Help is On the Way: The Story of the 2004 Democratic Primaries
By: Adam Martin
Tags: Presidential Election, George W Bush, Democratic Party, Democratic Primary, John Kerry

Author’s Note: So this is actually a term paper I completed for a college course back in the spring. While this was written before the most recent election we had, I think there are a number of interesting similarities between 2004 and 2020, both in the primary and during the general election. For those who followed the 2020 cycle closely, I hope these similarities are illuminated here. As promised, I plan to have my post-election analysis series out soon; I wanted to wait for as much of the results to be tabulated as possible to draw meaningful conclusions. With that said, I present to you this essay.

On November 2, 2004, over 120 million Americans went to the polls and cast their ballots. Having witnessed sitting President George W. Bush launch a War on Terror following the September 11 attacks and invade Iraq over its alleged production of nuclear weapons, the Democratic Party was desperate to defeat Bush’s re-election campaign and course-correct America from what it saw as disastrous foreign policy blunders. Each candidate received more votes than any presidential candidate in history up to that point, the previous record belonging to Ronald Reagan with 54.5 million votes in his 1984 landslide re-election. But despite his best efforts, Democratic challenger John Kerry failed to unseat President Bush.

It’s easy to look at the topline results and conclude that most Americans regarded their sitting President’s first term as successful while dismissing the challenger Kerry as a dud that had no place on the nation’s brightest stage. Others dismiss 2004 as the uneventful bridge between 2000, an otherwise conventional nomination and campaign cycle overshadowed by the general election’s drawn-out finish in Florida, and 2008, a fondly remembered election cycle with a dramatic nomination story and a plethora of game-changing innovations for campaigning. While these colorful characterizations of 2000 and 2008 are reasonably merited, the story of 2004 is often forgotten about because it follows the conventional wisdom too closely to be compared favorably to the latter and strips away too much victimhood from Democrats wishing to use the former to blame the Electoral College for their loss.

Behind the end results, however, lies a compelling story of the Democratic Party trying to craft its response heading into 2004, settling on its nominee and platform for confronting President Bush. While Kerry appeared to be a “conventional” candidate cruising his way to the nomination, this ignores the tight competition he faced in the Democratic Party against vastly different visions for the Party’s future in post-9/11 America. This story is worth telling because it provides insight into how political parties respond to adversity and formulate responses for its opposition. Additionally, 2004 presents an interesting case study in applying the conventional wisdom for nomination politics. Because it follows much of the conventional wisdom, the story of 2004 is instructive for seeing these strategies and principles in action while understanding the structural features of the current system. Simultaneously, while 2008 is often attributed for producing success through innovation, some of these strategies and messages, such as online campaigning and aggressively opposing the Iraq War, have their roots in 2004. To this end, 2004 also presents some insight into changes in the political landscape that bore some fruit, but would become more widely adopted in future election cycles.

Republican George W. Bush and Democrat Al Gore

The story of 2004 on the Democratic side can be traced back to 2000, when George W. Bush edged out then-Vice President Al Gore in the controversial Florida contest to achieve an electoral majority despite losing the national popular vote. The stinging loss left many in the reeling Democratic Party questioning its path forward, figuring out how to exact revenge in the next election. Some felt that the party needed to move on from the seemingly outdated Clinton coalition that delivered them the presidency during the 1990s while others felt that Gore was still the party’s heir apparent. Speculation of a Gore rematch drove much of the conversation during the first two years of the Bush administration. Many were uncomfortable anointing a “sore loser” back on the ticket and he would have faced stronger competition securing the nomination than in 2000, but a Gore candidacy would have been heavily favored by party leaders.

Ultimately, though, it wasn’t meant to be. In November 2002, President Bush enjoyed a 63 percent approval rating, largely due to his response to the September 11 terrorist attacks. In addition, the Republicans gained eight House seats and two Senate seats in the midterm elections, a rare phenomenon for the President’s party. One conclusion many Democrats, including Gore, drew was that the public opinion on Bush and congressional Republicans had moved on from 2000. Voters no longer saw Bush as an “illegitimate” president and any momentum to restore Gore as the “rightful ruler” evaporated. A month after the midterms, Gore announced during a 60 Minutes interview that he would not run in 2004, stating that “a rematch…would inevitably involve a focus on the past that would in some measure distract from the focus on the future.” Through this decision, the Democratic nomination in 2004 became a serious contest for deciding the party’s future in a post-9/11 America.

