At Their Mercy
By: Cornelius Hamilton
Tags: World War II, Politics, Lc Society, Indonesia, History

At Their Mercy

Lessons for Indonesia from the Japanese Invasion of the East Indies, 1942.

R. Bayuputra for Le Citoyen

DISCLAIMER: I am of the opinion that a war between Indonesia and China is definitely remote; increased economic cooperation between the two countries ever since C-AFTA along with multiple Chinese investments in many Indonesian projects have effectively ruled out an all-out attack. But assuming the situation with US-Iran tensions, China’s continuous breach of treaty obligations as ruled by the PCA in Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China in 2013 as well as the recent escalation of tensions in the Natuna Sea, the chance grows more and more likely as the days go by…

Kalidjati, 8th March 1942. The capitulation of Lieutenant-General Hein ter Poorten, commander of the Royal East Indies Army to General Hitoshi Imamura of the Imperial Japanese Army at Kalidjati is an image that many Indonesians–even the schoolchildren who actively learn it as a simple date to memorise in the history books–seem to overlook and forget. 8 March 1942 marks the defeat of one colonial power by another and the total, unconditional transfer of power from the Dutch colonial government to the Empire of Japan and thus put what is today ‘Indonesia’ into Japanese hands.

Regardless of the terrible fate the Indonesian people would face under their ‘new masters’–the forced labour, the secret police, institutionalised and forced prostitution–for many defence analysts and professionals, the conquest of the impossibly large archipelago of the East Indies in the span of 60 days’ time was nothing less than an admirable feat and a great example of military strategy. The Japanese, coming in from the North, in captured Malaya and the Philippines, released a whipping flash of an attack that decimated a combined Allied strike force in the Battle of the Java Sea, following suit with the conquest of the Dutch colonial heartlands of Java.[1]

The swiftness of the Japanese offensive, backed by a decade’s experience in modern wars in China, Korea, and Manchuria, had taken the Dutch by ultimate surprise.[2] It was, in the words of famous Indonesian publicist, P.K. Ojong,[3] an astounding, admirable victory against the odds, which was, by all means caused, by incoordination of Allied resources and the exposure of the deep unreadiness of the Royal Dutch East Indies Army (K.N.I.L.) and other allied forces in facing the Japanese onslaught.

Recent events have put the fear of global conflict back into the hearts of people from both the West and East. With the great powers in play: US-Iran tensions skyrocketing at the wake of the bombing of General Soleimani, Turkey sending troops to Libya, unending war in the Middle East after the Arab Spring, Russian expeditions in eastern Europe, and the PRC’s continuous and relentless creeping expansionism in the South China Sea (and previous trade wars with America, among other things), the turn of the decade (to 2020) makes of a world that seems to be again, at the brink of war.

This recent escalation of tensions between Indonesia and the People’s Republic of China (‘China’ for short) over EEZ claims in the Natuna Sea,[4] and with a military large enough to project force simulating the Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia in 1942 (and beyond that),[5] similar events should not be ruled out; Indonesia still remains a strategically-placed country with an abundance of strategic resources. What should, based on the precedent of the 1942 invasion, the Indonesian government do prior to and during a similar situation? This article plans to expand on this question.

A. The 1942 Invasion of the East Indies

(i) Dutch East Indies-Japan relations prior to the Second World War

Japan’s intentions to charge for the East Indies was done at the backdrop of several reasons. Prior to Japan’s participation in the Second World War by attacking Pearl Harbour, American and Great Britain was in a series of trade wars with Japan, as a result of Anglo-American disfavour to Japanese expansionism in China (starting from the ‘Manchuria Incident’ of 1931).

Thus, by 1940, Anglo-American trade embargoes to Japan as well as the cancellation of a number of important trade and economics-related treaties[6] had put the Dutch East Indies as the sole trading partner of Japan in supplying raw materials such as (among others) bauxite, nickel, and oil.[7] However, even the pro-commerce and neutral Dutch (at the time, the Dutch were regarded by many as a neutral power, as demonstrated by their neutrality in World War I) slowly ceded support to the Japanese, in favour of being on the Anglo-American side of things:[8]

On 2 February 1940, Japan made requests to the Dutch government on matters concerning reciprocal trade, the relaxation or abolition of immigration restrictions, and the granting of facilities for business investment or their enlargement. […] The amount of oil which Japan was importing from the Dutch East Indies at the time had been diminishing year by year from about 870,000 tons in 1937 to about 670,000 tons in 1938 and about 570,000 tons in 1939.

