Business as Usual: An Overview of Indonesian Covid-19 Policies
By: Arerazi, Alifian Arrazi
Tags: Covid, Indonesia, Political Economy, Indonesia Covid Policy, Public Policy

It has been a year and a half since Indonesia had covid-19 cases. Since then, few policies effectively lessen Covid-19 in this country. The fundamental problems that arose in Indonesia are not yet been fixed. Many people agreed that bureaucracy, miscommunication, and anti-science administration (also society) are the problem of our policy implementation. Nevertheless, the problem goes beyond that. The intertwined problem is consists of a weak political institution, a tremendous amount of concentrated economic growth, and a disproportionate power within the civil society. This article is going to explore the topic of Covid-19 policies using a Political-Economy lens.

Indonesia is one of the most growing economies in Southeast Asia. With a 5,05 YoY growth (2019), it is higher than any region, such as Singapore and Malaysia. This economic powerhouse is supported by growth in the services sector. The notion of social restrictions policy (such as PSBB/PPKM) in Indonesia is questionable by the public because of the effectiveness of its policy. Many people criticized the government for being selective in doing the policy. It argues that the government only imposed the policy on those who do not have government access (wong cilik). Other people advocate that the government impose a lockdown to contain the pandemic more effectively. The majority of the public wants the government to have strict regulations. Then, why is the government inconsistently do not imposed a more strict regulation to contain the pandemic — such as lockdown? Why, we, as a consumer of the government services, do not get what we want?

Besides the economical factor that the government needs to deal with to provide goods and services based on Kekarantinaan Wilayah Bill, the author argues that the government had other motives. In 1845 French candlemaker had its writing criticized called Candlestick Maker petition. In this petition, the manufacturer of a candlestick is demanding the government to help them. At that time, they need to compete with goods that have an absolute advantage. The candlestick manufacture argues that the sun is slashing the production of a candlestick. Yes, the sun. Therefore, they proposed that the government impose a law to prohibit people from using a window or using the sun. The candlemaker argues that this phoneme will drive up the economy of the candlestick and reduce unemployment. While Frederic Bastiat rejects the argument of candlestick makers, this axiom brings a tricky question. In a market-based economy, Who does the government stands for? Is it the consumer or the producer?

If the government stands with the consumer, then the argument of the candlestick maker is not rational at all. Because of this scenario, the consumer may lose many of its productive resources to buy the candlestick. Nevertheless, if the government stands with the producer, the notion of candlestick maker is a rational choice. From this point, we can interpret that in Covid-19 policies, the government stands with the produce. One of the reasons this decision can happen is that the government sees that if they reduce economic activity, the impact is concentrated. The government is scared that if significant industries are not open, there is a considerable unemployment rate, leading to a recession. Besides that, the interest of these companies is sometimes similarly aligned with the government. In its study conducted by Aspinall and many other researchers, money politics is very common in Indonesia. In addition, Aspinall and Mada Sukmajati view primary elections in various provinces in Indonesia. The conclusion is that money politics (which consists of many types such as pork barrel, club goods, et cetera) is still a favorably effective way to win the election. The notion of how inadequate political funding in Indonesia is also explored by Marcus Mietzner in his book, Money, Power, and Ideology (2014) that eloquently elaborates this topic. With the high price of being a political figure, a substantial amount of money flows to the elite. Many of this money came from conglomerates, private companies, or major corporations. It makes sense if there is private participation in defining or exercising the public interest.

Apart from that, if the consumer pays a higher price, the impact is distributed — not concentrated. With 270 million people, the government thinks this amount of people can distribute the impact of Covid-19 more proportionally. The upper and middle-income socioeconomic status (SES) would afford the capacity to have self-isolation. Leaving the lower-income SES that could be taken care of by the government. Besides that, the consumer also did not have a significant stakeholder that is aligned with their interest. The appointed legislative that function as an echo mechanism for the people is not enough. The party’s power structure favors an involuntary mechanism to support the party, even if the preferred policy is not aligned with the constituent or precampaign moment. The power structure determined by the party makes it harder to voice a parliamentary movement. The risk of being replaced by the Pergantian Antar Waktu (PaW) mechanism makes it inconvenient to create vibrant dynamics in Senayan. In addition, with only two (or maybe three) parties in parliament that opposed the government policy, the public was also left with fewer options. In sum, The power-sharing, rainbow coalition, and party cartelization conditions make it harder for the public to aggregate their interest at the parliamentary level. Left with CSO and NGO, the public does not have an adequate instrument for exercising their interest.

References

Aspinall, E., & Sukmajati, M. (2015). Politik uang di Indonesia: Patronase dan klientelisme pada pemilu legislatif 2014. PolGov.

Mietzner, M. (2013). Money, Power, and Ideology. NUS Press; JSTOR. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1nthsj