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<title> - THE GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS ACT: SENSIBLE GOVERNMENT FOR THE NEXT CENTURY</title> |
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[House Hearing, 105 Congress] |
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[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] |
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THE GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS ACT: SENSIBLE GOVERNMENT FOR THE |
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NEXT CENTURY |
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======================================================================= |
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HEARING |
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before the |
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COMMITTEE ON |
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GOVERNMENT REFORM |
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AND OVERSIGHT |
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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES |
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ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS |
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FIRST SESSION |
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__________ |
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FEBRUARY 12, 1997 |
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__________ |
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Serial No. 105-2 |
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__________ |
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight |
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39-381 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE |
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WASHINGTON : 1997 |
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____________________________________________________________________________ |
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For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office |
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Internet: bookstore.gpr.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800 |
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Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�090001 |
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT |
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DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman |
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BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California |
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J. DENNIS HASTERT, Illinois TOM LANTOS, California |
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CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia |
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CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut MAJOR R. OWENS, New York |
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STEVEN H. SCHIFF, New Mexico EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York |
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CHRISTOPHER COX, California PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania |
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ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida GARY A. CONDIT, California |
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JOHN M. McHUGH, New York CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York |
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STEPHEN HORN, California THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin |
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JOHN L. MICA, Florida ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington, |
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THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia DC |
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DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania |
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MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania |
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JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland |
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JOHN SHADEGG, Arizona DENNIS KUCINICH, Ohio |
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STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois |
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MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois |
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Carolina JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts |
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JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire JIM TURNER, Texas |
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PETE SESSIONS, Texas THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine |
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MIKE PAPPAS, New Jersey ------ |
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VINCE SNOWBARGER, Kansas BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont |
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BOB BARR, Georgia (Independent) |
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------ ------ |
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Kevin Binger, Staff Director |
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Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director |
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Judith McCoy, Chief Clerk |
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Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director |
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C O N T E N T S |
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Page |
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Hearing held on February 12, 1997................................ 1 |
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Statement of: |
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Armey, Hon. Richard, House Majority Leader................... 33 |
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Hinchman, James, acting Comptroller General of the United |
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States, accompanied by Chris Mihm, Assistant Director, |
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Federal Management Issue Area, General Accounting Office... 11 |
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Koskinen, John, Deputy Director for Management, Office of |
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Management and Budget...................................... 51 |
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Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by: |
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Armey, Hon. Richard, House Majority Leader, prepared |
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statement of............................................... 37 |
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Burton, Hon. Dan, a Representative in Congress from the State |
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of Indiana, prepared statement of.......................... 3 |
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Hinchman, James, acting Comptroller General of the United |
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States, prepared statement of.............................. 13 |
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Horn, Hon. Stephen, a Representative in Congress from the |
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State of California, prepared statement of................. 9 |
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Koskinen, John, Deputy Director for Management, Office of |
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Management and Budget: |
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Information concerning congressional consultations....... 75 |
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Prepared statement of.................................... 54 |
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Morella, Hon. Constance, a Representative in Congress from |
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the State of Maryland, prepared statement of............... 68 |
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Sessions, Hon. Pete, a Representative in Congress from the |
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State of Texas, prepared statement of...................... 48 |
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THE GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS ACT: SENSIBLE GOVERNMENT FOR THE |
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NEXT CENTURY |
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WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 1997 |
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House of Representatives, |
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Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, |
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Washington, DC. |
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The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in |
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room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dan Burton |
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(chairman of the committee) presiding. |
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Present: Representatives Burton, Shays, Horn, Mica, Davis |
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(VA), Shadegg, Sanford, Sununu, Sessions, Pappas, Snowbarger, |
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Barr, Condit, Sanders, Maloney, Barrett, Norton, and Holden. |
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Staff present: Kevin Binger, staff director; Dan Moll, |
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deputy staff director; John Rowley, general counsel; Jonathan |
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Yates, counsel; Kristine Simmons and Jane Cobb, professional |
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staff members; Judy McCoy, chief clerk; Teresa Austin, |
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assistant clerk/calendar clerk; Mark Stephenson, minority |
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professional staff; and Jean Gosa, minority administrative |
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staff. |
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Mr. Burton. We have the most important members of the |
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committee here, so far, so we'll go ahead and start. Good |
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morning, and welcome to the first Government Reform and |
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Oversight full committee hearing of the 105th Congress. I am |
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pleased that the first order of business on our full committee |
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oversight agenda is the Government Performance and Results Act, |
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or GPRA. |
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We will, henceforth, be calling this the Results Act for |
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simplicity purposes. I want everybody to understand what we're |
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talking about when you talk about GPRA. People probably think |
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it's some kind of a disease, and we don't want that to happen, |
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so we'll call it the Results Act. For some of us this is |
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familiar territory and for others it's brand new. But for all |
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of us on both sides of the aisle and at both ends of |
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Pennsylvania Avenue, the Results Act is the key to reforming |
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government now and into the next century. |
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The Government Performance and Results Act requires |
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agencies to set performance goals and eventually tie their |
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budgets to their performance. This is a sound business practice |
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that we should have been employing for a long time. This act |
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has the force of law to make agencies do what they should be |
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doing anyway, knowing what their mission is and fulfilling that |
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mission in the most efficient, cost-effective manner possible. |
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The subtitle of this hearing is Sensible Government for the |
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Next Century. And that is exactly what the Results Act is |
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about--a government that makes sense and is based on |
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performance and results. I hope this hearing will send a signal |
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to the administration and to American taxpayers that this |
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committee is very serious about using the act to make sure |
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citizens are getting what they expect and pay for from Federal |
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programs. |
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Throughout the 104th Congress, Chairman Steve Horn of the |
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Government Management Subcommittee worked diligently to oversee |
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the results process. Mr. Horn's efforts have taken the |
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important first step of educating Members of Congress and the |
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American people about this act. It is essential that members of |
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this committee and the other committees in Congress begin to |
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understand what the Results Act is and what role they must play |
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if it is to be implemented successfully. |
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Agencies are required under the law to consult with |
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Congress on their strategic goals and plans, which must |
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formally be submitted to Congress in September. Every committee |
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in the House and Senate needs to take an active and immediate |
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role in the consultative process. The key to the Results Act is |
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that it requires a cooperative effort among agencies, Congress |
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and, most importantly, the people that are affected by these |
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Federal programs. |
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To highlight the importance with which the House leadership |
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regards this Results Act, we will be pleased, before too long, |
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to welcome the House Majority Leader, Richard Armey, to speak. |
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Mr. Armey will be here, probably, in about 10 or 15 minutes, so |
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I will save his introduction for that time. We're happy to have |
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him and we regret that his minority counterpart, Richard |
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Gephardt, was unable to join us due to a scheduling conflict. |
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Following the majority leader, we will welcome the Acting |
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Comptroller General of the General Accounting Office, Mr. James |
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Hinchman, who will explain the requirements of the Results Act |
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and how we in Congress can use it as a vital oversight tool. |
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Finally, John Koskinen the Deputy Director of the Office of |
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Management and Budget, will testify regarding the priority the |
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administration has placed on the Results Act implementation and |
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the general readiness of agencies to comply with the act. |
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Since Mr. Armey is not yet here, I would like to now |
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recognize Mr. Waxman, who isn't here, he's detained at another |
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meeting--the ranking member of the subcommittee. Mrs. Maloney, |
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I think, has his statement and one of her own. So we'll now |
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recognize Mrs. Maloney for her own statement. |
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[The prepared statement of Hon. Dan Burton follows:] |
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Mrs. Maloney. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank |
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you for holding this hearing on the Government Performance and |
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Results Act. The Results Act is landmark legislation which has |
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enjoyed wide bipartisan support since its passage in 1993. |
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The act is approaching a critical period of implementation, |
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and I am hopeful that bipartisanship will continue. The Results |
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Act is that latest in a series of laws, such as the Chief |
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Financial Officers Act and the Inspector General Act, meant to |
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improve performance and reduce waste, fraud and abuse in the |
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Federal Government. |
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It is intended to improve the efficiency and the |
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effectiveness of the Federal Government and to begin a cultural |
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change in the Federal workforce by forcing the agencies to |
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focus on results. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased you are holding |
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this hearing at a time when government is getting fewer and |
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fewer resources yet being expected to do at least as much as it |
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always has. Improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the |
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Federal Government is more important than ever. |
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I would just like to add that I am pleased that you are |
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starting the committee work on this important piece of |
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legislation. It happens to be the very first piece of |
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legislation that I managed on the floor of the House of |
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Representatives in 1993. And it was also a cornerstone in Vice |
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President Gore's Reinventing Government, which has worked so |
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far to make government more effective and cost effective and |
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productive, even as we have moved, really, to the smallest |
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workforce in many years, since President Kennedy was in office. |
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It will force our agencies to plan better, to come forward |
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with their priorities, and it will allow us to analyze their |
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results. And I--it's a sensible, important bill. I look forward |
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to working with you on oversight of it. The importance that you |
