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| <title> - [H.A.S.C. No. 114-118] HEARING ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017 AND OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION</title> | |
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| [House Hearing, 114 Congress] | |
| [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] | |
| [H.A.S.C. No. 114-118] | |
| HEARING | |
| ON | |
| NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT | |
| FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017 | |
| AND | |
| OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS | |
| BEFORE THE | |
| COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES | |
| HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES | |
| ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS | |
| SECOND SESSION | |
| __________ | |
| SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES HEARING | |
| ON | |
| UPDATE ON THE F-35 JOINT STRIKE | |
| FIGHTER PROGRAM AND THE FISCAL | |
| YEAR 2017 BUDGET REQUEST | |
| __________ | |
| HEARING HELD | |
| MARCH 23, 2016 | |
| [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] | |
| ______ | |
| U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE | |
| 20-078 WASHINGTON : 2017 | |
| ----------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing | |
| Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; | |
| DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, | |
| Washington, DC 20402-0001 | |
| SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES | |
| MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio, Chairman | |
| FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey LORETTA SANCHEZ, California | |
| JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts | |
| CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr., | |
| PAUL COOK, California, Vice Chair Georgia | |
| BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois | |
| JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana MARC A. VEASEY, Texas | |
| SAM GRAVES, Missouri TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota | |
| MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey | |
| STEPHEN KNIGHT, California RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona | |
| THOMAS MacARTHUR, New Jersey MARK TAKAI, Hawaii | |
| WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina GWEN GRAHAM, Florida | |
| JOE WILSON, South Carolina SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts | |
| John Sullivan, Professional Staff Member | |
| Doug Bush, Professional Staff Member | |
| Neve Schadler, Clerk | |
| C O N T E N T S | |
| ---------- | |
| Page | |
| WITNESSES | |
| Bogdan, Lt Gen Christopher C., USAF, Program Executive Officer, | |
| F-35 Joint Program Office...................................... 4 | |
| Gilmore, Dr. J. Michael, Director, Operational Test and | |
| Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense................. 1 | |
| Stackley, Hon. Sean J., Assistant Secretary of the Navy for | |
| Research, Development and Acquisition.......................... 6 | |
| Sullivan, Michael J., Director, Acquisition and Sourcing | |
| Management, U.S. Government Accountability Office.............. 3 | |
| APPENDIX | |
| Prepared Statements: | |
| Gilmore, Dr. J. Michael...................................... 35 | |
| Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California, | |
| Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land | |
| Forces..................................................... 33 | |
| Stackley, Hon. Sean J., joint with Lt Gen Christopher C. | |
| Bogdan..................................................... 87 | |
| Sullivan, Michael J.......................................... 67 | |
| Turner, Hon. Michael R., a Representative from Ohio, | |
| Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces..... 31 | |
| Documents Submitted for the Record: | |
| Information Paper from Lt Gen Bogdan to Mr. Turner........... 113 | |
| Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing: | |
| [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] | |
| Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing: | |
| Ms. Duckworth................................................ 134 | |
| Mr. Jones.................................................... 134 | |
| Mr. Turner................................................... 125 | |
| . | |
| UPDATE ON THE F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER PROGRAM AND THE FISCAL YEAR | |
| 2017 BUDGET REQUEST | |
| ---------- | |
| House of Representatives, | |
| Committee on Armed Services, | |
| Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, | |
| Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 23, 2016. | |
| The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:28 a.m., in | |
| room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael R. | |
| Turner (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. | |
| Mr. Turner. The subcommittee will come to order to receive | |
| testimony concerning the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the JSF, | |
| program. I want to welcome our panel of distinguished | |
| witnesses, Dr. Michael Gilmore, Director of Operational Test | |
| and Evaluation [OT&E]; Dr. Michael J. Sullivan, Director of | |
| Acquisition and Sourcing, Government Accountability Office | |
| [GAO], and a good southwest Ohioan; the Honorable Sean | |
| Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, | |
| Development, and Acquisition; and Lieutenant General | |
| Christopher C. Bogdan, F-35 Program Executive Officer. | |
| Because we were held up for votes, I am going to enter my | |
| statement for the record, if there is no objection. | |
| [The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the | |
| Appendix on page 31.] | |
| Mr. Turner. And we will also enter Ms. Sanchez's statement | |
| in for the record, and we will proceed right to the statements | |
| of our witnesses. | |
| [The prepared statement of Ms. Sanchez can be found in the | |
| Appendix on page 33.] | |
| Mr. Turner. I believe we will start with Dr. Gilmore. | |
| STATEMENT OF DR. J. MICHAEL GILMORE, DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST | |
| AND EVALUATION, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE | |
| Dr. Gilmore. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the | |
| committee. In my opening statement I will focus on readiness | |
| for operational test and evaluation. | |
| My estimate is the program won't be ready to begin IOT&E | |
| [initial operational test and evaluation] until mid-calendar | |
| year 2018 at the earliest. That would be about a 1-year delay | |
| relative to what the program is carrying currently as its | |
| objective dates and about 6 months relative to its threshold | |
| dates. | |
| The reasons are the following. The most complex mission | |
| system testing remains, as does verification and fixes to | |
| significant problems, some of those fixes already having been | |
| identified and some not. Mission system stability, including | |
| the radar, still a problem. Inadequate fusion of sensor | |
| information from sensors on the same aircraft, as well as among | |
| different aircraft, continues to be a problem. There are | |
| shortfalls in electronic warfare, electronic attack, shortfalls | |
| in the performance of the Distributed Aperture System, and | |
| other issues that are classified with regard to mission | |
| systems. | |
| Stealth aircraft are not invisible. To achieve success | |
| against the modern stressing mobile threats we are relying on | |
| our $400 billion investment in F-35 to provide, mission systems | |
| must work, in some reasonable sense of that word. And we must | |
| provide every incentive to the contractors to make the mission | |
| systems work leading up to and after IOT&E, in my view. | |
| The program has now changed its approach from schedule- | |
| driven software releases, which had overlaid old problems on | |
| top of new problems, to a capabilities-based approach. So now | |
| the program is addressing the significant deficiencies with a | |
| given version of software prior to proceeding with the next | |
| version, and I certainly commend that approach. And that should | |
| help work through and solve some of these problems that I have | |
| mentioned with mission systems. | |
| Other reasons IOT&E is likely to be delayed include the | |
| need for weapons testing and certification. The rate at which | |
| that has been done in the past must triple in order to get all | |
| the events done. There has been talk of cutting the number of | |
| events by two-thirds. If that occurs, that would simply shift | |
| the work to IOT&E and make essentially certain late discoveries | |
| of problems requiring fixes during IOT&E. | |
| The program is exploring ways to up the rate of testing, | |
| including using ranges at Eglin, and that would be a good | |
| decision, but decisions and action need to be taken soon. | |
| There is also the issue of certification of full weapons | |
| usage throughout the full flight envelope. The most recent test | |
| community estimates are that that would occur in October 2017 | |
| for F-35A, February 2018 for F-35C, and May 2018 for F-35B. And | |
| we are looking at this. Some have proposed an incremental | |
| rolling start to occupational tests. That may not be practical, | |
| and it was certainly problematic when we tried it on F-22. | |
| There are still problems with the Autonomics Logistics | |
| Information System [ALIS], which is critical to the combat | |
| operations of the aircraft. There are many resource-intensive | |
| workarounds still required. Under the program's current | |
| schedule, ALIS 3.0, the full capability version required for | |
| IOT&E, would not be released until the first quarter of 2018. | |
| There is also the need for concurrency-driven extensive | |
| modifications required to early-lot aircraft bought for IOT&E | |
| when it was thought that IOT&E would begin in 2013. The current | |
| unmitigated--meaning no measures taken to correct the problem-- | |
| schedule shows mods extending into third quarter calendar year | |
| 2019. The program is, however, working on a multipronged | |
| approach, including using later-production aircraft slated for | |
| operational use and taking hardware from recently delivered | |
| aircraft on the production line that could move the completion | |
| of those modifications into 2018, and a decision is needed now | |
| on that. | |
| There are also inadequacies in the U.S. Reprogramming Lab | |
| that is used to generate the Mission Data Files, which are | |
| essential to the success in combat and certainly success in | |
| operational testing of the aircraft. | |
| The program's optimistic schedule for delivery of a | |
| validated--but, in my view, very possibly inadequate--Mission | |
| Data File for operational testing is the third quarter of 2017, | |
| but that date assumes the U.S. Reprogramming Lab receives a | |
| fully capable version of Block 3F by April 2016, next month, | |
| which we already know under the program's current plans will | |
| not happen until this summer at the soonest. | |
| So for all these reasons, I suspect that we won't be ready | |
| for operational testing until mid-calendar year 2018. | |
| Thank you. | |
| [The prepared statement of Dr. Gilmore can be found in the | |
| Appendix on page 35.] | |
| Mr. Turner. Mr. Sullivan. | |
| STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND | |
| SOURCING MANAGEMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE | |
| Mr. Sullivan. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the | |
| subcommittee. It is a pleasure to be here to discuss the | |
| progress on the F-35 program today. | |
| I have a written statement that I will submit for the | |
| record, and I just want to summarize five of the major points | |
| in that statement in my oral remarks. | |
| First, the Department [of Defense] is now planning to add | |
| new capability, known as Block 4, to the F-35 beyond its | |
| baseline capability and is planning to manage that effort as | |
| part of the existing program, rather than establishing a | |
| separate business case and baseline for this new work. | |
| This has significant implications as far as the Congress' | |
| role in oversight. This modernization effort is like a new | |
| program with estimated cost of about $3 billion over the next 6 | |
| years. That price tag alone would qualify it as a major defense | |
| acquisition program in its own right, and it should be managed | |
| as such, so that it is subject to the same statutory and | |
| regulatory reporting as any other program its size. | |
| The F-22 provides precedent for this. It began its | |
| modernization effort as part of the existing baseline program | |
| and it eventually established a separate business case and | |
| developed into a major acquisition program with its own | |
| Milestone B in order to better track progress and cost changes. | |
| Second, although the program has been managing costs very | |
| well since 2010, the Nunn-McCurdy breach back then, and cost | |
| estimates have actually decreased since then, it still poses | |
| significant affordability challenges for the Department and the | |
| Congress. As production begins to increase and the program | |
| begins procuring more aircraft each year, the Department is | |
| expected to spend about $14 billion per year over the next | |
| decade and will average about $13 billion per year over the | |
| next 22 years until all planned purchases are complete in 2038. | |
| These annual funding challenges will compound as the | |
| program begins to stack its funding needs against other large | |
| acquisitions, such as the bomber program, the tanker program | |
| that is ongoing, the Ohio-class submarine replacement, the new | |
| carrier, and many other very large programs. | |
| It is important to note this is just the remaining | |
| acquisition cost for the F-35. As we all know, the cost to | |
| operate and maintain the F-35 across its entire life cycle is | |
| estimated now at about $1 trillion, which has added to that | |
| overall price tag. | |
| My third point is software development and developmental | |
| flight testing of the F-35 are now nearing completion, but the | |
| program faces challenges in getting all of its development | |
| activity completed on time. I think Dr. Gilmore covered that | |
| pretty well. It is through with 80 percent of its developmental | |
| flight tests. It has completed the first three blocks of | |
| software, and it is now working to close out flight testing of | |
| its final block of software, Block 3F. | |
| That is the critical block of software as it will provide | |
| the full warfighting capabilities required for the F-35. | |
| Program officials have stated that there would be as much as a | |
| 3-month delay. We have done our own analysis and we think it | |
| could be more in line with 6 months. And I think Dr. Gilmore's | |
| analysis indicates even longer than that. | |
| Fourth, with regard to technical risks on the program, the | |
| program has most recently found fixes for its engine seal | |
| problem that we were talking about last year and the design of | |
| the helmet mounted display. And it has begun to retrofit | |
| aircraft with those fixes. They are not all in, but the | |
| solutions are there. | |
| Two new challenges have recently been identified. One | |
| concerns the ejection seat and the other concerns the wing | |
| structure of the carrier variant. The program is working now to | |
| find solutions to each of those problems. I think on the | |
| ejection seat they have a pretty good concept figured out to | |
| solve that one. | |
| It should also be noted that the Autonomic Logistics | |
| Information System, known as ALIS, continues to be challenging | |
| and has been cited as one of the most significant outstanding | |
| risks to the program today, and that has a lot to do with | |
| operations and maintenance, as you know. | |
| Finally, manufacturing and production data continue to show | |
| a positive trend toward more efficient production. The amount | |
| of labor hours it is taking to build each aircraft continues to | |
| go down, quality is increasing, and engineering changes have | |
| been reduced significantly. | |
| While there are still issues with late parts, this is | |
| consistently improving as well. Contractors are now delivering | |
| aircraft on time or ahead of schedule. We continue to track the | |
| measures for the aircraft's reliability and maintainability. | |
| And while they still fall short of expectations, they continue | |
| to improve, and there is still time to achieve the program's | |
| required goals at the right time. | |
| I will close with that. I look forward to your questions. | |
| [The prepared statement of Mr. Sullivan can be found in the | |
| Appendix on page 67.] | |
| Mr. Turner. General Bogdan. | |
| STATEMENT OF LT GEN CHRISTOPHER C. BOGDAN, USAF, PROGRAM | |
| EXECUTIVE OFFICER, F-35 JOINT PROGRAM OFFICE | |
| General Bogdan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. | |
| Chairman Turner, distinguished members of the committee, | |
| thank you for the opportunity to address the committee | |
| regarding the F-35 program. My purpose here today is to provide | |
| you a balanced assessment of where the program stands. That | |
| means I will tell you the good, the bad, and the ugly about the | |
| program, and tell you what my team is doing to reduce costs on | |
| the program and improve the F-35's performance and meet our | |
| scheduled commitment. | |
| Overall, the F-35 program is executing fairly well across | |
| the entire spectrum of acquisition, to include development and | |
| design, flight test, production, fielding, base stand-up, | |
| maintenance and support, and building a global sustainment | |
| enterprise. The program is at a pivot point and is now rapidly | |
| changing, growing, and accelerating. We will be finishing our | |
