A Precarious Peace: Education as a Double-Edged Sword in Post-Dayton Bosnia
By: Julian Postulart
Tags: Balkans, Dayton Agreement, Bosnia And Herzegovina, Turkey, Education

A sign demarcating the border between the Serbian-dominated Republic of Srpska and the Muslim-majority part of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (source: Wikimedia Commons)

More than 25 years after Bosnian war ended, Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter referred to as Bosnia) remains a divided country. Even today, Serbs and Muslims live more or less segregated. In the countryside, this largely invisible border becomes more obvious, as demonstrated by large signs that say: ‘Welcome to the Republic of Srpska.’

Indeed, Bosnia is not merely divided, it consists of two relatively independent statelets: a Serbian one with a relatively strong separatist movement, and another one in which most of the country’s Muslims and Croats live.

To complicate matters, these two entities have their own governments that each provide a representative to the country’s rotating presidency, which includes a Croat as well. Finally, there is also the Office of the High Representative (OHR), a delegate from the European Union that functions as a de facto viceroy with far-reaching influence over Bosnian politics, including veto powers.

This institutional complexity has been a direct consequence of the 1995 Dayton Agreement. Although this peace settlement finally ended the Bosnian War, it also left the country without effective self-government. Bosnia’s political intricacy has been the result of international pressure to stop the fighting as quick as possible, thus risking ‘imperfections’ in the agreement’s implementation. As such, some scholars have argued that:

[a] convoluted system incapable of functioning without external support emerged, and the international community would soon be confronted with a dilemma: either overturn Dayton and risk renewed violence, or stick with Dayton and stay indefinitely — Christopher Chivvis

Clearly, the supranational powers involved in Bosnian politics have been deferring a decision to the point of creating an untenable political situation. Indeed, as claimed by Chivvis, segregation of the country’s ethnic groups has only deepened in recent years.

This development has been especially evident in Bosnia’s educational system and already renders one side of the dilemma obsolete, i.e. that of sticking with the Dayton Agreement. Thus, unless the international community is willing to accept the Serbian part of the country to secede from the rest of Bosnia, with all that this implies, national actors in the region should face the only remaining option — that is, overturning the 1995 peace accords.

Such a decision would, as Chivvis righteously points out, risk a new outbreak of the violence that was seen in the first half of the 1990s. Yet, by doing nothing, a similar situation would emerge that could soon spiral out of control. To prevent this from happening, those involved should take the necessary steps to prepare a contingency plan if things go sideways.

In doing so, supranational actors should rely upon the lessons learnt from the mistakes made during the Bosnian War. A repetition of the horrors of Srebrenica should in that regard be seen as a worst-case scenario.

The fall of this UN-protected ‘safe area’ and the subsequent genocide of thousands of Muslim men, has largely been the result of the unwillingness of the international community, whether it be the UN, NATO, or national governments, to get entangled in the bigger crisis of war.

The unconditional commitment of national actors to ‘save’ Srebrenica would definitely have changed the course of history. Hence, in the case of contemporary Bosnia, it is the threat of direct military intervention that would deter domestic factions from picking up arms if ‘Dayton’ was to be renegotiated.

However, this should not imply that supranational partners such as the UN should let go of their traditional stance of impartiality. In the complex case of Bosnia, picking sides is messy. Instead, ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are qualifications that can be used interchangeably, depending on what starting point one has in explaining ethnic segregation in Bosnia.

As such, Bosnian Serbs are often labeled as the country’s primary source of instability. Indeed, this group has repeatedly threatened to declare independence per referendum, and more recently, also decided to harmonize much of their educational curricula with those in Serbia proper. Although allowed under the widely criticized Bosnian constitution, such decisions further entrench ethno-cultural divisions within the country, as they reproduce inter-ethnic hatred for generations to come.

Yet, that is not to say that the country’s largest ethnic group, the Bosnian Muslims, has been any less guilty in maintaining such tensions, despite the violence of Srebrenica. On the contrary, Serbian separatism within Bosnia did not develop in a vacuum. For a more nuanced picture, it is therefore important to look at its root causes as well.

Since the end of the war in the 1990s, Turkey has sought to expand its political influence over Muslim-majority parts of Bosnia by emphasizing the longstanding historical relations between both countries. Whereas neighboring states merely thought of the ‘Turks’ as a disruption in the course of history, Bosnian Muslims hope to gloss over this period by including it in their country’s historiography.

Concretely, this has affected the Bosnian educational system, as it enables Ankara to influence textbooks and curricula. Hence, it should come as no surprise that this process of neo-Ottomanism sustains anti-Muslim sentiment among the non-Muslim population of Bosnia.

In sum, education in Bosnia is a double-edged sword. Not only does it serve the (geo)political interests of Turkey in the Balkan region; it also functions as a way for the Bosnian Serbs to respond to what they perceive as a growing Muslim threat.

If the international community is to turn Bosnia into a more viable political entity, those involved should be well-aware of the potential that education has, both for creating and solving (future) conflict in Bosnia. Moreover, when national actors are willing to step in and prevent a new outbreak of violence, it is important they address both secessionism and its root causes by not only forcing Bosnian Serbs back to the negotiating table, but also by revising the country’s educational system, as laid down in the Bosnian constitution.

For that reason, it is important that organizations like the UN and NATO keep the military option in reserve, while directly involving Turkey in the renegotiation of the Dayton Agreement. Apart from having close ties with the Bosnian Muslims, Ankara maintains good relations with Serbia as well.

Turkey could use this trilateral format to force the Bosnian Serbs into compliance with a new peace accord, while consolidating its influence in Muslim-majority regions of Bosnia, even when pro-Turkish educational policies are reversed.

Of course, relying on an elusive cooperation of (supra)national actors for educational reform may be a tricky mission altogether. However, the only certainty there is, is that if no action is undertaken, the current agreement will cause inter-ethnic divisions to deepen, thus paving the way for a repetition of the Bosnian War.