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place on it is underscored by the fact that the Majority |
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Leader, Mr. Armey, will be here. And I look forward to his |
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testimony. In appreciation of time restraints, I'll put my |
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formal remarks in the record. Thank you. |
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Mr. Burton. Without objection, your remarks will be entered |
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into the record. |
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And I'd just like to say to Mrs. Maloney that, as you can |
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see, we are reaching out to the minority right off the bat |
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because this is one of your pet projects. Now, I'd like to |
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recognize the chairman of the Government Management, |
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Information, and Technology Subcommittee, a good friend and a |
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very fine legislator, Mr. Horn, who held a number of hearings |
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on the Results Act in the 104th Congress. And I'm sure he'll |
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continue to be a leader in this Congress as well. Mr. Horn. |
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Mr. Horn. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding |
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this hearing and your generous comments. I welcome this hearing |
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as a beginning step in what I think can be a sea change in the |
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way our government works. The Government Performance and |
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Results Act may be landmark legislation, in that it can |
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simplify and de-mystify our processes of government. |
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It does this by forcing Federal agencies to explain what |
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they intend to do with the tax dollars we give them and by |
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measuring whether the agencies then live up to their word. The |
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goal of this law can be summed up in one word: accountability. |
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That is, this law creates the ability for government to |
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actually account for the money it raises in taxes and then |
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spends on a vast array of programs. |
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That goal may seem elementary to many Americans. Families |
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and businesses go through the exercise on a routine basis. But |
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for the Federal Government this is a startling and even |
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wrenching exercise. Under this law, every Federal agency must |
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ask itself some basic common sense questions: What are we |
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doing? Should we be doing it? Can we do it better? Can we do it |
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cheaper? |
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Under this law, every Federal agency must establish clear, |
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realistic and understandable goals, and they must establish |
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effective ways to measure performance. Instead of focusing |
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solely on the bare minimum requirements of complying with the |
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law, they will be expected to produce real results, and they |
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will have to produce real balance sheets that can be verified |
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by outside auditors and understood by ordinary taxpayers. |
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The Government Performance and Results Act has the |
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potential to produce enormous change, particularly as it is |
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connected with other landmark laws such as the Chief Financial |
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Officers Act. These laws, for the first time, put a premium on |
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good management. They are the beginning steps in reversing the |
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Federal Government's long legacy of inattention, indifference, |
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and, at times, incompetence in managing the Nation's affairs. |
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But Mr. Chairman, I also want to note that there's another |
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important fundamental change underway, and it's demonstrated by |
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this hearing. That change is the commitment we're making here |
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in Congress to give real life and energy to these laws through |
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vigorous oversight of Federal agencies. The fact that the |
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Majority Leader, Mr. Armey, is here today is an illustration of |
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that commitment. |
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Tomorrow, the Subcommittee on Government Management, |
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Information, and Technology, which I chair and Mrs. Maloney |
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serves as the ranking Democrat, will continue this process with |
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our opening hearing on the 25 high risk Federal agencies |
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identified by the General Accounting Office. The subcommittee |
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will hold extensive hearings on these programs and agencies |
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over the next 2 years. |
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In short, Mr. Chairman, there's a lot of work to do. I'm |
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grateful for your support of this effort, and I thank you. |
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[The prepared statement of Hon. Stephen Horn follows:] |
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Mr. Burton. I thank Mr. Horn. I'd just like to say to all |
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the Members who are here, including the new Members, that we |
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will introduce all of you and tell of your backgrounds this |
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afternoon, at our organizational meeting, but because of time |
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constraints this morning and because of other meetings that are |
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being held, we'll hold your very important introductions until |
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later. |
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Our next witness, pending the arrival of the majority |
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leader, is the distinguished Acting Comptroller General of the |
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General Accounting Office, James Hinchman. GAO has done some |
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outstanding work tracking the implementation of the Results Act |
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to date. We look forward to Mr. Hinchman's testimony this |
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morning on the requirements of the act and how it can serve as |
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an essential oversight tool for Congress. |
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Mr. Hinchman has with him an associate. And Mr. Hinchman, |
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if you'd like to introduce him at this time, I'd appreciate it. |
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Mr. Hinchman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's a pleasure to |
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be here this morning. |
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Mr. Burton. Before you start your statement, would you mind |
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standing and being sworn in? |
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Mr. Hinchman. Of course. |
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Mr. Burton. This is a common practice we have here. Would |
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you raise your right hand? |
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[Witnesses sworn.] |
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Mr. Burton. OK. You may proceed, Mr. Hinchman. |
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STATEMENT OF JAMES HINCHMAN, ACTING COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE |
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UNITED STATES, ACCOMPANIED BY CHRIS MIHM, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, |
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FEDERAL MANAGEMENT ISSUE AREA, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE |
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Mr. Hinchman. As I said, thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a |
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pleasure to be here this morning. With me is Chris Mihm, |
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Assistant Director in GAO's Federal Management Issue Area. And |
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we and GAO, as a whole, are honored to be a part of this |
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important hearing on the Government Performance and Results Act |
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and its implementation. |
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I have a prepared statement. With your permission, I would |
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like to summarize it briefly, and, if that's acceptable to you, |
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request that that statement be put in the record. |
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Mr. Burton. Without objection. |
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Mr. Hinchman. GAO has, over the past year or so, Mr. |
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Chairman, done a great deal of work examining management issues |
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throughout the Federal Government, much of it for this |
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committee. This work includes our executive guide on |
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implementing the Government Performance and Results Act. It |
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also includes the work we now have underway, to report to you |
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by June 1 on the status of GPRA implementation. |
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Three important conclusions come out of this work. And I |
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want to summarize them for you briefly. First, we need better |
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management in the Federal Government. Our work has consistently |
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shown that Federal agencies have significant management |
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problems that undermine their ability to function efficiently |
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and effectively. Missions are unclear. Planning is inadequate. |
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There is too little goal-setting and performance measurement. |
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And too little of what there is is not results-oriented. |
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Financial management systems do not work. Information |
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technology is badly managed, as well. |
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The public will not accept, and we cannot afford, these |
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poor management practices, particularly in these days of budget |
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constraint. Part of the solution to the Federal Government's |
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fiscal problems must be more efficient and effective management |
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of its programs and activities, and I think there is growing |
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and broad consensus both in the government and among the |
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students of its institutions that this is so. |
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Second, Congress has put in place a sound statutory |
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framework for addressing these management problems. Much of |
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that work has been done under the leadership of this committee. |
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This framework includes the Chief Financial Officers Act, the |
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Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, the Clinger-Cohen Act; and its |
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cornerstone, its centerpiece, is the Government Performance and |
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Results Act. |
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At the request of this committee, we studied management |
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reform in State governments, in foreign governments, in other |
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public sector institutions, for lessons that can assist in the |
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successful implementation of the Results Act. The results of |
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this work are in our executive guide, and they confirm the |
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soundness that the course that the Congress has established. |
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Effective management in all of these institutions defines |
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clear missions and outcomes, measures performance in achieving |
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outcomes to gauge progress, and uses performance information to |
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make changes that will improve results. Our work shows that |
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this is the process that has worked for those successful public |
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sector institutions that have reformed their management, and it |
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is precisely the process that the Results Act mandates. |
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Third, and finally, Congress has an important role to play |
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in the implementation of the Results Act. For every agency, one |
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of the first steps in the implementation of the Results Act is |
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consultation with Congress about its mission and strategic |
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plan. |
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These consultations provide the opportunity for Congress to |
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work with the executive branch to ensure that missions are |
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focused, that goals are results oriented, and that they have |
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been clearly established. In our work we have found that |
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planning efforts that produced focused missions and results |
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oriented goals virtually always drive improved efficiency and |
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effectiveness. |
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We have also urged in the past that congressional |
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committees of jurisdiction hold regular oversight hearings of |
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major departments and agencies. Our work for this committee |
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underscores the importance of sustained leadership in assuring |
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successful implementation of results oriented management in the |
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public sector. |
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These hearings can be used to reinforce Congress's |
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commitment to improve management in the Federal sector and |
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ensure that agencies continue to pursue the reforms mandated by |
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the Results Act. As I said a moment ago, Mr. Chairman, these |
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are the three correlessants of the large body of work that we |
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have done for this committee. They support the direction in |
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which Congress has set the government in the Results Act. And |
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the test now before us is to assure that it is effectively |
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implemented. With that, let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, and take |
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any questions that you or other members of the committee may |
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have. |
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[The prepared statement of Mr. Hinchman follows:] |
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Mr. Burton. Well, thank you, Mr. Hinchman, for that very |
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concise summary of your views. Let me just ask a couple of |
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questions. Then I'll yield to my colleague, Mr. Horn, and then |
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to Mrs. Maloney. |
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Can you give us an example of how the Results Act can be |
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helpful in addressing the problem of overlapping Federal |
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programs--for instance, job training? |
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Mr. Hinchman. Yes. I think that there are many examples-- |
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one to which I would return is food safety. The General |
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Accounting Office did a review and we established that there |
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are 35 laws affecting food safety in this country, administered |
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by 12 agencies, and that there is a lack of coordination among |
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those agencies and overlapping jurisdiction in those laws. |
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The Results Act provides a framework in which agencies can |
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focus on the results of their efforts, and by focusing on |
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results, to identify these areas of overlap and inconsistency, |
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because they have to focus on the impact that these laws have |
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on the safety of the food supply. The strategic planning |
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process provides a framework in which they can begin to |
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coordinate their efforts and bring greater rationality to the |
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administration of those food laws. |
