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<title> - INVESTIGATING OSHA'S REGULATORY AGENDA AND ITS IMPACT ON JOB CREATION</title> |
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<body><pre> |
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[House Hearing, 112 Congress] |
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[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] |
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INVESTIGATING OSHA'S REGULATORY AGENDA AND ITS IMPACT ON JOB CREATION |
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======================================================================= |
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HEARING |
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before the |
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON WORKFORCE PROTECTIONS |
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COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION |
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AND THE WORKFORCE |
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U.S. House of Representatives |
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ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS |
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FIRST SESSION |
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__________ |
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HEARING HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, FEBRUARY 15, 2011 |
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__________ |
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Serial No. 112-5 |
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__________ |
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Education and the Workforce |
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Available via the World Wide Web: |
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http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/house/education/index.html |
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or |
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Committee address: http://edworkforce.house.gov |
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---------- |
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE |
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64-532 PDF WASHINGTON : 2011 |
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For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing |
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Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; |
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DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, |
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Washington, DC 20402-0001 |
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COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE |
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JOHN KLINE, Minnesota, Chairman |
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Thomas E. Petri, Wisconsin George Miller, California, |
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Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon, Senior Democratic Member |
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California Dale E. Kildee, Michigan |
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Judy Biggert, Illinois Donald M. Payne, New Jersey |
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Todd Russell Platts, Pennsylvania Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey |
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Joe Wilson, South Carolina Robert C. ``Bobby'' Scott, |
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Virginia Foxx, North Carolina Virginia |
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Duncan Hunter, California Lynn C. Woolsey, California |
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David P. Roe, Tennessee Ruben Hinojosa, Texas |
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Glenn Thompson, Pennsylvania Carolyn McCarthy, New York |
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Tim Walberg, Michigan John F. Tierney, Massachusetts |
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Scott DesJarlais, Tennessee Dennis J. Kucinich, Ohio |
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Richard L. Hanna, New York David Wu, Oregon |
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Todd Rokita, Indiana Rush D. Holt, New Jersey |
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Larry Bucshon, Indiana Susan A. Davis, California |
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Trey Gowdy, South Carolina Raul M. Grijalva, Arizona |
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Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Timothy H. Bishop, New York |
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Kristi L. Noem, South Dakota David Loebsack, Iowa |
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Martha Roby, Alabama Mazie K. Hirono, Hawaii |
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Joseph J. Heck, Nevada |
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Dennis A. Ross, Florida |
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Mike Kelly, Pennsylvania |
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[Vacant] |
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Barrett Karr, Staff Director |
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Jody Calemine, Minority Staff Director |
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------ |
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON WORKFORCE PROTECTIONS |
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TIM WALBERG, Michigan, Chairman |
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John Kline, Minnesota Lynn C. Woolsey, California, |
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Todd Rokita, Indiana Ranking |
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Larry Bucshon, Indiana Donald M. Payne, New Jersey |
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Trey Gowdy, South Carolina Dennis J. Kucinich, Ohio |
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Kristi L. Noem, South Dakota Timothy H. Bishop, New York |
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Dennis A. Ross, Florida Mazie K. Hirono, Hawaii |
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Mike Kelly, Pennsylvania George Miller, California |
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[Vacant] |
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C O N T E N T S |
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Page |
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Hearing held on February 15, 2011................................ 1 |
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Statement of Members: |
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Hirono, Hon. Mazie K., a Representative in Congress from the |
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State of Hawaii, prepared statement of..................... 54 |
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Kucinich, Hon. Dennis J., a Representative in Congress from |
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the State of Ohio, prepared statement of................... 55 |
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Walberg, Hon. Tim, Chairman, Subcommittee on Workforce |
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Protections................................................ 1 |
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Prepared statement of.................................... 2 |
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Additional submissions: |
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Letter, dated Feb. 22, 2011, from Tree Care Industry |
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Association, Inc. [TCIA]........................... 56 |
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Letter, dated Oct. 15, 2010, to Hon. Hilda L. Solis, |
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Secretary, U.S. Department of Labor, from U.S. |
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House Members...................................... 57 |
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Letter, dated Feb. 4, 2011, to Secretary Solis, from |
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U.S. Senators...................................... 60 |
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Letter, dated Aug. 5, 2008, Hon. Elaine L. Chao, |
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former Secretary, U.S. Department of Labor, from |
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U.S. House Members................................. 62 |
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Letter, dated Sept. 27, 2007, to former Secretary |
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Chao, from U.S. Senators........................... 64 |
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Woolsey, Hon. Lynn, ranking minority member, Subcommittee on |
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Workforce Protections...................................... 3 |
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Prepared statement of.................................... 5 |
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Additional submission: |
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Slide with photo of Hayes Lemmerze combustible dust |
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explosions and fire................................ 66 |
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Statement of Witnesses: |
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Holmes, Jacqueline M., Esq., of Counsel, Jones Day, |
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testifying on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce....... 26 |
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Prepared statement of.................................... 29 |
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Miser, Tammy, founder, United Support and Memorial for |
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Workplace Fatalities....................................... 22 |
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Prepared statement of.................................... 23 |
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Sessions, Stuart L., president, Environomics, Inc............ 13 |
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Prepared statement of.................................... 15 |
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Sullivan, Hon. Thomas M., Esq., of Counsel, Nelson Mullins |
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Riley and Scarborough...................................... 7 |
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Prepared statement of.................................... 9 |
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INVESTIGATING OSHA'S REGULATORY AGENDA AND ITS IMPACT ON JOB CREATION |
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---------- |
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Tuesday, February 15, 2011 |
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U.S. House of Representatives |
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Subcommittee on Workforce Protections |
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Committee on Education and the Workforce |
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Washington, DC |
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---------- |
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The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in |
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room 2175, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tim Walberg |
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[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. |
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Present: Representatives Walberg, Kline, Bucshon, Noem, |
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Ross, Kelly, Woolsey, Payne, Kucinich, and Miller. |
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Staff present: Kirk Boyle, General Counsel; Casey Buboltz, |
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Coalitions and Member Services Coordinator; Ed Gilroy, Director |
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of Workforce Policy; Ryan Kearney, Legislative Assistant; Brian |
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Newell, Press Secretary; Molly McLaughlin Salmi, Deputy |
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Director of Workforce Policy; Linda Stevens, Chief Clerk/ |
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Assistant to the General Counsel; Loren Sweatt, Professional |
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Staff Member; Aaron Albright, Minority Deputy Communication |
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Director; Tylease Alli, Minority Hearing Clerk; Daniel Brown, |
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Minority Staff Assistant; Jody Calemine, Minority Staff |
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Director; Brian Levin, Minority New Media Press Assistant; Kara |
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Marchione, Minority Senior Education Policy Advisor; Richard |
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Miller, Minority Senior Labor Policy Advisor; Megan O'Reilly, |
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Minority General Counsel; Julie Peller, Minority Deputy Staff |
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Director; and Michele Varnhagen, Minority Chief Policy Advisor |
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and Labor Policy Director. |
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Chairman Walberg [presiding]. Well, I am told a quorum is |
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present. It is time to begin, so let's begin. |
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The subcommittee will come to order. Good morning. Allow me |
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to welcome my colleagues and our guests to our first hearing of |
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the Subcommittee on Workforce Protections. The subcommittee |
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oversees a number of federal policies and programs that reach |
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into America's workplaces. The decisions that we make in this |
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subcommittee touch upon the lives of countless workers, |
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employers, and their families. |
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I look forward to working with my colleague, Lynn Woolsey, |
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the ranking Democrat member of the subcommittee. She has a deep |
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passion for these issues, and no one can question her |
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commitment to worker safety. |
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I know there will be times when we disagree. We have talked |
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about that. But I have pledged to put forward my best efforts |
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to find common ground whenever possible. The cause of worker |
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safety is best advanced when we work together. |
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And so that is why today's hearing will examine the |
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regulatory agenda at the Occupational Safety and Health |
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Administration. Since 1970, OSHA has been charged with |
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enforcing laws that govern worker safety and health by |
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developing rules intended to keep workplaces free from |
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recognized hazards. The regulatory agenda speaks to the |
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Administration's priorities. Worker safety is a goal we all |
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share. However, we have real concerns with the policies and |
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process the Administration has recently proposed to reach that |
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goal. |
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Over the last 2 years, OSHA has not only attempted to |
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implement several policy changes that would have profound |
|
impact on the workplace; it has become an Administration more |
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focused on punishment than prevention. All employers who |
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jeopardize the safety of workers should be held accountable to |
|
the fullest extent of the law. |
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However, punishment is just one piece of enforcing the law. |
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Our goal should be to prevent workplace accidents before they |
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happen, not simply shame an employer once a tragedy has |
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occurred on the job site. |
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And so that is why I am concerned with the recent actions |
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that suggest the Administration has shifted the balance toward |
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punishment and taken its sights off commonsense rules that |
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promote prevention. |
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Worker safety is a priority and so, too, is promoting |
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policies that will allow businesses to grow and hire new |
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workers. Needless rules and onerous regulations are often |
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roadblocks to economic growth and job creation, which we all |
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want. |
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The President has called on his Administration to scour the |
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books in search of policies that undermine private-sector job |
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growth. This subcommittee looks forward to joining that effort |
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in the weeks and months ahead. |
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I am particularly aware of the urgency of the task before |
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us. My home state of Michigan has been hit hard by recent |
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recession. Currently, the unemployment rate in Michigan stands |
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at 11.7 percent, and even higher in some counties in my |
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congressional district that I represent. We all must be |
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partners in an effort to get the American people back to work. |
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Our witnesses today will discuss the potential economic and |
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worker safety impact of OSHA's regulatory agenda. We have heard |
|
the mantra that good jobs are safe jobs. I agree. But let us |
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ensure that bad policy does not destroy the good jobs we need |
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to create. |
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At this time, I would like to yield to Congresswoman |
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Woolsey, the ranking member of the subcommittee, for her |
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opening remarks. |
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[The statement of Mr. Walberg follows:] |
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Prepared Statement of Hon. Tim Walberg, Chairman, |
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Subcommittee on Workforce Protections |
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Good morning. Allow me to welcome my colleagues and our guests to |
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our first hearing of the Subcommittee on Workforce Protections. This |
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subcommittee oversees a number of federal policies and programs that |
|
reach into America's workplaces. The decisions we make in this |
|
subcommittee touch upon the lives of countless workers, employers, and |
|
their families. |
|
I look forward to working with my colleague Lynn Woolsey, the |
|
ranking Democratic member of the subcommittee. She has a deep passion |
|
for these issues and no one can question her commitment to worker |
|
safety. I know there will be times when we disagree but I pledge to put |
|
forward my best efforts to find common ground whenever possible. The |
|
cause of worker safety is best advanced when we work together. |
|
That is why today's hearing will examine the regulatory agenda at |
|
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Since 1970, OSHA has |
|
been charged with enforcing laws that govern worker safety and health |
|
by developing rules intended to keep workplaces free from recognized |
|
hazards. The regulatory agenda speaks to the administration's |
|
priorities. Worker safety is a goal we all share, however, we have real |
|
concerns with the policies and process the administration has recently |
|
proposed to reach that goal. |
|
Over the last two years, OSHA has not only attempted to implement |
|
several policy changes that would have profound impact on the |
|
workplace, it has become an administration more focused on punishment |
|
than prevention. All employers who jeopardize the safety of workers |
|
should be held accountable to the fullest extent of the law. |
|
However, punishment is just one piece of enforcing the law. Our |
|
goal should be to prevent workplace accidents before they happen, not |
|
simply shame an employer once a tragedy has occurred on the job site. |
|
That is why I am concerned with recent actions that suggest the |
|
administration has shifted the balance toward punishment, and taken its |
|
sights of commonsense rules that promote prevention. |
|
