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<title> - THE DEBT LIMIT</title> |
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[House Hearing, 113 Congress] |
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[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] |
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THE DEBT LIMIT |
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HEARING |
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before the |
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COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS |
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U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES |
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ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS |
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FIRST SESSION |
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JANUARY 22, 2013 |
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Serial No. 113-FC01 |
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Ways and Means |
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] |
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE |
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21-129 WASHINGTON : 2017 |
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For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing |
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Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; |
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DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, |
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Washington, DC 20402-0001 |
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COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS |
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DAVE CAMP, Michigan, Chairman |
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SAM JOHNSON, Texas SANDER M. LEVIN, Michigan |
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KEVIN BRADY, Texas CHARLES B. RANGEL, New York |
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PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin JIM MCDERMOTT, Washington |
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DEVIN NUNES, California JOHN LEWIS, Georgia |
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PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio RICHARD E. NEAL, Massachusetts |
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DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington XAVIER BECERRA, California |
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CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, JR., Louisiana LLOYD DOGGETT, Texas |
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PETER J. ROSKAM, Illinois MIKE THOMPSON, California |
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JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut |
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TOM PRICE, Georgia EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon |
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VERN BUCHANAN, Florida RON KIND, Wisconsin |
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ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey |
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AARON SCHOCK, Illinois JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York |
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LYNN JENKINS, Kansas ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania |
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ERIK PAULSEN, Minnesota DANNY DAVIS, Illinois |
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KENNY MARCHANT, Texas LINDA SANCHEZ, California |
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DIANE BLACK, Tennessee |
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TOM REED, New York |
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TODD YOUNG, Indiana |
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MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania |
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TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas |
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JIM RENACCI, Ohio |
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Jennifer M. Safavian, Staff Director and General Counsel |
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Janice Mays, Minority Chief Counsel |
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C O N T E N T S |
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Page |
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Advisory of January 22, 2013 announcing the hearing.............. 2 |
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WITNESSES |
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Lee A. Casey, Partner, BakerHostetler, Washington, DC............ 6 |
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J.D. Foster, Ph.D., Norman B. Ture Senior Fellow in the Economics |
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of Fiscal Policy, The Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC...... 26 |
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G. William Hoagland, Senior Vice President, Bipartisan Policy |
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Center, Washington, DC......................................... 16 |
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Simon Johnson, Ph.D., Ronald A. Kurtz Professor of |
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Entrepreneurship, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Sloan |
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School of Management, Boston, MA............................... 44 |
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SUBMISSION FOR THE RECORD |
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Billy J. Spiva................................................... 91 |
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THE DEBT LIMIT |
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TUESDAY, JANUARY 22, 2013 |
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U.S. House of Representatives, |
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Committee on Ways and Means, |
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Washington, DC. |
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The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:34 p.m., in |
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Room 1100, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Sam Johnson |
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presiding. |
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[The advisory announcing the hearing follows:] |
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ADVISORY |
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FROM THE |
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COMMITTEE |
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ON WAYS |
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AND |
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MEANS |
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CONTACT: (202) 225-3625 |
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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE |
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Tuesday, January 15, 2013 |
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No. FC-01 |
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Camp Announces Hearing on the Debt Limit |
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House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dave Camp (R-MI) today |
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announced that the Committee will hold a hearing on the statutory debt |
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limit. The hearing will take place on Tuesday, January 22, 2013, in |
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Room 1100 of the Longworth House Office Building, beginning at 1:30 |
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p.m. |
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In view of the limited time available to hear witnesses, oral |
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testimony at this hearing will be from invited witnesses only. However, |
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any individual or organization not scheduled for an oral appearance may |
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submit a written statement for consideration by the Committee and for |
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inclusion in the printed record of the hearing. |
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BACKGROUND: |
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The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the authority to fund |
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government, including the power to ``lay and collect taxes,'' and to |
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``borrow [m]oney on the credit of the United States.'' Congress |
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provided the President with a limited delegation of borrowing authority |
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in 1917, and created the first statutory aggregate debt limit in 1939 |
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to pay obligations authorized by Congress. |
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As of December 2012, the public debt is currently at the statutory |
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limit of $16.4 trillion, and the U.S. Department of the Treasury |
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(Treasury) is currently operating under ``extraordinary measures'' that |
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give it additional, but limited, means to manage funds. According to |
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Treasury, it is expected that the government's ability to meet its |
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current obligations will be exhausted between mid-February and early |
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March of this year. |
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In announcing the hearing, Chairman Camp said, ``The Congress |
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created the debt limit as a check on the delegated borrowing power of |
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the President and it is critical that all parties understand the |
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implications of increasing the debt limit. This hearing will examine |
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the role and purpose of the debt limit, review past practices regarding |
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its increase, and explore solutions that ensure responsible management |
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of the government's finances.'' |
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FOCUS OF THE HEARING: |
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This hearing will examine the history of the debt limit, how past |
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Congresses and Presidents have negotiated and raised the limit, and |
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whether the Constitution provides options to the Executive Branch when |
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the debt limit is reached. |
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DETAILS FOR SUBMISSION OF WRITTEN COMMENTS: |
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Please Note: Any person(s) and/or organization(s) wishing to submit |
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written comments for the hearing record must follow the appropriate |
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link on the hearing page of the Committee website and complete the |
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informational forms. From the Committee homepage, http:// |
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waysandmeans.house.gov, select ``Hearings.'' Select the hearing for |
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which you would like to submit, and click on the link entitled, ``Click |
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here to provide a submission for the record.'' Once you have followed |
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the online instructions, submit all requested information. ATTACH your |
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submission as a Word document, in compliance with the formatting |
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requirements listed below, by the close of business on Tuesday, |
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February 12, 2013. Finally, please note that due to the change in House |
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mail policy, the U.S. Capitol Police will refuse sealed-package |
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deliveries to all House Office Buildings. For questions, or if you |
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encounter technical problems, please call (202) 225-3625 or (202) 225- |
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2610. |
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FORMATTING REQUIREMENTS: |
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The Committee relies on electronic submissions for printing the |
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official hearing record. As always, submissions will be included in the |
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record according to the discretion of the Committee. The Committee will |
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not alter the content of your submission, but we reserve the right to |
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format it according to our guidelines. Any submission provided to the |
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Committee by a witness, any supplementary materials submitted for the |
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printed record, and any written comments in response to a request for |
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written comments must conform to the guidelines listed below. Any |
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submission or supplementary item not in compliance with these |
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guidelines will not be printed, but will be maintained in the Committee |
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files for review and use by the Committee. |
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1. All submissions and supplementary materials must be provided in |
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Word format and MUST NOT exceed a total of 10 pages, including |
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attachments. Witnesses and submitters are advised that the Committee |
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relies on electronic submissions for printing the official hearing |
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record. |
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2. Copies of whole documents submitted as exhibit material will not |
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be accepted for printing. Instead, exhibit material should be |
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referenced and quoted or paraphrased. All exhibit material not meeting |
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these specifications will be maintained in the Committee files for |
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review and use by the Committee. |
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3. All submissions must include a list of all clients, persons and/ |
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or organizations on whose behalf the witness appears. A supplemental |
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sheet must accompany each submission listing the name, company, |
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address, telephone, and fax numbers of each witness. |
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The Committee seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons |
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with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please |
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call 202-225-1721 or 202-226-3411 TDD/TTY in advance of the event (four |
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business days notice is requested). Questions with regard to special |
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accommodation needs in general (including availability of Committee |
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materials in alternative formats) may be directed to the Committee as |
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noted above. |
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Note: All Committee advisories and news releases are available on |
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the World Wide Web at http://www.waysandmeans.house.gov/. |
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Mr. JOHNSON OF TEXAS. We are expecting votes, so we are |
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going to go ahead and get started. The Chairman is on his way. |
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He will be landing in a couple of minutes. But we are going to |
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get started. |
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Good afternoon. Welcome to today's hearing on the debt |
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limit. The Chairman has been delayed, but given the votes this |
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afternoon, he asked we go ahead and start the hearing so |
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Members may have as much time as possible with our |
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distinguished witnesses. |
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Before hearing from our witnesses, I will read Chairman |
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Camp's prepared opening statement and then turn it over to Mr. |
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Levin for his usual opening statement. |
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Good afternoon. Thank you for joining us today, all of you. |
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The topic of today's hearing is the debt limit, which has |
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increased higher and faster under President Obama than any |
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President in our Nation's history. Since the President first |
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took office in 2009, there have been four increases in the |
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statutory debt limit, totaling more than $5 trillion, a 55 |
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percent increase. |
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As of December 31, 2012, our Nation reached the current |
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debt limit of nearly $16.4 trillion, and the Treasury |
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Department has been using extraordinary measures to avoid |
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exceeding the debt limit. According to a letter from Secretary |
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Geithner, those measures will be exhausted between mid-February |
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and early March. |
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In the simplest of terms, the debt limit helps hold |
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Washington accountable to hardworking taxpayers, who ultimately |
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foot the bill for Washington's spending habits. Without a |
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limit, Washington would be free to borrow as much as it wanted |
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without even a review of the bills we have racked up and those |
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that are still coming due. |
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Now, as I have said many times before, no one party is |
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solely to blame. During 8 years of the previous Bush |
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Presidency, deficits increased by $2.4 trillion. President |
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Obama ran up twice that much during just his first term. |
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The debt is not just some number; it has a direct impact on |
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American families. During the President's fiscal commission, we |
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heard nonpartisan testimony that stated when the debt is this |
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large in comparison to the economy, it costs the country the |
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equivalent of about 1 million jobs. Think about that. If |
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Washington got its debt and spending under control, 1 million |
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more Americans would be working today. |
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As if that wasn't sobering enough, the staggering size of |
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our debt and lack of a plan to deal with it also threaten to |
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drive interest rates up. The Fitch Ratings agency recently |
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warned that the failure to make progress on our structural debt |
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would likely still result in a downgrade of the U.S. credit |
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rating. A lower credit rating is sure to mean higher interest |
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rates, which means families will face higher credit card |
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payments, higher car payments, higher student loan payments, |
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and certainly higher mortgage payments. |
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In 2006, when speaking in opposition to increasing the debt |
