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	<title> - THE INVISIBLE BATTLEGROUND</title>
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	[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
	[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



	THE INVISIBLE BATTLEGROUND

	=======================================================================

	HEARING

	before the

	SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY, SCIENCE, AND RESEARCH AND
	DEVELOPMENT

	of the

	SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
	HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

	ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

	FIRST SESSION

	__________

	SEPTEMBER 16, 2003

	__________

	Serial No. 108-26

	__________

	Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Homeland Security


	Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
	house


	__________

	U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
	21-354 WASHINGTON : 2005
	_____________________________________________________________________________
	For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
	Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
	Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�0900012005


	SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

	CHRISTOPHER COX, California, Chairman

	JENNIFER DUNN, Washington JIM TURNER, Texas, Ranking Member
	C.W. BILL YOUNG, Florida BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi
	DON YOUNG, Alaska LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
	F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
	Wisconsin NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington
	W.J. (BILLY) TAUZIN, Louisiana BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts
	DAVID DREIER, California JANE HARMAN, California
	DUNCAN HUNTER, California BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
	HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER,
	SHERWOOD BOEHLERT, New York New York
	LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
	CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania NITA M. LOWEY, New York
	CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
	PORTER J. GOSS, Florida ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON,
	DAVE CAMP, Michigan District of Columbia
	LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, Florida ZOE LOFGREN, California
	BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia KAREN McCARTHY, Missouri
	ERNEST J. ISTOOK, Jr., Oklahoma SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas
	PETER T. KING, New York BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey
	JOHN LINDER, Georgia DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN,
	JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona U.S. Virgin Islands
	MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina
	MAC THORNBERRY, Texas CHARLES GONZALEZ, Texas
	JIM GIBBONS, Nevada KEN LUCAS, Kentucky
	KAY GRANGER, Texas JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
	PETE SESSIONS, Texas KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida
	JOHN E. SWEENEY, New York

	JOHN GANNON, Chief of Staff

	UTTAM DHILLON, Chief Counsel and Deputy Staff Director

	DAVID H. SCHANZER, Democrat Staff Director

	MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk

	______

	Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science, and Research and Development

	MAC THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman

	PETE SESSIONS, Texas, Vice Chairman ZOE LOFGREN, California
	SHERWOOD BOEHLERT, New York LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
	LAMAR SMITH, Texas ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
	CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas
	DAVE CAMP, Michigan DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN,
	ROBERT W. GOODLATTE, Virginia U.S. Virgin Islands
	PETER KING, New York BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina
	JOHN LINDER, Georgia KEN LUCAS, KENTUCKY
	MARK SOUDER, Indiana JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
	JIM GIBBONS, Nevada KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida
	KAY GRANGER, Texas CHARLES GONZALEZ, Texas
	CHRISTOPHER COX, California, ex JIM TURNER, TEXAS, ex officio
	officio

	(ii)


	CONTENTS

	----------
	Page

	STATEMENTS

	The Honorable Mac Thornberry, a Representative in Congress From
	the State of Texas, and Chairman, Cybersecurity, Science, and
	Research and Development....................................... 1
	The Honorable Zoe Lofgren, a Representative in Congress From the
	State of California, and Ranking Member, Cybersecurity,
	Science, and Research and Development
	Oral Statement................................................. 2
	Prepared Statement............................................. 5
	The Honorable Donna M. Christensen, a Delegate From the U.S.
	Virgin Islands................................................. 24
	The Honorable Jennifer Dunn, a Representative in Congress From
	the State of Washington........................................ 4
	The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress From
	the State of North Carolina.................................... 20
	The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress
	From the State of Rhode Island
	Oral Statement................................................. 33
	Prepared Statement............................................. 6
	The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress
	From the State of Texas
	Oral Statement................................................. 29
	Prepared Statement............................................. 6
	The Honorable John Linder, a Representative in Congress From the
	State of Georgia............................................... 23
	The Honorable Ken Lucas, a Representative in Congress From the
	State of Kentucky.............................................. 26
	The Honorable Kendrick B. Meek, a Representative in Congress From
	the State of Florida........................................... 37
	The Honorable Pete Sessions, a Representative in Congress From
	the State of Texas............................................. 27

	Witness

	The Honorable Robert Liscouski, Assistant Secretary,
	Infrastructure Protection Directorate, Department of Homeland
	Security
	Oral Statement................................................. 7
	Prepared Statement............................................. 9


	WHAT THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
	SECURITY IS DOING TO MAKE AMERICA'S
	CYBERSPACE MORE SECURE

	----------


	Tuesday, September 16, 2003

	House of Representatives,
	Subcommittee on Cybersecurity,
	Science, and Research and Development,
	Select Committee on Homeland Security,
	Washington, DC.
	The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:30 a.m., in Room
	2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mac Thornberry
	[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
	Present: Representatives Thornberry, Sessions, Linder,
	Lofgren, Jackson-Lee, Christensen, Etheridge, Lucas, Langevin,
	and Meek.
	Also Present: Representative Dunn.
	Mr. Thornberry. The hearing will come to order. I would
	like to welcome our witness and guests to today's hearing,
	entitled The Invisible Battleground: What the Department of
	Homeland Security is Doing to Make America's Cybersecurity More
	Secure.
	Over the past several months this subcommittee has received
	a number of perspectives on cybersecurity. We have held
	classified and unclassified briefings and hearings. We have
	heard from witnesses from academia, think tanks, technology
	industry, government agency, users, and others. Our goal has
	been to deepen our understanding of the issues involved and to
	gain a truer perspective on how and where cybersecurity fits
	into homeland security.
	Now, today, we will hear a progress report from the new
	Department of Homeland Security.
	From the first bills introduced in Congress to create a
	Department of Homeland Security, cybersecurity was one of those
	critical elements that was given to the new department, one of
	the functions where a number of government agencies would be
	brought together with greater emphasis and broader
	responsibilities. It was clear that if we were really going to
	modernize and strengthen Homeland Security, cybersecurity had
	to be a part of it.
	The final legislation, in fact, did that. It did not set
	cybersecurity apart, as some proposed, but included it as one
	of the critical infrastructures placed under the Directorate
	for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection.
	Since the Department began operations in March this year,
	it has brought some key people on board, although sometimes it
	has seemed to have taken a while. In June, it announced the
	creation of a National Cybersecurity Division; just yesterday a
	director was announced for that division. Yesterday, also, an
	emergency response partnership with Carnegie Mellon University
	and a US-CERT was announced. So significant steps have been
	taken.
	In its strategy, released in February, the administration
	acknowledged that cyberspace is the nervous system of the other
	infrastructures, the control system of the country. Thus, the
	healthy functioning of cyberspace is essential to our economy
	and our national security.
	In our hearings so far, we have heard that cyber attacks
	are growing in number and complexity and in severity of the
	consequences. The recent bout with viruses and worms have shown
	that once they are launched, they are not easily contained; and
	as recently as last week, our hearing on the recent blackouts
	have shown again the interconnectiveness of various
	infrastructures. And yet there has been a lingering concern
	that cybersecurity has not been given the priority it deserves
	from the Department.
	Today, we are ready to hear from the administration on some
	answers to these important questions, such as: Where are we in
	implementing each of the five priorities contained in the
	national strategy;
	What can and should the Federal Government do to require or
	encourage better security for all of the IT infrastructure
	which is in private hands; and
	What about the human element where we have received
	testimony that up to two-thirds of the problems that are
	created are created by the interface of human beings with
	technology?
	In today's world, our computers and cyber networks are not
	just a place to do business and conduct research and
	communicate with our friends. Cyberspace is an invisible
	battleground that we must secure and defend, for attacks are
	being launched against us every day attacks against the central
	nervous system of the country and against our economy and our
	security. We must be ready. And today we hope to hear from our
	witness that we are in better shape than we have been in the
	past.
	Before we turn to our witness, I am going to yield to our
	distinguished ranking member, my partner in this effort, Ms.
	Lofgren.
	Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Chairman Thornberry, for holding
	this hearing and for your continued outstanding leadership of
	this committee.
	I think the chairman did a great job in summarizing the
	work that this subcommittee has done to date. All the members
	of the subcommittee have taken the time to study this
	incredibly complex set of issues involving cybersecurity, and
	we certainly know more now than we did when we began our
	endeavor.
	I think all of us agree that the Nation's cyber
	infrastructure remains vulnerable and that the Federal
	Government must provide leadership to better secure our systems
	in both the public and private sectors. My concerns about the
	Department of Homeland Security are that it is not providing
	sufficient leadership in the cyber arena, particularly in the
	following five areas:
	Reducing vulnerabilities: The Department is tasked with
	reducing vulnerabilities to government in critical asset
	computers as well as responding to cyber incidents. The number
	of cyber attacks and resulting damage, however, continues to
	increase. This past August was the worst ever for computer
	viruses. The Blaster, Welchia, and SoBigF viruses, along with
	other attacks, caused more than $32.8 billion in economic
	damages according to one digital risk assessments company.
	Two, coordination: Is the National Cybersecurity Division
	coordinating with the private sector, other government
	agencies, and State and local governments to identify
	vulnerabilities? Has the NCSD begun a national risk assessment?
	If so, when will it be complete? I am concerned that the
	Department is not providing quick leadership in this area.
	Departures from the administration: In the last 6 months
	the most senior Bush administration cyber officials have left
	the government. These individuals include Richard Clarke, the
	Special Advisor to the President for Cybersecurity; Howard
	Schmidt, the Vice Chair of the President's Critical
	Infrastructure Board, and Clarke's replacement; Ron Dick, the
	Director of the National Infrastructure Protection Center; and
	John Tritak, Director of the Critical Infrastructure Assurance
	Office. I am concerned about these departures and that the
	National Cybersecurity Division may lack sufficient personnel
	and resources to operate effectively.
	Cyber priorities at DHS: Clearly, as the chairman has
	mentioned, cybersecurity is enormously important to the
	infrastructure of the Nation. I am worried that cybersecurity
	has been demoted in importance in the administration with the
	lead official for cyber issues reduced from a Special Advisor
	to the President, working in the White House, to a directorship
	very deep within the Department of Homeland Security. The
	Nation's cyber chief must have both the access and resources to
	do the job, the cyber chief at DHS.
	It took the Department over 3 months to announce its choice
	for a leader of the NCSD. This delay is troublesome, and I am
	curious as to why it took the Department so long to settle on a
	candidate. I am also concerned about the number of other jobs
	that seem to be empty and vacant within NCSD, how many desks
	are empty. Is there anyone there to answer the phone?
	With these concerns in mind, I am very encouraged by the
	person chosen to lead the NCSD. Mr. Yoran currently serves as
	the Vice President of Managed Security Services Operation at
	Semantech Corporation, the Internet security firm headquartered
	in Cupertino, California, near my home.
	I am very familiar with the work of Semantech. It is one of
	the true bright spots in Silicon Valley, and its CEO, John
	Thompson, is a talented and thoughtful leader. I am hopeful
	that our new guy will provide needed leadership at the NCSD,
	and once he is on the job, I am going to tell him that he must
	candidly tell the chairman and me if he has the access and
	resources needed to accomplish his mission. If he is unable to
	do his job, Secretary Ridge should expect to hear from me and,
	I think, the chairman directly.
	As you can see, we have many concerns about the cyber
	program of the Department of Homeland Security. I am pleased
	that we finally today will hear directly from the top official
	at DHS on our efforts. And the Assistant Secretary for
	Infrastructure has served as the acting chief since it was
	established on June 6, so I am sure he will address the
	concerns that I have raised; and I hope he will be able to
	reassure me that cybersecurity is, in fact, a priority at the
	Department.
	I thank the chairman for yielding.
	Mr. Thornberry. Thank the gentlelady.
	Without objection, the distinguished vice chair of the full
	committee will sit with the subcommittee today, and the Chair
	would yield to the gentlelady from Washington for any opening
	statement she would like to make.
	Ms. Dunn. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
	Mr. Liscouski, I am looking forward to your testimony.
	Thank you for joining us here today. We are eager to learn
	about the Department of Homeland Security's most recent
	efforts, in fact, in June of this year to protect an important
	part of our Nation's critical infrastructure, our cyber
	systems.
	In the wake of September 11, the leaders of this Nation
	have realized that securing our homeland against terrorist
	attacks also means that we need to think creatively about where
	our targets might be. We have visual reminders of many targets
	every single day. When we board an airplane, when we drive over
	a bridge, when we have our bags searched at football games.
	But we also have targets that are far less visible. The
	power grid is one such example. Cyberspace is another. And that
	is why we are here today.
	Your division, Mr. Liscouski, faces no small task. Securing
	cyberspace is an international issue, something I realized with
	greater awareness this summer when I addressed a group in
	London on cybersecurity, and was very happy to learn how
	involved the people of the British Government are in making
	sure we get this right.
	Also, we know that a cyber attack from overseas cannot be
	intercepted at the border, or at least is very difficult to be
	intercepted at any border, since there are no borders in the
	cyber world.
	This issue is also one that requires intense partnership
	with the private sector. The key to achieving a desired level
	of cybersecurity is utilizing and supporting the relationships
	that we have formed with the private sector, those on the
	ground doing research and development. Companies like
	Microsoft, which I represent here in the United States
	Congress, have realized that many of its priorities in business
	are in line with our Homeland Security priorities here in
	Congress. We are all working to prevent a situation where
	critical technological infrastructure is brought down.
	This committee has spent a significant amount of time
	looking into the successful public-private and cross-industry
	partnerships that already exist. I hope the Department
	continues to work closely with the private sector to reach a
	clear understanding of what a safe network system looks like.
	As the Department works to protect America's technological
	infrastructure, it also must keep in mind the interconnectivity
	these cyber connections have with the world's financial
	markets, transportation and communications systems.
	I am very happy the Department is taking this charge
	seriously, and I look forward to your testimony.
	Mr. Thornberry. Thank the gentlelady. Does any other member
	wish to offer an opening statement at this time?
	Without objection, any member may submit an opening
	statement for the record.
	[The information follows:]

	Prepared Statement of the Honorable Zoe Lofgren, Ranking Member,
	Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science, and Research and Development

	Thank you Chairman Thornberry for holding this hearing and for your
	continued outstanding leadership of this subcommittee.
	Chairman Thornberry did a terrific job in summarizing the work that
	this subcommittee has done to date. All Members of this subcommittee
	should be commended for taking the time to study the incredible complex
	set of issues involving cybersecurity.
	We have learned a lot since this subcommittee first met at the
	beginning of the year. I think all would agree that our nation's cyber
	infrastructure remains vulnerable, and that the federal government must
	provide leadership to better secure our systems in both the public and
	private sector.
	My concerns about the Department of Homeland Security are that it
	is just not providing sufficient leadership in the cyber arena,
	particularly in the following five areas.
	<bullet> Reducing Vulnerabilities: The Department is tasked
	with reducing vulnerabilities to government and critical asset
	computers, as well as responding to cyber incidents. The number
	of cyber attacks, and resultant damage, however, continues to
	increase. This past August was the worst month ever for
	computer viruses. The Blaster, Welchia, and SoBig.F viruses,
	along with other attacks, caused more than $32.8 billion in
	economic damages, according to one digital risk assessment
	company.
	<bullet> Coordination: Is the National Cyber Security Division
	(NCSD) coordinating with the private sector, other government
	agencies, and state and local governments to identify
	vulnerabilities? Has the NCSD begun a national risk assessment?
	If so, when will it be complete? I am very concerned that the
	Department is just not providing leadership in this area.
	<bullet> Bush Administration Departures: In the last six
	months, the most senior Bush Administration cyber officials
	have left the government. These individuals include Richard
	Clarke, the special advisor to the president for cyber
	security; Howard Schmidt, the vice chair of the president's
	critical infrastructure board and Clarke's replacement; Ron
	Dick, the director of the National Infrastructure Protection
	Center; and John Tritak, director of the Critical
	Infrastructure Assurance Office.
	I am very concerned about these departures and that the National
	Cyber Security Division may lack sufficient personnel and resources to
	operate effectively
	<bullet> Cyber priorities at DHS: Clearly, cyber security has
	been demoted in importance in the Administration with the lead
	official for cyber issues reduced from a special advisor to the
	President working in the White House, to a Directorship buried
	deep within the Department of Homeland Security. The nation's
	cyber chief must have the both the access and resources to do
	the job.
	<bullet> Cyber Chief at DHS: In addition, it took the
	department over 3 months to announce its choice for a leader of
	the NCSD. This delay is troublesome, and I am curious as to why
	it took the department so long to settle on a candidate. I am
	also concerned about the number of other jobs that need to be
	filled within the NCSD. How many desks are empty? Is there
	anyone there to answer the phone?
	<bullet> With these concerns in mind, I am very encouraged by
	the person chosen to lead the NCSD. Mr. Amit Yoran currently
	serves as the Vice President of Managed Security Services
	Operations at Symantec Corporation, the internet security firm
	headquartered in Cupertino, California. I am very familiar with
	the work of Symantec. It remains one of the true bright spots
	in Silicon Valley, and its CEO, John Thompson is a talented and
	thoughtful leader.
	<bullet> I am hopeful that Mr. Yoran will provide needed
	leadership in the NCSD. Once he in on the job, I am going to
	tell him that he must candidly tell me if he has the access and
	resources needed to do his job. If he is unable to do his job,
	Secretary Ridge should expect to hear directly from me.
	As you can see, I have many concerns about the cyber program at the
	Department of Homeland Security. I am pleased that we finally get to
	hear directly from a top official at DHS today on its efforts. Robert
	Liscouski, Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, has
	served as the acting chief of the National Cyber Security Division
	(NCSD) since it was established on June 6, 2003.
	I hope that Mr. Liscouski will address my many concerns and
	reassure me that cyber security is in fact a priority at the Department
	of Homeland Security.

