In Search of Lifts and Mirrors: How a New Communication Approach Could Thwart Russian Propaganda
By: Lesia Dubenko
Tags: European Union, Propaganda, Russia, Communication, Communications Strategy

In Search of Lifts and Mirrors: How a New Communication Approach Could Thwart Russian Propaganda Lesia Dubenko Jan 3, 2020·6 min read

Russians use simple, straightforward and effective methods. Is the solution much the same?

The solution to Russian information warfare might be completely unorthodox.

Every once in a while, you stumble upon a thought that makes you re-consider what you have been long contemplating. In my case, it was a book-based speech by a well-known British PR and communications strategist Rory Sutherland, who argues that in a great many cases changing the problem is about changing its perception in ways that are seemingly illogical as exemplified by the lift/mirror case. Particularly, he refers to a group of people, who had been continuously complaining about a lift. They deemed it too slow, nothing short of a technological disaster in a world of speed and immediateness.

So how does a logic-driven person go about this problem? “We need to install a new lift”, “we need better cables”, “let’s opt for a carbon fiber material”. These solutions seem rational, do not they? Rather expensive, but a solid way of tackling the issue nonetheless.

But what if all you need to do is put up a high-quality mirror inside the lift? No carbon fiber, no new lift cabins or complex technical designs. A simple mirror, albeit a rather big one. From a logical perspective, this makes no sense, but the bewildering fact is that it is the solution. To that end, Sutherland points out that once the mirror has been installed, people went from despising the lift trip to adoring it — whether for purely narcissistic reasons or practical needs like adding finishing touches to one’s appearance before showing up at the office.

This peculiar solution, irrational at a glance, made me think of grander problems out there that could be taken on in the same way. Like information warfare and the case of Russian propaganda, which is, and we would all agree on that one, a salient problem.

Common is the notion, that Russia resorts to highly complex ways of devising its propaganda methods, using a mastermind combination of contradicting philosophical theories, channels, and techniques. My contention is the opposite: its design is extremely plain and comprises the classics of “whataboutisms” –“Putin has been in power for too long? Look at Merkel!” — , a simple set of negative messages –“Ukraine is bad”, “the EU is bad”, “the US is bad”, “liberal values are generally horrendous”, — repetitiveness and circularity.

When starting with a message like “Ukraine is a failed state”, all it really does is move it clockwise, throwing in arguments like “Ukrainians are stealing food from pigeons” while defying contradicting ones like “Ukraine is a state like any other out there”. Eventually, ending along the lines “Told you all along: failed”. Hence its effectiveness, more so since the built-in negativity strikes a chord with the average post-Soviet person who is, by and large, a gloomy-minded one, inclined to use constructions that well prepare the speaker for the futility of the whole initiative. For example,“do you not have?” (In Russian, it is, arguably, a more common version of formulating oneself than “do you have”?)

With that in mind, take a careful look at how the Russian TV, for instance, structures its programs. Rarely does it focus on elaborating its own achievements, albeit mentioning that Russia, in general, is “a powerhouse”, perhaps not in its best shape, not very democratic or anything, not very rich, but, you know, still going strong. Instead, it almost entirely focuses on the flaws of others, trying to debase whatever is present at hand. It stages a dialogue when no actual dialogue takes place, and the bastions of its informational influence like “Time will tell” are indicative of such a design.

First, the host commences a “discussion” with a specific message that is being elaborated on by other “experts”. Second, an intervening factor — let’s call it an anti-Russian speaker — tries to contest it and is almost immediately either verbally, or physically, defied. The format is straightforward; it is negative; the language used is lively; no restrictions are in place, except for a contradicting opinion. It is popular precisely because it is simple and re-applicable in many realms — a problem the Western governments have been trying to deal with for many years.

So, what kind of rational solutions immediately come to mind? Probably something along the lines of “we should employ more people to debunk Russian myths”. Or “let’s invest more in communicating the agenda of the EU and the U.S. in the Post-Soviet countries”. More “facts, campaigns, articles, — that is what we need”. Without a doubt, it is rational, both simple and evident. And expensive for that matter. Unfortunately, the Russian propagators seem to have grown immune to these solutions. The audience that they are targeting — in Russia and abroad, even within the EU — is not exactly a rational one. If it were, it would probably not embrace the opinion of a regime that can any time get away with murder or blatant human rights abuse and opt for the support for human rights and democracy.

It is not to say that projects like EU vs Disinfo or their counterparts in Ukraine like Stopfake.orgare are working in vain. On the contrary, they contribute immensely by providing a navigation tool through the Russian narratives. However, their findings are useful to those who are already aware of the problem and are trying to deal with it. They do not really reach those whose mindset is to be won over, the ones who are more likely to watch a staged verbal fight than an actual substantiated debate.

That said, some of those minds are, admittedly, too rigid; but in many cases, they are agile as well. A “for instance” retraces a 2013 interview with Channel 4 News, whereby a British voter admitted having a hard time choosing between supporting UKIP (a far-right predominantly xenophobic party formerly led by anti-EU Nigel Farage) and Labour (a leftist party, known for its multicultural agenda and pro-EU stance).

However, those minds, irrational ones in the majority, seem to require a different approach to have their perceptions altered, not the one which immediately comes to mind, i.e. the rational one. In other words, it is time to try and search for that mirror in the lift, a solution which at first seems awkward but has a very tangible effect.

So, where does one begin?

I would argue that the answer’s whereabouts might be Russian propaganda consumers themselves. After all, what are they really after when they are turning to it? Does it make them feel better about themselves? Are they finding solace in it? Could it even be that part of the problem lies in loneliness? If so, what could be changed, for example, in the EU’s communication line to tug at their heartstrings?

This calls for a rigorous study, the kind of study that will not scratch the surface of the already evident but delve deeper into the minds of people, producing a solution that could be just as simple as putting up that mirror on the lift’s wall instead of installing a new cabin. It is just we have not yet put our fingers on it. Surely, it will take some time to find it. It might even turn out to be a counter-intuitive measure, like a price raise instead of its reduction, as Sutherland argues when referring to another seemingly irrational successful move of tackling a problem. However, the point is it does exist.

As the search begins, there is no need to give up the other more logical if you will ways of countering Russian information warfare and its influence on the public — like projects aimed at debunking myths or fact-checking. Yet, the real solution might turn out to be completely unorthodox, — and one should be well prepared for that.