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<title> - ASSESSING CHINA'S BEHAVIOR AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. INTERESTS</title> |
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[House Hearing, 112 Congress] |
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[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] |
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ASSESSING CHINA'S BEHAVIOR AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. INTERESTS |
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BRIEFING |
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BEFORE THE |
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS |
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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES |
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ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS |
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FIRST SESSION |
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JANUARY 19, 2011 |
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Serial No. 112-2 |
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs |
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ |
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE |
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64-008 WASHINGTON : 2011 |
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For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, |
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http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202�09512�091800, or 866�09512�091800 (toll-free). E-mail, <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection" class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="7017001f301305030418151c005e131f1d">[email protected]</a>. |
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS |
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ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman |
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CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California |
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DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York |
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ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American |
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DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa |
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DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey |
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EDWARD R. ROYCE, California BRAD SHERMAN, California |
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STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York |
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RON PAUL, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York |
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MIKE PENCE, Indiana RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri |
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JOE WILSON, South Carolina ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey |
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CONNIE MACK, Florida GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia |
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JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida |
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MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas DENNIS CARDOZA, California |
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TED POE, Texas BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky |
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GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida BRIAN HIGGINS, New York |
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JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut |
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BILL JOHNSON, Ohio FREDERICA WILSON, Florida |
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DAVID RIVERA, Florida KAREN BASS, California |
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MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts |
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TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island |
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TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania VACANT |
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JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina |
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ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York |
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RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina |
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VACANT |
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Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director |
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Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director |
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C O N T E N T S |
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BRIEFERS |
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Mr. Larry Wortzel, commissioner, U.S.-China Economic and Security |
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Review Commission.............................................. 7 |
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Mr. Gordon Chang, author of ``The Coming Collapse of China,'' |
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Forbes.com Columnist........................................... 22 |
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Yang Jianli, Ph.D., president, Initiatives for China and Harvard |
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Fellow......................................................... 27 |
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Mr. Robert G. Sutter, visiting professor, School of Foreign |
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Service, Georgetown University................................. 31 |
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LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE BRIEFING |
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The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress |
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from the State of Florida, and chairman, Committee on Foreign |
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Affairs: Prepared statement.................................... 3 |
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Mr. Larry Wortzel: Prepared statement............................ 9 |
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Mr. Gordon Chang: Prepared statement............................. 24 |
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Yang Jianli, Ph.D.: Prepared statement........................... 29 |
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Mr. Robert G. Sutter: Prepared statement......................... 34 |
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APPENDIX |
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Briefing notice.................................................. 64 |
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Briefing minutes................................................. 65 |
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ASSESSING CHINA'S BEHAVIOR AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. INTERESTS |
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WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 19, 2011 |
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House of Representatives, |
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Committee on Foreign Affairs, |
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Washington, DC. |
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The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m., in |
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room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros- |
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Lehtinen (chairman of the committee) presiding. |
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Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. The briefing will be called to |
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order. Welcome to my fellow members of the committee, our |
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distinguished panel of witnesses, honored champions of the |
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struggle for human rights in China, who are joining us today, |
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ladies and gentlemen. There is an old saying that the Chinese |
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invoke when they wish to avoid political discourse with the |
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central powers in Beijing; the mountains are high and the |
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Emperor is far way. |
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Well, ladies and gentlemen, this morning there are no |
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mountains to shield us. And China's newest Emperor has just |
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landed in Washington and is at the front lawn of the White |
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House; yet the pressing issues which separate our countries |
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need to be urgently addressed. |
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Three of those many issues, which will be the focus of |
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today's briefing, include security concerns, human rights, and |
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how our trade imbalance and the Chinese currency manipulation |
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adversely impact<greek-l>s deg. our U.S. economy. |
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When the Cold War ended over two decades ago, many in the |
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West assumed that the threat from communism had been buried |
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with the rubble of the Berlin Wall. However, while America |
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slept, an authoritarian China was on the rise. China became one |
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of our biggest mortgage companies, holding over $900 billion of |
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our international debt. And in these past two decades Western |
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observers forgot that while freedom blossomed in Eastern |
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Europe, reform in China failed. |
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China was led by a cynical group of leaders who, sobered by |
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the Tiananmen massacre and marked by the blood of its victims, |
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were determined to go forward with economic but not political |
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change. And the China that emerged has fallen far short of the |
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benign China of which former Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick |
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spoke in the coining of the phrase ``responsible stakeholder.'' |
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Does a responsible stakeholder, as reported in the Western |
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press, allow the transshipment of North Korean missile |
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components to Iran via Beijing airport in open defiance of |
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those U.N. sanctions, which as a Perm-5 Member State, it is |
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duly bound to enforce? Does a responsible stakeholder declare |
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that the South China Sea is one of its core interests, in open |
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defiance of the navigational and territorial rights of its |
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Southeast Asian neighbors? Does a responsible stakeholder |
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admonish the U.S. Navy that it cannot operate in the Yellow Sea |
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in the very waters where General Douglas MacArthur undertook |
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the heroic landing which turned the tide of the Korean War? |
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Would a responsible stakeholder refer to the Nobel Peace |
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Prize Committee as a ``bunch of clowns'' for awarding an honor |
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to a distinguished Chinese human rights advocate? Would a |
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responsible stakeholder arrest the wife of a Nobel Peace Prize |
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winner as further retaliation for speaking the truth about the |
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gross human rights violations in China? |
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The United States took a big gamble when it voted for |
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permanent normal trade relations for China over a decade ago in |
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what some termed as the most important vote since World War II. |
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The vote was based upon what I see as a sadly mistaken belief |
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that economic openings and a free market reform would lead to |
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democracy, respect for the rule of law, and a full array of |
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political and human rights for the Chinese people. |
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Yet today as we meet here, the Laogai Research Foundation |
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estimates that there are close to 7 million people currently in |
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Chinese labor camps. It is as if the entire population of |
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Switzerland was being held behind barbed wire. Chinese |
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authorities' ruthless campaign against Falun Gong |
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practitioners, a peaceful organization which promotes truth, |
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compassion, and tolerance, has continued unabated for more than |
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11 years. |
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I was proud to be the sponsor of a resolution in the last |
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Congress which received overwhelming bipartisan support |
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addressing the persecution of Falun Gong. The brutal denial of |
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rights to the people of Tibet and the Uyghur people and the |
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forced repatriation of North Korean refugees continue to draw |
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the attention of concerned citizens throughout the world. |
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And the American people have also borne the brunt of |
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China's mercantile trade policies which promote trade surpluses |
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through cheap exports based upon an artificial depreciation of |
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China's currency. Jobs and American dollars have flown across |
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the Pacific to China for the past two decades as the American |
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people have suffered high unemployment and a diminished |
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standard of living. |
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Last fall I was pleased to be able to vote in favor of the |
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Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act, which overwhelmingly passed |
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the House 348 to 79. We are back with a new energy from our |
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newly elected Members who are determined to take back America's |
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economy and are committed to a foreign policy that stands with |
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our allies and holds accountable those who threaten our |
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Nation's security interests. |
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And now I am pleased to turn to my distinguished ranking |
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member for this committee Mr. Berman for his remarks. |
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[The prepared statement of Chairman Ros-Lehtinen follows:] |
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Mr. Berman. Well, thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. |
