Social Media, Echo Chambers and Political Polarisation
By: Olivier Sorgho
Tags: Political Science, Politics, Social Media, Technology, Poland

A critical reflection on the case study of Poland

Amid growing political divisions in liberal democracies, the term political polarisation has flooded media discourses, no longer explicitly referring to partisan cleavages in American politics but extending to the European sphere. As observed by the European Parliament – commissioned study from 2019, most of our knowledge on polarisation revolves around “studies of affluent countries in the Northern and Western regions” of Europe (Jenkins & Fletcher, 2019: 40). This paper aims to correct this imbalance by discussing the case study of Poland.

The author understands polarisation as a state or process whereby political attitudes move to ideological extremes (DiMaggio, Evans and Bryson, 1996). The focus is on divisions within Polish society through the lens of social media. First, the ‘echo chamber’ (Sunstein, 2017) debates are discussed against the empirics of online political engagement among Polish Facebook users. Secondly, alternative drivers of polarisation in Poland are weighed against the role of social media – particularly ideological extremism, and what Skitka (2010) calls moral political preferences. The final section considers the implications of online fragmentation and polarisation for Polish democracy.

Echo chambers online? A glance at the literature

Concerns with media fragmentation predate social media. As early as 1996, scholars like Katz warned that media commercialization could fragment audiences and deprive democracies of common meeting ground. The rise of Facebook and Twitter has further aggravated concerns. Academics like Sunstein (2017) warn of ‘echo chambers’ on social media, virtual spaces where citizens are disproportionately exposed to views like their own, not least due to algorithmic processes creating ‘filter bubbles’ (Pariser, 2011). Alternatives views are filtered out which creates “potential to increase polarisation” (Jenkins and Fletcher, 2019: 33). The argument thus suggests that social media fragments audiences and drives polarisation.



But the latest evidence appears at least to challenge the pessimism of those scenarios. Newman et al. (2017: 42-43) demonstrate how in Europe, a plurality of users report that social media has exposed them to outlets with which they otherwise wouldn’t be familiar. In a study of the United States, Stroud (2011) finds that the process of selective exposure (the conscious ‘filtering out’ of opposing views) is stronger on cable news than social media. Furthermore, Barbéra et al (2015) shows how political discussions on Twitter are cross-cutting and ideologically diverse rather than confined to ‘echo chambers’, while Heatherly et al (2017) link higher social media usage with exposure to opposing perspectives. The question remains whether exposure promotes or decreases polarization. An online survey-based study by Beam and others (2018) suggests that Facebook may have a depolarising effect. And although studies such as Bail et al (2019) refute this by linking cross-ideological exposure to increases in polarisation over the long term, these contradictory findings indicate that the direct link between social media and polarisation is still inconclusive, while declarations of online ‘echo chambers’ are empirically premature.

The Polish partisan divide - in society and on social media

Popular opinion about the state of Polish politics divides the electorate into two broad and antagonistic camps (Wanat in Politico, 2019). Supporters of the Law and Justice (PiS) led the government on one side, and the broad opposition often referred to as the anti-PiS camp, led by the Civic Platform (PO) party. The widely held view is that the two camps’ mutual dislike of one another is growing, with both groups becoming more polarised, less likely to engage in discussion and bipartisanship (Ibid). But the question remains: to what extent does this assertion hold true when measured against the empirics of Polish users on social media.?

In a comprehensive study, Kamil Rakocy (for Sotrender, 2016) reviewed data of Polish Facebook users during the 2015 presidential election. The author analysed popular fan pages on Facebook (>100,000 fans), classifying them into one of the two political camps and looking for engagement across the political divide. The results appeared to confirm the existence of ‘echo chambers’, whereby user engagement and convergence of ‘likes’ and ‘comments’ beyond one’s ideological camp was limited. For example, only 0.6% of users who liked posts by ‘right-wing’ pages also engaged with posts by left-wing opposition politician Robert Biedroń (Ibid). These numbers indicate a very high level of polarisation on Polish social media.

However, crucially, almost 80% of Facebook users didn’t engage at all in discussions of political nature, withdrawn from the conflict, at least online (Ibid). These numbers and findings appear to dispute the thesis that polarisation is primarily driven or enhanced by social media, as most users remain ‘neutral’ on the network (though not necessarily of it). The findings suggest that ‘echo chambers’ do indeed exist but among a select and minority group of highly engaged and politicized users (already polarised), which brings us to the paper’s next section.

Focus on the substance of divisions, not the medium: the role of extremism and ‘moral’ political preferences

Research by Alto Analytics (cited by Scott in Politico, 2019) demonstrated the disproportionate activity of far-right populists on Polish social media ahead of the European elections in May last year. To quote the author: “less than 0.1 percent of users across Germany, France, Spain, Italy, and Poland — many of them tied to far-right or fringe groups — generated around 10 percent of content related to politics and the European election on the platform over a one-month period ending on January 2” (Ibid). This highlights the role of ideological extremism on polarisation and should serve as a caution to extrapolate implications for society at large.