Worker safety is a priority, and so too is promoting policies that |
|
will allow businesses to grow and hire new workers. Needless rules and |
|
onerous regulations are often roadblocks to economic growth and job |
|
creation. The president has called on his administration to scour the |
|
books in search of policies that undermine private-sector job growth. |
|
This subcommittee looks forward to joining that effort in the weeks and |
|
months ahead. |
|
I am particularly aware of the urgency of the task before us. My |
|
home state of Michigan has been hit hard by the recent recession. |
|
Currently, the unemployment rate in Michigan stands at 11.7 percent and |
|
even higher in some counties in the congressional district I represent. |
|
We all must be partners in an effort to get the American people back to |
|
work. |
|
Our witnesses today will discuss the potential economic and worker |
|
safety impact of OSHA's regulatory agenda. We have heard the mantra |
|
that ``Good jobs are safe jobs.'' I agree. But let us ensure that bad |
|
policy does not destroy the good jobs we need to create. At this time, |
|
I would like to yield to Congresswoman Woolsey, the Ranking Member of |
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the Subcommittee, for her opening remarks. |
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______ |
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Ms. Woolsey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And congratulations |
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on your election as chair of this subcommittee. |
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Chairman Walberg. Thank you. |
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Ms. Woolsey. It was a very active subcommittee in the last |
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Congress. And I look forward to actually continuing much of the |
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work that we started in, moving forward in this Congress. And I |
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am certain that we are going to have a good working |
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relationship. |
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I applaud today's focus on OSHA's regulatory agenda, |
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because over the past 4 years, this panel has explored a number |
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of loopholes in OSHA's regulatory safety net. And I am hoping |
|
that under your leadership, Mr. Chairman, together we can fix |
|
what is needed and bring OSHA into the 21st century. |
|
But first things first. If OSHA comes under assault from |
|
the new majority, the fact is, the agency may not be able to |
|
carry out its core missions. For example, the 18 percent |
|
reduction of OSHA's budget in the Republican Continuing |
|
Resolution for fiscal year 2011 would eliminate 415 employees, |
|
bringing OSHA to its lowest staffing levels since 1974, likely |
|
forcing OSHA to furlough all of its employees for 3 months. |
|
This would mean 8,000 fewer workplace hazard inspections and |
|
740 fewer whistleblower discrimination investigations this year |
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alone. |
|
And the deeper one digs, the worse it appears. The |
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Republican funding resolution completely zeroes out OSHA's |
|
statistics and information division. Mr. Chairman, that means |
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no more data collection on workplace health and safety trends, |
|
which is critical for targeting hazardous work sites. This cut |
|
even shuts down OSHA's website. |
|
The continuing resolution we are currently debating |
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includes cuts to state OSHA programs, including California and |
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Michigan, both of our states, which are under extreme fiscal |
|
duress at the moment. It cuts OSHA's safety and health |
|
standards by 16 percent, blocking long-overdue rules, like the |
|
one to prevent falls at non-construction sites. |
|
In other words, Mr. Chairman, the Republican C.R. doesn't |
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just trim OSHA's budget; it absolutely cripples the agency and |
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needlessly jeopardizes safety standards and endangers American |
|
workers. |
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So today's hearing about how OSHA's regulatory agenda |
|
affects job creation and investment is truly serious. I |
|
strongly believe it is the lack of regulation that has killed |
|
workers and their jobs. |
|
Take, for example, a deadly 2009 explosion at the ConAgra |
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Slim Jim plant in Garner, North Carolina. Contractors purged |
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the natural gas line they were connecting to a new industrial |
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water heater, but they didn't smell gas, and they kept venting |
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the pipe for 2.5 hours, until the gas found a spark. Three |
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workers were killed; 71 were injured in that explosion. |
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Rather than rebuild the section of the plant that was |
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destroyed, ConAgra is consolidating production elsewhere, |
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closing the plant and putting 700 people out of work. |
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Now, I want you to look at this hose.---- |
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Chairman Walberg. I will move over, if necessary. |
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[Laughter.] |
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Ms. Woolsey. Had there been OSHA regulations banning indoor |
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gas purging, the contractors would have simply taken a piece of |
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hose like this, a piece of hose like this, and connected it to |
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the gas pipe and vented it outside, away from the building. So |
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everyone has to agree: Had there been such a rule, there would |
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have been no deaths, there would have been no injuries, and 700 |
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people would still have their prized factory jobs in their same |
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area where they live. |
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Red tape has slowed OSHA's efforts to prevent combustible |
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dust fires and explosions, like the 2008 tragedy at Imperial |
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Sugar and the Indiana dust explosion illustrated at the easel, |
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which is to my right over there. That is what that looked like, |
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that killed the brother of a witness who is here today. |
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We know the dust explosion problem can be fixed and without |
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damaging competitiveness. Following a string of grain elevator |
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explosions, OSHA issued a grain-handling standard in 1987. |
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Since that rule, there has been a dramatic decline in |
|
explosions without any negative economic impact on the grain- |
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handling industry or related small businesses. |
|
So, Mr. Chairman, as we begin our first hearing of the |
|
112th Congress, we have to challenge some of the long-held |
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erroneous assumptions about regulations being bad for profit |
|
margins and economic growth. OSHA needs the resources to carry |
|
out its mission to protect its workers and to help businesses |
|
at the same time. |
|
So, again, I want to thank you and I want to thank the |
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witnesses who are here today, especially those of you who have |
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had to travel long distances to be with us. I look forward to |
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your testimony. Thank you. |
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[The statement of Ms. Woolsey follows:] |
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Prepared Statement of Hon. Lynn Woolsey, Ranking Minority Member, |
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Subcommittee on Workforce Protections |
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Thank you Mr. Chairman, and congratulations on your election as |
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Chair of this subcommittee. |
|
I applaud today's focus on OSHA's regulatory agenda, because over |
|
the past four years, this panel has explored a number of loopholes in |
|
OSHA's regulatory safety net, and i'm hoping that under your |
|
leadership, together we can fix what is needed and bring OSHA into the |
|
21st century. |
|
But first things first. If OSHA comes under assault from the new |
|
majority, the fact is, the agency may not be able to carry out its core |
|
missions. |
|
<bullet> For example, the 18% reduction to OSHA's budget in the |
|
Republican continuing resolution for fiscal year 2011 would eliminate |
|
415 employees, bringing OSHA to its lowest staffing level since 1974. |
|
<bullet> Likely forcing OSHA to furlough all of its employees for 3 |
|
months. This would mean 8,000 fewer workplace hazard inspections and |
|
740 fewer whistleblower discrimination investigations this year. |
|
And the deeper one digs, the worse it gets: |
|
<bullet> The Republican funding resolution completely zeroes out |
|
OSHA's statistics and information division. That means no more data |
|
collection on workplace health and safety trends, which is critical to |
|
targeting hazardous work sites. This cut even shuts down OSHA's web |
|
site. |
|
<bullet> The continuing resolution we are currently debating |
|
includes cuts to state OSHA programs, including California and |
|
Michigan--both of which are under extreme fiscal duress. |
|
<bullet> It cuts OSHA's safety and health standards by 16%-- |
|
blocking long overdue rules, like the one to prevent falls at |
|
construction sites from comint to fruition. |
|
In other words, Mr. Chairman, the Republican CR doesn't just trim |
|
OSHA's budget, it absolutely cripples the agency needlessly |
|
jeopardizing safety standards and endangering American workers. |
|
So today's hearing about how OSHA's regulatory agenda affects job |
|
creation and investment is truly serious. |
|
I strongly believe it's the lack of regulations that has killed |
|
workers and their jobs. |
|
Take, for instance, a deadly 2009 explosion at the Con Agra ``Slim |
|
Jim'' plant in Garner, North Carolina. Contractors purged a natural gas |
|
line they were connecting to a new industrial water heater. But they |
|
didn't smell gas and kept venting the pipe for 2\1/2\ hours--until the |
|
gas found a spark. Three workers were killed and 71 were injured in the |
|
explosion. |
|
Rather than rebuild the section of the plant that was destroyed, |
|
Con Agra is consolidating production elsewhere, closing the plant and |
|
putting 700 people out of work. |
|
Had there been OSHA regulations banning in-door gas purging, the |
|
contractors would have simply taken a piece of hose like this, and |
|
connected it to the gas pipe, and vented it outside away from the |
|
building. |
|
Everyone agrees: had there been such a rule, there would have been |
|
no deaths or injuries, and 700 people would still have prized factory |
|
jobs.\1\ |
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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\1\ Safety Bulletin, Dangers of Purging Natural Gas into Buildings, |
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Chemical Safety Board, September 2009. |
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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Red tape has slowed OSHA's efforts to prevent combustible dust |
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fires and explosions, like the 2008 tragedy at imperial sugar, and the |
|
indiana dust explosion illustrated at the easel to my right, that |
|
killed the brother of a witness here today. |
|
We know the dust explosion problem can be fixed * * * and without |
|
damaging competitiveness. Following a string of grain elevator |
|
explosions, OSHA issued a grain handling standard in 1987. Since that |
|
rule, there has been a dramatic decline in explosions without any |
|
negative economic impact on the grain handling industry or related |
|
small businesses. |
|
Mr. Chairman, as we begin our first hearing of the 112th Congress, |
|
we must challenge some of these long-held, erroneous assumptions about |
|
regulations being bad for profit margins and economic growth. OSHA |
|
needs the resources to carry out its mission, protect workers, and help |
|
businesses at the same time. |
|
I want to thank our witnesses for being here today, especially |
|
those who had to travel a long distance to be with us, and I look |
|
forward to their testimony. Thank you. |
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______ |
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Chairman Walberg. I thank the gentlelady. And I think we |
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are both committed to making sure that these hearings do deal |
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with subjects of great interest, concern, and close to your |
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heart, as well as the rest of the committee. |
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Pursuant to Committee Rule 7(c), all members will be |
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permitted to submit written statements to be included in the |
|
permanent hearing record. And without objection, the hearing |
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record will remain open for 14 days to allow such statements |
|
and other extraneous material reference during the hearing to |
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be submitted for official hearing record. |
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It is now my pleasure to introduce our distinguished panel |
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of witnesses, the first being the Honorable Thomas Sullivan, |
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works in the law firm of Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, |
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where he represents clients on a number of regulatory and |
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rulemaking matters, while also serving as the head of the Small |
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Business Coalition for Regulatory Relief. Prior to joining |
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Nelson Mullins, Mr. Sullivan served as the chief counsel for |
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advocacy in the Small Business Administration from 2002 to |
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2008. Mr. Sullivan earned his JD from Suffolk University Law |
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School and a bachelor of arts in English from Boston College. |
|
We welcome you. |
|
Mr. Stuart Sessions is president of Environomics. Mr. |
|
Sessions was formally an analyst and manager with the Office of |
|
Management and Budget and Environmental Protection Agency. Mr. |
|
Sessions holds a master's of public policy from the Kennedy |
|
School of Government at Harvard University and a bachelor of |
|
arts and economics from Amherst College. Mr. Sessions is |
|
testifying today on behalf of the Coalition for Workplace |
|
Safety. |
|
Thank you, and we welcome you. |
|
Ms. Tammy Miser is an advocate for worker safety and |
|
founder of United Support and Memorial for Workplace |
|
Fatalities, an organization that serves as an advocacy group |
|
for individuals affected by workplace-related injury or death, |
|
and to add to that, has experienced the impact in her own life. |
|
We welcome you and thank you for being here. |
|
And then, finally, Ms. Jacqueline Holmes works in the law |
|
firm of Jones Day, where she focused her practice on litigation |
|
involving federal and state regulatory agencies. Ms. Holmes |
|
earned a JD from Loyola Law School in Los Angeles, California, |
|
and a bachelor in science from the California Institute of |
|
Technology. Ms. Holmes is testifying today on behalf of the |
|
U.S. Chamber of Commerce. |
|
And we welcome you. Thank you. |
|
Before I recognize each of you to provide your testimony, |
|
let me briefly explain our lighting system. You will each have |
|
5 minutes to present your testimony. When you begin, the light |
|
in front of you will turn green. When 1 minute is left, the |
|
light will turn yellow. And when your time is expired, the |
|
light will turn red, and it doesn't get any redder than that. |
|
I promise I won't gavel you down mid-sentence. I probably |
|
won't gavel you down, either. But we will make it clear that |
|
your time is expired. But I would ask you that you try to wrap |
|
up your testimony when your time has expired. |
|
After everyone has testified, members will each have 5 |
|
minutes to ask questions of the panel. I won't make the same |
|
promise to members that I won't gavel them down when their time |
|
is expired, but I am sure that we can work on that. |
|
With that, let me now turn to our distinguished panel, and |
|
let's begin with Mr. Sullivan. |
|
|
|
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS M. SULLIVAN, ESQ., OF COUNSEL, NELSON |
|
MULLINS RILEY AND SCARBOROUGH |
|
|
|
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the |
|
committee. I am pleased to present this testimony on how OSHA |
|
considers the impact on small entities when developing |
|
regulatory proposals. |
|
The testimony this morning is not being presented on behalf |
|
of any specific clients at my law firm. Rather, my advice today |
|
is drawn from my 2 decades of work on small business regulatory |
|
issues. I would like to briefly summarize my statement, so I |
|
ask that the full written statement be entered into the record. |
|
Thank you. |
|
Chairman Walberg. So ordered. |
|
Mr. Sullivan. The Regulatory Flexibility Act requires |
|
agencies to satisfy certain procedural requirements when they |
|
plan new regulations, including identifying the small entities |
|
to be affected, analyzing and understanding the economic |
|
impacts that will be imposed, and considering alternative ways |
|
to achieve the regulatory goal, while reducing the economic |
|
burden on those entities. |
|
The Reg Flex Act was amended in 1996 by the Small Business |
|
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act--yes, there is an acronym. |
|
That acronym is SBREFA, and SBREFA requires OSHA, EPA, and the |
|
newly created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to convene |
|
small-business review panels. I refer to those panels as SBREFA |
|
panels. Whatever their planned rules are likely to have a |
|
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small |
|
entities. |
|
The panel prepares a report containing constructive |
|
recommendations for the agency planning the rule, and that |
|
report is published with the proposed rule. |
|
So why are there small-business protections in the |
|
rulemaking system? Well, there are three basic reasons. One- |
|
size-fits-all federal mandates don't work when applied to small |
|
business. Small businesses face higher costs per employee to |
|
comply with the federal regulations. And small businesses are |
|
critically important to the American economy. |
|
First, prevention of one-size-fits-all federal mandates. |
|
Many times, federal rules that may work for large corporations |
|
simply don't work for small firms. The Regulatory Flexibility |
|
Act is supposed to force federal regulators to think about how |
|
a small operation would actually comply with a rule and tweak |
|
the proposal to make sure that it works for the small business, |
|
in addition to the large corporation. |
|
Disproportionate impact that federal rules have on small |
|
business. Research published last year pegs the total cost of |
|
complying with federal rules at over $1.75 trillion. That |
|
burden amounts to a cost of $15,580 per household, which is |
|
more than 1.5 times what households pay for medical care. Most |
|
alarming is the fact that in the 4 years studied, the cost of |
|
complying with federal rules rose faster than the cost of per |
|
household of providing medical care. |
|
Implementation of the Regulatory Flexibility Act at OSHA. |
|
In three recent regulatory actions, OSHA appears to be ignoring |
|
both the spirit and the legal requirements of the Reg Flex Act. |
|
First, OSHA's MSD reporting rule. |
|
In January last year, OSHA proposed that businesses record |
|
work-related MSDs in a new column on their OSHA 300 Log. OSHA |
|
estimated that the proposed rule would require employers to |
|
spend roughly 5 minutes to become familiar with the new rule |
|
and 1 minute to record the MSD injury or illness. |
|
This burden estimate is what OSHA used to justify its |
|
decision not to move forward with a SBREFA panel. Small |
|
businesses felt that OSHA's cost estimate reflected a |
|
misunderstanding of how small employers work and the pressure |
|
that employers feel writing down a number on a form that is |
|
required by the federal government. |
|
The purpose of SBREFA is for OSHA to better understand the |
|
impacts its regulations will have and how its cost estimates |
|
play out in the real world. OSHA missed that opportunity by |
|
deciding to bypass the SBREFA panel process. |
|
The second rule that I can talk about is the proposed |
|
changes to the on-site consultation procedures rule. Last |
|
September, OSHA proposed changes to the program. And the on- |
|
site consultation program is a shining example of how OSHA can |
|
evolve from ``gotcha'' to ``help ya.'' |
|
When OSHA decided to propose changes, it did not convene a |
|
SBREFA panel. OSHA, therefore, missed an opportunity to learn |
|
directly from small businesses about how changes would affect |
|
their participation in the program. |
|
And, finally, OSHA's noise rule. In October, OSHA proposed |
|
to change the requirements for employers to control noise |