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And Chinese President Hu Jintao is in Washington this week |
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for a state visit; and as we speak, he and President Obama are |
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meeting at the White House. After an often tense year in U.S.- |
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China relations, the two leaders will try to set the contours |
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of the relationship for the immediate future. |
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The U.S.-China relationship, one of the most interconnected |
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and complex in global affairs, has major implications for the |
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future of Asia and the entire world. The challenge for the |
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Obama administration is to manage that relationship in a way |
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that strengthens our cooperation with Beijing in areas where we |
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have shared interests, while at the same time addressing the |
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serious concerns we have regarding a number of China's |
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policies. |
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China is neither an ally nor an enemy. It is both a |
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competitor and a partner in foreign affairs, security, and |
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economics. A key goal of our China policy must be to prioritize |
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our myriad global interests, identify those issues where we are |
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most likely to positively change China's position, and then |
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find and use our leverage with the Chinese to achieve those |
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changes and accomplish our wider foreign policy objectives. |
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In my view, our highest priority with China should be Iran. |
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Gaining China's acceptance last year for tougher United Nations |
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sanctions on Iran was a significant diplomatic achievement for |
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the Obama administration. But there is ample evidence that |
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Chinese entities continue to invest in Iran's energy sector. |
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This helps Tehran avoid the full impact of sanctions and |
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facilitates Iran's continued development of nuclear weapons |
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capability, which threatens the United States, our allies in |
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the Middle East, and China, which is dependent on stable |
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sources of oil from the Middle East. We must intensify our |
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efforts to ensure China's full participation in the multi- |
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lateral sanctions regime against Iran. |
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The United States and China must also strengthen our |
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collaboration to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. As North |
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Korea's economic lifeline, Beijing holds considerable leverage |
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over Pyongyang; yet it has been too slow to make it clear to |
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the North Korean leadership that security and respect can be |
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obtained only by giving up its nuclear weapons and refraining |
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from other aggressive behavior. |
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The promotion of human rights and political freedom is a |
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central goal of American foreign policy. These universal values |
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must remain a central focus of our relationship with China, |
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whose record in this area remains deplorable. Moreover, those |
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values are in China's self-interest. Both its international |
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image and its economic growth are dependent on developing a |
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society based on the rule of law. |
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In the sphere of economics and trade, one area of |
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particular concern is China's theft of intellectual property |
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and its indigenous innovation policy. In addition to compliance |
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with the recent WTO decision, China must do more to stop the |
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piracy and counterfeiting that occurs openly on street corners |
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and over the Internet and step up its enforcement efforts. |
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The crossroads we currently face in the U.S.-China |
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relations present less of a choice for the United States and |
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more of a choice for China. The Obama administration has |
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articulated a pragmatic policy toward China, and in several key |
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areas the administration has had some modest success. There is |
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no clear indication, however, that China has made a fundamental |
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decision to alter its strategic goals of leveraging the |
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international community to promote its own policies of economic |
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growth, with heightened political control and military |
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modernization, with regional and extra regional power |
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projection, while at the same time insulating China as much as |
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possible from outside influences. As much as the rest of the |
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world looks to China to play a constructive role, it is not |
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clear China wants to play a positive influence beyond its |
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borders. |
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I look forward very much to hearing the testimony from all |
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of our witnesses today and I yield back. |
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Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Berman. |
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And now I would like to yield 3 minutes to the chairman- |
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designate of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Mr. |
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Manzullo. |
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Mr. Manzullo. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, for calling this |
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important briefing concerning China's rise and its impact on |
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the United States. I strongly believe that China's new |
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assertiveness in foreign and economic relations is one of the |
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greatest foreign policy challenges that we must face in this |
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century. China's weight in the global economy cannot be |
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ignored; that nation's rapid modernization represents both |
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opportunity and peril for America. |
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As chairman-designate of the Subcommittee on Asia and the |
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Pacific, I am keenly aware of the challenges our Nation faces |
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when it comes to dealing with China. As experience has shown, |
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China's unfair trade practices, including currency |
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manipulation, illegal subsidies, and lax enforcement of |
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intellectual property law make it very difficult for the |
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hardworking people of America to compete at a level playing |
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field and benefit from this relationship. |
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American manufacturers have been hurt most by this |
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unbalanced relationship. Manufacturing is the lifeblood of the |
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16th Congressional District of Illinois, which I represent. Our |
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congressional district has somewhere between 1,400 and 2,500 |
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factories--no one is quite sure--supporting more than 51,000 |
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jobs. In fact, 24 percent of value-added manufacturing in our |
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congressional district represents exports. It is one of the |
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most dense areas in terms of manufacturing base and one of the |
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most exporting congressional districts in the country. These |
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hardworking men and women want to know what their government is |
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doing to enforce our trade laws with China and preserve |
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America's industrial base. |
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I hope our distinguished witnesses will focus their remarks |
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on what the administration is doing and what more it can do to |
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urge the Chinese Government to follow the rules. Very little |
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has been done in the past several years. |
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My experience with the Chinese Government is that it is in |
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fact capable of stopping the violators when they see it is in |
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their interests to do so. With so many Americans out of work, |
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now is the time for this administration to work with Congress |
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to hold China responsible and give American manufacturers a |
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chance to compete with China on a level playing field so our |
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manufacturers can create jobs. |
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Madam Chairwoman, I commend you for giving the American |
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people a well-deserved voice when it comes to China. I look |
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forward to the testimonies of our witnesses. |
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Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Manzullo. |
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We would be recognizing the ranking member-designate, Mr. |
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Faleomavaega, but he is not present, so we will proceed with |
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the testimony. |
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We are pleased to have as our witnesses a wonderful panel. |
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Thank you. We are pleased to welcome Mr. Larry Wortzel to |
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today's briefing. Larry is a commissioner on the U.S.-China |
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Economic and Security Review Commission, appointed by Speaker |
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Boehner. Among his many qualifications, Mr. Wortzel served two |
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tours of duty as a military attache at the American Embassy in |
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China and retired from the Army with a rank of colonel. Thank |
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you for briefing us today. |
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Also with us is Gordon Chang, who is currently a columnist |
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at Forbes.com. Mr. Chang practiced law in China and Hong Kong |
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for nearly 20 years and has written extensively on China and |
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North Korea. We are grateful to have him today, as he is a much |
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sought after expert on the future of China's economy. |
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Mr. Yang Jianli is the founder and president of Initiatives |
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for China. In 2002 Mr. Yang was imprisoned in China. And |
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following an outcry by Congress and others for his release, Mr. |
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Yang was freed in April 2007. Immediately following his return |
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to the United States, Mr. Yang formed Initiatives for China, a |
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pro-democracy committee that is committed to peaceful |
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transition to democracy in China. |
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And lastly, Mr. Robert G. Sutter, who has been a visiting |
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professor of Asian studies at the School of Foreign Services in |
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Georgetown University since 2001. In addition to his full-time |
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position, Mr. Sutter teaches regularly as an adjunct professor |
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of Asian studies in the Elliott School of International |
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Affairs, George Washington University. Mr. Sutter had an |
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extensive government career--an extensive government career in |
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Congressional Research Service and other U.S. Federal agencies |
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that lasted 33 years. |
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So we will begin with Mr. Wortzel. I am sorry that I am not |
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so great with the pronunciations, but look at my name. I don't |
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get too picky. So I will be rather ruthless with the 5 minutes, |
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so please confine yourself to 5 minutes. Larry, you are |
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recognized. Thank you. |
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STATEMENT OF MR. LARRY WORTZEL, COMMISSIONER, U.S.-CHINA |
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ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION |
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Mr. Wortzel. Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member |
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Berman, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity |
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to brief you today. The views I present are my own and formed |
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by my service in the U.S. Army, on the U.S.-China Economic and |
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Security Review Commission, and my own research. |
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In late 2004, Chinese Communist Party Chairman Hu Jintao |
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set out a new set of missions for the People's Liberation Army, |
