Speak Loudly and Carry a Little Stick!
By: Asiri
Tags: Politics, Iran, Foreign Policy, Trump

The “Big stick” diplomacy and Trump’s approach toward Iran

In an address on “National Duties,” President Theodore Roosevelt defined his foreign policy in line with the West African proverb, “speak softly and carry a big stick — you will go far.” Such reference has established what came to be known as the “Big stick” diplomacy, comprising soft discourse and hard-power maneuvers. For Roosevelt, the soft discourse aims at bringing adversaries to the negotiation table. In international relations, states adjust their tone to a point where they secure a winning set of interests. On the other hand, hard power, defined in the Roosevelt era in terms of the Navy, is used to press adversaries toward compromise. Interestingly, the very success of diplomacy becomes contingent on the possibility of conflict. Roosevelt has found the “big stick” diplomacy effective in resolving the blockade of Venezuela in 1903 and the war between Japan and Russia in 1904.

More than a century later, President Donald Trump seems to have embraced a similar approach. During his campaign, his promises based for a unilateral and semi-isolationist policy, aiming at ending the US involvement in conflicts. However, he also used to opt out of the isolationist frame, waving the stick at the US adversaries. For Trump, the stick, or hard power, has been defined in terms of economic sanctions, used to alter adversaries’ behavior. The logic is that inflicting economic pain presses states to adjust their behavior to a preferred pattern. As for discourse, Trump’s version has not been associated with by a soft tone. Instead, Trump has resorted to extreme and threatening discourse, aiming, in his words, at “maximizing pressure” on adversaries. Hence, the Trump version of Roosevelt’s approach becomes a combination of threatening discourse and economic sanctions.

However, the combination seems to invalidate the tactical logic of the “Big stick” diplomacy. Within domestic contexts, Trump’s discourse works as an effective mechanism to mobilize support and funnel discontent toward the establishment. Nevertheless, it is destined to have the opposite effect at the international level. Usually, states use such discourse to mobilize domestic capital against what is perceived as an assault on national sovereignty. Besides this, Roosevelt’s hard power was defined in terms of the threat of force rather than the use of such force. By contrast, Trump’s sanctions are an example of use of force, leaving little room for diplomacy and cooperation. Besides this, sanctions may also become counterproductive, especially when accompanied with ineffective enforcement.

Among the cases where such approach has been applied is the case of Iran, regarding its political behavior and nuclear ambitions. Trump seems to have aimed at bringing Iran to the table or, at least, pressing the Iranian economy to the point where it becomes unable to finance political and military projects. However, the record suggests that Trump’s approach has not been able to achieve such goals. Combining threatening discourse and sanctions have rendered the first hollow and the second ineffective. In fact, it has developed an apparent discrepancy between the threat of force and the effects of the used force. In other words, the louder the talk is, the smaller the stick has become. Eventually, Trump’s approach has become closer to the “small” rather than the “big” stick diplomacy!

President Trump, tweeting a threat of force against Iran (July, 2018)

Speak loudly ..

Trump’s discourse toward Iran has been defined by hostility and threats. Even before he ran for office, Iran was at the center of his criticism of the Obama administration. In 2015, Trump referred to the Iran deal as the “worst, horrible, and laughable.” During his campaign, attacking Iran deal became the running theme of his political discourse. Almost in every rally, Trump referred to Iran’s deal as “disastrous.” The use of threats has defined Trump’s discourse in office. On different occasions, Trump threatened to use military force against Iran, warning of what he called “severe consequences” and “mean obliteration.” As recent as September 2020, Trump threatened Iran with an attack that is “1,000 times greater in magnitude.” Rarely, Trump’s discourse about Iran has been associated with deescalation and calls for diplomacy. The only two instances were touting a possible meeting with the Iranian president in 2019 and expressing openness to extend aid during the Coronavirus pandemic.

For many, Trump’s discourse seems to have been setting the stage for action. Many observers have rushed to drafting scenarios of a possible war between the US and Iran. However, time has shown that such discourse is merely an instrument of pressure, designed to force the Iranians to negotiate and compromise. While such strategy may not be ineffective in itself, the context within which it has been applied proves counterproductive. At one level, there has been a growing discrepancy between the threat of force and the used force. In other words, Trump has not been able to match his discourse with proportional action toward Iran. Such condition has affected the credibility of his threats. At another level, Trump’s discourse has rejuvenated a reservoir of anti-western sentiments in Iran. Hence, it gives way to the Iranian regime to build domestic capital against the US.

