we had before |
|
between the CIA and the FBI, between, you know, two agencies |
|
that were more focused perhaps on the rivalry than they were on |
|
providing the security. And we are full circle now, based on |
|
the reading, literal reading of those memos. Here you had the |
|
requests. |
|
So that is my question. They didn't come to the conclusion |
|
that we should increase security, but what about the question |
|
of having security actually withdrawn August 15 in terms of the |
|
security site team provided by the Department of Defense? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Again, I am glad you raised that. The |
|
ARB looked into this, as it looked into everything. It does not |
|
even discuss the SST or recommend that our personnel on the |
|
ground should have asked for its continued deployment. And I |
|
think that is in part because the SST was based in Tripoli. |
|
Chairman Royce. Right. |
|
Secretary Clinton. It hardly ever, less than 2 percent of |
|
the entire time it was in Libya, did it even go to Benghazi. |
|
Its responsibilities, which were about the siting of and |
|
security of the Embassy, were focused on Tripoli. And it was |
|
not an open-ended arrangement, as it has been understood. It |
|
was intended as an interim measure. And the experts who were |
|
there played vital roles. They were communications specialists, |
|
airfield specialists, trained medics. They helped to stand up |
|
our Embassy in Tripoli when we reopened it. And I think it is |
|
important that they were very helpful with the Embassy. But at |
|
the end of the day, they really were not focused on, nor did |
|
they pay much attention to, Benghazi. And I think since their |
|
primary mission was at the Embassy, the Embassy did acquire a |
|
lot of assets. And that was the decision that they should not |
|
be extended for a third time. |
|
Chairman Royce. Madam Secretary, thank you. |
|
We are going to go Mr. Engel from New York. |
|
Mr. Engel. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. |
|
Madam Secretary, you and the State Department have |
|
rightfully taken responsibility for what happened, convening |
|
the ARB and implementing its recommendations. But as I said in |
|
my opening statement, we need to be clear-eyed that there is |
|
blame to share right here in Congress. Over the past 2 years |
|
alone, the administration's requests for diplomatic security |
|
funding has been slashed by more than $0.5 billion in Congress. |
|
And the current appropriations bill for fiscal 2013 continues |
|
this negative trend by slashing funding for worldwide security |
|
protection, Embassy security, construction and maintenance by |
|
more than $260 million. |
|
So I would like to ask you, Madam Secretary, do you think |
|
that Congress has provided adequate resources for diplomatic |
|
security in recent years? Can you talk about security |
|
priorities you have not been able to complete due to an |
|
inadequate budget? And what advice would you give the committee |
|
as it considers funding to protect our diplomats? And I want to |
|
also ask what would happen to the security of our diplomats and |
|
our diplomatic facilities if there is a sequester, or worse, a |
|
government shut down? Has the State Department begun planning |
|
for the dangers of Congress not agreeing to a budget? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Well, Congressman Engel, this is a |
|
bipartisan problem. Since 2007, the Department has consistently |
|
requested greater funding for Embassy construction and |
|
diplomatic security. But with the exception of 2010, the |
|
Congress has consistently enacted less than requested. |
|
Most notably, in 2012, the department received $340 million |
|
less than requested, close to 10 percent less. Now, over the |
|
last 2 years cuts to the Embassy construction, security and |
|
maintenance budget was almost 10 percent of that as well. Now, |
|
the ARB, and I would refer to them, because, you know, they had |
|
an independent view of this, has recommended an increase in |
|
facilities funding to $2.2 billion per year to restore the |
|
construction levels that were called for in the 1998 ARB |
|
report. |
|
But I think it is also fair to make the point the ARB made. |
|
Consistent shortfalls have required the government to try to |
|
prioritize. And the department has attempted to do that. But I |
|
do think that there became a culture of reaction, you know, as |
|
the ARB report says, husbanding resources, and trying to figure |
|
out how to do as much with as little as possible. And so |
|
although our prioritization was certainly imperfect, the funds |
|
provided by Congress were inadequate. So somehow we have to |
|
work on both ends of that equation. Now, what can you do? |
|
Well, first of all, we came up with a request to the |
|
legislative and budget staffs for transfer authority language, |
|
namely taking money we already had in this budget and letting |
|
us move it quickly to do what the ARB told us to do. More |
|
Marine security guards, more Diplomatic Security guards, more |
|
construction and upgrades. We were able to get that included in |
|
the Senate version of the Sandy supplemental, which passed on |
|
December 28, but we were unable to get the language included in |
|
the House version. This is not new money. So, first and |
|
foremost, I would greatly appreciate this committee weighing |
|
in, working with your counterpart in the Senate, to give us |
|
this transfer authority. Otherwise, we are going to be behind |
|
the curve again. |
|
Secondly, I think it is very important to change the laws |
|
about best value contracting versus lowest price technically |
|
qualified. By statute, the State Department local guard |
|
contracts in dangerous places like Libya, and everywhere else, |
|
except Iraq and Afghanistan, must be awarded using a lowest |
|
price technically acceptable selection process. We have |
|
requested a change in the legislation that would allow us to |
|
use some discretion to try to deal with the varieties and |
|
vagaries of these local guard forces. We currently have it, as |
|
I said, in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. But it is going to |
|
expire. So that is something else that I would respectfully ask |
|
this committee to look into. |
|
And finally, the point that the chairman made and that you |
|
echoed, Congressman, an authorization. You know, working on an |
|
authorization. I was on the Armed Services Committee in the |
|
Senate. We did an authorization every year no matter what was |
|
going on in the world. It was a great organizing tool. It made |
|
sure that our defense needs were going to be met. I believe |
|
that in the world in which we are living, our diplomacy and |
|
development needs are very important. But we don't have the |
|
same focus. And so working with the Senate Foreign Relations |
|
Committee on an authorization where you can look at everything |
|
and you can have subcommittees really delving into all of these |
|
different issues, coming up with an authorization, I think |
|
would be a great step forward. |
|
Mr. Engel. Thank you. |
|
Thank you, Madam Secretary. |
|
Chairman Royce. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen from New York--from |
|
Florida. |
|
They retire from New York to Florida. From Florida. |
|
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. We will take them either way. New Jersey, |
|
New York, come on down. Madam Secretary---- |
|
Secretary Clinton. There are a lot of New Yorkers already |
|
down there, I think, aren't there? |
|
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. But you can only vote once. We are very |
|
picky about that. |
|
Madam Secretary, thank you for the positive working |
|
relationship that we have had during your tenure at the State |
|
Department. I request that I get written responses for the |
|
questions that I am going to ask. |
|
First, why were you not interviewed for the review board by |
|
the review board investigators? How can this review be |
|
considered thorough when the person at the top, the Secretary |
|
of State, was not part of the investigation? That is what was |
|
said in our open hearing when it was confirmed that you were |
|
never questioned for this report, and I think that is |
|
outrageous. |
|
Also, the State Department was clearly allowing the false |
|
narrative that Department officials were being held accountable |
|
for what went wrong in Benghazi, for ignoring the threat, and |
|
it was perceived as fact. Look at these headlines: The New York |
|
Times, ``Four are out at State Department after scathing report |
|
on Benghazi attack,'' not true. ``Heads roll at the State |
|
Department,'' not true. Yet State did nothing to correct the |
|
record. Here we are 130 days after the terrorist attack, why |
|
did you not take steps publicly to correct this false |
|
narrative, even up to and including today? Even when your |
|
deputies, Burns and Nides, testified before us, they both said |
|
that steps were being taken to discipline those State |
|
Department officials, when in fact no significant action had or |
|
has occurred. There has just been a shuffling of the deck |
|
chairs. |
|
Do you find it acceptable that the State officials |
|
responsible for this lack of leadership and mismanagement, and |
|
for ignoring security requests during the Benghazi attack and |
|
before, remain employed within the State Department? |
|
Also, the accountability report cites several systemic |
|
failures at the department that cannot be overlooked or |
|
ignored. Given that State was aware of the dangerously |
|
declining security situation in Benghazi--as pointed out by our |
|
chairman--the assassination attempt on the British Ambassador, |
|
and other attacks on Western interests, why did State not |
|
immediately revamp our security protocols prior to the |
|
September 11 attacks? Did State fail to act preemptively |
|
because it ignored the threat, or did it fail to act because it |
|
was unable to recognize this growing pattern of violence? |
|
Either way, State did fail to act. |
|
These failures highlighted by the ARB report serve as a |
|
blueprint for terrorists on where our weaknesses lie, where we |
|
are vulnerable. So what actions have been taken to ensure that |
|
when another Embassy, another consulate sounds the alarm on |
|
security threats, as it happened in Benghazi, that those |
|
requests are not yet again ignored? As we examine the |
|
willingness and capacity of host countries in the region, we |
|
must condition aid to countries with these high-threat posts |
|
based on their cooperation with the United States. I hope that |
|
we do that. |
|
Further, regarding the State's request for more money, it |
|
is worth pointing out that some State Department officials have |
|
stated that budget constraints are not to blame for the loss of |
|
lives in Benghazi. However, the State Department is notorious |
|
for wasteful spending and continues to have misplaced funding |
|
priorities. Between the State Department, Treasury, and USAID, |
|
the Fiscal Year 2012 request for global climate change |
|
initiative is over $1.3 billion. Now, what do we think or what |
|
do you think is a higher priority and a better use of |
|
taxpayers' money, national security or global climate change? |
|
This money could have been used for Embassy construction, for |
|
hiring more diplomacy security agents, for providing our posts |
|
and personnel overseas with adequate equipment and training. |
|
There is more that I can't get to, but certainly I would |
|
appreciate your written answers, including the 64 specific |
|
action items that you will be taking on the task force |
|
recommendation. Also, we look forward to getting a detailed |
|
report here in Congress on explaining their justification, |
|
their itemized funding layout, et cetera. |
|
So thank you, Madam Secretary, for the time. |
|
Secretary Clinton. Congressman, obviously, we will answer |
|
all of your questions. Let me just comment on two of them even |
|
though my time has run out. First, I was not asked to speak |
|
with the Accountability Review Board during their |
|
investigation. The specific issues they were looking at |
|
regarding the attack on Benghazi were handled by security |
|
professionals in the department. And that is where the ARB |
|
focused. Obviously, if they had thought that I was relevant or |
|
had information that would have helped the investigation, I |
|
would have gladly discussed that with them at their request. |
|
Secondly, on the personnel, this is another area where I |
|
need your help. First, all four individuals have been removed |
|
from their jobs. Second, they have been placed on |
|
administrative leave. Thirdly, Ambassador Pickering and Admiral |
|
Mullen specifically highlighted the reason why this has been so |
|
complicated. Under Federal statute and regulations, |
|
unsatisfactory leadership is not grounds for finding a breach |
|
of duty. And the ARB did not find that these four individuals |
|
breached their duty. So, fourthly, I have submitted legislation |
|
to this committee and to the Senate committee to fix this |
|
problem so future ARBs will not face this situation, because I |
|
agree with you, there ought to be more leeway given to the |
|
ARBs. But under current law, they were limited. |
|
Chairman Royce. Madam Secretary, we will be working to fix |
|
that problem. |
|
Mr. Faleomavaega from American Samoa. |
|
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and our ranking |
|
member for calling this important hearing. |
|
Madam Secretary, thank you for your most eloquent |
|
statement. Your service to our Nation has been exemplary and |
|
outstanding. And any suggestion otherwise during today's |
|
hearing I would consider unfair and unwarranted. |
|
We meet today under difficult circumstances. I am sure that |
|
when you, as Secretary of State, stood at Andrews Air Force |
|
Base for the transfer of the remains of Ambassador Christopher |
|
Stevens, Mr. Sean Smith, Mr. Tyrone Woods, and Mr. Glen |
|
Doherty, you must have had tremendous, or felt tremendous pain |
|
and suffering. As we express in our Samoan proverb, ``Ua tagi |
|
le fatu ma le eleele,'' meaning, ``the stones and the Earth |
|
wept.'' |
|
Madam Secretary, please know that we were not--you were not |
|
alone. We wept with you and with the families of our fallen |
|
heroes. It is true that the Benghazi attack is the first time |
|
since 1979 that an American Ambassador has been killed in the |
|
line of duty. But it is also true that the world has changed |
|
significantly since 1979, and consequently the Department of |
|
State is increasingly operating in high-threat locations |
|
throughout the world. This is why the Accountability Review |
|
Board rightly observed that Congress needs to make a serious |
|
and sustained commitment to supporting State Department needs. |
|
But in the Fiscal Year 2013 fiscal year budget, the House |
|
cut the administration's request by about $200 million. |
|
However, having been provided $2.6 billion of security funding, |
|
I wonder if the Congress had done its part and fulfilled its |
|
responsibility in providing the State Department with the |
|
necessary resources and funding to meet its needs, especially |
|
to provide security for our Embassies and consulates throughout |
|
the world. I agree with the ARB's recommendations that we |
|
should restore the capital security cost-sharing program, which |
|
pulls money from different agencies in order to accelerate |
|
construction of new Embassies and consulates. |
|
Madam Secretary, in honor of the lives of Ambassador |
|
Christopher Stevens, Mr. Sean Smith, Mr. Tyrone Woods, and Mr. |
|
Glen Doherty, we need answers so that we can prevent this kind |
|
of tragedy from happening again. It is no good for any of us to |
|
use this tragedy for political gain. This was a terrorist |
|
attack first and foremost. |
|
And we must not lose sight of this brutal fact. Instead, we |
|
must hold together in our commitment to defeat those who would |
|
do us harm. So, Madam Secretary, I commend you for convening |
|
the ARB in accordance with the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and |
|
Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, and for accepting all 29 of the |
|
recommendations of the ARB commission. For the past 20 years, |
|
you have served our Nation well. You have done all you could do |
|
to deliver freedom safely to future generations. I salute you, |
|
and I look ahead to 2016, wishing you much success and |
|
extending to you my highest regards. |
|
I do have one question, or a couple if I have the time. |
|
Madam Secretary, I note with interest one of your quotes, or a |
|
statement here that this is why Ambassador Chris Stevens went |
|
to Benghazi. I want to get the sense that the commitment of our |
|
Foreign Service Officers throughout the world is second to |
|
none, even at the risk of their lives. And I wish that my |
|
colleagues would understand, yes, we have logistical problems, |
|
yes, we have funding, but the fact that these people willingly |
|
did this, not only because of his love for the leaders and the |
|
people of Libya, but because he was so proud to represent this |
|
great Nation of ours. |
|
And I would like to ask if you could elaborate just a |
|
little further what you meant by this, that Ambassador Stevens |
|
went to Benghazi in the first place, knowing the dangers, |
|
knowing the dangers were there, he went still; could you please |
|
comment on that? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Well, Congressman, I think it is |
|
absolutely the case that we have a Foreign Service that is |
|
composed of men and women who take on these responsibilities |
|
because they love our country. They go in with their eyes wide |
|
open. They learn languages. They immerse themselves in |
|
cultures. They go out to the Foreign Service Institute and hone |
|
their skills. |
|
And Chris Stevens was one of our very best. He started off |
|
in the Peace Corps in Morocco, was a fluent Arabic speaker, had |
|