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limit, then-Senator Obama said, ``The fact that we are here |
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today to debate raising America's debt limit is a sign of |
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leadership failure.'' Those comments hold true today. That is |
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why it is disappointing that the President has declined to |
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engage in a meaningful dialogue to identify a responsible, |
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balanced approach to reducing spending and, by extension, |
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reducing the deficit, which the President promised to cut in |
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half during his first term. |
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Of course, it is tough to cut the deficit when the Senate, |
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which is controlled by the President's own party, will not or |
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cannot even produce a budget. It has been 4 years since the |
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Democrat-controlled Senate has passed a budget. That is a |
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disgrace. |
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I fully expect Republicans and Democrats will disagree |
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about what the budget should look like. Even when one party has |
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a majority in both the Senate and the House, the two bodies |
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often disagree. Disagreeing isn't the problem; the failure to |
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resolve those differences is the problem. And how can we even |
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start to find common ground if Senate Democrats won't tell us |
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where they stand? |
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In the first place, having the House and Senate pass a |
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budget is the first step toward getting our finances back in |
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shape. |
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I want to thank the witnesses for agreeing to testify today |
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and sharing your expertise on the debt, the debt limit, and |
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what it means for the country. I thank you for your being here. |
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And I would also like to welcome and thank our witnesses |
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for appearing before us. Before we hear from them, I recognize |
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now the Ranking Member, Mr. Levin, for his opening statement. |
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Mr. LEVIN. Thank you. |
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Welcome to all four of you. |
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Today's hearing appears to have been originally designed to |
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give the veneer of credibility to the notion that it might be |
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appropriate, thinkable, or manageable to default on our debt. |
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It is none of these. The debt ceiling is about paying the bills |
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of the United States of America, for spending that this |
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institution authorized. Manipulating it today, next week, or in |
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3 or 4 months damages our economy and our credibility. |
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In the summer of 2011--and I urge we all try to remember |
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it--Republicans in this Congress pushed our Nation toward |
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default. There were clear consequences--clear consequences. |
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Today, they are prolonging another debt-ceiling showdown |
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instead of a long-term extension. This continues and increases |
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the economic uncertainty. |
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Our Nation's economic wounds from 18 months ago are simply |
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too fresh to ignore. August 2011 was the single worst month for |
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job creation in the last 3 years. The Dow Jones plunged 2,000 |
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points in July and August of 2011, including one of its worst |
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single-day drops in history, tumbling 635 points on August 8th. |
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The Treasury was forced to spend $1.3 billion more in interest |
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payments, according to GAO. The Bipartisan Policy Center |
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estimates that the higher costs will be almost $19 billion over |
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the next decade. |
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And, of course, who could forget that the U.S. credit |
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rating was downgraded for the first time in our history? One |
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Standard & Poor's senior director said shortly after the credit |
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agency downgraded the U.S. credit rating that the stability and |
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effectiveness of American political institutions were |
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undermined by the fact, and I quote, ``that people in the |
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political arena were even talking about a potential default.'' |
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The Washington Post unequivocally stated in a story this |
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week that, and I quote, ``In 2011, the debt-ceiling dispute |
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traumatized the economy.'' A senior principal economist with |
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IHS Global Insight was one of the many economists who have |
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warned against a repeat. He wrote in a report last week, and |
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again I quote, ``If the political bickering over the debt- |
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ceiling issue reaches a fever pitch, as it did in the summer of |
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2011, then consumer confidence will nosedive further into |
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recession territory.'' |
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We are hearing today that instead of quickly enacting a |
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clean increase to the debt ceiling, there may be some other |
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options. Some of the witnesses seem to suggest that it might be |
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possible to instruct Treasury to pay bondholders while delaying |
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payments to others. Whose bills should be delayed or cut? The |
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Social Security checks of 56 million seniors and people with |
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disabilities? The salaries of more than 2 million American |
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personnel, many of whom are currently in harm's way? |
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The idea is so troubling that it drew a strong rebuke from |
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The Post Fact Checker last week. And he said, I quote, ``By |
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available evidence, it appears all but impossible for the |
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Treasury Department to pick and choose among payments.'' It is |
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reported, as I read, that our Chairman, Chairman Camp, also |
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cautioned his colleagues last week that such an approach is |
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unworkable. |
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I also urge--and I went back and checked it--that it |
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embellishes history to imply that threatening to default has |
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historically been used as leverage for deficit reduction, such |
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as with Gramm-Rudman, which I voted for. In the House in both |
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cases, the debt-ceiling bill was deemed passed, and the Senate |
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then used it as a vehicle, not as a threat, for deficit- |
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reduction legislation. |
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Over the past 2 years, we have achieved $2.5 trillion in |
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deficit reduction--I repeat: $2.5 trillion in deficit |
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reduction--and set an important precedent for future further |
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balanced deficit reduction that includes both spending cuts and |
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new revenue. And I close firmly urging we should proceed with |
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this effort, focusing further on economic growth and jobs, not |
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damaging this effort by attempting to use the debt ceiling for |
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political leverage. |
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Thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
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Mr. JOHNSON OF TEXAS. Thank you, Mr. Levin. |
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It is my pleasure to welcome the panel of witnesses before |
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us today. We have four witnesses on today's panel. |
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We will first hear from Lee Casey, a partner at the law |
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firm of BakerHostetler. Mr. Casey is a former official in the |
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Department of Justice Office of Legal Policy and Office of |
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Legal Counsel. |
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Second, we will welcome William Hoagland, Senior Vice |
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President of the Bipartisan Policy Center. Mr. Hoagland is also |
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the former Director of Budget and Appropriations for the Senate |
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Majority Leader, Bill Frist, and former Staff Director of the |
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Senate Budget Committee. |
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Third on the panel is Dr. J.D. Foster, the Norman B. Ture |
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Senior Fellow in the Economics of Fiscal Policy at The Heritage |
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Foundation. |
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Finally, we will hear from Dr. Simon Johnson, the Ronald A. |
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Kurtz Professor of Entrepreneurship at the Massachusetts |
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Institute of Technology's Sloan School of Management. |
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I appreciate all of you being here with us today. The |
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Committee has received your written statements. They will be |
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made part of the formal hearing record. Each of you will be |
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recognized for 5 minutes for your oral remarks. |
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Mr. Casey, we will begin with you. You are recognized for 5 |
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minutes. |
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STATEMENT OF LEE A. CASEY, |
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PARTNER, BAKERHOSTETLER, WASHINGTON, DC |
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Mr. CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the |
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Committee. It is an honor and a privilege to appear here today |
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to discuss the critical issue of the Federal debt ceiling. |
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Although there are many important policy questions raised |
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by the current debate over the debt ceiling, I would like to |
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address the more fundamental constitutional questions of |
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whether there must be a congressionally mandated limit to |
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Federal borrowing and the extent to which the President may |
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ignore these restraints or simply raise that limit and borrow |
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money on his own authority. |
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I believe that the answer is clear: Under the Constitution, |
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Congress alone has the power to decide how, when, and why |
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Federal spending should take place, and the extent to which |
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that spending may be supported by taxation and/or borrowing. |
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The debt limit is, of course, a statutory device that dates |
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to the First World War. Although the debt limit in its current |
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form is not constitutionally mandated, some type of |
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congressionally controlled limit on executive branch borrowing |
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is required and, whatever precise form that limitation takes, |
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it is constitutionally protected. The President can neither |
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ignore nor alter the debt limit without fundamentally |
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subverting the Constitution's separation of powers and |
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violating his oath of office. |
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There are two principal mechanisms by which the Federal |
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Government may obtain resources in order to operate: through |
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taxation and through borrowing. The Constitution makes both of |
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these mechanisms the peculiar province of the legislative |
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branch. Congress alone is granted the authority to lay and |
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collect taxes, to pay Federal debts, and to borrow money on the |
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credit of the United States. The executive branch then carries |
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out these functions; that is, its role is to execute what |
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Congress has enacted in these areas. The President has no |
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independent authority to raise taxes or to borrow on the |
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Nation's credit. |
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This was, of course, the purpose and intent of the |
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Constitution's Framers. In a basic division of governmental |
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power, they gave Congress the power of the purse, a grant they |
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viewed as especially empowering the House of Representatives, |
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where all revenue bills must originate. |
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Moreover, as James Madison explained in the Federalist No. |
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58, the Framers fully anticipated and intended that |
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congressional power over Federal taxation, borrowing, and |
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spending would be used as a political weapon. I quote, ``This |
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power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most |
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complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can |
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arm the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining |
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a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect |
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every just and salutary measure.'' |
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It follows, of course, that the President cannot raise the |
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debt ceiling on his own authority and is bound to respect this |
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limitation on Federal spending, even if this requires him to |
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make difficult decisions and take actions he would not |
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otherwise support. Claims that section 4 of the 14th Amendment |
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grants the President such power are mistaken. Section 4 forbids |
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repudiation of Federal debts lawfully incurred. Permitting the |
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President to raise the debt ceiling on his own authority under |
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section 4 would upset the Constitution's basic separation of |
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powers. And it is also plainly inconsistent with the 14th |
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Amendment's language that, I quote, ``The Congress shall have |
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power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of |
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this article.'' |
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It is also important to understand that the public debt |
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guaranteed by section 4 does not include ordinary Federal |
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spending programs but extends only to debt instruments issued |
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in exchange for money on the credit of the United States. |
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Thus, as a constitutional matter, Congress has the |
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authority and obligation to regulate Federal borrowing. It can |
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exercise this power in a number of different ways, including by |
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voting on individual debt issues as was the case before the |
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First World War, or by establishing an overall limit on the |
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amount of debt the Federal Government may incur without further |
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congressional action. |
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The President is bound by such limits. He can neither |
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ignore the debt ceiling, nor can he raise it on his own |
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authority. |
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And I would be pleased to answer any questions the |
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Committee may have. And thank you. |
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[The prepared statement of Mr. Casey follows:] |
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] |
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Mr. JOHNSON OF TEXAS. Thank you, Mr. Casey. I appreciate |
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your comments. |
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Mr. Hoagland, you are recognized for 5 minutes. |
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STATEMENT OF G. WILLIAM HOAGLAND, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, |
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BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC |
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Mr. HOAGLAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Levin, and |
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Members of the Committee. It is a privilege for me to be here |
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this afternoon. |
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Fundamentally, the debt-ceiling discussion emerges from the |