Dutch-Japanese relations soon went abysmal. Germany, as part of the Blitzkrieg that took France and Belgium by surprise, conquered continental Netherlands in May 1940, putting the Dutch government and royalty to exile in Britain.[9] This and the signing of the Tripartite Agreement between Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and Imperial Japan itself, pushed the Dutch into the American sphere, albeit somewhat reluctantly.[10]

The Dutch had always tried to maintain a neutral position in world affairs and focused on commercial activities instead of those of a military nature.[11] This policy is not exactly in place as of today with the Netherlands being one of the most active members of NATO as well as having fought on the Allied side in World War II completely (unlike, for example, Vichy France). An interesting fact is that the Indonesian bebas-aktif (independent-active) policy mirrors pre-1940 Dutch trade policies,[12] something that we will examine in the latter parts of this article and puts Indonesia in a very unique, yet tedious, position on the map.

The result of this ‘stay neutral’ policy would later cost the Dutch dearly after the Japanese began their strike south. Pulling out of such positions late, instead of picking a side to begin with, would cost them everything they had. In January 1942, when the guns started firing in Southeast Asia, the Dutch East Indies–protected by the colonial Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL) and the Royal Netherlands Navy (KM)–had too little time to prepare.

(ii) Mounting an impossible defence: ABDACOM and the impending peril

After the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941 (as commemorated in President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s famous speech), the Allies scrambled to protect its Pacific and Southeast Asian possessions. British Hong Kong fell before the turn of the year and Japanese troops had marched into Malaya with armour, horse, and bicycle three. Someway in the east, the American naval air base at Wake Island stood little chance.

The Japanese attacks mirrored that of the German Blitzkrieg in the West: swift, unexpected, relentless, with a strong emphasis on combined-arms warfare. This sudden ‘alien’ attack by the Empire of the Rising Sun had taken not only the Allies, but also the World, by surprise. Japan was swallowing Asia and the Pacific whole.

At the turn of 1942, precisely on 1 January, the Allies congregated a joint HQ called the ‘American-British-Dutch-Australian Command,’ or, for short, ABDACOM, which put what available military resources in Southeast Asia under one command structure, with General Sir Archibald Wavell, having been previously been the officer commanding of British Middle Eastern Command, famous for his exploits in pushing the Italians back into the Western Desert. ABDACOM had one purpose: stopping the Japanese advance at the Malay Barrier (modern Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia). History will tell that ABDACOM failed and it was not until the Battle of the Coral Sea and the Battle of Midway, ways deep into 1942, that the Japanese were finally stopped.

After several small-scale victories, such as the US Navy’s successful attack on the Japanese transport fleet at Balikpapan,[13] ABDACOM had managed to stall Japanese advances for a month before ABDACOM HQ in Singapore fell on 15 February 1942. After the fall of Singapore, however, instead of reorganising remaining resources, ABDACOM collapsed and individual commanders were left to their own to defend the Malay barrier: amongst them was Dutch Royal Navy Admiral Karel Doorman and KNIL General Hein ter Poorten, who were left to defend the East Indies–now with Java and Sumatra being the frontline.

(iii) Defeat at the Java Sea

‘I wish to impress upon all of you the need for every effort against the enemy to prevent his landing on Java.’

- Rear Admiral Karel Doorman (Dutch), Fleet Order, 22 February 1942

Despite giving out bitter resistance, KNIL and other ABDACOM forces were overrun in Sumatra in February 1942, not long after the fall of Singapore, which dispersed ABDACOM’s command element.[14] This left Allied naval forces with one point in the map where they could halt the Japanese attack that would prevent the fall of Java, and thus, the East Indies: the sea off the northern coast of Java.[15] General Wavell himself, however, was so struck by the fall of Singapore, that ‘Gibraltar of the East,’ that he stated Java unsaveable. In a message to Churchill:[16]

I AM AFRAID THAT THE DEFENCE OF ABDA AREA HAS BROKEN DOWN AND THAT DEFENCE OF JAVA CANNOT NOW LAST LONG. IT ALWAYS HINGED ON THE AIR BATTLE … ANYTHING PUT INTO JAVA NOW CAN DO LITTLE TO PROLONG THE STRUGGLE: IT IS MORE QUESTION FOR WHAT YOU WILL CHOOSE TO SAVE … I SEE LITTLE FURTHER USEFULNESS FOR THIS HQ … I HATE THE IDEA OF LEAVING THESE STOUT-HEARTED DUTCHMEN AND WILL REMAIN HERE AND FIGHT IT OUT WITH THEM AS LONG AS POSSIBLE IF YOU WOULD CONSIDER THIS WOULD HELP AT ALL.

