Datasets:

gtfintechlab
/

CoCoHD_transcripts

	<html>
	<title> - [H.A.S.C. No. 114-115]THE FISCAL YEAR 2017 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE</title>
	<body><pre>
	[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
	[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


	[H.A.S.C. No. 114-115]
	_____________________________________________________________________

	HEARING

	ON

	NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

	FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017

	AND

	OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

	BEFORE THE

	COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

	HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

	ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

	SECOND SESSION
	_____________


	FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

	ON

	THE FISCAL YEAR 2017 NATIONAL

	DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET

	REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT

	OF DEFENSE

	________________

	HEARING HELD

	MARCH 22, 2016


	[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

	__________________


	U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
	20-067 WASHINGTON : 2017

	______________________________________________________________________


	COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES


	One Hundred Fourteenth Congress

	WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman

	WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina ADAM SMITH, Washington
	J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
	JEFF MILLER, Florida ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
	JOE WILSON, South Carolina SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
	FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
	ROB BISHOP, Utah RICK LARSEN, Washington
	MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JIM COOPER, Tennessee
	JOHN KLINE, Minnesota MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
	MIKE ROGERS, Alabama JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
	TRENT FRANKS, Arizona NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
	BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania JOHN GARAMENDI, California
	K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
	DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado Georgia
	ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia JACKIE SPEIER, California
	DUNCAN HUNTER, California JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
	JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
	MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado SCOTT H. PETERS, California
	CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
	VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
	JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
	AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
	MO BROOKS, Alabama DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
	RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
	PAUL COOK, California MARK TAKAI, Hawaii
	JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma GWEN GRAHAM, Florida
	BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska
	JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
	BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama PETE AGUILAR, California
	SAM GRAVES, Missouri
	RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana
	ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
	MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona
	STEPHEN KNIGHT, California
	THOMAS MacARTHUR, New Jersey
	STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma

	Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
	Kari Bingen, Professional Staff Member
	William S. Johnson, Counsel
	Britton Burkett, Clerk

	C O N T E N T S

	----------
	Page

	STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

	Davis, Hon. Susan A., a Representative from California, Committee
	on Armed Services.............................................. 3
	Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas,
	Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.......................... 1

	WITNESSES

	Carter, Hon. Ashton B., Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of
	Defense; accompanied by Hon. Mike McCord, Under Secretary of
	Defense (Comptroller) and Chief Financial Officer, U.S.
	Department of Defense.......................................... 4
	Dunford, Gen Joseph F., Jr., USMC, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
	Staff.......................................................... 9

	APPENDIX

	Prepared Statements:

	Carter, Hon. Ashton B........................................ 67
	Dunford, Gen Joseph F., Jr................................... 104
	Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
	Member, Committee on Armed Services........................ 65

	Documents Submitted for the Record:

	[There were no Documents submitted.]

	Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

	Ms. Bordallo................................................. 123

	Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

	Mr. Coffman.................................................. 128
	Ms. Duckworth................................................ 129
	Mr. Lamborn.................................................. 127
	Ms. Speier................................................... 127
	Mr. Takai.................................................... 129


	THE FISCAL YEAR 2017 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM
	THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

	----------

	House of Representatives,
	Committee on Armed Services,
	Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 22, 2016.
	The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room
	2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ``Mac''
	Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding.

	OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A
	REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
	SERVICES

	The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
	The committee meets today to receive testimony from the
	Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
	Staff on the national defense authorization budget request from
	the administration.
	Like last year, the committee has spent a number of weeks
	hearing from our military leaders, the Intelligence Community,
	and outside witnesses before asking the Secretary to testify on
	the current budget request. What we have heard over these weeks
	reaffirmed the fact that the U.S. faces a wider range of
	serious threats than at any time in our history.
	The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA] told
	our committee that, quote: ``The world is far more complicated;
	it is far more destabilized; it is far more complex than at any
	time I have seen it.''
	Currently serving senior commanders have described the
	ability of the military we rely upon to face those threats as,
	quote, ``minimally adequate.'' Aviation units in the Marine
	Corps cannot meet training and mission requirements. With less
	than a third of Army forces at acceptable levels of readiness,
	the Army is not at a level that is appropriate for what the
	American people would expect to defend them. Those were quotes
	as well.
	Another is, less than half of the Air Force combat units
	are ready for a high-end fight. It is the smallest, oldest, and
	least-ready force across the full spectrum of operations in our
	history. Those snippets of testimony across the services is
	remarkably consistent, candid, and disturbing. Indeed, my own
	visits with service members recently leads me to suspect that
	even these assessments don't tell the whole story.
	We often discuss readiness, but it is a vague term without
	concrete meaning for a lot of Americans. Recently, I have heard
	firsthand from service members who have looked me in the eye
	and told of trying to cannibalize parts from a museum aircraft
	in order to get a current aircraft ready to fly an overseas
	mission; of getting aircraft that were sent to the boneyard in
	Arizona back and revitalized in order to fly missions; of
	pilots who were flying well below the minimum number of hours
	required for minimal proficiency and flying fewer training
	hours than those of adversaries that they were sent to meet.
	I have heard of not having enough senior enlisted people to
	train and supervise the younger ones, and those who remain
	working longer and longer hours. And I have even heard
	firsthand from service members who have to buy basic supplies
	like pins and cleaning supplies and paper towels out of their
	own pocket, because if they go through the military process, it
	will take 3 or 4 months, and for them, it is just not worth it.
	I expressed concern last week that there is a rise in class A
	mishaps, which may be another indicator of a readiness crisis.
	Last year, General Dempsey testified that the fiscal year
	2016 funding request was the lower, ragged edge that was
	necessary to execute the defense strategy and that we have no
	slack, no margin left for error or strategic surprise. Yet the
	budget request from the administration this year is $18 billion
	lower on meeting those basic requirement minimums, and it is
	less than the budget agreement of last December.
	It seems clear that the same strategy we assumed would have
	us out of Iraq and Afghanistan, where Russia would be a friend
	thanks to the reset, and where terrorism was confined to the JV
	[junior varsity] teams, does not continue to be valid. That is
	also the same strategy that has led us to cut troops,
	equipment, training, and bases.
	Both Congress and the administration are responsible for
	this state of affairs. Over the last 5 years, the President and
	Congress have cut over half a trillion dollars from defense,
	and these cuts come at a cost. It has increased risk that our
	troops will be killed or captured, that a mission will fail, or
	that we will lose a fight.
	What our hearings over these last few weeks have shown is
	that this risk is real, and there is evidence to prove it is
	growing. The military is strained to a breaking point. Our
	witnesses today are in a unique position to help our political
	leadership and the American people understand the state of
	affairs, and I would say we would all be derelict in our duty
	if we tried to sweep it under the rug.
	On a final note, this morning the news brought us, again,
	stories of tragedy in a terrorist attack in Europe. The
	administration's budget request asks for more money to fight
	ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] in Iraq and Syria, and I
	think that is understandable and appropriate.
	What I do not understand is that the law required the
	administration provide Congress a written document laying out
	its strategy to fight ISIS. That document was due February 15,
	2016. We have received nothing, and there is no indication that
	anything is on the way.
	The world is growing more dangerous. We have cut our
	military too much, and I believe it is up to the political
	leadership in this country to take the action necessary to
	enable our service men and women to defend American lives and
	American interests. The men and women who serve and the Nation
	deserve better than we are now.
	I yield to the distinguished gentlelady of California, as
	the acting ranking member today, for any comments she would
	like to make.
	Mrs. Davis. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	I ask unanimous consent that the ranking member's statement
	be entered into the record.
	The Chairman. Without objection.
	[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
	Appendix on page 65.]

	STATEMENT OF HON. SUSAN A. DAVIS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
	CALIFORNIA, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

	Mrs. Davis. Over the last several weeks, we have received
	testimony from combatant commanders, from our service chiefs,
	from service secretaries. And they all have given us their best
	military advice, and it could not be more clear: the threats,
	as the chairman has noted, we face are real and growing.
	Just this morning, attacks in Brussels claimed at least 26
	lives, and dozens were injured. Our hearts certainly go out to
	the Belgian people as they recover from this horrific act of
	violence.
	Secretary Carter, you have emphasized that the President's
	budget request centers on five key challenges: Deterring
	aggressive behavior on the part of a resurgent Russia and a
	rising China; containing the dangerous unpredictable North
	Korean regime; neutralizing Iran's malign influence; and
	defeating ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] and other
	manifestations of violent extremism.
	Unfortunately, in the midst of these challenges, we are
	searching for budget workarounds instead of fixing the
	underlying problem. The Department of Defense [DOD] needs
	fiscal certainty to reliably perform critical missions and to
	maintain lasting superiority.
	Secretary Carter, you have asserted that the fiscal year
	2017 shortfall risk can be mitigated but that DOD needs a
	comprehensive long-term budgetary solution. We must remember
	the devastating harms inflicted by sequestration in the Budget
	Control Act caps. Years of budgetary standoffs leading to
	numerous threatened government shutdowns, one actual government
	shutdown, and congressional overreliance on continuing
	resolutions have combined to produce debilitating fiscal
	uncertainty.
	Although it is unclear whether the House will pass a budget
	resolution this year, the resolution passed last week by the
	House Budget Committee raises more questions than it answers.
	The committee-passed resolution is nominally BBA [Bipartisan
	Budget Act] compliant, but it would offer a net increase of
	roughly $18 billion to the defense base budget. It would do so
	by assuming that $23 billion of overseas contingency
	operations--what we call OCO funding--would be used for base
	budget purposes, but it would not increase the BBA top line of
	$74 million for OCO funding.
	My first question is, which OCO beneficiary would end up
	paying the bill in this shuffle? Would the money come from the
	portion requested for DOD, that is, the warfighter? Would it
	come from the State Department, which also receives OCO funding
	to perform vital functions in contingency operations? Or would
	it come from both?
	Chairman Price's budget resolution also poses another open-
	ended question. It appears to allow the chairman of the House
	Budget Committee to adjust OCO funding levels going forward on
	the basis of new information, which means that, at some point,
	supplemental OCO funding could be used to circumvent BBA
	funding levels.
	The DOD, the Congress, has to make hard choices, especially
	when it comes to balancing force modernization with the very,
	very critical need that the chairman addressed: to sustain
	readiness. Would these issues become harder or easier if near-
	term OCO needs are supplemented by longer-term base budget
	requirements in fiscal year 2017? How would the DOD prioritize
	its needs if OCO funding levels are reduced within the BBA top
	line?
	And, most importantly, what poses the greatest risk to
	national security, providing funding for base budget
	requirements at the level requested by the President or
	providing funding for near-term OCO requirements at least
	initially at levels lower than requested? We need to carefully
	consider Chairman Price's proposal and every other potential
	adjustment to the defense budget as we work to build this
	year's defense authorization bill.
	We must also give the Department additional flexibility to
	reduce excess infrastructure and overhead, to phase out old
	platforms, and to adjust the healthcare and benefit structure.
	The President came to us with a budget that focuses on adapting
	to the threats that we face today and also one that follows the
	law by conforming to the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015,
	including approximately $582.7 billion in discretionary budget
	authority for the Department of Defense. So, now, we must
	uphold our end of the deal in Congress.
	Thank you all for being here today. I look forward to your
	testimony.
	And thank you again, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
	The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady.
	The committee is pleased to welcome today the Honorable
	Ashton B. Carter, the Secretary of Defense; General Joseph
	Dunford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; as well as
	the Honorable Mike McCord, the Comptroller and Chief Financial
	Officer [CFO] of the Department.
	Gentlemen, again, welcome to the committee. Without
	objection, your full written statements will be made part of
	the record.
	And Mr. Secretary, you are recognized for any comments you
	would like to offer.

	STATEMENT OF HON. ASHTON B. CARTER, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S.
	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY HON. MIKE McCORD, UNDER
	SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER) AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER,
	U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

	Secretary Carter. Thank you very much, Chairman Thornberry.
	Congresswoman Davis, thank you.
	Thanks, all the members of the committee. Thank you for
	hosting me here today.
	I want to begin by condemning this morning's bombings in
	Belgium. Our thoughts and our prayers are with those affected
	by this tragedy, the victims, their families, and survivors.
	And in the face of these acts of terrorism, the United States
	stands in strong solidarity with our ally Belgium. We are
	continuing to monitor the situation, including to ensure that
	all U.S. personnel and citizens are accounted for. We also
	stand ready to provide assistance to our friends and allies in
	Europe, as necessary.
	Brussels is an international city that has been host to
	NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and to the European
	Union [EU] for decades. Together, we must and we will continue
	to do everything we can to protect our homelands and defeat
	terrorists wherever they threaten us. No attack--no attack--
	will affect our resolve to accelerate the defeat of ISIL. I
	will have more to say about this later in the testimony.
	Thank you again for hosting me today and for steadfastly
	supporting DOD's men and women all over the world, military and
	civilian, who serve and defend us. I am pleased to be here with
	Chairman Dunford, Under Secretary McCord, to discuss President
	Obama's 2017 defense budget, which marks a major inflection
	point for the Department of Defense.
	As I will describe in detail, the threat from terrorism is
	one of the five challenges, as has been noted, that the United
	States now faces and will in the future. In this budget, we are
	taking the long view. We have to, because even as we fight
	today's fights, we must also be prepared for what might come
	10, 20, or 30 years down the road.
	Last fall's Bipartisan Budget Act gave us some much-needed
	stability after years of gridlock and turbulence. And I want to
	thank you and your colleagues for coming together to help pass
	it. That budget deal set the size of our budget, and with this
	degree of certainty, we focused on its shape, changing that
	shape in fundamental but carefully considered ways to adjust to
	a new strategic era and to seize opportunities for the future.
	Let me describe the strategic assessment that drove our
	budget decisions. First of all, it is evident that America is
	still today the world's foremost leader, partner, and
	underwriter of stability and security in every region of the
	world, as we have been since World War II. That is thanks in
	large part to the unequivocal strength of the U.S. military.
	And as we continue to fulfill this enduring role, it is
	also evident that we are entering a new strategic era. Today's
	security environment is dramatically different from the last 25
	years, requiring new ways of investing and operating. Five
	evolving strategic challenges--namely, Russia, China, North
	Korea, Iran, and terrorism--are now driving DOD's planning and
	budgeting, as reflected in this budget.
	I want to focus first on our ongoing fight against
	terrorism and especially ISIL, which as the attacks in Belgium
	today again remind us, we must and will deal a lasting defeat,
	most immediately in its parent tumor in Iraq and Syria but also
	where it is metastasizing, and all the while we are continuing
	to help protect our own homeland.
	Let me give you a quick snapshot of what we are doing to
	pressure and destroy ISIL's parent tumor in Iraq and Syria. In
	Iraq, with our support, the Iraqi Security Forces retook Ramadi
	and are now reclaiming further ground in Anbar Province and are
	simultaneously shifting the weight of their effort towards
	Mosul in the north.
	With our advice and assistance, Iraqi and Kurdish security
	forces have begun the shaping and isolation phase of the
	operation to collapse ISIL's control over Mosul. That was the
	mission Marine Staff Sergeant Louis Cardin was supporting when
	he gave his life over the weekend providing critical protection
	to Iraqi forces and coalition military advisers in northern
	Iraq. Our thoughts and prayers are with his family and with the
	other Marines injured in Saturday's rocket attack. Their
	sacrifice will not be forgotten, and our global coalition will
	complete the mission they were supporting.
	In Syria, capable and motivated local forces supported by
	the United States in our global coalition have retaken the east
	Syrian town of Shaddadi. This town served as an important
	logistical and financial hub for ISIL and a key intersection
	between its Syria and Iraq operations. In fact, Shaddadi was so
	important to ISIL that its so-called minister of war was
	involved in ISIL's defense of the town. We killed him while our
	local partners expelled ISIL from the town. In doing so, the
	coalition campaign severed the last major northern artery
	between Raqqa and Mosul and, therefore, between ISIL and Syria
	and ISIL and Iraq. And we are intent on further isolating and
	pressuring ISIL, including by cutting off its remaining lines
	of communication in southern Syria and into Turkey.
	In addition to local forces we are working with, 90 percent
	of our military and coalition partners from Europe, the Gulf,
	Asia, 26 countries in all, including, by the way, our ally
	Belgium, have committed to increase their contributions to help
	accelerate the defeat of ISIL.
	We have increased strikes on ISIL-held cash depots, oil
	revenues, and sites associated with its ambitions to develop
	and use chemical weapons. And we are addressing ISIL's
	metastases as well, having conducted targeted strikes against
	ISIL in Libya and Afghanistan. As we are accelerating our
	overall counter-ISIL campaign, we are backing it up with
	increased funding for 2017, as the chairman already noted,
	requesting 50 percent more than last year.
	Now, before I continue, I want to say a few words about
	Russia's role in this. Russia said it was coming into Syria to
	fight ISIL, but that is not what it did. Instead, their
	military has only prolonged the civil war, propped up Assad,
	and as of now, we haven't seen whether Russia has retained
	leverage over Assad to facilitate a diplomatic way forward,
	which is what the Syrian people need.
	One thing is clear, though: Russia's entry into Syria
	didn't impact our campaign against ISIL. Along with our
	coalition partners, we are intensifying our campaign against
	ISIL in both Iraq and Syria and will continue to do so until
	ISIL is dealt a lasting defeat.
	Two of the other four challenges reflect a return in some
	ways to great superpower competition. One is in Europe, where
	we are taking a strong and balanced approach to deter Russian
	aggression. We haven't had to devote a significant portion of
	our defense investment to this possibility for nearly a quarter
	century, but now we do.
	The other challenge is in the Asia-Pacific, where China is
	rising, which is fine, but behaving aggressively, which is not.
	There, we are continuing our rebalance to the region to
	maintain the stability we have underwritten for the past 70
	years, enabling so many nations to rise and prosper in this,
	the single most consequential region for America's future.
	Meanwhile, two other longstanding challenges pose threats
	in specific regions: North Korea is one. That is why our forces
	on the Korean Peninsula remain ready, as they say, to fight
	tonight; the other is Iran, because while the nuclear accord is
	a good deal for preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon,
	we must still deter Iranian aggression and counter Iran's
	malign influence against our regional friends and allies,
	especially Israel, to which we maintain an unwavering and
	unbreakable commitment.
	Now, addressing all of these five challenges requires new
	investments on our part, new posture in some regions, and also
	new and enhanced capabilities. For example, we know we must
	deal with these challenges across all domains and not just the
	usual air, land, and sea, but also especially in cyber,
	electronic warfare, and space, where our reliance on technology
	has given us great strengths and great opportunities but also
	led to vulnerabilities that our adversaries are eager to
	exploit.
	Key to our approach is being able to deter our most
	advanced competitors. We must have and we seem to have the
	ability to ensure that anyone who starts a conflict with us
	will regret doing so. In our budget, our capabilities, our
	readiness, and our actions, we must and will be prepared for a
	high-end enemy, what we call full spectrum.
	In this context, Russia and China are our most stressing
	competitors, as they have both developed and continue to
	advance military systems that seek to threaten our advantages
	in specific areas. We see them in the South China Sea and in
	Crimea and in Syria as well. In some cases, they are developing
	weapons and ways of war that seek to achieve their objectives
	rapidly before they think we can respond. Because of this, DOD
	has elevated their importance in our planning and budgeting.
	In my written testimony, I have detailed how our budget
	makes critical investments to help us better address these five
	evolving challenges. We are strengthening our deterrence
	posture in Europe by investing $3.4 billion for our European
	Reassurance Initiative [ERI], quadruple what we requested last
	year.
	We are prioritizing training and readiness for our ground
	forces, a very important matter emphasized very appropriately
	by the chairman, and reinvigorating the readiness and
	modernization of our fighter aircraft fleet. We are investing
	in innovative capabilities, like the B-21 Long Range Strike
	Bomber, micro-drone, and the arsenal plane, as well as advanced
	munitions of all sorts.
	In our Navy, we are emphasizing not just increasing the
	number of ships, which we are doing, but especially their
	lethality, with new weapons and high-end ships, and extending
	our commanding lead in undersea warfare, with new investments
	in unmanned undersea vehicles, for example, and more submarines
	with the versatile Virginia Payload Module that triples their
	strike capacity from 12 Tomahawks to 40.
	And we are doing more in cyber, electronic warfare, and
	space, investing in these three domains a combined total of $34
	billion in 2017. Among other things, this will help us build
	our cyber mission force, develop next-generation electronic
	jammers, and prepare for the possibility of a conflict that
	extends into space. In short, DOD will keep ensuring our
	dominance in all domains.
	As we do this, our budget also seizes opportunities for the
	future. That is a responsibility I have to all my successors,
	to ensure the military and the Defense Department they inherit
	is just as strong, if not stronger, than the one I have the
	privilege of leading today.
	That is why we are making increased investments in science
	and technology, innovating operationally, and building new
	bridges to the amazing American innovative system, as we always
	have, to stay ahead of future threats. That is why we are
	building what I have called the force of the future, because as
	good as our technology is, it is nothing compared to our
	people.
	And in the future, we must continue to recruit and retain
	the very best talent. Competing for good people, for an All-
	Volunteer Force, is a critical part of our military edge, and
	everyone should understand this need and my commitment to
	meeting it.
	And because we owe it to America's taxpayers to spend our
	defense dollars as wisely and responsibly as possible, we are
	also pushing for needed reforms across the DOD enterprise, and
	we need your help with all of them. From further reducing
	overhead and excess infrastructure, to modernizing and
	simplifying TRICARE, to proposing new changes to the Goldwater-
	Nichols Act that defines much of our institutional
	organization, as I intend to do shortly, to continuously
	improving acquisitions.
	And on that subject, I want to commend this committee, and
	especially its leaders, for your continued dedication and
	strong partnership with DOD on acquisition reform. We have
	already taken important strides here, such as last year's
	reforms to reduce redundant reporting requirements and
	documentation. And as you are looking to do more, so are we.
	Chairman Thornberry, I know you laid out new proposals on
	this last week. Some of what you are proposing would save us
	critical time in staying ahead of emerging threats. That is
	very important, and we appreciate that. It is extremely
	helpful.
	And I know this is just a draft, and I appreciate that you
	put it out there for discussion. In that regard, I have to say
	that, in the current draft, there are some things that are
	problematic for us, so I am also hopeful that we can continue
	to work with you on your proposals to ensure that DOD has the
	flexibility needed to apply the principles in your work to
	addressing all the diverse acquisition challenges we have to
	solve for our warfighters.
	I appreciate your willingness to hear our ideas as well,
	including ways to make it easier for program managers to do
	their jobs, and involving the service chiefs more in
	acquisition decisionmaking and accountability. And I look
	forward to working together as we have before.
	Let me close on the broader shift reflected in this budget.
	The Defense Department doesn't have the luxury of just one
	opponent or the choice between fights, between future fights
	and current fights. We have to do it all. That is what this
	budget is designed to do, and we need your help to succeed.
	I thank this committee again for supporting the Bipartisan
	Budget Act that set the size of our budget. Our submission
	focuses on the budget shape, making changes that are necessary
	and consequential. We hope you approve it.
	I know some may be looking at the difference between what
	we indicated last year we would be asking for and what the
	budget deal gave us: a net total of about $11 billion less is
	provided by the Bipartisan Budget Act out of a total of almost
	$600 billion. But I want to reiterate that we have mitigated
	that difference and that this budget meets our needs.
	The budget deal was a good deal. It gave us stability. We
	are grateful for that. Our greatest risk, DOD's greatest risk
	is losing that stability this year and having uncertainty and
	sequester return in future years. That is why, going forward,
	the biggest budget priority for us strategically is Congress
	averting the return of sequestration to prevent what would be
	$100 billion in looming automatic cuts so that we can maintain
	stability and sustain all these critical investments I have
	been speaking of.
	We have seen this before, and that same support coming
	together is essential today to address the security challenges
	we face and to seize the opportunities within our grasp. As
	long as we work together to do so, I know our national security
	will be on the right path and America's military will continue
	to defend our country and help make a better world for
	generations to come.
	Thank you.
	[The prepared statement of Secretary Carter can be found in
	the Appendix on page 67.]
	The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
	General Dunford.