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most basic tenet of our legislative sovereignty, and that, of |
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course, is the power of the purse. |
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I began my career here on Capitol Hill with the |
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Congressional Budget Office in 1975. Later, as staff on the |
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Senate Budget Committee and in the Senate Majority Leader's |
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office, I witnessed and participated in many budget standoffs. |
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But one of the first and most memorable was the one that the |
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Ranking Member mentioned, the 1985 Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. I |
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believe Mr. Levin and Mr. Rangel were the only two who were |
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here at that time in 1985. That legislation came about because |
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of the need to raise the statutory debt limit over $2 trillion |
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for the first time in the country's history. |
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The debt-limit bill has always been politically sensitive, |
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but as the country's debt has continued to increase, the need |
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to legislate an increase has become more frequent--78 times |
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since 1940--and more difficult. Further, based on the actions |
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that the 112th Congress took at the end of the 112th, I |
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estimate that the debt held by the public will continue to |
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rise, reaching 77 percent of GDP by 2022, and the debt subject |
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to limit will exceed $27 trillion. |
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My statement addresses two issues: First, what we call the |
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X date, the date at which extraordinary measures will run out |
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and there will be insufficient cash to pay our Nation's bills; |
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and, second, one of the foci of this hearing, what options are |
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available to the Executive when that X date is reached. |
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On the first question, the cash flows of the past week have |
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largely been, as we have anticipated, with no large |
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fluctuations. And we at the BPC base our estimates of those |
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cash flows on known cash flows and scheduled payments during |
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this time period and on previous years' patterns of payments. |
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And at this point, we are projecting the windows of the X date |
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between February 15th and March 1st, the same as Treasury. |
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On the second issue, what actions might the Treasury take |
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post-X date, the President and Treasury officials will face two |
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potential scenarios: First, the Treasury could prioritize |
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payments, choosing to pay some and not others. In 1985, the |
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Comptroller General issued a letter to the then-Chairman of the |
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Senate Finance Committee, Bob Packwood, concluding that the |
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Secretary of the Treasury does have the authority to choose the |
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order in which to pay obligations of the United States. I asked |
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the GAO general counsel last week if this opinion has changed |
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and have been told that GAO has not issued an opinion on this |
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question since 1985. It stands. |
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Now, while prioritization may be legal, the actual |
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implementation of it may not be practical. Treasury must make |
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over 5 million payments on each business day. Treasury's |
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computer systems are set up to confirm and process all payments |
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as they come due. Implementing prioritization would be a |
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dramatic overhaul and extremely difficult. Further, should |
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Congress take to itself the responsibility of setting payment |
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dates, possibly having to overturn the Prompt Payment Act or |
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Title X of the Budget Act dealing with impoundment and other |
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existing laws, one must be realistic as to how long such a |
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legislative debate would last. |
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The second scenario, should the Treasury deem |
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prioritization to be implausible, the Secretary could instead |
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announce that the government will make payments on daily |
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obligations but in the order in which they come due on a |
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delayed schedule. Assuming, as we do, that the X date is |
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February 15th, the Treasury enters that date with precisely |
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enough cash to fund the $30 billion interest payment due that |
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day, and all other interest payments are prioritized and paid |
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on time. |
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In this situation, there would be $22 billion of |
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noninterest payments owed on February 15th, which include |
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military pay and unemployment benefits. They would be delayed |
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until February 20th. Similarly, over $30 billion of payments |
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due on February 20th, which include Social Security benefits, |
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would have to be delayed until February 25th. These delays |
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would continue to cascade. Payments due March 1st, which |
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include Social Security benefits, military salaries, and |
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veterans benefits, among others, would be delayed until March |
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15th, half a month late. The government could face legal |
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challenges under the Prompt Payment Act, not to mention the |
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real impact on individuals and businesses across the country. |
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Finally, under normal conditions, Treasury issues new debt |
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to the public in order to raise cash to pay off outstanding |
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securities as they mature. However, in a situation where |
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Treasury has begun to delay payments on noninterest |
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obligations, there is a possibility that such auctions would be |
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disrupted. Investors might demand a significant premium on |
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their debt purchases or, in the worst-case scenario, Treasury |
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could find itself with insufficient buyers for an auction. |
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Were this to occur, it would force Treasury to step in with |
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enough cash to pay off the redeeming bondholders or face a |
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default on the U.S. debt, and it would further delay |
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noninterest obligations--a vicious circle. We expect that there |
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will be over $500 billion of debt that will need to be rolled |
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over from February 15th to March 15th. |
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In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the Bipartisan Policy Center |
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strongly believes that the imbalance in our Federal budget |
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ledger does need to be addressed. Risks are risks, and while no |
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one can know for sure what ramifications the largely |
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unprecedented scenario of passing the X date would have, those |
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risks clearly grow day by day and eventually could become |
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catastrophic. These are considerations I know the Members of |
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this Committee will keep in mind as you deliberate this |
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important issue. |
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Thank you. |
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[The prepared statement of Mr. Hoagland follows:] |
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] |
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Mr. JOHNSON OF TEXAS. Thank you, sir. I appreciate that. |
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Dr. Foster, you are recognized for 5 minutes. |
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STATEMENT OF J.D. FOSTER, PH.D., NORMAN B. TURE SENIOR FELLOW |
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IN THE ECONOMICS OF FISCAL POLICY, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, |
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WASHINGTON, DC |
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Mr. FOSTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Levin, Members of |
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the Committee. Good afternoon. It is nice to be back. |
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My name is J.D. Foster. I am the Norman B. Ture Senior |
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Fellow at The Heritage Foundation. The views I express today |
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are my own and should not be construed as the position of The |
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Heritage Foundation. |
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Mr. Chairman, once again we find ourselves in dire straits. |
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The President's position on the debt ceiling I believe could be |
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summed up simply as: Kick the can, and then we will have a |
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conversation; we will engage in a dialogue. The Senate's |
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position can be summed up simply as: Hoping not to be noticed. |
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And so it falls, as it so often does, on the House to lead. |
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On the debt ceiling, I believe we face basically three |
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options--two drastic, and one, which is sound. The first |
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drastic one: Congress could simply leave the debt ceiling in |
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place. While perhaps tempting to some, and understandably so, I |
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think we all know this would be unwise and irresponsible, with |
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consequences we can only begin to imagine--consequences that do |
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not include, however, defaulting on the Nation's debt, a |
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suggestion the President frequently makes in awesome |
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irresponsibility. |
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Second, Congress could raise the debt ceiling by some large |
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amount or repeal it altogether, as the President has suggested, |
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and do nothing else. Raising it substantially and doing nothing |
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else would continue a pattern of reckless, irresponsible fiscal |
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policy with no end in sight and, for this reason, would with |
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certainty also bring terrible consequences. To be sure, the |
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date of onset of these consequences is uncertain, which makes |
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this course so appealing in a political environment often |
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favoring perfect myopia. |
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The Federal Government's debt trajectory is dangerous-- |
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dangerous to our economy, dangerous to our future as a Nation. |
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And surely that, at least, we can all agree on. Fiscally, the |
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rise in the debt means more of the government's resources will |
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be crowded out in the future into paying interest expense, |
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making less resources available for other priorities. Americans |
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generally are willing to pay taxes, but they expect services in |
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return. Servicing the government's debt is not what they have |
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in mind. |
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Economically, it also means that savings that would |
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otherwise be available for productive investment in the private |
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sector have been captured by the government. Less private |
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saving means a smaller economy and lower wages. Soaring public |
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debt also means that when interest rates begin to rise--and |
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rise they most assuredly will--they are now set to rise much |
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farther and much faster. The consequences of these higher |
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interest rates will be the most terrible of all, for families, |
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for businesses, for the economy. And there will be nothing then |
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that Congress can do to stop them. |
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What Congress should do is raise the debt ceiling while |
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enacting concrete programmatic spending reforms, especially to |
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entitlements, to reduce the deficit in the short run and |
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especially the long run. There are sound, bipartisan, |
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commonsense, options for restraining entitlement spending while |
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ensuring these programs preserve economic security for the |
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elderly and the poor. Indeed, it is possible through reform to |
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remedy key failings, such as the woefully inadequate minimum |
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benefit in Social Security and the lack of a catastrophic |
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benefit in Medicare, while doing these reforms. Our mantra |
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should be ``reform and improve'' while slowing the growth of |
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spending. |
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If the President led on these issues, he could help shape |
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these vital programs to ensure their sustainability and |
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effectiveness and, in the process, transform himself from the |
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most fiscally irresponsible President to arguably the most |
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fiscally responsible President in our history. |
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Which brings us back to the debt limit. Modern history |
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provides fertile ground for doubt when process solutions |
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substitute for concrete decisions, such as the House is |
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considering. Thus, I have my qualms over the course the House |
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leadership has set. But I understand the difficulties the House |
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faces, and I accept as sincere assurances that there is a |
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firmer strategy. I accept this. |
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I agree entirely that if we are to make sustained progress |
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in restraining spending and deficits, Congress must return to |
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the regular order in a budget process, however much the other |
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body would like to do otherwise. The House is correct to press |
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for a regular, disciplined budget process. |
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I don't know whether the House can compel a change in |
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course. I acknowledge the difficulties. For all our sakes and |
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the sake of my children and yours, I fervently hope you |
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succeed. |
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I do know the House can take a stand to present the |
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American people a clear alternative to soaring debt and a |
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dimmer future: To choose to stand with deficits and debt and |
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decline, or to stand with the economic security and prosperity |
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of future generations of Americans. The American people deserve |
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at least to know this much from the U.S. House of |
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Representatives: Where the Nation is heading and what the House |
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would do differently. |
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Thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
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[The prepared statement of Mr. Foster follows:] |
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] |
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Mr. JOHNSON OF TEXAS. Thank you, Dr. Foster. |
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Professor Johnson, you are recognized for 5 minutes. Please |
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proceed. |
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STATEMENT OF SIMON JOHNSON, PH.D., RONALD A. KURTZ PROFESSOR OF |
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ENTREPRENEURSHIP, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY SLOAN |
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SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT, BOSTON, MA |
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Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. |
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I find it frightening and also hard to believe that we are |
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having this conversation in general and that you are having a |
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hearing on this matter. |
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Among other things, I am the former Chief Economist of the |
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International Monetary Fund, and I would remind you that the |
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United States is not just the center of the world's economy; |