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And I think we are seeing the consequences of that in the |
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proposals which are now before the Congress to bring greater |
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rationality to the administration of those food safety laws. |
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Mr. Burton. Let me ask you, Mr. Hinchman, if I can impose |
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upon you and Mr. Mihm. The majority leader has arrived, and he |
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is under severe time constraints. |
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Mr. Hinchman. Of course. |
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Mr. Burton. And so if I could get back to questioning you? |
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Mr. Hinchman. It would be a privilege to yield to him. |
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Mr. Burton. OK. Thank you. We'd like to now welcome the |
|
good-looking, dynamic leader of the Republican party, Mr. |
|
Armey. I don't know if that's a tan or whether I embarrassed |
|
you, Mr. Leader. |
|
Mr. Armey. Right. |
|
Mr. Burton. But he's a person who's been interested in this |
|
area for a long time. He's been very concerned about reforming |
|
government to make it more effective, more business-like, and |
|
obviously, he's somebody that we all admire in the Republican |
|
party, and I think a lot of our Democrats, as well. So Mr. |
|
Armey, we would love to hear from you this morning. |
|
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STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD ARMEY, HOUSE MAJORITY LEADER |
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|
Mr. Armey. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your |
|
accommodating me in my new role as chief disrupter of committee |
|
hearings. And I want to thank our colleagues in the GAO for |
|
their graciousness with allowing me to pop in as I do. It is, |
|
of course, an exciting thing for me to see these hearings on |
|
what I call the Results Act. |
|
And Mr. Chairman, I would ask that my longer statement be |
|
made a part of the record. Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous |
|
consent that my---- |
|
Mr. Burton. Without objection. Thank you, sir. |
|
Mr. Armey. All right. That was a wise move, if you don't |
|
mind my saying. [Laughter.] |
|
Mr. Chairman, the Results Act is a law sponsored by |
|
Republicans and Democrats alike and was signed into law by |
|
President Clinton in August 1993. It is the right tool to give |
|
us a more honest glimpse of how our Federal Government works. |
|
This law will focus on all existing Federal programs, and, for |
|
the first time mandated by statute, measure government |
|
performance and report on results. |
|
It is not an ideological law. It represents an opportunity |
|
for both Democrats and Republicans, the Congress and the |
|
executive branch, to work together to improve the way |
|
Washington works. Whether you want a smaller, more limited |
|
government, or whether you want a larger, more activist |
|
government, we can all agree--nobody wants government to waste |
|
money through inefficiencies, ineffectiveness, fraud, or bad |
|
management. |
|
I expect the 105th Congress to be viewed as the |
|
implementation Congress. With 1997 a critical implementation |
|
year for this new law, our success or failure with the Results |
|
Act could play a large part in defining this Congress. The |
|
Results Act gives us a common sense tool to analyze and solve |
|
problems between the Congress and the executive branch--a way |
|
to help us report to our shareholders and taxpayers on their |
|
inventory and the effectiveness of their expenditures in |
|
government. |
|
In 1996, the Federal Government spent $1.56 trillion. |
|
Eighty-five million families paid taxes in 1996. Washington is, |
|
therefore, spending $18,355 per tax family in our Federal |
|
Government. It is time to take stock of this spending. And I |
|
might add, Mr. Chairman, I just finished my own taxes last |
|
night, and I'm $10,000 over that number and I wonder if I can |
|
get a refund. [Laughter.] |
|
But it is good, at this time when we're all aware of how |
|
much we are giving to the government in taxes, that we put |
|
focus on this. And by that way, I relate this to my own life. |
|
If I pay good money to add insulation to my home, I'm going to |
|
be sure to check the electric bill to see if I've saved any |
|
money. |
|
The Results Act brings this common sense to the government. |
|
It is the ultimate common sense tool to help us ask whether our |
|
taxpayer-funded programs are working. We all want safer |
|
streets, cleaner air, and better schools for our children. |
|
Often, however, we disagree on how to get there. In any given |
|
legislative cycle, we, in the Congress, pass laws after |
|
negotiation and debate. We think problems are solved when we |
|
pass a law. |
|
In reality, the solution has only begun. We only win when, |
|
in fact, our streets are clean, safer, our air is, in fact, |
|
cleaner, our children are, in fact, well-educated. We must |
|
become more active participants in the implementation of the |
|
programs we enact. As the Congress and the Clinton |
|
administration prepare to make difficult decisions to balance |
|
the budget for our children and our Nation's future, we need |
|
credible, objective information about programs and whether or |
|
not they are really working. |
|
My testimony summarizes several areas where Federal |
|
jurisdiction overlaps and is calling out for better |
|
congressional oversight, such as education, Federal food |
|
safety, drug treatment, rural water treatment and job training. |
|
Let's focus on our own lives for a moment. |
|
If we found that services we were paying were not resulting |
|
in what we wanted, we'd take action. You and I don't rely on |
|
blind faith and continue paying in such instances. Take, for |
|
example, a child's medical care. When you take your child to |
|
the doctor, you take extra care that the doctor is qualified |
|
and capable. You monitor each stage of your child's treatment. |
|
This is how we must approach Federal programs, scrutinizing |
|
their implementation at every stage and making sure we get the |
|
desired results. If an education program was created to ensure |
|
that every third grader can read, improving literacy rate |
|
should be one measure of the program's effectiveness. The |
|
Results Act can be such a common sense approach to help |
|
Congress and the executive branch review our existing Federal |
|
Government with a focus on achieving the best results for the |
|
money we are contributing. |
|
The Results Act was passed out of frustration by the 103d |
|
Congress and signed into law by a Democrat President. This |
|
frustration was born out of our not knowing the government's |
|
ability to really affect critical issues in our world today: |
|
saving lives, preventing crime, and getting vital help to the |
|
American people. |
|
Indeed, during this consideration of the Results Act, the |
|
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee pointed to a recent poll |
|
which showed that the Americans believe that 48 cents our of |
|
every tax dollar is wasted. The committee noted that this could |
|
explain the apparent inconsistency between the public's desire |
|
for a wide range of government services on the one hand, and |
|
its disdain for the government and higher taxes on the other. |
|
The committee viewed the Results Act as a way to make clear |
|
what taxpayers are getting for their money. The Results Act |
|
should foster an atmosphere in Federal service where employees |
|
better understand what they do and the results their agency are |
|
trying to achieve. This law was enacted to ensure that every |
|
employee's work would be value added to public service. |
|
I commend you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing |
|
today, and for continuing the momentum that your predecessor, |
|
Bill Clinger, started on this important law. I commend our |
|
colleague, and your subcommittee chairman, Steve Horn, for |
|
continuing to devote his attention to something that will yield |
|
long term results and better government for taxpayers. |
|
I commend the GAO and others, who have encouraged the |
|
Congress to seriously--to take seriously the enactment of this |
|
law, as well as the OMB for working seriously with Congress to |
|
enact this law. And I should point out, it was a topic of |
|
conversation between myself and Frank Raines when he made a |
|
courtesy call to me in January. I also commend the Vice |
|
President for the reforms he's pursuing that are similarly |
|
motivated. |
|
So what is to be done? We need the vital information on |
|
actual performance that the Results Act can provide. For the |
|
success of this new tool, each congressional committee and each |
|
elected Representative must devote more attention to each and |
|
every agency's major plans and objectives. For the Results Act |
|
to succeed, we all must show a new willingness to re-examine |
|
pet projects with an ear toward objective, credible information |
|
about the results of these programs. |
|
Good intentions are not enough; we must pay close attention |
|
to the warning signs of operational disaster or excessive |
|
confusion in a department or agency charged by us to perform |
|
specific tasks. Specifically, Congress can use the Results Act |
|
in a variety of formal and informal settings, both immediately |
|
and in the long-term. Starting now, and moving through August, |
|
committees should be working with their executive branch |
|
departments to clarify what we want from programs, how that |
|
will be accomplished and how we expect to measure progress. |
|
Agencies are required by the law to consult with Congress |
|
as they prepare their 5-year strategic plans due in late |
|
September. Once results-oriented and measurable program goals |
|
are adopted, it is equally important that committees followup, |
|
through oversight hearings, GAO reviews and other means, to |
|
assess whether these goals are being met. Such program by |
|
program assessment should provide a road map to determine how |
|
limited Federal tax dollars can be applied most effectively in |
|
the future. |
|
In conclusion, the Results Act provides this Congress, the |
|
public and the President a management tool that has been widely |
|
used in making private business more effective. The American |
|
people and our children's children deserve a government that is |
|
accountable for results, a government that is a wise steward of |
|
their hard-earned money, and a government that directs |
|
resources to key priority areas, while ensuring the maximum |
|
impact for each and every Federal dollar spent. With your help, |
|
we might just give our children such a better government. And |
|
incidentally, we may just belie Armey's axiom that nobody |
|
spends somebody else's money as wisely as they spend their own. |
|
And with those comments, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you |
|
for the opportunity to be here. And I guess I'm at your |
|
disposal, like the plumber. |
|
[The prepared statement of Hon. Richard Armey follows:] |
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Mr. Burton. Well, thank you. We're always pleased to hear |
|
your remarks, and, in particular, Armey's axioms, because we |
|
don't hear them anyplace else. [Laughter.] |
|
But they're always very wise and well thought out. Did I |
|
understand you to say that in the Senate Oversight Committee |
|
hearing, someone estimated that 48 cents out of every tax |
|
dollar is wasted? |
|
Mr. Armey. I think there was a poll that showed the |
|
American people believe that 48 percent out of every tax dollar |
|
is wasted, cited in the committee by one of the Senators. |
|
Mr. Burton. So the American people feel very strongly that |
|
we're wasting a ton of money up here? |
|
Mr. Armey. Well---- |
|
Mr. Burton. Let me just ask you, I think our committee has |
|
become aware of the Results Act and the need to push very hard |
|
for more business-like management in government. But a number |
|
of other committees have oversight responsibilities. And I was |
|
wondering how the leadership on our side and, hopefully, the |
|
other side plans to stimulate them, raise their antennae, if |
|
you will, so that they will be a participant in trying to make |
|
sure that we literally force some of these agencies to accept |
|
business-like practices? |
|
Mr. Armey. Well, I appreciate your inquiry. Obviously, as |
|
you know, the government is a very, very big organization, and |
|
we can most effectively, I believe, do this oversight if we |
|
divide that labor among the competing committees by definition |
|
of their jurisdiction. |
|
GAO, once again, has been extremely helpful here. They are |
|
preparing, on a staff by staff basis--the committee staffs--for |
|
the process and procedures they should undertake. And I can |
|
just tell you that it is a high priority of this leadership. |
|
We will, in fact, do everything we can to encourage every |
|
committee. I would think that each committee--it seems almost a |
|
process of natural selection, that committees end up with |
|
people that have an acute interest in the jurisdictional areas |
|
of the committee, so that the committees, themselves, would |
|
find their own interest. We work hard to report a bill out of |
|
committee, and we take a great deal of satisfaction when we see |
|
that signed into law. |
|
And we do that because we have serious intentions for what |
|
good can be done in the lives of the American people. For us in |
|
our separate committees to have the opportunity to go back and |
|
revisit the implementation of that law, to see that our |
|
intentions were, in fact, met, I should think would be a |
|
welcome opportunity for every committee, and I'm going to |
|
encourage them to utilize that opportunity to the fullest |
|
capacity. |
|
Mr. Burton. I thank you, Mr. Leader. I think that |
|
statements from leadership that they utilize their committees |
|
to stimulate the various agencies will be helpful. We'll do our |
|
part, and if we can get the others to help it would be great. |
|
Mr. Horn. |
|
Mr. Horn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Leader. I want to |
|
commend you, not only for your historic Base Closure Act, which |
|
was a good way to get results out of an executive branch that |
|
had never closed anything, but also thank you for that fact |
|
that you included the Debt Collection Act, which I authored and |
|
Mrs. Maloney was co-author, into the omnibus appropriations |
|
bill. Very frankly, that would not have become law without you |
|
making a decision and getting it on a train that was leaving |
|
the station. |
|
And following up on what the chairman opened up on, we know |
|
Congress is a fragmented institution. We know there are very |
|
jealous jurisdictional lines that many have. Now, as one Member |
|
of Congress, to get this effort moving, I would be delighted to |
|
see on one of the walls in your offices, a matrix in which |
|
you've got authorizing committees, appropriation subcommittees, |
|
area to be changed. And that the majority leader's office |
|
coordinate that effort. And very frankly, if you don't, it |
|
won't happen. It will get lost on the cutting room floors of |
|
several committees you and I can think of. |
|
So I know you hate to take on any power. You want to |
|
devolve everything out of Washington, but may I suggest you |
|
save a wall and coordinate this operation. |
|
Mr. Armey. Well, let me, first of all, on the--we are |
|
developing a matrix, and I have--I'm not sure I want to hang it |
|
on my wall, but I would certainly make it available. But you |
|
are absolutely right. I would see this not as an exercise of |
|
power by the majority leader, but as an exercise of service. |
|
And I would be more than happy to undertake that. |
|
I wonder, Mr. Chairman, if I could just take a moment. Mr. |
|
Horn raised the question of base closing, and I just saw |
|
something last week, that this gives me an opportunity to cite |
|
one of my colleagues. Base closing was about bang for your |
|
buck, the effective use of dollars. I set up efficiency |
|
criteria, defense preparedness criteria by which judgments |
|
would be made. And I should mention that, as I reflected back |
|
on that, the chairman of the relevant subcommittee of armed |
|
services was one Mr. Dellums. |
|
Mr. Dellums had, at that time, many bases in his district |
|
that he could have--he could have put many obstacles in the way |
|
of that legislation, but he saw it for what it was--an honest |
|
effort to have a fair appraisal of the true effectiveness of |
|
deployment of resources in the Nation's defense--and he was one |
|
of the first people to hold hearings. He didn't vote for it, |
|
and I understand that. But I always felt that this was a |
|
commendable effort made very early that is perfectly consistent |
|
with what we are doing here. |
|
I saw a report the other day--and I have not talked to Ron |
|
Dellums about this--but it turns out, pursuant to base closing, |
|
every base in his district has been closed. And I think we |
|
ought to pay a little regard to our call. He must have known |
|
that risk, but he said, ``this is a necessary thing to do in |
|
the questions of efficiencies and effectiveness in government. |
|
It's a fair and honorable process.'' And he did not stand in |
|
the way of it. |
|
But if we would all be willing to be that objective and |
|
that committed to an objective that is more important and more |
|
dear than ourselves and our own destinies in our own districts, |
|
I think we could get a great deal of effectiveness. So if I may |
|
tip my hat to Mr. Dellums in this. As a matter of fact, I |
|
think, Mr. Burton, you were on that subcommittee, at the time, |
|
if I'm not mistaken. |
|
Mr. Burton. I believe I was. |
|
Mr. Horn. If I might comment on that. It was also the |
|
ranking Republican had a base closed in Charleston. It was |
|
rather ironic. Both of the key people on that committee had |
|
major facilities closed. |
|
I might add, as a humble freshman in that exercise, after |
|
you had passed the law, we now have every base in Long Beach, |
|
CA closed. We were once headquarters of the Pacific fleet. They |
|
moved to Hawaii, and you saw what happened to them. But we are |
|
now free to look with a very objective eye to the Pentagon. |
|
Mr. Armey. I appreciate that. And Mr. Horn, if you don't |
|
mind, I get nervous about my standing with my colleagues if |
|
these discussions of base closings go on for too long. So-- |
|
[laughter.] |
|
Mr. Burton. Are you finished, Mr. Horn? Mrs. Maloney. |
|
Mrs. Maloney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Majority Leader, |
|
the Results Act says, ``When developing a strategic plan, the |
|
agency shall consult with the Congress.'' |
|
And Mr. Armey, can you tell us what consulting with |
|
Congress means to the Republican leadership and what do you see |
|
as the role of the minority in the process? And also, the |
|
Results Act, if it is going to work, do you think it's a fair |
|
statement that we need a true consensus of the agencies' plans |
|
and Congress's intent from both sides of the aisle? |
|
Mr. Armey. Yes. I think these are very important questions. |
|
I think underlying your point is a very important point I'd |
|
like to speak to right now. It is absolutely imperative, if |
|
this is to work, for all Members of Congress, majority and |
|
minority, to be involved. I am discussing with Mr. Gephardt a |
|
liaison role from his staff to this process as I have |
|
established for my staff. |
|
We would expect that consult be taken as a rigorous |
|
discussion between the agency and the committee, and the |
|
committee as a whole, regarding what are the goals defined in |
|
the agency's report and the extent to which they comply with |
|
and agree with the intent of Congress at the time the law was |
|
passed, or any amendments made thereto. |
|
In the end, each of these programs is created by an act of |
|
Congress. Both the majority and the minority participate in |
|
that process. We all have a stake in what is actually done in |
|
the implementation, and we ought to work together. I would |
|
encourage you to work with Mr. Burton and encourage you to come |
|
discuss this with me. I do believe we must be inclusive in this |
|
process, in particular, and I am devoted to that effort. |
|
Mrs. Maloney. Thank you. Do you think that the |
|
implementation of the Results Act in Congress may strengthen |
|
the case of those who advocate a 2-year budget cycle, focusing |
|
on appropriations 1 year and oversight the next? |
|
Mr. Armey. No. I really hadn't thought about that. I may, |
|
now that you've prompted me, I'll go give some thought to that. |
|
I don't know what discussions might have been made regarding |
|
that point at the time it was enacted. And it's possible that |
|
could happen. I don't know. |
|
But I do think that the focus should be--I think we should |
|
be very focused on this in terms of the bang for the buck |
|
measurement that we get, the consistency of defining the |
|
activities of an agency with respect to a law relative to the |
|
intent of Congress when the law was passed. |
|
And my own view would be that if the case is going to be |
|
made for 2-year budgeting, it will have to be made on a far |
|
broader basis than that. |
|
Mrs. Maloney. I would like to join the comments of my |
|
colleague, Mr. Horn, in complimenting you on your leadership on |
|