Considering the fallout of the September 11 attacks, foreign policy and national security emerged as prominent issues heading into the 2004 campaign. Following these attacks, the Bush administration declared a “War on Terror” and deployed military forces to root out leaders of Al-Qaeda, the terrorist organization responsible for the September 11 attacks, and its allies. Even with this strong commitment, the Bush administration was also given congressional authority to launch additional military operations in Iraq under suspicions that the country was secretly producing weapons of mass destruction. The Bush administration acted upon this authorization in March 2003, where the month-long invasion culminated in capturing the capital of Baghdad and removing Saddam Hussein, the country’s authoritarian leader, from power. Although this seemingly quick victory was initially well-received, the protracted occupation of American troops and Iraq’s difficult transition to a democratic government gradually soured public opinion. Opposition of the war wasn’t as fierce in 2004 as it would become during Bush’s second term; however, seeds of doubt were already planted during the campaign.

A young John Kerry testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

The 2004 Democratic campaign produced nine serious candidates, three of which emerged as frontrunners. First, Massachusetts Senator John Kerry formed an exploratory committee on December 1, 2002, just two weeks before Gore officially backed down. Before entering public office, Kerry served in the Navy during America’s involvement in the Vietnam War, where he achieved the rank of lieutenant and was awarded three Purple Hearts, a Bronze Star, and a Silver Star. Despite this track record, Kerry turned against the war effort after returning home in 1970 and joined the Vietnam Veterans Against the War organization, where he rose to national prominence. Among his activities include testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on proposals to end the war, throwing his medals over a fence surrounding the Capitol Building, and running an unsuccessful campaign for a House seat in 1972. Upon entering the Senate in 1985, Kerry built upon this foreign policy background by opening an investigation that exposed illegal activities of then-Lieutenant Col. Oliver North that jump started the Iran-Contra affair. Through his long tenure, Kerry became a staple within the Senate Foreign Relations Committee he had once testified before.

John Kerry as a Senator

Given this resume, Kerry established himself as a seasoned veteran in handling foreign affairs and national security. Indeed, in announcing his exploratory committee, Kerry thought “there’s a deep anxiety in the American people about security…and on almost every issue facing the country, [he] believes there is a better choice.” Although he participated in many campaign activities during 2003, he didn’t officially announce his candidacy until after Labor Day aboard the USS Yorktown in Mt. Pleasant, South Carolina. Using this patriotic backdrop, Kerry centered his announcement around national security and America’s standing in the world. Citing the Iraq War, he proclaims that “George Bush has led and misled us on a course at odds with 200 years of our history [and] he has squandered the goodwill of the world after September 11 and lost the respect and influence we need to make our country safe.” Even in a crowded field, Kerry came to be seen as the “establishment” candidate given his long and decorated career in public service.

Howard Dean announces his candidacy in Burlington, Vermont

Next, Vermont Governor Howard Dean formed his exploratory committee in May 2002. As a sitting governor of a small state with little name recognition, Dean was initially seen as a long-shot candidate; however, he spent the next year campaigning aggressively during his “exploratory” phase while he centered his message around two key policy issues. First, as a former physician, he emphasized the need for universal healthcare. Under his plan, Dean called for expanding existing healthcare programs, such as the Children’s Health Insurance Program, and providing health insurance for almost 30 million Americans. Of the major candidates, Dean was the most vocal about expanding healthcare coverage.

But his fierce opposition to the Iraq War not only made Dean stand out from the rest of the Democratic Party, it aided his rise to national prominence. Unlike Senator Kerry, who voted in favor of the authorization bill, Dean was able to use his outsider status to proclaim himself an early critic of the War based his views on sound judgment and firm principles. He opened a March 2003 speech to the California State Democratic Convention by asking “what in the world so many Democrats are doing supporting the President’s unilateral intervention in Iraq”, a move separating himself both from the candidate field and the party insiders. In any case, his outsider status gained Dean early notoriety from many Democrats believing the Party lacked a backbone, lending itself to supporting the Bush administration’s ill-advised policy objectives.

By the time Dean officially announced his candidacy in June 2003, the flooded streets of Burlington were brimming with momentum. During his speech, Dean outlined the various missteps of the Bush administration, ranging from tax cuts for the top income brackets to engaging in foreign policy without coordinating with America’s allies. Dean also decried President Bush for destroying “the ideal of community” and leading many Americans to “stop participating, stop voting and stop believing that they can change America.” With his entry, the campaign found an “insurgent” candidate in Dean.