	STATEMENT OF GEN JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC, CHAIRMAN, JOINT
	CHIEFS OF STAFF

	General Dunford. Chairman Thornberry, Congresswoman Davis,
	distinguished members of the committee, good morning and thanks
	for the opportunity to join Secretary Carter and Secretary
	McCord in appearing before you.
	I would like to begin by echoing Secretary Carter's
	comments on the loss of Staff Sergeant Cardin; his family, the
	eight other Marines who were injured this weekend, and the
	victims of this morning's attack in Brussels are in our
	thoughts and prayers.
	I am honored to represent the extraordinary men and women
	of the joint force. Our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and
	civil servants remain our single most important competitive
	advantage. And thanks to your support, the United States
	military is the most capable fighting force in the world.
	I don't believe we should ever send Americans into a fair
	fight. Rather, we must maintain a joint force that has the
	capability and credibility to assure our allies and partners,
	deter aggression, and overmatch any potential adversary. This
	requires us to continually improve our joint warfighting
	capabilities, restore full-spectrum readiness, and develop the
	leaders who will serve as the foundation for the future.
	The United States is now confronted with challenges from
	both traditional state actors and non-state actors. The
	Department has identified five strategic challenges, and
	Secretary Carter has outlined those. Russia, China, Iran, and
	North Korea continue to invest in military capabilities that
	reduce our competitive advantage.
	They are also advancing their interests through competition
	with a military dimension that falls short of traditional armed
	conflict and the threshold for traditional military response.
	Examples include Russian actions in Ukraine, Chinese activities
	in the South China Sea, and Iran's malign influence across the
	Middle East.
	At the same time, non-state actors, such as ISIL and Al
	Qaeda, pose a threat to the homeland, the American people, our
	partners, and our allies. Given the opportunity, such extremist
	groups would fundamentally change our way of life. As we
	contend with the Department's five strategic challenges, we
	recognize that successful execution of our defense strategy
	requires that we maintain credible nuclear and conventional
	capabilities.
	Our strategic nuclear deterrent remains effective, but it
	is aging and requires modernization. Therefore, we are
	prioritizing investments needed for a safe, secure, and
	effective nuclear deterrent. We are also making investments to
	maintain a competitive advantage in conventional capabilities,
	and we must further develop capabilities in vital and
	increasingly contested domains of space and cyber space.
	As the joint force acts to mitigate and respond to
	challenges, we do so in the context of a fiscal environment
	that has hampered our ability to plan and allocate resources
	most effectively. Despite partial relief by Congress from
	sequester-level funding, the Department has absorbed $800
	billion in cuts and faces an additional $100 billion of
	sequestration-induced risk through fiscal year 2021.
	Absorbing significant cuts over the past 5 years has
	resulted in our underinvesting in critical capabilities. And
	unless we reverse sequestration, we will be unable to execute
	the current defense strategy and specifically to address the
	challenges that Secretary Carter outlined in his remarks.
	The fiscal year 2017 budget begins to address the most
	critical investments required to maintain our competitive
	advantage. To the extent possible, within the resources
	provided by the 2015 Bipartisan Budget Act, it addresses the
	Department's five challenges. It does so by balancing three
	major areas: investment in high-end capabilities; the
	capability and capacity to meet our current operational
	demands; and the need to rebuild readiness after an extended
	period of war. In the years ahead, we will need adequate
	funding levels and predictability to fully recover from over a
	decade at war and delayed modernization.
	A bow wave of procurement requirements in the future
	include the Ohio-class replacement, continued cyber and space
	investments, and the Long Range Strike Bomber. It will also be
	several years before we fully restore full-spectrum readiness
	across the services and replenish our stocks of critical
	precision munitions. And I know the committee has heard from
	the service chiefs on the specifics of that readiness recovery.
	In summary, I am satisfied that the fiscal year 2017 budget
	puts us on the right trajectory, but it will take your
	continued support to ensure the joint force has the depth,
	flexibility, readiness, and responsiveness that ensures our men
	and women never face a fair fight.
	Once again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before
	you this morning, and I look forward to your questions.
	[The prepared statement of General Dunford can be found in
	the Appendix on page 104.]
	The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
	Mr. McCord, I understand you do not have an oral statement.
	Is that correct?
	Secretary McCord. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
	The Chairman. I appreciate you being here today as well.
	Mr. Secretary, I think you are exactly right to condemn the
	attacks in Brussels, and you are exactly right to express
	sympathy for the victims. I think the question especially for
	this committee but for the American people is, okay, what are
	we going to do about it?
	And in last year's bill, section 1222 asked the
	administration to provide a strategy for how we were actually
	going to implement the President's stated desire to degrade and
	destroy ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]. And as I
	mentioned, it has been radio silent. We have heard not a word
	from anybody.
	Now, to be fair, it is not just a matter for the Department
	of Defense. It is not just the military who will defeat ISIS,
	and the requirement in law was not just directed to the
	Department of Defense. But do you have any idea when we might
	see a strategy on how to beat ISIS?
	Secretary Carter. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	And you are right: the Brussels attacks reinforce our need
	to accelerate the defeat of ISIL. We have a strategy for doing
	so. I will describe it in a moment. The strategy document, the
	strategy report you are asking for, its delivery is imminent.
	It is a DOD-plus-others document, and we will get that to you.
	But the strategy in brief is this, and then I will connect
	it to the Brussels attacks. I was describing the campaign in
	Iraq and Syria, which we are accelerating, and, Mr. Chairman
	and members, we are looking for more opportunities to do so. We
	found opportunities. I expect us to find more opportunities in
	the future.
	We want to accelerate the defeat of ISIL in Iraq and Syria.
	Why? Because that is what I call the parent tumor of the
	cancer. That is where it started. And if we can expel ISIL from
	Raqqa and Mosul, that will show that there is no such thing as
	an Islamic State based upon this ideology. So that is
	necessary, but it is not sufficient.
	We also need to destroy ISIL in the places to which it has
	metastasized around the world. And to get to the Brussels
	attack, that reminds us--and the report will also, by the way--
	that important as the military effort is, essential as it is
	and committed as we are to that in the Department of Defense,
	the Chairman and I and everybody else, it is necessary, but it
	is not sufficient.
	We need the intelligence. We need the homeland security. We
	need the law enforcement. And so do our partners because of the
	kind of thing you saw in Brussels this morning. So we have the
	strategy. We will produce the strategy--the report based on
	that. We need your help.
	And in that connection, finally, if I just may add a note,
	Mr. Chairman, an appeal, we have before this committee and
	three other committees some reprogramming requests that are
	relevant to our ability to carry out the campaign in both Iraq
	and Syria.
	And, as you know, according to the rules, if we are going
	to do a reprogramming, we have to ask the permission of this
	committee and three other committees. We have done so. So far,
	we have gotten different answers from everybody, which is fair
	enough, but if you can help us, we need to get across the
	finish line quickly. We have got to be agile in the defeat of
	ISIL, and that means we need to be agile in this matter of
	reprogramming as well. I appreciate your help in that regard.
	Let me ask the Chairman if he wants to add anything about
	the overall strategy.
	The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, on the reprogramming, I think
	all of us would feel better about a reprogramming if we knew
	what direction we were going, which is why in last year's bill,
	the request was: Okay, tell us how you are going to do this.
	And then, as you want to move money around and a variety of
	other things, I am sure there will be lots of support. But
	until there is some sort of coherent direction on how we are
	going to beat these guys, then I think it is harder to have
	that conversation.
	Let me just ask you one other thing because I know other
	members will want to continue to explore that topic. You were
	exactly right, as was Chairman Dunford, in expressing sympathy
	for the loss of the marine over the weekend.
	I am getting an increasing number of questions about the
	troop cap levels, which exist in both Iraq and Afghanistan,
	because, as I understand it, there are some people who are
	subject to the troop caps, and then there are some people who
	rotate in for a short amount of time that are not subject to
	the troop caps.
	And the argument is that if you are rotating people in
	every 30 days, or whatever it is, to keep below the troop caps,
	then the people who are rotating in are not going to have time
	to get acclimated to the environment and may be at increased
	risk. The other argument I have heard is that when you have
	these artificial troop caps, you don't bring in the force
	protection that you would in other situations where you are not
	subject to those troop caps.
	So, I guess, my question to you is, do you believe there is
	reason to be concerned that these artificial troop caps in Iraq
	and in Afghanistan lead to increased risk for our service
	members?
	Secretary Carter. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
	First of all, with respect to the troop cap numbers, there
	has been no change in that regard, and you are right: people
	who are temporarily assigned--and this has been true for here
	and in Afghanistan for some time--they, under the caps, are
	counted differently, as you well know. And I can't go into it
	in detail here, where each and every unit is, but we do provide
	that to the committee and so you can have that, not in this
	setting.
	But to get to the substance of what you said about
	everybody--I will get the Chairman to comment on this too--
	everybody that is in Iraq is properly trained for the mission,
	that included the Marines there. And to force protection, that
	was, in fact, their mission.
	What they were doing was helping to protect the staging
	area near Makhmur, where we are and our coalition partners are
	helping the Iraqi Security Forces, some of the brigades that
	will constitute the envelopment force of Mosul. So that is part
	of the preparation for operations against Mosul, and precisely
	what they were doing was protecting that position.
	That was a necessary task. We are very sorry about the loss
	of this member in accomplishing that necessary task, but it was
	necessary because we needed to position them there. And these
	Iraqi Security Forces, who in the end will be the force that
	both takes and holds Mosul, they need to be trained, and they
	need to be positioned near Makhmur. That is what was going on
	there.
	Let me ask the Chairman if he wants to add anything.
	General Dunford. Mr. Chairman, to your specific question
	about have we compromised force protection or other critical
	capabilities as a result of the force cap, I can tell you we
	haven't done that. And I have routinely engaged Lieutenant
	General McFarland and commanders on the ground and asked them,
	is there something else you need? In fact, I will see General
	McFarland again this afternoon, have the same conversation with
	him.
	To date, we haven't had any requests that we have gone to
	the President with--and this is now over the last several
	months--for capabilities that has been denied. We are in the
	process right now of bringing forward recommendations for
	increased capability as a result of operations in Mosul, Raqqa,
	and elsewhere, so we can maintain a momentum and accelerate the
	campaign.
	But at this time, Chairman, I don't have concerns that we
	have not put forces on the ground that have impacted either our
	force protection, CASEVAC [casualty evacuation] capability, or
	any of those things. We build a force from the bottom up with
	those in mind.
	The Chairman. Well, I appreciate that, General.
	To me, it makes no sense to put artificial troop caps in
	any place. The question is, what does it take to do the
	mission? And I know, just as I trust you to continue to follow
	this question, it is something that the committee wants to
	continue to follow as well.
	Last question. General, you heard some of my comments
	earlier about the readiness issues. Let me just offer a handful
	of other quotes on the record. General Neller said our aviation
	units are currently unable to meet our training and mission
	requirements primarily due to ready basic aircraft shortfalls.
	General Milley and General Allen have testified, less than
	one-third of Army forces are at acceptable levels of readiness.
	The readiness of the United States Army is not at a level that
	is appropriate for what the American people would expect to
	defend them.
	Last week, Secretary James: Less than half our combat
	forces are ready for a high-end fight. And she later said: The
	Air Force is the smallest, oldest, and least-ready force across
	the full spectrum of operations in our history.
	Do you agree that we have a significant readiness problem
	across the services, especially for the wide variety of
	contingencies that we have got to face?
	General Dunford. Mr. Chairman, I do. And I think those are
	accurate reflections of the force as a whole.
	From my perspective, there are really three issues: there
	are the resources necessary to address the readiness issue;
	there is time; and then there is the operational tempo. And the
	readiness challenges that we are experiencing right now are
	really a result of several years of unstable fiscal environment
	as well as extraordinarily high operational tempo. And it is
	going to take us some years to get out of the trough that we
	are in right now.
	What I am satisfied with in this year's budget, fiscal year
	2017, is that we have met the requirements from a fiscal
	perspective that the services have identified for readiness. In
	other words, we can't buy our way out of the problem in fiscal
	year 2017 with more money because of the aspect of time and
	operational tempo.
	I think the service chiefs probably also identified to you,
	Mr. Chairman, and the committee, that in the case of the Army,
	the Navy, and the Marine Corps, it will be sometime around
	fiscal year 2020 before they address their current readiness
	challenges. And the Air Force is projecting horizon as late as
	fiscal year 2028 before they come out of the challenge.
	And part of that is, again, operational tempo and resources
	and time. And some of it is what you saw in your recent visit
	down in the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing where depot-level
	maintenance has been backlogged. What you saw in the Marine
	Corps, I think, reflects in some part what you will see in all
	the services, perhaps not to the same degree as Marine
	aviation, but that same dynamic exists in each one of the
	services and reflects in the comments that you heard before the
	committee.
	The Chairman. I will just say, I think it is important for
	us and for you all to continue to not only watch this issue but
	really understand down deeper what is happening. Statistics are
	one thing, but you talk to these folks eyeball to eyeball and
	the sense of frustration and concern is very evident.
	Thank you for your answers. I yield to Mrs. Davis.
	Mrs. Davis. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Again, thank you both for your extraordinary service to our
	country.
	I wanted to go back for a second to the questions that I
	raised in the opening statement because I think we grapple with
	that here. And I know that we are going to be talking about OCO
	funding down the line, overseas contingency, and the Bipartisan
	Budget Act as well.
	You stated, as you just did, equipment is one thing but
	well-trained personnel and leadership are quite another, and
	the latter do take time. And so we need to work this as best we
	can. In the statement I offered, what you have said quite, I
	think, clearly, that modernization and readiness of our force
	structure is where your tradeoffs are going in the budget
	process. And I am wondering, would the Department's tradeoff
	choices become harder or easier if OCO needs are supplemented
	by base budget requirements within bipartisan budget compliant
	top line? Is that helpful? What poses the greatest risk really
	to our national security, providing funding for base budget
	requirements at the level requested by the President or
	providing funding for near-term OCO requirements at least
	initially at levels lower than requested?
	One of the things that I was just going to say, Mr.
	Secretary, that I know you have said so well here is that under
	the best of all possible worlds, we would be funding the base
	budget at the level that we need, including OCO for very
	specific oversea contingencies. But that is not exactly where
	we are right now. And we have to be certain that other budget
	requirements, whether it is in the homeland security, whether
	it is in--wherever that may be are also working well within our
	budget as we move forward.
	Secretary Carter. Well, you are right: generally speaking,
	the base and the OCO budgets have different managerial
	purposes. The base budget is for things that are enduring,
	meeting enduring requirements, and OCO is for the variable
	costs associated with urgent ongoing operations. That is still
	largely true, but it is not completely true.
	And to get to your question, one of the ways that we were
	able to mitigate the difference between what we last year
	planned in our 2017 budget and what the bipartisan budget
	agreement provided us, was to use some OCO, about $5 billion
	net. And that is one of the things that bought down that risk
	associated with that difference, but it is only one way that we
	did that.
	We also benefitted, by the way, from fuel costs, different
	inflation indices than we expected. And what we did with the
	remaining--to get to your point of what do we do to accommodate
	the Bipartisan Budget Act, that $11 billion change, we took it
	out of some procurement accounts, some aircraft, and some
	smaller programs. We took it out of MILCON [military
	construction].
	Let me tell you what we didn't do to accommodate that
	difference between the BBA and what we planned on last year. We
	didn't take it out of military compensation, any of our service
	members' compensation. We didn't take it out of readiness, out
	of the readiness recovery plans that the Chairman has referred
	to. We didn't take it out of any of our major acquisition
	programs, stop any of them, break any multiyear contracts. And
	we didn't change any of our end-strength numbers, targets, as a
	result of that.
	So that is how we accommodated the $11 billion, and that is
	the reason why the Chairman and I say, that part we managed to
	mitigate and bring forward a budget that meets our needs. Our
	worry is in the future and with the $100 billion cuts that we
	face. And wherever they come from in the accounting, that is
	the biggest strategic risk to us.
	Mrs. Davis. General Dunford, did you want to----
	General Dunford. Congresswoman, the thing I would probably
	add is, you talked about modernization over force structure.
	And, frankly, this year, as we focused on capability
	enhancements, it was really as a result of 3 or 4 years of not
	addressing those and realizing that we were losing our
	competitive advantage against the peer competitors that I
	mentioned, the Russias, the Chinas, and even in this case of
	North Korea and Iran.
	And we knew, were we not to make those capability
	investments this year, if you look out 3 to 4 or 5 years, we
	would not be where we needed to be. So, from my perspective, it
	isn't so much force structure over modernization; it is trying
	to get within the top line that we have the right balance
	between force structure and capability in today's force, with
	sufficient investment in tomorrow's force to make sure that the
	force that we have today that I am proudly able to say is the
	best in the world is the best in the world in 2021 and 2022.
	And that is why I think the Secretary directed us this year
	to make a slight course and speed correction in terms of how we
	were investing our funds to get better balance between today's
	fight and tomorrow's fight.
	Mrs. Davis. Yeah. And I think, Mr. McCord, as well, I think
	what may be understandable in terms of the defense budget isn't
	necessarily understandable to folks that are looking at their
	budgets in other departments, and that is partly where the rub
	comes.
	Secretary McCord. I think that is correct, Mrs. Davis.
	And just one point on your earlier question. To get a
	marginal maybe increase in OCO this year without knowing if we
	could count on it in the future is pretty sub-optimal for us in
	terms of being able to plan and use that money as effectively
	as we might. If we knew that the requirement would be taken
	care of permanently, that is much better for us.
	Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	The Chairman. Thank you.
	Mr. Jones.
	Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
	Mr. Secretary, I am going to take you in a different
	direction, totally different subject. I want to personally
	thank you and especially thank Secretary Robert Work. I spent
	13 years of my life trying to clear the names of two Marine
	pilots who crashed a V-22 Osprey in Marana, Arizona, on April 8
	of the year 2000.
	Secretary Carter, I want to thank Secretary Work publicly
	because he did something that I could not get the Marine Corps
	to do, and that is to look openly and evaluate the information
	that we had put together working with experts. Many of those
	were Marine pilots themselves. There were aeronautical
	engineers who came to the aid of saying that at the time, if
	you remember, that Secretary of Defense Cheney wanted to scrap
	the V-22 program. There was a lot of pressure. There was a lot
	of push by the Marine Corps to make sure that the V-22 was
	their plane for the future.
	When I reached out and found Secretary Work, he spent the
	time to meet with me and spent several hours, days, researching
	all the information that we had put together. A team of experts
	helped me to put it together. And then he came back with his
	evaluation that the record needed to be corrected, that it was
	unfair to Colonel John Brow, pilot, and Major Brooks Gruber,
	copilot, whose wife brought this to my attention in the year
	2002.
	And I want to say today that you have brought peace--
	Secretary Work and you--have brought peace to the families of
	John Brow and Brooks Gruber. And I believe sincerely that John
	Brow and Brooks Gruber are now resting in their graves, and
	they are resting peacefully because of what you and Secretary
	Work have done.
	This has gotten national attention. And I have talked to
	Trish Brow, and I have talked to Connie Gruber. They are
	hearing from marines who are now retired. They are hearing from
	friends from years passed who have said ``Hallelujah'' that now
	the truth is known and those two pilots will not take the blame
	for what was unfair at the time of the accident.
	So I want to thank you publicly and thank Deputy Secretary
	Robert Work, because the truth is now known that they were not
	responsible for that accident. It was a combination of many,
	many factors. So I will give you a chance to respond, and then
	I will yield back the balance of my time.
	Secretary Carter. Thank you so much. I appreciate you
	saying that. I am glad that the families are able to be at
	peace now, and I will pass that on to Secretary Work, my
	excellent Deputy Secretary. I am pleased to hear you say that
	about him, but I am not surprised.
	Mr. Jones. Thank you, sir.
	I yield back the balance of my time.
	The Chairman. Mr. Larsen.
	Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Mr. Secretary, I think you have an obligation, certainly a
	right, to respond to something that former Deputy Director of
	CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] said yesterday in response to
	a question. He said that ISIL is winning, and he said based on
	two assessments: one, although there is less caliphate
	territory, they seem to be spreading their influence beyond the
	caliphate territory; and then, of course, in direct reference
	to the attacks in Brussels.
	So I wanted to get your assessment about whether you think
	ISIL is winning, and if not, your assessment of the former
	Deputy Director of CIA's comments.
	Secretary Carter. I am not familiar with those comments.
	And as far as the campaign is concerned, I am confident
	that we will defeat ISIL and that we have the momentum of the
	campaign in Iraq and Syria. I gave you some of the details
	about that. And we are prepared to give you much more. We are
	doing more. We are actually looking to do yet more than that.
	And I am confident that that will result in the defeat of ISIL
	in Iraq and Syria. And as I said, that is necessary. It is not
	sufficient, as the attacks in Belgium suggest.
	And let me ask if the Chairman wants to add anything to
	that. But ISIL will be defeated. We have a strategy to do that.
	I am sorry the report hasn't gotten to you but will shortly,
	and I am confident that strategy will succeed.
	General Dunford. Congressman, first, I am not complacent
	about the threat of ISIL. And I recognize the spread of ISIL
	particularly over the last 15, 18 months transregionally or
	globally.
