Moscow’s Push for Multipolarity: A Bleak Future for Global Peace and Stability
By: Julian Postulart
Tags: Turkey, Geopolitics, Peace And Stability, Russia, World Order

Russian President Putin and his Turkish counterpart President Erdogan shake hands after a series of talks in Moscow, March 5, 2020. (source: Russian Presidential Press and Information Office)

‘Give him an inch and he’ll take a yard’ is probably what sums up Russian foreign policy best. Moscow’s involvement in Syria and Libya, and most recently Nagorno-Karabakh, has been instrumental to a strategy in which the Kremlin seeks to ally with other authoritarian regimes whenever this helps to prevent the West from gaining a foothold in regions Russia considers to be of national interest.

Russia’s tacit cooperation with Turkey has proven to be particularly powerful in that regard. It was first employed during the Syrian Civil War, when there were clear signs that the balance of power in Syria was shifting in favor of the West. As such, it was not inconceivable that Syria — a country with which Moscow has always maintained stable relations in an otherwise crucial but volatile region — would be the last bastion of Russian influence in Western Asia to change allegiance.

Hence, when a window of opportunity opened up after a series of terrorist attacks in the West, Putin’s Russia could establish itself as a co-combatant in the fight against terrorism, albeit on the side of Damascus. With the rise of Islamic State, this narrative strengthened and the gradual reduction of Western support for the Free Syrian Army created a power vacuum on the side of the Syrian opposition that was filled by Turkey.

Moscow’s intervention in Syria not only succeeded in pushing out the West, but also helped Russia to gain control of the conflict as the anti-Assad forces were now backed by a friendly authoritarian regime — that is, the semi-secular Turkey of President Erdogan. Since then, the course of the war has been largely predetermined in diplomatic backrooms rather than on the battlefield.

A similar scenario unfolded in Libya, where Russia and Turkey as intervening powers found themselves at opposing sides of the conflict as well. Not only did this simmer down regional tensions; the signing of the 23 October ceasefire has enabled both Moscow and Ankara to consolidate their influence in North Africa.

Even more recently, the Russo-Turkish tandem proved to be of great significance in putting an end to the hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh. After weeks of fighting, and no sign that the United States was willing to take on its traditional role as mediator, Moscow was, with the consent of Ankara, able to broker a ceasefire deal that plans for the deployment of several thousand Russian peacekeepers to the region.

Although initially for a period of five years, these peacekeepers are likely to stay indefinitely. The Russian presence will be a force to be reckoned with in any future peace settlement and renders the OSCE Minsk Group, a Western-dominated forum to encourage a negotiated resolution of the conflict, obsolete.

Moreover, for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there are Russian troops stationed on the internationally recognized territory of Azerbaijan. Whereas Moscow knows that without Turkey’s help, it is difficult to keep the West at bay, Russia’s peacekeepers also function as a deterrent to Ankara that it should not get too cozy with Baku. After all, the South Caucasus remains a region the Kremlin sees as part of its own backyard.

Indeed, over the past years, Russia has repeatedly demonstrated that it is actively looking for opportunities to push back on Western hegemony. However, carving out spheres of influence will go at the expense of maintaining relative peace and stability globally. Too little attention is paid to this dangerous trend that has developed in the margins of the predominant debate on the rise of China.

Naturally, politicians and scholars alike have focused on the relative ‘decline’ of the US as the world’s hegemon. Yet, the way in which great powers such as Russia and, to a lesser extent, Turkey, have sought to exploit the opportunities provided by the West’s preoccupation with China, poses a more serious threat to the global balance of power.

As a rule, unipolarity and even bipolarity produce more stability than multipolarity, as in case of the latter, states can easily misjudge the intentions of others. Still, this is where Russia’s geopolitical opportunism will bring us if the West allows Moscow to continue on this path.

In short, Russia’s geopolitical opportunism poses a bleak future. Due to its resulting multipolarity, Moscow seeks to create a world prone to conflict — something that should be avoided at all costs. To avert such a scenario, the West needs to change its relative disengagement in Syria and beyond before it is too late.