| 15-year development program in late 2017 and beginning to | |
| transition to a leaner, more efficient follow-on modernization | |
| program. | |
| We will see production grow from delivering 45 aircraft in | |
| 2015 to delivering over 100 aircraft in 2018 and up to 145 | |
| aircraft by 2020. Additionally, in the next 4 years we will | |
| continue to stand up 17 new operating bases all over the world. | |
| We are also accelerating the creation of our heavy maintenance | |
| and repair capabilities, and supply chain, throughout the | |
| globe, including the Pacific, European, and North American | |
| regions. | |
| However, the program is not without risks and challenges, | |
| as these come with any program of this size and complexity. I | |
| am confident that the current risks and issues we face can be | |
| resolved and we will be able to overcome future problems and | |
| deliver the full capability that we have committed to. | |
| I have often said that the mark of a good program is not | |
| that it has no problems, but rather that it discovers problems, | |
| implements solutions, improves the weapon system, and at the | |
| same time keeps the program on track. I believe we have been | |
| doing that for a number of years now. | |
| Let me highlight a few of our recent accomplishments since | |
| our last hearing. | |
| Last year, we began U.S. Air Force and partner pilot | |
| training at Luke Air Force Base, where a blend of U.S. and | |
| partner F-35 instructor pilots are helping train U.S. and other | |
| partner pilots. The Air Force is now receiving F-35As at Hill | |
| Air Force Base in Utah and training is underway to ready its | |
| first combat-coded squadron to be operational this year. Also, | |
| the United States Marine Corps successfully flying and | |
| deploying to austere sites for training, dropping and shooting | |
| live weapons with its F-35Bs. | |
| In addition, industry is committed to and then successfully | |
| delivered 45 airplanes last year, including the first aircraft | |
| that was produced in Italy and assembled in their factory in | |
| Cameri. From a production perspective, we have delivered a | |
| total of 172 aircraft to our test, operational, and training | |
| sites. | |
| On the cost front, the price of purchasing an F-35 | |
| continues to decline steadily, lot over lot. This is a trend I | |
| believe will continue for many years. I expect the cost of an | |
| F-35 with an engine and fee to decrease from about $108 million | |
| this year to about $85 million in 2019. | |
| As I said before, the program is changing, growing, and | |
| accelerating, but it is not without issues, risks, and | |
| challenges. So let me highlight a few of those areas. | |
| On the technical front we have a number of risks. At the | |
| top of my list are both software and our maintenance system, | |
| known as ALIS. On the software front we have seen stability | |
| issues recently with our Block 3 software and we are currently | |
| in the process of fixing and flight testing those fixes. We | |
| have also experienced issues with the development of our next | |
| version of ALIS, known as ALIS 2.0.2, and I am prepared to | |
| discuss these issues with you, as well as other risks and | |
| issues, such as our egress system, aircraft modifications, and | |
| our Reprogramming Labs. | |
| I am also prepared to discuss Air Force IOC [initial | |
| operating capability], initial operational testing, recent U.S. | |
| Air Force and Marine Corps deployments, and the status of our | |
| partners and FMS [foreign military sales] customers. | |
| In summary, the program is moving forward, sometimes slower | |
| than I would like, but moving forward and making progress | |
| nonetheless. We are nearing the completion of development and | |
| flight test in late 2017. We are ramping up production, | |
| standing up new bases, growing the global sustainment | |
| enterprise, and continuing to drive cost out of the program. | |
| I intend to continue leading this program with integrity, | |
| discipline, transparency, and accountability. It is my | |
| intention to complete this program within the resources and the | |
| time I have been given, and I intend on holding my team and | |
| myself accountable for the outcomes on this program. | |
| Thank you again for the opportunity to discuss the program. | |
| I look forward to your questions. | |
| [The joint prepared statement of General Bogdan and | |
| Secretary Stackley can be found in the Appendix on page 87.] | |
| Mr. Turner. Thank you. | |
| Mr. Stackley. | |
| STATEMENT OF HON. SEAN J. STACKLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE | |
| NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION | |
| Secretary Stackley. Chairman Turner, distinguished members | |
| of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear | |
| before you today to testify on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter | |
| program. I will provide brief opening remarks and submit a | |
| formal statement for the record. | |
| One year ago, we discussed with the subcommittee the | |
| challenges facing the program at that time and our plans to | |
| address those challenges. In the course of this past year cost, | |
| schedule, and technical performance of the Joint Strike Fighter | |
| have steadily improved across each variant of the aircraft, in | |
| each phase of the program, development, production, and | |
| sustainment. | |
| Known technical issues are being driven to closure and the | |
| aircraft's capabilities, measured in terms of flight envelope, | |
| mission systems, and weapons delivery, are being steadily | |
| expanded in support of each service's requirements for initial | |
| operating capability, or IOC. | |
| As noted, production of F-35 aircraft and engines has | |
| improved from lot to lot in terms of unit cost, schedule | |
| performance, improved quality, reduced rework, and concurrency | |
| related costs. These positive trends are being sustained while | |
| also methodically increasing our rate of production. | |
| The pacing activity on the program today is flight testing, | |
| which itself is being paced by the incremental release of | |
| warfighting capability and mission system software blocks, | |
| commonly referred to as Block 2B, 3i, and 3F. Block 2B testing | |
| completed in 2015 and provided the capability required to | |
| support the Marine Corps' declaration of IOC in July 2015. | |
| The completion of Block 3i testing has been delayed pending | |
| correction of software stability issues. In the course of the | |
| next week, we commence flight testing what is planned to be the | |
| final build of Block 3i capability, designed to improve that | |
| stability, all in support of the Air Force IOC scheduled later | |
| this year. | |
| Completion of the final block, Block 3F, poses the greatest | |
| remaining challenge to completion of system development. Block | |
| 3F includes the more complex functionality of the three | |
| software baselines, including what is referred to as sensor | |
| fusion. | |
| Further coding and testing of Block 3F has been impacted by | |
| resource demands, software engineers, and lab facilities | |
| associated with supporting completion of earlier software | |
| builds. These factors add up to the program's estimate of 4 | |
| months schedule risk to completion of Block 3F developmental | |
| testing. This projection still supports the Navy IOC with Block | |
| 3F in 2018. | |
| That said, we are wary that further technical issues are | |
| certain to emerge as we press on with testing, and it will be | |
| critical that the program rapidly correct these deficiencies | |
| while mitigating their impact on both test and production. | |
| The program's commitment is to mitigate these risks going | |
| forward and to do so within the bounds of the program's budget | |
| while delivering the full capability defined by the Lightning | |
| II requirements document. | |
| Meanwhile, the program's focus is increasingly shifting to | |
| operations in support of in-service aircraft. The program has | |
| accumulated 50,000 flight hours, and with 152 aircraft | |
| operating at 8 bases across the country, the warfighter's | |
| experience and feedback on the aircraft and support systems is | |
| beginning to shape the program's priorities. | |
| The Marines have two full squadrons in operation today and | |
| will stand up their third this June. They are building momentum | |
| as the service and the vanguard of the F-35 effort, gaining | |
| capability and confidence and employing it tactically every | |
| day. They have demonstrated operations from an austere forward | |
| operating base at Twentynine Palms in support of the Marine | |
| Corps combined arms exercise. They are training British pilots, | |
| as well as first tour Marine Corps pilots, in Beaufort, South | |
| Carolina. | |
| They will deploy the Nation's first operational F-35 | |
| squadron less than a year from now to Marine Corps Air Station | |
| Iwakuni, Japan, in January 2017. Marine pilots love this plane | |
| and the capability it brings to the Marine Corps air-ground | |
| task force. | |
| Meanwhile, delivery of Air Force F-35A aircraft at Eglin | |
| Air Force Base are completed, training for Air Force | |
| international partner pilots at Luke Air Force Base continues | |
| to ramp up, and the Air Force first operational squadron is | |
| filling out at Hill Air Force Base with seven aircraft at Hill | |
| and remaining aircraft completing modifications to support IOC. | |
| Separately, the Navy has gained extensive experience | |
| demonstrating launch, recovery, handling, and support of the F- | |
| 35C during at-sea trial periods aboard the aircraft carriers | |
| Eisenhower and Nimitz and a third sea trial scheduled for later | |
| this year. | |
| Two key points regarding operations and sustainment require | |
| mention. First, with particular regard to aircraft reliability, | |
| maintainability, and availability, or RM&A, one year ago we | |
| reported that overall performance in this area was poor and | |
| trending poor. Concerted efforts by the government/industry | |
| team have reversed those trends. And while we have much work | |
| remaining, improvements to design, parts availability, | |
| maintenance training and support, and tooling are yielding | |
| improved performance in the key metrics. RM&A will remain a | |
| principal focus area for the program in the years ahead. | |
| Second, the program is working closely with the services, | |
| our international partners, and industry to formulate an | |
| operating and support strategy for the program including the | |
| business plan that will accompany this strategy and an | |
| overarching O&S [operations and support] war on cost. | |
| A critical element of the O&S plan is the Autonomic | |
| Logistic Information System, or ALIS. ALIS continues to mature, | |
| improving with each version fielded. In the near term, we will | |
| be testing a new version, ALIS 2.0.2, which we expect to | |
| support the Air Force IOC. Additionally, to improve turnaround | |
| time for fixing issues highlighted by fleet maintainers, we | |
| have commenced delivery of service packs aimed to be more | |
| timely and responsive to a warfighter's immediate needs. | |
| In the long term, however, ALIS has yet to meet its full | |
| promise, and we will need to go the full distance in that | |
| regard if we are going to succeed in meeting our goals for | |
| reducing the ownership cost and increasing the operational | |
| availability for this complex aircraft, and we are committed to | |
| that end. | |
| In summary, the F-35 program is making solid progress | |
| across the full spectrum of development, production, testing, | |
| and fielding of capability. As known issues are retired, new | |
| issues will emerge, and these too will be wrestled to closure. | |
| The program's forecast for delivery of initial operating | |
| capability for each of the services, including risk, is largely | |
| unchanged from one year ago. Yet, the size and complexity of | |
| this program and the capability it represents is such that a | |
| great amount of work remains ahead, leading to each ensuing IOC | |
| and subsequent operations and sustainment and modernization of | |
| the aircraft. | |
| We are careful to neither minimize our assessment of the | |
| inherent risks nor to avoid them, but rather to assess them | |
| realistically and manage them aggressively. The warfighter and | |
| our international partners deserve nothing less. | |
| Mr. Chairman, again, thank you for the opportunity to | |
| testify today on the Joint Strike Fighter program. I look | |
| forward to answering your questions. | |
| [The joint prepared statement of Secretary Stackley and | |
| General Bogdan can be found in the Appendix on page 87.] | |
| Mr. Turner. Thank you, gentlemen. | |
| I want to start with a question that goes to the public's | |
| perception of this plane, the F-35. We all are very much aware | |
| of the difficulties that the F-35 has had both in development | |
| and in production and certainly in getting to operational | |
| capability. But I was surprised the other morning to wake up in | |
| my own hometown--Mr. Sullivan, you hail from Wright-Patterson | |
| Air Force Base, so you may have similarly seen a huge headline | |
| across the Dayton Daily News that says: ``Ohio Voters Favor | |
| Canceling Jet Fighter.'' I thought it was kind of interesting | |
| for a couple of reasons. One, no one called me to ask me to | |
| quote for it, and it is my local newspaper. But it's a | |
| Washington bureau that quotes a University of Maryland study, | |
| that then quotes a response from a Washington think tank. | |
| So I want to give you guys who actually know about the F-35 | |
| an opportunity to discuss what this article raises, because | |
| there is a fundamental flaw in the study that gives the | |
| screaming headline of Ohio voters favor canceling the jet | |
| fighter. | |
| Apparently, they did an online poll, and we all know the | |
| liability of online polls of course, but there are 520 | |
| registered voters in Ohio. And it concludes that Ohio voters | |
| favor upgrading current fighters instead of going forward with | |
| the F-35 and resulting in a $97 billion savings to taxpayers by | |
| 2037. | |
| Now, obviously, we have not done a very good job of | |
| communicating the importance of the F-35 and its capability and | |
| why it is necessary. But the article does, I do want to give | |
| Jack Torry, the author of the story, credit. He does end with | |
| Loren Thompson, chief executive officer of the Lexington | |
| Institute in suburban Washington, with this quote: ``It is | |
| impossible to upgrade any of our Cold War fighters that would | |
| be as survivable as a stealth plane. That is the biggest single | |
| appeal of the F-35, is that most enemy radars simply can't see | |
| it. You can't shoot down what you can't see.'' | |
| So the article concludes with an interesting point. But the | |
| fact that a poll is taken asking people would they rather | |
| upgrade something that is not upgradable rather than proceed | |
| with the F-35 probably is something that bears our discussion. | |
| General Bogdan, help us here so we can give people some | |
| information so they can feel the importance of the investment | |
| in the F-35. | |
| General Bogdan. Yes, sir. I have to be a little bit careful | |
| because---- | |
| Mr. Turner. I want to recognize--let me say it for you--I | |
| want to recognize that a portion obviously of the F-35 | |
| capabilities go into the classified realm and its adversaries' | |
| capabilities are in the classified realm. So some of the | |
| capabilities of the F-35, the need for the F-35 cannot be | |
| discussed. But certainly the concept that this is fifth | |
| generation and that we cannot merely just plug and play with | |
| our old generation is probably worthy of a discussion. | |
| General Bogdan. Yes, sir. | |
| I agree with you. I have never been associated with a | |
| program in my 25-plus years of acquisition where the public | |
| perception and the reality are so different. Part of that is | |
| our problem for not telling the story, but part of it is | |
| because the program is so big that every minor issue becomes a | |
| big issue. We have had a past that has not been conducive to | |
| people believing in what we say. We have added years and | |
| billions of dollars to the program in the past. Even though | |
| that hasn't happened since 2010, people remember that. | |
| And it sometimes is difficult to explain to the public how | |
| air warfare is changing and how it is not a turn-and-burn | |
| airplane that looks really cool at an air show that is going to | |
| win the fight for the United States when we go into combat in | |
| the next 20 or 30 years. | |
| So we do have a perception problem and we do have an | |
| information gap there. What do we do about that? | |
| First and foremost, I do want to thank the Congress for | |
| helping us. You do. And you do that in a number of ways. One, | |
| you help us by holding us accountable. And when people know | |
| that you are holding us accountable and we base what we do and | |
| say on our results, then people will start having a better | |
| understanding and a better trust in what this weapon system can | |
| do. | |
| On the Department side--and this is where I have to be | |
| careful, because I shouldn't be necessarily a salesman for the | |
| F-35, you need me to be a little more balanced than that--but | |
| for our warfighters there is clearly a role for them to play in | |
| advocating for this airplane. And in the past we haven't done a | |
| great job of that, simply because the airplane was immature, we | |
| were only operating at a number of locations, and we are still | |
| developing it. So let me just give you a few things that are | |
| going to happen this year that might change that a little bit. | |
| The Air Force has stood up an F-35 heritage flight, which | |