John Edwards as a Senator

And finally, North Carolina Senator John Edwards worked underground during most of President Bush’s first term to fuel his own ambitions. As a first-term senator who would only be fifty-one on Inauguration Day, Edwards was seen as one of the field’s least experienced and youngest candidates, requiring him to lay low and build a foundation for his campaign. From a financial standpoint, Edwards ran an aggressive fundraising operation. During the first quarter of 2003, Edwards raised $7.4 million, the most of any candidate. And from a messaging standpoint, Edwards realized that his vote favoring the Iraq authorization bill wouldn’t generate the necessary enthusiasm to raise his profile and could set himself up for attacks from Howard Dean. In an effort to stand out from the rest of the field, Edwards anchored his campaign around economic issues and expanding opportunities for the middle and working classes. Indeed, this message gave Edwards a leg to stand on heading into the race.

The first major indication he would run came in October 2002, when Edwards appeared as a guest on The Daily Show with Jon Stewart and promised to seek the nomination. Edwards later returned to The Daily Show on September 15, 2003 and fulfilled this promise by announcing his candidacy on the air. This move was largely a ploy to use his own youthful charm to appeal to younger voters, who are increasingly turning to comedic talk shows, such as The Daily Show, as their primary source of political news. To establish himself as a more serious candidate, he followed up the next day with a more formal announcement in his hometown of Robbins, North Carolina. Edwards presented a humble candidate that “grew up in an American town and grew up with America’s dream.” As he laid out America’s promise of “a fair shake for all [and] a free ride for none”, he decried the Bush administration for declaring a “war on work”, a clear attack against the tax cuts. Finally, citing his small-town and Southern roots, Edwards proclaimed himself the candidate that can “challenge [Bush] in every single state…[and] force him to defend his failed policies in the East and the West, in the North, and in the South.” And with Edwards joining in, the story of 2004 found a “young, fresh face”.

General Wesley Clark

Outside these three frontrunners, there were several other candidates that made noise during the campaign, but weren’t able to break the top three. Although he supported its initial response to the September 11 attacks, retired four-star general Wesley Clark gradually became a vocal critic of the Bush administration’s foreign policy. His opposition to the Iraq War made him the subject of a powerful “draft” movement over the summer of 2003, which garnered thousands of volunteers, over $1.5 million in pledged fundraising, and extensive media attention. This frenzy culminated with Clark’s entry on September 17, where he acknowledged that his decision was influenced by the “draft” movement.

Joseph Lieberman as Al Gore’s running mate

Joseph Lieberman also emerged on the scene. Although he was already a longtime Senator from Connecticut, Lieberman rose to prominence during the 2000 election when he served as Al Gore’s running mate. Not wishing to step on his toes, Lieberman waited until Gore withdrew before assembling his resources, lending itself to a fairly late entry into the race. Even so, Lieberman sought to represent the “Third Way” that the Democratic Party had endorsed during the 1990s, a clear effort to reassemble the coalition of independents and moderates that flocked to Clinton and Gore.

Reverend Al Sharpton

Senator Carol Moseley Braun

Two other candidates were Reverend Al Sharpton and former Illinois Senator Carol Moseley Braun. Sharpton was known for his civil rights activism, his close relationship with Jesse Jackson, and his multiple unsuccessful campaigns for various offices. With his track record, Sharpton hoped to fill a void left by Jackson as a candidate that could mobilize black voters and urge the Democratic Party to focus more on civil rights; his candidacy was less about winning the nomination and more about winning influence over the party platform. Even so, Sharpton faced multiple challenges during the campaign. The most prominent concerned his 1988 defense of Tawana Brawley, a fifteen-year-old black girl who claimed to have been raped by six white police officers, but was later found to have fabricated the allegations. Sharpton continued to defend Brawley, even accusing the case’s prosecutor of racism, and became the target of a successful defamation suit. Braun sought a similar role within the campaign, citing her distinction as the first black woman elected to the Senate. Although black leaders favored her over Sharpton, Braun received little support from these individuals or from major civil rights organizations. Ultimately, she was largely ignored on the campaign trail.

Among the candidates in the running, early polling favored Lieberman, who at one point led the crowded field with 29 percent. This can be attributed to his name recognition, having been Gore’s running mate in 2000. Even so, it wouldn’t last. While name recognition can lend itself to wide support, such support is soft and contingent on other candidates remaining under people’s radars. Indeed, the summer of 2003 was a period of intense campaigning where other candidates increased their own profile and exciting people’s imagination. By August, Lieberman had slipped into second place behind Dean.