served with distinction throughout the Arab world. And when I |
|
asked if he would be interested in going to Benghazi, where we |
|
had nothing when he first went, where he, you know, bunked up |
|
in a hotel, we didn't have any support to speak of, he was |
|
thrilled. And he understood immediately what it would mean. |
|
In the wake of this tragedy, this terrible terrorist |
|
attack, I think one of the most poignant events has been |
|
overlooked. And that is what happened after the Libyan people, |
|
from Benghazi to Tripoli, learned that Chris Stevens, someone |
|
whom they had gotten to know, whom they trusted and admired, |
|
had been murdered. They went out into the streets. They |
|
protested themselves, thousands, tens of thousands, far more |
|
than the dozens of highly armed, you know, invaders of our |
|
compound and our annex. And they made it clear that that was |
|
not the kind of country they were trying to build. So, in some |
|
ways, Chris' faith after his death was certainly validated. |
|
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
|
Thank you, Madam Secretary. |
|
Chairman Royce. Mr. Smith of New Jersey. |
|
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
|
Welcome, Madam Secretary. You know, we all deeply mourn the |
|
tragic loss of four extraordinarily brave Americans, including |
|
our distinguished Ambassador, Christopher Stevens. But one of |
|
my top concerns is that we seem to be relearning the same |
|
lessons again and again and again. |
|
Madam Secretary, after the August 1998 bombings of U.S. |
|
Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, Admiral Crowe sat exactly |
|
where you sit, that was 13 years ago, and told the subcommittee |
|
that I chaired at the time that, ``In our investigations of the |
|
bombings, the Boards were shocked how similar the lessons |
|
learned were to those drawn by the Inman Commission some 14 |
|
years ago.'' In other words, in 1985. In direct response, I |
|
authored a bipartisan law, the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg |
|
Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act. In it, we had a |
|
title, the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act |
|
of 1999, to upgrade diplomatic security and residences, to |
|
improve threat assessments and facilities, emergency action |
|
plans, security threat lists, perimeter distances, setbacks, |
|
for example, crisis management training, Diplomatic Security |
|
training, rapid response procedures, storage and emergency |
|
equipment, like fire suppressant capabilities, and increased |
|
antiterrorism training in Africa. Before 1998, there were 1,000 |
|
security specialists. Today, there are over 3,100. I agree we |
|
need more. But how present-day security personnel and assets |
|
are deployed are above all a leadership issue. And clearly, we |
|
have and had the Diplomatic Security assets that could have |
|
been deployed to Benghazi. |
|
When it comes to what you knew, Madam Secretary, and what |
|
requests were made of you and the department to beef up |
|
security in Benghazi, there are disturbing parallels to Kenya |
|
and Tanzania. Prior to the East Africa terrorist bombings, U.S. |
|
Ambassador to Kenya Prudence Bushnell repeatedly asked |
|
Secretary Madeleine Albright for more security upgrades. And |
|
the Ambassador's request was rejected. And the loss of life, as |
|
we all know, was horrific. |
|
There are numerous press reports that U.S. Ambassador to |
|
Libya Chris Stevens and his team made repeated requests for |
|
security assistance. So my questions are these: One, you |
|
defined taking responsibility for Benghazi in your testimony a |
|
few moments ago in terms and only in terms of during and after |
|
the terrorist attacks. What about before the attack on |
|
September 11, 2012? What did you personally and your staff |
|
know? When did you become aware of Ambassador Stevens' and his |
|
team's requests for security upgrades? What exactly did you do |
|
in response? You obviously were very close to him. Did he ask |
|
you personally at any time? |
|
When you said a moment ago that Ambassador Pickering's ARB |
|
perhaps didn't think you relevant to be interviewed, you are |
|
the most relevant person of all. You are the leader. You are on |
|
top of it all. So I would join with my colleague Ileana Ros- |
|
Lehtinen; you should have been interviewed, and very important |
|
questions asked. And were you personally in any way at fault? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Well, first, Congressman, I am well |
|
aware of the work that you did after the 1998 bombings. And I |
|
think that work and the legislation that you championed has |
|
been very important in protecting our people around the world. |
|
We have been not only reviewing but continuing to implement the |
|
recommendations of all the former ARBs. And the 18 previous |
|
ARBs resulted in 164 recommendations. And we have been very |
|
clear that the overwhelming majority have been implemented. A |
|
handful of such recommendations were by their very nature |
|
requiring continuous implementation, like what kind of security |
|
upgrades or radio communication was necessary. And there were a |
|
few that were only partially implemented because of some |
|
separate security concerns that that would have raised. |
|
But there was a need for ongoing funding. You remember that |
|
Admiral Crowe said, we wanted $2.2 billion for building |
|
Embassies. We had a number of Embassies that were built in |
|
those early years, thanks to your legislation. Then it petered |
|
off. You know, we put so much time and attention into Iraq and |
|
Afghanistan, trying to make sure that we secured our people |
|
there. We sent a lot of our Diplomatic Security personnel |
|
there. And so we had a slowdown over a number of years in our |
|
ability to build new Inman facilities. And now the latest ARB |
|
is saying, let's get back and do this again because there is no |
|
substitute for it. |
|
Mr. Smith. I am almost out of time, Madam Secretary. When |
|
did you become aware of Ambassador Stevens' request, and how |
|
did you respond to it? And did he ever personally ask you to be |
|
involved? |
|
Secretary Clinton. No, no and---- |
|
Mr. Smith. You didn't get---- |
|
Secretary Clinton. No. That any of the requests, any of the |
|
cables having to do with security did not come to my attention. |
|
Chairman Royce. Mr. Sherman from California. |
|
Mr. Sherman. Madam Secretary, it is a shame that this is |
|
your last appearance before our committee. And I would have |
|
thought that your last appearance would have been a chance for |
|
us to review your outstanding record as one of our great |
|
Secretaries of State, whether it be leading efforts to enforce |
|
sanctions on Iran, your work supporting women's rights around |
|
the world, engaging with civil society and restoring and |
|
maintaining American influence in a very difficult era. I would |
|
have thought that your last hearing would be your chance to |
|
give us some advice for what to do over the next 4 years and |
|
beyond. |
|
I take seriously your very strong advice, because I happen |
|
to agree with it, that it is about time we pass an |
|
authorization bill through both Houses of Congress. But |
|
instead, we are here on, I guess, our third hearing to deal |
|
with the tragic events in Benghazi because it is a chance for |
|
each political party to beat up on the other. We can talk about |
|
how Republicans did not provide you with resources. We can talk |
|
about the administration inside the State Department. |
|
So I would hope that maybe we get you to come back again--I |
|
realize that would be gratis; you wouldn't even be on the |
|
government payroll at that time--and do the hearing that I |
|
would like to have, which is getting your input on the bigger |
|
issues of foreign policy. |
|
Ultimately, the security of our diplomats depends on the |
|
host country. This is all the discussion is about, well, there |
|
might have been five security people on the ground and if only |
|
there had been more funding, more deployment, this cable, that |
|
cable, maybe there would have been eight or nine security |
|
people on the ground, which might have led to more protection, |
|
might have led to more casualties. |
|
And here in Washington, the decision was made to provide |
|
well more than 16 security people to Libya, and nobody that I |
|
know of in Washington was involved in the issue of how many of |
|
those were in Benghazi, either going with the Ambassador or |
|
there in advance. So the decision that all 16 weren't with him |
|
was a decision that you can't blame either political party or |
|
anyone in Washington for. |
|
Ultimately, all we can have at our Embassies is enough to |
|
stave off a militant attack for a few hours. And after that, if |
|
the host country doesn't come to the rescue, it doesn't matter |
|
whether we have 3, 6, 12, 16 or 36 armed guards and Marines at |
|
the location. |
|
One aspect of protecting our diplomats in the future is |
|
bringing to justice the criminals who did this this time. We |
|
did a lot for the people of Libya. We did a lot for those who |
|
are now ruling Libya. How would you appraise their efforts to |
|
cooperate with us in the investigation? And does this Libyan |
|
Government have the will and the capacity to arrest the |
|
suspects involved? And of course, will and capacity tend to go |
|
with each other. I think they would have to, at minimum, strain |
|
their capacity to try to arrest powerful armed elements in the |
|
eastern part of the country, and I don't know if they have the |
|
will to use that capacity. So can you tell us after the attack |
|
and now that we are trying to bring these culprits to justice, |
|
what do you think of the Libyan Government? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Well, I think, Congressman, you drew |
|
exactly the right description; is it will or is it capacity, |
|
when obviously what you need is both? I have found the Libyan |
|
officials to be willing but without capacity. And part of our |
|
challenge is to help them build greater capacity, because now |
|
it is about them. It is not only about what happened to us in |
|
Benghazi, which every official in the Libyan Government was |
|
deeply upset about, but they have their own problems now. They |
|
are having leaders attacked and assassinated on a regular |
|
basis. |
|
So we have to do more to help them build up their security |
|
capacity. And again, I would ask this committee to work with |
|
us; there are holds on a lot of security funding that would go |
|
to Libya to assist them in building capacity. |
|
There are those I know in the Congress who say, look, Libya |
|
is a wealthy nation, we don't need to give them any money. |
|
Well, until they get up and going, it is in our great interest |
|
to give them the resources, like we have with other countries |
|
over the past 40 years. |
|
Chairman Royce. We go to Mr. Rohrabacher of California. |
|
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. |
|
And thank you for being with us today and putting yourself |
|
through this. |
|
Secretary Clinton. Thank you. |
|
Mr. Rohrabacher. Let me just note that fixing |
|
responsibility, which we are trying to do today, and |
|
identifying bad policy and mistakes is the way that democracies |
|
fix problems. It is not all politics. It is how we do things |
|
here to make it better. So none of us have--should at all |
|
apologize for trying to get to the nitty gritty. |
|
Let me just note that Assistant Secretary of State Lamb |
|
testified here in Congress that budget considerations played |
|
absolutely no role in her decision--it was her decision, not |
|
yours, but you approved them--but her decision as to what the |
|
level of security would be there at Benghazi. So any suggestion |
|
that this is a budget issue is off base or political. |
|
Madam Secretary, you told the Senate this morning that you |
|
learned of the attack around 4 o'clock p.m. on that day and you |
|
were involved widely in the coordinated response, which |
|
included the Department of Defense and the White House, but did |
|
not speak to the President until later that evening. When did |
|
you talk to the President? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Two things, on the first point you made, |
|
Congressman, the ARB disagreed and did find that budget issues |
|
were at stake. |
|
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, she testified under oath and---- |
|
Secretary Clinton. Well, you know, that is why you have an |
|
independent group like an ARB. That is why it was created, to |
|
look at everything. |
|
Mr. Rohrabacher. Everybody has their own---- |
|
Secretary Clinton. Right. I think it is important, though, |
|
and I would urge---- |
|
Mr. Rohrabacher. What about when you saw the President, |
|
when did you see the President? |
|
Secretary Clinton. I talked to the President at the end of |
|
the day, but I had been in constant communication with the |
|
National Security Advisor. I had been on secure video |
|
conferences with high level officials in the White House and |
|
the Defense Department. |
|
Mr. Rohrabacher. Secretary Lamb, the lady we are talking |
|
about, did--testified that she had actually witnessed this in |
|
real time, the attack, in real time on a monitor. At any time, |
|
did you see the initial attack on a monitor or the President? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Congressman, there was no monitor. There |
|
was no real time. We got the surveillance videos some weeks |
|
later. That was the first time we saw any video of the attack. |
|
I think there was a misunderstanding. I think that, perhaps, I |
|
am just trying to clarify this--I may be going beyond my brief |
|
here, but I think perhaps what she meant was---- |
|
Mr. Rohrabacher. Was there audio? |
|
Secretary Clinton. She was on an open--she was talking to |
|
DS people, who were trying to understand what was going on. |
|
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right. Well, I would have to say that |
|
Admiral Mullen in briefing us suggested that they had seen some |
|
kind of video and that, within a few moments, it was very clear |
|
that this was a very coordinated terrorist attack and not some |
|
demonstration that had gone awry. |
|
Secretary Clinton. Well, I think surveillance video, which |
|
some of you may have seen in a classified setting, does |
|
demonstrate what happened that night. |
|
Mr. Rohrabacher. As you were dealing with the crisis as it |
|
went on, did you think or act on the basis that this was a film |
|
protest gone out of control, and when you briefed the |
|
President, did you tell him that? Or did you tell him, which |
|
Admiral Mullen suggests you knew by then, that this was a well |
|
planned and executed terrorist attack? Which was the President |
|
told? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Well, first of all, I said the very next |
|
morning that it was an attack by heavily armed militants. The |
|
President said that morning it was an act of terror. At the |
|
same time, however, I was dealing with protests against our |
|
facilities that were clearly connected to that video. So we |
|
were managing a number of such events. |
|
Mr. Rohrabacher. Let's say that you noted, and it can be-- |
|
people do that so you can say that you said it, but the |
|
emphasis we all remember what the emphasis was, over and over |
|
and over again, it was repeated that we had enraged the Islamic |
|
terrorists, which by the way, what--when you say we enraged the |
|
Islamic terrorists, that means we are at fault. They are not at |
|
fault. And then to look and see that the only people I know are |
|
in jail right now is the filmmaker. Isn't this a little |
|
disconcerting? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Well, first, Congressman, I want to be |
|
clear that, of course, it was the terrorist attack. The very |
|
next day I called it an attack by heavily armed militants on |
|
our compound. I think there are still, however, questions about |
|
exactly what caused it, who the attackers were. The ARB, after |
|
months of research, said the picture is still very complicated. |
|
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well---- |
|
Secretary Clinton. I think it is worth members looking a |
|
both the both unclassified and classified ARB with that in |
|
mind. |
|
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you. |
|
Chairman Royce. Mr. Meeks of New York. |
|
Mr. Meeks. I thank the chair. |
|
Madam Secretary, let me first thank you. First of all, I |
|
want to thank you for an extraordinary daughter who came to the |
|
Rockaways after Sandy, just helping people, unannounced, |
|
without fanfare, just getting down and helping people because |
|
they needed help after that terrible storm. And so just |
|
extraordinary public service. |
|
And then I want to also say, Madam Secretary, that you have |
|
been Secretary of State at an extraordinary time in the history |
|
of the United States of America and the world, and you have |
|
managed the challenge in an equally extraordinary manner. |
|
When you took the job, America had a tarnished image |
|
abroad. You have revised our brand, traveled over 1 million |
|
miles to the furthest reaches of the world, to the most |
|
challenging areas, and touched the lives of the most |
|
vulnerable. With your leadership of initiatives like the QDDR, |
|
you have deepened our confidence that foreign aid can be |
|
responsibly spent. On behalf of a grateful Nation and |
|
definitely the people of the Fifth Congressional District, I |
|
want to thank you for a job well done. |
|
The attacks on our mission in Benghazi were a painful |
|
reminder to all of us that our diplomats of course are in |
|
harm's way. And they are in some of the same unstable and even |
|
hostile environments as our military. Yet they don't have the |
|
same means of protecting themselves. And sadly, we go back, and |
|
we have talked, and I know at this committee I heard Admiral |
|
Mullen and Ambassador Pickering saying that money was and the |
|