The British were not too enthusiastic in assisting the defence of Java even if the Dutch had actively assisted the British in the land, sea, and air during the defence of Singapore and Malaya.[17] Java was the closest thing for the Dutch to a homeland with the fall of continental Netherlands and aside from being the only unconquered territory aside from the Papuan landmass, had deep sentimental value to the Dutch. Wavell, at the core of the non-enthusiasm, was dismissed then as CiC ABDACOM by Dutch request, and Dutch Vice-Admiral Conrad Helfrich was put at the helm of whatever remained of the scattered ABDACOM.[18] Rear-Admiral Karel Doorman headed naval operations with the combined allied fleet patrolling the Java Sea in anticipation of a Japanese advance.[19]

As the Japanese invasion of Java slowly trickling upon the horizon, Doorman’s plan was to lead the strike force and dismantle the Japanese the transport convoy which transported troops to Java, as well as the task force protecting it. Doorman led a multinational force of two heavy cruisers (HMS Exeter and USS Houston), three light cruisers (Doorman’s flagship HNLMS De Ruyter, HNLMS Java, HMAS Perth, and nine destroyers (HMS Electra, HMS Encounter, HMS Jupiter, HNLMS Kortenaer, HNLMS Witte de With, USS Alden, USS John D. Edwards, USS John D. Ford, and USS Paul Jones), facing against a Japanese task force protecting the conoy, commanded by Rear-Admiral Takeo Takagi, consisting of two heavy (Nachi and Haguro) and two light cruisers (Naka and Jintsū) and 14 destroyers (Yūdachi, Samidare, Murasame, Harusame, Minegumo, Asagumo, Yukikaze, Tokitsukaze, Amatsukaze, Hatsukaze, Yamakaze, Kawakaze, Sazanami, and Ushio) including the 4th Destroyer Squadron under the command of Rear Admiral Shoji Nishimura.[20]

Although the Allies were outnumbered only by a small margin, they were outclassed. The Japanese fleet, in particular its cruisers, had more powerful guns and aside from that, was a combination of two separate fleets tasked with taking Malaya and the Philippines, thus contributing to its superior numbers. Added with the recent string of victories, they were charged for battle. The resulting engagement was a desperate fight: a last gasp of ABDA in Pacific Southeast Asia.

The two forces clashed off the Javanese northern coast on 27th February, and continuous cat and mouse chases went on until the 28th. The engagement resulted in but one Japanese cruiser lost; for the Allies, two light cruisers and three destroyers were sunk with one heavy cruiser heavily damaged. The light cruiser HNLMS de Ruyter, Doorman’s flagship, was also sunk. Doorman had come into the battle sick with a certain tropical fever, and after his ship was heavily damaged by Japanese torpedo attacks, he ordered that the light cruiser be abandoned, though he personally refused to evacuate the vessel. Doorman died with his ship.

After the Battle of the Java Sea, the ABDA flotilla was scattered. Desperate attempts were made to escape, or to stall the invasion of Java, though to little effect. Cruisers USS Houston and HMS Perth were destroyed intercepting invading Japanese forces at the Sunda Strait;[21] others were subsequently destroyed in engagements in the Java Sea.[22] Whatever remained of the Allied fleet escaped to the Australian port of Fremantle.

Although ABDACOM did indeed fail, Jeffery Cox in Rising Sun, Falling Skies: the Disastrous Java Sea Campaign of World War II, concluded that the Dutch attempt to protect Java was no less than pulling off a Thermopylae so that the other Allies could reorganise in the face of Japanese defeat and perform meaningful counteroffensives.[23] Citing T.J. Cain of the HMS Electra:[24]

“We knew we couldn’t win, not in the ultimate. But at least we could fight, and fulfil our obligations. We knew that we couldn’t stop an invasion, but we were still pretty confident that we’d take our toll of the invaders. We knew that the Nip was formidable, but we were sick of being chivvied around by him … British, Australian, American, Dutch, we were all in it together.”