| means that the F-35 is now going to be publicly displayed in | |
| many, many places over the next year. In fact, they have 14 | |
| public events between now and the end of 2016, some of the | |
| places including Luke Air Force Base, Langley Air Force Base, | |
| Fort Lauderdale, New York City, Chicago, Baltimore, Reno, Las | |
| Vegas. So the Air Force is getting out there with the airplane | |
| to these air shows and is going to start talking to folks about | |
| the airplane. | |
| The U.S. Marine Corps and the Navy, similarly, when they go | |
| to sea this year for their sea trials, will bring media with | |
| them so that they can tell their story. The Dutch, who are a | |
| partner on this program, are planning on bringing their two | |
| airplanes to the Netherlands in June for 2 weeks for the very | |
| thing that you just talked about, Congressman Turner, to | |
| introduce the airplane to their public, to talk about it, and | |
| to talk about why the airplane is needed for them. The U.S. | |
| Marines, the U.S. Air Force, and the U.K. will bring five | |
| airplanes to Farnborough and RIAT [Royal International Air | |
| Tattoo] this year in July at the U.K. Air Show. | |
| So I think getting out there and telling the story is part | |
| of what we need to continue to do. I also think we need to | |
| continue to base things on fact. And when people out there | |
| don't have the facts, then it is my job and my team's job to | |
| correct the record for that. | |
| Mr. Turner. And, General Bogdan, in getting to the issue of | |
| facts, this poll asked people would they rather upgrade the | |
| current fighters instead of proceeding with the F-35. Loren | |
| Thompson said: It is impossible to do what they have asked, you | |
| cannot upgrade our Cold War fighters. Would you agree with the | |
| statement of Thompson and would you want to elaborate? | |
| General Bogdan. Yes, sir. You can only do so much with our | |
| fourth-generation fighters today. You can only add so many | |
| upgrades and structurally improve them to last a certain period | |
| of time. | |
| But what I will tell you from the knowledge I have on this | |
| program and the capabilities of the F-35, our legacy airplanes, | |
| now and in the future, will not survive the threat environments | |
| we know we are going to have to face. So no matter how much you | |
| upgrade them and how much you put into them, eventually they | |
| will not survive. | |
| This airplane differently. It will survive---- | |
| Mr. Turner. In combat. | |
| General Bogdan. In combat will survive for decades to come. | |
| Mr. Turner. I just want to point one thing before I ask Mr. | |
| Sullivan his comments on this. This poll asks people about | |
| sticking with our current fighters through 2037. I wonder what | |
| the poll would have been if they asked people would they be | |
| willing to drive their current car through 2037. | |
| Mr. Sullivan, would you agree also that the poll is skewed | |
| in it gives people a false option, you can't upgrade our | |
| current fighters, as Loren Thompson says, in any way that would | |
| be as survivable as the F-35? | |
| Mr. Sullivan. I think it is clear that this aircraft, | |
| fifth-gen aircraft, does things that the generations in the | |
| past can't do, won't ever be able to do. The stealthiness alone | |
| is a major part of this, but it is also probably more | |
| versatile. It is three different variants. It is replacing or | |
| complementing a number of different aircraft that are growing | |
| older every day as we sit here and are having service life | |
| extensions and things like that. | |
| So, yeah, I would agree that the F-35 is going to be a more | |
| versatile and a more powerful threat than what we have | |
| existing. And I think probably a lot of this has just come | |
| from--the past is the past, I understand that, but people still | |
| see a lot of money being put forth for the F-35. | |
| The other thing, I think, that you have to consider is that | |
| some of these aircraft, their production lines are shut down or | |
| they are not as hot as they used to be. And you can't, I think, | |
| as General Bogdan said, you can't plug and play these new | |
| technologies into those old aircraft anyway. So, yeah. | |
| Mr. Turner. Mr. Sullivan, I appreciate your comments on | |
| that because you being the Director of Acquisition and Sourcing | |
| for this program with the U.S. Government Accountability | |
| Office, you are responsible for giving us some of the most | |
| critical oversight information that we have on the program. I | |
| know you know its difficulties and the areas in which we | |
| struggle to try to make certain that the program is effective. | |
| So I appreciate your overarching statement. | |
| Mr. Sullivan. Our beef has always just been with the | |
| acquisition strategy of this and many other programs. It takes | |
| way longer and costs more than they thought. But we have never | |
| really challenged the need for this or what its capabilities | |
| are eventually going to bring us. | |
| Mr. Turner. Excellent. | |
| Mr. Stackley, Dr. Gilmore, do you wish to comment on this? | |
| Excellent. | |
| Dr. Gilmore. The fourth-generation aircraft that we have | |
| and the systems that they have, and even with upgrades, | |
| wouldn't be able to handle the threats that we have already | |
| seen being deployed by our potential enemies for over half a | |
| decade. Those are very challenging air defense threats that are | |
| mobile, so you can't count on knowing where they are. The F-35, | |
| with mission systems that work as I alluded to in my opening | |
| statement, will provide capability that we don't have in any | |
| other platform to dynamically sense that very stressing mobile | |
| threat environment you can't know ahead of time with certainty | |
| and deal with it. | |
| So that is why it is so important that we get the F-35, | |
| including its mission systems, to work. It will provide us | |
| capability that we otherwise won't have and can't get in | |
| upgraded systems. | |
| Mr. Turner. Mr. Stackley. | |
| Secretary Stackley. Sir, let me just add, our operational | |
| planning for major combat operations, first and foremost, | |
| relies upon air superiority, air dominance. The F-35 is not | |
| being designed and built for the fight today, it is being | |
| designed and built for the fight in the future against the | |
| high-end threat. So we are not willing to take risk in terms of | |
| maintaining air superiority that we will need in the 2020s, | |
| 2030s, and beyond. And the capabilities that are being brought | |
| to this aircraft are what we envision today as that necessary | |
| to overcome the threat in the future. | |
| I agree with Loren Thompson here that somebody is offering | |
| a false choice when they say we can just upgrade the existing | |
| fighters to get that level of capability. You cannot. The Navy/ | |
| Marine Corps does have a mixed fleet in the future of fourth- | |
| and fifth-generation aircraft. We will continue to have a mixed | |
| fleet at least through the mid-2030s. But we cannot enter high- | |
| end fight without the fifth-generation capability that the JSF | |
| brings. That is why we are so committed to this capability. | |
| Mr. Turner. Thank you. Very important discussion. | |
| Now turning, however, to some of the issues and | |
| difficulties that we have in making certain that this plane | |
| reaches its full potential. | |
| General Bogdan, Dr. Gilmore, and Mr. Sullivan's testimony | |
| indicate that significant challenges still do remain in | |
| completing the final software block, Block 3F. As you know, | |
| this is the version of software that gives the F-35 a full | |
| wartime capability, so it is very important. You also indicated | |
| in your testimony that Block 3F software is likely to be | |
| delivered 4 months late. | |
| What is the operational significance if this software is | |
| delivered 4 months late? Could it impact the current scheduled | |
| initial operational test and evaluation, IOT&E test? And what | |
| risk-mitigation actions are you taking to be able to fix this? | |
| General Bogdan. Thank you, sir. | |
| The issue today with the Block 3 software--and we see the | |
| problem in both our 3i, or 3 initial, software and in our 3F | |
| software--has to do with stability. | |
| And just very quickly, what the pilots are seeing is, when | |
| they take off and they need to use the sensors, particularly | |
| the radar, there are some instances where the communication | |
| between the radar and the main computers in the airplane are | |
| mistimed. | |
| And that mistiming builds up little delays. And eventually | |
| those delays get to be big enough where the radar shuts off. | |
| Okay? And the radar will recover, but it will recover and take | |
| a few minutes to regain the picture that it had. Some of the | |
| other sensors experience the same thing. That is not good. | |
| We are experiencing that kind of problem about once every 4 | |
| hours of flight time. We need the system to be much more stable | |
| in that, something on the order of once every 8 to 10 hours. | |
| So what we did when we found this problem out in the last | |
| few months is we went back and did a root cause analysis. As I | |
| just talked about, we know it is a timing issue. Lockheed | |
| Martin has a number of fixes in the software that we are about | |
| to flight test, starting next week in our next version of 3i | |
| software. In the next month or so we will know if those fixes | |
| work. | |
| If those fixes work, the stability fixes and some of the | |
| other software fixes, then the impact of this problem to Air | |
| Force IOC will be minimal. The impact to the remaining testing | |
| of 3F, as I said, will probably just delay the end of flight | |
| test about 4 months. That does not impact Navy IOC because we | |
| had some margin there, but it clearly would impact how ready | |
| the airplanes are for IOT&E. | |
| So we are looking forward to the flight tests that we are | |
| going to do in the next month or so to see if we have this | |
| solved. If we do have it solved, again, no impact to Air Force | |
| IOC, no impact to Navy IOC, but probably an impact overall to | |
| the end of testing, and that would eventually impact the start | |
| of IOT&E. | |
| Mr. Turner. Mr. Bogdan, I must have misunderstood. You were | |
| describing a problem with the software that you said would | |
| occur one time every 4 hours, but it would be okay if it | |
| occurred every 8 to 10 hours. Isn't that still a problem with | |
| the software? | |
| General Bogdan. With 8 million lines of code in the | |
| airplane, it is not unusual for both legacy airplanes and | |
| modern fifth-generation airplanes every now and then to have to | |
| reset one of the sensors in flight or have an automatic reset. | |
| That is not an uncommon situation. | |
| What we find is, if that happens more frequently and it | |
| happens at critical times, then that impacts the pilot's | |
| ability to get the mission done. But over time and historically | |
| we have seen that somewhere between 8 and 10 hours is probably | |
| about what we can expect and that, according to the | |
| warfighters, is good enough. | |
| Mr. Turner. Thank you for clarifying that. | |
| Mr. Sullivan, Dr. Gilmore, would you like to clarify on the | |
| 3F software. | |
| Dr. Gilmore. Well, the rate at which these instability | |
| incidents were occurring with Block 2B was one every 30-plus | |
| hours, and now it is one every 4 hours. And the initial | |
| versions of Block 3i don't provide any more combat capability | |
| than Block 2B, it was supposed to be rehosting of Block 2B with | |
| the new processor. | |
| So with regard to whether 8 to 10 hours is sufficient, what | |
| you want is a low probability that during a combat mission, | |
| which comprise several hours, you want a low probability that | |
| one of these upsets that takes time to reset--and several | |
| minutes in the middle of a fight is not acceptable--you want | |
| the time between these instability incidents to be long enough | |
| that you have a very low probability it would occur in a multi- | |
| hour combat mission. | |
| Whether 8 hours would be sufficient is something that we | |
| will certainly be looking at in IOT&E. It was much better than | |
| once every 8 hours with the Block 2B software. And again, 3i | |
| initially provided no more capability than Block 2B. | |
| Now, as we add capability and more complexity in Block 3F, | |
| you might see the numbers come down again. Ultimately, | |
| operational testing will tell us what is sufficient. | |
| Mr. Turner. Mr. Sullivan. | |
| Mr. Sullivan. Yeah, I think, depending on the mission | |
| scenarios and things like that, it is certainly a critical | |
| thing. I don't know if I would want to be a pilot and watch the | |
| screen go blank. But it is a spec, I assume, it is a spec that | |
| the contractor has, they are in development. We have talked to | |
| the contractor and the program office about this and it is a | |
| very serious problem. But 2B had issues and they worked through | |
| those and I would hope they can do the same with 3i. And I | |
| think probably they will be the same thing with 3F. | |
| So eventually I would hope that they will work that out and | |
| get it to whatever the spec is, which I would hope would | |
| support the warfighter. And if they do that--that is why the | |
| timing is so critical, because you would want that done by IOCs | |
| obviously, you would want to be able to go to IOT&E with | |
| problems like that under your belt as opposed to adding that to | |
| the burden of the operational testers. | |
| Mr. Turner. I am going to ask Mr. Stackley to follow up, | |
| but I have a few other questions that I am going to have to get | |
| through, but considering this is our last day for votes, I want | |
| to be sensitive to members who might need to leave. Since I am | |
| the only one on this side, I am going to ask unanimous consent | |
| if I let Mr. Stackley respond. And then the order is Mr. | |
| Johnson, Gallego, and Ms. Graham. | |
| What I will do is I will let each of you ask your | |
| questions, and then I will go back to my next question, and | |
| then we will finish up, and that way you can exit, if that is | |
| okay. | |
| Mr. Stackley. | |
| Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir, very briefly. The 2B software | |
| is performing very stably and I think everybody is satisfactory | |
| with its performance. The rehosting of that software into the | |
| new what is referred to as tech refresh on the JSF, the | |
| complexity of that rehosting should not be understated. We went | |
| through that on this tech refresh. We don't anticipate as large | |
| a leap in future tech refresh. But that complexity should not | |
| be understated. | |
| That did create a reset in terms of stability and now with | |
| each such successful build of software going back at building | |
| back up the degree of stability that we require. General | |
| Bogdan's reference to an 8 to 10 hours at this stage of the | |
| program, that probably is satisfactory. In the longer haul, Dr. | |
| Gilmore is correct, we want to get this up to a low probability | |
| of occurrence such that the pilot does not have to worry about | |
| resetting his mission systems mid-flight. | |
| Mr. Turner. Mr. Johnson. | |
| Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. | |
| To follow up on your questions about the need for our | |
| country to invest in a fifth generation of aircraft to take | |
| over from the legacy aircraft that have been flying for decades | |
| now, the F/A-18, the A-10, and the AV-8B, would all be replaced | |
| by our investment in the F-35 fifth generation. | |
| And it is important to note that other nations are | |
| investing in fifth-generation aircraft--the Russians, the | |
| Chinese--and that is what we mean by a changing threat | |
| environment, which America must step up to the plate. And if it | |
| intends to remain superior in the air, we must step up to the | |
| plate and invest and prepare for the long term. And that is | |
| what the F-35 enables us to do. | |
| With respect to those who may have participated in the poll | |
| that Chairman Turner referred to and were of the opinion that | |
| we should extend the legacy fleet and rely on it for our future | |
| protection, isn't it--and I assume they want to do that because | |
| it saves money. So penny-wise, pound-foolish, that would apply | |
| in this kind of a situation here. | |
| Isn't it a fact that if America were to do what some | |
| prefer, which is to extend the life of the legacy fleet, isn't | |
| it a fact that operations and supply costs to extend the legacy | |
| fleet would cost approximately four times what operations and | |
| support costs would be for the F-35 over the next 50 years? | |
| Isn't it a fact? | |
| Secretary Stackley. Well, let me start with responding to | |
| that. I don't know about the four times number, but what we do | |
| know is that---- | |
| Mr. Johnson. Approximately. | |
| Secretary Stackley [continuing]. As our aircraft age, for | |
| example the early versions of the F-18 that the F-35 Bs and Cs | |
| are going to be replacing, the A through D version, as they | |
| age, the cost of sustaining them, the cost of keeping them | |
| flying, the availability rates for those aircraft, they are, | |
| frankly, hurting us in terms of our strike fighter inventory | |
| for today. | |
| So we have got to get this next version, generation of | |
| aircraft, not just the capability, but also to retire the | |
| legacy aircraft that are costing us today. So as that timeline | |
| extrapolates out, all the legacy aircraft could be running into | |
| similar costs associated with sustaining a fleet that is not | |
| just old, but a lot of the sustainment is dealing with obsolete | |
| parts and capabilities that fall short of what we require for | |
| the warfighter. | |
| Mr. Johnson. Anyone else want to add to that? | |