Howard Dean’s emergence as a frontrunner became a pivotal story during the campaign. Starting in June, his campaign released a series of TV ads in Iowa, many of which were simply Dean talking directly to the camera about his policies, particularly his opposition to the Iraq War and support for comprehensive health insurance. These ads boosted Dean’s polling in Iowa and his national profile. But one of the biggest factors contributing to his success was his pioneering of online campaigning. While each of the major candidates utilized the Internet to various degrees during the 2004 nomination, Dean was the only one to embrace and substantially benefit from the online model, particularly through his use of Meetup.com. Beginning with only 300 users and 11 monthly meetings, Dean supporters used the platform to recruit others by setting up in-person campaign events. By the end of March 2003, Dean for America became the top group on Meetup.com and by mid-November, the campaign had over 140,000 members and 800 monthly meetings on the platform. In addition, the Internet became a viable means of fundraising for Dean; in the third quarter of 2003, Dean raised $15 million, the largest one-quarter haul for a Democratic candidate in history up to that point. Part of this success was attributed to Dean’s appeal as a candidate. His strong anti-war message and desire to buck the party establishment appealed to many online users that “have given up on traditional politics precisely because it was about television and the ballot box, and had no way to shout back.” The Dean campaign urged its supporters to participate through blogging, connecting with others online, and translating that energy into real-world action.

Even so, the campaign suffered multiple setbacks. One is that while he was the first major candidate to oppose the Iraq War, other candidates successfully incorporated anti-war messages into their campaigns. Although Kerry voted in favor of the authorization, he was not only able to distance himself from this vote, but was successfully able to brand himself to voters as an anti-war candidate. Over time, Dean lost his edge of being the only anti-war candidate, leaving him vulnerable to other factors, such as “electability” and foreign policy experience. Another critical factor was organizational dysfunction within the Dean campaign. Joe Trippi, Dean’s campaign manager, was responsible for many of the campaign’s key innovations; however, he also had severe shortcomings as a leader. Whenever something went wrong, Trippi “either lashed out at the offender…or often retreated to his corner office and behind the computer, giving off such strong vibrations of doom and darkness that even his most trusted and loyal members of his staff did not dare disturb him.” Trippi was often a source of tension within the organization as he fought to make his views known. He particularly took issue with the campaign’s lack of organization in Iowa, where he felt staffers weren’t doing enough outreach across the counties and locking down solid supporters.

Even so, Dean was able to keep momentum throughout the campaign. Despite being known as the “insurgent outsider”, Dean secured multiple party endorsements. Among these included Iowa Senator Tom Harkin and the Service Employees International Union, one of the country’s largest labor unions. Both of these were large advantages for Dean, being able to win the support of both party insiders and progressive grassroots organization. But the most surprising came on December 9, when Al Gore broke his silence and endorsed Howard Dean. Considering this, Dean should have built an insurmountable lead heading into Iowa; however, timing and missteps proved damaging.

Several days after the endorsement later, former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was captured. Considering Dean’s opposition to the Iraq War, this proved difficult ground to maneuver. He attempted to weave a middle path by acknowledging the bravery of the troops that captured the authoritarian leader while still calling the War a mistake. This move backfired; in the biggest one-week drop of the campaign, Dean’s favorability rating shrunk by six points, allowing Kerry to slip into the top spot for the first time in months. In addition to sticking to his anti-war stance, some argue that the media’s interpretation of Dean as the “man to beat” following the Gore endorsement irritated many former Gore caucus goers. Dean’s pollster Paul Maslin noted that these Gore supporters not only turned out in high numbers, but in the traditional Iowa spirit, were “proud of their role in the process, and not about to let anyone tell them what to do — not the media, and not even the party’s former standard-bearer.” This turnaround was a further indication that many in the Democratic Party had moved on from Gore and the Clinton-era coalition, given how little his endorsement affected the race.

Kerry campaigns in New Hampshire

Another factor is that in the weeks leading up to the Iowa caucuses, Kerry mounted a remarkable comeback. As Dean’s lead in Iowa shrunk, his campaign sensed that Dick Gephardt was their biggest threat to win the caucuses, given Gephardt’s regional ties from Missouri and his appeal to working class voters. The Dean campaign responded by launching a series of attack ads against Gephardt. Gephardt retaliated with his own set of attack ads against Dean, shifting the tone of the race and ultimately decreasing both of their favorability ratings. Kerry, meanwhile, revamped his campaign in November 2003 by replacing his campaign manager and installing staffers connected to his fellow Massachusetts Senator Ted Kennedy. He also brought on Michael Whouley, a longtime campaign advisor who worked to strengthen Kerry’s ground game and hone his message. Through these efforts, Kerry improved as a candidate and his poll numbers improved. By the time Dean and Gephardt began attacking each other, Kerry was ready to seize the opportunity and emerged as a viable alternative for Iowans second-guessing the previous frontrunners just weeks before the caucuses.