	With regard to Syria and Iraq, in October I appeared before
	the committee, and at that time, I think it was fair to say
	that ISIL had the momentum. Since that time, they not only have
	less territory, they have less resources. They have less
	freedom of movement. We have reduced the number of foreign
	fighters that are actually able to flow back and forth. And,
	frankly, I think their narrative is less effective than it was
	some months ago.
	But this is a long fight. And I am confident in telling you
	that we have the momentum today. I am also confident in the end
	state that Secretary Carter identified. But this morning was
	another reminder that there is a long fight ahead, and it will
	require not only the military effort to deny sanctuary to the
	enemy in Syria and Iraq, to limit their freedom of movement, to
	build the capacity of regional partners, which is what we are
	doing, but it will require a much greater cooperation amongst
	intelligence organizations from nations.
	There are over 100 nations that have foreign fighters in
	Syria and Iraq with over 30,000 foreign fighters. So the
	cooperation of all those countries and the intelligence
	organizations, law enforcement officials, as well as the
	military coalition that we put together in Iraq and Syria and
	conducting operations elsewhere, is all going to be critical.
	And it is going to take some time before we get there.
	But I am confident, at least today, that we have the
	momentum in Iraq and Syria. And we are increasingly taking
	actions outside of Iraq and Syria to make sure that we also
	keep pressure, as we have tried to keep pressure on Iraq, on
	the enemy simultaneously across both of those countries. It is
	going to be necessary that we do the same thing
	transregionally.
	Mr. Larsen. I am going to move to the budget and talk about
	taking the long view.
	Unfortunately for you, you don't get to be here for the
	implementation of the long view and to help us deal with the
	actual long view. And we have been having this debate a little
	bit, and Mrs. Davis touched upon it. And I am just wondering
	how you envision affording these incredibly expensive programs
	that we have outside, not just outside of this budget but
	outside of the 5 years and even 10. Nuclear modernization is
	one of those, but it is not the only one where we are going to
	be called upon, if we have the fortunate success of staying
	here, to resolve and solve.
	Secretary Carter. Well, we can afford all of those. We
	wouldn't have started them if we didn't think we could complete
	them. However, we are assuming when we do so that we will
	continue to have budget stability. If there is instability or
	sequester, as I said, and I think the Chairman just said, we
	are going to have to fundamentally reassess our ability to meet
	our needs, not only in the long run but in the short run.
	And you are right: it will be future Congresses and future
	administrations who carry that burden. I hope that they
	continue to give us budget stability as we have had now for 2
	years. That is what the country needs. That is what our
	Department needs. That is what, by the way, what every
	department trying to administer programs needs.
	But if we snap back to the sequester cuts, we are going to
	have to reconsider all of these programs. We need them and
	therefore we need the stability. Chairman.
	Mr. Larsen. That is fine. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	I yield back.
	The Chairman. Mr. Forbes.
	Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank all of you
	gentlemen for being here.
	General Dunford, it is always an honor to have the top
	uniformed officer in the United States before us, and so I am
	going to direct my questions to you since I only have 5
	minutes. And I would like to first ask you a question we have
	been asking all of our officers before us. Did you submit your
	written remarks to anyone for approval or review other than
	someone under your direct command before you had to come before
	us?
	General Dunford. Congressman, I did submit my remarks to
	the Office of Secretary of Defense as well as Office of
	Management and Budget. No changes were made in my written
	remarks as a result of that review.
	Mr. Forbes. Now, one of the things that I heard you just
	say in response to the chairman was you said that your
	readiness concerns were based on an unstable fiscal
	environment. And one of the concerns I always have, we wrestle
	within this committee, is simply this: when we look at whether
	strategy is driving the budget, the President's budget, or
	whether the President's budget is driving strategy, the
	question is, which one of them are predominant?
	Is it the strategy that is predominant in driving the
	President's budget, or is it the President's budget that is
	predominant in driving the strategy?
	General Dunford. Congressman, I think this year, it is fair
	to say that within the top line that we were given----
	Mr. Forbes. No. For the last several years, just as a rule,
	is it the strategy that is more predominant in driving the
	budget or the budget that is more predominant in driving the
	strategy?
	General Dunford. I would say if you go back to the last few
	years and particularly look at sequestration in 2013, the
	fiscal environment has had a bigger impact than the budget.
	Mr. Forbes. So, then, when we have constantly asked people
	that have come in here, many people from the Pentagon, saying
	that the budgets are in line with the strategy, then what you
	are saying is basically that it has been the budget that has
	been driving our strategy?
	General Dunford. Congressman, let me--if I can give you
	just a little bit of a nuanced answer, here what I am confident
	in saying. Today, we have a defense strategy that calls for us
	to defeat an enemy, to deny another adversary, to protect the
	homeland, as well as deal with violent extremism. I am
	confident in fiscal year 2017 that we will be able to do that--
	--
	Mr. Forbes. All right.
	General Dunford [continuing]. With risk.
	Mr. Forbes. Let me ask you this. And I don't mean to cut
	you off. I only have 3 minutes. I am looking at a document here
	that was signed by President Obama on January 3, 2012, for the
	Defense Guidance, and he says specifically in here: This
	guidance was requested to guide the spending over the coming
	decade. Then I have it signed on January 5, the Defense
	Guidance, by Secretary Panetta, and this is what over and over
	again people who have been coming in here pointing to and
	saying this has been directing their spending. And then we had,
	in 2014, the Quadrennial Defense Review. Over and over again,
	people have sat where you are sitting and have said that this
	has guided the spending of the Department of Defense.
	Has the Department of Defense been following the
	President's guidelines and been basing their spending on these
	two documents?
	General Dunford. We have, Congressman, but what we have
	been doing is living year to year and deferring modernization
	that is going to cause a build in the out years, so----
	Mr. Forbes. And I understand that. Now, let me ask you
	this, because these documents are based on certain assumptions.
	Did either of these two documents account for the rise of ISIL?
	General Dunford. They did not.
	Mr. Forbes. Did either of these two documents assume that
	U.S. forces will no longer be in Iraq and Afghanistan?
	General Dunford. They did not.
	Mr. Forbes. And, in fact, we do have forces still in Iraq
	and Afghanistan.
	Did either of these two documents assume that we would
	reset our relationship with Russia and that we would be able to
	cooperate with them?
	General Dunford. We did not foresee Russia's current
	actions in those documents.
	Mr. Forbes. So the assumptions made for these two documents
	were not correct with the Russians, right?
	General Dunford. With regard to Russia, that is correct.
	Mr. Forbes. Did either of these two documents account for
	China's aggressive behavior in the South China Sea?
	General Dunford. Not to the extent that we have seen it,
	Congressman.
	Mr. Forbes. Now, with that, wouldn't it be fair to say if
	the assumptions that these assumptions were based upon were
	invalid or wrong, that the strategy would also have been
	invalid or wrong?
	General Dunford. The strategy needs to be refined, and we
	are in the process of doing that. That is correct, sir.
	Mr. Forbes. And, also, General Odierno, when I asked him
	that question right after these were put into place, he said:
	We struggle to even meet one major contingency operation. It
	depends on assumptions. And I believe some of the assumptions
	that were made are not good assumptions; they are unrealistic
	and very positive assumptions.
	Yet these are the two documents that helped guide the
	President's budget in 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017. So wouldn't
	it be fair, General, for us to say that, instead of just the
	unstable fiscal environment, that a big part of the reason we
	are in the current situation we are in is because the
	President's strategies were based on faulty assumptions?
	General Dunford. This year, Congressman, we----
	Mr. Forbes. I am talking about the last several years
	leading up to this. This year's budget is not putting us in the
	situation that the chairman talked about.
	General Dunford. If you are asking, did we foresee the
	current conflict with ISIL and Russia----
	Mr. Forbes. I am asking you, wouldn't it be fair to say
	that rather than just fiscal instability, that the reason we
	are in the problem is because of a faulty strategy?
	And, with that, Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up, and I
	yield back.
	The Chairman. Mr. Courtney.
	Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	And thank you to both witnesses for your service and your
	testimony today. I just have a couple quick questions.
	And, Secretary Carter, Admiral Stavridis, retired admiral,
	Under Secretary Stackley, Secretary Mabus have all appeared
	over the last couple of weeks, and we have talked about this
	question of the long view of the undersea fleet, which Admiral
	Harris and General Breedlove said at this point are kind of
	playing zone defense out there because of what is happening in
	the Pacific and the North Atlantic.
	Again, this is a good budget in terms of investing, as you
	point out, in shipbuilding or submarine building, but down the
	road, you know, there is a possibility that we are going to see
	a dip at probably the worst possible time. And so I guess the
	question is, do you agree that this is an issue that we need to
	work on, as Secretary Stackley has promised, so that we, again,
	are able to keep our eyes focused on the long view in terms of
	that emerging challenge?
	Secretary Carter. I do agree with that. Our undersea
	capability is a critical strength of the United States. We need
	to keep that strength and extend that strength. And I think the
	biggest issue we are going to face beginning in the 2020s is
	the beginning of the Ohio-class replacement, and that is the
	building, once again, of SSBNs [ballistic missile submarines]
	as well as attack submarines, SSNs, which we are doing today.
	And we have been stressing now for several years we are going
	to need some consideration of the need to recapitalize our
	undersea nuclear deterrent, because that can't be done at the
	expense of the rest of the undersea fleet or we will erode our
	dominance, so that is going to--that is a major issue that is
	looming in the 2020s.
	Mr. Courtney. Thank you. And, again, we think--you know, we
	have found some ways to use different authorities, multiyear
	procurement, et cetera, to try and, again, maximize every
	efficiency to help in that effort. And, again, Secretary
	Stackley emphasized that when he appeared before the committee.
	I would like to shift gears for a second. First of all, I
	want to thank you for your comments regarding what happened in
	Brussels yesterday, and also noting that Brussels is actually
	the home of NATO, and, you know, there is a lot of work that
	takes place in that city which is extremely important in terms
	of our national defense. Yesterday, the frontrunner for the
	Republican nomination told the Washington Post, NATO was set up
	at a different time; I think NATO as a concept is good, but it
	is not as good as it was when it first evolved.
	In your testimony, I counted three instances--the fight
	against ISIL, the continuing efforts in Afghanistan, and also
	the European Reassurance Initiative--where NATO is absolutely
	at the center of our military strategy and operations. Is NATO
	relevant today? I mean, I guess we need to ask that question,
	given what is out there in the public domain.
	Secretary Carter. Well, let me begin by saying the
	following, and I have said this before, and I am going to say
	this again and again in the course of the year: I recognize
	that this is an election year. I will not speak to anything
	that is in the Presidential debate. I believe that our
	Department has a tradition of standing apart, and I very much
	value and respect that tradition, and so I am going to, with
	great respect, decline to answer any question that is framed in
	those terms and, by the way, also not have General Dunford or
	any of our, especially of our uniformed officers----
	Mr. Courtney. So I agree, and I respect that. And I guess
	the question I would ask, then, is that the European
	Reassurance Initiative, that funding, again, is going to flow
	through the NATO structure. I mean, that is not a, you know----
	Secretary Carter. It is. It is. It is. And securing our
	NATO partners from particularly Russian aggression is the
	principal purpose of the European Reassurance Initiative.
	With respect to the counter-ISIL fight, the NATO allies as
	individual countries are members of the coalition. The question
	has arisen whether NATO as a group should also be a member of
	the coalition, and that is being discussed right now with NATO.
	The reason for that being that NATO has some force generation
	capabilities that no individual country has, and that is the
	reason why the question arises whether it can play a role in
	the counter-ISIL fight.
	Mr. Courtney. Thank you for those answers.
	The Chairman. Mr. Miller.
	Mr. Miller. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
	General Dunford, looking back at the 2012-2014 Strategic
	Guidance and Defense Reviews, what specifically has changed in
	the geopolitical world? And based on those changes, is it safe
	to say that we need to look at--following on what Mr. Forbes
	said--recalibration or resizing of our current forces?
	General Dunford. Congressman, thanks. I would say that the
	most significant changes: one has been Russia; two has been the
	rise of ISIL. We talked about the behavior of China in the
	South China Sea, and certainly the capability development of
	North Korea have all been a concern. Iran remains a concern,
	but, quite frankly, the trajectory that they have been on was
	predictable even as those strategy documents were written, and
	so I think we accounted for Iran; but in the four other areas,
	we have seen either capability development or behavior or a
	combination of the two that have significantly changed the
	operating environment over the last few years.
	Mr. Miller. And I do think it is important that the
	American people understand the guidance that was used to set
	the size and shape of the force, and the current guidance, as
	you have already stated, said to defeat a regional adversary
	and deny another aggressor in the another region. However, in
	your written statement, you stated that, quote, ``The joint
	force will be challenged to respond to a major written
	contingency,'' unquote, and that, quote, ``Capability and
	capacity shortfalls would be particularly acute if the force
	were called to respond to a second contingency on an
	overlapping timeline.''
	So I would think that this might suggest that there is a
	significant risk that the joint force wouldn't even be able to
	execute a single major contingency operation. Is that true?
	General Dunford. Congressman, our assessment is we can meet
	the requirements of a single contingency. There is significant
	risk in our ability to do that, certain capability areas would
	be particularly stressed, but we can accomplish the objectives,
	albeit with much more time and probably casualties than we
	would like.
	Mr. Miller. The guidance calls for sufficient forces to
	execute, as you just said, two contingency operations,
	defeating one aggressor and denying the other. So, you know, if
	you put it in a real world scenario, could the current force
	today defeat a North Korea and deny Russia while at the same
	time defending the homeland?
	General Dunford. Congressman, we would be challenged to do
	those three things. Our assessment is we can do that, again,
	but it would take more time, particularly in the case of North
	Korea. It would take more time, and we would see more
	casualties than we would want to have.
	Mr. Miller. So the Department has cut the end strength and
	the force structure on the assumption that it did have the
	sufficient forces to carry out the assumptions that are there.
	So, given the current strategic environment, will the
	Department need to revisit the force size and guidance?
	General Dunford. Congressman, just to be clear, in terms of
	cutting force structure, my perspective is, you know, force
	structure is one element, but what is most important is that
	the force structure that we have has the proper resourcing to
	be well trained and well equipped. And so what I believe we
	have done inside the budget is we have got the force structure
	that is affordable within the top line that we have, and we can
	achieve the balance between the training, the resourcing, the
	modernization, the infrastructure support, and the force
	structure, all those things have to be combined. And so, you
	know, my assessment is that we are trying to get the balance
	right as opposed to saying that the current force structure is
	absolutely the best force structure we could have.
	Mr. Miller. Thank you.
	I yield back.
	The Chairman. Ms. Tsongas.
	Ms. Tsongas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	And welcome to our guests. It is always good to have you
	before us. And I think today's tragic events in Brussels really
	are a stark reminder of the many challenges that you all deal
	with every day and that we are here to support you with. And I
	especially appreciated both your comments on the need for
	budget stability as you deal with the challenges of today, but
	also with the need to look forward, because as we all know, and
	I remember a previous chairman, Ike Skelton, always commenting
	upon, that we plan for today but we never quite know where the
	next challenge is going to come from. And in the world we live
	in today, it is clear that they can come from many, many
	different places.
	But, Secretary Carter, I also wanted to thank you for the
	emphasis that you have placed in this year's budget on research
	and development, really knowing that it is key to maintaining
	our technological edge, that in this rapidly changing
	environment, we have got to maintain our investments. And as
	many on the committee know, defense-related research and
	development has faced a disproportionately large cut over the
	past several years, far more than has been required under the
	Budget Control Act. So I was especially encouraged to see that
	the Department will be investing in two new facilities at MIT's
	[Massachusetts Institute of Technology's] Lincoln Lab. As you
	know, the lab has provided the Department with breakthrough
	advancements for decades, and I thank you for your support of
	the lab's revitalization and the important role that it plays
	in the Massachusetts innovation ecosystem. It is part of
	something much larger.
	But I would like to turn to the issue of sexual assault
	prevention and response in the military. I have been troubled
	by a number of stories, including a series in the AP
	[Associated Press] and recent stories in the Washington Post,
	about senior officer sexual assault cases, which have called
	into question the transparency of the military justice system
	and the services' willingness to pursue allegations against
	officers. I understand that the Military Justice Review Group's
	proposal that was shared with this committee by the Department
	gives the Department 2 years to come up with a design for an
	online system of tracking cases and 2 years to implement that
	system. And I would encourage the Department to work with all
	speed to make the military justice system as transparent as
	possible. And I hope the Department will make the system open
	to survivors and the public as you move ahead.
	But we have all heard the troubling accounts of victims of
	military sexual assault who are later retaliated against, those
	who seek recourse through the system of justice. Some 62
	percent of victims have experienced social or professional
	retaliation, according to the Department's own survey data. And
	I have also read the Judicial Proceedings Panel recommendation
	to implement a standard retaliation reporting form. It is
	imperative to me that the Department track these incidents and
	hold those responsible accountable. It is key to maintaining
	the unit cohesion and all that is part of readiness as well.
	So my questions are, Secretary Carter, what is the
	Department doing to ensure service members who report sexual
	assault aren't retaliated against?
	Secretary Carter. Thank you very much for that question.
	And sexual assault is unacceptable anywhere in society, but it
	is particularly unacceptable in our military, and the reason is
	this: the profession of arms is based upon trust, and it is
	based upon honor, and sexual assault erodes both honor and
	trust and, for that reason, is completely unacceptable at any
	level.
	Moreover, to get to your point, as we study that question
	more and take more action--and I am not happy that there is
	sexual assault in the military, I am very pleased that we are
	taking it on frontally, and we need to do that, and we need to
	learn how to do better. The two issues you raised are places
	where we are learning how to do better. Retaliation, for
	example, was something that I don't think--I think it is fair
	to say in our department, we did not appreciate the importance
	of that phenomenon until the last couple of years, and so we
	are having to take that on board. Retaliation creates
	additional victims to the victim of the sexual assault, and
	this can be peers, and it can be others who are part of giving
	the victim their care, their right--the options and the
	response that they deserve, and so it is an important new
	ingredient, and we are trying to get on top of that.
	And, finally, with respect to transparency, we are
	committed to that. You are right, we have made a commitment to
	you about greater transparency in this matter, and I intend for
	us to carry that through. Thank you for raising that.
	Ms. Tsongas. Thank you. I have run out of time. Thank you.
	The Chairman. Mr. Wilson.
	Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being
	here today.
	With the attacks in Brussels, it is another reminder we are
	in a global war on terrorism, and it is continuing. And I just
	want you to know that I have faith in you, and we are counting
	on you to protect American families. And part of that is not
	forgetting 9/11. This is a continuing war; we will be in it for
	quite a while, but your service I know I appreciate as a
	grateful dad of four sons who have served in the military under
	you all's command.
	General Dunford, as Chairman Thornberry has mentioned, we
	have serious concerns about the state of the Marine Corps
	aviation. Marine Corps aviators and maintainers at the Marine
	Corps Air Station in Beaufort, South Carolina, tell us how they
	have had to cannibalize parts from museum aircraft to get their
	current fleet in the air. They don't have the parts. They don't
	have the people. They are not getting the training.
	Furthermore, General Robert Neller has testified that there
	aren't enough aircraft to even meet our training and mission
	requirements. I am very concerned that if they had to deploy
	tomorrow, they would be sent into a fight unprepared and ill
	equipped.
	How are we addressing this potential reality of an
	inability to respond to near-peer adversary or multi-adversary
	engagement? Beyond Marine Corps aviation, what else is at risk?
	Secretary Carter. Before you answer that, can I just thank
	you very much. I acknowledge your comments. And especially
	thank you for your contribution of your sons. Thank you,
	Congressman.
	Mr. Wilson. Well, again, hey, we are in this together, but
	the American people need to know it is a global war on
	terrorism;
	9/11 must not be forgotten. So thank you.
	General Dunford. Congressman, quickly, go back to how we
	got in the position we are in with Marine aviation, as well as,
	frankly, as I mentioned, across the joint force, there are
	similar stories that I could point out. Part of it was deferred
	modernization, so we are flying aircraft now that are very old.
	Part of it was, back in 2013, we went through sequestration. We
	had a backlog of depot-level maintenance that has caused the
	availability of ready basic aircraft and so forth. So these
	issues exist throughout the joint force. And part of what we
	are arguing for now is stability in funding, managing the
	operational tempo, and getting the appropriate resources is
	going to be what we need to get out of this trough, and it is
	going to take some years before we are able to do that.
	Mr. Wilson. And we will be working with you.
	And, Secretary Carter, last week, Admiral John Richardson
	testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee [SASC]
	that Iran had violated international law earlier this year by
	boarding sovereign U.S. vessels, detaining 10 U.S. sailors, and
	seizing an estimated 13,000 pages worth of information from
	laptops, GPS [Global Positioning System] devices, and maps.
	Would you agree with Admiral Richardson's assessment? If
	so, would you please let us know what subsequent action has
	been taken to rectify this brazen defiance of international
	law?
	Secretary Carter. I absolutely agree with Admiral
	Richardson. The actions of the Iranians with respect to our
	sailors was unprofessional; it was outrageous. And I just
	caution you all, since Admiral Richardson is looking into the
	circumstances of this matter, but when you see something on
	television, you are looking through the lens of Iranian TV and