	Prepared Opening Statement of the Honorable James Langevin, a
	Representative in Congress from the State of Rhode Island

	Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to welcome Assistant
	Secretary Liscouski, and express my appreciation for your willingness
	to come here for what I expect will be a very informative and
	productive hearing. We have heard so much from both the private and
	academic sectors about the state of information security and their
	hopes and fears about the Department of Homeland Security's plans, and
	now we can find out about those plans directly from the source.
	Mr. Chairman, my greatest concern by far is the fact that no
	information has been forthcoming from DHS until now. While I am pleased
	to finally get the chance to discuss how information security fits into
	the overall plan for critical infrastructure protection, I must express
	my disappointment at how long it has taken.
	I believe it is the duty of this Subcommittee to determine what is
	being done, and what more can be done, to safeguard our critical
	infrastructure. While it is true that much of our information
	infrastructure lies with private industry, that should in no way reduce
	DHS's efforts to secure and protect it.
	I am especially interested to hear Mr. Liscouski's opinion on
	whether or not the structure and resources being devoted to
	cybersecurity at DHS are sufficient to handle the tasks for which it is
	now responsible. In addition, I hope to learn what, if any, attention
	is being paid to home users and their security, an important group that
	is often left out of ``big picture'' views of information security.
	Most importantly, this Subcommittee needs to know how DHS can best work
	in conjunction with our computer industry partners and other agencies
	in order to raise the bar for information security for all users.
	Again, I greatly appreciate Assistant Secretary Liscouski taking
	time to be here to discuss these vital issues with us.
	Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

	Prepared Opening Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a
	Representative in Congress from the State of Texas

	Mr. Chairman, Thank you for calling this important and provocative
	hearing. With the recent blackouts, and the viruses which have been
	plaguing the House computer systems, our infrastructure networks--and
	our dependence on them--is abundantly clear. It will be good to explore
	what the Administration is doing to make them more secure.
	Obviously, national security is foremost on everyon's minds these
	days. As we work to improve our country's security, it is important
	that we take inventory of all systems that are vital to the functioning
	of the nation, and do all we can to protect them. This certainly
	includes our computer networks systems that can be attacked anonymously
	and from far away. These networks are the glue that holds our nation's
	infrastructure together. An attack from cyberspace could jeopardize
	electric power grids, railways, hospitals and financial services, to
	name a few. The recent blackouts made it clear how fragile and
	vulnerable our infrastructure may be.
	We are all aware of the growing number of internet security
	incidents. These incidents can come in many flavors: annoying attacks
	through emails, involving such things as computer viruses, denial of
	service attacks, and defaced web sites; or cyber-crime, such as
	identity theft. Such events have disrupted business and government
	activities, and have sometimes resulted in significant recovery costs.
	Despite the risks, our hospitals and power grids, our
	communications, our transportation systems, will probably always be
	critically dependent on computers and information flow and the
	satellites above us. A terrorist or other criminal tampering with those
	systems could devastate entire industries and potentially cost lives.
	While we have been fortunate so far in avoiding a catastrophic cyber
	attack, Richard Clarke, the President's cyber-terrorism czar from last
	year, I guess I should say ``two czars ago,'' said that the government
	must make cybersecurity a priority or face the possibility of a
	``Digital Pearl Harbor''.
	This was truly a frightening prospect. On paper, it seems we are
	taking bold steps toward securing cyberspace: we now have a National
	Cyber Security Division (NCSD) at the DHS, and its new U.S. Computer
	Emergency Response Team (US-CERT). I would like to thank Mr. Liscouski
	for taking the time away from the challenges that face him at the DHS
	to enlighten us on the progress the Department and the Administration
	are making on this important front.
	We have been working on this subject for the past year in the
	Science Committee as well. One thing I have been disturbed by is the
	lack of good data on the threats that face us, and the absence of a
	solid assessment of the risks we face. How can we know how much to
	invest, and where, if we do not know those basics?
	I want to know the magnitude of the threat out there, and how
	Americans are dealing with it. What is the role of the private sector,
	and of private citizens, and of the federal government? Are we putting
	adequate resources and energy into fulfilling that role?
	I look forward to the dialogue. Thank you.

	Mr. Thornberry. With that, we will turn to our witness. We
	want to welcome, Robert P. Liscouski, Assistant Secretary for
	Infrastructure Protection of the Department of Homeland
	Security.
	I understand this is your first opportunity to testify in
	front of Congress. We appreciate your being here and you are
	recognized. Your full statement will be made part of the
	record, and you are recognized to summarize it as you wish.

	STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT P. LISCOUSKI, ASSISTANT
	SECRETARY FOR INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
	HOMELAND SECURITY

	Mr. Liscouski. Thank you and good morning, Chairman
	Thornberry and members of the committee. I am pleased to appear
	before you this morning to discuss some of our efforts to
	protect and secure our Nation's critical infrastructure.
	From the beginning of DHS, IAIP and the Infrastructure
	Protection Office for which I am responsible recognized the
	equal importance of protecting physical as well as cyber
	assets. Thus, we created the National Cybersecurity Division on
	June 6 of this year. Today, I am here to give you a progress
	report on where we are now and where we will be going in the
	future to implement the President's national strategy to secure
	cyberspace.
	Mr. Thornberry. Excuse me, Mr. Liscouski, would you pull
	the microphone just a little closer to you. It will be easier
	for us to hear. Thank you.
	Mr. Liscouski. All right.
	I am pleased to announce this morning that Amit Yoran has
	been formally named as the Director of the NCSD, effective
	today. Mr. Yoran is a strategic thinker, a disciplined leader,
	who understands the unique threats and vulnerabilities
	manifested in cyberspace and is the individual who will further
	accelerate our efforts in building a full NCSD team and
	increasing the strength of our public and private sector
	partnerships.
	Building upon the formation of the NCSD, the Department has
	worked to assemble a consolidated and coordinated team of
	cybersecurity professionals. Despite the many organizational
	and cultural challenges associated with integrating these
	elements into one entity, our initial efforts have yielded very
	effective positive and tangible results. The creation of the
	NCSD has enabled the initial consolidation of three 24x7 cyber
	watch capabilities; formulation of standardized incident
	handling procedures for responding to cybersecurity events; and
	the creation of a single national focal point for cybersecurity
	leadership for prevention, protection, and response to
	incidents.
	The most recent accomplishments of the NCSD is the creation
	of the National Computer Emergency Response Team or the US-
	CERT. The US-CERT, in collaboration with the private sector and
	leading response organizations, will improve warning and
	response time to security incidents by fostering the
	development of detection tools and utilizing common commercial
	incident and vulnerability reporting protocols. This will
	increase the flow of critical security information throughout
	the Internet community.
	I would like to take a moment to address our rationale
	behind the decision to integrate physical and cybersecurity
	within the IAIP directorate. I believe that this approach is
	the correct one for three reasons.
	First, cybersecurity cannot stand alone. The critical
	interdependencies between cyber and physical domains demand
	that we coordinate our intelligence and our protection efforts.
	Second, with the creation of the NCSD, we have for the
	first time implemented a single point of contact for
	cybersecurity within the Federal Government that will interact
	with other agencies, private security, the resource communities
	and State and local governments on a 24x7 basis.
	Third, though the director of the NCSD serves as a
	technical and operational lead for cybersecurity issues,
	cybersecurity will also be championed by Under Secretary Frank
	Libutti and myself. And we are committed to the implementation
	and the full funding of the NCSD as one of the top priorities
	for the IAIP directorate and for DHS at large.
	As demonstrated by recent events, the consequences of cyber
	attack can manifest with little or no warning, on a widespread
	scale, with tremendous speed. Impacts can quickly escalate
	across multiple infrastructures, resulting in widespread
	disruption of essential services, significant economic losses,
	and potentially endangering public safety and national
	security. The NCSD, therefore, is implementing its objectives
	for the timely execution of three key mission areas--outreach,
	prevention, and remediation.
	The NCSD is aggressively pursuing an outreach agenda that
	will provide education tools for children, parents, teachers,
	business owners, and business operators. NCSD, through the
	development of partnerships with government agencies such as
	the Federal Trade Commission, nonprofits like the National
	Cybersecurity Alliance and Internet service providers, will
	work to establish and enhance awareness programs for all users
	at all levels. We will be making announcements on our progress
	in the coming weeks.
	NCSD partnerships with industry, academia, and government
	will be the foundation for program implementation for
	protective and preventive measures to reduce America's
	vulnerabilities to cyber attacks. It is crucial that we improve
	existing public and private partnerships whose missions are
	consistent with the NCSD.
	A prime example is the National Cybersecurity Alliance
	whose members have committed their time and resources to
	regularly educating the home consumer and small businesses on
	good security practices. Proactive response and recovery
	efforts associated with the recent Blaster worm and SoBig virus
	offer the best evidence of the value of partnerships. SoBig
	spread faster and more aggressively than any previous e-mail
	virus, affecting millions of residential business and
	government computers worldwide.
	We recognize a cyber attack could easily cascade across
	multiple infrastructures, causing widespread, rapid disruption
	of essential services and impacting our national economy,
	public safety, and national security. The NCSD is committed to
	closely working with other government and law enforcement
	agencies, private industry, as well as academia, to help secure
	our cyberspace from future and potentially more serious
	malicious exploitation.
	To this end, I am pleased to announce that we are beginning
	to organize a National Cybersecurity Summit for later this fall
	in order to assemble key industry and government leaders to
	energize decisions like several key national cybersecurity
	issues.
	The Internet and cyber technologies have greatly improved
	both the quality of life for our citizens and the efficiency
	and the productivity of our business and our government. These
	societal and economic benefits are not without their costs.
	Malicious actors are devising new and ingenious ways to exploit
	vulnerabilities in our cyber world, to disrupt our quality of
	life, and threaten our national and economic security. Much
	like the larger global war on terrorism, this effort will take
	time, resources, dedication, energy, and hard work. But in the
	few short months we have been in existence, we have made great
	strides and we look forward to working with the Members of
	Congress, this committee, our government partners, the private
	sector, and the international community in this endeavor.
	I come before you today to dedicate ourselves to this
	common goal: one team, one fight, one mission, to protect the
	United States of America.
	I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today
	and I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
	[The statement of Mr. Liscouski follows:]

	Prepared Statement of the Hon. Robert Liscouski

	Good morning Chairman Thornberry and Members of the committee. My
	name is Robert Liscouski, I am the Assistant Secretary for
	Infrastructure Protection and Acting Director of the National Cyber
	Security Division (NCSD) within the Department of Homeland Security. I
	am pleased to appear before your Subcommittee to discuss some of our
	efforts to protect and secure our Nation's critical infrastructure.
	Last week's observances of the two-year anniversary of the
	September 11th attacks offer a stark reminder of the threats and
	vulnerabilities we as a Nation still confront. The Department's
	Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP)
	was established by the Homeland Security Act to lead the Nation's
	efforts to prepare for, prevent, respond to, and recover from terrorist
	attacks like those perpetrated on 9/11. These terrorist acts may
	manifest in many forms, including physical and cyber attacks against
	our critical infrastructure, key assets, and national icons. Both
	physical and cyber assets have vulnerabilities that may be exploited by
	our enemies. The highly interconnected nature of our infrastructure
	makes these physical and cyber weaknesses impossible to separate--and
	difficult to address separately. Our protection methodology leverages
	an integrated physical/cyber protection approach to reduce
	vulnerabilities and to optimize our response when an attack does occur.
	From the beginning of DHS, the IAIP directorate which includes the
	Infrastructure Protection Office for which I am responsible, has
	implemented a dedicated organization committed to protecting physical
	assets. The organization is called the Protective Security Division
	(PSD). Recognizing the equal importance of protecting cyber assets, we
	created the National Cyber Security Division on June 6 of this year.
	These organizations within the Infrastructure Protection Office work
	together to implement the integrated protection methodology that I
	previously discussed. Today, I am here to give you a progress report on
	where we are now, and what we have in store for the coming months and
	years to implement the President's National Strategy to Secure
	Cyberspace.
	I am pleased to announce that Amit Yoran has been formally named as
	the Director of the NCSD effective today. Mr. Yoran is a strategic,
	disciplined leader who understands the unique threats and
	vulnerabilities manifested in cyberspace and is an individual capable
	of managing a diverse, highly technical organization Mr.Yoran was most
	recently the Vice President for Managed Security Services at Symantec
	Corporation where he was primarily responsible for managing security
	infrastructures in 40 different countries. Before working with
	Symantec, Mr. Yoran was the Founder, President and CEO of Riptech,
	Inc., a leader in outsourced information security management and
	monitoring. Before working in the private sector, he was the Director
	of the Vulnerability Assessment Program within the Computer Emergency
	Response Team at the Department of Defense and the Network Security
	Manager and the Department of Defense where he was responsible for
	maintaining operations of the Pentagon's network Mr. Yoran's leadership
	and respect within the information security industry will further
	accelerate our efforts in building the full NCSD team, and increasing
	the strength of our public and private sector partnerships.
	Since its formal establishment in June, the National Cyber Security
	Division has worked closely with our partners in the private sector,
	including coordinating response and mitigation of the Blaster worm and
	SoBig virus. Without these coordinated efforts, the significant
	economic impact of these attacks could have been much worse. In each
	situation, the Department's cyber security experts demonstrated the
	ability to quickly reach out to the security community, rapidly assess
	emerging threats, and provide timely warnings to government, industry,
	and the general public. These initial efforts were crucial--they
	allowed the NCSD to establish its credibility and demonstrate its value
	to the national and international cyber security community.
	Since June, IAIP has been assembling a consolidated and coordinated
	team of cyber security professionals. These experts were integrated
	from portions of the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC),
	Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO), Energy Assurance
	Office (EAO), and the Federal Computer Incident Response Center
	(FedCIRC). Despite the many organizational and cultural challenges
	associated with integrating these elements into one entity, our initial
	efforts have yielded effective and tangible results. Creation of the
	NCSD has enabled:

	<bullet> Planning for consolidation of three 24x7 cyber watch
	centers;

	<bullet> Formulation of a standardized incident handling
	procedure for responding to cybersecurity events; and

