France’s implementation of Operation Serval in Mali.
Tags: Humanitarian Intervention, Realism, French Intervention, Imperialism, Foreign Policy

Introduction,

Prior to 2012 Mali had been perceived as a pioneer for democracy as it pursued its efforts in remaining stabile as many states in its region were subject to coups detat (Boeke & Schuurman, 2015). On the contrary, Boeke and Schuurman (2015)argue that Mali was separated by the north and south, with the northern region occupied by the Tuareg; a nomadic ethnic group and the south by the sedentary. The Tuareg have a history of violent rebellion revolts against the Mali government of which have always been deterred with militant action. The 1994 “flamme de la paix” was peace-accord was agreed by the central government and Tuareg factions, but the tensions persisted. Consequentially, the formation of the Mouvement National pour la Liberation d’Azawad(MNLA) spearheaded the political movement in aims of autonomy for the Tuareg North resulting in a devastating act of rebellion against the central government (Charbonneau B. , Intervention in Mali: building peace between peacekeeping and counterterrorism, 2017; Boeke & Schuurman, 2015). The Tuareg faction supported by the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Mouvement pour I’unicite et le jihad en Afrique de I’Ouest (MUJAO) coordinated the attack against the central government that struggled to amass to the threat posed by the MNLA rebels due to the corruption in the Malian Army force. Furthermore, March 2012 saw MNLA rebel forces declare a coups detat that was subsequently denounced by the international community (Laird, 2012). As a consequence, Mali was suspended from the African Union (AU), the World Bank, the African Development Bank and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Additionally, the coup successfully expelled Malian army forces and gaining majority of the Malian territory including two main cities in the North(Wing, 2016; Boeke & Schuurman, 2015). AQIM and MUJAO soon then took advantage of the Malian government’s inability to appoint an interim president to overthrow the MNLA rebels influence in the North and establish its Islamic law in the region by July 2012 (Boeke & Schuurman, 2015). After MNLA attempted to recapture its territory from its former allies, it joined forces with the Mali government though peace negotiations. Laird (2012), Boeke and Schuurman (2015) argue that the ECOWAS appointed Diouncounda Traore as “acting President for the legitimate transitional government of Mali”. Under the leadership of the Interim President the Malian government with the aid of MNLA continue to be unsuccessful in the fight against the Islamic group occupying the north. The ECOWAS requests for assistance from the Security Council for the Mali army in their fight to regain its territory from the Islamic groups through the international military aid. Sequentially, the Security Council ruled for the Security Council Resolution (2085) that called for “the deployment of an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) for an initial period of one year, which shall take all necessary measures,” (cited in Laird, 2012) but this was subsequently sanctioned by the Security Council thus delaying the deployment of military aid. The Islamic groups used this time to gain territory thus prompting the French military intervention in Mali on 11 January 2013 as per request of acting President Diouncounda Traore. The research question that will be investigated in this essay is why France used military intervention in Mali in 2013. The essay explores the foreign policy pursued by France given the rise of Islamic groups in Western Africa and its decision-making in the region is pivotal to understanding the relationship with its former colonial states and whether the French indeed acted in Humanitarian aid or in national interest. French Military presence from the Serval Operation created the opportunity for establishment of the Operation Barkhane which saw France deploy more of its troops into North eastern Africa

Literature Review,

The scholars who have tackled French military inventions in Africa have found two fundamental influences that drive France to use its military to intervene in aiding foreign nationals. Henke (2017)argues that France is driven to use military intervention when; a) France’s asserting its global status through its influence in African states; b) France’s colonial history with its former colonies (Charbonneau & Sears, 2014, Charbonneau, 2017, Burgess, 2019). The French military intervention in Mali has been linked to these driving factors that have influenced the decision made by French President, Francois Hollande (Schofield, 2013). Charbonneau and Sears (2014) argue that “liberal peace” is the ideology that best advocates for the French military intervention in Mali and understanding the relationships between the two states. “Liberal peace” is the theoretical perspective that externalizes the views of the relationship between local and international states by emphasizing the power between both actors involved and altering the perception international intervention. Furthermore, “it is a model through which Western led agency, epistemology, and institutions, have attempted to unite the world under a hegemonic system that replicates liberal institutions, norms, and political, social and economic systems” (Richmond, 2011). Wing (2016)argues that liberals argue for the justification of the French military intervention as it acted in support of global justice. Furthermore, the invention was legal as the French were invited to help and it see by the international and regional states as morally right. Chafer et al (2020)argue that France has been acting innovatively in its approach to multilateralism which refrains from the formation of coalitions. Moreover, this is illustrated in its manner of working alongside other interveners but acting independently. Chafer et al (2020)suggest the concept of historical institutionalist (HI) to describe the changes in policy made by the French in its military interventions. In addition, HI draws from the rationalist and a constructivist approach to describe the decision made by actors and how their personalities influence the policies undertaken.

