The S-400: Is Turkey Just a Practical Customer?
By: Turkish Heritage Organization
Tags: Syria

The S-400: Is Turkey Just a Practical Customer?

By THO Non-Resident Fellow Ezra Mannix

*Disclaimer: The THO Non-Resident Fellows do not represent the Turkish Heritage Organization’s Positions or Policies*

What’s the big deal about Turkey buying the S-400 anti-aircraft defense system from Russia?

Firstly, I’ll concede that I don’t know much about strategic defense issues. I have a standard international affairs degree-holder’s knowledge about security and military affairs. My expertise is in the softer topics: education, democracy, and the refugee issue as they pertain to Turkey.

I do have a passing knowledge of how the global economy works. I’m also an American who grew up during the 90’s with NAFTA and the end of America’s industrial might. I know the “buy American” argument doesn’t work. People buy the widget that’s most cost effective (in theory): the one that best fits their needs at the best possible price, alliances or not.

And in the case of the S-400, that price is half: $500 million vs. $1 billion for the U.S.-made Patriot system. And there are tactical advantages to the S-400. Charlie Gao The National Interest wrote back in October about the S-400’s advantages: A “key aspect of the S-400 is the ability to use four different types of missiles with different weights and capabilities, allowing the system by itself to form a large portion of a layered air defense. This makes the S-400 a more flexible system. It also can utilize missiles employed by earlier S-300 variants.”

This is how I’m seeing Turkey purchasing the S-400 system from Russia over the competing system from the US. It seems to be a simply better product purchased on an open, globalized market.

So, again, what’s the problem? It’s hard to see exactly. The Washington Post notes that the S-400, “has advanced radars and isn’t compatible with NATO technology.” But that’s all it says. (This child of the 90’s also remembers when Mac and Windows weren’t compatible. Sorry to be flippant, but surely there’s a workaround). Meanwhile, Reuters stated that it “may compromise (America’s) Lockheed Martin F-35 fighter jets” without elaborating.

You might be thinking to yourself: C’mon Ezra, this is Russia we’re talking about. Russia! Why is a country in NATO, whose very founding was to create a security block to counter Soviet belligerence, buying from the very rival that spurred its creation? It should be a no brainer that a NATO country buy a weapons system from another NATO country.

Other Friendlies Use Russian Systems

Back in January, I attended a Turkish Heritage Organization panel discussion with Ret. Adm. James Stavridis, a brilliant, thoughtful former NATO supreme allied commander, and Ret. Adm. Deniz Kutluk, a distinguished Turkish counterpart. The two sparred over a number of issues, one of them was Turkey’s insistence on going ahead with the S-400. Adm. Kutluk pointed out that a number of NATO allies and friends utilize Russian-built weapons systems.

As a 2018 graduate of the Fletcher School, I’ve seen Adm. Stavridis speak many times and have chatted with him in person and over email. I’d never seen him as visibly perturbed as he was on that day. I wasn’t taking notes, but while Adm. Kutluk was listing off NATO and friendly neighborhood countries that use the S-300, Stavridis cut him off with something to the effect of “that’s a completely different scenario and you know it!” In a slightly threatening tone, he warned Adm. Kutluk by urging him not to go down the rabbit hole of technical reasons why purchasing and installing the S-400 was a terrible idea.

In terms of the other countries, Adm. Kutluk was technically correct about the proliferation of Russian-made weapons. Countries like Slovakia and Ukraine indeed have active, S-300 weapons systems. Greece owns an older version of the defense system, the S-300. It should be noted that Greece did not purchase the S-300, the system was transferred from Cyprus and installed on the island of Crete in 1998. Cyprus, which is not a NATO member due to the island’s divided status, purchased the system in 1997 and pointed its missiles at Turkey. Turkey threatened all-out war; a compromise was reached in 1998 and the S-300 system was transferred to Greece’s largest island, where they still operate. This last clause is important, because while Greece didn’t purchase the system, it’s still active and on the frontier of the alliance. It should also be noted that several other strategic allies — such as Saudi Arabia, India and China, and Qatar — are mulling over or have already received deliveries of the upgraded system.

But back to the heated exchange between Adms. Kutluk and Stavridis. I wish Adm. Stavridis HAD gone down that rabbit hole of technical reasons why this case is different and why, from a strategic defense standpoint, it’s a bad idea (there wasn’t enough time in the talk and Adm. Stavridis had a plane to catch). From my view, it seems like the reasons for pressuring Turkey to purchase the Patriot system are more economic: Turkey is an enormous patron of the U.S. military-industrial complex, and they ought to continue to be one.

Send Me Your Reasons

Technically, perhaps there is a glaring reason why, besides compatibility and potential threat to U.S. equipment. Maybe the S-400’s advanced software would fail Turkey if there were a military escalation with Russia or a Russian ally. Or perhaps there’s an unfortunate bi-product of the missile system’s software, such as a Trojan horse, that would allow the Russians to spy on or steal data from the NATO country, or undermine its cyber defense in another way. This has been hinted at in other news sources, again without elaboration.

Lastly, it’s worth reminding ourselves that while defense against the Soviet Union was clearly its motivator for forming NATO, nowhere in the most recent or original treaty is there mention of “Russia” or “Soviet Union.” Also, NATO stresses that missiles are used for internal defense, and that its envoys meet regularly to discuss regional issues, albeit with strong disagreements.

If Adm. Stavridis or another security expert does read this post, perhaps he or she can explain to a lay audience in greater detail why the S-400 is such a bad idea for Turkey (I understand a lot of things are classified). I’m all ears. Right now, it seems more a case of sour grapes.