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or PLA. These new historic missions provide the basis for |
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China's future defense research and weapons acquisition plans. |
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They also set the stage for a more assertive use of the armed |
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forces inside and outside of Asia in pursuit of expanding |
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national interests. The PLA's military modernization efforts |
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provide the means for the armed forces to fulfill these new |
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missions. |
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China's military modernization efforts are comprehensive, |
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affecting all of the domains of war, including space and cyber |
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operations. In recent years, China has acquired advanced |
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surface ships and submarines, modern combat aircraft, ballistic |
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and cruise missiles, and advance command and control missions |
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that tie everything together. |
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In addition, as Admiral Willard, the PACOM commander, |
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recently stated, China will field an antiship ballistic |
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missile, a potential threat against U.S. aircraft carriers in |
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the region. The PLA is still the fallback force of repression |
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for the Communist Party against the populace. |
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The combination of these new missions and the means to |
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carry them out has brought about changes in China's military |
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operations. Traditionally, the PLA focused on domestic response |
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and local contingencies. Now it is a military with a wider |
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range of missions and activities. The dispatch of Chinese naval |
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vessels in support of antipiracy operations off Africa is one |
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example. |
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China's national interests are global and the PLA is |
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becoming a force capable of acting beyond China's periphery. A |
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more capable military accompanies a more assertive Chinese |
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foreign policy. This can be seen in China's recent provocative |
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activities concerning its disputed territorial claims in the |
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South and East China Seas and in the exclusive economic zone. |
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China's military capabilities also stoke Beijing's |
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confidence. China's officials stridently complained about U.S. |
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and allied operations in the Western Pacific. Beijing failed to |
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condemn North Korean attacks on South Korea and strongly |
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objected to joint military exercises in the region between the |
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United States and South Korea. |
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In military-to-military relations, Beijing continues to |
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circumscribe the range of discussions between China and the |
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United States, refusing to address strategic issues such as |
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cyber warfare and space operations. I am pleased to see that |
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Secretary Gates got to visit the 2nd Artillery Corps and there |
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was some discussion of nuclear doctrine during his visit. |
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Despite a noticeable improvement in relations across the |
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Taiwan Strait, Beijing continues to insist on the right to use |
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force should it interpret Taiwan's activities as moves toward |
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independence. The cross-Strait military balance increasingly |
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favors China, and Beijing has deployed over 1,100 short-range |
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ballistic missiles opposite the island. In my view, Taiwan's |
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most pressing need is for new or modernized fighter aircraft. |
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China continues arms sales in support to international |
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pariah states such as North Korea, Burma and Iran. In addition, |
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the food and energy and foreign investment that China provides |
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to North Korea indirectly enabled Pyongyang to continue its |
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nuclear efforts. It showed its economic power by a stoppage of |
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the supply of rare Earth minerals to Japan when it was unhappy |
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with Japanese policy. |
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Madam Chairwoman, members of the committee, thank you for |
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the opportunity to address you today. I look forward to your |
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questions. |
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[The prepared statement of Mr. Wortzel follows:] |
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Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so very much, and thank |
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you for the time limit. |
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Mr. Chang, we appreciate your time. Five minutes, please. |
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STATEMENT OF MR. GORDON CHANG, AUTHOR OF ``THE COMING COLLAPSE |
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OF CHINA,'' FORBES.COM COLUMNIST |
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Mr. Chang. Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Berman, |
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distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the |
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opportunity to be here today. |
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The dominant narrative in the United States and elsewhere |
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is that China has the upper hand when it comes to the United |
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States, and that is why President Obama is hosting a state |
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visit for an autocrat, Chinese President Hu Jintao. |
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But does China really have the upper hand? I think that |
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most Americans misperceive the economic relationship between |
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the United States and China, and today I would like to comment |
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on three of those misperceptions. |
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First of all, everybody says that China is decreasing its |
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dependence on the United States. Well, China has an economy |
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that is geared to selling things to us. The Chinese economy is |
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dependent on exports, and its export sector is especially |
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reliant on sales to the United States. Last year, when all the |
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statistics are in, I think that we are going to see that more |
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than 140 percent of China's overall trade surplus related to |
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sales to the United States. That is up from an already |
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stupendous 90.1 percent in 2008. Now, China's trade dependence |
|
on us gives us enormous leverage, because China is not a free |
|
trader. China has accumulated its surpluses because of real |
|
clear violations of its obligations under the World Trade |
|
Organization. |
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Second, everybody says that China's debt provides--our debt |
|
held in the hands of China--provides a weapon that the Chinese |
|
can use against us. Since August 2007, the Chinese have talked |
|
in public about using debt as a weapon, and of course they call |
|
it, appropriately, ``the nuclear option.'' Well, China hasn't |
|
used the nuclear option since it first started talking about |
|
it, and the reason is they know their attack plan won't work. |
|
Let's think about the worst possible scenario, that the Chinese |
|
drop all of our debt at one time. Well, we have got to look at |
|
the way the global markets operate. If the Chinese do that, |
|
they have got to buy something, which means they have got to |
|
buy things denominated in pounds, euros and yen. That would |
|
send those currencies soaring through the ceiling in their |
|
values, which means that London, Brussels, and Tokyo would have |
|
to go out into the global markets to rebalance their |
|
currencies; in other words, to bring their currencies back down |
|
in value. And the only way they can do that is <greek-l>is |
|
deg.to buy dollars. There would be turmoil in the global |
|
markets, but it wouldn't last very long, just a few weeks, |
|
maybe a calendar quarter at the most. And after this is all |
|
done, we would have our debt held by our friends rather than a |
|
potential enemy. I think the global markets are deep and they |
|
can handle just about everything, and although I don't think |
|
the United States should be accumulating debt, and certainly I |
|
don't want the Chinese to hold it, I also don't think it gives |
|
them a weapon. |
|
Third, you hear many commentators say that China's currency |
|
manipulation is not the sole cause of America's trade deficit. |
|
Well, of course that's right, because there are a number of |
|
reasons that relate to our trade deficit, but China's currency |
|
manipulation is an important reason. Due to Beijing's active |
|
manipulation of its currency--it intervenes in the markets |
|
every day--the discount value of the renminbi to the U.S. |
|
dollar is somewhere in the vicinity of 20 to 40 percent. Maybe |
|
30 percent would be a good estimate for today. A discount of |
|
that magnitude, of course, is significant. |
|
When I practiced law in Asia, many of my clients were U.S. |
|
manufacturers, and I would just watch my clients haggle for |
|
days over pennies on unit prices. That is how important price |
|
is. |
|
So it is counterintuitive to think that a discount of 30 to |
|
40 percent--and that is what we are talking about--would not |
|
have an effect on our trade deficit. But you don't have to take |
|
my word for it. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, the top economic |
|
officer in China, came to the United States last September and |
|
he said--he talked about the possibility of<greek-l>, |
|
quote, deg. ``countless Chinese enterprises going bankrupt and |
|
countless Chinese workers becoming unemployed if the renmimbi |
|
increased in value.'' Well, if that is what the currency does |
|
to China's manufacturers and their employees, then what do you |
|
think it does to ours? |
|
Nonetheless, many economists say, well, you know, you |
|
shouldn't do this, this currency bill, H.R. 2378, which passed |
|
the House. I think that we certainly need to do that. China |
|
won't change its destructive currency practices if we appeal to |
|
its self-interest, which is what the Bush administration and |
|
the Obama administration were doing. I think that we have to |
|
apply pressure. |
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[The prepared statement of Mr. Chang follows:] |
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Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you Mr. Chang. Thank you so |
|
much. |
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Mr. Yang. |
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STATEMENT OF YANG JIANLI, PH.D., PRESIDENT, INITIATIVES FOR |
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CHINA AND HARVARD FELLOW |
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Mr. Yang. Thank you, Your Excellency. Thank you for the |
|
opportunity for me to testify on a very fundamental matter in |
|
the relationship between the United States and China that must |
|
be addressed. It is the matter of how the Chinese Government |
|
treats its own citizens. China is the country with the most |
|
prisoners-of-conscience in the world, including a Nobel Peace |
|
Prize winner. Among thousands, if not tens of thousands of |
|
prisoners-of-conscience, is Dr. Liu Xiaobo who got the longest |
|
prison term, life imprisonment. His two children, Song Tung, |
|
and a daughter Tiana are here with us today. |
|
In addition to the official prison system, it is |
|
practically public knowledge that in China there exist hundreds |
|
of black jails established and run by local governments of |
|
various levels. These prisons take in numerous innocent |
|
petitioners arbitrarily. |
|
Going beyond this prison system, there are three new types |
|
of measures of control that the Chinese authorities have been |
|
increasingly using in the past 3 years. |
|
Number one, direct violence. The direct violence against |
|
dissidents, human rights activists, and petitioners has |
|
increased in recent years. The people who have been doing this |
|
are local policemen or rogues hired by the police. In some |
|
cases governmental officials are also involved. |
|
Number two, house arrest. In recent years, house arrest has |
|
become more and more widely used as a means for limiting |
|
dissidents and their families. Yuan Weijing and Liu Xia are two |
|
typical examples. As the wife of the blind human rights lawyer |
|
Chen Guangcheng, Yuan Weijing was placed under house arrest not |
|
long after her husband had been arrested. Ever since Chen |
|
Guangcheng was released after serving 4 years and 3 months in |
|
prison last September, the entire family has been put under |
|
house arrest. The Chens, the entire family, has been cut off |
|
from all contacts with the outside world. Those who tried to |
|
visit them were badly beaten. Liu Xia, Liu Xiaobo's wife, has |
|
been put under house arrest ever since last year, when her |
|
husband won the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize. And her communication |
|
with the outside world has been completely cut off since |
|
October 20th, last year. |
|
Number three, ``made disappearances.'' I also urge you to |
|
pay attention to the disappearance of Chinese citizens as the |
|
result of the government's unwarranted actions. The most |
|
notorious case is Gao Zhisheng. He has not been heard from ever |
|
since last April, after repeatedly being detained and severely |
|
tortured. And his wife is with us today here. |
|
Another important case is Mongolian scholar Hada who was |
|
arrested in December 1995 for peaceful activities demanding |
|
more autonomy for the Mongolian region. He was later sentenced |
|
to 15 years in jail. His prison term was set to end on December |
|
10th last year, but a few days before that the Chinese |
|
authorities detained his wife and their son. Hada was never |
|
seen getting out of prison. And to date, the entire family has |
|
not been heard from. |
|
Around the time of the Nobel Peace Ceremony, more than 100 |
|
of Mr. Liu's friends, family members, and supporters, including |
|
Tiananmen mother Ding Zilin and her husband, were either put |
|
under house arrest or made missing. |
|
So coming back to the issue I raised at the outset, the |
|
question is why should China's treatment of its citizens be an |
|
important concern for U.S. foreign policy toward China? Pundits |
|
and laymen can give a slew of analysis on and answers to this |
|
question, and some people can even denounce this question as |
|
irrelevant. But I just want to echo Phelim Kine's question from |
|
his Wall Street Journal article last Monday: Will a rising |
|
power that fails to honor commitments to its own people act |
|
responsibly to fulfill its commitments to other nations and |
|
their peoples? |
|
[The prepared statement of Mr. Yang follows:] |