	<bullet> Creation of a single national focal point for
	cybersecurity leadership for prevention, protection, and
	response to incidents.
	The most recent accomplishment of the NCSD is the creation of the
	National Computer Emergency Response Team (US-CERT). The US-CERT, in
	collaboration with the private sector and leading response
	organizations, will improve warning and response time to security
	incidents by fostering the development of detection tools and utilizing
	common commercial incident and vulnerability reporting protocols. This
	will increase the flow of critical security information throughout the
	Internet community by leveraging the extensive resources and brand of
	the Federal Government and Carnegie Mellon's CERT/Coordination Center.
	The CERT/CC is a part of the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) and
	is affiliated with Carnegie Mellon's new Cyber Security Laboratory. A
	key enabler of this partnership is the 19 years of leadership
	demonstrated by the U.S. Department of Defense in its sponsorship of
	the SEI, a federally funded research & development center. By
	integrating capabilities from the Government (FedCIRC), Academia (The
	CERT/CC), and the private sector (vendors of security products and
	services), the US-CERT will provide a coordination center that, for the
	first time, links public and private response capabilities to
	facilitate communication across all infrastructure sectors.
	Before detailing our future programs and initiatives, I would like
	to begin by providing rationale behind the decision to treat physical
	and cyber security on part with one another, within the IAIP
	directorate. I believe that this approach is the correct one for three
	reasons.
	First, cyber security cannot be a ``stand alone'' effort. As I
	described earlier in my statement, the success of DHS as a Department,
	and IAIP specifically, depends on our ability to protect the entire
	critical infrastructure against physical and cyber attacks together. We
	realize the dominant components common to all 13 critical
	infrastructures are physical and cyber components. To best protect the
	country against attack, careful integration of both components is
	required to achieve a holistic view of critical infrastructure
	vulnerabilities. In fact, this view is validated by a common criticism
	voiced by the private sector and security experts preceding the
	creation of the Department: physical and cyber security were being
	addressed by the government independently. We believe the physical and
	cyber domains are inextricably linked and vulnerabilities cannot be
	effectively analyzed independently. Placing both responsibilities under
	one Under Secretary and one Assistant Secretary has ensured successful
	integration.
	Second, the NCSD will identify, analyze, and reduce cyber threats
	and vulnerabilities; disseminate threat warning information, coordinate
	incident response; and provide technical assistance in Continuity of
	operations and recovery planning. With the creation of the NCSD, we
	have for the first time, implemented a single point of contact for the
	prevention, protection, and coordination of response to incidents, that
	will interact with all federal agencies, private industry, the research
	community, State and local governments, and other partners on a 24x7
	basis.
	Third, while the Director of the NCSD serves as the technical and
	operational lead for cybersecurity issues, it is important to remember
	that the cyber security issue will now be championed within IAIP by
	Under Secretary Frank Libutti, and myself. The Under Secretary and I
	have already demonstrated our commitment to developing a world-class
	cyber security capability within the Department and believe the
	continued implementation and full funding of the NCSD is one of the top
	priorities for the IAIP Directorate. Furthermore, cyber security
	research and development will be conducted in partnership with the
	Department's Science and technology Directorate under the leadership of
	Under Secretary Charles McQueary.
	Now I would like to focus the remainder of my testimony on our plans
	for building on our accomplishments of the last three months to fully
	implement the operational NCSD in the coming months.

	The Mission: Outreach, Prevention, and Remediation
	As demonstrated by recent events, the consequences of a cyber
	attack can manifest with little or no warning, on a widespread scale,
	and with tremendous speed. Impacts can quickly cascade across multiple
	infrastructures, resulting in widespread disruptions of essential
	services, significant economic losses, and potentially endangering
	public safety and national security. The National Cyber Security
	Division, therefore, is implementing its objectives through the timely
	execution of three key mission areas--Outreach, Prevention, and
	Remediation.

	Outreach
	The NCSD will create, in coordination with the Office of Personnel
	Management and the National Institute of Standards and Technology,
	cyber security awareness and education programs and partnerships with
	consumers, businesses, governments, academia and international
	communities.
	An effective outreach program lays the foundation for the ultimate
	success of all mission areas of the NCSD. Accordingly, the NCSD
	championing the implementation of awareness efforts and campaigns that
	use a multi-level approach to provide awareness/educational tools for
	all users; for the home, awareness tools for children, parents and
	teens; customized approaches for small, medium, and large businesses;
	and for government agencies. Every level of user must realize they have
	an equally important role in the security of cyberspace. The end user,
	for example, needs to be informed about the technical aspects of
	security and about their role as gatekeepers in a larger data and
	information sharing community.
	The NCSD is aggressively pursuing an outreach agenda that will
	target groups of citizens by providing education tools for children,
	parents, teachers and business owners and operators. There are many
	effective existing programs and the NCSD is developing partnerships
	with government agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission, non-
	profits like the National Cyber Security Alliance, and the Internet
	Service Providers to establish and enhance awareness programs for all
	users. We are working to build on existing public/private outreach
	groups to assist the spectrum of users in securing their systems
	through implementation of effective security practices.
	One quick example is establishing National Cyber Security Days. As
	Americans change their clocks twice a year, to Daylight Savings and
	Standard times, the partnership of the NCSD and the National Cyber
	Security Alliance's StaySafeOnline Campaign asks consumers to use the
	days as reminders to assess their own computer security. Computer
	security needs to be a regular consideration when protecting a home.
	Just as consumers remember to lock their doors, so too should they
	remember to secure their computers. As a result of this partnership
	with the NCSD many other partners in the business and government
	communities are starting to design their national ad campaigns around
	these two dates to further amplify this important message.
	At the same time, the NCSD is partnering with other federal
	agencies, including, Commerce, NSA and DOD, state and local government,
	private industry, and academia to promote a well-trained IT security
	workforce.

	Prevention
	Consistent with law and policy, NCSD will coordinate closely with
	the Office of Management and Budget and NIST regarding the security of
	Federal systems and coordinate with Federal law enforcement
	authorities, as appropriate. NCSD will leverage other DHS components
	including the Science and Technology Directorate, the U.S. Secret
	Service and the Department's privacy officer.
	To achieve its mission, the NCSD is working with State and local
	governments, and the private sector to conduct infrastructure
	vulnerability field assessments, while providing the best and most
	cost-effective prevention and protection strategies for ``at risk''
	infrastructure facilities, assets, and personnel. Due to the diversity
	of the critical infrastructure, cyber protection strategies for each
	sector must be customized based on the unique geographical and business
	operating models of that sector. Due to the highly interconnected yet
	physically distributed nature of our critical infrastructure,
	prevention and protection strategies are prioritized based on regional,
	State, and local needs and on the need for cross-sector coordination.
	We recognize that collaborating with industry, academia, and
	Government is a key focus of our NCSD activities. With partnerships as
	the foundation for program implementation, the NCSD will coordinate
	implementation of protective and preventative measures to reduce
	America's vulnerability to cyber attacks. It is crucial that we improve
	existing public-private partnerships whose missions are consistent with
	NCSD functions. A prime example is the National Cyber Security
	Alliance, whose members have committed their time and resources to
	regularly educating the home consumer and small businesses on good
	security practices.
	With nearly all of the backbone of cyberspace owned by the private
	sector, it is imperative that the NCSD strengthen its relationships
	with them. Fortunately, there are mechanisms already in place to
	facilitate cooperation between industry and government on cyber
	security, most notably the National Coordinating Center (NCC) for
	Telecommunications and its Telecommunications Information Sharing and
	Analysis Center (ISAC), which are each part of the National
	Communications System (NCS) and IAIP. These entities provide the
	Department with direct access to leading industry operational and
	security experts whose knowledge and insights may prove crucial in
	managing a cyber incident. The NCSD, as part of IAIP, also helps to
	support two CEO-level advisory committees--The National Security
	Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) and the National
	Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC),--which provide advice and
	counsel on national security telecommunications and critical
	infrastructure matters, including cyber security issues.
	By acting as a champion for creating a national and international
	culture of cyber security, we aim to promote a security culture at the
	CEO-level and demonstrate to corporate leaders that cyber security
	ultimately promotes the resiliency of their infrastructures, protects
	the interests of their shareholders and corporate brand, and preserves
	value and competitive advantage for businesses that implement security
	best practices.

	Remediation
	As I discussed earlier, the proactive response and recovery efforts
	associated with the Blaster worm and SoBig computer virus offer the
	best evidence of the value of partnerships. SoBig spread faster and
	more aggressively than any previous email virus, affecting millions of
	residential, business, and government computers worldwide. Internet
	traffic was substantially affected by these two events, causing a 25
	percent increase in internet traffic and infecting over 600,000
	computers. It had a significant impact on cross-sector communication
	and impacted productivity.
	In August, when the Blaster worm surfaced on the Internet, the NCSD
	issued a timely warning to security professionals, suggesting that
	Internet service providers and other corporate network administrators
	shut off inbound traffic to ports 135, 139, and 445 to block the
	spreading of the Blaster infection. Blaster took advantage of a known
	vulnerability in a Windows operating system component that handles
	messages sent using the remote procedure call (RPC) protocol. RPC is a
	common protocol that software programs use to request services from
	other programs running on servers in a networked environment.
	Vulnerable systems were compromised automatically without any
	interaction from users. Through the advisory, users were instructed to
	install the appropriate software patches to prevent their computers
	from being infected. In the following weeks, the NCSD continued to
	issue advisories warning security professionals that a variant of the
	Blaster worm, dubbed ``nachi,'' ``welchia'' or ``msblast.D,'' was
	proliferating.
	Working with Internet security researchers and experts from private
	industry and academia, the Division and the FBI uncovered malicious
	code hidden within the SoBig worm on twenty master machines that was
	programmed to launch a massive denial of service attack. Federal
	authorities located the twenty computers infected with this variant of
	the worm and asked their Internet service providers to shut down their
	Internet access. As a consequence, the second wave of attacks never
	materialized.
	The NCSD recognizes that a cyber attack could cascade across
	multiple infrastructures, causing widespread rapid disruption of
	essential services, and impacting our national economy, public safety,
	and national security. While this generation of worms has not yet
	resulted in irreversible damage (albeit slowing communication,
	overstuffing e-mail inboxes, and reducing productivity), the NCSD is
	committed to working closely with other government and law enforcement
	agencies, private industry, as well as academia to help secure our
	cyberspace from future, and potentially more serious malicious
	exploitation.
	To this end, I am pleased to announce that we are beginning to
	organize a National Cyber Security Summit for later this fall, in order
	to assemble key industry and government leaders to energize decisions
	on several key National cyber security issues. Key goals of the summit
	are to--.
	<bullet> Produce a common threat and vulnerability reporting
	protocol to enhance prevention and response capabilities and to
	drive a standards-based system for communicating threats and
	vulnerabilities across the Nation;
	<bullet> Develop a Vulnerability Reduction Initiative to
	significantly reduce vulnerabilities based upon improved
	evaluation standards, tools and measures for software, new
	tools and methods for rapid patch deployment, and best practice
	adoption of security for cyber systems across the critical
	infrastructure in partnership with industry and the leading
	research universities in the United States;
	<bullet> Create an outreach and education partnership to offer
	training and awareness to 50 million home users and small
	businesses in cyber security within one year; and
	<bullet> Formulate and ratify a National Cyber Security Road
	Map that defines milestones, work streams, and metrics for
	``raising the bar'' of cyber security across the United States
	and identify work stream leads from government and industry.
	Since its inception, the National Cyber Security Division has
	delivered on its commitment to provide a centralized coordination point
	for the collection and dissemination of protective measures to reduce
	vulnerabilities and risks to the cyber infrastructure through
	implementation of the Cyber Security Tracking Analysis and Response
	Center (CSTARC). As announced in our press release on Monday morning,
	CSTARC, through a partnership with Carnegie Mellon University's CERT/
	Coordination Center, will evolve to a new capacity as a national
	Computer Emergency Response Team (US-CERT). The US-CERT will enhance
	our Nation's prevention of and response to cyber threats and
	vulnerabilities. There are currently over two hundred private sector
	groups, public sector groups, and universities that operate computer
	emergency response teams (CERTs) within the United States. Many of
	these groups have varying levels of informal and formal partnerships
	with each other and with the US-CERT. This initiative will harness this
	massive capability to significantly increase America's ability to
	protect against, and respond to, massive scale cyber attacks.
	We view the US-CERT as a fundamental element of the DHS strategy to
	ensure timely notification of all types of attacks, working toward
	having, within a year, an average of a 30-minute response to any
	attack. Moreover, the US-CERT will provide a coordination center that,
	for the first time, links all public and private response capabilities
	and facilitates communication across all sectors. US-CERT will also
	lead collaboration with the private sector to develop and distribute
	new tools and methods for detecting and identifying vulnerabilities in
	an effort to significantly reduce vulnerabilities. Lastly, US-CERT will
	help improve incident prevention methods and technologies by
	identifying and disseminating best practices and working with the
	private security industry to improve warning sensor data collection and
	analysis.

	Conclusion
	The Internet and cyber technologies have greatly improved both the
	quality of life for our citizens and the efficiency and productivity of
	our businesses and our government. These societal and economic benefits
	are not without their costs. Malicious actors are devising new and
	ingenious ways to exploit vulnerabilities in those cyber systems, to
	disrupt our quality of life and to threaten our national and economic
	security. Our ever-growing reliance on the Internet and cyber systems
	compels us to counter these threats and vulnerabilities by building
	productive partnerships with key stakeholder communities in cyberspace,
	improving how we share information, and developing and fielding
	innovative technical solutions. As the focal point for the prevention,
	protection and coordination of response to incidents, the NCSD must
	achieve its mission of ensuring the security of cyberspace. We know
	this will not be an easy assignment. Much like the larger global war on
	terrorism, this effort will take time, resources, dedication, energy,
	and hard work to succeed. But in a few short months, we have made great
	strides and are excited about the possibilities that the future offers.
	With the appointment of the new Director of the NCSD, we have focused
	leadership to guide us forward, to forge new alliances and
	partnerships, to implement new tools and capabilities, and to provide a
	vision for cyberspace security.
	Again, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today. I
	would be pleased to answer any questions that you have at this time.

