Pragmatism for Whomst?. What’s the counterbalance to hope?
By: Krishna Hammond
Tags: Defund, Racial Justice, Democratic Party, Politics

What’s the counterbalance to hope?

Frequently, we talk about ‘pragmatism’ in politics. Words like ‘reasonable,’ ‘compromise,’ ‘balanced’ and ‘thoughtful’ are all, aesthetically, associated with more moderate members of the Democratic Party. Critics of this might allege that ‘caution,’ or ‘fear’ might also be hallmarks of the pragmatist. This connotative norm can contrasted with words like ‘hope,’ ‘idealism,’ and ‘values’ being associated with liberals and left wing Democrats (and some times, ‘purity’ or ‘unrealistic’). ‘Pragmatism’ is often offered as a balm to the excesses and overreach of idealistic but naïve liberals — and the form of this sentiment is moderation of policy and political communication. But does moderation always naturally follow from a commitment to pragmatism? Are there times when the counterbalance to idealism isn’t moderation?

Put a pin in that question.

In this piece, I want to speak on the controversy around ‘Defund the Police’ using this recent Minneapolis Star-Tribune article as the focal point. It discusses the issue in depth (one reason why local papers are so crucial).

Here’s a recap of the relevant events of this intraparty discussion. The discussion of how the slogan “Defund the Police” impacted the 2020 elections was kicked off after Rep. Spanberger’s comments during a closed doors House Democratic Caucus meeting leaked. She blamed specifically the slogan and how it was toxic in her district for poor outcomes (despite an eventual win). “No one should say ‘defund the police’ ever again,” Spanberger said on the call, according to two sources. “Nobody should be talking about socialism." Shortly after, similar sentiments have been expressed by Democrats in South Florida and Texas, and Rep. Jim Clyburn has cited this in the loss of Jaime Harrison in South Carolina. Jim Clyburn has also raised concerns “Defund” is comparable to “burn burn burn it all down” and the “black power” slogans of the late sixties, which has been blamed by some for a decrease in white support.

To condense these sentiments, the argument being made is that the Democratic Party should abandon Defund the Police and other polarizing slogans, and attempt to squelch use of then by activists. Respectfully, I believe this analysis is wrong. I have three issues with this framing and general theory of the case.

But first, a quick disclaimer. Exit polls are very bad many years — they often require substantial de-skewing and adjustment to yield usable results. Further, exit polls often don’t breakdown complex groups like Latinos or Asians, where nationality and class significantly impact voter behavior. The best evidence towards the sentiment of the electorate is typically academic work, and not enough time has elapsed yet — as of writing, it’s been about two weeks since the election. Already some emerging evidence conflicts with the conclusions Spanberger et. al., but I don’t want to fall into the trap of presenting this evidence as decisive. Flatly — we do not have great data yet for trends in the electorate until real, sustained research takes place. While Gallup and others have begun this process, it will take time. That said, I think even with the facts available to us, the analysis presented by Spanberger, Clyburn, and others, is flawed.

Turning now to our first substantive problem, take a look at this excerpt from the article above: “[Minneapolis City Councilor] Palmisano said some in political circles had told her privately that if Democrats lost this year, “the blame will be laid in Minneapolis.” She declined to name them, saying she didn’t want to betray their confidence. “I think some of that is really fair,” she said. “Some of it is not.””

Is it reasonable for a representative democracy with degenerate (a fancy word for ‘localized’) government to have a totally nationalized political climate? I don’t think it’s reasonable for elected officials grappling with a city governance issue to be held accountable for outcomes thousands of miles away either. Never mind the fact that the police have yet to actually be defunded in Minneapolis, despite the pledge of some public officials. Let’s be clear: conservative and moderate voters don’t merely have aesthetic or tone issues with this policy. They have *substantive* issues with the policy. They don’t want it to happen anywhere, period. How do you square that? Should locally popular but nationally unpopular policies just be outright quashed by the national Democratic Party? Notably, Democratic voter share and turnout in Minneapolis ticked up to above 2016’s narrow victories, despite the optics problems of burning police stations (although a Democratic seat in Western Minnesota was lost). With this in mind, how do we justice to those voters’ interests? How do we translate local nuance in opinions to a polarized national electorate? What are the implications for the independence of Democratic clubs and state parties?

To be blunt: the implications are bad. What moderates are looking for is an overbearing national mandate, obviating the independence of local and state organizing. And this mandate isn’t without costs.

Above: an August 15, 2020 poll of Minneapolis voters.

Second, let’s assume that we could get this policy (‘defunding the police’) to majority approval, nationally, with the right framing. How do we manage message discipline for the over 80 million Democratic voters?

That’s not a rhetorical question — Republicans referenced individual *mean tweets* during Amy Comey Barrett’s hearings. Clearly, the salience of a comment, and the notoriety of a commenter, doesn’t need to be high to become the subject of partisan propaganda. This also creates the risk of a vicious cycle. Once Republicans figure out any scrap of bad messaging can block action in blue states and cities, they will weaponize this tool to limit our ability to function and govern even where we do hold power. This has already started happening. This is particularly galling around questions of infrastructure spending and homelessness issues, where great fear (among elected officials) of the monikers of ‘public housing’ and ‘socialism’ persist (despite the general popularity of affordable housing). This creates latent pressure on even common sense policies like transit expansion. It is a ‘lowest common denominator’ spiral, and we cannot risk this escalating.