| Mr. Sullivan. I would just say that I wouldn't focus as | |
| much on the cost for O&S. The Joint Strike Fighter is going to | |
| be very costly with sustainment too. It is more about the | |
| capability. They need that greater capability. The fifth- | |
| generation aircraft is really just far superior. | |
| I think O&S costs, it would cost a lot to keep these legacy | |
| aircraft in the air--I know the Harriers are really old--and | |
| eventually they just won't be able to fly them, I would think, | |
| after a while. | |
| So there is just nothing out there. The F-16 is another | |
| aircraft that the F-35 is going to replace. So there is an | |
| awful lot of aircraft it replaces. | |
| Mr. Johnson. Thank you. | |
| Lieutenant General Bogdan and Secretary Stackley, the | |
| Marine Corps declared initial operational capability last year | |
| for the F-35B and the Air Force is planning to do the same this | |
| year. This, to me, demonstrates a program that is maturing and | |
| reaching a point where it would benefit from increased | |
| production. Do you agree? And if so, what are some of the | |
| benefits and increased production rates for the F-35 program? | |
| Secretary Stackley. Let me start. First, it clearly | |
| reflects a program that is maturing. It was mentioned earlier | |
| that back in 2010 we restructured the program and within months | |
| we are holding to that restructured program's schedule here in | |
| 2016 and our costs at the same time are coming down in terms of | |
| production while we hold the line on development. | |
| The program is methodically increasing its production rates | |
| to today in terms of both the U.S. and our international | |
| partners and foreign military sales customers joining in that | |
| production. So the production rate is methodically increasing. | |
| And what we are seeing in terms of benefit is we are | |
| accelerating the learning curve on the production floor, it is | |
| driving down our costs. And as described earlier, we are seeing | |
| positive trends by every measure as it relates to both airframe | |
| and engine manufacturing. | |
| The longer term, when we complete IOT&E and getting to the | |
| full-rate production decision, I think we are on track for | |
| that, again, within months, within a budget cycle. And as we | |
| march in that direction, we are looking forward to such | |
| vehicles as block buying contract and ultimately multiyear | |
| contracting to, again, further leverage the benefits of a | |
| stable design, mature production lines, and then let's buy it | |
| as efficiently as possible. | |
| Mr. Johnson. Thank you. | |
| I will yield back, Mr. Chairman. | |
| Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Johnson. | |
| Turning back to the initial operating capability concerns | |
| and the requirements for later this year, General Bogdan, in | |
| attention to software development I understand that General | |
| Welsh is closely watching the progress of the Autonomic | |
| Logistics Information System, known as ALIS, as well as | |
| challenges facing aircraft software stability which is | |
| affecting the radar. As you know, ALIS was a significant area | |
| of concern raised by maintainers during our visit to the Eglin | |
| Air Force Base last year. | |
| Please provide us with a short update on these two issues | |
| and what your concerns are concerning the IOC later this year. | |
| General Bogdan. Yes, sir. As I said before, within the next | |
| 30 days we ought to know if the fixes we have put into the | |
| software on stability will take hold. And if that is the case, | |
| then we will incrementally upgrade the Air Force's airplanes at | |
| Hill Air Force Base with that version of software and the | |
| software stability issue will not impact their ability to | |
| declare IOC. | |
| That is not the case with ALIS. ALIS, the next increment of | |
| capability we are delivering, as you know, is 2.0.2, and we | |
| were supposed to have that fielded by August of this year. I am | |
| estimating that that delivery of that system is probably about | |
| 60 days late now. I am not sure if we will be able to pull that | |
| schedule back any. If that is the case, then it will be up to | |
| the U.S. Air Force to decide what to do in August when it comes | |
| to ALIS 2.0.2 if it is going to be about 60 days late. | |
| Mr. Turner. Does anyone else wish to comment? | |
| Mr. Sullivan. I would only say that we have another team | |
| within GAO that is looking and specifically kind of looking at | |
| ALIS. And I believe they have a draft report over on the Hill | |
| right now. That might be helpful, to look for that. In fact, I | |
| can probably make sure that the committee gets a draft copy of | |
| that. | |
| [The report referred to, GAO-16-439, is retained in the | |
| subcommittee files; it can be found online at http://gao.gov/ | |
| products/GAO-16-439.] | |
| Mr. Turner. That would be great. We should, because we had | |
| significant concerns for the maintenance group. | |
| Mr. Sullivan. Yeah. So this team is focused really on O&S | |
| and ALIS and things like that. | |
| Mr. Turner. Thank you. | |
| General Bogdan. Can I make one other comment, sir, about | |
| ALIS, very quickly? If you went to Eglin Air Force Base today | |
| or if you went to Luke Air Force Base, what you would find over | |
| the past year is not all, but many of the maintenance | |
| workarounds and burdens that we placed on the maintainers over | |
| the last few years are systematically getting improved. | |
| We are not anywhere near where we need to be with ALIS, but | |
| I think what you would get from the maintainers if you talked | |
| to them today is the fact that they do indeed see an | |
| improvement each and every time we put out a new version of | |
| software, which means the trending is going in the right | |
| direction, we just have a long way to go. | |
| Mr. Turner. Thank you, General. | |
| One thing we know is that consumers weren't given iPhones | |
| until they were done. You have to, however, put planes in | |
| pilots' hands while you are still developing them. And so we | |
| all get to look over your shoulder as you are doing it, and we | |
| appreciate both the work of the GAO and others to ensure that | |
| we have the right to-do list, but your diligence to try to make | |
| certain we complete it. | |
| Mr. Gallego. | |
| Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Chair. | |
| General Bogdan, the original concept of the F-35 platform | |
| was to retain about 70 percent similarity between the three | |
| variants in order to keep costs down on the budget. But as we | |
| know, this has not been achieved, which calls the original | |
| concept into question. | |
| Knowing this, would you support programs in the future that | |
| aim for commonality between platforms for the services or do | |
| you think these efforts would also have too many cost and | |
| schedule overruns? | |
| General Bogdan. Congressman, what I have said before about | |
| joint programs is that they are hard, they are neither good nor | |
| bad, and it really depends on how you manage them. But they are | |
| indeed hard, and they are hard because when you bring together | |
| a number of different customers that may have varying | |
| requirements, it is sometimes hard to meet all those | |
| requirements without going to the least common denominator. | |
| And so what I would tell you is a decision to move forward | |
| on any platform in the joint arena would depend on how much | |
| overlap the services see in the requirements that they have. | |
| There are opportunities outside of a joint program to benefit | |
| from commonality, using similar engines, using similar flight | |
| control systems. But to embody that in the same airplane that | |
| would try and meet the requirements of varied customers is a | |
| really hard thing to do. | |
| Mr. Gallego. I hope we will remember that in the future. | |
| Moving on to pilots, though. An October subcommittee | |
| hearing discussed the problems with the ejection process for | |
| pilots. Two solutions you talked about were developing lighter | |
| helmets and managing parachute timing after ejection. However, | |
| today we find out the GAO report notes that the helmet weight | |
| was not the root cause of neck injuries during ejection. | |
| What is the status of the efforts to protect our pilots, | |
| one? And with certainty, can you say that we've identified all | |
| the problems related to this issue? | |
| General Bogdan. Yes, Congressman. One point of | |
| clarification. There are two technical issues as to why a pilot | |
| less than 136 pounds has an added risk of injury during | |
| ejection. One of them is indeed because the helmet is too | |
| heavy, but the other is a technical issue having to do with the | |
| way the seat fires up and the center of gravity of a light | |
| pilot. But both of those problems contribute. | |
| We have three fixes in place to remedy this. The first is | |
| an ejection seat switch. That will be set by the pilot based on | |
| his or her weight. We have tested that. We are in the design | |
| phase of it. And that fix will be cut into production on our | |
| lot 10, and we will start retrofitting airplanes with that fix | |
| in November of this year. | |
| We also have a head support panel, which is a pad that will | |
| be sewn into the risers of the parachute. That fix has been | |
| tested. It too will be incorporated into lot 10 and it will | |
| start being retrofitted in November. | |
| Relative to the helmet weight, we needed to get the helmet | |
| down to about 4.6 pounds. We are in process of doing that as we | |
| speak. Originally the estimate was that that helmet wouldn't be | |
| ready for fielding until November of 2017. I can report now | |
| that that helmet will be available in November of 2016. | |
| So when we have the switch, the helmet support pad, and the | |
| lighter helmet out there in November, I believe by the end of | |
| this year we can remove the requirement of a pilot not being | |
| able to fly the airplane less than 136 pounds. | |
| Mr. Gallego. And then just the second portion of my | |
| question was, can you say with certainty that we have | |
| identified all the problems related to this issue in terms of | |
| our pilot safety ejection. | |
| General Bogdan. Sir, we have 14 more sled tests and | |
| ejection tests to go between now and September. So I cannot | |
| tell you right now definitively that we won't find other | |
| things. | |
| What I will tell you is we will completely test it. If | |
| there are problems, we have a good track record of fixing them. | |
| Because we will not put pilots' lives in danger by putting them | |
| in an airplane and an ejection system that is not safe. | |
| Mr. Gallego. Thank you. I yield back my time. | |
| Mr. Turner. Thank you. | |
| General Bogdan, as you are aware, a lot of our discussions | |
| between you and the committee are based upon our visit to Eglin | |
| Air Force Base, and the questions that we pose are a result of | |
| that fact-finding trip. There were 14 of them. And you have | |
| continued to both answer those questions and update them. I | |
| have your March 17, 2016, letter in response continuing to | |
| update us on those issues. If there is no objection, I am going | |
| to enter this into the record of your discussion on these items | |
| and the issues that we have been looking for, for oversight. | |
| [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix | |
| on page 113.] | |
| General Bogdan. Thank you, sir. | |
| Mr. Turner. Ms. McSally. | |
| Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. | |
| And thank you, gentlemen. | |
| I remain a strong supporter of a fifth-generation fighter, | |
| having been an airman myself. Knowing the threats that we have | |
| that are emanating, we need that capability. However, I remain | |
| concerned about the close air support of FAC(A) [forward air | |
| controller-airborne] and combat search and rescue missions that | |
| are currently being done by the A-10 Warthog and the F-35's | |
| capabilities to replace that without increasing risk to | |
| American lives. | |
| General Bogdan, can you confirm that the F-35 requirements | |
| document is still that the F-35 would replace the A-10 and the | |
| F-16? | |
| General Bogdan. Ma'am, what I will tell you is the | |
| requirements document that I have on the program does not | |
| specifically say that it will replace the A-10 and the F-16. My | |
| requirements document has to do with what the capabilities of | |
| the F-35 is. The decision to replace airplanes with the F-35 is | |
| a service decision. | |
| Ms. McSally. Okay. I think, though, on the program page, I | |
| mean, the intent of the Department, the intent of certainly the | |
| Air Force is that the F-35 will replace the A-10 and the F-16. | |
| Is that fair to say? | |
| General Bogdan. I would believe, from the public statements | |
| I have heard from the Chief and the Secretary and the combatant | |
| commanders, that is a true statement. | |
| Ms. McSally. Okay. And I think that is also on the JSF Web | |
| site, as well, for the program. | |
| On March 3rd, the Air Force Chief of Staff said in a | |
| hearing that the mission capability of the A-10 will not be | |
| replaced by the F-35. He also talked to me about this after our | |
| hearing last week. He went on to say the A-10's current | |
| workload would be handled by the F-16 and the F-15E. This was a | |
| total surprise to me to hear him say this, to be frank with | |
| you. So I am concerned. | |
| And I look at their 5-year plan, that they are going to | |
| start mothballing more A-10s, next year, 49; 49 the year after | |
| that; 64 the year after that; 98 the year after that, finishing | |
| in fiscal year 2022. When do you think, again, we are going to | |
| be at FOC [full operational capability] for the F-35? | |
| General Bogdan. Ma'am, the full capability of the F-35 | |
| relative to close air support will be delivered in the late | |
| 2017 timeframe. We will have additional capabilities in our | |
| block for modernization that would make that mission more | |
| viable for the F-35. And I am not sure if the Air Force has | |
| declared an FOC date yet. | |
| Ms. McSally. Okay. But from the testimony, I think, for Dr. | |
| Gilmore, I mean, we have seen the F-35A, and we have talked | |
| about this in previous hearings, capabilities are limited, 20, | |
| 30 minutes time on station; two bombs; you know, excuse my | |
| language, but we call one pass haul ass; no time to loiter; | |
| having to go to tankers; being Winchester; 182 bullets; limited | |
| night capability; inability to get data; targeting information; | |
| inability to survive a direct hit in close combat. These are | |
| all limitations we know about, we have talked about in previous | |
| hearings. | |
| So, Dr. Gilmore, I appreciate that your office has decided | |
| to do a comparison test between the F-35 and the A-10 on close | |
| air support. And I am concerned also about the combat search | |
| and rescue and the forward air control mission. Can you give us | |
| an update on that comparison test and when that is going to | |
| happen and whether there are any concerns about funding or its | |
| continuation in another administration? | |
| Dr. Gilmore. First, with regard to requirements, I reviewed | |
| the requirements document before I came here. And there is a | |
| clear statement at the beginning of the requirements document, | |
| which has been in force for a number of years now, that the F- | |
| 35 would replace the A-10. | |
| Ms. McSally. That is what I thought. Thanks, Dr. Gilmore. | |
| Dr. Gilmore. I am happy to send you a copy of that. | |
| Ms. McSally. Please do. | |
| Dr. Gilmore. In any event, with regard to---- | |
| General Bogdan. Can I correct the record? When I talk about | |
| requirements on the program, I talk about a specification that | |
| I put contractors on to deliver a capability. The document you | |
| are talking about is a service document known as an operational | |
| requirements document,---- | |
| Ms. McSally. Okay. | |
| General Bogdan [continuing]. An ORD, which I do not | |
| control. | |
| Ms. McSally. Okay. Thank you. | |
| Dr. Gilmore. And that's the one the Chief of the Air Force, | |
| the Chief of Staff of the Air Force signed---- | |
| Ms. McSally. Great. | |
| Dr. Gilmore [continuing]. Namely, the operational | |
| requirements document. So that is what I was talking about. | |
| With regard to the close air support tests, comparison | |
| tests, yes, we are planning that. We are planning all the open | |
| air tests as we speak, working with the joint operational test | |
| team and the services. We expect to have that effort completed | |
| in June or July of this year. And we are happy to share those | |
| results with the committee and with you. | |
| With regard to funding, the costs of the close air support | |
| tests, including combat search and rescue [CSAR] and Sandy | |
| <dagger>---- | |
| --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| <dagger> ``Sandy'' refers to a mission in which an aircraft (most | |
| often an A-10) is tasked to support and provide protective coverage for | |
| a combat search and rescue mission to recover an ejected pilot behind | |
| enemy lines. | |
| --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| Ms. McSally. Right. | |
| Dr. Gilmore [continuing]. Compared to not doing them---- | |
| Ms. McSally. Right. | |
| Dr. Gilmore [continuing]. You know, compared to not having | |
| the A-10s fly, you know, conducting the same missions that the | |
| F-35s would conduct in those two areas or those three areas, | |
| varies between $3.5 million and $5.2 million. The difference is | |
| the amount of refly that you have to do. When you are doing-- | |
| just like when you are doing a test, you can't count on every | |
| scenario that you are trying to run actually working. | |
| Ms. McSally. Right. | |
