Part Two: Doing too Much Loses Wars — Like Afghanistan
By: Mason Nsi
Tags: Military, Afghanistan, War, Conflict, Featured Analysis

By Mike Nelson and Jennifer Cafarella, NSI Visiting Fellows

Mistakes are inevitable in war. The recurring strategic failure the United States experienced in Afghanistan demands serious reflection, however. There is no question that American leaders should have done better — both at home and in Afghanistan. While we cannot soon repair those mistakes, it is essential that we learn from them and ensure they do not recur in other theaters.

The serious debate about objectives that should have shaped U.S. strategy as the Taliban fought to reclaim Afghanistan’s future never materialized. In the absence of an informed and engaged public, U.S. leaders escaped greater scrutiny and isolationist narratives took root. Americans did have basic expectations regarding the war, however. Americans both within and outside the military expected to never again face the terror and loss we experienced on 9/11 and to deliver justice for those responsible. Many envisioned a better future for the Afghans. After all, that’s what the greatest nation in the world ought to be able to deliver.

U.S. leaders only recognized a hard reality that undermined our efforts as we headed for the exit: the Taliban would never come to the negotiating table absent a role in Afghanistan’s future. President Trump’s effort to broker compromise between the Taliban and the Afghan government came too late. The military balance had become a stalemate and U.S. will had eroded. The decision to cut a separate deal with the Taliban in exchange for a U.S. withdrawal doomed Afghanistan to a new phase of civil war in which the Taliban could gain the upper hand over the government.

However, the United States did accomplish some positive outcomes that were central to our initial purpose in entering the war, albeit far short of victory. The United States has enjoyed twenty years of relative safety from al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks due to the pressure the U.S. maintained on al Qaeda leaders and networks in Afghanistan. The United States also revolutionized our special operations capabilities, creating advantages our adversaries dream of replicating and which are necessary for the new phase of competition with rising powers like Russia and China. U.S. leaders should be identifying these important outcomes for the public.

The U.S. also achieved some objective good. An entire generation of Afghan girls has received an education. Many have gone on to universities in Afghanistan and abroad and have made — and will continue to make — enormous contributions to their nation’s legacy. Millions have received medical care and other services that were unthinkable under the Taliban. These outcomes are a disappointing minimum given the scale of our effort, but no less important to the Afghans whose lives we’ve changed.

Afghans now face a dark future, however. The most likely and best-case scenario would be for the Taliban to control only a few provinces and occasionally extend attacks into government-controlled population centers. Yet, the rate of districts falling to the Taliban as U.S. forces withdraw indicate it will be much worse. The Taliban could again march into Kabul to seize control. Regional instability will add fuel to the fire, including competition between India and Pakistan, backed by China. Transnational jihadists will flourish. The Taliban is already allowing al Qaeda to scale back up operations from areas it controls and could allow new external attacks. U.S. leaders are again failing the public by glossing over or putting positive spin on the outcomes we’re accepting as we leave.

Americans cannot afford to fail to learn the lessons of Afghanistan. U.S. operations in Syria already reflect similar mistakes. In Syria, the United States has pursued lofty objectives that are unattainable with the levels of resources committed, such as a nationwide ceasefire. U.S. operations have achieved important wins, including defeating ISIS’s physical caliphate, but risk becoming an open-ended conflict absent achievable near-term objectives. Just like Afghanistan, early military successes and opportunities have been hampered by indecision and vague objectives. The differences between the Syrian war and the one we’ve abandoned in Afghanistan are numerous, but the harmful policy habits that contributed to our defeat in Afghanistan could cause us to lose important gains yet again.

Fredrick the Great famously warned, “He who defends everything, defends nothing.” America’s experience in Afghanistan demonstrates that he who dedicates effort to win everything — with nothing clearly definable — may well win nothing. Wholesale retreat from the world, as some advocate, is no solution for the world’s challenges or America’s failings. Avoiding threats does not deter them and refusing to face difficult challenges will not produce the good leadership Americans and Afghans alike deserve. Leadership requires action, along with the humility to recognize error and the courage to remedy it. We failed to deliver this in Afghanistan. But there remains no nation more capable of accomplishing its bold aims. Americans simply must rediscover the will.

Jennifer Cafarella is the inaugural National Security Fellow at the Institute for the Study of War and an NSI Visiting Fellow.

Michael D. Nelson is an Army Special Forces Lieutenant Colonel and currently serves as Professor of Military Science and Chair of the Military Science Department at George Mason University.

Previously, he served as the Deputy Director of the Commander’s Action Group at United States Central Command for General Joseph Votel. In this capacity he served as a direct adviser to the CENTCOM Commander and was responsible for coordinating all strategic communication between the CENTCOM Commander and political and military leaders throughout the Middle East and Central Asia.