|
exposures. OSHA's proposal last year was to reverse the |
|
preference for personal protective equipment and require |
|
engineering controls without consideration of cost unless it |
|
would threaten a company's ``ability to remain in business.'' |
|
OSHA circumvented the SBREFA panel requirement by declaring |
|
its proposal was just revising an interpretation and therefore |
|
was not a rule subject to normal rulemaking procedures, |
|
including the SBREFA panel requirement. That type of rationale |
|
is unfortunate, because it ignored the value of SBREFA panels. |
|
OSHA's policy apparatus suffers--and I will sum up here-- |
|
when the agency treats the SBREFA process as a legal barrier. |
|
The purpose of the Reg Flex Act and the SBREFA amendments is |
|
for OSHA to benefit from small-business input, so the agency |
|
can fulfill its mission to ensure safe workplaces without |
|
unduly burdening small employers. Constructive input by small |
|
firms provides OSHA with valuable insight that allows for the |
|
agency to draft proposals that will work on Main Street, and |
|
OSHA benefits when it embraces the SBREFA process as a |
|
constructive dialogue. |
|
Thank you. |
|
[The statement of Mr. Sullivan follows:] |
|
|
|
Prepared Statement of Hon. Thomas M. Sullivan, Esq., of Counsel, Nelson |
|
Mullins Riley and Scarborough |
|
|
|
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am pleased to present |
|
this testimony on how the Occupational Safety and Health Administration |
|
(OSHA) considers the impact on small entities when developing |
|
regulatory proposals. My name is Tom Sullivan. I am an attorney with |
|
the law firm of Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP and I run the |
|
Small Business Coalition for Regulatory Relief.\1\ This testimony is |
|
not being presented on behalf of any specific clients. Rather, my |
|
advice to the Committee today is drawn from my two decades of work on |
|
small business regulatory issues. |
|
My first job in Washington was with the U.S. Environmental |
|
Protection Agency (EPA). I served under both Administrator Bill Reilly |
|
and Administrator Carol Browner. After learning about regulatory policy |
|
development from within government, I joined the Washington office of |
|
the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB). In February |
|
2002, I was unanimously confirmed to head the Office of Advocacy at the |
|
U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA).\2\ The Office of Advocacy is |
|
responsible for overseeing the Regulatory Flexibility Act.\3\ I served |
|
as Chief Counsel for Advocacy until October 2008. |
|
OSHA must consider the impact on small entities prior to issuing a new |
|
regulation |
|
The Regulatory Flexibility Act requires federal agencies to satisfy |
|
certain procedural requirements when they plan new regulations, |
|
including: (1) identifying the small entities that will be affected, |
|
(2) analyzing and understanding the economic impacts that will be |
|
imposed on those entities, and (3) considering alternative ways to |
|
achieve their regulatory goal while reducing the economic burden on |
|
those entities.\4\ The Regulatory Flexibility Act was amended in 1996 |
|
by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA).\5\ |
|
SBREFA requires OSHA, EPA, and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau |
|
(CFPB) to convene small business review panels (I refer to the panels |
|
as ``SBREFA panels '') whenever their planned rules are likely to have |
|
a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small |
|
entities. SBREFA panels include representatives from SBA's Office of |
|
Advocacy, the Office of Management and Budget's Office on Information |
|
and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) and the agency proposing the rule. The |
|
panel prepares a report containing constructive recommendations for the |
|
agency planning the rule and that report is published with the proposed |
|
rule. |
|
The need for small business protections in the federal rulemaking |
|
system |
|
There are three basic reasons for the Regulatory Flexibility Act. |
|
<bullet> one-size-fits-all federal mandates do not work when |
|
applied to small business; and |
|
<bullet> small businesses face higher costs per employee to comply |
|
with federal regulation; and |
|
<bullet> small businesses are critically important to the American |
|
economy. |
|
Prevention of one-size-fits-all federal mandates |
|
Many times federal regulations that may work for large corporations |
|
simply do not work for small firms. I remember working with Brian |
|
Landon on the ergonomics regulation when it was being developed in the |
|
late 1990's. Brian owned and operated a carwash in Canton, |
|
Pennsylvania. Parts of the ergonomics regulation distinguished between |
|
the employees who worked on equipment and employees who were in charge |
|
of paperwork and accounting. As is the case in many small businesses, |
|
Brian did all the jobs. And, his most trusted employees also performed |
|
multiple tasks, some clerical and some operational. The ergonomics |
|
regulation spelled out duties for equipment maintenance employees that |
|
were very different from those responsibilities for employees in charge |
|
of paperwork. Brian continually asked OSHA for help to figure out which |
|
classification would apply to him--and never really got an answer. |
|
Sometimes we forget that our country has millions of small enterprises |
|
that are at various stages of automation. For instance, when there is a |
|
new labeling requirement, a tendency is to naively think that |
|
compliance with a regulation mandating changes to labels can be |
|
accomplished with little effort through a computer program. The |
|
Regulatory Flexibility Act is supposed to force federal regulators to |
|
think about how a small operation would actually comply, realizing that |
|
it may not be as simple as entering information into a computer. |
|
The disproportionate impact federal regulations have on small business |
|
Research published in September by Nicole Crain and W. Mark Crain |
|
of Lafayette College updates three previous studies on the impact of |
|
federal regulations on small business.\6\ The report is entitled, ``The |
|
Impact of Regulatory Costs on Small Firms,'' and it provides a look at |
|
the regulatory burden in 2008. The total cost of complying with federal |
|
regulations was over $1.75 trillion. The burden amounts to a cost of |
|
$15,586 per household which is more than 1\1/2\ times what households |
|
pay for medical care. Most alarming, is the fact that in the four years |
|
studied, the cost of complying with federal regulations rose faster |
|
than the per-household cost of medical care. |
|
The Crain study found that small businesses shoulder costs that are |
|
36% more than their larger business competitors. Firms with fewer than |
|
20 employees pay $10,585 per employee per year and firms with 500 or |
|
more employees pay $7,755 per employee to comply with federal |
|
regulations. The cost difference is most severe when looking at |
|
compliance with environmental regulations, with the smallest firms |
|
paying 4 times the amount per employee than the largest businesses. |
|
The research provides data for a common sense reality in a small |
|
business owner's world. Small businesses generally do not have vice |
|
presidents for safety and health to figure out OSHA rules. They do not |
|
have accounting departments to navigate changes to the tax code. Even |
|
if small businesses hire accountants to prepare their taxes, the owners |
|
take hours sweating the details because it is their signature on the |
|
IRS forms. Nor do small firms usually employ occupational health |
|
experts and safety engineers to keep up with OSHA rules and the more |
|
than 22,000 national consensus standards that exist in the United |
|
States. The task of figuring out volumes of federal requirements often |
|
falls on the small business owners themselves, taking more time for |
|
them than it would for regulatory experts. Since time is money--it |
|
costs the small businesses more. |
|
The intention of the Regulatory Flexibility Act and, in particular |
|
the SBREFA panel process, is to bring small entities directly into an |
|
advisory role with agencies so that final regulations reflect an |
|
accurate understanding of how compliance can cost small firms more. |
|
The importance of small business to the U.S. economy |
|
Recent figures show there are more than 27.3 million small |
|
businesses in the United States.\7\ They represent over 99% of the |
|
employer firms in the United States, employ half of the private sector |
|
employees, and produce 13 times more patents per employee than large |
|
research & development firms.\8\ Of particular importance is the job- |
|
creation aspect of entrepreneurship. Small firms accounted for 65% of |
|
the 15 million net new jobs created between 1993 and 2009. Data show |
|
that since the 1970's small businesses hire two out of every three jobs |
|
and the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation likes to point out that in the |
|
last 30 years, literally all net job creation in the United States took |
|
place in firms less than five years old.\9\ |
|
History of the Regulatory Flexibility Act |
|
One of the top five recommendations from the 1980 White House |
|
Conference on Small Business was for a law requiring regulatory impact |
|
analysis and a regular review of regulations. That recommendation |
|
became reality when President Jimmy Carter signed the Regulatory |
|
Flexibility Act into law on September 19, 1980. The Regulatory |
|
Flexibility Act directed all agencies that use notice and comment |
|
rulemaking to publicly disclose the impact of their regulatory actions |
|
on small entities and to consider less burdensome alternatives if a |
|
proposal was likely to impose a significant impact. The law authorized |
|
SBA's Chief Counsel for Advocacy to appear as amicus curiae in |
|
Regulatory Flexibility Act challenges to rulemakings and it required |
|
SBA's Office of Advocacy to report annually on agencies' compliance |
|
with the Regulatory Flexibility Act. |
|
In 1996, Congress considered changes to the Regulatory Flexibility |
|
Act. Again, there was a White House Conference--and that conference's |
|
top recommendation was to strengthen the Regulatory Flexibility Act by |
|
directing small business participation in rulemakings and to allow for |
|
judicial review of agency compliance. President Clinton signed SBREFA |
|
in March of 1996.\10\ Those amendments to the Regulatory Flexibility |
|
Act established formal procedures for the EPA and for OSHA to receive |
|
input from small entities prior to the agencies proposing rules.\11\ |
|
In August of 2002, President Bush signed Executive Order 13272, |
|
Proper Consideration of Small Entities in Agency Rulemaking.\12\ The |
|
Executive Order directed SBA's Office of Advocacy to train regulatory |
|
agencies on how to comply with the RFA and further instructed agencies |
|
to consider the Office of Advocacy's comments on proposed rules. The |
|
Small Business Jobs Act signed five months ago codified the Executive |
|
Order's requirements for agencies to respond to the Office of |
|
Advocacy's comments in final rules.\13\ |
|
There was one recent additional amendment to the Regulatory |
|
Flexibility Act. An amendment authored by Senators Olympia Snowe and |
|
Mark Pryor was adopted as part of the Dodd-Frank financial regulatory |
|
reform law. That amendment requires the newly created Consumer |
|
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to undergo a SBREFA panel process |
|
when issuing rules, the same requirement that has applied to EPA and |
|
OSHA since 1996.\14\ |
|
What is required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act |
|
The basic spirit of the RFA is for government agencies to analyze |
|
the effects of their regulatory actions on small entities and for those |
|
agencies to consider alternatives that would allow agencies to achieve |
|
their regulatory objectives without unduly burdening small entities. |
|
The RFA covers all agencies that issue rules subject to the |
|
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The RFA requires agencies to |
|
publish an initial regulatory flexibility analysis (IRFA) unless the |
|
promulgating agency certifies that the rule will not have a significant |
|
impact on a substantial number of small entities.\15\ The IRFA is |
|
supposed to be a transparent small business impact analysis that |
|
includes discussion of alternatives that can accomplish the stated |
|
objectives of the rule while minimizing impact on small entities. In |
|
the case of EPA, OSHA, and the CFPB, a SBREFA panel aids the agency's |
|
analysis and discussion of alternatives. This transparent analysis and |
|
exchange of information with small entities is published with the |
|
agency's proposed rule, educating stakeholders who participate in the |
|
notice and comment process. |
|
The availability of an IRFA allows for a more informed notice and |
|
comment process that can guide an agency's formulation of its final |
|
rule. Under the RFA, an agency's final rule must contain a final |
|
regulatory flexibility analysis (FRFA) if it published an IRFA with its |
|
proposal. The FRFA is basically a public response to issues raised in |
|
the IRFA. |
|
Implementation of the Regulatory Flexibility Act at OSHA |
|
Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act, an agency either certifies |
|
that a proposed rule has no significant economic impact on a |
|
substantial number of small entities or the agency prepares an IRFA on |
|
the proposal. When OSHA decides to prepare an IRFA, the agency convenes |
|
a SBREFA panel to obtain pre-proposal input from small entities. In |
|
three recent regulatory actions, OSHA appears to be ignoring both the |
|
spirit and the legal requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. |
|
Even if OSHA is able to certify that a regulation will not have |
|
sufficient impact to warrant a SBREFA panel, the agency always has the |
|
option to voluntarily use the SBREFA panel process to gain insight from |
|
the small business community. |
|
1. Proposed Occupational Injury and Illness Recording and Reporting |
|
Requirements Rule (MSD Reporting Rule):\16\ |
|
In January of last year, OSHA proposed that businesses record work- |
|
related musculoskeletal disorders (MSDs) in a new column on their OSHA |
|
300 Log. When OSHA proposed the rule, it certified under the Regulatory |
|
Flexibility Act that the rule, if promulgated, would not have a |
|
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small |
|
entities.\17\ OSHA estimated that the proposed rule would require |
|
employers to spend roughly 5 minutes to become familiar with the new |
|
rule and one minute pre MSD injury or illness to record the MSD in the |
|
new column on the OSHA 300 Log. This burden estimate is what OSHA used |
|
to justify its decision to move forward with the rule without a SBREFA |
|
panel. |
|
Small businesses strongly disagreed with OSHA on its estimate of |
|
how much the rule would cost. Recording an MSD in a column is not as |
|
simple as just transcribing a number. Under the rule, employers would |
|
be required to diagnose whether the injury or illness is a MSD and |
|
whether it is work-related. Keep in mind that after several years of |
|
study and research, experts are unable to reach consensus over the |
|
definition of an MSD, yet small business owners would be expected to |
|
make a diagnosis of the injury or illness and determine whether it is |
|
work related--in less than 5 minutes. That burden estimate reflected a |
|
clear misunderstanding of how small employers work and the pressure of |
|
legal liability employers feel when writing down a number on a form |
|
required by the federal government. |
|
The purpose of SBREFA panels is for OSHA to better understand the |
|
impacts its regulations will have and how its cost estimates play out |
|
in the real small business world. OSHA missed that opportunity by |
|
deciding to bypass the SBREFA panel process. |
|
2. Proposed changes to On-Site Consultation Procedures rule:\18\ |
|
Last September, OSHA proposed changes to the criteria under which |
|
participants in the agency's On-site Consultation program could be |
|
subject to enforcement action by OSHA inspectors. The On-site |
|
Consultation program is a shining example of how OSHA can evolve from |
|
``gotcha'' to ``help ya.'' Under the program, small businesses can |
|
request a free consultation with a state-certified consultant. The |
|
consultant identifies hazards and provides advice on how to address |
|
them. |
|
Part of the program's success is derived from the understanding |
|
that information uncovered by the voluntary inspection is not shared |
|
with OSHA enforcement if the identified hazards are corrected. OSHA's |
|
proposal last September threatened to break down the barrier between |
|
the On-site Consultation program and OSHA's enforcement program. I |
|
doubt OSHA wanted to push small firms out of its On-Site Consultation |
|
program, but the agency lacked an appreciation for how the changes |
|
would impact small business's willingness to participate. OSHA did not |
|
convene a SBREFA panel prior to proposing the changes to its |
|
consultation agreements program despite the On-site Consultation |
|
program's focus on small business. OSHA, therefore, missed an |
|
opportunity to learn directly from small businesses about how changes |
|
would affect their participation in the program. Through a SBREFA |
|
panel, OSHA would have heard how the agency could achieve its goal, |
|
without scaring away small businesses from a program that has improved |
|
workplace safety in thousands of small businesses. |
|
3. Proposed Interpretation of OSHA's Provisions for Feasible |
|
Administrative or Engineering Controls of Occupational Noise:\19\ |
|
In October, OSHA proposed to change the requirements for employers |
|
to control noise exposures. Currently, OSHA requires engineering and |
|
administrative controls to prevent hearing loss if personal protective |
|
equipment (PPE) such as earplugs is ineffective in reducing workplace |
|
noise to acceptable levels or if such controls can be implemented for |
|
less cost than PPE. OSHA's proposal last year was to reverse the |
|
preference for PPE and require engineering controls without |
|
consideration of cost unless it would threaten a company's ``ability to |
|
remain in business.'' \20\ |
|
OSHA circumvented the SBREFA panel requirement by declaring its |
|
proposal was just revising an interpretation and, therefore, was not a |
|
new rulemaking subject to normal rulemaking procedures, including the |
|
SBREFA panel requirement. That type of rationale was unfortunate |
|
because it ignored the value of SBREFA panels. A SBREFA panel could |
|
have informed OSHA that PPE has proven effective in reducing harmful |
|
exposure to noise in the workplace and that driving employers away from |
|
the preference for PPE could actually increase danger. Also, a SBREFA |
|
panel could have informed OSHA about the cost considerations of |
|
engineering controls. Maybe OSHA wanted to see what engineering |
|
controls were ``feasible'' for small manufacturers. The way to find out |
|
was to convene a SBREFA panel, not to declare that ``feasible'' is |
|
anything short of causing a business to close its doors and go out of |
|
business. |
|
Conclusion |
|
In the examples of OSHA's proposed MSD reporting rule and OSHA's |
|
proposed changes to its On-site Consultation program, SBA's Office of |
|
Advocacy wrote to the agency and shared the concerns voiced by the |
|
small business community.\21\ In both letters, the Office of Advocacy |
|
publicly criticized the failure by OSHA to incorporate flexibility for |
|
small business in their proposals. Even though OSHA recently pulled |
|
back its plans to go ahead with the noise rule and the MSD reporting |
|
rule, the Committee is justified in its concern that OSHA is moving |
|
forward with regulatory policy that will impact the small business |
|
community in a way that ignores their input. OSHA's policy apparatus |
|
suffers when the agency treats the SBREFA process as a legal barrier. |
|
The purpose of the Regulatory Flexibility Act and the SBREFA amendments |
|
is for OSHA to benefit from small business input so the agency can |
|
fulfill its mission to ensure safe workplaces without unduly burdening |
|
small employers. Constructive input by small firms provides OSHA with |
|
valuable insight that allows for the agency to draft proposals that |
|
will work on Main Street. OSHA benefits when it embraces the SBREFA |
|
process as a constructive dialogue. |
|
endnotes |
|
\1\ See http://www.SBCRR.com. |
|
\2\ See http://www.sba.gov/advocacy. |
|
\3\ Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 |
|
(1980), amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness |
|
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 857 (1996) (codified as |
|
amended at 5 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 601-612), also amended by Sec. 1100 G |
|
of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. |
|
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 2112 (July 21, 2010). |
|
\4\ Keith W. Holman, The Regulatory Flexibility Act at 25: Is the |
|
Law Achieving Its Goal?, 33 Fordham Urban Law Journal 1119 (2006). |
|
\5\ Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, |
|
Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 857 (1996). |
|
\6\ Nicole V. Crain and W. Mark Crain, The Impact of Regulatory |
|
Costs on Small Firms, written for the Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small |
|
Business Administration (September 2010), available at http:// |
|
www.sba.gov/advocacy/853/2016. |
|
\7\ Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration, |
|
Frequently Asked Questions (January 2011), available at http:// |
|
www.sba.gov/advocacy/7495. |
|
\8\ Id. |
|
\9\ John Haltiwanger, Business Dynamics Statistics Briefing: Jobs |
|
Created from Business Startups in the United States, Ewing Marion |
|
Kauffman Foundation (January 2009), available at: http:// |
|
www.kauffman.org/research-and-policy/bds-jobs-created.aspx. |
|
\10\ Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, |
|
Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 857 (1996). |
|
\11\ See, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 609. |
|
\12\ Executive Order 13272, Proper Consideration of Small Entities |
|
in Agency Rulemaking, 67 Fed. Reg. 53461 (August 16, 2002). |
|
\13\ Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-240, |
|
Sec. 1601 (September 27, 2010). |
|
\14\ Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, |
|
Pub. L. No. 111-203, Sec. 1100G (July 21, 2010). |
|
\15\ See, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 605(b). |
|
\16\ 75 Fed. Reg. 4728 (January 29, 2010). |
|
\17\ 75 Fed. 4736. |
|
\18\ 75 Fed. Reg. 54064 (September 3, 2010). |
|