Burgess (2019)is of the opinion that France’s foreign policy can be described as Realism as it is acting from in its natural interests. In addition, Burgess asserts that the French only intervened once its interests were threatened hence it had military troops ready for deployment which have been in the region since the 1960s. As a consequence, Burgess (2019) indicates that the notion of neo-colonialism is still present in the region because of the subtle French presence. Constructivism is utilised by Burgess (2019) as an alternative theory to describe France’s military intervention by the means of Operation Serval as he argues that the strategy employed by the France is influenced by its colonial experience. Moreover, the establishment of the counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy allowed France to assert dominance in Africa in its ability to defend its interests. Henke (2017)notes that the role of the French President is important in the decision taken towards the state’s military approach. Moreover, she asserts that President Hollande prioritised Mali in his foreign policy, but former President Sarkozy did not answer any aid requests towards Mali. Wing (2016)argues that President Hollande was partly influenced by public opinion when deciding to deploy French troops into Mali and this was his ploy at demonstrating his strengths as a formidable President. Similarly, Saunders (Saunders E. , 2017)is of the opinion that French foreign policy is heavily influenced by the collaborative efforts of the President and their team of advisors in finding solutions and methods in acting accordingly. Henke (2017)attests to this as she argues that Defence Minister Le Drian convinced President Hollande to intervene in Mali as the Ministers plan included strategies for the military to use in its deployment as he thought that a French-led intervention would be favourable for France and Mali.

Case Study: Operation Serval

After Jihadist AQIM and MUJAO asserted their dominance in northern Mali by overthrowing their then separatist allies MNLA they continued in their pursuit of establishing Sharia Law in its captured regions. The ECOWAS requested assistance from the Security Council as the Mali armed forces working alongside MNLA continuously failed reclaiming its lost territory from the Jihadist groups. The Security Council ruled for the Security Council Resolution (2085) that called for “the deployment of an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) that was granted permission to use “all necessary measures” in combating and deterring the Jihadists threat in Mali (Laird, 2012). The Islamic groups ventured into the southern region of Mali towards the city of Bamako soon after the deployment of AFISMA, and this was seen as act of aggression by the France and Operation Serval undertaken (Oxford Research Group, 2019). Operation Serval was the deployment of 2 500 French troops with armed vehicles and aircrafts working with AU soldiers to stabilise Mali from Jihadist occupation. Furthermore, Operation Serval was 3 divided into 3 phases of eliminating the Jihadist threat in Mali; 1) Nullifying the Jihadist threat in the South; 2) Reclaiming the north and; 3) Dismantling Jihadist sects in Mali (Boeke & Schuurman, 2015). France aimed to use military intervention as a means of stabilising Mali and eliminating the Jihadist terrorists occupying its borders. The French utilised military intervention as it was requested to do so by Diouncounda Traore who was the “acting President for the legitimate transitional government of Mali” at the time thus legitimising the use of its military strength within foreign borders. France shifted from a unilateral approach to a multilateral approach to as it was allied with the EU and AU in its efforts in stabilising Mali. This is illustrated by the use of the responsibility to protect (R2P) used by France in compliance with the UN Security Council (Seyedfarshi, 2015). The French government justified its intervention as means of self-defence which they argued was in line with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter(Laird, 2012; Seyedfarshi, 2015). Furthermore, the French government justified its militant action against the Jihadists was in accordance to the United Nations Resolutions ruled by the Security Council, specifically, Security Council 2085 that explicitly stated, “all necessary means”. The swift use of military troops into Mali is due to the French military presence in the region with two bases in Dakar, Senegal and others in surrounding which allowed for quick mobilisation after it was clear to act within reason in Mali.

