The Clash Between Khrushchev and Castro After the Cuban Missile Crisis
By: Emmanuel Rosado
Tags: Politics, Cuba, Books, War, History

The Clash Between Khrushchev and Castro After the Cuban Missile Crisis Emmanuel Rosado Follow May 20 · 9 min read

Fidel Castro and Nikita Khrushchev make their way in the midst of a crowd / World-Telegram & Sun photo by Herman Hiller (Library of Congress).

In 1955, after Stalin’s death in 1953, plus a battle for command of the USSR, Nikita Khrushchev came to power. Intentions to protect Eastern Europe, the crisis in Berlin, and concerns about nuclear weapons were a focus in Soviet policy.

However, Khrushchev’s policy and attitude were different from that of his predecessor. Khrushchev did not use obscure terminologies of Marxism-Leninism to justify his decisions and proceed with any situation; often, he made hasty decisions without any rigorous analysis of the consequences. These contrasts were notable in the little discretion that the leader of the Soviet Union had when using secret plans, as was the “Cuban Missile Crisis”.

It is in the Khrushchev panorama that the episode of the Cuban Revolution and the new strategies with the Caribbean enter. Fidel Castro came to power in 1959, however, the Soviet-Cuban relationship was not made official immediately.

The Revolution was perceived in the foreground by the Soviet Union as one of an anti-imperialist nature. However, nothing was highlighted in the Soviet press about their approach to Cuba or about a new socialist country, as Jacques Lévesque explains:

In reading the articles in the Soviet press for the greater part of 1959, one is struck by the absence of any mention of Soviet support of Cuba or promises of support, even merely political support. The events taking place in Cuba, although presented in a very favorable light, never led to more than vague expressions of moral support; the press mentioned, for example, the sympathy “of all peace-loving peoples” and avoided explicitly involving the Soviet Union.[1]

The relationship between Cuba and the USSR was gradually developing. The duality in which Khrushchev and the USSR walked, forced a non-immediate approach. At the time of the events in Cuba, Khrushchev was touring the United States, in an attempt to détente between the two powers. From New York to Camp David, Khrushchev’s new image tried to create a less aggressive atmosphere, recalling new nuclear possibilities.

However, Eisenhower was alarmed at the possibility of having the Soviets in the western hemisphere. Machiavellically, the USSR approached economically first, committing to buy sugar from Cuba, which at first instance was not so alarming, given that in 1960 they promised to buy, for two years, 31.3 million dollars in sugar, which was a substantial drop, given that in 1957 alone, Cuba had received $47.1 million dollars for its sugar (when Cuba was under Batista). The Soviet Union preferred that the United States also continue to buy sugar from Cuba, but when the latter (USA), in retaliation, did not commit to buying 700,000 tons of sugar from Cuba, Khrushchev had to commit to also buy those tons. The more they committed financially, the more funds the Soviets were redirecting to the Caribbean country.[2]

Not only was the purchase of sugar under Khrushchev used for a Soviet rapprochement in the Caribbean. Castro had access to loans of 250 million at 2.5 percent annual interest in 1960. Cuba “wanted to move away from sugar and diversify and industrialize” the country. According to Robert F. Lamberg: “In February 1963 and January 1964, new long-term investment and delivery agreements were concluded with the Soviet Union. However, none of these agreements included military aid to Cuba.”

Cuba had become the new symbol against anti-imperialism and socialist possibility in America. In 1961 the Latin American Institute was founded, “within the system of the USSR Academy of Sciences to advance further improvements in research work on Latin America in our country.” In addition, Cuba stimulated a sharper approach of the Soviet Union in Latin America, in August 1961, “Secretary of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, M.P. Geordgadze, visited Brazil, Ecuador and Cuba. This was a most important diplomatic step which surpassed earlier athletic and cultural contacts in its significance.” [3]

For the USSR, Cuba’s strategic point was convenient. Located right next to the United States, it gave them the necessary range, able to launch missiles towards the main cities of the United States or at least — something that was very common about the quality of political strategy that Khrushchev implemented — to have a chip to balance the dynamics of the Cold War and making the United States think twice before engaging in direct aggression with the USSR.

On the other hand, Cuba was already going through an economic crisis, nationalizing the private sector and receiving 90% of profits through its “scientific socialism”. The Soviet Union could offer them an economic pact, on equal terms; Cuba being a lodging for their nuclear weapons and thus a withdrawal of US aggression.

The above was not paranoid thinking, given that in 1961 the US, Kennedy, and the CIA had already tried to stop the Castro government through the “Bay of Pigs” maneuver. However, a debate sparked: Was it an equal treatment? Did the USSR simply see Cuba as a lower priority? A simple nuclear warehouse?

In a way, this debate grew during the tensions of 1962 with the “Missile Crisis”. On the heels of the confirmation of a “socialist” Cuba, Khrushchev designed his most ambitious plan during his leadership. In 1962, the Soviet Union did not yet have the necessary nuclear power to confront or at least push back the United States from the table of negotiations.

While the latter had bases all over Europe, the Soviets barely had a close point to actually deliver their new rockets to America. Cuba presented the ideal place to move the missiles into America and to create a balance. Again, Khrushchev had to work under a pantomime of actions, which did not raise suspicion of the US about any movement of nuclear warheads.

In July 1962, Raúl Castro visited Moscow and the “Anadyr” plan was made official, which agreed on “missile deployment and other Cuban defense issues.” In the first instance, the plan was justified before the people and certain officials as a strategy to defend socialist Cuba.

As Lévesque explains, a certain justification was not so far-fetched, given that, after the failure of the “Bay of Pigs”, President John F. Kennedy was ready to design another plan to invade the island, putting the plan under General Maxwell Taylor. But, the real strategy was always geopolitical. Cuba had a privileged position that would “equalize the West” and finally achieve “the balance of power.”

Khrushchev’s strategy in the general scheme was not an empty illusion. If the USSR truly wanted to slow the advancement of the West and weaken the dominant Cold War psychology regarding American superiority — given its many bases around Europe; an approach through the patio of the US could do it.

Still, Khrushchev did not count on several factors. His hasty demeanor in combination with bluffing made any future confrontation more delicate than it should have. Already, the incursions into Berlin and the Suez crisis had shown a hesitant and insecure man.

He decided to leave the shadow of Stalin and in search of finally succeeding in putting on site the new weapons developments of the Soviet Union and its military-industrial complex. In a way, although to a certain extent beneficial for Cuba, the Latin American country found itself in the midst of a collision that defined the times.