\19\ 75 Fed. Reg. 64216 (October 19, 2010). |
|
\20\ 75 Fed. Reg. at 64217. |
|
\21\ Susan M. Walthall, Acting Chief Counsel for Advocacy, letter |
|
to OSHA Assistant Secretary David Michaels, (March 30, 2010). Available |
|
at: http://www.sba.gov/content/letter-dated-033010-department-labor- |
|
occupational-safety-and-health-administration. Winslow Sargeant, Chief |
|
Counsel for Advocacy, letter to OSHA Assistant Secretary David |
|
Michaels, (November 2, 2010). Available at: http://www.sba.gov/content/ |
|
letter-dated-110210-department-labor-occupational-safety-and-health- |
|
administration. |
|
______ |
|
|
|
Chairman Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Sullivan. |
|
Moving on to Mr. Sessions? |
|
|
|
STATEMENT OF STUART SESSIONS, PRESIDENT, ENVIRONOMICS, INC., |
|
TESTIFYING ON BEHALF OF THE COALITION FOR WORKPLACE SAFETY |
|
|
|
Mr. Sessions. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the |
|
Subcommittee on Workforce Protections. Thank you for inviting |
|
me here to testify specifically on OSHA's recent proposal |
|
regarding the noise exposure standard and the potential impact |
|
of this proposal on job creation. This is one of OSHA's three |
|
actions that Tom Sullivan just referred to. |
|
I am here on behalf of the Coalition for Workplace Safety. |
|
The coalition has retained me to analyze the potential cost and |
|
economic impacts if OSHA were to finalize this proposed new |
|
reinterpretation of the term ``feasible'' as it applies to the |
|
noise standard. |
|
I want to share with the subcommittee today some initial |
|
results from two recent analyses of this new reinterpretation |
|
by OSHA that have been conducted by the coalition and its |
|
members. The two analyses are, number one, a series of case |
|
studies. |
|
I have been working with a number--about a dozen different |
|
companies to evaluate what the impact of OSHA's proposal would |
|
be on their operations. How much would it cost each of these |
|
companies? How much would the new interpretation revise what |
|
they need to do in terms of meeting the noise standard? And |
|
what would these compliance costs mean to these businesses in |
|
terms of their competitive position and in terms of jobs? |
|
The second piece of research is a large survey that has |
|
been done by the National Association of Manufacturers, in |
|
which they asked their manufacturing members what the impact of |
|
OSHA's proposal would be on their operations and on their |
|
competitive position. And NAM obtained more than 315 lengthy |
|
responses to this questionnaire on the impact of the OSHA |
|
proposal. |
|
I have combined data from these two sources, my case |
|
studies and the NAM survey, along with other data to attempt to |
|
estimate what the overall impact on the national economy would |
|
be if OSHA's proposal were finalized, the impact in particular |
|
in terms of costs and in terms of jobs. |
|
I draw four conclusions from these analyses, and I would |
|
like to share these conclusions with the subcommittee. First, |
|
the proposed OSHA noise reinterpretation would affect a large |
|
number and very broad range of American businesses and their |
|
employees. Most companies involved in manufacturing, most |
|
involved in construction, and many involved in transportation |
|
have employees exposed to noise levels at which the OSHA |
|
reinterpretation would apply. |
|
In addition, there are many other businesses that do |
|
various other activities, including lawn care, tree service, |
|
automobile repair, warehousing, anything involving maintenance |
|
and repair of large, noisy equipment that would also be |
|
affected by OSHA's proposal. In total, I estimate that |
|
somewhere between 2 million and 7 million workers would be |
|
affected by OSHA's proposal, and their employers would |
|
similarly be affected. |
|
Second conclusion: The costs for American business to |
|
comply with OSHA's proposed new policy would be very high. OSHA |
|
estimated long ago that the average highly exposed worker who |
|
is exposed to a level of noise at which this proposal would |
|
have an impact, OSHA estimated that the average cost per |
|
engineering controls--engineering controls alone to protect |
|
that worker would average about $4,000 per worker per year. |
|
The NAM survey provides more recent information than OSHA's |
|
old estimate on the cost per worker. And the NAM survey |
|
estimates costs for engineering controls alone as a protective |
|
approach of somewhere between $2,000 and $10,000 per year per |
|
highly exposed worker. |
|
Under the current policy, employers are allowed to protect |
|
workers via a combination of engineering controls, |
|
administrative controls, and hearing protection--earmuffs, |
|
earplugs, and the like--and typically earmuffs and earplugs are |
|
far less expensive than engineering controls. |
|
So OSHA's policy essentially requires employees to spend on |
|
the order of this $2,000 to $10,000 per employee, rather than |
|
the much lesser sums that they can spend to protect employees |
|
via hearing protection alone. |
|
If we put these costs of $2,000 to $10,000 per worker per |
|
year together with the number of exposed workers, the total |
|
cost for OSHA's proposal, as I estimate it, is somewhere |
|
between $1 billion and $27 billion per year. This amount, if it |
|
were to be a cost of a regulation, would trigger the |
|
requirements for Executive Order 12866 and economic analysis of |
|
significant regulations, and it would trigger the SBREFA |
|
requirements that Mr. Sullivan referred to for small-business |
|
panels, et cetera. OSHA essentially sidestepped these |
|
procedural safeguards by issuing this as an administrative |
|
interpretation rather than a regulation. |
|
Conclusion number three: OSHA's proposed new interpretation |
|
and these costs would have a substantial negative impact on |
|
U.S. jobs and competitiveness. We have done a little bit of |
|
work to run the estimated compliance costs through a national |
|
model that predicts the macroeconomic impacts of compliance |
|
costs. Actually, we haven't run them through the model; we have |
|
analogized from a recent run of the model on it, a different, |
|
similar regulation. |
|
And we estimate that the impact on the nation's employment, |
|
if OSHA's proposal were to be finalized, would be a loss of |
|
somewhere between 10,000 and 220,000 jobs. |
|
Final conclusion number four. All of this would be for |
|
relatively little benefit in terms of improved hearing |
|
protection for workers. Two points. |
|
One, currently the number of reportable work-related |
|
hearing losses for highly exposed workers is very low. The |
|
current system of--the current regulation and OSHA's previous |
|
interpretation of the noise standard are working, less than |
|
0.6---- |
|
Chairman Walberg. I would ask you to wrap up. |
|
Mr. Sessions. Fifteen seconds. Less than 0.6 percent of |
|
workers are currently--have evidence of a work-related hearing |
|
loss. Under the current system, that is less than the number |
|
of--the percentage of the general population that has such |
|
hearing losses. |
|
So there isn't a problem in the first place that the |
|
regulation would be addressing. And, secondly, the regulation |
|
would have minimal impacts in reducing--or the proposal would |
|
have minimal impacts in reducing this already low rate of |
|
hearing loss. |
|
Thank you, sir. |
|
[The statement of Mr. Sessions follows:] |
|
|
|
Prepared Statement of Stuart L. Sessions, President, Environomics, Inc. |
|
|
|
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee on |
|
Workforce Protections. Thank you for inviting me today to testify on |
|
OSHA's recent proposal regarding the noise exposure standard and the |
|
potential impact of the proposal on job creation. |
|
I am Stuart Sessions, President of the consulting firm |
|
Environomics, Inc. I am here today representing the Coalition for |
|
Workplace Safety (CWS). The Coalition for Workplace Safety is a group |
|
of associations and employers who seek to cost-effectively improve |
|
workplace safety. The Coalition has retained me to analyze the |
|
potential costs and economic impacts if OSHA were to finalize their |
|
proposed new interpretation of the term ``feasible'' as it applies to |
|
the Agency's standards for occupational exposure to noise. |
|
As an economist, I have worked for more than 30 years in analyzing |
|
how a wide variety of environmental, health and safety regulations and |
|
administrative actions may affect the U.S. economy. Roughly half of my |
|
work in analyzing the economic impact of environmental, health and |
|
safety requirements has been as a Federal government employee or |
|
contractor, and about half has been as a consultant to private |
|
industry. |
|
OSHA proposed its reinterpretation of the noise standard as a |
|
policy interpretation and not specifically as a regulation. |
|
Nevertheless, this proposed action is typical of how a new government |
|
requirement, whether achieved by formal regulation or simply as a |
|
declaration of policy by the agency that enforces the regulations, can |
|
affect the U.S. economy and jobs. |
|
I want to share with the Subcommittee today some initial results |
|
from two recent analyses of OSHA's proposed noise reinterpretation by |
|
CWS and its members. These analyses have not yet been completed, and |
|
they may well not be completed, since OSHA has withdrawn its proposed |
|
new interpretation. These analyses, however, focus directly on the |
|
Subcommittee's concern about how OSHA's requirements may affect job |
|
creation I expect that our preliminary findings from these analyses |
|
will be of interest and I have no expectation that the thrust of these |
|
analyses will change in a material way. The two analyses are: |
|
1. Case studies. I have been working with about a dozen different |
|
companies on case studies of what the OSHA proposal would mean to their |
|
operations. The case studies examine how each of these employers |
|
complies with the OSHA noise standard now, what they would have to do |
|
differently if the proposed interpretation were finalized, and how much |
|
compliance with the new interpretation would cost them. And then, the |
|
case studies proceed to analyzing the impacts of these compliance |
|
costs: what would these compliance costs mean to these businesses and |
|
their competitive position, and what would the costs mean in terms of |
|
jobs? Would some of the current employees of these companies lose their |
|
jobs because the companies become less competitive and lose business, |
|
or might the noise compliance measures open new opportunities for these |
|
businesses and perhaps result in increasing numbers of jobs in the |
|
future? |
|
2. NAM survey. The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) has |
|
conducted a large survey of its member companies with regard to the |
|
companies' hearing protection programs for their employees and the |
|
potential impact of the OSHA noise proposal. NAM asked a broad set of |
|
questions of the companies, including similar questions as in my case |
|
studies about the costs and economic consequences of OSHA's proposed |
|
new interpretation. NAM has obtained more than 315 responses to their |
|
survey from manufacturing companies. |
|
In addition to reporting today on some of the results from my case |
|
studies and the NAM survey, I have combined data from these and other |
|
sources and have estimated the overall potential impact on the national |
|
economy of OSHA's noise reinterpretation in terms of costs and in terms |
|
of jobs. While I readily admit that my estimates are rough and |
|
uncertain, they contrast with the complete absence of any economic |
|
analysis conducted by, or at least made public by, OSHA. |
|
I draw four conclusions from this set of analyses--from the |
|
combination of my case studies, the NAM survey, and the national |
|
aggregate analysis: |
|
1. The proposed OSHA noise interpretation would affect a large |
|
number and very broad range of American businesses and their employees. |
|
2. The costs for American businesses to comply with OSHA's proposed |
|
new policy would be very high. |
|
3. OSHA's proposed new interpretation would have substantial |
|
negative impacts on U.S. jobs and competitiveness. |
|
4. All this would be for relatively little benefit in terms of |
|
improved hearing protection for workers. |
|
Before I explain these conclusions in more detail, I would like to |
|
summarize what OSHA's proposed noise reinterpretation would have |
|
required. |
|
OSHA has long had a standard that prescribes 90 decibels as the |
|
maximum average noise level to which a worker may be exposed over an 8- |
|
hour work shift. OSHA has for several decades maintained the policy |
|
that an employer can comply with this 90 decibel standard through |
|
whatever combination of three noise-limiting approaches that the |
|
employer finds is cost-effective. The three noise-limiting approaches |
|
include what are known as: 1) Engineering controls; 2) Administrative |
|
controls; and 3) Personal protective equipment. ``Engineering |
|
controls'' include measures to reduce noise by engineered means such as |
|
mufflers on noisy equipment, sound-deadening enclosures for noisy |
|
equipment, redesigning or changing equipment or processes so as to make |
|
them less noisy, and so forth. ``Administrative controls'' include |
|
measures such as rotating a worker's tasks so as to limit the fraction |
|
of his work shift that the worker spends performing activities with |
|
high noise levels. ``Personal protective equipment'', or PPE, includes |
|
such things as ear plugs or ear muffs that reduce the amount of noise |
|
exposure the individual worker receives despite whatever level of |
|
ambient noise surrounds the worker. In general, reducing a worker's |
|
noise level is substantially less costly through use of personal |
|
protective equipment than through engineering controls or |
|
administrative controls. |
|
OSHA's noise standard does not treat these three means of reducing |
|
a worker's noise exposure equivalently. The standard requires an |
|
employer to limit exposure to 90 decibels first by implementing all |
|
feasible engineering and administrative controls. Only then, after all |
|
feasible engineering and administrative controls have been implemented, |
|
can an employer add personal protective equipment in order to get below |
|
the 90 decibel limit. The key in how OSHA has sensibly implemented for |
|
many years this preference for engineering and administrative controls |
|
lies in how OSHA has interpreted the term ``feasible'' as a limitation |
|
on the engineering and administrative controls that will be required. |
|
OSHA has long interpreted the word ``feasible'' as meaning ``cost- |
|
effective relative to PPE''. Those engineering and administrative |
|
controls that are defined as feasible and required to be implemented |
|
first consist only of those that are cost-effective relative to PPE. |
|
Or, said in a different way, if PPE is effective in limiting workers' |
|
noise exposure to less than 90 decibels and is less costly than |
|
engineering and administrative controls, the employer can choose to |
|
implement PPE rather than more costly engineering and administrative |
|
controls. |
|
In the fall of last year, though, OSHA proposed to reinterpret the |
|
term ``feasible'' as it applies in the noise standard. OSHA proposed to |
|
reinterpret ``feasible'' to mean ``capable of being done'' instead of |
|
meaning ``cost-effective''. Under OSHA's proposed new interpretation, |
|
then, in seeking to limit noise exposures to below 90 decibels, an |
|
employer would need to implement all possible engineering and |
|
administrative controls without regard to cost unless the employer can |
|
show that the engineering and administrative controls would threaten |
|
the employer's ability to remain in business. Under the proposed new |
|
interpretation, the limit on required engineering and administrative |
|
controls would change from only those that are cost-effective to all |
|
such controls that are available short of putting the employer out of |
|
business. |
|
Obviously OSHA's proposed new interpretation of the term |
|
``feasible'' would greatly increase the required use of engineering and |
|
administrative controls relative to PPE in reducing noise exposures. I |
|
and the Coalition for Workplace Safety have been working to estimate |
|
the costs and economic impacts that would result from OSHA's proposed |
|
new policy. I would like to summarize the four conclusions that I have |
|
drawn from our analyses thus far. |
|
1. The proposed OSHA noise interpretation would affect a large |
|
number and very broad range of American businesses and their employees. |
|
There are a wide variety of tools, machines, vehicles and processes |
|
that can generate noise exceeding 90 decibels: saws, hammers, punches, |
|
presses, sanders, burners, boilers, blowers, crushers, generators, |
|
compressors, aircraft, trucks, busses, locomotives, boats, compressed |
|
air, combustion, abrasive blasting, welding and many, many more. |
|
Workers operating or maintaining these items, or performing other tasks |
|
in the vicinity of these items, can be exposed to noise that may exceed |
|
an average of 90 decibels across an 8-hour work shift. |
|
I have reviewed various data sources in order to develop a rough |
|
estimate for the number of employees that are exposed above 90 decibels |
|
and that therefore could be affected by OSHA's proposed |
|
reinterpretation. I have organized these estimates by industry: |
|
<bullet> Manufacturing. In regulatory impact analyses that OSHA |
|
developed in the late 1970s/early 1980s to support potential changes to |
|
the noise standard, the Agency estimated that 19.4% of all production |
|
employees in manufacturing industries (SIC codes 20 through 37, plus |
|
SIC 49, utilities) work in settings with average ambient noise |
|
exceeding 90 decibels. This estimate is rather old, but is apparently |
|
the most recent comprehensive estimate that OSHA has developed. Noise |
|
exposures in manufacturing have likely been reduced since OSHA's |
|
estimate. I will assume in my calculations that the fraction of |
|
manufacturing production workers now exposed above 90 decibels is |
|
somewhere between the roughly 20% that OSHA estimated 30 years ago and |
|
2%, a level one-tenth as high. |
|
<bullet> Construction (SIC 15-17). A large recent noise survey for |
|
residential construction trades found for virtually every job category |
|
that at least 10% of full-shift samples exceeded 90 decibels (roofer, |
|
framing carpenter, finish carpenter, excavator, drywall installer, |
|
brick mason and helpers, landscaper, miscellaneous trades). Exposures |
|
among commercial construction workers are higher than among residential |
|
workers, while exposures among heavy/public works construction workers |
|
are likely also to be higher. Any particular construction worker's |
|
noise exposure can vary significantly from shift to shift as a function |
|
of how much of the shift he spends using or near a noisy tool. A brick |
|
mason, for example, may spend a large share of one shift using a noisy |
|
brick saw, but may not use the saw at all on the next shift. The result |
|
is that the fraction of construction workers who are occasionally |
|
exposed above 90 decibels for a shift substantially exceeds the |
|
fraction of all full-shift samples that exceed 90 decibels. I will |
|
assume that somewhere between 20% and 50% of all construction workers |
|
are occasionally exposed above 90 decibels, in contrast to the roughly |
|
10% or so of all construction worker samples that exceed 90 decibels. |
|
<bullet> Transportation (SIC 40-49). Workers around concentrations |
|
of transportation vehicles, particularly aircraft, can be exposed to |
|
noise levels exceeding 90 decibels. I will assume that the fraction of |
|
non-office transportation workers exposed above 90 decibels is similar |
|
to that for manufacturing production workers; somewhere between 2% and |
|
20%. |
|
<bullet> Other industries. There are many additional industries |
|
where workers can often be exposed at average levels exceeding 90 |
|
decibels, such as lawn care, tree service, automobile repair, |
|
maintenance and repair of large, noisy equipment, and warehousing. |
|
These other industries likely account for many fewer highly exposed |
|
workers than manufacturing, construction and transportation. I have not |
|
sought to estimate the likely much smaller numbers of highly exposed |
|
workers in additional industries. |
|
Combining recent employment figures for manufacturing, construction |
|
and transportation with estimates of the percentages of each industry's |
|
workers that are exposed to average noise levels exceeding 90 decibels, |
|
I estimate that there are some 2 to 7 million workers currently exposed |
|
at such levels. These workers and their employers would be directly |
|
affected by OSHA's proposed new interpretation. |
|
I have provided a table at the end of this testimony that shows |
|
these estimates and summarizes how I proceed further to calculate the |
|
costs and job impacts of OSHA's proposed policy. |
|
2. The costs for American businesses to comply with OSHA's proposed |
|
new policy would be very high. |
|
OSHA has not estimated what the costs would be for the additional |
|
engineering and administrative controls that would be necessitated by |
|
the policy. The most recent nationwide cost estimates that OSHA has |
|
developed involving additional noise controls can be found in the |
|
regulatory impact analyses in the late 1970's/early 1980's that I |
|
referred to earlier. At that time, OSHA estimated the costs for |
|
additional technologically feasible engineering and administrative |
|
controls sufficient to reduce ambient noise to 90 decibels or less as |
|
the equivalent of $4,037 per affected employee per year in 2010 |
|
dollars. Said another way, OSHA estimated for each employee exposed to |
|
ambient noise levels exceeding 90 decibels that the cost of engineering |
|
and administrative controls to reduce these levels to 90 decibels or |
|
below would average $4,037 per year. This cost estimate is OSHA's most |
|
recent, but it is still roughly 30 years old. |
|
A much more current estimate for the costs of the engineering and |
|
administrative controls necessitated by OSHA's proposed |
|
reinterpretation can be developed from the NAM survey results and my |
|
case studies. Across these two data sources, 45 companies or facilities |
|
have estimated both the number of their employees exposed to average |
|
ambient noise levels exceeding 90 decibels and the costs of available |
|
engineering and administrative controls to reduce these exposures. The |
|
resulting estimates for the cost of the proposed OSHA policy per |
|
affected employee span a very wide range, all the way from less than $1 |
|
per employee per year to more than $200,000 per employee per year. The |
|
median estimate from the case studies and NAM's survey is $2,950 per |