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Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. That is a good question. |
|
Thank you. |
|
Mr. Sutter. |
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STATEMENT OF MR. ROBERT G. SUTTER, VISITING PROFESSOR, SCHOOL |
|
OF FOREIGN SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY |
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|
Mr. Sutter. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman and |
|
members of the committee. |
|
The U.S. relationship with the People's Republic of China |
|
has been troubled throughout its twisted history. Important |
|
areas of converging interests between the two powers are |
|
usually accompanied by important areas of differences. The |
|
relationship has become very broad ranging, multifaceted and |
|
complicated, and it is the most important bilateral |
|
relationship in the world today. |
|
A pattern of seeking to advance common ground while |
|
managing differences prevailed throughout most of the George W. |
|
Bush administration. Like President Bush, President Obama |
|
showed a course with China involving pursuing constructive |
|
contacts, preserving and protecting American interests, and |
|
dealing effectively with challenges posed by rising Chinese |
|
influence and power. A strong theme in President Obama's |
|
initial foreign policy was to seek cooperation of other world |
|
powers, including China, to deal with salient international |
|
concerns. He worked very hard at this, but he found the Chinese |
|
leaders offered only limited cooperation on issues like climate |
|
change and others. |
|
More worrisome were the challenges that the Chinese |
|
administration posed for the Obama government, and this has |
|
been well documented by my colleague, Mr. Wortzel, particularly |
|
about the maritime areas about the periphery of China, but also |
|
a hard line on the President's arms sales to Taiwan, on his |
|
meeting with the Dalai Lama, and the U.S. interventions in the |
|
South China Sea and other issues. |
|
The Obama government reacted calmly and firmly to what |
|
Secretary of State Clinton called these tests or manifestations |
|
of new assertiveness by China. It gave no ground on any of the |
|
Chinese demands. It also found that Chinese assertiveness with |
|
the United States in neighboring countries over various issues |
|
damaged China's efforts to portray a benign image in Asia. |
|
These Asian governments became more active in working more |
|
closely with the United States and encouraging an active U.S. |
|
presence in the Asia Pacific. The overall effect was a decline |
|
in China's position in the Asia Pacific and a rise in the |
|
position of the United States. |
|
Meanwhile, the Obama government made clear to the Chinese |
|
Government and to the world that the United States is prepared |
|
to undertake military measures needed to deal with the buildup |
|
of Chinese forces targeting Americans and American interests in |
|
the Asia Pacific. It also helped to move China to curb North |
|
Korea's repeated provocation by warning privately as well as |
|
publicly that the United States viewed North Korea's nuclear |
|
weapons development as a direct threat to the United States. |
|
Over the past few months China has tried to ease |
|
differences with the United States in the period leading up to |
|
the current visit of President Hu Jintao. We have done a number |
|
of different things in calming the situation between the United |
|
States and China over these various areas of differences. |
|
Looking out, President Obama wants to pursue closer engagement |
|
with China as part of his administration's overall reengagement |
|
with the Asia Pacific. His administration also has made clear |
|
that it will not give in to Chinese assertiveness or pressure |
|
and, if needed, will respond to such Chinese actions with |
|
appropriate military diplomatic or other means. |
|
Given China's recent assertiveness, it may appear less |
|
certain that President Hu Jintao shares President Obama's |
|
interest in reengagement. On the other hand, China's recent |
|
assertiveness has proven much more costly than beneficial for |
|
China's broader interest. |
|
It is against this background it seems likely that |
|
prevailing circumstances will preserve and reinforce the |
|
positive equilibrium in U.S.-China relations for three general |
|
reasons. First, both administrations seek benefit from positive |
|
engagement in various areas. Second, both administrations see |
|
that the two powers have become so interdependent that |
|
emphasizing the negatives in their relationship will hurt the |
|
other side but also will hurt them. Third, both leaderships are |
|
preoccupied with a long list of urgent domestic and foreign |
|
priorities. In this situation one of the last things they would |
|
seek is a serious confrontation in relations with one another. |
|
Thank you for your attention. I look forward to responding |
|
to your questions. |
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[The prepared statement of Mr. Sutter follows:] |
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Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much to an excellent |
|
set of panelists. I will be recognizing members for 5 minutes |
|
of questions and answers in order of seniority, for those who |
|
were in their seats when the gavel fell, and in order of |
|
arrival for those who arrived after the briefing began. I would |
|
like to yield my 5 minutes for questions and answers to |
|
Congresswoman Buerkle of New York. The Congresswoman is |
|
recognized for 5 minutes. |
|
Ms. Buerkle. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I will direct my |
|
question to Colonel Wortzel, but if anyone else on the panel |
|
would like to comment, I would welcome the answer as well. |
|
First of all, thank you for your service. According to |
|
recent news reports, China facilitated the transshipment of |
|
missile parts from North Korean aircraft to Air Iran cargo |
|
flight at Beijing's airport. How involved are both the Chinese |
|
Government officials and Chinese companies in weapons |
|
procurement for Iran and in the development of Iran's nuclear |
|
and missile programs? |
|
Mr. Wortzel. Congresswoman Buerkle, they are pretty heavily |
|
involved. They accept those transshipments from North Korea |
|
through China. They facilitate them. Those things don't happen |
|
without the concurrence of central authorities in the provinces |
|
and from a national air control system. They have got their own |
|
customs people, so they are well aware of it and they could |
|
stop it. They have refused to participate in the Proliferation |
|
Security Initiative which would have the effect of at least |
|
helping to control North Korean proliferation. I mean, they |
|
simply have very different interests in Iran than we do. And I |
|
would argue that one of their interests is frustrating United |
|
States policy and creating a second potential military |
|
competitor that is at least a barb down in that part of the |
|
world. That limits what we can do. That means we have to be a |
|
lot more careful in how we act. |
|
They have sold--everything falls below the limits of the |
|
missile technology control regime, but they have sold short- |
|
range missiles, they have sold cruise missiles, anti-aircraft |
|
missiles. So they are not doing a thing to reduce the potential |
|
level of violence and tension in that region. |
|
Ms. Buerkle. Thank you very much. |
|
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. The gentlelady yields back. I would |
|
like to recognize the ranking member, Mr. Berman, for 5 |
|
minutes. |
|
Mr. Berman. Well, thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. |
|
And I would like to get Mr. Chang's response and also perhaps |
|
hear from Mr. Wortzel and Sutter on the very interesting thesis |
|
that Mr. Chang had, essentially looking at the issue of our |
|
debt obligations to China and our trade deficit as perhaps more |
|
our leverage than China's leverage, and to ask you to play that |
|
out a little longer. |
|
To what extent are you suggesting we use that leverage and |
|
whether it is in countervailing duties or in passing the kind |
|
of legislation that the House passed last year, and for what |
|
policy purposes should they be restricted to persuading and |
|
pushing China to live within the WTO ground rules, or should |
|
they be utilized to achieve broader geopolitical and military |
|
purposes? So that is one question. I will ask them all right |
|
now. |
|
And then the second question, 15, 20 years ago, there was a |
|
notion that in its heart of hearts, China liked American |
|
presence in the Western Pacific, that that was a lot better for |
|
them than Japan reconsidering its traditional military policy, |
|
thinking about its own nuclear weapons; more recently, what |
|
South Korea might decide to do. But in a way there was a |
|
beneficial effect. Is that just out the window now? |
|
Is the Chinese military modernization so strong now that |
|
they are not concerned about that, and they are truly seeking |
|
to have us reverse a position we have had since the end of |
|
World War II? |
|
And add to that, if either Robert Sutter or Larry Wortzel |
|
would do it, this notion that this weekend, that this isn't the |
|
visit of the most recent Emperor of China, that there is a |
|
People's Liberation Army out there that is starting to do their |
|
own things without necessarily under the direct direction of |
|
the leadership of the Communist Party. Is there anything to a |
|
couple of those stories that have emerged recently? |
|
And then finally, if we can get it--I don't know if there |
|
will be time--Mr. Yang, you were eloquent regarding the issue |
|
of political disappearances and the families and the abuse and |
|
what goes on inside China. But what you weren't able to get |
|
into is how do you think we--what role can we play in affecting |
|
and changing that? I do worry that there won't be time for that |
|
last one, but go ahead. |
|
Mr. Chang. First of all, I would like to thank the |
|
Congressman for being so polite in his characterization of my |
|
views. Most people think that I am wrong, and you were very |
|
nice in saying so, in saying what you just did. |
|
I think there are a couple of things that we need to do. |
|
First of all, we need a little bit less diplomacy. We are |
|
feeding China's self--a sense of self-importance. I think we |
|
don't need new agreements on economic matters, because everyone |
|
says when there is a problem with China let's go out and |
|
negotiate a new deal. We have tons of deals with the Chinese. |
|
All we need to do is enforce them; and we need to enforce them |
|
more vigorously, which means that we need to take cases to the |
|
WTO more quickly. And also because of the real problem that |
|
China does pose to American manufacturers, as I heard earlier, |
|
I think we need to do a little bit of self help, which is H.R. |
|
2378; in other words, imposing penalties at an early stage for |
|
Chinese subsidies. Of course, currency manipulation is one. |
|
Mr. Berman. Basically, you want to limit that to the |
|
economic issues--the currency valuation, the violation of trade |
|
rules, the subsidies--not to larger geopolitical issues? We |
|
only have 30 seconds. I would just like to get real quickly |
|
from Mr. Wortzel and Mr. Sutter. |
|
Mr. Wortzel. I think the PLA is not an independent actor. |
|
It is currently under the control of the Politburo Standing |
|
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the Central |
|
Military Commission. I think China is ambivalent about the U.S. |
|
presence. It is very happy that extended deterrents restrains |
|
Japan from becoming a nuclear power but wants a more forceful |
|
role in the Pacific. And I think Gordon is absolutely correct |
|
on U.S. treasuries. |
|
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. We will continue with Mr. |
|
Sutter at another time. |
|
Before yielding to Mr. Smith, I would like to recognize, as |
|
has been pointed out, the presence of Chinese human rights |
|
dissidents in the audience, representing a cross-section of |
|
oppressed groups inside China, including representatives of Liu |
|
Xiaobo, the Falun Gong, the Uyghurs, the wife of Mr. Gao, one |
|
of several Chinese political prisoners unjustly imprisoned by |
|
the Chinese regime. |
|
And now I am pleased to recognize Mr. Smith, the chairman- |
|
designate of the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and |
|
Human Rights for 5 minutes. |
|
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. Besides |
|
being the jailer of Liu Xiaobo, the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize |
|
winner, we have to ask ourselves a very serious question: Who |
|
is Hu Jintao? Let us not forget that in 1989, just a few months |
|
before the massive Tiananmen Square, the massacre at Tiananmen |
|
Square, Hu Jintao was Beijing's iron fist in Tibet, the man who |
|
ordered the savage beating of Tibetan nuns and monks, even |
|
children--there are eyewitness accounts of children being |
|
pummeled to death--and the murder of hundreds of Tibetans. |
|
Hu Jintao presides over a gulag state, clearly a |
|
dictatorship. President Hu is directly responsible for the |
|
systematic detention and torture of millions of peaceful |
|
Chinese, Tibetans, and Uyghurs. Harry Wu, who is here with us, |
|
spent almost two decades in the Laogai. He knows what happens |
|
in those gulags--torture, cattle prods put under the armpits |
|
and at the genitals. President Hu Jintao presides over that |
|
sickness and that perversity. |
|
President Hu's secret police hunts down Christians, Uyghur |
|
Muslims, Falun Gong, and Tibetan Buddhists and beats them often |
|
to death, especially the Falun Gong who are massively being |
|
killed in China today. President Hu is responsible for the |
|
barbaric, and really the worst violation of women's rights, in |
|
my opinion, ever: The one-child-per-couple policy, which relies |
|
on forced abortion to achieve its goals. |
|
In President Hu's China, brothers and sisters are illegal. |
|
They are illegal. Anyone in the audience who has a sibling in |
|
China, you are only allowed one. As a direct result, the |
|
cumulative effect of this barbaric policy, there are 100 |
|
million missing girls in China. Why haven't the feminists--most |
|
of them have been silent about this terrible gendercide |
|
directed against little girls. |
|
Let me ask Yang Jianli who has been an outspoken leader on |
|
behalf of Chinese human rights. It seems to me that when a man |
|
like Hu Jintao comes in, the press give him a free pass. There |
|
will be a press conference. I would ask the press to ask the |
|
hard questions, not just the generic questions about human |
|
rights. Ask specifics about what is happening in the Laogai, |
|
what is happening to Liu Xiaobo, what is happening to Gao, |
|
whose wife is with us today, missing, who has been repeatedly |
|
tortured, and the misuse--and the terrible burden they put on |
|
the children of the dissidents. Ask the tough questions of the |
|
press. |
|
And to President Obama and Secretary Clinton, please be |
|
very specific in your conversation with Hu Jintao. Just a |
|
glossing over of we talked about human rights, something on a |
|
list of talking points simply won't cut it. Be specific and |
|
press this man who I believe ought to be at The Hague being |
|
held to account for crimes, rather than being treated with a |
|
state dinner. So I would ask Mr. Yang Jianli, please. |
|
Mr. Yang. I agree, Congressman Smith, and I will answer |
|
Congressman Berman's question also--I think the U.S. Government |
|
should, at least what the U.S. Government can do and should do |
|
is to raise the specific occasions in various meetings with |
|
their counterparts. |
|
This upcoming--I mean this meeting, for example, if Obama |
|
really raised the cases like Liu Xia, Liu Xiaobo, it works. It |
|
worked with my case; it will continue to work with the other |
|
cases. And look at the practice of the U.S. Government in the |
|
past 2 years. The government believes that the private talking |
|
will work more effectively. But look at the record. The U.S. |
|
Government has not been successful in the past 2 years in |
|
helping get any of the prisoners out of the prison. So we have |
|
to do it, we have to apply pressure, raising specific cases, |
|
both privately and publicly. And that is the least the U.S. |
|
Government can do and should do. |
|
And another way to do it is to engage with Chinese |
|
democracy movements directly. Now we have recognized the |
|
leadership. Then we have a shared principle that is enshrined |
|
in China weight. As the democracy movement is viable in China, |
|
so engagement with China contains a part that is engaged with |
|
the people, with the China's democracy movement. Thank you. |
|
Mr. Smith. Thank you. And you emphasized the word |
|
``publicly,'' not just private conversations. |
|
Mr. Yang. Yes, also public. |
|
Mr. Smith. Conversations with President Obama must be very |
|
public. |
|
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. The gentleman's time is |
|
expired. |
|
I am pleased to recognize Mr. Payne, the ranking member- |
|
designate of the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and |
|
Human Rights for 5 minutes. |
|
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much for yielding, Ms. |
|
Chairperson. I would like to focus my line of questioning on |
|
China's economic interest in Africa and impact and implications |
|
of China's engagement with African nations for governance, |
|
economic growth, and human rights across the continent. |
|
The expansion of China's investment in Africa that we |
|
witness today began in the 1990s. In that decade alone, China's |
|
investment grew by an impressive 700 percent. Accompanying this |
|
economic expansion was the wave of Chinese migrants, some |