B. Lessons Learnt: Avoiding Another Java Sea

Like Father, Like Son

The events circling Indonesia today is deeply similar to that of the Dutch East Indies in the late 1930s and early 1940s. It acts as a neutral, trying to cooperate with greater powers in all circumstances; then, it was the Anglo-Americans and the Japanese. Now it is the Anglo-American-Korean-Japanese industrial complex and the Chinese complex. Indonesia has received investment deals from all corners: the Chinese and the American Bloc (Japan, South Korea, and Singapore) being the predominant actors.[25]

Such ‘double-alignments’ could be argued to be based on the nature of the Indonesian foreign policy doctrine ‘independent and active’ (politik bebas aktif) which pivots Indonesian foreign policy in international cooperation through a non-partisan stance except in the elimination of colonialism and other forms of oppression[26] as found in the preamble to the Indonesian Constitution of 1945. Aside from that, just like the East Indies of the past, Indonesia is in great demand for foreign capital inflow to further economic growth.[27]

Being supplier and consumer of both the Western Bloc and China puts Indonesia right in the crosshairs of both in the event of war. What, then, should Indonesia do to prevent its fall if China, forever expanding, decides to put its foot to the pedal?

ABDACOM’s failures

ABDACOM’s failures lie in its miscoordinations born out of mistrust. The British and American position to assist the East Indies had always been unclear until December 1941.[28] On the other hand, Dutch commercial opportunism to the Japanese further invigorated these suspicions. Military assistance by any means did not reach the East Indies in time until early 1942, when it had been way too late. The East Indies played their money cards as if they had a strong military to back them up. The fact was, the Royal Netherlands Navy was far away and was deeply underpowered in comparison to the Japanese and the KNIL may have had the personnel, but they lacked both the experience and equipment to fight off the Japanese on their own… The KNIL itself was tasked with internal defence, that being, to quell uprisings and insurgencies, instead of facing foreign enemies much like Japan.

Strong Diplomatic Alliances

The disastrous Java Sea campaign could be contributed to the lack of trust and cooperation between the newly-instituted ABDACOM members. Concurrently, strong alliances, or at least the will to reach out for alliances, should have been taken. Indonesia should take this step.

If Communist China decides to realise its geopolitical ambitions through conventional means, Indonesia needs to ‘bunch up’ with other Southeast Asian nations, and if need be, Western powers such as Australia and the ever-present United States. The People’s Republic stands second in the world’s military budget, trailing on America; aside from that and unlike Japan, modern-day China is a more venerable adversary in terms of economics: strong, growing, and ever-expanding on a global scale.

While trade and commerce may be something on a ‘need-to-have’ basis and limiting cooperation with other nations would certainly contradict Indonesia’s independent-active foreign policy doctrine, Indonesia must, in the face of Chinese aggression, find military alliances to turn to. It is not a secret that although the Indonesian Navy has shown its steel in recent years–with interception and destruction of foreign vessels by patrol boats and corvettes–the Indonesian Army and the Indonesian Air Force perhaps have been devoid of a conventional conflict since the East Timor Intervention in 1975, facing mostly non-international conflicts against guerrillas and insurgents, making it similar, if not in the same situation as the KNIL in 1942.

Additionally, serious logistical concerns have always been an issue with the Indonesian military. A 2015 report by the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) stated that due to the severe lack of maintenance, ammunition, and war materiel, with the contemporary state of the Indonesian armed forces, Indonesia would fall in about a week from a foreign invading force as significant as the United States or China.[29] Indonesia would have to up its logistics game–Historian Stephen Ambrose states in Citizen Soldiers, that the American soldier’s morale is uplifted more with warm boots, abundant ammunition, rather than his training, say, being as skilful as the German. And this, too, like anything else, demands monetary strength: another reason for military cooperation with foreign countries.

However, in the face of foreign intervention, Indonesia would turn to its Sishankamrata (citizens defence and security system), or in other words, guerrilla warfare supported by the entirety of its populace, something that had succeeded well in the Indonesian Revolution. Though popular support to fight a guerrilla war may have been true in 1945–1949, nobody could be so sure that support for the government had stayed the same in 2020.

C. CONCLUSION

Indonesia’s unique position in the geopolitical map, abundant natural resources, as well as its unique foreign policy has put it at the crosshairs of great powers for decades. It has been a ground for proxy war, trade wars, and wars fought with bank credits and ideas instead of machineguns and artillery. However, when it comes to that, unless the Indonesian government is suddenly in surplus of weaponry, supplies, and money, Indonesia cannot fight alone. Not against the Chinese.

References

Books

Hornfischer, James D. Ship of Ghosts: The Story of the USS Houston, FDR’s Legendary Lost Cruiser, and the Epic Saga of Her Survivors. New York, NY: Random House Publishing, 2017.

Weinstein, Franklin B. Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma to Dependence: From Soekarno to Soeharto. Equinox Publishing, 2007.