	Iranian propaganda. Those sailors didn't deserve that. That
	is--we would never treat people in that manner. And to get to
	your question, I can't say much about it, but at the time, we
	were preparing to protect our people as soon as they were
	seized, and we only stood down that effort when we were assured
	that they were going to be returned to us safely, but it was
	outrageous treatment. I think Admiral Richardson has stressed
	that, and I would second that, but also I want to commend him
	on the treatment of the sailors. They are back home. The Navy
	did what it needed to do, which is, first of all, take care of
	their health and welfare, and is now learning the full
	circumstances of that.
	He has not completed his review of that, so I don't know
	what his consequences are from that, but this much we know,
	which is that is not behavior that we would have exhibited in
	the reverse circumstance.
	Mr. Wilson. I also want to thank you, Mr. Secretary, for
	your efforts to promote public-private cooperation in
	cybersecurity, but a challenge we have is recruiting and
	training. What are we doing to prepare for the continuing cyber
	war?
	Secretary Carter. Well, thank you for that question. You
	are absolutely right. The critical thing in cyber is people,
	good people. We are spending more money on it, we are making
	big investments in it, but that is not the key. The key is, are
	we able to get the good people to flesh out our 133 cyber
	mission force teams, which, as you know, is what we are
	building up at CYBERCOM [Cyber Command] and all the other
	service components. The key is people. And we are doing better
	at attracting and retaining skilled technical people. I will be
	up at a physics class at West Point, as it happens, tomorrow,
	seeing some of our wonderful people who are being technically
	trained in their cyber center there. But, in addition, let me
	say that building bridges, which I am trying to do, we are all
	trying to do, between our department and the technology
	community is critical.
	Historically, the United States has drawn upon the great
	strength of this Nation, whether it is satellites or missiles
	or the Internet itself, and we need to keep doing that, and I
	am committed to doing that, because that is part of the future.
	And the last thing I will say is just a pitch for the role
	of the National Guard and Reserve Component in this regard. I
	was up in Washington State a couple of weeks ago. There is a
	Reserve unit up there that consists of people who work at
	topnotch companies like Microsoft all day on network defense,
	and then, in their Guard duty, they are defending our networks.
	It doesn't get any better than that, a citizen soldier coming
	in in cyber.
	So there are lots of ways we are trying to make sure we
	have good people, but we are able to, but that is the key, is
	good people in cyber.
	Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
	The Chairman. Mr. Takai.
	Mr. Takai. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Secretary Carter, I would like to talk about the Rim of the
	Pacific exercises, or RIMPAC. In your letter last year to
	Senators McCain and Reid, you stated that you believe that
	China's participation in RIMPAC would advance cooperative
	approaches to common security challenges, increase transparency
	and mutual understanding, and integrate China into a
	cooperative forum. You also say that you may modify our defense
	engagement decisions based on evolving circumstances.
	My question is, have you recently evaluated China, and have
	you made any changes to the invitation to the PLA [People's
	Liberation Army] navy to participate in this year's RIMPAC?
	Secretary Carter. We are constantly evaluating our
	relationship with China and China's behavior, including in the
	South China Sea, where I emphasize we have very serious
	concerns about their aggressive militarization there.
	They have an invitation to RIMPAC, and we will continue to
	review that, but you might say, what is the logic for having
	them there in the first place? Our strategy in the Asia-Pacific
	is not to exclude anyone, but to keep the security architecture
	going there in which everyone participates, and that is what
	has led over 50 years to the rise of Japan, then South Korea,
	then Taiwan, then Southeast Asia, and now, yes, China and
	India. We are not excluding China from that security
	architecture, in which America plays the pivotal role, and we
	intend to keep playing that pivotal role. That is what the
	rebalance is all about.
	China is, however, self-isolating. Its behavior is
	isolating itself in the region. That is why all these partners
	are coming to us and saying: Can you do more with us? So not
	just big exercises with lots of parties, like RIMPAC, but we
	have the Japanese investing more, the Australians investing
	more, the Philippines just inviting us, once again, to work
	with them more closely, even Vietnam, India. So Chinese
	behavior is self-isolating and driving many countries to want
	to do more with us and are doing more with us, but that is not
	the way China is going to continue to benefit, as it has now
	for several decades, from the security system and the open
	system that we, the United States, have underwritten now for
	many decades.
	Mr. Takai. Okay. So if China builds a runway on Scarborough
	Shoal reef, PACOM [Pacific Command] Commander Admiral Harris
	assesses that Beijing will have total access across the South
	China Seas.
	Secretary Carter, is China conducting or preparing to
	conduct reclamation at the Scarborough Shoals, which is only
	120 miles from Subic Bay in the Philippines where our Navy
	regularly operates? And would you say that this behavior is
	consistent with U.S. objectives and the regional security
	environment?
	Secretary Carter. Well, Congressman, we are concerned about
	that prospect. And is it consistent? No, it is not consistent.
	It is the kind of behavior that we will react to in our own
	military posture and deployments, and all the regional partners
	will react to. So it will be self-defeating and self-isolating
	for China, so I hope they don't do that, but we are prepared
	for that eventuality should it occur. But, no, it is not a good
	thing for them to do that, and they shouldn't.
	And by the way, I would just say just to be fair about it,
	that our policy is that no one ought to be militarizing these
	features. There are these disputes over maritime claims in the
	South China Sea. Our view isn't to take sides on them. Our view
	is that everybody ought to resolve those peacefully and not
	militarize those features, China and anyone else who has done
	that, but China has done it far more than anybody else.
	Mr. Takai. Thank you. And I do agree, it is not consistent
	with U.S. objectives, and like you say, no one should be
	militarizing that area.
	So my question, then, is why, then, should we reward China
	with their aggressive behavior by including them in an event
	meant for allies and partners? China's behavior is the polar
	opposite, as you mentioned, of U.S. objectives in the region,
	and that is why I submitted a proposal to the NDAA [National
	Defense Authorization Act] that would prohibit China's
	participation in RIMPAC this year. I hope you and your
	department will reassess this situation and follow suit. Do you
	have any comment? Briefly. We have 10 seconds.
	Secretary Carter. No. We are constantly reassessing that. I
	gave you the logic for the invitation in the first place and
	will continue to reassess it in accordance with your letter.
	Mr. Takai. Thank you.
	The Chairman. Mr. Turner.
	Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Last week, General Milley stated before the committee,
	quote, that less than one-third of the Army forces are at
	acceptable readiness levels to conduct sustained ground combat
	in a full-spectrum environment against a highly lethal hybrid
	threat or near-peer adversary. Obviously, this statistic is
	undoubtedly alarming and illustrates that the risk associated
	with a less-than-ready military force is unacceptable.
	All too often, we speak about military risk in terms of
	numbers and percentages as opposed to more real and tangible
	consequences. When asked a similar question last year about
	risk, then Chief of Staff, Army, General Ray Odierno, made
	clear that direct correlation existed between increased risk
	and loss of lives on the battlefield. Quite plainly, Odierno
	stated that people would die. While I apologize for my
	frankness, it is critically important that our colleagues in
	Congress and the general public clearly understand what is
	meant when you say ``risk.'' We are currently in the throes of
	our debate on the budget, and there are those who continue to
	say: We can accept increased risks; we can lower the costs; we
	can continue to accept sequestration or cuts.
	General Dunford, would you please help us better understand
	what you mean when you say ``risk''? Is there a direct
	correlation between risk and loss of lives on the battlefield?
	And, also, is there a direct correlation between risk and
	winning, knowing that we now have issues with Russia, China,
	North Korea, and certainly ISIS? Could you give us an
	understanding of how the word ``risk'' translates?
	General Dunford. Congressman, I can. First of all, there is
	a correlation between risk and casualties. And when I talk
	about risk against our objectives, I am talking about how long
	it will take and how many casualties we will suffer. Those are
	the two elements of risk that I refer to.
	You mentioned sequestration, and I will tell you what the
	risk of sequestration is. The risk of sequestration--and I am
	talking now the $100 billion that still looms out there--means
	that we would have to go back and actually rewrite our
	strategy, and I am talking about the ends of our strategy. So
	when you talk about winning, there is a correlation also
	between our ability to win against the current adversaries that
	we have identified, the peer competitors that we have
	identified, and sequestration. And my assessment is that we
	will not be able to deal with the five challenges that
	Secretary Carter and I outlined in our opening remarks, the
	Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and violent extremism. Were
	we to go to sequester-level funding, I can't imagine us being
	able to satisfactorily deal with those five challenges and, by
	the way, the challenges that we can't foresee.
	Mr. Turner. Secretary Carter, when you were here last year,
	one of the things that you said was that it would be so
	important to get a 2-year budget deal. Many of us in Congress,
	including myself, who voted for it, believed we had a 2-year
	budget deal. We believed that we would be looking this year at
	the budgetary process with a fairly firm 574 commitment to base
	budget funding, which would result in stopping the cuts that
	the Department of Defense has been put to, but when we received
	the President's budget, the President indicated that there were
	increased overseas contingency operations funding that he would
	need for his operations, $3.4 billion for Europe, additional
	dollars for ISIS. And rather than putting those on top, meaning
	that they are additional things that the President would need
	to do, he took that out of the base funding of the Department
	of Defense. Now, we are having in Congress the debate putting
	those dollars back. And, again, it was unexpected, because that
	was not part of the 2-year budget deal that you advocated for
	and that we voted for and that we all thought we were operating
	under.
	Could you please tell us what the consequences are of the
	cuts that will happen to the base budget of the Department of
	Defense if we accept the President's budget, because clearly
	there are things that you are going to have to not do that you
	will get to do if we put that money back.
	Secretary Carter. Well, the President's budget reflects the
	bipartisan budget agreement. The numbers in the budget are the
	numbers in the BBA.
	Mr. Turner. Secretary Carter, I know you know that we
	completely disagree with you. I mean, Congress' expectation is
	that you had a base budget of 574. I don't think you would have
	supported a 2-year budget deal that would have had a cut to the
	base budget in year 2017. And my question is not really, what
	is the deal? My question is, what are you losing? Because you
	are obviously losing something from 574 with the reduction that
	the President has taken of about $13 billion out of the base
	budget for OCO operations.
	Secretary Carter. We are going to have to agree to disagree
	about that, about whether we budgeted to BBA, because we
	believe we did. However, to answer what I gather is part of
	your question, namely what did we do about the difference
	between what we said last year we intended to request this year
	and what we requested this year. I addressed that earlier. That
	was a $22 billion difference that, because of OCO and some
	other economic adjustments that went our way, like fuel prices
	and so forth, ended up being a net of $11 billion. And I
	explained exactly what we did to adjust and mitigate risk
	associated with that $11 billion. We cut a lot of minor
	procurement programs. We scaled back some of our aircraft buys.
	We took it out of MILCON. That is how we accommodated the $11
	billion. We can tell you in detail how that was done.
	And I also explained what we didn't do. We didn't go into
	military pay to make up that difference. We didn't go into the
	readiness recovery plans that the Chairman has described and
	that are so critical to restore our readiness, including full-
	spectrum readiness for the Army and the other services. We
	didn't cancel any multiyear procurements or other major
	acquisition programs. And we didn't change any of our force
	structure targets, number of ships, Army end strength, or
	anything like that. We did what we did. We have described what
	it is. We believe that we were able to mitigate that risk, and
	that is what we did.
	Our biggest risk going forward--I will just say it again;
	we have said it many times--the biggest risk to us
	strategically in our defense is a return to sequestration, a
	collapse of the bipartisan budget agreement, and that is our
	biggest concern.
	The Chairman. Mr. O'Rourke.
	Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Mr. Secretary, last week, we were able to listen to
	testimony from Acting Secretary of the Army Murphy and General
	Milley. And Secretary Murphy said, to continue this line of
	questioning on risk begun by Mr. Turner, said something to the
	effect of this budget places the Army at high risk. And prior
	to that, General Milley had made that connection explicit
	between risk and the loss of the service members' lives who we
	will put in harm's way. We reduce risk, we reduce that loss of
	life. So there couldn't be anything more serious or grave for
	us to make a decision on.
	My question for you is, is that level of risk comparable in
	the other service branches? And what is your guidance to us as
	a committee going into the NDAA as a Congress that might look
	in the near future at supplemental funding to further mitigate
	that risk in this upcoming budget year?
	Secretary Carter. Well, first of all, let me completely
	associate myself with what Acting Secretary Murphy and General
	Milley said. That is our highest priority for the Army in this
	budget, is readiness. They both made that clear, I concurred in
	that, and that is why the Army's readiness recovery plan is
	fully funded in the budget.
	Now, what does that consist of? It gets back to the
	question earlier about full spectrum. In order to recover full
	spectrum--remember where we are coming from here is an Army
	that was working extremely hard in Iraq and Afghanistan to meet
	the rotational needs of a counterinsurgency battle, and they
	were being trained for that. Now they are trying to restore
	their training to full spectrum for the other problems that we
	highlighted among the five that we are highlighting in this
	budget. To do that, they need to pass through their training
	ranges, and those high-level training ranges have a certain
	capacity. We are building that capacity, but it is going to
	take some time for them to come out of it. And it is not going
	to just take time; it is going to take budget stability. That
	is why I keep coming back to the need for budget stability.
	And then the last thing in your question, the other
	services have comparable readiness issues. They are all
	different, but they are comparable in the following sense: all
	are trying to make long-term plans to get better in readiness.
	In the Marine Corps, it is particularly aviation, as the
	Chairman has pointed out. In the Navy, it is principally a
	maintenance issue, and they are working very hard on that. In
	the Air Force, it is, very importantly, and I think the Air
	Force leadership has indicated this and the chairman mentioned
	this as well, the very high OPTEMPO [operational tempo]. The
	Air Force is trying to train for high readiness. At the same
	time, we are working them very hard in the counter-ISIL fight
	and elsewhere. So it is a little bit different in each service,
	but there is a challenge in each case, and that challenge--and
	we have plans to improve readiness, but they can't be executed
	if we are returned to budget--to sequester levels.
	Mr. O'Rourke. Let me ask two followup questions to clarify.
	One, are we doing all we can do within this budget request to
	mitigate that risk? If not, what do we need to do? I would be
	happy to join my colleagues and you in making the necessary
	changes too. My understanding is that risk is a term of art in
	terms of what the service chief submits to the Chairman of the
	Joint Chiefs. And what I would like to know, is what we heard
	from the Acting Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the Army
	reflected in the other service branches? Yes or no, if we have
	less risk in those others, are there more resources to pull to
	address the high risk, which I understand is a term of art,
	that was disclosed to us in the hearing last week?
	Secretary Carter. Well, with respect to the first part, we
	have in this budget for 2017 done everything that the Army
	wanted to do. I completely support them to get on the path to
	restoring readiness. It can't be done overnight----
	Mr. O'Rourke. This is as much as we can do.
	Secretary Carter [continuing]. As I described. And so it is
	not a money issue. It is a money stability issue for the Army,
	and we have got to have that.
	And with respect to, ``does that translate into risk,''
	yes. Does it translate into risk for the other services? Yes,
	it does. And is that reflected in how the Chairman and I and
	the rest of the Joint Chiefs and the service secretaries deal
	with risk in each service contribution to joint war plans and
	across joint war plans? Absolutely, it does.
	Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you. I am out of time.
	Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	The Chairman. Mr. Rogers.
	Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Mr. Secretary, what priority do you assign to the
	Department's nuclear deterrence mission?
	Secretary Carter. It is the bedrock of our defense. It is
	not in the news every day, thank goodness, but it is the
	bedrock of our defense. So having a safe, secure, and reliable
	nuclear deterrent is bedrock priority, and we give it the
	highest priority, and that is both in operating the force
	currently, and the subject was raised earlier about the need to
	keep a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent. The
	particular issue being raised was the submarine force. In the
	future, we will change out the Ohio for the Ohio-class
	replacement. That is a necessary evolution. It is a very
	expensive evolution, but we have to do it, because we have to
	retain a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear force as a bedrock.
	Mr. Rogers. Well, that leads me to my second question. Do
	you see the recapitalization of the nuclear deterrent as
	affordable in this budget environment?
	Secretary Carter. As I said earlier, particularly you can
	see it right now that the submarine recapitalization in the
	decades of the 2020s cannot be taken out of the rest of the
	Navy's shipbuilding budget without seriously crippling that
	shipbuilding budget. So we are going to need to make room for
	that. We have been saying that now for several years. You can
	see it. It gets nearer every year, but sure as shooting, we
	have to do that, and the reason is that the Trident submarines
	are aging out. It has to do with the stress on the hulls of
	submerging and coming up so many times. And they are going to
	have to be replaced. And that is the survivable part of our
	triad. It is absolutely essential. We are going to need to
	recapitalize it.
	Mr. Rogers. Great.
	General Dunford, are the Joint Chiefs convinced and
	unanimous that we must modernize the triad?
	General Dunford. Congressman, I am. I have not talked to
	the current group of Chiefs collectively, but previously, when
	I was the Commandant of the Marine Corps and we met with
	General Dempsey, my predecessor, the Joint Chiefs unanimously
	subscribed to modernization of the triad.
	Mr. Rogers. Great.
	General, your predecessor undertook an assessment of the
	Russian violation of the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear
	Forces] Treaty. He concluded it posed a risk to the United
	States itself as well as to the security of our allies in
	Europe. Do you agree?
	General Dunford. I do, Congressman. In fact, it reflected
	in the budget our capabilities to deal with just that threat.
	Mr. Rogers. Well, we have been waiting over a year to be
	briefed on the military options that you have in response to
	that. Can you assure me we will get that for my staff, me and
	the ranking member of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, within
	the next 3 or 4 weeks?
	General Dunford. Congressman, I or my staff will come over
	and see you soonest.
	Mr. Rogers. I would appreciate that.
	Mr. Chairman, I would like to yield the balance of my time
	to my friend and colleague from Minnesota, Mr. Kline.
	Mr. Kline. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
	General Dunford, a couple of years ago, I was in
	Afghanistan, and you were the senior American commander there,
	and we had significantly more than 10,000 U.S. forces. In
	January, I was back in Afghanistan, and General Campbell was
	the commander there, and it was operating under a force
	management level of 9,800 troops. Now General Nicholson is on
	the ground there, and he is currently undertaking a review of
	the situation there to make his recommendations.
	If he were to come back after completing his review with a
	recommendation to change the force management level--I don't
	know who invented that term, by the way, but it bothers me a
	lot, because it is a strategy by political numbers--but if he
	were to come back and say, ``We need to increase that FML by
	some unspecified number, 1,000, 2,000 or something like that,''
	and if he were to come back and say, ``We need to lift the
	restrictions that we are operating under that says I can't
	train and advise and assist below the Afghan corps level,'' and
	if he were to come back and say, ``I need the authority to
	unilaterally target the Taliban and the Haqqani network,''
	would you support those recommendations going to the President?
	General Dunford. Congressman, first of all, General
	Nicholson is going to provide recommendations, and I know what
	the President has articulated as the end state, and I can
	assure you my recommendation, which will forward any
	recommendation that General Nicholson will make, will be
	benchmarked against my assessment of our ability to meet our
	objectives. That is exactly what I did when I was a commander
	on the ground and exactly what I would do in my current
	position.
	Mr. Kline. So you don't know whether or not you would
	support General Nicholson's recommendations if he came back
	with those that I just suggested?
	General Dunford. What I would make clear to the President
	in making a recommendation is whatever capabilities I believe
	are necessary, and I can't speculate as to whether General
	Nicholson will ask for an increase right now, Congressman, but
	what I would say is if he came in and said, ``These are the
	capabilities we need to accomplish the mission,'' and I agreed
	with General Nicholson's assessment, I would forward to the
	Secretary a recommendation that would include whatever
	capabilities are necessary for us to achieve the end state. Of
	that, I am clear.
	Mr. Kline. Thank you. My time has expired.
	Secretary Carter. Let me just second that.
	Mr. Kline. Thank you.
	Secretary Carter. That is the way it works.
	The Chairman. Ms. Gabbard.
	Ms. Gabbard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Gentlemen, thank you for being here this morning and for
	your service.
	Secretary Carter and General Dunford, both of you talked
	about the threat of North Korea in your opening remarks. And I
	appreciate your leadership in maintaining the Department's
	focus both on current and emerging threats in the Asia-Pacific.
	I think North Korea's launch of their short-range missiles
	demonstrated just yesterday how serious and important this
	threat is, which must remain at the forefront as we look at how
	and where we are placing and investing our defense resources.
	Obviously, representing Hawaii, this is something that we are
	keenly aware of, as the threat from North Korea continues with
	their increased capabilities, as well as people on the West
	Coast who find themselves within range of their ICBMs
	[intercontinental ballistic missiles].
	Secretary Carter, you discussed the ongoing consultations
	with South Korea's hosting a THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area
	Defense] system. Can you give us an update on those talks and
	can you also share the Department's commitment to continuing to
	increase and enhance our missile defense capabilities of the
	homeland? In particular, in Hawaii we have a test site for the
	Aegis Ashore at the Pacific Missile Range Facility, and I and
	others here on the committee are pushing toward
	operationalizing that to increase that protection.
	Secretary Carter. Well, thank you. And thank you for the
	role that the Hawaiian facilities do play in allowing us to
	develop and test our missile defenses. And we are doing a
	number of things to react to and protect ourselves and our
	people from the North Korean missile threat.
	Let me just back up a minute and say, you know, I talked
