What Makes A Table A ‘Table’?
By: Wei Xiang
Tags: Philosophical Questions, Ontology, Science, Thinking, Philosophy

Ontology as a Taxonomy

Photo by NASA on Unsplash

The first interpretation we’re going to discuss is an ontological interpretation. It could be rephrased to: ‘Why do you call this a table?’ or ‘What makes you think this is a table?’

This, I think, is the most literal interpretation of the question. Ontology studies how things are being categorised and given names. It’s a taxonomy. Every field of study has this. Biology is the easiest to understand. We human are called mammals, so are dogs, cats, whales, and cows. Why are we called ‘mammals’? Because the females of these animals contain mammary glands (hence, ‘mammals’) that produce milk to feed their offsprings. Come to think of it: biology is quite feminine. Our species is defined by the females.

A fellow mammal. Photo by Juan Rumimpunu on Unsplash

Likewise, we can ask the same questions to literally every object in this world. ‘What makes a table a “table”?’ could be asked as ‘why do we call this thing a “table”?’. It’s like asking ‘Why do we call this animal a “mammal”?

Now, the quickest prima facie response is to say that we’ve grown up seeing enough of the same thing again and again. We were taught that ‘thing’ is called a table. So when we see another of that ‘thing’ that is similar to all the tables we've seen, we can confidently say that it is, hence, a ‘table’.

Now, philosophy begins like how a biologist would begin asking questions. When we’ve seen an animal and studied it, we propose a hypothesis: this is a mammal because, like all the other mammals, it contains mammary glands. Then we begin testing that hypothesis.

In philosophy, it’s the same. We conjecture a definition of a table. An example (and an obviously weak one) would be: ‘that’s a table because, like all the other tables, it has a flat surface supported by legs’.

When we hypothesise or conjecture a definition, we are making a universal claim. That means anything that has a flat surface supported by legs is a ‘table’. Then, we test the hypothesis by finding counterexamples. Quite quickly, we can think of a contemporary-designed table that is attached to a wall that has no legs supporting it; a ‘mounted table’. So, not all tables are supported by legs. So, we are forced into two options. Either we do not call that monstrosity of a ‘table’ a ‘table’ (maybe, we could call it a ‘plank’), or we revise our initial definition of ‘table’.

Hopefully, you’re like me and think the latter is the way to go. Or else you’d be stuck saying ‘I left my keys on that plank’ for the rest of your life. But, to be honest, people will still probably understand where you left your keys. So, after thinking through this question for some time, my best conjecture is:

A table is a surface which we use to place everyday objects on.

Thus, any surface which we can habitually use to place our stuff on can be aptly called a ‘table’. It doesn't need to be flat, nor does it need to be supported by legs.

Of course, ontological philosophy extends such an inquiry to other objects and entities as well, like ‘What is God?’, ‘What is knowledge?’, ‘What is the mind?’, ‘What makes a person?’ etc. These questions are interested in understanding the characteristics of the object of our inquiry. Conversely, we want to be able to systematically and consistently categorise things into their respective identities. It seems easy, but it never is. The world around us resists categorising and systematising. Subjects that are confident that they have this system break off from philosophy into their respective sciences. Chemistry, for example, is confident that they can answer ‘what is matter?’ or ‘what is the nature of matter?’

Now, I say ‘confident’. It’s because the foundation of these sciences aren’t as strong as we think they are. These sciences break off into their own field of study because they are usually practically good enough to stand alone. We can build strong bridges with theories of physics, and we can manufacture smartphones with computer science. They’re ‘good enough’ to go. So, they did.

Naturally, we can say that philosophy deals with the ‘leftovers’. Objects of studies that aren’t categorised into adequate identities are left for philosophers to think about. This is also why people often lament philosophy isn’t as practical as the sciences. It isn’t. And it wasn’t meant to be.