2004 Iowa caucus results. Kerry (blue), Edwards (orange), Dean (green), tie (gray)

Finally, on January 19, 2004, Iowa held its caucuses. In an outcome unexpected just a few weeks earlier, Kerry won the caucuses with 37.6 percent of the state-delegate equivalents. Edwards, who also enjoyed a bump in the final weeks, came in second with 31.8 percent. Meanwhile, Dean and Gephardt settled for distant third and fourth place finishes, with 18 percent and 10.6 percent respectively. Entrance polls showed that Kerry and Edwards performed consistently well across a variety of demographics. For example, in terms of age, Kerry performed the best among caucus goers 65 and over, but polled well among all age groups. Edwards finished first among caucus goers ages 30–44, but also consistently beat Dean across age groups, especially among younger caucus goers. In terms of issues, Kerry and Edwards virtually tied among caucus goers citing the economy and jobs as the most important issue, which made up 29 percent of the electorate. But the most critical factor to their success is that 41 percent of the electorate made up their minds in the last week before the caucus. Among this critical group, Kerry and Edwards dominated by winning 39 percent and 35 percent respectively. Considering all these factors, Kerry and Edwards performed well in Iowa.

The surprise success of Kerry and Edwards was a boon for both of their campaigns. After concerns that he wouldn’t make it to New Hampshire, Kerry told his supporters on caucus night that “we came from behind and we came for the fight.” Fellow Senator Ted Kennedy labeled Kerry the “Comeback Kid”, referring to the nickname attached to Clinton after his campaign’s revival following the 1992 New Hampshire primary. By winning Iowa, Kerry had beat expectations and conventional wisdom indicates that this is critical for improving one’s polling numbers in subsequent contests; one builds momentum, even if previous polling numbers were less than impressive.

As for the rest, Iowa was a fatal blow to the Gephardt campaign, given his extensive ties to the region and long tenure in the House. He dropped out after the caucuses, telling his supporters that while “my campaign for working people may be ending tonight, but our fight will never end.” He also vowed to support the eventual nominee, which increasingly seemed like Kerry. Meanwhile, the Dean campaign was left bitterly disappointed. Many caucus goers cited “electability” as an important issue for producing a candidate capable of beating President Bush, an attribute more closely associated to Kerry than to him. In many aspects, Dean attracted the types of supporters his campaign targeted, but unfortunately, their support for him underwhelmed. The Dean campaign sought to bring out new voters that don’t normally participate. And while 41 percent of Iowa’s electorate was first-time caucus goers, Dean only won 19 percent of this group, placing him in a distant third. The Dean campaign hoped their innovations with online campaigning would change the game. And learning that 40 percent of the Iowa electorate used the Internet for election information seemed encouraging for the campaign, until it found out that Dean trailed Kerry by nine points among that group. Finally, Dean staked much of his candidacy on his staunch opposition to the Iraq War. And considering the crowded field, Dean won 37 percent of caucus goers citing the Iraq War as their most important issue. But even with the War’s extensive media coverage, this group only constituted 14 percent of the electorate, doing little to improve Dean’s numbers.

“Yeah”

To call Dean’s Iowa performance disappointing is an understatement, given his campaign’s immense resources and the media’s lofty expectations. Determined to steer the ship, Dean spoke to supporters on caucus night, reminding them that “if you had told us one year ago that we would come in third in Iowa, we would have given anything for that.” He proceeded to energize the crowd, asserting that the campaign plans to dominate the rest of the calendar; his voice rose with excitement with each state he rattled off. And after winning all these states, Dean proclaimed that “we’re going to Washington DC to take back the White House. YEAH!”

Emerging from the venue’s lively atmosphere and an ill-timed voice crack, many pundits cited the “Dean scream” as the moment that destroyed his campaign. In the days following the caucus, the soundbite was played endlessly on news outlets and mocked relentlessly on late night talk shows; within a week, the clip had been played over 900 times across various national cable networks. To the casual observer, the soundbite rendered Dean “unpresidential” and made it impossible for anyone to take his campaign seriously moving forward. Dean’s persistent decline in the polls following Iowa also fed the perception that he was undone by this soundbite. But to say that this one moment single handedly destroyed Dean’s campaign ignores the conventional wisdom of modern nomination politics and broader trends in the year’s campaign. Dean’s dip in the polls pre-dated Iowa and the post-caucus news coverage was already a setback for Dean before the soundbite went viral. Even without the “Dean scream”, Dean faced an uphill battle going into the New Hampshire primary where, despite being from a neighboring state, had to contend with a Kerry campaign on the upswing.