	Mr. Thornberry. Thank you. And I can assure you that this
	subcommittee shares your goal of working together to help the
	country be safer. Let me just ask one brief question before
	yielding to Ms. Lofgren.
	It seems as though that the Department has made several
	significant announcements yesterday and today. The
	establishment of the US-CERT, the naming of the Director for
	the Cybersecurity Division, and now this National Cybersecurity
	Summit, which will take place later this fall.
	Why is it all coming down now? What has been your decision-
	making process, and why are we just having these decisions
	made.
	Mr. Liscouski. Well, Mr. Chairman, it is a function of our
	timing is, we have been working very hard since June, and as
	you well know, we have engaged in a lot of other activities in
	standing up the division.
	One of the things I have been working hard at over the past
	few months is putting the right team in place to ensure we
	could actually carry out the things that we announced just
	these past couple of days. So it is one.
	We could have announced them, or at least our intention is
	to execute on these objectives, earlier; but the framework from
	which we are operating is really one in which we plan
	carefully, but quickly, and then with the ability to execute.
	So I am here before you today to say that our announcements
	are timed with our ability to execute, not so much as anything
	else, but just a function of the ability that we are working
	very hard, and we have got a good plan together, and we finally
	have our teams together to be able to execute on the strategies
	we have identified.
	Mr. Thornberry. Yield to Ms. Lofgren.
	Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have just a few
	questions.
	As I mentioned in my opening statement, the President had a
	Special Advisor on Cybersecurity, but that position has been
	eliminated. Will the director of the Cybersecurity Division
	have direct contact with the President or with Secretary Ridge
	on cybersecurity issues? What kind of access will this
	individual have?
	This is kind of a nerdy subject we all know that and yet it
	is very important; and it is important that the decision
	makers, who are not necessarily living and breathing computer,
	be contacted and be aware of the scope of the issues.
	Mr. Liscouski. Yes, ma'am. Mr. Yoran--first of all let me
	explain.
	Our management style at DHS is, one, a very direct one.
	Working for Under Secretary Libutti and Secretary Ridge
	requires one to be constantly engaged to ensure that the
	leadership knows what is going on. I mean, this is a constant
	dialogue we have at senior management levels, particularly as
	it relates to infrastructure protection. Information analysis,
	because of the very uniqueness of what IAIP brings to the
	Department in terms of a function, is one which is heavily
	relied upon by the senior management of DHS. So I can tell you
	from personal experience that Secretary Ridge, Under Secretary
	Libutti reach down into the organization at any level that they
	think they need to get the answers to questions that they have,
	and we are very responsive.
	To that end, Secretary Ridge has been personally involved
	in not just overseeing the implementation or the creation of
	this division, but engaged with me in identifying the type of
	leadership we need and what we need to do to be successful in
	this endeavor. So if Mr. Yoran is going to have the the
	pleasure, because it is indeed a pleasure to work with the
	senior leadership, but more importantly the responsibility of
	reporting directly. My management style, Under Secretary
	Libutti's management style, is not one in which we say, You
	have got to go through a, quote, unquote, ``chain of command.''
	Ours is pretty much, You are the expert, you have got the con,
	you take the lead, answer the questions, take the initiatives.
	Ms. Lofgren. Okay. That is very reassuring. Thank you.
	One of the questions I was mentioning to the chairman,
	there is modeling going on around the country, university
	based, and I am interested in whether the Cybersecurity
	Division will be working with the Science and Technology
	Directorate on modeling in simulation issues and whether cyber
	threats are going to be integrated into these efforts. Can you
	give us a progress update on that?
	Mr. Liscouski. Yes, ma'am. Let me take the partnership with
	S&T first because I think that is where it starts.
	The Cyber Division has got a direct nexus into Under
	Secretary McCrery's S&T organization, the Directorate. We have
	a deputy director named in the research center in S&T. So we
	are directly partnering by driving requirements in S&T that we
	have identified from the field, not just from our own efforts,
	but through our partnerships with State and local governments,
	with the industry, with our international partners. We are
	taking those requirements and driving them into S&T. That is
	point number one.
	As it relates to the universities, our relationship with
	the US-CERT at Carnegie Mellon clearly is one example. We have
	many other relationships with universities and labs to do
	modeling. We have got the benefit of having the opportunity of
	reaching out to lab relationships we have currently that came
	over to us when we formed DHS earlier this year, so we have
	already been working on computer simulations for different
	types of modeling for attacks and for things that relate to
	cybersecurity as well as other parts of our infrastructure.
	Ms. Lofgren. Can I ask you about this US-CERT? I saw the
	announcement. We have the Federal Government has been a partner
	with CERT at Carnegie Mellon for many years. And how is US-CERT
	going to be different than regular old CERT?
	Mr. Liscouski. Well, I would like to recognize the
	Department of Defense obviously for taking the initiative back
	some almost 20 years ago, after the Morris worm, to establish
	the CERT/CC capability. That relationship has allowed many
	parts of the Federal Government to take advantage of the CERT
	capabilities.
	CERT, as you well know, remains one of the premier
	capabilities in the world, and to that end, the partnership
	that DHS is establishing is a key one for us because we are
	increasing our level of financing to the CERT. So therefore we
	are increasing the resources available directly to DHS, vis-a-
	vis the CERT, to do things not just around the incident
	response area, but also looking at establishing a malicious
	code lab there, as well as other enhancements through
	financing, through partnerships, through positioning people at
	the CERT, working closely with them to ensure that US-CERT can
	mature to a capability that is going to serve the National
	Strategy for Cyberspace.
	Ms. Lofgren. Finally, one of the responsibilities of your
	office is to coordinate outreach to State and local
	governments, and I am interested in how you are doing that. Is
	there an office that is responsible for outreach? Is outreach
	institutionalized? And in particular I am interested not just
	in what we might think of as cybersecurity, but the physical
	infrastructure that allows the cyber world to exist; and I
	continue to be concerned about the level of information and
	coordination between the Federal Government and State and
	local, especially local police officials, in terms of
	vulnerabilities that exist to the physical infrastructure.
	Because we are very concerned with the viruses and worms
	and cyber attack, but the model for terrorists remains some
	maniac with a bomb; and so we have vulnerabilities in that area
	that I am not yet convinced we have addressed adequately. And
	really our first line of defense is going to be local, not
	Federal officers.
	So can you address that issue for me?
	Mr. Liscouski. Yes, ma'am. And I agree with you; I don't
	think we have addressed it adequately yet either. We are
	working hard to do that. We have got a number of mechanisms for
	outreach, and let me just articulate those.
	We have a branch in the NCSD dedicated to outreach. It is
	headed up by a very seasoned professional. Sally McDonald, who
	came to us from the Fed CERT, has done a tremendous amount of
	effort in outreach and has got a lot of experience in this
	area, so we are relying upon Ms. McDonald to really take the
	programs where we need to go.
	We have a number of programs currently established at the
	NCSD. StaySafeOnline Campaign is one of the dominant ones in
	which we are using that to reach many different levels of
	constituents in the cyber world. That is just one example.
	We are partnering up as you may know, we have got
	relationships with ISACS, the Information Sharing Analysis
	Centers. There is an IT ISAC, but there is a cyber component in
	every ISAC we use for outreach.
	We have our advisory systems in which we put out notices
	about threats or incidents and events relating to the cyber
	world.
	We are going to continue to use the private sector for
	outreach. Our partnerships with the private sector are
	absolutely key for us to ensure that we have got the right
	things, the right awareness, going on because, as you are fully
	aware, this problem is not necessarily just a technological
	problem. In fact, most computer security professionals would
	articulate that the problem is typically not the technology; it
	is the implementation of proper standards and procedures to
	ensure that the technology is used accordingly, patches are
	made, remediation work is being done. And those are process
	issues; those are not technological issues.
	It is all about awareness training, so we are reaching out
	using universities, using the private sector, using our own
	outreach capabilities to ensure we have multilevel awareness
	programs going on; and these are in development, and we are
	welcoming suggestions from any of those out there, anybody who
	has got an interest in this area to ensure we are doing the
	right thing.
	As I mentioned in my statement, we are working with ISPs to
	ensure that we have got the right awareness going on for users
	of broadband connections to ensure that they understand the
	dangers of getting on line and in open systems without taking
	the appropriate precautions, so--.
	Ms. Lofgren. Thank you. I will reserve my other questions
	for the next second round.
	Mr. Liscouski. Thank you.
	Mr. Thornberry. I think the Chair will use the clock not
	just as a guide for members, not as a hard and fast rule; and
	Ms. Lofgren and I have agreed that we will have as many rounds
	as members have questions, with Mr. Liscouski's indulgence.
	The Chair would now recognize the gentlelady from
	Washington.
	Ms. Dunn. I thank the chairman.
	Mr. Liscouski, this committee has made it a priority to
	understand how communications and information are being shared
	across Federal agencies. How will the Cyber Division work
	within the larger Information Analysis Division responsible for
	analysis and warnings to the Homeland Security community and,
	if necessary in an extreme case, to the public?
	Mr. Liscouski. Let me describe first our relationship with
	the Information Analysis Office. That is the IA component of
	IAIP. We are tightly knit together. The IAIP Directorate,
	combined of those two offices, was created with the intention
	of ensuring that we had overlap of our functions and our
	thinking within the structure to ensure that we always had a
	very close look at the intelligence components of the threats
	mapping vulnerabilities, whether they be physical
	vulnerabilities or logical or cyber vulnerabilities.
	And in this case, the NCSD plays sort of a unique role.
	While it is not an intelligence function, it is a capability-
	oriented, technical capability. And we lend ourselves to the IA
	function to understand how technical exploits can be used to
	conduct cyber terrorist attacks, while the IA function has
	clearly got the intelligence requirements to understand how
	terrorist groups may, or what their intentions may be to use
	technologies to conduct a cyber attack. They are a portal to
	the Intelligence Community.
	We drive our requirements through the information analysis
	component to ensure that they maintain that constant look and
	their constant contextual piece around what we are worried
	about from a vulnerability standpoint and what the Intelligence
	Community needs to be looking at from an intelligence
	standpoint. So we are tightly integrated. We drive
	requirements. We have--the IA analysts are frequently as
	knowledgeable about the technology, at least at a top level, as
	our folks are to understand what the vulnerabilities are. So
	when they see intelligence pieces they understand the relevance
	of intelligence to a particular infrastructure component.
	Ms. Dunn. Will you find yourself working with TTIC, with or
	through TTIC, during any of the process?
	Mr. Liscouski. Yes, ma'am. We would be working with TTIC,
	and we do now quite actively through our IA counterparts; and
	my colleague, Bill Parrish, the Acting Assistant Secretary for
	Information Analysis can go into that much more deeply. But I
	am very familiar with our relationships there. We use them
	quite robustly.
	But, again, we drive those through the IA component, ma'am.
	Ms. Dunn. Do you--in your Cyber Division, do you believe
	now you have adequate resources to conduct all your activities?
	Are there areas where you see specific needs our committee
	ought to be focusing on?
	Mr. Liscouski. I think, for the present, we have the
	resources we need. As you know, we are staffing up. We
	currently have approximately 65 people in the division, and we
	are looking to staff up to somewhere, I would say about 100 or
	so for fiscal year 2004 is our plan.
	From my perspective, I think we are adequately staffed. I
	think we have got the resources we need, particularly with the
	partnership with the US-CERT. I think downstream, as we learn
	more about the vulnerabilities and particularly the initiatives
	we want to take and the resource areas in the short terms areas
	that we need to make improvements, we will probably be coming
	back to this committee and articulating what those needs are.
	Ms. Dunn. I am not seeing any timing clock. Do you have
	one, Mr. Chairman?
	Mr. Thornberry. The green light is down in front of the
	witness.
	Ms. Dunn. Got it.
	As I mentioned in my opening statement, we all fully
	appreciate cyberspace has no borders. How will you find
	yourself working with international organizations in your role?
	Mr. Liscouski. The international component is a very
	critical one for us. As you know, we have some informal
	arrangements. We are working closely with the British
	Government, with the Australians, the Germans, the Canadians.
	It is critical for us to expand our relationships for
	international cooperation. We are working with the Department
	of State to formalize those agreements. Bilateral and
	multilateral agreements are very key for us.
	The national strategy articulated the need for signing for
	the--I am sorry--the European convention on cybersecurity. That
	is not the exact term, but we fully support that.
	We need to work with the international community to ensure
	that we have got uniform laws across international boundaries
	to enforce violations, to ensure that we have got good thinking
	about best practices.
	To your point, there are no boundaries. A vulnerability in
	Slovakia is as critical as a vulnerability in the United
	States. If a company is a Fortune 50 company operating around
	the world, we have to be very cognizant of those
	vulnerabilities. We are working hard with our partners to bring
	them up a level of capability, as well.
	Ms. Dunn. And does that include cooperative working when
	responding to something?
	Mr. Liscouski. Yes, ma'am. The US-CERT is going to be nexus
	for that capability. We are going to be using the US-CERT as a
	model for CERTs around the world to--and this has clearly been
	the model.
	So to your point, yes.
	Ms. Dunn. What about--is your division considering and in
	cooperation with the private sector, considering setting up a
	code of standards, best practices, that would be in place both
	for the private sector, which you, in your testimony, mentioned
	had something over 80 percent of all of the cyber work that we
	need to be dealing with and also the public sector?
	Mr. Liscouski. Yes, ma'am. And best practices occur at many
	different levels.
	We are trying to articulate identify and articulate best
	practices for home users, for small businesses, universities,
	big businesses. We have got to work in cooperation with the
	industry to ensure that best practices are effective,
	implementable, cost-effective, measurable, all the elements
	that you would want to have programs to identify what the right
	level of security is.
	This is a big area, a big body of work, and we are
	spending, we have been spending time, and we are spending much
	more a lot more time in the future on this. We are working with
	our councils. We have got the NIAC, the National Infrastructure
	Advisory Council, you are familiar with, I am sure; the NSTAC,
	the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Council. Both
	of those bodies have been involved in helping us identify
	standards.
	We are working with the private sector to determine what
	additional standards may be necessary. We are going to make
	these standards publicly available on our Web sites as we
	promulgate them. So this is all part of our outreach program.
	Ms. Dunn. And you can do that, you believe, without
	legislation?
	Mr. Liscouski. Yes, ma'am. And I think at this point in
	time, we have got the industry with the support of the
	Congress, with the support of this administration, attuned to
	the need that security is more than just something which you
	can spend a dollar for and say, I have got adequate security.
	The biggest challenge in the business community is, again,
	ensuring you can identify what the appropriate level is and
	what the right level of investment for a dollar of security,
	does it get you anything in return. The cost and the return on
	investment is always a key component in the private sector.
	The business case here in terms of why businesses should be
	spending money on security in advance of legislation, I think,
	is one which is based upon competitive advantage. The more we
	can educate consumers, either at the basic consumer level,
	those who might shop at Amazon.com on line or those who
	implement multimillion dollar programs in their businesses,
	should know that they have choices about what the right choices
	are to make for security, for levels of security in the
	technology that they are buying; and the more we can make
	those--that awareness known to the consumer groups, the more
	pressure they will put on the private sector to ensure that
	security is baked into their programs.
	Ms. Dunn. Good. Thank you very much.
	Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
	Mr. Liscouski. Thank you.
	Mr. Thornberry. Thank the gentlelady. The gentleman from
	North Carolina.
	Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
	holding this hearing. I think it is we all know how important
	it is.
	Mr. Liscouski, when we think in terms of cybersecurity, a
	lot of folks, when they first hear it, they think of it as how
	we protect computers. The truth is, as you know, it is much
	broader than that, because so much of our productivity and our
	economic fiber of this country is tied to the whole integration
	system that we have; and over the last 10, 20 years we have
	seen tremendous amounts.
	So let me get back to the risk assessment, and I am going
	to try not to cover something that hasn't been covered, but
	maybe get a little better perspective on it. Because realizing
	that a department is just gearing up, and thinking about just
	the amount of problems we have had that was mentioned by our
	ranking member just this past August, the economic damage that
	was done to business and others by independent assessments, by
	some of the digital risk companies are saying it was about $32
	to $33 billion. So obviously, this whole issue of cybersecurity
	is a huge issue.
	What progress has the Department of Homeland Security made
	in identifying cyber threats and vulnerabilities? And in
	conjunction with that, how have you been able to share this
	information with State and local organizations, which I think
	is critical? You know, just because they have the information
	doesn't really do us a whole lot of good unless we can figure
	out how we can get it, to get some results in the assessment
	area.
	Mr. Liscouski. It is an excellent question because it is
	the heart of what a good protection program is all about:
	understanding the risks, the vulnerabilities to those risks,
	and the right practices in which you can engage to mitigate or
	reduce those risks or alleviate them.
	To that end, a major component of what we have done there
	are a number of them. We have got one effort as part of our
	responsibility for securing the Federal Government, which is
	initiated through the Fed CERT. That is the responsibility, to
	ensure that the proper warning alerts, incident notices, are
	going out across the Federal Government.
	That program has been in place for a while, originally
	established with GSA, now moved over to DHS, and is, at the
