A Russian Master’s Class in Great Power Competition
By: Mason Nsi
Tags: Nato, Syria, Russia, Featured Analysis, Disinformation

By Jennifer Cafarella, NSI Visiting Fellow

Losing Great Power Competition could be less dramatic than it seems. While U.S. military planners rightly warn of the consequences of Russian and Chinese technological innovation, the U.S. is as if not more at risk of experiencing strategic defeat through a series of incremental losses. U.S. adversaries are already racking up small victories that could amount to strategic upheaval as technology continues to transform warfare. Russia’s quiet expansion of basing and leverage in the Middle East since 2015 is an example of a game-changing accomplishment that remains wholly overlooked in Washington. U.S. policymakers continue to assume that Russia, despite its assault on Europe and U.S. democracy, is a potential partner in the Middle East. Putin is both reinforcing this framing while exploiting it for all it is worth. In doing so, he is teaching a master’s class in Great Power Competition.

Russia’s establishment of permanent military infrastructure in the Middle East in 2015 established a beachhead that the United States failed to recognize as a strategic threat. Russia acquired leases to operate Syria’s Hmeimim airbase and Tartous naval base in return for military support to Syrian President Bashar al Assad’s faltering regime. U.S. policy assumed Russia would remain focused on Syria. Instead, Putin leveraged his role in Syria to accomplish multiple strategic outcomes: driving a wedge within NATO, transforming the Russian military, super-charging Russian weapon sales, positioning Russia as a diplomatic heavyweight, and creating a launch pad for further expansion into Africa.

Russia is now transforming its Black Sea Fleet from possessing a regional power projection capability to a global one. In late 2020, Russia gained access to a naval base in Sudan that will provide a second logistics hub, allowing Russia to reduce its reliance on Syria. Russia is meanwhile expanding the Tartous facility into a multipurpose naval base, which will include a floating dock by 2022. Public statements by senior Russian military commanders indicate Putin’s vision is for the Black Sea Fleet to operate through the Red Sea and Persian Gulf east towards the Indian Ocean and south towards Madagascar. The potential leverage this expanded presence would provide Russia would significantly increase the strategic pressure Putin can place on NATO.

Russia’s greatest success may be shifting U.S. policy discourse away from confronting Russia’s power plays in the Middle East and North Africa. The same Russian disinformation networks that are attempting to paralyze the United States through internal division are also shaping regional narratives to build support for Russia’s expansion among U.S. partners as the United States pulls back. Russia is also directly shaping U.S. policy by capably wielding its leverage. Russian-backed narratives that inflate the risks of a major U.S.-Russia confrontation continue to cause policymakers to turn a blind eye to Russia’s growing escalation against U.S. forces in eastern Syria. Russia has also funneled the United States into negotiations over humanitarian access to a single border crossing instead of larger strategic outcomes.

Russia is using its free rein to prepare for future air and ground operations. After five years of tough fighting, Russia is expanding at least one runway and building a new “medical treatment and rehabilitation centre” at the Hmeimim airbase that will enable greater casualty evacuation. Russia may be preparing for future combat operations in Syria or Libya, where Russian private military companies have seized an airfield and fortified an enduring presence. Finally, Russia has established a robust presence at a second air base in northeast Syria, including rotary wing capabilities and military police. Russia is using the base to gain leverage over Turkey and pressure U.S. forces supporting the Syrian Democratic Forces.

The future wars the Defense Department seeks to deter will become more likely if the United States continues to cede leverage and strategic positioning to our adversaries. In a similar example in the Indo-Pacific theater, Adm. Phil Davidson, the outgoing U.S. theater commander had pushed hard for funding for near-term capabilities needed to seize the initiative and restore deterrence against a Chinese escalation against Taiwan in the next 6 years. However, the Biden Administration’s budget declines to fund this requirement. The administration must ensure that its preparation for future war recognizes the pathways to conflict within the current environment — and mitigates them.

Jennifer Cafarella is the inaugural National Security Fellow at the Institute for the Study of War and an NSI Visiting Fellow.