2004 New Hampshire primary results. Kerry (blue), Dean (yellow)

With few exceptions, the rest of the primary calendar was a victory march for the Kerry campaign. The following week, Kerry won the New Hampshire primary convincingly with 38.4 percent and the neighboring Dean finishing a distant second with 26.3 percent. Rather than being dismissed as winning a “regional primary”, Kerry’s victory in New Hampshire allowed him to build off his momentum in Iowa, solidifying his frontrunner status. Dean wasn’t afforded similar treatment and was derided for not being more competitive in his neighboring state. Similar to Iowa, exit polls for New Hampshire reveal the depth and breadth of Kerry’s support relative to his competition. Kerry finished first among voters across all age groups, all income brackets, all education levels, and all party registration statuses. As for Dean, while he did win among voters citing the Iraq War as the most important issue, similar to Iowa, this group only constituted 19 percent of the electorate in New Hampshire. Instead, Kerry thrived among voters citing healthcare or the economy as important issues, which collectively constitute half the electorate.

The following week, dubbed as “Mini Tuesday”, saw seven states hold contests. Kerry won five of these states, including Gephardt’s home Missouri; however, to prevent the race from growing dull, much attention was drawn to the two states Kerry lost. Although it was effectively a three-way race along with Kerry and Edwards, Wesley Clark surprised many by winning the Oklahoma primary. Clark invested significant resources in this state, citing his extensive military background and his roots from neighboring Arkansas. But the bigger story was Edwards, who many saw as Kerry’s primary challenger to the nomination, with his competitive finishes in numerous states as well as his victory in South Carolina. A decisive victory with 45 percent of the vote, Edwards was able to capitalize with a primetime speech that captured the media’s attention. Although it was only his neighboring state, Edwards was determined to keep the competition alive down the calendar, especially as the field winnowed with each contest.

Indeed, once seen as the field’s torchbearer for Al Gore, Joseph Lieberman dropped out following Mini Tuesday. His support of the Iraq War and the Bush tax cuts cost him the frontrunner status early on and prevented him from recovering. In addition to drawing little enthusiasm from his policy positions, critics also cited his lackluster fundraising as a critical handicap to his campaign. Meanwhile, Howard Dean, another former frontrunner, found his campaign on life support following Mini Tuesday. Although he vowed to continue through the Wisconsin primary, it was unlikely he would regain the lost ground.

In the end, though, efforts to produce a serious competition were for naught. With the exception of Dean’s Vermont and Edwards’s North Carolina, Kerry won all remaining states, most of them by double digits. Dean withdrew on February 18, following a dismal showing in the Wisconsin primary. Speaking to his supporters in Burlington, Vermont, Dean was confident that the movement he created could translate to platform concessions at the party convention that summer, such as stronger calls for universal healthcare and firm opposition to the Iraq War. Above all, though, he proclaimed that “the bottom line is that we must beat George W. Bush in November, no matter what.”

Edwards was able to hold out for a few more weeks; however, he never followed up on his South Carolina victory with any meaningful success. March 2 marked Super Tuesday, where ten states went to the polls. Kerry won nine of these states, including California, Georgia, New York, and his home state of Massachusetts. With his path to the nomination narrowed, Edwards dropped out that evening. Speaking to supporters in Atlanta, Edwards used his concession speech to praise Kerry, claiming that Kerry has “run a strong, powerful campaign. [Kerry’s] been an extraordinary advocate for causes that all of us believe in.” With Edwards’s withdrawal and no other candidate within his reach, John Kerry emerged as the presumptive Democratic nominee.

Kerry’s next move was selecting a vice presidential nominee to serve as his running mate, a process often known for generating speculation from the media and party insiders. Having been shortlisted for Gore’s “veepstakes” in 2000, Kerry understood the internal jockeying and strategic calculations involved in the selection process. This includes fundraising and campaigning for the presumptive nominee as well as making the case that if selected, the running mate could carry a critical swing state, win support from a core voting bloc, or provide resources the presumptive nominee lacks. Top contenders for the “veepstakes” included Florida Senator Bob Graham, Iowa Governor Tom Vilsack, and New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson. In addition to being vocal campaigners and fundraisers, these three each offered Kerry the possibility of carrying their respective states, arguing that those electoral votes would be critical to victory in the general election. But Kerry also considered some of his former opponents, particularly Edwards, Gephardt, and Clark.

