We Need to Stop Pushing for Democracy After Conflict
By: Yomna El-Serafy
Tags: War, Peace, Politics, Democracy, International Relations

5 pathologies of liberalisation

However, even liberalisation in highly-divided societies emerging from conflict has its dangers, as it encourages competition and contest, rather than cohesion, in societies that are already divided, mobilised and conflict-prone.

Roland Paris (2004) points to what he calls the five “pathologies of liberalisation”, which render liberalisation in post-conflict societies dangerous:

“Bad civil society”: Promoting competition in a society that lacks the norms and mechanisms for navigating competition can be harmful, and may result in conflict.

Promoting competition in a society that lacks the norms and mechanisms for navigating competition can be harmful, and may result in conflict. “Opportunistic ethnic entrepreneurs”: These are people within society that can recognise the increased trend toward competition and harness it to mobilise ethnic masses and engender ethnic conflict. In The Dark Side of Democracy, Michael Mann expands on this risk, describing “ethnic cleansing” as a “modern” phenomenon, that is facilitated by the competition encouraged by democratising efforts.

These are people within society that can recognise the increased trend toward competition and harness it to mobilise ethnic masses and engender ethnic conflict. In The Dark Side of Democracy, Michael Mann expands on this risk, describing “ethnic cleansing” as a “modern” phenomenon, that is facilitated by the competition encouraged by democratising efforts. Elections: Elections can serve as focal points for “destructive social competition”.

Elections can serve as focal points for “destructive social competition”. Economic liberalisation: Economic liberalisation encourages market competition, which can engender conflict. This is related to his first pathology, in its implicit distinction between “good” and “destructive” societal competition. A post-authoritarian society unaccustomed to regulated competition may erupt in conflict when competition is encouraged.

Economic liberalisation encourages market competition, which can engender conflict. This is related to his first pathology, in its implicit distinction between “good” and “destructive” societal competition. A post-authoritarian society unaccustomed to regulated competition may erupt in conflict when competition is encouraged. “Local saboteurs”: Opportunistic individuals and groups who act to undermine democracy.

Though these ‘pathologies’ are possible in all societies, Paris argues that they are particularly pertinent in post-conflict societies, due to “intense societal conflict”, “weak conflict dampeners”, and “ineffective political institutions”.

Institutionalisation before liberalisation

Observing these dangers of liberalisation in highly-divided, post-conflict societies, scholars have debated the ways in which these risks can be mitigated, so as to maintain order. Paris advocates for a strategy of “institutionalisation before liberalisation”, which argues that building effective institutions to regulate social competition and to create norms of effective competition within society are crucial prior to efforts of liberalisation. Indeed, Runciman, in a 2014 discussion with Francis Fukuyama on the successes and failures of liberal democracy, attributed the failure of democracy to take hold in the aftermath of the 2011 Egyptian revolution to the lack of effective democratic institutions in the country.

The fundamental argument of ‘institutionalisation before liberalisation’ is that market democracies are inherently tumultuous and conflict-inducing, and so “peace-builders should delay liberalisation and limit political and economic freedoms in the short run, in order to create conditions for a smoother and less hazardous transition to market democracy — and durable peace — in the long run”. The elements of this approach include waiting until conditions are ripe for elections, controlling hate speech, rewarding moderate behaviour and punishing extremist behaviour, and adopting conflict-reducing economic policies. According to Paris, this approach would both ensure order in the short term, and ensure and more stable democracy in the long term.

The fallacy of delaying democracy

However, the argument by Paris that his proposed approach would simply ‘delay’ democracy is too optimistic: the elements he proposes are also likely to prolong conflict in the short term, and institute mechanisms that favour certain groups within society over others in the long term, thus directly undermining democracy.

The language on rewarding ‘moderates’ and punishing ‘extremists’ constructs actors along a Manichean duality of ‘good’ and ‘bad’, rather than viewing actors within political society as having valid and legitimate claims to grievances and expression. Indeed, that language of ‘extremism’ has often been used in conflict and post-conflict societies to punish dissidents that the government saw as a threat. The Assad regime in Syria attempted to justify the bombings of eastern Ghouta in Damascus in February 2018 by claiming that it was fighting ‘terrorism’. The Turkish government justified crackdowns on the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) by labelling them as ‘terrorists’, and justified crackdowns on supporters of exiled Abdullah Gulen by labelling them ‘traitors’.

This argument is not to say that such language can never be used; rather, in post-conflict societies with significant cleavages, equipping a non-democratic government with the power to favour certain groups in the political sphere over others is not achieving ‘democracy’ in the sense of ‘rule by consent of the governed’; rather it is attaching normative judgement to who is and who is not fit to be chosen by ‘the governed’.

Autocratic leaders don’t want democracy

As well as that, the ‘institutionalisation before liberalisation’ approach rests on several false premises. The first premise is that autocrats are incentivised to build effective institutions for competition, that may jeopardise their own power. Autocrats in post-conflict societies are unlikely to reward the behaviour of political opponents who are likely to pose a threat to them. Rather, if they do build institutions for effective political and economic competition, they are more likely to ‘reward’ the opponents that pose the least threat, and to give reasons for punishing others, such as painting them as ‘extremists’. This goes hand in hand with the proposition by Paris to ‘control hate speech’. While he is right that a limitlessly free media in the heated aftermath of conflict may mobilise further violence, a restricted media also allows the government to paint dissidents and opponents in the way that best serves them strategically, under the guise of limiting ‘hate speech’.

The symbolic importance of elections

Secondly, the argument that delaying elections until the society is ‘ready’ will reduce conflict and help to achieve order discounts the appeal of elections to local populations. In agreement with Carothers (2007), this argument seems to rest on the overemphasis of the international community’s role in pushing for elections, and in underestimating the widespread appeal that elections have gained around the world.

Quick elections in the aftermath of conflict offer a visible, tangible sign that the needs of the population are being met, and that their say in their own governance is important. This is particularly so in highly divided societies, for whom there is bound to be a higher level of disagreement on who ought to govern the post-conflict society. Elections would serve as a practical and real signal to societies that they can mediate their differences through non-violent political means, rather than through combat.

Conversely, delaying elections in post-conflict societies, especially those that are highly divided, is likely to send the signal that the needs of fighters and different cleavages within society are being dampened rather than met, and is likely to disadvantage some groups at the expense of others. This does not incentivise combatants to cease their engagement in violent conflict. The longer elections are put off, the higher the likelihood that societies will feel that their needs are not being met, to become frustrated, and to revert to conflict.