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our financial assets, our government debt serves as a linchpin |
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of the world's financial system. |
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From 1948 to 1968, foreigners held as reserves U.S. |
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Government debt worth about 2 percent of our GDP. Their |
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reserves now, their rainy-day funds, the basis of their |
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financial calculations, are now at least 15 percent of our GDP. |
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These are assets they hold willingly. They hold them because |
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this has in the past been regarded as the world's safest asset. |
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You are calling this into question when you raise the issue of |
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not increasing the debt ceiling. This, to the world, to the |
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world's investors, is just unbelievable, that you would even |
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have this conversation. |
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Could I show, please, the first slide? |
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I testified before this Committee and I made these exact |
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same points in the summer of 2011. And the point I tried to |
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communicate to you then was that if you continued to have a |
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confrontation around the debt ceiling, you would create an |
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unprecedented level of uncertainty regarding economic policy in |
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the United States. |
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This chart is taken from the work of Professors Baker, |
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Bloom, and Davis. The full reference is in my written |
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testimony. And they have measured policy uncertainty since |
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1985--not, I would say, at my behest or particularly focusing |
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on the debt ceiling. But what do they find? What do you see in |
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this chart? |
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Matching exactly with what Mr. Levin said at the beginning, |
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August 2011 stands out as the moment since 1985 when we had the |
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greatest uncertainty, the most lack of clarity for everyone-- |
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not just for the government, everyone in the private sector. |
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Consumers, businesses cannot make decisions if they don't know |
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what is going to happen to the government debt. |
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And listening to the testimony just now, I was further |
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frightened by the extent to which leading experts disagree or |
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vary in opinion with regard to exactly what may happen if we |
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are to breach or come up against or somehow play with this debt |
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ceiling. |
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The United States has never threatened to default, not |
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since the 1780s. That has been the key element of U.S. fiscal |
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policy since the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. |
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That is actually a lesson that President Madison learned the |
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hard way in and after the War of 1812, the importance of being |
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very careful with your public debt and very careful with all |
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communications around your public debt management. |
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If you don't raise the debt ceiling now or if you postpone |
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this conversation, if you say, every 60, 90, or 100 days we are |
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going to again have the same kind of conversation about the |
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debt ceiling, you will continue to have this sort of spike in |
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policy uncertainty, you will continue to undermine the private |
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sector, you will continue to delay investment and to reduce |
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employment relative to what it would be otherwise. |
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I urge you--I understand you have many difficult fiscal |
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conversations to come. I appreciate that. I realize there is a |
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range of reasonable opinion here. But I urge you, as I urged |
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you in the summer of 2011: Take the debt ceiling off the table. |
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Do it for our sakes. Do it for the world economy. Do it for the |
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global financial system, which has still not recovered from the |
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problems of 2007-2008. |
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If you want to destabilize the European economy, if you |
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want to put pressure on all those sovereigns in Europe who are |
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right now struggling fiscally, then you should have exactly |
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this confrontation, pushing up the yield on risky assets around |
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the world. But you don't want to do that. You don't want to |
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destabilize Europe. You don't want another downgrade of U.S. |
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debt. You don't want another spike in policy uncertainty. |
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Please, take the debt ceiling, once and for all, completely |
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off the table. |
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Thank you. |
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[The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:] |
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] |
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Mr. JOHNSON OF TEXAS. Thank you, sir. |
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We have a vote going on right now, and it appears to me |
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that we are not going to be able to continue as we are. So I |
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think we will recess until the vote is over, which will be |
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about half an hour, they say, and return. So the meeting stands |
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in recess---- |
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Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, let me just mention, there is |
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going to be a Rules Committee meeting on the bill, so I may not |
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be here for the questioning. I think my colleagues will be |
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pressing the issue of a 3-month delay and the potential harm it |
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can do. |
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We went through this once, Dr. Johnson. I remember your |
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testimony so well. And to think of going through it again, my |
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hope is that there will be questions that can elicit your view |
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as to why we should not be playing with fire once again. |
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Thank you. |
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Mr. JOHNSON OF TEXAS. The Committee stands in recess. |
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[Recess.] |
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Chairman CAMP [presiding]. The Committee will come back to |
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order. |
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I want to thank our witnesses for being here today. |
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And I think we will move into the question and answer |
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period. I am going to reserve my question time for a minute, |
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and I will go to Mr. Brady. |
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You are recognized for 5 minutes. |
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Mr. BRADY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
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And thank you to all those who were here for the testimony |
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today. It was very helpful. |
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First, clearly, America will pay its debts. That has been |
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made clear by Republicans and Democrats in Congress. We always |
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have. And I hope that those who choose to be melodramatic about |
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it these days to gain political advantage, if you could please |
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stop, that would be helpful. |
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Second, there is absolutely no chance that the President's |
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request to have a permanent unlimited debt ceiling will occur. |
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This is the constitutional prerogative of the House and the |
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Senate. As we have seen in the past, it has also been a helpful |
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tool, not only on checks and balances, but to enact spending |
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reforms and restraints that can be helpful, although, in my |
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view, have not been as helpful as they have in the past. |
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And a third point is that the claim we heard earlier today, |
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that a short-term extension of the debt limit may raise our |
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U.S. Government debt service cost, that is highly speculative. |
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The 2011 GAO study showed mixed results, with no significant |
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impacts in 40 percent of the extensions. So three out of every |
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five had no impact. The 2012 report was based on only one |
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event, so it is statistically inconclusive. The Bipartisan |
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Policy Center estimates are based upon both of these |
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questionable GAO studies, and they miss the point. |
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The fact of the matter is, unsustained spending over time, |
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without doubt, will raise the cost of our borrowing in America. |
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That is why we are all here today to deal with this issue or |
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attempt to give our best insight. |
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I would like to ask Dr. Foster a question because it |
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relates to the debt ceiling. Many of us see the other side of |
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that coin as a credit downgrade, a second one, which has |
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serious consequences not just for our borrowing but for |
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borrowing of small businesses and consumers at home. |
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My question to you--and I know there are different |
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opinions, but what do you think Congress has to do? What steps |
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should we take to create not just medium-term fiscal |
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consolidation addressing that issue, but long term, dealing |
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with our long-term drivers of debt and spending? What do we |
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need to do to avoid a second downgrade, or a downgrade by a |
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second credit rating, to be accurate? |
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Mr. FOSTER. To avoid another downgrade, which on our |
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current path is almost assured, we really need to do two |
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things. And they are pointed out in the letter expressing the |
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first downgrade. |
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One, don't raise any question about not raising the debt |
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ceiling; ultimately, we have to do that. And the second is we |
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have to get our long-term fiscal house in order. That means we |
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have to get the entitlement programs under control, achieving |
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two goals: One, the reforms necessary to make sure they achieve |
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the result intended, which is protecting at-risk populations, |
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while spending moneys that we can afford to spend and no more. |
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There are simple entitlement reforms-- |
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straightforward, and well- vetted--that this Congress could |
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adopt, I believe, fairly quickly. They are not even |
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legislatively complex. And these are the kinds of reforms that |
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have received bipartisan support in the past. They are sort of |
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commonsense changes. |
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It is frustrating, in fact, that we don't take these |
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reforms more seriously and move on them because they would have |
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profound impacts in the long run, where the fiscal problem |
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really lies. Yes, we have a serious problem with a trillion- |
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dollar budget deficit today, but, really, as large as that is, |
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that problem is dwarfed by our long-run fiscal problems from |
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the entitlement programs. |
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We know some of the basic reforms, bipartisan reforms that |
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can be enacted that will go a long way to getting Medicare and |
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Social Security, in particular, on a more sustainable path. And |
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that is where the Congress should be looking as we debate |
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fiscal policy this year, beginning with the debt ceiling. |
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Mr. BRADY. Do you think investors look beyond that debt- |
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ceiling issue to those fundamentals you talked about, answering |
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the question, is America serious about getting its financial |
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house in order over the long term? Do you think that really |
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creates the most uncertainty going forward over the long term? |
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Mr. FOSTER. It is certainly a tremendous source of |
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uncertainty. There are others, but that is a major source of |
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uncertainty that credit markets most assuredly look at, as |
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indicated by the letter transmitting the credit rating |
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downgrade the last time. |
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Mr. BRADY. All right. |
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Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. |
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Chairman CAMP. Thank you. |
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Mr. Rangel is recognized for 5 minutes. |
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Mr. RANGEL. Thank you. And welcome back, Mr. Chairman. |
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Chairman CAMP. Thank you. |
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Mr. RANGEL. I am under the impression that the debt ceiling |
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is to give the authority to the President to assure our |
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creditors that each and every nickel that we would borrow will |
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be paid back. I also believe that we have to have some |
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guidelines on the spending in order to share with creditors and |
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Americans alike the fact that we are going to reduce |
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unnecessary spending. Having said that, there are some people |
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who believe that we have to have to be involved, this debt |
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ceiling, and with the deficit. And, of course, that is |
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controversial. |
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Under the system of prioritizing payments, as some people |
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are pushing forward, they would believe that we can determine |
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just who we were going to pay out interest to while we get a |
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better handle on the spending part of this dilemma. And I just |
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want to ask Dr. Johnson some questions. |
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These programs, I think you pay your interest on your debt |
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as the number-one priority. I think every family would like to |
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pay off interest; Social Security; and then third, somewhere |
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active duty military. And I think that is patriotic as well as |
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political. |
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But under this scenario, Dr. Johnson, will we be paying the |
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people that we borrowed from in China, the debt that we owe |
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China, the biggest creditor, or one of the largest, before we |
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would pay our American military that got caught, like I did, in |
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Korea, fighting the Chinese? Does this work out, that in terms |
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of avoiding the payment of our debt, that we would pay off our |
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debtors before we pay off our military? Is that part of this |
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plan? |
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Mr. JOHNSON. Well, Mr. Rangel, it is hard to know. I mean, |
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I don't think these plans are very detailed, worked-out, |
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credible plans. They are vague notions, the ones I have seen. |
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But, yes, I have seen the notion expressed that the United |
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States would pay its debts in the form of interest and |
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principal on bonds, a substantial fraction of which are held by |
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the Chinese Government, for example, ahead of payments that it |
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would make of other kinds, which would include, presumably, the |