|
affected employee per year, while the average across the 45 companies |
|
or facilities is $18,137 per employee per year. I believe that this |
|
average figure is skewed by several very high estimates of cost per |
|
employee that represent situations where costly controls would reduce |
|
noise exposures for very few workers, and that these controls might not |
|
actually be implemented in practice. I will assume that the controls |
|
more likely to be implemented in practice might average somewhere |
|
between about $3,000 and about $10,000 per employee per year. This |
|
range brackets the figure that OSHA derived previously of about $4,000 |
|
per affected employee per year. |
|
These represent my estimated costs per affected worker of OSHA's |
|
proposed new policy for manufacturing industries specifically. (Both |
|
OSHA's estimate and the NAM survey that provided most of my cost data |
|
addressed manufacturers only.) |
|
I would expect that the cost per affected worker for transportation |
|
industries would be roughly similar to these estimated costs for |
|
manufacturing industries. I thus will assume an identical range of |
|
between $3,000 and $10,000 per affected employee per year. |
|
For construction industries, I believe that these costs for |
|
engineering and administrative controls would be much lower than for |
|
manufacturing, perhaps only one-tenth as much. Most of the engineering |
|
controls for construction involve changes to small equipment--less |
|
noisy saws, compressors, jackhammers, etc., in contrast to |
|
manufacturing where the noise-reducing measures would often involve |
|
changes to large machines, entire process lines or significant portions |
|
of a shop floor. For my very rough total national cost estimate for |
|
OSHA's proposed policy, I estimate the cost per affected worker in |
|
construction industries at one-tenth that for manufacturing, and thus |
|
roughly $300 to $1,000 per worker per year. |
|
To develop an estimate for the total national cost of OSHA's |
|
proposed policy, we can multiply each of these figures on the cost per |
|
affected employee by the estimates I discussed earlier for the number |
|
of employees in different industries that are exposed to ambient |
|
workplace noise exceeding 90 decibels. In total, we get a national cost |
|
estimate for OSHA's proposed noise reinterpretation that is somewhere |
|
in the range from $1.2 billion dollars per year to $27 billion dollars |
|
per year. The total national cost is nearer the higher end of this |
|
range if we assume OSHA's figure to the effect that nearly 20% of |
|
manufacturing production workers are in work settings with ambient |
|
noise levels exceeding 90 decibels, while the figure is near the lower |
|
end of this range if we assume conservatively that only one-tenth as |
|
many workers are exposed to high noise levels as OSHA estimated. |
|
An annual cost of somewhere between $1.2 and $27 billion is quite |
|
large relative to most other new requirements that the Federal |
|
government imposes on private industry. Only a few Federal regulations, |
|
typically fewer than five per year over the several decades that OMB |
|
has been keeping records, impose a burden of this magnitude on the |
|
economy. This figure reflects all Federal regulations for all |
|
purposes--environmental protection, homeland security, transportation |
|
safety, consumer protection, etc., as well as occupational health and |
|
safety. OSHA's proposed new policy on noise would be among the most |
|
expensive new requirements that the Federal government considers each |
|
year. |
|
This is a very large cost for a policy that OSHA proposed to adopt |
|
by simply declaring it, without meeting the due process sorts of |
|
requirements that would apply if the policy reinterpretation were |
|
instead to be a regulation. If OSHA's reinterpretation were to have |
|
been proposed as a regulation, as many would say it should have been, |
|
at a cost of more than a billion dollars per year this initiative would |
|
have been subject to the following important requirements: |
|
<bullet> Executive Order 12866. The Executive Order requires any |
|
agency proposing a regulation that would cost more than $100 million to |
|
prepare a regulatory impact analysis (RIA). In the RIA, OSHA would need |
|
to: 1) Provide a clear and thorough explanation of the need for the |
|
proposed action; 2) Explicitly estimate the benefits and costs and |
|
economic impacts of the proposal; and 3) Fairly consider alternatives |
|
to the proposal. |
|
<bullet> The Small Business Regulatory and Enforcement Fairness Act |
|
(SBREFA). OSHA's proposal would undoubtedly have a significant impact |
|
on a substantial number of small businesses. As such, pursuant to the |
|
requirements of SBREFA, OSHA would need to: 1) Analyze the impact of |
|
the proposed policy on small businesses specifically; 2) Convene a |
|
panel of small business representatives that would provide the Agency |
|
with advice on how potentially to reduce the impact of the proposal on |
|
small businesses; and 3) Consider a range of alternatives that would |
|
reduce the economic burden on small businesses. |
|
By attempting to issue the noise standard interpretation as a |
|
policy declaration instead of a regulation, OSHA avoided all these |
|
procedural safeguards. OSHA avoided the need for analyzing costs and |
|
benefits and considering alternatives under Executive Order 12866. |
|
Indeed, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs was not even |
|
informed of this proposal. OSHA avoided the need to examine impacts on |
|
small businesses and the need to consider alternatives that might |
|
reduce these impacts. In my view, avoiding these requirements for |
|
analysis, disclosure and transparency makes for poor public policy. |
|
3. OSHA's proposed new interpretation would have substantial |
|
negative impacts on U.S. jobs and competitiveness. |
|
The companies responding to the NAM survey and those involved in |
|
the case studies have offered a variety of comments on what OSHA's |
|
proposed new interpretation would mean for their businesses. I will |
|
quote some responses to the question of whether OSHA's proposal would |
|
affect the company's competitive position: |
|
<bullet> Foreign imports (even from Canada) are coming in at lower |
|
delivered cost. Labor content is already more than 25% of each sales |
|
dollar. More labor inefficiency [from administrative controls] will |
|
push us far higher. |
|
<bullet> I would shut down. |
|
<bullet> Most of our facilities agreed that given the estimated |
|
costs required to comply, they would in many cases either contract the |
|
work to outside suppliers (who would have to meet the same |
|
requirements) or consider moving the work out of the U.S. |
|
<bullet> Cost increases would significantly increase cost for two |
|
processes where there is already significant and growing competition |
|
from China. |
|
<bullet> Added costs with no commensurate increase in efficiency or |
|
output make us even less competitive than we are against the Chinese |
|
who have no such requirements to hamper them. |
|
<bullet> The changes would have to be paid for. With already slim |
|
margins it would almost certainly require an increase in our product |
|
cost. It is already difficult to compete with foreign competitors on a |
|
cost basis. We can't and won't produce product for free or at a |
|
negative margin. |
|
<bullet> Negative impact. We would have to invest precious assets |
|
in equipment that actually negatively affects productivity. |
|
<bullet> We would shift more of our production overseas. |
|
<bullet> We would attempt to fully automate the noisy process so it |
|
would not need an operator who would be exposed to the noise. |
|
<bullet> As we continue to spend money on new and existing |
|
compliance requirements the cost to do business goes up each year. It |
|
gets tougher to stay competitive especially with the overseas markets |
|
because you can't pass these costs on to the customers. |
|
<bullet> It would cost us a lot of unnecessary money. We are a |
|
small company and it would be a hit to our bottom line for sure, but |
|
our competitors would have the same issues so we'd all lose money |
|
together at least. |
|
<bullet> There is no return on that investment. We don't see |
|
hearing loss now, so why invest any money in it? |
|
<bullet> Our competition would be investing their money into |
|
projects that make them lower cost producers. |
|
<bullet> Significant distraction from what we need to do to stay |
|
competitive in a globalized manufacturing economy. |
|
<bullet> Implementing all feasible engineering and administrative |
|
controls would be a very expensive exercise that would have significant |
|
safety and financial consequences. |
|
The great majority of the responses forecast an important negative |
|
impact on the responding company's competitiveness. |
|
In answer to another question on whether OSHA's proposed new |
|
approach would cause the company to reduce its number of employees in |
|
the U.S., 70% of the respondents said ``yes'' and 30% said ``no''. |
|
In my view, the best way to quantitatively estimate the ultimate |
|
economic impact from a broad new requirement such as OSHA's noise |
|
reinterpretation is to use a national economic forecasting and policy |
|
simulation model. The estimated industry-by-industry compliance costs |
|
from the new requirement are loaded into the model, and the model then |
|
predicts the particular industries that will be winners and losers and |
|
the overall impacts on GNP, employment and other economic variables of |
|
interest. We have not yet run such a model to estimate the impacts that |
|
would ensue from OSHA's proposed noise reinterpretation, but I believe |
|
that we can reasonably extrapolate from the recent results when such a |
|
model was run for a comparable potential new requirement. |
|
The REMI Policy Insight Model is one of the most respected national |
|
economic forecasting models that is used to estimate the aggregate |
|
economic impacts from significant new spending initiatives, whether the |
|
initiatives involve private industry compliance spending such as may be |
|
required by a regulation, or investment spending such as might be |
|
associated with a governmental stimulus program. The REMI model was |
|
recently run to estimate the impact of EPA's proposed national |
|
regulation to tighten the air quality standard for ozone. EPA's |
|
potential requirement regarding ozone and OSHA's potential requirement |
|
regarding noise are qualitatively similar: both affect primarily the |
|
manufacturing and transportation industries, both will have broad |
|
national impact, and both have costs estimated to exceed a billion |
|
dollars per year. The recent REMI run for EPA's proposed ozone standard |
|
found that a net of about 8 U.S. jobs would be lost for every million |
|
dollars per year in compliance costs. Applying this factor to the |
|
compliance costs that we estimate for the proposed OSHA noise |
|
reinterpretation, we project a net loss of somewhere between about |
|
10,000 and 220,000 U.S. jobs if OSHA's noise proposal were to be |
|
finalized. |
|
4. All this would be for relatively little benefit in terms of |
|
improved hearing protection for workers |
|
I would like to make two points here: |
|
<bullet> First, it does not appear that work-related hearing loss |
|
is a frequent problem now, under OSHA's existing and long-standing |
|
noise regulation and enforcement policies. |
|
<bullet> Second, it seems unlikely that OSHA's proposed policy |
|
shift would significantly reduce the already low rate of work-related |
|
hearing loss. |
|
The current rate of work-related hearing loss is low |
|
OSHA's noise standard requires an employer to operate a hearing |
|
conservation program if any employees are exposed to an average noise |
|
level exceeding 85 decibels. A hearing conservation program must |
|
include monitoring of ambient noise levels and employee noise |
|
exposures, provision of hearing protectors, annual audiometric testing |
|
of employees, specific follow-up activities if the annual audiogram |
|
shows indication of hearing loss, and more. The employer must provide |
|
hearing protection devices to all employees exposed above 85 decibels, |
|
and must both provide and require the use of hearing protection devices |
|
for all employees exposed above 90 decibels. And, as I discussed |
|
previously, the employer must also implement all feasible engineering |
|
and administrative controls to reduce exposures exceeding 90 decibels. |
|
Among the companies responding to NAM's survey, more than 90% have |
|
employee exposures exceeding 85 decibels and operate a hearing |
|
conservation program as they are required to do under the noise |
|
standard. I want to emphasize these two important characteristics of |
|
the vast majority of the companies that have responded to the NAM |
|
survey. These companies: a) Have relatively high noise exposures |
|
(employees exposed over 85 decibels); and b) Take measures to protect |
|
their employees by operating the hearing conservation programs that |
|
OSHA requires. These companies provide an ideal test for how well |
|
OSHA's longstanding approaches are performing in protecting workers' |
|
hearing. These companies have the relatively high noise levels that |
|
OSHA is concerned about, and they have been implementing the programs |
|
that OSHA mandates. What is the result in terms of hearing loss among |
|
the exposed workers at these companies? |
|
The answer from the NAM survey is that these companies show very |
|
low rates of worker hearing loss. For the year 2010, 132 companies |
|
provided information on both the number of their employees exposed |
|
above 85 decibels and the number of employees that showed evidence of |
|
work-related hearing loss (a ``Standard Threshold Shift'' or STS). The |
|
percentage of these relatively highly exposed workers that had a |
|
recordable STS was only 0.59% (184 with STS out of 31,074 employees |
|
exposed above 85 decibels among the 132 companies that responded). This |
|
incidence of STS is very low. |
|
This already low rate of work-related hearing loss is unlikely to |
|
decline much further with OSHA's proposed policy shift |
|
Most companies in my case studies (and additional companies in the |
|
NAM survey) reported that the feasible engineering and administrative |
|
controls they would implement under the proposed OSHA policy shift |
|
would not be sufficient to reduce current exposures exceeding 90 |
|
decibels to below 90 decibels. PPE would continue to be required for |
|
these employees, despite the additional engineering and administrative |
|
controls. Under current OSHA requirements and policy the rate of work- |
|
related hearing loss among highly exposed workers is low and depends |
|
substantially on the efficacy of PPE--this situation would change |
|
little if OSHA changed its policy as proposed. |
|
Summary of Conclusions |
|
1. The proposed OSHA noise interpretation would affect a large |
|
number and very broad range of American businesses and their employees. |
|
2. The costs for American businesses to comply with OSHA's proposed |
|
new policy would be very high. |
|
3. OSHA's proposed new interpretation would have substantial |
|
negative impacts on U.S. jobs and competitiveness. |
|
4. All this would be for relatively little benefit in terms of |
|
improved hearing protection for workers. |
|
Thank you for the opportunity to participate in this hearing. |
|
|
|
ESTIMATED COST/YR OF OSHA'S PROPOSED NEW INTERPRETATION OF FEASIBILITY FOR NOISE STANDARD |
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
Percent of ``line'' Cost/yr of engr/ Estimated total Estimated jobs impact |
|
workers needing admin controls per cost for OSHA of OSHA policy |
|
Percent in controls because of worker exposed >90 policy (in ---------------------- |
|
Current or ``line,'' ambient exposures >90 dBA $billions/yr) |
|
Sector typical # non-office dBA ---------------------------------------- |
|
of workers jobs ------------------------ High Low |
|
High Low High Low High Low estimate estimate |
|
estimate estimate estimate estimate estimate estimate |
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
Manfacturing.......................... 14,000,000 60% 19% 2% $10,000 $3,000 $16 $0.5 -130,368 -3,911 |
|
Construction.......................... 10,000,000 90% 50% 20% $1,000 $200 $5 $0.4 -36,000 -2,880 |
|
Transportation........................ 6,500,000 50% 19% 2% $10,000 $3,000 $6 $0.2 -50,440 -1,513 |
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
Total............................... ........... ............ 6,760,100 2,026,010 ........ ........ $27 $1 -216,808 -8,304 |
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
|
|
______ |
|
|
|
Chairman Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Sessions. I apologize for |
|
not catching the red light sooner. Since this is my first |
|
chairman duties, I am more used to listening and enjoying what |
|
I am hearing or reacting to what I am hearing. But that won't |
|
continue long, and the next two witnesses I certainly will give |
|
some latitude, but my--you know, I am from a red state, so it |
|
looks just normal. But we will try to keep the time here. Thank |
|
you. |
|
Moving on to Ms. Miser? |
|
|
|
STATEMENT OF TAMMY MISER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, UNITED SUPPORT |
|
AND MEMORIAL FOR WORKPLACE FATALITIES |
|
|
|
Ms. Miser. Chairman Walberg and members of the |
|
subcommittee, thank you very much for asking me to be here |
|
today. My name is Tammy Miser, and I have traveled from |
|
Lexington, Kentucky, to give you a very personal story of why |
|
OSHA regulations are needed. |
|
In 2003, my brother Shawn Boone, was 33 years old, and he |
|
was killed in an aluminum dust explosion. The company, Hayes |
|
Lemmerz, they produced aluminum wheels. They had had fires on a |
|
regular basis, and protocol was that they let the fires burn |
|
down and then they go back in and re-light the chip melt |
|
furnace. And they were also instructed not to call the fire |
|
department, because it was costing them too much money to do |
|
this. |
|
So that is what they did. And my brother went back in to |
|
collect his tools in the furnace room, and there was an |
|
explosion. This explosion caused aluminum dust to rain down |
|
from the rafters and the equipment, and there was a second, |
|
more intense explosion. |
|
This explosion actually left my brother blind with third- |
|
degree burns over most of his--at least 90 percent of his body, |
|
is what they were saying. Shawn was still conscious. He was |
|
still aware of what was going on. And some say that in between |
|
his cries for help he was joking about a fishing trip. It was |
|
just the kind of guy he was. He was a really wonderful guy. |
|
So when we were able to actually--he had no clue what |
|
condition his body was in, because he couldn't see. And we |
|
think that that is probably why he was able to get through it |
|
and he was conscious in knowing what was going on. |
|
But when we finally were able to see him, his face was |
|
splitting, he was swollen, his body was raw, and they refused |
|
to bandage his body. And I had been with him for a lifetime. He |
|
was my brother. And I could only recognize him by a few |
|
freckles on his face and--and this is the hardest thing that a |
|
family can face, truly. |
|
And many can't take this. And in 2007, my youngest brother |
|
drove halfway across the United States with a few photos of |
|
Shawn and the phone records of the night he was killed tucked |
|
in his Bible. He proceeded to shoot himself in the head. And I |
|
can't say that this incident alone caused my brother to take |
|
his life, but I know that he was not able to handle it, and |
|
that was what was on his mind. |
|
The argument that the regulations kill jobs, and I just |
|
really feel that it is just nonsense. There have only been two |
|
OSHA regulations in the past 10 years, crane and derricks and |
|
chromium. Both only affect a fraction of the U.S. businesses. |
|
As I talk to families around the country, I don't see this huge |
|
avalanche of regulations. It is more like a drought. |
|
Rules that protect construction workers from dying in |
|
confined spaces has been on the regulatory agenda for 15 years. |
|
This little guy here, Steven Lillicrap, he was only 21 years |
|
old when he was pulled in to the cables of 100-ton crane. OSHA |
|
had been working on revising outdated crane standards for 10 |
|
years. |
|
But this rule came too late for Steven. It was finally |
|
issued in July and is expected to prevent 22 deaths and 175 |
|
injuries and millions of dollars in property damage per year. |
|
The benefits far outweigh the costs of this rule. |
|
The U.S. Chemical Safety Board warned OSHA in 2006 about |
|
combustible dust handlers. And it is not well known--but in |
|
2002, the year before my brother was killed, they had also let |
|
OSHA know that this was an issue. So if just the National Fire |
|
Protection Association consensus standards were mandatory, my |
|
brother would still be here, and others would still be here |
|
today. |
|
In 2008, the Imperial Sugar refinery dust explosion killed |
|
14 workers and injured 36. And some of these were severely |
|
injured, severe burns. And the means to prevent this was well- |
|
known. Some companies choose to gamble with workers' lives |
|
because there are no OSHA standards. |
|
When preventable disasters strike in the workplace, they |
|
not only take a huge toll on the injured and their families, |
|
but workers can lose their jobs and communities suffer. In |
|
2009, the Sunoco refinery in Pennsylvania, the company decided |
|
not to rebuild after their explosion. Fifty workers were laid |
|
off. That same year, ConAgra's Slim Jim plant exploded. Three |
|
workers were killed, and 71 were injured. Before the disaster, |
|
700 people were employed there. Now the place is closing. |
|
A contractor working for ConAgra using a dangerous blowout |
|
procedure that purged natural gas in the indoor work |
|
environment is what had caused this. It was well known, that if |
|
OSHA had prevented--if OSHA could have prevented this with |
|
governing and rulemaking, this would have never happened. |
|
There is no price tag that can be put on seeing your |
|
husband walk your daughter down the aisle or seeing your baby |
|
born. I have talked to family members that have had children |
|
and their husbands are gone. Their babies are never going to |
|
know their father. It is nothing like seeing your child |
|
graduate from college or holding your grandbaby. |
|
I respectfully ask this subcommittee to not just look on |
|
one side of the ledger of the costs, but remember the benefits |
|
of the OSHA rules for workers, responsible employers, and |
|
families and communities. |
|
Thank you. |
|
[The statement of Ms. Miser follows:] |
|
|
|
Prepared Statement of Tammy Miser, United Support and Memorial for |
|