	about ``fight tonight'' on the Korean peninsula. We are
	absolutely committed to that. The Chairman and I pay attention
	to that every day. Again, that is not something that is in the
	newspapers every day, but our contribution to the defense of
	South Korea is very, very important and rock solid.
	On the missile defense front, we are doing things at all
	ranges. You mentioned Aegis Ashore, THAAD. And just to answer
	your question about THAAD on the Korean Peninsula, we are
	discussing that with the Koreans; we have an agreement in
	principle to do that. And I should say the reason for that, the
	reason for that is to be able to protect the entirety of the
	peninsula against North Korean missiles of greater range. That
	is why we want to add THAAD to what already exists there, which
	is Patriot, both South Korean and U.S. Patriot.
	Finally, to the homeland, it is with the possibility of
	North Korea having the capability to range the United States
	with ICBMs that we began several years ago to increase both the
	number of our ground-based interceptor system and also its
	capability. So we are increasing the number of those
	interceptors from 30 to 44. We are improving the kill vehicle
	on the front end, and we are adding radars to that. So we are
	doing a great deal. But, unfortunately, we have to, because we
	see, as you mentioned yesterday, the action of North Korea.
	Let me see if the Chairman wants to add anything to that.
	Ms. Gabbard. I would like to shift to both of your comments
	as well with regard to Ukraine and Russia. Much of the $3.4
	billion for the European Reassurance Initiative goes towards
	military funding and training and so on and so forth. In
	particular in the Ukraine, obviously, there are many challenges
	that they are facing kind of in their whole of government, but
	specifically within the military, we have seen time and time
	again how there is no tank-to-tank competition possible as
	Ukraine faces different threats coming from Russia. But can you
	speak to what kind of training we are assisting them with with
	regards to unconventional or special forces tactics and
	guerilla warfare, which can take a toll on what Russia is doing
	there?
	Secretary Carter. We are doing that. That is part of the
	support that we give to the Ukrainian forces, both against what
	you might call symmetrical or traditional kinds of combat
	operations, and also helping them with this unique brand, but I
	am afraid to say a here-to-stay brand of hybrid warfare that we
	have seen in Eastern Ukraine.
	Let me ask the Chairman to elaborate.
	General Dunford. Congressman, on that issue specifically,
	we have currently five conventional Ukrainian battalions going
	through training and one special operations unit going through
	training. Their training cycle will complete in September. I
	recently received an update probably assessed as some of the
	best, most effective training we have provided to the
	Ukrainians to date, and that is both the Ukrainian and U.S.
	perspective. Much of that training is informed by Russian
	behavior over the last few years and lessons learned in terms
	of integrating unconventional warfare, information operations,
	cyber capabilities, conventional capabilities. So I believe we
	are addressing that in our training program right now that is
	taking place with Ukrainian forces. And this is Ministry of
	Defense forces. Heretofore, we had trained just Ministry of
	Interior forces. This is the first cycle now of Ministry of
	Defense forces trained in these areas.
	Ms. Gabbard. Thank you.
	The Chairman. Mr. Conaway.
	Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here. General Austin,
	CENTCOM [Central Command] commander, said to the Senate Armed
	Services Committee that additional capabilities are going to be
	necessary to take Raqqa and Mosul, including additional U.S.
	personnel, intelligence, logistics, other advise-and-assist
	teams.
	Do you agree with General Austin on the assessment that
	additional U.S. troops on the ground in Iraq and Syria are
	going to be necessary to take Mosul and Raqqa, and will you
	personally support that----
	Secretary Carter. I do. We already have. I expect us to do
	more, because we are looking for opportunities to do more. So
	General Austin is right. And, of course, all this is in support
	of the Iraqi Security Forces, but it includes support to the
	Iraqi Army, support to Sunni tribal forces, support for police
	training. By the way, it is not just U.S., but I have been
	getting coalition contributions as well. And as we assemble the
	forces to move on Mosul, we will be doing more. And when we
	have taken those requests to the President, as the Chairman
	said earlier, he has consistently granted those requests. And I
	expect there to be more in the future, because we want to get
	Mosul; we want to defeat ISIL in Iraq.
	Mr. Conaway. Well, we have got to have Raqqa as well. ABC
	is reporting that the----
	Secretary Carter. Yes, Raqqa as well.
	Mr. Conaway [continuing]. Brussels came out of Raqqa.
	Secretary Carter. Absolutely.
	Mr. Conaway. Let me pivot to something that is a little
	more mundane, but nevertheless important, and that is auditing.
	Secretary Carter. Yes.
	Mr. Conaway. I worry that--oh, by the way, Michael McCord,
	thank you for the report from your group on where everything
	stands right now. I don't necessarily want to go into the
	details of that, but thanks for getting that over to the
	committee in response to the NDAA.
	Can you talk to us about transition to a new civilian
	leadership team next year and the impact that might have on the
	affordable minimum with respect to getting this audit process
	done by the deadlines? I worry that the impact from, you know--
	Leon Panetta started this deal; Hagel kept it up. Secretary
	Carter, you are full throated in favor of it. Are there risks
	that a new civilian team might not have the same emphasis?
	And, General Dunford, will you comment on the military's
	side of that issue as well?
	Secretary Carter. I am absolutely fully in support of it,
	and I thank you very much for your persistence and your
	leadership in inducing us to do this. And I also want to thank
	Mike McCord and his whole team for their role in it.
	You asked about the future. My guess is that this will
	continue, because the logic is quite clear. The necessity is
	quite clear, so I think that will be clear to people who come
	after myself and the Chairman. I am pretty confident that it
	will. It certainly should, and of course, you will have a role
	in helping remind them of this. There is a whole team behind
	this in all of our components, and I think they will--they are
	committed to this work. They will remain committed to this
	work.
	Chairman.
	General Dunford. Congressman, I could speak from both my
	current perspective and as a former service chief. I mean, I
	would tell you I really do believe that it is now part of our
	culture. And as you know, we have been at this now 4 or 5 years
	and worked pretty hard at it. And, frankly, I think the
	uniformed personnel that are involved in the audit process and
	the civil servants involved in the audit process are fully
	committed to actually coming back over here and laying on the
	table a clean audit. I mean, that is a bar they have set for
	themselves. And, again, I don't think the civilian transition
	that will take place this year is going to change the objective
	of the individuals who have been working so hard. Again, most
	of the folks that are doing the heavy lifting, they aren't
	going anywhere, and they are pretty clear about in their
	commitment to get this thing done.
	Mr. Conaway. Well, I appreciate that. And I hope our Senate
	colleagues during the confirmation process, whoever is doing
	that next time, will make that clear.
	And just to be sure, the resources necessary to move this
	forward are in this budget, the requests?
	Secretary Carter. They are.
	Mr. Conaway. General Dunford, did you want to comment on
	the need for additional U.S. troops to counter ISIL and
	actually defeat them in Mosul and in Raqqa?
	General Dunford. Yes. Congressman, I fully support the
	comments that General Austin has made and that the Secretary
	has endorsed. We have from the very beginning said that we
	would recommend whatever capabilities are necessary to maintain
	momentum and achieve the end state. And I do assess that to be
	successful in both Raqqa and Mosul and beyond, we are going to
	need additional capabilities. And at the right time, we will be
	prepared to provide that recommendation to the President.
	Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	I yield back.
	The Chairman. Mr. McCord, let me warn you, I promised Mr.
	Conaway, we are going to do a briefing or hearing on the audit
	issue, and it will be talking with you and the other folks
	about dates for that, but it is something that Mr. Conaway is
	going to stay on our case till we see it all the way through,
	and I think----
	Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	The Chairman [continuing]. A lot of us are committed to
	doing that.
	Ms. Bordallo.
	Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
	As a representative from the Asia-Pacific area, I would
	like to start off by expressing my sincere sympathy for the
	people of Belgium and for the family of the marine killed this
	weekend in Iraq.
	I do know that Representative Takai already spoke on China
	and Representative Gabbard referenced North Korea. So, on Guam,
	we are considered the tip of the spear in the Asia-Pacific
	region, and I know the budget request contains nearly $250
	million for fiscal year 2017 military construction projects. We
	are seeing tangible development, such as facility construction,
	take place. So I am asking, Secretary Carter, what role the
	administration sees for Guam in the broader strategy; should
	Congress continue moving forward with construction on Guam?
	And, additionally, it is often said that budgets reflect
	priorities, and you spoke to the Senate Armed Services
	Committee last week about continuing to support the Asia-
	Pacific rebalance strategy. So would you say that this strategy
	continues to be a priority of the administration?
	Secretary Carter. I can. And the Asia-Pacific is where half
	of humanity lives. It is where half of the economic activity of
	the globe is. It is the single region of greatest consequence
	for America's future. We can't forget that. And thank you for
	everything Guam does with us and for us and as part of us out
	there.
	Guam is a critical part of the posture improvements and
	strengthenings we are doing in the Asia-Pacific. I mentioned
	the part that we are doing unilaterally. That is very
	important. Guam is a part of that. We do a lot with partners as
	well, and there is so much momentum out there. Now, part of
	that momentum is caused, as I mentioned earlier, by Chinese
	aggression. But we are determined to meet it, and Guam is an
	important part of that. So thank you.
	Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. You've
	done so much for us. I thank you for your contributions.
	Also, I have another question for either yourself or
	Secretary McCord. It is estimated that the Defense Department
	spends nearly twice as much on service contractors as it does
	on civilian personnel, even though they are often doing the
	same work. Nevertheless, the Department's budget request seeks
	to cut civilian personnel and increase spending on service
	contracts.
	In this extremely constrained fiscal environment, can we
	expect to see the Department leverage the clear cost savings
	found in civilian personnel versus contractors? Are we still
	waiting for a complete accounting of all service contracts that
	was mandated back in 2008, but we have still not received the
	report?
	Secretary Carter. Thank you. I will just say at the
	beginning, then turn it over to Under Secretary McCord, we are
	committed to reducing the strength particularly of headquarter
	staffs, both civilian and contractor, and for that matter,
	military. That is where those numbers come from.
	And are we getting better at understanding how we are doing
	the spend for services contracting? Yes, we are getting better
	at that. The Deputy Chief Management Officer [DCMO] of the
	Department along with Mr. McCord work on that, and we are
	committed to meeting those targets. They are part of our budget
	outlook. If we don't keep working on tail, we are not going to
	be able to invest in the tooth. So it is an essential thing to
	do.
	And I ask if Under Secretary McCord wants to add anything.
	Ms. Bordallo. The contract.
	Secretary McCord. I would just add, as the Secretary said,
	we have the instructions both internal and from the Congress to
	hold down civilian and to keep commensurate with the drawdown
	of the military, and we recognize that mandate.
	And as he said also, we are looking hard at service
	contractors. The DCMO, Mr. Levine, is leading an effort. In
	fact, my turn is coming, I think, within the week to report to
	him within my own office, just like everybody else has to do,
	on what we are doing to review all of our service contracts to
	make sure they are still justified. And history has shown that
	just the sunlight of looking at that drives the cost down. You
	relook whether you really need everything that you are doing,
	and that is an important part of our efficiency effort for this
	budget.
	Ms. Bordallo. I only have a few seconds left.
	We still haven't received the report. Will we receive a
	report of some kind? This has been due since 2008.
	Secretary McCord. We will have to get back to you for the
	record on the exact status of the report. I don't have it at my
	fingertips.
	[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
	on page 123.]
	Ms. Bordallo. All right. Thank you very much.
	And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
	The Chairman. Thank you.
	Mr. Wittman.
	Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Secretary Carter, General Dunford, Mr. McCord, thanks so
	much for joining us today.
	General Dunford, in the previous hearings that the House
	Armed Services Committee has held, there has been a lot of
	discussion about readiness. And, obviously, for all of us, the
	concern about returning to full-spectrum readiness is at the
	very top of our list. I think General Milley put it best. He
	said: Readiness doesn't have a constituency. And I think that
	is why it is critical for members of the House Armed Services
	to make sure that we are the constituency for military
	readiness for our men and women in uniform.
	Tell me where we are with the current budget situation with
	where we project to be with the proposal in fiscal year 2017 on
	the path to restore readiness. We are right now just at the
	point of setting conditions to restore readiness. Tell us how
	far away we are and what milestones you expect to achieve in
	restoring full-spectrum readiness.
	General Dunford. Thanks, Congressman.
	With regard to 2017, we took inputs from all the services
	as to what they needed in fiscal year 2017 along their path to
	restore readiness, as you've outlined. And that was a priority
	for the Secretary. And so we fully resourced the service plans
	for readiness restoration. Keeping in mind that we knew we
	couldn't get to where we needed to be in 2017 because of the
	other elements associated with readiness recovery: One,
	operational tempo; the other the aspect of time.
	So with regard to where are we relative to where we need to
	be, three of the services have indicated that fiscal year 2020
	or 2021 would be where they would get to if we are not
	sequestered and we actually received the resources we project
	to receive.
	The Air Force is a little bit outside of that because of
	the unique challenges they have, and I think some of the
	numbers I have seen are as long as 2028, somewhere between 2024
	and 2028. So three of the services probably about 5 years away;
	one of the services may be 7 or 8 years away from full
	restoration of readiness.
	Mr. Wittman. Gotcha.
	Let me get your perspective on one of the elements of that
	readiness restoration, and that is aviation readiness. And when
	you paint the picture about full-spectrum readiness it is
	across the service branches. But one of the areas that really
	concerns me is the assessments that we are hearing about
	aviation readiness, and it starts with the Marine Corps and
	what they are trying to do to restore. And Lieutenant General
	Davis, I think, is doing all that he can.
	It is a pipeline issue; how much can we do, and how fast
	can we do it just based on capacity? But give me your
	perspective about where we are with aviation readiness across
	the service branches, and what can we do in the context of
	full-spectrum readiness to get there as soon as possible also?
	General Dunford. Thanks, Congressman.
	There are two issues: One is the state of the current
	aircraft that we have. And, again, we had some difficulty with
	depot-level maintenance and so forth associated with the last
	few years. And so we are in a trough with regard to the
	readiness of the platforms that are in the inventory right now,
	what we call ready basic aircraft.
	And although the Marine Corps perhaps is the most extreme,
	each of the services has similar challenges with regard to the
	ready basic aircraft for deployability, particularly those
	units that are in home station. We are confident that those
	units that are forward deployed have what they need. But those
	units that are at home station have a shortfall of ready basic
	aircraft.
	The path to address the maintenance issue, of course, is
	stable funding in the future, both for our depot-level and also
	for our local-level maintenance. The other issue is the
	modernization piece. Much of the reason we are where we are is
	we deferred modernization, and so the aircraft that we are
	flying is in the inventory longer than it needs to be. So there
	is really two pieces of this that are not unrelated, but they
	both come together.
	So my assessment of what we need to do is, one, we need to
	fully fund our depot-level maintenance and sustain the aircraft
	that are in the inventory; and, number two, we need to stay on
	path for the modernization plan we have to address the long-
	term issue, which we really see manifest itself out in 2021,
	2022, and beyond.
	Mr. Wittman. I want to get perspective from both you and
	Secretary Carter as far as the concept of readiness restoration
	and looking at, how do we get to the point that we need to be?
	And you bring up, I think, an extraordinarily important point.
	Readiness as a term of art has traditionally represented
	training, operation, and maintenance. But I believe it also
	should reflect the element of modernization, because I think
	that is directly tied to readiness.
	I want to get your perspective on where you see
	modernization as part of the list of elements that must be
	attained in restoring readiness.
	Secretary Carter. For my part, you are absolutely right:
	training, maintenance are important parts of readiness. But in
	some forces, and you mentioned aviation, the real answer is the
	replacement of an aircraft that is now so old that it has cost
	too much to maintain, or we are simply not able to maintain
	them at the levels that--so the guys don't have aircraft to
	fly. We are seeing that with respect to the CH-53 in the Marine
	Corps. I am sure you are familiar with that. That is an example
	of it. Also, to take another Marine Corps example, the F-18s in
	the Marine Corps, the older versions of those. So modernization
	is a key part of restoring readiness.
	Chairman.
	General Dunford. I will be very quick. I think I am out of
	time, Congressman. But what I would say is this: I have talked
	about fiscal year 2017 as being sufficient. It is not
	everything we needed, and I subscribed to what the service
	chiefs have said when they came in. But my greatest challenge
	as I look in the budget in the future is the bow wave of
	modernization that is going to come in 2019, 2020, 2021. We
	talked about the nuclear enterprise, but, frankly, it is the
	whole inventory of joint capabilities.
	And we have had 4 or 5 years of deferred modernization
	right now. We have done the best we can to start to rebalance
	that in fiscal year 2017. It took us years to get to where we
	are. It will take us years to get out of where we are.
	But this modernization issue is tomorrow's readiness. I
	equate it to health and wellness. So today we are not as
	healthy as we would want to be, but we can get the job done. We
	are not investing in the health of the organization today,
	which will result in some wellness challenges down the road,
	which will read readiness.
	Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	I yield back.
	The Chairman. Ms. Duckworth.
	Ms. Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	And I just want to take a moment to also express my deep
	condolences and solidarity with our allies in Belgium, across
	NATO, and across the European Union. This morning's cowardly
	terrorist attacks were not only an attack on the people of
	Brussels but an attack against Europe and civilized people
	everywhere who condone such horrific acts of terror.
	Secretary Carter, in your written testimony, you lay out
	five evolving challenges that are driving the Department's
	planning and budget. And I want to focus on the fifth
	challenge: countering terrorism overseas and protecting our
	homeland. In your written testimony, you also outline three
	military objectives to defeat ISIL, and you say the third is
	the most important to protect the homeland again.
	With that in mind, please provide the specific steps the
	Department is taking to coordinate with its interagency
	partners to protect the homeland and what actions Congress
	needs to take to bolster those initiatives, funding,
	legislative.
	Additionally, you mentioned the development of DOD's
	transregional counterterrorism strategy. Could you describe the
	pillars of that strategy and how it complements current efforts
	to deny terrorists a safe haven from which they can train,
	plan, operate, and launch these kind of attacks, for example,
	here in the homeland?
	Secretary Carter. Certainly. And thank you for the
	question.
	I will start and then ask the Chairman to reinforce. You
	are right: our mission of protecting the homeland, which we
	need to do at the same time we fight overseas to defeat ISIL,
	is one we share with the Intelligence Community, with law
	enforcement at all levels, and also with Homeland Security. And
	we work very closely with them.
	Through NORTHCOM [Northern Command], we have a command that
	actually has precisely that mission, which is to protect the
	homeland by working with other interagency partners. We do
	that. We have plans to reinforce them if they request it. In an
	incident, we support them all the time with equipment,
	technology, intelligence, and so forth. And it is a two-way
	street. We work with them. It is a very smooth working
	relationship, and the Chairman can elaborate more on that.
	One thing I want to particularly ask him to elaborate on is
	your second point about transregional. One of the things that I
	am looking at in connection with the so-called Goldwater-
	Nichols issue is strengthening the role of the Joint Chiefs of
	Staff and the Chairman in precisely this way, the transregional
	coordination. We have combatant commanders. They are excellent,
	but they are focused on particular regions.
	I look to the Chairman--and he does an excellent job of
	this--of balancing resources and making sure that the different
	COCOMs [combatant commands] are cooperating, both in NORTHCOM
	and the other combatant commanders. Let me ask him to
	elaborate.
	General Dunford. Congresswoman, to be specific, what we did
	back in November, we asked the Special Operations Command to
	take the lead, not from a special operations perspective but
	because they did have connective tissue in each one of our
	combatant commands, and they were capable of doing this.
	To begin the development of a transregional terrorism plan
	and countering violent extremism writ large, we have been
	working at that now for a couple months. We most recently had a
	meeting in The Tank on Friday afternoon where I convened the
	Joint Chiefs and all of our combatant commands to look at this.
	Critical to that is having a common operational picture and
	a common intel picture across all of our combatant commands, so
	that is the first part. The second thing is having an
	assessment process that integrates what all the combatant
	commanders see transregionally into a single vision that the
	Secretary of Defense can see.
	And then, as the Secretary alluded to at the end of his
	comments, a process to make recommendations for the
	prioritization and allocation of resources across all the
	combatant commands so that, much like we are trying to provide
	pressure across ISIL in Iraq and Syria, we are trying to do
	that transregionally at the same time. So we are very focused
	on that.
	You asked a specific question about, what are we doing to
	improve our interagency, and I would add to that interagency
	and international cooperation, which is very critical. Within
	the interagency, we meet routinely now and the Secretary and
	Secretary Kerry lead the effort. We meet routinely to do deep
	dives on issues like resourcing or foreign fighters or
	intelligence sharing.
	And with regard to our partners, we have a very promising
	initiative in Jordan right now where we have, I think we are up
	to 15 nations that participate in an information and
	intelligence exchange to help us just on the problem of foreign
	fighters. And so those kind of collaborative processes are
	really necessary.
	And to be honest with you, there is a lot of walls for us
	to break down in order for us to be effective. And that is what
	we are in the process of doing. And our transregional plan is
	designed not only to integrate our capabilities across the
	combatant commands but also with our coalition partners, and
	this plan will be borne with a coalition perspective in mind.
	Ms. Duckworth. Thank you. I am very interested in the
	Jordan initiative, and perhaps I will have my staff follow up
	with your office, if that is possible.
	Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
	The Chairman. Mr. Gibson.
	Mr. Gibson. Well, thanks, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
	panelists.
	The attack this morning reminds us we are still at war with
	an evil, determined enemy that must be defeated.
	And earlier in the testimony today, we had discussion about
	restoring deterrence as well, peace through strength. And I am