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way that is framed, payments to active service military |
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personnel, for example. |
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Now, that just seems like a very strange notion---- |
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Mr. RANGEL. It seems to me, if you owed anybody any money, |
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no matter whether it was the country or your company, and you |
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were not giving the executive director the authority to pay |
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what has already been borrowed, that that shouldn't make our |
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lenders feel comfortable. |
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But about the question of reducing spending, is there a |
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vehicle that the Congress can exercise its ability without |
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jeopardizing the reputation of credit? I mean, we have to deal |
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with it, but you say and I think most people believe, don't |
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attack the debt ceiling and integrity of the United States of |
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America, but use the constitutional vehicles you have. What can |
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the Congress do to express America's concern about spending? |
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Mr. JOHNSON. Well, Congressman, as you know far better than |
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I do, you have a wide range of tools, and, in fact, you have |
|
more than 200 years of fiscal history in which the Congress did |
|
exactly that. Congress exerted for many, many years both a |
|
reasonable tax base that was consistent with the spending that |
|
they wanted, and nobody ever put the debt ceiling or the U.S. |
|
willingness to pay its obligations on the table in the way that |
|
it was placed in the summer of 2011 and the way that I fear it |
|
is now being placed on the table again. |
|
It was a big mistake in 2011 to create this degree of |
|
uncertainty and fear in the United States and around the world, |
|
and it is a big mistake to do it again today. |
|
Mr. RANGEL. Why would any good-thinking, patriotic American |
|
who loves the country as well as we all do want to use the debt |
|
ceiling as a vehicle to reduce spending rather than the other |
|
legislative opportunities we would have? What would their |
|
reasoning be? Certainly not to embarrass the United States of |
|
America. |
|
Mr. JOHNSON. I have no idea, Mr. Rangel. But I can tell you |
|
that---- |
|
Mr. RANGEL. Well, if you don't have any, then maybe it is |
|
to defeat the objectives of this President at whatever cost, as |
|
some leaders or so-called leaders have said: That they want to |
|
stop this President, and they were unsuccessful in that |
|
measure. So maybe, maybe they have decided to change tactics. |
|
And maybe this discussion is unnecessary and we find some other |
|
way to get a handle on the deficit. |
|
Let me thank you for your contributions to this hearing, as |
|
you have contributed so many times before. |
|
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. |
|
Chairman CAMP. Thank you. |
|
Mr. Johnson is recognized. |
|
Mr. JOHNSON OF TEXAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
|
Mr. Foster, in his famous farewell address, President |
|
Eisenhower said, ``We cannot mortgage the material assets of |
|
our grandchildren without risking the loss also of their |
|
political and spiritual heritage. We want democracy to survive |
|
for all generations to come, not to become the insolvent |
|
phantom of tomorrow.'' |
|
In your testimony, you say that with respect to our fiscal |
|
future, ``a change of course is inevitable.'' The question is, |
|
what kind of change? You warn that one such change may be |
|
brought by credit markets increasingly intolerant of |
|
Washington's fiscal imprudence. |
|
In essence, you are saying, if we don't do anything, it is |
|
only a matter of time that financial markets will, so to speak, |
|
blow the whistle on Washington and say, ``The game is over.'' |
|
In other words, we are on borrowed time here, aren't we? |
|
Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir, I am afraid we are. |
|
And this is rather an unusual posture for Americans to be |
|
in. We are not used to thinking in these terms because, |
|
traditionally, even though we have had a fair amount of |
|
government debt, it has ranged in the order of 40 percent of |
|
our economy, which is completely manageable. It has since shot |
|
up dramatically and is going to continue to shoot up under |
|
current policies. |
|
And the evidence is very clear in the academic literature; |
|
it is very clear in international observation. There comes a |
|
point where your debt, as a share of your economy, reaches |
|
levels at which credit markets become noticeably disturbed. |
|
They become very worried. And it is expressed, in part, as |
|
rising interest rates, which then spread throughout the |
|
economy. We are not just talking about Treasury interest rates |
|
but mortgage rates and consumer rates and so forth. |
|
Mr. JOHNSON OF TEXAS. Well---- |
|
Mr. FOSTER. This is a certainty. And it is a path that we |
|
are on that will have extreme consequences that we are not used |
|
to thinking about in this country. |
|
Mr. JOHNSON OF TEXAS. Well, I ask the question, how much |
|
time do we really have? You know, with the U.S. per-person debt |
|
now 35 percent higher than that of Greece, when do you think we |
|
face our Greek moment if we fail to take meaningful action to |
|
get our fiscal house in order? |
|
Mr. FOSTER. Well, right now we are having a good news/bad |
|
news situation. The good news is that, despite all that we have |
|
done wrong, we are still one of the safest places in the world |
|
to invest. And there are a lot of places around the world that |
|
capital wants to avoid. So it keeps coming into this country, |
|
driving down our interest rates, even as we are raising debt |
|
rapidly. |
|
Well, at some point that is going to reverse, and that |
|
capital will flow out again, and interest rates will rise |
|
rapidly. When that will happen I cannot say because I don't |
|
know when, for example, Europe is finally going to get its |
|
fiscal house and monetary houses in order. But once they do, |
|
this process will reverse and we will see the consequences of |
|
what we have done. |
|
Mr. JOHNSON OF TEXAS. Yeah, Germany is making moves now. |
|
Mr. Hoagland, would you care to comment? |
|
Mr. HOAGLAND. I agree with Dr. Foster that we are probably |
|
the best-looking horse in the glue factory today. That may not |
|
last. |
|
I would also say that I am very worried about, as I said in |
|
my opening statement, the fact that we are looking at debt-to- |
|
GDP that is close to 77 percent. And while in the past we have |
|
had debt-to-GDP after World War II at that level, we didn't |
|
have 50 percent of it being owned by foreign investors. And |
|
that is what scares me in terms of our sovereignty. We think we |
|
have to deal with this going forward. |
|
I agree also that the real issue here is mandatory spending |
|
and putting in procedures, processes, and building upon a |
|
regular-order process up here of getting budget resolutions |
|
adopted, conference agreements, a reconciliation bill, and |
|
working it through the regular order. And that is why I would |
|
say that while this is not the perfect solution in terms of the |
|
3-month extension, it puts you back closer to what would |
|
normally have been a regular-order process. And I think that is |
|
positive. |
|
Mr. JOHNSON OF TEXAS. Well, I would like to know what both |
|
of you think, if we don't get it in order, you know, to our |
|
small-business owners, to our young families, to our aspiring |
|
college students, what kind of future are we looking at for |
|
these folks? Either one of you. |
|
Mr. HOAGLAND. I think the standard of living that we |
|
experienced and enjoyed, we have to be honest with ourselves |
|
that we are lessening that standard of living for future |
|
generations, our children and our grandchildren. I don't think |
|
there is any question that this level of debt would lower that |
|
standard of living that we enjoyed. |
|
Mr. JOHNSON OF TEXAS. Yeah, and people will stop wanting to |
|
come here, won't they? |
|
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. |
|
Chairman CAMP. Thank you. |
|
Mr. McDermott, you are recognized for 5 minutes. |
|
Mr. MCDERMOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
|
I have to tell you, listening to this hearing is like we |
|
are living in ``Alice in Wonderland.'' Here we are hearing from |
|
witnesses telling us how to use default creatively or use it to |
|
get some leverage or something. And simply talking about it |
|
here is destructive. The whole world is watching this hearing. |
|
It is the first hearing on this issue. |
|
And the whole point of a society is to create and run a |
|
government in order to make order for people. People don't like |
|
chaos. And this hearing is about how to create chaos to get |
|
what you can't get politically with votes. Businesses and |
|
workers in my district think this kind of talk is crazy. |
|
Today we are talking about a crisis manufactured by the |
|
Republicans, a crisis they have manufactured to achieve |
|
policies that the voters wouldn't vote for at the ballot box. |
|
The Republicans are taking the economy hostage every single |
|
time they get a chance. There are threats for workers and |
|
businesses, investors, retirees. And job growth stops every |
|
time the Republicans have a crisis; the economy falters. This |
|
is the Republican governance and economic policy at work--or |
|
not working, really. |
|
The biggest problem with the Republican arguments that are |
|
before us--and we just heard it again--is that spending and |
|
debt are problems. And this is a misdirection. Republican |
|
Congresses and Republican Presidents were happy to run up huge |
|
deficits to wage wars they didn't pay for, or take tax cuts for |
|
individuals and industry and give billions to oil companies. |
|
Now, deficits aren't what the Republicans care about. What |
|
Republicans want to do is end the guarantees on Medicare and |
|
Social Security. We just heard somebody say it is the |
|
entitlement payments that are the problem. I disagree. I think |
|
this country can have a social safety net that covers people |
|
and pay for it. |
|
And that ought to be happening, but what is happening on |
|
the other side of the aisle here is that they want everybody |
|
who is lucky and doing well to just do well, and if you aren't |
|
doing well, well, you have to deal with it. It is your problem. |
|
It is social Darwinism; it is survival of the fittest put into |
|
public policy in this Committee. |
|
That is the Republican policy. And I respect that they want |
|
a different policy than I do, but we ought to be honest about |
|
the debate. Instead, we just watch people say ``spending'' in |
|
the TV cameras again and again and again. ``Spending'' is just |
|
a term that the polls like. Republicans won't say what they |
|
want to cut because the public doesn't want their policies. But |
|
the word ``spending'' polls very well, so we hear a lot of it. |
|
But we don't hear debate because the Republicans want crisis |
|
but no solution. |
|
If we were serious about having a debate here, we would |
|
start talking about what in Medicare should be cut, or how are |
|
we going to change it, or how are we going to finance |
|
physicians. All those things would be on the table. But we |
|
don't hear that. What we say is, ``Let's just cut.'' And when |
|
you start talking across the board, you are talking about |
|
medical research, and you are talking about NASA, and you are |
|
talking about NOAA, and you are talking about all these |
|
government agencies as though they don't do anything that add |
|
anything to this society. |
|
So when we are spending our time here talking about this |
|
deficit stuff and raising the debt limit, we are simply saying |
|
to the world, for the first time, America is not going to pay |
|
its debts. |
|
Now, my question to you, Mr. Johnson, is this: If this was |
|
such a good idea, why haven't we done it before? We could have |
|
saved a lot of money by not paying our debts. Why have we |
|
suddenly decided that this is the time to do it? |
|
Give me some understanding so the American people can |
|
understand why, after all these years since the First World |
|
War, we have paid our debts under Republicans and Democrats. I |
|
voted under George Bush--both of them--to raise the debt limit. |
|
But now we are going to stop paying. Please tell me why they |
|
are doing it. |
|
Mr. JOHNSON. Well, Congressman, it is not a good idea, and |
|
it is not the way fiscal policy was run not just since World |
|
War I, but going back to 1789, after the initial assumption of |
|
debt at the Federal level and the restructuring of debt with |
|
which Alexander Hamilton began fiscal policy in this country; |
|
policy has absolutely been to always pay your debts and your |
|
other obligations. And it took a long time to convince the |
|
world that the United States was the safest place to put your |
|
reserve assets or your rainy-day money. And it was a great |
|
achievement. And now it is being squandered and thrown away |
|
for, I presume, some negotiating purpose. It makes no sense |
|
from a broader economic perspective. |
|
Chairman CAMP. Thank you. Time has expired. I would ask |
|
unanimous consent to place in the record a Statement of |
|
Administration Policy on H.R. 325, the temporary suspension of |
|
the debt ceiling, where the Administration says, ``For these |
|
reasons, the Administration would not oppose a short-term |
|
solution to the debt limit and looks forward to continuing to |
|
work with both the House and the Senate to increase certainty |
|
in the stability for the economy.'' |
|
Without objection, so ordered. |
|
[The submission of The Honorable Dave Camp follows:] |
|
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] |
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|
|
|
|
Mr. Tiberi, you are recognized for 5 minutes. |
|
Mr. TIBERI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
|
Thank you, gentlemen, for coming and testifying. |
|
Let me expand a little bit on Mr. McDermott's line of |
|
questioning and just get a quick response from the four of you. |
|
Back in 2006, speaking on the Senate floor, then Senator Obama |
|
announced that he intended to vote no on the debt-ceiling |
|
increase. He went on to say, and I quote, to oppose the |
|
effort--``I oppose the effort to increase America's debt limit. |
|
We now depend on ongoing financial assistance from foreign |
|
countries to finance our Government's reckless fiscal policies. |
|
Over the past 5 years, our Federal debt has increased by $3.5 |
|
trillion dollars to $8.6 trillion.'' Oh, to have those numbers |
|
today. Since then, we now have a $16.4 trillion debt, nearly |
|
doubled in 6 years. In fact, since this President has become |
|
President in 2009, he has added more than four times, more |
|
than--more debt in 4 years, excuse me, than the previous |
|
President did in 8. |
|
So, to the four of you, a quick question. Was the President |
|
right, is this a failure of leadership? And is there a better |
|
direction? |
|
Mr. Casey. |
|
Mr. CASEY. Well, I certainly think he was right that we |
|
oughtn't to continue to run the store based on borrowing. There |
|
is a lot of ways you can pay your debts, and they don't all |
|
include incurring---- |
|
Mr. TIBERI. But since he made that speech, it has gotten |
|
worse; we have done nothing to change the trajectory. |
|
Mr. CASEY. I agree. |
|
Mr. TIBERI. It has gotten worse. So is the President right, |
|
it is a leadership failure? |
|
Mr. CASEY. Yeah, I would agree with that, it is. |
|
Mr. HOAGLAND. Congressman, it didn't say that he was right |
|
to say what he said. I would be careful to point out that some |
|
of that increase in that debt that took place was a result of |
|
obligations that were incurred long before he was ever |
|
President of the United States or he---- |
|
Mr. TIBERI. Oh, right. |
|
Mr. HOAGLAND. Or wherever. And I just would make that very |
|
clear. |
|
Mr. TIBERI. Oh, sure. |
|
Mr. HOAGLAND. Also, I would simply say, the House-passed |
|
budget resolution last year under Congressman Ryan, which was |
|
going in the right direction of controlling spending, still had |
|
a debt for the end of this year at $17.1 trillion. |
|
Mr. TIBERI. Right. It is getting worse. |
|
Mr. HOAGLAND. It is--and getting worse. It is built into |
|
the pipeline. |
|
Mr. TIBERI. Thank you. Agreed. |
|
Mr. Foster. |
|
Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir, thank you. There is no question that |
|
allowing debt to continue to build more rapidly as a share of |
|
GDP is reckless; it is irresponsible. Under some circumstances, |
|
it is inevitable. Those circumstances are not what we have |
|
today. We should be getting it under control and doing so |
|
quickly. |
|
Mr. TIBERI. Mr. Johnson. |
|
Mr. JOHNSON. Congressman, figures 2 and 3 in my written |
|
testimony address this issue directly; where did the debt come |
|
from? These are the Congressional Budget Office numbers. This |
|
is figure 2, and you can see the impact of the tax cuts; the |
|
two foreign wars; Medicare Part D, which was not paid for; the |
|
2008 Bush tax cut; and then, of course, the financial crisis. |
|
The largest swing, if you move to figure 3, this shows you the |
|
swing in medium-term debt projected by the CBO before and after |
|
they realized the severity of the financial crisis. |
|
Mr. TIBERI. Let me ask you a quick question. |
|
Mr. JOHNSON. That is a 50 percent of GDP increase in debt. |
|
Mr. TIBERI. Was the President right, yes or no? |
|
Mr. JOHNSON. The President was right when he spoke of the |
|
reckless fiscal policies at the moment. What he didn't realize |
|
was how bad it was going to get as a result of reckless |
|
financial policies---- |
|
Mr. TIBERI. And so the President is right today, then, you |
|
are saying as well. Even though the debt has nearly doubled and |
|
we had a deficit actually that was on the decline with what you |
|
talked about, two wars, prescription drug benefits, tax cuts, |
|
it was actually less than $200 billion the year that Rob |
|
Portman, now Senator, was budget director and has now since |
|
gone over a trillion dollars 4 years in a row. |
|
Mr. JOHNSON. Congressman, we had the largest financial |
|
crisis since the Great Depression. |
|
Mr. TIBERI. I have heard this before. |
|
Mr. JOHNSON. We lost a huge amount of revenue, according to |
|
the Congressional Budget Office that is 70 to 80 percent of the |
|
swing in debt. These are the CBO's numbers. |
|
Mr. TIBERI. We are not going to solve it. I have another |
|
question for Mr. Hoagland. |
|
Mr. Hoagland, I notice that you have some experience on |
|
budget issues in the Senate. How many years did you work in the |
|
Senate, and when you worked in the Senate on budget issues, did |
|
they pass budgets when you were there? How many times? Or did |
|
they fail to pass a budget 1 year, 2 years, or maybe 3 years? |
|
Mr. HOAGLAND. I was with the Senate Budget starting with |
|
the CBO in 1975, with the Budget Committee since 1982, and left |
|
the Senate after Majority Leader's Office in 2007. Over the 33 |
|
years that we have had budget resolutions, beginning in 1979, |
|
seven times have we failed to get a conference agreement on a |
|
budget resolution. Unfortunately, over that 33 years, three of |
|
those times have been in the last 3 years. There is one time |
|
when I |
|
was staff director of the Senate Budget Committee with Chairman |
|
|
|
Pete Domenici that we did not get a concurrent resolution on |
|
the budget, and that had to do in 1998 when John Kasich was |
|
Chairman of the House Budget Committee, and we had just |
|
finished the 19--but one time. |
|
Mr. TIBERI. One time. |
|
Mr. HOAGLAND. The Senate not---- |
|
Chairman CAMP. Time has expired. Thank you. |
|
Mr. TIBERI. Thank you. |
|
Chairman CAMP. Mr. Doggett. |
|
Mr. DOGGETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. |
|
I know opinions clearly differ about where we are headed in |
|
the future, but I think as Mr. Johnson's chart demonstrates, |
|
when we concluded the Clinton Administration, we had a surplus |
|
for the first time in recent memory, and a huge tax cut, where |
|
Alan Greenspan sat where you are sitting, Mr. Johnson, and told |
|
us that the justification for this tax cut in part was that we |
|
were reducing the debt too fast, that we would create some |
|
uncertainties in the bond market because we were moving so |
|
quickly, but an unpaid tax cut, unpaid prescription benefits, |
|
two unpaid wars. Now we are told we can no longer afford, by |
|
some of our Republican colleagues, to provide health security |
|
for people at 65 or 66 that you just--you would like to do it, |
|
but we just can't afford to do it anymore. |
|
And as it relates specifically to the proposal we just |
|
heard the Administration's statement on, I gather your opinion, |
|
Mr. Johnson, is, you know, better than have a Valentine's Day |
|
cliff to at least have some additional time to help resolve |
|
this, but if we keep moving in 3-month or 1-month or 6-month |
|
spurts, the effect on economic growth will be very damaging. |
|
Mr. JOHNSON. Absolutely, Congressman. If we could pull up |
|
figure 1 from my written testimony---- |
|
Mr. DOGGETT. Please. |
|
Mr. JOHNSON [continuing]. What you would get is the spike, |
|
this is the spike from August 2011, you are going to have that |
|
every 3 months. That was a disastrous month for hiring because |
|
who wants to hire when you don't know if there are going to be |
|
payments made by the government or if various other disruptions |
|
are going to take place? These are big numbers for the U.S. |
|
economy. You are going to do this every 3 months, for how long? |
|
Until you have another election? That is far too long for the |
|
health and sanity of the American people. |
|
Mr. DOGGETT. And at the same time we had that phenomenon, I |
|
believe the General Accountability Office has estimated that |
|
the direct cost of Republicans taking us right up to the brink |
|
on the debt, on the full faith and credit of the United States |
|
last time was over a billion dollars in increased interest |
|
costs. We could also expect to see an increase in borrowing |
|
costs for taxpayers if we don't get this debt ceiling resolved. |
|
Mr. JOHNSON. That is a definite possibility, Congressman. |
|
To the extent we disrupt debt markets, if we worry investors, |
|
if we create risk, and we are hurting not just the Federal |
|