budget is very important and makes a difference. Yet, sadly, |
|
this House has failed to do its part in addressing the |
|
challenges they face, even after the tragedy of the Benghazi |
|
attacks. |
|
You, however have been responsible and accepted the |
|
recommendations of the ARB and put measures in place |
|
immediately after the September attacks that demonstrate that |
|
you are serious about changing the status quo. But, of course, |
|
again, it is a two-way street. Congress failed to act in a |
|
meaningful way. And I believe it is a shame on the leadership |
|
for its failure to give the State Department the authority to |
|
transfer already appropriated funds, not new money, already |
|
money that you have toward bolstering security for our |
|
diplomats to give you that discretion. And shame on the House |
|
for its failing to adequately fund the administration's request |
|
for diplomatic security funding. |
|
Now, I hope that this Congress will act swiftly to fix |
|
these critical funding matters. |
|
It is also my hope, as you have said, that we finally have |
|
a State authorization bill that the President can sign into |
|
law. |
|
But let me ask you this question, at the time of the |
|
Benghazi attacks, you indicated, there were risings going on in |
|
Egypt and in Yemen and in Tunisia. It seems as though a lot, |
|
because no one could have imagined and I am sure you did not |
|
when you initially took office, that we would have the Arab |
|
Spring and the nature of what was going on in these various |
|
countries would have happened. |
|
I want to ask you a question, somewhat what Mr. Sherman was |
|
asking, just to get your thoughts, on what we might do as |
|
Members of Congress and how we might move forward with the |
|
nations of the Arab Spring so that maybe that is a way we can |
|
prevent these kinds of things from happening in the future. |
|
Secretary Clinton. Well, it is an excellent question, |
|
Congressman, and deserves a very thoughtful answer, longer than |
|
the time I have. |
|
But let me just make three quick points: First, we cannot |
|
retreat from, give up on, turn our backs on these new Arab |
|
Spring revolutionary countries and new regimes. They are very |
|
new. Most of them have leaders that have never run anything. |
|
They have come from backgrounds where they are suspicious of |
|
security, because security was a dirty word; it through them in |
|
jail. It harassed themselves and their families. So we have to |
|
do some work, and that work requires that we stay engaged. |
|
Secondly, we have to do a much better job in helping |
|
rebuild security apparatus that can be used. Quick example, we |
|
had a terrible assault on our Embassy in Tunis, and I called |
|
the President of Tunisia; I said, you have got to send |
|
reinforcements right now. Our Embassy is going to be overrun. |
|
He sent it. It stopped. The government really has been |
|
responsive, understanding that, you know, these terrorists, |
|
these extremists, don't just threaten us in Western countries. |
|
They threaten the stability and the future of these |
|
governments. So we have to help them the way we helped Colombia |
|
years ago. |
|
And finally, we need do a better job conveying a counter |
|
narrative to the extremist jihadist narrative. You know, I have |
|
said this to this committee before, a lot of new members on it, |
|
we have abdicated the broadcasting arena. Yes, we have private |
|
stations, CNN, FOX, NBC, all of that. They are out there. They |
|
convey information. But we are not doing what we did during the |
|
Cold War, our Broadcasting Board of Governors is practically |
|
defunct in terms of its capacity to be able to tell a message |
|
around the world. So we are abdicating the ideological arena, |
|
and we need to get back into it. |
|
We have the best values. We have the best narrative. Most |
|
people in the world just want to have a good decent life that |
|
is supported by a good decent job and raise their families. And |
|
we are letting the jihadist narrative fill a void. We need to |
|
get in there and compete, and we can do it successfully. |
|
Chairman Royce. Mr. Chabot of Ohio. |
|
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
|
Madam Secretary, first, let me thank you for your service, |
|
and I wish you the best in your future endeavors, mostly. |
|
I have a couple of questions, but I do want to take a |
|
moment or two to say a couple of words about our late |
|
Ambassador Chris Stevens. Many members and staff on our |
|
committee have had the opportunity to know and to work with |
|
him, even before he was named our U.S. Ambassador to Libya. I |
|
think all would agree that he was one of our most able |
|
diplomats. I had the opportunity to meet with him in Tripoli a |
|
little less than a month before he and three other outstanding |
|
Americans were murdered in Benghazi. His enthusiasm for the job |
|
was really something to behold. He was excited about the |
|
opportunity to help a nation newly freed from decades of brutal |
|
dictatorship. |
|
My first night in country, I had the opportunity to join |
|
the Ambassador for an IFTAR dinner with a number of newly |
|
elected Libyan parliamentarians. They were optimistic about |
|
building a democracy, creating a vibrant economy, and restoring |
|
fundamental human rights for the Libyan people. He was as |
|
enthusiastic as they were about the prospects. There is no |
|
question that he will be missed by all who knew him and worked |
|
with him. |
|
One of the things that really troubles me, Madam Secretary, |
|
is the hoops that we on this committee have had to jump through |
|
to get to the facts surrounding the deaths of these public |
|
servants. The State Department has delayed and delayed coming |
|
forth with information. When this committee was finally |
|
presented with relevant data, it amounted often times to what |
|
might be called a document dump--hundreds of pages of paper in |
|
wide disarray, in no particular order, either in terms of |
|
relevance or in chronology, often duplicates in different |
|
binders, making it very difficult to locate documents that were |
|
of any help. |
|
Our public servants in Libya were murdered on September 11. |
|
It is now January 23, more than 4 months later. It is |
|
unacceptable that the State Department has made it so difficult |
|
for Congress to exercise its oversight responsibility. |
|
Now a couple of questions. Within a couple of months of the |
|
attack, during the July-August period, Ambassador Stevens |
|
expressed concern about militia activity, particularly in |
|
Benghazi, and the need for additional security assistance. We |
|
have seen the cables where security officers on the ground |
|
expressed considerable frustration at the difficulty in getting |
|
the personnel they believed were needed to protect American |
|
diplomats and property. And we now know that management of |
|
security personal, especially the assignment of State |
|
Department agents on very short-term duty, virtually |
|
guaranteeing very limited institutional knowledge was grossly |
|
inadequate. Why was the department hierarchy so obstinate, and |
|
why would the department deny a personal plea from Ambassador |
|
Stevens? Given his expertise on Libyan affairs, why did the |
|
department and senior leadership not take into consideration |
|
the approaching September 11 anniversary, particularly in light |
|
of direct requests from our mission in Libya? |
|
And finally, Madam Secretary, we heard numerous times over |
|
the last several months that more funding is needed for |
|
diplomatic security, including in your testimony before the |
|
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and to some extent this |
|
afternoon. I don't believe there is anybody in this room who |
|
doesn't want to protect our diplomats stationed abroad, often |
|
in very dangerous regions. |
|
Since 2000, Congress has provided funding in the |
|
neighborhood of $10 billion for Embassy security construction |
|
and maintenance. We will no doubt continue to provide |
|
significant funding in the future. Given that our Nation now |
|
faces a mountain of debt, sadly I might add, given short |
|
shrift, I have to say, by the President in his Inaugural |
|
address, of course means that we cannot fund every single |
|
program that every Federal agency requests. So when we increase |
|
funding in one area, we have to consider cuts in others, at |
|
least that is the way it should work. Is the State Department |
|
currently conducting any internal reviews, for example, to |
|
determine what offsets in current program funding might be |
|
considered? |
|
Finally, I know that some have been pedaling this story |
|
that it's Congress' fault for not providing sufficient funding |
|
for security. I would just note that Robert Baldre, your chief |
|
financial officer for diplomatic security stated, and I quote, |
|
``I do not feel that we have ever been at a point where we have |
|
sacrificed security due to lack of funding.'' |
|
I know that I have used my 5 minutes, so I would appreciate |
|
your remarks. |
|
Chairman Royce. The gentleman from Ohio has used his 5 |
|
minutes, and if we want to get through the members, we are |
|
going to have to hold to those 5 minutes. |
|
So I will just ask for a response in writing, and we will |
|
go down to Mr. Deutch from Florida. |
|
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
|
We won't have to wait long, because those are some good |
|
questions that I will take up in a moment. |
|
Secretary Clinton, first, I would like to thank you for the |
|
truly remarkable job that you have done as Secretary of State. |
|
You have represented the interests of this Nation |
|
magnificently. And I, for one, hope that after a bit of rest, |
|
you will consider a return to public service, and should that |
|
return bring to you Florida, I would look forward to welcoming |
|
you there. |
|
I would be remiss if I did not take this opportunity to |
|
once again thank you for your efforts on behalf of my |
|
constituent Robert Levinson, who went missing in Iran in 2007, |
|
now 2,147 days ago. And I ask that the department continue to |
|
do everything that it can to return Robert to his family. |
|
I also want to thank you for the ways that you have handled |
|
the tragic events in Benghazi. Your personal commitment to |
|
ensuring that those Americans who serve American interests |
|
overseas, often at great risk to themselves, is a testament to |
|
the commitment that you have shown throughout your tenure at |
|
State to strengthen our diplomatic efforts around the world. |
|
And I would like to return to Mr. Chabot's question. There |
|
is an awful a lot of debate here on the Hill about how we spend |
|
our dollars. We all recognize that we have budgetary concerns; |
|
we also recognize that we have an obligation to provide |
|
security and to protect American personnel abroad. As we have |
|
ended our military operations in Iraq, as we wind down in |
|
Afghanistan, what kind of--I would like to ask, what kind of |
|
strain will the presence of less military personnel in the |
|
region put on diplomatic security? Let's start with that. |
|
Secretary Clinton. That is a very important question that |
|
we are really going to have to grapple with together I would |
|
hope. We saw, for example, that when our troops withdrew from |
|
Iraq, it dramatically altered what our civilians were capable |
|
of being able to do, because there had been, over the course of |
|
the war in Iraq, a very good working relationship between DoD, |
|
State and USAID. We are going to face the same kind of |
|
questions in Afghanistan as our troops draw down from |
|
Afghanistan, and in a lot of these places, we don't have |
|
military resources. The Department of Defense was a very good |
|
partner to us in responding to Benghazi, but their assets were |
|
too far away to make much difference in any timely fashion. |
|
AFRICOM was stood up 10 years ago. I think that is going to |
|
look quite prescient because we are going to need to figure out |
|
how to work more effectively together between our civilian and |
|
military assets in Africa, and I think that would be a worthy |
|
subject of this committee, perhaps working with the Armed |
|
Services Committee, because it is often difficult. |
|
In my 4 years, we tried to work out more cooperative |
|
relationship, more funding streams between State and DoD, in |
|
order to be able to maximize the cooperation between us. |
|
Mr. Deutch. When you talk about the need to prioritize, |
|
because of shortfalls, more Marine security guards, talk about |
|
construction budgets and upgrades, what does that mean? What |
|
are the decisions that have to be made, and how do they |
|
actually impact our diplomatic personnel? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Well, first and foremost, we have to do |
|
the right job prioritizing, based on the resources we do have. |
|
And I would be the first to say, it is not all about money, but |
|
it is also not without budgetary consequences. And so we have |
|
to figure out what is the right balance. |
|
Secondly, immediately after this happened, I spoke with |
|
Secretary Panetta, Chairman Dempsey and asked the Defense |
|
Department to work with us in putting together Interagency |
|
Security Assessment Teams to go out and look at our high-threat |
|
posts because our military brings a different perspective, and |
|
that was a very important process, which we are going to |
|
continue. |
|
We are also looking to see how we can better cooperate on |
|
the security aid that we give to other countries. It has got to |
|
be a combination of both military assets and expertise, but |
|
also development, rule of law, democracy building. It can't be |
|
one or the other. They have to be married together. |
|
Mr. Deutch. And if you could, in the few seconds we have |
|
left, Madam Secretary, could you speak more broadly about the |
|
important role that that would play? In this budget debate that |
|
is going to take place, why is it so important for us to |
|
continue to fund this? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Well, let me just give you an example, |
|
Colombia. Colombia, 15, 20 years ago, was in a very difficult |
|
state. It had an insurgency. It had a drug cartel that was |
|
basically controlling territory. The United States stepped in, |
|
worked with the Colombians, and the progress, I think, is |
|
evident for all to see. There was a front page article in the |
|
travel section about go to Medellin. That is what America can |
|
do. We don't do it ourselves. We partner with willing |
|
governments to help them acquire the capacity to protect their |
|
own citizens. |
|
Chairman Royce. We will go to Mr. Joe Wilson of South |
|
Carolina. |
|
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
|
And Madam Secretary, thank you for being here today, and I |
|
particularly appreciate your recognition of AFRICOM, and Plan |
|
Colombia. Indeed, these have been extraordinary success stories |
|
promoting peace throughout the world. |
|
The American people will always appreciate as American |
|
heroes, Chris Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods and Glen |
|
Doherty. |
|
As we begin, I do want to point out, though, for the |
|
record, I believe that Congressman Rohrabacher is correct; |
|
there was an e-mail from the Chief Financial Officer for |
|
Diplomatic Security following the Benghazi attack, |
|
specifically, ``Although diplomatic security has been fiscally |
|
prudent, I do not feel that we have ever been at a point where |
|
we sacrificed security due to a lack of funding.'' That |
|
actually is an attribute to you, and I have faith in the chief |
|
financial officer that it is a correct statement. |
|
As we begin, it has been reported that since you managed |
|
the response to Benghazi attack, why weren't you the person to |
|
appear on the Sunday shows immediately following the attack? |
|
Ambassador Susan Rice said that you declined. Was that correct? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Well, I have to confess here in public, |
|
going on the Sunday shows is not my favorite thing to do. There |
|
are other things that I would prefer to do on Sunday mornings. |
|
And, you know, I haven't been on a Sunday show in way over |
|
year. So it just isn't something that I normally jump to do. |
|
And I did feel strongly that we had a lot that we had to |
|
manage, that I had to respond to, and I thought that is what |
|
should be my priority. |
|
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. And I believe that part of |
|
the priority is telling correct information. And you could have |
|
done that, and I think it was very unfortunate--the multiple |
|
appearances by Ambassador Rice with information that has been |
|
discovered not to be correct. |
|
In the November 21, 2012, edition of the Charleston Post |
|
and Courier a letter was published by William J. Boudreau, a |
|
retired Foreign Service Officer of Seabrook Island. He wrote, |
|
|
|
``Within the U.S. State Department, there is an office |
|
known as Op Center. It is located in the Office of the |
|
Secretary of State. It is staffed around the clock, 24/ |
|
7, by seasoned Foreign Service Officers. Its function |
|
is to be sensitive to any threat to American interests |
|
wherever they might arise. The Op Center has direct |
|
secure communication lines to the White House Situation |
|
Room, the National Military Command Center at the |
|
Pentagon and, the CIA's Op Center. Having worked as a |
|
watch officer at the Op Center, I know that any |
|
information that indicates a threat to the safety of |
|
American citizens overseas is passed to other agencies |
|
mentioned above. If it is of significant message |
|
concerning American interest is received, it is the |
|
watch officer's job to ensure that these other agencies |
|
are informed.'' |
|
|
|
He goes on, there are many questions that need to be |
|
answered, and I would like to present these questions on his |
|
behalf. First and foremost, what was going on at the Op Center |
|