|
750,000 in 2007, who live in Africa now, mainly construction, |
|
mining workers, and oil workers and private traders, but not an |
|
expansion of the Africa middle class that would normally |
|
accompany infrastructure development. |
|
There has been complex and varied reactions among analysts |
|
regarding the implications of China's engagement in Africa. |
|
These range from enthusiasm and guarded optimism to concern |
|
over potential Chinese strategy and economic threats to Western |
|
or African interests. |
|
So I would like to get your thoughts on the overall scope |
|
of China's growing ties with Africa. What are the main |
|
political and economic goals? What are the main potential |
|
benefits and drawbacks for Africa of these ties? Also, in what |
|
way would you say China's relations with African governments |
|
have a negative impact on human rights in Africa? And what are |
|
the potential opportunities for U.S.-China cooperation on |
|
political humanitarian development priorities in China? |
|
They have had a meeting where 43 countries were invited to |
|
China; 42 showed up, heads of states in Africa. On the one |
|
hand, they have opened fire on workers who protested about poor |
|
working conditions in Zambia. Chinese soldiers just fired on |
|
them and wounded 11 or 12 of them. But on the other hand, they |
|
give 4,000 scholarships a year to African students, and that |
|
may be to indoctrinate them as to China. So maybe Mr. Wortzel |
|
or Mr. Sutter would like to take that. |
|
Mr. Sutter. Thank you very much, Congressman. This is a |
|
very complicated and important issue. Keep in mind that China-- |
|
I think the driving force of China's high profile in Africa is |
|
somewhat desperate in a way. They need resources. And so what |
|
you find is a highly competitive environment where companies of |
|
China are in Africa getting these resources. In a way, the |
|
government is sort of lagging behind these companies as they |
|
search and get these resources. |
|
The intensity of the Chinese economic development is such |
|
that for the Chinese to improve their GDP they have to use four |
|
times the level of resources that are used in the United States |
|
for the same amount of improvement. They need stuff. And so |
|
they are all over Africa trying to get the material that they |
|
really need to promote their economic development. |
|
At the same time, China is full of competitive companies |
|
that are looking to sell things, and the Chinese administration |
|
wants to have a balanced trade with Africa. And they have one |
|
because all these Chinese enterprises, very competitive with |
|
one another, are building things throughout Africa, selling |
|
things. And as you say, these migrants have gone to Africa to |
|
sell these sorts of things. It is a very understandable way to |
|
keep a balanced type of relationship that the Chinese seek with |
|
Africa. |
|
So if you understand it this way, you can see the driving |
|
force isn't really to control Africa; it is really to get the |
|
stuff and to make money at the same time. And there are several |
|
good books on this. Deborah Brautigam of American University |
|
has done an excellent book on this if you are interested in |
|
this topic. I am sure as you are interested. And so the upshot |
|
of Chinese behavior vis-a-vis the United States and so forth, |
|
it is secondary. They are out to get the material. And as a |
|
result there is collateral damage, if you will, there is a |
|
variety of things that aren't very good. |
|
Just a small point. I am not sure the PLA were the people |
|
that shot these people in Zambia; I think it may have been |
|
guards of some sort. |
|
Mr. Wortzel. Congressman, thank you for the question. I |
|
agree with Mr. Sutter. I do not believe there are PLA soldiers |
|
in Africa. I believe they are people out of the PLA working for |
|
government-controlled security companies. And we have done a |
|
lot of work on that in our committee. |
|
Mr. Payne. In Ethiopia in the Ogadan region they were |
|
soldiers that actually were killed by the OLF. They are in the |
|
Ogadan region. |
|
Mr. Wortzel. I think they were U.N. peacekeepers, United |
|
Nations peacekeepers, but I will look at that. |
|
Mr. Payne. All right. No, they were there protecting the |
|
oil reserves in Ethiopia. |
|
Mr. Wortzel. I will have to look at that. I may be |
|
incorrect. China is interested in the extraction of resources. |
|
They don't care about human rights in those countries, and they |
|
bring in their own labor and transfer no jobs whatsoever to the |
|
African citizens. And that is the major dissatisfaction in |
|
Africa. |
|
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. The gentleman's time has expired. I |
|
recognize Mr. Rohrabacher, the chairman-designate of the |
|
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, for 5 minutes. |
|
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. And |
|
also I would like to thank you for having this hearing at this |
|
moment, because we have to understand that as we speak, our |
|
country is officially welcoming President Hu as if he had the |
|
same stature and acceptability here as a democratic leader. And |
|
we welcome him the same as we do countries that are democratic |
|
and respect their human rights. This is wrong. We should not be |
|
granting monstrous regimes that are engaged with massive human |
|
rights abuses. And, in this case, the world's worst human |
|
rights abuser is being welcomed to our White House, with |
|
respect. Now, what does that do to those people in China who |
|
are our only hope for a peaceful future with that large chunk |
|
of humanity? The people of China are America's greatest allies. |
|
The people of China who want democracy, the people of China who |
|
want to respect human rights, and are looking forward to a more |
|
humane system at peace with the world, those are our allies. |
|
What do we do to them when we welcome their oppressor, their |
|
murderer, the one who is murdering their children, here to the |
|
United States with such respect? |
|
And as we look to this visit with President Hu, if our |
|
government, if our President follows suit the way our former |
|
Presidents have as well--this isn't just President Obama--we |
|
are doing a great disservice not only to the people of China |
|
and to our future, the cause of peace, but we are doing a great |
|
disservice to the American people. Because what is happening? |
|
We have for three decades leaned over backwards for this |
|
regime. We have permitted the regime in China, a monstrously |
|
human rights abusing regime, to have trade benefits that we |
|
wouldn't give to democratic countries. We have built them with |
|
technological transfers, with investments. We have let them get |
|
away with murder, economically as well as human rights--in the |
|
area of human rights. |
|
Well, these are things we have got to call them to task for |
|
or our situation will continue to deteriorate. We are now |
|
vulnerable to a regime that was weak 30 or 40 years ago. We are |
|
vulnerable to them. If we do not change our way of dealing with |
|
that regime, they will destroy the peace of the world and we |
|
will be to blame for that, not only the repression of their own |
|
people. |
|
So I would like to ask Mr. Wortzel in particular, China |
|
now, not only does it have a more peaceful stand to the rest of |
|
the world, we see claims, slowly but surely, more land claims |
|
and sea claims coming out. China is making claims in the |
|
Pacific that threaten Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and |
|
commerce throughout that area. We see claims against India and |
|
Vietnam. And, frankly, let me just say, our Russian friends |
|
someday are going to wake up and find out that they have now |
|
become partners with a country that means them great harm and |
|
is willing to take away their territory. Do these Russian--do |
|
you see any major threat to the peace of the world in the |
|
expanding territorial claims of China? |
|
Mr. Wortzel. Mr. Rohrabacher, first of all, I think it is |
|
ironic that while China is brutally repressing the Falun Gong, |
|
the Chinese Government is flooding the United States with |
|
Confucius institutes, that are universities that are supposedly |
|
spreading this peaceful Chinese culture. |
|
With respect to their security claims, as they get stronger |
|
militarily, they are simply becoming more forceful in the |
|
region and they are expanding their claims. And that affects |
|
all the countries in Southeast Asia and all the countries on |
|
their periphery. |
|
For that reason, I think it was very important that both |
|
Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates took pretty forceful |
|
stands on ensuring the peaceful resolution of these disputed |
|
claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea. And I think |
|
it is very important that our military works with and backs up |
|
Japan, even though we don't take a position on the disputed |
|
claims, because it is a threat to peace and stability. |
|
Mr. Rohrabacher. Let me just note that this government |
|
which we have bolstered with policies that we knew would make |
|
that country stronger under the idea if it was more prosperous |
|
it would be more peaceful, that strategy hasn't worked. And |
|
this country now is the head of an alliance of rogue nations |
|
that threaten the peace and freedom of the entire world. |
|
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. The gentleman's time is expired. |
|
I would like to recognize Mr. Sires of New Jersey for 5 |
|
minutes. |
|
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Madam Chair. |
|
You know, as I read the newspaper, some of the accounts, I |
|
am always fascinated by the statement that the Chinese simply |
|
have different interests in many parts of the world than we do. |
|
I think that that hides an awful lot. |
|
I do think that the Chinese have a hidden agenda. And their |
|
agenda, in my eyes, is more like world domination. Somehow they |
|
want to go back to 2,000 years ago, and I think they never lost |
|
that. But we seem to help them in their goals. They just fill |
|
the void wherever we are not. |
|
Take North Korea, for example. They do nothing. They do |
|
nothing, and they use North Korea to their benefit. |
|
The relationship with Iran. All they do is just boost Iran. |
|
And everywhere we seem to have a void they are there. |
|
I look at South America, and I see going in South America |
|
many of the businesses. I look at what they are doing in |
|
Africa, the way they are using Africa. |
|
I don't know. We just don't seem to get it. And I was just |
|
wondering, Dr. Yang, you have been a spokesman for human rights |
|
and the abuses that have gone on in China. Do you still fear |
|
for your life or your family's life back home? |
|
Mr. Yang. Yes. |
|
Mr. Sires. You still do, after all these years? |
|
And some of the members that are here today from some of |
|
the other groups, I assume that they also fear for their |
|
families as they speak up against this, you know, this monster |
|
that is developing before our eyes. I was just wondering if you |
|
could comment on that. Do you still get threats? Does your |
|
family still get threats back home? |
|
Mr. Yang. Yes. My family members in China need to report to |
|
the authorities on a regular basis. |
|
Mr. Sires. They have to report to the authorities on a |
|
regular basis? |
|
Mr. Yang. Yes, so that is why I minimize my correspondence |
|
with them, to minimize the trouble to them. And my case may not |
|
be the worst. I think many of my colleagues and their family |
|
members are being with us today. And I want to emphasize that |
|
China has the largest Communist system in the whole world, and |
|
it is still able to put anybody in prison, disappear anybody if |
|
it determines to do so. So this government is not responsive to |
|
its own people, and treats its own people harshly. |
|
So I am wondering this kind of a government will do any |
|
good in the rest of the world. So we have to keep asking this |
|
question once and once again. So when we come to the foreign |
|
policies toward China, we cannot forget this component. And I |
|
often hear many people in this country talking about Cold War |
|
mentality. So whenever we hear the word Cold War we will fear. |
|
So I don't understand. But I, my comment is, we just cannot |
|
simply explain away the component which can be described as |
|
Cold War in the relationship between U.S. and China. |
|
Look at the U.S. allies, friends with China, Japan, South |
|
Korea, Taiwan, these countries are democratic, and these two |
|
countries, U.S. and China, have fundamentally conflicting |
|
values which you just cannot explain away. It will not go away |
|
in the days to come. So there is a component that can be called |
|
Cold War. And the only difference is that U.S. and China has |
|
economic interdependence that the Cold War did not. The United |
|
States has no such close economic relationship with former |
|
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. But that is the only different |
|
element. |
|
But I echo what Mr. Gordon Chang said. There is a myth in |
|
this country that China always has upper hand in economic |
|
relationship with U.S. |
|
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. The gentleman's time has expired. |
|
Thank you. |
|
I recognize Mr. Manzullo, the chairman-designate of the |
|
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. |
|
Mr. Manzullo. Thank you, Madam Chair. As I mentioned in my |
|
opening statement, manufacturing is the backbone of our economy |
|
in northern Illinois. This question is for Mr. Chang, but |
|
others on the panel are obviously welcome to answer. I spend |
|
much of my time working with numerous small and medium size |
|
manufacturers that have been harmed in one way or another in |
|
China. Most of the time the issue is theft of intellectual |
|
property and piracy, which is the case with a waste water |
|
treatment company in my district called Aqua Aerobics. We |
|
actively engaged the Chinese embassy and asked them to |
|
intervene and actually got a favorable ruling in the Chinese |
|
courts on that issue. But how many companies can pick up the |
|
phone or go to their Congressman to get a direct intervention |
|
on an obvious IP violation? |
|
Other times the problem is more complicated, such as the |
|
case of the office shredder maker Fellows. It is, I think, the |
|
number one paper shredder maker in this country. They are |
|
fighting a fierce battle in China on a joint venture where they |
|
were locked out, inventory stolen, machine tools, business |
|
practices and IP. And if you are big you can succeed. But the |
|
small guys or the medium sized manufacturers are having an |
|
extraordinarily difficult time. And so how do we encourage the |
|
national provincial and local governments of China to enforce |
|
the law? And beyond the rhetoric and grand themes there has to |
|
be a better way of dealing with China. |
|
I guess that is an easy question. |
|
Mr. Chang. Right. And I think the important thing that we |
|
have to do is start, as I said, less diplomacy in a way. But I |
|
also think that we need to follow the approach of H.R. 2378, |
|
which is really to impose penalties whenever we see that there |
|
are violations of China's trade obligations because this gives |
|
us immediate relief. You talk about the problems of small |
|
manufacturers. They can't wait for the 3 or 4 years that it |
|
takes to get through the dispute resolution mechanism of the |
|
World Trade Organization. That is just not a practical remedy |
|
for them. And that is why I think that we need legislation, |
|
which is really tough, because when we do that the Chinese will |
|
understand. They have reacted to pressure, and this is really |
|
about the only way I think that we can do it in terms of saving |
|
small manufacturers because their plight is not only important, |
|
it is also urgent. |
|
Mr. Manzullo. And sometimes it is like Whack-a-Mole. You go |
|
in there, I have testified twice before the ITC on tires, |
|
recreational vehicle tires and automobile tires, and once was |
|
on the surge and the other two were on dumping and illegal |
|
subsidies. And you get the remedies, and then they come right |
|
back again and all of a sudden someone is doing the same thing |
|
under a different name. It is over and over and over and over |
|
and again, and these companies spend fortunes on attorney's |
|
fees trying to protect their intellectual property. |
|
Isn't there, can't there be a mechanism that our government |
|
can have, for lack of a better word, an 800 number for people |
|
who are the objects of piracy that simply can't afford |
|
attorneys to go in there and do battle for them? |
|
Mr. Chang. Well, we certainly could do that in many ways. |
|
That would basically involve beefing up the commercial sections |
|
of our embassy in Beijing and in the consulates around China, |
|
but also in the Department of Commerce. It just needs to be put |
|
at a higher priority that we have. |
|
Normally, what happens in trade disputes, as you point out, |
|
is you have this enormous litigation, and the United States |
|
really relies on injured parties to bring their case and to |
|
prosecute it. I think that your suggestion is an excellent one, |
|
which is really to have the government be much more proactive |
|
and to bring all sorts of proceedings, both internally in the |
|
United States and through the WTO because that is about the |
|
only way we can do it. We need to speed up the process because |
|
time, I think, is critical. |
|
Mr. Manzullo. I would look forward to meeting you in my |
|
office and putting our heads together and try to come up with |
|
some type of remedy there. |
|
Mr. Chang. I will be there. |
|