Government; this has implications for State governments and for |
|
local governments that, of course, do not generally borrow at |
|
the low interest rate the Federal Government borrows at, so |
|
they have a risk premium in there. You are driving up risk |
|
premia around the world when you generate this kind of |
|
uncertainty. |
|
Mr. DOGGETT. Your written testimony indicates that, for a |
|
decade, actually for a couple of decades, we have seen income |
|
inequality increase dramatically with little change in income |
|
for 90 percent of wage earners and a 50 percent increase for |
|
those at the top. What are the policies that you think we most |
|
need to address other than getting stability on this full faith |
|
and credit of the United States to change that and to ensure |
|
that there is a more equitable share in the success of the |
|
American economy? |
|
Mr. JOHNSON. Well, the evidence is completely compelling |
|
that education, human capital, the ability of people to work |
|
with information technology, these are huge determinants of |
|
what has happened to income inequality. And many people in |
|
American society today cannot afford by themselves to get that |
|
kind of education. |
|
To the extent that you can make resources available to support |
|
younger people, support families in the pursuit of high |
|
productivity human capital, that is good for them, that is good |
|
for the economy, and that is good for the tax base, so over the |
|
medium term, that is absolutely going to strengthen the budget. |
|
Mr. DOGGETT. And in terms of competitiveness worldwide, |
|
building a stronger workforce from, as you mentioned, early |
|
childhood education to access to a college education is really |
|
vital to American competitiveness, isn't it? |
|
Mr. JOHNSON. It is the number one determinant of both our |
|
competitiveness, the extent to which we can compete with other |
|
countries, and our productivity, how much do we actually |
|
produce per person in this economy. The number one determinant |
|
looking forward is human capital; that is about education. It |
|
is about ability to innovate, ability to work with those new |
|
technologies. |
|
Mr. DOGGETT. And over the short run, what is the effect of |
|
across-the-board cuts on early childhood education, on Pell |
|
grants, on research funding for medical research and other |
|
basic scientific research? |
|
Mr. JOHNSON. It is all going to be negative for growth and |
|
for human capital, and it is going to impact equality, and to |
|
the extent that you don't have a progressive tax system, it is |
|
also going to give you negative impact on the budget. |
|
Mr. DOGGETT. While the most immediate concern, I know, and |
|
the main focus of your testimony is upholding the full faith |
|
and credit of the United States, is it your feeling that at |
|
this time in our economy, we need to see a contraction of |
|
government spending? |
|
Chairman CAMP. All right, time has expired, I am sorry. |
|
Mr. Reichert. |
|
Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
|
My first question is to all the panelists. Thank you for |
|
being here. There are a lot of--there is a lot of talk across |
|
the aisle about raising revenue to solve our debt problem. Is |
|
it possible to raise taxes enough to permanently sustain |
|
programs such as Social Security and Medicare without reforming |
|
the programs themselves? And what sort of tax increase would |
|
this be on the middle class, and what would this sort of tax |
|
increase do to our broader economy? |
|
Mr. CASEY. I would ask the Committee if I may pass on that |
|
since it goes beyond my legal expertise. I will defer to the |
|
economists. |
|
Mr. HOAGLAND. I believe that it would require a balance |
|
between both spending, controlling entitlement spending, |
|
mandatory spending, and revenue increases to lower the debt-to- |
|
GDP figure to a goal of about 60 percent. I believe the last |
|
proposal that was on the table before the fiscal cliff |
|
discussion was that the House Republican leader's proposal was |
|
$800 billion in tax increases; the President's was $960 |
|
billion. You get $600 billion; there is $200 billion there that |
|
you are still looking at for this next 10-year window, but I |
|
think that has to be coupled with changes to mandatory spending |
|
programs. |
|
To Mr. McDermott's position, there are specific proposals |
|
as it relates to changing the Medicare program that does not |
|
harm current recipients of Medicare but protects the program |
|
for the future beneficiaries out there. |
|
Mr. FOSTER. There is an illusion that you can solve all |
|
these problems with tax increases without getting into the |
|
question of whether or not you should, or that you could. The |
|
answer is you can't. The costs in these programs are rising so |
|
rapidly over the next decades, not 2014 or 2015, but over the |
|
near future, that you can't solve them with tax increases. We |
|
would not have much of an economy left if we tried that. |
|
So you must understand, the starting point for getting our |
|
fiscal house in order is reducing the growth in the entitlement |
|
spending, just as Mr. Hoagland suggested. Then it is a |
|
political point, a debatable point, as to whether or not you |
|
want to mix in tax increases as part of that solution. That is |
|
a political decision at that point, not an economic decision, |
|
understanding that the tax increases we tend to enact tend to |
|
be those most harmful to the economy, thereby slowing the |
|
growth of the economy as well as the tax base. But you have to |
|
start with the entitlement reform, slowing the growth of that |
|
spending. That is a necessary and unavoidable component of |
|
getting our fiscal house in order. |
|
Mr. JOHNSON. Congressman, I actually wrote a book on this |
|
topic, which I would be happy to send you. |
|
Mr. REICHERT. Congratulations. |
|
Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. And the bottom line is that Social |
|
Security you could rebalance relatively easily with new |
|
revenue, and some relatively minor---- |
|
Mr. REICHERT. What kind of impact would that have on the |
|
middle class, just using revenue, just taxing people? |
|
Mr. JOHNSON. The impact on the middle class would be |
|
relatively small, and again, I can send you the numbers. The |
|
key issue there is that they are raising the cap on earnings |
|
subject to Social Security, which was not indexed last time |
|
that was changed by this Congress in the mid 1980s. |
|
The big problem is healthcare spending, Congressman, but it |
|
is not Medicare, per se, it is healthcare spending. If you |
|
shift that, the responsibility of health care from Medicare on |
|
to families, individuals, and companies, you will raise |
|
healthcare spending as a percent of GDP, that is the CBO |
|
scoring of that issue. And that is not going to help American |
|
families. You need to find a way to control, limit healthcare |
|
spending as a percent of GDP. That is the key variable to focus |
|
on, how the healthcare system functions, how it delivers, and |
|
what it costs. |
|
Mr. REICHERT. If tax increases were the only solution that |
|
you are talking about here, you are just relating the tax |
|
increase to Social Security. Medicare, Medicaid, what is the |
|
impact there? What is the impact of just raising taxes on the |
|
broader economy totally? |
|
Mr. JOHNSON. The problem, Congressman, is the healthcare |
|
spending. If healthcare spending increases, you can either pay |
|
that out of the budget, in which case it would be very high |
|
cost, or you can shift that on to individuals, in which case it |
|
ruins them. Either way, it doesn't make much difference. It is |
|
the healthcare costs that you have to focus on. |
|
Mr. REICHERT. I want to go to some of the discussion that |
|
was occurring earlier. Why are we focusing on spending today, |
|
now? Why now? I may not have enough time to get to that |
|
question. I see the yellow light is on. So, Mr. Chairman, I |
|
will yield back before. It is a long question. |
|
Chairman CAMP. All right. Okay. |
|
Mr. Larson, you are--I am sorry, Mr. Neal has come back in. |
|
Mr. Neal is recognized for 5 minutes. |
|
Mr. NEAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
|
As we debate increasing the debt ceiling this afternoon, I |
|
think a bit of history is important as we acknowledge the |
|
current fiscal situation. In January 2001, CBO estimated that |
|
the total budget surplus for 2002 to 2011 would be $5.6 |
|
trillion, surplus. Instead, after years of reckless spending |
|
and tax cuts, the Federal Government ran deficits from 2002 |
|
until 2011. The total deficit over that 10-year period amounted |
|
to $6.1 trillion, a swing of $11.7 trillion from January 2001 |
|
and its projections. |
|
We began down this path by enacting tax cuts that cost the |
|
government $2.3 trillion. The other major expenditure during |
|
those years that contributed mightily to these deficits is the |
|
engagement in two wars. By the time we got to January of 2009, |
|
the debt was $10.6 trillion, setting a record for debt for any |
|
Administration. Pursuing two wars and massive tax cuts was the |
|
reason, and Mr. Johnson, while he was temporarily holding the |
|
chair for Mr. Camp, indicated that we were all responsible for |
|
many of those positions. Having voted against the war in Iraq |
|
and having voted against the Bush tax cuts in 2001 and 2003, I |
|
think I have earned an element of credibility on these |
|
questions. |
|
So today we are debating another increase in the debt |
|
limit. I don't understand how anyone who voted for the Iraq war |
|
could now vote against raising the debt ceiling. In reality, |
|
arguing over the debt ceiling is essentially an argument over |
|
whether or not we should pay our bills. We should pay our |
|
bills. |
|
This debt is about the past, not about the future. If you |
|
voted for the war in Iraq and the Bush tax cuts, the bill is |
|
here. Remind our colleagues and friends: 1.7 million new |
|
veterans, 45,000 of whom have served us honorably, as the other |
|
1.7 million have, but they have been wounded. Half of the |
|
45,000 have claimed disability. |
|
So we hear from some of our friends, the default deniers, |
|
that they think hitting the debt ceiling is no big deal, that |
|
we could raise the debt ceiling only if we cut government |
|
spending as well. But where were they during those years, those |
|
very difficult years? And incidentally, I have compiled the |
|
voting records on the debt limit increases that President Bush |
|
requested during those years. |
|
And I hope, Mr. Chairman, I could insert that into the |
|
record. |
|
Chairman CAMP. Without objection. |
|
[The submission of The Honorable Richard Neal follows:] |
|
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|
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] |
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|
|
Mr. NEAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
|
Many of the most senior Members of this Committee routinely |
|
voted to raise the debt ceiling during those years, even though |
|
the money for the tax cuts and the wars was put on emergency |
|
basis for the purpose of hiding the costs. So I am pleased that |
|
we are coming around to a more reasonable position today, and I |
|
hope that we are going to find a common path forward on many of |
|
these issues. |
|
Mr. Johnson, you state in your testimony that low-- |
|
unemployment depresses tax revenue, and this is the major |
|
reason for our current deficits and why they are so large. Once |
|
the economy recovers fully and the unemployment rate is |
|
lowered, it certainly will take some of the pressure off of |
|
these discussions, acknowledging there are long-term challenges |
|
that we have to address. I have been making this point inside |
|
of my own caucus, not to overreact to the situation in which we |
|
find ourselves, and if we could only find that common path |
|
forward that I referenced, we would find that you could have a |
|
conversation that would be worthwhile past the political |
|
talking points. |
|
Now, getting Americans back to work should be the number |
|
one priority, and as we address this fiscal situation, toying |
|
with the debt, considering that American companies are |
|
estimated to be sitting on $1 trillion domestically and more |
|
than $1.8 trillion offshore. If we offered a picture of |
|
stability, and again a conversation worth having, we might be |
|
able to ameliorate some of the tension that surrounds this |
|
issue. |
|
Would you comment, Mr. Johnson? |
|
Chairman CAMP. You have 8 seconds. You can follow up with a |
|
letter, but we are going to stay on time here. |
|
Mr. JOHNSON. We should pay our bills. That is the number |
|
one priority. If we don't pay our bills as a government, we |
|
will disrupt the economic recovery and push unemployment |
|
higher. |
|
Mr. NEAL. Thank you. |
|
Chairman CAMP. Thank you. |
|
Mr. Boustany, Dr. Boustany is recognized. |
|
Mr. BOUSTANY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
|
I want to put this in perspective for a moment. The former |
|
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, was |
|
quoted as saying the debt of the United States is a threat to |
|
our national security, and while it might not rise to that |
|
level acutely immediately, it certainly is a serious strategic |
|
restraint on the ability of the United States to operate in an |
|
international environment. And it is clearly a threat to our |
|
economic prosperity. |
|
I want to make it clear, nobody on this side of the aisle |
|
is talking about default, none of us are talking about default. |
|
We are talking about a serious solution going forward with a |
|
big problem, which is widely acknowledged to be a spending |
|
problem. |
|
Now, several of you made a number of points. Mr. Casey, you |
|
talked about Congress having the power of the purse and using |
|
it wisely, with discretion, to enact spending reforms which are |
|
desperately needed. |
|
Mr. Hoagland talked about going back to regular order, |
|
something we all believe needs to happen. You also mentioned |
|
temporary extraordinary measures that are currently being used |
|
and talked a little bit about prioritization, and I want to |
|
bring that up again in a moment. |
|
Mr. Foster, you spoke about process not being a substitute |
|
for real policy reforms. We all agree with that, I think both |
|
sides could agree with that. |
|
But the bottom line is this: We have a spending problem, |
|
and we have to also recognize that in the context of how it |
|
plays out in the economy, it is not just spending, but it is |
|
also a need for growth. This is why we want to do tax reform, |
|
real tax reform, fundamental tax reform that puts our Tax Code |
|
on a 21st century basis that promotes American competitiveness |
|
and growth. |
|
Now, historically, and I went back and I read a CRS report, |
|
short-term debt limit increases have been used just to buy time |
|
in order to get to a point where you couple it with real |
|
spending reforms. This has happened historically. Am I correct? |
|
Mr. HOAGLAND. Yes, sir. |
|
Mr. BOUSTANY. So we are not talking about something out of |
|
the ordinary as we talk about this current proposal on the |
|
table. |
|
But I want to go back, Mr. Hoagland, to prioritization |
|
because we know there are extraordinary measures already being |
|
done by Treasury, and prioritization, we wouldn't have to be in |
|
this crisis if the President had come forward with a real plan. |
|
He has had opportunities with four budgets and hasn't done that |
|
and has continued to perpetuate the problem. |
|
Now we are caught in a situation where we are waiting with |
|
the budget and the timing, but the bottom line is this: We |
|
don't need to be in this. We didn't need to be in this crisis, |
|
but we find ourselves in it. Now if prioritization is going to |
|
be used as one of these extraordinary measures, talk a little |
|
bit more, elaborate a little more on the fact that we have |
|
uneven receipts coming in and how this plays out. I want this |
|
to be real clear for the public that might be paying attention |
|
to this. |
|
Mr. HOAGLAND. The Treasury has estimated that the cash |
|
flows in are very unprecise. Even in a 1-week forecast out, the |
|
estimate is that varies on statistically plus or minus $18 |
|
billion, just 1 week out, just estimating the receipts coming |
|
in. Two weeks out, the estimates are a $30 billion variation |
|
plus or minus. When you combine that with the requirements, in |
|
terms of statute, the payments going out, you create a |
|
tremendous level of difficulty in terms of being able to set |
|
the timeframe in which you should pay those when you don't know |
|
exactly, when you are doing prioritization, paying with income |
|
coming in with the degree of variation that exists in the |
|
receipts coming in. It is just very, very difficult. |
|
Mr. BOUSTANY. For the interest payments, there is a |
|
different computer system, right, than what is used for the |
|
other payments? |
|
Mr. HOAGLAND. Correct. The interest payments is a separate |
|
computer system. It is possible that you could just prioritize |
|
those interest payments, but I think the Fitch report last week |
|
said that you could avoid an actual default, default being |
|
defined as paying the interest, but then those other |
|
noninterest obligations will be looked at as another form of |
|
default, which would also affect Fitch's rating. |
|
Mr. BOUSTANY. I see. How much time do you think we would |
|
have with prioritization? How much time could be bought? |
|
Mr. HOAGLAND. Congressman, I mentioned in my report that we |
|
are talking about the pay-fors, the Prompt Payment Act, the |
|
Impoundment Act; I think you have a long time in terms of you |
|
determining prioritization. |
|
Chairman CAMP. Time has expired. |
|
Mr. Larson, you are recognized. |
|
Mr. LARSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and it's |
|
always good to see you back here and in good health. Let me |
|
start by saying thank you to our panelists for their testimony |
|
and thank you for your service to your institutions and the |
|
country and I thank the Chairman for this hearing. |
|
I think it is a good news/bad news story. On one hand, the |
|
good news is that we have avoided yet another immediate crisis. |
|
The bad news is that we are just kicking the can down the road |
|
for 3 months and, in essence, then are dealing with default and |
|
not paying on our bills just 3 months later. That creates an |
|
enormous problem and one I think that--I would hope that this |
|
Committee, above all others, could solve because I do believe |
|
in this Committee and its bipartisan membership in our ability |
|
to address this issue. We know that what we have to do is both |
|
stabilize this economy, invest in this economy, reform this |
|
economy, and grow it in terms of what everyone has testified |
|
and what the people on this Committee believe in. |
|
No less than Speaker Gingrich said on ``Face the Nation'' |
|
that, look, take the debt ceiling off the table, at least |
|
provide the American people with a modicum of security that |
|
they know we are not going to hold this hostage, too. We ought |
|
to be adults about it, as the former Speaker said, and take |
|
that off the table. That doesn't mean to desert the issue or |
|
back away from the issue of dealing with debt. And there are |
|
still appropriate opportunities, as he pointed out, whether |
|
through sequester or continuing resolution to do it, but we owe |
|
it to the American people to make sure we take this uncertainty |
|
away from them. We saw what that uncertainty does in terms of |
|
impacting their pensions and their 401(k)s, and they look to |
|
this Congress, and frankly, I think the Congress looks to this |
|
body to return to regular order. And I know we have the |
|
leadership on this body to do that, and by returning to regular |
|
order, we can go after the difficult things. |
|
Mr. Johnson pointed out that the issue is healthcare costs. |
|
That is true. Mr. Ryan, who serves on the Budget Committee and |
|
this Committee, has pointed out the issue is healthcare costs. |
|
How do we go after those costs? It just simply isn't |
|
entitlements, aka insurance that people have paid. They have |
|
paid for that; that is their insurance. What are the actuarial |
|
assumptions around that? What do we have to do to change and |
|
alter that? We ought to be able to carry that out in regular |
|
order, not in meetings in the White House, not in meetings in |
|
the Senate, where they won't do a budget and where they will |
|
wait to do some kind of bill themselves. We ought to be doing |
|
it in this Committee. |
|
Mr. Johnson, I was confronted in my hometown by our CFO, |
|
who said, ``Listen, if you guys don't provide us some certainty |
|
again, we have to go out to the bond market again in this very |
|
difficult time, and what happens to us is we end up in a |
|
situation where we have to raise people's property taxes |
|
because Congress twiddles and diddles and plays hostage |
|
politics.'' What is your experience with respect to the impact |
|
that this will have on local municipalities, our cities, and |
|
our communities? |
|
Mr. JOHNSON. Well, Congressman, the impact is going to be |
|
bad, and it could be dramatically bad, depending on what |
|
happens in 3 months. I don't agree with Mr. Gingrich on many |
|
fiscal issues, but I think on this one, he is right. Take the |
|
debt ceiling off the table permanently. Investors around the |
|
world are watching this hearing. They are looking at your |
|
words. They are trying to understand, what does prioritization |
|
mean? How does this not involve default? The degree of |
|
uncertainty that is being multiplied by this conversation is |
|
extraordinary, the impact on municipalities is going to be |
|
tough. They will face higher borrowing costs to the extent that |
|
risk premia rise in the United States and around the world and |
|
that means either they are going to fire people or they are |
|
going to raise property taxes or they are going to face some |
|
other problems. So this is a very bad route to go down from |
|
that perspective. |
|
Mr. LARSON. I have great respect for Dr. Boustany, but we |
|
are talking about default. And whether we are talking about |
|
immediate default or default 3 months from now, that is a |
|
policy issue. |
|
Mr. Hoagland, you also talked about bringing balance to |
|
this issue. I thought that was an excellent point, and you said |
|
that it ought to be done through regular order. How do you see |
|
that proceeding? |
|
Mr. HOAGLAND. I see that proceeding by the President |
|
submitting a budget. I see that proceeding by the Budget |
|
Committee passing budget resolutions. I see that by a |
|
conference agreement between the House and Senate on a budget |
|
resolution. I see that by including a reconciliation |
|
instruction to achieve the savings over the time period, and I |
|
see that working through the normal course. |
|
