Georgia and the European Union
By: Fsi Student Programs
Tags: Georgia, Internships, Fsi Students, Stanford

About the author: Justin Tomczyk ’20 is an FSI Global Policy Intern with the Economic Policy Research Center. He is currently an a Master’s student in Russian, East European, Eurasian Studies, at Stanford University.

A major component of Georgian foreign policy is the ongoing process of Euro-Atlantic integration. In an effort to distance itself from the Russian Federation, Tbilisi has fostered closer ties with the major pillars of the Euro-Atlantic community. One of the most noteworthy examples of this partnership is Georgia’s relationship with NATO and the United States. Outside of the areas of security and defense, the European Union remains one of Georgia’s largest partners on economic and political matters. While this relationship is largely based on a mutual interest in extending the rules-based order of the European Union to the Caucasus, there is also the potential that European integration and a healthy relationship with the EU may be used as a counterweight against Russian aggression in the region. To many in the South Caucasus, the EU and its associated forms of governance represent a departure from the corruption, oligarchy, and general mismanagement seen since the collapse of the USSR. While naturally Georgia will continue to trade extensively with other countries in the post-Soviet space (due to geography and preexisting supply chains), integrating with the EU and its associated single market would be one of the most viable ways to develop an innovative economy and efficient governance while moving beyond the economic malaise seen in much the post-Soviet space.

Georgia’s main form of engagement with the EU is through the framework of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) — an initiative designed to foster closer ties between the EU and six former Soviet Republics in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. As a part of the Eastern Partnership, Georgia regularly participates in a variety of summits and conferences with not only representatives of the EU but also other members of the EaP. In addition to maintaining diplomatic relations with virtually every member of the EU, Georgia also maintains diplomatic representation with the union’s super-state structures through its embassy in Brussels and the EU delegation in Tbilisi. With regards to economic and political integration, two treaties serve as the bedrock for EU-Georgia relations. The first is the EU-Georgia Association Agreement, which is a bilateral treaty designed to approximate legal standards, regulations, and other elements of legislation between the EU and Georgia. The purpose of this is to enable a greater sense of political alignment between both parties. An example of the impact of this association agreement is the alignment of standards for biometric passports alongside entry and exit protocols, leading to the mutual removal of entry visas for citizens of Georgia and the EU. The second major treaty is the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), which is designed to remove as many barriers to trade as possible between Georgia and the EU. While the agreement does not contain provisions for the establishment of a customs union, the DCFTA has partially integrated Georgia into the Single Common Market while allowing Tbilisi to still hold and pursue FTAs with third parties.

Although Georgia has been officially elevated to the status of an “associate” of the European Union, Brussels’ often provides ambiguous posturing towards the prospects of future Georgian membership in the EU. The largest obstacle in Georgia’s EU aspirations is the unresolved status of territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. These two territories are de jure part of Georgia but under the de facto control of Russian-backed separatist authorities. The unresolved nature of these conflicts and occasional outbreaks in fighting raise the question of Georgia’s ability to maintain its own territorial integrity. Additionally, the notion of “expansion fatigue” has struck some parts of Western Europe following the 2004 eastern expansion of the EU. This is compounded by the perspective held by some in Brussels that eastward expansion of the EU serves to antagonize Russia. Regardless of these challenges, Georgia has shown itself to be a committed partner of the European Union and will likely remain the EU’s main partner in the South Caucasus.