Recent Arab-Israel agreements: The Israel-Palestine view
By: More Intelligence
Tags: Biden, Trump, Israel, Middle East, Palestine

Since August 2020, several normalization agreements have been signed (and others have been advanced towards signing) between Israel and Arab countries from among the “second circle” (that is, — which do not border with Israel or in direct conflict with her). The latest agreement is the one that is being formed with Morocco, about which it has only been published in recent days.

At first glance, it can be suspected that these agreements come at the expense of the negotiation process between Israel and the Palestinians, and they show that Israel can assimilate into the Arab region — even without reaching a solution to the core problem with the Palestinians.

It is possible that the factors behind these moves also aspired to this, especially the Trump administration and their close friend Benjamin Netanyahu, both have apparently sought to gain some political value in the face of harsh criticism from home.

The Palestinians are probably sitting on the sidelines in recent months, in despair, and seeing Israel expand its ties with countries in the Arab world, but this time — unlike in the post-Oslo Accords era in the 1990s, Israel’s social circle in the region is not depend on its willingness to advance in the negotiations with the Palestinians, but mainly depends on material elements that the United States is willing to provide to the Arab side, in exchange for its consent to approach Israel.

The Palestinians, for their part, can rightly feel that Arab solidarity has passed from the world and they have no real and reliable factor that can back them up, perhaps except for a limited number of countries in the region.

However, it seems that the Palestinians’ optimism can be found these days mainly in the new administration that is about to enter the White House. Based on the figures who are going to fill key positions in this administration, it can be estimated that the renewal of the political process between Israel and the Palestinians will be one of the expected projects in US foreign policy in the coming years.

Despite the rapid and somewhat suspicious way the latest agreements were built in the last days of the Trump administration, it can be estimated that the Biden administration will not deny these agreements, mainly because they also eventually strengthen American hold in the Middle East — mainly by making more countries dependent on US goodwill, and thus actually prevents their “fall” into the hands of the Russians or the Chinese.

Perhaps now, the Palestinians will understand that they really have to compromise. The period in which Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas, each in turn, could present a tough and uncompromising front — even in the face of relatively generous proposals from the Israeli side (especially during the Ehud Barak and Ehud Olmert periods), has passed, and now, in order to remain relevant, they must abandon the “stubborn child” attitude, and take on a more mature and responsible role. The continuation of the status quo in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is not in favor of the Palestinian Authority (and to be honest, it is also not in favor of Israel either, mainly because the latter seems to be moving slowly but surely towards a destructive reality of a de facto bi-national state).

Because the strategy of gaining political benefits by initiating popular violence has already been tried and failed during the Arafat era, Palestinians have no choice but to get down to the ground of reality, look around, and understand that the regional atmosphere has changed, and that they must also change.

Regarding Israel, assuming that Netanyahu continues to serve as prime minister for the foreseeable future (subject to additional elections likely to take place in a few months, and in parallel with the progress of his criminal trial), it can be assumed that (the expected) pressure from the Biden administration, combined with pressure from the Arab states that Israel has formed with official alliances in recent months, will also force even a conservative right-wing government in Israel to limit its political and settlement aspirations in the West Bank, and to return (albeit reluctantly) back to the negotiating table with the Palestinians.

At the end of the day, and from an optimistic point of view, it is likely that the Trump administration’s recent moves in the Israeli-Arab relations (even if this is not what the Trump administration intended in the first place), will eventually fit in well with the democratic foreign policy agenda for the Middle East, and will assist to revive the Israeli-Palestinian political process.

Renewal of this process is an existential necessity for both peoples. Any other option is bad for both parties.