While not a common strategy, selecting a former primary opponent as running mate has certain advantages for a nominee. Former opponents have high name recognition from their campaign, along with existing supporters, resources, and infrastructure. When executed properly, selecting former opponents can consolidate campaign resources as well as unify the party, increasing the odds of victory in the general election. Of course, there are also risks to this strategy, particularly if the opponent in question has animosity towards the nominee after a bitter, negative primary campaign. Even so, Kerry ultimately selected Edwards as his running mate in July, noting in his announcement speech that Edwards “has honored the lessons of home and family…and he brings those values to shape a better America together.” While he had attacked Kerry in the final weeks of his own campaign, Edwards was quick to throw his support behind the presumptive nominee and strongly positioned himself to accept the VP slot to further bolster his own profile. Some also noted Edwards’s differences with Kerry, such as his youth and Southern background, could help balance the ticket heading into the general election.

Kerry accepts the Democratic nomination

Finally, the story of the nomination ended with the official proceedings at the Democratic National Convention. Held between July 26–29 in Boston, capital of Kerry’s home state, the 2004 Convention marked a defining moment in how the party would respond to the Bush administration’s first term in post-9/11 America. The adopted party platform emphasized the need to restore a “strong and respected America” by relying more on coordination and diplomacy in foreign affairs, as well as building an economy that works for the middle class by repealing the Bush tax cuts for households making more than $200,000 per year. More notably, the platform criticized President Bush’s handling of the Iraq War, citing his inadequate intelligence gathering regarding Iraq’s possession of nuclear weapons, his premature and unilateral use of military force, and his failed efforts to stabilize the country following Saddam Hussein’s ouster. While it acknowledged the initial success of the invasion, the platform called for the Democratic Party to “win the peace” in Iraq.

The Convention was also defined by the primetime speeches made by the two candidates being nominated. Running mate Edwards returned to the economic issues that defined his campaign for the top of the ticket, illustrating the divide between “two different Americas…one for all those people who have lived the American Dream and don’t have to worry, and another for most Americans, everybody else who struggle to make ends meet every single day.” This frame allowed him to proclaim support for investing more in comprehensive healthcare, public education, and repealing the Bush tax cuts on the very wealthy. But the main event was Kerry’s acceptance speech for the nomination. Citing his previous military experience from Vietnam, Kerry opened his speech with a military salute, announcing that he was “reporting for duty”, drawing strong applause. Although he used the speech to tell his life story and cover his entire platform in broad strokes, Kerry tried to center it back on foreign policy and how his experience makes him a steady pair of hands for resolving the Iraq War. In announcing his plans to cooperate more with America’s allies and to invest more in the welfare of the armed forces, Kerry promised that “help was on the way”. Kerry concluded his speech with an anecdote from his service in Vietnam, how his fellow servicemen looked out for each other, regardless of their background or race. He believed this embodied America’s deepest values and would empower the country to “reach for the next dream…to look to the next horizon”, and see that “our best days are still to come.”

With the nomination wrapped up, the Democratic Party believed Kerry and Edwards were the best course of action for beating President Bush, who had become a source of radical change in foreign policy and of polarization across America. Given the intense activity and resources dedicated to the yearlong primary campaign, much was riding on the Party to coalesce behind a winning ticket, even if Kerry’s ties to the party establishment threaten to deflate enthusiasm. As it turned out, however, Kerry faced significant challenges in the general election. Despite his rousing acceptance speech, Kerry didn’t enjoy a polling “bounce” that normally followed the nomination Convention; while he gained support among veterans in the week following the Convention, his overall lead over Bush only increased by one point. Kerry’s small lead only shrunk as Bush became more aggressive on the campaign trail. Citing Kerry’s vote supporting the authorization of military force in Iraq and subsequent reversal on the war, Bush painted him as a “flip-flopper” on the issue. While Kerry tried to flip this into an attack on Bush’s judgment in conducting the war, Kerry struggled to deflect the “flip-flopper” image. Kerry was also put on the defensive by the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth (SBVT), a political group formed to attack Kerry’s military service record. Through a series of television advertisements, SBVT built an argument that Kerry not only embellished his military accomplishments, but betrayed his fellow soldiers by joining the anti-war movement and renouncing his service medals. Finally, in an “October surprise”, Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden released a videotape several days before the election mocking President Bush and his handling of the War on Terror. Emboldened by this video, many Americans rallied around their leader, giving Bush an important polling bump and leaving Kerry with little room to navigate.