the Base Closing Commission Act. This was a problem that |
|
Congress confronted for years. We could never agree. You came |
|
up with a unique and original approach, and we solved the |
|
problem. |
|
I truly believe that if you never do another thing in your |
|
life, you will have made a tremendous contribution to public |
|
policy enactment in this country. And to really pay you a very |
|
large compliment, I was so impressed with that bill and the |
|
accomplishments of it, that I copied it. I took your bill, and |
|
I copied your bill on another very important issue before this |
|
Congress that we confront, which is campaign finance reform. |
|
And we have a tremendous division between the Republican |
|
party and the Democratic party on how to control the role of |
|
money and spending of money in campaigns. And we can't seem to |
|
agree. I've only been here--this is my third term, and Mr. Horn |
|
and I have probably both been on around 15 different task |
|
forces on campaign finance reform. |
|
So I copied your bill. And I would like to know whether you |
|
would consider having an approach of your bill on campaign |
|
finance this year if the Republican--because even though we're |
|
bipartisan--but if we cannot agree on a campaign finance |
|
proposal, would you support your bill creating a commission, if |
|
a Republican campaign finance plan fails, a Democratic campaign |
|
finance plan fails, would you then support a commission to move |
|
this process forward? |
|
For years we could not close bases in this country. We all |
|
agreed. Bases had to be closed. And you came up with an idea to |
|
take what everybody agreed on and move it. We face the same |
|
problem now. Whether it's the President or Mr. Gingrich or Mr. |
|
Gephardt, everyone says they are for campaign finance. We |
|
cannot agree. Would you support moving the Armey commission |
|
idea forward for campaign finance, so we could get it off of |
|
the discussion table and onto the floor for a serious vote, to |
|
try to move forward in this critical area of our country? |
|
Mr. Armey. Well, let me just respond by first pointing out |
|
that the base closing commission is one of the great ironies in |
|
my life, because I ordinarily do not believe in Congress |
|
referring its work to commissions. And I like to console myself |
|
by reminding people that the Base Closing Commission was |
|
created to keep Congress from continuing to meddle in other |
|
people's business. |
|
Now, insofar as Congress has its own responsibilities, I |
|
think they should do this without a commission. I believe that |
|
we can, if we will work together, through a congenial |
|
legislative process, I think we can, in this Congress, between |
|
ourselves and the Senate, on both sides of the aisle, and the |
|
White House, come up with campaign finance reform. |
|
And I would prefer to see us do our own work. Now, what |
|
I've also learned is don't rule anything out. But the first |
|
thing I want to do is--before I go to a commission--is I want |
|
to have clearly irrefutable evidence that it is, indeed, in |
|
fact, impossible for us to do our job ourselves. |
|
Mrs. Maloney. May I add that the true genius of your last |
|
bill on base closing was that it was not just a commission that |
|
came back with a report, your bill forced a vote. Your bill was |
|
not just a commission. It forced a conclusion or a step toward |
|
a conclusion of a particular problem. |
|
And if we cannot reach a conclusion, I would like to join |
|
you in moving forward with a commission approach, so, at least, |
|
we can get a product that can pass on the floor and move the |
|
project further in an area where everyone agrees something |
|
needs to be done. |
|
Mr. Armey. Well, let's--if you don't mind--let's stay in |
|
touch on that while I--and I hope you will understand--I feel |
|
my obligation is to, first, encourage the Congress, in every |
|
way, to take care of this important job on its own. |
|
Mrs. Maloney. May I underscore that I would go to a |
|
commission only after the Republicans can't pass it, the |
|
Democrats can't. Let's go forward with a commission. |
|
Mr. Burton. Yes. The gentlelady's time has expired. I |
|
understand that Mr. Shays of Connecticut has decided to pass, |
|
so we'll go to Mr. Mica of Florida. |
|
Mr. Shays. I have other questions I could ask you, but-- |
|
[laughter.] |
|
Mr. Burton. Mr. Mica. |
|
Mr. Mica. Mr. Chairman, just one quick question, Mr. Armey, |
|
I heard your testimony and read this written testimony, and-- |
|
you know--you cite part of the problem: education. We have 760 |
|
Federal education programs and 39 different agencies, food |
|
safety programs administered by 12 different agencies, rural |
|
water--8 agencies--job training--15 different agencies--I tried |
|
to consolidate our international trade efforts, which are |
|
disorganized and disjointed among 19 Federal agencies. |
|
My legislation was referred to 11 committees of |
|
jurisdiction. It's almost impossible to change the bureaucracy. |
|
You've got two problems. One, which I just outlined, all the |
|
committees and their vast jurisdiction. Second, the |
|
bureaucracies have now become effective lobbying forces for the |
|
status quo and view the members as only passing stars in the |
|
constellation, something to be ignored. |
|
What about a bureaucracy closure commission, where we take |
|
your same example, which has been cited now in reference to do |
|
something with campaign reform, but for dealing with the |
|
problem we have with closing down some of the bureaucracy and |
|
the duplication? |
|
Mr. Armey. Well, again, let me remind you that this is |
|
within the authority and the responsibility of the Congress. I |
|
believe that what we may learn from the effective |
|
implementation of the Results Act will help us to gather the |
|
information by which we can make the justifiable case for |
|
consolidation of efforts, where we see so many duplications. |
|
But you know, again--I mean--this ridiculous position of |
|
having, apparently, one as sort of a place in the sun for a |
|
commission. |
|
And turning around and saying I'm not all that big on |
|
commissions. I think we should do that job. That is our job. |
|
And I think we are capable of doing that job. |
|
Mr. Mica. Without a bureaucracy closure commission? |
|
Mr. Armey. Without it. |
|
Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
|
Mr. Burton. Mr. Sanders. |
|
Mr. Sanders. Mr. Armey, I'm very impressed by the |
|
discussion today. Mrs. Maloney wants to emulate your efforts |
|
for campaign finance reform. Mr. Mica wants to emulate your |
|
efforts for bureaucracy reform. Do you want to write a new |
|
Constitution for the United States while you're here? |
|
[Laughter.] |
|
I mean, it seems to me, everyone is very impressed. |
|
But I would just say I think that regardless of one's |
|
political persuasion and disagreement about the role of |
|
government in civil life, I don't think any sensible person |
|
feels good about government waste, and we can all acknowledge |
|
that there is bureaucracy, inefficiency, and waste, and we want |
|
to, all of us, make the government more efficient. |
|
But maybe picking up on Mr. Mica's question, next year when |
|
Congress is presented with a governmentwide performance plan |
|
for fiscal year 1999, how do you anticipate that plan will be |
|
used in Congress? |
|
In other words, where do we go with it? Will it, for |
|
example, be referred automatically to all committees with |
|
jurisdiction over agency and program authorizations? How do you |
|
feel that the plan will be used? |
|
Mr. Armey. Well, first of all, let me just say this--and I |
|
mentioned this in my testimony--this is not an ideological |
|
discussion. And I think that one of the reasons base closing |
|
got enacted was it was clearly understood to be non- |
|
ideological. |
|
So we're talking about efficiency. The first thing we must |
|
do is to undertake a period of discovery. And it's almost as if |
|
we're taking an inventory of the government, what is there, |
|
gaining information. Now, as we gather that information, I |
|
would think we would distill from that, in our separate |
|
committees of jurisdiction, amendments to the law, a revision |
|
of the law, very likely some program consolidations or |
|
closures. |
|
One of the things I might say, I was laughing this morning. |
|
I had some experience with this when I was with the university. |
|
Mr. Horn, you may have encountered this, too. I remember as a |
|
department chairman receiving this elaborate set of |
|
instructions from the dean about how I was to define my goals |
|
and come up with empirical bases for measuring achievement of |
|
those goals and so forth. |
|
It's not easy, and it's not going to be something that is |
|
going to be heartily welcomed by everybody that's all of a |
|
sudden steamed at this new effort. So we'll have to encourage |
|
people to do a thorough job, and that's where the consultation |
|
comes in. |
|
We will have to be encouraging to them, because they are |
|
going to feel a bit overwhelmed. In many cases, people will |
|
feel overwhelmed by it. So we'll have to sort of lend a guiding |
|
hand. |
|
Mr. Sanders. But what I'm hearing you say is that you see |
|
this going through the normal legislative process? |
|
Mr. Armey. Yes. I have to say, Mr. Sanders, I am a big fan |
|
of regular order. |
|
Mr. Sanders. Mm-hmm. |
|
Mr. Armey. I'm an economist by trade, and I will tell you |
|
pursuant, of course, to Adam Smith, that all economic progress |
|
comes from division of labor, and division of labor works best |
|
when people mind their own business. So that for everything |
|
that we see, there would be a legitimate jurisdiction and a |
|
committee of jurisdiction. |
|
And we should then have that profession and that expertise |
|
and that interest that has resulted in people joining these |
|
committees, brought to bear on these discoveries so that they |
|
could be measured up and evaluated in a very sober and |
|
business-like fashion. |
|
Mr. Sanders. OK. Thank you very much. |
|
Mr. Burton. We'll now recognize your colleague from Texas, |
|
Mr. Sessions. |
|
Mr. Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Armey, it's |
|
great to see you here. As a freshman of this committee, I must |
|
confess through the last few years, I didn't know that I would |
|
be sitting on this side of the bar and you on that side. It's |
|
good to see you. |
|
Yesterday, we had a press conference where there were fewer |
|
people there than here today, and so I'd like to take this |
|
opportunity to let you know about my thoughts on this |
|
Government Performance and Results Act. Because I think that |
|
throughout the media and, perhaps, in bureaucracy, there is a |
|
sense of fear of this act. |
|
And I had an opportunity, yesterday, to really say that I |
|
thought it was essential that bureaucrats and the management of |
|
the Federal Government look at this as really a cleansing |
|
opportunity, an opportunity to have dialog from not just at the |
|
upper end of management, but down to the lower ends, to where |
|
they could talk about not only the things that are measurable |
|
and within their control, but also an opportunity to look |
|
strategically at how they are going to guide their departments |
|
in the era of lowering and lessening budgets. |
|
What I'd like to hear from you is whether this serious |
|
discussion that's going to begin and whether it's near term, |
|
whether we're going to send the correct signal--which I think |
|
is correct--of this is an opportunity to begin a serious dialog |
|
with the managers of government, with the expectation that they |
|
will present these strategic views and that we will be able to |
|
work hand in hand. |
|
I think that's what it is, but I'm interested in hearing |
|
what you have to say about that, sir. |
|
[The prepared statement of Hon. Pete Sessions follows:] |
|
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9381.031 |
|
|
|
Mr. Armey. Well, let me just say, first of all, I |
|
understand that fear. I related earlier as a department |
|
chairman receiving these complex papers from my dean. And I |
|
tell you, my first reaction is, what is the dean up to? Deans |
|
are not very trustworthy people. [Laughter.] |
|
Every chairman knows that. So there is a tendency to be |
|
defensive. And now we have the GAO working, I think, very |
|
actively here. The OMB is enthusiastic. I mentioned my |
|
discussions with Frank Raines. But we ought to--I always |
|
believe that we ought to take a service model, not a power |
|
model. And we ought to make it clear to folks that we're not |
|
here to hold a hammer over your head, but to work in |
|
partnership with you toward that end of fulfilling what we most |
|
often find to be our mutual shared objectives. |
|
I always kind of laugh. You know, one of our favorite |
|
whipping boys in American political discourse is the |
|
bureaucrat. And I can say ``bureaucrat'' with as much disdain |
|
in my voice as any, but when you get right down to it, these |
|
are decent, hard-working men and women that are trying to |
|
accomplish something. And often, they are drawn to this agency |
|
because of their concern for this area of what von Mieses |
|
called human action, just as we were drawn to this committee |
|
because we had that concern. |
|
And if we undertake our relationship with these folks as |
|
one that is encouraging and not threatening and so forth, we |
|
can put at ease a lot of those concerns. Now, I must say, after |
|
20 years of being a professor, I never got to the point where I |
|
accepted that deans were people that were operating in my own |
|
best interest. |
|
So it's a tough job. I'm sure deans were frustrated, too, |
|
with my doubt and skepticism along the way. But I think we need |
|
to understand that we do not come off hammering. Now, when we |
|
find people who are reluctant to move forward and, therefore-- |
|
perhaps, even, we will encounter some that are recalcitrant |
|
about it, I think we have to be assertive. |
|
But I think there's a far, far difference in the |
|
effectiveness of your demeanor when you understand to be |
|
assertive with somebody, as opposed to being angry at someone. |
|
And most people, I think, do understand that most agencies, I |
|
believe, of the Federal Government owe their existence to an |
|
act of Congress, and I'm sure they understand that they can get |
|
caught up in consolidation, and recalcitrance might encourage |
|
that. |
|
So I think we just need to go forward on a business-like |
|
basis with a good deal of respect and appreciation for each |
|
other, and I think we can do a good job. |
|
Mr. Sessions. Thank you. Well, it makes me feel good to |
|
know that as our leader, you're expecting the best from someone |
|
we have no control over but someone that we do have oversight |
|
functions with and that we can work hand in hand. |
|
Mr. Chairman, just really the bottom line to our press |
|
conference yesterday was that I was setting the expectation and |
|
the hopeful expectation that what these strategic plans will |
|
result in is something that is measurable, something that is |
|
realistic, and something that represents the true nature of the |
|
business or the work that these agencies are involved in. |
|
And I believe if they will come hand in hand and work with |
|
us--but it's up to them to make sure that their plan, their |
|
strategic plan and their direction is given to us, then we'll |
|
be able to work very comfortably together. |
|
I thank the majority leader for taking his time today, and |
|
I agree with everything you said, sir. Thank you. |
|
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Sessions. I guess Ms. Norton |
|
doesn't have any questions? Is that correct? Mr. Barr. |
|
Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Armey, the timetable |
|
for implementation of GPRA and GPRA, itself, I think, is really |
|
an important beginning, but it's really fairly modest in terms |
|
of the long-term goal that we have before us. As Mr. Mica |
|
pointed, just the proliferation of agencies that are |
|
overlapping in their jurisdiction and so forth. |
|
Is it your view--it is mine, but I'd be interested on the |
|
record, Mr. Armey, if it's your view that the time table set |
|
out for implementation of GPRA ought to be adhered to really is |
|
the minimum requirement that we ought to have, and that this |
|
Congress ought to resist efforts, which are starting already in |
|
the executive branch, to soften it and postpone some of the |
|
requirements? |
|
Mr. Armey. Well, yes, it is. First of all, the time table |
|
is set out in the law. And--I hate to harken always back to my |
|
years as a professor---- |
|
Mr. Barr. I think you take great delight in doing it, as a |
|
matter of fact. [Laughter.] |
|
Mr. Armey. I don't remember a semester when I didn't have a |
|
host of students who found 100 reasons why they couldn't get |
|
their term paper in on time. And you just have to learn that's |
|
the deadline. I was particularly impressed with the one young |
|
man that had three dead grandmothers in the same semester. |
|
[Laughter.] |
|
That didn't upset me so much as their dying again the next |
|
semester. [Laughter.] |
|
Mr. Barr. That's a very dysfunctional family, apparently. |
|
Mr. Armey. But again, I think a firm insistence that, you |
|
know, deadlines are there and they must be met. And again, we |
|
will have a process of discovery. You know, one of my great |
|
anticipations about the implementation of this law is, what |
|
will we discover. What will we find out? What can we learn? |
|
That will, undoubtedly, generate the basis by which we can |
|
get together on both sides of the committee room and write laws |
|
to improve and make more effective the public--could I say-- |
|
apparatus, for accomplishing the goals of the Congress and the |
|
President. |
|
Mr. Barr. I appreciate that and I appreciate your stating |
|
on the record how important that you think it is to adhere to |
|
the time table and the requirements that are currently in |
|
there, and that we ought to resist efforts to soften them or |
|
postpone them. |
|
Thank you, Mr. Armey. |
|
Mr. Armey. Thank you. |
|
Mr. Burton. Mr. Majority Leader, we want to thank you for |
|
taking time out of your very busy schedule to be with us. Your |
|
remarks were very cogent. We appreciate it, and thank you for |
|
being with us. |
|
Mr. Armey. Well, let me thank you. And again, if I can |
|
thank the gentlemen behind me from GAO and OMB for their |
|
graciousness in letting me go. Gentlemen, I hope I didn't say |
|
anything that was too amusing. [Laughter.] |
|
I did the best I could. |
|
Mr. Burton. Well, those Armey axioms are pretty |
|
interesting. Thanks a lot. Could we have Mr. Hinchman and Mr. |
|
Mihm up here, and, also, could we have your opening statement, |
|
Mr. Koskinen, now? The reason for that, if it's possible--it |
|
would help expedite the hearing and make sure that everybody on |
|
the panel gets a chance to question both of you, |
|
simultaneously, if necessary, so we can speed things along. |
|
So right now, we'll recognize you, Mr. Koskinen, for your |
|
opening remarks, and then we'll go to questions. Oh, pardon me. |
|
Before we do that. |
|
[Witness sworn.] |
|
Mr. Burton. Please have a seat. |
|
|
|
STATEMENT OF JOHN KOSKINEN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR MANAGEMENT, |
|
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET |
|
|
|
Mr. Koskinen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I seem to spend most |
|
of my time testifying on panels with GAO and, in fact, these |
|
gentlemen. |
|
So this works out just fine. I'm pleased to appear before |
|
this committee to discuss the importance of the Government |
|
Performance and Results Act and to give you an assessment of |
|
our progress in meeting its requirements. I will be brief to |
|
allow time for questions and ask that my written statement be |
|
included in the record. |
|
Mr. Burton. Without objection. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. Thank you. GPRA became law 3\1/2\ years ago |
|
and it will soon take effect governmentwide. This was |
|
bipartisan legislation that the administration strongly |
|
supported. This committee played an important role in passing |
|
this act, and we look forward to continue working with you and |
|
others in the Congress as we carry out this law in the months |
|
ahead. |
|
On behalf of the administration, Mr. Chairman, let me thank |
|
you for holding this hearing, which signifies the importance we |
|
all attach to this very significant legislation. Let me also |
|
express our appreciation for the excellent work GAO has done in |
|
this area over the past several years. We have found it to be |
|
of great assistance, and have enjoyed our working relationship |
|
with them. |
|
At its simplest, GPRA can be reduced to a single question: |
|
What are we getting for the money we are spending? The answer |
|
to this question is important to all of us in government and to |
|
the American public as well. Regaining public confidence |
|
requires that the government not only work better, but that it |
|
be seen as working better. |
|
Let me summarize briefly those aspects of GPRA |
|
implementation that are our most immediate focus. The basic |
|
foundation for what agencies do under GPRA is their strategic |
|
plans. Agencies are required to send their strategic plans to |
|
Congress and OMB by this September 30th. When developing its |
|
strategic plan, an agency is to consult with Congress and |
|
consider the views of stake holders, customers, and other |
|
interested parties. |
|
Since last year, OMB has been encouraging agencies to begin |
|
