China’s Obsession with Sinicization of Tibetan Buddhism
By: Jamphel Shonu
Tags: Dalai Lama, Sinicization, Tibet, Buddhism, China

One of the most notable and significant events to have taken place with regard to the Tibet issue in the last few months was China’s Seventh Work Forum on Tibet held from 29–30 August. The key takeaway from the meeting was the Chinese government’s call for renewed emphasis on Sinicizing Tibetan Buddhism. Although China’s emphasis on controlling Tibetan Buddhism is not something new, the call to renew its efforts to Sinicize Tibetan Buddhism in its latest forum on Tibet illustrate China’s growing challenges in assimilating Tibetan people and culture.

As a state objective, cultural assimilation of its minorities such as the Tibetans, Uyghurs, Mongols, Zhuangs, etc., serve a dual purpose for China. First, assimilation of its minority ethnicities remain key to China’s ongoing process of nation building. Second, it safeguards China’s territorial integrity as the modern Chinese state exists within frontiers that are multi-ethnic in nature such as East Turkestan in the northwest, Tibet in the Southwest, Inner Mongolia in the north, and Zhuang and other minorities in its southern border with the Indo-China regions.

In the case of Tibet, for centuries, China, earlier under the imperial dynasties and now under the CCP, has faced a unique challenge in dealing with the Tibetan people. The Chinese notion of the nation rests on Han identity and its perceived superior culture. There exists a belief of a superior China surrounded by less sophisticated, less developed, peoples. According to this view, as the non-Chinese begin to recognize the glory of the Chinese civilization, they would gravitate towards China and seek to integrate into the Chinese civilization, in other words, willingly assimilate into the Chinese fold. However, the resilience and the prosper of a distinct Tibetan civilization on China’s southwest belies this notion. In contrast, Tibet has historically looked towards India in its south as the source of high culture, not China. This has been so particularly since the Great Debate of Samye, also known as the Council of Lhasa, between the Chinese Buddhist monk Heshang Moheyan and Kamalasila in the eighth century. Ever since, Tibetan culture underwent broad changes and a particular brand of Mahayana Buddhism, specifically referred to as Tibetan Buddhism, began to infuse every aspect of Tibetan culture, thereby giving Tibetans a distinct identity. When the Chinese army arrived in 1950 and occupied Tibet in 1959, it was Tibetan Buddhism and its monasteries and monks that became Tibet’s symbolic structures and icons of identity challenging Chinese occupation. The Tibetan attitude of Choesi Sungdrel — the blend of religion and politics, is another tension that confounds the modern Chinese leadership in its control of Tibet. As such, China sees Tibetan Buddhism as the essence of Tibet, and without controlling or distorting it, it knows it cannot effectively make Tibet into China.

In Marxist formulation, organised religion in any form is defined as ‘opium of the people’. Tibetan Buddhism as such was no different. Mao’s infamous quote ‘religion is poison’ that was whispered into His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s ear during their meeting in 1954 was an indication of that attitude towards religion. In tune with this ideology, Tibetan Buddhism faced an onslaught of destruction under Mao’s campaign of destroying the ‘Four Olds’: old ideas, old culture, old habits, and old customs during the Cultural Revolution. Despite the destructive policies of the Cultural Revolution, China’s principle of regional ethnic autonomy (multi-nation state) remained consistent since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. Due to the consistency of the ethnic autonomy laws, with the culmination of the Cultural Revolution after Mao’s death, the restrictions on religion were relaxed and a brief respite prevailed for minority cultures and religions. However, the system favoring ethnic minorities under the regional autonomy system reached a turning point in 2008. This turning point, reflected by a renewed emphasis on cultural assimilation (one nation, one state), under the erstwhile Hu Jintao and the current Xi Jinping administrations, was a result of the majority Han Chinese ethnicity’s response to the unrest in Tibet (2008) and East Turkestan (2009). The reaction of the Han Chinese public towards these unrests took the Chinese government by surprise. Given that Han Chinese account for 90% of China’s population, simmering discontent among the Han was seen as a source of instability for the survival of the CCP. To mollify Han Chinese grievances and anger, even if it meant coming down hard on minorities such as Tibetans and Uyghurs, the Chinese government started reinvigorating their emphasis on cultural assimilation and integration since 2008. For the Chinese leadership, any attempt to appease the minorities meant inflaming Han Chinese grievances, and addressing ethnic minorities’ complaints was rendered unimportant even when the minorities have legitimate social or political grievances.

The Communist Party’s legitimacy is associated with the economic development that it was able to bring in the rest of China. Yet economic development takes second place to social stability when it comes to regime survival. Chinese history, including that of the Communist Party itself, has maintained that social unrest leads to revolution. Therefore, to ensure the Communist Party’s survival as China’s hegemon, and assuage Han Chinese public’s anger at perceived minority advantages, the CPC has shifted from a policy of multi-nation China to creating a China of one nation, one state, and one ethnicity. This is being done through a state-led effort to erode ethnic identity as evidenced by its policies of cultural assimilation. From the point of view of this state policy, Tibet’s Buddhism-infused culture is the main stumbling block towards its goal of cultural assimilation. Hence, the ongoing effort on sinicizing Tibetan Buddhism by the Chinese government. And the call for a renewed emphasis on sinicizing Tibetan Buddhism during the 7th Tibet Work Forum was just another example of this policy.