at the State Department in Washington while our consulate was |
|
under attack for 7 hours? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Well, we can certainly give you greater |
|
detail, but the Op Center is, as you have described, the place |
|
where communications go in and out. They were placing calls. |
|
They were receiving calls. They were deeply engaged in trying |
|
to help us. They don't reach out on their own, but to help us |
|
acquire information so that we could respond in real time. |
|
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. And 7 hours, I mean, goodness |
|
gracious, there should have been a response. Why the delay in |
|
labeling the attack as terrorism when it was immediately known |
|
that it was. |
|
Secretary Clinton. Well, you know, again, I would say, |
|
Congressman, that we described the attack, I described the |
|
attack the next morning; the President called it an act of |
|
terror. There with a, as you will find in reading both the |
|
unclassified and classified version of the ARB, there was a lot |
|
of questions about who was behind it, what motivated it, and |
|
the ARB says those questions are still not fully answered |
|
today. |
|
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. And he continues, why weren't |
|
Marine guards posted in Benghazi in the first place? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Because historically Marine guards are |
|
at posts where there is classified information. Marine guards |
|
have not historically had the responsibility for protecting |
|
personnel. Their job is to protect and, if necessary, destroy |
|
classified material. At our compound, there was no classified |
|
material. |
|
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. He continues in line with |
|
everybody else pointing out that there were requests to enhance |
|
security that were denied. We weren't able to reach all the |
|
questions, but I appreciate your responding to Mr. Boudreau's |
|
questions. I will submit them for the record to your office for |
|
a written response. |
|
Secretary Clinton. Thank you, Congressman. |
|
Chairman Royce. Karen Bass of California. |
|
Ms. Bass. Thank you very much. |
|
Thank you, Chairman Royce and Ranking Member Engel, for |
|
convening this hearing. |
|
Secretary Clinton, I want to take the time to thank you for |
|
your willingness to come before this committee for the final |
|
time. And I want to offer my sincere and deep gratitude for |
|
your remarkable service to our Nation. I am also very glad to |
|
know that you are feeling much better. |
|
For the past 4 years and well before, you have put country |
|
first, and for that, our Nation is indebted to you. With |
|
confidence and careful consideration, you have shown |
|
extraordinary leadership on countless issues, ensuring that |
|
diplomacy is an essential part of our country's foreign policy. |
|
And your tireless effort to elevate women and girls' rights is |
|
without comparison. You have strengthened our State Department, |
|
made it better today than when you arrived. |
|
As the ranking member on the Africa Subcommittee, I am |
|
especially appreciative of the attention you have given to the |
|
54 nations of Africa. While Africa may lose one of its most |
|
steadfast and dedicated champions at the State Department, I |
|
trust Africa will not be far from your thoughts and will remain |
|
a top priority in your future work. |
|
I also want to associate my comments with Congressman |
|
Sherman, who said that it is unfortunate that it is the last |
|
time we will hear from you, so I want to focus my time on |
|
moving us forward and asking your advice. You made reference in |
|
your testimony about best-value contracts and you mentioned, I |
|
believe, several nations where best-value contracts are not |
|
used. And in thinking about Africa and the instability in a |
|
number of nations in Northern Africa, Central Africa, Mali, |
|
what we are dealing with now, I want to know whether or not |
|
those nations are subject to those types of contracts and |
|
whether or not exemptions or waivers should be made, what |
|
should we do? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Congresswoman, thank you very much for |
|
your emphasis on Africa, which I think is going to be |
|
increasingly important. There are only three nations where the |
|
State Department has an exemption by Congress for using |
|
different contracting rules in order to get the best value for |
|
our country. Those are Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, so |
|
every other country in the world we are under the kind of |
|
contracting rules that I think do interfere with our capacity |
|
to get the best deal, particularly when it comes to security, |
|
that we should in these countries where the threats, |
|
unfortunately, are going to always be with us. |
|
Ms. Bass. Should we look to extend that to Mali, to the |
|
DRC, to Somalia? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Well, I would certainly recommend--there |
|
was an article in I think one of the newspapers today that went |
|
into some detail--basically, here is how it started, for more |
|
than two decades, Federal laws required the State Department to |
|
select the cheapest rather than the best contractor to provide |
|
local guard services at its Embassies abroad. And you know, |
|
there is that old saying, you get what you pay for. And this |
|
lowest-price provision started off in 1990, but it has just |
|
stayed with us, and I would respectfully request that this |
|
committee take a hard look at it. |
|
You can't do a total lifting of it for everybody, at least |
|
look at the high-threat posts, where, obviously, we did it for |
|
Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the countries you are |
|
naming are countries that I think would fall into that |
|
category. |
|
Ms. Bass. Well, thank you very much. |
|
Among the various Islamic extremist groups operating in |
|
Africa today AQIM, al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, to name a few, in |
|
your view, which pose the greatest threats, direct threat to |
|
the United States? And then, given the limited capacity and, in |
|
some cases, the limited political will of the countries in |
|
which these groups operate, are U.S. military, intelligence and |
|
security assistance resources devoted to these threats |
|
adequately or appropriately balanced? And what recommendations |
|
would you have for us? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Well, I think if you are focusing just |
|
on North Africa, al-Qaeda is a brand name, as much as an |
|
organization, people wake up, they form these jihadist groups, |
|
they then claim to be associated with, somehow affiliated with |
|
al-Qaeda in order to gain some credibility with local people, |
|
as well as beyond. |
|
I think that we have to take seriously all of these |
|
terrorist groups, whatever they call themselves. Now, at the |
|
moment, they don't necessarily have either the interest or the |
|
ability to attack our homeland, but we have a lot of |
|
facilities. We have lot of assets in North Africa. We just saw |
|
Americans killed and held hostage at a gas facility because we |
|
do business all over that continent. So I think we have to take |
|
a hard look at all of them and constantly be upping our |
|
military and intelligence and diplomatic assets to deal with |
|
them. |
|
Ms. Bass. Thank you very much. |
|
Chairman Royce. I would like to just take a moment and |
|
explain to the gentlelady, we passed last year the best-value |
|
contract language that you are speaking of in the House |
|
appropriations measure. We are going to try to get our |
|
colleagues in the Senate to take that measure up. |
|
We go down to Mr. McCaul from Texas. |
|
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
|
Welcome, Madam Secretary. Thank you for your service. |
|
Similar to September 11, 2001, there were warning signs |
|
prior to Benghazi September 11. There was an April 6, 2012, |
|
crude IED thrown over the wall of the U.S. Facility in |
|
Benghazi. On May 22, 2012, Red Cross building in Benghazi hit |
|
by two RPGs. The brigades of the imprisoned Blind Sheikh took |
|
responsibility for that attack. On June 6, 2012, U.S. consulate |
|
in Benghazi was targeted by an IED, an attack that blew a hole |
|
in the perimeter wall. Again, the Blind Sheikh brigade took |
|
credit. And then, on August 16, we had this cable that has been |
|
widely reported, a classified State Department cable warning |
|
that the Benghazi consulate could not withstand a coordinated |
|
attack. And the regional security officer believed our |
|
consulate could not be protected at an emergency meeting less |
|
than 1 month before the attack on 9/11. A contingency plan was |
|
supposedly drafted to move the operations to the CIA annex |
|
about a mile away from the compound. This cable was presumed to |
|
have been shared by senior staff. It was sent to your office. |
|
It was sent to the NSC. And even on September 11, the day that |
|
Ambassador Stevens was killed, he personally warned about |
|
``growing problems with security in Benghazi and growing |
|
frustration with security forces and the Libyan police.'' Were |
|
you aware of this cable, this August 16 cable? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Congressman, that cable did not come to |
|
my attention. I have made it very clear that the security |
|
cables did not come to my attention or above the assistant |
|
Secretary level where the ARB placed responsibility; whereas I |
|
think Ambassador Pickering said, the rubber hit the road. Now I |
|
think---- |
|
Mr. McCaul. Can I ask, when were you aware of this cable? |
|
Secretary Clinton. After the ARB began to gather |
|
information and material. |
|
Mr. McCaul. Who within your office did see this cable? |
|
Secretary Clinton. I am not aware of anyone within my |
|
office, within the Secretary's Office having seen the cable. |
|
Mr. McCaul. Within the National Security Council. |
|
Secretary Clinton. I have no information or awareness of |
|
anyone in the National Security Council having seen that cable. |
|
Mr. McCaul. Was this cable a surprise to you? |
|
Secretary Clinton. You know, Congressman, it was very |
|
disappointing to me that the ARB concluded there were |
|
inadequacies and problems in the responsiveness of our team |
|
here in Washington to the security requests that were made by |
|
our team in Libya. And I was not aware of that going on. It was |
|
not brought to my attention, but obviously, it is something we |
|
are fixing and intend to put into place protocols and systems |
|
to make sure it doesn't happen again. |
|
Mr. McCaul. I certainly hope so. I think when you have a |
|
United States Ambassador personally warning about the situation |
|
over there, sending this cable to your office---- |
|
Secretary Clinton. If I could, 1.43 million cables a year |
|
come to the State Department. They are all addressed to me. |
|
They do not all come to me. They are sorted through the |
|
bureaucracy. |
|
Mr. McCaul. Certainly somebody within your office should |
|
have seen this cable, in my judgment. Could I ask one last |
|
question? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Also, I just want to clarify, you know, |
|
with regard to the security requests subsequent to the August |
|
16 cable, our personnel in Libya had not submitted any |
|
additional security requests to Washington at the time of the |
|
September 11 attack. Now there was an ongoing dialogue, as you |
|
know, between Libya and Washington. |
|
Mr. McCaul. Reclaiming my time, it is very limited. An |
|
emergency meeting was held and a cable sent out on August 16 by |
|
the Ambassador himself, warning what could happen. And this |
|
cable went unnoticed by your office. That is the bottom line. |
|
Secretary Clinton. Well, the facts as we have them, |
|
Congressman, and I will be happy to have people give you this |
|
in detail, the August 16 cable stated that security requests |
|
for Benghazi would be forthcoming. The RSO in Benghazi |
|
submitted to Tripoli a preliminary list of proposed security |
|
recommendations on August 23, but no requests were submitted to |
|
Washington before the attacks. Now this sounds very |
|
complicated, and to some extent, it is. We are trying to |
|
simplify it and avoid the kind of problems that are identified. |
|
Mr. McCaul. One last question, why was he in Benghazi on |
|
September 11? |
|
Chairman Royce. Go down to---- |
|
Mr. McCaul. I will submit that in writing. |
|
Chairman Royce. That will be fine. |
|
We are going to go now to Mr. William Keating of |
|
Massachusetts. |
|
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
|
You know, I must say that after the tragedy last September, |
|
one of the things that just moved me so much were the comments |
|
of the family members of one of the heroes who lost their |
|
lives, Glen Doherty in Massachusetts. Paraphrasing them, but |
|
they told people they shouldn't lose sight over who was |
|
ultimately responsible for these deaths and made a statement |
|
putting things into perspective here. And the other thing they |
|
mentioned was, do not lose sight of the causes that these men |
|
gave their lives for. |
|
And as a person who has advanced those causes, I want to |
|
thank you for your incredible service as Secretary of State. |
|
Now, one of the parts of the ARB report that is of great |
|
concern to me dealt with what they described as a culture of |
|
austerity in the State Department. |
|
Madam Secretary, can you take a few moments an expand on |
|
the ARB's finding on that subject and how it affects the State |
|
Department's ability to carry out crucial tasks, not just |
|
security but all crucial tasks? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Well, Congressman, that is what the ARB |
|
found. They found that there was a culture of husbanding |
|
resources, of being quite concerned about responding, even on |
|
security, as important as security is, because one never knows |
|
what the budget is going to be going forward. |
|
And we have had some ups and downs budgetary wise going |
|
back, as I said, into prior administrations, but it is fair to |
|
say that many of the professionals in the State Department have |
|
really gotten used to worrying greatly that they will give |
|
something to somebody, and that will become an expectation that |
|
will then have to be taken away. And it did affect the security |
|
professional's decisions according to the ARB. |
|
Mr. Keating. These prioritizations, in my opinion, in this |
|
culture has to change, not just for security reasons but our |
|
overall mission. Just quickly, with the crisis in Mali and the |
|
insurgency there and spreading jihadist threat in Northern |
|
Africa, Maghreb, and the Arabian Peninsula. In that area, they |
|
are relatively technologically advanced, and there are threats |
|
that go along those lines that I am concerned about in terms of |
|
cultural austerity there as well. |
|
Cyber threats and other security upgrades that are going to |
|
be vitally necessary, and I hope those things are not lost as |
|
we review this situation. Can you just comment on what we need |
|
in that regard going forward and how much of a threat that may |
|
pose to us? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Well, you mention a word that is rarely |
|
mentioned in these hearings but I predict will be a major |
|
threat to us and that is ``cyber'' because it is not only going |
|
to be nation states, where we already are seeing cyber |
|
intrusions, both against our Government and against our private |
|
sector. But increasingly, nonstate actors will have more |
|
capacity to disrupt, to hack into, to put out false |
|
information, to accuse the United States of things that can |
|
light fires before we can put them out. |
|
So I think it is important we have a really thoughtful |
|
comprehensive review about the threats of today and the threats |
|
of tomorrow, and that will help guide the committee. It will |
|
help guide the Senate and certainly the administration in |
|
working together to answer them. |
|
Mr. Keating. Thank you and--thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
|
I think I am going to do something that hasn't been done |
|
yet; I am going to yield back the rest of my time. |
|
Chairman Royce. We go now to Mr. Poe of Texas. |
|
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
|
Madam Secretary, thank you, once again, for your service to |
|
our country. |
|
Gordon Rowan from Oregon; Frederick Buttaccio from Katy, |
|
Texas; and Victor Lovelady from my district of Atascocita, |
|
Texas. Three Americans, overseas killed, not in Benghazi, but |
|
killed at a remote gas facility in Algeria. Killed, in my |
|
opinion, because they were Americans. Over the last weekend, |
|
myself and others have tried to get information. I will just |
|
say that there is too much, in my opinion, red tape while |
|
trying to get just basic information to the families as to what |
|
happened in a situation like that. I would hope that the State |
|
Department would look at that protocol and try to streamline |
|
it, because people died. |
|
The Algerian Government now reports, after they have |
|
captured some of the terrorists alive, some claiming to be from |
|
Egypt. One says that, after interrogation by the Algerian |
|
Government, whatever that interrogation may entail, that there |
|
were Egyptians involved in the Benghazi attack that were at the |
|
attack on the gas plant in Algeria. At the time of the Benghazi |
|
attack, Ansar al Sharia the next day--a terrorist group, as you |
|
know--they claimed responsibility for the attack. We probably |
|
don't know if the statements made by the Algeria or, excuse me, |
|
Egyptian terrorist that was captured are true, if Egyptians |
|
were followed or were involved in that attack or not. It does |
|
seem to show that the whole region is very fluid with different |
|
groups getting together, causing mischief throughout the entire |
|
region. |
|
As of today, several months later after the attack in |
|