Mr. Manzullo. Thank you very much. I yield back my time. |
|
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Manzullo. |
|
We are proud to recognize Mr. Cicilline of Rhode Island. |
|
Welcome to our committee, sir. |
|
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I appreciate the |
|
opportunity to ask some questions. My questions also relate to |
|
the impact of our relationship with China on American |
|
manufacturing. And I know that, I think it has been pretty |
|
clear to most of us that the Chinese have really woefully been |
|
weak in addressing the theft of intellectual property, and it |
|
is presenting real problems for American businesses, and so I |
|
would like to hear your thoughts on what actions we might take |
|
to really protect American businesses from this theft of |
|
intellectual property, the seizing of assets in joint ventures, |
|
and the refusal to meet contractual obligations. And related to |
|
that, I am particularly interested in your thoughts on what |
|
mechanisms we have, in particular on the opportunity that |
|
exists for the production and development of renewable energy. |
|
I know there was a recent complaint filed at the WTO against |
|
the Chinese subsidy policy which the administration contends |
|
favored Chinese producers of wind equipment and that there have |
|
been examples where those kinds of conflicts have been resolved |
|
at the U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade. |
|
So in answering that, I am wondering whether you think |
|
those are an effective place for resolution, if there are |
|
changes we need to make that really will help American |
|
manufacturers be sure that we are enforcing in every way |
|
policies that protect the American manufacturers and the jobs |
|
connected to those manufacturers. |
|
Mr. Chang. We really have two problems. One of them is |
|
China's internal rules such as the new indigenous innovation |
|
product accreditation rules that President Hu Jintao has been |
|
pushing. Those would basically force a transfer of American |
|
intellectual property to joint venture companies for anyone who |
|
wants to sell to government or state enterprises. And that is |
|
really an issue for the United States itself in its discussions |
|
with China. The Obama administration has put this up at a |
|
higher priority because it is so important. And I think that it |
|
is just a question of these needing to be discussed all the |
|
time. |
|
The other point which as you raised, which is just the |
|
outright theft, this is extremely difficult because you can't |
|
litigate in the Chinese courts because the courts are |
|
controlled by the party and often controlled by local interests |
|
that have been, really, the culprits. And so the only way the |
|
United States can deal with this issue really is to have the |
|
commercial section in the embassy and in the various consulates |
|
make it known to both national and provincial authorities that |
|
this is a case which is of importance to the United States |
|
which oftentimes is sending the Ambassador or the Consul |
|
General to a court case to show the presence of Washington and |
|
its importance to us. But this is extremely very difficult. |
|
Mr. Cicilline. Mr. Sutter, do you have anything to add? |
|
Mr. Sutter. I would agree. I think you need to keep the |
|
pressure on. It has to cost the Chinese. I think you are |
|
advocating an approach, you are pushing on an opening door with |
|
the Obama administration, it seems to me. Listening to the |
|
Secretary of Commerce and the USTR, they very much want to do |
|
this kind of thing. Maybe they need more people. Maybe they |
|
need some funding from the Congress to help in this regard. But |
|
I think there is a broad sentiment in the Obama government that |
|
this should be done, that you have just what Mr. Chang was |
|
saying. You need case-by-case, you need to work these issues, |
|
you need to pressure in a way that is credible. And I think |
|
that high level attention to it with officials is a way to go. |
|
And I think that is going to, as I say, it is going to win some |
|
support, I think, from the USTR and the Commerce Department. |
|
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you very much. I yield back the |
|
balance of my time. |
|
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Cicilline yields back. Thank you |
|
for that. |
|
I recognize Mr. Rivera of Florida for 5 minutes. |
|
Mr. Rivera. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I am going |
|
to ask about two island nations, Cuba and Taiwan, one, an |
|
island prison and the other a bastion of democracy surrounded |
|
by a fortress of tyranny. And we will start with Cuba. |
|
Given China's involvement in Cuba, and this question |
|
specifically we will start off with Dr. Wortzel. Given China's |
|
involvement in Cuba, I wonder if you could give us your |
|
thoughts as to China's geopolitical intentions in Cuba, perhaps |
|
as establishing another beachhead in Latin America, generally, |
|
and specifically, what you believe China is up to with regard |
|
to oil drilling, given information that has been published |
|
regarding the company involved with oil drilling also having a |
|
nexus with Iran. So generally speaking, China's geopolitical |
|
interest in Cuba, and specifically with regard to oil drilling. |
|
Mr. Wortzel. Thanks for the question. First of all, China |
|
has taken over, as I understand it, the entire signals |
|
intercept complex that the Soviet Union had in Cuba. So there |
|
is, without question, a military and an intelligence purpose |
|
for their relationship. I think part of it is also support for |
|
another socialist state, and I think you can link Chinese |
|
activities with Venezuela and support there, their support in |
|
Cuba and for Cuba. |
|
With respect to resources, I think they would be very happy |
|
to extract resources any way they could get it. But if you look |
|
at the visits of Chinese military leaders and political |
|
leaders, I always ask myself why the head of China's strategic |
|
rocket forces, the Second Artillery, is visiting Cuba? We are |
|
not going to be in another Cuban missile crisis, but there is |
|
certainly something to a military relationship going on there, |
|
and the same goes with Venezuela. |
|
In some cases their relationships in Central America and |
|
Latin America are related to diplomatic relations with Taiwan, |
|
and they have managed to wean a couple of countries away from |
|
recognition of Taiwan and toward recognition to China. And that |
|
is part of it. I think it is fair to say, and I sum it up, that |
|
they sure don't recognize the Monroe doctrine. |
|
Mr. Rivera. Thank you very much. With respect to Taiwan, |
|
and I will direct this question to Mr. Chang, and the issue of |
|
the F-16s and this administration's decision or decisions, |
|
previous decisions on prolonging shipment of F-16s to Taiwan |
|
and what you believe is your perspective on how this affects |
|
the Taiwan Relations Act and fulfillment of the Taiwan's |
|
Relations Act. |
|
Mr. Chang. I would love to talk about this topic, but I am |
|
sitting next to the world's expert, and so perhaps---- |
|
Mr. Rivera. I yield to Mr. Wortzel. Thank you. |
|
Mr. Wortzel. Taiwan's Air Force really needs modernized |
|
aircraft. The debate is F-16 CD, which has longer range and |
|
could be used for deeper strikes inside China if their military |
|
chose to do that, versus modernizing the AB. When I talk to |
|
aviation engineers, they think you could take the AB, put in |
|
brand new avionics, new radar and targeting equipment, it needs |
|
new refrigeration to be able to handle that, and that they |
|
would then have a very, very capable aircraft. It is not one |
|
that would necessarily satisfy the Taiwan legislature. And |
|
there would still be a fight over the programming for the |
|
weapons systems and the avionics. They are going to want |
|
program codes. We are not going to transfer them. We never do. |
|
So they need it. If you have made the decision, I don't think |
|
there is any guarantee that they would accept the way we make |
|
it. And then there is the political cost of approving a brand |
|
new system that China would object to. They are going to object |
|
no matter what we do, but they need the aircraft and I think |
|
they have to have that need addressed. |
|
Mr. Rivera. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. |
|
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Rivera. |
|
I am pleased to recognize Mr. Connolly of Virginia. Welcome |
|
back, my friend. |
|
Mr. Connolly. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. And thank |
|
you for your service. I want to thank the panel. And |
|
particularly Bob Sutter. Bob, we used to work together when I |
|
was on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and you were at |
|
CRS, as I recall, so great to see you on the other side of the |
|
table. Let me ask you, Bob, understanding serious, serious |
|
human rights issues in China, and lots of other issues that we |
|
are concerned about that have been enumerated here at this |
|
dais: In your view, given the fact that since Richard Nixon we |
|
have had a level of relations with the head of state of that |
|
country notwithstanding, is it a mistake for this |
|
administration to receive the President of China? |
|
Mr. Sutter. Thank you, Congressman. It is great to be here. |
|
I think what you find is that we have a very complicated and |
|
interdependent type of relationship. We have so many |
|
priorities, we have to balance them. And as you have indicated, |
|
every President that we have had since Nixon has done this. And |
|
so people can object in various ways and have very good reasons |
|
for this, but obviously Republican and Democratic Presidents, |
|
they prioritize these things and they determine no, this is the |
|
best way to go. |
|
We may be at a crossroads now. We may have to change the |
|
situation. China may be trying to dominate the world and this |
|
type of thing. I don't think so. I think China has got too many |
|
problems. I think the United States is the leading power in the |
|
world, and that is going to stay that way for some time. And so |
|
it gives me a lot of confidence in this situation. |
|
But I think the bottom line is, you have to figure out |
|
where do you come down on these priorities and I think it is, |
|
and as you have indicated, every President of the United States |
|
has endorsed this kind of approach. |
|
Mr. Connolly. Thank you. Mr. Wortzel, you were talking a |
|
little earlier about Taiwan's defense capability, and you said |
|
they are in bad need of an upgrade of their fighter aircraft. |
|
Is there any reason to believe that the government in Taiwan is |
|
not capable of defending itself in the event of a military |
|
incursion? |
|
Mr. Wortzel. I don't think that that is the issue. I think |
|
that the issue is how capable would they be of doing it and |
|
what form might any attack take. They would have a hard time |
|
defending against all those 1,100 ballistic missiles which |
|
could do a lot of damage. I think they would be very hard |
|
pressed if there were massive special operations insertions |
|
into Taiwan to disrupt infrastructure. They themselves could do |
|
more to harden some of their air fields and their storage |
|
facilities. I think they have been woefully deficient in the |
|
way they dribbled in the command and control and data links for |
|
their current forces. I mean, if I--and I said this to their |
|
Minister of Defense. If there is one thing you could do to |
|
immediately improve your capabilities, it is take the whole |
|
data link and C-4 ISR package and link all your ground and |
|
naval and air assets and missiles so they could take part in |
|
cooperative targeted engagements. |
|
But they are doing things, and they have bought a lot, not |
|
everything that we offered. They are also developing their own |
|
modable launch rocket systems. They could probably use |
|
assistance with precision guided rounds. |
|
Mr. Connolly. Let me ask you another part of that, given |
|
the limitation of time. We have 1 minute. Is there--one of the |
|
things that always concerns somebody about the Taiwan Straits |
|
is that there is a misunderstanding about the nature of the |
|
United States' commitment to the security of Taiwan. |
|
In your view, does the current government of China fully |
|
understand the nature of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan? |
|
Mr. Wortzel. I think the government of China does. I think |
|
at times some of the political actors in Taiwan misinterpret |
|
our support as--I mean, I had a legislator from Taiwan say, you |
|
know, we are glad to get this $16 billion arms package. As far |
|
as we are concerned it is a $16 billion insurance policy that |
|
you will come to our defense. They have to be ready to defend |
|
themselves. |
|
Mr. Connolly. That is right. Mr. Chang, we have 20 seconds, |
|
but you wanted to answer that, too. |
|
Mr. Chang. I think that with the remilitarization of |
|
Chinese politics and policy, there is a danger that Beijing |
|
does not understand our commitment and thinks that we will not |
|
defend Taiwan. |
|
Mr. Connolly. Thank you. |
|
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Connolly. |
|
I would like to recognize Congresswoman Ellmers of North |
|
Carolina; so pleased that you selected our committee. Welcome. |
|
Mrs. Ellmers. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I would like to |
|
thank our distinguished panel, and I would also like to reach |
|
out to the individuals and family members who have suffered |
|
human rights violations in China. You are a constant reminder |
|
to us that we need to be vigilant around the world to human |
|
rights violations and how fortunate we are here in the United |
|
States. |
|
My question is for Dr. Wortzel, do you prefer to be |
|
referred to as Colonel? Doctor? |
|
Mr. Wortzel. It doesn't matter, ma'am. Either are very |
|
polite. I have been called a lot of other things. |
|
Mrs. Ellmers. Along the security issues that we have been |
|
discussing, last September a Chinese fishing boat, thought to |
|
be a spy vessel, deliberately collided with some Japanese Coast |
|
Guard vessels in the vicinity of the Senkaku Islands. Tensions |
|
rose to an unprecedented level before the Chinese boat captain |
|
was released. How close did the two sides come to military |
|
conflict? And in your opinion, what are the implications for |
|
the United States, given our treaty obligations with Japan? |
|
Mr. Wortzel. I don't think in that instance they came close |
|
to military conflict, but it was a very serious diplomatic |
|
spat, and it still continues to reverberate among the populace |
|
in both countries. But I think these things can escalate and |
|
could escalate if there are other incidents. |
|
We have a treaty obligation with Japan. It is a very, very |
|
important ally. And without question, if Japan got into a |
|
conflict, a military conflict with China, we would be at their |
|
side. I think that the Pacific Commander and the Secretary of |
|
State have taken very strong and principled positions not |
|
recognizing the sovereignty of the island, of the islands, but |
|
at the same time, ensuring that the Chinese understand that the |
|
United States is fully supportive of its treaty ally, and I |
|
think the Japanese understand that. We need to be very close to |
|
them. We need to work very closely with them. And even under |
|
the Democratic Party in Japan I know the Foreign Minister well, |
|
they have got a strong leadership that understands the threats |
|
from China. |
|
Mr. Sutter. If I could say something about this, it is part |
|
of a pattern we have seen over the last 2 years of China being |
|
very assertive about the maritime area around their periphery, |
|
South China Sea, Yellow Sea, this type of thing. The net effect |
|
of this has really damaged China's position in the Asia Pacific |
|
region. China is weaker today than it was a year ago because of |
|
this behavior. The United States is much stronger and the Obama |
|
government has this re-engagement of Asia strategy which this |
|
just feeds into. And so what you are doing is reinforcing |
|
America's stature and strength in Asia while weakening China. |
|
If I were a calculating person in China I would say this is |
|
really dumb policy. We have to stop doing this type of thing. |
|
And so the thing to watch, after Mr. Hu Jintao's visit is will |
|
they stop. Will they stop doing this kind of thing? Because it |
|
really is dumb. It is hurting them. And I think this is how you |
|
get the attention of the Chinese leaders. It costs them. You |
|
make it hurt them and then they stop. And I think the Obama |
|
government has done a very good job, very quietly, of |
|
intervening in various ways and saying, we are not going to |
|
allow this; this isn't going to happen. And I think it has been |
|
quite effective. And so let's watch. Let's see what happens. |
|
If we have a situation where the military is out of control |
|
in China, if it is being remilitarized, as Mr. Chang suggested, |
|
then it could be a more dangerous situation. But at this point |
|
I would have to agree with Mr. Wortzel. I think the civilian |
|
leaders do have ultimate control and when they look at their |
|
cost and benefits this kind of behavior hurts them, and so I |
|
think they have to calm it down. |
|
Mrs. Ellmers. Thank you very much. And thank you, Madam |
|
Speaker. I yield back the remainder of my time. |
|
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. The gentlelady |
|
yields back. |
|
I am pleased to recognize Mr. Ackerman, the ranking member- |
|
designate on the Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asia. |
|
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Madam Chair. The Chinese have |
|
always been bad actors. They were the national focus of |