Quispel, H.V. Nederlansch-Indie in den Tweeden Wereldoorlog (London, UK: The Netherland Publishing Company Ltd., 1945)

Tarling, Nicholas. Britain, Southeast Asia and the onset of the Pacific War. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Ojong, P.K. Perang Pasifik, 5th ed. Jakarta, Indonesia: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2001.

Remmelink, Willem. The Invasion of the Dutch East Indies. Leiden, the Netherlands: Leiden University Press, 2015.

Cox, Jeffery. Rising Sun, Falling Skies: the Disastrous Java Sea Campaign of World War II. Osprey Publishing, 2014

ACADEMIC JOURNALS

Newmyer, Jacqueline. “Oil, Arms, and Influence: The Indirect Strategy Behind Chinese Military Modernization” Orbis (Elsevier) (on behalf of the Foreign Policy Research Institute) Vol. 53 Issue 2 2009 204–219

ONLINE NEWSPAPERS

BBC. (bbc.co.uk)

Radio Free Asia. (Rfa.com)

MISCELLANEOUS

UNCTAD Indonesian Investment Policy Review 2018 (https://www.oecd.org/investment/investmentfordevelopment/indonesia-investmentpolicyreview-oecd.htm)

[1] P.K. Ojong, Perang Pasifik, 5th ed. (Jakarta, Indonesia: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2001) pp. 17–23

[2] Willem Remmelink, The Invasion of the Dutch East Indies (Leiden, the Netherlands: Leiden University Press, 2015) pp. 587–589.

[3] P.K. Ojong, Perang Pasifik, p. 23.

[4] Indonesia Boosts Patrols Near Natuna Islands, as Row with China Escalate. Radio Free Asia, published 6 January 2020. https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/indonesia-natuna-01062020105107.html

[5] Jacqueline Newmyer, “Oil, Arms, and Influence: The Indirect Strategy Behind Chinese Military

Modernization” Orbis (Elsevier) (on behalf of the Foreign Policy Research Institute) Vol. 53 Issue 2 2009 204–219; at p. 205

[6] Willem Remmelink, The Invasion of the Dutch East Indies (Leiden, the Netherlands: Leiden University Press, 2015) pp. 1–3

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Nicholas Tarling, Britain, Southeast Asia and the onset of the Pacific War (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996) pp. 21–25

[12] Franklin B. Weinstein, Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma to Dependence: From Soekarno to Soeharto (Equinox Publishing, 2007) pp. 161–162.

[13] See: Jeffery Cox, Rising Sun, Falling Skies: the Disastrous Java Sea Campaign of World War II (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2014) pp. 151–162

[14] Ibid. p. 240

[15] Ibid., p. 284

[16] Ibid., p. 244

[17] Ibid. p. 244–246

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

[20] BBC Fact File: Battle of the Java Sea. https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peopleswar/timeline/factfiles/nonflash/a1122300.shtml

[21] See: James D. Hornfischer, Ship of Ghosts: The Story of the USS Houston, FDR’s Legendary Lost Cruiser, and the Epic Saga of Her Survivors. (New York, NY: Random House Publishing, 2017).

[22] Cox, Rising Sun, Falling Skies, pp. 353–367.

[23] Ibid. pp. 408.

[24] Ibid. pp. 410–411.

[25] Indonesia: Foreign Investment https://santandertrade.com/en/portal/establish-overseas/indonesia/foreign-investment retrieved 6 January 2020.

[26] Franklin B. Weinstein, Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma to Dependence: From Soekarno to Soeharto (Equinox Publishing, 2007) pp. 161–162.

[27] See: UNCTAD Indonesian Investment Policy Review 2018 https://www.oecd.org/investment/investmentfordevelopment/indonesia-investmentpolicyreview-oecd.htm accessed 1 January 2020. In its executive summary: “Indonesia is actively promoting investment and has worked to streamline investment approval procedures through a one-stop integrated service. Administration and promotion of investment is vested in the Indonesian Investment Co-ordination Board, while a National Team on Export and Investment Promotion has been formed to advance reforms. Local investment promotion agencies vary in capacity, and decentralisation of power has led to uneven policy implementation.”

[28] Nicholas Tarling, Britain, Southeast Asia and the onset of the Pacific War (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996) at pp. 146–148.

[29] LIPI: Jangankan 3 Hari, Indonesia Perang Selama 5 Jam Saja Keteteran. Republika, published Sunday 22 February 2015. https://nasional.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/umum/15/02/22/nk6gb2-lipi-jangankan-3-hari-indonesia-perang-selama-5-jam-sajaem-keteteranem accessed 7 January 2020.