their congressional consultations. OMB issued guidance over 18 |
|
months ago on the preparation and submission of strategic |
|
plans. In the summer of 1996, as a followup, OMB conducted a |
|
comprehensive review of the agencies' strategic planning |
|
efforts and the status of their plans. The reviews' objectives |
|
was to gauge how the agencies were doing and identify any |
|
concerns with the plans themselves or the process being |
|
followed. |
|
Generally, the agency plans reflected a serious effort and |
|
allowed us to conclude that agencies should be able to produce |
|
useful and informative strategic plans by this fall. Their |
|
review also revealed several challenges, including the need to |
|
ensure clear linkage between the general goals and objectives |
|
of these strategic plans and the annual performance goals to be |
|
included in the annual performance plans. We also expect to see |
|
increasing inter-agency discussions on performance goals and |
|
measures for cross-cutting programs, and increased involvement |
|
by the senior leadership of the departments in the completion |
|
of the strategic plans. |
|
The first of the agency annual performance plans, as |
|
opposed to strategic plans, for fiscal year 1999 will be sent |
|
to OMB this September with the agency's budget request. These |
|
annual plans will contain the specific performance goals that |
|
the agency intends to achieve in the fiscal year. A subsequent |
|
iteration of the annual performance plan is sent to Congress |
|
concurrently with the release of the President's budget next |
|
year at this time. The agencies and OMB gained valuable |
|
experience in preparing annual performance plans through the |
|
pilot project phase of GPRA. |
|
GPRA also requires that a governmentwide performance plan |
|
be annually prepared and be made part of the President's |
|
budget, as noted. The first plan will be sent in February 1998, |
|
and will cover fiscal year 1999. We would welcome your views on |
|
those futures that this committee believes would make this |
|
governmentwide plan informative and useful to Congress. |
|
As I noted, we expect agencies to provide useful and |
|
informative strategic and annual performance plans within the |
|
timeline specified by the act. However, as Mr. Armey noted, |
|
preparing a good GPRA plan is not an easy task. No one should |
|
expect the first plans to be perfect. We should view these |
|
plans as the beginning of a process of improvement and |
|
refinement that will evolve over several years. Even as these |
|
performance plans and measures become more refined, we should |
|
always bear in mind that using performance measures in the |
|
budgeting process will never be an exact science or even a |
|
science at all. |
|
Comparing results across program lines will always require |
|
political judgments about relative priorities of, for example, |
|
programs for highways and education. And we should not lose |
|
sight of the fact that performance information will often be |
|
used to adjust the way the programs are managed, rather than to |
|
change the resources provided. Accurate, timely performance |
|
information is important in all these situations, and that is |
|
why the administration is committed to the successful |
|
implementation of GPRA. |
|
As I've said on other occasions, if we are successful over |
|
time, GPRA should disappear. If GPRA works as envisioned, |
|
government managers will absorb it into day-to-day agency |
|
administration and program management. That's why I suggest |
|
that the true measure of the success of GPRA will be the extent |
|
to which the concepts of management and good business practices |
|
set out in this law become the accepted way that the government |
|
works, without reference to any particular statutory framework |
|
or requirements. |
|
This concludes my brief oral statement, Mr. Chairman. I'd |
|
be pleased to take any questions you may have and join in this |
|
panel. Thank you. |
|
[The prepared statement of Mr. Koskinen follows:] |
|
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|
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|
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9381.037 |
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|
|
Mr. Horn [presiding]. Thank you very much for your |
|
testimony. Mr. Hinchman, did you have some other remarks you |
|
want to make in general on this? And then we'll throw it open |
|
to questions. |
|
Mr. Hinchman. Thank you for that offer, Mr. Chairman. I |
|
think that the three central conclusions from our work that I |
|
described are the important message that we have. I think that |
|
they are consistent with what Mr. Armey said and with what my |
|
friend Mr. Koskinen said, as well. So I have nothing more to |
|
add to that. |
|
Mr. Horn. OK. Mr. Shays. Do you have a question? Ms. |
|
Norton. Do you have a question, at all? Mr. Sununu. Do you have |
|
a question? You do? OK. Well, let me pursue some of the things, |
|
here, just in general. |
|
One of the problems you face when you're developing any |
|
strategic plan are the units of measurement, as well as not |
|
just relation to the budget, but how do you know we're being |
|
successful? How would you generalize, both from the Comptroller |
|
General standpoint and the Office of Management and Budget |
|
standpoint, where we are on achieving certain reasonable units |
|
of measurement? |
|
You're familiar, I think, both of you, with the Oregon |
|
experience, when they went out and talked to the citizens, said |
|
what programs do you like, how will you know if we got there |
|
and achieve those goals, and so forth? What's the--give me a |
|
good generalization here as to where you think we are in the |
|
Federal Government on this. |
|
Mr. Hinchman. We have been monitoring both the pilot |
|
projects which OMB is conducting and the implementation in the |
|
24 major agencies that comprise 95 percent of the budget. I |
|
think I would make one point. Progress is further in those |
|
agencies which are engaged in direct delivery of services. For |
|
example, the Social Security Administration, which can measure |
|
the effectiveness of its 800 telephone service and the |
|
timeliness of its check mailing. |
|
Progress is slower in those agencies which work through |
|
third parties, like State and local government, in which the |
|
precise goal of the Federal involvement is less clear, at least |
|
less specifically defined, and in which--I think we have to |
|
say--the agency officials are more concerned about committing |
|
themselves to outcome goals over which they have less control. |
|
On the other hand, I have to say that I think we will get-- |
|
as Mr. Koskinen said--we will get both strategic and annual |
|
performance plans from those 24 agencies for fiscal year 1999. |
|
And while some will be better than others, basically the |
|
framework for outcome measurement is going to be there. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. I would agree with that perspective. I would |
|
add that our experience over the last three as we've worked |
|
with the agencies, is that focusing on missions and goals is |
|
complicated, difficult and challenging. But your question goes |
|
right to the heart of it. Trying to figure out what are our |
|
appropriate performance measures is really the intellectually |
|
challenging and stimulating task. |
|
This is true partially because of the wide range of |
|
activities in which the government engages. And besides the |
|
point Mr. Hinchman, we say that when we get to areas like basic |
|
research, and when we get to areas of operations like policy |
|
operations, even OMB, for example, trying to figure out how to |
|
measure successful performance gets to be a very complicated |
|
process. This is why, as I said in my testimony, I think what |
|
we have to expect is that these first plans won't be the last |
|
plans. And they should not be the last plans. |
|
We will find with some performance measures that--we'll |
|
find over time that they don't appear to be appropriate. They |
|
measure the wrong outcomes. We'll find with other performance |
|
measures that the data is either very difficult to obtain or |
|
too expensive to obtain. And we will find with other |
|
performance measures that we get a better understanding of the |
|
utility of those measures over time. |
|
I think your reference to the Oregon benchmark project is |
|
very appropriate. There they had the same experience. Their |
|
measures have gotten better over--with the passage of time. And |
|
I would hope that we would understand that the provision of the |
|
strategic plans in the fall of 1997 and the provision of the |
|
first performance plans in the winter of 1998 will be the start |
|
of a dialog and not the end of it, and that we do need a |
|
partnership, not only in a bipartisan nature in the Congress, |
|
but a partnership between the Congress and the agencies as we |
|
continue to review what are the appropriate, most effective |
|
performance measures. |
|
Mr. Horn. Let me ask one more generality on this, then I'm |
|
going to get down to specific agencies. What have you found |
|
were the ``performance measures'' that really haven't worked |
|
out? Can we generalize from what you've seen in changes when |
|
you've looked at the way some agencies have used ceratin |
|
measurements and just decided, hey, this isn't going to work? |
|
Any of those cases you could describe for the committee? |
|
Mr. Hinchman. The only point that I would make as |
|
generality is the importance of result oriented performance |
|
standards, that there is a temptation to look at outputs or |
|
ever process measures and to shy away from commitment to |
|
measuring actual impact which programs have on the lives of |
|
Americans. And that that's a temptation which has to be |
|
resisted. I think that we will get better at that over time. |
|
That is certainly the experience of GAO. We have been |
|
trying to measure our performance. We currently have a mix of |
|
both outcome and output measures. We hope to evolve toward |
|
completely--complete use of outcome measures, but it's going to |
|
take us some years to do that, I think. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. Our review of the pilot showed that the |
|
biggest problem at the front end as we're dealing with this is, |
|
in fact, the data collection. There may be an agreement that |
|
the measure looks appropriate, but the question is can you |
|
accurately collect timely data. As I said, going back to |
|
something to even something like research, a lot of impacts and |
|
outcomes are longitudinal, so you may be spending the money now |
|
and you won't see the results of that expenditure over a longer |
|
period of time. |
|
As we've told the agencies, that doesn't mean you shouldn't |
|
start measuring now, because if it takes 3 to 5 years to see |
|
the results, 3 to 5 years from now, if we haven't started, we |
|
won't know what the results were. But that's one of the |
|
issues--is in terms of programs with a longitudinal impact. |
|
Another is a point Mr. Hinchman made earlier, and that is how |
|
to obtain data when, in fact, the services are being provided |
|
by third parties, and we're making grants and there are |
|
actually intermediaries who are engaged in the activity. And |
|
what are appropriate measures--and--that they can effectively |
|
collect. |
|
Mr. Horn. In business, one of the measures would be, |
|
obviously, client satisfaction, the attitude that the customer |
|
can do no wrong. And businesses prosper that way. Now, with |
|
government, to what extent have we tried actual surveys of |
|
client satisfaction, the taxpayer, in brief, or anybody we |
|
serve. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. As they say in the trade, I'm glad you asked |
|
that question. A major initiative of the Vice President's |
|
National Performance Review has been directed in that area, |
|
which is focusing on developing customer service standards and |
|
then surveying customers to find out how those standards are |
|
being met, as well as collecting data. So there are not |
|
literally hundreds of standards that have been designed and |
|
developed across the government. And many of them depend upon |
|
government surveys. |
|
Now, one of the interesting ironies is that when you want |
|
to collect survey data, you have to be very careful about |
|
Privacy Act and Paperwork Reduction Act requirements that we do |
|
not want from the Federal Government, to burden the public with |
|
a wide range of data calls and data requests. So that--we are |
|
right now in the process of trying to develop the right |
|
balance. |
|
But I think you're exactly right. A lot of what we do |
|
interfaces directly with the government. Obviously, Social |
|
Security Administration, IRS, Veterans Administration, in the |
|
Customs Service, in INS. And across the board, part of the |
|
effectiveness of that agency has to be the perception and the |
|
satisfaction of the customers of those agencies. |
|
Mr. Horn. Has OMB rejected some of the proposed client |
|
satisfaction criteria? |
|
Mr. Koskinen. At this point, we have not. But as I say, at |
|
this point, the statute provides that we're really focused now |
|
on trying to get the strategic plans done and begin to focus on |
|
the development of the measures. The mechanics of how we |
|
collect that data will then be in the performance plan |
|
discussions. And we are concerned about that in holding |
|
discussions about it. |
|
Mr. Horn. So you're saying it's premature right now to |
|
consider this? When is it not? |
|
Mr. Koskinen. No. Actually, there are surveys that have |
|
been done. And in fact, if you look at annual reports being put |
|
out by agencies, you will see what those results are. The |
|
Social Security Administration has one of the most effective |
|
performance measurement devices. |
|
Mr. Horn. Mm-hmm. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. It puts out an accountability report that |
|
measures all of its range of activities in terms of standards |
|
and goals. |
|
Mr. Horn. Now, is that an in-house or is that contracted? |
|
Mr. Koskinen. My understanding is that--well, I do not know |
|
the answer to that question. |
|
Mr. Horn. Yes. I think we ought to look at should we |
|
contract this out to objective survey people or do we trust a |
|
particular agency and is it simply throwing things in the box |
|
as you leave the field office as to whether you were satisfied |
|
with the people at the counter, sort of like a hotel does. |
|
[Laughter.] |
|
And I'm just curious to what degree we're looking at the |
|
credibility of the data and how we go about it. |
|
Mr. Hinchman. Let me share one success story from SSA that |
|
does rely on external data. |
|
Mr. Horn. Sure. |
|
Mr. Hinchman. I had mentioned earlier that SSA runs a very |
|
large 800 number information system. They get over 60 million |
|
phone calls a year. And when they became more customer focused, |
|
they decided they needed to improve that service. They made a |
|
large investment in that, and then had the quality of that |
|
service tested by an outside firm, which measures, essentially, |
|
the quality of 800 service. |
|
Mr. Horn. Right. |
|
Mr. Hinchman. And there was a study done by that firm, |
|
involved eight respected private sector companies and SSA, and |
|
SSA won. |
|
Mr. Horn. Now, was that merely looking at how rapidly that |
|
phone was answered? |
|
Mr. Hinchman. No. |
|
Mr. Horn. Or was that talking about the end result? |
|
Mr. Hinchman. It was about calling people who had used the |
|
number and asking them about the quality of the service they |
|
received, how quickly the phone was answered, how polite the |
|
people who spoke to them were, how knowledgeable they were, how |
|
quickly their problems were resolved. |
|
Mr. Horn. Yes. Good. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. And in fact, and across the range of those |
|
quality indicators, the 800 number at Social Security did not |
|
answer the fastest. |
|
Mr. Horn. Mm-hmm. |
|
Mr. Hinchman. But nonetheless, the overall satisfaction and |
|
quality of the information made it the most effective 800 |
|
number in that comparison. |
|
Mr. Horn. Yes. I think that's probably true. I've checked |
|
myself every once in a while on Social Security. But an agency |
|
we have real problems with, as you know in management--and I |
|
must say the President has a choice now when he nominates |
|
people. This agency, he needs not a good tax accountant, not a |
|
wonderful tax lawyer. What he needs is a manager. And that's |
|
the IRS. This is obviously a basket case agency. |
|
And we've had numerous congressional hearings on this. |
|
They're going through hearings in Ways and Means. Hopefully, |
|
they will be included in the debt collection act that we passed |
|
here last year. And they have not yet agreed to that. But I'm |
|
told by the chairman, Ms. Johnson of Connecticut, that she will |
|
generally follow what was done here. And that's long overdue. |
|
Now, what worries me is when the thousands of citizens I |
|
have heard from on this subject all over America, is that this |
|
is an agency they are frustrated by, in the sense they can't |
|
get through to somebody to solve the problem. And there needs |
|
to be some sort of telephone tree that ends up, maybe, with an |
|
agent somewhere that can answer a question. And you know, the |
|
airlines have worked on this, lots of different groups have |
|
worked on it. |
|
It isn't impossible. Social Security has already done some |
|
of it, and we need to take a real good look at that. Because if |
|
we were ranking agencies in customer satisfaction, that would |
|
be one right at the bottom. And I just wonder what you are |
|
doing about it. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. Well, I think we might disagree with whether |
|
it's a basket case or not. It fairly effectively collects a |
|
trillion-and-a-half dollars a year in finances. But in terms of |
|
being---- |
|
Mr. Horn. But it very ineffectively has $100 million |
|
written off. That bothered me. That's what got me started on |
|
the Debt Collection Act. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. As you know, we worked with you very closely |
|
on that act and appreciate your support of it. What has |
|
happened is that the issues of management of the IRS are |
|
receiving the highest level of attention. The Secretary of the |
|
Treasury has set up a modernization management board, chaired |
|
by the deputy secretary, Mr. Summers, that is working on a |
|
regular basis really as a board of directors with the |
|
management of the IRS focused directly on those questions, on |
|
its information technology systems. |
|
As you know, we basically--that board made a decision to |
|
stop a program for document processing which was going to cost |
|
a $1,200,000,000 billion, and it wasn't clear that it was going |
|
to, in fact, work. And over $1 billion was not spent as a |
|
result of that decision. There is a focus on the 800 numbers, |
|
there's a focus on electronic filing, making it easier for |
|
people to file their returns. |
|
And one of the great successes they've had is, in fact, |
|
increasing the speed with which they provide refunds. But |
|
you're right. One of the questions taxpayers legitimately have |
|
is they'd like to be able to get advice promptly and |
|
effectively. And we are focused on that. |
|
And I think you're also correct that we need to focus on |
|
the management internally in the IRS. We've been very |
|
successful and very fortunate to recruit a new chief |
|
information officer from the State of New York, Art Gross, who, |
|
I think, is doing a phenomenal job. And we have high |
|
expectations, but also high demands of the need for improvement |
|
in that agency. |
|
Mr. Horn. Before I yield to the gentlewoman from Maryland, |
|
let me make sure the record shows I said $100 billion, not |
|
million. I think I mushed that a little. |
|
But now, I yield to the gentlewoman from Maryland, Mrs. |
|
Morella. |
|
Mrs. Morella. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We know that you |
|
always operate in the magnitude of billions. [Laughter.] |
|
Gentlemen, particularly Mr. Hinchman and Mr. Koskinen, I |
|
wanted to ask you about the Government Performance and Results |
|
Act--usually requires agencies to consult with Congress in |
|
preparing their strategic plans. From my experience, agencies |
|
always check in with OMB first before they move forward beyond |
|
that. |
|
And so this happens with testimony before Congress. We find |
|
out. And certainly, with the current budget process. So my |
|
question to you is, whether agencies must clear through OMB |
|
every single document, idea, goal, or mission that is required |
|
by the Government Performance and Results Act? |
|
Mr. Koskinen. No. That's not required. |
|
Mrs. Morella. It's not? |
|
Mr. Koskinen. Some people would like to think of us as all- |
|
powerful and all-encompassing, but the agencies actually have a |
|
lot of dialog with the Congress that does not clear through us. |
|
We clear testimony, but not, generally, materials provided. We |
|
have, as a I noted in my testimony over a 1\1/2\ years ago, |
|
sent out guidance to the agencies which we reaffirmed last |
|
fall, encouraging them--reminding them of the statutory |
|
requirement that they consult with Congress as their plans are |
|
developed, and encouraging them to begin--engage in that |
|
consultation. |
|
So quite the contrary in terms of resisting that, we think |
|
that the statute not only requires it, but that it's an |
|
important part of the development of the strategic plan. The |
|