Workplace Fatalities |
|
|
|
Chairman Wahlberg, Ranking Member Woolsey and Members of the |
|
Subcommittee: My name is Tammy Miser. I am the founder of United |
|
Support and Memorial for Workplace Fatalities (USMWF). Our not-for- |
|
profit organization offers support, guidance, resources, and advocacy |
|
to empower family members who have lost a loved one from work-related |
|
injuries or illnesses. We work with other organizations, government |
|
agencies, and businesses as a catalyst for positive change to ensure |
|
safe and healthy working conditions for all. |
|
My brother Shawn Boone worked at the Hayes Lemmerz plant in |
|
Huntington, Indiana where they made aluminum wheels. The plant had a |
|
history of fires, but workers were told not to call the fire |
|
department. My brother and a couple coworkers went in to relight a chip |
|
melt furnace. They decided to stick around a few minutes to make sure |
|
everything was ok and then went back to gather tools. Shawn's back was |
|
toward the furnace when the first explosion occurred. Someone said that |
|
Shawn got up and started walking toward the doors when there was a |
|
second and more intense blast. The heat from that blast was hot enough |
|
to melt copper piping. Shawn did not die instantly. He laid on floor |
|
smoldering while the aluminum dust continued to burn through his flesh |
|
and muscle tissue. The breaths that he took burned his internal organs |
|
and the blast took his eyesight. Shawn was still conscious and asking |
|
for help when the ambulance took him. |
|
Hayes Lemmerz never bothered to call any of my family members to |
|
let us know that there was an explosion, or that Shawn was injured. The |
|
only call we received was from a friend of my husband, Mark, who told |
|
them that Shawn was in route to a Ft. Wayne burn unit. (Mark also |
|
worked at the plant.) When Mark asked the hospital staff where Shawn |
|
was, we found that no one even bothered to identify him. We were told |
|
that there was a ``white, unidentified male'' admitted to the unit. |
|
When Mark tried to describe Shawn, the nurse stopped him to say that |
|
there was an unidentified male with no body hair and no physical |
|
markings to identify. So my Shawn was ultimately identified only by his |
|
body weight and type. |
|
We drove five hours to Indiana wondering if it really was Shawn, |
|
hoping and praying that it wasn't. This still brings about guilt |
|
because I would not wish this feeling on anyone. We arrived only to be |
|
told that Shawn was being kept alive for us. The onsite pastor stopped |
|
us and told us to prepare ourselves, adding he had not seen anything |
|
like this since the war. The doctors refused to treat Shawn, saying |
|
even if they took his limbs, his internal organs were burned beyond |
|
repair. This was apparent by the black sludge they were pumping from |
|
his body. |
|
I went into the burn unit to see my brother. Maybe someone who |
|
didn't know Shawn wouldn't recognize him, but he was still my brother. |
|
You can't spend a lifetime with someone and not know who they are. |
|
Shawn's face had been cleaned up and it was very swollen and splitting, |
|
but he was still my Bub. My family immediately started talking about |
|
taking Shawn off of life support. If we did all agree, I would be |
|
ultimately giving up on Shawn. I would have taken his last breath, even |
|
if there was no hope and we weren't to blame. I still had to make that |
|
decision. To watch them stop the machines and watch my little brother |
|
die before my eyes. |
|
But we did take him off and we did stay to see his last breath. The |
|
two things I remember most are Shawn's last words, ``I'm in a world of |
|
hurt.'' And his last breath. |
|
This has been the hardest thing my family has had to deal with |
|
until 2007. My youngest brother drove half way across the United States |
|
with a few photo's and phone records of the night Shawn was killed that |
|
he had tucked into his bible. Tommy then proceeded to shoot himself in |
|
the head. I can't say that Shawn's death alone caused my brother to |
|
take his own life, but I know for a fact he couldn't deal with it and |
|
that was what was on his mind. |
|
The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) said |
|
the explosion that killed Shawn probably originated in a dust collector |
|
that was not adequately vented or cleaned. The dust collector was also |
|
too close to the aluminum scrap processing area. Hayes Lemmerz |
|
management allowed dust to accumulate on overhead beams and structures |
|
which caused a second, more massive explosion. The CSB concluded that |
|
had the company adhered to the National Fire Protection Association's |
|
standard for combustible metal dust, the explosion would have been |
|
minimized or prevented altogether.\1\ |
|
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
\1\ U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board. |
|
Investigation Report Aluminum Dust Explosion, Hayes Lemmerz |
|
International, Huntington, Indiana, October 29, 2003. Report No. 2004- |
|
04-I-IN, September 2005. |
|
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
During my own struggle for information about the OSHA investigative |
|
process, it became clear that family member victims of workplace |
|
fatalities needed a place to get information and support. That's how |
|
USMWF was formed. We are a virtual community of individuals with the |
|
shared experience of losing a loved one from a work-related injury or |
|
disease. Thousands of family members across the U.S. suffer profoundly |
|
because of our nation's inadequate regulatory system and its failure to |
|
protect workers' fundamental right to a safe and healthy worksite. |
|
The buzz is that OSHA regulations are bad for business and kill |
|
jobs. This is nonsense. There have only been 2 new OSHA regulations in |
|
the last 10 years: crane and derricks, and hexavalent chromium. Both |
|
only affect a fraction of U.S. businesses. As I talked to families from |
|
around the country who have lost loved ones from workplace hazards, I |
|
don't see an avalanche of new OSHA regulations. It's more like a |
|
drought. For example, a rule to protect construction workers from dying |
|
in confined spaces has been on OSHA's regulatory agenda for 15 years. |
|
Steven Lillicrap was only 21 years old in February 2009 when he was |
|
fatally pulled into the cables of a 100-ton crane. OSHA had been |
|
working to revise its outdated crane safety standard for 10 years, but |
|
the new rule came too late for Steven. It was finally issued last July |
|
and is expected to prevent 22 deaths, 175 injuries, and millions of |
|
dollars in property damage per year. The benefits far outweigh the $154 |
|
million cost. When you look at the few standards that OSHA has issued |
|
over its 40 year history, the benefits always exceed the costs. And |
|
those are only the benefits you can quantify. |
|
The CSB warned OSHA in 2006 about combustible dust hazards. Had the |
|
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standard been implemented, |
|
as a mandatory regulation instead of a voluntary consensus code, my |
|
brother Shawn and many others would still be here today. In 2008 the |
|
Imperial Sugar refinery explosion killed 14 workers and 36 were burned. |
|
The means to prevent these deadly explosions is well known. And |
|
preventing dust explosions has been done before, such as in grain |
|
handling facilities. Prior to OSHA's 1978 safety standard, there were |
|
about 20 explosions per year in grain elevators. Today, there are only |
|
about six. Yet some companies choose to gamble with workers' lives |
|
because there is no OSHA standard and failing to act gives them a |
|
competitive advantage over more responsible companies. |
|
When preventable disasters strike in the workplace, they not only |
|
take a huge toll on the injured and their families, but workers can |
|
lose their jobs and the community suffers. |
|
Some disasters occur because employers fail to comply with safety |
|
regulations. After the 2009 explosion at the Sunoco refinery in |
|
Pennsylvania, the company decided not to rebuild its ethylene unit. |
|
Fifty workers were laid off.\2\ Had there been better compliance with |
|
OSHA's process safety management requirements, it would never have |
|
happened. |
|
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
\2\ Logue T. Sunoco to lay off 40-50, close ethylene complex. Daily |
|
(Delaware) Times. July 7, 2009. |
|
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|
Some disasters occur because of inadequate regulations. In 2009, |
|
Con Agra's Slim Jim plant exploded, 3 workers were killed and 71 were |
|
injured. A contractor was using a procedure that purged natural gas |
|
into the indoor work environment, instead of purging the gas out of |
|
doors and using an explosivity detection meter. This disaster could |
|
have been prevented if OSHA had regulations requiring natural gas to be |
|
purged out of doors. The CSB found that OSHA doesn't have specific |
|
rules for natural gas purging, nor are there voluntary codes.\3\ |
|
Because there is no OSHA regulation, there have been too many |
|
explosions of this nature in commercial and industrial facilities. |
|
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
\3\ U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board. Urgent |
|
Recommendations on Gas Purging. August 2010. |
|
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
The lack of regulations not only killed 3 workers at the ConAgra |
|
plant, it also killed jobs. Before the disaster 700 people worked at |
|
the factory. Now the factory is closing. Rather than rebuild the |
|
damaged portion of the plant, the company is consolidating production |
|
elsewhere.\4\ |
|
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\4\ Nagem S, Wolf AM. Slim Jim plant's demise to put 450 out of |
|
work. NewsObserver.com. March 4, 2010. |
|
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|
The T-2 gasoline additive factory near Jacksonville, Florida had a |
|
runaway reaction in December 2007 involving highly reactive sodium |
|
metal. The explosion killed 4 and injured 32, including 28 at |
|
surrounding businesses. Pieces of the building were found a mile away. |
|
An investigation by the CSB found that the reactions could have been |
|
prevented if OSHA's process safety management standard covered reactive |
|
hazards. Sadly, the owner of the T-2 factory was among those killed by |
|
the explosion. Three adjacent businesses had to relocate from the |
|
industrial area, and a fourth business--a trucking company--was put out |
|
of business due to the damage. |
|
There's no price tag that can be put on seeing your husband walk |
|
your daughter down her wedding aisle, or seeing your son graduate from |
|
college, or holding a grandchild. The economic disruption to a family |
|
who loses a breadwinner is never offset by workers' compensation |
|
benefits. Workplace safety regulations and even-handed enforcement help |
|
level the playing field for employers who do the right thing versus |
|
those who take the low road. |
|
A one-sided look at the costs of OSHA rules, but excluding the |
|
benefits, does a disservice to workers, responsible employers, families |
|
and communities. |
|
______ |
|
|
|
Chairman Walberg. Thank you, Ms. Miser. And thank you for |
|
your courage. And thank you for sharing this with us. I think |
|
it certainly punctuates the purpose of this subcommittee and |
|
the importance that we have as we carefully look at all the |
|
surrounding issues. Thank you. |
|
Ms. Holmes, thank you for being here. |
|
|
|
STATEMENT OF JACQUELINE M. HOLMES, ESQ., OF COUNSEL, JONES DAY, |
|
TESTIFYING ON BEHALF OF THE U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE |
|
|
|
Ms. Holmes. Thank you, Chairman Walberg, Ranking Member |
|
Woolsey, and members of the subcommittee. I appreciate you |
|
inviting me to testify today. |
|
Before I summarize my own testimony, I would like to say |
|
that I was very touched, as I am sure we all were, by Ms. |
|
Miser's statement. And I, too, appreciate her being here. It is |
|
always a tragedy when someone loses their life in the |
|
workplace. |
|
And I refer in my statement, as I believe you did, as well, |
|
Chairman Walberg, in your opening statement, to the shared goal |
|
of worker safety that is shared by businesses and workers, and |
|
it really is a shared goal. The question, really, that we want |
|
to look at is, what is the best way to achieve that goal in the |
|
most cost-effective way? |
|
By way of background, for purposes of my own testimony, I |
|
am an attorney with the Washington, D.C., office of Jones Day, |
|
where I have practiced in the OSHA area since 1994. I am |
|
pleased to be here today on behalf of the United States Chamber |
|
of Commerce, which represents the interests of over 3 million |
|
businesses of all sizes and in all sectors; 96 percent of the |
|
chamber's members are small businesses who employ 100 or fewer |
|
employees. |
|
It may seem surprising to some members of the subcommittee |
|
that we are here--that many of us are here testifying today |
|
about proposals that OSHA has withdrawn, such as, for example, |
|
the noise standard reinterpretation. But we believe it is |
|
important to do so, because these proposals reflect a troubling |
|
pattern of efforts by the agency to impose substantial burdens |
|
on American business without regard to the cost of those |
|
efforts or their efficacy in improving worker health and safety |
|
or, indeed, in the case of the noise standard, whether there is |
|
a problem that requires solving in the first place. This is |
|
contrary to OSHA's own interpretation of its statutory |
|
mandates. |
|
Understanding that OSHA regulations can be very costly, the |
|
courts and--itself impose very substantial burdens on OSHA when |
|
it chooses to regulate. OSHA must first identify a problem that |
|
creates a significant risk of harm in the workplace. It must, |
|
second, establish that its proposal will substantially reduce |
|
that risk. It must, third, show that its proposal is |
|
economically and technologically feasible. And it must, fourth, |
|
show that it selected the most cost-effective means of |
|
achieving the health and safety objective that the standard |
|
sets. The act, of course, does not require a formal cost- |
|
benefit analysis, but that does not mean that costs can be |
|
ignored. |
|
I would like to focus briefly on the last requirement that |
|
I mentioned, which is the requirement of cost-effectiveness, in |
|
other words, that OSHA select the most cost-effective means to |
|
achieve its regulatory goals. This is echoed by President |
|
Obama's recent executive order, which suggests that agencies |
|
should use the least burdensome means to achieve its regulatory |
|
ends. Those two concepts are really quite similar. |
|
OSHA has embraced this interpretation of the act. It did so |
|
in the early 1990s to assure the federal courts that the OSH |
|
ACT did not represent an unconstitutional delegation of |
|
authority to the agency. |
|
But OSHA completely ignored this requirement for purposes |
|
of its reinterpretation of the noise standard. Instead, it |
|
charged ahead with its reinterpretation without any effort to |
|
consider whether what it was proposing was the most cost- |
|
effective means of achieving its objectives. And given the |
|
information that Mr. Sessions has presented to the subcommittee |
|
a few moments ago, it seems quite clear that the methods that |
|
OSHA selected are not the most cost-effective. |
|
The problem with OSHA's reinterpretation of the noise |
|
standard, however, runs even deeper than its failure to select |
|
the most cost-effective alternative. Indeed, its failure to |
|
study the cost is only the beginning. |
|
In proposing its reinterpretation, OSHA also made no effort |
|
whatsoever even to identify that there was a problem that |
|
required solving. To be sure, it pointed to hearing loss |
|
generally as a workplace health and safety issue, which we |
|
would all agree that it is, but it failed to examine the scope |
|
of the problem or whether current efforts are reducing it. Had |
|
it done so, it would have seen occupational hearing loss cases |
|
have consistently declined since they have been separately |
|
reported on employer injury and on the logs. |
|
You can see on the charts that are up on the screen that we |
|
have a declining trend since 2003 when OSHA mandated that |
|
employers separately report these types of injuries and |
|
illnesses. |
|
These results suggest employers are doing quite well in |
|
reducing occupational exposure to noise. Noise, like some |
|
other--noise like other--some other exposures occurs both in |
|
the workplace and out of the workplace. And over the same |
|
period, noise exposures have--outside the workplace have |
|
exploded, the advent of iPods, Bluetooth headsets. People are |
|
constantly wired for sound. And the fact that we still are |
|
seeing a decrease in occupational exposure suggests that |
|
employers are doing a pretty good job. |
|
Thus, the data suggests employers are really working--and |
|
employer efforts are working to reduce hearing loss cases. ``If |
|
it ain't broke, don't fix it'' is not an enforceable maxim of |
|
administrative law, but it is not a bad place to start. |
|
So here we are. OSHA hasn't demonstrated any obvious |
|
problem that requires solving, gave no examination whatsoever |
|
to the costs of this proposal. On top of that, the agency made |
|
the proposal at a time of substantial unemployment. |
|
It is, in effect, telling American industry that it has to |
|
expend resources retrofitting its factories rather than hire |
|
new employees and increase production. And because OSHA didn't |
|
propose to change the exposure levels that are acceptable under |
|
the noise standard, but simply to require engineering controls |
|
rather than personal protective equipment in the first |
|
instance, it was doing so to achieve exactly the same noise |
|
exposure levels as are currently achieved through less |
|
expensive means. |
|
Even if OSHA came up with a legal basis to support its |
|
actions--and it hasn't done so yet--that doesn't mean it should |
|
take these actions now without any consideration for how it may |
|
impact the U.S. economy. |
|
While we appreciate that OSHA has withdrawn this proposal |
|
and committed to a number of steps, such as increased outreach, |
|
a lack of outreach was not the problem with the proposal. The |
|
problem is the lack of common sense and an overabundance of |
|
arrogance. There is no evidence that OSHA even believed it |
|
necessary to assess seriously whether there was a problem that |
|
required fixing, to study the cost, or to consult with the |
|
business community before making this change, and these |
|
failures led them to propose something that was bad policy, |
|
plain and simple. |
|
If the law allows OSHA to take such steps--and I am |
|
skeptical that it does--that law should be changed. And if this |
|
is how the agency intends to use the agency that it has, it |
|
should not be given any more. |
|
Thank you very much. |
|
[The statement of Ms. Holmes follows:] |
|
|
|
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] |
|
|
|
------ |
|
|
|
Chairman Walberg. Thank you, Ms. Holmes. Appreciate the |
|
testimony of the witnesses and look forward to further |
|
statements and developing the concepts during the course of the |
|
questioning. |
|
And those questions will have 5-minute time span. And I |
|
will be much more attentive to that now, since we are starting |
|
fresh at this point, and so let me begin. |
|
Mr. Sullivan, in your testimony, you discussed OSHA's on- |
|
site consultation program and the changes the agency proposed |
|
that could compromise this proactive safety program run by |
|
OSHA. Can you explain how the changes OSHA proposed would be |
|
detrimental to small businesses? |
|
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am happy to. |
|
It is actually very simple. And my impression of the |
|
changes is mostly gained from my work when I was at the |
|
National Federation of Independent Business. The success of |
|
OSHA's on-site consultation program largely is due to the |
|
understanding by the small-business community that violations |
|
and problems that are found will not be shared with the |
|
enforcement side of the shop, especially if those problems are |
|
solved. |
|
And, I mean, isn't that the reason that we are here and |
|
talking about this, is that we want solutions to these problems |
|
to fix the different problems? And that barrier between the on- |
|
site consultation and enforcement encouraged small businesses |
|
to come in and say, ``You know, I am not sure if we have it |
|
quite right. Can you help me?'' |
|
And the proposed changes break down that barrier between |
|
the on-site consultation program and the enforcement program. |
|
OSHA wants to share--now share information between those two |
|
programs. And in my experience working with small businesses, |
|
that will have an absolutely awful effect on the program, |
|
because small businesses will no longer want to participate in |
|
a program where they may be subject to enforcement without |
|
having the chance to fix the problem. |
|
Chairman Walberg. Thank you. |
|
Mr. Sessions, the noise proposal takes issue with the way |
|
economists undertake cost-benefit analysis. One of your |
|
conclusions suggests that, had this proposal gone forward, |
|
there would have been--and I quote--``relatively little |
|
benefit'' in terms of improved hearing protection for workers. |
|
Can you explain how you reached your cost-benefit analysis |
|
conclusion? |
|
Mr. Sessions. There are two halves to that conversation. |
|
The first half is essentially the point that Ms. Holmes was |
|
talking about, also, which is that the problem is--the problem |
|
of work-related hearing loss is relatively well managed and |
|
further declining. The rate of reported work-related hearing |
|
loss incidents is very low and declining. |
|
So the problem in the first place isn't all that large. The |
|
particular approach OSHA proposed for further reducing that low |
|
level of hearing loss will not significantly further reduce it. |
|
Under current policy, employers use hearing protection for a |
|
very large share of the hearing--personal hearing protection |
|
devices for a very large share of the protection that workers |
|
get. And under OSHA's proposal, the engineering controls that |
|
would be required would still not typically reduce noise levels |
|
sufficiently to eliminate the need for hearing protection. |
|
So currently, hearing protectors are a large share of the |
|
protection. And even after OSHA's proposal, they would continue |
|
to be a large share of the protection. So the problem isn't all |
|
that large in the first place. And the reduction that would be |
|
achieved by OSHA's proposal is not particularly substantial. |
|
Chairman Walberg. Okay. Going on from that, several of your |
