Third Short Summary of Kurt Lampe’s The Birth of Hedonism: The Cyrenaic Philosophers and Pleasure as a Way of Life
By: Jordan Crago
Tags: Pessimism, Philosophy, Hellenistic Age, Atheism

Third Short Summary of Kurt Lampe’s The Birth of Hedonism: The Cyrenaic Philosophers and Pleasure as a Way of Life Jordan Crago Jun 8·5 min read

Chapter 7 focuses on the later Cyrenaic philosopher Hegesias, who is remarkable, so Lampe claims, for being the only true pessimist philosopher of ancient Greece. Hegesias is clearly a Cyrenaic, for he holds that pleasure is the only intrinsic good and pain the only intrinsic bad — thus, anything which is good is only good insofar as it brings pleasure and anything which is bad is only bad insofar as it brings pain. However, Hegesias breaks with the Cyrenaic tradition before him by denying that pleasure is the telos — which is to say, the goal of our choices and avoidances. He does this because he believes — and this where his pessimism comes in — that living pleasurably (which is the definition of Cyrenaic eudaimonia) is impossible. Since living pleasantly is impossible, we must pursue some other kind of life — living neither painfully nor distressingly. If the pleasant life cannot be attained — and since pain is the greatest evil — then you must live such as to avoid an unpleasant life.

Lampe argues that Hegesias advocates a life of indifference — which is to say, a life whereby one is indifferent to conventional sources of pleasure: wealth, fame, and power. However, Hegesiac pessimism is far more radical than indifference to such goods — an indifference one finds, for example, in the Epicureans and, to a lesser degree, in the earlier Cyrenaics. Hegesias’ indifference extends also to friendship and even life itself. Lampe explains that the Hegesiac sage is self-sufficient — all they need is what they can draw from themselves. Therefore, friends can offer the Hegesiac sage nothing they already have in abundance.

Furthermore, the Hegesiac sage will be indifferent to their own life. To argue for this thesis, Lampe draws upon Cologn Papyrus 205, which is a Socratic dialogue which has been attributed to Hegesias. It is a significantly incomplete dialogue which would need great explication, so instead I will simply report Lampe’s conclusions. As in Xenophon’s treatment of Socrates’ impiety trial — where Socrates is condemned to die for impiety — Hegesias depicts Socrates as giving no counter-sentence because he (Socrates) sees no reason to save his own life.

To make sense of the rather extreme indifferent elements in Hegesiac ethics, Lampe appeals to the Homeric/heroic virtue of magnanimity — it’s important to note here that by magnanimity it is not meant generosity of spirit, but rather the ability to accept without losing equanimity the great misfortunes of life. Think of Odysseus’ heroic perseverance in Homer’s Odyssey. Thus, on Lampe’s interpretation, the Hegesiac sage is a kind of philosophical hero who pursues a painless life and who is willing, if the circumstances produce too much pain, to surrender this life because they treat it with indifference.

Chapter 8 focuses on another later Cyrenaic philosopher — Theodorus. Theodorus accepts Hegesiac indifference and agrees that the goods most people value are indifferent goods — freedom, nobility, fame, wealth, power, friends, and life. However, Theodorus does not share Hegesias’ pessimism — he believes that a pleasant life is indeed possible. Furthermore, Theodorus breaks from the Cyrenaic tradition preceding him by denying that bodily pleasure and bodily pain are, respectively, the chief good and the chief evil. Indeed, he goes so far as to teach that pleasure and pain are indifferents.

In place of pleasure and pain, Theodorus teaches that the chief good and the chief evil are joy and distress — which is to say, Theodorus contradicts Aristippus and Mainstream Cyrenaics by holding that mental pleasure and pain are greater than bodily pleasure and pain. Thus, the Theodorean telos and conception of eudaimonia is living joyfully. Having established the goal of Theodorian ethics, Lampe explores how it works practically. Central to Theodorean ethics, Lampe argues, is Theodorus’ conception of justice and practical wisdom.

Theodorus denies that justice can be reduced to a set of principles or rules — it is simply far too complex to be thus reduced. In reality, what action is best for the Theodorean sage to do depends on the specifics of the situation facing them. In other words, justice resists the kind of systematisation one sees throughout Greek philosophy, as well as modern philosophy. I’m reminded of the subtle relativism of the contemporary philosopher Bernard Williams who critiqued systematic ethics.

Given the lack of an objective justice, the Theodorean sage must rely upon his own “extemporaneous” (impromptu) judgement. In other words, Theodorean practical wisdom consists of the ability to intuitively recognise what is best or appropriate to do under the particular circumstance facing the agent. Thus, the Theodorean sage regards herself as the source of action. As with Hegesias, Lampe paints the Theodorean sage as a Homeric hero who embodies the virtue of magnanimity. Finally, the self-worth which the Theodorean sage will derive from considering themselves the benchmark of justice and wisdom will be a source of great joy.

Lampe ends his book with an interpretation of the work of Walter Pater as a modern incarnation of Cyrenaic ethics. It’s a shame that Lampe does not explore how Cyrenaic philosophy influenced Epicureanism, which seems to me owes a great debt to the Cyrenaic movement, but his discussion about Pater is certainly interesting and concludes an accessible but by no means simple exploration of the original philosophers of Pleasure.

Outro and reference:

If you enjoyed these (admittedly short) summaries of Lampe’s book, I highly recommend that you purchase the book so as to learn much more about what I have written. I will also soon be publishing a more in-depth summary of chapter 4, especially the part which focuses on the pragmatic values and practices of Aristippus the Elder — I intend that piece to be an instruction on how to live the Cyrenaic life.

If you are interested in being part of a community devoted to learning about Cyrenaic philosophy — either as a historical phenomenon or as a pragmatic way of life for the modern day — please consider joining the New Cyrenaicism group on Facebook.

Kurt Lampe, The Birth of Hedonism: The Cyrenaic Philosophers and Pleasure as a Way of Life, Princeton University Press, 2015