Furthermore, Stroud (2010) argues that selective exposure of information on social media is more likely among people who already hold extreme views because such individuals have a higher certainty in their beliefs. Considering the disproportionate engagement of ideologically extreme individuals on social media, as well as their lower likelihood of exposure to alternative views, platforms like Facebook may create an illusion of very high polarisation, not necessarily reflecting the fabric of social reality. What’s more, in their analysis of the Brexit discussion online, Del Vicario et al (2017: 10) found that polarisation often depends on the topic. Certain trending topics on Facebook like ‘Alex Salmond’ and ‘David Davis’ were far more polarising than others like ‘social democracy’ or ‘racism’.

We may link these findings with insights of social psychologist Linda Skitka (2010) who differentiates between preferential and moral political beliefs. For instance, one may consider having an abortion in the future and support the pro-choice movement as a matter of preference, or one may oppose it as a matter of moral principle. Research suggests that higher levels of moral views in society lead to aversion towards individuals who hold different views, and difficulty in resolving conflict (Skitka, 2010: 267).

These dynamics help explain divisions in Polish society, which contain a heavy dose of moral preferences on both sides of the ideological spectrum. Negative attitudes from Civic Platform supporters towards Law and Justice voters largely stems from perceptions that the latter is assaulting democracy and the constitution. Hence, opposition figure Robert Biedroń wrote on Facebook in November 2018: “that’s what separates us, Democrats, from PiS – we want to obey the law”. Thus, opposition to PiS and their electorate is often a matter of moral beliefs in democracy, rule of law (Do Rzeczy, 2019)

Government supporters, on the other hand, are drawn to ideals such as patriotism and sovereignty. Survey data from Wirtualna Polska (cited in Do Rzeczy, 2019] finds that 65% of PiS voters disagree with the statement that opposition voters are patriotic. Only 8% believe that opposition voters “care about Poland”. This suggests that polarisation stems from mutually held moral disdain, being a matter of ‘right and wrong’, rather than simple preference. This takes the author to the central argument of this paper: In understanding polarisation in Poland, perhaps one should focus on the nature of divisions, as opposed to the medium (like social media) where partisan cleavages find their expression. Nevertheless, platforms like Facebook allow polarized and individuals of ideological extremes to take advantage of virtual spaces and poison public debates, not least through name-calling and dehumanising political opponents, as Górska (2019: 8) demonstrates.

Social media and Polish democracy

Michael Keane (cited in Mancini, 2013: 46) refers to the internet age as the era of abundance. Citizens have more choice, giving rise to more pluralism, a key tenet of democratic theory (Dahl, 1956). The question of whether online ‘abundance’ which includes extreme elements - of which some are unsupportive of democracy itself - should be celebrated is another matter altogether. Perhaps such considerations led Facebook to ban far-right Polish groups ONR and NOP from the platform In April 2018 (TVN24, 2018).

Social media creates the potential for independent citizen journalism and civic action in places “where traditional political organisations are absent” (Mancini, 2013: 52), but since “there are more possibilities to control the government…the impact may be weaker and scattered”. Mancini here argues that back in the day, a non-scattered homogeneous readership of say, The New York Times meant the government couldn’t ignore the paper’s criticism and demands, whereas now audiences are scattered in niches (Ibid: 54) and thus their impact is weaker. The author here questions whether Mancini’s fears about scattered audiences are justified. Although niche audiences do exist, I argue that wherever the social relevance of an issue is high, and the public motivated, serious government scrutiny through social media is likely to succeed.



The successful Czarny Protest [The Black Protest] initiative where hundreds of thousands of women went on strike to protest government abortion laws was initially planned and coordinated on Facebook (Kuchta -Nykiel in Social Press, 2016). Amid current attempts to re-introduce the law, women are once more mobilizing on social media, raising 200,000 signatures in the online petition (Rogaska in Onet, 2020). Such civic initiatives can however become instantly politicized and by extension, polarised on social media. The Facebook page Ośrodek Monitorowania Zachowań Rasistowskich i Ksenefobicznych [Centre for Monitoring Racist and Xenophobic Behaviours] is a case in point. The group has attracted over 230,000 followers, with a mission to track and report hate crime and misconduct online, including by government officials. However, by now the page is largely considered an opposition-friendly, political outlet. Hence, Jan Fiedorczuk from the government-friendly outlet Do Rzeczy (2019) refers to the page as the “Centre for creation of hate”. The page has nonetheless been successful in filing lawsuits and fighting hate crime despite its polarising effect, perhaps highlights Dahlberg’s (2007) argument that a certain amount of fragmentation is necessary for political action.

Conclusion

A significant and growing body of academic literature places the ‘echo chamber’ thesis into question. Some studies even suggest social media can potentially depolarise users specifically through exposure to alternative views. Nonetheless, data shows that polarisation and echo chambers exist on polish social media, but the picture may be skewed due to the disproportionate presence and activity of people who already hold extreme views. Furthermore, the substance of divisions in Polish society should not be underestimated, largely a matter of ‘moral’ preferences which could serve as a better explanation for polarisation than that of the medium on which divisions are expressed. From the standpoint of a healthy democracy, a certain degree of polarisation is necessary to avoid political ambivalence (Dahlberg, 2007), and recent women’s protests in Poland against government abortion laws demonstrate social media’s power to fuel civic action. Such initiatives, however, do have the potential to deepen already present partisan wedges.