| Dr. Gilmore. So you have to plan in the test for refly, the | |
| same way General Bogdan is planning for refly in developmental | |
| testing. So that is the reason for the range of $3.5 million to | |
| $5.2 million. We are working to, with the joint operational | |
| test team, to fit all of these comparison tests within the | |
| budget for operational testing, which was established, I think, | |
| about 5 years ago in the TEMP [Test and Evaluation Master Plan] | |
| that is now rather out of date. But, nonetheless, we take that | |
| budget seriously. And we are working to fit all the comparison | |
| testing within that budget. | |
| If there is--if we do go over, which, again, we are trying | |
| very hard not to do because we do take that budget limit | |
| seriously, it wouldn't be by more than 10 or 15 percent. And I | |
| would remind the committee that the Block 2B operational | |
| utility evaluation, which was supposed to have been done in | |
| 2015, was canceled at my recommendation 2 years ago because it | |
| was clear to me that the aircraft wouldn't be ready for that | |
| kind of rigorous operational test. And the service acquisition | |
| executives agreed. And that was a savings of about $100 | |
| million. | |
| So we are working to keep within the existing budget and | |
| the CAS comparison testing, CSAR, and so forth is, again, a | |
| small amount of the overall cost, $3.5 million to $5.2 million. | |
| Ms. McSally. Thanks, Dr. Gilmore. I am over my time. But | |
| could you--when would we be able to have those results | |
| delivered to Congress of the tests, do you think? | |
| Dr. Gilmore. Well, if we begin the operational testing, | |
| according to my estimate, which would be mid-calendar year | |
| 2018, the operational test will compose, will comprise, rather, | |
| about a year. It will take about a year. And then it would be a | |
| few months after that, no more than 6, hopefully fewer, to | |
| actually finish the report. | |
| Ms. McSally. So late 2019, early 2020 would be fair? | |
| Dr. Gilmore. Yes. | |
| Ms. McSally. Okay. Thank you. I appreciate it. | |
| Thank you, Mr. Chairman. | |
| Mr. Turner. Thank you. | |
| Mr. Walz. | |
| Mr. Walz. Thank you, Chairman. And thank you all for being | |
| here again. We really appreciate it. The strategic need for the | |
| F-35, I think everyone knows that. We hear it. It is now crunch | |
| time, though, on the delivery piece of it. | |
| And, General Bogdan, you are right, there is a perception | |
| issue both in what they are going to get and what they expect | |
| to get. But there is also this perception that I have held and | |
| I have used this as an example. | |
| I have been to no less than 14 hearings dealing with | |
| changes to retirement plans, taking away of the housing | |
| allowance, transferability of the GI Bill benefit, commissary | |
| changes, and TRICARE. And where that relates to this is the | |
| perception out there is, is when the Pentagon needs to save | |
| money, they go to those programs. And I always use the example | |
| that we haven't had as many of these. | |
| So I hear statements like this from one of our partners | |
| from the Australian Defence Force, I think it was Keith Joiner | |
| said it. He's responsible for evaluating this, and he said some | |
| systems like the radar are fundamentally worse than earlier, | |
| which is not a good sign. The next software version Block 4 | |
| won't be available. So here we are with bug fixes for the next | |
| 7 years. And they are looking, am I correct in this, they are | |
| reevaluating their purchases on this. | |
| So I go back home. I talk to soldiers and sailors, say, | |
| ``So I just lost a GI Bill benefit. What is happening with | |
| this?'' How do I talk to them about it? Is it a matter of until | |
| you deliver it, this is just going to go on? Because I do kind | |
| of feel like I am asked to come into the play and do my part | |
| and say this, and then it is going to be delivered. How do I go | |
| back? How would you answer on this? | |
| General Bogdan. It is a tough question, Congressman. And I | |
| clearly understand the point of view here. I guess the best I | |
| would offer, if I were asked that question, is that bringing a | |
| new weapon system online to defend our country is never easy. | |
| And it always is fraught with mistakes, bad choices, technical | |
| challenges. And the history of especially developing airplanes | |
| has been murky. We have had lots of problems over the years | |
| bringing new airplanes online. | |
| Mr. Walz. And that is a helpful piece. You have more | |
| experience in this. How similar is this to when the F-16 came | |
| on? How similar is what we are seeing here today? | |
| General Bogdan. The F-16 was a very simple airplane when it | |
| first came out and over the years got more complicated. And it | |
| had setbacks. I am not sure if you are aware, the very first | |
| flight of the F-16, sir, was an accident. They were not | |
| supposed to take off. Because of the flight control system not | |
| being properly rigged, the pilot, in order to save the | |
| airplane, had to take off. So airplanes experience this. | |
| Mr. Walz. No, I think that is true. And I want to be clear | |
| on this so that I am not, and I am not teeing this up, because | |
| I am one who believes we need these systems. Is it apples to | |
| oranges because of the exponential technical differences | |
| between that launch and this launch? And I know that is kind of | |
| a hard question because we were at our technological limit then | |
| and now maybe we are there, so it may be similar to that. But | |
| is it the case that there is more things that can go wrong so | |
| they probably will? | |
| Secretary Stackley. Sir, let me jump in and say that is | |
| absolutely the case. And it is not unique to the F-35 program. | |
| We are going after a high-end capability on this and other | |
| warfare systems that are significantly more complex than the | |
| systems that they are replacing. So there is no such thing as | |
| replacing legacy, whether it is aircraft, missile systems, | |
| ships, tactical vehicles, on a one-for-one basis anywhere near | |
| the same cost of those legacy systems because these are so much | |
| more capable. | |
| You know, the comments and perceptions from folks that are | |
| not well informed on the program, those are tough to defeat | |
| because now you are talking about an education process. | |
| The reality is that the F-35 program, albeit it has gone | |
| through restructuring, is on a path to deliver all the | |
| capability that was promised from day one. It is going to cost | |
| more than what was estimated back in the 2002 timeframe. Those | |
| costs were rebaselined in 2010. And we have kept those under | |
| control to the extent that now we are actually reducing costs | |
| with time as the program gets more and more mature. | |
| What you are not hearing, and I think General Bogdan | |
| touched on this earlier, is the warfighters that are flying | |
| this plane, what their perception is. My comment in the opening | |
| statement was the Marines love this aircraft, absolutely love | |
| this aircraft. This is what they plan to go to war with, if | |
| called upon. I think that you are going to hear that overtake | |
| the other rhetoric over time as more and more of our Air Force, | |
| Marine Corps, and Navy pilots, and our international partners | |
| climb into this cockpit, see what its capability is, train with | |
| it, and then deploy with it over time. | |
| Mr. Walz. Yes, Mr. Sullivan. | |
| Mr. Sullivan. Your question is an excellent question. And | |
| it is not just the F-35 program. It is about the acquisition | |
| process. We do acquisition reform all the time. And actually, | |
| it has been improving the last few years. But the bottom-line | |
| answer to this is there has got to be a little truth in | |
| advertising when these weapon systems start up because they are | |
| always started up with optimistic cost estimates and schedules. | |
| This program was originally planned to be completed, | |
| everything purchased, by 2026. Now that is 2038. And so that | |
| additional 12 years of funding---- | |
| Mr. Walz. And that has as much to do with this side of the | |
| table as that side. | |
| Mr. Sullivan. Yeah. So, I mean, and that is what you are | |
| talking about, is that the Congress is faced with unplanned, | |
| you know, funding for 12 years that they weren't planning on | |
| when they started. Like I said, it is not the F-35, it is most | |
| of the major weapon systems. They just don't have a good | |
| business case at the outset. | |
| The F-16 was a really good aircraft when it was delivered, | |
| and it was simple. And it is not that simple anymore. It is a | |
| very complex aircraft because they planned it properly. They | |
| had incremental planning on that and they did block upgrades. | |
| That is really what, I think what this is all about. And so | |
| other priorities go by the wayside. | |
| Mr. Walz. I know. Well, thank you. I yield back. | |
| Thank you, Chairman. | |
| Mr. Turner. Ms. McSally. | |
| Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do just want to | |
| follow up on our discussion on requirements, just to make sure. | |
| Luckily, I flew airplanes, I never had to procure them. So this | |
| process seems a little cumbersome to me. | |
| But just, Dr. Gilmore, an Air Force Chief of Staff has said | |
| that the A-10 will not be replaced by the F-35, on the record, | |
| within the last few weeks. And then said that to me in a | |
| conversation last week, surprising me. Is the Air Force going | |
| to be updating their ORD, or whatever you just called it---- | |
| Dr. Gilmore. The operational requirements document? I | |
| haven't heard that they are. | |
| Ms. McSally [continuing]. To reflect that? | |
| Dr. Gilmore. I haven't heard that they are. And then the F- | |
| 35s are going to be replacing the F-16s. | |
| Ms. McSally. Right. | |
| Dr. Gilmore. So I am a bit puzzled. But all I know is what | |
| the existing operational requirements document said. | |
| Ms. McSally. Okay. So you know of no efforts to update | |
| that. And if it is currently---- | |
| Dr. Gilmore. I am not aware of any. | |
| Ms. McSally [continuing]. Going to be replacing the A-10 | |
| and the F-16, but he is saying the F-16 is going to replace the | |
| A-10, but then the F-35 is going to replace the F-16, then we | |
| are still in the same situation where we are. In specific | |
| circumstances for close air support, we potentially have | |
| additional risk or a gap or capabilities that are going to be | |
| degraded, which is why it is so important that we have this | |
| flyoff. Do you agree, Dr. Gilmore? | |
| Dr. Gilmore. Well, you know, I don't know whether the | |
| capabilities will be degraded. | |
| Ms. McSally. Right. | |
| Dr. Gilmore. That is what the comparison testing is | |
| supposed to find out. | |
| Ms. McSally. Absolutely. | |
| Dr. Gilmore. And that is why we are planning it to be, you | |
| know, absolutely fair. We are going to consider all the | |
| conditions under which close air support are done, all the | |
| different kinds of threats. And it certainly will be a | |
| challenge. | |
| In fact, the A-10 couldn't survive in the highest threat | |
| environments. But we are also looking at, you know, less | |
| stressing threats like the ones that the A-10 is being used in, | |
| the environments it is being used in today: urban, rural | |
| situations, buildings, vehicle personnel, different kinds of | |
| control for the close air support, different kinds of control | |
| interaction, all of the things that you know are done in close | |
| air support missions. | |
| We are going to set up the missions. And then the A-10 | |
| pilots and the F-35 pilots will use those two aircraft to their | |
| best capabilities, using whatever TTPs [tactics, techniques, | |
| and procedures] they have. We are certainly not going to | |
| specify how the missions are done. We are going to specify what | |
| the mission is. And then we will do matched pairs comparisons | |
| of how well each set of pilots and aircraft can perform those | |
| missions the way they choose to. | |
| Ms. McSally. Great. Thank you. And it seems like there is | |
| just some different messages coming out of the Pentagon. I | |
| mean, the Secretary of Defense, when he announced his budget, | |
| said A-10s will be replaced squadron by squadron, with the F-35 | |
| predetermining the outcome of this test. So we are trying to | |
| get some consistency out of the Pentagon by just asking these | |
| questions. I highlighted this to the Secretary yesterday. We | |
| are going to follow up with him and the Chairman. Because it | |
| just seems like even between the Air Force and the Secretary of | |
| Defense, they have got two different messages going on here. | |
| We believe that any movement forward should be conditional. | |
| Let's have the test. Let's get the results of the test. And | |
| then let's make a decision afterwards as to whether we are | |
| going to be increasing risks to our troops on the ground. | |
| So I appreciate the additional time, Mr. Chairman. Thank | |
| you, gentlemen. And I yield back. | |
| Mr. Turner. Thank you. | |
| Gentlemen, this is one of our most important and certainly | |
| largest programs. And I want to thank each of you for your | |
| diligence in trying to ensure that this program reaches all of | |
| the capabilities that are obviously going to be necessary. | |
| Because of that, before we conclude, knowing your diligence, I | |
| want to give each of you an opportunity if you have anything | |
| else that you want to put on the record or that you want to | |
| raise before the committee as we consider this, knowing that | |
| your input is incredibly important. | |
| If not, I know we have your opening statements. And we | |
| continue to have your advice and counsel. We appreciate the | |
| information you have provided to the committee. Thank you. | |
| [Whereupon, at 12:42 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] | |
| ======================================================================= | |
| A P P E N D I X | |
| ======================================================================= | |
| PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD | |
| March 23, 2016 | |
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| DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD | |
| March 23, 2016 | |
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| QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING | |
| March 23, 2016 | |
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| QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER | |
| Mr. Turner. What do you think are the biggest hurdles for the | |
| program to overcome to be ready for IOT&E? | |
| Dr. Gilmore. The current plan to complete development and enter | |
| IOT&E by August 2017 is unrealistic. Several obstacles must be overcome | |
| before IOT&E can begin. These include: | |
| <bullet> Completion of Block 3F development. The completion of | |
| Block 3F development will provide full combat capability to the F-35, | |
| including the ability to employ the full suite of weapons planned for | |
| the F-35. However, the program has completed less than 20 percent of | |
| the baseline Block 3F test points as of the end of April 2016. | |
| Completing the remaining nearly 4,200 baseline points will likely not | |
| occur until the end of January 2018, based on historical test point | |
| burn rates. | |
| <bullet> Weapons integration. Much of the weapons testing remains, | |
| particularly to support the additional weapons being brought on with | |
| Block 3F (SDB, JSOW, AIM-9X, and the gun) | |
| <bullet> Mission data. The programming lab that provides mission | |
| data needs to be upgraded to provide adequate, optimized, and tested | |
| mission data files for IOT&E. Despite being provided a $45 Million | |
| budget in FY13, the program has still not designed, contracted for, and | |
| ordered the required equipment--a process that will take at least two | |
| years, not counting installation and check-out. As a result, the signal | |
| generators needed to adequately test the mission data loads against | |
| advanced threat waveforms will probably not arrive until 2019 at the | |
| soonest, causing risk to F-35 avionics performance during IOT&E and in | |
| combat. | |
| <bullet> Sustainment. The program set a target of 60 percent | |
| aircraft availability for the fleet as an objective at the end of CY14, | |
| but has yet to reach that goal. To efficiently complete the mission | |
| trials during IOT&E, most of which will require 4-ship formations of a | |
| single variant (out of 6-aircraft fleets of each US variant), the | |
| program will need to have an availability of approximately 80 percent, | |
| which is also the availability that will be required to succeed in | |
| actual combat. Improvements in reliability and maintainability, along | |
| with significant improvements to ALIS, are all needed. | |
| <bullet> Modifications to operational test aircraft. The | |
| operational test aircraft must be production-representative and have | |
| the required instrumentation called for in the Test and Evaluation | |
| Master Plan (TEMP). Modifying the currently designated fleet of | |
| operational test aircraft to the Block 3F configuration would extend | |
| beyond August 2017. Although the requirement to modify these aircraft | |
| has been known for years by the program and Lockheed-Martin, adequate | |
| plans were not made to accommodate these modifications. For example, | |
| all of the operational test aircraft need the Tech Refresh 2 (TR2) | |
| processors, which have been included in the production aircraft since | |
| Lot 6 aircraft were delivered in late 2014, but TR2 processors for | |
| retrofitting the OT aircraft were not ordered in time to support | |
| completing modifications prior to August 2017. | |