Benghazi, has, to your knowledge, any person been put currently |
|
in custody anywhere, by any government, for the responsibility |
|
or as a suspect involved in the Benghazi attack? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Congressman, there is one potential |
|
suspect, who has been placed under monitoring by the Tunisian |
|
Government. There are other suspects that the FBI are both |
|
closely following and consulting with partner governments. |
|
I think, based on my last conversation with Director |
|
Muller, which was just a few days ago, he went to Libya. He |
|
went to Tunisia. He believes that the investigation is |
|
proceeding. I know that the FBI has been up on the Hill doing |
|
classified briefings with certain committees; I don't know |
|
about this committee. But I certainly hope that the FBI is able |
|
to investigate, identify and hold responsible those who waged |
|
this attack against us. And I think that, based on their work, |
|
they feel that they are pursuing some very positive leads. |
|
Mr. Poe. Okay. My understanding is the Tunisian--the person |
|
that was held in Tunisia was held by a judge there, and that |
|
person has been released. So, basically, we don't really know |
|
at this point who did it. |
|
Secretary Clinton. Well, Congressman, I confirmed with |
|
Director Muller, who was just in Tunisia meeting with their |
|
high officials, that this person is basically under law |
|
enforcement surveillance and forbidden to leave Tunis. Director |
|
Muller told me that that had been confirmed to him by the |
|
Tunisians. |
|
Mr. Poe. Just very briefly, we don't know who--no one has |
|
been held accountable, charged with this event. Before Ghadafi |
|
was taken out, my understanding is the nation of Qatar shipped |
|
in 18 shipments, 20,000 tons of weapons, machine guns, RPGs |
|
into the region to help different groups overthrow Omar |
|
Ghadafi. Did the United States give a wink and a nod to this? |
|
And I would like a written answer to that, Mr. Chairman. |
|
Chairman Royce. We will go now to Mr. Cicilline from Rhode |
|
Island. |
|
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
|
Thank you, Madam Secretary, for your extraordinary service |
|
to our country, that has earned you the deep respect and |
|
admiration of people all over the world and has enhanced |
|
America's standing all over the globe. |
|
Your leadership on women's issues, LGBT equality, |
|
supporting emerging democracies and enhancing American national |
|
security are too numerous to list. But I want to begin by |
|
thanking you for all of your hard work in everything you have |
|
done in service of our country. |
|
Thank you also for your testimony today. The terrorist |
|
attacks on September 11 in Benghazi, Libya resulted in the |
|
tragic deaths of Ambassador Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods |
|
and Glen Doherty. And these are constant reminders of the |
|
dangerous work that our diplomats engage in every single day |
|
all throughout the world. And while we cannot eliminate all |
|
risks, it is our duty to enact protocols and policies that will |
|
reduce these risks and to provide all the resources and support |
|
necessary to help mitigate and manage those risks. |
|
With that in mind, I hope my colleagues will consider the |
|
Accountability Review Board, which you, Madam Secretary, |
|
convened, and it calls for, and I quote, ``A more serious and |
|
sustained commitment from Congress to support State Department |
|
needs.'' This is particularly important, given the implications |
|
that the looming sequester as well as potential government |
|
shutdown would have on our diplomatic security, especially in |
|
high-risk posts. |
|
I also want to take a moment to commend and thank Admiral |
|
Mullen and Ambassador Pickering for the comprehensive and |
|
prompt review that they conducted and, of course, applaud you, |
|
Madam Secretary, for the adoption of all 29 ARB recommendations |
|
and for promptly undertaking that implementation and providing |
|
guidance on the status of that implementation here today. |
|
And just to say, there has been some discuss about the |
|
importance of getting to the nitty gritty and fixing problems, |
|
and I hope that we will rely on the security professionals and |
|
the expert advice and recommendations of the ARB. I think they |
|
are much more likely to produce the best response to what needs |
|
to be undertaken. |
|
And so I want to ask you, Madam Secretary, one of the |
|
things that you did, in anticipation of some of the |
|
recommendations, you created for the first time ever a |
|
Diplomatic Security Deputy Assistant Secretary, and I think, |
|
with respect to the ARB report, the importance of examining the |
|
State Department's organization and management as it relates to |
|
security planning, my expectation is that that would be one of |
|
the responsibilities of this new position. I am wondering if |
|
you would just tell us a little bit about the role of this new |
|
Secretary within the bureau, what responsibilities the position |
|
will have, and will this individual in particular have the |
|
authority to reallocate resources in order to fill potential |
|
resource gaps if that is one of the challenges they will face? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Thank you, Congressman, this is a Deputy |
|
Assistant Secretary for High-Threat Posts. I want one person |
|
held accountable, looking at high-threat posts talking to our |
|
military and intelligence partners, being a voice at the table, |
|
not just for all 275 posts but really zeroing in on a real-time |
|
constant evaluation about what our high-threat posts need. |
|
But in addition to that, we are going to continue our work |
|
with the Defense Department and Interagency Security Assessment |
|
to threats. I am also for the first time elevating a lot of |
|
these security issues for high-threat posts to the Secretary |
|
level because it hasn't been there before, and I think, given |
|
what we have experienced, it needs to be. We are also looking |
|
for the transfer authority to add to our Marine security |
|
guards, our construction, and our diplomatic security. We are |
|
enhancing the training for everyone. |
|
And we are taking a hard look at another problem that it |
|
the ARB pointed out and that was other temporary duty |
|
assignments. You know, very often, given especially the |
|
experiences we have had in Iraq and Afghanistan and to a lesser |
|
extent in some other large posts, we have a lot of our most |
|
experienced diplomatic security people going there. I mean, you |
|
know, in the--two times we have had serious assaults on our |
|
Embassy in Kabul. Kabul is fortified. Kabul has ISAF troops |
|
across the street. As they draw down, we have to recognize that |
|
the danger is not going to leave with our ISAF military. So we |
|
have to take a hard look at all of this and we have to embed |
|
that responsibility in this new experienced Deputy Assistant |
|
Secretary to do that. |
|
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Madam Secretary. |
|
I yield back, Mr. Chairman. |
|
Chairman Royce. Matt Salmon of Arizona. |
|
Mr. Salmon. Thank you. |
|
Madam Secretary, I appreciate your desire to come before |
|
our committee today to testify and answer questions to help us |
|
make the changes necessary to ensure the safety of all of our |
|
Foreign Service Officers, but particularly those who are making |
|
heavy sacrifices serving in high-threat regions. |
|
But I have to say that I am troubled by what seems to be |
|
this administration's pattern of misleading the American people |
|
and failing to hold decision-makers accountable. From Operation |
|
Fast and Furious, where Attorney General Eric Holder has |
|
repeatedly misled the American people and Congress about an |
|
intentional international gun-walking scheme, to U.N. Secretary |
|
Susan Rice, who on five separate occasions went before the |
|
American people days after the attacks on Benghazi talking |
|
about a demonstration at a facility that never happened. It was |
|
not even suggested in any of the reports and information coming |
|
from Benghazi. |
|
And I know the purpose of this hearing is to find out how |
|
to ensure another Benghazi never happens again. I would hope |
|
that we would all include the aftermath of the tragedy, as |
|
well. How can we make sure that such gross misrepresentations |
|
of attacks on Americans never happen again? |
|
A couple of other questions. I know you have put the four |
|
individuals identified as culpable by the Accountability Review |
|
Board on administrative leave. What do you anticipate the final |
|
resolution of their status with the Department will be? |
|
And the Accountability Review Board did not identify any |
|
individuals above the Assistant Secretary level as accountable |
|
for the security failures at the Benghazi mission. Now, you |
|
have said that the numerous cables requesting and begging for |
|
additional security resources sent by Ambassador Chris Stevens |
|
were never seen by State officials above Assistant Secretary |
|
Eric Boswell or Deputy Assistant Secretary Charlene Lamb. |
|
I know you care very deeply about the people that work with |
|
you in the Department. So, given the fact that your testimony |
|
is that you never saw any of these multiple requests and nobody |
|
above Assistant Secretary level saw these requests, does not |
|
that give you some concerns about the flow of information |
|
within the Department, and maybe some of your underlings' |
|
ability to prioritize and bring serious issues to your |
|
attention? |
|
You said that you get hundreds of thousands of cables all |
|
the time. And these cables sent directly to you, I understand |
|
that you do not read them all, nor do you have the time to do |
|
that. But I would think that within the Department you would |
|
have people who work for you who are able to prioritize and get |
|
to you the ones that are more serious in nature, and especially |
|
when somebody's security is on the line. |
|
Finally, President Truman had a placard on his desk that |
|
said, ``The buck stops here.'' I know that you have taken |
|
responsibility, and I applaud you for that. But I really hope |
|
that this isn't just an exercise, another exercise in finding |
|
lower-level bureaucrats who we can kind of throw under the bus, |
|
and actually get somewhere with this. This is not about a game |
|
of ``gotcha,'' but how we can fix this for the future. |
|
And I yield back the balance, and I would love your |
|
answers. |
|
Secretary Clinton. Well, Congressman, that is exactly what |
|
I am intent on doing. And I think the ARB, not I, has made its |
|
findings. The reason ARBs were created is to try to take a |
|
dispassionate, independent view of what happened and then come |
|
up with recommendations that are the responsibility of the |
|
Department to implement. |
|
You know, the ARB makes very clear that Chris Stevens, who |
|
probably knew more about Libya than anybody else in our |
|
Government, did not see a direct threat of an attack of this |
|
nature and scale, despite the overall trend of security |
|
problems that we faced. And I have to add, neither did the |
|
intelligence community. The ARB makes that very clear, that the |
|
intelligence community also did not really zero in on the |
|
connection between the deteriorating threat environment in |
|
eastern Libya and in Benghazi and a direct threat on our |
|
compound. |
|
So we have work to do. We have work to do inside the |
|
Department, we have work to do with our partners in the DoD and |
|
the intelligence community to constantly be taking in |
|
information, making sure it does get to the right people, that |
|
it isn't somehow stove piped or stalled but that it does rise |
|
to decision-makers. And I am committed to improving every way |
|
that I can on what the ARB told us to do, on assessing our |
|
intelligence. |
|
And I think that it is fair to say, Congressman, that we |
|
have to do this now because I predict we are going to be, as we |
|
saw in Algeria, seeing all kinds of asymmetric threats, not |
|
just to our Government facilities but to private-sector |
|
facilities. In Tunisia, although we protected our Embassy, our |
|
school was badly damaged. So we have to take a broader view. |
|
And I think that the ARB gives us a start, but it is not the |
|
whole story. |
|
Chairman Royce. Mr. Grayson from Florida. |
|
Mr. Grayson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
|
And thank you very much, Secretary Clinton, for your |
|
contributions to securing America's place in the world for the |
|
past 4 years and for your contributions toward world peace. |
|
The first question I would like to ask you has to do with |
|
the Accountability Review Board's report. The report does |
|
identify specifically people who were found to have engaged in |
|
the Department in systematic failures and deficiencies. I want |
|
to be clear about this: You were not one of those people; is |
|
that correct? |
|
Secretary Clinton. That is correct. |
|
Mr. Grayson. All right. |
|
Now, it was identified earlier that a report dating from |
|
the 1990s had said that the Secretary should take a personal |
|
and active role in security. Have you done that during your 4 |
|
years at the State Department? |
|
Secretary Clinton. I have been very attuned to the |
|
environment in which threats are occurring, the intelligence |
|
that is available; certainly not the specific requests and |
|
decision-making, which rests with the security professionals. |
|
Mr. Grayson. All right. |
|
Regarding the security professionals, is there anybody now |
|
in existence in the Department who is responsible for reviewing |
|
the itineraries of Ambassadors in advance in order to determine |
|
whether there is an undue threat to their safety? |
|
Secretary Clinton. The general answer to that is no. |
|
Ambassadors are given what is called ``chief of mission |
|
authority.'' Ambassadors, especially those who we ask to go to |
|
dangerous posts, are pretty independent folks. Some them might |
|
say, well, what do you think about this or that? But most of |
|
them make their own decisions. |
|
Chris Stevens did not ask anyone for permission to go to |
|
Benghazi; I don't think it would have crossed his mind. Robert |
|
Ford, who served as our Ambassador to Syria, went out on |
|
numerous occasions to talk to the opposition before we pulled |
|
him out of Damascus. We had, you know, very brave Ambassadors |
|
like Ryan Crocker, one of our very best, who it would be very |
|
difficult to say, Ryan, you can't go do this even though you |
|
have decided that you should do it. |
|
But what we are trying to do is to create a more ongoing |
|
discussion between our Ambassadors, our bureaus back in the |
|
State Department who are regional experts, and our security |
|
people so that, at the very least, no Ambassador is taking an |
|
unnecessary risk, however that is defined. |
|
Mr. Grayson. Well, with regard to Ambassador Stevens, |
|
certainly it was brave of him to go to Benghazi on the date |
|
that he did. I have to ask you honestly, though, was there |
|
anything in his itinerary on the 10th or the 11th that actually |
|
specifically required his personal presence? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Well, he certainly thought so, |
|
Congressman. And he did, of course, discuss this with his own |
|
security people. Remember, we do have regional security |
|
officers in these posts. They are the ones that an Ambassador |
|
will turn to. |
|
He believed that it was important for him to go to |
|
Benghazi. There were a number of meetings that he was holding |
|
and some public events that he had on his schedule. And, you |
|
know, he was someone who really believed strongly he had to get |
|
out there. And I think, as the ARB has pointed out, he was |
|
given great deference by the rest of the government. |
|
Mr. Grayson. Do you have any concept of the number of |
|
American troops it might have taken to actually create a |
|
totally secure environment for him in Benghazi on September 10 |
|
and 11? |
|
Secretary Clinton. No. The number of Diplomatic Security |
|
personnel requested in the cables was five. There were five |
|
there that night with him. Plus, there was a mutual |
|
understanding with the annex that had a much more heavily armed |
|
presence because of the work that they were doing in the |
|
region. |
|
It is very difficult to, in retrospect, really anticipate |
|
what might have been. One of the RSOs who had served in Libya |
|
said the kind of attack that the compound suffered had not been |
|
anticipated. We had gotten used to, you know, preparing for car |
|
bombs and suicide bombers and things like that, but this was of |
|
a different nature. |
|
And we even saw that, at the annex, which was much more |
|
heavily fortified, had much more heavy military equipment, we |
|
lost two of our best and had one of our Diplomatic Security |
|
officers badly injured. He is still at Walter Reed. So even the |
|
annex, which had more assets in the face of the attack, was |
|
suffering losses that night. |
|
Mr. Grayson. Thank you very much. |
|
Chairman Royce. Mr. Marino of Pennsylvania. |
|
Mr. Marino. Good afternoon, Madam Secretary. |
|
In August 2012, prior to the Benghazi attack, the Library |
|
of Congress published a report on behalf of a division of DoD |
|
called ``Al-Qaeda in Libya: A Profile.'' This report outlined |
|
al-Qaeda's growing presence in Libya, particularly in east |
|
Libya, where Benghazi is located. Something that was especially |
|
alarming to me in this DoD report was the mention that Ansar |
|
al-Sharia and other al-Qaeda groups in Libya have adopted the |
|
black flag, which symbolizes commitment to violent jihad, |
|
promoted by al-Qaeda's senior leaders. |
|
In my hand, I hold a picture of the flag that the |
|
Department of State identified to be a prominent issuance of |
|
this flag and on the rise in Libya. I also hold a picture of |
|
the same flag, same type of flag, in Tunisia, where the |
|
protesters were outside the Embassy there. In addition, I have |
