Analysis: The Leadership of Haibatullah Akhundzada and the Taliban
Tags: Afghanistan, Analysis, Afghan Peace Talks, Taliban Leadership, Terrorism

A CNN broadcast announcing the selection of Akhundzada as the successor of Mullah Akhtar Mansour. Akhundzada is pictured.

The 2018 Eid al-Fitr Ceasefire demonstrated a handful of important facts in terms of the Taliban, their tactics, and their overall strategy. However, perhaps most important was the fact that the ceasefire refuted the widely accepted Western analysis of the time that the Taliban had remained fractured after the targeted killing of Akhtar Mansour on 21 May 2016 by the United States. While there is by no means a hard and fast command and control system in place that allows Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada to control small-unit maneuvers in provinces — or, for that matter, control even provincial governors — directly, Akhundzada does command the allegiance of his fighters much more effectively than Mansour did while in power between 2015 and his death.

A key spiritual leader for the movement, Akhundzada lacks significant military experience. His relatively low profile made him a perfect choice over the perceived frontrunner Sirajuddin Haqqani, and his spiritual and jurist background allowed him to be perceived as a true heir to Mullah Omar to a degree that far surpassed Omar’s first successor This brief analysis will attempt to determine Akhundzada’s strengths as a leader for the movement and why his ability to fuse together the movement politically and religiously have been so successful. Additionally, the conclusion will address concerns and problems faced by Akhundzada and the movement generally.

According to the analysis of Johnson’s Taliban Narratives, a deep concern of the Taliban leadership into the mid-2010s was the issue of unity. Having recruiting fighters from a wide range of backgrounds (ethnic, tribal, etc.), the unity of the movement was in a vital phase by 2010. The Taliban attempted to address this through the 2010 Layeha, or code of conduct for the movement, but with the death of Mullah Mohammad Omar and subsequent selection as Akhtar Mansour over Omar’s son, Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob, these issues were likely magnified. Additionally, with some elements of the majority-Pashtun Taliban asserting that Taliban commander Mullah Dadullah Akhund (KIA 2007) was assassinated by Mansour’s leadership group, some elements may have been seeking blood retribution, as is amongst Pashtuns. Thus, Akhundzada’s selection following the targeted killing of Mansour on 21 May 2016 makes logical sense. Akhundzada’s deeply spiritual background gives him the same aura as Mullah Omar: a man who lacks ambition but sees Islam as the law of the land and will fight and sacrifice for the implementation of Islamic law. By lacking ambition, Akhundzada is able to bridge the gaps and differences between tribal, ethnic, and other blocs within the movement, which almost undoubtedly exist.

The Taliban are keenly aware of the dangers of splits amongst groups of allies. While a great deal of the Taliban’s success as they stormed out of Kandahar in 1994 did come from a general sense that many mujahideen commanders from the Anti-Soviet Jihad were taking advantage of the local people, another factor limiting the ability of the local Mujahideen cadres to resist was their general lack of unity. If one extrapolates Malkasian’s findings in his book on the Helmand district of Garmser — War Comes to Garmser — to the remainder of the country, it paints a picture that local people outside of Kandahar in Taliban-controlled areas were fed up with the mujahideen, but also that the mujahideen were unable to counter the Taliban as they were far too divided along tribal lines. While extrapolating the findings in one small district of about 100,000 Pashtuns to the remainder of Taliban-occupied Afghanistan in 1990s is problematic, it does demonstrate the Taliban’s ability to divide and conquer their enemy.

Due to their success in driving wedges between various groups between 1994 and 2001, one can come to understand that the Taliban are deeply understanding of the dangers major — and even minor — rifts may cause in a non-state organization within Afghanistan due to the country’s extremely heterogenous structure. Thus, Akhundzada’s selection may be reflective of this understanding. The more telling test for Akhundzada, however, has yet to come. As Afghanistan and the Taliban begin to pivot from a wartime movement to a peacetime political movement or government in a peace deal, Akhundzada may find it increasingly difficult to control radical elements. It is moderately likely that should the Taliban find a suitable peace deal with the United States and the Resolute Support mission is brought to a close, the same divisions that split the mujahideen factions and brought them into Civil War in the early 1990s will come to wreak havoc within the Taliban without an external enemy to bind factions together. Akhundzada will need to get creative with religion as well as command and control to retain power over an increasingly diverse movement.