| There is very little which can be done to mitigate these timelines | |
| to meet an August 2017 IOT&E start date. Although the program office is | |
| considering options with the Services provide operational test aircraft | |
| earlier, either by getting parts from the production line or from | |
| later-lot aircraft, or by substituting in newer aircraft, decisions | |
| must be made soon to have the TEMP-required number of production- | |
| representative aircraft in time for IOT&E. | |
| Mr. Turner. Do the F-35 development and production schedules have | |
| more or less risk than last year and what is that level of risk? | |
| Dr. Gilmore. My assessment is that the progress in development over | |
| the past year has been less than planned, and hence--given the shorter | |
| timeline remaining to the completion of System Development and | |
| Demonstration (SDD)--the risk to the development schedule is greater | |
| than it was last year. The program's decision to pause the Block 3F | |
| mission systems development in order to address the Block 3i stability | |
| and other deficiencies was a good decision, but the needed fixes came | |
| at a cost to schedule. For several reasons, SDD will likely not be | |
| complete before March 2018, at the earliest. This assessment is based | |
| on the following assumptions: | |
| <bullet> Block 3i mission systems testing is complete and will not | |
| need to restart | |
| <bullet> Block 3i stability fixes have been successfully | |
| transferred to the Block 3F software | |
| <bullet> Block 3F mission systems has restarted in earnest with | |
| all SDD aircraft | |
| <bullet> The balance of approximately 4,200 Block 3F mission | |
| systems baseline test points (the number as of the beginning of May) | |
| will be completed by the test teams, without significant deletions by | |
| the program | |
| <bullet> No additional discoveries which cause significant delays | |
| or unplanned software releases (beyond those currently planned) occur | |
| in Block 3F flight testing | |
| <bullet> All planned weapon delivery accuracy (WDA) events--which | |
| include 25 events with air-to-air missiles or bombs and two sets 19 WDA | |
| events supporting of gun tests, one with the embedded gun in the F-35A | |
| and one with the podded gun for the F-35B and F-35C--are completed | |
| before the end of SDD. As of the end of April, none of these WDA events | |
| had been completed and will likely not begin before August 2016, after | |
| a version of software is released to flight test that will support the | |
| start the of the WDA events. The latest Program Office schedule shows | |
| that the missile and bomb events are planned to start in June and be | |
| complete by the end of November 2016, a schedule that I consider to be | |
| unrealistic. The program has prioritized 16 of the 25 bomb and missile | |
| events to be completed to support flight certification of weapons | |
| releases for Block 3F; however, all events, including the WDAs with the | |
| gun, must be completed to support end-to-end fire control | |
| characterization for all required weapons prior to the start of IOT&E. | |
| Although possible, the program's ability to complete these events | |
| before March 2018 will depend on efficiencies in completing WDA events | |
| and data analyses that have not been seen in the past (i.e., during the | |
| Block 2B and Block 3i WDA events) and the maturity of mission systems | |
| software to support the find-fix-track-target-engage-assess kill chain | |
| for each of these events. | |
| Concerning production risk, the program continues to have | |
| discoveries from testing that require modifications to be cut into | |
| production and retrofits to fielded aircraft. These discoveries are | |
| reflective of a design that is still not mature. Recent examples | |
| include cracking in the titanium bulkhead of the F-35C durability test | |
| article (CJ-1) where significant limitations to the life of the fielded | |
| F-35C aircraft can only be addressed with intrusive structural | |
| modifications prior to the expected full service life, and show again | |
| the high cost of concurrent production and development. Another example | |
| is the observed structural exceedances in both the F-35A and F-35C at | |
| the external carriage points for the AIM-9X missile--a weapon being | |
| integrated in Block 3F. Both aircraft have shown structural exceedances | |
| during in-flight maneuvering, and the F-35C during simulated carrier | |
| landings. The program is currently investigating a way forward to | |
| address these structural exceedances. | |
| Mr. Turner. Your report mentioned some concerns in your annual | |
| report about the U.S. Reprograming Lab not having the equipment | |
| necessary to produce the software necessary for F-35 combat operations. | |
| What are the implications of the USRL not having the required | |
| equipment? | |
| Dr. Gilmore. Significant, correctable deficiencies exist in the | |
| U.S. Reprogramming Laboratory (USRL) that will preclude development and | |
| adequate testing of effective mission data loads for Block 3F. Despite | |
| a $45 Million budget provided to the Program Office in FY13, the | |
| required equipment was not ordered in time and the USRL is still not | |
| configured properly to build and optimize Block 3F Mission Data Files | |
| (MDFs). The program still has not designed, contracted for, and ordered | |
| all of the required equipment--a process that will take at least two | |
| years for some of the complex equipment--after which significant time | |
| for installation and check-out will be required. The estimate of | |
| earliest completion, with the required signal generators and other | |
| upgrades to properly test Block 3F mission data loads, is late 2019, | |
| which is after the planned IOT&E of Block 3F. As I explain in my annual | |
| report, the corrections to the USRL are needed to provide the F-35 with | |
| the ability to succeed against the modern threats that are the key | |
| rationale for pursuing this $400-Billion program. If the situation with | |
| the USRL is not rectified, U.S. F-35 forces will be at substantial risk | |
| of failure if used in combat against these threats. Further, I note | |
| that the laboratory being built to provide MDFs to the partner nations | |
| will be more capable than the USRL is when we are preparing for IOT&E. | |
| The program must take immediate action to complete required | |
| modifications and upgrades to the lab before the USRL is required to | |
| provide the Block 3F mission data load for tactics development and | |
| preparations for IOT&E. | |
| Mr. Turner. Are you concerned that the program paused its software | |
| development schedule to try and fix the avionics stability problems and | |
| other critical deficiencies in Block 3i and 3F? | |
| Dr. Gilmore. No, I am not concerned. In fact, I applaud the | |
| program's effort to change from the schedule-driven, concurrent | |
| development process that the program was previously using to develop, | |
| test, and field versions of missions systems software to pursue a | |
| serial approach of addressing deficiencies before moving on to the next | |
| iteration of software. The decision by the program in February to | |
| return to the Block 3i configuration and address the poor mission | |
| systems performance has caused some near-term delays, but it is a | |
| necessary step to ensure the Air Force has adequate Block 3i software | |
| for IOC and that the additional full set of combat capabilities planned | |
| in Block 3F can be effectively tested with a stable baseline of | |
| software and eventually fielded to operational units. The success of | |
| Block 3F mission systems depends on the program resolving the problems | |
| with Block 3i. The stability and functionality problems in the initial | |
| versions of Block 3F, including those inherited from Block 3i and | |
| problems caused by new Block 3F capabilities, were so significant that | |
| the program could not continue flight test. I agree with the program's | |
| decision to shift to a serial process of testing and fixing software in | |
| the lab before releasing the next software version, and the recent | |
| improvements observed in Block 3i stability validate this serial | |
| approach. The program recently released an updated version of Block | |
| 3FR5 software to flight test in April and then plans to release Block | |
| 3FR6 later this summer. If the fixes to stability programmed into the | |
| latest Block 3i software continue to suppress the need for avionics | |
| resets in flight, mission systems testing and weapons releases can | |
| potentially resume in earnest and the test point completion rate will | |
| increase, which is essential given the significant amount of testing | |
| that remains. | |
| Mr. Turner. What more can be done or focused on to improve | |
| operational suitability? | |
| Dr. Gilmore. The operational suitability of all variants continues | |
| to be less than desired by the Services and relies heavily on | |
| contractor support and workarounds that would be difficult to employ in | |
| a combat environment. Almost all measures of performance have improved | |
| over the past year, but most continue to be below their interim goals | |
| to achieve acceptable suitability by the time the fleet accrues 200,000 | |
| flight hours, the benchmark set by the program and defined in the | |
| Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for the aircraft to meet | |
| reliability and maintainability requirements. To improve operational | |
| suitability, the program should: | |
| 1. Improve the reliability of components with higher-than-planned | |
| failure rates. While the program focuses on contract specification | |
| requirements, particularly Mean Flight Hours Between Failure for | |
| Design-Controllable components, I noted in my annual report that, among | |
| the measures of reliability that have ORD requirement thresholds, eight | |
| of nine measures are still below program target values for the current | |
| stage of development, although two are within 5 percent of their | |
| interim goal. | |
| 2. Improve aircraft availability. Aircraft availability improved | |
| slightly in CY15, reaching a fleet-wide average of 51 percent by the | |
| end of the year, but the trend was flat in the last few months and was | |
| well short of the program's goal of 60 percent availability that it had | |
| established for the end of CY14. It is also important to understand | |
| that the program's metric goals are modest, particularly in aircraft | |
| availability, and do not represent the demands on the weapons system | |
| that will occur in combat. With respect to IOT&E readiness, if the | |
| program is only able to achieve and sustain its goal of 60 percent | |
| aircraft availability, the length of IOT&E will increase significantly | |
| because a combat-ready availability of 80 percent is planned and needed | |
| to efficiently accomplish the open-air mission trials with the number | |
| of aircraft planned for IOT&E. | |
| 3. Improve maintainability by improving the quality and number of | |
| validated and verified Joint Technical Data, which are the reference | |
| documents used by uniformed personnel to conduct maintenance. Doing so | |
| would reduce the dependence on Action Requests currently experienced by | |
| fielded units to complete actions not clearly addressed in JTD, or to | |
| fix faults which are not yet addressed or covered by JTD. | |
| 4. Deliver the planned capabilities of ALIS through ALIS 3.0 by the | |
| end of SDD. Functions such as propulsion data and life-limited parts | |
| management are expected to improve the overall utility of ALIS and | |
| streamline post-mission maintenance processes. | |
| 5. Improve the accuracy of the Prognostic Health Management (PHM) | |
| system by reducing the number of false alarms reported after each | |
| flight. PHM is designed to automatically detect faults in the aircraft | |
| and alert maintenance personnel to take corrective actions. Unit | |
| maintenance personnel spend a sizable amount of maintenance time | |
| confirming there is no fault when one is reported, including time | |
| clearing known ``nuisance'' faults in the maintenance logs within ALIS. | |
| Mr. Turner. Your latest report indicates that it is premature to | |
| commit to a block buy for the F-35 program. However, the Department | |
| does have the potential to benefit in cost savings from such an | |
| approach. a. Please discuss the risks that you see in such a | |
| commitment. b. Given that a block buy was not requested in fiscal year | |
| 2017, do you believe the Department would be in a better position to | |
| commit to a block buy in fiscal year 2018? Please discuss why or why | |
| not and at what point you feel a commitment would be warranted. | |
| Dr. Gilmore. a. As stated in my annual report, committing to a | |
| block buy prior to completing the Initial Operational Test and | |
| Evaluation (IOT&E) may cause the Department and the partners | |
| participating in the block buy to: | |
| 1. Commit to aircraft that may require corrections to significant | |
| deficiencies discovered during IOT&E before they can be used in combat, | |
| particularly with the expected capabilities from Block 3F. | |
| 2. Commit to large numbers of aircraft in a configuration that may | |
| need modifications to reach full combat capability and full service | |
| life. | |
| 3. Lose the needed incentives to the contractor and the Program | |
| Office to correct an already substantial list of deficiencies in | |
| performance, a list that will only lengthen as Block 3F testing | |
| continues and IOT&E is conducted. | |
| 4. Commit to an acquisition strategy that is not consistent with | |
| the ``fly before you buy'' approach to defense acquisition that many in | |
| the Administration have supported and is not consistent with the intent | |
| of Title 10 U.S. Code, which stipulates that IOT&E must be completed | |
| and a report on its results provided to Congress before committing to | |
| Full-Rate Production--a commitment that some could argue would be made | |
| by executing the ``block buy. | |
| b. My understanding is that the program and the Services have | |
| decided to delay the consideration of the block buy for at least | |
| another year, possibly starting in FY18. Nonetheless, even if the | |
| proposed block buy is delayed to FY18, all of the risks I identified | |
| previously remain valid, since IOT&E will not start until FY18, at the | |
| earliest, and will likely not be complete until FY19. The Department | |
| should not commit to a block buy until after IOT&E is complete and the | |
| decision to do so can be informed by the results of the planned, | |
| dedicated, operational testing. | |
| Mr. Turner. In your statement, you highlight similarities of the F- | |
| 22 modernization program and the current F-35 modernization program. | |
| Can you discuss some of these similarities and the risks involved with | |
| the Department's current approach to managing the F-35 modernization | |
| program? | |
| Mr. Sullivan. Our experience with the F-22 highlighted that | |
| managing modernization programs of this magnitude under an existing | |
| baseline hinders transparency. In March 2005, we found that the Air | |
| Force was managing its multi-billion dollar F-22 modernization efforts | |
| as part of the program's baseline and had not established a separate | |
| knowledge-based business case.\1\ As a result, the F-22 baseline and | |
| schedule were adjusted to reflect the new timeframes and additional | |
| costs, comingling the funding and some content for the baseline | |
| development and modernization efforts--some content that had not been | |
| achieved under the baseline program were deferred into the | |
| modernization program. When the content, scope, and phasing of | |
| modernization capabilities changed over time, it appeared that the F-22 | |
| program was fraught with new schedule delays and further cost overruns. | |
| The comingling of modernization efforts with the existing baseline | |
| reduced transparency and Congress could not readily distinguish the new | |
| costs associated with modernization funding from cost growth in the | |
| original baseline. We recommended that the Air Force structure and | |
| manage F-22 modernization as a separate acquisition program with its | |
| own business case--matching requirements with resources--and | |
| acquisition program baseline. Eventually, the department separated the | |
| F-22 modernization program from the baseline program with a Milestone B | |
| review, in line with our recommendation, which increased transparency | |
| and better facilitated oversight. | |
| --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| \1\ GAO, Tactical Aircraft: Air Force Still Needs Business Case to | |
| Support F/A-22 Quantities and Increased Capabilities, GAO-05-304 | |
| (Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2005). | |
| --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| The F-35 Block 4 modernization effort is much larger than the F-22 | |
| modernization effort. DOD expects Block 4 modernization to develop and | |
| deliver 80 new capabilities and 17 weapons that were not part of the | |
| program's original acquisition baseline, compared to 8 new capabilities | |
| and 3 weapons for the F-22 modernization effort. In its fiscal year | |
| 2017 budget request, DOD has identified the need for nearly $3 billion | |
| over the next 6 years for development of the new capabilities. If Block | |
| 4 is managed as a distinct program with a separate baseline, it would | |
| be easier for Congress and DOD decision makers to track program- | |
| specific cost and schedule progress. A hypothetical $1 billion cost | |
| increase in Block 4 illustrates the difference in cost reporting and | |
| oversight. While a $1 billion cost increase is significant, it would | |
| represent growth of less than 1 percent if tracked against the current | |