Mr. LARSON. I have been in Congress 14 years; we have not |
|
completed that once since I have been here in full complete |
|
order. |
|
That is why I think it is incumbent upon our Committee, and |
|
I know the great integrity that our Chairman and Members of |
|
this Committee have. I think that we can achieve those goals. I |
|
know my time is up. |
|
Chairman CAMP. Thank you. Thank you very much. |
|
Mr. Paulsen is recognized for 5 minutes. |
|
Mr. PAULSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, also for holding the |
|
hearing. |
|
I want to thank each of the witnesses for being here. You |
|
know, it is pretty clear to me that there is actually broad |
|
bipartisan consensus that our country is on a fiscally |
|
unsustainable path right now. The 2010 report by the Bipartisan |
|
Policy Center's Debt Reduction Task Force--Mr. Hoagland, I |
|
believe you were a member of that Task Force--included the very |
|
sobering warning that the Federal budget is on a dangerous, |
|
unsustainable path. Federal spending is projected to rise |
|
substantially faster than revenues, and the government will be |
|
forced to borrow ever-increasing amounts. Federal debt will |
|
rise to unmanageable levels, which will push interest rates up, |
|
endanger our prosperity, and make us increasingly vulnerable to |
|
the dictates of our creditors, including nations whose |
|
interests may differ from ours. We have talked a little bit |
|
about that earlier from some of the other questions. |
|
My constituents are, quite honestly, very perplexed that |
|
Washington continues to borrow 40 some cents of every dollar it |
|
spends. They can't get their arms around that. And there is a |
|
recognition now that without significant changes to our fiscal |
|
policy, the national debt itself is going to become an |
|
existential threat. I would like each of the panelists, if you |
|
could, just comment what are the implications of current debt |
|
levels? What are the consequences of increased levels? And what |
|
really is the turning point where our debt becomes |
|
unmanageable, where it becomes an unmanageable situation? |
|
Mr. Casey. |
|
Mr. CASEY. Well, I think on most of that question, I will |
|
defer to the economists, but I will say that one thing I think |
|
we need to keep in mind is that we are not--we fling around the |
|
term debt ceiling. What we are talking about here is Congress' |
|
power to borrow money and how we should be paying our bills |
|
based on that or based on some other method of raising revenue, |
|
so I think it is very important to keep that clearly in mind. |
|
Mr. PAULSEN. Mr. Hoagland, you were a member of that Task |
|
Force as well. |
|
Mr. HOAGLAND. Yes, and in fairness, Congressman, that Task |
|
Force also recommended a balanced plan that included tax |
|
increases as well as spending cuts going forward, more on the |
|
spending side than on reduction of the rate of growth. The |
|
implications of the debt level, that we are headed at 77 |
|
percent going into the future, I think has a major--will |
|
jeopardize, quite frankly, our standing in the world. When we |
|
have about 40, 50 percent of this debt owned by investors |
|
outside of the United States, we are questioning, we are |
|
raising questions about the sovereignty of this country going |
|
forward. |
|
In terms of, where is the turning point, I think that is |
|
the problem; most economists would say they can't answer that |
|
question. Who knows when that last drop into the test tube |
|
turns the water blue? But it will turn at some point, and that |
|
is the problem. When it turns, it will turn fast. That is why I |
|
think you have to have a plan going forward to avoid that date |
|
coming. I don't know. There is a book out on this called, |
|
``This Time is Different.'' This time is not different. |
|
Something will happen. We just want you to control that so it |
|
has some process behind it. |
|
Mr. PAULSEN. Now, knowing that the United States is still a |
|
safe haven in terms of money flocking here, based on what is |
|
happening in Europe, I mean, can we learn anything of what is |
|
happening in Europe basically on how capital---- |
|
Mr. HOAGLAND. We are not Greece. We are not Italy. We are |
|
not Spain, but I think when you look at the level of spending |
|
there relative to their assets, I think you end up with a |
|
situation where you do create social disorder which is very |
|
dangerous. |
|
Mr. PAULSEN. Mr. Foster. |
|
Mr. FOSTER. There are three basic things. The first is that |
|
with all that debt, you are going to see in the future a lot |
|
more of government's resources, the Federal Government's |
|
resources being used just to pay off the interest on the debt |
|
from the past. As I said in my testimony, Americans expect |
|
services from the taxes they pay; they don't expect just that |
|
you service the debt from previous deficits. |
|
Second, interest rates are going to rise. We have now |
|
increased the debt sufficiently that all previous debates about |
|
whether deficits matter for interest rates can be set aside. It |
|
has now risen enough that it will matter, and it will matter a |
|
lot. Interest rates will rise and they will rise a lot faster |
|
and further than they ever would have otherwise. |
|
Third, as my colleague was just saying, it is like a family |
|
or any business, if you take on far too much debt, you lose |
|
control of your own future. You lose control of your path |
|
forward. Somebody else is going to be able to dictate the terms |
|
to you as to what you are going to do. The dictator in this |
|
case will be the bondholders and the credit markets. We lose |
|
control of our future as a Nation. Ask these countries in |
|
Europe, Mr. Hoagland knows, we are not Spain or Italy or |
|
Greece, but we will have one thing in common if we keep this |
|
path: We will lose control of our future as they have lost |
|
control of theirs. |
|
Mr. PAULSEN. Can you comment in terms of if there is even a |
|
1 percent or a 2 percent increase in interest rates what the |
|
effect is going to be on interest payments, on a dollar amount? |
|
Mr. FOSTER. Well, if you think about it, 1 percent payment, |
|
and you have $15 trillion out there, that's $150 billion---- |
|
Chairman CAMP. All right, thank you, time has expired. |
|
Mr. Kind is recognized for 5 minutes. |
|
Mr. KIND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
|
I want to thank you for holding this hearing and thank the |
|
panelists for your input and your discussion today, which is |
|
important. I think we all understand what the ultimate solution |
|
is of the debt ceiling: We need a long-term, bipartisan deficit |
|
reduction agreement in this place that is comprehensive and |
|
that will get our fiscal house in order, especially dealing |
|
with the demographics and the aging population. That is the |
|
answer. I equate this to the Middle East peace plan. We all |
|
know where we need to end up; it is just finding the political |
|
process and the will to get there. Every bipartisan commission |
|
that has met and been tasked to come up with a solution has |
|
reached the same conclusion, there is going to have to be some |
|
additional revenue and some major spending reforms in the |
|
budget for this to make sense in a balanced and a fair fashion. |
|
Mr. Foster, I appreciated your testimony here today where |
|
you said there is some additional room on the revenue side, |
|
even given where we ended up with the fiscal cliff, a little |
|
over $600 billion over 10 years in new revenue, but that was |
|
short of where things stood during the previous conversations. |
|
But, Mr. Johnson, in your written testimony and also your |
|
oral testimony here today, I think you have been fairly clear |
|
that the greatest if not the chief contributor to the deficits |
|
and the fiscal shortfall today has been the underperforming |
|
economy and the high unemployment rate, so I would assume then |
|
that one of the responses if not the response to help with the |
|
fiscal situation is to get the economy back fully functioning |
|
with good-paying jobs and lowering the unemployment rate. Is |
|
that right? |
|
Mr. JOHNSON. Absolutely, Congressman, and it would be, in |
|
that context, disastrous if you were either not to extend the |
|
debt ceiling or create a lot of uncertainty about who is |
|
getting paid and how they are getting paid because of the debt |
|
ceiling or because of the sequester or because of some sort of |
|
government shutdown. All of those things are bad for the |
|
recovery. They are bad for revenue, and all those things would |
|
tend to push up interest rates, which has the adverse |
|
consequences that my colleague just described. |
|
Mr. KIND. So I really don't understand the argument for |
|
holding the debt ceiling hostage and jeopardizing the full |
|
faith and credit and possibly defaulting on our financial |
|
obligations for the first time in our Nation's history, given |
|
the safe haven that we have enjoyed. In fact, the great irony |
|
in this recession is the fact that people have been willing to |
|
pay us to take their money, which is, in effect, what has been |
|
going on. It has been a lifesaver for us economically, and all |
|
that, I assume, would be in jeopardy overnight if we do default |
|
on our financial obligations. Would you agree? |
|
Mr. JOHNSON. Absolutely. The most obvious risk we face is |
|
that we will, through our own deliberate irresponsibility, |
|
undermine the safe haven status of the United States. The world |
|
is a complicated, dangerous place; people look to the United |
|
States as a safe place to keep their reserves, keep their |
|
money, but we can throw that out the window very, very quickly |
|
if irresponsible actions are taken around the debt ceiling. |
|
Mr. KIND. I would also submit that, you know, both sides, |
|
both political parties need to be a little more realistic in |
|
our approach to this whole discussion, and not to sound too |
|
partisan, but we have just come off two national campaigns |
|
where my colleagues on the other side accused Democrats of |
|
taking $700 billion out of Medicare and promising to restore |
|
that money while at the same time promising to increase defense |
|
spending by $2 trillion over the next 10 years. Those are the |
|
two largest spending programs we have in the Federal deficit, |
|
and that is a $2.7 trillion proposition of new spending that |
|
they were offering in two national campaigns, and now they want |
|
to sit back and criticize the President for not being realistic |
|
in his budget choices? They lose me on that argument. |
|
But, Mr. Hoagland, you have had a lot of experience and |
|
especially with Dr. Frist, and we do understand that the |
|
largest and fastest growing area of spending is rising |
|
healthcare costs. I think there is a solution to getting |
|
enhanced quality of care but at a better price. We need to |
|
change the way we pay for health care in this country, so it is |
|
value- and outcome-based and no longer volume-based, which fee- |
|
for-service brings. Would that help improve the fiscal outlook |
|
if we can make that conversion to a different payment system? |
|
Mr. HOAGLAND. Yes, Congressman. I don't want to scoop my |
|
bosses. Senator Frist, Senator Daschle, Senator Domenici, and |
|
Alice Rivlin will be coming out with a report here in the |
|
middle of March, where we are looking specifically at this |
|
question, and one of the areas where we are focusing, we have |
|
to move away from the fee-for-service payment system to a more |
|
orderly system and move it away, and we believe that in the |
|
long run will help control costs overall in the Medicare area, |
|
but that also some 50 percent of health care is---- |
|
Mr. KIND. Well, I knew you guys were involved in that work |
|
because the Institute of Medicine is doing a comparable report |
|
coming out in a couple months. I also appreciated Mr. Brady's |
|
comment, he is going to be the new Chair of the Health |
|
Subcommittee, about getting away from SGR and moving to a |
|
quality-based physician reimbursement system, too. I think that |
|
is going to be key to the fiscal outlook as well, but there is |
|
a lot here we can follow up on. |
|
But, Mr. Chairman, thanks again for this hearing and the |
|
feedback here today. Thank you all. |
|
Chairman CAMP. Mr. Reed is recognized for 5 minutes. |
|
Mr. REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
|
I have been listening to this testimony all afternoon, and |
|
I just have to say, I am embarrassed to hear some of the |
|
comments that have been made today about what I believe to be |
|
the biggest threat to the future security of our country, the |
|
security of our country, when it comes to our kids and our |
|
grandkids, and that is the debt. So I am going to ask you, |
|
point blank, each and every member of this panel, is the |
|
present debt path sustainable? Does anybody think that it is? |
|
Mr. HOAGLAND. No. |
|
Mr. REED. Mr. Casey. |
|
Mr. CASEY. No. |
|
Mr. REED. Mr. Foster. |
|
Mr. FOSTER. No, sir. |
|
Mr. REED. Mr. Johnson. It is a yes or no question. |
|
Mr. JOHNSON. No, sir, not over the long term, Congressman. |
|
Mr. REED. Thank you. Why is it not sustainable? Can each of |
|
you briefly answer that question? |
|
Mr. Casey, starting with you. |
|
Mr. CASEY. Well, frankly, as a layman, there comes a point |
|
when they start cutting up your credit cards, and we will reach |
|
it. |
|
Mr. REED. Mr. Hoagland. |
|
Mr. HOAGLAND. And when the rate of growth in terms of |
|
payment on the interest of that debt is faster than the rate of |
|
growth of the economy, then you are, the country is defaulting. |
|
Mr. REED. Mr. Foster. |
|
Mr. FOSTER. That is the heart of it, sir, when your |
|
interest expenses are growing faster than your income, you are |
|
in trouble. |
|
Mr. REED. Mr. Johnson. |
|
Mr. JOHNSON. Healthcare costs, Congressman, it is the |
|
failure to control healthcare costs, as just discussed. |
|
Mr. REED. So that is the debt, but the debt crisis, why it |
|
is not sustainable, is eventually the interest on the debt |
|
becomes so large that you can't pay that payment, correct? |
|
Okay, because I have done some calculations on that point, |
|
and I have looked at, what is our--if our present debt at $16 |
|
trillion, just close to 3 percent, what is the debt service |
|
payment on that for our interest costs? Do you guys know that |
|
off the top of your head? Well, it is $492 billion. Let's say |
|
it goes to 6 percent. Does anybody know what that is? |
|
Mr. FOSTER. Twice. |
|
Mr. REED. That is $985 billion. Do you know what that |
|
means? What are we presently paying on our debt service |
|
payment? Do any of you know that number off the top of your |
|
head? |
|
Mr. FOSTER. It is about $250 billion I believe. |
|
Mr. REED. Yeah, so if you take the difference between the |
|
two, it goes up to 6 percent, you have $765 billion of |
|
additional need for cash payments to service the debt. What do |
|
we pay on our national defense budgets in an annual year? |
|
Mr. HOAGLAND. We pay about $700 billion. |
|
Mr. REED. So overnight, because that is an annual number, |
|
we are going to have to find the amount that we pay on our |
|
national defense lines in our Federal budget, an equivalent |
|
amount of dollars to service our debt. Is my understanding |
|
correct? Does anyone disagree with that math? |
|
Mr. JOHNSON. You are right, Congressman, but if you have a |
|
big fight over the debt ceiling, that is going to push up |
|
interest rates and cause exactly the effect you are worried |
|
about. |
|
Mr. REED. So if we just take care of the debt ceiling, put |
|
our head in the sand and say, we are never going to worry about |
|
the debt ceiling, at what point in time does the debt become so |
|
large that our creditors say, you know what, we are going to |
|
charge you a little bit more interest, and that interest then |
|
goes up to 6 percent on the $16 trillion. Don't we just get to |
|
the same problem that you are concerned about in the short term |
|
on a long-term approach by not dealing with the underlying |
|
problem at all? |
|
Mr. JOHNSON. Congressman, I am totally in favor of dealing |
|
with the budget, that is the point of the book we wrote called |
|
``White House Burning,'' a dramatic enough title I hope, but |
|
the point is you need a balanced approach, as Mr. Levin said at |
|
the beginning, and you have the forces to do it---- |
|
Mr. REED. Mr. Johnson, if I could, it is my time, it is my |
|
time. And I have heard the balanced approach now for a year and |
|
a half, and I heard it today from the panel. There has been |
|
$600 billion of additional revenue that--as a result of the |
|
fiscal cliff negotiations. A balanced approach to me was if you |
|
gave revenue, you got spending reforms. Has the President |
|
offered any spending reforms as of yet in regard to that $600 |
|
billion of additional revenue? |
|
Mr. FOSTER. We are hoping to see some in the budget, sir. |
|
Mr. HOAGLAND. When he, when the President put--when |
|
Secretary Geithner put forth his proposal on November 29th, he |
|
had spending reductions of like $400 billion. |
|
Mr. REED. So $400 billion in relationship to $600 billion |
|
of new tax revenue, and the President offered $400 billion in |
|
spending cuts. |
|
Mr. HOAGLAND. In fairness, the President proposed $1.6 |
|
trillion in revenues for $400 billion in spending cuts. |
|
Mr. REED. That doesn't sound too balanced to me, in my |
|
opinion. So I will just end with this. It is clear that Admiral |
|
Mullen had it right; this debt--and I could care less about all |
|
the people here in Washington, D.C.--I am really concerned |
|
about the people back at home, my constituents, my kids, my |
|
grandkids. This isn't sustainable, and to have this bickering |
|
over these issues without putting a real concrete proposal in |
|
front of the American people to say these are the visions of |
|
how we deal with this problem, that is why I wholeheartedly |
|
support this 3-month extension, and I am glad to hear the White |
|
House supports it also because at least now we will put in |
|
black and white hopefully in the Senate and in the House a |
|
vision to deal with this number one threat to our national |
|
security. Thank you. |
|
With that, I yield back. |
|
Chairman CAMP. Thank you. |
|
Mr. Pascrell is recognized for 5 minutes. |
|
Mr. PASCRELL. Three-quarters of the deficit reduction to |
|
date has been spending cuts, and I would rather err on the side |
|
of what Roosevelt said in his second inaugural, and that was, |
|
``The test of our progress is not whether we add more to the |
|
abundance of those who have much; it is whether we provide |
|
enough for those who have too little.'' He said that in 1937 in |
|
the second inaugural. |
|
I am more concerned about one-fifth of our children living |
|
in poverty, and I am more concerned about the guys who are |
|
working out there--male income compared from 1969 to the |
|
present, and what do we have? We have people making, males |
|
making $1,000 more back in 1969. That is what I am concerned |
|
about. We have had a redistribution of wealth, all right, in |
|
this country. It was all upward. It was all upward. Let's get |
|
our facts straight here. |
|
This storied Committee, Mr. Chairman, is even discussing |
|
the idea that America will not pay our bills, that we will be a |
|
deadbeat Nation, as the President said, and that is |
|
unbelievable to me. Certain things are unbelievable to you. |
|
That is unbelievable to me because if you read Article XIV and |
|
Section 4, questioning whether or not to pay the public debt |
|
may be unconstitutional from this body. It is not a long |
|
section. It is the public debt. It is right there. |
|
And about the public debt, it also says--Mr. Foster, you |
|
didn't read the whole section. It says, if the House--if the |
|
Congress doesn't do it, the Executive must do it. It says that |
|
right in the bill. Am I not correct? |
|
Mr. FOSTER. I will leave that to the constitutional |
|
scholars. |
|
Mr. PASCRELL. I will read it to you. |
|
Mr. FOSTER. Go ahead. |
|
Mr. CASEY. No, sir, it doesn't say that, but please read |
|
it. |
|
Mr. PASCRELL. I will. If Congress won't pay them, then the |
|
Executive must. |
|
Mr. CASEY. In Section 4 of the 14th Amendment. |
|
Mr. PASCRELL. Well, I am talking about the interpretation |
|
of Section 4 of Article XIV. |
|
Mr. CASEY. Okay. |
|
Mr. PASCRELL. You disagree with that? |
|
Mr. CASEY. I disagree most wholeheartedly. |
|
Mr. PASCRELL. So the Executive has nothing to say about the |
|
debt? |
|
Mr. CASEY. Well, the Executive has no power to raise the |
|
debt, certainly. He has an obligation to pay the public debt, |
|
which is to say pay the amounts of money that have been loaned. |
|
Mr. PASCRELL. And how is he going to do that if the |
|
Congress does not give him the ability to do that? That is a |
|
little problem, isn't it? |
|
Mr. CASEY. It is obviously a problem. |
|
Mr. PASCRELL. Okay. Well, let me go on here. We are not |
|
going to default on our obligations and not just to our |
|
bondholders, because another thing that we are talking about, |
|
which is questionable, is whether we can prioritize the |
|
payments to make everybody happy. I have heard that here. Go |
|
ahead. |
|
Mr. HOAGLAND. I just want to be clear that I was not |
|
proposing prioritization. I was just pointing out the |
|
difficulties of prioritization. |
|
Mr. PASCRELL. So you understand it is questionable under |
|
the Constitution? |
|
Mr. HOAGLAND. Yes, sir. |
|
Mr. PASCRELL. We all saw the economic impact that the last |
|
debt ceiling had on the economy. The Dow dropped 2,000 points. |
|
We added $18.9 billion to our deficit just in that time, and |
|
for the first time in our history, we were downgraded for our |
|
credit rating. That was all when we didn't default, either. The |
|
mere threat of default and irresponsible discussions of default |
|
is what I am talking about right now, like the one we are |
|
having today, were enough to do significant damage to our |
|
economy, just the discussion of it. And we saw that. |
|
So let's give the American people some certainty. We have |
|
been saying that for the last 2 years. You have heard that. |
|
When are we going to solve that problem? When we solve this |
|
problem. How are people going to invest if they don't really |
|
know what is coming toward them? So let's end the talk of |
|
default, the irresponsible discussion. Responsibly default, |
|
could we responsibly default? Let's get an end to that |
|
discussion. Let's pass a long-term increase in the debt ceiling |
|
so that the phrase ``backed by the full faith and credit of the |
|
United States of America'' continues to mean something, and I |
|
believe it does mean something to all of you, and thank you for |
|
coming today. |
|
Chairman CAMP. Thank you. I would just note for the record |
|
that this discussion may not be as harmful as we think as the |
|
Dow S&P 500 just hit a 5-year high today. With that, I will---- |
|
Mr. PASCRELL. I am sure it is because of our discussion, |
|
Mr. Chairman. |
|
Chairman CAMP. Yes, I am sure it will be. |
