Tech: Survivable Computer Systems What Are They
By: Cedric Zewas
Tags: Computing, Technology, Computers, Survivable Computer, Survivable Systems

A computer system, which may consist of multiple individual systems and components, designed to provide mission critical services must be able to perform consistently and in a timely manner under a variety of operating conditions.

It must be able to meet its goals and objectives whether it is in normal operation or in a state of strife or in a hostile setting. A discussion about survivable computer systems can be very complex and wide-ranging. However, in this article, we will only cover the fundamentals.

Computer Security And Survivable Computer Systems

Survivable computer systems and computer security are related in many ways, but they are very different on a fundamental level. For example, hardening a specific system to be resistant to intelligent attacks could be a component of a survivable computer system.

It does not address a computer system’s ability to fulfill its purpose when it is impacted by an event such as a deliberate attack, natural disaster, accident, or widespread failure.

A survivable computer system must be able to adapt and perform its primary critical functions even in a hostile environment, even if various computer system components are incapacitated. Even if the entire “primary” system has been destroyed in some cases.

As an example, due to widespread communication failure, a system designed to provide real-time critical information regarding the analysis of specialized medications ceases to function for a few hours. It does, however, maintain the data’s validity when communication is restored and systems are brought back online. This computer system may be considered to have survived in circumstances beyond its control.

However, if the same system fails to provide continuous access to information under normal circumstances or operating conditions due to a localized failure, it may not be considered to have fulfilled its purpose or met its objective.

Computer Systems That Are Fault Tolerant And High Availability

Many computer systems are built with fault-tolerant components to ensure that they continue to function even when critical components fail. Multiple power supplies, redundant disk drives or arrays, and even multiple processors and system boards that can continue to function even if their peer component is destroyed or fails are examples of redundant components.

The likelihood of all redundant components failing at the same time is quite low. A malicious entity that knows how the redundant components are configured, on the other hand, may be able to engineer critical failures throughout the system, rendering the fault tolerant components ineffective.

Many computer systems are built with fault-tolerant components to ensure that they continue to function even when critical components fail. Multiple power supplies, redundant disk drives or arrays, and even multiple processors and system boards that can continue to function even if their peer component is destroyed or fails are examples of redundant components.

The likelihood of all redundant components failing at the same time is quite low. A malicious entity that knows how the redundant components are configured, on the other hand, may be able to engineer critical failures throughout the system, rendering the fault tolerant components ineffective.

A survivable computer system also has high availability. This design component, however, may not ensure computer system survival during certain events, such as various types of malicious attack.

A critical web service that has been duplicated, say, across multiple machines, to allow continuous functionality if one or more of the individual web servers fails is an example of this. The issue is that many high availability implementations use the same components and methodology on all of the individual systems.

If an intelligent attack or malicious event occurs that targets a specific set of vulnerabilities on one of the individual systems, it is reasonable to assume that the remaining computer systems participating in the highly available implementation are also vulnerable to the same or similar vulnerabilities. A certain degree of variation in how all systems participate in the highly available implementation must be achieved.

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