statute, I think, wisely contemplates that the agency should |
|
consult with Congress. The agency should consult with their |
|
stake holders, whether that be State and local governments or |
|
the public, in the development of their final plans. |
|
And we are encouraging them to do that. We have spent, as a |
|
I noted in my prepared testimony, a significant amount of time |
|
over the last 3 years working with them, reviewing their |
|
processes, trying to provide them my help, assistance and |
|
guidance, drawing to their attention a lot of the good work |
|
that GAO has done in terms of the development of strategic |
|
plans. |
|
So on occasion, we hear that someone has said, well, gee, |
|
OMB won't let us do that. And I'd be delighted if anybody would |
|
refer any difficulties they're having getting consultation with |
|
their agencies. You can call me directly, because our--we're at |
|
the other end of that spectrum. We're encouraging that |
|
consultation. |
|
We think the time now is right, that it needs to be done |
|
this spring and this summer, so that when those plans come in, |
|
as the statute notes, to the extent that the agencies have |
|
consulted and they have not reflected in the plans, views of |
|
anyone they consulted, their cover letters are supposed to |
|
highlight that for both us and for you, so that they--when they |
|
publish these plans, which will be submitted not only to the |
|
Congress, but available to the public, it will be clear where |
|
the agency's plan is going, with the administration's support, |
|
and what views are not--have been made that have not been |
|
reflected, significant views, obviously, in that plan. |
|
So I think it's an important process, and we support it |
|
significantly. |
|
Mrs. Morella. And they don't need to OK it with you? That's |
|
not mandatory? |
|
Mr. Koskinen. No. At this point, they don't have a plan to |
|
OK. |
|
Mrs. Morella. When they do. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. What they need to be discussing with you is |
|
what are their proposed goals and objectives. We have--there is |
|
one case, actually, in the press, if they start to produce |
|
long-term projections about the impacts of what's going to |
|
happen to their performance before they've actually reviewed |
|
that in the budget process, then we actually do not allow that |
|
to happen, only because the reason for the OMB review of budget |
|
numbers and numbers, themselves, is to make sure that when you |
|
get those numbers, they come with the imprimatur and support of |
|
the administration. |
|
That--but that's a level of detail that we're not involved |
|
in at this point. At this point, the agency should be |
|
discussing with you what their views are and your views are of |
|
their goals, their missions, their objectives, and, as Mr. Horn |
|
stated, what are their performance measures going to look like |
|
in terms of categories, not the details or what the numbers are |
|
actually going to be. |
|
Mrs. Morella. They don't need the clearance. Great. How |
|
about, Mr. Hinchman, would you like to get back on this? |
|
Mr. Hinchman. We are doing a review for Mr. Kasich of the |
|
consultation process required by the act. As you, I think, |
|
know, relatively few consultations have taken place so far, |
|
perhaps half a dozen or so, I think, most of them initiated by |
|
Congress and its staff, not by the agencies. As Mr. Koskinen |
|
has indicated, that pace will pick up rapidly over the coming |
|
months. We'll begin to get a better idea of how it's going to |
|
go as we get into a larger volume of activity. |
|
I would add one other note. I think that we have to |
|
recognize that the Office of Management and Budget has a |
|
legitimate concern for ensuring that the President's policies |
|
are reflected in all the communications that occur between |
|
execute agencies and the Congress, and that that concern is not |
|
going to go away. |
|
What I think is important is to also recognize that GPRA is |
|
basically about improving the management of the government. And |
|
a lot of what the government does is about the management of |
|
trillions of dollars of assets and billions of dollars in |
|
expenditures every year, and that we all have a shared |
|
interests beyond the policy issues over which we disagree about |
|
making that management process more effective. |
|
And I would hope that these consultations can provide for |
|
frequent open dialog about how we can improve that management |
|
process and what the goals and outcomes of that management |
|
undertaking ought to be. |
|
Mrs. Morella. Could I ask one more question, and it's |
|
simply that when agencies form their strategic plan and their |
|
mission, how do we ensure that the appropriate group is working |
|
on the process? I mean, by that I mean, is there any kind of a |
|
mechanism that would include a cross-section of employees, |
|
managers, budget experts, policy experts, you know, stake |
|
holders and others that might be appropriate? |
|
Mr. Koskinen. In our guidance to the agencies and in our |
|
reviews with the agencies, we have stressed the importance of |
|
that point. One of my concerns is that if we're not careful in |
|
the implementation of this act, we'll create what I call a GPRA |
|
bureaucracy, and that is, in an agency we'll have a group of |
|
people off on the side, in a planning office or someplace, who |
|
fill in the blanks and provide whatever documents the statute |
|
seems to require, without drawing upon the expertise and the |
|
perspectives of everyone in the organization. |
|
Mr. Hinchman is exactly right, that this statute is not |
|
meant as an abstract exercise in producing neat binders with |
|
blue covers. The purpose of this statute is to improve the |
|
effectiveness of government operations. And one of our pitches |
|
to the agencies has been, what they should focus on is what |
|
data and information do they need to effectively manage their |
|
programs, and to the extent that they can work with us to |
|
define that data, we will guarantee them that that will be |
|
acceptable performance data for the management of those |
|
programs and reporting. |
|
Because, again, as I say, it will be counterproductive if |
|
we have strategic plans to collect artificial information that |
|
no one is actually using in the day-to-day operations of the |
|
agencies, because one of the key utilizations of this |
|
information is not just to make resource allocations, the most |
|
immediate impact of the information is to adjust or change or |
|
modulate the way the program is organized or managed. |
|
If we never allocated a budget dollar differently because |
|
of GPRA performance, it would not mean that the exercise was |
|
for nought. If we do it well, all of that performance |
|
information will be reflected in changes in the way we actually |
|
manage or operate those programs. So it's critical that we |
|
focus on this. And that can only be done effectively, as you |
|
note in your question, if the people focusing on this include |
|
the senior leadership in the agencies as well as the people on |
|
the front lines. |
|
Our responses to the agencies last summer, after our |
|
reviews went to the cabinet secretaries, and noted wherever we |
|
thought it was important, that those senior political |
|
appointees of the agency have to be intimately involved in this |
|
process, just as much as the front line workers. |
|
Mrs. Morella. So the directions are that they--the |
|
assumption is that they will do so? |
|
Mr. Koskinen. Yes. |
|
Mrs. Morella. And not make---- |
|
Mr. Koskinen. And we've--we've asked that question of them |
|
and encouraged them to broaden the base of their planning |
|
effort. |
|
Mrs. Morella. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
|
[The prepared statement of Hon. Constance Morella follows:] |
|
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|
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9381.038 |
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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9381.039 |
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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9381.040 |
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|
Mr. Hinchman. If I could just add one note to that, Mr. |
|
Chairman. In our work with successful public sector reform |
|
efforts, one of the best practices we've identified--and it's |
|
reflected in our executive guide--is involving stake holders. |
|
And there are both internal and external stake holders. And |
|
they all need to be part of the planning process. |
|
Mr. Horn. Before yielding to Mr. Sessions, let me round out |
|
what Mrs. Morella has correctly begun. I think your answer is a |
|
very good one in terms of what the data--what those data ought |
|
to be down the line. And I guess my query is, does OMB plan to |
|
have the agencies, when they come in for future budgets, show |
|
this performance data as part of the budget review process in |
|
OMB, and is it understood that secretaries will sign off on |
|
this? I agree with everything you've said, because I've been |
|
through this, 35 years ago and 25 years ago. |
|
The University of Toronto was the first to have university- |
|
wide planning. I was at the second, in terms of California |
|
State University at Long Beach. And we started from the bottom |
|
up, just exactly as you're talking about. You've got to really |
|
get people involved. |
|
I was amused by my colleague, Mr. Armey's, department |
|
chair. That's what most people do. Say, you have them file a |
|
report at the end of the night. The people who are there |
|
rendering the service are never involved. It's just somebody |
|
writing it out, and it's pieces of paper moving around. And |
|
your comments lead me to believe you're very alert to that |
|
situation and you want involvement. And you want something that |
|
works. |
|
And that's what we're talking about. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. Right. |
|
Mr. Horn. Now, are you going to include it in the budget |
|
process? |
|
Mr. Koskinen. As they say in the trade, you bet. Our hope |
|
is, ultimately, that we would evolve an accountability report, |
|
as we call it. And we've had pilot program experimentation with |
|
that, in which we would pull all of the results of agency |
|
activities and reviews together in one document. And our hope |
|
would be that an agency, ultimately, in the budget process, |
|
would come to OMB and, ultimately, to the Congress, saying, |
|
these are the results of our activities thus far and our |
|
accountability report, and these are our resource requests. And |
|
if we get these resources, these are what our performance plan |
|
show we will be able to receive with those. |
|
And a year later, they would come in with an accountability |
|
report, saying, these are the resources you gave us, these are |
|
the results we got, these are the resources we'd like in the |
|
next cycle. |
|
Mr. Horn. Mm-hmm. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. It will take us some time to get from here to |
|
there. But we started in the fall of 1994 with the 1996 budget |
|
process, asking for as much performance information as the |
|
agencies had in their justifications to us. This last fall, in |
|
the 1998 budget process, we told agencies it would be a very |
|
effective time to start a pilot program for seeing how much |
|
performance information they had. We ran a spring review in |
|
1995, saying for your major key programs, what measures would |
|
you use to judge their effectiveness? |
|
So we've engaged, over the last 2 years, 2\1/2\ years, in |
|
an on-going dialog, trying to bring to bear the focus of the |
|
agencies, not only on the results, but, in fact, as you say, |
|
that these should be involved in the explanations as to what |
|
they're going to be accomplishing with the additional resources |
|
they're asking. |
|
Mr. Horn. Now, does the gentleman from Texas have any |
|
questions he'd like to ask? |
|
Mr. Sessions. Yes. I would. Thank you. |
|
Mr. Horn. Yes. |
|
Mr. Sessions. I would direct to either three of you, is |
|
there any indication that you have when you hear back from |
|
these agencies that there's some reluctance or some unknowing |
|
of about what these strategic directions might be, that you |
|
could direct them to their IGs, Inspector Generals, and/or to |
|
this report that this committee came out with last year, as a |
|
good indication about realistic approaches that need to be made |
|
within their agencies, at least as a starting point? |
|
Or do you find that they do understand this as strategic |
|
direction and that they've got a good handle on it? So it's |
|
just a general question and comment about feedback from these |
|
agencies. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. You've been doing well, Jim. |
|
Mr. Hinchman. Chris, do we have any feedback from the |
|
agencies on that issue? Do you know of any? I'm not aware of |
|
any. |
|
Mr. Mihm. Mr. Sessions, we haven't heard specifically of |
|
agencies referencing the committee report or thinking of going |
|
to their Inspectors General for decisions or questions about |
|
strategic direction. To the broader issue that you're raising, |
|
though, about a lack of strategic direction, that's one of the |
|
major challenges to the implementation of GPRA. It's one of the |
|
opportunities that GPRA affords, is that we've found an awful |
|
lot of agencies where the basic approach of Federal program |
|
management has been an adaptive approach over time, where we've |
|
had new responsibilities overlaid on existing missions, such |
|
that now some agencies have really lost their way. |
|
And in Mr. Hinchman's prepared statement, he talks about a |
|
couple of those. And so, there is a real need as agencies go |
|
through the strategic planning process, to start first with |
|
what is our purpose, what business are we in? And for some |
|
agencies, that's going to be quite a struggle. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. We have not had any feedback that would |
|
indicate a difficulty. We have increasingly encouraged |
|
agencies, though--and will again in a review and an assessment |
|
we're doing this spring--to take a look at their major, what we |
|
call, management challenges. And those challenges come in a lot |
|
of different formats and have been drawn to their attention in |
|
a lot of different ways. And encourage them to take a look at |
|
what are their performance measures going to be for solving or |
|
dealing with those management challenges. |
|
And to the extent that they are significant, they should |
|
be, we think, reflected in their overall strategic planning |
|
effort. But as Mr. Mihm noted, the strategic planning effort |
|
deals with, ultimately, the basic goals and missions and drive |
|
of the agencies. And a lot of the particular IG reports or |
|
other issues are significant, but not clearly sufficient to |
|
cover the wide level of activities going on. |
|
I would note, also, in response to your earlier discussion |
|
with the majority leader, that I very much appreciate your |
|
concern that agencies not come forth with fear and trepidation |
|
and concern that nothing good is going to come out of this for |
|
them. As Woody Hayes once said when he was coach at Ohio State, |
|
why did he like forward passes, ``two out of three things that |
|
happen to you are bad.'' |
|
Part of my concern has been that the agencies may, over |
|
time, feel that nothing, everything will be bad with measures, |
|
that it will only be used as a way of justifying fewer |
|
resources. I think to the extent that we can in a bipartisan |
|
way and in a cooperative way--a partnership between the |
|
administration and the Congress--get everybody to understand |
|
our goal here really is to be effective. |
|
We may argue, as noted earlier, about whether the |
|
government ought to be doing one thing or another, but we all |
|
ought to agree, once the government is in an activity, it ought |
|
to be doing it in the most productive way possible. And as I |
|
noted in my prepared testimony, we need to have people |
|
understand that if an agency is not performing well, the answer |
|
may not be fewer resources, the answer may be more resources. |
|
On the other hand, an agency that's continually moving |
|
along may turn out to be a lower priority over time, and we may |
|
decide that the performance isn't good enough and we won't get |
|
increased performance, there just is no way to turn it around |
|
with resources or management changes. |
|
But those dialogs need to be held, and I think, as I say, |
|
your focus on the positive aspects of it are important, because |
|
I think agencies need to understand that this is an important |
|
dialog and, at least, on occasion some good things will happen |
|
as a result of a dialog, as well as some hard questions being |
|
asked. |
|
Mr. Sessions. Good. Thank you. Let me just say this, that |
|
the work that you do is in the best interest of the taxpayer, |
|
should continue. And I think, Mr. Chairman, this committee |
|
should do all we can do to reinforce not only the work you're |
|
going to do, but to present a positive spin to all managers of |
|
the government, that they must comply, but it's up to them what |
|
they present. |
|
And then we will get into an oversight, if necessary, of |
|
the discussion of the priorities. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. |
|
Mr. Horn. Thank you. The gentlewoman from Maryland. |
|
Mrs. Morella. Thanks. Just as a followup, Mr. Koskinen, I |
|
was looking at an article here in the Washington Post, which |
|
quotes Franklin Raines and states that--OK. ``He encouraged |
|
agencies to consult with congressional committees but requested |
|
that all substantive documents related to strategic plans |
|
should be provided to OMB beforehand.'' |
|
Is that accurate? |
|
Mr. Koskinen. Well, they've all, actually, been provided to |
|
OMB. I mean, as Mr. Hinchman stated, these plans have been |
|
under review with us for the last 2 years as they've evolved. |
|
And what we've told the agencies is they need to consult with |
|
the Congress, they need to provide the most updated |
|
information. And to the extent that they are providing to you, |
|
we'd like to know what that information is. But at this point, |
|
as I say, they've already submitted the bulk of their material |
|
to us. So we have it under review. So it's not an obstacle. |
|
It's not as if the agencies have been off on their own and |
|
we've never seen it. We've seen the information and our |
|
encouragement to the agencies now is they need to discuss their |
|
basic goals and measures and where they're going with you. |
|
Mrs. Morella. So they've already--what you're saying is |
|
that since they've already presented some of this material to |
|
you, they can move forward? |
|
Mr. Koskinen. Yes. Right. |
|
Mrs. Morella. But they need to present it to you. I mean, |
|
it is a requirement. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. Yes. It's not an obstacle because they've |
|
already done it. But it is part of the normal process, that |
|
they would continue to deal with us. |
|
Mrs. Morella. It is part of the process that they report |
|
it. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. I would renew my offer. If there is ever an |
|
area where someone feels that an agency is not being |
|
forthcoming--and worthy explanation for that, I would be |
|
delighted to make sure that we resolve whatever issue there is |
|
promptly. |
|
Mrs. Morella. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. I'm not aware of any at this point. |
|
Mrs. Morella. OK. I see that same statement is quoted here |
|
in the memorandum for the heads of executive departments and |
|
agencies, ``All substantive documents related to strategic plan |
|
should be provided to OMB beforehand. And OMB comments ensuring |
|
consistency with national program and budget policies should be |
|
incorporated before the documents are given to Congress.'' |
|
That's correct, though? Right? |
|
Mr. Koskinen. That's correct. |
|
Mrs. Morella. Thanks. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. And in fact, I'd be happy to put into the |
|
record that letter which pursues--is pursuant to the guidance |
|
we gave a year earlier encouraging congressional consultation. |
|
As noted, our goal is primarily to make sure that when you get |
|
engaged in a dialog with the agencies, you're engaging with a |
|
dialog with the administration--with the administration's |
|
support, that there's--and that's our role in OMB, is not to |
|
think up new things, it's basically to make sure that when |
|
agencies make presentations to you on major matters like this, |
|
that you're not going to find out later on that that |
|
presentation is disowned because it doesn't reflect the |
|
understanding of the President's priorities or our view of |
|
where we're going to be going with it. |
|
But as I say, at this juncture, all of the agencies are |
|
sharing that material with us. We're giving them feedback. We |
|
expect to have another assessment starting in the next couple |
|
weeks with them of where they are. Our problem is less--our |
|
concern is less what they're doing with those plans. Our real |
|
concern is making sure that they have the consultation with you |
|
and that they complete acceptable and useful plans for |
|
submission to all of us by next September. |
|
[The information referred to follows:] |
|
|
|
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9381.041 |
|
|
|
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9381.042 |
|
|
|
Mrs. Morella. OK. Thank you. Thank you. |
|