|
With that, I would recognize Mr. Young for 5 minutes. |
|
Mr. YOUNG. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. |
|
I thank all our panelists for being here today. |
|
It is clear, based on all your testimony, that really the |
|
big issue here, I think Mr. Hoagland put it most succinctly, |
|
the real issue is mandatory spending, and, you know, we are |
|
entering budget season, what ought to be budget season here in |
|
Washington, D.C., and I am just curious. First, Dr. Foster, I |
|
will start with you. As the President submits his budget for |
|
fiscal year 2014, what do you anticipate the likelihood is that |
|
his request will include any reforms of significance to make |
|
sustainable Medicare and Social Security in that budget |
|
request? |
|
Mr. FOSTER. Well, sir, despite being an economist, I am |
|
also an optimist, so I am going to say I think he may take the |
|
opportunity and really choose to lead on this, and until he |
|
proves otherwise, that is what I am going to believe. |
|
Mr. YOUNG. Well, good. I share your hope. I spent a couple |
|
of years on the Budget Committee before being on this Committee |
|
and was hopeful then, too, so I think that is the most |
|
important thing that certainly could be done because it is |
|
important that we act quickly. There is a cost to waiting, and |
|
perhaps, Mr. Hoagland, you could discuss the important benefits |
|
of acting quickly here, coming up with a clear, specific, |
|
comprehensible, and comprehensive plan to make these largest |
|
unsustainable programs of government sustainable. |
|
Mr. HOAGLAND. Congressman, I think it is necessary that a |
|
plan be put together that shows a path toward regaining |
|
sustainability in the Medicare program long term and in the |
|
Social Security program. The President back in November had |
|
proposed about $400 billion in spending reductions. I am, like |
|
Dr. Foster, I am optimistic he will come forth with that. The |
|
proposal here by the Republican leadership was $600 billion. |
|
This is over a 10-year period. The only comment I would have, |
|
Mr. Young, would be that the issue of controlling healthcare |
|
costs in a 10-year window is difficult. What we really should |
|
be looking at is a much longer window because some of the |
|
fundamental changes we have to make in the healthcare delivery |
|
system will take time to implement, such as Mr. Ryan's proposal |
|
last year. |
|
Mr. YOUNG. Well, fair enough, and I supported Mr. Ryan's |
|
proposal last year. I was encouraged that it received some |
|
bipartisan support. I would hope in the future it might get a |
|
bit more. |
|
But, Mr. Hoagland, to continue with you, the road map, if |
|
you will, in order to arrive at a spot where we can get |
|
concrete ideas from Democrat leadership, from the President of |
|
the United States about how to make these largest programs of |
|
government sustainable is through regular order. Could you |
|
bring us through that regular order as we have articulated it? |
|
Mr. HOAGLAND. I am a regular order guy. I have spent my |
|
career up here. I believe the power of making legislative |
|
decisions lies with committees such as this very powerful |
|
Committee here, and I think it is better that the decisions in |
|
terms of what legislation could flow forward come out of the |
|
committees. Therefore, that is why I believe a budget |
|
resolution that is put together that sets the broad parameters |
|
for how much you are trying to achieve in the way of deficit |
|
reduction worked through the committees of jurisdiction is the |
|
most salient way of achieving a goal and expressing to the |
|
American public we really are serious about a fiscal blueprint |
|
that puts us on a path of sustainability, and we are lowering |
|
that level of debt to GDP in the future. |
|
Mr. YOUNG. It strikes me as an orderly approach, a |
|
collaborative approach, one that ought to receive bipartisan |
|
support, and one that by design is set up to come together with |
|
some degree of consensus about what our Nation's priorities |
|
are, and then give the markets a degree of certainty about what |
|
is going to happen in the future, allowing us to create more |
|
jobs, et cetera. |
|
Incidentally, this is exactly the approach that the House |
|
Republican Conference has taken with respect to the debt limit |
|
increase. We have tied increasing this debt limit contingent |
|
upon the Senate finally producing a budget for the first time |
|
in several years. It strikes me as eminently reasonable. It |
|
happens to also be very popular among the American people. So I |
|
do agree that talk about default is irresponsible to |
|
characterize this hearing as about something other than an |
|
effort to bring us back into balance and to try to get a budget |
|
out of the U.S. Senate and a clear budget out of the President |
|
of the United States. I think it is irresponsible to |
|
characterize it otherwise. |
|
And I would just say to Mr. Johnson, I will give you a |
|
brief opportunity to respond, sir, that you spoke a great deal |
|
about policy uncertainty, but really it strikes me the greatest |
|
uncertainty longer term exists when you have Medicare, |
|
Medicaid, and Social Security unsustainable and no plan to make |
|
them sustainable. |
|
Chairman CAMP. All right. Mr. Johnson will have to respond |
|
to that question in writing as time has expired. |
|
Mr. Davis is recognized for 5 minutes. |
|
Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. |
|
I certainly want to thank our witnesses for coming. You |
|
know, it appears to me that as we continue to raise the specter |
|
of possible default, that we undermine the confidence of our |
|
citizenry, and we certainly do a disservice to our country. You |
|
know, if you are living every day with the idea wondering, are |
|
we going to be able to make it until next week, or are we going |
|
to be able to make it for the next 3 months, I am not sure that |
|
that is the most effective way of convincing our citizenry that |
|
we are a stable, viable government, able to solve its problems, |
|
to meet its needs, and bring resolution to whatever crisis |
|
there might be facing us. |
|
Dr. Johnson, let me ask you, after the 2011 crisis, we had |
|
the worst job creation month in 27 months. Why? Why did that |
|
occur? |
|
Mr. JOHNSON. That occurred because of the additional |
|
uncertainty created for everyone, including companies that make |
|
the hiring decisions about what is going to happen next week or |
|
next month. This is a classic problem many countries have, but |
|
those are usually countries much poorer and less well organized |
|
than the United States. It was in 2001, extraordinary and |
|
unbelievable to people that we would come so close to default, |
|
and it is extraordinary again today that you would put the debt |
|
ceiling on the table in these negotiations when the last thing |
|
you surely want to do is get into any of these complicated |
|
games about prioritization, nonpayment or this or that creditor |
|
or potential default. |
|
Mr. DAVIS. Let me ask, how do business interests, how does |
|
a company respond to this short-term kick the can down the |
|
road, when they have to make decisions about their company, |
|
people they must hire, or products they must develop? How does |
|
the business community respond to that? |
|
Mr. JOHNSON. They delay decisions; they wait. That is the |
|
finding, overwhelming finding, for example, by Baker Bloom and |
|
Davis but also other people who studied uncertainty, the |
|
effects of uncertainty. We don't know what is going to happen; |
|
therefore, we hesitate to make commitments. We are not going to |
|
buy that new equipment. We are not going to expand. We are not |
|
going to hire people. Let's wait and see. And while uncertainty |
|
remains elevated as it is today, there will be hesitation in |
|
hiring and hesitation for the overall macroeconomic recovery. |
|
Mr. DAVIS. It is my position that one of the great needs |
|
that we have to get out of the economic crisis that we have |
|
been facing and creating and wondering about is to create jobs. |
|
I mean, it seems to me that if more people were working, that |
|
that means more people would be paying taxes; they would be |
|
putting more money into the Treasury. And if jobs are not being |
|
created, then I don't think we can just keep dallying around |
|
and dallying around and still there is no bottom line. How does |
|
this impact job creation and really provide the kind of |
|
assurance that people are going to be able to work and |
|
contribute significantly to further development of our economy? |
|
Mr. JOHNSON. Job creation is going to be impacted |
|
negatively by the uncertainty around fiscal policy, |
|
particularly any discussion of the debt ceiling, any of the |
|
debt-ceiling-related points that have come up today. Those are |
|
negative in terms of increasing uncertainty. Those are going to |
|
cause more hesitation in hiring. Those are going to slow |
|
employment growth below what it would otherwise be. And those |
|
are not helpful to the economic recovery or, as you say, |
|
Congressman, to the budget. |
|
Mr. DAVIS. So, in essence, we are kind of kidding ourselves |
|
about being able, without creating jobs, to solve economic |
|
problems; that just making decisions to shift thoughts and |
|
ideas and processes, and at the end of the day, there are still |
|
no more people working. |
|
Mr. JOHNSON. You need an economic recovery, Congressman, |
|
for everything else that you want to do. And that requires jobs |
|
to come back to where they were. We are still at least 3 |
|
percent below peak employment pre-financial crisis. This is the |
|
longest, worst recession in American history since the 1930s. |
|
Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much. |
|
And thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
|
Chairman CAMP. Thank you, Mr. Davis. |
|
Mr. Griffin is recognized for 5 minutes. |
|
Mr. GRIFFIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
|
Thank you all for testifying today. I want to be really |
|
clear as well. I haven't heard any talk on this side of the |
|
aisle about default, wanting to default, using default as |
|
leverage. That is a straw man. The only people I have really |
|
heard a lot about default from are on the other side of the |
|
aisle. So I just want to make that abundantly clear. |
|
And it reminds me of what now Majority Leader Reid said |
|
back in 2006. He is the one that was talking about default. He |
|
said, ``Americans know that increasing debt is the last thing |
|
we should be doing. After all, I repeat, the Baby Boomers are |
|
about to retire. Under the circumstances, any credible |
|
economist would tell you we should be reducing debt, not |
|
increasing it. Democrats won't be making argument to support |
|
this legislation, which will weaken our country, weaken our |
|
country. We are being asked to do what shouldn't be asked of |
|
us, to increase the debt to almost $9 trillion.'' |
|
So there is a lot of politics going on here. And what I |
|
would like to do--and most of the questions I had to ask have |
|
been asked. So I would like to just go over a couple of things |
|
to clarify. We have heard a lot of talk about the Bush tax cuts |
|
and the wars adding to our debt. And I was looking here at |
|
revenue as a percentage of GDP. And it is interesting that in |
|
the mid-1990s, when taxes were higher--1995, for example-- |
|
revenue as a percentage of GDP was 18.4 percent. During the |
|
Bush years, in 2007, after the economy recovered from 9/11, it |
|
was 18.5 percent. So the idea that revenue dipped significantly |
|
during the Bush years because of tax cuts is just not true. |
|
Sure, it went down after 9/11. |
|
I didn't see 9/11 labeled on this chart, Mr. Johnson. |
|
But I think that that is a critical part of the equation. |
|
The other thing that I would point out, a key change--and |
|
Majority Leader Reid referred to it--the key change has been |
|
demographics. We all agree we have spent too much in Congress, |
|
a lot of it long before I got here. But the issue now is not |
|
who spent too much. The issue now is, who is willing to fix the |
|
problem and who is not? That is ultimately the issue. |
|
And we have heard a lot about a balanced approach, and we |
|
just had an agreement here in the House, in the Congress, that |
|
raised taxes. |
|
Now, from my calculations, before the taxes that were |
|
raised on the American people recently--a few weeks ago--we had |
|
a deficit of about $1 trillion. After those tax increases, we |
|
have a deficit of about $1 trillion. Does anyone disagree with |
|
that? |
|
Mr. Casey, do you agree that it had no significant impact |
|
on our deficit? |
|
Mr. CASEY. I agree. |
|
Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. Hoagland. |
|
Mr. HOAGLAND. I agree that the deficit for fiscal year 2013 |
|
will still be about $1 trillion. |
|
Mr. GRIFFIN. Even after the tax increases? |
|
Mr. HOAGLAND. Yes. But of course those tax increases phase |
|
in over a longer period of time. |
|
Mr. GRIFFIN. If you take $60 billion a year and subtract it |
|
from a little over $1 trillion, you are still right at $1 |
|
trillion. Correct, Mr. Foster? |
|
Mr. FOSTER. That is the simple math, sir. |
|
Mr. GRIFFIN. And Mr. Johnson. |
|
Mr. JOHNSON. No, Congressman. Look, the way that you have |
|
discussed the budget and the way you argue about the budget |
|
is over a 10-year timeframe. Those were insufficient, I agree, |
|
to completely address the budget issue. I supported larger, |
|
stronger strengthening of revenue--not immediately, though. |
|
Phasing it in over time is the right way to do it. You don't |
|
want to shock the economy too much. Phasing it in over 10, 15 |
|
years. |
|
Mr. GRIFFIN. I am running out of time. The bottom line is, |
|
I understand you look at things over 10 years. And we all know |
|
that in 10 years, there is no control over what is going to be |
|
spent and what is going to be coming in. But the bottom line |
|
is, the tax increases we got with no cuts did nothing to impact |
|
the deficit of any significance--it is still about $1 trillion. |
|
You could say it is $910 billion. Okay. It is still about $1 |
|
trillion. The bottom line is, we still are about $1 trillion in |
|
the red every single year. And I will be waiting with optimism |
|
to see the President's budget. |
|
Again, thank you all for coming today. And I yield back. |
|
Chairman CAMP. Mr. Hoagland, in your 33-plus years of |
|
dealing with budget issues in the Senate on the Senate Budget |
|
Committee and in other areas, have you ever known in the |
|
history of our country of four successive years of trillion- |
|
dollar deficits? |
|
Mr. HOAGLAND. No, sir. |
|
Chairman CAMP. So it is an unprecedented position we are |
|
in, in terms of the annual deficits? |
|
Mr. HOAGLAND. I never thought I would see trillion-dollar |
|
deficits. |
|
Chairman CAMP. And the debt--and I tend to use gross debt |
|
as a percentage of GDP. |
|
Have you ever seen the gross debt as a percentage of GDP at |
|
the level that we are seeing right now? |
|
Mr. HOAGLAND. Only after World War II. But then we owed it |
|
to ourselves, and we brought it down rather substantially |
|
there. |
|
Chairman CAMP. So since World War II, the level of GDP---- |
|
Mr. HOAGLAND. Has averaged about 40 percent. |
|
Chairman CAMP. Okay. And I was on the President's fiscal |
|
commission. And at that time, it was about 90 percent. Now it |
|
is over 100 if you look at gross debt. And we had a |
|
presentation there by doctors--it was by Drs. Carmen Reinhart |
|
and Kenneth Rogoth--who indicated that a country's economic |
|
growth would--and I am using their words--deteriorate markedly |
|
when its debt-to-GDP ratio was above 90. And obviously, we are |
|
at that point now. |
|
Mr. HOAGLAND. Correct. |
|
Chairman CAMP. What impact do you believe that will have on |
|
the economic growth and job creation in the United States in |
|
the future? |
|
Mr. HOAGLAND. I believe, again, that has a very negative |
|
impact upon the growth of this country going forward in terms |
|
of our credit rating around the world, in terms of our economic |
|
growth pattern will be negatively affected by that level of |
|
debt to GDP. While it is not a good example, all we have to do |
|
is look at what is happening in Europe and see the consequences |
|
that that has had over there. |
|
Chairman CAMP. We recently got a Fitch ratings report. And |
|
I am quoting from their report that said, ``In the absence of |
|
an agreed and credible medium-term deficit reduction plan that |
|
would be consistent with sustaining the economic recovery and |
|
restoring confidence in the long-run sustainability of the U.S. |
|
public finances, the current negative outlook on the AAA rating |
|
is likely to be resolved with a downgrade later this year, even |
|
if another debt-ceiling crisis is averted.'' |
|
How do you think the financial markets and the broader |
|
economy would react if Congress simply increased the debt limit |
|
and there was no credible commitment to addressing the current |
|
fiscal situation, as we have just discussed? |
|
Mr. HOAGLAND. Mr. Chairman, I think that the debt limit |
|
bill does not control or limit the ability of the Federal |
|
Government to run deficits or incur obligations. But I do |
|
believe there is a limit on our ability to pay obligations. So |
|
I think that while this is not the perfect solution, at least |
|
you do have the opportunity here by--if you simply raised it |
|
without some form of a process, which I hope would come about |
|
through going back to regular order, I think that would be |
|
looked upon very favorably. But if you simply raised it with no |
|
process involved, I think that would be looked upon negatively |
|
by the market. |
|
Chairman CAMP. All right. |
|
Dr. Foster, any comment on that? |
|
Mr. FOSTER. I think that is exactly right. The markets are |
|
looking. They understand something of Washington and how |
|
Washington works. They understand there are only a few moments |
|
in a given year or 2- or 4-year period in which we have a |
|
forcing moment, a time when Congress must actually do |
|
something. And the critical value of the debt limit and the |
|
debate around the debt limit that is a simple enough issue that |
|
the American people can understand it. The budget is |
|
complicated. They don't understand the budget. They do |
|
understand debt. They have debt. They understand. They don't |
|
understand trillions. But the concept, they get. |
|
The second value is that it is a forcing moment. It forces |
|
Congress to act when the regular order of the budget process |
|
has failed. Mr. Hoagland talked about this--and I completely |
|
agree with him regarding the importance of the regular order. |
|
But Congress has a regular habit of ignoring the regular order. |
|
This is a forcing moment, and it is a critical time to take |
|
action. |
|
Chairman CAMP. And Mr. Hoagland, again, given your |
|
experience on budget, we have had other short-term extensions |
|
of the debt limit in the history of this country, have we not? |
|
Mr. HOAGLAND. Yes, we have a number of times. Looking it |
|
up, I think it was at least--in my career up here, we have had |
|
it at least seven or eight times, we have had a short-term |
|
limited increase. |
|
Chairman CAMP. And we have also had extensions of the debt |
|
limit that have had policy reforms attached to them as well, |
|
have we not? |
|
Mr. HOAGLAND. Oh, I think the most important one--I said my |
|
first experience here was with the 1985 Gramm-Rudman-Hollings |
|
Act, which was tied to debt limit increase because we were |
|
going over $2 trillion. |
|
Chairman CAMP. So when the President and many Democrats |
|
call for a so-called clean increase in the debt ceiling, which |
|
they mean has no other reforms or other proposals attached to |
|
that or changes in spending behavior, how do you see the path |
|
forward? And what should advocates of lower spending expect |
|
from the Administration? Or other budget reforms that might be |
|
attached with it? You mentioned Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. And I |
|
would like you to comment and then Dr. Foster. |
|
Mr. HOAGLAND. As I say, I don't think the debt limit bill, |
|
per se, it controls spending. It controls--it is a limit. But I |
|
do think that there are other tools. And they are not pretty. |
|
But you do have a sequester. I would certainly argue--and this |
|
is just myself speaking, not BPC--that you would look at the |
|
sequester as something that really does reduce spending. And I |
|
would also argue that one thing to do there would be to modify |
|
the sequester so that it actually does affect more than just |
|
the discretionary portion of the budget and maybe, and with |
|
some trepidation, also tax expenditures. |
|
Chairman CAMP. All right. Dr. Foster. |
|
Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir. As I mentioned, the debt limit is a |
|
forcing moment. And one of the things it can force is a shift |
|
in budget processes to make them more effective, to get |
|
Congress to take actions that it might not otherwise take under |
|
the regular order as it then stands, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings |
|
being the great example. |
|
One of the things we should be looking for in this current |
|
debate is, how do we tighten up, make more rigorous the budget |
|
process regular order so Congress takes it seriously and then |
|
puts forward the kinds of resolutions and reconciliation bills |
|
that Mr. Hoagland was talking about? |
|
Chairman CAMP. Thank you. |
|
And Mr. Casey, I just want to clarify this point before we |
|
adjourn. The Constitution grants Congress the sole authority |
|
over fiscal powers to tax, spend, and borrow; is that correct? |
|
Mr. CASEY. Absolutely correct. |
|
Chairman CAMP. And because the power resides in Congress, |
|
the debt limit is not actually a limitation on the Executive's |
|
power to borrow; is that correct? It is the statute that |
|
contains the debt ceiling is actually a grant of authority to |
|
the President. |
|
Mr. CASEY. It certainly can be read that way. I mean, it is |
|
a limit on the amount that Congress is permitting the Executive |
|
to borrow. |
|
Chairman CAMP. But it would be authority he would not |
|
otherwise have---- |
|
Mr. CASEY. Absolutely. Absolutely. Without it, he cannot |
|
borrow a nickel. |
|
Chairman CAMP. So when that authority runs out, it is |
|
actually the Constitution of the United States that is |
|
preventing the President from attempting to borrow on the |
|
credit of the United States? |
|
Mr. CASEY. Yes. |
|
Chairman CAMP. All right. Thank you. |
|
I want to thank all of our witnesses and certainly the |
|
Members for participating in this hearing today. |
|
And with that, this hearing is now adjourned. |
|
[Whereupon, at 4:36 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] |
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[Submission for the Record follows:] |
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