|
attention for being almost exclusively the world's number one |
|
recluse until Richard Nixon, as was pointed out, came along and |
|
decided to have an intervention, and decided it was a better |
|
policy to try to engage the Chinese rather than to continue |
|
with China bashing, which to some seemed counterproductive to |
|
reaching a particular policy and behavior change end. Now we |
|
have noticed that there is a small club of recluse nations, and |
|
the Chinese and the North Koreans have found each other, and |
|
have formed Recluse Anonymous, with China being the recovering |
|
recluse, trying sometimes very unsuccessfully to affect the |
|
behavior of the North Koreans. Both seem to be engaging in very |
|
provocative activities on and off, especially of late. |
|
Can the Chinese really affect the behavior of the North |
|
Koreans? They seem to be looking like they are trying, |
|
sometimes looking like they are not. Is that something that |
|
they dial up, dial down, depending on China's needs, kind of a |
|
control? Or do they lack any influence in the end? |
|
Mr. Wortzel. I don't think it is a can they. The question |
|
is will they?, Congressman Ackerman. |
|
Mr. Ackerman. You are saying they can? |
|
Mr. Wortzel. Well, they provide somewhere between 70 and 90 |
|
percent of North Korea's energy needs, somewhere around 40, 50 |
|
percent of their fuel needs, and a great deal of foreign |
|
investment. So, yes, they can. They fear that if they cut some |
|
of that, it would lead to instability in North Korea, and they |
|
would end up with South Korea, Japan, and the United States on |
|
their border. That is one thing. |
|
Second, my view is that they absolutely enjoy the fact that |
|
the United States is pretty heavily dependent on them, at least |
|
perceptually, to interact with North Korea, and that certainly |
|
restrains, in my view, a lot of the State Department's |
|
diplomacy against China--or toward China. |
|
Mr. Sutter. I think China could help with North Korea, too, |
|
and I think their interest is very much on stability. That is |
|
what they want. And they worry that pressure on North Korea not |
|
only could lead to the effects that Mr. Wortzel pointed out, |
|
but North Korea, you could see them as an enemy. The North |
|
Koreans talk like this quite often, how hostile their feeling |
|
is toward China. And so--but the net effect is what will the |
|
Chinese do? I would think they will seat their interest in |
|
stability. If the situation in North Korea looks like it is |
|
going to become very unstable then they will intervene. And I |
|
think they did intervene in the case of the North Korean |
|
provocation at the artillery barrage that killed several South |
|
Koreans later, in the latter part of last year. And the United |
|
States has maintained to the North Koreans that North Korea's |
|
provocations, and particularly its development of nuclear |
|
weapons, is a direct threat to the United States. |
|
So the United States put I think very good pressure on the |
|
Chinese to get them off the dime to move the North Koreans into |
|
their tactical---- |
|
Mr. Ackerman. You are saying that the Chinese have an |
|
actual 12-step plan? |
|
Mr. Sutter. No, they don't have a 12-step. I think this the |
|
idea of China rising and being in control. They are not in |
|
control. They are riding the tiger on this one. They don't |
|
control North Korea. They have a lot of influence over it, but |
|
this is---- |
|
Mr. Ackerman. The same can be said with their very |
|
different but also dangerous relationship with Iran. |
|
Mr. Sutter. Iran is much further away and their influence |
|
in Iran is much lower than it is in a place like North Korea. |
|
They are fundamental in North Korea. It is right on their |
|
border, it is very---- |
|
Mr. Ackerman. But they are dealing with a nuclear power and |
|
a nuclear wannabe. And the Chinese are usually pretty |
|
farsighted. Don't they see this as a threat, not just to us, |
|
but to themselves? |
|
Mr. Sutter. They see the more near term threat more |
|
dangerous. The danger of instability, not so much the |
|
geopolitical. It is the geopolitical element of South Korea |
|
being on the border of China. It is the basic whole idea of |
|
instability. |
|
Mr. Ackerman. You are talking about the economic |
|
instability? |
|
Mr. Sutter. Exactly. It is bad for business. |
|
Mr. Ackerman. And they are threatened more by that than the |
|
nuclear instability? |
|
Mr. Sutter. I believe they are, yes, sir. |
|
Mr. Ackerman. I yield back the remaining 4 seconds. |
|
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Ackerman. |
|
I recognize Mr. Burton, chairman-designate of the |
|
Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia. |
|
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Madam Chair, for having this |
|
hearing. I am going to ask, after I ask a couple of questions, |
|
I am going to yield my time to my good friend, Mr. Smith. First |
|
of all, you may have answered this question, Mr. Yang, but is |
|
there any, do you have any idea how many people, how many |
|
million people are in Communist gulags? |
|
Mr. Yang. It is really difficult to get a number, for the |
|
obvious reason. And I am talking about a prison system. I have |
|
to talk to two prison systems. One is official. Through the |
|
court, you can get a record of how many people they detained. |
|
But there is another prison system that is black jail. There |
|
are hundreds of them in China now run by local government on |
|
various levels. So you just cannot find out how many people are |
|
being detained. And on top of that, many people are made |
|
missing, and many people are being put under house arrest. So |
|
you just don't know how many people. |
|
Mr. Burton. Well, we have been told it is in the millions. |
|
And I presume that you would agree with that. |
|
Mr. Yang. I don't have a specific number, and I would say |
|
many. I would say China has the most prisoners of conscience in |
|
the world. Yeah. |
|
Mr. Burton. One of the things that I gathered from |
|
listening to these learned people is that I believe China is |
|
not dumb. I believe they are very smart. They are leaders and I |
|
think that they are playing chess and they are doing it over a |
|
long period of time. They are moving as they can into the |
|
Caribbean and into South America. They are making friends and |
|
supporting tyrants who are not socialists, but many of them are |
|
just plain out Communists. And they are putting us in a trick |
|
bag because of the economic things that they are doing to us. |
|
Right now we have a $270 billion trade deficit with them. I |
|
think we are well over $1 trillion in hock to them as far as |
|
what we owe them. And if they started pulling those strings, |
|
which I think they probably will at some point, they can make |
|
us, at least to some degree, dance to their tune. |
|
And so I would like to get from you gentlemen your |
|
perception on the long term goals of China and whether or not |
|
they are doing what I think they are doing, both economically |
|
and militarily. They are building their military up |
|
dramatically, and so they have got us by the throat as far as |
|
our debt to them. And that would threaten our economy long |
|
term. And if they are building up their military and making |
|
these connections around the world, does that pose as a real |
|
long-term threat to the United States and our security? And I |
|
yield to Mr. Chang and Mr. Wortzel. |
|
Mr. Wortzel. Let me say that, in my view, there is a long- |
|
term historical and cultural---- |
|
Mr. Burton. Can you sum up pretty quickly? |
|
Mr. Wortzel. Yes, long-term cultural affinity for the |
|
accrual of power and dominance in China, and that creates the |
|
sense of suzerainty where Chinese leaders believe they can |
|
almost dictate to other independent states how they should |
|
behave. And that is the way I read a lot of their behavior, |
|
particularly around their periphery. |
|
Mr. Chang. I believe that they want to be a peer competitor |
|
to the United States. They want to drive the United States out |
|
of Asia, which I think is very clear. They would like the |
|
renmimbi, their currency, to be the world's reserve currency. |
|
And certainly, they want to dominate nations on their |
|
periphery. |
|
This is clear from what the Chinese have been doing. And as |
|
we have seen in this past year, it has been very concerned |
|
about their relations with Japan, South Korea, India, where we |
|
see military or semi-military moves against these countries, |
|
which are after all our allies. So clearly, China is an |
|
adversary, and one that we have to be very careful about |
|
because, yes, I do think that they do play chess. But the one |
|
thing though is that they often make very serious strategic |
|
errors. They are very good on tactics, but long-term strategic |
|
moves may be not so good, as we saw in this past year, and as |
|
Dr. Sutter talked about. |
|
Mr. Burton. Thank you. I yield to Mr. Smith. |
|
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Smith is recognized. |
|
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much. Let me just make a point. |
|
My friend and colleague, Mr. Connolly, a moment ago asked the |
|
question about receiving, you know, a Chinese President like Hu |
|
Jintao. It is not that you don't meet with or receive, it is |
|
how you do it. And the concern that many of us have is that a |
|
state dinner, when Bush had a working lunch in 2006, it sends a |
|
message, especially when he is the jailer of Liu Xiaobo. |
|
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Smith. Thank you. |
|
We welcome Congresswoman Bass of California to our |
|
committee. Thank you. And I am pleased to recognize Mr. Chabot |
|
of Ohio. We are so pleased to have you return to serve with us. |
|
Thank you. The gentleman is recognized. |
|
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Mr. Wortzel, |
|
I have a couple of questions for you first. I was, for quite a |
|
few years, one of the cochairmen of the Congressional Taiwan |
|
Caucus and so have been very interested in those issues and |
|
been there many times over the years. And relative to their |
|
defense, you had mentioned the fighter planes, in particular. |
|
Could you discuss, at the time there was a move for some |
|
submarines as well, and that ultimately didn't go anywhere. I |
|
see you frowning. What are your thoughts about that? |
|
Mr. Wortzel. It is a very difficult problem. It is a |
|
problem for the United States Navy because they really don't |
|
want to have to work on or produce diesel submarines. |
|
Mr. Chabot. They were talking about doing it in France or |
|
Europe or someplace. |
|
Mr. Wortzel. The French got away with bribing enough |
|
Chinese and Taiwanese to get some destroyers there. Everybody |
|
involved in that had an accident falling off a tall building. I |
|
don't think that will work a second time. They need this |
|
submarine. I mean, if the United States could get Costa Rica to |
|
buy a dozen submarines from Germany and then transfer them it |
|
doesn't hurt anybody, if the Germans look the other way on the |
|
retransfer license. If we brought them and retransfer, they |
|
need them. But I don't think it is viable to think that they |
|
are going to begin to produce them from nothing and then fill |
|
out the rest of their defense budget. |
|
Mr. Chabot. Okay. And relative to the missiles, I think |
|
when we first organized the caucus, and this has been 12, 14 |
|
years ago or so, I think the number then was 400 or 500 |
|
missiles, then it went to 600 or 700, kept going up now to |
|
1,100. I mean, clearly China has been threatening Taiwan for |
|
many, many years now, and bullying to a considerable degree. |
|
Relative to the missiles, is there anti-missile technology that |
|
would be helpful? There was talk about that at the time. You |
|
mentioned some missile system. Could you elaborate on that |
|
slightly? |
|
Mr. Wortzel. Well, we have sold them ballistic missile |
|
defense technology. They bought a limited amount. It will help |
|
them. It could protect specific areas. That is still an awful |
|
lot of missiles. My personal view, and this is really a United |
|
States defense need, we need to be working on a laser. We don't |
|
want to be shooting two or three missiles at another missile. |
|
We need to melt them right out of the sky quickly. |
|
Mr. Chabot. Okay. And then slightly off topic, but not |
|
really that much, again, continuing in the Taiwan vein, |
|
President Chen Shui-bian has been in prison now for some time. |
|
And you know certainly he has been punished for his alleged |
|
transgression. Isn't enough enough? Isn't it about time--I |
|
mean, have they reached the point where you have perhaps the |
|
criminalization of politics here? |
|
Mr. Chang, I see you nodding. If you want to jump in you |
|
are welcome to do so. |
|
Mr. Chang. I think the real issue with former President |
|
Chen is the procedures under which he was convicted, and at |
|
this point there needs to be a thorough review of the way that |
|
the current government, the Kuomintang government, has been |
|
prosecuting and persecuting members of the Democratic |
|
Progressive Party. This is really a very bad story. The United |
|
States needs to pay attention. Freedom House has talked a lot |
|
about the erosion of human rights in Taiwan and it is going to |
|
be a big story in Taiwan for the next 2 or 3 years. |
|
Mr. Chabot. Okay. Thank you. |
|
Mr. Sutter. Congressman, if I could just say something |
|
about Chen Shui-bian and your comments about Taiwan. One thing |
|
about the--first, on the Chen Shui-bian side, yes, there have |
|
been problems perhaps with the due process. But, my God, the |
|
charges against him that have been proven are very damning. So |
|
the fact that he is in jail it seems to make a lot of sense to |
|
someone like me. |
|
Mr. Chabot. How long has he been in prison now? |
|
Mr. Sutter. 2 years maybe, a little less than 2 years. |
|
Mr. Chabot. Family members in prison as well, son, I think |
|
wife. |
|
Mr. Sutter. Yes. His wife. I am not sure where she is right |
|
now but she has been convicted. So this is big corruption, sir. |
|
And so I think the charges are worth looking at carefully. On |
|
the military side, just keep in mind, with the one reservation |
|
I have about this, one of the most important ones, is Taiwan |
|
willing to buy? Taiwan, their GDP, their military budget is |
|
less than 3 percent of their GDP. You are not dealing with a |
|
country that really wants to militarize itself or build itself |
|
up militarily. |
|
Mr. Chabot. And I have only got 5 seconds. That was one of |
|
the frustrating parts. We kept pushing them to buy the weapons |
|
system and the legislature just couldn't find a way to do it. |
|
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. And we thank Ms. Bass of |
|
California for yielding her time. And recognize Mr. Marino of |
|
Pennsylvania who will be yielding his time to Mr. Smith. If you |
|
could make that motion. |
|
Mr. Marino. Madam Chair, I do yield my time to Mr. Smith. |
|
Thank you. |
|
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Smith is recognized. |
|
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Madam Chair, for that courtesy, and |
|
my good friend and colleague, the new member. Just a couple of |
|
questions in follow-up. I kind of ran out of time a moment ago |
|
about the issue of how you receive a person who, with his past |
|
and present, raises serious issues about what we are actually |
|
doing, especially to the dissidents who we know in the laogai |
|
throughout all of China, including Liu Xiaobo and his wife who |
|
is under house arrest, that the jailer of Liu Xiaobo is getting |
|
a state dinner. These aren't nuances. These are profound issues |
|
that are raised here. |
|
So if you could perhaps some of you might want to speak to |
|
that issue. And let me also say that and the distinguished |
|
chairlady mentioned a moment ago that in this audience are some |
|
of the greatest and finest human rights defenders and their |
|
loved ones. Liu Dejun was abducted out of Vietnam right as the |
|
President took over in 2002. They have not seen their father. |
|
They try to get in to see him. He was abducted out of Vietnam |
|
back to China where he is now spending a horrific, enduring a |
|
horrific ordeal in the laogai. Geng He, who is Gao's wife, who |
|
is here today, she made a 2000 trek to Thailand with her two |
|
children, after her older daughter was so despondent, perhaps |
|
even suicidal because she was being so mistreated. |
|
What we often forget, it is not just the dissidents, but it |
|
is their families who share in the cruelty meted out by the |
|
Chinese dictatorship. She made it, thankfully, and her |
|
children. But again, it raises the question about how can a man |
|
who is responsible, and I would say directly responsible, he |
|
gets a state dinner. When Frank Wolf and I made several trips |
|
to the PRC we met with Li Peng, premier. I believe we do have |
|
meetings like that. We had a list of prisoners. We had issues |
|
dealing with forced abortion, religious persecution. We laid it |
|
all out. He wasn't happily in receipt of all that, but it was a |
|
very, very real conversation. And I wonder if, when the toasts |
|
are made later on tonight and there is all of this hoopla |
|
around a state dinner that all of that kind of like simmers |
|
into the background and what message have we sent? |
|
Also, if you can speak to this then I will yield to you, |
|
the bad governance model. You know, I chaired, when I chaired |
|
the Africa Subcommittee years ago, three hearings on what China |
|
is doing in Africa, you know, when people like Bashir in |
|
Zimbabwe, Mugabe and so many others who are dictators love the |
|
Chinese model of control and secret police. And I am very |