	heart, the NCSD. It is a very robust program. Part of that is
	also a patch remediation capability which goes back to the
	reduction of vulnerabilities and spreading that word.
	As it relates to the private sector and State and local
	governments, I think that is where much of our work is required
	to be done yet. We have got great relationships in the private
	sector in providing us information about vulnerabilities. Our
	relationships with Microsoft, with Cisco recently, have enabled
	us to be able to respond very quickly to vulnerability
	information and exploits and put notices out there to the
	general public and the State and local governments as well.
	They are all on the same alert system, so therefore they have
	the opportunity of receiving this information very quickly.
	It is our goal, with the establishment of the US-CERT and
	the leadership that we are establishing in the NCSD, to reduce
	these notification times from hours, currently, to, hopefully
	by the end of fiscal year 2004, an average of 30 minutes. We
	are looking to get robust communications capabilities out there
	beyond what we have now working, establishing networks with
	State and local governments.
	We have got some efforts under way right now, which I would
	like to keep at a top level, in terms of working very closely
	with State initiatives to develop communication networks, and
	then ultimately to establish State CERTs again, using the US-
	CERT as a model to reach down into the State governments to
	help them set up their own capabilities for incident response
	and incident warnings.
	So there are a number of initiatives we have got going in
	the pipeline. Again, we have only been working here for 3
	months, so we are moving from the thinking and planning stages
	into the execution stages in the next quarter.
	Mr. Etheridge. Let me follow that up, if I might, please,
	because I think you moved into the advisory and warning area,
	which I think is very critical as you deal with the assessed
	risk assessment.
	You have started a long--but as the Department looks at
	this whole area of integrating warnings about the possible
	problems of cybersecurity, and you have talked about what you
	are doing across the Federal Government to get it done on the
	security advisory system, talk to us a little bit more, if you
	will, please, about how are you reaching out to locals. You
	have talked about it in general terms. Because I think it is
	important, because most of the people who are going to be
	called upon to respond to such an attack are not traditional
	first responders, as we think, in terms of the agency reaching
	out to first responders--our fire, police or rescue; they are
	important because they have to receive it too--but you are also
	talking about a whole new group of first responders.
	How about talking about how those two are integrated,
	because I think it is critical to know, and what the Department
	is doing on it? Because if all you do is go to the end user,
	that will help, but you have really got to get upstream; and I
	hope that is what you are talking about.
	Mr. Liscouski. Yes, sir. And if I understand your question
	correctly, this is again a multilevel approach.
	Mr. Ethridge. Absolutely, because you have also got the
	private sector category there.
	Mr. Liscouski. That is correct.
	The first responder category in the cyber world is every
	user. I mean, it starts with prevention, as you well know, and
	ensuring we have got the right procedures in place to protect
	our systems; and that is just through basic security practices.
	Part of our outreach program is intended to continue to
	elevate the level of awareness and understanding and security
	posture within our--across the entire Nation by getting the
	average user or the business user to understand what they must
	do to protect themselves. In response mode, I think the Blaster
	and the SoBig virus are a example of how our response needs to
	be enhanced. I think we did a very admirable job responding and
	putting the advisories out, and we got a significant reach
	across our community to do that, both horizontally and
	vertically within the State and local government community, as
	well as in the private sector.
	But the home user was the one that I believe probably
	lacked the ability to understand what the implication of the--
	they clearly understood the implication, primarily because they
	couldn't get on the Internet. It was--remediating from that
	problem was where we saw the biggest challenge to be.
	So we are looking at many creative ways to put out the
	word. We are working with the major media, establishing
	relationships with the major media to put the word out to make
	sure we have got a consistent message across there. Information
	sharing is the primary goal of DHS.
	It is often said, you know, it is not need to know, but it
	is need to share, and we are looking for as many ways as we can
	to put the information out there--on best practices, on
	vulnerabilities, on threats--that we possibly can, irrespective
	of whether they are in the physical world or the cyber world.
	We are not differentiating those things.
	The only thing I would add, and I can probably get into
	this a little bit later, is the speed at which the cyber world
	works. As you well know, it requires a little bit of a
	different sort of ops tempo, so to speak, or posture in
	ensuring that we have got a consistent, a thorough and a
	consistent look across all the infrastructure to ensure that we
	are aware of what is going on in the cyber world.
	I can address that later.
	Mr. Ethridge. Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up, but may I
	follow up with one final, since we are on this point, because I
	think it is so critical as we do this.
	I hope at some point we have in the system a measurement to
	know at least when we have we have had some measure of success.
	You know, it is one thing to do the assessment, another to
	notify. But unless we have a measurement down the road we talk
	about what business does in terms of measuring inputs and
	outputs. But we have to find a way to know, because this
	pressures us to speed up our process in the decision-making
	process to save those multitudes of billions of dollars down
	the road.
	Mr. Liscouski. You are absolutely right, sir. It is about
	metrics. It is about ensuring we can find those measurable
	programs and those factors within our programs to determine if,
	in fact, we are doing the right thing. That is precisely the
	business approach that we are taking.
	Again, going back to the leadership--and the comments
	earlier, ma'am, about, you know, why it took so long to find
	our director--the only response on that is, we wanted to make
	sure--we are only going to get a chance of doing this right
	once, and finding the person with the right capabilities and
	qualifications that can understand working in an
	entrepreneurial environment.
	How do you build an organization and who do you be able to
	quickly execute against the requirements you have and this type
	of highly threatened environment to make those --to measure
	those successes is the type of person we were looking for and
	is precisely the reason we were looking for them. It is all
	about metrics.
	Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Mr. Thornberry. Thank the gentleman.
	The gentleman from Georgia.
	Mr. Linder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I only have a couple
	of questions on this idea of sharing intelligence and
	information.
	I think we are beyond the stage where our intelligence
	agencies are not sharing with each other. Is that fair to say?
	Mr. Liscouski. Yes, if I heard you say, we are beyond the
	point where we are not sharing.
	Mr. Linder. Yeah.
	Mr. Liscouski. Implying we really are sharing the
	information. Yes, sir, you are correct.
	Mr. Linder. How good are we at analyzing what we are
	getting?
	Mr. Liscouski. At what level, at the physical level or the
	traditional threat level or at the cyber level, sir?
	Mr. Linder. The threat level.
	Mr. Liscouski. At the traditional threats level, I think we
	are very good at analyzing it.
	This is an extremely difficult problem, and I can speak to
	it some, but I really defer to my colleague, Bill Parrish, the
	Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis, in his domain.
	But I have operated in this space for quite a long time, and
	our capabilities for analyzing information have only increased
	over the years. I mean, we have gotten very good as a whole, as
	the Intelligence Community, to analyze information.
	It is an extremely complex problem because you never have
	the perfect information. You can never do the perfect analysis.
	You can only do it in hindsight and retrospect. It is an
	extremely difficult problem to solve. But I think the
	capability is the people we have attracted into the
	Intelligence Community, particularly in DHS, are really some of
	the finest minds out there to be able to understand these
	complex problems.
	Mr. Linder. And lastly, how cautious or how careful are you
	in sharing this with first responders? There was a time when
	they were being overburdened with unanalyzed intelligence right
	after September 11 to the point they just set it all aside, and
	it had no value whatsoever. I think you have to be careful what
	you give to them, that it has to have some specificity, some
	analysis, and that it is right down their alley.
	Mr. Liscouski. Yes, sir. In fact, our focus is not on first
	responders, and I don't mean this in any other way than calling
	them first preventors.
	When we are sharing intelligence information, it is really
	intended to prevent the act from occurring, and we will err on
	the side of sharing probably too much sometimes. Of course, not
	in the sense of sharing classified information inappropriately.
	But working with TTIC, IA, the FBI, we have been very
	aggressive in assuring we can quickly declassify information to
	share out to the field, to our consumer base, as quickly and as
	effectively as we can.
	That is a challenge we are always going face. Sources and
	methods, as you well know, are one of those things--that is
	something that has to be guarded very carefully. But I
	believe--and I have seen it in practice--that we will err on
	the side of maybe sharing too much information sometimes,
	because the frustration you can create by sharing general
	information without specifics, and particularly with specific
	activities to follow, sometimes can create a frustration. But,
	nonetheless, I think as we all mature in this process,
	particularly as our end users understand the context during
	this threat environment, they themselves will raise up their
	capabilities as well.
	Mr. Linder. Thank you.
	Mr. Liscouski. Thank you, sir.
	Mr. Thornberry. Thank the gentleman.
	Gentlelady from the Virgin Islands.
	Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	I want to welcome the Assistant Secretary and thank the
	chairman and ranking member for holding this hearing, given the
	recent attacks, like the Blaster worm, and the concerns that
	even a worse attack could occur within several hours or days
	and the fact that so much of our physical infrastructure is
	dependent--is so cyber dependent.
	It is an important hearing, and I want to applaud you, Mr.
	Assistant Secretary, for your focus on ensuring that
	cybersecurity and physical infrastructure security are linked
	in your operation, as it is important as they are linked in
	reality.
	I have a couple of questions. One of the--we have been
	concerned about the slowness of the Department in getting
	started and being able to plan and address many issues; and one
	of the obstacles to that has been the fact that we were
	bringing together 22 agencies and trying to blend them into a
	smooth operational unit. The NCSD brings together about five
	different parts of five different agencies--FBI, Commerce,
	Defense--as well as a center. Are you pretty comfortable that
	some of the obstacles of bringing different agencies with
	different cultures together has been addressed and that you are
	able to move forward smoothly now?
	Mr. Liscouski. Yes, ma'am. I will tell you why that is a
	great question.
	I am satisfied because--I mean, that has been tremendously
	challenging. I mean, bringing these organizations together
	under one roof has been something that I don't think any person
	who even architected this in the planning stages understood the
	complexity of it.
	I can speak for my own area within IAIP. As you pointed
	out, we brought five different organizations into the NCSD and
	IAIP. I just remind everyone respectfully that we have been in
	business for 6 months, and the challenge we face in trying to
	overcome some of those organizations has been pretty daunting;
	I've got to be honest with you. I mean, when I came in from the
	private sector to do this, it set me back a little bit when I
	thought about, How are we going to do this and how are we going
	to do this in the context that we have a real threat we are
	facing every single day?
	If you recall, when we did this, we were at war; and we had
	to organize ourselves around work to respond to very real
	threats in addition to bringing people on, creating
	organization. It was pretty challenging.
	The leadership at DHS, the senior leadership of DHS,
	provided the right latitude in order to make mistakes. And that
	is what we are going to be doing. I mean, clearly, as we start
	out with this organization what it looks like today, in 2003,
	will probably be a lot different in 2005, 2010. And hopefully
	if we are succeeding we are going to continue the path of
	evolution that will eventually evolve DHS into the robust
	organization it really does need to be.
	But we are on that path. It is a long road, but it has been
	good. I mean, I can tell you in my private-sector experience
	the thing that has been kind of very helpful to me is knowing
	that we are going to make mistakes. But we don't have the
	luxury of not making them. In fact, when we tell people when
	they come on board--and I have said this before, I think,
	before the committee--that we have got sort of one thinking. It
	is a think big, act small scale, fast.
	We know we are going to make mistakes. We know we have to
	learn and we are going to evolve. It has been gratifying when
	you look at it; and we were, on the way over here, reminding
	ourselves it has only been 3 months for the division and it is
	been 6 months for the DHS. In dog years it seems like it has
	been a lifetime.
	I can tell you that right now, it has been pretty
	challenging, but we are making some very tremendous progress.
	Mrs. Christensen. The other concern that I have is, the
	officials who have left the positions over the few months; and
	is, related to this, the difficulty in bringing the Department
	together? Have you identified what the fault is, what were the
	problems that would cause these officials to leave?
	As you were looking for a Director of the NCSD several
	candidates had indicated they weren't interested because it was
	too far down the chain; they didn't have a direct link to the
	Secretary.
	Have you identified what it is that needed to be fixed?
	Because the continuity of leadership is critical.
	Mr. Liscouski. Yeah. I would suggest that I am not so sure
	it needed to be fixed as much as we just had to find the right
	person that understood this is about execution.
	The challenge we had was taking a strategy, a highly
	articulate and well-developed National Strategy to Secure
	Cyberspace, and then putting implementation plans for that
	strategy for execution. Two different types of people are
	required for that job. And it is really difficult to be a
	strategist at one level and an implementer at another level;
	and we needed an implementer, and we needed a start-up person
	that could take something where, to be quite candid with you,
	is now somewhat of a chaotic environment, when you start things
	up and just make some very short-term, measurable progress. And
	that is the type of person we were looking for.
	So I don't think there was a problem as much as there was
	finding the right talent to fit that. And it is a challenge,
	and it is a very risky challenge, because, you know, Mr. Yoran
	is coming in to us with very definable goals. We have got high
	expectations. It is very visible. And the risk to him--is you
	know, at a personal level in terms of potentially not
	succeeding, as well as to the Department is great.
	So it is--when you are out there publicly like that, not
	many people really want to take that challenge on.
	Mrs. Christensen. Okay. One last question in this round.
	Reading some of the articles in our background material--and it
	is also my feeling that the Federal Government should lead by
	example in cybersecurity--where are we in identifying the risks
	and vulnerabilities of the government's cyber assets? Are we
	leading by example?
	Mr. Liscouski. Leading by example; I think we are probably
	on a path to leading by example. I suspect there is always a
	lot of room for improvement. We do have efforts underway to do
	that. I think FISMA--the law has provided us tremendous
	guidance and leadership or a framework from which we can
	operate to ensure we are doing the rights things. So from that
	perspective I think, frankly, FISMA is a wonderful example to
	look at as a guide across the board. So I suggest the
	government is leading by example on that, in that realm.
	In our purchasing requirements, our ability to justify our
	programs based upon good security practice, are things that I
	think are very rational approaches to take as it relates to
	cybersecurity. So I would argue, yes, I would think that the
	government is leading by example.
	We can be doing better. Cataloging our infrastructures,
	understanding the interdependencies, those are things we are
	trying to do across the board, and we have got programs in
	place to do that. I think we will be getting better as we move
	along.
	Mrs. Christensen. Thank you.
	Mr. Thornberry. I thank the gentlelady.
	The gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Lucas.
	Mr. Lucas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Mr. Secretary, in June you had detailed the plans for
	Consolidated Cybersecurity Tracking Analysis and Response
	Center that would detect and respond to Internet incidents,
	track potential threats and vulnerabilities, and coordinate
	cybersecurity and incident response for the Federal, State,
	local governments, private sector, and international partners.
	What has been the status of the center?
	Mr. Liscouski. Sir, the CSTARC, the Cybersecurity Tracking
	Analysis Center, has evolved into the US-CERT. That was a
	preliminary step for us to be able to organize ourselves around
	this effort, consolidate the watch centers and the efforts we
	had within the other organizations that came to us when DHS was
	created--those organizations being the NIPC, the CIAO, elements
	of the NCS, the FedCIRC--into one organization. And that CSTARC
	represented the first iteration of what we knew was going to
	become the US-CERT. With the CSTARC we were able to very
	capably manage a number of significant incidents, the SoBig,
	the Blaster virus, the Cisco vulnerability. And then that, as I
	indicated, provided the framework for us to be able to build on
	that to create the CERT, the US-CERT.
	Mr. Lucas. This is a hypothetical. In the event that we had
	a terrorist incident today, a cyberterrorist event, could you
	just explain to me what process we would use today to notify
	all these different interested agencies?
	Mr. Liscouski. Yes, sir. In the hypothetical example,
	suppose we were notified in the private sector that they first
	identified a particular exploit, and that exploit resulted in
	our analysis to determine that that might be something that
	would be used or may be the focus of a terrorist attack. The
	combination of resources we have across the Federal Government
	currently, if it comes to DHS first, our analysis capabilities,
	leveraging on the US-CERT to understand those exploits is our
	first stopping point. The US-CERT then quickly engages with
	other components of the Federal Government, the JTF, CNO, for
	cooperation and additional analysis. We would reach out to the
	private sector to do additional analysis. And as quickly as we
	get our analysis completed to determine what the vulnerability
	or the threat might be, then DHS has got the advisory
	capability of putting warnings out very quickly to the entire
	community vis-a-vis its alert system as well as the ISACs to
	ensure that we have got thorough coverage.
	And, again, it is a work in progress. I am not suggesting
	it works the way it should work all the time or it is as
	thorough as it should be. Over time, our goal is to ensure that
	we increase that coverage.
	Mr. Lucas. I understand you said you were staffing up. You
	have about 65 now, and you are hoping to have 100-plus.
	Mr. Liscouski. Yes, sir.
	Mr. Lucas. So, do I take it from that that you feel that
	you have the financial resources you need to carry out your
	mission? Or, if you had additional financial resources, how
	would you utilize them?
	Mr. Liscouski. You could always use money, but I am not so
	sure if adding more money at any point in time is necessarily