| F-35 program baseline--currently about $400 billion. That same cost | |
| increase, if tracked against the $3 billion funding estimate reflected | |
| in DOD's budget request for Block 4, would be more visible, | |
| representing a 33 percent cost increase. The department has the | |
| opportunity to apply lessons learned from the F-22 modernization effort | |
| to the F-35 Block 4 program. | |
| Mr. Turner. In this testimony as well as in the past, you have | |
| consistently raised long-term affordability as a key area of risk. | |
| Please explain why you continue to believe that affordability is a | |
| risk. In your opinion, has the program addressed this risk? | |
| Mr. Sullivan. Affordability continues to be a concern because of | |
| the sheer magnitude of the funding needs for this one program. For | |
| example, the F-35 program will require more than $14 billion a year on | |
| average for a decade. Affordability challenges will compound as the F- | |
| 35 program competes with other large acquisition programs including the | |
| long range strike bomber and KC-46A Tanker. At the same time, the | |
| number of operational F-35 aircraft that DOD will have to support will | |
| be increasing. The total cost to operate and support the F-35 fleet is | |
| still estimated to be more than $1 trillion. In recent years, | |
| affordability challenges, in part, have forced the Air Force to defer | |
| F-35 aircraft procurements to later years. Since 2014, the Air Force | |
| deferred 45 aircraft between 2017 and 2021 to later years. This will | |
| likely require the military service to make unplanned investments in | |
| extending the service life of their current fighter aircraft. The cost | |
| of extending the lives of current fighter aircraft and acquiring other | |
| major weapon systems, while continuing to produce and field new F-35 | |
| aircraft, poses significant affordability risks in a period of austere | |
| defense budgets. | |
| Mr. Turner. Your statement mentioned that the program is making | |
| progress in testing, but that the most complex testing still remains. | |
| What do you see as the major risks in completing the remaining | |
| developmental test program? | |
| Mr. Sullivan. Although early software blocks (Block 2A through 3i) | |
| have completed testing, risks remain with the completion of Block 3F | |
| mission systems software testing. These risks center on the complexity | |
| of Block 3F, software issues, and the completion of a number of weapons | |
| accuracy events that have proven to be difficult in the past. Block 3F | |
| is the F-35's full warfighting capability and consists of challenging | |
| testing given the complexity of the missions and the stressing | |
| environments that are required. The program continues to experience | |
| problems with some mission system software functions shutting down and | |
| restarting during flight testing. Officials believed they had | |
| identified a fix at the end of 2015 and program officials plan to | |
| continue addressing the issue during 2016 in order to meet the Air | |
| Force initial operational capability in August 2016. There are also | |
| concerns about the tight timeframes to conduct the 55 weapons accuracy | |
| events that remain--30 of which are related to a gun. As of December | |
| 2015, the program had completed 17 weapons events many of which were | |
| delayed by months due to software deficiencies and fleet groundings. | |
| Program officials are analyzing the remaining test schedule to identify | |
| potential efficiencies in their weapons test plan. Any delays in | |
| developmental testing could pose risk to the timely start of initial | |
| operational test and evaluation, currently planned for December 2017. | |
| Mr. Turner. The committee is concerned about meeting the U.S. Air | |
| Force's IOC requirements later this year. The Chief of Staff of the | |
| United States Air Force, General Mark Welsh, recently summarized two | |
| risks related to reaching Air Force F-35A IOC later this year (Aug-Dec | |
| time frame), the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS), and | |
| aircraft software stability. a. Do you agree with General Welsh's | |
| assessment? b. Please tell us where you are with the ALIS development, | |
| its challenges, and what lies ahead to meet the Air Force initial | |
| operational capability? c. Characterize for us the software challenges, | |
| the approach you are taking to address them, as well as the timing to | |
| get this resolved for the warfighters? d. Finally, please share with us | |
| the progress you are making to get the Air Force combat ready with its | |
| F-35s later this year. | |
| General Bogdan. a) At the time United States Air Force Chief of | |
| Staff General Welsh made this remark, his assessment was spot on. These | |
| were the two biggest risks my team was working. Fortunately since that | |
| time, the software issue has been resolved. | |
| b) The ALIS software development to support AF IOC is complete and | |
| this version of the ALIS system is currently in the Integration and | |
| Test Phase. We are finding defects that are taking longer than planned | |
| to fix which is delaying our test events. In this version, we are | |
| integrating the F-135 Pratt & Whitney (P&W) engine management | |
| capabilities into ALIS for the first time. The ALIS system will be | |
| connected to the P&W enterprise supply and maintenance systems. This is | |
| a complex effort and we will take the time necessary to ensure we get | |
| it right. We are working through these issues and expect its resolution | |
| before the AF IOC threshold date of 31 December 2016. | |
| c) The F-35 had been experiencing some timing communications issues | |
| between the sensors and the aircraft main operating computer causing | |
| the system to reset. However, after much lab and flight testing to get | |
| to root causes, the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) has completed | |
| development of the Block 3i software the AF will use to declare IOC | |
| this year. The Block 3i software provides F-35s with initial | |
| warfighting capability on upgraded computer hardware. As of 1 May, the | |
| F-35 program has flown more than 100 flight hours with the 3i software | |
| and it has shown approximately twice the level of stability as the | |
| previously fielded Block 2B software and three times better stability | |
| than the original 3i software. The JPO began upgrading the F-35 fleet | |
| (Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) Lots 6-8 aircraft) with 3i software | |
| the week of 9 May. The same stability and mission effectiveness | |
| enhancements have also been incorporated into a new version of Block 2B | |
| software, for the benefit of earlier fleet aircraft. The new version of | |
| 2B software will be used to start upgrading LRIP Lots 2-5 aircraft by | |
| the end of May. The entire fleet of fielded F-35 aircraft will | |
| eventually be upgraded to these two new software versions by the end of | |
| calendar year 2016. | |
| d) In addition to resolving the software stability, the newest | |
| software also includes fixes to deficiencies that the USAF deemed | |
| ``must-fix'' prior to IOC and also includes the Generation III helmet | |
| which has improved night sensor video processing and optics above the | |
| Generation II helmet. Other IOC needs are Mission Data Files (MDFs), | |
| training simulators, spares and support equipment, aircraft and | |
| training. Three developmental versions of MDFs to support USAF IOC have | |
| been delivered to Hill Air Force Base (AFB) in Utah to aid in its IOC | |
| preparations. Currently, we project two of the operational MDFs to | |
| deliver in early August 2016 and the remaining two to deliver in | |
| September 2016. We are working to pull all four MDFs further left in | |
| the schedule. All required training simulators have been delivered to | |
| Hill AFB. Sufficient support equipment and spares are forecasted to be | |
| in place to support IOC declaration. Twelve jets have already been | |
| delivered to Hill AFB and by July have 12 jets completed with all | |
| required modifications. For ALIS, we've already delivered (March 2016) | |
| the necessary hardware to Hill AFB that will support USAF IOC. | |
| Additionally, we've developed a training plan with USAF that provides | |
| multiple opportunities to review the new capabilities, train on those | |
| capabilities and ultimately receive ``hands-on'' experience with the | |
| new software prior to delivery at Hill AFB to support the AF IOC | |
| decision. | |
| Mr. Turner. The President's Budget request includes provisions to | |
| leverage economies of scale for a block buy contract. a. Please share | |
| with the committee what the benefits are of a block procurement | |
| strategy. b. Do these benefits also include the engine? c. Could you | |
| implement this sooner if we advance the President's proposal to FY17? | |
| And in your response, please let us know where the F-35 International | |
| Partners are with this and their view of the timing. d. If the | |
| International Partners elect to proceed with Block Buy economies of | |
| scale investments in FY17, and the United States waits until FY18, | |
| could this result in the U.S. Services paying a higher procurement | |
| price for the same F-35? e. If granted block buy authority, what would | |
| be your strategy to mitigate risks to the United States if the U.S. | |
| Services reduced or deferred their procurement quantities, similar to | |
| the five-aircraft reduction included in the current budget request for | |
| the U.S. Air Force? | |
| General Bogdan. a) The F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) believes a | |
| Block Buy Contract (BBC) approach has the potential to save real money | |
| on this program. A BBC would achieve significant program cost savings | |
| by allowing the contractors to utilize Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) | |
| purchases, enabling suppliers to maximize production economies of scale | |
| through batch orders. To substantiate the potential savings of a BBC | |
| concept, the F-35 Joint Program Office contracted with RAND Project Air | |
| Force, a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC), to | |
| conduct an independent assessment. RAND's assessment, delivered in | |
| March 2016, indicated that savings on the order of $2.5 to $3.0 billion | |
| can be achieved by providing a total of 4 percent EOQ funding to | |
| selected suppliers. b) Yes, overall BBC savings includes the propulsion | |
| system. EOQ will be provided to engine suppliers that offer the best | |
| return on EOQ funding. c) The JPO is ready to implement a BBC sooner if | |
| Congress includes the language and EOQ funding in FY17. Almost all F-35 | |
| International Partners expressed they would follow the U.S. in such a | |
| BBC, while most may elect to begin in FY17 even if the U.S. starts in | |
| FY18. d) At this time, RAND is evaluating this hybrid option for the | |
| JPO; however if the F-35 International Partners follow this strategy | |
| and begin a year earlier than the U.S., the cost of an International | |
| Partner F-35 could be lower than one sold to the US Services. e) It is | |
| important to guard against year-to-year adjustments to the budget; | |
| therefore, the F-35 JPO will structure the contract using a variable- | |
| quantity matrix as a tool to accommodate year-to-year adjustments | |
| should they occur, regardless if they are due to a downward budget | |
| adjustment or to address an increase to the quantities coming from the | |
| International Partners, Congressional adds, or through Foreign Military | |
| Sales. | |
| Mr. Turner. The President's Budget request includes $290 million in | |
| FY17 for F-35 Follow-on Modernization Block 4. What is your strategy to | |
| structure the F-35 Follow-on Modernization so it provides the most | |
| efficient use of tax payers' dollars while at the same time providing | |
| the maximum amount of transparency to the Congress to support our | |
| oversight responsibilities? | |
| General Bogdan. The F-35 Lightning II Joint Program is committed | |
| 100% to ensuring the Follow-on Modernization (FoM) effort is as lean as | |
| possible so that the output--capability to our warfighters--is | |
| maximized. This will not be System Development and Demonstration (SDD) | |
| all over again but a smaller effort with a smaller footprint. We | |
| believe the F-35 FoM program should not be designated a separate Major | |
| Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) but should be sub-program to the | |
| existing F-35 program. The JPO estimates the documentation and | |
| approvals necessary to establish and start a new program will cost | |
| between $10 million and $13 million and delay execution of FoM six to | |
| twelve months. | |
| The JPO will place FoM on a separate contract, establish a separate | |
| program baseline and require cost, schedule, and performance metrics-- | |
| to include Earned Value Management metrics and Nunn-McCurdy criteria-- | |
| on this separate FoM baseline. This contract structure will allow the | |
| JPO, Defense Contract Audit Agency and you the Congress and your staffs | |
| to have full insight into its costs, performance, and earned value--all | |
| the tools necessary for you to perform your oversight function. We are | |
| completely receptive to adding your specific reporting requirements | |
| that you believe are necessary. The JPO has no intent to ``bury'' the | |
| FoM program within the larger F-35 program to avoid performance | |
| monitoring and oversight--we just want to avoid unnecessary and costly | |
| effort. We can assure this openness and believe it is achievable | |
| without characterizing it as a new program, as some have recommended. | |
| Mr. Turner. When you appeared before this committee last fall we | |
| heard a lot about the pilot escape system. You testified that there are | |
| three things you are pursuing to address the light-weight pilot | |
| restriction. Briefly summarize the problem and the fixes that you're | |
| developing. More importantly, let us know the status of the fixes and | |
| when can we expect to see them so the pilot restriction can be lifted? | |
| General Bogdan. The F-35 pilot escape system is designed to be | |
| superior to legacy systems. The system provides reduced ejection | |
| stresses on the pilot and accommodates the widest range pilot sizes and | |
| weights (103 to 245 lbs). | |
| Lightweight Pilot Restriction: In August 2015, the U.S. Services | |
| and International Partners restricted F-35 lightweight pilots (weighing | |
| less than 136 lbs) from operating the F-35 after tests to qualify safe | |
| escape with an F-35 Generation (Gen) III helmet at low speed ejections | |
| indicated the potential for increased risk of neck injury for | |
| lightweight pilots due to forces experienced on the pilot's head. | |
| Solutions: There are three technical solutions that when in place | |
| will reduce the risk of neck injury to all pilots and will eliminate | |
| the restriction. All three are planned to be ready by the end of 2016, | |
| clearing the way for the U.S. Services and International Partners to | |
| lift the F-35 lightweight pilot restriction. These solutions include: | |
| 1. A head support panel between the parachute risers. This eliminates | |
| the possibility of the head/helmet going between the parachute risers | |
| in low speed ejections. 2. A pilot-selectable switch to delay parachute | |
| deployment for lighter weight pilots. This 0.5 second delay will | |
| reduce parachute opening shock and neck loads during the parachute | |
| deployment phase of the ejection. 3. A lighter Gen III pilot helmet. | |
| This will reduce neck loads during all phases of ejection (catapult, | |
| windblast, drogue, and parachute deployment). | |
| Mr. Turner. As the F-35 program continues to field aircraft and the | |
| number of F-35 sites increase, there is a concern that the ALIS global | |
| network will become more vulnerable. What efforts are you pursuing to | |
| protect the ALIS global network from nefarious activities and other | |
| network disruptions such as those caused by natural disasters? | |
| General Bogdan. We are continuing to implement the necessary | |
| Information Assurance controls and testing required by the Department | |
| and the individual Services to allow Autonomic Logistics Information | |
| System (ALIS) to be connected to the US Air Force, US Marine Corps, and | |
| US Navy networks. Second, the Joint Operational Test Team (JOTT) is now | |
| performing Cyber Testing on the ALIS system and will continue this over | |
| the next year and a half. This testing will inform us of any | |
| deficiencies that may require mitigation. And finally, we have | |
| contracted for backup hardware for key elements of the ALIS system that | |
| we will be installing later this year in different geographic areas. | |
| This effort will eliminate single points of failure and mitigate risks | |
| from natural disasters. | |
| Mr. Turner. Last year, the Fiscal Year 2016 NDAA included a | |
| provision that asked for assurances that Block 3F software is on the | |
| right course and will be in F-35A aircraft delivered during fiscal year | |
| 2018. | |
| a. Can you elaborate on this and share with us what capabilities | |
| are in the Block 3F software? b. What is the status of Block 3F | |
| development and what risks and mitigations are you managing to deliver | |
| this capability? | |
| General Bogdan. a) The Senate included this provision to prevent | |
| the significant ramp up in annual F-35A procurement rate unless the F- | |
| 35A aircraft hardware and software were mature enough to minimize costs | |
| for retrofits should aircraft continue to be delivered without the full | |
| capability. In this regard, the Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) Lots | |
| 9 and 10 aircraft delivered after 1 October 2017 (start of FY18) have | |
| an extremely low risk of retrofit costs because the full Block 3F | |