|
a flag--a picture that was taken in Cairo at the U.S. Embassy, |
|
where demonstrations took place. Another picture in Jordan at |
|
the U.S. Embassy, where protests took place. In Bahrain, over |
|
2,000 protesters who burned numerous U.S. and Israeli flags, |
|
again at the Embassy. In Kuwait, U.S. Embassy, 500 |
|
demonstrators chanting, ``Obama, we are all Osama,'' the flag |
|
again. And finally in Libya, the U.S. compound, the flag was |
|
flown there and carried through the streets, as well. |
|
My question, Madam Secretary, is, were you aware of this |
|
DoD report prior to the terrorist attack in Benghazi? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Well, I was certainly aware of a number |
|
of reports from throughout our Government. I don't know of the |
|
specific one that you are referring to. There were DoD reports, |
|
intelligence community reports, State Department reports |
|
talking about the decreasing--or the increasing threat |
|
environment in eastern Libya. That was what we were trying to |
|
address with the Libyans. |
|
And remember, the election in July in Libya brought to |
|
victory what we would consider moderates, people who had a very |
|
different view of the kind of future than, certainly, al-Qaeda |
|
or any of these militants have. |
|
But there is going to be a struggle, there is going to be a |
|
struggle in this region. And the United States has to be as |
|
effective in partnering with the non-jihadists, whether they |
|
fly a black flag or any other color flag---- |
|
Mr. Marino. I clearly understand that---- |
|
Secretary Clinton [continuing]. To be successful. |
|
Mr. Marino [continuing]. Madam Secretary. |
|
Secretary Clinton. What? |
|
Mr. Marino. I clearly understand that. However, this flag |
|
was pointed out to be affiliated with al-Qaeda terrorists who |
|
attack and kill United States citizens and other individuals |
|
around the world. |
|
Did anyone in your department below you, were they aware of |
|
this report and these photos prior to? And don't you think they |
|
should have brought this to your attention? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Well, what I am trying to say, |
|
Congressman, is I am well aware that there were people claiming |
|
to be associated with al-Qaeda that were attempting to |
|
influence militias, attempting to exercise more authority, |
|
along with a number of other groups that didn't necessarily |
|
work under that flag but had the same militant jihadist |
|
mentality. |
|
So, yes, I was certainly aware of that. And so was Chris |
|
Stevens. |
|
Mr. Marino. But my point---- |
|
Secretary Clinton. And so was our team in Libya. |
|
Mr. Marino. But my point is this flag kept coming up, and |
|
you did not think that that was important enough to increase |
|
security, when, after how many Embassies where this flag was |
|
shown in demonstrations? I personally think that it would |
|
demand an increase in security. And those below you that might |
|
have known this should have brought that to your attention. |
|
Secretary Clinton. Well---- |
|
Mr. Marino. I come from industry. I come from government. |
|
And there are individuals that just have to be cut loose when |
|
they are not performing their tasks. Are these three people |
|
that are on leave, are they still being paid? |
|
Secretary Clinton. They are on administrative leave, and |
|
under Federal law and regulations, they are still being paid. |
|
Mr. Marino. What is the holdup? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Because there are regulations and law |
|
that have to be followed. |
|
Mr. Marino. No, no. Well, what is the holdup from a |
|
management perspective of saying, you three let me down, this |
|
should have been brought to my attention, I no longer need your |
|
services? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Well, Congressman, I would be happy to |
|
give you an answer, because personnel discussions are not |
|
appropriate for public settings. But we have taken every step |
|
that was available, and we will continue to do so, and we are |
|
looking for additional authority. |
|
But to just finish up on the point you made, we had good |
|
security at all of those Embassies, other than in Tunisia |
|
because of the newness of the government. And then when they |
|
were asked to respond, they did. |
|
Because I go back to the point that was made on the other |
|
side of the aisle: We are dependent on host-government support. |
|
And where it doesn't exist, unless we invade and unless we have |
|
a big military presence in a country, we are doing the best we |
|
can with our Diplomatic Security and private security guards |
|
and any other help we can get. |
|
Chairman Royce. Mr. Vargas of California. |
|
Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the |
|
opportunity. |
|
And thank you very much, Madam Secretary, for being here. I |
|
also want to thank you for the excellent work that you have |
|
done not only here in the United States but across the world. I |
|
have to say that because it is true, one, and, secondly, I |
|
don't think that my wife, my 16-year-old daughter or my 9-year- |
|
old daughter, she would probably even turn on me and wouldn't |
|
let me in the house if I didn't say that. You are a hero to |
|
many, especially women. And you seem to bring out these deep |
|
aspirations that they have in ways that I have never seen |
|
anyone do before. So, again, thank you for your service. |
|
When I was reading the information here, it brought back to |
|
mind another assassination, murder. I was a Jesuit for 5 years, |
|
and I spent some time in El Salvador. And in 1989, there was an |
|
assassination of Father Ignacio Ellacuria, Father Segundo |
|
Montes, Father Ignacio Martin-Baro, Father Juan Ramon Moreno, |
|
Father Armando Lopez, Father Joaquin Lopez y Lopez, and also |
|
the housekeeper, Mrs. Elba Ramos, and her young daughter--she |
|
was 15-years-old--Celina Ramos. I knew them because I worked |
|
with them. Segundo Montes was my superior. And I know the pain |
|
that I felt when I heard that they died. I had left the Jesuits |
|
by then. And so I know that, as you being the superior of the |
|
people who died, I am sure felt the same way. |
|
And that is why I am glad that we brought up the names here |
|
today. I think it is important to mention the names: Ambassador |
|
Christopher Stevens, Mr. Sean Smith, Mr. Tyrone Woods, Mr. Glen |
|
Doherty. Because many of us who have faith believe that they |
|
didn't die in vain. And that is why I am very proud that you |
|
are here bravely standing before us, trying to figure out what |
|
to do. |
|
And one of the things that did trouble me as I read this |
|
was the reliance that we have on local security. That is the |
|
part that didn't make sense to me. I come from San Diego. We |
|
have the Marine Corps there. We have the Navy. We have |
|
incredibly good security and service people. Why don't we rely |
|
more on them? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Well, that is an excellent question. And |
|
you brought back some very sad memories in talking about the |
|
losses that occurred in El Salvador. |
|
You know, we do rely primarily on host-nation support, but |
|
we have to take a harder look at the commitment and the |
|
capacity of these host nations. And, therefore, in places all |
|
over the world, we also have private security guards, some |
|
armed, some unarmed. We have Marine guards at many places, |
|
about 150, who at least are demonstrating a line of defense. |
|
But we have to do more. |
|
And when you ask, why do we rely on these? Well, in part |
|
because we don't have military assets everywhere. If you look |
|
at the statements particularly by Admiral Mullen, who was our |
|
Chairman of our Joint Chiefs, he basically said, look, we have |
|
to work together more closely between State and DoD, but it is |
|
unrealistic, in his words, to tether our military to every |
|
high-risk post. |
|
So part of what we are trying to struggle through with is, |
|
how do we make our facilities as secure as possible without |
|
turning them into fortresses? Because our diplomats are not |
|
soldiers. How do we have reliable private security? The |
|
February 17th Brigade was a Libyan Government-supported militia |
|
that started defending Chris Stevens when he showed up before |
|
Ghadafi fell. They had been reliable, they had been responsive. |
|
But they were not particularly available during those first |
|
minutes and hours of the attack on our compound. |
|
So we also had contracted with a private security company |
|
that had a permit to operate in Libya. Because, you know, the |
|
United States, unless we go into a country with massive |
|
military force, we, you know, go in and we follow the rules of |
|
the country. And we had to get a security force that had a |
|
permit from the Libyan Government. |
|
So these are all issues that are being looked at so that we |
|
try to fill the gaps that have been identified. |
|
Mr. Vargas. Well, thank you. |
|
And the last thing I would just correct that you said |
|
earlier, that we haven't done enough about promoting ourselves |
|
around the world, I think you have. I think you have done a |
|
fantastic job. And other than President Kennedy, I don't know |
|
of anyone that has had a better image in Latin America. So we |
|
thank you. |
|
Secretary Clinton. Thank you very much, Congressman. |
|
Chairman Royce. We go now to Mr. Duncan of South Carolina. |
|
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
|
And, Madam Secretary, let me just tell you, Americans are |
|
frustrated. They are frustrated over the handling of Benghazi, |
|
what happened when four Americans died there. They are |
|
frustrated and sometimes they are downright angry about being, |
|
what they think, being misled about what really happened there, |
|
being told that this was a protest over a video not just for a |
|
couple of days but for weeks on in. |
|
And then they are frustrated when they see comments from |
|
you this morning when you said, what difference at this point |
|
does it make? I will tell you what difference it makes. It |
|
makes a difference when Americans think they were misled about |
|
something for political reasons. |
|
In the hearing this morning, you mentioned that we were |
|
clear-eyed about the threats and dangers as they were |
|
developing in eastern Libya. Madam Secretary, if you were |
|
really, in your words, clear-eyed about the levels of threat to |
|
our consulate in Benghazi, or our special mission in Benghazi, |
|
then you should have known about Chris Stevens' memo, I believe |
|
of 16 August, that said our consulate could not be defended |
|
from a coordinated attack. |
|
The question Americans have is, did he expect an attack? If |
|
you were clear-eyed, then why did your department reject the |
|
request, I believe on 7 June, for 16 additional security |
|
agents, the site security team that would have been funded by |
|
DoD, not a State expenditure? |
|
If you were clear-eyed, shouldn't you have known that there |
|
was no real Libyan Government to turn to for security |
|
assistance? You answered that question from Mr. Meeks earlier, |
|
when you said you were unsure about the Libyan Government and |
|
their ability to provide that assistance. |
|
If you were clear-eyed, were you clear-eyed about al- |
|
Qaeda's displeasure with whom we seemed to be supporting during |
|
the summer elections, the moderate that was elected? |
|
If you were clear-eyed, shouldn't you have known that al- |
|
Qaeda roamed freely in and around Benghazi? As my friend from |
|
Pennsylvania pointed out, there were al-Qaeda flags not just at |
|
the protest, there were al-Qaeda flags flying all over |
|
Benghazi. |
|
If you were clear-eyed, were you clear-eyed when the Brits |
|
left Benghazi because they had the attack? Why did four |
|
Americans die? What was so important that Ambassador Stevens, |
|
if he knew there was a security threat in Benghazi--and he went |
|
there on September 10 and 11 and gave his life for our |
|
country--what was so important for him to go to eastern Libya, |
|
knowing all these threats, knowing the memos are clear? |
|
And I think you misspoke earlier when you said that you |
|
didn't know of any requests that were denied for more security. |
|
June 7 e-mail exchange between Ambassador Stevens and John |
|
Moretti, when he requested for one MSD team, or, actually, an |
|
additional MSD team. And the reply from John Moretti said, |
|
unfortunately, MSD cannot support the request. There was a |
|
request made for more security, and it was denied on June 7. |
|
And so, Madam Secretary, you let the consulate become a |
|
death trap, and that is national security malpractice. You said |
|
you take responsibility. What does responsibility mean, Madam |
|
Secretary? You are still in your job, and there are four people |
|
at the Department of State that have culpability in this that |
|
are still in their jobs. |
|
I heard the answer about firing or removing personnel. I |
|
get that. But this was gross negligence. At what point in time |
|
can our administration and can our Government fire someone |
|
whose gross negligence left four Americans dead in Benghazi? |
|
What does the word ``responsibility'' mean to you, Madam |
|
Secretary? |
|
Secretary Clinton. I think I have made that very clear, |
|
Congressman. |
|
And let me say that we have come here and made a very open, |
|
transparent presentation. I did not have to declassify the ARB. |
|
I could have joined 18 of the other ARBs, under both Democratic |
|
and Republican administrations, kept it classified, and then, |
|
you know, just said ``goodbye.'' That is not who I am; that is |
|
not what I do. |
|
And I have great confidence that the Accountability Review |
|
Board did the job they were asked to do, made the |
|
recommendations that they thought were based on evidence, not |
|
on emotion, not on---- |
|
Mr. Duncan. There was a lot of evidence---- |
|
Secretary Clinton. Well---- |
|
Mr. Duncan. Reclaiming my time, there was a lot of evidence |
|
that led up to the security situation. |
|
Secretary Clinton. Well, I am sorry, Congressman---- |
|
Mr. Duncan. You mentioned transparency? You haven't |
|
provided the call logs of the messages, instant messages, |
|
during the attack between the post and the operations center. |
|
In an air of transparency, will you release these |
|
communications between Benghazi, Tripoli, and Washington? |
|
Secretary Clinton. I will get an answer to you on that. But |
|
I will tell you once more, the reason we have Accountability |
|
Review Boards is so that we take out of politics, we take out |
|
of emotion what happened, and we try to get to the truth. I |
|
think this very distinguished panel did just that. And we are |
|
working diligently overtime to implement their recommendations. |
|
That is my responsibility. I am going to do everything I can |
|
before I finish my tenure. |
|
And I would also, going back to your first point about the |
|
concerns that people you represented have expressed about |
|
statements that were made, I would refer you both to the |
|
unclassified version of the ARB, where, after months of |
|
research and talking to more than 100 witnesses, the picture is |
|
still very complicated about what happened that night. ``There |
|
are key questions''--I am quoting--``surrounding the identity, |
|
actions, and motivations of the perpetrators that remain to be |
|
determined.'' And I recommend that every member read the |
|
classified version, which goes into greater detail that I |
|
cannot speak to here today. |
|
Mr. Duncan. It was a terrorist attack. It is pretty clear |
|
what the motivation was. |
|
Chairman Royce. Mr. Schneider. |
|
Mr. Schneider. Madam Secretary, let me again thank you for |
|
joining us. |
|
Thank you for opening up the ARB report. We are grateful. |
|
And let me also echo the words of my colleagues and extend |
|
my own personal gratitude for your service. You did our Nation |
|
well and made our people proud. You have done an extraordinary |
|
job as our Nation's top diplomat, and you will be sorely |
|
missed. |
|
The Benghazi attack claimed the lives of four brave |
|
Americans, including Ambassador Chris Stevens, who had done so |
|
much to liberate the Libyan people. Despite the risk involved, |
|
he returned to that country as our Ambassador because he knew |
|
the important work of building a new Libya remained unfinished. |
|
America's diplomatic corps dedicate their lives to |
|
promoting Americans' interests abroad and knowingly put |
|
themselves in danger to serve their country. While we know that |
|
these jobs are not without risk, we must do more to support our |
|
diplomats. |
|
I am pleased that the State Department conducted a serious |
|
investigation, and I appreciate that you have already stated |
|
that you will accept every one of the 29 review board's |
|
recommendations. |
|
The State Department is increasingly operating in high- |
|
threat locations throughout the world, requiring our diplomats |
|
to be stationed further afield and closer to dangers on the |
|
ground. This not only raises the security risks faced by our |
|
diplomats and development experts but also places a strain on |
|
existing resources. |
|
As we move forward, how will the State Department evaluate |
|
the benefits to U.S. interests from having an official presence |
|
in a given location versus the security risks faced by that |
|
diplomatic mission? How do you expect the Department will weigh |
|
the physical and technical personnel and political costs as |
|
opposed to the gains of operating in frontline states? And, |
|
last, what changes do you think these demands will require vis- |
|
a-vis people and other resources at the State Department? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Those are very important questions, and |
|
I can't do justice to them in the time left, but we will |
|
certainly get you additional written information. |
|
But let me briefly say, Congressman, that, you know, I |
|
ordered the first ever Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development |