	the quickest solution. The biggest thing you have got to do is
	build the right framework in the right organization in which to
	put people in in the partnerships.
	I think we are adequately funded right now. I think we have
	got the right path to go on. We can come back and address that
	downstream in fiscal year 2005.
	Mr. Lucas. Those are my questions.
	Mr. Thornberry. I thank the gentleman. The Chair recognizes
	the Vice Chairman of the subcommittee, Mr. Sessions.
	Mr. Sessions. I thank the Chairman and appreciate him
	holding this hearing today, along with the Ranking Member.
	Mr. Liscouski, welcome. We are delighted to have you here
	today. And I would say to you, and I think you have heard this
	from members, we appreciate your private sector experience and
	the things which you learned there and the focus that that
	brings to you and the DHS; I think that the Federal Government
	will be better off because of those lessons that you have
	learned.
	I would like to focus my questions today; I just heard you
	use the word ``framework.'' Some people could also say the word
	``business plan'' might fit in the middle of that, framework
	business plan.
	On page 2 of your testimony, there are six different pieces
	that are called status of integrating organizations and
	functions below into DHS. And it talks about the elements of
	the National Infrastructure protection center--formerly housed
	in the Federal Bureau of Investigation--DOD, FEMA, Department
	of Commerce, Energy, and General Services, GSA, into functions
	that you are evidently going to be responsible for.
	I am interested in your discussion with us about the word
	``framework,'' about how you are going to bring these functions
	in to make sure--I guess the best word is to say, ``to measure
	twice and saw once'' for the efficiency and the effectiveness
	so that we are not recreating something 7 or 8 or 10 months
	down the line because of your need just to rush into service.
	Would you mind discussing those things, those activities of
	those six different pieces.
	Mr. Liscouski. Sure. And this is broader than cyber, sir.
	This really relates to the entire Infrastructure Protection
	Office. And I would be happy to address that because I think I
	have got to talk about that, and then the framework for the
	other divisions fall out of that.
	Generally speaking--and I will go back to the very
	beginning when I came to DHS back in March--as I indicated, it
	was obviously brand new. We had been involved-- when I got
	there it was about 3 weeks old. So--and we were in the middle
	of a war and we were staffing up to respond to the threats we
	had.
	It was immediately apparent that the work that we were
	engaged in could not change substantively, because the same
	elements that came to us from the Energy assurance office, from
	the NIPC, from the CIAO, from the NCS, those elements were the
	very elements that were responding to the threats of the
	present day. So we had to be very careful as we were building
	this framework and identifying what our bigger mission
	requirements were that we didn't break anything. So that was
	job one, and make sure that we responded to those threats.
	So in our current-day thinking, what we did was basically
	establish a capability that would operate at one level, which
	was just putting one foot in front of the other to make sure we
	were not stepping on a land mine, so to speak, and we were
	executing against the goals that we had against that particular
	threat.
	Now, by the same token, we had to also think in a bigger
	picture to understand what did the organization need to look
	like over the 6, 12, or 18 months? So we began to develop an
	organization based upon the work that we were in. And that was
	the first question: What business were we in? You know, were we
	out there doing vulnerability assessments; were we just out
	there thinking great thoughts about protection strategies we
	should be doing? How do we create a capability that could
	address critical infrastructure vulnerabilities across 13
	critical infrastructures, 5 key assets, the cyber environment,
	in a way that we could put coherence around this?
	So we were able to organize ourselves at the first level to
	understand what the organization needed to look like. It
	started off with a very basic line of block chart with two
	organizations in it. We added a third. We kind of mixed it up.
	I mean, we really learned as we were going.
	To your point, we wanted to ensure that we acted quickly to
	identify the immediate needs but as we built an organization
	for the longer term. We are exactly in that process right now.
	I now have four divisions in my organization, because we have
	identified the need to build it out but yet stay integrated;
	not specialize too much, but orient ourselves according to sort
	of our business approach.
	And I can get into some more detail if you would like. But
	effectively what we started doing was a supply chain analysis.
	We looked at our client base and we looked at the private
	sector, the Federal sector, State and local governments, the
	territories. We looked at all those client bases and determined
	what was it we were delivering, what was it they needed, and
	how do we deliver it and what were the inputs into that
	delivery system, into the production system. And that is
	precisely what we are doing.
	So we are still going through that process. I suggest it is
	going to take a few more months before we really figure out the
	exact processes we need in terms of an organization. And then,
	as I said earlier, this organization is probably going to
	evolve as we learn more about our businesses as we go along. It
	will be a continuous work in process, I can promise you that.
	Mr. Sessions. You know, I think some of my comments--and I
	don't presume to know the things which are important
	necessarily to each one of these elements, not being aware of
	all the databases; but it is my hope that you would be able to
	develop in some efficient factor a database with firewalls with
	the elements that you need to avoid six database
	administrators, six of everything to accomplish these things.
	And that kind of goes back to the framework that the
	house--the sandbox you are going to build. And it is my hope
	that really your private sector vision would allow you and the
	assistant secretary that luxury to please make sure when you
	build that, whatever it is, that you do it within that
	framework. And I guess my last comment is very plain. And that
	is, we heard testimony last week where the people who were in
	charge didn't communicate what they were in charge of, didn't
	tell anybody what they needed to be doing, and there was a
	failure from top to bottom, command-and-control structure. And
	it is my hope that you really do follow up with those things of
	integrating yourself with business leaders and commercial
	leaders in this country to make sure they know not only what
	you stand for but the lessons learned; because I think that the
	key to this is avoiding or being prepared to avoid a strike
	that would cripple this great Nation.
	Thank you for your service. And we appreciate your being
	here today.
	Mr. Liscouski. Thank you, sir.
	Mr. Thornberry. The gentlelady from Texas.
	Ms. Jackson-Lee. I thank the Chairman and Ranking Member
	again for holding a very vital and important hearing. And Mr.
	Liscouski, thank you for your willingness to accept what I
	think is a larger-than-life challenge. It is something that I
	hear when we travel. We had some hearings, field hearings in
	Los Angeles and Long Beach, looking at the ports; and
	cybersecurity technology permeates every aspect of the needs of
	homeland security. And I am hoping that you are getting that
	sense by the position. And I am going to take a line of very
	rapid-fire questions and a series of them, and then if you
	could try to respond.
	One of the questions already asked about being able to
	coordinate, if there was a cybersecurity or cyber attack,
	coordinate with respect to our own Federal agencies. My pointed
	question is: Do you feel confident that you have the authority,
	in essence the power, to be able to command forces that deal
	with cyber issues in a time of a cyber attack? And I really
	want you to be pointed on the question of authority, because
	that is our responsibility. How can we assist you to do that?
	Because it certainly is telling that we have had a trail of
	back--the back of people's backs--and that is departures--
	respecting their reasons for doing so, but that is what has
	occurred. So it is a great concern to me that you be vested
	with the authority to do the job.
	One of the things that the Federal Government has as its
	assets--it has many assets, but it has several that relate to
	homeland security and terrorist attacks. Certainly it is a role
	model in action. So goes the Federal Government, so goes the
	rest of the community in terms of looking to how we respond.
	They watched us on 9/11, and I think we are quite grateful
	that we were able to muster our senses about us and maintain
	the continuity of government. The Pentagon was excellent in the
	face of tragedy, and we all tried to support them and go
	forward. But that was looked upon.
	We also have the bully pulpit as to how we can encourage
	communities to pull up their boot straps and get going on some
	important issues. So I want to know specifically about the
	authority.
	Let me also say that--have we made and do you have under
	your belt the enunciated vulnerabilities of the Federal
	Government; specifically know where the cracks in our armor is?
	We wanted to come and either have you delineate those--and you
	might give them to me generally--but if we wanted to have a
	closed-door session where you said, really pointed out some of
	the large gaping holes, could you today, September the 16,
	2003, list those for us? Very vital. Because as I said, if the
	government collapsed in the midst of a tragedy, we are
	certainly sending a bad signal out to those who are struggling
	to overcome whatever the problem is.
	Rapid fire, I continue. Have you found any connection to
	cyber problems with respect to the massive blackout? Are you
	engaged in a collaborative effort in that investigation?
	What would be your response to the fact that we are raising
	brighter and more inquisitive teenagers? I cite the 17-year-old
	in the western State who was part of the virus epidemic. Of
	course, everybody is talking about what a great young man he
	is; he didn't mean it. But they are everywhere.
	How are we dealing with the potential of this bright
	emerging army of detractors? And do we do an outreach campaign?
	Do we work with schools? How can Homeland Security be of
	help to you on that? Do we have a doctor in the House? Are we
	able to have our researchers and doctors look at--and when I
	say ``doctors,'' I put quotes around it--look at the next virus
	on the scene? Why are we only reacting? Our Nation is going to
	look to us to be preventative medicine, so why are we in the
	same boat as my BlackBerry ran away with itself a couple of
	weeks ago with it is coming, it is coming, it is coming? No
	solution, but it is coming. I think we need to be in the
	business of preventative medicine. Who are we retaining? What
	kind of resources do you need to be able to be the predictor of
	what is to come?
	And, finally, we did something in a bipartisan manner last
	week that I am very proud of, and that is the Fair Credit Act,
	I believe. But a big piece of that was the protection against
	identity theft. But we can't do it alone with an authorization
	bill under financial services.
	I believe that identity threat is a threat to the homeland
	security because why? Terrorists can steal your identity and
	walk around and be as unpredictable as possible. What are we
	doing with respect to identity theft which comes a lot through
	the computer? And I thank you for responding to these rapid-
	fire questions.
	Mr. Liscouski. Thank you, ma'am. If I took them down right,
	I will be able to respond to them intelligently, hopefully.
	First, I have to be able to read my own handwriting.
	With respect to coordination, and specifically with respect
	to the question of authority, I want to clarify one point. DHS
	has got authority, protection authority. By statute, the
	Homeland Security Act has set DHS up to be the promulgator of
	protection strategies. From an investigative standpoint, we
	partner up with the FBI, with the Secret Service, which is
	clearly part of DHS. But the FBI has got the lead in many of
	these cases to-- and this is where we probably need to get in a
	little bit of a closed-door session, I think. But at the top
	level, the authorities that we have, clearly I would say we
	have adequate authorities to ensure that we have protection on
	our cyberspace. And I say that in a thinking mode primarily
	because we are just in the execution phase of our strategy. And
	I think time will tell whether we have the appropriate--whether
	we are impeded from executing fully the strategy that we need,
	as has been articulated in the strategy and as we have
	identified it. But I would say right now, yes, DHS has been
	provided the full authority that we need, there are some
	excellent programs we have in place and that we have in plan,
	that are not appropriate for this session, that I think really
	can articulate what those authorities are and how we are
	meeting those things.
	As it relates to responding to an attack and what that
	might imply for other activities the U.S. Government would be
	engaged in to prevent or actually to intercede or interdict a
	cyber attack, those are resources which are not just owned by
	DHS but other components of the Federal Government. So again,
	that might be a more appropriate discussion for a closed
	session, if you can indulge me on that.
	On the second point: Have we made a full analysis of our
	vulnerabilities? Again, I can tell you it is a work in
	progress. I don't think we will ever know. I mean, the context
	of a full analysis of our vulnerabilities implies that we can
	get our arms around these things. And in the dynamic and ever-
	changing environment in the technology world, new
	vulnerabilities are always going to be coming out. And the
	challenge we have is not just articulating or clearly
	identifying and articulating those vulnerabilities in a steady
	state. But there is no such thing as a steady state in the
	technology world you identify with the vulnerability of a
	nuclear power plant, because typically that technology doesn't
	change. The threats to the nuclear power plant are not
	necessarily static, but there are only so many ways you can
	attack it. In the cyber world, it is very dynamic. So that will
	be a continuous work in progress.
	We have our hands on what I think is a good fund of
	information that articulates what our vulnerabilities are in
	the government, and clearly we are working hard on that. Again,
	that might be more appropriate discussion for a closed session.
	With respect to the blackout, again I have to apologize. In
	fact, I guess I will be coming back tomorrow at a different
	committee hearing to discuss the blackout. I am not at liberty
	to say what we have found in terms of root cause and what the
	respective relationships are in the cyber components. That
	report will be coming out. I believe there will be an interim
	report here in October, and that will be published by DOE and
	the task force. I will have to indulge you on that question as
	well.
	An interesting point you brought up about the teenagers and
	those who are propagating viruses and the relative ease they
	have with which they can do that is a serious concern. You have
	got a number of different types of viruses that can be created
	out there. One is just basic tool sets that people pick up off
	the Internet. They get bored with--they decide they want to
	cobble them together, and they create a virus, and that can
	happen fairly quickly. There is a different one, a different
	set, different mind-set of people who decide they want to do
	this, and then just quietly make them available to those in the
	quote -unquote teenage realm here that you described, that they
	are not even smart enough to maybe make their own viruses; they
	might evolve them a little bit, but they are not the original
	architects, and then all of a sudden these viruses find their
	way into the public domain. I think our authorities, I think
	the law enforcement community needs to aggressively pursue
	these people.
	I think this is similar to a discussion I had with some
	advocates in the private sector who operate in the security
	space, that they really want to see the government, the law
	enforcement community, go after folks who provide the basic
	tool sets, the basic knowhow to anybody on how to propagate a
	virus. This is similar to becoming a conspirator in a crime.
	Somebody mentioned an excellent example. If you are the
	driver of a getaway car in a bank robbery and a passenger, your
	codefendant, decides to shoot somebody and kills them, you are
	equally as guilty as the shooter, just being the driver. We
	should probably take the same attitude toward people who
	propagate viruses. This is serious. And when you talk about
	billions of dollars' worth of damage and losses to the private
	sector and the government, these are no light matters. We need
	to take this seriously.
	The doctor in the house, the capability that we have in the
	research community of developing the right talent, I think DHS
	partnered up with others in the community, DOD in particular,
	creating centers of excellence, providing scholarship programs
	for cyber--you know, in the information security world. It is a
	tremendous step forward. Do we need more people? We absolutely
	need more people. And I think we are making the right steps to
	address those needs.
	And your final question: The Fair Credit Act and what are
	we doing to protect against that? Again, I think there are good
	efforts going on in that space. I think the FTC, and I know
	Orson Swindle in particular, has been very aggressive in
	putting the word out about what consumers need to do to protect
	themselves. The Secret Service operates in the identity theft
	space.
	I agree with you, it is a very, very important issue. It
	gets back to the issue about privacy and how you protect
	privacy, and that is a central component of information
	security. You cannot have privacy without good information
	security.
	So,I appreciate your questions.
	Mr. Thornberry. The gentleman from Rhode Island.
	Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to join
	with my colleagues in thanking the Chairman and the Ranking
	Member for organizing this hearing. And, Mr. Secretary, thank
	you for being here as well.
	If I could, you had said that home and broadband users are
	one of the groups you would like to focus on outreach and
	education. And certainly, without a doubt, they are one of the
	greatest neglected weaknesses in our national plan to secure
	cyberspace. Can you give us a better sense of how DHS is
	planning to address this? And would it be appropriate to work
	with, for example, the Federal Trade Commission, which, as you
	may know, is also mounting its own ``stay safe on-line
	campaign''? And do you feel that a large-scale public awareness
	campaign needs to be launched? And, in particular, and
	following up with one of the points my colleague from Texas
	made in terms of reaching out to young people, and maybe
	through demonstration programs, how we can involve young people
	in these awareness campaigns and kind of harness their energy
	and natural ability to work with computers? I think that would
	be a good place to start.
	And one other point I would like to address, and this may
	have to be addressed in closed session, but I think it is an
	important point of focus. And that is in your vulnerability
	assessment on our national assets and other areas. We have seen
	a trend in recent years worldwide among terrorist attacks, that
	terrorists focus on high-casualty, high-shock value events. And
	I am curious and I think we all need to be attentive to what
	those areas are in the world of cybersecurity that fall into
	that realm. There may be only a few areas that would compare to
	the use of a WMD in the cyber world, but those are the things
	that I think we need to have high priority and focus on.
	And I would like to at some point, even if we can't do it
	here in open session, to follow up on that. And I think that
	would be important. Thank you.
	Mr. Liscouski. Thank you. I am just trying to read my own
	handwriting--your first question.
	Mr. Langevin. It was on your comment earlier that home and
	broadband users--.
	Mr. Liscouski. Do we need a large-scale--exactly. With
	respect to the broadband, one of the things we are working with
	the National Cybersecurity Alliance. Among those
	representatives on the Alliance are ISPs, AOL, and others. And
	they are taking an individual responsibility to educate home
	users to the challenges and security challenges they face in
	broadband connections. I would like to see that expanded. I
	think there is no question that the broadband community, you
	know, the commercial space there needs to be really--from my
