Why The U.S. Failed in Afghanistan
By: Tawab Hamidi
Tags: Afghanistan, Taliban, War, Pakistan, Islam

Why The U.S. Failed in Afghanistan

Few mistakes are as damaging and as difficult to unwind as a bad hire. Companies such as Google and Apple have a policy to leave key positions unfulfilled, even when there are cost ramifications, as opposed to filling the position with mediocrity. Moreover, successful corporations speak about a “no jerks” policy which clarifies that no amount of contribution can make up for a lack of character. The failure of Afghanistan and the US intervention rests mainly on backing the wrong horse from the get-go. When we unmask what transpired we find that, far more than jerks, America backed individuals with gut wrenching records of abuse, corruption and incompetence.

Senior government officials in Afghanistan included members who are accused of war crimes and human rights violations. It had members who were mired in corruption and far too many who are incompetent. Widespread nepotism became a norm as public confidence in the government eroded.

The US policies implemented under George W. Bush and then furthered by the Obama administration bares much of the blame for Afghanistan’s failure. Both administrations were so focused on fighting the Taliban and Al Qaeda, that they allied with warlords and individuals who were considered far worse than the Taliban by many Afghans. Many of them were hated. Take for example the story of Captain Dan Quinn, who was a decorated green beret and was relieved from the US Army for beating up an Afghan militia commander, Abdul Rahman, in 2011. Captain Quinn beat up the militia leader because he had abducted a small boy and chained him to his bed as a sex slave and would regularly rape the boy. While Captain Quinn’s conscience could not stand such a monstrosity, the US policy makers and senior military leadership had instituted a policy to look the other way at those it considered to be US allies, and they were not to be harmed for their personal activities. How can we Americans blame the parents of the boy who was raped or the village who heard about the story, as to why they would support the Taliban over the US and its local allies?

Human Rights Watch, has strong evidence that the last Afghan defense minister, Asadullah Khalid, under President Ashraf Ghani, had a torture dungeon, raped women and girls, trafficked drugs, and killed 5 UN workers. General Abdul Rashid Dostum, has been accused of war crimes as far back as the 1990’s by Human Rights Watch, and separately for killing and looting civilians in Northern Faryab province in June of 2016. In Nov. 2016, Dostum physically beat his political rival, Ahmad Ischi, and he was then accused of kidnapping Ischi for 5 days and raping him at gun point. After the incident and with public outcry, Dostum was forced to flee into exile to Turkey, but only to come back 2 years later, at the insistence of Dr. Abdullah Abdullah and be given the position of a Marshal of the Afghan National Army in President Ghani’s government. Since the collapse of the Taliban in 2001, Dostum has had various senior positions in the Afghan government. While he was recently a Marshal in the Afghan National Army, he was the First VP to President Ashraf Ghani in 2014, and a deputy defense minister during President Hamid Karzai. Why would it surprise anyone to realize that the Afghan army would rather surrender to the Taliban than to fight for criminal and corrupt leaders as such?

The extent of corruption in Afghanistan has been undeniable and Special Inspector General of Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), created by congress to ensure accountability, has routinely issued damning reports of corruption among Afghan officials, as well as US military personnel. Over the past 15 years, Afghanistan has routinely ranked amongst the top 10 corrupt countries in the world and made it to number 2 several times. Senior government leaders in Afghanistan have enriched themselves and their cronies through embezzlement of foreign aid destined for Afghan people. Ahmed Massoud’s family and circle were a major part of the corruption. Zia Massoud, former VP to president Karzai, who is the uncle of Ahmad Massoud and brother of Ahmad Shah Massoud, was reportedly caught bringing $52 million cash into Dubai from Kabul. A majority of those in positions of influence moved money and their families outside of Afghanistan into destinations like Dubai and Turkey, leaving little at stake within Afghanistan. The corruption caused a massive income gap between the wealthy and the poor, which had further fueled lack of confidence and support in the government.

According to SIGAR, the Afghan National Army had about a thousand generals on paper, and many more that it could not account for. The 1000 generals in Afghanistan are nearly twice as much as the total number of generals the U.S. has. These generals have hefty salaries, with numerous perks, and many were given these positions based on nepotism and had not ever served in the army previously. To steal and embezzle money, senior figures in government and the Afghan National Army created fake military posts and ghost soldiers that were only on paper (and ghost students and ghost schools on the education sector). While money was being pumped into the pocket of senior military figures, many Afghan soldiers would go unpaid for months. While the Taliban were fighting for a cause and could go hungry for days on the battlefield, the Afghan army was simply there to collect their $200 per month and had no ambitions to risk their lives for corrupt leaders and a corrupt regime.

Given Afghanistan’s massive challenges, it also inherited incompetent leadership. Hamid Karzai was a featherweight who stepped into the arena of heavy weights and performed miserably. While well educated, President Ashraf Ghani was a World Bank anthropologist lead, who lacked leadership, people management skills, and the necessary social skills to maneuver within the country. In his last elections, he was accused of fraud by many, and the election was marred with vote rigging. He received around 973K votes (lowest in Afghan history), out of a nation that has nearly 40 million people. Not only was there rampant corruption during his administration, but he has been accused of further enabling it.

Former president Ghani was also described as emotionally unstable; he often screamed and yelled at his subordinates, with condescension, and he was described as arrogant by president Biden. President Ghani was considered a micro manager without charisma and was never able to bond with the Afghan people, and inspired few. Having come from an academic background where daily routines were organized, process oriented, and timely, he found himself stubbornly as a fish trying to climb a tree in Afghanistan. Given Afghanistan’s pervasive issues, he spent far more energy prioritizing and micromanaging his personnel rather than focusing on major issues and being solution oriented.

The fall of the Afghan government was a symptom of 20 years of continued failed policies to nation build without the requisite attention to who we enabled. In corporate speak, the US political and military complex tried to nation build with a group of incompetent jerks. It is naïve and foolish to point the finger of blame at Biden or Trump, while the cause of U.S. and Afghan failure was rooted early on in the decisions of the Bush and Obama administrations. On the contrary, while the tactical approach to ending the war was ill planned, the Trump and Biden administration had the awareness that the $2.26 trillion rebuilding enterprise was too ruined to resurrect. The Afghan government had become the Bermuda triangle for American taxpayers, and regardless of how long we kept troops in Afghanistan and poured money into it, it was still going to result in failure. The American and Afghan people must now tend with its fallout.