Jihad in the Desert
By: Not Even Past
Tags: Middle East, Not Even Past, Al Qaeda, Terrorism, Sahel

Understanding Al-Qaeda’s position in the Sahel

Photo: AFP / Souleymane Ag Anara

The caves of Tora Bora in eastern Afghanistan lay empty as the War of Terror raged on. The United States had managed to dislodge Al-Qaeda from their sanctuaries in Afghanistan from which they were able to plan and successfully carry out their devastating attack on September 11. Rather than ‘Mission Accomplished,’ Al-Qaeda still exists in Afghanistan and has multiple franchises across the world such as Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). None perhaps are currently as potent as Al-Qaeda’s presence in the Sahel, that long strip of semi-arid land that stretches across Africa just under the Sahara desert. Operating under the umbrella organisation known by the acronym ‘JNIM’, Al-Qaeda has combined with other local jihadi groups in the region to wage a campaign of violence against local government and French armed forces there to assist in combatting these groups. Far from being defeated by the War on Terror Al-Qaeda lives on with increasing success in the sands of West Africa.

The past eighteen-year counter-terror campaign by the US and its allies against the group devastated its organisational ability. However, in recent years Al-Qaeda has made somewhat of a resurgence. In 2014 it got some well needed breathing space from being Enemy №1 when a newcomer on the jihadi stage emerged in the form of the so-called Islamic State. This organisation captured the attention of the world with the speed of its conquests and its media-savvy brutality, overshadowing Al-Qaeda as the main terrorist threat in the eyes of the public. It seems that Al-Qaeda have been conducting a policy of remaining behind the scenes, discouraging the use of its world famous brand in favour of front organisations, allowing the

Islamic State to take the brunt of counter-terror operations, and in turn gather its own strength to strike in vulnerable places such as the poverty-stricken, ethnically diverse Sahel region.

JNIM

The Al-Qaeda franchise in the region dates back to 2007 when Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was formed. In 2011 the group split when AQIM militants critical of a leadership that was dominated by Algerians broke away to form the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), which was comprised of more native Sahelians and contextualised its jihadi ideology in a West African context. Another split occurred in 2012, this group becoming known as al-Mulathamun. Eight months later these two offshoot groups would themselves merge into al-Murabitoun. The Tuareg rebellion of 2012, an early stage of the ongoing Mali War, also gave rise to a jihadi group known as Ansar al-Dine and in 2015 the Macina Liberation Front (MLF) was formed. These four groups merged in 2017 to create Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), which pledged allegiance to al-Zawahiri the current leader of Al-Qaeda.

JNIM has been responsible for 65% of all terrorist fatalities in the Sahel. Their strongest presence is in Mali, which unsurprisingly has been the focal point of militant violence in the region. Indeed, MINUSMA, the UN peacekeeping mission in the region has become the most dangerous mission in the organisation’s history. The success of JNIM has been made possible by poor governance, porous borders, ethnic tension, large ungoverned spaces and high levels of poverty exacerbated by climate change. The central government in Mali is not widely trusted by all groups within the country; longstanding divides between sedentary and pastoralist populations remain, as well as divisions between the north and south where there exist large areas where the government has no real presence. In these spaces JNIM can fill a governance vacuum left by the central government, providing security to communities that feel threatened. This threat often comes in the form of violence between different ethnic groups, such as the regional Tuareg and Fulani. JNIM successfully exploits these tensions to its own benefit, gaining recruits and legitimacy as the force in the region that can provide a degree of security. Furthermore, in the context of a region that suffers from high levels of poverty that are increasing due to climate change, JNIM acts as a well of opportunity for many young men. Many

of JNIM’s recruits join less because of religious ideology and more due to the opportunities that joining the group provides, including access to arms for security, as well as the chance to participate in ventures that bring in wealth for the group, such as cattle rustling and the control of local resources. Often recruits join the group on an ad-hoc basis, paid to carry out a specific attack and then leaving until they are recruited again. The fall of the Gadaffi regime in Libya in 2011 made the level of violence in the area possible as it saw a massive influx of arms spread south to the Sahel, giving JNIM access to the firepower needed to launch successful attacks against its regional rivals. The porous borders not only allow the guns to flow in but also allow JNIM fighting groups to flow out. After launching an attack JNIM forces can escape across a border into safety from reprisal.

Sharing the Desert

The fall of the caliphate in Iraq and Syria has not spelt the end for the Islamic State which continues to operate in multiple areas across the globe. Many groups have formed which pledge allegiance to the caliphate such as in Afghanistan and the Philippines. In 2016 the leader of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, recognised the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). It became to be seen as an emerging force in the region after its first large foray in October 2017 which resulted in the deaths of Nigerian and US troops. Though it has carried out some deadly attacks ISGS remains a relatively small group with only around 200–300 members. JNIM remains the larger group and is responsible for more deaths in the region. However due to the global notoriety of the Islamic State in recent years, there has been more counter-terrorism focus on ISGS as the ‘new kid on the block,’ whilst JNIM has flown under the radar.

Unlike in other areas of the world where relations between Islamic State and Al-Qaeda have been hostile, there is some evidence that there exists a somewhat amicable relationship between JNIM and ISGS and perhaps even some cooperation. Besides a notable clash in 2015 the two groups have largely avoided targeting one another. In 2016 the two groups were in contact, and leaders of JNIM and ISGS have met and members have been seen together. There has been more familiarity at the lower levels of both groups. Both JNIM and ISGS tap into the same local grievances to gain recruits and so local members of both groups therefore share a close

connection to one another. JNIM remains the most potent Islamic terror group in the region but it must share the Sahel with others such as ISGS in the ongoing campaign for domination of the region.

The Future of Al-Qaeda in the Sahel

2019 saw 4,000 fatalities with the vast majority perpetrated by JNIM. The group’s ability to maintain a powerful presence in the Sahel has not diminished and attempts to dismantle them have not worked. The French counterterrorism force in the region, Operation Barkhane, which has attempted to stabilise the Sahel against groups like JNIM has been largely unsuccessful. The Malian government has attempted to open peace negotiations with JNIM, displaying the strong foothold JNIM has in the country. The group, perhaps sensing the strength of their position, have set one major precondition to negotiations with the Mali government and that is that the French must remove its forces from the country.

For the United States there has been a shift in security priorities, moving the spotlight from counterterrorism to a focus on the increasing multi-polar threat from states such as Russia and China. This has led to the US administration contemplating a major drawdown of its forces in the Sahel as well as reducing its support for France’s operations, despite no decrease in the threat posed by JNIM. Indeed, the Al-Qaeda franchise will benefit greatly from a lack of international attention on the region as it will it allow a space for radicalisation to increase, which in turn creates an Islamist-controlled environment that will provide an incubator for international terrorist attacks. Furthermore, continuing conflict in the region will lead to increased population displacement, adding to the refugee crisis that has strengthened the position of far-right parties across Europe. Al-Qaeda’s growing power in the Sahel also threatens other countries in the West Africa. Countries such as Guinea, Togo, Benin and Nigeria will come under increasing pressure from Islamic terror groups.

The successes of JNIM in the Sahel reveal that Al-Qaeda still retains the capacity to spread itself across the globe and operate effectively. Its ability to stay under the radar by utilising franchises that do not use its world-famous brand has the potential to make the international community

complacent in fighting the threat and allowing international terrorism to grow. JNIM’s position in the Sahel is stronger than when it was formed and it will continue to be a major threat to the countries of the Sahel well into the future.