	point of view, I need to use the bully pulpit to get them to
	understand their responsibility that, as they sell broadband
	connections, they have got to provide better awareness notices
	to their users about the potential damage that can be done.
	Because it doesn't just affect the individual. As you are
	well aware, the individual user--these viruses propagate very
	quickly, and consequently can spread across--using zombies or
	using personal computers that are accessible via broadband
	connections and then propagate these attacks. So there is a
	real, I would suggest almost fiduciary responsibility on their
	behalf. But that might be a little bit too aggressive. But at
	the end of the day, we need to put that awareness and that
	responsibility with the ISPs and the broadband connections,
	cable companies, et cetera. So I do certainly agree with that.
	The educational efforts, the outreach efforts, from our
	point of view are geared toward educating the consumer. Your
	point about young people and education, I liken that to, you
	know, the DARE program, the Drug Abuse Resistance Education
	program that has been around for--must be 20 years now.
	Educating kids--and this is clearly a different
	perspective. We are moving from self-esteem to responsibility
	and how do you act. But I agree. I mean, it scares me to death
	to know that young kids are on these Internet connections not
	knowing about the dangers that they face through going to chat
	rooms and the vulnerabilities that they have there. I mean,
	just the vulnerabilities of kids being on the Internet is
	something that scares me. And that is something that we can
	address through good education programs in the schools.
	DHS is going to be working hard to figure out how we do
	that and reaching out to the schools to provide good awareness
	and good education programs. Fortunately, the NIPC did this
	previously. We have inherited those programs so we have got a
	basis for doing that, and I think they have been successful.
	They have got poster programs. But we need to expand that. It
	is a high priority for me personally.
	The vulnerability assessments, the trend in recent years
	that you have articulated. Clearly, you know, I can get into
	depth in this in a closed session, but at a top level we do
	worry about the combination of a physical and cyber attack. You
	know, a cyber attack preceding a physical attack, taking out a
	9/11 system and then combining that with a physical attack. You
	know, it is a scare. Is it doable? I would say at this point
	anything is doable. And it is something we worry about a lot.
	And we are working down--I can tell you one thing we are
	working very aggressively on is--and the categories of all the
	critical infrastructure we really worry about--we look at what
	the nexus would be with a cyber attack to see how that might be
	enhanced or what that sequence might look like.
	Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
	Mr. Thornberry. I thank the gentleman.
	Mr. Liscouski, I would like to--first let me ask this.
	Before you took office, the administration put forward this
	document, which is the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace,
	dated February 2003. So far, have you discovered a major gap or
	something that--where you think the emphasis was not placed,
	the proper emphasis was not placed in this document? Or is this
	something that you can still go by today?
	Mr. Liscouski. No, sir. It is still a very valid document.
	A lot of good thinking went into that, and I think the private
	sector's input into that became particularly valuable to me as
	we thought about how we needed to create our national
	cybersecurity division.
	Mr. Thornberry. Well, I would like to just briefly--and
	this will entail a little bit of repetition from what you have
	already talked about--but I would like to go through those five
	priorities and ask you to kind of give us a snapshot of where
	we are with each of them.
	For example, the first priority listed in that document was
	a National Cyberspace Security Response System. And they talked
	about a public/private architecture where you would analyze
	attacks and warn and manage incidents and then respond. It
	sounds to me like that is essentially what US-CERT is going to
	be doing. Is that the primary way that we are going to
	implement that priority?
	Mr. Liscouski. Yes, sir. It is the foundation for it. The
	US-CERT is clearly the linchpin for that effort.
	Mr. Thornberry. And then what more needs to be done?
	Mr. Liscouski. Well, we need to--clearly, building
	relationships at the private sector. I think the US-CERT is an
	excellent start at that foundation. And we have engaged in
	discussions with the private sector, the Nortons and the
	McAfees of the world, to determine how we can integrate their
	contributions to this effort. I think there is a lot of good
	work that can be done there.
	The private sector is doing a tremendous amount of good
	information collection and analysis on viruses and
	vulnerabilities that we would like to be able to integrate more
	robustly. And then extending the information out--as we spoke
	earlier, the National Response System is not just national but
	it is international as well. So we have a lot of work to do
	there as well, sir.
	Mr. Thornberry. The second priority is a National
	Cyberspace Security Threat and Vulnerability reduction program,
	where the National Strategy talks about reducing the threat,
	identifying vulnerabilities, and then trying to develop systems
	with fewer vulnerabilities. Give me a snapshot of our efforts
	to implement priority No. 2.
	Mr. Liscouski. Again, and you know, the dominant theme here
	is private sector. And we have to again work with the major
	manufacturers and the smaller manufacturers of both hardware
	and software technologies to ensure that when they produce
	technology, it is according to guidelines and expectations that
	they have fewer and fewer security vulnerabilities. And if we
	can--and to be candid with you, companies are stepping up to
	that challenge. You know, pointing out to Microsoft and the
	things that they have done, they have taken this
	responsibility. I know they have been subject to a lot of
	criticism, but at the end of the day they are--their chief
	security officer is responsible for overseeing many of the
	programs that they have. They have taken very good steps here.
	It is a good example of what we need to be doing with the
	private sector. Those who produce it have to understand that
	they have the responsibility of producing good technology the
	first time around. Security defaults should not be off. I mean,
	this is the classic thinking of just basic things that need to
	be done. They are making good inroads there.
	The other point is to continually look at the
	infrastructures, you know,the vulnerabilities that we create by
	implementing technologies. I mean, this is a bigger discussion,
	to be quite candid with you, but we are doing a lot of analysis
	as converging technologies come in. I mean, we look at the
	convergence between the IP world and the telecom world and the
	vulnerabilities that are inherent there, because of--and
	forgive me for going too deep into this. But just as an
	interesting example, one of the advances of technologies,
	because they become more efficient, they themselves bring about
	vulnerabilities because now one device can do the work of 10.
	Where you had redundancy before, now you are down to a critical
	path of one device as being a key vulnerability. So we are
	constantly looking at those things as well.
	Mr. Thornberry. Talking about the private sector, at this
	point, do you have an opinion about whether market forces are
	going to be enough to elicit the kind of response from hardware
	and software vendors that the country must have?
	Mr. Liscouski. I am optimistic that the market forces will
	be sufficient. But I am prepared to say that if they are not,
	we need to quickly adapt our thinking.
	Mr. Thornberry. And as part of that reduction of
	vulnerability, is the Department looking at physical
	infrastructure related to cybersecurity as part of our
	vulnerabilities and part of what we need to assess?
	Mr. Liscouski. Yes, sir. And, unfortunately, this has been
	going on prior to even the establishment or the articulation of
	a national strategy. The NCS, the National Communication
	System, which was previously a DOD component, did a significant
	amount of work on vulnerability analysis of the telecom
	industry and then the IP backbones. So we have got a
	significant amount of data here that already allows us to be
	able to identify these vulnerabilities, and we are continuing
	to expand that.
	Mr. Thornberry. It seems to me greater work is going to be
	needed in that area, and we can discuss that at another time.
	Mr. Liscouski. Yes, sir.
	Mr. Thornberry. Let me briefly go through. The third
	priority was a Cybersecurity Awareness and Training Program; a
	number of questions have dealt with that so far. Is that going
	to be the focus of your summit in the fall?
	Mr. Liscouski. That is a key component of it--for us,
	understanding how we can better reach the community. And our
	summit is going to include not just those in the technology
	industry, but across industries, so we have a broad approach to
	understanding the problems. So, yes, sir.
	Mr. Thornberry. The fourth priority was securing
	government's own cyberspace. You have been asked about that
	before. But I am unclear, frankly, as to how much authority or
	influence you have in bringing the rest of the Federal
	Government along. My understanding is that that has been
	primarily OMB's responsibility. And just about every witness we
	have had before this subcommittee says that the government is
	nowhere near where they should be, and that if the government
	would lead, it is such a big consumer and has such market
	power, that it brings the rest of the country along with it.
	But what is your role exactly in bringing the rest of the
	government along?
	Mr. Liscouski. Our role is really to support the OMB. OMB
	does have the initial lead to ensure that, through FISMA and
	through the regulations that they provide and the oversight,
	that the government is responding to their responsibilities to
	provide security. DHS's role in this is really to coordinate
	the incident response and warning through the FedCIRC through
	the Federal Government, and I think that could be expanded to
	understanding more about the vulnerabilities.
	As I indicated earlier, we do have the patch for
	remediation responsibility through the PATC to ensure that the
	right tools are available to the government. So we have a
	responsibility there, sir.
	Mr. Thornberry. The final priority was national security
	and international security cooperation. I don't know--you have
	alluded to those things briefly before in your testimony. I
	suppose that is an area where there are an ongoing efforts and
	will have to continue to be ongoing. Let me ask you to do this.
	Rate where you believe international cooperation is on
	cybersecurity at this point.
	Mr. Liscouski. I had said in the beginning stages, it is
	tough to put a numerical code on it. I would say we are really
	in the beginning stages of understanding--well, we clearly know
	what we need to do, but we are just in the very beginning
	stages of really making some progress and establishing the
	relationships that are so necessary for us. There is a lot of
	opportunity there for us. It is a big world. I mean, there is a
	lot. And as you pointed out earlier, this technology is
	ubiquitous. It is not necessarily discriminating by economic
	income in terms of gross national product. I mean, you can get
	cheap technology out there and create these vulnerabilities. So
	we have a lot of work ahead of us to do, and I think we are
	positioned to do it.
	Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
	The Chair recognizes the distinguished gentleman from
	Florida, Mr. Meek.
	Mr. Meek. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
	Secretary, for being here.
	Speaking of the private sector, and I guess when we speak
	of the private sector we are just not talking about domestic
	private sector, because the cybersecurity is a huge issue.
	Recently, as you know, with the New York blackout you had
	thousands of New Yorkers in subways and you had folks in
	Detroit and auto plants that were shut down, and it halted
	after-hours trading as it relates to Wall Street. A lot of
	things took place. What exercise did the Department go through
	to find out was it or was it not a cyber attack? That is one.
	Two, what happened in the private sector as it relates to
	that, especially in our energy industry and those that handle
	their cyber needs? What took place as it relates to checking,
	making sure that we weren't under a cyber terrorist attack?
	Mr. Liscouski. Okay. If you can indulge me, I have to speak
	in general terms.
	Mr. Meek. Sure.
	Mr. Liscouski. We are in the process of investigating that
	component. I chair the Security Working Group for the
	Electricity Task Force. So, in that capacity, I have got to be
	careful what I can say and what I can't say. We are going to
	have a hearing tomorrow on this and we are going to be
	publishing reports downstream, so I want to be a little bit
	circumspect. But what I can do is discuss what we did as DHS
	during the blackout, and I might add some clarity about how
	this process works a little bit, because I think it is clearly
	relevant and it is not going to be disclosing anything that
	can't be disclosed.
	I am quite proud--I mean, DHS should be very proud of how
	we came together to respond to the blackout along with the rest
	of the Federal Government. But DHS in particular was sort of
	the point in contact in understanding what was going on in the
	industry. We immediately reached out, upon learning what was
	going on, to the industry to determine what was their
	perspective. I mean, it is the unique thing that DHS has the
	ability to reach, through the ISAACS, to the private sector, in
	this case the NERC, to determine what is going on and what is
	the situational awareness component that we need to respond to.
	Do we have a terrorist event? Because precisely how we are
	positioned to respond is, you look at an event like that, then
	you immediately go to the next step of saying what can occur
	next? Is this a terrorist event? And even if it is not, A,
	could it be exploited? Or, B, if it is a terrorist event, what
	is the next step? And we immediately have the capability to do
	that.
	So DHS was able to come together very quickly across its
	directorates, ask those questions, gain situational awareness,
	and provide direct advice to the Secretary and subsequently to
	the President about where we were. And then working with the
	FBI, the combination between DHS and FBI, we were able to
	quickly conclude from an initial perspective that there was no
	terrorist nexus there.
	Mr. Meek. So were you pleased with the checking process as
	it relates to is it terrorism or is it not terrorism amongst
	many departments and even the private sector?
	Mr. Liscouski. Yes, sir.
	Mr. Meek. So this report is going to be based upon trying
	to better what is good already? Or what areas will you be
	looking at?
	Mr. Liscouski. Well, the report is not examining how DHS or
	the Federal community acted. We are really looking at the root
	cause of the blackout.
	Mr. Meek. And its potential for taking place again?
	Mr. Liscouski. Correct. That is correct.
	Mr. Meek. As you know, with the World Trade Center, there
	were many attempts and sometimes folks get great ideas. Will
	there be any discussion on how to not only share with New
	Yorkers but Americans when an attack like that takes place--as
	you know, the power was out, there was no cable television for
	folks to look at, there was really no communications
	whatsoever. Will that be something that DHS will be looking at,
	to see how can we contact--I mean, everyone you hear, oh, New
	Yorkers, they did their thing, things went very smoothly,
	people knew where to go. But there was a lot of street
	hollering on the corner on how do you get out of Manhattan.
	Does the Department's looking into reaching out and to
	individuals need to be through two-way pagers, through the
	telephone, through things that were working?
	Mr. Liscouski. Yes, sir. In fact, that is really within the
	domain of Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate under
	Secretary Mike Brown. They are looking, they are doing a deep
	look about that type of communication requirement, first
	responders, et cetera. I would really defer to them.
	Mr. Meek. Okay. One last question, Mr. Secretary, or I
	guess a concern of mine. I just want to make sure that cyber
	partners that we do have that are working with us against this
	effort in terrorism, that they are working as hard as possible
	and together. I look at what--your job is almost similar to
	almost the Intelligence Community. It is kind of hard to share
	information. You have competition, you have private sector
	needs and technology needs and things that they want to keep to
	themselves. But if is not put on the table on behalf of
	security as it relates to the cyber world here in the United
	States, we may very well have problems. And when we have a
	problem, that means that things will be legislated and
	decisions will be made in haste that individuals may not like.
	And I think it is important that we encourage them to work.
	I wish you well on your report. I am looking forward to
	seeing and hearing more about it.
	Mr. Liscouski. Thank you.
	Mr. Meek. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Mr. Thornberry. I thank the gentleman, and want to mention,
	again, that this subcommittee as well as the Border
	Subcommittee will hold our second hearing tomorrow on this
	interdependency of infrastructures. And Mr. Liscouski will be
	one of the witnesses, as well as others from the Department,
	because I agree with the gentleman from Florida; these are
	critical issues and we need to learn the lessons when it
	happens the first time so that we are not put at a
	disadvantage.
	The Chair would recognize the Ranking Member.
	Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A lot of the
	questions I thought I would ask have already been asked, so I
	really just have two issues that I want to raise. One has to do
	with the ISACs. You mentioned them in your testimony. And the
	feedback I have received from the private sector is that some
	of them are performing a lot better than others. And that, in
	particular, telecom actually seems to be working pretty well,
	IT; but, in the other sectors, that they are basically not
	functioning. And--and I don't know if this is true or not, but
	this is what some of the private sector people have said--and
	the problem may be a lack of funding support. At least that is
	what some of the private sector people identified.
	Do you think that that assessment about some of these ISACs
	is correct? And what should we do to pump them up a bit?
	Mr. Liscouski. Yes, I think it is fair. I think your
	characterization of the telecoms and the IT-ISAC as well as
	others--I think the energy ISAC is another good example, oil
	and gas. We are looking at them. I guess the easiest answer is
	that we are examining the best model.
	I think currently it is sort of a one-size-fits-all model
	and it is really not the appropriate one. I think the more we
	learn about the way information sharing needs to be propagated
	across the sectors, they are so diverse, many of them are very
	diverse and not technically connected. We need to look at that
	more quickly, and we are going through that examination process
	right now.
	Ms. Lofgren. When will that be completed, do you think?
	Mr. Liscouski. You know, completion is probably--I mean, I
	am really looking at changing the model fairly quickly. The
	funding model is one of those things. I don't want to give you
	specific data. I would like to get back to you with more of an
	intelligent answer about what that is going to look like. I
	think what I would like to do and what I am planning on doing
	is actually starting a couple of different types of pilots to
	see what does work. And I would be happy to share that with you
	in more detail at a later time when we have pretty much our
	plans finalized.
	Ms. Lofgren. I would be interested in that, if you could
	keep us posted. I am sure the whole committee would like to
	know about it. And if there is a requirement to change the
	funding stream--I don't know whether we need legislation to do
	that or not--but I would be interested in that recommendation
	from you.
	Mr. Liscouski. Sure.
	Ms. Lofgren. And additionally, in addition to the
	functioning of the ISACs, internally I have heard criticism
	that there is sort of--they are piped, and that there really
	needs to be some communication among them as well. So I assume
	that you are--.
	Mr. Liscouski. Yes, ma'am, that is precisely the point we
	are looking.
	Ms. Lofgren. All right. The final question I have has to do
	with the vacancy rate in your Department. And when you were
	talking about how challenging it was to come in, I am sure it