|
answers, Mr. Sessions, you received in your survey of |
|
manufacturers would give anyone cause for concern. The idea |
|
that a proposal would cause manufacturers to shut down or move, |
|
work offshore as a result of the proposed reinterpretation |
|
would further exacerbate the problems in the economy. |
|
Are there other proposals that you can point to that would |
|
have a similar negative impact? And please be brief. |
|
Mr. Sessions. I think that the jury is out on that. OSHA |
|
has additional proposals in the works. One is certainly that I |
|
am following is the proposal to reduce the worker exposure |
|
level to crystalline silica. But we don't know what the |
|
specific reduced--tighter standard is that OSHA is going to |
|
propose. |
|
And particularly importantly for this and other standards |
|
that OSHA has in the works, assuming that OSHA is treating them |
|
as regulations, OSHA will accompany the proposed regulation |
|
with a full study of, how big is the problem in the first |
|
place? What are the costs? What are the benefits? And what are |
|
the economic impacts? |
|
And it is essentially those requirements for analysis, for |
|
transparency, for disclosure, for estimating the impacts on the |
|
economy that give the regulator community and the public the |
|
chance to make a reasoned decision on OSHA's regulation and---- |
|
Chairman Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Sessions. I am going to |
|
have to break it there to hold myself to the 5-minute time |
|
limit. |
|
I will turn it to the ranking member, Ms. Woolsey? |
|
Ms. Woolsey. And, Mr. Chairman, I would like to step aside |
|
for the ranking member of the full committee. |
|
Oh, we thought you had to leave. Oh, well, thank you. |
|
Tammy, thank you for your testimony. It is nice to have you |
|
here again. You are a brave woman. |
|
I want everybody else to realize--that following three |
|
combustible dust accidents in 2003, which killed 14 workers-- |
|
one of them was Tammy's brother--the U.S. Chemical Safety Board |
|
investigated. They found that in the 25 years between 1980 and |
|
2005, there had been 281 combustible dust explosions and fires, |
|
resulting in 119 fatalities and 718 injuries. |
|
So in 2006, they urged OSHA to issue a comprehensive |
|
standard. Yet the recommendation gathered dust until the Obama |
|
Administration put it on their regulatory agenda in 2009. |
|
OSHA faces another 4 to 5 years of rulemaking before this |
|
can become a standard. At best, it will have a rule 13 years |
|
after Tammy's brother was killed. How is this system working |
|
for new worker protection rules? And how does it keep employees |
|
out of danger, large employers, small employers? |
|
See, as far as I am concerned, if you are an employee, you |
|
need to be kept safe. It doesn't matter if you work for a large |
|
or small--and, actually, large employers have fewer accidents |
|
than the small employers do. |
|
So, Tammy, do you want to respond to--do you have any |
|
idea--do any of you have any idea what should be done to speed |
|
the process along, other than not having a process? |
|
Ms. Miser. Well, as of right now, they do have--National |
|
Fire Protection Association has an actual standard. And that |
|
would actually cover a lot of the issues that they are having, |
|
because of right now, I mean, we know it is an issue. |
|
And some--I firmly believe that there are some issues that |
|
are more urgent, and this would be one of them. I mean, people |
|
are dying. There are explosions. People are losing their |
|
businesses. In the House, there is a bill for combustible dust. |
|
And if that was to be applied now, at least that would be taken |
|
care of. And that would be a start. |
|
Because I think a lot of it is, is there is just--there was |
|
just so must buzz and so much going on about what needed to be |
|
done and what couldn't be done. And you have seen where people |
|
have kind of dropped off, because at first I thought there was |
|
going to be a regulation. Well, now there is not. |
|
And I am not saying every company is that way. I had a |
|
small business. I had two small businesses. Some people really |
|
try, but there are other companies that try to cut corners, and |
|
this is one of them. |
|
Mr. Sullivan. Congresswoman, you had asked if any of us had |
|
suggestions on how to speed the process. I do. And it has to do |
|
with OSHA's recent MSD rulemaking. |
|
You know, it is great that OSHA decided to withdraw the |
|
rule and say, we would like to talk more with small businesses |
|
before we actually move forward. That is great. But 16 months |
|
ago, if they had done what the law requires, and that was to |
|
have a small-business panel made up of small businesses, then |
|
they would be much longer down the process. |
|
Ms. Woolsey. Mr. Sullivan, you have already told us that. I |
|
mean, let's go to something beyond what should have happened. |
|
What can happen, is what I want to know. What can be done now? |
|
Mr. Sullivan. OSHA can listen to small businesses at the |
|
front end of the process, not 16 months later when it says, |
|
okay, we will start over again. I think that that would speed |
|
the process, Congresswoman. |
|
Ms. Woolsey. Ms. Holmes, I appreciate that you acknowledge |
|
that these standards have been withdrawn, and we are sort of |
|
beating a dead horse here, the three of you talking about |
|
something that has already been stopped. I mean, we are not |
|
going to do it that way. |
|
A mistake? Possibly. But let's go forward. Where can we go |
|
forward? And what is our next best step so that everybody |
|
benefits? |
|
Ms. Holmes. Well, I think--first of all, I think that there |
|
is a reason we are talking about things that have been |
|
withdrawn, and that is because they reflect a fundamentally |
|
troubling allocation of resources. The notion that OSHA spent |
|
resources on the noise reinterpretation when there is--without |
|
even looking to see whether there was an issue---- |
|
Ms. Woolsey. Well, then that was back then. Would you agree |
|
that employees of small businesses have the same right to a |
|
safe workplace as a large business? |
|
Ms. Holmes. I certainly agree that worker safety is |
|
something that should be of concern to all businesses---- |
|
Ms. Woolsey. Thank you. |
|
Ms. Holmes [continuing]. Of all sizes. And I believe that |
|
it is of concern to all businesses of all sizes. |
|
Chairman Walberg. Thank you for your response. The time has |
|
expired. |
|
We will move on now to the gentlelady from South Dakota, |
|
Ms. Noem. |
|
Ms. Noem. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
|
Well, I would like to follow up on that discussion with Mr. |
|
Sullivan in a little bit more of a proactive approach then, |
|
since that is where the discussion is going. So does the Small |
|
Business Administration ever partner with other agencies, such |
|
as OSHA, on regulations in order to better understand the |
|
implications or impact of regulations or proposals before they |
|
are issued? |
|
Mr. Sullivan. Yes. Congresswoman, SBA's Office of Advocacy |
|
does just that. A pre-proposal in a dialogue between agencies |
|
that is not a public dialogue--it is a helpful, constructive |
|
dialogue--the SBA's Office of Advocacy works with agencies, |
|
EPA, OSHA, the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, in |
|
fact, all agencies, to try to make sure that what an agency's |
|
going forward with actually makes sense when it comes to a Main |
|
Street small business. |
|
When an agency actually takes the advice of SBA's Office of |
|
Advocacy, it is a much smoother process. And I think that |
|
Congresswoman Woolsey is right. Looking forward, about how you |
|
get the process down is where we should be devoting our |
|
attention. And if these agencies actually do listen to SBA's |
|
Office of Advocacy, it would be a much smoother regulatory |
|
process. |
|
Ms. Noem. So in your opinion, do you feel that these |
|
agencies look favorably about that process and they are willing |
|
to cooperate as it goes forward? |
|
Mr. Sullivan. No, I don't view agencies looking at the |
|
process as a constructive dialogue, although there is some |
|
hope. Professor Elizabeth Warren, who is in charge of staffing |
|
up this new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, actually has |
|
traveled with Senator Snowe up to Maine and said, you know, |
|
Senator, even if I wasn't required to consult with small |
|
businesses, I would do it, because it makes sense, the type of |
|
analysis that should be public makes sense, and she is |
|
committed to doing that moving forward with an entirely new |
|
regulatory agency. |
|
So if other agencies adopted that approach, I think we |
|
would have a much smoother process. |
|
Ms. Noem. Okay. I have one more follow-up question for Ms. |
|
Holmes, if that is possible, real quick. OSHA has several |
|
proposals pending that the agency suggested would not be |
|
significant regulations and the fact these proposals should |
|
have been certified as significant. |
|
So what do you believe would be the outcome, will be on |
|
your clients and on their businesses? |
|
Ms. Holmes. You know, I think that OSHA does, as you |
|
suggested, create a number of proposals that they prefer to |
|
characterize as insignificant, because that allows them to-- |
|
they believe, I think--short-cut a lot of the processes. But as |
|
Mr. Sullivan has pointed out, that really creates a great deal |
|
of trouble at the back side. |
|
If we could have, you know, an honest assessment of what a |
|
regulation purports to do, what it is going to require, and how |
|
much it is going to cost at the front end, that would, I think, |
|
reduce challenges at the back end and would allow those |
|
regulations to be put in place, you know, more quickly and more |
|
effectively, and that they would be more effective for |
|
everyone. |
|
Businesses certainly have a lot to say about what works and |
|
what doesn't and what is cost-effective and what isn't, in |
|
terms of regulation, and I think that is an area that OSHA |
|
would do well to consult about at the front end. |
|
Ms. Noem. Okay. Thank you. |
|
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
|
Chairman Walberg. Thank you. We will move on to the |
|
gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Payne? |
|
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much. |
|
Let me--Mr. Sullivan, Ms. Holmes, there has been a--you |
|
know, the dead horse has been beaten. But isn't it sort of the |
|
American way to try to use technology, try to use our advance |
|
that we have over other nations, by and large, at least in the |
|
past, to try to deal with the problem? I mean, it seems like |
|
you are saying it is so absurd that there might be some notion |
|
on a part of OSHA to use some technological way to try to |
|
improve the problem. |
|
I can't understand--and maybe it was--the cost was |
|
prohibitive and they decided to withdraw it. But what is so |
|
wrong about trying to use technology? That is what we are all |
|
about, isn't it? |
|
Mr. Sullivan. Congressman, there is nothing wrong with |
|
using technology. What I have been trying to impress upon the |
|
committee is the need to force a dialogue between the small- |
|
business community who may be using that technology and OSHA, |
|
in order to come up with a solution. |
|
I will give as an example the SBREFA panel that was |
|
convened for the hexavalent chrome rule. And at one point, OSHA |
|
was thinking of requiring a venting operation over the chrome |
|
plating operation. So, basically, you would have chrome plating |
|
and a flow of air directly above the plating to prevent the |
|
fumes from reaching the workers. |
|
Well, because of this small-business panel process, a small |
|
manufacturer who met with OSHA explained, if you require that, |
|
then you put me out of compliance with Environmental Protection |
|
Agency rules. And because of that dialogue, they actually |
|
worked towards a successful solution. |
|
So it is bringing in the realities of the workplace, |
|
sometimes, many times involving advanced technologies that |
|
helps OSHA come up with a better rulemaking. |
|
Mr. Payne. Okay, let me ask. There has been an affirmative, |
|
I think, Ms. Holmes and you, too, Mr. Sullivan, that there has |
|
been a reduction in the complaints about hearing. You know, |
|
that doesn't necessarily mean that the problem isn't as bad as |
|
it was. |
|
I think when you find employees and when you find an |
|
unemployment rate of 10 percent, many times employees will |
|
forego their own safety, as for reporting noise violations, in |
|
order to keep a job. I mean, in other words, what I am saying |
|
is that because you say statistically you have empirical data |
|
that says that there is less of a problem today does not |
|
necessarily mean that the problem isn't as great. |
|
And I will tell you, I worked in a place where there was--I |
|
was personnel director where there was noise. It is very |
|
difficult to keep compliance. Hard hats will wear hard hats, |
|
because they are out in the public and people can see them, if |
|
the hat is on or not. However, in a place where you have over |
|
85 decibels is where you need to have ear protection. |
|
It is very difficult to keep those earplugs on, because, |
|
one, they are uncomfortable; two, they are hot when it is in |
|
the summertime. Workers really don't like to use them. So you |
|
have to really stay on top of them. So I am just simply saying |
|
that, because they are less reported numbers don't necessarily |
|
mean that the problem isn't as great as it was. |
|
Let me just ask you, Ms. Miser, there has been a request in |
|
the new C.R. that the Republicans put forth to cut 15 percent |
|
from the OSHA in one area and another really slashes. What do |
|
you think this is going to do, the impact on occupational |
|
safety, when you don't have inspectors, et cetera? |
|
Ms. Miser. Well, of course, I am not an expert. But it does |
|
concern me, because as of right now, it is going to take 100 |
|
years to--if they were to inspect every single employer. And |
|
the fellow over here was saying, you know, there can't be any |
|
communication there. If they do want to get the information, |
|
they won't even be able to get it because of that. |
|
And then on top of that, my real concern is the fact that |
|
this may affect the state plans. I mean, I don't know. I don't |
|
know what the budget is. Kentucky does a pretty good job. They |
|
really do. And if their budget is cut, they aren't going to be |
|
able to do that. And they are the only plans that cover |
|
government employees, these state plans. |
|
And if--I mean, it is a shame. I think every government |
|
employee should be--everybody should have the same rights to |
|
health and safety in the workplace. But they don't. And I am |
|
just really afraid that it is going to cut that back and harm |
|
the state plans, who are really doing a good job out there. |
|
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much. |
|
Chairman Walberg. The time has ended. We will move on to |
|
the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Ross? |
|
Mr. Ross. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
|
I want to take a little different tact here. I know we are |
|
talking about the regulatory impact of OSHA, but I have a |
|
concern--and I want to talk about specifically--and to you, Mr. |
|
Sullivan, with regard to the muscular skeletal disorders. And |
|
the reason I want to do that is because it appears to me that |
|
trying to define repetitive trauma and putting the burden on |
|
the employer would result in the creation of new causes of |
|
action for which an employer could be sued. |
|
For example, ADA. Now that they are made aware of a |
|
particular incident or condition that the employee may have, |
|
does reasonable accommodation now have to be made? Is there an |
|
onus on the employer now to investigate that? Is there an onus |
|
on the employer now to investigate a causal relationship? |
|
For example, just because a repetitive trauma condition may |
|
occur either as a result of a bad knee or carpal tunnel or |
|
something, would that then require the employer to invest in a |
|
medical diagnosis of his condition and take a patient history |
|
to determine whether such a condition could be causally related |
|
to the job requirements or to something else, just maybe even |
|
degenerative changes? |
|
And also, when you look at retaliatory terminations, causes |
|
of actions for retaliatory terminations--in other words, as an |
|
employee, I have been let go for cause, but I don't believe so. |
|
I believe it is because I have put on my Log 300 now that I |
|
have, you know, a constant pain in my back and, therefore, they |
|
are letting me go because they don't want to have to invest |
|
further. |
|
So I would appreciate your opinion with regard to the MSDs |
|
and the likelihood of a new cause of action may ensue. |
|
Mr. Sullivan. Well, Congressman, the thought process you |
|
just went through is similar to the thought process a small- |
|
business owner would go through when they are looking at |
|
whether or not to put an injury or illness onto a log. And to |
|
say that that calculation in your mind, even without any type |
|
of diagnostics, would take under 5 minutes really gets at a |
|
disagreement between small businesses and OSHA over their |
|
proposal. |
|
I would actually elevate your concerns even higher, because |
|
when you talk about the diagnosis of an injury, you are |
|
actually putting the employer potentially in the place of a |
|
doctor to make a diagnosis. And so they have to really go |
|
through two things. One is to determine whether or not it is an |
|
MSD, which sometimes requires a doctor, and it wouldn't be fair |
|
to be put that---- |
|
Mr. Ross. It would require a doctor. I mean---- |
|
Mr. Sullivan [continuing]. Onus on an employer. The other |
|
is whether or not it is work-related. And you get into some |
|
really sticky situations not only to see if it was part of a |
|
weekend touch football game, but, really, whether or not that |
|
is any of the employer's business. And so navigating all those |
|
sensitivities under the cloud of potential legal liability is a |
|
very real concern to small businesses on this proposal. |
|
Mr. Ross. And, for example, if they left employment and |
|
later filed suit for a work-related accident under the workers' |
|
compensation rules for carpal tunnel, but they fail to disclose |
|
it on their Log 30, then couldn't the employer not be availed |
|
to an affirmative defense of a misrepresentation of a physical |
|
condition? |
|
Mr. Sullivan. All very good concerns that are echoed by the |
|
small-business community. |
|
Mr. Ross. Mr. Sessions, you commented about the noise |
|
protection ruling. And more importantly, you indicated that it |
|
was done by way of an administrative interpretation, rather |
|
than by regulation. Is that something that is normally |
|
delivered or promulgated by OSHA, with disregard to the |
|
regulatory process? |
|
Mr. Sessions. It has been a grey area, both for OSHA and |
|
other regulatory agencies, sort of, what is done by regulation |
|
and what is done by administrative interpretation, by guidance |
|
documents, or by other means that aren't subjected to---- |
|
Mr. Ross. Or by regulatory fiat, as I would say. |
|
Mr. Sessions. You know, there are procedural safeguards if |
|
an agency is going to do something by formal regulation. SBREFA |
|
applies, the executive order for analysis applies, but they |
|
don't apply if the agency somehow takes the action under a |
|
different guise. And that has been a very difficult issue for a |
|
number of years across all regulatory agencies. |
|
Mr. Ross. Thank you. |
|
Ms. Holmes, just real quickly, because I am running out of |
|
time here, I think the greatest balance that we could afford is |
|
to make sure that the regulatory environment is as stringent |
|
and necessary as possible to maintain a good business |
|
environment and also to protect against the incidents which |
|
occurred that cost Ms. Miser her brother. |
|
But I--my concern at this point--and I address this to you |
|
for your members and dealing with the chamber--have not we lost |
|
sight in this regulatory process of the foundation upon which |
|
we rely, and that is logic and reason? |
|
Ms. Holmes. You know, I think we have in many respects, |
|
Congressman, because we have, you know, an agency that, again, |
|
I said and I meant, what we--what OSHA did in connection with |
|
the noise standard is really unbridled arrogance. They did not |
|
feel the need to look to see whether there was a problem, |
|
whether what they were proposing would fix the problem, or how |
|
much it would cost. |
|
We simply can't have that. And they did, in fact, by |
|
regulatory fiat, as you suggested, rather than going through a |
|
rulemaking process where there would have been---- |
|
Mr. Ross. Thank you. I believe my time is up. Thank you. |
|
Ms. Holmes. And now I will be quiet. |
|
Chairman Walberg. Thank you. |
|
We will move on to the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Bucshon? |
|
Mr. Bucshon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks to the |
|
panel. |
|
Just to give you a little background on me, I am a |
|
physician, cardiovascular surgeon. I see a lot of patients with |
|
their lung problems that have a history of workplace exposure, |
|
so I understand that concept. And also, my father was a United |
|
Mine Worker and a coalminer underground for many years, so I |
|
have also seen that--it from that side. |
|
And my question is from a budgetary standpoint. And would-- |
|
and anyone on the panel can address this. I mean, in 2008, |
|
would anyone say that OSHA was having difficulty with what they |
|
were trying to do based on their budget in 2008? |
|
Ms. Holmes? |
|
Ms. Holmes. From my perspective, Congressman, I don't think |
|
they were. I think it is a matter of setting regulatory |
|
priorities, as well as, to the extent possible, deferring |
|
resources to compliance. The vast, vast, vast majority of |
|
employers want very much to do the right thing by their |
|
employees. It does not serve any business to lose employees or |
|
have employees become injured on the job. It is--in addition to |
|
the human factor, which is very important, it is |
|
extraordinarily costly. Workers compensation costs are very |
|
high. It is good business to work safely. |
|
And in businesses of--the vast, vast majority--and |
|
certainly everyone I have had the privilege to represent in my |
|
16 years--has taken that tack, that they want to do the right |
|
thing. And I think OSHA has the resources to--I think it is a |
|
matter of smart use of resources, candidly. |
|
Mr. Bucshon. Okay. Thank you. |
|
I yield back. |
|
Chairman Walberg. He will be right here. I am looking |
|
forward to calling on the gentleman who was my chairman the |
|
last time I served here before coming back this term, and now |
|
the ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Miller? |
|
Mr. Miller. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. My |
|
apologies. I am unfortunately having to duck in and out. |
|
Let me just, if I might, see if I can get some |
|
clarification. Mr. Sullivan, in your testimony, you are not |
|
arguing that the Regulatory Flexibility Act at OSHA is not |
|
working? You don't like the way it is being handled in this |
|
particular case? |
|
Mr. Sullivan. I believe that the attitude of trying to |
|
avoid SBREFA instead of embracing it is cause for concern. |
|
Mr. Miller. See, that--you are talking about--but it has |
|
been in one iteration since the 1980s. You are not arguing that |
|
the underlying law is somehow not working? I mean---- |
|
Mr. Sullivan. I believe that there is an attitudinal |
|
problem---- |
|
Mr. Miller. I understand that. I understand that. |
|
Mr. Sullivan. There is---- |
|
Mr. Miller. I am asking about the generic law. Apparently |
|
you were happy with it 2 years ago. |
|
Mr. Sullivan. Actually, I testified last week on measures |
|
that should be adopted to---- |
|
Mr. Miller. That is different. I understand that. |
|
Mr. Sullivan [continuing]. Improve the law, so---- |
|
Mr. Miller. So what is your testimony? |
|
Mr. Sullivan. My testimony is before the committee---- |
|
Mr. Miller. You don't like the way this Administration of |
|
OSHA is administering the law? |
|
Mr. Sullivan. I have been critical of OSHA's implementation |
|
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act past this Administration, |
|
when I was working---- |
|
Mr. Miller. Okay, that is--I am trying to figure this out. |
|
Mr. Sullivan. Okay. Well, I believe that OSHA has been able |
|
to do a better job and continues to be able to do a better job |
|
in complying with the Regulatory Flexibility Act. |
|
Mr. Miller. Mr. Sullivan, in this discussion of the cost of |
|
regulation--now, you have obviously chosen to and it is right |
|
in your testimony, just to talk about the cost. Are you |
|
suggesting there are no benefits of OSHA regulations? There |
|
have been no benefits throughout the various administrations of |
|
OSHA here? |
|
Mr. Sullivan. I am not suggesting that there are no |
|
benefits. The reason I focused on cost is because, in that way, |
|
it is very clear that small businesses are disproportionately |
|
impacted by costs. And the Regulatory Flexibility Act---- |
|
Mr. Miller. Small businesses---- |
|
Mr. Sullivan [continuing]. Tries to--tries---- |
|
Mr. Miller. Don't small businesses also generate a somewhat |
|
higher percentage of the accidents, given--to the small- |
|
business employee population? |
|
Mr. Sullivan. Congressman, I don't know what the comparison |
|
of small-business accidents are compared to large-business. I |
|
do know that there is a disproportionate cost on small business |
|
when it comes to regulation, and the idea of the--Congressman, |
|
could I actually just finish my answer? |
|
Mr. Miller. I am running out of time. As you know, the |
|
chair is being---- |
|
Mr. Sullivan. I would like to just answer your question, |
|
Congressman. |
|
Mr. Miller. I would like to ask you another question. |
|
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you. |
|
Mr. Miller. Because it goes to the point you are about to |
|
make. If they generate 45 percent of the fatalities with 14 |
|
percent of the workforce, you might want to check in with them |
|
to see what is going on. |
|
Mr. Sullivan. I think OSHA wants to issue rules that work |
|
on Main Street small business. And in order for it to work, |
|
they have to consider the impact and the constructive impact by |
|
small business before moving forward with rules. |
|
Mr. Miller. I would make the point that when you decide you |
|
are only going to talk about cost, one, the question is whether |
|
or not small business is a generator of fatalities that |
|
justifies their consideration by OSHA for rules and, two, that |
|
when you talk only about the cost of regulation, somewhere in |
|
the testimony there has to be some understanding of what the |
|
benefits are, of whether we can arrive at that mutually or not. |
|
There has to be some understanding of that, because you get |
|
studies all the time from various insurance companies and |
|
others who cover various sectors of our economy about the cost |
|
of fatalities, about the cost of the injuries, of the |
|
retraining, of the rehabilitation that go on with this. |
|
And so I think--I don't get the---- |
|
Mr. Sullivan. I think we actually both want the same end |
|
point, and that is a smarter regulation at the end of the |
|
process. And how they get there---- |
|
Mr. Miller [continuing]. If I only talk about the benefits |
|
of the regulation and suggest we start from that basis and you |
|
only talk about the costs and suggest that we start from that |
|
basis. |
|
Mr. Sullivan. Well, actually, I think we get to the same |
|
place when OSHA not only asks small business how a rule can be |
|
written better to reduce costs, but also to ask---- |
|
Mr. Miller. I understand that. |
|
Mr. Sullivan [continuing]. Ask the small employer, hey, |
|
this is what we are looking at. Do you think it increases |
|
benefits more from a small-business perspective---- |
|
Mr. Miller. So you do give some recognition to the fact |
|
that there are benefits to many of these regulations and have |
|
been, in terms of saving lives or reducing injuries or cost of |
|
businesses? |
|
Mr. Sullivan. Of course I do. |
|
Mr. Miller. Okay. |
|
Mr. Sullivan. And I also recognize that the small |
|
businesses, in engaging in that dialogue with OSHA, would like |
|
to come up with those solutions. |
|
Mr. Miller. I understand. Okay. Thank you. |
|
Chairman Walberg. Thank you. |
|
Mr. Miller. I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman. |
|
Chairman Walberg. Appreciate that. We have the Chairman of |
|
the full committee here, the gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. |
|
Kline. |
|
Mr. Kline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for coming |
|
in late. You have probably noticed that--how this place works. |
|
It is a bit confusing, as Members are moving back and forth |
|
between competing hearings and competing commitments. |
|
I do want to thank all of you for being here today and for |
|
your testimony. And I want to give Mr. Sullivan the opportunity |
|
to pick up--he was trying to complete an answer to Mr. Miller's |
|
question having to do with cost-benefit analysis and assessing |
|
the costs of regulations, which fall disproportionately on |
|
small businesses. |
|
And I know you were starting to finish that thought, and I |
|
would like to give you the opportunity to do that. |
|
Mr. Sullivan. Well, thank you, Congressman. There has been |
|
a great deal of attention to figures that have to do with the |
|
cost of regulation on small firms. And from my opinion, that |
|
actually is a separate conversation than what I tried to bring |
|
across in my testimony, which is that small businesses are |
|
disproportionately impacted. |
|
And that really gets at that federal rules just aren't-- |
|
they should not be encouraged to be one-size-fits-all. And if |
|
OSHA sits down with small business and says, ``We would like to |
|
solve a problem. How do you, small business, propose that we |
|
try to solve this problem?'' |
|
Forcing that dialogue is what makes for a better final |
|
regulation. And in my opinion, OSHA is not doing a good enough |
|
job in having that dialogue. |
|
Mr. Kline. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. |
|
Chairman Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Kline. |
|
Now we moved to the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Kucinich. |
|
Mr. Kucinich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
|
To Ms. Miser--and welcome to you and to all the witnesses-- |
|
Ms. Miser, your testimony talked about the OSHA crane standard, |
|
which will provide a net benefit of $55 million a year, based |
|
on lives saves and injuries avoided, yet the Mercatus |
|
Institute, a think-tank funded by corporate interests, gives |
|
this rule a low score on its regulatory report card. |
|
Now, given the deaths from crane accidents, should OSHA |
|
have simply ignored this problem? And isn't it the case that |
|
industry also wanted the standard updated? |
|
Ms. Miser. Well, in that particular case, all they would |
|
have needed is a spotter, and he would be here today. So, I |
|
mean, absolutely not, I don't think that they should. It is a |
|
simple solution, and it should have, you know, been done way |
|
before that. |
|
And I guess, to me, what you need to do is look at |
|
standards that work, standards that are working now. For |
|
instance, the grain standard. We know for a fact that it saves |
|
lives. You know, it saves--I have the figures here. It says |
|
that--and this was by the National Grain and Feed Association. |
|
They say that explosions declined 71 percent, injuries by 90 |
|
percent, and fatalities by 95 percent. |
|
So, no, I don't. I think that there are times when you have |
|
to--standards, and I think that they are very important. And I |
|
don't think that they should be given up. I think we should |
|
keep pushing until we get it done. And if it takes a little |
|
work, if it takes a little talk, that is fine, but let's get to |
|
it and let's get it done. |
|
Mr. Kucinich. Mr. Sullivan, let's discuss fatality rates in |
|
small business. The Kauffman-RAND Institute Center for the |
|
Study of Small Business and Regulation found that firms with 1 |
|
to 19 employees had the highest fatality rate in all sectors, |
|
except wholesale trade. They found that firms with more than |
|
1,000 employees had the lowest fatality rates in all |
|
industries. |
|
The Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries, which is |
|
published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, reports that 45 |
|
percent of all workplace fatalities occur at small businesses |
|
which employ between 1 and 9 employees, even though these |
|
establishments only employ 14 percent of the workforce. |
|
So, Mr. Sullivan, do you agree that that small-business |
|
establishments have on average higher fatality rates than |
|
larger establishments? And if not, is the Labor Department data |
|
in error? |
|
Mr. Sullivan. Congressman Kucinich, I don't disagree with |
|
the data. I would be interested in having a subsequent |
|
conversation and drilling into that data. I remember when I was |
|
working at the Small Business Administration and hearing those |
|
statistics and asking, why are they so high? And I believe that |
|
the answer uniformly was because of traffic fatalities, which, |
|
you know, ironically are outside of the scope of OSHA. |
|
But I think a very serious set of statistics that point out |
|
a problem--and I will go back to kind of my--the whole purpose |
|
of my testimony, which is to encourage OSHA to sit down with |
|
small employers to hammer out rules that work. And when you |
|
look at those types of fatality rates, I think it only elevates |
|
that type of approach, because they do want to finalize rules |
|
that work on Main Street and not have to redo these regulations |
|
when fatalities go up. |
|
Chairman Walberg. Time is expired. I will say thank you to |
|
each of the witnesses for taking the time to be here today to |
|
share your expertise, your experience, your data, and your |
|
heart, as well, on this issue. |
|
And there will be other opportunities that we will |
|
aggressively continue to look. And I agree with my ranking |
|
member that we want to have an aggressive hearing schedule, as |
|
well, to plum the depths of what is involved here. And even the |
|
fact with the grain standard, took 7 years to develop that, and |
|
we want to encourage more rapid, but we certainly want to |
|
encourage vital and useful standards, as well. |
|
Having said that, I would like to recognize Ms. Woolsey, |
|
the ranking member, gentlelady from California, to close with |
|
her comments. |
|
Ms. Woolsey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
|
And it is obvious we have--both sides of this debate are |
|
interested and active in participating today. I give you a lot |
|
of credit for that. And my subcommittee has been really active |
|
for the last 4 years. They want to keep on going. |
|
I really believe that, unless the goal is to underfund and |
|
undermine in the long run OSHA, we really can work together, |
|
because we have to bring OSHA into the 21st century, period, |
|
because all of our workers are depending on us. So thank you |
|
very much. |
|
Chairman Walberg. Thank you, Ms. Woolsey. |
|
Again, thank you to the witnesses for sharing with us |
|
today. We will approach these issues differently, I am certain, |
|
as we work on this subcommittee. And all of the issues |
|
pertinent to that mix, that creative tension of having jobs, |
|
which people need, and an expanded economy, which that can |
|
produce, the prosperity, the lifestyle, the happiness, and the |
|
safety in carrying out all of these functions in a society that |
|
works well together. |
|
But that is a creative tension. And at each time in our |
|
history, there are approaches that must be flexible in how we |
|
approach it in order to keep the movement forward, as opposed |
|
to stopping, which, as we all know, once you stop, you move |
|
backwards. |
|
So thank you again for participating. I thank the |
|
subcommittee for your involvement, as well. We will have |
|
opportunities to continue to explore. I look forward to doing |
|
that. We will certainly have OSHA and its representatives in |
|
front of us. We look forward to hearing the Secretary tomorrow |
|
in hearing, in the full committee, and then moving from that |
|
with further testimony from business and industry, from |
|
workers, and from the regulators themselves. |
|
So there being no further business, the subcommittee stands |
|
adjourned. |
|
[The statement of Ms. Hirono follows:] |
|
|
|
Prepared Statement of Hon. Mazie K. Hirono, a Representative in |
|
Congress From the State of Hawaii |
|
|
|
Today Republicans have called a hearing to argue that the |
|
Occupational Safety and Health Agency (OSHA) costs too much and burdens |
|
businesses with too much regulation. |
|
The workers in my district and I know better! |
|
I have heard from workers in Hawaii about how OSHA regulations and |
|
enforcement reduce injuries and save lives. |
|
One worker at an electric utility company told me of the hazardous |
|
conditions she and her team are exposed to every day: electricity, |
|
chemicals, high pressure steam and water lines, and high temperature |
|
fuel. OSHA's rules and guidelines require regular safety trainings and |
|
updates, and ensure that workers wear safety glasses, steel-toed shoes, |
|
flame-retardant clothing, chemical hoods, and safety gloves. The goal |
|
is NO injuries. |
|
Despite these precautions and wearing the proper equipment, she was |
|
burned by sulfuric acid in an accident 15 years ago. When reviewing the |
|
work area she was in when the burn occurred, the company's safety |
|
department--following OSHA guidelines--determined that additional |
|
engineering measures were necessary to prevent future injuries. |
|
Fortunately, no future injuries have occurred at this workplace. |
|
Safety guidelines and regulations can help save lives, and so can |
|
enforcement. |
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In another story in Hawaii, lack of sufficient enforcement led to |
|
tragic results. In May 2009, an 800-foot tower collapsed at the |
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Hawaiian Cement facility, killing worker Juan Navarro. Subcontractor AG |
|
Transport did not have a license, engineering survey, or evacuation |
|
plan for the demolition project. The company was fined a paltry $750. |
|
This accident could have been prevented, but Hawaii only had 11 state |
|
OSHA staffers to inspect and enforce worker safety on construction |
|
projects across all 7 of our inhabited islands. |
|
In September of 2010, the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) found that |
|
under former Governor Linda Lingle, Hawaii had under-funded and |
|
systematically neglected its state Occupational Safety and Health Act |
|
plan (OSHA state plan). As a result, Hawaii did not have enough |
|
workplace inspections or on-site consultations to keep workers safe. |
|
Hawaii was the only state in the nation found breaking its state plan |
|
obligations. |
|
Unfortunately, for Hawaii and the 27 states/territories with |
|
approved state plans, DOL is extremely limited in its authority to help |
|
state plans improve. DOL's only option under current law is to |
|
completely end the state plan's local control and step in with federal |
|
control. |
|
My Ensuring Worker Safety Act (H.R. 571) would allow federal OSHA |
|
more flexibility to collaborate with states and improve underperforming |
|
state plans, such as Hawaii's. I urge my colleagues to support it. |
|
On the U.S. House floor today, the Republican job-slashing |
|
resolution would decimate federal OSHA's budget by $99 billion this |
|
year, requiring 3-month furloughs of OSHA employees, then layoffs next |
|
year. This is not the way to ensure worker safety. |
|
In reviewing today's witness testimony, I note that those who |
|
question OSHA's programs focus on OSHA's costs without discussing the |
|
benefits. I would point out the following: |
|
<bullet> According to the latest ``Death on the Job'' report, OSHA |
|
regulations and enforcement have saved an estimated 410,000 lives in |
|
the 40 years since the Act was passed in 1970. |
|
<bullet> Liberty Mutual insurance estimated that the annual direct |
|
cost to businesses of work-related injuries and illnesses were $53.4 |
|
billion per year, more than $1 billion per week! |
|
<bullet> Since 2000, OSHA has reviewed the costs and benefits of |
|
its rules 8 times, finding its regulations to reduce accidents and |
|
injuries. For example, the review found that OSHA's grain handling |
|
standards reduced explosions by 42% and reduced deaths by 70%; sharps |
|
injuries were reduced by 88%; and excavation fatalities were reduced by |
|
40%. |
|
Beyond these measurable economic and safety benefits, what value do |
|
we place on reducing worker injury, illness, and death? OSHA |
|
protections must be upheld and enforced properly to keep our workers |
|
safe. |
|
______ |
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|
|
[The statement of Mr. Kucinich follows:] |
|
|
|
Prepared Statement of Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich, a |
|
Representative in Congress From the State of Ohio |
|
|
|
Today's hearing is presented as an examination of the impact of the |
|
actions of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and |
|
the alleged negative effect on job creation. Despite having issued only |
|
2 new health and safety standards in the past ten years, OSHA is being |
|
cast as a villain that has our economy in its clutches. OSHA is being |
|
asked to be more responsive to the needs of small business, while |
|
facing $99 million in cuts in the continuing resolution (CR) we are |
|
expected to vote on this week. |
|
The unemployment rate is still at record levels. The labor force |
|
participation rate is nearly at its lowest level in a generation. There |
|
are nearly 5 unemployed workers for every job opening in this country. |
|
Millions of Americans are under water on their homes, and so they |
|
cannot sell them and they cannot move to pursue better economic |
|
opportunities in other parts of this country. Meanwhile, American |
|
corporations are sitting on $2 trillion in cash. Much of that $2 |
|
trillion it appears is being spent on high-priced industry lobbyists, |
|
instead of workers. And we know that worker productivity--the output |
|
per worker per hour--has steadily increased over the years, especially |
|
in manufacturing and service industries, but the average worker's |
|
income has not kept pace. This tells us that employers have the upper |
|
hand right now. So this Subcommittee should be focused on the matters |
|
under its jurisdiction: are the regulations designed to protect |
|
American workers being followed? Can they be improved? |
|
Instead, we have heard examples of the supposed heavy financial and |
|
paperwork burden that OSHA regulations impose on small businesses. It |
|
is true that American businesses large and small deserve clear |
|
workplace safety regulations from their government. But the evidence |
|
cannot be ignored that such regulations are absolutely vital to the |
|
safety of the American worker. Every year in this country, hundreds of |
|
workplace accidents continue to occur, some of which are playing out |
|
before our eyes in gruesome detail. But as the fires are put out or the |
|
toxic spill cleaned or the toll in human lives is counted, the |
|
opponents of workplace safety laws once again take up their call of |
|
``overly burdensome regulations.'' |
|
No price tag can be put on the life of a healthy, living American. |
|
We cannot credibly demand that OSHA should rededicate itself to more |
|
quickly and efficiently serving American businesses while at the same |
|
time, extolling the virtues of the complex and time-consuming process |
|
OSHA undertakes before any new workplace safety and health standard can |
|
be established. |
|
Last year, the Office of Management and Budget performed a cost- |
|
benefit analysis of Federal regulations which showed that the benefits |
|
of regulations far outweigh their costs. Between 1999 and 2009, the |
|
estimated costs of regulations were between $43 billion and $55 |
|
billion, while the estimated economic benefits were between $128 |
|
billion and $616 billion. That means, during that ten year period, the |
|
cost-to-benefit ratio of regulations was one-to-two based on OMB's |
|
lowest estimations, and one-to-fourteen based on OMB's highest |
|
estimations. |
|
The data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics shows that in 2008, |
|
5,214 workers were killed on the job in this country--an average of 14 |
|
workers per day. If the CR passes with the proposed cuts to OSHA, , it |
|
will have to furlough all employees for the last three months of the |
|
fiscal year, and then lay off 415 of its 2335 employees. It will cut |
|
OSHA's funding so drastically that it will cripple its ability to |
|
function. I intend to do all I can to prevent this from happening. |
|
______ |
|
|
|
[Additional submissions of Mr. Walberg follow:] |
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] |
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------ |
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[Additional submission of Ms. Woolsey follows:] |
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] |
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------ |
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[Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] |
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