|
worried about the influence that their bad governance model and |
|
their bad human rights model is having, unless we really speak |
|
loud and clear. And I would again make my appeal to the |
|
President, to the Press Corps, be public. Don't namby pamby, |
|
don't walk on egg shells. Speak boldly about, especially |
|
President Obama, about his fellow Peace Prize winner, because |
|
he won it last year, this year obviously Liu Xiaobo, who is |
|
languishing guilty in prison and his wife under house arrest. |
|
Mr. Yang. Congressmen, I am personally upset about the |
|
honor that Hu Jintao is receiving. So it is not a matter |
|
whether to meet or to receive Hu Jintao. It is how to do it. I |
|
agree with you totally. And giving Hu Jintao this honor will |
|
send two messages to China, one to Chinese government and the |
|
other to Chinese people. To the Chinese government that can be |
|
described as that we can get away with the atrocities we |
|
perpetrated in the past. Disappearing people. Put Nobel Peace |
|
Prize winner in jail. We can get away with any human rights |
|
violations. |
|
The message to the people, that is, U.S. may not be that |
|
sincere about human rights issues in China. And I want to |
|
emphasize that China is a very practical, very rational player. |
|
Chinese government legitimacy is performance based; namely, the |
|
only source of legitimacy for this regime to continue its rule |
|
in China is fast economic growth. |
|
So we have too much imposed fear on ourselves thinking that |
|
if we take a stronger position on human rights issues, that |
|
will jeopardize our economic relationship with China. Why |
|
should I fear? They are the persons, it is them that we should |
|
fear, you know, any jeopardizing of economic relationship with |
|
the United States and the rest of the world because the slow |
|
economic growth will leave bare all the problems we have been |
|
accumulating in the past years that will cause the government |
|
to collapse. |
|
Mr. Smith. Thank you. |
|
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Marino, for |
|
yielding the time to Mr. Smith. |
|
And now, batting cleanup, one of our committee's super |
|
stars, Mr. Royce, chairman-designate of the Subcommittee on |
|
Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, is recognized for 5 |
|
minutes. |
|
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Madam Chair. I was going to ask Larry |
|
a question. I think this is an issue that maybe everybody who |
|
is representative of the business community who does business |
|
in China should be thinking about. There was an article on |
|
extortion in the Harvard Business Review in December entitled |
|
``China vs the World: Whose technology Is It?'' It is an |
|
exhaustive study of the actual consequences for U.S. businesses |
|
in China. Let me just read you, Larry, one of the conclusions |
|
that the authors wrote here: |
|
|
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``Chinese officials have learned to tackle multi- |
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national companies,'' including U.S. companies, ``often |
|
forcing them to form joint ventures with its national |
|
champions and transfer the latest technology in |
|
exchange for current and future business opportunities. |
|
Companies that resist are simply excluded from |
|
projects. The Chinese Government uses the restrictions |
|
to drive wedges between foreign rivals vying to land |
|
big projects in the country and induce them to transfer |
|
the technologies that state-owned enterprises need to |
|
catch up.'' |
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This is extortion, and we all know numerous examples. We |
|
have heard from witnesses; I think 2 years ago we heard from |
|
Nancy Weinstein, of Nancy's Lifestyles, who opened a business |
|
in Beijing, only to have it stolen out from under her. She was |
|
in Shanghai. That was a Shanghai example. But since that |
|
hearing I have probably heard from a half dozen businesses that |
|
said we don't want to go public, but this is their modus |
|
operandi. Now this appears in the Harvard Business Review, |
|
laying out the case that this is the modus operandi for the |
|
Chinese Government. |
|
Could I have your thoughts on that. |
|
Mr. Wortzel. Mr. Royce, it is the modus operandi. Now, I |
|
have to say that American companies that are induced to do that |
|
do that of their own volition because they hope that, based on |
|
the ability to enter the marketplace, they can earn a lot of |
|
money. Some do, some don't. |
|
Mr. Royce. Larry, we understand that part. But the next |
|
chapter is once the technology is stolen, that company had |
|
better be prepared for a pretty quick exit out of China because |
|
its contracts are often about to change, its work force doesn't |
|
show up the next morning. This is in violation of any number of |
|
new rules, its leases are terminated. We have heard the stories |
|
over and over again. |
|
Mr. Wortzel. Well, I would only suggest a legislative |
|
strategy to remedy it, and that is if a company can |
|
legitimately demonstrate that its products or its technology |
|
were stolen, then prohibit the sale of that stuff in the United |
|
States. |
|
Mr. Royce. Well, that is a good remedy. But from the |
|
experience that we have had going to bat with our constituents |
|
out in California, and Nancy Weinstein would be an example, we |
|
have not been able, through the court system in China, to have |
|
any success and, to my knowledge, I don't know of any success. |
|
I wondered if you would agree with one of the points made |
|
in this report, and the authors conclude, it might be useful |
|
for the United States to dispense with the premise that it can |
|
have an economically compatible relationship with China; in |
|
other words, knowing that these are two radically different |
|
systems and China has failed to bring their system into |
|
compliance with any of the international norms for commercial |
|
activity or for rule of law. |
|
Mr. Wortzel. I don't know why you would choose to do |
|
business with a documented thief. |
|
Mr. Royce. Well---- |
|
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Excuse me. Did you say ``documented |
|
thief''? |
|
Mr. Wortzel. Yeah. |
|
Mr. Royce. My hope would be that there are many other |
|
countries in Asia that have an interest in closer relations |
|
with the United States. We see this in polling all the time, |
|
and I think a key aspect of managing China's rise will be our |
|
alliances with China's neighbors across East Asia and South |
|
Asia. I think that giving reassurance to our friends and |
|
placing a check on China's regional ambitions is going to be |
|
necessary. But, what more should we be doing with these |
|
countries to encourage trade investment? And what more should |
|
we do to let the U.S. business community know their return on |
|
investment is a negative one in terms of China? That gets out |
|
occasionally in the Journal, but not often enough. |
|
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, the gentleman's time has |
|
expired. And now for truly our last question and answer, 5 |
|
minutes, will be Mr. Fortenberry of Nebraska, a strong pro-life |
|
legislator, Mr. Fortenberry to close out our hearing. |
|
Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you, Madam Chair, for the time. And |
|
thank you, gentlemen, for appearing before us today. I have a |
|
fairly lofty sentence in front of me. Basically it says, I want |
|
to stress the importance of managing our complex relationship |
|
with China in a manner that honors the transcendent principles |
|
that define our national purpose and identity. |
|
But let me stop there. As I look out into the audience |
|
here, I see a number of young people. And I think it is |
|
important to get your mind around this. Many of you are perhaps |
|
newly married or hope to be married in the future. Let's |
|
suppose you were in China, and the authorities come by and say, |
|
how many children do you have? We have one, and we have one on |
|
the way. Well, that is one too many. Come with us. |
|
Can you imagine that in the United States? We can't even |
|
get our mind around these concepts. And yet, this is President |
|
Hu Jintao's China of today. Now, I sincerely hope that as the |
|
President meets with--as President Obama meets with President |
|
Hu, that human rights issues are going to figure most |
|
prominently in these discussions and the White House has |
|
indicated some direction in that regard. But since I have been |
|
serving in Congress, members of both sides of the aisle have |
|
boldly challenged Beijing on the ruthless treatment of |
|
democracy activists and their families, Internet freedom |
|
activists, religious minorities, and women and families |
|
victimized by a callous policy of coerced abortion. |
|
Now, let's turn to economics. A full estimate is that we |
|
owe about $2 trillion to China, and we have a bilateral trade |
|
deficit approaching $300 billion and, of course, this poses |
|
weighty concerns. Where appropriate, I believe we must |
|
challenge China to abandon its unbridled mercantilism which |
|
manifests itself in massive subsidies and other trade |
|
distorting practices that contribute to this staggering |
|
imbalance. I think also we must look ourselves in the eye in |
|
the United States and take action to get our fiscal house in |
|
order, to revive our stagnant manufacturing industries, |
|
refurbish our industrial base and take responsibility for our |
|
economic future. |
|
The reality is we buy their stuff and they buy our debt, |
|
and this is a truly dysfunctional marriage. So I think we have |
|
an obligation to forthrightly address the sources of tension in |
|
this relationship with China, and our commitment to mutual |
|
respect should never entice us to ignore these very serious |
|
concerns. And I hope that the administration will echo these |
|
concerns in their meetings today with the Chinese leadership. |
|
My question to the panel is this: The Chinese give cover to |
|
the North Koreans. The Chinese do business with Iran. The |
|
Chinese do not respect human rights. What type of world does |
|
China envision? What is their end game? A nationalistic surge |
|
underwritten by a new capitalistic Communist model never |
|
foreseen in the history of the world? Can you comment on that, |
|
please? |
|
Mr. Sutter. I would be very happy to comment. I think the |
|
Chinese objective is very much focused on the here and now. Mr. |
|
Yang emphasized that they have a legitimacy deficit. And their |
|
legitimacy rests on economic performance and to do that they |
|
need stability. And to do that they have to interact with the |
|
world on a lot of different ways, in a lot of different ways, |
|
with economic development being primary. And so to confront the |
|
United States in a major way is something that I think is not |
|
fundamental to what they are about right now. Their long-term |
|
plans are very vague. They have got a very big agenda for the |
|
short term, and it is going to keep them busy for a long time. |
|
Mr. Fortenberry. So does raising the concerns that I |
|
raised, as well as many others today, help address or give rise |
|
to more legitimacy concerns as they further distance themselves |
|
from what we would consider to be the international community |
|
of responsible nations? |
|
Mr. Sutter. The idea that we should address all the issues |
|
that you have mentioned in a forthright way is very, very |
|
clear. We should do that. No question. But I think your idea |
|
that somehow the Chinese have this plan for domination and |
|
control of the world, I think, a better image is that China is |
|
a bit scrambling, trying to keep legitimacy, trying to keep |
|
control over their very, very vibrant economic and social |
|
situation, that isn't under good control in many respects. |
|
Mr. Fortenberry. Does raising the issues I just raised |
|
hinder their quest for this legitimacy. |
|
Mr. Sutter. I think it could. It could. |
|
Mr. Fortenberry. Or do you not care, because economics |
|
trumps everything? |
|
Mr. Sutter. No, economics does not trump<greek-l>, deg. |
|
everything because prestige is important as well and their |
|
position is important as well. |
|
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. The gentleman's time has |
|
expired. |
|
It is a testament to the great interest that this topic has |
|
that members keep coming back. So pleased to recognize Mr. |
|
Deutch, my Floridian colleague, for 5 minutes. |
|
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chair, I appreciate it. I |
|
appreciate your leadership of this committee. |
|
I would like to spend a couple of minutes talking about the |
|
way in which the Chinese Government has been willfully weak in |
|
enforcing intellectual property rights. The creativity, the |
|
imagination, the innovation of American workers, their |
|
intellect, is being stolen and it is being stolen on a regular |
|
basis in China. It is being stolen by illegal downloads, it is |
|
being stolen by pirated DVDs, it is being stolen by seizing, |
|
again, the intellectual property of our Nation. |
|
What can we do to increase the pressure on the Chinese |
|
Government to be more serious in enforcing and protecting the |
|
intellectual property rights of our citizens? |
|
Mr. Chang. I think the one thing that we can do if we |
|
really are serious about it is start adding tariffs for goods |
|
of countries that do engage in willful theft of intellectual |
|
property. This is a really important thing for us to do, and I |
|
think it is probably about the only way to do it. |
|
There are a number of other strategies. And one thing the |
|
Obama administration has done is, it has gone after these |
|
indigenous innovation rules that President Hu Jintao has |
|
sponsored and really does put American companies at a serious |
|
disadvantage if they want to do business in China. So that is |
|
one thing. |
|
But when it comes to the actual theft, which is another |
|
issue, I believe that the only way to deal with this is |
|
sanctions of some sort, penalties of some sort. And they |
|
probably are going to follow the general trajectory of H.R. |
|
2378. |
|
Mr. Deutch. Dr. Wortzel, are you nodding your head? |
|
Mr. Wortzel. I agree with Mr. Chang. We have to avail |
|
ourselves of the available World Trade Organization remedies, |
|
and we are not always doing that. They are more limited than we |
|
might like, but we must avail ourselves of them. And we have to |
|
work particularly with our European allies and friends, so that |
|
when a case is brought, it is not just brought by one country. |
|
I think that helps. |
|
Countervailing duties is another potential remedy that I |
|
think would be useful. |
|
Mr. Deutch. I would like to broaden the discussion to the |
|
implications of the theft of intellectual property to the links |
|
between stealing intellectual property and the funding of |
|
terrorist organizations like Hezbollah and Hamas. A majority of |
|
the counterfeit goods originate in China and wind up in places |
|
like the tri-border region of South America, where millions of |
|
dollars in direct contributions have then been to Hezbollah. |
|
One such specially designated global terrorist entity in |
|
Paraguay provided a lump-sum payment of $3.5 million |
|
<greek-l>dollars deg.to Hezbollah. |
|
Is there a way, even moving beyond the important nature of |
|
intellectual property rights on its own, to helping, to |
|
reinforcing the severe implications of these violations in our |
|
own and helping to protect our national security? |
|
Mr. Wortzel. I kind of think you just pointed the way |
|
toward a response to that. And that would be to take a look at |
|
the Iran Sanctions Act, and with the terrorism nexus see if |
|
legislation could be modeled along the lines of the Iran |
|
Sanctions Act that would specifically sanction the Chinese |
|
violators that are engaged in that activity. |
|
Mr. Deutch. And along those lines, Dr. Wortzel, under the |
|
Iran Sanctions Act and the legislation that we passed last |
|
year, by all accounts there are Chinese firms that ought to be |
|
sanctioned. They have not been. Do you have thoughts on the |
|
actions taken by these Chinese companies, state-owned in Iran, |
|
in helping them to overcome the sanctions that have been |
|
imposed on other companies? |
|
Mr. Wortzel. You know, here you really have to get the |
|
Oversight Administration and Enforcement. If they are not doing |
|
the job, they are not doing the job. |
|
Mr. Chang. You know, we sanctioned individual Chinese |
|
enterprises, but essentially they all are controlled by the |
|
state. So essentially what we should be doing is thinking about |
|
sanctions that go beyond just the individual enterprise. |
|
Because essentially what we are doing is, we are going after |
|
the pinkie when we really should be going after the head. |
|
Mr. Deutch. In the remaining seconds on that specific |
|
issue, how do we go after the head? |
|
Mr. Chang. It would be basically putting sanctions on goods |
|
from countries that are involved in certain prohibitive |
|
behavior. This is going to be very difficult for the United |
|
States to do. We haven't, up to now, had the will to do it. But |
|
when it comes to things like Iran sanctions or selling arms to |
|
the Taliban, something else, we really have to think about our |
|
priorities. |
|
Mr. Deutch. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. |
|
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch. |
|
Thank you, panelists, for excellent testimony. And thank you to |
|
the members who participated, thank you to the audience. And |
|
the briefing is now adjourned. Thank you. |
|
[Whereupon, at 12:43 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] |
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