| "{\"id\": \"2277899\", \"name\": \"N. P. ATTERBERRY, Respondent, v. THE PORTLAND & WILLAMETTE VALLEY R'Y CO., Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Atterberry v. Portland & Willamette Valley R'y Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1889-10-21\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"85\", \"last_page\": \"86\", \"citations\": \"18 Or. 85\", \"volume\": \"18\", \"reporter\": \"Oregon Reports\", \"court\": \"Oregon Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Oregon\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:28:49.538657+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"N. P. ATTERBERRY, Respondent, v. THE PORTLAND & WILLAMETTE VALLEY R'Y CO., Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"[Filed October 21, 1889.]\\nN. P. ATTERBERRY, Respondent, v. THE PORTLAND & WILLAMETTE VALLEY R'Y CO., Appellant.\\nWhere an appellant seeks to reverse the judgment of a circuit court, upon the ground that the respondent failed to prove a case sufficient to he submitted to the jury, he must make up a bill of exceptions containing all the evidence given in the case, and have attached thereto a statement or certificate to the effect that it contains all tbe evidence, and bring the same to this court with the transcript.\\nAppeal from a judgment of the circuit court for the county of Multnomah, entered in favor of the respondent and against the appellant upon the verdict of a jury.\\nThe appellant is a railroad corporation, engaged in the transportation of freight and passengers upon its line of railroad in this State. The action was for personal injuries received by tbe respondent while a passenger upon tbe appellant\\u2019s railroad from Smock\\u2019s station to Portland, in consequence- of its cars being thrown from tbe track. Tbe respondent alleged in bis complaint that tbe casualty occurred on account of tbe negligence and mismanagement of tbe appellant\\u2019s agents in attaching to and making a part of its train of cars, two cars in front of tbe passenger-car thereof, in which tbe respondent was, being conveyed, filled with live cattle; that tbe said cattle-cars were so constructed that tbe boxes or cars containing tbe cattle were so much wider than tbe tracks of said railroad as to render it extremely unsafe to attach them so loaded with live cattle to a train carrying passengers, on aecomit of tbe liability of tbe said cattle-cars to turn over, by reason of tbe cattle crowding to one side thereof, or being thrown against one side of tbe cars when passing around curves of tbe track; and said cattle were so carelessly and negligently loaded in said cars by tbe appellant as to permit them to crowd to one side of tbe cars, and by their weight throw tbe cars off tbe track; and that by reason of tbe premises said cars, together with tbe car in which tbe respondent was riding, were thrown from tbe track to tbe ground, a distance of nearly twenty feet; that respondent was thereby permanently injured, to bis damage, etc. Tbe appellant denied all tbe material allegations of tbe com plaint. The jury returned a verdict for tlie respondeut in the sum of $800.\\nG. J. McDougall, for Appellant.\\nRaleigh Stott, for Respondent.\", \"word_count\": \"764\", \"char_count\": \"4385\", \"text\": \"Thayer, C. J.\\nThe appellant seeks to reverse tbe judgment in this case upon the ground tbat tbe respondent failed to prove a cause sufficient to be submitted to tbe jury. Tbe counsel for tbe appellant, after tbe evidence for tbe respondent was given at tbe trial, moved for a judgment of nonsuit, wbicb tbe circuit court overruled. He thereupon submitted evidence on tbe part of tbe appellant, and after doing so renewed bis motion for a nonsuit, wbicb tbe said court again overruled. He now brings tbe case to this court, and insists tbat the circuit court committed error in its said rulings. He has brought here what purports to be tbe evidence in the case, but whether it is all tbe evidence does not appear by any statement or certificate. It may be, and very likely is, tbe substance of all tbe evidence given upon tbe trial; but it has been repeatedly held tbat, unless tbe bill of exceptions contains an affirmative statement tbat such is tbe fact, this court will not consider it in determining whether or not it is sufficient to support tbe verdict. Tbe court will not infer tbat tbe evidence contained' in tbe bill of exceptions is all tbe evidence given at tbe trial, unless tbe bill of exceptions contains a positive statement to that effect. This rule is universally adhered to, and is founded, I suppose, upon tbe principle tbat tbe judgment of a court is evidence of its own rectitude; tbat the fact of its rendition creates a presumption in its favor tbat it would not have been given unless all tbe material facts in tbe case entitling tbe party to a recovery bad been proved. Such presumption is conclusive in a collateral action, and cannot be overcome in a direct proceeding except by a positive statement in tbe bill of exceptions to tbe effect tbat it contains all tbe evidence given upon tbe trial. Tbe point is conclusive against tbe appellant's right to a reversal of tbe judgment herein, and consequently it must be affirmed.\"}" |