|
Review because, as I said, I served on the Armed Services |
|
Committee, where we get every 4 years a Quadrennial Defense |
|
Review, which really does help the Armed Services Committees in |
|
both houses plan for their authorization, and I wanted to lay |
|
the groundwork for us to do the same with the State Department. |
|
In that document, we began what is a very difficult |
|
analysis about how to balance and mitigate risk versus |
|
presence. It was one of the most challenging aspects of the |
|
QDDR process, and we have an ongoing effort under way. Because |
|
if you talk to many of our Ambassadors, especially the |
|
experienced ones, they really don't want to be told by |
|
Washington or anybody where they can go, when they can go, what |
|
they can do. They have been in the Foreign Service 10, 20, 30 |
|
years or more, and they believe in their missions, and they |
|
believe they have a better sense of how to evaluate risk. |
|
At the same time, we do have to be conscious of and make |
|
difficult decisions about how to protect not just Ambassadors |
|
but all of our personnel and their families in these high-risk |
|
posts. It is a constant debate, Congressman. |
|
You know, we have authorized departure, we have ordered |
|
departure, and it is something that we take very seriously when |
|
we do it. You know, when we left Benghazi on the night of 11th- |
|
12th, there were others still there. The Italians were there; |
|
the Turks were there. The Italians had just left. |
|
I mean, people evaluate risk over time, and I think it is |
|
important to do what we can to minimize it. Some of that will |
|
be done by technology, some of that will be done by hard |
|
security, and some of that will be done by what we call soft |
|
power. But trying to get the balance right is very difficult. |
|
Mr. Schneider. As we look forward to the steps taken, we |
|
will be in new places, we are going to face new challenges. How |
|
do we make sure that we are able to provide the resources to |
|
these high-threat, high-risk posts? |
|
Secretary Clinton. It is very, very difficult. You know, |
|
that is going to be a question of new streamlined processes and |
|
protocols; sufficient security, both hard and soft; and |
|
resources. And we just have to--we have to ask you, based on |
|
our best assessment, about what we need to do our jobs. |
|
And sometimes, you know, you have a budget process, and |
|
nobody has predicted that you are going to have a revolution |
|
against Ghadafi, and then you have to scramble. How do you get |
|
somebody into Benghazi? How do you figure out what to do in |
|
Tripoli? And I could go down the line and tell you 10 or 20 of |
|
those examples that we live with every day. |
|
So it is more of an art than a science, to be honest, |
|
because, as of now, we don't have, you know, hard parameters, |
|
but we are trying to develop the best we can. |
|
Mr. Schneider. Thank you. |
|
Chairman Royce. Madam Secretary, I understand that you have |
|
a meeting at the White House but have agreed to stay so that |
|
members can have a few more questions. We will end by 5 |
|
o'clock. And we really appreciate that. |
|
We go to Mr. Kinzinger of Illinois. |
|
Mr. Kinzinger. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
|
Madam Secretary, thank you for staying. I really appreciate |
|
it. I appreciate your service to your country. And, you know, |
|
as was mentioned earlier, we look forward to your next steps. |
|
We will see what happens. |
|
Let me just say, I am actually an Air Force pilot. And I |
|
have a few concerns I want to lay out here. One of the first |
|
things I was told as a pilot in the military is that your |
|
country will never leave you behind. If you find yourself down |
|
in enemy lines, rest assured your country will move heaven and |
|
earth to come get you. If you find yourself in armed conflict, |
|
rest assured your country will do everything in its power to |
|
come save you from that armed conflict. |
|
Now, as a representative of the administration here, I have |
|
to ask you this: From the initial attack to the second attack, |
|
there was a lull of 7 hours. |
|
Now, I am going to say this; I was one of a handful of |
|
Republicans to vote to support the President's position in |
|
Libya. I think we did the right thing there. But I did it with |
|
the knowledge that we would have the military forces in place |
|
to be able to rescue any personnel in a tough situation. |
|
In that intervening 7 hours, military assets, to what we |
|
know, what we can talk about, were not put in place. Aviano Air |
|
Base is 1,044 miles from Benghazi. Aviano Air Base is an F-16 |
|
base. Airplanes could have been put in the air, after being |
|
fueled, even if they didn't have missiles on them. And there |
|
can be nonviolent things that F-16s can do to disperse crowds |
|
that I know of well. So that is a concern. |
|
Originally, also, when you briefed us, I remember--and this |
|
has been, I know, hammered a little bit--but when you briefed |
|
us, you said unequivocally this was a result of the video. And |
|
I remember, in fact, you got pretty upset about it when |
|
somebody suggested that this was a terrorist attack. This was |
|
our briefing that we had. But we find out now it wasn't. We |
|
find out now that it wasn't the video, it was this terrorist |
|
attack. |
|
When we come to talk about the issue of the drone and the |
|
surveillance overhead, if there was, in fact, a drone overhead, |
|
I would assume that there would be a link in which you could |
|
watch what is going on live, or else maybe somebody under you |
|
was able to see what was going on live, or else that link was |
|
down. |
|
And another question I have, when it comes to--I watched |
|
your testimony in the Senate, and you said, you know, part of |
|
the reason we had a little bit of delay in understanding what |
|
was going on, we did not have immediate access to the security |
|
cameras, the security footage. But yet, at the same time, you |
|
had mortars being reported as being fired on security |
|
personnel. If I would hear that mortars are being fired, I |
|
would immediately assume, regardless of whether I could see |
|
what is going on overhead, regardless of if I could see the |
|
security footage, that this is more than a spontaneous |
|
demonstration. |
|
The other question I have, too--I am laying a few out for |
|
you--the FEST team, the foreign response team, was that your |
|
decision not to deploy that right away? Was that an issue of |
|
logistics? Where does that come from? |
|
And the final thing I want to say is this. As, again, a |
|
believer, which I think you believe, that we are in a time |
|
where it is very important for American leadership to be out in |
|
front to prevent a resurgence of jihadist activity, of al-Qaeda |
|
activity, I am worried about the strategy of leading from |
|
behind. |
|
If the United States Ambassador in Libya--and I say this |
|
respectfully--can't get a message forward to the Secretary of |
|
State about his concern about security in one of the most hot |
|
zones in the world, I worry about a lead-from-behind strategy. |
|
And if we have no assets on alert that can respond in a 7- |
|
hour lull in two different attacks in the most hot spot, one of |
|
the most hot spots in the world, on 9/11, on the anniversary, |
|
is the lead-from-behind strategy failing? |
|
Because I really want American leadership to be strong. I |
|
believe in freedom, and I believe we are the people that are |
|
going to be able to take freedom around the globe. |
|
With that, I will give you the remaining minute, and I |
|
thank you for your generosity. |
|
Secretary Clinton. And I thank you for your service, |
|
Congressman, both in the Air Force and here. |
|
There was a lot packed into that. Let me see what I can |
|
cover quickly, and then we will get the rest to you in writing. |
|
DoD took every action it could take, starting from the time |
|
that the President directed Secretary Panetta and Chairman |
|
Dempsey to do so. |
|
Again, I turn to the ARB because that is, to me, a much |
|
more factually based finding. The board found no evidence of |
|
any undue delays in decision-making or denial of support from |
|
Washington or from military combatant commanders. Quite the |
|
contrary, the safe evacuation of all U.S. Government personnel |
|
from Benghazi 12 hours after the initial attack, and |
|
subsequently to Ramstein, was the result of exceptional U.S. |
|
Government coordination and military response and helped save |
|
the lives of two severely wounded Americans. |
|
Now, having said that, I think it is very important we do |
|
more to coordinate with DoD along the lines of what you are |
|
talking about, because who knows what is going to be facing us |
|
in the next months and years? |
|
With respect to the video, I did not say that it was about |
|
the video for Libya. It certainly was for many of the other |
|
places where we were watching these disturbances. |
|
Now, with respect to Predator feed or video of the attack, |
|
we could not see that at the State Department. There was no |
|
access to that. At no time did I have a live feed of the |
|
attack, not from any system in our compound and not from the |
|
annex, nor from any UAV. There has been confusion, |
|
understandably, because we did talk a lot about the |
|
surveillance camera video that eventually got to us. |
|
I will give you more information about that because I think |
|
it is important to understand how this happened. And, as you |
|
know, Congressman, the annex was not under my authority. So |
|
information was flowing into another agency, more than one |
|
other agency. And those people were incredibly brave, but |
|
overwhelmed as well. |
|
Chairman Royce. Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts. |
|
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member. |
|
And, Madam Secretary, thank you for what I can only |
|
describe as a truly exemplary career in public service and a |
|
dedication to public service. |
|
Secretary Clinton. Thank you. |
|
Mr. Kennedy. And I look forward to what the future holds |
|
for you, as well. |
|
I have two broad-based questions for you, if I can, Madam |
|
Secretary. |
|
You now have obviously held this office for 4 years at an |
|
extraordinarily challenging time in our history. We recently |
|
passed the 2-year anniversary of the Arab Awakening. We are |
|
seeing in the recent headlines, emerging threats from Algeria |
|
and Mali across Northern Africa, spreading out through the |
|
Middle East--Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. |
|
As you close on your tenure, I was wondering if you might |
|
be willing to share some important lessons learned from the |
|
time that you have spent in this post and enlighten us as to |
|
what Congress can do to help respond and even get in front of |
|
these threats as you move forward. |
|
And related to that, if I may, assuming that you are going |
|
to say what you have said a couple of times about increased |
|
engagement at the ground level, how do we do that in areas that |
|
are unstable, where we need to depend on local governments or |
|
local security forces that, quite frankly, we have seen don't |
|
have the ability to provide the type of security that our |
|
diplomats are going to demand? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Well, Congressman, it is wonderful to |
|
see you here. And I thank you for your interest in looking, |
|
sort of, into the future. |
|
Let me just make a couple of points. |
|
First, we have a lot of tools that we don't use as well as |
|
we should. I think we have abdicated the broadcasting arena, |
|
where both in TV and radio, which are considered kind of old- |
|
fashioned media, are still very important in a lot of these |
|
ungoverned areas, a lot of these difficult places where we are |
|
trying to do business. And I think we have to get our act |
|
together. I would hope that this committee would pay attention |
|
to the Broadcasting Board of Governors, which is in desperate |
|
need of assistance, intervention, and change. |
|
I think, too, social media is a great tool. We have begun |
|
trying to use it much more in the State Department, and not to |
|
communicate with just, you know, leaders and officials, but |
|
really, as you say, get down into the grass roots. |
|
We have also--I started two organizations to deal with |
|
countering violent extremism: One, a new operation inside the |
|
State Department that is staffed with interagency experts so |
|
that--you know, I am not saying anything that is classified, |
|
but it is beginning to try to respond to al-Qaeda and other |
|
jihadist propaganda. So if they put up a video which talks |
|
about how terrible Americans are, we put up a video which talks |
|
about, you know, how terrible they are. We are trying to meet |
|
them in the media channels that they are communicating with |
|
people. |
|
We are also at the beginning of an organization I helped to |
|
stand up, the Global Counterterrorism Forum. Because if we |
|
don't work with partners and understand more effectively how to |
|
counter violent extremism, how to stop recruiters, how to turn |
|
families and communities against these jihadists, there will be |
|
a constant flow of them. So we have to be smarter about that. |
|
And there are other things that I would, you know, like to |
|
share with you and others on the committee who are interested. |
|
You know, it is not a perfect analogy, but I would say that |
|
our fight against international communism, against the Soviet |
|
Union, during the cold war, we did a lot of things really well. |
|
I mean, we kept people's hopes alive, we communicated with |
|
freedom lovers and advocates behind the Iron Curtain. We did it |
|
through media, we did through our values. Well, I think we have |
|
a similar challenge, even though it is a very different world. |
|
And let's get smart about it, and let's figure out how we are |
|
going to put some points on the board, so to speak, in dealing |
|
with both governments and populations. |
|
And if I could, just very--I know that Representative |
|
Duncan has left, but his question took me a little by surprise |
|
because our ops center does not do instant messaging. So the |
|
reason you haven't gotten instant messaging is we don't do |
|
instant messaging. So I wanted to put that into the record and |
|
hope that his staff or someone will convey that to him. |
|
Thank you. |
|
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you. |
|
Chairman Royce. Thank you. |
|
We will go to Mr. Brooks of Alabama. |
|
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Secretary Clinton. |
|
It is an honor to be here today. And I want to thank you for |
|
the time that you have spent with us and with the Senate, for |
|
that matter. I am sure it has been a long day. |
|
It has been my experience that truth without credibility is |
|
meaningless, and credibility, once lost, is difficult to |
|
reacquire. My concern is the degree to which false statements |
|
about Benghazi have damaged America's credibility not only here |
|
but also abroad. |
|
I don't focus on any of your statements in that regard; |
|
rather, I focus on some others. On September 16, 2012, on Meet |
|
the Press, Ambassador Susan Rice stated, and I quote, |
|
|
|
``What happened in Benghazi was, in fact, initially a |
|
spontaneous reaction to what had just transpired hours |
|
before in Cairo. Almost a copycat of the demonstrations |
|
against our facility in Cairo, which were prompted, of |
|
course, by the video.'' |
|
|
|
Now, let me break this statement down to three parts, if I |
|
might. And I would ask you to confirm, based on the data we now |
|
have, whether her comments were true or false. |
|
Secretary Clinton, is Ambassador Rice's statement that |
|
Benghazi was a spontaneous reaction to the Cairo protests |
|
factually accurate? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Well, I think if you look at the ARB |
|
finding, Congressman, there is still question about what caused |
|
it. So I don't want to mislead you in any way. That is not the |
|
weight of the evidence right now. But I think until the FBI |
|
completes its investigation, we are not going to know all the |
|
reasons why these people showed up with weapons and stormed our |
|
compound. |
|
Mr. Brooks. Well, Secretary Clinton, is Ambassador Rice's |
|
statement that Benghazi was a copycat of the Cairo |
|
demonstrations factually accurate? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Well, it turned out not to be because |
|
the Cairo demonstrations were not heavily armed, and we did |
|
eventually get host-nation security support. So there were |
|
differences. |
|
But, again, I would say that Secretary Rice conveyed |
|
information that had been provided by the intelligence |
|
community and the interagency process. |
|
Mr. Brooks. I am not trying to go into the process right |
|
now. I am just trying to determine what the truth is as best we |
|
know at this time. |
|
Secretary Clinton, is Ambassador Rice's statement that |
|
Benghazi was ``prompted, of course, by an anti-Muslim video'' |
|
put on the Internet in the United States factually accurate? |
|
Secretary Clinton. I would have to go back to my first |
|
answer, Congressman, and just say that we don't know all the |
|
motivations, so I don't want to give a sweeping answer as to |
|
what prompted those men to come out that night and attack our |
|
compound. |
|
Mr. Brooks. Okay. Well, on September 16, the very same day |
|
U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice made her statements to the American |
|
people and the world, Libyan President Mohammed Magariaf said |
|
on NPR that the idea that this criminal and cowardly act was a |
|
spontaneous protest, that it just spun out of control, is |
|
completely unfounded and preposterous. We firmly believe that |
|
this was a precalculated, preplanned attack that was carried |
|
out specifically to attack the United States consulate. |
|
As we now know, from everything I have read at least, the |
|