	interested in hearing first from General Dunford. The RAND
	Corporation has published a study, Limiting Regret: Building
	the Army We Will Need, and here we are talking about the ERI
	[European Reassurance Initiative] initiative.
	And RAND concludes that we are going to need three armored
	brigade combat teams and associated forces to restore a
	credible deterrence. I am interested to know whether or not you
	agree with that assessment, and if you don't, then what you
	think is necessary to restore that credible deterrence.
	And then, for both the Secretary and for the Chief, I have
	a bill, a bipartisan bill, over 40 cosponsors now, the POSTURE
	Act, which stops the drawdown for the Army and the Marine
	Corps. That is the total Army, the Army, the National Guard,
	the Army Reserve, and the Active Duty Marine Corps and the
	Marine Corps Reserve.
	Assuming that that would come with the necessary resources
	for operations so that we don't hollow out the force and the
	complement of modernization that goes with it, I am interested
	in your assessment on how that would impact the risk that we
	currently have, given the fact that earlier in your testimony
	today, Mr. Secretary, you talked about where we are today was
	based on a series of assumptions which have changed.
	So how would this POSTURE Act, if enacted with the
	necessary resources so we don't hollow out the force, how do
	you assess that would impact the risk, and how might these
	additional land forces be arrayed to deal with things, such as
	the ERI?
	Secretary Carter. I will start. On the two issues, first,
	with the armored brigade combat teams, the Chairman can
	elaborate, and I don't want to go into our operational plans
	here. But we are developing our operational plans for the
	defense of NATO territory against both ordinary attack and what
	I called earlier hybrid warfare, and we are developing those
	plans and the requirements that come from them.
	I am not familiar with the particular report that you cite,
	but that is now a necessity as a consequence of Russian
	behavior, as I said in my opening statement.
	With respect to Army and Marine Corps end strength, the
	Chairman can speak to that also, and I am sure the chiefs have
	as well. But I will just, both in the Army and the Marine
	Corps, their emphasis to me in the preparation of this budget
	has been on readiness. And they have end-strength plans to come
	down from the levels that they were previously, and their
	priority is the readiness of the force not changing those end-
	strength goals. I concur with that.
	Chairman.
	General Dunford. Congressman, we have made a down payment.
	You talk about what do we need in Europe, and, of course, it is
	not just about Army forces; it is the aggregate of joint
	capability. In the ERI, I think you know that we have an
	armored BCT's [brigade combat team's] worth of equipment at
	division headquarters, engineering equipment on other units
	that are part of our prepositioned stocks.
	We also pay for a constant presence of another brigade
	combat team that will be over there for exercises and assurance
	for our partners as well as deterrence. What the overall number
	is that we may have a year or 2 or 3 years down the road I
	couldn't speculate. I don't think the RAND study is wildly off
	base, but, again, to me, it is a function of not just looking
	at Army presence in isolation but looking at the aggregate of
	joint capability that will do what we need it to do, which is
	assure our partners as well as deter.
	With regard to the end-strength issue, Congressman, my
	greatest concern is, in fact, that we have balance in the
	force, and we have not only the right force structure, but we
	have the right capability. And you hit it exactly right: if we
	are going to grow the force, we need to make sure that the
	infrastructure supports that; we need to make sure that the
	manpower supports that; we need to make sure the equipment
	modernization supports that; and then the operations, the
	maintenance dollars that will allow us to train that force as
	well.
	So all of those levers have to be adjusted at the same
	time. Otherwise, the force gets out of balance. And that is why
	our focus this year was on capability over capacity. The reason
	is we felt like we were getting out of balance where we didn't
	actually have the right amount of training, the right amount of
	equipment in place to make sure the units that we had were at
	the highest level of readiness possible.
	Mr. Gibson. Well, thank you, General.
	And let me just say for my colleagues and for the American
	people watching at home for the record that we are on path to
	draw down our land forces to pre-World War II levels. We had
	General Milley here last week, and he describes the array and
	the mission set, and given the changes to the assumption as
	high risk and given the fact that when you turn this off, it
	takes 3 to 4 years to actually get the combat readiness
	restored, I think this bipartisan bill, we need to summon the
	will, get the resources, and get it enacted.
	And, with that, I know my time has expired. Thank you,
	Chairman.
	The Chairman. Mr. Scott.
	Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Gentlemen, thank you for being here today.
	General Dunford, your statement warns of an expanding
	Iranian malign influence and increasing capability in the
	region. In your assessment, is Iran more or less capable today,
	militarily speaking, than they were the day the nuclear deal
	was signed?
	General Dunford. Congressman, I believe that Iran was
	spreading malign influences. They were capable of doing that
	before the agreement, and I think they are capable of doing it
	after the agreement. I haven't seen any measurable increase in
	their capabilities. But, again, I am under no illusion about
	what Iran's intent is, what their capabilities are, or what the
	current level of activity is across the Middle East.
	Mr. Scott. Have you seen any change in their behavior?
	General Dunford. I have not seen any specific change in
	their behavior, Congressman, with the caveat that they were
	spreading malign influence before the agreement, and they
	continue to do so.
	Mr. Scott. Absolutely, now they have $150 billion to help
	them spread it. And if there has been no change in the
	behavior, then certainly my concern is that the world is not
	more safe but less safe with them having that money.
	Just a couple of quotes from the President, if I may:
	Today, after 2 years of negotiations, the United States,
	together with our international partners, has achieved
	something that decades of animosity has not, a comprehensive
	long-term deal with Iran that will prevent it from obtaining a
	nuclear weapon. The deal offers an opportunity to move in a new
	direction, a different path, one of tolerance and peaceful
	resolution of conflict.
	Another quote, September 10 of 2015: This is a victory for
	democracy, for American national security, and the safety and
	security of the world.
	And then the budget that was presented, and I agree with
	the budget statement: Iran's malign activities in pursuit of
	missile technology continue to pose a threat to our interests
	and allies in the region. To combat those threats the budget
	continues efforts to hold Iran accountable for its
	destabilizing behavior by advancing preparations, posture,
	regional partnerships, and planning to preserve the President's
	options for any contingency.
	So one statement September, a budget statement 5 months
	later.
	Secretary Hagel--what is the Defense Department doing to
	mitigate what is a clearly growing risk from the Iranian
	ballistic missile program?
	Secretary Carter. Well, thank you for that.
	And you are right: the nuclear deal with Iran was about
	their nuclear weapons program and, if implemented--and we will
	know whether it is implemented or not--will keep them from
	having a nuclear weapon. That doesn't stop them from having
	other capabilities and exhibiting other behavior that concerns
	us.
	One of those is ballistic missiles. That is why we are
	strengthening our ballistic missile defenses in the region, in
	Europe, to defend our friends and allies there, our own forces
	there that are deployed there. That is why we have Aegis
	Afloat. That is why we have Aegis Ashore. That is why our other
	partners procured those same missile defenses from us, and that
	is why we help Israel with its defense against short-range
	rockets, both the Iron Dome system and the David's Sling
	system.
	They are also, by the way, developing the Arrow system
	against longer range missiles. We help them with that too. So
	we are doing a great deal in the missile defense area in that
	region.
	Chairman, if you have anything.
	Mr. Scott. If I can quote James Clapper, the Director of
	National Intelligence, what he said to SASC [Senate Armed
	Services Committee] on February 9: Iran probably views the
	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action as a means to remove
	sanctions while preserving nuclear capabilities.
	General Austin, March 8, 2016: We have not seen any
	indication that they--meaning the Iranians--intend to pursue a
	different path.
	Now, I think he is talking about with regard to their
	malign activities, not specifically with nuclear, with regard
	to General Austin's statement there.
	But just a few things that they have done since then: Aside
	from what they did to our sailors, they have continued to test
	ballistic missiles. October 11, 2015, they tested a new
	generation of surface-to-surface missiles. The U.N. [United
	Nations] stated this test violated U.N. Security Council
	Resolution 1929.
	On November 21, 2015, they launched another medium-range
	missile. On March 8 of this year, Iran launched several
	missiles from multiple sites around the country. The Iranian
	general who commands the program stated: Revolutionary Guard
	Corps does not give in to threats.
	Secretary Carter.
	Secretary Carter. The nuclear agreement, and I said at the
	time that it was struck, hasn't changed our commitments in the
	Department of Defense at all. We remain postured and committed
	to defending our friends and allies, our own interests in the
	region, and countering Iran's malign influence in all of these
	areas.
	It is good if it is implemented, which it is being so far,
	at eliminating the nuclear danger. But for everything else, we
	remain full speed ahead and on course for what we were doing
	last year, the year before. And those programs are just
	building. I will see if the Chairman wants to add anything, but
	we have a major commitment there.
	Mr. Scott. My time has expired. But I just don't understand
	why we wouldn't have included other threats in any type of deal
	that gave them $150 billion.
	The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
	Dr. Wenstrup.
	Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	I would like to, if we could for a second, talk about our
	current rules of engagement in our theaters of operation. I
	have service members who are leaving the military, and they are
	coming to me saying that this is dangerous. We are not able to
	engage in a way that will allow us to defeat our enemy.
	And I understand the need to try and keep down civilian
	casualties. I get that completely. But I have a concern that we
	are protecting our enemies more than we are those that we are
	sacrificing to try and save. And that is the real concern.
	Throughout our history, we have people that have given
	their lives so that others can live. And with what we see
	taking place, my concern is that every time we let an enemy go,
	because of our very restrictive rules of engagement, hundreds
	if not thousands of more innocents are killed. They become
	fatalities because of genocide. Are we really winning?
	And so I would like you to address our rules of engagement
	that I am hearing so many complaints about from our service
	members.
	Secretary Carter. We assess and reassess them all the time,
	including on a strike-by-strike basis. So your question is very
	apt, very appropriate, and we try to balance those things. We
	do it every day, and we do it in a very practical way.
	Dr. Wenstrup. Mr. Secretary, when was the last time we
	changed them?
	Secretary Carter. Geez, we modify them all the time. Let me
	ask the Chairman to explain.
	Dr. Wenstrup. Sure.
	General Dunford. Congressman, I would like to distinguish
	between rules of engagement and collateral damage. Those have
	been conflated a bit in some of the discussion. I have heard
	the same thing you have. And I want to make it clear on the
	rules of engagement, those are enduring.
	And any time one of our young soldiers, sailors, airmen,
	and marines is in harm's way, and it is a hostile intent and
	that you can positively identify an enemy, they can engage.
	That hasn't changed. There is no restriction on our ability to
	do what must be done to protect themselves.
	With regard to collateral damage, we make an assessment
	virtually every time we engage. And right now, we start with a
	baseline of zero civilians. But I am here to tell you, if we
	have a target that justifies an expanded view of collateral
	damage in a particular case, we will make that adjustment.
	So to your question, when was the last time we changed, I
	can't assure you that it was this morning, but I can assure you
	it was probably sometime in the last couple days where General
	Austin made a decision to expand the number of civilian
	casualties that might be incurred in a particular target given
	the importance of that target.
	What we have tried not to do is make enemies of the very
	people that we are trying to protect in places like Iraq and
	Syria. And we also try to make sure that, at the end of the
	day, we don't become the enemy. We are fighting with our
	values. And at the end of the day, 5, 10 years from now when
	this war is over, it will be because we won the war of values
	and the war of ideas, not because we dropped a bomb in one
	place or another.
	Dr. Wenstrup. I understand that is a very fine balance. I
	personally would give my life so my family could live, if that
	is what it came down to.
	My other concern comes to, are we in any way, shape, or
	form trying to work out an international or system of justice
	for those that we detain? We are not dealing with a Timothy
	McVeigh here with domestic terror, and we are not dealing with
	a World War II situation where at the end of the war we sign a
	peace treaty and return our POWs [prisoners of war]. We are
	releasing people from Guantanamo. Some are returning to the
	fight.
	Do we really have a formal system of justice? We are a
	country of laws, and we have a system of justice, and I think
	that is an expectation. And I haven't seen us going in that
	direction.
	Secretary Carter. Well, thank you.
	We have various possibilities for detention if we take a
	prisoner. There is law-of-war detention. There is detention by
	transfer to another country. We did that, for example, in the
	case of the Umm Sayyaf raid and Abu Sayyaf raid, where the
	custody became the Government of Iraq. And then we have the
	possibility of criminal prosecution in Article III courts,
	which has also been exercised by the United States, a number of
	convictions.
	With respect to Guantanamo, what you say is the reason why
	we are looking for--and I personally support this--a place to
	detain those people who are in Guantanamo Bay. Let me be clear
	about this. There are people in GTMO [Guantanamo Bay] that it
	will not be safe to transfer to another location. I won't sign
	off on their transfer to another location for just the reason
	you described.
	Dr. Wenstrup. I appreciate it.
	Secretary Carter. So that is why we need an alternative
	detention facility for law-of-war detainees. We need to be
	extremely careful about that, and that is why I would like to
	find an alternative location.
	Dr. Wenstrup. Well, I would also like to see a more clear
	system of justice rather than we could do one, two, or three
	things.
	But my time has expired. Thank you, sir.
	The Chairman. Mr. Langevin.
	Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	And I want to thank our witnesses for appearing before the
	committee today. We certainly all greatly appreciate your
	service to the Nation and over the course of your very
	distinguished career, so we thank you for your service.
	Secretary Carter and General Dunford, over the past decade,
	the Department has had to reconcile the reality of a reemerging
	great power competition with the size and composition of our
	own military today.
	Secretary, I highly commend and am very supportive of your
	vision for the third offset strategy and look forward to seeing
	how that unfolds and look forward to being supportive as we
	make that transformation.
	Beyond that, as we evaluate the architecture of our future
	fighting force, what should the balance between the forward-
	deployed power and sufficient surge Ready Reserve capacity look
	like across the services?
	Secretary Carter. Well, first of all, thank you for your
	support for our technology efforts, third offset, and so forth.
	It is an important part of planning for the future. I said,
	this is a budget that tries to turn a corner and, while dealing
	with today's threats, also look ahead 10, 20, 30 years from
	now, and particularly to high-end potential opponents that we
	haven't had to worry about as much in recent years. So thank
	you for your support for that.
	And I am sorry; the second part of your question?
	Mr. Langevin. Sure. Just saying that as we evaluate the
	architecture of our fighting force, what should the balance
	between a forward-deployed power and sufficient surge Ready
	Reserve capacity look like across the services?
	Secretary Carter. I will start and then maybe the Chairman
	can pitch in.
	It is important to have forward forces because they are the
	first edge of the response to a crisis, number one; number two,
	their being there is a way of working with friends and allies
	so we don't have to do everything ourselves. So it is an
	important part of our building partner capacity capability.
	But what deters is the full weight of the American military
	that would arrive on the scene after those initial forces had
	engaged. And I think that is what we--when we talk about
	deterring opponents, what deters them is not just what is right
	there in front of them; what deters them is the full weight of
	the American military that will arise.
	And so our surge forces are a critical part of the
	deterrent. And no one should measure our deterrent capability
	by what we have forward presence. That is an indication, but it
	is not the whole story.
	Chairman.
	General Dunford. Congressman, getting that balance right is
	dynamic. And to assure you, every year, we gather up all the
	combatant commanders' requirements for both the crisis response
	and assurance mission as well as what they need for major,
	major operations plan contingency.
	And so we make adjustments annually to make sure that we
	get that balance right between those forces that have forward
	deployed, forward engaged on a day-to-day basis, providing us
	access, making sure that we are prepared to respond to crisis,
	and also making sure that the residual capabilities and
	capacities on the bench, if you will, are prepared for a major
	contingency.
	So when you ask what is the right balance, it is a constant
	process of evaluation to make sure we do exactly what you are
	suggesting we should do, which is get that balance right.
	Mr. Langevin. Thank you, both of you.
	Going back to the third offset strategy--and, again, very
	supportive of that--and the technology game changing, and it is
	going to help provide us with the advantages that we need,
	especially on cybersecurity, which I have been a strong
	proponent on and other technologies.
	But, Secretary, how do you believe we can best direct our
	investments and our policies to ensure that the progress that
	we made toward achieving a third offset strategy is sustained
	into the next administration?
	Secretary Carter. Well, I think in this and in other
	matters, the strategic logic behind our investments this year,
	behind this 2017 budget, is intended to point the direction
	toward the future. So we have crafted it carefully. And I think
	that both--it is the needs it highlights in terms of the five
	challenges and what we have put in motion, especially including
	these technology efforts are so compelling that I am confident
	that they will continue into the future.
	Mr. Langevin. And Secretary Carter, I have been one of the
	biggest proponents of cybersecurity as a critical warfighting
	domain during my time in Congress. And I believe it is
	imperative that the services understand the cybersecurity
	requirements laid before them when it comes to much-needed DOD
	programs and weapons systems in order to avoid serious cost
	impacts and schedule delays.
	How are we managing cybersecurity at an enterprise level
	and incorporating cyber technologies into program requirements
	sooner? And I guess, we will have to answer that one for the
	record.
	[The information referred to was not available at the time
	of printing.]
	The Chairman. Secretary, if you would, please. Thank you.
	Mr. Langevin. Thank you. And I will yield back.
	The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
	Mrs. Walorski.
	Mrs. Walorski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Thank you, Mr. Secretary and General Dunford, for being
	here.
	Mr. Secretary, just following up on Representative
	Wenstrup's question, but are you aware of any discussions to
	close the naval station at Guantanamo Bay or transfer it to
	Cuba?
	Secretary Carter. I am not, no.
	Mrs. Walorski. General Dunford, same question for you. Are
	you aware of any discussions to close the naval station at
	Guantanamo Bay or transfer it to Cuba?
	General Dunford. I am not, Congresswoman.
	Mrs. Walorski. Mr. Secretary, your department delivered a
	product in February entitled ``Plan for Closing the Guantanamo
	Bay Detention Facility.'' However, this document failed to
	address the specific elements required by the fiscal year 2016
	NDAA. Therefore, as this committee has previously stated, the
	requirement has not been met.
	In this document, there were three options outlined for
	handling future detainees. They were on a case-by-case basis:
	number one was prosecution of the military commission system or
	in Federal court; two, transfer to another country for an
	appropriate disposition there; or, three, law-of-war detention.
	Yet, in recent testimony, senior Department of Defense
	officials testified that--and I am referencing this article in
	Stars and Stripes--they testified there is a requirement for a
	long-term detention but, quote, ``they do not know where long-
	term prisoners would be housed,'' which, I think this is very
	troubling testimony, Mr. Secretary, considering we currently do
	have a location.
	So my question is, prior to conducting an operation where
	capturing individuals is either intended or possible, do you
	have to determine which of these three options is appropriate?
	Secretary Carter. Generally speaking, we do and have and
	that has worked out. And with respect to the report, if I can
	just respond to that----
	Mrs. Walorski. Sure.
	Secretary Carter [continuing]. And the question of
	location. We were not specific about a location, and the reason
	for that is this: The optimal location for a law-of-war
	detention facility will depend upon several things that we
	don't know right now. For example, we don't know whether the
	Congress is going to respond to this idea. If we can do it
	quickly, then we will probably pick an existing facility and
	try to build on that. If we have----
	Mrs. Walorski. An existing facility in this country or----
	Secretary Carter. Yes. And if we have a longer period of
	time, we may build a new facility from scratch. It will depend
	upon the number of detainees that we have and that we plan for.
	It will depend upon the structure of the military commissions
	process, which is something which is set in statute, by the
	way.
	So the very reason that we have to discuss this with the
	Congress--and we submitted this plan. Because let me be clear,
	it is forbidden by law to do this now, so we need your
	concurrence----
	Mrs. Walorski. Oh, I understand. I am very familiar with
	the law.
	Secretary Carter [continuing]. About that. And the reason
	that the plan calls for a dialogue between us and the Hill is
	that we can't select the optimal design and, therefore, the
	optimal location and, therefore, fully do the costing until
	that conversation has been had, because you guys have a say----
	Mrs. Walorski. I understand.
	Secretary Carter [continuing]. In the design parameters of
	the ultimate facility.
	But I hope you will give it consideration. I have said--and
	I believe this--I think it would be good to put this on a path
	to being dealt with by the time the administrations change.
	Mrs. Walorski. I understand. And I apologize for
	interrupting. I guess, two things. You and I have talked about
	this for months. But two things: I think the American people
	look at this, as I do, as a very dangerous precedent; that we
	are looking at potentially bringing these terrorists with blood
	on their hands that have already killed Americans back to this
	soil, which I think is reprehensible.
	But, secondly, we were just reminded again with this
	bombing this morning in Brussels that there is an active war on
	terror. And I have been sitting here 3 hours, and the first
	question the chairman asked was about strategy and things that
	were supposed to be handed over to the Congress in February,
	and they still haven't. And I look at this kind of as the same
	thing, that we are still waiting for some kind of a detailed
	plan that the President said would be made available and you
	have too.
	My question is this: Is it possible that, due to such
	factors as bureaucratic obstacles, delays in timing, inability
	to negotiate with another country, that an opportunity to
	conduct a capture operation would be lost? Or, in other words,
	would this issue of not being able to have a place for future
	detainees--because of the President's desire to close
	Guantanamo and bring those terrorists here--ever inhibit a
	question on these attacks that we are doing with ISIL and
	engaging with them the issue of, like, let's not go there
	because we don't know, and we don't want these long-term
	prisoners?
	Secretary Carter. That has not occurred in my observation.
	Let me ask the Chairman.
	General Dunford. No, Congresswoman. And, frankly, that
	would be one of the first things that I would ask if we were