Mr. Horn. As I understand, where we are on this question |
|
and answer, the consultation can be oral up here. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. Right. |
|
Mr. Horn. And they can talk to us and we can talk to them. |
|
But when the chips are down, what they put in writing is |
|
cleared through OMB. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. That's correct. If they are going to give you |
|
a plan, we should have seen it beforehand. |
|
Mr. Horn. Right. Yes. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. But--but there's nothing that we---- |
|
Mr. Horn. So I don't think any of us are deluded that OMB |
|
won't be involved. And I think if Members are concerned about |
|
what the agency suggests that was knocked out, we can ask them. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. You can ask them. |
|
Mr. Horn. And they have to tell us, just as we do, what did |
|
you ask them in money. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. Exactly. |
|
Mr. Horn. And then what did they do to you? |
|
Mr. Koskinen. And at that point, you'll have exactly the |
|
right information you need, which is what the agency suggested |
|
and, for whatever reason, we didn't want to put in, and then we |
|
can have a dialog about that. Our concern is that if we don't |
|
have that process, you'll get agency discussions and you'll |
|
move forward with them only to discover after the fact that |
|
that's been--turned out to be a problem and the administration |
|
is not supporting that position. |
|
But the chairman has it exactly right, that the agencies |
|
are encouraged to have those discussions with you, |
|
freewheeling. They should be talking with you. And we encourage |
|
them to engage you in a dialog in your perspectives of what |
|
those goals and missions and objectives ought to be, |
|
recognizing that the final plans will be agency plans as part |
|
of the administration. But as I say, if you have ideas that are |
|
not reflected, the cover letter for those plans should reflect |
|
that for you. |
|
So they should say, we had congressional consultations and |
|
the Congress said we ought to have a mission statement that |
|
looked like that. We have a mission statement that varies |
|
somewhat, and now you can take a look at the differences. So |
|
the important point is to get all of that out so people |
|
understand exactly where everyone is. |
|
Mr. Horn. Let me go back, as the gentlewoman--let me go |
|
back to a couple of areas. Mr. Hinchman, you mentioned the |
|
report on ``consultation'' that you are preparing for Budget |
|
Chairman Kasich. If you would be good enough to send Mr. Burton |
|
and Mr. Waxman, myself and Mrs. Maloney copies of that, we'd be |
|
most grateful. |
|
Mr. Hinchman. Of course, Mr. Chairman. |
|
Mr. Horn. We'd like to keep up on what's going on here, and |
|
there's no use asking you twice. Just copy us. Now, let me ask |
|
you, Mr. Hinchman, on the basis of what the General Accounting |
|
Office has learned, do you plan to propose any changes to the |
|
legislation when you report on June 1, 1997? Do you have a |
|
number of changes that will be coming to---- |
|
Mr. Hinchman. I think that we do not expect to report new |
|
changes. I think our view is that the framework in the statute, |
|
as I said in my testimony, is sound and that we need to try to |
|
make it work. And that it's not time yet to begin thinking |
|
about changes in that structure. |
|
Mr. Horn. OK. Now, one of the concerns that we have is on |
|
the various pilots. Some of them relate to those agencies that |
|
are also on your high risk list, which we will begin discussing |
|
tomorrow. For example, the HUD Office of Chief Financial |
|
Officer. Apparently, the department cannot get an opinion on |
|
its audited financial statements and has serious and pervasive |
|
weaknesses in its internal controls that cause it to be on your |
|
1997 high risk theories. And the EPA Superfund program. There's |
|
another one. |
|
Mr. Hinchman. Mm-hmm. |
|
Mr. Horn. What is your feeling on this in terms of being a |
|
pilot when we have so many problems? Is that good, bad? Does |
|
that just force them to focus more attention on it and solve |
|
the problem? And why haven't they? |
|
Mr. Hinchman. I think, in general, we would say that |
|
participating in the pilot program has been good for agencies, |
|
that those agencies that have been in the pilot program are a |
|
few steps ahead of others in achieving effective implementation |
|
of the requirements of the act. And I think we will see that |
|
when we see the 1999 plans. That is to say that those, in |
|
general, those pilot agencies, will do the better jobs of |
|
meeting the requirements of the act that time around. |
|
With respect to specific cases like HUD, I don't think that |
|
we can expect that participation in the pilot program is going |
|
to solve HUD's problems. HUD has made progress, however, and |
|
I'm hopeful, I like to think that its involvement in the pilot |
|
project has helped focus its thinking on the kind of steps |
|
which will lead to progress. Our high risk report will say that |
|
things are better at HUD than they were 2 years ago. |
|
But you are right. Things are not OK, and there is more |
|
work to be done there. |
|
Mr. Horn. Let me move to the Forest Service. It's also |
|
listed as a pilot for performance plan phase. I'm told its cost |
|
accounting is abysmal. |
|
Mr. Hinchman. Mm-hmm. |
|
Mr. Horn. It doesn't track the cost with associated |
|
revenues on a consistent, logical basis as good cost accounting |
|
practices dictate. |
|
Mr. Hinchman. Mm-hmm. |
|
Mr. Horn. It would seem that the pilot implementation would |
|
require better cost accounting. Have you seen any improvement |
|
in the Forest Service management lately? |
|
Mr. Hinchman. We currently have work underway concerning |
|
Forest Service management. I am not in a position, today, to |
|
say exactly what the outcome of that will be. There is no |
|
question, though, that the Forest Service does have financial |
|
management problems. It is not unique in that regard. I think |
|
that one of the reasons I talk about the Results Act as being |
|
part of a framework of statutes is because I think that solving |
|
our information technology and financial management problems is |
|
a critical part of solving our general management problems. |
|
And we're going to have to rely on those statutes working |
|
together to make the government a well run institution. |
|
Mr. Horn. Do you want to comment on any of these? |
|
Mr. Koskinen. I would just echo Mr. Hinchman's comment that |
|
I think wherever we've had agencies participating in pilots, |
|
it's been a benefit to them as well as to the statute. I think |
|
it has helped focus them, not only on improvements, but |
|
actually on how to measure those improvements, and that's one |
|
of our biggest challenges, is to not just keep coming back |
|
every year saying, well, things are a little better. |
|
We need to have actual measures. And I think the |
|
application of the statute and through the pilot program is a |
|
significant step in the right direction. |
|
Mr. Horn. As you know from the private sector, there have |
|
been experiments with looking at a particular corporate culture |
|
of a firm, a plant, especially when you've merged maybe three |
|
or four unique companies under one conglomerate. Has anybody |
|
looked at that from the point of the Federal Government, where |
|
you think in these pilots, now, that you have a good cross- |
|
section of the government? Do you feel that you have or are |
|
there other ones, perhaps, you should convince to be pilots? |
|
Mr. Koskinen. Well, the great genius of the act was to |
|
allow us to have the pilot program phase and have the agencies |
|
as well as us learn. Now what we're doing is turning the whole |
|
government into a pilot. In September of this year, everyone is |
|
supposed to show up with a strategic plan, has to show up with |
|
a strategic plan, and in February, next year, they will all |
|
show up with a performance plan. |
|
So that at this point, we're out of the pilot phase and |
|
we're into the actual full implementation phase. |
|
Mr. Horn. Mr. Hinchman, back to you. In terms of your |
|
testimony, you stated that the Department of Defense is unable |
|
to properly manage its cost resources, and that the critical |
|
cost data are absent for almost all of the department's non- |
|
cash assets such inventory, equipment, aircraft, missiles. |
|
Mr. Hinchman. Mm-hmm. |
|
Mr. Horn. I'm just curious how they're doing with |
|
implementing the pilot project. |
|
Mr. Hinchman. I think that financial management at the |
|
Department of Defense remains a very big challenge, and I don't |
|
think that we will see that problem fixed in the near term. And |
|
obviously, part of a good financial management system includes |
|
cost accounting systems. And I think we all share the goal of |
|
reaching a point at which financial management, including cost |
|
accounting within the government, meets private sector |
|
standards. DOD is not there today. |
|
Mr. Horn. We found in our hearing last year of what did you |
|
do with the $25 billion, and they said we didn't steal, or |
|
nobody stole, but we just can't find it all. Forty-nine |
|
accounting systems exist in the Department of Defense. Anything |
|
happening to consolidate that? And if you were suddenly made |
|
the Chief Financial Officer of Defense, what would you do? |
|
Mr. Hinchman. I would begin---- |
|
Mr. Horn. Besides go to Australia. [Laughter.] |
|
Mr. Koskinen. That's right. |
|
Mr. Horn. What would you do? |
|
Mr. Hinchman. I would begin a strategic planning process to |
|
determine what the goals of that system need to, and begin |
|
developing plans to move toward those goals year by year. I |
|
think it's going to be a long-term process. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. There is--I would note--that there is a |
|
strategic plan in this particular area, to over a reasonably |
|
definable period of time, migrate those systems to five basic |
|
financial accounting systems. It's not easy. It's been a |
|
project underway for some time, but they have begun to make |
|
significant progress. But I think Mr. Hinchman is right. This |
|
is one of the major challenges in the government, is to, in |
|
fact, work with the Department, which is very focused on this, |
|
in bringing its financial system up to date. |
|
Mr. Horn. Well, we know they won't be able to give us a |
|
balance sheet, I think. Both IRS and Defense, for 4 years now, |
|
everybody said they can't possibly meet the law on that. Do you |
|
feel that is still true? |
|
Mr. Hinchman. I believe that we will have financial |
|
statements from the Department of Defense when it's required |
|
under the CFO act. I do not know, at this point, what the |
|
opinion in the statements will be. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. Right. |
|
Mr. Horn. Any reaction on that? |
|
Mr. Koskinen. I think that's correct. We are--we have |
|
actually worked jointly--the Treasury Department, GAO and OMB-- |
|
in developing and preparing for the governmentwide financial |
|
statement required under the CFO Acts and Government Management |
|
and Reform Act, and, clearly, we all are working together with |
|
the areas you've discussed and some others, to make sure that |
|
we comply with the statute. |
|
So I think, at this point, we've arrayed all the resources |
|
in the government together in a very cooperative and very |
|
focused effort to see if we can improve these problems. |
|
Mr. Horn. Before I yield to Mr. Sessions, let me ask you |
|
one question while we're on this topic. IRS has had major |
|
problems implementing the new technology down there. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. Yes. |
|
Mr. Horn. We went through this with FAA 3 years ago. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. Uh-huh. |
|
Mr. Horn. Absolute basket case. And we have this throughout |
|
the government, now. What have we learned from these |
|
experiences, either from the OMB side or the Comptroller |
|
General side. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. Well, I won't give you my full half hour |
|
speech that I gave yesterday morning. |
|
Mr. Horn. Give me your executive summary. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. The executive summary is that thanks to the |
|
assistance of this committee and the Governmental Affairs |
|
Committee, we passed the Information Technology Management |
|
Reform Act, now known and referred to as the Clinger-Cohen |
|
Act---- |
|
Mr. Horn. Right. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. Which fundamentally changes the way the |
|
government plans for, acquires and manages information |
|
technology. Again, it was--we had the benefit of a lot of |
|
insight and experience and reviews by GAO, in which we drew on |
|
the promising practices or best practices of 10 of the best |
|
private sector companies who use information technology. We |
|
know have Chief Information Officers in every agency. They are |
|
focused on dealing with what we think were the fundamental |
|
weaknesses in the prior system. |
|
Mr. Horn. But what were those weaknesses? |
|
Mr. Koskinen. Fundamental weaknesses are, first of all, |
|
partially driven by the nature of the procurement system. We |
|
tended to design large complicated systems all on one |
|
procurement so that we would be buying systems and planning |
|
them over 8 to 10 to 12-year time horizons. The best private |
|
sector companies buy systems with deliverables no farther out |
|
in time than 12 to 18 months. |
|
A corollary to that means that if you are designing a large |
|
system, you need to, in fact, then buy it in modular or phases, |
|
with testing of each phase to make sure you're moving in the |
|
direction in which you want to go. Another major lessen of the |
|
private sector is that these are not technology questions--the |
|
problems--they are actually management questions. |
|
And the best companies, before anyone automates anything, |
|
ask the question of A, do we need to do this work at all?; B, |
|
if it needs to be done, is there someone else who can do it |
|
better? And probably most functionally and important in dealing |
|
with not only the government's problems, but the private |
|
sector's problems, if we need to do the work and no one else |
|
can do it better, have we restructured and re-engineered the |
|
way the work is done to be able to maximize the impact of |
|
information technology. |
|
A corollary to that is, have we re-engineered the work so |
|
that we can take advantage of off the shelf software and |
|
existing systems, rather than customizing a new system to meet |
|
what is often an idiosyncratic way of doing the work. |
|
Mr. Horn. Yes. Since we knew all that 25 years ago, does |
|
this mean the role of Assistant Secretary for management has |
|
failed in these departments? |
|
Mr. Koskinen. Well, I would tell you that A, people didn't |
|
know this 25 years ago. So I would challenge on that. |
|
Mr. Horn. But we did. On the systems that--look, the |
|
dumbest thing you can do is bring in a computer, which they |
|
will sell to you with all the wonderful things they can do with |
|
it, and not clean up your systems to start with, and ask, are |
|
you doing it, just as you said, and get rid of it. And then you |
|
automate that. The other dumb thing you do--and the FAA did |
|
that regular--is you don't get closure on everybody's great |
|
idea. And there's nobody managing it. It's everybody doing add- |
|
ons. McNamara got into that trouble in the early 1960's with |
|
building a plane that had to do everything, which didn't work. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. I would respectfully note that the government |
|
has no monopoly on these problems, that, in fact, there are |
|
vast numbers of failed systems right now in the private sector. |
|
A study last year showed that over half of the private sector |
|
systems being designed last year and implemented either didn't |
|
work or came in over budget and did not come in on time. |
|
So that these lessons which are straightforward and |
|
understandable are not technological lessons, have not |
|
necessarily been out there in everybody's mind for 25 years, |
|
and the government has not led the failure parade. There are, |
|
as I say, far more dollars that have been spent on failed |
|
systems in the private sector in the last few years than in the |
|
government. |
|
That doesn't mean that we don't need to learn the lessons. |
|
And that's where GAO's reviews were very helpful. They went out |
|
and didn't look at the private sector generally because if they |
|
had done that, they would have seen a lot of failed systems as |
|
well as successes. What they said was what are the best |
|
companies and what are their practices, and what can we learn |
|
from those. And I think the government, if we implement the |
|
Clinger-Cohen Act effectively, can become a state-of-the-art |
|
acquirer, manager and user of information technology. But we'll |
|
continue to need the support of this committee, as well as that |
|
of the agencies, if we're going to do that. |
|
Mr. Horn. Now, when you say effectively implement that act, |
|
you're talking about the CIO, I assume. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. I'm talking, actually, about the CIO being a |
|
catalyst for the agency coming to grips with these problems. |
|
Mr. Horn. Right. Now, are there situations where we have |
|
the CIO also holding other responsibilities, as we have in |
|
Treasury with the Assistant Secretary for management also being |
|
the Chief Financial Officer, something I think is just crazy, |
|
and yet we haven't done anything about it? |
|
Mr. Koskinen. There are those. If you'd like, we could hold |
|
a hearing on this. There's a long discussion going on about |
|
that. |
|
Mr. Horn. No. When you've got a problem and we give you the |
|
authorization to do something about it, it seems to me there's |
|
got to be focus. And why these problems continue is many of |
|
these people aren't really devoting full time to either the CIO |
|
or the CFO. It's like having the Inspector General be chewed |
|
away by some other agency responsibility. |
|
Now, since that's an adverse relationship in many cases is |
|
why we don't do that, I gather. But I must say it bothers me |
|
when we have that kind of overlap. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. Yes. Our premise and assumption has been that |
|
we should not have that overlap. There are three or four cases |
|
where we--on what we call an evaluation mode--have allowed the |
|
agencies to combine the CIO and the CFO. That's primarily where |
|
the CFO both has significant IT background and experience and |
|
where a significant part of the information technology problems |
|
in the agency come within the CFO's jurisdiction, so that |
|
bifurcation did not necessarily look like the most logical way |
|
to proceed. |
|
But in those cases we have told the agencies, we, with GAO, |
|
will be evaluating, at the end of their first year, the |
|
effectiveness of that operation. And virtually all of the other |
|
agencies where we're working, we have a CIO who is free |
|
standing. That, by itself, will not self execute. There are |
|
other issues that need to be addressed that we are working with |
|
the agencies on. |
|
And to make sure that the CIO is a catalyst for reform, a |
|
leader of effective implementation. But much like GPRA, |
|
effective implementation of information technology requires |
|
that the senior program managers and the senior managers of the |
|
agency participate in the basic decisions, that it not be left |
|
to what I call the tekies or the people who are knowledgeable |
|
about systems. They need to be involved, but the basic |
|
questions and the basic failings often times are not |
|
technological issues, they are actually program management |
|
issues. |
|
Mr. Horn. No. I agree with that. Mr. Hinchman, Mr. Mihm, do |
|
you have any reaction to that? |
|
Mr. Hinchman. No. I think that Mr. Koskinen is exactly |
|
right about that. And I think the most important point he |
|
makes, and one that we ought to all take some comfort in is |
|
that the Clinger-Cohen Act, in fact, reflects the lessons that |
|
we have learned both from experience within the government and |
|
in our study of the experiences of others who have run |
|
successful information technology programs. That act embodies |
|
what we know. |
|
Mr. Horn. You've done a fine job on that best practices |
|
series you have, and I think all of us have profited from it. |
|
Mr. Sessions. Gentleman, Mr. Sessions. |
|
Mr. Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Koskinen, I |
|
appreciate you taking our questions and comments as the way |
|
they're intended, and I hope that they can continue to be |
|
positive, but I must confess you'll probably be able to go home |
|
today to your Director and say that you turned in an honest |
|
day's work for an honest day's pay, and that he would not want |
|
to switch places with you. |
|
I'd like to, if I could, to say a couple things. The |
|
chairman was going into to some of the questions that I have |
|
about the IRS. Obviously, many people have known. It's been |
|
widely publicized. Some $4 billion that was spent by the IRS to |
|
begin the development of a new computer program. I heard you |
|
say, probably many of the problems are with program management |
|
within getting these data systems up and working. |
|
My background includes that of being at Bell labs for |
|
several years where I was deeply involved in the intricate |
|
management of programming and those systems. Start with me, if |