The theory of neo-colonialism is considered as the most dangerous form of imperialism as it is a theory that is mostly applicable in the African context as colonial powers linger on in the political, economic and social affairs of certain states. Kwame (1965) asserts that neo-colonialism is often in the form of economic control there he suggests that foreign capital is used as a means of manipulation and exploitation rather than to stimulate growth and development in the country. Additionally, former colonial states are dependent on their former colonial masters thus seeking aid only when there is an economic disaster or humanitarian crisis is the only instance the neo-colonial power will act with military action. This is further instilled with the separation of colonial states into small states incapable of defending itself and reliant on its neo-colonial master for its national security. This theory can be applied to the case of Mali and Operation Serval as France only acted once its national interests were threatened (Burgess, 2019). The French had established colonial rule in Northeast Africa by 1900 and deterred any rebellion that grew against it. Additionally, France oversaw the establishment of states such as Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali and Algeria etc in which it retained its influence throughout the years. France’s influence in West Africa has been rooted in its unilateral approach to its foreign policy in Africa but has now pursued a leading role whenever engaging in multilateral endeavours that take place in Africa (Burgess, 2019). This was present in Operation Serval as it agreed to work alongside the AU and Mali armed forces in fighting against the Jihadist groups occupying the Northern region of Mali. Therefore, France is acting under the guise of invited interventionism, United Nations Charter article 51 and Self-defence to mask its true intentions of overseeing the actions of its former colonial states. The establishment of military bases in its CFA states illustrates the military presence and intelligence that it has in the region hence the deployment of the troops in Mali were able to prevent the Islamic advancement on the city of Bamako.

Neoclassical realism is the foreign policy approach that accounts for the unpredictable nature of the international system to in order to provide a summative analysis. Therefore, this approach asserts that states act in accordance to the opportunities and the challenges presented by the political environment in which they interact. Furthermore, the results of their policies are influenced by factors such as “state-society relations, strategic culture, the nature of their domestic political regimes and leader-perceptions” (Ripsman, 2011). The neoclassical realist theory can be partially applied to the case of France’s military intervention in Mali and Operation Serval. The notion of state foreign policies being influenced by its political leader’s perception is applicable as the election of President Francois Hollande played a pivotal role in the France intervening in Mali. Former French President Sarkozy preferred not to intervene in Mali, but the newly elected Hollande found it profitable to intervene in the name of combatting the war on terror. ‘The UN’s honour comes from acting whenever people’s freedom is denied … (and when) fundamental rights are compromised … (and) from intervening when extremism threatens international security… (and) from acting to advance peace’ said President Hollande speaking at the 68thUnited Nations General Assembly. Burgess (2019)argues that the French population have stood by its leaders when using military force when they are asserted that it is necessary. Additionally, casualties are not considered important by French nationals should national interests be at risk. French nationals have partly influenced the decision taken by President Francois Hollande in aiding the Jihadist advancement occurring in Mali. Neoclassical realism can partly account for foreign policy that was taken France under the rule of President Hollande. The French strategic culture argued to be rooted in its colonial past by Burgess (2019)but fails to describe the strategic culture taken during the Operation Serval and the theory of Neoclassical realism is weakened by its limitations.

Conclusion,

Boeke and Schuurman (2015)argue that Mali was separated by the north and south, with the northern region occupied by the Tuareg; a nomadic ethnic group and the south by the sedentary and the 1994 “flamme de la paix” was peace-accord was agreed by the central government and Tuareg factions, but the tensions persisted. Consequentially, the formation of the Mouvement National pour la Liberation d’Azawad(MNLA) spearheaded the political movement in aims of autonomy for the Tuareg North resulting in a devastating act of rebellion against the central government (Charbonneau B. , Intervention in Mali: building peace between peacekeeping and counterterrorism, 2017; Boeke & Schuurman, 2015).The Tuareg faction was supported by the AQIM and MUJAO coordinated the attack against the central government that struggled to amass to the threat posed by the MNLA rebels due to the corruption in the Malian Army force. AQIM and MUJAO soon then took advantage of the Malian government’s inability to appoint an interim president to overthrow the MNLA rebels influence in the North and establish its Islamic law in the region by July 2012 (Boeke & Schuurman, 2015). The Security Council ruled for the Security Council Resolution (2085) that called for “the deployment of an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) for an initial period of one year, which shall take all necessary measures,”The Islamic groups used this time to gain territory thus prompting the French military intervention in Mali on 11 January 2013 as per request of acting President Diouncounda Traore. The research question aimed to answer why France implemented Operation Serval and the French government justified its intervention as means of self-defence which they argued was in line with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter(Laird, 2012; Seyedfarshi, 2015). Furthermore, the French government justified its militant action against the Jihadists was in accordance to the United Nations Resolutions ruled by the Security Council, specifically, Security Council 2085 that explicitly stated, “all necessary means”. (Francois, 2013)