	asked to do something is--that is going to be part of the
	decision making to go after an individual--is, what is going to
	be the disposition of that individual?
	Mrs. Walorski. And what if the answer comes back? Because
	we know there are long-term situations now engaging. What if
	the answer comes back and says: We simply don't know? Or GTMO,
	because GTMO is an operation right now that is there?
	Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	The Chairman. Mr. Byrne.
	Mr. Byrne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Mr. Secretary, obviously, we are here on a day of tragedy,
	tragedy for the Belgians, tragedy for the world. ISIS is now
	taking responsibility for the murders this morning. We had a
	marine that was killed last weekend in Iraq. I know you feel
	that personally. We have a law that we passed called the
	National Defense Authorization Act. It required you to submit
	to the Congress by February the 15th a plan for defeating these
	people.
	I know you told the chairman that it was imminent. The
	statute says you shall do it by February the 15th. You are in
	violation of the law. When an average American is in violation
	of the law, there are consequences. Would you care to explain
	to the committee why there shouldn't be consequences for your
	failure to follow a law that was signed by your President?
	Secretary Carter. Well, I already explained that that
	report will be in front of you imminently. With respect to the
	larger question----
	Mr. Byrne. Mr. Secretary, that is not my question. The
	statute says you shall do it by February the 15th. Do you not
	agree that you are in violation of that law?
	Secretary Carter. We are going to submit that report. It
	has taken some time. It is not just a department----
	Mr. Byrne. I am going to ask you again. Do you not agree
	that you are in violation of the law?
	Secretary Carter. We will have that report to you shortly,
	Congressman.
	Mr. Byrne. I don't think that is a satisfactory response.
	When we pass a law around here, it means something. Now,
	people's lives are at stake. You know that better than any of
	the rest of us.
	Secretary Carter. Well, the people's lives aren't at stake
	over a report.
	Mr. Byrne. Excuse me for a minute, Mr. Secretary. It is not
	too much to ask that you comply with the laws that we pass and
	the President signs.
	Secretary Carter. As the Chairman----
	Mr. Byrne. So it is not sufficient for you to say it is
	imminent. You need to give us a plan now.
	Let me ask you about another report. You are also required
	to submit when the President puts forth his budget a 30-year
	ship plan for the Navy. You didn't do that either. That is a
	statutory requirement. Why didn't you submit a 30-year ship
	plan?
	Secretary Carter. I don't know about the 30-year ship plan.
	We have a number of these statutory plans. We work on them very
	hard. There are many, many, many of them, Congressman.
	Let me ask Mr. McCord if he knows the status of that
	particular one, the second one that the Congressman raised.
	Secretary McCord. I believe it is in process also and is
	nearing completion.
	Mr. Byrne. Well, under the law, that was supposed to be
	submitted with the President's budget request. Now, the
	existing ship plan we have got calls for 52 littoral combat
	ships [LCS]. You have not amended that plan. You have requested
	40. The Secretary of the Navy has told us in this room he needs
	52. He has told us there is no study to change that. Mr.
	Stackley, his Assistant Secretary for Acquisitions, says there
	is no Navy study or analysis that would change that. You have
	no 30-year ship plan to change that, yet you've tried to
	unilaterally change it in the budget. What is your basis, if
	you have no 30-year ship plan that updates the 52 request, when
	there is no Navy analysis, what is your basis for reducing the
	ship request from 52 to 40 on the LCS?
	Secretary Carter. The basis is this, and this is something
	that we decided all jointly, and that the joint requirement--
	that we were going to buy 40 and not 52 littoral combat ships.
	The littoral combat ship is successful. It is good at what it
	does. It is better than the mine countermeasure ships it
	replaces. It is better than the coastal patrol craft it
	replaces. But 40 is enough.
	And the reason we made that decision is that we thought--we
	believe and were convinced that the money is better spent on
	ships that are more capable. We are looking for more capable
	and lethal ships as well as more ships in the Navy. And we also
	added----
	Mr. Byrne. If the Navy has no analysis on that, where's
	your analysis? Do you have a report?
	Secretary Carter. We did an analysis in the course of----
	Mr. Byrne. Where is it?
	Secretary Carter [continuing]. Of preparing the budget. We
	did a lot over the course of the last summer, and we can
	provide that to you.
	Mr. Byrne. Shouldn't it be in that ship plan?
	Secretary Carter. We can provide that to you. But the point
	I am making is a very important strategic one, which is we need
	ships that are more capable and more lethal and more high end.
	That is one of the themes of this whole budget. So exactly the
	point you are raising is one of the very themes----
	Mr. Byrne. Mr. Secretary, if that is so important, why
	wouldn't you give us a new ship plan? Because your old ship
	plan, the one----
	Secretary Carter. I am sure the shipbuilding plan will
	reflect that.
	Mr. Byrne. You were supposed to give it to us when the
	President's budget was submitted. Now, you and your staff may
	not think these laws are important, but they are.
	People wonder why the people of America are angry right
	now. They are angry because people in Washington feel like they
	are above the law. And none of us, Mr. Secretary, I am not
	above the law, and you are not above the law. Give us a plan
	for the Middle East and give us some sort of analysis that is
	different from the Navy's analysis on reducing the LCS request
	from 52 to 40.
	And I yield back.
	Secretary Carter. We will provide those reports.
	The Chairman. Ms. McSally.
	Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
	gentlemen.
	Secretary Carter, could you just prioritize--I know you
	have a lot of choices to make and priorities to make--low,
	medium, or high, the fight against ISIS, the military fight
	against ISIS in the next 5 years?
	Secretary Carter. Oh, that is extremely high.
	Ms. McSally. How about the priority of ensuring that if we
	do send our troops into harm's way, that they have the best
	capability overhead for close air support should they come
	under fire?
	Secretary Carter. Close air support is a critical part of
	the joint capability.
	Ms. McSally. So high as well? Great.
	How about if we have an American who has to eject or is
	shot down or an isolated personnel and they need the best
	capabilities overhead for combat search and rescue to be able
	to get them out of there. Low, medium, or high?
	Secretary Carter. Well, combat search and rescue is a must
	have everywhere we have forces deployed.
	Let me ask the Chairman if he has----
	Ms. McSally. Just in general. That is just the context. I
	think you would agree high, right?
	General Dunford [continuing]. Right----
	Ms. McSally. So I am pleased to see that you are choosing
	not to mothball any A-10s in this fiscal year, but I am deeply
	concerned about the 5-year plan based on you sharing that those
	priorities are all high. We have mothballed the equivalent of
	four A-10 squadrons since 2012. We have only nine remaining,
	and there are actually less airplanes in them than they used to
	have.
	The squadron I commanded used to have 24, and now they are
	down to 18. They are currently in three theaters, South Korea,
	Europe, and in the fight against ISIS. And I think you saw that
	firsthand.
	I am confused about some statements and really
	contradictions in the 5-year plan, so I just want to see if I
	can figure this out. The F-35 requirements document says that
	the A-10 will be replaced by the F-35. The F-35 is supposed to
	replace the A-10. That is part of the requirements document.
	We have highlighted over the last year--I have--in many
	hearings concerns about shortfalls. We need a fifth-generation
	fighter. But when it comes to close air support, the F-35
	having shortfalls in loiter time, lethality, weapons load, the
	ability to take a direct hit, the ability to fly close combat
	and be able to survive, and their night capability and their
	digital targeting capability.
	Because of that, your [office of] Operation[al] Test and
	Evaluation has agreed to do a fly-off between the F-35 and the
	A-10 as part of the evaluation of the F-35, which we were glad
	to see, because we are concerned that this space is going to
	have increased risk until we see if there is a proven
	replacement.
	But in your budget, you say that the A-10s will be replaced
	squadron by squadron by the F-35s. So that seems to me that the
	outcome is being predetermined. That is my first concern. We
	are yet to have a fly-off. We think that is going to happen in
	fiscal year 2018 or 2019, yet you are saying that we are
	predetermining the outcome that the A-10s will be replaced
	squadron by squadron by the F-35.
	Similarly, we have the Air Force leadership, when asked in
	a March 3 hearing--and then I followed up last week--basically
	said the F-35 is really not going to replace the A-10. That is
	going to be more the F-16 and the F-15E, which contradicts the
	requirements doc and contradicts your own statement.
	If you look at the Air Force's 5-year plan, they are going
	to put 49 A-10s in the boneyard in fiscal year 2019, another 49
	in fiscal year 2020, 64 the year after that, 96 the year after
	that. Basically, they are getting rid of the A-10. But the fly-
	off isn't going to happen until at least fiscal year 2018. We
	won't be able to see the outcome of whether we are going to
	have a decrease in capabilities until at least a couple years
	down the line.
	So I am just concerned about these contradictions. The Air
	Force recently is saying that manning is their challenge, that
	this is their newest excuse as to why they need to be starting
	to put the A-10 in the boneyard, talking about how they just
	don't have the manning.
	And yet last we looked at, we have got hundreds of people
	that are playing the tuba and the clarinet wearing the uniform
	as opposed to core military capabilities. If we really had a
	manning crisis, from my perspective, we would tell people to
	put down the tuba and pick up a wrench or a gun, but we are not
	at that place.
	So I am just concerned with where we are right now in these
	conflicting statements. So I just ask you, General Dunford, do
	you think that if we put the A-10 in the boneyard before we
	have a proven tested replacement for these high-priority
	missions, will there be a risk to American lives?
	General Dunford. Congresswoman, what we need in the joint
	force is the ability to deliver close air support effectively.
	That is, as you know, it is not just a flat formation; it is a
	training issue and so forth.
	Ms. McSally. Right.
	General Dunford. So as the advocate for close air support
	and joint capabilities, I absolutely believe that we need a
	transition plan, and there needs to be a replacement for the A-
	10 before it goes away. There is no question.
	Ms. McSally. So that means you don't agree with us putting
	it in the boneyard before we even assess whether the F-35 would
	replace it?
	General Dunford. What I don't agree with is getting rid of
	a capability without replacing it. And what I can tell you,
	without going into great length, is we recently met with all
	the chiefs--General Welsh was there--to take a look at the
	issue of close air support as a whole and to make sure that we
	are looking carefully at the platforms that are being
	introduced, what capability gaps will exist, how do we mitigate
	those gaps, and from that, if we can't mitigate the gap, how
	does that inform the program in the future.
	So I can tell you that the interest that Congress has
	generated quite a bit of interest inside the Department. And
	again, as the proponent for joint capabilities, I can assure
	you I will look at this from a close air support perspective to
	make sure the joint force has the close air support capability
	that it needs to have.
	Ms. McSally. Thanks. My time has expired, but I just want
	to say, I believe we need a conditional-based replacement not a
	time-based replacement; that we shouldn't be putting any more
	of these in the boneyard until the fly-off is done and A-X [A-
	10 replacement aircraft] is developed; and we make sure that we
	are not putting more American lives at risk.
	The Chairman. Mr. Coffman.
	Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	Mr. Coffman. Mr. Chairman, General Dunford, first of all,
	thank you all for your service to our country.
	General Dunford, how would you assess our combined arms
	capability today that we have been involved in
	counterinsurgency warfare for quite some time, although we are
	more to an advise and assist role. But I am concerned about
	just the fact that we haven't trained for some time. And how
	would you make that assessment?
	General Dunford. Congressman, there is no question that
	over the course of almost a decade involved in primarily
	counterinsurgency operations, the joint force's ability to
	integrate combined arms at the high end eroded. We are probably
	about 2\1/2\ years or 3 years into focusing on that once again.
	Are we where we need to be? No, we are not. And that is
	exactly why we are focused on both restoring full-spectrum
	readiness as well as making sure our exercises regenerate the
	kind of capability that we had some 10 or 15 years ago, that we
	are all confident that we had 10 or 15 years ago.
	Mr. Coffman. Thank you.
	Mr. Secretary and General Dunford, I am concerned that--I
	would hope respectively that we would take a harder look at
	shifting more capability to the Guard and Reserve and also not
	allowing them to lapse into being a strategic reserve and to
	somehow maintain them as an operational reserve.
	Now, take a look at their training requirements, take a
	look at potentially mobilizing them on a periodic basis even in
	a peacetime role to maintain their effectiveness. But I think
	that we are not taking a hard enough look prospectively at
	being able to more cost-effectively maintain our capability but
	to utilize the Guard and Reserve more. And I wonder if both of
	you could comment on that.
	Secretary Carter. I concur with you that we need to do more
	thinking. We are doing more thinking. I think that the simple
	dichotomy between an operational reserve and a strategic
	reserve made sense in the Cold War. I think the Reserve
	Component proved its versatility in the course of the years of
	war in Iraq and Afghanistan and is proving uniquely valuable in
	some particular areas.
	I mentioned cyber earlier. That is very important. That is
	not a niche. It is not exotic. It is a critical part of our
	future. And so I think being creative and effective about the
	use of the Reserve Component for strategic effect, not as a
	strategic reserve in the old Cold War sense, absolutely. We are
	thinking that way, and we need to continue to think that way.
	Chairman.
	General Dunford. Congressman, one of my responsibilities on
	behalf of the Secretary is global force management. And I can
	assure you right now in virtually every place where we are, the
	joint force, the Guard and Reserve are fully integrated into
	that. And, of course, as you know, the difference between a
	strategic reserve and the operational reserve is that we
	wouldn't typically be using them to meet the kind of
	requirements that we are meeting today.
	But you can go to South America today. I was there last
	week. Guard and Reserve are down there doing partnership
	capacity. You can go to Africa. You can go to Asia. You can
	look at BCTs [brigade combat teams] that are being mobilized to
	participate in operations, elements of BCTs to participate in
	operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
	So I would tell you today the Guard and Reserve are fully
	integrated in meeting all the commitments that the joint force
	has. And I would envision that to be the case in the future,
	not just because it helps to maintain effective Guard and
	Reserve but because we actually can't meet our requirements
	without fully integrating the Guard and Reserve into our
	overall force management processes.
	Mr. Coffman. Thank you.
	I do think that there are--when I look at the personnel
	cost differences between an Active Duty soldier and Guard and
	Reserve member, nondeployed, that they are fairly
	extraordinary. And so whatever we can do, I think, to be able
	to save money but maintain capability I think we really need to
	take a look at going forward.
	I think the last question, in your view, this attack in
	Belgium, is it a result of the fact that we are making gains in
	Iraq and Syria in terms of rolling back ISIS and ISIS needs to
	maintain the narrative of being ascendant in order to attract
	recruits and money from across the radical Islamic world in
	that this is a way to maintain that narrative by striking
	outside their territory?
	General Dunford. Congressman, I can't say whether this
	particular attack is a result of that, but we have always said,
	and we anticipate, that as we put increased pressure on the
	enemy in Iraq and Syria and their narrative begins to erode
	because their freedom of movement erodes, the resources erode
	and so forth, that they are going to lash out and conduct
	terrorist attacks.
	And so we would expect the kinds of things we saw in
	Belgium to be a result of pressure that they feel in other
	places. There is no question about it. They will balance
	conventional tactics, which we have seen from the enemy, with
	guerilla tactics in places like Syria and Iraq when they are
	not as successful, with terrorist attacks around the world to
	maintain relevance and to continue to jihad. There is no
	question about it.
	Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
	I yield back.
	The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
	If you all will allow me, I have got just a couple issues I
	want to touch on right quick.
	Mr. McCord, we have talked a lot about readiness and
	training and maintenance. It is true, is it not, that virtually
	all the money for training, for maintenance of aircraft and so
	forth, is in the base part of the budget?
	Secretary McCord. That is correct. The vast majority is,
	Mr. Chairman.
	The Chairman. Yeah.
	Secondly, my understanding is, as you all were putting
	together your budget request, over $5 billion of that request,
	$5 billion worth, was savings, inflation and especially fuel
	savings. Now, obviously, the price of oil goes up and down, and
	you have a very long period when you have to formulate your
	budget.
	My question is, as you look at it today, how do your
	assumptions on the price of fuel measure against the reality of
	today?
	Secretary McCord. For----
	The Chairman. Is it better or worse than you assumed?
	Secretary McCord. It is better today. Are you talking most
	about fiscal year 2016 or 2017?
	The Chairman. 2017.
	Secretary McCord. For 2017. The prices that we were
	directed to assume are higher than what are prevailing today.
	As you note, that fiscal year hasn't even started and won't
	start for some time, and it will go a year after that. So there
	is a long time for these prices to have to hold before such
	savings would actually be realizable. But, yes, they are lower
	today.
	The Chairman. Well, I just am a little concerned that there
	are assumptions built in the budget. And nobody knows what the
	price of oil is going to be, although it has been going up some
	in recent days. But as you point out, this doesn't even start
	until October 1. I was just wondering how it measured up.
	10 U.S.C. 153 requires that the Chairman of the Joint
	Chiefs provide a risk assessment to Congress by February 15. We
	heard from the service chiefs that they have provided that
	input to the Chairman. My understanding is it has been done,
	and it is sitting in OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense]
	somewhere. Do you all have any clue about when this might be
	coming?
	General Dunford. Mr. Chairman, I can answer that. We did
	complete it some time ago. What we wanted to do was bring the
	chiefs together in The Tank to discuss it with the Secretary.
	We did that a week ago Monday. And so we now have that to the
	Secretary and that should be coming over right away. I mean, it
	is complete.
	We worked on it pretty hard this time, Mr. Chairman. And
	what you will see is a different organizational construct. We
	tried to take a look at each of the five challenges we have
	spoken about and really get after in a meaningful way the risks
	associated with each one of those five challenges and then what
	I would call a crosscutting risk of the joint force.
	So while it has been a couple weeks late now, I hope you
	will find it worth it. And, again, one of the reasons why we
	kept it a little bit longer was so we could have an opportunity
	to do a face-to-face with the chiefs and the Secretary, and we
	did complete that last Monday.
	The Chairman. Well, I do think this is important, and so I
	look forward to it. It is significant for the committee.
	If I can just make an offer again to both of you, it has
	been one of my goals--and I have certainly not been as
	successful as I wanted to--to reduce the paperwork burdens that
	Congress puts on the Department, so fewer reports, if a
	briefing can be done, a one-time report rather than a recurring
	report.
	I would offer, again, if you all want to submit to us
	reports that you think are superfluous or overly burdensome,
	not worth the time and effort, get me that. And I will
	definitely look at it, because I want to continue to reduce the
	unnecessary or less-than-necessary paperwork burdens that
	Congress puts on the Department.
	At the same time, as you have heard today, what is left we
	are serious about. And so time is important. Again, we talked
	about the ISIS report, come up with reprogramming requests. We
	don't have a strategy on where it is happening. So I am trying
	to have fewer things but be serious about the ones that we
	have.
	Please tell me and get it to me about things you think are
	unnecessary. But at the same time, as you have heard some of
	today, I think there is frustration when the law is not
	complied with.
	Finally, General Dunford, I saw an open letter--I don't
	know--signed by several dozen retired military, other notable
	names, that the time was right to relook at Goldwater-Nichols
	of 30 years ago and that we needed to be serious that
	significant changes were in order, although they did not detail
	what those changes should be, by the way, in the letter.
	So I want to ask you your view. I know there is a fair
	amount of interest about examining and perhaps modifying the
	Goldwater-Nichols requirements. Please tell me where you think
	we are on that, if it needs to happen, and then suggestions you
	may have.
	General Dunford. Thanks, Chairman.
	First of all, I do think there is an imperative for reform
	at this time, and I think it is a result of a change in the
	character of war. The basic nature of war, in my estimation,
	doesn't change. The character of war has changed. And by that
	specifically, I mean that most of the crises and contingencies
	that we have today, immediately transregional; they cut across
	multiple combatant commands. They are multidomain: sea, air,
	space, cyberspace, undersea. And they are multifunctional:
	ballistic missile defense, special operations, strike
	capabilities, and so forth. And that has changed the nature of
	integration of the joint force and, frankly, the requirements
	for the Secretary to make timely decisions in a transregional,
	multidomain, multifunctional fight.
	So I think the more fundamental areas that we need to look
	at for change with regard to Goldwater-Nichols is, number one,
	making sure that the Secretary does have the ability to make
	decisions in a timely manner and making sure he does have the
	ability to integrate the joint force in that transregional,
	multidomain, multifunctional fight.
	It also requires, in my estimation, the Joint Staff to take
	a different approach to strategy and to ensure that we write
	strategies for, for example, the problem sets we spoke about
	today. So it isn't just an aggregation of operations plans if
	you are dealing with a Russia or a China, but you have a
	strategic framework within which those operations plans are
	met. And I think the National Military Strategy needs to be
	refined in order to provide that framework within which OPLANs
	[operations plans] are developed.
	And then the final piece of that in execution is the
	Secretary's ability to prioritize and allocate resources in a
	timely manner for a fight that is ongoing in multiple combatant
	commands at the same time. So, from my perspective, as we think
	about reform, we should focus on the character of war and what
	reforms are necessary to make sure we can fight in the 21st
	century.
	And what I have alluded to are some fundamental changes in
	warfighting in the 21st century that I think we can reinforce
	and optimize the joint force's ability to meet with some very
	fundamental changes. And I am prepared to make those
	recommendations to you, Chairman.
	Secretary Carter. And may I just second that. That is
	exactly along the lines that we are thinking, Chairman, as I
	alluded to earlier. Obviously, we will need your support if any
	of that requires statutory change, but those are the dimensions
	to which I am looking to the Joint Staff and the Joint Chiefs
	of Staff, and especially the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
	Staff, given the changed nature of warfare. We would like to
	strengthen that.
	The Chairman. Well, I am anxious to see what you suggest,
	even if it is not all the reforms that some of these other
	folks are pursuing. But, obviously, with markup basically for
	this committee about a month away, for us to have time to look
	at it, we will want to see it promptly.
	Secretary Carter. I am planning that, to do that quite
	soon, and it will involve the capabilities, the Joint Chiefs of
	Staff and the Chairman, while preserving the independent
	military advice that they provide to me and the President.
	The Chairman. Okay. Good. Thank you. Thank you, all three,
	for being here today. The hearing stands adjourned.
	[Whereupon, at 1:07 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]


