Alfred T. Mahan’s Wrong Prediction
By: Márton Ujvári
Tags: Warships, History, Theodore Roosevelt, Navy, American History

Alfred T. Mahan’s Wrong Prediction

The Great White Fleet Passing Through Magellan Straits by Henry Reuterdahl / Source: U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command

In 1890 American Naval Captain Alfred T. Mahan published one of the most influential books ever published on naval history. In The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660–1783, he brought attention to how controlling the seas had a profound effect on the outcome of wars and history in general.

While much of the book is extremely thought-provoking and shows how important controlling the sea has been not just from 1660, but even from Ancient Athens and Rome, when it came to the future, he made a terrible prediction in the introduction of his book:

“As the United States has at present no aggressive purposes, and as its merchant service has disappeared, the dwindling of the armed fleet and general lack of interest in it are strictly logical consequences. When for any reason sea trade is again found to pay, a large enough shipping interest will reappear to compel the revival of the war fleet. It is possible that when a canal route through the Central American Isthmus is seen to be a near certainty, the aggressive impulse may be strong enough to lead to the same result. This is doubtful, however, because a peaceful, gain-loving nation is not far-sighted, and far-sightedness is needed for adequate military preparation, especially in these days.” (Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History)

Alfred Thayer Mahan, one of the most influential thinkers in American naval history / Source: britannica.com

The short summary is something like this: Mahan saw it unlikely that his government would be willing to fight if there was any threat to the Panama Canal. He based this view upon the fact that at the time of his writing the United States didn’t seem particularly interested in becoming a naval power.

While at the time it might’ve seemed as if the United States would not pursue overseas ambitions or have a significant navy, there was one person who paid particular attention to Mahan’s views. That was Theodore Roosevelt, who became the President of the United States in 1901. Under his two terms, the United States increased the size of its navy to the point where it became the third-largest in the world after Great Britain and France.

How he was wrong

US President Theodore Roosevelt, one of the fathers of the US Navy / Source: US Library of congress

Ultimately, it was this shift in American strategic thinking that resulted in the United States (US) opting to support Panama militarily in its struggle for independence when negotiations about the Panama Canal broke down with Colombia. The United States, contrary to what Mahan predicted, was willing to go to war over its commercial interests. The interesting paradox is that Mahan’s book had a profound influence on Theodore Roosevelt and his aim of making the US a real naval power.

This naval expansion was crucial for America, as the Spanish-American war of 1898 forced the US Navy to go beyond its previous role of defending the US coastline to take the fight to the enemy. The overseas territories (Puerto Rico, Guam, Philippines) taken from Spain at the end of this war and the annexation of Hawaii also made a larger navy necessary to guard lines of communication between these territories and the US mainland. Roosevelt and his contemporaries realized this necessity and built a formidable navy that was capable not only of defending the coastline but also of deploying thousands of miles from home.

The most symbolic moment of this transformation of American naval doctrine was the voyage of the ‘Great White Fleet’: 16 battleships and their escort vessels from America’s Atlantic Fleet circumnavigated the globe between 1907 and 1909. In terms of foreign policy this was intended as both a show of force to potential rivals and as a diplomatic mission: although it was a fleet of warships, white was the peacetime paint for the US Navy and the twenty port calls were mostly friendly courtesy calls — a common practice in diplomatic relations at the time. The voyage also served as practice for the tens of thousands of seamen serving aboard these vessels. Decisionmakers understood that having extensive sailing experience was crucial for an effective navy in wartime.

In the decades following the Great White Fleet’s voyage, the United States took over Great Britain as the largest naval power in the world. Today, America operates half of all aircraft carriers and by far the largest fleet of cruisers as well as naval bases in 17 different countries in addition to US overseas territories. Alfred T. Mahan remains one of the most influential strategic thinkers when it comes to seapower and naval strategy — that is due to both his historical analysis and practical recommendations contained in his book.