Third, we’ve seen the collapse of the deactivation theory of organizing. Republican turnout has been sky-high for four years of the worst president in a century. Initial returns indicate high Republican turnout — even in places Democrats won narrowly. During a pandemic. Sans the intercession of an alleged *pedophile* candidate (Roy Moore), it is rare that Republicans stay home. We should anticipate more polling errors in the future due to low trust and response rates among Republican voters. We should not have the tacit expectation that moderate messaging will prevent the inflammation of the Republican base. It is highly probable our ability to impact this is marginal in light of initial returns. Ticket splitting, from initial results, remains low, and when it does happen, it seems to favor Republicans. It is not likely, then, that any amount of short-term softening of rhetoric will depress turnout. As a result, sans actual, long term persuasion and conversion of Republicans into moderate Democrats (and moderate democrats into proper liberals), we will not be able to solve the problem of high Republican engagement in red districts.

It is true that mere mobilization is not enough in red and purple districts. But we should also respect that but for sky-high participation in Detroit, Philadelphia, the Navajo and Hopi Nations, Las Vegas, and Atlanta, we would have been completely fucked. This is thanks to Black Voters, Latino voters, Navajo and Hopi voters, and union organizing. We cannot understate that our reliance on these communities has been vindicated, and any strategy going forward has to ‘reward’ these voters with tangible progress and sustained investment. Punishing them for grievances held by the residents of purple and red districts further entrenches invidious hierarchies and and is counterproductive. And let’s be clear: when we talk about ‘softening rhetoric,’ in practice, this often means acquiescing to the prejudice of the target electorate (white voters) and distancing ourselves from Black voters. ‘Welfare,” “public housing,” “busing,” and other issues are not just objected to on technocratic grounds — people don’t like them because it reminds them of us.

Here’s my response to these problems.

It is neither workable nor pragmatic to expect politically toxic slogans that are specific to a given geographic area to go away. Pragmatism is not an aesthetic. It requires prediction. It requires models, and plans. There is no meaningful plan I am aware of that can completely mitigate the risks created by voters speaking off-message outside of the target district. We can barely get people to wear masks. The probability of total compliance among activists approaches zero. Further, the damage such a strategy would do to partisan infrastructure would be substantial. Further, virtually no national-level elected officials support defunding the police. Further, there is little to no evidence that such a strategy would address the cyclical surge in Republican turnout in vulnerable districts (and the sustained high floor for turnout). So what do we do? We need to solve this problem with field operation principles rather than communications principles.

First, we can soften the edges of public anger and increase popular support through canvassing, which in studies can have a causal impact — in one French study approaching approximately 3% of additional vote share. Arizona in particular benefited heavily from canvassing and outreach efforts to Latino voters. We can also improve our digital strategy and shift funds away from ad spending. We can tacitly give moderates the gift of attacking progressives rhetorically, if said moderates cooperate substantively. The AOC-Mancin beef is an example — it’s largely beneficial to both parties for them to fight in public. Both have voter bases that hate each other’s voter bases. Finally, we can become more nimble with our positive messaging in specific districts. We should invest into better polling so that we can remedy the polling errors introduced by low-trust voters and shy conservatives.

This is not the first time we have grappled with this issue. Abortion, gay rights, and even the ACA have had their turn being ‘the one obstacle’ to Democratic success. Indeed, this issue is so recurrent that ‘Dems in Disarray’ has become a meme. The frustration of some liberals is understandable: in the eyes of some commentators, the proposed answer to all circumstances, victory or defeat, is moderation of messaging and policy.

It is irrational to permit our policy debates to be pegged to the lowest common denominator in every circumstance. The stakes are too high. This is especially dire with regard to climate issues, wherein we have a literal ticking clock on our hands. We cannot operate as a party that is aggressive on offense and brittle on defense. While some issues must be abandoned, tactically, this should be a district by district decision made by the campaigns themselves — not national level operatives, press commentators, or even moderate members attempting to defend their turf. While I am sympathetic to the fears of those sympathetic to Rep. Spanberger, and to the lived experience of Rep. Clyburn, these fears appear to be grounded more in trauma and reactive emotion than a workable strategy. They are not ‘pragmatic’ despite urging moderation. This does not mean substantial work is required to persuade voters to soften their views on hot button issues — even black and brown voters. Nor does it mean that national Democrats should become fire-breathing bomb-throwers. But our strategies must be grounded by workable goals. Total party discipline is not workable.

I know it is not enough to have high minded ideals. We must win. But the counterbalance to hope isn’t fear. It’s clarity of vision. The facts we have available to us show us the outline what we must do. Our understanding of these facts will change as the scholarship improves. That does not change the ultimate conclusion: it is time to begin the process of following through.