	=======================================================================


	A P P E N D I X

	March 22, 2016


	=======================================================================


	PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

	March 22, 2016

	=======================================================================




	[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


	=======================================================================


	WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

	THE HEARING

	March 22, 2016

	=======================================================================



	RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO

	Mr. McCord. During the House Armed Services Committee hearing on
	March 22, 2016, you asked about a report which was requested in the
	National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law
	110-181). A member of your staff, Mr. Jason McMahon, confirmed section
	807 as the item of interest to you. The Department produced section 807
	reports for FY2009, and every subsequent year up to and including the
	report for FY2014. The reports and accompanying data are posted on the
	Department's Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L) public
	webpage:
	http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/cpic/cp/
	acquisition_of_services_policy.html
	The files are large, because they contain the report and the
	inventory listing of service contracts. The inventory data for FY2015
	is posted, but the report is not yet finished. The reports are usually
	finished in July or August for the previous year's data.
	Every year when complete, these reports and the corresponding
	inventory listings are sent to the defense committees, the Speaker of
	the House and President of the Senate. They are then posted on the
	website above. A Federal Register notice is also published to notify
	the public of the update. [See page 38.]


	=======================================================================


	QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

	March 22, 2016

	=======================================================================



	QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN

	Mr. Lamborn. The Director of National Intelligence recently
	testified to Congress that ``Russia and China continue to pursue weapon
	systems capable of destroying satellites on orbit, placing U.S.
	satellites at greater risk in the next few years.'' 1. Please describe
	the foreign counterspace threat. 2. Can you confirm that Russia and
	China both have or have tested ASAT weapons launched by ballistic
	missiles?
	Secretary Carter. [No answer was available at the time of
	printing.]
	Mr. Lamborn. You said in a recent speech in San Francisco that
	``DOD must now prepare for and seek to prevent the possibility of a
	conflict that extends into space, and we are.'' What exactly is the
	Department doing to prepare for such a conflict, from resourcing and
	training to developing operational capabilities? What is at risk if we
	lose our space capabilities early in a conflict, and how will this
	affect our ability to fight and win wars?
	Secretary Carter. [No answer was available at the time of
	printing.]
	Mr. Lamborn. Secetary Carter said in a recent speech in San
	Francisco that ``DOD must now prepare for and seek to prevent the
	possibility of a conflict that extends into space, and we are.'' What
	exactly is the Department doing to prepare for such a conflict, from
	resourcing and training to developing operational capabilities? What is
	at risk if we lose our space capabilities early in a conflict, and how
	will this affect our ability to fight and win wars?
	General Dunford. Space is essential to the defense of the homeland,
	allies, and interests abroad. Space-based capabilities such as
	positioning, navigation, and timing signals; protected and secured
	communications; and strategic and theater missile warning underpin
	Joint Force operations. Our space systems increase our Joint Force's
	overall efficiency and effectiveness while helping to reduce risk and
	limit losses. The Department is working to ensure that the United
	States does not cede the space domain and that we maintain our access
	to, and freedom of action with, space-borne capabilities. Initiatives
	include the development of Joint doctrine for space operations, and
	ways to increase space system and architecture resiliency and
	survivability.
	______

	QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER
	Ms. Speier. How does DOD intend to ensure notifications of released
	sex offenders reach the appropriate local law enforcement jurisdiction
	personnel where that offender intends to reside?
	Secretary Carter. [No answer was available at the time of
	printing.]
	Ms. Speier. How will the Director of Emergency Services (DES) or
	Provost Marshals Office account for sex offenders on post?
	Secretary Carter. [No answer was available at the time of
	printing.]
	Ms. Speier. How do you plan to track offenders who served no
	confinement time?
	Secretary Carter. [No answer was available at the time of
	printing.]
	Ms. Speier. How do you intend to track offenders in States that do
	not utilize the SORNA Exchange Portal?
	Secretary Carter. [No answer was available at the time of
	printing.]
	Ms. Speier. How do you plan to comply with International Meagan's
	Law (IML) as it applies to sending dependents overseas that are
	convicted sex offenders?
	Secretary Carter. [No answer was available at the time of
	printing.]
	Ms. Speier. For purposes of uniformity and continuity, it makes the
	most sense to have a universal set of policies/practices across all
	services that is managed by OSD and not the service component heads.
	Can you explain to the committee why DOD has chosen to maintain
	differentiating regulations, policies, and practices in each of the
	service branches?
	Secretary Carter. [No answer was available at the time of
	printing.]
	______

	QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN
	Mr. Coffman. Secretary Carter recently stated, ``We don't want a
	draft . . . We don't want people chosen for us. We want to pick people.
	That's what the All-Volunteer Force is all about. That's why the All-
	Volunteer Force is so excellent.'' He also recently noted that one-
	third of Americans aren't eligible for military service for various
	reasons. Given the quality and the success of the All-Volunteer Force,
	do you believe maintaining the selective service system in its current
	form is necessary as a matter of defense policy?
	Secretary Carter. [No answer was available at the time of
	printing.]
	Mr. Coffman. Since 2009, the Army has separated at least 22,000
	combat veterans who had been diagnosed with mental health disabilities
	or traumatic brain injury for misconduct. These discharges have
	significant impact on those veterans' eligibility for benefits and
	services from the Department of Veterans Affairs, including mental
	health services. The Department has instituted several changes to its
	discharge process to prevent the improper separation of service members
	suffering from PTSD, but I believe many are still falling through the
	cracks, and thousands more were discharged prior to the Department's
	changes. I also believe that this situation applies to all of the armed
	services, not just to the Army. From the DOD perspective, do you
	believe that the discharge review boards should be more friendly to
	veterans appealing their discharge on account of PTSD diagnosis? And if
	so, do you have any specific proposals?
	Secretary Carter. [No answer was available at the time of
	printing.]
	Mr. Coffman. Currently, veterans of the National Guard and Reserve
	forces are disproportionally denied on their VA claims for service-
	connected disabilities. I believe a major reason for this is the fact
	that the services can decline to provide them separation physicals,
	which are actually mandatory for Active Duty members. Do you believe
	that end-of-service physicals should be permitted for National Guard
	members and reservists of all branches of service if they'd like a
	physical to document any service-related injuries or disabilities? How
	do you ensure that Guard and Reserve members' service-connected
	injuries are documented?
	Secretary Carter. [No answer was available at the time of
	printing.]
	Mr. Coffman. Since 2009, the Army has separated at least 22,000
	combat veterans who had been diagnosed with mental health disabilities
	or traumatic brain injury for misconduct. These discharges have
	significant impact on those veterans' eligibility for benefits and
	services from the Department of Veterans Affairs, including mental
	health services. The Department has instituted several changes to its
	discharge process to prevent the improper separation of service members
	suffering from PTSD, but I believe many are still falling through the
	cracks, and thousands more were discharged prior to the Department's
	changes. I also believe that this situation applies to all of the armed
	services, not just to the Army. From the DOD perspective, do you
	believe that the discharge review boards should be more friendly to
	veterans appealing their discharge on account of PTSD diagnosis? And if
	so, do you have any specific proposals?
	General Dunford. The Department is committed to ensuring that
	Service members who experience mental health issues are accurately
	diagnosed, receive the treatment, benefits, and follow-on care and
	benefits commensurate with their characterization of service, and are
	not unfairly stigmatized or inappropriately subjected to negative
	administrative or punitive action. The Military Department Review
	Boards, including the Discharge Review Boards, have robust procedures
	and responsive personnel in place to ensure full and fair reviews of
	requests from members and former members of the Armed Forces to change
	the characterization of their discharges or seek other relief based
	upon a diagnosed mental health condition.
	The law requires the Military Departments to conduct a health
	assessment sufficient to evaluate the health of all members at the time
	of separation. This assessment determines if existing medical
	conditions were incurred during active duty service, provides a
	baseline for future care, completes a member's military record, and
	provides a final opportunity to document health concerns, exposures, or
	risk factors associated with active duty service, prior to separation.
	It is DOD policy that the Service Review Boards considering post-
	traumatic stress or traumatic brain injury cases include a physician,
	clinical psychologist or psychiatrist. Each Military Department has
	assigned at least one physician on a permanent, full-time basis to the
	Military Department Review Boards Agency, usually the Offices of the
	Surgeons General, where such expertise is resident. These assigned
	physicians provide each Board with the expertise and guidance necessary
	to assess any medical issues, to include mental health-related matters,
	in their deliberations over requests for records corrections.
	Mr. Coffman. Currently, veterans of the National Guard and Reserve
	forces are disproportionally denied on their VA claims for service-
	connected disabilities. I believe a major reason for this is the fact
	that the services can decline to provide them separation physicals,
	which are actually mandatory for Active Duty members. Do you believe
	that end-of-service physicals should be permitted for National Guard
	members and reservists of all branches of service if they'd like a
	physical to document any service-related injuries or disabilities? How
	do you ensure that Guard and Reserve members' service-connected
	injuries are documented?
	General Dunford. Current Department of Defense policy requires all
	Reserve Component (RC) members serving 180 days or more on active duty
	or more than 30 days in support of a contingency operation to have a
	Separation Health Physical Exam (SHPE). All Services and the National
	Guard Bureau are fully committed to meeting this requirement to ensure
	any service related injury or disability is properly identified,
	evaluated, and documented prior to separation.
	Mr. Coffman. Since 2009, the Army has separated at least 22,000
	combat veterans who had been diagnosed with mental health disabilities
	or traumatic brain injury for misconduct. These discharges have
	significant impact on those veterans' eligibility for benefits and
	services from the Department of Veterans Affairs, including mental
	health services. The Department has instituted several changes to its
	discharge process to prevent the improper separation of service members
	suffering from PTSD, but I believe many are still falling through the
	cracks, and thousands more were discharged prior to the Department's
	changes. I also believe that this situation applies to all of the armed
	services, not just to the Army. From the DOD perspective, do you
	believe that the discharge review boards should be more friendly to
	veterans appealing their discharge on account of PTSD diagnosis? And if
	so, do you have any specific proposals?
	Mr. McCord. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
	Mr. Coffman. Currently, veterans of the National Guard and Reserve
	forces are disproportionally denied on their VA claims for service-
	connected disabilities. I believe a major reason for this is the fact
	that the services can decline to provide them separation physicals,
	which are actually mandatory for Active Duty members. Do you believe
	that end-of-service physicals should be permitted for National Guard
	members and reservists of all branches of service if they'd like a
	physical to document any service-related injuries or disabilities? How
	do you ensure that Guard and Reserve members' service-connected
	injuries are documented?
	Mr. McCord. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
	______

	QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. DUCKWORTH
	Ms. Duckworth. During the hearing, General Dunford indicated there
	were still interagency barriers that limit the effectiveness of the
	DOD's transregional terrorism plan. Please provide a detailed list,
	along with an accompanying explanation of each, of what those barriers
	are, indicating where appropriate, what, if any statutory impediments
	are limiting your efforts and where congressional action is required.
	Secretary Carter. [No answer was available at the time of
	printing.]
	Ms. Duckworth. During the hearing, General Dunford indicated there
	were still interagency barriers that limit the effectiveness of the
	DOD's transregional terrorism plan. Please provide a detailed list,
	along with an accompanying explanation of each, of what those barriers
	are, indicating where appropriate, what, if any statutory impediments
	are limiting your efforts and where congressional action is required.
	General Dunford. We are working with Interagency and international
	partners to implement a comprehensive approach designed to counter
	threat networks operating across our various Geographic Combatant
	Command boundaries. The Joint Force lacks sufficiently flexible
	transregional fiscal authorities or appropriation language that would
	allow for streamlined movement of resources between Combatant Command
	regional boundaries.
	While we have not identified specific statutory impediments that
	are limiting our current approach, we are undertaking a holistic look
	at this issue and will be prepared to seek Congressional action as
	appropriate in the future.
	______

	QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAKAI
	Mr. Takai. In regard to the ``pivot to Asia'' strategy--the
	Department has been on the Hill to do notifications for the Maritime
	Security Initiative money in FY16. You are currently looking to execute
	funding mostly for the Philippines and some for Vietnam, Malaysia, and
	Indonesia. I have heard big ideas about the foreign military sales and
	financing being provided under a rubric of ``sense, share, and
	contribute.'' Please provide information about FY16 funding, and what
	you plan on doing with the $60 million FY17 request?
	Secretary Carter. [No answer was available at the time of
	printing.]
	Mr. Takai. North Korea is developing its nuclear weapons and long-
	range ballistic missile programs in defiance of U.N. Security Council
	resolutions. Alarmingly, this year North Korea conducted its fourth
	nuclear test and last month, launched a satellite into orbit using
	long-range ballistic missile technology. While U.N. resolutions
	requiring member states to inspect all cargo in and out of North Korea
	for illicit goods and arms are helpful, and I applaud the
	administration for stepping up its sanctions policy to freeze North
	Korean government property in America, and ban U.S. exports to, or
	investment in, North Korea, I have to ask this question. If the U.S. is
	so concerned that North Korea may develop the ability to place a bomb
	on a long-range ballistic missile that could reach the U.S. West Coast,
	WHEN are we going to convert the Aegis missile defense test site in
	Hawaii into a combat-ready facility to help protect the U.S. mainland?
	Secretary Carter. [No answer was available at the time of
	printing.]

	[all]
	</pre></body></html>