	has been and you want to get good people, you want to get the
	right people; and it is hard to start an organization from
	scratch and try and go 65 miles an hour while you are doing it.
	So I don't want to appear overly critical.
	But I am concerned that the vacancy rate is still very
	high, about 40 percent, I would think. And in a way I have been
	concerned about this, not just with DHS but other Federal
	departments when we have tried to get people with expertise and
	technology to come to work for the Federal Government. I tried
	with the former commissioner of the INS before the creation of
	the Department. I mean, we couldn't get people to come to work
	for the Federal Government, which is disappointing. And
	especially now with the terrible economic situation in the tech
	sector, it seems almost mysterious that we can't do a faster,
	better job of recruiting in this sector.
	So the question is: What are you going to do to fill those
	vacancies? What can we do, if anything, to help you in getting
	staffed up as quickly as possible?
	Mr. Liscouski. Well, I appreciate the concern. And, you
	know, attrition rates and vacancy rates are things that always
	plague every business or every government. So it is not a
	question of that. And I can't speak to the exact number, so I
	apologize. I mean, we can get back to you on that.
	But let me just address it by this. First of all, the
	workforce we are attracting is a talented workforce. I mean, we
	are extremely fortunate with some of the folks that we have
	attracted. And I think, you know, in my experience--I was in
	the government; I left my career with the State Department back
	in 1991 And was very impressed with the folks I worked with and
	my colleagues. I am happy to say I think that workforce has
	continually increased in its capabilities, particularly in DHS;
	I have been gratified to see that, folks particularly in the
	IAIP area. So we have been successful in doing that.
	One of the challenges we have when we recruit people from
	the private sector is going through the clearance process,
	because the clearance process and working at the levels we are
	working at require us to take a 6--to 9-month clearance
	process, and you really can't even work effectively at all
	until you have got those appropriate clearances. So, while we
	may have people identified in positions, they can't occupy
	those positions until they have been vetted and the clearances
	have granted. And that might be contributing to some of the
	vacancies you are hearing about.
	But we are working hard. And, you know, I appreciate your
	comments and I would like to just kind of, I guess, recognize
	that the people that are there today are really working
	extremely hard. I mean, this country is extremely fortunate,
	and I have got the benefit of working with them on a daily
	basis, and they put in some incredible hours and they are
	really dedicated.
	And I can tell you right now, since March 1st, the folks
	that work in our directorate have been working nonstop. I mean,
	literally, you go in there on Saturdays and Sundays, and some
	days you think it is a Wednesday. You know, it is just--it is
	staffed, And people work hard and they are dedicated. So we are
	very fortunate.
	Ms. Lofgren. If I can follow up--and that is good to hear.
	Perhaps the resources that we should apply then might not even
	be in your Department but in the FBI to--maybe additional
	resources to do the clearances. Would that be of assistance? I
	mean, there is no real reason why it has to take 9 months to do
	the clearances, just the work is the lack of personnel to put
	on it.
	Mr. Liscouski. I am not competent to be able to answer that
	question, but I suspect we can probably get back to you on
	that.
	Ms. Lofgren. I would like to know that. And that may be
	something we could help to address, because that is something
	we ought to address, it seems to me.
	And I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
	Mr. Thornberry. I thank the gentlelady.
	Dr. Christensen.
	Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and
	Ranking Member, it does occur to me, and it came up earlier,
	that there may be reasons for us to ask the assistant secretary
	to meet with us in a closed and classified setting, because
	there may be some questions we might not want to ask in a
	public hearing.
	I have one further question for you, Assistant Secretary.
	One of the objectives of the National Strategy is to foster
	adequate training and education programs to support the
	national security need. You talked about the relationship with
	Carnegie-Mellon and you made reference to relationships with
	other universities. I wonder if you would elaborate on that
	some, and also talk a bit about how you would ensure the
	involvement of historically black colleges and universities and
	other minority-serving institutions.
	Mr. Liscouski. Yes, ma'am. There are a couple of different
	ways we are addressing that. First of all, my colleague, Under
	Secretary McCreary, has got a program--and forgive me for not
	knowing the exact specifics on this--in which they are creating
	partnerships with universities. And I believe it is among those
	major components that the partnerships are to enhance
	educational opportunities for the specific areas that we need.
	So I think it is probably more appropriate to sort of field
	that question to Under Secretary McCreary's area.
	But in our area and working with other partners, you know,
	the NSA sponsoring the centers of excellence and the university
	programs that they have, are geared toward enabling
	opportunity, creating opportunities for educational programs
	and students to get into the information security area in
	particular. It is an area that we have a very keen interest in
	and we are looking to support that.
	I can't speak to the programs themselves in terms of where
	the emphasis is on that program in historically black colleges,
	but I am almost certain I remember a conversation with NSA
	officials that they have established centers of excellence at
	schools that really honor diversity. But, again, I can't speak
	competently to that question, but I would be happy to get back
	to you.
	Mrs. Christensen. Well, given the extensive need for
	personnel who are really--who are well-skilled and trained, and
	the sensitivity of the issues that we are going to be dealing
	with, not allowing us to always go overseas to seek personnel
	for these offices, I think it is important that we build up our
	personnel from within and that we extend and expand it to
	include these institutions as well.
	Mr. Liscouski. I agree.
	Mrs. Christensen. Thank you.
	Mr. Liscouski. Thank you.
	Mr. Thornberry. Ms. Jackson-Lee.
	Ms. Jackson-Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I again thank you
	for the hearing that we will have tomorrow and the one that we
	are having today.
	I would like to join Congresswoman Christensen on this
	issue of HBCUs and the matching of talent. And I think that
	your point about outreach is extremely important. I would make
	a suggestion that the Secretary be referred to having a meeting
	with the president of at least a number of our HBCUs. They are
	certainly--I think it is definable as to those institutions
	that may even have those disciplines that would be an excellent
	feeding source, or a source of talent. And I would add, of
	course, Hispanic-serving institutions as well. We did that in
	the previous administration with having a roundtable with about
	10 to 20 HBCU presidents, and it really, really is effective in
	terms of getting them focused and working in partnership with
	talented individuals who may not be aware of the opportunities
	and but yet they have great talent.
	So I would appreciate it if we could get a response back on
	that request as to the facilitating of that meeting. And any
	way that we can help to facilitate would be happy to do so.
	Mr. Liscouski. Yes, ma'am, thank you. I think that is a
	great suggestion. And I can tell you, we would like to take you
	up on that, but we will get back to you formally.
	Ms. Jackson-Lee. I appreciate it very much.
	Mr. Liscouski. Thank you.
	Ms. Jackson-Lee. Let me note, if I understand, when I asked
	the question about blackout, just give me your answer again.
	You were saying it is another committee? Or you are going to be
	here tomorrow discussing? I know we have a hearing tomorrow and
	we have that as one of our topics. Is that what you were
	suggesting to me, that you would be able to give more on this
	issue of what impacts cyber had on the blackout tomorrow? Or
	are you waiting on a report?
	Mr. Liscouski. I may be able to speak at a top level
	tomorrow; but in earnest, I have to tell you, we have to really
	conclude the report. We are still going through the analysis.
	So it is really any preliminary conclusions we come to at this
	point can easily be eclipsed by other facts that might lead us
	to a different conclusion. So I will just have to defer to the
	report, ma'am.
	Ms. Jackson-Lee. And that report will be--what is the date
	are we looking at for that?
	Mr. Liscouski. I don't know if it has been published in
	terms of the specific dates. I know the task force is shooting
	for sometime in the late October time frame.
	Ms. Jackson-Lee. Late October.
	Mr. Liscouski. Yes, ma'am.
	Ms. Jackson-Lee. And that is, of course, a public report?
	Mr. Liscouski. Ma'am, I don't know, to be honest with you.
	I will have to find out.
	Ms. Jackson-Lee. All right. Well, will you provide us with
	that information even tomorrow as to the status of that report?
	Mr. Liscouski. Certainly.
	Ms. Jackson-Lee. Let me just pursue briefly the line of
	questioning that I had before about authority and the role of
	DHS. And I think you said to me that the role is to protect
	from cyber terrorism; that DHS protects from cyber terrorism,
	and the FBI is in the business of responding to the attacks or
	really on the aggressive end of it.
	My concern is does it make sense to divide the experts, the
	ones that are telling us the story, and then those who have to
	react to the story? Is there a protocol to have two teams, the
	two teams interact with each other? And then when there is a
	crisis--that is a question I was asking--who is in charge? Now,
	you indicated the FBI. But then how does the component that you
	work with get merged into the FBI? Because when we are in
	crisis, we need all of the thinkers working together, the
	reactors; but those who say I have got a solution, because I
	know on the protection side what we had to do. And a protection
	response, is it making it more difficult to get people in the
	protection side? Because certainly there is a lot more energy
	and excitement maybe on the response side. But I am
	particularly concerned about the authority question and the
	protocol that would merge them, if necessary, and whether there
	is interaction even in the backdrop of the day-to-day work,
	which I think is extremely important.
	Mr. Liscouski. I thank you for the opportunity to clarify,
	because I think I misled you a bit on my remarks earlier. It is
	not unique to the FBI in terms of the enforcement and the
	investigative responsibility. The Secret Service--and, as you
	know, Secret Service is a component of DHS with whom we closely
	work--also has a responsibility to investigate cyber crime. In
	fact, within the financial domain, they are really the
	preeminent experts.
	Ms. Jackson-Lee. That was a new addition to their
	responsibilities.
	Mr. Liscouski. Yes, ma'am, and they are effectively
	executing against that. They have some tremendous talent, as
	does the FBI. We are very ecumenical in our approach. We try to
	ensure that we have got the right resources. And I think the
	recent--forgive me, I don't know if it was Blaster or SoBig in
	which both the FBI and the Secret Service jointly investigated,
	and they worked extremely well together; they complemented
	themselves extremely well.
	From my point of view, you can never have enough resources
	to investigate these things. So I think if a little is good,
	more is better in this case. And the unique capabilities that
	are within the domain of the Bureau and the FBI I think both
	complement themselves and overlap where they are necessary; it
	is appropriate. We work very closely.
	And I will just state this: that my intention in creating
	our capability within IAP and the NCSD is to continuously
	increase our reliance upon the Secret Service for their
	capabilities. So, by extension, I would say DHS clearly has the
	authorities we need. When I was discussing this as it relates
	to the protection responsibility, it was really relevant to the
	IAIP mission and the infrastructure protection mission
	specifically. We do not have investigative authority. We don't
	need investigative authority, to be candid with you. We have
	the resources in-house, the DHS, to investigative requirements
	as we identify them.
	Ms. Jackson-Lee. But you feel you have sufficient authority
	to work on the matters that you are working on, but also to
	coordinate with the other agencies when there is a time of
	crisis?
	Mr. Liscouski. Yes, ma'am. In fact, I think we have been
	able to demonstrate that effectively, as I indicated, through
	the recent Blaster and SoBig viruses, the blackout. All those
	incidents have served to really validate the fact that this
	approach is the appropriate one.
	Ms. Jackson-Lee. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Mr. Thornberry. I thank the gentlelady.
	Does Mr. Meek have additional questions?
	Mr. Meek. Just a small one, Mr. Chairman.
	Mr. Secretary, I guess we are going to need at a future
	date--and I don't know, maybe the Chairman and others are
	thinking about it--but a closed hearing; we can ask a few
	aggressive questions as it relates to cybersecurity and as it
	relates to the security of our infrastructure here in the
	United States.
	What level of, would you say, urgency and concern that
	jointly government and the private sector may have as it
	relates to a cyber attack? The reason why I ask that question,
	Mr. Secretary--there may be a quick answer that you can give
	me--is the fact that we know that there are terrorist groups
	that are abroad, and possibly could be domestic, that would
	like to take our ability to be able to live financially and
	socially through the Internet. And since we are doing--seems
	that we are doing a good job as it relates to trying to keep
	terrorists and track them down before they cross our borders,
	and using the approach that they are using in Iraq right now of
	saying why do we have to come to the United States, we can go
	to Iraq and still accomplish our goal--what kind of urgency do
	you see? Because I hear a lot of we are fine, we don't need X,
	Y, and Z, when I know that there are issues out there that need
	to be addressed and there are issues that this subcommittee
	needs to address legislatively. There are issues that the
	Department needs to address rule-wise and administratively. But
	maybe there are some areas that you feel that are important
	that we need to fill the gap. And I am just trying to think of
	the urgency.
	I used to be a law enforcement person, and no one is really
	concerned about the parking lot security outside of any
	hospital until someone gets pushed down and their wallet or
	purse is taken. So I am trying to make sure that what--from a
	scale of 1 to 10, where do you think we are and where do we
	need to be? Or are we in the right position right now?
	Everyone, hands on deck, just like they were for the last
	couple of years? What do you think we need to do here?
	Mr. Liscouski. Well, I mean, let me just clarify my
	statements earlier about where we are. I think we are
	positioned for success. I think we have got the right
	architecture, the right framework to build on. I think we know
	where we have to go. But I did not mean to imply that the world
	out there is not a bad world.
	I agree with you 100 percent; there are some serious
	threats that we face. The cyber community, the cyber world is
	one which we are just really beginning to understand and
	beginning to see the evidence of what those threats can do to
	manifest themselves in our technologies. So in terms of sense
	of urgencies, I don't want to sit here calmly explaining to you
	what we are doing and give you the false perception that I am
	not worried about it. I am worried about it all the time. And
	we need to be worried about it. And the community needs to be
	worried about it, because we are not in control of those
	threats.
	The challenge we have on the cyber world, unlike the
	physical world where you can really put your arms around
	somebody and identify the command-and-control structure and the
	capabilities that they may or may not have to conduct an
	attack, the cyber world is a lot easier to work in. And
	although the technologies that you need to do to--there is a
	debate about how technically savvy you have to be to really
	conduct a really effective attack or a long sustainable attack.
	I would argue that I wouldn't want to wait to find that out,
	and we need to move aggressively and we need to be worried
	about it.
	So I am happy to sit calmly before this committee and talk
	about the things we are doing. But we are not sitting back
	calmly back at DHS and other places, just thinking about are we
	doing the right things. We are really trying to move out and
	get urgency around this.
	So I agree with you and I share that, and I appreciate your
	comments of concern, because we are concerned about it. These
	threats are real, they are ubiquitous, they are everything from
	the kid that gets bored and decides that he is going to put a
	virus out there, to organized crime groups that are out there
	exploiting our networks and exploiting our information and
	extorting them.
	Mr. Liscouski. Terrorist groups, state groups, you name it.
	They are out there. Common thieves, common criminals. They all
	have the capabilities of doing these things and doing it all
	the time. We are constantly under attack on the Internet, and
	you know, if you talk to any of the providers out there and you
	talk to the folks who are providing services on the Internet
	community, the backbone, they see threats all the time. They
	see stuff, it just would boggle your mind. Fortunately, you
	know they haven't manifest themselves in anything serious yet.
	And it is the ``yet'' that worries me, the ability to do that
	is out there, so.
	Mr. Meek. Mr. Secretary, if I may, that's where I mean, you
	are hitting exactly where I thought you would hit as it relates
	to the threat. And the threat is real. We have individuals that
	are being robbed right now over the Internet, stuck up, ransom,
	what have you, $50,000 transferred here and no one will ever
	know about it because it has a lot to do with stocks and trades
	and investors and security of their own infrastructure. I just
	want to make sure that we continue to have a sense of urgency.
	It is not about the preparedness. It is about the consistency
	of the preparedness. And I know my job and I know our job is to
	support the Department and the private sector in its efforts,
	but at the same time, make sure not only that DHS has what it
	needs, but we keep the pressure on all players of making sure
	that we do what we have to do, because the last thing that we
	want is for you for me or anyone on this committee to be
	identified as okay. You are okay, I am okay, okay, fine.
	Everything is fine. We need to make sure that you are okay, I
	am okay, how do we move this ball and play offense because they
	are playing offense.
	So I am glad to hear that you are still sitting on the edge
	of your seat personally and that people who serve in your
	capacity in the private sector has that same sitting on the
	edge of the seat hopefully as it relates to playing toward
	overall infrastructure protection. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Mr. Liscouski. Thank you.
	Mr. Thornberry. I thank the gentleman. And I think that
	discussion that he just had with the witness is an appropriate
	way to end our hearing because--and I have some additional
	questions I would like to submit for the record, but I think
	that sense of urgency that he described is difficult to
	maintain, not just with cyber, with the whole range of Homeland
	Security responsibilities. But, yet, we must try to keep that
	sense of urgency because there is so much at stake. Mr.
	Liscouski, I will say for me, personally, I am impressed by the
	actions that you have taken in the cyber field to help bring us
	closer to where we need to be. I am also convinced that you
	maintain this sense of urgency.
	As you said at the end of your opening statement, we are
	partners in this effort. That doesn't mean we are a rubber
	stamp, it doesn't mean we are a cheerleading squad. But we are
	partners with you to try to help maintain the sense of urgency
	and take real concrete steps that help our country be safer. We
	look forward to working with you in the future to do that. And
	again, thank you for your appearance today. I thank the
	gentlelady from California as always for her work and with that
	the hearing stands adjourned.
	[Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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