In a way, Trump’s discourse has pushed the Iranians away from the negotiation table. In 2018, the supreme leader Khamenei said that “there will be no war, nor will we negotiate with the us.” Following, President Rohani refused to negotiate as long as sanctions are imposed. While such responses may not necessarily spring from a position of power, they spring from an understanding of Trump’s strategy. The discrepancy between his threats and his actions has revealed his threats as hollow. Hence, Iran’s hardliners seized an assurance to hold their positions. They were also aided by a shift in public opinion inside and outside Iran. According to Iran Poll, 86% of Iranians express an unfavorable view of the US. Such percentage marks a thirteen-point increase in the percentage of Iranians with such views in 2016. Besides this, views about Iran’s regional influence have changed along with Trump’s approach. According to a poll by PEW Research Center, the majority of Lebanese and Jordanians and more than half of Israelis believe that Iran has become stronger, compared to ten years ago.

President Trump, signing an executive order for new sanctions against Iran (June, 2020)

Carry a little stick ..

Trump’s discourse has been accompanied with the use of hard power, defined in terms of economic sanctions. Such use is not new to the America foreign policy. Since 1979, the US has imposed various economic, trade, and military sanctions against Iran. It was only in 2015 when most sanctions were lifted in exchange of Iran’s commitment to the nuclear deal. However, what is new about Trump’s sanctions is the fact they are the only choice. Trump’s use of military force would have upset his base and broken a promise of withdrawal and isolation. Hence, sanctions have become a way to deter Iran and keep the base onboard. Besides this, Trump’s sanctions are defined by unilateral imposition, an approach that diminishes effectiveness and enables evasion. Besides this, it has also casted the US as an outlier, challenging the P5+1 consensus in regard of the approach toward Iran.

Essentially, sanctions are problematic due to the missing link between economic pain and change in political behavior. Political scientists contend that such pain does not usually translate into change in behavior. In some cases, it may harden the positions of the sanctioned regime as it externalizes blame for economic hardship. Apparently, the US sanctions have exhausted the Iranian economy. In 2019, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) expected Iran’s economy to shrink by 9.5%, down from a previous estimate of a 6% contraction. Besides this, exports of Iranian oil dropped to 100,000 barrels per day (bpd) in the same year. However, the economic pain does not seem to have altered Iran’s behavior. Instead, Iran seems to have become more aggressive amid the US sanctions. Examples include Iran’s alleged involvement in the attack on Saudi Aramco in 2019 and the Soleimani Operation against the US bases in Iraq in 2020. Furthermore, Iran still exercises influence in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen.

Along with this, sanctions do not seem to have restrained Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Following the reimposition of sanctions, Iran resumed uranium enrichment and reopened closed facilities. According to a report issued by the Congressional Research Service in 2019, Iran has exceeded the permitted level of uranium enrichment and processing of heavy water. Iran has also, according to Reuters, reopened a nine-year-old nuclear power plant to expand its program. In July 2020, Iran’s stockpile of low-enriched uranium had reached 2,442.9 kg (5,385.6 lb), twelve times of the amount allowed under the deal. According to the IAEA inspectors, such level would be enough to reach the weapons grade and produce three atomic bombs. In other words, Iran has become closer to nuclear weapons than it was in 2016.

Trump’s unilateral approach seems to have also undermined any possible effect of the economic pain on Iran’s behavior. Generally, unilateral sanctions are marked by a higher probability of evasion. As states find alternative trade patterners, sanctions lose their grip on the targeted system. In Iran’s case, China and Russia have seized the opportunity to defy the US. Following the US sanctions, Russia announced that sanctions are not expected to influence economic interaction with Iran. China went further to extend aid to Iran through a 400-billion-dollar deal of economic and military cooperation. Along with this, the Trump administration has also undermined sanctions through the use of exemptions. In 2018, the US exempted Japan, China, India, and five other countries from the reimposed sanctions. Such condition continued until last year when the US declared that exemptions will not be renewed!

Iran has also managed to defy the US sanctions on its own. Using third party traders or what is known as dummy companies, Iran has continued to trade and export oil and other products. According to a report in The Wall Street Journal, Iran has used five UAE companies to facilitate selling oil and petrochemical products. The report adds that the UAE ports have also become a trading hub for Iran’s products. Besides this, Iran has also used, according to the same report, six companies in Hong-Kong to broker and obscure sales of its oil and other products. Recent data, published on TankerTrackers, seem to confirm the report, showing that exports of Iranian oil have reached 1.5 million barrels per day (bpd), a sharp increase from the 100 thousand (bpd) level in 2019. Along with this, Iran has used informal payment systems to continue trading with partners. While the US continues to trace and sanction such means, most remain beyond the reach of the US institutions.

The Iranian case shows that the president’s approach has not only been unable to achieve its goals. Instead, it has produced the opposite effects, hardening Iran’s position and furthering its political and nuclear ambitions. The combination of the threatening discourse and sanctions has dulled the pressure and failed to translate into proportional deterrence. As the sanctions lose their grip on the Iranian economy and threats become uncredible, the legacy of Trump’s foreign policy toward Iran becomes defined in line with, “speak loudly and carry a little stick!”

This article is available in Arabic HERE