Mohsen Fakhrizadeh’s death: will it affect Iran’s nuclear path?
By: More Intelligence
Tags: Biden, Iran Nuclear Deal, Trump, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, Israel

The assassination in the life of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, a general in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and a figure who is characterized as the head of the country’s military nuclear program, is considered a severe blow to Iran — especially on the moral level. The way in which elements (foreign elements, according to the publications) managed to harm a senior and secure figure in the heart of the country, is a painful hit to the reputation and respect of the security forces in Iran.

Fakhrizadeh is considered a dominant and central figure in the Iranian nuclear project — and especially in its military aspects. However, it can be estimated that even after his death, the military knowledge, and capabilities, will remain as before, in the hands of those who served under him. This is not what will delay or prevent from Iran’s leaders from striving to fulfill their nuclear strategy.

It should be mentioned that in the previous decade quite a few Iranian nuclear scientists have been assassinated, although not to the rank of Fakhrizadeh, but some of them are quite senior in the country’s nuclear system. Despite this, it was clear that Iran continues to operate in accordance with the strategy of “walking on the brink”, that is, of gaining knowledge and ability to soon turn its nuclear program into military needs, when what will activate it, or prevent it from doing so, is only a decision of its leaders.

According to various publications, unknown elements have tried and continue to constantly try to delay and postpone the same “point of no return”, sometimes by assassinations of scientists, sometimes by damaging infrastructure at nuclear sites and more. It is not entirely clear how effective these moves are, and even if they are — then their effectiveness is only relevant for short periods of time.

History teaches us that the cessation of a military nuclear program is sometimes achieved through clear military means (for example, the attacks on nuclear reactors in Iraq and Syria, which were attributed to Israel at the time), but in other cases it is derived only from the decision of the subjected country’s leaders (such as in the cases of South Africa during the Apartheid era, or North Korea today). And what usually affects those leaders is continuous and effective international pressure.

The Iranian case is an example that can probably be attributed to the second type of countries, that is, although activities with military characteristics probably managed to delay the country’s military nuclear project, but at the end of the day, the decision whether to continue “walking on the threshold” Is solely in the hands of the Iranian leaders. And the way in which this decision is made with them is a clear derivative of the international pressures exerted on the country — and especially these are economic sanctions, whose harm to the Iranian economy is crucial.

The time in which the assassination of Fakhrizadeh took place, is an interim period, between the change of presidents in the United States, and on the background of the COVID-19 pandemic, which severely damaged Iran — not only on the health level, but also economically.

Hence, despite several belligerent statements by senior Iranian officials after Fakhrizadeh’s death, it can be estimated that Iran will currently refrain from initiating provocative (North Korean-style) measures and wait for Biden’s entry into the White House, mainly to understand how much dialogue can be reached with the new administration, especially regarding the nuclear deal (JCPOA), which was signed at the time under the Obama administration and from which the Trump administration came out and tried to avoid it as much as it could.

With respect to Biden, a cautious assessment is that he will try and return to the original outline of the Obama administration’s nuclear deal, perhaps with some changes and adjustments. It is likely that the Biden administration will renew its cooperation with Europe around the agreement and will not continue the anti-Iran policies of the Trump’s administration.

The fact that Biden is less subject to manipulations (at least in comparison to Trump) by allies in the Middle East (Israel and the Sunni Gulf states), has the potential to create at the Iranian leaders’ minds the assumption that despite the moral damage (and by the way, a tactical military response by Iran, towards Israel or Israeli interests, is still a relevant threat), at least from a strategic point of view, it is better to hold back and wait to see what Biden will bring with him, rather than “playing into the hands” of their rivals in the Middle East.