Opinion: The Afghanistan Peace Talks
Tags: Peace Talks, Afghanistan, Civil War, Taliban, Insurgency

Peace Delegation Members for the Taliban Movement

Author’s Note: Written originally 17 May 2019. At this stage, some information may be outdated or otherwise refuted.

The United States has been at war in Afghanistan for nearly eighteen years. Thousands of American men and women have given life and limb, and yet for what? As Zalmay Khalilzad closed the sixth round of talks with representatives of the Taliban in Doha, reports noted he was frustrated by the lack of progress being made. The United States and the Taliban are at a critical juncture in talks: the insurgency wishes for a timetable and announcement of American troop withdrawal, while the US negotiating team wishes for promises of Al-Qaeda’s marginalization and elimination from Afghanistan. Even if such assurances are made by the Taliban, how could they be monitored? If the Taliban renege on their agreements, what leverage would Washington have at their disposal? The Afghanistan peace talks themselves are perhaps misnamed, as these talks will not lead to peace but rather continued death and destruction, though with minimal American footprint. Thus, these talks are more talks about withdrawal than they are legitimate peace talks. The American challenge — and perhaps, more individually, the Khalilzad challenge — is to forge a lasting peace, or at least a manageable one.

Ask any Afghan on the street — regardless of ideology or political belief — and they will give you the much same answer: they all want peace. However, the economy and civil society of Afghanistan has been so ruthlessly destroyed after almost forty-one years of unbridled conflict, civil war, and insurgency that the governing consensus reached under the Musahiban monarchs no longer exists. The more telling question, then, is how Afghans want their peace. For many, peace means security and predictability from the government. For those who rule, however, peace means victory.

The last time the question of peace was laid forth, in the autumn and winter of 2001, the Coalition made a fatal mistake. According to journalist Steve Coll’s book on the US in Afghanistan, Directorate S, little thought was given by the American government to “how [the Taliban’s] exclusion from the country’s new politics might create a backlash”. This mistake must not be made again by giving one party undue influence over Afghan politics; the negotiations at Doha must create an all-inclusive political solution between the Taliban and the current administration in Kabul. This will certainly be a challenge, and writing these words are easier than putting such a proposal into reality.

However, the Taliban has real governing legitimacy in much of Afghanistan, for better or for worse. Including them in the American-sponsored Government of Afghanistan would result in improvements in governance should the Taliban be placed in control of key government ministries such as the Ministry of Justice. The Justice Ministry is especially important as it is one area in which the current Administration in Kabul has failed completely, and where the Taliban have experienced great success. While sometimes brutal, many Afghans in rural areas see the Taliban courts as fair and incorruptible.

Moreover, the religiosity of the Taliban leadership is a great positive for improving the perception of Afghan government. Many in the upper leadership are seen as righteous religious scholars by the rural populace and are seen as impossible to corrupt. As the present Government is known for pervasive corruption and patronage politics, such perceived righteousness will undoubtedly assuage some of the concerns of the common Afghan. In so doing, many reasons that low-level insurgents (for example, local Taliban fighters) have in engaging anti-government activity may be able to be eliminated.

Most importantly, including the movement into the present government structure — albeit with some minor modifications that secure Taliban control over some key ministries — would allow for checks both on the strongmen that currently rule areas of the country, as well as allowing these strongmen to check the power of the Taliban. While certainly a tenuous balance, the United States would be able to trust that Al-Qaeda is unlikely to be able to reassemble under the watchful eye of these strongmen. Furthermore, as the Taliban would control ministries such as the Ministry of Justice, these strongmen could be controlled and prosecuted for mistreatment of the populace. While undue prosecution may occur, the Taliban may think twice about resuming the civil war by attacking their political enemies unnecessarily.

Speaking broadly, the peace talks in Afghanistan must not become a negotiated withdrawal or a Vietnam-esque “peace with honor”. They must be talks that truly value peace; talks that emphasize compromise, understanding, and building an Afghanistan of the future. This will be hard, though not impossible. Other countries with brutal ethnic division and civil war, such as Lebanon, have succeeded and while not perfect, stand as a testament to the power of human will for peace. Now the United States, the Taliban, and the Afghan Government must be willing to do the same.