Libyan President told the truth. Contrast that with the |
|
statements by Ambassador Rice, to the United Nations. It forces |
|
one to wonder whether Libya's intelligence was that much better |
|
than America's on September the 16th or whether Libyan leaders |
|
were that much more willing to be candid or to avoid |
|
misstatements. |
|
Secretary Clinton, what evidence was there that was so |
|
compelling that it caused the White House, through Ambassador |
|
Susan Rice, to make these representations about spontaneous |
|
protests, anti-Muslim videos, and the like, despite evidence |
|
and statements of Libya's own President to the contrary? You |
|
know, if she is going to make these statements, an affirmative |
|
act on her part, where was the compelling evidence, and what |
|
was it? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Well, Congressman, I was not involved in |
|
the so-called talking points process. My understanding is it |
|
was a typical process trying to get to the best information |
|
available. It was an intelligence product. They are, as I again |
|
understand it, working with their committees of jurisdiction to |
|
try to unpack that. |
|
But I will say that all of the senior administration |
|
officials, including Ambassador Rice, who spoke publicly to |
|
this terrible incident, had the same information from the |
|
intelligence community. |
|
Mr. Brooks. If I might interject. I appreciate your |
|
response so far. But if you are not familiar with any |
|
compelling evidence that would support the statements made by |
|
Ambassador Rice, who would know? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Well, there was evidence, and the |
|
evidence was being sifted and analyzed by the intelligence |
|
community, which is why the intelligence community was the |
|
principal decider about what went into talking points. |
|
And there was also the added problem of nobody wanting to |
|
say things that would undermine the investigation. So it was |
|
much more complex than I think we are giving it credit for, |
|
sir. |
|
Mr. Brooks. Thank you for your candor, and thank you for |
|
your time. |
|
Chairman Royce. The ranking member and I have discussed |
|
going to 3 minutes for questions from here on out. And, without |
|
objection, that is what we will do. |
|
Let's go to Mr. Bera from California. |
|
Mr. Bera. Secretary Clinton, thank you for appearing before |
|
the committee today. |
|
You know, as a new Member of Congress, I think I speak for |
|
all the freshmen that we are not going to get much time to |
|
serve with you, but we hope in a few years we will get that |
|
chance to serve again. |
|
You know, from my perspective, the tragedy in Benghazi was |
|
the loss of four American patriots. That loss was felt pretty |
|
deeply in northern California, particularly around Ambassador |
|
Chris Stevens. You know, his family had deep roots in our |
|
community. |
|
The best way for us to honor their memory and their service |
|
is to do our utmost to make sure the lessons of Benghazi--and |
|
do everything that we can to honor and protect our men and |
|
women around the world, you know, in an increasingly dangerous |
|
situation. You have been very forthright today and forthcoming |
|
with information, and we truly appreciate that. |
|
You know, much has been made today about the flow of |
|
information, but I want to quote former Chairman of the Joint |
|
Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, who said after the ARB |
|
was issued, ``As someone who has run large organizations--and |
|
the Secretary of State has been very clear about taking |
|
responsibility here--it was, from my perspective, not |
|
reasonable, in terms of having a specific level of knowledge |
|
that was very specifically resident in her staff, and over time |
|
certainly didn't bring that to her attention.'' That was |
|
Admiral Mike Mullen. |
|
Secretary, how many cables did you say arrive every year to |
|
the State Department? One-point-four million? Can you tell me |
|
how long it takes you to read 1.4 million cables? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Well, if I had ever tried to read 1.4 |
|
million cables, I don't think I would be sitting here today. I |
|
would probably be, you know, collapsed somewhere. |
|
You know, I appreciated what Admiral Mullen said because |
|
when you do sit on top of large organizations--in his case the |
|
United States military, which is huge, and in my case the State |
|
Department and USAID--you put into place processes. And you |
|
have to trust the judgment, the good sense of the people in |
|
your organization. |
|
So those 1.43 million cables, they come into the State |
|
Department. You know, the tradition is they are all addressed |
|
to me, but, you know, the vast, vast majority are funneled |
|
through these processes to get to the right people, who are |
|
expected to take the right actions. And 99.9 percent of the |
|
time people do. |
|
I want to reiterate that. It is an incredible organization, |
|
with dedicated people, particularly our security professionals, |
|
who have stopped so many attacks, protected so many people. But |
|
occasionally we see a serious problem like we have seen here, |
|
and that is what we are trying to fix. |
|
Mr. Bera. Well, thank you for your candor. |
|
Secretary Clinton. Thank you, sir. |
|
Chairman Royce. Mr. Tom Cotton of Arkansas. |
|
Mr. Cotton. Good afternoon, Madam Secretary. Thank you for |
|
coming. We are all here very happy to have you here, very happy |
|
for your recovery. I know I bring greetings from many of our |
|
mutual friends in Arkansas. |
|
Some of our peers on the other side have expressed their |
|
ambitions for your future. I would like to say that I just wish |
|
you had won the Democratic primary in 2008. |
|
Secretary Clinton. I did pretty well in Arkansas. |
|
Mr. Cotton. You did. |
|
You said on September 21 that we will not rest until we |
|
have tracked down and brought to justice the terrorists who |
|
murdered the four Americans at Benghazi. |
|
Secretary Clinton. Yes, sir. |
|
Mr. Cotton. Earlier today, you said, I certainly hope the |
|
FBI is able to investigate, identify, and hold those |
|
responsible. |
|
Does the difference in those two statements reflect any |
|
concern on your part of the progress of that investigation? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Well, Congressman, first, |
|
congratulations. It is good to see you here. |
|
Mr. Cotton. Thank you. |
|
Secretary Clinton. No, it does not. But I am conscious of |
|
the fact that talking about FBI investigations is something you |
|
have to be extremely careful about, for obvious reasons. |
|
I think it is clear, or I hope it is clear, that President |
|
Obama, when he says we are going to bring people to justice |
|
even if it takes some time, he means what he says. Obviously, |
|
the FBI is conducting an investigation. What actions are taken |
|
will be determined in the future. |
|
Mr. Cotton. What is the United States Government's position |
|
on the role of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the attacks |
|
at Benghazi? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Again, I am not going to prejudge what |
|
the FBI determines. We know that there are al-Qaeda related |
|
organizations, as we saw from the pictures that were held up, |
|
throughout the region, including in eastern Libya. We know that |
|
people, like we saw with the recent attacks in Algeria, like to |
|
associate themselves with al-Qaeda. |
|
But we have to be careful about what that means. Core al- |
|
Qaeda has been severely depleted coming out of Afghanistan and |
|
Pakistan. What we are dealing with now are the jihadists who |
|
have been associated with al-Qaeda, who have gained, |
|
unfortunately, very serious combat experience, coming back to |
|
the countries that they left in order to go wage jihad in |
|
Central Asia. |
|
So whether they call themselves al-Qaeda or Boko Haram or |
|
Ansar al-Sharia, they are all part of the same global jihadist |
|
movement. And there may be differences between them, but their |
|
goals are unfortunately similar and pose threats to us and our |
|
partners. |
|
Mr. Cotton. Both the chairman and Mr. Poe have referenced a |
|
Tunisian suspect who has been released. I believe that is Mr. |
|
Ali Harzi. |
|
Secretary Clinton. Right. |
|
Mr. Cotton. On January 8, it was reported in The New York |
|
Times. |
|
Do you find it distressing that the Tunisian Government has |
|
released that gentleman in light of the hundreds of millions of |
|
dollars of aid we have given them over the last 2 years? |
|
Secretary Clinton. At this point, Congressman, I do not, |
|
for two reasons. |
|
First, I had a long conversation with high-ranking Tunisian |
|
officials about this, as did Director Mueller of the FBI when |
|
he was there in person. We have been assured that there was an |
|
effort to have rule of law, judicial process, sufficient |
|
evidence not yet available to be presented, but a very clear |
|
commitment made to us that they will be monitoring the |
|
whereabouts of Harzi. And we are going to hold them to that and |
|
watch carefully. |
|
Mr. Cotton. Thank you, Madam Secretary. |
|
Chairman Royce. Mr. Lowenthal of California. |
|
Mr. Lowenthal. Thank you, Madam Secretary. First, I also |
|
want to compliment you on your exemplary service. But more than |
|
that, I really want to say how much I have appreciated your |
|
openness, your thoughtfulness today, your transparency. |
|
And what I am struck with in this hearing is a greater |
|
appreciation of the courage of State Department personnel. I |
|
think we are left with that understanding of just how |
|
courageous the personnel have been in taking on assignments |
|
that in the past never had been taken on before. And you have |
|
ably, I think, presented to us why that is important, why it is |
|
important for emerging democracies that we be there. |
|
My question is very similar to the one of Congressman |
|
Schneider's, and that was: How do you make that analysis |
|
between risk and presence? What are some of the obstacles in |
|
making that? How do we move forward with that? And how does the |
|
Congress understand some of that kind of balance? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Well, this is my ongoing hope: That we |
|
can get it more right than wrong. Let me just make a few points |
|
because it is an issue that I hope this committee takes very |
|
seriously. |
|
First of all, you have to remember that when we talk about |
|
the State Department and diplomatic facilities, that covers--we |
|
are the umbrella for so many other agencies in our Government. |
|
If we were not there, many of those agencies' representatives |
|
would have a difficult time being there. I mean, we are the |
|
diplomatic presence that permits us to pursue law enforcement |
|
objectives, intelligence objectives, military objectives, and |
|
so much more. |
|
So it is not just about us sitting around and saying, you |
|
know, do we really want our diplomats at risk? It is, okay, |
|
what are the equities of the rest of the government that would |
|
be affected if we decided we had to close shop because the risk |
|
was too great? I want to stress that because I don't think you |
|
can understand, at least from my perspective, how difficult the |
|
calculation is without knowing that it is not just about the |
|
State Department and USAID. |
|
Secondly, I don't think we can retreat from these hard |
|
places. We have to harden our security presence, but we can't |
|
retreat. We have to be there. We have to be picking up |
|
intelligence, information, building relationships. And if we |
|
had a whole table of some of our most experienced Ambassadors |
|
sitting here today, they would be speaking with a loud chorus, |
|
like, you know, ``Yes, help us be secure, but don't shut us |
|
down. Don't keep us behind high walls in bunkers so we can't |
|
get out and figure out what is going on.'' |
|
So that is the balance I have been trying to make for 4 |
|
years. |
|
Mr. Lowenthal. Thank you. |
|
Chairman Royce. We will only have time for two more |
|
questions. We will end at 5 o'clock. |
|
We will go now to Mr. Cook from California. |
|
Mr. Cook. Thank you, Madam Secretary. |
|
First of all, I want to compliment you. It has been a long, |
|
long day. And to survive all these questions and everything, it |
|
has been tough. |
|
I want to talk to you about the Marine security guards. |
|
Secretary Clinton. Yes. |
|
Mr. Cook. And this is from somebody who spent a long time |
|
in the Marine Corps but not under the cognizance part of DoD, |
|
not under the State Department. |
|
And you had some things in here about additional Marine |
|
security guard detachments. |
|
Secretary Clinton. Yes, sir. |
|
Mr. Cook. And the question is about whether it is prudent |
|
to task-organize those assets that are organic to you and |
|
perhaps put them in those areas that have the high-threat |
|
level. And if you could answer that, I would appreciate that. |
|
Secretary Clinton. Congressman, that is a very astute |
|
observation. I mean, we believe that we need to increase both |
|
our Marine security guard detachments as well as our Diplomatic |
|
Security and create more synergy and cooperation in these high- |
|
threat posts. |
|
The Marine security guards, as you know, are very much a |
|
presence on more than 150 of our posts. And in order to give |
|
them the facilities and support they need, they need a Marine |
|
house, they need to be very close to the Embassy. Because if |
|
you saw the recent movie ``Argo,'' you saw the Marines in |
|
there, you know, destroying the classified material when the |
|
mob was outside in Tehran. They are experts at that; they are |
|
people that are totally relied on by the entire mission. |
|
But as I said earlier, historically their job has not been |
|
personal security. So we have to figure out, working with DoD |
|
and particularly with the Marines, you know--and most of them |
|
are very young. You know, I take pictures with them everywhere |
|
I go, and usually the sergeants, you know, are older, more |
|
experienced, but most of the Marines on duty are quite young. |
|
We have to figure out how we really take advantage of their |
|
presence. And that is a conversation we are in the midst of |
|
with our DoD colleagues. And with your experience, I would |
|
welcome any insight or ideas you have about how we really do |
|
use our Marine security detachments better. |
|
Mr. Cook. Thank you very much. |
|
I yield my time. |
|
Chairman Royce. Thank you. |
|
We will go to Grace Meng from New York. |
|
Secretary Clinton. Congratulations, too, Grace. |
|
Ms. Meng. Thank you. |
|
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member. |
|
Madam Secretary, it is wonderful to see you here again. And |
|
if you have any advice for a fellow New Yorker finding her way |
|
around this town, please let me know. |
|
As a woman and as a mom, thank you so much for being a role |
|
model for women not only in the United States but all |
|
throughout the world. Thank you for your compassion and |
|
leadership always. |
|
I am curious, in the past weeks we have seen the French |
|
respond decisively to the situation in Mali. The African Union |
|
has fought well in Somalia. Do you see this as an advancement |
|
of multilateralism in combating Islamic extremism in the Middle |
|
East, in Africa? And what more can we ask from allies in that |
|
area? |
|
Secretary Clinton. Well, congratulations, Grace. |
|
And that is an excellent question because I think that is |
|
exactly what we are coping with right now. I am very proud of |
|
the work we did with African nations to stand up, financially |
|
support, and train the AMISOM force that has driven al-Shabaab |
|
out of the dominant position that it had. That meant putting |
|
American trainers, working with troops from Uganda, Burundi, |
|
Djibouti, eventually Kenya, advising some other countries that |
|
were willing to put in assets. It took money, it took time. But |
|
we just recognized the new Somali Government, which could never |
|
have been possible without American support and multilateralism |
|
because the U.N. was strongly behind it, we got other nations |
|
to invest. |
|
What we are looking at now in West Africa is to try to help |
|
support an African, AU-blessed, ECOWAS-supported troop |
|
combination from a number of countries to really take the lead |
|
against the terrorists in northern Mali. |
|
Again, this is hard. If the United States comes in and does |
|
something on our own--and I appreciated what Congressman |
|
Kinzinger said--you know, nobody can match us in military |
|
assets and prowess. But a lot of the challenges we face are not |
|
immediately or sustainably solved by military action alone. |
|
Therefore, we have to get countries in the region to increase |
|
their border security, to increase their antiterrorist, |
|
counterterrorist efforts inside their own borders. We have a |
|
lot to do now in West Africa. |
|
So I think you are right to point out the United States has |
|
to play a role, but it needs to be part of a multilateral |
|
effort in order to have a chance at success. |
|
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Madam Secretary. |
|
We have discussed many important issues. I remain concerned |
|
about whether the Accountability Review Board captured the full |
|
picture of what happened. But I think we can agree to work |
|
together moving ahead to improve security in a number of |
|
different areas. |
|
This hearing now stands adjourned. |
|
[Whereupon, at 5:02 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] |
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A P P E N D I X |
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Material Submitted for the Hearing Record |
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Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Christopher H. |
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Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State of New Jersey |
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