On Determinism: A Brief Case for Free Will
By: M. Mollenthiel
Tags: Science, Free Will, Psychology, Philosophy, Mind

Benjamin Libet, a psychologist who specialized in consciousness, famously showed that activity in the brain’s motor cortex can be detected at appropriately 300 milliseconds before a person feels, or is consciously aware of having decided to make a move.

What does this say about consciousness? And more specifically, what does this say about free will? Let us explore this a bit.

As a result of these findings, the expected position to take is that of a determinist one — being, whether a philosopher or scientist, that we are all constrained within the material framework of our neurophysiology; thus, making free will a non-entity within the physical laws of nature.

Is this necessarily true?

Well, to some degree, our consciousness is a product of the brain and the many neuronal networks of its structure. For in order to perform a lower-level task, like lift a finger, a distributed population of neurons in the motor cortex, which overlap in its spacial locations, would control for the flexion-extension of a finger. But I don’t believe that this necessarily lies at the root of free will or consciousness, more generally.

What if, say, during the moment in which brain scans detect activity in the motor cortex (e.g., to lift a finger) prior to our being aware of having felt the decision to lift a finger, that we thought of not lifting a finger at that precise moment prior to our being aware of it? Or, what if we coincidentally thought of lifting a finger at the moment brain activity occurs — again, for lifting a finger — prior to our being aware of it? What are the implications of the answers to these questions?

For starters, if we thought of not lifting a finger at the moment our brain made the decision to (excuse the personification of “brain.” It’s not without purpose), then the fact that we eventually felt the decision to lift our finger implies that our brain overrides our conscious impulses.

A paradox presents itself: on one hand, the override works as a “change of decision” from the perspective of the Subject experiencing the feeling of having made a decision to do that which was already decided by the brain prior to them being aware of having made the decision, while consciously thinking of not performing the action at the moment that the brain decided to, which creates the feeling of free will; and, on the other hand, this implies a level of consciousness of the brain independent of the conscious-awareness of the Subject, which, in all honestly, is illogical.

Taking a determinist stance on these findings suggest that the brain stands alone as a consciously autonomous matter, with two functions: (1) to create an illusion of an external, consciously non-autonomous Subject that nevertheless feels as if it were (i.e., the Self), and (2) make decisions for the Self. “(1)” is a bizarre form of dualism; whereby, one is conscious of one’s Self, but this (simulated) “Self” exists only within an illusion created by the super-consciousness of the brain.

What evolutionary purpose would there be for a dual-consciousness, where one is autonomous and the other is not?

Also, since the brain originally evolved to adapt to a considerably different environment, what evolutionary function would provide for the brain to make a decision — independent of our conscious, simulated “Selves” — between using my laptop or browsing on my phone?

The experience of having dealt with technology informs my decision on which two options I should choose from.

The Brain In a Vat thought experiment by Hilary Putnam possibly presents the most interesting insight into the split between the Brain and the Self. If, say, I was to connect a brain to a supercomputer, the computer could function as a somatic substitute to the biological-physical body. The brain can gain experience from the simulated reality created by the computer, and create a simulated Self within the simulation.

Something interesting occurs here — if we go by Libet’s experiment, the brain will make decisions prior to the Self being aware of having felt making those decisions, but this will all happen within a computer simulation responsible for the reality the Brain experiences.

The Self would only exist within the program of the simulation itself; which is to say, the simulation would provide code that would allow for the Brain to create the Self, which, in this case, would be a simulation of a simulation within a simulation.

How can the Brain make a decision prior to the conscious Self being aware of having felt making the decision if the Self can only exist within the constraints of the simulation’s coding that is already pre-determined?

Clearly, the Brain In the Vat thought experiment shows there is no distinction between Brain and Mind, Mind and Self, etc. So there has to be some other explanation for the Libet experiment that doesn’t lean towards determinism or imply a separation between the Mind and Brain.

In a way, what it does show, though, is that free will is compatible with determinism. For example, a pilot is flying a plane through expected clear skies. He nevertheless has to navigate through the external realities of weather conditions. The pilot may be swayed by the wind to and fro, and maybe even encounters a storm; this is out of his control. But he nonetheless reacts to that which is out of his control and decides — out of his own volition — to either stay clear the course (upon further risk-value assessment) or take another course. This is similar to free will. In this example, our “Mind” is the plane and the Brain is the external environment swaying us.

In short, I am my brain, my brain is my “Self,” and the Self makes decisions to act, respond, contemplate, draw from memory and experience, negotiate between options, and choose between them after assessment. The Libet experiment only measured non-deliberative hand-waving tasks, and this, I believe, is not where freedom of the will, or “willing,” lies. A case for compatibilism (the confluence of free will and determinism) can, and should be made in its stead.