|
you can, on some sort of a dialog on where the IRS is in this |
|
general process. Were they in the pilot program? Were they |
|
considered for that? What sort of help is OMB giving them to |
|
get them to direct themselves? Do they have any inward |
|
recollection that the perception is that they are not as |
|
effective and efficient? |
|
I'm not going to ask you to reach the final conclusion that |
|
really begs itself with, do we have a system that we can put on |
|
a sheet of paper to draw a flow chart to with our tax code? But |
|
let's keep this within the confines: Where's the IRS? How |
|
realistic are they? What is your working relationship with |
|
them? And where can we expect any near term advantages or |
|
something that would be considered positive out of this agency? |
|
Mr. Koskinen. I'm happy to respond. And I think that your |
|
point is well taken that this is an important dialog. With |
|
regard to the pay issue, I think if we hold three hearings for |
|
the price of one here, then I'm going to ask for a bonus as it |
|
goes. |
|
But let's deal with the IRS. It's an important question. |
|
First, I think the leadership at the IRS as well as the |
|
Treasury Department, as I said earlier, recognizes that there |
|
are serious issues to be addressed within the IRS. I think |
|
there is no sense of denial. Whatever may have happened in the |
|
past, there is a real attempt to come to grips with these |
|
issues. They are working very carefully with GAO--people on |
|
their systems. |
|
But more significantly, under the leadership of people in |
|
the Treasury, as well as in the IRS, triggered and headed by |
|
the Chief Information Officer, they are looking at their |
|
strategic plan. They are basically saying, what are our goals |
|
over the next 3 to 4 years, what system developments match |
|
those goals, and which system developments are a lower priority |
|
and, therefore, should not have our attention. |
|
Because one of the things they have discovered is that they |
|
have a number of systems that will achieve various goals, but |
|
it's clear there's no capacity there--and because of the huge |
|
undertaking--to do them all at once. And what they need is |
|
exactly what you're saying: Say, where are we going; what are |
|
our major problems; what are the major expectations that people |
|
have that we need the most improvements. Let's focus on those. |
|
Let's make sure that we have a coherent plan for getting from |
|
here to there. And in particular, let us take a hard look at |
|
one of the fundamental pesky questions, and that is, of the |
|
work that needs to be done, how much of it has to be done here, |
|
how much of it can be done somewhere else, how much of it is |
|
out there already in systems or in processes that we could take |
|
advantage of. |
|
And I think that's a big breakthrough for the Internal |
|
Revenue Service that, historically, has prided itself, |
|
appropriately, on doing all of the work internally, developing |
|
all of its systems internally. But as life gets more |
|
complicated and as the alternatives get to be more complex, |
|
that process hasn't stood them in good stead recently. And I |
|
think they recognize that. |
|
So I'm confident that they are addressing the problem, that |
|
they understand the magnitude of it and that they are coming up |
|
with constructive solutions. I mentioned that management-- |
|
modernization management board that the Secretary of the |
|
Treasury has set up. We have agreed--from OMB--to support that |
|
process. Steve Kelman, the Administrator of the Office of |
|
Federal Procurement Policy at OMB, and I serve as adjunct |
|
members of that committee. |
|
We are not in a position where we could exercise direct |
|
authority. We attend the meetings, though, and have |
|
participated with them, and have a better dialog now than we've |
|
ever had with the IRS and the Treasury about the problematic |
|
implications of what they're doing and the budgetary |
|
implications of what they're doing. As we've said, we're |
|
prepared to give them one stop shopping. That is, they bring |
|
these issues up in the modernization management board. If we |
|
have OMB perspectives, we will bring them to bear there and |
|
we'll engage in that dialog so they don't have to go through |
|
the process twice. |
|
But the bottom line, much like defense, is--and, as you |
|
know far better than most, with your background--these are very |
|
complicated, difficult problems. Were talking about literally |
|
hundreds of millions of transactions and relationships, and |
|
it's a phenomenal amount of data. And they have major obstacles |
|
to overcome. So I would be the last one to tell you that in the |
|
next year it will all be done. |
|
But I am very confident that in the next year, you will be |
|
able to see measurable progress, that we will develop plans |
|
there, where we will have benchmarks that basically have broken |
|
it down into modules and components that can be monitored, and, |
|
also, that lead more directly and clearly to the achievement of |
|
mission goals and strategic efforts. |
|
Mr. Sessions. So what you're saying is you believe that |
|
their work will result in a document--a blue print--that will |
|
be a guiding principle for them, measurable, realistic, and |
|
it's something that represents the true nature of the business? |
|
Mr. Koskinen. Yes. Over time I think that's exactly right. |
|
Mr. Sessions. Good. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the |
|
questions. Best of luck. I hope that spirit in which you know |
|
that we're involved in this process is one that will translate |
|
throughout the government. And I say this over and over again |
|
because I think that every piece of government, all the |
|
agencies, need to recognize that mission statement orientation |
|
will get them back to the point of what their core business is. |
|
And if the taxpayer needs it supported, then that will be done. |
|
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question. |
|
Mr. Horn. Well, we thank you for your good questions. Also, |
|
there's only a few more to go and you can all get a decent |
|
meal. [Laughter.] |
|
You'll have put in your day's work before noon, you can |
|
tell the Director. |
|
I want to start with Mr. Hinchman on this. Beginning in |
|
fiscal year 1999, the performance plans required by the Results |
|
Act may include proposals to OMB to waive certain |
|
administrative requirements, including staffing levels, |
|
limitations on compensation or remuneration, and prohibitions |
|
or restrictions on funding transfers among budget |
|
classifications in return for specific individual or |
|
organization accountability to achieve a performance goal. |
|
The expected improvements in performance that would result |
|
are to be quantified as part of the request for the waiver. |
|
Now, the pilot projects for this stage, called pilot projects |
|
for managerial accountability and flexibility, were never |
|
implemented because the OMB did not improve any pilots. Did the |
|
GAO review these pilots? Why, in your opinion, did OMB not |
|
improve any pilots? And what impact does that have, in your |
|
opinion, on the potential success of the Results Act? Mr. |
|
Hinchman, it's all yours. We'll get to your colleague in a |
|
minute. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. In 30 words or less. |
|
Mr. Hinchman. Yes. |
|
Mr. Horn. That's right. |
|
Mr. Hinchman. I think that we do not yet know what the |
|
impact of the waiver provisions in the Results Act are going to |
|
be. I think we didn't find any what OMB felt were some |
|
appropriate opportunities to apply the waiver authority. There |
|
were some situations, I think, where agencies originally sought |
|
waivers and then later concluded that, in fact, authority to do |
|
what they wanted to do existed anyway, or legislation changed |
|
the underlying constraints against which they were working, and |
|
that, as a result, we just haven't had a good test of the |
|
waiver authority. |
|
I don't think that we're in a position to say that OMB has |
|
been unwilling to use that authority is circumstances where it |
|
seems to us to be obviously appropriate. I don't think that our |
|
work suggested OMB is opposed to the waiver authority. As I |
|
said, I think it's just that we haven't yet had an environment |
|
in which we can get a good test of it. And we're going to have |
|
to wait and see what happens. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. Yes. Let me just make clear, we are strong |
|
supporters of the concept of administrative and other |
|
flexibilities, regulatory flexibilities for people if they can |
|
tie it to our performance measures. To some extent, part of the |
|
problem in the act is the success of this committee and the |
|
Congress in generally relieving agencies of a lot of |
|
administrative requirements, a number of them in the |
|
procurement area. |
|
The major procurement reforms that this Congress and this |
|
committee have supported eliminated a lot of potential requests |
|
for waivers. The Office of Personnel Management threw out a lot |
|
of old time regulations and requirements on personnel that, |
|
again, would have been very good subjects for--in contemplation |
|
for waivers. |
|
So when we reached out to the agencies for proposals, we |
|
discovered that part of the reason, beyond that, that we didn't |
|
get very good candidates was, first of all, they wanted waivers |
|
from statutory requirements, which the statute does not allow. |
|
It really talks about administrative waivers. So a lot of their |
|
waivers were from statutory requirements. Or they wanted |
|
waivers from limitations on agencies outside the executive |
|
branch that we did not have the ability and the authority under |
|
the act to grant beyond that. |
|
Also, when we then dwindle down to the precious few, we did |
|
not have what we thought were very--we didn't have a large |
|
number, and the small number that we did have didn't have a |
|
very clear nexus between the relative limited waiver they |
|
wanted and any improvement in performance. And so, our judgment |
|
was that at this point in time, we would not gain anything by |
|
pursuing the relatively small number of applicants for very |
|
minor waivers. |
|
Mr. Horn. Who reviewed the pilots on managerial |
|
accountability and flexibility, and how much time did they |
|
spend with the agencies before deciding the pilot proposals |
|
were unacceptable? |
|
Mr. Koskinen. Those come through OMB. Ultimately, they--the |
|
whole process reports to me. The development of the proposals |
|
and the request for them were generated by inter-agency groups. |
|
So we had a range of people that we taxed for this. The actual |
|
development of this particular number was handled under, at |
|
that time, my supervision by one of our senior career people, |
|
who has, in fact, been the guru of GPRA. And he spent a |
|
significant amount of time trying to generate acceptable |
|
proposals, working with other agencies and OMB to make sure |
|
that we hadn't overlooked any possibilities that would---- |
|
Mr. Horn. So these proposals were circulated around the |
|
program areas of OMB? |
|
Mr. Koskinen. OMB. |
|
Mr. Horn. And coordinated. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. We went to the agencies in the program areas, |
|
saying what are their--here's a whole set of possibilities, |
|
which of these are you willing to waive, in terms of the |
|
agencies, and in terms of program managers, to try to, again, |
|
see what was there out there that agencies might find |
|
attractive. |
|
And we sent to the agencies, then, that list, saying here |
|
are a whole set--it wasn't very large by the time we got done-- |
|
but here are a range of waivers that you could apply for and |
|
participate in the pilot program for. And as I say, by the time |
|
we got done with it, we got a number of responses back, but a |
|
number of them, most of them were really out of bounds for the |
|
purposes of the statute. |
|
Mr. Horn. Was this a written reaction or did you sit around |
|
a table and go over it with them line by line and say, maybe we |
|
can make a deal on this? |
|
Mr. Koskinen. Yes. Most of it was by document. So we don't |
|
have--we don't have enough people to go to all of the agencies |
|
and have those conversations. But when we had applications, |
|
then we would talk with the agency about that. But---- |
|
Mr. Horn. So they submitted it. OMB pursued it, asked their |
|
program pro what they thought, maybe some other agencies, maybe |
|
OPM, whatever? |
|
Mr. Koskinen. Right. And then our final judgment---- |
|
Mr. Horn. Then you gave it back in paper, but nobody really |
|
sat down and had a dialog on those? |
|
Mr. Koskinen. About the ones we made? Yes. When we got down |
|
with it all and looked at the final applications we had from |
|
the agencies, our judgment was that it was not worth pursuing |
|
those at this time. |
|
Mr. Horn. Now, did the agencies make any reaction to that |
|
judgment in terms of suggesting improvements or suggesting |
|
changes on their part or was that just the killer? |
|
Mr. Koskinen. I'm not aware of any further conversations |
|
with the agencies. |
|
Mr. Horn. OK. Are you going to encourage any |
|
experimentation with managerial flexibility and accountability |
|
before fiscal year 1999? Or is this it? |
|
Mr. Koskinen. As you know, one of our major initiatives, |
|
only partially growing out of this experience, but out of a |
|
number of other experiences, is to propose a significant number |
|
of performance-based organizations, as we call them, in which |
|
we have pulled together statutory waivers in procurement and |
|
personnel areas. And we, in effect, think that those will serve |
|
very clearly as pilot programs, as it were, for what improved |
|
performance can you get if you eliminate some of the statutory |
|
limitations in procurement and personnel. |
|
And in fact, the proposals that we're developing and the |
|
template require that any of the performance-based |
|
organizations, to obtain those flexibilities, have to enter |
|
into a very clear performance agreement between the head of the |
|
organization and this cabinet secretary, measured on an annual |
|
basis. And the new chief operating officer for the performance- |
|
based organization is there under a term contract and can be |
|
dismissed if performance is not adequate. |
|
So that, as I say, we did not design with the Vice |
|
President and the National Performance Review the concept of |
|
performance-based organizations in response to our differences |
|
here, but we think that we will get more fulsome experimental |
|
results out of these performance-based organizations than |
|
looking at an individual, independent waiver and saying, what |
|
performance improvement do we get from that. |
|
Mr. Horn. Let me ask you now. In terms of encouraging |
|
agencies to propose pilots in this managerial accountability, |
|
flexibility area, what do you plan to include in your report |
|
required under Section 9704C of the act? It's apparently due in |
|
May of this year. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. In May of this year we will give you the |
|
background and experience. GAO has a draft report out, as well, |
|
on their own, and we will share that with you in May as |
|
required. |
|
Mr. Horn. Yes. We'd like to ask formally that OMB provide |
|
the staff on both sides of the aisle here and committee with |
|
copies of all the proposals submitted to OMB for managerial |
|
flexibility and accountability in the pilot phase including any |
|
notes or reasons the proposals were not accepted. We just need |
|
to get a feel for this particular aspect of the process. |
|
So if you and majority and minority staff could work out |
|
what we need in that area, we'd appreciate the chance to review |
|
that on both sides. Because I think there's an interest in |
|
getting focus on managerial flexibility. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. I would commend to you, again--not to over |
|
sell the point---- |
|
Mr. Horn. OK. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. Your review and support of the performance- |
|
based organization concept, which, as I say, is really focused |
|
on managerial flexibility in a much broader way than we've been |
|
able to deal with under the statute, or will be able to deal |
|
with under the statute. |
|
Mr. Horn. Let me ask you one last question and then Mrs. |
|
Maloney can have the final word on the subject. In terms of |
|
consultation, which we've talked about, with the authorizing |
|
committees and the agencies, do you have any feelings in terms |
|
of OMB consultation with this committee or others? |
|
Will that process be orchestrated to assure that the |
|
agencies do talk to their congressional counterparts and not |
|
just make it a staff thing, but sit down with Members in, say, |
|
agriculture, if you're in agriculture--this kind of thing--or |
|
you sit down with Government Reform and Oversight and |
|
Governmental Affairs officials. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. We are doing our own strategic planning |
|
exercise, which has been instructive, I think, for all the |
|
staff at OMB. In fact, later this month, as I noted in my |
|
prepared testimony, we're having an agency-wide stand down day |
|
to, in fact, develop the next iteration of our plan. And we |
|
will be here consulting with you as the other agencies are. |
|
We are encouraging the agencies. We obviously can lead them |
|
to water. We cannot necessarily make them drink. But I think, |
|
we need also response from the hill. I think it's very |
|
important, as you noted--this committee did in a conversation |
|
with the majority leader--that the other committees, |
|
themselves, be forthcoming in expressing their interest and |
|
concern in this area, that the, in some cases, as we start to |
|
evolve, it will be just as important for the congressional |
|
committees to be interested and responsive as it is for the |
|
agencies to be willing to consult. |
|
We can manage our end of the process by continuing to |
|
require that. We need some support from the hill across the |
|
spectrum of committee activities and authorizers and |
|
appropriators, for them to both become knowledgeable about the |
|
act and then participate in that dialog. |
|
Mr. Horn. Very good. Mr. Hinchman, do you have any comment |
|
on these last few minutes of discussion? |
|
Mr. Hinchman. No, sir. |
|
Mr. Horn. The distinguished gentlewoman from New York. |
|
Mrs. Maloney. Following up on your last comment on your own |
|
strategic plan, you're required to consult with this committee |
|
on that plan, and when may we expect to receive your |
|
consultation and how do you propose to conduct it? |
|
Mr. Koskinen. We will be up here before summer, well in |
|
advance of our attempt to then finalize our plan. As I say, at |
|
this point, we have an outline. We've had a strategic planning |
|
process that started last summer. The budget process puts us in |
|
the limbo from the first of October until about now, which is |
|
why we're renewing it. I would expect that we would be here-- |
|
our plans are to have consultation with you and other stake |
|
holders certainly before the end of May. And we would hope to |
|
do it as early as April. |
|
Mrs. Maloney. OK. The Department of Defense is the largest |
|
Federal agency and has components which are themselves larger |
|
than some agencies. To date, DOD has not provided guidance to |
|
the various services on how to link goals and performance |
|
measures, and GAO has found that many subordinate units are |
|
unsure of how to implement the results law and are waiting for |
|
guidance. And I'd just like you to comment on it. Do you know |
|
when DOD plans to issue this guidance and if it doesn't, how |
|
DOD plans to assure that the services and other units support |
|
the overall DOD plans and goals? |
|
Mr. Koskinen. I don't know the answer to that now. As I |
|
noted, we are about to begin yet another assessment, agency by |
|
agency, of where they are in their strategic planning process. |
|
We had a detailed set of conversations with the Defense |
|
Department last summer, and we will pursue that further this |
|
spring. And one of the questions we will be pursuing is what is |
|
their internal process, who is involved in it, and when will |
|
they begin to have products. |
|
Mrs. Maloney. Thank you very much. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. Thank you. |
|
Mr. Horn. Well, if there are no further questions, then we |
|
thank all three of you for coming up and sharing your thoughts |
|
with us on this very important subject. A lot of these seem to |
|
be very simple laws, in a way, long overdue, but, without |
|
question, they will make a difference in the executive |
|
establishment and hopefully in the congressional establishment. |
|
Because it's going to take two working together to solve a |
|
lot of these problems. And that's why the consultation is so |
|
important between executive branch legislative committees. And |
|
that's why Mr. Armey's role, in particular, in having the war |
|
room to make sure a few things get done around here in the |
|
limited amount of time that we have as elected Members. |
|
And we thank you for your thoughts on that. We welcome any |
|
ideas you have. But we're not talking about amending laws, |
|
we're talking about implementing the law. |
|
Mr. Koskinen. Right. |
|
Mr. Horn. So without any further questions, this hearing is |
|
adjourned. |
|
[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] |
|
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