2004 presidential election results

In the end, John Kerry failed to unseat President Bush, losing with 48.3 percent of the national popular vote and 251 electoral votes to Bush’s 50.7 percent and 286 electoral votes. Exit polls indicated that the two candidates were closely matched across demographic cross-sections; however, several polling lines are noteworthy. One is that Kerry won decisively among voters citing Iraq or the economy as their most important issues, which collectively constituted 35 percent of the electorate, but was trounced among voters citing terrorism or moral values as their most important issues, which collectively constituted 41 percent of the electorate. This suggests that while many in the Democratic Party stirred anger and enthusiasm on key policy issues, Kerry failed to build a winning coalition on the issues. Another is that a quarter of the electorate said their vote for president was mostly against the opponent and within this group, 70 percent supported Kerry. This indicates that many voters in Kerry’s coalition were more “anti-Bush” than “pro-Kerry”, suggesting deflated enthusiasm from his nomination. While anti-Bush sentiment was strong during the primaries, its possible that certain candidates could have inspired strong support for their own aspirations rather than merely unseating an unpopular incumbent. And thirdly, among the 17 percent of the electorate that did not participate in the 2000 election, Kerry only won 54 percent of these voters. Considering the controversy surrounding the 2000 election and the Democratic Party’s determination to prevent another snub through increased turnout, Kerry’s failure to win overwhelmingly among these new voters was a missed opportunity and a reflection on the enthusiasm his campaign generated.

The electoral map provides additional insight. Although many hoped John Edwards could use his regional ties and rising national prominence to help the ticket, Kerry failed to win a single southern state; he lost Edwards’s North Carolina by double digits. Although Florida generated much attention and consternation by the Democrats, it swung to Bush by 5 percentage points. Overall, while most states voted for the same party in both 2000 and 2004, seven of Bush’s states gained electoral votes through reapportionment following the 2000 Census while six states carried by the respective Democrat lost electoral votes, meaning that Kerry couldn’t simply rely on holding what Gore had in 2000. Although Kerry took one step forward in this goal by winning New Hampshire (which eluded Gore in 2000), he took two steps backwards by losing Iowa and New Mexico. And ultimately, all eyes turned to Ohio, which decided its victor (and the presidency) by 2 percentage points. Attention was brought to issues in Ohio’s election administration, such as long lines, flawed ballot tabulation machines, and inconsistencies in the vote count; however, these didn’t elevate Ohio to the level of scrutiny that Florida received in 2000. Kerry conceded the race the morning after the election. No recount. No litigation. Bush had simply won.

When considering the 2004 nomination, one can point to the shortcomings of the current system in explaining the final outcome; it stirred up a lot of buzz and activity, but ultimately failed to produce a winning candidate. These critics cite issues with Iowa’s “first in the nation” status or the media’s outsized influence in defining the horse race as factors that handed the nomination to a competent, yet unexciting candidate. It’s impossible to know for certain whether a different nominee, such as Howard Dean or Joseph Lieberman, could have beaten President Bush; however, the long menu of options primary voters were given in 2004 was bound to generate disappointments and counterfactuals regardless of who came out on top.

In many ways, 2004 captures much of the prevailing conventional wisdom surrounding modern party nominations. Momentum was the critical force driving the candidates through the year of campaigning leading up to Iowa. Each of the major candidates understood that the path to the nomination ran through doing well in the early states and carefully managing expectation levels, a common strategy forged and tested in the modern era. Debates on the role of parties also underpinned much of the process. Being out in the political wilderness, the Democratic Party had to decide which set of policies to endorse and which candidate to nominate. Of course, this question assumes the Party to be a monolithic entity, which the modern nomination system strongly challenges. Each of the candidates had their own set of ideas, their own base of support, and ultimately their own path to the nomination. How the current system produces a candidate depends on the actions and coordination (or lack thereof) of many countervailing forces.

While the current nomination system is imperfect and doesn’t always produce winning candidates, they are effective ways for parties to assess the temperature in the country and which candidates can withstand a complicated political environment. Similar to 2000, the Democratic Party was thrust into similar debates following 2004 on how to win supporters and define its role in contemporary policy debates. And while the Party didn’t immediately resolve these questions, 2004 presented possibilities for the future. It gave the Party Howard Dean, who went on to serve as the Chair of the Democratic National Committee during President Bush’s second term. The 2004 Democratic National Convention selected as its keynote speaker Barack Obama, a then-obscure Senate candidate who offered a promising vision of the American Dream and national unity that would echo across the Party just four years afterward. And the campaign of 2004 saw innovations in campaign and messaging strategies that would evolve into success just four years later.