| mission software will be inherent with all LRIP 9 aircraft by May 2017. | |
| Block 3F includes the Tech Refresh 2 suite of hardware, coupled with | |
| software functionality that enables or enhances several F 35A mission | |
| areas. Block 3F incorporates advanced tactical avionics and opens the | |
| full flight envelope for the F-35. Block 3F weapons for the F 35A will | |
| include the GAU-22 internal 25-millimeter gun system, internally- | |
| carried AIM-120C Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles, GBU 31 | |
| Joint Direct Attack Munitions, GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bombs, GBU-12 | |
| Paveway II laser guided bombs, and externally-carried AIM-9X Sidewinder | |
| missiles. | |
| b) The program plans to deliver the first F-35A (LRIP 9 procured | |
| with FY15 funds) with Block 3F hardware and software in August 2017 | |
| with the full Block 3F capability minus the ability to use the AIM-9X | |
| weapon until the airworthiness and engineering communities clear the | |
| capability for use. We expect this AIM-9X capability to be released in | |
| September 2017. It will provide the full Block 3F combat capability of | |
| the F-35A, in advance of the first F-35A delivery in FY18. However, | |
| there is some schedule risk to meeting this full Block 3F capability as | |
| a result of delays in improving Block 3i and Block 3F software | |
| stability, which delayed the start of Block 3F flight testing. The | |
| program is taking concrete steps to mitigate this schedule risk | |
| including: committing all software development activities to Block 3F, | |
| condensing software release cycles, increasing software maturity prior | |
| to release from the lab, surging manpower and material resources, and | |
| deploying to high-capacity flight test ranges. We are confident we will | |
| be able to mitigate this schedule risk. | |
| Mr. Turner. As more and more F-35 aircraft are produced and enter | |
| operational use, there is a concern if we have everything in place to | |
| provide for their continued support. Are we providing adequate levels | |
| of spare parts across all the F-35 variants, or is there an imbalance | |
| between aircraft quantities and spare parts procurement along with | |
| other aspects of support. What are the impacts? | |
| General Bogdan. Sustaining the fleet especially our operational | |
| units is a top priority for the F-35 team and we will continue to | |
| ensure it remains as such. Spares are essential to keeping sortie rates | |
| up and we will do everything we can to keep our operational units flush | |
| with spares. There are three things that have impacted spares: 1) a | |
| prior year underfunding, 2) a downward congressional mark (e.g., $380M | |
| reduction to aircraft support per 2016 Consolidated Appropriations Act) | |
| and, 3) upward congressional aircraft procurement quantities (e.g., +11 | |
| aircraft per 2016 Consolidated Appropriations Act). The combination of | |
| these requires us to rebalance our spares pools to support scheduled | |
| 2017 deployments but adds risks to home base F-35 operations resulting | |
| in higher supply downtime, decreased aircraft readiness levels and poor | |
| contingency availability. | |
| Mr. Turner. GAO and others continue to raise concerns about the | |
| long term affordability of the F-35 acquisition program, noting that as | |
| procurement ramps up over the next 5 years, annual funding requests are | |
| projected to increase significantly. By 2022 it is projected to reach | |
| between $14 and $15 billion and stay at that level for a decade. At the | |
| same time other high profile DOD programs will be competing for funds, | |
| including the KC-46A Tanker, new bomber, and the Ohio class submarine | |
| replacement. a. What are the key factors driving the current F-35 | |
| procurement plans-production rate levels and funding levels? b. Given | |
| Federal budget constraints and the competition for funding within DOD, | |
| do you believe that sustained annual funding of that magnitude is going | |
| to be achievable? Has the Department considered different procurement | |
| options, and if so, what has been considered? Are there any viable | |
| alternatives if the current plan is not affordable? | |
| Secretary Stackley. The key factors driving the Department's | |
| procurement plans-production rate levels and fiscal decisions include | |
| the F-35 Program's progress and fiscal constraints as the Navy | |
| considers competing priorities for annual resources. Since the program | |
| was re-baselined in 2012, following the Nunn-McCurdy unit cost critical | |
| breach in 2010, the development costs have remained stable. The costs | |
| required to complete the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) | |
| phase are tracking to what was budgeted for in 2011. Production costs | |
| continue to decrease with each production lot. Unit cost reductions are | |
| in line with projections and allowing for procurement quantity changes. | |
| The F-35 Program is tracking to meet the unit costs targets that were | |
| established when Milestone B was re-certified in 2012. | |
| The sustained funding requirements are certainly a priority for the | |
| Department. The F-35B and F-35C are much needed replacements for legacy | |
| platforms that have well outlived their expected service life. The AV- | |
| 8B and F/A-18A-D fleet of aircraft were originally designed as 6,000- | |
| hour airframes. The Department has successfully enabled flight beyond | |
| the designed services lives, but continued modernization and | |
| sustainment is a fiscal challenge. Moreover, warfighting requirements | |
| demand a fifth generation aircraft to counter the expanding threat | |
| environment. Consequently, the Department considers the F-35 Program a | |
| critical node in Naval Aviation warfighting requirements and | |
| prioritizes funding accordingly. | |
| The Department is also considering a number of options in | |
| resourcing competing priorities. Given the fiscal and strategic | |
| implications for the Department of Defense as a whole, the Under | |
| Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics is | |
| examining the long-term health and viability of the TACAIR industrial | |
| base in depth. This study includes affordability as a primary objective | |
| in evaluating the TACAIR procurement plans. | |
| Mr. Turner. A year ago, the Navy deferred nearly 20 aircraft to the | |
| out-years. The latest Presidential Budget request shows that the Navy | |
| appears to be moving some of those same aircraft into the near-term and | |
| at the same time buying more F-18s. a. What is the rationale for these | |
| constant changes? b. How will this address the current fighter | |
| shortfall? | |
| Secretary Stackley The 2017 President's Budget submission | |
| represents a comprehensive approach to close growing gaps in Naval | |
| Aviation warfighting capacity and capability. The Department has | |
| committed to a balanced objective of sustainment, modernization and | |
| procurement across the strike fighter force. If resourced as requested, | |
| the plan will integrate fifth generation capabilities to meet the | |
| expanding adversary threat, continue modernization of the current fleet | |
| to maintain warfighting relevance and sustain strike fighter capacity | |
| to meet anticipated operational commitments into the future. | |
| The 2017 President's Budget request addresses all facets of Strike | |
| Fighter Inventory Management. In the near-term, sustainment investments | |
| are targeted at maximizing F/A-18A-D availability. The Navy has | |
| harmonized critical readiness accounts to target repair requirements | |
| which will ultimately continue to increase depot throughput to meet | |
| operational demand. In the mid-term, investments are targeted at | |
| decreasing F/A-18E/F service life extension risk to sustain inventory | |
| capacity into the 2030's. Targeted investments accelerate the F/A-18E/F | |
| Service Life Assessment Program and procure additional aircraft to | |
| ensure inventory capacity and pipeline aircraft availability during the | |
| process. In the far-term, the Department has focused on overmatching | |
| the expanding adversary threat with the integration of fifth generation | |
| capabilities. An additional ten F-35C aircraft over the Future Years | |
| Defense Program, relative to the 2016 President's Budget request, will | |
| assure capacity to meet warfighting requirements. | |
| Mr. Turner. Regarding the prospect of a block buy, do you believe | |
| the program is in a position to capitalize on economies of scale | |
| beginning in FY17 if the Congress provided the authority? | |
| Secretary Stackley The Department supports a future Block Buy | |
| Contract (BBC) to capitalize on economies of scale. A BBC would achieve | |
| significant savings by allowing the contractors to utilize Economic | |
| Order Quantities (EOQ) purchases, enabling suppliers to maximize | |
| production economies of scale through batch orders. An independent | |
| assessment by RAND Project Air Force, a Federally Funded Research and | |
| Development Center (FFRDC), indicates potential BBC savings between | |
| $2.5B and $3.0B over three Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) lots | |
| starting in Lot 12. The cost savings from a BBC have been factored into | |
| the procurement cost savings in the F-35 Fiscal Year 2015 Selected | |
| Acquisition Report (SAR 2015). | |
| As the Department is exploring the possibility of a block buy, the | |
| F-35 International Partners and FMS customers are already considering a | |
| three-year BBC beginning with production Lot 12 (FY18), which requires | |
| EOQ funding in FY17. The risk of entering into a BBC in Lot 12 is low. | |
| By the time it is necessary to commit to a BBC in Lot 12, many aspects | |
| of the Program will be stable, including completion of durability | |
| testing, 98 percent completion of all hardware qualification, | |
| completion of majority of 3F software and weapons delivery testing, | |
| stable production processes and ramp-up. | |
| ______ | |
| QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. DUCKWORTH | |
| Ms. Duckworth. Why is the program office including follow-on | |
| modernization efforts (Block 4 upgrades) within the base F-35 | |
| acquisition program? Is there a quantifiable benefit to not treat the | |
| Block 4 upgrades as a separate major development and acquisition | |
| program? | |
| General Bogdan. We estimate the documentation and approvals | |
| necessary to establish and start a new program Major Defense | |
| Acquisition Program (MDAP) will cost between $10 million and $13 | |
| million and delay execution of Follow-on Modernization (FoM) six to | |
| twelve months. The F-35 Lightning II Joint Program is committed 100% to | |
| ensuring the FoM effort is as lean as possible so that the output-- | |
| capability to our warfighters--is maximized. | |
| The JPO will place FoM on a separate contract, establish a separate | |
| program baseline and require cost, schedule, and performance metrics-- | |
| to include Earned Value Management metrics and Nunn-McCurdy criteria-- | |
| on this separate FoM baseline. This contract structure will allow the | |
| JPO, Defense Contract Audit Agency and you the Congress and your staffs | |
| to have full insight into its costs, performance, and earned value--all | |
| the tools necessary for you to perform your oversight function. We are | |
| completely receptive to adding your specific reporting requirements | |
| that you believe are necessary. The JPO has no intent to ``bury'' the | |
| FoM program within the larger F-35 program to avoid performance | |
| monitoring and oversight--we just want to avoid unnecessary and costly | |
| effort. We can assure this openness and believe it is achievable | |
| without characterizing it as a new program. | |
| ______ | |
| QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JONES | |
| Mr. Jones. What is the total cost of the F-35 program from its | |
| inception through FY 2016? | |
| Dr. Gilmore. Program costs are officially reported in the Selected | |
| Acquisition Reports (SAR), formally submitted by the Department. | |
| According to the December 2015 SAR for the F-35 (as of the FY 2017 | |
| President's Budget), released in March, 2016, the ``Appropriation | |
| Summary'' table on page 28 shows that the total cost of the F-35 | |
| program from inception through FY 2016 is $111,219.4M or $111.2B. | |
| Mr. Jones. What is the total cost of the F-35 program from its | |
| inception through the President's Budget request for FY2017? | |
| Dr. Gilmore. Program costs are officially reported in the Selected | |
| Acquisition Reports, formally submitted by the Department. The | |
| following answer is from the December 2015 SAR for the F-35 (as of the | |
| FY 2017 President's Budget), released in March, 2016. Per the | |
| ``Appropriation Summary'' table on page 28, the total cost of the F-35 | |
| program from inception through FY 2017 is $121,931M or $121.9B. | |
| Mr. Jones. What is the total cost of the F-35 program from its | |
| inception through FY 2016? | |
| Mr. Sullivan. By the end of fiscal year 2016, DOD will have | |
| invested a total of $59.02 billion in F-35 development and procurement. | |
| When the F-35 development program began in 2001 DOD estimated the total | |
| acquisition cost to be $233 billion (then-year). As of December 2015, | |
| the total program acquisition cost estimate had increased to $379 | |
| billion (then-year), an increase of 62 percent. | |
| Mr. Jones. What is the total cost of the F-35 program from its | |
| inception through the President's budget request for FY2017? | |
| Mr. Sullivan. The total investment in F-35 development and | |
| procurement from program inception through the end of fiscal year 2017 | |
| will be $69.14 billion, based on DOD's fiscal year 2017 budget request. | |
| Mr. Jones. What is the total cost of the F-35 program from its | |
| inception through FY 2016? | |
| General Bogdan and Secretary Stackley. $127.5B | |
| Appropriated through Fiscal Year (FY) 2016: Below reflects the | |
| total cost of the F-35 program from inception through FY16 to include | |
| United States Air Force (USAF), United States Marine Corps (USMC), | |
| United States Navy (USN) and the International Partners. System | |
| Development and Demonstration (SDD) includes Pre-SDD and International | |
| Partner contributions. Military Construction funds are not executed out | |
| of the Joint Program Office but are shown for completeness. | |
| The USMC declared Initial Operational Capability (IOC) with its F- | |
| 35Bs in July 2015 and USAF IOC is scheduled between 1 August and 31 | |
| December 2016. The F-35 program completed Block 2B and Block 3i | |
| software. Block 3F software is now in Developmental Flight Test. The | |
| program completed Italian, Australian, and Dutch tanker aerial | |
| refueling flight test. Overall, the F-35 Fleet has over 51,000 flight | |
| hours and we recently completed the second trans-Atlantic flight in an | |
| F-35. The Fleet consist of 184 operational and test aircraft, and the | |
| program has procured a total of 203 US and International aircraft | |
| through Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) Lot 8 and will contract for | |
| an additional 52 and 91 in LRIP Lots 9 and 10, respectively, by end of | |
| 3rd quarter FY16. | |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| FY94-FY16 | |
| Program / Appropriation FY94-FY16 US $M International $M Total $M | |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| System Development and Demonstration 48,182 5,205 53,387 | |
| Defense Wide (1994-1998) 118 0 118 | |
| Deployability and Suitability 287 57 344 | |
| Follow-on Modernization 167 51 218 | |
| Procurement 55,879 14,303 70,182 | |
| Other Procurement Navy 33 0 33 | |
| Operations and Maintenance 1,482 0 1,482 | |
| Military Construction 1,782 0 1,782 | |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| Total 107,930 19,616 127,546 | |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| Mr. Jones. What is the total cost of the F-35 program from its | |
| inception through the President's budget request for FY2017? | |
| General Bogdan and Secretary Stackley. $144.7B | |
| Appropriated through Fiscal Year (FY) 2017: Below reflects the | |
| total cost of the F-35 program from inception through FY17 to include | |
| United States Air Force (USAF), United States Marine Corps (USMC), | |
| United States Navy (USN) and the International Partners. System | |
| Development and Demonstration (SDD) includes Pre-SDD and International | |
| Partner contributions. Military Construction funds are not executed out | |
| of the Joint Program Office but are shown for completeness. | |
| During FY17, the program will complete Block 3F Verification and | |
| Mission Effectiveness Testing and begin Block 3F introduction to F-35A. | |
| Also, the program will transition to leaner Follow-on Modernization for | |
| developing and delivering enhanced capability. The program will procure | |
| 63 aircraft for the US Services as part of Low Rate Initial Production | |
| (LRIP) Lot 11 and we will continue to build the Global Sustainment | |
| Posture in order to best deliver the required cost and performance | |
| outcomes. | |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| FY94-FY17 | |
| Program / Appropriation FY94-FY17 US $M International $M Total $M | |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| System Development and Demonstration 49,596 5,227 54,823 | |
| Defense Wide (1994-1998) 118 0 118 | |
| Deployability and Suitability 383 67 450 | |
| Follow-on Modernization 458 178 636 | |
| Procurement 64,582 19,712 84,294 | |
| Other Procurement Navy 36 0 36 | |
| Operations and Maintenance 2,155 0 2,155 | |
| Military Construction 2,354 0 2,354 | |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| Total 119,682 25,184 144,866 | |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| [all] | |
| </pre></body></html> | |